

THE  
ROMAN HISTORY

OF

APPIAN<sup>WA</sup><sub>^</sub> OF ALEXANDRIA

*TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK*

BY

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*WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS*

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I

THE FOREIGN WARS

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Vastness ! and Age ! and Memories of Eld !  
Silence ! and Desolation ! and dim Night !  
I feel ye now — I feel ye in your strength —  
O spells more sure than e'er Judæan King  
Taught in the gardens of Gethsemane !  
O charms more potent than the rapt Chaldee  
Ever drew down from out the quiet stars.

EDGAR A. POE.

## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

My reasons for translating the works of Appian are that they constitute an indispensable part of Roman history, that they are not accessible in English, and that none of the persons more competent to perform the task have seen fit to undertake it. The last English translation, made in 1679, is not now obtainable, and would not be readable if obtainable.

All that we know about Appian as an individual is gleaned from his own writings and from the letters of Fronto, the tutor of Marcus Aurelius. It is supposed that he was born about A.D. 90, and that he died about A.D. 160. He left an autobiography, as he tells us at the conclusion of his Preface, but it was lost early. It was not known to Photius in the ninth century, although Appian's historical works were all extant at that time. He tells us in his Preface also that he was a native of Alexandria,<sup>1</sup> in Egypt, and that he came to Rome where he practised the profession of an advocate in the courts of the emperors until they appointed him procurator. As he says in the same paragraph that he had reached the highest place in his own country, it is inferred that he was procurator of Egypt. A fragment of his works, brought to

<sup>1</sup> A papyrus recently unearthed and published by the Egypt Exploration Fund (*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part I. p. 62, London, 1898) contains the record of the arraignment of a certain Appianus of Alexandria at Rome before the Emperor (probably Marcus Aurelius) for participation in a rebellion. The accused describes himself as "a nobleman and a gymnasiarch." Our Appian might possibly have been alive then, but he could not have been the person on trial, since the latter was addressed by one of his friends present as a young man.

light in recent years,<sup>1</sup> speaks of a war against the Jews in Egypt in which he had an adventure. This was probably the war waged by the Emperor Trajan to suppress the Jewish insurrection in that country A.D. 117, the year of Trajan's death. It is inferred, therefore, that Appian did not come to Rome till the reign of Hadrian, and that he lived there until the reign of Antoninus Pius, and that he was appointed procurator by the latter. Among the letters of Fronto, discovered by Cardinal Mai,<sup>2</sup> is one addressed to Antoninus Pius asking the appointment of his friend Appian as procurator as a mark of distinction in his old age, not that he (Appian) desires it to gratify his ambition, or for the sake of the pay. Age and bereavement are mentioned among the reasons why this distinction should be conferred, and Fronto vouches for his friend's honor and integrity. A letter from Appian to Fronto, in a fragmentary state, and Fronto's reply, both written in Greek, are among the finds of Cardinal Mai, but they are of slight importance. Appian had sought to give two slaves to Fronto as a present, and Fronto, from motives of delicacy, had declined to accept them. So Appian writes to Fronto and asks why it should be considered improper for friends to accept presents from friends, when it is not considered improper for cities to accept gifts from their own citizens, or even from strangers.

This is all that we know of Appian as a person. He says in his Preface (Sec. 9) that Rome had then existed 900 years, which would imply that his book was published, in whole or in part, about A.D. 150; *i. e.*, during the reign of Antoninus Pius. The *Testimonia Veterum*, which Schweighäuser places at the beginning of his third volume, tells us that Stephanus of Byzantium (sixth century), in his geographical dictionary, referred to Appian in three places, and

<sup>1</sup> Concerning the Divination of the Arabs, vol. ii. p. 489.

<sup>2</sup> *Frontonis Reliquiæ*, Berlin, 1816, p. 27.

that Evagrius (A.D. 531–593) mentioned the names of five Greek writers of Roman history, of whom Appian was one. The earliest detailed account of Appian's works that has reached us is that of Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, who died A.D. 891. Photius wrote an encyclopedia of literature called the *Myriobiblon*, containing notices of 280 authors whose works were then extant, together with extracts from some of them. Of Appian he said (Cod. 57) :—

“ We read the Roman history of Appian in three volumes, embracing twenty-four books. The first book contains the exploits and doings of the seven kings. It is entitled *Rome under the Kings*. The second embraces all of Italy except the part along the Adriatic gulf, and is entitled *Italian Roman history*. The next includes the war of the Romans against the Samnites, a great nation and one hard to conquer. The Romans waged war with them eighty years, and with difficulty subjugated them and the nations allied with them. This is called the *Samnite Roman history*. The fourth, as it contains the wars of the Romans against the Gauls, is called the *Gallic Roman history*. The remaining books are styled in like manner: the fifth, *Sicily and the Islands*, since it relates to the Sicilians and the islanders; the sixth, *Spanish*; the seventh, *Hannibalic*, embracing the war of the Romans against Hannibal the Carthaginian; the eighth, *African, Carthaginian, and Numidian*; the ninth, *Macedonian*; the tenth, *Grecian and Ionian*; the eleventh, *Syrian and Parthian*; the twelfth, *Mithridatic*.

“ Thus far are exhibited the transactions of the Romans with foreign nations and their wars with them. The next books treat of the internal dissensions of the Romans and their wars with each other, and are entitled the *Civil Wars*, first, second, and so on to the ninth, which is the twenty-first of the whole history. The twenty-second book is called *The Hundred Years*, the next after that the *Dacian*, and the twenty-fourth, the *Arabian*. These are the divisions of the whole history.

“ The first book of the *Civil Wars* contains those which Marius and Sulla waged against each other. The next treats

of the contest between Pompey and Julius Cæsar, and of the great battles they fought, showing how fortune turned the scale in favor of Cæsar, and how he put Pompey to flight. Next come the wars of Antony and Octavius Cæsar (Augustus) against the murderers of the first Cæsar, at which time also many illustrious Romans were put to death without any kind of trial, and, finally, how they fell out (I mean Antony and Augustus) and warred against each other with powerful armies and great slaughter, showing how victory finally declared itself in favor of Augustus, and how Antony, bereft of allies, was pursued as a fugitive to Egypt where he took his own life. In the same book, which is the last one of the *Civil Wars*, Egypt was brought under Roman sway, and the Roman government fell under the monarchy of Augustus. His history begins [here follows the first of the Excerpta]. . . .

“His history begins, as I have said, with Æneas, and goes on to the boys Romulus and Remus. Then from Romulus, the founder, it gives a detailed account of events to the time of Augustus, and thence disconnectedly to that of Trajan.

“This Appian was an Alexandrian by birth. At first he pleaded causes at Rome, and afterwards was deemed worthy to be appointed procurator of the emperors. His style is simple and unaffected, and his history adheres strictly to the truth, and he, if anybody, is careful in his account of military operations. Whether to arouse by speech the spirits of the dejected soldier, or to calm the fiery one, or to portray emotion, or to express anything else by words, he stands in the first rank. He flourished in the times of Trajan and of Hadrian.”

The lexicon of Suidas (about A.D. 970) contains a brief account of the works of Appian, but it is extremely confused. He takes the title of the first book for the title of the whole work. He mentions three books relating to the affairs of Italy, one relating to the Gallic wars in Italy, and one relating to the Punic wars in Italy. Next, he says that the civil wars of the Romans are treated separately. Then he speaks of the Gallic wars on the river Rhine and those waged by Julius Cæsar. Finally, he says that Appian wrote

nine books of Roman history. He concludes by saying that some persons spell the name of Appian with one p.

An anonymous writer of the Middle Ages inscribed upon a manuscript copy of Appian a list of his works differing somewhat from that of Photius, and especially in making the whole number of books twenty-two instead of twenty-four, and the whole number of books of the *Civil Wars* five instead of nine. This list was copied again and again, so that at the time of the revival of learning in Europe it was found in several codices. This list differed from that of Photius also, in assigning to the Parthian book a place separate from the Syrian.

We may as well dispose of this Parthian book now. It was a forgery. It consists of extracts from Plutarch's biographies of Crassus and of Antony, copied verbatim and foisted upon Appian's works by somebody who lived earlier than Photius. Appian has nowhere said that he had written a Parthian history, but only that he intended to write one. The probability is that he did not carry that intention into effect, but that some early book maker observing the expressed intention of the author, pieced together these extracts from Plutarch and patched them upon the genuine books in order to add to the market value of his product. So the Parthian book passed into the works of Appian and was regularly reproduced, printed, and translated, until 1557 when William Xylander accidentally discovered that it was copied word for word from Plutarch. He concluded from internal evidence that it had been foisted upon Appian's history by some enterprising book maker. There was a gap in the history from the death of Crassus to the expedition sent by Antony against the Parthians, under the command of Ventidius. If Appian had stolen a Parthian history from Plutarch he would not have overlooked that gap of seventeen years. He would have put something into it.

No sooner was Xylander's discovery made than the learned world divided into two opposing parties, one of which, led by Henry Stephen and Joseph Scaliger, held that Appian had committed a fraud, while the other adhered to the opinion of Xylander that he had been the victim of one. The controversy continued for two centuries, and we find participating in it Voss, Fabricius, Freinshem, Reimar, Baudoin and others, and finally Schweighäuser. At first the preponderance of authority was against Appian, but there was a gradual change culminating in the masterly array of evidence and argument advanced by Schweighäuser in defence of the integrity of the author whose text he had done so much to restore and purify.<sup>1</sup> At present nobody sustains the charge advanced by Henry Stephen, that Appian had stolen a book from Plutarch. On the other hand Stephen has lost reputation as a critic by reason of his making the charge.

A discrepancy exists between Photius and the anonymous writer respecting the books of the *Civil Wars*, the former making them nine in number, the latter only five. Schweighäuser explained this discrepancy by showing that Photius included in the *Civil Wars* four books that Appian himself designated as Egyptian history, and that these four books had been lost between the time of Photius and that of the anonymous writer.<sup>2</sup> That there were four books of Egyptian history is proved by citations from them in fragments of Appian preserved in a MS. known as the Saint Germain Grammar and published in Bekker's *Anecdota Græca*. This explains the reason why the *Civil Wars* terminate so abruptly with the death of young Pompeius instead of going on to the battle of Actium, as Appian himself proposed. In Book I., Sec. 6, of the *Civil Wars* the author gives us his plan as follows:—

<sup>1</sup> Schweighäuser's *Appian*, Leipzig, 1785, vol. iii. p. 905 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 892 *seq.*



“On account of its magnitude I have divided the work, first taking up the events that occurred from the time of Sempronius Gracchus to that of Cornelius Sulla; next, those that followed to the death of Cæsar. The remaining books of the *Civil Wars* treat of those waged by the triumvirs against each other and the Roman people, until the end of these conflicts, and the greatest achievement, the battle of Actium, fought by Octavius Cæsar against Antony and Cleopatra together, which will be the beginning of the Egyptian history.”

Under this plan the book containing the battle of Actium and the death of Antony and Cleopatra might have been designated either as the last book of the *Civil Wars* or as the first book of the *Egyptian* history. Evidently it was classed with the latter and perished with the remainder of that history, to our infinite regret.<sup>1</sup> The book makers of the Middle Ages were concerned to keep alive the history of the civil wars of Rome. There was a sufficient demand for that part of Appian to keep copyists at work on it. There was not a sufficient demand for the Egyptian history. If the book makers and their public at that time were as indiscriminating as we have seen that Suidas was, we can easily understand how they allowed that important book to perish, simply because it was under a wrong title.

How the MSS. of Appian have fared from the earliest periods to which we can trace them, and what is their present condition, is told by the late Professor Mendelssohn, of the University of Dorpat, Russia, in the preface to his (Teubner) edition of this author. I had thought at first to prepare a summary from this, and from Schweighäuser's

<sup>1</sup> Photius, it is true, says that the *last* book of the *Civil Wars* contains the defeat and death of Antony, and this would mean, in his enumeration, the ninth, *i.e.*, the last Egyptian book; but, as Schweighäuser observes, it is evident from his wrong cataloguing that Photius himself had not read these Egyptian books.

preface, which would serve both for the student and the ordinary reader, but on reflection I concluded that the former would like to see the whole scope of Mendelssohn's work, which, while built upon that of Schweighäuser, is even more thorough. I have accordingly translated Mendelssohn's Latin preface, and added it to my own as a separate essay, so that students can see all of it, and the ordinary reader can omit all of it if he chooses.

The praise which Mendelssohn bestows upon the great scholar who preceded him makes it unnecessary for me to recount the labors of Schweighäuser on the text of Appian. Every one who speaks or thinks of that text thinks of Schweighäuser. Everything dates before or after him. A few facts not mentioned by Mendelssohn may be here recapitulated. Schweighäuser was professor of Greek in the University of Strassburg in the latter part of the eighteenth century. He was prompted to undertake the emendation of Appian by the English scholar, Samuel Musgrave, about the year 1780. He began to accumulate materials at first for the use of Musgrave, but the latter fell sick and was unable to use them. He urged Schweighäuser to continue and complete the work and promised to contribute the notes he had made on the printed text of the author. Musgrave died soon afterward, but by some mistake his notes did not reach Schweighäuser till two years later. Some additional notes of the German scholar Reiske came into his hands subsequently. The successive steps which he took to purify the text by the examination of the MSS., within his reach, and by the assistance of friends upon those not within his reach, are related by him in detail in his preface. Five years of incessant and well-directed labor were bestowed upon this revision, which was published in 1785 in three volumes containing 2851 octavo pages. No greater service was ever rendered by one man of letters to another.

Together with the Greek text Schweighäuser printed the Latin version of Appian made by Sigismund Geslen and published at Basle in 1554, with such corrections as his own emendation had made necessary or his own scholarship suggested. This Latin translation of Geslen was a truly remarkable production considering the state of the text and of Greek learning at that time. "He was a man," says Schweighäuser, "thoroughly versed in both Greek and Latin, and no less skilled in criticism than profound in his knowledge of Roman history. It was not the task of a mere interpreter that he performed, but, applying a healing hand to the corrupted text, he frequently and dexterously, but for the most part cautiously, restored in the happiest manner a countless number of passages which had been miserably deformed in his Greek copy, and in many places where the previous translator (Candidus) had gone widely astray, he expressed the true meaning of the author in language clear and terse." The translation of Geslen did not embrace the Spanish or the Illyrian history. The translation of the former which is found in Geslen's book was made by Cælius Secundus Curio and that of the latter by Candidus. I was so fortunate as to procure a reprint of this book at an auction sale in this city two years ago. Geslen's Latin version as amended by Schweighäuser, and still further by Dübner, is published in the Didot edition of Appian in parallel columns with the Greek text.

The table of contents of the present volumes shows what works of Appian have come down to us. The Excerpta are passages extracted from the lost books, and preserved in compilations made by others. They are of four or five different kinds, but are principally embraced in two compilations made by order of the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, about 950 A.D., one entitled "Concerning the Embassies" and the other "Concerning Virtues and

Vices." Each of these books contains extracts from Appian and other ancient historians on the subjects named. Those of Appian from the former of the two compilations were first collected in a slovenly manner by Fulvio Orsini in Rome and published at Antwerp in 1580. Those from the latter were reproduced with great fidelity by Henry de Valois at Paris in 1634, from a MS. belonging to his friend Peiresc. Other excerpts have been preserved for us by Suidas. These, although numerous, are short and unimportant. A few have been collected by Cardinal Mai among his gleanings in the Vatican, but their authenticity is not established in all cases.

Appian has been accused of unduly favoring the Romans in his treatment of their wars and diplomacy with other nations. The accusation is not warranted. Impartiality and the judicial temper are his striking characteristics. These are especially shown in his treatment of the Numantine war, the third Punic war and the Mithridatic wars, in all of which the blame of their inception is put upon the Romans.

Appian was, however, a narrator of events, not a philosophic historian. His style is as destitute of ornament as a lawyer's brief, and in the narrative parts almost as arid. In the rhetorical passages, however, which are numerous, it is animated, forcible and at times eloquent. It has been the translator's aim to put the whole into smooth, idiomatic English, even at the risk of offending the taste which requires a translation to reproduce the author's style as well as his meaning. Occasionally Appian rises to the dignity of the best writers of the classical period. The introduction to the history of the civil wars is an example of this kind. Here the events leading up to the tragedy of Tiberius Gracchus move forward with a dignified and measured tread, which has been followed and imitated by many later historians of that period, but has been surpassed by none. Occasionally

he gives us with startling clearness a glimpse of social and political conditions, but these are only incidental.<sup>1</sup> His aim is to narrate events, not to pass judgment on them. And so, although he has given us a thousand pages filled with matter of absorbing interest, and has preserved for us facts and documents of the greatest value which, but for him, would have been wholly lost, he does not reach the first rank of historical writers.

Appian has been severely censured for want of accuracy in details. According to modern canons of criticism, accuracy is the first and indispensable requisite of the historian; but it was not so in the ancient world. General conformity to facts was of course necessary, but in most cases the aim of the ancient writer was to make an interesting book or to furnish a setting for the political ideas or the moral principles which he entertained. Appian was neither better nor worse in this respect than the average historian of the ancient world. He stands on the same plane with Plutarch, Dio Cassius, Suetonius, Florus, Velleius Paterculus, Diodorus Siculus, and Valerius Maximus, all of whom overlapped him here and there. Between himself and Plutarch there is a striking parallelism covering the whole period of the civil wars. In some places they use the same Greek phraseology, and this has led one modern commentator<sup>2</sup> to the opinion that their common source here was a Greek, not a Latin, writer, since it would have been very remarkable if, in translating independently from the Latin, they had often used the same Greek words. After examining the passages cited by Dr. Vollgraff, and some that he has not cited, I concur in his opinion.

How far Appian is contradicted in matters of fact by

<sup>1</sup> *Civil Wars*, ii. 19 and 120.

<sup>2</sup> *Greek Writers of Roman History: Some Reflections upon the Authorities Used by Plutarch and Appianus*, by J. C. Vollgraff, Leyden, 1880, pp. 113.

better authorities than himself I have sought to show by foot-notes accompanying the text, although I do not assume that I have made a complete census of such passages. The better authorities are :

I. The works of Cicero, especially the Letters, a historical mine without a parallel in the ancient world and still unexhausted.

II. Polybius, whose extant works, however, overlap those of Appian only in small part. Although Polybius was an eye-witness of the third Punic war, and of the destruction of Carthage, his history of those events and every other account except Appian's, has perished. That Appian drew from Polybius in part is proved by his citation in the Punic wars, Sec. 132.

III. Cæsar's Commentaries, including in this term the writings of Hirtius and of the unknown author or authors of the wars in Africa and Spain.

IV. The works of Sallust. These touch only a small part of Appian's history.

V. The works of Livy perhaps. It is open to dispute whether Livy is more to be depended upon than Appian in dealing with facts, but as Livy's works later than the conquest of Macedonia, B.C. 168, have perished, we have little opportunity for comparison, except with the Epitome, or table of contents, of his lost books.

It was the habit of ancient historians to put speeches into the mouths of their leading actors in order to present the ideas that moved peoples, or parties, or factions, and sometimes to deliver the author's moral lectures to mankind. This practice was introduced by Thucydides. It was, says Mr. Gilbert Murray,<sup>1</sup> "a fatal legacy to two thousand years of history-writing after him." Appian followed the fashion. The speeches which he delivered in this way are the best

<sup>1</sup> *Ancient Greek Literature*, London, 1897, p. 186.

part of his work in point of style. We feel that here we are listening to the practised debater, the trained pleader of causes in the imperial courts. If we could imagine these speeches to have been made by the men from whose mouths they proceed, we should wonder at the high range of dialectical skill and eloquence that prevailed in those times. We should wonder also that two speakers should show equal cleverness in maintaining opposite opinions so that we can scarcely decide, after reading their arguments, which of them ought to prevail. An excellent example is the conversation between Octavius and Antony.<sup>1</sup> The whole debate that followed the assassination of Cæsar is forceful and lifelike, but the best speech in the course of the civil wars is the one ascribed to Cassius shortly before the battle of Philippi.<sup>2</sup> It pleads in the strongest possible terms the expiring cause of the Roman republic, and makes us forget for the moment the detestable crime that Cassius had committed and was about to expiate with his own blood.

From what sources Appian drew the materials of his history is a perplexing question. He makes mention of Polybius,<sup>3</sup> Hieronymus,<sup>4</sup> Cæsar,<sup>5</sup> Augustus,<sup>6</sup> and Asinius Pollio,<sup>7</sup> as authors, in such a way as to imply that he is quoting from them. He mentions the names of Varro,<sup>8</sup> Fabius Pictor,<sup>9</sup> Cassius Hemina,<sup>10</sup> and Rutilius Rufus,<sup>11</sup> as authors, but not in terms which imply any use of their works. He refers to two other authors about whom nothing is known; viz. Paulus Claudius<sup>12</sup> and Libo.<sup>13</sup> In the absence of any additional clues from the author himself respecting his authorities, resort must be had to the writings of those who preceded

<sup>1</sup> *C. W.* iii. 15-20.

<sup>2</sup> *C. W.* iv. 90-100.

<sup>3</sup> *Pun.* 132.

<sup>4</sup> *Mithr.* 8.

<sup>5</sup> *Gall.* xviii.; *C. W.* ii. 76, 99.

<sup>6</sup> *Illyr.* 14; *C. W.* iv. 110, v. 45.

<sup>7</sup> *C. W.* ii. 82.

<sup>8</sup> *C. W.* ii. 9; iv. 47.

<sup>9</sup> *Han.* 27.

<sup>10</sup> *Gall.* vi.

<sup>11</sup> *Sp.* 88.

<sup>12</sup> *Gall.* i. 3.

<sup>13</sup> *C. W.* iii. 77.

him. Two monographs on this subject, of comparatively recent date, in addition to that of Vollgraff, will be briefly noticed.<sup>1</sup>

Dr. Wynne considers only the five books of the *Civil Wars*. "Not only," he says, "does Appian almost everywhere abstain from indicating his authorities, but a careful comparison of his books on the civil wars with other writers treating the same convinces me that most of the writings that served him as sources have perished, and that any one sedulously comparing Appian's histories with the extant writings of others treating the same events will be almost certainly persuaded that most of them he was either ignorant of, or neglected." He gives us a list of the works which Appian might have consulted for the first book of the *Civil Wars*, and thinks that he made use of those of Rutilius Rufus and of Posidonius (both in Greek and both lost), and also those of Livy, judging from Appian's general agreement with the Epitome of the latter. He does not believe that Appian drew anything from Cicero or Velleius Paterculus; or from Diodorus Siculus, or Valerius Maximus, for this book.

In the second book of the *Civil Wars* reference is made by Appian to Varro, to Pompey's and Cæsar's letters to the Senate, to Asinius Pollio, to Cæsar's *Anti-Cato* and to his "memoranda of the government," ὑπομνήματα τῆς ἀρχῆς. The references to Varro, and to the two last-mentioned works of Cæsar, are only incidental. They do not imply that anything was drawn from them. Asinius Pollio is mentioned as an authority, as also are the letters of Cæsar and Pompey to the Senate. The oration of Brutus justifying the murder of Cæsar and the funeral oration of Antony are in the

<sup>1</sup> *De Fide et Auctoritate Appiani, in Bellis Romanorum Civilibus Enarrandis, exploratis fontibus quibus usus esse videtur.* Scripsit Dr. I. A. Wynne, Groningen, 1855, p. 129.

*Appianus und seine Quellen*, by Dr. Emanuel Hannak, Vienna, 1869, p. 184.



second book. Both of these may have been genuine reports of the spoken words. The speech made by Brutus existed in manuscript at one time; for Cicero says that it was sent to him for revision.<sup>1</sup> Dr. Wynne thinks that Appian may have drawn from the works of Tanusius Geminus, which are not now extant. He infers this because Appian makes allusion to a fact which Plutarch also records and for which the latter gives Tanusius as authority. He thinks also that the Memoirs of Augustus may have contributed something to the concluding chapters of this book, since we know that Appian used the Memoirs in other places, and we know from Dio Cassius that they contained the details of Cæsar's last will and testament.<sup>2</sup> A large number of passages showing similarity between Appian and the Epitome of Livy are cited by Dr. Wynne together with a few discrepancies; and also some passages in Florus and Orosius drawn from the lost books of Livy which have their parallel in Appian's history, and which lead him to say that after carefully weighing all these passages he concludes that Appian is much indebted to Livy in this book and that he has resorted to him here oftener than in the former one. He thinks that Appian made considerable use of Cæsar's orations and of his Commentaries on the Civil War, but that he used other authorities also, the discrepancies between himself and Cæsar being thus accounted for. He thinks that Appian was not acquainted with the writings of Lucan, or of Suetonius, or of Plutarch.

Among the authorities for the third, fourth, and fifth books of the *Civil Wars*, in Dr. Wynne's opinion, were the history of Asinius Pollio, the Memoirs of Augustus, and very probably the writings of Messala Corvinus, and possibly those of P. Volumnius (the companion of Brutus at Philippi), from whom Plutarch makes citations which are found also in Appian. The edict of proscription signed by the triumvirs,

<sup>1</sup> *Ad Att.* xv. i.

<sup>2</sup> Dio, xlv. 35.

Antony, Octavius, and Lepidus, is an important addition to the fourth book of the *Civil Wars*. Dr. Wynne thinks that in this book also Appian drew much from Livy, but he cites also several contradictions which exist between the two. He acknowledges that his conclusions are uncertain and unsatisfactory wherever he goes beyond the very few writers whom Appian himself cites.

I cannot agree with Dr. Wynne's conclusions respecting either Cæsar or Livy. I had compared all of the Commentaries on the Civil Wars with the corresponding parts of Appian before Dr. Wynne's treatise fell into my hands, and had formed the opinion that Appian had not used Cæsar as an authority, except perhaps at second hand. I had reached the same conclusion as regards Livy also. Of all the commentators upon Appian's authorities with whom I am familiar, Vollgraff is the most satisfactory. He seeks to show that the sources of both Plutarch and Appian for the civil wars were mainly the writings of Greek, not Latin, authors, whose works have since perished. The illustrations with which he sustains this thesis, all being in the nature of internal evidence, are, to my mind, convincing.

Dr. Wynne concludes his essay by inquiring how much confidence should be reposed in Appian as a historian, and whether the orations and conversations with which his works abound can be considered genuine. His opinion, sustained by a large number of citations, is that Appian was a candid author, and that he aimed to give a true account of the events which he described, but that his work contains many faults which are to be attributed for the most part to the times in which he lived. Also that with a few exceptions, which are named, the speeches are either wholly composed by the author or are partly genuine and partly manufactured, the proportions of the one and the other being indeterminable. Among those that must be considered genuine is the con-

versation between Octavius and Lucius Antonius, preceding the surrender of Perusia,<sup>1</sup> as the author expressly says that he has translated it from the Memoirs of the former.

Dr. Hannak deals only with the Excerpta. He takes them up seriatim and points out their sources, or what might have been their sources, in earlier writings now extant. For the first and second books he finds Dionysius of Halicarnassus the principal authority, a few passages being found in the pages of Diodorus Siculus. For the third (Samnite) book a few resemblances are found in Dionysius, but the greater number in Livy. In the fourth (Celtic) book Diodorus seems to be the principal authority, with one or two references to Cæsar. The Sicilian excerpta seem to have been mainly derived from Polybius, one being referable to the Epitome of Livy. The few Numidian fragments find striking resemblances in Sallust's *Jugurthine War*. Dr. Hannak thinks that King Juba's history may have furnished Appian with some of his material here. The Macedonian fragments are referable to Polybius and Livy. It is, of course, an open question whether Appian drew his materials from the sources where these resemblances are found, or from books now lost which were the common sources of Dionysius, Diodorus, and Livy, and of himself. I have compared all of Dr. Hannak's citations without being able to form any decided opinion on this question, except as to Polybius, and here my opinion is based on the fact already mentioned that Polybius is once quoted by Appian as an authority. In the *fragmenta* of Diodorus are several paragraphs which have a striking resemblance to passages in Appian's Spanish and Hannibalic books.

There have been two English translations of Appian, more or less complete, before this one, the first by W. B., in 1578, the second by J. D., in 1679. The former is in old English

<sup>1</sup> *Civil Wars*, v. 45, 46.

black-letter, and is not easy to read. It contains the five books of the *Civil Wars*, followed by a continuation written by the translator himself, bringing the history down to the death of Antony. A second part contains the Preface, the Mithridatic, Spanish, Punic, Syrian, Parthian, and Illyrian wars entire, and the Celtic epitome, and in that order. It does not contain the Hannibalic war. The matter is the same as that contained in the Latin version of Geslen, but not in the same order. As the Illyrian wars had not yet been published in Greek, it follows that W. B. must have translated this book from the Latin version of Candidus. Inspection shows this to be the fact, but it does not show that the remainder was translated from Geslen. I do not know who W. B. was.<sup>1</sup>

The translation of 1679 was made by a certain John Davies. It was published in folio, and a second edition was issued in 1690, but this seems to have been the unsold portion of the first, as it is identical with it in every particular except the title page. A third edition was published in 1703, but I have never seen a copy of it. It contains the Punic, Syrian, Parthian, Mithridatic, Illyrian, Spanish, and Hannibalic wars and the five books of the *Civil Wars*. Whatever may be said of Mr. Davies's knowledge of Greek, his use of English was very bad. M. Combes-Dounous, the French translator of the *Civil Wars* (1808), alludes to the translation of Davies in his preface thus: "While I was engaged in translating this historian, I had occasion to speak of him in the presence of an English lady quite well versed in ancient literature. This lady assured me that there was an English translation of Appian in existence. I begged her to try to procure a copy of it for me on her return to

<sup>1</sup> A copy of this extremely rare book is owned by Mr. Wilberforce Eames, Librarian of the Lenox Library, to whose kindness I am indebted for the privilege of examining it.

London. In fact she took the trouble of searching for it in the great bookstore of Lackington, who declared that he knew of this translation, and added that it had been published under the name of the celebrated Dryden, who had had no share in it, but had allowed the obscure author of it to use his name to give his work some reputation and lustre. Lackington had promised to procure a copy of this translation, but the war which has broken out has prevented my gathering the fruit of this promise. Besides, this work must surely be quite rare even in England, since neither Fabricius nor Harles knew anything about it."

The first translation of Appian into a modern language was made by Alexander Braccio into Italian. It was published in two parts, the first at Rome in 1502, and the second at Florence in 1519. This was merely a translation of the Latin version of Candidus, but like its original it was immensely popular and ran through many editions in the course of the two following centuries. Two other Italian translations of parts of Appian were published in the sixteenth century—that of Dolce in 1559, and that of Ruscelli in 1563.

The first French translation was made by Claude de Seyssel, Bishop of Marseilles. This also was made from the Latin version of Candidus. Its subsequent amendment, and its publication in 1544, after the death of Seyssel, are mentioned in Professor Mendelssohn's essay which follows this preface. A second edition was published in 1552, and a third in 1569. The latter contained a translation of the Spanish and Hannibalic books made by Philippe des Avenelles. A new French translation was made by Odet Philippe Desmares and published in 1659. I have never seen this work. J. J. Combes-Dounous, the third French translator, says that Desmares only revamped the French version of Seyssel with the help of the Latin version of

Geslen. Combes-Dounous translated the *Civil Wars* only, in 1808. This is a scholarly work, abounding in valuable notes. Its only defect consists in using rather more words than are needed to convey the author's meaning. Combes-Dounous divided the books of the *Civil Wars* into chapters to avoid the appearance of heaviness, and put chapter-headings over each. Schweighäuser had previously divided the whole of Appian into short sections. I have followed the example of Combes-Dounous as to all the books.

Other translations of Appian in modern tongues are mentioned in the Bibliography.

I have been engaged upon this translation for five years, in the intervals of more pressing occupations, and it has been at all times a pleasure and a recreation. If the work has been fairly well done, I shall consider it worth while to have drawn attention again to an author who has fallen into undeserved neglect. I think that all the precious memorials of antiquity ought to be accessible in English. The fact that any literary work propagated itself for more than a thousand years through the Dark Ages by the toilsome process of copying by hand is pretty good evidence that it is worth reading in a modern tongue. Appian deals with the most momentous events of the ancient world, and his work can never be lost sight of while men continue to take an interest in Roman history.

I have adhered to the old fashion of using the names Pompey and Antony, instead of Pompeius and Antonius, in order to avoid confusion with the names of Sextus Pompeius and Lucius Antonius, which are of frequent occurrence. For the same reason I have used the name Octavius for the adopted son and heir of Julius Cæsar, although Appian generally gives him the name of Cæsar after the death of the latter. In using the names of the gods in the old mythologies I have employed the Greek ones where they are

applicable in Greek countries, and the Latin ones elsewhere.

I have used the text of Mendelssohn (Teubner edition) generally, but with constant reference to that of the Didot edition, and to that of Schweighäuser.

I owe hearty thanks to my friend Theodore Lyman Wright, Professor of Greek Literature and Art in Beloit College, for revising my work and correcting inaccuracies inevitable in the work of an amateur, and for numerous suggestions for bettering the phraseology. I desired to make a more ample recognition of Professor Wright's service than these lines convey, but he declined it.

My thanks are due to Father Ehrle, the Librarian of the Vatican, for permission extended to me, during a recent visit at Rome, to take photographs of specimen pages of the two oldest MSS. of Appian, for reproduction in this work. The one facing the Author's Preface bears the stamp of the *Bibliothèque Nationale* of Paris, which shows that it was a part of the plunder carried away by the first Napoleon and restored after the Congress of Vienna.

The portraits used as illustrations were in part selected by myself at Rome and in part contributed from Duruy's History by the generosity of the American publishers of that work, Messrs. Dana Estes & Co., Boston. The maps, with one exception, are from Shuckburgh's History of Rome, by permission of the publishers, who are also the publishers of this work. I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. Strachan-Davidson and the Oxford University Press, the publisher of his *Selections from Polybius*, for permission to use his plan of the battle of Cannæ; also to Messrs Longmans, Green & Co. for permission to use the diagram of the harbor of Carthage contained in Mr. Bosworth Smith's *Carthage and the Carthaginians*.

H. W.

NEW YORK, August, 1899.

# THE MANUSCRIPTS OF APPIAN

By PROFESSOR L. MENDELSSOHN<sup>1</sup>

It is now well established that the Roman History of Appian was originally embraced in twenty-four books which he divided in the following order:<sup>2</sup>—

## ROMAN AFFAIRS

I The Kings	IV Gallic
II Italic	V Sicily and the Islands
III Samnite	VI Spanish

<sup>1</sup> Preface to vol. i., Teubner edition, Leipzig, 1879.

<sup>2</sup> The first nine books, as far as the Macedonian, and then (the intervening ones being omitted) five books of the *Civil Wars*, are enumerated separately by the author himself in his Preface, Sec. 14. But the Preface itself seems to have been written before the whole history was finished, and thence it comes about that the last seven books, beginning with the eighteenth, are not even mentioned here, and that the only one promised after the *Civil Wars*, the one on the civil budget of the Romans, never was written, unless, possibly, the material of it passed into *The Hundred Years*. Therefore, Photius remains the only sure witness concerning the series of distinct books after the ninth, although his copy had already suffered some slight changes, as will be shown at the respective passages. But we must entirely disregard at once the order, obviously transposed, given by the anonymous writer published by Schweighäuser (vol. iii. p. 12), and by myself in the *Rheinisches Museum* (vol. xxxi. p. 210), and also the sequence shown by the codices themselves, whether good or bad, and the numbers they give to the books, which are inconsistent with that order; as I now believe them to be of no value, although I had once thought them to contribute something to an understanding of the merits at least of the several classes. If the arrangement I have given above differs in places from that of Schweighäuser (vol. iii. p. 887 *seq.*, or in his *opusc. acad.* vol. ii. p. 15 *seq.*), or from Westermann (as cited by Pauly, vol. i. p. 1340 *seq.*), and finally from Hannak (*Appian and his Sources*, Vienna, 1869, p. 2 *seq.*), I differ from them knowingly.



VII	Hannibalic	XV	Civil Wars, 3
VIII	African (Carthaginian and Numidian) <sup>1</sup>	XVI	" " 4
		XVII	" " 5
IX	Macedonian and Il- lyrian <sup>2</sup>	XVIII	Egyptian, 1 <sup>5</sup>
		XIX	" 2
X	Grecian and Ionian <sup>3</sup>	XX	" 3
XI	Syrian <sup>4</sup>	XXI	" 4
XII	Mithridatic	XXII	The Hundred Years <sup>6</sup>
XIII	Civil Wars, 1	XXIII	Dacian <sup>6</sup>
XIV	" " 2	XXIV	Arabian <sup>7</sup>

This so voluminous work early met a fate corresponding to its bulk. Undoubtedly the Byzantine age, impatient of

<sup>1</sup> Appian himself in his Preface, Sec. 14, calls this merely "Carthaginian." Photius calls it "African, Carthaginian and Numidian," and finally in the Vatican MS., 141, it is inscribed "The Libyca of Appian, or Carthaginian Affairs." Indeed, I think that "Libyca" was inscribed on this little book as a general title, of which Carthaginian and Numidian were divisions. Yet the Numidian fragments have hitherto been wrongly published separate from the Punic book.

<sup>2</sup> The Illyrian book, which was reluctantly placed by Schweighäuser after the Mithridatic (see his vol. iii. p. 897), I have restored to its original position (see *Civil Wars*, v. 145), and subjoined to the Macedonian history.

<sup>3</sup> See Schweighäuser, vol. iii. p. 889 *seq.* [In the place referred to S. gives reasons, drawn from other parts of Appian's works, why the Grecian and Ionian should be considered as forming one book (Book X) instead of two (Books X and XI), as the anonymous writer designated them.]

<sup>4</sup> Inasmuch as Photius found a Parthian history appended to the Syrian, the fraud pointed out by Xylander and Perizon (*An. Hist.*, p. 390), and demolished at great length by Schweighäuser (vol. iii. p. 905), must have been perpetrated very early. From the *Civil Wars*, ii. 18 and v. 65, it fully appears that Appian intended to write a Parthian book, not that he had written one. Finally, the fragment in Bekker's *Anecdota Græca* (p. 156, 29), or the sixth in Bekker's *Appian* (vol. ii. p. 915), also belongs to that spurious history.

<sup>5</sup> Photius relates that there were nine books of the civil wars. In these he included, or ought to have included, the four books of the Egyptian history repeatedly promised by Appian. See Mithr. 114; *Civil Wars*, i. 6; ii. 90; also Bekker's *Anecdota Græca*, p. 179, 21; p. 139, 31; p. 174, 14.

<sup>6</sup> See Schweighäuser, vol. iii. p. 895 *seq.*

<sup>7</sup> That this was in reality the twenty-fourth book is now fully shown by the first line of the fragment of Miller. [See vol. ii. p. 489 of this translation.]

reading and transcribing books in general, and especially of an author not very remarkable for art or genius, and who had severed the connection of the events themselves by a bad plan, preferred an immediate enjoyment of selections to the trouble of continuous reading. Their rules of dismembering an author were two, by one of which they extracted certain special passages from the whole work and brought them together according to their resemblance of subject; by the other they selected those entire books which seemed to them more important than the rest, and these alone were circulated by copying. To this rule, often salutary and oftener pernicious, are due whatever of the fragments of Appian were collected in the Constantinian extracts, and it is truly astonishing that the compilers of these extracts were acquainted with, or gave attention to, only one volume of his works, the one containing the first nine books. On the other hand, it seems to have been in consequence of the importance of the subjects and of the multitude of readers thence arising that, besides the Preface and the Celtic epitome, the Spanish, Hannibalic, Punic, Illyrian, Syrian, and Mithridatic histories, and the five books of the *Civil Wars*, escaped entire the slothfulness of those ages.<sup>1</sup>

The remains of the whole work, which in one way and another were preserved, became known late, and little by

<sup>1</sup> An account of their method of making extracts (not referring, however, to the books now extant) follows the Preface in the Vatican MS., 141, whence it passed into the inferior MSS. of class i., as follows: "I have placed the Preface only of the Italian history of Appian in the present volume, since, for the details of Italian affairs, the Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus are the most noteworthy of all the histories. . . . Many others have written of Roman affairs, and among them Dio Cassius. . . . It is fitting therefore to take the early Roman history from Dionysius, if you seek not merely the knowledge of events, but improvement in speech from the reading of them; and what took place after the time of the kings from Dio. The histories of the several races you will learn from this Appian. From his *Civil Wars*, I have chosen those of Augustus and Antony and those which follow next, namely, of the Romans against the Egyptians to the death of Cleopatra; then the Jewish, Pontic, and Dacian wars, in which Trajan distinguished himself; then the Spanish, Hannibalic, Punic, and Sicilian, and in addition to these the Macedonian and Grecian. Although there are many others, I thought these enough, and have embraced them in two volumes."

little, to learned men, and still later began to receive attention from them. The beginnings and gradual progress of Appianic criticism have already been described in great part by Schweighäuser in his edition of Appian (vol. i. p. iii *seq.*) and in his *opusc. acad.* (vol. ii. p. 97), but it will be pertinent to give a new sketch of it, which, while more brief, will in several particulars be more correct; especially since it will naturally introduce us to the contributions which are peculiar to the present edition.

In the early times of the revival of learning it was not seldom the fortune of Greek writers that before they were presented in their own tongue, or could be, they were brought out clad in Latin, or something like Latin, garb. This fate overtook Appian also. He found a translator in Peter Candidus December,<sup>1</sup> master of correspondence to Pope Nicholas V., not a new hand at the translation of Greek books, but always a rude one. About the middle of the fifteenth century he made a translation of those works which were then ascribed to Appian, which translation, both in manuscript (of which a number of copies still remain) and in print, was usually embraced in two parts, thus:—

## II

Appian's Preface  
Punic  
Syrian  
[Parthian]  
Mithridatic

## I

Civil Wars, 5 books  
The Illyrica entire  
The Celtic Epitome

<sup>1</sup> The life of Candidus has been written by many, including Tiraboschi (*Italian Literary History*, vol. vi. 2, Venice, 1795, p. 669 *seq.*), Zeno (*dissert. Voss.*, vol. i., Venice, 1752, p. 202 *seq.*) and others, and many writings of Candidus are extant in the Ambrosian library. Nevertheless, the time when he made the translation of Appian is difficult to determine unless one should be willing to read the whole history of those times on purpose. As I am neither able nor willing to do so, I will say that one fact derived from a letter of Candidus written to L. Petronius, a knight of Siena, and published by Muccioli (*catal. bibl. Cesenat.*, vol. ii., ed. Cesenæ, 1782, p. 101), convinces me that the *whole* translation was finished and delivered to Pope Nicholas in the year 1452. This view coincides with facts mentioned by Dominicus Georgius in his *Life of Nicholas V.* (Rome, 1792), p. 190 *seq.*, respecting these matters, although it still remains obscure how Candidus, after the death of

That this translation of Candidus was not only uncouth, but in many places utterly misleading, is the unanimous voice of scholars. It has, nevertheless, been universally esteemed till now, and reckoned among the sources for the emendation of Appian, because it was believed to have been based upon a good copy that was afterwards lost. Although this general view is correct, it will be possible to define it with more precision than has yet been given to it, and for this reason I shall return to it later.

Although this work of Candidus, such as it was, was frequently reprinted from the year 1472 onward, the Greek text remained unpublished until Charles Stephen, the uncle of Henry Stephen, published the Preface, the Celtic epitome, the Punic wars, the Illyrian fragment, the Syrian [Parthian] and Mithridatic wars, and the five books of the Civil Wars, arranged in that order, at Paris, in the year 1551. The sources and critical method of this edition were first made plain by Schweighäuser in his preface (p. vi. *seq.*), showing that it had proceeded from the two Paris MSS., 1681 and 1682 (designated by Schweighäuser as Reg. A. and B., and by myself as a. and b.), and still remaining in Paris; but that it did not follow the text of these MSS. closely, and did not observe the same order of arrangement of the books. For the order of arrangement in these "Royal" MSS., as Schweighäuser styled them, was the following:—

Preface	Illyrian fragment
Celtic Epitome	[Parthian]
Syrian	Mithridatic
Punic	Civil Wars, V.

And finally he showed that their goodness, or rather their badness, was about equal, and that their age and origin were about the same, *i.e.* the beginning of the sixteenth or end of the fifteenth century. That all this was true I perceived as soon as I had these Paris MSS. in my own hands, and also that that distinguished man had left nothing undone to add to the accuracy of his collation.<sup>1</sup>

Nicholas, *i.e.*, after the year 1455, could dedicate anew the second part of his translation to Alfonso, King of the Sicilies.

<sup>1</sup> Concerning the former codex, the following words of Seyssel, the French translator of Appian, to Louis XII., who reigned between the

This *editio princeps*<sup>1</sup> was followed by a separate edition of the Spanish and Hannibalic books which Henry Stephen obtained on the occasion of his journey to Italy, from Arnold Arlen, and which he published, together with some fragments of Ctesias, Agatharcides, and Memnon, at Geneva in 1557. That the copy of these books of Appian was very faulty Henry Stephen himself lamented, and his edition testifies.<sup>2</sup>

Although the Stephens had limited their labors to the books of Appian which had been preserved entire, a little later the fragments which had been taken from the first nine books and thrown together in the store of the Constantinian collections began to find editors. Of these, F. Orsini published at Antwerp, in 1582, the one entitled *De Legationibus*,

years 1498 and 1515 (preface new Paris edition, 1580), are worthy of note: "Having some time since acquired again by your help the eleven books of this history which are found in the Greek language, which the Seignior of Florence has sent to you, I have gone through it anew, and corrected what I had previously done, throughout, with the assistance of John Lascarys, who is very well versed in both languages." This Florentine codex, sent to Louis XII. about the year 1500, could have been no other than Reg. A., for Reg. B. seems to have been brought from Venice to Paris not earlier than about 1530 (see Schweighäuser's preface, vol. i. p. vii. note), and Bishop Claude de Seyssel, who died in 1520, using this very book, and with the help of John Lascaris, revised his own translation, which had been made from that of Candidus, and this alone was printed, first at Paris [Combes-Dounous says at Lyons. — *Tr.*] in 1544, the former one having been suppressed. Nor does the age of that codex militate against this reasoning.

<sup>1</sup> This was admirably translated into Latin by Sigismund Geslen and published at Basle in 1554, after his death, by Cælius Secundus Curio, who added his own translation of the Spanish history. How extremely aggravating it is that we are utterly ignorant from what Greek codex Curio translated, for there are places where his work is useful in addition to the Vatican 141, although oftener it is either pedantic, or inaccurate and useless.

<sup>2</sup> Yet Charles Sigoni, in a note to Livy xxiii. 11 — that is, before the edition of Stephen — tells us that he had often read the Hannibalic history of Appian in manuscript (doubtless Greek) at the house of Louis Beccatelli; and Paul Manutius likewise brought out at Venice in 1545 the Spanish book translated from Greek into Italian (see Hoffman's *lex. bibl.* I.<sup>2</sup> p. 218), which translation I regret that I have never seen. Finally, concerning Curio's Latin translation of the Spanish history made from some Greek codex — it may have been the same as that of Manutius — see the preceding note. All which seems to teach us that copies of the Spanish and Hannibalic books were not extremely rare.

he relying upon the Vatican Greek MS. No. 1418, and the Neapolitan III. B. 15, but reproducing the text with too little accuracy.

Following this came a second edition of Henry Stephen, published at Geneva in 1592, to which he added the Spanish and Hannibalic books recently issued by himself, but to this edition he applied no other aids than a talent often happy but often wide of the mark. So it came about that in this edition also he was able to give of the *Illyrica* (which Candidus had entire in his Greek copy) only the fragment preserved in the Royal MSS. Seven years later David Hoeschelius found in a MS. of Appian then at Augsburg (mentioned on page 67 of Reiser's "catalogue of the Augsburg library," published at that place in 1675), but now of the Munich library, Gr. 374, the Greek text of the *Illyrica* entire, and gave it to the light at Augsburg in a separate book. After this Henry de Valois, a man of rare learning and industry, merited well of Appian by bringing out, in 1634, a considerable number of extracts from Appian preserved under the Constantinian title *De Virtutibus et Vitiis* from a codex belonging to Peiresc. For these reasons little praise is due to Alex. Tollius, who superintended a republication at Amsterdam, in 1670, of the relics of Appian's work; for besides being scarcely acquainted with Greek he had no knowledge of his predecessors who were his own superiors, and so it came about that the passages published by Orsini and Hoeschelius are not contained in that edition.

Such were the labors of the men, learned and unlearned, who contributed to the study of Appian before Schweighäuser. He alone was of more service than all the rest. Certainly when he found that, for revising those books of Appian which remained entire — for it was plain that the condition of the excerpts was deplorable and almost beyond hope of amendment — it was impossible to rest satisfied with those Royal MSS. of Charles Stephen or the Italian one of Henry Stephen, he resolved first to strengthen the very basis of his emendations. Nor was this a vain attempt, for in addition to some other small helps, he obtained this threefold apparatus for emendation:

Vatican Gr. 141.	Laurentian LXX, 26, 15th Century.	Augsburg class <sup>1</sup> (O), 15th Century.
Preface } 12th Century Celtic epitome } Spanish } Hannibalic } 11th Century Punic }	Spanish Hannibalic	Preface Punic Syrian [Parthian] Mithridatic Civil Wars, V. Illyrica entire

These MSS., to which were added the Royal MSS. (class i) newly collated by himself, and the translation of Candidus, he so used that he brought in requisition for the Preface the Vatican MS. 141, and those of classes O and i; for the Celtic epitome, Vat. 141 and i; for the Spanish and Hannibalic books, Vat. 141 and the Laurentian edition of H. Stephen; for the Punic wars, Vat. 141, O and i; for the Illyrica, O, the fragment in the Royal MSS., the Leyden codex, and the translation of Gradius,<sup>2</sup> and finally for the Mithridatic and the remaining books, O and i; but in such a way as to give a preference over the Royal MSS. whenever possible, to class O, which he saw was much superior. Finally he made constant use of Candidus, who, in common with O, had the Illyrica entire, but regarding him as a source of much less authority than O.

When Schweighäuser's materials had been augmented by the welcome addition of the notes of Musgrave and Reiske, in whatever way one man could earn distinction by the restoration of a text deformed by extraordinary corruption — either by the choice of MSS. or by long-continued study of the writer, or finally by a genius for emendation — he distinguished himself abundantly, and relieved his successors of the greater part of their labor. Yet even then it was impossible but that some faults should be left which it were desirable to remove; for besides the fact that not all the codices

<sup>1</sup> That is, the Augsburg MS. of Hoeschelius itself, the Marcian 387, and the Mithridatica of the Vatican 134, of which books I shall speak separately below.

<sup>2</sup> Of these two I will speak later.

that have some weight were within his reach, and that the friends to whom he had entrusted the task of making collations did not, in all cases, perform that task with scrupulous fidelity, what was of more consequence, he did not himself arrive at a true estimate of the codices. Although this renowned work is lame in these particulars, no one after Schweighäuser has concerned himself with the emendation of the very words of Appian on a settled plan and guided by new lights. For the editors who have succeeded him — they are, beside Teucher, who did not distinguish himself, the Didot editor, Dübner, and Bekker — have satisfied themselves with inserting in their editions a few small fragments of Appian embraced in the Constantinian title *De Sententiis*, and almost limited the remainder of their work to a repetition of Schweighäuser's text, although Bekker must not be deprived of the praise due him for some notable emendations and for an improved punctuation of the whole.

We may now pass to our opinion of the relations of the codices and inquire whether perchance any connection or kinship exists between the five classes, or whether each one must be considered, as Schweighäuser thought, to have its own authority and origin, distinct from the others. These classes, we repeat, were the following: —

I	II	III	IV	V
Vat. 141	Laur. LXX 26 and H. Steph. book 15th Century	August. class (O) 15th Cen- tury	Cand. (C) 15th Cen- tury	Reg. class (i) 15th and 16th Centuries
Preface Celt. epit. } 12th Century	Span.	Preface	Preface	Preface
Span. } 11th Century	Hann.	Pun.	Pun.	Celt. epit.
Hann. }		Syr.	Syr.	Syr.
Pun. }		[Parth.]	[Parth.]	Pun.
		Mithrid.	Mithrid.	Illyr. fragm.
		C. W. b. V	C. W. b. V	[Parth.]
		Illyr. entire	Illyr. entire	Mithrid.
			Celt. epit.	C. W. b. V



As it was not credible that this large number of codices, for the most part carelessly examined, should not show distinct and decided marks of relationship of the MSS., it was the twofold duty of a new editor that, in selecting the codices, a sound rule should be observed, and that the account of those selected should be as exact as possible, especially of those that Schweighäuser had not himself handled. Whence sprang the necessity of narrowing, as well as of enlarging, our critical apparatus. The necessity of narrowing it I could not but perceive clearly as soon as I touched the oldest one of all, the Vat. 141.<sup>1</sup> This codex, however, is not of a uniform type. Without doubt the first eight leaves, containing the Preface and the Celtic epitome, did not originally belong to this codex. They were written in the twelfth century, the others in the eleventh, and, what is of more importance, the quaternions are reckoned from the ninth folio on; and it is evident that the plan of these two small parts is not the same as of the others, *i.e.* of the Spanish, Hannibalic, and Punic books. For those books, therefore, I have set these codices in the lowest place of authority, although they are all derived from that very Vatican 141. It is perfectly evident from differences in the text that neither Candidus's Preface nor that of the Augsburg MS. go back to V, although i has come from that source. Therefore, in the study of these few pages, V and O C had to be compared. On the other hand, in the Celtic epitome, which is omitted in O, there was no doubt that C, no less than i, was of no authority as compared with V, and although it is doubtful from what source Candidus drew his knowledge of the epitome, I am inclined to believe that it was from i.

By this means a more certain judgment can be formed of the other three books which V contains. That the Laurentian codex lxx. 26, and that of H. Stephen of the Spanish and Hannibalic histories in their farthest origin<sup>2</sup> go back

<sup>1</sup> It is a parchment of 166 large folios. Many hands of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries have corrected it, especially the Punic wars, attending mostly to orthography. Iota subscript generally omitted in the codex, rare use also of the adscript, and the greatest negligence and license in respect of accents and breathings.

<sup>2</sup> This Laurentian seems to have been transcribed from the Vatican itself, and very carefully too, for in hardly any place does it differ from

to that same V, or to some twin copy, my own collation of the Vatican proves, since the work of Spalletti, which Schweighäuser was obliged to use, had been very negligently performed. Therefore, while both manuscripts had to be rejected, yet sometimes, as it happens, some reading from Stephen's text not attested by evidence, but conjectured with felicity, had to be adopted, although too often it was far from clear what the book had contained and what the editor had inserted by way of conjecture.<sup>1</sup>

While it is quite plain, therefore, that the Spanish and the Hannibalic books should be edited from Vat. 141 alone, the same ease and clearness of proof exist also respecting the Punic book. For example, in this Vatican book chapters 56-59 of the Punic wars have disappeared in a vast lacuna, and the same lacuna exists in all the other codices (i and O and C), and could not be filled except by inserting that scrap embraced in the Constantinian excerpta of the Embassies of the Nations to the Romans. But this lacuna in V. 141, much the oldest of all the MSS., as I have said, is not as Schweighäuser thought (iii. 426), primitive. It did not proceed from its original, but was due to accident and chance, for while the fifteenth quaternion ought to have four pairs of leaves in the following order :



the middle one (4 and 5) has fallen out by accident, as will immediately appear to any one examining it with his own eyes, as Schweighäuser did not. Since, then, it is quite certain that this lacuna had its origin in V. itself and not

it. On the other hand, that most shocking book of H. Stephen, infected with every kind of blemish, ascends eventually to the Vatican by the third or fourth step. Although Schweighäuser himself knew that the Ottoboni MS. 45 (Vat. B) was of no value, — no doubt this also was drawn from Vat. 141, as were other Roman codices containing the Spanish and Hannibalic wars, like the Palatine 51 and 61, — yet he wrongly and repeatedly appealed to it as a witness of real authority.

<sup>1</sup> I have already remarked on the value which Curio's translation of the Spanish book sometimes has.

in its original, the Punic books of all the remaining codices which have this lacuna must have been *transcribed from this very same Vatican*, or, to speak more accurately, from copies derived in the course of time from it. O, C, and i therefore cannot have any superiority in the Punic wars over V. itself. What they have peculiar to themselves and differing from V. are blemishes, or interpolations, or corrections of errors, usually slight ones; for he would greatly err who should attribute the not very easy amendment of certain passages to some original copy, rather than to the happy genius of certain learned copyists of whom there was no lack. By virtue of these emendations, therefore, and not of the codices themselves, it has come to pass that in some places mention of copies of the Punic wars has been found setting them almost above V. in point of honor.

Although in the Spanish, Hannibalic, and Punic histories there is no manuscript authority before Vat. 141, another help exists in the compilations of Constantine and the themes drawn from them by Suidas — an assistance in some degree for the Spanish and Punic entire books, and the sole help (except the fragments preserved in Bekker's *Anecdota*) for the other first six books, *i.e.* the Kings, Italic, Samnite, Celtic, Sicilian, and Macedonian. I have deemed it not the least part of my duty to give an account of these compilations somewhat more copious and certain in this edition than has been done before. To touch each one briefly — there are two parts of the title treating of the Embassies, one written “concerning ambassadors (not embassies) of the Romans to the nations”; the other “concerning ambassadors of the nations to the Romans.” After Orsini had published that part from the Vatican Gr. codex 1418 and the Neapolitan III. B 15 with such carelessness as I have described above, Schweighäuser acquired the Munich codex 185 — which he calls Bav., and I call M — containing the Embassies of the nations to the Romans, and from it he extracted quite accurately not only the fragments of the first six books, but he added also, most advantageously, scattered scraps from the Spanish and Punic histories evidently neglected by Orsini. That the account of this part, by far the most important of all, might be established with certainty, I myself collated afresh this M 185, and I obtained by the

courtesy of Alfred Eberhard, a new collation of the Neapolitan MS., from which the carelessness and almost fraudulent license of Orsini fully appeared; and finally I examined the third, the one considered the best of all, the Ambrosian, N 135 *sup.*<sup>1</sup>

Of the second and much shorter part of this title, which contains the Embassies of the Romans to the nations, I have myself afresh gone over the codex Vat. 1418, and also the Munich codex 267,<sup>2</sup> and I have added what few fragments exist in either, extracted from the Spanish and Punic histories.

Since all the careful study that rests on manuscripts has been already applied to the fragments of Appian in the compilation entitled *De Legationibus* — and it is hardly possible for farther help to be found — it has been possible to accomplish scarcely anything in respect of the other compilations which have to do with this writer. For in the book of Peiresc containing the copies of “Virtues and Vices,” although H. de Valois bestowed admirable and most scrupulous work upon it, nevertheless he also, as it were, knowingly and designedly passed by everything that he found that had been previously published. That these passages were not few I inferred from the preface of M. Gros’s edition of Dio Cassius, vol. i. p. lvii, and so I applied by letter to Julius Wollenberg, by whom I knew that this whole codex had been freshly examined; but in vain, for that distinguished man had died a little before. So I was obliged reluctantly to rest satisfied with the very few excerpts that de Valois himself had extracted from it at the end of his book, p. 125.

Nor did my efforts succeed better in the extracts *De Sententiis*, although there were so few from Appian among

<sup>1</sup> With truth Nissen, in the *Rheinisches Museum* (vol. xxii. p. 627), filling out Ernst Schulz’s defective reasoning on this subject (*De exc. Const. quaest. Crit.* Bonn, 1866), asserts that the Ambrosian MS. was derived from the same Spanish copy with others. And yet since Darmarius has employed extraordinary care in transcribing it, its value is distinguished above that of the Neapolitan and the Bavarian. Besides, these copies are all on paper and are of the sixteenth century.

<sup>2</sup> Concerning that other Munich codex 267 which, after the time of M. Gros’s preface to Dio Cassius (vol. i. p. xlvi *seq.*), was described by Nissen (*Quaest. Liv.*, p. 314 *seq.*), and employed in the first Dindorf edition of Polybius, Schulz likewise argued well (l.s. p. 29 *seq.*), but he selected the fragments of Appian with too little care.

them that the damage is rather slight. The things found by A. Mai in cod. Vat. Gr. 73 and inserted in his new collection of ancient writers, v. ii. p. 367, are so affected by Mai's doctoring that I have scarcely been able to gather anything, or to trust Mai for anything except the trifles which Herwerden has ingeniously extracted from him.

Such, then, is the critical apparatus of both Schweighäuser and myself for reviewing the remains of the first nine books. For the remaining whole books, the *Illyrica*, — which seems to have been rather early torn from the Macedonian and should accordingly be connected with the latter part of that book, — the *Syriaca*, the *Mithridatica*, and the five books of the *Civil Wars*, there were, as I have said above, three kinds of codices employed by Schweighäuser; namely, the Augsburg, class O, the translation of Candidus (C), and the Royal i. He gave the foremost place to O, constantly referring to C and i, but not following them except in case of necessity. The painstaking man was quite correct in this preference, for there is scarcely a chapter in which the supreme merit of O does not outshine the rags and tatters of C and i. Yet it will not be amiss to define a little more precisely than he has done the distinctions of value between the three classes, especially as it is not possible to dispense entirely with C or with i.

O and C betray in two ways a certain primitive relationship, by having in common the *Illyrica* entire and by the order of arrangement of the books. (I will speak of the Celtic epitome later.) While O and C eventually go back to the same fountain, yet they deviated early, as is shown by certain lacunæ which each of them supplies for the other and by the general differences of the text. This difference, even if it must be attributed to the inexperience of the translator himself, nevertheless remains always very great, and its nature is such that one ought for the most part to follow O and reject C. What almost every page of Schweighäuser and of this edition teaches, it seems unnecessary to confirm by examples.

The general merit of O being sufficiently accepted, the relations of the several codices belonging to that class must be explained. Three sound ones belong there, namely: —

1. A. Munich Gr. 374, formerly Augsburg, on cotton

paper, 382 small leaves, fifteenth century, written by many hands nicely indeed, but mingled with very many errors of orthography. Many correcting hands appear.

2. B. Venice, St. Mark's library, 387, paper, 390 square pages written in the year 1441 by a certain Gedeo. Described in the catalogues of Zanetti and Morelli. Cited by Schweighäuser as *Ven.*

3. V. Vatican Gr. 134, cotton paper, square form, 318 pages written by many hands in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, for the most part carefully. The Appiana are written on pages 125-318; the previous ones are occupied by the Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Books VI.-X., after which, on page 124, come some iambic verses of J. Eugenicus to the emperor John Paleologus. The Appiana are corrected only by the first hand. This is cited by Schweighäuser in the *Mithridatica* as *Vat.*

Additional to these, containing the *Civil Wars*, ii. 149-154 and iv. 1-52 :—

4. F. Paris, Reg. 1672, parchment, largest size, 944 pages. Compilations of Appian begin on page 937, written at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The first part, embracing Plutarchea, I had attributed to the thirteenth century, but more correctly now M. Treu attributes this also to the fourteenth. I have myself collated it.

5. E. Paris, Reg. 1642, paper, of various sizes, fifteenth century. The Appiana are transcribed from a copy very similar to the preceding and by a poor use of the codex. Schweighäuser collated it with sufficient care. It is Reg. C. in his list. I afterwards reread it myself. Each of these two codices was at Constantinople until the year 1687. See Bernhardt's *History of Greek Literature*, I<sup>4</sup>, p. 744.

Now, to drop further discussion of E, F, Schweighäuser saw that A, B, V, were transcripts of the same original, but he thought that the greatest confidence in the matter of copying should be placed in A. The conscientious man examined this whole MS. himself. Of the Venetian one he had only the collation of Blessing, and finally it must be that he had nothing of Vat. 134 except the *Mithridatica* carelessly treated by Spalletti. On the other hand, what is not difficult to understand at present is that this very Vatican MS. has been most carefully, and the Aug. and Venet. have been

rather less carefully, written. So I have collated the whole of it and have also reëxamined the Aug. collation of Schweighäuser; and finally, for the Venetian, which for lack of time I have not been able to examine, I have contented myself with drawing from Schweighäuser's<sup>1</sup> materials.

So much for the first group of codices. Proceeding to the remainder—that there can be no doubt that the merit of Candidus is much inferior to O we have already signified. Nevertheless it will be worth while to explore a little more carefully the sources and as it were the incunabula of the translation made by him. From what has been said above it is clear that he used some Greek copy which belonged by contents and order of books to class O. As he worked at Rome and from Roman copies, one of which (Vat. 134) belongs to class O, I had for some time (while I was first collating that book) the same belief as Schweighäuser, that I had discovered the copy used by Candidus. But that was an error. Besides other things less important, not only did numerous readings at variance with the Vat. oppose this conclusion, but certain lacunæ in the Vat. were filled by Candidus. On the other hand, the copy of Candidus could not have been of the class Reg., for, to say nothing of all other matters, the very order of the books agreeing with O excludes the Reg. unless perchance the Celtic epitome was drawn from it by him (see below). So, as far as I can see, only two assumptions are possible. Either Candidus had that Vat. 134, and besides it other books belonging to class Reg. and free from those lacunæ, or he used a book similar to Vat. 134, but not that book itself. And for some time I was induced to adopt the former assumption by an unpublished

<sup>1</sup> At this place we may conveniently advert to the extracts of Gemistus Pletho from the Syrian history embracing sections 52-66 and 1-28. Concerning this work of Pletho it is not easy to form a judgment. No doubt he used some codex approximating class O in point of goodness, but, for the sake of improving the reading perhaps, he made so many rash changes that you often remain in doubt whether you have a figment of Pletho or a text of approved fidelity. There are places, however, where he is authority for sure emendations—for instance, one in his codex at the beginning of sec. 2, Syr.—and for this reason I have carefully examined those excerpts in the Marcian codex 406 (P) in comparison with which MS., in the handwriting of Pletho himself, the copies that Schweighäuser made use of are valueless.

memorandum in the Medicean collection concerning the translation itself, which was kindly communicated to me by Æneas, Count de Piccolomini, professor at Pisa, and which I afterwards examined in person.<sup>1</sup> It is as follows:—

“per procuratione Nicholas V.

“Dear son. Health and apostolic benediction. We learn that in the Florentine library of St. Mark, which by your diligence you have made illustrious with Latin and Greek books, two volumes are to be found written in Greek by Appian of Alexandria, on one of which is the inscription: ‘Third book of Appian concerning Roman affairs,’ and on the other ‘Appian concerning Italian history.’ Since we have received from elsewhere books in Greek of this same Appian and we greatly desire to see in Latin what that man considered worthy of the memory of posterity, we have ordered that they be translated. But since a truer understanding and a more faithful interpretation can be obtained from the reading of several volumes than from the inspection of one (since what is wanting in one the other may supply), we have thought to beseech your nobility to send us those books as quickly as possible. Immediately after using them we will return them to you to be put back in their own place. Since you have always been most compliant to our wishes, we are sure from your kindness that you will gratify us in this matter also.

“Given at St. Peter’s in Rome under the seal of the fisherman, the 7th day of December, 1450, and the fourth year of our pontificate.  
P. CANDIDUS.

“To our dear son Cosmo de’ Medici, citizen of Florence.”

Since, then, this letter written by Candidus with his own hand was certainly very important, I began at once to inquire what these two Appian codices could be which Nicholas desired to be supplied to himself by Cosmo. And now, since there are three altogether in the Laurentian library, it was manifest that MS. lxx. 26, containing the Spanish and Hannibalic histories could not be taken into the reckoning, since Candidus did not have those books.

<sup>1</sup> It is at Florence in the Central Royal Archives among the Medicean ecclesiastical parchments, No. 36.



Therefore it was easier to find the "third book of Appian concerning Roman affairs"; for, in fact, codex lxx. 33, belonging to the family Reg. and containing the three last books of the *Civil Wars* has, in an ancient hand, this writing on the blank leaf before the first page: "Third Book of Appian concerning Roman affairs." Besides this, Nicholas asked for another volume inscribed "Appian concerning Italian history." This one may have been the Laurentian codex lxx. 5, this also belonging to the family Reg. and containing all that they contain, to which, in fact, the title "Appian's Italian history" was prefixed.<sup>1</sup> Whence it might seem quite certain that besides the Roman books, others also and those belonging to class Reg. were employed by Candidus in his translation. Without doubt they were sent to Rome. But that the good man did not everywhere compare them with his own copy, but thought it sufficient to trust to one codex, the tenor and form of his whole translation convince me.<sup>2</sup> To embrace the matter in one word,

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps Francesco Filelfo employed this same book twenty years later in his translation of Appian. For since he could not endure the crudeness of the work of Candidus he applied himself to a new translation, and for the purpose of obtaining some Greek codex, first besought Pope Paul II. As the latter boggled and kept making delays, he applied to Lorenzo de' Medici, by whom a certain Florentine codex was transmitted to him at Milan in the year 1470 (see Filelfo's *Letters to his Friends*, l., xxxvii. published at Venice in 1502, fol. 219<sup>r</sup>). But the facts remaining about this translation are so obscure that it is not certain that it was ever completed and published. That the story which his biographer Angelo Venusino tells about his excellent Latin translation of Appian is nothing but conjecture drawn from his letters, the facts which Rosminius, in his life of Filelfo (vol. i., Milan, 1808, p. viii seq.), relates concerning this Angelo clearly prove. And rightly too, Zeno ('dissert. Voss.,' vol. i. p. 294 seq.) and Rosminius himself (vol. ii. p. 205) seem to affirm that that work was never finished. In the bill of sale of books sold by John Lascaris to Lorenzo de' Medici in Candia in the year 1492 there is mentioned in the fifth place '5 Appianus p.' (see Piccolomini in the *Rivista di Filologia*, vol. ii. p. 413). This codex either perished, or was fraudulently abstracted, with not a few others, from the Marcian convent.

<sup>2</sup> It is true that Candidus, when he translated the words in Sec. 6 of the *Illyrica*, καὶ περὶ Κρήτης λέγων, "when we come to write of the Celts," made a note on the margin, "in another book it says 'of the Cretans.'" From this, however, no conclusion should be drawn except that *in the Illyrica alone* he examined from time to time more than one codex. Of course there may have been in the Vatican in the time of Candidus

not only are there in the readings given by Candidus very many which differ equally from Reg. and Vat. 134, but also he has peculiar lacunæ of his own which do not exist in either of them, of which a most remarkable example is *Civil Wars*, iii. 22, which he has omitted entirely.<sup>1</sup>

But if Candidus cannot be supposed to have made his translation from Vat. 134 alone, nor from that amended by other books joined to it, it follows that he used one codex and that one of a lineage of books approaching O. But the Celtic epitome, the translation of which I have already said differs in no respect from Vat. 141, nor from the i class which were transcribed from it — you will probably judge was known to Candidus from another copy of the i kind. For its very position seems to prevent us from believing that it could have been in the copy from which he drew the rest.

In using his work, I have followed in the main the example of Schweighäuser; that is, in no place have I failed to inspect Candidus, and I have not put confidence in him except where O failed me. Wherever mention is made of him it refers to my copy published at Venice in 1477, except that in the Mithridatic wars, 11–121, it was better to rely upon that published by Michael Vascosan, Paris, 1538. The utility of the more recent editions is almost the same as of the most ancient, since they differ in no respect except in some trifles of orthography.

The argument concerning the codices has now resolved

single copies of that entire book, since Stephen Gradius, in 1668, translated the Illyrica into Latin from some Vatican codex which differed here and there both from Vat. 134, and from the codex of Candidus. Of this kind is the separate copy of the Illyrica at Leyden (L), which was transcribed by Wyttenbach for the use of Schweighäuser, itself also belonging to class O; also the Vat. Pal. codex 390, of the sixteenth century, useless, nevertheless. Finally, the words which the copyist places under the fifth book of the *Civil Wars*, viz. “the fifth and last book of Appian’s *Civil Wars* ends this codex,” proclaim clearly that the next book, *i.e.* the Illyrica, was added by him from some other codex.

<sup>1</sup> To show more clearly the peculiarity of the codex of Candidus, I adduce the following passages omitted in one or the other class: *Mithr.* 21, καὶ εἴ τῳ — ἦν omitted by C, contained in O and i; *Civil Wars*, i. 5, αἱ δὲ στάσεις — μάλιστα omitted by i, contained in O and C; *ibid.* ii. 46, Ἄσινος — ἀναλαβεῖν omitted by O, contained in C and i; *ibid.* iv. 78, κἀνταῦθα — κρατοῦντες contained in O, omitted by C and i.

itself into this, that whereas before Schweighäuser the i class held the sole place, it was by him justly consigned to the lowest place. Wherefore, not unwilling to spare my eyes and my strength in a paltry matter, I have acquiesced in the labors of my predecessor. Yet when by way of experiment I had examined one, the Laurentian, lxx. 33 (f), parchment, fifteenth century, III octavo pages, containing *Civil Wars*, iii.-v., I gained scarcely anything new that was not in Reg., and the same happened to Schweighäuser in the case of a certain Breslau codex, which seems to be the first part of this Laurentian, since it does not contain those last three books of the *Civil Wars*.<sup>1</sup> That both of these are somewhat more carefully written than the Reg. is of no moment, since the same badness is common to all of them. So, as I did not care to accumulate rubbish, whatever other books of that class<sup>2</sup> I knew of, I rejected, and I have been satisfied with the Parisian a and b of which I have spoken above, and Schweighäuser's report upon the Breslau MS., and my own test of the Laurentian. Let no one think, however, that this whole class should be despised, since some blemishes which have crept into O and C are not in it and some lacunæ have been filled.

These materials which I have just enumerated have been employed in this new revision in such a way that, except manifest errors of book makers and orthographic minutiae, all the apparatus has been referred to in proportion to the authority of the several classes of MSS. Upon the emendation, for which there was great room even after the collation of the best books, not only did I myself labor according to my powers, but August Nauck did splendid work. For while he, by a rare example of friendship, voluntarily shared with me the task of correcting the proofs, he wrote down a great many emendations such as might naturally come from a man of so

<sup>1</sup> In the preface to his second volume, Professor Mendelssohn says that he finds by a personal inspection of the Breslau MS. that his conjecture that it was the first part of the Laurentian lxx. 33 was erroneous. It contains the same matter as the others of class i, except the last three books of the *Civil Wars*. It has a subscription in an antique hand: "finished at Rome, Sep. 25, 1453." — *Tr.*

<sup>2</sup> For example, the Vatican 142, the Vat. Urbino 103, the Laurentian lxx. 5, the London British Museum Addit. MSS. 5422, all of which when inspected must be at once cast aside.

great genius and learning. If I affirm that I am under the greatest obligations to the kindness of this illustrious scholar, I shall say too little. In respect of using the things found by him Nauck lays down the rule that whatever I adopt I shall adopt at my own peril, because they occurred to him while he was reading, since it has not been his fortune to have been deeply acquainted with the editor's author. So if from Nauck I have either accepted or adduced anything at variance with Appian's peculiarity of diction, the blame of the error must fall upon me. I have applied or sought to apply the same caution also to my own conjectures, for this writer employs so unusual and perverse a style of discourse that often you do not venture to decide for certain what is in accordance with his style and what is not.

It only remains that I testify, in this place also, my sense of obligation to Charles Halm, by whose kindness the Munich codices were sent to me at Leipzig, and to Alfred Eberhard, to whom I have said I am indebted for the collation of the Neapolitan MS. ; and finally to Rudolph Schöll, who kindly imparted to me some emendations of Nipperdey.

DORPAT, January 1, 1879.

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EDITIO PRINCEPS. 'Αππιανού 'Αλεξανδρέως Ρωμαϊκῶν, Κελτική, Λιβυκή ἢ Καρχηδονική, 'Ιαλλυρική, Συριακή, Παρθική, Μιθριδάτειος, 'Εμφυλίων ε'. Appiani Alexandrini Romanarum Historiarum, Celtica, Libyca vel Carthaginiensis, Illyrica, Syriaca, Parthica, Mithridatica, Civilis, quinque libris distincta. Ex Bibliotheca Regis. Βασιλέϊ τ' ἀγαθῷ κρατερῷ τ' αἰχμητῇ. Lutetiae, Typis Regis, Cura ac diligentia Caroli Stephani, MDLI. Cum privilegio Regis, folio.

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REDUCED FACSIMILE, VATICAN MS. GR. 141. XII CENTURY. FIRST PAGE OF AUTHOR'S PREFACE

## AUTHOR'S PREFACE


INTENDING to write the history of the Romans I have deemed it best to begin with the boundaries of the nations under their sway. They are as follows: In the ocean, the major part of those who inhabit the British Isles. Then entering the Mediterranean by the Pillars of Hercules and circumnavigating the same we find under their rule all the islands and the mainlands washed by that sea. The first of these on the right hand are the Mauritanians of the coast and various other African nations as far as Carthage. Farther inland are the nomad tribes whom the Romans call Numidians and their country Numidia; then other Africans who dwell around the Syrtes as far as Cyrene, and Cyrene itself; also the Marmaridæ, the Ammonii, and those who dwell by the lake Mareotis; then the great city founded by Alexander on the border of Egypt, and Egypt itself, as one sails up the Nile, as far as eastern Ethiopia; and as far as Pelusium by sea.

2. Here turning our course we take in Palestine-Syria, and beyond it a part of Arabia. The Phœnicians hold the country next to Palestine on the sea, and beyond the Phœnician territory are Cœle-Syria, and the parts stretching from the sea as far inland as the river Euphrates, namely Palmyra and the sandy country round about, extending even to the Euphrates itself. The Cilicians come next to the Syrians, and their neighbors are the Cappadocians, and that part of the Armenian country called Lesser Armenia. Along the Euxine are other nations called by the common name Pontic, subject to the Roman rule. The Syrians and Cilicians border on the Mediterranean, the Armenians and Cappadocians extend to the Pontic nations and to the interior as far as Greater Armenia, which is not subject to the Romans in the way of tribute, but its people

appoint their own kings. Descending from Cilicia and Cappadocia to Ionia we find the great peninsula bounded on the right by the Euxine, the Propontis, the Hellespont, and the Ægean, and on the left by the Pamphylian or Egyptian sea, for it is called by both names. Some of the countries embraced in it look toward the Egyptian sea, namely: Pamphylia and Lycia and after them Caria extending to Ionia. Others look toward the Euxine, the Propontis, and the Hellespont, namely: the Galatians, Bithynians, Mysians, and Phrygians. In the interior are the Pisidians and Lydians. So many nations inhabit this peninsula and all are under Roman rule.

3. Crossing from these coasts they rule other nations around the Euxine, the Mysians of Europe and the Thracians who border that sea. Beyond Ionia are the Ægean sea, the Adriatic, the straits of Sicily, and the Tyrrhenian sea stretching to the Pillars of Hercules. This is the distance from Ionia to the ocean. Following the coast line we find the following countries subject to the Romans: all of Greece, Thessaly, and Macedonia, also the adjoining Thracians, the Illyrians, and Pannonians, and Italy itself, the longest of all, extending from the Adriatic and bordering the greater part of the Tyrrhenian sea as far as the country of the Celts (whom the Romans call Gauls), some of whom border the Mediterranean, others the Northern ocean, and still others dwell along the river Rhine; also all of Spain and Celtiberia on the Northern and Western oceans as far as the Pillars of Hercules. Of these I shall speak more particularly when I come to deal with each nation. But for the present let this suffice for the principal boundaries which define their empire along the sea.

4. On the landward side the boundaries are a part of Mauritania lying against western Ethiopia and the remainder of Africa (having a very warm climate, or much infested with wild beasts) extending to eastern Ethiopia. These are the Roman boundaries in Africa. Those of Asia are the river Euphrates, Mount Caucasus, the kingdom of Greater Armenia, the Colchians who dwell along the Euxine sea, and the remainder of that coast. In Europe the two rivers, Rhine and Danube, for the most part bound the Roman empire. Of these the Rhine empties into the



Map by G. H. Fisher, N.Y.





Northern ocean and the Danube into the Euxine. On the other side of these rivers, however, some of the Celts beyond the Rhine are under Roman sway, and beyond the Danube some of the Getæ, who are called Dacians. These, with the nearest approach to accuracy, are the boundaries on the mainland.

5. All the islands of the sea also, the Cyclades, Sporades, Ionian isles, Echinades, the Tuscan isles, the Balearic isles, and all the rest in Libyan, Ionian, Egyptian, Myrtoan, Sicilian, and Mediterranean waters, by whatever names called; also those which the Greeks by way of distinction call the great islands, Cyprus, Crete, Rhodes, Lesbos, Eubœa, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, and whatever other isle there may be, large or small—all are under Roman rule. Crossing the Northern ocean to Britain, a continent in itself, they took possession of the better and larger part, not caring for the remainder. Indeed, the part they do hold is not of much use to them.

6. Although holding the empire of so many and so great nations the Romans labored five hundred years with toil and difficulty to establish their power firmly in Italy itself. Half of this time they were under kings, but having expelled them and sworn to have kingly rule no longer, they adopted aristocracy, and chose their rulers yearly. In the two hundred years next succeeding the five hundred their dominion increased greatly, they acquired unexampled foreign power, and brought the greater part of the nations under their sway. Gaius [Julius] Cæsar having got the upper hand of his rivals possessed himself of the sovereignty, holding it in a firm grasp, and preserved the form and name of the republic but made himself the absolute ruler of all. In this way the government, from that time to this, has been a monarchy; but they do not call their rulers kings, out of respect, as I think, for the ancient oath. They call them imperators [emperors], that being the title also of those who formerly held the chief command of the armies for the time being. Yet they are very kings in fact.

7. From the advent of the emperors to the present time is nearly two hundred years more, in the course of which the city has been greatly embellished, its revenue much increased, and in the long reign of peace and security every-

thing has moved toward a lasting prosperity. Some nations have been added to the empire by these emperors, and the revolts of others have been suppressed. Possessing the best part of the earth and sea they have, on the whole, aimed to preserve their empire by the exercise of prudence, rather than to extend their sway indefinitely over poverty-stricken and profitless tribes of barbarians, some of whom I have seen at Rome offering themselves, by their ambassadors, as its subjects, but the chief of the state would not accept them because they would be of no use to it. They give kings to a great many other nations whom they do not wish to have under their own government. On some of these subject nations they spend more than they receive from them, deeming it dishonorable to give them up even though they are costly. They surround the empire with great armies and they garrison the whole stretch of land and sea like a single stronghold.

8. No government down to the present time ever attained to such size and duration. That of the Greeks, even if we count the mastery of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes successively from the invasion of Darius, which was the beginning of their glory, to the hegemony of Greece held by Philip the son of Amyntas, lasted comparatively but few years. Their wars were not for conquest abroad but rather for preëminence among themselves, and they were most distinguished for the defence of their freedom against foreign invaders. Those of them who invaded Sicily with the hope of extending their dominion made a failure, and whenever they marched into Asia they accomplished small results and speedily returned. In short the Greek power, although ardent in fighting for the Grecian hegemony, never advanced steadfastly beyond the boundaries of Greece, but took pride in holding itself unenslaved and seldom conquered, and from the time of Philip the son of Amyntas, and of Alexander the son of Philip, they seem to me to have done very badly and to have been unworthy of themselves.

9. The mastery of Asia is not to be compared, as to labor and bravery, with that of the smallest of the countries of Europe, on account of the effeminacy and cowardice of the Asiatic peoples, as will be shown in the progress of this history. Such of the Asiatic nations as the Romans hold, they

subdued in a few battles, though even the Macedonians joined in the defence, while the conquest of Africa and of Europe was in many cases very exhausting. Again, the duration of the Assyrians, Medes, and Persians taken together (the three greatest empires before Alexander), does not amount to nine hundred years, which that of Rome has already reached, and the size of their empire I think was not half that of the Romans, whose boundaries extend from the setting of the sun and the Western ocean to Mount Caucasus and the river Euphrates, and through Egypt to Ethiopia and through Arabia as far as the Eastern ocean, so that their boundary is the ocean both where the sun-god rises and where he sinks, while they control the entire Mediterranean, and all its islands as well as Britain in the ocean. The greatest sea-power of the Medes and Persians included either the gulf of Pamphylia and the single island of Cyprus or perhaps some other small islets belonging to Ionia in the Mediterranean. They controlled the Persian gulf also, but how much of a sea is that?<sup>1</sup>

10. The history of Macedonia before Philip, the son of Amyntas, was of very small account; there was a time, indeed, when the Macedonians were a subject race. The reign of Philip himself was full of toil and struggles which were not contemptible, yet even his deeds concerned only Greece and the neighboring country. The empire of Alexander was splendid in its magnitude, in its armies, in the success and rapidity of his conquests, and it wanted little of being boundless and unexampled, yet in its shortness of duration it was like a brilliant flash of lightning. Although broken into several satrapies even the parts were splendid. The kings of my own country [Egypt] alone had an army consisting of 200,000 foot, 40,000 horse, 300 war elephants, and 2,000 armed chariots, and arms in reserve for 300,000 soldiers more. This was their force for land service. For naval service they had 2,000 barges propelled by poles, and other smaller craft, 1,500 galleys with from one and a half to five benches of oars each, and galley furniture for twice as many ships, 800 vessels provided with cabins, gilded on stem and stern for the pomp of war, with which the kings

<sup>1</sup> This is a conjectural rendering; the text is corrupt.

themselves were wont to go to naval combats; and money in their treasuries to the amount of 740,000 Egyptian talents. Such was the state of preparedness for war shown by the royal accounts as recorded and left by the king of Egypt second in succession after Alexander, who was the most formidable of these rulers in his preparations, the most lavish in expenditure, and the most magnificent in projects. It appears that many of the other satrapies were not much inferior in these respects. Yet all these resources were wasted under their successors by warring with each other. By means of such civil dissensions alone are great states destroyed.

11. Through prudence and good fortune has the empire of the Romans attained to greatness and duration;<sup>1</sup> in gaining which they have excelled all others in bravery, patience, and hard labor. They were never elated by success until they had firmly secured their power, nor were they ever cast down by misfortune, although they sometimes lost 20,000 men in a single day, at another time 40,000, and once 50,000, and although the city itself was often in danger. Neither famine, nor frequently recurring plague, nor sedition, nor all these falling upon them at once could abate their ardor; until, through the doubtful struggles and dangers of seven hundred years, they achieved their present greatness, having enjoyed the favors of fortune through wisdom.

12. These things have been described by many writers, both Greek and Roman, and the history is even more copious than that of the Macedonian empire, which was the longest history of earlier times. Being interested in it, and desiring to compare the Roman prowess carefully with that of every other nation, my history has often led me from Carthage to Spain, from Spain to Sicily or to Macedonia, or to join some embassy to foreign countries, or some alliance formed with them; thence back to Carthage or Sicily, like a wanderer, and again elsewhere, while the work was still unfinished. At last I have brought the parts together, show-

<sup>1</sup> Literally: "The Roman power has excelled in greatness and good fortune by reason of prudence and long duration." This, as Schweighäuser points out, is an awkward expression and inharmonious with the author's argument, in which prudence and good fortune are grouped together as causes, and greatness and duration as consequences.

ing how often the Romans sent armies or embassies into Sicily and what they did there until they brought it into its present condition ; also how often they made war and peace with the Carthaginians, or sent embassies to them or received the same from them, and what damage they inflicted upon or suffered from them until they demolished Carthage and made Africa a Roman province, and how they rebuilt Carthage and brought Africa into its present condition. I have made this research also in respect to each of the other provinces, desiring to learn the Romans' relations to each, in order to understand the weakness of these nations or their power of endurance, as well as the bravery or good fortune of their conquerors or any other circumstance contributing to the result.

13. Thinking that the public would like to learn the history of the Romans in this way, I am going to write the part relating to each nation separately, omitting what happened to the others in the meantime, and taking it up in its proper place. It seems superfluous to put down the dates of everything, but I shall mention those of the most important events now and then. The Roman citizens, like other people, formerly had only one name each ; afterwards they took a second, and not much later, for easier recognition, there was given to some of them a third derived from some personal incident or as a distinction for bravery. In like manner surnames have been added to the names of certain Greeks. For purposes of distinction I shall sometimes mention all the names, especially of illustrious men, but for the most part I shall call these and others by the names that are deemed most characteristic.

14. As there are three books which treat of the numerous exploits of the Romans in Italy, these three must together be considered the Italian Roman history ; but on account of the great number of events in them the division has been made. The first of these will show the events that took place in successive reigns while they had kings, of whom there were seven, and this I shall call the history of Rome under the kings. Next in order will be the history of the rest of Italy except the part along the Adriatic. This, by way of distinction from the former, will be called the second Italian book of Roman history. With the last nation, the

Samnites, who dwelt on the Adriatic, the Romans struggled eighty years under the greatest difficulties, but finally they subjugated them and the neighbors who were allied with them, and also the Greeks who had settled in Italy. This, by way of distinction from the former, will be called the Samnite Roman history. The rest will be named according to its subject, the Celtic, Sicilian, Spanish, Hannibalic, Carthaginian, Macedonian, and so on. The order of these histories with respect to each other is according to the time when the Romans began to be embroiled in war with each nation, even though many other things intervened before that nation came to its end. The internal seditions and civil wars of the Romans — to them the most calamitous of all — will be designated under the names of their chief actors, as the wars of Marius and Sulla, those of Pompey and Cæsar, those of Antony and the second Cæsar, surnamed Augustus, against the murderers of the first Cæsar, and those of Antony and Augustus against each other. At the end of this last of the civil wars Egypt passed under the Roman sway, and the Roman government itself became a monarchy.

15. Thus, the foreign wars will be divided into books according to the nations, and the civil wars according to the chief commanders. The last book will show the present military force of the Romans, the revenues they collect from each province, what they spend for the naval service, and other things of that kind. It is proper to begin with the origin of the people of whose prowess I am about to write. Who I am, who have written these things, many indeed know, and I have already indicated.<sup>1</sup> To speak more plainly I am Appian of Alexandria, having reached the highest place in my native country, and having been, in Rome, a pleader of causes before the emperors, until they deemed me worthy of being made their procurator. And if any one has a great desire to learn more [about my affairs] there is a special treatise of mine on that subject.

<sup>1</sup> Schweighäuser considers this an allusion to the title page (now lost) which probably contained the name and nationality of the author.

# BOOK I — EXCERPTA

## CONCERNING THE KINGS

### I. FROM PHOTIUS<sup>1</sup>

1. **ÆNEAS**, the son of Anchises, the son of Capys, flourished in the Trojan war. After the capture of Troy he fled, and after long wandering arrived at that part of the Italian coast called Laurentum, where his camping-place is shown to this day, and that shore is called, after him, the Trojan beach. The Aborigines of this part of Italy were then ruled by Faunus, the son of Mars, who gave to Æneas his daughter Lavinia in marriage, and also a tract of land four hundred stades<sup>2</sup> in circuit. Here Æneas built a town, which he named after his wife, Lavinium. Three years later, at the death of Faunus, Æneas succeeded to the kingdom by virtue of his marriage relationship, and he called the Aborigines Latins, from his father-in-law, Latinus Faunus. Three years later still, Æneas was killed by the Rutuli, a Tuscan tribe, in a war begun on account of his wife Lavinia, who had been previously betrothed to their king. He was succeeded in the government by Euryleon, otherwise called Ascanius, the son of Æneas and Creusa, a daughter of Priam, to whom he had been married in Troy. But some say that the Ascanius who succeeded to the government was the son of Æneas and Lavinia.

2. Ascanius died four years after the founding of Alba (for he also built a city and gave it the name of Alba, and settled it with a colony from Lavinium), and Silvius succeeded to the throne. They say that this Silvius had a son

<sup>1</sup> The extract from Photius reads: "Appian begins his history with Æneas . . ., who flourished," etc.

<sup>2</sup> The stade = 582 English feet.

named Æneas Silvius, and he a son named Latinus Silvius, and he a son named Capys, and he a son named Capetus, and he a son named Tiberinus, and he a son named Agrippa, who was the father of the Romulus who was struck by lightning, and who left a son Aventinus, who was the father of Procas. All of these bore the surname of Silvius. Procas had two sons, the elder named Numitor, and the younger Amulius. When the elder succeeded to the throne on the death of the father, the younger took it away from him by force and violence. He also killed Egestus, his brother's son, and he made Rhea Silvia, his brother's daughter, a vestal, so that she might remain childless. Notwithstanding a conspiracy against his life, Numitor himself was saved because of the gentleness and clemency of his manners. Silvia having become pregnant contrary to law, Amulius cast her into prison by way of punishment, and when she had given birth to two sons he gave them to some shepherds with orders to throw the babes into the neighboring stream called the river Tiber. These boys were Romulus and Remus. Being of the lineage of Æneas, on their mother's side, for their father's lineage was unknown, they always boasted their descent from the former.

## II. FROM THE SAME

My first book contains the deeds of Rome's seven kings, viz. : Romulus, Numa Pompilius, Tullus Hostilius,<sup>1</sup> Ancus Marcius (a descendant of Numa), Tarquinius, Servius Tullius, and Lucius Tarquinius, a son of the other Tarquinius. The first of these was the founder and builder of Rome, and although he governed it rather as a father than as an absolute monarch, he was nevertheless slain, or, as some think, translated. The second, not less kingly, but even more so than the first, died at the age of . . . The third was struck by lightning. The fourth died of a disease. The fifth was murdered by some shepherds. The sixth lost his life in a similar manner. The seventh was expelled from the city and kingdom for violating the laws. From that

<sup>1</sup> The text says, "Ancus Hostilius," an obvious error.



time kingly rule came to an end, and the administration of government was transferred to consuls.

### III. FROM SUIDAS

Having kept careful watch against her father's return, she (Tarpeia) promises Tattius to betray the garrison.

### IV. FROM THE SAME

At the command of Tattius they threw pieces of gold at the girl until she succumbed to her wounds and was buried under the heap.

### V. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

When Tattius waged war against Romulus, the wives of the Romans, who were daughters of the Sabines, made peace between them. Advancing to the camp of the parents they held out their hands to them and showed the infant children already born to them and their husbands, and testified that their husbands had done them no wrong. They prayed that the Sabines would take pity on themselves, their sons-in-law, their grandchildren, and their daughters, and either put an end to this wretched war between relatives, or first kill them in whose behalf it was begun. The parents, moved partly by their own difficulties and partly by pity for the women, and perceiving that what the Romans had done was not from lust but necessity, entered into negotiations with them. For this purpose Romulus and Tattius met in the street which was named from this event *Via Sacra* and agreed upon these conditions: that both Romulus and Tattius should be kings, and that the Sabines who were then serving in the army under Tattius, and any others who might choose to come, should be allowed to settle in Rome on the same terms and under the same laws as the Romans themselves.

### VI. FROM SUIDAS

The general, learning this fact from one of his personal friends, communicated it to Hostilius.

## VII. FROM THE SAME

Some blamed him [Tullus Hostilius] because he wrongly staked everything on the prowess of three men (the Horatii).

## VIII. FROM THE SAME

[The Romans thought] that peace might be made [by Tarquinius] on the terms that the Gabini considered just.

## IX. FROM THE ANONYMOUS GRAMMARIAN

[Tarquinius] bought three books [from the Sibyl] at the price [previously asked] for the nine.

## X. FROM SUIDAS

Horatius [Cocles] was a cripple. He failed of reaching the consulship, either in war or in peace, on account of his lameness.

## XI. FROM THE SAME

The Consuls tendered the oaths [by which they bound themselves], and said that they would yield everything rather than take back Tarquinius.

## XII. FROM PEIRESC

YEAR  
OF  
ROME  
250

Tarquinius incited the Sabines against the Roman people. Claudius, an influential Sabine of the town of Regillus, opposed any violation of the treaty, and being condemned for this action, he took refuge in Rome with his relatives, friends, and slaves, to the number of five thousand. To all these the Romans gave a place of habitation, and land to cultivate, and the right of citizenship. Claudius, on account of his brilliant exploits against the Sabines, was chosen a member of the Senate, and the Claudian *gens* received its name from him.

B.C.  
504

## XIII. FROM SUIDAS

<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
<sub>256</sub> The Latins, although allied to the Romans by treaty, <sup>B C</sup> nevertheless made war against them, 49<sup>8</sup> They accused the Romans of despising them, although they were allied to them, and of the same blood.

[Here follow, in the Teubner edition, four detached sentences, or parts of sentences, which, without their context, convey no meaning.]

## BOOK II — EXCERPTA

### CONCERNING ITALY

#### I. FROM SUIDAS

<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
256 THE Volsci, in nowise terrified by the misfortunes of their neighbors, made war against the Romans and laid siege to their colonies. <sup>B.C.</sup>  
498

#### II. FROM THE SAME

263 The people refused to elect Marcius (Coriolanus) when he sought the consulship, not because they considered him unfit, but because they feared his domineering spirit. <sup>491</sup>

#### III. FROM THE SAME

265 Marcius being inflamed against the Romans when they banished him went over to the Volsci, meditating no small revenge. <sup>489</sup>

#### IV. FROM THE SAME

266 When he arrived there, having renounced his own country and kin, he did not meditate anything in particular, but intended to side with the Volsci against his country.<sup>1</sup> <sup>488</sup>

#### V. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

1. When Marcius had been banished, and had taken refuge with the Volsci, and made war against the Romans, and was encamped at a distance of only four hundred stades from the city, the people threatened to betray the walls to

<sup>1</sup> Mendelssohn considers this whole fragment corrupt.

Y.R.  
266B.C.  
488

the enemy unless the Senate would send an embassy to him to treat for peace. The Senate reluctantly sent plenipotentiaries for this purpose. When they arrived at the camp of the Volsci and were brought into his presence and that of the Volscian chiefs, they offered oblivion and permission to return to the city if he would discontinue the war, and they reminded him that the Senate had never done him any wrong. He, while accusing the people of the many wrongs they had done to him and to the Volsci, promised nevertheless that the latter would come to terms with them if they would surrender the land and towns they had taken from the Volsci and admit them to citizenship on the same terms as the Latins. But if the vanquished were to keep what belonged to the victors, he did not see how peace could be made. Having named these conditions, he dismissed the ambassadors and gave them thirty days to consider. Then he turned against the remaining Latin towns, and having captured seven of them in the thirty days, he came back to receive the answer of the Romans.

2. They replied that if he would withdraw his army from the Roman territory they would send an embassy to him to conclude peace on fair terms. When he refused this, they sent ten others to beg him that nothing should be done unworthy of his native country, and to allow a treaty to be made, not by his command, but of their own free will, for he should regard the honor of his country and the principles of his ancestors, who had never done him any wrong. He replied merely that he would give them three days more in order that they might think better of it. Then the Romans sent their priests to him wearing their sacred vestments to add their entreaties. To these he said that either they must obey his commands or they need not come to him again. Then the Romans prepared for a siege and brought stones and missiles upon the walls to fight off Marcius from above.

3. Now Valeria, the daughter of Publicola, brought a company of women to Veturia, the mother of Marcius, and to Volumnia his wife. All these, clad in mourning garments and bringing their children to join in the supplication, implored that they would go out with them to meet Marcius, and beseech him to spare them and their country. The Senate allowed these women to go alone to the camp of

Y. R.  
266

the enemy. Marcius admiring the high courage of the city, where even the women were inspired by it, advanced to meet them, sending away the rods and axes of the lictors, out of respect for his mother. He ran forward and embraced her, brought her into the council of the Volsci, and told her to tell what she wanted.

B. C.  
488

4. She said that, being his mother, she was as much wronged as he in his banishment from the city; that she saw that the Romans had already suffered grievously at his hands, and had paid a sufficient penalty, so much of their territory had been laid waste and so many of their towns demolished, and themselves reduced to the extremity of sending their consuls and priests, and finally his own mother and wife, as ambassadors to him, and offering to rescind the decree and to grant him forgetfulness of the past and a safe return to his home. "Do not," she said, "cure an evil by an incurable evil. Do not be the cause of calamities that will smite yourself as well as those you injure. Whither do you carry the torch? From the fields to the city? From the city to your own hearthstone? From your own hearthstone to the temples of the gods? Have mercy, my son, on me and on your country as we plead." After she had thus spoken Marcius replied that the country which had cast him out was not his, but rather the land which had given him shelter. Nothing was dear to him that was unjust, nor was anybody his enemy who treated him well. He told her to cast her eyes upon the men here present with whom he had exchanged the pledge of mutual fidelity, who had granted him citizenship, had chosen him their general, and had intrusted to him their private interests. He mentioned the honors bestowed upon him and the oath he had sworn, and he urged his mother to consider his friends and enemies hers also.

