READING HALLTHE DOORS OF WISDOM |
BIOGRAPHYCAL UNIVERSAL LIBRARY |
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF PERICLES(495-429 BC)AND THE GOLDEN AGE OF ATHENSBY
EVELYN ABBOTT
I. THE
ALCMEONIDS (570-500 BC)
II. XANTHIPPUS
AND THEMISTOCLES (5OO-480 BC)
III. THE
CONGRESS AT CORINTH, AND THE DELIAN LEAGUE (481-476 BC)
IV. THE EARLY
YEARS OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE THE FALL OF PAUSANIAS AND THEMISTOCLES (481-476 BC)
V. DECADENCE OF
SPARTA — REVOLT OF THE HELOTS — BREACH BETWEEN SPARTA AND ATHENS (476- 453 BC)
VI. THE AREOPAGUS AND EPHIALTES.
VII. THE FIRST
WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA, (459-453
BC)
VIII. CONTINUATION
OF THE WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA—A TRUCE FOR FIVE YEARS—CIMON'S LAST
EXPEDITION HIS DEATH AND CHARACTER (456-449
BC )
IX. THE YEARS
OF PEACE AND THE SECOND WAR BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA (449-445 BC)
X. THE THIRTY
YEARS' PEACE—THURII—SAMOS (445439 BC)
XI AMPHIPOLIS—THE
COMING WAR (437-435 BC)
XII. THE CAUSES
OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (435431 BC)
XIII. THE
OUTBREAK OF THE WAR (432-431 BC)
XIV. FIRST YEAR
OF THE WAR (431 BC)
CHAPTER XV. THE LAST YEAR OF PERICLES —THE FUNERAL SPEECH, (430-429 BC) CHAPTER XVI.
CHAPTER XVII.
CHAPTER XVIII.
PREFACE
THIS sketch of the Age of Pericles consists of two
parts : in the first and larger part I have endeavored to trace the growth of
the Athenian empire and the causes which alienated Athens and Sparta; in the
second I have given a brief account of the government, the art and literature,
the society and manners of the Periclean Athens.
It will be seen that I have ventured to form an
opinion about the part which Pericles played as a practical statesman widely
different from the estimate presented by Grote and Curtius.
It is, so far as I can judge, impossible to deny that he destroyed a form of
government under which his city attained to the height of her prosperity and
that he plunged her into a hopeless and demoralizing war. These are not the
achievements of a great statesman. And so far as legislation goes, the Age of
Pericles is a blank in the history of Athens.
In what then did his greatness lie? The answer is,
that it lay in the ideals which he cherished. He saw what a city might do for
her citizens; and what citizens might do for their city. In the years of peace
his dreams took shape, and the result is before us in the Parthenon and the
great Funeral Speech: but against the hard obstinacy of facts, which followed
the outbreak of the war, he struggled in vain. His visions of empire faded
away, and he lived long enough to see the treasury impoverished, the people
more than decimated, the most faithful of Athenian allies shut up to certain
destruction.
CHAPTER I.
THE ALCMAEONIDAE.
ABOUT two miles
from the shore, at the southeast corner of the Corinthian Gulf, an elevated
platform of triangular shape its steeply between two streams, the Asopus on the east, and the Helisson on the west. The elevation is not great, but the sides of the tableland
are so precipitous that only a few narrow paths lead up o it, and for
this reason it forms the natural acropolis if the surrounding district.
This was the site of the ancient Sicyon, and though the splendid city
which once crowned the height has been swept away, the natural
features of the place are what they ever were. Looking northward, we see
the waters of the Corinthian Gulf, and beyond this the “summits old
in story”: Parnassus, sheltering the sacred Delphi ; Helicon, the home of
the Muses and of Hesiod; and Cithaeron, the great rampart
which divides Attica from Boeotia. On the east, beyond the Asopus, rises the lofty Acrocorinthus,
the most imposing perhaps of all the mountains of Greece; on the west
stretches a fair and fertile plain, covered with the olive gardens for
which Sicyon was famous. Behind the city, to the south, runs the valley of
the Asopus, penetrating into the hills which
form the northern rampart of Peloponnesus. Here were the mines of
copper, whose produce enabled Sicyon at an early time to win a high place
in the history of Grecian art.
In the beginning
of the sixth century, B.C., this city was ruled by a Tyrant named Clisthenes,
of the race of Orthagoras. In the ears of a
Greek, who cherished his freedom above all things, the name of a
Tyrant was at all times odious, but the knowledge that they would incur
the deadly hatred of their citizens did not prevent ambitious men from
aspiring to the sole command of their cities. “Only let me become
Tyrant of my city,” cried a contemporary of Solon, “and I will give my
body to be flayed, my skin for a bottle.” For seventy years or
more before the accession of Clisthenes, Sicyon had been governed by
the Orthagoridae. Their origin was humble, but
they had attained to wealth and distinction ; the second or third of the family
had won an Olympian victory with his four-horse chariot,
a distinction coveted beyond all others by a wealthy Greek.
Clisthenes outshone all his predecessors ; he was one of the foremost of
the Tyrants of his time, and under his rule the city enjoyed a
prosperity which perhaps was never exceeded before or after.
Unhappily, his
greatness was destined to die with him. His only child was a daughter, who
could not inherit the position which her father held. But if she
could not be Queen of Sicyon, she was at least the greatest heiress of her
time, and in seeking a husband for her Clisthenes might choose from
the best and richest families in Greece. Herodotus has told, in his
inimitable way, the story of the wooing of Agariste.
At the festival of Olympia, at which he was victorious in a four-horse
chariot, Clisthenes caused a proclamation to be made, that anyone
who held himself worthy to become the son-in-law of the King of
Sicyon should repair to that city by the sixtieth day after the festival;
in a year from the sixtieth day, Clisthenes would betroth his daughter.
“Upon which
notification, all such Grecians as thought highly of themselves and their
country, went to Sicyon, where Clisthenes had made preparations for races
and wrestling. From Italy arrived Smindyrides,
the son of Hippocrates, a man plunged in voluptuousness beyond most
examples, and born at Sybaris, which was then at the height of its
prosperity; with Damasus of Siris, the son of
Amyris, surnamed the Wise. From the Gulf of Ionia came Amphimnestus, the son of Epistrophus of Epidamnus; and from Astolia,
Males, the brother of Titormus, who surpassed all
the Grecians in strength, and had retired to the extremities of Astolia. From Peloponnesus arrived Leocedes,
the son of Phidon, Tyrant of Argos: of that Phidon, I say, who prescribed measures to the
Peloponnesians; and exceeding all the Grecians in arrogance,
removed the Elean judges, and assumed to himself
the power of appointing the Olympian exercises; Amiantus, an
Arcadian of Trapezus, and son to Lycurgus; with Laphanes, the Azanian of Paeus,
son of that Euphorion, who, according to a
common report, entertained Castor and Pollux in his house, and from that
time received all strangers with great hospitality. These, with Onomastus of Elis, the son of Agaeus,
came from Peloponnesus. From Athens came Megacles,
the son of that Alcmaeon who visited Croesus;
and Hippoclides, the son of Tisander, in riches
and beauty surpassing all the Athenians of his time. From Euboea, Lysanias alone, a native of Eretria, which was then in
a flourishing condition. From Thessaly, Diactorides of Crannon; and from the Molossians, Alcon. All
these were pretenders to the daughter of Clisthenes, and arrived in
Sicyon before the sixty days were expired. Clisthenes, in pursuance
of his design, first examined every one touching his country and descent ;
after which he detained them a whole year in order to inform himself
fully of their fortitude, temperance, institution, and manners ; conversing
with them frequently, apart and together, and conducting the youngest to the
gymnastic exercises. Above all, he endeavoured to
discover their inclinations, when he entertained them with feasting; for
he tried all experiments, and treated them with great magnificence,
during the whole time they stayed with him. But among the several
candidates he principally favoured the Athenians, especially Hippoclides, the son of Tisander,
because he was esteemed for his courage, and derived his descent from the
Corinthian Cypsclidae. When the day was come,
which Clisthenes had appointed for the naming of the person he
should choose, he sacrificed a hecatomb, and invited the pretenders,
with all the Sicyonians, to the feast. After
supper they entered into a dispute concerning music and other things that
occasionally fell into discourse at that time; and as the wine
went warmly about, Hippoclides, with an assuming air, commanded the
musician to play a tune called ‘ Emmelia,’ in
which, being readily obeyed, he danced with much satisfaction to himself,
though Clisthenes, observing all that passed, began to suspect the event.
When Hippoclides had finished his dance, and rested some time, he
commanded a table to be brought in, which was no sooner done
than, mounting upon it, he first imitated the Laconian measures, then
danced after the Athenian manner, and, last of all, setting his head upon
the table, and erecting his feet, he moved his legs in such
postures as he had already practised with his
hands. Though the first and second of these dances had sufficiently dissuaded
Clisthenes from choosing a son-in-law of so much profligate impudence, yet
he contained himself, and would not break out into an open passion. But
when he saw him endeavouring with his legs
to imitate the actions of his hands, he lost all patience, and cried
out: ‘ O son of Tisander, thou hast danced away
thy marriage.’ The other answered: ‘That is nought to Hippoclides,’ which saying afterwards obtained the authority of a
proverb. Then Clisthenes, having commanded silence, spoke to those who
pretended to his daughter in these words: ‘I commend you all, and am
willing to gratify you all, if I could, without distinguishing any one in
particular, to the disadvantage of the rest. But because I have no more
than one daughter, and consequently cannot comply with the desires of so
many persons, I give a talent of silver to every one of those who
shall be excluded, as well in acknowledgment of your readiness to
enter into my family by this match, as of the time you have spent in a
long absence from your habitations; and I give my daughter Agariste to Megacles, the
son of Alcmaeon, to be his wife under the
conditions and usages of the Athenians.’ Megacles immediately declared his consent, and the nuptials were celebrated in the
house of Clisthenes.”
The man thus
distinguished was the heir of the great house of the Alcmaeonidae, a family
well known for good and evil in the annals of Athens. They traced
their lineage to Alcmaeon, the grandson
of Nestor, the aged king of Pylus, whose figure
is one of the most striking in Homeric story. Driven from the
Peloponnesus at the time of the Dorian invasion, they came to Athens, and
established themselves as one of the first families of the city. Their
kinsmen, the Medontidae, were for many
generations the royal race of Athens, and in the seventh century
B.C., when the archonship was still closely restricted to the noble
families (the Eupatridae), Megacles,
the grandfather of the youth now chosen by Clisthenes, held the
office. In his archonship a distinguished Athenian, named Cylon, attempted to make himself Tyrant of Athens, and
seized the Acropolis with a number of followers. The attempt was
quickly crushed, but not without fixing a lasting stain on the city.
A number of Cylon’s adherents, who had
taken refuge at the altars of the gods were induced to leave the
sanctuaries by promises of safety, and then treacherously murdered (620 ?
or 612? B.C.). The guilt of their death was laid upon the
the altars. Henceforth the family was known as the “Accu Alcmaeonidae, who, it was said, had persuaded them to leave
rsed”; and
they were sentenced to banishment from Athens. But either the sentence
wasrevoked, or it was not strictly enforced, for soon afterwards we
find Alcmaeon, the son of Megacles, leading
the Athenian forces in the First Sacred War(595-586 BC).
Many years later, after the marriage of his son with Agariste, Alcmaeon paid a visit to Croesus, the wealthy
King of Lydia, who allowed him to enter his treasure-house and carry away
as much gold as he could. Alcmaeon made the most
of the opportunity. He arrayed himself in the largest and loosest attire
he could procure, put on the widest and tallest of top-boots, and thus
equipped, entered the chamber. Not content with stuffing his robe
and filling his boots to overflowing, he sprinkled gold-dust on his hair,
and crammed it into his mouth, till nothing more could be added to his
load. Then he staggered from the room, looking “ like anything rather
than a man,” greatly to the amusement of Croesus. The gain thus strangely
gotten added largely to the wealth of the family, already
increased by the inheritance of Clisthenes. In the troubles which
overtook Athens in the second half of the sixth century, the Alcmaeonidae
made a not ignoble use of their riches and power, but men did not forget
that the curse was still upon them, and that their wealth was derived, in
a considerable degree, from their connection with tyrants.
When next we hear
of Megacles he is one of the leaders in the party
struggles, which disturbed Athens in the middle of the sixth century
B.C. The reforms of Solon had failed to produce the harmony, which
their great author had expected; and in twenty or thirty years after
Solon’s archonship, the parties of the Shore, the Plain, and the Mountain
were again arrayed against each other, each seeking for the foremost place
in the city. Megacles, as the head of the house
of the Alcmaeonidae, led the party of the Shore ; his rivals at the head
of the Plain were Miltiades, the chief of the ancient house of the Philaidae, who claimed descent from Ajax, and
Lycurgus. At the head of the Mountain was Pisistratus, of the race of the Nelidse, who, like the Alcmaeonids, claimed descent
from Nestor of Pylus. As Plutarch has described
them to us, the men of the Plain were chiefly the inhabitants of the
plain of Cephisus;—rich land-holders of a
strict conservative type, who wished to retain unimpaired all their
ancient rights and privileges. The men of the Shore were the inhabitants
of the district known as the Paralia, the coast
between Athens and Sunium. They included many of
the merchant class, who naturally sought to put the claims of wealth
above those of birth. The men of the Mountain were the poor goat-herds of the
hilly region between the upper valley of the Cephisus and the sea. They were the radical party of the time, whose only hope
of improving their condition lay in breaking the power of their opponents, and
removing the barriers of birth and privilege. They had found a leader
in the ranks of their opponents, a clever and unscrupulous man, who saw
clearly that if he triumphed with the aid of peasants and shepherds, there
would be no necessity to share his power with his supporters. In 560 B.C.,
matters came to a crisis, and Pisistratus established himself as Tyrant
of Athens. His success was short-lived. Within a very few years his
opponents combined and drove him from the city. He retired to his estates
in the neighbourhood of Marathon, biding his time. It
was not long before the rival parties quarrelled,
and Pisistratus at once seized the opportunity to win over Megacles by promising to marry his daughter, (the child of Agariste).
By this means he became tyrant of the city a second time. He fulfilled his
promise of marrying the daughter of Megacles,
but having no
For thirty years
or more (541-509 B.C.), they ate the bread of strangers. In this period Megacles died, and his place as head of the family was
taken by Clisthenes, his son by Agariste. As a young
man, Clisthenes was probably more active than his father in his efforts to
regain his position at Athens, and after the death of Pisistratus, in 527, the
prospect was more encouraging. The sons of Pisistratus, Hippias and Lipparchus, who were associated in the government, ere
not the equals of their father; they had but succeeded to the throne,
which he had won. Their conduct soon aroused such bitter hatred that a conspiracy
was formed against them, and though Hippias scaped, Hipparchus was slain.
This event, which took place in 514, produced a change for the
worse 1 the character of Hippias ; he became morose, suspicious, and oppressive. Uncertain of his position :
home, he looked for support abroad, and married is daughter to the son of
the Tyrant of Lampsacus, irough whose good offices he hoped to find favour ith the Persian monarch.
The Alcmaeonidae
were doubtless well aware of le state of feeling at Athens; they thought the
time ad come for driving out the tyrant by force, and ith this object they entered Attica and established lemselves in a fortified position at Lipsydrium,
on le slopes of Mount Parnes. But the attempt
proved remature. Hippias was able to expel them
from le country.
Thus baffled, the
exiles sought assistance in anther quarter. In 548 the temple of Delphi had een burned down. The rebuilding was made a ational work; money was collected from far and near
that a temple might be raised worthy of the lost famous oracular shrine in
the world. The Almaeonidae undertook to carry
out the reconstrucion, and fulfilled their
obligations with the greatest berality, building
the front of the temple with Parian marble, when nothing more than
ordinary stone was required by the terms of the contract. From this
time the family was naturally in great favour at
Delphi, and they now made use of their position. They induced the
priestess—it was said by bribes—to impress upon all the Spartans
who came to the oracle the imperative duty of liberating Athens. The
Spartans were slow to answer to the call. They had always been on
excellent terms with Pisistratus and his sons, under whose
government Athens had been a good neighbour. Why
should they begin the quarrel? But the priestess was importunate, and at
length Anchimolius, a distinguished Spartan, was
sent with an army to expel the tyrants from Attica. The task was not
accomplished without difficulty. Anchimolius was
defeated, and slain, and even when Cleomenes,
the King of Sparta, appeared in person at Athens, it was a mere
accident which threw the victory into his hands. The tyrants and
their partisans were preparing to sustain a siege in the Acropolis, when
news was brought that the children of the family, who were being sent away
for safety, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. This at once
changed the situation ; Hippias agreed to leave the country in five days,
and retired to Sigeum, in the Troad.
The departure of
their rivals was of course the signal for all the exiled families to return to
Athens, and at their head was Clisthenes. What were his views when
he found himself once more in the city, it is difficult to say. Perhaps he
had dreams of securing for himself the tyranny of which Hippias had been
deprived. He might at least look forward to an established position as the
foremost man in the city. In either case he was disappointed. No sooner had
he returned than he found himself engaged in party
quarrels. The oligarchical party, (the remnant we may suppose of the old
party of the Plain), of whom Isagoras was now
the leader, had no mind to be the subjects of the ambitious Alcmaeonidse, and offered violent opposition to his
projects. Finding himself unable to maintain his position without fresh
support, Clisthenes determined, as Pisistratus had done before him,
to seek the aid of the people; but he sought it in a different manner. He
set about rearranging the whole constitution of Athens. Increasing the
tribes from four to ten, and the Council from four hundred to five
hundred, he gave the people as much authority in elections as he could, and
sought in every way to emancipate them from the influence of
the great families. Isagoras and his party were
taken by surprise; they at once summoned Sparta to their aid, and the
appeal was successful. Cleomenes, who was a
personal friend of Isagoras, sent a herald
to Athens calling on Clisthenes and the Alcmaeonidae to leave the
city, as being “under the curse.” Clisthenes at once retired ; he had no wish
to see the Spartans at Athens, and he expected to secure his recall
without difficulty. But Cleomenes was
not contented ; he soon appeared with a small force at Athens, and in
concert with Isagoras he drove no fewer than
seven hundred families out of the town. Then he attempted to destroy the
Council, and put the government into the hands of three hundred of
the friends of Isagoras. The Council refused to
submit, and, far from being able to coerce it, Cleomenes and Isagoras found themselves driven into the
citadel. Their forces were few in number ; they had made no provision
for the siege, and after two days the Lacedaemonians came to terms. With a
brutal selfishness, of which this is not the only instance, they secured
a free passage for themselves, while abandoning their Athenian
friends to the mercy of the conquerors. Clisthenes and the seven hundred
were at once recalled ; their opponents were put to death, and
the ground was cleared for the great reformation which Clisthenes now
proceeded to carry out. It is true that Cleomenes was not inclined to submit to the humiliating repulse which he had
received ; and still less so, when he discovered that the Delphian
priestess had been bribed into insisting on the liberation of Athens. But
he could not induce the Peloponnesian allies, whose contingents formed a
considerable part of any force which Sparta could put into the field, to
listen to him. A large expedition, which he led as far as Eleusis, melted
away, when it heard the object for which it had been collected ; and
when Hippias was brought from Asia to Sparta, and a general assembly of
the Confederation was held to discuss his restoration, the Corinthians, as the
foremost of the allies, declared that they would have neither part
nor lot in setting up that cruel and bloodthirsty monster, a Tyrant. The
subject was dropped, and never revived. Hippias returned to Sigeum, and Athens was henceforth a free city.
We have
unfortunately no full account of the measures of Clisthenes. A few sentences,
some
Every statesman is
of course guided largely by the circumstances of his time ; he cannot advise
or legislate in the air, but must have something definite in view. We
shall see that Pericles trained the Athenians to acquire and maintain an
imperial position. Clisthenes had no such aim ; he merely sought to
secure Athens against the undue influence of great families and its
attendant evils—the outbreak of local and domestic faction and the rise
of a tyrant. And in this object he succeeded.
All the villages
of Attica were collected into a hundred “Demes,” which he distributed among
the ten tribes, ten to each. In each Deme he established a local officer,
the Demarch, who was supported by a local council. The Demarch managed the
affairs of the Deme, arranged for elections, and kept the register of
citizens for purposes of contribution or service. The Demes belonging to
the various tribes were not adjacent in every case ; but sometimes Demes
from widely different parts of the country were united in one tribe,
doubtless with a view to prevent undue local influence. The whole of
the new arrangements were put under the sanction of new religious rites or
forms of worship: each Deme had its sanctuary ; each tribe its
tutelary hero. The political life of the citizens was thus dissociated
from the family and domestic life, through which, no doubt, the old houses
had largely exercised their power.
Within a very few
years after the establishment of the new government, Athens was called upon
to undergo a number of trials, each severer than the other; she
passed triumphantly through them all, and emerged the greatest city in
Greece. “Not in one instance only,” says Herodotus, “but everywhere, it
is manifest that freedom of speech is an excellent thing; in the days of
their tyrants, the Athenians were no better in the field than their neighbours, but no sooner had they got rid of
them, than they were first of all. It is therefore quite clear that,
when held in subjection, they would not do their best, because they were
working for a master, but when they were free, every
one did his utmost for himself.” The historian’s remark is
true, though in justice to the Athenian Tyrants we must at least
allow that their rule, however oppressive, did not prevent the growth of a
vigorous population, able and willing to fight their own battles.
CHAPTER II
XANTHIPPUS AND THEMISTOCLES.
FROM the time that his reforms were completed, little
is known of Clisthenes. He is said to have been ostracized, and the same fate
twice befell his son Megacles, whose daughter Dinomache became the mother of Alcibiades. But Hippocrates,
the younger brother of Clisthenes, was the father of a second Agariste, and from this daughter, who married Xanthippus of the old Athenian family of the Buzygs, was born Pericles.
Though not himself an Alcmaeonid, Xanthippus seems to have acquired a considerable portion of the influence of the family by
marrying into it. For sixteen years (from 494 to 478) he was one of the most
prominent men in Athens. It was he who brought Miltiades to trial; who, with
Aristides, endeavored to thwart the plans of Themistocles.
In 479 he commanded the Athenian ships at Mycale; and,
in the ensuing spring, he conquered Sestos. Then, like so many of the leading
Greek statesmen in the evening of their lives, he disappears from our view and
nothing more is recorded of him.
Pericles was probably born about the year 493 BC.
Even before his birth, indications of his future greatness were not wanting.
Herodotus, at any rate, believed a story, which was current in his time, that Agariste, a few days before the birth of her great son,
dreamed that she was delivered of a lion. The year of his birth was not a happy
one in Athenian annals. In 494 BC the great city of Miletus had
fallen before the arms of Persia, and the ill-timed and disastrous revolt of
the cities of Ionia, in which Athens had played no creditable part, was brought
to an end amid universal desolation and destruction. The victorious Phoenician
fleet pressed onwards to the north of the Aegean with nothing to check its
course. The Chersonese, which for two generations had been governed by members
of the Athenian house of the Philaids, passed into the possession of the
Persians, and Miltiades, the son of Cimon, the present ruler, came flying home
with all his goods in five triremes, one of which was captured by the enemy.
The bitter feeling aroused at Athens by these reverses is shown by the
treatment of the poet Phrynichus, who had chosen the
capture of Miletus for the subject of a tragedy. The artistic success of the
drama was so great that the audience were moved to tears, but the subject was
felt to be too painful for a play, and the poet was fined one thousand drachmae
for reminding his countrymen of their misfortunes.
On his return to Athens, Miltiades found that he was
by no means at the end of his troubles. We have seen that the two great families
of the Alcmaeonids and Philaids had stood at the head of rival parties at
Athens in the political factions of the sixth century; Megacles,
the grandfather of Agariste, had led the Shore;
Miltiades, the uncle of the present ruler of the Chersonese, had led the Plain.
Though the old factions were at an end, the Alcmaeonids were by no means
pleased to see the chief of their rivals back in the city.
