| READING HALLTHE DOORS OF WISDOM | 
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| THE LIFE AND TIMES OF PERICLES(495-429 BC)AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF ATHENSBY
          EVELYN ABBOTT
          
           
           I.  THE
          ALCMEONIDS  (570-500 BC)
   II.  XANTHIPPUS
          AND THEMISTOCLES  (5OO-480 BC)
   III.  THE
          CONGRESS AT CORINTH, AND THE DELIAN LEAGUE  (481-476 BC)
   IV.  THE EARLY
          YEARS OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE THE FALL OF PAUSANIAS AND THEMISTOCLES  (481-476 BC)
   V.  DECADENCE OF
          SPARTA — REVOLT OF THE HELOTS — BREACH BETWEEN SPARTA AND ATHENS (476- 453 BC)
           VI. THE AREOPAGUS AND EPHIALTES.
           VII.  THE FIRST
          WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA,  (459-453
          BC)
   VIII.  CONTINUATION
          OF THE WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA—A TRUCE FOR FIVE YEARS—CIMON'S LAST
          EXPEDITION HIS DEATH AND CHARACTER  (456-449
          BC )
   IX.  THE YEARS
          OF PEACE AND THE SECOND WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA  (449-445 BC)
   X.  THE THIRTY
          YEARS' PEACE—THURII—SAMOS  (445439 BC)
   XI  AMPHIPOLIS—THE
          COMING WAR  (437-435 BC)
   XII.  THE CAUSES
          OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR  (435431 BC)
   XIII.  THE
          OUTBREAK OF THE WAR  (432-431 BC)
   XIV.  FIRST YEAR
          OF THE WAR (431 BC)
           CHAPTER XV. THE LAST YEAR OF PERICLES —THE FUNERAL SPEECH, (430-429 BC) CHAPTER XVI.
             CHAPTER XVII.
           CHAPTER XVIII.
           
           
           PREFACE
           
           THIS sketch of the Age of Pericles consists of two
          parts : in the first and larger part I have endeavored to trace the growth of
          the Athenian empire and the causes which alienated Athens and Sparta; in the
          second I have given a brief account of the government, the art and literature,
          the society and manners of the Periclean Athens.
           It will be seen that I have ventured to form an
          opinion about the part which Pericles played as a practical statesman widely
          different from the estimate presented by Grote and Curtius.
          It is, so far as I can judge, impossible to deny that he destroyed a form of
          government under which his city attained to the height of her prosperity and
          that he plunged her into a hopeless and demoralizing war. These are not the
          achievements of a great statesman. And so far as legislation goes, the Age of
          Pericles is a blank in the history of Athens.
   In what then did his greatness lie? The answer is,
          that it lay in the ideals which he cherished. He saw what a city might do for
          her citizens; and what citizens might do for their city. In the years of peace
          his dreams took shape, and the result is before us in the Parthenon and the
          great Funeral Speech: but against the hard obstinacy of facts, which followed
          the outbreak of the war, he struggled in vain. His visions of empire faded
          away, and he lived long enough to see the treasury impoverished, the people
          more than decimated, the most faithful of Athenian allies shut up to certain
          destruction.
           
           CHAPTER I.
           THE ALCMAEONIDAE.
           
           ABOUT two miles
          from the shore, at the southeast corner of the Corinthian Gulf, an elevated
          platform of triangular shape its steeply between two streams, the Asopus on the east, and the Helisson on the west. The elevation is not great, but the sides of the tableland
          are so precipitous that only a few narrow paths lead up o it, and for
          this reason it forms the natural acropolis if the surrounding district.
          This was the site of the ancient Sicyon, and though the splendid city
          which once crowned the height has been swept away, the natural
          features of the place are what they ever were. Looking northward, we see
          the waters of the Corinthian Gulf, and beyond this the “summits old
          in story”: Parnassus, sheltering the sacred Delphi ; Helicon, the home of
          the Muses and of Hesiod; and Cithaeron, the great rampart
          which divides Attica from Boeotia. On the east, beyond the Asopus, rises the lofty Acrocorinthus,
          the most imposing perhaps of all the mountains of Greece; on the west
          stretches a fair and fertile plain, covered with the olive gardens for
          which Sicyon was famous. Behind the city, to the south, runs the valley of
          the Asopus, penetrating into the hills which
          form the northern rampart of Peloponnesus. Here were the mines of
          copper, whose produce enabled Sicyon at an early time to win a high place
          in the history of Grecian art.
           In the beginning
          of the sixth century, B.C., this city was ruled by a Tyrant named Clisthenes,
          of the race of Orthagoras. In the ears of a
          Greek, who cherished his freedom above all things, the name of a
          Tyrant was at all times odious, but the knowledge that they would incur
          the deadly hatred of their citizens did not prevent ambitious men from
          aspiring to the sole command of their cities. “Only let me become
          Tyrant of my city,” cried a contemporary of Solon, “and I will give my
          body to be flayed, my skin for a bottle.” For seventy years or
          more before the accession of Clisthenes, Sicyon had been governed by
          the Orthagoridae. Their origin was humble, but
          they had attained to wealth and distinction ; the second or third of the family
          had won an Olympian victory with his four-horse chariot,
          a distinction coveted beyond all others by a wealthy Greek.
          Clisthenes outshone all his predecessors ; he was one of the foremost of
          the Tyrants of his time, and under his rule the city enjoyed a
          prosperity which perhaps was never exceeded before or after.
           Unhappily, his
          greatness was destined to die with him. His only child was a daughter, who
          could not inherit the position which her father held. But if she
          could not be Queen of Sicyon, she was at least the greatest heiress of her
          time, and in seeking a husband for her Clisthenes might choose from
          the best and richest families in Greece. Herodotus has told, in his
          inimitable way, the story of the wooing of Agariste.
          At the festival of Olympia, at which he was victorious in a four-horse
          chariot, Clisthenes caused a proclamation to be made, that anyone
          who held himself worthy to become the son-in-law of the King of
          Sicyon should repair to that city by the sixtieth day after the festival;
          in a year from the sixtieth day, Clisthenes would betroth his daughter.
           “Upon which
          notification, all such Grecians as thought highly of themselves and their
          country, went to Sicyon, where Clisthenes had made preparations for races
          and wrestling. From Italy arrived Smindyrides,
          the son of Hippocrates, a man plunged in voluptuousness beyond most
          examples, and born at Sybaris, which was then at the height of its
          prosperity; with Damasus of Siris, the son of
          Amyris, surnamed the Wise. From the Gulf of Ionia came Amphimnestus, the son of Epistrophus of Epidamnus; and from Astolia,
          Males, the brother of Titormus, who surpassed all
          the Grecians in strength, and had retired to the extremities of Astolia. From Peloponnesus arrived Leocedes,
          the son of Phidon, Tyrant of Argos: of that Phidon, I say, who prescribed measures to the
          Peloponnesians; and exceeding all the Grecians in arrogance,
          removed the Elean judges, and assumed to himself
          the power of appointing the Olympian exercises; Amiantus, an
          Arcadian of Trapezus, and son to Lycurgus; with Laphanes, the Azanian of Paeus,
          son of that Euphorion, who, according to a
          common report, entertained Castor and Pollux in his house, and from that
          time received all strangers with great hospitality. These, with Onomastus of Elis, the son of Agaeus,
          came from Peloponnesus. From Athens came Megacles,
          the son of that Alcmaeon who visited Croesus;
          and Hippoclides, the son of Tisander, in riches
          and beauty surpassing all the Athenians of his time. From Euboea, Lysanias alone, a native of Eretria, which was then in
          a flourishing condition. From Thessaly, Diactorides of Crannon; and from the Molossians, Alcon. All
          these were pretenders to the daughter of Clisthenes, and arrived in
          Sicyon before the sixty days were expired. Clisthenes, in pursuance
          of his design, first examined every one touching his country and descent ;
          after which he detained them a whole year in order to inform himself
          fully of their fortitude, temperance, institution, and manners ; conversing
          with them frequently, apart and together, and conducting the youngest to the
          gymnastic exercises. Above all, he endeavoured to
          discover their inclinations, when he entertained them with feasting; for
          he tried all experiments, and treated them with great magnificence,
          during the whole time they stayed with him. But among the several
          candidates he principally favoured the Athenians, especially Hippoclides, the son of Tisander,
          because he was esteemed for his courage, and derived his descent from the
          Corinthian Cypsclidae. When the day was come,
          which Clisthenes had appointed for the naming of the person he
          should choose, he sacrificed a hecatomb, and invited the pretenders,
          with all the Sicyonians, to the feast. After
          supper they entered into a dispute concerning music and other things that
          occasionally fell into discourse at that time; and as the wine
          went warmly about, Hippoclides, with an assuming air, commanded the
          musician to play a tune called ‘ Emmelia,’ in
          which, being readily obeyed, he danced with much satisfaction to himself,
          though Clisthenes, observing all that passed, began to suspect the event.
          When Hippoclides had finished his dance, and rested some time, he
          commanded a table to be brought in, which was no sooner done
          than, mounting upon it, he first imitated the Laconian measures, then
          danced after the Athenian manner, and, last of all, setting his head upon
          the table, and erecting his feet, he moved his legs in such
          postures as he had already practised with his
          hands. Though the first and second of these dances had sufficiently dissuaded
          Clisthenes from choosing a son-in-law of so much profligate impudence, yet
          he contained himself, and would not break out into an open passion. But
          when he saw him endeavouring with his legs
          to imitate the actions of his hands, he lost all patience, and cried
          out: ‘ O son of Tisander, thou hast danced away
          thy marriage.’ The other answered: ‘That is nought to Hippoclides,’ which saying afterwards obtained the authority of a
          proverb. Then Clisthenes, having commanded silence, spoke to those who
          pretended to his daughter in these words: ‘I commend you all, and am
          willing to gratify you all, if I could, without distinguishing any one in
          particular, to the disadvantage of the rest. But because I have no more
          than one daughter, and consequently cannot comply with the desires of so
          many persons, I give a talent of silver to every one of those who
          shall be excluded, as well in acknowledgment of your readiness to
          enter into my family by this match, as of the time you have spent in a
          long absence from your habitations; and I give my daughter Agariste to Megacles, the
          son of Alcmaeon, to be his wife under the
          conditions and usages of the Athenians.’ Megacles immediately declared his consent, and the nuptials were celebrated in the
          house of Clisthenes.” 
           The man thus
          distinguished was the heir of the great house of the Alcmaeonidae, a family
          well known for good and evil in the annals of Athens. They traced
          their lineage to Alcmaeon, the grandson
          of Nestor, the aged king of Pylus, whose figure
          is one of the most striking in Homeric story. Driven from the
          Peloponnesus at the time of the Dorian invasion, they came to Athens, and
          established themselves as one of the first families of the city. Their
          kinsmen, the Medontidae, were for many
          generations the royal race of Athens, and in the seventh century
          B.C., when the archonship was still closely restricted to the noble
          families (the Eupatridae), Megacles,
          the grandfather of the youth now chosen by Clisthenes, held the
          office. In his archonship a distinguished Athenian, named Cylon, attempted to make himself Tyrant of Athens, and
          seized the Acropolis with a number of followers. The attempt was
          quickly crushed, but not without fixing a lasting stain on the city.
          A number of Cylon’s adherents, who had
          taken refuge at the altars of the gods were induced to leave the
          sanctuaries by promises of safety, and then treacherously murdered (620 ?
          or 612? B.C.). The guilt of their death was laid upon the
          the altars. Henceforth the family was known as the “Accu          Alcmaeonidae, who, it was said, had persuaded them to leave
rsed”; and
          they were sentenced to banishment from Athens. But either the sentence
          wasrevoked, or it was not strictly enforced, for soon afterwards we
          find Alcmaeon, the son of Megacles, leading
          the Athenian forces in the First Sacred War(595-586 BC).
          Many years later, after the marriage of his son with Agariste, Alcmaeon paid a visit to Croesus, the wealthy
          King of Lydia, who allowed him to enter his treasure-house and carry away
          as much gold as he could. Alcmaeon made the most
          of the opportunity. He arrayed himself in the largest and loosest attire
          he could procure, put on the widest and tallest of top-boots, and thus
          equipped, entered the chamber. Not content with stuffing his robe
          and filling his boots to overflowing, he sprinkled gold-dust on his hair,
          and crammed it into his mouth, till nothing more could be added to his
          load. Then he staggered from the room, looking “ like anything rather
          than a man,” greatly to the amusement of Croesus. The gain thus strangely
          gotten added largely to the wealth of the family, already
          increased by the inheritance of Clisthenes. In the troubles which
          overtook Athens in the second half of the sixth century, the Alcmaeonidae
          made a not ignoble use of their riches and power, but men did not forget
          that the curse was still upon them, and that their wealth was derived, in
          a considerable degree, from their connection with tyrants.
           When next we hear
          of Megacles he is one of the leaders in the party
          struggles, which disturbed Athens in the middle of the sixth century
          B.C. The reforms of Solon had failed to produce the harmony, which
          their great author had expected; and in twenty or thirty years after
          Solon’s archonship, the parties of the Shore, the Plain, and the Mountain
          were again arrayed against each other, each seeking for the foremost place
          in the city. Megacles, as the head of the house
          of the Alcmaeonidae, led the party of the Shore ; his rivals at the head
          of the Plain were Miltiades, the chief of the ancient house of the Philaidae, who claimed descent from Ajax, and
          Lycurgus. At the head of the Mountain was Pisistratus, of the race of the Nelidse, who, like the Alcmaeonids, claimed descent
          from Nestor of Pylus. As Plutarch has described
          them to us, the men of the Plain were chiefly the inhabitants of the
          plain of Cephisus;—rich land-holders of a
          strict conservative type, who wished to retain unimpaired all their
          ancient rights and privileges. The men of the Shore were the inhabitants
          of the district known as the Paralia, the coast
          between Athens and Sunium. They included many of
          the merchant class, who naturally sought to put the claims of wealth
          above those of birth. The men of the Mountain were the poor goat-herds of the
          hilly region between the upper valley of the Cephisus and the sea. They were the radical party of the time, whose only hope
          of improving their condition lay in breaking the power of their opponents, and
          removing the barriers of birth and privilege. They had found a leader
          in the ranks of their opponents, a clever and unscrupulous man, who saw
          clearly that if he triumphed with the aid of peasants and shepherds, there
          would be no necessity to share his power with his supporters. In 560 B.C.,
          matters came to a crisis, and Pisistratus established himself as Tyrant
          of Athens. His success was short-lived. Within a very few years his
          opponents combined and drove him from the city. He retired to his estates
          in the neighbourhood of Marathon, biding his time. It
          was not long before the rival parties quarrelled,
          and Pisistratus at once seized the opportunity to win over Megacles by promising to marry his daughter, (the child of Agariste).
          By this means he became tyrant of the city a second time. He fulfilled his
          promise of marrying the daughter of Megacles,
          but having no
   For thirty years
          or more (541-509 B.C.), they ate the bread of strangers. In this period Megacles died, and his place as head of the family was
          taken by Clisthenes, his son by Agariste. As a young
          man, Clisthenes was probably more active than his father in his efforts to
          regain his position at Athens, and after the death of Pisistratus, in 527, the
          prospect was more encouraging. The sons of Pisistratus, Hippias and Lipparchus, who were associated in the government, ere
          not the equals of their father; they had but succeeded to the throne,
          which he had won. Their conduct soon aroused such bitter hatred that a conspiracy
          was formed against them, and though Hippias scaped, Hipparchus was slain.
          This event, which took place in 514, produced a change for the
          worse 1 the character of Hippias ; he became morose, suspicious, and oppressive. Uncertain of his position :
          home, he looked for support abroad, and married is daughter to the son of
          the Tyrant of Lampsacus, irough whose good offices he hoped to find favour ith the Persian monarch.
           The Alcmaeonidae
          were doubtless well aware of le state of feeling at Athens; they thought the
          time ad come for driving out the tyrant by force, and ith this object they entered Attica and established lemselves in a fortified position at Lipsydrium,
          on le slopes of Mount Parnes. But the attempt
          proved remature. Hippias was able to expel them
          from le country.
   Thus baffled, the
          exiles sought assistance in anther quarter. In 548 the temple of Delphi had een burned down. The rebuilding was made a ational work; money was collected from far and near
          that a temple might be raised worthy of the lost famous oracular shrine in
          the world. The Almaeonidae undertook to carry
          out the reconstrucion, and fulfilled their
          obligations with the greatest berality, building
          the front of the temple with Parian marble, when nothing more than
          ordinary stone was required by the terms of the contract. From this
          time the family was naturally in great favour at
          Delphi, and they now made use of their position. They induced the
          priestess—it was said by bribes—to impress upon all the Spartans
          who came to the oracle the imperative duty of liberating Athens. The
          Spartans were slow to answer to the call. They had always been on
          excellent terms with Pisistratus and his sons, under whose
          government Athens had been a good neighbour. Why
          should they begin the quarrel? But the priestess was importunate, and at
          length Anchimolius, a distinguished Spartan, was
          sent with an army to expel the tyrants from Attica. The task was not
          accomplished without difficulty. Anchimolius was
          defeated, and slain, and even when Cleomenes,
          the King of Sparta, appeared in person at Athens, it was a mere
          accident which threw the victory into his hands. The tyrants and
          their partisans were preparing to sustain a siege in the Acropolis, when
          news was brought that the children of the family, who were being sent away
          for safety, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. This at once
          changed the situation ; Hippias agreed to leave the country in five days,
          and retired to Sigeum, in the Troad.
   The departure of
          their rivals was of course the signal for all the exiled families to return to
          Athens, and at their head was Clisthenes. What were his views when
          he found himself once more in the city, it is difficult to say. Perhaps he
          had dreams of securing for himself the tyranny of which Hippias had been
          deprived. He might at least look forward to an established position as the
          foremost man in the city. In either case he was disappointed. No sooner had
          he returned than he found himself engaged in party
          quarrels. The oligarchical party, (the remnant we may suppose of the old
          party of the Plain), of whom Isagoras was now
          the leader, had no mind to be the subjects of the ambitious Alcmaeonidse, and offered violent opposition to his
          projects. Finding himself unable to maintain his position without fresh
          support, Clisthenes determined, as Pisistratus had done before him,
          to seek the aid of the people; but he sought it in a different manner. He
          set about rearranging the whole constitution of Athens. Increasing the
          tribes from four to ten, and the Council from four hundred to five
          hundred, he gave the people as much authority in elections as he could, and
          sought in every way to emancipate them from the influence of
          the great families. Isagoras and his party were
          taken by surprise; they at once summoned Sparta to their aid, and the
          appeal was successful. Cleomenes, who was a
          personal friend of Isagoras, sent a herald
          to Athens calling on Clisthenes and the Alcmaeonidae to leave the
          city, as being “under the curse.” Clisthenes at once retired ; he had no wish
          to see the Spartans at Athens, and he expected to secure his recall
          without difficulty. But Cleomenes was
          not contented ; he soon appeared with a small force at Athens, and in
          concert with Isagoras he drove no fewer than
          seven hundred families out of the town. Then he attempted to destroy the
          Council, and put the government into the hands of three hundred of
          the friends of Isagoras. The Council refused to
          submit, and, far from being able to coerce it, Cleomenes and Isagoras found themselves driven into the
          citadel. Their forces were few in number ; they had made no provision
          for the siege, and after two days the Lacedaemonians came to terms. With a
          brutal selfishness, of which this is not the only instance, they secured
          a free passage for themselves, while abandoning their Athenian
          friends to the mercy of the conquerors. Clisthenes and the seven hundred
          were at once recalled ; their opponents were put to death, and
          the ground was cleared for the great reformation which Clisthenes now
          proceeded to carry out. It is true that Cleomenes was not inclined to submit to the humiliating repulse which he had
          received ; and still less so, when he discovered that the Delphian
          priestess had been bribed into insisting on the liberation of Athens. But
          he could not induce the Peloponnesian allies, whose contingents formed a
          considerable part of any force which Sparta could put into the field, to
          listen to him. A large expedition, which he led as far as Eleusis, melted
          away, when it heard the object for which it had been collected ; and
          when Hippias was brought from Asia to Sparta, and a general assembly of
          the Confederation was held to discuss his restoration, the Corinthians, as the
          foremost of the allies, declared that they would have neither part
          nor lot in setting up that cruel and bloodthirsty monster, a Tyrant. The
          subject was dropped, and never revived. Hippias returned to Sigeum, and Athens was henceforth a free city.
   We have
          unfortunately no full account of the measures of Clisthenes. A few sentences,
          some
           Every statesman is
          of course guided largely by the circumstances of his time ; he cannot advise
          or legislate in the air, but must have something definite in view. We
          shall see that Pericles trained the Athenians to acquire and maintain an
          imperial position. Clisthenes had no such aim ; he merely sought to
          secure Athens against the undue influence of great families and its
          attendant evils—the outbreak of local and domestic faction and the rise
          of a tyrant. And in this object he succeeded.
           All the villages
          of Attica were collected into a hundred “Demes,” which he distributed among
          the ten tribes, ten to each. In each Deme he established a local officer,
          the Demarch, who was supported by a local council. The Demarch managed the
          affairs of the Deme, arranged for elections, and kept the register of
          citizens for purposes of contribution or service. The Demes belonging to
          the various tribes were not adjacent in every case ; but sometimes Demes
          from widely different parts of the country were united in one tribe,
          doubtless with a view to prevent undue local influence. The whole of
          the new arrangements were put under the sanction of new religious rites or
          forms of worship: each Deme had its sanctuary ; each tribe its
          tutelary hero. The political life of the citizens was thus dissociated
          from the family and domestic life, through which, no doubt, the old houses
          had largely exercised their power.
   Within a very few
          years after the establishment of the new government, Athens was called upon
          to undergo a number of trials, each severer than the other; she
          passed triumphantly through them all, and emerged the greatest city in
          Greece. “Not in one instance only,” says Herodotus, “but everywhere, it
          is manifest that freedom of speech is an excellent thing; in the days of
          their tyrants, the Athenians were no better in the field than their neighbours, but no sooner had they got rid of
          them, than they were first of all. It is therefore quite clear that,
          when held in subjection, they would not do their best, because they were
          working for a master, but when they were free, every
            one did his utmost for himself.” The historian’s remark is
          true, though in justice to the Athenian Tyrants we must at least
          allow that their rule, however oppressive, did not prevent the growth of a
          vigorous population, able and willing to fight their own battles.
   
           CHAPTER II
           XANTHIPPUS AND THEMISTOCLES.
           
           
           FROM the time that his reforms were completed, little
          is known of Clisthenes. He is said to have been ostracized, and the same fate
          twice befell his son Megacles, whose daughter Dinomache became the mother of Alcibiades. But Hippocrates,
          the younger brother of Clisthenes, was the father of a second Agariste, and from this daughter, who married Xanthippus of the old Athenian family of the Buzygs, was born Pericles.
   Though not himself an Alcmaeonid, Xanthippus seems to have acquired a considerable portion of the influence of the family by
          marrying into it. For sixteen years (from 494 to 478) he was one of the most
          prominent men in Athens. It was he who brought Miltiades to trial; who, with
          Aristides, endeavored to thwart the plans of Themistocles.
           In 479 he commanded the Athenian ships at Mycale; and,
          in the ensuing spring, he conquered Sestos. Then, like so many of the leading
          Greek statesmen in the evening of their lives, he disappears from our view and
          nothing more is recorded of him.
           Pericles was probably born about the year 493 BC.
          Even before his birth, indications of his future greatness were not wanting.
          Herodotus, at any rate, believed a story, which was current in his time, that Agariste, a few days before the birth of her great son,
          dreamed that she was delivered of a lion. The year of his birth was not a happy
          one in Athenian annals. In 494 BC the great city of Miletus had
          fallen before the arms of Persia, and the ill-timed and disastrous revolt of
          the cities of Ionia, in which Athens had played no creditable part, was brought
          to an end amid universal desolation and destruction. The victorious Phoenician
          fleet pressed onwards to the north of the Aegean with nothing to check its
          course. The Chersonese, which for two generations had been governed by members
          of the Athenian house of the Philaids, passed into the possession of the
          Persians, and Miltiades, the son of Cimon, the present ruler, came flying home
          with all his goods in five triremes, one of which was captured by the enemy.
          The bitter feeling aroused at Athens by these reverses is shown by the
          treatment of the poet Phrynichus, who had chosen the
          capture of Miletus for the subject of a tragedy. The artistic success of the
          drama was so great that the audience were moved to tears, but the subject was
          felt to be too painful for a play, and the poet was fined one thousand drachmae
          for reminding his countrymen of their misfortunes.
   On his return to Athens, Miltiades found that he was
          by no means at the end of his troubles. We have seen that the two great families
          of the Alcmaeonids and Philaids had stood at the head of rival parties at
          Athens in the political factions of the sixth century; Megacles,
          the grandfather of Agariste, had led the Shore;
          Miltiades, the uncle of the present ruler of the Chersonese, had led the Plain.
          Though the old factions were at an end, the Alcmaeonids were by no means
          pleased to see the chief of their rivals back in the city.
   Miltiades had shown himself daring and unscrupulous in
          his management of the Chersonese; his wealth was great; his family had been
          conquerors at Olympia; he was perhaps descended from Cypselus,
          the Tyrant of Corinth, and for many years of his life he had occupied the
          position of an irresponsible despot. Would such a man consent to be an equal
          among equals in his old city? In the interval which had elapsed since Miltiades
          had taken the place of his elder brother, Stesagoras,
          in the Chersonese, Athens had gone through the crisis which we have described
          in the preceding chapter. When he left the city, the tyrants were still on the
          throne; when he returned, the reforms of Clisthenes had been firmly established
          for more than ten years. To a man of such experiences, accustomed to the
          unlimited exercise of personal power, “freedom of speech” was not likely to
          commend itself. Xanthippus and his friends
          determined, if possible, to get rid of the danger. They brought an action
          against Miltiades, immediately after his return to Athens, charging him with
          tyrannical government in the Chersonese. The charge was ridiculous. The Athenians
          had nothing whatever to do with the government of the Chersonese. The first
          Miltiades had gone out at the invitation of a native tribe to protect them
          against the incursions of their neighbors on the north, and the ‘tyranny’ thus
          acquired had remained in the hands of the family ever since. Under such
          circumstances Miltiades was, of course, acquitted; the plot of his enemies
          entirely broke down.
   Three years later came the invasion of the Persians
          under Datis and Artaphernes, ending in the battle of
          Marathon. On this occasion we hear nothing of Xanthippus,
          but we can hardly suppose that he took no part in the defence of his country. It is true that, fifty years later, in the time of Herodotus,
          the Alcmaeonids were suspected of having carried on some treacherous
          negotiations with the invaders. It was even said that they raised aloft the
          shield which gave the signal to the Persians to re-embark from Marathon and
          hasten to Athens in the hope of surprising the city. And those who were hostile
          to the family might remind the Athenians that they owed their wealth in a great
          degree to the tyrants of Sardis and Sicyon; that Clisthenes himself had sought
          the aid of Persia in strengthening his position against Isagoras.
          But even if the story of the shield is true, there is no proof that Xanthippus acted with the Alcmoaenid in this matter; and in the great invasion of Xerxes in 480 BC he
          certainly took a prominent part in the destruction of the Persian fleet.
   In the next year (489 BC) Xanthippus was the chief actor in a scene which has left a lasting stain on himself and
          his city. The victory of Marathon was chiefly due to Miltiades; it was he who
          brought on the engagement, and he was chief in command on the day when the
          battle was fought. Such a brilliant success greatly improved his position in
          the city, and excited in his enemies a still deeper hatred. Ever on the watch
          for an opportunity to pull down their rival, it was not long before they found
          one. Soon after his victory Miltiades came before the Athenians with a request
          that a squadron of seventy ships might be placed at his disposal. The purpose
          for which he required them he would not disclose, though pledging his word that
          the expedition would add largely to the wealth and prosperity of the city. The
          request being granted, he sailed with the ships to Paros, an island which at
          this time was subject to Persia. From the Parians he demanded one hundred
          talents, and when they refused to pay he blockaded the city. So vigorous and
          successful was the resistance offered that, after a long delay, Miltiades,
          himself dangerously wounded, was compelled to return home. His enemies, with Xanthippus at their head, at once attacked him for
          misconduct in the enterprise. They declared that he had deceived the Athenians,
          and, so far from adding to their wealth and prosperity, had wasted the treasure
          and lives of his fellow-citizens. For such an offence death was the only
          adequate penalty. Miltiades was unable to reply in person; he was carried into
          court, while his friends pleaded his cause. The sentence was given against him,
          but the penalty was reduced from death to a fine of fifty talents. So large a
          sum was more than even Miltiades could pay; he was thrown into prison as a
          public debtor, where he soon died from the mortification of his wound.
   In the account which Herodotus gives of this event we
          are informed that Miltiades attacked Paros from motives of private vengeance,
          and that he received his wound while seeking an interview with the Parian
          priestess of Demeter. But as we are not told what was the object of the
          interview, and as the cause assigned for the private quarrel is quite
          incredible, this account is not of much value. On the other hand it is obvious
          that Miltiades, if he wished to detach the wealthy island of Paros from Persia,
          would desire his object to be kept as secret as possible. He well knew that a
          project openly discussed in the Athenian Assembly would be known at Paros long
          before he could reach the island. The secrecy of the expedition was therefore
          justifiable. The object was not less so. Paros as a subject of Persia was a
          source of danger in the Aegean; if the Athenians conquered the island they
          would have a base of operations in the Cyclades, from which they could
          intercept such an expedition as that which brought Datis to Marathon. But Miltiades failed, and failure at the moment was intolerable.
          In the animation of their recent victory the Athenians forgot how inadequate
          were the means at their disposal for the capture of walled cities; they thought
          that there could be no limits to their success; and the enemies of Miltiades
          took advantage of this feeling to bring about his ruin. His condemnation was
          one in a long series of similar punishments. The Athenians never learnt to be
          just to those who served them, or to distinguish between treachery and errors
          of judgment. It was the natural result of such conduct that those who entered
          their service were compelled to sacrifice their devotion to their country to
          the precautions necessary for their own safety.
   We have very little information about the state of
          Athens immediately after the battle of Marathon. So far as we can tell, for the
          chronology is most uncertain, she was now engaged in a war with Aegina, which
          though at first carried on with vigor, at length lapsed into inactive
          hostility, neither side being able, to inflict any serious mischief on the
          other. Meanwhile a man was rising to power who may be said to have created the
          history of Athens for the rest of the century, Themistocles, the son of Neocles.
   What we know of the birth and early life of this
          eminent man is derived from the biography written by Plutarch, a late author,
          whose accuracy depends on that of the writers from whom he collected his
          information—writers often divided by centuries from the facts which they
          recorded. We are told that he was not born of true Athenian blood, his mother
          being an alien. The sons of such mixed marriages were not without political
          rights at Athens, but they lay under certain social disadvantages. They could
          not train or exercise with the young Athenians of pure descent; a separate
          gymnasium was assigned to them—the Cynosarges—on the
          banks of the Ilissus, outside the walls of the city.
          From his early youth, therefore, Themistocles found himself separated from
          those ancient families, who had been the ruling power in Athens. He could not
          expect the support which came to them from their equals. Yet his spirit would not
          allow him to be content with any but the foremost place in the city. While he
          was yet a boy his schoolmaster had predicted his future greatness; whether he
          would be famous for his virtues or his vices he could not say, but famous he
          would certainly be. His father, observing his inordinate ambition, sought to
          win him from a public career by pointing to the hulls of some disused triremes.
          These had once been employed in the service of the city—gallant ships, the
          pride of those who manned them; and what were they now? But Themistocles was
          not to be shaken in his purpose. As a young man he had fought at Marathon; and
          the trophy of Miltiades would not let him rest. Was it possible for him,
          without friends, without wealth, to win success even more brilliant than that
          of the great chief of the Philaids? Was it possible to raise Athens, which had
          just achieved so remarkable a victory, to a position of irresistible power, and
          wrest from Sparta the leadership of Greece?
   On the very day of Marathon, Themistocles had probably
          made up his mind that the Persians would visit Greece again. What was to keep
          them away, so long as they were masters of the Aegean? He was also aware that
          Athens, above all cities, was the object of the wrath of Darius. How could she
          be saved? Recent experience was entirely in favor of the army. At Marathon the
          Athenian hoplites had put to flight a host ten times their own in number; but
          the fleet had been unable to reduce the single city of Paros. For the last
          twenty years Athens had been uniformly successful on land, while nothing
          decisive had been done in the maritime war with Aegina. With such evidence
          before them, few men would have ventured to strike into the line which
          Themistocles took—a line which implied an entirely new departure in the
          military history of Athens. With an insight almost incredible he perceived that
          the Athenians could become a maritime nation, that Athens possessed harbors
          large enough to receive an enormous fleet, and capable of being strongly
          fortified; that in possession of a fleet she could not only secure her own
          safety, but stand forth as a rival power to Sparta.
           But how could Themistocles induce the Athenians to
          abandon the line in which they had been so successful for a mode of warfare in
          which even Miltiades had failed? After the fall of the great general, the
          conduct of affairs was in the hands of Xanthippus,
          whom we know, and Aristides. Both these men after the battle of Salamis took a
          prominent part as leaders of the Athenian fleet, but ten years earlier they
          were by no means prepared for the change which Themistocles was meditating.
          This is more especially true of Aristides. He had been a friend of Clisthenes;
          he was known as an admirer of Spartan customs; and doubtless looked on a
          trained army as the great bulwark of a state. He had been second in command at
          Marathon, and was now the most eminent general at Athens. From him Themistocles
          could only expect the most resolute opposition.
   Xanthippus and Aristides could reckon on the support of old
          traditions and great connections. Themistocles had no support of the kind. He
          had to make his party. He began by collecting round him a few energetic men,
          who were perhaps convinced by his arguments, or at any rate jealous of the
          power of the great families. These he formed into an association for the spread
          of his views,—the first instance, so far as we know, of a political ‘club’ at
          Athens. At a later time such clubs were common enough; in fact they were the
          principal means by which the aristocratical or oligarchical party at Athens
          preserved what influence it had. They were always regarded with some suspicion,
          and the more severely they were treated the more dangerous they became. In this
          early instance the significance of the movement was probably disregarded.
          Conscious of their own position, Aristides and Xanthippus looked with contempt upon the knot of men who began to gather round their
          unmannerly and uncultivated leader.
   And they might perhaps have maintained their position
          if it had not been for the Aeginetan war. That
          unlucky struggle had begun, soon after the reforms of Clisthenes, with an
          unprovoked attack of the Aeginetans on the coast of
          Attica (506 BC). It was renewed when the Aeginetans gave earth and water to the heralds of Darius in 491, and though suspended at
          the time of the Persian invasion, it broke out again with renewed ferocity soon
          afterwards. The Aeginetans succeeded in carrying off
          a missionship, which was conveying some of the
          leading Athenian citizens to the festival of Poseidon on the headland of Sunium. The Athenians, in revenge, attempted a coup
          d'état in concert with Nicodromus, a dissatisfied Eeginetan oligarch, who promised to raise the people at the
          same moment that an Athenian fleet attacked the city. But the Athenians had not
          sufficient ships for the purpose—for Aegina could put seventy vessels on the
          water,—and while they were obtaining others from Corinth, time passed on, and
          they arrived at Aegina a day too late. The Aeginetan oligarchs got rid of their domestic enemies by a horrible massacre, and after
          some contests fought with varying fortune, they finally succeeded in defeating
          the Athenian fleet. From this time onwards hostilities ceased on a large scale;
          each city ravaged the coasts of the other as opportunity offered.
   Such experiences naturally caused a change in the
          minds of the Athenians. Had they driven the Persians into the sea only to be
          defeated, harried, and defied by a neighboring island? If they could have the Aeginetans on land they would soon give an account of them;
          but now the warfare lay on a different element. It was clear that the old
          arrangements for the navy were quite inadequate to the task which was now
          required of them. Yet the leaders of the state made no proposals. They seemed
          content with a navy of fifty or seventy ships, regardless of past defeats and
          present devastations. Miltiades had been condemned for his failure at Paros,
          but failure at Aegina was treated in quite a different manner. These may have
          been the murmurs which Themistocles and his associates sought to diffuse
          through the city. In the confidence that they were gaining ground, he came
          forward publicly with proposals of naval reform, and, as he expected, he drew
          upon himself the strenuous opposition of Aristides.
   We need not assume that Aristides had contracted that
          dislike of a seafaring population which was so marked a feature among the
          philosophers of the next century; but he could not avoid seeing that a fleet
          was useless without rowers, and that the rowers would be drawn from the lowest
          class of citizens. The defence of the city would no
          longer be in the hands of that middle class, who were at least able to supply
          themselves with a suit of armor, but in the hands of men who must be paid for
          their labor. Aristides was slow to perceive that this class might be as
          patriotic and trustworthy as the citizens of higher position. At a later time
          he redeemed his error, but for the present he employed all his influence in
          thwarting the plans of Themistocles. So severe was the contest that the public
          peace was in danger. Aristides was heard to confess that the Athenians would be
          wise if they threw both himself and his opponent into the pit into which great
          criminals were cast.
   Affairs were at a dead lock. It was clear that nothing
          decisive could be done in the Aeginetan war unless
          the proposals of Themistocles were carried; it was equally clear that they
          never would be carried while Aristides and Xanthippus were at hand to oppose them. Under these circumstances recourse was had to the
          safety-valve of the constitution. Ostracism was proposed and accepted; and in
          this manner, by 483 BC, Themistocles had got rid of both of his rivals in the
          city.
   He was now master of the situation. The only obstacle
          to the realization of his plans was the expense involved in building ships. And
          this he was able to meet by a happy accident, which brought into the treasury
          at this time a large surplus from the silver mines from Laurium.
          Various accounts are given of the precise method in which the fleet was built,
          and none is perhaps more worthy of credit than another. But, by the summer of
          480, the Athenians, who previously had borrowed twenty ships of the Corinthians
          in order to bring up their navy to a total of seventy, were able to launch a
          hundred and eighty vessels, besides providing twenty for the use of the
          Chalcidians of Euboea. These, or the greater part of them, as we know, on the
          testimony of Herodotus, were primarily built with a view to the war with
          Aegina, but, when the news of the second Persian invasion arrived, that quarrel
          was made up, and the Athenians were at liberty to devote their whole strength
          to the salvation of Greece.
   At the same time, Themistocles set about the
          fortification of the Piraeus. Down to this time the harbor of Athens had been
          the open roadstead of Phalerum, which, though
          spacious and convenient was exposed to the wind, and without any protection
          from attack. A large fleet could not be allowed to remain there; harbors and
          convenient docks were an indispensable part of the policy which endeavored to
          turn Athens into a maritime power. A little to the west of Phalerum a rocky promontory runs out from the shore of Attica into the Gulf of Salamis.
   Connected with the land by a somewhat narrow isthmus,
          the headland becomes broader as it enters into the sea. It is pierced by three
          deep basins, each with a narrow entrance, but varying in size. Themistocles at
          once perceived that these basins were the harbors which he required. In the
          largest, which was called Piraeus, all the ships of Athens could, if necessary,
          be collected. The other two, if smaller, were even more defensible. He resolved
          to make this promontory the port of Athens, and to fortify the harbors for the
          protection of the ships. Could he have carried the Athenians with him, he would
          have made the Piraeus the capital of the country, in order that the ships and
          the city might be in close connection. But for this the people were not
          prepared. They clung to the ancient rock, round which were gathered the most
          sacred legends of the past—the seat of temples hallowed by immemorial
          antiquity.
           This ambitious scheme was suspended by the disasters
          of the years 480-479, in which Xerxes attempted to avenge the defeat of his father
          Darius, and bring Greece into subjection to Persia. As everyone knows, the
          attempt ended in utter failure.
           The Persian fleet was broken at Salamis, and finally
          destroyed at Mycale; the greater part of the army hastened back with Xerxes,
          and those who remained behind with Mardonius were cut
          down with prodigious slaughter on the battlefield of Plataea. The historian can
          hardly have a more delightful task than to trace, even in such outlines as our
          knowledge permits, the steps by which a mere handful of brave and patriotic men
          delivered their country from the Persian despot. Of nine tenths of the wars
          which have destroyed empires and laid waste whole territories, we may say that
          the world has gained nothing by them; but there can be no doubt that the loss
          of Greek civilization would have been irreparable. And there can also be no
          doubt that the glorious victory which saved so priceless a possession was
          chiefly due to the Athenians, and among the Athenians to the incomparable
          genius and courage of Themistocles. But we cannot here enter on this subject;
          we are only concerned with the effect which the Persian war had on the position
          of Athens among Greek cities, and the stimulus which it imparted to the Greek
          mind.
   We must also remember that among those who saw the
          desolation of the city, and were carried away to escape the ravages of the
          Barbarians was Pericles, now a boy of thirteen years of age. Of this flight
          Plutarch has recorded an incident which is worth repeating. When Xanthippus embarked on board ship to cross the gulf from
          Attica to Salamis, his favorite dog was forgotten, or reached the shore too
          late to be taken on board. Unable to bear separation from his master, the dog
          sprang into the sea and swam the whole breadth of the gulf, behind the ship.
          But the effort was too great for his strength; on reaching the island he fell
          down exhausted and died.
   
           CHAPTER III.
           THE CONGRESS AT CORINTH, AND THE DELIAN LEAGUE.
           
           WHEN it was known in Greece that Xerxes was on his
          march into Europe, it became necessary to take measures for the defence of the country. At the instigation of the
          Athenians, the Spartans, as the acknowledged leaders of Hellas and head of the
          Peloponnesian confederacy, called on those cities which had resolved to uphold
          the independence of their country, to send plenipotentiaries to a congress at
          the Isthmus of Corinth. When the envoys assembled, a kind of Hellenic alliance
          was formed under the presidency of Sparta, and its unity was confirmed by an
          oath, binding the members to visit with severe penalties those Greeks who,
          without compulsion, had given earth and water to the envoys of Xerxes. This
          alliance was the nearest approach to a Hellenic union ever seen in Greece; but
          though it comprised most of the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, except Argos
          and Achaea, the Megarians, Athenians, and two cities of Boeotia, Thespiae and Plataea, were the only patriots north of the
          Isthmus. Others, who would willingly have been on that side, such as the common
          people of Thessaly, the Phoceans and Locrians, were compelled by the force of circumstances to
          ‘medize’.
   From the time at which it met in the autumn or summer
          of 481 to the autumn of 480 BC, the congress at the Isthmus directed the
          military affairs of Greece. It fixed the plan of operations. Spies were sent to
          Sardis to ascertain the extent of the forces of Xerxes; envoys visited Argos,
          Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse, in the hope, which proved vain, of obtaining
          assistance in the impending struggle. As soon as Xerxes was known to be in
          Europe, an army of ten thousand men was sent to hold the pass of Tempe, but
          afterwards, on the advice of Alexander of Macedon, this barrier was abandoned;
          and it was finally resolved to await the approaching forces at Thermopylae and Artemisium. The supreme authority, both by land and sea,
          was in the hands of the Spartans; they were the natural leaders of any army
          which the Greeks could put into the field, and the allies refused to follow
          unless the ships also were under their charge.
   For this reason Eurybiadas the Spartan, though he had only ten vessels under his command, was chosen
          general-in-chief of the whole fleet. Of the other cities, each sent one
          commander, with full powers at the head of her contingent. Themistocles
          commanded the Athenians, Adimantus the Corinthians. From the time that
          hostilities actually commenced at Thermopylae till the return of the fleet
          after the victory of Salamis to the Isthmus, the direction of affairs was, of
          course, taken by the general-in-chief. The commanders were allowed to discuss
          matters in a common assembly, but the final decision rested with Eurybiadas. Of the council or congress at the Isthmus we
          hear nothing at this time. But when hostilities were suspended, the congress
          reappears, and the Greeks once more meet at the Isthmus to apportion the spoil
          and adjudge the prizes of valor. In the next year we hear of no common plan of
          operations, the fleet and army seeming to act independently of each other; yet
          we observe that the chiefs of the medizing Thebans were taken to the Isthmus
          (Corinth) to be tried, after the battle of Plataea.
   It appears then that, under the stress of the great
          Persian invasion, the Greeks were brought into an alliance or confederation;
          and for the two years from midsummer 481 to midsummer 479 a congress continued
          to meet, with more or less interruption, at the Isthmus, consisting of
          plenipotentiaries from the various cities. This congress directed the affairs
          of the nation, so far as they were in any way connected with the Persian
          invasion. When the Barbarians were finally defeated, and there was no longer
          any alarm from that source, the congress seems to have discontinued its
          meetings. But the alliance remained; the cities continued to act in common, at
          any rate, so far as naval operations were concerned, and Sparta was still the
          leading power.
           On the other hand, the relative position of the states
          was greatly altered by the events of 480 and 479. In the first place, there
          were states which had joined the invader, and states which had resisted him.
          Thessaly and Thebes had done their best to place a foreign ruler over Greece;
          Argos, in spite of her ancient traditions, had been neutral or worse. The
          action of these states was not forgotten, if it was not punished. Thebes and Athens
          had already quarreled over the allegiance of Plataea; the cities were now more
          divided than ever; and all hope of the union of Northern Greece, so vital a
          point in the defence of the country, was at an end.
          In like manner the long-standing separation of Argos and Sparta was more
          clearly marked than before. The approach to confederation, which the war seemed
          to have created, had been accompanied by an increase of the divisions, an
          aggravation of the hatreds, which rent Hellas asunder.
   And this was not all. The part which Athens played at Artemisium and Salamis created a great impression in
          Greece. Her neighbors and rivals in trade, the Aeginetans and Corinthians, saw with surprise and alarm that she had risen at a single
          leap to a position far above their own. She was now the greatest maritime power
          of any single state in Greece; and though in the war she had consented to
          follow the lead of Sparta, it was clear to everyone that Themistocles and not Eurybiadas had been the real power in the fleet. In this
          case also the war, while seeming to unite Hellas, had created two leading
          cities, where previously there had only been one. Over against the great Dorian
          city of the Peloponnesus stood the Ionian city of Central Hellas. The trained
          courage of the Spartan hoplite was matched by the skill of the Athenian sailor.
   The events which immediately followed the final defeat
          of the Persians gave prominence to this new division. Athens made it clear that
          she intended to pursue an independent line. She did not break loose from the
          confederation which had been formed in 481; she was still the ally of Sparta,
          and looked to Sparta to lead the allied forces, but in all that concerned her
          own safety she claimed to be free and unfettered. The Athenians had hardly
          returned from Salamis to Athens—which the Persians had leveled to the
          ground—than they began to build a wall round the city far larger and stronger
          than any which had previously existed. This was done on the advice of
          Themistocles, who saw that such a protection was absolutely necessary, if the
          Athenians were to devote themselves to the sea. Without such a wall the city
          would be exposed to the attacks of their neighbors—attacks which could only be
          successfully repelled by a large and well trained army, equal to the best
          soldiers which the Peloponnese and Boeotia could bring against it, and such an
          army was impossible at Athens. His advice was the more readily accepted at a
          time when the citizens, who had been twice driven out of house and home in two
          successive years, were in a mood to make sacrifices for the protection of the
          city.
           The walls began to rise. No sooner did the neighboring
          allies see what was going on than they called on the Spartans to put a stop to
          the ambitious project. The situation was difficult; Sparta as the head of the
          alliance might make suggestions to the Athenians, but she could hardly venture
          to interfere in a more decided manner. She sent envoys to Athens pointing out
          the danger of walls; should another invasion occur, Athens if a walled city
          might become what Thebes had been in the last: the base of operations for the
          invaders. Sparta herself had no walls; why should Athens need them? The
          Athenians were not deceived, but they could not openly resent this interference.
          Themistocles found it necessary to outwit the Spartans and protract the
          negotiations till the walls were of a height which made the city defensible.
          Then he threw off the mask and boldly declared that Athens had a right to take
          whatever steps she pleased to ensure her own safety. She chose to have walls
          and she would have them. There the matter ended. It could not indeed be carried
          further without an appeal to arms, and as yet the memory of the services of
          Athens was too recent to admit of any but a friendly feeling between her and
          Sparta.
           In the fleet also the Athenians had been able to
          assert their independence. The Spartan king Leotychidas had succeeded Eurybiadas as high admiral, and under
          his command the allied squadrons won the victory of Mycale, 479 BC. The
          Greeks had been assisted by the Samians and Milesians—who were glad to turn
          upon their oppressors,—and when the fleet returned to Samos, after the battle,
          the Chians and Lesbians and others asked to be
          received into the alliance. The Greeks now found themselves face to face with a
          question of no little importance. Were they to undertake the defence of the Greeks on the islands and the mainland of
          Asia? It was obvious that they could only undertake it, if they were prepared
          to maintain a fleet which could keep the Persians out of the Aegean. The
          Peloponnesians, with the Spartans at their head, were unwilling to charge the
          confederacy with such a burden. They proposed that the Ionians should be
          removed from their present homes, and placed in the peninsula, in the ports of
          the medizing Greeks, whom they would expel for the purpose. But the Athenians,
          who were now commanded by Xanthippus, the father of
          Pericles, took another view: the Ionians were their colonists, and they alone
          had a right to decide on their future.
   They determined that they should remain where they
          were, and themselves undertook their protection. To this view the Spartans
          assented, and soon afterwards Leotychidas and the
          Peloponnesian contingents sailed home, leaving the Athenians to carry on the
          war by themselves. Nothing daunted, the Athenians attacked Sestos, and
          continued the siege till they captured the city, in the spring of 478.
   By land and sea Athens had carried her point, even
          against the wishes of Sparta. But the cities were still on the best of terms;
          the old alliance remained, and, as we have said, Sparta was regarded as the
          leading city in Greece.
           When in the summer of 478 a new expedition was sent
          out to carry on the war, it was placed under Pausanias, the general who had
          commanded the united forces at Plataea as regent for his nephew, the infant
          king of Sparta. The Aegean had been cleared of Persian ships by this time, but
          the ambition of the Greeks grew with their success. They wished to make another
          invasion impossible. With this view, Pausanias attacked Cyprus, the best
          station from which to keep watch on the Cilician plain, the rendezvous of the
          Persian troops, when required in the west. He succeeded in conquering the
          greater part of the island, though we are not told that he left any garrison to
          retain what he had won. From Cyprus he proceeded to Byzantium, the key of the Bosphorus; this city also he succeeded in taking, and at
          the capture many Persians of high rank fell into his hands.
   Among the spoils left on the field after the battle of
          Plataea was found the tent of Mardonius, the Persian
          general. This was no other than the tent of Xerxes, which at his departure the
          King had left for the use of his successor in the command. It was, of course,
          constructed with royal magnificence, resplendent with gold, and the richest
          embroidery; a sight such as had never before come under the eyes of the
          astonished Greeks. When Pausanias saw it, he bade the attendants prepare a meal
          as they were accustomed to prepare it for Mardonius,
          and at the same time gave orders to his Helots to cook a common Spartan supper.
          Then he summoned the captains of the Greeks to see the difference. “How
          foolish”, he exclaimed, “were the men who while they enjoyed the one sought to
          rob the Greeks of the other!” The sight of this magnificence seems to have sunk
          deeply into the mind and memory of Pausanias. Forgetting the infinite
          difference between freedom and slavery, he contrasted the bare and dreary life
          of a Spartan with the softness and splendor of a Persian satrap. His successes
          in the last two years had raised him to the foremost rank in Greece, and he had
          felt no scruple in claiming for himself the honors which had been won by the
          devotion of others. Was he to abandon his ‘great place’ and return to Sparta,
          to be the subject of an infant king? Was he, whose name was inscribed on the
          serpents at Delphi and the cauldron at the Bosphorus as the captain of the Greeks, to be recalled to Sparta by the uncontrolled
          decision of the ephors? His ambitious hopes led him to dream of a far different
          position. Might he not fill the place which Mardonius had failed to fill, and govern Greece as the Viceroy of Persia?
   With these schemes in his mind, Pausanias entered into
          negotiations with the Great King. He sent the prisoners taken at the capture of
          Byzantium back to Persia, excusing their departure to the Greeks under the pretence that they had escaped. He also wrote a letter to
          Xerxes, in which he proposed to become the son-in-law of the king (as Mardonius had been of Darius), and requested that a
          trustworthy person should be sent down to the coast, with whom he could develop
          his plans. Xerxes eagerly entered into the scheme. Pausanias received ample
          promises of support, and a Persian was sent to cooperate with him.
          Unfortunately for his own purposes, he was unable to conceal his delight. He
          already regarded himself as a servant of Persia. In Persian dress, with a bodyguard
          of Medes and Egyptians about him, he made a tour through Thrace, where a number
          of fortified posts were still held by the King’s troops. His conduct towards
          the allies became more intolerable every day. He made the lives of the men
          miserable by harsh punishments, and when their commanders interfered, he
          refused to hear them. The irritation, especially of the Ionians, was increased
          by the politic courtesy of the generals of the Athenian contingent, Cimon
          and Aristides. At length the smoldering fires broke into flame. The allies,
          with the Samians at their head, transferred their allegiance from the Spartan
          commander to the Athenians, and in spite of all his negotiations with Persia,
          Pausanias was not in a position to prevent the change by force. Meanwhile the
          Spartans heard of the dispute, and having before had some suspicion of the
          motives of Pausanias, they recalled him from Byzantium. This step left the
          course clear for the Athenians. They assumed the command, and when a successor
          to Pausanias was sent out from Sparta, he was not received by the allied fleet.
          The Spartans were, in fact, no longer recognised as
          the head of the maritime forces of the Hellenic alliance, and as the rest of
          the Peloponnesians, who naturally followed the lead of the Spartans, also
          ceased from this time, to send contingents to the Hellenic fleet, the Athenians
          and their allies were left in control of the sea. The Ionians could now claim
          to be as supreme on the water as the Dorians were on the land.
   Thucydides tells us that the Spartans were not
          unwilling that the command of the fleet should pass over to the Athenians. They
          felt that their citizens were becoming corrupted by their residence and service
          abroad; Spartan simplicity was not proof against the temptations which Persia
          could offer; the seclusion of the valley of the Eurotas became dreary to those who had mixed with the life and movement of the sea. And
          at the same time they thought the Athenians loyal friends, who would carry on
          the maritime war in the cause of Hellas. Of their ability and energy there
          could, of course, be no doubt.
   Thus within three or four years of the battle of
          Salamis, united Greece had fallen into halves. The great alliance still
          existed, but Sparta had practically gone back to her old position as leader of
          the Peloponnesians. Athens had risen to be the first city of Central Greece and
          head of the maritime forces of the nation. As on the one hand, the Ionian
          allies of Athens had renounced allegiance to the Spartan commander, so, on the
          other, the Dorian cities of the Peloponnese had withdrawn their contingents
          from the allied fleet. Athens and Sparta, Ionians and Dorians, began to be
          ranged in opposition.
           The division was increased by the use which the Athenians
          made of their position as head of the Hellenic fleet. They had established
          their power in Central Hellas by surrounding their city with impregnable walls;
          they now proceeded to consolidate the bond which united them with their allies
          into a firm and lasting league. Still remaining allies of the Spartans, they
          nevertheless formed a fresh alliance of their own. This was the famous Delian
          confederacy—the foundation, we may say, upon which the Athens of Pericles and
          the Peloponnesian war was reared. The avowed object of the Athenians in forming
          the league was to compensate themselves and their allies for their losses by
          devastating the King’s country. They had no sooner been acknowledged leaders of
          the fleet in the Bosphorus than they proceeded to
          form a synod, to which all the allied cities, great or small, should send a
          deputy, each deputy having an equal vote on the board. As a second step, it was
          necessary to arrange which of the cities should provide ships, and which should
          provide money, for the war. Some cities, such as Chios, Lesbos, Samos, Naxos,
          and others, in spite of the requisitions of Xerxes, seem to have been able to
          furnish ships at once; others had either lost their vessels, or for some other
          reasons found it difficult to build any. For their convenience a scale was
          fixed by Aristides, according to which their ‘tribute’ to the league was to be
          paid, and the Athenians were charged with the collection of it, a new office
          being created at Athens for the purpose—the so-called “Hellenic Treasurers”.
          What money was collected was placed in a common chest in the temple of Apollo
          at Delos, which was also selected as the common meeting-place of the synod. The
          alliance was confirmed by solemn oaths, which were ratified, as the custom was,
          by sinking masses of iron in the sea; when these should reappear, the oaths
          would cease to be binding. In the enthusiasm of the moment it seemed that the
          alliance would last for ever.
   The Athenians who took a leading part in the formation
          of the league were Aristides and Cimon. Aristides we know. After his ostracism
          in 483 he had returned to Athens on the eve of the battle of Salamis, either
          under a public resolution, or because he felt that, at such a time, he might
          disregard the law in offering his services to his country. Whatever his old
          opposition to Themistocles had been, it was forgotten now, and no one rendered
          more efficient aid in carrying out the plans of his rival for the development
          of Athenian maritime power. Cimon was the son of Miltiades, and inherited his
          father’s military genius; from this date, till his death in 449, he takes the
          first place among Athenian generals. Both Aristides and Cimon were men
          eminently fitted to make Athens popular with the allies. As Aristides was renowned
          for his upright character, so was Cimon the delight of the society in which he
          moved, the idol of his soldiers.
           Splendid as the fortune of Athens was in every respect
          at this time, it was in nothing more remarkable than in the number of great men
          whom she had at her disposal. And for a time, at any rate, old animosities were
          forgotten; all worked together in harmony for the good of their city. Happy
          would it have been for the reputation of the republic if this harmony had
          continued.
           