5. While he was still speaking, she, in a burst of anger, and holding her hands up to heaven, invoked their household gods. "Two processions of women," said she, "have set forth from Rome in the deepest affliction, one in the time of King Tadius, the other in that of Gaius Marcius. Of these two Tadius, a stranger and downright enemy, had respect for the women and yielded to them. Marcius scorns a like delegation of women, including his wife, and his mother besides. May no mother, unblessed in her son, ever again

V. R.

266 be reduced to the necessity of throwing herself at his feet. 488

This I must submit to. I must prostrate myself before yours." So speaking she flung herself on the ground. He burst into tears, sprang forward and lifted her up, exclaiming with the deepest emotion: "Mother, you have gained the victory, but it is a victory by which you have lost your son." So saying he led back the army, in order to give his reasons to the Volsci and to make peace between the two nations. There was some hope that he might be able to persuade the Volsci, but on account of the jealousy of their leader Attius he was put to death.<sup>1</sup>

B. C.

V.<sup>b</sup> FROM SUIDAS

Marcus did not think proper to gainsay either of these [demands].

## VI. FROM THE SAME

275 (The Fabii) were as much to be pitied for their misfortunes 479 as they were worthy of praise for their bravery. For it was a great misfortune to the Romans, on account of their number, the dignity of a noble house, and its total destruction. The day on which it happened was ever after considered unlucky.<sup>2</sup>

## VII. FROM THE SAME

283 The army was incensed against the general (Appius Clau- 471 dius) from remembrance of old wrongs, and refused to obey him. They fought badly on purpose, and took to flight, putting bandages on their bodies as though they were wounded. They broke up camp and tried to retreat, putting the blame on the unskilfulness of their commander.

## VIII. FROM PEIRESC

359 1. Bad omens from Jupiter were observed after the capture 395 of Veii. The soothsayers said that some religious duty had

<sup>1</sup> The tale of Coriolanus is found in Livy, ii. 35-41, and at greater length in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, book viii.; also in Plutarch, *Life of Coriolanus*.

<sup>2</sup> The tale of the Fabian family and their voluntary assumption of the war against the Veientians, and their total destruction in an ambuscade is related in Livy, ii. 48-50.

Y R. B.C.  
 359 been neglected, and Camillus remembered that it had been 395  
 forgotten to appropriate a tenth of the plunder to the god  
 that had given the oracle concerning the lake. Accordingly  
 the Senate decreed that those who had taken anything from  
 Veii should make an estimate, each one for himself, and  
 bring in a tenth of it under oath. Their religious feeling  
 was such that they did not hesitate to add to the votive  
 offering a tenth of the produce of the land that had already  
 been sold, as well as of the spoils. With the money thus  
 obtained they sent to the temple of Delphi a golden cup  
 which stood on a pedestal of brass in the treasury of Rome  
 and Massilia<sup>1</sup> until Onomarchus melted the cup during the  
 Phocæan war. The pedestal is still standing.

363 2. Camillus was afterwards accused before the people of 397  
 being himself the author of those bad omens and portents.  
 The people, who had been for some time set against him,  
 fined him heavily, having no pity for him although he had  
 recently lost a son. His friends contributed the money in  
 order that the person of Camillus might not be disgraced.  
 In deep grief he went into exile in the city of Ardea, pray-  
 ing the prayer of Achilles that the time might come when  
 the Romans would long for Camillus. And in fact this came  
 365 to pass very soon, for when the Gauls captured the city, the 389  
 people fled for succor to Camillus and again chose him  
 Dictator, as has been told in my Gallic history.<sup>2</sup>

#### IX. FROM THE SAME

When Marcus Manlius, the patrician, saved the city of  
 Rome from a Gallic invasion, he received the highest honors.  
 370 At a later period when he saw an old man, who had often 384  
 fought for his country, reduced to servitude by a money  
 lender, he paid the debt for him. Being highly commended  
 for this act, he released all his own debtors from their obli-  
 gations. His glory being much increased thereby, he paid  
 the debts of many others. Being much elated by his popu-  
 larity, he even proposed that all debts should be cancelled,  
 or that the people should sell the lands that had not yet  
 been distributed and apply the proceeds for the relief of  
 debtors.

<sup>1</sup> Marseilles.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, v. 32 seq. Plutarch, *Life of Camillus*.



# BOOK III—EXCERPTA

## THE SAMNITE HISTORY

### I. FROM PEIRESC

V.R.

411

B.C.

343

1. WHEN the Roman generals Cornelius and Corvinus, and the plebian Decius, had overcome the Samnites they left a military guard in Campania to ward off the Samnite incursions. These guards, partaking of the luxury and profuseness of the Campanians, were corrupted in their habits and began to envy the riches of these people, being themselves very poor and owing alarming debts in Rome. Finally they took counsel among themselves to kill their entertainers, seize their property, and marry their wives. This infamy would perhaps have been carried out at once, had not the new general Mamercus, who was marching against the Samnites, learned the design of the Roman guard. Concealing his intentions, he disarmed some of them and dismissed them, as soldiers entitled to discharge for long service. The more villanous ones he ordered to Rome on the pretence of important business, and he sent with them a military tribune with orders to keep a secret watch over them. Both parties of soldiers suspected that their design had leaked out, and they broke away from the tribune near the town of Terracina. They set free all those who were working under sentence in the fields, armed them as well as they could, and marched to Rome to the number of about 20,000.

412 2. About one day's march from the city they were met 342

by Corvinus who went into camp near them on the Alban mount. He remained quietly in his camp while investigating what the matter was, and did not consider it wise to attack these desperadoes. The men mingled with each other privately, the guards acknowledging with groans and tears, as among relatives and friends, that they were to blame, but

V.R. 412 declaring that the cause of it all was the debts they owed at Rome. When Corvinus understood this he shrank from the responsibility of so much civil bloodshed and advised the Senate to release these men from debt. He exaggerated the difficulty of the war if it should be necessary to put down such a large body of men, who would fight with the energy of despair. He had strong suspicions also of the result of the meetings and conferences, lest his own army, who were relatives of these men and not less oppressed with debt, should be to some extent lacking in fidelity. If he should be defeated he said that the dangers would be greatly increased; if victorious, the victory itself would be most lamentable to the commonwealth, being gained over so many of their own relatives. The Senate was moved by his arguments and decreed a cancellation of debts to all Romans, and immunity also to these revolters. The latter laid down their arms and returned to the city. B.C. 342

## II. FROM THE SAME

414 Such was the bravery of the consul Manlius Torquatus. 340 He had a penurious father who did not care for him, but kept him at work with slaves in the fields and left him to partake of their fare. When the tribune Pomponius prosecuted him for numerous misdeeds and thought to mention among others his bad treatment of his son, young Manlius, concealing a dagger under his clothes, went to the house of the tribune and asked to see him privately as though he had something of importance to say about the trial. Being admitted, and just as he was beginning to speak, he fastened the door and threatened the tribune with instant death if he did not take an oath that he would withdraw the accusation against his father. The latter took the oath, dismissed the accusation, and explained the reason to the people. Manlius acquired great distinction from this affair, and was praised for being such a son to such a father.

## III. FROM SUIDAS

414 With jeers he challenged him to single combat. The 340 other [Manlius, the consul's son] restrained himself for a

Y.R. 414 while; but when he could no longer endure the provoca- R.C. 340  
tion, he dashed on his horse against him.

#### IV. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

432 1. While the Samnites were raiding and plundering the ter- 300  
ritory of Fregellæ, the Romans captured eighty-one villages  
belonging to the Samnites and the Daunii, slew 21,000 of  
their men, and drove them out of the Fregellian country.  
Again the Samnites sent ambassadors to Rome bringing the  
dead bodies of the men whom they had executed as guilty  
of causing the war, and also gold taken from their store.  
Wherefore the Senate, thinking that they had been utterly  
crushed, expected that a people who had been so sorely  
afflicted would concede the supremacy of Italy. The Sam-  
nites accepted the other conditions, or if they disputed any,  
they either entreated and begged for better terms, or re-  
ferred the matter to their cities. But as to the supremacy,  
they could not bear even to hear anything on that subject,  
because, they said, they had not come to surrender their  
towns, but to cultivate friendship. Accordingly they used  
their gold in redeeming prisoners, and went away angry  
and resolved to make trial for the supremacy hereafter.  
Thereupon the Romans voted to receive no more embassies  
from the Samnites, but to wage irreconcilable, implacable  
war against them until they were subjugated by force.

433 2. A god humbled this haughty spirit, for soon afterwards 301  
the Romans were defeated by the Samnites and compelled  
to pass under the yoke. The Samnites, under their general  
Pontius, having shut the Romans up in a defile where they  
were oppressed by hunger, the consuls sent messengers to him  
and begged that he should win the gratitude of the Romans,  
such as not many opportunities offer. He replied that they  
need not send any more messengers to him unless they were  
prepared to surrender their arms and their persons. There-  
upon a lamentation was raised as though a city had been  
captured, and the consuls delayed several days longer, hesi-  
tating to do an act unworthy of Rome. But when no means  
of rescue appeared and famine became severe, there being  
50,000 young men in the defile whom they could not bear  
to see perish, they surrendered to Pontius and begged him

Y.R.

433 either to kill them, or to sell them into slavery, or to keep them for ransom, but not to put any stigma of shame upon the persons of the unfortunate.

B.C.

321

3. Pontius took counsel with his father, sending to Caudium to fetch him in a carriage on account of his age. The old man said to him: "My son, for a great enmity there is but one cure, — either extreme generosity or extreme severity. Severity terrifies, generosity conciliates. Regard this first and greatest victory as a treasure-house of good fortune. Release them all without punishment, without shame, without loss of any kind, so that the greatness of the benefit may inure to your advantage. I hear that they are very sensitive on the subject of their honor. Vanquished by benefits only, they will strive to surpass you in deeds of kindness. It is in your power to attain this state of kindly action as a security for everlasting peace. If this does not suit you, then kill them to the last man, not sparing one to carry the news. I advise as my choice the former, otherwise the latter is a necessity. The Romans will avenge themselves inevitably for any shame you put upon them. In that case you should strike the first blow and you will never deal them a heavier one than the slaughter of 50,000 of their young men at one time."

4. When he had thus spoken his son answered: "I do not wonder, father, that you have suggested two plans absolutely opposed to each other, for you said in the beginning that you should propose extreme measures of one kind or the other. But I cannot put such a large number of men to death. I should fear the vengeance of a god and the opprobrium of mankind. Nor can I take away from the two nations all hope of mutual accommodation by doing an irreparable wrong. As to releasing them I myself do not approve of that. After the Romans have inflicted so many evils upon us and while they hold so many of our fields and towns in their possession to this day, it is impossible to let these captives go scot free. I shall not do that. Such unreasonable leniency is insanity. Now look at this matter, leaving me out of the account. The Samnites, whose sons, fathers, and brothers have been slain by the Romans, and who have lost their goods and money, want satisfaction. A victor is naturally a haughty creature and our men are greedy

Y. R.

433 of gain. Who then will endure that I should neither kill, <sup>B. C.</sup> 321 nor sell, nor even fine these prisoners, but dismiss them unharmed like meritorious persons? Therefore let us discard the two extremes—the one because it is not in my power, the other because I cannot be guilty of such inhumanity. Yet, in order to humble the pride of the Romans to some extent, and to avoid the censure of others, I will take away the arms they have always used against us, and also their money (for even their money they get from us). Then I will make them pass safe and sound under the yoke, this being the mark of shame they are accustomed to put upon others. Then I will establish peace between the two nations and select the most illustrious of their knights as hostages for its observance until the entire people ratify it. In this way I think I shall have accomplished what belongs to a victor and to a humane man. I think also that the Romans themselves will be content with these terms, which they, who lay claim to such excellence of character, have often imposed upon others.”

5. While Pontius was speaking the old man burst into tears, then seated himself in his carriage and went back to Caudium. Pontius then summoned the Roman envoys and asked them if they had any fetial<sup>1</sup> priest with them. There was none present because the army had marched to undertake an irreconcilable, implacable war. Accordingly he commanded the envoys to make this announcement to the consuls and other officers of the army and to the whole multitude: “We had concluded perpetual friendship with the Romans, which you yourselves violated by giving aid to the Sidicini, our enemies. When peace was concluded again, you made war upon the Neapolitans, our neighbors. Nor did it escape us that these things were part of a plan of yours to seize the dominion of all Italy. In the first battles, where you gained the advantage on account of the unskillfulness of our generals, you showed us no moderation. Not content with devastating our country and occupying towns and villages not your own, you planted colonies in them.

<sup>1</sup>The *fetiales* were a Roman college of priests who sanctioned treaties when concluded, and who demanded satisfaction of an enemy before a declaration of war.

Y. R.

433

B. C.

321

Moreover, when we twice sent embassies to you and made many concessions, you treated us disdainfully, and demanded that we should yield you the supremacy and obey you, as though we were not a nation to make terms with but a conquered race. Thereupon you decreed this irreconcilable, implacable war against your former friends, descendants of the Sabines whom you made your fellow-citizens. On account of your insatiable cupidity we ought not to make a treaty with you. But I, having regard for the divine wrath (which you despised), and mindful of our former relationship and friendship, will permit each one of you to pass under the yoke safe and sound with the clothes you stand in, if you swear to give up all of our lands and strongholds and withdraw your colonies from the same, and never wage war against the Samnites again."

6. When these terms were communicated to the camp there was wailing and lamentation, long and loud, for they considered the disgrace of passing under the yoke worse than death. Afterwards, when they heard about the knights who were to be held as hostages, there was another long lament. Yet they were compelled by want to accept the conditions. Accordingly they took the oaths, Pontius on the one side, and the two consuls, Postumius and Veturius, on the other, together with two quæstors, four division commanders, and twelve tribunes,—all the surviving officers. When the oaths had been taken, Pontius opened a passage from the defile, and having fixed two spears in the ground and laid another across the top, caused the Romans to go under it as they passed out, one by one. He also gave them some animals to carry their sick, and provisions sufficient to bring them to Rome. This method of dismissing prisoners, which they call sending under the yoke, seems to me to serve only to insult the vanquished.

7. When the news of this calamity reached the city there was wailing and lamentation like a public mourning. The women mourned for those who had been saved in this ignominious way as for the dead. The senators discarded their purple-striped tunics. Feasts, marriages, and everything of that kind were prohibited for a whole year, until the calamity was retrieved. Some of the returning soldiers took refuge in the fields for shame, others stole into the city by

V.R.

B.C.

433 night. The consuls entered by day according to law, and they wore their usual insignia, but they exercised no further authority.<sup>1</sup> 321

## V. FROM SUIDAS

464 On account of admiration for his bravery a multitude of chosen youths numbering eight hundred were in the habit of following Dentatus, ready for anything. This was an embarrassment to the Senate at their meetings. 290

## VI. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

471 1. Once a great number of the Senones, a Celtic tribe, aided the Etruscans in war against the Romans. The latter sent ambassadors to the towns of the Senones and complained that, while they were under treaty stipulations, they were furnishing mercenaries to fight against the Romans: Although they bore the caduceus, and wore the garments of their office, Britomaris cut them in pieces and flung the parts away, alleging that his own father had been slain by the Romans while he was waging war in Etruria. The consul Cornelius, learning of this abominable deed while he was on the march, abandoned his campaign against the Etruscans, dashed with great rapidity by way of the Sabine country and Picenum against the towns of the Senones, and devastated them with fire and sword. He carried their women and children into slavery, and killed all the adult youth except a son of Britomaris, whom he reserved for awful torture, and led in his triumph. 283

2. When the Senones who were in Etruria heard of this calamity, they joined with the Etruscans and marched against Rome.<sup>2</sup> After various mishaps these Senones, having no homes to return to, and being in a state of frenzy over their misfortunes, fell upon Domitius [the other consul], by whom most of them were destroyed. The rest slew themselves in despair. Such was the punishment meted out to the Senones for their crime against the ambassadors.

<sup>1</sup> Livy, ix. 1 *seq.*

<sup>2</sup> The text at this place is corrupt. The translation is in part conjectural.

## VII. FROM THE SAME

Y.R.  
472

1. Cornelius went sight-seeing along the coast of Magna Græcia with ten ships with decks. At Tarentum there was a demagogue named Philocharis, a man of obscene life, who was for that reason nicknamed Thais. He reminded the Tarentines of an old treaty by which the Romans had bound themselves not to sail beyond the promontory of Lacinium. By his passion he persuaded them to excitement against Cornelius, and they sunk four of his ships and seized one of them with all on board. They accused the Thurini of preferring the Romans to the Tarentines although they were Greeks, and held them chiefly to blame for the Romans overpassing the limits. Then they expelled the noblest citizens of Thuriî, sacked the city, and dismissed the Roman garrison that was stationed there under a treaty.

B.C.  
282

2. When the Romans learned of these events, they sent an embassy to Tarentum to demand that the prisoners who had been taken, not in war, but as mere sight-seers, should be surrendered; that the citizens of Thuriî who had been expelled should be brought back to their homes; that the property that had been plundered, or the value of what had been lost, should be restored; and finally, that they should surrender the authors of these crimes, if they wished to continue on good terms with the Romans. The Tarentines made difficulties about admitting the embassy to their council at all, and when they had received them jeered at them because they did not speak Greek perfectly, and made fun of their togas and of the purple stripe on them. [The text here describes an indignity put upon Postumius, the chief of the embassy, by one Philonidas, which will not bear translation.] This spectacle was received with laughter by the bystanders. Postumius, holding out his soiled garment, said: "You will wash out this defilement with plenty of blood — you who take pleasure in this kind of jokes." As the Tarentines made no sort of answer the embassy departed. Postumius carried the soiled garment just as it was, and showed it to the Romans.

473

3. The people, deeply incensed, sent orders to Æmilius, who was waging war against the Samnites, to suspend operations for the present and invade the territory of the Taren-

281



Y. R.  
473 tines, and offer them the same terms that the late embassy B. C.  
had proposed, and if they did not agree, to wage war against 281  
them with all his might. He made them the offer accordingly. This time they did not laugh for they saw the army. They were about equally divided in opinion until one of their number said to them as they doubted and disputed: "To surrender citizens is the act of a people already enslaved, yet to fight without allies is hazardous. If we wish to defend our liberty stoutly and to fight on equal terms, let us call on Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, and designate him the leader of this war." This was done.

### VIII. FROM PEIRESC

474 After a shipwreck, Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, arrived at the 280  
harbor of Tarentum. The Tarentines were very much put out with the king's officers, who quartered themselves upon the citizens by force, and openly abused their wives and children. Afterwards Pyrrhus put an end to their revels and other social gatherings and amusements as incompatible with a state of war, and ordered the citizens to sever military exercise, under penalty of death if they disobeyed. Then the Tarentines, tired out by these most unusual exercises and orders, fled the city as though it were a foreign government and took refuge in the fields. Then the king closed the gates and placed guards over them. In this way the Tarentines gained a clear perception of their own folly.

### IX. FROM THE SAME

1. Some Roman soldiers were stationed in Rhegium for the safety and protection of the city against enemies. They, and their leader Decius, envying the good fortune of the inhabitants and seizing an opportunity when they were observing a public festival, slew them and violated their wives. They offered an excuse for this crime, that the citizens of Rhegium were about to betray the garrison to Pyrrhus. So Decius became supreme ruler instead of a prefect of the guard, and he contracted an alliance with the Mamertines, who dwelt on the other side of the strait of Sicily, and who

<sup>V. R.</sup>  
474 had perpetrated the same kind of an outrage on their hosts <sup>B. C.</sup> 280 not long before.

2. Suffering from an affection of the eyes and distrusting the physicians of Rhegium, Decius sent for a medical man who had migrated from Rhegium to Messana so long before that it was forgotten that he was a Rhegian. The latter persuaded him that, if he wished speedy relief, he should use certain hot drugs. Having applied a burning and corrosive ointment to his eyes, he told him to bear the pain till he should come again. Then he secretly returned to Messana. Decius, after enduring the pain a long time, washed off the ointment and found that he had lost his eyesight.

3. Fabricius was sent by the Romans to restore the city to those Rhegians who still remained. He sent the guards who had been guilty of this revolt back to Rome. They were beaten with rods in the forum, then beheaded, and their bodies cast away unburied. Decius, being placed under strict guard, in the discouragement of a blind man, committed suicide.

#### X. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

1. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, having gained a victory over the Romans and desiring to recuperate his forces after the severe engagement, and expecting that the Romans would be particularly desirous of coming to terms, sent to the city Cineas, a Thessalian, who was so renowned for eloquence that he had been compared with Demosthenes. When he was admitted to the senate-chamber, he extolled the king for a variety of reasons, and among others for his moderation after the victory, in that he had neither marched directly against the city nor attacked the camp of the vanquished. He offered them peace, friendship, and an alliance with Pyrrhus, provided the Tarentines should be included in the same treaty, and provided the other Greeks dwelling in Italy should remain free under their own laws, and provided the Romans would restore to the Lucanians, Samnites, Daunii, and Bruttians whatever they had taken from them in war. If they would do this, he said that Pyrrhus would restore all his prisoners without ransom.

2. The Romans hesitated a long time, being much in-

V. R.

474

timidated by the prestige of Pyrrhus and by the calamity that had befallen them. Finally Appius Claudius, surnamed the Blind (because he had lost his eyesight from old age), commanded his sons to lead him into the senate-chamber, where he said: "I was grieved at the loss of my sight; now I regret that I did not lose my hearing also, for never did I expect to see or hear deliberations of this kind from you. Have you become so forgetful of yourselves all of a sudden, by reason of one misfortune, as to take the man who brought it upon you, and those who called him hither, for friends instead of enemies, and to give back to the Lucanians and Bruttians the property that your ancestors took from them? What is this but making the Romans servants of the Macedonians? And some of you dare to call this peace instead of servitude!" Many other things in the like sense did Appius urge to arouse their spirit. If Pyrrhus wanted peace and the friendship of the Romans, let him withdraw from Italy and then send his embassy. As long as he remained let him be considered neither friend nor ally, neither judge nor arbitrator in Roman affairs.

B. C.

280

3. The Senate made answer to Cineas as Appius advised. They decreed the levying of two new legions for Lævinus, and made proclamation that whoever would volunteer in place of those who had been lost should put their names on the army roll. Cineas, who was still present and saw the multitude hastening to be enrolled, is reported to have said to Pyrrhus on his return: "We are waging war against a hydra." Others say that not Cineas, but even Pyrrhus himself said this when he saw the new Roman army larger than the former one; for the other consul, Coruncanus, came from Etruria and joined his forces with those of Lævinus. It is said also that when Pyrrhus made some further inquiries about Rome, Cineas replied that it was a city of generals; and when Pyrrhus wondered at this, he corrected himself, and said that it seemed more like a city of kings. When Pyrrhus saw that there was no expectation of peace from the Senate, he marched toward Rome, laying everything waste on his way. When he had come as far as the town of Anagnia, finding his army encumbered with booty and a host of prisoners, he decided to postpone the battle. Accordingly he turned back to

V.R.  
474 Campania, sending his elephants in advance, and distrib-  
uted his army in winter quarters among the towns. B.C.  
280

4. Hither came Roman ambassadors proposing either to ransom the prisoners or to exchange them for Tarentines and his other allies whom they held. He replied that if they were ready for peace on the terms proposed by Cineas, he would release the prisoners gratuitously, but if the war was to continue, he would not give up such a large number of valiant men to fight against him. Otherwise he treated them in a kingly way. Perceiving that Fabricius, the chief of the embassy, had great influence in the city, and also that he was a very poor man, he approached him and said that if he would bring about a treaty of peace, he (Pyrrhus) would take him to Epirus, and make him his chief officer and the sharer of all his possessions; and he asked him to accept a present of money then and there, on the pretext that he was to give it to those who perfected the treaty. Fabricius burst out laughing. He made no answer as to public matters, but said: "Neither you nor your friends, O King, can take away my independence. I consider my poverty more blessed than all the riches of kings if conjoined with fear." Others report the conversation differently, saying that Fabricius replied: "Beware lest the Epirotes share my nature and prefer me to you."

5. Whichever answer he made, Pyrrhus admired his high spirit. He then tried another plan for procuring peace. He allowed the prisoners to go home without guards to attend the festival of Saturn, on the condition that if the city accepted the terms offered by him they should be free, but if not that they should return to him at the end of the festival. Although the prisoners earnestly besought and urged the Senate to accept the terms, the latter ordered them, at the conclusion of the festival, to deliver themselves up to Pyrrhus on a day specified, and decreed the death penalty to those who should linger beyond that time. This order was observed by all. In this way Pyrrhus learned again that everything depended on the arbitrament of arms.

## XI. FROM THE SAME

<sup>V. R.</sup>  
<sub>476</sub> 1. While Pyrrhus was perplexed by the Roman complication he was disturbed by an uprising of the Molossians. At this time also Agathocles, the king of Sicily, had just died. As Pyrrhus had married his daughter Laneia, he began to look upon Sicily as more of his concern than Italy. Still he was loath to abandon those who had summoned him to their aid, without some kind of arrangement for peace. Seizing eagerly the occasion of the sending back of a traitor who had deserted from him, he testified his gratitude to the consuls for this act and sent Cineas again to Rome to repeat his thanks for the man's safe-keeping, and to surrender the prisoners by way of recompense,—instructing him to procure peace in whatever way he could. Cineas brought a large number of presents both for men and women, knowing that the people were fond of money and gifts, and that the women had had large influence among the Romans from the earliest times. B. C.  
278

2. But they warned each other against the gifts, and replied that no man or woman would accept anything. They gave Cineas the same answer as before. If Pyrrhus would withdraw from Italy and send an embassy to them without gifts, they would agree to fair terms in all respects. They treated the embassy, however, in a sumptuous manner and sent back to Pyrrhus in exchange all the Tarentines and others of his allies whom they held as prisoners. Thereupon Pyrrhus sailed for Sicily with his elephants and 8000 horse, promising his allies that he would return to Italy. Three years later he returned, for the Carthaginians had driven him out of Sicily.

## XII. FROM PEIRESC

<sup>478</sup> 1. After the battle and the armistice with the Romans, <sup>276</sup> Pyrrhus sailed for Sicily promising he would return to Italy. Three years later he returned, having been driven out of Sicily by the Carthaginians, and having been a grievous burden to the Sicilians themselves by reason of the lodging and supplying of his troops, the garrisons and the tribute he had imposed on them. Enriched by these exactions he set

Y.R.

478

sail for Rhegium with 110 decked ships, besides a much larger number of merchant vessels and ships of burthen. But the Carthaginians made a naval attack upon him, sunk seventy of his ships, and disabled all the rest except twelve. Fleeing with these he took vengeance on the Italian Locrians who had put to death his garrison and their commanding officer, because of outrages committed upon the inhabitants. Such savage vengeance did he take on them in the way of killing and plundering that he did not spare even the temple gifts of Proserpina, saying by way of joke that unseasonable piety was no better than superstition, and that it was good policy to obtain wealth without labor.

B.C.

276

2. Loaded down with spoils, a tempest overtook him, sunk some of his ships with the men in them, and cast the others ashore. The waves cast all the sacred things safe upon the Locrian beach. Wherefore Pyrrhus, perceiving too late the consequences of his impiety, restored them to the temple of Proserpina and sought to propitiate the goddess with numerous sacrifices. As the victims were unpropitious he became still more furious, and he put to death all those who had advised the temple-robbing, or had assented to it, or had taken part in it. Thus had Pyrrhus come to grief.

## BOOK IV—EXCERPTA

### THE GALLIC HISTORY

#### I. AN EPITOME OF APPIAN'S BOOK "DE REBUS GALLICIS"

- V.R.  
365 1. AT an early period the Gauls waged war against the  
Romans, took Rome itself, except the Capitol, and burned it. Camillus, however, overcame and expelled them. At a later period, when they had made a second invasion, he overcame them again and enjoyed a triumph in consequence, being then in his eightieth year. A third army of Gauls which invaded Italy was destroyed by the Romans under Titus Quintius. Afterwards the Boii, the most savage of the Gallic tribes, attacked the Romans. Gaius Sulpicius, the dictator, marched against them, and is said to have used the following stratagem. He commanded those who were in the front line to discharge their javelins, and immediately crouch low; then the second, third, and fourth lines to discharge theirs, each crouching in turn so that they should not be struck by the spears thrown from the rear; then when the last line had hurled their javelins, all were to rush forward suddenly with a shout and join battle at close quarters. The hurling of so many missiles, followed by an immediate charge, would throw the enemy into confusion. The spears of the Gauls were not like javelins, but what the Romans called *pila*, four-sided, part wood and part iron, and not hard except at the pointed end. In this way the army of the Boii was completely destroyed by the Romans.
- B.C.  
389
- 404 2. Another Gallic force was defeated by Popillius, and  
after this Camillus, son of the former Camillus, defeated the same tribe. Afterwards Æmilius Pappus won some trophies  
649 from the Gauls. Shortly before the consulships of Marius 105  
a most numerous and warlike horde of Celtic tribes, most formidable in bodily strength, made incursions into both

V. R.

649 Italy and Gaul, and defeated some of the Roman consuls, and cut their armies in pieces. Marius was sent against them and he destroyed them all. The latest and greatest war of the Romans against the Gauls was that waged under the command of Cæsar, for, in the ten years that he held command there, he fought with more than 4,000,000 barbarians, taken all together. Of these 1,000,000 were captured and as many more slain in battle. He reduced to subjection 400 tribes and more than 800 towns, which had either revolted from their allegiance or were conquered for the first time. Even before Marius, Fabius Maximus Æmilianus with a very small army killed 120,000 of them in one battle, losing only fifteen of his own men; and he did this although suffering from a recent wound, urging and encouraging his troops and showing them how to fight barbarians, now borne on a litter and now hobbling on foot leaning on the arms of others.

B. C.

105

3. Cæsar began his war against them by gaining a victory over some 200,000 of the Helvetii and Tigurini. The latter at an earlier period had captured a Roman army commanded by Piso and Cassius and sent them under the yoke, as is related in the writings of Paulus Claudius. The Tigurini 656 were now overcome by Labienus, Cæsar's lieutenant, and the others by Cæsar himself, together with the Tricorii, who 58 were aiding them. He also overcame the Germans under Ariovistus, a people who excelled all others, even the largest men, in size; savage, the bravest of the brave, despising death because they believe they shall live hereafter, bearing heat and cold with equal patience, living on herbs in time of scarcity, and their horses browsing on trees. It seems that they were without patient endurance in their battles, and did not fight in a scientific way or in any regular order, but with a sort of high spirit simply made an onset like wild beasts, for which reason they were overcome by Roman science and endurance. For, although the Germans made a tremendous rush and pushed the legions back a short distance, the Romans kept their ranks unbroken, and outmanœuvred them, and eventually slew 80,000 of them.

697 4. Afterwards Cæsar fell upon the so-called Belgæ as 57 they were crossing a river, and killed so many of them that he crossed the stream on a bridge of their bodies. The



Y.R.

697 Nervii defeated him by falling suddenly upon his army as it was getting itself into camp after a march. They made a very great slaughter, killing all of his tribunes and centurions. Cæsar himself took refuge on a hill with his body-guard, and there he was surrounded by the enemy. The latter being assailed in the rear by the tenth legion were destroyed, although they were 60,000 in number. The Nervii were the descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones.

B.C.

699 Cæsar conquered the Allobroges also. He slaughtered 400,000 of the Usipetes and Tenchteri, armed and unarmed together. The Sicambri with 500 horse put to flight 5000 of Cæsar's horse, falling upon them unexpectedly. They subsequently paid the penalty for this in a defeat.

5. Cæsar was also the first of the Romans to cross the Rhine. He also passed over to Britain, an island larger than a very large continent, and still unknown to the men of Rome. He crossed by taking advantage of the movement of the tide. As it rose the fleet was impelled by the waves, slowly at first, then more rapidly, until finally Cæsar was carried with great swiftness to Britain.

## II. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

364 In the 97th Olympiad, according to the Greek calendar, 390 a considerable part of the Gauls who dwelt along the Rhine moved off in search of new land, that which they occupied being insufficient for their numbers. Having scaled the Alps they fell upon the territory of Clusium, a fertile part of Etruria. The Clusians had made a league with the Romans not long before, and now applied to them for aid. So the three Fabii were sent with the Clusians as ambassadors to the Gauls to order them to vacate the country that was in alliance with Rome, and to threaten them if they did not obey. The Gauls replied that they feared no mortal man in threat or war, that they were in need of land, and that they had not yet meddled with the affairs of the Romans. The Fabii urged the Clusians to make an attack upon the Gauls while they were heedlessly plundering the country. They took part in the expedition themselves and slew an immense number of the Gauls whom they caught foraging. Quintus Fabius, one of the Roman embassy,

<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
<sup>364</sup> himself killed the chief of that band, stripped his body, and <sup>B.C.</sup>  
 carried his arms back to Clusium. <sup>390</sup>

### III. FROM THE SAME

After the Fabii had slain this large number of Gauls, Brennus, their king, though he had refused to recognize the Roman embassy, for the purpose of intimidating the Romans selected as ambassadors to them certain Gauls who exceeded all the others in bodily size as much as the Gauls exceeded other peoples, and sent them to Rome to complain that the Fabii, while serving as ambassadors, had joined in war against him, contrary to the law of nations. He demanded that they should be given up to him for punishment unless the Romans wished to make the crime their own. The Romans acknowledged that the Fabii had done wrong, but having great respect for that distinguished family, they urged the Gauls to accept a pecuniary compensation from them. As the latter refused, they elected the Fabii military tribunes for that year, and then said to the Gallic ambassadors that they could not do anything to the Fabii now because they were now holding office, but told them to come again next year if they were still in a bad humor. Brennus and the Gauls under him considered this an insult and took it hard. Accordingly they sent around to the other Gauls asking them to make common cause of war with them. When a large number had collected in obedience to this summons they broke camp and marched against Rome.<sup>1</sup>

### IV. FROM SUIDAS

<sup>365</sup> He (Cædicus) promised to carry letters through the <sup>389</sup>  
 enemy's ranks to the Capitol.

### V. FROM PEIRESC

When Cædicus bore the decree of the Senate to Camillus, by which he was made consul, he exhorted him not to lay up against his country the injury it had done him. The

<sup>1</sup> Livy, v. 36 *seq.*

V.R. 365 latter, interrupting him, said: "I could not have prayed to the gods that the Romans might some time long for me if I had cherished any such feeling as that towards them. Now I pray the nobler prayer that I may render my country a service equal to the calamity that has befallen her." B.C. 389

#### VI. FROM THE SAME

When the Gauls could find no means for scaling the Capitol they remained quietly in camp in order to reduce the defenders by famine. A certain priest named Dorso went down from the Capitol to make a certain yearly sacrifice in the temple of Vesta, and passed safely, with the sacred utensils, through the ranks of the enemy, who were either awed by his courage or had respect for his piety and his venerable appearance. Thus he who had incurred danger for the sake of his holy office was saved by it. That this event occurred, as related, the Roman writer Cassius tells us.<sup>1</sup>

#### VII. FROM SUIDAS AND PEIRESC

The Gauls filled themselves to repletion with wine and other luxuries, being intemperate by nature, and inhabiting a country which yielded only cereals, and was unfruitful and destitute of other productions. Thus their large bodies became delicate, distended with fatness, and heavy by reason of excessive eating and drinking, and quite incapable of running or hardship; and when any exertion was required of them they speedily became exhausted by perspiration and shortness of breath.

#### VIII. FROM SUIDAS

He (Camillus) showed them naked to the Romans and said: "These are the creatures who assail you with such

<sup>1</sup> This writer was L. Cassius Hemina, who lived about the beginning of the second century B.C. Schweighäuser refers to two passages in Pliny's *Natural History* (xiii. 37, and xxix. 1), where he is mentioned as one of the earliest Roman annalists; also to a passage in Aulus Gellius (xvii. 21), where his name appears. All the writings of Cassius Hemina have been lost except a few fragments preserved in the works of other authors.

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
365 terrible shouts in battle, and clash their arms and shake <sup>B.C.</sup> 389  
their long swords and toss their hair. Behold their weak-  
ness of soul, their slothfulness and flabbiness of body, and  
gird yourselves to your work."

## IX. FROM THE SAME

394 The people beheld the battle from the walls, and constantly <sup>B.C.</sup> 360  
sent fresh troops to take the place of the tired ones. But  
the tired Gauls having to engage with fresh opponents took  
to disorderly flight.

## X. FROM THE SAME

405 The Gaul, furious and exhausted with loss of blood, <sup>B.C.</sup> 349  
pursued Valerius, hastening in order to grapple with him. As  
Valerius was all the time dodging just in front of him, the  
Gaul fell headlong. The Romans felicitated themselves on  
this second single combat with the Gauls.

## XI. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

471 The Senones, although they had a treaty with the Romans, <sup>B.C.</sup> 283  
nevertheless furnished mercenaries against them, wherefore  
the Senate sent an embassy to them to remonstrate against  
this infraction of the treaty. Britomaris, the Gaul, being  
incensed against them on account of his father, who had  
been killed by the Romans while fighting on the side of the  
Etruscans in this very war, slew the ambassadors while they  
held the caduceus in their hands, and wore the garments of  
their office. He then cut their bodies in small pieces and  
scattered them in the fields. The consul Cornelius, learning  
of this abominable deed while he was on the march, moved  
with great speed against the towns of the Senones by way of  
the Sabine country and Picenum, and ravaged them all with  
fire and sword. He reduced the women and children to  
slavery, killed all the adult males without exception, devas-  
tated the country in every possible way, and made it unin-  
habitable for anybody else. He carried off Britomaris alone  
as a prisoner for torture. A little later the Senones (who were  
serving as mercenaries), having no longer any homes to re-

Y.R.

471 turn to, fell boldly upon the consul Domitius, and being <sup>B.C.</sup>283 defeated by him killed themselves in despair. Such punishment was meted out to the Senones for their crime against the ambassadors.<sup>1</sup>

## XII. FROM THE SAME

633 The chiefs of the Salyi, a nation vanquished by the Romans, <sup>121</sup> took refuge with the Allobroges. When the Romans asked for their surrender and it was refused, they made war on the Allobroges, under the leadership of Cnæus Domitius. When he was passing through the territory of the Salyi, an ambassador of Bituitus, king of the Allobroges, met him, arrayed magnificently and followed by attendants likewise arrayed, and also by dogs : for the barbarians of this region use dogs also as body-guards. A musician was in the train who sang in barbarous fashion the praises of King Bituitus, and then of the Allobroges, and then of the ambassador himself, celebrating his birth, his bravery, and his wealth ; for which reason chiefly their illustrious ambassadors usually take such persons along with them. But this one, although he begged pardon for the chiefs of the Salyi, accomplished nothing.

## XIII. FROM THE SAME

641 A numerous band of the Teutones bent on plunder in- <sup>123</sup> vaded the territory of Noricum. The Roman consul, Papirius Carbo, fearing lest they should make an incursion into Italy, occupied the Alps at a place where the pass is narrowest. As they made no attempt in this direction he attacked them, complaining that they had invaded the people of Noricum, who were foreign friends of the Romans. It was the practice of the Romans to make foreign friends of any people for whom they wanted to intervene on the score of friendship, without being obliged to defend them as allies. As Carbo was approaching, the Teutones sent word to him that they had not known anything about this relationship between Rome and Noricum, and that for the future they would keep hands off. He praised the ambassadors, and gave them guides for their homeward journey, but privately charged the guides to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Excerpt VI., Samnite History, *supra*.

<sup>Y. R.</sup>  
641 take them by a longer route. He himself then marched by <sup>B. C.</sup> 113 a shorter one and fell unexpectedly upon the Teutones, though they were still desisting from hostilities, but he suffered severely for his perfidy, and lost a large part of his army. He would probably have perished with his whole force had not darkness and a tremendous thunder-storm fallen upon them while the fight was in progress, separating the combatants and putting an end to the battle by sheer terror from heaven. Even as it was, the Romans fled in small bands through the woods and came together with difficulty three days later. The Teutones passed into Gaul.<sup>1</sup>

#### XIV. FROM SUIDAS

He ordered them to leave the bodies of the Cimbri intact till daylight because he believed they were adorned with gold.

#### XV. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

696 Two nations, the Tigurini and the Helvetii, made an in- 58  
cursion into the Roman province of Gaul. When Cæsar heard of this movement he built a wall along the river Rhone about a hundred and fifty stades in length to intercept them. When they sent ambassadors to him to endeavor to make a treaty, he ordered them to give him hostages and money. They replied that they were accustomed to receive these things, not to give them. As he wished to prevent them from forming a junction he sent Labienus against the Tigurini, who were the weaker, while he marched against the Helvetii, taking with him about 20,000 Gallic mountaineers. The work was easy to Labienus, who fell upon the Tigurini unawares on the river bank, defeated them, and scattered the greater part of them in disorderly flight.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The *Epitome* of Livy (lxiii.) assigns this victory to the Cimbri.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch (*Life of Cæsar*, 18) agrees with Appian that the victory over the Tigurini was won by Labienus. Cæsar himself does not mention Labienus. He says that he himself marched about the third watch (midnight) and came upon the Tigurini on the bank of the river Arar, etc. (*Gallic War*, i. 12.)

## XVI. FROM THE SAME

V.R. 695 Ariovistus, the king of the Germans beyond the Rhine, crossed to this side before Cæsar's arrival and made war against the Ædui, who were friends of the Romans. But when the Romans commanded him to desist, he obeyed and moved away from Ædui and desired to be accounted a friend of the Roman people also, and this was granted, Cæsar being consul and voting for it. B.C. 59

## XVII. FROM THE SAME

Ariovistus, the king of the Germans, who had been voted a friend of the Roman people, came to Cæsar to have a colloquy. After they had separated he wished to have another. Cæsar refused it, but sent some of the leading men of the Gauls to meet him. Ariovistus cast them in chains, wherefore Cæsar threatened him and made war on him, but fear fell upon the army on account of the military reputation of the Germans.<sup>1</sup>

## XVIII. FROM THE SAME

699 It is believed that the Usipetes and the Tenchteri, German tribes, with 800 of their own horse, put to flight about 55 5000 of Cæsar's horse. When they sent ambassadors to Cæsar he held them as prisoners and made an attack on them, and took them so completely by surprise that 400,000 of them were cut to pieces. One writer says that Cato in the Roman Senate proposed that Cæsar should be surrendered to the barbarians for this deed of blood perpetrated while negotiations were pending. But Cæsar in his own diary says that when the Usipetes and Tenchteri were ordered to go back forthwith to their former homes, they replied that they had sent ambassadors to the Suevi, who had driven them away, and that they were waiting for their answer; that while these negotiations were pending, they set upon his men with 800 of their horse, and by the suddenness of the attack put to flight his 5000; and that when they sent another embassy to explain this violation of good faith

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Cæsar's *Gallie War*, i. 42 seq.

Y.R.

699 he suspected a similar deception, and made his attack before giving his answer.<sup>1</sup>

B.C.

55

## XIX. FROM SUIDAS

Straightway they stirred up the Britons to violate the oath, complaining that while a treaty with them was in force the camp was still among them.

## XX. FROM THE SAME

700 Cæsar apprehending an attack on [Quintus] Cicero turned back.<sup>2</sup> 54

## XXI. FROM THE VATICAN MSS. OF CARDINAL MAI

Britores seduced the Ædui from their Roman allegiance. When Cæsar reproached them for this, they said that an ancient alliance had the precedence.

[Here follow two fragments of only three words each.]

<sup>1</sup> Cæsar's *Gallic War*, iv. 1-5; Plutarch, *Life of Cæsar*, 22. The latter repeats Cato's proposal that Cæsar should be surrendered to the barbarians for his breach of faith.

<sup>2</sup> Cæsar's *Gallic War*, v. 38 *seq.*



# BOOK V

## OF SICILY AND THE OTHER ISLANDS

### I. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

Y. R.  
502 BOTH Romans and Carthaginians were destitute of money ; B. C.  
252 and the Romans could no longer build ships, being exhausted by taxes, yet they levied foot soldiers and sent them to Africa and Sicily from year to year, while the Carthaginians sent an embassy to Ptolemy, the son of Ptolemy the son of Lagus, king of Egypt, seeking to borrow 2000 talents. He was on terms of friendship with both Romans and Carthaginians, and he sought to bring about peace between them. As he was not able to accomplish this, he said : " It behooves one to assist friends against enemies, but not against friends." <sup>1</sup>

### II. FROM THE SAME

512 I. When the Carthaginians had met with two disasters on 249 land at the same time, and two at sea where they had considered themselves much the superior, and were already short of money, ships, and men, they sought an armistice from Lutatius and having obtained it sent an embassy to Rome to negotiate a treaty on certain limited conditions. With their own embassy they sent Atilius Regulus, the consul, who was their prisoner, to urge his countrymen to agree to the terms. When he came into the senate-chamber, clad as a prisoner in Punic garments, and the Carthaginian ambassadors had retired, he exposed to the Senate the desperate state of Carthaginian affairs, and advised that either the war should be prosecuted vigorously, or that more satisfactory

<sup>1</sup> No other mention of this embassy, says Schweighäuser, is found in any ancient writings that have come down to us.

Y. R.

512

conditions of peace should be insisted on. For this reason, after he had returned voluntarily to Carthage, the Carthaginians put him to death by enclosing him in a standing posture in a box the planks of which were stuck full of iron spikes so that he could not possibly lie down. Nevertheless peace was made on conditions more satisfactory to the Romans.

B. C.

242

2. The conditions were these : All Roman prisoners and deserters held by the Carthaginians were to be delivered up ; Sicily and the small neighboring islands to be surrendered to the Romans ; the Carthaginians not to initiate any war against Syracuse or its ruler, Hiero, nor to recruit mercenaries in any part of Italy ; the Carthaginians to pay the Romans a war indemnity of 2000 Euboic talents in twenty years, in yearly instalments payable at Rome. The Euboic talent is equal to 7000 Alexandrine drachmas. So ended the first war between the Romans and the Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily, having lasted twenty-four years, in which the Romans lost 700 ships and the Carthaginians 500. In this way the chief part of Sicily (all of it that had been held by the Carthaginians) passed into the possession of the Romans. The latter levied tribute on the Sicilians, and apportioned certain naval charges among their towns, and sent a prætor each year to govern them. On the other hand Hiero, the ruler of Syracuse, who had coöperated with them in this war, was declared to be their friend and ally.

3. When this war was ended the Gallic mercenaries demanded of the Carthaginians the pay still due to them for their service in Sicily, together with the presents that Hamilcar had promised to give them. The African soldiers, although they were Carthaginian subjects, demanded the same things, on account of their service in Sicily, and this they did the more arrogantly as they saw that the Carthaginians were weakened and humbled ; they were angry also on account of the killing of 3000 of their own number whom the Carthaginians had crucified for deserting to the Romans. When the Carthaginians refused the demands of both Gauls and Africans, they joined together and seized the city of Tunis, and also Utica, the largest city in Africa after Carthage. Starting thence they detached the rest of Africa, and brought over to their side some Numidians, and re-

V.R. <sup>B.C.</sup>  
 512 ceived into their ranks a vast number of fugitive slaves, 242  
 and pillaged the Carthaginian possessions in every direc-  
 tion. Being pressed by enemies on all sides the Cartha-  
 ginians appealed to the Romans for aid against the Africans.  
 The Romans did not send them a military force, but allowed  
 them to draw supplies from Italy and Sicily, and to recruit  
 mercenaries in Italy for this war only. They also sent depu-  
 ties to Africa to arrange peace if they could, but they re-  
 turned without accomplishing anything. The Carthaginians  
 prosecuted the war vigorously.

### III. FROM PEIRESC

540 Hippocrates and Epicydes, two brothers, were generals 214  
 of the Syracusans. They had been for a long time incensed  
 against the Romans, and when they could not stir up their  
 fellow-countrymen to war, they went over to the Leontines,  
 who had some differences with the Syracusans. They  
 accused their own countrymen of renewing a separate  
 league with the Romans, although Hiero had made one to  
 include the whole of Sicily. The Leontines were much  
 stirred up by this. The Syracusans made proclamation that  
 if anybody would bring them the head of Hippocrates or of  
 Epicydes, they would give him its weight in gold. But the  
 Leontines chose Hippocrates as their general.<sup>1</sup>

### IV. FROM THE SAME

542 The Sicilians, who had been for a long time embittered 212  
 against the Roman general Marcellus, on account of his  
 severity, were still more excited against him because he had  
 gained entrance to Syracuse by treachery. For this reason  
 they joined themselves to Hippocrates, and took an oath  
 together that none of them would make peace without the  
 others, and sent him supplies and an army of 20,000 foot  
 and 5000 horse.<sup>2</sup>

### V. FROM THE SAME

Marcellus was in such bad odor that nobody would trust  
 him except under oath, for which reason, when the Tauro-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Livy, xxiv. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Livy, xxvi. 30.

Y.R.

542 menians gave themselves up to him, he made an agreement and confirmed it with an oath, that he would not station any guard in their city nor require the inhabitants to serve as soldiers.

B.C.

212

## VI. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

- 680 1. The island of Crete seemed to be favorably disposed towards Mithridates, king of Pontus, from the beginning, and it was said that they furnished him mercenaries when he was at war with the Romans. It is believed also that they recommended to the favor of Mithridates the pirates who then infested the sea, and openly assisted them when they were pursued by Marcus Antonius. When Antonius sent legates to them on this subject, they made light of the matter and gave him a disdainful answer. Antonius forthwith made war against them, and although he did not accomplish much, he gained the title of Creticus for his work. He was the father of the Mark Antony who, at a later period, fought against Octavius Cæsar at Actium. When the Romans declared war against the Cretans, on account of these things, the latter sent an embassy to Rome to treat for peace. The Romans ordered them to surrender Lasthenes, the author of the war against Antonius, and to deliver up all their pirate ships and all the Roman prisoners in their hands, together with 300 hostages, and to pay 4000 talents of silver.
- 685 2. As the Cretans would not accept these conditions, 69 Metellus was chosen as the general against them. He gained a victory over Lasthenes at Cydonia. The latter fled to Gnossus, and Panares delivered over Cydonia to Metellus on condition of his own safety. While Metellus was besieging Gnossus, Lasthenes set fire to his own house there, which was full of money, and fled from the place. Then the Cretans sent word to Pompey the Great, who was conducting the war against the pirates, and against Mithridates, that if he would come they would surrender themselves to him. As he was then busy with other things, he commanded Metellus to withdraw from the island, as it was not seemly to continue a war against those who offered to give themselves up, and he said that he would come to receive the surrender of the island later. Metellus paid no attention to this order, but pushed on the war until the island was subdued, making

V. R. 68<sub>5</sub> the same terms with Lasthenes as he had made with Panares. B. C. 69  
Metellus was awarded a triumph and the title of Creticus with more justice than Antonius, for he actually subjugated the island.<sup>1</sup>

## VII. FROM PEIRESC

69<sub>2</sub> The patrician Clodius, surnamed Pulcher, which means 62  
handsome, was in love with Cæsar's wife. He arrayed himself in woman's clothes from head to foot, being still without a beard, and gained admission to Cæsar's house as a woman in the night, at a time when the mysteries [of the Bona Dea] were celebrated, to which only women were admitted. Having lost his guide, and being detected by others by the sound of his voice, he was hustled out.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Florus, iii. 7.

<sup>2</sup> This was one of the important events in Roman history, both in its consequences and as showing the rottenness of society at the time. The presence of Clodius at the festival of the Bona Dea (the Good Goddess) was sacrilege of the deepest dye, and as religion was the foundation of Roman law and life, the culprit must needs be punished. Both Cicero and Hortensius took part in the prosecution. A bill for his trial was brought before the Senate. It provided that the jury of fifty-six persons should be appointed by the prætor. The tribune Fufius proposed that they should be chosen by lot. As there was no room for dispute about the facts, the only question being whether Clodius was there or not, Hortensius accepted the amendment of Fufius, being constrained to do so by the fact that Fufius had the power to veto the bill and stop the proceedings altogether. Hortensius, in his confidence, said that he could cut the throat of Clodius with a leaden sword. The jurors were selected by lot. They were bribed with money advanced by Crassus. Thirty-one voted for acquittal and twenty-five for conviction. The whole affair is described in two of Cicero's letters to Atticus (i. 14, 16). "You ask," he says, "what is the state of public affairs and of my own. That constitution of the republic which you thought had been confirmed by my counsels [by the overthrow of Catiline's conspiracy], and which I thought had been confirmed by Divine Providence, — which seemed to be fixed and founded on the union of all good men and the authority of my consulship, — has, you may be sure, unless some god takes pity on us, slipped from our hands by this single verdict; if it can be called a verdict that thirty men, the basest and most worthless of the Roman people, bought with money, should subvert all law and justice, and that Talna and Plautus and Spongia and other riff-raff of that sort should decide that a thing was not done, which not only all men but even cattle know was done." The only person who really suffered in consequence of the trial of Clodius was Cicero himself. See *Civil Wars*, ii. 14, 15, *infra*.

# BOOK VI

## THE WARS IN SPAIN

### CHAPTER I

Boundaries of Spain — King Arganthonius — Early Carthaginian Occupation — Hamilcar Barca — His Death

1. THE Pyrenees mountains extend from the Tyrrhenian sea to the Northern ocean. The eastern part is inhabited by Celts, otherwise called Galatians, and more lately Gauls. From this part westward, beginning at the Tyrrhenian sea and making a circuit by way of the Pillars of Hercules to the Northern ocean, the Iberians and Celtiberians dwell. Thus the whole of Iberia is sea-girt, except the part embraced by the Pyrenees, the largest and perhaps the most precipitous mountains in Europe. In coasting they follow the Tyrrhenian sea as far as the Pillars of Hercules. They do not traverse the Western and Northern ocean, except in crossing over to Britain, and this they accomplish by availing themselves of the tide, as it is only half a day's journey.<sup>1</sup> For the rest, neither the Romans nor any of the subject peoples navigate that ocean. The size of Iberia (now called Hispania by some) is almost incredible for a single country. Its breadth is reckoned at ten thousand stades, and its length is equal to its breadth. Many nations of various names inhabit it, and many navigable rivers flow through it.

2. What nations occupied it first, and who came after them, it is not very important for me to inquire, in writing

<sup>1</sup> This is a bad blunder in geography, but no worse than that of Cæsar, who places Spain to the west of Britain (*Gallie War*, v. 13). Tacitus repeats this error (*Agricola*, 10).



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merely Roman history. However, I think that the Celts, passing over the Pyrenees at some former time, mingled with the natives, and that the name Celtiberia originated in that way. I think also that from an early time the Phœnicians frequented Spain for purposes of trade, and occupied certain places there. In like manner the Greeks visited Tartessus and its king Arganthonius,<sup>1</sup> and some of them settled in Spain; for the kingdom of Arganthonius was in Spain. It is my opinion that Tartessus was then the city on the seashore which is now called Carpesus. I think also that the Phœnicians built the temple of Hercules which stands at the straits. The religious rites performed there are still of Phœnician type, and the god is considered by the worshippers the Tyrian, not the Theban, Hercules. But I will leave these matters to the antiquaries.

3. This fruitful land, abounding in all good things, the Carthaginians began to exploit before the Romans. A part of it they occupied and another part they plundered, until the Romans expelled them from the part they held, and immediately occupied it themselves. The remainder the Romans acquired with much toil, extending over a long period of time, and in spite of frequent revolts they eventually subdued it and divided it into three parts and appointed a prætor over each. How they subdued each one, and how they contended with the Carthaginians for the possession of them, and afterwards with the Iberians and Celtiberians, this book will show, the first part containing matters relating to the Carthaginians, since it was necessary for me to introduce their relations with Spain in my Spanish history. For the same reason the doings of the Romans and Carthaginians in respect to Sicily from the beginning of the Roman invasion and rule of that island are embraced in the Sicilian history.

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus (i. 163) mentions the visit of the Phocæans (who were driven from their own country by Harpagus, the Persian general) to Tartessus and its king Arganthonius. Strabo (iii. 2, 11-14) mentions both, and quotes from Anacreon concerning the king, who is said to have "reigned over Tartessus 150 years." Herodotus says that he reigned 80 years and lived to be 120. Several other ancient authors mention Arganthonius, but all seem to rely upon Herodotus and Anacreon.

V.R.

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4. The first external war waged by the Romans against the Carthaginians in reference to Sicily was waged in Sicily itself. In like manner the first one concerning Spain was waged in Spain, although in the course of it the combatants sent large forces into, and devastated, both Italy and Africa. 536 This war began about the 140th Olympiad by the infraction 218 of a treaty which had been made at the end of the Sicilian war. The infraction came about in this way. Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, while commanding the Carthaginian forces in Sicily, had promised large rewards to his Celtic mercenaries and African allies, which they demanded after he returned to Africa; and thereupon the African war was kindled. In this war the Carthaginians suffered severely at the hands of the Africans, and they ceded Sardinia to the Romans as compensation for injuries they had inflicted upon Roman merchants during this war. When Hamilcar was brought to trial for these things by his enemies, who held him to blame for such serious calamities to the country, he secured the favor of the chief men in the state (of whom the most popular was Hasdrubal, who had married Barca's daughter), by which means he escaped punishment; and as a disturbance with the Numidians broke out about this time, he secured the command of the Carthaginian forces in conjunction with Hanno the Great, although he had not yet rendered an account of his former generalship.
- 516 5. At the end of this war, Hanno was recalled to answer 238 certain charges against him in Carthage, and Hamilcar was left in sole command of the army. He associated his son-in-law Hasdrubal with him, crossed the straits of Gades and began to plunder the territory of the Spaniards, although they had done him no wrong. Thus he made for himself an occasion for being away from home, and also for performing exploits and acquiring popularity. For whatever property he took he divided, giving one part to the soldiers, to stimulate their zeal for future plundering with him. Another part he sent to the treasury of Carthage, and a third he distributed to the chiefs of his own faction there. This 525 continued until certain Spanish kings and other chieftains 229 gradually united and put him to death in the following manner. They loaded a lot of wagons with wood and drove them in advance with oxen, they following behind

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
525 prepared for battle. When the Africans saw this they fell <sup>B.C.</sup>  
to laughing, not perceiving the stratagem. When they 229  
came to close quarters the Spaniards set fire to the wagons  
and drove the oxen against the enemy. The fire, being  
carried in every direction by the fleeing oxen, threw the  
Africans into confusion. Their ranks being thus broken  
the Spaniards dashed among them and killed Hamilcar  
himself and a great many others who came to his aid.

## CHAPTER II

Hasdrubal succeeds Hamilcar — Rise of Hannibal — He attacks  
Saguntum — The Saguntines appeal to Rome

6. The Carthaginians, enjoying the gains they had received from Spain, sent another army thither and appointed Hasdrubal, the son-in-law of Hamilcar, who was still in Spain, commander of all their forces there. He had with him in Spain Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar and brother of his own wife, a young man zealous in war, beloved by the army, and who soon after became famous for his military exploits. Him he appointed lieutenant-general. Hasdrubal brought many Spanish tribes to his support by persuasion, for he was attractive in personal intercourse, and where force was needed he made use of the young man. In this way he pushed forward from the Western ocean to the interior as far as the river Iberus (Ebro), which divides Spain about in the centre, and at a distance of about five days' journey from the Pyrenees flows down to the Northern ocean.<sup>1</sup>

7. The Saguntines, a colony of the island of Zacynthus, who lived about midway between the Pyrenees and the river Iberus,<sup>2</sup> and other Greeks who dwelt in the neighborhood of Emporia and other Spanish towns, having apprehensions for their safety, sent ambassadors to Rome. The Senate, who were unwilling to see the Carthaginian power augmented, sent an embassy to Carthage. It was agreed

<sup>1</sup> Another blunder in geography. The Ebro empties into the Mediterranean.

<sup>2</sup> Another mistake. Saguntum was situated a long distance southwest of the Ebro.

Y. R. 525 between them that the limit of the Carthaginian power in B. C. 229 Spain should be the river Iberus; that beyond that river the Romans should not carry war against the subjects of Carthage, nor should the Carthaginians cross it for a similar purpose; and that the Saguntines and the other Greeks in Spain should remain free and autonomous. So these agreements were added to the treaties between Rome and Carthage.

534 8. Some time later, while Hasdrubal was governing that 220 part of Spain belonging to Carthage, a slave whose master he had cruelly put to death killed him secretly in a hunting expedition. Hannibal convicted him of this crime and put him to death with dreadful tortures. Now the army proclaimed Hannibal, although still very young, yet greatly beloved by the soldiers, their general, and the Carthaginian Senate confirmed the appointment. Those of the opposite faction, who had feared the power of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, when they learned of their death, despised Hannibal on account of his youth and prosecuted their friends and partisans with the old charges. The people took sides with the accusers, bearing a grudge against those now prosecuted, because they remembered the old severities of the times of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, and ordered them to turn into the public treasury the large gifts that Hamilcar and Hasdrubal had bestowed upon them, as being enemy's spoils. The prosecuted parties sent messengers to Hannibal asking him to assist them, and admonished him that, if he should neglect those who were able to assist him at home, he would be thoroughly despised by his father's enemies.

9. He had foreseen all this and he knew that the persecution of his friends was the beginning of a plot against himself. He determined that he would not endure this enmity as a perpetual menace, as his father and brother-in-law had done, nor put up forever with the fickleness of the Carthaginians, who usually repaid benefits with ingratitude. It was said also that when he was a boy he had taken an oath upon the altar, at his father's instance, that when he should arrive at man's estate he would be the implacable enemy of Rome. For these reasons he thought that, if he could involve his country in arduous and protracted undertakings and plunge it into doubts and fears, he would place his own

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affairs and those of his friends in a secure position. He beheld Africa, however, and the subject parts of Spain in peace. But if he could stir up a war with Rome, which he strongly desired, he thought that the Carthaginians would have enough to think about and to be afraid of, and that if he should be successful, he would reap immortal glory by gaining for his country the government of the habitable world (for when the Romans were conquered there would be no other rivals), and if he should fail, the attempt itself would bring him great renown.

B. C.

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10. Conceiving that if he should cross the Iberus that would constitute a brilliant beginning, he suborned the Turbulettes, neighbors of the Saguntines, that they should complain to him that the latter were overrunning their country and doing them many other wrongs. They made this complaint. Then Hannibal sent their ambassadors to Carthage, and wrote private letters saying that the Romans were inciting Carthaginian Spain to revolt, and that the Saguntines were cooperating with the Romans for this purpose. Nor did he desist from this deception, but kept sending messages of this kind until the Carthaginian Senate authorized him to deal with the Saguntines as he saw fit. Since he had a pretext, he arranged that the Turbulettes should come again to make complaints against the Saguntines, and that the latter should send legates also. When Hannibal commanded them to explain their differences to him, they replied that they should refer the matter to Rome. Hannibal thereupon ordered them out of his camp, and the next night crossed the Iberus with his whole army, laid waste the Saguntine territory, and planted engines against their city. Not being able to take it, he surrounded it with a wall and ditch, stationed plenty of guards, and pushed the siege at intervals.

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11. The Saguntines, oppressed by this sudden and unheralded attack, sent an embassy to Rome. The Senate commissioned its own ambassadors to go with them. They were instructed first to remind Hannibal of the agreement, and if he should not obey to proceed to Carthage and complain against him. When they arrived in Spain and were approaching his camp from the sea, Hannibal forbade their coming. Accordingly they sailed for Carthage with the Saguntine ambassadors, and reminded the Carthaginians of

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535 the agreement. The latter accused the Saguntines of committing many wrongs on their subjects. When the Saguntines offered to submit the whole question to the Romans as arbitrators, the Carthaginians replied that there was no use of an arbitration because they were able to avenge themselves. When this reply was brought to Rome some advised sending aid to the Saguntines. Others favored delay, saying that the Saguntines were not inscribed as allies in the agreement with them, but merely as free and autonomous, and that they were still free although besieged. The latter opinion prevailed.

12. The Saguntines, when they despaired of help from Rome, and when famine weighed heavily upon them, and Hannibal kept up the siege without intermission (for he had heard that the city was very prosperous and wealthy, and for this reason relaxed not the siege), issued an edict to bring all the silver and gold, public and private, to the forum, where they melted it with lead and brass, so that it should be useless to Hannibal. Then, thinking that it was better to die fighting than starve to death, they made a sally by night upon the besiegers while they were asleep and not expecting an attack, and killed some as they were getting out of bed, others as they were clumsily arming themselves, and still others who were actually fighting. The battle continued until many of the Africans and all the Saguntines were slain. When the women witnessed the slaughter of their husbands from the walls, some of them threw themselves from the housetops, others hanged themselves, and others slew their children and then themselves. Such was the end of Saguntum, once a great and powerful city. When Hannibal learned what had been done with the gold he was angry, and put all the surviving adults to death with torture. Observing that the city was not far from Carthage and with good land about it situated on the sea, he rebuilt it and made it a Carthaginian colony, and I think it is now called Spartarian Carthage.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> ἦν νῦν οἶμαι Καρχηδόνα καλεῖσθαι τὴν Σπαρταγενήν. This sentence has given rise to many conjectures as to the significance of the word "Spartagena." Schweighäuser, relying on a passage in Strabo (iii. iv. 10), which speaks of "the Spartarian plain" near New Carthage (the present Carthage) concludes that the word Σπαρταγενήν is another

## CHAPTER III

## War declared — The Two Scipios — Their Defeat and Death

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536B.C.  
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13. The Romans now sent ambassadors to Carthage to demand that Hannibal should be delivered up to them as a violator of the treaty unless they wished to assume the responsibility. If they would not give him up, war was to be declared forthwith. The ambassadors obeyed their instructions, and when the Carthaginians refused to give up Hannibal they declared war. It is said that it was done in the following manner. The chief of the embassy, pointing to the fold of his toga and smiling, said: "Here, Carthaginians, I bring you peace or war, you may take whichever you choose." The latter replied: "You may give us whichever you like." When the Romans offered war they all cried out: "We accept it." Then they wrote at once to Hannibal that he was free to overrun all Spain, as the treaty was at an end. Accordingly he marched against all the neighboring tribes and brought them under subjection, persuading some, terrifying others, and subduing the rest. Then he collected a large army, telling nobody what it was for, but intending to hurl it against Italy. He also sent out ambassadors among the Gauls, and caused an examination to be made of the passes of the Alps, which he traversed later, leaving his brother Hasdrubal in command in Spain.

14. When the Romans saw that war must be waged against the Carthaginians in Spain and Africa (for they never dreamed of an incursion of Africans into Italy), they sent Tiberius Sempronius Longus with 160 ships and two legions into Africa. What Longus and the other Roman generals did in Africa has been related in my Punic history.<sup>1</sup> They also ordered Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain with sixty

Greek form of the word used by Strabo. A Spartan plain means a plain covered with the fibrous plant *spartum* — the Esparto grass of modern commerce.

<sup>1</sup> No doings of Sempronius Longus in Africa are related in Appian's Punic history as it has reached us, or in any other history, so far as my knowledge extends. The consul Sempronius was carrying on war against the Carthaginians in Sicily at the time here mentioned. See Livy, xxii. 49 *seq.*

<sup>V. R.</sup>  
<sup>536</sup> ships, 10,000 foot, and 700 horse, and sent his brother <sup>B. C.</sup>  
 218 Gnæus Cornelius Scipio with him as a legate. The former (Publius), learning from Massilian merchants that Hannibal had crossed the Alps and entered Italy, and fearing lest he should fall upon the Italians unawares, turned over to his brother the command in Spain and sailed with his quinqueremes to Etruria. What he and the other Roman generals after him did in Italy, until, at the end of sixteen years and with exceeding difficulty, they drove Hannibal out of the country, will be shown in the following book, which will contain all the exploits of Hannibal in Italy, and is called the Hannibalic book of Roman history.

15. Gnæus did nothing in Spain worthy of mention before his brother Publius returned thither. When the latter's term of office expired, the Romans, having despatched the new consuls against Hannibal in Italy, appointed him proconsul, and sent him again into Spain. From this time the two Scipios managed the war in Spain, Hasdrubal being the general opposed to them until the Carthaginians recalled him and a part of his army to ward off an attack of Syphax, the ruler of the Numidians. The Scipios easily overcame the remainder. Many towns also came over to them voluntarily, for they were as persuasive in inducing subjects as in leading armies.

16. The Carthaginians, having made peace with Syphax, again sent Hasdrubal into Spain with a larger army than before, and with thirty elephants. With him came also two other generals, Mago and another Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco. After this the war became more serious to the Scipios. They were successful, nevertheless, and many Africans and elephants were destroyed by them. Finally, winter coming on, the Africans went into winter quarters at Turdania, Gnæus Scipio at Orso, and Publius at Castolo. When news was brought to the latter that Hasdrubal was approaching, he sallied out from the city with a small force to reconnoitre the enemy's camp and came upon Hasdrubal unexpectedly. He and his whole force were surrounded by <sup>542</sup> the enemy's horse and killed. Gnæus, who knew nothing <sup>212</sup> of this, sent some soldiers to his brother to procure corn, who fell in with another African force and became engaged with them. When Gnæus learned this he started out, with



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542 such troops as he had under arms, to assist them. The Carthaginians who had cut off the former party made a charge on Gnæus, and compelled him to take refuge in a certain tower, which they set on fire, and burned him and his comrades to death.

B.C.

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17. In this way the two Scipios perished, excellent men in every respect, and greatly regretted by those Spaniards who, by their labors, had been brought over to the Roman side. When the news reached Rome the people were greatly troubled. They sent Marcellus, who had lately come from Sicily, and with him Claudius [Nero], to Spain, with a fleet and 1000 horse, 10,000 foot, and sufficient means. As nothing of importance was accomplished by them, the Carthaginian power increased until it embraced almost the whole of Spain, and the Romans were restricted to a small space in the Pyrenees mountains. When this was learned in Rome the people were greatly discouraged, and apprehensive lest these same Africans should make an incursion into northern Italy while Hannibal was ravaging the other extremity. Although they desired to abandon the Spanish war it was not possible, because of the fear that that war would be transferred to Italy.

#### CHAPTER IV

Cornelius Scipio — Arrives in Spain — Attacks New Carthage —  
Captures the City and Vast Booty

543 18. Accordingly a day was fixed for choosing a general 211 for Spain. When nobody offered himself the alarm was greatly augmented, and a gloomy silence took possession of the assembly. Finally Cornelius Scipio, son of that Publius Cornelius who had lost his life in Spain, still a very young man (for he was only twenty-four years of age), but reputed to be discreet and high-minded, advanced and made an impressive discourse concerning his father and his uncle, and after lamenting their fate said that he was the only member of the family left to be the avenger of them and of his country. He spoke copiously and vehemently, like one possessed, promising to subdue not only Spain, but Africa and Carthage in addition. To many this seemed like youth-

Y.R. 543 ful boasting, but he revived the spirits of the people (for those who are cast down are cheered by promises), and was chosen general for Spain in the expectation that he would do something worthy of his high spirit. The older ones said that this was not high spirit, but foolhardiness. When Scipio heard of this he called the assembly together again, and repeated what he had said before, declaring that his youth would be no impediment, but he added that if any of his elders wished to assume the task he would willingly yield it to them. When nobody offered to take it, he was praised and admired still more, and he set forth with 10,000 foot and 500 horse. He was not allowed to take a larger force while Hannibal was ravaging Italy. He received money and apparatus of various kinds and twenty-eight war-ships with which he proceeded to Spain. B.C. 211

544 19. Taking the forces already there, and joining them in one body with those he brought, he performed a lustration, and made the same kind of grandiloquent speech to them that he had made at Rome. The report spread immediately through all Spain, wearied of the Carthaginian rule and longing for the virtue of the Scipios, that Scipio the son of Scipio had been sent to them as a general, by divine providence. When he heard of this report he took care to give out that everything he did was by inspiration from heaven. He learned that the enemy were quartered in four camps at considerable distances from each other, containing altogether 25,000 foot and above 2500 horse, and that they kept their supplies of money, food, arms, missiles, and ships, besides prisoners and hostages from all Spain, at the city formerly called Saguntum (but then called Carthage),<sup>1</sup> and that it was in charge of Mago with 10,000 Carthaginian soldiers. He decided to attack these first, on account of the smallness of the force and the great quantity of stores, and because he believed that this city, with its silver-mines and its rich and prosperous territory abounding in everything, and its very short passage to Africa, would constitute a secure base of operations by land and sea against the whole of Spain.

20. Excited with these thoughts and communicating his

<sup>1</sup> Another error in Appian's geography. Saguntum was not the site of New Carthage.

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intentions to no one, he led his army out at sunset and marched the whole night toward New Carthage. Arriving there the next morning he took the enemy by surprise and began to enclose the town with trenches and planned to open the siege the following day, placing ladders and engines everywhere except at one place where the wall was lowest and where, as it was encompassed by a lagoon and the sea, the guards were careless. Having charged the machines with stones and darts in the night, and stationed his fleet in the harbor so that the enemy's ships might not escape (for he had high hopes of capturing everything the city contained), at daylight he manned the engines, ordering some of his troops to assail the enemy above, while others propelled the engines against the walls below. Mago stationed his 10,000 men at the gates, some to sally out at a favorable opportunity with swords alone (since spears would be of no use in such a narrow space), and others to man the parapets. He made good use of his machines, stones, darts, and catapults, and did effective work. There was shouting and cheering on both sides, and neither was wanting in dash and courage. Stones, darts, and javelins filled the air, some thrown by hand, some by machines, and some by slings; and whatever other apparatus or force was available was made use of to the utmost.

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21. Scipio suffered severely. The 10,000 Carthaginians who were at the gates made sallies with drawn swords and fell upon those who were working the engines. Although they fought bravely, they suffered in their turn no less, until finally the perseverance and endurance of the Romans began to prevail. With the change of fortune, those who were on the walls began to be distressed. When the ladders were put in place, the Carthaginian swordsmen, who had sallied out, ran back through the gates, closed them, and mounted the walls. This gave new and severe labor to the Romans. Scipio, who, as commanding general, was everywhere, giving orders and cheering on his men, had noticed that, at the place where the wall was low and washed by the lagoon, the sea retired about midday. That was the daily ebb tide, for at one time of day the waves were up to one's breast; at another they were not knee high. When Scipio observed this, after ascertaining the nature of the tidal movement and

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that it would be low water for the rest of the day, he darted<sup>B.C.</sup> hither and thither, exclaiming: "Now, soldiers, now is our chance. Now the deity comes to my aid. Attack that part of the wall where the sea has made way for us. Bring the ladders. I will lead you."<sup>210</sup>

22. He was the first to seize a ladder and carry it into the lagoon, and he began to mount where nobody else had yet attempted to do so. But his armor-bearers and other soldiers surrounded him and held him back, while they brought a great number of ladders together, planted them against the wall, and began to mount. Amid shouts and clamor on all sides, giving and receiving blows, the Romans finally prevailed and succeeded in occupying some of the towers, where Scipio placed trumpeters and ordered them to sound a blast as though the city were already taken. This brought others to their assistance and created consternation among the enemy. Some of the Romans jumped down and opened the gates to Scipio, who rushed in with his army. Some of the inhabitants took refuge in their houses, but Mago drew up his 10,000 in the market-place. After most of these were cut down he fled with the remainder to the citadel, which Scipio immediately invested. When Mago saw that he could do nothing with his beaten and cowering force, he surrendered.

23. Having taken this rich and powerful city by audacity and good fortune in one day (the fourth after his arrival), he was greatly elated and it seemed more than ever that he was divinely inspired. He began to think so himself and to give it out to others, not only then, but all the rest of his life. At all events, he frequently went into the Capitol alone and closed the doors as though he were receiving counsel from the god. Even now in public processions they bring the image of Scipio alone out of the Capitol, all the others being taken from the Forum. In the captured city he obtained great stores of goods, useful in peace and war, many arms, darts, engines, dockyards containing thirty-three war-ships, corn, and provisions of various kinds, ivory, gold, and silver, some in the form of plate, some coined and some uncoined, also Spanish hostages and prisoners, and everything that had previously been captured from the Romans themselves. On the following day he sacrificed to

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the gods, celebrated the victory, praised the soldiers for their bravery, and after his words to his army made a speech to the townspeople in which he admonished them not to forget the name of the Scipios. He dismissed all the Spanish prisoners to their homes in order to conciliate the towns. He gave rewards to his soldiers for bravery, the largest to the one who first scaled the wall, half as much to the next, one-third as much to the next, and to the others according to their merit. The rest of the gold, silver, and ivory he sent to Rome in the captured ships. The city held a three days' thanksgiving, because after so many trials their ancestral good fortune had shown itself once more. All Spain, and the Carthaginians who were there, were astounded at the magnitude and suddenness of this exploit.

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## CHAPTER V

## Scipio marches against the Two Hasdrubals — Battle of Carmone

24. Scipio placed a garrison in New Carthage and ordered that the wall which was washed by the tide should be raised to the proper height. He then moved against the rest of Spain, sending friends to conciliate where he could, and subduing the others. There were two Carthaginian generals still remaining, both named Hasdrubal. One of these, the son of Hamilcar, was recruiting an army of mercenaries far away among the Celtiberians. The other, the son of Gisco, sent messengers to the towns that were still faithful, urging them to maintain their Carthaginian allegiance, because an army of countless numbers would soon come to their assistance. He sent another Mago<sup>1</sup> into the neighboring country to recruit mercenaries wherever he could, while he made an incursion into the territory of Lersa which had revolted, intending to lay siege to some town there. On the approach of Scipio he retreated to Bætica and encamped before that city.<sup>2</sup> On the following day he

<sup>1</sup> *Μάγωνα δ' ἕτερον*. "Another Mago," *i.e.*, not the one who was captured by Scipio in New Carthage, but the one mentioned in sec. 16, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> There was a province, but no city of the name of Bætica in Spain. Schweighäuser has a very long note on this passage, which need not be recapitulated, since it leaves us as much in the dark as before.

V. R.

544 was defeated by Scipio, who captured his camp and Bætica also. B. C. 210

547 25. Now this Hasdrubal ordered all the remaining Carthaginian forces in Spain to be collected at the city of Carmone to fight Scipio with their united strength. Hither came a great number of Spaniards under the lead of Mago, and of Numidians under Masinissa. Hasdrubal had the infantry in a fortified camp, Masinissa and Mago, who commanded the cavalry, bivouacking in front of it. Scipio divided his own horse so that Lælius should attack Mago while he himself should be opposed to Masinissa. This fight was for some time doubtful and severe to Scipio, since the Numidians discharged their darts at his men, then suddenly retreated, and then wheeled and returned to the charge. But when Scipio ordered his men to hurl their javelins and then pursue without intermission, the Numidians, having no chance to turn around, retreated to their camp. Here Scipio desisted from the pursuit and encamped in a strong position, which he had chosen, about ten stades from the enemy. The total strength of the enemy was 70,000 foot, 5000 horse, and thirty-six elephants. That of Scipio was not one-third of the number. For some time, therefore, he hesitated and did not venture a fight, except some light skirmishes.

26. When his supplies began to fail and hunger attacked his army, Scipio considered that it would be base to retreat. Accordingly he sacrificed, and bringing the soldiers to an audience immediately after the sacrifice, and putting on again the look and aspect of one inspired, he said that the deity had appeared to him in the customary way and told him to attack the enemy, and had assured him that it was better to trust in heaven than in the size of his army because his former victories were gained by divine favor rather than by numerical strength. In order to inspire confidence in his words he commanded the priests to bring the entrails into the assembly. While he was speaking he saw some birds flying overhead with great swiftness and clamor. Looking up he pointed them out and exclaimed this was a sign of victory which the gods had sent him. He followed their movement, gazing at them and crying out like one possessed. The whole army, as it saw him turning hither and

Y.R. 547 thither, imitated his actions, and all were fired with the idea of certain victory. When he had everything as he wished he did not hesitate, nor permit their ardor to cool, but still as one inspired exclaimed: "These signs tell us that we must fight at once." When they had taken their food he ordered them to arm themselves, and led them against the enemy, who were not expecting them, giving the command of the horse to Silanus and of the foot to Lælius and Marcius. B.C. 207

27. Hasdrubal, Mago, and Masinissa, when Scipio was coming upon them unawares, being only ten stades distant, and their soldiers not having taken their food, drew up their forces in haste, amid confusion and tumult. Battle being joined with both cavalry and infantry, the Roman horse prevailed over the enemy by the same tactics as before, by giving no respite to the Numidians (who were accustomed to retreat and advance by turns), thus making their darts of no effect by reason of their nearness. The infantry were severely pressed by the great numbers of the Africans and were worsted by them all day long, nor could Scipio stem the tide of battle, although he was everywhere cheering them on. Finally, giving his horse in charge of a boy, and snatching a shield from a soldier, he dashed alone into the space between the two armies, shouting: "Romans, rescue your Scipio in his peril."<sup>1</sup> Then those who were near seeing, and those who were distant hearing, what danger he was in, and all being in like manner moved by a sense of shame and fear for their general's safety, charged furiously upon the enemy, uttering loud cries. The Africans were unable to resist this charge. They gave way, as their strength was failing for lack of food, of which they had had none all day. Then, for a short space of time, there was a terrific slaughter. Such was the result to Scipio of the battle of Carmone, although it had been for a long time doubtful. The Roman loss was 800; that of the enemy 15,000.

<sup>1</sup> ἐπικουρεῖτε, ὦ Ῥωμαῖοι, κινδυνεύοντι ὑμῶν τῷ Σκίπιῳ. The Latin version of Cœlius Secundus Curio renders the last three words "your Scipio," and Schweighäuser concurs, but the latter prints a note by Henry Stephen who affirms that that is not a good Greek locution, and that the rendering should be, "rescue Scipio who incurs danger in your behalf," a criticism which can hardly be sustained.

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547B.C.  
207

28. After this engagement the enemy retreated with all speed, and Scipio followed dealing blows and doing damage whenever he could overtake them. After they had occupied a stronghold, where there was plenty of food and water, and where nothing could be done but lay siege to them, Scipio was called away on other business. He left Silanus to carry on the siege while he went into other parts of Spain and subdued them. The Africans who were besieged by Silanus deserted their position and retreated again until they came to the straits and passed on to Gades. Silanus, having done them all the harm he could, rejoined Scipio at New Carthage. In the meantime Hasdrubal, the son of Hamilcar, who was still collecting troops along the Northern ocean, was called by his brother Hannibal to march in all haste to Italy. In order to deceive Scipio he moved along the northern coast, and passed over the Pyrenees into Gaul with the Celtiberian mercenaries whom he had enlisted. In this way he was hastening into Italy without the knowledge of the Italians.

## CHAPTER VI

Scipio visits Africa — Other operations in Spain — Destruction of Ilurgia — The Fate of Astapa

548 29. Now Lucius [his brother], having returned from 206 Rome, told Scipio that the Romans were thinking of sending the latter as general to Africa. Scipio had strongly desired this for some time and hoped that events might take this turn. Accordingly he sent Lælius with five ships to Africa on a mission to King Syphax, to make presents to him and remind him of the friendship of the Scipios, and ask him to join the Romans if they should make an expedition to Africa. He promised to do so, accepted the presents, and sent others in return. When the Carthaginians discovered this they also sent envoys to Syphax to seek his alliance. When Scipio heard of this, judging that it was a matter of importance to win and confirm the alliance of Syphax against the Carthaginians, he took Lælius and went over to Africa with two ships, to see Syphax in person.

30. When he was approaching the shore the Carthaginian envoys who were still with Syphax sailed out against him



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548 with their war-ships, without Syphax's knowledge. But he spread his sails, outran them completely, and reached the harbor. Syphax entertained both parties, but he made an alliance with Scipio privately, and having exchanged pledges sent him away. He also detained the Carthaginians, who were again lying in wait for Scipio, until he was a good distance out to sea. So much danger did Scipio incur both going and returning. It is reported that at a banquet given by Syphax, Scipio reclined on the same couch with Hasdrubal and that the latter questioned him about many things, and was greatly impressed with his gravity, and afterwards said to his friends that Scipio was formidable not only in war but also at a feast. B. C.  
206

31. At this time certain of the Celtiberians and Spaniards were still serving under Mago as mercenaries, although their towns had gone over to the Romans. Marcius set upon them, slew 1500, and scattered the rest of them among their towns. He corralled 700 horse and 6000 foot of the same force, of whom Hanno was in command, on a hill. When they were reduced to extremities by hunger they sent messengers to Marcius to obtain terms. He told them first to surrender Hanno and the deserters, and then he would treat. Accordingly they seized Hanno, although he was their general and was listening to the conversation, and they delivered up the deserters. Then Marcius demanded the prisoners also. When he had received these he ordered them to bring a specified sum of money down to a certain point in the plain, because the high ground was not a suitable place for suppliants. When they had come down to the plain he said: "You deserve to be put to death for adhering to the enemy and waging war against us after your country has espoused our side. Nevertheless, if you will lay down your arms, I will allow you to go unpunished." At this they were very angry and exclaimed with one voice that they would not lay down their arms. A severe engagement ensued in which about half of the Celtiberians fell, not unavenged, the other half escaping to Mago, who had arrived a little before at the camp of Hanno with sixty war-ships. When he learned of Hanno's disaster he sailed to Gades and awaited the turn of events, meanwhile suffering from want of provisions.

32. While Mago lay here inert, Silanus was sent by Scipio

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548 to receive the submission of the city of Castax. When the inhabitants received him in a hostile manner, he encamped before it, and communicated the fact to Scipio. The latter sent him some siege engines and prepared to follow, but turned aside to attack the town of Ilurgia. This place had been an ally of the Romans in the time of the elder Scipio, but at his death changed sides secretly, and having given shelter to the Roman soldiers who had fled thither supposing it to be friendly, had delivered them up to the Carthaginians. To avenge this crime Scipio in his indignation took the place in four hours, and, although wounded in the neck, did not desist from the fight until he had conquered. The soldiers, for his sake, in their fury even forgot to plunder the town, but slew the whole population, including women and children, although nobody gave them any orders to do so, and did not desist until the whole place was razed to the ground. When he arrived at Castax, Scipio divided his army into three parts and invested the city. He did not press the siege, however, but gave the inhabitants time to repent, having heard that they were so disposed. The latter, having slain those of the garrison who objected and put down all opposition, surrendered the place to Scipio, who stationed a new garrison there and placed the town under the government of one of its own citizens, a man of high reputation. He then returned to New Carthage, and sent Silanus and Marcius to the straits to devastate the country as much as they could.

B.C.  
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33. There was a town named Astapa which had been always and wholly of the Carthaginian party. Marcius laid siege to it, and the inhabitants foresaw that, if they were captured by the Romans, they would be reduced to slavery. Accordingly they brought all their valuables into the market-place, piled wood around them, and put their wives and children on the heap. They made fifty of their principal men take an oath that whenever they should see that the city must fall, they would kill the women and children, set fire to the pile, and slay themselves thereon. Then calling the gods to witness what they had done, they sallied out against Marcius, who did not anticipate anything of the kind. For this reason they easily repulsed the light-armed troops and cavalry whom they met. When they became

v. r. <sup>B. C.</sup>  
548 engaged with the legionaries, they still had the best of it, <sup>206</sup>  
because they fought with desperation. Finally the Romans overpowered them by sheer numbers, for the Astapians certainly were not inferior to them in bravery. When they had all fallen, the fifty who remained behind slew the women and children, kindled the fire, and flung themselves on it, thus leaving the enemy a barren victory. Marcius, in admiration of the bravery of the Astapians, spared the houses.

## CHAPTER VII

Mutiny in Scipio's Army—The Mutiny suppressed—Masinissa makes an Alliance with Scipio

34. After this Scipio fell sick, and the command of the army devolved on Marcius. Some of the soldiers, who had squandered their means in riotous living, and who thought that because they had nothing they had found no fit compensation for their toils, but that Scipio was appropriating all the glory of their deeds, seceded from Marcius and went off and encamped by themselves. Many from the garrisons joined them. Messengers came to them from Mago, bringing money and inviting them to revolt to him. They took the money, chose generals and centurions from their own number, made other arrangements to their liking, put themselves under military discipline, and exchanged oaths with each other. When Scipio learned this, he sent word to the seceders separately that on account of his sickness he had not yet been able to remunerate them for their services. He urged others to try and win back their erring comrades. He also sent a letter to all the soldiers in common, as though they had already been reconciled, saying that he was about ready to discharge his debt to them, and telling them to come to New Carthage and get their provisions.

35. Upon reading these letters, some thought that they were not to be trusted. Others put faith in them. Finally they came to an agreement that all should go to New Carthage together. When they were coming, Scipio enjoined upon those senators who were with him that each one

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should attach himself to some one of the leaders of the sedition as they came in, as if to admonish him in a friendly way, should then make him his guest, and quietly secure him. He also ordered the military tribunes that each should have his most faithful soldiers in readiness at daylight unobserved, with their swords, and station them at intervals in convenient places about the assembly, and if any tumult should arise, to draw their weapons and kill at once, without waiting for orders. Shortly after daybreak, Scipio was conveyed to the tribunal, and he sent the heralds around to summon the soldiers to the place of meeting. The call was unexpected to them and they were ashamed to keep their sick general waiting. They thought also that they were only called to get their rewards. So they came running together from all sides, some without their swords, others dressed only in their tunics, not having had time to put on all their clothing, by reason of their haste.

B.C.

206

36. Scipio, having a guard around himself that was not observed, first accused them of their misdeeds. "Nevertheless," he said, "the blame belongs only to the authors of the conspiracy, whom I will punish with your help." He had scarcely said this when he ordered the lictors to divide the crowd in two parts, and when they had done so the senators dragged the guilty leaders into the middle of the assembly. When they cried out and called their comrades to their aid, every one who uttered a word was killed by the tribunes. The rest of the crowd, seeing that the assembly was surrounded by armed men, remained in sullen silence. Then Scipio caused the wretches who had been dragged to the middle space to be beaten with rods, those who had cried for help being beaten hardest, after which he ordered that their necks should be fastened to stakes driven in the ground and their heads cut off. The heralds proclaimed pardon to the rest. In this way was the mutiny in Scipio's camp put down.<sup>1</sup>

37. While the mutiny was going on in the Roman army, a certain Indibilis, one of the chiefs who had come to an understanding with Scipio, made an incursion into the territory of Scipio's allies. When Scipio marched against him

<sup>1</sup> This mutiny is described at great length by Livy (xxviii. 24).

<sup>Y. R.</sup>  
548 he made a very stiff fight, and killed some 1200 of the <sup>B. C.</sup>  
Romans, but having lost 20,000 of his own men he sued for 206  
peace. Scipio made him pay a fine, and then came to an  
agreement with him. At this time also Masinissa crossed  
the straits, without the knowledge of Hasdrubal, and estab-  
lished friendly relations with Scipio, and swore to join him  
if the war should be carried into Africa. This man re-  
mained faithful under all circumstances and for the fol-  
lowing reason. The daughter of Hasdrubal had been  
betrothed to him while he was fighting under the latter's  
command. But King Syphax was desperately in love with  
the same girl, and the Carthaginians, considering it a matter  
of great moment to secure Syphax against the Romans, gave  
her to him without consulting Hasdrubal. The latter, when  
he heard of it, concealed it from Masinissa out of regard  
for him. When Masinissa learned the facts he made an  
alliance with Scipio. Mago, the admiral, despairing of  
Carthaginian success in Spain, sailed to the country of the  
Ligurians and the Gauls to recruit mercenaries. While he  
was absent on this business the Romans took possession of  
Gades, which he had abandoned.

549 38. From this time, which was a little before the 144th <sup>205</sup>  
Olympiad, the Romans began to send prætors to Spain  
yearly to the conquered nations as governors or superin-  
tendents to keep the peace. Scipio left them a small force  
suitable for a peace establishment, and settled his sick and  
wounded soldiers in a town which he named Italica after  
Italy, and this was the native place of Trajan and Hadrian,  
who afterwards became emperors of Rome. Scipio himself  
sailed for Rome with a large fleet magnificently arrayed,  
and loaded down with captives, money, arms, and all kinds  
of booty. The city gave him a glorious reception, bestowing  
noble and unprecedented honors upon him on account of  
his youth and the rapidity and greatness of his exploits.  
Even those who envied him acknowledged that his boastful  
promises of long ago were realized in facts. And so, ad-  
mired by all, he was awarded the honor of a triumph. As  
soon as Scipio departed from Spain, Indibilis rebelled again.  
The generals in Spain, collecting together an army from the  
garrisons and such forces as they could obtain from the  
subject tribes, defeated and slew him. Those who were

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549
B. C.  
205
 guilty of inciting the revolt were brought to trial, and punished with loss of goods and death. The tribes that took sides with Indibilis were fined, deprived of their arms, required to give hostages, and placed under stronger garrisons. These things happened just after Scipio's departure. And so the first war undertaken by the Romans in Spain came to an end.

## CHAPTER VIII

Cato the Censor — His Victory in Spain — Revolt of the Lusones —  
The Elder Gracchus in Spain

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 39. Subsequently, when the Romans were at war with the Gauls on the Po, and with Philip of Macedon, the Spaniards attempted another revolution, thinking the Romans now too distracted to heed them. Sempronius Tuditanus and Marcus Helvius were sent from Rome as generals against them, and after them Minucius. As the disturbance became greater,

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 Cato was sent in addition, with larger forces. He was still a very young man, austere, laborious, and of such solid understanding and superb eloquence that the Romans called him Demosthenes for his speeches, for they learned that Demosthenes had been the greatest orator of Greece.

40. When Cato arrived in Spain at the place called Emporia, the enemy from all quarters assembled against him to the number of 40,000. He took a short time to discipline his forces. When he was about to fight he sent away the ships which he had brought, to Massilia. Then he told his soldiers that they had not so much to fear from the superior numbers of the enemy (for courage could always overcome numbers), as from their own want of ships, so that there was no safety for them unless they beat the enemy. With these words he had not inspired his army, as would other generals, with hope — but with fear; then he ordered an engagement. But when battle was joined he flew hither and thither exhorting and cheering his troops. When the conflict had continued doubtful till evening and many had fallen on both sides, he ascended a high hill with three cohorts of the reserve, where he could overlook the whole field. When he saw the centre of his own line sorely

Y.R.

559 pressed he sprang to their relief, exposing himself to danger, 195 and broke the ranks of the enemy with a charge and a shout, and here his victory began. He pursued them the whole night, captured their camp, and slew a vast number. Upon his return the soldiers congratulated and embraced him as the author of the victory. After this he gave the army a rest and sold the plunder.

B.C.

41. Now envoys came to him from all sides, from whom he required hostages. To each of their towns he sent sealed letters, and he charged the bearers that they should all deliver the letters on one and the same day, for he had fixed the day by calculating how long it would take to reach the farthest town. The letters commanded the magistrates of all the towns to demolish their walls on the very day they received the order. If there was a day's delay he threatened to sell them into slavery. They, having been lately vanquished in a great battle, and not knowing whether these orders had been sent to them alone or to all, were much perplexed, for if it were to them alone they felt that they were but weak objects of scorn, but if it were to the others also, they feared to be the only ones to delay. Wherefore, as they had no time to send to each other, and the officers who brought the letters urged them to obey, they decided to do so, each town consulting its own safety. And so they threw down their walls with all speed, for when they had once decided to obey they thought that those who did the work most expeditiously would receive most favor. Thus the towns along the river Iberus in one day, and by one act of generalship, levelled their own walls. Being less able to resist the Romans thereafter, they remained longer at peace.

573 42. Four Olympiads later,—that is, about the 150th 18x Olympiad,—many Spanish tribes, having insufficient land, including the Lusones and others who dwelt along the river Iberus, revolted from the Roman rule. These being overcome in battle by the consul Fulvius Flaccus, the greater part of them scattered among their towns. The rest, being destitute of land and living a vagabond life, collected at Complega, a city newly built and fortified, and which had grown rapidly. Sallying out from this place they demanded that Flaccus should deliver to each of them a cloak, a horse,

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and a sword as recompense for their dead in the late war, and take himself out of Spain or suffer the consequences. Flaccus replied that he would bring them plenty of cloaks, and following closely after their messengers, he encamped before the city. Far from making good their threats, they took to their heels, plundering the neighboring barbarians on the road. These people wore a thick outer garment with a double fold which they fastened with a clasp after the manner of the military cloak, and they called it the *sagum*.

B.C.

181

575 43. Flaccus was succeeded in the command by Tiberius 179

Sempronius Gracchus, at which time the city of Caravis, which was in alliance with Rome, was besieged by 20,000 Celtiberians. As it was reported that the place was about to be taken Gracchus hastened all the more to relieve it. He could but circle about the besiegers, and had no means of communicating to the town his own nearness. Cominius, a prefect of horse, having considered the matter carefully, and communicated his plan to Gracchus, donned a Spanish *sagum* and secretly mingled with the enemy's foragers. In this way he gained entrance to their camp as a Spaniard, and passed through it into Caravis and told the people that Gracchus was approaching. Wherefore they endured the siege patiently and were saved, for Gracchus arrived three days later, and the besiegers fled. About the same time the inhabitants of Complega, to the number of 20,000, came to Gracchus' camp in the guise of petitioners bearing olive-branches, and when they arrived they attacked him unexpectedly, and threw everything into confusion. Gracchus adroitly abandoned his camp to them and simulated flight; then suddenly turning he fell upon them while they were plundering, killed most of them, and captured Complega and the surrounding country. Then he divided the land among the poor and settled them on it, and made carefully defined treaties with all the tribes, binding them to be the friends of Rome, and giving and receiving oaths to that effect. These treaties were often longed for in the subsequent wars. In this way Gracchus became celebrated both in Spain and in Rome, and was awarded a splendid triumph.



## CHAPTER IX

The Belli and the Titthi — Beginning of the Numantine War — Claudius Marcellus in Spain — Makes an Armistice — Licinius Lucullus succeeds Him — His Infamous Conduct — Scipio Africanus the Younger — Retreat of the Romans

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
<sup>600</sup> 44. Some years later another serious war broke out in <sup>B.C.</sup>  
Spain for the following reason: Segeda, a large and powerful city of a Celtiberian tribe called the Belli, was included in the treaties made by Gracchus. It persuaded some of the smaller towns to settle in its own borders, and then surrounded itself with a wall forty stades in circumference. It also forced the Titthi, a neighboring tribe, to join in the undertaking. When the Senate learned this it forbade the building of the wall, demanded the tribute imposed by Gracchus, and ordered the inhabitants to furnish a contingent for the Roman army, for this was one of the stipulations of the treaty made with Gracchus. As to the wall they replied that the Celtiberians were forbidden by Gracchus to build new cities, but not forbidden to fortify existing ones. As to the tribute and the military contingent they said that they had been released from these requirements by the Romans themselves subsequently. This was true, but the Senate, when granting these exemptions, always added that they should continue only during the pleasure of the Roman people.

<sup>601</sup> 45. Accordingly the prætor Nobilior was sent against <sup>153</sup>  
them with an army of nearly 30,000 men. When the Segedians learned of his coming, their wall not being yet finished, they fled with their wives and children to the Arevaci and begged that the latter would receive them. The Arevaci did so, and also chose a Segedian named Carus, whom they considered skilful in war, as their general. On the third day after his election he placed 20,000 foot and 500 horse in ambush in a dense forest and fell upon the Romans as they were passing through. The battle was for a long time doubtful, but in the end he gained a splendid victory, 6000 Roman citizens being slain. So great a disaster befell the city on that day. But while he was engaged in a disorderly pursuit after the victory, the Roman horse,

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B. C.