Miltiades had shown himself daring and unscrupulous in
his management of the Chersonese; his wealth was great; his family had been
conquerors at Olympia; he was perhaps descended from Cypselus,
the Tyrant of Corinth, and for many years of his life he had occupied the
position of an irresponsible despot. Would such a man consent to be an equal
among equals in his old city? In the interval which had elapsed since Miltiades
had taken the place of his elder brother, Stesagoras,
in the Chersonese, Athens had gone through the crisis which we have described
in the preceding chapter. When he left the city, the tyrants were still on the
throne; when he returned, the reforms of Clisthenes had been firmly established
for more than ten years. To a man of such experiences, accustomed to the
unlimited exercise of personal power, “freedom of speech” was not likely to
commend itself. Xanthippus and his friends
determined, if possible, to get rid of the danger. They brought an action
against Miltiades, immediately after his return to Athens, charging him with
tyrannical government in the Chersonese. The charge was ridiculous. The Athenians
had nothing whatever to do with the government of the Chersonese. The first
Miltiades had gone out at the invitation of a native tribe to protect them
against the incursions of their neighbors on the north, and the ‘tyranny’ thus
acquired had remained in the hands of the family ever since. Under such
circumstances Miltiades was, of course, acquitted; the plot of his enemies
entirely broke down.
Three years later came the invasion of the Persians
under Datis and Artaphernes, ending in the battle of
Marathon. On this occasion we hear nothing of Xanthippus,
but we can hardly suppose that he took no part in the defence of his country. It is true that, fifty years later, in the time of Herodotus,
the Alcmaeonids were suspected of having carried on some treacherous
negotiations with the invaders. It was even said that they raised aloft the
shield which gave the signal to the Persians to re-embark from Marathon and
hasten to Athens in the hope of surprising the city. And those who were hostile
to the family might remind the Athenians that they owed their wealth in a great
degree to the tyrants of Sardis and Sicyon; that Clisthenes himself had sought
the aid of Persia in strengthening his position against Isagoras.
But even if the story of the shield is true, there is no proof that Xanthippus acted with the Alcmoaenid in this matter; and in the great invasion of Xerxes in 480 BC he
certainly took a prominent part in the destruction of the Persian fleet.
In the next year (489 BC) Xanthippus was the chief actor in a scene which has left a lasting stain on himself and
his city. The victory of Marathon was chiefly due to Miltiades; it was he who
brought on the engagement, and he was chief in command on the day when the
battle was fought. Such a brilliant success greatly improved his position in
the city, and excited in his enemies a still deeper hatred. Ever on the watch
for an opportunity to pull down their rival, it was not long before they found
one. Soon after his victory Miltiades came before the Athenians with a request
that a squadron of seventy ships might be placed at his disposal. The purpose
for which he required them he would not disclose, though pledging his word that
the expedition would add largely to the wealth and prosperity of the city. The
request being granted, he sailed with the ships to Paros, an island which at
this time was subject to Persia. From the Parians he demanded one hundred
talents, and when they refused to pay he blockaded the city. So vigorous and
successful was the resistance offered that, after a long delay, Miltiades,
himself dangerously wounded, was compelled to return home. His enemies, with Xanthippus at their head, at once attacked him for
misconduct in the enterprise. They declared that he had deceived the Athenians,
and, so far from adding to their wealth and prosperity, had wasted the treasure
and lives of his fellow-citizens. For such an offence death was the only
adequate penalty. Miltiades was unable to reply in person; he was carried into
court, while his friends pleaded his cause. The sentence was given against him,
but the penalty was reduced from death to a fine of fifty talents. So large a
sum was more than even Miltiades could pay; he was thrown into prison as a
public debtor, where he soon died from the mortification of his wound.
In the account which Herodotus gives of this event we
are informed that Miltiades attacked Paros from motives of private vengeance,
and that he received his wound while seeking an interview with the Parian
priestess of Demeter. But as we are not told what was the object of the
interview, and as the cause assigned for the private quarrel is quite
incredible, this account is not of much value. On the other hand it is obvious
that Miltiades, if he wished to detach the wealthy island of Paros from Persia,
would desire his object to be kept as secret as possible. He well knew that a
project openly discussed in the Athenian Assembly would be known at Paros long
before he could reach the island. The secrecy of the expedition was therefore
justifiable. The object was not less so. Paros as a subject of Persia was a
source of danger in the Aegean; if the Athenians conquered the island they
would have a base of operations in the Cyclades, from which they could
intercept such an expedition as that which brought Datis to Marathon. But Miltiades failed, and failure at the moment was intolerable.
In the animation of their recent victory the Athenians forgot how inadequate
were the means at their disposal for the capture of walled cities; they thought
that there could be no limits to their success; and the enemies of Miltiades
took advantage of this feeling to bring about his ruin. His condemnation was
one in a long series of similar punishments. The Athenians never learnt to be
just to those who served them, or to distinguish between treachery and errors
of judgment. It was the natural result of such conduct that those who entered
their service were compelled to sacrifice their devotion to their country to
the precautions necessary for their own safety.
We have very little information about the state of
Athens immediately after the battle of Marathon. So far as we can tell, for the
chronology is most uncertain, she was now engaged in a war with Aegina, which
though at first carried on with vigor, at length lapsed into inactive
hostility, neither side being able, to inflict any serious mischief on the
other. Meanwhile a man was rising to power who may be said to have created the
history of Athens for the rest of the century, Themistocles, the son of Neocles.
What we know of the birth and early life of this
eminent man is derived from the biography written by Plutarch, a late author,
whose accuracy depends on that of the writers from whom he collected his
information—writers often divided by centuries from the facts which they
recorded. We are told that he was not born of true Athenian blood, his mother
being an alien. The sons of such mixed marriages were not without political
rights at Athens, but they lay under certain social disadvantages. They could
not train or exercise with the young Athenians of pure descent; a separate
gymnasium was assigned to them—the Cynosarges—on the
banks of the Ilissus, outside the walls of the city.
From his early youth, therefore, Themistocles found himself separated from
those ancient families, who had been the ruling power in Athens. He could not
expect the support which came to them from their equals. Yet his spirit would not
allow him to be content with any but the foremost place in the city. While he
was yet a boy his schoolmaster had predicted his future greatness; whether he
would be famous for his virtues or his vices he could not say, but famous he
would certainly be. His father, observing his inordinate ambition, sought to
win him from a public career by pointing to the hulls of some disused triremes.
These had once been employed in the service of the city—gallant ships, the
pride of those who manned them; and what were they now? But Themistocles was
not to be shaken in his purpose. As a young man he had fought at Marathon; and
the trophy of Miltiades would not let him rest. Was it possible for him,
without friends, without wealth, to win success even more brilliant than that
of the great chief of the Philaids? Was it possible to raise Athens, which had
just achieved so remarkable a victory, to a position of irresistible power, and
wrest from Sparta the leadership of Greece?
On the very day of Marathon, Themistocles had probably
made up his mind that the Persians would visit Greece again. What was to keep
them away, so long as they were masters of the Aegean? He was also aware that
Athens, above all cities, was the object of the wrath of Darius. How could she
be saved? Recent experience was entirely in favor of the army. At Marathon the
Athenian hoplites had put to flight a host ten times their own in number; but
the fleet had been unable to reduce the single city of Paros. For the last
twenty years Athens had been uniformly successful on land, while nothing
decisive had been done in the maritime war with Aegina. With such evidence
before them, few men would have ventured to strike into the line which
Themistocles took—a line which implied an entirely new departure in the
military history of Athens. With an insight almost incredible he perceived that
the Athenians could become a maritime nation, that Athens possessed harbors
large enough to receive an enormous fleet, and capable of being strongly
fortified; that in possession of a fleet she could not only secure her own
safety, but stand forth as a rival power to Sparta.
But how could Themistocles induce the Athenians to
abandon the line in which they had been so successful for a mode of warfare in
which even Miltiades had failed? After the fall of the great general, the
conduct of affairs was in the hands of Xanthippus,
whom we know, and Aristides. Both these men after the battle of Salamis took a
prominent part as leaders of the Athenian fleet, but ten years earlier they
were by no means prepared for the change which Themistocles was meditating.
This is more especially true of Aristides. He had been a friend of Clisthenes;
he was known as an admirer of Spartan customs; and doubtless looked on a
trained army as the great bulwark of a state. He had been second in command at
Marathon, and was now the most eminent general at Athens. From him Themistocles
could only expect the most resolute opposition.
Xanthippus and Aristides could reckon on the support of old
traditions and great connections. Themistocles had no support of the kind. He
had to make his party. He began by collecting round him a few energetic men,
who were perhaps convinced by his arguments, or at any rate jealous of the
power of the great families. These he formed into an association for the spread
of his views,—the first instance, so far as we know, of a political ‘club’ at
Athens. At a later time such clubs were common enough; in fact they were the
principal means by which the aristocratical or oligarchical party at Athens
preserved what influence it had. They were always regarded with some suspicion,
and the more severely they were treated the more dangerous they became. In this
early instance the significance of the movement was probably disregarded.
Conscious of their own position, Aristides and Xanthippus looked with contempt upon the knot of men who began to gather round their
unmannerly and uncultivated leader.
And they might perhaps have maintained their position
if it had not been for the Aeginetan war. That
unlucky struggle had begun, soon after the reforms of Clisthenes, with an
unprovoked attack of the Aeginetans on the coast of
Attica (506 BC). It was renewed when the Aeginetans gave earth and water to the heralds of Darius in 491, and though suspended at
the time of the Persian invasion, it broke out again with renewed ferocity soon
afterwards. The Aeginetans succeeded in carrying off
a missionship, which was conveying some of the
leading Athenian citizens to the festival of Poseidon on the headland of Sunium. The Athenians, in revenge, attempted a coup
d'état in concert with Nicodromus, a dissatisfied Eeginetan oligarch, who promised to raise the people at the
same moment that an Athenian fleet attacked the city. But the Athenians had not
sufficient ships for the purpose—for Aegina could put seventy vessels on the
water,—and while they were obtaining others from Corinth, time passed on, and
they arrived at Aegina a day too late. The Aeginetan oligarchs got rid of their domestic enemies by a horrible massacre, and after
some contests fought with varying fortune, they finally succeeded in defeating
the Athenian fleet. From this time onwards hostilities ceased on a large scale;
each city ravaged the coasts of the other as opportunity offered.
Such experiences naturally caused a change in the
minds of the Athenians. Had they driven the Persians into the sea only to be
defeated, harried, and defied by a neighboring island? If they could have the Aeginetans on land they would soon give an account of them;
but now the warfare lay on a different element. It was clear that the old
arrangements for the navy were quite inadequate to the task which was now
required of them. Yet the leaders of the state made no proposals. They seemed
content with a navy of fifty or seventy ships, regardless of past defeats and
present devastations. Miltiades had been condemned for his failure at Paros,
but failure at Aegina was treated in quite a different manner. These may have
been the murmurs which Themistocles and his associates sought to diffuse
through the city. In the confidence that they were gaining ground, he came
forward publicly with proposals of naval reform, and, as he expected, he drew
upon himself the strenuous opposition of Aristides.
We need not assume that Aristides had contracted that
dislike of a seafaring population which was so marked a feature among the
philosophers of the next century; but he could not avoid seeing that a fleet
was useless without rowers, and that the rowers would be drawn from the lowest
class of citizens. The defence of the city would no
longer be in the hands of that middle class, who were at least able to supply
themselves with a suit of armor, but in the hands of men who must be paid for
their labor. Aristides was slow to perceive that this class might be as
patriotic and trustworthy as the citizens of higher position. At a later time
he redeemed his error, but for the present he employed all his influence in
thwarting the plans of Themistocles. So severe was the contest that the public
peace was in danger. Aristides was heard to confess that the Athenians would be
wise if they threw both himself and his opponent into the pit into which great
criminals were cast.
Affairs were at a dead lock. It was clear that nothing
decisive could be done in the Aeginetan war unless
the proposals of Themistocles were carried; it was equally clear that they
never would be carried while Aristides and Xanthippus were at hand to oppose them. Under these circumstances recourse was had to the
safety-valve of the constitution. Ostracism was proposed and accepted; and in
this manner, by 483 BC, Themistocles had got rid of both of his rivals in the
city.
He was now master of the situation. The only obstacle
to the realization of his plans was the expense involved in building ships. And
this he was able to meet by a happy accident, which brought into the treasury
at this time a large surplus from the silver mines from Laurium.
Various accounts are given of the precise method in which the fleet was built,
and none is perhaps more worthy of credit than another. But, by the summer of
480, the Athenians, who previously had borrowed twenty ships of the Corinthians
in order to bring up their navy to a total of seventy, were able to launch a
hundred and eighty vessels, besides providing twenty for the use of the
Chalcidians of Euboea. These, or the greater part of them, as we know, on the
testimony of Herodotus, were primarily built with a view to the war with
Aegina, but, when the news of the second Persian invasion arrived, that quarrel
was made up, and the Athenians were at liberty to devote their whole strength
to the salvation of Greece.
At the same time, Themistocles set about the
fortification of the Piraeus. Down to this time the harbor of Athens had been
the open roadstead of Phalerum, which, though
spacious and convenient was exposed to the wind, and without any protection
from attack. A large fleet could not be allowed to remain there; harbors and
convenient docks were an indispensable part of the policy which endeavored to
turn Athens into a maritime power. A little to the west of Phalerum a rocky promontory runs out from the shore of Attica into the Gulf of Salamis.
Connected with the land by a somewhat narrow isthmus,
the headland becomes broader as it enters into the sea. It is pierced by three
deep basins, each with a narrow entrance, but varying in size. Themistocles at
once perceived that these basins were the harbors which he required. In the
largest, which was called Piraeus, all the ships of Athens could, if necessary,
be collected. The other two, if smaller, were even more defensible. He resolved
to make this promontory the port of Athens, and to fortify the harbors for the
protection of the ships. Could he have carried the Athenians with him, he would
have made the Piraeus the capital of the country, in order that the ships and
the city might be in close connection. But for this the people were not
prepared. They clung to the ancient rock, round which were gathered the most
sacred legends of the past—the seat of temples hallowed by immemorial
antiquity.
This ambitious scheme was suspended by the disasters
of the years 480-479, in which Xerxes attempted to avenge the defeat of his father
Darius, and bring Greece into subjection to Persia. As everyone knows, the
attempt ended in utter failure.
The Persian fleet was broken at Salamis, and finally
destroyed at Mycale; the greater part of the army hastened back with Xerxes,
and those who remained behind with Mardonius were cut
down with prodigious slaughter on the battlefield of Plataea. The historian can
hardly have a more delightful task than to trace, even in such outlines as our
knowledge permits, the steps by which a mere handful of brave and patriotic men
delivered their country from the Persian despot. Of nine tenths of the wars
which have destroyed empires and laid waste whole territories, we may say that
the world has gained nothing by them; but there can be no doubt that the loss
of Greek civilization would have been irreparable. And there can also be no
doubt that the glorious victory which saved so priceless a possession was
chiefly due to the Athenians, and among the Athenians to the incomparable
genius and courage of Themistocles. But we cannot here enter on this subject;
we are only concerned with the effect which the Persian war had on the position
of Athens among Greek cities, and the stimulus which it imparted to the Greek
mind.
We must also remember that among those who saw the
desolation of the city, and were carried away to escape the ravages of the
Barbarians was Pericles, now a boy of thirteen years of age. Of this flight
Plutarch has recorded an incident which is worth repeating. When Xanthippus embarked on board ship to cross the gulf from
Attica to Salamis, his favorite dog was forgotten, or reached the shore too
late to be taken on board. Unable to bear separation from his master, the dog
sprang into the sea and swam the whole breadth of the gulf, behind the ship.
But the effort was too great for his strength; on reaching the island he fell
down exhausted and died.
CHAPTER III.
THE CONGRESS AT CORINTH, AND THE DELIAN LEAGUE.
WHEN it was known in Greece that Xerxes was on his
march into Europe, it became necessary to take measures for the defence of the country. At the instigation of the
Athenians, the Spartans, as the acknowledged leaders of Hellas and head of the
Peloponnesian confederacy, called on those cities which had resolved to uphold
the independence of their country, to send plenipotentiaries to a congress at
the Isthmus of Corinth. When the envoys assembled, a kind of Hellenic alliance
was formed under the presidency of Sparta, and its unity was confirmed by an
oath, binding the members to visit with severe penalties those Greeks who,
without compulsion, had given earth and water to the envoys of Xerxes. This
alliance was the nearest approach to a Hellenic union ever seen in Greece; but
though it comprised most of the inhabitants of the Peloponnesus, except Argos
and Achaea, the Megarians, Athenians, and two cities of Boeotia, Thespiae and Plataea, were the only patriots north of the
Isthmus. Others, who would willingly have been on that side, such as the common
people of Thessaly, the Phoceans and Locrians, were compelled by the force of circumstances to
‘medize’.
From the time at which it met in the autumn or summer
of 481 to the autumn of 480 BC, the congress at the Isthmus directed the
military affairs of Greece. It fixed the plan of operations. Spies were sent to
Sardis to ascertain the extent of the forces of Xerxes; envoys visited Argos,
Crete, Corcyra, and Syracuse, in the hope, which proved vain, of obtaining
assistance in the impending struggle. As soon as Xerxes was known to be in
Europe, an army of ten thousand men was sent to hold the pass of Tempe, but
afterwards, on the advice of Alexander of Macedon, this barrier was abandoned;
and it was finally resolved to await the approaching forces at Thermopylae and Artemisium. The supreme authority, both by land and sea,
was in the hands of the Spartans; they were the natural leaders of any army
which the Greeks could put into the field, and the allies refused to follow
unless the ships also were under their charge.
For this reason Eurybiadas the Spartan, though he had only ten vessels under his command, was chosen
general-in-chief of the whole fleet. Of the other cities, each sent one
commander, with full powers at the head of her contingent. Themistocles
commanded the Athenians, Adimantus the Corinthians. From the time that
hostilities actually commenced at Thermopylae till the return of the fleet
after the victory of Salamis to the Isthmus, the direction of affairs was, of
course, taken by the general-in-chief. The commanders were allowed to discuss
matters in a common assembly, but the final decision rested with Eurybiadas. Of the council or congress at the Isthmus we
hear nothing at this time. But when hostilities were suspended, the congress
reappears, and the Greeks once more meet at the Isthmus to apportion the spoil
and adjudge the prizes of valor. In the next year we hear of no common plan of
operations, the fleet and army seeming to act independently of each other; yet
we observe that the chiefs of the medizing Thebans were taken to the Isthmus
(Corinth) to be tried, after the battle of Plataea.
It appears then that, under the stress of the great
Persian invasion, the Greeks were brought into an alliance or confederation;
and for the two years from midsummer 481 to midsummer 479 a congress continued
to meet, with more or less interruption, at the Isthmus, consisting of
plenipotentiaries from the various cities. This congress directed the affairs
of the nation, so far as they were in any way connected with the Persian
invasion. When the Barbarians were finally defeated, and there was no longer
any alarm from that source, the congress seems to have discontinued its
meetings. But the alliance remained; the cities continued to act in common, at
any rate, so far as naval operations were concerned, and Sparta was still the
leading power.
On the other hand, the relative position of the states
was greatly altered by the events of 480 and 479. In the first place, there
were states which had joined the invader, and states which had resisted him.
Thessaly and Thebes had done their best to place a foreign ruler over Greece;
Argos, in spite of her ancient traditions, had been neutral or worse. The
action of these states was not forgotten, if it was not punished. Thebes and Athens
had already quarreled over the allegiance of Plataea; the cities were now more
divided than ever; and all hope of the union of Northern Greece, so vital a
point in the defence of the country, was at an end.
In like manner the long-standing separation of Argos and Sparta was more
clearly marked than before. The approach to confederation, which the war seemed
to have created, had been accompanied by an increase of the divisions, an
aggravation of the hatreds, which rent Hellas asunder.
And this was not all. The part which Athens played at Artemisium and Salamis created a great impression in
Greece. Her neighbors and rivals in trade, the Aeginetans and Corinthians, saw with surprise and alarm that she had risen at a single
leap to a position far above their own. She was now the greatest maritime power
of any single state in Greece; and though in the war she had consented to
follow the lead of Sparta, it was clear to everyone that Themistocles and not Eurybiadas had been the real power in the fleet. In this
case also the war, while seeming to unite Hellas, had created two leading
cities, where previously there had only been one. Over against the great Dorian
city of the Peloponnesus stood the Ionian city of Central Hellas. The trained
courage of the Spartan hoplite was matched by the skill of the Athenian sailor.
The events which immediately followed the final defeat
of the Persians gave prominence to this new division. Athens made it clear that
she intended to pursue an independent line. She did not break loose from the
confederation which had been formed in 481; she was still the ally of Sparta,
and looked to Sparta to lead the allied forces, but in all that concerned her
own safety she claimed to be free and unfettered. The Athenians had hardly
returned from Salamis to Athens—which the Persians had leveled to the
ground—than they began to build a wall round the city far larger and stronger
than any which had previously existed. This was done on the advice of
Themistocles, who saw that such a protection was absolutely necessary, if the
Athenians were to devote themselves to the sea. Without such a wall the city
would be exposed to the attacks of their neighbors—attacks which could only be
successfully repelled by a large and well trained army, equal to the best
soldiers which the Peloponnese and Boeotia could bring against it, and such an
army was impossible at Athens. His advice was the more readily accepted at a
time when the citizens, who had been twice driven out of house and home in two
successive years, were in a mood to make sacrifices for the protection of the
city.
The walls began to rise. No sooner did the neighboring
allies see what was going on than they called on the Spartans to put a stop to
the ambitious project. The situation was difficult; Sparta as the head of the
alliance might make suggestions to the Athenians, but she could hardly venture
to interfere in a more decided manner. She sent envoys to Athens pointing out
the danger of walls; should another invasion occur, Athens if a walled city
might become what Thebes had been in the last: the base of operations for the
invaders. Sparta herself had no walls; why should Athens need them? The
Athenians were not deceived, but they could not openly resent this interference.
Themistocles found it necessary to outwit the Spartans and protract the
negotiations till the walls were of a height which made the city defensible.
Then he threw off the mask and boldly declared that Athens had a right to take
whatever steps she pleased to ensure her own safety. She chose to have walls
and she would have them. There the matter ended. It could not indeed be carried
further without an appeal to arms, and as yet the memory of the services of
Athens was too recent to admit of any but a friendly feeling between her and
Sparta.
In the fleet also the Athenians had been able to
assert their independence. The Spartan king Leotychidas had succeeded Eurybiadas as high admiral, and under
his command the allied squadrons won the victory of Mycale, 479 BC. The
Greeks had been assisted by the Samians and Milesians—who were glad to turn
upon their oppressors,—and when the fleet returned to Samos, after the battle,
the Chians and Lesbians and others asked to be
received into the alliance. The Greeks now found themselves face to face with a
question of no little importance. Were they to undertake the defence of the Greeks on the islands and the mainland of
Asia? It was obvious that they could only undertake it, if they were prepared
to maintain a fleet which could keep the Persians out of the Aegean. The
Peloponnesians, with the Spartans at their head, were unwilling to charge the
confederacy with such a burden. They proposed that the Ionians should be
removed from their present homes, and placed in the peninsula, in the ports of
the medizing Greeks, whom they would expel for the purpose. But the Athenians,
who were now commanded by Xanthippus, the father of
Pericles, took another view: the Ionians were their colonists, and they alone
had a right to decide on their future.
They determined that they should remain where they
were, and themselves undertook their protection. To this view the Spartans
assented, and soon afterwards Leotychidas and the
Peloponnesian contingents sailed home, leaving the Athenians to carry on the
war by themselves. Nothing daunted, the Athenians attacked Sestos, and
continued the siege till they captured the city, in the spring of 478.
By land and sea Athens had carried her point, even
against the wishes of Sparta. But the cities were still on the best of terms;
the old alliance remained, and, as we have said, Sparta was regarded as the
leading city in Greece.
When in the summer of 478 a new expedition was sent
out to carry on the war, it was placed under Pausanias, the general who had
commanded the united forces at Plataea as regent for his nephew, the infant
king of Sparta. The Aegean had been cleared of Persian ships by this time, but
the ambition of the Greeks grew with their success. They wished to make another
invasion impossible. With this view, Pausanias attacked Cyprus, the best
station from which to keep watch on the Cilician plain, the rendezvous of the
Persian troops, when required in the west. He succeeded in conquering the
greater part of the island, though we are not told that he left any garrison to
retain what he had won. From Cyprus he proceeded to Byzantium, the key of the Bosphorus; this city also he succeeded in taking, and at
the capture many Persians of high rank fell into his hands.