           CHAPTER IV.
           THE EARLY YEARS OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE—THE FALL OF
          PAUSANIAS AND THEMISTOCLES.
           
           IN 476 BC, the Delian league was formed, amid
          universal enthusiasm, and at the Olympian festival of that year Themistocles
          was the “observed of all observers”, as the man who had saved his country. In
          466 Naxos, the most important of the Cyclades, the last of the larger islands
          to fall under the Persian yoke, and the first to break loose from it, was in
          revolt against the Athenians, and Themistocles was flying from his country to
          seek the protection of the Persian king. A change so striking of necessity
          excites our curiosity; we would fain trace the steps by which it was brought
          about. Who was to blame for consequences so disastrous?
           Was it the Athenians, who in the plenitude of their
          power destroyed the fair promise of united action in Hellas, in order to
          establish a maritime empire in the place of an equal league of confederate
          cities?
           Or did the allies, in the feverish restlessness of
          Hellenic independence, refuse to submit to the control inseparable from any
          form of confederation?
           Was Themistocles a traitor to the country which he had
          served so well, an associate of Pausanias, and a hireling of the Persian king;
          or were his exile and flight due to party feuds and political strife?
           On the answer to these questions our judgment of the
          Athenians in this great period of their history must largely depend. And
          unhappily the answer is vague and uncertain. With the help of Thucydides we can
          trace a faint outline of the causes which led to the revolt of Naxos; we can
          see that there was negligence on the one side, and ambition on the other. But
          at the causes which brought about the fall of Themistocles we can only guess;
          so far as we know, no truthful record of the events of this period of the
          domestic history of Athens was ever made, or, if made, it was not preserved.
          The last days of the greatest of Athenians became a myth; the manner of his death
          and the place of his burial were unknown.
           The first achievement of the new league was the
          capture of Eion, a town at the mouth of the Strymon in Thrace. This success was gained under the
          command of Cimon. Not long afterwards, but how long the meager record of
          Thucydides does not allow us to determine, the island of Scyrus was acquired by Athens. The inhabitants, who were Dolopians,
          were reduced to slavery and their land divided among Athenian citizens. This
          fate, we are told, the Dolopians brought upon
          themselves. Their island was little better than a nest of pirates, and it was
          at the request of the Delphian Amphictyony that the Athenians entered upon the
          crusade against them. After this a war broke out between the league and
          Carystus, a town in Euboea. Some time was spent in indecisive warfare, but at
          length terms were proposed upon which both sides could agree. The next event
          recorded by Thucydides in the history of the league is the revolt of the Naxians, who were reduced by a siege. This was the first
          allied city which was enslaved contrary to “Hellenic law”, but afterwards the
          same fate overtook the rest, “each as its turn came”. Various reasons were
          given for these acts of aggression on the part of Athens, but the most common
          was the failure to supply the tribute and ships, or the refusal to join in an
          expedition. The Athenians were extreme in their exactions, and caused great
          irritation by using compulsion upon men who had never been accustomed to endure
          any hardship. And by this time they were not so popular in the command as they
          had been. They were not content with their old position as an equal among
          equals, and they found it easy to reduce those who revolted. For this the
          allies were themselves to blame. Owing to their aversion to service, which took
          them from home, the greater part preferred paying money to providing ships, and
          thus they not only supplied the Athenians with money to increase their fleet,
          but when they revolted, they were as deficient in skill as in resources.
   At first, we are told, the Athenians were inclined to
          insist on receiving the vessels according to the original agreement, but Cimon
          pointed out that it was far more to the advantage of Athens to allow the allies
          to have their own way. The revenues of the city were increased at the very time
          when the power of resistance declined, with the inevitable result that the
          Athenians became not merely the leaders, but the rulers of the confederacy. In
          the same careless spirit the allies seem to have neglected the attendance at the
          synod at Delos, upon which their existence as equals in the league depended.
          The synod was in fact allowed to fall into decay.
           Before the death of Cimon it had probably ceased to
          exist; and even the chest of the allies had been transferred to Athens, where
          it was, in effect, administered by the Athenian council. It was reserved for
          Pericles to carry out the change further, and to insist that the Athenian
          empire had taken the place of the Delian league. The change was perhaps
          inevitable; or at least, the choice lay between two alternatives. Either the
          Delian league must be broken up into a number of independent navies, which
          might or might not act together, or it must be consolidated in the hands of
          Athens. The first alternative was impossible, so long as Persia was a dangerous
          power; and when by repeated defeats Athens had crippled her great enemy, she
          had achieved a position which left the old equality no more than a fiction. Had
          the Peloponnesians remained in the alliance, the preponderance of Athens might
          have been obviated; there would at least have been two great states, round
          which the allies could have ranged themselves, and the division of power,
          though fertile of dissensions, might have saved the weaker cities.
          Unfortunately the treachery of Pausanias rendered such an arrangement
          impossible; owing to his conduct the Spartans were not only hated abroad, but
          found themselves involved in serious danger at home. The rest of the
          Peloponnesians were unable to take an independent line.
           Of the internal affairs of Athens after the building
          of the city walls we know very little. Four great names are before us: Xanthippus, Aristides, Themistocles, and Cimon. Of Xanthippus we hear no more after the fall of Sestos, in
          478 BC. That he died is more than probable, for if he had lived it is
          difficult to understand why his name is never mentioned. His birth, his wealth,
          his success, and his ambition would have secured him a leading place in the
          politics of the day. We must, therefore, think of Pericles as deprived of his
          father’s guidance at the age of fifteen. At this critical period of life he was
          left to shape his own career, and select the party to which he would attach
          himself. Of the part which Aristides took in the formation of the Delian league
          we have already spoken. His action as commander of the Athenian fleet is a
          proof, as we have said, that he no longer cherished his old opposition to the
          maritime plans of Themistocles. He had, in fact, so fully identified himself
          with the forward policy, which made the lower classes all-important for the
          service of the city, that he proposed to relieve them from the restrictions
          hitherto laid upon them.
   By the arrangements of Solon, the citizens of Athens
          were divided into four classes, according to their wealth. In the highest class
          were placed those who derived from landed property an income of five hundred medimni (seven hundred and fifty English bushels) of corn,
          or equivalent produce; in the second, those whose income from similar sources
          amounted to three hundred medimni; in the third,
          those whose income amounted to one hundred and fifty medimni.
          Into the fourth class, who were known as the Thetes,
          or ‘day laborers’, fell all the citizens whose income derived from landed
          property was less than one hundred and fifty medimni,
          and all whose income, no matter how large, was derived from other sources than
          land. To each of these classes duties were assigned according to their means,
          and privileges granted according to their duties. The first class bore the
          heaviest burdens, and enjoyed the exclusive right to the highest offices. The
          members of the second class, who were known as the Knights, were liable to the
          charge of providing a horse in the service of the city; the members of the
          third class were called the Hoplites, or Heavy-armed; every man was expected to
          take his place in the army, when called upon, and to furnish himself with a
          suit of body-armor. These two classes shared with the first the privilege of
          election to the council of Five Hundred, and perhaps some other offices were
          open to them.
   The Thetes were excluded
          from office of any kind, and the only duty demanded of them was that of
          attending the hoplites in the field as light-armed soldiers.
           The Solonian scheme had undergone considerable
          modifications at the hands of Clisthenes in regard to the three higher classes,
          by which many of the old restrictions had been removed, but no change had been
          made in regard to the fourth class. They were still excluded from every kind of
          office, though as rowers in the ships they had recently been called upon to
          take a far larger share in the service of the state than ever fell to their lot
          as light-armed soldiers. Aristides saw the injustice of the restriction. He had
          aided Clisthenes in throwing open office to the higher classes; he now went
          further in the same direction, and proposed that members of the fourth class
          should be eligible to the archonship.
           So far as the poorer citizens were concerned, the
          proposal was rather a compliment than an advantage. Few of the members of the
          fourth class, whose position was due to their poverty, would be able to support
          the expense attending high office, or even to give up the time necessary for
          the discharge of their duties. But with the men who were placed in the class
          because their income was derived from trade and not from land, the case was
          very different. They were by this time a numerous and increasing body, eager,
          no doubt, to be released from the restriction which lay upon them. The proposal
          of Aristides placed them on an equality with the rest of the citizens, and
          opened careers which they felt themselves able to pursue. At the same time it
          gave to capital employed in trade an importance hitherto reserved to capital
          invested in land.
           But where, we ask, was Themistocles when this proposal
          was made? Why did he allow a measure, at once so popular and so obviously
          favorable to his own views of the future of Athens, to be passed by Aristides?
          Our authorities tell us that Aristides was opposed to the extreme democratic
          views of Themistocles. Yet Aristides passes a measure more democratic by far
          than any which we know to have been passed by Themistocles! Are we to suppose
          that these two great men were once more opponents, as of old, but on a different
          ground? Does Aristides attempt to outbid Themistocles in winning the popular
          vote? Or was the measure of Aristides, however democratic in appearance, a
          modified form of some still more extreme measure contemplated by Themistocles?
           What is certain is that, after the building of the
          city walls and the fortification of the Piraeus, which he persuaded the
          Athenians to complete—for a beginning had been made a few years previously—when
          the walls were finished, the popularity of Themistocles began to decline. We
          never hear of him in any public capacity; he carried no important measures.
          Full of schemes, as he must have been for the aggrandizement of Athens, and the
          extension of her power, he found himself not only unable to carry them out, but
          even to maintain the position to which his great achievements had raised him.
          This change in his position can hardly be explained by the extreme nature of
          his views on the democracy, for the most democratic measure of the time was
          carried by Aristides. It was due partly to the character of Themistocles
          himself, and partly to the state of parties at Athens at the time.
           Themistocles was not a man likely to attract the love
          or respect of those with whom he lived and worked, let his services be never so
          great. He was too purely intellectual, too intent on doing what was best to do,
          without regard to the means by which he did it. His conduct towards the
          Spartans shows him in a disagreeable light, and many of those who approved of
          the result of his policy would not hesitate to condemn the manner in which the
          result had been attained. We have no reason to suppose that he ever entertained
          any other than patriotic motives in his dealings with Persia, but the secret
          and tortuous arts by which he brought about the battle of Salamis would not be
          forgotten by those who wished to ruin his character. This dislike and distrust
          were perhaps increased by defects of manner.
           Themistocles is described to us as insolent and
          overbearing; he did not disguise his contempt for those around him; he was
          never weary of dwelling on his own merits, a weakness not uncommon among
          Athenians. And this may have been the reason that the ‘club’, on which he
          relied ten years before, was no longer willing to support him. His old friends
          grew weary or afraid of one who posed as a ‘necessary’ man; for, on the one
          hand, the step was short from the necessary man to the tyrant; and, on the
          other, though it was true that in great emergencies Themistocles, more than any
          other Athenian, was competent to guide the state, the case was altered when the
          danger had passed away. Cimon and Aristides were far better fitted to carry on
          the work of the Delian league. It is indeed probable, though there is no
          authority for saying so, that it was in the management of the confederacy that
          Themistocles and Aristides once more came into opposition. For if Themistocles
          could have carried out his own views, Athens would not have entered the
          confederacy as an equal among equals; she would at once have occupied the
          imperial position, which she gained some twenty years later, and the Aegean
          would have become an Athenian lake. The opposition of Cimon to Themistocles can
          be also explained by the different views which they took of the proper policy
          for Athens to adopt towards Sparta.
           However this may be, the party leaders at Athens were
          able to keep Themistocles out of power. Cimon was the head of the Philaid;
          Aristides carried on the policy of the Alcmaeonids. Both were sincere
          patriots—Cimon the more aristocratic, Aristides, though also of an ancient
          family, the more democratic, in his views. Each could count on a great
          following: the landed gentry, as we should call them, had for a century looked
          on the Philaids as their leaders; the merchants and traders—the Parali of the preceding century—had been raised to
          power in the state by the recent measures of Aristides, and at the same time
          the whole of the poorer classes, whether living by agriculture or trade, had
          been freed from an invidious restriction. But Themistocles was without a
          following; the peasants and poorer farmers, who had once supported Pisistratus,
          no longer formed a third party, and if they had, Themistocles, whose desire was
          to make Athens a maritime power, was not likely to be their leader. Under such
          circumstances it was not difficult for Cimon and Aristides, by combining their
          influence, to destroy the position of Themistocles. In 471 BC, the
          opposition reached a climax; ostracism was demanded, and Themistocles was
          expelled the country.
   On his banishment he retired to Argos. Whether he was
          prompted by his old hatred of Sparta, or whether he suspected that Spartan
          influence had been active in procuring his exile, we do not know; but we can
          hardly doubt that he chose Argos as a place of retirement because it offered a
          convenient base of operations against Sparta. And though the feeling between
          Argos and Athens, owing to the conduct of the Argives in the Persian war, was
          far from friendly, the Argives may have been pleased to have among them an
          Athenian who was better able than any other Greek to aid them in their designs
          on their detested neighbors.
           To Argos Themistocles went. At this point his life
          becomes linked with the fate of Pausanias, who, when we last heard of him, had
          been recalled by Sparta from the command of the fleet at Byzantium.
           After his recall Pausanias remained at Sparta but a
          short time. He was too deeply interested in his negotiations with the Persian
          king to abandon his aims at the first check. In a single vessel he sailed from
          the coast of Argolis to the Hellespont, on the pretext that he wished to join
          in the war as a private person. By some means, perhaps on the score of the
          great services which he had rendered to Greece at Plataea, he obtained an
          entrance into Byzantium, and established himself there in some degree of power.
          But his position was not such as to enable him to take any active steps in
          concert with Persia; year after year passed on, and nothing whatever was
          accomplished of the promises which he had held out to the King. His treachery
          meanwhile grew more and more apparent, until at last the Athenians found it
          necessary to expel him from Byzantium.
           He retired to Colon, a city in the Troad,
          where he was at least within easy reach of the satrap of Phrygia. But the
          suspicions of the Spartans had been aroused; ere long a Spartan herald appeared
          at Colon, bidding him return home on pain of incurring the displeasure of the
          Spartans. Pausanias did not venture to disobey; a breach with the authorities of
          his government, apart from the personal danger to himself, would have been
          fatal to his plans, which embraced an entire change of the situation in
          Peloponnesus as well as in the Aegean.
           On his previous recall he had been punished for some
          injuries which he had done to private persons, but on the graver charge of
          treachery he had been acquitted. He was now thrown into prison by the ephors,
          whose power was such that they could imprison even the kings of Sparta on bare
          suspicion. It was not long before he found his way out, when he at once
          challenged his enemies to produce their charges. For a time no one came
          forward. Many suspicious actions of Pausanias were remembered; his conduct at
          Byzantium; his affectation of the Persian dress and manners; his ambitious
          inscription on the tripod at Delphi, in which he claimed the honors won by
          Greece for himself; but certain proof was not to be had. What touched the
          Spartan authorities even more nearly was the report that he was intriguing with
          the Helots, of whose rebellious spirit they were in constant alarm. And it was
          true that Pausanias had been in treaty with them, promising them freedom and
          civic rights if they would revolt. Still, there was no incontestable evidence
          to hand, which would justify the ephors in going to extremities against a
          citizen of the royal blood, and the most successful of Spartan generals.
           At length a favorite servant turned informer.
          Observing that of the messengers whom Pausanias sent to Asia none ever
          returned, he opened the dispatches placed in his hands, in alarm for his own
          safety. He found, as he expected, that directions were given for his death. He
          at once showed the letter to the ephors. Their suspicions were of course
          confirmed, but they still wished to hear something from the lips of Pausanias
          himself; a dispatch might be forged, and there was the greater fear of this,
          because in order to hide his opening of the letter the servant had in fact
          forged the seal of Pausanias. A plan was arranged by which the truth was
          brought to light. The servant, as if in fear for his life, took sanctuary at
          the temple of Poseidon, on the promontory of Taenarus,
          in the south of Laconia. Here he built a hut, divided by a wall into two
          compartments, in one of which he concealed the ephors, while he was visited by
          Pausanias in the other. The conversation which passed between him and his
          master was so arranged as to leave no doubt whatever of the guilt of Pausanias.
   The ephors returned to Sparta, intending to arrest
          him. But even now they were not really in earnest in their work. They did not
          send to his house, or attempt to take him by surprise, and when they met him in
          the street, one of the body gave him a sign of warning, which enabled him to
          escape for the moment. He turned and fled. Before the pursuers could come up,
          he had taken refuge in a chamber adjacent to the temple of Athena of the Brazen
          House, and within the sacred precincts. Here he was at least safe from
          violence. But Spartan cruelty was a match for Spartan superstition. Unwilling
          to remove the suppliant, the ephors found means to defeat his object. They
          unroofed the chamber in which he lay, and finding that he was certainly there,
          with no means of egress but the door, they built up the doorway, and left him
          to starve. It is said by later writers that his own mother laid the first stone
          in this iniquitous work. When he was at length on the point of death they drew
          him out of the sacred place; if it was sacrilege to remove a suppliant, it was
          pollution for anyone to die in a temple. He was no sooner removed than he
          expired. Not long afterwards the Spartans appear to have felt some scruples
          about the manner in which they had dealt with him. They consulted Apollo of
          Delphi, who, besides other instructions, informed them that they had brought a
          curse upon themselves, and must offer two bodies in place of one. This was the
          curse of Athena of the Brazen House. The Spartans endeavored to expiate their
          offence by erecting two bronze statues of Pausanias.
           The chronology of this period is too uncertain to
          allow us to speak with confidence, but it is probable that Themistocles was at
          Argos when the treachery of Pausanias came to light. For the Spartans it was
          highly inconvenient that one who had shown so strong a determination to
          dislodge them from their position as leaders of Greece should become
          influential in a city more famous in legend than their own, and a bitter enemy
          from the earliest times. As they could not call on the Argives to expel him,
          they devised a more secret and a more certain method of attaining their object.
          In the papers of Pausanias they professed to find evidence which involved
          Themistocles in his guilt. And though they could not appeal to any overt act in
          support of such a charge, they could remind the Athenians that Themistocles was
          known to have entered into secret communications with the Great King at the
          battle of Salamis. Themistocles had enemies enough at Athens, who were willing
          to take up the charge. An Alcmaeonid, by name Leobotes,
          impeached him before the assembly, and the Athenian people were persuaded to
          send envoys to join the Spartans in arresting him as a traitor to Greece.
   Themistocles received timely warning of their
          approach, and retired from Argos to Corcyra, a city which, in spite of her
          conduct during the Persian war, he had in some way befriended. Even here the
          Spartans followed him; and the Corcyrans finding
          themselves unequal to his protection, conveyed him to the opposite shore. Here
          also his enemies pursued him. He was compelled to seek shelter with Admetus,
          the king of the Molossians, who, though Themistocles had opposed him in some
          negotiations with the Athenian people, refused to surrender the suppliant, and
          sent him safely to Pydna in Macedonia.
   From Pydna he took ship to
          Ionia. But misfortune pursued him still. The ship in which he was carried was
          driven by a storm to Naxos at the very time when the city was being blockaded
          by the Athenians. Themistocles saw his danger, and sending for the captain,
          told him who he was, and offered a large sum of money on condition that he
          would neither land at Naxos nor allow anyone to leave the ship. If he refused,
          he would denounce him as an accomplice in his flight. The captain accepted the
          money and Themistocles was safely landed at Ephesus.
           From Ephesus he entered into communication with the
          Persians. In a letter to Artaxerxes, who had just succeeded his father Xerxes,
          he offered his services to Persia. It was true that he had done the Great King
          more harm than anyone else, but he had also done him greater service, for it
          was owing to his advice that the bridge over the Hellespont had not been broken
          down, and Xerxes had been enabled to retire in safety. He was now driven from
          his country as a friend of the King.
           In a year’s time, if permission were given, he would
          himself explain to Artaxerxes why he had come to Asia. Artaxerxes was delighted
          at the thought that his great enemy had come over to him. When the year was
          ended, Themistocles appeared at Susa, and at once became the most influential
          of all the Greeks who had ever visited Persia. He was made governor of Magnesia
          in Ionia, a convenient station from which to keep watch over the seaboard. With
          oriental magnificence certain cities were set apart for his maintenance.
          Magnesia itself, a city with a revenue of fifty talents, supplied him with
          bread; Lampsacus with wine; Myus with meat. For the time, he was a Persian satrap, enjoying the special favor of
          the King.
   But no result followed. The victory of Cimon at the
          Eurymedon in 466 had crushed any immediate hope of invading Greece.
          Themistocles had to confess in secret that the power which he had created was
          too great for him to destroy. According to one account, he put an end to his
          own life because he could not fulfill his promise to Artaxerxes; but
          Thucydides, who was at pains to make careful inquiries about his great
          countryman, assures us that he died a natural death. A monument was erected to
          his memory in the market-place of Magnesia, and Plutarch’s personal friend,
          Themistocles of Athens, enjoyed the honors which were bestowed on his
          posterity, even in the second century AD, in that city. But his bones, so at
          least his family asserted, were secretly brought home and placed in Attic
          earth.
           Of the genius of Themistocles it is needless to speak.
          It is attested by the victory which he won, and the career of the great city,
          to which he gave, as it were, a second foundation. In defence of his honesty, we may say that there is no reason to suppose that he cherished
          treasonable designs against his country before the moment when it was no longer
          possible for him to remain safely in it; and when the combination of his
          enemies in Sparta and Athens drove him out of Hellas, there was no place but
          Persia to which he could retire. It is extremely doubtful whether there was any
          real ground for the charge of medism upon which he
          was hunted out of Greece. The evidence comes to us from a very suspicious
          source—from the Spartans, who knew that Themistocles was their enemy, and who
          had at the time very urgent reasons for securing his expulsion from the
          Peloponnesus. Unhappily, the enemies of Themistocles at Athens were only too
          ready to join in the work. They had succeeded in banishing him from the city,
          but they knew that while he was in Greece he might return and find some means
          of revenging himself upon them. It did not occur to their minds that the honor
          of their city was bound up with that of her greatest citizen. In the malice of
          party spirit they forgot what they owed to the world and posterity.
   The leader of the attack is said to have been an
          Alcmeonid, but whether Pericles took any part in it is unknown. Assuming that
          Themistocles was condemned in 467 or 466, Pericles would be twenty-six or
          twenty-seven at the time. His mind was already occupied with politics, and, as
          we shall see, he came forward in a very few years as the leader of the popular
          party; but his sympathy with the views of Themistocles must have been too great
          to allow him to share in the feud which drove him to the court of Persia.
          Nevertheless, the flight of Themistocles and the death of Aristides, which
          seems to have occurred about the same time, left the way clear for the new
          leader of the democracy.
           
           CHAPTER V.
           DECADENCE OF SPARTA—REVOLT OF THE HELOTS—BREACH
          BETWEEN SPARTA AND ATHENS.
           
           FROM the time that she withdrew her contingent from
          the Grecian fleet Sparta began to decline rapidly in prestige and power. Her
          want of firmness in investigating and punishing the conduct of Pausanias
          allowed events to take a turn which was disastrous to her reputation and even
          to her power; while the growth of democratic feeling, fostered no doubt by the
          example of Athens, was raising an amount of hostility, or at any rate of
          disaffection, in the Peloponnesus, to which she had hitherto been a stranger.
           As a means of increasing her influence on land in
          compensation for the loss of her influence in the fleet, Sparta took up the
          line of punishing those states which had supported Xerxes in his invasion of
          Greece. The patriotic states were indeed pledged to this step, but the
          Athenians were far too busy with their new confederacy to give much attention
          to the claims of the old alliance, and the moment was favorable for independent
          action on the part of Sparta. Among the most flagrant offenders were the Aleuads, the princely house which practically governed
          Thessaly. They had not only received the Persians into their country, and
          conducted them to the south of Greece, but they had even sent envoys to Persia
          with the object of bringing about the invasion. To punish such conduct Leotychidas, the king of Sparta, was dispatched at the head
          of an army into Thessaly. Unhappily for Sparta, Leotychidas was more corrupt, or at least less able to conceal his corruption, than
          Pausanias himself. He received bribes from the Aleuads with so little secrecy that he was found with the money in his tent. The army
          was at once recalled; Leotychidas was put on his
          trial and condemned. He fled for refuge to Tegea in
          Arcadia, and so unfriendly were the terms which now prevailed between Sparta
          and her ally, that the Tegeatae refused to give him
          up. He was succeeded on the throne by his son Archidamus.
   The first attempt to pursue a patriotic policy had
          ended in failure and disgrace. The second also proved abortive. From very
          ancient times a league of twelve tribes had met at Thermopylae and Delphi,
          which was known as the Delphian Amphictyony. It was perhaps in the first
          instance founded for common worship and defence, but
          at the time of which we are speaking its functions were almost exclusively
          religious; very rarely did it take a part in the political affairs of the
          country. At the Persian invasion a large proportion of the cities and tribes
          forming the league had gone over, either voluntarily or on the compulsion of
          powerful neighbors, to the side of the Persians. The Spartans now proposed to
          purge the Amphictyony by the expulsion of the medizing members. The proposal
          was strictly in accordance with the resolution which had been taken in
          481 BC to punish those Greeks who failed in their duty to their
          country, but nevertheless the aims of Sparta were suspected. It was thought
          that she wished to gain for herself a preponderance in the council of the
          league, and by this means to lay the foundation of a confederacy in Northern
          Greece, which would be as fully under her control as the confederacy in the
          Peloponnesus. On these grounds Themistocles at once came forward to oppose the
          proposal of the Spartans. His arguments, whether well founded or not, proved
          convincing; in spite of its delinquencies the Amphictyony remained without
          change.
   The attention of Sparta was soon recalled from these
          more distant projects by troubles nearer home. We have seen that the Tegeatae refused to give up Leotychidas at the request of the Spartans. A war appears to have broken out between the
          cities, in which the Argives came to the help of the Tegeatae.
          The Spartans were victorious, but the victory cannot have been very decisive,
          for Leotychidas remained safe at Tegea till his death, and no steps were taken against Argos. Not long afterwards the
          whole of Arcadia, with the exception of the Mantineans, took the field against
          Sparta. The armies met at Dipaea, where a great
          battle was fought, in which the Spartans were again victorious. But though she
          proved her power in the field, it was obvious that a spirit of independence was
          gaining ground among her neighbors and allies which threatened her ascendancy
          at the very time when there was no one at Sparta of sufficient ability and
          character to counteract it. For in this crisis of her history Sparta was as
          deficient in great men as Athens was prolific of them.
   The same tendency appeared in a great revolution which
          about this time took place in Elis. Hitherto that state had been oligarchical,
          and a warm friend of Sparta, but after the Persian war a reaction set in, which
          now showed itself in a very definite step. The constitution was changed in the
          direction of democracy, and the change was marked and confirmed by the
          formation of a large central city, called Elis after the country. Up to this
          time the great families which had governed Elis had lived in small towns; and
          indeed a country life was at all times characteristic of the Eleans. The change which now took place transferred the
          ruling authority to the citizens who were gathered into the new city.
   More important were the changes which went on in
          Argos. Ever since the great defeat by Cleomenes of
          Sparta, in which six thousand Argives perished, the city had devoted her
          attention to recovering and consolidating her power. A hard task lay before
          her. So low had she been brought by her disaster, that the slaves or serfs had
          usurped the dominion of the country after the slaughter of their masters, and
          not till these were deposed was Argos her true self. This exhaustion was put
          forward as a plea by the Argives for their omission to send help against Persia
          in 481 BC. Slowly the city recovered her strength, and when she found
          Sparta occupied with her Arcadian neighbors, she seized the opportunity to break
          up all the independent towns in the vale of Argos,
          and concentrate their inhabitants in the city. The ancient towns of Mycena and Tiryns, in spite of their legendary glory, and
          the patriotic part they had played in the Persian invasion, ceased to exist.
          Those of their inhabitants who were not embodied in the Argive community were
          driven out to find shelter wherever they could. By this means Argos rose once
          more to the condition of a flourishing state. At the same time, the
          concentration of somewhat heterogeneous elements in the city may have
          strengthened the democratic tendencies of the constitution, so as to draw her
          nearer to Athens. At any rate we hear of a king of Argos in the Persian war,
          and we never hear of one after.
   Thus was the influence of Sparta limited on every side
          at the moment when the conduct of her leaders excited hatred and suspicion
          throughout Greece. But these were not the whole, nor by any means the greatest,
          of the troubles by which she was now beset. As we have seen, Pausanias was
          suspected of inciting the Helots to revolt. The Helots were principally the
          ancient population of Messenia, whom the Spartans had reduced to serfdom, a
          brave and hardy race, who tilled the soil in remote farms and hamlets, on a
          sort of metayer system, under which a certain amount
          of the produce was paid to the Spartan owner. They never forgot their lost
          independence, or regarded the Spartans as anything but conquerors, whom they
          would strike down in a moment, if the opportunity occurred. This feeling was well
          known to their masters, who dreaded nothing so much as a revolt of the Helots,
          and took the most atrocious measures to prevent it. They had recently torn some
          Helots from the sanctuary at Taenarus, and put them
          to death in spite of the divine protection to which they were entitled, an act
          which had brought on them the curse of Taenarus. The
          present time was naturally a period of excitement among the Helots; they saw
          with delight the repeated attacks upon Sparta, and felt that a support was at
          hand which had hitherto been denied to them. They were also moved by the
          promises of Pausanias, who no doubt held out a hope of Persian help.
   With the death of Pausanias and the destruction of the
          Persian army at the Eurymedon the worst danger might seem to have passed away
          (466 BC). But in the autumn of the year 464 a sudden disaster overtook
          Sparta which brought her to the very brink of destruction. A terrific
          earthquake laid the city in ruins. Only five houses were left standing;
          more than twenty thousand persons are said to have perished. In this
          fearful moment Archidamus the king saved his country.
          While others were dazed with terror at the falling ruins, or lamenting the loss
          of their property, he gave the signal for war, and by this means drew the
          Spartans out of the city. It was the salvation of the Spartan name. For the
          Helots no sooner heard of the earthquake than they flocked together to complete
          the ruin of their hated masters. Messenia broke into revolt, and though the
          rebels could not penetrate to Sparta, they entrenched themselves firmly on
          Mount Ithome, the ancient stronghold of their race.
          From this centre they carried on a predatory warfare,
          often inflicting severe loss on the enemy. In vain did the Spartanse to dislodge them from their fortress; in vain did they call on their allies for
          help. The Messenians held out, and every attempt to capture Ithome only ended in new disaster.
   In this critical state of their affairs the Spartans
          determined to apply for help to the Athenians, who had a great reputation for
          their skill in capturing fortified places. The feeling between the cities was
          not very good; when the earthquake occurred, the Spartans were about to invade
          Attica in spite of the peace which nominally prevailed. But there had been no
          open breach, and in the hope that their secret intentions were unknown the
          Spartans in the year 463 BC despatched Periclidas to Athens.
   That city had been rising to power and reputation
          under the command of Cimon, who, for a few years, was without a rival. The
          Delian confederacy was becoming more and more an Athenian empire, and after the
          reduction of Naxos it was clear that Athens was resolved to keep the league
          together by force. The policy was justified, at any rate, for the moment, by
          the events which followed the fall of Naxos. The battles of the Eurymedon,
          which took place in 466 BC, were perhaps the most overwhelming defeats ever
          suffered by Persia, but unfortunately no contemporary description exists of
          them.
           Thucydides briefly records the fact that the Athenians
          and their allies, under the command of Cimon, conquered the Persians on land
          and sea at the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, and destroyed two hundred
          Phoenician vessels. Later writers have a good deal more to tell, but it is
          extremely doubtful whether they had any real knowledge of what they pretend to
          describe. The accounts are neither very credible nor very consistent. Perhaps
          we may venture to record the few details which Plutarch, who is far more cautious
          than Diodorus, has given in his Life of Cimon. He tells us that after altering
          the shape of the Athenian vessels so that more hoplites or heavy-armed soldiers
          could be placed on board, Cimon set sail from Cnidus with two hundred triremes
          to Lycia, where, with the help of the Chian contingent in his fleet, he won over the important town of Phaselis for the confederacy. Off the coast of Lycia he was informed that the Persian
          fleet lay at the mouth of the Eurymedon, while a further contingent was
          expected from Cyprus. Without a moment’s hesitation he attacked the fleet in
          the Eurymedon, defeated it, and captured not less than two hundred vessels.
          Pursuing his success he landed his troops and defeated the Persians a second
          time on shore, gaining possession of the camp and an immense booty. After this
          victory he went in search of the eighty ships at Cyprus. These also he
          destroyed, thus annihilating the whole of the Persian fleet, and defeating any
          hopes, if any had been cherished, of an invasion of Greece.
   The victory of the Eurymedon brought the cities of
          Caria within the Delian confederacy. It is, however, remarkable that no attempt
          was made to appropriate Cyprus. That island, so important as a military post,
          was allowed to remain in the hands of Phoenician princes, though Athens could
          now sweep the shores on every side.
           Such successes confirmed the Athenians in their
          imperial policy. Soon after their return from the Eurymedon they quarreled with
          the Thasians about their mines on the opposite coast, and demanded a share in
          their trade with the Thracians (465 BC). They were eager to establish
          themselves on the Strymon, and were jealous of the
          prosperity of the island, which seemed to stand in the way of their own
          ambitions. The Thasians answered by revolting from the league. Cimon was at
          once sent to blockade the city, and about the same time no fewer than ten
          thousand colonists, partly Athenian and partly allies, were sent to occupy the
          important station of the Nine Ways on the Strymon.
          Could a vigorous colony be planted there in Athenian interests, it would
          greatly curtail the trade of the Thasians, and appropriate a large part of the
          profits of that district. So far as the colony was concerned, however, the
          project came to a most disastrous end; the warlike natives of the district were
          jealous of the interference of strangers, and combined their forces for attack.
          A fierce engagement took place at Drabescus, in which
          the whole of the immigrants were cut down.
   Nor could Thasos itself be taken without a protracted
          siege. The Thasians were rich; their walls were strong; their town well
          prepared for resistance. They even induced the Spartans to take up their cause
          and invade Attica in order to divert the attention of the Athenians, a scheme
          which only failed owing to the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. But
          Cimon was not to be shaken off. After a siege of two years Thasos succumbed.
          Henceforth she became a tributary ally of the Delian confederacy, or, more
          precisely, a subject city of the Athenian empire (463 BC).
   On his return to Athens Cimon was by no means received
          with universal congratulation. In his absence the popular party had gained
          ground, and among their leaders was Pericles, who now appears for the first
          time in the history of Athens. At his instigation or, at any rate, with his
          consent, a charge was brought forward that Cimon had failed in his duty: he
          might have acquired a portion of Macedonia for Athens, had he not been bribed
          by King Alexander to let the opportunity slip. The charge was, no doubt,
          without foundation, and disgraceful to those who made it, but it is an
          indication of the state of party spirit at Athens. The reign of Cimon was at an
          end; the harmony in which parties had worked together since the expulsion of
          Themistocles was at an end also. A new democracy was rising under the auspices
          of Pericles, which would be satisfied with nothing less than absolute and
          direct supremacy.
           At this juncture came the application of the Spartans
          for aid in capturing Ithome. Cimon was in favor of
          sending help; Ephialtes—at this time the foremost man in the new democracy—was
          against it. Cimon declared that he could not stand by and see Athens deprived
          of her yoke-fellow; Ephialtes would not raise a finger to prevent the ruin of a
          city which never looked with favor on democratic principles. Cimon gained the
          day. He was dispatched with a force to the Peloponnesus. But Ithome was strong enough to resist even Athenian skill. The
          siege lingered on, and at length the Spartans became suspicious of the
          Athenians. They were conscious that they at any rate had been secret and
          treacherous in concerting operations with the Thasians against the Athenians;
          they were also probably aware of the opposition which had been made to their
          request at Athens, and though they might have confidence in Cimon, they
          distrusted his soldiers. Suavity was not a Spartan virtue; no sooner had these
          suspicions arisen, than the Athenians, alone of the allies who had come to the
          assistance of Sparta, were sent home in a most ungracious manner. Cimon saw
          himself compelled to lead back in disgrace the army which he had with so much
          difficulty persuaded the Athenians to send out. The rebuff was fatal to him and
          to the Athenian friends of Sparta, and his opponents were not slow to avail
          themselves of the opportunity which the failure of his policy afforded.
   
           CHAPTER VI.
           THE AREOPAGUS AND EPHIALTES.
           
           THE next appearance of Pericles in public life, after
          the attack on Cimon, is closely connected by ancient authors with the fall of
          the council of the Areopagus. In concert with Ephialtes, he succeeded in
          reducing that ancient council from a position of supreme authority in the state
          to that of a court for the trial of murder and arson—solemn functions, which it
          had long discharged, but which obviously carried with them no political
          importance. The change was one of great significance in the constitutional
          history of Athens, and it is said to have removed the last serious check on the
          development of democracy. Pericles appears to have been the prime mover in the
          work, though the measures were actually brought forward by Ephialtes.
           Of the origin and history of the council we have very
          uncertain information. It was a debated question even in the time of Aristotle,
          whether existed before the days of Solon or not. The more probable account
          seems to be, that from immemorial time cases of murder had been tried on the
          sacred Hill of Ares, which lay to the north-west of the Acropolis. Here on a
          bare and rugged table-land of naked stone, Ares had himself been tried for the
          slaughter of his son Halirrhothius; Cephalus for the
          murder of Procris; and Orestes for the murder of his mother Clytemnestra. At
          this last great trial Apollo had pleaded the cause of his suppliant, and Athena
          had presided in the court. Legendary as these stories are, they mark out the
          Hill of Ares as an ancient place of judgment, and in this respect they are
          confirmed by the little historical evidence which we possess.
   In the eighth century BC the Messenians were
          willing to refer their quarrel with Sparta to the decision of the Areopagus,
          and in Solon’s Law of Amnesty, those men were exempted from its provisions who
          had incurred the sentence of that court. The council of the Areopagus then was
          an ancient place of judgment for the most serious offences which can arise in a
          community. It was characteristic of Greek religious feeling to regard such a
          tribunal as under the special protection of the deities, whose care it was to
          see that bloodshed did not go unpunished.
           The Furies, the dread spirits who moved in the
          darkness of Erebus, ever ready to hear the cry of those who called upon them,
          were thought to have taken up their abode in a cavern at the foot of the hill.
          It was not less characteristic that the ritual observed at the trials in this
          hallowed place should be of a primitive kind. The court was held in the open
          air, that no one might be polluted by coming into the same chamber with the man
          guilty of blood. Two rude stones, the Stone of Outrage and the Stone of
          Shamelessness, were assigned to the accuser and the accused; the judges sat on
          the bare rock. No mitigating circumstances could be taken into consideration;
          no penalty was inflicted less than death, though the accused might avoid
          execution by going into exile.
           Solon seems to have availed himself of the sanctity
          which surrounded this ancient judgment-seat to create a council whose powers
          extended far beyond the punishment of bloodshed. He ordained that the nine archons,
          who in his day were the chief executive officers of the city, should enter
          after their year of office into the council of the Areopagus, and that the
          court thus enlarged should be the supreme guardian of the welfare of the city.
          It watched over the laws, to the end that they might be duly carried out; it
          even went beyond the law in enquiring into the moral conduct of the citizens.
          It punished the idle and extravagant; it weeded out from the city every noxious
          growth; it was a wakeful guardian over those that slept, the like of which
          could not be found in the broad island of Pelops (the Peloponnesus) or in
          far-off Scythia, a land of mythical righteousness and mysterious power.
           Such was Solon’s council, as Plutarch and Aeschylus
          describe it to us. Of the real working of the institution we know little or
          nothing. In the long period which elapsed between Solon and Pericles (one
          hundred and thirty years), we only hear of the Areopagus twice; a citizen is
          said to have cited Pisistratus the tyrant before the court, but when
          Pisistratus appeared, in answer to the summons, the accuser thought it prudent
          not to come forward. This incident, which is recorded by Aristotle, is a proof
          that under the tyranny of Pisistratus the Areopagus, like all the other institutions
          of Athens, was allowed to continue in existence, and also that its powers, like
          those of all other public bodies, were at this time little more than nominal.
          We also learn, on the same authority, that the Areopagus came forward with some
          vigorous measures at the time of the Persian war, and “braced the
          constitution”. What the measures were is uncertain, unless Aristotle refers to
          an incident mentioned by Plutarch, who informs us that the council provided the
          poorer citizens with means to pass over from Athens to Salamis, and thus
          enabled the whole city to act together in offering defiance to the invader.
           The political changes of Clisthenes in
          509 BC were not without effect of the the Areopagus. He did not interfere directly with the council, nor with the archons
          who composed it. But the creation of the board of the ten generals greatly
          diminished the power of the archons as executive officers. For thirty or forty
          years after this time we find great names in the list of Athenian archons, but
          it is not as archons that they exercised great power. The generals were of far
          more importance, especially from the time of the second Persian invasion in
          480 BC. As it became less influential, the archonship became less
          attractive; and the change naturally caused some alteration in the class of men
          who sought the office. This was still more the case when, on the proposal of
          Aristides, the archonship was thrown open to the lowest class of citizens. In
          fact the archons soon became little more than a mayor and aldermen, with
          special functions in the administration of law. And as ex-archons formed nearly
          the whole of the council of the Areopagus, any change in the archons of
          necessity produced a change in the council.
   We naturally ask if such were the case why should the
          council have been worth attacking; and why should the curtailment of its powers
          be regarded as the turning-point in the development of democracy? The first of
          these questions is more easily answered than the second. The Areopagus was
          worth attacking by a democratical reformer, because
          the existence of it involved two principles which democracy could not tolerate.
          The members held office for life; and they were not responsible to any higher
          authority for the proper discharge of their duties. As a rule, every public
          officer at Athens—and members of the council were regarded as officers,—from
          the highest to the lowest, held office for a year only; and at the end of the
          year he was not released from responsibility till he had rendered a
          satisfactory account of his office. The exception implied that there was a
          power in Athens which the people could not touch;—a superior court, in which
          only a part of the citizens shared. This was not the worst : in the life
          tenure, and in the freedom of the members from responsibility, the council of
          the Areopagus presented a striking resemblance to the Gerousia at Sparta. To
          some Athenians this might be a recommendation; to Pericles and his party, who
          were convinced that Sparta was the great obstacle to the final realization of
          their views, it was an additional cause for dislike. These then were the
          reasons why the democracy wished to remove the council. It was the last vestige
          of a form of constitution which they had renounced; it was an anomaly which
          stood in glaring contrast to the legislation of the last thirty years.
   It is another matter, when we ask what was gained by
          its removal. How could the council be said to limit the freedom of the
          citizens, and impose a check on the growing spirit of democracy? Why did
          aristocrats like Cimon contend for its preservation? Its authority, so far as
          we know, had greatly declined; and it was not easy to make it an instrument of
          aristocratical power when the archons were chosen by lot, and the members of the
          fourth Solonian class could enter their names for the office. We can only reply
          that our information is so defective that, for aught we know to the contrary,
          the council may have exercised a great influence on social life in Athens, even
          after Clisthenes. A council which had the right to make annoying enquiries
          would perhaps seem more powerful than it really was, and its power must have
          been most odious to those who were rising into public life. The more a man
          attracted notice, the more was the Areopagus likely to have an eye upon him. Or
          it may have had a large control over the administration of the law. The paid
          juris of Athens were the creation of Pericles; the elaborate system of
          legislation by means of the Nomothet, was certainly
          not earlier than Pericles (if, indeed, it was so early). Before these came into
          existence, the Areopagus may have exercised considerable power, judicial and
          legal. Moreover, the mere fact that the Areopagus was attacked by Pericles, and
          that its fall was succeeded by the development of the jury-courts, with which
          the democracy was so closely linked, would create in later ages the impression
          that its removal was the last step in the development of democracy, or, from
          another point of view, that its power had been in some way a check on the democratical spirit. In any case, the later writers who
          speak of the power of the Areopagus cannot have known very much about it. It
          was to them an ideal; they saw in it the check which the Athenians of their own
          day greatly needed; but whether the reality corresponded to their conception of
          it, is more than we can say.
   That the aristocratical or Spartan party at Athens
          should support the Areopagus was inevitable. The council was in some respects a
          distinctly oligarchical institution. Even if largely filled from the lowest
          class, which is very unlikely, it was capable of being influenced by corporate
          party feeling; it naturally was jealous of its power, as all corporations are;
          it had great traditions. However dissatisfied aristocrats like Cimon might be
          with the alterations in the Areopagus caused by the law of Aristides, they
          supported it as the remnant of a constitution to which they looked back with
          reverence and pride. Cimon had acquiesced in the maritime development of
          Athens; he had taken a leading part in establishing the Delian confederacy; he
          had not attempted to oppose the admission of all classes to office. But ill the
          Areopagus he probably saw, like—Solon himself, an anchor of the state, and he
          supported it with all his influence.
           The attack was begun during the absence of Cimon from
          Athens, and probably when he was absent assisting the Spartans at Ithome in 463. This expedition, as we have seen, had been
          taken against the advice of Ephialtes, who may very well have compensated
          himself for his defeat, by bringing forward measures which, as he well knew,
          Cimon would oppose. And when Cimon did return, he returned in such disgrace
          that the balance of power was thrown into the opposite scale.
   Of Ephialtes who led the attack we only know that he
          was the ‘Incorruptible’ of this period of Athenian history. Poor, active, and
          fearless, he busied himself with bringing accusations against the rich who
          enjoyed office. By this means he became a power in the state; he was the
          People’s Friend of the new régime. As he had opposed the proposal to send
          assistance to Sparta, the discourteous conduct of the Spartans in sending the
          Athenians home brought him a new accession of strength. Had he not shown
          himself a better judge of the situation than the great general? The Spartans
          were utterly untrustworthy, as he had said, and it was impossible to be on
          terms with them. In these views he had Pericles with him. The aims of Pericles
          went far beyond anything of which Ephialtes was capable; but Ephialtes had made
          a hit, and Pericles found in him a very useful ally.
           Though Ephialtes could take advantage of the absence
          of Cimon on military expeditions to bring forward his sweeping measures,
          nothing could really be done so long as Cimon led the opposition. Soon after
          his return from Sparta a proposal was made that there should be ostracism in
          the city. No doubt the ground had been prepared; Ephialtes and Pericles had
          made such progress in popular favour that they could
          look forward to the popular vote with confidence. Even if the measures by which
          Pericles gained his ascendancy—the payment of the juries, the distribution of
          public money at festivals, and the sending out of colonies—came later his
          friends had no doubt been assiduous in spreading abroad the belief that popular
          measures and reform could not be carried out so long as Cimon was in Athens.
   Ostracism was a device for putting an end to faction
          and strife in the city. It is said to have been invented by Clisthenes, but we
          find it in other cities than Athens, and we do not know where it was first
          established. The people were asked in the sixth prytany of the year (a prytany is a tenth part of the Attic
          year), whether it was their wish that ostracism should take place. If they
          agreed, an assembly was held in the market-place in the eighth prytany, which would fall in the spring, in which they gave
          their votes against any citizen they pleased by writing his name on what the
          Greeks called ostraka, i.
          e. on small pieces of earthenware. No name was proposed to them; no charge was
          brought against anyone; each citizen wrote on his tablet the name of the man
          who in his judgment was most pernicious to the peace of the community. If six
          thousand votes were recorded against any one citizen, he was expected to leave
          the city in ten days, and to remain beyond the borders of Attica for five or
          perhaps ten years. His property was not touched; his civic rights remained unimpaired. A decree of the people could at any moment
          reinstate him in his full privileges as an Athenian citizen. In the days of
          Clisthenes, when a political opponent was ready to call in the power of Sparta,
          ostracism might be of some value; a man against whom six thousand votes were
          recorded would be proved to have little support to offer to his foreign
          accomplices. But on the whole the institution contributed little to the
          security or peace of Athens. As a political engine, it was nearly always,
          worked for party ends, and the instance of Cimon was no exception to the rule.
          No one could seriously maintain that his presence endangered the public peace,
          or that Athens was better without him than with him. Ostracized he was,
          and with him went the great defender of ancient institutions.
   Ephialtes was now quite free to carry out his reforms,
          for Cimon stood so high as the leader of his party that there was no second to
          take his place. The Areopagus was at once stripped of a large portion of its
          functions, and ceased to be a political power in the city. What were the
          precise functions taken from it, and what was done to compensate the city for
          the loss, are doubtful. One authority tells us that a number of legal cases
          were removed from its jurisdiction, and in a quotation from Aristotle's
          ‘Constitution of Athens’ we find that even Themistocles endeavored to restrict
          the judicial powers of the council. If this be true, the fall of the Areopagus
          was, no doubt, closely connected with the development of the popular
          jury-courts. An obscure notice informs us that the function of watching over
          the laws, which was now removed from the Areopagus, was transferred to seven Nomophylakes or Guardians of the Laws, who had a seat in
          the council of Five Hundred and could at once interfere if any proposal were
          made which seemed to contradict the laws. But these Nomophylakes are never mentioned by any ancient author, and there may be a confusion between
          them and officers of the same name who existed at Athens at the end of the
          fourth century.
   In this uncertainty we must suppose that the
          curtailment of the Areopagus, which is so universally ascribed to Ephialtes and
          Pericles, consisted in removing from it the supervision over the laws which it
          had previously exercised, and in cancelling its censorial powers. Henceforth
          the Areopagus was no more than a court for the trial of murder; it could not
          interfere in the private life of the citizen; it had no power to prevent the
          alteration of the laws. It is quite possible, as we have said, that under the
          disguise of censorial supervision, the Areopagus had acquired a good deal of
          judicial power in excess of what really belonged to it. If this were the case,
          this power was now transferred to the law courts.
           The ostracism of Cimon and the fall of the Areopagus
          were great victories for the democratic party. Ephialtes was now the first
          minister of Athens; and the way was clear for any reform which he and Pericles
          might propose. They had the people with them, and the opposition was helpless.
          The aristocratical party could only look forward to the complete overthrow of
          their influence and their principles. They became desperate, and endeavored to
          avert by illegitimate means, what they could no longer resist in the assembly.
          Within a few years after the overthrow of the Areopagus, Ephialtes fell by the
          knife of an assassin. The name of the murderer was at a later time asserted to
          be Aristodicus, a native of Tanagra in Boeotia;
          whoever he was, he was only a tool in the hands of a party. Those who could
          never speak evil enough of Pericles asserted that he had removed from his path
          an associate who had acquired an inconvenient degree of power, but this is the
          mere malignity of personal hatred. It was no doubt the oligarchical party, whom
          he had pestered by his prosecutions, and whose prospects he had ruined, that
          secured his removal.
   It is a coincidence worth mentioning that about the
          time of the death of Ephialtes some members of the oligarchical party were in
          treasonable correspondence with the Spartans. As Ephialtes had always been a
          strong opponent of the Spartan party at Athens, those who wished to restore
          Spartan influence might feel that their aims could not be realized so long as
          he was in power. As a first step to efficient cooperation he must be removed.
          But whoever were the immediate authors of the deed, it is satisfactory to know
          that Cimon was away from Athens at the time when this murder, the first
          political assassination at Athens, was committed.
           Ephialtes was a ‘Radical’, as Themistocles had been
          before him. Like Themistocles, he was desirous that Athens should be a naval
          power; and, like him, he was extremely opposed to any union with Sparta. But
          unlike Themistocles, he was free from the suspicion of bribery. And though he
          fell a victim to the ferocity of party strife, he was more fortunate than
          Themistocles in retaining the favor of his own adherents to the last. What his
          ulterior views may have been, we cannot say. Were his democratical measures shaped like those of Themistocles with a view to an Athenian empire,
          or did he also wish, like Pericles, to secure the conditions of a noble life
          for every citizen of Athens? or, like later demagogues, o provide an easy
          subsistence for the mob of the city? These are questions which we cannot
          answer. With the assassination of Ephialtes, Pericles became the acknowledged
          leader of the Athenian democracy, and he kept the position till his death. All
          the measures passed in that period are his work; whether he carried out the
          ideas of Ephialtes, or Ephialtes had been put forward to prepare the way for
          the ideas of Pericles, it is impossible to decide.
   
           CHAPTER VII.
             THE FIRST WAR
            BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA.
             