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who were guarding the baggage, fell upon him and killed Carus himself, who was performing prodigies of valor, and not less than 6000 others with him. Finally night put an end to the conflict. This disaster happened on the day on which the Romans are accustomed to celebrate the festival of Vulcan. For which reason, from that time on, no general will begin a battle on that day unless compelled to do so.

46. The Arevaci convened immediately, even in the night, at Numantia, which was a very strong city, and chose Ambo and Leuco as their generals. Three days later Nobilior advanced and pitched his camp twenty-four stades from the place. Here he was joined by 300 horse and ten elephants sent to him by Masinissa. When he moved against the enemy he placed these animals in the rear where they could not be seen. Then when battle was joined the army divided and brought the elephants into view. The Celtiberians and their horses, who had never seen elephants before, were thunderstruck and fled to the city. Nobilior advanced at once against the city walls, where the battle raged fiercely, until one of the elephants was struck on the head with a large falling stone, when he became savage, uttered a loud cry, turned upon his friends, and began to destroy everything that came in his way, making no distinction between friend and foe. The other elephants, excited by his cries, all began to do the same, trampling the Romans under foot, scattering and hurling them this way and that. This is always the way with elephants when they are enraged. Then they take everybody for foes; wherefore some people call them the common enemy, on account of their fickleness. The Romans took to disorderly flight. When the Numantines perceived this they sallied out and pursued them, killing about 4000 men and three elephants. They also captured many arms and standards. The loss of the Celtiberians was about 2000.

47. Nobilior, recovering a little from this disaster, made an attack upon the stores which the enemy had collected at the town of Axinium, but he accomplished nothing, and having lost many of his men there, he returned by night to his camp. Thence he sent Biesius, his master of horse, to secure the alliance of a neighboring tribe and to ask for assist-

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
<sup>601</sup>ance in the way of cavalry. They gave him some, and as <sup>B.C.</sup>  
 he was returning with them the Celtiberians laid an ambush <sup>153</sup>  
 for him. The ambush was discovered and the allies escaped,  
 but Biesius, who engaged the enemy, was killed and many  
 of his soldiers with him. Under the influence of such a  
 succession of disasters to the Romans, the town of Ocilis,  
 where their provisions and money were stored, revolted to  
 the Celtiberians. Then Nobilior in despair went into winter  
 quarters in his camp, sheltering himself as well as he could.  
 He suffered much from scantiness of supplies, having only  
 what was inside the camp, and from heavy snowstorms and  
 severe frost, so that many of his men perished while outside  
 gathering wood, and others inside fell victims to confine-  
 ment and cold.

<sup>602</sup> 48. The following year Claudius Marcellus succeeded <sup>154</sup>  
 Nobilior in the command, bringing with him 8000 foot and  
 500 horse. The enemy laid an ambush for him also, but he  
 moved with circumspection and pitched his camp before  
 Ocilis with his whole army. As he was renowned for good  
 fortune in war, he brought the place to terms at once and  
 granted it pardon, taking hostages and imposing a fine of  
 thirty talents of silver. The Nergobriges, hearing of his  
 moderation, sent and asked what they could do to obtain  
 peace. In reply he ordered them to furnish him 100 horse-  
 men as auxiliaries, and they promised to do so, but in the  
 meantime they were attacking the rear guard of the Romans  
 and carried off a lot of baggage. When the leaders of the  
 hundred horse arrived according to agreement, and were  
 interrogated about the attack on the rear guard, they re-  
 plied that this had been done by some of their people who  
 did not know of the agreement. Marcellus then put the  
 hundred horsemen in chains, sold their horses, devastated  
 their country, distributed the plunder to his soldiers, and  
 besieged the city. When the Nergobriges saw the engines  
 advanced and the mounds thrown up against their walls they  
 sent a herald, who wore a wolf's skin instead of bearing a  
 caduceus, and begged forgiveness. Marcellus replied that  
 he would not grant it unless all the Arevaci, the Belli, and  
 the Titthi would ask it together. When these tribes heard  
 of this, they sent ambassadors eagerly, and begged that  
 Marcellus would let them off with a light punishment and

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renew the terms of the agreement made with Gracchus. This petition was opposed by some of the country people who had been incited to war by them.

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49. Marcellus sent ambassadors from each party to Rome to carry on their dispute there. At the same time he sent private letters to the Senate urging peace. He desired that the war should be brought to an end by himself, thinking that he should gain glory thereby. Some of the ambassadors from the friendly faction on coming to the city were treated as guests, but, as was customary, those from the hostile faction lodged outside the walls. The Senate rejected the proposal of peace and took it ill that these people had refused terms to the Romans when they were asked by Nobilior, the predecessor of Marcellus. So they replied that Marcellus would announce the Senate's decision to them. And now for the first time they chose an army for Spain by lot, instead of the customary levy, for since many had complained that they had been treated unjustly by the consuls in the enrolment, while others had been chosen for easy service, it was decided now to choose by lot. The consul Licinius Lucullus was appointed to the command, and he had for his lieutenant Cornelius Scipio who was not long afterwards distinguished as the conqueror of Carthage and of Numantia.

50. While Lucullus was on the march Marcellus notified the Celtiberians of the coming war, and gave back the hostages in response to their request. Then he sent for the chief of the Celtiberian embassy in Rome and conferred with him privately a long time. From this circumstance it was then suspected, and was strongly confirmed by later events, that he sought to persuade them to put their affairs in his hands, because he tried in every way to bring the war to an end before the arrival of Lucullus. Directly after this conference 5000 of the Arevaci took possession of the city of Nergobriga. Marcellus marched against Numantia, encamped at a distance of five stades from it, and was driving the Numantines inside the walls when their leader Litenno halted and called out that he would like to have a conference with Marcellus. This being granted he said that the Belli, Titthi, and Arevaci would put themselves entirely in his hands. He was delighted to hear this and having de-

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manded and received hostages and money, he let them go free. Thus the war with the Belli, the Titthi, and the Arevaci was brought to an end before Lucullus arrived.

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51. Lucullus being greedy of fame and needing money, because he was in straitened circumstances, invaded the territory of the Vaccæi, another Celtiberian tribe, neighbors of the Arevaci, against whom war had not been declared by the Senate, nor had they ever attacked the Romans, or offended Lucullus himself. Crossing the river Tagus he came to the city of Cauca, and pitched his camp near it. The citizens asked him what he had come for and what occasion there was for war, and when he replied that he had come to aid the Carpetani whom the Vaccæi had maltreated they retired inside their walls, from which they sallied out and fell upon his wood-cutters and foragers, killing many and pursuing the remainder to the camp. When battle was joined the Cauçæi, who resembled light-armed troops, had the advantage at first, but when they had expended all their darts they were obliged to fly, not being accustomed to a standing fight, and while forcing their way through the gates about 3000 of them were slain.

52. The next day the elders of the city came out wearing crowns on their heads and bearing olive-branches, and asked Lucullus what they should do to establish friendly relations. He replied that they must give hostages and 100 talents of silver, and furnish a contingent of horse to the Roman army. When all these demands had been complied with he asked that a Roman garrison should be admitted to the city. When the Cauçæi assented to this he brought in 2000 soldiers carefully chosen, to whom he gave orders that when they were admitted they should occupy the walls. When this was done Lucullus introduced the rest of his army and ordered them at the sound of the trumpet to kill all the adult males of the Cauçæi. The latter, invoking the gods who preside over promises and oaths, and upbraiding the perfidy of the Romans, were cruelly slain, only a few out of 20,000 escaping by leaping down the sheer walls at the gates. Lucullus sacked the city and brought infamy upon the Roman name. The rest of the barbarians collecting together from the fields took refuge among inaccessible rocks or in the most strongly fortified towns, carrying away what

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603 they could, and burning what they were obliged to leave, <sup>B. C.</sup> 151 so that Lucullus should not find any plunder.

53. The latter, having traversed a long stretch of deserted country, came to the city of Intercatia where more than 20,000 foot and 2000 horse had taken refuge together. Lucullus very foolishly invited them to enter into a treaty. They reproached him with the slaughter of the Caucaei, and asked him whether he invited them to the same kind of a pledge that he had given to that people. He, like all guilty souls, being angry with his accusers instead of reproaching himself, laid waste their fields. Then he drew a line of siege around the city, threw up several mounds, and repeatedly set his forces in order of battle to provoke a fight. The enemy did not respond but fought with projectiles only. There was a certain barbarian distinguished by his splendid armor, who frequently rode into the space between the armies and challenged the Romans to single combat, and when nobody accepted the challenge he jeered at them, made insulting gestures, and went back. After he had done this several times, Scipio, who was still a youth, felt very much aggrieved, and springing forward accepted the challenge. Fortunately he won the victory over this giant although he was himself a man of small size.

54. This victory raised the spirits of the Romans, but the next night they were seized with panic. A body of the enemy's horse who had gone out foraging before Lucullus arrived, returned and not finding any entrance to the city because it was surrounded by the besiegers, ran about shouting and creating disturbance while those inside the walls shouted back. These noises caused strange terror in the Roman camp. Their soldiers were sick from want of sleep, and because of the unaccustomed food which the country afforded. They had no wine, no salt, no vinegar, no oil, but lived on wheat and barley, and the flesh of deer and rabbits boiled without salt, which caused dysentery, from which many died. Finally when a mound was completed so that they could batter the enemy's walls, they knocked down a section and rushed into the city, but they were speedily overpowered. Being compelled to retreat and being unacquainted with the ground, they fell into a reservoir where many perished. The following night the barbarians repaired

V.R. 603 their broken wall. As both sides were now suffering severely (for famine had fastened upon both), Scipio promised the barbarians that if they would make a treaty it should not be violated. They had so much confidence in his word that the war was brought to an end on these conditions: The Intercatii to give to Lucullus 10,000 cloaks, a certain number of cattle, and fifty hostages. As for the gold and silver that Lucullus was after (and for the sake of which he had waged this war, thinking that all Spain abounded with gold and silver), he got nothing. Not only did they have none, but these particular Celtiberians did not set any value on those metals. B.C. 131

55. He went next to Pallantia, a city more renowned for bravery, where many refugees had congregated, for which reason he was advised by some to pass by without making an attempt upon it. But, having heard that it was a rich place, he would not go away until the Pallantian horse, by incessantly harassing his foragers, prevented him from getting supplies. When his food was exhausted Lucullus withdrew his army, marching in the form of a square, and pursued by the Pallantians as far as the river Durius. From that place the Pallantians returned by night to their own country. Lucullus passed into the territory of the Turditani, and went into winter quarters. This was the end of the war with the Vaccæi, which was waged by Lucullus without the authority of the Roman people, but he was never called to account for it.

## CHAPTER X

The Lusitanian War — The Doings of Mummius — Servius Galba — His Infamous Conduct

599 56. At this time another part of autonomous Spain 135 called Lusitania, under Punicus as leader, was ravaging the fields of the Roman subjects and having put to flight their prætors (first Manilius and then Calpurnius Piso), killed 6000 Romans and among them Terentius Varro, the quæstor. Elated by this success Punicus swept the country as far as the ocean, and joining the Vettones to his army he laid siege to the Blastophœnicæ, who were Roman subjects. It is said

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B. C.

599 that Hannibal, the Carthaginian, brought among these people 155  
settlers from Africa, from whence they derived their name.  
Here Punicus was struck on the head with a stone and killed.  
He was succeeded by a man named Cæsarus. The latter  
joined battle with Mummius, who came from Rome with  
another army, was defeated and put to flight, but as Mummius  
was pursuing him in a disorderly way, he rallied and slew  
about 9000 Romans, recaptured the plunder they had taken  
from him as well as his own camp, and took that of the  
Romans also, together with many arms and standards which  
the barbarians in derision carried throughout all Celtiberia.

601 57. Mummius took his 5000 remaining soldiers and drilled 153  
them in camp, not daring to go out into the plain until they  
should have recovered their courage. While he was watch-  
ing his opportunity the barbarians passed by, carrying a part  
of the booty they had captured. He fell upon them sud-  
denly, slew a large number, and recaptured the plunder and  
the standards. Some of the Lusitanians on the other side  
of the Tagus, under the leadership of Cauenus, being in-  
censed against the Romans, invaded the Cunei, who were  
Roman subjects, and captured their large city, Conistorgis,  
and near the Pillars of Hercules they crossed over the straits,  
and some of them overran part of Africa, while others laid  
siege to the city of Ocile. Mummius followed them with  
9000 foot and 500 horse, and slew about 15,000 of them  
who were engaged in plundering, and a few of the others, and  
raised the siege of Ocile. Falling in with a party who were  
carrying off booty he slew all of them, so that not one was  
left to bear the tidings of the disaster. All the booty that it  
was possible to carry he divided among the soldiers. The  
rest he devoted to the gods of war and burned. Having  
accomplished these results, Mummius returned to Rome  
and was awarded a triumph.

602 58. He was succeeded in the command by Marcus 152  
Atilius, who made an incursion among the Lusitanians and  
killed about 700 of them and took their largest city, called  
Oxthracæ. This so terrified the neighboring tribes that they  
all made terms of surrender. Among these were some of  
the Vettones, a nation adjoining the Lusitanians. But when  
he went away into winter quarters they all forthwith revolted  
and besieged some of the Roman subjects. Servius Galba,



V. R.

603 the successor of Atilius, hastened to relieve them. Having <sup>B. C.</sup> 152 marched 500 stades in one day and night, he came in sight of the Lusitanians and sent his tired army into battle instantly. Fortunately he broke the enemy's ranks, but he imprudently followed the fugitives, the pursuit being feeble and disorderly on account of the fatigue of his men. When the barbarians saw them scattered, and by turns stopping to rest, they rallied and fell upon them and killed about 7000. Galba, with the cavalry he had about him, fled to the city of Carmone. There he received the fugitives, and having collected allies to the number of 20,000 he moved to the territory of the Cunei, and wintered at Conistorgis.

59. Lucullus, who had made war on the Vaccæi without authority, was wintering in Turdania. When he discovered that the Lusitanians were making incursions in his neighborhood he sent out some of his best lieutenants and slew about 4000 of them. He killed 1500 others while they were crossing the straits near Gades. The remainder took refuge on a hill and he drew a line of circumvallation around it and captured an immense number of them. Then he <sup>604</sup> 150 invaded Lusitania and gradually depopulated it. Galba did the same on the other side. When some of their ambassadors came to him desiring to renew the treaty made with Atilius, his predecessor in the command, though they had transgressed this treaty, he received them favorably, and made a truce and pretended to sympathize with them because they had been compelled by poverty to rob, make war, and break their engagements. "For, of course," said he, "poorness of soil and penury forced you to do these things. If you wish to be friendly, I will give you good land for your poor people and settle them in three divisions, in a fertile country."

60. Beguiled by these promises they left their own habitations and came together at the place where Galba directed. He divided them into three parts, and showing to each division a certain plain, he commanded them to remain in this open country until he should assign them their places. Then he came to the first division and told them as friends to lay down their arms. When they had done so he surrounded them with a ditch and sent in soldiers with swords who slew them all, they, meanwhile, crying aloud and invoc-

<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
 604 ing the names and faith of the gods. In like manner he hastened to the second and third divisions and destroyed them while they were still ignorant of the fate of the first. Thus he avenged treachery with treachery in a manner unworthy of a Roman, but imitating barbarians. A few escaped, among them Viriathus, who not long afterward became the leader of the Lusitanians and killed many Romans and performed the greatest exploits, which I shall relate hereafter. Galba, being even more greedy than Lucullus, distributed a little of the plunder to the army and a little to his friends and kept the rest himself, although he was already one of the richest of the Romans. Not even in time of peace, they say, did he abstain from lying and perjury in order to get gain. Although generally hated, and called to account for his rascalities, he escaped punishment by means of his wealth.
 <sup>B.C.</sup>  
 150

## CHAPTER XI

The rise of Viriathus — He defeats Vetilius — Defeats Plautius in Two Battles — Is defeated by Maximus Æmilianus

606 61. Not long afterward those who had escaped the vil-<sup>148</sup>lany of Lucullus and Galba, having collected together to the number of 10,000, overran Turditanian. Gaius Vetilius marched against them, bringing a new army from Rome and taking also the soldiers already in Spain, so that he had about 10,000 men. He fell upon their foragers, killed many of them, and forced the rest into a place where, if they stayed, they were in danger of famine, and if they came out would fall into the hands of the Romans. Being in these straits they sent messengers to Vetilius with olive-branches asking land for a dwelling-place, and agreeing from that time on to obey the Romans in all things. He promised to give them the land, and an agreement was nearly made to that effect when Viriathus, who had escaped the perfidy of Galba and was then among them, reminded them of the bad faith of the Romans, told them how the latter had often set upon them in violation of oaths, and how this whole army was composed of men who had escaped from the

V. R.  
606 perjuries of Galba and Lucullus. If they would obey him, B. C.  
he said, he would show them a safe retreat from this place. 148

62. Excited by the new hopes with which he inspired them, they chose him as their leader. He drew them up in line of battle as though he intended to fight, but gave them orders that when he should mount his horse they should scatter in every direction and make their way by different routes to the city of Tribola and there wait for him. He chose 1000 only whom he commanded to stay with him. These arrangements having been made, they all fled as soon as Viriathus mounted his horse. Vetilius was afraid to pursue those who had scattered in so many different ways, but turning towards Viriathus who was standing there and apparently waiting a chance to attack, joined battle with him. The latter, having very swift horses, harassed the Romans by attacking, then retreating, again standing still and again attacking, and thus consumed the whole of that day and the next dashing around on the same field. As soon as he conjectured that the others had made good their escape, he hastened away in the night by devious paths and arrived at Tribola with his nimble steeds, the Romans not being able to follow him at an equal pace by reason of the weight of their armor, their ignorance of the roads, and the inferiority of their horses. Thus did Viriathus, in an unexpected way, rescue his army from a desperate situation. This feat, coming to the knowledge of the various tribes of that vicinity, brought him fame and many reënforcements from different quarters, and enabled him to wage war against the Romans for eight years.

607 63. It is my intention here to relate this war with 147  
Viriathus, so very harassing to the Romans and so badly managed by them, and to take up hereafter the other events that happened in Spain at the same time. Vetilius pursued him till he came to Tribola. Viriathus, having first laid an ambush in a dense thicket, retreated until Vetilius was passing through the place, when he turned, and those who were in ambush sprang up. On all sides they began killing the Romans, driving them over the cliffs and taking prisoners. Vetilius himself was taken prisoner; and the man who captured him, not knowing who he was, but seeing that he was old and fat, and considering him worthless, killed him. Of

- V. R. <sup>607</sup> the 10,000 Romans, 6000 with difficulty made their way to <sup>R. C.</sup> 147  
 the city of Carpassus on the seashore, which I think was  
 formerly called by the Greeks Tartessus, and was ruled by  
 King Arganthonius, who is said to have lived one hundred  
 and fifty years. The soldiers, who made their escape to  
 Carpassus, were stationed on the walls of the town by the  
 quæstor who accompanied Vetilius, badly demoralized.  
 Having asked and obtained 5000 allies from the Belli and  
 Titthi, he sent them against Viriathus who slew them all, so  
 that there was not one left to tell the tale. After that the  
 quæstor remained quietly in the town waiting for help from  
 Rome.
- <sup>608</sup> 64. Viriathus overran the fruitful country of Carpetania <sup>146</sup>  
 without hinderance, and ravaged it until Caius Plautius came  
 from Rome bringing 10,000 foot and 1300 horse. Then  
 Viriathus again feigned flight and Plautius sent 4000 men to  
 pursue him but he turned upon them and killed all except a  
 few. Then he crossed the river Tagus and encamped on a  
 mountain covered with olive-trees, called Venus' mountain.  
 There Plautius overtook him, and eager to retrieve his mis-  
 fortune, joined battle with him, but was defeated with great  
 slaughter, and fled in disorder to the towns, and went into  
 winter quarters in midsummer not daring to show himself  
 anywhere. Accordingly, Viriathus overran the whole coun-  
 try without check and required the owners of the growing  
 crops to pay him the value thereof, or if they would not, he  
 destroyed them.
- <sup>609</sup> 65. When these facts became known at Rome, they sent <sup>145</sup>  
 Fabius Maximus Æmilianus, the son of Æmilius Paulus  
 (who had conquered Perseus, the king of Macedonia), to  
 Spain, having given him power to levy an army. As Car-  
 thage and Greece had been but recently conquered, and the  
 third Macedonian war brought to a successful end, in order  
 that he might spare the soldiers who had just returned from  
 those places, he chose young men who had never been  
 engaged in war before, to the number of two legions. He  
 obtained additional forces from the allies and arrived at  
 Orso, a city of Spain, having altogether 15,000 foot and about  
 2000 horse. As he did not wish to engage the enemy until  
 his forces were well disciplined, he made a voyage through  
 the straits to Gades in order to sacrifice to Hercules. In

V. R. 609 the meantime Viriathus fell upon his wood-cutters, killed many, and struck terror into the rest. His lieutenant coming out to fight, Viriathus defeated him also and captured a great booty. When Maximus returned, Viriathus drew out his forces repeatedly and offered battle. But Maximus declined an engagement with the whole army and continued to exercise his men, frequently sending out skirmishing parties, making trial of the enemy's strength, and inspiring his own men with courage. When he sent out foragers he always placed a cordon of legionaries around the unarmed men and himself rode about the region with his cavalry. He had seen his father Paulus do this in the Macedonian war. Winter being ended, and his army well disciplined, he 610 attacked Viriathus and was the second Roman general to put him to flight (although he fought valiantly), capturing two of his cities, one of which he plundered and the other burned. He pursued Viriathus to a place called Bæcor, and killed many of his men, after which he wintered at Corduba.<sup>1</sup>

611 66. Now Viriathus, being not so confident as before, detached the Arevaci, Titthi, and Belli, very warlike peoples, from their allegiance to the Romans, and these began to wage another war on their own account which was long and tedious to the Romans, and which was called the Numantine war from one of their cities. I shall give an account of this after finishing the war with Viriathus. The latter coming to an engagement in another part of Spain with Quintus, another Roman general, and being worsted, returned to the Venus mountain. From this he sallied and slew 1000 of Quintus' men and captured some standards from them and drove the rest into their camp. He also drove out the garrison of Itucca and ravaged the country of the Bastitani. Quintus was unable to render them aid by reason of his timidity and inexperience, but went into winter quarters at Corduba in the middle of autumn, and frequently sent Caius Marcius, a Spaniard from the city of Italica, against him.

<sup>1</sup> The text of sec. 65 concludes with words which are repeated near the end of sec. 68, viz.: "having already been two years in the command. Having performed these labors, Æmilianus returned to Rome and was succeeded in the command by Quintus Pompeius Aulus." Schweighäuser considered the text corrupt in both places and cast it out altogether from sec. 65.

## CHAPTER XII

War with Viriathus continued — A Treaty with Viriathus — The Treaty is broken by the Romans — D. Junius Brutus — Guerilla Bands coöperate with Viriathus — Viriathus assassinated — Character of Viriathus

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612

B.C.  
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67. At the end of the year, Fabius Maximus Servilianus, the brother of Æmilianus, came to succeed Quintus in the command, bringing two new legions from Rome and some allies, so that his forces altogether amounted to about 18,000 foot and 1600 horse. He wrote to Micipsa, king of the Numidians, to send him some elephants as speedily as possible. As he was hastening to Itucca with his army in divisions, Viriathus attacked him with 6000 troops with great noise and barbaric clamor, and wearing the long hair which in battles they are accustomed to shake in order to terrify their enemies, but he was not dismayed. He stood his ground bravely, and the enemy was driven off without accomplishing anything. When the rest of his army arrived, together with ten elephants and 300 horse from Africa, he established a large camp, advanced against Viriathus, defeated and pursued him. The pursuit became disorderly, and when Viriathus observed this as he fled he rallied, slew about 3000 of the Romans, and drove the rest to their camp. He attacked the camp also where only a few made a stand about the gates, the greater part hiding under their tents from fear, and being with difficulty brought back to their duty by the general and the tribunes. Here Fannius, the brother-in-law of Lælius, showed splendid bravery. The Romans were saved by the approach of darkness. But Viriathus continued to make incursions by night or in the heat of the day, appearing at every unexpected time with his light-armed troops and his swift horses to annoy the enemy, until he forced Servilianus back to Itucca.

68. Then at length Viriathus, being in want of provisions, and his army much reduced, burnt his camp in the night and returned to Lusitania. Servilianus did not overtake him, but fell upon the country of Bæturia and plundered five towns that had sided with Viriathus. After this he marched against the Cunæi, and thence to Lusitania once

Y.R.

612 more, against Viriathus. While he was on the march two captains of robbers, Curius and Apuleius, with 10,000 men attacked the Romans, threw them into confusion, and captured some booty. Curius was killed in the fight, and Servilianus not long afterward recovered the booty and took the towns of Escadia, Gemella, and Obolcola, which had been garrisoned by Viriathus. Others he plundered and still others he spared. Having captured about 10,000 prisoners, he beheaded 500 of them and sold the rest as slaves. Then he went into winter quarters, having already been two years in the command. Having performed these labors, Servilianus returned to Rome and was succeeded in the command by Quintus Pompeius Aulus. The brother of the former, Maximus Æmilianus, having received the surrender of a captain of robbers, named Connoba, released him but cut off the hands of all of his men.

B.C.

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69. While following Viriathus, Servilianus laid siege to Erisana, one of his towns. Viriathus entered the town by night, and at daybreak fell upon those who were working in the trenches, compelling them to throw away their spades and run. In like manner he defeated the rest of the army, which was drawn up in order of battle by Servilianus, pursued it, and drove the Romans among some cliffs from which there was no chance of escape. Viriathus was not arrogant in the hour of victory, but considering this a favorable opportunity to bring the war to an end and win the great gratitude of the Romans, he made an agreement with them, and this agreement was ratified at Rome. Viriathus was declared to be a friend of the Roman people, and it was decreed that all of his followers should have the land which they then occupied. Thus the Viriathic war, which had been so extremely tedious to the Romans, seemed to have been settled satisfactorily and brought to an end.

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70. The peace was not of long duration, for Cæpio, brother of the Servilianus who had concluded it, and his successor in the command, complained of the treaty, and wrote home that it was most unworthy of the dignity of the Roman people. The Senate at first authorized him to annoy Viriathus according to his own discretion, provided it were done secretly. By persisting and continually sending letters he procured the breaking of the treaty and a

- Y. R. <sup>B. C.</sup>  
 614 renewal of open hostilities against Viriathus. When war <sup>140</sup>  
 was publicly declared Cæpio took the town of Arsa, which  
 Viriathus abandoned, and followed Viriathus himself (who  
 fled and destroyed everything in his path) as far as Car-  
 petania, the Roman forces being much stronger than his.  
 Viriathus deeming it unwise to engage in battle, on account  
 of the smallness of his army, ordered the greater part of  
 it to retreat through a hidden defile, while he drew up the  
 remainder on a hill as though he intended to fight. When  
 he judged that those who had been sent before had reached  
 a place of safety, he darted after them with such disregard  
 of the enemy and such swiftness that his pursuers did not  
 know whither he had gone. Cæpio turned against the  
 Vettones and the Callaici and wasted their fields.
- 616 71. Emulating the example of Viriathus many other gue- <sup>138</sup>  
 rilla bands made incursions into Lusitania and ravaged it.  
 Sextus Junius Brutus, who was sent against them, despaired  
 of following them through the extensive country bounded  
 by the navigable rivers Tagus, Lethe, Durius, and Bætis,  
 because he considered it extremely difficult to overtake  
 them while flying from place to place after the manner of  
 robbers, and yet disgraceful not to do so, and a task not  
 very glorious even if he should conquer them. He there-  
 fore turned against their towns, thinking that thus he should  
 take vengeance on them, and at the same time secure a  
 quantity of plunder for his army, and that the robbers would  
 scatter, each to his own place, when their homes were  
 threatened. With this design he began destroying every-  
 thing that came in his way. Here he found the women  
 fighting and perishing in company with the men with such  
 bravery that they uttered no cry even in the midst of  
 slaughter. Some of the inhabitants fled to the mountains  
 with what they could carry, and to these, when they asked  
 pardon, Brutus granted it, taking their goods as a fine.
- 617 72. He then crossed the river Durius, carrying war far <sup>137</sup>  
 and wide and taking hostages from those who surrendered,  
 until he came to the river Lethe, being the first of the  
 Romans to think of crossing that stream. Passing over this  
 he advanced to another river called the Nimis, where he  
 attacked the Bracari because they had plundered his pro-  
 vision train. They were a very warlike people, the women



<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
617 bearing arms with the men, who fought never turning, never <sup>B.C.</sup> 137  
showing their backs, or uttering a cry. Of the women who were captured some killed themselves, others slew their children with their own hands, considering death preferable to captivity. There were some towns that surrendered to Brutus and soon afterwards revolted. These he reduced to subjection again.

73. One of the towns that often submitted and as often rebelled was Talabriga. When Brutus moved against it the inhabitants begged pardon and offered to surrender at discretion. He first demanded of them all the deserters, the prisoners, and the arms they had, and hostages in addition, and then he ordered them to vacate the town with their wives and children. When they had obeyed these orders, he surrounded them with his army and made a speech to them, telling them how often they had revolted and renewed the war against him. Having inspired them with fear and with the belief that he was about to inflict some terrible punishment on them, he ceased his reproaches. Having deprived them of their horses, provisions, public money, and other general resources, he gave them back their town to dwell in, contrary to their expectation. Having accomplished these results, Brutus returned to Rome. I have united these events with the history of Viriathus, because they were undertaken by other guerilla bands at the same time, and in emulation of him.

<sup>614</sup> 74. Viriathus sent his most trusted friends Audax, Ditalco, <sup>140</sup>  
and Minurus to Cæpio to negotiate terms of peace. The latter bribed them by large gifts and promises to assassinate Viriathus, which they did in this way. Viriathus, on account of his excessive cares and labors, slept but little, and for the most part took rest in his armor so that when aroused he should be prepared for every emergency. For this reason it was permitted to his friends to visit him by night. Taking advantage of this custom, those who were associated with Audax in guarding him entered his tent as if on pressing business, just as he had fallen asleep, and killed him by stabbing him in the throat, which was the only part of his body not protected by armor. The nature of the wound was such that nobody suspected what had been done. The murderers fled to Cæpio and asked for the rest of their pay.

Y. R.

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For the present he gave them permission to enjoy safely what they had already received; as for the rest of their demands he referred them to Rome. When daylight came the attendants of Viriathus and the remainder of the army thought he was still resting and wondered at his unusually long repose, until some of them discovered that he was lying dead in his armor. Straightway there was grief and lamentation throughout the camp, all of them mourning for him, fearing for their own safety, thinking what dangers they were in, and of what a general they had been bereft. Most of all were they grieved that they could not find the perpetrators of the crime.

B. C.

140

75. They arrayed the body of Viriathus in splendid garments and burned it on a lofty funeral pile. Many sacrifices were offered for him. Troops of horse and foot in armor marched around him singing his praises in barbarian fashion. Nor did they depart from the funeral pile until the fire had gone out. When the obsequies were ended, they had gladiatorial contests at his tomb. So great was the longing for Viriathus after his death — a man who had the highest qualities of a commander as reckoned among barbarians, always foremost in facing danger and most exact in dividing the spoils. He never consented to take the lion's share, even when friends begged him to, but whatever he got he divided among the bravest. Thus it came about (a most difficult task and one never before achieved by any other commander so easily) that in the eight years of this war, in an army composed of various tribes, there never was any sedition, the soldiers were always obedient and fearless in the presence of danger. After his death they chose a general named Tantalus and made an expedition against Saguntum, the city which Hannibal had overthrown and re-established and named New Carthage, after his own country. When they had been repulsed from that place and were crossing the river Bætis, Cæpio pressed them so hard that Tantalus became exhausted and surrendered his army to Cæpio on condition that they should be treated as subjects. The latter took from them all their arms and gave them sufficient land, so that they should not be driven to robbery by want. In this way the Viriathic war came to an end.

## CHAPTER XIII

The Numantine War — Pompeius Aulus lays Siege to Numantia — Makes a Treaty with the Numantines — The Senate repudiates it — Mancinus makes a Fresh Treaty — Æmilius Lepidus makes War Contrary to Orders of the Senate — The Senate repudiates the Treaty of Mancinus

- Y. R. 611 76. Our history returns to the war against the Arevaci<sup>B. C. 143</sup> and the Numantines, whom Viriathus stirred up to revolt. Cæcilius Metellus was sent against them from Rome with a larger army and he subdued the Arevaci, falling upon them suddenly while they were gathering their crops. There still remained the two towns of Termantia and Numantia to engage his attention. Numantia was difficult of access by reason of two rivers and the ravines and dense woods that surrounded it. There was only one road to the open country and that had been blocked by ditches and palisades. The Numantines were first-rate soldiers, both horse and foot, there being about 8000 altogether. Although small in numbers, yet they gave the Romans great trouble by their bravery. At the end of winter Metellus surrendered to his successor, Quintus Pompeius Aulus, the command of the army, consisting of 30,000 foot and 2000 horse, admirably trained. While encamped against Numantia, Pompeius had occasion to go away somewhere. The Numantines made a sally against a body of his horse that was ranging after him and destroyed them. When he returned he drew up his army in the plain. The Numantines came down to meet him, but retired slowly as though intending flight, until they had drawn Pompeius to the ditches and palisades.<sup>1</sup>
- 613 77. When he saw his forces wasted day by day in skir-<sup>141</sup> mishes with an enemy much inferior in numbers, he moved against Termantia as being an easier task. Here he engaged the enemy and lost 700 men; and one of his tribunes, who was bringing provisions to his army, was put to flight by the Termantines. In a third engagement the same day they drove the Romans into a rocky place where many of their infantry and cavalry with their horses were forced down a

<sup>1</sup> At this point there is a lacuna in the text.

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
613 precipice. The remainder, panic-stricken, passed the night <sup>B.C.</sup>  
under arms. At daybreak the enemy came out and a regular battle was fought which lasted all day with equal fortune. Night put an end to the conflict. Thence Pompeius marched against a small town named Malia, which was garrisoned by Numantines. The inhabitants slew the garrison by treachery and delivered the town to Pompeius. He required them to surrender their arms and give hostages, after which he moved to Sedatania, which a robber chief named Tanginus was plundering. Pompeius overcame him and took many of his men prisoners. So high-spirited were these robbers that none of the captives would endure servitude. Some killed themselves, others killed those who had bought them, and others scuttled the ships that carried them away. <sup>141</sup>

614 78. Pompeius, coming back to the siege of Numantia, <sup>140</sup>  
endeavored to turn the course of a certain river in order to reduce the city by famine. The inhabitants harassed him while he was doing this work. They rushed out in crowds without giving any signal, and assaulted those who were working on the river, and hurled darts at those who came to their assistance from the camp, and finally shut the Romans up in their own fortification. They also attacked the foragers and killed many, and among them Oppius, a military tribune. They made an assault in another quarter on a party of Romans who were digging a ditch, and killed about 400 of them including their leader. About this time certain counsellors came to Pompeius from Rome, together with an army of new recruits, still raw and undisciplined, to take the places of the soldiers who had served their six years. Pompeius, being put to shame by so many disasters, and desiring to wipe out the disgrace, remained in camp in the winter time with these raw recruits. The soldiers, being exposed to severe cold without shelter, and unaccustomed to the water and climate of the country, fell sick with dysentery and many died. A detachment having gone out for forage, the Numantines laid an ambush near the Roman camp and provoked them to a skirmish. The latter, not enduring the affront, sallied out against them. Then those who were in ambush sprang up, and many of the common soldiers and many of the nobility lost their

<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
<sup>614</sup> lives. Finally the Numantines encountered the foraging party on its return and killed many of those also. <sup>B.C.</sup>  
<sup>140</sup>

79. Pompeius, being cast down by so many misfortunes, marched away with his senatorial council to the towns to spend the rest of the winter, expecting a successor to come early in the spring. Fearing lest he should be called to account, he made overtures to the Numantines secretly for the purpose of bringing the war to an end. The Numantines themselves, being exhausted by the slaughter of so many of their bravest men, by the loss of their crops, by want of food, and by the length of the war, which had been protracted beyond expectation, sent legates to Pompeius. He publicly advised them to surrender at discretion, because no other kind of treaty seemed worthy of the dignity of the Roman people, but privately he told them what terms he should impose. When they had come to an agreement and the Numantines had given themselves up, he demanded and received from them hostages, together with the prisoners and deserters. He also demanded thirty talents of silver, a part of which they paid down and the rest he agreed to wait for. His successor, <sup>615</sup> Marcus Popillius Læna, had arrived when they brought the last instalment. <sup>139</sup> Pompeius being no longer under any apprehension concerning the war, since his successor was present, and knowing that he had made a disgraceful peace and without authority from Rome, began to deny that he had come to any understanding with the Numantines. The latter proved the contrary by witnesses who had taken part in the transaction, senators, and his own prefects of horse and military tribunes. Popillius sent them to Rome to carry on the controversy with Pompeius there. The case was brought before the Senate, and the Numantines and Pompeius debated it there. The Senate decided to continue the war. Thereupon Popillius attacked the Lusones who were neighbors of the Numantines, but he accomplished nothing, and on the arrival of his successor in office, Hostilius Mancinus, he returned to Rome.

<sup>617</sup> 80. Mancinus had frequent encounters with the Numantines in which he was worsted, and finally, after great loss, took refuge in his camp. <sup>137</sup> On a false rumor that the Cantabri and Vaccæi were coming to the aid of the Numantines, he became alarmed, extinguished his fires, and fled in the dark-

Y. R.

B. C.

617 ness of night to a desert place where Nobilior once had a camp. Being shut up in this place at daybreak without preparation or fortification and surrounded by Numantines, who threatened all with death unless he made peace, he agreed to terms like those previously made between the Romans and Numantines. To this agreement he bound himself by an oath. When these things were known at Rome there was great indignation at this most ignominious treaty, and the other consul, Æmilius Lepidus, was sent to Spain, Mancinus being called home to stand trial. The Numantine ambassadors followed him thither. Æmilius becoming tired of idleness while awaiting the decision from Rome (for some men sought the command, not for the advantage of the city, but for glory, or gain, or the honor of a triumph), falsely accused the Vaccæi of supplying the Numantines with provisions during the war. Accordingly he ravaged their country and laid siege to their principal city, Pallantia, which had in no way violated the treaty, and he persuaded Brutus, his brother-in-law, who had been sent to Farther Spain (as I have before related), to join him in this undertaking.

618 81. Here they were overtaken by Cinna and Cæcilius, messengers from Rome, who said that the Senate was at a loss to know why, after so many disasters had befallen them in Spain, Æmilius should be seeking a new war, and they placed in his hands a decree warning him not to attack the Vaccæi. But he, having actually begun the war, considered that the Senate was ignorant of that, and of the fact that Brutus was coöperating with him, and that the Vaccæi had aided the Numantines with provisions, money, and men. Accordingly he made answer that it would be dangerous to abandon the war, since nearly all Spain would rebel if they should imagine that the Romans were afraid. He sent Cinna's party home without having accomplished their errand, and he wrote in this sense to the Senate. After this he began, in a fortified place, to construct engines and collect provisions. While he was thus engaged, Flaccus, who had been sent out on a foraging expedition, found himself in an ambushade but he saved himself by a trick. He cunningly spread a rumor among his men that Æmilius had captured Pallantia. The soldiers raised a shout of victory. The barbarians, hearing it

V.R.

618 and thinking that the report was true, withdrew. In this 136  
way Flaccus rescued his convoy from danger.

B.C.

82. The siege of Pallantia was long protracted, the food supply of the Romans failed, and they began to suffer from hunger. All their animals perished and many of the men died of want. The generals, Æmilius and Brutus, kept heart for a long time. Being compelled to yield at last, they gave an order suddenly one night, about the last watch, to retreat. The tribunes and centurions ran hither and thither to hasten the movement, so as to get them all away before daylight. Such was the confusion that they left behind everything, and even the sick and wounded, who clung to them and besought them not to abandon them. Their retreat was disorderly and confused and much like a flight, the Pallantines hanging on their flanks and rear and doing great damage from early dawn till evening. When night came the Romans, worn with toil and hunger, threw themselves on the ground by companies just as it happened, and the Pallantines, moved by some divine interposition, went back to their own country. And this was what happened to Æmilius.

83. When these things were known at Rome, Æmilius was deprived of his command and consulship, and when he returned to Rome as a private citizen he was fined besides. The dispute before the Senate between Mancinus and the Numantine ambassadors was still going on. The latter exhibited the treaty they had made with Mancinus; he, on the other hand, put the blame on Pompeius, his predecessor in the command, who had turned over to him a worthless and ill-provided army, with which Pompeius himself had often been beaten, and so had made a similar treaty with the Numantines. He added that the war had been under bad omens, for it had been decreed by the Romans in violation of these agreements. The senators were equally incensed against both, but Pompeius escaped because he had been tried for this offence long before. They decided to deliver Mancinus to the Numantines for making a disgraceful treaty without their authorization. In this they followed the example of the fathers, who once delivered to the Samnites twenty generals who had made similar treaties without authority. Mancinus was taken to Spain by Furius, and delivered naked to the Numantines, but they

Y. R. 619 refused to receive him. Calpurnius Piso was chosen general against them, but he did not march against Numantia. He made an incursion into the territory of Pallantia, and having collected a small amount of plunder, spent the rest of his term of office in winter quarters in Carpetania. B. C. 135

## CHAPTER XIV

Scipio Africanus the Younger sent against the Numantines — He restores Discipline in the Army — Scipio's Maxims of War — Skirmishes with the Numantines

620 84. The Roman people being tired of this Numantine 134 war, which was protracted and severe beyond expectation, elected Cornelius Scipio, the conqueror of Carthage, consul again, believing that he was the only man who could subdue the Numantines. As he was still under the consular age the Senate voted, as was done when Scipio was appointed general against the Carthaginians, that the tribunes of the people should repeal the law respecting the age limit, and reënact it for the following year.<sup>1</sup> Thus Scipio was made consul a second time and hastened to Numantia. He did not take any army by levy because the city was exhausted by so many wars, and because there were plenty of soldiers in Spain. With the Senate's consent he took a certain number of volunteers sent to him by cities and kings on the score of private friendship. To these were added 500 of his clients and friends whom he joined in one body and called it the troop of friends. All these, about 4000 in number, he put under marching orders in charge of Buteo, his nephew, while he went in advance with a small escort to the army in Spain, having heard that it was full of idleness, discord, and luxury, and well knowing that he could never overcome the enemy unless he should first bring his own men under strict discipline.

85. When he arrived he expelled all traders and harlots ;

<sup>1</sup> Scipio was not under the consular age at this time. He was born in the year of Rome 569 and was now fifty-one years old. The consular age was forty-three. Livy, xlv. 44; Velleius, ii. 4; Cicero, *De Amicitia*, 3.



V. R.

B. C.

620 also the soothsayers and diviners, whom the soldiers were 134 continually consulting because they were demoralized by defeat. For the future he forbade the bringing in of anything not necessary, or any victims for purposes of divination. He ordered all wagons and their superfluous contents to be sold, and all pack animals, except such as he designated, to remain. For cooking utensils it was permitted to have only a spit, a brass kettle, and one cup. Their food was limited to plain boiled and roasted meats. They were forbidden to have beds, and Scipio was the first one to sleep on straw. He forbade them to ride on mules when on the march; "for what can you expect in a war," said he, "from a man who is not able to walk?" Those who had servants to bathe and anoint them were ridiculed by Scipio, who said that only mules, having no hands, needed others to rub them. Thus in a short time he brought them back to good order. He accustomed them also to respect and fear himself by being difficult of access and sparing of favors, especially favors contrary to regulations. He often said that those generals who were severe and strict in the observance of law were serviceable to their own men, while those who were easy-going and bountiful were useful only to the enemy. The soldiers of the latter, he said, might be joyous but insubordinate, while the others, although downcast, would be obedient and ready for all emergencies.

86. He did not venture to engage the enemy until he had trained his men by many laborious exercises. He traversed all the neighboring plains, and daily fortified new camps one after another, and then demolished them, dug deep trenches and filled them up again, constructed high walls and overthrew them, personally overlooking the work from morning till night. In order to prevent the men from straggling while on the march, as heretofore, he always moved in the form of squares, and no one was allowed to change the place assigned to him. Moving around the line of march he often visited the rear and caused horsemen to dismount and give their places to the sick, and when the mules were overburdened he made the foot soldiers carry a part of the load. When he had come to the end of the day's march he required those who had formed the vanguard during the day to deploy around the camping-place,

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B. C.

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and a body of horse to scour the country, while the rest performed their allotted tasks, some digging the trench, others building the rampart, and others pitching the tents. He also fixed the time within which these tasks must be finished, and kept an accurate account thereof.

87. When he judged that the army was alert, obedient to himself, and patient in labor, he moved his camp near to Numantia. He did not place advance guards in fortified stations, as some do, because he did not wish to divide his army as yet, lest he should meet some disaster at the outset and gain the contempt of the enemy, who had so long despised the Romans. Nor did he proceed at once to attack the enemy because he was still studying the nature of this war, watching his opportunity, and trying to discover the plans of the Numantines. In the meantime he foraged through all the fields behind his camp and cut down the unripe grain. When those fields had been harvested and it was necessary to move forward, and a short road to Numantia was found across the country which many advised him to take, he said: "What I am afraid of is the coming back. Our enemies are very nimble. They can dart out of the city and dart back again, while our men, like soldiers who return from foraging, will be tired out with the booty, the wagons, and the burdens they bring. For this reason the fighting will be severe and unequal. If we are beaten the danger will be serious, and if victorious, neither the glory nor the gain will be great. It is foolish to incur danger for small results. He must be considered a reckless general who would fight before there is any need, while a good one takes risks only in cases of necessity." He added by way of simile that physicians do not cut and burn their patients till they have first tried drugs. Having spoken thus, he ordered his officers to take the longer road. Then he made some excursions beyond the camp and later advanced into the territory of the Vaccæi, from whom the Numantines bought their food supplies, cutting down everything, taking for himself what was useful as food, and piling the rest in heaps and burning it.

88. In a part of Pallantia called Complanio the Pallantians had concealed a large force just below the brow of a hill while others openly annoyed the Roman foragers.

V. R.

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Scipio ordered Rutilius Rufus, a military tribune (who afterwards wrote a history of these transactions), to take four troops of horse and drive back the assailants. Rufus followed them too sharply when they retreated, and darted up the hill with the fugitives. When he discovered the ambush he ordered his troops not to pursue or attack the enemy further, but to stand on the defensive with their spears presented to the enemy and merely ward off their attack. Straightway Scipio, seeing that Rufus had exceeded his orders, and fearing for his safety, followed with all haste. When he discovered the ambush he divided his horse into two bodies and ordered them to charge the enemy on either side alternately, hurling their javelins all together and then retiring, not to the same spot from which they had advanced, but a little further back each time. In this way the horsemen were brought in safety to the plain. As he was shifting quarters and retiring again, he had to cross a river which was difficult to ford by reason of its muddy banks, and here the enemy had laid an ambush for him. Having learned this fact, he turned aside and took a route that was longer, and where there was no water supply. Here he marched by night on account of the heat and thirst, and dug wells which yielded for the most part only bitter water. He saved his men with extreme difficulty, but some of his horses and pack animals perished of thirst.

89. While passing through the territory of the Caucaei, whose treaty with the Romans Lucullus had violated, he made proclamation that they might return in safety to their own homes. Thence he came again to the Numantine territory and went into winter quarters. Here Jugurtha, the grandson of Masinissa, joined him with twelve elephants and the body of archers and slingers who usually accompanied them in war. While Scipio was constantly ravaging and plundering the neighboring country, the enemy laid an ambush for him at a certain village which was surrounded on nearly all sides by a marshy pool. On the remaining side was a ravine in which the ambuscading party was hidden. Scipio's soldiers were divided so that one part entered the village to plunder it, leaving the standards outside, while another, but not large party, was coursing around it on horseback. The men in ambush fell upon the latter, who began a

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desperate fight. Scipio, who happened to be standing in front of the village near the standards, recalled by trumpet those who had gone inside, and before he had collected a thousand men went to the aid of the horsemen who were in difficulties. The greater part of those who were in the village rushed out and put the enemy to flight. He did not pursue the fugitives, however, but returned to the camp, a few having fallen on each side.

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## CHAPTER XV

Builds a Wall around the City — Stops Communication by the River — Numantia Closely Invested — The Exploit of Rhetogenes — Negotiations with Scipio — Numantia surrenders — Heroism of the Numantines — Scipio razes Numantia to the Ground

- 621 90. Not long afterwards he established two camps very near to Numantia and placed his brother Maximus in charge of one while he commanded the other. The Numantines came out in large numbers and offered battle, but he disregarded their challenge, not thinking it wise to engage in battle with men who were fighting in sheer desperation, but rather to shut them up and reduce them by famine. Placing seven towers around the city, he began the siege and wrote letters to each of the allied tribes, telling them what forces he desired them to send. When they came he divided them into several parts and afterwards subdivided his own army. Then he appointed a commander for each division and ordered them to surround the city with a ditch and palisade. The circumference of Numantia itself was twenty-four stades, that of the enclosing works more than twice as great. All of this space was carefully allotted to the several divisions, and he had given orders that if the enemy should make a sally anywhere they should signal to him by raising a red flag on a tall spear in the daytime or by a fire at night, so that he or Maximus might hasten to the aid of those who needed it. When this work was completed and he could effectually repel any assaults, he dug another ditch not far behind this one and fortified it with palisades and built a wall eight feet wide and ten feet high, exclusive of the parapets. He built towers along the whole

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of this wall at intervals of 100 feet. As it was not possible to carry the wall around the adjoining marsh he threw an embankment around it of the same height and thickness as the wall, to serve in place of it.

B.C.

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91. Thus Scipio was the first general, as I think, to throw a wall around a city which did not shun a battle in the open field. However, the river Durius, which took its course through the fortifications, was very useful to the Numantines for bringing provisions and sending men back and forth, some diving and others concealing themselves in small boats, some making their way with sail-boats when a strong wind was blowing, or with oars aided by the current. As he was not able to span it on account of its breadth and swiftness, Scipio built two towers in place of a bridge. To each of these towers he moored large timbers with ropes and set them floating across the river. The timbers were stuck full of knives and spear-heads, which were kept constantly in motion by the force of the stream dashing against them, so that the enemy were prevented from passing covertly, either by swimming, or diving, or sailing in boats. Thus was accomplished what Scipio especially desired, namely, that nobody could have any dealings with them, nobody could come in, and they could have no knowledge of what was going on outside. Thus they would be in want of provisions and apparatus of every kind.

92. When everything was ready and the catapults, ballistæ, and other engines were placed on the towers, the stones, darts, and javelins collected on the parapets, and the archers and slingers in their places, he stationed messengers at frequent intervals along the entire wall to pass the word from one to another by day or night to let him know what was taking place. He gave orders to each tower that in any emergency the one that was first attacked should hoist a signal and that the others when they saw it should do the same, in order that he might be advised of the commotion quickly by signal, and learn the particulars afterward by messengers. The army, together with the native forces, now numbering some 60,000 men, he arranged so that one-half should guard the wall and in case of necessity go to any place where they should be wanted, 20,000 were to fight from the top of the wall when necessary, and the re-

Y. R.

621 maining 10,000 were kept in reserve. Each division had its place assigned, and it was not permitted to any to change without orders. Each man was to spring to the place assigned to him when any signal of an attack was given. So carefully was everything arranged by Scipio.

B. C.

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93. The Numantines made several attacks here and there upon those guarding the walls. Swift and terrible was the appearance of the defenders, the signals being everywhere hoisted, the messengers running, the defenders of the walls springing to their places in crowds, and the trumpets sounding on every tower, so that the whole circuit of fifty stades presented to all beholders a most formidable aspect. This circuit Scipio traversed each day and night for the purpose of inspection. He was convinced that the enemy thus enclosed, and unable to obtain food, arms, or succor from without, could not hold out very long.

94. In the meantime Rhetogenes, a Numantine, surnamed Caraunius, a man of the greatest valor, induced five of his friends to take an equal number of servants and horses, and cross the space between the two armies secretly, on a cloudy night, carrying a bridge made in sections. Arriving at the wall he and his friends sprang upon it, slew the guards on either side, sent back the servants, drew the horses up the bridge, and rode off to the towns of the Arevaci, bearing olive-branches and entreating them, as blood relations, to help the Numantines. The chiefs of the Arevaci, fearing the Romans, would not even listen to them, but sent them away immediately. There was a rich town named Lutia, distant 300 stades from Numantia, whose young men sympathized with the Numantines and urged their city to send them aid. The older citizens secretly communicated this fact to Scipio. Receiving this intelligence about the eighth hour, he marched thither at once with a numerous and well-equipped force. Surrounding the place about daylight, he demanded that the leaders of the young men should be delivered up to him. When the citizens replied that they had fled from the place, he sent a herald to tell them that if these men were not surrendered to him he would sack the city. Being terrified by this threat, they delivered them up, to the number of about 400. Scipio cut off their hands, withdrew his

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force, rode away, and was back in his own camp the next morning.

B.C.

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95. The Numantines, being oppressed by hunger, sent five men to Scipio to ask whether he would treat them with moderation if they would surrender. Their leader, Avarus, discoursed much about the prestige and bravery of the Numantines, and said that even now they had done no wrong, but had fallen into their present misery for the sake of their wives and children, and for the freedom of their country. "Wherefore, O Scipio," he said, "it is worthy of you, as a man renowned for virtue, to spare a brave and honorable race and to extend to us terms dictated by humanity, which we shall be able to bear, now that we have at last experienced a change of fortune. It rests not with us but with you whether you receive the surrender of our city on fair terms, or allow it to perish in a last struggle." When Avarus had thus spoken, Scipio (who knew from prisoners the state of affairs inside) said merely that they must surrender their arms and place themselves and their city in his hands. When this answer was made known, the Numantines, who were previously savage in temper because of their absolute freedom and quite unaccustomed to obey the orders of others, and were now wilder than ever and beside themselves by reason of their hardships, slew Avarus and the five ambassadors who had accompanied him, as bearers of evil tidings, and perhaps thinking that they had made private terms for themselves with Scipio.

96. Soon after this, all their eatables being consumed, having neither grain, nor flocks, nor grass, they began, as is frequently necessary in wars, to lick boiled hides. When these also failed, they boiled and ate the bodies of human beings, first of those who had died a natural death, chopping them in small bits for cooking. Afterwards being nauseated by the flesh of the sick, the stronger laid violent hands upon the weaker. No form of misery was absent. They were rendered savage in mind by their food, and their bodies were reduced to the semblance of wild beasts by famine, plague, long hair, and neglect. In this condition they surrendered themselves to Scipio. He commanded them the same day to bring their arms to a place designated by him, and on the following day to assemble at

<sup>Y. R.</sup>  
<sup>621</sup> another place. But they put off the day, declaring that <sup>B. C.</sup>  
many of them still clung to liberty and desired to take their <sup>133</sup>  
own lives. Wherefore they asked for a day to arrange for  
death.

97. Such was the love of liberty and of valor which existed in this small barbarian town. With only 8000 fighting men before the war began, how many and what terrible reverses did they bring upon the Romans! How many treaties did they make on equal terms with the Romans, which the latter would not consent to make with any other people! How often did they challenge to open battle the last general sent against them, who had an army of 60,000 men! But he showed himself more experienced in war than themselves, by refusing to join battle with wild beasts when he could reduce them by that invincible enemy, hunger. In this way alone was it possible to capture the Numantines, and in this way alone were they captured. Reflecting upon their small numbers and great sufferings, their valiant deeds and long endurance, it has occurred to me to narrate these particulars of the Numantine history. Many, directly after the surrender, killed themselves in whatever way they chose, some in one way and some in another. The remainder congregated on the third day at the appointed place, a strange and shocking spectacle. Their bodies were foul, their hair and nails long, and they were smeared with dirt. They smelt most horribly, and the clothes they wore were likewise squalid and emitted an equally foul odor. For these reasons they appeared pitiable even to their enemies. At the same time there was something fearful to the beholders in the expression of their eyes—an expression of anger, grief, toil, and the consciousness of having eaten human flesh.

98. Having reserved fifty of them for his triumph, Scipio sold the rest and razed the city to the ground. So this Roman general overthrew two most powerful cities, — Carthage, by decree of the Senate, on account of its greatness, its power, and its advantages by land and sea; Numantia, small and with a sparse population, the Romans knowing nothing about the transaction as yet. He destroyed the latter either because he thought that it would be for the advantage of the Romans, or because he was in a violent



<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
<sup>621</sup> rage against the captives, or, as some think, in order to <sup>R.C.</sup>  
 acquire the glory of two surnames from two great calamities. At any rate, the Romans to this day call him Africanus and Numantinus from the ruin he brought upon those two places. Having divided the territory of the Numantines among their near neighbors and transacted certain business in the other cities, threatening or fining any whom he suspected, he sailed for home. <sup>133</sup>

## CHAPTER XVI

### Later History — Infamous Behavior of Didius — Sertorius in Spain

99. The Romans, according to their custom, sent ten senators to the newly acquired provinces of Spain, which Scipio, or Brutus before him, had received in surrender, or had taken by force, to settle their affairs on a peace basis. <sup>622</sup> At a later time, other revolts having taken place in Spain, <sup>112</sup> Calpurnius Piso was chosen as commander. He was succeeded by Servius Galba. When the Cimbri invaded Italy, and Sicily was torn by the second servile war, the Romans were too much preoccupied to send soldiers to Spain, but sent legates who endeavored to settle affairs without war as far as they could. When the Cimbri were driven out Titus Didius was sent to Spain, and he slew about 20,000 of the Arevaci. He also removed Termesum, a large city always insubordinate to the Romans, from a place of security into the plain, and ordered the inhabitants to live without walls. <sup>656</sup> He also besieged the city of Colenda and captured it nine <sup>98</sup> months after he had invested it, and sold the inhabitants with their wives and children.

100. There was another city near Colenda inhabited by mixed tribes of Celtiberians who had been the allies of Marcus Marius in a war against the Lusitanians, and whom he had settled there five years before with the approval of the Senate. They were living by robbery on account of their poverty. Didius, with the concurrence of the ten legates who were still present, resolved to destroy them. Accordingly, he told their principal men that he would allot the land of Colenda to them because they were poor.

V.R. 656 Finding them very much pleased with this offer, he told them to communicate it to their people, and to come with their wives and children to the parcelling out of the land. When they had done so he ordered his soldiers to vacate their camp, and these people, whom he wanted to ensnare, to go inside, so that he might make a list of their names, the men on one register and the women and children on another, in order to know how much land should be set apart for them. When they had gone inside the ditch and palisade, Didius surrounded them with his army and killed them all, and for this he was honored with a triumph. At a later period, the Celtiberians having revolted again, Flaccus was sent against them and slew 20,000. The people of the town of Belgida were eager for revolt, and when their senate hesitated they set fire to the senate-house and burned the senators. When Flaccus arrived there he put the authors of this crime to death. B.C. 98

101. These are the events which I have found most worthy of mention in the relations of the Romans with the Spaniards until that time. At a later period, when the dissensions of Sulla and Cinna arose in Rome, and the country was torn with civil wars and hostile camps, Quintus Sertorius, one of Cinna's party, who had been chosen to the command in Spain, stirred up that country against the Romans. He raised a large army, created a senate of his own friends after the manner of the Roman Senate, and marched towards Rome full of confidence and high courage, for he had been renowned for valor elsewhere. The Senate in great alarm sent against him their most famous generals, first Cæcilius Metellus with a large army, and then Pompey with another army, in order to repel if possible this war from Italy, which was terribly distracted with 682 civil strife. But Sertorius was murdered by Perpenna, one of his own partisans, who proclaimed himself general of the faction in place of Sertorius. Pompey slew Perpenna in battle, and so this war, which had greatly alarmed the Romans, came to an end; but I shall speak of this more particularly in my account of the civil wars of Sulla. 72

693 102. After the death of Sulla, Gaius Cæsar was sent as prætor into Spain with power to make war wherever it was needful. All of those Spaniards who were doubtful in their 61

<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
693 allegiance, or had not yet submitted to the Romans, he <sup>B.C.</sup>  
brought under subjection by force and arms. Some, who <sup>62</sup>  
afterwards rebelled, were subdued by his adopted son Octa-  
<sup>729</sup> vius, surnamed Augustus. From that time it appears that <sup>25</sup>  
the Romans have divided Iberia (which they now call His-  
pania) into three parts and sent a prætor to govern each,  
two being chosen annually by the Senate, and the third ap-  
pointed by the emperor to hold office during his pleasure.

# BOOK VII

## THE HANNIBALIC WAR

### CHAPTER I

Hamilcar Barca — Hannibal in Spain — Hannibal marches over the Alps

1. WHAT Hannibal the Carthaginian did to, and suffered from, the Romans during the sixteen years that he persisted in war against them, from his first march from Spain to Italy until he was recalled by the Carthaginians (their own city being in danger), and was then driven out by the Romans, this book will show. What Hannibal's real reasons for that invasion were, as well as his public pretext, have been very clearly set forth in my Spanish history, yet I shall mention them here by way of reminder.

2. Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, the father of this Hannibal, was the commander of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily when they contended with the Romans for possession of that island. Being prosecuted by his enemies on a charge of maladministration, and fearing a conviction, he managed to get himself chosen general against the Numidians before he had settled his accounts. Having proved useful in this war and having secured the favor of the army by plunder and largesses, he passed over the straits into Spain and made an expedition against Gades without the authority of Carthage. From thence he sent much booty to Carthage in order to win the favor of the multitude so that if possible he might ward off censure on account of his command in Sicily. Having gained much territory and great glory he inspired the Carthaginians with a desire to possess the whole of Spain, and persuaded them that it would be an easy task. Thereupon the Saguntines and other Greeks who were settled in Spain had recourse to the Romans, and a

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boundary was fixed to the Carthaginian possessions in that country, namely, that they should not cross the river Iberus (Ebro), and a treaty to this effect was made between the Romans and the Carthaginians. After this, Hamilcar, while settling the affairs of Carthaginian Spain, was killed in battle, and Hasdrubal, his son-in-law, succeeded him as general. The latter while hunting was killed by a slave whose master he had put to death.

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3. After them this Hannibal was chosen by the army as the third commander in Spain because he seemed to have great aptitude and fondness for war. He was the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hasdrubal's wife, a very young man whose early years had been passed in the company of his father and his brother-in-law. The people of Carthage confirmed his election as general. In this way Hannibal, whose history I am about to write, became the commander of the Carthaginians against the Spaniards. The enemies of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal in Carthage continued to persecute the friends of those men, despising Hannibal on account of his youth. The latter, believing that this persecution was originally directed against himself and that he might secure his own safety by means of his country's fears, began to think about involving it in a great war. Believing, as was the fact, that a war between the Romans and Carthaginians once begun would last a long time, and that the undertaking would bring great glory to himself, even if he should fail (it was said, also, that he had been sworn on the altar by his father, while yet a boy, that he would be an eternal enemy of Rome), he resolved to cross the Iberus in defiance of the treaty. For a pretext he pro-

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535 cured certain persons to make accusations against the Saguntines. By continually forwarding these accusations to Carthage, and by accusing the Romans of secretly inciting the Spaniards to revolt, he obtained permission from Carthage to take such steps as he should think fit. Thereupon he crossed the Iberus and destroyed the city of Saguntum with its inhabitants. Thus the treaty, made between the Romans and the Carthaginians after the war in Sicily, was broken.

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4. What Hannibal himself and what the other Carthaginian and Roman generals after him did in Spain, I have

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536 related in the Spanish history. Having collected a large army of Celtiberians, Africans, and other nationalities, and put the command of Spain in the hands of his brother Hasdrubal, he crossed over the Pyrenees mountains into the country of the Celts, which is now called Gaul, with 90,000 foot, 12,000 horse, and 37 elephants. He passed through the country of the Gauls, conciliating some with money and some by persuasion, and overcoming others by force. When he came to the Alps and found no road through or over them (for they were exceedingly precipitous), he nevertheless marched boldly forward, but suffered great losses. The snow and ice being heaped high in front, he cut down and burned wood, quenched the ashes with water and vinegar, and thus rendering the rocks brittle he shattered them with iron hammers and opened a passage which is still in use over the mountains and is called Hannibal's pass. As his supplies began to fail he pressed forward, the Romans remaining in ignorance until he was actually in Italy. Scarcely six months after leaving Spain, and after suffering heavy losses of men, he descended from the mountains to the plain.

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## CHAPTER II

Battle of Ticinus — Battle of Trebia — Battle of Lake Trasimene —  
Hannibal destroys the Detachment of Centenius — Fabius Maximus  
chosen Dictator

5. After a brief pause he attacked Taurasia, a Gallic town, took it by storm, and put the prisoners to death, in order to strike terror into the rest of the Gauls. Then he advanced to the river Eridanus, now called the Padus [Po], where the Romans were at war with the Gallic tribe called the Boii, and pitched his camp. The Roman consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, was at that time contending with the Carthaginians in Spain. When he learned of Hannibal's incursion into Italy, he left his brother, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, in charge of affairs in Spain and sailed for Etruria. Marching thence with such allies as he could collect, he came before Hannibal to the Po. He sent Manlius and Atilius, who were conducting the war against the Boii, back to Rome, as they had no right to command when a consul







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was on the ground, and taking their forces drew them up for battle with Hannibal. After a skirmish and a cavalry engagement, the Romans were surrounded by the Africans and fled to their camp. The next night they took refuge in Placentia, a place strongly fortified, crossing the Po and then breaking down the bridge. Nevertheless Hannibal made a new bridge and crossed the river.

6. These exploits, one after another, following his passage of the Alps, exalted Hannibal's fame among the Cisalpine Gauls as an invincible commander and one most highly favored by fortune. In order to increase the admiration of those barbarians, who were easily deceived, he frequently changed his clothes and his hair, using carefully prepared devices each time. When the Gauls saw him moving among their people now an old man, then a young man, and again a middle-aged man, and continually changing from one to the other, they were astonished and thought that he partook of the divine nature. Sempronius, the other consul, being then in Sicily and learning what had happened, embarked his forces, came to Scipio's aid, and encamped at a distance of forty stades from him. The following day they all made ready for battle. The river Trebia separated the hostile armies, which the Romans crossed before daylight on a raw, sleety morning of the spring equinox, wading in the water up to their breasts. Hannibal allowed his army to rest till the second hour and then marched out.

7. The order of battle on each side was as follows. The Roman cavalry were posted on the wings in order to protect the infantry.<sup>1</sup> Hannibal ranged his elephants opposite the Roman horse and his foot-soldiers against the legions, and he ordered his own cavalry to remain quiet behind the elephants until he should give the signal. When battle was joined the horses of the Romans, terrified by the sight and smell of the elephants, broke and fled. The foot-soldiers, although suffering much and weakened by cold, wet clothes, and want of sleep, nevertheless boldly attacked these beasts, wounded them, and cut the hamstrings of some, and were already pushing back the enemy's infantry. Hannibal, ob-

<sup>1</sup> At this point there is a lacuna in the text.

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serving this, gave the signal to his horse to attack the Roman flank. The Roman horse having been just dispersed by fear of the elephants, the foot-soldiers were left without protection, and were now in difficulties. Fearing lest they should be surrounded, they everywhere broke in flight to their own camp. Many foot-soldiers were cut off by the enemy's horse and many perished in the swift stream, for the river was now swollen with melting snow so that they could not wade, on account of its depth, nor could they swim, on account of the weight of their armor. Scipio, who followed trying to rally them, was wounded and almost killed, and was with difficulty rescued and carried to Cremona. There was a small arsenal near Placentia which Hannibal laid siege to, where he lost 400 men and was himself wounded. And now they all went into winter quarters, Scipio in Cremona and Placentia, and Hannibal on the Po.

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8. When the Romans in the city learned of this third defeat on the Po (for they had in fact been beaten by the Boii before Hannibal arrived), they levied a new army of their own citizens which, with those already on the Po, amounted to thirteen legions, and they called for double that number from the allies. At this time the legion consisted of 5000 foot and 300 horse. Some of these they sent to Spain, some to Sardinia (for they were at war there also), and some to Sicily. The greater part were despatched against Hannibal under Cn. Servilius and Gaius Flaminius, who had succeeded Scipio and Sempronius as consuls. Servilius hastened to the Po where he received the command from Scipio. The latter, having been chosen proconsul, sailed for Spain. Flaminius, with 30,000 foot and 3000 horse, guarded Italy within the Apennines, which alone can be properly called Italy. The Apennines extend from the centre of the Alpine range to the sea. The country on the right-hand side of the Apennines is Italy proper. The other side, extending to the Adriatic, is now called Italy also, just as Etruria is now called Italy, but is inhabited by people of Greek descent, along the Adriatic shore, the remainder being occupied by Gauls, the same people who at an early period attacked and burned Rome. When Camillus drove them out and pursued them to the Apennines

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nines, it is my opinion that they crossed over these mountains and made a settlement near the Adriatic instead of their former abode. Hence this part of the country is still called Gallic Italy.

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9. Thus had the Romans divided their large armies at this juncture for many campaigns. Hannibal, learning this fact, moved secretly in the early spring, devastated Etruria, and advanced toward Rome. The citizens became greatly alarmed as he drew near, for they had no force at hand fit for battle. Nevertheless, 8000 of those who remained were brought together, over whom Centenius, one of the patricians, although a private citizen, was appointed commander, there being no regular officer present, and sent into Umbria to the Plestine marshes to occupy the narrow passages which offered the shortest way to Rome. In the meantime Flaminius, who guarded the interior of Italy with 30,000 men, learning of the rapidity of Hannibal's movement, changed his position hastily, giving his army no chance to rest. Fearing for the safety of the city and being inexperienced in war (for he had been wafted into power on a popular breeze), he hastened to engage with Hannibal.

10. The latter, well aware of his rashness and inexperience, moved forward and took a position with a mountain and a lake [Thrasimenus] before him, concealing his light-armed troops and his cavalry in a ravine. Flaminius, seeing the enemy's camp in the early morning, delayed a little to let his men rest from their toilsome march and to fortify his camp, after which he led them straightway to battle, although they were still weary with night-watches and hard labor. Caught between the mountain and the lake and the enemy (for the ambush suddenly appeared everywhere), he lost his own life, and 20,000 men were slain with him. The remaining 10,000 escaped to a village strongly fortified by nature. Maharbal, Hannibal's lieutenant, who had himself acquired very great renown in war, not being able to take them easily and thinking it unwise to fight with desperate men, persuaded them to lay down their arms, agreeing that they should go free wherever they pleased. When they had complied with this agreement he brought them disarmed to Hannibal. The latter, denying that

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Maharbal had authority to make such an agreement without his consent, nevertheless treated the Roman allies with kindness and sent them home without ransom, in order to conciliate their towns. He kept all the Romans as prisoners. He gave the booty to the Gauls who were serving with him, in order to attach them to him by the hope of gain, and then marched forward. When this news reached the consul Servilius on the Po, he marched to Etruria with 40,000 men. Centenius, with his 8000, had already occupied the narrow passage previously mentioned.

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11. When Hannibal saw the Plestine marsh and the mountain overhanging it, and Centenius between them guarding the passage, he inquired of the guides whether there was any way around. When they said there was no path but that the whole region was rugged and precipitous, he, nevertheless, sent a body of light-armed troops, under the command of Maharbal, to explore the district and pass around the mountain by night. When he judged that they had reached their destination he attacked Centenius in front. While the engagement was in progress, Maharbal was seen pushing forward strenuously on the summit above, where he raised a shout. The Romans thus surrounded took to flight, and there was a great slaughter among them, 3000 being killed and 800 taken prisoners. The remainder escaped with difficulty. When this news reached the city they feared lest Hannibal should march against them at once. They collected stones upon the walls, and the old men armed themselves. Being in want of arms they took down from the temples those that had been hung there as trophies of former wars, and, as was customary in times of great danger, they chose a dictator, Fabius Maximus being selected.

### CHAPTER III

The Policy of Fabius Maximus — Rashness of Minucius Rufus — Hannibal caught in a Trap — His Escape from Fabius — Carthage refuses to send Reinforcements to Hannibal — The New Consuls — Their Disagreement

12. But divine Providence turned Hannibal away toward the Adriatic, where he ravaged the sea-coast and gathered





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vast plunder. The consul Servilius, marching parallel with him, came to Ariminum, being distant from Hannibal by one day's march. He retained his army there in order to hearten those Gauls who were still friendly to Rome. When Fabius Maximus, the dictator, arrived, he sent to Rome Servilius, who could be no longer either consul or general after a dictator had been chosen. Fabius followed Hannibal closely, but did not come to an engagement with him, although often challenged. He kept careful watch on his enemy's movements, and lay near him and prevented him from besieging any town. After the country was exhausted Hannibal began to be short of provisions. So he traversed it again, drawing his army up each day and offering battle. Fabius would not come to an engagement, although his master of horse, Minucius Rufus, disapproved of his policy, and wrote to his friends in Rome that Fabius held back on account of cowardice. As Fabius had occasion to go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, the command of the army fell to Minucius, and he had a sort of a fight with Hannibal, and as he thought he had the best of it he grew bolder and wrote to the Senate accusing Fabius of not wanting to win a victory; and the Senate, when Fabius had returned to the camp, voted that his master of horse should share the command equally with him.

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13. They accordingly divided the army and encamped near each other; and each held to his own opinion, Fabius seeking to exhaust Hannibal by the lapse of time and meanwhile to receive no damage from him, while Minucius was eager for a decisive fight. Shortly afterward Minucius joined battle, and Fabius looked on to see what would happen, holding his own forces well in hand. In this way he was enabled to receive Minucius when he was beaten, and to drive Hannibal's men back from the pursuit. Thus did Fabius save Minucius from a great disaster, bearing him no malice for his slander. Then Minucius, recognizing his own want of experience, laid down his command and delivered his part of the army to Fabius, who held to the belief that the only time for a skilful captain to fight is when it is necessary. This maxim, at a later time, was often brought to mind by Augustus, who was slow to fight and preferred to win by art rather than by valor. Fabius

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continued to watch Hannibal as before and prevented him from ravaging the country, not coming to an engagement with his whole army but merely cutting off stragglers, well knowing that Hannibal would soon be short of supplies.

14. They were now approaching a narrow pass of which Hannibal was ignorant. Fabius sent forward 4000 men to occupy it, keeping the remainder of his force at the other extremity where he encamped on a strong hill. When Hannibal discovered that he had been caught between Fabius and the defended pass he was more alarmed than he had ever been before, for there was no way of escape, but all the country round about was rugged and precipitous. He could not hope to overcome Fabius or those defending the pass, on account of the difficulties of the ground. In this desperate situation he put to death his 5000 prisoners lest they should add a new tumult to the danger. Then he tied torches to the horns of all the cattle he had in the camp (and there were many), and when night came he lighted the torches, extinguished all the camp fires, and commanded the strictest silence. Then he ordered the most courageous of his young men to drive the cattle up the rocky places between Fabius and the pass. These, urged on by their drivers and burned by the torches, ran furiously up the mountain side, and if any of them fell down they would get up and run on again.

15. The Romans on either side when they observed the silence and darkness in Hannibal's camp and the many and various lights on the mountain side, could not exactly make out what was taking place, because it was night. Fabius, indeed, suspected that it was some stratagem of Hannibal's, but not being sure he kept his army in its position on account of the darkness. But those who held the pass imagined, just as Hannibal wished, that in his extremity he was trying to escape by scaling the cliffs above. So they hastened away to the place where they saw the lights, in order to catch Hannibal there in difficulties. The latter, when he discovered that the pass was deserted, advanced with a flying detachment, in dead silence and without light, in order to conceal the movement. Having seized the pass and strengthened his position he made a signal by trumpet, and the army in camp answered him with a shout and im-



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mediately relighted the fires. Then the Romans saw that they had been deceived. The remainder of Hannibal's army and those who drove the cattle now advanced to the pass without fear, and when he had brought them all together he moved forward. Thus did Hannibal succeed beyond expectation and rescue his army from danger. Thence he advanced to Geronia, a city of Apulia, which was well stored with provisions. This town he captured, and here went into winter quarters in the midst of abundance.

16. Fabius, pursuing the same policy as before, followed and camped at a distance of ten stades from Geronia, with the river Aufidus flowing between them. The six months which limited the terms of dictators among the Romans now expired, and the consuls Servilius and Atilius resumed their offices and came to the camp, and Fabius returned to Rome. During the winter frequent skirmishes took place between Hannibal and the Romans in which the latter were generally successful, and showed to the better advantage. Hannibal was all the time writing exultingly to the Carthaginians about the events of the war, but now, having lost many men and being in want of assistance, he asked them to send him soldiers and money. But his enemies, who had jeered at all of his doings, replied that they could not understand how Hannibal should be asking for help when he said he was winning victories, since victorious generals did not ask for money but sent it home to their own people. The Carthaginians followed their suggestion and sent neither soldiers nor money. Hannibal, lamenting this short-sighted policy, wrote to his brother Hasdrubal in Spain, telling him to make an incursion into Italy at the beginning of summer with what men and money he could raise, and ravage the other extremity so that the whole country might be wasted at once and the Romans exhausted by the double encounter. Such was the situation of Hannibal's affairs.

17. The Romans, distressed by the magnitude of the disasters to Flaminius and Centenius, and considering such a succession of surprising defeats unworthy of their dignity, and that a war within their own territory was not to be tolerated, and furious against Hannibal, levied four new


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legions in the city to serve against him, and hurried the allied forces from all quarters to Apulia. As consuls they chose Lucius Æmilius, who had acquired military fame in the war against the Illyrians, and Terentius Varro, a demagogue who had won popular favor by the usual high-sounding promises. When they sent the consuls forward they begged them as they were leaving the city to end the war by battle, and not to exhaust the city by delay, by conscriptions, by taxes, and by hunger and idleness due to the devastation of the fields. The consuls on taking command of the army in Apulia had altogether 70,000 foot and 6000 horse, and they encamped near a village called Cannæ. Hannibal's camp was near by. Hannibal, who was always ready to fight and impatient of idleness, was especially so now because he was troubled lest his supplies should fail, for which reason he continually offered battle. He feared also lest his mercenaries should desert him, as they had not received their pay, or disperse through the country in search of food. For this reason he challenged the enemy daily.

18. The opinions of the consuls were diverse. Æmilius thought that it was best to exhaust Hannibal by delay, as he could not hold out long for want of provisions, rather than come to an engagement with a general so skilled in war and an army so accustomed to victory. But Varro, like the demagogue he was, reminded his colleague of the charge which the people had laid upon them at their departure, that they should bring matters to a speedy decision by battle. Servilius, the consul of the previous year, who was still present, alone sustained the opinion of Æmilius. All the senators and the so-called knights who held offices in the army agreed with Varro. While they were still disputing, Hannibal set upon some detachments of theirs that were collecting wood and forage, and he pretended to be defeated, and about the last watch put the bulk of his army in motion as if in retreat. Varro, seeing this, led out the army with the thought of pursuing Hannibal in his flight. Æmilius even then forbade the movement, and as Varro did not obey he consulted the omens alone, according to the Roman custom, and sent word to Varro, just as he was starting, that the day was unpropitious. The latter thereupon came back, not venturing to disregard the omen, but he tore his





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#### CHAPTER IV

##### Preparations for Battle — Battle of Cannæ — Total Defeat of the Romans — Roman Losses — Hannibal's Strategy

19. Hannibal, when his scheme failed, returned forthwith to his camp, thus showing that his retreat was feigned, but this did not teach Varro to suspect every movement of Hannibal. Hurrying armed as he was to the prætorium, he complained in the presence of senators, centurions, and tribunes that Æmilius had made a pretence about the omen in order to snatch a sure victory from the city, either hesitating from cowardice or moved by jealousy toward himself. While he was thus venting his wrath the soldiers standing around the tent listened to him and joined in the censure of Æmilius. The latter nevertheless continued to give good advice to those within, but in vain. When all the others, Servilius alone excepted, sided with Varro, he yielded, and on the following day he himself drew up the army in order of battle as commander, for Varro yielded to him that title. Hannibal perceived the movement but he did not come out of his camp because he was not quite ready for battle. On the next day both armies came down to the open field. The Romans were drawn up in three lines with a small interval between them, each part having infantry in the centre, with light-armed troops and cavalry on the wings. Æmilius commanded the centre, Servilius the left wing, and Varro the right. Each had a thousand picked horse at hand to carry aid wherever it should be needed. Such was the Roman formation.

20. Hannibal had previously observed that a stormy east wind began to blow in that region regularly about noon. So he chose the ground where he should have the wind at his back. Then on a wooded hill cut by ravines he placed some cavalry and light-armed troops in ambush, to whom he gave orders that when the battle was joined and the wind had risen, they should fall upon the enemy's rear.

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With them were placed 500 Celtiberians who had, in addition to the long swords at their belts, short daggers under their garments. These they were not to use till he himself gave the signal. He divided his whole army into three lines of battle and extended his horse at long distances on the wings in order to outflank the enemy if possible. He gave the command of the right wing to his brother Mago, and of the left to his nephew Hanno, retaining the centre for himself on account of Æmilius' reputation as an experienced commander. He had 2000 picked horse and Maharbal had 1000, who were ordered to move about and give assistance wherever they saw any part of the army in difficulties. In making these arrangements he protracted the time till about the second hour so that the wind might come to his aid the sooner.

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21. When all was in readiness on either side the commanders rode up and down the ranks encouraging their soldiers. The Romans were exhorted to remember their parents, wives, and children, and to wipe out the disgrace of former defeats. They were admonished that this battle was the last hope of safety. Hannibal reminded his men of their former exploits and their victories over these same enemies, and said that it would be shameful to be vanquished now by the vanquished. When the trumpets sounded the foot-soldiers raised a shout and the archers, slingers, and light-armed troops advanced and began the battle. After them the legions took up the work. Now began a great slaughter and a great struggle, each side contending valiantly. Presently Hannibal gave the signal to his horse to surround the enemy's wings. The Roman horse, although inferior in number, advanced against them, and extending their line of battle to a dangerous thinness, nevertheless fought valiantly, especially those on the left toward the sea. Hannibal and Maharbal together now led against them the cavalry they had kept around their own persons, with loud barbarian shouts, thinking to terrify their enemies. Yet the Romans received the shock without flinching and without fear.

22. When Hannibal saw that his manœuvre had failed, he gave the signal to his 500 Celtiberians. These passing out of their own line of battle went over to the Romans,

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holding out their shields, spears, and swords in the manner of deserters. Servilius commended them and at once took possession of their arms and stationed them in the rear, in their tunics alone as he supposed, for he did not think it best to put deserters in chains in the sight of the enemy, nor did he have any suspicion of men whom he saw with nothing but their tunics, nor was there time to take counsel in the thick of the fray. Now some of the African cohorts made a pretence of flight toward the mountains, uttering loud cries. This was the signal to those concealed in the ravines to fall upon the pursuers. Straightway the light-armed troops and cavalry that had been placed in ambush showed themselves, and simultaneously a strong and blinding wind rose carrying dust into the eyes of the Romans, which prevented them from seeing their enemies. The impetus of the Roman missiles was lessened by the opposing wind, while that of the enemy's was increased and their aim made surer. The Romans, not being able to see and avoid the enemy's weapons nor to take good aim with their own, stumbled against each other and soon fell into disorder of various kinds.

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23. At this juncture the 500 Celtiberians, seeing that the expected opportunity had come, drew their daggers from their bosoms and first slew those who were just in front of them, then, seizing the swords, shields, and spears of the dead, made a greater onslaught against the whole line, darting from one to another indiscriminately, and they accomplished all the greater slaughter inasmuch as they were in the rear of all. Now were the Romans in great and various trouble, assailed by the enemy in front, by ambuscades in flank, and butchered by foes amid their own ranks. They could not turn upon the latter on account of the pressure of the enemy in front and because it was not easy to distinguish these assailants, for they had possessed themselves of Roman shields. Most of all were they harassed by the dust, which prevented them from even guessing what was taking place. But (as usually happens in cases of disorder and panic) they considered their condition worse than it was, the ambuscades more dreadful, and the 500 more numerous than 500. In short, they imagined that their whole army was surrounded by hostile cavalry and deserters.

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538 So they turned and broke into headlong flight, first those on the right wing where Varro himself led the retreat, and after them the left wing, whose commander, Servilius, however, went to the assistance of Æmilius. Around these the bravest of the horse and foot rallied, to the number of about 10,000. B C  
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24. The generals and all the others who had horses, although surrounded by Hannibal's cavalry, dismounted and fought on foot. They charged the enemy with fury and performed many brilliant exploits, the fruit of military experience, being nerved by the energy of despair. But they fell on all sides, and Hannibal, darting hither and thither, encouraged his soldiers, now exhorting them to make their victory complete, now rebuking and reproaching them because, after they had scattered the main body of the enemy, they could not overcome the small remainder. As long as Æmilius and Servilius survived the Romans stood firm, although giving and receiving many wounds, but when their generals fell they forced their way through the midst of their enemies most bravely, and escaped in various directions. Some took refuge in the two camps where others had preceded them in flight. These were altogether about 15,000, whom Hannibal straightway besieged. Others, to the number of about 2000, took refuge in Cannæ, and these surrendered to Hannibal. A few escaped to Canusium. The remainder were dispersed in groups through the woods.

25. Such was the result of the battle between Hannibal and the Romans at Cannæ, which was begun after the second hour of the day and ended within two hours of night-fall, and which is still famous among the Romans as a disaster, for in these few hours 50,000 of their soldiers were slain and a great many taken prisoners. Many senators who were present lost their lives and with them all the military tribunes and centurions, and their two best generals. The most worthless one, who was the cause of the calamity, had made good his escape at the beginning of the rout. The Romans, in their two years' war with Hannibal in Italy, had now lost, of their own and their allied forces, about 100,000 men.

26. Hannibal gained this rare and splendid victory by



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 employing four stratagems in one day: by the force of the wind, by the feigned desertion of the Celtiberians, by the pretended flight, and by the ambuscades in the ravines. Immediately after the battle he went to view the dead. When he saw the bravest of his friends lying among the slain he lifted up his voice and wept, saying that he did not want another such victory. It is said that Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, made the same exclamation aforetime, when he too gained a victory over the Romans in Italy, with like loss to himself. Some of those who escaped from the battle and who had taken refuge in the larger camp and in the evening had chosen Publius Sempronius as their general, forced a passage through Hannibal's guards, who were exhausted by weariness and want of sleep. These men, to the number of about 10,000, made their way to Canusium about midnight. But the 5000 in the smaller camp were captured by Hannibal the following day. Varro, having collected the remains of the army and sought to revive their fainting spirits, put them under the command of Scipio, one of the military tribunes, and himself hastened to Rome.

## CHAPTER V

Consternation in Rome — Senate refuses to ransom the Prisoners —  
 Siege and Capture of Petilia — Dasius of Arpi

27. When the disaster was announced in the city, multitudes thronged the streets uttering lamentations for their relatives, calling on them by name, and bewailing their own fate as soon to fall into the enemy's hands. Women went to the temples with their children and prayed that there might sometime be an end to the calamities to the city. The magistrates besought the gods by sacrifices and prayers that if they had any cause of anger they would be satisfied with the punishment already visited. The Senate sent Quintus Fabius (the same who wrote a history of these events) to the temple of Delphi to seek an oracle concerning the present posture of affairs. They freed 8000 slaves with their masters' consent, and ordered everybody in the city to go to work making arms and projectiles. They also

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made a conscription, as was allowed, even among certain of the allies. They also changed the destination of Claudius Marcellus, who was about to sail to Sicily, and sent him to fight against Hannibal. Marcellus divided the fleet with his colleague Furius and sent a part of it to Sicily, while he himself took the manumitted slaves and as many others as he could collect of citizens and allies, amounting altogether to 10,000 foot and 2000 horse, and marched to Teanum in order to see what Hannibal would do next.

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28. Hannibal allowed his captives to send messengers to Rome in their own behalf, to see if the citizens would ransom them with money. Three were chosen by them, of whom Gn. Sempronius was the leader, from whom Hannibal exacted an oath that they would return to him. The relatives of the prisoners, collecting around the senate-house, declared their readiness to redeem their friends severally with their own money and begged the Senate to allow them to do so, and the people joined them with their own prayers and tears. Some of the senators thought it was not wise, after such great calamities, to expose the city to the loss of so many more men, or to disdain free men while giving liberty to slaves. Others thought that it was not fitting to accustom men to flight by compassion, but rather to teach them to conquer or die, as would be the case if not even his relative should pity the runaway. Many precedents having been adduced on either side, the Senate finally decided that the prisoners should not be ransomed by their relatives, being of opinion that while so many dangers were still impending present clemency would tend to future harm, while severity, although painful, would be for the public advantage hereafter, and indeed at this very time would startle Hannibal by the very boldness of their action. Accordingly Sempronius and the two prisoners who accompanied him returned to Hannibal. The latter in his anger sold some of his prisoners, put others to death, and made a bridge of their bodies with which he passed over a stream. The senators and other distinguished prisoners in his hands he compelled to fight with each other, as a spectacle for the Africans, fathers against sons, and brothers against brothers. He omitted no act of disdainful cruelty.

29. Hannibal next turned his arms against the territory

- <sup>V.R.</sup>  
<sup>538</sup> of the Roman allies and, having devastated it, laid siege <sup>B.C.</sup>  
to Petilia. The inhabitants, although few in number, made 216  
courageous sallies against him (their women joining in the  
fight) and performing many noble deeds of daring. They  
burned his siege engines unceasingly, and in these enter-  
prises the women were in no wise inferior to the men.  
But their numbers were reduced by each assault, and they  
began to suffer the pangs of hunger. When Hannibal per-  
ceived this he drew a line of circumvallation around them  
and left Hanno to finish the siege. As their sufferings in-  
creased they first thrust outside the walls all those who were  
incapable of fighting and looked on without grieving while  
Hanno slew them, considering the dead better off than the  
living, for which reason the remainder, when reduced to  
the last extremity, made a sally against the enemy, and  
after performing many splendid acts of bravery, being  
nearly starved and completely exhausted, they were unable  
to return and were all slain by the Africans. Thus Hanno  
possessed himself of the town. But yet a few escaped, who  
had sufficient strength to run. These wanderers the Romans  
carefully collected, to the number of about 800, and re-  
placed them in their own country after the war, being  
moved by kind feeling toward them and admiration for  
their exceptional fidelity.
- <sup>539</sup> 30. As the Celtiberian horse, who were serving with <sup>215</sup>  
Hannibal as mercenaries, were seen to be splendid fighters,  
the Roman generals in Spain obtained an equal number  
from the towns under their charge and sent them to Italy  
to contend against the others. These when encamped near  
Hannibal mingled with their fellow-countrymen and won  
them over. Thus it came about that many of them went  
over to the Romans and others deserted or ran away, while  
the remainder were no longer trusted by Hannibal, as they  
were under suspicion by him and he by them. Hannibal's  
affairs began to decline from this circumstance.
- <sup>541</sup> 31. There is a city called Arpi in Daunia which is said <sup>213</sup>  
to have been founded by Diomedes, the Argive. Here a  
certain Dasius, said to have been a descendant of Dio-  
medes, a very fickle-minded person, quite unworthy of such  
descent, after the terrible defeat of the Romans at Cannæ  
drew his people over to the Carthaginian side. But now

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when Hannibal's power began to wane he rode secretly to Rome, and being introduced to the Senate, said that he could bring the city back to the Roman allegiance and thus atone for his error. The Romans very nearly killed him and drove him from the city forthwith. Then, being in equal fear of them and of Hannibal, he became a wanderer through the country. Hannibal burned his wife and children alive. Arpi was betrayed by a portion of the inhabitants to Fabius Maximus, who captured it by night, and having put to death all the Carthaginians he found there, he established a Roman garrison in the city.

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## CHAPTER VI

The Capture of Tarentum — The Citadel holds out — Hannibal captures Thurii — Also Metapontum and Heraclea — The Romans besiege Capua — Hannibal marches to Rome — Consternation in the City — Flaccus follows Hannibal

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32. Tarentum, which was held by a Roman garrison, <sup>212</sup> was betrayed by Cononeus in the following manner. Being in the habit of hunting and always bringing a present of game to Livius, the prefect of the guard, he became very familiar with him. As war was raging in the country he said that it was necessary to hunt and bring back his game by night. For this reason the gates were opened to him by night. He made an arrangement with Hannibal in pursuance of which he took a body of soldiers, some of whom he concealed in a thicket near the town; others he ordered to follow himself at no great distance, and still others to go with him, clad outwardly in hunting garments but girded with breastplates and swords underneath. He came by night, a wild boar being carried in front of them on poles. When the guards had opened the gates as usual, those who came with him slew the gate-men immediately. Those following behind made a sudden dash upon the other guards, those from the thicket were admitted, and the gates were opened to Hannibal. When the latter was once inside he speedily possessed himself of the remainder of the town, and having conciliated the Tarentines he laid siege to the citadel, which was held by a Roman garrison. In this way was Tarentum betrayed by Cononeus.

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33. The Romans who held the citadel were about 5000 in number, and some of the Tarentines came to their aid. The prefect of the guard at Metapontum joined them with half of his force, bringing an abundance of missiles and engines with which they expected to drive Hannibal easily back from the walls. But Hannibal had a plentiful supply of these things also. Accordingly he brought up towers, catapults, and tortoises with which he shook some of the walls, pulled off the parapets with hooks attached to ropes, and laid bare the defences. The garrison hurled stones down upon the engines and broke many of them, turned aside the hooks with slip-knots, and making frequent and sudden sallies always threw the besiegers into confusion and returned after killing many. One day when they noticed that the wind was violent some of the Romans threw down firebrands, flax, and pitch upon the engines, while others darted out and put fire under them. Hannibal, despairing of his attempt, threw a wall around the city except on the sea side, where it was not possible to do so. Then turning the siege over to Hanno he advanced into Apulia.

34. The port of Tarentum looked toward the north and gave entrance through a narrow passage to those sailing in from the sea. The passage was now closed by bridges which were under the control of the Roman garrison, by which means they obtained provisions by sea and prevented the Tarentines from supplying themselves. For this reason the latter began to suffer from want, until Hannibal came back and suggested the making of another passage by excavating the public highway, which ran through the midst of the city from the harbor to the sea on the south. When this was done they had provisions in plenty, and with their triremes they worried the Roman garrison who had no ships, even coming close to the walls, especially in calm weather, and intercepting the supply ships coming to them. The Romans in turn began to suffer from want. When the people of Thurii sent them some ships laden with corn by night, under a convoy of triremes, the Tarentines and the Carthaginians in league with them, getting wind of the affair, laid a trap for them and captured them all, including the corn and the men that brought it. The Thurians sent

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542 numerous messengers to negotiate for the release of the captives, and the Tarentines won the negotiators over to Hannibal, who thereupon released all the Thurian prisoners he held. These, when they came home, forced their relatives to open the gates to Hanno. Thus the Thurians, while endeavoring to help the Romans in Tarentum, unexpectedly fell into the power of the Carthaginians. The Roman garrison in Thurii escaped secretly by sea to Brundisium. B. C. 212

543 35. The Metapontines, whose prefect had taken half of his force to Tarentum, slew the remainder, who were few in number, and delivered themselves up to Hannibal. Heraclea, which lay midway between Metapontum and Tarentum, followed their example, being moved by fear rather than inclination. Thus Hannibal's affairs again began to wear a flourishing aspect. In the following year some of the Lucanians revolted from Rome, and Sempronius Gracchus, the proconsul, marched against them. A certain Lucanian named Flavius, of the party that had remained faithful to the Romans, who had been also a friend and guest of Gracchus but was now his betrayer, persuaded him to come to a certain place to have a conference with the Lucanian generals, saying that they had repented and wished to return to the Roman allegiance. Suspecting nothing, he went to the place with thirty horsemen, where he found himself surrounded by a large force of Numidians in ambush, with whom Flavius then joined himself. When Gracchus discovered the treachery he leaped from his horse with his companions, and after performing many noble deeds of valor was slain with all the others, except three. These were the only ones captured by Hannibal, who had exerted himself to the utmost to take the Roman proconsul alive. Although he had basely entrapped him, nevertheless in admiration of his bravery in the final struggle he gave him a funeral and sent his bones to Rome. After this he passed the summer in Apulia and collected large supplies of corn.

36. The Romans decided to attack the Capuans, and Hannibal sent Hanno with 1000 foot and as many horse to enter Capua by night. This he did without the knowledge of the Romans. At daylight the Romans discovered what

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B.C.

543 had taken place by observing greater numbers of men on the walls. So they turned back from the city forthwith and began hurriedly to reap the harvest of the Capuans and the other inhabitants of Campania. When the Campanians bewailed their losses Hannibal said to them that he had plenty of corn in Apulia, and he gave an order that they should send and get it as often as they wished. Accordingly they sent not only their pack animals and men, but also their women and children, to bring loads of corn. They had no fear of danger on the way because Hannibal had transferred his headquarters from Apulia to Campania and was encamped on the river Calor near the country of the Beneventines, whom alone they feared as the latter were still in alliance with Rome. While Hannibal was there they despised all their enemies.

542 37. It happened, however, that Hannibal was called by Hanno into Lucania, leaving the greater part of his baggage under a small guard in the camp near Beneventum. One of the two Roman consuls who were in command there (Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius), learning of this, fell upon the Campanians who were bringing corn and slew many who were unprepared for an attack, and gave the corn to the Beneventines. He also took Hannibal's camp and plundered his baggage, and, as Hannibal was still in Lucania, drew a line of circumvallation around Capua. Then the two consuls built another wall outside of this and established their camp between the two. They erected battlements also, some toward the besieged Capuans and others toward the enemy outside. There was the appearance of a great city enclosing a smaller one. The space between the enclosing wall and Capua was about two stades, in which many enterprises and encounters took place each day and many single combats, as in a theatre surrounded by walls, for the bravest were continually challenging each other. A certain Capuan named Taureus having had a single combat with the Roman Claudius Asellus, and seeking to escape, retreated, Asellus pursuing till he came to the walls of Capua. The latter not being able to check his horse dashed at full speed through the gate into Capua, and galloping through the whole city, ran out at the opposite gate and rejoined the Romans, and was thus marvellously saved.

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38. Hannibal, having failed in the task that called him to Lucania, turned back to Capua, considering it very important to defend a city so large, and which had been a city of importance under Roman sway. He accordingly attacked their enclosing wall, but as he accomplished nothing and could devise no way to introduce either provisions or soldiers into the city, and as none of them could communicate with him on account of the closeness of the siege, he marched to Rome with his whole army, having learned that the Romans also were hard pressed by famine and hoping to draw the Roman generals away from Capua, or to accomplish something more important than its relief. Moving with the greatest celerity through the country inhabited by many hostile peoples, some of whom were not able to hinder him while others would not incur the risk of battle, he encamped at the river Anio, two and thirty stades from Rome.

39. The city was thrown into consternation as never before. They were without any suitable force (what they had being in Campania), and now this strong, hostile army came suddenly against them under a general of invincible bravery and good fortune. Nevertheless, for the present emergency those who were able to bear arms manned the gates, the old men mounted the walls, and the women and children brought stones and missiles, while those who were in the fields flocked in all haste to the city. Confused cries, lamentations, prayers, and mutual exhortations on every side filled the air. Some went out and cut down the bridge over the river Anio. The Romans had at one time fortified a small town among the Æqui, which they called Alba after the name of their mother city. Its inhabitants with the lapse of time, either because of carelessness of pronunciation or corruption of language, or to distinguish them from the Albanians, were called Albenses. Two thousand of these Albenses hastened to Rome to share the danger. As soon as they arrived they armed themselves and mounted guard at the gates. Such zeal did this one small town, out of many colonies, exhibit, just as the little city of Plataea came to the aid of the Athenians at Marathon and shared their danger.