Among the spoils left on the field after the battle of
Plataea was found the tent of Mardonius, the Persian
general. This was no other than the tent of Xerxes, which at his departure the
King had left for the use of his successor in the command. It was, of course,
constructed with royal magnificence, resplendent with gold, and the richest
embroidery; a sight such as had never before come under the eyes of the
astonished Greeks. When Pausanias saw it, he bade the attendants prepare a meal
as they were accustomed to prepare it for Mardonius,
and at the same time gave orders to his Helots to cook a common Spartan supper.
Then he summoned the captains of the Greeks to see the difference. “How
foolish”, he exclaimed, “were the men who while they enjoyed the one sought to
rob the Greeks of the other!” The sight of this magnificence seems to have sunk
deeply into the mind and memory of Pausanias. Forgetting the infinite
difference between freedom and slavery, he contrasted the bare and dreary life
of a Spartan with the softness and splendor of a Persian satrap. His successes
in the last two years had raised him to the foremost rank in Greece, and he had
felt no scruple in claiming for himself the honors which had been won by the
devotion of others. Was he to abandon his ‘great place’ and return to Sparta,
to be the subject of an infant king? Was he, whose name was inscribed on the
serpents at Delphi and the cauldron at the Bosphorus as the captain of the Greeks, to be recalled to Sparta by the uncontrolled
decision of the ephors? His ambitious hopes led him to dream of a far different
position. Might he not fill the place which Mardonius had failed to fill, and govern Greece as the Viceroy of Persia?
With these schemes in his mind, Pausanias entered into
negotiations with the Great King. He sent the prisoners taken at the capture of
Byzantium back to Persia, excusing their departure to the Greeks under the pretence that they had escaped. He also wrote a letter to
Xerxes, in which he proposed to become the son-in-law of the king (as Mardonius had been of Darius), and requested that a
trustworthy person should be sent down to the coast, with whom he could develop
his plans. Xerxes eagerly entered into the scheme. Pausanias received ample
promises of support, and a Persian was sent to cooperate with him.
Unfortunately for his own purposes, he was unable to conceal his delight. He
already regarded himself as a servant of Persia. In Persian dress, with a bodyguard
of Medes and Egyptians about him, he made a tour through Thrace, where a number
of fortified posts were still held by the King’s troops. His conduct towards
the allies became more intolerable every day. He made the lives of the men
miserable by harsh punishments, and when their commanders interfered, he
refused to hear them. The irritation, especially of the Ionians, was increased
by the politic courtesy of the generals of the Athenian contingent, Cimon
and Aristides. At length the smoldering fires broke into flame. The allies,
with the Samians at their head, transferred their allegiance from the Spartan
commander to the Athenians, and in spite of all his negotiations with Persia,
Pausanias was not in a position to prevent the change by force. Meanwhile the
Spartans heard of the dispute, and having before had some suspicion of the
motives of Pausanias, they recalled him from Byzantium. This step left the
course clear for the Athenians. They assumed the command, and when a successor
to Pausanias was sent out from Sparta, he was not received by the allied fleet.
The Spartans were, in fact, no longer recognised as
the head of the maritime forces of the Hellenic alliance, and as the rest of
the Peloponnesians, who naturally followed the lead of the Spartans, also
ceased from this time, to send contingents to the Hellenic fleet, the Athenians
and their allies were left in control of the sea. The Ionians could now claim
to be as supreme on the water as the Dorians were on the land.
Thucydides tells us that the Spartans were not
unwilling that the command of the fleet should pass over to the Athenians. They
felt that their citizens were becoming corrupted by their residence and service
abroad; Spartan simplicity was not proof against the temptations which Persia
could offer; the seclusion of the valley of the Eurotas became dreary to those who had mixed with the life and movement of the sea. And
at the same time they thought the Athenians loyal friends, who would carry on
the maritime war in the cause of Hellas. Of their ability and energy there
could, of course, be no doubt.
Thus within three or four years of the battle of
Salamis, united Greece had fallen into halves. The great alliance still
existed, but Sparta had practically gone back to her old position as leader of
the Peloponnesians. Athens had risen to be the first city of Central Greece and
head of the maritime forces of the nation. As on the one hand, the Ionian
allies of Athens had renounced allegiance to the Spartan commander, so, on the
other, the Dorian cities of the Peloponnese had withdrawn their contingents
from the allied fleet. Athens and Sparta, Ionians and Dorians, began to be
ranged in opposition.
The division was increased by the use which the Athenians
made of their position as head of the Hellenic fleet. They had established
their power in Central Hellas by surrounding their city with impregnable walls;
they now proceeded to consolidate the bond which united them with their allies
into a firm and lasting league. Still remaining allies of the Spartans, they
nevertheless formed a fresh alliance of their own. This was the famous Delian
confederacy—the foundation, we may say, upon which the Athens of Pericles and
the Peloponnesian war was reared. The avowed object of the Athenians in forming
the league was to compensate themselves and their allies for their losses by
devastating the King’s country. They had no sooner been acknowledged leaders of
the fleet in the Bosphorus than they proceeded to
form a synod, to which all the allied cities, great or small, should send a
deputy, each deputy having an equal vote on the board. As a second step, it was
necessary to arrange which of the cities should provide ships, and which should
provide money, for the war. Some cities, such as Chios, Lesbos, Samos, Naxos,
and others, in spite of the requisitions of Xerxes, seem to have been able to
furnish ships at once; others had either lost their vessels, or for some other
reasons found it difficult to build any. For their convenience a scale was
fixed by Aristides, according to which their ‘tribute’ to the league was to be
paid, and the Athenians were charged with the collection of it, a new office
being created at Athens for the purpose—the so-called “Hellenic Treasurers”.
What money was collected was placed in a common chest in the temple of Apollo
at Delos, which was also selected as the common meeting-place of the synod. The
alliance was confirmed by solemn oaths, which were ratified, as the custom was,
by sinking masses of iron in the sea; when these should reappear, the oaths
would cease to be binding. In the enthusiasm of the moment it seemed that the
alliance would last for ever.
The Athenians who took a leading part in the formation
of the league were Aristides and Cimon. Aristides we know. After his ostracism
in 483 he had returned to Athens on the eve of the battle of Salamis, either
under a public resolution, or because he felt that, at such a time, he might
disregard the law in offering his services to his country. Whatever his old
opposition to Themistocles had been, it was forgotten now, and no one rendered
more efficient aid in carrying out the plans of his rival for the development
of Athenian maritime power. Cimon was the son of Miltiades, and inherited his
father’s military genius; from this date, till his death in 449, he takes the
first place among Athenian generals. Both Aristides and Cimon were men
eminently fitted to make Athens popular with the allies. As Aristides was renowned
for his upright character, so was Cimon the delight of the society in which he
moved, the idol of his soldiers.
Splendid as the fortune of Athens was in every respect
at this time, it was in nothing more remarkable than in the number of great men
whom she had at her disposal. And for a time, at any rate, old animosities were
forgotten; all worked together in harmony for the good of their city. Happy
would it have been for the reputation of the republic if this harmony had
continued.
CHAPTER IV.
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE DELIAN LEAGUE—THE FALL OF
PAUSANIAS AND THEMISTOCLES.
IN 476 BC, the Delian league was formed, amid
universal enthusiasm, and at the Olympian festival of that year Themistocles
was the “observed of all observers”, as the man who had saved his country. In
466 Naxos, the most important of the Cyclades, the last of the larger islands
to fall under the Persian yoke, and the first to break loose from it, was in
revolt against the Athenians, and Themistocles was flying from his country to
seek the protection of the Persian king. A change so striking of necessity
excites our curiosity; we would fain trace the steps by which it was brought
about. Who was to blame for consequences so disastrous?
Was it the Athenians, who in the plenitude of their
power destroyed the fair promise of united action in Hellas, in order to
establish a maritime empire in the place of an equal league of confederate
cities?
Or did the allies, in the feverish restlessness of
Hellenic independence, refuse to submit to the control inseparable from any
form of confederation?
Was Themistocles a traitor to the country which he had
served so well, an associate of Pausanias, and a hireling of the Persian king;
or were his exile and flight due to party feuds and political strife?
On the answer to these questions our judgment of the
Athenians in this great period of their history must largely depend. And
unhappily the answer is vague and uncertain. With the help of Thucydides we can
trace a faint outline of the causes which led to the revolt of Naxos; we can
see that there was negligence on the one side, and ambition on the other. But
at the causes which brought about the fall of Themistocles we can only guess;
so far as we know, no truthful record of the events of this period of the
domestic history of Athens was ever made, or, if made, it was not preserved.
The last days of the greatest of Athenians became a myth; the manner of his death
and the place of his burial were unknown.
The first achievement of the new league was the
capture of Eion, a town at the mouth of the Strymon in Thrace. This success was gained under the
command of Cimon. Not long afterwards, but how long the meager record of
Thucydides does not allow us to determine, the island of Scyrus was acquired by Athens. The inhabitants, who were Dolopians,
were reduced to slavery and their land divided among Athenian citizens. This
fate, we are told, the Dolopians brought upon
themselves. Their island was little better than a nest of pirates, and it was
at the request of the Delphian Amphictyony that the Athenians entered upon the
crusade against them. After this a war broke out between the league and
Carystus, a town in Euboea. Some time was spent in indecisive warfare, but at
length terms were proposed upon which both sides could agree. The next event
recorded by Thucydides in the history of the league is the revolt of the Naxians, who were reduced by a siege. This was the first
allied city which was enslaved contrary to “Hellenic law”, but afterwards the
same fate overtook the rest, “each as its turn came”. Various reasons were
given for these acts of aggression on the part of Athens, but the most common
was the failure to supply the tribute and ships, or the refusal to join in an
expedition. The Athenians were extreme in their exactions, and caused great
irritation by using compulsion upon men who had never been accustomed to endure
any hardship. And by this time they were not so popular in the command as they
had been. They were not content with their old position as an equal among
equals, and they found it easy to reduce those who revolted. For this the
allies were themselves to blame. Owing to their aversion to service, which took
them from home, the greater part preferred paying money to providing ships, and
thus they not only supplied the Athenians with money to increase their fleet,
but when they revolted, they were as deficient in skill as in resources.
At first, we are told, the Athenians were inclined to
insist on receiving the vessels according to the original agreement, but Cimon
pointed out that it was far more to the advantage of Athens to allow the allies
to have their own way. The revenues of the city were increased at the very time
when the power of resistance declined, with the inevitable result that the
Athenians became not merely the leaders, but the rulers of the confederacy. In
the same careless spirit the allies seem to have neglected the attendance at the
synod at Delos, upon which their existence as equals in the league depended.
The synod was in fact allowed to fall into decay.
Before the death of Cimon it had probably ceased to
exist; and even the chest of the allies had been transferred to Athens, where
it was, in effect, administered by the Athenian council. It was reserved for
Pericles to carry out the change further, and to insist that the Athenian
empire had taken the place of the Delian league. The change was perhaps
inevitable; or at least, the choice lay between two alternatives. Either the
Delian league must be broken up into a number of independent navies, which
might or might not act together, or it must be consolidated in the hands of
Athens. The first alternative was impossible, so long as Persia was a dangerous
power; and when by repeated defeats Athens had crippled her great enemy, she
had achieved a position which left the old equality no more than a fiction. Had
the Peloponnesians remained in the alliance, the preponderance of Athens might
have been obviated; there would at least have been two great states, round
which the allies could have ranged themselves, and the division of power,
though fertile of dissensions, might have saved the weaker cities.
Unfortunately the treachery of Pausanias rendered such an arrangement
impossible; owing to his conduct the Spartans were not only hated abroad, but
found themselves involved in serious danger at home. The rest of the
Peloponnesians were unable to take an independent line.
Of the internal affairs of Athens after the building
of the city walls we know very little. Four great names are before us: Xanthippus, Aristides, Themistocles, and Cimon. Of Xanthippus we hear no more after the fall of Sestos, in
478 BC. That he died is more than probable, for if he had lived it is
difficult to understand why his name is never mentioned. His birth, his wealth,
his success, and his ambition would have secured him a leading place in the
politics of the day. We must, therefore, think of Pericles as deprived of his
father’s guidance at the age of fifteen. At this critical period of life he was
left to shape his own career, and select the party to which he would attach
himself. Of the part which Aristides took in the formation of the Delian league
we have already spoken. His action as commander of the Athenian fleet is a
proof, as we have said, that he no longer cherished his old opposition to the
maritime plans of Themistocles. He had, in fact, so fully identified himself
with the forward policy, which made the lower classes all-important for the
service of the city, that he proposed to relieve them from the restrictions
hitherto laid upon them.
By the arrangements of Solon, the citizens of Athens
were divided into four classes, according to their wealth. In the highest class
were placed those who derived from landed property an income of five hundred medimni (seven hundred and fifty English bushels) of corn,
or equivalent produce; in the second, those whose income from similar sources
amounted to three hundred medimni; in the third,
those whose income amounted to one hundred and fifty medimni.
Into the fourth class, who were known as the Thetes,
or ‘day laborers’, fell all the citizens whose income derived from landed
property was less than one hundred and fifty medimni,
and all whose income, no matter how large, was derived from other sources than
land. To each of these classes duties were assigned according to their means,
and privileges granted according to their duties. The first class bore the
heaviest burdens, and enjoyed the exclusive right to the highest offices. The
members of the second class, who were known as the Knights, were liable to the
charge of providing a horse in the service of the city; the members of the
third class were called the Hoplites, or Heavy-armed; every man was expected to
take his place in the army, when called upon, and to furnish himself with a
suit of body-armor. These two classes shared with the first the privilege of
election to the council of Five Hundred, and perhaps some other offices were
open to them.
The Thetes were excluded
from office of any kind, and the only duty demanded of them was that of
attending the hoplites in the field as light-armed soldiers.
The Solonian scheme had undergone considerable
modifications at the hands of Clisthenes in regard to the three higher classes,
by which many of the old restrictions had been removed, but no change had been
made in regard to the fourth class. They were still excluded from every kind of
office, though as rowers in the ships they had recently been called upon to
take a far larger share in the service of the state than ever fell to their lot
as light-armed soldiers. Aristides saw the injustice of the restriction. He had
aided Clisthenes in throwing open office to the higher classes; he now went
further in the same direction, and proposed that members of the fourth class
should be eligible to the archonship.
So far as the poorer citizens were concerned, the
proposal was rather a compliment than an advantage. Few of the members of the
fourth class, whose position was due to their poverty, would be able to support
the expense attending high office, or even to give up the time necessary for
the discharge of their duties. But with the men who were placed in the class
because their income was derived from trade and not from land, the case was
very different. They were by this time a numerous and increasing body, eager,
no doubt, to be released from the restriction which lay upon them. The proposal
of Aristides placed them on an equality with the rest of the citizens, and
opened careers which they felt themselves able to pursue. At the same time it
gave to capital employed in trade an importance hitherto reserved to capital
invested in land.
But where, we ask, was Themistocles when this proposal
was made? Why did he allow a measure, at once so popular and so obviously
favorable to his own views of the future of Athens, to be passed by Aristides?
Our authorities tell us that Aristides was opposed to the extreme democratic
views of Themistocles. Yet Aristides passes a measure more democratic by far
than any which we know to have been passed by Themistocles! Are we to suppose
that these two great men were once more opponents, as of old, but on a different
ground? Does Aristides attempt to outbid Themistocles in winning the popular
vote? Or was the measure of Aristides, however democratic in appearance, a
modified form of some still more extreme measure contemplated by Themistocles?
What is certain is that, after the building of the
city walls and the fortification of the Piraeus, which he persuaded the
Athenians to complete—for a beginning had been made a few years previously—when
the walls were finished, the popularity of Themistocles began to decline. We
never hear of him in any public capacity; he carried no important measures.
Full of schemes, as he must have been for the aggrandizement of Athens, and the
extension of her power, he found himself not only unable to carry them out, but
even to maintain the position to which his great achievements had raised him.
This change in his position can hardly be explained by the extreme nature of
his views on the democracy, for the most democratic measure of the time was
carried by Aristides. It was due partly to the character of Themistocles
himself, and partly to the state of parties at Athens at the time.
Themistocles was not a man likely to attract the love
or respect of those with whom he lived and worked, let his services be never so
great. He was too purely intellectual, too intent on doing what was best to do,
without regard to the means by which he did it. His conduct towards the
Spartans shows him in a disagreeable light, and many of those who approved of
the result of his policy would not hesitate to condemn the manner in which the
result had been attained. We have no reason to suppose that he ever entertained
any other than patriotic motives in his dealings with Persia, but the secret
and tortuous arts by which he brought about the battle of Salamis would not be
forgotten by those who wished to ruin his character. This dislike and distrust
were perhaps increased by defects of manner.
Themistocles is described to us as insolent and
overbearing; he did not disguise his contempt for those around him; he was
never weary of dwelling on his own merits, a weakness not uncommon among
Athenians. And this may have been the reason that the ‘club’, on which he
relied ten years before, was no longer willing to support him. His old friends
grew weary or afraid of one who posed as a ‘necessary’ man; for, on the one
hand, the step was short from the necessary man to the tyrant; and, on the
other, though it was true that in great emergencies Themistocles, more than any
other Athenian, was competent to guide the state, the case was altered when the
danger had passed away. Cimon and Aristides were far better fitted to carry on
the work of the Delian league. It is indeed probable, though there is no
authority for saying so, that it was in the management of the confederacy that
Themistocles and Aristides once more came into opposition. For if Themistocles
could have carried out his own views, Athens would not have entered the
confederacy as an equal among equals; she would at once have occupied the
imperial position, which she gained some twenty years later, and the Aegean
would have become an Athenian lake. The opposition of Cimon to Themistocles can
be also explained by the different views which they took of the proper policy
for Athens to adopt towards Sparta.
However this may be, the party leaders at Athens were
able to keep Themistocles out of power. Cimon was the head of the Philaid;
Aristides carried on the policy of the Alcmaeonids. Both were sincere
patriots—Cimon the more aristocratic, Aristides, though also of an ancient
family, the more democratic, in his views. Each could count on a great
following: the landed gentry, as we should call them, had for a century looked
on the Philaids as their leaders; the merchants and traders—the Parali of the preceding century—had been raised to
power in the state by the recent measures of Aristides, and at the same time
the whole of the poorer classes, whether living by agriculture or trade, had
been freed from an invidious restriction. But Themistocles was without a
following; the peasants and poorer farmers, who had once supported Pisistratus,
no longer formed a third party, and if they had, Themistocles, whose desire was
to make Athens a maritime power, was not likely to be their leader. Under such
circumstances it was not difficult for Cimon and Aristides, by combining their
influence, to destroy the position of Themistocles. In 471 BC, the
opposition reached a climax; ostracism was demanded, and Themistocles was
expelled the country.
On his banishment he retired to Argos. Whether he was
prompted by his old hatred of Sparta, or whether he suspected that Spartan
influence had been active in procuring his exile, we do not know; but we can
hardly doubt that he chose Argos as a place of retirement because it offered a
convenient base of operations against Sparta. And though the feeling between
Argos and Athens, owing to the conduct of the Argives in the Persian war, was
far from friendly, the Argives may have been pleased to have among them an
Athenian who was better able than any other Greek to aid them in their designs
on their detested neighbors.
To Argos Themistocles went. At this point his life
becomes linked with the fate of Pausanias, who, when we last heard of him, had
been recalled by Sparta from the command of the fleet at Byzantium.
After his recall Pausanias remained at Sparta but a
short time. He was too deeply interested in his negotiations with the Persian
king to abandon his aims at the first check. In a single vessel he sailed from
the coast of Argolis to the Hellespont, on the pretext that he wished to join
in the war as a private person. By some means, perhaps on the score of the
great services which he had rendered to Greece at Plataea, he obtained an
entrance into Byzantium, and established himself there in some degree of power.
But his position was not such as to enable him to take any active steps in
concert with Persia; year after year passed on, and nothing whatever was
accomplished of the promises which he had held out to the King. His treachery
meanwhile grew more and more apparent, until at last the Athenians found it
necessary to expel him from Byzantium.
He retired to Colon, a city in the Troad,
where he was at least within easy reach of the satrap of Phrygia. But the
suspicions of the Spartans had been aroused; ere long a Spartan herald appeared
at Colon, bidding him return home on pain of incurring the displeasure of the
Spartans. Pausanias did not venture to disobey; a breach with the authorities of
his government, apart from the personal danger to himself, would have been
fatal to his plans, which embraced an entire change of the situation in
Peloponnesus as well as in the Aegean.
On his previous recall he had been punished for some
injuries which he had done to private persons, but on the graver charge of
treachery he had been acquitted. He was now thrown into prison by the ephors,
whose power was such that they could imprison even the kings of Sparta on bare
suspicion. It was not long before he found his way out, when he at once
challenged his enemies to produce their charges. For a time no one came
forward. Many suspicious actions of Pausanias were remembered; his conduct at
Byzantium; his affectation of the Persian dress and manners; his ambitious
inscription on the tripod at Delphi, in which he claimed the honors won by
Greece for himself; but certain proof was not to be had. What touched the
Spartan authorities even more nearly was the report that he was intriguing with
the Helots, of whose rebellious spirit they were in constant alarm. And it was
true that Pausanias had been in treaty with them, promising them freedom and
civic rights if they would revolt. Still, there was no incontestable evidence
to hand, which would justify the ephors in going to extremities against a
citizen of the royal blood, and the most successful of Spartan generals.
At length a favorite servant turned informer.
Observing that of the messengers whom Pausanias sent to Asia none ever
returned, he opened the dispatches placed in his hands, in alarm for his own
safety. He found, as he expected, that directions were given for his death. He
at once showed the letter to the ephors. Their suspicions were of course
confirmed, but they still wished to hear something from the lips of Pausanias
himself; a dispatch might be forged, and there was the greater fear of this,
because in order to hide his opening of the letter the servant had in fact
forged the seal of Pausanias. A plan was arranged by which the truth was
brought to light. The servant, as if in fear for his life, took sanctuary at
the temple of Poseidon, on the promontory of Taenarus,
in the south of Laconia. Here he built a hut, divided by a wall into two
compartments, in one of which he concealed the ephors, while he was visited by
Pausanias in the other. The conversation which passed between him and his
master was so arranged as to leave no doubt whatever of the guilt of Pausanias.
The ephors returned to Sparta, intending to arrest
him. But even now they were not really in earnest in their work. They did not
send to his house, or attempt to take him by surprise, and when they met him in
the street, one of the body gave him a sign of warning, which enabled him to
escape for the moment. He turned and fled. Before the pursuers could come up,
he had taken refuge in a chamber adjacent to the temple of Athena of the Brazen
House, and within the sacred precincts. Here he was at least safe from
violence. But Spartan cruelty was a match for Spartan superstition. Unwilling
to remove the suppliant, the ephors found means to defeat his object. They
unroofed the chamber in which he lay, and finding that he was certainly there,
with no means of egress but the door, they built up the doorway, and left him
to starve. It is said by later writers that his own mother laid the first stone
in this iniquitous work. When he was at length on the point of death they drew
him out of the sacred place; if it was sacrilege to remove a suppliant, it was
pollution for anyone to die in a temple. He was no sooner removed than he
expired. Not long afterwards the Spartans appear to have felt some scruples
about the manner in which they had dealt with him. They consulted Apollo of
Delphi, who, besides other instructions, informed them that they had brought a
curse upon themselves, and must offer two bodies in place of one. This was the
curse of Athena of the Brazen House. The Spartans endeavored to expiate their
offence by erecting two bronze statues of Pausanias.
The chronology of this period is too uncertain to
allow us to speak with confidence, but it is probable that Themistocles was at
Argos when the treachery of Pausanias came to light. For the Spartans it was
highly inconvenient that one who had shown so strong a determination to
dislodge them from their position as leaders of Greece should become
influential in a city more famous in legend than their own, and a bitter enemy
from the earliest times. As they could not call on the Argives to expel him,
they devised a more secret and a more certain method of attaining their object.