             THE churlish and
            suspicious rudeness with which the Athenian troops had been dismissed from Ithome by the Spartans created a reaction in the
            feelings of the Athenians towards that city. Hitherto, in spite of the
            efforts of Themistocles and others, and though various causes of
            complaint had arisen, the two cities had preserved the appearance of
            friendship. Even those Athenians who would have claimed the supremacy at
            sea for themselves were willing to allow that the Spartans were the
            rightful leaders of the Greeks on land. Harmonious action between the great
            cities was the best warranty of the safety of Greece. But now the irritation
            was uncontrollable, and it was decided not only to break off the alliance which
            had existed since 481 B.C., but to take up a line which made it clear that
            Athens was as willing to support the enemies of Sparta as she had
            been to support Sparta herself.
             Argos was of
            course at all times hostile to Sparta. As we have seen, the city had recently
            recovered a considerable degree of power, and at the same
            time changes had taken place which made the democratic feeling there
            stronger than ever.
             Thus there were
            now two bonds to draw Athens and Argos together—hatred of Sparta, and
            democratic sympathies. At the moment both these feelings were almost at fever
            heat at Athens, owing to the influence of Ephialtes. Under such
            circumstances the events of 480 B.c. were forgotten ;
            Athens and Argos became allies.
             The step is
            significant of the change which had taken place in Greece since the Persian
            war. Then oaths had been sworn binding the patriotic
            Greeks to take vengeance on those who had so foully betrayed their country
            ; Argos and Thessaly were outcasts from the circle of Greek cities, and Sparta
            had herself undertaken an expedition to punish the Thessalians for their
            conduct. Now the Athenians, to whom all the rest of the
            Greeks owed their freedom, who had twice abandoned their homes, and
            undergone the greatest privations in the cause of Hellas, were content to
            enter into an alliance with a city which, to say the best of her, had
            pursued a weak and temporising policy. But the
            Athenians did not stop here. With Argos to aid them they renewed the old
            alliance with Thessaly, which had existed in the time of the tyrants. They
            knew by experience that Thessalian cavalry were valuable in the field,
            and they could reckon on the hatred of the Thessalians for the
            Spartans. In this second alliance they not only disregarded the part which
            the great princes of Thessaly had played in bringing Xerxes into Greece
            ; they forgot the character of the Thessalian people, who were not
            less treacherous than brave. In the hour of peril, as we shall see, they
            had bitter reason to repent their mistake.
             These proceedings
            did not amount to open war with Sparta, but they were nothing less than
            open preparation for war. And they were succeeded by a number of
            events which made war inevitable. The years 460 and 459 B.C., during which
            the two cities were nominally at peace, were years of great
            military activity on the part of the Athenians. Never before did they
            exhibit so plainly the strength of the city; never before was their strength
            displayed in a manner so likely to rouse the suspicions of their neighbours.
             The Spartans had
            by this time succeeded in crushing the rebellion of the Helots. For about three
            years after the dismissal of the Athenians in 463 B.C. the fortress of Ithome held out, then it capitulated, and the defenders
            were allowed to depart on condition that they would never set foot in
            the Peloponnesus again. The Athenians, who had recently taken
            Naupactus, a town near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf, from the Ozolian Locrians, allowed
            the exiles to settle there. The permission was equivalent to establishing
            the deadliest enemies of Sparta in a position where they could at
            any moment land on the shores which they were forbidden to tread.
             The next step
            aroused the wrath of a city which had formerly been on the most friendly terms
            with Athens, but from henceforth became her most active enemy; a city
            to whose unsleeping hatred a large part of her misfortunes were due. For
            some time past the Megarians and Corinthians had quarrelled as neighbouring states in Greece were only too
            apt to do. Some question of boundaries had arisen, such as centuries
            before, in the time of Orsippus, had led to war
            between the cities. Megara was, of course, no match for her formidable
            rival ; her only hope of justice lay in an appeal to Sparta, as the
            head of the confederacy to which Corinth and Megara belonged. But Sparta
            would not interfere ; she was probably unwilling to incur the enmity
            of Corinth, and unable to perceive what would be the inevitable
            result of her inaction. She was also still affected by the panic caused by
            the recent outbreak of the Helots, “ a turn for the worse ” in a long
            disease which might recur at any time. The Megarians then applied to
            Athens, where they found a ready reception. Nothing indeed could be more
            opportune. It was the weakness of Athens that her territory could be invaded
            without much difficulty from Megara; and through the territory of Megara,
            along the eastern extremity of the Corinthian gulf, lay the route which
            connected Peloponnesus and Bceotia. Athenian
            troops were at once sent to the aid of the
             Megarians and,
            with their consent, garrisons were placed in the two ports of their city: in Pegae on the Corinthian gulf, and in Nisaea on the Saronic gulf. Nisaea was also connected with Megara by long walls, which were protected by
            Athenian soldiers. By this measure Megara was not only brought
            into close relations with the Peiraeus, but Athens practically secured a
            frontier in the Megarid extending from sea to
            sea, and a station for her ships on the Corinthian gulf. For a time she
            had effectually blocked the way to Attica from that direction.
             At the very time
            that she was thus irritating her most powerful neighbours,
            Athens did not hesitate to enter once more upon the conflict with
            Persia. Egypt had been made a Persian province in 525 B.C.; in the
            last year of Darius it had revolted, but it was quickly subdued by Xerxes,
            to whom it had subsequently furnished a very large contingent of ships for
            the invasion of Greece. In 465 B.C. Xerxes was murdered, and the first
            years of his successor were occupied with suppressing conspiracies. A
            rebellion in Bactria then carried him to the eastern edge of
            his empire. To the- oppressed Egyptians an opportunity seemed to have
            arrived when there was a reasonable hope of shaking off the hated yoke. Inaros, the son of Psammetichus,
            the king of Libya, which formed a part of the Egyptian satrapy, seized Mareia, a Persian outpost on the south-western shore
            of the Mareotic lake. He was at once joined by
            the greater part of Egypt; the Persian governor was expelled ; and Inaros elected king of the country. For a short
            time he remained undisturbed, but in 459 B.c. he
            became aware that a vigorous attempt was about to be made to recover
            Egypt. His own forces were inadequate to resist the army which was being
            brought against him, and he sent to Athens for assistance.
             For some years
            after the decisive victories of Eurymedon the Athenians had sent out no
            expeditions to the East, but at this time they had just despatched two
            hundred ships to Cyprus. That island, in spite of the victories of
            Pausanias and Cimon, had never been acquired by the Greeks. It formed no
            part of the Delian league ; there was neither ally nor colony among
            its numerous cities. It was a wealthy island, well situated for trade with
            the East, and exceedingly valuable as a military station. It lay
            opposite that Cilician plain which formed the rendezvous of the
            Persian Empire ; it commanded the cities of Asia Minor and the mouth of the
            Nile. With Egypt in revolt and the Egyptian fleet detached from
            the service of the king, there was a reasonable hope of annexing the
            island to the league.
             But on receiving
            the application of Inaros the project of acquiring
            Cyprus was abandoned for the time, and the fleet was ordered to proceed to
            Egypt to co-operate with the rebels. Egypt was not only the more
            valuable prize of the two, a country which could at once supply vast
            stores of grain, and furnish a number of brave and experienced seamen, but
            the conquest of Egypt carried with it the conquest of Cyprus. The
            temptation was irresistible ; the gathering clouds at home were disregarded,
            and at the moment when the war with the Peloponnesians was inevitable,
            Athens sent more than half her fleet to the Nile. She may have
            felt that even without these ships, her position at the head of the
            Delian confederacy rendered her far more than a match for any
            combination which would be brought against her ; she probably
            overestimated the effect of the revolt of the Helots on the Spartan state.
            Whatever her views, we may observe that she would never have permitted
            such a division of her forces had she intended to make any serious attack
            upon Sparta. As yet, it would seem, Pericles was unable either to restrain
            the Athenians from the Persian war or to concentrate their energies on the
            conflict with their rival.
             The situation did
            not escape the watchful eye of the Corinthians. They were
            encouraged to resist the next movement of the Athenians by open
            force. On the coast of Argolis lay the small town of Halieis. Unimportant
            in itself, the place possessed a convenient harbour,
            and formed an admirable station for any power which desired to control the
            navigation of the Saronic gulf. In the hands of the
            Athenians Halieis would be a rival to Epidaurus
            and Hermione ; and now that the Argives and Athenians
            were allies, it might afford Argos some compensation for the loss of
            her old trading-stations at Epidaurus and Aegina. There were other reasons
            also which made the acquisition of Halieis desirable to the Athenians. The town was inhabited by the Tirynthians whom
            the Argives had expelled from their ancient home; and there is reason to
            suppose that it was in some connexion with
            Sparta. To the Corinthians and Epidaurians nothing could be more disastrous than an Athenian settlement in this
            region. Already ships were at Pegae watching the
            entrance to the great western port of Corinth ; from Peiraeus and Nisaea they commanded the northern half of the Isthmus
            ; if they were settled at Halieis, the
            Saronic gulf would be entirely in their hands. The Epidaurians were even more closely touched, as their territory lay nearer Halieis. When, therefore, the Athenians landed on the Argolic coast they were met by a combined force of
            Corinthians and Epidaurians. It is certain that
            the Athenians were defeated, though they afterward succeeded in gaining a
            footing in the town of Troezen, a still better
            station than Halieis. The defeat was overweighed
            by a victory over the fleet of the enemy at Cecryphaleia,
            a small island off the coast. Insignificant in themselves, these
            skirmishes were not insignificant in the history of Greece. They were the
            first steps in the disruption of the Hellenic league which had been formed
            at the Isthmus in the autumn of 481 B.C. for the defence of Greece. For years it ’ .d been obvious that Greece was parting into two
            camps, but now for the first time had hostilities b’- en out.
             The next movement
            was of far greater importance, opening a new scene in a drama, in which,
            more vividly perhaps than elsewhere, we perceive the dire effects of neighbourly hatred and commercial rivalry among the
            Greeks. Since the general pacification of 481 B.C. Athens and Aegina had
            been on friendly terms, but now, owing, perhaps, to some hints
            from the Corinthians, the suspicions of the Aeginetans were aroused. Were they not being surrounded by the Athenian power? Was
            not their union with Athens treachery to the older
            allegiance, which they owed to the Peloponnesian confederacy ? At the
            present moment, with two hundred ships in Egypt, Athens could not be
            a match for the combined Corinthian and Aeginetan fleets. Whatever the impulse under which she acted, Aegina now went to war
            with Athens, and all the bitter feelings of the ancient feud were
            once more aroused. An obstinate battle was fought off Aegina between the
            fleets of the two cities. The Athenians were victorious, capturing no
            fewer than seventy of the ships of the enemy. They then landed on the
            island and proceeded to besiege the city. The Peloponnesians sent over a
            small force to aid the Aeginetans, but it was of
            no avail. Meanwhile, the Corinthians, believing that the whole force of
            the Athenians was now employed, resolved to create a diversion by seizing
            the passes of Mount Geraneia, which divided
            Megara and Corinth, and invading the Megarian territory. But the
            Athenians were equal to the occasion ; they met the Corinthians with a
            force composed of their oldest and youngest men, under the command of Myronides, a general who had served in the Persian
            war. The first engagement ended with doubtful success ; a second was
            decisively in favour of the Athenians.
             While such were
            the achievements of the Athenians abroad, their proceedings at home made it
            clear that they intended to secure the position they had gained. They had
            already built long walls to connect the town of Megara with the port of Nisaea; they now united Athens and Peiraeus in the
            same permanent manner. Of the two walls which were built, one
            extended from the north-west edge of Peiraeus across the marshy ground to
            the western wall of Athens, a distance of very nearly five miles. The
            second ran in a direction almost due south from Athens to the eastern edge
            of the harbour of Phalerum,
            a distance of four miles. Such an immense work could not be carried out in
            one year, and there is some reason to suppose that the walls were
            begun by Cimon and brought to completion by Pericles. The object of
            the walls was clear. When thus united with the sea, Athens would be
            impervious to attacks by land. Even if the Peloponnesians succeeded
            in passing the Megarian frontier and invading Attica, they could
            inflict no damage on the city. They could lay waste the cornfields of Thria, or the olivegardens of the Cephisus ; they could consume the harvest and
            carry off the cattle, but they could never separate Athens from the sea.
            With the building of the walls the policy of .Athens under Pericles
            became possible.
             It was time for
            Sparta to stir, if she wished to keep her allies round her. Her reputation
            was declining; and the recent movements of Athens seemed to shut her
            out from any participation in the affairs of Northern Greece. So at least
            the Phocians thought, and they took advantage of
            the situation to attack the communities of the Dorians who inhabited
            the northern declivities of Mount Parnassus, one of whose towns they
            captured. The Lacedaemonians could not allow a state which
            they acknowledged as their “ mother city ” to be laid waste. Nicomedes, who was regent at the time in behalf of Plistoanax, the young son of Pausanias, was at once despatched to Phocis with a large force of Spartans
            and allies. He crossed the Corinthian gulf and marched through Boeotia
            into Phocis, which he quickly compelled to make such terms as
            he pleased, and restore the captured town. But now a difficulty
            arose. How were the Peloponnesians to return ? They had crossed the gulf
            on their way out without attracting the notice of the Athenian ships
            at Pegae, but they could not expect to do this a
            second time. To cross Geraneia was still
            more impossible, for the passes were held by Athenian troops. For the
            present it seemed best to remain in Boeotia. The delay was not without
            advantage. If Boeotia could be raised from the degradation into which
            it had sunk after the battle of Plataea, and made a solid power, it would
            form an excellent counterpoise to Athens. The natural centre of the country was, of course, Thebes. In 480 B.C. that city had been
            governed by one or two powerful families, who had been instrumental in
            bringing the Persians into Boeotia. After the battle of Plataea the
            leaders of these families had been executed or expelled, but, so far
            as we can make out, an oligarchy still continued at the head of affairs. This
            oligarchy the Lacedaemonians now attempted to make the ruling power
            in Boeotia, by bringing the smaller allies into a sort of dependent
            alliance with Thebes. And this was not the only result of their stay in Boeotia. The
            present policy of Athens, external and domestic, was not approved by all the
            citizens. The limitation of the powers of the Areopagus, the constant
            prosecutions of Ephialtes, had roused the fiercest passions of the
            oligarchs. They would gladly have seen some check placed upon the development
            of the demos, which now, as in the days of Clisthenes, seemed to be
            carried to victory on a wave of enthusiasm. More especially they
            were opposed to the building of the long walls, which implied a
            complete change from Athens as the head of Attica to Athens as a trading
            city, relying wholly on her fleet. They foresaw that a union of the
            port and town would give a new accession of strength to the rabble of
            artisans and sailors. Their influence was no doubt far less in the
            Peiraeus than in the city, as it was far less in the city than in
            the country. With these views they entered into negotiations with the
            Spartans in order to secure their assistance. The negotiations could be
            carried on the more readily as the Spartans were now at Tanagra, a town in
            the extreme south of Boeotia, and on the borders of Attica.
             Pericles and his
            friends became alarmed. They were aware of the treachery in the city and
            resolved to attack the enemy before it went further. They called upon
            the Argives for one thousand heavyarmed soldiers, and
            on the Thessalians for a troop of horse. Help came from other cities also,
            and the whole available force of the city was put in the field. The
            battle was hotly contested, but ended in favour of
            the Spartans. The result was largely due to the treachery of the Thessalians,
            who went over to the enemy in the midst of the engagement, thus depriving
            Athens of the assistance which was specially needed
            against the excellent cavalry of the Boeotians. The Lacedaemonians were now at
            liberty to return home by land. They marched through Megara and the
            Isthmus, laying waste the country as they went, and on their return they
            suspended a golden shield in front of the temple at Olympia as
            a thank-offering for their victory (457 B.C.).
             At last the fatal
            event had happened: Sparta and Athens had come to blows. The result
            was partly due to the action of the oligarchs at Athens, who wished
            to call in the aid of Sparta to their own support; partly to the desire to
            cut off the Spartan army before it could return home. The battle
            of Tanagra was the first occasion on which the Spartans and Athenians
            had been in conflict since the time when Cleomenes led his forces—sixty years before— to Athens to expel Clisthenes; it was a
            step in that fatal progress which soon divided Greece into oligarchical
            and democratical parties, each eager to
            pull down the other, let the result be what it might.
             The victory cannot
            have been very decisive, or the Spartans would have been able to support their
            party at Athens and hinder the building of the walls. At any rate,
            they made no other use of it than to convey their troops safely home.
            Whether Boeotia was secure from any further attack on the part of
            Athens, they did not enquire. Yet it was pretty clear that
            a territory lying between Phocis and Attica, both of which countries
            were at the time bitterly hostile to Sparta, was in some danger. The
            result of their carelessness was soon apparent. Sixty-two days after
            the battle of Tanagra the Athenian forces were again in Bceotia under the command of Myronides. The
            battle took place at Oenophyta, not far
            from Tanagra, and ended in a most decisive victory for the Athenians.
            All Bceotia was now at their feet.
            They demolished the walls of Tanagra and reduced the country to the
            condition of a subject ally. At the same time Phocis passed into the
            Athenian alliance, while the Locrians of Opus,
            who may have fought in the allied army against Athens, were kept in
            submission by the surrender of one hundred of their richest citizens (456
            B.C.).
             Not long
            afterwards the Aiginetans, who had been closely
            besieged since their great defeat nearly two years before, came to terms.
            They surrendered their ships, dismantled their walls, and agreed to pay
            tribute to Athens as members of the Delian league. This was a serious loss
            to the Peloponnesian confederacy. If the Aeginetan fleet was not so large as the Corinthian, and this is doubtful, the Aeginetans were the better and braver sailors. The
            prize of valour had been awarded to them at
            Salamis ; their ships were known from Palestine to Campania ; their
            trade penetrated the remotest valleys of Arcadia. The helpless
            condition of the Peloponnesians in the face of vigorous action was never
            more plainly demonstrated than by the loss of Boeotia and Aegina; never
            was the selfish policy of Sparta placed in a clearer light. Bitter,
            indeed, must have been the vexation of Corinth when she saw the Athenians not
            only established on the coast of Argolis and in possession of the ports of
            Megara, but also masters of new resources by land and sea.
             It was a proud
            moment for Athens. On land she controlled continental Hellas from the Pass of
            Thermopylae to the Isthmus. Phocis and Megara were willing allies; Boeotia
            and Locris were subject to her power. At home the long walls secured her
            from attack. In the Peloponnesus, Argos was her ally ; she had
            planted a foot in the north-east coast of Argolis, and was on friendly terms
            with Achaea. Near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf she held Naupactus. On
            sea she was without a rival. The Delian confederacy, which was rapidly becoming
            the Athenian empire, extended from Byzantium to Phaselis,
            from Miletus to Euboea. Aegina, her old rival, was humbled, and Athenian
            fleets swept the shores of the Peloponnesus at pleasure. The Spartans, the only
            power now capable of vigorous opposition, were little better than
            caged wolves.
             On the internal
            politics of Athens the battle of Tanagra had a very important effect. When
            the Athenian army was in Boeotia, Cimon appeared before the generals and
            begged permission to take his place among the soldiers of his tribe. He
            was known to be a firm friend of the Lacedaemonians, and he wished to
            prove that his friendship did not extend to enemies in the field. But the
            generals refused ; there was no place for an ostracised citizen in the Athenian army any more than on Athenian soil. Thus
            repulsed, Cimon adjured those of his followers who were most suspected of
            sympathy with Lacedaemonians to clear his name from every stain of treachery.
            They responded to the appeal, and, faithful even unto death, fell on the
            battle-field to the number of a hundred. Such a proof of
            patriotism could not be denied or ignored. Pericles, who was himself
            present at the battle, brought forward a proposal for cancelling the decree of
            ostracism which had been pronounced four years previously, and Cimon
            was allowed to return to Athens.
             Meanwhile, a cloud
            was gathering in the East. The great expedition which had been sent out to
            the assistance of Inaros had at first met with
            considerable success. Even before it arrived, Inaros had defeated the large army which Artaxerxes had sent against him,
            under the command of Achaemenes, and had slain Achaemenes with his own
            hand. The battle-field of Papremis on the Sebennytic
            arm of the Nile was one of the most famous scenes of
            Persian disaster. When the Athenian fleet of two hundred triremes
            sailed up from Cyprus it had no difficulty in defeating the Persian fleet
            of eighty ships which defended the mouths of the Nile. It ascended
            the river as far as Memphis and captured two-thirds of that city. But
            here their success came to an end. The “ White Fortress,” which formed the
            stronghold of the town, was able to resist their utmost efforts, and the
            revolution received a serious check.
             Artaxerxes was
            quickly informed of the defeat and death of Achaemenes. New preparations
            were arranged, for at any risk it was necessary to recover Egypt. Not
            less than two years (459-457 b.c.)  seemed to have been consumed in getting together a force which should make
            successful resistance impossible. In the interim Megabazus,
            a distinguished Persian, was sent to Sparta with a sum of money in the
            hope that some diversion could be created which would draw the Athenian
            forces from Egypt. The Spartans were willing enough to take the
            money, but no active measures followed, and Megabazus soon returned with the remainder of his treasure to Persia.
             In the year 457
            B.C. Megabyzus, the son of that Zopyrus, whose devotion had recovered Babylon
            for Darius, marched from Susa to Cilicia, where the forces which he
            was to command were assembled. He spent no less than a year in practising and drilling his troops, and it was not till the
            beginning of 455 B.C. that he marched upon Memphis.
             The appearance of
            such a vast armament—the fleet amounted to three hundred triremes—was
            calculated to fill the Eastern Mediterranean with terror. In spite of the
            crushing defeats of the Eurymedon ten years before, and the overthrow of
            Achaemenes at Papremis, Persia could put forth a
            power which it seemed impossible to resist. The day of vengeance was come
            at last, and the cities of the coasts and islands would be exposed to the
            fury of the Phoenician fleet. We may imagine how great was the alarm,
            when the news came that Megabyzus had utterly defeated Inaros and the Athenians, and had shut them up in Prosopitis,
            an island formed by two converging arms of the Nile, and a canal which
            connected them. It was about this time that the chest of the Delian league
            was transferred from Delos to Athens; a change proposed by the Samians.
            The only reason given for this change by any ancient author is that
            found in Justin, who tells us that the Athenians removed the money from
            Delos lest it should become a prey to the Lacedaemonians, who were
            abandoning the alliance. It is possible to connect this statement with the
            mission of Megabyzus to Lacedaemon. But the Samians would
            certainly be aware of the danger in the East, and it is not improbable
            that this was the immediate cause of their proposal.
             The investment of Prosopitis by Persian troops continued for a year and six
            months. Weary of the delay, Megabyzus then drained the canal, at the
            base of the island, upon which the Athenians burnt their ships, in order
            to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Persians. The
            Persian army could now march dry-shod into the “ island ; ” and after
            a severe resistance it was conquered. Inaros and
            a number of Athenians escaped to Byblus, but
            Megabyzus induced them to capitulate by guaranteeing to Inaros his life, and to the Greeks an unmolested return. The Greeks
            marched through Libya to Cyrene, whence they returned home, “ few out
            of many.” Inaros was conveyed to Susa, and in
            spite of the pledges of Megabyzus was crucified at the instance of Amestris, the cruel widow of Xerxes, whose daughter
            Achaemenes had married.
             The disasters of
            the Athenians were not yet ended. After the capture of Prosopitis,
            and in ignorance of the event, a squadron of fifty triremes sailed
            into the Mendesian arm of the Nile. Here they
            were immediately attacked by land and sea, and the larger part was
            destroyed.
             So after six years
            ended the great expedition of the Athenians to Egypt. It was the most
            severe disaster which had overtaken Athens ; the first failure in a long
            series of successes against Persia. To most men the catastrophe would
            appear an unmixed evil, but Pericles might reflect that such a
            severe lesson would teach the Athenians not to waste their strength on
            distant expeditions; and that the transference of the chest from Delos to
            Athens would in the end prove an ample compensation for the terrible
            reverse which had fallen on his city.
             
             CHAPTER VIII.
             THE LAST YEARS OF
            CIMON.
             
 PLUTARCH found
            among his authorities a story that Pericles had made it a condition of Cimon’s
            return to Athens, that he should himself be left undisturbed in the
            control of the domestic policy of the city, while Cimon led out the fleet
            against Persia. Whether this story is true or not, it is a fact that Cimon
            took little or no part in the “ Hellenic war” after his return.
             In the years which
            immediately follow the conquest of Boeotia, we hear of two expeditions against
            the Peloponnesus. In 456 B.C. a fleet was sent round the peninsula under
            the command of Tolmides, a general who, like Myronides, had distinguished himself in the Persian
            war. He burned the dockyards of the Lacedaemonians at Gytheum,
            attacked and captured Chaicis, a Corinthian
            colony near the mouth of the Evenus, outside the
            entrance to the Gulf of Corinth, and carried the Athenian arms with success
            into the territory of Sicyon. A short time afterwards (453 B.C. ?)
            Pericles was again in the territory of Sicyon, and again the inhabitants were
            defeated, but no lasting settlement was effected. In the same expedition
            Pericles attempted to gain possession of Oeniadae, a
            city in Acarnania, lying in the lakes near the mouth of the Achelous, but
            without success. We hear nothing of the details of these campaigns,
            though they were famous in their day, and created a great impression in
            Greece, but we see that Athens is now endeavouring to obtain the complete control of the Corinthian gulf, as she
            had obtained the control of the Saronic gulf. The attacks on Sicyon
            were no doubt made with the intention of rendering it impossible for a
            Peloponnesian army to cross from Sicyon to the opposite shore, as the
            Spartans had done in their invasion of Phocis in 457 B.C. It was useless
            to guard the passes of Geraneia if Spartan
            troops could be conveyed from Sicyon to Creusis.
             These attempts
            were not rewarded with encouraging success, and in the north of Greece Athens
            met with a definite repulse. At Tanagra, as we have seen, the Thessalian
            cavalry went over to the enemy. The truth was that the common people of
            Thessaly were always on the side of the Athenians, whom they regarded
            as the champions of liberty, and the great family of the Aleuadae also thought it worth while to cultivate their alliance. But the nobles and knights of Thessaly—the
            class between the dominant family and the subjects—were more inclined to
            Sparta than to Athens. This middle class was in the ascendant, as we may
            see from an incident which occurred at this time. Orestes, the son of Echecratidas, the king of Thessaly, was expelled from
            Pharsalus. He appealed to Athens for help. The application came when the
            Egyptian expedition was either destroyed or in a hopeless condition ;
            yet the Athenians sent a force of Boeotians and Phocians under Myronides, the hero of Oenophyta,
            to restore Orestes. Nothing was effected. The forces
            reached Pharsalus, but they failed to take the city, and so annoying
            were the attacks of the Thessalian horse, that they could not venture far
            from their camp. In a short time they returned home bringing
            Orestes with them. All hope of acquiring influence in Thessaly was at an
            end.
             Meanwhile matters
            were going from bad to worse in Egypt. When the crash came, the
            Athenians must have felt that the situation was grave (453 B.C. ? ).
            What use would Persia make of her great success? Would she assume the
            offensive and endeavour to recover what she had lost
            at the Eurymedon, or perhaps to avenge the defeat of Salamis ? What would
            the feeling of the allies be? Would they regard the defeat of the
            Athenians in Egypt as an indication of declining power? The expenses
            of the war with Egypt had compelled Athens to impose heavier contributions
            on the subject cities, and symptoms of the discontent, which was soon
            to break out on the Asiatic coast, may have shewn themselves.
            If she was to retain her hold on the Delian confederacy, it was necessary
            for her to appear once more in the East with an imposing force.
             There must also
            have been considerable distress at home. The constant service harassed the
            hoplite class and the loss of men was very great. It may have been
            with the combined intention of stilling discontent, and securing the power
            of Athens, that Pericles began, about this time, to send out a
            number of colonies. In 453 B.C. Pericles himself took one thousand
            colonists to the Chersonesus, which he secured once
            more from the attacks of the barbarians on the north. In the same year Tolmides conducted another thousand to Euboea, where
            already no fewer than four thousand Athenians possessed plots
            of land. And not long afterwards a large number were settled in
            Naxos. These colonists were of the class known as “ cleruchs ” or lot-holders. They did not cease to be citizens of Athens, many of
            them perhaps never left the city, but they were provided with plots
            of land at the expense of the subject or conquered countries. If the
            colonists left Athens their presence ensured the obedience and loyalty
            of the regions in which they were planted ; and those who chose to
            remain at home, living on the produce of their lots, were perhaps by this
            means qualified to bear the expenses which fell on the
            heavy-armed soldier.
             Under such
            circumstances, peace with Sparta was almost a necessity for Athens. What forces
            she had must be devoted to the recovery of prestige in the East, on
            which the very life of the Delian league was largely dependent. The great
            commander, whose name would inspire confidence among the allies,
            was still in the city, and, in spite of the repulse of 463
            B.C., Cimon was on friendly terms with Sparta ; a grata persona, through
            whom negotiations could be opened. By his intervention a truce was
            concluded between the two cities for five years. The shortness of
            the time proves that neither side looked on the present situation as
            tenable. But the Spartans were irritated and discouraged by the naval
            expeditions which harassed their coasts, and owing to the loss of Aegina and
            the humiliation of Corinth, the fleet of the confederacy was seriously damaged.
            To us it seems almost ludicrous that two belligerent cities
            should make a peace which was obviously nothing more than a breathing
            space in which to prepare for the renewal of hostilities on more favourable terms. But in Grecian politics such
            arrangements were common. It is even stated, though perhaps without
            sufficient authority, that after the battle of Tanagra
            Athens succeeded in obtaining a truce for four months from Sparta, in
            order that she might recover from the blow which had fallen upon her,—and
            reassert her superiority over Boeotia!
             When it was known
            at Argos that Athens had entered, or was about to enter, into a truce
            with Sparta, it became necessary to reconsider the situation. If Argos
            remained unprotected, and Sparta was freed from the fear of attack from
            Athens, she might have reason to expect the worst. The work of the
            last ten or fifteen years, during which she had slowly consolidated her
            power, might be undone in a single battle. Moreover, she had gained
            nothing by her alliance with Athens. That city, it was clear, sought
            her own advantage, and not the advantage of Argos. Under such
            circumstances it seemed prudent to enter into negotiations with Sparta.
            In 481 B.C. Argos had proposed a peace for thirty years ; she now
            renewed the offer. Sparta accepted it. Knowing that the truce with Athens
            was nothing more than a cessation of hostilities, it would be
            an advantage to be secure on the side of Argos, when the war broke
            out again. A peace was concluded between the two cities ; and in spite of
            the subsequent commotions which shook Hellas, it ran out to the full term,
            coming to a close in 421 B.C.
             When affairs had
            been settled at home, the Athenians prepared a new expedition to the East.
            Cyprus was once more the object of attack, and Cimon was the commander. It
            was now more necessary than ever to hold a station which should command
            Cilicia and Egypt. In the spring of 449 B.C. a fleet of two hundred
            ships, supplied by Athens and her allies, was sent out. Sixty ships were
            detached for the assistance of Amyrtaeus, who, even
            after the annihilation of the forces of Inaros,
            could bid defiance to Persia in the impenetrable swamps of the Delta. With
            the remaining one hundred and forty Cimon sailed to Mareion, on the west coast of Cyprus, whence he passed
            along the south shore and laid siege to Citium,
            which was at this time governed by a Phoenician prince. The city was
            defended with the stubborn spirit which has made the sieges of Phoenician
            cities so famous in military annals. Ere long the Athenian fleet began to
            suffer from famine, and, to increase the misfortune, their great
            commander fell sick and died. On his death-bed he is said to have
            given orders for the besieging forces to retire and conceal the news of his
            death. But retirement was impossible ; a Phoenician fleet had already
            appeared on the north coast of Cyprus ; to refuse an engagement would
            imply the cession of the Eastern Mediterranean. In spite of the weakness
            created by famine and the loss of their leader, the Athenians put to
            sea and sailed upon the enemy. The battle took place off Salamis, and
            ended in a complete victory for Athens. The defeated Phoenician vessels
            fled to the shore, where the army was drawn up to protect them, but
            the Athenians followed close, disembarked and defeated the army no less
            than the fleet. Thus the achievement of the Eurymedon was
            repeated, and Athens once more proved her immense superiority over the
            Persian power. On its return home the fleet was rejoined by the ships from
            Egypt, which do not appear to have rendered any efficient service to Amyrtzeus. Cimon’s corpse was brought to Athens and
            buried in the sepulchre of the Philaidze, outside the Melitian gate of Athens.
             The balance was
            once more in favour of Hellas in the East, but the
            success was far from complete, and it had been purchased at severe cost.
            The Phoenician fleet had been defeated, but Cyprus was as far as ever from
            being annexed to the Delian league. The island remained a dependency of
            Persia ; Persian troops could land on it; Phoenician princes ruled
            in most of the cities. Hellenes and Hellenism had but a precarious
            footing. The coveted post, from which Greece could have thwarted the
            embarkation of troops from the Cilician plain and held the Phoenician and
            Egyptian fleets in check, passed from henceforth out of the grasp of
            Athenian generals.
             And Cimon was
            dead. The great commander, who for nearly thirty years had led the allies to
            victory, would lead them no more. We first hear of him in 480 B.C. as
            an Athenian knight, cheerfully hanging up his bridle in the temple of
            Athena, in recognition of the change which made it imperative for
            every Athenian to fight on board ship, as Themistocles demanded. From 478
            B.C., when Xanthippus the hero of Mycale
            disappears from sight, Cimon is associated with Aristides in the command
            of the fleet. With him he founded the Delian confederacy. From
            this time forward he was the life and soul of every military undertaking ;
            it was he who secured the Thracian coast for Athens ; it was he who quelled
            the revolt of Thasos ; it was he who inflicted the terrific defeat of
            Eurymedon on the Persian army and fleet. Even after his death his name
            seems to have inspired victory. He was the greatest seaman Athens
            ever knew—the Nelson of his time.
             His manners and
            character were those of a soldier. Tall in stature, with hair curling close to
            his head, and winning eyes, he was a well-known sight in Athens. His
            accomplishments made him a welcome guest at every social gathering ; a
            song from Cimon was remembered by those who heard it, while
            others listened attentively to the stories which he could tell
            in abundance of his military life and experiences. His wealth was
            great and his liberality unbounded. At times indeed his profusion was such
            that his enemies accused him of seeking to win the people by unworthy
            means. He would command his well-clad servants to exchange garments with
            aged beggars, or he would remove the fences which protected
            his gardens and orchards, bidding all who passed take what they
            chose. Or he would squander small coin among those who were willing to
            pick it up. But he also applied his wealth to nobler uses. He
            adorned the city with the spoils taken from the enemy ;
            the market-place was planted with trees, to afford the shade so
            grateful in the fierce heat of summer ; the Academy was irrigated and laid
            out with clear racing courses and pleasant walks ; the foundations for
            the walls which connected Athens and the harbour were begun. The Acropolis was prepared for a new temple; and Pheidias
            was employed to erect the great bronze statue of Athena, whose bright spear could
            be seen even by the mariners off Sunium.
             Two charges have
            been brought against Cimon. It is said that he hunted Themistocles out of
            Athens, thus depriving the city of her greatest man, and that he
            prevented the destruction of Sparta at the moment when destruction was
            possible. The charges are not without foundation, though there is much
            to say on the other side. Cimon and Themistocles were opponents ; and
            Cimon was the winner. But we may observe that Themistocles was never employed as
            a general in the field after 480 B.C., and though he served Athens in
            other ways, he did so at the cost of provoking the animosity of Sparta.
            Whether Themistocles would have succeeded as well as Cimon and
            Aristides in organising the Delian league,
            is open to question. It was doubtless a grievous misfortune for Athens
            that she could not retain Themistocles, but the blame of the expulsion may
            have been due to his own conduct not less than the jealousy of his
            enemies. That Cimon persuaded the Athenians to send help to the Spartans
            at a moment when it would perhaps have been possible to destroy their
            power by supporting the Helots is undeniable. He was always the firm
            friend of Sparta ; he never accepted the doctrine that Athens and Sparta
            could not work together; and under his management they probably would
            have worked together. Co-operation on the lines of Pericles and
            Themistocles was impossible ; to both of these statesmen Athens was
            an imperial city, and Sparta a rival who must be crushed. To speak of
            them as Pan-Hellenes is a mistake ; they were Pan-Athenians. But Cimon
            was sincerely Pan-Hellenic, so far as any Greek could be so. He knew
            that the loss of Sparta would be an irreparable loss to the Hellenic name.
            He wished to see the two great cities of Greece drawing together in
            harmony, at peace at home, and united in making war on Persia. With his
            death all hope of continuing that war, and all hope of lasting peace
            between Athens and Sparta came to an end.
             
             CHAPTER X PEACE
            AND THE SECOND WAR WITH SPARTA
             
 
 
            
            
            
            
               The death of Cimon marks an epoch in the history of Athens. He was the last of
            the great generals who thought it the mission of Hellas to be at war with
            Persia. With him closed the generation of the “ Heroes of Marathon.”
            For the next fifty years Greece is occupied with the duel between Athens
            and Sparta; and it is only when this disastrous episode comes to an
            end with the fall of Athens that the traditional policy is resumed by
            Agesilaus, the king of Sparta. Cimon was also the last leader of his
            party, who led it as a soldier rather than as a statesman. Those who came
            after him had other views, and other means of carrying them out. The
            soldier and the politician began to diverge. In this respect the aristocratical
            party suffered even more than their opponents. Pericles, if not a great,
            was a respectable general, as generals 118 went in Greece; Cleon
            rendered his country one important service; Alcibiades, if we may
            count him among the democrats, was probably the greatest military
            genius of his time. But, with the exception of Nicias, the aristocrats
            hardly possessed a man after Cimon, who by his success in the field
            could add to the power of his party at home.
             Pericles was now
            the foremost man in Athens, but he was not yet without opponents. A
            few years had still to elapse before he could win that undisputed
            mastership of the city, which he held when at the height of his influence
            ; and they were years full of events. The truce with Sparta
            had hardly been concluded when troubles broke out at Miletus. That
            city was famous of old for its factions, though for the last century,
            partly owing to a better government, and partly to the
            disastrous Persian conquests which merged party quarrels in submission to
            a master, we hear little of them. On the reception of Miletus into the
            Delian league, the oligarchical section were in power, and the
            Athenians made no attempt to introduce a change. The reception probably
            took place very soon after the battle of Mycale (479 B.C.), when the
            democratic spirit was by no means strong enough at Athens to require
            a similarity of political views in allied states. The victories of
            the Persians in Egypt may have altered the sentiments of the Milesian
            oligarchs, and inclined them to closer union with Persia. Or the
            growing democratical spirit at Athens may have
            induced the “ demos ” at Miletus to put forward new claims.
             Whatever the
            cause, about 450 B.C. the oligarchs attacked the people, and renounced their
            connection with the Delian league. The people, of course, appealed to
            Athens; the oligarchs sought aid from Persia. It became necessary for the
            Athenians to interfere. -The government of Miletus was reconstructed in
            the interests of the people, and an Athenian garrison was placed in the
            city for their protection. Five Athenians were chosen to administer the
            affairs of the city, and all suits at law for the value of more than one
            hundred minae (about ,£335) were to be brought
            to Athens for decision. We may observe that this last provision is an
            indication of that development of the law courts which became so marked a
            feature of Athenian democracy.
             Similar
            disturbances took place at Erythrm and at Colophon,
            and similar measures were taken to restore order. The decree by which the
            constitution of Erythrm was reorganised has come down to us, and parts of it may still be read. The document is
            interesting, for it was doubtless framed either by Pericles or under his
            influence. It expresses the Periclean views of the best and safest form of
            government for an independent state in the interest of Athens. Erythrae was to be ruled by a senate consisting  of
            one hundred and twenty members, chosen yearly by lot. No citizen could
            offer himself for election if less than thirty years of age. From the
            senators when elected an oath was required under the most solemn
            sanctions: “To the best of my power I will advise what is lawful and good
            for the people of Erythrae, the Athenians, and
            the allies. I will not revolt from the people of Athens and their allies,
            or help others to do so ; I will not go over to the enemy, or help
            others to do so ; I will not receive an exile or help others to do so, nor
            any of those who have taken refuge with the Medes, without
            the sanction of the Athenians and the state. I will not put any Erythraean to death without the sanction of the
            Athenians and the state. If any citizen slay another, he shall be put to death
            ; and if any citizen sin against the gods, he shall be put to death ;
            if anyone offend against the alliance he shall be banished, and his
            property shall be given to the Erythraeans. If
            anyone is convicted of betraying the city of Erythrae to tyrants, he shall be put to death, and his children also.” The Erythraeans were to send victims of not less value
            than three minae to the Panathenaea, and, in return, each Erythraean was allowed to have a portion of the sacrificial food, not exceeding a
            drachma in value . A further oath bound the citizens of Erythrae to be faithful to the Athenians and the allies.
            There were also regulations about the government of Erythrae,
            and the duties of the officers or “ overseers ” whom Athens sent to
            the city, but owing to the imperfect state of the inscription we cannot
            read what these were.
             In these
            regulations we see that Athens identified herself with the confederacy:
            treachery to the alliance was treachery to her. And she did not
            hesitate to plant garrisons of Athenian soldiers in the citadels of
            allied cities, if the step seemed necessary to secure their allegiance, or
            to reduce them to the condition of subject cities by claiming the
            sovereignty in their administration of law. Naxos and Thasos,
            Miletus and Erythrae, were no longer
            confederates on equal terms, but on compulsion ; their contributions
            went to swell a fund which made resistance on their part more and
            more impossible. Even more significant were the results of the
            transference of the chest from Delos to Athens. The old Ionian place of
            gathering was no longer the centre of the
            confederacy; to Athena and not to Apollo were dues paid and
            victims brought. The whole administration of the league and its funds
            was conducted at Athens, and perhaps by this time by Athenians. At Athens,
            too, the more important law-suits of the confederates were decided.
             By common consent
            all operations against Persia were discontinued after the death of Cimon.
            Neither Pericles nor his opponents cared to renew the war. But the
            Athenian sailors and soldiers remembered how Cimon had led them to
            victory, and the sailors and soldiers were an important element in the
            state. Pericles could not fail to perceive the importance of securing
            their good-will. Hitherto they had probably been inclined to take sides with
            the party to which Cimon belonged, in spite of the
            democratic measures of Pericles. But now that their great commander
            was dead, they were no longer carried away by the enthusiasm of the
            soldier for his general, an enthusiasm against which a merely political leader
            is powerless. A slight impetus might bring them round to the side which
            had made them a
             Our knowledge of
            the colony at Brea is due to the fortunate accident which has preserved the
            decree under which the colony was sent out. But for this we should
            know nothing beyond the mere fact that the Athenians had sent out a colony
            to Brea— a sufficient proof, if the proof were needed, that our
            knowledge of this period is scanty and uncertain to the last degree. From the
            decree we learn that ten commissioners (Geonomi,
            “ dividers of land ”) were to divide the land among the colonists. Democlides, the author of the decree, was chosen to be
            the founder of the colony, with full powers. All the temples and sacred
            precincts already existing on the site were to be carefully
            preserved, but no new ones were to be provided. The colonists were to
            send a bull and two sheep to the Panathenrea, and
            an emblem to the festival of Dionysus.
             The merchants of
            Athens had long carried on a trade in corn with the ports of the Black Sea,
            where the innumerable colonies which Miletus had planted were so many
            stations for shipping the products of the interior to Greece. And if it be
            true that Aristides died in the Pontus, the expedition of Pericles was not
            the first which the Athenians had undertaken in that direction. But it was
            probably the first time that an Athenian general had appeared beyond
            the Bosphorus with an imposing force. The
            immediate cause of the expedition seems to have been an application from
            the inhabitants of Sinope for aid against their “tyrant,” Timesilaus. This “tyrant” was, no doubt, an officer
            representing the Persian power in the city, and any attempt to expel him
            was equivalent to an attack on the Persian king. This did not prevent
            Pericles from taking the allied fleet into the Black Sea, or from leaving Lamachus behind with thirteen ships to aid the
            citizens of Sinope, who, with this reinforcement, succeeded in driving out Timesilaus. Six hundred Athenians were afterwards
            sent to the city to occupy the lands and houses of the tyrant and his
            party. This is the only specific act which is recorded of the expedition,
            though Plutarch tells us, in a vague manner, that Pericles settled
            all the petitions which the Greek cities brought to him, and
            exhibited to the barbarian princes and potentates around the greatness of his
            power and the confidence with which his fleet sailed wherever they chose,
            and subjugated every sea to themselves. The barbarian princes and
            potentates would be Teres, the king of the Odrysians, whose dominion
            extended from the Hebrus to the Danube, and his
            son-in-law and neighbour beyond the Danube, Ariapeithes, king of Scythia, both princes of great vigour and capacity. The Greek cities on the western
            shore of the Pontus paid tribute to Teres, and those on the northern
            were of course the neighbours of the Scythians.
            It was of great importance that these princes should be on good terms
            with the Greeks, and a timely display of force was likely enough to
            impress them with a sense of the power which, if need were, could come to
            the aid of the Greek colonies. But even in the Greek cities there
            were potentates. In Panticapaeum, the most
            important trading station in the Pontus, a family was ruling which claimed
            descent from Archaeanax, the ancient king of
            Lesbos. It is quite possible that Pericles entered into friendly
            relations with a city from which more corn was exported than from any
            other, for at a time when the granaries of Egypt were passing into the
            hands of the Persians, such a step would be especially opportune.
            Whether the connexion was due to Pericles or
            not, we find, in the fourth century, the princes of the Cimmerian Bosphorus making presents of corn to Athens,
            and treating the city with the greatest respect and consideration.
             This was perhaps
            the most lasting gain of the great expedition. Sinope, if relieved for the
            time, fell back under the dominion of Persia. And we have no certain
            evidence that the Athenians established themselves at any other point. It is
            true that we afterwards find them in possession of Nymphaeum, a port a
            little to the south of Panticapaeum, and that twenty years
            later than this expedition, they hold a post at Chrysopolis,
            at which they taxed the corn ships on their way from the Pontus. There is,
            however, no proof that we ought to connect these establishments with
            the voyage of Pericles.
             Meanwhile, in
            spite of the peace, events were taking place which showed that Sparta and
            Athens were still rivals for the supremacy in Greece. In <448 B.C. the Phocians made an attempt to secure possession of the
            temple at Delphi. The shrine lay in their territory, and they had long regarded
            it as wrongfully taken from them. Relying, perhaps, on the power of
            Athens in Northern Greece, they now seized it for themselves. The
            Delphians appealed to Sparta, who at once responded. Troops were once
            more sent across the bay of Corinth, and Delphi was restored to the
            Delphians. In return for the timely assistance the Lacedaemonians received
            the right of consulting the oracle first, and their name
            was inscribed on the front of the great bronze wolf, which stood near
            the principal altar at Delphi. No sooner had the Lacedaemonians departed
            than Pericles marched to Delphi at the head of a force of Athenians and
            gave the temple once more to the Phocians. The honour of first consultation was now given to the
            Athenians, and their name appeared on the right side of the bronze wolf.
            Thus were Athens and Sparta written up as competitors at the
            most central shrine of Hellas. These events were known as the “
            Sacred War.” For the moment no result followed; but it was now plain to
            Northern Greece that in any revolt against Athens they could
            reckon on the support of Sparta.
             It was not long
            ere the revolt came. While we hear of distant expeditions and colonies on the
            part of Athens, nothing is recorded of any measures by which her
            authority was secured in Bceotia. That authority
            rested on the presence of a democracy in the various states, a democracy
            which was resolved that Bceotia should ''ot be subject to Thebes, even
             The battle of Coronea was probably fought in the spring of 446 B.C. The
            summer had even worse news to bring. The island of Euboea had formed
            a part of the Delian confederacy from the first; for more than thirty
            years it had been the faithful ally of Athens, and for two generations
            Athenian citizens had been settled as colonists in it. But the
            oligarchs of Bceotia appear to have been able to
            inspire the oligarchs of Euboea—the remnant of the old proprietors who had
            suffered heavily at the hands of Athens—with their own courage and hope.
            What if Euboea also could shake off the yoke of the conqueror? The moment
            seemed favourable now that all Northern Greece
            was independent. Sparta would doubtless support the attempt ; perhaps she
            had already pledged herself to do so. For the five years’ truce was on the
            point of expiration ; and even if it had not expired, the Spartans were
            not over-scrupulous about agreements, when it was possible to make an effective
            attack on the enemy. So Euboea revolted. Her action was part of a
            wider plan. No sooner had Pericles crossed over to the island than
            Megara threw off her allegiance ; the Athenian garrison was partly cut
            down, and partly compelled to take refuge in Nissea.
            And when the way over the Isthmus, was thus opened the
            Spartans hastened to take advantage of it. Plistoanax,
            the youthful king of Lacedtemon, invaded Attica
            with a Peloponnesian force. Thus was Athens surrounded on every side;
            and a combined attack on the city seemed inevitable.
             Athens had no army
            to put in the field which could for a moment stand against the enemy, if
            they had time to unite. Pericles saw where the danger lay, and also
            how it was to be met. He returned in haste from Euboea, which, owing to
            his command of ships, he had pretty much at his mercy, to Attica. The
            Peloponnesian army was already on the Thri-asian plain near Eleusis, and had begun to devastate the country, when suddenly,
            without any apparent reason, before even meeting with the
            Athenian troops, it returned home. In the minds of the Spartans there
            could be but one solution of the strange event: their king and his
            adviser, Cleandri-das, must have been bribed to leave
            Attica. The suspicion was probably correct; Pericles hiijaself refused
            to account publicly for all the money which passed through his hands as
            general; he merely announced that he had spent a large sum on “ a necessary
            purpose.” This necessary purpose was supposed to be the retreat of the
            Peloponnesian army from Attica. The Spartans fined their king on his
            return, 9
             and as he was
            unable to pay the sum, he fled in fear for his life to the temple of Zeus Lycseus in Arcadia, where for the next nineteen years
            he remained in a dwelling so constructed that he could at any moment
            retire into the temple of the god. The throne passed to his son Pausanias,
            who was still a child. Cleandridas did not even
            venture to return to Sparta; in his absence he was condemned and his
            property confiscated ; we hear of him subsequently at Thurii, and
            his famous son, Gylippus, was the saviour of Syracuse.
             Pericles was now
            able to return to Eubcea. He took over a force of
            fifty triremes and five thousand hoplites, with which in a very short time
            he reduced the island to submission. From the Boeotians no assistance
            whatever was sent, and without it the Eubceans were quite unable to meet such a force as that of Athens. Only in Histisea, a district in the extreme north, do we hear
            of vigorous resistance, and even there the rebels were soon
            overcome. Their punishment was severe ; the Histiaeans were expelled, and their territory was divided among two thousand
            Athenian colonists. In the south of the island the constitution of the
            city of Chaicis was re-arranged, and here, as in
            the case of Erythrae, the inscription containing
            the details of the arrangement has been preserved. We can still read the
            very words in which Pericles, or his agent, determined the relation
            of the subjects to the sovereign city. The Chalcidians were compelled to
            swear that neither in word nor deed would they revolt from Athens,
            and should anyone revolt, they were pledged to give information at once. Chaicis was to pay the tribute imposed on her by
              Athens after due inquiry, and to supply forces to Athens according to her
              ability, and in every way to be a faithful and efficient ally.
              On their part the Athenians guaranteed to the Chalcidians the possession of their city. Without a formal trial no Chalcidian was to
              be punished with loss of civil rights, banished, imprisoned, put to
              death or punished in his property. In every action the accused was to
              be legally cited, and without such citation no sentence could be
              pronounced. Any embassy from Chaicis which
              visited Athens was to be brought before the assembly by the
              Prytanes within ten days of its arrival.
               Similar
            arrangements were made with the rest of the cities of Euboea. Documents exist
            regulating the trade of the new colony in Histiaea with Athens, and arranging for the settlement of small actions at law
            by the appointment of local judges. In all these decrees we observe that
            Athens does not deal with Euboea as a member of the confederacy ; she is
            a conquered territory, a subject of Athens, and bound to serve her
            interests without reference to any others. More plainly here than
            elsewhere do we see the head of the alliance formed after the battle of
            Mycale emerging into the tyrant city which entered into
            the Peloponnesian war.
             The prompt and
            complete reduction of Euboea was an immense service to Athens. But even
            with this success her condition was sufficiently deplorable. Four
            years had elapsed since Cimon’s death, and already she had sunk far below
            the military eminence
             Such a sudden fall
            from the height of her prosperity naturally produced a feeling of despondency
            at Athens. It was clear that she could not now keep her allies in hand and
            sustain the burden of a war in Hellas. At all costs she must come to terms
            with Sparta and her allies. In the winter of 446-445 B.C. ten
            plenipotentiaries were sent to Sparta, through whom the Thirty Years’
            Peace was concluded between the cities. The Athenians renounced all
            their acquisitions in Peloponnesus: Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea.
            For the rest, each state was to retain its possessions; the Athenians were
            not to admit Lacedaemonian cities, and the Lacedaemonians were not to
            admit Athenian cities into their league without the permission of the
            other side, but any city which was independent of either alliance might
            join whichever of the two it pleased. The zEginetans were apparently to remain independent, but to pay a certain
            contribution to the Athenian alliance ; that is, they were not to be
            reduced to the condition of the Euboeans. The Argives had no part in the
            peace; they were already at peace with Lacedaemon, and they might, if
            they liked, make a separate peace with Athens. Should any differences
            arise between the cities they were to be settled by arbitration.
            The terms of peace were engraven on stone and
            set up at Athens, and in the shrine of Apollo at Amyclae.
            A bronze copy was also to be seen at Olympia.
             
            
            
            
            
               
 
            
            
            
            
               CHAPTER X.
             
 THE conclusion of
            peace left the Athenians to their confederacy and their internal politics.
            There could not
             After the death of
            Cimon the oligarchical party at Athens had been led by Thucydides, the son
            of Melesias, a man of high character and a
            kinsman of Cimon. The better to keep together the party, which had
            suffered so severely by the death of their great leader, Thucydides organised the oligarchs into a compact body. Hitherto
            the members had sat here or there in the assembly as they pleased ;
            now they were combined into a single body, and sat in a special
            place.
             