40. Appius, one of the Roman generals, remained at



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543 Capua, believing that he could capture the place by himself. Fulvius Flaccus, the other one, marched with untiring haste by other roads and encamped opposite Hannibal, with the river Anio flowing between them. When Hannibal found that the bridge had been destroyed and that Fulvius was occupying the opposite bank, he decided to go around by the sources of the stream. Fulvius moved parallel with him on the other side. Here, again, as was his custom, Hannibal devised a stratagem. He left some Numidian horse behind, who, as soon as the armies had moved off, crossed the Anio and ravaged the Roman territory until they had come very near to the city itself, and had carried consternation into it, when they rejoined Hannibal according to their orders. The latter, when he had passed around the sources of the stream, whence the road to Rome was not long, is said to have reconnoitred the city with three body-guards secretly by night, and to have observed the lack of force and the confusion prevailing. Nevertheless he went back to Capua, either because divine Providence turned him aside this time as in other instances, or because he was intimidated by the valor and fortune of the city, or because, as he said to those who urged him to attack it, he did not wish to bring the war to an end lest the Carthaginians should deprive him of his command. At any rate, the army under Fulvius was by no means a match for him. Fulvius followed him as he retreated, merely preventing him from foraging and taking care not to fall into any traps.

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## CHAPTER VII

Hannibal breaks into the Camp of Fulvius, but is driven out — Capua surrenders to the Romans — A Town of Bruttium lost and regained — The Story of Dasius and Blatius

41. Hannibal, on a certain moonless night, having observed that Fulvius, at the close of the day, had neglected to throw up a wall in front of his camp (but had merely dug a ditch with certain spaces in lieu of gates, and the earth thrown outward instead of a wall), quietly sent a body of cavalry to a fortified hill overlooking Fulvius' camp,

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and ordered them to keep silence until the Romans should believe the hill unoccupied. Then he ordered his Indians to mount their elephants and break into the camp of Fulvius through the open spaces, and over the piles of earth, in any way they could. He also directed a number of trumpeters and horn-blowers to follow at a short distance. When they should be inside the entrenchments some of them were ordered to run around and raise a great tumult so that they might seem to be very numerous, while others, speaking Latin, should call out that Fulvius, the Roman general, ordered the evacuation of the camp and the seizure of the neighboring hill. Such was Hannibal's stratagem, and at first all went according to his intention. The elephants broke into the camp, trampling down the guards, and the trumpeters did as they were ordered. The unexpected clamor striking the ears of the Romans as they started out of bed in the darkness of the night was something fearful. Hearing orders given in Latin directing them to take refuge on the hill, they hurried in that direction.

42. Fulvius, who was always looking out for some stratagem and suspecting one in everything that Hannibal did, being guided either by his own intelligence or by divine inspiration, or having learned the facts from some prisoner, quickly stationed his military tribunes in the roads leading to the hill to stop those who were rushing that way, and to tell them that it was not the Roman general but Hannibal who had given the command in order to lead them into an ambush. Then he stationed strong guards at the ramparts to repel any new attack from without, and with others passed rapidly through the camp exclaiming that there was no danger and that those who had broken in with the elephants were but few. Torches were lighted and fires kindled on all sides. Then the smallness of the attacking force was so manifest that the Romans utterly despised them, and, turning from fear to wrath, slew them the more easily since they were few in number and light-armed. The elephants not having room to turn around, and being entangled among the tents and huts, furnished an excellent mark for darts by reason of the narrowness of the place and the size of their bodies. Enraged with pain and unable to reach

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543 their enemies, they shook off their riders and trampled them under foot with fury and savage outcries, and broke out of the camp. Thus did Fulvius Flaccus by his constancy and skill bring to naught this unexpected ambush, frustrate Hannibal, and save his army, which had always been in terror of Hannibal's stratagems. B. C.  
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43. When his scheme had failed, Hannibal moved his army to Lucania and went into winter quarters, and here this fierce warrior gave himself up to unaccustomed luxury and the delights of love. From this time, little by little, his fortune changed. Fulvius returned to his colleague at Capua and both of them pressed the siege vigorously, hastening to take the city during the winter while Hannibal remained quiet. The Capuans, their supplies being exhausted and no more being obtainable from any quarter, surrendered themselves to the Roman generals, together with the Carthaginian garrison and their two commanders, another Hanno and Bostar. The Romans stationed a garrison in the city and cut off the hands of all the deserters they found there. They sent the Carthaginian nobles to Rome and the rest they sold as slaves. Of the Capuans themselves they put to death those who had been chiefly responsible for the defection of the city. From the others they only took away their land. All the country round about Capua is very fertile, being a plain. When Capua was once more restored to the Romans the principal advantage possessed by the Carthaginians in Italy was taken from them.

544 44. In Bruttium, which is a part of Italy, there was a man of the town of Tisia (which was garrisoned by the Carthaginians) who was in the habit of plundering and sharing his booty with the commander of the garrison, and who had by this means so ingratiated himself with the latter that he almost shared the command with him. This man was incensed at the arrogant behavior of the garrison toward his country. Accordingly, by an arrangement with the Roman general, with whom he exchanged pledges, he brought in a few soldiers each day as prisoners and lodged them in the citadel, to which place he took their arms also as spoils. When he had introduced a sufficient number he released and armed them, and overpowered the Carthaginian 210

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garrison, after which he brought in another garrison from the Roman forces. But as Hannibal passed that way not long afterwards, the guards fled in terror to Rhegium, and the inhabitants of Tisia delivered themselves up to Hannibal, who burned those who had been guilty of the defection and placed another garrison in the town.

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45. In Salapia, subject to Carthage in Apulia, were two men preëminent by birth, wealth, and power, but for a long time enemies to each other. One of these, named Dasius, sided with the Carthaginians, the other, Blatius, with the Romans. While Hannibal's affairs were flourishing Blatius remained quiet, but when the Romans began to recover their former supremacy he endeavored to come to an understanding with his enemy, simply for the sake of their country, lest, if the Romans should take it by force, some irreparable harm should befall it. Dasius, pretending to agree with him, communicated the matter to Hannibal. Hannibal took the part of a judge between them, Dasius accusing and Blatius defending himself, and saying that he was slandered by reason of his accuser's personal enmity. He was emboldened to use such language in the presence of his enemy, because he foresaw that such a foe would be likely to be distrusted on account of his private grudge. Hannibal thought that it was not wise to reject the accusation altogether, or to put too much faith in an accuser who was a personal enemy; so he dismissed them as though he would consider of the matter by himself. As they were going out by a very narrow passage Blatius said to Dasius in a low tone, "Are you not willing to save your country, good sir?" The latter immediately repeated the words in a loud voice, thus letting Hannibal know.

46. Then in a piteous tone Blatius cried out with much appearance of credibility, that his cunning enemy had made a plot against him. "This present scheme," he said, "will relieve me from all suspicion, if there was any, as to the former one. For who would have made a confidant of an enemy in such matters in the first place, or, if he had been so thoughtless before, would now, while still in danger and under trial and denying the charge against him, dare to say the same things a second time to one who had been his false accuser concerning these very matters, and especially

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544 in the judgment hall where many can hear his words and B.C.  
210 where his accuser stands ready to renew the charge against him. Even supposing the accuser had suddenly become friendly and well disposed, how would he be able to coöperate with me in saving the country after what has happened? Why should I ask the aid of one who is not able to give any?" I think that Blatius again designedly whispered those things to Dasius because he foresaw the event, in order to discredit him still more, and thus induce Hannibal to disbelieve his former accusations. Nor did Blatius, after he had been acquitted, desist from persuading his enemy to change sides, for he despised him now as a person utterly discredited. So Dasius again pretended to agree with him and sought to learn the plan of the revolt. Blatius replied without hesitation: "I will ride to one of the Roman camps (indicating one that was very far distant) the commander of which is my particular friend, and obtain a force which I will bring hither. You will remain here and keep watch upon affairs in the city."

47. Having spoken thus he immediately rode away, without the knowledge of Dasius, not to the camp he had named but to Rome by a shorter journey, and having given his son as a hostage to the Senate, he asked for a thousand horse, with which he hastened back with all speed, anticipating what would be the result. Dasius not seeing his enemy during the next few days thought that he had taken in hand the business they had agreed upon, as now having confidence in him. Supposing that Blatius had in fact gone to the more distant camp he rode to Hannibal, not doubting that he should get back before Blatius. "And now," said he to Hannibal, "I will deliver Blatius to you in the very act of bringing a hostile force into the city." Having exposed the affair and having received a military force, he hastened back to the town, not imagining that Blatius was yet anywhere near. But the latter was already inside, having slain the Carthaginian garrison, which was small, and taken care to prevent anybody from going out. He had also closed all the gates except that by which Dasius was expected to return. On that side he removed the guards from the wall to avoid suspicion, but the ground inside was intersected by ditches so that an attacking force

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should not be able to make its way through the whole town. Dasius was delighted when he saw the gates open, thinking that he had anticipated his enemy, and he entered the town rejoicing. Then Blatius shut the gate and slew him and his companions, who were squeezed together in a narrow place and had no way of passage through the ditches. A few of them escaped by leaping from the walls. Thus did Blatius overcome Dasius at the third encounter of their wits.

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## CHAPTER VIII

Defeat and Death of the Consul Fulvius — The Romans recover Tarentum — Death of Marcellus — Hannibal foiled at Salapia — Battle of the Metaurus — Hannibal retires to Bruttium

48. While Fulvius, the Roman consul, was besieging Herdônia, Hannibal approached him quietly one evening, having given orders that no fires should be lighted and that strict silence should be observed. Early in the morning, which happened to be foggy, he sent a body of horse to attack the Roman camp. The latter repelled them with some confusion as they hurried from their beds, but with boldness, for they believed their foe to be some few men from somewhere or other. As Hannibal was passing around to the other side of the town with a body of infantry in order to reconnoitre, and at the same time to encourage the people inside, he fell in with the Romans in the course of his circuit, either by chance or by design, and surrounded them. Being attacked on both sides they fell confusedly and in heaps. About 8000 of them were killed, including the consul Fulvius himself. The remainder took refuge inside a fortification in front of their camp, and by fighting bravely preserved it and prevented Hannibal from taking the camp.

49. After this, the Romans ravaged the country of the revolted Apulians, and Hannibal that of the Campanians, all of whom had returned to the Roman allegiance except the Atellæi. The latter he settled in Thurii in order that they might not suffer by the war that was raging in Bruttium, Lucania, and Apulia. The Romans settled the exiles of Nuceria in Atella and then, continuing their attacks on

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Hannibal's allies, they took Aulonia and overran the territory of the Bruttians. They also laid siege by land and sea to Tarentum, which was under the command of Carthalo. The latter, as he had few Carthaginian soldiers present, had taken Bruttians into his service. The captain of these Bruttians was in love with a woman whose brother was serving with the Romans, and the latter managed, by means of his sister, that this captain should surrender that part of the wall which he commanded to the Romans, who were directing their engines against it. In this way the Romans again got possession of Tarentum, a place admirably situated for the purposes of war both by land and by sea.

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50. Hannibal was hastening to its relief when he learned of its capture. He turned aside to Thurii greatly disappointed, and proceeded thence to Venusia. There Claudius Marcellus, who had conquered Sicily and was now consul for the fifth time, and Titus Crispinus took the field against him, not venturing, however, to fight a pitched battle. But Marcellus happening to see a party of Numidians carrying off plunder, and thinking that they were only a few, attacked them confidently with three hundred horse. He led the attack in person, being a man of daring courage in battle and ever despising danger. Suddenly, a large body of Africans started up and attacked him on all sides. Those Romans who were in the rear early took to flight, but Marcellus, who thought that they were following him, fought valiantly until he was thrust through with a dart and killed. When Hannibal stood over his body and saw the wounds all on his breast, he praised him as a soldier but criticised him as a general. He took off his ring, burned his body with distinguished honors, and sent his bones to his son in the Roman camp.

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51. Being angry with the Salapians, Hannibal sent a Roman deserter to them with a letter stamped with the signet ring of Marcellus, before the latter's death had become generally known, saying that the army of Marcellus was on the way thither and that Marcellus gave orders that the gates should be opened to receive them. But the citizens had received letters a little before from Crispinus, who had sent word to all the surrounding towns that Hannibal had got possession of Marcellus' ring. So they sent

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Hannibal's messenger back in order that he might not know by remaining there what was going on, and they promised to do as they had been ordered. Then they armed themselves and having taken their station on the walls awaited the result of the stratagem. When Hannibal came with his Numidians, whom he had armed with Roman weapons, they drew up the portcullis as though they were gladly welcoming Marcellus. When they had admitted as many as they thought they could easily master, they dropped the portcullis and slew all those who had gained entrance. Upon those who were still standing around outside the walls they hurled missiles from above and covered them with wounds. Hannibal, having failed in his second attempt against the city, now withdrew.

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52. In the meantime his brother Hasdrubal, with the army he had enlisted in Celtiberia, marched to Italy. Being received in a friendly way by the Gauls he had passed over the Alps by the road that Hannibal had opened, accomplishing in two months the journey which had previously taken Hannibal six. He debouched in Etruria with 48,000 foot, 8000 horse, and fifteen elephants. He sent letters to his brother announcing his arrival. These letters were intercepted by the Romans so that the consuls, Salinator and Nero, learned the number of his forces. They combined their own forces in one body, moved against him, and encamped opposite him near the town of Sena. He did not intend to fight yet, but hastening to join his brother, moved off, marching by night among swamps and pools and along an unfordable river, where he lost his way. At daybreak the Romans came up with them, while they were scattered about and wearied with toil and want of sleep, and slew most of them with their officers, while they were still assembling and getting themselves in order of battle. Hasdrubal himself was slain with them. Many of them were taken prisoners. Thus was Italy delivered from a great fear, since Hannibal could never have been conquered if he had received this addition to his forces.

53. It seems to me that a god gave this victory to the Romans as a compensation for the disaster of Cannæ, as it came not long afterward and was about equal to it in other respects. In both cases the commanding generals lost their



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lives, and the number of soldiers killed and the number of prisoners taken were very nearly the same in each case. Each side also captured the other's camp and a vast quantity of baggage. Thus did Rome taste good and bad fortune alternately. Of the Celtiberians who escaped the slaughter, some made their way to their own country and some to Hannibal.

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54. Hannibal was greatly depressed by the loss of his brother and of so great an army, destroyed suddenly through ignorance of the roads. Deprived of all that he had gained by the untiring labors of fourteen years, during which he had fought with the Romans in Italy, he withdrew to Bruttium, whose people were the only ones that remained in alliance with him. Here he remained quiet, awaiting new forces from Carthage. They sent him 100 merchant ships laden with supplies, soldiers, and money, but as they had not a sufficient force of rowers they were driven by the wind to Sardinia. The prætor of Sardinia attacked them with his war-ships, sunk twenty and captured sixty of them. The remainder escaped to Carthage. Thus was Hannibal still further straitened and he despaired of assistance from the Carthaginians. Nor did Mago, who was collecting mercenaries in Gaul and Liguria, send him any aid, but waited to see what turn affairs would take. Perceiving that he could not stay there long, Hannibal now began to despise the Bruttians themselves as men who would soon be strangers to him, and he loaded them with taxes. He transferred the strongholds of their towns to the plains as though they were planning a revolt. He despoiled many of their men, bringing accusations against them in order that he might confiscate their property. Such was his situation.

## CHAPTER IX

Scipio sails to Sicily — A Sacred Image brought to Rome — Hannibal's Troubles in Bruttium — Hannibal recalled by Carthage — Tries to take his Italian Soldiers thither — Embarks for Africa — Punishment of the Bruttians

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55. In Rome the consuls at this time were Licinius Crassus and Publius Scipio, the conqueror of Spain.

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Crassus conducted the war against Hannibal in Apulia, but Scipio advised the people that they would never drive Hannibal and the Carthaginians out of Italy except by sending a Roman army into Africa and so bringing danger to their own doors. By persisting strenuously and persuading those who hesitated he was himself chosen general for Africa and sailed forthwith to Sicily. Having collected and drilled an army there he sailed suddenly to Locri in Italy which was garrisoned by Hannibal. Having slain the garrison and put the town under the command of Pleminius he embarked for Africa. Pleminius visited upon the Locrians every kind of outrage, licentiousness, and cruelty, and ended by robbing the temple of Proserpina. For this the Romans put him and his companions in wrongdoing to death in prison, and gave the property they left to the Locrians to be deposited in the treasury of the goddess. All the rest of the plunder that they could find they restored to the goddess, and what they could not find they made good out of their own public treasury.

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56. During the same time Crassus detached Consentia, a large town of Bruttium, and six others, from Hannibal. As certain direful prodigies sent by Jupiter had appeared in Rome, the decemviri, having consulted the Sibylline books, said that something would soon fall from heaven at Pessinus in Phrygia (where the mother of the gods is worshipped by the Phrygians), which ought to be brought to Rome. Not long after, the news came that it had fallen and the image of the goddess was brought to Rome, and still to this day they keep holy to the mother of the gods the day that it arrived. It is said that the ship which bore it stuck in the mud of the river Tiber, and could by no means be moved until the soothsayers proclaimed that it would follow only when drawn by a woman who had never committed adultery. Claudia Quintia, who was under accusation of that crime but not yet tried (being suspected of it on account of fast living), vehemently called the gods to witness her innocence, and fastened her girdle to the ship, whereupon the goddess followed. Thus Claudia acquired the greatest fame in place of her previous bad reputation. But before this affair of Claudia the Romans had been admonished by the Sibylline books to send their best man to

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550 bring the image from Phrygia. Scipio Nasica, son of Gn. Scipio, who had been general in Spain and had lost his life there, and cousin of Scipio Africanus the elder, was judged to be their best man. In this way was the goddess brought to Rome by the best of their men and women.

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57. When the Carthaginians were continually beaten by Scipio in Africa those of the Bruttians who heard of it revolted from Hannibal, some of them slaying their garrisons and others expelling them. Those who were not able to do either of these things sent messengers to Rome secretly to explain the necessity under which they had acted and to declare their good will. Hannibal came with his army to Petelia, which was not now occupied by the Petelians, as he had expelled them and given the town to the Bruttians. He accused the latter of sending an embassy to Rome. When they denied it he pretended to believe them, but in order, as he said, that there might be no ground for suspicion, he delivered their principal citizens over to the Numidians, who were ordered to guard each one of them separately. He also disarmed the people, armed the slaves, and stationed them as guards over the city. He did the same to the other cities that he visited. He removed 3000 citizens of Thurii, who were particularly friendly to the Carthaginians, and 500 others from the country, but gave the goods of the remainder as spoils to his soldiers. Leaving a strong garrison in the city he settled these 3500 people at Croton, which he found to be well situated for his operations and where he established his magazines and his headquarters against the other towns.

551 58. When the Carthaginians summoned him to hasten to the aid of his own country, which was in danger from Scipio, and sent Hasdrubal, their admiral, to him that there might be no delay, he lamented the perfidious and ungrateful conduct of the Carthaginians toward their generals, of which he had had long experience. Moreover, he had apprehensions for himself touching the cause of this great war, which had been begun by himself in Spain. Nevertheless, he recognized the necessity of obeying, and accordingly he built a fleet, for which Italy supplied abundant timber. Despising the cities still allied to him now as foreigners, he resolved to plunder them all, and

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thus, by enriching his army, render himself secure against his calumniators in Carthage. But being ashamed of such a breach of faith, he sent Hasdrubal, the admiral, about, on pretence of inspecting the garrisons. The latter, as he entered each city, ordered the inhabitants to take what things they and their slaves could carry, and move away. Then he plundered the rest. Some of them, learning of these proceedings before Hasdrubal came, attacked the garrisons, overcoming them in some places and being overcome by them in others. Indiscriminate slaughter, accompanied by the violation of wives and the abduction of virgins, and all the horrors that usually take place when cities are captured, ensued.

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59. Hannibal himself, knowing that the Italians in his army were extremely well-drilled soldiers, sought to persuade them by lavish promises to accompany him to Africa. Those of them who had been guilty of crimes against their own countries willingly expatriated themselves and followed him. Those who had committed no such wrong hesitated. Collecting together those who had decided to remain, as though he wished to say something to them, or to reward them for their services, or to give them some command as to the future, he surrounded them with his army unexpectedly, and directed his soldiers to choose from among them such as they would like to have for slaves. Some made their selections accordingly. Others were ashamed to reduce their comrades in so many engagements to servitude. All the rest Hannibal put to death with darts in order that the Romans might not avail themselves of such a splendid body of men.<sup>1</sup> With them he slaughtered also about 4000 horses and a large number of pack animals, which he was not able to transport to Africa.

60. Thereupon he embarked his army and waited for a wind, having left a few garrisons on the land. These the Petalini and other Italians set upon, slew some of them, and then ran away. Hannibal passed over to Africa, having devastated Italy for sixteen successive years, and inflicted countless evils upon the inhabitants, and reduced Rome several times to the last extremity, and treated his own sub-

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix to this Book.

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551 jects and allies with contumely as enemies. For, just as <sup>B.C.</sup> 203 he had made use of them for a time, not from any good will but from necessity, so now that they could be of no further service to him he scorned them and considered them enemies.

61. When Hannibal had departed from Italy the Senate pardoned all the Italian peoples who had sided with him, and voted a general amnesty except as to the Bruttians, who remained most zealous for him to the end. From these they took away a considerable part of their land, also their arms, if there were any that Hannibal had not taken. They were also forbidden to be enrolled in the military forces thereafter, as being no longer free persons, and they were required to attend as servants upon the consuls and prætors who went about inspecting the affairs of government and the public works of the provinces. Such was the end of Hannibal's invasion of Italy.

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## APPENDIX

BY THE TRANSLATOR

The accusation against Hannibal that he put to death those of his Italian soldiers who refused to follow him to Africa is referred to by Livy (xxx. 20) in these words: "Many of Italian birth who refused to follow him to Africa and withdrew to the shrine of Juno Lacinia, hitherto inviolate, were foully slain in the temple itself." The tale is generally discredited by modern historians as an impossible crime and as inconsistent with the relations that existed between Hannibal and his soldiers as related by Livy himself (xxviii. 12), viz.:—

"No battle was fought with Hannibal that year, for neither did he take the offensive after the recent public and private wound [at the Metaurus], nor did the Romans disturb his quiet, so great a power resided in him, although everything else around him was going to ruin. And I know not whether he was not more wonderful in adversity than in prosperity, because, although he waged war in a hostile

country thirteen years, far from home, with varying fortune, not with an army composed of his own citizens but of the mingled riff-raff of all nations, who had no law, custom, or language in common, but were different in character, dress, arms, religious belief and ceremony, and I had almost said in their gods, he held them together by such a bond that no disturbance ever broke out, either among themselves or against their commander, although, in the territory of enemies, he was often in want of money to pay them and of supplies to feed them, the lack of which in the former Punic war had been the cause of many dreadful scenes between the commanders and the soldiers. After the army of Hasdrubal and its chief, in whom all hope of victory had been reposed, had perished, and he had yielded the rest of Italy by retiring to the corner of Bruttium, to whom does it not seem wonderful that no commotion took place in his camp? For, to other things, this also was added, that there was no hope of feeding his soldiers except from the Bruttian territory, which, even if it were all cultivated, would be very scant for supporting so great an army, whereas the war absorbed a large part of the young men, who were drawn away from the tillage of the fields, and a custom ingrafted on a depraved people prevailed of carrying on military operations by robbery. Nor was anything sent to him from home, where they were solicitous about retaining their hold on Spain, as though all their affairs were flourishing in Italy."

The foregoing is in part copied from a passage in Polybius, viz. : "Who can fail to be struck with admiration for the generalship, the courage, the ability of this man in the field, when we think of the length of time the war lasted; when we look at it as a whole, and at the particular battles, sieges, and revolts of cities, and at the turns of fortune; when we contemplate the totality of the design and execution in the course of which Hannibal waged continuous war against the Romans in Italy for sixteen years and never once dismissed his forces from field service, but held them like a good pilot in subjection to himself, and restrained such a multitude from mutiny and from strife with each other, although the forces he made use of were not all of one nation or even of the same race? They were composed

of Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Gauls, Phœnicians, Italians, and Greeks, who had neither law, custom, speech, nor anything else naturally in common. Yet such was the skill of the general that, notwithstanding these great diversities, he made them all attentive to one command and obedient to one will, although circumstances were not always propitious but varied; although fortune did not always come in favoring but sometimes in adverse gales. In view of these facts one may well be astonished at his commanding ability in military affairs, and may confidently affirm that if he had begun with other parts of the earth and had attacked the Romans last, he would not have failed of any part of his designs. But now, as he began with those who should have been the last, he made both the beginning and the end of his exploits among them." (*Fragment xi. 19.*)

# BOOK VIII—PART I

## THE PUNIC WARS

### CHAPTER I

First Phœnician Settlement — First Punic War — Regulus defeated by Xanthippus — Fate of Regulus — The Mercenary War

1. The Phœnicians settled Carthage, in Africa, fifty years before the capture of Troy. Its founders were either Zorus and Carchedon, or, as the Romans and the Carthaginians themselves think, Dido, a Tyrian woman, whose husband had been slain clandestinely by Pygmalion, the ruler of Tyre. The murder being revealed to her in a dream, she embarked for Africa with her property and a number of men who desired to escape from the tyranny of Pygmalion, and arrived at that part of Africa where Carthage now stands. Being repelled by the inhabitants, they asked for as much land for a dwelling place as they could encompass with an ox-hide. The Africans laughed at this frivolity of the Phœnicians and were ashamed to deny so small a request. Besides, they could not imagine how a town could be built in so narrow a space, and wishing to unravel the mystery they agreed to give it, and confirmed the promise by an oath. The Phœnicians, cutting the hide round and round in one very narrow strip, enclosed the place where the citadel of Carthage now stands, which from this affair was called Byrsa (a hide).

2. Proceeding from this start and getting the upper hand of their neighbors, as they were more adroit, and engaging in traffic by sea, like the Phœnicians, they built a city around Byrsa. Gradually acquiring strength they mastered Africa and the greater part of the Mediterranean, carried war into Sicily and Sardinia and the other islands of that











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sea, and also into Spain. They sent out numerous colonies. They became a match for the Greeks in power, and next to the Persians in wealth. But about 700 years after the foundation of the city the Romans took Sicily and Sardinia away from them, and in a second war Spain also. Then, assailing each the other's territory with immense armies, the Carthaginians, under Hannibal, ravaged Italy for sixteen years in succession, but the Romans, under the leadership of Cornelius Scipio the elder, carried the war into Africa, crushed the Carthaginian power, took their ships and their elephants, and required them to pay tribute for a time. A second treaty was now made between the Romans and the Carthaginians which lasted fifty years, until, upon an infraction of it, the third and last war broke out between them, in which the Romans under Scipio the younger razed Carthage to the ground and forbade the rebuilding of it. But another city was built subsequently by their own people, very near the former one, for convenience in governing Africa. Of these matters the Sicilian part is shown in my Sicilian history, the Spanish in the Spanish history, and what Hannibal did in his Italian campaigns in the Hannibalic history. This book will deal with the operations in Africa from the earliest period.

- 498 3. About the beginning of the Sicilian war the Romans 256 sent 350 ships to Africa, captured a number of towns, and left in command of the army Atilius Regulus, who took some 200 more towns, which gave themselves up to him on account of their hatred of the Carthaginians; and continually advancing he ravaged the territory. Thereupon the Carthaginians, considering that their misfortunes were due to bad generalship, asked the Lacedemonians to send them a commander. The Lacedemonians sent them Xanthippus.
- 499 Regulus, being encamped in the hot season alongside a 255 lake, marched around it to engage the enemy, his soldiers suffering greatly from the weight of their arms, from dust, thirst, and fatigue, and exposed to missiles from the neighboring heights. Toward evening he came to a river which separated the two armies. This he crossed at once, thinking in this way to terrify Xanthippus, but the latter, anticipating an easy victory over an enemy thus harassed and exhausted and having night in his favor, drew up his forces

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499 and made a sudden sally from his camp. The expecta-<sup>B.C.</sup>  
tions of Xanthippus were not disappointed. Of the 30,000 255  
men led by Regulus, only a few escaped with difficulty to  
the city of Aspis. All the rest were either killed or taken  
prisoners, and among the latter was the consul Regulus  
himself.<sup>1</sup>

504 4. Not long afterward the Carthaginians, weary of fight- 250  
ing, sent him, in company with their own ambassadors, to  
Rome to obtain peace or to return if it were not granted.  
Yet Regulus in private strongly urged the chief magistrates  
of Rome to continue the war, and then went back to cer-  
tain torture, for the Carthaginians shut him up in a cage  
stuck full of spikes and thus put him to death. This suc-  
cess was the beginning of sorrows to Xanthippus, for the  
Carthaginians, in order that the credit might not seem to  
be due to the Lacedemonians, pretended to honor him  
with splendid gifts, sent galleys to convey him back to  
Lacedemon, but enjoined upon the captains of the ships to  
throw him and his Lacedemonian comrades overboard.<sup>2</sup>  
In this way he paid the penalty for his successes. Such  
513 were the results, good and bad, of the first war of the 241  
Romans in Africa, until the Carthaginians surrendered  
Sicily to them. How this came about has been shown in  
my Sicilian history.

5. After this there was peace between the Romans and  
the Carthaginians, but the Africans, who were subject to  
the latter and had served them as auxiliaries in the Sicilian  
war, and certain Celtic mercenaries who complained that  
their pay had been withheld and that the promises made to  
514 them had not been kept, made war against the Carthagin- 240  
ians in a very formidable manner. The latter appealed to  
the Romans for aid on the score of friendship, and the  
Romans allowed them for this war only to hire mercenaries  
in Italy, for even that had been forbidden in the treaty.  
Nevertheless they sent men to act as mediators between  
them. The Africans refused the mediation, but offered to  
become subjects of the Romans if they would take them.

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix to this Book.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius (i. 36) says that Xanthippus returned home in safety.  
He seems to have been aware of the report of foul play against Xan-  
thippus, but discredited it.

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 514 The latter would not accept them. Then the Carthaginians blockaded the towns with a great fleet, and cut off their supplies from the sea, and as the land was untilled in consequence of the war they overcame the Africans by the famine, but were driven to supply their own wants by piracy, even taking some Roman ships, killing the crews, and throwing them overboard to conceal the crime. This  
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 516 escaped notice for a long time. When the facts became 538 known and the Carthaginians were called to account they put off the day of reckoning until the Romans voted to make war against them, when they surrendered Sardinia by way of compensation. And this clause was added to the former treaty of peace.

## CHAPTER II

Hannibal's Invasion of Italy — Scipio's Invasion of Africa — Consternation at Carthage — Syphax and Masinissa — War between Masinissa and Carthage

525 6. Not long afterwards the Carthaginians invaded Spain 529 and were gradually subduing it, when the Saguntines appealed to Rome and a boundary was fixed to the Carthaginian advance by agreement that they should not cross the river Ebro. The Carthaginians, under the lead of Hannibal, violated this treaty by crossing the stream, and having done so Hannibal marched against Italy, leaving the command in Spain in the hands of others. The Roman generals in Spain, Publius Cornelius Scipio and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, two brothers, after having performed some brilliant exploits were both slain by the enemy. The generals who succeeded them fared badly until Scipio, the son of the Publius Scipio who was killed in Spain, set sail  
 544 thither, and making all believe that he was come by a 510 divine mission and had divine counsel in all things, prevailed brilliantly, and achieving great glory by this success, gave over his command to those sent to succeed him, returned to Rome, and asked to be sent with an army to Africa so as to draw Hannibal out of Italy and to bring retribution upon the Carthaginians in their own country.

549 7. Some of the leading men opposed this plan, saying 505

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that it was not best to send an army into Africa while Italy was wasted by such long wars and was subject to the ravages of Hannibal, and while Mago was enlisting Ligurian and Celtic mercenaries for a flank attack upon her. They ought not to attack another land, they said, until they had delivered their own country from its present perils. Others thought that the Carthaginians were emboldened to attack Italy because they were not molested at home, and that if war were brought to their own doors they would recall Hannibal. So it was decided to send Scipio into Africa, but they would not allow him to levy an army in Italy while Hannibal was ravaging it. If he could procure volunteers he might take them, and he might use the forces which were then in Sicily. They authorized him to fit out ten galleys and allowed him to take crews for them, and also to refit those in Sicily. They did not give him any money except what he could raise among his friends. So indifferently at first did they undertake this war, which soon came to be the most great and glorious for them.

8. Scipio, who seemed to be divinely inspired from long ago against Carthage, having collected scarcely 7000 soldiers, cavalry and infantry, sailed for Sicily, taking as a body-guard 300 chosen youths whom he ordered to accompany him without arms. He then chose 300 wealthy Sicilians by conscription and ordered them to report on a certain day, provided with the best possible arms and horses. When they came he told them that they might furnish substitutes for the war if they preferred. As they all accepted this offer he brought forward his 300 unarmed youths and directed the others to supply them with arms and horses, and this they did willingly. So it came about that Scipio had in place of the Sicilians, 300 Italian youths admirably equipped at other people's expense, who at once thanked him for this favor and ever afterward rendered him excellent service.

9. When the Carthaginians learned these things they sent Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, to hunt elephants, and they despatched to Mago, who was enlisting Ligurian mercenaries, 6000 foot, 800 horse, and seven elephants, and commanded him to attack Etruria with these and such other forces as he could collect, in order to draw Scipio from



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Africa. But Mago delayed because he could not join Hannibal at such a distance and because he was always of a hesitating disposition. Hasdrubal, on his return from the elephant hunt, levied 6000 foot and 600 horse from both the Carthaginian and the African population, and bought 5000 slaves as oarsmen for the ships. He also obtained 2000 horse from the Numidians and hired mercenaries and exercised them all in camp at a distance of two hundred stades from Carthage.

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10. There were many chieftains in Numidia who had separate dominions. Syphax occupied the highest place among them and was held in greater honor than the others. There was also a certain Masinissa, son of the king of the Massylians, a powerful tribe. He had been brought up and educated at Carthage. He was a man of fine presence and good manners. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, who was second in rank to nobody in Carthage, betrothed his daughter to him although he was a Numidian, and after the betrothal took the young man with him to the war in Spain. Syphax, who was also in love with the girl, was indignant at this and began to pillage the Carthaginian territory, and he proposed to Scipio (who made a journey from Spain to meet him) that they should make a joint attack on Carthage. The Carthaginians, learning this and knowing how great service Syphax could render them in the war against the Romans, gave the girl to him without the knowledge of Hasdrubal or Masinissa, since they were in Spain. The latter, being greatly exasperated, made an alliance with Scipio in Spain, concealing it from Hasdrubal, as he supposed. Hasdrubal, although he was grieved at the outrage put upon the young man and his daughter, nevertheless thought that it would be an advantage to the country to make away with Masinissa. So when the latter returned from Spain to Africa at the death of his father, he sent a cavalry escort with him and told them to put him to death secretly in whatever way they could.

11. Masinissa, getting wind of this plot, managed to escape, and made his inherited power strong by collecting a body of cavalry who were trained to hurl the javelin advancing and retreating and advancing again, either by day or by night; for their only method of fighting was flight

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and pursuit. The Numidians also know how to endure hunger. They often subsist on herbs in place of bread, and they drink nothing but water. Their horses never even taste grain; they feed on grass alone and drink but rarely. Masinissa collected about 20,000 such and led them in the chase and in pillaging expeditions against other tribes, thinking to keep them exercised in this way. The Carthaginians and Syphax, thinking that these preparations of the young man were made against them (for they were conscious of the affront they had put upon him), decided to make war on him first, and after crushing him to march against the Romans.

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12. Syphax and the Carthaginians were much the more numerous. They marched with wagons and a great load of luggage and luxuries. On the other hand, Masinissa was an example in all doing and enduring and had only cavalry, no pack animals and no provisions. Thus he was able the more easily to retreat, to attack, and to take refuge in strongholds. Often, when surrounded, he divided his forces so that they might scatter as best they could, concealing himself with a handful until they should all come together again, by day or by night, at an appointed rendezvous. Once he was one of three who lay concealed in a cave around which his enemies were encamped. He never had any fixed camping-place. His generalship consisted especially in concealing his position. Thus his enemies never could make a regular assault upon him, but were always warding off his attacks. His provisions were obtained each day from whatever place he came upon toward evening, whether village or city. He seized and carried off everything and divided the plunder with his men, for which reason many Numidians flocked to him, although he did not give regular pay, for the sake of the booty, which was better.

### CHAPTER III

Scipio arrives in Africa — First Skirmishes — Capture of Locha —  
Siege of Utica — Negotiations of Syphax

550 13. In this way Masinissa made war on the Carthaginians. In the meantime Scipio, having completed his prep- 204

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arations in Sicily, and sacrificed to Jupiter and Neptune, set sail for Africa with fifty-two war-ships and 400 transports, with a great number of smaller craft following behind. His army consisted of 16,000 foot and 1600 horse. He carried also projectiles, arms, and engines of various kinds, and a plentiful supply of provisions. And thus Scipio accomplished his voyage. When the Carthaginians and Syphax learned of this they decided to pretend to make terms with Masinissa for the present, until they should overcome Scipio. Masinissa was not deceived by this scheme. In order to deceive them in turn he marched to Hasdrubal with his cavalry as though he were reconciled to him, fully advising Scipio beforehand. Hasdrubal, Syphax, and Masinissa encamped not far from each other near the city of Utica, to which Scipio had been driven by the winds, and he also was camped hard by. Not far from him was Hasdrubal with an army of 20,000 foot, 7000 horse, and 140 elephants.

14. Now Syphax, either being moved by fear, or being faithless to all parties in turn, pretended that his country was harassed by the neighboring barbarians, and set out for home. Scipio sent out some detachments to feel the enemy, and at the same time several towns surrendered themselves to him. Then Masinissa came to Scipio's camp secretly by night, and, after mutual greeting, advised him to place not more than 5000 men in ambush on the following day, about thirty stades from Utica, near a tower built by Agathocles, the tyrant of Syracuse. At daybreak he persuaded Hasdrubal to send Hanno, his master of horse, to reconnoitre the enemy and throw himself into Utica, lest the inhabitants, taking advantage of the proximity of the enemy, should start a revolution. He promised to follow if ordered to do so. Hanno set out accordingly with 1000 picked Carthaginian horse and a lot of Africans. Masinissa followed with his Numidians. Thus they came to the tower and Hanno passed on with a small force to Utica. Hereupon a part of the men in ambush showed themselves, and Masinissa advised the officer who was left in command of the cavalry to attack them as being a small force. He followed at a short distance, as if to support the movement. Then the rest of the men in ambush showed themselves and

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550 surrounded the Africans; and the Romans and Masinissa together assailed them on all sides and slew all except 400, who were taken prisoners. After he had accomplished this, Masinissa, as though a friend, hastened after Hanno, who was returning, seized him and carried him to Scipio's camp, and exchanged him for his own mother, who was in Hasdrubal's hands.

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15. Scipio and Masinissa ravaged the country and released the Roman prisoners who were digging in the fields, who had been sent thither by Hannibal from Spain, from Sicily, and from Italy itself. They also besieged a large town called Locha, where they met great difficulties. As they were putting up the scaling ladders, the Lochaians asked a parley and offered to leave the city under a truce. Thereupon Scipio sounded a retreat; but the soldiers, angry at what they had suffered in the siege, refused to obey. They scaled the walls and slaughtered indiscriminately, not sparing women and children. Scipio dismissed the survivors in safety; he then deprived the army of its booty and compelled the officers who had disobeyed orders to cast lots publicly, and punished three of them, upon whom the lot had fallen, with death. Having done these things he began ravaging the country again. Hasdrubal sought to draw him into ambush by sending Mago, his master of horse, to attack him in front, while he fell upon his rear. Scipio and Masinissa being surrounded in this way divided their forces into two parts, turning in opposite directions against the enemy, by which means they slew 5000 of the Africans, took 1800 prisoners, and drove the remainder over a precipice.

16. Soon afterward Scipio besieged Utica by land and sea. He built a tower on two galleys joined together, from which he hurled missiles three cubits long, and also great stones, at the enemy. He inflicted much damage and also suffered much, and the ships were badly shattered. On the landward side he built great mounds, and battered the wall with rams, and tore off with hooks what hides and other coverings were on it. The enemy, on the other hand, undermined the mounds, turned the hooks aside with slip-knots, and deadened the force of the rams by interposing transverse wooden beams. They made sallies against the

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machines with fire whenever the wind was blowing toward them. Whereupon Scipio, despairing of the capture of the city by this means, established a close siege around it.

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17. Syphax, when he learned how things were going, came back with his army and encamped not far from Hasdrubal. Pretending still to be the friend of both parties, and thinking to protract the war until the new ships which were building for the Carthaginians were ready, and the Celtic and Ligurian mercenaries arrived, he proposed an arbitration. He thought that it would be fair for the Romans to discontinue the war in Africa and the Carthaginians in Italy, and that the Romans should retain Sicily, Sardinia, and whatever other islands they now held, and also Spain. He said that if either party should refuse these terms he would join forces with the other. While he was doing this he attempted to draw Masinissa to himself by promising to establish him firmly in the kingdom of the Massylians and to give him in marriage whichever of his three daughters he should choose. The person who delivered this message brought gold also, in order that, if he could not persuade Masinissa, he might bribe one of his servants to kill him. As he did not succeed, he paid the money to one of them to murder him. The servant took the money to Masinissa and exposed the giver.

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body, joined the Carthaginians openly. He captured, by means of treachery, an inland town named Tholon, where the Romans had a large store of war materials and food, and slew all of the garrison who would not depart on parole. He also called up another large reënforcement of Numidians. And now, as the mercenaries had arrived and the ships were in readiness, they decided to fight, Syphax attacking those besieging Utica, and Hasdrubal the camp of Scipio, while the ships should bear down upon the ships; all these things to be done the next day and at the same time in order to overwhelm the Romans with numbers.

## CHAPTER IV

Scipio's Night Attack on Hasdrubal — Speech to his Officers before the Attack — Complete Victory of Scipio — Retreat of Syphax — Scipio advances against Carthage — Indecisive Naval Engagement

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19. Masinissa learned of these plans at nightfall from certain Numidians, and communicated them to Scipio. The latter was perplexed, being apprehensive lest his army, divided into so many parts, should be too weak to sustain the whole strength of the enemy. He forthwith called his officers to a council at night. Finding that they were all at a loss what to do, and after meditating for a long time himself, he said: "Courage and swiftness, friends, and desperate fighting are our only salvation. We must anticipate the enemy in making the attack. Just see what we shall gain by it. The unexpectedness of the attack and the very strangeness of the thing, — that those who are so few in number should be the aggressors, — will terrify them. We shall employ our strength not divided into several detachments, but all together. We shall not be engaged with all of our enemies at once, but with those we choose to attack first, since their camps are separate from each other. We are their equals in strength when we take them separately, while in courage and good fortune we are their superiors. If heaven shall give us victory over the first, we may despise the others. Upon whom the assault shall be made first, and what shall be the time and manner of delivering it, if you please, I will now tell you."

20. As they all agreed, he continued: "The time to strike is immediately after this meeting ends, while it is still night, since the blow will be the more terrifying and the enemy will be unprepared, and none will be able to give aid to their allies in the darkness. Thus we shall anticipate their intention of attacking us to-morrow. They have three stations; that of the ships is at a distance, and it is not easy to attack ships by night. Hasdrubal and Syphax are not far from each other. Hasdrubal is the head of the hostile force. Syphax will not dare to do anything at night; he is a barbarian, effeminate and timid. Come now, let us attack Hasdrubal with all our force. We will

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place Masinissa in ambush for Syphax, if, contrary to expectation, he should move out of his camp. Let us advance with our infantry against Hasdrubal's defences, surround and storm them on every side, with high hope and resolute courage, for these are the things most needed now. As the cavalry are not of much use in a night attack, I will send them to surround the enemy's camp a little farther off, so that if we are overpowered we may have friends to receive us and cover our retreat, and if we are victorious they may pursue the fugitives and destroy them."

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21. Having spoken thus he sent the officers to arm the troops, and he offered sacrifice to Courage and also to Fear<sup>1</sup> in order that no panic should overtake them in the night, but that the army should show itself absolutely intrepid. At the third watch the trumpet sounded lightly and the army moved, observing the most profound silence until the cavalry had completely surrounded the enemy and the infantry had arrived at the trenches. Then, with shouts mingled with the discordant blast of trumpets and horns for the purpose of striking terror into the enemy, they swept the guards away from the outposts, filled up the ditch, and tore down the palisades. The boldest, pushing forward, set some of the huts on fire. The Africans, starting in consternation out of sleep, fumbled around for their arms and tried confusedly to get into order of battle, but on account of the noise could not hear the orders of their officers, nor did their general himself know exactly what was happening. The Romans caught them, as they were starting up and trying to arm themselves, with confusion on every hand. They fired more huts and slew those whom they met. The noise of the invaders, their appearance, and the fearful work they were doing in the midst of darkness and uncertainty made the catastrophe complete. Thinking that the camp had been taken, and being afraid of the fire of the burning huts, they were glad to get out of them; and they pushed on to the plain as a safer place. Thus they ran helter-skelter, just as it happened, and the

<sup>1</sup> The Roman mythology was very comprehensive. "There were gods," says Duruy, "for every act of a man's life from the cradle to the grave."

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Roman horse, who had completely surrounded them, fell upon them and slaughtered them. B.C.  
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22. Syphax, hearing the noise and seeing the fire in the night, did not leave his quarters, but sent a detachment of horse to the assistance of Hasdrubal. Masinissa fell upon these unawares and made a great slaughter. At daybreak, learning that Hasdrubal had fled and that his forces were destroyed, or taken prisoners, or dispersed, and that his camp and war material had fallen into the hands of the Romans, he fled precipitately to the interior, leaving everything behind, fearing lest Scipio should return from the pursuit of the Carthaginians and fall upon him. Masinissa took possession of his camp and belongings.

23. Thus by one act of daring and in a little part of a night, did the Romans demolish two camps and two armies much greater than their own. The Romans lost about 100 men killed, the enemy a little less than 30,000, besides 2400 prisoners. Moreover, 600 horse surrendered themselves to Scipio on his return. Some of the elephants were killed and some wounded. Scipio, having gained a great store of arms, gold, silver, ivory, and horses, Numidian and other, and having prostrated the Carthaginians by one splendid victory, distributed prizes to the army and sent the richest of the spoils to Rome. Then he began drilling the army diligently, expecting the arrival of Hannibal forthwith from Italy, and of Mago from Liguria.

24. While Scipio was thus engaged, Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian general, who had been wounded in the night engagement, fled with 500 horse to the town of Anda, where he collected some mercenaries and Numidians who had escaped from the battle, and proclaimed freedom to all slaves who would enlist. Learning that the Carthaginians had decreed the penalty of death against him for his bad generalship, and had chosen Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, as commander, he made this an army of his own, recruited a lot of malefactors, robbed the country for provisions, and drilled his men to the number of 3000 horse and 8000 foot, resting his hopes solely on fighting. His doings were for a long time unknown to both the Romans and the Carthaginians. And now Scipio, having his army in readiness, led it to Carthage itself and haughtily offered battle, but



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nobody responded. Meanwhile Hamilcar, the admiral, hastened with 100 ships to attack Scipio's naval station, hoping to outstrip him in reaching the place, and thinking that he could easily destroy the twenty Roman ships there with his hundred.

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25. Scipio, seeing him sail away, sent orders ahead to block up the entrance to the harbor with ships of burthen anchored at intervals so that the galleys could dart out, as through gates, when they should see an opportunity. These ships were bound together by their yard arms and fastened to each other so as to form a wall. This work done he entered into the action. When the Carthaginians made their attack their ships were battered by missiles from the Roman ships, from the shore, and from the walls, and they withdrew at evening discomfited. As they were retreating, the Romans pressed upon them, darting out through the open spaces, and when they were overpowered withdrawing again. They took one ship in tow without any men and brought it to Scipio. After this both combatants went into winter quarters. The Romans received plentiful supplies by sea, but the Uticans and Carthaginians, being pinched with hunger, robbed the merchant ships until new galleys, sent to Scipio from Rome, blockaded the enemy and put an end to their plundering, after which they were severely oppressed by hunger.

## CHAPTER V

Masinissa defeats and captures Syphax—Syphax and Sophonisba—Death of Sophonisba—Plot to burn Scipio's Camp—Siege of Utica raised

26. This same winter, Syphax being near them, Masinissa asked of Scipio a third part of the Roman army as a reënforcement to his own, and with this force under the command of Lælius, he set out in pursuit of him. Syphax retreated until he came to a certain river, where he gave battle. The Numidians on both sides, as is their custom, discharged volleys of missiles at each other while the Romans advanced, holding their shields in front of them. Syphax, seeing Masinissa, dashed upon him with rage. The latter encountered him eagerly. The battle between them

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continued until the forces of Syphax turned in flight and began to cross the river. Syphax's horse received a wound and threw his rider. Masinissa ran up and caught him and also one of his sons, and sent them forthwith to Scipio. In this battle 10,000 of Syphax's men were killed. The Roman loss was seventy-five and Masinissa's 300. Four thousand of Syphax's men also were taken prisoners, of whom 2500 were Massylians who had deserted from Masinissa to Syphax. These Masinissa asked Lælius to surrender to him, and having received them he put them to the sword.

27. After this they entered the country of the Massylians and of Syphax, and settled them under the government of Masinissa, persuading some and coercing others. Ambassadors came to them from Cirta offering them the palace of Syphax, and others came specially to Masinissa from Sophonisba, the wife of Syphax, to make explanations about her forced marriage. Masinissa accepted her explanations gladly and married her; but when he returned to Scipio he left her at Cirta, foreseeing what would happen. Scipio asked Syphax: "What evil genius misled you, after inviting me as your friend to come to Africa, and caused you to forfeit your oath to the gods and your faith to the Roman people, and to join the Carthaginians in making war against us, when not long before we were helping you against the Carthaginians?" Syphax replied: "Sophonisba, the daughter of Hasdrubal, with whom I fell in love to my hurt, is passionately attached to her country and she is able to make everybody subservient to her wishes. She turned me away from your friendship to that of her own country, and plunged me from that state of good fortune into my present misery. I advise you (for, being now on your side and relieved of Sophonisba, I must be faithful to you) to beware lest she draw Masinissa over to her designs, for it is not to be expected that this woman will ever espouse the Roman side, so strongly is she attached to her own country."

28. So he spake, but whether he was telling the truth or was moved by jealousy and a desire to hurt Masinissa as much as possible, is not known. But Scipio called Syphax to the council, as he had shown himself sagacious and was acquainted with the country, and advised with him as Cyrus

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did with Crœsus, king of Lydia. Lælius having returned and told him the same things about Sophonisba that he had learned from many others, he commanded Masinissa to deliver up the wife of Syphax. When the latter tried to beg off and related the facts concerning her as above, Scipio ordered him more sharply not to possess himself by force of the Roman spoils of victory, but to ask for her after she was delivered up and obtain her if he could. Accordingly Masinissa went with a Roman detachment to fetch Sophonisba, but he went ahead secretly and gave her a dose of poison, explaining the circumstances and telling her that she must either drink it or go into voluntary captivity to the Romans. Without another word he mounted his horse. She showed the cup to her nurse, told her not to weep for her since she died gloriously, and drank the poison. Masinissa showed her dead body to the Romans who had now come up, then gave her a royal funeral; after which he returned to Scipio. The latter praised him, and to console him for the loss of a worthless woman, crowned him for his successful attack upon Syphax and gave him many presents. When Syphax arrived in Rome, some of the authorities thought that he ought to be spared because he had been their friend and ally in Spain, others, that he ought to be punished for fighting against his friends. In the meantime he sickened of grief and died.

29. When Hasdrubal had his forces well drilled he sent word to Hanno, the Carthaginian general, proposing to share the command with him, and intimating that there were many Spanish soldiers serving with Scipio under compulsion, who might be bribed with gold and promises to set fire to Scipio's camp. He said that he would lend a hand if he were duly notified. Hanno, although he intended to cheat Hasdrubal, did not neglect the suggestion. He sent a trusty man, in the guise of a deserter, with gold to Scipio's camp, who, winning the confidence of those he fell in with, corrupted many, and having fixed a day for the execution of the plot, disappeared. Hanno communicated the date to Hasdrubal. To Scipio, while sacrificing, the victims revealed that there was danger from fire. Accordingly he sent orders all around the camp if any glowing fires were found to put them out. He continued sacrificing sev-

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55<sup>r</sup> eral days, and as the victims still indicated danger from fire he became anxious and determined to shift his camp. B.C.  
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30. At this juncture a Spanish servant of one of the Roman knights, suspecting something of the conspiracy, pretended to be one of the accomplices and in this way learned all about it, and told his master. The latter brought him to Scipio, and he convicted the whole crowd. Scipio put them all to death and cast their bodies out of the camp. Knowledge of this coming quickly to Hanno, who was not far off, he did not come to the rendezvous, but Hasdrubal, who remained in ignorance, did. When he saw the multitude of corpses he guessed what had happened and withdrew. But Hanno slandered him and told everybody that he had come to surrender himself to Scipio, but that the latter would not receive him. Thus Hasdrubal was made more hateful to the Carthaginians than ever. About this time Hamilcar made a sudden dash on the Roman fleet and took one galley and six ships of burthen, and Hanno made an attack upon those who were besieging Utica, but was beaten off. As the siege had lasted a long time without result, Scipio raised it and moved his engines against the town of Hippo. As he accomplished nothing there, he burned his engines as useless, and overran the country, making allies of some and pillaging others.

## CHAPTER VI

Hannibal recalled—Negotiations for Peace—Hannibal lands at Hadrumetum—The Armistice violated—Hannibal sent for—He proposes a Renewal of the Armistice

31. The Carthaginians, depressed by their ill success, chose Hannibal as their commanding general and sent an admiral with ships to hasten his coming. At the same time they sent ambassadors to Scipio to negotiate for peace, thinking to gain one of two things, either peace or a delay until Hannibal should arrive. Scipio consented to an armistice, and having thus gained sufficient supplies for his army allowed them to send their ambassadors to Rome. They did so, but they were received there as enemies and required to lodge outside the walls. When the Senate gave

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them audience they asked pardon. Some of the senators <sup>B. C.</sup> 203  
adverted to the faithlessness of the Carthaginians, and told how often they had made treaties and broken them, and what injuries Hannibal had inflicted on the Romans and their allies in Spain and Italy. Others represented that the Carthaginians were not more in need of peace than themselves, Italy being exhausted by so many wars; and they showed how much danger was to be feared from the great armies moving together against Scipio, that of Hannibal from Italy, that of Mago from Liguria, and that of Hanno at Carthage.

32. The Senate was not able to agree, but sent counselors to Scipio with whom he should advise, and then do whatever he should deem best. Scipio made peace with the Carthaginians on these terms: That Mago should depart from Liguria forthwith, and that hereafter the Carthaginians should hire no mercenaries; that they should not keep more than thirty long galleys; that they should restrict themselves to the territory within the so-called "Phœnician trenches"; that they should surrender to the Romans all captives and deserters, and that they should pay 1600 talents of silver within a certain time; also that Masinissa should have the kingdom of the Massylians and as much of the dominion of Syphax as he could take. Having made this agreement, ambassadors on both sides set sail, some to Rome to take the oaths of the consuls, and others from Rome to Carthage to receive those of the Carthaginian magistrates. The Romans gave to Masinissa, as a reward for his alliance, a crown of gold, a signet ring of gold, a chair of ivory, a purple robe, a horse with gold trappings, and a suit of armor.

33. In the meantime Hannibal set sail for Africa against his will, knowing the untrustworthy character of the people of Carthage, their bad faith toward their magistrates, and their general recklessness. He did not believe that a treaty would be made, and if made he well knew that it would not last long. He landed at the city of Hadrumentum, in Africa, and began to collect corn and buy horses. He made an alliance with the chief of a Numidian tribe called the Areacidæ. He slew with arrows 4000 horsemen who had come to him as deserters. These had formerly

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been Syphax's men and afterward Masinissa's, and he suspected them. He gave their horses to his own army. Mesotulus, another chieftain, came to him with 1000 horse; also Verminia, another son of Syphax, who ruled the greater part of his father's dominions. He gained some of Masinissa's towns by surrender and some by force. He took the town of Narce by stratagem in this way. Dealing in their market he sent to them as to friends, and when he thought the time had come to spring the trap he sent in a large number of men carrying concealed daggers, and ordered them not to do any harm to the traders until the trumpet should sound, and then to set upon all they met, and hold the gates for him. In this way was Narce taken.

34. The common people of Carthage, although the treaty had been so lately concluded, and Scipio was still there, and their own ambassadors had not yet returned from Rome, plundered some of Scipio's stores that had been driven into the port of Carthage by a storm, and put the carriers in chains, in spite of the threats of their own council and of their admonitions not to violate the treaty so recently made. The people found fault with the treaty, and said that hunger was more dangerous to them than treaty-breaking. Scipio did not deem it best to renew the war after the treaty, but he demanded reparation as from friends who were in the wrong. The people attempted to seize his messengers, intending to hold them until their own ambassadors should return from Rome, but Hanno the Great and Hasdrubal Eriphus [the Kid] rescued them from the mob and sent them away in two galleys. Some others, however, sent word to Hasdrubal, the admiral, who was moored near the promontory of Apollo, that when the escort should leave them he should set upon Scipio's galleys. This he did, and some of the messengers were killed with arrows. The others were wounded, and the rowers darted into the harbor of their own camp and sprang from the ship which was just being seized. So narrowly did they escape being taken prisoners.

35. When the Romans at home learned these things they ordered the Carthaginian ambassadors, who were still there treating for peace, to depart immediately as enemies. They accordingly set sail, and were driven by a tempest to

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551 Scipio's camp. To his admiral, who asked what he should do with them, Scipio said: "We shall not imitate Carthaginian bad faith; send them away unharmed." When the Carthaginian Senate learned this they chided the people for the contrast between their behavior and Scipio's, and advised them to beg Scipio to adhere to the agreement and to accept reparation for the Carthaginian wrong-doing. But the people had been finding fault with the Senate a long time for their ill success, because they had not sufficiently foreseen what was for their advantage, and being pushed on by demagogues and excited by vain hopes, they summoned Hannibal and his army.

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552 36. Hannibal, in view of the magnitude of the war, 203 asked them to call in Hasdrubal and the force he had in hand. Hasdrubal was accordingly forgiven for his offence, and he delivered his army over to Hannibal. Yet he did not dare to show himself to the Carthaginians, but concealed himself in the city. Now Scipio blockaded Carthage with his fleet and cut off their supplies by sea, while from the land they were poorly supplied by reason of the war. About this time there was a cavalry engagement between the forces of Hannibal and those of Scipio near Zama, in which the latter had the advantage. On the succeeding days they had sundry skirmishes until Scipio, learning that Hannibal was very short of supplies and was expecting a convoy, sent the military tribune, Thermus, by night to attack the supply train. Thermus took a position on the crest of a hill at a narrow pass, where he killed 4000 Africans, took as many more prisoners, and brought the supplies to Scipio.

37. Hannibal, being reduced to extremity for want of provisions and considering how he might arrange for the present, sent messengers to Masinissa reminding him of his early life and education at Carthage, and asking that he would persuade Scipio to renew the treaty, saying that the former infractions of it were the work of the common people, and of fools who had stirred them up. Masinissa, who had in fact been brought up and educated at Carthage, and who had a high respect for the dignity of the city, and was the friend of many of the inhabitants, besought Scipio to comply, and brought them to an agreement on the fol-

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lowing terms: That the Carthaginians should surrender the men and ships bringing provisions to the Romans, which they had taken, also all plunder, or the value of it, which Scipio would estimate, and pay 1000 talents as a penalty for the wrong done. These things were agreed upon. An armistice was concluded until the Carthaginians should be made acquainted with the details; and thus Hannibal was saved in an unexpected way.

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## CHAPTER VII

Riots in Carthage — Second Armistice broken — Preparations for Battle — Speeches of Hannibal and Scipio — Battle of Zama — Personal Encounter of Hannibal and Scipio — Hannibal's Defeat and Flight

38. The Carthaginian council warmly welcomed the agreement and exhorted the people to adhere to its terms, explaining all their misfortunes and their immediate want of soldiers, money, and provisions. But the people, like a mere mob, behaved like fools. They thought that their generals had made this arrangement for their own private ends, so that, relying upon the Romans, they might hold the power in their own country. They said that Hannibal was doing now what had been done before by Hasdrubal, who had betrayed his camp to the enemy by night, and a little later wanted to surrender to Scipio, having approached him for that purpose, and was now concealed in the city. Thereupon there was a great clamor and tumult, and some of them left the assembly and went in search of Hasdrubal. He had anticipated them by taking refuge in his father's tomb, where he destroyed himself with poison. But they pulled his corpse out, cut off his head, put it on a pike, and carried it about the city. Thus was Hasdrubal first banished unjustly, next falsely slandered by Hanno, and then driven to his death by the Carthaginians, and loaded with indignities after his death.

39. Then the Carthaginians ordered Hannibal to break the truce and begin war against Scipio, and to fight as soon as possible on account of the scarcity of provisions. Accordingly he sent word that the truce was at an end. Scipio



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marched immediately, and took the great city of Partha and encamped near Hannibal. The latter moved off, but he sent three spies into the Roman camp who were captured by Scipio. The latter did not put them to death, however, according to the custom of dealing with spies, but ordered that they should be taken around and shown the camp, the arsenals, the engines, and the army under review. He then set them free so that they might inform Hannibal concerning all these things. The latter deemed it advisable to have a parley with Scipio, and when it was granted he said that the Carthaginians had rejected the former treaty on account of the money indemnity. If he would remit that, and if the Romans would content themselves with Sicily, Spain, and the islands they now held, the agreement would be lasting. "Hannibal's escape from Italy would be a great gain to him," said Scipio, "if he could obtain these terms in addition." He then forbade Hannibal to send any more messages to him. After indulging in some mutual threats they departed, each to his own camp.

40. The town of Cilla was in the neighborhood and near it was a hill well adapted for a camp. Hannibal, perceiving this, sent a detachment forward to seize it and lay out a camp. Then he started and moved forward as though he were already in possession of it. Scipio having anticipated him and seized it beforehand, Hannibal was cut off in the midst of a plain without water and was engaged all night digging wells. His army, by toiling in the sand, with great difficulty obtained a little muddy water to drink, and so they passed the night without food, without care for their bodies, and some of them without removing their arms. Scipio, mindful of these things, moved against them at daylight while they were exhausted with marching, with want of sleep, and want of water. Hannibal was troubled, since he did not wish to join battle in that plight. Yet he saw that if he should remain there his army would suffer severely from want of water, while if he should retreat the enemy would take fresh courage and fall upon his rear. For these reasons it was necessary for him to fight. He speedily put in battle array about 50,000 men and eighty elephants. He placed the elephants in the front line at intervals, in order

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to strike terror into the enemy's ranks. Next to them he placed the third part of his army, composed of Celts and Ligurians, and mixed with them everywhere Moorish and Balearic archers and slingers. Behind these was his second line, composed of Carthaginians and Africans. The third line consisted of Italians who had followed him from their own country, in whom he placed the greatest confidence, since they had the most to apprehend from defeat. The cavalry were placed on the wings. In this way Hannibal arranged his forces.

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41. Scipio had about 23,000 foot and 1500 Italian and Roman horse. He had as allies Masinissa with a large number of Numidian horse, and another prince, named Dacamas, with 1600 horse. He drew up his infantry, like those of Hannibal, in three lines. He placed all his cohorts in straight lines with open spaces so that the cavalry might readily pass between them. In front of each cohort he stationed men armed with heavy stakes two cubits long, mostly shod with iron, for the purpose of assailing the oncoming elephants by hand, as with catapult bolts. He ordered these and the other foot-soldiers to avoid the impetus of these beasts by turning aside and continually hurling javelins at them, and by darting around them to hamstring them whenever they could. In this way Scipio disposed his infantry. He stationed his Numidian horse on his wings because they were accustomed to the sight and smell of elephants. As the Italian horse were not so, he placed them all in the rear, ready to charge through the intervals of the foot-soldiers when the latter should have checked the first onset of the elephants. To each horseman was assigned an attendant armed with plenty of darts with which to ward off the attack of these beasts. In this way was his cavalry disposed. Lælius commanded the right wing and Octavius the left. In the middle both Hannibal and himself took their stations, out of respect for each other, each having a body of horse in order to send reënforcements wherever they might be needed. Of these Hannibal had 4000 and Scipio 2000, besides the 300 Italians whom he had armed in Sicily.

42. When everything was ready each one rode up and down encouraging his soldiers. Scipio, in the presence of

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his army, invoked the gods, whom the Carthaginians had offended by their frequent violation of treaties. He told the soldiers not to think of the numbers of the enemy but of their own valor, by which aforesaid these same enemies, in even greater numbers, had been overcome in this same country. If fear, anxiety, and doubt oppress those who have hitherto been victorious, how much more, he said, must these feelings weigh upon the vanquished. Thus did Scipio encourage his forces and console them for their inferiority in numbers. Hannibal reminded his men of what they had done in Italy, their great and brilliant victories won, not over Numidians, but over those who were all Italians, and throughout Italy. He pointed out, in plain sight, the smallness of the enemy's force, and exhorted them not to show themselves inferior to a less numerous body in their own country. Each general magnified to his own men the consequences of the coming engagement. Hannibal said that the battle would decide the fate of Carthage and all Africa; if vanquished, they would be enslaved forthwith, if victorious, they would have universal supremacy hereafter. Scipio said that there was no safe refuge for his men if they were vanquished, but if victorious there would be a great increase of the Roman power, a rest from their present labors, a speedy return home, and glory forever after.

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43. Having thus exhorted their men they joined battle. Hannibal ordered the trumpet to sound, and Scipio responded in like manner. The elephants began the fight decked out in fearful panoply and urged on with goads by their riders. The Numidian horse flying around them incessantly thrust darts into them. Being wounded and put to flight and having become unmanageable, their drivers took them out of the combat. This is what happened to the elephants on both wings. Those in the centre trampled down the Roman infantry, who were not accustomed to that kind of fighting and were not able to avoid or to pursue them easily on account of their heavy armor, until Scipio brought up the Italian cavalry, who were in the rear and more lightly armed, and ordered them to dismount from their frightened horses, and run around and stab the elephants. He was himself the first to dismount and

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wound the front-tramping elephant. The others were encouraged by his example, and they inflicted so many wounds upon the elephants that these also withdrew.

44. The field being cleared of these beasts the battle was now waged by men and horses only. The Roman right wing, where Lælius commanded, put the opposing Numidians to flight, and Masinissa struck down their prince, Massathes, with a dart, but Hannibal quickly came to their rescue and restored the line of battle. On the left wing, where Octavius commanded and where the hostile Celts and Ligurians were stationed, a doubtful battle was going on. Scipio sent the tribune Thermus thither with a reënforcement of picked men, but Hannibal, after rallying his left wing, flew to the assistance of the Ligurians and Celts, bringing up at the same time his second line of Carthaginians and Africans. Scipio, perceiving this, brought his second line in opposition. When the two greatest generals of the world thus met, in hand to hand fight, there was, on the part of the soldiers of each, a brilliant emulation and reverence for their commanders, and no lack of zeal on either side in the way of sharp and vehement fighting and cheering.

45. As the battle was long and undecided, the two generals had compassion on their tired soldiers, and rushed upon each other in order to bring it to a more speedy decision. They threw their javelins at the same time. Scipio pierced Hannibal's shield. Hannibal hit Scipio's horse. The horse, smarting from the wound, threw Scipio over backwards. He quickly mounted another and again hurled a dart at Hannibal, but missed him and struck another horseman near him. At this juncture, Masinissa, hearing of the crisis, came up, and the Romans seeing their general not only serving as a commander but fighting also as a common soldier, fell upon the enemy more vehemently than before, routed them, and pursued them in flight. Nor could Hannibal, who rode by the side of his men and besought them to make a stand and renew the battle, prevail upon them to do so. Therefore, despairing of these, he turned to the Italians who had come with him, and who were still in reserve and not demoralized. These he led into the fight, hoping to fall upon the Romans in disorderly pursuit.

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But they perceived his intention, and speedily called one another back from the pursuit and restored the line of battle. As their horse were no longer with them and they were destitute of missiles, they now fought sword in hand in close combat. Great slaughter ensued and innumerable wounds, mingled with the shouts of the combatants and the groans of the dying, until, finally, the Romans routed these also and put them to flight. Such was the brilliant issue of this engagement.

46. Hannibal in his flight seeing a mass of Numidian horse collected together, ran up and besought them not to desert him. Having secured their promise, he led them against the pursuers, hoping still to turn the tide of battle. The first whom he encountered were the Massylians, and now a single combat between Masinissa and Hannibal took place. Rushing fiercely upon each other, Masinissa drove his spear into Hannibal's shield, and Hannibal wounded his antagonist's horse. Masinissa, being thrown, sprang towards Hannibal on foot, and struck and killed a horseman who was advancing towards him in front of the others. At the same time he received in his shield — made of elephant's hide — several darts, one of which he pulled out and hurled at Hannibal; but, as it happened, it struck another horseman who was near and killed him. While he was pulling out another, he was wounded in the arm, and withdrew from the fight for a brief space. When Scipio learned this, he feared for Masinissa and hastened to his relief, but he found that the latter had bound up his wound and returned to the fight on a fresh horse. Thus the battle continued doubtful and very severe, the soldiers on either side having the utmost reverence for their commanders, until Hannibal, discovering a body of Spanish and Celtic troops on a hill near by, dashed over to them to bring them into the fight. Those who were still engaged, not knowing the cause of his going, thought that he had fled. Accordingly, they abandoned the fight of their own accord and broke into disorderly rout, not following after Hannibal, but helter skelter. This band having been dispersed, the Romans thought that the fight was over and pursued them in a disorderly way, not perceiving Hannibal's purpose.

47. Presently Hannibal returned accompanied by the

Y.R. 55<sup>a</sup> Spanish and Celtic troops from the hill. Scipio hastened to recall the Romans from the pursuit, and formed a new line of battle much stronger than those who were coming against him, by which means he overcame them without difficulty. When this last effort had failed, Hannibal despaired utterly, and fled in plain sight. Many horsemen pursued him, and among others Masinissa, although suffering from his wound, pressed him hard, striving eagerly to take him prisoner and deliver him to Scipio. But night came to his rescue and under cover of darkness, with twenty horsemen who had alone been able to keep pace with him, he took refuge in a town named Thon. Here he found many Bruttian and Spanish horsemen who had fled after the defeat. Fearing the Spaniards because they were fickle barbarians, and apprehending that the Bruttians, as they were Scipio's countrymen, might deliver him up in order to secure pardon for their transgression against Italy, he fled secretly with one horseman in whom he had full confidence. Having accomplished about 3000 stades<sup>1</sup> in two nights and days, he arrived at the seaport of Hadrumetum, where a part of his army had been left to guard his supplies. Here he began to collect forces from the adjacent country and from those who had escaped from the recent engagement, and to prepare arms and engines of war.

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## CHAPTER VIII

Spoils of the Victory — An Embassy to Scipio — Speech of Hasdrubal Eriphus — Scipio's Reply — Scipio's Conditions of Peace

48. Now Scipio, having gained this splendid victory, girded himself as for a sacrifice and burned the less valuable spoils of the enemy, as is the custom of the Roman generals. He sent to Rome ten talents of gold, 2500 talents of silver, a quantity of carved ivory, and many distinguished captives in ships, and Lælius to carry news of the victory. The remainder of the spoils he sold, and divided the proceeds among the troops. He also made presents for distinguished valor, and crowned Masinissa again. He also

<sup>1</sup> About 330 miles.

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sent out expeditions and gathered in more cities. Such was the result of the engagement between Hannibal and Scipio, who here met in combat for the first time. The Roman loss was 2500 men, that of Masinissa rather more. That of the enemy was 25,000 killed, and 8500 taken prisoners. Three hundred Spaniards deserted to Scipio, and 800 Numidians to Masinissa.

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49. Before the news reached either Carthage or Rome, the former sent word to Mago, who was collecting Gallic mercenaries, to invade Italy if possible, and if not, to set sail with his forces for Africa. These letters being intercepted and brought to Rome, another army, together with horses, ships, and money, was despatched to Scipio. The latter had already sent Octavius by the land route to Carthage, and was going thither himself with his fleet. When the Carthaginians learned of Hannibal's defeat they sent ambassadors to Scipio on a small fast-sailing ship, of whom the principal ones were Hanno the Great and Hasdrubal Eriphus, who bore a herald's staff aloft on the prow and stretched out their hands toward Scipio in the manner of suppliants. He directed them to come to the camp, and when they had arrived he attended to their business in high state. They threw themselves on the ground weeping, and when the attendants had lifted them up and bade them say what they wished, Hasdrubal Eriphus spoke as follows:

50. "For myself, Romans, and for Hanno here, and for all sensible Carthaginians, let me say that we are guiltless of the wrongs which you lay at our door. For when the same men, driven by hunger, did violence to your legates, we rescued them and sent them back to you. You ought not to condemn all the people of Carthage who so recently sought peace, and when it was granted eagerly took the oath to support it. But cities are easily swayed to their hurt, because the masses are always controlled by what is pleasing to their ears. We have had experience of these things, having been unable either to persuade or to restrain the multitude by reason of those who slandered us at home and who have prevented us from making ourselves understood by you. Romans, do not judge us by the standard of your own discipline and good counsel. If any one esteems it a crime to have yielded to the persuasions of

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these rabble-rousers, consider the hunger and the necessity that was upon us by reason of suffering. For it could not have been a deliberate intention on the part of our people, first to ask for peace, and give such a large sum of money to obtain it, and deliver up all their galleys except a few, and surrender the bulk of their territory, swear to these things, and send an embassy to Rome with the ratifications, and then wantonly to violate the agreement before our embassy had returned. Surely some god misled them and the tempest that drove your supplies into Carthage; and besides the tempest, hunger carried us away, for people who are in want of everything do not form the best judgments respecting other people's property. It would not be reasonable to punish with severity a multitude of men so disorganized and unfortunate.

51. "But if you consider us more guilty than unfortunate, we confess our fault and ask pardon for it. Justification belongs to the innocent, entreaty to those who have offended. And much more readily will the fortunate extend pity to others, when they observe the mutability of human affairs, and see people craving mercy to-day who yesterday were carrying things with a high hand. Such is the condition of Carthage, the greatest and most powerful city of Africa, in ships and money, in elephants, in infantry and cavalry, and in subject peoples, which has flourished 700 years and held sway over all Africa and so many other nations, islands, and seas, standing for the greater part of this time on an equality with yourselves, but which now places her hope of safety not in her dominion of the sea, her ships, her horses, her subjects (all of which have passed over to you), but in you, whom we have heretofore shamefully treated. Contemplating these facts, Romans, it is fit that you should beware of the Nemesis which has come upon them and should use your good fortune mercifully, to do deeds worthy of your own magnanimity and of the former fortunes of Carthage, and to deal with the changes which Providence has ordered in our affairs without reproach, so that your conduct may be blameless before the gods and win the praises of all mankind.

52. "There need be no fear that the Carthaginians will change their minds again, after being subjected to such re-



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penitance and punishment for their past folly. Wise men are prevented from wrong-doing by their wisdom, the wicked by their suffering and repentance. It is reasonable to suppose that those who have been chastised will be more trusty than those who have not had such experience. Be careful that you do not imitate the cruelty and the sinfulness that you lay at the door of the Carthaginians. The misfortunes of the miserable are the source of fresh transgressions arising from poverty. To the fortunate the opportunity for clemency exists in the abundance of their means. It will be neither to the glory nor to the advantage of your government to destroy so great a city as ours, instead of preserving it. Still, you are the better judges of your own interests. For our safety we rely on these two things: the ancient dignity of the city of Carthage and your well-known moderation, which, together with your arms, has raised you to so great dominion and power. We must accept peace on whatever terms you grant. It is needless to say that we place everything in your hands."

53. At the conclusion of his speech Eriphus burst into tears. Then Scipio dismissed them and consulted with his officers a long time. After he had come to a decision, he called the Carthaginian envoys back and addressed them thus: "You do not deserve pardon, you who have so often violated your treaties with us, and only lately abused our envoys in such a public and heaven-defying manner that you can neither excuse yourselves nor deny that you are worthy of the severest punishment. But what is the use of accusing those who confess? And now you take refuge in prayers, you who would have wiped out the very name of Rome if you had conquered. We did not imitate your bad example. When your ambassadors were at Rome, although you had violated the agreement and maltreated our envoys, the city allowed them to go free, and when they were driven into my camp, although the war had been recommenced, I sent them back to you unharmed. Now that you have condemned yourselves, you may consider whatever terms are granted to you in the light of a gain. I will tell you what my views are, and our Senate will vote upon them as it shall think best.

54. "We will yet grant you peace, Carthaginians, on

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condition that you surrender to the Romans all your warships except ten, all your elephants, the plunder you have lately taken from us, or the value of what has been lost, of which I shall be the judge, all prisoners and deserters and those whom Hannibal led from Italy. These conditions to be fulfilled within thirty days after peace is declared. Mago to depart from Liguria within sixty days, and your garrisons to be withdrawn from all cities beyond the Phœnician trenches and their hostages to be surrendered. You to pay to Rome the sum of 250 Euboïc talents per annum for fifty years. You shall not recruit mercenaries from the Celts or the Ligurians, nor wage war against Masinissa or any other friend of Rome, nor permit any Carthaginians to serve against them with consent of your people. You to retain your city and as much territory inside the Phœnician trenches as you had when I sailed for Africa. You to remain friends of Rome and be her allies on land and sea; all this, if the Senate please, in which case the Romans will evacuate Africa within 150 days. If you desire an armistice until you can send ambassadors to Rome, you shall forthwith give us 150 of your children as hostages whom I shall choose. You shall also give 1000 talents in addition for the pay of my army, and provisions likewise. When the treaty is ratified we will release your hostages."

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## CHAPTER IX

Hannibal advises their Acceptance — Another Embassy to Rome — Debate in the Senate — Views of Scipio's Friends — The Counsels of Clemency and of Prudence — Views of Scipio's Rivals — The Crimes of Carthage — Call for Vengeance — The Senate ratifies Scipio's Treaty — Scipio's Return — Form of a Roman Triumph

55. When Scipio had finished speaking the envoys bore his conditions to Carthage, where the people debated them in the Assembly for several days. The chief men thought that it was best to accept the offer and not, by refusing a part, to run the risk of losing all; but the vulgar crowd, not considering the instant peril rather than the draft, great as it was, upon their resources, and being the majority, refused compliance. They were angry that their rulers, in

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time of famine, should send provisions away to the Romans instead of supplying their own citizens during the armistice, and they banded together, threatening to plunder and burn the houses of every one of them. Finally, they decided to take counsel with Hannibal, who now had 6000 infantry and 500 cavalry stationed at the town of Marthama. He came and, although moderate citizens feared lest a man so fond of war should excite the people to renewed exertions, he very gravely advised them to accept peace. But the people, mad with rage, reviled him also, and threatened everybody, until some of the notables, despairing of the city, took refuge with Masinissa, and others with the Romans themselves.

56. The remaining Carthaginians, hearing that a large quantity of provisions had been stored by Hannibal at a certain place, sent a number of transports and war-ships thither, being resolved, if they could obtain food, to continue the war and to endure everything rather than accept servitude to the Romans. But after a storm had shattered their ships, despairing of everything, they accused the gods of conspiring against them, assented to the agreement with Scipio, and sent an embassy to Rome. Scipio also sent counsellors to confirm the agreement. It was said that Scipio was moved by two considerations. He thought that peace would be for the advantage of the city. He knew also that the consul, C. Cornelius Lentulus, would grasp at his command, and he was not willing that another should reap the glory of bringing the war to an end. At all events he enjoined upon his messengers to say that if there should be delay at Rome he would conclude peace himself.

57. There was great rejoicing at Rome that this mighty city, which had brought so many calamities upon them and had been the second or third in the leadership of the world, had been completely vanquished. But there were differences of opinion as to what should be done. Some were exceedingly bitter toward the Carthaginians. Others had pity on them, thinking that this was a more becoming attitude to take respecting other people's misfortunes. One of Scipio's friends rose and said: "Gentlemen, this is not so much a question of saving Carthage as it is of preserving our faith with the gods and our reputation among men—

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lest it be said that we, who have so often charged the Carthaginians with cruelty, behave with greater cruelty than they, and that we, who always exercise moderation in small matters, neglect it wholly in large ones, which, on account of their very magnitude, cannot escape notice. The deed will be sounded through all the earth, now and hereafter, if we destroy this famous city, former mistress of the seas, ruler of so many islands, and of the whole expanse of water, and more than half of Africa, and which in contests with ourselves has exhibited such wonderful success and power. While they were in arms it was necessary to fight them; now that they have fallen they should be spared, just as athletes refrain from striking a fallen antagonist, and as many wild beasts spare the enemies they have thrown down. It is fitting, in the hour of success, to beware of the indignation of the gods and of the envy of mankind. If we consider closely what they have done to us, that is itself a most fearful example of the fickleness of fortune, that they are now asking us simply to save them from destruction, they who have been able to inflict so many and so great evils upon us, and not long ago were contending on even terms with us for the possession of Sicily and Spain. But, for these things they have already been punished. For their later transgressions blame the pangs of hunger, the most painful suffering that can afflict mankind, a torture that may easily dethrone the reasoning powers of men.

58. "I do not speak for the Carthaginians; that would not be fitting. Nor do I forget that they violated other treaties before those which are now under review. What our fathers did in like circumstances (and by which means they arrived at the summit of fortune) I will recall to your minds for you know them already. Although the neighboring peoples round about us often revolted and were continually breaking treaties, our ancestors did not disdain them — the Latins, the Etruscans, the Sabines, for example. Afterward, the Æqui, the Volsci, the Campanians, also our neighbors, and various other peoples of Italy, committed a breach of their treaties, and our fathers met it magnanimously. Moreover, the Samnite race, after betraying friendship and agreements three times and waging the most desperate war against us for eighty years, were not de-

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stroyed, nor were those others who called Pyrrhus into Italy. Nor did we destroy those Italians who lately joined forces with Hannibal, not even the Bruttians, who remained with him to the last. We took from them a part of their lands and allowed them to keep the remainder. Thus it was esteemed both generous to them and useful to us not to exterminate a whole race, but to bring them into a better state of mind.

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59. "Why, in dealing with the Carthaginians, should we change our nature, in the exercise of which we have until now so greatly prospered? Is it because their city is large? That is the very reason why it ought to be spared. Is it because they have often violated their treaties with us? So have other nations, almost all of them. Is it because they are now to be subjected to a light punishment? They are to lose all their ships but ten. They are to give up their elephants, which constitute so large a part of their strength. They are to pay 10,000 Euboic talents. They are to yield all the cities and territories outside of the Phoenician trenches, and they are forbidden to enlist soldiers. What they took from us when pressed by hunger they are to restore, although they are still hungry. As to all doubtful matters, Scipio, the man who fought against them, is the judge. I praise Scipio the rather for the magnitude and multitude of these things. I think you ought to spare them considering the invidiousness and the mutability of human affairs. They still have (until the treaty is ratified) an abundance of ships and elephants, and Hannibal, that most skilful captain, who still has an army; also Mago, who is leading another considerable force of Celts and Ligurians; also Vermina, the son of Syphax, is allied with them, and other Numidian tribes. They have also a great many slaves. If they despair of pardon from you they will use all these things with a lavish hand. Nothing is more dangerous than desperation in battles, in which also the divine will is both uncertain and vengeful.

60. "It seems that Scipio was apprehensive of these things when he communicated his own opinion to us, saying that if we delayed he would conclude peace himself. It is reasonable to suppose, too, that he can form a better judgment than ourselves, since the one who presides over

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the whole business can have the best view of it. If we reject his advice we shall give pain to that ardent patriot, that renowned general, who urged us to carry the war into Africa when we were not in favor of it; and when he could not obtain an army from us, raised it himself, and there achieved for us a success far beyond our expectations. It is astonishing that you who entered upon this war so sluggishly in the beginning, should now prosecute it so fiercely and to such extremity. If any one agrees to this, but fears lest the Carthaginians should break faith again, I answer that it is more likely that they now perceive the necessity of keeping their agreements because they have suffered so much from former violations of them, and that they will observe the claims of religion all the more since their impiety has led only to their ruin. It is not consistent to despise the Carthaginians as being powerless, and in the same breath to fear lest they should have power to rebel. It will be easier for us to keep watch over them, that they do not become too great hereafter, than to destroy them now. They will fight with desperation now, but hereafter they will always be held in check by their fears. Besides, they will have plenty of troubles without us, for all their neighbors, angered by their former tyranny, will press upon them, and Masinissa, our most faithful ally, will always be there lying in wait for them.

61. "If any one is disposed to treat all these considerations lightly, and is only thinking how he may succeed to Scipio's command and turn it to his own advantage, trusting that the favors of fortune will attend him to the end, what are we going to do with the city after we have taken it—supposing we do take it? Shall we destroy it utterly because they seized some of our corn and ships, which they are ready to give back, together with many other things? If we do not do this (having regard to the indignation of the gods and the censures of men) shall we give it to Masinissa? Although he is our friend, it is best not to make him too strong. It should rather be considered a public advantage to the Romans that the two should be at strife with each other. Is it said that we might collect rent from their land? The expense of military protection would eat up the rent, for we should need a strong force to ward off

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so many surrounding tribes, all of them uncivilized. Can we plant colonies in the midst of such a host of Numidians? They would always be exposed to the depredations of these powerful barbarians, and if they should conquer them they might hereafter become objects of fear and jealousy to us, possessing a country so much more fruitful than ours. All of which things, it seems to me, Scipio clearly discerned when he advised us to yield to the prayers of the Carthaginians. Let us then grant their request and that of our general."

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62. When he had thus spoken, Publius Cornelius, a relative of Cornelius Lentulus, who was then consul and who expected to be Scipio's successor, replied thus: "In war, gentlemen, the only thing to be considered is, what is advantageous. We are told that this city is still powerful. So much the more ought we to be on our guard against treachery joined to power, and to crush the power since we cannot extinguish the treachery. No time can be better chosen to free ourselves from all fear of the Carthaginians than the present, when they are weak and stripped of everything, and before they grow again to their former proportions. Not that I would deny the claims of justice, but I do not think that we can be accused of want of moderation toward the Carthaginians, who in their days of prosperity were unjust and insolent to everybody, but have become suppliants in adversity, and will immediately break away from the new treaty if they have a chance. They have neither respect for treaties nor regard for their oaths—these people whom the gentleman thinks we ought to spare, in order that we may avoid the indignation of the gods and the censures of men. I think that the gods themselves have brought Carthage into this plight in order to punish for their former impiety those who in Sicily, in Spain, in Italy, and in Africa itself, with us and with all others, were always making covenants and breaking their oaths, and committing outrage and savagery. Of these things I will give you some foreign examples before I speak of those that concern ourselves, in order that you may know that all men will rejoice over the Carthaginians if they are brought to condign punishment.

63. "The people of Saguntum, a noble city of Spain, in

V.R. 553 league with themselves and friendly to us, they slaughtered B.C. 201  
 to the last man, although they had given no offence. Those  
 of Nuceria, a town subject to us, surrendered to them under  
 a sworn agreement that they might depart with two garments  
 each. They shut the senators of Nuceria up in a bath-room  
 and suffocated them with heat. Then they shot the com-  
 mon people with arrows as they were going away. After  
 entering into a treaty with the Senate of Acerra they threw  
 them into wells and buried them alive. Our consul, Mar-  
 cus Cornelius, they lured by false oaths to an interview with  
 their general, who pretended to be sick. They seized him  
 and carried him prisoner from Sicily into Africa with  
 twenty-two of our ships. They put our other general,  
 Regulus, to death with torture after he had gone back to  
 them in accordance with his oath. The acts perpetrated  
 by Hannibal himself in war, stratagem and perjury, against  
 our cities and armies, and at last against his own allies,  
 destroying their cities and slaughtering their soldiers serv-  
 ing with him, it would take too long to enumerate. In a  
 word, 400 of our towns were depopulated by him. He cast  
 our men, whom he had taken prisoners, into ditches and  
 rivers, making bridges of their bodies to pass over. He  
 had them trodden under foot by elephants. He made them  
 fight with each other, brothers against brothers and fathers  
 against sons. And just now, while they were here treating  
 for peace, and calling the gods to witness, and taking oaths,  
 and while their ambassadors were still among us, they seized  
 our ships in Africa and put our men in chains. To such a  
 pitch of madness have they been brought by the practice of  
 cruelty.

64. "What pity, therefore, or what moderation is due  
 from others to these Carthaginians, who have never exer-  
 cised moderation or clemency in anything, and who, as  
 Scipio says, would have expunged the very name of Rome  
 if they had vanquished us? But good faith, you say, and  
 the right hand are reliable. How so? What treaty, what  
 oath, have they not trampled under foot? We should not  
 imitate them, the gentleman says. What treaty can we  
 violate when we have not yet made any? But we should  
 not imitate their cruelty, he says. Ought we to make the  
 most cruel people in the world our friends and allies?



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Neither of these things is desirable. Let them surrender at discretion, as is the custom of the vanquished, as many others have surrendered to us. Then we shall see what we will do, and whatever we accord to them they shall take in the light of a favor and not of a bargain. There is this difference between the two plans. As long as we treat with them they will violate the treaties as they have heretofore, always making some excuse that they were overreached. They will always find plausible grounds for dispute. But when they surrender at discretion, and we take away their arms, and when their persons are in our possession and they see that there is nothing they can call their own, their spirits will be tamed and they will welcome whatever we allow them to have, as a gratuity bestowed by others. If Scipio thinks differently you have the two opinions to choose from. If he is going to make peace with the Carthaginians without you, what is the need of his sending any word to you? For my part, I have given you the opinion which I hold to be for the advantage of the city, as to judges who are really going to exercise a judgment on the matter in hand."

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65. After Publius had spoken, the Senate took a vote on the question, and the majority agreed with Scipio. Thus a third treaty was made between the Romans and the Carthaginians. Scipio deemed it best to urge this policy upon the Romans, either for the reasons mentioned above, or because he considered it a sufficient success for Rome to have taken the supremacy away from Carthage. There are some who think that in order to preserve the Roman discipline he wished to keep a neighbor and rival as a perpetual menace, so that they might never become intoxicated with success and careless by reason of the greatness of their prosperity. That Scipio had this feeling, Cato, not long after, publicly declared to the Romans when he reproached them for undue severity toward the Rhodians. When Scipio had concluded the treaty, he sailed from Africa to Italy with his whole army, and made a triumphal entry into Rome more glorious than that of any of his predecessors.

66. The form of the triumph (which the Romans continue to employ) was as follows: All who were in the procession wore crowns. Trumpeters led the advance and

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wagons laden with spoils. Towers were borne along representing the captured cities, and pictures showing the exploits of the war; then gold and silver coin and bullion, and whatever else they had captured of that kind; then came the crowns that had been given to the general as a reward for his bravery by cities, by allies, or by the army itself. White oxen came next, and after them elephants and the captive Carthaginian and Numidian chiefs. Lic-tors clad in purple tunics preceded the general; also a chorus of musicians and pipers, in imitation of an Etruscan procession, wearing belts and golden crowns, and they march evenly with song and dance. They call themselves Lydi because, as I think, the Etruscans were a Lydian colony. One of these, in the middle of the procession, wearing a purple cloak and golden bracelets and necklace, caused laughter by making various gesticulations, as though he were insulting the enemy. Next came a lot of incense bearers, and after them the general himself on a chariot embellished with various designs, wearing a crown of gold and precious stones, and dressed, according to the fashion of the country, in a purple toga embroidered with golden stars. He bore a sceptre of ivory, and a laurel branch, which is always the Roman symbol of victory. Riding in the same chariot with him were boys and girls, and on horses on either side of him young men, his own relatives. Then followed those who had served him in the war as secretaries, aids, and armor-bearers. After these came the army arranged in companies and cohorts, all of them crowned and carrying laurel branches, the bravest of them bearing their military prizes. They praised some of their captains, derided others, and reproached others; for in a triumph everybody is free, and is allowed to say what he pleases. When Scipio arrived at the Capitol the procession came to an end, and he entertained his friends at a banquet in the temple.



SCIPIO AFRICANUS  
In the Capitoline Museum, Rome



## CHAPTER X

Masinissa's Depredations — Factions in Carthage — The Visit of Cato — War with Masinissa — A Battle with Masinissa — Carthaginian Army surrounded and captured

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67. Thus the second war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, which began in Spain and terminated in Africa with the aforesaid treaty, came to an end. This was about the 144th Olympiad according to the Greek reckoning. Presently Masinissa, being incensed against the Carthaginians and relying on the friendship of the Romans, seized a considerable part of the territory belonging to the former on the ground that it had once belonged to himself. The Carthaginians appealed to the Romans to bring Masinissa to terms. The Romans accordingly sent arbitrators, but told them to favor Masinissa as much as they could. Thus Masinissa appropriated a part of the Carthaginian territory and made a treaty with them which lasted about fifty years, during which Carthage, blessed with peace, advanced greatly in population and wealth by reason of the fertility of her soil and the profits of her commerce.

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561 68. By and by (as frequently happens in periods of prosperity) factions arose. There was a Roman party, a democratic party, and a party which favored Masinissa as king. Each had leaders of eminence in position and in bravery. Hanno the Great was the leader of the Romanizing faction; Hannibal, surnamed the Starling, was the chief of those who favored Masinissa; and Hamilcar, surnamed the Samnite, and Carthalo, of the democrats. The latter party, watching their opportunity while the Romans were at war with the Celtiberians, and Masinissa was marching to the aid of his son, who was surrounded by other Spanish forces, persuaded Carthalo (the commander of auxiliaries and in discharge of that office going about the country) to attack the subjects of Masinissa, whose tents were on disputed territory. Accordingly he slew some of them, carried off booty, and incited the rural Africans against the Numidians. Many other hostile acts took place on both sides, until the Romans again sent envoys to restore peace, telling them as before to help Masinissa secretly. They artfully

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- Y. R. confirmed Masinissa in the possession of what he had taken before, in this way. They would neither say anything nor listen to anything, so that Masinissa might not be worsted in the controversy, but they passed between the two litigants with outstretched hands, and this was their way of commanding both to keep the peace. Not long afterward Masinissa raised a dispute about the land known as the "big fields" and the country belonging to fifty towns, which is called Tysca. Again the Carthaginians had recourse to the Romans. Again the latter promised to send envoys to arbitrate the matter, but they delayed until it seemed probable that the Carthaginian interests would be utterly ruined.
- 572 580 597 B. C. 182 174 157 602 70. The democratic faction in Carthage sent the leaders

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 of the party favoring Masinissa into banishment, to the number of about forty, and confirmed it by a vote and an oath that they should never be taken back, and that the question of taking them back should never be discussed. The banished took refuge with Masinissa and urged him to declare war. He, nothing loath, sent his two sons, Gulussa and Micipsa, to Carthage to demand that those who had been expelled on his account should be taken back. When they came to the city gates the boëtharch warned them off, fearing lest the relatives of the exiles should prevail with the multitude by their tears. When Gulussa was returning Hamilcar the Samnite set upon him, killed some of his attendants, and thoroughly frightened him. Thereupon Masinissa, making this an excuse, laid siege to the town of Oroscopa, which he desired to possess contrary to the treaty. The Carthaginians with 25,000 foot and 400 city horse under Hasdrubal, their boëtharch, marched against Masinissa. At their approach, Asasis and Suba, Masinissa's lieutenants, on account of some difference with his sons, deserted with 6000 horse. Encouraged by this accession, Hasdrubal moved his forces nearer to the king and in some skirmishes gained the advantage. But Masinissa by stratagem retired little by little as if in flight, until he had drawn him into a great desert surrounded by hills and crags, and destitute of provisions. Then turning about he pitched his camp in the open plain. Hasdrubal drew up among the hills as being a stronger position.

71. They were to fight the following day. Scipio the younger, who afterwards captured Carthage, and who was then serving Lucullus in the war against the Celtiberians, was on his way to Masinissa's camp, having been sent thither to procure elephants. Masinissa, as he was preparing his own person for battle, sent a body of horse to meet him, and charged some of his sons to receive him when he should arrive. At daylight he put his army in order of battle in person, for although he was eighty-eight years old he was still a vigorous horseman and rode bare-back, as is the Numidian custom, both when fighting and when performing the duties of a general. Indeed, the Numidians are the most robust of all the African peoples and of the long-lived they live the longest. The reason

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probably is that their winter is not cold enough to do them much harm and their summer not so extremely hot as that of Ethiopia and of India; for which reason also this country produces the most powerful wild beasts, and the men are always performing labor in the open air. They use very little wine and their food is simple and frugal. When Masinissa, upon his charger, drew up his army Hasdrubal drew up his in opposition. It was very large, since many recruits had flocked in from the country. Scipio witnessed this battle from a height, as one views a spectacle in a theatre. He often said afterwards that he had witnessed various contests, but never enjoyed any other so much, for here only had he seen at his ease 110,000 join battle. He added with an air of solemnity that only two had had such a spectacle before him: Jupiter from Mount Ida, and Neptune from Samothrace, in the Trojan war.

72. The battle continued from morning till night, many falling on both sides, and it seemed that Masinissa had the advantage. As he was returning from the field Scipio presented himself, and Masinissa greeted him with the greatest attention, having been a friend of his grandfather. When the Carthaginians learned of Scipio's arrival they besought him to make terms for them with Masinissa. He brought them to a conference, and the Carthaginians made proposals that they would surrender to Masinissa the territory belonging to the town of Emporium and give him 200 talents of silver now and 800 talents later. When he asked for the deserters they would not give them up. So they separated without coming to an agreement. Then Scipio returned to Spain with his elephants. Masinissa drew a line of circumvallation around the hill where the enemy were encamped and prevented them from bringing in any food. Nor could any be found in the neighborhood, for it was with the greatest difficulty that he could procure a scant supply for himself from a long distance. Now Hasdrubal thought that he should be able to break through the enemy's line with his army, which was still strong and unharmed. Having more supplies than Masinissa, he thought it would be a good plan to provoke him to battle and he delayed because he had just learned that envoys were on their way from Rome to settle the difficulty. By and by



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they came. They had been instructed if Masinissa were beaten to put an end to the strife, but if he were successful, to spur him on. And they carried out their orders.

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73. In the meantime hunger wasted Hasdrubal and the Carthaginians and, being much debilitated, they were no longer able to assault the enemy. First they ate their pack animals, and after them their horses, and they boiled their leather straps for food. They also fell sick of various diseases due to lack of food, want of exercise, and the season, for they were enclosed in one place and in a contracted camp—a great multitude of men exposed to the heat of an African summer. When the supply of wood for cooking failed they burned their shields. They could not carry out the bodies of the dead because Masinissa kept strict guard; nor could they burn them for want of fuel. So there was a terrible pestilence among them in consequence of living in the stench of putrefying corpses. The greater part of the army was already wasted away. The rest, seeing no hope of escape, agreed to give up the deserters to Masinissa and to pay him 5000 talents of silver in fifty years, and to take back those who had been banished, although this was contrary to their oath. They were to pass out through their enemies, one by one, through a single gate, and with nothing but a short tunic for each. Gulussa, full of wrath at the assault made upon him not long before, either with the connivance of his father or upon his own motion, made a charge upon them with a body of Numidian cavalry as they were going out. As they had neither arms to resist nor strength to fly, many were slain. So, out of 58,000 men composing the army only a few returned safe to Carthage, among them Hasdrubal, the general, and others of the nobility.