In the papers of Pausanias they professed to find evidence which involved
Themistocles in his guilt. And though they could not appeal to any overt act in
support of such a charge, they could remind the Athenians that Themistocles was
known to have entered into secret communications with the Great King at the
battle of Salamis. Themistocles had enemies enough at Athens, who were willing
to take up the charge. An Alcmaeonid, by name Leobotes,
impeached him before the assembly, and the Athenian people were persuaded to
send envoys to join the Spartans in arresting him as a traitor to Greece.
Themistocles received timely warning of their
approach, and retired from Argos to Corcyra, a city which, in spite of her
conduct during the Persian war, he had in some way befriended. Even here the
Spartans followed him; and the Corcyrans finding
themselves unequal to his protection, conveyed him to the opposite shore. Here
also his enemies pursued him. He was compelled to seek shelter with Admetus,
the king of the Molossians, who, though Themistocles had opposed him in some
negotiations with the Athenian people, refused to surrender the suppliant, and
sent him safely to Pydna in Macedonia.
From Pydna he took ship to
Ionia. But misfortune pursued him still. The ship in which he was carried was
driven by a storm to Naxos at the very time when the city was being blockaded
by the Athenians. Themistocles saw his danger, and sending for the captain,
told him who he was, and offered a large sum of money on condition that he
would neither land at Naxos nor allow anyone to leave the ship. If he refused,
he would denounce him as an accomplice in his flight. The captain accepted the
money and Themistocles was safely landed at Ephesus.
From Ephesus he entered into communication with the
Persians. In a letter to Artaxerxes, who had just succeeded his father Xerxes,
he offered his services to Persia. It was true that he had done the Great King
more harm than anyone else, but he had also done him greater service, for it
was owing to his advice that the bridge over the Hellespont had not been broken
down, and Xerxes had been enabled to retire in safety. He was now driven from
his country as a friend of the King.
In a year’s time, if permission were given, he would
himself explain to Artaxerxes why he had come to Asia. Artaxerxes was delighted
at the thought that his great enemy had come over to him. When the year was
ended, Themistocles appeared at Susa, and at once became the most influential
of all the Greeks who had ever visited Persia. He was made governor of Magnesia
in Ionia, a convenient station from which to keep watch over the seaboard. With
oriental magnificence certain cities were set apart for his maintenance.
Magnesia itself, a city with a revenue of fifty talents, supplied him with
bread; Lampsacus with wine; Myus with meat. For the time, he was a Persian satrap, enjoying the special favor of
the King.
But no result followed. The victory of Cimon at the
Eurymedon in 466 had crushed any immediate hope of invading Greece.
Themistocles had to confess in secret that the power which he had created was
too great for him to destroy. According to one account, he put an end to his
own life because he could not fulfill his promise to Artaxerxes; but
Thucydides, who was at pains to make careful inquiries about his great
countryman, assures us that he died a natural death. A monument was erected to
his memory in the market-place of Magnesia, and Plutarch’s personal friend,
Themistocles of Athens, enjoyed the honors which were bestowed on his
posterity, even in the second century AD, in that city. But his bones, so at
least his family asserted, were secretly brought home and placed in Attic
earth.
Of the genius of Themistocles it is needless to speak.
It is attested by the victory which he won, and the career of the great city,
to which he gave, as it were, a second foundation. In defence of his honesty, we may say that there is no reason to suppose that he cherished
treasonable designs against his country before the moment when it was no longer
possible for him to remain safely in it; and when the combination of his
enemies in Sparta and Athens drove him out of Hellas, there was no place but
Persia to which he could retire. It is extremely doubtful whether there was any
real ground for the charge of medism upon which he
was hunted out of Greece. The evidence comes to us from a very suspicious
source—from the Spartans, who knew that Themistocles was their enemy, and who
had at the time very urgent reasons for securing his expulsion from the
Peloponnesus. Unhappily, the enemies of Themistocles at Athens were only too
ready to join in the work. They had succeeded in banishing him from the city,
but they knew that while he was in Greece he might return and find some means
of revenging himself upon them. It did not occur to their minds that the honor
of their city was bound up with that of her greatest citizen. In the malice of
party spirit they forgot what they owed to the world and posterity.
The leader of the attack is said to have been an
Alcmeonid, but whether Pericles took any part in it is unknown. Assuming that
Themistocles was condemned in 467 or 466, Pericles would be twenty-six or
twenty-seven at the time. His mind was already occupied with politics, and, as
we shall see, he came forward in a very few years as the leader of the popular
party; but his sympathy with the views of Themistocles must have been too great
to allow him to share in the feud which drove him to the court of Persia.
Nevertheless, the flight of Themistocles and the death of Aristides, which
seems to have occurred about the same time, left the way clear for the new
leader of the democracy.
CHAPTER V.
DECADENCE OF SPARTA—REVOLT OF THE HELOTS—BREACH
BETWEEN SPARTA AND ATHENS.
FROM the time that she withdrew her contingent from
the Grecian fleet Sparta began to decline rapidly in prestige and power. Her
want of firmness in investigating and punishing the conduct of Pausanias
allowed events to take a turn which was disastrous to her reputation and even
to her power; while the growth of democratic feeling, fostered no doubt by the
example of Athens, was raising an amount of hostility, or at any rate of
disaffection, in the Peloponnesus, to which she had hitherto been a stranger.
As a means of increasing her influence on land in
compensation for the loss of her influence in the fleet, Sparta took up the
line of punishing those states which had supported Xerxes in his invasion of
Greece. The patriotic states were indeed pledged to this step, but the
Athenians were far too busy with their new confederacy to give much attention
to the claims of the old alliance, and the moment was favorable for independent
action on the part of Sparta. Among the most flagrant offenders were the Aleuads, the princely house which practically governed
Thessaly. They had not only received the Persians into their country, and
conducted them to the south of Greece, but they had even sent envoys to Persia
with the object of bringing about the invasion. To punish such conduct Leotychidas, the king of Sparta, was dispatched at the head
of an army into Thessaly. Unhappily for Sparta, Leotychidas was more corrupt, or at least less able to conceal his corruption, than
Pausanias himself. He received bribes from the Aleuads with so little secrecy that he was found with the money in his tent. The army
was at once recalled; Leotychidas was put on his
trial and condemned. He fled for refuge to Tegea in
Arcadia, and so unfriendly were the terms which now prevailed between Sparta
and her ally, that the Tegeatae refused to give him
up. He was succeeded on the throne by his son Archidamus.
The first attempt to pursue a patriotic policy had
ended in failure and disgrace. The second also proved abortive. From very
ancient times a league of twelve tribes had met at Thermopylae and Delphi,
which was known as the Delphian Amphictyony. It was perhaps in the first
instance founded for common worship and defence, but
at the time of which we are speaking its functions were almost exclusively
religious; very rarely did it take a part in the political affairs of the
country. At the Persian invasion a large proportion of the cities and tribes
forming the league had gone over, either voluntarily or on the compulsion of
powerful neighbors, to the side of the Persians. The Spartans now proposed to
purge the Amphictyony by the expulsion of the medizing members. The proposal
was strictly in accordance with the resolution which had been taken in
481 BC to punish those Greeks who failed in their duty to their
country, but nevertheless the aims of Sparta were suspected. It was thought
that she wished to gain for herself a preponderance in the council of the
league, and by this means to lay the foundation of a confederacy in Northern
Greece, which would be as fully under her control as the confederacy in the
Peloponnesus. On these grounds Themistocles at once came forward to oppose the
proposal of the Spartans. His arguments, whether well founded or not, proved
convincing; in spite of its delinquencies the Amphictyony remained without
change.
The attention of Sparta was soon recalled from these
more distant projects by troubles nearer home. We have seen that the Tegeatae refused to give up Leotychidas at the request of the Spartans. A war appears to have broken out between the
cities, in which the Argives came to the help of the Tegeatae.
The Spartans were victorious, but the victory cannot have been very decisive,
for Leotychidas remained safe at Tegea till his death, and no steps were taken against Argos. Not long afterwards the
whole of Arcadia, with the exception of the Mantineans, took the field against
Sparta. The armies met at Dipaea, where a great
battle was fought, in which the Spartans were again victorious. But though she
proved her power in the field, it was obvious that a spirit of independence was
gaining ground among her neighbors and allies which threatened her ascendancy
at the very time when there was no one at Sparta of sufficient ability and
character to counteract it. For in this crisis of her history Sparta was as
deficient in great men as Athens was prolific of them.
The same tendency appeared in a great revolution which
about this time took place in Elis. Hitherto that state had been oligarchical,
and a warm friend of Sparta, but after the Persian war a reaction set in, which
now showed itself in a very definite step. The constitution was changed in the
direction of democracy, and the change was marked and confirmed by the
formation of a large central city, called Elis after the country. Up to this
time the great families which had governed Elis had lived in small towns; and
indeed a country life was at all times characteristic of the Eleans. The change which now took place transferred the
ruling authority to the citizens who were gathered into the new city.
More important were the changes which went on in
Argos. Ever since the great defeat by Cleomenes of
Sparta, in which six thousand Argives perished, the city had devoted her
attention to recovering and consolidating her power. A hard task lay before
her. So low had she been brought by her disaster, that the slaves or serfs had
usurped the dominion of the country after the slaughter of their masters, and
not till these were deposed was Argos her true self. This exhaustion was put
forward as a plea by the Argives for their omission to send help against Persia
in 481 BC. Slowly the city recovered her strength, and when she found
Sparta occupied with her Arcadian neighbors, she seized the opportunity to break
up all the independent towns in the vale of Argos,
and concentrate their inhabitants in the city. The ancient towns of Mycena and Tiryns, in spite of their legendary glory, and
the patriotic part they had played in the Persian invasion, ceased to exist.
Those of their inhabitants who were not embodied in the Argive community were
driven out to find shelter wherever they could. By this means Argos rose once
more to the condition of a flourishing state. At the same time, the
concentration of somewhat heterogeneous elements in the city may have
strengthened the democratic tendencies of the constitution, so as to draw her
nearer to Athens. At any rate we hear of a king of Argos in the Persian war,
and we never hear of one after.
Thus was the influence of Sparta limited on every side
at the moment when the conduct of her leaders excited hatred and suspicion
throughout Greece. But these were not the whole, nor by any means the greatest,
of the troubles by which she was now beset. As we have seen, Pausanias was
suspected of inciting the Helots to revolt. The Helots were principally the
ancient population of Messenia, whom the Spartans had reduced to serfdom, a
brave and hardy race, who tilled the soil in remote farms and hamlets, on a
sort of metayer system, under which a certain amount
of the produce was paid to the Spartan owner. They never forgot their lost
independence, or regarded the Spartans as anything but conquerors, whom they
would strike down in a moment, if the opportunity occurred. This feeling was well
known to their masters, who dreaded nothing so much as a revolt of the Helots,
and took the most atrocious measures to prevent it. They had recently torn some
Helots from the sanctuary at Taenarus, and put them
to death in spite of the divine protection to which they were entitled, an act
which had brought on them the curse of Taenarus. The
present time was naturally a period of excitement among the Helots; they saw
with delight the repeated attacks upon Sparta, and felt that a support was at
hand which had hitherto been denied to them. They were also moved by the
promises of Pausanias, who no doubt held out a hope of Persian help.
With the death of Pausanias and the destruction of the
Persian army at the Eurymedon the worst danger might seem to have passed away
(466 BC). But in the autumn of the year 464 a sudden disaster overtook
Sparta which brought her to the very brink of destruction. A terrific
earthquake laid the city in ruins. Only five houses were left standing;
more than twenty thousand persons are said to have perished. In this
fearful moment Archidamus the king saved his country.
While others were dazed with terror at the falling ruins, or lamenting the loss
of their property, he gave the signal for war, and by this means drew the
Spartans out of the city. It was the salvation of the Spartan name. For the
Helots no sooner heard of the earthquake than they flocked together to complete
the ruin of their hated masters. Messenia broke into revolt, and though the
rebels could not penetrate to Sparta, they entrenched themselves firmly on
Mount Ithome, the ancient stronghold of their race.
From this centre they carried on a predatory warfare,
often inflicting severe loss on the enemy. In vain did the Spartanse to dislodge them from their fortress; in vain did they call on their allies for
help. The Messenians held out, and every attempt to capture Ithome only ended in new disaster.
In this critical state of their affairs the Spartans
determined to apply for help to the Athenians, who had a great reputation for
their skill in capturing fortified places. The feeling between the cities was
not very good; when the earthquake occurred, the Spartans were about to invade
Attica in spite of the peace which nominally prevailed. But there had been no
open breach, and in the hope that their secret intentions were unknown the
Spartans in the year 463 BC despatched Periclidas to Athens.
That city had been rising to power and reputation
under the command of Cimon, who, for a few years, was without a rival. The
Delian confederacy was becoming more and more an Athenian empire, and after the
reduction of Naxos it was clear that Athens was resolved to keep the league
together by force. The policy was justified, at any rate, for the moment, by
the events which followed the fall of Naxos. The battles of the Eurymedon,
which took place in 466 BC, were perhaps the most overwhelming defeats ever
suffered by Persia, but unfortunately no contemporary description exists of
them.
Thucydides briefly records the fact that the Athenians
and their allies, under the command of Cimon, conquered the Persians on land
and sea at the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, and destroyed two hundred
Phoenician vessels. Later writers have a good deal more to tell, but it is
extremely doubtful whether they had any real knowledge of what they pretend to
describe. The accounts are neither very credible nor very consistent. Perhaps
we may venture to record the few details which Plutarch, who is far more cautious
than Diodorus, has given in his Life of Cimon. He tells us that after altering
the shape of the Athenian vessels so that more hoplites or heavy-armed soldiers
could be placed on board, Cimon set sail from Cnidus with two hundred triremes
to Lycia, where, with the help of the Chian contingent in his fleet, he won over the important town of Phaselis for the confederacy. Off the coast of Lycia he was informed that the Persian
fleet lay at the mouth of the Eurymedon, while a further contingent was
expected from Cyprus. Without a moment’s hesitation he attacked the fleet in
the Eurymedon, defeated it, and captured not less than two hundred vessels.
Pursuing his success he landed his troops and defeated the Persians a second
time on shore, gaining possession of the camp and an immense booty. After this
victory he went in search of the eighty ships at Cyprus. These also he
destroyed, thus annihilating the whole of the Persian fleet, and defeating any
hopes, if any had been cherished, of an invasion of Greece.
The victory of the Eurymedon brought the cities of
Caria within the Delian confederacy. It is, however, remarkable that no attempt
was made to appropriate Cyprus. That island, so important as a military post,
was allowed to remain in the hands of Phoenician princes, though Athens could
now sweep the shores on every side.
Such successes confirmed the Athenians in their
imperial policy. Soon after their return from the Eurymedon they quarreled with
the Thasians about their mines on the opposite coast, and demanded a share in
their trade with the Thracians (465 BC). They were eager to establish
themselves on the Strymon, and were jealous of the
prosperity of the island, which seemed to stand in the way of their own
ambitions. The Thasians answered by revolting from the league. Cimon was at
once sent to blockade the city, and about the same time no fewer than ten
thousand colonists, partly Athenian and partly allies, were sent to occupy the
important station of the Nine Ways on the Strymon.
Could a vigorous colony be planted there in Athenian interests, it would
greatly curtail the trade of the Thasians, and appropriate a large part of the
profits of that district. So far as the colony was concerned, however, the
project came to a most disastrous end; the warlike natives of the district were
jealous of the interference of strangers, and combined their forces for attack.
A fierce engagement took place at Drabescus, in which
the whole of the immigrants were cut down.
Nor could Thasos itself be taken without a protracted
siege. The Thasians were rich; their walls were strong; their town well
prepared for resistance. They even induced the Spartans to take up their cause
and invade Attica in order to divert the attention of the Athenians, a scheme
which only failed owing to the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. But
Cimon was not to be shaken off. After a siege of two years Thasos succumbed.
Henceforth she became a tributary ally of the Delian confederacy, or, more
precisely, a subject city of the Athenian empire (463 BC).
On his return to Athens Cimon was by no means received
with universal congratulation. In his absence the popular party had gained
ground, and among their leaders was Pericles, who now appears for the first
time in the history of Athens. At his instigation or, at any rate, with his
consent, a charge was brought forward that Cimon had failed in his duty: he
might have acquired a portion of Macedonia for Athens, had he not been bribed
by King Alexander to let the opportunity slip. The charge was, no doubt,
without foundation, and disgraceful to those who made it, but it is an
indication of the state of party spirit at Athens. The reign of Cimon was at an
end; the harmony in which parties had worked together since the expulsion of
Themistocles was at an end also. A new democracy was rising under the auspices
of Pericles, which would be satisfied with nothing less than absolute and
direct supremacy.
At this juncture came the application of the Spartans
for aid in capturing Ithome. Cimon was in favor of
sending help; Ephialtes—at this time the foremost man in the new democracy—was
against it. Cimon declared that he could not stand by and see Athens deprived
of her yoke-fellow; Ephialtes would not raise a finger to prevent the ruin of a
city which never looked with favor on democratic principles. Cimon gained the
day. He was dispatched with a force to the Peloponnesus. But Ithome was strong enough to resist even Athenian skill. The
siege lingered on, and at length the Spartans became suspicious of the
Athenians. They were conscious that they at any rate had been secret and
treacherous in concerting operations with the Thasians against the Athenians;
they were also probably aware of the opposition which had been made to their
request at Athens, and though they might have confidence in Cimon, they
distrusted his soldiers. Suavity was not a Spartan virtue; no sooner had these
suspicions arisen, than the Athenians, alone of the allies who had come to the
assistance of Sparta, were sent home in a most ungracious manner. Cimon saw
himself compelled to lead back in disgrace the army which he had with so much
difficulty persuaded the Athenians to send out. The rebuff was fatal to him and
to the Athenian friends of Sparta, and his opponents were not slow to avail
themselves of the opportunity which the failure of his policy afforded.
CHAPTER VI.
THE AREOPAGUS AND EPHIALTES.
THE next appearance of Pericles in public life, after
the attack on Cimon, is closely connected by ancient authors with the fall of
the council of the Areopagus. In concert with Ephialtes, he succeeded in
reducing that ancient council from a position of supreme authority in the state
to that of a court for the trial of murder and arson—solemn functions, which it
had long discharged, but which obviously carried with them no political
importance. The change was one of great significance in the constitutional
history of Athens, and it is said to have removed the last serious check on the
development of democracy. Pericles appears to have been the prime mover in the
work, though the measures were actually brought forward by Ephialtes.
Of the origin and history of the council we have very
uncertain information. It was a debated question even in the time of Aristotle,
whether existed before the days of Solon or not. The more probable account
seems to be, that from immemorial time cases of murder had been tried on the
sacred Hill of Ares, which lay to the north-west of the Acropolis. Here on a
bare and rugged table-land of naked stone, Ares had himself been tried for the
slaughter of his son Halirrhothius; Cephalus for the
murder of Procris; and Orestes for the murder of his mother Clytemnestra. At
this last great trial Apollo had pleaded the cause of his suppliant, and Athena
had presided in the court. Legendary as these stories are, they mark out the
Hill of Ares as an ancient place of judgment, and in this respect they are
confirmed by the little historical evidence which we possess.
In the eighth century BC the Messenians were
willing to refer their quarrel with Sparta to the decision of the Areopagus,
and in Solon’s Law of Amnesty, those men were exempted from its provisions who
had incurred the sentence of that court. The council of the Areopagus then was
an ancient place of judgment for the most serious offences which can arise in a
community. It was characteristic of Greek religious feeling to regard such a
tribunal as under the special protection of the deities, whose care it was to
see that bloodshed did not go unpunished.
The Furies, the dread spirits who moved in the
darkness of Erebus, ever ready to hear the cry of those who called upon them,
were thought to have taken up their abode in a cavern at the foot of the hill.
It was not less characteristic that the ritual observed at the trials in this
hallowed place should be of a primitive kind. The court was held in the open
air, that no one might be polluted by coming into the same chamber with the man
guilty of blood. Two rude stones, the Stone of Outrage and the Stone of
Shamelessness, were assigned to the accuser and the accused; the judges sat on
the bare rock. No mitigating circumstances could be taken into consideration;
no penalty was inflicted less than death, though the accused might avoid
execution by going into exile.
Solon seems to have availed himself of the sanctity
which surrounded this ancient judgment-seat to create a council whose powers
extended far beyond the punishment of bloodshed. He ordained that the nine archons,
who in his day were the chief executive officers of the city, should enter
after their year of office into the council of the Areopagus, and that the
court thus enlarged should be the supreme guardian of the welfare of the city.
It watched over the laws, to the end that they might be duly carried out; it
even went beyond the law in enquiring into the moral conduct of the citizens.
It punished the idle and extravagant; it weeded out from the city every noxious
growth; it was a wakeful guardian over those that slept, the like of which
could not be found in the broad island of Pelops (the Peloponnesus) or in
far-off Scythia, a land of mythical righteousness and mysterious power.
Such was Solon’s council, as Plutarch and Aeschylus
describe it to us. Of the real working of the institution we know little or
nothing. In the long period which elapsed between Solon and Pericles (one
hundred and thirty years), we only hear of the Areopagus twice; a citizen is
said to have cited Pisistratus the tyrant before the court, but when
Pisistratus appeared, in answer to the summons, the accuser thought it prudent
not to come forward. This incident, which is recorded by Aristotle, is a proof
that under the tyranny of Pisistratus the Areopagus, like all the other institutions
of Athens, was allowed to continue in existence, and also that its powers, like
those of all other public bodies, were at this time little more than nominal.
We also learn, on the same authority, that the Areopagus came forward with some
vigorous measures at the time of the Persian war, and “braced the
constitution”. What the measures were is uncertain, unless Aristotle refers to
an incident mentioned by Plutarch, who informs us that the council provided the
poorer citizens with means to pass over from Athens to Salamis, and thus
enabled the whole city to act together in offering defiance to the invader.
The political changes of Clisthenes in
509 BC were not without effect of the the Areopagus. He did not interfere directly with the council, nor with the archons
who composed it. But the creation of the board of the ten generals greatly
diminished the power of the archons as executive officers. For thirty or forty
years after this time we find great names in the list of Athenian archons, but
it is not as archons that they exercised great power. The generals were of far
more importance, especially from the time of the second Persian invasion in
480 BC. As it became less influential, the archonship became less
attractive; and the change naturally caused some alteration in the class of men
who sought the office. This was still more the case when, on the proposal of
Aristides, the archonship was thrown open to the lowest class of citizens. In
fact the archons soon became little more than a mayor and aldermen, with
special functions in the administration of law. And as ex-archons formed nearly
the whole of the council of the Areopagus, any change in the archons of
necessity produced a change in the council.
We naturally ask if such were the case why should the
council have been worth attacking; and why should the curtailment of its powers
be regarded as the turning-point in the development of democracy? The first of
these questions is more easily answered than the second. The Areopagus was
worth attacking by a democratical reformer, because
the existence of it involved two principles which democracy could not tolerate.
The members held office for life; and they were not responsible to any higher
authority for the proper discharge of their duties. As a rule, every public
officer at Athens—and members of the council were regarded as officers,—from
the highest to the lowest, held office for a year only; and at the end of the
year he was not released from responsibility till he had rendered a
satisfactory account of his office. The exception implied that there was a
power in Athens which the people could not touch;—a superior court, in which
only a part of the citizens shared. This was not the worst : in the life
tenure, and in the freedom of the members from responsibility, the council of
the Areopagus presented a striking resemblance to the Gerousia at Sparta. To
some Athenians this might be a recommendation; to Pericles and his party, who
were convinced that Sparta was the great obstacle to the final realization of
their views, it was an additional cause for dislike. These then were the
reasons why the democracy wished to remove the council. It was the last vestige
of a form of constitution which they had renounced; it was an anomaly which
stood in glaring contrast to the legislation of the last thirty years.