            
            
            
            
               Pericles did not
            stop here. Since the cessation of the war with Persia there had been fewer
            drafts on the public purse, and the contributions of the allies were
            accumulating in the public treasury. A scrupulous man would have regarded the
            surplus as money of the allies, which could only be spent on objects
            connected with their protection, and with their approval. Pericles took
            another view. He plainly told the Athenians that so long as the
            city fulfilled the contract made with the allied cities, and kept
            Persian vessels from their shores, the surplus was at the disposal of
            Athens. Acting on this principle, he devoted a part of it to the
            embellishment of the city. With the aid of Pheidias, the
            sculptor, and Ictinus, the architect, a new temple began to rise on
            the Acropolis in honour of Athena—the celebrated Parthenon
            or “ Virgin’s Chamber,”—the unrivalled triumph of architectural skill, of which
            we shall speak in a later chapter. Other public buildings were also begun
            about this time. Athens was in fact a vast workshop, in which employment
            was found for a great number of citizens. Nor was this all. Though
            little inclined to war, Pericles was sufficiently aware of the value of
            the Athenian fleet to take steps for preserving its efficiency. For eight
            months of the year sixty ships were kept at sea with crews on board,
            in order that there might be an ample supply of practical seamen. These
            crews wert largely composed of the poorer citizens, who were glad to receive
            pay for their services. Thus by direct or indirect means Pericles made the
            state the paymaster of a vast number of citizens, and the state was
            practically himself, with these paid citizens at his back. At the same
            time the public festivals of the city were enlarged and adorned with new splendour. There were innumerable processions and
            spectacles, contests and dramas to delight the Athenians ; and that
            all might attend the theatre in which the plays were acted, Pericles
            provided that every citizen should receive from the state a sum sufficient
            to pay the charge demanded from the spectators by the lessee.
             We may look on
            these measures as the arts of a demagogue who seeks by
            spending the public money to secure the public favour.
            Or we may say that Pericles was able to gratify his passion for art at
            the expense of the Athenians and their allies. Neither of these
            views is altogether untenable ; and both are far from including the whole
            truth. Pericles did undoubtedly seek by every means in his
              power to win an undisputed position at Athens ; and undoubtedly he had a
              passion for art and literature. He was, if we please to say it, a
              demagogue and a connoisseur. But he was something more. Looking at the
              whole evidence before us with impartial eyes, we cannot refuse to
              acknowledge that he cherished aspirations worthy of a great statesman. He
              sincerely desired that every Athenian should owe to his city the blessing
              of an education in all that was beautiful, and the opportunity of a happy
              and useful life. If Solon had laid down rules, not less excellent than
              precise, for the education of the Athenian youth, Pericles would go
              further, and educate the Athenian man. The promise of youth is always
              beautiful; perhaps it was nowhere more beautiful than at Athens ;
              but it is the performance of manhood which sets the stamp of value on
              life. Pericles wished to influence that performance, and raise it to a
              higher level; he sought to unite a passionate enthusiasm with clear and
              definite aims. Whether these aspirations could be realised at all; whether they ought to be realised in the
              manner in which Pericles sought to realise them,
              are questions which admit of discussion ; perhaps the experience of the world
              has driven us to confess that while leisure is necessary for the
              development of the highest natures, the mass of men are only kept from
              ruin by severe and continuous labour. But there
              is no reason to doubt that such aspirations were cherished by Pericles.
               The organisation of the oligarchy by Thucydides and the
            development of the democracy by Pericles naturally caused the opposition
            between the two to become more marked than it had hitherto been. Now,
            for the first time, as Plutarch informs us, were the words “ oligarch ” and
            “ demos ” heard in Athens. They were words of evil omen; though as
            yet neither side can have perceived in what the opposition would end. A
            democracy in a prosperous country is a very different thing from a
            democracy in a poor country; an oligarchy which seeks to defend its power
            differs widely from one which seeks to defend its wealth. But, sooner or
            later, the opposition of the Few and the Many passes over into the
            opposition of the Rich and the Poor.
             The oligarchs
            determined to pull down Pericles, if it were possible. Above all things they endeavoured to cut off the supplies from which he supported
            his schemes. They pointed out the discontent which prevailed among the
            allies, who found their money used in adorning Athens, not in
            forwarding the purposes of the league. They argued that the money was
            either required for the purpose for which it was given, or it was not. If
            it was not required, let less tribute be demanded. Was Athens to be
            dressed out, like a vain and extravagant woman, with the spoils of others?
            Already some allies had thrown off their allegiance; others
            were paying diminished sums. Euboea, a faithful ally for thirty
            years, had endeavoured to shake off the
            yoke, and others would doubtless do the same; such flagrant
            dishonesty in the administration of the funds would bring the confederacy
            to ruin.
             In answer to such
            arguments, Pericles held to his opinion ; the city, he said, fulfilled its duty
            to the allies ; the contributions were the price of an undisturbed
            enjoyment of the Atgean, and this Athens had
            secured. If Athens saved money on her bargain, what was that to the allies? As
            for the expenditure, it was expedient for the allies, aye, and for
            all Hellas, that Athens should be beautiful; that her festivals should be
            splendid ; that she should be the home of art and literature ; the
            abode of freedom and culture; the Hellas of Hellas. In such reasoning
            there was nothing very cogent, at any rate to the minds of the
            contributing cities, and those who took their part. Athens, they
            might reply, was not the sole judge of the cost necessary for the
            maintenance of a free Aegean, but the board of the Delian league, and that
            board had been set aside. The arguments of Pericles veiled the absurd
            claim that of two contracting parties one only has a right to decide
            whether the bargain shall continue. And where was the evidence that
            the board and Athens had ever entered into such a contract as that
            behind which Pericles sheltered himself? The Delian league was an alliance
            between equal states in which Athens ranked with the rest; her present
            position was an outrage—a tyrannous outrage — on the rights of free
            Hellenic cities.
             The oligarchs
            probably believed that a large party in the city held these views, and their
            new organisation gave them confidence. Moreover, the
            last year had been disastrous ; had Cimon been alive, the war with
            Sparta might have been averted, or peace obtained on different conditions.
            Was it not possible to throw the blame of this on the
            all-powerful Pericles ? On these grounds they proposed, in the winter
            of 445 B.C., that there should be an ostracism in the city. The people
            agreed, and the usual arrangements were made. But when the day came
            for decision, in the spring of 444. B.C., the sentence fell, not on
            Pericles, but on Thucydides.
             The sentence left
            no doubt about the feeling of the Athenian people, and it was accepted as
            final. Thucydides disappeared from Athens, and for the next fifteen
            years Pericles was master of the city. In fact, the oligarchs had chosen a
            most' unpro-pitious moment. The disasters which
            marked the year 446-445 B.C. had without exception been the work of
            the oligarchical enemies of Athens ; she was now surrounded by hostile
            states, all of which were oligarchical. No wise citizen, even if he
            disapproved of the democracy, could at such a time have ventured to put
            the control of his city in the hands of the oligarchical party. Besides,
            the measures which had saved Athens—the reduction of Eubcea and
            the removal of Plistoanax from Attica—were due
            to the strategy and political skill of Pericles. The oligarchs had done
            nothing in this crisis of their country. Indeed it was their rashness in
            supporting the ill-advised expedition of Tolmides to Coronea which had brought the crisis on; had
            they listened to the advice of Pericles, that disastrous blow might
            have been averted. The plea in behalf of the allies was not likely to stir
            the people
             While discouraging
            all attempts to enter into conflict with the Great King, Pericles was still
            intent on the extension of Athenian power. We have already seen how
            anxiously he had striven, in the years of Athens’s greatest power, to
            secure a strong position in the Corinthian gulf. The most important
            stations in this quarter, Pegae and Achaea,
            had been abandoned at the peace. The route to the West now lay over
            the alien Isthmus, or round the dreaded promontory of Malea.
            But in those distant regions there were openings which did not
            escape the eye of Pericles. In Southern Italy there was no Persian
            monarch, animated by hereditary hatred, and master of innumerable troops ;
            the rivalry of Athenian and Peloponnesian had not yet been carried there.
            Was it possible to found a city in Italy which should exhibit the
            spectacle of Greeks from all quarters living harmoniously together,
            undivided by the jealousies of race or city?
             The passion for
            Italy had long haunted the Athenians. When Themistocles was brought to bay
            by the Peloponnesian commanders before the battle of Salamis, he declared
            that Siris had been assigned by an oracle to Athens, and if the Peloponnesian
            generals abandoned Salamis, he would carry away his two hundred ships and
            found a new city there. So strong was the attraction which the
            West exercised on him that he named his two daughters Italia and
            Sybaris. The feeling is by no means unintelligible. The West was
            pre-eminently the goal of the adventurer. The Greek cities of
            Sicily and Italy were prosperous beyond the dreams of hope. The
            Sicilian princes were the most prominent men in the Grecian world ; the
            luxury of Sybaris had not been surpassed in the East. The
            stories which came to the ears of the Greeks about Tartes-sus and Sardinia
            were greatly exaggerated, but there was daily evidence that valuable
            products and manufactures, carpets from Carthage and metal-work
            from Etruria, could be imported from the West. It is remarkable that
            Athens should never have attempted to secure for herself a footing in this
            coveted region. Perhaps her trade was not important—or her ships were
            few—till the Persian war; and for a generation after that event her
            attention was occupied with the Delian confederacy and the East. But
            though she had no depots in the West, we know that the pottery of Athens
            was exported into Etruria and Campania, into Sicily and Lombardy, early in the
            fifth century B.C. There is also reason to believe that the Athenians
            and the Segestaeans were brought into some kind
            of communication about the middle of the century.
             To an excited
            nation nothing could be more welcome than the invitation which now came from
            the Sybarites, asking for assistance in refounding their ancient city. After the destruction of Sybaris by the Crotoniates in 510 B.C., the remnant of the Sybarites had
            found a home in Scidros and Laos, where they
            maintained their own against the attacks of their enemies. About the year
            452 B.C., in conjunction with some Thessalians they founded a community
            which they called New Sybaris, after the old town. This was more than
            Croton could bear. A resolute attack was made on the city, and five
            years after its foundation the Sybarites were again driven out. They now
            resolved to ask the assistance of Greece in founding a state. Ambassadors
            were sent to Lacedaemon and to Athens, offering in return for assistance a
            share in the new colony. At Lacedaemon nothing was done, but at
            Athens the scheme was readily taken up. Not only were Athenians
            enrolled, but envoys were sent into the Peloponnesus to
              enlist all who were willing to join. The colony was not to be the colony of any
              single state, but a colony founded by all Hellas, and a proof of
              Hellenic unity. In 445 B.C., ten ships left Athens to carry the colonists
              to their homes ; at their head was Lampon, who,
              though not the founder of the colony, in the Greek sense, was of great
              authority as a seer, by whose power of divination the scheme had been
              greatly aided, and might be aided still more. In their choice of a site
              the colonists were guided by the Delphian oracle, which bade them
              seek a place “ where water was measured and bread was not.” They found,
              near the ancient site of Sybaris, a spring which poured its water
              through an iron pipe, to which the inhabitants gave the name of “ the
              bushel.” This seemed to indicate the measurement of water, and the
              richness of the soil promised unmeasured abundance of corn.
              Here, then, was the site indicated by the oracle : it was known as Thurii, from the name of the spring (“ fast-flowing ”), and lay in a plain by
              the Crathis.
               On this land the
            colonists proceeded to build a town. Among the emigrants was Hippodamus, the architect, who had recently laid out
            the Peiraeus in a rectangular block with intersecting streets.
            The same regularity was observed in the new city. It was built in an
            oblong; four streets ran through the length, which were known as the
            streets of Heracles, Aphrodite, Olympia, and Dionysus. Three streets traversed
            the width—the Street of Heroes, the Thurian Street, and the Thurina. Such regularityof structure was
              new in the Grecian world ; in this respect also Thurii was a model city.
               The colonists had
            not long been settled before dissensions broke out amongst them. The
            Sybarites claimed the first place in the colony ; they were
            not content to hold an equal position with the rest. The highest
            offices were to be reserved for them ; their wives were to have precedence
            at the sacrifices. They also retained possession of all the land
            immediately round the city, which was, of course, of the most value. Such
            claims could not be allowed without conceding that Thurii was not a Hellenic city, but merely the old Sybaris restored and
            protected by the new settlers. The quarrel led to a battle, in which
            the unfortunate Sybarites were once more defeated ; the greater part were
            slain, the rest expelled from the country.
             This victory left
            the conquerors in possession of a large quantity of fertile land. They
            immediately sent to Greece inviting a number of colonists to come and
            occupy it on terms of equality, an invitation widely accepted. The state now
            rapidly increased in power; the Crotoniates,
            after the expulsion of the Sybarites, were, for a time at least, on
            friendly terms with the settlers, and a popular government was devised, in
            which all the inhabitants had a share. Ten tribes were established, as at
            Athens; in three of them were included the colonists of the Peloponnesus;
            three others comprised the settlers from Bceotia and Central Hellas. In the remaining four were collected
            the colonists from Athens, Eubcea, and other
            Ionian cities, and the islands. These events took place in 443 B.C.
             The colony of Thurii is interesting from many points of view. It was an
            attempt to found a colony which could not be claimed by any Grecian town
            as its daughter city. It was intended to prove that there were
            circumstances under which the jealousies of race and city could be
            forgotten, and Ionian and Dorian, Athenian and Boeotian, could dwell
            together in unity. It was also, from the first, the home
            of distinguished men. We have spoken of Lampon and Hippodamus, both of them men from the Periclean
            circle, who had aided their leader in his work at Athens. Herodotus, the
            historian, was also one of those who joined the colony. The last fifteen
            or twenty years of the life of the great historian were passed, no
            doubt with intervals of travel, in his western home. Thither also went
            Lysias, the young son of that aged Cephalus, who is so well known to
            all readers of Plato’s “ Republic.” There too dwelt Tisias,
            the Sicilian teacher of rhetoric, from whom Lysias may have learnt his
            skill as a writer of speeches. And, as we have said, Thurii has yet another interest as a town built on the plan of an architect.
            It was not a mere collection of houses, like the Grecian cities, where old
            and new jostled each other in gay confusion, but a town constructed with
            a view to convenience, health, and protection. It is from these points of
            view that Thurii becomes the ideal colony of the
            Periclean era; other cities were of far more use to Athens by supporting
            her citizens, or holding places of strategical value ; but none
            reflects so much of the mind of Pericles as the Hellenic town by the
            waters of the Crathis—where Herodotus, the most
            Hellenic of Greek historians, was wont to talk and meditate.
             Diodorus, in the
            account of Thurii from which we derive our knowledge
            of the city, takes the opportunity to give a sketch of the laws of Charondas. In so doing he makes the incredible blunder
            of asserting that Charondas, who lived in Sicily some
            two hundred years before this time, actually composed his code for
            the benefit of the citizens of Thurii. Such
            inaccuracy staggers us; we cannot feel that we are justified in supposing
            that the laws which he quotes were those observed in Thurii;
            still less that they represent the genuine code of Charondas.
            But as Diodorus probably copied his account of them from Ephorus, a
            historian of the fourth century B.C., who was in a position to know what
            laws passed as those of Charondas at that time,
            we may assume that the enactments are not pure imagination. They represent
            rules which were then obeyed in the cities of Magna Graecia. To this
            extent they are a genuine picture of society and manners among the
            colonies in Italy. And we may at least say that whatever their value,
            there is no doubt about their interest.
             Under this code, a
            father who married a second wife to be a step-mother over his children, was
            not allowed to sit in the public council of his city. For how could
            one who ordered things so ill for his own family give good advice to the
            state ? Besides, those who had been happy in their marriage ought to
            be content with their lot; and those who had not, were foolish to try
            the experiment a second time. Men who were convicted of dishonest
            practices at law were compelled to walk the city in garlands
            of tamarisk ; all the world was to know that they had received the
            crown of villainy. By this wise law the city was freed from one of the
            worst pests of Greek society,—the man who made a dishonest use of
            his legal knowledge. Another law forbade all association with criminals or
            disreputable persons. Another established compulsory education ; every boy
            must learn to read and write, and the state paid the teachers. With
            regard to orphans, Charondas ordained that their
            property should be managed by the kindred of the father, but the children
            should be in the possession of the kindred of the mother. The kindred
            of the mother had no part in the inheritance, and therefore had no motive to
            make away with the heirs ; the kindred of the father could not come
            at them. Any citizen who had been guilty of cowardice was not, as in other
            cities, put to death, but compelled to sit for three days in the
            market-place in woman’s attire. In regard to the letter of the law, Charondas was precise ; bad or good, the law, while it
            was the law, must be strictly obeyed. If it worked ill it might be
            corrected, but obeyed it must be.
             The method by
            which Charondas allowed his laws to be corrected is
            one which is elsewhere mentioned in connection with Zaleucus the law-giver of Locri. It was not likely to
            make law reform popular. Anyone who chose could plead against a law in the
            public assembly, but he did so with his neck in a noose. If he
            convinced his audience, the law was changed ; if he failed, the noose was
            drawn. Instances are recorded of corrections made even under such
            severe conditions. It was the law that bodily injuries should be requited by the lex talionis: “ An eye for
            an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.” This continued in force till a
            ruffian threatened to knock out the eye of a man who had already lost one
            ; he knew that the law would only deprive him of one of his eyes in
            return, and yet his opponent would be totally blind. As this was
            obviously unjust, the one-eyed man obtained a modification of the rule,
            and henceforth anyone who destroyed the eye of a man who had but
            one lost the sight of both eyes. Another correction related to divorce. An
            aged man, who had been abandoned by his young wife, succeeded in
            persuading the citizens to correct the law which permitted second
            marriages to divorced persons, to the extent that no woman might marry a
            man, no man might marry a woman, younger than the husband or
            wife whom they had abandoned. These stories are ridiculous, but they are
            probably true. They exhibit the humorous common-sense which meets us in
            Greek legislation. We know for a fact that Pittacus doubled the
            penalties for all misdeeds committed in intoxication, and Solon protected
            heiresses from greed by regulations which appeal to the animal rather
            than the moral nature of man.
             Within a very few
            years from the foundation of Thurii the attention of
            Pericles was called away to the extreme east of the Athenian empire, and a
            struggle began which taxed his resolution and his resources to the
            utmost. We have seen that in the year 450 B.C. troubles had broken out in Miletus,
            in which the Athenians had found it necessary to interfere;
            the constitution had been changed from an oligarchy to a democracy,
            and an Athenian garrison had been placed in the city. Such reforms
            naturally brought Miletus into very close connection with Athens. The
            democracy there might expect the support of the democracy of Athens in any
            contest with oligarchy. It was perhaps in this spirit that they entered
            into a contest with Samos for the possession of Priene, though it is
            difficult to understand how two cities belonging to the confederacy of
            Delos could contest the possession of a third which was also an
            independent .member of the same confederacy. It is possible that the
            Samians were the aggressors. They were never very scrupulous in their
            acquisitions, and they had been at war with Priene in old days for the
            possession of certain places on the mainland. Or it is possible that in
            Priene herself there were two factions, one of which wished to place
            the town under the protection of Samos, the other under the protection of
            Miletus. Whatever the cause of strife, the cities flew to arms, and
            Miletus was defeated. She at once appealed to Athens, where the appeal was
            received with favour; the more so, as it was
            supported by a party from Samos who wished to overthrow the
            government there. For Samos was in the hands of an oligarchy composed
            of the rich landowners of the island, the very class of men whose power at
            Athens had been finally broken by Pericles. Plutarch tells us that
            the Athenians called on the Samians to discontinue hostilities and submit
            the matter to arbitration, but in Thucydides we hear nothing of this, and
            the Samians are treated forthwith as guilty of rebellion. A force of
            forty triremes was despatched from Athens in
            the spring of 440 B.C. under the command of Pericles.
            He met with no resistance, and proceeded to reorganise affairs
            in Samos. Fifty men and fifty boys were taken as hostages from the leading
            families, and placed with Athenian colonists in Lemnos. The Samians
            were compelled to pay a fine of eighty talents, the oligarchs were
            deposed, the constitution was changed into a democracy, and a garrison was
            left in the city to preserve order. These measures were carried
            out with the greatest decision and rapidity; in a very few weeks
            Samos had been degraded from her position as one of the most powerful of
            the allies of Athens to the rank of a subject, held by a garrison and
            punished by a fine. Here, as in Eubcea,
            the policy of Pericles had triumphed ; the Delian confederacy was a thing
            of the past.
             But Samos was not
            prepared to submit. The oligarchs could not forget that Samos had once
            been the ruler of the Eastern Aigean ; that her
            fleet was still a great power. The city was strongly fortified, and
            help might be expected from Persia. A number of the discontented citizens
            left the island and entered into communication with Pissuthnes,
            the satrap of Sardis. With his support they returned at the head of a
            body of men by whose aid, in concert with their friends, they succeeded in
            capturing or expelling the Athenian garrison and recovering possession of the
            city. The old constitution was at once restored ; and before the
            Athenians had time to stir the hostages were removed from Lemnos. The
            work of Pericles was undone in less time than he had taken to do it.
             Athens found
            herself face to face with a powerful ally in revolt. The danger was great;
            greater even than at the revolt of Eubcea. There
            was imminent risk that the war with Persia might be opened again, and
            Athens might be alone in the contest. Sparta certainly would not join her,
            and who could tell whether the allies would remain faithful ?
            Samos was taking every step to strengthen her position, the leaders
            of the democracy were expelled from the city, the officers and garrison of
            the Athenians, who had been captured, were placed as hostages with Pissuthnes, the aid of the Spartan confederacy
            was invoked. In order, if possible, to cut off any assistance from
            Miletus, the Samians at once sent an expedition against the city. Could
            they capture it before the arrival of the Athenians, such a
            signal success might induce all the cities of Asia Minor to join in
            the revolt. Byzantium had joined already, and the cities of Caria were
            uncertain.
             The whole policy
            of Pericles was at stake. Instantaneous action was necessary. A defeat at Samos
            would undo the work of years. Sixty ships were at once ordered to Samos,
            and apparently all the ten generals, with Pericles at their head, went over
            in charge of them. Part of the fleet was despatched to watch for the Phoenician ships, which were reported to be coming up
            from the south, part was sent to bring reinforcements from Chios
            and Lesbos. With the remaining vessels Pericles attempted to cut off the
            Samian force which was engaged on the mainland in attacking Miletus.
            A severe engagement took place in which both sides claimed the
            victory. The Samians were able to force their way through to Samos ; while
            Pericles was able to blockade the harbour.
            Further operations were deferred till reinforcements came up.
             Twenty-five
            triremes now arrived from Chios and Lesbos, perhaps under the command of the
            poet Sophocles, whom we know to have been a general in this war, and
            hear of at Chios; forty, from Athens. Thus reinforced Pericles was able to
            land forces at Samos and draw lines round the city, which he
            also blockaded by sea. While he was thus engaged the news arrived
            that the Phoenician fleet was at hand. Pericles at once set out to
            intercept it with sixty ships. It was better to call off half his
            forces than to engage with the Phoenicians off the shore of Samos,
            where the Samians would be at hand to take part in the battle. The
            Phoenician fleet did not appear, but meantime the Samians were able to break through
            the sixty-five ships which Pericles had left behind. For fourteen days
            they were masters of the sea and could carry into the city whatever
            provisions they pleased. Then Pericles returned. The
            Samians attempted to cut him off from the island but in vain. They were
            defeated, and the city was once more blockaded by sea and land. It was now
            midsummer 440 B.C., and the generals for the year came into office at
            Athens. Pericles was re-elected and remained with the fleet, but the rest of
            the commanders at Samos were replaced by new officers, who brought large
            reinforcements. First forty and then twenty ships were brought from Athens
            ; Chios and Lesbos added thirty to the triremes previously sent, and
            the total amount of the fleet was more than two hundred sail. It was apparently
            an overwhelming force, yet the Samians defied it. Their walls were strong
            ; their city well stocked with provisions ; they could still hope that
            assistance would come from Persia or from Peloponnesus. So they held
            out, month after month, waiting for help which never came. The Persians
            failed to seize the opportunity ; the Peloponnesus decided, on the motion
            of the Corinthians, that they would not go to the aid of a city which
            had revolted from her leader. To do so might form a very inconvenient precedent;
            were the Megarians to revolt and Athens to aid them, Corinth would
            find herself in the same difficulties as before the peace of 445 B.c. By this time the prospects of the Samians were
            gloomy enough. At length when nine months had passed, and the supplies in
            Samos were exhausted, the city agreed to a capitulation. The terms were
            severe; all the triremes of Samos were to be given up to Athens ; the
            walls of the city were to be thrown down ; the cost of the war was
            to be defrayed by the Samians, and hostages placed with the Athenians
            as a surety for good behaviour. The oligarchs
            who had brought about the revolt were of course expelled from the city—we
            find them afterwards at Anaea on the mainland
            opposite,—and a democratical form of government
            was established. Duris of Samos, a late and
            untrustworthy historian, had horrible stories to tell of the cruelty of
            Pericles toward the Samian trierarchs and
            marines. They are doubtless fictions ; the Greeks were not
            merciful to the captives who fell into their power, but they were
            content with putting them to death. They did not add torture to bloodshed.
             The cost of the
            war had been enormous; if we exclude all the previous operations, the siege
            of eight months with two hundred triremes would require 1,600
            talents, if we allow a drachma a day as the entire cost in food and hire
            for each man on board a trireme. So far as we can judge from
            a mutilated inscription, 1,276 talents, in addition to the ordinary
            income from the league, were paid out of the treasury of Athens in the
            war, this implies a total expenditure of more than 2,000 talents; if
            the Samians paid even half this sum, it would be a severe tax on the
            island for many years.
             Once more was
            Pericles victorious. When he returned to Athens, in the spring of 439 B.C., he
            might feel that his policy was now fairly established. In her dealings
            with Samos, Athens had acted from first to last as an imperial city. To
            her the complaints of the Milesians had been brought ; she had
            interfered as a sovereign in the domestic politics of Samos. She had
            employed the fleets of Chios and Lesbos, and the money of other cities, to
            reduce Samos to subjection. She had compelled the city to accept
            a form of government in harmony with her own. To those who had eyes
            to see, such conduct proved pnly too clearly
            that Athens claimed sovereign rights over the confederacy, and was
            resolved to use them for her own advantage.
             The measures which
            Pericles took on the news of the revolt of Samos were not less clear-sighted
            than rapid. The attempts to cut off the Samians on the mainland from
            the island, and to meet the Phoenician fleet before it could reach Samos,
            were excellent pieces of strategy. Yet we notice that here,
            as elsewhere, the Greeks were helpless in the presence of a walled
            city. Thasos, TEgina, Samos, had bidden defiance
            to all the skill of the best Athenian engineers. Famine or treachery alone
            could bring a strongly fortified place into the possession of
            the enemy. In the case of Samos, we must allow that Pericles was highly favoured by fortune. Had the Persians taken up
            the cause of the Samians, as it was their interest to do ; had the Chians and Lesbians joined in the revolt, or even
            refused to send ships to subjugate an ally; had the Corinthians been
            less short-sighted in their advice, the event of the war would
            probably have been different. It is interesting to know that the defence of Samos was conducted by a man whose name is
            remembered in another sphere. Melissus, who
            defeated Pericles, and defied his forces so long, was a philosopher of the
            Eleatic school. As Pericles occupied his leisure with
            the speculations of Anaxagoras on the physical world, so did Melissus ponder the problem of the Many and the One,
            striving to find beyond and behind the change and decay of all visible
            things a reality which was always and everywhere the same.
             With the fall of
            Samos, Byzantium also came in
             
            
            
            
            
               
 CHAPTER XI.
             AMPHIPOLIS—THE
            COMING WAR.
             
 HE success of the
            Athenians at Samos did not enable them entirely to repair the breaches
            which the revolt had made in the confederacy. When we compare the lists of the
            tribute paid by the allies in the Delian confederacy in the years
            just preceding the outbreak of the revolt with that of 436-435 B.C., we
            find that no fewer than twenty-two of the Carian cities are wanting
            in the later list, and that these cities no longer form a separate
            district, but are united with the Ionian. In Thrace also there had been
            disturbances. The cities on Pallene had fallen into arrears with
            their tribute or refused to pay it. In this district Athens was able
            to restore order, and the defaulters were punished by the exaction of
            higher sums; Scione, for instance, pays fifteen
            talents in the list of 437 B.C. instead of six talents, and many towns
            that hitherto had been subordinate to neighbouring cities, were now detached and formed into independent members of the league. But the revolt of Byzantium, and the
              uncertain fidelity of the Chalcidic cities, seem
              to have convinced Pericles that something had still to be done to secure
              the interests of Athens in this quarter. How keenly he felt the necessity
              of providing for a close and unbroken connexion between Athens and the north, he had already shewn by his voyage into the
              Pontus and the colonies he had sent out. With the exception of Naxos,
              the cleruchies of Pericles were all planted in a line more or less
              direct between Athens and Byzantium. Chalcis secured
              the south of the Euripus, Histisea the north ;
              Brea was in the territory of the Bisaltians; the
              Chersonese commanded the Hellespont. At all these points Athenian colonies
              were established of such a nature that their loyalty to Athens
              could never for a moment be called in question.
               Another site
            remained, more valuable from every point of view ; a site where the Athenians
            had already attempted to establish themselves, but only to meet with
            overwhelming disaster. At the point where the Strymon leaves Lake Cercinitis are the “ Nine ways,” —the centre to which all the roads from east
            and west, north and south converge in order to strike the bridge over
            the river. Here in 465 B.C. Leagros had led out
            an Athenian colony of 10,000 men, all of whom had perished at Drabescus, in conflict with the warlike tribes of the
            district. It was a severe loss, but a further attempt was worth making;
            the region was not only rich in all materials required for building
            ships, but it lay in the immediate neighbourhood of
            the mines of Pangseum, and above all it
            com-11 manded the principal route to the north. In 437 B.C. another
            band of colonists was led out by Hagnon the son
            of Nicias, who had been a general with Pericles in the Samian war. He
            landed at Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, which had long been in the occupation of the
            Athenians, and from thence forced his way up the river till he obtained
            possession of the coveted place. Just above the bridge, on
            an eminence skirted by the river, Hagnon placed
            his city, which from its site he called Amphipolis. Two sides of the
            town were swept by the stream and needed no defence ; on the third, a wall was built, reaching at each end to the river. The
            colony was strengthened by settlers from the neighbouring cities of Chalcidice, but so far as wO know the
            native tribes made no attempt to drive out the intruders. Hagnon was regarded as the founder of the city,
            and public honours were paid to him in this
            capacity.
             Great changes had
            taken place in this region since Cimon had conquered Eion,
            and Leagros had perished at Drabescus—changes
            which perhaps explain the inefficient resistance of the natives to this
            new attempt of the Athenians. In 464 Alexander was still king of
            Macedon ; the prince who in his youth, by an act of great daring, had
            cleared his country of the Persians, when sent to demand submission
            from his father Amyntas. When he came to the throne he had pursued a
            policy which enabled him to preserve his kingdom from the Persian invaders,
            without incurring the open hostility of the Greeks. A series of
            conquests had extended his empire from Mount Bceum to the middle course of the Strymon; and
             In like manner on
            the death of Teres, in 440 B.C., the great kingdom of the Odrysians was
            divided between his sons Sitalces and Sparadocus. They too were soon at variance. The
            quarrel was a fortunate circumstance for Athens, while it lasted.
            Some years later, when Sitalces had overpowered
            and expelled his brother, the Athenians were alarmed at his forces and
            flattered him by every means in their power. Fortunately the Odrysians
            never attained consolidation, and the time was not yet come when the
            powers of the north could make or mar in Greece.
             While Athens was
            thus active, organising her confederacy and securing
            her communication with the north, the Peloponnesians had allowed the years ter pass in apathy and inattention. At length
            they awoke to a sense of the situation. It was clear that Athens had
            abandoned all idea of war with Persia and that the confederacy of Delos
            was transformed into an Athenian empire, of whose forces the
            great city was absolutely mistress. And meanwhile in visible greatness
            Athens had become far the first city in Greece. Her walls were unrivalled,
            her harbours and docks ample for the largest
            fleet, and protected by the strongest fortifications. On the height of
            the Acropolis new temples were rising, surpassing in beauty all that
            had hitherto been achieved by architect or sculptor, and at the head of all was
            Pericles, under whose guidance Athens seemed to be forever falling
            into the greatest dangers only to rise again more splendid than before. An
            uneasy feeling began to prevail. What would the end be? Who could forecast
            the action of democracy or penetrate the designs of the silent, self-reliant
            statesman, who wielded such immense power? Pericles seems to have
            perceived the discontent. He knew what it foreboded. War with Sparta had
            perhaps never been wholly absent from his thoughts, even when
            he concluded the Thirty Years’ Peace. In such a struggle it was necessary
            for Athens to have as large a following as possible. By a wise policy he might
            at least prevent the growing suspicion that Athens was using her
            power for her own interest only, and that she was utterly careless of the
            great charge entrusted to her. He might shew the world that if Greece
            was once more willing to unite against Persia, Athens was ready to do
            her part. If they refused, it was no longer open to them to charge Athens
            with any want of patriotism ; but if by any means Hellas could
            be united round Athens, her position would be immensely improved. Such a
            union would at once put her in the first place in Greece, and Sparta in
            the second. We are told by Plutarch that at the time when
            the Lacedaemonians were beginning to feel great annoyance at the rise of
            Athens, Pericles encouraged the people to aim at a still higher position.
            With this object he brought forward a decree that all the Greeks,
            whether in Europe or Asia, should be invited to send envoys to a
            conference at Athens for the purpose of discussing a number of questions of
            national interest. The temples which the Persians had destroyed were still
            unrestored ; the offerings vowed at the time of the great struggle had not
            been fully paid; no definite arrangement had been made for the
            control of the sea and the preservation of peace. These were matters in
            which every Greek had an interest, and they could only be discussed in a
            Pan-Hellenic conference. Twenty Athenians—men of more than fifty years of
            age—were chosen, of whom five visited the Ionians and Dorians in Asia, and
            the islands as far as Lesbos and Rhodes ; a second five were sent to
            the Greeks in the Hellespont and in Thrace as far as Byzantium. Other five
            went to Bceotia, Phocis, and the Peloponnesus,
            from which they passed through Locri to
            Acarnania and Ambracia; the remainder visited the CEtaeans, the Malian Gulf, the Achaeans of Phthiotis, and the Thessalians. But the scheme fell
            dead to the ground ; nowhere was there any response to the invitations ;
            not a single envoy appeared at Athens. The attempt to make the city
            the centre of Hellas completely broke down.
             Pericles was not
            discouraged by the failure of his plan. He was content that Athens should
            stand alone ; that the division which had been slowly widening since the
            Peloponnesians withdrew from Byzantium should continue till one or other of the
            great cities, which stood at the head of the opposite sections, was
            brought to submission.' And he resolved that Athens at any rate should not
            be first in shewing signs of weakness. Let the cost be what it might, she
            must still pursue the career of progress on which she had advanced for the
            last fifty years. If the rest of Greece failed to sympathise with a forward movement and preferred to cling to their old leader, so
            much the more reason was there for Athens to be resolute in her
            purpose and solid in her power. From this time forward Pericles sought to
            brace his citizens to the idea of war with Sparta. He endeavoured to instil into their minds the greatness of the
            objects for which they would fight. He pointed to the glorious city, the
            like of which could be seen nowhere else in Greece. He called to their
            minds all that the city had been to them ; the happy life they
            enjoyed in her, the numerous recreations she provided for them. He
            told them of the great empire the city controlled ; an empire which, he
            said, would certainly fall to pieces, if Athens became in any way
            subject to Sparta. He enumerated the wealth stored up in the
            treasuries of the city, and explained how indispensable money was for the
            successful prosecution of
             The policy of
            Pericles was not without opponents. There were many in Athens whom his
            eloquence failed to convince, and who spoke of him and his measures
            with a bitter and even personal hatred. The oligarchical party, though
            politically helpless since the ostracism of Thucydides, was still
            vigorous. If it could accomplish nothing in the assembly, much could
            be done by the organised co-operation of clubs,
            by clever satire, and well-conducted personal attacks upon Pericles and
            his friends. The position of Pericles was not less difficult because it
            was unique. Year after year he was elected one of the ten generals, and
            this permanence gave him a peculiar authority on the board. Whether he was
            so formally or not, he was in reality chairman of the generals, the
            first executive officer in Athens. It was thought that he superintended everything,
            and therefore everything could be charged upon him. If any scheme
            went wrong, it was Pericles who was to blame. More especially did the
            poets of the old comedy take up this line. Their sympathies were not
            with the people whom they sought to amuse, but with the people of the
            age of Cimon, “ the men of Marathon ; ” they praised the good old times and criticised all that was new. Those who listened were
            willing enough to be discontented. The years of peace left the
            Athenians with little to occupy their minds. A long peace is always a time
            of trial for a government, however able and efficient. Men grow captious
            in their criticisms when they have no severe burdens to bear, no
            definite aim before them. Besides the comedians, there were men who rightly or
            wrongly took great offence at the conduct of Pericles. Dracontides scented
            corruption in the public expenditure ; Dio-peithes was convinced that the doctrines of Anaxagoras must lead to the overthrow of
            all sound religion, and bring on the city the dire vengeance of the
            gods ; others saw in Aspasia, the Milesian friend of Pericles, the
            destruction of Athenian domestic life. These various sections were drawing
            together, and if they could not reach Pericles himself, they could,
            when the right moment came, attack him through his friends. For the
            present they contented themselves with abuse. Aspasia was spoken of as the new Omphale, as the Hera of the Olympian, the child of
              corruption, an impudent mistress. Pericles was the prince of satyrs, his house was an office for
                the corruption of female honour. Pheidias was a
                thief, Anaxagoras an atheist.
                 While the storm was gathering at home, Pericles was extending the influence of Athens in the West as well as in the north. We have seen how anxious he had been before the peace in 445 B.C. to secure a firm footing at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, and the subsequent foundation of the colony at Thurii proves that he had not lost sight of his old policy. A favourable opportunity soon offered for renewing it. On the shore of the bay of Ambracia lay the city of Argos Amphilochicum, so called from the founder, Amphilochus of Argos, who, according to a tradition preserved by Thucydides, founded the city on his return from Troy. It was the greatest city in that region. At a date which we cannot fix, the Amphilochians, being in great distress, invited their neighbours, the Ambraciots, to join in the settlement. The Ambraciots came and after a time, finding themselves the stronger, drove out the Argives and took possession of the city for themselves. The Argives now sought the protection of the Acarnanians and both together appealed to Athens. A fleet of thirty ships was sent under the command of Phormio, who had recently served in the war with Samos. When Phormio arrived, Argos was taken by storm, and the Argives and Acarnanians dwelt together in the place. This was the beginning of the alliance between Athens and Acar-nania, which we find subsisting at the time of the Peloponnesian war. The acquisition of
            a friendly port on the shore of the Ambracian Gulf
            was of great advantage to Athens in keeping up a communication with
            the west. We hear of an alliance between Athens and the Messapians and of the presence of an Athenian admiral, Diotimus, at Naples, and though we have
            no evidence on which to fix the date of either, it has been
            conjectured with some reason that they were connected with that advance of
            the Italian tribes to the west and south which about this time threatened
            the cities of Magna Gracia. In the Greek cities
            also of Italy and Sicily affairs had taken a turn which could not fail to
            attract the attention of Athens. From the first the new colony of Thurii had aroused the jealousy of Tarentum ; war had
            broken out, and though no decisive result had followed,
            the Tarentines had acquired an equal share in a new colony on the
            site of Siris, which the Athenians in the days of Themistocles claimed for
            themselves. This was a gain for the Dorian element in Italy; it was
            hardly less so that the Thurians had been led in
            their defence by Cleandridas,
            the Spartan exile, the father of the famous Gylippus.
            In Sicily also the Dorian cities of Syracuse an Agrigentum had recently made such progress that the Ionians had reason to be
            apprehensive. It may have occurred to Pericles, that if he could not place
            Athens at the head of Greece in a combination against Persia, she
            might at least come forward as the defender and supporter of the
            Ionians, and he could hardly fail to see that a war of Athens with Sparta
            meant also a war of Ionians with Dorians, in which the cities of the
            west would be called upon to furnish ships to their kinsmen in the east.
            So much the more important Was it that Athens should be in a position to
            control the passage from Syracuse to Corinth.
             Thus we see Athens
            repairing the loss which the peace inflicted upon her by drawing more
            tightly the reins with which she governed the confederacy, and by
            strengthening her communications with the north and the west. It was from
            these quarters that the storm finally broke.
             
             
 CHAPTER XII.
           CAUSES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.
           
           THUCYDIDES informs us that the real cause of the
          Peloponnesian war was the growing dread and jealousy of the Athenian power; but
          the avowed cause was the part which Athens took in the affairs of Epidamnus and Potidaea. The contemporary comedians
          attributed the war to corrupt personal motives on the part of Pericles—his wish
          to shield his own peculations and those of Phidias, or to avenge some insult
          done to Aspasia. Ephorus, the historian who flourished in the fourth
          century BC, fixes the blame on Pericles, on the ground that he wished by
          this means to extricate himself from the difficulties into which his
          appropriation of the public funds had brought him. In a time of distress the
          people would forget to prosecute enquiries, and the need of their great leader
          would be felt more severely. But all writers agreed that the immediate cause of
          the war was the refusal of the Athenians to rescind a decree which excluded
          the Megarians from trading in the markets of Athens or her allies,
          and that Pericles, who was the author of this decree, persuaded the Athenians not
          to rescind it.
   That such a trifling matter would never have brought
          about hostilities between two allied nations without other and more grave
          causes of ill feeling, is obvious; nor would Pericles have been so peremptory
          in his refusal to make a slight concession if he had not been persuaded that
          war was the best policy.
           Whatever the immediate cause of the struggle, the
          question of war or peace was first opened before the Spartan confederacy, and
          it was opened by Corinth. Ever since the Persian war Corinth had felt that the
          Athenian fleet was vastly superior to her own, and for years past she had had
          reasons to fear that Athens would become a dangerous rival in the trade to the
          west. Before the Thirty Years’ Peace, Pericles had endeavored to acquire the
          control of the Corinthian Gulf by the settlement of the Messenians
          at Naupactus, by attacks on Oeniadae and
          Sicyon, by occupying the Megarian harbor of Pegae,
          and by entering into friendly relations with Achaea. When compelled to withdraw
          from Achaea and Pegae, he had helped to found
          the colony of Thurii, and still later he had
          entered into an alliance with the Messapians of
          Italy and the Acarnanians of Western Greece. These movements were sufficiently
          alarming to a city conscious of declining power, as Corinth was, and an
          incident now occurred which made the intentions of Athens still more clear.
   The island of Corcyra had been colonized by the
          Corinthians in the eighth century BC. The island—the modern Corfu—enjoyed
          a most fortunate situation. It was sufficiently distant from Greece to lie
          outside the currents which disturbed the politics of the peninsula; and yet it
          formed a convenient station in the route from Corinth to the west. For almost a
          generation after the founding of the city, Corcyra and Corinth were on the
          usual terms of colony and mother-city; but as the colony grew in power,
          quarrels arose between them. Before the middle of the seventh century Corcyra
          had shaken off her allegiance and conquered the Corinthians in a great naval
          engagement. It was in vain that Cypselus, the
          first tyrant of Corinth, strove to bring the island into subjection; the utmost
          that he could do was to check the extending commerce of the Corcyraeans by establishing rival colonies on the shore of Acarnania. His son Periander was more successful; he brought the rebels
          back to their allegiance; but on his death they established their independence
          once more. These conflicts left bitter memories behind them. In their common
          festivals the Corcyraeans would not allow the
          Corinthians the customary privileges of founders, and at their sacrifices they
          denied to a Corinthian the right of receiving first the lock of hair cut from
          the head of the victim. Such conduct on the part of a daughter city was
          equivalent to the renunciation of the bond which linked her to the source from
          which she sprang.
   At the time of the Persian invasion the Corcyraeans were in possession of sixty ships, while the
          Corinthians had but forty; in the next fifty years they had increased the sixty
          to one hundred and twenty, a number far in excess of any navy in Greece but that
          of Athens. When invited to assist in the deliverance of Greece they had played
          a double game—promising assistance to the patriotic side, but delaying to send
          it, and waiting for the event. In the subsequent quarrels between Athens and
          Sparta they had taken no part they were allies of neither side. They considered
          that their position enabled them to stand alone, and it was not their interest
          to favor one party more than the other.
           From Corcyra a colony had been sent out (625 BC)
          to Epidamnus on the Illyrian coast. The
          leader of the emigrants was Phalius,
          a Heraclid of Corinth, for it was the custom, when a colony sent out
          an off-shoot, to renew the connection with the ancient mother city by bringing
          thence a founder for the new settlement. The colony was valuable to the Corcyraeans, because it secured their trade with the
          interior of Illyria and Epirus. It rapidly became a wealthy and populous town.
          The government was a close oligarchy, the supreme council being formed by the
          heads of the tribes, of whom one was chosen annually to be the President of the
          city.
   This constitution was subsequently modified by the
          creation of a less exclusive council, and finally, about the year 435 BC,
          the people succeeded in driving the oligarchs out of the town and establishing
          a thoroughly democratic form of government. The exiled oligarchs at once united
          with the neighboring barbarians, with whose aid they plundered the property of
          their opponents. So severe was the damage inflicted, that the Epidamnians were at length compelled to send to
          Corcyra for assistance. Their request was received with the greatest apathy;
          the Corcyraeans showed no inclination to enter into
          the domestic quarrels of Epidamnus. In their
          distress, the Epidamnians sought the advice
          of Delphi. Should they apply to Corinth, the home of their founder, for the
          help which Corcyra denied? The oracle approved the suggestion, and to Corinth
          they went, repeating the command given at Delphi, and offering to place their
          city in the hands of the Corinthians. Their overtures met with a ready
          response. The Corinthians were not inclined to forego any claim which
          they had upon Epidamnus, and their hatred of
          Corcyra was an additional motive for securing the colony. Without consulting
          the wishes of Corcyra, they at once invited any Corinthian who pleased to
          settle at Epidamnus, and a force of troops was
          sent to protect them in the city.
   Upon this the exiled oligarchs went to Corcyra, and
          entreated the city to restore them. The appeal came at the right moment. When
          the Corcyraeans found that their colony had gone over
          to Corinth, and had admitted Corinthian troops and settlers, they were highly
          indignant. Taking the exiles with them they set sail at once for Epidamnus, and demanded that they should be taken back. The
          demand was, of course, refused, upon which they set about investing the city,
          with the aid of the exiles and neighboring Illyrians.
   The Corinthians were not less active; they
          no sooner heard of the investment of Epidamnus,
          than they proclaimed a new colony to the town. Any Corinthian who chose might
          go, and he would be an equal among equals in the new city; those who found it
          inconvenient to leave Corinth at once could secure a place by depositing a sum
          of money. Appeals were also sent round to friendly cities for ships and money.
          A large force must be dispatched, and a large fleet would be required as a
          convoy. The Corcyraeans now repaired to Corinth,
          complaining loudly of the injustice done to them. The Corinthians, they said,
          had no interest in Epidamnus, which was a Corcyraean colony. Let them choose any Peloponnesian
          state to decide between them; or let the matter be referred to Delphi. Before
          going further the Corinthians demanded the withdrawal of the Corcyraean troops from Epidamnus.
          The Corcyraeans replied with a similar demand. But
          all negotiations were useless; the Corinthians were resolved upon
          war, and sent their fleet to sea. A great battle was fought at the mouth of
          the Ambracian Gulf, seventy-five Corinthian
          ships against eighty Corcyraean, in which the
          Corinthians were entirely defeated, with a loss of fifteen ships. On the same
          day, Epidamnus was compelled by the
          besieging force to capitulate. Such disasters were overwhelming, and though
          hostilities went on for the rest of the year (435 BC), the Corinthians did
          not venture on a second engagement.
   The old feud had broken out once more; once more the
          mother-city had been defeated by her ungrateful daughter. The humiliation was
          intolerable. The Corinthians were filled with a desire for revenge.
          All through the year 434 BC and for part of 433, they were busy with building
          ships and preparing to renew the struggle. The Corcyraeans became alarmed. They were alone, and without allies, while
          the Corinthians were members of a great confederacy. It was necessary
          to seek assistance from the second great power in Greece.
   In 433 BC Corcyraean envoys
          appeared at Athens asking that the island might be admitted into the Athenian
          alliance. Their position was difficult, for they had to clear themselves of the
          two charges to which their conduct was open. Was it not inconsistent for a
          state, which had refused to become the ally of others, to be now seeking an
          alliance? Was it not ungrateful for a colony to be engaged in war with her
          mother-city? They confessed that they had made a mistake in standing apart from
          an alliance with the Grecian cities; but a mistake was pardonable when it
          proceeded from no bad motive. And it was now impossible to adhere to a policy
          which left them alone, while the Corinthians could bring all the Peloponnesus
          against them. The war with Corinth had been forced upon them, in spite of their
          appeal to arbitration. It was the duty of a colony to treat her mother-city
          with all proper respect and deference, but she could not submit to injustice.
          The colonists were the equals of those whom they had left behind; and it was
          the duty of a mother-city to treat them as such. After this justification, the Corcyraeans attempted to show that the Athenians would not
          be guilty of a breach of the treaty with Lacedaemon, in accepting them as
          allies. Technically this was true; by the treaty it was open to either side to
          receive as allies states who were as yet the allies of neither. But
          the slightest reflection was enough to show that a mere alliance was not what
          the Corcyraeans wanted. They wanted help, and how
          could the Athenians help them without coming into collision with the
          Corinthians? This difficulty was perhaps forgotten when the Corcyraeans pointed out that war between Athens and Sparta was inevitable and even
          imminent. Let the Athenians choose whether they would enter into the war with
          the navy of Corcyra—the second largest navy in Greece—as an ally or an enemy.
          From Corcyra too more conveniently than from any other state they could control
          the route to Sicily, if it should prove important to send ships thither, or to
          cut off those which came from the west.
   In reply to these arguments the Corinthians, who had
          at once sent an embassy to Athens to oppose the request of their enemies, had
          much to say of the iniquity of the Corcyraeans, both
          in their general conduct and in their treatment of their mother-city. They had
          of course to veil as best they could their own refusal to submit the points at
          issue to arbitration; but on the other hand they had no difficulty in showing
          that an alliance between Corcyra and Athens must lead to a breach of the peace
          between Athens and Corinth. They could not deny the great advantage which
          Athens would gain by the addition of the Corcyraean navy
          to her own, but the war in which this navy was to be of such signal service was
          still in the future; there was no reason why it should come soon; and it might
          not come at all. They reminded the Athenians that they had restrained the
          Peloponnesians from interfering to help the Samians against Athens;
          let the same principle be maintained now. Whatever the balance of
          immediate advantage in the long run an honest and consistent policy was the
          best.
   The Athenians were at first inclined to listen to the
          Corinthians, who, whatever their conduct to Corcyra, had justice on their side
          in opposing the alliance. But on further consideration they resolved to enter
          into a defensive alliance with Corcyra. They believed that war with Sparta
          would come, and, with that danger before them, they wished to have Corcyra on
          their side. They also felt that Corcyra was an important station on the way to
          Sicily and Italy—a station which they could not allow to fall into the hands of
          their rivals and enemies. It Was at once determined to send ten ships
          to Corcyra with orders not to attack the Corinthians, but to act with the Corcyraeans, if any attempt were made to land on their
          island, or on any territory belonging to them. For in this case the Corinthians
          would be the assailants, and the Athenians would be merely defending allies,
          whom they had a right, under the treaty, to receive. Soon afterwards, feeling
          that ten ships were an inadequate force, they sent off twenty more. The first
          squadron was under the command of Lacedaemonius,
          the son of Cimon, and two others.
   From this narrative, which has the authority of
          Thucydides, we can hardly avoid drawing the conclusion that there was a great
          diversity of opinion at Athens about the Corcyran proposal.
          Pericles was no doubt strongly in favor of accepting it; he would employ all
          his eloquence to put in the most striking light the two reasons which
          eventually determined the choice of the Athenians. But the opposition was also
          very strong—that is, there was a large party at Athens, which did not believe
          that war with Sparta was imminent, or perhaps inevitable, which wished to
          restrain Athens from any conduct likely to bring on a war, and which still
          cherished the hope that the international relations of Greece might be guided
          by principles of equity rather than expedience. How small was the encouragement
          given to Pericles is shown by the fact that Lacedaemonius—the
          son of his old opponent—was put in command of the squadron; and that the
          squadron was so insufficient. Lacedaemonius might
          be trusted to do nothing, if he could help it, which would irritate the
          Spartans, and with so few ships he could neither alarm the Corinthians into
          acquiescence nor render any real service to Corcyra. Indeed both parties seem
          to have felt that the dispatch of such a force was ludicrous. It was one of
          those half-measures which always entail fatal consequences.
   The Corcyraeans and
          Corinthians now prepared for battle. The Corinthians equipped ninety ships of
          their own, and obtained sixty more from their allies. With those they sailed to
          the mainland opposite Corcyra, where they pitched a camp near the promontory
          of Cheimerium. The Corcyraeans met them with one hundred and ten ships and the ten Athenian vessels. A severe
          engagement took place the most severe which had yet been fought between two
          Hellenic fleets. The Corcyraeans were successful on
          their own left wing, and not only drove the Corinthian allies to shore, but
          even landed and destroyed the vacant tents; but on their right, where they were
          engaged with the Corinthians themselves, they were defeated. Unhappily it was
          at this point that the Athenian ships were stationed. For a time they
          endeavored to abstain from any actual collision, “but when the Corcyraeans fled outright and the Corinthians pressed them
          hard, then every man fell to work; all distinctions were forgotten; the time
          had arrived when Corinthian and Athenian were driven to attack one another”.
   The Corinthians pursued their enemy to the shore, and
          then began to collect their own wrecks and dead. These they conveyed to the
          mainland, where the barbarian allies were at hand to protect them. They then
          formed afresh for a second attack, and the Corcyraeans sailed to meet them. The war-cry had already been sounded, when the Corinthians
          suddenly retired. Twenty vessels were seen sailing up, which proved to be the
          second squadron from Athens. These joined the Corcyraean fleet.
   The next day the Corinthians did not venture to renew
          the attack. Enough if they could get away with their prisoners without being
          captured by the Athenians, whom they now regarded as declared enemies. In order
          to ascertain what opposition would be offered, they sent a few men in a boat to
          the Athenians, upbraiding them with their action, and calling upon them, if
          they were at war, to take the crew of the boat and deal with them accordingly.
          But the Athenians merely replied that they were defending their allies; if
          the Corinthians were going to sail against Corcyra, resistance would
          be offered, but not otherwise. The Corinthians then set up a trophy in honor of
          victory, and sailed home. Among their captives were two hundred and fifty of
          the most influential men at Corcyra. These they treated with great
          consideration, in the hope that by their influence the city might yet be won;
          the remaining captives, who were slaves, they sold.
   “Thus the war ended to the advantage of Corcyra, and
          the Athenian fleet returned home. This was the first among the causes of the
          Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians alleging that the Athenians had taken part
          with the Corcyraeans, and had fought against them, in
          defiance of the treaty”.
   What was the result of the Corcyraean victory
          at Epidamnus, we are not informed; nor what
          became of the Corinthian captives there. But the Corinthians must have seen
          with intense irritation the fruits of their final victory over the Corcyraeans snatched from their hands by the appearance of
          the second Athenian squadron; and their anger would not be lessened when they
          found that Athens followed up the alliance with Corcyra by giving favorable
          audience to envoys from Leontini and Rhegium (Chalcidian towns in Sicily and Italy)
          and entering into an alliance with Zacynthus.
          The influence of Corinth in the West was in greater danger than ever.
   Another cause of quarrel soon arose, and in this case
          also it was the Athenians and Corinthians who were brought into collision.
          Potidaea, a Corinthian colony on the isthmus of Pallene, was a tributary
          ally of Athens, but governed by magistrates sent annually from Corinth. The
          Athenians, aware of the hostile spirit which now prevailed at Corinth, were
          afraid that the Potidaeans might be induced to
          revolt. They had the greater reason for alarm, because Perdiccas, king of
          Macedonia, their former ally, had now become their enemy, and was doing all
          that he could to kindle war between Athens and Sparta. The revolt of Potidaea,
          under such circumstances, would be followed by the revolt of Chalcidice. To
          prevent this disaster, the Athenians called on the Potidaeans to raze their walls, and give hostages for good behavior; and, in order to
          secure the execution of this demand, they directed the generals of an
          expedition, which they were about to send against Perdiccas, to put in at
          Potidaea. The Potidaeans in their distress sent
          envoys to Athens to obtain if possible some remission of the demand. The
          Athenians were inexorable, and when the envoys found that negotiations were
          useless, they passed on to Lacedaemon, where they received a promise that, if
          the Athenians attacked Potidaea, the Peloponnesians would invade Attica. When the Potidaeans heard this, they determined to revolt.
          They were joined by the Chalcidian Greeks and the neighboring Bottiaeans, and on the advice of Perdiccas,
          the Chalcidians even abandoned their small settlements on the coast,
          and gathered at Olynthus, which they formed into a strong city. Aid was also
          sent from Corinth to support the rebellion. The Athenians on their part
          reinforced their former expedition, which had abandoned the hope of reducing
          Potidaea, and was occupied with Macedonia. A peace was made
          with Perdiccas—who had no sooner got the Athenian army out of his country
          than he reverted to his old position, and sent two hundred horse to aid the
          rebels—and the whole force moved upon Potidaea. A successful engagement enabled
          them to drive the Potidaeans and Corinthians into the
          walls of the city, which they at once cut off from the mainland. With the aid
          of subsequent reinforcements they cut off the other side also, towards the
          isthmus, and the ships prevented any communication from the sea. Though Athens
          and Corinth were nominally at peace, the Athenians were now blockading a
          Corinthian garrison in a Corinthian city.
   The excitement at Corinth was great; it was
          unfortunate for the peace of Hellas that, of all the cities of the confederacy,
          it was Corinth which Athens had injured. For a long time past the city had
          cherished a deadly hatred of her neighbor, and in energy and capacity she was
          quite the leading city of Peloponnesus. Aegina and Megara had felt the weight
          of Athenian oppression, but they had taken no active steps to obtain redress,
          and might have taken none, had not the Corinthians set the example.
           They invited the injured allies to meet at Sparta and
          inveighed against the Athenians, declaring that they had broken the treaty by
          their proceedings at Corcyra and Potidaea. They called on the Spartans to
          rescue the cities of the confederacy which looked to them for help. The
          Spartans had no special reason for going to war. Athens had in no way injured
          them, nor shown the least inclination to attack the Peloponnesus. But it was
          impossible to turn a deaf ear to the complaints of so important a city as
          Corinth. They summoned any other allies, who had similar charges to make, and
          calling their own ordinary assembly bade them speak before it. Among others,
          the Megarians came forward, declaring that they had been excluded
          from dealing in the Athenian markets, contrary to the provisions of the Thirty
          Years’ Peace. The Aeginetans did not
          venture to send envoys openly to the conference, but in secret they complained
          bitterly of their lost independence. Others followed with the story of their
          wrongs, and at last the Corinthians, trusting to the indignation which these
          tales of oppression had excited, came forward. In the speech which Thucydides
          has put into their mouths on this occasion, they treat the question from a
          general point of view. They reproach the Spartans with their inactivity, which
          allowed the Athenians to enslave one Grecian community after another. The
          crimes of the aggressor were no secret, yet no measures had been taken to
          counteract them. Sparta trusted that her reputation alone would save her
          allies, but Athens was active and restless. “Of all the Hellenes,
          Lacedaemonians, you are the only people, who never do anything. Instead of
          attacking your enemy, you wait to be attacked”. The Corinthians then drew an
          elaborate parallel between the Spartan and Athenian character, a comparison
          which is one of the most famous passages in the history of Thucydides, bringing
          before us in the clearest light the nature of the two forces which were about
          to meet in deadly conflict :
   “You have never considered what manner of men are
          these Athenians with whom you will have to fight, and how utterly unlike
          yourselves. They are revolutionary, equally quick in the conception and in the
          execution of every new plan; while you are conservative—careful only to keep
          what you have, originating nothing, and not acting even when action is most
          necessary. They are bold beyond their strength; they run risks which prudence would
          condemn; and in the midst of misfortune they are full of hope. Whereas it
          is your nature, though strong, to act feebly; when your plans are most prudent,
          to distrust them; and when calamities come upon you, to think that you will
          never be delivered from them. They are impetuous, and you are dilatory;
          they are always abroad and you are always at home. For they hope to gain
          something by leaving their homes; but you are afraid that any new enterprise
          may imperil what you have already. When conquerors, they pursue their victory
          to the utmost; when defeated, they fall back the least. Their bodies they
          devote to their country as though they belonged to other men; their true self
          is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. When
          they do not carry out an intention which they have formed, they seem to have
          sustained a personal bereavement; when an enterprise succeeds, they have gained
          a mere installment of what is to come; but if they fail, they at once conceive
          new hopes and so fill up the void. With them alone to hope is to have, for they
          lose not a moment in the execution of an idea. This is the life-long task, full
          of danger and toil, which they are always imposing upon themselves. None enjoy
          their good things less because they are always seeking for more. To do their
          duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as
          disagreeable as the most tiresome business. If a man should say of them, in a
          word, that they were born neither to have peace themselves, nor to allow peace
          to other men, he would simply speak the truth”.
   In the face of such an enemy delay was fatal. Let the
          Spartans at last shake off their lethargy, and go with the stream. They must
          invade Attica and relieve Potidaea as they were pledged to do. They could not
          expect loyalty from their allies, unless they came to their help in a time of
          trouble.
           Some Athenian envoys who happened to be at
          Sparta at the time, on other business, were allowed to reply to the charges of aggression
          which the Corinthians had made against their city. Their empire, they said, was
          the growth of circumstances; it was administered wisely, as the Greeks would
          discover if the Lacedaemonians were placed in a similar position. The ruling
          power, whatever it was, was always disliked; the Lacedaemonians now enjoyed the
          good-will of Hellas, but they would lose it, if they succeeded to the Athenian
          empire. Let the matters in dispute be settled by arbitration; war was a
          calamity of which the end could not be foreseen, and all cities should shrink
          from bringing it upon Hellas. When the allies had stated their case, the
          Spartans bade them retire, and discussed the question among themselves.
          There was a difference of opinion. King Archidamus was
          strongly opposed to immediate war; he considered that the confederacy in its
          present condition was no match for the Athenians. For nearly fifty years Sparta
          had remained stationary, while Athens had pressed forward with rapid strides.
          Delay was necessary to restore the balance. Let them send and remonstrate with
          the Athenians, and while negotiations went forward, put themselves in a state
          of preparation. Such a course was wise and not unworthy of Sparta. On the other
          hand, the ephor Sthenelaidas, who came
          forward last of all, was for immediate and open war. The alliance must be kept
          together; and the oppressor must be resisted, not by words but by deeds. The
          honor of Sparta demanded prompt and immediate action. The question was then put
          to the assembly, whether or not the Athenians had broken the treaty. It was the
          custom at Lacedaemon to decide by acclamation and not by votes, but on this
          occasion, under the pretence that he could not
          distinguish which was the louder cry, Sthenelaidas divided
          the assembly by directing those who said "Aye" to go to one side, and
          those who said "No" to the other. The result was thus placed beyond
          doubt. A large majority voted that the treaty had been broken. The decision was
          at once communicated to the allies, but before further steps were taken it was
          resolved to summon a general meeting of the confederacy at Sparta, and ask the
          allies to vote separately for peace or war.
   Meanwhile the reaction against Pericles at Athens was
          becoming more and more powerful. He had never been without enemies, but they
          had been powerless so long as the people were with him, and the people were
          with him as long as he courted their favor. But when he began to control them
          and resist their will, another feeling prevailed. Pericles was no longer their
          idol; they looked round for other leaders who would go further on the path
          which he seemed to have deserted. For Pericles had roused a spirit which
          he could not quell, without resorting to extreme measures. This “demos”,
          on which he had risen to power, was insatiable; and when its demands were
          refused, it was ready to turn upon the man who had hitherto ruled it. Another
          class of enemies consisted of the old aristocratical party, which
          viewed the entire policy of Pericles with dislike, and had opposed it as long
          as opposition was possible, first under Cimon, and afterwards under Thucydides.
          Between the two sections, the demos and the aristocrats, there was of course no
          real sympathy; yet they were now drawn together by common opposition to
          Pericles. Without the demos the aristocrats were powerless; with it they might
          at least get rid of the man who had so long kept them in subjection. In this
          coalition they were also joined by those who were offended at the presence
          of Anaxagoras and Aspasia at Athens. Thus, by a momentary combination of
          parties, a power was brought to bear upon Pericles which rendered his position
          insecure. He found first his friends, and then himself exposed to
          attacks; and in more than one instance the vote was given against him.
   The first attack was made against Phidias. The great
          sculptor had been the adviser of Pericles in erecting the stately buildings
          which adorned Athens. Phidias therefore was peculiarly obnoxious to those who
          had opposed the expenditure of public money on these objects. If the people
          could be induced to condemn him it would be an indication that they sympathized
          with the party which had endeavored to check this expenditure. The first charge
          was one of embezzlement. Some years previously Phidias had constructed the
          famous statue of Athena of ivory and gold. He was accused of keeping back part
          of the materials assigned to him for the purpose by the people. This accusation
          he was able to repel. On the advice of Pericles the statue had been so constructed
          that the gold and ivory could be removed without injury to the work. It was now
          taken off and weighed and no deficiency was discovered. Such evidence was
          conclusive, and Phidias was triumphantly acquitted. The accusers were foiled,
          but they were not silenced. The public mind had already been disquieted
          by Diopeithes and his friends on the
          subject of religion; a charge of impiety might succeed where the charge of
          embezzlement had failed. It was found out that in the figures which Phidias had
          depicted on the shield of Athena, he had inserted portraits of himself and
          Pericles. This was interpreted to be an offence against the goddess. Phidias
          was at once thrown into prison, and all the efforts of Pericles to procure his
          release were in vain. Before the day of trial arrived he was found dead. There
          was a strong suspicion that he had been poisoned, but the truth was never
          known. Some even suggested that Pericles himself had made away with the man who
          had been the instrument of his own peculation. Such was the end to which party
          strife brought the great artist who had made Athens the wonder of the world.
   Another object of attack was Anaxagoras. Of all his
          associates, this man seems to have exercised the most influence on Pericles. He
          was a native of Clazomena, and belonged to the
          Ionian school of philosophers. Like Thales of Miletus and Heraclitus of
          Ephesus, he endeavored to find a cause for physical phenomena, but, unlike
          them, he did not seek the cause in any single physical element, but in a
          guiding and uniting force. This force was Mind or Intellect; “all things were
          together in confusion, and were brought into order by Intellect”, was his
          maxim. On this principle Anaxagoras sought to eliminate chance from everything,
          and to substitute natural causes for supernatural.
   Plutarch tells an amusing story of the different
          explanations given of a supposed portent by Anaxagoras and his
          contemporary Lampon, the great soothsayer of the
          age. A ram with one horn was brought to Pericles. When Lampon saw
          it, he at once interpreted the meaning of the malformation. As the ram had one
          horn, instead of two, so would the two parties which now divided the state
          disappear, and the whole power pass over into the hands of Pericles.
          But Anaxagoras had the ram’s head opened, and showed that the single horn was
          the result of natural causes. For the moment the philosopher seemed to have
          triumphed over the soothsayer, but the subsequent fall of Thucydides created a
          reaction in favour of Lampon. A man whose mind was ever directed to the search
          for natural causes was of course raised above many of the fears and
          superstitions of his time. Among the multitudes of prophets, who swarmed in
          Greece, he could pursue a calm and even path. From Anaxagoras Pericles is said
          to have learned much of the stately reserve which was so remarkable a trait in
          his character. From him also he learned to differ from the common opinion of
          his day, which was ever on the watch for portents and omens, and was content to
          be guided in the most important affairs of life by the flight of birds or the
          monstrous births of animals.
   Such a philosophy of necessity came into collision
          with the cherished religious beliefs of the Greeks. There was no room in it for
          that gay variety of powers, with which a lively imagination had peopled earth
          and sea and sky. The sun, in the eyes of the Greeks, was a holy god, a living
          personal deity, who traversed the heaven daily from east to west in his bright
          chariot. Anaxagoras openly taught that the sun and stars were nothing more than
          red-hot stones.
           To those who held the old beliefs, and entered heart
          and soul into all the various forms of worship with which the old gods were
          celebrated, such tenets were “flat blasphemy”, and the author was a dangerous
          man.
           On these grounds Diopeithes,
          a friend of the orthodox Nicias, so well known to us
          from the pages of Thucydides, brought forward a proposal that those, who
          disbelieved in deities, and passed their time in discussing the nature of the
          heavenly bodies, should be impeached before the assembly. This general
          proposition was accepted—but whether Anaxagoras was attacked personally
          by Diopeithes is not known. A late writer
          informs us that Cleon brought an accusation against him for impiety; or, as
          others said, Thucydides, who had returned from his ostracism, attacked him for
          treachery. Whatever the precise nature of the charge and the process, it is
          pretty certain that Anaxagoras was condemned. He was thrown into prison. In a
          short time he either escaped or was allowed to go free, and a few years later
          he died an old man at Lampsacus.
   The ferocity of party strife was not satisfied with
          attacking two of the most intimate friends of Pericles. A still more savage
          blow was aimed at one with whom his domestic happiness was inseparably
          connected. Aspasia of Miletus belonged to the class of women whom the Greeks
          called Hetaerae, or companions. We can only describe them as adventurers, who
          attached themselves to any man willing to spend money upon them.
           Such relations were openly tolerated in Greece—where
          society was more masculine than among us,—but they were not approved. No man
          could associate with a “companion” without some loss of reputation; no
          thoughtful citizen for a moment confounded the marriage relation with such
          connections. There was no greater outrage on social feeling than to bring the
          members of an Athenian family into the society of “companions”. For the
          hetaerae themselves we must allow that the tolerance with which they were
          regarded saved them from the degradation into which the outcast of modern
          society is plunged. Whatever the misery of their lives might be, they were not
          hunted or starved into suicide, and as slaves, for most of them were
          slaves, they were too valuable to be murdered or injured with
          impunity. For such women it was necessary to be attractive. They had recourse
          to the various feminine arts in order to beautify their persons, and some at
          least sought to improve their minds and conversation. In this last respect more
          especially they had the advantage of the Greek matrons, who knew nothing of
          society, and were uninstructed in anything beyond the duties of the house.
   Aspasia then was a “companion”, but she was the first
          of her class. Ancient writers agree about her beauty and her intellect. Her
          circle was the first circle in Athens. How and when she attracted Pericles we
          do not know; we cannot say whether she drew him from his wife, or whether the
          short and somewhat unhappy years of his married life were ended before he made
          her acquaintance. What is certain is that he entered into a close relationship
          with her, which continued for the rest of his days. That she ever became his
          wife, as recent writers assume, is not asserted by any ancient author of
          credit; her son was certainly regarded as illegitimate, and the attacks of her
          enemies imply that she held a position which was at the best dubious. But
          whatever her position, the bond which united her with Pericles was very close.
          The two lived together in perfect harmony; their tastes and sympathies agreed.
          In the company of this cultivated woman Pericles found the relaxation which he
          never so much as sought in ordinary society. Once, and once only, as Plutarch
          relates, was the great statesman present at an evening entertainment, and even
          then he went away early. But he never left his house to go to his daily duties
          without taking a tender leave of Aspasia.
           The comedians had long made merry with the character
          of Aspasia. The worst charges were brought against her. That married Athenian
          women visited her salon—if we may use the term—was a proof that she corrupted
          women as well as men. That Anaxagoras and Socrates were seen in her company was
          a proof that she sympathized with godless and atheistical sophists.
          Was it not she who in the past had brought on the Samian war, by persuading
          Pericles to aid Miletus? Was it not she who had procured
          the Megarian decree, to revenge the loss of two of her shameless
          women? And now Hermippus, a comedian whose power
          lay in the coarseness of his satire, weary perhaps of his
          own abuse, or believing that the ground was well prepared, determined
          to bring her to trial. In this case also the charge was impiety, but it was
          united with a more odious accusation. Aspasia was represented to the court as
          an atheist and a procuress. Her position as an alien did not give her the right
          of appearing at the trial; and she might confidently leave her cause in the
          hands of Pericles. He came forward in person to defend her. For the first time
          the Athenians saw their great statesman overcome with emotion, and pleading as
          men plead for their lives, with the entreaties and tears which Greek manners
          permitted in a court of law. The judges were stirred by such an exhibition, and
          Aspasia was acquitted.
   The attack was no doubt made in the interests of a
          party, but it probably commanded the sympathy of a great many honest citizens.
          Such a character as Aspasia was out of place in a Greek community, and the more
          out of place, as the relation between her and Pericles approached the nature of
          lawful union. There was no room at Athens for women educated to live the life
          which Aspasia lived in the house of Pericles; and there could be no room, until
          the whole structure of society was altered. Greek society was emphatically a
          society of men; as men they met in the assembly or the marketplace; as men
          they raced, or talked, or fought. Their homes were isolated; and family life
          came into little or no relation with social life. No doubt Greek society
          suffered by the absence of women; and the Greek nature would have been improved
          had their women been better educated. There are writers who would have us
          believe that Pericles endeavored by means of Aspasia to give Greek women an
          insight into their true position. Without admitting this, we may allow that he
          was conscious of a great defect in Athenian life. But it is easier to detect an
          evil than to devise a remedy. Even Lycurgus was baffled when he attempted to
          reform the Spartan women!
   The acquittal of Aspasia was merely a concession to
          the personal influence of Pericles. His enemies were defeated, but the victory
          did not strengthen his position. On the contrary, he had been compelled to
          appear in open court to defend the mistress of his household from charges which
          could not even be breathed against an honest woman. His behavior at the trial
          had made it clear that he was sensible to the attacks made upon him, and this
          was an additional reason for continuing them. His opponents now ventured to
          bring a direct charge against the statesman himself. Dracontides proposed
          in the assembly that Pericles should give, before the Fifty Prytanes, an
          account of his expenditure of the public money, and that in this case the
          judges should give their votes in the most solemn manner on the altar. The
          proposal was subsequently altered, and Pericles was to be brought before a
          jury of fifteen hundred men, voting in the usual way by dropping pebbles into
          an urn.
   The proposal probably referred to some extraordinary
          payments of Pericles; at least it is difficult to understand how he could be
          called upon to give an account of transactions which had been examined and
          passed by the financial officers at Athens. Such extraordinary payments were
          sometimes made for objects which it was not convenient to announce openly; they
          were in fact secret-service money. In 445 BC Pericles had paid away a
          sum of ten talents, and when required to account for it had merely replied that
          it was spent “on a necessary purpose”. The answer was accepted in the days when
          he had the confidence of the people, but now a different temper prevailed. Was
          it so certain that the necessary purpose was a public purpose? In any case it
          would be difficult for Pericles to prove it. Secret-service money is secretly
          paid, and without acknowledgment. It is an expenditure in which absolute faith
          must be reposed in the honor of the man who makes it, and to call for the
          details of the payments is a breach of the conditions upon which they are made.
          But the opponents of Pericles had no scruples of this kind, and the people were
          in a mood in which Pericles could not trifle with them. It was necessary for
          him to find some answer to the charge or divert the attention of the Athenians
          into another path. Plutarch tells a story which at least puts the situation in
          a dramatic form. Pericles was discovered one day by Alcibiades in deep and
          anxious thought. Alcibiades enquired what was causing him so much trouble. He
          was thinking, he replied, how he could best render the Athenians an account of
          the public money he had spent. Would it not be better, rejoined Alcibiades, to
          think of a plan, by which you need not give them any account at all?
   Such was the position of affairs external and internal
          at Athens in the years 435-431 BC. Among their own allies the Athenians
          were an object of dislike, and some were in open revolt. Among those of the
          Peloponnesians who had been brought in contact with them they were regarded
          with hatred; the Corinthians more especially were prepared to go to
          any extremity in order to bring about a war between Athens and Sparta. At the
          same time Pericles was losing ground; it was greatly to his advantage to
          distract the attention of the people from the matters which now occupied them,
          and to break up the coalition which had formed against him. A war with Sparta
          would accomplish both these objects. It would naturally fill the public mind,
          and it would divide the oligarchs who clung to Sparta from that advanced
          section of the demos who attacked Pericles because he would not satisfy their
          demands. In the next chapter we shall see that at the last moment the Peloponnesian
          confederacy hung back, and endeavored to avoid an open breach, while Pericles
          insisted that no concession whatever should be made. The guilt of the final
          outbreak lies decisively at his door. Had the Athenians refused to
          follow his lead, the war could have been postponed, if it could not have been
          averted.
   