## CHAPTER XI

Third Punic War — No Excuse for It — Utica joins the Romans — Hostages demanded of Carthage — Pitiful Scenes when the Hostages were sent — Roman Army lands at Utica — Embassy from Carthage

605 74. Such was the war between Masinissa and the Carthaginians. The third and last Punic war of the Romans 149

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in Africa followed it. The Carthaginians having suffered this calamity at the hands of Masinissa, and the city being much weakened by it, they began to be apprehensive of the king himself, who was still near them with a large army, and also of the Romans, who were always harboring ill-will toward them and would make the affairs of Masinissa an excuse for it. They were not wrong in either particular. The Romans, when they learned the foregoing facts, straightway began to collect an army throughout all Italy, not telling what it was intended for, but in order, they said, to have it ready for emergencies. The Carthaginians, thinking to put an end to the excuse, condemned Hasdrubal, who had conducted the campaign against Masinissa, and Carthalo, the boëtharch, and any others who were concerned in the matter, to death, putting the whole blame of the war upon them. They sent ambassadors to Rome to complain of Masinissa, and at the same time to accuse their own citizens of taking up arms against him too hastily and rashly, and of furnishing an occasion for an imputation of hostility on the part of their city. When one of the senators asked the ambassadors why they did not condemn their officers at the beginning of the war instead of waiting till they were beaten, and why they did not send their embassy before, instead of postponing it till now, they could not give any answer. The Senate, which had previously resolved upon war and was only seeking some petty excuse, answered that the defence offered by the Carthaginians was not satisfactory. The latter, much disturbed, asked again, if they had done wrong, how they could atone for it. The answer was given in a word: "You must make it right with the Roman people." When they inquired among themselves what would make it right, some thought that the Romans would like to have something added to the pecuniary fine imposed by Scipio; others, that the disputed territory should be given up to Masinissa. Being at a loss what to do they sent another embassy to Rome, and asked to know exactly what they should do to make it right. The Romans replied that the Carthaginians knew perfectly well what was necessary, and having given this answer dismissed them.

75. While they were stricken with fear and perplexity

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on this account, the city of Utica (the largest in Africa after Carthage itself, having a harbor with good anchorage and well adapted for landing an army, at a distance of sixty stades from Carthage and well situated as a base of operations against it), observing the plight the Carthaginians were in, and recalling their ancient animosity toward them, sent an embassy to Rome at this critical moment offering to give themselves up to the Romans. The Senate, which had been previously eager and prepared for war, having gained the accession of a city so strong and so conveniently placed, now disclosed its purpose. Assembling in the Capitol (where they were accustomed to deliberate on the subject of war), the senators voted to declare war against Carthage. They immediately despatched the consuls in command of the forces, M. Manlius having charge of the foot soldiers and L. Marcius Censorinus of the fleet, and they gave them secret orders not to desist from the war until Carthage was razed to the ground. After offering sacrifice they sailed for Sicily, intending to cross over thence to Utica. They were conveyed in 50 quinqueremes and 100 hemiolii,<sup>1</sup> besides many open boats and transports. The army consisted of 80,000 infantry and about 4000 cavalry, all the very best. There was a general rush of citizens and allies to join this splendid expedition, and absolute confidence in the result, and many were eager to have their names on the enrolment.

76. The declaration of war and the war itself reached the Carthaginians by the same messenger. He brought the vote of the Senate, and told them that the fleet had already sailed. They were astounded, and in despair for want of ships and by the recent loss of so many young men. They had neither allies, nor mercenaries, nor supplies for enduring a siege, nor anything else in readiness for this sudden and unheralded war. They knew that they could not prevail against the Romans and Masinissa combined. They sent another embassy to Rome with full powers to settle the difficulty on any terms they could. The Senate was convened and it told them that if, within thirty days, the Carthaginians would give to the consuls, who were still in

<sup>1</sup> The quinquereme was a ship with five banks of oars, the hemiolius with one-and-a-half.

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Sicily, three hundred children of their noblest families as hostages, and would obey their orders in other respects, the freedom and autonomy of Carthage should be preserved and that they should retain their lands in Africa. This was voted in public, and they gave the resolution to the ambassadors to carry to Carthage; but they sent word privately to the consuls that they should carry out their secret instructions.

77. The Carthaginians had some suspicion of this Senate resolution, since there was no security given for the return of the hostages. Nevertheless, the danger was so great that they could omit nothing in which hope could be placed. So, anticipating the appointed time, they sent their children into Sicily, amid the tears of the parents, the kindred, and especially the mothers, who clung to their little ones with frantic cries and seized hold of the ships and of the officers who were taking them away, even holding the anchors and tearing the ropes, and throwing their arms around the sailors in order to prevent the ships from moving; some of them even swam out far into the sea beside the ships, shedding tears and gazing at their children. Some of them tore out their hair on the shore and smote their breasts in the extremity of their grief. It seemed to them that they were giving hostages only nominally, but were really giving up the city, when they surrendered their children without any fixed conditions. Many of them predicted, with lamentations, that it would profit the city nothing to have delivered up their children. Such were the scenes that took place in Carthage when the hostages were sent away. When the consuls received them in Sicily they sent them to Rome, and said to the Carthaginians that they would give them further information at Utica in reference to the ending of the war.

78. Crossing to the latter place they pitched the camp for their infantry at the same place where that of Scipio had formerly been. The fleet remained in the harbor of Utica. When the ambassadors came there from Carthage the consuls placed themselves on a high seat, with the chief officers and military tribunes standing near, and the whole army drawn up on either side with arms glistening and standards erect, in order that the ambassadors might be

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impressed in this way with the strength of the expedition. When the consuls had proclaimed silence by the trumpet, a herald told the Carthaginian envoys to come forward, and they advanced through the long camp, but did not draw near to the place where the consuls sat, because they were fenced off by a rope. The consuls then ordered them to tell what they wanted. The envoys then told a various and pitiful tale about the former agreements between the Romans and themselves, about the antiquity of Carthage, its size and power, and its wide dominion on land and sea. They said that they did not mention these things in a boasting way, this was no fit occasion for boasting, "but that you, Romans (they said), may be moved to moderation and clemency by the example of our sudden change of fortune. The bravest are those who pity the fallen, and they may cherish confidence in their own continued prosperity in proportion as they do nothing to the injury of others. Such a course will be worthy of you, Romans, and of that reverent spirit which you, of all men, most profess.

79. "But even if we had met ruthless enemies we have suffered enough. Our leadership on land and sea has been taken from us; we delivered our ships to you, and we have not built others; we have abstained from the hunting and possession of elephants. We have given you, both before and now, our noblest hostages, and we have paid tribute to you regularly, we who had always been accustomed to receive it from others. These things were satisfactory to your fathers, with whom we had been at war. They entered into an agreement with us that we should be friends and allies, and we took the same oath together to observe the agreement. And they, with whom we had been at war, observed the agreement faithfully afterward. But you, with whom we have never come to blows, what part of the treaty do you accuse us of violating, that you vote for war so suddenly, and march against us without even declaring it? Have we not paid the tribute? Have we any ships, or any hateful elephants? Have we not been faithful to you from that time to this? Are we not to be pitied for the recent loss of 50,000 men by hunger? But we have fought against Masinissa, you say. He was always grabbing our property, and we endured all things on your account.

Y.R. 605 While holding, all the time and contrary to right, the very ground on which he was nurtured and educated, he seized other lands of ours around Emporium, and after taking that he invaded still others, until the peace which we made with you was broken. If this is an excuse for the war, we condemned those who resisted him, and we sent our ambassadors to you to make the necessary explanations, and afterwards others empowered to make a settlement on any terms you pleased. What need is there of a fleet, an expedition, an army against men who do not acknowledge that they have done wrong, but who, nevertheless, put themselves entirely in your hands? That we are not deceiving you, and that we will submit ungrudgingly to whatever penalty you impose, we demonstrated plainly when we sent, as hostages, the children of our noblest families, demanded by you, as soon as the decree of your Senate ordered us to do so, not even waiting the expiration of the thirty days. It was a part of this decree that if we would deliver the hostages Carthage should remain free under her own laws and in the enjoyment of her possessions."

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## CHAPTER XII

Reply of Censorinus — "Perfidia plusquam Punica" — Terrible Plight of Carthage — Pathetic Speech of Banno — Reply of Censorinus

80. So spake the ambassadors. Then Censorinus rose and replied as follows: "Why is it necessary that I should tell you the causes of the war, Carthaginians, when your ambassadors have been at Rome and have learned them from the Senate? What you have stated falsely, that I will refute. The decree itself declared, and we gave you notice in Sicily when we received the hostages, that the rest of the conditions would be made known to you at Utica. For your promptness in sending the hostages and your care in selecting them, you are entitled to praise. If you are sincerely desirous of peace why do you need any arms? Bring all your weapons and engines of war, both public and private, and deliver them to us." When he had thus spoken the ambassadors said that they would comply with this order

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also, but that they did not know how they could defend themselves against Hasdrubal, whom they had condemned to death, and who was now leading 20,000 men against them, and was already encamped near Carthage. When the consul said that he would take care of Hasdrubal they promised to deliver up their arms. Thereupon Cornelius Scipio Nasica and Cnæus Cornelius Hispanus were sent with the ambassadors, and they received complete armor for 200,000 men, besides innumerable javelins and darts, and 2000 catapults for throwing pointed missiles and stones. When they came back it was a remarkable and unparalleled spectacle to behold the vast number of loaded wagons which the enemy themselves brought in. The ambassadors accompanied them, together with numerous senators and other leading men of the city, priests and distinguished persons, who hoped to inspire the consuls with respect or pity for them. They were brought in and stood in their robes before the consuls. Again Censorinus (who was a better speaker than his colleague) rose, and with a stern countenance spoke as follows:—

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81. "Your ready obedience up to this point, Carthaginians, in the matter of the hostages and the arms, is worthy of all praise. In cases of necessity we must not multiply words. Bear bravely the remaining commands of the Senate. Yield Carthage to us, and betake yourselves where you like within your own territory at a distance of at least ten miles from the sea, for we are resolved to raze your city to the ground." While he was yet speaking, the Carthaginians lifted their hands toward heaven with loud cries, and called on the gods as avengers of violated faith. They heaped reproaches on the Romans, as if willing to die, or insane, or determined to provoke the Romans to sacrilegious violence to ambassadors. They flung themselves on the ground and beat it with their hands and heads. Some of them even tore their clothes and lacerated their flesh as though they were absolutely bereft of their senses. After the first frenzy was past there was great silence and prostration as of men lying dead. The Romans were struck with amazement, and the consuls thought it best to bear with men who were overwhelmed at an appalling command until their indignation should subside, for they well knew

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605 that great dangers often bring desperate courage on the instant, which time and necessity gradually subdue. This was the case with the Carthaginians, for when the sense of their calamity came over them, during the interval of silence, they ceased their reproaches and began to bewail, with fresh lamentations, their own fate and that of their wives and children, calling them by name, and also their country, as though she could hear their cries like a human being. The priests invoked their temples, and the gods within them, as though they were present, accusing them of being the cause of their destruction. So pitiable was this mingling together of public and private grief that it drew tears from the Romans themselves.

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82. The consuls, although moved to pity by this exhibition of the mutability of human affairs, awaited with stern countenances the end of their lamentations. When their outcries ceased there was another interval of silence, in which they reflected that their city was without arms, that it was empty of defenders, that it had not a ship, not a catapult, not a javelin, not a sword, nor a sufficient number of fighting men, having lost 50,000 a short time ago. They had neither mercenaries, nor friends, nor allies, nor time to procure any. Their enemies were in possession of their children, their arms, and their territory. Their city was besieged by foes provided with ships, infantry, cavalry, and engines, while Masinissa, their other enemy, was on their flank. Seeing the uselessness of lamentation and reproaches they desisted from them, and again began to talk. Banno, surnamed Tigillas, the most distinguished man among them, having obtained permission to speak, said:—

83. "If it is permitted to repeat what we have already said to you, Romans, we would speak once more, not as though we were contending for rights (since disputation is never timely for the unfortunate), but that you may perceive that pity on your part toward us is not without excuse and not without reason. We were once the rulers of Africa and of the greater part of the sea, and we contended with yourselves for empire. We desisted from this in the time of Scipio, when we gave up to you all the ships and elephants we had. We agreed to pay you tribute and we pay it at the appointed time. Now, in the name of the gods



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who witnessed the oaths, spare us, respect the oath sworn by Scipio that the Romans and Carthaginians should be allies and friends. We have not violated the treaty. We have no ships, no elephants. The tribute is not in default. On the contrary, we have fought on your side against three kings. You must not take offence at this recital, although we mentioned it before when you demanded our arms. Our calamities make us verbose, and nothing gives more force to an appeal than the terms of a treaty. Nor can we take refuge in anything else than words, since we have given all other power over to you. Such, Romans, were the former conditions, for which Scipio was our surety. Of the present ones you, consuls, are yourselves the doers and the witnesses. You asked hostages, and we gave you our best. You asked for our arms, and you have received them all, which even captured cities do not willingly give up. We had confidence in your habits and your character. Your Senate sent us word, and you confirmed it, when the hostages were demanded, that if they were delivered, Carthage should be left free and autonomous. If it was added that we should endure your further commands it was not to be expected that in the matter of the hostages you would, in your distinct demand, promise that the city should be independent, and then besides the hostages would make a further demand that Carthage itself be destroyed. If it is right for you to destroy it, how can you leave it free and autonomous as you said you would?

84. "This is what we have to say concerning the former treaties and those made with yourselves. If you do not care to hear it we will omit it altogether and have recourse to prayers and tears, the one refuge of the unfortunate, for which there is ample occasion in the greatness of our calamity. We beseech you, in behalf of an ancient city founded by command of the gods, in behalf of a glory that has become great and a name pervading the whole world, of the many temples it contains and of its gods who have done you no wrong. Do not deprive them of their festivals, solemnities, and sacrifices. Deprive not the dead, who have never harmed you, of the offerings which their children bring to their tombs. If you have pity for us (as you say that out of pity you yield us another dwelling-place),

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spare our shrines, spare our forum, respect the deity who presides over our council, and all else that is dear and precious to the living. What fear can you have of Carthage when you are in possession of our ships and our arms and our hateful elephants? As to a change of dwelling-place (if that is considered in the light of a consolation), it is impracticable for our people, a countless number of whom get their living by the sea, to move into the country.<sup>1</sup> We propose an alternative more desirable for us and more glorious for you. Spare the city which has done you no harm, but if you please, kill us, whom you have ordered to move away. In this way you will seem to vent your wrath upon men, not upon temples, gods, tombs, and an innocent city.

85. "Romans, you desire a good name and reputation for piety in all that you do, and you announce and claim moderation in all your successes and acquisitions. Do not, I implore you in the name of Jove and of your other gods, as well as of those who still preside over Carthage (and may they never remember ill against you or your children), do not tarnish your good name for the first time in your dealings with us. Do not defile your reputation by an act so horrible to do and to hear, and which you will be the first in all history to perform. Greeks and barbarians have waged many wars, and you, Romans, have waged many against other nations, but no one has ever destroyed a city whose people had surrendered before the fight, and delivered up their arms and children, and submitted to every other penalty that could be imposed upon men. Reminding you of the oaths sworn before the gods, of the mutability of the human lot, and the avenging Nemesis that ever lies in wait for the fortunate, we beseech you not to do violence to your own fair record, and not to push our calamities to the last extremity. Or, if you cannot spare our city, grant us time to send another embassy to your Senate to present our petition. Although the intervening time is short, it will bring long agony to us through the

<sup>1</sup> Literally: "It is impracticable for a seafaring people, a countless number of whom get their living by the sea," etc. Tautology, which weakens the force of an expression in English, gave it additional strength in Greek.

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uncertainty of the event. It will be all the same to you whether you execute your purposes now or a little later, and in the meantime you will have performed a pious and humane act."

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86. So spake Banno, but the consuls showed by their stern looks that they would yield nothing. When he had ceased, Censorinus replied: "What is the use of repeating what the Senate has ordered? It has issued its decrees and they must be carried out. We have no power to alter the commands already laid upon us. If we were addressing you as enemies, Carthaginians, it would be necessary only to speak and then to use force, but since this is a matter of the common good (somewhat of our own and still more of yours), I have no objection to giving you the reasons, if you may be thus persuaded instead of being coerced. The sea reminds you of the dominion and power you once acquired by means of it. It prompts you to wrong-doing and brings you to grief. By this means you invaded Sicily and lost it again. Then you invaded Spain and were driven out of it. While a treaty was in force you plundered merchants on the sea, and ours especially, and in order to conceal the crime you threw them overboard, until finally you were caught at it, and then you gave us Sardinia by way of penalty. Thus you lost Sardinia also by means of this sea, which always begets a grasping disposition by the very facilities which it offers for gain.<sup>1</sup>

87. "In like manner the Athenians, when they became a maritime people, grew mightily, but they fell as suddenly. Naval prowess is like merchants' gains—a good profit to-day and a total loss to-morrow. You know that those very people whom I have mentioned, when they had extended their sway over the Ionian Sea to Sicily could not restrain their greed until they had lost everything, and were compelled to surrender their harbor and their ships to their enemies, to receive a garrison in their city, to demolish their own long walls, and to become almost exclusively an

<sup>1</sup> Here Censorinus touches the real cause of the expedition. "It was, of course, the commercial monopolists," says Professor Mahaffy, "and not old Cato and his figs, who destroyed Carthage. These horse-leeches of the world could not bear the modest rivalry of either Corinth or Carthage."

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inland people. And this very thing kept them going a long time. Believe me, Carthaginians, country life, with the joys of agriculture and freedom from danger, is much more wholesome. Although the gains of agriculture are smaller than those of mercantile life, they are surer and a great deal safer. In fact, a maritime city seems to me to be more like a ship than like solid ground, being so tossed about on the waves of trouble and so much exposed to the vicissitudes of life, whereas an inland city enjoys all the security of *terra firma*. For this reason the ancient seats of empire were generally inland, and in this way those of the Medes, the Assyrians, the Persians, and others became very powerful.

88. "But I will omit kingly examples, which no longer concern you. Look over your African possessions, where there are numerous inland cities out of the reach of danger, from which you can choose one that you would like to have for neighbors, so that you may no longer be in the presence of the thing that excites you, so that you may lose the memory of the ills that now vex you whenever you cast your eyes upon the sea empty of ships, and call to mind the great fleets you once possessed and the spoils you captured and proudly brought into your harbor, and gorged your dockyards and arsenals. When you behold the barracks of your soldiers, the stables of your horses and elephants, and the storehouses alongside them, all empty, what do these things put into your minds? What else but grief and an intense longing to get them back again if you can? When we recall our departed fortune it is human nature to hope that we may recover it. The healing drug for all evils is oblivion, and this is not possible to you unless you put away the sight. The plainest proof of this is that as often as you obtained forgiveness and peace from us you violated the agreement. If you still yearn for dominion, and bear ill-will toward us who took it away from you, and if you are waiting your opportunity, then of course you have need of this city, this great harbor and its dockyards, and these walls built for the shelter of an army. Why should we spare our captured enemies? If you have abdicated dominion sincerely, not in words only but in fact, and are content with what you possess in Africa, and

<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
605 if you honestly desire peace with us, come now, prove it <sup>B.C.</sup> 149  
by your acts. Move into the interior of Africa, which  
belongs to you, and leave the sea, the dominion of which  
you have yielded to us.

89. "Do not pretend that you are grieved for your  
temples, your shrines, your forum, your tombs. We shall  
not harm your tombs. You may come and make offerings  
there, and sacrifice in your temples, as often as you like.  
The rest, however, we shall destroy. You do not sacrifice  
to your shipyards nor do you make offerings to your walls.  
You can provide yourselves with other shrines and temples  
and a forum in the place you move to, and presently this  
will be your country; just as you left your old ones in Tyre  
when you migrated to Africa, and now consider the newly  
acquired land your country. Understand then, in brief,  
that we do not make this decision from any ill-will toward  
you, but in the interest of a lasting peace and of the com-  
mon security. If you will remember, we caused Alba, not  
an enemy, but our mother city, to change her abode to  
Rome for the common good, acting not in a hostile spirit,  
but receiving them as settlers with due honor, and this  
proved to be for the advantage of both. But you say you  
have many work-people who gain their living by the sea.  
We have thought of this. In order that you might easily  
have traffic by sea and a convenient importation and expor-  
tation of commodities, we have not ordered you to go more  
than ten miles from the shore, while we, who give the order,  
are twelve miles from it ourselves. We offer you whatever  
place you choose to take, and when you have taken it you  
shall live under your own laws. This is what we told you  
beforehand, that Carthage should have her own laws if  
you would obey our commands. We consider *you* to be  
Carthage, not the ground and buildings where you live."

### CHAPTER XIII

Return of the Ambassadors—Terrible Scenes in the City—Carthage  
resolves to fight—Slow Movements of the Consuls

90. Having spoken thus, Censorinus paused. When the  
Carthaginians, thunderstruck, answered not a word, he

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added, "All that can be said in the way of persuasion and consolation has been said. The order of the Senate must be carried out, and quickly too. Therefore take your departure, for you are still ambassadors." When he had thus spoken they were thrust out by the lictors, but as they foresaw what was likely to be done by the people of Carthage, they asked permission to speak again. Being readmitted they said, "We see that your orders are inexorable since you will not even allow us to send an embassy to Rome. Nor can we hope to return to you again, since we shall be slain by the people of Carthage before we have finished speaking to them. We pray you, therefore, not on our account (for we are ready to suffer everything), but on account of Carthage itself, that you will, if possible, strike terror into them so that they may be able to endure this calamity. Advance your fleet to the city while we are returning by the road, so that, seeing and hearing what you have ordered, they may learn to bear it if they can. To this state has dire necessity brought us that we ask you to hasten your ships against our fatherland." Having spoken thus, they departed, and Censorinus set sail with twenty quinqueremes and cast anchor alongside the city. Some of the ambassadors wandered away from the road, but the greater part moved on in silence.

91. Meanwhile some of the Carthaginians were watching from the walls the return of the ambassadors, and tore their hair with impatience at their delay. Others, not waiting, ran to meet them in order to learn the news; and when they saw them coming with downcast eyes they smote their own foreheads and questioned them, now all together, now one by one, as each chanced to meet a friend or acquaintance, seizing hold of them and asking questions. When no one answered they wept aloud as though certain destruction awaited them. When those on the walls heard them they joined in the lamentations, not knowing why, but as though some great evil were impending. At the gates the crowd almost crushed the envoys, rushing upon them in such number. They would have been torn in pieces had they not said that they must make their first communication to the senate. Then some of the crowd turned aside, and others opened a path for them, in order to learn the news

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sooner. When they were come into the senate-chamber the senators turned the others out and sat down alone by themselves, and the crowd remained standing outside. Then the envoys announced first of all the order of the consuls. Immediately there was a great outcry in the senate which was echoed by the people outside. When the envoys went on to tell what arguments and prayers they had used to get permission to send an embassy to Rome, there was again profound silence among the senators, who listened to the end; and the people kept silence also. When they learned that they were not even allowed to send an embassy, they raised a loud and mournful outcry, and the people rushed in among them.

92. Then followed a scene of indescribable fury and madness such as the Mænads are said to enact in the Bacchic mysteries. Some fell upon those senators who had advised giving the hostages and tore them in pieces, considering them the ones who had led them into the trap. Others treated in a similar way those who had favored giving up the arms. Some stoned the ambassadors for bringing the bad news and others dragged them through the city. Still others, meeting certain Italians, who were caught among them in this sudden and unexpected mischance, maltreated them in various ways, saying that they would make them suffer for the fraud practised upon them in the matter of the hostages and the arms. The city was full of wailing and wrath, of fear and threatenings. People roamed the streets invoking whatever was most dear to them and took refuge in the temples as in asylums. They upbraided their gods for not being able to defend themselves. Some went into the arsenals and wept when they found them empty. Others ran to the dockyards and bewailed the ships that had been surrendered to perfidious men. Some called their elephants by name, as though they had been present, and reviled their own ancestors and themselves for not perishing, sword in hand, with their country, instead of paying tribute and giving up their elephants, their ships, and their arms. Most of all was their anger kindled by the mothers of the hostages who, like Furies in a tragedy, accosted those whom they met with shrieks and accused them of giving away their children against their protest, or mocked at

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them, saying that the gods were now taking vengeance on them for the lost children. A few kept their wits about them, closed the gates, and brought stones upon the walls to be used in place of catapults.

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93. The same day the Carthaginian senate declared war and proclaimed freedom to the slaves. They also chose generals and selected Hasdrubal for the outside work, whom they had condemned to death, and who had already collected 30,000 men. They despatched a messenger to him begging that, in the extreme peril of his country, he would not remember, or lay up against them, the wrong they had done him under the pressure of necessity from fear of the Romans. Within the walls they chose for general another Hasdrubal, the son of a daughter of Masinissa. They also sent to the consuls asking a truce of thirty days in order to send an embassy to Rome. When this was refused a second time, a wonderful change and determination came over them, to endure everything rather than abandon their city. Quickly all minds were filled with courage from this transformation. All the sacred places, the temples, and every other unoccupied space, were turned into workshops, where men and women worked together day and night without pause, taking their food by turns on a fixed schedule. Each day they made 100 shields, 300 swords, 1000 missiles for catapults, 500 darts and javelins, and as many catapults as they could. For strings to bend them the women cut off their hair for want of other fibres.

94. While the Carthaginians were preparing for war with such haste and zeal, the consuls, who perhaps hesitated about performing such an atrocious act on the instant, or because they thought that they could easily capture an unarmed city whenever they liked, kept delaying. They thought also that the Carthaginians would give in for want of means, as it usually happens that those who are in desperate straits are very eager to resist at first, but as time brings opportunity for reflection, fear of the consequences of disobedience takes possession of them. Something of this kind happened in Carthage, where a certain citizen, conjecturing that fear had already come upon them, walked into the assembly as if on other business and dared to say that among evils they ought to choose the least, since they







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were unarmed, thus speaking his mind plainly. Masinissa was vexed with the Romans, and took it hard that when he had brought the Carthaginians to their knees others should carry off the glory, not even communicating with him beforehand as they had done in the former wars. Nevertheless, when the consuls, by way of testing him, asked his assistance, he said that he would send it whenever he should see that they needed it. Not long after he sent to inquire if they wanted anything at present. They, not tolerating his haughtiness and already suspicious of him as a disaffected person, answered that they would send for him whenever they needed him. Yet they were already in much trouble for supplies for the army, which they drew from Hadrumetum, Leptis, Saxo, Utica, and Acholla only, all the rest of Africa being in the power of Hasdrubal, from which he sent supplies to Carthage. Several days having been consumed in this way, the two consuls moved their forces against Carthage, prepared for battle, and laid siege to it.

#### CHAPTER XIV

Topography of Carthage — The Two Harbors — The Romans repulsed — Roman Rams destroyed — Scipio the Younger — Fleet burned — Exploits of Phameas

95. The city lay in a recess of a great gulf and was in the form of a peninsula. It was separated from the mainland by an isthmus about three miles in width. From this isthmus a narrow and longish tongue of land, about 300 feet wide, extended toward the west between a lake and the sea. On the sea side the city was protected by a single wall. Toward the south and the mainland, where the citadel of Byrsa stood on the isthmus, there was a triple wall. The height of each wall was forty-five feet without counting parapets and towers, which were separated from each other by a space of 200 feet, and each was divided into four stories. The depth was thirty feet. Each wall was divided vertically by two vaults, one above the other. In the lower space there were stables for 300 elephants, and alongside were receptacles for their food. Above were stables for 4000 horses and places for their fodder and grain. There

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
were barracks also for soldiers, 20,000 foot and 4000 horse. Such preparation for war was arranged and provided for in their walls alone. The angle which ran around from this wall to the harbor along the tongue of land mentioned above was the only weak and low spot in the fortifications, having been neglected from the beginning.

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96. The harbors had communication with each other, and a common entrance from the sea seventy feet wide, which could be closed with iron chains. The first port was for merchant vessels, and here were collected all kinds of ships' tackle. Within the second port was an island which, together with the port itself, was enclosed by high embankments. These embankments were full of shipyards which had capacity for 220 vessels. Above them were magazines for their tackle and furniture. Two Ionic columns stood in front of each dock, giving the appearance of a continuous portico to both the harbor and the island. On the island was built the admiral's house, from which the trumpeter gave signals, the herald delivered orders, and the admiral himself overlooked everything. The island lay near the entrance to the harbor and rose to a considerable height, so that the admiral could observe what was going on at sea, while those who were approaching by water could not get any clear view of what took place within. Not even the incoming merchants could see the docks, for a double wall enclosed them, and there were gates by which merchant ships could pass from the first port to the city without traversing the dockyards. Such was the appearance of Carthage at that time.

97. Now the consuls, having divided their work, moved against the enemy. Manilius advanced from the mainland by way of the isthmus, intending to fill up the ditch, surmount the low parapet overlooking it, and from that to scale the high wall. Censorinus raised ladders both from the ground and from the decks of ships against the neglected angle of the wall. Both of them despised the enemy, thinking that they were unarmed, but when they found that they were provided with new arms and were full of courage they were astounded and took to their heels. Thus they met a rebuff at the very beginning, in expecting to take the city without fighting. When they made a sec-



PLAN OF HARBORS AT CARTHAGE.

From "Carthage and the Carthaginians," by R. Bosworth Smith. By kind permission of Longmans, Green & Co.



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ond attempt and were again repulsed, the spirits of the Carthaginians were very much raised. The consuls, fearing Hasdrubal, who had pitched his camp behind them on the other side of the lake, not far distant, fortified two camps, Censorinus on the lake under the walls of the enemy, and Manilius on the isthmus leading to the mainland. When the camps were finished Censorinus crossed the lake to get timber for building engines and lost about 500 men, who were cutting wood, and also many tools, the Carthaginian cavalry general, Himilco, surnamed Phameas, having suddenly fallen upon them. Nevertheless, he secured a certain amount of timber with which he made engines and ladders. Again they made an attempt upon the city in concert, and again they failed. Manilius, after some feeble efforts, having with difficulty beaten down a little of the outworks, gave up in despair of taking the city from that side.

98. Censorinus, having filled up a portion of the lake along the tongue of land in order to have more room, brought up two enormous battering rams, one of which was driven by 6000 foot-soldiers under charge of the military tribunes, and the other by oarsmen of the ships under charge of their captains. Moved by a spirit of emulation among officers and men in the performance of their similar tasks, they beat down a part of the wall, so that they could look into the city. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, drove them back and strove to repair the breaches in the wall by night. As the night time was not sufficient for the work and they feared lest the Roman arms should readily destroy by daylight their moist and newly made wall, they made a sally, some with arms and others with torches, to set fire to the machines. They did not succeed in destroying these entirely (the Romans rallying and not giving them sufficient time), but they rendered them quite useless and regained the city. When daylight returned the Romans conceived the purpose of rushing in through the opening where the Carthaginians had not finished their work and overpowering them. They saw inside an open space, well suited for fighting, where the Carthaginians had stationed armed men in front and others in the rear provided only with stones and clubs, and many others on the roofs of the

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neighboring houses, all in readiness to meet the invaders. The Romans, when they saw themselves scorned by an unarmed enemy, were still more exasperated, and dashed in fiercely. But Scipio, who a little later took Carthage and from that feat gained the surname Africanus, being then a military tribune, held back, divided his companies into several parts, and stationed them at intervals along the wall, not allowing them to go into the city. When those who entered were driven back by the Carthaginians, who fell upon them from all sides, he gave them succor and saved them from destruction. And this action first brought him renown, as he had shown himself wiser than the consul.

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99. Now the dog star began to rise and sickness broke out in the camp of Censorinus, who was conducting his operations on a lake of stagnant water with high walls shutting off the fresh air from the sea, for which reason he moved his station from the lake to the sea. The Carthaginians, observing that the wind blew toward the Romans, attached ropes to some small boats and hauled them behind the walls, so that they should not be observed by the enemy, and filled them with dry twigs and tow. Then they pushed them back, and as they turned the corner and came in sight of the enemy, they poured brimstone and pitch over the contents, spread the sails, and, as the wind filled them, set fire to the boats. These, driven by the wind and the fury of the flames against the Roman ships, set fire to them and came a little short of destroying the whole fleet. Shortly afterward Censorinus went to Rome to conduct the election. Then the Carthaginians began to press more boldly against Manilius. They made a sally by night, some with arms, others, unarmed, carrying planks with which to bridge the ditch of the Roman camp, and began to tear down the palisades. While all was in confusion in the camp, as is usual in nocturnal assaults, Scipio passed out with his horse by the rear gates where there was no fighting, moved around to the front, and so frightened the Carthaginians that they betook themselves to the city. Thus a second time Scipio appeared to have been the salvation of the Romans by his conduct in this nocturnal *melée*.

100. Manilius thereupon fortified his camp more carefully. He threw around it a wall in place of the palisade



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and built a fort on the sea-shore at the place where his supply-ships came in. Then, turning to the mainland, he ravaged the country with 10,000 foot and 4000 horse, collecting wood and forage and provisions. These foraging parties were in charge of the military tribunes by turns. Now Phameas, the chief of the African horse, — a young man eager for fighting, having small but swift horses that lived on grass when they could find nothing else, and could bear both hunger and thirst when necessary, — hiding in thickets and ravines, when he saw that the enemy were not on their guard swooped down upon them from his hiding-place like an eagle, inflicted as much damage on them as he could, and took refuge in flight. But when Scipio's turn came he never made his appearance, because Scipio always kept his foot-soldiers in line and his horsemen on horseback, and in foraging he never broke ranks until he had encircled the field where his harvesters were to work, with cavalry and infantry. Moreover, he was always reconnoitring with other troops of horse around the circle, and if any of the harvesters straggled away or passed outside of the circle he punished them severely. For this reason he was the only one that Phameas did not attack.

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## CHAPTER XV

A Sally from the City — Manilius marches against Hasdrubal and is repulsed — Flight of Manilius — A Detachment rescued

101. As these things were happening all the time, the fame of Scipio was on the increase, so that the other tribunes, out of envy, spread a report that there was an understanding between Phameas and Scipio, arising from the former friendship between the ancestors of Phameas and Scipio's grandfather Scipio. Certain Africans had taken refuge in towers and castles, with which the country abounded, in pursuance of agreements made with the other tribunes, and the latter, after giving them this permission, had set upon them when they were going out; but Scipio always conducted them safely home. For this reason none of them would make any agreement unless Scipio were present. In this way his reputation for courage and good faith

<sup>Y. R.</sup>  
605 spread gradually among both friends and enemies. After <sup>B. 1</sup>  
the Romans had returned from their foraging the Cartha- 146  
ginians made a night attack on their fort by the sea, causing  
tremendous confusion, in which the citizens joined by  
making noises to add to the alarm. While Manilius kept  
his forces inside, not knowing where the danger lay, Scipio,  
taking ten troops of horse, led them out with lighted torches,  
ordering them, as it was night, not to attack the enemy,  
but to course around them with the firebrands and make a  
show of numbers and to frighten them by making a feint of  
attacking here and there. This was done until the Cartha-  
ginians, thrown into confusion on all sides, became panic-  
stricken and took refuge in the city. This also was added  
to the famous exploits of Scipio. Thus in the mouths  
of all he was proclaimed as the only worthy successor of  
his father, Paulus, the conqueror of Macedonia, and of the  
Scipios into whose family he had been received by adoption.

102. Manilius undertook an expedition to Nephers  
against Hasdrubal, which Scipio disapproved of, because  
the road was flanked by mountain crags, gorges, and thick-  
ets, and the heights were occupied by the enemy. When  
they had come within a third of a mile of Hasdrubal, and  
to the bed of a river where it was necessary to go down  
and up again, in order to reach the enemy, Scipio urged  
him to turn back, saying that another time and other means  
would be more propitious for attacking Hasdrubal. The  
other tribunes, moved by jealousy, took the opposite view  
and held that it savored of cowardice, rather than of pru-  
dence, to turn back after coming in sight of the enemy, and  
that it would embolden him to attack them in the rear.  
Then Scipio gave another piece of advice, that they ought  
to fortify a camp on the hither side of the stream, to which  
they could retreat if they were overpowered, there being  
now no place where they could take refuge. The others  
laughed at this, and one of them threatened to throw away  
his sword if Scipio, instead of Manilius, were to command  
the expedition. Thereupon Manilius, who had not had  
much experience in war, crossed the river and on the other  
side encountered Hasdrubal. There was great slaughter on  
both sides. Finally Hasdrubal took refuge in his strong-  
hold, where he was safe and from which he could watch his

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chance of attacking the Romans as they moved off. The latter, who already repented of their undertaking, retired in good order till they came to the river. As the crossing was difficult on account of the fewness and narrowness of the fords, it was necessary for them to break ranks. When Hasdrubal saw this he made a most brilliant attack, and slew a vast number of them who were more intent upon flight than upon defending themselves. Among the killed were three of the tribunes who had been chiefly instrumental in urging the consul to risk the engagement.

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103. Scipio, taking 300 horsemen that he had with him and as many more as he could hastily collect, divided them into two bodies and led them, with many charges, against the enemy, discharging darts at them and retreating by turns, then straightway coming back at them and again retreating, for he had given orders that one-half of them should advance by turns continually, discharge their javelins, and retire, as though they were attacking on all sides. This movement being constantly repeated without any intermission, the Africans, thus assailed, turned against Scipio and pressed less heavily on those who were crossing. The latter hurried across the stream and after them came Scipio with his men under a shower of darts and with great difficulty. At the beginning of this fight four Roman cohorts were cut off from the stream by the enemy and took refuge on a hill. These Hasdrubal surrounded, and the Romans did not miss them until they came to a halt. When they learned the facts they were in a quandary. Some thought they ought to continue their retreat and not to endanger the whole army for the sake of a few, but Scipio maintained that while deliberation was proper when you were laying out your plans, yet in an emergency, when so many men and their standards were in danger, nothing but reckless daring was of any use. Then, selecting some companies of horse, he said that he would either rescue them or willingly perish with them. Taking two days' rations, he set out at once, the army being in great fear lest he should never return. When he came to the hill where the men were besieged he took possession of another eminence hard by and separated from the former by a narrow ravine. The Africans pressed the siege vigorously, making signals to each other and think-

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
605 ing that Scipio would not be able to relieve his friends on <sup>B.</sup>  
account of the excessive fatigue of his march. But Scipio, seeing that the bases of the two hills curved around the ravine, lost no time but dashed around them and secured a position above the enemy. They, finding themselves surrounded, fled in disorder. Scipio did not pursue them, as they were much superior in numbers.

104. Thus Scipio saved these men also, who had been given up for lost. When the army at a distance saw him returning safe, and that he had saved the others contrary to expectation, they shouted for joy and conceived the idea that he was aided by the same deity that was supposed to have enabled his grandfather Scipio to foresee the future. Manilius then returned to his camp in front of the city, having suffered severely from not following the advice of Scipio, who had tried to dissuade him from the expedition. When all were grieved that those who had fallen in battle, and especially the tribunes, remained unburied, Scipio released one of the captives and sent him to Hasdrubal, asking that he would give burial to the tribunes. The latter searched among the corpses, and, recognizing them by their signet rings (for the military tribunes wore gold rings while common soldiers had only iron ones), he buried them, thus thinking to do an act of humanity not uncommon in war, or perhaps because he was in awe of the reputation of Scipio and thought to do him a service. As the Romans were returning from the expedition against Hasdrubal, Phameas made an attack upon them while demoralized by that disaster, and as they came into camp the Carthaginians made a sally from the city and killed some of the camp followers.

## CHAPTER XVI

Rising Fame of Scipio — Death of Masinissa — A Talk with Phameas — Treason of Phameas — Arrival of the New Consul Piso — Piso repulsed — The Carthaginians in High Spirits

606 105. Now the Senate sent commissioners to the army to get particulars, before whom Manilius and the council and the remaining tribunes bore testimony in favor of Scipio;

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for all jealousy had been stifled by his glorious actions. The whole army did the same, and his deeds spoke for themselves, so that the messengers, on their return, reported to everybody the military skill and success of Scipio and the attachment of the soldiers to him. These things greatly pleased the Senate. On account of the many mishaps that had taken place they sent to Masinissa to secure his utmost aid against Carthage. The envoys found that he was no longer living, having succumbed to old age and disease. Having several illegitimate sons, to whom he had made large gifts, and three legitimate ones, who differed from each other in their qualities, he had asked Scipio, on the ground of his (Masinissa's) friendship with him and with his grandfather, to come and consult with him concerning his children and the government. Scipio went immediately, but shortly before he arrived Masinissa breathed his last, having charged his sons to obey Scipio in the matter of the division of the estate.

106. Having uttered these words he died. He had been a fortunate man in all respects. By divine favor he regained his ancestral kingdom, that had been snatched from him by Syphax and the Carthaginians, and extended it from Mauritania on the ocean through the continent as far as the government of Cyrene. He brought a good deal of land under cultivation where Numidian tribes had lived on herbs for want of agricultural knowledge. He left a large sum of money in his treasury and a well-disciplined army. Of his enemies he took Syphax prisoner with his own hand, and he was a cause of the destruction of Carthage, having left it a prey to the Romans, completely deprived of strength. He was by nature tall, and very strong to extreme old age, and he participated in battles and could mount a horse without assistance to the day of his death. The strongest testimony to his robust health was, that while many children were born to him and died before him, he never had less than ten living at one time, and when he died, at the age of ninety, he left one only four years old. Such a lifetime and such strength of body had Masinissa, but he died at last. Scipio made gifts to the sons of his concubines in addition to those they had already received. To each of the legitimate sons he gave treasures and reve-

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nues and the title of king. The other things he divided as he judged fitting, according to the dispositions of each. To Micipsa, the oldest, a lover of peace, he assigned the city of Cirta and the royal palace there. Gulussa, a man of warlike parts and the next in age, he made the director of matters relating to peace and war. Mastanabal, the youngest, who was learned in the law, was appointed judge to decide causes between their subjects.

107. In this way Scipio divided the government and estate of Masinissa among his children, and he brought Gulussa straightway to the aid of the Romans. The latter searched out the hiding-places from which Phameas had inflicted such distress upon the Romans, and speedily put an end to his raids. One wintry day Scipio and Phameas found themselves on the opposite sides of an impassable stream, where neither could do any harm to the other. Scipio, fearing lest there might be an ambuscade farther on, advanced with three companies to reconnoitre. Phameas, observing this movement, advanced with only one companion. Scipio, anticipating that Phameas wanted to say something to him, advanced further with only one. When they had come near enough to hear each other and were at a sufficient distance from the Carthaginians, Scipio said, "Why do you not look out for your own safety since you cannot do anything for your country?" The other replied, "What chance is there for my safety when the affairs of Carthage are in such straits and the Romans have suffered so much at my hands?" "If you have any confidence in my word and influence," said Scipio, "I will promise you safety and pardon from the Romans and their favor besides." Phameas praised Scipio as the most trustworthy of men, and replied, "I will think of it, and if I find that it can be done I will let you know." Then they separated.

108. Manilius, being ashamed of the miscarriage of his attack upon Hasdrubal, again advanced to Nepheris, taking rations for fifteen days. When he neared the place he fortified a camp with palisade and ditch as Scipio had advised on the former occasion. But he accomplished nothing and was more ashamed than before, and was again in fear of being attacked by Hasdrubal on his retreat. While he was

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606 in this helpless state a messenger brought a letter from B. C.  
148 Gulussa's army to Scipio, which he showed to the consul under seal. Breaking the seal, they read as follows: "On such a day I will occupy such a place. Come there with as many men as you please and tell your outposts to receive one who is coming by night." Such was the content of the letter, which was without signature, but Scipio knew that it was from Phameas. Manilius feared lest Scipio might be drawn into an ambuscade by this very versatile man; nevertheless, when he saw how confident he was, he allowed him to go and authorized him to give Phameas the strongest assurances of safety, but not to make any definite promise of reward, but to tell him that the Romans would do what was fitting. There was no need of promises, for Phameas, when he came to the rendezvous, said that he trusted in the good faith of Scipio for his safety, and as for favors he would leave all that to the Romans. Having said this he drew up his forces on the following day in battle order, and going forward in conference with his officers as though about some other matters, he said, "If there is any chance of rendering service to our country I am ready to stand by you for that purpose, but in the state of things that exists, I am going to look out for my own safety. I have made terms for myself and for as many of you as I can persuade to join me. You have now the opportunity to consider what is for your advantage." When he had said this, some of the officers went over to the enemy with their forces to the number of about 2200 horse. The remainder were held together by Hanno, surnamed the White.

109. When Scipio was returning with Phameas the army went out to meet him and welcomed him as in a triumph. Manilius was overjoyed, and as he after this no longer considered his return disgraceful or thought that Hasdrubal would pursue him after such a stroke, he moved away for want of provisions on the seventeenth instead of the fifteenth day of the expedition. They must have three days more of suffering in their return; therefore Scipio, taking Phameas and Gulussa and their horse, together with some of the Italian cavalry, hastened to the plain called Great Barathrum and returned to the army by night laden with a great quantity of spoils and provisions. Manilius, learning

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that his successor, Calpurnius Piso, was coming, sent Scipio to Rome with Phameas. The army conducted Scipio to the ship with acclamations and prayed that he might return to Africa as consul, because they thought that he alone could take Carthage, for the opinion had sprung up among them, as by divine inspiration, that only Scipio would take Carthage. Many of them wrote to this effect to their relatives in Rome. The Senate lauded Scipio and bestowed on Phameas a purple robe with gold clasps, a horse with gold trappings, a complete suit of armor, and 10,000 drachmas of silver money. They also gave him 100 minas of silver plate and a tent completely furnished, and told him that he might expect more if he would cooperate with them to the end of the war. He promised to do so and set sail for the Roman camp in Africa.

110. In the early spring Calpurnius Piso, the new consul, arrived, and with him Lucius Mancinus as admiral of the fleet, but they did not attack either the Carthaginians or Hasdrubal. Marching against the neighboring towns they made an attempt on Aspis by land and sea, and were repulsed. Piso took another town near by and destroyed it, the inhabitants accusing him of attacking them in violation of a treaty. He then moved against Hippagreta, a large city, with walls, citadel, harbor, and dockyards handsomely built by Agathocles, the tyrant of Sicily. Being situated between Carthage and Utica it intercepted the Roman supply-ships and was growing rich thereby. Calpurnius thought to punish them and deprive them of their gains at the same time, but he besieged them the whole summer and accomplished nothing. Twice the inhabitants made sallies, with the aid of the Carthaginians, and burned the Roman engines. The consul, being foiled, returned to Utica and went into winter quarters.

111. The Carthaginians, finding themselves and the army of Hasdrubal unharmed, and that they had worsted Piso in the fighting around Hippagreta, and their forces being augmented by 800 horse, who had deserted from Gulussa, under Bithya, a Numidian chief; seeing also that Micipsa and Mastanabal, the sons of Masinissa, were always promising arms and money to the Romans, but always delaying and waiting to see what would happen, plucked up their



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spirits and roamed through Africa without fear, fortifying the country, and making abusive speeches in the town assemblies against the Romans. In proof of their cowardice they pointed to the two victories at Nepheris and the more recent one at Hippagreta, and to Carthage itself, which the enemy had not been able to take although it was unarmed and poorly defended. They sent to Micipsa and Mastanabal and to the free Moors asking their aid, and showing them that they, as well as Carthage, were in danger of subjection to the Romans. They sent messengers to Macedonia to the supposed son of Perseus, who was at war with the Romans, exhorting him to carry on the war with vigor and promising that Carthage would furnish him money and ships. Being now armed they considered nothing too small to be worth attention, and they gained in confidence, courage, and preparation from day to day. Hasdrubal, who commanded in the country and who had twice got the better of Manilius, was in high spirits also. Aspiring to the command in the city, which was held by another Hasdrubal, a nephew of Gulussa, he accused the latter of an intention to betray Carthage to Gulussa. This accusation being brought forward in the assembly, and the accused being at a loss to answer the unexpected charge, they fell upon him and beat him to death with the benches.

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## CHAPTER XVII

Scipio elected Consul — Saves Mancinus from Destruction — Demoralization of the Army — Scipio's Speech to the Soldiers

112. When the ill success of Piso and the preparation of the Carthaginians were reported at Rome, the people were chagrined and anxious, as the war was growing larger and more irreconcilable, and coming nearer every day. There could be no expectation of peace since they had been the first to break faith. Remembering the exploits of Scipio while he was a military tribune not long before, and comparing them with the present blunders and recalling the letters written to them by friends and relatives from the army on that subject, there was presently an intense

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desire that he should be sent to Carthage as consul. The election was drawing near and Scipio was a candidate for the ædileship, for the laws did not permit him to hold the consulship as yet, on account of his youth; yet the people elected him consul. This was illegal, and when the consuls showed them the law they became importunate and urged all the more, exclaiming that by the laws handed down from Tullius and Romulus the people were the judges of the elections, and that, of the laws pertaining thereto, they could set aside or confirm whichever they pleased. Finally one of the tribunes of the people declared that he would take from the consuls the power of holding an election unless they yielded to the people in this matter. Then the Senate allowed the tribunes to repeal this law, and after one year they reënacted it. In like manner the Lacedæmonians, when they were obliged to relieve from disgrace those who had surrendered at Pylus,<sup>1</sup> said, "Let the laws sleep to-day." Thus Scipio, while seeking the ædileship, was chosen consul. When his colleague, Drusus, proposed to him to cast lots to see which should have Africa as his province, one of the tribunes put the question of the command of that army to the people, and they chose Scipio. They also allowed him to take as many soldiers by conscription as had been lost in the war, and as many volunteers as he could enlist among the allies, and for this purpose to send to the allied kings and states letters written in the name of the Roman people, according to his own discretion. In this way he obtained assistance from them.

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113. Having made these arrangements, Scipio sailed first to Sicily and thence to Utica. Piso, in the meantime, had laid siege to a town in the interior. Mancinus, observing a neglected part of the wall of Carthage, which was protected by continuous and almost impassable cliffs and had been neglected for that reason, made an attack there, thinking to scale the wall secretly by means of ladders. These being fixed, certain soldiers mounted boldly. The Carthaginians, despising their small numbers, opened a gate adjacent to these rocks and made a sally against the enemy. The

<sup>1</sup> This refers to the capture of 292 Spartan hoplites on the island of Sphacteria by the Athenians in the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war, B.C. 425.

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Romans repulsed and pursued them, and rushed into the city through the open gate. They raised a shout of victory, and Mancinus, transported with joy (for he was giddy and rash by nature), and the whole crowd with him, rushed from the ships, unarmed or half-armed, to aid their companions. As it was now about sunset they occupied a strong position adjacent to the wall and spent the night there. Being without food, Mancinus called upon Piso and the magistrates of Utica to assist him in his perilous position and to send him provisions in all haste, for he was in danger of being thrust out by the Carthaginians at daylight and dashed to pieces on the rocks.

114. Scipio arrived at Utica that same evening, and happening, about midnight, to meet those to whom Mancinus had written, he ordered the trumpet to sound for fighting immediately, and the heralds to call to the sea-shore those who had come with him from Italy, and also the young men of Utica, and he directed the older ones to bring provisions to the galleys. At the same time, he released some Carthaginian captives so that they might go and tell their friends that Scipio was coming upon them with his fleet. To Piso he sent horseman after horseman, urging him to move with all speed. About the last watch he put to sea, giving orders to the soldiers that when they approached the city they should stand up on the decks in order to give an appearance of vast numbers to the enemy. At early dawn the Carthaginians attacked Mancinus from all sides and he formed a circle with his 500 armed men, within which he placed the unarmed ones, 3000 in number. Suffering from wounds and being forced back to the wall, he was on the point of being pushed over the precipice when Scipio's fleet came in sight, driven at a tremendous rate of speed, with soldiers crowding the decks everywhere. This was not a surprise to the Carthaginians, who had been advised of it by the returned prisoners, but to the Romans, who were ignorant of what had happened, Scipio brought unexpected relief. Gradually the Carthaginians drew back and Scipio received those who had been in peril into his ships. Straightway he sent Mancinus to Rome (for his successor, Serranus, had come with Scipio to take command of the fleet), and he pitched his camp

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not far from Carthage. The Carthaginians advanced five stades from the walls and fortified a camp opposite him. Here they were joined by Hasdrubal, the commander of the forces in the country, and Bithya, the cavalry general, who had 6000 foot-soldiers and 1000 horse well trained and seasoned.

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115. Scipio, finding the discipline of the army relaxed and the soldiers under Piso given up to idleness, avarice, and rapine. and a multitude of hucksters mingled with them, who followed the camp for the sake of booty, and accompanied the bolder ones when they made expeditions for plunder without permission (although in contemplation of law everybody was a deserter who went beyond the sound of the trumpet in time of war); seeing also that the commander was held to blame for all their failures and that the plunder they took was the cause of fresh quarrels and demoralization among them, for many of them fell out with their comrades on account of it and proceeded to blows, wounds, and even manslaughter — in view of all these things and believing that he should never master the enemy unless he first mastered his own men, he called them together and, mounting a high platform, he lashed them with these words: —

116. "Soldiers, when I served with you under the command of Manilius, I gave you an example of obedience, as you can testify. I ask the same from you, now that I am in command; for while I have ample powers to punish the disobedient, I think it best to give you warning beforehand. You know what you have been doing. Therefore why should I tell you what I am ashamed to speak of? You are more like robbers than soldiers. You are runaways instead of guardians of the camp. You are more like hucksters than conquerors. You are in quest of luxuries in the midst of war and before the victory is won. For this reason the enemy, from the hopeless weakness in which I left him, has risen to such strength, and your labor has been made harder by your laziness. If I considered you to blame for this I should punish you now, but since I ascribe it to another, I shall overlook the past. I have come here not to rob, but to conquer, not to exact money before victory, but to overcome the enemy first. Now, all of you who are

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not soldiers must leave the camp to-day, except those who have my permission to remain, and of those who go, I shall allow none to come back except such as bring food, and this must be for the army, and plain food at that. A definite time will be given to them to dispose of their goods, and I and my quæstor will superintend the sale. So much for the camp followers. For you, soldiers, I have one order adapted to all occasions, and that is, that you follow the example of my habits and my industry. If you observe this rule you will not be wanting in your duty and you will not fail of your reward. We must toil while the danger lasts; spoils and luxury must be postponed to their proper time. This I command and this the law commands. Those who obey shall reap large rewards; those who do not will repent it."

## CHAPTER XVIII

Restores Discipline and captures Megara — Cruelties of Hasdrubal — Scipio's Intrenched Camp — Cuts off the Supplies of Carthage — Attempts to close the Harbor but fails — Indecisive Naval Engagement — Desperate Fight for Possession of a Quay — Scipio captures Nepheris

117. Having spoken thus, Scipio forthwith expelled the crowd of useless persons and with them whatever was superfluous, idle, or luxurious. The army being thus purged, and full of awe for him, and keenly intent for his commands, he made an attempt one night, in two different places, to surprise that part of Carthage called Megara. This was a very large suburb adjacent to the city wall. He sent a force round against the opposite side, while he advanced directly against it a distance of twenty stades with axes, ladders, and crowbars, without noise and in the deepest silence. When their approach was perceived and a shout was raised from the walls, they shouted back — first Scipio and his force, then those who had gone around to the other side — as loudly as possible. The Carthaginians were at first struck with terror at finding such a large force of the enemy attacking them on both sides in the night-time, but Scipio with his utmost efforts was not able to scale the walls. There was a deserted tower outside the

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walls, belonging to a private citizen, of the same height as the walls themselves. He sent some of his bravest young men to the top of this tower, who with their javelins fought back the guards on the wall, threw planks across, and made a bridge by which they reached the walls, descended into the town, broke open a gate, and admitted Scipio. He entered with 4000 men, and the Carthaginians made a hasty flight to Byrsa, as though the remainder of the city had already been taken. All kinds of noises were raised and there was great tumult. Many fell into the hands of the enemy, and the alarm was such that those encamped outside left their fortification and rushed to Byrsa with the others. As Megara was planted with gardens and was full of fruit-bearing trees divided off by low walls, hedges, and brambles, besides deep ditches full of water running in every direction, Scipio was fearful lest it should be impracticable and dangerous for the army to pursue the enemy through roads that they were unacquainted with, and lest they might fall into an ambush in the night. Accordingly he withdrew.

118. When daylight came Hasdrubal, enraged at the attack upon Megara, took the Roman prisoners whom he held, brought them upon the walls, in full sight of their comrades, and tore out their eyes, tongues, and tendons with iron hooks; of some he lacerated the soles of the feet, he cut off the fingers of others, and some he flayed alive. All who survived these tortures he hurled from the top of the walls. He thus gave the Carthaginians to understand that there was no possibility of peace with the Romans, and sought to fire them with the conviction that their only safety was in fighting. But the result was contrary to his intention, for the Carthaginians, conscience-stricken by these nefarious deeds, became timid instead of courageous, and hated Hasdrubal for depriving them of all hope of pardon. Their senate especially denounced him for committing these savage and unusual cruelties in the midst of so great domestic calamities. So he arrested some of the complaining senators and put them to death. Making himself feared in every way he came to be more like a tyrant than a general, for he considered himself secure only if he were an object of terror to them, and he trusted that he should be protected from danger in this way.

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119. Now Scipio set fire to the camp of the enemy, which they had abandoned the day before, when they took refuge in the city. Being in possession of the whole isthmus he began a trench across it from sea to sea not more than a stone's throw from the enemy. The latter were not idle. Along the whole distance of five and twenty stades he had to work and fight at the same time. When he had finished this one he dug another of the same length, at no great distance from the first, looking towards the mainland. He then made two others running transversely, giving the interior space the form of a quadrangle, and threw around the whole a palisade of *chevaux-de-frise*. In addition to the palisade he fortified the ditches also, and along the one looking toward Carthage he built a wall twenty-five stades in length and twelve feet high, without counting the parapets and towers which surmounted the wall at intervals. The width of the wall was about one-half of its height. The highest tower was at the middle, and upon this another of wood, four stories high, was built, from which to observe what was going on in the city. Having completed this work in twenty days and nights, the whole army working and fighting and taking food and sleep by turns, he brought them all within the fortification.

120. This was at the same time a camp for himself and a rather long fort commanding the enemy's country. From this base he could intercept all the supplies sent to the Carthaginians from the interior, since Carthage was everywhere washed by the sea except on this neck. Hence this fort was the first and principal cause of famine and other troubles to them, for, while the great multitude betook themselves from the fields to the city, and none could go out on account of the siege, foreign merchants ceased to frequent the place on account of the war. Thus they had to rely on food brought from Africa alone, little coming in by sea and only when the weather was favorable, much the greater part being forwarded by the land route. Deprived of this, they began to suffer severely from hunger. Bithya, their cavalry general, who had been sent out some time before to procure food, did not venture to make the attempt by attacking and breaking through Scipio's fortification, but he sent supplies a long way around by water,

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although Scipio's ships were blockading Carthage. The latter did not keep their place all the time, nor did they stand thickly together, as they had no shelter and the sea was full of reefs. Nor could they anchor near the city itself, with the Carthaginians standing on the walls and the sea pounding on the rocks there worst of all. Thus the ships of Bithya and an occasional merchant, whom the love of gain made reckless of danger, watching for a strong and favorable wind, spread their sails and ran the blockade, the Roman galleys not being able to pursue merchant ships sailing before the wind. But these chances were rare and only when a strong wind was blowing from the sea. These supplies Hasdrubal distributed to his 30,000 soldiers exclusively, for he despised the multitude; for which reason they suffered greatly from hunger.

121. When Scipio perceived this he planned to close the entrance to the harbor on the west side, not very far from the shore. For this purpose he carried a strong embankment into the sea, beginning on the tongue of land which lay between the lake and sea, advancing straight toward the harbor's mouth. He filled it with heavy stones so that it might not be washed away by the waves. The embankment was twenty-four feet wide on the top and four times as much on the bottom. The Carthaginians at first despised this work as likely to take a long time, and perhaps impossible of execution altogether. But when they saw the whole army proceeding eagerly, and not intermitting the work by day or by night, they became alarmed, and began to excavate another entrance at another part of the harbor in mid-sea, where it was impossible to carry an embankment on account of the depth of the water and the fury of the wind. Even the women and children helped to dig. They began the work inside, and carefully concealed what they were doing. At the same time they built triremes and quinqueremes from old material, and they left nothing to be desired in the way of courage and high spirit. Moreover, they concealed everything so perfectly that not even the prisoners could tell Scipio with certainty what was going on, but merely that there was a great racket in the harbor day and night; what it was about they did not know. Finally, everything being finished, the Carthaginians



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607 opened the new entrance about the dawn of day and passed <sup>B.C.</sup> 147 out with fifty triremes, besides pinnaces, brigantines, and other small craft decked out in a way to cause terror.

122. The Romans were so astounded by the sudden appearance of this new entrance, and of the fleet issuing from it, that if the Carthaginians had at once fallen upon their ships, which were in disorder by reason of beleaguering of the walls, neither sailors nor rowers being present, they might have possessed themselves of the whole fleet. But now (since it was fated that Carthage should perish) they only sailed out to make a show, and, having flouted the enemy in a pompous way, they returned inside the harbor. Three days later they set out for a naval engagement, and the Romans advanced to meet them with their ships and other apparatus in good order. They came together with loud shouts on both sides and cheers from the rowers, steersmen, and marines, the Carthaginians resting their last hope of safety on this engagement and the Romans hoping to make it their final victory. The fight raged till midday. During the battle the Carthaginian small boats, running under the sides of the Roman ships, which were taller, stove holes in their sterns and broke off their oars and rudders, and damaged them in various other ways, advancing and retreating nimbly. As the day verged toward evening the battle was still undecided, and the Carthaginians thought best to withdraw, not that they were beaten, but to renew the engagement the next day.

123. Their small boats retired first, and arriving at the entrance, and becoming entangled on account of their number, they blocked up the mouth so that when the larger ones arrived they were prevented from entering. They took refuge at a wide quay, which had been built against the city wall for unloading merchant ships some time before, and on which a small parapet had been erected during this war lest the space might sometime be occupied by the enemy. When the Carthaginian ships took refuge here for want of a harbor, they ranged themselves with their bows outward and received the attack of the enemy, some of them standing on the ships, some on the quay, and still others on the parapet. To the Romans the onset was easy, for it is not hard to attack ships that are standing still, but

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when they attempted to turn around, in order to retire, the movement was slow and difficult on account of the length of the ships, for which reason they received as much damage as they had given; for while they were executing the movement they were exposed to the onset of the Carthaginians. Finally five ships of the city of the Sidetæ, which were in alliance with Scipio, dropped their anchors in the sea at some distance, attaching long ropes to them, by which means they were enabled to dash against the Carthaginian ships by rowing, and having delivered their blow warp themselves back by the ropes stern foremost. Then the whole fleet, catching the idea from the Sidetæ, followed their example and inflicted great damage upon the enemy. Night put an end to the battle, after which the Carthaginians withdrew to the city — as many of them as survived the engagement.

124. At daylight Scipio attacked this quay because it was well situated to command the harbor. Assailing the parapet with rams and other engines he beat down a part of it. The Carthaginians, although oppressed by hunger and distress of various kinds, made a sally by night against the Roman engines, not by land, for there was no passage-way, nor by ships, for the water was too shallow, but naked and bearing torches not lighted, so that they might not be seen at a distance. Thus, in a way that nobody would have expected, they plunged into the sea and crossed over, some of them wading in water up to their breasts, others swimming. When they reached the engines they lighted their torches, and becoming visible and being naked they suffered greatly from wounds, which they courageously returned. Although the barbed arrows and spear-points rained on their breasts and faces, they did not relax their efforts, but rushed forward like wild beasts against the blows until they had set the engines on fire and put the Romans to disorderly flight. Panic and confusion spread through the whole camp and such fear as was never before known, caused by the frenzy of these naked enemies. Scipio, fearing the consequences, ran out with a squadron of horse and commanded his attendants to kill those who would not desist from flight. He killed some of them himself. The rest were brought by force into the camp, where they passed the night under

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arms, fearing some desperate deed of the enemy. The latter, having burned the engines, swam back home. B. C.  
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125. When daylight returned the Carthaginians, no longer molested by the engines, rebuilt that part of the outwork which had been battered down and added to it a number of towers at intervals. The Romans constructed new engines and built mounds in front of these towers, from which they threw upon them lighted torches and vessels filled with burning brimstone and pitch, and burned some of them, and drove away the Carthaginians. The footway was so slippery with coagulated blood, lately shed in great quantity, that the Romans were compelled, unwillingly, to abandon the pursuit. Scipio, having possessed himself of the entire quay, fortified it and built a brick wall of the same height as that of Carthage, and at no great distance from it. When it was finished, he put 4000 men on it to discharge darts and javelins at the enemy, which they could do with comparative safety. As the walls were of equal height the darts were thrown with great effect. And now the summer came to an end.

126. At the beginning of winter, Scipio resolved to sweep away the Carthaginian power in the country, and the allies from whom supplies were sent to them. Sending his captains this way and that he moved in person to Nephesis against Diogenes, who held that town as Hasdrubal's successor, going by the lake while sending Gaius Lælius by land. When he arrived he encamped at a distance of two stades from Diogenes. Leaving Gulussa to keep Diogenes unceasingly employed, he hastened back to Carthage, after which he kept passing to and fro between the two places overseeing all that was done. When two of the spaces between Diogenes' towers were demolished Scipio came and stationed 1000 picked soldiers in ambush in the enemy's rear, and 3000 more, also carefully selected for bravery, in his front, to attack the demolished rampart. They did not make the attack *en masse*, but by divisions in close order, following each other, so that if those in front were repulsed they could not retreat on account of the weight of those coming behind. The attack was made with loud shouts, and the Africans were drawn thither. The 1000 in ambush, unperceived and unsuspected, fell boldly upon

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the rear of the camp, as they had been ordered, and tore down and scaled the palisade. When the first ones entered the Africans were panic-stricken and fled, thinking that the numbers of the new assailants were much greater than they were. Gulussa pursued them with his Numidian cavalry and elephants and made a great slaughter, some 70,000, including non-combatants, being killed. Ten thousand were captured and about 4000 escaped. In addition to the camp the city of Nopheris was taken also, after a siege of twenty-two days, prosecuted by Scipio with great labor and suffering on account of the severity of the weather. This success contributed much to the taking of Carthage, for provisions were conveyed to it by this army, and the people of Africa were in good courage as long as they saw this force in the field. As soon as it was captured the remainder of Africa surrendered to Scipio's lieutenants or was taken without much difficulty. The supplies of Carthage now fell short, since none came from Africa or from foreign parts, navigation being cut off in every direction by the war and the storms of winter.

## CHAPTER XIX

Scipio takes the Inner Harbor — Fighting in the Streets — Scenes of Horror — Fighting in Byrsa — Hasdrubal and his Wife — Destruction of Carthage — Scipio sheds Tears

608 127. When spring returned, Scipio laid siege to Byrsa and to the harbor of Cothon. Hasdrubal one night set fire to that part of Cothon which is in the form of a quadrangle. But Lælius, still expecting Scipio to make the attack, and while the Carthaginians were turned to that quarter, without being observed, mounted the other part of Cothon, which was in the form of a circle. A shout went up as though a victory had been gained, the Carthaginians became alarmed, while the Romans mounted on all sides, despising the danger, and filled up the vacant spaces with timbers, engines, and scaffolding, the guards making only a feeble resistance because they were weak from hunger and down-cast in spirit. The wall around Cothon being taken, Scipio seized the neighboring forum. Being unable to do more,

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night there under arms. At daylight he brought in 4000 fresh troops. They entered the temple of Apollo, whose statue was there, covered with gold, in a shrine of beaten gold, weighing 1000 talents, which they plundered, chopping it with their swords, disregarding the commands of their officers until they had divided it among themselves, after which they returned to their duty.

128. Now Scipio hastened to the attack of Byrsa, the strongest part of the city, where the greater part of the inhabitants had taken refuge. There were three streets ascending from the forum to this fortress, along which, on either side, were houses built closely together and six stories high, from which the Romans were assailed with missiles. They were compelled, therefore, to possess themselves of the first ones and use those as a means of expelling the occupants of the next. When they had mastered the first, they threw timbers from one to another over the narrow passageways, and crossed as on bridges. While war was raging in this way on the roofs, another fight was going on among those who met each other in the streets below. All places were filled with groans, shrieks, shouts, and every kind of agony. Some were stabbed, others were hurled alive from the roofs to the pavement, some of them alighting on the heads of spears or other pointed weapons, or swords. No one dared to set fire to the houses on account of those who were still on the roofs, until Scipio reached Byrsa. Then he set fire to the three streets all together, and gave orders to keep the passageways clear of burning material so that the army might move back and forth freely.

129. Then came new scenes of horror. As the fire spread and carried everything down, the soldiers did not wait to destroy the buildings little by little, but all in a heap. So the crashing grew louder, and many corpses fell with the stones into the midst. Others were seen still living, especially old men, women, and young children who had hidden in the inmost nooks of the houses, some of them wounded, some more or less burned, and uttering piteous cries. Still others, thrust out and falling from such a height with the stones, timbers, and fire, were torn asunder in all shapes of horror, crushed and mangled. Nor

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608 was this the end of their miseries, for the street cleaners, who were removing the rubbish with axes, mattocks, and forks, and making the roads passable, tossed with these instruments the dead and the living together into holes in the ground, dragging them along like sticks and stones and turning them over with their iron tools. Trenches were filled with men. Some who were thrown in head foremost, with their legs sticking out of the ground, writhed a long time. Others fell with their feet downward and their heads above ground. Horses ran over them, crushing their faces and skulls, not purposely on the part of the riders, but in their headlong haste. Nor did the street cleaners do these things on purpose; but the tug of war, the glory of approaching victory, the rush of the soldiery, the orders of the officers, the blast of the trumpets, tribunes and centurions marching their cohorts hither and thither—all together made everybody frantic and heedless of the spectacles under their eyes.

130. Six days and nights were consumed in this kind of fighting, the soldiers being changed so that they might not be worn out with toil, slaughter, want of sleep, and these horrid sights. Scipio alone toiled without rest, hurrying here and there, without sleep, taking food while he was at work, until, utterly fatigued and relaxed, he sat down on a high place where he could overlook the work. Much remained to be ravaged, and it seemed likely that the carnage would be of longer duration, but on the seventh day some suppliants presented themselves to Scipio bearing the sacred garlands of Æsculapius, whose temple was much the richest and most renowned of all in the citadel. These, taking olive branches from the temple, besought Scipio that he would spare the lives of all who might wish to depart from Byrsa. This he granted to all except the deserters. Forthwith there came out 50,000 men and women together, a narrow gate in the wall being opened, and a guard furnished for them. The Roman deserters, about 900 in number, despairing of their lives, betook themselves to the temple of Æsculapius with Hasdrubal and his wife and their two boys. Here they might have defended themselves a long time although they were few in number, on account of the height and rocky nature of the place, which in time of

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peace was reached by an ascent of sixty steps. But, finally, overcome by hunger, want of sleep, fear, toil, and approaching dissolution, they abandoned the enclosures of the temple and fled to the shrine and roof.

131. Thereupon Hasdrubal secretly presented himself to Scipio, bearing an olive branch. Scipio commanded him to sit at his feet and there showed him to the deserters. When they saw him, they asked silence, and when it was granted, they heaped all manner of reproaches upon Hasdrubal, then set fire to the temple and were consumed in it. It is said that as the fire was lighted the wife of Hasdrubal, in full view of Scipio, arrayed in the best attire possible under such circumstances, and with her children by her side, said in Scipio's hearing, "For you, Roman, the gods have no cause of indignation, since you exercise the right of war. Upon this Hasdrubal, betrayer of his country and her temples, of me and his children, may the gods of Carthage take vengeance, and you be their instrument." Then turning to Hasdrubal, "Wretch," she exclaimed, "traitor, most effeminate of men, this fire will entomb me and my children. Will you, the leader of great Carthage, decorate a Roman triumph? Ah, what punishment will you not receive from him at whose feet you are now sitting." Having reproached him thus, she slew her children, flung them into the fire, and plunged in after them. Such, they say, was the death of the wife of Hasdrubal, which would have been more becoming to himself.

132. Scipio, beholding this city, which had flourished 700 years from its foundation and had ruled over so many lands, islands, and seas, rich with arms and fleets, elephants and money, equal to the mightiest monarchies but far surpassing them in bravery and high spirit (since without ships or arms, and in the face of famine, it had sustained continuous war for three years), now come to its end in total destruction — Scipio, beholding this spectacle, is said to have shed tears and publicly lamented the fortune of the enemy. After meditating by himself a long time and reflecting on the rise and fall of cities, nations, and empires, as well as of individuals, upon the fate of Troy, that once proud city, upon that of the Assyrians, the Medes, and the Persians, greatest of all, and later the splendid Macedonian

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empire, either voluntarily or otherwise the words of the poet escaped his lips: —

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“The day shall come in which our sacred Troy  
And Priam, and the people over whom  
Spear-bearing Priam rules, shall perish all.”<sup>1</sup>  
(*Iliad*, vi, 448, 449; Bryant's translation.)

Being asked by Polybius in familiar conversation (for Polybius had been his tutor) what he meant by using these words, he said that he did not hesitate frankly to name his own country, for whose fate he feared when he considered the mutability of human affairs. And Polybius wrote this down just as he heard it.

## CHAPTER XX

Rejoicings in Rome — Scipio's Triumph — Carthage rebuilt by Augustus

133. Carthage being destroyed, Scipio gave the soldiers a certain number of days for plunder, reserving the gold, silver, and temple gifts. He also gave prizes to all who had distinguished themselves for bravery, except those who had violated the shrine of Apollo. He sent a swift ship, embellished with spoils, to Rome to announce the victory. He also sent word to Sicily that whatever temple gifts they could identify as taken from them by the Carthaginians in former wars they might come and take away. Thus he endeared himself to the people as one who united clemency with power. He sold the rest of the spoils, and, in sacrificial cincture, burned the arms, engines, and useless ships as an offering to Mars and Minerva, according to the Roman custom.

134. When the people of Rome saw the ship and heard of the victory early in the evening, they poured into the streets and spent the whole night congratulating and embracing each other like people just now delivered from some great fear, just now confirmed in their world-wide supremacy, just now assured of the permanence of their

<sup>1</sup> Ἔσσεται ἡμαρ, ὅταν ποτ' ὀλώλη Ἴλιος ἱρῆ,  
καὶ Πρίαμος, καὶ λαὸς ἐϋμμελίῳ Πριάμοιο.



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own city, and winners of such a victory as never before. Many brilliant deeds of their own, many more of their ancestors, in Macedonia and Spain and lately against Antiochus the Great, and in Italy itself, had they celebrated; but no other war had so terrified them at their own gates as the Punic wars, which ever brought peril to them by reason of the perseverance, skill, and courage, as well as the bad faith, of those enemies. They recalled what they had suffered from the Carthaginians in Sicily and Spain, and in Italy itself for sixteen years, during which Hannibal destroyed 400 towns and killed 300,000 of their men in battles alone, more than once marching up to the city and putting it in extreme peril. Pondering on these things, they were so excited over this victory that they could hardly believe it, and they asked each other over and over again whether it was really true that Carthage was destroyed. And so they gabbled the whole night, telling how the arms of the Carthaginians were got away from them and how, contrary to expectation, they supplied themselves with others; how they lost their ships and built a great fleet out of old material; how the mouth of their harbor was closed, yet they managed to open another in a few days. They talked about the height of the walls, and the size of the stones, and the fires that so often destroyed the engines. They pictured to each other the whole war, as though it were just taking place under their own eyes, suiting the action to the word; and they seemed to see Scipio on the ladders, on shipboard, at the gates, in the battles, and darting hither and thither. In this way the people of Rome passed the night.

135. The next day there were sacrifices and solemn processions to the gods by tribes, also games and spectacles of various kinds. The Senate sent ten of the noblest of their own number as deputies to arrange the affairs of Africa in conjunction with Scipio, to the advantage of Rome. They decreed that if anything was still left of Carthage, Scipio should obliterate it and that nobody should be allowed to live there. Direful threats were levelled against any who should disobey and chiefly against the rebuilding of Byrsa or Megara, but it was not forbidden to go upon the ground. The towns that had allied themselves with the enemy it was decided to destroy, to the last one. To those

<sup>Y. R.</sup>  
 608 who had aided the Romans there was an allotment of lands <sup>B. C.</sup> 146  
 won by the sword, and first of all to the Uticans was given  
 the territory of Carthage itself, extending as far as Hippo.  
 Upon all the rest a tribute was imposed, both a land tax  
 and a personal tax, upon men and women alike. It was  
 decreed that a prætor should be sent from Rome yearly to  
 govern the country. After these arrangements had been  
 carried out by the deputies, they returned to Rome. Scipio  
 did all that they directed, and he instituted sacrifices and  
 games to the gods for the victory. When all was finished,  
 he sailed for home and was awarded the most glorious tri-  
 umph that had ever been known, splendid with gold and  
 gorged with statues and votive offerings that the Cartha-  
 ginians had gathered from all parts of the world through all  
 time, the fruit of their countless victories. It was at this  
 time also that the third Macedonian triumph occurred for  
 the capture of Andriscus, surnamed Pseudophilippus, and  
 the first Grecian one, for Mummius. This was about the  
 160th Olympiad.

631 136. Some time later, in the tribunate of Gaius Gracchus, 123  
 uprisings occurred in Rome on account of scarcity, and it  
 was decided to send 6000 colonists into Africa. When  
 they were laying out the land for this purpose in the vi-  
 cinity of Carthage, all the boundary lines were torn down  
 and obliterated by wolves. Then the Senate put a stop to

708 the settlement. At a still later time it is said that Cæsar, 46  
 who afterwards became dictator for life, when he had pur-  
 sued Pompey to Egypt, and Pompey's friends from thence  
 into Africa, and was encamped near the site of Carthage,  
 was troubled by a dream in which he saw a whole army  
 weeping, and that he immediately made a memorandum  
 in writing that Carthage should be colonized. Returning to  
 Rome not long after, and while making a distribution of  
 lands to the poor, he arranged to send some of them to  
 Carthage and some to Corinth. But he was assassinated  
 shortly afterward by his enemies in the Roman Senate,  
 and his son Augustus, finding this memorandum, built the  
 present Carthage, not on the site of the old one, but very  
 near it, in order to avoid the ancient curse. I have ascer-  
 tained that he sent some 3000 colonists from Rome and  
 that the rest came from the neighboring country. And

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708 thus the Romans took Africa away from the Carthaginians, destroyed Carthage, and repeopled it again 102 years after its destruction. 46

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## APPENDIX A

BY THE TRANSLATOR

Appian's account of the defeat of Regulus by Xanthippus is altogether different from that given by Polybius. I sub-join a translation of the latter: —

“About this time a certain recruiting officer returned to Carthage who had been sent to Greece some time before, bringing a large number of soldiers, and among them a certain Xanthippus, a Lacedemonian, versed in the Spartan discipline and having corresponding experience in matters of war. When he had acquainted himself with the circumstances of the late defeat and had observed what still remained of the Carthaginian forces, and particularly their great strength in cavalry and elephants, he began to put this and that together, and showed his friends how it happened that the Carthaginians had been beaten, not by the Romans, but by the unskilfulness of their own generals. The words of Xanthippus, being rumored around among the multitude and the generals, finally reached the ears of the magistrates, who sent for him in order to get better information. When he came he explained the causes of their recent failure, and showed that if they would follow his advice and choose the level ground for their marches, camps, and battles, they might easily repair their losses and overcome the enemy. The generals accepted this advice and immediately put their forces under his training. When the advice of Xanthippus was spread through the city hopeful talk and rumors became common among the people. When he brought the forces in front of the city, and marshalled them in good order, and began to drill them by divisions, and to give the word of command according to rule, he presented such a contrast to the want of discipline of the former commanders that the rank and file applauded and demanded to be led against the enemy as soon as possible, feeling assured that no misfortune could befall them under the lead of Xanthippus. The generals, seeing the spirits of the soldiers so

wonderfully raised, addressed them in a manner befitting the occasion, and a few days later put their forces on the march. They had 12,000 foot, 4000 horse, and about 100 elephants.

"The Romans, seeing the Carthaginians marching through the open country and camping on level ground, were surprised at this unexpected movement and hastened to meet them. At the end of the first day's march they encamped at a distance of only ten stades from the enemy. The next day the Carthaginian generals held a council of war to determine what should be done. But the soldiers, despising the danger, ran together in crowds and, shouting the name of Xanthippus, demanded to be led immediately against the enemy. The generals, observing the eagerness and confidence of their men and being urged by Xanthippus not to lose this opportunity, gave orders to the army to prepare for battle and put everything in the hands of Xanthippus to do as he liked. He took command, ranged the elephants in a single line in front of the whole army, and stationed the Carthaginian phalanx a short distance behind them. He placed the bulk of the mercenaries on the right wing, but the light-armed ones were stationed at the front of each wing, together with the horse. The Romans, observing the enemy's movements, drew up their forces with equal readiness. In order to protect themselves against the onset of the elephants, which they dreaded, they threw forward a large number of skirmishers armed with javelins. Behind these were ranged the legions, and the horse were divided between the two wings. Their line of battle was somewhat shorter than usual, but deeper, being well calculated to receive the attack of the elephants, but not to withstand that of the enemy's horse, which far outnumbered their own. When both armies had been put in battle array, according to their respective plans and divisions, they stood still for a while, each one eagerly expecting the moment of attack.

"At the same time that Xanthippus gave the order for the elephants to advance and break the ranks of the enemy, and for the horse to surround and attack their wings, the Roman soldiers, clashing their arms, according to their custom, and raising a shout, rushed against their adversaries. The Roman horse were speedily put to flight on both

wings, being so much inferior in number to the Carthaginians. Their foot soldiers, stationed on the left wing in order to avoid the onset of the elephants and because they despised the enemy's mercenaries, dashed furiously against the Carthaginian right wing, broke it, and pursued them as far as their camp. The first who encountered the elephants were thrust aside by their momentum, or trampled down in heaps, and utterly destroyed, but the column, as a whole, remained unbroken for a considerable time by reason of the depth of the files. When those bringing up the rear were surrounded on all sides by the Carthaginian horse and compelled to turn and ward off this danger, and when those who had struggled through the line of elephants to the front encountered, in the rear of the beasts, the solid Carthaginian phalanx still in perfect order, and were slaughtered by them, the Romans were everywhere in difficulties. The greater part were trampled down by the enormous weight of the elephants and the rest fell in their very ranks under the javelins of the Carthaginian horse. Finally, a few took refuge in flight. As their line of retreat lay through an open country, most of these were destroyed by the enemy's cavalry and elephants. About 500, who had escaped with their general, Marcus, were, after a little, overtaken and made prisoners. About 800 of the Carthaginian mercenaries, who were opposed to the Roman left wing, were killed, and the 2000 Romans who pursued them, being thus carried out of danger, were saved. All the rest were slain except Marcus and those who were retreating with him. Those who escaped found refuge unexpectedly in the city of Aspis. The Carthaginians, having stripped the dead, returned to the city rejoicing over their victory and bringing the Roman general and the prisoners captured with him." (Polybius I., 32-34.)

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#### APPENDIX B

##### The Topography of Carthage

The following sketch of the present appearance of the site of ancient Carthage is from the pen of the Rt. Hon. James Bryce, M.P. : —

“At the extremity of a peninsula stretching eight or ten miles into the Mediterranean, and connected with the mainland by a flat isthmus, across which the sea must once have flowed, there is a ridge of hills, forming a sort of semicircle some four miles long, with its convex turned toward the sea, and rising at its highest point to about 400 feet. The sea under the hills is deep and sheltered from the northwest, the quarter whence most high winds come, while toward the land the neck of the peninsula, even now only some three miles wide, and 2500 years ago probably much narrower, makes the defence of a settlement upon the hills comparatively easy. It was at the southern extremity of this line of hills that the Tyrian founders of Carthage planted their settlement, and the last eminence or hummock toward the south became their citadel or Bozrah (for ‘Bozrah’ seems to be the true Phœnician form of the word which the Greek and Roman authors have written Byrsa). This hummock rises about 200 feet above the sea, from which its base is a quarter of a mile distant. It is steep towards the sea on the east and the south, while sloping more gently towards the west. On it and around its base the city arose. The ports were excavated beneath it to the southeast, and were easily made large enough (the ground being partly alluvial and the rock soft) to contain a large fleet and many merchant vessels. Thus the position was both convenient and strong. The citadel defended the ports, and while the citadel was surrounded by a wall of its own, the city, stretching along the line of eminences to the north, had also an enclosing wall of its own, and thus gave a double protection to the citadel on the sides (north and west) where the acclivities were gentle.

“So much is clear. The so-called ports which are now visible have been dug out afresh recently, on what is believed to be the site, or part of the site, of the ancient ports. The space they occupy is so decidedly smaller than the descriptions of ancient writers imply that some antiquaries suppose there existed another port, enclosed by moles projecting into the sea, which has since vanished. The remains of the amphitheatre have been unearthed in the lower ground at the western base of the hill. And as to the Bozrah itself, on whose summit stood in Punic times the

temple of the great god Eshmun, and where probably stood afterwards the residence of the Roman proconsul, and still later the palace of the Vandal kings, there is no question. But almost everything else is uncertain. Various spots have been suggested as the sites of the temples and churches and other public edifices mentioned by the ancient writers, but no data have yet been discovered sufficient to fix them. Even the direction of the walls and the extent of ground covered by the city are matters of controversy, so far as the evidence of the diggings goes. The ground area included in the compass of the city proper would appear to have been small (hardly more than a square mile) compared with its population, which is said to have at one time reached 700,000 or even 1,000,000. But probably there were large suburbs; and as the bulk of the population consisted of slaves, many might well be crowded into a small space.

\* \* \* \* \*

“As the position is strong for defence, with the sea environing it, as it is admirable for maritime empire, lying in the middle of the Mediterranean, with Sicily and Sardinia close at hand, half-way from the mother-land of Tyre to the outermost Phœnician settlements on the edge of the ocean, so it rivals in the nobility of its landscape Constantinople or Corinth or Gibraltar. The hill of Bozrah is not lofty, but it rises so steeply from the sea, and commands so unbroken a prospect in every direction, except northeast (where it is overtopped by Sidi Bou Said, another eminence of the same chain of hills two miles away), that the view seems boundless over both land and sea. To the east there is the vast expanse of the Mediterranean, broken twenty-five miles off by the rocky isle of Zembra. To the southeast a long line of hills rises over the ample bosom of the Gulf of Tunis, running far out to the Fair Promontory, as the ancients called it, now Cape Bon. To the northwest, beyond the flat lands which the sea once covered, rise the gentler ridges where stand the lonely ruins of Utica, the elder sister of Carthage, the spot where Cato's death left Julius Cæsar master of all the Roman world except Spain. To the south and southwest three magnificent mountain groups successively arrest the eye and carry it far into the interior

of Africa. Nearest, with its foot washed by the sea, is the double-peaked summit of Bou Kornein, the mountain of the two-horned Baal (Saturnus Baalcaranensis, as the Romans called him), where the ruins of his temple have been recently discovered. Further to the south is Jebel Resas, the Lead Mountain, among whose gorges the mercenary troops that revolted from Carthage, and brought her almost to destruction after the First Punic war, were hemmed in and destroyed by famine and the sword. Furthest of all, and highest, is the magnificent pinnacle of Zaghwan, 'Mons Zeugitanus,' whence the Zeugitanian province took its name. In this peak rise the copious springs which, led by an aqueduct more than eighty miles in length, supplied Carthage with the purest water, and from its craggy top the view extends far away to the south over plains once rich, but now mostly waste and desolate, almost to the verge of the Sahara. Immediately beneath the hill of Carthage is the narrow strip of land that divides the lagoon of Tunis from the sea, with Goletta, long a stronghold of the Moorish pirates, stormed by the Emperor Charles V., and again (after his troops had been withdrawn) the arsenal and fortress of the Beys, rising upon it at the point where a narrow channel gives access from the sea to the lagoon. And at the head of the lagoon, its smooth surface ruffled only by the flocks of flamingoes that disport themselves in the sunshine, rise the minarets and cupolas of Tunis, glittering white across the blue waters, with line after line of hill seen behind it, growing dimmer and more delicate in their soft blue-gray tints till they sink beneath the western horizon on the borders of Numidia. As there are few more exquisite views in the world, so there are few which embrace a region more full of stirring and terrible events. For 1600 years, down to the destruction of Carthage by the Arabs in A.D. 697 a fierce and strenuous life ebbed and flowed incessantly round this hill and on the plain that lies between it and Tunis. For 1200 years the hill has stood silent and melancholy as it stands now, and, in the words of Tasso,

“Low lies proud Carthage; and the silent shore  
Keeps of her lordly ruins scarce a trace.”



# BOOK VIII—PART II—EXCERPTA

## NUMIDIAN AFFAIRS

### I. FROM THE VATICAN MSS. OF CARDINAL MAI

<sup>v. r.</sup>  
644 BOMILCAR being under accusation fled before his trial, <sup>b. c.</sup> 110  
and with him Jugurtha, who uttered that famous saying  
about bribetakers, that "the whole city of Rome could be  
bought if a purchaser could be found for it."

### II. FROM PEIRESC

645 Metellus went back to the African province, where he <sup>109</sup>  
was accused by the soldiers of slothfulness toward the  
enemy and of cruelty toward his own men, because he  
punished offenders severely.

### III. FROM THE SAME

646 Metellus put the whole senate of Vacca to death because <sup>108</sup>  
they had betrayed the Roman garrison to Jugurtha, and  
with them, also, Turpilius, the prefect of the guard, a Ro-  
man citizen, who was under suspicion of being in league  
with the enemy. After Jugurtha had delivered up to Metel-  
lus certain Thracian and Ligurian deserters, the latter cut  
off the hands of some, and others he buried in the earth up  
to their stomachs, and after transfixing them with arrows  
and darts set fire to them while they were still alive.

### IV. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

647 When Marius arrived at Cirta messengers came to him <sup>107</sup>  
from Bocchus asking that he would send somebody to hold

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647

a conference with him. He accordingly sent Aulus Manlius, his lieutenant, and Cornelius Sulla, his quæstor. To them Bocchus said that he fought against the Romans on account of the acts of Marius, who had taken from him the territory which he himself had taken from Jugurtha. To this complaint of Bocchus, Manlius replied that the Romans had taken this territory from Syphax by the law of war, and had made a present of it to Masinissa, and that such gifts were made by the Romans to be kept by those who received them during the pleasure of the Senate and people of Rome. Nor did the Romans take back their gifts without reason. Masinissa was dead, and Jugurtha, who had murdered his grandchildren, was at war with the Romans. "It is not right," he said, "that an enemy should keep the gift that we made to a friend, nor should you think that you can take from Jugurtha property that belongs to the Romans." These were the words of Manlius concerning the territory in question.

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107

## V. FROM THE SAME

Bocchus sent another embassy who were to solicit peace from Marius and urge Sulla to assist them in the negotiation. These ambassadors were despoiled by robbers on the road, but Sulla received them kindly and entertained them until Marius returned from Gætulia. Marius advised them to urge Bocchus to consult with Sulla as to all his affairs. Accordingly, when Bocchus was inclined to betray Jugurtha he sent messengers around to the neighboring Ethiopians (who extend from eastern Ethiopia westward to the Mauritanian Mount Atlas) under pretence of raising a new army, and then asked Marius to send Sulla to him for a conference, and Marius did so. In this way Bocchus himself, and his friend Magdalses, and a certain freedman of Carthage, named Cornelius, deceived Apsar, the friend of Jugurtha, who had been left in Bocchus' camp to keep watch on his doings.

## BOOK IX — EXCERPTA

### MACEDONIAN AFFAIRS

#### I. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

<sup>v.R.</sup> THE Romans paid no attention to Philip, the Macedonian, when he began war against them. They were so busy about other things that they did not even think of him, for Italy was still scourged by Hannibal, the Carthaginian general, and they were at war in Africa, Carthage, and Spain, and were restoring order in Sicily. Philip himself, <sup>215</sup> moved by a desire of enlarging his dominions, although he had suffered nothing whatever at the hands of the Romans, sent an embassy, the chief of which was Xenophanes, to Hannibal in Italy, proposing to aid him in Italy if he would promise to assist him in the subjugation of Greece. Hannibal agreed to this arrangement and took an oath to support it, and sent an embassy in return to receive the oath of Philip. A Roman trireme intercepted the ambassadors of both on their return and carried them to Rome. Thereupon Philip in his anger attacked Corcyra, which was in alliance with Rome.

#### II. FROM THE VATICAN MSS. OF CARDINAL MAI

The Sibylline books induced the Romans to make war against Philip by these lines: "The Macedonians boast their descent from Argive kings. Philip will be the arbiter of weal or woe to you. The elder of that name shall give rulers to cities and peoples, but the younger shall lose every honor, and shall die the subject of a western race."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ἀρχοῦντες βασιλεῦσι Μακηδόνες Ἀργεᾶδῃσιν,  
ἡμῖν κοιρανέων ἀγαθὸν καὶ πῆμα Φίλιππος.  
"Ἦτοι ὁ μὲν πρότερος πόλεσιν λαοῖσι τ' ἀνακτας  
θήσει, ὁ δ' ὀπλότερος τιμὴν ἀπὸ πᾶσαν ὀλέσσει,  
δημηθεὶς δ' ἐσπερίοισιν ὑπ' ἀνδράσιν ἐνθάδ' ὀλεῖται.

## III. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

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546

1. Ambassadors from Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and with them others from Chios and Mitylene, and from Amynder, king of the Athamanes, assembled at two different times at the place where the Ætoliens were accustomed to call their cities together for consultation, to compose the differences between the Romans, the Ætoliens, and Philip. But as Sulpicius said that it was not in his power to conclude peace, and wrote privately to the Senate that it was for the advantage of the Romans that the Ætoliens should continue the war against Philip, the Senate forbade the treaty and sent 10,000 foot and 1000 horse to assist the Ætoliens. With their help the Ætoliens took Ambracia, which Philip recovered, not long afterward, on their departure. Again the ambassadors assembled and said that it was very evident that Philip and the Ætoliens, by their differences, were subjecting the Greeks to servitude to the Romans, because they were accustoming the latter to make frequent attempts upon Greece. When Sulpicius rose to reply to them the crowd would not hear him, but shouted that the ambassadors had told the truth.
- 549 2. Finally the Ætoliens took the initiative and made peace with Philip by themselves without the Romans, and messengers were sent to Rome by Philip himself and by the commander of the Roman forces in order to come to an agreement. Peace was made between them on the condition that neither party should do any injury to the friends of the other. This was the result of the first trial of strength between them, and neither of them believed that the treaty would be lasting, since it was not based on goodwill.

## IV. FROM THE SAME

- 554 Not long afterward Philip, having ordered a fleet to be prepared by his maritime subjects, took Samos and Chios and devastated a part of the territory of King Attalus. He even attempted Pergamus itself, not sparing temples or sepulchres. He also ravaged Peræa, which belonged to the Rhodians, who had been promoters of the treaty of peace.

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554

With another part of his army he ravaged Attica and laid siege to Athens, as though none of these countries concerned the Romans. It was reported also that a league had been made between Philip and Antiochus, king of Syria, to the effect that Philip should help Antiochus to conquer Egypt and Cyprus, of which Ptolemy IV., surnamed Philopator,<sup>1</sup> who was still a boy, was the ruler; and that Antiochus should help Philip to gain Cyrene, the Cyclades islands, and Ionia. This rumor, so disquieting to all, the Rhodians communicated to Rome. After the Rhodians, ambassadors of Athens came complaining of the siege instituted by Philip. The Ætoliens also had repented of their treaty, and they complained of Philip's bad faith toward them and asked to be inscribed again as allies. The Romans reproached the Ætoliens for their recent defection, but they sent ambassadors to the kings ordering Antiochus not to invade Egypt, and Philip not to molest the Rhodians, or the Athenians, or Attalus, or any other ally of theirs. To them Philip made answer that it would be well if the Romans would abide by the treaty of peace they had entered into with him. Thus was the treaty dissolved and a Roman army hastened to Greece, Publius commanding the land forces and Lucius the fleet.

B. C.

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#### V. FROM THE VATICAN MSS. OF CARDINAL MAI

556 Philip, king of Macedon, had a conference with Flamininus, which had been brought about by the ambassadors of the Epirots. When Flamininus ordered Philip to retire to Greece, not on account of the Romans, but of the Greek cities themselves and to make good the damage he had done to the aforesaid cities. . . .

#### VI. FROM SUIDAS

A shepherd promised to guide an army well equipped for the climb by a mountain path in three days' time.

<sup>1</sup> This should be Ptolemy V., surnamed Epiphanes, the son of Ptolemy Philopator. The latter died in the year 551 (B.C. 203). The error is repeated in Syr. 1, 2, and 4 (Schweighäuser, vol. iii. pp. 507 and 529).

## VII. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

Y.R.  
556

Lucius Quintius [Flamininus]<sup>1</sup> sent envoys to the Achæan League to persuade them, together with the Athenians and Rhodians, to abandon Philip and join the Romans, and to ask them to furnish aid as allies. But they, being troubled by a civil war and also by one with Nabis, the neighboring tyrant of Lacedæmon, were divided in mind and hesitated. The greater part of them preferred the alliance of Philip and sided against the Romans on account of certain outrages against Greece committed by Sulpicius, the former commander. When the Roman faction urged their views with vehemence, most of their opponents left the assembly in disgust, and the remainder, being forced to yield by the smallness of their number, entered into an alliance with Lucius and followed him at once to the siege of Corinth, bringing their engines with them.

B.C.  
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## VIII. FROM THE SAME

557 Flamininus came into conference with Philip a second time at the Malian gulf. When the Rhodians, the Ætoli-<sup>197</sup>ans, and Amynder, king of the Athamanes, made their complaints against Philip, Flamininus ordered him to remove his garrison from Phocis, and required both parties to send ambassadors to Rome. When this was done the Greeks asked the Roman Senate to require Philip to remove from their country the three garrisons which he called the fetters of Greece: the one at Chalcis, which threatened the Bœotians, the Eubœans, and the Locrians; the one at Corinth, which closed the door of the Peloponnesus; and the third at Demetrias, which lay, as it were, in ambush for the Ætoli-ans and the Magnesians. The Senate asked Philip's ambassadors what the king's views were respecting the garrisons. When they answered that they did not know, the Senate said that Flamininus should decide the question and do what he considered just. So the ambassadors took

<sup>1</sup> L. Quintius Flamininus was a brother of the consul Titus Quintius Flamininus, who conducted the war against Philip and defeated him at Cynocephalæ in the year 557 (B.C. 197).

<sup>Y.R.</sup>  
557 their departure from Rome. Flamininus and Philip, being <sup>B.C.</sup> 197  
unable to come to any agreement, resumed hostilities.

### IX. FROM THE SAME

1. Philip, being defeated again, sent a herald to Flamininus to sue for peace, and again Flamininus granted him a conference, whereat the Ætoliens were greatly displeased and accused him of being bribed by the king, and complained of his sudden change of mind as to all these matters. But he thought that it would not be to the advantage of the Romans, or of the Greeks, that Philip should be deposed and the Ætolian power made supreme. Perhaps, also, the unexpected greatness of the victory made him satisfied. Having agreed upon a place where Philip should come, he directed the allies by cities to deliver their opinions. Some of them were disposed to be moderate, viewing suspiciously the mysteries of fortune as evinced in the calamities of Philip, and considering this disaster that had befallen him due not so much to weakness as to bad luck. But Alexander, the presiding officer of the Ætoliens, said, "Flamininus cannot be ignorant that this victory will be of no advantage to the Romans or the Greeks unless the kingdom of Philip is overthrown."

2. Flamininus replied, "Alexander cannot be ignorant of the custom of the Romans, who never destroy an enemy at once, but have spared many offenders, as recently the Carthaginians, restoring their property to them and making allies of those who had done them wrong. You forget also that there are many barbarous tribes on the border of Macedonia, who would make easy incursions into Greece if the Macedonian kings were taken away. Wherefore, I think that the Macedonian government should be left to protect you against the barbarians, but Philip must retire from those Greek places that he has hitherto refused to give up, and must pay the Romans 200 talents for the expenses of the war, and give hostages of the most noble families, including his own son, Demetrius. Until the Senate ratifies these conditions there shall be an armistice of four months."