It is another matter, when we ask what was gained by
its removal. How could the council be said to limit the freedom of the
citizens, and impose a check on the growing spirit of democracy? Why did
aristocrats like Cimon contend for its preservation? Its authority, so far as
we know, had greatly declined; and it was not easy to make it an instrument of
aristocratical power when the archons were chosen by lot, and the members of the
fourth Solonian class could enter their names for the office. We can only reply
that our information is so defective that, for aught we know to the contrary,
the council may have exercised a great influence on social life in Athens, even
after Clisthenes. A council which had the right to make annoying enquiries
would perhaps seem more powerful than it really was, and its power must have
been most odious to those who were rising into public life. The more a man
attracted notice, the more was the Areopagus likely to have an eye upon him. Or
it may have had a large control over the administration of the law. The paid
juris of Athens were the creation of Pericles; the elaborate system of
legislation by means of the Nomothet, was certainly
not earlier than Pericles (if, indeed, it was so early). Before these came into
existence, the Areopagus may have exercised considerable power, judicial and
legal. Moreover, the mere fact that the Areopagus was attacked by Pericles, and
that its fall was succeeded by the development of the jury-courts, with which
the democracy was so closely linked, would create in later ages the impression
that its removal was the last step in the development of democracy, or, from
another point of view, that its power had been in some way a check on the democratical spirit. In any case, the later writers who
speak of the power of the Areopagus cannot have known very much about it. It
was to them an ideal; they saw in it the check which the Athenians of their own
day greatly needed; but whether the reality corresponded to their conception of
it, is more than we can say.
That the aristocratical or Spartan party at Athens
should support the Areopagus was inevitable. The council was in some respects a
distinctly oligarchical institution. Even if largely filled from the lowest
class, which is very unlikely, it was capable of being influenced by corporate
party feeling; it naturally was jealous of its power, as all corporations are;
it had great traditions. However dissatisfied aristocrats like Cimon might be
with the alterations in the Areopagus caused by the law of Aristides, they
supported it as the remnant of a constitution to which they looked back with
reverence and pride. Cimon had acquiesced in the maritime development of
Athens; he had taken a leading part in establishing the Delian confederacy; he
had not attempted to oppose the admission of all classes to office. But ill the
Areopagus he probably saw, like—Solon himself, an anchor of the state, and he
supported it with all his influence.
The attack was begun during the absence of Cimon from
Athens, and probably when he was absent assisting the Spartans at Ithome in 463. This expedition, as we have seen, had been
taken against the advice of Ephialtes, who may very well have compensated
himself for his defeat, by bringing forward measures which, as he well knew,
Cimon would oppose. And when Cimon did return, he returned in such disgrace
that the balance of power was thrown into the opposite scale.
Of Ephialtes who led the attack we only know that he
was the ‘Incorruptible’ of this period of Athenian history. Poor, active, and
fearless, he busied himself with bringing accusations against the rich who
enjoyed office. By this means he became a power in the state; he was the
People’s Friend of the new régime. As he had opposed the proposal to send
assistance to Sparta, the discourteous conduct of the Spartans in sending the
Athenians home brought him a new accession of strength. Had he not shown
himself a better judge of the situation than the great general? The Spartans
were utterly untrustworthy, as he had said, and it was impossible to be on
terms with them. In these views he had Pericles with him. The aims of Pericles
went far beyond anything of which Ephialtes was capable; but Ephialtes had made
a hit, and Pericles found in him a very useful ally.
Though Ephialtes could take advantage of the absence
of Cimon on military expeditions to bring forward his sweeping measures,
nothing could really be done so long as Cimon led the opposition. Soon after
his return from Sparta a proposal was made that there should be ostracism in
the city. No doubt the ground had been prepared; Ephialtes and Pericles had
made such progress in popular favour that they could
look forward to the popular vote with confidence. Even if the measures by which
Pericles gained his ascendancy—the payment of the juries, the distribution of
public money at festivals, and the sending out of colonies—came later his
friends had no doubt been assiduous in spreading abroad the belief that popular
measures and reform could not be carried out so long as Cimon was in Athens.
Ostracism was a device for putting an end to faction
and strife in the city. It is said to have been invented by Clisthenes, but we
find it in other cities than Athens, and we do not know where it was first
established. The people were asked in the sixth prytany of the year (a prytany is a tenth part of the Attic
year), whether it was their wish that ostracism should take place. If they
agreed, an assembly was held in the market-place in the eighth prytany, which would fall in the spring, in which they gave
their votes against any citizen they pleased by writing his name on what the
Greeks called ostraka, i.
e. on small pieces of earthenware. No name was proposed to them; no charge was
brought against anyone; each citizen wrote on his tablet the name of the man
who in his judgment was most pernicious to the peace of the community. If six
thousand votes were recorded against any one citizen, he was expected to leave
the city in ten days, and to remain beyond the borders of Attica for five or
perhaps ten years. His property was not touched; his civic rights remained unimpaired. A decree of the people could at any moment
reinstate him in his full privileges as an Athenian citizen. In the days of
Clisthenes, when a political opponent was ready to call in the power of Sparta,
ostracism might be of some value; a man against whom six thousand votes were
recorded would be proved to have little support to offer to his foreign
accomplices. But on the whole the institution contributed little to the
security or peace of Athens. As a political engine, it was nearly always,
worked for party ends, and the instance of Cimon was no exception to the rule.
No one could seriously maintain that his presence endangered the public peace,
or that Athens was better without him than with him. Ostracized he was,
and with him went the great defender of ancient institutions.
Ephialtes was now quite free to carry out his reforms,
for Cimon stood so high as the leader of his party that there was no second to
take his place. The Areopagus was at once stripped of a large portion of its
functions, and ceased to be a political power in the city. What were the
precise functions taken from it, and what was done to compensate the city for
the loss, are doubtful. One authority tells us that a number of legal cases
were removed from its jurisdiction, and in a quotation from Aristotle's
‘Constitution of Athens’ we find that even Themistocles endeavored to restrict
the judicial powers of the council. If this be true, the fall of the Areopagus
was, no doubt, closely connected with the development of the popular
jury-courts. An obscure notice informs us that the function of watching over
the laws, which was now removed from the Areopagus, was transferred to seven Nomophylakes or Guardians of the Laws, who had a seat in
the council of Five Hundred and could at once interfere if any proposal were
made which seemed to contradict the laws. But these Nomophylakes are never mentioned by any ancient author, and there may be a confusion between
them and officers of the same name who existed at Athens at the end of the
fourth century.
In this uncertainty we must suppose that the
curtailment of the Areopagus, which is so universally ascribed to Ephialtes and
Pericles, consisted in removing from it the supervision over the laws which it
had previously exercised, and in cancelling its censorial powers. Henceforth
the Areopagus was no more than a court for the trial of murder; it could not
interfere in the private life of the citizen; it had no power to prevent the
alteration of the laws. It is quite possible, as we have said, that under the
disguise of censorial supervision, the Areopagus had acquired a good deal of
judicial power in excess of what really belonged to it. If this were the case,
this power was now transferred to the law courts.
The ostracism of Cimon and the fall of the Areopagus
were great victories for the democratic party. Ephialtes was now the first
minister of Athens; and the way was clear for any reform which he and Pericles
might propose. They had the people with them, and the opposition was helpless.
The aristocratical party could only look forward to the complete overthrow of
their influence and their principles. They became desperate, and endeavored to
avert by illegitimate means, what they could no longer resist in the assembly.
Within a few years after the overthrow of the Areopagus, Ephialtes fell by the
knife of an assassin. The name of the murderer was at a later time asserted to
be Aristodicus, a native of Tanagra in Boeotia;
whoever he was, he was only a tool in the hands of a party. Those who could
never speak evil enough of Pericles asserted that he had removed from his path
an associate who had acquired an inconvenient degree of power, but this is the
mere malignity of personal hatred. It was no doubt the oligarchical party, whom
he had pestered by his prosecutions, and whose prospects he had ruined, that
secured his removal.
It is a coincidence worth mentioning that about the
time of the death of Ephialtes some members of the oligarchical party were in
treasonable correspondence with the Spartans. As Ephialtes had always been a
strong opponent of the Spartan party at Athens, those who wished to restore
Spartan influence might feel that their aims could not be realized so long as
he was in power. As a first step to efficient cooperation he must be removed.
But whoever were the immediate authors of the deed, it is satisfactory to know
that Cimon was away from Athens at the time when this murder, the first
political assassination at Athens, was committed.
Ephialtes was a ‘Radical’, as Themistocles had been
before him. Like Themistocles, he was desirous that Athens should be a naval
power; and, like him, he was extremely opposed to any union with Sparta. But
unlike Themistocles, he was free from the suspicion of bribery. And though he
fell a victim to the ferocity of party strife, he was more fortunate than
Themistocles in retaining the favor of his own adherents to the last. What his
ulterior views may have been, we cannot say. Were his democratical measures shaped like those of Themistocles with a view to an Athenian empire,
or did he also wish, like Pericles, to secure the conditions of a noble life
for every citizen of Athens? or, like later demagogues, o provide an easy
subsistence for the mob of the city? These are questions which we cannot
answer. With the assassination of Ephialtes, Pericles became the acknowledged
leader of the Athenian democracy, and he kept the position till his death. All
the measures passed in that period are his work; whether he carried out the
ideas of Ephialtes, or Ephialtes had been put forward to prepare the way for
the ideas of Pericles, it is impossible to decide.
CHAPTER VII.
THE FIRST WAR
BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA.
THE churlish and
suspicious rudeness with which the Athenian troops had been dismissed from Ithome by the Spartans created a reaction in the
feelings of the Athenians towards that city. Hitherto, in spite of the
efforts of Themistocles and others, and though various causes of
complaint had arisen, the two cities had preserved the appearance of
friendship. Even those Athenians who would have claimed the supremacy at
sea for themselves were willing to allow that the Spartans were the
rightful leaders of the Greeks on land. Harmonious action between the great
cities was the best warranty of the safety of Greece. But now the irritation
was uncontrollable, and it was decided not only to break off the alliance which
had existed since 481 B.C., but to take up a line which made it clear that
Athens was as willing to support the enemies of Sparta as she had
been to support Sparta herself.
Argos was of
course at all times hostile to Sparta. As we have seen, the city had recently
recovered a considerable degree of power, and at the same
time changes had taken place which made the democratic feeling there
stronger than ever.
Thus there were
now two bonds to draw Athens and Argos together—hatred of Sparta, and
democratic sympathies. At the moment both these feelings were almost at fever
heat at Athens, owing to the influence of Ephialtes. Under such
circumstances the events of 480 B.c. were forgotten ;
Athens and Argos became allies.
The step is
significant of the change which had taken place in Greece since the Persian
war. Then oaths had been sworn binding the patriotic
Greeks to take vengeance on those who had so foully betrayed their country
; Argos and Thessaly were outcasts from the circle of Greek cities, and Sparta
had herself undertaken an expedition to punish the Thessalians for their
conduct. Now the Athenians, to whom all the rest of the
Greeks owed their freedom, who had twice abandoned their homes, and
undergone the greatest privations in the cause of Hellas, were content to
enter into an alliance with a city which, to say the best of her, had
pursued a weak and temporising policy. But the
Athenians did not stop here. With Argos to aid them they renewed the old
alliance with Thessaly, which had existed in the time of the tyrants. They
knew by experience that Thessalian cavalry were valuable in the field,
and they could reckon on the hatred of the Thessalians for the
Spartans. In this second alliance they not only disregarded the part which
the great princes of Thessaly had played in bringing Xerxes into Greece
; they forgot the character of the Thessalian people, who were not
less treacherous than brave. In the hour of peril, as we shall see, they
had bitter reason to repent their mistake.
These proceedings
did not amount to open war with Sparta, but they were nothing less than
open preparation for war. And they were succeeded by a number of
events which made war inevitable. The years 460 and 459 B.C., during which
the two cities were nominally at peace, were years of great
military activity on the part of the Athenians. Never before did they
exhibit so plainly the strength of the city; never before was their strength
displayed in a manner so likely to rouse the suspicions of their neighbours.
The Spartans had
by this time succeeded in crushing the rebellion of the Helots. For about three
years after the dismissal of the Athenians in 463 B.C. the fortress of Ithome held out, then it capitulated, and the defenders
were allowed to depart on condition that they would never set foot in
the Peloponnesus again. The Athenians, who had recently taken
Naupactus, a town near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf, from the Ozolian Locrians, allowed
the exiles to settle there. The permission was equivalent to establishing
the deadliest enemies of Sparta in a position where they could at
any moment land on the shores which they were forbidden to tread.
The next step
aroused the wrath of a city which had formerly been on the most friendly terms
with Athens, but from henceforth became her most active enemy; a city
to whose unsleeping hatred a large part of her misfortunes were due. For
some time past the Megarians and Corinthians had quarrelled as neighbouring states in Greece were only too
apt to do. Some question of boundaries had arisen, such as centuries
before, in the time of Orsippus, had led to war
between the cities. Megara was, of course, no match for her formidable
rival ; her only hope of justice lay in an appeal to Sparta, as the
head of the confederacy to which Corinth and Megara belonged. But Sparta
would not interfere ; she was probably unwilling to incur the enmity
of Corinth, and unable to perceive what would be the inevitable
result of her inaction. She was also still affected by the panic caused by
the recent outbreak of the Helots, “ a turn for the worse ” in a long
disease which might recur at any time. The Megarians then applied to
Athens, where they found a ready reception. Nothing indeed could be more
opportune. It was the weakness of Athens that her territory could be invaded
without much difficulty from Megara; and through the territory of Megara,
along the eastern extremity of the Corinthian gulf, lay the route which
connected Peloponnesus and Bceotia. Athenian
troops were at once sent to the aid of the
Megarians and,
with their consent, garrisons were placed in the two ports of their city: in Pegae on the Corinthian gulf, and in Nisaea on the Saronic gulf. Nisaea was also connected with Megara by long walls, which were protected by
Athenian soldiers. By this measure Megara was not only brought
into close relations with the Peiraeus, but Athens practically secured a
frontier in the Megarid extending from sea to
sea, and a station for her ships on the Corinthian gulf. For a time she
had effectually blocked the way to Attica from that direction.
At the very time
that she was thus irritating her most powerful neighbours,
Athens did not hesitate to enter once more upon the conflict with
Persia. Egypt had been made a Persian province in 525 B.C.; in the
last year of Darius it had revolted, but it was quickly subdued by Xerxes,
to whom it had subsequently furnished a very large contingent of ships for
the invasion of Greece. In 465 B.C. Xerxes was murdered, and the first
years of his successor were occupied with suppressing conspiracies. A
rebellion in Bactria then carried him to the eastern edge of
his empire. To the- oppressed Egyptians an opportunity seemed to have
arrived when there was a reasonable hope of shaking off the hated yoke. Inaros, the son of Psammetichus,
the king of Libya, which formed a part of the Egyptian satrapy, seized Mareia, a Persian outpost on the south-western shore
of the Mareotic lake. He was at once joined by
the greater part of Egypt; the Persian governor was expelled ; and Inaros elected king of the country. For a short
time he remained undisturbed, but in 459 B.c. he
became aware that a vigorous attempt was about to be made to recover
Egypt. His own forces were inadequate to resist the army which was being
brought against him, and he sent to Athens for assistance.
For some years
after the decisive victories of Eurymedon the Athenians had sent out no
expeditions to the East, but at this time they had just despatched two
hundred ships to Cyprus. That island, in spite of the victories of
Pausanias and Cimon, had never been acquired by the Greeks. It formed no
part of the Delian league ; there was neither ally nor colony among
its numerous cities. It was a wealthy island, well situated for trade with
the East, and exceedingly valuable as a military station. It lay
opposite that Cilician plain which formed the rendezvous of the
Persian Empire ; it commanded the cities of Asia Minor and the mouth of the
Nile. With Egypt in revolt and the Egyptian fleet detached from
the service of the king, there was a reasonable hope of annexing the
island to the league.
But on receiving
the application of Inaros the project of acquiring
Cyprus was abandoned for the time, and the fleet was ordered to proceed to
Egypt to co-operate with the rebels. Egypt was not only the more
valuable prize of the two, a country which could at once supply vast
stores of grain, and furnish a number of brave and experienced seamen, but
the conquest of Egypt carried with it the conquest of Cyprus. The
temptation was irresistible ; the gathering clouds at home were disregarded,
and at the moment when the war with the Peloponnesians was inevitable,
Athens sent more than half her fleet to the Nile. She may have
felt that even without these ships, her position at the head of the
Delian confederacy rendered her far more than a match for any
combination which would be brought against her ; she probably
overestimated the effect of the revolt of the Helots on the Spartan state.
Whatever her views, we may observe that she would never have permitted
such a division of her forces had she intended to make any serious attack
upon Sparta. As yet, it would seem, Pericles was unable either to restrain
the Athenians from the Persian war or to concentrate their energies on the
conflict with their rival.
The situation did
not escape the watchful eye of the Corinthians. They were
encouraged to resist the next movement of the Athenians by open
force. On the coast of Argolis lay the small town of Halieis. Unimportant
in itself, the place possessed a convenient harbour,
and formed an admirable station for any power which desired to control the
navigation of the Saronic gulf. In the hands of the
Athenians Halieis would be a rival to Epidaurus
and Hermione ; and now that the Argives and Athenians
were allies, it might afford Argos some compensation for the loss of
her old trading-stations at Epidaurus and Aegina. There were other reasons
also which made the acquisition of Halieis desirable to the Athenians. The town was inhabited by the Tirynthians whom
the Argives had expelled from their ancient home; and there is reason to
suppose that it was in some connexion with
Sparta. To the Corinthians and Epidaurians nothing could be more disastrous than an Athenian settlement in this
region. Already ships were at Pegae watching the
entrance to the great western port of Corinth ; from Peiraeus and Nisaea they commanded the northern half of the Isthmus
; if they were settled at Halieis, the
Saronic gulf would be entirely in their hands. The Epidaurians were even more closely touched, as their territory lay nearer Halieis. When, therefore, the Athenians landed on the Argolic coast they were met by a combined force of
Corinthians and Epidaurians. It is certain that
the Athenians were defeated, though they afterward succeeded in gaining a
footing in the town of Troezen, a still better
station than Halieis. The defeat was overweighed
by a victory over the fleet of the enemy at Cecryphaleia,
a small island off the coast. Insignificant in themselves, these
skirmishes were not insignificant in the history of Greece. They were the
first steps in the disruption of the Hellenic league which had been formed
at the Isthmus in the autumn of 481 B.C. for the defence of Greece. For years it ’ .d been obvious that Greece was parting into two
camps, but now for the first time had hostilities b’- en out.
The next movement
was of far greater importance, opening a new scene in a drama, in which,
more vividly perhaps than elsewhere, we perceive the dire effects of neighbourly hatred and commercial rivalry among the
Greeks. Since the general pacification of 481 B.C. Athens and Aegina had
been on friendly terms, but now, owing, perhaps, to some hints
from the Corinthians, the suspicions of the Aeginetans were aroused. Were they not being surrounded by the Athenian power? Was
not their union with Athens treachery to the older
allegiance, which they owed to the Peloponnesian confederacy ? At the
present moment, with two hundred ships in Egypt, Athens could not be
a match for the combined Corinthian and Aeginetan fleets. Whatever the impulse under which she acted, Aegina now went to war
with Athens, and all the bitter feelings of the ancient feud were
once more aroused. An obstinate battle was fought off Aegina between the
fleets of the two cities. The Athenians were victorious, capturing no
fewer than seventy of the ships of the enemy. They then landed on the
island and proceeded to besiege the city. The Peloponnesians sent over a
small force to aid the Aeginetans, but it was of
no avail. Meanwhile, the Corinthians, believing that the whole force of
the Athenians was now employed, resolved to create a diversion by seizing
the passes of Mount Geraneia, which divided
Megara and Corinth, and invading the Megarian territory. But the
Athenians were equal to the occasion ; they met the Corinthians with a
force composed of their oldest and youngest men, under the command of Myronides, a general who had served in the Persian
war. The first engagement ended with doubtful success ; a second was
decisively in favour of the Athenians.
While such were
the achievements of the Athenians abroad, their proceedings at home made it
clear that they intended to secure the position they had gained. They had
already built long walls to connect the town of Megara with the port of Nisaea; they now united Athens and Peiraeus in the
same permanent manner. Of the two walls which were built, one
extended from the north-west edge of Peiraeus across the marshy ground to
the western wall of Athens, a distance of very nearly five miles. The
second ran in a direction almost due south from Athens to the eastern edge
of the harbour of Phalerum,
a distance of four miles. Such an immense work could not be carried out in
one year, and there is some reason to suppose that the walls were
begun by Cimon and brought to completion by Pericles. The object of
the walls was clear. When thus united with the sea, Athens would be
impervious to attacks by land. Even if the Peloponnesians succeeded
in passing the Megarian frontier and invading Attica, they could
inflict no damage on the city. They could lay waste the cornfields of Thria, or the olivegardens of the Cephisus ; they could consume the harvest and
carry off the cattle, but they could never separate Athens from the sea.
With the building of the walls the policy of .Athens under Pericles
became possible.
It was time for
Sparta to stir, if she wished to keep her allies round her. Her reputation
was declining; and the recent movements of Athens seemed to shut her
out from any participation in the affairs of Northern Greece. So at least
the Phocians thought, and they took advantage of
the situation to attack the communities of the Dorians who inhabited
the northern declivities of Mount Parnassus, one of whose towns they
captured. The Lacedaemonians could not allow a state which
they acknowledged as their “ mother city ” to be laid waste. Nicomedes, who was regent at the time in behalf of Plistoanax, the young son of Pausanias, was at once despatched to Phocis with a large force of Spartans
and allies. He crossed the Corinthian gulf and marched through Boeotia
into Phocis, which he quickly compelled to make such terms as
he pleased, and restore the captured town. But now a difficulty
arose. How were the Peloponnesians to return ? They had crossed the gulf
on their way out without attracting the notice of the Athenian ships
at Pegae, but they could not expect to do this a
second time. To cross Geraneia was still
more impossible, for the passes were held by Athenian troops. For the
present it seemed best to remain in Boeotia. The delay was not without
advantage. If Boeotia could be raised from the degradation into which
it had sunk after the battle of Plataea, and made a solid power, it would
form an excellent counterpoise to Athens. The natural centre of the country was, of course, Thebes. In 480 B.C. that city had been
governed by one or two powerful families, who had been instrumental in
bringing the Persians into Boeotia. After the battle of Plataea the
leaders of these families had been executed or expelled, but, so far
as we can make out, an oligarchy still continued at the head of affairs. This
oligarchy the Lacedaemonians now attempted to make the ruling power
in Boeotia, by bringing the smaller allies into a sort of dependent
alliance with Thebes. And this was not the only result of their stay in Boeotia. The
present policy of Athens, external and domestic, was not approved by all the
citizens. The limitation of the powers of the Areopagus, the constant
prosecutions of Ephialtes, had roused the fiercest passions of the
oligarchs. They would gladly have seen some check placed upon the development
of the demos, which now, as in the days of Clisthenes, seemed to be
carried to victory on a wave of enthusiasm. More especially they
were opposed to the building of the long walls, which implied a
complete change from Athens as the head of Attica to Athens as a trading
city, relying wholly on her fleet. They foresaw that a union of the
port and town would give a new accession of strength to the rabble of
artisans and sailors. Their influence was no doubt far less in the
Peiraeus than in the city, as it was far less in the city than in
the country. With these views they entered into negotiations with the
Spartans in order to secure their assistance. The negotiations could be
carried on the more readily as the Spartans were now at Tanagra, a town in
the extreme south of Boeotia, and on the borders of Attica.
Pericles and his
friends became alarmed. They were aware of the treachery in the city and
resolved to attack the enemy before it went further. They called upon
the Argives for one thousand heavyarmed soldiers, and
on the Thessalians for a troop of horse. Help came from other cities also,
and the whole available force of the city was put in the field. The
battle was hotly contested, but ended in favour of
the Spartans. The result was largely due to the treachery of the Thessalians,
who went over to the enemy in the midst of the engagement, thus depriving
Athens of the assistance which was specially needed
against the excellent cavalry of the Boeotians. The Lacedaemonians were now at
liberty to return home by land. They marched through Megara and the
Isthmus, laying waste the country as they went, and on their return they
suspended a golden shield in front of the temple at Olympia as
a thank-offering for their victory (457 B.C.).