           CHAPTER XIII.
           THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR
           
           AFTER passing the vote in their own assembly that the
          treaty had been broken, the Lacedaemonians still delayed to enter upon active
          measures. They consulted the deity at Delphi, who replied that if they did
          their best in the war they would gain the day, and he would himself be on their
          side, invited or uninvited; but even this favorable reply did not lead to
          immediate action. Wishing to implicate the whole confederacy in their policy,
          they again summoned the allies to Sparta, where the question of peace and war
          was put before them. Here, as everywhere, the Corinthians were most
          energetic; they did their utmost to excite the allies; and, when all had made
          their complaints, they came forward and insisted that immediate war was
          necessary to put an end to the growing power of the Athenians. There was every
          prospect of success. On land the Peloponnesian confederacy had greater numbers,
          superior skill and organization.
   The Athenians, it was true, had money and ships in
          abundance, but the allies could contribute or borrow funds from Olympia and
          Delphi; and when they had money, it would be easy to build ships and buy up the
          foreign sailors who rowed in the Athenian fleet. Or the allies of Athens might
          be induced to revolt. At any rate, the risk must be run, for submission implied
          slavery. “The tyrant city, which has been set up in Hellas, is a standing
          menace to all alike; she rules over some of us already, and would fain rule
          over others. Let us attack and subdue her that we may ourselves have safety for
          the future, and deliver the Hellenes whom she has enslaved. We are not the
          aggressors; we have justice on our side, and the god has promised his help”.
          When all had spoken, the Lacedaemonians put the question to each ally—great and
          small,—and the majority were in favor of war. But so slow and ill-prepared was
          the confederacy; so unwilling, we may perhaps add, were the Spartans
          themselves, or at least a large party among them, to take any active
          measures—for no wrong had been done to them by the Athenians—that nearly a year
          passed before open hostilities broke out. In the meantime, embassies went to
          and fro between Sparta and Athens in the hope that
          peace might still be maintained, or, if this were impossible, that there might
          at least be a definite cause for war. For in all the quarrels of the Greeks,
          whether public or private, each side was at all times eager to prove that he
          was not the aggressor.
   The Spartans were anxious by every means to put the
          Athenians in the wrong. First they called on them to banish the accursed of
          Athena—by which were meant the Alcmaeonidae, the great family with which
          Pericles was connected. Had the Athenians agreed to this demand, Pericles must
          have gone into exile, and the greatest opponent of Sparta and of peace would
          have been removed. But so far from yielding, the Athenians retorted by bidding
          the Spartans expel the “curse of Taearus”, and
          the “curse of Athena of the Brazen House”. In a second demand the Athenians
          were asked to raise the siege of Potidea and
          restore Aegina to independence. They could reply that the allied states of
          Sparta had already agreed to the principle that each confederacy should deal as
          it chose with its own allies; and the position of Aegina was precisely what it
          had been when the Thirty Years’ Peace was concluded. Once more, the Spartans
          insisted that the decree which excluded the Megarians from trading in
          the markets of Athens and the Athenian empire, should be rescinded.
          To this the Athenians answered : first, that the Megarians had tilled
          the border-land between the two countries, and received Athenian slaves;
          secondly, that there was no agreement in the terms of the peace stipulating
          that the Megarians should trade with Athens; and that the Spartans
          were in the habit of expelling strangers from their own city. A final embassy
          came with a demand which swept away these small differences in one
          general stipulation : The Lacedaemonians, they said, desire peace,
          “and peace there will be if you restore independence to the Hellenes, if not,
          there will be war”.
   This broad demand appealed to the sympathy of Hellas.
          It enabled the Spartans to call on their confederacy for help, and supplied a
          common motive for war. Allies might ask: Why should they go to war for the
          interests of Megara, or Aegina? What was the siege of Potidaea to them? But if
          the Athenians refused to restore independence to the Hellenes, their
          empire was placed in its most odious light, and the danger threatened
          all alike. On the other hand, such a request was calculated to strengthen the
          hands of Pericles at Athens. He could now point out what the design of Sparta
          really was. It might seem preposterous to enter upon a great war merely to
          keep the Megarians out of Athens, but now it was clear that the
          existence of the empire was at stake. The form in which the demand was thrown
          was even worse than its substance. The Spartans were in no position to dictate
          to Athens, and Athens could not accept such orders without admitting the claim
          of Sparta to act as a sovereign city. All the hatred and suspicion which for
          years past Pericles had been laboring to implant among the Athenians against
          their great rivals would be called into new activity by this sweeping demand.
   Pericles at once availed himself of the situation, and
          employed to the utmost his powers of eloquence to induce the Athenians to be
          firm for war. He pointed out that the Spartans enforced their demands by the
          threat of arms; there was no talk of arbitration. But in the treaty it was
          arranged that any differences which arose were to be settled by arbitration,
          each side in the meanwhile retaining what it possessed.
          The Megarian decree was a mere pretext, veiling further claims, and,
          even if it were not, concession was impossible. No matter how small the point
          at issue, the principle involved was the existence of Athens. For “any claim,
          the smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neighbor and an equal, where
          there has been no legal award, can mean nothing but slavery”. Such arguments
          were sufficient to prevail with his audience; but they could hardly have
          prevailed with Pericles himself, if he had not wished to make peace impossible.
          The Spartans had declared that there would be no war, if
          the Megarian decree were cancelled; was it not worthwhile to try the
          experiment? Fourteen years before, Pericles had purchased peace by enormous
          concessions to Sparta, without in the least injuring the position of Athens in
          the Delian confederacy. Why was concession so fatal now? There was,
          as Pericles well knew, a powerful peace party at Sparta. Had he acted in concert
          with Archidamus, his own personal friend, in this
          matter, a better feeling might have prevailed between the two cities. As it is,
          we see the greatest statesman of the day putting logic in the place of policy;
          and if he does not drive his nation into war with the rude brutality of a
          Spartan ephor, the reason is that as an Athenian he has learnt the art of
          calling in general principles to support his views.
   Pericles gave the Athenians ground for hoping that
          they would be successful in the war. And here again his love of a principle
          misled him. The wealth of Athens was doubtless an enormous advantage, which
          enabled her to keep control of the sea; and so long as she was mistress of the
          sea, the Spartan confederacy could not touch her. The walls of Athens were
          impregnable; whatever damage the Peloponnesians might do to Attica,
          they could not enter the city or break the communication with the Piraeus. But
          on the other hand ships will wear out, and money is quickly spent. A very few
          years of war served to empty the Athenian treasury, and she was thrown back on
          her yearly income, no less than the Spartans and their allies. It is true that
          she received the contributions of her subjects, but these could not be
          collected without a force; and there was the constant fear that they might
          revolt. From these defects the Peloponnesians were free. Their soldiers were
          citizens who fought without pay; if there was any want of action, it was not
          for want of money, but for want of leisure. Their operations were limited, no
          doubt, but they were effective as far as they went. Pericles himself was driven
          to confess that on land the Athenians could not risk an engagement with the
          Peloponnesians. The indomitable spirit of the citizen-soldier is something
          which money cannot buy, and it was with this spirit that Pericles was going to
          war. He might destroy the Corinthian navy, but what hope had he of ever
          conquering the Boeotian and Spartan infantry? His treasures would be exhausted
          long before the spirit of his enemies was broken. At the best, such a war as
          that which he contemplated would go on indefinitely, each side being superior
          to the other on its own element, but neither able to inflict irreparable
          damage. Only when one or other struck out a new line or committed a fatal
          mistake, could the end come.
   The Athenians were persuaded by Pericles, and answered
          the Laconian envoys as he wished. They would do nothing upon
          compulsion, but were ready to settle the differences by arbitration upon fair
          terms according to the treaty. The ambassadors returned; the treaty was
          practically suspended; but neither party would commence hostilities.
   Suddenly, in an unexpected quarter, a decisive step
          was taken. The Thebans were in no way concerned in the dispute which had
          brought about the suspension of the treaty, but they were allies of the
          Spartans, and for three-quarters of a century they had cherished a deep-seated
          hatred of the Athenians. About the time when the Pisistratidae were
          expelled from Athens, the inhabitants of Plataea, a city on the northern slopes
          of Cithron, had applied to Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, for protection against
          Thebes. Afraid of the aggression of their neighbor—Thebes is six or seven miles
          to the north of Plataea, beyond the Asopus—they
          wished to break loose from the Boeotian confederation, of which Thebes was now
          the head, and attach themselves to Sparta. But Cleomenes pointed out that his city lay at a great
          distance from Plataea; before assistance could arrive from the Peloponnesians,
          the Thebans could lay waste the Plataean territory and enslave the city twice over. He recommended the Plataeans to apply to Athens, their next neighbor, who
          would be able to protect them. The Plataeans acted on
          this advice, and, finding a ready response, placed themselves under Athenian protection.
          A quarrel with Thebes was the immediate result, and though the Corinthians, who
          were called in to decide the matter, decided that Plata should choose her own
          alliance, the Thebans never acquiesced in the arrangement. They looked on Plataae as a part of Boeotia, and only waited for an
          opportunity to assert their claim.
   Such an opportunity seemed now to have arrived. At the
          beginning of spring, in the year 431 BC, a force of over three hundred
          Thebans, under the command of two of the Boeotarchs,
          as the officers of the Boeotian confederacy were called, entered Plataae by night. No watch had been set, for as yet
          war had not been openly proclaimed, and the Plataeans had no reason to apprehend an attack. But the Thebans did not stand on
          ceremony, and here, as was always the case in Greece, treachery had been at
          work. There was a party in Plataea which hoped, by detaching the city from
          Athens, to get the chief power into their own hands. With this view they
          negotiated with an eminent Theban for the dispatch of the force, and, when it
          arrived, they opened the gates and received it into the city. Their desire was
          to cut down their enemies at once, and so clear the ground for their own
          advancement; but the Thebans took a more conciliatory course. Grounding their
          arms in the market-place of the city, they called on those who wished to return
          to the ancient constitution of Boeotia to join them, and become their allies.
          It was not in the interests of a party, but in the interests of Boeotia, that
          they wished to recover Plataea.
   The delay was fatal. At the first entrance of the
          Thebans, in the darkness of night, the Plataeans were
          panic-stricken; they could form no estimate of the number of the enemy, and, in
          the belief that they were much more numerous than they really were, they
          listened to their proposals. By degrees they discovered that the force was not
          overwhelming, and as the Plataean people were
          strongly attached to Athens, they resolved to attack the invaders, and drive
          them out. They reflected that the Thebans were strangers in the city, of which
          every street, house, and gateway was familiar to themselves. It was easy
          to surprise them, if the attack was made in the dark. The plan was carried out.
          Just before daybreak a furious onset was made, and though for a short time the
          Thebans were able to resist, they were soon driven in confusion along the
          streets, seeking their way out of the city. All the gates save that by which
          they entered were closed; the Plataeans met them at
          every turn. Even the women from the house-tops threw tiles and stones upon
          them, and when day returned, the force which had entered so
          easily, was annihilated; one hundred and eighty Thebans, including
          the leader, were taken captive; of the rest, the majority had been killed.
   It had been arranged that the main body of the Theban
          army should march out in support of the attack. But a heavy rain had caused
          the Asopus to rise in the night, and it
          could not now be crossed without difficulty. Before the Thebans reached the Plataean territory, they were met with the news of the
          disaster which had befallen their countrymen. They pressed on, hoping to seize
          men and property as a compensation for their own citizens, who were in the
          hands of the Plataeans; the Plataeans,
          however, warned them by a herald that, if any damage were done to their
          property, the Theban captives would be put to death; if they retired, the
          captives would be given up. On this the Thebans went back into their own
          country.
   The Plataeans at once set
          about bringing in their property from the fields, and, as soon as all was
          secured, they slew the whole of their prisoners. News of the attack had been at
          once conveyed to Athens, and a second messenger had reported the capture of the
          Thebans. The Athenians at once arrested all the Boeotians who happened to be in
          Attica, and dispatched an envoy to Plataea, requesting that the prisoners
          should be kept for further instructions. The request unhappily came too late.
          The prisoners were already dead when the envoy arrived, and the Plataeans were busy preparing their city against further
          attacks.
   Such was the first act in the great drama. It forms a
          striking instance of the insecurity of Greek life, and the furious passions to
          which this insecurity naturally gave rise. In Plataea there is a party of
          traitors, waiting for an opportunity to cut the throats of their opponents; the
          Thebans attack a city secured by treaty, without waiting for any formal
          declaration of war; the Plataeans, in spite of the
          promise by which the Thebans were induced to retire, put all the captives to
          death. The question was indeed debated whether the promise was or was not
          confirmed by an oath. Their cruelty and perfidy the Plataeans could not deny, but they resented the charge of perjury; a refinement which
          merely proves the superstition and sophistry in which the Greeks of the time
          were sunk. A hundred years had still to pass; Plataea had twice to be leveled
          to the ground before this neighborly quarrel was finally settled by the utter
          destruction of Thebes at the hands of Alexander.
   The Thirty Years’ Truce had now been openly broken.
          Had the Plataeans preserved their prisoners alive,
          the Thebans might have been brought to terms; Sparta might have disowned the
          action of her ally in violating the treaty. But the murder of one hundred and
          eighty Thebans made it impossible to draw back. On both sides preparations were
          made for immediate war. The enthusiasm was great,—the greater because it was
          intended that the struggle should be final. The Peloponnesians, aware of their
          deficiency on sea, requested their allies in Italy and Sicily to build
          additional ships and contribute money; in their ambition they dreamed of a navy
          of five hundred vessels! The Athenians sent to their allies in the Ionian Sea,
          Corcyra, Acarnania, and Zacynthus, with
          whose assistance they hoped to enclose the Peloponnesus and cut off all
          communication with the west. There were doubtless many who hailed the outbreak
          as a relief from an intolerable tension; many more who, from mere ignorance and
          love of change, were weary of peace. “The youth of Peloponnesus and the youth
          of Athens were numerous, and neither of them had ever seen war”. Prophecies and
          oracles passed from mouth to mouth, and the ingenuity of diviners was tasked to
          the utmost. Every uncommon phenomenon of nature was noticed and recorded.
          The Delians announced that their sacred island had been “shaken” for
          the first time in the memory of man.
   Whatever the faults of the Peloponnesian confederacy,
          it seems to have answered to the ideas which the Greeks formed of federation.
          The allies had the right of making themselves heard at Sparta, they were not
          harassed by constant requisitions; and though Pericles asserts that Sparta
          insisted on a form of government among her allies which was suitable to her own
          interests, it is difficult up to this time to produce an instance of any
          interference on her part with the politics of her allies. She had of course
          reduced Laconia and Messenia to submission, but this was accepted by the rest
          of Greece with the same acquiescence as the union of Attica, or the federation
          of Boeotia. These were changes which, whether the result of just or unjust
          dealing, were regarded as final. But Athens was a conquering state, engaged at
          the moment in consolidating an empire, and exposed to the bitterness now
          present in the hearts of men who were conscious of lost independence. Some
          longed to be delivered from her control; others were afraid of falling under
          it.
           The Athenians had taken no very active part in the
          incident of Plataea; no additional complaint could be brought against
          them on this ground, except the arrest of the Boeotians in Attica, which was
          merely a measure of precaution. Sparta was still without any clear and
          well-defined casus belli, so far as she herself was concerned. But the spirit of
          war had been aroused, and even those who deeply regretted the outbreak of
          hostilities were compelled to go with the stream. Immediately after the affair
          at Plataea, the ephors of Sparta, who were practically the executive
          of the confederacy, sent round to the allies bidding them furnish troops
          equipped for a foreign expedition; and at the time appointed, a little before
          midsummer, the various states met at the Isthmus of Corinth, each with
          two-thirds of her whole force, for the invasion of Attica. Each contingent was
          commanded by its own generals, but the whole expedition was under the command
          of Archidamus, king of Lacedaemon.
   Archidamus, as we have seen, had attempted to dissuade the
          confederacy from open war; even now he cherished the hope that the last and
          irrevocable step might be avoided. He impressed his army with the necessity of
          caution in attacking so powerful an enemy, who might at the last moment be
          stung into desperate resistance; and even dispatched a Spartan envoy to Athens,
          in the hope that some concession might yet be made. But the Athenians were
          resolute. The envoy was not even admitted into the city, for Pericles had
          induced the people to refuse to listen to any overtures, so long as the
          Lacedaemonians were in the field. He was sent away without a hearing, and told
          that he must cross the frontier before sunset; if the Lacedaemonians wished to
          negotiate with the Athenians, they must disband their army and go home. When he
          arrived at the frontier, and was about to take leave of the escort which had
          accompanied him, the envoy, impressed with the greatness of the struggle which
          was now inevitable, uttered these words of melancholy prophecy: “This day will
          be to the Hellenes the beginning of great calamities”. On learning that no
          concessions would be made, Archidamus gave the final
          order and prepared to enter Attica.
   Meanwhile Pericles had taken measures for the safety
          of the Athenians. He was well aware that he could not meet the Peloponnesians
          in the field, or prevent them from laying waste as much of Attica as they
          chose. He must place his city in a state of siege, and concentrate Attica in
          Athens. Within the walls of the city, and Piraeus, and the long walls which
          connected the two, the whole population of the country could be secured; and the
          damage which might be done to the country would be a trifling matter so long as
          the city retained her ships, her money, and her allies.
           His authority prevailed; the country people left their
          pleasant homes, and cultivated farms, and came to Athens with their wives and
          children, their household goods, and even the woodwork of their houses, which
          in Attica was far more valuable than stone or brick. But the removal was not
          accomplished without much discomfort and vexation. Many families had lived in
          the country for generations; the town and town life was quite strange to them;
          they were leaving the tombs of their race, the temples where they worshipped.
          And when they arrived in the city, there were no houses to receive them. They
          had to obtain such shelter as they could in vacant spaces, or temples and
          shrines, or the turrets of the walls. Afterwards they spread down the long
          walls, and into Piraeus, but for a time the sudden influx of so large a
          population caused the greatest disorder. The sanitary conditions created by the
          change must have been little less than revolting. That Pericles should have
          contemplated the removal of such numbers into the city without making due
          provision for them was of course a gross oversight,—an oversight of which no
          shrewd practical man would ever have been guilty. He could discuss physical
          phenomena with Anaxagoras, and arrange with Phidias and Ictinus for the
          construction of beautiful buildings, but the prosaic details of life were
          forgotten. The day of vengeance was not long in coming.
           At the same time that he called on the Athenians to
          make this great sacrifice, he cheered them with hopes of victory. Still
          insisting on his old maxim that war was mainly an affair of money, he pointed
          to the large revenues and accumulations at the disposal of the Athenian state.
          From the allies the income was 600 talents a year; in the treasury of the
          Acropolis there was a reserve of 6,000 talents of coined money. The offerings
          and sacred vessels and the like were worth 800 talents more, and in a great
          extremity the gold, 40 talents in weight, could be taken from the statue of
          Athena, and converted into money. Sacred as many of these objects were, it was
          proper to use them in self-defense on the understanding that they would be
          replaced at a future time. Then he passed in review the forces of Athens. Her
          heavy-armed soldiers amounted to 13,000, besides the 16,000 engaged in garrison
          duty at Athens or in the various fortresses of Attica. The cavalry numbered
          1,200, including mounted archers; of foot archers there were 1,800; the
          triremes were no fewer than 300. Such an array of forces was imposing, and
          Pericles left it for others to point out that the heavy-armed soldiers were of
          little use, if they could not be put in the field, while the constant
          desolation of Attica by the Peloponnesians must inevitably impoverish the class
          from which the trierarchs, so necessary for the
          equipment of the fleet, were taken. Nor did he make it clear how Athens, even
          if she obtained the most brilliant victories by sea, could ever keep a hold on
          the Peloponnesus. That was impossible without a large army of soldiers, strong
          enough to occupy a number of fortresses in Laconia and Elis. If the Spartans
          were in perpetual fear of the Helots, whom they had held in subjection for two
          centuries, what would have been the position of the Athenians with rebellious
          Spartans round them? In their dreams of empire they never spoke of restoring
          Messenia to independence. Yet such a restoration, and perhaps the entire
          extirpation of the whole Spartan race, would have been the only conditions on
          which Athens could have ruled the Peloponnesus. Nevertheless, the Athenians
          were full of spirit, and set about preparing a fleet of one hundred ships, with
          which to sail round the Peloponnesus, and make reprisals for any damage which
          might be inflicted on Attica.
   
           
 CHAPTER XIV.
           THE FUNERAL SPEECH.
           
           THIRTY-THREE days had now elapsed since the Thebans
          entered Plataea. Even Archidamus could delay no
          longer. Leaving the Isthmus, he led his forces over Mount Geraneia into the territory of Megara, where two
          routes lay before him: he might turn to the right, and pursue the coast road to
          Eleusis; or he might continue his march in a north-easterly direction till he
          reached the confines of Boeotia, and then strike into the direct road which
          connects Thebes and Athens. He chose the second, and when we next hear of him,
          he is besieging Oenoe, the fortress which secured the
          communication of Athens with Plataea. In taking this course he may have acted
          on the advice of his Boeotian allies, for, if this fortress were in his hands,
          the Thebans would not only be able to pass in and out of Attica as they
          pleased, but Athens would be prevented from coming to the aid of Plataea. At
          the same time he would open a more easy and convenient road between the
          northern and southern halves of the Peloponnesian alliance, than the usual
          route by Aegosthena and Creusis.
   The fortresses which commanded the various passes into
          Attica were held by garrisons formed chiefly of young men in the earliest years
          of military service. Of the fortifications of Oenoe we know nothing, but, whatever they were, they were sufficient with the natural
          strength of the place to enable such a garrison to bid defiance to the whole
          strength of the Peloponnesian army. After a waste of time, which brought on him
          the suspicion of intentional delay, Archidamus found
          himself compelled to leave the fortress in his rear. Descending down the valley
          of the Eleusinian Cephisus, he ravaged Eleusis
          and the Thriasian plain, from which he
          advanced over the ridge of hills to Acharnae, the
          largest of the ‘demes’ of Attica, and barely seven miles from the city.
          Here he encamped for some time, ravaging the immediate neighborhood, but not
          entering the central plain.
   In thus holding his hand while within sight of the
          city he sought to draw the Athenians out of the walls. He had hoped, though in
          vain, that they would come to meet him at Eleusis, and when he encamped within
          sight of Athens, in a town which furnished no fewer than 3,000 heavy-armed
          soldiers to the Athenian army, he confidently expected to reap one of two
          advantages. Either he would exasperate the enemy into fighting in the open
          field; or the Acharnians, knowing that their own
          property was destroyed, would be less eager to fight for that of others, and Archidamus would be at liberty to ravage Attica as he
          pleased.
   His plans were not ill-laid, but they were frustrated
          by the strong personal ascendancy of Pericles. So long as the Peloponnesian
          army lay at Eleusis, the Athenians still cherished the hope that the rest of
          the country would escape. Those who knew the history of the past would call to
          mind that Cleomenes, the famous king of Sparta,
          had once led a Peloponnesian army as far as Eleusis, only to see it disperse.
          And many would remember that fourteen years before the present
          invasion Plistoanax had reached the Thriasian plain, and then retired. But when the
          invaders were actually in sight, and the fairest possessions of Attica were at
          their mercy, the situation seemed intolerable. The whole people, and more
          especially the younger men, were eager to go out and put a stop to it. The
          sight was new to them, and they had little experience of the Spartan soldiers’
          courage and skill. Men gathered in the streets, abusing Pericles and his
          cowardly policy; the excitement was increased by all kinds of oracles invented
          or remembered for the occasion. The Acharnians, as
          was natural, were in the last stage of exasperation. They were a hardy race,
          the colliers of Attica, who got their living by manufacturing charcoal, “hearts
          of maple”, stiff and sturdy as the logs they burned. Forgetting all the
          counsels of Pericles, the whole people called on him to do his duty as a
          general. The situation was difficult, but Pericles did not flinch. He seems at
          this time to have enjoyed an extraordinary degree of authority, and in virtue
          of this power he abstained from summoning any public meeting at which the
          popular excitement might find expression. He did what he could to soothe the
          prevailing irritation; and meanwhile sent out parties of horse to prevent the
          invaders from coming too close to the city walls. The Thessalians, true to
          their old alliance, had sent cavalry to the aid of Athens, and these with the
          native horse proved themselves at least a match for the Boeotians in
          the Peloponnesian army.
   These measures seem to have had some effect upon Archidamus. It is at any rate remarkable that when he broke
          up from Acharnae on finding that the Athenians would
          not come out against him, he directed his course to the north, and contented
          himself with ravaging the country between Mt. Parnes and
          Mt. Brilessus. Here his provisions began to
          fail, and he found it necessary to retire. Passing through the coast land
          near Oropus, to the north-east of Parnes, and wasting the country as he went, he entered
          Boeotia by the route past Tanagra. The invasion had lasted about five weeks.
   The successful defense of Oenoe had shown that the army of the Peloponnesus was powerless against an
          insignificant fortress. Athens, therefore, was absolutely safe behind her
          walls, and though the Athenians suffered severely by the invasion, Pericles
          found means in the course of the year to compensate many of the sufferers. In
          spite of opposition he held on his way. His plans for the war were still
          accepted as the best, and in the conviction that Athens, and not Attica, was
          the vulnerable point of the state, a decree was passed that a thousand talents
          should be set apart out of the reserve in the treasury, and a hundred of the
          best triremes selected every year, with trierarchs appointed
          for each, to be ready for use in case an attack was made on the Piraeus. So
          earnest were the people in the matter, that the proposal to use the money or
          ships for any other purpose was made a capital offence. Measures were also
          taken for securing the safety of the country from unexpected attack by
          establishing guards on the frontiers.
   While the Lacedaemonians were still in their country
          the Athenians took steps to revenge themselves. A fleet of a hundred vessels
          was dispatched to ravage the shores of the Peloponnese. They were joined by a
          contingent of fifty ships from Corcyra, and a combined attack was made on Methone, a fortress on the coast of Messenia, a little to
          the south of Pylos (Navarino), which, in the days of Tolmides, had been captured and again abandoned by the
          Athenians. Had the attack succeeded, the Athenians would have anticipated in
          some degree the position which they obtained six years later by the capture
          of Pylos. They would have established a support in Messenia for any Helots
          who could find an opportunity of joining them, and a convenient station for the
          union of the contingents coming from east and west. But the attempt failed. In
          this, their very first landing on the shores of the Peloponnesus, they were
          confronted by a Spartan, whose courage and genius were more than a match for
          the plans of Pericles and the power of Athens—Brasidas, the son of Tellis. He happened to be on guard in the neighborhood—for
          the Spartans sent out parties of their citizens to keep watch on the outlying
          districts of their dominions,—and knowing the weakness of the place, he came to
          the rescue with a hundred men. Without a moment’s delay he broke through the
          scattered troops of the Athenians, and secured the town for Sparta. Thus
          repulsed the Athenian fleet sailed on to Elis, where it was joined by a few
          ships from Naupactus. Some successes were gained at Pheia, near the mouth of the Alpheus, but on the approach
          of the Elean army the Athenians
          re-embarked. More important by far was the conquest of Sollium, a Corinthian town near Leucas, and the
          acquisition of the whole of the island of Cephallenia for
          the alliance. This success was achieved without a single blow, and not long
          afterwards the fleet returned home. No attempt appears to have been made by the
          Peloponnesians to intercept the progress of the Athenians or to meet them on
          the seas; but after their return the Corinthians ventured out as far as Astacus in Acarnania. The town had been captured
          by the Athenians, who had expelled Evarchus the
          reigning tyrant, and added it to their confederacy. It now fell back into the
          hands of Corinth, and Evarchus was restored
          to his throne. An attempt to recover Cephallenia turned
          out a complete failure.
   While thus engaged on the shores of the Peloponnesus,
          the Athenians were able to send a smaller fleet into the Euripus, to cruise
          off Locris and keep watch over the island of Euboea. The expedition
          was successful; the Locrian coast was ravaged, the town of Thronium was captured, and the Locrians defeated in an attempt to relieve it. To
          secure their good behavior a number of hostages were taken, and the island
          of Atalante, which had hitherto been uninhabited, was fortified and held
          by an Athenian garrison. By these measures any designs which the Locrians or Phocians may
          have had upon Euboea were entirely frustrated.
   These successes were accompanied by others nearer
          home, from which the Athenians reaped a more definite and tangible advantage.
          Soon after the return of the Peloponnesian army from Attica the Athenians
          crossed over to Aegina, and, on the plea that the Aeginetans had been the main cause of the war, entirely expelled the inhabitants from the
          island. The long quarrel between the cities was drawing to a close, though
          unhappily even this severe punishment did not fill up the measure of Athenian
          hatred. Most of the Aeginetans were received by the
          Lacedaemonians and settled in the Thyreatis—the
          beautiful coast-land on the western shore of the bay of Argos, which so long
          formed a bone of contention between that city and Sparta. From this point they
          continued to sail out and harass the Athenians, until at last, in 424 BC,
          a descent was made on the country and they were cut down to a man. After
          expelling the inhabitants from Aegina, the Athenians divided the farms, houses,
          and other property in the island among their own citizens, who now occupied the
          island as colonists (cleruchs).
   Later in the summer, Pericles led out the entire force
          of the city into the territory of Megara to ravage the country. The army was
          joined by the fleet, which had just returned from Western Greece, and by this
          union of forces, the largest force which Athens ever had in one place, was
          occupied in devastating the fields of an unresisting and insignificant
          adversary! The same display, though on a small scale, was repeated twice a year
          for the next seven years. The exasperation of Athens against Megara was
          extreme, even beyond the measure of neighborly hatred in Greece. It was no
          doubt vexatious to find so small a state so obstinate in its attachment to the
          Peloponnesian cause; the more so as Megara had once been the friend of Athens.
          Her forts had been garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; her long walls had been
          built by Athenian citizens, even before Athens had long walls of her own. While
          Megara was the ally of Athens the route from the Peloponnesus to Attica was
          closed, and Pericles was not likely to forget that in the day of danger Megara
          had thrown Athens over and opened the Isthmus to Plistoanax.
          Indeed his feeling towards the Megarians amounted to a personal
          animosity. Not only had he refused to cancel the decree which excluded
          the Megarians from Athenian ports, even at the cost of a war with
          Sparta, but at his instigation a second decree was passed on the motion
          of Charinus, declaring truceless and
          eternal war against Megara. Every Megarian found on Athenian soil was
          to be put to death at once; and twice in every year the Athenian generals were
          compelled to invade the country. These savage measures were excused by
          historians on the plea that the Megarians had murdered Anthemocritus, a herald sent to them from Athens, while
          protected by the sanctity of his office; and explained by comedians as the
          vengeance demanded by Aspasia for the loss of three courtesans who had crossed
          the border! From Megara, where no defense could be offered, the army returned
          home with such spoil as the country afforded, and this, like the property of
          the Aeginetans, was no doubt consumed in soothing the
          irritation of the Athenians at their own losses and privations.
   In addition to these expeditions Athens had been
          sustaining for the whole year the burden of the siege of Potidea, where no fewer than three thousand of the citizen
          soldiers were permanently encamped, besides a large additional force, subsequently
          dispatched under the command of Phormio. The
          invasion of Attica had not caused the Athenians to withdraw a single man, and
          nevertheless, in spite of strenuous exertions, the city itself held out, and
          not one of the revolted Chalcidic towns
          returned to its allegiance. In these circumstances it was tempting to try what
          could be done by negotiation with the princes of the Barbarian nations in the
          neighborhood. Could they be induced to assist the Athenians against their
          rebellious subjects? With this object a citizen of Abdera, Nymphodorus by name, whose sister Sitalces, the king of the Odrysian Thracians,
          had married, was appointed by the Athenians their representative
          at Abdera, and invited to Athens in order to negotiate an alliance with
          his brother-in-law. Sitalces was willing
          enough to avail himself of the support of the Athenians in extending and
          strengthening his kingdom; the Athenians were not less willing to obtain his
          alliance against Chalcidice. Their expectations were fulfilled. Nymphodorus not only brought about the desired
          alliance, but also set on foot a peace between Athens and Perdiccas, the
          king of Macedonia, a crafty and unscrupulous barbarian, without courage or
          honor, whose sole guide was the advantage of the moment. For some time past he
          had been at war with the Athenians, but now he joined Phormio,
          the Athenian general, in fighting against the Chalcidians. That the
          alliance with Sitalces might be the more
          lasting, the Athenians gratified the wish of Sadocus the
          son of Sitalces, by making him a citizen of
          their city. Further and more brilliant promises which Nymphodorus held
          out during his stay at Athens—that Sitalces would
          send forces to Chalcidice, and bring the war to an end—were only partially
          fulfilled.
   So the year ended, the first year of the terrible
          conflict in which Pericles had involved his city. The Athenians had acquired
          some distant and uncertain allies; they had secured the shores of Euboea from
          attack; they had repulsed the Peloponnesian army at Oenoe;
          they had acquired Cephallenia for the
          alliance, and they had gained some successes at the mouth of the Corinthian
          gulf. On the other hand the Peloponnesians had defeated the attack on Methone; they were in as good a position at the end of the
          year as they had been at the beginning; and they had desolated a great part of
          Attica. We can imagine with what bitterness the country people revisited their
          ruined homes and desolate fields. Their vexation was the greater when they
          reflected that the same thing would happen from year to year without any end.
          What was gained, they asked, by such a sacrifice? The empire must be
          maintained, no doubt, but why force matters to such an extremity with Sparta?
          The two cities had drawn together in old days; why should there not be mutual
          concessions now? Sparta had shown a great desire to avoid war; why should
          Athens insist on it?
   The custom of the Athenians furnished Pericles with an
          opportunity of stating at length his view of the issues which were really at
          stake. The bones of those who perished in the service of their country were
          always brought home to be buried at the public expense, in the Ceramicus, or Potter’s Field, the most beautiful suburb of
          the city, and a day was appointed in the winter, when military operations were
          over, for the funeral. The strictness of Athenian habits was relaxed on the
          occasion; the funeral procession was accompanied by anyone who chose, whether
          citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the dead were present at the
          sepulchers to make lamentation. When the remains had been laid in the earth
          some man “of known ability and high reputation” was chosen by the city to
          pronounce an oration over those who had fallen in her cause. In accordance with
          this custom Pericles was chosen to speak over those who were first buried in
          the war; and Thucydides has availed himself of the opportunity to put into his
          mouth a sketch of Athenian life and institutions, which the world accepts as
          the ideal description of democratic government.
   He began with deprecating the custom which demanded a
          speech on such an occasion. Those who had acted nobly should only be honored by
          noble acts—such as were the funeral rites paid by a grateful country. Their
          glory should not be risked upon the eloquence of one man, who might speak well
          or ill, and who would certainly be thought to say too much or too little. But
          such was the law, and he must obey it.
           Then he spoke of those who in past days had been
          brought to their rest in the Ceramicus. Their
          ancestors had possessed the land from immemorial antiquity, handing it down
          from generation to generation unstained by foreign conquest, the home of
          freedom. Their fathers had beaten back the tide of foreign and Hellenic war,
          and after many a struggle had transmitted to their sons the great empire which
          they now enjoyed. And those who were assembled there, most of them men in the
          prime of life, had improved their inheritance and endowed the city with all
          that she needed to enable her to stand alone in peace or war. “Let me dwell”,
          he continued, “on the principles of action by which we rose to power; on the
          institutions and manners which have brought our empire to this pitch of
          greatness. Such thoughts are a fitting prelude to the praises of those who have
          died for Athens; and there is no one here, whether citizen or stranger, who
          will hear them without profit.
   “Our institutions are not borrowed from those around
          us; they are our own, the creation of Athenian statesmen; an example, and not a
          copy. In the political language of the day we are called a democracy; and the
          name is true and not true. It is true, because the administration of our city
          is in the hands of the people; and there is one law for rich and poor; it is
          not true, because, above all states, we recognize the claims of excellence. In
          this sense we are an aristocracy; not of birth, for among us there is no
          privilege; not of wealth, for poverty is a bar to none; but of merit; a state
          in which every one who can benefit the
          city may do so without let or hindrance.
   “Such is the freedom of our political life, and in
          society we are equally without constraint. Everyone does what he pleases,
          without suspicion or offence. There is nothing modish, nor exclusive, in our
          habits; we do not banish a man from our company because his ways are different
          from our own. But along with this unconstrained liberty there goes a spirit of
          reverence, which pervades every act of our public life; authority is
          maintained; the laws are obeyed, not from fear of punishment, but from
          principle; and of all ordinances the most sacred in our eyes are those which
          protect the injured, who cannot retaliate; and the unwritten laws, which,
          though enforced by no legal penalty, bring reproach to the transgressor.
           “First, then, we have striven to be free, and we seek
          to be happy. We have provided ourselves, in a greater degree than any other
          city, with festivals and public games, to be a rest and refreshment after toil;
          in our own homes we are surrounded by elegance and refinement, as a charm
          against melancholy; and owing to the greatness of our city, to which the
          produce of all the earth is brought, we are as familiar with the gifts of the
          most distant regions, as we are with the fruits of Attica.
           “In the same spirit we approach the severer duties of
          the citizen’s life. Our resources are not a mystery to be concealed from every
          eye, but anyone may visit our city and learn from us what he can. We do not
          afflict ourselves with laborious training, and yet, in the hour of trial, our
          courage does not fail. Free and light of heart, trusting to habit rather than
          law, we are yet as ready for action as those who spend their lives in
          anticipating danger and preparing to meet it. So much the greater is our gain.
           “Once more: we dare to think as well as act; we live
          for ourselves, while living for the state. With us a love of what is beautiful
          is consistent with economy, and a man is a man, though he cultivates his mind.
          .Yet we do not separate the citizen from the statesman; when a man has no time
          to give to state affairs, we do not merely say that he is minding his own
          business, but we call him an unprofitable servant. If we cannot always set a
          policy on foot, we can form a good judgment about it, for we look on discussion
          as the best preparation for action; our courage is not due to ignorance, or
          stupidity, but we go into anger with our eyes open, and counting the cost. And
          yet our policy is not a mere calculation of self-interest. More than any other
          nation, we have drawn our friends to us by kindly actions, and we have assisted
          others, without hope of advantage, in the confidence of freedom. From such a
          city the Hellenic world may take a lesson. Of all men, the Athenian citizen is
          the most accomplished and versatile; his parts are many, and he is admirable in
          each. Of all cities, Athens alone is even greater than her fame. She needs no
          poet to sing her praises; every land and every sea can furnish proofs of her
          enterprise and success. Her enemies, when defeated, are not disgraced; her
          subjects confess that she is worthy to rule them.
           “Such is the city for which these men have given their
          lives, whose obsequies we have met to celebrate. Her praises are theirs, for it
          is they, and such as they, who have made her what she is. What can be more
          glorious than such a fate as theirs, which, whether early or late, the first
          indication or the final seal of virtue, is the ‘true assurance of a man’.
          Neither hope of the future, nor desire to redeem the past; neither
          wealth, nor poverty, checked them in their noble race. Their hearts were set on
          vengeance and honor, and when the final moment came, it was in the glory of
          victory, not in the terror of flight, that they fell.
   “Let us, who remain, endeavor to follow their example,
          while praying that our days may be longer in the land. I will not stir your
          hearts by speaking of the blessings which are secured to those who defeat their
          country’s enemies, for we have other and higher reasons for our devotion. Look
          round on this glorious city; think of her mighty empire. Let the love of her beauty
          sink into your souls, and when you contemplate her greatness, remember that it
          was by the daring deeds of her citizens, done in the cause of duty and honor,
          that she was raised to this glorious height. Even when their efforts failed,
          they remained faithful to the death, giving their lives, when nothing else was
          left to give. Their reward is worthy of them. Their glory shall never die; the
          whole wide world is their sepulcher; their epitaphs are written in the hearts
          of mankind; and wherever there is speech of noble deeds, their names are held
          in remembrance.
           “To men who fall as they have fallen death is no evil.
          And therefore, while I sorrow with the parents of the dead, I will also remind
          them of the changes and chances of life, in which his lot is fortunate whose
          days, though short, are days of happiness and honor. I know that the lesson is
          hard to learn, especially for those who see others in the enjoyment of
          blessings which they have known and lost. Still I say : Be not
          broken-hearted, but endure. With some of you other children will take the place
          of the dead, filling the void at home, and making good the loss to the city.
          And those to whom this hope is denied may comfort themselves with the thought
          that their years are drawing to a close. The better part of life has been the
          longer part ; and for the brief remainder they will enjoy the honor
          and reverence which are at once the solace and the glory of old age.
   “For those of you who are the children or brothers of
          the dead an arduous struggle is in store. While men live they are but men; but
          when they die their deeds become superhuman. What a task for you to emulate
          virtue, which is beyond the reach of malice and calumny!
           “To the wives, who will henceforth live in widowhood,
          I will speak, in one short sentence only, of womanly virtue. She is the best of
          women who is most truly a woman; and her reputation is the highest whose name
          is never in the mouths of men for good or evil.
           “There is nothing more to be said, and what remains to
          be done will be the care of the city, which will bring up to manhood the
          orphans of those who have fallen in her defense, for this is the prize, with
          which, as with a garland, she crowns the virtues of her citizens. Wherefore,
          when your lamentations are ended, you may depart”.
           