558 3. Philip accepted all these conditions, and the Senate, 196

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558B. C.  
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when it learned the facts, ratified the peace, but considered the terms granted by Flamininus too lenient, and, accordingly, decreed that all the Greek cities that had been under Philip's rule should be free, and that he should withdraw his garrisons from them before the next celebration of the Isthmian games; that he should deliver to Flamininus all his ships, except one with six benches of oars and five small ones with decks; that he should pay the Romans 500 talents of silver down, and remit to Rome 500 more in ten years, in annual instalments; and that he should surrender all prisoners and deserters in his hands. These conditions were added by the Senate and Philip accepted them all, by which it was made plain that those named by Flamininus were much too lenient. They sent to him as counsellors ten men (as was customary at the end of a war), with whose aid he should regulate the new acquisitions.

4. When he had arranged these things with them he went to the Isthmian games, and, the stadium being full of people, he commanded silence by trumpet and directed the herald to make this proclamation, "The Roman people and Senate, and Flamininus, their general, having vanquished the Macedonians and Philip, their king, order that Greece shall be free from foreign garrisons, not subject to tribute, and shall live under her own customs and laws." Thereupon there was great shouting and rejoicing and a scene of rapturous tumult; and groups here and there called the herald back in order that he might repeat his words for them. They threw crowns and fillets upon the general and voted statues for him in their cities. They sent ambassadors with golden crowns to the Capitol at Rome to express their gratitude, and inscribed themselves as allies of the Roman people. Such was the end of the second war between the Romans and Philip.

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5. Not long afterward Philip lent aid in Greece to the Romans in their war against King Antiochus. As they were moving against Antiochus in Asia, passing through Thrace and Macedonia by a difficult road, he escorted them with his own troops, supplied them with food and money, repaired the roads, bridged the unfordable streams, and dispersed the hostile Thracians, until he had conducted them to the Hellespont. In return for these favors the



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564 Senate released his son Demetrius, who had been held by them as a hostage, and remitted the payments of money still due from him. But these Thracians fell upon the Romans when they were returning from their victory over Antiochus, when Philip was no longer with them, carried off booty and killed many — by which it was plainly shown how great a service Philip had rendered them when they were going.

B. C.

190

571 6. That war being ended, many of the Greeks charged Philip with doing or omitting various things, in disregard of the orders given by Flamininus when he settled the affairs of Greece. To answer these charges Demetrius went as an envoy to Rome in his father's behalf, the Romans being well pleased with him aforesaid, when he had been a hostage, and Flamininus strongly recommending him to the Senate. As he was a very young man and somewhat flustered, they directed him to read his father's memorandum in which were written down, one by one, the things already done and those yet to be done, although decided upon contrary to justice; for, indeed, his unjust acts were prominent in the thought of many. Nevertheless, the Senate, having regard to his late zeal in the matter of Antiochus, said that it would pardon him, but added that it did so on account of Demetrius. Philip, having been confessedly most useful to them in the war with Antiochus, when he might have done them the greatest damage if he had cooperated with Antiochus, as the latter asked him to, expecting much on this account and now seeing himself discredited and accused, and considered worthy of pardon rather than of gratitude, and even this merely on account of Demetrius, was indignant and angry, but concealed his feelings for a time. Afterwards, in a certain arbitration before the Romans, they transferred much of his territory to Eumenes, seeking all the time to weaken him. Then, at once, he began secretly preparing for war.

#### X. FROM SUIDAS

Philip utterly destroyed all forces that sailed against him, lest the Romans should say that the Macedonian power was weakening.

## XI. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

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582

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1. The Romans were suspicious of Perseus (the son of Philip) on account of his rapidly growing power, and they were especially disturbed by his nearness to the Greeks and their friendship for him, due to hatred of the Romans, which the Roman generals had caused. Afterward the ambassadors, who were sent to the Bastarnæ, reported that they had observed that Macedonia was strongly fortified and had abundant war material, and that its young men were well drilled; and these things also disturbed the Romans. When Perseus perceived this he sent other ambassadors to allay the suspicion. At this time also Eumenes, king of that part of Asia lying about Pergamus, fearing Perseus on account of his own former enmity to Philip, came to Rome and accused him publicly before the Senate, saying that he had always been hostile to the Romans; that he had killed his brother for being friendly to them; that he had aided Philip in collecting material for war against them, which material, when he became king, he did not desist from collecting, but added much more to it; that he was conciliating the Greeks in every possible way and furnishing military aid to the Byzantines, the Ætolians, and the Bœotians; that he had possessed himself of the great stronghold of Thrace and had stirred up dissensions among the Thessalians and the Perrhæbi when they wanted to send an embassy to Rome.

2. "And of your two friends and allies," he said, "he drove Abrupolis out of his kingdom and conspired to kill Arthetaurus, the Illyrian chief, and gave shelter to his murderers." Eumenes also slandered him on account of his marriages, both of which were with royal families, and for his bridal processions escorted by the whole fleet of Rhodes. He even made his industry a crime and his sobriety of life (being so young), and his being beloved and praised by so many in so short a time. Of the things that could excite their jealousy, envy, and fear even more strongly than direct accusations, Eumenes omitted nothing, and he urged the Senate to beware of a youthful enemy so highly esteemed and so near to them.

3. The Senate, in fact, did not like to have on their

V. R.  
58a flank a sober-minded, laborious, and popular king, an hereditary enemy to themselves, attaining eminence so suddenly. So, making a pretended accusation of the things alleged by Eumenes, they decided to make war against Perseus, but kept the matter a secret among themselves. When Harpalus, who had been sent by Perseus to answer the charge of Eumenes, and a certain ambassador of the Rhodians, desired to discuss the matter in the presence of Eumenes, who was still there, they were not admitted; but after his departure they were received. These, being angry at such treatment, and using too much freedom of speech, exasperated still more the Romans, who were already meditating war against Perseus and the Rhodians. Many senators, however, blamed Eumenes for causing so great a war on account of his own private grudges and fears, and the Rhodians refused to receive only his among all the representatives of the kings sent to their festival of the sun.

4. When Eumenes was returning to Asia he went up from Cirrha to Delphi to sacrifice, and there four men, hiding behind a wall, made an attempt upon his life. Other causes besides this were advanced by the Romans for a war against Perseus, although it had not yet been decreed, and ambassadors were sent to the allied kings, Eumenes, Antiochus, Ariarathes, Masinissa, and Ptolemy of Egypt, also to Greece, Thessaly, Epirus, Acarnania, and to such of the islands as they could perhaps draw to their side. This specially troubled the Greeks, some because fond of Perseus as a Philhellene, and some because compelled to enter into agreement with the Romans.

583 5. When Perseus learned these facts he sent other ambassadors to Rome, who said that the king was surprised and wished to know for what reason they had abandoned the agreement and sent around legates against himself, their ally. If they were offended at anything, they ought to discuss the matter first. The Senate then accused him of the things that Eumenes had told them, and also of what Eumenes had suffered, and especially that Perseus had taken possession of Thrace and had collected an army and war material, which were not the doings of one desiring peace. Again he sent ambassadors who, deeply grieved, spoke as follows in the senate-chamber: "To those who are seeking

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an excuse for war, O Romans, anything will serve for a pretext, but if you have respect for treaties, — you who profess so much regard for them, — what have you suffered at the hands of Perseus that you should bring war against him? It cannot be because he has an army and war material. He does not hold them against you, nor do you prohibit other kings from having them, nor is it wrong that he should take precautions against those under his rule, and against his neighbors, and foreigners who might have designs against him. But to you, Romans, he sent ambassadors to confirm the peace and only recently renewed the treaty.

6. “But, you say, he drove Abrupolis out of his kingdom. Yes, in self-defence, for he had invaded our territory. This fact Perseus himself explained to you, and afterward you renewed the treaty with him, as Eumenes had not yet slandered him. The affair of Abrupolis antedates the treaty and seemed to you just, when you ratified it. You say that he made war on the Dolopians, but they were his own subjects. It is hard if he is to be obliged to give an account to you of what he does with his own. He gives it nevertheless, being moved by his high regard for you and for his own reputation. The Dolopians put their governor to death with torture, and Perseus asks what you would have done to any of your subjects who had been guilty of such a crime. But the slayers of Arthetaurus lived on in Macedonia! Yes, by the common law of mankind, the same under which you give asylum to fugitives from other countries. But when Perseus learned that you considered this a crime he forbade them his kingdom entirely.

7. “He gave aid to the Byzantines, the Ætolians, and the Bœotians, not against you, but against others. Of these things our ambassadors advised you beforehand, and you did not object until Eumenes uttered his slander against us, which you did not allow our ambassadors to answer in his presence. But you accuse Perseus of the plot against him at Delphi. How many Greeks, how many barbarians, have sent ambassadors to you to complain against Eumenes, to all of whom he is an enemy because so base a man! As for Erennius of Brundisium, who would believe that Perseus would choose a Roman citizen, your friend and patron, to administer poison to the Senate, as though he could destroy

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the Senate by means of him, or by destroying some of them render the others more favorable to himself? Erennius has lied to those who are inciting you to war, furnishing them a plausible pretext. Eumenes, moved by hatred, envy, and fear, does not scruple to make it a crime on the part of Perseus that he is liked by so many people, that he is a Philhellene, and that he leads the life of a temperate ruler, free from drunkenness and luxury. And you endure to listen to such stuff from this accuser!

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8. "Beware lest his slanders multiply against yourselves, if you cannot endure temperate, honest, and industrious neighbors. Perseus challenges Erennius and Eumenes and anybody else to scrutiny and trial before you. He reminds you of his father's zeal and assistance to you against Antiochus the Great. You realized it very well at the time; it would be base to forget it now. He invokes the treaties that you made with his father and with himself, and he does not hesitate to exhort you to fear the gods by whom you swore, and not to bring an unjust war against your allies and not to make nearness, sobriety, and preparation causes of complaint. It is not worthy of you to be stirred by envy and fear like Eumenes. On the contrary, it will be the part of wisdom for you to spare neighbors who are diligent and, as Eumenes says, are well prepared!"

9. When the ambassadors had thus spoken the Senate gave them no answer, but made a public declaration of war, and the consul ordered the ambassadors to depart from Rome the same day and from Italy within thirty days. The same orders were proclaimed to all Macedonian residents. Consternation mingled with anger followed this action of the Senate, that, on a few hours' notice, so many people were compelled to depart together, who were not able to find animals in so short a time, or to carry all their goods themselves. Some, in their confusion, could not reach a lodging-place, but passed the night in the middle of the roads. Others threw themselves on the ground at the city gates with their wives and children. Everything happened that was likely to follow such an unexpected decree, for it was unexpected to them on account of the pending negotiation.

## XII. FROM THE SAME

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After his victory Perseus, either to make sport of Crassus, and by way of joke, or to test his present state of mind, or fearing the power and resources of the Romans, or for some other reason, sent messengers to him to treat for peace, and promised to make many concessions which his father, Philip, had refused. In this promise he seemed to be rather joking with him and testing him. But Crassus replied that it would not be worthy of the dignity of the Roman people to come to terms with him unless he should surrender Macedonia and himself to them. Being ashamed that the Romans were the first to retreat, Crassus called an assembly, in which he praised the Thessalians for their brave conduct in the catastrophe, and falsely accused the Ætolians and the other Greeks of being the first to fly; and these men he sent to Rome.

## XIII. FROM SUIDAS

Both armies employed the rest of the summer in collecting corn, Perseus threshing in the fields and the Romans in their camp.

## XIV. FROM THE SAME

He (Q. Marcius) was foremost in labor, although sixty years of age and very corpulent.

## XV. FROM THE SAME

Then somebody ran to Perseus, while he was refreshing himself with a bath, and told him [that the enemy was approaching]. He sprang out of the water, exclaiming that he had been captured before the battle.

## XVI. FROM PEIRESC

585 Perseus, having already gradually plucked up courage 169 after his flight, wickedly put to death Nicias and Androni-

Y R.  
585B.C.  
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cus, whom he had sent with orders to throw his money into the sea and to burn his ships; because after the ships and money had been saved he knew that they were witnesses of his disgraceful panic and might tell others of it. And from that time, by a sudden change, he became cruel and reckless toward everybody. Nor did he show any soundness or wisdom of judgment thereafter, but he, who had before been most persuasive in council and shrewd in calculation and courageous in battle, barring his inexperience, when fortune began to change became suddenly and unaccountably timid and imprudent, as well as changeable and maladroit in all things. Thus we see many who lose their usual discretion when reverses come.

#### XVII. FROM "THE EMBASSIES"

The Rhodians sent ambassadors to Marcius to congratulate him on the state of affairs in his war with Perseus. Marcius advised the ambassadors to persuade the Rhodians to send legates to Rome to bring about peace between the Romans and Perseus. When the Rhodians heard these things they changed their minds, thinking that the affairs of Perseus were not in such bad shape, for they could not imagine that Marcius would have given this advice without the concurrence of the Romans. But he did this and many other things on his own motion, by reason of cowardice. The Rhodians nevertheless sent ambassadors to Rome and others to Marcius.

#### XVIII. FROM PEIRESC

586 1. Genthius, king of a tribe of Illyrians bordering on 168 Macedonia, having formed an alliance with Perseus in consideration of 300 talents, of which he had received a part down, made an attack upon Roman Illyria, and when the Romans sent Perpenna and Petilius as ambassadors to inquire about it, he put them in chains. When Perseus learned this he decided not to pay the rest of the money, thinking that now the Romans would make war on him for this outrage. He also sent legates to the Getæ on the other side of the

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586B. C.  
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Danube, and he offered money to Eumenes if he would come over to his side, or negotiate for him a peace with Rome, or help neither party in the contest. He hoped either that Eumenes would do some one of these things, which could not be kept secret from the Romans, or that he should cause Eumenes to be suspected by the very attempt. Eumenes refused to come over to his side, and he demanded 1500 talents for negotiating a peace, or 1000 for remaining neutral. But now Perseus, learning that 10,000 foot and as many horse were coming to him as mercenaries from the Getæ, began forthwith to despise Eumenes, and said that he would pay nothing for his neutrality, for that would be a disgrace to both of them, but for negotiating a peace he would not fail to pay, and would deposit the money in Samothrace until the treaty was concluded, so fickle and penurious in all matters had he become in his infatuation. Nevertheless, one of the things that he hoped for took place: Eumenes fell under suspicion at Rome.

2. When the Getæ had crossed the Danube, it was claimed that there was due to Clælius, their leader, 1000 gold staters and, also, ten to each horseman and five to each foot-soldier, the whole amounting to a little over 150,000 pieces of gold. Perseus sent messengers to them bearing military cloaks, gold necklaces, and horses for the officers, and 10,000 staters. When he was not far from their camp he sent for Clælius. The latter asked the messengers whether they had brought the gold, and when he learned that they had not, he ordered them to go back to Perseus. When Perseus learned this, he was again misled by his evil genius, and complained among his friends of the fickleness and bad faith of the Getæ, and pretended to be afraid to receive 20,000 of them in his camp. He said that he could hardly subdue 10,000 of them if they should rebel.

3. While saying these things to his friends, he offered other fictions to the Getæ and asked for half of their force, promising to give them the gold that he had on hand — so inconsistent was he, and so anxious about the money that he had ordered to be thrown into the sea a little while before. Clælius, seeing the messengers returning, asked in a loud voice whether they had brought the gold, and when they wanted to talk about something else he ordered them



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to speak of the gold first. When he learned that they did not have it, he led his army home without waiting to hear another word from them. Thus Perseus deprived himself of this powerful force of auxiliaries, which had opportunely arrived. He was so foolish, also, that while wintering with a large army at Phila he made no incursion into Thessaly, which furnished supplies to the Romans, but sent a force to Ionia to prevent the bringing of supplies to them from that quarter.

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## XIX. FROM THE SAME

Some divinity was jealous of the prosperity of Paulus when he had reached such a pinnacle of fortune. Of his four sons he gave the two elder, Maximus and Scipio, for adoption into other families. The two younger ones died, one of them three days before his triumph and the other five days after it. Paulus alluded to this among other things in his address to the people. When he came to the forum to give an account of his doings, according to the custom of generals, he said, "I sailed from Brundisium to Corcyra in one day. Five days I was on the road from Corcyra to Delphi, where I sacrificed to the god. In five days more I arrived in Thessaly and took command of the army. Fifteen days later I overthrew Perseus and conquered Macedonia. All these strokes of good fortune coming so rapidly led me to fear the approach of some calamity to the army or to you. When the army was made safe, I feared for you on account of the invidiousness of fate. Now that the calamity falls upon me, in the sudden loss of my two sons, I am the most unfortunate of men for myself, but free from anxiety as to you." Having spoken thus, Paulus became the object of universal admiration, and commiseration on account of his children; and he died not long after.

# BOOK X

## THE ILLYRIAN WARS

### CHAPTER I

Origin of the Illyrians—The Vengeance of Apollo—First Contact with the Romans

1. THE Greeks call those people Illyrians who occupy the region beyond Macedonia and Thrace from Chaonia and Thesprotia to the river Ister (Danube). This is the length of the country. Its breadth is from Macedonia and the mountains of Thrace to Pannonia and the Adriatic and the foot-hills of the Alps. Its breadth is five days' journey and its length thirty—so the Greek writers say. The Romans measured the country and found its length to be upward of 6000 stades and its width about 1200.

2. They say that the country received its name from Illyrius, the son of Polyphemus; for the Cyclops Polyphemus and his wife, Galatea, had three sons, Celtus, Illyrius, and Galas, all of whom migrated from Sicily; and the nations called Celts, Illyrians, and Galatians took their origin from them. Among the many myths prevailing among many peoples this seems to me the most plausible. Illyrius had six sons, Encheleus, Autarieus, Dardanus, Mædus, Taulas, and Perrhæbus, also daughters, Partho, Daortho, Dassaro, and others, from whom sprang the Taulantii, the Perrhæbi, the Enchelees, the Autarienses, the Dardani, the Partheni, the Dassaretii, and the Darsii. Autarieus had a son Pannonius, or Pæon, and the latter had sons, Scordiscus and Triballus, from whom nations bearing similar names were derived. But I will leave these matters to the archæologists.

3. The Illyrian tribes are many, as is natural in so ex-

tensive a country; and celebrated even now are the names of the Scordisci and the Triballi, who inhabited a wide region and destroyed each other by wars to such a degree that the remnant of the Triballi took refuge with the Getæ on the other side of the Danube, and, though flourishing until the time of Philip and Alexander, is now extinct and its name scarcely known in the regions once inhabited by it. The Scordisci, having been reduced to extreme weakness in the same way, and having suffered much at a later period in war with the Romans, took refuge in the islands of the same river. In the course of time some of them returned and settled on the confines of Pannonia, and thus it happens that a tribe of the Scordisci still remains in Pannonia. In like manner the Ardiæi, who were distinguished for their maritime power, were finally destroyed by the Autarienses, whose land forces were stronger, but whom they had often defeated. The Liburni, another Illyrian tribe, were next to the Ardiæi as a nautical people. These committed piracy in the Adriatic Sea and islands with their light, fast-sailing pinnaces, from which circumstance the Romans to this day call their own light, swift biremes *liburnicas*.

4. The Autarienses were overtaken with destruction by the vengeance of Apollo. Having joined Molostimus and the Celtic people called Cimbri in an expedition against the temple of Delphi, the greater part of them were destroyed by storm, hurricane, and lightning just before the sacrilege was committed. Upon those who returned home there came a countless number of frogs, which filled the streams and polluted the water. The noxious vapors rising from the ground caused a plague among the Illyrians which was especially fatal to the Autarienses. At last they fled from their homes, and as the plague still clung to them (and for fear of it nobody would receive them), they came, after a journey of twenty-three days, to a marshy and uninhabited district of the Getæ, where they settled near the Bastarnæ. The god visited the Celts with an earthquake and overthrew their cities, and did not abate the calamity until these also fled from their abodes and made an incursion into Illyria among their fellow-culprits, who had been weakened by the plague. While robbing the Illyrians they

caught the plague and again took to flight and plundered their way to the Pyrenees. When they were returning to the east the Romans, mindful of their former encounters with the Celts, and fearful lest they should cross the Alps and invade Italy, sent against them both consuls, who were annihilated with the whole army. This calamity to the Romans brought great dread of the Celts upon all Italy until Gaius Marius, who had lately triumphed over the Numidians and Mauritanians, was chosen commander and defeated the Cimbri repeatedly with great slaughter, as I have related in my Celtic history. Being reduced to extreme weakness, and for that reason excluded from every land, they returned home, inflicting and suffering many injuries on the way.

5. Such was the punishment which the god visited upon the Illyrians and the Celts for their impiety. But they did not desist from temple-robbing, for again, in conjunction with the Celts, certain Illyrian tribes, especially the Scordisci, the Mædi, and the Dardani again invaded Macedonia and Greece together, and plundered many temples, including that of Dephi, but losing many men this time also. The Romans, thirty-two years after their first encounter with the Celts, having fought with them at intervals since that time, now, under the leadership of Lucius Scipio, made war against the Illyrians, on account of this temple-robbing, as they [the Romans] now held sway over the Greeks and the Macedonians. It is said that the neighboring tribes, remembering the calamity that befell all the Illyrians on account of the crime of the Autarienses, would not give aid to the temple-robbers, but abandoned them to Scipio, who destroyed the greater part of the Scordisci, the remainder fleeing to the Danube and settling in the islands of that river. He made peace with the Mædi and Dardani, accepting from them part of the gold belonging to the temple. One of the Roman writers says that this was the chief cause of the numerous civil wars of the Romans after Lucius Scipio's time till the establishment of the empire. So much by way of preface concerning the peoples whom the Greeks called Illyrians.

6. These peoples, and also the Pannonians, the Rhæretians, the Noricans, the Mysians of Europe, and the other

<sup>Y.R.</sup> neighboring tribes who inhabited the right bank of the Danube, the Romans distinguished from one another just as the various Greek peoples are distinguished from each other, and they call each by its own name, but they consider the whole of Illyria as embraced under a common designation. Whence this idea took its start I have not been able to find out, but it continues to this day, for they farm the tax of all the nations from the source of the Danube to the Euxine Sea under one head, and call it the Illyrian tax. Why the Romans subjugated them, and what were the real causes or pretexts of the wars, I acknowledged, when writing of Crete, that I had not discovered, and I exhorted those who were able to tell more, to do so. I shall write down only what I know. <sup>B.C.</sup>

## CHAPTER II

First Illyrian War — Second Illyrian War — War with Genthius — War with the Dalmatians

<sup>524</sup> 7. Agron was king of that part of Illyria which borders <sup>230</sup> the Adriatic Sea, over which sea Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, and his successors held sway. Agron captured a part of Epirus and also Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Pharus in succession, where he established garrisons. When he threatened the rest of the Adriatic with his fleet, the isle of Issa implored the aid of the Romans. The latter sent ambassadors to accompany the Issii and to ascertain what offences Agron imputed to them. The Illyrian vessels attacked the ambassadors on their voyage and slew Cleemporus, the envoy of Issa, and the Roman Coruncanus; the remainder escaped <sup>525</sup> by flight. Thereupon the Romans invaded Illyria by land <sup>229</sup> and sea. Agron, in the meantime, had died, leaving an infant son named Pinnes, having given the guardianship and regency to his wife, although she was not the child's mother. Demetrius, who was Agron's governor of Pharus and who held Corcyra also, surrendered both places to the invading Romans by treachery. The latter then entered into an alliance with Epidamnus and went to the assistance of the Issii and of the Epidamnians, who were besieged by the Illyrians.

V. R. 525 The latter raised the siege and fled, and one of their tribes, 229  
 called the Atintani, went over to the Romans. After these  
 526 events the widow of Agron sent ambassadors to Rome to 228  
 surrender the prisoners and deserters into their hands. She  
 begged pardon also for what had been done, not by herself,  
 but by Agron. They received for answer that Corcyra,  
 Pharus, Issa, Epidamnus, and the Illyrian Atintani were  
 already Roman subjects, that Pinnes might have the re-  
 mainder of Agron's kingdom and be a friend of the Roman  
 people if he would keep hands off the aforesaid territory,  
 and agree not to sail beyond Lissus nor to keep more than  
 two Illyrian pinnaces, both to be unarmed. The woman  
 accepted all these conditions.

8. This was the first conflict and treaty between the  
 Romans and the Illyrians. Thereupon the Romans made  
 Corcyra and Apollonia free. To Demetrius they gave cer-  
 tain castles as a reward for his treason to his own people,  
 adding the express condition that they gave them only con-  
 ditionally, for they suspected the man's bad faith; and  
 532 before long he began to show it. While the Romans were 222  
 engaged in a three years' war with the Gauls on the river  
 Po, Demetrius, thinking that they had their hands full, set  
 forth on a piratical expedition, brought the Istrians, another  
 Illyrian tribe, into the enterprise, and detached the Atintani  
 from Rome. The Romans, when they had settled their  
 business with the Gauls, immediately sent a naval force and  
 overpowered the pirates. The following year they marched  
 against Demetrius and his Illyrian fellow-culprits. De-  
 metrius fled to Philip, king of Macedon, but when he re-  
 turned and resumed his piratical career in the Adriatic they  
 slew him and utterly demolished his native town of Pharus,  
 534 which was associated with him in crime. They spared the 220  
 Illyrians on account of Pinnes, who again besought them  
 to do so. And such was the second conflict and treaty  
 between them and the Illyrians.

9. The following events I have written as I have found  
 them, not in due order according to their times of occur-  
 rence, but rather taking each Illyrian nation separately.  
 586 When the Romans were at war with the Macedonians during 168  
 the reign of Perseus, the successor of Philip, Genthius, an  
 Illyrian chief, made an alliance with Perseus for money and

v. R. <sup>B.C.</sup>  
586 attacked Roman Illyria. When the Romans sent ambas- 168  
sadors to him on this subject he put them in chains, charg-  
ing that they had not come as ambassadors, but as spies.  
The Roman general, Anicius, in a naval expedition, cap-  
tured some of Genthius' pinnaces and then engaged him  
in battle on land, defeated him, and shut him up in a castle.  
When he begged a parley Anicius ordered him to surrender  
himself to the Romans. He asked and obtained three days  
for consideration, at the end of which time, his subjects  
having meanwhile gone over to Anicius, he asked for an  
interview with the latter, and, falling on his knees, begged  
pardon in the most abject manner. Anicius encouraged  
the trembling wretch, lifted him up, and invited him to  
supper, but as he was going away from the feast he ordered  
the lictors to cast him into prison. Anicius afterward led  
both him and his sons in triumph at Rome. The whole  
war with Genthius was finished within twenty days. When  
Æmilius Paulus, the conqueror of Perseus, returned to  
Rome, he received secret orders from the Senate to go back  
on particular business relating to the seventy towns that  
587 had belonged to Genthius. They were much alarmed, but 167  
he promised to pardon them for what they had done if they  
would deliver to him all the gold and silver they had.  
When they agreed to do so he sent a detachment of his  
army into each town appointing the same day for all the  
commanding officers to act, and ordering them to make  
proclamation at daybreak in each that the inhabitants  
should bring their money into the market-place within three  
hours, and when they had done so to plunder what remained.  
Thus Paulus despoiled seventy towns in one hour.

10. The Ardei and the Palarii, two other Illyrian tribes,  
made a raid on Roman Illyria, and the Romans, being  
otherwise occupied, sent ambassadors to scare them. When  
they refused to be obedient, the Romans collected an army  
of 10,000 foot and 600 horse to be despatched against them.  
619 When the Illyrians learned this, as they were not yet pre- 135  
pared for fighting, they sent ambassadors to crave pardon.  
The Senate ordered them to make reparation to those whom  
they had wronged. As they were slow in obeying, Fulvius  
Flaccus marched against them. This war resulted in an  
excursion only, for I cannot find any definite end to it.

Y. R. 625 Sempronius Tuditanus and Tiberius Pandusa waged war with the Iapydes, who live among the Alps, and seem to have subjugated them, as Lucius Cotta and Metellus seem to have subjugated the Segestani; but both tribes revolted not long afterward. B. C. 129

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598 11. The Dalmatians, another Illyrian tribe, made an attack on the Illyrian subjects of Rome, and when ambassadors were sent to them to remonstrate they were not received. The Romans accordingly sent an army against them, with Marcius Figulus as consul and commander. While Figulus was laying out his camp the Dalmatians overpowered the guard, defeated him, and drove him out of the camp in headlong flight to the plain as far as the river Naro. As the Dalmatians were returning home (for winter was now approaching), Figulus hoped to fall upon them unawares, but he found them reassembled from their towns at the news of his approach. Nevertheless, he drove them into the city of Delminium, from which place they first got the name of Delmatenses, which was afterward changed to Dalmatians. As he was not able to attack this strongly defended town from the road, nor to use the engines that he had, on account of the height of the place, he attacked and captured some other towns that were partially deserted on account of the concentration of forces at Delminium. Then, returning to Delminium, he hurled sticks of wood, two cubits long, covered with flax and smeared with pitch and sulphur, from catapults into the town. These caught fire from friction and, flying in the air like torches, wherever they fell caused a conflagration, so that the greater part of the town was burned. This was the end of the war waged by Figulus against the Dalmatians. At a later period, in 635 the consulship of Cæcilius Metellus, war was declared against the Dalmatians, although they had been guilty of no offence, because he desired a triumph. They received him as a friend and he wintered among them at the town of Salona, after which he returned to Rome and was awarded a triumph. 119



## CHAPTER III

## Julius Cæsar and the Illyrians—The Pannonians on the Danube

Y.R.

B.C.

12. At the time when Cæsar held the command in Gaul these same Dalmatians and other Illyrians, who were then in a very prosperous condition, took the city of Promona from the Liburni, another Illyrian tribe. The latter put themselves in the hands of the Romans and appealed to Cæsar, who was near by. Cæsar sent word to those who were holding Promona that they should give it up to the Liburni, and when they refused, he sent against them a strong detachment of his army who were totally destroyed by the Illyrians. Nor did Cæsar renew the attempt, for he had no leisure then, on account of the civil strife with Pompey. When the civil strife burst forth in war Cæsar crossed the Adriatic from Brundisium in the winter, with what forces he had, and opened his campaign against Pompey in Macedonia. Antony brought another army to Cæsar's aid in Macedonia, he also crossing the Adriatic in mid-winter. Gabinius led fifteen cohorts of foot and 3000 horse for him by way of Illyria, passing around the Adriatic. The Illyrians, fearing punishment for what they had done to Cæsar not long before, and thinking that his victory would be their destruction, attacked and slew the whole army under Gabinius, except Gabinius himself and a few who escaped. Among the spoils captured was a large amount of money and war material.

13. Cæsar was preoccupied by the necessity of coming to a conclusion with Pompey, and, after Pompey's death, with the numerous parts of his faction still remaining. When he had settled everything he returned to Rome and made preparations for war with the Getæ and the Parthians. The Illyrians began to fear lest he should attack them, as they were on his intended line of march. So they sent ambassadors to Rome to crave pardon for what they had done and to offer their friendship and alliance, vaunting themselves as a very brave race. Cæsar was hastening his preparations against the Parthians; nevertheless, he gave them the dignified answer that he could not make friends of those

Y. R.

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who had done what they had, but that he would grant them pardon if they would subject themselves to tribute and give him hostages. They promised to do both, and accordingly he sent Vatinius thither with three legions and a large cavalry force to impose a light tribute on them and receive the hostages. When Cæsar was slain the Dalmatians, thinking that the Roman power resided in him and had perished with him, would not listen to Vatinius on the subject of the tribute or anything else. When he attempted to use force they attacked and destroyed five of his cohorts, including their commanding officer, Bæbius, a man of senatorial rank. Vatinius took refuge with the remainder of his force in Epidamnus. The Roman Senate transferred this army, together with the province of Macedonia and Roman Illyria, to Brutus Cæpio, one of Cæsar's murderers, and at the same time assigned Syria to Cassius, another of the assassins. But they also, being involved in war with Antony and the second Cæsar, surnamed Augustus, had no time to attend to the Illyrians.

B. C.

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14. The Pæones are a great nation on the Danube, extending from the Iapydes to the Dardani. They are called Pæones by the Greeks, but Pannonians by the Romans. They are counted by the Romans as a part of Illyria, as I have previously said, for which reason it seems proper that I should include them in my Illyrian history. They have been renowned from the Macedonian period through the Agrianes, who rendered very important aid to Philip and Alexander and are Pæones of Lower Pannonia bordering on Illyria. When the expedition of Cornelius against the Pannonians resulted disastrously, so great a fear of those people came over all the Italians that for a long time afterwards none of the consuls ventured to march against them. Concerning the early history of the Illyrians and Pannonians, I have not been able to discover anything further, nor have I found in the commentaries of Augustus anything earlier in the chapters treating of the Pannonians.

15. I think that other Illyrian tribes besides those mentioned had previously come under Roman rule, but how, I do not know. Augustus did not describe the transactions of others so much as his own, telling how he brought back those who had revolted and compelled them again to pay

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
710 tribute, how he subjugated others that had been independent from the beginning, and how he mastered all the tribes that inhabit the summits of the Alps, barbarous and warlike peoples, who often plundered the neighboring parts of Italy. It is a wonder to me that so many great Roman armies traversing the Alps to conquer the Gauls and Spaniards, should have overlooked these tribes, and that even Gaius Cæsar, that most successful man of war, did not despatch them during the ten years that he was fighting the Gauls and wintering in that very country. But the Romans seem to have been intent only upon getting through the Alpine region on the business they were bestirring themselves about, and Cæsar seems to have delayed putting an end to the Illyrian troubles on account of the Gallic war and the strife with Pompey, which closely followed it. It appears that he was chosen commander of Illyria as well as of Gaul — not the whole of it, but as much as was then under Roman rule. <sup>B.C.</sup>  
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## CHAPTER IV

Augustus invades Illyria — Subjugation of the Salassi and of the Iapydes — Hard Fighting at Metulus — Destruction of the City — War against the Segestani — Their City Captured

16. When Augustus had made himself master of everything, he informed the Senate, by way of contrast with Antony's slothfulness, that he had freed Italy from the savage tribes that had so often raided it. He overcame the <sup>719</sup> Oxyæi, the Perthoneatæ, the Bathiatæ, the Taulantii, the Cambæi, the Cinambri, the Meromenni, and the Pyrissæi <sup>35</sup> in one campaign. By more prolonged effort he also overcame the Docleatæ, the Carui, the Interphurini, the Naresii, the Glintidiones, and the Taurisci. From these tribes he exacted the tributes they had been failing to pay. When these were conquered, the Hipphasini and the Bessi, neighboring tribes, were overcome by fear and surrendered themselves to him. Others which had revolted, the Meliteni and the Corcyreans, who inhabited islands and practised piracy, he destroyed utterly, putting the young men to death and selling the rest as slaves. He deprived the Liburnians of their ships because they also practised piracy.

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 The Mœntini and the Avendeatæ, two tribes of the Iapydes, dwelling within the Alps, surrendered themselves to him at his approach. The Arrepini, who are the most numerous and warlike of the Iapydes, betook themselves from their villages to their city, but when he arrived there they fled to the woods. Augustus took the city, but did not burn it, hoping that they would deliver themselves up, and when they did so he allowed them to occupy it.
17. Those who gave him the most trouble were the Salassi, the transalpine Iapydes, the Segestani, the Dalmatians, the Dæsitiatæ, and the Pannonians, far distant from the Salassi, who occupy the higher Alpine mountains, difficult of access, the paths being narrow and hard to climb. For this reason they had not only preserved their independence, but had levied tolls on those who passed through their country. Vetus assaulted them unexpectedly, seized the passes by stratagem, and besieged them for two years. They were driven to surrender for want of salt, which they use largely, and they received a Roman garrison; but when Vetus went away they expelled the garrison forthwith, and, possessing themselves of the mountain passes, they mocked at the forces that Augustus sent against them, as unable to accomplish anything of importance. Thereupon Augustus, anticipating a war with Antony, acknowledged their independence and allowed them to go unpunished for their offences against Vetus. But as they were suspicious of what might happen, they laid in large supplies of salt and made
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 incursions into the Roman territory until Messala Corvinus was sent against them and reduced them by hunger. In this way were the Salassi subjugated.
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 18. The transalpine Iapydes, a strong and savage tribe, drove back the Romans twice within the space of about twenty years, overran Aquileia, and plundered the Roman colony of Tergestus. When Augustus advanced against them by a steep and rugged road, they made it still harder for him by felling trees. As he advanced farther they took refuge in another forest, where they lay in ambush for the approaching foe. Augustus, who was always suspecting something of this kind, sent forces to occupy certain ridges which flanked both sides of his advance through the flat country and the fallen timber. The Iapydes darted out

V. R.

719

from their ambush and wounded many of the soldiers, but the greater part of their own forces were killed by the Romans who fell upon them from the heights above. The remainder again took refuge in the thickets, abandoning their town, the name of which was Terponus. Augustus took this town, but did not burn it, hoping that they also would give themselves up, and they did so.

B. C.

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19. Thence he advanced to another place called Metulus, which is the chief town of the Iapydes. It is situated on a heavily timbered mountain, on two ridges with a narrow valley between them. Here were about 3000 warlike and well-armed youth, who easily beat off the Romans who surrounded their walls. The latter raised a mound. The Metulians interrupted the work by assaults by day and by night, and harassed the soldiers from the walls with engines which they had obtained from the war which Decimus Brutus<sup>1</sup> had waged there with Antony and Augustus. When their wall began to crumble they built another inside, abandoned the ruined one, and took shelter behind the other. The Romans captured the abandoned one and burned it. Against the new fortification they raised two mounds and from these threw four bridges to the top of the wall. Then, in order to distract their attention, Augustus sent a part of his force around to the rear of the town and ordered the others to dash across the bridges to the walls. He ascended to the top of a high tower to see the result.

20. Some of the barbarians ran from the parapet to meet the Romans who were crossing, while others, unseen, sought to undermine the bridges with their long spears. They were much encouraged at seeing one bridge fall and a second one follow on top of it. When a third one went down a regular panic overtook the Romans, so that no one ventured on the fourth bridge until Augustus leaped down from the tower and reproached them. As they were not roused to their duty by his words, he seized a shield and

<sup>1</sup> All the codices say, "Decimus Brutus." The Latin version of Candidus omits "Decimus." Decimus Brutus did not wage war against Antony and Octavius in Illyria. He fought against Antony in Cisalpine Gaul and was killed there, while trying to escape to Illyria, as we learn from our author (Civil Wars, iii. 98) and numerous other authorities.

Y. R.

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sprang upon the bridge himself. Agrippa and Hiero, two of the generals, and one of his body-guard, Lucius, and Volas ran with him, only these four with a few armor-bearers. He had almost crossed the bridge when the soldiers, overcome by shame, rushed after him in crowds. Then this bridge, being overweighted, fell also, and the men on it went down in a heap. Some were killed and others were carried away with broken bones. Augustus was injured in the right leg and in both arms. Nevertheless, he ascended the tower with his signals forthwith and showed himself safe and sound, lest dismay should arise from a report of his death. In order that the enemy might not fancy that he was going to give in and retire he began to construct new bridges; by which means he struck terror into the Metulians, who thought that they were contending against an unconquerable will.

B. C.

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21. The next day they sent messengers to Augustus offering to give fifty hostages whom he might select, and promising to receive a garrison and to assign to them the highest hill while they themselves would occupy the other. When the garrison entered and he ordered them to lay down their arms they were very angry. They shut their wives and children up in their council-chamber and stationed guards there with orders to set fire to the building in case things went wrong with them, and then they attacked the Romans with desperation. Since, however, they made the attack from a lower position upon those occupying higher ground, they were completely overpowered. Then the guards set fire to the council-chamber and many of the women killed their children and themselves. Others, holding in their arms their children still alive, leaped into the flames. Thus all the Metulian youth perished in battle and the greater part of the non-combatants by fire. Their city was entirely consumed, and, large as it was, not a trace of it now remains. After the destruction of Metulus the remainder of the Iapydes, being terror-stricken, surrendered to Augustus. The transalpine Iapydes were then for the first time brought in subjection to the Romans. After Augustus departed the Poseni

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rebelled and Marcus Helvius was sent against them. He conquered them and after punishing the leaders of the revolt with death sold the rest as slaves.

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V.R.

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22. At an earlier time the Romans twice attacked the country of the Segestani, but obtained no hostages nor anything else, for which reason the Segestani became very arrogant. Augustus advanced against them through the Pannonian territory, which was not yet under subjection to the Romans. Pannonia is a wooded country extending from the Iapydes to the Dardani. The inhabitants do not live in cities, but scattered through the country or in villages according to relationship. They have no common council and no rulers over the whole nation. They number 100,000 fighting men, but they do not assemble in one body, because they have no common government. When Augustus advanced against them they took to the woods, from which they darted out and slew the stragglers of the army. As long as Augustus hoped that they would surrender voluntarily he spared their fields and villages. As none of them came in he devastated the country with fire and sword for eight days, until he came to the Segestani. Theirs is also Pannonian territory, on the river Save, on which is situated a city strongly fortified by the river and by a very large ditch encircling it. For this reason Augustus greatly desired to possess it as a magazine convenient for a war against the Dacians and the Bastarnæ on the other side of the Ister, which is there called the Danube, but a little lower down is called the Ister. The Save flows into it, and Augustus caused ships to be built in the latter stream to bring provisions to the Danube for him.

23. For these reasons he desired to obtain possession of Segesta. As he was approaching, the Segestani sent to inquire what he wanted. He replied that he desired to station a garrison there and to have them give him 100 hostages in order that he might use the town safely as a base of operations in his war against the Dacians. He also asked for as much food as they were able to supply. The chief men of the town acquiesced, but the common people were furious, yet consented to the giving of the hostages, perhaps because they were not their children, but those of the notables. When the garrison came up, however, they could not bear the sight of them, but shut the gates in a mad fury and stationed themselves on the walls. Thereupon Augustus bridged the river and surrounded the place with ditch and

B.C.

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V.R.

719 palisade, and, having blockaded them, raised two mounds. Upon these the Segestani made frequent assaults and, being unable to capture them, endeavored to destroy them with torches and fire thrown from above. When aid was sent to them by the other Pannonians Augustus met and ambuscaded this reinforcement, destroyed a part of their force, and put the rest to flight. After this they got no more help from the Pannonians.

B.C.  
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24. Thus the Segestani, after enduring all the evils of a siege, were taken by force on the thirtieth day, and then for the first time they began to beg. Augustus, admiring them for their bravery and yielding to their prayers, neither killed nor banished them, but contented himself with a fine. He caused a part of the city to be separated from the rest by a wall, and in this he placed a garrison of twenty-five cohorts. Having accomplished this he went back to Rome, intending to return to Illyria in the spring. But a rumor becoming current that the Segestani had massacred the garrison, he set forth hastily in the winter. However, he found that the rumor was false, yet not without cause. They had been in danger from a sudden uprising of the Segestani and had lost many men by reason of its unexpectedness, but on the next day they rallied and put down the insurgents. Augustus turned his forces to Dalmatia, another Illyrian country bordering on Taulantia.

## CHAPTER V

Second War against the Dalmatians—The City of Promona taken—  
Sunodium burned—The Dalmatians subdued

720 25. The Dalmatians, after the slaughter of the five cohorts under Gabinius and the taking of their standards, elated by their success, had not laid down their arms for ten years. When Augustus advanced against them they made an alliance with each other for mutual aid in war. They had upwards of 12,000 fighting men under a general named Versus. He occupied Promona, the city of the Liburni, and fortified it, although it was very strong by nature. It is a mountain stronghold surrounded on all sides by sharp-pointed hills like saw-teeth. The greater part of his forces

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were stationed in the town, but he placed guards on the hills and all of them looked down upon the Romans from elevated positions. Augustus in plain sight began to draw a wall around the whole, but secretly he sent his bravest men to seek a path to the highest of the hills. These, concealing themselves in the woods, fell upon the guards by night while they were asleep, slew them, and signalled to Augustus in the twilight. He led the bulk of the army to make an attempt upon the city, and sent another force to hold the height that had been taken, while the captors of it should get possession of the lower hills. Terror and confusion fell upon the barbarians everywhere, for they believed themselves to be attacked on all sides. Especially were those on the hills alarmed lest they should be cut off from their supply of water, for which reason they all fled to Promona.

B.C.

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26. Augustus surrounded the town, and two hills which were still held by the enemy, with a wall forty stades in length. When Testimus, another Dalmatian general, brought an army to the relief of the place Augustus met him and drove him back to the mountains, and while Testimus was still looking on he took Promona before the line of circumvallation was finished. For when the citizens made a sally and were sharply repulsed, the Romans pursued them and entered the town with them, where they killed a third part of them. The remainder took refuge in the citadel, at the gates of which a Roman cohort was placed to keep watch. On the fourth night the barbarians assaulted them, and they fled terror-stricken from the gates. Augustus repulsed the enemy's assault, and the following day received their surrender. The cohort that had abandoned its position was obliged to cast lots, and every tenth man suffered death. The lot fell upon two centurions among others. It was ordered, as a further punishment, that the surviving members of the cohort should subsist on barley instead of wheat for that summer.

27. Promona being thus taken, Testimus, who was still looking on, disbanded his army, telling them to scatter in all directions. For this reason the Romans were not able to pursue them long, as they feared to divide themselves into small bands, being ignorant of the roads, and the foot-

V. R.

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prints of the fugitives being much confused. They took the town of Sunodium at the edge of the forest in which the army of Gabinius had been entrapped by the Dalmatians in a long and deep gorge between two mountains. There also they laid an ambushade for Augustus, but after he had burned Sunodium he sent soldiers around by the summits of the mountains to keep even pace with him on either side while he passed through the gorge. He cut down trees and captured and burned all the towns he found on his way. While he was besieging the city of Setovia a force of barbarians came to its assistance, which he met and prevented from entering the place. In this conflict he was struck by a stone on the knee and was confined for several days. When he recovered he returned to Rome to perform the duties of the consulship with Volcatius Tullus, his colleague, leaving Statilius Taurus to finish the war.

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721 28. Entering upon his new consulship on the Calends 33 of January, and delivering the government to Autronius Pætus the same day, he started back to Dalmatia at once, the triumvirate still existing; for two years remained of the second five-year period which the triumvirs themselves had ordained and the people confirmed. And now the Dalmatians, oppressed by hunger and cut off from foreign supplies, met him on the road and delivered themselves up with supplications, giving 700 of their children as hostages, as Augustus demanded, and also the Roman standards taken from Gabinius. They also promised to pay the tribute that had been in arrears since the time of Gaius Cæsar and to be obedient henceforth. Augustus deposited the standards in the portico called the Octavia. After the Dalmatians were prostrated Augustus advanced against the Derbani, who likewise begged pardon with supplications, gave hostages, and promised to pay the past-due tribute.<sup>1</sup> In like manner other tribes at his approach gave hostages for observing the treaties that he made with them. Some, however, he was prevented by sickness from reaching. These gave no hostages and made no treaties. It appears, however, that they were subjugated later. Thus Augustus subdued the whole Illyrian country, not only the parts that

<sup>1</sup> At this point there is a lacuna in the text.

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had revolted from the Romans, but those that had never  
725 before been under their rule. Wherefore the Senate 29  
awarded him an Illyrian triumph, which he enjoyed later,  
together with one for his victory over Antony.

29. The remaining peoples, who are considered by the  
Romans to be parts of Illyria, are the Rhætians and the  
Noricans, on this side of Pannonia, and the Mysians on  
the other side as far as the Euxine Sea. I think that the  
Rhætians and Noricans were subdued by Gaius Cæsar during  
the Gallic war or by Augustus during the Pannonian war,  
as they lie between the two. I have found no mention of  
any war against them separately, whence I infer that they  
were conquered along with other neighboring tribes.

30. Marcus Lucullus, brother of that Licinius Lucullus  
who conducted the war against Mithridates, advanced  
against the Mysians and arrived at the river where six Gre-  
cian cities lie adjacent to the Mysian territory, namely,  
Istrus, Dionysopolis, Odessus, Mesembria, Catalis, and  
Apollonia;<sup>1</sup> from which he brought to Rome the great statue  
of Apollo which was afterward set up on the Palatine Hill.  
I have found nothing further done by the Roman republic  
as to the Mysians. They were not subjected to tribute by  
Augustus, but by Tiberius, who succeeded him as Roman  
emperor. All the things done by command of the people  
before the taking of Egypt have been written by me for  
each country separately. Those countries that the emper-  
ors themselves pacified after Egypt was taken, or annexed  
as their own work, will be mentioned after the affairs of the  
commonwealth. There I shall tell more about the Mysians.  
For the present, since the Romans consider the Mysians a  
part of Illyria and this is my Illyrian history, in order that  
it may be complete it seems proper to premise that Lucul-  
lus invaded Mysia as a general of the republic and that  
Tiberius took it in the time of the empire.

<sup>1</sup> The text here is imperfect.

# BOOK XI

## THE SYRIAN WARS

### CHAPTER I

Ambition of Antiochus the Great — His First Disagreement with Rome  
— A Conference at Lysimacheia — Hannibal at Ephesus — Antiochus  
forms Alliances


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I. ANTIOCHUS (the son of Seleucus and grandson of Antiochus), king of the Syrians, the Babylonians, and other nations, was the sixth in succession from that Seleucus who succeeded Alexander in the government of the Asiatic countries around the Euphrates. He invaded Media and Parthia, and other countries that had revolted from his ancestors, and performed many exploits, from which he was named Antiochus the Great. Elated by his successes, and by the title which he had derived from them, he invaded Cœle-  
556 Syria and a portion of Cilicia and took them away from Ptolemy Philopator [Epiphanes],<sup>1</sup> king of Egypt, who was still a boy. As there was nothing small in his views he marched among the Hellespontines, the Æolians, and the Ionians as though they belonged to him as the ruler of Asia; and, indeed, they had been formerly subjects of the Asiatic  
558 kings. Then he crossed over to Europe, brought Thrace under his sway, and reduced by force those who would not obey him. He fortified Chersonesus and rebuilt Lysimacheia, which Lysimachus, who ruled Thrace in the time of Alexander, built as a stronghold against the Thracians themselves, but which they destroyed after his death. Antiochus repopled it, calling back the citizens who had fled, redeeming those who had been sold as slaves, bringing in others, supplying them with cattle, sheep, and agricultural

<sup>1</sup> See note to p. 245.





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implements, and omitting nothing that might contribute to its speedy completion as a stronghold; for the place seemed to him to be admirably situated to hold all of Thrace in subjection, and a convenient base of supplies for other operations that he contemplated.

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2. Here the open disagreements between him and the Romans began, for as he passed among the Greek cities thereabout most of them joined him and received his garrisons, because they feared capture by him. But the inhabitants of Smyrna and Lampsacus, and some others who still resisted, sent ambassadors to Flamininus, the Roman general, who had lately overthrown Philip the Macedonian in a great battle in Thessaly; for the affairs of the Macedonians and of the Greeks were closely linked together at certain times and places, as I have shown in my Grecian history. Accordingly, certain embassies passed between Antiochus and Flamininus and tested each other to no purpose. The Romans and Antiochus had been suspicious of each other for a long time, the former surmising that he would not keep quiet because he was so much puffed up by the extent of his dominions and the acme of fortune that he had reached. Antiochus, on the other hand, believed that the Romans were the only people who could put a stop to his increase of power and prevent him from passing over to Europe. Still, there was no outward cause of enmity between them until ambassadors came to Rome from Ptolemy Philopator complaining that Antiochus had taken Syria and Cilicia away from him. The Romans gladly seized this occasion as one well suited to their purposes, and sent to Antiochus ostensibly to bring about a reconciliation between him and Ptolemy, but really to find out his designs and to check him as much as they could.

3. Gnæus,<sup>1</sup> the chief of the embassy, demanded that Antiochus should allow Ptolemy, who was a friend of the Roman people, to rule over all the countries that his father had left to him, and that the cities of Asia that had been part of the dominions of Philip should be independent, for

<sup>1</sup> The name of this ambassador, according to Polybius (xvii. 31), was Lucius Cornelius. In other respects the account of the conference by Polybius agrees with that of our author. The conference took place at Lysimacheia.

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it was not right that Antiochus should usurp powers of which the Romans had deprived Philip. "We are wholly at a loss to know," he said, "why Antiochus should come from Media bringing such a fleet and such an army from the upper country to the Asiatic coast, make an incursion into Europe, build cities there, and subdue Thrace, unless these are the preparations for another war." Antiochus replied that Thrace had belonged to his ancestors, that it had fallen away from them when they were occupied elsewhere, and that he had resumed possession because he had leisure to do so. He had built Lysimacheia as the future seat of government of his son Seleucus. He would leave the Greek cities of Asia independent if they would acknowledge the gratitude therefor as due to himself and not to the Romans. "I am a relative of Ptolemy," he said, "and I shall be his father-in-law, although I am not so now, and I will see to it that he renders gratitude to you. I am at a loss to know by what right you meddle with the affairs of Asia when I never interfere with those of Italy." And so they separated without coming to any understanding, and both sides broke into more open threats.

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4. A rumor having spread abroad that Ptolemy Philopator was dead, Antiochus hastened to Egypt in order to seize the country while bereft of a ruler. While on this journey Hannibal the Carthaginian met him at Ephesus. He was now a fugitive from his own country on account of the accusations of his enemies, who reported to the Romans that he was hostile to them, that he wanted to bring on a war, and that he could never enjoy peace. This was a time when the Carthaginians were leagued with the Romans by treaty. Antiochus received Hannibal in a magnificent manner on account of his great military reputation, and kept him near himself. At Lycia he learned that Ptolemy was alive. So he gave up the idea of seizing Egypt and turned his attention to Cyprus, hoping to take it instead of Egypt, and sailed thither with all speed. Encountering a storm at the mouth of the river Sarus and losing many of his ships, some of them with his soldiers and friends, he sailed back to Seleucia in Syria to repair his damaged fleet. There he celebrated the nuptials of his children, Antiochus and Laodice, whom he had joined together in marriage.

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5. Now, determining no longer to conceal his intended war with the Romans, he formed alliances by marriage with the neighboring kings. To Ptolemy in Egypt he sent his daughter Cleopatra, surnamed Syra, giving with her Coele-Syria as a dowry, which he had taken away from Ptolemy himself, thus flattering the young king in order to keep him quiet during the war with the Romans. To Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, he sent his daughter Antiochis, and the remaining one to Eumenes, king of Pergamus. But the latter, seeing that Antiochus was about to engage in war with the Romans and that he wanted to form a marriage connection with him on this account, refused her. To his brothers, Attalus and Philetærus, who were surprised that he should decline marriage relationship with so great a king, who was also his neighbor and who made the first overtures, he showed that the coming war would be of doubtful issue at first, but that the Romans would prevail in the end by their courage and perseverance. "If the Romans conquer," said he, "I shall be firmly seated in my kingdom. If Antiochus is the victor, I may expect to be stripped of all my possessions by my powerful neighbor, or, if I am allowed to reign, to be ruled over by him." For these reasons he rejected the proffered marriage.

## CHAPTER II

Sends an Embassy to Rome — Hannibal's Advice to Antiochus — Hannibal sends a Messenger to Carthage — Roman Ambassadors meet Hannibal at Ephesus — Colloquy between Hannibal and Scipio Africanus — The Place of Hannibal's Death

6. Then Antiochus went down to the Hellespont and crossed over to Chersonesus and possessed himself of a large part of Thrace by conquest or surrender. He freed the Greeks who were under subjection to the Thracians, and conciliated the Byzantines in many ways, because their city was admirably situated at the outlet of the Euxine Sea. By gifts and by fear of his warlike preparations he brought the Galatians into his alliance, because he considered them formidable by reason of their bodily size. Then he went back to Ephesus and sent as ambassadors to Rome Lysias,

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561 Hegesianax, and Menippus. They were sent really to find

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out the intentions of the Senate, but for the sake of appearances Menippus said, "King Antiochus, while strongly desirous of the friendship of the Romans and willing to be their ally if they wish, is surprised that they urge him to give up the cities of Ionia and to remit tribute for certain states, and not to interfere with certain of the affairs of Asia and to leave Thrace alone, though it has always belonged to his ancestors. Yours are not the exhortations of friends, but resemble orders given by victors to the vanquished." The Senate, perceiving that the embassy had come to make a test of their disposition, replied curtly, "If Antiochus will leave the Greeks in Asia free and independent, and keep away from Europe, he can be the friend of the Roman people if he desires." Such was the answer of the Romans, and they gave no reason for their rejoinder.

7. As Antiochus intended to invade Greece first and thence begin his war against the Romans, he communicated his design to Hannibal. The latter said that as Greece had been wasted for a long time, the task would be easy; but that wars which were waged at home were the hard ones to bear, by reason of the scarcity which they caused, and that those which took place in foreign territory were much easier to endure. Antiochus could never vanquish the Romans in Greece, where they would have plenty of home-grown corn and all needed material. Hannibal urged him to occupy some part of Italy and make his base of operations there, so that the Romans might be weakened both at home and abroad. "I have had experience of Italy," he said, "and with 10,000 men I can occupy some convenient place and write to my friends in Carthage to stir up the people to revolt. As they are already discontented with their condition, and harbor ill-will toward the Romans, they will be filled with courage and hope if they hear that I am ravaging Italy again." Antiochus listened eagerly to this advice, and as he considered a Carthaginian accession a great advantage (as it would have been) for his war, directed him to write to his friends at once.

8. Hannibal did not write the letters, since he did not consider it yet safe to do so, as the Romans were searching out everything and the war was not yet openly declared,

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
<sup>561</sup> and he had many opponents in Carthage, and the city had <sup>B.C.</sup>  
<sup>193</sup> no fixed or sound policy, — the very lack of which caused its destruction, not long afterward. But he sent Aristo, a Tyrian merchant, to his friends, on the pretext of trading, to tell them that when he should invade Italy they should rouse Carthage to avenge her wrongs. Aristo did this, but when Hannibal's enemies learned that he was in the city they raised a tumult as though a revolution was impending, and searched everywhere to find him. In order that Hannibal's friends might not be particularly accused, he posted letters in front of the senate-chamber secretly by night, saying that Hannibal exhorted the whole senate to rescue the country with the help of Antiochus. Having done this he sailed away. In the morning the friends of Hannibal were relieved of their fears by this afterthought of Aristo, which implied that he had been sent to the whole senate. The city was filled with all kinds of tumult, the people feeling bitterly toward the Romans, but despairing of accomplishing anything indirectly. Such was the situation of affairs in Carthage.

<sup>562</sup> 9. In the meantime Roman ambassadors, and among <sup>193</sup>  
them Scipio, who had humbled the Carthaginian power, were sent, like those of Antiochus, to ascertain his designs and to form an estimate of his strength. Learning that the king had gone to Pisidia, they waited for him at Ephesus. There they entered into frequent conversations with Hannibal, Carthage being then at peace with them and war with Antiochus not yet declared. They reproached Hannibal for flying his country when the Romans had nothing to complain against him, or against the other Carthaginians, under the terms of the last treaty. They did this in order to cast suspicion on Hannibal in the mind of the king by the protracted conversations and intercourse. Hannibal, although a most profound military genius, did not perceive their design, but the king, when he learned what had been going on, did suspect him, and was more reluctant to give him his confidence thereafter. There was also some jealousy and envy added, lest Hannibal should carry off the glory of the exploits.

10. It is said that at one of their meetings in the gymnasium Scipio and Hannibal had a conversation on the

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subject of generalship, in the presence of a number of bystanders, and that Scipio asked Hannibal whom he considered the greatest general, to which the latter replied, "Alexander of Macedon." To this Scipio assented since he also yielded the first place to Alexander. Then he asked Hannibal whom he placed next, and he replied, "Pyrrhus of Epirus," because he considered boldness the first qualification of a general; "for it would not be possible," he said, "to find two kings more enterprising than these." Scipio was rather nettled by this, but nevertheless he asked Hannibal to whom he would give the third place, expecting that at least the third would be assigned to him; but Hannibal replied, "To myself; for when I was a young man I conquered Spain and crossed the Alps with an army, the first after Hercules. I invaded Italy and struck terror into all of you, laid waste 400 of your towns, and often put your city in extreme peril, all this time receiving neither money nor reinforcements from Carthage." As Scipio saw that he was likely to prolong his self-laudation he said, laughing, "Where would you place yourself, Hannibal, if you had not been defeated by me?" Hannibal, now perceiving his jealousy, replied, "In that case I should have put myself before Alexander." Thus Hannibal continued his self-laudation, but flattered Scipio in a delicate manner by suggesting that he had conquered one who was the superior of Alexander.<sup>1</sup>

11. At the end of this conversation Hannibal invited Scipio to be his guest, and Scipio replied that he would be so gladly if Hannibal were not living with Antiochus, who was held in suspicion by the Romans. Thus did they, in a manner worthy of great commanders, cast aside their enmity at the end of their wars. Not so Flamininus, for, at a later period when Hannibal had fled after the defeat of Antiochus and was wandering around Bithynia, Flamininus sent an embassy to King Prusias on other matters, and, although he had no grievance against Hannibal, and had no

<sup>1</sup> This tale is considered by most modern critics a fiction. It is, however, found in Plutarch and Livy. The latter (xxxv. 14), gives the authority for it, viz: "Claudius, following the Greek history of Acilius, says that Africanus was in that embassy," etc. But in his own account of the embassy Livy does not include Africanus as a member of it.

V.R. 562 orders from the Senate, and Hannibal was no longer formidable to them, Carthage having fallen, he caused Prusias to put him to death by poison. There was a story that an oracle had once said:

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“Libyssan earth shall cover Hannibal’s remains.”<sup>1</sup>

So he believed that he should die in Libya. But there is a river Libyssus in Bithynia, and the adjoining country takes the name of Libyssa from the river.<sup>2</sup> These things I have placed side by side as memorials of the magnanimity of Hannibal and Scipio and of the smallness of Flamininus.

### CHAPTER III

Antiochus invades Greece—Amynder, King of the Athamans, joins him—Hannibal repeats his Advice—The Romans prepare for War—Philip joins the Romans

12. Antiochus, on his return from Pisidia to Ephesus, entered upon the business with the Roman ambassadors and promised to leave the Rhodians, the Byzantines, the Cyziciæans, and the other Greeks of Asia free and independent if the Romans would make a treaty with him, but he would not release the Ætolians and the Ionians, since they had long been accustomed to obey the barbarian kings of Asia. The Roman ambassadors came to no agreement with him—in fact, they had not come to make an agreement, but to find out his purposes. So they returned to Rome. Thereupon an Ætolian embassy came to Antiochus, of which Thoas was the principal member, offering him the command of the Ætolian forces and urging him to embark for Greece at once, as everything was in readiness there. They would not allow him to wait for the army that was coming from upper Asia, but by exaggerating the strength of the Ætolians and promising the alliance of the Lacedæmonians and of Philip of Macedon in addition, who was angry with the Romans, they urged his crossing. He assembled his forces very hastily, nor did even the news of his son’s death in Syria delay him at all. He sailed to Eubœa with 10,000

<sup>1</sup> Λίβυσσα κρύψει βῶλος Ἄννιβου δέμας.

<sup>2</sup> Hannibal’s burial-place at Libyssa was still visible in the time of Pliny, A.D. 23-79 (*Natural History*, v. 43).

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men, who were all that he had in hand at the time. He took possession of the whole island, which surrendered to him through fear. Michithio, one of his generals, fell upon the Romans at Delium (a place sacred to Apollo), killed some of them, and took the rest prisoners.

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13. Amynder, king of the Athamanes, leagued himself with Antiochus for the following reason. A certain Macedonian, named Alexander, who had been educated at Megalopolis and admitted to citizenship there, pretended that he was a descendant of Alexander the Great, and to make people believe his fables he named his two sons Philip and Alexander and his daughter Apama. The latter he betrothed to Amynder. Her brother Philip conducted her to the nuptial ceremony, and when he saw that Amynder was weak and inexperienced he remained there and took charge of the government by virtue of this connection. By holding out to this Philip the hope that he would restore his ancestral kingdom of Macedonia to him, Antiochus secured the alliance of the Athamanes. He secured that of the Thebans also by going to Thebes and making a speech to the people. He was emboldened to enter upon this great war relying most rashly on the Thebans, Amynder, and the Ætolians, and he made a reconnaissance of Thessaly to determine whether he should invade it at once or after the winter had passed. As Hannibal expressed no opinion on the subject, Antiochus, before coming to a decision, asked him his thought.

14. Hannibal replied, "It is not difficult to reduce the Thessalians either now or at the end of winter, if you wish. Exhausted by much suffering they will change now to you, and again to the Romans, if any misfortune befalls you. We have come here without any army of our own, trusting to the Ætolians, who said that the Lacedæmonians and Philip would join us. Of these I hear that the Lacedæmonians are as hostile to us as the Achæans are, and as for Philip I do not see him here helping you, although he can turn the scale of this war for whichever side he favors. I hold the same opinion as before, that you should call in an army from Asia as quickly as possible and not put any reliance on Amynder or the Ætolians. When your army comes, carry the war into Italy so that they may be dis-

- V. R.  
562 tracted by evils at home, and thus harm you as little as B. C. 192 possible, and make no advance movement for fear of what may befall themselves. The plan I spoke of before is no longer available, but you ought to employ half of your fleet in ravaging the shores of Italy and keep the other half lying in wait for opportunities, while you station yourself with all your land forces at some point in Greece near to Italy, making a feint of invasion and invading it at any time if you can. Try by every means to make an alliance with Philip, because he can be of the greatest service to whichever side he espouses. If he will not consent, send your son Seleucus against him by way of Thrace so that Philip likewise may be distracted by troubles at home, and prevented from furnishing aid to the enemy." Such were the counsels of Hannibal, and they were the best of all that were offered; but, moved by jealousy of his reputation and judgment, the other counsellors, and the king himself no less, cast them all aside lest Hannibal should seem to excel them in generalship, and lest the glory of the exploits should be his — except that Polyxenidas was sent to Asia to bring an army.
- 563 15. When the Romans heard of the irruption of Antiochus into Greece and the killing and capture of Romans at Delium, they declared war. In this way the war between them, which had been smouldering a long time, first actually broke out. So great was the dominion of Antiochus, ruler of many powerful nations of upper Asia, and of all but a few on the sea-coast, who had now invaded Europe; so formidable was his reputation and so complete his preparation, so many and so famous had been his exploits against other peoples, from which he had earned the title of Great, that the Romans anticipated that this war would be long and severe for them. They had their suspicions also of Philip of Macedon, whom they had lately conquered, and of the Carthaginians also, lest they should prove false to the treaty because Hannibal was coöperating with Antiochus. Other subject peoples were under suspicion lest revolution should break out among them in consequence of the fame of Antiochus. For these reasons they sent forces into all the provinces to watch them without provoking hostilities. With them were sent commanders

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called six-axe men (prætors), so called because the consuls had twelve bundles of rods and axes (as the kings before them had), whereas the prætors had only half the dignity of the consuls and half the number of insignia of office. As in cases of great peril they showed their anxiety for Italy also, lest there should be some weakening or revolt against them there. They sent a large force of infantry to Tarentum to guard against an attack in that quarter, and also a fleet to patrol the coast. So great was the alarm caused by Antiochus at first. When everything appertaining to the government at home was arranged, they raised an army to serve against Antiochus, 20,000 from the city and double that number from the allies, to cross the Adriatic in the early spring. Thus they employed the whole winter in making preparations for war.

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16. Antiochus marched against the Thessalians and came to Cynoscephalæ, where the Macedonians had been defeated by the Romans, and finding the remains of the dead still unburied, gave them a magnificent funeral. Thus he curried favor with the Macedonians and accused Philip before them of leaving unburied those who had fallen in his service. Until now Philip had been wavering and in doubt which side he should espouse, but when he heard of this he joined the Romans at once. He invited Bæbius, their nearest general, to a rendezvous and gave pledges anew of faithful alliance against Antiochus. Bæbius praised him for this, and felt emboldened to send Appius Claudius straightway with 2000 foot through Macedonia into Thessaly. When Appius arrived at Tempe and from that point saw Antiochus besieging Larissa, he kindled a large number of fires to conceal the smallness of his force. Antiochus thought that Bæbius and Philip had arrived, and became panic-stricken, abandoned the siege on a pretext of bad weather, and retreated to Chalcis. There he fell in love with a pretty girl, and, although he was above fifty years of age and was supporting the burden of so great a war, he celebrated his nuptials with her, gave a public festival, and allowed his army to spend the whole winter in idleness and luxury. When spring came he made a descent upon Acarnania, where he perceived that idleness had unfitted his army for every kind of duty. Then he repented himself



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of his marriage and his public festival. Nevertheless he reduced a part of Acarnania and was besieging the rest of its strongholds when he learned that the Romans were making a passage of the Adriatic. Then at once he returned to Chalcis.

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## CHAPTER IV

The Romans cross the Adriatic — Antiochus occupies Thermopylæ — Battle at Thermopylæ — Antiochus defeated — Flees to Asia — The two Scipios sent against him

17. The Romans crossed hastily from Brundisium to Apollonia with the forces that were then ready, being 2000 horse, 20,000 foot, and a few elephants, under the command of Acinius Manius Glabrio. They marched to Thessaly and relieved the besieged cities. They expelled the enemy's garrisons from the towns of the Athamanes and made a prisoner of that Philip of Megalopolis who was still expecting the throne of Macedonia. They also captured about 3000 of the soldiers of Antiochus. While Manius was doing these things, Philip made a descent upon Athamania and brought the whole of it under subjection, King Amynder fleeing to Ambracia. When Antiochus learned these facts, he was terrified by the rush of events and by the suddenness of the change of fortune, and he now perceived the wisdom of Hannibal's advice. He sent messenger after messenger to Asia to hasten the coming of Polyxenidas. Then from all sides he drew in what forces he had. These amounted to 10,000 foot and 500 horse of his own, besides some allies, with which he occupied Thermopylæ in order to put this difficult pass between himself and the enemy while waiting for the arrival of his army from Asia. The passage at Thermopylæ is long and narrow, flanked on the one side by a rough and inhospitable sea and on the other by a deep and impassable morass. It is overhung by two mountain peaks, one called Tichius and the other Callidromus. The place also contains some hot springs, whence comes the name Thermopylæ (the Hot Gates).

18. There Antiochus built a double wall on which he placed engines. He sent Ætolian troops to occupy the

<sup>Y. R.</sup>  
<sup>563</sup> summits of the mountains to prevent anybody from coming <sup>B. C.</sup>  
<sup>191</sup> around secretly by way of the hill called Atropos, as Xerxes had come upon the Spartans under Leonidas, the mountain paths at that time being unguarded. One thousand Ætolians occupied each mountain. The remainder encamped by themselves near the city of Heraclea. When Manius saw the enemy's preparations he gave the signal for battle on the morrow and ordered two of his tribunes, Marcus Cato and Lucius Valerius, to select such forces as they pleased and to go around the mountains by night and drive the Ætolians from the heights as best they could. Lucius was repulsed from Mount Tichius by the Ætolians, who at that place fought well, but Cato, who moved against Mount Callidromus, fell upon the enemy while they were still asleep, about the last watch. Nevertheless there was a stiff fight here, as he was obliged to climb over high rocks and precipices in the face of an opposing enemy. Meantime Manius was leading his army against Antiochus' front in straight lines, as this was the only way possible in the narrow pass. The king placed his light-armed troops and peltasts in front of the phalanx, and drew up the phalanx itself in front of the camp, with the archers and slingers on the right hand next to the foot-hills, and the elephants, with the guard that always accompanied them, on the left near the sea.<sup>1</sup>

19. Battle being joined, the light-armed troops assailed Manius first, rushing in from all sides. He received their onset bravely, first yielding and then advancing and driving them back. The phalanx opened and let the light-armed men pass through. It then closed and pushed forward, the long pikes set densely together in order of battle, with which the Macedonians from the time of Alexander and Philip have struck terror into enemies who have not dared to encounter the thick array of long pikes presented to them. At this juncture the Ætolians were seen fleeing from Callidromus with loud cries, and leaping down into the camp of Antiochus. At first neither side knew what had happened, and there was confusion among both in their uncer-

<sup>1</sup> The words right and left are transposed in the text. As Antiochus was looking toward Thessaly, his right hand was on the sea-shore and his left against the mountains.

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tainty; but when Cato made his appearance pursuing the Ætolians with shouts of victory and was already close above the camp of Antiochus, the king's forces, who had been hearing for some time back fearful accounts of the Roman style of fighting, and who knew that they themselves had been enervated by idleness and luxury all winter, took fright. Not knowing how large Cato's force was, it was magnified to their minds by terror. Fearing for the safety of their camp they fled to it in disorder, with the intention of defending it against the enemy. But the Romans were close at their heels and entered the camp with them. Then there was another flight of the Antiocheans as disorderly as the first. Manius pursued them as far as Scarphia, killing and taking prisoners. Returning thence he plundered the king's camp, and by merely showing himself drove out the Ætolians who had broken into the Roman camp during his absence.

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20. The Romans lost about 200 in the battle and the pursuit; Antiochus about 10,000, including prisoners. The king himself, at the first sign of defeat, fled precipitately with 500 horse as far as Elateia, and from Elateia to Chalcis, and thence to Ephesus with his bride Eubœa, as he called her, with his ships; but not all of them, for the Roman admiral made an attack upon some that were bringing supplies, and sunk them. When the people of Rome heard of this victory, so swiftly and easily gained, they offered sacrifice, being satisfied with their first trial of the formidable reputation of Antiochus. To Philip, in return for his services as an ally, they sent his son Demetrius, who was still a hostage in their hands.

21. While these things were going on in the city, Manius received the supplications of the Phoceans, the Chalcideans, and others who had coöperated with Antiochus, and he relieved their fears. He and Philip ravaged Ætolia and reduced its cities. He captured, in hiding, Democritus, the general of the Ætolians, who had threatened Flaminius that he would pitch his camp on the banks of the Tiber. Manius, with an army laden with baggage and spoils, made his way to Callipolis over Mount Corax, the highest, rockiest, and most difficult in that region. Many soldiers, by reason of the badness of the road, fell over precipices

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and were dashed in pieces with their arms and accoutrements. Although the Ætolians might have punished them severely, they were nowhere to be seen, having sent an embassy to Rome to treat for peace. In the meantime Antiochus ordered the satraps of upper Asia to send their army down to the coast in all haste, and he fitted out a fleet which he put under the command of Polyxenidas, an exile from Rhodes. He crossed over to Chersonesus and again fortified it. He also strengthened Sestos and Abydos, through which the Roman legions would be obliged to pass if they should invade Asia. He made Lysimacheia his principal magazine for the present war and accumulated large supplies of arms and provisions in it, believing that the Romans would presently attack him with large land and sea forces. The latter appointed Lucius Scipio as the successor of Manius in the command, as he was then consul, but as he was inexperienced in war they appointed as his lieutenant his brother, Publius Scipio, who had humbled the Carthaginian power and who first bore the title of Africanus.

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## CHAPTER V

The Romans win a Naval Victory — The Scipios march to the Hellespont — A Roman Fleet captured by Stratagem — Fighting at Pergamus — The Naval Battle of Myonessus

22. While the Scipios were still making their preparations, Livius, who had charge of the coast defence of Italy and who had been chosen the successor of Atilius, with his own coast-guard ships and some contributed by the Carthaginians and other allies, sailed for the Piræus. Receiving there the fleet from Atilius he set sail with eighty-one decked ships, Eumenes following with fifty of his own, one-half of which had decks. They put in at Phocæa, a place belonging to Antiochus, but which received them from fear, and on the following day they sailed out for a naval engagement. Polyxenidas, commanding the fleet of Antiochus, met them with 200 ships much lighter than those opposed to him, which was a great advantage to him, since the Romans were not yet experienced in nautical affairs. Seeing two Carthaginian ships sailing in front, he sent three

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563 of his own against them and took them, but found them empty, the crews having leaped overboard. Livius dashed angrily at the three with his flag-ship, much in advance of the rest of the fleet. The enemy being three to one grappled him contemptuously with iron hooks, and when the ships were fastened together the battle was fought as though it were on land. The Romans, being much superior in valor, sprang upon the enemy's ships, overpowered them, and returned, bringing back two ships captured simultaneously by one. This was the prelude to the naval engagement. When the fleets came together the Romans had the best of it by reason of their bodily strength and bravery, but on account of the unwieldy size of their ships they could not capture the enemy, who got away with their nimble craft, and, by rapid flight, took refuge in Ephesus. The Romans repaired to Chios, where twenty-seven Rhodian ships joined them as allies. When Antiochus received the news of this naval fight, he sent Hannibal to Syria to fit out another fleet from Phœnicia and Cilicia. When he was returning with it the Rhodians drove him into Pamphylia, captured some of his ships, and blockaded the rest.

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564 23. In the meantime Publius Scipio arrived in Ætolia with the consul and received the command of the army from Manius. He scorned the siege of the Ætolian towns as small business, and allowed the imploring people to send a new embassy to Rome, while he hastened against Antiochus before his brother's consulship should expire. He moved by way of Macedonia and Thrace to the Hellespont, and it would have been a very hard march for him had not Philip of Macedon repaired the roads, entertained him, escorted him, bridged the streams some time before, and furnished him provisions. In return for this the Scipios immediately relieved him from the payment of the remaining money indemnity, having been authorized to do so by the Senate if they should find him zealous. They also wrote to Prusias, king of Bithynia, reminding him that the Romans were in the habit of augmenting the possessions of the kings in alliance with them. They said that, although they had conquered Philip of Macedon, they had allowed him to retain his kingdom, had released his son whom they had held as a hostage, and had remitted the money pay-

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ment still due. Thereupon Prusias willingly entered into alliance with them against Antiochus. Livius, the commander of the fleet, when he learned that the Scipios were on the march, left Pausimachus, the Rhodian, with the Rhodian ships and a part of his own, in Æolis, and himself sailed with the greater part to the Hellespont to assist the army. Sestos and Rhæteum, and the harbor of the Achæans,<sup>1</sup> and several other places surrendered to him. Abydos refused and he laid siege to it.

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24. After the departure of Livius, Pausimachus trained his sailors by repeated exercises, and constructed machines of various kinds. He attached iron pans containing fire to long poles and suspended them over the sea, so as to clear his own ships and fall upon those of the enemy when they approached. While he was thus engaged Polyxenidas, the admiral of Antiochus, who was also a Rhodian, but had been banished for crime, laid a trap for him. He promised to deliver the fleet of Antiochus to him if he would agree to help him in securing readmittance to his own country. Pausimachus suspected the wily rascal and took special pains to guard against him. But after Polyxenidas had written him an autograph letter on the subject of the betrayal and in accord therewith had sailed away from Ephesus on the pretence of procuring corn for the army, Pausimachus, observing the movement and thinking that no one would put his own signature to a letter proposing a betrayal unless he was speaking the truth, felt entire confidence, relaxed his vigilance, and sent his own fleet away to procure corn. Polyxenidas, seeing that his stratagem was successful, reassembled his ships, and sent the pirate Nicander to Samos with a few men to create confusion by getting in the rear of Pausimachus on the land, and himself sailed at midnight, and about daybreak fell upon him while still asleep. Pausimachus, in this sudden and unexpected catastrophe, ordered his men to abandon their ships and defend themselves on land. When Nicander attacked him in the rear he thought that the land had been taken

<sup>1</sup> ὁ Ἀχαιῶν λιμὴν. This was the harbor at the mouth of the river Xanthus where the Greeks are supposed to have landed when they came to besiege Troy. It is mentioned by our author in *Mithr.* 77, and in the *Civil Wars*, v. 138.

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possession of by night not merely by those who were visible, but by a much larger number. So he made another confused rush for his ships. He was foremost in the encounter and the first to fall, fighting bravely. The rest were all captured or killed. Seven of the ships, which were provided with the fire-apparatus, escaped, as no one dared approach them for fear of conflagration. The remaining twenty Polyxenidas towed to Ephesus.

25. Upon the news of this victory Phocæa again changed sides to Antiochus, as did also Samos and Cuma. Livius, fearing for his own ships, which he had left in Æolis, returned to them in haste. Eumenes hastened to join him, and the Rhodians sent the Romans twenty new ships. In a short time they were all in good spirits and they sailed toward Ephesus prepared for another engagement. As no enemy appeared they divided their naval force into two parts, one half for a long time showing itself on the high sea, while the other landed on the enemy's coast and ravaged it until Nicander attacked them from the interior, took away their plunder, and drove them back to their ships. Then they withdrew to Samos, and Livius' term of office as admiral expired.

26. About this time Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, ravaged the territory of Eumenes and laid siege to Pergamus, shutting up the soldiers in it. On account of this Eumenes sailed with haste to Elæa, the naval station of his kingdom, and with him L. Æmilius Regillus, the successor of Livius as admiral. One thousand foot-soldiers and 100 picked horse had been sent by the Achæans as allies to Eumenes. When their commander, Diophanes, from the wall saw the soldiers of Seleucus sporting and drinking in a contemptuous way, he urged the Pergameans to join him in a sally against the enemy. As they would not agree to this he armed his 1000 foot and his 100 horse, led them out of the city under the wall, and stood there quietly. The enemy derided him for a long time on account of the smallness of his force and because he did not dare to fight, but he fell upon them while they were taking their dinner, threw them into confusion, and put their advance guard to flight. While some sprang for their arms, and others tried to bridle their horses or to catch those that ran away or to

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mount those that would not stand, Diophanes won a most glorious victory, the Pergameans cheering vociferously from the walls, but even then not venturing out. Having killed as many as he could in a brief demonstration and taken a certain number of prisoners with their horses, he quickly returned. The following day he again stationed the Achæans under the wall, the Pergameans again not going out with him. Seleucus approached him with a large body of horse and challenged him to battle, but Diophanes did not accept the challenge. He kept his station close under the wall and watched his opportunity. Seleucus remained till midday, when he turned and led his tired horsemen back. Then Diophanes fell upon his rear and threw it into confusion, and after doing all the damage he could, returned forthwith to his place under the wall. By continually stealing upon the enemy in this way whenever they were collecting forage or wood, and inflicting losses upon them, he compelled Seleucus to move away from Pergamus, and finally drove him out of Eumenes' territory altogether.

27. Not long afterward Polyxenidas and the Romans had a naval engagement near Myonnesus, in which the former had ninety decked ships, and Regillus, the Roman admiral, eighty-three, of which twenty-five were from Rhodes. The latter were ranged by their commander, Eudorus, on the left wing. Seeing Polyxenidas on the other wing extending his line much beyond that of the Romans, and fearing lest it should be surrounded, he sailed rapidly around there with his swift ships and experienced oarsmen, and brought his fire-ships against Polyxenidas first, scattering flames everywhere. The ships of the latter did not dare to meet their assailants on account of the fire, but, sailing round and round, tried to keep out of the way, shipped much water, and were exposed to ramming behind the bows.<sup>1</sup> Presently a Rhodian ship struck a Sidonian, and the blow being severe the anchor of the latter was dislodged and stuck in the former, fastening them together. The two ships being immovable the contest between the crews became like a land fight. As many others hastened to the aid of each, the

<sup>1</sup> θαλάσσης ἐπίμπλαντο καὶ ἐς τὰς ἐπωτίδας ἐτύπτοντο. Schweighäuser thought that this sentence ought to be transposed, the shipping of water being the usual consequence of ramming.



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competition on both sides became spirited, and the Roman ships broke through the Antiochean line of battle, which was exposed in this way, and surrounded the enemy before they knew it. When they discovered it there was a flight and a pursuit. Twenty-nine of the Antiochean ships were lost, thirteen of which were captured with their crews. The Romans lost only two vessels. Polyxenidas captured the Rhodian ship and brought it to Ephesus.

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## CHAPTER VI

Consternation of Antiochus — Antiochus sends Proposals to the Scipios — Both Armies prepare for Battle — The Roman Formation — Antiochus draws up his Forces — The Battle of Magnesia — The Macedonian Phalanx broken — Total Defeat of Antiochus

28. Such was the result of the naval engagement at Myonnesus. Before Antiochus heard of it he was fortifying the Chersonesus and Lysimacheia with the greatest care, thinking, as was the fact, that this was very important as a defence against the Romans, who would have found it very difficult to pass, or to get through the rest of Thrace, if Philip had not conducted them. But Antiochus, who was generally fickle and light-minded, when he heard of his defeat at Myonnesus was completely panic-stricken, and thought that his evil genius had conspired against him. Everything had turned out contrary to his expectations. The Romans had beaten him on the sea, where he thought he was much superior. The Rhodians had shut Hannibal up in Pamphylia. Philip was helping the Romans over the impassable roads, whereas Antiochus supposed that he would have a lively remembrance of what he had suffered from them. Everything unnerved him, and the deity took away his reasoning powers (as is usually the case when misfortunes multiply), so that he abandoned the Chersonesus without cause, even before the enemy came in sight, neither carrying away nor burning the great stores which he had collected there of grain, arms, money, and engines, but leaving all these sinews of war in good condition for the enemy. He paid no attention to the Lysimacheans who, as though after a siege, with lamentations accompanied him in his flight,

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564 together with their wives and children. He was intent only upon preventing the enemy from crossing at Abydos, and rested his last hope of success wholly on that. Yet he was so beside himself that he did not even defend the crossing, but hastened to reach the interior in advance of the enemy, not even leaving a guard at the straits.

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29. When the Scipios learned of his flight they took Lysimacheia on their march, possessed themselves of the treasure and arms in the Chersonesus, crossed the unguarded Hellespont in haste in order to arrive at Sardis before Antiochus, who did not yet know that they had crossed. The panic-stricken king, charging his own faults to the score of fortune, sent Heraclides the Byzantine to the Scipios to treat for peace. He offered to give them Smyrna, Alexandria on the Granicus, and Lampsacus, on account of which cities the war had been begun, and to pay them half the cost of the war. He was authorized if necessary to surrender the Ionian and Æolian cities which had sided with the Romans in the fight and whatever else the Scipios might ask. These things Heraclides was to propose publicly. He was authorized to promise Publius Scipio privately a large sum of money and the surrender of his son, whom the king had taken prisoner in Greece as he was sailing from Chalcis to Demetrias. This son was the Scipio who afterwards took and destroyed Carthage, and was the second to bear the name of Scipio Africanus.<sup>1</sup> He was the son of Paulus, who conquered Perseus, king of Macedon, and of Scipio's daughter, and had been adopted by Scipio. The Scipios in council gave this answer to Heraclides, "If Antiochus wishes peace he must surrender not only the cities of Ionia and Æolia, but all of Asia this side of Mount Taurus, and pay the whole cost of the war incurred on his account." Privately Publius said to Heraclides, "If Antiochus had offered these conditions while he still held the Chersonesus and Lysimacheia they would have been gladly accepted; perhaps so if he were only still guarding the passage of the Hellespont. But now that we have crossed

<sup>1</sup> This is an inexcusable blunder. Scipio Africanus the Younger was the son of Æmilius Paulus and the adopted son of the son of Scipio Africanus the Elder, and was not born till five years after the events here mentioned.

v.r. 564 in safety and have not merely bridled the horse (as the saying is), but mounted him, we cannot consent to such light conditions. I thank the king for his proposal and shall thank him still more after receiving my son. I will repay him now with good advice, that he accept the terms offered instead of waiting for severer ones." B.C. 190

30. After this conference Publius was taken sick and withdrew to Elæa, leaving Gnæus Domitius as his brother's counsellor. Antiochus thinking, as Philip of Macedon did, that nothing worse than these terms could befall him if he were vanquished in war, drew his forces together near the plain of Thyatira not far from the enemy, and sent Scipio's son to him at Elæa. Scipio advised those who brought his son that Antiochus should not fight until he himself should return to the army. Antiochus, acting on this advice, transferred his camp to Mount Sipylus and fortified it with a strong wall. He also interposed the river Phrygius between himself and the enemy, so that he should not be compelled to fight against his will. Domitius, however, in a spirit of ambition, wanted to decide the war himself. So he boldly crossed the river and established a camp at a distance of twenty stades from Antiochus. Four days in succession they both drew up their forces in front of their own fortifications, but neither of them began a battle. On the fifth day Domitius did the same again and haughtily advanced. As Antiochus did not meet him he moved his camp nearer. After an interval of one day he announced by herald in the hearing of the enemy that he would fight Antiochus on the following day whether he was willing or not. The latter was perplexed and again changed his mind. Although he would have ventured heretofore only to make a stand under the wall or to repel the enemy from the wall, till Scipio should regain his health, he now thought that with superior numbers it would be disgraceful to decline an engagement. So he prepared for battle.

31. Both marched out about the last watch, just before daylight. The ordering of the troops on either side was as follows. The Roman legionaries, to the number of 10,000, formed the left wing resting on the river. Behind these were 10,000 Italian allies, and both these divisions were in files in triple line of battle. Behind the Italians

Y. R. 564 came the army of Eumenes and about 3000 Achæan pel-<sup>B. C. 190</sup>  
tasts. Thus stood the left, while on the right wing were the Roman and Italian cavalry and those of Eumenes, not more than 3000 in all. Mingled with all these were light-armed troops and bowmen, and around Domitius himself were four troops of horse. Altogether they were about 30,000 strong. Domitius took his station on the right wing and placed the consul in the centre. He gave the command of the left wing to Eumenes. Considering his African elephants of no use, being few in number and of small size, as those of Africa usually are (and the small ones are afraid of the larger), he placed them in the rear of all. Such was the Roman line of battle.

32. The total force of Antiochus was 70,000 and the strongest of these was the Macedonian phalanx of 16,000 men, still arrayed after the fashion of Alexander and Philip. These were placed in the centre, divided into ten sections of 1600 men each, with fifty men in the front line of each section and thirty-two deep. On the flanks of each section were twenty-two elephants.<sup>1</sup> The appearance of the phalanx was like that of a wall, of which the elephants were the towers. Such was the arrangement of the infantry of Antiochus. His horse were stationed on either wing, consisting of the mail-clad Galatians and the Macedonian corps called the Agema, so named because they were picked horsemen. An equal number of these were stationed on either side of the phalanx. Besides these the right wing had certain light-armed troops, and other horsemen with silver shields, and 200 mounted archers. On the left were the Galatian bands of the Tectosagi, the Trocmi, the Tolistoboi, and certain Cappadocians furnished by King Ariarthes, and a mingling of other tribes. There was another body of horse, mail-clad but light-armed, called the Companion cavalry. In this way Antiochus drew up his forces. He seems to have placed most reliance on his cavalry, whom he stationed in large numbers on his front. The serried phalanx, in which he should have placed most confidence, on account

<sup>1</sup> ἐς δὲ τὰ πλευρὰ ἐκάστου μέρους ἐλέφαντες δύο καὶ ἑκοσίη. This arrangement requires 220 elephants, an incredible number, whereas Livy says that there were two for each of the ten divisions. Evidently the words καὶ ἑκοσίη should be rejected.

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564 of its high state of discipline, was crowded together unskillfully in a narrow space. Besides the forces enumerated there was a great multitude of slingers, archers, javelin throwers, and peltasts from Phrygia, Lycia, Pamphylia, Pisidia, Crete, Tralles, and Cilicia, armed after the Cretan fashion. There were also other mounted archers from the Dahæ, Mysia, Elymaïs, and Arabia, riding on swift camels, who shot arrows with dexterity from their high position, and used very long thin knives when they came to close combat. Antiochus also placed scythe-bearing chariots in the space between the armies to begin the battle, with orders to retire after the first onset.

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33. The appearance of his formation was like that of two armies, one to begin the fight, the other held in reserve. Each was arranged in a way to strike terror into the enemy both by numbers and equipment. Antiochus commanded the horse on the right wing in person; his son Seleucus commanded the left. Philip, the master of the elephants, commanded the phalanx, and Mendis and Zeuxis the skirmishers. The day was dark and gloomy so that the sight of the display was obscured and the aim of the missiles of all kinds impaired by the misty and murky atmosphere. When Eumenes perceived this he disregarded the remainder of the enemy's force, and fearing only the onset of the scythe-bearing chariots, which were mostly ranged against him, he ordered the slingers, archers, and other light-armed under his command to circle around the chariots and aim at the horses, instead of the drivers, for when a horse becomes unmanageable in a chariot all the chariot becomes useless. He often breaks the ranks of his own friends, who are afraid of the scythes. So it turned out. The horses being wounded in great numbers charged with their chariots upon their own ranks. The camels were thrown into disorder first, as they were next in line to the chariots, and after them the mail-clad horse who could not easily dodge the scythes on account of the weight of their armor. Great was the tumult and various the disorder started chiefly by these runaways and spreading along the whole front, the apprehension being even worse than the fact. For, as by reason of distance and multitude, discordant cries and manifold fears, the truth was not clearly grasped even by

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stantly magnified to those beyond. B. C. 190

34. Eumenes, having succeeded admirably in his first attempt and cleared the ground held by the camels and chariots, led his own horse and those of the Romans and Italians in his division against the Galatians, the Cappadocians, and the other collection of mercenaries opposed to him, cheering loudly and exhorting them to have no fear of these inexperienced men who had been deprived of their advance supports. They obeyed him and made so heavy a charge that they put to flight not only those, but the adjoining squadrons and the mail-clad horse, who were already thrown into disorder by the chariots. The greater part of these, unable to turn and fly quickly, on account of the weight of their armor, were captured or killed. While this was the state of affairs on the left of the Macedonian phalanx, Antiochus, on the right, broke through the Roman line of battle, dismembered it, and pursued a long distance.

35. The Macedonian phalanx, which had been stationed between the two bodies of horse in a narrow space in the form of a square, when denuded of cavalry on either side, had opened to receive the light-armed troops, who had been skirmishing in front, and closed again. Thus crowded together, Domitius easily enclosed them with his numerous light cavalry. Having no opportunity to charge or even to deploy their dense mass, they began to suffer severely; and they were indignant that military experience availed them nothing, exposed as they were on all sides to the weapons of the enemy. Nevertheless, they presented their thick-set pikes on all four sides. They challenged the Romans to close combat and preserved at all times the appearance of being about to charge. Yet they did not advance, because they were foot-soldiers and heavily armed, and saw that the enemy were mounted. Most of all they feared to relax their close formation lest they might not readily bring it together again. The Romans did not come to close quarters nor approach them because they feared the discipline, the solidity, and the desperation of this veteran corps; but circled around them and assailed them with javelins and arrows, none of which missed their mark in the dense mass, who could neither turn the missiles aside

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nor dodge them. After suffering severely in this way they yielded to necessity and fell back step by step, but with a bold front, in perfect order and still formidable to the Romans. The latter kept their distance and continued to circle around and wound them, until the elephants inside the Macedonian phalanx became excited and unmanageable. Then the phalanx broke into disorderly flight.

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36. After he had gained this success, Domitius hastened to the camp of Antiochus and overpowered the forces guarding it. In the meantime Antiochus, after pursuing for a long distance that part of the Roman legionaries opposed to him, came to the Roman camp, where he found no guard, either of cavalry or light-armed troops (for Domitius, thinking that the river afforded sufficient protection, had not provided any). But a military tribune, the prefect of the camp, hastened to meet him with a body of fresh troops and checked his advance, and the fugitives took new courage from their comrades and rallied. The king returned haughty as one who had gained a victory, knowing nothing of what had taken place elsewhere. When Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, with a large body of horse, threw himself in his way, Antiochus easily cut through them, but he disregarded the enemy, who took to flight before they had received much damage. When he discovered his defeat and saw the field of battle strewn with the bodies of his own men, horses, and elephants, and his camp already captured, he fled precipitately, arriving at Sardis about midnight. From Sardis he went to the town Celænæ, which they call Apamea, whither he had been informed that his son had fled. On the following day he retreated to Syria, leaving officers in Celænæ to collect the remains of his army. He also sent ambassadors to the consul to treat for peace. The latter was engaged in burying his own dead, stripping those of the enemy, and collecting prisoners. Of the Roman dead there were found twenty-four knights and 300 foot-soldiers from the city, being mostly those whom Antiochus had slain. Eumenes lost only fifteen of his horse. It is believed that the loss of Antiochus, including prisoners, was 50,000. It was not easy to number them on account of their multitude. Some of his elephants were killed and fifteen were captured.

## CHAPTER VII

Antiochus sues for Peace — Scipio's Reply — Treaty ratified — Accusations against Scipio — A Similar Accusation against Epaminondas — Manlius succeeds Scipio — A Disaster in Thrace — Rewards to Eumenes

37. After this brilliant victory, to many people quite unexpected (for it did not seem at all likely that the smaller force, fighting in a strange land, would overcome a much larger one so completely, and especially the Macedonian phalanx which was then in a high state of discipline and valor, and had the reputation of being formidable and invincible), the friends of Antiochus began to blame him for his rashness in quarrelling with the Romans and for his want of skill and his bad judgment from the beginning. They blamed him for giving up the Chersonesus and Lysimacheia with their arms and apparatus without making any defence against the enemy, and for leaving the Hellespont unguarded, when even the Romans would not have expected to force a passage easily. They accused him of his latest blunder in rendering the strongest part of his army useless by its cramped position, and for putting his reliance on the promiscuous multitude of raw recruits rather than on men who had become skilled in military affairs by long training, and had been hardened by many wars to the highest state of valor and endurance. While these discussions were going on among the friends of Antiochus, the Romans were in high spirits and considered no tasks too hard for them now, under favor of the gods and their own courage, for it brought them great confidence in their own good fortune that such a small number, meeting the enemy on the march, in the first battle, in a foreign country, should have overcome a much greater number, composed of so many peoples, with all the royal preparations, including valiant mercenaries and the renowned Macedonian phalanx, and the king himself, ruler of this vast empire and surnamed the Great, — all in a single day. It became a common saying among them, "There *was* a king — Antiochus the Great!"

38. While the Romans were thus congratulating them-



Y.R.  
564B.C.  
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selves the consul gave audience to the ambassadors of Antiochus, his brother, Publius, having recovered his health and returned from Elæa. These wanted to know on what terms Antiochus could be a friend of the Roman people. To them Publius made the following reply: "The grasping nature of Antiochus has been the cause of his present and past misfortunes. While he was the possessor of a vast empire, which the Romans did not object to, he seized Cœle-Syria, which belonged to Ptolemy, his own relative and our friend. Then he invaded Europe, which did not concern him, subjugated Thrace, fortified the Chersonesus, and rebuilt Lysimacheia. He passed thence into Greece and took away the liberty of the people whom the Romans had lately freed, and kept on this course till he was defeated in battle at Thermopylæ, and put to flight. Even then he did not forego his grabbing propensity, for, although frequently beaten at sea, he did not seek peace until we had crossed the Hellespont. Then he scornfully rejected the conditions offered to him, and, again collecting a vast army and uncounted supplies, he continued the war against us, determined to come to an engagement with his betters, until he plunged into this great calamity. We might properly impose a severer punishment on him for his obstinacy in fighting us so persistently, but we are not accustomed to abuse our own prosperity or to aggravate the misfortunes of others. We will offer him the same conditions as before, adding a few which will be equally for our own and his future advantage. He must abandon Europe altogether and all of Asia this side of the Taurus, the boundaries to be fixed hereafter; he shall surrender all the elephants he has, and such number of ships as we may prescribe, and for the future keep no elephants and only so many ships as we allow; must give twenty hostages, whom the consul will select, and pay for the cost of the present war, incurred on his account, 500 Euboïc talents down and 2500 more when the Senate ratifies the treaty; and 12,000 more during twelve years, each yearly installment to be delivered in Rome. He shall also surrender to us all prisoners and deserters, and to Eumenes whatever remains of the possessions he acquired by his agreement with Attalus, the father of Eumenes. If Antiochus accepts these condi-

V.R. 564 tions without guile we will grant him peace and friendship subject to the Senate's ratification." B.C. 190

39. All the terms offered by Scipio were accepted by the ambassadors. That part of the money which was to be paid down, and the twenty hostages, were furnished. Among the latter was Antiochus, the younger son of Antiochus. The Scipios and Antiochus both sent messengers to Rome. The Senate ratified their acts, and a treaty was written carrying out Scipio's views, a few things being added or made plain that had been left indefinite. The boundaries of the dominions of Antiochus were to be the two promontories of Calycadnus and Sarpedonium, beyond which he should not sail for purposes of war. He should have only twelve war-ships for the purpose of keeping his subjects under control, but he might have more if he were attacked. He should not recruit mercenaries from Roman territory nor entertain fugitives from the same, and the hostages should be changed every third year, except the son 189

565 of Antiochus. This treaty was engraved on brazen tablets and deposited in the Capitol (where it was customary to deposit such treaties), and a copy of it was sent to Manlius Vulso, Scipio's successor in the command. He administered the oath to the ambassadors of Antiochus at Apamea in Phrygia, and Antiochus did the same to the tribune, Thermus, who was sent for this purpose. This was the end of the war between Antiochus the Great and the Romans, and some thought that it was by reason of the favor extended by Antiochus to Scipio's son that it went no farther.