At last the fatal
event had happened: Sparta and Athens had come to blows. The result
was partly due to the action of the oligarchs at Athens, who wished
to call in the aid of Sparta to their own support; partly to the desire to
cut off the Spartan army before it could return home. The battle
of Tanagra was the first occasion on which the Spartans and Athenians
had been in conflict since the time when Cleomenes led his forces—sixty years before— to Athens to expel Clisthenes; it was a
step in that fatal progress which soon divided Greece into oligarchical
and democratical parties, each eager to
pull down the other, let the result be what it might.
The victory cannot
have been very decisive, or the Spartans would have been able to support their
party at Athens and hinder the building of the walls. At any rate,
they made no other use of it than to convey their troops safely home.
Whether Boeotia was secure from any further attack on the part of
Athens, they did not enquire. Yet it was pretty clear that
a territory lying between Phocis and Attica, both of which countries
were at the time bitterly hostile to Sparta, was in some danger. The
result of their carelessness was soon apparent. Sixty-two days after
the battle of Tanagra the Athenian forces were again in Bceotia under the command of Myronides. The
battle took place at Oenophyta, not far
from Tanagra, and ended in a most decisive victory for the Athenians.
All Bceotia was now at their feet.
They demolished the walls of Tanagra and reduced the country to the
condition of a subject ally. At the same time Phocis passed into the
Athenian alliance, while the Locrians of Opus,
who may have fought in the allied army against Athens, were kept in
submission by the surrender of one hundred of their richest citizens (456
B.C.).
Not long
afterwards the Aiginetans, who had been closely
besieged since their great defeat nearly two years before, came to terms.
They surrendered their ships, dismantled their walls, and agreed to pay
tribute to Athens as members of the Delian league. This was a serious loss
to the Peloponnesian confederacy. If the Aeginetan fleet was not so large as the Corinthian, and this is doubtful, the Aeginetans were the better and braver sailors. The
prize of valour had been awarded to them at
Salamis ; their ships were known from Palestine to Campania ; their
trade penetrated the remotest valleys of Arcadia. The helpless
condition of the Peloponnesians in the face of vigorous action was never
more plainly demonstrated than by the loss of Boeotia and Aegina; never
was the selfish policy of Sparta placed in a clearer light. Bitter,
indeed, must have been the vexation of Corinth when she saw the Athenians not
only established on the coast of Argolis and in possession of the ports of
Megara, but also masters of new resources by land and sea.
It was a proud
moment for Athens. On land she controlled continental Hellas from the Pass of
Thermopylae to the Isthmus. Phocis and Megara were willing allies; Boeotia
and Locris were subject to her power. At home the long walls secured her
from attack. In the Peloponnesus, Argos was her ally ; she had
planted a foot in the north-east coast of Argolis, and was on friendly terms
with Achaea. Near the mouth of the Corinthian gulf she held Naupactus. On
sea she was without a rival. The Delian confederacy, which was rapidly becoming
the Athenian empire, extended from Byzantium to Phaselis,
from Miletus to Euboea. Aegina, her old rival, was humbled, and Athenian
fleets swept the shores of the Peloponnesus at pleasure. The Spartans, the only
power now capable of vigorous opposition, were little better than
caged wolves.
On the internal
politics of Athens the battle of Tanagra had a very important effect. When
the Athenian army was in Boeotia, Cimon appeared before the generals and
begged permission to take his place among the soldiers of his tribe. He
was known to be a firm friend of the Lacedaemonians, and he wished to
prove that his friendship did not extend to enemies in the field. But the
generals refused ; there was no place for an ostracised citizen in the Athenian army any more than on Athenian soil. Thus
repulsed, Cimon adjured those of his followers who were most suspected of
sympathy with Lacedaemonians to clear his name from every stain of treachery.
They responded to the appeal, and, faithful even unto death, fell on the
battle-field to the number of a hundred. Such a proof of
patriotism could not be denied or ignored. Pericles, who was himself
present at the battle, brought forward a proposal for cancelling the decree of
ostracism which had been pronounced four years previously, and Cimon
was allowed to return to Athens.
Meanwhile, a cloud
was gathering in the East. The great expedition which had been sent out to
the assistance of Inaros had at first met with
considerable success. Even before it arrived, Inaros had defeated the large army which Artaxerxes had sent against him,
under the command of Achaemenes, and had slain Achaemenes with his own
hand. The battle-field of Papremis on the Sebennytic
arm of the Nile was one of the most famous scenes of
Persian disaster. When the Athenian fleet of two hundred triremes
sailed up from Cyprus it had no difficulty in defeating the Persian fleet
of eighty ships which defended the mouths of the Nile. It ascended
the river as far as Memphis and captured two-thirds of that city. But
here their success came to an end. The “ White Fortress,” which formed the
stronghold of the town, was able to resist their utmost efforts, and the
revolution received a serious check.
Artaxerxes was
quickly informed of the defeat and death of Achaemenes. New preparations
were arranged, for at any risk it was necessary to recover Egypt. Not
less than two years (459-457 b.c.) seemed to have been consumed in getting together a force which should make
successful resistance impossible. In the interim Megabazus,
a distinguished Persian, was sent to Sparta with a sum of money in the
hope that some diversion could be created which would draw the Athenian
forces from Egypt. The Spartans were willing enough to take the
money, but no active measures followed, and Megabazus soon returned with the remainder of his treasure to Persia.
In the year 457
B.C. Megabyzus, the son of that Zopyrus, whose devotion had recovered Babylon
for Darius, marched from Susa to Cilicia, where the forces which he
was to command were assembled. He spent no less than a year in practising and drilling his troops, and it was not till the
beginning of 455 B.C. that he marched upon Memphis.
The appearance of
such a vast armament—the fleet amounted to three hundred triremes—was
calculated to fill the Eastern Mediterranean with terror. In spite of the
crushing defeats of the Eurymedon ten years before, and the overthrow of
Achaemenes at Papremis, Persia could put forth a
power which it seemed impossible to resist. The day of vengeance was come
at last, and the cities of the coasts and islands would be exposed to the
fury of the Phoenician fleet. We may imagine how great was the alarm,
when the news came that Megabyzus had utterly defeated Inaros and the Athenians, and had shut them up in Prosopitis,
an island formed by two converging arms of the Nile, and a canal which
connected them. It was about this time that the chest of the Delian league
was transferred from Delos to Athens; a change proposed by the Samians.
The only reason given for this change by any ancient author is that
found in Justin, who tells us that the Athenians removed the money from
Delos lest it should become a prey to the Lacedaemonians, who were
abandoning the alliance. It is possible to connect this statement with the
mission of Megabyzus to Lacedaemon. But the Samians would
certainly be aware of the danger in the East, and it is not improbable
that this was the immediate cause of their proposal.
The investment of Prosopitis by Persian troops continued for a year and six
months. Weary of the delay, Megabyzus then drained the canal, at the
base of the island, upon which the Athenians burnt their ships, in order
to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Persians. The
Persian army could now march dry-shod into the “ island ; ” and after
a severe resistance it was conquered. Inaros and
a number of Athenians escaped to Byblus, but
Megabyzus induced them to capitulate by guaranteeing to Inaros his life, and to the Greeks an unmolested return. The Greeks
marched through Libya to Cyrene, whence they returned home, “ few out
of many.” Inaros was conveyed to Susa, and in
spite of the pledges of Megabyzus was crucified at the instance of Amestris, the cruel widow of Xerxes, whose daughter
Achaemenes had married.
The disasters of
the Athenians were not yet ended. After the capture of Prosopitis,
and in ignorance of the event, a squadron of fifty triremes sailed
into the Mendesian arm of the Nile. Here they
were immediately attacked by land and sea, and the larger part was
destroyed.
So after six years
ended the great expedition of the Athenians to Egypt. It was the most
severe disaster which had overtaken Athens ; the first failure in a long
series of successes against Persia. To most men the catastrophe would
appear an unmixed evil, but Pericles might reflect that such a
severe lesson would teach the Athenians not to waste their strength on
distant expeditions; and that the transference of the chest from Delos to
Athens would in the end prove an ample compensation for the terrible
reverse which had fallen on his city.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE LAST YEARS OF
CIMON.
PLUTARCH found
among his authorities a story that Pericles had made it a condition of Cimon’s
return to Athens, that he should himself be left undisturbed in the
control of the domestic policy of the city, while Cimon led out the fleet
against Persia. Whether this story is true or not, it is a fact that Cimon
took little or no part in the “ Hellenic war” after his return.
In the years which
immediately follow the conquest of Boeotia, we hear of two expeditions against
the Peloponnesus. In 456 B.C. a fleet was sent round the peninsula under
the command of Tolmides, a general who, like Myronides, had distinguished himself in the Persian
war. He burned the dockyards of the Lacedaemonians at Gytheum,
attacked and captured Chaicis, a Corinthian
colony near the mouth of the Evenus, outside the
entrance to the Gulf of Corinth, and carried the Athenian arms with success
into the territory of Sicyon. A short time afterwards (453 B.C. ?)
Pericles was again in the territory of Sicyon, and again the inhabitants were
defeated, but no lasting settlement was effected. In the same expedition
Pericles attempted to gain possession of Oeniadae, a
city in Acarnania, lying in the lakes near the mouth of the Achelous, but
without success. We hear nothing of the details of these campaigns,
though they were famous in their day, and created a great impression in
Greece, but we see that Athens is now endeavouring to obtain the complete control of the Corinthian gulf, as she
had obtained the control of the Saronic gulf. The attacks on Sicyon
were no doubt made with the intention of rendering it impossible for a
Peloponnesian army to cross from Sicyon to the opposite shore, as the
Spartans had done in their invasion of Phocis in 457 B.C. It was useless
to guard the passes of Geraneia if Spartan
troops could be conveyed from Sicyon to Creusis.
These attempts
were not rewarded with encouraging success, and in the north of Greece Athens
met with a definite repulse. At Tanagra, as we have seen, the Thessalian
cavalry went over to the enemy. The truth was that the common people of
Thessaly were always on the side of the Athenians, whom they regarded
as the champions of liberty, and the great family of the Aleuadae also thought it worth while to cultivate their alliance. But the nobles and knights of Thessaly—the
class between the dominant family and the subjects—were more inclined to
Sparta than to Athens. This middle class was in the ascendant, as we may
see from an incident which occurred at this time. Orestes, the son of Echecratidas, the king of Thessaly, was expelled from
Pharsalus. He appealed to Athens for help. The application came when the
Egyptian expedition was either destroyed or in a hopeless condition ;
yet the Athenians sent a force of Boeotians and Phocians under Myronides, the hero of Oenophyta,
to restore Orestes. Nothing was effected. The forces
reached Pharsalus, but they failed to take the city, and so annoying
were the attacks of the Thessalian horse, that they could not venture far
from their camp. In a short time they returned home bringing
Orestes with them. All hope of acquiring influence in Thessaly was at an
end.
Meanwhile matters
were going from bad to worse in Egypt. When the crash came, the
Athenians must have felt that the situation was grave (453 B.C. ? ).
What use would Persia make of her great success? Would she assume the
offensive and endeavour to recover what she had lost
at the Eurymedon, or perhaps to avenge the defeat of Salamis ? What would
the feeling of the allies be? Would they regard the defeat of the
Athenians in Egypt as an indication of declining power? The expenses
of the war with Egypt had compelled Athens to impose heavier contributions
on the subject cities, and symptoms of the discontent, which was soon
to break out on the Asiatic coast, may have shewn themselves.
If she was to retain her hold on the Delian confederacy, it was necessary
for her to appear once more in the East with an imposing force.
There must also
have been considerable distress at home. The constant service harassed the
hoplite class and the loss of men was very great. It may have been
with the combined intention of stilling discontent, and securing the power
of Athens, that Pericles began, about this time, to send out a
number of colonies. In 453 B.C. Pericles himself took one thousand
colonists to the Chersonesus, which he secured once
more from the attacks of the barbarians on the north. In the same year Tolmides conducted another thousand to Euboea, where
already no fewer than four thousand Athenians possessed plots
of land. And not long afterwards a large number were settled in
Naxos. These colonists were of the class known as “ cleruchs ” or lot-holders. They did not cease to be citizens of Athens, many of
them perhaps never left the city, but they were provided with plots
of land at the expense of the subject or conquered countries. If the
colonists left Athens their presence ensured the obedience and loyalty
of the regions in which they were planted ; and those who chose to
remain at home, living on the produce of their lots, were perhaps by this
means qualified to bear the expenses which fell on the
heavy-armed soldier.
Under such
circumstances, peace with Sparta was almost a necessity for Athens. What forces
she had must be devoted to the recovery of prestige in the East, on
which the very life of the Delian league was largely dependent. The great
commander, whose name would inspire confidence among the allies,
was still in the city, and, in spite of the repulse of 463
B.C., Cimon was on friendly terms with Sparta ; a grata persona, through
whom negotiations could be opened. By his intervention a truce was
concluded between the two cities for five years. The shortness of
the time proves that neither side looked on the present situation as
tenable. But the Spartans were irritated and discouraged by the naval
expeditions which harassed their coasts, and owing to the loss of Aegina and
the humiliation of Corinth, the fleet of the confederacy was seriously damaged.
To us it seems almost ludicrous that two belligerent cities
should make a peace which was obviously nothing more than a breathing
space in which to prepare for the renewal of hostilities on more favourable terms. But in Grecian politics such
arrangements were common. It is even stated, though perhaps without
sufficient authority, that after the battle of Tanagra
Athens succeeded in obtaining a truce for four months from Sparta, in
order that she might recover from the blow which had fallen upon her,—and
reassert her superiority over Boeotia!
When it was known
at Argos that Athens had entered, or was about to enter, into a truce
with Sparta, it became necessary to reconsider the situation. If Argos
remained unprotected, and Sparta was freed from the fear of attack from
Athens, she might have reason to expect the worst. The work of the
last ten or fifteen years, during which she had slowly consolidated her
power, might be undone in a single battle. Moreover, she had gained
nothing by her alliance with Athens. That city, it was clear, sought
her own advantage, and not the advantage of Argos. Under such
circumstances it seemed prudent to enter into negotiations with Sparta.
In 481 B.C. Argos had proposed a peace for thirty years ; she now
renewed the offer. Sparta accepted it. Knowing that the truce with Athens
was nothing more than a cessation of hostilities, it would be
an advantage to be secure on the side of Argos, when the war broke
out again. A peace was concluded between the two cities ; and in spite of
the subsequent commotions which shook Hellas, it ran out to the full term,
coming to a close in 421 B.C.
When affairs had
been settled at home, the Athenians prepared a new expedition to the East.
Cyprus was once more the object of attack, and Cimon was the commander. It
was now more necessary than ever to hold a station which should command
Cilicia and Egypt. In the spring of 449 B.C. a fleet of two hundred
ships, supplied by Athens and her allies, was sent out. Sixty ships were
detached for the assistance of Amyrtaeus, who, even
after the annihilation of the forces of Inaros,
could bid defiance to Persia in the impenetrable swamps of the Delta. With
the remaining one hundred and forty Cimon sailed to Mareion, on the west coast of Cyprus, whence he passed
along the south shore and laid siege to Citium,
which was at this time governed by a Phoenician prince. The city was
defended with the stubborn spirit which has made the sieges of Phoenician
cities so famous in military annals. Ere long the Athenian fleet began to
suffer from famine, and, to increase the misfortune, their great
commander fell sick and died. On his death-bed he is said to have
given orders for the besieging forces to retire and conceal the news of his
death. But retirement was impossible ; a Phoenician fleet had already
appeared on the north coast of Cyprus ; to refuse an engagement would
imply the cession of the Eastern Mediterranean. In spite of the weakness
created by famine and the loss of their leader, the Athenians put to
sea and sailed upon the enemy. The battle took place off Salamis, and
ended in a complete victory for Athens. The defeated Phoenician vessels
fled to the shore, where the army was drawn up to protect them, but
the Athenians followed close, disembarked and defeated the army no less
than the fleet. Thus the achievement of the Eurymedon was
repeated, and Athens once more proved her immense superiority over the
Persian power. On its return home the fleet was rejoined by the ships from
Egypt, which do not appear to have rendered any efficient service to Amyrtzeus. Cimon’s corpse was brought to Athens and
buried in the sepulchre of the Philaidze, outside the Melitian gate of Athens.
The balance was
once more in favour of Hellas in the East, but the
success was far from complete, and it had been purchased at severe cost.
The Phoenician fleet had been defeated, but Cyprus was as far as ever from
being annexed to the Delian league. The island remained a dependency of
Persia ; Persian troops could land on it; Phoenician princes ruled
in most of the cities. Hellenes and Hellenism had but a precarious
footing. The coveted post, from which Greece could have thwarted the
embarkation of troops from the Cilician plain and held the Phoenician and
Egyptian fleets in check, passed from henceforth out of the grasp of
Athenian generals.
And Cimon was
dead. The great commander, who for nearly thirty years had led the allies to
victory, would lead them no more. We first hear of him in 480 B.C. as
an Athenian knight, cheerfully hanging up his bridle in the temple of
Athena, in recognition of the change which made it imperative for
every Athenian to fight on board ship, as Themistocles demanded. From 478
B.C., when Xanthippus the hero of Mycale
disappears from sight, Cimon is associated with Aristides in the command
of the fleet. With him he founded the Delian confederacy. From
this time forward he was the life and soul of every military undertaking ;
it was he who secured the Thracian coast for Athens ; it was he who quelled
the revolt of Thasos ; it was he who inflicted the terrific defeat of
Eurymedon on the Persian army and fleet. Even after his death his name
seems to have inspired victory. He was the greatest seaman Athens
ever knew—the Nelson of his time.
His manners and
character were those of a soldier. Tall in stature, with hair curling close to
his head, and winning eyes, he was a well-known sight in Athens. His
accomplishments made him a welcome guest at every social gathering ; a
song from Cimon was remembered by those who heard it, while
others listened attentively to the stories which he could tell
in abundance of his military life and experiences. His wealth was
great and his liberality unbounded. At times indeed his profusion was such
that his enemies accused him of seeking to win the people by unworthy
means. He would command his well-clad servants to exchange garments with
aged beggars, or he would remove the fences which protected
his gardens and orchards, bidding all who passed take what they
chose. Or he would squander small coin among those who were willing to
pick it up. But he also applied his wealth to nobler uses. He
adorned the city with the spoils taken from the enemy ;
the market-place was planted with trees, to afford the shade so
grateful in the fierce heat of summer ; the Academy was irrigated and laid
out with clear racing courses and pleasant walks ; the foundations for
the walls which connected Athens and the harbour were begun. The Acropolis was prepared for a new temple; and Pheidias
was employed to erect the great bronze statue of Athena, whose bright spear could
be seen even by the mariners off Sunium.
Two charges have
been brought against Cimon. It is said that he hunted Themistocles out of
Athens, thus depriving the city of her greatest man, and that he
prevented the destruction of Sparta at the moment when destruction was
possible. The charges are not without foundation, though there is much
to say on the other side. Cimon and Themistocles were opponents ; and
Cimon was the winner. But we may observe that Themistocles was never employed as
a general in the field after 480 B.C., and though he served Athens in
other ways, he did so at the cost of provoking the animosity of Sparta.
Whether Themistocles would have succeeded as well as Cimon and
Aristides in organising the Delian league,
is open to question. It was doubtless a grievous misfortune for Athens
that she could not retain Themistocles, but the blame of the expulsion may
have been due to his own conduct not less than the jealousy of his
enemies. That Cimon persuaded the Athenians to send help to the Spartans
at a moment when it would perhaps have been possible to destroy their
power by supporting the Helots is undeniable. He was always the firm
friend of Sparta ; he never accepted the doctrine that Athens and Sparta
could not work together; and under his management they probably would
have worked together. Co-operation on the lines of Pericles and
Themistocles was impossible ; to both of these statesmen Athens was
an imperial city, and Sparta a rival who must be crushed. To speak of
them as Pan-Hellenes is a mistake ; they were Pan-Athenians. But Cimon
was sincerely Pan-Hellenic, so far as any Greek could be so. He knew
that the loss of Sparta would be an irreparable loss to the Hellenic name.
He wished to see the two great cities of Greece drawing together in
harmony, at peace at home, and united in making war on Persia. With his
death all hope of continuing that war, and all hope of lasting peace
between Athens and Sparta came to an end.
CHAPTER X PEACE
AND THE SECOND WAR WITH SPARTA
The death of Cimon marks an epoch in the history of Athens. He was the last of
the great generals who thought it the mission of Hellas to be at war with
Persia. With him closed the generation of the “ Heroes of Marathon.”
For the next fifty years Greece is occupied with the duel between Athens
and Sparta; and it is only when this disastrous episode comes to an
end with the fall of Athens that the traditional policy is resumed by
Agesilaus, the king of Sparta. Cimon was also the last leader of his
party, who led it as a soldier rather than as a statesman. Those who came
after him had other views, and other means of carrying them out. The
soldier and the politician began to diverge. In this respect the aristocratical
party suffered even more than their opponents. Pericles, if not a great,
was a respectable general, as generals 118 went in Greece; Cleon
rendered his country one important service; Alcibiades, if we may
count him among the democrats, was probably the greatest military
genius of his time. But, with the exception of Nicias, the aristocrats
hardly possessed a man after Cimon, who by his success in the field
could add to the power of his party at home.
Pericles was now
the foremost man in Athens, but he was not yet without opponents. A
few years had still to elapse before he could win that undisputed
mastership of the city, which he held when at the height of his influence
; and they were years full of events. The truce with Sparta
had hardly been concluded when troubles broke out at Miletus. That
city was famous of old for its factions, though for the last century,
partly owing to a better government, and partly to the
disastrous Persian conquests which merged party quarrels in submission to
a master, we hear little of them. On the reception of Miletus into the
Delian league, the oligarchical section were in power, and the
Athenians made no attempt to introduce a change. The reception probably
took place very soon after the battle of Mycale (479 B.C.), when the
democratic spirit was by no means strong enough at Athens to require
a similarity of political views in allied states. The victories of
the Persians in Egypt may have altered the sentiments of the Milesian
oligarchs, and inclined them to closer union with Persia. Or the
growing democratical spirit at Athens may have
induced the “ demos ” at Miletus to put forward new claims.
Whatever the
cause, about 450 B.C. the oligarchs attacked the people, and renounced their
connection with the Delian league. The people, of course, appealed to
Athens; the oligarchs sought aid from Persia. It became necessary for the
Athenians to interfere. -The government of Miletus was reconstructed in
the interests of the people, and an Athenian garrison was placed in the
city for their protection. Five Athenians were chosen to administer the
affairs of the city, and all suits at law for the value of more than one
hundred minae (about ,£335) were to be brought
to Athens for decision. We may observe that this last provision is an
indication of that development of the law courts which became so marked a
feature of Athenian democracy.
Similar
disturbances took place at Erythrm and at Colophon,
and similar measures were taken to restore order. The decree by which the
constitution of Erythrm was reorganised has come down to us, and parts of it may still be read. The document is
interesting, for it was doubtless framed either by Pericles or under his
influence. It expresses the Periclean views of the best and safest form of
government for an independent state in the interest of Athens. Erythrae was to be ruled by a senate consisting of
one hundred and twenty members, chosen yearly by lot. No citizen could
offer himself for election if less than thirty years of age. From the
senators when elected an oath was required under the most solemn
sanctions: “To the best of my power I will advise what is lawful and good
for the people of Erythrae, the Athenians, and
the allies. I will not revolt from the people of Athens and their allies,
or help others to do so ; I will not go over to the enemy, or help
others to do so ; I will not receive an exile or help others to do so, nor
any of those who have taken refuge with the Medes, without
the sanction of the Athenians and the state. I will not put any Erythraean to death without the sanction of the
Athenians and the state. If any citizen slay another, he shall be put to death
; and if any citizen sin against the gods, he shall be put to death ;
if anyone offend against the alliance he shall be banished, and his
property shall be given to the Erythraeans. If
anyone is convicted of betraying the city of Erythrae to tyrants, he shall be put to death, and his children also.” The Erythraeans were to send victims of not less value
than three minae to the Panathenaea, and, in return, each Erythraean was allowed to have a portion of the sacrificial food, not exceeding a
drachma in value . A further oath bound the citizens of Erythrae to be faithful to the Athenians and the allies.