 CHAPTER XV.
             THE LAST YEAR OF
            PERICLES.
             
 WITH the return of
            spring (430 B.C.) the Peloponnesians were again in Attica. After
            desolating the central plain they passed on towards Sunium,
            laying waste the coast land on either side of the promontory ; but before many
            days had passed they received the news that the plague had broken out at
            Athens, and it is said that their invasion was cut short on this account.
            However this may be, they remained not less than forty days, the longest
            stay they ever made, and ravaged the entire country. During the whole of
            the time the plague was raging in the ill-fated city.
             This new and
            terrible disaster, the like of which is not recorded in Grecian history, came,
            as such disorders commonly do, from the East. It first appeared in the
            Peiraeus, from which it spread rapidly to the upper city. For a time it
            was supposed that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the water-tanks,
            but the disease was soon discovered to be of an infectious nature,
            utterly unknown to the Greek physicians, and beyond the reach of help,
            human or divine.
             Athens was ill
            prepared for such a visitation. The city was crowded with the inhabitants who
            had been brought in from the country, and, as they had no houses of
            their own, the new-comers were closely packed together in stifling huts,
            among which the disease raged with terrible effect. The dead lay
            in heaps ; the dying wallowed in the streets or crawled round the
            fountains. The very temples were filled with corpses. There was no organised service for the removal of the dead ; each
            man buried his own as he could, and often the survivors, overcome
            by the number of the corpses, made use of burial-places not their
            own, or threw the dead on funeral pyres which were burning for others.
             Great and terrible
            as were the physical evils of the plague, the moral evils which it wrought were
            greater still. There were men at Athens, as there are everywhere, who
            found it convenient to conform to the decencies of life, though without
            moral principle; there were still more who were only deterred from crime
            by the fear of punishment. Of both these classes of men the conduct was
            now entirely changed. Those who had concealed their pleasures threw
            the veil away, and the criminal was no longer terrified by any fear
            of God or man. The divine law was disregarded, when good and evil perished
            alike, and the human law was superseded by the terrible sentence which
            seemed to be passed on the whole city.
             In the
            Peloponnesus the plague did little harm. That it appeared in the peninsula we
            know from the statement of Thucydides, but we do not hear of it in
            any of the great cities. Only in the remote town of Phigalea,
            in the south-west corner of Arcadia, have we any record of its presence.
            Here, in the glen of Bassae, surrounded by rocks
            and old knotted oaks, stands the temple of Apollo the
            Healer,—-the most perfect ruin in Greece next to the “ Theseum ” at Athens,—which was built as a thank-offering for the assistance
            rendered by the god when the plague raged at Phigalea.
             The horrors with
            which he was surrounded did not turn Pericles from his purpose. Even in
            the early days of the invasion, before the Peloponnesians had left the
            central plain for the coast, he equipped a fleet of one hundred vessels,
            on which were placed no fewer than four thousand Athenian hoplites. A
            number of old ships were also converted into transports, for the conveyance of
            three hundred horses, a new feature in the naval equipment of Athens. The
            armament was then joined by fifty vessels from Chios and Lesbos. At the
            head of this imposing force, Pericles set sail for the Peloponnesus to
            make reprisals for the damage done to Attica. From the coast land, into
            which they had now moved, the Peloponnesians would see the enormous
            fleet standing out across the bay, a convincing proof that Athens was not yet
            crushed by her misfortunes.
             Arriving off the
            coast of Argolis, the fleet attacked Epidaurus, but, though the country was
            laid waste, the town could not be taken. Similar descents were made
            at Troezen, Halieis, and
            Hermione, cities on the same coast, which were allies of Sparta,
            and with a similar result. At Prasiae, an
            insignificant place on the coast of Laconia, the expedition was so
            far successful that it took and destroyed the town, besides ravaging the
            country round, but no attempt at permanent occupation seems to
            have been made. The fleet then returned to Athens, whence it was
            immediately sent out again, under the officers who had served with
            Pericles, to take part in the siege of Potidaea. It had hardly
            arrived at its destination before the plague broke out among the
            troops, spreading from the new-comers to the soldiers previously engaged
            in the siege, and as every attempt to take the city failed, the
            fleet returned to Athens, after a stay of forty days, with a loss of
            more than a fourth of the four thousand hoplites.
             No wonder that a
            change came over the spirit of the Athenians. In the city the plague was
            raging; and no one could deny that its effects were greatly increased
            by the policy which kept the Athenians confined within the walls. Had they
            been scattered over Attica, the danger of infection, at any
            rate, would have been greatly reduced. Outside the walls the whole of
            Attica from Athens to Sunium, from Sunium to Marathon, from Marathon to Eleusis, was
            utterly laid waste. Every proprietor and farmer was cut off from the
            income which his lands might have brought him. At the same time, the
            richer men, on whom the chief burdens of the navy and cavalry fell, had
            been called upon to furnish an enormous force, which cannot have been at sea
            for less than two months. And what had the force accomplished ? A few
            patches of coast-land had been ravaged in Argolis; a Laconian hamlet
            had been destroyed. At Potidaea the expedition had not only failed,
            but had carried the plague into a healthy army.
             The first effect
            of the change of feeling was seen in the despatch of
            envoys to Sparta with proposals for peace. But the Spartans, who probably
            had received very exaggerated accounts of the plague, and looked on
            Athens as hopelessly ruined, would listen to no overtures. Or they may
            have distrusted proposals which did not come to them with the authority of
            Pericles. Whatever the reason, the envoys entirely failed in their
            mission. The greater was the exasperation against the author of the war.
            Pericles found himself the object of a furious outbreak of popular
            odium. He had hitherto done his utmost to prevent the people from meeting
            for the discussion of public affairs, but he now found it necessary to
            summon an assembly, and endeavour to bring them
            into a better mood. He had no confessions of error to make ; it was the
            people, not himself, who had changed; with the exception of the
            plague, which was beyond human foresight, nothing had happened of
            which they had not been forewarned. If they had been right in resolving
            upon the war, they were wrong in wishing now to discontinue it. The
            change was indeed unworthy of them, and more unworthy still was the
            determination to make one man responsible for a policy to which all
            were pledged. War was a great evil, which no city would bring upon
            herself, if it could be avoided, but loss of independence was a greater
            evil by far, and, when the choice lay between the two, there could
            be no room for hesitation.
             Pericles then
            pointed out that the evils which had overtaken the Athenians, however
            disastrous to individual citizens, left the strength of the
            city unimpaired. Their chances of victory were as good as ever. Their
            navy was still the greatest in the world ; they were absolute masters of
            the sea; and not even the Great King could prevent their vessels from
            sailing wherever they chose. What was the loss of houses or lands to men
            who possessed such a power ? So long as they preserved their
            freedom, they could quickly recover what had been lost; but if they
            became the servants of others, they would lose not freedom only, but all
            that freedom brings with it. Their ancestors had won a great
            empire, were they unable even to maintain it? Far be such a disgrace
            from them !
             It was the
            possession of this great empire which made the position so critical. “ Do not
            imagine,” Pericles said, “that you are fighting for a simple issue,
            freedom or slavery. You have an empire to lose ; you are exposed to the
            hatred into which your imperial policy has brought you. Your empire is
            a 'tyranny, which in the opinion of mankind has been unjustly
            acquired, and which you cannot safely surrender. It is too late to play the
            honest man ; and those who advise such a policy will bring the
            state to ruin.”
             “ No ! we must
            hold on our way, and tread the path of glory. Our city has the greatest name in
            all the world because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but has sacrificed
            more lives and endured severer hardships in war than any other;
            wherefore also she has the greatest power of any state up to this
            day, and the memory of her glory will always survive. Even if we shall be
            compelled at last to abate somewhat of our greatness (for all things
            have their time of growth and decay) yet will the recollection live, that
            of all Hellenes, we ruled over the greatest number of Hellenic subjects,
            that we withstood our enemies whether single or united, in the most terrible
            wars, and that we were the inhabitants of a city endowed with every sort
            of wealth and greatness. The indolent may indeed find fault, but the
            man of action will seek to rival us, and he who is less fortunate will
            envy us. To be hateful and offensive has ever been at the time the fate of
            those who have aspired to empire. But he judges well who accepts
            unpopularity in a great cause. Hatred does not last long, and, besides the
            immediate splendour of great actions, the renown of
            them endures forever in men’s memories. Looking forward to such
            future glory and present avoidance of dishonour, make
            an effort now and secure both. Let no herald be sent to the
            Lacedaemonians, and do not let them know that you are depressed by your
            sufferings. For the greatest states and the greatest men,
            when misfortunes come, are the least depressed in spirit, and the
            most resolute in action.”9
               We cannot but
            admire the undaunted spirit of the man who, in the teeth of a powerful
            opposition, amid the ruin and desolation of Attica, with the groans
            of the dying almost sounding in his ears, could present such a front to
            his enemies. Of such stuff the rulers of the world are made. And yet this
            last speech of Pericles is a terrible speech—breathing in every
            line a love of domination which threatened the freedom of Greece.
            Beyond the walls of Athens such words would be received with fierce
            denunciation; and within the city they nourished the most
            selfish passions of the Athenian people. The Athenians had long been
            taught to regard the money of the allies as their own, and the Delian
            confederacy had been reduced to submission by the contributions which
            were made to ensure its freedom. Now they were taught that Athens was a
            tyrant city, hated like a tyrant, and compelled like a tyrant to rely
            upon force for protection. “ Necessity, the tyrant’s plea,” was laid
            upon her ; and glory, the conqueror’s idol, was held out as the final goal
            of ambition. Not only were the interests of Hellas regarded as subordinate
            to the interests of Athens, but honesty was confessed to be a ruinous
            policy. Such was the dangerous eminence to which Athens had been
            raised by the policy of Pericles, a policy which he sought to defend
            by sophistry and exaggeration. It was an exaggeration to say that peace
            with Sparta involved the slavery of Athens, for even at the close of
            the war, Athens was not enslaved. It was sophistry to separate the
            misfortunes of Athens from the misfortunes of her citizens. What sort of spirit
            was likely to arise in men who were bidden to “ die like sheep
            ” behind the city walls, rather than face their enemy in the field ?
            What was the value of an invincible fleet, when it failed at Epidaurus and
            Potidaea?
             The Athenians were
            so far moved by the advice of Pericles, that they sent no more embassies
            to Sparta, and resumed with eagerness the prosecution of the war. Yet
            the opposition was not only strong enough to secure the deposition of
            Pericles from his post of general, but also his condemnation in
            a court of law, on a charge of embezzlement. He was sentenced to a
            fine of fifty talents. As we find his old opponent Cleon among the leaders
            of the prosecution, we may assume that the extreme democrats, who
            were in favour of the war and yet opposed to
            Pericles, proved stronger than the oligarchical party, who would have
            combined his overthrow with negotiations for peace. The inhabitants of the
            country, who were the worst sufferers by the plague and the war, seem to have been
            unable to turn the scale. The condemnation was of course a party stroke,
            for embezzlement was of all offences the one which could not be proved
            against Pericles. But it was an offence readily believed of all
            public men at Athens, and that was enough.
             For the first time
            for fifteen years Pericles was without public office ; he was compelled to look
            idly on while the management of the state passed into the hands of
            others. The bitterness of his fall was rendered more acute by the private
            misfortunes which gathered thick upon him. In his youth he had
            married the wife of Hipponicus, who seems
            to have been transferred to him from her husband by some arrangement,
            which caused neither a scandal nor a feud. By her he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. Xanthippus had long been on bad terms with his father
            owing to his own worthless character, and that he fell a victim to the
            plague was perhaps no reason for regret. So much the deeper was the
            affection lavished on Paralus, and when he also
            was carried off by the remorseless pestilence, Pericles was entirely crushed by
            the blow. As he placed the funeral crown on his son’s head, he broke
            into loud lamentations at the doom which had left him desolate. The
            Athenians were so greatly moved by his calamities that a decree was
            passed, under which his son by Aspasia, Pericles the younger, was
            made an Athenian citizen, and by this expedient his house was saved from
            extinction.
             From July 430 to
            July 429 B.C., Athenian policy was not controlled by Pericles. The war went
            on as before. The operations were chiefly in Western Greece. The
            Lacedaemonians endeavoured to make reprisals for
            the Athenian expedition round the Peloponnesus, by sending a hundred ships
            against Zacynthus, the ally of the Athenians,
            but though the island was ravaged, the Zacynthians could not be brought to terms. Later on in the year the Ambraciots summoned a force of Chaonians and other barbarians to their aid for an attack on the city of Amphilochian Argos, with which they had been on bad
            terms for years, but in this case also the city could not be taken, and
            after ravaging the country the army dispersed.
             These movements
            naturally attracted the notice of the Athenians, who were allies of the Argives
            and Acarnanians. An expedition of twenty ships was despatched to Naupactus under the command of Phormio, one of the generals of the year.
            The appointment was a most happy one. Some years before, Phormio had delivered Argos from the aggression of the Ambraciots ; he was well known in the West, and was
            soon to prove himself the ablest naval officer at Athens. In the North
            affairs were favourable to the Athenians. A
            number of envoys from the Peloponnesus with Aristeus of Corinth at their head—a man whom the Athenians considered to be
            the cause of all their troubles in Chalcidice— had been despatched to Asia in the hope of persuading the king of
            Persia to take part in the war. On their way they went to the court of the Odrysian king, Sitalces,
            thinking that he might be induced to throw the Athenians over, or at least
            to convey the envoys across the Hellespont. The visit proved a fatal
            mistake. Two Athenians who happened to be with Sitalces at the time persuaded his son Sadocus to seize
            the envoys as they were about to cross the straits and deliver them into
            their hands. The captives were at once carried to Athens, where they were
            put to death on the very day of their arrival, without any trial, and
            their bodies thrown down precipices. This _savage act —which
            might not have occurred had Pericles been in power—was justified as a
            retaliation on the Lacedaemonians, who, at the beginning of the war,
            slaughtered every one captured at sea, whether he was an ally of the
            Athenians or a neutral. A bad act cannot justify a worse, but it was
            certainly a gain to the Athenians to have got rid of Aristeus and to have put a stop to Spartan negotiations with Persia. The alliance
            with Sitalces was not without results.
             More important was
            the surrender of Potidaea, which took place towards the end of the year 430
            B.C. For more than two years the heroic defenders had held out
            against the utmost efforts of Athenian skill and energy. But the invasions
            of Attica, from which so much was expected, had brought no relief, and at
            last supplies ran short. Even then the city held out, and it was not until
            the extremity of famine, “ even to the eating of human flesh,”
            had been endured, that the final overtures were made. On the other
            hand, the besiegers had suffered much, and they had before them the
            prospect of a third winter in their exposed situation, while the expenses
            of the siege had run up to ,£400,000 of our money. On both sides,
            therefore, there was an eagerness to bring the long drama to an end,
            and the terms proposed were accepted by the Athenian generals. The Potidaeans with their wives and children, and even the
            foreign troops, came out of the city, the men with one garment, the women
            with two ; besides which they received a certain sum of money for
            their journey. They dispersed among the cities of Chalcidice or wherever
            they could find a home, and Potidaea was henceforth occupied
            by Athenian colonists.
             In the spring of
            the following year (429 B.C.) the Peloponnesians did not invade Attica. They
            may have been afraid of the plague, or they may have left so little
            behind them in the previous year that invasion was useless. At the request
            of the Thebans, they marched upon Plataea, and endeavoured to detach the city from Athens, or at least to insure its neutrality. On
            applying to Athens for advice, the Plataeans were urged to hold out, the Athenians declaring that they never had
            forsaken them and never would, but would assist them to the utmost
            of their power. On this assurance they refused to enter into any
            negotiations with Archidamus, and prepared to
            resist his attack. All the resources of engineering skill were brought to
            bear upon the city, but in vain; when a huge mound was raised against the
            wall, the Plataeans rendered it useless, partly
            by raising the wall, partly by removing the earth through a mine, but
            most of all by building a second wall within that part against which the
            mound was raised, so that, if it were captured, the city would still
            be defensible. When battering-rams were brought up, they broke off the
            heads by dropping heavy beams upon them. The Peloponnesians
            then attempted to set the town on fire, but the plan failed of
            success, owing to the stillness of the weather and an opportune storm of
            rain. Finding his efforts useless, Archidamus was driven to invest the city; a double wall was built round it,
            and garrisoned partly with Peloponnesian, partly with Boeotian
            soldiers.
             These operations
            occupied the Peloponnesians from May to October. During the whole of
            this time Athens took no steps whatever to deliver those who had
            allowed their country to be ravaged in reliance on promises of Athenian
            help. For these promises Pericles was not himself responsible,
            but those who gave them must have been aware that they could not
            assist the Plataeans without meeting the
            Boeotians, at least in the open field—a policy which had been renounced in
            the very beginning of the war. The abandonment of Plataea to her
            fate, for so we must call it, was the inevitable result of the line
            taken by Pericles since the peace of 445 B-C. Nothing but
            an effective Athenian army could have saved the town, and the Athenian
            army in the hands of Pericles became eminently ineffective. Some
            years after his death, the Athenians tried their strength against Boeotia
            in the battle of Delium (424 B.C.), but only to
            meet with a most disastrous overthrow.
             While their
            faithful friends and allies were being shut up to destruction on the borders of
            Attica, an Athenian army, which had been sent out to Chalcidice, was
            severely defeated at Spartolus. The victory was
            chiefly due to the superiority of the Chalcidic horse and targeteers, or light-armed troops, who
            now appear for the first time as an efficient force against heavy-armed
            soldiers. About one-fifth of the Athenian force and all the three generals
            in command were slain.
             The news of this
            defeat seems to have caused a reaction at Athens in favour of Pericles. At the next election of generals he was chosen into his
            old place, and “ all things were put into his hands.” But the
            reaction came too late. At the time when he returned to office he was
            already perhaps stricken with the disease which in two or three
            months brought him to the grave, and under such circumstances he can
            hardly have taken any very active part in public affairs. Nevertheless,
            his last days were cheered by reports of the most brilliant exploits ever
            achieved by the Athenian fleet.
             Though the Ambraciots had failed to take Argos Amphilochicum in the preceding summer, they had not abandoned their designs on the city.
            On the contrary, they now came forward with a plan for subjugating
            the whole country of Acarnania, and detaching it from the Athenian
            alliance. A combined attack was to be made by land and sea, so that the
            Acarnanians might be unable to unite their whole forces for resistance.
            With this view, the Ambraciots called upon the
            Lacedaemonians to send them a fleet, with a thousand hoplites on
            board. On their own part, they would bring into the field their army,
            and also obtain the help of the barbarian tribes of Epirus. If the plot
            succeeded, Zacynthus and Cephallenia,
            and perhaps even Naupactus, would fall into the hands of Sparta, and it
            would no longer be easy for the Athenians to cruise round the
            Peloponnesus.
             The scheme was
            eagerly taken up at Sparta. Cnemus, the admiral who
            had conducted the attack upon Zacynthus in the
            previous year, was at once despatched with a
            thousand hoplites in a few ships to Ambracia; a
            larger contingent of vessels from Sicyon and Corinth, which, as the
            mother-country of Ambracia, warmly espoused her
            cause, was to follow as soon as ready. When he reached Leucas, Cnemus was joined by the ships furnished from Leucas, Ambracia, and Anactorium, with
            which he at once crossed the sea, unperceived by Phormio, the
            Athenian officer at Naupactus. On landing, Cnemus found a large force of Chaonians and other
            barbarians ready to obey his orders, and as he felt himself sufficiently
            strong to open the game without waiting for the ships from Corinth,
            he at once began his march. His route lay along the eastern edge of
            the Ambracian gulf, through the territory of
            Argos, to Stratus, on the Achelous, which was the largest city in
            Acarnania.
             The Acarnanians at
            once sent to Phormio for help ; but as Phormio was daily expecting to see the Corinthian fleet
            sail down the gulf, he could not leave Naupactus. Meanwhile the combined
            forces were approaching the town. They came on in three divisions, of
            which the barbarians formed the centre. The
            Hellenic soldiers marched in good order as they had been trained to do,
            but the barbarians rushed on at full speed, thinking they had only to be
            first on the scene to capture the town. The Stratians saw their opportunity ; if they could destroy the barbarians before the
            Greeks came up, the whole expedition would receive a very sensible check.
            They placed some of their soldiers in ambuscades outside the city,
            and when the barbarians were close to the walls, a combined onset was made
            from the city and from the ambuscades. The Chaonians were at once seized with a panic; many were slaughtered ; the rest,
            carrying the other barbarians with them, rushed back to the Greeks, who
            received their first news of the battle from the defeated fugitives. Here a
            stand was made for the remainder of the day, but when night came on Cnemus began his retreat to Oeniadae.
            The invasion was at an end before the Acarnanians could assemble all their
            forces, and the plan which promised so fair turned out an
            utter failure.
             And this was not
            the worst. Almost on the very day of the battle of Stratus the fleet from
            Corinth, which should have co-operated with Cnemus and the land army, was utterly defeated by Phormio at the mouth of the gulf. From his station at Naupactus the Athenian
            commander saw the ships moving along the Peloponnesian shore; they had no
            intention of attacking him, for they were not equipped for a battle, but
            for the conveyance of troops, and that Phormio would attack their forty-seven vessels with his twenty never occurred to
            them. Suddenly they saw the Athenian ships moving along the opposite coast
            of Aetolia, and when in the dim light of morning they attempted to cross
            over from Patrae in Achaea towards Acarnania
            they were met by Phormio bearing down upon them from
            the mouth of the Evenus. It was impossible to
            avoid an engagement.
             The Corinthian
            commanders knew that their seamen were not a match for the Athenians in point
            of skill. To be forced into an engagement was bad enough ; to be attacked
            in the open sea where there was room for every manoeuvre was still worse. They resolved to arrange their fleet in such a manner
            that the ordinary tactics of sailing through the lines of vessels and
            then charging from the rear would be impossible. With this object they
            drew up their ships in a circle, turning the prows outward, and
            keeping them sufficiently close to avoid any inlet. The smaller craft
            were gathered in the central space, where also were placed five of their
            swiftest triremes ready to run out at any point, which the
            enemy attacked.
             On seeing this
            formation Phormio at once took his measures.
            Arranging his vessels in a single line, he bade the sailors row round the
            enemy’s fleet in ever narrowing circles. By this means he brought
            their ships into the smallest possible compass, and kept them in
            constant expectation of an attack. He continued this manoeuvre till the moment when the morning breeze came down from the Corinthian
            gulf —as he knew that it would—and made it impossible for the
            Peloponnesian vessels to remain steadily in their places. Ship began to
            dash against ship ; the attention of the sailors was occupied in keeping
            them clear of each other, the more so as the rough water made rowing
            difficult for the unpractised oarsmen. Then Phormio gave the signal for attack. The first vessel
            sunk was one of the admirals, but soon the havoc was universal; no
            resistance could be made ; in wild disorder the whole fleet ran for the
            Achaean coast, hotly pursued by Phormio, who
            captured twelve vessels with most of their crews. The rest escaped to
            Cyllene in Elis, where they were joined by Cnemusand the ships from Leucas.
             At the news of
            this disaster the Lacedaemonians were highly indignant. They did not indeed recall their
            admiral and condemn him to death, as the Athenians would have done under
            similar circumstances, but while sending him orders to fight again, they
            also sent three commissioners, one of whom was Brasidas, to advise with
            him. They could not understand how a few ships could defeat so many, or recognise that their own fleet was so vastly inferior
            to the Athenian, as the battle had proved it to be. When the
            commissioners arrived at Cyllene, Cnemus sent
            round to the Peloponnesian allies for more vessels and refitted those
            which had been damaged in the engagement.
             Intelligence of
            their movements was conveyed to Phormio. He at once
            sent to Athens for reinforcements ; a battle might take place any day, in
            which he would have to meet the whole Peloponnesian fleet with only
            twenty vessels. From Corcyra, whose fleet was to be of such advantage to
            Athens in operations in Western Greece, not one vessel had been sent,
            either to the aid of Argos or Acarnanian Phormio,
            who was left entirely to his own resources or help from Athens. The
            greater is our astonishment to find that the reinforcement decreed
            at Athens amounted only to twenty vessels, and that even these,
            though every day was of great importance, were bidden to sail to Crete before
            they went r to the west! Who was responsible for this
            extraordinary order we do not know ; the Athenians could have gained
            nothing by the most brilliant success in Crete—which, so far as we know,
            they never revisited in the course of the war ; while on the other hand the
            position of Athens in Western Greece was in peril, It was a grave blunder,
            and nothing but the wonderful skill of Phormio saved Athens from irretrievable disaster.
             When all was ready
            the Peloponnesian fleet left Cyllene for Panormus in Achaea,
            where the land forces were assembled to support it. Phormio meanwhile, who was resolved not to fight in the narrow channel, if he was
            compelled to fight at all, sailed from Naupactus to the promontory of Antirrhium, where he anchored. The Peloponnesians, who
            were as anxious to fight in the gulf as Phormio was to fight out of it, met him by moving to a point exactly opposite,
            where the gulf was not more than a mile broad. The number of their vessels
            was seventy-seven, while Phormio had no more than his
            original twenty. For six or seven days the two fleets lay opposite
            each other. At length Cnemus and Brasidas, finding
            that Phormio would not return within the strait,
            determined to draw him into it. Forming their vessels four deep, they
            fronted north-east or east and sailed along the Achaean shore into
            the gulf, twenty of their fastest vessels leading the way. Phormio at once saw the danger; he had left Naupactus
            without any guard, for even the Messenians of the town had followed him on
            shore, to support his vessels, and if the Peloponnesian fleet got
            ahead, they would reach the place before he could save it. He at once
            embarked, and bidding the Messenians follow sailed in single file along
            the coast with all speed for Naupactus. This was exactly what Bras-idas wished ; the Athenian ships had now no room for
            any exhibition of their dreaded skill. Changing front, he suddenly brought
            his whole line, four deep, upon the flank of Phormio’s vessels. It was an excellent manoeuvre, and well
            carried out; but owing to the superiority of the Athenians in rowing, it
            was only partially successful. Eleven of Phormio’s vessels escaped the swiftest Peloponnesian ships; the remaining nine were
            forced aground, and one ship was already taken with its crew, when the Messenians
            dashed into the water and saved the rest.
             So far, the
            victory was on the side of the Lacedaemonians, who might reasonably have
            thought that they had redeemed their previous failure. But half the
            Athenian fleet still remained. Of the eleven ships which escaped the
            attack, ten reached Naupactus and ranged themselves in a position of defence should the enemy attempt to force them to
            shore. One remained behind, unable to keep up in the race. In their
            wake came the twenty Peloponnesian vessels, of which one, far in advance of the
            rest, was chasing the Athenian laggard. It chanced that in the deep
            water off Naupactus a merchantman lay at anchor in the line of pursuit.
            The Athenians saw their opportunity. Quick as thought they sped round the anchored vessel, and bearing down on the ship by
            which they were themselves pursued, struck her amidships and sent her to
            the bottom. Such a splendid feat of audacity and skill filled the
            Peloponnesians with dismay. They had come on in loose order singing the
            paean of victory, but their temper changed in a moment, and checking their
            pursuit, they waited for the body of the fleet to come up. The delay
            was fatal ; the Athenians, cheered by the brilliant success of their ship,
            and seeing the disorder of the enemy, sailed out and fell upon the
            Peloponnesian fleet, which was without any settled plan of battle. Some of
            the sailors, ignorant of the locality, had run their vessels ashore ; all
            were expecting the fate of the Leucadians. After a short resistance
            the whole fleet fled to Panormus, whence they
            had started, with the Athenians after them, eleven ships in chase of
            more than seventy! On the following night the Peloponnesians stole away to
            Corinth.
             This was perhaps
            the last event of which the news was brought to Pericles. It was a great and
            decisive victory won by an old comrade of his own—a victory which
            confirmed his policy and proved the incomparable superiority of the Athenians
            on the sea. But the eye which in days gone by would have brightened
            at such achievements was growing dim; the eloquent voice which would have
            bestowed on them their due reward of praise was silent.
            Though Pericles had escaped the first virulence of the plague, he was
            seized by the disease in an insidious form, and in the late summer of 429
            B.C., two years and a half after the outbreak of the war, he lay on his
            deathbed. The misfortunes of the year had broken him, and when the final
            illness came, there was little strength of body or mind to resist it. The
            master spirit was laid low ; half conscious of his weakness, he would
            shew to the friends who visited him the amulets, which the women of the
            household had tied about his neck in the vain hope of checking
            the progress of his sickness. Yet something of the old Pericles
            remained ; a few days before his death, when friends were praising his
            deeds, thinking perhaps that he was unconscious of their words,
            he murmured that in all the past nothing gave him so much
            satisfaction as the thought that no Athenian had by any act of his put on
            the robe of mourning! The boast was true. Himself the constant object
            of calumny and attack, he had never abused his power to pursue an
            enemy to the death.
             He died in the
            sixty-fifth year of his age.
             
 CHAPTER XVI.
             THE ATHENS OF
            PERICLES-THE GOVERNMENT, HOME AND FOREIGN.
             
             FROM the days of
            Solon Athens had been a democracy, and from the days of Clisthenes the
            people had been conscious of their power. But the democracy of Pericles was
            widely different from that of Solon or Clisthenes ; and the change was
            partly in form and partly in spirit.
             During the Persian
            wars, and for some time afterwards, the influence of the great families, or at
            any rate of the great men among them, was still dominant at Athens.
            However deeply attached to the blessings of freedom and “ equal speech,” the
            Athenian people had not yet cast aside the habit of
            deference 258 to those who for generations had been their
            leaders in all matters of public importance—a habit almost natural in
            the ignorant and inexperienced. So long as this habit existed, the
            sovereign people were more or less guided in the exercise of their
            sovereignty by the will of a few great men ; when it ceased to
            exist, the majority of the moment became supreme.
             This spirit of
            deference may have been shaken to some extent by the quarrels between the
            great families, though we know from our own history that Whig and
            Tory may carry on an almost internecine strife without damaging in any
            serious degree the prestige of the aristocratic members of either
            party. Something was also effected, no doubt, by the constant attacks
            of Ephialtes on the aristocrats who abused their position in order to make
            a profit for themselves. But the change of feeling which created the
            Periclean democracy seems to have been principally due to the overthrow of the
            Areopagus and the development of the popular jury-courts. The successful
            attack upon an ancient and venerable institution taught the people that there
            was nothing, however sacred, which their power could not remove, and the
            constant combination of the citizens into juries not only gave them a new
            idea of their importance, but taught them to act together for their
            own ends.
             The far-famed
            training of Sparta was not more characteristic of that city than these
            jury-courts were of the Athens of Pericles. Several thousands of the
            citizens—men over thirty years of age—spent their time in deciding the
            differences which arose between Athenians or between Athenians and
            foreigners. All offences except murder, arson, and one or two more, which
            were left to the cognisance of the Areopagus,
            were decided in these courts, which without any direct participation in
            politics exercised by this means a great influence on the policy of
            the Athenians. Did a general fail in an expedition, he was brought
            before a jury and fined or condemned to death. Was a public officer inaccurate
            in his account of the money which had passed through his hands, he
            was brought into a court. Did a citizen propose a decree which was contrary to
            an existing law, no matter how beneficial the object he had in
            view, he was brought before a court. If any allied city complained of
            the amount of tribute imposed upon her by the assessors, the question was
            referred to a jury; and most of the more serious offences, civil or
            criminal, throughout the Athenian empire were brought to Athens to be
            judged by Athenian citizens. It was through the law-courts that
            Athens, in the days of Pericles, maintained her authority over the
            executive of the government, an authority enforced by the severest
            penalties and extending to the most minute details. It was through them
            that she controlled the trade of her great empire. And from the
            decision of these courts there was no appeal. The public Assembly often
            referred matters to the decision of the court, but the converse
            process was unknown. Nor was any decision of a law-court ever
            cancelled or revised. The jurors were exempt from all responsibility—a
            privilege which they shared with the public Assembly and with that only.
             They were also the
            only power capable of enacting new laws. We are very ill informed about the
            process by which new laws were passed at Athens in the time of Pericles,
            but we may certainly affirm that the power of making them rested with the
            jurors, and not with the Assembly. The utmost that the Assembly could do,
            except in rare and exceptional cases, was to pass a decree, which, if it
            was not contrary to any existing law, was valid for the current
            year. The Assembly was competent to change the whole constitution of
            Athens ; it could decide whether the laws of Solon should be maintained or
            superseded by a new code; it could close the law-courts; it
            could give permission for new laws to be passed, or withhold it, but it
            had not the power, by a mere resolution, to add to the statute-book.
             Lastly, an
            Athenian juror was both judge and juryman. Though an archon presided in the
            courts, he merely introduced the case; he did not explain the law to
            the jury or check the contending parties in their statements. It was
            indeed forbidden under pain of death to quote the law falsely in a
            court, but the interpretation of the law, on which so much depends in
            the administration of justice, was within the competence of the juror. It
            was also for him to decide whether he would insist on the letter of
            the statute, or allow himself to be moved by pathetic appeals and
            extenuating circumstances.
             The technical name
            for the whole body of jurors was the Heliaea. It is
            probable that a Heliaea existed in some form at
            Athens, from the time of Solon onwards, and that appeals could be made
            to it from the sentence of the archons, who in those days had a good
            deal of judicial power. But it was not till the time of Pericles that the Heliaea acquired the position which we have described.
            So long as the Areopagus retained its extensive powers, the Heliaea could hardly be more than a court of law in
            the stricter sense ; and until the jurors were paid, their functions could
            not be very engrossing. It was Pericles, as we have seen,
            who overthrew the Areopagus; it was he who caused the jurors to be
            paid. With him, therefore, the reign of the Heliaea must have begun. We cannot indeed trace the steps by which the system
            was built up, but we know from the plays of Aristophanes that it was in
            full working order before the death of Pericles. For good or for evil,
            the Heliaea, as we find it in the “Wasps,” is
            his contribution to the public institutions of Athens.
             By the development
            of these courts at the expense of the Areopagus, he withdrew important
            functions from a section of the community and conferred them on all
            Athenians of full age, who could prove that they were fit to receive it.
            Above all, he established the majesty of law, and claimed for it the
            support of the whole nation. Every Athenian had now a direct reason
            for knowing what the law was, and for helping to maintain it. The reign of
            the Heliaea was the reign of law. The Athenians,
            as a body, had probably a better acquaintance with their laws than
            the citizens of any other state, equally large; and even in moments of the
            greatest political excitement, they were to an unusual degree
            a law-abiding nation. The laws were simple and clear, and lay within
            the comprehension of every citizen. There was no “bar” at Athens, nor
            indeed anything which could be called a legal profession, though a
            few men of a special aptitude wrote speeches for their clients to deliver,
            and others, owing to their special knowledge of law and custom, were
            able to advise men in difficult circumstances. Every man was his own
            lawyer. In none of the great cities of the world has the interpretation
            of the law occupied so small a space as at Athens; and in none has
            the administration of it occupied so large a space.
             Other results
            which followed from the change were by no means so satisfactory. In the first
            place, Pericles destroyed a time-honoured institution, and erected in its place an arrangement which had nothing
            dignified or majestic about it. This was in itself a great evil. In all
            departments of government, customs and institutions are needed
            which arouse a sense of awe and reverence; and in the administration of
            law such customs and institutions are peculiarly necessary. The ermine
            robes, the black cap, the antique foppery of wigs and gowns, are not
            without a real value. They awake wonder, and shew that something unusual
            is going on. In the jury-courts of Athens these elements were wanting,
            and the respect for the administration of justice suffered in consequence.
            Of the same sort was another evil, inseparably connected with
            the institution. The jurors could not be the best and most
            influential citizens at Athens. No man living in the country could be a
            juror, for the duties demanded his constant presence at Athens;
            no one engaged in any occupation, even moderately remunerative, would
            care to spend his time in a court for a payment of about a day; no
            one serving in the army, no senator, no public officer, could spare
            time for the duties of a juror. There remained two classes of men: the old
            or infirm, who could sit in a court, when they could do nothing else;
            and the idle or nefarious person, for whom the court offered amusement or
            occupation.
             The spirit of
            litigation, to which such courts gave rise, was in itself a great evil, but it
            became worse when the courts were composed of men who looked to them
            for a living. We are told that speakers sometimes warned the courts that
            if they were slow in the work of fining and confiscating, the funds
            out of which their payments came would fall off; and whether this be
            true or not, it is obvious that the rich offered the most tempting victims
            to courts largely composed of the very poor. The establishment of such
            courts was a step onwards in the development of class-hatred, ranging the
            rich and poor on opposite sides; for though the law was the same for
            all, the administration of it was now as entirely in the hands of the
            poor, as it had once been in the hands of the rich. And along with
            this inequality went the degradation of moral sentiment, which could
            not fail to arise in men who were engaged from morning to night not only
            in listening to legal quibbles, or falsehoods, but in deciding for
            hire on the lives and properties of others without the least
            responsibility or control.’"
             For a time these
            evils did not appear. Cimon lived for eleven years after the fall of the
            Areopagus, and his party survived his death; a party which preserved
            old traditions, and looked back on the past with reverence. Pericles, too,
            though he established the courts, stood aloof from them. He kept up
            the majesty of the state, partly by his own reserved and dignified habits,
            partly by the splendid buildings with which, following the policy of
            Cimon, he adorned the city. But when Pericles had passed away, the
            orators of the law-courts came to the front, and the tone of political
            life was changed. Unhappily for Athens, the change came at a time when
            a captious sophistry was destroying the intellectual no less than the
            moral fibre of the nation.
             In all that concerned
            the administration of the state, home or foreign, the supreme authority
            was vested in the Assembly, or Ecclesia, as the Greeks called it.
            Every Athenian of full age—that is, every Athenian who had attained his
            eighteenth year, was a member of the Assembly, and could record
            his vote on any question brought before it. He had also the right of
            addressing the Assembly and proposing any measure he pleased on the
            subject under discussion ; but in practice the younger citizens were expected
            to wait till the elders had said their say, if indeed they spoke at all.
            Yet even a young man, if he possessed the gift of persuasive speech,
            quickly became a power in the Assembly; his friends and supporters would gather
            round him to applaud what he said, and cry down everything which came
            from the opposite side. In earlier times, and down to the death of
            Pericles, the general was, as a rule, the politician, and the Assembly
            trusted for information and guidance to those who were chiefly responsible
            for carrying its wishes into effect, but after his death the “ speaker ”
            became almost synonymous with the statesman. This was more especially
            the case when sophists and rhetoricians had established themselves in the
            city, teaching men how to “ make the worse the better cause,”
            and reducing the management of politics to general rules, to the
            great disparagement of experience and knowledge.
             There were four
            stated meetings of the Assembly in each of the ten divisions into which the
            civic year of the Athenians was divided ; and, if occasion required
            it, extraordinary assemblies could also be summoned. Early in the morning
            a flag was raised at the place of meeting; the people gathered
            from all parts, and took their seats, without any order or division
            of tribe or demes. Here they remained in eager expectation till the Councillors appeared and opened the business of the
            day. Before they entered on their duties, the blood of sucking-pigs was
            carried round the assembled people as a purification; and a solemn
            curse was pronounced upon any one who should seek to mislead the Assembly
            for private ends. Then the Councillors brought
            forward their proposals on the subject of the day, and the
            people were invited to discuss them. After the motion of the Council,
            which was always brought in in writing, had been read, the herald first asked
            if any citizen over fifty years of age wished to speak ; and
            when these had given their opinions, the turn of the younger men
            came. The resolution of the Council might be rejected and replaced by a
            new one, or it might be amended, or simply accepted. The people gave
            their votes by holding up their hands, and the chairman pronounced on
            which side the majority lay. For this reason no sitting of the
            Assembly could be prolonged till an hour at which it was no longer
            possible to see the hands held up. And if any untoward sign occurred which
            seemed to indicate the displeasure of the gods, such as an earthquake, or
            thunder or lightning, or even rain, the sitting broke up at once.
               In his play of the
            “ Acharnians,” Aristophanes has given us a picture of
            a meeting in the Ecclesia. Dicaeopolis, an
            honest farmer, who has been driven into Athens by the war, is discovered
            in his place in the Pnyx, where the meetings
            were held, in the early morning, waiting impatiently for the arrival of
            the Prytanes, or presidents.
             Dicceopolis.                              Ah
            there !
             The presidents at
            last ; see, there they come ! All scrambling for their seats—-I told you so
            ! Herald.
             Move forward there
            ! Move forward all of ye !
             Further! Within
            the consecrated ground.
             Amphitheus.
             Has anybody spoke
            ?
             Her.  Is anybody
             Prepared to speak
            ?
             Amp.           Yes,
            I.
             Her.             Who
            are you and what ?
             Amp. Amphitheus the demigod.
             The gods moreover
            have dispatched me here Commissioned specially to arrange a peace, Betwixt
            this city and Sparta—notwithstanding I find myself rather in want at
            present Of a little ready-money for my journey.
             The magistrates
            won’t assist me.
             Her.                          Constables
            I
             Die. You
            presidents, I say ! you exceed your powers ;
             You insult the
            assembly, dragging off a man That offered to make terms and give us peace.
             Her. Keep silence
            there.
             Die.               By
            Jove, but I won’t be silent.
             Except I hear a
            motion about peace.
             Her. Ho there !
            the Ambassadors from the King of Persia. Die. What King of
            Persia ? What Ambassadors ?
             I’m sick of
            foreigners and foreign animals. Peacocks and coxcombs and Ambassadors.
             ********
             Amp. We’ve
            brought you here a nobleman, Shamartabas
             By name, by rank
            and office the king’s eye.
             Dic. God send a crow to peck
            it out, I say.
             And yours the
            Ambassador’s into the bargain.
             ********
             Her. Silence
            there ! Keep your seats !
             The council have
            invited the King’s eye To feast with them in the Prytaneum.
             Dic.                          There—
             Ain’t it enough to drive one mad ? To drive one To hang
            himself? To be kept here in attendance, Whilst every door flies open to
            these fellows.
             *******!*
             The Thracians that
            came hither with Theorus Let them come forward !
             Dic.  What the plague are
            these ?
             Theorus. The Odomantian army.
             Dic. The Odomantians !
             Out, out upon it!
            I’m a plundered man,
             I’m robbed and
            ruined here with the Odomantians.
             They ’re seizing
            upon my garlic.
             You magistrates,
            have you the face to see it
             With your own
            eyes—your fellow-citizen Here, in the city itself, robb’d by barbarians?
             —But I forbid the
            assembly. There’s a change
             In the heaven ! I
            felt a drop of rain 1 I ’m witness ! 
             Her. The
            Thracians must withdraw, to attend again
             The first of next
            month. The assembly is closed.
             
 Thus the sovereign
            power of Athens rested with a gathering which might be composed of the whole,
            or of but a small portion, of the citizens, and the votes were given
            under the immediate influence of the speeches made on the occasion. By the
            Assembly the whole of the executive officers of Athens
            were immediately and directly controlled. It is characteristic of
            democracies, at any rate of city democracies, to be exceedingly jealous of
            their servants: either they allow them to hold office for a very
            short time, as at Florence; or they retain the right of discharging
            them at a moment’s notice. At Athens the magistrates held office for a
            year, but once in every prytany—i.e., ten
            times in the year—the question was put in the Assembly whether
            they should be continued in office or superseded. If anyone among
            them was held guilty of any offence, he was at once superseded and
            delivered over to the mercies of a law-court. By the Assembly also
            war was declared, expeditions sent out, and conquered states reduced
            to slavery; and if a general was sometimes trusted so far as to carry out
            the details of a campaign, he often received minute and
            precise instructions to guide his conduct. Any change in the
            constitution of Athens, such as the restriction of the powers of the Areopagus
            and the admission of the fourth Solonian class to office, could only
            be made in the Assembly.
             This sovereign
            power, so comprehensive and yet so minute in its operation, could not be left
            without checks upon its action. Of those which existed in the time of
            Pericles some dated from the days of Solon, while others must have been
            introduced, or at any rate increased in force, by Pericles
            himself. Solon established the law that the Assembly could only
            discuss and decide on business brought before it by the Council. It had
            not the power of simple initiation. No citizen could get up and propose
            a measure without regard to the action of the Council. The utmost
            latitude allowed, if indeed so much was allowed, permitted him to suggest
            a measure for the consideration of the Council, and the measure
            thus suggested was included by the Council in the programme of business at the next meeting. Or a clause might be inserted in a
            decree, compelling the Council to bring forward the business to which
            it referred, or to introduce envoys within a certain time. In the
            settlement with Chaicis (p. 131), the prytanes
            are pledged to bring any envoy from Chal-cis before
            the Council and people within ten days of his arrival. And in another
            decree, concerning the first-fruits at Eleusis, Lampon the seer is to report to the Council in the ninth prytany,
            and the Council nolens volens must bring the matter forward before the
            Assembly. The insertion of these clauses shews that it was in the power of
            the Council to delay, or even to quash, at least for their year
            of office, any measures to which they were opposed, and the only
            safeguards against an abuse of this power, except such peremptory orders,
            were the numbers of the Council, and the “ scrutiny ” at the close of
            the year of office.
             Another check or
            limitation of the power of the Assembly was the separation of the judicial
            and legislative from the administrative functions. The Assembly was
            indeed a sovereign power, but, as we have said, it could not, except in
            peculiar circumstances, make a law, or pass a legal sentence. Nor could it
            revoke a sentence when passed by a lawcourt. In its own sphere it was absolute;
            it could bring forward for discussion a matter on which a vote had
            been taken; it could cancel a previous decree ; it refused, in fact, to be
            bound by its own acts; but over it was the law, and the administration of
            the law. This limitation—which is honourable to the Athenian democracy—was so strictly observed that on the few
            occasions when the Assembly became a court of law, it met, as a rule, under
            peculiar conditions. The place of meeting was the marketplace, and not the Pnyx; the citizens voted by their tribes, and
            not promiscuously ; the votes were given by ballot; and in order to be
            valid, the decision must be supported by no fewer than six thousand votes.
             The supremacy of
            the law over the Assembly was probably maintained by the Areopagus, so long
            as that court was in possession of its ancient privileges. With the
            development of the paid juries a peculiar form of process replaced the
            supervision of the Court. It was open to any citizen in the Assembly to
            declare that the motion brought forward was contrary to the law of the
            land, and by pledging himself to indict the proposer for “ illegality,” he
            at once secured the suspension of the motion. The case was then tried
            in a court. If the proposal was found to be illegal, the mover was
            punished more or less severely; if the attack turned out
            frivolous, the accuser was fined one thousand drachmae (about £3 5).
            This process was the “graphe Paranomon,”
            the great engine by which the daily working of the constitution was kept
            in harmony with its established principles. So long as this was in
            force, the decrees of the Assembly could not over-ride the
            laws or institutions of the State.
             Once more, it
            seems that the presiding officer in the Assembly had the power to refuse to put
            a motion to the vote, if he considered it to be plainly illegal. On
            the famous occasion, when it was proposed to condemn six Athenian generals to
            death by a single vote in the Assembly, instead of trying them
            separately, Socrates was the chairman for the day, and he refused to put
            the proposal to the vote. As it was carried in spite of him, the
            opposition must have been in some way overcome ; but unfortunately our
            meagre information does not allow us to explain how this was done.
             It was also a
            limitation, not on the power of the Assembly, but on the use of it, that anyone
            who came forward with a proposal was regarded as responsible for what he
            proposed, even when he was strictly within the law. In all states, and
            under all forms of constitution, treachery and corruption are the
            just objects of severe punishment, but the Athenians went further than
            this. They brought to trial for “ misleading the people ”
            anyone whose advice had caused disaster to the state. The evil of the
            custom was as great as the good, and perhaps greater. For if on the one
            hand it checked any inclination to make reckless proposals in the
            Assembly, it tended on the other to make a single individual suffer for
            acts done with the approval of a majority. We find Pericles himself more
            than once speaking in severe condemnation of this unwillingness of the
            Assembly to accept the responsibility of its own acts; and after his
            death the mischief became worse. Successful orators knew how to turn
            the indignation of the people at the failure of measures, which they had
            proposed, on the heads of the unfortunate generals who had failed to
            execute them.
             The Council, whose
            preliminary action was necessary to legalise any
            decree passed by the Assembly, was an institution founded by Solon, but altered
            and developed by Clisthenes. In the time of Pericles it consisted of
            five hundred members, fifty from each of the ten tribes. They were men of
            thirty years of age or more, chosen by lot to hold office for a
            year. Before admission each candidate had to undergo a public
            examination, touching his life and character, 18 at which every
            Athenian was at liberty to put what questions he pleased. If approved, the Councillors entered on their office with solemn
            ceremonies, binding themselves by an oath to discharge their
            functions honestly, and at the end of the year of service the whole
            Council and each member of it were held responsible for their conduct. During
            their year of office the Councillors were
            relieved from certain burdens, which fell upon the ordinary citizen;
            they could not, for instance, be called upon to serve in the army.
            They received a drachma (8T.) a day as payment for their services—a
            payment which, like the half-drachma of the jurors, was probably
            established by Pericles.
             The Council met
            daily, with the exception of festivals and days of ill omen. In times of
            great distress or excitement it sat continuously, ready to act at a
            moment's notice. A special chamber in the market-place was known as the
            Council-chamber, but this did not prevent the Council from assembling at
            any convenient place. If, for instance, they had naval business in hand,
            -they assembled at the dock-yards ; if the subject concerned the
            Mysteries, at the Eleusinium. The meetings were
            so far open to all that the public were only separated from
            the Council by a cord drawn round the meeting, and could easily hear
            all that was said, though private persons could not communicate with the
            chamber unless permitted to do so by a decree of the Assembly or the
            Council. Nothing would have created greater alarm and suspicion than a
            sitting of the Council with closed doors.
             Besides its duties
            as a preparatory assembly, the Council was the great agent in carrying out the
            decrees of the people. It formed the connecting link between the Athenians
            gathered in the Assembly and the individual officer or magistrate. The
            details of measures were often left to the Council, which was
            empowered to supplement what was wanting in the decree of the Assembly by
            decrees of its own, or it received authority to investigate any matter
            of public importance, such as the famous mutilation of the Hermae,
            which took place just before the Sicilian expedition. It was especially
            charged with the maintenance of the fleet;—a Council which during its
            year of office had not built a single trireme, would not venture at the
            close of it to ask for the crowd which it was usual to bestow as a mark of honour for a proper discharge of its duties. To it
            also were brought all matters concerning foreign policy and the
            league. Above all, the Council managed the finances of the state,
            receiving money, and confirming by its presence the acts of the financial
            officers.
             It is obvious that
            so large a body as five hundred men could not be kept constantly at work.
            However important it might be to have the whole number at hand when
            wanted, it was necessary for practical ^purposes to subdivide it. For this
            object the fifties elected from each of the ten tribes were kept
            apart; and the Greek year of 354 days was also divided into ten
            periods of 35 or 36 days. Then one of the ten tribes was allotted to each
            of the ten periods, to be in office constantly during that time. The
            periods were called “prytanies” or presidencies
            ; the tribe in office was the
            “ presiding tribe”; and the members of it were the “ presidents.” Out of
            the fifty presidents, one was chosen by lot to be the chairman for
            each day and night in the term of office, and, as the same person
            could not be chosen twice, thirty-five or thirty-six out of the fifty would
            hold the office of chairman. During the day of office, the chairman “ took
            the chair,” as we should say, in the Council and the Assembly, if an
            Assembly were held ; he also kept the state seal and the key of the state
            archives. To the presidents all business of immediate importance was
            at once conveyed, and the generals and the officers chiefly responsible for the
            peace of the community were in constant communication with them. In the “
            Knights ” of Aristophanes, Cleon, who is one of the generals of the year,
            attempts to forestall the attack of the Sausage-Seller by hastening to
            the Council :
             “ I ’ll set off
            this instant to the Council,
             To inform them of
            your conspiracies and treasons,
             Your secret
            nightly assemblies and cabals, Your private treaty with the King of
            Persia, Your correspondence with Bceotia, And
            the business that you keep there in the cheese press, Close pack’d, you think, and ripening out of sight.”
             