567 40. When Scipio returned, some persons accused him 187 of this, and two tribunes of the people brought a charge of corruption and betrayal of the public interest against him. He made light of it and scorned the accusation, and as his trial was set for the day which happened to be the anniversary of his victory over Carthage, he sent victims for sacrifice to the Capitol in advance of his coming, and then made his appearance in court clad in festive garments instead of the mournful and humble garb customary to those under accusation, whereby he made a profound impression on all and predisposed them favorably as to a high-minded citizen conscious of his own rectitude. When he began to speak he made no mention of the accusation against him,

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 567 but detailed the events of his life, what he had done, the 187  
 wars he had waged for his country, how he had carried on  
 each, and how often he had been victorious. It delighted  
 the listeners to hear this grand discourse. When he came  
 to the overthrow of Carthage he was roused to the highest  
 pitch of eloquence and filled the multitude, as well as him-  
 self, with noble rage, saying, "On this very day, O citizens,  
 I won the victory and laid at you feet Carthage, that had  
 lately been such an object of terror to you. Now I am  
 going up to the Capitol to offer the sacrifice appointed for  
 the day. As many of you as love your country join me in  
 the sacrifice, which is offered for your own good." Having  
 finished his speech he went to the Capitol, having made no  
 allusion to the charge against him. The crowd followed  
 him, including most of the judges, with joyful acclama-  
 tions, which were continued while he was performing the  
 sacrifice. The accusers were nonplussed and did not dare  
 to call him to trial again, as that was to no purpose, or to  
 charge him with demagogism, because they knew that his  
 whole life had been above the reach of suspicion or cal-  
 umny.

41. In this way Scipio disdained to notice an accusation  
 unworthy of his career, being wiser, as I think, than Aris-  
 tides when charged with theft, or Socrates when accused as  
 he was. Each of these under a like calumny made no  
 reply, unless Socrates said what Plato makes him say.  
 385 Scipio was more lofty-minded than Epaminondas, too, 369  
 when he held the office of Bœotarch with Pelopidas and  
 one other. The Thebans gave each of them an army and  
 sent them to assist the Arcadians and Messenians, in war  
 against the Lacedæmonians, but recalled them on account  
 of certain calumnies, before they had accomplished what  
 they intended to do. Yet they did not turn over the com-  
 mand to their successors for six months, nor until they had  
 driven out the Lacedæmonian garrisons and substituted  
 Arcadians in their places. Epaminondas had compelled  
 his colleagues to take this course and had undertaken that  
 they should be held guiltless. When they returned home  
 the prosecuting officers put them on trial for their lives,  
 separately (for the law made it a capital offence to withhold  
 by force a command which had been assigned to another),

Y. R. 385 but the other two escaped punishment by exciting pity and B. C. 369  
 by long speeches, putting the blame on Epaminondas, who had authorized them to say this and who so testified while they were speaking. He was tried last. "I acknowledge," he said, "that I retained the command beyond my time, contrary to law, and that I coerced those whom you have just acquitted. Nor do I deprecate the death penalty, since I have broken the law. I only ask, for my past services, that you inscribe on my tomb, 'Here lies the victor of Leuctra. Although his country had not dared to face this enemy, or even a stranger that wore the Doric cap, he led his fellow-citizens to the very doors of Sparta. His country put him to death for violating the laws for her own good.'" After saying this he stepped down from the rostrum and offered to surrender his person to those who wished to drag him to punishment. The judges, moved to shame by the speech, and to admiration of the defence, and to reverence for the man who had spoken, did not wait to take the vote, but ran out of the court-room. The reader may compare these cases together as he likes.

565 42. Manlius, who succeeded Scipio as consul, went to 189  
 the countries taken from Antiochus and regulated them. The Tolistoboi, one of the Galatian tribes in alliance with Antiochus, had taken refuge on Mount Olympus in Mysia. With great difficulty Manlius ascended the mountain and pursued them as they fled until he had killed and hurled over the rocks so large a number that it was impossible to count them. He took 40,000 of them prisoners and burned their arms, and as it was impossible to take about with him so many captives while the war was continuing, he gave them to the neighboring barbarians. Among the Tectosagi and the Trocmi he fell into danger by ambush and barely escaped. He came back against them, however, and found them packed together in a great crowd in camp. He enclosed them with his light-armed troops and rode around ordering his men to shoot them at a distance, but not to come in contact with them. The crowd was so dense that no dart missed its mark. He killed 8000 of them and pursued the remainder beyond the river Halys. Ariarthes, king of Cappadocia, who had sent military aid to Antiochus, became alarmed and sent entreaties, and 200 talents

<sup>V. R.</sup>  
<sup>566</sup> in money besides, by which means he kept Manlius out of his country. The latter returned to the Hellespont with vast treasures, uncounted money, and an army laden with spoils. <sup>B. C.</sup>  
<sup>188</sup>

43. Manlius had done well so far, but he managed very badly afterward. He scorned to go home by water in the summer time. He made no account of the burden he was carrying. He neglected to keep the army in good discipline while on the march, because it was not going to war, but returning home with its spoils. He marched by a long, narrow, and difficult road through Thrace in a stifling heat. Nor did he send word to Philip of Macedonia to meet and escort him. He did not divide his army into parts, so that it might move more lightly and have what was needed more handy. Nor did he keep his baggage in good order for easy defence. He led his army higgledy-piggledy, all strung out, with the baggage in the centre of the line, so that neither the vanguard nor the rear-guard could render assistance quickly by reason of the length and narrowness of the road. So, when the Thracians attacked him in flank from all directions, he lost a large part of the spoils, and of the public money, and of the army itself. He escaped into Macedonia with the remainder — by which means it became very plain how great a service Philip had rendered by escorting the Scipios, and how Antiochus had blundered in abandoning the Chersonesus. Manlius passed from Macedonia into Thessaly, and thence into Epirus, crossed to Brundisium, dismissed what was left of his army to their homes, and returned to Rome.

44. The Rhodians and Eumenes, king of Pergamus, were very proud of their share in the alliance against Antiochus. Eumenes set out for Rome in person and the Rhodians sent envoys. The Senate gave to the Rhodians Lycia and Caria, which they took away from them soon afterward, because in the war with Perseus, king of Macedonia, they showed themselves rather favorable to him. They bestowed upon Eumenes all the rest of the territory taken from Antiochus, except the Greek cities in Asia. Of the latter, those that were formerly tributary to Attalus, the father of Eumenes, were ordered to pay tribute to Eumenes, while those which formerly paid to Antiochus were released from tribute

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
566 altogether and made independent. In this way the Romans <sup>B.C.</sup> 188  
disposed of the lands they had gained in the war.

## CHAPTER VIII

The Successors of Antiochus the Great — Antiochus Epiphanes —  
Antiochus Eupator — Demetrius Soter — Tigranes, King of Armenia,  
conquers Syria — Pompey seizes it for the Romans — Also Phœnicia  
and Palestine — Later History of Syria

- 567 45. Afterward, on the death of Antiochus the Great, his 187  
son Seleucus succeeded him. He gave his son Demetrius  
as a hostage in place of his brother Antiochus. When the  
latter arrived at Athens on his way home, Seleucus was as-  
sassinated as the result of a conspiracy of a certain Helio-  
dorus, one of the court officers. When Heliodorus sought  
to possess himself of the government he was driven out by  
Eumenes and Attalus, who installed Antiochus therein in  
order to secure his good-will; for, by reason of certain  
bickerings, they had already grown suspicious of the Ro-  
mans. Thus Antiochus, the son of Antiochus the Great,  
ascended the throne of Syria. He was called Epiphanes  
(the Illustrious) by the Syrians, because when the govern-  
ment was seized by usurpers he showed himself to be their 175  
true sovereign. By cementing the friendship and alliance  
of Eumenes he governed Syria and the neighboring nations  
with a firm hand. He appointed Timarchus as satrap of  
Babylon and Heraclides as treasurer, two brothers, both of  
whom had been his favorites. He made an expedition  
against Artaxias, king of Armenia, and took him prisoner.
- 590 46. Epiphanes died, leaving a son, Antiochus, nine years 164  
of age, to whom the Syrians gave the name of Eupator, in  
commemoration of his father's bravery. The boy was edu-  
cated by Lysias. The Senate was glad that this Antiochus,  
who had early shown himself high spirited, died young.  
When Demetrius, the son of Seleucus and nephew of Antio-  
chus Epiphanes (grandson of Antiochus the Great and first  
cousin of this boy), at this time a hostage at Rome, and  
twenty-three years old, asked that he should be installed in  
the kingdom as belonging to him rather than to the boy,  
the Senate would not allow it. They thought that it would

<sup>v. r.</sup>  
<sup>590</sup> be more for their advantage that Syria should be governed <sup>B. C.</sup>  
 164 by an immature boy than by a full-grown man. Learning that there were many elephants in Syria and more ships than had been allowed to Antiochus in the treaty, they sent ambassadors thither, who killed the elephants and burned the ships. It was a pitiful sight, the killing of these rare and tame beasts and the burning of the ships. A certain Leptines of Laodicea was so exasperated by the sight that he stabbed Gnæus Octavius, the chief of this embassy, while he was anointing himself in the gymnasium at that place, and Lysias buried him.

47. Demetrius came before the Senate again and asked at all events to be released as a hostage, since he had been given as a substitute for Antiochus, who was now dead. When his request was not granted he escaped secretly by <sup>592</sup>boat. As the Syrians received him gladly, he ascended the <sup>162</sup>throne after having put Lysias to death and the boy with him. He removed Heraclides from office and killed Timarchus, who rebelled and who had administered the government of Babylon badly in other respects. For this he received the surname of Soter (the Protector), which was first bestowed upon him by the Babylonians. When he was firmly established in the kingdom he sent a crown valued at 10,000 pieces of gold to the Romans as the gift of their former hostage, and also delivered up Leptines, the murderer of Octavius. They accepted the crown, but not Leptines, because they intended to hold the Syrians responsible for that crime. <sup>595</sup>Demetrius took the government of <sup>159</sup>Cappadocia away from Ariarthes and gave it to Olophernes, who was supposed to be the brother of Ariarthes, receiving 1000 talents therefor. The Romans, however, decided that as brothers both Ariarthes and Olophernes should reign together.

48. These princes were deprived of the kingdom — and their successor, Ariobarzanes, also, a little later — by Mithridates, king of Pontus. The Mithridatic war grew out of this event, among others, — a very great war, full of vicissitudes to many nations and lasting nearly forty years. During this time Syria had many kings, succeeding each other at brief intervals, but all of the royal lineage, and there were many changes and revolts from the dynasty.

- <sup>Y. R.</sup> 595 The Parthians, who had previously revolted from the rule of the Seleucidæ, seized Mesopotamia, which had been subject to that house. Tigranes, the son of Tigranes, king of Armenia, who had annexed many neighboring principalities, and from these exploits had acquired the title of King of Kings, attacked the Seleucidæ because they would not acknowledge his supremacy. Antiochus Pius was not able
- 672 to withstand him. Tigranes conquered all of the Syrian peoples this side of the Euphrates as far as Egypt. He took Cilicia at the same time (for this was also subject to the Seleucidæ) and put his general, Magadates, in command of all these conquests for fourteen years.
- 685 49. When the Roman general, Lucullus, was pursuing Mithridates, who had taken refuge in the territory of Tigranes, Magadates went with his army to Tigranes' assistance. Thereupon Antiochus, the son of Antiochus Pius, entered Syria clandestinely and assumed the government with the consent of the people. Nor did Lucullus, who first made war on Tigranes and wrested his newly acquired territory from him, object to Antiochus exercising his ancestral authority. But Pompey, the successor of Lucullus,
- 688 when he had overthrown Mithridates, allowed Tigranes to reign in Armenia and expelled Antiochus from the government of Syria, although he had done the Romans no wrong. The real reason for this was that it was easy for Pompey, with an army under his command, to rob an unarmed king, but the pretence was that it was unseemly for the Seleucidæ, whom Tigranes had dethroned, to govern Syria, rather than the Romans who had conquered Tigranes.
50. In this way the Romans, without fighting, came into possession of Cilicia and both inland Syria and Cœle-Syria, Phœnicia, Palestine, and all the other countries bearing the Syrian name from the Euphrates to Egypt and the sea. The
- 691 Jewish nation still resisted, and Pompey conquered them, sent their king, Aristobulus, to Rome, and destroyed their greatest, and to them holiest, city, Jerusalem, as Ptolemy, the first king of Egypt, had formerly done. It was afterward rebuilt and Vespasian destroyed it again, and Hadrian did the same in our time. On account of these rebellions the tribute imposed upon all Jews is heavier per capita than upon the generality of taxpayers. The annual tax on the



F. R.

69<sup>r</sup> Syrians and Cilicians is one per cent. of the valuation of the property of each. Pompey put the various nations that had belonged to the Seleucidæ under kings or chiefs of their own. In like manner he confirmed the four chiefs of the Galatians in Asia, who had coöperated with him in the Mithridatic war, in their tetrarchies. Not long afterward they all came gradually under the Roman rule, mostly in the time of Augustus.

B. C.

63

51. Pompey now put Scaurus, who had been his quæstor in the war, in charge of Syria, and the Senate afterward appointed Marcius Philippus as his successor and Lentulus Marcellinus as the successor of Philippus, both being of prætorian rank. Much of the biennial term of each was consumed in warding off the attacks of the neighboring Arabs. It was on account of these events in Syria that Rome began to appoint for Syria proconsuls, so-called, with power to levy troops and engage in war like consuls. The first of these sent out with an army was Gabinius. As he 69<sup>9</sup> was in readiness to begin the war, Mithridates, king of the Parthians, who had been driven out of his kingdom by his brother, Orodes, persuaded Gabinius to turn his forces from the Arabs against the Parthians. At the same time Ptolemy XI., king of Egypt, who likewise had lost his throne, prevailed upon him by a large sum of money to turn his arms from the Parthians against Alexandria. Gabinius over- 70<sup>0</sup> came the Alexandrians and restored Ptolemy to power, but was himself banished by the Senate for invading Egypt without their authority, and undertaking a war considered ill-omened by the Romans; for it was forbidden by the Sibylline books. I think that Crassus succeeded Gabinius in the government of Syria — the same who met with a great disaster when waging war against the Parthians. While 70<sup>3</sup> Lucius Bibulus was in command of Syria after Crassus, the Parthians made an incursion into that country. While the 71<sup>4</sup> government was in charge of Saxa, the successor of Bibulus, they overran the country as far as Ionia, the Romans being then occupied by the civil wars. I shall deal with these events more particularly in my Parthian history. 40

## CHAPTER IX

Syria at the Death of Alexander the Great — Seleucus Nicator — The  
Extent of the Empire — Oracles and Prodigies concerning Seleucus  
— Cities founded by him — Seleucia-on-the-Tigris

v.R.

52. In this book of Syrian history I have told how the Romans came into possession of Syria, and how they brought it to its present condition. It will not be amiss to tell how the Macedonians, who ruled Syria before the Romans, acquired the same country. After the Persians, Alexander became the sovereign of Syria as well as of all other peoples whom he found. He died leaving one son very small and another yet unborn. The Macedonians, who were loyal to the race of Philip, chose Ardiæus, the brother of Alexander, as king during the minority of Alexander's sons, although he was considered to be hardly of sound mind, and they changed his name from Ardiæus to Philip. They also kept careful guard over the wife, who was *enceinte*. Meanwhile Alexander's friends continued in charge of the conquered nations, divided into satrapies, which Perdiccas parcelled among them by the authority of King Philip. Not long afterward, when the true kings died, these satraps became kings. The first satrap of Syria was Laomedon of Mitylene, who derived his authority from Perdiccas and from Antipater, who succeeded the latter as prime minister. To this Laomedon, Ptolemy, the satrap of Egypt, came with a fleet and offered him a large sum of money if he would hand over Syria to him, because it was well situated for defending Egypt and for attacking Cyprus. When Laomedon refused Ptolemy seized him. Laomedon bribed his guards and escaped to Alcetas in Caria. Thus Ptolemy ruled Syria for a while, left a garrison there, and returned to Egypt.

B.C.

433 53. Antigonus was satrap of Phrygia, Lycia, and Pamphylia. Having been left as overseer of all Asia when Antipater went to Europe, he besieged Eumenes, the satrap of Cappadocia, who had been publicly declared an enemy of the Macedonians. The latter fled and brought Media under his power, but Antigonus afterward captured and killed him. When he returned he was received magnifi-

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Y.R.

438 cently by Seleucus, the satrap of Babylon. One day Seleucus punished one of the governors without consulting Antigonus, who was present, and the latter became angry and demanded an accounting of his money and possessions. As Seleucus was inferior to Antigonus in power he fled to Ptolemy in Egypt. Thereupon Antigonus removed Blitor, the governor of Mesopotamia, from office, because he allowed Seleucus to escape, and took upon himself the government of Babylon, Mesopotamia, and all the countries from Media to the Hellespont, Antipater having died in the meantime. The other satraps at once became envious of his possession of so large a share of the territory; for which reason chiefly, and at the instance of Seleucus, Ptolemy, Lysimachus, the satrap of Thrace, and Cassander, the son of Antipater and leader of the Macedonians after his father's death, entered into a league with each other. They sent a joint embassy to Antigonus and demanded that he should share with them and with the other Macedonians who had lost their satrapies, his newly acquired lands and money. Antigonus treated their demand with scorn, and they jointly made war against him. Antigonus prepared to meet them. He drove out all of Ptolemy's garrisons in Syria and stripped him of all the possessions that he still retained in Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria.

54. Then he marched beyond the Cilician gates, leaving his son Demetrius, who was about twenty-two years of age, at Gaza with an army to meet Ptolemy, who was coming from Egypt, but the latter defeated the young man badly in a battle near Gaza and compelled him to fly to his father.

442 Ptolemy immediately sent Seleucus to Babylon to resume the government and gave him 1000 foot-soldiers and 300 horse for the purpose. With this small force Seleucus took Babylon, the inhabitants receiving him with enthusiasm, and within a short time he augmented his power greatly. Nevertheless Antigonus warded off the attack of Ptolemy and gained a splendid naval victory over him near Cyprus, in which his son Demetrius was the commander. On account of this very notable exploit the army began to call both Antigonus and Demetrius kings, as their own kings (Ardiæus, the son of Philip and Olympias, and the two sons of Alexander) were now dead. Ptolemy's army also

B.C.

316

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<sup>Y. R.</sup>  
442 saluted him as king lest by inferiority of rank he should be deemed less lofty than the victors in the late battle. Thus for these men similar consequences followed contrary events. All the others followed suit, and all the satraps became kings. <sup>B. C.</sup>  
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55. In this way Seleucus became king of Babylonia. He also acquired the kingdom of Media, slaying with his own hand in battle Nicator whom Antigonus had left as satrap of that country. He afterward waged many wars with Macedonians and barbarians. The two principal ones were with Macedonians, the second with Lysimachus, king of Thrace, the first with Antigonus at Ipsus in Phrygia, where Antigonus commanded in person and fought in person although he was above eighty years of age. Antigonus was killed in battle, and then all the kings who had been <sup>301</sup>  
453 in league with Seleucus against him divided his territory among themselves. At this division all Syria from the Euphrates to the sea, also inland Phrygia, fell to the lot of Seleucus. Always lying in wait for the neighboring nations, strong in arms and persuasive in council, he acquired Mesopotamia, Armenia, the so-called Seleucid Cappadocia, the Persians, Parthians, Bactrians, Arabs, Tapyri, Sogdiani, Arachotes, Hyrcanians, and other adjacent peoples that had been subdued by Alexander, as far as the river Indus, so that the boundaries of his empire were the most extensive in Asia after that of Alexander. The whole region from Phrygia to the Indus was subject to Seleucus. He crossed the Indus and waged war with Androcottus, king of the Indians, who dwelt on the banks of that stream, until they came to an understanding with each other and contracted a marriage relationship. Some of these exploits were performed before the death of Antigonus and some afterward.

56. It is said that while he was still serving under Alexander and following him in the war against the Persians he consulted the Didymæan oracle to inquire about his return to Macedonia and that he received for answer:—

“Do not hurry back to Europe; Asia will be much better for you.”

It was said also that in Macedonia a great fire burst forth on his ancestral hearth without anybody lighting it; also

Y. R.  
453 that his mother saw in a dream that whatever ring she found B. C.  
301 she should give him to carry, and that he should be king at the place where he should lose the ring. She did find an iron ring with an anchor engraved on it, and he lost it near the Euphrates. It is said that at a later period, when he was returning to recover Babylon, he stumbled against a stone and that when he caused this stone to be dug up an anchor was found under it. When the soothsayers were alarmed at this prodigy, thinking that it portended delay, Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, who accompanied the expedition, said that an anchor was a sign of safety, not of delay. For this reason Seleucus, when he became king, used an engraved anchor for his signet-ring. Some say that while Alexander was still alive and looking on, another omen of the future power of Seleucus was made manifest in this wise. After Alexander had returned from India to Babylon and while he was sailing around the Babylonian lagoons with a view to the irrigation of the Assyrian fields from the Euphrates, a wind struck him and carried away his diadem 323 and hung it on a bunch of reeds growing on the tomb of an ancient king. This of itself signified the early death of Alexander. They say that a sailor swam after it, put it on his own head, and, without wetting it, brought it to Alexander, who gave him at once a silver talent as a reward for his kind service. The soothsayers advised putting the man to death. Some say that Alexander followed their advice. Others say the contrary. Other narrators skip that part of the story and say that it was no sailor at all, but Seleucus who swam after the king's diadem, and that he put it on his own head to avoid wetting it. The signs turned out true as to both of them in the end, for Alexander departed from life in Babylon and Seleucus became the ruler of a larger part of his dominions than any other of Alexander's successors.

57. Such are the prophecies I have heard of concerning Seleucus. Directly after the death of Alexander he became the leader of the Companion cavalry, which Hephæstion, and afterwards Perdiccas, commanded during the life of Alexander. After commanding the horse he became satrap of Babylon, and after satrap, king. As he was very successful in war he acquired the surname of Nicator. At

Y. R.

442-

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least that seems more probable than that he received it from the killing of Nicator. He was of such a large and powerful frame that once when a wild bull was brought for sacrifice to Alexander and broke loose from his ropes, Seleucus held him alone, with nothing but his hands, for which reason his statues are ornamented with horns. He built cities throughout the entire length of his dominions and named sixteen of them Antioch after his father, five Laodicea after his mother, nine after himself, and four after his wives, that is, three Apamea and one Stratonicea. Of these the two most renowned at the present time are the two Seleucias, one on the sea and the other on the river Tigris, Laodicea in Phœnicia, Antioch under Mount Lebanon, and Apamea in Syria. To others he gave names from Greece or Macedonia, or from his own exploits, or in honor of Alexander; whence it comes to pass that in Syria and among the barbarous regions of upper Asia many of the towns bear Greek and Macedonian names, such as Berrhœa, Edessa, Perinthus, Maronea, Callipolis, Achaia, Pella, Orophus, Amphipolis, Arethusa, Astacus, Tegea, Chalcis, Larissa, Herœa, and Apollonia; in Parthia also Sotera, Calliope, Charis, Hecatompilos, Achaia; in India Alexandropolis; in Scythia Alexandreschata. From the victories of Seleucus come the names of Nicephorium in Mesopotamia and of Nicopolis in Armenia very near Cappadocia.

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58. They say that when he was about to build the two Seleucias a portent of thunder preceded the foundation of the one by the sea, for which reason he consecrated thunder as a divinity of the place. Accordingly the inhabitants worship thunder and sing its praises to this day. They say, also, that when the Magi were ordered to indicate the propitious day and hour for beginning the foundations of Seleucia-on-the-Tigris they falsified as to the hour because they did not want to have such a stronghold built against themselves. While the king was waiting in his tent for the appointed hour, and the army, in readiness to begin the work, stood quietly till Seleucus should give the signal, suddenly, at the true hour of destiny, they seemed to hear a voice ordering them on. So they sprang to their work with such alacrity that the heralds who tried to stop them

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were not able to do so. When the work was brought to an end Seleucus, being troubled in his mind, again made inquiry of the Magi concerning his city, and they, having first secured a promise of impunity, replied, "That which is fated, O King, whether it be for better or worse, neither man nor city can change, for there is a fate for cities as well as for men. It pleases the gods that this city shall endure for ages, because it was begun on the hour on which it was begun. We feared lest it should be a stronghold against ourselves, and falsified the appointed time. Destiny is stronger than crafty Magi or an unsuspecting king. For that reason the deity announced the more propitious hour to the army. It is permitted you to know these things so surely that you need not suspect us of deception still, for you were presiding over the army yourself, as king, and you had yourself ordered them to wait; but the army, ever obedient to you in facing danger and toil, could not now be restrained, even when you gave them the order to stop, but sprang to their work, not a part of them merely, but all together, and their officers with them, thinking that the order had been given. In fact it had been given. That was the reason why not even you could hold them back. What can be stronger in human affairs than a king, unless it be a god, who overcame your intention and supplanted us in giving you directions about the city; for the god is in hostility to us and to all the people round about? What can our resources avail hereafter with a more powerful race settled along side of us? This city of yours has had a fortunate beginning, it will be great and enduring. We beg that you will confirm your pardon of our fault which we committed from fear of the loss of our own prosperity." The king was pleased with what the Magi said and pardoned them. This is what I have heard about Seleucia.

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## CHAPTER X

Seleucus, Antiochus, and Stratonice — Seleucus divides his Kingdom —  
Death of Seleucus — Death of Lysimachus

46x 59. Seleucus, while still living, appointed his son, Antiochus, king of upper Asia in place of himself. If this

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seems noble and kingly on his part, even nobler and wiser was his behavior in reference to his son's falling in love, and his self-restraint in suffering; for Antiochus was in love with Stratonice, the wife of Seleucus, his own step-mother, who had already borne a child to Seleucus. Recognizing the wickedness of this passion, Antiochus did nothing wrong, nor did he show his feelings, but he fell sick, took to his bed, and longed for death. Nor could the celebrated physician, Erasistratus, who was serving Seleucus at a very high salary, form any diagnosis of his malady. At length, observing that his body was free from all the symptoms of disease, he conjectured that this was some condition of the mind, through which the body is often strengthened or weakened by sympathy. Grief, anger, and other passions disclose themselves; love only is concealed by the modest. As Antiochus would confess nothing when the physician asked him in confidence, he took a seat by his side and watched the changes of his body to see how he was affected by each person who entered his room. He found that when others came the patient was all the time weakening and wasting away at a uniform pace, but when Stratonice came to visit him his mind was greatly agitated by the struggles of modesty and conscience, and he remained silent. But his body in spite of himself became more vigorous and lively, and when she went away he became weaker again. So the physician told Seleucus that his son had an incurable disease. The king was overwhelmed with grief and cried aloud. Then the physician added, "His disease is love, love for a woman, but a hopeless love."

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60. Seleucus was astonished that there could be any woman whom he, king of Asia, could not prevail upon to marry such a son as his, by entreaties, by gold, by gifts, by the whole of this great kingdom, the eventual inheritance of the sick prince, which the father would give to him even now, if he wished it, in order to save him. Desiring to learn only one thing more, he asked, "Who is this woman?" Erasistratus replied, "He is in love with my wife." "Well then, my good fellow," rejoined Seleucus, "since you are so bound to us by friendship and favors, and are a model of goodness and wisdom in matters of small moment, will



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461 you not save this princely young man for me, the son of your friend and king, unfortunate in love but virtuous, who has concealed his sinful passion and prefers to die rather than confess it? Do you so despise Antiochus? Do you despise his father also?" Then Erasistratus changed his tactics, and, as though he were giving him a knock-down argument, said, "You would not give Antiochus your wife if he were in love with her, although you are his father." Seleucus swore by all the gods of his royal house that he would willingly and cheerfully give her, and make himself an illustrious example of a kind and good father to a chaste son who controlled his passion and did not deserve such suffering. Much more he added of the same sort, and, finally, began to lament that he could not himself be the physician to his unhappy boy, but must needs depend on Erasistratus in this matter also.

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61. When Erasistratus saw that the king was in earnest and not hypocritical, he told the whole truth. He related how he had discovered the nature of the malady, and how he had detected the secret passion. Seleucus was overjoyed, but it was a difficult matter to persuade his son and not less so to persuade his wife; but he succeeded finally. Then he assembled his army, which was perhaps expecting something of the kind, and told them of his exploits and of the extent of his empire, showing that it surpassed that of any of the other successors of Alexander, and saying that as he was now growing old it was hard for him to govern it on account of its size. "I wish," he said, "to divide it, and so at the same time to provide for your safety in the future and give a part of it now to those who are dearest to me. It is fitting that all of you, who had advanced to such greatness of dominion and power under me since the time of Alexander, should coöperate with me in everything. The dearest to me, and well worthy to reign, are my grown-up son and my wife. As they are young, I pray they may soon have children to be an ample guarantee to you of the permanency of the dynasty. I will join them in marriage in your presence and will send them to be sovereigns of the upper provinces now. And I charge you that none of the customs of the Persians and other nations is more worthy of observance than this one law, which is common to all

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461 of them, "That what the king ordains is always right." B.C. 293

When he had thus spoken the army shouted that he was the greatest king of all the successors of Alexander and the best father. Seleucus laid the same injunctions on Stratonice and his son, then joined them in marriage, and sent them to their kingdom, showing himself even stronger in this famous act than in his deeds of arms.

62. Seleucus had seventy-two satraps under him, so extensive was the territory over which he ruled. The greater part he had transferred to his son, but he continued to reign over the country which lies between the Euphrates and the sea. The last war that he waged was with Lysimachus, for the possession of Phrygia on the Hellespont. Lysimachus 473 was defeated and slain in battle. Then Seleucus crossed 281 the Hellespont in order to possess himself of Lysimacheia, but he was killed by Ptolemy Ceraunus who accompanied him. This Ceraunus was the son of Ptolemy Soter and Euridice, the daughter of Antipater. He had left Egypt from fear, because his father had decided to leave the kingdom to his youngest son. Seleucus had received him as the unfortunate son of his friend, and thus he supported, and took around with himself everywhere, his own murderer.

474 63. Thus Seleucus died at the age of seventy-three, 280 having reigned forty-two years. It seems to me that the oracle hit the mark in his case when it said to him, "Do not hurry back to Europe; Asia will be much better for you," for Lysimacheia is in Europe, and he then crossed over to Europe for the first time after leaving it with the army of Alexander. It is said also that once when he consulted an oracle in reference to his own death he received this answer:—

"If you keep away from Argos you will reach your allotted year, but if you approach that place you will die before your time."

There is an Argos in Peloponnesus, another in Amphilochia, another in Orestea (whence come the Macedonian Argeadæ), and the one on the Ionian sea, said to have been built by Diomedes during his wanderings, — all these, and every place named Argos in every other country, Seleucus inquired about and avoided. While he was advancing

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from the Hellespont to Lysimacheia a splendid great altar presented itself to his view, which he was told had been built either by the Argonauts on their way to Colchis, or by the Achæans who besieged Troy, for which reason the people in the neighborhood still called it Argos, either by a corruption of the name of the ship *Argo*, or from the native place of the sons of Atreus. While he was learning these things he was killed by Ptolemy, who stabbed him in the back. Philetærus, the prince of Pergamus, bought the body of Seleucus from Ceraunus for a large sum of money, burned it, and sent the ashes to his son Antiochus. The latter deposited them at Seleucia-by-the-Sea, where he erected a temple to his father on consecrated ground, to which ground he gave the name of Nicatoreum.

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64. I have heard that Lysimachus, who was one of the armor-bearers of Alexander, was once running by his side for a long distance, and, being fatigued, took hold of the tail of the king's horse and continued to run; that he was struck in the forehead by the point of the king's spear, which opened one of his veins from which the blood flowed profusely; that Alexander, for want of a bandage, bound up the wound with his own diadem which was thus saturated with blood; and that Aristandrus, Alexander's soothsayer, when he saw Lysimachus carried away wounded in this manner, said, "That man will be a king, but he will reign with toil and trouble." He reigned nearly forty years, counting those in which he was satrap, and he did reign with toil and trouble. He fell in battle, while still commanding his army, at the age of seventy. Seleucus did not long survive him. Lysimachus' dog watched his body lying on the ground for a long time, and kept it unharmed by birds or beasts until Thorax of Pharsalia found and buried it. Some say that he was buried by his own son, Alexander, who fled to Seleucus from fear when Lysimachus put to death his other son, Agathocles; that he searched for the body a long time and found it at last by means of the dog, and that it was already partly decomposed. The Lysimacheians deposited the bones in their temple and named the temple itself the Lysimacheum. Thus did these two kings, the bravest and most renowned for bodily size, come to their end at nearly the same time, one of them at

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
<sup>474</sup> the age of seventy, the other three years older, and both <sup>B.C.</sup>  
<sup>280</sup> fighting with their own hands until the day of their death.

## CHAPTER XI

The Successors of Seleucus — Demetrius Soter — Palace Conspiracies  
— End of the Seleucidæ

65. After the death of Seleucus, the kingdom of Syria passed in regular succession from father to son as follows: the first was the same Antiochus who fell in love with his stepmother, to whom was given the surname of Soter (the Protector) for driving out the Gauls who had made an incursion into Asia from Europe. The second was another Antiochus, born of this marriage, who received the surname of Theos (the Divine) from the Milesians in the first instance, because he slew their tyrant, Timarchus. This Theos was poisoned by his wife. He had two wives, Laodice and Berenice, the former a love-match, the latter a daughter pledged to him by Ptolemy Philadelphus. Laodice assassinated him and afterward Berenice and her child. Ptolemy, the son of Philadelphus, avenged these crimes by killing Laodice. He invaded Syria and advanced as far as Babylon. The Parthians now began their revolt, taking advantage of the confusion in the house of the Seleucidæ.

<sup>508</sup> 66. Seleucus, the son of Theos and Laodice, surnamed <sup>246</sup>  
<sup>528</sup> Callinicus (the Triumphant), succeeded Theos as king of  
<sup>528</sup> Syria. After Seleucus his two sons, Seleucus and Antio-  
<sup>530</sup> chus, succeeded in the order of their age. As Seleucus was  
<sup>530</sup> sickly and poor and unable to command the obedience of  
<sup>530</sup> the army, he was poisoned by a court conspiracy in the  
<sup>530</sup> second year of his reign. His brother was Antiochus the <sup>224</sup>  
<sup>567</sup> Great, who went to war with the Romans, of whom I have  
<sup>567</sup> written above. He reigned thirty-seven years. I have <sup>187</sup>  
<sup>567</sup> already spoken of his two sons, Seleucus and Antiochus,  
<sup>567</sup> both of whom ascended the throne. The former reigned  
<sup>567</sup> twelve years, but feebly and without success by reason of  
<sup>579</sup> his father's misfortune. Antiochus (Epiphanes) reigned <sup>175</sup>  
<sup>579</sup> not quite twelve years, in the course of which he captured  
<sup>579</sup> Artaxias the Armenian and made an expedition into Egypt

<sup>V.R.</sup>  
579 against Ptolemy VI., who had been left an orphan with one <sup>B.C.</sup>  
brother. While he was encamped near Alexandria, Popilius came to him as Roman ambassador, bringing an order in writing that he should not attack the Ptolemies. When he had read it he replied that he would think about it. Popilius drew a circle around him with a stick and  
590 said, "Think about it here." He was terrified and with-<sup>164</sup>  
drew from the country, and robbed the temple of Venus Elymais; then died of a wasting disease, leaving a son nine years of age, the Antiochus Eupator already mentioned.

592 67. I have also spoken of Demetrius, his successor, who <sup>162</sup>  
<sup>592.</sup> had been a hostage in Rome and who escaped and became <sup>162</sup>  
king. He was also called Soter by the Syrians, the next who bore that title after the son of Seleucus Nicator. Against him a certain Alexander took up arms, falsely pretending to be of the family of the Seleucidæ, to whom Ptolemy, king of Egypt, gave aid because he hated Demetrius. The latter was deprived of his kingdom by this means and died. His son, Demetrius, drove out Alexander. For his victory over this bastard of the family he was surnamed Nicator by the Syrians, the next who bore that title after Seleucus. Following the example of Seleucus he made an expedition against the Parthians. He was taken prisoner by them and lived in the palace of King Phraates, who gave him his sister, Rhodoguna, in marriage.

68. While the country was without a government Diodotus, a slave of the royal house, placed on the throne a young boy named Alexander, a son of Alexander the Bastard and of Ptolemy's daughter. Afterward he put the boy to death and undertook the government himself and assumed the name of Trypho. But Antiochus, the brother of the captive Demetrius, learning in Rhodes of his captivity, came home and, with great difficulty, put Trypho to death. Then he marched with an army against Phraates and demanded his brother. Phraates was afraid of him and sent Demetrius back. Antiochus nevertheless fought with the Parthians, was beaten, and committed suicide. When Demetrius returned to his kingdom he was killed by the craft of his wife, Cleopatra, who was jealous on account of his marriage with Rhodoguna, for which reason also she had previously married his brother Antiochus. She had

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borne two sons to Demetrius, named Seleucus and Antiochus Grypus (the Hook Nosed); and to Antiochus one son, named Antiochus Cyzicenus. She had sent Grypus to Athens and Cyzicenus to Cyzicus to be educated.

69. As soon as Seleucus assumed the diadem after his brother's death his mother shot him dead with an arrow, either fearing lest he should avenge his father or moved by an insane hatred for everybody. After Seleucus, Grypus became king, and he compelled his mother to drink poison that she had mixed for himself. So justice overtook her at last. Grypus was worthy of such a mother. He laid a plot against Cyzicenus, his half-brother, but the latter found it out, made war on him, drove him out of the kingdom, and became king of Syria in his stead. Then Seleucus, the son of Grypus, made war on his uncle and took the government away from him. The new sovereign was violent and tyrannical and was burned to death in the gymnasium at the city of Mopsus in Cilicia. Antiochus, the son of Cyzicenus, succeeded him. The Syrians thought that he escaped a plot of his cousin Seleucus on account of his piety, for which reason they gave him the name of Antiochus Pius. He was really saved by a handsome prostitute with whom he was in love. I think that the Syrians must have given him this title by way of joke, for this Pius married Selene, who had been the wife of his father, Cyzicenus, and of his uncle, Grypus. For this reason the divine vengeance pursued him and he was expelled the kingdom by Tigranes.

70. The son of Pius and Selene, who was brought up in Asia and was for that reason called Asiaticus, was deprived of the government of Syria by Pompey, as I have already mentioned. He was the seventeenth king of Syria, reckoning from Seleucus (for I leave out Alexander and his son as being illegitimate, and also their slave, Diodotus), and he reigned only one year, while Pompey was busy elsewhere. The dynasty of the Seleucidæ lasted 230 years. To compute the time from Alexander the Great to the beginning of the Roman domination there must be added fourteen years of the rule of Tigranes. So much, in the way of foreign history, concerning the Macedonian kings of Syria.

# BOOK XII

## THE MITHRIDATIC WARS

### CHAPTER I

Prusias, King of Bithynia — His Attack upon Attalus — His Son Nicomedes — Conspiracy against Prusias — Death of Prusias

1. THE Greeks think that the Thracians who marched to the Trojan war with Rhesus, who was killed by Diomedes in the night-time in the manner described in Homer's poems,<sup>1</sup> fled to the outlet of the Euxine sea at the place where the crossing to Thrace is shortest. Some say that as they found no ships they remained there and possessed themselves of the country called Bebrycia. Others say that they crossed over to the country beyond Byzantium called Thracian Bithynia and settled along the river Bithya, but were forced by hunger to return to Bebrycia, to which they gave the name of Bithynia from the river where they had previously dwelt; or perhaps the name was changed by them insensibly with the lapse of time, as there is not much difference between Bithynia and Bebrycia. So some think. Others say that their first ruler was Bithys, the son of Zeus and Thrace, and that the two countries received their names from them.

2. So much by way of preface concerning Bithynia. Of the forty-nine kings who successively ruled the country before the Romans, it does not concern me to make special mention in writing Roman history. Prusias, surnamed the Hunter, was the one to whom Perseus, king of Macedonia, gave his sister in marriage. When Perseus and the Romans, not long afterward, went to war with each other, Prusias did not take sides with either of them. When Perseus

<sup>1</sup> *Iliad*, x. 482-497.

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was taken prisoner Prusias went to meet the Roman generals, clad in a toga which they call the *tebennus*, shod in the Italian fashion, with his head shaved and wearing on it a *pilleus*<sup>1</sup> in the manner of slaves who have been made free in their masters' wills, and making himself appear base and insignificant in other ways. When he met them he said in the Latin tongue, "I am the freedman of the Romans, which is to say 'emancipated.'" They laughed at him and sent him to Rome. As he appeared equally ridiculous there he obtained pardon.

600 3. Some time later, being incensed against Attalus, king<sup>154</sup> of the Asiatic country about Pergamus, Prusias ravaged his territory. When the Roman Senate learned of this they sent word to Prusias that he must not attack Attalus, who was their friend and ally. As he was slow in obeying, the ambassadors laid stern commands upon him to obey the orders of the Senate and to go with 1000 horse to the boundary line to negotiate a treaty with Attalus, who, they said, was awaiting him there with an equal number. Despising the handful of men with Attalus and hoping to ensnare him, Prusias sent the ambassadors in advance to say that he was following with 1000 men, but actually put his whole army in motion and advanced as if to battle. When Attalus and the ambassadors learned of this they took to promiscuous flight. Prusias seized the beasts of burden belonging to the Romans that had been left behind, captured and destroyed the stronghold of Nicephorium, burned the temples in it, and besieged Attalus, who had fled to Pergamus. When these things became known in Rome a fresh embassy was sent, ordering Prusias to make compensation to Attalus for the damage done to him. Then Prusias became alarmed, obeyed the order, and retired. The ambassadors decided that as a penalty he must transfer to Attalus twenty decked ships at once, and pay him 500 talents of silver within a certain time. Accordingly he gave up the ships and began to make the payments at the prescribed time.

4. As Prusias was hated by his subjects on account of his extreme cruelty they became greatly attached to his son,

<sup>1</sup> The *pilleus* is known to the modern world as the "cap of liberty."



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600 Nicomedes. Thus the latter fell under the suspicion of 154  
Prusias, who sent him to live in Rome. Learning that he  
606 was much esteemed there also, Prusias directed him to 148  
petition the Senate to release him from the payment of the  
money still due to Attalus. He sent Menas as his fellow-  
ambassador, and told him if he should secure a remission  
of the payments to spare Nicomedes, but if not, to kill him  
at Rome. For this purpose he sent a number of small  
boats with him and 2000 soldiers. As the fine imposed on  
Prusias was not remitted (for Andronicus, who had been  
sent by Attalus to argue on the other side, showed that it  
was less in amount than the plunder), Menas, seeing that  
Nicomedes was an estimable and attractive young man, was  
at a loss to know what to do. He did not dare to kill him,  
nor to go back himself to Bithynia. The young man noticed  
his delay and sought a conference with him, which was  
just what he wanted. They formed a plot against Prusias  
and secured the coöperation of Andronicus, the legate of  
Attalus, that he should persuade Attalus to take back Nico-  
medes to Bithynia. They met by agreement at Bernice, a  
small town in Epirus, where they entered into a ship by  
night to confer as to what should be done, and separated  
before daylight.

5. In the morning Nicomedes came out of the ship clad  
in the royal purple and wearing a diadem on his head.  
Andronicus met him, saluted him as king, and formed an  
escort for him with 500 soldiers that he had with him.  
Menas, pretending that he had then for the first time learned  
that Nicomedes was present, rushed to his 2000 men and  
exclaimed with assumed trepidation, "Since we have two  
kings, one at home and the other going there, we must look  
out for our own interests, and form a careful judgment of  
the future, because our safety lies in foreseeing correctly  
which of them will be the stronger. One of them is an old  
man, the other is young. The Bithynians are averse to  
Prusias; they are attached to Nicomedes. The leading  
Romans are fond of the young man, and Andronicus has  
already furnished him a guard, showing that Nicomedes is  
in alliance with Attalus, who rules an extensive dominion  
alongside the Bithynians and is an old enemy of Prusias."  
In addition to this he expatiated on the cruelty of Prusias

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and his outrageous conduct toward everybody, and the general hatred in which he was held by the Bithynians on this account. When he saw that the soldiers also abhorred the wickedness of Prusias he led them forthwith to Nicomedes and saluted him as king, just as Andronicus had done before, and formed a guard for him with his 2000 men.

6. Attalus received the young man warmly and ordered Prusias to assign certain towns for his occupation, and territory to furnish him supplies. Prusias replied that he would presently give his son the whole kingdom of Attalus, which he had intended for Nicomedes when he invaded Asia<sup>1</sup> before. After giving this answer he made a formal accusation at Rome against Nicomedes and Attalus and cited them to trial. The forces of Attalus at once made an incursion into Bithynia, the inhabitants of which gradually took sides with the invaders. Prusias, trusting nobody and hoping that the Romans would rescue him from the toils of the conspiracy, asked and obtained from his son-in-law, Diegyllis, the Thracian, 500 men, and with these alone as a body-guard he took refuge in the citadel of Nicæa. The Roman prætor, in order to favor Attalus, delayed introducing the ambassadors of Prusias to the Senate at Rome. When he did introduce them, the Senate voted that the prætor himself should choose legates and send them to settle the difficulty. He selected three men, one of whom had once been struck on the head with a stone, from which he was badly scarred; another was a diseased cripple, and the third was considered almost a fool; wherefore Cato made the contemptuous remark concerning this embassy, that it had no understanding, no feet and no head.

7. The legates proceeded to Bithynia and ordered that the war be discontinued. Nicomedes and Attalus pretended to acquiesce. The Bithynians had been instructed to say that they could no longer endure the cruelty of Prusias, especially after they had openly complained against him. On the pretext that these complaints were not yet known at Rome the legates adjourned, leaving the business unfinished. When Prusias despaired of assistance from the

<sup>1</sup> In Roman nomenclature Asia meant the proconsular province composed of Mysia, Lydia, Caria, and Phrygia.

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606 Romans (in reliance upon whom he had neglected to provide means for his own defence) he retired to Nicomedia in order to possess himself of the city and resist the invaders. The inhabitants, however, betrayed him and opened the gates, and Nicomedes entered with his army. Prusias fled to the temple of Zeus, where he was stabbed by some of the emissaries of Nicomedes. In this way Nicomedes succeeded Prusias as king of the Bithynians. At his death his son, Nicomedes, surnamed Philopator, succeeded him, the Senate confirming his ancestral authority. So much for Bithynia. To anticipate the sequel,<sup>1</sup> another Nicomedes, grandson of this one, left the kingdom to the Romans in his will. B.C.  
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## CHAPTER II

Cappadocia in Ancient Times — The First Mithridates — Mithridates Eupator — His First Difficulty with the Romans — Sends an Ambassador to Them — His Dispute with Nicomedes — Duplicity of the Roman Legates

8. Who were the rulers of Cappadocia before the Macedonians I am not able to say exactly — whether it had a government of its own or was subject to Darius. I judge that Alexander left behind him governors of the conquered nations to collect the tribute while he hastened after Darius. But it appears that he restored to Amisus, a city of Pontus, of Attic origin, its original democratic form of government. Yet Hieronymus<sup>2</sup> says that he did not touch those nations at all, but that he went after Darius by another road, along the sea-coast of Pamphylia and Cilicia. But Perdiccas, who ruled the Macedonians after Alexander, captured and hanged Ariarthes, the governor of Cappadocia, either

<sup>1</sup> Literally: "If anybody wishes to know it all beforehand."

<sup>2</sup> Hieronymus of Cardia accompanied Alexander in his campaign against Darius and wrote a history of it which has not come down to us. He is mentioned by Diodorus the Sicilian as a friend and fellow-citizen of Eumenes. After the death of Alexander he served under Eumenes and afterwards under Antigonos and the latter's son and grandson. His history embraced the successors of Alexander and was continued to the death of Pyrrhus. It is said that he lived to the age of 104.

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because he had revolted or in order to bring that country under Macedonian rule, and placed Eumenes of Cardia over these peoples. Eumenes was afterward adjudged an enemy of Macedonia and put to death, and Antipater, who succeeded Perdikkas as overseer of the territory of Alexander, appointed Nicanor satrap of Cappadocia.

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9. Not long afterward dissensions broke out among the Macedonians. Antigonus expelled Laomedon from Syria and assumed the government himself. He had with him one Mithridates, a scion of the royal house of Persia. Antigonus had a dream that he had sowed a field with gold, and that Mithridates reaped it and carried it off to Pontus. He accordingly arrested him, intending to put him to death, but Mithridates escaped with six horsemen, fortified himself in a stronghold of Cappadocia, where many joined him in consequence of the decay of the Macedonian power, and possessed himself of the whole of Cappadocia and of the neighboring countries along the Euxine. This great power, which he had built up, he left to his children. They reigned one after another until the sixth Mithridates in succession from the founder of the house, and he went to war with the Romans. Since there were kings of this house of both Cappadocia and Pontus, I judge that they divided the government, some ruling one country and some the other.

10. At any rate a king of Pontus, the Mithridates surnamed Euergetes (the Benefactor), who was the first of them inscribed as a friend of the Roman people, and who even sent some ships and a small force of auxiliaries to aid them against the Carthaginians, invaded Cappadocia as though it were a foreign country. He was succeeded by his son, Mithridates, surnamed Dionysus, and also Eupator. The Romans ordered him to restore Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes, who had fled to them and who seemed to have a better title to the government of that country than Mithridates; or perhaps they distrusted the growing power of that great monarchy and thought it would be better to have it divided into several parts. Mithridates obeyed the order, but he put an army at the service of Socrates, surnamed Chrestus, the brother of Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, who overthrew the latter and usurped the government. This Nicomedes

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664 was the son of Nicomedes the son of Prusias, who had received the kingdom of Bithynia as his patrimony at the hands of the Romans. Simultaneously Mithraas and Bagoas drove out Ariobarzanes, whom the Romans had confirmed as king of Cappadocia, and installed Ariarthes in his place.

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11. The Romans decided to restore Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes at the same time, each to his own kingdom, and sent thither for this purpose an embassy, of which Manius Aquilius was the chief, and ordered Lucius Cassius, who was in charge of the Asiatic country around Pergamus and had a small army under his command, to cooperate in their mission. Similar orders were sent to Mithridates Eupator himself. But the latter, being angry with the Romans on account of their interference in Cappadocia, and having been recently despoiled of Phrygia by them (as narrated in my Hellenic history), did not cooperate. Nevertheless Cassius and Manius, with the army of the former, and a large force collected from the Galatians and Phrygians, restored Nicomedes to Bithynia and Ariobarzanes to Cappadocia. They urged them at the same time, as they were neighbors of Mithridates, to make incursions into his territory and stir up a war, promising them the assistance of the Romans. Both of them hesitated to begin so important a war on their own border, because they feared the power of Mithridates. When the ambassadors insisted, Nicomedes, who had agreed to pay a large sum of money to the generals and ambassadors for restoring him to power, which he still owed, together with other large sums which he had borrowed on interest from the Romans in his country and for which they were dunning him, made an attack reluctantly on the territory of Mithridates and plundered it as far as the city 666 of Amastris, meeting no resistance. Although Mithridates 88 had his forces in readiness he retreated, because he wanted to have good and sufficient cause for war.

12. Nicomedes returned with large booty and Mithridates sent Pelopidas to the Roman generals and ambassadors. He was not ignorant that they wanted to bring on a war, and that they had incited this attack upon him, but he dissembled in order to procure more and clearer causes for the coming war, for which reason he reminded them of

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his own and his father's friendship and alliance, in return for which Pelopidas said that Phrygia and Cappadocia had been wrested from him, of which Cappadocia had always belonged to his ancestors and had been left to him by his own father. "Phrygia," he continued, "was given to him by your own general as a reward for his victory over Aristonicus; nevertheless he paid a large sum of money to that same general for it. But now you allow Nicomedes even to close the mouth of the Euxine, and to overrun the country as far as Amastris, and you see him carrying off vast plunder with impunity. My king was not weak, he was not unprepared to defend himself, but he waited in order that you might be eye-witnesses of these transactions. Since you have seen all this, Mithridates, who is your friend and ally, calls upon you as friends and allies (for so the treaty reads) to defend us against the wrong-doing of Nicomedes, or to restrain the wrong-doer."

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13. When Pelopidas had finished speaking the ambassadors of Nicomedes, who were there to answer him, said: "Mithridates plotted against Nicomedes long ago and put Socrates on the throne by force and arms, though Socrates was of a quiet disposition and thought it right that his elder brother should reign. This was the act of Mithridates to Nicomedes whom you, Romans, had established on the throne of Bithynia — a blow which was evidently aimed as much at you as at us. In like manner after you had commanded the Asiatic kings not to molest Europe, he seized the greater part of Chersonesus. Let these acts stand as examples of his arrogance, his hostility, his disobedience towards yourselves. Look at his great preparations. He stands in complete readiness, as for a great and predetermined war, not merely with his own army, but with great force of allies, Thracians, Scythians, and many other neighboring peoples. He has formed a marriage alliance with Armenia, and has sent to Egypt and Syria to make friends with the kings of those countries. He has 300 ships of war and is still adding to the number. He has sent to Phœnicia and Egypt for naval officers and steersmen. These things, that Mithridates is collecting in such vast quantities, are not designed for Nicomedes, nay, O Romans, but for you. He is angry with you because, when

V.R. 666 he had bought Phrygia by a corrupt bargain from one of your generals, you ordered him to give up his ill-gotten gains. He is angry on account of Cappadocia, which was given by you to Ariobarzanes. He fears your increasing power. He is making preparations under pretence that they are intended for us, but he means to attack you if he can. It will be the part of wisdom not to wait till he declares war against you, but to look at his deeds rather than his words, and not give up true and tried friends for a hypocrite who offers you the fictitious name of friendship, nor allow your decision concerning our kingdom to be annulled by one who is equally the foe of both of us." B.C. 88

14. After the ambassadors of Nicomedes had thus spoken Pelopidas again addressed the Roman assembly, saying that if Nicomedes was complaining of bygones, he accepted the decision of the Romans, but as to present matters which were transpiring under their eyes, the ravaging of Mithridates' territory, the closing of the sea, and the carrying away of such vast plunder, there was no need of discussion or adjudication. "We call upon you, Romans, again," he said, "either to prevent such outrages, or to assist Mithridates, who is their victim, or at all events to stand aside, allow him to defend himself, and not help either party." While Pelopidas was repeating his demand, though it had been determined by the Roman generals long before to help Nicomedes, they made a pretence of listening to the argument on the other side. Yet the words of Pelopidas and the alliance of Mithridates, which was still in force, put them to shame, and they were at a loss for some time what answer to make. Finally, after long thought, they made this artful reply, "We would not wish that Mithridates suffer harm at the hands of Nicomedes, nor can we allow war to be made against Nicomedes, because we do not think that it would be for the interest of Rome that he should be weakened." Having delivered this response they dismissed Pelopidas from the assembly, although he wanted to show the insufficiency of their answer.

## CHAPTER III

Mithridates seizes Cappadocia — Sends Another Embassy — First Mithridatic War — The Romans badly defeated — Retreat of the Roman Forces — The Roman Generals captured

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15. Mithridates, having been denied justice by the Romans in this public manner, sent his son Ariarthes with a large force to seize the kingdom of Cappadocia. Ariarthes speedily overpowered it and drove out Ariobarzanes. Then Pelopidas returned to the Roman generals and said: "How patiently King Mithridates bore injury from you when he was deprived of Phrygia and Cappadocia not long ago you have been told already, O Romans. What injuries Nicomedes inflicted upon him you have seen — and have not heeded. And when we appealed to your friendship and alliance you answered as though we were not the accusers but the accused, saying that it would not be for your interest that harm should come to Nicomedes, as though he were the injured one. You therefore are accountable to the Roman republic for what has taken place in Cappadocia. Mithridates has done what he has done because you disdained us and mocked us in your answers. He intends to send an embassy to your Senate to complain against you. He summons you to defend yourselves there in person in order that ye may do nothing in haste, nor begin a war of such magnitude without the decree of Rome itself. You should bear in mind that Mithridates is ruling his ancestral domain, which is 2000 stades long, and that he has acquired many neighboring nations, the Colchians, a very warlike people, the Greeks bordering on the Euxine, and the barbarian tribes beyond them. He has allies also ready to obey his every command, Scythians, Taurians, Bastarnæ, Thracians, Sarmatians, and all those who dwell in the region of the Don and Danube and the sea of Azof. Tigranes of Armenia is his son-in-law and Arsaces of Parthia his ally. He has a large number of ships, some in readiness and others building, and apparatus of all kinds in abundance.

16. "The Bithynians were not wrong in what they told you lately about the kings of Egypt and Syria. Not only

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666 are these likely to help us if war breaks out, but also your newly acquired province of Asia, and Greece, and Africa, and a considerable part of Italy itself, which even now wages implacable war against you because it cannot endure your greed. Before you are able to compose this strife you attack Mithridates and set Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes on him by turns, and you say, forsooth, that you are our friends and allies. You pretend to be so, and yet you act like enemies. Come now, if at last the consequences of your acts have put you in a better frame of mind, either restrain Nicomedes from injuring your friends and allies (in which case I promise that King Mithridates shall help you to put down the rebellion in Italy), or throw off the mask of friendship for us, or let us go to Rome and settle the dispute there." So spake Pelopidas. The Romans considered his speech insolent and ordered Mithridates to let Nicomedes and Cappadocia alone (for they had again restored Ariobarzanes to the latter). They also ordered Pelopidas to leave their camp immediately, and not to return unless the king obeyed their commands. Having given this answer they sent him away under guard lest he should inveigle some persons on the road.

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17. After they had finished speaking they did not wait to hear what the Senate and people of Rome would think about such a great war, but began to collect forces from Bithynia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, and the Galatians of Asia. As soon as Lucius Cassius, the governor of Asia, had his own army in readiness all the allied forces were assembled. Then they were put in separate divisions and sent into camp, Cassius on the boundary of Bithynia and Galatia, Manius on Mithridates' line of march to Bithynia, and Oppius, the third general, among the mountains of Cappadocia. Each of these had about 40,000 men, horse and foot together. They had also a fleet under command of Minucius Rufus and Gaius Popillius at Byzantium, guarding the mouth of the Euxine. Nicomedes was present with 50,000 foot and 6000 horse under his command. Such was the total strength of the forces brought together. Mithridates had in his own army 250,000 foot and 40,000 horse, 300 ships with decks, 100 with two banks of oars each, and other apparatus in proportion. He had for gen-

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erals Neoptolemus and Archelaus, two brothers. The king took charge of the greater number in person. Of the allied forces Archathias, the son of Mithridates, led 10,000 horse from Armenia Minor, and Doryalus commanded the phalanx. Craterus had charge of 130 war chariots. So great were the preparations on either side when the Romans and Mithridates first came in conflict with each other, about the 173d Olympiad.

18. When Nicomedes and the generals of Mithridates came in sight of each other in a wide plain bordered by the river Amnias they drew up their forces for battle. Nicomedes had his entire army in hand; Neoptolemus and Archelaus had only their light infantry and the cavalry of Archathias and a few chariots; for the phalanx had not yet come up. They sent forward a small force to seize a rocky hill in the plain lest they should be surrounded by the Bithynians, who were much more numerous. When Neoptolemus saw his men driven from the hill he was still more in fear of being surrounded. He advanced with haste to their assistance, at the same time calling on Archathias for help. When Nicomedes perceived the movement he sought to meet it by a similar one. Thereupon a severe and bloody struggle ensued. Nicomedes prevailed and put the Mithridateans to flight until Archelaus, advancing from the right flank, fell upon the pursuers, who were compelled to turn their attention to him. He yielded little by little in order that the forces of Neoptolemus might have a chance to rally. When he judged that they had done so sufficiently he advanced again. At the same time the scythe-bearing chariots made a charge on the Bithynians, cutting some of them in two, and tearing others to pieces. The army of Nicomedes was terrified at seeing men cut in halves and still breathing, or mangled in fragments and their parts hanging on the scythes. Overcome rather by the hideousness of the spectacle than by loss of the fight, fear took possession of their ranks. While they were thus thrown into confusion Archelaus attacked them in front, and Neoptolemus and Archathias, who had turned about, assailed them in the rear. They fought a long time facing both ways. After the greater part of his men had fallen, Nicomedes fled with the remainder into Paphlagonia,

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666 although the Mithridatean phalanx had not come into the engagement at all. His camp was captured, together with a large sum of money and many prisoners. All these Mithridates treated kindly and sent to their homes with supplies for the journey, thus gaining a reputation for clemency among his enemies.

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19. This first engagement of the Mithridatic war alarmed the Roman generals, because they had kindled so great a strife precipitately, without good judgment, and without any public decree. A small number of soldiers had overcome a much larger one, not by having a better position, or through any blunder of the enemy, but by the valor of the generals and the fighting quality of the army. Nicomedes now encamped alongside of Manius. Mithridates ascended Mount Scoroba, which lies on the boundary between Bithynia and Pontus. A hundred Sarmatian horse of his advance-guard came upon 800 of the Nicomedean cavalry and took some of them prisoners. Mithridates dismissed these also to their homes and furnished them supplies. Neoptolemus, and Nemanes the Armenian, overtook Manius on his retreat at the castle of Protophachium about the seventh hour, while Nicomedes was moving away to join Cassius, and compelled him to fight. He had 4000 horse and ten times that number of foot. They killed 10,000 of his men and took 300 prisoners. When they were brought to Mithridates he released them in like manner, thus winning the good opinion of his enemies. The camp of Manius was also captured. He fled to the river Sangarius, crossed it by night, and escaped to Pergamus. Cassius and Nicomedes and all the Roman ambassadors who were with the army decamped to a place called the Lion's Head, a very powerful stronghold in Phrygia, where they began to drill their newly collected mob of artisans, rustics, and other raw recruits, and made new levies among the Phrygians. Finding them worthless they abandoned the idea of fighting with such unwarlike men, dismissed them and retreated; Cassius with his own army to Apamea, Nicomedes to Pergamus, and Manius toward Rhodes. When those who were guarding the mouth of the Euxine learned these facts they scattered also and delivered the straits and all the ships they had to Mithridates.

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20. Having subverted the whole dominion of Nicomedes at one blow, Mithridates took possession of it and put the cities in order. Then he invaded Phrygia and lodged at an inn which had been occupied by Alexander the Great, thinking that it would bring him luck to halt where Alexander had once stopped. He overran the rest of Phrygia, together with Mysia and those parts of Asia which had been lately acquired by the Romans. Then he sent his officers to the adjoining provinces and subjugated Lycia, Pamphylia, and the rest as far as Ionia. To the Laodiceans on the river Lycus, who were still resisting (for the Roman general, Quintus Oppius, had arrived with his cavalry and certain mercenaries at their town and was defending it), he made this proclamation by herald before the walls, "King Mithridates promises that the Laodiceans shall suffer no injury if they will deliver Oppius to him." Upon this announcement they dismissed the mercenaries unharmed, but led Oppius himself to Mithridates with his lictors marching in front of him by way of ridicule. Mithridates did him no harm, but took him around with him unbound, exhibiting a Roman general as his prisoner.

21. Not long afterward he captured Manius Aquilius, one of the ambassadors and the one who was most to blame for this war. Mithridates led him around, bound on an ass, and compelled him to introduce himself to the public as Manius. Finally, at Pergamus, Mithridates poured molten gold down his throat, thus rebuking the Romans for their bribe-taking. After appointing satraps over the various nations he proceeded to Magnesia, Ephesus, and Mitylene, all of which received him gladly. The Ephesians overthrew the Roman statues which had been erected in their cities — for which they paid the penalty not long afterward. On his return from Ionia Mithridates took the city of Stratonicea, imposed a pecuniary fine on it, and placed a garrison in it. Seeing a handsome virgin there he added her to his list of wives. Her name, if anybody wishes to know it, was Monima, the daughter of Philopœmen. Against those Magnesians, Paphlagonians, and Lycians who still opposed him he directed his generals to make war.

## CHAPTER IV

Mithridates orders a Massacre of Romans in Asia — Frightful Scenes in Ephesus and Other Cities — Mithridates attacks Rhodes — Is defeated on the Sea — Makes an Assault by Land — Is beaten off

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22. Such was the state of affairs with Mithridates. As soon as his outbreak and invasion of Asia were known at Rome they declared war against him, although they were occupied with grievous dissensions in the city and a formidable Social war, almost all parts of Italy having revolted one after another. When the consuls cast lots, the government of Asia and the Mithridatic war fell to Cornelius Sulla. As they had no money to defray his expenses they voted to sell the treasures that King Numa Pompilius had set apart for sacrifices to the gods; so great was their want of means at that time and so great their ambition for the commonwealth. A part of these treasures, sold hastily, brought 9000 pounds' weight of gold and this was all they had to spend on so great a war. Moreover Sulla was detained a long time by the civil wars, as I have stated in my history of the same. In the meantime Mithridates built a large number of ships for an attack on Rhodes, and he wrote secretly to all his satraps and magistrates that on the thirtieth day thereafter they should set upon all Romans and Italians in their towns, and upon their wives and children and their domestics of Italian birth, kill them and throw their bodies out unburied, and share their goods with himself. He threatened to punish any who should bury the dead or conceal the living, and offered rewards to informers and to those who should kill persons in hiding, and freedom to slaves for betraying their masters. To debtors for killing money-lenders he offered release from one-half of their obligations. These secret orders Mithridates sent to all the cities at the same time. When the appointed day came calamities of various kinds befell the province of Asia, among which were the following:

23. The Ephesians tore fugitives, who had taken refuge in the temple of Artemis, from the very images of the goddess and slew them. The Pergameans shot with arrows

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666 those who had fled to the temple of Æsculapius, while they<sup>B.</sup> were still clinging to his statues. The Adramytteans followed those who sought to escape by swimming, into the sea, and killed them and drowned their children. The Caunii, who had been made subject to Rhodes after the war against Antiochus and had been lately liberated by the Romans, pursued the Italians who had taken refuge about the Vesta statue of the senate-house, tore them from the shrine, killed children before their mothers' eyes, and then killed the mothers themselves and their husbands after them. The citizens of Tralles, in order to avoid the appearance of blood-guiltiness, hired a savage monster named Theophilus, of Paphlagonia, to do the work. He conducted the victims to the temple of Concord, and there murdered them, chopping off the hands of some who were embracing the sacred images. Such was the awful fate that befell the Romans and Italians throughout the province of Asia, men, women, and children, their freedmen and slaves, all who were of Italian blood; by which it was made very plain that it was quite as much hatred of the Romans as fear of Mithridates that impelled the Asiatics to commit these atrocities. But they paid a double penalty for their crime — one at the hands of Mithridates himself, who ill-treated them perfidiously not long afterward, and the other at the hands of Cornelius Sulla. In the meantime Mithridates crossed over to the island of Cos, where he was welcomed by the inhabitants and where he received, and afterward brought up in a royal way, a son of Alexander, the reigning sovereign of Egypt, who had been left there by his grandmother, Cleopatra, together with a large sum of money. From the treasures of Cleopatra he sent vast wealth, works of art, precious stones, women's ornaments, and a great deal of money to Pontus.

24. While these things were going on the Rhodians strengthened their walls and their harbor and erected engines of war everywhere, receiving some assistance from Telmessus and Lycia. All the Italians who escaped from Asia collected at Rhodes, among them Lucius Cassius, the proconsul of the province. When Mithridates approached with his fleet, the inhabitants destroyed the suburbs in order that they might not be of service to the enemy. Then

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they put to sea for a naval engagement with some of their ships ranged for an attack in front and some on the flank. Mithridates, who was sailing around in a quinquereme, ordered his ships to extend their wing out to sea and to quicken the rowing in order to surround the enemy, for they were fewer in number. The Rhodians were apprehensive of this manœuvre and retired slowly. Finally they turned about and took refuge in the harbor, closed the gates, and fought Mithridates from the walls. He encamped near the city and continually tried to gain entrance to the harbor, but failing to do so he waited for the arrival of his infantry from Asia. In the meantime there was continual skirmishing going on among the soldiers in ambush around the walls. As the Rhodians had the best of it in these affairs, they gradually plucked up courage and kept their ships well in hand in order to dart upon the enemy whenever they should discover an opportunity.

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25. As one of the king's merchantmen was moving near them under sail a Rhodian two-bank ship advanced against it. Many on both sides hastened to the rescue and a severe naval engagement took place. Mithridates outweighed his antagonists both in fury and in the multitude of his fleet, but the Rhodians circled around and rammed his ships with such skill that they took one of his triremes in tow with its crew and tackle and much spoil, and brought it into the harbor. Another time, when one of their quinqueremes had been taken by the enemy, the Rhodians, not knowing this fact, sent out six of their swiftest ships to look for it, under command of their admiral, Demagoras. Mithridates despatched twenty-five of his against them. Demagoras retired before them until sunset. When it began to grow dark and the king's ships turned around to sail back, Demagoras fell upon them, sunk two, drove two others into Lycia, and returned home on the open sea by night. This was the result of the naval engagement, as unexpected to the Rhodians on account of the smallness of their force as to Mithridates on account of the largeness of his. In this engagement while the king was sailing about in his ship and urging on his men, an allied ship from Chios ran against his in the confusion with a severe shock. The king pretended not to mind it at the time,

v. r. 666 but later he punished the pilot and the lookout man, and B. 4  
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conceived a hatred for all Chians.

26. About the same time the land forces of Mithridates set sail in merchant vessels and triremes, and a storm, blowing from Caunus, drove them toward Rhodes. The Rhodians promptly sailed out to meet them, fell upon them while they were still scattered and suffering from the effects of the tempest, captured some, rammed others, and burned others, and took about 400 prisoners. Thereupon Mithridates prepared for another naval engagement and siege at the same time. He built a *sambuca*, an immense machine for scaling walls, and mounted it on two ships. Some deserters showed him a hill that was easy to climb, where the temple of Zeus Atabyrius was situated, surrounded by a low wall. He placed a part of his army in ships by night, distributed scaling ladders to others, and commanded both parties to move silently until they should see a fire signal given from Mount Atabyrius; and then to make the greatest possible uproar, and some to attack the harbor and others the wall. Accordingly they approached in profound silence. The Rhodian sentries knew what was going on and lighted a fire. The army of Mithridates, thinking that this was the fire signal from Atabyrius, broke the silence with a loud shout, the scaling party and the naval contingent shouting all together. The Rhodians, not at all dismayed, answered the shout and rushed to the walls in crowds. The king's forces accomplished nothing that night, and the next day they were beaten off.

27. The Rhodians were most dismayed by the *sambuca*, which was moved against the wall where the temple of Isis stands. It was operating with weapons of various kinds, both rams and projectiles. Soldiers in numerous small boats circled around it with ladders, ready to mount the wall by means of it. Nevertheless the Rhodians awaited its attack with firmness. Finally the *sambuca* collapsed of its own weight, and an apparition of Isis was seen hurling a great mass of fire down upon it. Mithridates despaired of his undertaking and retired from Rhodes. He then laid siege to Patara and began to cut down a grove dedicated to Latona, to get material for his machines, until he was warned in a dream to spare the sacred trees. Leaving Pelop-



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idas to continue the war against the Lycians he sent Archelaus to Greece to gain allies by persuasion or force according as he could. After this Mithridates committed most of his tasks to his generals, and applied himself to raising troops, making arms, and enjoying himself with his Stratonicean wife. He also held court to try those who were accused of conspiring against him, or of inciting revolution, or of favoring the Romans in any way.

## CHAPTER V

Athens sides with Mithridates—Other Greek States follow her Example—Cornelius Sulla marches against Mithridates—Besieges the Piræus—Archelaus makes a Sally—Sulla sends Lucullus to procure Ships—Hard Fighting on the Walls—Famine in Athens—Battles Underground—Sulla repulsed from Piræus

667 28. While Mithridates was thus occupied the following

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events took place in Greece: Archelaus, sailing thither with abundant supplies and a large fleet, possessed himself by force and violence of Delos and other strongholds which had revolted from the Athenians. He slew 20,000 men in these places, most of whom were Italians, and turned the strongholds over to the Athenians. In this way, and by boasting about Mithridates and extravagantly praising him, he brought the Athenians into alliance with him. Archelaus sent them the sacred treasure of Delos by the hands of Aristion, an Athenian citizen, attended by 2000 soldiers to guard the money. These soldiers Aristion made use of to make himself master of the country, putting to death immediately some of those who favored the Romans and sending others to Mithridates. And these things he did although he professed to be a philosopher of the school of Epicurus. Nor was it only in Athens that men played the part of tyrants as did he and before him Critias and his fellow-philosophers. But in Italy, too, some of the Pythagoreans and those known as the Seven Wise Men in other parts of the Grecian world, who undertook to manage public affairs, governed more cruelly, and made themselves greater tyrants than ordinary despots; whence arose doubt and suspicion concerning other philosophers, whether their dis-

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667 courses about wisdom proceeded from a love of virtue or as a comfort in their poverty and idleness. We see many of these now, obscure and poverty-stricken, wearing the garb of philosophy as a matter of necessity, and railing bitterly at the rich and powerful, not because they have any real contempt for riches and power, but from envy of the possessors of the same. Those whom they speak ill of have much better reason for despising them. These things the reader should consider as spoken against the philosopher Aristion, who is the cause of this digression.

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
29. Archelaus brought over to the side of Mithridates the Achæans, the Lacedæmonians, and all of Bœotia except Thespiæ, to which he laid close siege. At the same time Metrophanes, who had been sent by Mithridates with another army, ravaged Eubœa and the territory of Demetrias and Magnesia, which states refused to espouse his cause. Bruttius advanced against him with a small force from Macedonia, had a naval fight with him, sunk one large ship and one hemiolia, and killed all who were in them while Metrophanes was looking on. The latter fled in terror and, as he had a favorable wind, Bruttius could not overtake him, but stormed Sciathos, which was a storehouse of plunder for barbarians, and crucified some of them who were slaves and cut off the hands of the freemen. Then he turned against Bœotia, having received reënforcements of 1000 horse and foot from Macedonia. Near Chæronea he was engaged in a fight of three days' duration with Archelaus and Aristion, which had an indecisive result. When the Lacedæmonians and Achæans came to the aid of Archelaus and Aristion, Bruttius thought that he was not a match for all of them together and withdrew to the Piræus until Archelaus came up with his fleet and seized that place also.

30. Sulla, who had been appointed general of the Mithridatic war by the Romans, now for the first time passed over to Greece with five legions and a few cohorts and troops of horse and straightway called for money, reënforcements and provisions from Ætolia and Thessaly. As soon as he considered himself strong enough he crossed over to Attica to attack Archelaus. As he was passing through the country all Bœotia joined him except a few, and among



L. CORNELIUS SULLA

In the Chiaramonti Museum, Rome. Considered by Bernoulli a probable but not certain likeness



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667 others the great city of Thebes which had rather lightly taken sides with the Mithridateans against the Romans, but now even more nimbly changed from Archelaus to Sulla before coming to a trial of strength. When Sulla reached Attica he detached part of his army to lay siege to Aristion in Athens, and himself went down to attack the Piræus, where Archelaus had taken shelter behind the wall with his forces. The height of the wall was about forty cubits and it was built of large square stones. It was the work of Pericles in the time of the Peloponnesian war, and as he rested his hope of victory on the Piræus he made it as strong as possible. Notwithstanding the height of the walls Sulla planted his ladders against them at once. After inflicting and receiving much damage (for the Cappadocians bravely repelled his attack), he retired exhausted to Eleusis and Megara, where he built engines for a new attack upon the Piræus and formed a plan for besieging it with mounds. Artifices and apparatus of all kinds, iron, catapults, and everything of that sort were supplied by Thebes. Sulla chopped down the grove of the Academy and constructed his largest engines there. He demolished the Long Walls, and used the stones, timber, and earth for building mounds.

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31. Two Athenian slaves in the Piræus — either because they favored the Romans or were looking out for their own safety in an emergency — wrote down everything that took place there, enclosed their writing in leaden balls, and threw them over to the Romans with slings. As this was done continually it came to the knowledge of Sulla, who gave his attention to the missives and found one which said, "To-morrow the infantry will make a sally in front upon your workers, and the cavalry will attack the Roman army on both flanks." Sulla placed an adequate force in ambush and when the enemy dashed out with the thought that their movement would completely surprise him he gave them a greater surprise with his concealed force, killing many and driving the rest into the sea. This was the end of that enterprise. When the mounds began to rise Archelaus erected opposing towers and placed the greatest quantity of missiles on them. He sent for reinforcements from Chalcis and the other islands and armed his oarsmen,

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for he considered himself in extreme danger. As his army was superior in number to that of Sulla before, it now became much more so by these reënforcements. He then darted out in the middle of the night with torches and burned one of the tortoises and the machines alongside of it; but Sulla made new ones in ten days' time and put them in the places of the former ones. Against these Archelaus established a tower on that part of the wall.

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32. Having received from Mithridates by sea a new army under command of Dromichætes, Archelaus led all his troops out to battle. He distributed archers and slingers among them and ranged them close under the walls so that the guards above could reach the enemy with their missiles. Others were stationed around the gates with torches to watch their opportunity to make a sally. The battle remained doubtful a long time; each side yielding by turns. First the barbarians gave way until Archelaus rallied them and led them back. The Romans were so dismayed by this that they were put to flight next, until Murena ran up and rallied them. Just then another legion, which had returned from gathering wood, together with some soldiers who had been disgraced, finding a hot fight in progress, made a powerful charge on the Mithridateans, killed about 2000 of them and drove the rest inside the walls. Archelaus tried to rally them again and stood his ground so long that he was shut out and had to be pulled up by ropes. In consideration of their splendid behavior Sulla removed the stigma from those who had been disgraced and gave large rewards to the others.

33. Now winter came on and Sulla established his camp at Eleusis and protected it by a deep ditch, extending from the high ground to the sea so that the enemy's horse could not readily reach him. While he was prosecuting this work fighting took place daily, now at the ditch, now at the walls of the enemy, who frequently came out and assailed the Romans with stones, javelins, and leaden balls. Sulla, being in need of ships, sent to Rhodes to obtain them, but the Rhodians were not able to send them because Mithridates controlled the sea. He then ordered Lucullus, a distinguished Roman who later succeeded Sulla as commander in this war, to proceed secretly to Alexandria and

<sup>Y. R.</sup> 667 Syria, and procure a fleet from those kings and cities that <sup>B. C.</sup> 87 were skilled in nautical affairs, and to bring with it the Rhodian naval contingent also. Lucullus had no fear of the hostile fleet. He embarked in a fast sailing vessel and, by changing from one ship to another in order to conceal his movements, arrived at Alexandria.

668 34. Meanwhile the traitors in the Piræus threw another <sup>86</sup> message over the walls, saying that Archelaus would on that very night send a convoy of soldiers with provisions to the city of Athens, which was suffering from hunger. Sulla laid a trap for them and captured both the provisions and the soldiers. On the same day, near Chalcis, Minutius wounded Neoptolemus, Mithridates' other general, killed 1500 of his men, and took a still larger number prisoners. Not long after, by night, while the guards on the walls of the Piræus were asleep, the Romans took some ladders from the engines near by, mounted the walls, and killed the guards at that place. Thereupon some of the barbarians abandoned their posts and fled to the harbor, thinking that all the walls had been captured. Others, recovering their courage, slew the leader of the assailing party and hurled the remainder over the wall. Still others darted out through the gates and almost burned one of the two Roman towers, and would have burned it had not Sulla ridden up from the camp and saved it by a hard fight lasting all that night and the next day. Then the barbarians retired. Archelaus planted another great tower on the wall opposite the Roman tower and these two assailed each other, discharging all kinds of missiles constantly until Sulla, by means of his catapults, each of which discharged twenty of the heaviest leaden balls at one volley, had killed a large number of the enemy, and had so shaken the tower of Archelaus that it was rendered untenable, and the latter was compelled, by fear of its destruction, to draw it back with all speed.

35. Meanwhile famine pressed more and more on the city of Athens, and the ball throwers in the Piræus gave information that provisions would be sent thither by night. Archelaus suspected that some traitor was giving information to the enemy about his convoys. Accordingly, at the same time that he sent it, he stationed a force at the gates with torches to make an assault on the Roman works if

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Sulla should attack the provision train. So it turned out that Sulla captured the train and Archelaus burned some of the Roman works. At the same time Archathias, the son of Mithridates, with another army invaded Macedonia and without difficulty overcame the small Roman force there, subjugated the whole country, appointed satraps to govern it, and advanced against Sulla, but was taken sick and died near Tisæus. In the meantime the famine in Athens became very severe. Sulla built stockades around it to prevent anybody from going out so that, by reason of their numbers, the hunger should be more severe upon those who were shut in.

36. When Sulla had raised his mound to the proper height at the Piræus he planted his engines on it. But Archelaus undermined the mound and carried away the earth, the Romans for a long time suspecting nothing. Suddenly the mound sank down. Quickly understanding the state of things, the Romans withdrew their engines and filled up the mound, and, following the enemy's example, began in like manner to undermine the walls. The diggers met each other underground, and fought there with swords and spears as well as they could in the darkness. While this was going on, Sulla pounded the wall with rams erected on the tops of mounds until part of it fell down. Then he hastened to burn the neighboring tower, and discharged a large number of fire-bearing missiles against it, and ordered his bravest soldiers to mount the ladders. Both sides fought bravely, but the tower was burned. Another small part of the wall was thrown down also, over against which Sulla at once stationed a guard. Having now undermined a section of the wall, so that it was only sustained by wooden beams, he placed a great quantity of sulphur, hemp, and pitch under it, and set fire to the whole at once. The walls fell — now here, now there — carrying the defenders down with them. This great and unexpected crash demoralized the forces guarding the walls everywhere, as each one expected that the ground would sink under him next. Fear and loss of confidence kept them turning this way and that way, so that they offered only a feeble resistance to the enemy.

37. Against the forces thus demoralized Sulla kept up



Y.R. 668 an unceasing fight, continually changing the active part of his own army, bringing up fresh soldiers with ladders, one division after another, with shout and cheer, urging them forward with threats and encouragement at the same time, and telling them that victory would shortly be theirs. Archelaus, on the other hand, brought up new forces in place of his discouraged ones. He, too, changed their labor continually, cheering and urging them on, and telling them that their salvation would soon be secured. A high degree of zeal and courage was excited in both armies again and the fight became very severe, the slaughter being substantially equal on both sides. Finally Sulla, being the attacking party and therefore soonest exhausted, sounded a retreat and led his forces back, praising many of his men for their bravery. Archelaus forthwith repaired the damage to his wall by night, protecting a large part of it with a lunette curving inward. Sulla attacked this newly built wall at once with his whole army, thinking that as it was still moist and weak he could easily demolish it, but as he had to work in a narrow space and was exposed to missiles from above, both in front and flank, as is usual with crescent-shaped fortifications, he was again worn out. Then he abandoned all idea of taking the Piræus by assault and established a siege around it in order to reduce it by famine.

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## CHAPTER VI

Athens taken — Slaughter of the Inhabitants — Sulla returns to the Piræus — Drives Archelaus out — Burns the Piræus — Follows Archelaus — Battle of Chæronea — Archelaus routed — Great slaughter of the Barbarians

38. Knowing that the defenders of Athens were severely pressed by hunger, that they had devoured all their cattle, boiled the hides and skins, and licked what they could get therefrom, and that some had even partaken of human flesh, Sulla directed his soldiers to encircle the city with a ditch so that the inhabitants might not escape secretly, even one by one. This done, he brought up his ladders and at the same time began to break through the wall. The feeble defenders were soon put to flight, and the Romans

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rushed into the city. A great and pitiless slaughter ensued in Athens, the inhabitants, for want of nourishment, being too weak to fly. Sulla ordered an indiscriminate massacre, not sparing women or children. He was angry that they had so suddenly joined the barbarians without cause, and had displayed such violent animosity toward himself. Most of the Athenians when they heard the order given rushed upon the swords of the slayers voluntarily. A few had taken their feeble course to the Acropolis, among them Aristion, who had burned the Odeum, so that Sulla might not have the timber in it at hand for storming the Acropolis. Sulla forbade the burning of the city, but allowed the soldiers to plunder it. In many houses they found human flesh prepared for food. The next day Sulla sold the slaves at auction. To the freemen who had escaped the slaughter of the previous night, a very small number, he promised their liberty but took away their right as voters and electors because they had made war upon him. The same terms were extended to their offspring.

39. In this way did Athens have her full of horrors. Sulla stationed a guard around the Acropolis, to whom Aristion and his company were soon compelled by hunger and thirst to surrender. Sulla inflicted the penalty of death on Aristion and his body-guard, and upon all who exercised any authority or who had done anything whatever contrary to the rules laid down for them after the first capture of Greece by the Romans. Sulla pardoned the rest and gave to all of them substantially the same laws that had been previously established for them by the Romans. About forty pounds of gold and 600 pounds of silver was obtained from the Acropolis, — but these events at the Acropolis took place somewhat later.

40. As soon as Athens was taken Sulla, impatient at the long siege of the Piræus, brought up rams, and projectiles of all kinds, and a large force of men, who battered the walls under the shelter of tortoises, and numerous cohorts who hurled javelins and shot arrows in vast numbers at the defenders on the walls in order to drive them back. He knocked down a part of the newly built lunette, which was still moist and weak. Archelaus had anticipated this from the first and had built several others like it inside, so that





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endless. But he pushed on with tireless energy, he relieved his men often, he was ubiquitous among them, urging them on and showing them that their entire hope of reward for their labors depended on accomplishing this small remainder. The soldiers, too, believing that this would in fact be the end of their toils, and spurred to their work by the love of glory and the thought that it would be a splendid achievement to conquer such walls as these, pressed forward vigorously. Finally, Archelaus was dumbfounded by their senseless and mad persistence, and abandoned the walls to them and betook himself to that part of the Piræus which was most strongly fortified and enclosed on all sides by the sea. As Sulla had no ships he could not attack it.

41. Thence Archelaus withdrew to Thessaly by way of Bœotia and drew what was left of his entire forces together at Thermopylæ, both his own and those brought by Dromichætes. He also united with his command the army that had invaded Macedonia under Archias, the son of King Mithridates, which was fresh and at nearly its full strength, and had lately received recruits from Mithridates; for he never ceased sending forward reinforcements. While Archelaus was hastily gathering these forces Sulla burned the Piræus, which had given him more trouble than the city of Athens, not sparing the arsenal, or the navy yard, or any other of its famous belongings. Then he marched against Archelaus, proceeding also by way of Bœotia. As they neared each other the forces of Archelaus just from Thermopylæ advanced into Phocis, consisting of Thracian, Pontic, Scythian, Cappadocian, Bithynian, Galatian, and Phrygian troops, and others from Mithridates' newly acquired territory, in all 120,000 men. Each nationality had its own general, but Archelaus had supreme command over all. Sulla's forces were Italians and some Greeks and Macedonians, who had lately deserted Archelaus and come over to him, and a few others from the surrounding country, but they were not one-third the number of the enemy.

42. When they had taken position opposite each other Archelaus repeatedly led out his forces and offered battle. Sulla hesitated on account of the nature of the ground and the numbers of the enemy. When Archelaus moved toward

Y. R. 668 Chalcis Sulla followed him closely, watching for a favorable time and place. When he saw the enemy encamped in a rocky region near Chæronea, where there was no chance of escape for the vanquished, he took possession of a broad plain near by and drew up his forces in such a way that he could compel Archelaus to fight whether he wanted to or not, and where the slope of the plain favored the Romans either in advancing or retreating. Archelaus was hedged in by rocks which, in a battle, would not allow his whole army to act in concert, as he could not bring them together by reason of the unevenness of the ground; and if they were routed their flight would be impeded by the rocks. Relying for these reasons on his advantage of position Sulla moved forward in such a way that the enemy's superiority of numbers should not be of any service to him. Archelaus did not dream of coming to an engagement at that time, for which reason he had been careless in choosing the place for his camp. Now that the Romans were advancing he perceived sorrowfully and too late the badness of his position, and he sent forward a detachment of horse to prevent the movement. The detachment was put to flight and shattered among the rocks. He next charged with sixty chariots, hoping to sever and break in pieces the formation of the legions by the shock. The Romans opened their ranks and the chariots were carried through by their own momentum to the rear, and before they could turn back they were surrounded and destroyed by the javelins of the rear guard.

43. Although Archelaus might have fought safely from his fortified camp, where the crags would perhaps have defended him, he hastily led out his vast multitude of men who had not expected to fight here, and drew them up, in a place that had proved much too narrow, because Sulla was already approaching. He first made a powerful charge with his horse, cut the Roman formation in two, and, by reason of the smallness of their numbers, completely surrounded both parts. The Romans turned their faces to the enemy on all sides and fought bravely. The divisions of Galba and Hortensius suffered most since Archelaus led the battle against them in person, and the barbarians fighting under the eye of the commander were spurred by emu-

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lation to the highest pitch of valor. But Sulla moved to their aid with a large body of horse and Archelaus, feeling sure that it was Sulla who was approaching, for he saw the standards of the commander-in-chief, and a greater cloud of dust arising, released his grasp and began to resume his first position. Sulla, leading the best part of his horse and picking up two new cohorts that had been placed in reserve, struck the enemy before they had executed their manœuvre and formed a solid front. He threw them into confusion, put them to flight, and pursued them. While victory was dawning on that side, Murena, who commanded the left wing, was not idle. Chiding his soldiers for their remissness he, too, dashed upon the enemy valiantly and put them to flight.

44. When Archelaus' two wings gave way the centre no longer held its ground, but took to promiscuous flight. Then everything that Sulla had foreseen befell the enemy. Not having room to turn around, or an open country for flight, they were driven by their pursuers among the rocks. Some of them rushed into the hands of the Romans. Others with more wisdom fled toward their own camp. Archelaus placed himself in front of them and barred the entrance, and ordered them to turn and face the enemy, thus betraying the greatest inexperience of the exigencies of war. They obeyed him with alacrity, but as they no longer had either generals to lead, or officers to align them, or standards to show where they belonged, but were scattered in disorderly rout, and had no room either to fly or to fight, the pursuit having brought them into their very narrowest place, they were killed without resistance, some by the enemy, upon whom they could not retaliate, and others by their own friends in the jam and confusion. Again they fled toward the gates of the camp, around which they became congested. They upbraided the gate-keepers. They appealed to them in the name of their country's gods and their common relationship, and reproached them that they were slaughtered not so much by the swords of the enemy as by the indifference of their friends. Finally Archelaus, after more delay than was necessary, opened the gates and received the disorganized runaways. When the Romans observed this they gave a great cheer, burst into

Y. R. 668 the camp with the fugitives, and made their victory complete. B. C. 86

45. Archelaus and the rest, who made their escape singly, came together at Chalcis. Not more than 10,000 of the 120,000 remained. The Roman loss was only fifteen, and two of these turned up afterward. Such was the result of the battle of Chæronea between Sulla and Archelaus, the general of Mithridates, to which the sagacity of Sulla and the blundering of Archelaus contributed in equal measure. Sulla captured a large number of prisoners and a great quantity of arms and spoils, the useless part of which he put in a heap. Then he girded himself according to the Roman custom and burned it as a sacrifice to the gods of war. After giving his army a short rest he hastened with his best troops after Archelaus, but as the Romans had no ships the latter sailed securely among the islands and ravaged the coasts. He landed at Zacynthus and laid siege to it, but being attacked in the night by a party of Romans who were sojourning there he reëmbarked in a hurry and returned to Chalcis more like a robber than a warrior.

## CHAPTER VII

Fury and Cruelty of Mithridates — The Dismal Fate of Chios — Terror of the Greek Cities in Asia — Conspiracy against Mithridates — Battle of Orchomenus — Archelaus again defeated by Sulla

46. When Mithridates heard of this great disaster he was astonished and terror-stricken, as was natural. Nevertheless, he proceeded with all haste to collect a new army from all his subject nations. Thinking that certain persons would be likely to turn against him on account of his defeat, either now or later, if they should find a good chance, he arrested all suspects before the war should become sharper. First, he put to death the tetrarchs of Galatia with their wives and children, not only those who were united with him as friends, but those who were not his subjects — all except three who escaped. Some of these he took by stratagem, the others he slew one night at a banquet. He believed that none of them would be faithful to him if Sulla should come near. He confiscated their prop-



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erty, established garrisons in their towns, and appointed Eumachus satrap of the nation. But the tetrarchs who had escaped raised an army from the country people forthwith, expelled him and his garrisons, and drove them out of Galatia, so that Mithridates had nothing left of that country except the money he had seized. Being angry with the inhabitants of Chios, one of whose vessels had accidentally run against the royal ship in the naval battle near Rhodes, he first confiscated the goods of all Chians who had fled to Sulla, and then sent persons to inquire what property in Chios belonged to Romans. For a third move, his general, Zenobius, who was conducting an army to Greece, seized the walls of Chios and all the fortified places by night, stationed guards at the gates, and made proclamation that all strangers should remain quiet, and that the Chians should repair to the assembly so that he might give them a message from the king. When they had come together he said that the king was suspicious of the city on account of the Roman faction in it, but that he would be satisfied if they would deliver up their arms and give the children of their principal families as hostages. Seeing that their city was already in his hands they gave both. Zenobius sent them to Erythræ and told the Chians that the king would write to them directly.

47. A letter came from Mithridates of the following tenor: "You favor the Romans even now, and many of your citizens are still sojourning with them. You are reaping the fruits of Roman property of which you do not make returns to us. Your trireme ran against and shook my ship in the battle before Rhodes. I willingly imputed that fault to the pilots alone, hoping that you would observe the rules of safety and remain my submissive subjects. Now you have secretly sent your chief men to Sulla, and you have never proved or declared that this was done without public authority, as was the duty of those who were not coöperating with them. Although my friends consider that those who conspire against my government, and who intend to conspire against my person, ought to suffer death, I will let you off with a fine of 2000 talents." Such was the purport of the letter. The Chians wanted to send legates to the king, but Zenobius would not allow it. As they were dis-

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armed and had given up the children of their principal families, and a large barbarian army was in possession of the city, they groaned aloud, but they collected the temple ornaments and the women's jewellery to the full amount of 2000 talents. When this sum had been made up Zenobius accused them of giving him short weight and summoned them to the theatre. Then he stationed his army with drawn swords around the theatre itself and along the streets leading from it to the sea. Then he led the Chians one by one out of the theatre and put them in ships, the men separate from the women and children, and all treated with indignity by their barbarian captors. In this way they were dragged to Mithridates, who packed them off to Pontus on the Euxine. Such was the calamity that befell the citizens of Chios.

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48. When Zenobius approached Ephesus with his army, the citizens ordered him to leave his arms at the gates and come in with only a few attendants. He obeyed the order and made a visit to Philopœmen (the father of Monima, the favorite wife of Mithridates), whom the latter had appointed overseer of Ephesus, and summoned the Ephesians to the assembly. They expected nothing good from him, and adjourned the meeting till the next day. During the night, however, they met for mutual consultation and encouragement, after which they cast Zenobius into prison and put him to death. They then manned the walls, put the citizens in training, brought in supplies from the country, and put the city in a state of complete defence. When the people of Tralles, Hypæpa, Metropolis, and several other towns heard of this they feared lest they should meet the fate of Chios, and followed the example of Ephesus. Mithridates sent an army against the revolvers and inflicted terrible punishments on those whom he captured, but as he feared other defections, he gave freedom to the Greek cities, proclaimed the cancelling of debts, gave the right of citizenship to all sojourners therein, and freed the slaves. He did this hoping (as indeed it turned out) that the debtors, sojourners, and slaves would consider their new privileges secure only under the rule of Mithridates, and would therefore be well disposed toward him. In the meantime Mynnio and Philotimus of Smyrna, Cleisthenes and Ascle-

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piodotus of Lesbos, all of them the king's intimates (Asclepiodotus had once entertained him as a guest) joined in a conspiracy against Mithridates. Of this conspiracy Asclepiodotus himself became the informer, and in order to confirm his story he arranged that the king should conceal himself under a couch and hear what Mynnio said. The plot being thus revealed the conspirators were put to death with torture, and many others suffered from suspicion of similar designs. Thus eighty citizens of Pergamus were caught taking counsel together to like purpose, and others in other cities. The king sent spies everywhere who denounced their own enemies, and in this way about 1500 men lost their lives. Some of these accusers were captured by Sulla a little later and put to death, others committed suicide, and still others took refuge with Mithridates himself in Pontus.

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49. While these events were taking place in Asia, Mithridates assembled an army of 80,000 men, which Dorylaeus led to Archelaus in Greece, who still had 10,000 of his former force remaining. Sulla had taken a position against Archelaus near Orchomenus. When he saw the great number of the enemy's horse coming up, he dug a number of ditches through the plain ten feet wide, and drew up his army to meet Archelaus when the latter advanced. The Romans fought badly because they were in terror of the enemy's cavalry. Sulla rode hither and thither a long time, encouraging and threatening his men. Failing to bring them up to their duty in this way, he leaped from his horse, seized a standard, ran out between the two armies with his shield-bearers, exclaiming, "If you are ever asked, Romans, where you abandoned Sulla, your general, say that it was at the battle of Orchomenus." When the officers saw his peril they darted from their own ranks to his aid, and the troops, moved by the sense of shame, followed and drove the enemy back in their turn. This was the beginning of the victory. Sulla again leaped upon his horse and rode among his troops praising and encouraging them until the end of the battle. The enemy lost 15,000 men, about 10,000 of whom were cavalry, and among them Diogenes, the son of Archelaus. The infantry fled to their camps.

50. Sulla feared lest Archelaus should escape him again,

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because he had no ships, and take refuge in Chalcis as before. Accordingly he stationed night watchmen at intervals over the whole plain, and the next day he enclosed Archelaus with a ditch at a distance of less than 600 feet from his camp, to prevent his escape. Then he appealed to his army to finish the small remainder of the war, since the enemy were no longer even making show of resistance; and so he led them against the camp of Archelaus. Like scenes transpired among the enemy, with a change of feeling necessarily, the officers hurrying hither and thither, representing the imminent danger, and upbraiding the men if they should not be able to defend the camp against assailants inferior in numbers. There was a rush and a shout on each side, followed by many valiant deeds on the part of both. The Romans, protected by their shields, were demolishing a certain angle of the camp when the barbarians leaped down from the parapet inside and took their stand around this corner with drawn swords to ward off the invaders. No one dared to enter until the military tribune, Basillus, first leaped over and killed the man in front of him. Then the whole army dashed after him. The flight and slaughter of the barbarians followed. Some were captured and others driven into the neighboring lake, and, not knowing how to swim, perished while begging for mercy in barbarian speech, not understood by their slayers. Archelaus hid in a marsh, where he found a small boat by which he reached Chalcis. Whatever remained of the Mithridatean forces in separate detachments he summoned thither with all speed.