There were also regulations about the government of Erythrae,
and the duties of the officers or “ overseers ” whom Athens sent to
the city, but owing to the imperfect state of the inscription we cannot
read what these were.
In these
regulations we see that Athens identified herself with the confederacy:
treachery to the alliance was treachery to her. And she did not
hesitate to plant garrisons of Athenian soldiers in the citadels of
allied cities, if the step seemed necessary to secure their allegiance, or
to reduce them to the condition of subject cities by claiming the
sovereignty in their administration of law. Naxos and Thasos,
Miletus and Erythrae, were no longer
confederates on equal terms, but on compulsion ; their contributions
went to swell a fund which made resistance on their part more and
more impossible. Even more significant were the results of the
transference of the chest from Delos to Athens. The old Ionian place of
gathering was no longer the centre of the
confederacy; to Athena and not to Apollo were dues paid and
victims brought. The whole administration of the league and its funds
was conducted at Athens, and perhaps by this time by Athenians. At Athens,
too, the more important law-suits of the confederates were decided.
By common consent
all operations against Persia were discontinued after the death of Cimon.
Neither Pericles nor his opponents cared to renew the war. But the
Athenian sailors and soldiers remembered how Cimon had led them to
victory, and the sailors and soldiers were an important element in the
state. Pericles could not fail to perceive the importance of securing
their good-will. Hitherto they had probably been inclined to take sides with
the party to which Cimon belonged, in spite of the
democratic measures of Pericles. But now that their great commander
was dead, they were no longer carried away by the enthusiasm of the
soldier for his general, an enthusiasm against which a merely political leader
is powerless. A slight impetus might bring them round to the side which
had made them a
Our knowledge of
the colony at Brea is due to the fortunate accident which has preserved the
decree under which the colony was sent out. But for this we should
know nothing beyond the mere fact that the Athenians had sent out a colony
to Brea— a sufficient proof, if the proof were needed, that our
knowledge of this period is scanty and uncertain to the last degree. From the
decree we learn that ten commissioners (Geonomi,
“ dividers of land ”) were to divide the land among the colonists. Democlides, the author of the decree, was chosen to be
the founder of the colony, with full powers. All the temples and sacred
precincts already existing on the site were to be carefully
preserved, but no new ones were to be provided. The colonists were to
send a bull and two sheep to the Panathenrea, and
an emblem to the festival of Dionysus.
The merchants of
Athens had long carried on a trade in corn with the ports of the Black Sea,
where the innumerable colonies which Miletus had planted were so many
stations for shipping the products of the interior to Greece. And if it be
true that Aristides died in the Pontus, the expedition of Pericles was not
the first which the Athenians had undertaken in that direction. But it was
probably the first time that an Athenian general had appeared beyond
the Bosphorus with an imposing force. The
immediate cause of the expedition seems to have been an application from
the inhabitants of Sinope for aid against their “tyrant,” Timesilaus. This “tyrant” was, no doubt, an officer
representing the Persian power in the city, and any attempt to expel him
was equivalent to an attack on the Persian king. This did not prevent
Pericles from taking the allied fleet into the Black Sea, or from leaving Lamachus behind with thirteen ships to aid the
citizens of Sinope, who, with this reinforcement, succeeded in driving out Timesilaus. Six hundred Athenians were afterwards
sent to the city to occupy the lands and houses of the tyrant and his
party. This is the only specific act which is recorded of the expedition,
though Plutarch tells us, in a vague manner, that Pericles settled
all the petitions which the Greek cities brought to him, and
exhibited to the barbarian princes and potentates around the greatness of his
power and the confidence with which his fleet sailed wherever they chose,
and subjugated every sea to themselves. The barbarian princes and
potentates would be Teres, the king of the Odrysians, whose dominion
extended from the Hebrus to the Danube, and his
son-in-law and neighbour beyond the Danube, Ariapeithes, king of Scythia, both princes of great vigour and capacity. The Greek cities on the western
shore of the Pontus paid tribute to Teres, and those on the northern
were of course the neighbours of the Scythians.
It was of great importance that these princes should be on good terms
with the Greeks, and a timely display of force was likely enough to
impress them with a sense of the power which, if need were, could come to
the aid of the Greek colonies. But even in the Greek cities there
were potentates. In Panticapaeum, the most
important trading station in the Pontus, a family was ruling which claimed
descent from Archaeanax, the ancient king of
Lesbos. It is quite possible that Pericles entered into friendly
relations with a city from which more corn was exported than from any
other, for at a time when the granaries of Egypt were passing into the
hands of the Persians, such a step would be especially opportune.
Whether the connexion was due to Pericles or
not, we find, in the fourth century, the princes of the Cimmerian Bosphorus making presents of corn to Athens,
and treating the city with the greatest respect and consideration.
This was perhaps
the most lasting gain of the great expedition. Sinope, if relieved for the
time, fell back under the dominion of Persia. And we have no certain
evidence that the Athenians established themselves at any other point. It is
true that we afterwards find them in possession of Nymphaeum, a port a
little to the south of Panticapaeum, and that twenty years
later than this expedition, they hold a post at Chrysopolis,
at which they taxed the corn ships on their way from the Pontus. There is,
however, no proof that we ought to connect these establishments with
the voyage of Pericles.
Meanwhile, in
spite of the peace, events were taking place which showed that Sparta and
Athens were still rivals for the supremacy in Greece. In <448 B.C. the Phocians made an attempt to secure possession of the
temple at Delphi. The shrine lay in their territory, and they had long regarded
it as wrongfully taken from them. Relying, perhaps, on the power of
Athens in Northern Greece, they now seized it for themselves. The
Delphians appealed to Sparta, who at once responded. Troops were once
more sent across the bay of Corinth, and Delphi was restored to the
Delphians. In return for the timely assistance the Lacedaemonians received
the right of consulting the oracle first, and their name
was inscribed on the front of the great bronze wolf, which stood near
the principal altar at Delphi. No sooner had the Lacedaemonians departed
than Pericles marched to Delphi at the head of a force of Athenians and
gave the temple once more to the Phocians. The honour of first consultation was now given to the
Athenians, and their name appeared on the right side of the bronze wolf.
Thus were Athens and Sparta written up as competitors at the
most central shrine of Hellas. These events were known as the “
Sacred War.” For the moment no result followed; but it was now plain to
Northern Greece that in any revolt against Athens they could
reckon on the support of Sparta.
It was not long
ere the revolt came. While we hear of distant expeditions and colonies on the
part of Athens, nothing is recorded of any measures by which her
authority was secured in Bceotia. That authority
rested on the presence of a democracy in the various states, a democracy
which was resolved that Bceotia should ''ot be subject to Thebes, even
The battle of Coronea was probably fought in the spring of 446 B.C. The
summer had even worse news to bring. The island of Euboea had formed
a part of the Delian confederacy from the first; for more than thirty
years it had been the faithful ally of Athens, and for two generations
Athenian citizens had been settled as colonists in it. But the
oligarchs of Bceotia appear to have been able to
inspire the oligarchs of Euboea—the remnant of the old proprietors who had
suffered heavily at the hands of Athens—with their own courage and hope.
What if Euboea also could shake off the yoke of the conqueror? The moment
seemed favourable now that all Northern Greece
was independent. Sparta would doubtless support the attempt ; perhaps she
had already pledged herself to do so. For the five years’ truce was on the
point of expiration ; and even if it had not expired, the Spartans were
not over-scrupulous about agreements, when it was possible to make an effective
attack on the enemy. So Euboea revolted. Her action was part of a
wider plan. No sooner had Pericles crossed over to the island than
Megara threw off her allegiance ; the Athenian garrison was partly cut
down, and partly compelled to take refuge in Nissea.
And when the way over the Isthmus, was thus opened the
Spartans hastened to take advantage of it. Plistoanax,
the youthful king of Lacedtemon, invaded Attica
with a Peloponnesian force. Thus was Athens surrounded on every side;
and a combined attack on the city seemed inevitable.
Athens had no army
to put in the field which could for a moment stand against the enemy, if
they had time to unite. Pericles saw where the danger lay, and also
how it was to be met. He returned in haste from Euboea, which, owing to
his command of ships, he had pretty much at his mercy, to Attica. The
Peloponnesian army was already on the Thri-asian plain near Eleusis, and had begun to devastate the country, when suddenly,
without any apparent reason, before even meeting with the
Athenian troops, it returned home. In the minds of the Spartans there
could be but one solution of the strange event: their king and his
adviser, Cleandri-das, must have been bribed to leave
Attica. The suspicion was probably correct; Pericles hiijaself refused
to account publicly for all the money which passed through his hands as
general; he merely announced that he had spent a large sum on “ a necessary
purpose.” This necessary purpose was supposed to be the retreat of the
Peloponnesian army from Attica. The Spartans fined their king on his
return, 9
and as he was
unable to pay the sum, he fled in fear for his life to the temple of Zeus Lycseus in Arcadia, where for the next nineteen years
he remained in a dwelling so constructed that he could at any moment
retire into the temple of the god. The throne passed to his son Pausanias,
who was still a child. Cleandridas did not even
venture to return to Sparta; in his absence he was condemned and his
property confiscated ; we hear of him subsequently at Thurii, and
his famous son, Gylippus, was the saviour of Syracuse.
Pericles was now
able to return to Eubcea. He took over a force of
fifty triremes and five thousand hoplites, with which in a very short time
he reduced the island to submission. From the Boeotians no assistance
whatever was sent, and without it the Eubceans were quite unable to meet such a force as that of Athens. Only in Histisea, a district in the extreme north, do we hear
of vigorous resistance, and even there the rebels were soon
overcome. Their punishment was severe ; the Histiaeans were expelled, and their territory was divided among two thousand
Athenian colonists. In the south of the island the constitution of the
city of Chaicis was re-arranged, and here, as in
the case of Erythrae, the inscription containing
the details of the arrangement has been preserved. We can still read the
very words in which Pericles, or his agent, determined the relation
of the subjects to the sovereign city. The Chalcidians were compelled to
swear that neither in word nor deed would they revolt from Athens,
and should anyone revolt, they were pledged to give information at once. Chaicis was to pay the tribute imposed on her by
Athens after due inquiry, and to supply forces to Athens according to her
ability, and in every way to be a faithful and efficient ally.
On their part the Athenians guaranteed to the Chalcidians the possession of their city. Without a formal trial no Chalcidian was to
be punished with loss of civil rights, banished, imprisoned, put to
death or punished in his property. In every action the accused was to
be legally cited, and without such citation no sentence could be
pronounced. Any embassy from Chaicis which
visited Athens was to be brought before the assembly by the
Prytanes within ten days of its arrival.
Similar
arrangements were made with the rest of the cities of Euboea. Documents exist
regulating the trade of the new colony in Histiaea with Athens, and arranging for the settlement of small actions at law
by the appointment of local judges. In all these decrees we observe that
Athens does not deal with Euboea as a member of the confederacy ; she is
a conquered territory, a subject of Athens, and bound to serve her
interests without reference to any others. More plainly here than
elsewhere do we see the head of the alliance formed after the battle of
Mycale emerging into the tyrant city which entered into
the Peloponnesian war.
The prompt and
complete reduction of Euboea was an immense service to Athens. But even
with this success her condition was sufficiently deplorable. Four
years had elapsed since Cimon’s death, and already she had sunk far below
the military eminence
Such a sudden fall
from the height of her prosperity naturally produced a feeling of despondency
at Athens. It was clear that she could not now keep her allies in hand and
sustain the burden of a war in Hellas. At all costs she must come to terms
with Sparta and her allies. In the winter of 446-445 B.C. ten
plenipotentiaries were sent to Sparta, through whom the Thirty Years’
Peace was concluded between the cities. The Athenians renounced all
their acquisitions in Peloponnesus: Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea.
For the rest, each state was to retain its possessions; the Athenians were
not to admit Lacedaemonian cities, and the Lacedaemonians were not to
admit Athenian cities into their league without the permission of the
other side, but any city which was independent of either alliance might
join whichever of the two it pleased. The zEginetans were apparently to remain independent, but to pay a certain
contribution to the Athenian alliance ; that is, they were not to be
reduced to the condition of the Euboeans. The Argives had no part in the
peace; they were already at peace with Lacedaemon, and they might, if
they liked, make a separate peace with Athens. Should any differences
arise between the cities they were to be settled by arbitration.
The terms of peace were engraven on stone and
set up at Athens, and in the shrine of Apollo at Amyclae.
A bronze copy was also to be seen at Olympia.
CHAPTER X.
THE conclusion of
peace left the Athenians to their confederacy and their internal politics.
There could not
After the death of
Cimon the oligarchical party at Athens had been led by Thucydides, the son
of Melesias, a man of high character and a
kinsman of Cimon. The better to keep together the party, which had
suffered so severely by the death of their great leader, Thucydides organised the oligarchs into a compact body. Hitherto
the members had sat here or there in the assembly as they pleased ;
now they were combined into a single body, and sat in a special
place.
Pericles did not
stop here. Since the cessation of the war with Persia there had been fewer
drafts on the public purse, and the contributions of the allies were
accumulating in the public treasury. A scrupulous man would have regarded the
surplus as money of the allies, which could only be spent on objects
connected with their protection, and with their approval. Pericles took
another view. He plainly told the Athenians that so long as the
city fulfilled the contract made with the allied cities, and kept
Persian vessels from their shores, the surplus was at the disposal of
Athens. Acting on this principle, he devoted a part of it to the
embellishment of the city. With the aid of Pheidias, the
sculptor, and Ictinus, the architect, a new temple began to rise on
the Acropolis in honour of Athena—the celebrated Parthenon
or “ Virgin’s Chamber,”—the unrivalled triumph of architectural skill, of which
we shall speak in a later chapter. Other public buildings were also begun
about this time. Athens was in fact a vast workshop, in which employment
was found for a great number of citizens. Nor was this all. Though
little inclined to war, Pericles was sufficiently aware of the value of
the Athenian fleet to take steps for preserving its efficiency. For eight
months of the year sixty ships were kept at sea with crews on board,
in order that there might be an ample supply of practical seamen. These
crews wert largely composed of the poorer citizens, who were glad to receive
pay for their services. Thus by direct or indirect means Pericles made the
state the paymaster of a vast number of citizens, and the state was
practically himself, with these paid citizens at his back. At the same
time the public festivals of the city were enlarged and adorned with new splendour. There were innumerable processions and
spectacles, contests and dramas to delight the Athenians ; and that
all might attend the theatre in which the plays were acted, Pericles
provided that every citizen should receive from the state a sum sufficient
to pay the charge demanded from the spectators by the lessee.
We may look on
these measures as the arts of a demagogue who seeks by
spending the public money to secure the public favour.
Or we may say that Pericles was able to gratify his passion for art at
the expense of the Athenians and their allies. Neither of these
views is altogether untenable ; and both are far from including the whole
truth. Pericles did undoubtedly seek by every means in his
power to win an undisputed position at Athens ; and undoubtedly he had a
passion for art and literature. He was, if we please to say it, a
demagogue and a connoisseur. But he was something more. Looking at the
whole evidence before us with impartial eyes, we cannot refuse to
acknowledge that he cherished aspirations worthy of a great statesman. He
sincerely desired that every Athenian should owe to his city the blessing
of an education in all that was beautiful, and the opportunity of a happy
and useful life. If Solon had laid down rules, not less excellent than
precise, for the education of the Athenian youth, Pericles would go
further, and educate the Athenian man. The promise of youth is always
beautiful; perhaps it was nowhere more beautiful than at Athens ;
but it is the performance of manhood which sets the stamp of value on
life. Pericles wished to influence that performance, and raise it to a
higher level; he sought to unite a passionate enthusiasm with clear and
definite aims. Whether these aspirations could be realised at all; whether they ought to be realised in the
manner in which Pericles sought to realise them,
are questions which admit of discussion ; perhaps the experience of the world
has driven us to confess that while leisure is necessary for the
development of the highest natures, the mass of men are only kept from
ruin by severe and continuous labour. But there
is no reason to doubt that such aspirations were cherished by Pericles.
The organisation of the oligarchy by Thucydides and the
development of the democracy by Pericles naturally caused the opposition
between the two to become more marked than it had hitherto been. Now,
for the first time, as Plutarch informs us, were the words “ oligarch ” and
“ demos ” heard in Athens. They were words of evil omen; though as
yet neither side can have perceived in what the opposition would end. A
democracy in a prosperous country is a very different thing from a
democracy in a poor country; an oligarchy which seeks to defend its power
differs widely from one which seeks to defend its wealth. But, sooner or
later, the opposition of the Few and the Many passes over into the
opposition of the Rich and the Poor.
The oligarchs
determined to pull down Pericles, if it were possible. Above all things they endeavoured to cut off the supplies from which he supported
his schemes. They pointed out the discontent which prevailed among the
allies, who found their money used in adorning Athens, not in
forwarding the purposes of the league. They argued that the money was
either required for the purpose for which it was given, or it was not. If
it was not required, let less tribute be demanded. Was Athens to be
dressed out, like a vain and extravagant woman, with the spoils of others?
Already some allies had thrown off their allegiance; others
were paying diminished sums. Euboea, a faithful ally for thirty
years, had endeavoured to shake off the
yoke, and others would doubtless do the same; such flagrant
dishonesty in the administration of the funds would bring the confederacy
to ruin.
In answer to such
arguments, Pericles held to his opinion ; the city, he said, fulfilled its duty
to the allies ; the contributions were the price of an undisturbed
enjoyment of the Atgean, and this Athens had
secured. If Athens saved money on her bargain, what was that to the allies? As
for the expenditure, it was expedient for the allies, aye, and for
all Hellas, that Athens should be beautiful; that her festivals should be
splendid ; that she should be the home of art and literature ; the
abode of freedom and culture; the Hellas of Hellas. In such reasoning
there was nothing very cogent, at any rate to the minds of the
contributing cities, and those who took their part. Athens, they
might reply, was not the sole judge of the cost necessary for the
maintenance of a free Aegean, but the board of the Delian league, and that
board had been set aside. The arguments of Pericles veiled the absurd
claim that of two contracting parties one only has a right to decide
whether the bargain shall continue. And where was the evidence that
the board and Athens had ever entered into such a contract as that
behind which Pericles sheltered himself? The Delian league was an alliance
between equal states in which Athens ranked with the rest; her present
position was an outrage—a tyrannous outrage — on the rights of free
Hellenic cities.
The oligarchs
probably believed that a large party in the city held these views, and their
new organisation gave them confidence. Moreover, the
last year had been disastrous ; had Cimon been alive, the war with
Sparta might have been averted, or peace obtained on different conditions.
Was it not possible to throw the blame of this on the
all-powerful Pericles ? On these grounds they proposed, in the winter
of 445 B.C., that there should be an ostracism in the city. The people
agreed, and the usual arrangements were made. But when the day came
for decision, in the spring of 444. B.C., the sentence fell, not on
Pericles, but on Thucydides.
The sentence left
no doubt about the feeling of the Athenian people, and it was accepted as
final. Thucydides disappeared from Athens, and for the next fifteen
years Pericles was master of the city. In fact, the oligarchs had chosen a
most' unpro-pitious moment. The disasters which
marked the year 446-445 B.C. had without exception been the work of
the oligarchical enemies of Athens ; she was now surrounded by hostile
states, all of which were oligarchical. No wise citizen, even if he
disapproved of the democracy, could at such a time have ventured to put
the control of his city in the hands of the oligarchical party. Besides,
the measures which had saved Athens—the reduction of Eubcea and
the removal of Plistoanax from Attica—were due
to the strategy and political skill of Pericles. The oligarchs had done
nothing in this crisis of their country. Indeed it was their rashness in
supporting the ill-advised expedition of Tolmides to Coronea which had brought the crisis on; had
they listened to the advice of Pericles, that disastrous blow might
have been averted. The plea in behalf of the allies was not likely to stir
the people
While discouraging
all attempts to enter into conflict with the Great King, Pericles was still
intent on the extension of Athenian power. We have already seen how
anxiously he had striven, in the years of Athens’s greatest power, to
secure a strong position in the Corinthian gulf. The most important
stations in this quarter, Pegae and Achaea,
had been abandoned at the peace. The route to the West now lay over
the alien Isthmus, or round the dreaded promontory of Malea.
But in those distant regions there were openings which did not
escape the eye of Pericles. In Southern Italy there was no Persian
monarch, animated by hereditary hatred, and master of innumerable troops ;
the rivalry of Athenian and Peloponnesian had not yet been carried there.
Was it possible to found a city in Italy which should exhibit the
spectacle of Greeks from all quarters living harmoniously together,
undivided by the jealousies of race or city?
The passion for
Italy had long haunted the Athenians. When Themistocles was brought to bay
by the Peloponnesian commanders before the battle of Salamis, he declared
that Siris had been assigned by an oracle to Athens, and if the Peloponnesian
generals abandoned Salamis, he would carry away his two hundred ships and
found a new city there. So strong was the attraction which the
West exercised on him that he named his two daughters Italia and
Sybaris. The feeling is by no means unintelligible. The West was
pre-eminently the goal of the adventurer. The Greek cities of
Sicily and Italy were prosperous beyond the dreams of hope. The
Sicilian princes were the most prominent men in the Grecian world ; the
luxury of Sybaris had not been surpassed in the East. The
stories which came to the ears of the Greeks about Tartes-sus and Sardinia
were greatly exaggerated, but there was daily evidence that valuable
products and manufactures, carpets from Carthage and metal-work
from Etruria, could be imported from the West. It is remarkable that
Athens should never have attempted to secure for herself a footing in this
coveted region. Perhaps her trade was not important—or her ships were
few—till the Persian war; and for a generation after that event her
attention was occupied with the Delian confederacy and the East. But
though she had no depots in the West, we know that the pottery of Athens
was exported into Etruria and Campania, into Sicily and Lombardy, early in the
fifth century B.C. There is also reason to believe that the Athenians
and the Segestaeans were brought into some kind
of communication about the middle of the century.
To an excited
nation nothing could be more welcome than the invitation which now came from
the Sybarites, asking for assistance in refounding their ancient city. After the destruction of Sybaris by the Crotoniates in 510 B.C., the remnant of the Sybarites had
found a home in Scidros and Laos, where they
maintained their own against the attacks of their enemies. About the year
452 B.C., in conjunction with some Thessalians they founded a community
which they called New Sybaris, after the old town. This was more than
Croton could bear. A resolute attack was made on the city, and five
years after its foundation the Sybarites were again driven out. They now
resolved to ask the assistance of Greece in founding a state. Ambassadors
were sent to Lacedaemon and to Athens, offering in return for assistance a
share in the new colony. At Lacedaemon nothing was done, but at
Athens the scheme was readily taken up. Not only were Athenians
enrolled, but envoys were sent into the Peloponnesus to
enlist all who were willing to join. The colony was not to be the colony of any
single state, but a colony founded by all Hellas, and a proof of
Hellenic unity. In 445 B.C., ten ships left Athens to carry the colonists
to their homes ; at their head was Lampon, who,
though not the founder of the colony, in the Greek sense, was of great
authority as a seer, by whose power of divination the scheme had been
greatly aided, and might be aided still more. In their choice of a site
the colonists were guided by the Delphian oracle, which bade them
seek a place “ where water was measured and bread was not.” They found,
near the ancient site of Sybaris, a spring which poured its water
through an iron pipe, to which the inhabitants gave the name of “ the
bushel.” This seemed to indicate the measurement of water, and the
richness of the soil promised unmeasured abundance of corn.
Here, then, was the site indicated by the oracle : it was known as Thurii, from the name of the spring (“ fast-flowing ”), and lay in a plain by
the Crathis.
On this land the
colonists proceeded to build a town. Among the emigrants was Hippodamus, the architect, who had recently laid out
the Peiraeus in a rectangular block with intersecting streets.
The same regularity was observed in the new city. It was built in an
oblong; four streets ran through the length, which were known as the
streets of Heracles, Aphrodite, Olympia, and Dionysus. Three streets traversed
the width—the Street of Heroes, the Thurian Street, and the Thurina. Such regularityof structure was
new in the Grecian world ; in this respect also Thurii was a model city.