             Of the numerous
            officers at Athens the Generals were the most important. In the earliest times
            the third archon, or Polemarch, was the commander-in-chief of the Athenian
            army, but after the reforms of Clisthenes, ten Strategi, or generals, were
            elected, one for each tribe, with whom the polemarch was associated. This
            was the system in existence at the time of the battle of Marathon. On that
            famous ' occasion each of the ten tribes of Athens furnished
            a contingent to the army, and each contingent was commanded by a general,
            who in his turn became commander-in-chief of the whole army, the
            polemarch retaining a nominal control and commanding on the right
            wing, but with little real authority. Each general belonged to the tribe which
            he commanded, but he was not chosen by the tribe ; the election was the work
            of the whole Athenian people assembled for the purpose in the Pnyx, under the control of the archons. In the next
            ten years we find a great change taking place in the duties of the
            generals ; one of the body was chosen commander with full powers, and
            the rest were subordinated to him, while the polemarch disappears
            entirely. In this capacity Themistocles commanded at Salamis, Aristides at
            Plataea, and Xanthippus at Mycale. Under these
            circumstances the generals could not any longer be the commanders
            of their tribes, and we sometimes find two generals belonging to the
            same tribe. The tribes were now commanded by the Taxiarchs,
            the generals being set free for executive functions of a
            higher nature. They were, in fact, the chief executive officers at Athens.
            Not only the management of the army, whether on land or sea, but the
            management of public business generally, was in their hands.
            They were, as we have said, in constant communication with the
            Council, to which they conveyed information and made proposals for meeting any emergencies which
            arose.
             As the office was
            one which required special knowledge and capacity, the generals were chosen by
            show of hands, not by lot. For the same reason an efficient officer was often
            re-elected ; Pericles, for instance, was a general for fifteen years after the
            peace of 445 B.C. Such constant re-election was of course the
            strongest proof of popular confidence; a man so favoured was not only the most influential member of the board of generals, but he
            was the foremost man in the city. In order to retain such a
            position it was necessary that he should be something more than a
            good captain and a clever administrator; he must also be a clear and
            eloquent speaker, able to explain his policy to the people, and convince
            them of its merits. Such a combination of qualities was rare,
            especially when rhetoric became a passion with the young Athenians who
            haunted the Assembly. The orator and the general then parted company
            ; one was supreme in the Assembly, the other in the field ; and
            nothing delighted the Athenians more than a passage of arms between the
            two.
             It is not
            necessary here to go into the working of the board of ten generals. That they
            could not always act together is obvious. As a rule they were sent
            out in such numbers as the importance of the expedition required, and
            possibly one of the number was placed in some sort of authority
            over the rest. At the end of the year they, like all other officers
            at Athens, had to give an account of their office; more especially of the money
            which passed through their hands. Very often the Athenians, without
            waiting for the end-of the year, condemned their generals to death, or exile,
            for failing to carryout in a satisfactory manner the instructions
            given them. In fact the position of a general was by no means an easy
            one; his conduct was judged, not by a committee of experts, who could form
            a sound opinion of the extent to which there had been a want of
            honesty or of capacity, but by an irresponsible mob, led by an orator who was
            only too anxious to make good the position of his party, or to
            throw the blame of mistakes made by the people on those who had to
            carry them out.
             As we have seen,
            the Athenians deposed Pericles from the office of general in the year 430 B.C.
            But in the years 431 and 429 B.C. he seems to have occupied a
            position of extraordinary authority. Thucydides informs us that he
            prevented the Athenians, when shut up in Athens, from meeting together to
            express their discontent at his plans, “ being still general ” ; and
            that after his re-election, “ all things were committed into his hands,”
            expressions which imply a far greater power than was commonly exercised
            by a general.
             Among the civic
            magistrates of Athens, the archons held the first place. They were nine in
            number, elected annually, like the generals, but elected by lot. The
            office was one of the oldest in the city, the archons being in fact the
            successors to the power of the kings who had once ruled the people. But
            the creation of the board of generals detracted largely from their
            executive powers, and when the lawcourts were established—if not earlier—their
            judicial functions were confined to a preliminary examination of the cases
            brought before them. The first archon gave his name to the year; he was
            also in a sense the pater patrice, under
            whose care were all orphans requiring protection, and other
            matters connected with family rights and duties. The second was the
            King archon ; he was in charge of the religious observances of the city,
            and before him were brought, in the first instance, all charges
            of murder and homicide. The third archon was the polemarch, or
            general-in-chief, of whom we have already spoken. The remaining six were
            called the Thesmothetae, or “makers of
            ordinances” ; they were concerned with the administration of justice, and
            in old days, when there were no written laws in existence, they must have
            been to a large extent the administrators and repositories of law, in all
            those cases which did not come under the Areopagus. When the
            law-courts came into vogue, the thesmothetae were
            occupied in allotting the juries and bringing cases before them. Their
            functions in this respect were purely formal. They were not
            judges, and they gave no votes. They merely provided that the
            proceedings of the courts should be legal and orderly.
             Before entering
            office the archons had to be approved as fit and proper persons for the
            duties which fell upon them, and at the end of the year they had to
            undergo the usual “ scrutiny.” When this was satisfactorily passed they
            took their seats in the Areopagus, where they continued for the rest
            of their lives. No citizen could be elected archon a second time.
             Besides these
            officers there was a host of others, some charged with keeping order in the
            market-place, others with the care of the public buildings,
            others with the exportation of corn, etc. There were stewards and
            treasurers and collectors and clerks, all of whom were only elected after
            a formal approval, and only released from office after a formal scrutiny ;
            liable at any moment to be suspended by a decree of the Assembly and
            brought to trial before a law-court. Most of these officers were united in
            boards, usually of ten, for it was the exception to trust anything
            to the care of an individual. Never, we may say, was there a state
            more suspicious of her public servants than Athens; never was there a
            state which held them responsible for their actions with
            greater severity. Where other governments, perhaps too blindly, have
            trusted to personal honour and esprit de
              corps, the Athenians insisted on a public approval of character
            before entering office, and a formal discharge on leaving it, and the ever
            present fear of punishment for misconduct. And never, we
            are compelled to add, was there a state in which the belief in the
            corruption of public servants was more universal.
             We turn now from
            Athens to the Athenian empire. The sovereign power was of course the same
            in both, but we have to examine the manner in which that power acted upon
            the allies and subjects throughout the wide dominion where it was
            the ruling force.
             In the fourth
            chapter we have pointed out the causes which tended to transform the Delian
            league into the Athenian empire. The subjugation of Naxos, the first
            act of aggression which brought home to the confederates the true nature
            of their position, was followed by the splendid victories of
            the Eurymedon, whereby the limits of the league were widely extended,
            and the management of Athens was justified, so far as success could
            justify it. Not long afterwards, twelve years at the latest, the
            chest of the league was brought from Delos to Athens, and whatever
            the reasons for the change may have been, the result was inevitable. The
            last vestiges of the Delian synod disappeared ; Athena, and
            not Apollo, became the presiding deity of the league, and the
            management of the common fund, which had from the first been collected by
            Athenians, now fell wholly under Athenian control. It was no
            longer the representatives of the allies, of whom we never hear, but
            the Athenian Assembly, which decided on the outlay of the accumulated
            treasures.
             From the year 454
            B.C. onwards, the evidence of inscriptions enables us to speak with some
            certainty about the arrangements of the league, or of the empire, as
            we might more justly call it. We see that the payments made by the cities
            were frequently revised ; sometimes they were raised, sometimes
            they were lowered. The amount was generally fixed by the Council,
            after consultation with certain officers called “ Assessors ”—who were
            sent, when necessary, to visit the various cities, — but any city could
            appeal from the decision of the Council, if it appeared unjust. The case
            was then tried in a law-court, whose award was final. Other cities are
            registered in inscriptions as fixing their own tribute ; in others the amount
            seems to have been fixed by private persons on the part of
            the community. The assessment took place at the Panathenaea at the
            beginning of the Attic year, but the payments were brought to Athens at
            the time of the great Dionysia in the following spring. They were
            received by the Hellenotamiae in the presence of
            the Council, and, after one sixtieth had been deducted as the share of Athena,
            the residue was paid over to the public chest of the city.
             The three great
            islands of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos never paid any tribute. Chios to the last,
            and Lesbos till the revolt of 427 B.C., continued to be independent
            allies, who furnished ships and crews to the service of Athens. After the
            great revolt of 440 B.C., Samos was deprived of her fleet, and
            compelled to pay an indemnity for the expenses of the war. She was
            reckoned among the subject and tributary allies, but her name never
            appears in the tribute lists.
             Beyond this great
            distinction, that a few supplied ships as independent states and the majority
            paid tribute as subjects, we cannot lay down any general rules about
            the relations prevailing between Athens and the allies. They differed in
            each case. In some instances Athens fixed the constitutions of the subject
            cities, as at Erythrae and Chaicis ; in others they were left very much to themselves. But the
            system of laissez-faire extended only to their internal
            politics ; in the administration of law, Athens interfered to a
            considerable extent. Not only were the allies compelled to come to Athens
            to answer any charge touching their allegiance to the league, but any
            cases involving the life of a citizen were tried at Athens ; even
            civil suits, if the amount at issue exceeded a certain sum, were brought
            before Athenian courts. This was doubtless regarded as a great burden
            and expense ; men would much prefer to fight out their own quarrels,
            than to feel that their lives and properties were at the mercy of the Athenian
            jurors. But these regulations, which seem to us so extraordinary and
            even tyrannical, were not an invention of the Athenians. In very early
            times, when the island of zEgina was a
            dependency of Epidaurus, the inhabitants were compelled to take their suits to
            Epidaurus for settlement.
             If we attempt to
            balance the good and evil, the justice and injustice, of the conduct of Athens in
            the Delian league, we must admit that the Athenians delivered the allies
            from the power of Persia, and that they kept the zEgean free of pirates ; the amounts which they exacted from the cities were
            not large, and, so far as we know, they imposed but few restrictions on
            their trade. We must also allow that Athens was elected to be president of
            the league by the voluntary choice of the allies, and that it is the duty
            of a president to keep a league in order and prevent it from falling to pieces
            through the inactivity or carelessness of the members. Nor can we justly
            blame the Athenians for the decay of the Delian synod, or for acceding
            to the wish of the allies to pay money instead of sending ships. These
            changes were indeed fatal to the equality of the league, but they were not
            fatal to its efficiency. Nevertheless, when the allies found themselves the
            helpless subjects of a tyrant, instead of equal allies led by a
            president, they could not fail to resent the change ; they felt that
            their contributions, though small, amounted in the aggregate to a sum
            which in Athenian hands maintained a fleet sufficient to overpower
            their utmost resistance. Their contributions were no longer voluntary,
            but exacted whether they would or no; the expenditure was beyond their
            control, and not less so the disposition of the forces which
            they were compelled to supply. The necessity of carrying their law-suits
            to Athens was a proof that their independence was gone, and in some cases
            the loss was made more evident by the presence of Athenian garrisons
            and overseers in their cities. The growth of Athens, the adornment of the
            city out of funds intended for other purposes, while it tended to
            make the city more and more the centre of the
            Grecian world, attracted thither an ever increasing amount of trade
            to the detriment of other ports in the Aegean. The allies could not but
            feel that the interests of Athens were distinct from their own, and often
            opposed to them; and Athens did nothing to soothe the irritation. As she
            felt her greatness depending on her empire, she resolved to maintain it at
            all costs; and for this purpose it was easier to employ force than
            policy. Indeed a Greek statesman would never have attempted to form an
            United State on the only basis on which it could last—by destroying
            the political isolation of the units and fusing them into a larger
            whole. Had Pericles proposed to make all the members of the alliance
            citizens of Athens, the Athenians would not have permitted it, and
            the allies themselves would have resisted to the death.
             Besides the
            members of the confederation, the Athenian empire included all the various
            cleruchies, or colonies composed of Athenian citizens. These, as we
            have seen, were part and parcel of the Athenian state, and pledged to
            support her interests to the death. They were chiefly founded
            by Pericles, and were intended to support the power of Athens in
            Euboea and the Aegean, especially in the northern part of it. The Lemnian and Imbrian troops
            fought in the Athenian armies, and the colonists were in fact Athenians,
            members of Athenian tribes. But the gain was counterbalanced to some
            degree by the suspicion which these colonies excited in the rest of Greece
            ; they were evidence of an appropriation of territory, which
            was neither forgotten nor forgiven.
             Lastly, Athens had
            a number of allies outside the circle of the league, through whom her
            influence was extended to the remoter parts of Hellas. She was on
            friendly terms with Thessaly in the North of Greece, though we must admit that
            on more than one occasion the Thessalians shewed themselves to be
            untrustworthy allies. The reigning monarch of Macedonia, Perdiccas, was so
            perfidious that it was difficult to say whether he was a friend or
            foe, for he became one or the other as it suited his immediate policy. The
            alliance with Sitalces, the king of the Odrysian Thracians (p. 227),was of more value, chiefly
            because it prevented any attacks by the natives on the Athenian
            possessions in the Chersonese. More important still, from a commercial
            point of view, were the relations which united Athens and the powerful
            princes in the Greek cities on the northern shore of the Euxine.
            These cities were the granaries of Athens, from which, even in the
            beginning of the fifth century, Greece was supplied with corn, and with
            the increase of the city Athens became more and more the centre of the corn trade.
             With the remote
            east Athens had little connexion. Egypt was, of
            course, wholly in the hands of Persia. We have seen that Pericles refused
            to send aid to the rebellious king, though he accepted the cargo of
            corn which was given in the hope of securing Athenian assistance. Of Cyprus we
            hear little or nothing after the victory of 449 B.C. Relations were
            kept up with Crete, but they led to no result. The island was once visited
            by the Athenian fleet during the Peloponnesian war, and we hear of
            Cretan mercenaries in the Athenian army; but Crete was never
            connected, even remotely, with the Delian confederacy.
             In the west,
            Athenian influence was widely felt. An Athenian general, Diotimus,
            is said to have instituted a torch race at Naples, and traces
            of Athenian pottery are abundant in Campania. Of the colony of Thurii we have already spoken (p. 146), and of the
            alliances with Rhegium and Leontini.
            It seems to have been a part of the Periclean policy to develop the connexion with the west, and by every possible means
            to raise the condition of the Ionic cities of Sicily and Italy as a
            counterpoise to the Dorian power in Tarentum and Syracuse. Of the
            relations of Athens to Carthage, we can say nothing but that she
            traded with the Etruscans, either directly or indirectly, is proved by the
            Athenian vases found in Etruria. The day of Rome was not yet come.
             Nearer home Athens
            was on friendly terms with Acarnania, which looked to her for help against
            the aggression of the neighbouring city of Ambracia. Corcyra was received into alliance in 433
            B.C., and Cephallenia was gained in the first
            year of the war. In the Peloponnesus she could count in the neutrality of
            Argos and Achaea.
             Thus at the time
            of her greatest power, the influence of Athens extended from the Crimea to
            Crete, from Miletus to Sicily and Naples; and she could place upon the sea
            a fleet incomparably superior to any force which could be brought against
            her. It was a great empire, and it was the greater because it included
            within its circle the most active and civilised states
            in the world. But from the first it was doomed to failure. The Greeks
            could never be induced to accept the principle on which it was founded. At
            the moment when the Delian synod ceased to exist, the Athenian empire
            became a tyrannis, and the strongest sentiment which
            could animate a Grecian breast—the love of independence —was aroused
            against her,
             
             CHAPTER XVII.
             THE ATHENS OF
            PERICLES : ART AND LITERATURE.
             
 HE early stages of
            civic freedom, the attempt to found an empire in the most civilised people of antiquity, the methods by which a
            democracy sought to govern itself and carry , on a vigorous foreign
            policy, will always have an interest for mankind, however small may
            be the scale on which these events took place, but no one will deny that it is
            the Art and Literature of the time of Pericles which have won for it
              the title of the “Golden Age of Athens.” In his treatise on the “Glory of the Athenians,”
                Plutarch endorses the criticism of the Laconian who declared that the
                Athenians spent on amusement the funds which ought to have gone
                to more serious objects. “ If we were to calculate,” he says, “the
                cost of the various plays, we shall find that the Athenians laid out more
                on “Bacchae” and “Phoenisae,” on “Oedipuses and Antigones,” on
                the woes of Medea and Electra, than was spent on the wars which they waged
                against the barbarians for empire and freedom.” Time has justified
                the Athenians in their expenditure ; the money which they lavished on
                amusements has turned out an imperishable investment, a source of instruction
                and delight throughout the civilised world.
                 When the Persians
            retired from Athens in 479B.C., they left behind them a ruined city. The walls
            and houses were destroyed ; the temples blackened and burnt. Fifty
            years later, at the death of Pericles, Athens was incomparably the most
            strongly fortified and the most beautiful city in Greece. It is
            indeed true that the houses even of the richest inhabitants were of a
            modest size and appearance, and the streets were narrow and irregular
            owing to the haste and disorder in which the city was rebuilt.
            This defect could not be remedied without a reconstruction of the city.
            But the walls were impregnable, those of the port were stronger still, and
            the two were connected by the Long Walls, or “ Legs,” and the Phaleric wall. The new town of Peiraeus was laid out
            with straight and spacious streets by Hippodamus;
            while the spoils of Persia and the contributions of the allies were
            lavished on the adornment of the ancient city.
             The probable
            direction and extent of the city walls in the time of Themistocles are shewn in
            the accompanying map. From Thucydides we learn that the circuit of
            the city, excluding the space between the Phaleric wall and the outer of the two “ Legs,” was somewhat more than five miles.
            Of the walls subsequently built, the Phaleric wall was more
              than four miles long ; the Peiraeic, five, the total
              circuit of Peiraeus and Munychia was about
              seven miles and a half. Thus, without counting the inner of the two
              “Legs,” or the length of the city wall between the Phaleric and the outer “ Leg,” we have no less than twenty-one miles of
              fortification. Of part of these walls we are told that, though
              the height was only half that intended, the width was such that two
              wagons could pass each other, and the whole wall was made of large stones
              hewn square and clamped together on the outer faces with iron and
              lead.
               In the most
            ancient times the city of Athens included the Acropolis and the land to the
            south as far as the Ilissus, and to the last, the
            shrines and sacred places, with the exception of the Areopagus and
            one or two others, lay in this district. In the citadel itself were
            the temples of Athena and Poseidon, who were said to have striven for the
            possession of the place. In the low lands by the banks of the stream was
            the temple of Dionysus, and farther to the east the temples of Zeus and
            Apollo. Here, too, was the fountain of Callirrhoe, the water of which was
            always used “ on great occasions, at marriage rites and
            other ceremonies.” But long before the fifth century, the city had
            spread to the west and north of the citadel, and by the time of
            Themistocles a part of the Ceramicus, or
            Potter’s Field, was included in the circuit of the wall. This was in fact the
            busiest part of the town, lying as it did between the great
            western gate of the city and the market-place ; and when Cimon began
            to adorn the city with the spoils of his great victories, it was still
            possible to make alterations in this quarter. Outside the large
            double gate (Dipylon) by which the city was
            entered, a road ran in a north-westerly direction, to the groves of
            the Academy, where amid shady recesses the waters of the Cephisus preserved a verdure even in the glare of an
            Attic summer. In this pleasant place a gymnasium was built, at which the
            Athenian youths ran and wrestled, or sat beneath the planetrees which
            Cimon had planted. To the west from the gate ran the “ Sacred Way,” along
            which processions passed to Eleusis at the time of the Mysteries, and towards
            the south a broad road carried the traffic between the city and Peiraeus.
            On either side of these roads were placed the monuments, which reminded
            the Athenians of the mighty dead who had fallen in the service of their
            country (p. 228); the district was in fact the public cemetery of
            the city, where even in the second century A.D., Pausanias the traveller could still see the tombs of Pericles and Phormio. Within the gate a broad road—the Dromos or
            Corso—led to the market-place, in which were grouped the public buildings
            of the city, the offices of the archons, the Council-Chamber, and the
            Dome or Rotunda, in which the Prytanes were to be found during their term
            of office. The eastern end was occupied by the Painted Porch, which
            was erected by Peisianax, a friend of Cimon, and
            adorned with pictures by Polygnotus and
            others; on the northern side, where the Dromos entered, were Hermae
            or pillar-statues, some of which were erected by Cimon, and inscribed with
            records of his victories in Thrace; the centre was
            made shady with trees, which also were due to the care and liberality of
            Cimon. In the neighbourhood was the Theseum, a shrine built to receive the bones
            of Theseus, and on a terrace to the west rose the beautiful
            temple—whether sacred to Heracles or Theseus is uncertain—which now
            remains the most perfect among the ruined temples of Greece.
             The east of the
            city presented a strong contrast to the west. Here all was quiet and seclusion,
            for the overland traffic from Euboea was carried past Decelea and Acharnae to the northern gate of the
            city. Outside the walls, near the Ilissus, were
            two gymnasiums, one at the Lyceum, which was built by Pericles, the other
            at the Cynosarges (p. 24). Within the city, on a
            low terrace, rose the pillars of the temple of Olympian Zeus, a temple
            which was begun by Pisistratus on a scale far exceeding that of
            any other, but which was never finished, perhaps because the memory
            of the tyrant was too closely connected with it.
             On the south-east
            slope of the Acropolis was the great theatre of Dionysus, at which dramas
            were acted twice a year, in the winter at the Lenaea, or festival of the wine-press ; in the spring
            at the Great Dionysia, the festival at which the allies came
            to Athens with their tribute. The theatre was not begun by Pericles, nor
            was it finished till long after his time, but we cannot doubt that he
            carried on the work, and did much to adorn it. Not far from the theatre
            Pericles built an Odeum, or Music Hall, which is said to have been a copy
            of the tent of Xerxes, and some writers add that the woodwork was
            made out of the masts of the ships which fought at Salamis.
             But the adornment
            of the Acropolis was the highest object of Athenian ambition. The rugged rock,
            precipitous on all sides but the west, rises to a height of 156 metres from the sea level; in length it is about 300 metres; in breadth at the broadest, 140 metres. As the level of the orchestra in the theatre of
            Dionysus is 91 metres, and the level of the Ilissus about 40 metres above the sea, we get a rise from the river to the lowest part of the
            theatre of about 150 feet; and again from the theatre to the
            summit of the citadel, of about 200 feet. The surface of the rock is
            far from being level, rising considerably towards the eastern end, and
            being higher in the centre than at the sides,
            for which reason sub-structures of considerable extent were required
            before the temples could be erected. In the sixth century B.C. the
            Acropolis was the fortress of Athens ; the place which was always seized,
            as a first step, by anyone who wished to obtain control of the city.
            So far as we can ascertain, a wall ran round the summit, along the
            edge of the rock, and a second wall round the base, at some little
            distance from the foot of the precipitous rocks. This second wall was
            called the “ Pelasgic fortress,” because it was
            supposed to have been built by Pelasgians, and the name spread to the
            space between the precipices and the wall. Pisistratus, and his sons after
            him, had their palace on the citadel, and in the final struggle, when
            the Spartans came to expel him from Athens, Hippias prepared
              for a siege in the “ Pelasgicum.” The entrance to the
              Acropolis was then, as' always, at the western end, which was, no doubt,
              secured by fortifications. At this time there were two temples in the
              citadel—the ancient Erechtheum, at the northern edge, and a larger temple,
              apparently built by the tyrants, which occupied the centre.
               In the Persian
            invasion of 480-479 B.C. all the buildings on the Acropolis were utterly swept
            away; the Pelasgic wall was entirely destroyed ; the
            temples were levelled to the ground. For a time the ruins
            were allowed to remain as mute evidence of the outrages of the
            impious foe, or perhaps because Themistocles urged the imperative duty of
            securing the city from attack; but when Cimon brought home the spoils
            of Persia from the Eurymedon he resolved to spend a part of them in
            rebuilding the shrine of the guardian goddess. As the whole city was now
            surrounded by an enormous wall, it was no longer necessary to treat
            the Acropolis as a fortress. No attempt was made to restore the Pelasgic wall. But in order to obtain a sufficient
            area for the new temple which he contemplated, Cimon not only rebuilt on a
            larger scale the southern wall of the citadel, but he
            carried substructures oyer the depressions in
            the native rock for the support of his heavy pillars and walls. But
            the work was never carried out as Cimon planned it. When Pericles became
            leader of the city, the matter passed into his hands, and it was under
            his authority that the great temple, which is the wonder of the
            world, was carried out by Ictinus the architect (aided by Callicrates) and Pheidias the sculptor.
             The form and
            position of the Parthenon will be best understood from the plan of the
            Acropolis, which is taken from that of Dr. Kaupert.
             The Doric pillars
            rose on a base of three receding steps; at each end there were eight, on each
            side seventeen, counting the corner pillars twice. The total length
            was 69.51 metres; the width, 30.86 m., a
            proportion of 9 to 4. Each pillar was 10.43 m in height, and
            1.905 m. in diameter; the distance between them was 2.4 m. The pillars
            were channelled in the Dorian manner, each with
            twenty grooves.
             The lines of the
            temple were not rigidly straight. The “ stylobates,” i.e., the
            courses of stones on which the pillars were placed, were higher in the
            middle than at the corners, and the pillars were slightly diminished
            as they rose; they also inclined inwards.
             Within the rows of
            pillars was the temple in the stricter sense, consisting of four parts : the
            Pronaos, fronting east ; the Celia ; the Parthenon ; and the Opisthodomus. The Pronaos and Opisthodomus were
            porticoes. The Celia (also called the Heca-tompedos because it was just one hundred Attic feet in length) contained the great
            chryselephantine statue of Athena. It was divided by two rows
            of pillars into three “ naves,” of which the central nave was closed
            at the end opposite the entrance by pillars, and separated from the
            Parthenon chamber by a wall, without any door, so that the temple
            was really divided into two parts, one entered from the west, the
            other from the east. The Parthenon chamber was the treasure-house of Athena, in
            which a part of the furniture and sacred vessels belonging to the temple were
            kept.
             Within and without
            the whole temple was adorned with sculptures and ornamentation and colour. The sculptures are of three kinds: those
            contained in the “ pediments,” or triangular spaces formed by
            the gables of the roof at either end of the temple ; those on the “
            metopes,” i.e., on the flat slabs which, alternating with
            grooved slabs (or “ triglyphs ”), ran outside the temple
            between the architrave, which immediately rested on the pillars, and the roof;
            and the “ frieze,” which ran round the whole of the wall of the inner
            temple above the architrave.
             In the pediments
            the sculptor had to deal with a triangular space in which the figures must be
            arranged according to their size. In the centre there was room for figures standing erect; towards the angles
            the figures must appear as sitting or recumbent. The subjects
            represented were the-birth of Athena, which was depicted in the eastern
            gable, and the strife of Athena and Poseidon for the possession of
            Attica, which occupied the western gable, looking towards the Propykca.
             The figures of
            these sculptures were removed from their places and brought to England by
            Lord Elgin, but drawings have been preserved, which enable us to realise their position before removal, though even
            then the eastern gable had suffered severely, the central group being
            destroyed. At the left or southern corner of this pediment the
            horses of the sun were seen rising from underground ; at the right or
            north they sank down again into the darkness. In the centre was a group which represented Zeus, Athena, and Hephaestus ; between
            the two were the seated sisters or “ Fates,” and the reclining figure
            which is sometimes called Theseus and sometimes Olympus, statues which are
            the ne plus ultra of the sculptor’s art. The figures on
            the western gable are not so striking, and the identification of them is
            very doubtful.
             All the figures in
            these pediments were of colossal size, but each, without exception, was
            finished with the most minute accuracy. Even those parts which were
            hidden from view by being turned to the surface of the pediment were worked out
            with the same finish as the parts turned to the spectator. Man has
            here striven with nature to produce perfect work regardless of the eye
            which sees it.
             Of the metopes
            each contained two figures, which were represented in conflict; and they were
            so arranged that the figures on the four sides of the temple formed
            four separate groups. Originally there were ninety-two metopes in all,
            fourteen at each end and thirty-two on each side. A great number
            were destroyed in the explosion of 1687, but fifteen have been
            brought to London, one is at Paris, three in the Museum at Athens, and
            some fragments of others remain in their original position. The metopes
            at the eastern end represented the contest of Athena with the Giants;
            those at the western end, the contest of Theseus and Heracles with the
            Amazons; on the north was depicted the capture of Ilium; on the
            south, where the sculpture has been best preserved, the conflict of the Lapithae and Centaurs.
             The frieze is not
            less than 159.42 metres in length. The whole of this
            splendid work, strange to say, received no direct light whatever ; it was
            only illuminated by the reflected light which, streaming through the
            pillars, struck the white marble floor beneath. The sculpture represents
            in all its details the great Panathenaic procession, which took place
            every fourth year in the month of July. The frieze at the western
            end, which exhibits the preparation for the procession, is still in its
            original place; of the remainder, fifty-three slabs are in the British
            Museum and one at Paris.
             The Parthenon and
            all the sculptures upon it are throughout of Pentelic marble, obtained from
            quarries in the north of Attica, a stone distinguished by its fine grain
            and the yellowish tinge which, deepening with time, has contributed in no
            slight degree to the almost magical colouring of
            the glorious temple.
             The crowning work
            of the genius of Pheidias at Athens was the statue of the goddess, of gold
            and ivory, which was placed in the Celia of the temple in 438-437
            B.C. The oldest statues—and often the most sacred—in Greece were rude
            idols of wood. Then stone and bronze were adopted, and, finally, in
            the hands of the ’great artists of the fifth century, gold and
            ivory—ivory being used in the parts where the flesh was allowed to appear,
            while the robes and attributes were of gold. Of course no relics of
            these costly and perishable materials have come down to us, and our ideas
            of the statue of Athena must be derived from copies of the great original.
            In 1879 a marble statuette was found at Athens which is thought to be
            a copy of the Parthenos, more accurate than any hitherto known. The
            goddess, who is heavily draped in chiton and diplois,
            wears her helmet and aegis ; on her right hand, which is supported by a
            pedestal, rests a winged Victory; her left hand holds the upper rim of her
            shield, within which coils a serpent, the emblem of Erichthonius.
            From this copy we may gain some idea of the outward form of the work
            of Pheidias, but it will always be difficult to realise the difference between the marble and the more .delicate material.
            Moreover, the statue ’’ of Pheidias was coloured.
            It was a supreme work of art, the pride of the temple and the city, representing
            the goddess in all the majesty of complete victory. All strife is now
            ended ; peaceful and powerful she protects the nation which has built the
            glorious shrine for her use.
             Besides the
            Parthenon, there was another temple on the Acropolis—the Erechtheum, which
            Athena shared with Poseidon. This was the older and more sacred
            temple of the two ; in it was preserved the wooden block, which in the
            minds of the Athenians was the most holy idol of their goddess.
            The central parts of the shrine seem to have been restored and
            enlarged not long after the Persian war, and before the building of the
            Parthenon (447-438 B.C.) it was perhaps the treasury of
            the Athenians; but the beautiful colonnades on the north and south,
            which form the chief attraction of the Erechtheum, were not finished till
            after Pericles’s death. The temple differs from the Parthenon
            in being very small; it is also built in the Ionic, not in the Doric
            style. Though it has suffered severely at the hand of time, it is sufficiently
            perfect to allow us to judge of its beauty. The slender Ionic pillars are
            in their places, though the gable and pediment are gone. The porch of
            the Caryatides, i.e., the porch looking to the south at
            the western end, and furnished with draped female figures instead of
            pillars, cannot fail to attract peculiar attention owing to the beauty of
            the statues and the boldness of the design.
             As we have said,
            the Acropolis can only be entered at the western end. Here, therefore, were the
            great gates or Propylsea, which Pericles began
            to build after the completion of the Parthenon. The architect was Menecles. The entire plan was never carried out, owing
            perhaps to the enormous expense which it involved, but what was done was
            executed in a manner worthy of the site on which the gateway stood.
             The entrance was
            formed by two porticoes, facing east and west, and separated by a wall. The
            western portico was, of course, that which first met the eye of the
            Athenian who was about to ascend the hill. He saw before him six massive
            Dorian pillars, three on r each side of a broad path,
            surmounted by a gable.
             The pillars were
            approached by steps, but the path was perhaps merely smoothed, in order that
            horses and carriages might ascend by it. On either side of
            the approach, at right angles to left and right, were
            other porticoes, each with three Dorian pillars. The portico on the left
            (north) was large, and formed a kind of picture-gallery; the portico on
            the right (south) was contracted in order to leave room for the temple of
            Wingless Victory, which occupied the southwest corner of the Acropolis. On
            entering the portico, by the path, the traveller found three Ionic pillars on either hand, supporting a decorated
            marble roof, and before him was a wall pierced with five openings,
            one large central door which received the path, and two smaller on each
            side confronting the spaces between the great Dorian columns of
            the portico. Passing through the door he found himself in the inner
            portico, which was a repetition of the outer, but not so deep, and without
            the Ionic pillars on either side of the central path.
             When he passed
            beyond the pillars he was on sacred ground. Before him was the Erechtheum,
            and a little to the right the Parthenon. Immediately in front, raised
            aloft on a high pedestal, was the colossal bronze statue of Athena Promachus, the work of Pheidias, which was said to
            have been furnished by the spoil of Marathon. On every side were
            offerings dedicated either by the state or by individual citizens: the
            Bull dedicated by the Areopagus; the Chariot and Four, which commemorated
            the victory over Chaicis ; the Perseus of Myron
            ; the Aphrodite of Calamis. On every side were
            inscriptions testifying to the wealth and power of Athens: lists of
            the tribute, catalogues and inventories of the temples, treaties with
            foreign states, records of her anger against traitors such as Arthmius of Zelea, who
            first brought Persian gold into Greece, and of her gratitude to patriots;
            portrait statues set up in honour of
            distinguished citizens, of Xanthippus, of Phormio the great sailor, and of Pericles himself.
             The Acropolis was
            indeed the centre of the life of Athens. If the
            Erechtheum was the home of thel guardian deities
            of the city, the shrine which reminded the Athenians more than any other of
            their legendary past, the Parthenon was the symbol of the city and
            empire of Pericles. It was not intended in the least to replace the older
            temple; it was not regarded as a dwelling-house of the goddess, but
            rather as her treasury. There was no priesthood connected with the
            Athena of the Parthenon, as the Praxier-gidae, for
            instance, were connected with Athena Polias, and
            no organised provision for worship.
            The Parthenon was, if the expression may be used, the palace of the
            goddess, where she received her worshippers on the day of her great festival.
             It would be
            tedious to continue the description of the works of art which adorned Athens at
            the time when Pericles fell a victim to the plague, and no description can
            give anything but a very inadequate idea of the splendour,
            strength, and beauty which met the eye of the Athenian, whether he walked
            round the fortifications or through the broad streets of the Peiraeus,
            or along the Long Walls, or in the shades of the Academy, or amidst the
            tombs of the Ceramicus; whether he chaffered in the
            market-place, or attended assemblies in the Pnyx, or
            loitered in one of the numerous porticoes, or watched the exercises
            in the gymnasia, or listened to music in the Odeum and plays in the
            theatre, or joined the throng of worshippers ascending to the great gateway
            which formed the front of the Acropolis. And this magnificence was
            not the result of centuries of toil; it was the work of fifty years. In
            479 B.C. Athens was a heap of blackened ruins ; in 429 B.C. all the great
            works of the Periclean age had been accomplished except the Erechtheum.
            Athens indeed became a vast workshop, in which artisans of every kind found
            employment ; all in their various degrees contributing to the execution of
            the plans of the master-minds— Pheidias, Ictinus, Callicrates, Mnesicles, and others. Their productions aroused
            the wonder of the Grecian world hardly less on account of their
            excellence, than on account of the rapidity with which they
            were carried into execution.
             When we reflect on
            this great achievement, we naturally ask: How did it become possible
            that, within the lifetime of one man, such a series of masterpieces
            could be created ? Attica could supply marble in plenty ; the surplus of
            the treasury of Athena could be spent in the purchase of gold
            and ivory, and in paying for the services of artists and workmen ;
            but genius cannot be so easily procured ; the wealth of a kingdom may be
            offered in vain for a Pheidias. We must allow that Pericles was in this respect
            peculiarly fortunate. His life fell at a time when artistic genius was abundant
            ; a wave of inspiration seemed to pass over the sculptors and architects
            of Greece, and through the liberality of Cimon and Pericles that
            inspiration reached its highest level at Athens. It is true that some of the
            artists employed were not Athenians at all, and that others were
            trained in foreign schools, but their best work was done at Athens, and by
            their efforts the city became the centre of the
            art of Hellas.
               The greatest
            painter of the age, Polygnotus, was a native of
            Thasos, and may have come to Athens with Cimon after the reduction of his
            native city. We hear of his work at Delphi and Platsea;
            but he seems to have settled permanently at Athens. He founded a
            school, and in conjunction, with his contemporaries and pupils, he adorned the
            Painted Porch at the eastern end of the market-place, the Theseum, and the chamber in the northern wing of the
            Propylaea. Among the artists who came after him, there were perhaps some
            who were as great, or greater, masters of technique ; but no one ever
            attained the elevation of his style. He was the great painter of character
            or “ morals,” an artist who could depict men as “ they ought to be.” It
            was good for the young to look at his paintings, for, like
            the greatest of the Italian masters, he idealised human nature, and impressed on the spectator the combination of beauty,
            grace, and virtue.
             Before the time of Polygnotus, the pictorial art of Greece was mainly
            employed on the decoration of vases, which, however delicate and
            beautiful, were productions for private use. It was otherwise with sculpture.
            This art was from the first employed in the service of religion or for the
            commemoration of great events and persons. Even in the sixth century
            B.C.—under the rule of the tyrants,—the sculptors of Athens had attained some
            eminence, as we know from the statues recently dug up in the Acropolis
            (pp. 16, 34). These statues are of marble, and as we might expect in early
            work in that stubborn material, they are massive and rigid, with a good
            deal of conventionality in the more difficult parts, such as the hair,
            eyes, and mouth. About the end of the century a new impulse was given to
            the art by the use of bronze, a material which admits of greater
            lightness and mobility than stone. It was in the Peloponnesus that the
            great artists in bronze arose : Canachus at
            Sicyon, Onatas at Aigina,
            and Ageladas at Argos. And not only were they
            famous for their success in metal, but the skill with which they were able
            to treat the human and animal forms in that material exercised a
            strong influence on work in marble. Following their example, artists
            sought to produce something more vigorous, life-like, and
            graceful, and pupils trained in their schools carried plastic art to
            its greatest height.
             Among the pupils
            of Ageladas at Argos were the Athenians Myron and
            Pheidias. The works of Myron were to be seen throughout all Hellas.
            Like Polycleitus of Sicyon, he was a great master of the art of
            casting bronze: his Ladas expiring at the moment of victory in the Olympic
            race, and his  Discobolus, were perhaps his most signal triumphs with the
            human body; hardly less excellent, in another region, was the famous
            cow which Cicero saw in the market-place at Athens. Pheidias, on the
            other hand, from the time that he returned from Argos to his native city
            till his departure for Olympia after the completion of the Parthenon, was
            almost exclusively employed at Athens and in Attica. Among his earliest
            works were the statues which commemorated the battle of Marathon,
            and before the death of Cimon he had cast the great statue of Athena Promachus. When Pericles succeeded in acquiring the supreme
            direction of affairs, the decoration of the Acropolis became a part of
            his public policy. He did not dedicate a statue or build a temple as
            a private gift or thank-offering ; he determined to use the services of art in
            order to bring before the Athenians in visible form the position
            of their city, and unite the whole empire under the protection of the
            guardian goddess. The Acropolis was to be a fortress no more, but a sanctuary,
            and Pheidias was at hand to assist in carrying out the plan.
             To Pheidias,
            therefore, these great achievements were mainly due. But he was well supported
            by his architects ; and even in the decoration and plastic work he
            must have been able to secure the services of a number of admirable
            artists. The sculpture in the Parthenon, amounting, it is said, to four
            thousand square feet of frieze and metopes, besides fifty colossal
            statues, cannot have been the work of Pheidias’s own hand, and yet it is
            all finished with the same perfect skill. We must assume that he
            was able to breathe his spirit into those around him, and inspire
            them with the devotion which alone can produce such masterpieces of art.
            When the great work was done and the temple with the statue of the
            goddess was presented to the eyes of the astonished Greeks, it was inevitable
            that Pheidias should be regarded as the foremost of the sculptors of
            his time. As such he was summoned to Olympia, in order that he might
            do for Hellas what he had done for Athens. On a larger scale and with
            still greater magnificence, he created an image of the
            supreme Hellenic deity, which, by its superhuman majesty, filled
            every beholder with wonder and awe.
             From art we turn
            to letters. In two departments of literature, the drama and history, the
            achievements of the age of Pericles have never been surpassed, and in
            a third, the department of philosophy, the foundation was laid for
            triumphs not less splendid. The dialogues of Plato, which remain without a
            rival in their beauty of form and language, belong to the generation after
            Pericles; but they are due, both in manner and matter, to the influence
            of Socrates, whose strange figure and still stranger habits were
            known throughout Athens for some years before the beginning of the
            Peloponnesian war. Of course these were not the only forms
            of literature produced at this period. Epic poetry was indeed a thing
            of the past, but elegiacs were still used for inscriptions, and the lyric
            poetry of Pindar and Simonides, if less passionate and personal than the
            poems of the Aeolian school, was distinguished by a greater dignity and
            sweetness. The songs in which Pindar celebrated the Olympian victors
            of his day still remain to attest the almost superhuman glory
            achieved on the banks of the Alpheus; the “epigram” of Simonides on the
            Spartans who fell at Thermopylae is felt to be a tribute not
            unworthy even of their devotion; and the fragment of his “ Danae ”
            leaves in every reader the memory of a tender and delicate grace which can
            never be forgotten.
             But neither Pindar
            nor Simonides stands in any close relation to Pericles and Athens. Neither
            poet was an Athenian ; their poetry is Hellenic rather than Attic; it
            has little or nothing in common with the spirit which created the new
            democracy, or the Athenian empire ; it would have been what it is
            if the theatre of Dionysus had never been built, or the Peloponnesian
            war had never been fought. In these respects it differs widely from the
            plays of Sophocles and of Aristophanes.
             It is not worth while to trace the dramatic literature of Athens back
            to its earliest sources. It is sufficient to say that at the beginning of the
            fifth century B.C., Aeschylus was twenty-five years old. Now Aeschylus
            is the Homer of Greek tragedy, and though there is enough evidence to shew
            that the Athenians were devoted to the drama before his time, there
            is also enough to shew that the drama, as we know it, was his work. Of the
            ninety plays which he wrote, seven only have come down to us; the
            earliest in date being the “ Persae,” which was brought
            out in 472 B.C., eight years after the famous battle of Salamis, which it
            commemorates, and the last, the “ Orestea,” a
            group of three plays, acted in 458 B.C. These dates shew us that Aeschylus
            was a poet of the Cimonian rather than the
            Periclean Athens, and indeed we cannot read his plays without feeling
            that the spirit by which they are pervaded is the spirit of the Persian
            rather than the Peloponnesian war.
             Like every
            dramatic poet the Greek tragedian attempted to please his audience, and in his
            case this feeling was the stronger because his plays were brought out
            as part of a contest, just as much as the tunes played, or the races run,
            at the Panathensea. Whatever his theme, this
            object must be kept in view. His plays were acted at the festival of
            Dionysus, but he was not compelled to make the acts and sufferings of the
            god his principal theme; it was enough that in addition to the three
            plays, which he brought out as tragedies, he provided a satyric drama, in which the chorus was composed of the attendants
            of Dionysus. For the rest, he might choose a historical subject as Aeschylus
            did in the “ Persae,” or he might take a plot
            from the myths of Theban and Trojan story.
             On the other hand
            there were limitations. The tragedy of the Greeks, though arising out of
            the worship of the god of wine, became so severe and elevated in tone
            that there was no room in it for comic or humorous scenes. It was grave
            and solemn, dealing indeed with the passions of men, but dealing with them
            In reference to human destiny ; it was religious, in the sense that it
            carried the mind beyond the limits of visible life, and attempted to trace
            the working of a divine power in the great scenes which it depicted. The
            characters which it presented were intended to be typical and ideal,
            far removed from the life and individuality of the common world. Even in
            the “ Persae,” where events are described in
            which the audience had participated, the realism is softened, partly by
            the use of general terms—no Greek is ever mentioned by name in
            the play—partly, by placing the action in Persia, and partly by
            bringing on the stage the shade of the great Darius, a device which at
            once lifts the drama above the level of a merely human victory of Greeks over
            Persians.
             In none of the
            Greek dramatists is this elevation more conspicuous than in Aeschylus. The
            spirit of the great scenes in which he took a part passed into his
            soul, and received from his lips an expression not unworthy of it. The
            experiences of the sixth century B.C., when the strongest thrones had crumbled
            to dust, and tyrants had been hurled from the height of power and
            luxurious enjoyment into the deepest abysses of ruin, had impressed on the
            Greeks a deep distrust of human prosperity. That the anger of the
            gods was provoked by the violent deeds of men was an old truth, but a
            feeling now began to spread abroad that mere prosperity, if it exceeded a
            certain limit, was regarded with jealousy by the gods and brought
            down their vengeance upon men. From the first—even from Homer’s time—the
            Greeks were wont to take a far from cheerful view of human existence,
            and as time went on the shadows deepened. Man’s capacity for happiness was
            never satisfied, and if at one moment he seemed to have triumphed over his
            evil fortune, and laid up goods for many days, in the next, he was an
            outcast in the world. This view of man’s condition, which is constantly
            dwelt on by Pindar and Herodotus, received an immense support from the
            failure of the great armament of Xerxes. The ruin of that mighty
            host was a signal instance of the humiliation of those who deemed
            themselves exalted above the lot of mankind. After the battle of Salamis
            the instability of human greatness and the punishment of “ insolence ”
            echoed as an undertone through all Greek thought.
             But while other
            writers were content to speak of the gods as jealous beings, who cut down the
            mighty things of earth, simply because they were mighty, Aeschylus
            took another view : he insisted on the justice of the divine dealings with men
            ; on eliminating anything like caprice or favour.
            The evil which fell upon men never came without some provocation. The
            race of the just is at all times prosperous; their happiness is abiding,
            and passes from father to son; but if prosperity leads to evil and
            impious words and acts—as in Greece it often did—it is never so great
            that it can resist the vengeance which it provokes. Sooner or later, in
            this generation or the next, the sentence pronounced will come to
            pass, and if man will only consent to look at human nature, as it appears
             “ in those pure
            eyes
             And perfect
            witness of all-judging Jove,”
             the sentence will
            be found in every case to agree with the highest conception of
            divine justice.
             In the light of
            such thoughts Aeschylus composed his tragedies, reading anew the lessons of the
            old mythology for his purpose. Even when the material was most
            untoward, as in some of the legends of Zeus, he endeavours to harmonise it with his central thought of
            justice. In the “ Prometheus Vinctus,” which is
            the most commonly read of his plays, we see the friend of man, to whom he
            owes his rise from a condition lower than that of the animals,
            waging an unequal contest with the youthful god, who has built up his
            throne on the ruins of ancient dynasties. It is a strange allegory which
            the poet presents to us ; an allegory of which we hardly know the meaning,
            but expressing perhaps a consciousness of the ceaseless strife raging
            between human intellect and a superhuman power, whose ways are not as our
            ways. Whatever the interpretation may be, Aeschylus makes it clear
            that the conflict of human aspirations with divine ordinances will find a
            reconciliation in the decrees of a justice which reigns supreme over
            gods and men. It is only when Zeus becomes the highest minister of
            justice that his power is supreme.
             In a similar
            spirit the poet muses over the stories of Thebes and Troy. What was the meaning
            of the curse, he asks, which rested on the sons of Oedipus and the
            house of Atreus? Was it a blind impulse driving the innocent on to ruin?
            He allows that it was an impulse, but it was not irresistible ; and
            only when reinforced by other passions, did it carry men on to the
            appointed end. The passages in which the poet describes the passions which
            drive Eteocles on to meet his brother Polynices at the gates
            of Thebes, and those which impel Agamemnon to sacrifice his daughter, are
            masterpieces of subtle analysis. Personal ambition and inveterate hatred
            are blended with the sense of an inherited curse and divinely appointed purpose.
            Crimes must be punished, yet in the punishment a new crime is committed ;
            and so the tragedy goes on from generation to generation, bringing
            down the great and noble, whenever they allow their ambition or rage to
            lead them astray.
             Thus the drama
            becomes with Aeschylus an attempt to interpret the conditions and limits of
            human life. As much as any prophet or philosopher, he strives to establish a
            firm basis upon which a man may act and think ; delivering him on the
            one hand from superstitious fears, and warning him on the other
            against self-assertion. It was a noble conception of poetry, and it was nobly
            carried out. The grandeur of his characters has never been surpassed
            : the proud defiance of Prometheus; the dauntless courage of
            Clytemnestra, who seems lifted by her very crime into an avenging spirit;
            and above all the prescient frenzy of Cassandra, in which every element of
            pathos is rendered more pathetic by a helpless fore-knowledge of death—are
            among the immortal productions of human genius. And the language of Aeschylus
            is unlike the language of any other poet, ancient and modern. The lines of
            Marlowe— the so-called “master of the mighty line,”—are faltering and
            feeble when compared with the large and ample utterance of the old Greek
            poet. Gods and heroes move before us in his scenes, and god-like are
            the tones in which their words are conveyed to our ears.
             The long life of
            Sophocles nearly fills the whole of the fifth century. He was born about 495
            B.C.; his first victory was won over Aeschylus in 469 B.C., and his
            last play was brought out just after his death in 405 B.C. In that long
            space of time the spirit of the Greek drama was entirely changed, for
            there can hardly be a greater contrast than the contrast between Aeschylus
            and Euripides, and, to a certain degree, Sophocles participated in the
            change. He made improvements in the scenery and added a third actor,
            for hitherto no more than two had been allowed to appear on the stage at
            the same time, thus attaining a greater degree of variety in
            his situations and a more vivid contrast of characters. He made each
            of the three plays which, in obedience to custom, he brought out at the same
            time a separate piece, unconnected with the rest; a change which
            enabled him to gain a separate interest and a more rapid movement in each of
            the dramas. No one who reads the “Orestea” of Aeschylus
            can resist the feeling that the “ Agamemnon ” is more than half of the
            whole. The plays which follow want variety and incident ; the
            movement grows ever weaker as it approaches the close. This error
            Sophocles sought to avoid. He perceived that concentration and unity were
            among the advantages which dramatic possessed over narrative
            representation, and that these advantages could not be fully realised if a single theme were spread over
            three plays.
             There is also
            another change to be observed when we compare him with his great predecessor.
            Though his dramas are filled with a religious spirit, and rest to a
            large degree on the contrast of the divine and human will, they are not
            conceived in the high prophetic tone of Aeschylus. He is nearer the
            common thought of his time. He accepts the inevitable, and muses over
            the strange sad destiny of man. What a wonderful creature is man ! he
            exclaims in a chorus of the “ Antigone ”; how infinite in art and
            invention ! what victories has he not won ! victories over bird and beast;
            over earth and sea; over his own unsocial temper. Yet his wilfulness and pride bring him to nought.
            And when a race is once doomed to ruin, the evil passes on from generation
            to generation, and there is no release. With Aeschylus he agrees that
            insolence or rebellion is the worst of crimes; it is the root from which
            the tyrant springs, the destruction of the high laws which govern
            the host of heaven—yet he sees clearly that the passions of men are
            the chief agents in their undoing. The spirit of love holds an equal
            empire with the most solemn ordinances—that is, it is as powerful a
            motive in the actions of men. Love is invincible in battle, and none
            may win a match from Aphrodite. The same deep sympathy with the passions
            of life is seen in his abhorrence of old age—a truly Greek
            feeling —and in the part which he assigns to women in his dramas. In
            two of them the denouement is brought about by the love
            of youth and maid, of wife and husband ; a motive which never appears in the
            extant plays of Aeschylus. We observe the same tendency in the
            situations in which we can compare him with his rival. Aeschylus keeps the
            relations of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra steadily in the background ; Sophocles
            brings them vividly to the front. Aeschylus makes little of the sisterly
            devotion of Antigone for Polynices ; in Sophocles it is the first motive
            of the play. But we must not think of Sophocles as wanting in force, or
            dependent on love for a tragic situation. In the “Ajax” the love of Tecmessa merely adds a tender grace to the rugged
            hero, whose noble spirit cannot survive the death of his honour, and in the “ Philoctetes ” there is no female
            character at all. Nor is there any want of sterner stuff in
            his plays; he never shrinks, when necessary, from the terrible
            resources of his art. Ajax slays himself on the stage in the presence of
            the spectators ; Oedipus staggers into sight, with his bleeding eyes,
            crying for some one to support and guide him ;
            Philoctetes sinks down in a swoon of intolerable anguish; we are
            allowed to hear the appeal of Clytemnestra to Orestes: “ My son, have pity
            on the breast that nursed thee! ” and from the lips of Electra, standing
            watchful at the door, falls the crushing answer : “ Pity she had none, for
            thee or for thy father.”
             Yet terrible as
            these scenes are, we never close a play of Sophocles with feelings shocked or
            distressed. A perfect master of his art, he knows how to give the
            pleasure which tragedy ought to give—the pleasure of elevated feeling
            passing beyond the limits of individual nature to be engaged on
            high and solemn themes, and so returning with renewed strength and
            patience to the everlasting puzzle of human existence.
             In his language
            Sophocles is less simple and also less grandiloquent than Aeschylus. The
            majestic lines, which fall on our ears as “ thunder-drops fall on a
            sleeping sea,” have disappeared, and in the place of the splendid wealth
            of metaphor in which the older poet clothes—and sometimes
            veils—his meaning, there is a striving after subtle combinations which
            often ends in obscurity—at least for us. Nevertheless there is a beauty in
            the songs and a pathos in the speeches of Sophocles which Aeschylus
            has not surpassed ; he has written lines in which we seem to come near to
            the utmost limits of human expression. Such are those with which
            Electra closes her lament over the urn of Orestes; such, too, are those in
            which the poet has chosen to paint the beauties of his own birthplace,
            Colonus.
             There are scenes in
            Aeschylus more striking than any scene in Sophocles, but, on the other
            hand, almost any play of Sophocles, taken as a whole, is a more
            perfect work of art than the best play of Aeschylus. There is a better connexion of the scenes, a more even balance of the
            parts. This superiority, as we have said, was partly attained by the
            limitation of the subject to a single play, but it was also due to the
            consummate skill of the poet in arranging his plots. In this respect the “
            Oedipus Rex ” has always been regarded as the model of a perfect
            play.
             Euripides, who, by
            common consent, stood third in the list of Greek tragic poets, was a
            contemporary of Sophocles, both poets dying in the same year.
             But he was a much
            younger man, and the difference of age coincided with a remarkable difference
            of nature and development. It is perhaps hardly too extreme to say
            that the difference between Shakespeare and Euripides is scarcely greater than
            the difference between Euripides and Sophocles. The conception of
            tragedy is changed ; and human nature is regarded from an entirely
            different point of view. The old submissive attitude, in which man is
            taught to think human thoughts, and walk in reverent humility towards
            higher powers, whose laws, however inscrutable, are nevertheless righteous and
            form the foundation of human society, is cast aside in favour of a criticism which shrinks from
            nothing, however sacred and sublime. The old myths, so simple and
            stately, are dragged down to the level of a case at law; the old heroes
            appear as stupid, brutal, or contemptible men ; the great dames
            of story scold like fish-wives. Every illusion of epic art is
            dispelled ; we are brought face to face with the absurd facts, or the
            gross passions which underlie them. The very worship of the gods is shewn
            to be an occasion of ruin to those who cherish it. In the excitement
            of the Dionysiac possession Agave tears her son to pieces, and Artemis
            cannot protect her votary from the implacable wrath of Aphrodite. Or
            the politics of the day are allowed to influence the characters of Trojan
            legend. Agamemnon and Menelaus are Spartans, as an Athenian
            thought of Spartans in the Peloponnesian war; Helen and Hermione are
            such women as Aristotle in a later generation declared that the Spartan
            women were —imperious, proud, and licentious. The strife of man with
            destiny, which gives such elevation to the earlier drama, has passed away;
            man is now shewn contending with the base passions of his own nature.
            Lying, treachery, malice, uncleanness, jealousy, rage, vengeance,
            envy,—these are the instruments with which Euripides works to bring about
            a tragic situation. He deals with no ideals; he is misled by no illusions
            ; he is softened by no pity; he will not spare us a line of the
            picture; in his merciless analysis of human motives, he tears away
            the tender coverings which contrition or hope or pity have spread over the
            weakness of human nature ; and proclaims aloud, often in the name of
            the gods, the triumph of what is evil and base.
             Such is Euripides
            on his sterner side—the author of the “ Hippolytus,” “ Medea,” and “ Bacchae.”
            But there is also another Euripides—the author of the “ Alcestis,”
            the singer of sweet lyric songs, the magician at whose touch the common things
            of life become radiant with an eternal beauty,—the master of description,
            telling his tale at one time with matchless simplicity and grace, at
            another with a splendour of rhetoric,
            unsurpassed in any literature. The dignity and graciousness of the dying
            Alcestis; the glad, eager, stainless youth of Ion, who knows no home
            but the temple of Delphi, no parent but-Apollo ; the songs of the “ Hecuba ”
            and “ Electra,” the description of the Bacchants, the appeal of Iphigenia
            to her father—these will always exercise a charm even over those who turn
            from the darker scenes. And even in the darkest, it must be admitted that the
            expression is almost perfect. The fury of Hecuba crying to Agamemnon to
            avenge her murdered son is sublime, and not less so the wild
            declamation of Cassandra, when foretelling her own and Agamemnon’s death.
             A poet so wide in
            his range and so daring in his departure from the antique solemnity of his art
            must needs have friends and enemies. Euripides was hated and
            worshipped in his own day, and the division of opinion exists to this hour. The
            comedian Aristophanes condemned him as immoral, holding up to scorn
            his Phaedras and Sthenoboeas,
            and caricaturing his sophistry and rhetoric. On the other hand, he was the favourite poet of Socrates, and not of Socrates
            only, but of the Athenians of his time, and even of those who lived far
            from Athens. A story was current in antiquity that, of the
            Athenian prisoners cast into the stone quarries at Syracuse, every one was allowed his liberty who could recite
            a verse of Euripides. The charm has not vanished with time. Milton
            and Goethe, Coleridge and Browning, have left a record of their admiration
            of this “most tragic of poets.’’ Of criticism, which takes a different view,
            there is enough and to spare ; and even the most devoted admirers of
            Euripides must admit that his work is very unequal. Fate, which has given
            us only seven plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles, has given us nineteen of
            Euripides. Had the same severe selection been exercised in his case,
            and nothing left but his “ Alcestis,” “ Medea,” “Hippolytus,” his “Bacchae,”
            “Ion,” and “Iphigenia in Tauris,” the judgments of his readers would be
            more consistent.
             The difference
            which divides Euripides from Sophocles must not be ascribed merely to his
            personal character or genius. The two men were indeed widely different;
            Sophocles was at once a poet and a man of the world, the charm of the
            society in which he moved, and now and then employed in the public business
            of the city ; Euripides was retired, solitary, studious, a reader of
            books, which in his day were still perhaps a suspicious novelty. Under any
            circumstances the two would have taken different views of life. But when
            Euripides was growing up to manhood, at the time at which the imagination is
            not yet controlled by experience and new ideas are most powerful to
            sway the mind, a great change came over Athenian thought. The “spirit that
            denies” made itself felt in every department of life, and questions
            which had never yet been raised—questions touching the foundation of society
            and morals —were matters of every-day discussion.
             It was in the
            Ionian cities of Asia that the movement first began, and it began with
            enquiries into the phenomena of nature. What was the cause of existence
            and growth ? How did the sun and moon and stars and earth arise ? How were
            their motions regulated ? Numerous answers were given to these questions.
            The elements were distinguished from their composite forms, and sometimes one
            and sometimes another was thought to be the cause of the rest. Various
            processes of rarefaction and condensation, of attraction and repulsion, were
            supposed— one philosopher inventing a system which may fairly be
            called evolution. As thought became stronger the causes of existence
            became more abstract: one teacher would find the key to the puzzle of the
            universe in number ; another postulated constant change as the condition
            of existence ; a third demanded unity and self-existent Being as the basis
            of all things. But one and all agreed in denying truth and reality to
            the changing phenomena of the outward world. By degrees the same criticism
            was applied to politics and ethics. The various forms of government
            were discussed, and with them the object and purpose of all governments. In connexion with such enquiries it was natural to ask
            what was legal and what was illegal. A contrast was established between “
            nature ” and “ ordinance,” between universal and particular laws. It was
            but a short step to pass on to ethical truths, and ask : What was the
            measure of right and wrong? What was the value of custom ? To -what degree
            was a man a law to himself ? Is truth the same for all, or does it
            vary according to the circumstances and temperament of each ?
             Questions such as
            these cannot be raised under any circumstances without a considerable degree
            of danger, and the danger was unusually great in a civilisation like that of Greece, in which morality and religion were by no means in
            close harmony with each other. But so long as they are raised in
            an honest desire to get at the truth, and establish the laws of
            conduct and government upon a firmer basis, the good which attends the
            discussion is greater than the evil. Unfortunately, this was by no
            means the case in Greece. For a time, it is true, the “ sophists ”
            and the philosophers were the same, and both were thoroughly in earnest in
            their speculations. The great names of Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus,
            and Pythagoras are never to be mentioned without respect. But when politics
            and ethics came within the sphere of criticism ; above all, when the
            Ionian spirit of enquiry was allied with Sicilian rhetoric, a different
            spirit prevailed. Sophistry and philosophy parted company ; and while
            the more disinterested seekers after truth pursued their researches
            into Change and Being, there were others who made discussion a profitable
            profession. They travelled through Greece as teachers, imparting
            for pay their secrets of logic and dialectics, and making “the worse
            appear the better reason.” Their wandering life emancipated them from the
            traditions of any state, and though we cannot deny to them the credit
            of great ability and great knowledge, we must allow that they made an
            ignoble use of both. It is true that they stimulated the intellects of
            those who came to them, but the stimulus was all in
            one direction—towards the removal of restraint and the development of
            personal ambition. Or they taught the art of making speeches, which,
            though they would not bear examination, were brilliant enough to
            carry away the feelings of a great audience.
             It was in this
            atmosphere that the youth of the age of Pericles grew up, and Euripides among
            them. From the “ sophists " he learned to question every thing, bringing the deepest feelings of man to
            the touchstone of a formal and ill-developed logic. From them he
            learned to turn outwards the “ seamy side ” of Greek mythology and
            religion.
             The same change
            was present everywhere, and to many it was a change wholly evil. We have
            seen how sensitive the Greeks became at this time to attacks upon
            religion, bringing charges of “ impiety ” against those of the Periclean
            circle who seemed in any way favourable to the
            new intellectual movement. More especially were the comedians filled with
            antipathy to the sophists and their followers. They looked on them as the
            corrupters of youth, whose pernicious doctrines were calculated to destroy
            moral conduct and civic patriotism. Cratinus,
            the first great comic poet at Athens, had a fling at the “ prying rascals
            ” in his play of the “ Panoptae ” ; and in one
            of his earliest plays, brought out immediately after the death of
            Pericles, Aristophanes contrasts the young man, as the sophists had taught
            him to be, with the youth of an earlier age. In the “ Clouds,” which
            appeared in 423 B.C., he selected Socrates, as the most prominent sophist
            of the time, for the chief object of his ridicule. In this he was partly
            right and partly wrong; he was right in pointing to the evil wrought
            in the minds of the young by a crude emancipation from old beliefs and customs
            ; he was wrong in confounding Socrates with those who sought to make
            the worse the better cause.
             Socrates availed
            himself of the instruments which the sophists put into his hands to destroy
            sophistry. From morning to night his strange figure might be seen in
            the market-place, or at some other centre of public resort; there he stood, regardless of poverty, incapable of
            fatigue, asking questions of all around him in the endeavour to find some general principles of action, and awaken others to an interest
            in such questions. What was the relation of virtue to knowledge ?
            Could a man know what was right and do what was wrong? Could virtue be
            taught, and, if so, who were the teachers and where could they be
            found ? Was political government an art like medicine, and what was the
            aim of the art, as health is the aim of medicine? It often happened that
            his questions led to no result beyond the negative result, that the
            common practice and customs of men were irrational; often they were raised
            on absurd analogies, in which vital distinctions were overlooked, as the
            analogy of men and animals, but they never carried him astray from the
            position of a good man and an honest citizen. While the
            professional sophists wandered far and wide in search of profitable employment,
            he remained within the walls of Athens, or only left them to fight in the
            service of his country. And though many of his numberless disciples
            by no means followed in his steps—on the contrary, it was owing to the
            conduct of such men as Alcibiades, Critias, and
            Charmides that he was finally brought to trial for corrupting the youth of
            Athens,—there was one among them on whom his spirit descended in a double
            measure. Through the dialogues of Plato the name of Socrates has
            become a symbol for a life passed in the service of truth and wisdom.
             Aristophanes did
            not see this side of the life of Socrates ; and even if he had seen it, his
            business as a comedian was not to say what was true, but what was
            amusing. The “ Old Comedy ” of Athens, that is, roughly speaking, the
            comedy of the fifth century, presents us with a picture of Athenian life and manners;
            but the picture is far from being true, and it was not meant to be true.
            We cannot judge of Athenian politics and society, of
            Athenian statesmen and philosophers, of Athenian men and women, from
            the descriptions given by the comedians, without being unjust both to the poets
            and the people.
             Attic comedy was
            essentially a creation of the age of Pericles; it was about the middle of the
            century when the earliest comedians of any note came forward. It had its
            root in the merry-makings at the vintage, when the hamlets of Attica
            worshipped the wine god with indecent rites and riotous glee.
            The Greeks had a passion for dramatic representation, and their
            religious worship, like their poetry and even their history, tended to
            take a dramatic form. Hardly any deity was worshipped without some sort
            of miracle-play, or at least a procession. The village wits took the
            opportunity of the festival to form themselves into a band and amuse the
            audience, who gathered round, with tales of village scandal, or by imitating
            the dress, style, and language of anyone who had earned the aversion of his neighbours. With the growth of democracy these
            amusements, which were essentially amusements of the people, attracted
            more attention, until at length they too, in a more developed form, found
            a place among the dramas brought out in the great theatre at the
            foot of the Acropolis. The old village stories and scandal were of course
            dropped, in order to make room for scurrilous attacks on the conduct and
            character of men well known in the city, but the old buffoonery and
            extravagance, by which the attention of the village had been caught, the
            old indecency, which symbolised the worship of
            the productive power of nature, were still permitted.
             Of the comedies
            acted in the lifetime of Pericles, we have nothing but fragments ; but there is
            no reason to suppose that they differed from the comedies of Aristophanes,
            which began to appear in 427 B.C. The fragments which have been preserved,
            and the little that we know of their history, allow us to assert that from
            the time that comedies were acted as part of the great festival of
            Dionysus, they were distinguished by three characteristics: the
            direct attacks on public characters; the extravagant forms assumed by
            the choruses; and the nakedness of their indecency.
             We have already
            spoken of the attacks made by the comic poets on Pericles and Aspasia. Even
            as early as 444 B.C., Cratinus, in the “
            Thracian Women,” spoke of Pericles as going about with the Odeum
            on his head,—a sarcasm on his habit of wearing a helmet to conceal the
            shape of his head, and on the recent erection of the music-hall. In another
            play of the same author, Pericles is “ the new Zeus born of Faction and of
            Cronos,” enthroned, like Zeus himself, on the destruction of ancient
            order; and in yet another fragment, Hera-Aspasia is spoken of in
            language of untempered vigour.
            Even after the death of Pericles, Aristophanes had no hesitation in
            repeating the scandal which declared that Aspasia and her runaways
            and the embezzlements of Pheidias were the real cause of the Peloponnesian
            war. The same measure was dealt out to others: to Cleon, the ferocious
            opponent of Pericles, to Hyperbolus, and Cleophon, leaders of the extreme democracy,
            who insisted on war to the death with Sparta; and, in a less degree,
            to Nicias and Theramenes, who were in favour of a more moderate constitution and peace. Only
            one of the great Athenians of the Peloponnesian war is allowed to escape :
            Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, about whom, in spite
            of much that must have been very tempting in his position and
            character, Aristophanes is remarkably silent. And not the leading men
            only, but the institutions of the people, and even the people—the
            all-powerful sovereign Demos, —are brought forward for satire and
            ridicule. The absurdities of the law-courts form the subject of
            the “Wasps” of Aristophanes; the absurdities of the Demos form the subject
            of the “ Knights.” When there was nothing to be made of the men, the
            poets turned upon the women. Two of the plays of Aristophanes shew us
            Athens under the “ regiment ” of women; a third presents a picture of the
            women as they were, when left to themselves, and celebrating their
            sacred Thesmophoria.
             On this side Attic
            comedy is not to be compared with the comedy of our own stage, but with the
            pamphlets of the age of Swift, or the Rolliad, the
            caricatures of Gillray and Rowlandson, and Punch. But the
            comparison is only partially true. Much greater licence was allowed at Athens than with us, owing partly to the state of society
            at the time, and partly to the fact that gross and licentious ribaldry was
            an accepted part of some religious rites in Greece. And doubtless a
            great part of the attacks were made and taken in no very serious spirit.
            So long as the persons assailed were in a strong position, they cared
            little for the extravagances of comic satire. Unmeasured abuse often
            brings its own antidote. We know that when Fox was hurling his
            denunciations upon North in the House of Commons, the recipient was
            generally asleep ! So, too, with the city. So long as Athens felt her
            greatness secure, she was willing to let the comedians do their worst
            upon men and institutions. She was pleased with her own follies, as
            Justice Shallow was pleased with the wildness of his youth, and
            not the less pleased because “ every third word was a lie.” In times
            of distress and danger her temper changed. She became fretful and suspicious.
            Twice in the fifth century—in 440 B.C., when Samos was in revolt, and
            in 415 B.C., at the time when the great Sicilian expedition was being sent
            out, and the public mind was disturbed by the mutilation of the Hermae—it
            was forbidden to satirise anyone by name. The
            result in the second case may be seen in the comedies of Aristophanes. In
            all the plays brought out before this date he is political and personal;
            in the “Birds,” which appeared in 414 B.C., he never alludes directly to
            the events which were occupying the minds of all. After the fall of
            Athens, in 404 B.C., the character of comedy entirely changed : it
            became a comedy of manners ; the allusions to politics either disappeared
            or were carefully veiled.
             The plays of
            Aristophanes are sometimes named after the choruses which appear in them ; and
            among these we find such fantastic titles as “ Wasps,” “ Clouds,” “
            Birds,” and “ Frogs.” The practice did not begin with him ; he tells us
            that his predecessor, Magnes, availed himself of
            the same artifice to attract an audience, and from the fragments we
            can see that the practice was universal in the older comedy. The
            names were not without meaning; in appearance and dress, so far as
            possible, the choruses in these plays were what they were called. A painting
            on a vase has preserved to us a picture of men dressed to represent birds,
            and though we have no right to connect it with Aristophanes, the
            picture probably represents some scene from a comedy.
             But why, we ask,
            does the poet have recourse to these strange disguises ? We may answer the
            question by saying that comedy never forgot her origin. In the village
            festivals all kinds of fantastic dresses had been worn to attract
            attention and excite curiosity, as well as for the sake of concealment, and
            the practice thus begun was continued when comedy became a part of
            the state festivals. There was also another reason. By bringing in a
            chorus of Birds or Clouds, the poets were able to look at
            human nature and society from an external and abnormal point of view,
            as they might appear to beings who did not share the delusions of mankind.
            Like the Fairies in “ Midsummer Night’s Dream,” they could watch the
            stir and stress of life, and declare : “ Lord! what fools these mortals be
            ! ” It is the same feeling which has prompted the introduction of animals
            into fables. The “ great and sane and simple race of beasts,” whose
            instincts never swerve from the appointed end, have always formed an
            excellent vehicle for the delivery of moral precepts and criticism. The
            comic poets claimed an even greater licence than
            the fabulists, for their fancy was not bounded by the animate world ;
            but amid all their extravagance there ran a vein of common-sense and sound
            criticism, often of vigorous personal remonstrance—especially in the form
            of chorus called a Parabasis, which could only be introduced under some
            sort of disguise.
             Of the gross
            indecency of the old Attic comedy it is impossible to speak without reserve,
            and yet a few words of explanation, if not of palliation, must be
            said. However strange the statement may appear to us, it is
            nevertheless true, that this grossness is largely due to the nature of
            Greek religion. In its essence that religion was a worship of the powers
            which are at work in the universe, whatever they might be, without
            distinction of higher or lower, or the exclusion of animal forces in favour of moral. Not only were there rites of a
            grossly obscene nature in Greek temples, but there were festivals in which
            the worshippers claimed the privilege, in language and in
            symbolism, of being naked and not ashamed. This strange departure from the
            ordinary manners and customs of life was found among women no less than
            men; what the worship of Dionysus was to the one, the worship of
            Demeter was to the other. In our eyes it forms a repellent feature in
            Greek civilisation, and it was repellent to the
            Greeks themselves at a later age. Aristotle and Plutarch condemn it ; in
            their time the open and outrageous indecency of Cratinus and
            Aristophanes had been exchanged for veiled suggestions and innuendoes. The
            change may have been in the interest of good manners ; but whether it
            was in the interest of pure morals is more doubtful, and at any rate we must
            not be misled into harsh judgments on the morality of the age
            of Pericles. These are matters in which one age cannot understand another.
            In spite of the drunkenness which prevailed at the Dionysia, the
            Greeks were a sober nation ; and though we have no evidence on which to
            found a good opinion of the private life of the Athenians, we are at least
            in possession of two facts which prove the high value placed, in
            theory, at any rate, on good conduct: No nation was ever more careful than
            they of the moral and physical education of youth ; none watched more
            strictly to prevent the slightest insult to women of the household.
             Philosophy was not
            the only gift of the Asiatic Greeks to their kinsmen on the peninsula.
            The same spirit of enquiry which led them to investigate the causes of
            natural phenomena induced them also to examine and record the past history
            of Greek cities and the customs of neighbouring barbarians. By the beginning of the fifth century Hecataeus of Miletus had written a description of the earth; maps had been
            drawn ; lists had been made of priestesses and officers; genealogies had
            been compiled and worked into a foundation for chronology ;
            legends had been compared and assimilated ; traditions of
            the founding of cities had been committed to writing. A prose
            literature made its appearance beside the various forms of poetry, which had
            hitherto been the only literature of Greece, and, as was natural in
            an age of such mental activity, it spread rapidly. The sense of style
            was awakened—a sense which could not fail to be stimulated by the
            importance of rhetoric in civic life and the attention paid by
            the sophists to expression. By the middle of the century Herodotus had
            begun the composition of the immortal work, which forms the foundation of
            our knowledge of the history of antiquity ; and at the beginning of
            the Peloponnesian war Thucydides was preparing to record the struggle
            which he thought the greatest of all wars ; though his history,
            which he did not live to complete, was not published till after the
            end of it.
             We have already
            seen that Sophocles and Euripides, though contemporaries in age, were widely separated
            in thought and feeling. The same distinction may be observed between Herodotus
            and Thucydides, though it is shown in a different way. Herodotus is
            essentially the historian of Hellas; Thucydides is the historian of Athens
            : the first is penetrated with the feeling of the Persian war ;
            the second, with the feeling of the Peloponnesian war. Both were
            great admirers of Athens and of Pericles; but one looks at them from
            without, the other, as it were, from within. The spirit of criticism,
            which is all in all to Thucydides, is faintly felt by Herodotus. He
            repeats what he has heard, even when he does not believe it; he asserts
            what he believes, even when it is against all evidence. He is wrong
            when he is at the greatest pains to be scientific, as in his account
            of the Nile; and right when he is merely guessing, as in his account of
            the Caspian/ which he asserts to be a “ sea by itself,” i.e., closed
            at the northern end. His measurements are wrong, for he makes the
            Euxine twice as long as it really is ; his numbers are wrong, for he
            calculates the length of life on a year of 375 days ! He describes the
            pyramids of Memphis, but says nothing of the Sphinx; he travelled to
            Thebes, but passed by the splendid buildings of the Ramessids without a word. His interest in history was not the interest which a
            modern historian would have. Of the countries which he knew best he
            tells us least, and what he does tell is often of very little historical
            value. He might have said a great deal about the Greek cities
            in Asia, as they existed in his own day, when they were claimed as
            subjects by Athens and Persia, or about the constitution of Sparta; among
            the “episodes which his work affects,” these would have found a fitting
            place. Instead of these we have accounts of remote and unknown nations, foreign
            criticisms on Greek myths, or popular stories about the domestic
            complications of the Spartan kings, or legends of the burning of Croesus
            and the invasion of Scythia ; and it is not till he settles down to the invasion
            of Greece by the Persians that he pursues his theme in a settled order,
            and with some attempt at chronology. The history of Thucydides is the
            reverse of all this. He opens his work with a preface in which he
            establishes his view that the Peloponnesian war was the greatest ever
            known in Greece, and dwells on the importance of wealth in warfare,
            knowing that Athens entered on the struggle incomparably richer than her
            opponents. Then he traces the causes of the war, and, after a
            digression, in which he relates the origin and growth of the
            Athenian power, he enters on his subject, never to leave it again.
            His narrative is annalistic in form, each year being divided into two
            parts, a summer and a winter; he took the greatest personal trouble not
            only to find out what men said, for Herodotus did that, but to find
            out the precise truth of what they said, having the greatest mistrust of
            poets whose business it was to exaggerate, and of “ logographers,” who
            composed less with a view to the lasting value of their work than to the
            immediate impression made by it. But, with all this devotion to accuracy,
            he does not approach the task in the spirit of a modern historian. He
            tells us little of the internal politics of Athens during the earlier part
            of the tremendous struggle. Of some of the popular leaders who
            played a considerable part in the drama, such as Lysicles and Hyperbolus,
            he hardly says a word ; the comedians and the sophists, Sophocles and Socrates,
            are never so much as mentioned. It is the war, and nothing but the
            war, on which he has fixed his attention. Attica was laid waste, but we hear
            nothing of the revolution in property which this must
            have caused ; the education of the Athenian youth was influenced by
            sophists and philosophers, but Thucydides never condescends to say whether the
            issue of the war was or was not in any degree due to the decay of the fibre of the Athenian nation.
             The work of
            Herodotus is epic in its plan and highly religious in feeling. The episodes
            which carry him almost over the whole known world may be compared
            with the episodes which carry Odysseus to Calypso’s isle and to Scheria ; the strong, swift stream of narrative, which
            runs through the later books of the “ Odyssey,” may have furnished a hint
            to the historian in the management of the closing part of his story.
            Throughout the whole he is tracing the doom which overtakes human pride
            and insolence; Croesus, Polycrates, and Xerxes are all examples of
            the favourite theme, that the paths of pride
            lead to destruction. It is in vain that men are warned of the danger.
            Croesus is warned by Solon ; Xerxes by Artabanus; Polycrates by Amasis,
            but without effect. There is no way of saving a man from the anger
            which is in store for him.
             Thucydides, as we
            have said, is annalistic,—attempting by this means to secure strictness in
            chronology even at the expense of the connexion of
            events,—and he is anything rather than religious.
             He speaks in
            contempt of signs and wonders and prophets, for any crisis will bring its crop
            of such; he never alludes to any theories of divine envy or human
            pride; he wishes to record things merely as they are, believing that human
            life moves in cycles, and that the past may form a guide to the
            future. Yet we may notice that even he cannot wholly free himself
            from the idea that the plague was the work of Apollo, the god who was
            pledged to aid the Spartans.
             In spite of all
            their differences, Herodotus and Thucydides are alike in one point : they are
            both more dramatic than any modern historian would venture to be. Not
            only do they introduce speeches into their works on occasions, when
            perhaps no speeches were made, and relate conversations which could
            not have been preserved,—this is especially the case with Herodotus, who
            can tell us what Atossa said to Darius in the
            silence of the royal bedchamber—but the speeches are obviously in
            some cases composed with a view to the situation ; they are not a
            record of what was actually said at any time. This is going further than a
            modern writer would venture to do, but this is not all. In some cases
            it seems very probable that Herodotus did not hesitate to ascribe to
            others opinions which were really his own—at any rate it is very difficult
            to understand what interest the Egyptian priests could have taken in the
            story of Helen,—and Thucydides has been accused, not without some shew of
            reason, of making rhetorical comments on the Corcyrean sedition.
            Whatever the truth of this criticism, we shall, in any case, find it
            difficult to deny that the nature and use of historical evidence was
            imperfectly understood by Greek historians. Yet the two great works will
            never be displaced from the position which they hold at the head of
            descriptive and philosophical history, for Herodotus has never been
            surpassed in the art of telling a story, nor Thucydides in his insight
            into the motives of human action.
             Pericles was not
            content that Athens should be the centre of the
            highest art and literature of Greece ; he resolved that, so far as
            possible, the people should share in all the pleasure which art and
            literature could give. In regard to the great artistic triumphs of
            Pheidias and his fellow-workers, the end was easily attained ; the
            beautiful Parthenon was there for all who chose to see; and once in
            every four years, at the festival of the great Panathenaea, all Athens
            went in procession through the gateway to the temple. The plays at the
            Dionysia could not be so easily thrown open. The theatre in
            which they were acted was leased to a manager, who charged a certain
            sum for entrance to cover his expenses. The sum was not high—about threepence a day during the festival,—but even this
            trifle was more than many of the Athenians could afford to spend.
            Pericles met the difficulty by distributing to each of the poorest class,
            out of the public funds, the amount which would enable him to pay
            the fee charged for entrance. This was the celebrated “ Theoricon,” or sum given for attendance on amusements.
            In the time of Pericles it was given to the very poor and only at the
            Dionysia, but afterwards the word was used to cover the division of the
            surplus funds of the state among the citizens.
             