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## CHAPTER VIII

Sulla declared a Public Enemy — Flaccus and Fimbria — Fimbria destroys Ilium — Mithridates sues for Peace — Sulla's Answer — Terms of the Treaty offered by Sulla — Mithridates delays and Sulla marches to Asia — A Personal Conference — What Sulla said to Mithridates — Mithridates accepts the Terms

51. The next day Sulla decorated the tribune, Basillus, and gave rewards for valor to others. He ravaged Bœotia, which was continually changing from one side to the other,

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668 and then moved to Thessaly and went into winter quarters, and waited for Lucullus and his fleet. As he had no tidings of Lucullus he began to build ships for himself. At this juncture Cornelius Cinna and Gaius Marius, his rivals at home, caused him to be declared an enemy of the Roman people, destroyed his houses in the city and the country, and murdered his friends. This, however, did not weaken him in the least, since he had a zealous and devoted army. Cinna sent Flaccus, whom he had caused to be chosen as his colleague in the consulship, to Asia with two legions to take charge of that province and of the Mithridatic war in place of Sulla, who was now declared a public enemy. As Flaccus was inexperienced in the art of war, a man of senatorial rank named Fimbria, who was skilled in military affairs, accompanied him as a volunteer. As they were sailing from Brundisium many of their ships were destroyed by a tempest, and some that had gone in advance were burned by a new army that had been sent forward by Mithridates. Moreover, Flaccus was a rascal, and, being severe in punishments and greedy of gain, was hated by the whole army. Accordingly, a part of them who had been sent ahead into Thessaly went over to Sulla, but Fimbria kept the rest of them from deserting, because they considered him more humane and a better general than Flaccus.

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669 52. Once while he was at an inn he had a dispute with the quæstor about their lodgings. Flaccus, who acted as arbiter between them, showed little consideration for Fimbria, and the latter was vexed and threatened to go back to Rome. Accordingly Flaccus appointed a successor to perform the duties which he then had charge of. Fimbria watched his opportunity, and when Flaccus had sailed for Chalcedon he first took the fasces away from Thermus, whom Flaccus had left as his prætor, as though the army had conferred the command upon himself, and when Flaccus returned soon afterward and was angry with him, Fimbria compelled him to fly. Flaccus took refuge in a certain house and in the night-time climbed over the wall and fled first to Chalcedon and afterward to Nicomedia, and closed the gates of the city. Fimbria overcame the place, found him concealed in a well, and killed him, although he was a Roman consul and the commanding officer of this war,

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669 and Fimbria himself was only a private citizen who had gone with him as an invited friend. Fimbria cut off his head and flung it into the sea, and left the remainder of his body unburied. Then he appointed himself commander of the army and fought several successful battles with the son of Mithridates. He drove the king himself into Pergamus. The latter escaped from Pergamus to Pitane. Fimbria followed him and began to enclose the place with a ditch. Then the king fled to Mitylene on a ship.

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53. Fimbria traversed the province of Asia, punished the Cappadocian faction, and devastated the territory of the towns that did not open their gates to him. The inhabitants of Ilium, who were besieged by Fimbria, appealed to Sulla for aid. The latter said that he would come, and told them to say to Fimbria meanwhile that they had intrusted themselves to Sulla. Fimbria, when he heard this, congratulated them on being already friends of the Roman people, and ordered them to admit him within their walls because he also was a Roman. He spoke in an ironical way also of the relationship existing between Ilium and Rome. When he was admitted he made an indiscriminate slaughter and burned the whole town. Those who had been in communication with Sulla he tortured in various ways. He spared neither the sacred objects nor the persons who had fled to the temple of Athena, but burned them with the temple itself. He demolished the walls, and the next day made a search to see whether anything of the place was left standing. So much worse was the city now treated by one of its relations than it had been by Agamemnon, that not a house, not a temple, not a statue was left. Some say that the image of Athena, called the Palladium, which was supposed to have fallen from heaven, was then found unbroken, the falling walls having formed an arch over it; and this may be true unless Diomedes and Ulysses carried it away from Ilium during the Trojan war. Thus was Ilium destroyed by Fimbria at the close of the 173d Olympiad. Some people think that 1050 years had intervened between this calamity and that which it suffered at the hands of Agamemnon.

54. When Mithridates heard of his defeat at Orchome-

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nus, he reflected on the immense number of men he had sent into Greece from the beginning, and the continual and swift disaster that had overtaken them. Accordingly, he sent word to Archelaus to make peace on the best terms possible. The latter had an interview with Sulla in which he said, "King Mithridates was your father's friend, O Sulla. He became involved in this war through the rapacity of other Roman generals. He will avail himself of your virtuous character to make peace, if you will grant him fair terms." As Sulla had no ships; as his enemies at Rome had sent him no money, nor anything else, but had declared him an outlaw; as he had already spent the money which he had taken from the Pythian, Olympian, and Epidauric temples, in return for which he had assigned to them half of the territory of Thebes on account of its frequent defections; and because he was in a hurry to lead his army fresh and unimpaired against the hostile faction at home, he assented to the proposal, and said, "If injustice was done to Mithridates, O Archelaus, he ought to have sent an embassy to show how he was wronged, instead of which he put himself in the wrong by overrunning such a vast territory belonging to others, killing such a vast number of people, seizing the public and sacred funds of cities, and confiscating the private property of those whom he destroyed. He has been just as perfidious to his own friends as to us, many of whom he has put to death, including the tetrarchs whom he had brought together at a banquet, and their wives and children, although they had committed no hostile act. Toward us he was moved by an inborn enmity rather than by any necessity for war, visiting every possible calamity upon the Italians throughout Asia, torturing and murdering all of our race, together with their wives, children, and servants. Such hatred did this man bear toward Italy, who now pretends friendship for my father! — a friendship which ye did not call to mind until I had destroyed 160,000 of your troops.

55. "Instead of treating for peace we ought to be absolutely implacable toward him, but for your sake I will undertake to obtain his pardon from Rome if he actually repents. But if he is playing the hypocrite again, I advise you, Archelaus, to look out for yourself. Consider how

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669 matters stand at present between you and him. Bear in mind how he has treated his other friends and how he treated Eumenes and Masinissa." While he was yet speaking, Archelaus rejected the offer with indignation, saying that he would never betray one who had put an army under his command. "I hope," he said, "to come to an agreement with you if you offer moderate terms." After a short interval Sulla said, "If Mithridates will deliver to us the entire fleet in your possession; if he will surrender our generals and ambassadors and all prisoners, deserters, and runaway slaves, and send back to their homes the people of Chios and all others whom he has dragged off to Pontus; if he will remove his garrison from all places except those that he held before the outbreak of hostilities; if he will pay the cost of the war incurred on his account, and remain content with his ancestral dominions, — I shall hope to persuade the Romans not to remember the injuries he has done them." Such were the terms which he offered. Archelaus at once withdrew his garrison from all the places he held and referred the other conditions to the king. In order to make use of his leisure in the meantime, Sulla marched against the Eneti, the Dardani, and the Sinti, tribes on the border of Macedonia, who were continually invading that country, and devastated their territory. In this way he exercised his soldiers and enriched them at the same time.

670 56. The ambassadors of Mithridates returned with ratifications of all the terms except those relating to Paphlagonia, and they added that Mithridates could obtain better conditions, "if he should negotiate with your other general, Fimbria." Sulla was indignant that he should be brought into such comparison and said that he would bring Fimbria to punishment, and would go himself to Asia and see whether Mithridates wanted peace or war. Having spoken thus he marched through Thrace to Cypsella after having sent Lucullus forward to Abydus, for Lucullus had arrived at last, having run the risk of capture by pirates several times. He had collected a sort of a fleet composed of ships from Cyprus, Phœnicia, Rhodes, and Pamphylia, and had ravaged much of the enemy's coast, and had skirmished with the ships of Mithridates on the way. Then Sulla ad-



v. r. 670 vanced from Cypsella and Mithridates from Pergamus, and they met in a conference. Each went with a small force to a plain in sight of the two armies. Mithridates began by discoursing of his own and his father's friendship and alliance with the Romans. Then he accused the Roman ambassadors, committeemen, and generals of doing him injuries by putting Ariobarzanes on the throne of Cappadocia, depriving him of Phrygia, and allowing Nicomedes to wrong him. "And all this," he said, "they did for money, taking it from me and from them by turns; for there is nothing of which most of you are so liable to accusation, O Romans, as the love of lucre. When war had broken out through the acts of your generals all that I did was in self-defence, and was the result of necessity rather than of intention."

57. When Mithridates had ceased speaking Sulla replied: "Although you called us here," he said, "for a different purpose, namely, to accept our terms of peace, I shall not refuse to speak briefly of those matters. I restored Ariobarzanes to the throne of Cappadocia by decree of the Senate when I was governor in Cilicia, and you obeyed the decree. You ought to have opposed it and given your reasons then, or forever after held your peace. Manius gave Phrygia to you for a bribe, which was a crime on the part of both of you. By the very fact of your getting it by bribery you confess that you had no right to it. Manius was tried at Rome for other acts that he had done for money and the Senate annulled them all. For this reason they decided, not that Phrygia, which had been given to you wrongfully, should be made tributary to Rome, but should be free. If we who had taken it by war did not think best to govern it, by what right could you hold it? Nicomedes charges that you sent against him an assassin named Alexander, and then Socrates Chrestus, a rival claimant of the kingdom, and that it was to avenge these wrongs that he invaded your territory. However, if he wronged you, you ought to have sent an embassy to Rome and waited for an answer. But although you took swift vengeance on Nicomedes, why did you attack Ariobarzanes, who had not harmed you? When you drove him out of his kingdom you imposed upon the Romans, who were there,

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670 the necessity of putting him back. By preventing them from doing so you brought on the war. You had meditated war a long time, because you hoped to rule the whole world if you could conquer the Romans, and the reasons you tell of were mere pretexts to cover your real intent. The proof of this is that you, although not yet at war with any nation, sought the alliance of the Thracians, Sarmatians, and Scythians, sought aid from the neighboring kings, built a navy, and enlisted pilots and helmsmen.

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58. "The time you chose convicts you of treachery most of all. When you heard that Italy had revolted from us you seized the occasion when we were occupied to fall upon Ariobarzanes, Nicomedes, Galatia, and Paphlagonia, and finally upon our Asiatic province. When you had taken them you committed all sorts of outrages on the cities, appointing slaves and debtors to rule over some of them, and freeing slaves and cancelling debts in others. In the Greek cities you destroyed 1600 men on one false accusation. You brought the tetrarchs of Galatia together at a banquet and slew them. You butchered or drowned all residents of Italian blood in one day, including mothers and babes, not sparing even those who had fled to the temples. What cruelty, what impiety, what boundless hate did you exhibit toward us! After you had confiscated the property of all your victims you crossed over to Europe with great armies, although we had forbidden the invasion of Europe to all the kings of Asia. You overran our province of Macedonia and deprived the Greeks of their freedom. Nor did you begin to repent and tell Archelaus to intercede for you, until I had recovered Macedonia and delivered Greece from your grasp, and destroyed 160,000 of your soldiers, and taken your camps with all their belongings. I am astonished that you should now seek to justify the acts for which you asked pardon through Archelaus. If you feared me at a distance, do you think that I have come into your neighborhood to have a debate with you? The time for that passed by when you took up arms against us, and we vigorously repelled your assaults and repelled them to the end." While Sulla was still speaking with vehemence the king yielded to his fears and consented to the terms that had been offered through Archelaus. He delivered up the

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670 ships and everything else that had been required, and went back to his paternal kingdom of Pontus as his sole possession. And thus the first war between Mithridates and the Romans came to an end. <sup>B.C.</sup>  
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## CHAPTER IX

Sulla demands the Surrender of Fimbria — Suicide of Fimbria — Sulla settles the Affairs of Asia — His Speech to the People — Imposes Five Years' Taxes and the Cost of the War — Piracy in the Mediterranean — Second Mithridatic War — The Aggressions of Murena — Mithridates appeals to Rome — Attacks and defeats Murena — Sulla puts a Stop to the War

59. Sulla now advanced within two stades of Fimbria and ordered him to deliver up his army since he held the command contrary to law. Fimbria replied jestingly that Sulla himself did not now hold a lawful command. Sulla drew a line of circumvallation around Fimbria, and many of the latter's soldiers deserted openly. Fimbria called the rest of them together and urged them to stand by him. When they refused to fight against their fellow-citizens he rent his garments and besought them man by man. As they still turned away from him, and still more of them deserted, he went around among the tents of the tribunes, bought some of them with money, called these to the assembly again, and got them to swear that they would stand by him. Those who had been suborned exclaimed that all ought to be called up by name to take the oath. He summoned those who were under obligations to him for past favors. The first name called was that of Nonius, who had been his close companion. When even he refused to take the oath Fimbria drew his sword and threatened to kill him, and would have done so had he not been alarmed by the outcry of the others and compelled to desist. Then he hired a slave, with money and the promise of freedom, to go to Sulla as a pretended deserter and assassinate him. As the slave was nearing his task he became frightened, and thus fell under suspicion; was arrested and confessed. Sulla's soldiers who were stationed around Fimbria's camp were filled with anger and contempt for him. They reviled

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him and nicknamed him Athenio — a man who was once a king of fugitive slaves in Sicily for a few days.

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60. Thereupon Fimbria in despair went to the line of circumvallation and asked for a colloquy with Sulla. The latter sent Rutilius instead. Fimbria was disappointed at the outset that he was not deemed worthy of an interview, although it had been given to the enemy. When he begged pardon for an offence due to his youth, Rutilius promised that Sulla would allow him to go away in safety by sea if he would take ship from the province of Asia, of which Sulla was proconsul. Fimbria said that he had another and better route. He went to Pergamus, entered into the temple of Æsculapius, and stabbed himself with his sword. As the wound was not mortal he ordered a slave to drive the weapon in. The latter killed his master and then himself. So perished Fimbria, who next to Mithridates had most sorely afflicted Asia. Sulla gave his body to his freedmen for burial, adding that he would not imitate Cinna and Marius, who had deprived many in Rome of their lives and of burial after death. The army of Fimbria came over to him, and he exchanged pledges with it and joined it with his own. Then he directed Curio to restore Nicomedes to Bithynia and Ariobarzanes to Cappadocia, and reported everything to the Senate, ignoring the fact that he had been voted an enemy.

61. Having settled the affairs of Asia, Sulla bestowed freedom on the inhabitants of Ilium, Chios, Lycia, Rhodes, Magnesia, and some others, either as a reward for their coöperation, or a recompense for what they had bravely suffered on his account, and inscribed them as friends of the Roman people. Then he distributed his army among the remaining towns and issued a proclamation that the slaves who had been freed by Mithridates should at once return to their masters. As many disobeyed and some of the cities revolted, several massacres ensued, of both free men and slaves, on various pretexts. The walls of many towns were demolished. Many others were plundered and their inhabitants sold into slavery. The Cappadocian faction, both men and cities, were severely punished, and especially the Ephesians, who, with servile adulation of the king, had treated the Roman offerings in their temples with

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indignity. After this a proclamation was sent around commanding the principal citizens to come to Ephesus on a certain day to meet Sulla. When they had assembled Sulla addressed them from the tribune as follows:—

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62. "We first came to Asia with an army when Antiochus, king of Syria, was despoiling you. We drove him out and fixed the boundaries of his dominions beyond the river Halys and Mount Taurus. We did not retain possession of you when we had delivered you from him, but set you free, except that we awarded a few places to Eumenes and the Rhodians, our allies in the war, not as tributaries, but as clients. The proof of this is that when the Lycians complained of the Rhodians we deprived them of their authority. Such was our conduct toward you. You, on the other hand, when Attalus Philometor had left his kingdom to us in his will, gave aid to Aristonicus against us for four years. When he was captured most of you, under the impulse of necessity and fear, returned to your duty. Notwithstanding all this, after a period of twenty-four years, during which you had attained to great prosperity and embellishment, public and private, you again became puffed up by ease and luxury and took the opportunity, while we were preoccupied in Italy, some of you to call in Mithridates and others to join him when he came. Most infamous of all, you obeyed the order he gave to kill all the Italians in your communities, including women and children, in one day. You did not even spare those who fled to the temples dedicated to your own gods. You have received some punishment for this crime from Mithridates himself, who broke faith with you and gave you your fill of rapine and slaughter, redistributed your lands, cancelled debts, freed your slaves, appointed tyrants over some of you, and committed robberies everywhere by land and sea; so that you learned immediately by experiment and comparison what kind of defender you chose instead of your former ones. The instigators of these crimes paid some penalty to us also. It is necessary, too, that some penalty should be inflicted upon you in common, as you have been guilty in common, and something corresponding to your deserts. But may the Romans never even conceive of impious slaughter, indiscriminate confiscation, servile insur-

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rections, or other acts of barbarism. I shall spare even now the Greek race and name so celebrated throughout Asia, and for the sake of that fair repute that is ever dear to the Romans I shall only impose upon you the taxes of five years, to be paid at once, together with the cost of the war expended by me, and whatever else may be spent in settling the affairs of the province. I will apportion these charges to each of you according to cities, and will fix the time of payment. Upon the disobedient I shall visit punishment as upon enemies."

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63. After he had thus spoken Sulla apportioned the fine to the delegates and sent men to collect the money. The cities, oppressed by poverty, borrowed it at high rates of interest and mortgaged their theatres, their gymnasiums, their walls, their harbors, and every other scrap of public property, being urged on by the soldiers with contumely. Thus was the money collected and brought to Sulla. The province of Asia had her fill of misery. She was assailed openly by a vast number of pirates, resembling regular fleets rather than robber bands. Mithridates had first fitted them out at the time when he was ravaging all the coasts, thinking he could not long hold these regions. Their numbers had then greatly increased, and they did not confine themselves to ships alone, but openly attacked harbors, castles, and cities. They captured Iassus, Samos, and Clazomenæ, also Samothrace, where Sulla was staying at the time, and it was said that they robbed the temple at that place of ornaments valued at 1000 talents. Sulla, willing perhaps that those who had offended him should be maltreated, or because he was in haste to put down the hostile faction in Rome, left them and sailed for Greece, and thence passed on to Italy with the greater part of his army. What he did there I have related in my history of the civil wars.

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64. The second Mithridatic war began in this way. Murena, who had been left by Sulla with Fimbria's two legions to settle affairs of the rest of Asia, sought trifling pretexts for war, being ambitious of a triumph. Mithridates, after his return to Pontus, went to war with the Colchians and the tribes around the Cimmerian Bosphorus who had revolted from him. The Colchians asked him to give them his son, Mithridates, as their ruler, and when he did

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671 so they at once returned to their allegiance. The king <sup>B. C.</sup> 83

suspected that this was brought about by his son through his own ambition to be king. Accordingly he sent for him and first bound him with golden fetters, and soon afterward put him to death, although he had served him well in Asia in the battles with Fimbria. Against the tribes of the Bosphorus he built a fleet and fitted out a large army. The magnitude of his preparations gave rise to the belief that they were made not against those tribes, but against the Romans, for he had not yet restored the whole of Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes, but still retained a part of it. He also had suspicions of Archelaus. He thought that the latter had yielded more than was necessary to Sulla in his negotiations in Greece. When Archelaus heard of this he became alarmed and fled to Murena, and by working on him persuaded him to anticipate Mithridates in beginning hostilities. Murena marched suddenly through Cappadocia and attacked Comana, a very large country town belonging to Mithridates, with a rich and renowned temple, and killed some of the king's cavalry. When the king's ambassadors appealed to the treaty he replied that he saw no treaty; for Sulla had not written it out, but had gone away after the terms had been fulfilled by acts. When Murena had delivered his answer he began robbing forthwith, not sparing the money of the temples, and he went into winter quarters in Cappadocia.

672 65. Mithridates sent an embassy to the Senate and to <sup>B. C.</sup> 82

Sulla to complain of the acts of Murena. The latter, meantime, had passed over the river Halys, which was then swollen by rains and very difficult to cross. He captured 400 villages belonging to Mithridates. The king offered no opposition, but waited for the return of his embassy. Murena returned to Phrygia and Galatia loaded down with plunder. There he met Calidius, who had been sent from Rome on account of the complaints of Mithridates. Calidius did not bring a decree of the Senate, but he declared in the hearing of all that the Senate ordered him not to molest the king, as he had not broken the treaty. After he had thus spoken he was seen talking to Murena alone. Murena abated nothing of his violence, but again invaded the territory of Mithridates. The latter, thinking that

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672 open war had been ordered by the Romans, directed his general, Gordius, to retaliate on their villages. Gordius straightway seized and carried off a large number of animals and other property and men, both private citizens and soldiers, and took position against Murena himself, with a river flowing between them. Neither of them began the fight until Mithridates came up with a larger army, when a severe engagement immediately took place on the banks of the river. Mithridates prevailed, crossed the river, and got the better of Murena decidedly. The latter retreated to a strong hill where the king attacked him. After losing many men Murena fled over the mountains to Phrygia by a pathless route, severely harassed by the missiles of the enemy.

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66. The news of this brilliant and decisive victory spread quickly and caused many to change sides to Mithridates. The latter drove all of Murena's garrisons out of Cappadocia and offered sacrifice to Zeus Stratius on a lofty pile of wood on a high hill, according to the fashion of his country, which is as follows. First, the kings themselves carry wood to the heap. Then they make a smaller pile encircling the other one, on which they pour milk, honey, wine, oil, and various kinds of incense. A banquet is spread on the ground for those present (as at the sacrifices of the Persian kings at Pasargadæ) and then they set fire to the wood. The height of the flame is such that it can be seen at a distance of 1000 stades from the sea, and they say that nobody can come near it for several days on account of the heat. Mithridates performed a sacrifice of this kind according to the custom of his country.

673 Sulla thought that it was not right to make war against Mithridates when he had not violated the treaty. Accordingly, Aulus Gabinius was sent to tell Murena that the former order, that he should not fight Mithridates, was to be taken seriously, and to reconcile Mithridates and Ariobarzanes with each other. At a conference between them Mithridates betrothed his little daughter, four years old, to Ariobarzanes, and improved the occasion to stipulate that he should not only retain that part of Cappadocia which he then held, but have another part in addition. Then he gave a banquet to all, with prizes of gold for those who

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673 should excel in drinking, eating, jesting, singing, and so forth, as was customary, in which Gabinius was the only one who did not engage. Thus the second war between Mithridates and the Romans, lasting about three years, came to an end.

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## CHAPTER X

New Troubles brewing — Mithridates forms an Alliance with Sertorius and prepares for War — Makes a Speech to his Troops — Invades Bithynia

674 67. As Mithridates was now at leisure he subdued the tribes of the Bosphorus and appointed Machares, one of his sons, king over them. Then he fell upon the Achæans beyond Colchis (who are supposed to be descended from those who lost their way when returning from the Trojan war), but lost two divisions of his army, partly by open war, partly by the severity of the climate, and partly by stratagem. When he returned home he sent ambassadors to Rome to sign the agreements. At the same time Ariobarzanes, either of his own notion or at the prompting of others, sent thither to complain that Cappadocia had not been delivered up to him, but that a greater part of it was yet retained by Mithridates. Sulla commanded Mithridates to give up Cappadocia. He did so, and then sent another embassy to sign the agreements. But now Sulla had just died, and as the Senate was otherwise occupied the prætors did not admit them. So Mithridates persuaded his son-in-law, Tigranes, to make an incursion into Cappadocia as though it were on his own account. This artifice did not deceive the Romans. The Armenian king threw, as it were, a drag net around Cappadocia and made a haul of about 300,000 people, whom he carried off to his own country and settled them, with others, in a certain place where he had first assumed the diadem of Armenia and which he had called after himself, Tigranocerta, or the city of Tigranes.

676 68. While these things were taking place in Asia Sertorius, the governor of Spain, incited that province and all the neighboring country to rebel against the Romans, and

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selected from his associates a senate in imitation of that of Rome. Two members of his faction, Lucius Magius and Lucius Fannius, proposed to Mithridates to ally himself with Sertorius, holding out the hope that he would acquire a large part of the province of Asia and of the neighboring nations. Mithridates fell in with this suggestion and sent ambassadors to Sertorius. The latter introduced them to his senate and felicitated himself that his fame had extended to Pontus, and that he could now besiege the Roman power in both the Orient and the Occident. So he made a treaty with Mithridates to give him Asia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, and Galatia, and sent Marcus Varius to him as a general and the two Luciiuses, Magius and Fannius, as counsellors. With their assistance Mithridates began his third and last war against the Romans, in the course of which he lost his entire kingdom, and Sertorius lost his life in Spain. Two generals were sent against Mithridates from Rome; the first, Lucullus, the same who had served as prefect of the fleet under Sulla; the second, Pompey, by whom the whole of his dominions, and the adjoining territory as far as the river Euphrates, under the pretext and impetus of the Mithridatic war, were brought under Roman sway.

69. Mithridates had been in collision with the Romans so often that he knew that this war, so inexcusably and hastily begun, would be an implacable one. He made every preparation with the thought that all was at stake. The remainder of the summer and the whole of the winter he spent in cutting timber, building ships, and making arms. He distributed 2,000,000 medimni<sup>1</sup> of corn along the coast. Besides his former forces he had for allies the Chalybes, Armenians, Scythians, Taurians, Achæans, Heniochi, Leucosyrians, and those who occupy the territory about the river Thermodon, called the country of the Amazons. These additions to his former strength were from Asia. From Europe he drew of the Sarmatian tribes, both the Basilidæ and the Jazyges, the Coralli, and those Thracians who dwell along the Danube and on the Rhodope and Hæmus mountains, and besides these the Bastarnæ, the

<sup>1</sup> The medimnus = 12 gallons.

Y. R. 679 bravest nation of all. Altogether Mithridates recruited a fighting force of about 140,000 foot and 16,000 horse. A great crowd of road-makers, baggage-carriers, and sutlers followed. B. C. 75

680 70. At the beginning of spring Mithridates made trial of his navy and sacrificed to Zeus Stratius in the customary manner, and also to Poseidon by plunging a chariot with white horses into the sea. Then he hastened against Paphlagonia with his two generals, Taxiles and Hermocrates, in command of his army. When he arrived there he made a speech to his soldiers, eulogistic of his ancestors and still more so of himself, showing how his kingdom had grown to greatness from small beginnings, and how his army had never been defeated by the Romans when he was present. He accused the Romans of avarice and lust of power "to such an extent," he said, "that they had enslaved Italy and Rome itself." He accused them of bad faith respecting the last and still existing treaty, saying that they were not willing to sign it because they were watching for an opportunity to violate it again. After thus setting forth the cause of the war he dwelt upon the composition of his army and his apparatus, upon the preoccupation of the Romans, who were waging a difficult war with Sertorius in Spain, and were torn with civil dissensions throughout Italy, "for which reason," he said, "they have allowed the sea to be overrun by pirates a long time, and have not a single ally, nor any subjects who still obey them willingly. Do you not see," he added, "some of their noblest citizens (pointing to Varius and the two Luciuses) at war with their own country and allied with us?" 74

71. When he had finished speaking and exciting his army, he invaded Bithynia. Nicomedes had lately died childless and bequeathed his kingdom to the Romans. Cotta, its governor, was a man altogether unwarlike. He fled to Chalcedon with what force he had. Thus Bithynia again passed under the rule of Mithridates. The Romans from all directions flocked to Cotta at Chalcedon. When Mithridates advanced to that place Cotta did not go out to meet him because he was inexperienced in military affairs, but his naval prefect, Nudus, with a part of the army occupied a very strong position on the plain. He was driven

V.R.

680 out of it, however, and fled to the gates of Chalcedon over many walls which greatly obstructed his movement. There was a struggle at the gates among those trying to gain entrance simultaneously, for which reason no missile cast by the pursuers missed its mark. The guards at the gates, fearing for the city, let down the gate from the machine. Nudus and some of the other officers were drawn up by ropes. The remainder perished between their friends and their foes, holding out their hands in entreaty to each. Mithridates made good use of his success. He moved his ships up to the harbor the same day, broke the brazen chain that closed the entrance, burned four of the enemy's ships, and towed the remaining sixty away. Nudus offered no resistance, nor Cotta, for they remained shut up inside the walls. The Roman loss was about 3000, including Lucius Manlius, a man of senatorial rank. Mithridates lost twenty of his Bastarnæ, who were the first to break into the harbor.

## CHAPTER XI

Lucullus takes the Command against him and cuts off his Supplies at Cyzicus — Mithridates besieges Cyzicus — Valiant Defence of the City — Famine in the Besieging Army — Flight of Mithridates — Lucullus pursues — Mithridates suffers Shipwreck

72. Lucius Lucullus, who had been chosen consul and general for this war, led one legion of soldiers from Rome, joined with it the two of Fimbria, and added two others, making in all 30,000 foot and 1600 horse, with which he pitched his camp near that of Mithridates at Cyzicus. When he learned from deserters that the king's army contained about 300,000 men and that all his supplies were furnished by foragers or came by sea, he said to those around him that he would presently reduce the enemy without fighting, and he told them to remember his promise. Seeing a mountain well suited for a camp, where he could readily obtain supplies, and could cut off those of the enemy, he moved forward to occupy it in order to gain a victory by that means without danger. There was only one narrow pass leading to it, and Mithridates held it by a

V.R.  
68o

strong guard. He had been advised to do so by Taxiles and his other officers. Lucius Magius, who had brought about the alliance between Sertorius and Mithridates, now that Sertorius was dead, opened secret communications with Lucullus, and having secured pledges from him persuaded Mithridates to allow the Romans to pass through and encamp where they pleased. "The two legions of Fimbria," he said, "want to desert, and will come over to you directly. What is the use of a battle and bloodshed when you can conquer the enemy without fighting?" Mithridates assented to this advice heedlessly and without suspicion. He allowed the Romans to go through the pass unmolested and to fortify the great hill on his front. When they had possessed themselves of it they were able to draw supplies from their rear without difficulty. Mithridates, on the other hand, was cut off by a lake, by mountains, and by rivers, from all provisions on the landward side, except an occasional supply secured with difficulty; he had no easy way out and he could not overcome Lucullus on account of the difficulty of the ground, which he had disregarded when he himself had the advantage. Moreover, winter was now approaching and would soon interrupt his supplies by sea. As Lucullus looked over the situation he reminded his friends of his promise, and showed them that his prediction was practically accomplished.

B.C.  
74

73. Although Mithridates might perhaps even now have been able to break through the enemy's lines by force of numbers, he neglected to do so, but pressed the siege of Cyzicus with the apparatus he had prepared, thinking that he should find a remedy in this way both for the badness of his position and for his want of supplies. As he had plenty of soldiers he pushed the siege in every possible way. He blockaded the harbor with a double sea wall and drew a line of circumvallation around the rest of the city. He raised mounds, built machines, towers, and rams protected by tortoises. He constructed a siege engine 100 cubits high, from which rose another tower furnished with catapults discharging stones and various kinds of missiles. Two quinqueremes joined together carried another tower against the port, from which a bridge could be projected by a mechanical device when brought near the wall. When

Y.R.

680 all was in readiness he first sent against the city on ships  
 3000 inhabitants of Cyzicus whom he had taken prisoners.  
 These raised their hands toward the wall in supplication  
 and besought their fellow-citizens to spare them in their  
 dangerous position, but Pisistratus, the Cyzicean general,  
 proclaimed from the walls that as they were in the enemy's  
 hands they must meet their fate bravely.

B.C.

74

74. When this attempt had failed Mithridates brought  
 up the machine erected on the ships and suddenly projected  
 the bridge upon the wall and four of his men ran across.  
 The Cyziceans were at first dumbfounded by the novelty of  
 the device and gave way somewhat, but as the rest of the  
 enemy were slow in following, they plucked up courage  
 and thrust the four over the wall. Then they poured burn-  
 ing pitch on the ships and compelled them to back out  
 stern foremost with the machine. In this way the Cyzi-  
 ceans beat off the invaders by sea. Three times on the  
 same day all the machines on the landward side were massed  
 against the toiling citizens, who flew this way and that way  
 to meet the constantly renewed assault. They broke the  
 rams with stones, or turned them aside with nooses, or  
 deadened their blows with baskets of wool. They extin-  
 guished the enemy's fire-bearing missiles with water and  
 vinegar, and broke the force of others by means of gar-  
 ments suspended or linen cloth stretched before them. In  
 short, they left nothing untried that was within the com-  
 pass of human zeal. Although they toiled most persever-  
 ingly, yet a portion of the wall, that had been weakened by  
 fire, gave way toward evening; but on account of the heat  
 nobody was in a hurry to dash in. The Cyziceans built  
 another wall around it that night, and about this time a  
 tremendous wind came and smashed the rest of the king's  
 machines.

75. It is said that the city of Cyzicus was given by Zeus  
 to Proserpina by way of dowry, and that of all the gods the  
 inhabitants have most veneration for her. Her festival  
 now came around, on which they are accustomed to sacrifi-  
 ce a black heifer to her, and as they had none they made  
 one of paste. Just then a black heifer swam to them from  
 the sea, dived under the chain at the mouth of the harbor,  
 walked into the city, found her own way to the temple, and

Y. R.

680 took her place by the altar. The Cyziceans sacrificed her with joyful hopes. Thereupon the friends of Mithridates advised him to sail away from the place since it was sacred, but he would not do so. He ascended Mount Dindymus, which overhung the city, and built a mound extending from it to the city walls, on which he constructed towers, and, at the same time, undermined the wall with tunnels. As his horses were not useful here, and were weak for want of food and had sore hoofs, he sent them by a roundabout way to Bithynia. Lucullus fell upon them as they were crossing the river Rhyndacus, killed a large number, and captured 15,000 men, 6000 horses, and a large amount of baggage. While these things were transpiring at Cyzicus Eumachus, one of Mithridates' generals, overran Phrygia and killed a great many Romans, with their wives and children, subjugated the Pisidians and the Isaurians and also Cilicia. Finally Deïotarus, one of the tetrarchs of Galatia, drove the marauder away and slew many of his men. Such was the course of events in and around Phrygia.

B. C.  
74

76. When winter came Mithridates was deprived of his supplies by sea, if he had any, so that his whole army suffered from hunger, and many of them died. There were some who ate the entrails<sup>1</sup> according to a barbarian custom. Others were made sick by subsisting on herbs. Moreover the corpses that were thrown out in the neighborhood unburied brought on a plague in addition to that caused by famine. Nevertheless Mithridates continued his efforts, hoping still to capture Cyzicus by means of the mounds extending from Mount Dindymus. But when the Cyziceans undermined them and burned the machines on them, and made frequent sallies upon his forces, knowing that they were weakened by want of food, Mithridates began to think  
681 of flight. He fled by night, going himself with his fleet 73 to Parus, and his army by land to Lampsacus. Many lost their lives in crossing the river Æsepus, which was then greatly swollen, and where Lucullus attacked them. Thus the Cyziceans escaped the vast siege preparations of the king by means of their own bravery and of the famine that Lucullus brought upon the enemy. They instituted games

<sup>1</sup> The text here is defective.

V.R.

68: in his honor, which they celebrate to this day, called the Lucullean games. Mithridates sent ships for those who had taken refuge in Lampsacus, where they were besieged by Lucullus, and carried them away, together with the Lampsaceans themselves. Leaving 10,000 picked men and fifty ships under Varius (the general sent to him by Sertorius), and Alexander the Paphlagonian, and Dionysius the eunuch, he sailed with the bulk of his force for Nicomedia. A storm came up in which many of both divisions perished.

B.C.

73

77. When Lucullus had accomplished this result on land by starving his enemies, he collected a fleet from the Asiatic province and distributed it to the generals serving under him. Trirarius sailed to Apamea, captured it, and slew a great many of the inhabitants who had taken refuge in the temples. Barba took Prusias, situated at the base of a mountain, and occupied Nicæa, which had been abandoned by the Mithridatic garrison. At the harbor of the Achæans Lucullus captured thirteen of the enemy's ships. He overtook Varius and Alexander and Dionysius on a barren island near Lemnos (where the altar of Philoctetes is shown with the brazen serpent, the bows, and the breast-plate bound with fillets, to remind us of the sufferings of that hero), and dashed at them in a contemptuous manner. They stoutly held their ground. He checked his oarsmen and sent his ships toward them by twos in order to entice them out to sea. As they declined the challenge, but continued to defend themselves on land, he sent a part of his fleet around to another side of the island, disembarked a force of infantry, and drove the enemy to their ships. Still they did not venture out to sea, but hugged the shore, because they were afraid of the army of Lucullus. Thus they were exposed to missiles on both sides, landward and seaward, and received a great many wounds, and after heavy slaughter took to flight. Varius, Alexander, and Dionysius the eunuch were captured in a cave where they had concealed themselves. Dionysius drank poison which he had with him and immediately expired. Lucullus gave orders that Varius be put to death, since he did not want to have his triumph graced by a Roman senator, but he kept Alexander for that purpose. Lucullus sent letters wreathed with





L. LICINIUS LUCULLUS  
In the Museum of the Hermitage (Duruy)



<sup>V.R.</sup>  
68<sup>r</sup> laurel to Rome, as is the custom of victors, and then pressed forward to Bithynia. <sup>B.C.</sup>  
73

78. As Mithridates was sailing to Pontus a second tempest overtook him and he lost about 10,000 men and sixty ships, and the remainder were scattered wherever the wind blew them. His own ship sprang a leak and he went aboard a small piratical craft although his friends tried to dissuade him. The pirates landed him safely at Sinope. From that place he was towed to Amisus, whence he sent appeals to his son-in-law, Tigranes the Armenian, and his son, Machares, the ruler of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, that they should hasten to his assistance. He ordered Diocles to take a large quantity of gold and other presents to the neighboring Scythians, but Diocles took the gold and the presents and deserted to Lucullus. 72  
68<sup>a</sup> Lucullus moved to the front with the prestige of victory, subduing everything in his path and subsisting on the country. Presently he came to a rich district, exempt from the ravages of war, where a slave was sold for four drachmas,<sup>1</sup> an ox for one, and goats, sheep, clothing, and other things in proportion. Lucullus laid siege to Amisus and also to Eupatoria, which Mithridates had built alongside of Amisus<sup>2</sup> and named after himself and where he had fixed the royal residence. With another army he besieged Themiscyra, which is named after one of the Amazons and is situated on the river Thermo-don. The besiegers of this place brought up towers, built mounds, and dug tunnels so large that great subterranean battles could be fought in them. The inhabitants cut openings into these tunnels from above and thrust bears and other wild animals and swarms of bees into them against the workers. Those who were besieging Amisus suffered in other ways. The inhabitants repelled them bravely, made frequent sallies, and often challenged them to single combat. Mithridates sent them plenty of supplies and arms and soldiers from Cabira, where he wintered and collected a new army. Here he brought together about 40,000 foot and 4000 horse.

<sup>1</sup> The metallic equivalent of the drachma was 9½*d.* English money.

<sup>2</sup> Another geographical error. Amisus was on the sea-coast and Eupatoria a considerable distance inland.

## CHAPTER XII

Second Campaign of Lucullus against Mithridates — Crosses a Mountain Range — A Panic in the Camp of Mithridates — Mithridates takes Refuge with Tigranes — Lucullus regulates the Pontic Cities — Demands the Surrender of Mithridates from Tigranes — Marches against Tigranes — Besieges Tigranocerta — Battle of Tigranocerta — Total Defeat of Tigranes — Capture of Tigranocerta

V. R.  
683

79. When spring came Lucullus marched over the mountains against Mithridates, who had stationed advanced posts to hinder his approach, and to start signal fires whenever anything important should happen. He appointed a member of the royal family, named Phœnix, commander of this advance guard. When Lucullus drew near, Phœnix gave the fire-signal to Mithridates and then deserted to Lucullus with his forces. Lucullus now passed over the mountains without difficulty and came down to Cabira, but was beaten by Mithridates in a cavalry engagement and retreated again to the mountain. Pomponius, his master of horse, was wounded and taken prisoner and brought to the presence of Mithridates. The king asked him what favor he (Pomponius) could render him for sparing his life. Pomponius replied, "A great one if you make peace with Lucullus, but if you continue his enemy I will not even consider your question." The barbarians wanted to put him to death, but the king said that he would not do violence to bravery overtaken by misfortune. He drew out his forces for battle several days in succession, but Lucullus would not come down and fight; so he looked about for some way to come at him by ascending the mountain. At this juncture a Scythian, named Olcaba, who had deserted to Lucullus some time before and had saved the lives of many in the recent cavalry fight, and for that reason was deemed worthy to share Lucullus' table, his confidence, and his secrets, came to his tent while he was taking his noonday rest and tried to force his way in. He was wearing a short dagger in his belt as was his custom. When he was prevented from entering he became angry and said that there was a pressing necessity that the general should be aroused. The servants replied that there was nothing more useful to Lucullus than

B. C.  
71

683 his safety. Thereupon the Scythian mounted his horse and went immediately to Mithridates, either because he had plotted against Lucullus and now thought that he was suspected, or because he considered himself insulted and was angry on that account. He exposed to Mithridates another Scythian, named Sobdacus, who was about to desert to Lucullus. Sobdacus was accordingly arrested.

80. Lucullus hesitated about going down directly to the plain since the enemy was so much superior in horse, nor could he discover any way around, but he found a hunter in a cave who was familiar with the mountain paths. With him for a guide he made a circuitous descent by rugged paths over Mithridates' head. He avoided the plain on account of the cavalry, and came down and chose a place for his camp where he had a mountain stream on his front. As he was short of supplies he sent to Cappadocia for corn, and in the meantime had frequent skirmishes with the enemy. Once when the royal forces were put to flight Mithridates came running to them from his camp and, with reproachful words, rallied them to such good purpose that the Romans became terrified in turn and fled up the mountain side with such swiftness that they did not know for a long time that the hostile force had desisted from the pursuit, but each one thought that the fleeing comrade behind him was an enemy, so great was the panic that had overtaken them. Mithridates sent bulletins everywhere announcing this victory. He then sent a detachment composed of the bravest of his horse to intercept the convoy that was bringing supplies from Cappadocia to Lucullus, hoping to bring upon him the same scarcity of provisions from which he had himself suffered at Cyzicus.

81. It was his great object to cut off Lucullus' supplies, which were drawn from Cappadocia alone, but when his cavalry came upon the advance guard of the convoy in a narrow defile, they did not wait till their enemies had reached the open country. Consequently their horses were useless in the narrow space, where the Romans hastily put themselves in line of battle across the road. Aided, as foot-soldiers would naturally be, by the difficulties of the ground, they killed some of the king's troops, drove others over precipices, and scattered the rest in flight. A few

V. R.

683

B. C.

71

Y. R.

68<sub>3</sub>

of them arrived at their camp by night, and said that they were the only survivors, so that rumor magnified the calamity which was indeed sufficiently great. Mithridates heard of this affair before Lucullus did, and he expected that Lucullus would take advantage of so great a slaughter of his horsemen to attack him forthwith. Accordingly he fell into a panic and contemplated flight, and at once communicated his purpose to his friends in his tent. They did not wait for the signal to be given, but while it was still night each one sent his own baggage out of the camp, which made a great crush of pack animals around the gates. When the soldiers perceived the commotion, and saw what the baggage-carriers were doing, they imagined every sort of absurdity. Filled with terror, mingled with anger that the signal had not been given to them also, they demolished and ran over their own fortification and scattered in every direction over the plain, helter-skelter, without orders from the commanding general or any other officer. When Mithridates heard the disorderly rush he dashed out of his tent among them and attempted to say something, but nobody would listen to him. He was caught in the crowd and knocked from his horse, but remounted and was borne to the mountains with a few followers.

B. C.

71

82. When Lucullus heard of the success of his provision train and observed the enemy's flight, he sent out a large force of cavalry in pursuit of the fugitives. Those who were still collecting baggage in the camp he surrounded with his infantry, whom he ordered for the time to abstain from plunder, but to kill indiscriminately. But the soldiers, seeing vessels of gold and of silver in abundance and much costly clothing, disregarded the order. Those who overtook Mithridates himself cut open the pack saddle of a mule that was loaded with gold, which fell out, and while they were busy with it they allowed him to escape to Comona. From thence he fled to Tigranes with 2000 horsemen. Tigranes did not admit him to his presence, but ordered that royal entertainment be provided for him on his estates. Mithridates, in utter despair of his kingdom, sent the eunuch Bacchus to his palace to put his sisters, wives, and concubines to death as he could. These, with wonderful devotion, destroyed themselves with daggers,

V.R.

684 poison, and ropes. When the garrison commanders of Mithridates saw these things they went over to Lucullus in crowds, all but a few. Lucullus marched among the others and regulated them. He also sent his fleet among the cities on the Pontic coast and captured Amastris, Heraclea, and some others.

B.C.

70

83. Sinope continued to resist him vigorously, and the inhabitants fought him on the water not without success, but when they were besieged they burned their heavier ships, embarked on the lighter ones, and went away. Lucullus at once made it a free city, being moved thereto by the following dream. It is said that Autolycus, the companion of Hercules in his expedition against the Amazons, was driven by a tempest into Sinope and made himself master of the place, and that his consecrated statue gave oracles to the Sinopeans. As they were hastening their flight they could not embark it on shipboard, but wrapped it up with linen cloths and ropes. Nobody told Lucullus of this beforehand and he knew nothing about it, but he dreamed that he saw Autolycus calling him, and the following day, when some men passed him carrying the image wrapped up, he ordered them to take off the covering and then he saw what he thought he had seen in the night. This was the kind of dream he had. After Sinope Lucullus restored to their homes the citizens of Amisus, who had fled by sea in like manner, because he learned that they had been settled there by Athens when she held the empire of the sea; that they had had a democratic form of government at first, and afterward had been subject for a long time to the kings of Persia; that their democracy had been restored to them by decree of Alexander; and that they had finally been compelled to serve the kings of Pontus. Lucullus sympathized with them, and in emulation of the favor shown to the Attic race by Alexander he gave the city its freedom and recalled the citizens with all haste. Thus did Lucullus desolate and repeople both Sinope and Amisus. He entered into friendly relations with Machares, the son of Mithridates and ruler of the Bosphorus, who sent him a crown of gold. He demanded the surrender of Mithridates from Tigranes. Then he went back to the province of Asia. When the instalment of tribute imposed by Sulla became

V.R.

B.C.

due he levied upon one-fourth of the harvest, and imposed a house-tax and a slave-tax. He offered a triumphal sacrifice to the gods for the successful termination of the war.

685 84. After the sacrifices had been performed he marched 69

with two legions and 500 horse against Tigranes, who had refused to surrender Mithridates to him. He crossed the Euphrates, but he required the barbarians, through whose territory he passed, to furnish only necessary supplies since they did not want to fight, or to expose themselves to suffering by taking sides in the quarrel between Lucullus and Tigranes. No one told Tigranes that Lucullus was advancing, for the first man who brought this news he hanged, considering him a disturber of the good order of the cities. When he learned that it was true, he sent Mithrobarzanes forward with 2000 horse to hinder Lucullus' march. He intrusted to Mancæus the defence of Tigranocerta, which city, as I have already said, the king had built in this region in honor of himself, and to which he had summoned the principal inhabitants of the country under penalty of confiscation of all of their goods that they did not transfer to it. He surrounded it with walls fifty cubits high and wide enough to contain stables for horses. In the suburbs he built a palace and laid out large parks, enclosures for wild animals, and fish-ponds. He also erected a strong tower near by. All these he put in charge of Mancæus, and then he went through the country to collect an army. Lucullus, at his first encounter with Mithrobarzanes, defeated him and put him to flight. Sextilius shut up Mancæus in Tigranocerta, plundered the palace outside the walls, drew a ditch around the city and tower, moved machines against them, and undermined the wall.

85. While Sextilius was doing this Tigranes brought together some 250,000 foot and 50,000 horse. He sent about 6000 of the latter to Tigranocerta, who broke through the Roman line to the tower, and seized and brought away the king's concubines. With the rest of his army Tigranes marched against Lucullus. Mithridates, who was now for the first time admitted to his presence, advised him not to come to close quarters with the Romans, but to circle around them with his horse only, to devastate the country, and reduce them by famine if possible, in the same way



V. R.

685 that he had been served by Lucullus at Cyzicus, where he lost his army without fighting. Tigranes derided such generalship and advanced and made preparations for battle. When he saw how small the Roman force was, he said jestingly, "If they are here as ambassadors they are too many; if as enemies, altogether too few." Lucullus saw a hill favorably situated in the rear of Tigranes. He pushed his horse forward from his own front to worry the enemy and draw them upon himself, retiring as they came up, so that the barbarians should break their own ranks in the pursuit. Then he sent his own infantry around to the hill and took possession of it unobserved. When he saw the enemy pursuing as though they had won the fight, and scattered in all directions, with their entire baggage-train lying at the foot of the hill, he exclaimed, "Soldiers, we are victorious," and dashed first upon their baggage-carriers. These immediately fled in confusion and ran against their own infantry, and the infantry against the cavalry. Presently the rout was complete. Those who had been drawn a long distance in pursuit of the Roman horse, the latter turned upon and destroyed. The baggage-train came into collision with others tumultuously. They were all packed together in such a crowd that nobody could see clearly from what quarter their discomfiture proceeded. There was a great slaughter. Nobody stopped to plunder, for Lucullus had forbidden it with threats of punishment, so that they passed by bracelets and necklaces on the road, and continued killing for a distance of 120 stades until nightfall. Then they betook themselves to plunder with the permission of Lucullus.

86. When Mançæus beheld this defeat from Tigranocerta he disarmed all of his Greek mercenaries because he suspected them. They, in fear of arrest, walked abroad or rested only in a body, and with clubs in their hands. Mançæus set upon them with his armed barbarians. They wound their clothing around their left arms, to serve as shields, and fought their assailants courageously, killed some, and shared their arms with each other. When they were sufficiently provided with weapons they seized some of the towers, called to the Romans outside, and admitted them when they came up. In this way was Tigranocerta

B. C.  
69

V.R.

68<sup>5</sup> taken, and the immense wealth, appertaining to a newly <sup>B.C.</sup> 69  
built and nobly peopled city, plundered.

## CHAPTER XIII

Tigranes collects a New Army — Indecisive Movements — Mithridates  
defeats the Romans under Fabius and overwhelms Triarius — In-  
trigue against Lucullus at Rome

686 87. Now Tigranes and Mithridates traversed the country 68  
collecting a new army, the command of which was com-  
mitted to Mithridates, because Tigranes thought that his  
disasters must have taught him some lessons. They also  
sent messengers to Parthia to solicit aid from that quarter.  
Lucullus sent opposing legates asking that the Parthians  
should either help him or remain neutral. Their king  
made secret agreements with both, but was in no haste to  
help either of them. Mithridates manufactured arms in  
every town. The soldiers he recruited were almost wholly  
Armenians. From these he selected the bravest to the  
number of about 70,000 foot and half that number of horse  
and dismissed the rest. He divided them into companies  
and cohorts as nearly as possible according to the Italian  
system, and turned them over to Pontic officers to be  
trained. When Lucullus moved toward them Mithridates,  
with all the foot-soldiers and a part of the horse, held his  
forces together on a hill. Tigranes, with the rest of the  
horse, attacked the Roman foragers and was beaten, for  
which reason the Romans foraged more freely afterward  
even in the vicinity of Mithridates himself, and encamped  
near him. Again a great dust arose indicating the ap-  
proach of Tigranes. The two kings had resolved to sur-  
round Lucullus. The latter perceived their movement and  
sent forward the best of his horse to engage Tigranes at as  
great a distance as possible, and prevent him from deploy-  
ing from his line of march into order of battle. He also  
challenged Mithridates to fight.<sup>1</sup> He began to surround  
him with a ditch, but could not draw him out. Finally,  
winter came on and interrupted the work on both sides.

<sup>1</sup> At this place there is a lacuna in the text.

V.R.  
686B.C.  
68

88. Tigranes now withdrew into the interior of Armenia and Mithridates hastened to what was left of his own kingdom of Pontus, taking with him 4000 of his own troops and as many more that he had received from Tigranes. Lucullus slowly followed him, but was obliged to turn back frequently for want of provisions. Mithridates made haste and attacked Fabius, who had been left in command by Lucullus, put him to flight, and killed 500 of his men. Fabius freed the slaves who had been in his camp and fought again an entire day, but the battle was going against him until Mithridates was struck by a stone on the knee and wounded by a dart under the eye, and was hastily carried out of the fight. For many days thereafter his forces were alarmed for his safety, and the Romans were quiet on account of the great number of wounds they had received. Mithridates was cured by the Agari, a Scythian tribe, who make use of the poison of serpents as remedies. Some of this tribe always accompanied the king as physicians. Triarius, the other general of Lucullus, now came with his own army to the assistance of Fabius and received from the latter his forces and authority. He and Mithridates not long afterward joined battle, during which a tempest of wind, the like of which had not been known in the memory of man, tore down the tents of both, swept away their beasts of burden, and even dashed some of their men over precipices. Both sides then retreated.

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89. News having been received that Lucullus was coming, Triarius hastened to anticipate his action and made a night attack upon the outposts of Mithridates. The fight continued for a long time doubtful, until the king made a powerful charge on that division of the enemy that was opposed to him and decided the battle. He broke through their ranks and drove their infantry into a muddy trench, where they were unable to stand and were slaughtered. He pursued their horse over the plain and made the most spirited use of the stroke of good luck until a certain Roman centurion, who was riding with him in the guise of an attendant, gave him a severe wound with a sword in the thigh, as he could not expect to pierce his back through his corselet. Those who were near immediately cut the centurion in pieces. Mithridates was carried to the rear and his

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friends recalled the army, by a hasty signal, from their splendid victory. Confusion befell them by reason of the unexpectedness of the signal, and fear lest some disaster had happened elsewhere. When they learned what it was they gathered around the person of the king on the plain in consternation, until Timotheus, his physician, had stanchd the blood and lifted the king up so that he could be seen. In like manner in India, when Alexander was cured, he showed himself on a ship to the Macedonians, who were alarmed about him. As soon as Mithridates came to himself he reproved those who had recalled the army from the fight, and led his men again the same day against the camp of the Romans. But they had already fled from it in terror. In stripping the dead there were found 24 tribunes and 150 centurions. So great a number of officers had seldom fallen in any single Roman defeat.

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90. Mithridates withdrew into the country which the Romans now call Lesser Armenia, taking all the provisions he could and spoiling what he could not carry, so as to prevent Lucullus from getting any on his march. At this juncture a certain Roman of senatorial rank, named Attidius, a fugitive from justice, who had been with Mithridates a long time and had enjoyed his friendship, was detected in a conspiracy against him. The king condemned him to death, but not to torture, because he had once been a Roman senator. His fellow-conspirators were subjected to dreadful tortures. The freedmen who were cognizant of the designs of Attidius he dismissed unharmed, because they were under obligations to their patron. When Lucullus was already encamped near Mithridates, the proconsul of Asia sent heralds to proclaim that Rome had accused Lucullus of unnecessarily prolonging the war, and had ordered that the soldiers under him be dismissed, and that the property of those who did not obey this order should be confiscated. When this information was received the army disbanded at once, all but a few, who remained with Lucullus because they were very poor and did not fear the penalty.

## CHAPTER XIV

Pompey invested with the Command—The Pirates in the Mediterranean—Distress and Anxiety at Rome—Pompey assigned to Command against the Pirates—His Arrangements for attacking them—Proceeds to Cilicia—Captures and destroys their Strongholds

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91. So it turned out that the Mithridatic war under Lucullus came to no fixed and definite conclusion. The Romans, torn by revolts in Italy and threatened with famine by pirates on the sea, considered it inopportune to undertake another war of this magnitude until their present troubles were ended. When Mithridates perceived this he again invaded Cappadocia and fortified his own kingdom. The Romans overlooked these transactions while they were clearing the sea. When this was accomplished, and while Pompey, the destroyer of the pirates, was still in Asia, the Mithridatic war was at once resumed and the command of it given to Pompey. Since the campaign at sea was a part of the operations under his command, which was begun before his Mithridatic war, and has not found proper mention elsewhere in my history, it seems well to introduce it here and to run over the events as they occurred.

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666 92. When Mithridates first went to war with the Romans and subdued the province of Asia (Sulla being then in difficulties respecting Greece), he thought that he should not hold the province long, and accordingly plundered it in all sorts of ways, as I have mentioned above, and sent out pirates on the sea. In the beginning they prowled around with a few small boats worrying the inhabitants like robbers. As the war lengthened they became more numerous and navigated larger ships. Relishing their large gains, they did not desist when Mithridates was defeated, made peace, and retired. Having lost both livelihood and country by reason of the war and fallen into extreme destitution, they harvested the sea instead of the land, at first with pinnaces and hemiolii, then with two-bank and three-bank ships, sailing in squadrons under pirate chiefs, who were like generals of an army. They fell upon unfortified towns. They undermined or battered down the walls of

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others, or captured them by regular siege and plundered them. They carried off the wealthier citizens to their haven of refuge and held them for ransom. They scorned the name of robbers and called their takings the prize of warfare. They had artisans chained to their tasks and were continually bringing in materials of timber, brass, and iron. Being elated by their gains and determined not to change their mode of life yet, they likened themselves to kings, rulers, and great armies, and thought that if they should all come together in the same place they would be invincible. They built ships and made all kinds of arms. Their chief seat was at a place called the Crags in Cilicia, which they had chosen as their common anchorage and encampment. They had castles and towers and desert islands and retreats everywhere. They chose for their principal rendezvous the coast of Cilicia where it was rough and harborless and rose in high mountain peaks, for which reason they were all called by the common name of Cilicians. Perhaps this evil had its beginning among the men of the Crags of Cilicia, but thither also men of Syrian, Cyprian, Pamphylian, and Pontic origin and those of almost all the Eastern nations had congregated, who, on account of the long continuance of the Mithridatic war, preferred to do wrong rather than to suffer it, and for this purpose chose the sea instead of the land.

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93. Thus, in a very short time, they increased in number to tens of thousands. They dominated now not only the Eastern waters, but the whole Mediterranean to the Pillars of Hercules. They vanquished some of the Roman prætors in naval engagements, and among others the prætor of Sicily on the Sicilian coast itself. No sea could be navigated in safety, and land remained untilled for want of commercial intercourse. The city of Rome felt this evil most keenly, her subjects being distressed and herself suffering grievously from hunger by reason of her very greatness. It appeared to them to be a great and difficult task to destroy so large a force of seafaring men scattered everywhither on land and sea, and so nimble of flight, sallying out from no particular country or any known places, having no habitation or anything of their own, but only what they might chance to light upon. Thus both the

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669 greatness and the unexampled nature of this war, which 85  
was subject to no laws and had nothing tangible or visible  
about it, caused perplexity and fear on all sides. Murena  
had attacked them, but accomplished nothing worth men-  
tion, nor had Servilius Isauricus, who succeeded him. And  
now the pirates contemptuously assailed the coasts of Italy,  
around Brundisium and Etruria, and seized and carried off  
some women of noble families who were travelling, and  
also two prætors with their very insignia of office.

687 94. When the Romans could no longer endure the dam- 67  
age and disgrace they made Gnæus Pompey, who was then  
their man of greatest reputation, commander by law for  
three years, with absolute power over the whole sea within  
the Pillars of Hercules, and of the land for a distance of  
400 stades from the coast. They sent letters to all kings,  
rulers, peoples, and cities, that they should aid Pompey in  
all ways. They gave him power to raise troops and to col-  
lect money from the provinces, and they furnished a large  
army from their own enrolment, and all the ships they had,  
and money to the amount of 6000 Attic talents, — so great  
and difficult did they consider the task of overcoming such  
great forces, dispersed over so wide a sea, hiding easily in  
so many nooks, retreating quickly and darting out again  
unexpectedly. Never did any man before Pompey set  
forth with so great authority conferred upon him by the  
Romans. Presently he had an army of 120,000 foot and  
4000 horse, and 270 ships, including hemiolii. He had  
twenty-five assistants of senatorial rank, whom they call  
lieutenant-generals, among whom he divided the sea, giving  
ships, cavalry, and infantry to each, and investing them  
with the insignia of prætors, in order that each one might  
have absolute authority over the part intrusted to him, while  
he, Pompey, like a king of kings, should course among  
them to see that they remained where they were stationed,  
lest, while he was pursuing the pirates in one place, he  
should be drawn to something else before his work was fin-  
ished, and so that there might be forces to encounter them  
everywhere and to prevent them from forming junctions  
with each other.

95. Pompey disposed of the whole in the following  
manner. He put Tiberius Nero and Manlius Torquatus

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in command of Spain and the Straits of Hercules. He assigned Marcus Pomponius to the Gallic and Ligurian waters. Africa, Sardinia, Corsica, and the neighboring islands were committed to Lentulus Marcellinus and Publius Atilius, and the coast of Italy itself to Lucius Gellius and Gnæus Lentulus. Sicily and the Adriatic as far as Acarnania were assigned to Plotius Varus and Terentius Varro; the Peloponnesus, Attica, Eubœa, Thessaly, Macedonia, and Bœotia to Lucius Sisenna; the Greek islands, the whole Ægean sea, and the Hellespont in addition, to Lucius Lollius; Bithynia, Thrace, the Propontis, and the mouth of the Euxine to Publius Piso; Lycia, Pamphylia, Cyprus, and Phœnicia to Metellus Nepos. Thus were the commands of the prætors arranged for the purpose of attacking, defending, and guarding their respective assignments, so that each might catch the pirates put to flight by others, and not be drawn a long distance from their own stations by the pursuit, nor carried round and round as in a race, and the time for doing the work protracted. Pompey himself made a tour of the whole. He first inspected the western stations, accomplishing the task in forty days, and passing through Rome on his return. Thence he went to Brundisium and, proceeding from this place, he occupied an equal time in visiting the eastern stations. He astonished all by the rapidity of his movement, the magnitude of his preparations, and his formidable reputation, so that the pirates, who had expected to attack him first, or at least to show that the task he had undertaken against them was no easy one, became straightway alarmed, abandoned their assaults upon the towns they were besieging, and fled to their accustomed citadels and inlets. Thus the sea was cleared by Pompey forthwith and without a fight, and the pirates were everywhere subdued by the prætors at their several stations.

96. Pompey himself hastened to Cilicia with forces of various kinds and many engines, as he expected that there would be need of every kind of fighting and every kind of siege against the rock-bound citadels; but he needed nothing. The terror of his name and the greatness of his preparations had produced a panic among the robbers. They hoped that if they did not resist they might receive lenient

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treatment. First, those who held Cragus and Anticragus, their largest citadels, surrendered themselves, and after them the mountaineers of Cilicia, and, finally, all, one after another. They gave up at the same time a great quantity of arms, some completed, others in the workshops; also their ships, some still on the stocks, others already afloat; also brass and iron collected for building them, and sail-cloth, rope, and various kinds of materials; and finally a multitude of captives either held for ransom or chained to their tasks. Pompey burned the materials, carried away the ships, and sent the captives back to their respective countries. Many of them there found their own cenotaphs, for they were supposed to be dead. Those pirates who had evidently fallen into this way of life not from wickedness, but from poverty consequent upon the war, Pompey settled in Mallus, Adama, and Epiphanea, or any other uninhabited or thinly peopled town in Craggy Cilicia. Some of them he sent to Dyme in Achaia. Thus the war against the pirates, which it was supposed would prove very difficult, was brought to an end by Pompey in a few days. He took seventy-one ships by capture and 306 by surrender from the pirates, and 120 of their towns, castles, and other places of rendezvous. About 10,000 of the pirates were slain in battles.

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## CHAPTER XV

Extraordinary Powers given to Pompey—He marches against Mithridates—The King retreats by Night—Pompey overtakes and defeats him—Mithridates again flees to Armenia, and thence to the Scythians—Pompey advances to Colchis—Fights a Battle with the Barbarians—Marches against Tigranes—Tigranes comes to him as a Suppliant—Pompey pardons him, and settles the Affairs of Armenia

97. For this victory, so swiftly and unexpectedly gained, the Romans extolled Pompey beyond measure; and while he was still in Cilicia they chose him commander of the war against Mithridates, giving him the same unlimited powers as before, to make war and peace as he liked, and to proclaim nations friends or enemies according to his own judgment. They gave him command of all the forces

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687 beyond the borders of Italy. All these powers had never <sup>B. C.</sup> 67 been given to any one general before. This was perhaps the reason why they gave him the title of Pompey the Great, for the Mithridatic war had been successfully prosecuted by other generals before him. He accordingly collected his army and marched to the territory of Mithridates. The latter had an army selected from his own forces, of 30,000 foot and 3000 horse, stationed on his frontier; but since Lucullus had lately devastated that region there was a scant supply of provisions, and for this reason many of his men deserted. The deserters whom he caught he crucified, or put out their eyes, or burned them alive. But while the fear of punishment lessened the number of deserters, the scarcity of provisions weakened him.

98. Mithridates sent envoys to Pompey asking on what terms he could obtain peace. Pompey replied, "By delivering up our deserters and surrendering at discretion." When Mithridates was made acquainted with these terms he communicated them to the deserters, and when he observed their consternation he swore that on account of the cupidity of the Romans he would never make peace with them, nor would he give up anybody to them, nor would he ever do anything that was not for the common advantage of all. So spake Mithridates. Then Pompey placed a cavalry force in ambush, and sent forward others to harass the king's outposts openly, and ordered them to provoke the enemy and then retreat, as though vanquished. This was done until those in ambush took their enemy in the rear and put them to flight. The Romans might have broken into the enemy's camp along with the fugitives had not the king, apprehending this danger, led forward his infantry. Then the Romans retired. This was the result of the first trial of arms and cavalry engagement between Pompey and Mithridates.<sup>1</sup>

688 99. The king, being short of provisions, retreated reluctantly and allowed Pompey to enter his territory, expecting 66 that he also would suffer from scarcity when encamped in the devastated region. But Pompey had arranged to have his supplies sent after him. He passed around to the east-

<sup>1</sup> There is one lacuna, if not more, in the concluding part of this section.

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688 ward of Mithridates, established a series of fortified posts and camps extending a distance of 150 stades, and drew a line of circumvallation around him which made foraging still difficult for him. The king did not oppose this work, being either afraid or mentally paralyzed, as often happens on the approach of calamity. Being again pressed for supplies he slaughtered his pack animals, keeping only his horses. When he had scarcely fifty days' provisions left he fled by night, in profound silence, by bad roads. Pompey overtook him with difficulty in the daytime and assailed his rear guard. The king's friends then urged him to prepare for battle, but he would not fight. He merely drove back the assailants with his horse and retired into the thick woods in the evening. The following day he took up a strong position defended by rocks, to which there was access by only one road, which he held with an advance guard of four cohorts. The Romans put an opposing force on guard there to prevent Mithridates from escaping.

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100. At daybreak both commanders put their forces under arms. The outposts began skirmishing along the defile, and some of the king's horsemen, without their horses and without orders, went to the assistance of their advance guard. A larger number of the Roman cavalry came up against them, and the horseless Mithridateans rushed back to their camp to mount their horses and thus to make themselves a more equal match for the advancing Romans. When those who were still arming on the higher ground looked down and saw their own men running toward them with haste and outcries, but did not know the reason, they thought that they had been put to flight. They threw down their arms and fled as though their own camp had already been captured on the other side. As there was no road out of the place they fell foul of each other in the confusion, until finally they leaped down the precipices. Thus the army of Mithridates perished through the rashness of those who caused a panic by going to the assistance of the advance guard without orders. The remainder of Pompey's task was easy, in the way of killing and capturing men not yet armed and shut up in a rocky defile. About 10,000 were slain and the camp with all its apparatus was taken.

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101. Mithridates made his escape through the cliffs with his attendants only, and fled. He fell in with a troop of mercenary horse and about 3000 foot who accompanied him directly to the castle of Simorex, where he had accumulated a large sum of money. Here he gave rewards and a year's pay to those who had fled with him. Taking 6000 talents he hastened to the head waters of the Euphrates, intending to proceed thence to Colchis. As his march was uninterrupted, he crossed the Euphrates on the fourth day. Three days later he put in order and armed the forces that had accompanied or joined him, and entered Chotene in Armenia. There the Choteneans and Iberians tried with darts and slings to prevent him from coming in, but he advanced and proceeded to the river Apsarus. Some people think that the Iberians of Asia were the ancestors of the Iberians of Europe; others think that the former emigrated from the latter; still others think they merely have the same name, as their customs and languages are not similar. Mithridates wintered at Dioscurias in Colchis, which city, the Colchians think, preserves the remembrance of the sojourn there of the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux, with the Argonautic expedition. Mithridates here made no small plans, nor yet plans suitable for a fugitive, but conceived the idea of making the circuit of the whole Pontic coast, passing from Pontus to the Scythians around the sea of Azov and thus arriving at the Bosporus. He intended to take away the kingdom of Machares, his ungrateful son, and confront the Romans once more; wage war against them from the side of Europe while they were in Asia, and to put between them as a dividing line the strait which is believed to have been called the Bosporus because Io swam across it when she was changed into a cow and fled from the jealousy of Hera.

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102. Such was the chimerical undertaking that Mithridates now set about. He imagined, nevertheless, that he should accomplish it. He pushed on through strange and warlike Scythian tribes, partly by permission, partly by force, for although a fugitive and in misfortune he was still respected and feared. He passed through the country of the Heniochi, who received him willingly. The Achæans, who resisted him, he put to flight. These, it is said, when

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689 returning from the siege of Troy, were driven by a storm into the Euxine sea and underwent great sufferings there at the hands of the barbarians because they were Greeks; and when they sent to their home for ships and their request was disregarded, they conceived such a hatred for the Grecian race that whenever they captured any Greeks they immolated them, Scythian fashion. At first in their anger they served all in this way, afterwards only the handsomest ones, and finally a few chosen by lot. So much for the Achæans of Scythia. Mithridates finally reached the Azov country, of which there were many princes, all of whom received him, escorted him, and exchanged presents with him, on account of the fame of his deeds, his empire, and his power, which were still not to be despised. He formed alliances with them in contemplation of other and more novel exploits, such as marching through Thrace to Macedonia, through Macedonia to Pannonia, and passing over the Alps into Italy. With the more powerful of these princes he cemented the alliance by giving his daughters in marriage. When his son, Machares, learned that he had made such a journey in so short a time among savage tribes, and through the so-called Scythian Gates, which had never been passed by any one before, he sent envoys to him to defend himself, saying that he was under the necessity of conciliating the Romans. But, knowing his father's inexorable temper, he fled to the Pontic Chersonesus, burning the ships to prevent his father from pursuing him. When the latter procured other ships and sent them after him, he anticipated his fate by killing himself. Mithridates put to death all of his own friends whom he had left here in places of authority when he went away, but those of his son he dismissed unharmed, as they had acted under the obligations of private friendship. This was the state of things with Mithridates.

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688 103. Pompey pursued Mithridates in his flight as far as Colchis, but he thought that his foe would never get around to Pontus or to the sea of Azov, or undertake anything great even if he should escape. He advanced to Colchis in order to gain knowledge of the country visited by the Argonauts, Castor and Pollux, and Hercules, and especially he desired to see the place where they say that Prometheus

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688 was fastened to Mount Caucasus. Many streams issue from

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Caucasus bearing gold-dust so fine as to be invisible. The inhabitants put sheepskins with shaggy fleece into the stream and thus collect the floating particles. Perhaps the golden fleece of Ætes was of this kind. All the neighboring tribes accompanied Pompey on his exploring expedition. Only Oroeses, king of the Albanians, and Artoces, king of the Iberians, placed 70,000 men in ambush for him at the river Cyrtus, which empties into the Caspian sea by twelve navigable mouths, receiving the waters of several large streams, the greatest of which is the Araxes. Pompey, gaining knowledge of the ambush, bridged the river and drove the barbarians into a dense forest. These people are terrible forest fighters, hiding in the woods and darting out unexpectedly. Pompey surrounded this forest with his army, set it on fire, and pursued the fugitives when they ran out, until they all surrendered and brought him hostages and presents. Pompey was afterward awarded one of his triumphs at Rome for these exploits. Among the hostages and prisoners many women were found, who had suffered wounds no less than the men. These were supposed to be Amazons, but whether the Amazons are a neighboring nation, who were called to their aid at that time, or whether certain warlike women are called Amazons by the barbarians there, is not known.

104. On his return from that quarter Pompey marched against Armenia, making it a cause of war against Tigranes that he had assisted Mithridates. He was now not far from the royal residence, Artaxata. Tigranes was resolved to fight no longer. He had had three sons by the daughter of Mithridates, two of whom he had himself killed, — one in battle, where the son was fighting against the father, and the other in the hunting-field because he had neglected to assist his father who had been thrown, but had put the diadem on his own head while the father was lying on the ground. The third one, whose name was Tigranes, had seemed to be much distressed by his father's hunting accident, and had received a crown from him, but, nevertheless, he also deserted him after a short interval, waged war against him, was defeated, and fled to Phraates, king of the Parthians, who had lately succeeded his father Sintri-

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688 cus, in the government of that country. As Pompey drew near, this young Tigranes, after communicating his intentions to Phraates and receiving his approval (for Phraates also desired Pompey's friendship), took refuge with Pompey as a suppliant; and this although he was a grandson of Mithridates. Pompey's reputation among the barbarians for justice and good faith was great. Tigranes the father, trusting to it, came to Pompey unheralded to submit all his affairs to the latter's decision and to make complaint against his son. Pompey ordered tribunes and prefects of horse to meet him on the road, as an act of courtesy, but those who accompanied Tigranes feared to advance without the sanction of a herald and fled to the rear. Tigranes came forward, however, and prostrated himself before Pompey as his superior, in barbarian fashion. There are those who relate that he was led up by lictors when sent for by Pompey. However that may be, he came and made explanations of the past, and gave to Pompey for himself 6000 talents, and for the army fifty drachmas to each soldier, 1000 to each centurion, and 10,000 to each tribune.

105. Pompey pardoned him for the past, reconciled him with his son, and decided that the latter should rule Sophene and Gordyene (which are now called Lesser Armenia), and the father the rest of Armenia, and that at his death the son should succeed him in that also. He required that Tigranes should at once give up the territory that he had gained by war. Accordingly he gave up the whole of Syria from the Euphrates to the sea; for he held 689 that and a part of Cilicia, which he had taken from Antiochus, surnamed Pius. Those Armenians who deserted Tigranes on the road, when he was going to Pompey, because they were afraid, persuaded his son, who was still with Pompey, to make an attempt upon his father. Pompey seized him and put him in chains. As he still tried to stir up the Parthians against Pompey, he was led in the latter's triumph and afterward put to death. And now Pompey, thinking that the whole war was at an end, founded a city on the place where he had overcome Mithridates in battle, which is called Nicopolis (the city of victory) from that affair, and is situated in Lesser Armenia. To Ariobarzanes he gave back the kingdom of Cappadocia and 65

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added to it Sophene and Gordyene, which he had partitioned to the son of Tigranes, and which are now administered as parts of Cappadocia. He gave him also the city of Castabala and some others in Cilicia. Ariobarzanes intrusted his whole kingdom to his son while he was still living. Many changes took place until the time of Cæsar Augustus, under whom this kingdom, like many others, became a Roman province.

B. C.

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## CHAPTER XVI

Other Wars of Pompey — Brings Syria under Roman Rule — Mithridates in the Crimea — Prepares for Another War — Revolt against Mithridates — He plans an Invasion of Italy — His Son Pharnaces forms a Plot against him — Mutiny in the Army — Mithridates takes Poison, but without Effect — Is killed at his Own Request — Character and Career of Mithridates — He is buried at Sinope

690 106. Pompey then passed over Mount Taurus and made war against Antiochus, the king of Commagene, until the latter entered into friendly relations with him. He also fought against Darius the Mede, and put him to flight, either because he had helped Antiochus, or Tigranes before  
691 him. He made war against the Arabs of Nabathæi, whose king was Aretas, and against the Jews (whose king, Aristobulus, had revolted), until he had captured their holiest city, Jerusalem. He advanced against, and brought under Roman rule without fighting, those parts of Cilicia that were not yet subject to it, and the remainder of Syria which lies along the Euphrates, and the countries called Cœle-Syria, Phœnicia, and Palestine, also Idumea and Ituræa, and the other parts of Syria by whatever name called; not that he had any complaint against Antiochus, the son of Antiochus Pius, who was present and asked for his paternal kingdom, but because he thought that since he (Pompey) had dispossessed Tigranes, the conqueror of Antiochus, it belonged to the Romans by the law of war. While he was settling these affairs ambassadors came to him from Phraates and Tigranes, who had gone to war with each other. Those of Tigranes asked the aid of Pompey as an ally, while those of the Parthian sought to secure for him the friendship of



v.R. 691 the Roman people. As Pompey did not think it best to  
fight the Parthians without a decree of the Senate, he sent  
mediators to compose their differences. B.C. 63

689 107. While Pompey was about this business Mithridates 65  
had completed his circuit of the Euxine and occupied Panticapæum, a European market-town at the outlet of that sea.<sup>1</sup> There at the Bosphorus he put to death Xiphares, one of his sons, on account of the following fault of his mother. Mithridates had a castle where, in a secret underground treasury, a great deal of money lay concealed in numerous iron-bound brazen vessels. Stratonice, one of the king's concubines or wives, had been put in charge of this castle, and while he was still making his journey around the Euxine she delivered it up to Pompey and revealed to him the secret treasures, on the sole condition that he should spare her son, Xiphares, if he should capture him. Pompey took the money and promised her that he would spare Xiphares, and allowed her to take away her own things. When Mithridates learned these facts he killed Xiphares at the straits, while his mother was looking on from the opposite shore, and cast his body out unburied, thus wreaking his spite on the son in order to grieve the mother who had offended him. And now he sent ambassadors to Pompey, who was still in Syria and who did not know that the king was at that place. They promised that the king would pay tribute to the Romans if they would let him have his paternal kingdom. When Pompey required that Mithridates should come himself and make his petition as Tigranes had done, he said that as long as he was Mithridates he would never agree to that, but that he would send some of his sons and his friends to do so. Even while he was saying these things he was levying an army of freemen and slaves promiscuously, manufacturing arms, projectiles, and machines, helping himself to timber, and killing plough-oxen for the sake of their sinews. He levied tribute on all, even those of the slenderest means. His ministers made these exactions with harshness to many, without his knowledge, for he had fallen sick with ulcers on his face and allowed himself to be seen only by three eunuchs, who cured him.

<sup>1</sup> On the contrary, Panticapæum was at the outlet of the Palus Mæotis (sea of Azov) on the site of the modern city of Kertsch.

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108. When he had recovered from his illness and his army was collected (it consisted of sixty picked cohorts of 600 men each and a great multitude of other troops, besides ships and strongholds that had been captured by his generals while he was sick) he sent a part of it across the strait to Phanagoria, another trading-place at the mouth of the sea, in order to possess himself of the passage on either side while Pompey was still in Syria. Castor of Phanagoria, who had once been maltreated by Trypho, the king's eunuch, fell upon the latter as he was entering the town, killed him, and summoned the citizens to revolt. Although the citadel was already held by Artaphernes and other sons of Mithridates, the inhabitants piled wood around it and set it on fire, in consequence of which Artaphernes, Darius, Xerxes, and Oxathres, sons, and Eupatra, a daughter, of Mithridates, in fear of the fire, surrendered themselves and were led into captivity. Of these Artaphernes alone was about forty years of age; the others were handsome children. Cleopatra, another daughter, resisted. Her father, in admiration of her courageous spirit, sent a number of row-boats and rescued her. All the neighboring castles that had been lately occupied by Mithridates now revolted from him in emulation of the Phanagoreans, namely, Chersonesus, Theodosia, Nymphæum, and others around the Euxine which were well situated for purposes of war. Mithridates, observing these frequent defections, and having suspicions of the army itself, lest it should fail him because the service was compulsory and the taxes very heavy, and because soldiers always lack confidence in unlucky commanders, sent some of his daughters in charge of eunuchs to be married to the Scythian princes, asking them at the same time to send him reënforcements as quickly as possible. Five hundred soldiers accompanied them from his own army. Soon after they left the presence of Mithridates they killed the eunuchs who were leading them (for they always hated these persons, who were all-powerful with Mithridates) and conducted the young women to Pompey.

109. Although bereft of so many children and castles and of his whole kingdom, and in no way fit for war, and although he could not expect any aid from the Scythians, still no

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690 inferior position, none corresponding to his present mis-  
fortunes, even then found a place in his mind. He pro-  
posed to turn his course to the Gauls, whose friendship he  
had cultivated a long time for this purpose, and with them  
to invade Italy, hoping that many of the Italians themselves  
would join him on account of their hatred of the Romans;  
for he had heard that such had been Hannibal's policy after  
the Romans had waged war against him in Spain, and that  
he had become in this way an object of the greatest terror  
to them. He knew that almost all of Italy had lately re-  
volted from the Romans by reason of their hatred and had  
waged war against them for a very long time, and had sus-  
tained Spartacus, the gladiator, against them, although he  
was a man of no repute. Filled with these ideas he was  
for hastening to the Gauls, but his soldiers, though the  
very bold enterprise might be attractive, were deterred  
chiefly by its magnitude, and by the long distance of the  
expedition in foreign territory, against men whom they  
could not overcome even in their own country. They  
thought also that Mithridates, in utter despair, wanted to  
end his life in a valiant and kingly way rather than in  
idleness. So they tolerated him and remained silent, for  
there was nothing mean or contemptible about him even in  
his misfortunes.

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691 110. While affairs were in this plight Pharnaces, the 63  
son whom he was most fond of and whom he had often  
designated as his successor, either alarmed about the ex-  
pedition and the kingdom (for he still had hopes of par-  
don from the Romans, but reckoned that he should lose  
everything completely if his father should invade Italy), or  
spurred by other motives, formed a conspiracy against his  
father. His fellow-conspirators were captured and put to  
the torture, but Menophanes persuaded the king that it  
would not be seemly, just as he was starting on his expe-  
dition, to put to death the son who had been until then the  
dearest to him. People were liable to such turns, he said,  
in time of war, and when they came to an end things  
quieted down again. In this way Mithridates was persuaded  
to pardon his son, but the latter, still fearing his father's  
anger, and knowing that the army shrank from the expedi-  
tion, went by night to the leading Roman deserters who

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were encamped very near the king, and by representing to them in its true light, and as they well knew it, the danger of their advancing against Italy, and by making them many promises if they would refuse to go, induced them to desert from his father. After Pharnaces had persuaded them he sent emissaries the same night to other camps near by and won them over. Early in the morning the first deserters raised a shout, and those next to them repeated it, and so on. Even the naval force joined in the cry, not all of them having been advised beforehand perhaps, but eager for a change, despising failure, and always ready to attach themselves to a new hope. Others, who were ignorant of the conspiracy, thought that all had been corrupted, and that if they remained alone they would be scorned by the majority,<sup>1</sup> and so from fear and necessity rather than inclination joined in the shouting. Mithridates, being awakened by the noise, sent messengers out to inquire what the shouters wanted. The latter made no concealment, but said, "We want your son to be king; we want a young man instead of an old one who is ruled by eunuchs, the slayer of so many of his sons, his generals, and his friends."

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III. When Mithridates heard this he went out to reason with them. A part of his own guard then ran to join the deserters, but the latter refused to admit them unless they would do some irreparable deed as a proof of their fidelity, pointing at the same time to Mithridates. So they hastened to kill his horse, for he himself had fled, and at the same time saluted Pharnaces as king, as though the rebels were already victorious, and one of them brought a broad papyrus leaf from a temple and crowned him with it in place of a diadem. The king saw these things from a high portico, and he sent messenger after messenger to Pharnaces asking permission to fly in safety. When none of his messengers returned, fearing lest he should be delivered up to the Romans, he praised the body-guards and friends who had been faithful to him and sent them to the new king, but the army killed some of them under a misapprehension as

<sup>1</sup> μόνοι ἔτι ὄντες, ἔσεσθαι τοῖς πλεοσιν εὐκαταφρόνητοι. "That if they remained alone they would be scorned by the majority," i.e., they might be considered a negligible quantity. The Latin version has missed the meaning here: *ratique se solos non posse resistere pluribus*.

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they were approaching. Mithridates then took out some poison that he always carried next to his sword, and mixed it. There two of his daughters, who were still girls growing up together, named Mithridatis and Nyssa, who had been betrothed to the kings of Egypt and of Cyprus, asked him to let them have some of the poison first, and insisted strenuously and prevented him from drinking it until they had taken some and swallowed it. The drug took effect on them at once; but upon Mithridates, although he walked around rapidly to hasten its action, it had no effect, because he had accustomed himself to other drugs by continually trying them as a means of protection against poisoners. These are still called the Mithridatic drugs. Seeing a certain Bituitus there, an officer of the Gauls, he said to him, "I have profited much from your right arm against my enemies. I shall profit from it most of all if you will kill me, and save from the danger of being led in a Roman triumph one who has been an autocrat so many years, and the ruler of so great a kingdom, but who is now unable to die by poison because, like a fool, he has fortified himself against the poison of others. Although I have kept watch and ward against all the poisons that one takes with his food, I have not provided against that domestic poison, always the most dangerous to kings, the treachery of army, children, and friends." Bituitus, thus appealed to, rendered the king the service that he desired.

112. So died Mithridates, who was the sixteenth in descent from Darius, the son of Hystaspes, king of the Persians, and the eighth<sup>1</sup> from that Mithridates who left the Macedonians and acquired the kingdom of Pontus. He lived sixty-eight or sixty-nine years, and of these he reigned fifty-seven, for the kingdom came to him when he was an orphan. He subdued the neighboring barbarians and many of the Scythians, and waged a formidable war against the Romans for forty years, during which he frequently

<sup>1</sup> In Sec. 9, *supra*, Mithridates Eupator is called the sixth in line from the first of that name, *ἕκτον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου*. Here he is called the eighth, *ὄγδοος*. This discrepancy has led to some controversy in the learned world. Palmer constructed a family tree for Mithridates, showing that he was the sixth in line, counting the founder of the house as No. 1, but the matter is not entirely free from doubt.

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conquered Bithynia and Cappadocia, besides making incursions into the Roman province of Asia and into Phrygia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, and Macedonia. He invaded Greece, where he performed many remarkable exploits, and ruled the sea from Cilicia to the Adriatic until Sulla confined him again to his paternal kingdom after destroying 160,000 of his soldiers. Notwithstanding these great losses he renewed the war without difficulty. He fought with the greatest generals of his time. He was vanquished by Sulla, Lucullus, and Pompey, although several times he got the better of them also. Lucius Cassius, Quintus Oppius, and Manius Aquilius he took prisoners and carried them around with him. The last he killed because he was the cause of the war. The others he surrendered to Sulla. He defeated Fimbria, Murena, the consul Cotta, Fabius, and Triarius. He was always high-spirited and indomitable even in misfortunes. Until finally overthrown he left no avenue of attack against the Romans untried. He made alliances with the Samnites and the Gauls, and he sent legates to Sertorius in Spain. He was often wounded by enemies and by conspirators, but he never desisted from anything on that account, even when he was an old man. None of the conspiracies ever escaped his detection, not even the last one, but he voluntarily overlooked it and perished in consequence of it — so ungrateful is the wickedness that has been once pardoned. He was bloodthirsty and cruel to all — the slayer of his mother, his brother, three sons, and three daughters. He had a large frame, as his armor, which he sent to Nemea and to Delphi, shows, and was so strong that he rode horseback and hurled the javelin to the last, and could ride 1000 stades<sup>1</sup> in one day, changing horses at intervals. He used to drive a chariot with sixteen horses at once. He cultivated Greek learning, and thus became acquainted with the religious cult of Greece, and was fond of music. He was abstemious and patient of labor for the most part, and yielded only to pleasures with women.

113. Such was the end of Mithridates, who bore the surnames of Eupator and Dionysus. When the Romans

<sup>1</sup> 110 miles.

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691 heard of his death they held a festival because they were delivered from a troublesome enemy. Pharnaces sent his father's corpse to Pompey at Sinope in a trireme, together with the persons who captured Manius, and many hostages, both Greek and barbarian, and asked that he should be allowed to rule either his paternal kingdom, or Bosphorus alone, which his brother, Machares, had received from Mithridates. Pompey provided for the expenses of the funeral of Mithridates and directed his servants to give him remains a royal interment, and to place them in the tombs of the kings in Sinope, because he admired his great achievements and considered him the first of the kings of his time. Pharnaces, for delivering Italy from much trouble, was inscribed as a friend and ally of the Romans, and was given Bosphorus as his kingdom, except Phanagoria, whose inhabitants were made free and independent because they were the first to resist Mithridates when he was recovering his strength, collecting ships, creating a new army and military posts, and because they led others to revolt and were the cause of his final collapse. <sup>B. C.</sup>  
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## CHAPTER XVII

Pompey's Exploits in the East — Cities founded by him — Pompey's Triumph — Captives led in his Procession — Inscription on his Tablet — New Countries added to the Roman Sway — The Armaments of Mithridates — The Career of Pharnaces — Later History of Pontus

114. Pompey, having cleaned out the robber dens, and prostrated the greatest king then living, in one and the same war, and having fought successful battles, besides those of the Pontic war, with Colchians, Albanians, Iberians, Armenians, Medes, Arabs, Jews, and other Eastern nations, extended the Roman sway as far as Egypt. But he did not advance into Egypt, although the king of that country invited him there to suppress a sedition, and sent gifts to himself and money and clothing for his whole army. He either feared the greatness of this still prosperous kingdom, or wished to guard against the envy of his enemies, or the warning voice of oracles, or for other reasons which I will publish in my Egyptian history. He let some of the

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69<sup>r</sup> subjugated nations go free and made them allies. Others he placed at once under Roman rule, and others he distributed to kings—to Tigranes, Armenia; to Pharnaces, Bosphorus; to Ariobarzanes, Cappadocia and the other provinces before mentioned. To Antiochus of Commagene he turned over Seleucia and the parts of Mesopotamia that he conquered. He made Deiotarus and others tetrarchs of the Gallogræcians, who are now the Galatians bordering on Cappadocia. He made Attalus prince of Paphlagonia and Aristarchus prince of Colchis. He also appointed Archelaus to the priesthood of the goddess worshipped at Comana, which is a royal prerogative. Castor of Phanagoria was inscribed as a friend of the Roman people. Much territory and money were bestowed upon others.

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115. He founded cities also,—in Lesser Armenia Nicopolis, named for his victory; in Pontus Eupatoria, which Mithridates Eupator had built and named after himself, but destroyed because it had received the Romans. Pompey rebuilt it and named it Magnopolis. In Cappadocia he rebuilt Mazaca, which had been completely ruined by the war. He restored other towns in many places, that had been destroyed or damaged, in Pontus, Palestine, Coele-Syria, and Cilicia, in which he had settled the greater part of the pirates, and where the city formerly called Soli is now known as Pompeiopolis. The city of Talauri Mithridates used as a storehouse of furniture. Here were found 2000 drinking-cups made of onyx welded with gold, and many cups, wine-coolers, and drinking-horns, also ornamental couches and chairs, bridles for horses, and trappings for their breasts and shoulders, all ornamented in like manner with precious stones and gold. The quantity of this store was so great that the inventory of it occupied thirty days. Some of these things had been inherited from Darius, the son of Hystaspes; others came from the kingdom of the Ptolemies, having been deposited by Cleopatra at the island of Cos and given by the inhabitants to Mithridates; still others had been made or collected by Mithridates himself, as he was a lover of the beautiful in furniture as well as in other things.

69<sup>a</sup> 116. At the end of the winter Pompey distributed re- 62  
wards to the army; 1500 Attic drachmas to each soldier and



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in like proportion to the officers, the whole, it was said, amounting to 16,000 talents. Then he marched to Ephesus, embarked for Italy, and hastened to Rome, having dismissed his soldiers at Brundisium to their homes, by which act his popularity was greatly increased among the Romans. As he approached the city he was met by successive processions, first of youths, farthest from the city, then bands of men of different ages came out as far as they severally could walk; last of all came the Senate, which was lost in wonder at his exploits, for no one had ever before vanquished so powerful an enemy, and at the same time brought so many great nations under subjection and extended the Roman rule to the Euphrates. He was awarded a triumph exceeding in brilliancy any that had gone before, being now only thirty-five years of age.<sup>1</sup> It occupied two successive days, and many nations were represented in the procession from Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia, Cilicia, all the peoples of Syria, besides Albanians, Heniochi, Achæans, Scythians, and Eastern Iberians. Seven hundred complete ships were brought into the harbor. In the triumphal procession were two-horse carriages and litters laden with gold or with other ornaments of various kinds, also the couch of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, the throne and sceptre of Mithridates Eupator himself, and his image, eight cubits high, made of solid gold, and 75,100,000 drachmas of silver coin. The number of wagons carrying arms was infinite, and the number of the beaks of ships. After these came the multitude of captives and pirates, none of them bound, but all arrayed in their native costumes.

117. Before Pompey himself were led the satraps, sons, and generals of the kings against whom he had fought, who were present (some having been captured and others given as hostages) to the number of 324. Among them were Tigranes, the son of Tigranes, and five sons of Mithridates, namely, Artaphernes, Cyrus, Oxathres, Darius, and Xerxes, also his daughters, Orsabarís and Eupatra. Olthaces, chief of the Colchians, was also led in the procession, and Aristobulus, king of the Jews, the tyrants of the Cilicians, and the female rulers of the Scythians, three chiefs of the Ibe-

<sup>1</sup> Pompey was born in the year 106 B.C. Consequently he was now in his 45th year.

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 rians, two of the Albanians, and Menander the Laodicean, who had been chief of cavalry to Mithridates. There were carried in the procession images of those who were not present, of Tigranes and of Mithridates, representing them as fighting, as vanquished, and as fleeing. Even the besieging of Mithridates and his silent flight by night were represented. Finally it was shown how he died, and the daughters who perished with him were pictured also, and there were figures of the sons and daughters who died before him, and images of the barbarian gods decked out in the fashion of their countries. A tablet was borne also with this inscription: "Ships with brazen beaks captured, 800; cities founded in Cappadocia, 8; in Cilicia and Coele-Syria, 20; in Palestine the one which is now Seleucis. Kings conquered: Tigranes the Armenian, Artoces the Iberian, Oroëzes the Albanian, Darius the Mede, Aretas the Nabatean, Antiochus of Commagene." These were the facts recorded on the inscription. Pompey himself was borne in a chariot studded with gems, wearing, it was said, a cloak of Alexander the Great, if any one can believe that. This was supposed to have been found among the possessions of Mithridates that the inhabitants of Cos had received from Cleopatra. His chariot was followed by the officers who had shared the campaigns with him, some on horseback and others on foot. When he arrived at the Capitol he did not put any of the prisoners to death as had been the custom at other triumphs, but sent them all home at the public expense, except the kings. Of these Aristobulus alone was shortly put to death and Tigranes somewhat later. Such was the character of Pompey's triumph.

118.<sup>1</sup> Thus the Romans, having conquered King Mithridates at the end of forty-two years, reduced to subjection Bithynia, Cappadocia, and other neighboring peoples dwelling near the Euxine sea. In this same war that part of Cilicia which was not yet subject to them, together with the Syrian countries, Phœnicia, Coele-Syria, Palestine, and the territory lying between them and the river Euphrates,

<sup>1</sup> In all the codices Sec. 118 and 119 are placed at the beginning of the Mithridatic wars. Schweighäuser transferred them to this place.

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692 although they did not belong to Mithridates, were gained by the impetus of the victory over him and were required to pay tribute, some immediately and others later. Paphlagonia, Galatia, Phrygia, and the part of Mysia adjoining Phrygia, and in addition Lydia, Caria, Ionia, and all the rest of Asia Minor formerly belonging to Pergamus, together with old Greece and Macedonia, that Mithridates had drawn away from them, were completely recovered. Many of these peoples, who did not pay them tribute before, were now subjected to it. For these reasons I think they especially considered this a great war and called the victory which ended it the Great Victory and gave the title of Great to Pompey who gained it for them (by which peculiar appellation he is called to this day); on account of the great number of nations recovered or added to their dominion, the length of time (forty years) that the war had lasted, and the courage and endurance that Mithridates had shown himself capable of in all emergencies.

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119. Many times he had over 400 ships of his own, 50,000 cavalry, and 250,000 infantry, with engines and arms in proportion. For allies he had the king of Armenia and the princes of the Scythian tribes around the Euxine and the sea of Azov and beyond, as far as the Thracian Bosphorus. He held communications with the leaders of the Roman civil wars, which were then fiercely raging, and with those who were inciting insurrection in Spain. He established friendly relations with the Gauls for the purpose of invading Italy. From Cilicia to the Pillars of Hercules he filled the sea with pirates, who stopped all commerce and navigation between cities and caused severe famine for a long time. In short, he left nothing within the power of man undone or untried to start the greatest possible movement, extending from the Orient to the Occident, to vex, so to speak, the whole world, which was warred upon, tangled in alliances, harassed by pirates, or vexed by the neighborhood of the warfare. Such and so diversified was this one war, but in the end it brought the greatest gains to the Romans, for it pushed the boundaries of their dominion from the setting of the sun to the river Euphrates. It has been impossible to distinguish all these exploits by nations, since they were performed at the same time and

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698 were complicated with each other. Those which could be separated I have arranged each by itself.

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120. Pharnaces besieged the Phanagoreans and the towns neighboring to the Bosphorus until the former were compelled by hunger to come out and fight, when he overcame them in battle; yet he did them no other harm, but made friends with them, took hostages, and withdrew. Not long afterward he took Sinope and had a mind to take Amisus also, for which reason he made war against Calvinus, the Roman commander, at the time when Pompey and Cæsar were contending against each other, until Asander, an enemy of his own, drew him away from Asia, while the Romans were still preoccupied. Afterward he fought with Cæsar himself (when the latter had overthrown Pompey and returned from Egypt), near Mount Scotius, where his father had defeated the Romans under Triarius. He was beaten and fled to Sinope with 1000 cavalry. Cæsar was too busy to follow him, but sent Domitius against him. He surrendered Sinope to Domitius, who agreed to let him go away with his cavalry. He killed his horses, though his men were extremely dissatisfied at this, then took ship and fled to the Bosphorus.<sup>1</sup> Here he collected a force of Scythians and Sarmatians and captured Theodosia and Panticapæum. His enemy, Asander, attacked him again, and his men were defeated for want of horses, and because they were not accustomed to fighting on foot. Pharnaces alone fought valiantly until he died of his wounds, being then fifty years of age and having been king of Bosphorus fifteen years.

121. Thus Pharnaces was cut off from his kingdom and Cæsar bestowed it upon Mithridates of Pergamus, who had rendered him very important help in Egypt. But the people of Bosphorus now had rulers of their own and a prætor was sent by the Senate yearly to govern Pontus and Bithynia. Although Cæsar was offended with the other rulers who held their possessions as gifts from Pompey, since they had aided Pompey against him, nevertheless he confirmed their titles, except the priesthood of Comana

<sup>1</sup> The text says, *ἐς τὸν Πόντον*, "to the Euxine," but Pharnaces, being at Sinope, was already at the Euxine. So Schweighäuser suggests *ἐς τὸν Βοσπόρον*.

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which he took from Archelaus and gave to Lycomedes.

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Not long after, all these countries, and those which Gaius Cæsar or Mark Antony had given to others, were made Roman provinces by Augustus Cæsar, after he had taken Egypt, as the Romans needed only the slightest pretext in each case. Thus, since their dominion had been advanced in consequence of the Mithridatic war, from Spain and the Pillars of Hercules to the Euxine sea, and the sands which border Egypt, and the river Euphrates, it was fitting that this victory should be called the great one, and that Pompey, who commanded the army, should be styled the Great.<sup>1</sup> As they held Africa also as far as Cyrene (for Apion, the king of that country, a bastard of the house of the Lagidæ, left Cyrene itself to the Romans in his will), Egypt alone was lacking to their grasp of the whole Mediterranean.

<sup>1</sup> This is an anachronism. The title of Great was bestowed upon Pompey by Sulla, in consequence of Pompey's victory over the Marian faction in Africa, in the year 81 B.C. (Plutarch, *Life of Pompey*, 13).

MAY 6 - 1915



COIN OF MITHRIDATES EUPATOR (Duruy)