             CHAPTER XVIII.
             THE ATHENS OF
            PERICLES : MANNERS AND SOCIETY—CONCLUSION.
             
             THE monuments of
            Athens remain, though in ruins, to attest the splendour of the art which adorned the city in the days of Pericles; the noble works of
            literature, which delighted the Athenian of his day, can be read by us
            in a form not very different from that in which they first appeared.
            But when we turn to matters of a more ephemeral nature, and attempt to realise the manners and society of the time, our
            evidence is far more precarious. It is always difficult to judge of
            an age by the literature which it produces; ideals mislead us in one
            direction, and caricatures in another; or we mistake the part for the
            whole in our ignorance of the extent to which literature penetrated; or,
            to take another point of view, in our ignorance of the area from
            which ideas and characters are drawn. We know, for instance, that all
            Athens congregated in the theatre of Dionysus to hear the new
            tragedies at the Spring Festival, but we cannot tell how many of the
            audience entered into the spirit of Aeschylus and Sophocles. The eager
            interest in knowledge, which we find among the young men who figure
            in the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon, must have been confined to a
            few; and when we ask what was the general level of intelligence and
            culture at Athens in the best days of the city, it is very difficult to
            give an answer.
             The most obvious
            point of difference in Greek civilisation, when we
            compare it with our own, is the existence of slavery. There were slaves
            everywhere; in every workshop and every household ; on the farms and
            in the mines ; the police were slaves, the clerks in public offices were
            slaves. This feature at once places a wide distinction between the
            democracy of Athens and the democracies of modern times. The questions
            which are now among the most prominent, such as the relations of labour and capital, the growth of population, or the
            extension of the franchise, were hardly raised at Athens; their place
            was taken by others, not less important to the welfare of the society, but
            widely different: the defence of the masters
            against their slaves ; the admission of the evidence of slaves in courts of
            law; the rules and sanctions of manumission. On these subjects much
            might be said which would not be to the credit of Greek civilisation. If we remember that twenty thousand
            slaves deserted to the Peloponnesians at a time when the Public Assembly
            at Athens never numbered five thousand citizens, we can understand
            that there was reason to dread the combination of slaves against masters ; and
            under such circumstances the measures taken for repression were not likely
            to err on the side of mercy. We also know that the evidence of slaves was
            never taken except under torture, more or less severe. On the other
            hand, it would not be difficult to collect instances of kind and humane
            treatment of slaves by their masters, or of devotion on the part of
            slaves. It is also obvious that the existence of female slaves placed a
            number of questions, which are among the most difficult of our day, in
            quite a different light; and without attempting to decide whether the
            evil was greater or less, it is at least certain that a slave, who was
            always an article of value, in one way or another, was never so
            utterly abandoned to her fate as the outcast of modern society. Her
            death, at any rate, could be traced and avenged. But these are wide and
            intricate results of slavery, on which we cannot enter here. Looking at
            the matter from a more special point of view, we may ask: What was the
            effect of slavery on the Athenian democracy ?
             As a first and
            obvious effect it allowed the citizen an amount of leisure which without it
            would have been impossible. While the slave was at work, the master
            was in the Ecclesia, or in the law-courts, or in the market-place, or in
            one of the numerous porticoes. Without the opportunities thus
            afforded, the Periclean constitution could not have existed. Had the
            poorer part of the population been compelled to spend their days in laborious
            occupations, the rich must have remained the governing body of the
            city, but the existence of slavery, united with payment for service in the
            Council and the lawcourts, placed a majority of the citizens in
            the position of men who had both the means and the leisure to devote
            their time to the state.
             Such an
            arrangement not only led to the development of an extreme democracy, but it
            also gave a new turn to the old conflict between rich and poor. In
            countries where the franchise depends on wealth, or the poor live on wages
            paid them by the rich, democracy may degenerate into socialism. But
            this is less likely to be the case in a state where all the citizens
            are equal, and few, if any, are employed in the service of others. In
            Athens, at any rate democracy never took a socialistic form. A man
            who possessed a large fortune was expected to contribute largely to
            the state ; he was burdened with heavy contributions to the maintenance of
            the fleet; out of his pocket came the money necessary for the choruses,
            which took part in the Dionysia and other festivals of the city. So long
            as he paid these sums —and many citizens not only paid them, but
            seized the opportunity to make a display of their liberality, —he was
            permitted to enjoy his fortune, however large. Pettifoggers might attack
            him, it is true, but they could be beaten off by their own
            weapons—as Socrates advised his rich friend Crito to keep a
            tame sycophant who would defend him from others of his kind ! The
            jurors might bear hardly upon him in their administration of the law, for
            that evil, as we have said, was inseparable from the institution
            of the law-courts, but the democracy never attempted anything like a
            confiscation of property, even under the severest pressure. Such measures
            appear for the first time in the acts of the “Thirty Tyrants.”
            The same protection was extended even to those who, though not
            citizens of Athens, were residents in the city, the “resident aliens,” or metoeci. These men paid certain taxes, and liberal
            gifts were expected from them, but no attempt was made to
            interfere with their just gains, so long as these were made in a
            manner which did not impair the wellbeing of the city. Most of the metoeci were traders, and, in fact, the trade of
            Athens was largely in their hands; as a class they were probably richer
            than a large number of the citizens ; their property, and even their
            lives, were at the mercy of the Athenian jurors ; yet we never hear
            that they were oppressed. The fact that they were politically in a
            subordinate position satisfied the ambition of the citizens, whose vanity
            was much in excess of their cupidity. That an alien or even a slave
            was better clad and better fed than the citizen provoked no jealousy. The
            citizen was the only free man in the city. He lived as he pleased,
            master of his time and of his actions, and, what was more delightful
            still, master of the time and actions of others. The poorest citizen, in
            theory, at least, was the equal of the richest, and when he held up
            his hand in the Assembly, or dropped his pebble in the juror’s box,
            he felt not only that he was the ruler of a mighty empire, but that the
            rich who came forward as officers of the state were in a manner his
            servants. This consciousness of a superiority went far to balance the
            bitterness of feeling between classes. If the poor man felt that the rich
            received more than his share of the good things of the city, he could
            at least say his say without reserve. He was not the servant of
            another, dependent on his will and purse. It is in this spirit that Dicaeopolis expresses himself towards one of the
            Athenian generals:
             Lamachus.
             Is this the sort
            of language for a beggar
             To use to a
            commander such as me?
             Dicaopolis.
             k. beggar am I
            ?
             Lam.                Why
            what else are you ?
             Die. I ’ll tell
            ye ! An honest man : that’s what I am,
             A citizen that has
            served his time in the army,
             As a footsoldier, fairly, not like you,
             Pilfering and
            drawing pay, with a pack of foreigners. —Frere.
             Slavery had also
            another effect. Like every government the government of Athens had to contend
            with extremes of intelligence and ignorance. On the one hand was the
            citizen, who, belonging, let us say, to the circle of Pericles, was not
            only trained in the best education of the time, but knew the relations
            which prevailed between Athens and foreign states, and the past history of
            his city ; on the other was the dull peasant whose talk was wholly of
            oxen. But owing to the presence of slaves these extremes were
            probably less marked at Athens than in modern states. Every citizen could,
            if he chose, attend the meetings of the Assembly, where he would hear
            a good deal of discussion and acquire at least an outline of the facts; he
            could sit as a juror in a lawcourt and have his wits sharpened by distinguishing between
            the lies and counterlies which were
            prevalent there. Twice in the year he could listen to comedies ; once, at
            least to the masterpieces of the great tragedians, and though books were
            scarce, every citizen had been to some kind of school, and could at
            least read and write. It is probable that the average intelligence of an
            Athenian audience was not less than the average intelligence of artisans
            in a modern city, and their knowledge of affairs was certainly
            greater. It is true that they had no newspapers, but on the other hand they had
            few books and no religious dogma, so that the affairs of the city,
            and no doubt the affairs of the citizens also, occupied a far larger share
            of attention with them than with us, and as few hours of the day were
            spent in labour, they had a great deal more
            leisure to bestow upon their city and their neighbours than the modern artisan.
             From Aristophanes
            we can borrow pictures of Athenian life which in spite of exaggeration
            bring before us some leading traits of character. His sympathies are
            largely with the farming class, on whom the war brought such suffering. We
            have already made the acquaintance of Dicaeopolis,
            the hero of the “ Acharnians.” While the
            authorities are busy forming alliances with Persia and Thrace, Dicaeopolis—in the play—ventures on a private peace
            with Sparta, and the reign of peace begins, at least in his household. He
            revisits his country home, where he celebrates the rural festival
            of Dionysus with the abundance and freedom of old days.
             Die. Oh blessed
            Bacchus, what a joy it is
             To go thus
            unmolested, undisturbed,
             My wife, my
            children, and my family,
             With our accustom’d, joyful ceremony,
             To celebrate thy
            festival in my farm.
             —Well, here’s
            success to the truce of thirty year«!
             Wife. Mind your behaviour, child ; carry the basket
             In a modest,
            proper manner ; look demure
             And grave—
            * * * Come, move on.
             Mind your gold
            trinkets, they ’ll be stolen else.
             Die. Follow
            behind there, Xanthias, with the pole,
             And I ’ll strike
            up the bacchanalian chant.
             —Wife, you must be
            spectator ; go within
             And mount the
            housetop to behold us pass.
             —Frere.
             Then he proceeds
            to establish a market, in which the products of Megara and Boeotia, both
            contraband during the war, are brought to him. Fish and fowl are
            cooked for his table, while the miserable soldier has nothing but an onion
            and salt fish. The enjoyments of Dicaeopolis are
            gross and material enough, but there is an air of honesty and
            straightforwardness about him which contrasts—or at least is
            represented as contrasting—very strongly with the meanness and greed
            of politicians and informers. Another character of the same kind is Trygaeus in the “ Peace,” who triumphantly brings down
            Peace from the gods to Attica, and in his own person illustrates very
            vividly the blessings of her return.
             How sweet it is to
            see the new-sown corn-field fresh and even,
             With blades just
            springing from the soil that only ask a shower from Heaven.
             There, while
            kindly rains are falling, indolently to rejoice,
             Till some worthy neighbour, calling, cheers you with his hearty voice: “
            Well, with weather such as this, let us hear Trygseus tell us What should you and I be doing? You ’re the king of all
            good fellows.
             Since it pleases
            Heaven to prosper your endeavours, friend, and mine,
             Let us have a
            merry meeting, with some friendly talk and wine. In the vineyard there’s your
            lout, hoeing in the slop and mud ; Send the wench to call him out, this
            weather he can do no good. Dame, take down two pints of meal, and do some
            fritters in your way ;
             Boil some grain to
            stir it in, and let us have those figs, I say. Send a servant to my house—any
            one that you can spare— [There he ’ll find a brace of linnets, and beside
            them] pies of hare.
             There should be
            four of them in all, if the cat has left them right; We heard her racketing and
            tearing round the larder all last night. Boy, bring three of them to us
            :—take the other to my father : Cut some myrtle for our garlands, sprigs
            in flower, or blossom rather, Give a shout upon the way to Charinades our neighbour
             To join our
            drinking bout to-day, since Heaven is pleased to bless our labour.”
             —Frere.
             In the “ Clouds ”
            we have a man of a similar stamp married to a lady of the highest rank. On his
            side there is nothing but coarseness and thrift; on hers, finery and
            extravagance. The son born to this ill-assorted pair takes after his mother,
            involving his father deeply in debt by his extravagance in horseflesh and
            carriages. To be rid of his creditors Strepsiades is anxious that his son should learn the new doctrine by which the “worse
            is made the better cause.” The son will not hear of it. He
            associate with Socrates and the god-forsaken Chaerephon!
            he would lose his complexion, become pale instead of sunburnt, and
            what would his companions say to him then? Strepsiades then offers himself as a pupil, but he is so old and stupid that nothing
            can be made of him. To save the house from ruin the son is at length
            induced to give way and study the new learning, which he does with such
            effect that he beats his father out of the door!
             Other pictures
            bring before us the informers, who made it their business to detect any goods
            introduced into Athens contrary to law; and the hardly less miserable
            hierophants, who quickly appeared on the scene whenever any sacrifice was
            going on, for a sacrifice meant a dinner to all concerned. Another
            feature of Athenian life constantly occurring in the
            comedies is the faith in omens and oracles. Oracles are quoted on every
            occasion, and for any purpose. Here is a scene from the “ Knights ” of
            Aristophanes :
             Demos. But what are
            these ?—all ?
             Cleon.                              Oracles.
             Demos.                       What
            all ?
             Cleon. Ah, you ’re
            surprised, it seems, at the quantity J That’s nothing : I ’ve a trunk full of ’em at home— Sausage-Seller.
             And I ’ve a
            garret, and out-house both brimful. Demos. Let’s give them a
            look—Whose oracles are these? Cleon. Bakis’s mine are.
             Demos, to S.-S.            Well
            1 and whose are yours ?
             5.-5. Mine are
            from Glanis, Bakis’s elder
            brother.
             Demos. And what are
            they all about ?
             Cleon.                             About
            the Athenians,
             About the island
            of Pylos, about myself— About yourself—about all kinds of things.
             Demos. And what are
            yours about ?
             5.-5.
                                       About
            the Athenians,
             About pease-pudding and porridge, about the Spartans, About the
            war, about the pilchard fishery, About the state of things in
            general, About short weights and measures in the market, About all
            things and persons whatsoever, About yourself and me. Bid him go whistle.
             
             The wrath of
            Aristophanes is more especially bitter against the men who have come forward as
            political leaders : Cleon the tanner, Lysicles the cattle-dealer, and Hyperbolus the
            lamp-maker. As a type of the degradation to which the city was sinking, he
            introduces the Sausage-Seller, who in ignorance and impudence outstrips
            the rest. The fellow can barely read or write, but his future eminence was
            predicted even in his boyhood, from the readiness with which he could
            steal and lie.
             Cleon.                     Answer
            me truly !
             What was your
            early school ? Where did you learn The rudiments of letters and of music ?
             5.-5. Where hogs
            are singed and scalded in the shambles, There was I pummelled to a proper tune.
             Cleon. Hah ! say‘st thou so ? thy prophecy begins To bite me to the soul
            with deep foreboding. Yet tell me again—What was your course of
            practice In feats of strength and skill at the Palaestra ?
             5.-5. Stealing and
            starving, perjuring and swearing. ‘
             Cleon. O mighty
            Apollo, your decree condemns me ! Say what was your employment afterwards ?
             5.-5. I practised as a Sausage-Seller chiefly, Occasionally as
            pimp, and errand boy.
             Cleon. Oh misery. I
            am lost and gone.
             
             These pictures
            are, of course, exaggerations, yet the contrast of country and city, the
            degeneration of education and politics, were facts. In the
            better days, before the war broke out, Athens was a beautiful and
            well cultivated territory. There were excellent houses and homesteads in
            the villages, and round them settled a contented and thriving population.
            In the city, on the other hand, there was a considerable number of persons
            who, while existing in a very low degree of comfort, claimed for
            themselves almost the foremost place in the state. They were restless and
            dissatisfied, full of suspicions of every one who undertook public office,
            and anxious to make the most out of the advantages which the empire
            offered. The richer citizens were helpless against them, and when Pericles
            died the power passed into the hands of their nominees. For with
            the war came the ruin of Attica, the confinement of the people in the
            city, the impoverishment and final destruction of all whose income
            depended on land. The change was an inevitable accompaniment of
            the war as planned by Pericles, and it was fatal to the state. Athens
            rose again after her fall; Attica was once more cultivated and prosperous,
            but the old spirit never revived. The great names of the
            fourth century are quite different from those of the fifth, a change
            which implies that the old families had disappeared ; and the feeling which
            animated public men was different too.
             We have already
            spoken of the presence of sophists at Athens. Under any circumstances they
            would have made their appearance in a great city, which was the centre of Greek thought and intellect, but the growing
            importance of public speaking for those who took a part in the affairs of
            the city made them especially welcome. Among the younger men of the
            richer classes, who wished to be somebody in the city, their influence was
            very great, and it seems to have penetrated into the common education
            of the time. In the “ Clouds,” Aristophanes pits the new education,
            with its immorality, its ruthless logic and impudence, against the old
            quiet, seemly, reverent training of the Attic youth ; in the “ Acharnians ” he contrasts the young man who could
            speak with the old warriors who had done great things in the past.
            The influence, though intellectually stimulating, was not a good influence ; it
            put private interests above public, and taught the disciples to look
            at everything in reference to themselves. The action of Pericles towards
            the Areopagus had long ago destroyed the spirit of reverence for the
            ancient institutions of public life; sophistry went farther and
            destroyed it in private life. If the people were becoming more and more
            impatient of restraint, until at length they insisted on doing “ what
            they pleased,” regardless of the checks provided by the constitution,
            the young Athenians became impatient of the general decorum which the old
            education imposed upon them. Such freedom was especially dangerous in
            Greece. The old sanctions which religion and moral law had supplied were
            poor at the best, and it was useless to quote them when the young
            retorted by appeals to the grosser side of Greek mythology, or even denied
            the existence of the gods altogether.
             Along with this
            evil went another. In a very striking passage Thucydides has shown us
            how, under the crushing influence of the war,
            political considerations began to outweigh all others. “ The seal of
            good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime. If an enemy, when
            he was in the ascendant, offered fair words, the opposite party received 23 them
            not in a generous spirit, but by a jealous watchfulness of his actions.
            Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. Any agreements sworn
            by either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding so
            long as both were powerless. But he who, on a favourable opportunity, first took courage and struck at his enemy when he saw him
            off his guard, had greater pleasure in a perfidious than he would
            have had in an open act of revenge; he congratulated himself that he had
            taken the safer course, and also that he had overreached his
            enemy and gained the prize of superior ability.” 13 Such feelings
              would co-operate with the new views of life in bringing about an
              extirpation of the old patriotism which united an honest love of
              country with the best traditions of domestic life and personal conduct.
              The spirit of the best men was corrupted, and the spirit of the worst was
              not good for much at any time. The sons of the men who had fought
              with Cimon and Aristides became intriguers with Antiphon and Theramenes, and when the game fell into their hands
              they came forward as the Thirty Tyrants. Their opponents — the democratical party—were first led by Pericles, then by
              Cleon, then by Hyperbolus, and the like, until
              at length they found themselves the prey of the Spartan commander, without
              empire, without revenues, and without ships.
               The tone of society
            at Athens was peculiarly masculine. Men lived little at home, and much in the
            market-place or the porticoes, or the barbers’ shops, or wherever they found it
            convenient to congregate. Yet there, as elsewhere, the women were one half
            of the whole, and, in spite of the seclusion in which they lived, a very
            important half. Plutarch tells us how Themistocles spoke of his little son
            as the most influential person in Athens ; “ for,” he said, “ the child
            rules his mother, his mother rules me, I rule the Athenians, and the
            Athenians the Greeks.” The greater is our disappointment at the few
            records which have survived of the women of Athens during the fifth
            century. The ribaldry of Aristophanes is of course no evidence of the
            domestic life of the time. Nearer the truth is the pretty
            picture which Xenophon has given in the “ CEconomicus” of
            the married life of an Athenian gentleman, but such a picture, even if it
            is not ideal, only gives us the idyllic side of life; it tells us nothing
            of the sterner aspect; and there were times when the aspect must have
            been stern indeed. In the darkest periods of the century, after the
            overthrow of the great Egyptian expedition, at the time of the plague,
            and after the Sicilian expedition, there can have been few houses at
            Athens in which there was not one dead. What was the effect of this
            constant bereavement on the minds and feelings of the women ? Were they
            hardened into a stupor, or were they rendered hysterical and wild, or were
            they merely indifferent ?
             We cannot tell.
            The only occasions on which we get a glimpse of the Athenian women are the
            festivals and the funerals. From her early childhood a pretty girl might
            share in the rites and ceremonies of the city ; when she grew older she
            took part in the Panathenaic procession ; older still, she worshipped with
            other Athenian matrons at the Thes-mophoria, and to
            her lot it fell to discharge the last duties to the dead. Through these
            ceremonies she was allowed to feel that she had a part in civic
            life. “ It is right,” says the chorus in the “ Lysistrata ”
            of Aristophanes, “ that we women should give good advice to the city
            which has nursed us in splendour and softness.
            At seven years of age I carried the sacred chest of Athena ; at ten I was
            mill-woman to our Lady; then, clad in saffron dress, I was a bear at
            the Brauronia, and once again, with a string of
            figs round my neck, I bore a basket in a procession.”
             There were other
            occasions on which a larger scope was given to personal feelings. At the
            worship of Adonis, which became common at Athens during
            the Peloponnesian war, emotions long repressed found relief in wild
            lamentations; and in the orgiastic festival of Dionysus—though this was Theban
            rather than Athenian—the outpourings of hysterical passion were
            carried to an extreme which seems almost incredible.
             It is common to
            speak of society at Athens in the time of Pericles as highly intellectual and
            grossly immoral. We can point to great names, and we can point to great
            vices. But on closer examination we shall find that it is easy to
            exaggerate. There were great names in France before the Revolution— greater
            than any since,—yet the mass of the people were sunk far below their present
            level of intelligence ; the vices of the court of Charles II. are notorious,
            but we can draw no conclusions from them about the state of the
            people. So far as can be ascertained, the Athenians were extremely careful
            of their children and their women, and this care cannot have failed to
            exercise a great influence on the men, for most Athenians had a wife and
            children. There, as everywhere, there were men who refused to live
            the life of the ordinary citizen, and gave themselves up to dissolute
            habits. Their excesses may have been more uncontrolled than with us, for
            there were no adequate arrangements at Athens for keeping order
            in the streets; they were certainly more known, owing to the greater
            publicity of life. Yet if we remember that the streets in Athens were
            narrow and crooked, that there were deserted houses where bad
            characters could congregate, and that there were no lamps of any
            kind, we shall not deny that the Athens of Pericles contrasts favourably with what we know of the state of London a
            hundred years ago. And if the satire of Aristophanes is more open in
            its attacks on vice, it does not exhibit a deeper acquaintance with
            iniquity than the satire of Swift or Mandeville.
             Such was Athens in
            the age of Pericles. Let us try, in conclusion, to estimate the work which he
            did for his city and for the world.
             The democracy of
            Athens was carried by Pericles to its highest stage of development; when he
            substituted the law-courts for the Areopagus, and allowed pay to the jurors, he
            removed the last traces of the aristocratic constitution. By the new
            arrangement he enlisted an immense body of citizens on the side of law,
            with the result that there was perhaps no city where the law was more
            strictly maintained than at Athens. Whatever the law was, it was supreme ;
            even the omnipotent Demos could not touch it without a formal repeal, a
            process which could only take place at a particular time and with
            elaborate formalities. This supremacy of the law was
            chiefly maintained by the distinction drawn between decrees or acts of the
            sovereign assembly, and laws or ordinances, and though this distinction is
            not due to Pericles, the “ indictment for illegality,” which kept
            it alive, was probably his work. The aim of Pericles was to create a
            sovereign people, but to regulate their sovereignty by fixed laws. This
            result he could only attain by instituting a body of jurors, or
            possible jurors, so large that they were sure to command a majority in the
            Assembly, if any question touching the sovereignty of law arose. And
            here the evil of the system came in. The arrangements of the courts were
            so cumbersome and imperfect that they did as much harm in administering
            the law as they did good in upholding it. They brought together a number
            of men who, without being themselves responsible to any one, were
            constantly pronouncing upon the lives and fortunes of their fellow
            citizens. And from the very circumstances of the case, these men were
            drawn from the class of needy and useless citizens, who could least
            of all be expected to forget themselves and their own interests.
             To Pericles is
            also due the final development of the Athenian empire. With the suppression
            of the revolts of Euboea and Samos the equality which prevailed among
            the original members of the Delian confederacy became a mere fiction.
            The league was now an empire, existing for Athens only, and
            controlled entirely by her. She was the centre of the circle ; the guardian goddess of the city was the guardian goddess
            of the league. It may be said in defence of this
            high-handed proceeding that Pericles merely sought to put unity in
            the place of isolation, and build up a great national power out of a
            number of cities, which would otherwise have been perpetually at war with each
            other. He saw clearly that the want of  lenity was the great defect of Hellas and
            he determined, if possible, to remedy the defect. Such aims were in
            themselves more than legitimate. No statesman could have rendered a
            greater service to his country than the formation of a league, which
            should combine the scattered forces into one focus. But here again . Pericles
            adopted means which failed to bring about the desired result. His
            hostility to Sparta was fatal to any attempt to unite Greece, while his
            constant efforts to win the control of the Corinthian Gulf brought on
            him the bitter hatred of Corinth, by far the most enterprising member of
            the Peloponnesian confederacy.
             The truth is that
            he regarded the matter far too exclusively from an Athenian point of view.
            If Greece could be united under the headship of Athens, he would accept
            the position ; if not, Greece must be subject to Athens. Whether any
            means could have been found in the existing state of Greek feeling,
            by which the various cities, Dorian and Ionian, within Peloponnesus and
            without, could have been brought into a single confederation, is
            very doubtful; the love of “autonomy” was too inveterate to admit of the
            smallest infraction of civic rights. But, in any case, the methods adopted
            by Pericles were not likely to find favour. The
            cities naturally resented the tyrannical force which compelled them to
            furnish troops for wars declared without their consent, and to carry their
            disputes for settlement before a jury which looked on them
            as subjects of Athens. It is true that they brought their tribute to Athens
            at the Dionysia, when they could admire the splendour of the city and enjoy the plays in the theatre, but these delights were a
            poor compensation for the degradation which the enforced payment of
            tribute seemed to entail. When Pericles spoke of Athens as the “ School of
            Hellas,” he confounded the theories of the lecture-room with
            the common-sense of politics. A few of the allies were attracted by
            the splendours of the dominant city, but if
            these were intended to create a feeling of attachment in the subjects,
            they were pretty certain to fail of their object.
             It was otherwise
            with the Athenian people. They doubtless were proud of their city and proud of
            her position as head of the empire. The “ great name of Athens ” was
            a spell wherewith to charm them. The older party, who would gladly have
            seen Athens less imperial, if only she could have kept on terms
            with Sparta, were silenced after 444 B.C., and for twelve or fourteen
            years Pericles was supreme. In this period he succeeded in instilling the
            imperial policy so deeply into the hearts of the people, that when
            the struggle came, they were willing to fight to the death rather
            than relinquish it. In this, the crude, material side of the matter, the
            Athenians were willing disciples. But the higher motives, which guided the policy
            of Pericles, were little appreciated by the masses. The sights presented
            to the populace at the Panathenaea and Dionysia were indeed magnificent,
            and at such times the whole city might seem to be united in great acts of
            worship. But dearer far to the inhabitants of Attica, than these great
            displays, were the little local festivals in the country; the jovial
            hospitality of neighbours, the delights
            of spring-time and harvest; the “ rest on the violet-bed by the
            well.” The enjoyments of the average Athenian were those of the average man ;
            he did not take that delight in higher art and literature, which
            caused Pericles to give them so large a share in his theory
            of politics. In this matter the leader mistook his followers; he had too
            little sympathy with what was commonplace in them, and failed to apprehend
            how closely what was soundest in civic life at Athens was connected
            with the rather limited—not to say mean —desires and aims of the Athenian
            people. In seeking to carry them away from their old views by
            the spectacle of something higher and more intellectual, he
            aggravated some of their failings. What the Athenians needed above all
            things was balance and weight. Even at the best their institutions and
            beliefs were supported by sanctions which would not bear logical
            examination. It was a great mistake to weaken the force of such sanctions
            as were established, for it was very unlikely that anything
            more intellectual would have greater force. The beauty of the city,
            the great name of Athens, might flatter the selfishness of the Athenians,
            but they could never become the source of a national morality.
             Still more
            disastrous for the future of his country was the personal government which
            Pericles established. In his determination to be the foremost man in the
            city, he left no room for a second. He repressed the growth of those who in the
            course of nature would be required to take his place. Under his
            shadow no fresh shoots sprang. He taught the people to follow a leader,
            and left no one behind to lead them; he destroyed their independence—or
            at least the mutual play of opposite forces,—and when he died came “the
            deluge.” There was no one who could succeed him. A democracy without
            great men is a dangerous form of democracy, unless it be steadied by
            a very strict constitution. It is at the mercy of every wave of feeling—of
            every unprincipled orator. When Pericles rose to power it would have been
            possible to frame a Pan-Hellenic union, in which Sparta and Athens would
            have been the leading states; and such a dualism would have been the best
            guarantee for the rights of the smaller cities. When he died there was no
            policy left but war with Sparta, and conquest in the West. And not only
            so, but there was no politician who could adjust the relations of domestic
            war and foreign conquest. The Athenians passed from one to the other, as they
            were addressed by Cleon or Alcibiades. We cannot wonder that the men, who
            lived in those days of trouble spoke bitterly of Pericles, holding him
            accountable for the miseries which fell upon Athens.
            Other statesmen had bequeathed good laws, as Solon and Clisthenes, or
            the memory of great achievements, as Themistocles or Cimon, but the only
            changes which Pericles had introduced were thought, not
            without reason, to be changes for the worse; and he left his country
            involved in a ruinous war.
             But though Greece
            hated him, and Athens spoke of him with mingled feelings, the debt which the
            world owes to Pericles is immense. Without him and his personal
            government; without the money which he lavished on shows and spectacles,
            on temples and statues ; without the sophists and philosophers
            whom he sheltered, we should have been the poorer by the loss of half
            our intellectual life. And in his political aims, however unfortunate the
            results, we can trace the outlines of a purpose which must always
            be the guiding light of the greatest statesmen: the wish to give to
            every citizen in and through the state, not only the blessings of peace
            and prosperity, but the still greater blessing of unimpeded action
            in all noble aspirations; to awaken in him such a devotion to his state as
            shall prove an unerring guide in conduct; to train his intellectual and
            moral powers, not with the lessons of a school, but by the experience of
            life; to develop an equal balance between the individual and the citizen ;
            to make duty a delight, and service an honour; to
            remove the sting from poverty and the charm from wealth; and to recognise benefits to the community as the only ground
            of civic distinction. Such a purpose was perhaps a distant ideal, even at
            Athens, and it is far more distant now; but near or far away, it is
            from such ideals that the spark is sent which kindles the flame of
            our highest efforts.
             A few details have
            come down to us of the personal appearance and manners of Pericles. In his
            looks, and still more in his voice, he so closely resembled Pisistratus
            that for some time he was afraid to come forward in political life, lest
            he should be suspected of cherishing the designs which made the name
            of the tyrant hateful to every Athenian. His head, which was of unusual
            size and shape, was a common theme of merriment with the comedians ;
            they compared it to a kind of bean, called schinus, and
            exercised their wits in all kinds of allusions to the heavy head of the
            new Olympian. To conceal the defect, Pericles was accustomed, when in
            public, to wear a helmet, a practice which, as we have said, provoked Cratinus into declaring that he went “about with the
            Odeum on his head.” The suspicions which his appearance excited were not
            diminished by his education and manners. His tutor in “ music,” which at
            Athens included most of the intellectual part of education, as opposed
            to the physical, was Damon, the “ friend of tyrants ” and a “
            consummate sophist,” who, under cover of his art, was thought to cherish
            designs against the democracy. Whether this view was correct or not,
            Damon was ostracised from Athens.
            Another teacher was Zeno, from whom Pericles learned the art of
            disputation as it was practised in the
            Eleatic school.
             More important
            still was his connexion with Anaxagoras. In the
            society of this eminent man he not only acquired a knowledge and
            an elevation of thought which raised him above the superstitions of
            his time, but the influence extended to his language and demeanour. As an orator, Pericles was stately and
            dignified, carefully avoiding anything familiar or common in his
            language; calm and quiet in his delivery, and by these very qualities
            producing a deep impression on his audience. His movements were at all times
            sedate ; his dress was careful and becoming; he was rarely seen to
            smile, and nothing could provoke him to anger. When an impudent scoundrel,
            who had pursued him all day long with abuse and threats, followed him even to
            his door, he merely gave orders to his servants to see the fellow home
            through the dusk of the evening. He never moved in society, and was
            rarely seen in any street in the city but that which led from the public
            offices to his own home. He lived apart, dividing his time
            between the friendships of his intimate circle and the cares of
            state. Such reserve was a novel feature in an Athenian statesman, and
            different interpretations were placed upon it. To some it was mere
            arrogance and pride; he was the Olympian who governed Athens with his nod ;
            others regarded it as a cloak for private vices, and told the
            worst stories of the Periclean household. For himself he held that
            familiarity bred contempt; a man so greatly occupied in public business
            must beware of making himself too cheap. Like the state galley, he
            must only appear when his presence was required.
             His power was far
            greater than that of any other man of his time. Yet he never abused it for
            mean or malicious purposes. In his last utterance, as we have said,
            he declared that no Athenian had ever put on mourning owing to any act of
            his. With these words before him, Plutarch, no mean judge of Greek
            and Roman character, pronounces sentence on the great Athenian. The Roman
            selected for comparison with Pericles in Plutarch’s series is Fabius
            Maximus, the opponent of Hannibal—
             Unus qui nobis cunctando restituit rem.
               In graciousness
            and clemency, in the forbearance and patience with which they endured the
            attacks of foolish and ignorant enemies, the Roman and the Grecian
            were fairly matched. “ But not less admirable than his clemency was the
            loftiness of spirit which prompted Pericles to utter that last noble
            speech, giving the foremost place among his triumphs to the self-restraint
            which had governed his exercise of supreme authority. Such a saying
            changes the epithet Olympian—attached to his name by a rash and
            thoughtless crowd—into a worthy and becoming title. For if indeed Olympus be a
            place of radiant calm,
             Where falls not
            hail, or rain, or any snow,
             Nor ever wind
            blows loudly, a life so unruffled by the storms of state, so spotless amid the
            temptations of unbounded power, may be called in the truest sense Olympian
            and divine.”
             
             
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