The colonists had
not long been settled before dissensions broke out amongst them. The
Sybarites claimed the first place in the colony ; they were
not content to hold an equal position with the rest. The highest
offices were to be reserved for them ; their wives were to have precedence
at the sacrifices. They also retained possession of all the land
immediately round the city, which was, of course, of the most value. Such
claims could not be allowed without conceding that Thurii was not a Hellenic city, but merely the old Sybaris restored and
protected by the new settlers. The quarrel led to a battle, in which
the unfortunate Sybarites were once more defeated ; the greater part were
slain, the rest expelled from the country.
This victory left
the conquerors in possession of a large quantity of fertile land. They
immediately sent to Greece inviting a number of colonists to come and
occupy it on terms of equality, an invitation widely accepted. The state now
rapidly increased in power; the Crotoniates,
after the expulsion of the Sybarites, were, for a time at least, on
friendly terms with the settlers, and a popular government was devised, in
which all the inhabitants had a share. Ten tribes were established, as at
Athens; in three of them were included the colonists of the Peloponnesus;
three others comprised the settlers from Bceotia and Central Hellas. In the remaining four were collected
the colonists from Athens, Eubcea, and other
Ionian cities, and the islands. These events took place in 443 B.C.
The colony of Thurii is interesting from many points of view. It was an
attempt to found a colony which could not be claimed by any Grecian town
as its daughter city. It was intended to prove that there were
circumstances under which the jealousies of race and city could be
forgotten, and Ionian and Dorian, Athenian and Boeotian, could dwell
together in unity. It was also, from the first, the home
of distinguished men. We have spoken of Lampon and Hippodamus, both of them men from the Periclean
circle, who had aided their leader in his work at Athens. Herodotus, the
historian, was also one of those who joined the colony. The last fifteen
or twenty years of the life of the great historian were passed, no
doubt with intervals of travel, in his western home. Thither also went
Lysias, the young son of that aged Cephalus, who is so well known to
all readers of Plato’s “ Republic.” There too dwelt Tisias,
the Sicilian teacher of rhetoric, from whom Lysias may have learnt his
skill as a writer of speeches. And, as we have said, Thurii has yet another interest as a town built on the plan of an architect.
It was not a mere collection of houses, like the Grecian cities, where old
and new jostled each other in gay confusion, but a town constructed with
a view to convenience, health, and protection. It is from these points of
view that Thurii becomes the ideal colony of the
Periclean era; other cities were of far more use to Athens by supporting
her citizens, or holding places of strategical value ; but none
reflects so much of the mind of Pericles as the Hellenic town by the
waters of the Crathis—where Herodotus, the most
Hellenic of Greek historians, was wont to talk and meditate.
Diodorus, in the
account of Thurii from which we derive our knowledge
of the city, takes the opportunity to give a sketch of the laws of Charondas. In so doing he makes the incredible blunder
of asserting that Charondas, who lived in Sicily some
two hundred years before this time, actually composed his code for
the benefit of the citizens of Thurii. Such
inaccuracy staggers us; we cannot feel that we are justified in supposing
that the laws which he quotes were those observed in Thurii;
still less that they represent the genuine code of Charondas.
But as Diodorus probably copied his account of them from Ephorus, a
historian of the fourth century B.C., who was in a position to know what
laws passed as those of Charondas at that time,
we may assume that the enactments are not pure imagination. They represent
rules which were then obeyed in the cities of Magna Graecia. To this
extent they are a genuine picture of society and manners among the
colonies in Italy. And we may at least say that whatever their value,
there is no doubt about their interest.
Under this code, a
father who married a second wife to be a step-mother over his children, was
not allowed to sit in the public council of his city. For how could
one who ordered things so ill for his own family give good advice to the
state ? Besides, those who had been happy in their marriage ought to
be content with their lot; and those who had not, were foolish to try
the experiment a second time. Men who were convicted of dishonest
practices at law were compelled to walk the city in garlands
of tamarisk ; all the world was to know that they had received the
crown of villainy. By this wise law the city was freed from one of the
worst pests of Greek society,—the man who made a dishonest use of
his legal knowledge. Another law forbade all association with criminals or
disreputable persons. Another established compulsory education ; every boy
must learn to read and write, and the state paid the teachers. With
regard to orphans, Charondas ordained that their
property should be managed by the kindred of the father, but the children
should be in the possession of the kindred of the mother. The kindred
of the mother had no part in the inheritance, and therefore had no motive to
make away with the heirs ; the kindred of the father could not come
at them. Any citizen who had been guilty of cowardice was not, as in other
cities, put to death, but compelled to sit for three days in the
market-place in woman’s attire. In regard to the letter of the law, Charondas was precise ; bad or good, the law, while it
was the law, must be strictly obeyed. If it worked ill it might be
corrected, but obeyed it must be.
The method by
which Charondas allowed his laws to be corrected is
one which is elsewhere mentioned in connection with Zaleucus the law-giver of Locri. It was not likely to
make law reform popular. Anyone who chose could plead against a law in the
public assembly, but he did so with his neck in a noose. If he
convinced his audience, the law was changed ; if he failed, the noose was
drawn. Instances are recorded of corrections made even under such
severe conditions. It was the law that bodily injuries should be requited by the lex talionis: “ An eye for
an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.” This continued in force till a
ruffian threatened to knock out the eye of a man who had already lost one
; he knew that the law would only deprive him of one of his eyes in
return, and yet his opponent would be totally blind. As this was
obviously unjust, the one-eyed man obtained a modification of the rule,
and henceforth anyone who destroyed the eye of a man who had but
one lost the sight of both eyes. Another correction related to divorce. An
aged man, who had been abandoned by his young wife, succeeded in
persuading the citizens to correct the law which permitted second
marriages to divorced persons, to the extent that no woman might marry a
man, no man might marry a woman, younger than the husband or
wife whom they had abandoned. These stories are ridiculous, but they are
probably true. They exhibit the humorous common-sense which meets us in
Greek legislation. We know for a fact that Pittacus doubled the
penalties for all misdeeds committed in intoxication, and Solon protected
heiresses from greed by regulations which appeal to the animal rather
than the moral nature of man.
Within a very few
years from the foundation of Thurii the attention of
Pericles was called away to the extreme east of the Athenian empire, and a
struggle began which taxed his resolution and his resources to the
utmost. We have seen that in the year 450 B.C. troubles had broken out in Miletus,
in which the Athenians had found it necessary to interfere;
the constitution had been changed from an oligarchy to a democracy,
and an Athenian garrison had been placed in the city. Such reforms
naturally brought Miletus into very close connection with Athens. The
democracy there might expect the support of the democracy of Athens in any
contest with oligarchy. It was perhaps in this spirit that they entered
into a contest with Samos for the possession of Priene, though it is
difficult to understand how two cities belonging to the confederacy of
Delos could contest the possession of a third which was also an
independent .member of the same confederacy. It is possible that the
Samians were the aggressors. They were never very scrupulous in their
acquisitions, and they had been at war with Priene in old days for the
possession of certain places on the mainland. Or it is possible that in
Priene herself there were two factions, one of which wished to place
the town under the protection of Samos, the other under the protection of
Miletus. Whatever the cause of strife, the cities flew to arms, and
Miletus was defeated. She at once appealed to Athens, where the appeal was
received with favour; the more so, as it was
supported by a party from Samos who wished to overthrow the
government there. For Samos was in the hands of an oligarchy composed
of the rich landowners of the island, the very class of men whose power at
Athens had been finally broken by Pericles. Plutarch tells us that
the Athenians called on the Samians to discontinue hostilities and submit
the matter to arbitration, but in Thucydides we hear nothing of this, and
the Samians are treated forthwith as guilty of rebellion. A force of
forty triremes was despatched from Athens in
the spring of 440 B.C. under the command of Pericles.
He met with no resistance, and proceeded to reorganise affairs
in Samos. Fifty men and fifty boys were taken as hostages from the leading
families, and placed with Athenian colonists in Lemnos. The Samians
were compelled to pay a fine of eighty talents, the oligarchs were
deposed, the constitution was changed into a democracy, and a garrison was
left in the city to preserve order. These measures were carried
out with the greatest decision and rapidity; in a very few weeks
Samos had been degraded from her position as one of the most powerful of
the allies of Athens to the rank of a subject, held by a garrison and
punished by a fine. Here, as in Eubcea,
the policy of Pericles had triumphed ; the Delian confederacy was a thing
of the past.
But Samos was not
prepared to submit. The oligarchs could not forget that Samos had once
been the ruler of the Eastern Aigean ; that her
fleet was still a great power. The city was strongly fortified, and
help might be expected from Persia. A number of the discontented citizens
left the island and entered into communication with Pissuthnes,
the satrap of Sardis. With his support they returned at the head of a
body of men by whose aid, in concert with their friends, they succeeded in
capturing or expelling the Athenian garrison and recovering possession of the
city. The old constitution was at once restored ; and before the
Athenians had time to stir the hostages were removed from Lemnos. The
work of Pericles was undone in less time than he had taken to do it.
Athens found
herself face to face with a powerful ally in revolt. The danger was great;
greater even than at the revolt of Eubcea. There
was imminent risk that the war with Persia might be opened again, and
Athens might be alone in the contest. Sparta certainly would not join her,
and who could tell whether the allies would remain faithful ?
Samos was taking every step to strengthen her position, the leaders
of the democracy were expelled from the city, the officers and garrison of
the Athenians, who had been captured, were placed as hostages with Pissuthnes, the aid of the Spartan confederacy
was invoked. In order, if possible, to cut off any assistance from
Miletus, the Samians at once sent an expedition against the city. Could
they capture it before the arrival of the Athenians, such a
signal success might induce all the cities of Asia Minor to join in
the revolt. Byzantium had joined already, and the cities of Caria were
uncertain.
The whole policy
of Pericles was at stake. Instantaneous action was necessary. A defeat at Samos
would undo the work of years. Sixty ships were at once ordered to Samos,
and apparently all the ten generals, with Pericles at their head, went over
in charge of them. Part of the fleet was despatched to watch for the Phoenician ships, which were reported to be coming up
from the south, part was sent to bring reinforcements from Chios
and Lesbos. With the remaining vessels Pericles attempted to cut off the
Samian force which was engaged on the mainland in attacking Miletus.
A severe engagement took place in which both sides claimed the
victory. The Samians were able to force their way through to Samos ; while
Pericles was able to blockade the harbour.
Further operations were deferred till reinforcements came up.
Twenty-five
triremes now arrived from Chios and Lesbos, perhaps under the command of the
poet Sophocles, whom we know to have been a general in this war, and
hear of at Chios; forty, from Athens. Thus reinforced Pericles was able to
land forces at Samos and draw lines round the city, which he
also blockaded by sea. While he was thus engaged the news arrived
that the Phoenician fleet was at hand. Pericles at once set out to
intercept it with sixty ships. It was better to call off half his
forces than to engage with the Phoenicians off the shore of Samos,
where the Samians would be at hand to take part in the battle. The
Phoenician fleet did not appear, but meantime the Samians were able to break through
the sixty-five ships which Pericles had left behind. For fourteen days
they were masters of the sea and could carry into the city whatever
provisions they pleased. Then Pericles returned. The
Samians attempted to cut him off from the island but in vain. They were
defeated, and the city was once more blockaded by sea and land. It was now
midsummer 440 B.C., and the generals for the year came into office at
Athens. Pericles was re-elected and remained with the fleet, but the rest of
the commanders at Samos were replaced by new officers, who brought large
reinforcements. First forty and then twenty ships were brought from Athens
; Chios and Lesbos added thirty to the triremes previously sent, and
the total amount of the fleet was more than two hundred sail. It was apparently
an overwhelming force, yet the Samians defied it. Their walls were strong
; their city well stocked with provisions ; they could still hope that
assistance would come from Persia or from Peloponnesus. So they held
out, month after month, waiting for help which never came. The Persians
failed to seize the opportunity ; the Peloponnesus decided, on the motion
of the Corinthians, that they would not go to the aid of a city which
had revolted from her leader. To do so might form a very inconvenient precedent;
were the Megarians to revolt and Athens to aid them, Corinth would
find herself in the same difficulties as before the peace of 445 B.c. By this time the prospects of the Samians were
gloomy enough. At length when nine months had passed, and the supplies in
Samos were exhausted, the city agreed to a capitulation. The terms were
severe; all the triremes of Samos were to be given up to Athens ; the
walls of the city were to be thrown down ; the cost of the war was
to be defrayed by the Samians, and hostages placed with the Athenians
as a surety for good behaviour. The oligarchs
who had brought about the revolt were of course expelled from the city—we
find them afterwards at Anaea on the mainland
opposite,—and a democratical form of government
was established. Duris of Samos, a late and
untrustworthy historian, had horrible stories to tell of the cruelty of
Pericles toward the Samian trierarchs and
marines. They are doubtless fictions ; the Greeks were not
merciful to the captives who fell into their power, but they were
content with putting them to death. They did not add torture to bloodshed.
The cost of the
war had been enormous; if we exclude all the previous operations, the siege
of eight months with two hundred triremes would require 1,600
talents, if we allow a drachma a day as the entire cost in food and hire
for each man on board a trireme. So far as we can judge from
a mutilated inscription, 1,276 talents, in addition to the ordinary
income from the league, were paid out of the treasury of Athens in the
war, this implies a total expenditure of more than 2,000 talents; if
the Samians paid even half this sum, it would be a severe tax on the
island for many years.
Once more was
Pericles victorious. When he returned to Athens, in the spring of 439 B.C., he
might feel that his policy was now fairly established. In her dealings
with Samos, Athens had acted from first to last as an imperial city. To
her the complaints of the Milesians had been brought ; she had
interfered as a sovereign in the domestic politics of Samos. She had
employed the fleets of Chios and Lesbos, and the money of other cities, to
reduce Samos to subjection. She had compelled the city to accept
a form of government in harmony with her own. To those who had eyes
to see, such conduct proved pnly too clearly
that Athens claimed sovereign rights over the confederacy, and was
resolved to use them for her own advantage.
The measures which
Pericles took on the news of the revolt of Samos were not less clear-sighted
than rapid. The attempts to cut off the Samians on the mainland from
the island, and to meet the Phoenician fleet before it could reach Samos,
were excellent pieces of strategy. Yet we notice that here,
as elsewhere, the Greeks were helpless in the presence of a walled
city. Thasos, TEgina, Samos, had bidden defiance
to all the skill of the best Athenian engineers. Famine or treachery alone
could bring a strongly fortified place into the possession of
the enemy. In the case of Samos, we must allow that Pericles was highly favoured by fortune. Had the Persians taken up
the cause of the Samians, as it was their interest to do ; had the Chians and Lesbians joined in the revolt, or even
refused to send ships to subjugate an ally; had the Corinthians been
less short-sighted in their advice, the event of the war would
probably have been different. It is interesting to know that the defence of Samos was conducted by a man whose name is
remembered in another sphere. Melissus, who
defeated Pericles, and defied his forces so long, was a philosopher of the
Eleatic school. As Pericles occupied his leisure with
the speculations of Anaxagoras on the physical world, so did Melissus ponder the problem of the Many and the One,
striving to find beyond and behind the change and decay of all visible
things a reality which was always and everywhere the same.
With the fall of
Samos, Byzantium also came in
CHAPTER XI.
AMPHIPOLIS—THE
COMING WAR.
HE success of the
Athenians at Samos did not enable them entirely to repair the breaches
which the revolt had made in the confederacy. When we compare the lists of the
tribute paid by the allies in the Delian confederacy in the years
just preceding the outbreak of the revolt with that of 436-435 B.C., we
find that no fewer than twenty-two of the Carian cities are wanting
in the later list, and that these cities no longer form a separate
district, but are united with the Ionian. In Thrace also there had been
disturbances. The cities on Pallene had fallen into arrears with
their tribute or refused to pay it. In this district Athens was able
to restore order, and the defaulters were punished by the exaction of
higher sums; Scione, for instance, pays fifteen
talents in the list of 437 B.C. instead of six talents, and many towns
that hitherto had been subordinate to neighbouring cities, were now detached and formed into independent members of the league. But the revolt of Byzantium, and the
uncertain fidelity of the Chalcidic cities, seem
to have convinced Pericles that something had still to be done to secure
the interests of Athens in this quarter. How keenly he felt the necessity
of providing for a close and unbroken connexion between Athens and the north, he had already shewn by his voyage into the
Pontus and the colonies he had sent out. With the exception of Naxos,
the cleruchies of Pericles were all planted in a line more or less
direct between Athens and Byzantium. Chalcis secured
the south of the Euripus, Histisea the north ;
Brea was in the territory of the Bisaltians; the
Chersonese commanded the Hellespont. At all these points Athenian colonies
were established of such a nature that their loyalty to Athens
could never for a moment be called in question.
Another site
remained, more valuable from every point of view ; a site where the Athenians
had already attempted to establish themselves, but only to meet with
overwhelming disaster. At the point where the Strymon leaves Lake Cercinitis are the “ Nine ways,” —the centre to which all the roads from east
and west, north and south converge in order to strike the bridge over
the river. Here in 465 B.C. Leagros had led out
an Athenian colony of 10,000 men, all of whom had perished at Drabescus, in conflict with the warlike tribes of the
district. It was a severe loss, but a further attempt was worth making;
the region was not only rich in all materials required for building
ships, but it lay in the immediate neighbourhood of
the mines of Pangseum, and above all it
com-11 manded the principal route to the north. In 437 B.C. another
band of colonists was led out by Hagnon the son
of Nicias, who had been a general with Pericles in the Samian war. He
landed at Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, which had long been in the occupation of the
Athenians, and from thence forced his way up the river till he obtained
possession of the coveted place. Just above the bridge, on
an eminence skirted by the river, Hagnon placed
his city, which from its site he called Amphipolis. Two sides of the
town were swept by the stream and needed no defence ; on the third, a wall was built, reaching at each end to the river. The
colony was strengthened by settlers from the neighbouring cities of Chalcidice, but so far as wO know the
native tribes made no attempt to drive out the intruders. Hagnon was regarded as the founder of the city,
and public honours were paid to him in this
capacity.
Great changes had
taken place in this region since Cimon had conquered Eion,
and Leagros had perished at Drabescus—changes
which perhaps explain the inefficient resistance of the natives to this
new attempt of the Athenians. In 464 Alexander was still king of
Macedon ; the prince who in his youth, by an act of great daring, had
cleared his country of the Persians, when sent to demand submission
from his father Amyntas. When he came to the throne he had pursued a
policy which enabled him to preserve his kingdom from the Persian invaders,
without incurring the open hostility of the Greeks. A series of
conquests had extended his empire from Mount Bceum to the middle course of the Strymon; and
In like manner on
the death of Teres, in 440 B.C., the great kingdom of the Odrysians was
divided between his sons Sitalces and Sparadocus. They too were soon at variance. The
quarrel was a fortunate circumstance for Athens, while it lasted.
Some years later, when Sitalces had overpowered
and expelled his brother, the Athenians were alarmed at his forces and
flattered him by every means in their power. Fortunately the Odrysians
never attained consolidation, and the time was not yet come when the
powers of the north could make or mar in Greece.
While Athens was
thus active, organising her confederacy and securing
her communication with the north, the Peloponnesians had allowed the years ter pass in apathy and inattention. At length
they awoke to a sense of the situation. It was clear that Athens had
abandoned all idea of war with Persia and that the confederacy of Delos
was transformed into an Athenian empire, of whose forces the
great city was absolutely mistress. And meanwhile in visible greatness
Athens had become far the first city in Greece. Her walls were unrivalled,
her harbours and docks ample for the largest
fleet, and protected by the strongest fortifications. On the height of
the Acropolis new temples were rising, surpassing in beauty all that
had hitherto been achieved by architect or sculptor, and at the head of all was
Pericles, under whose guidance Athens seemed to be forever falling
into the greatest dangers only to rise again more splendid than before. An
uneasy feeling began to prevail. What would the end be? Who could forecast
the action of democracy or penetrate the designs of the silent, self-reliant
statesman, who wielded such immense power? Pericles seems to have
perceived the discontent. He knew what it foreboded. War with Sparta had
perhaps never been wholly absent from his thoughts, even when
he concluded the Thirty Years’ Peace. In such a struggle it was necessary
for Athens to have as large a following as possible. By a wise policy he might
at least prevent the growing suspicion that Athens was using her
power for her own interest only, and that she was utterly careless of the
great charge entrusted to her. He might shew the world that if Greece
was once more willing to unite against Persia, Athens was ready to do
her part. If they refused, it was no longer open to them to charge Athens
with any want of patriotism ; but if by any means Hellas could
be united round Athens, her position would be immensely improved. Such a
union would at once put her in the first place in Greece, and Sparta in
the second. We are told by Plutarch that at the time when
the Lacedaemonians were beginning to feel great annoyance at the rise of
Athens, Pericles encouraged the people to aim at a still higher position.
With this object he brought forward a decree that all the Greeks,
whether in Europe or Asia, should be invited to send envoys to a
conference at Athens for the purpose of discussing a number of questions of
national interest. The temples which the Persians had destroyed were still
unrestored ; the offerings vowed at the time of the great struggle had not
been fully paid; no definite arrangement had been made for the
control of the sea and the preservation of peace. These were matters in
which every Greek had an interest, and they could only be discussed in a
Pan-Hellenic conference. Twenty Athenians—men of more than fifty years of
age—were chosen, of whom five visited the Ionians and Dorians in Asia, and
the islands as far as Lesbos and Rhodes ; a second five were sent to
the Greeks in the Hellespont and in Thrace as far as Byzantium. Other five
went to Bceotia, Phocis, and the Peloponnesus,
from which they passed through Locri to
Acarnania and Ambracia; the remainder visited the CEtaeans, the Malian Gulf, the Achaeans of Phthiotis, and the Thessalians. But the scheme fell
dead to the ground ; nowhere was there any response to the invitations ;
not a single envoy appeared at Athens. The attempt to make the city
the centre of Hellas completely broke down.
Pericles was not
discouraged by the failure of his plan. He was content that Athens should
stand alone ; that the division which had been slowly widening since the
Peloponnesians withdrew from Byzantium should continue till one or other of the
great cities, which stood at the head of the opposite sections, was
brought to submission.' And he resolved that Athens at any rate should not
be first in shewing signs of weakness. Let the cost be what it might, she
must still pursue the career of progress on which she had advanced for the
last fifty years. If the rest of Greece failed to sympathise with a forward movement and preferred to cling to their old leader, so
much the more reason was there for Athens to be resolute in her
purpose and solid in her power. From this time forward Pericles sought to
brace his citizens to the idea of war with Sparta. He endeavoured to instil into their minds the greatness of the
objects for which they would fight. He pointed to the glorious city, the
like of which could be seen nowhere else in Greece. He called to their
minds all that the city had been to them ; the happy life they
enjoyed in her, the numerous recreations she provided for them. He
told them of the great empire the city controlled ; an empire which, he
said, would certainly fall to pieces, if Athens became in any way
subject to Sparta. He enumerated the wealth stored up in the
treasuries of the city, and explained how indispensable money was for the
successful prosecution of
The policy of
Pericles was not without opponents. There were many in Athens whom his
eloquence failed to convince, and who spoke of him and his measures
with a bitter and even personal hatred. The oligarchical party, though
politically helpless since the ostracism of Thucydides, was still
vigorous. If it could accomplish nothing in the assembly, much could
be done by the organised co-operation of clubs,
by clever satire, and well-conducted personal attacks upon Pericles and
his friends. The position of Pericles was not less difficult because it
was unique. Year after year he was elected one of the ten generals, and
this permanence gave him a peculiar authority on the board. Whether he was
so formally or not, he was in reality chairman of the generals, the
first executive officer in Athens. It was thought that he superintended everything,
and therefore everything could be charged upon him. If any scheme
went wrong, it was Pericles who was to blame. More especially did the
poets of the old comedy take up this line. Their sympathies were not
with the people whom they sought to amuse, but with the people of the
age of Cimon, “ the men of Marathon ; ” they praised the good old times and criticised all that was new. Those who listened were
willing enough to be discontented. The years of peace left the
Athenians with little to occupy their minds. A long peace is always a time
of trial for a government, however able and efficient. Men grow captious
in their criticisms when they have no severe burdens to bear, no
definite aim before them. Besides the comedians, there were men who rightly or
wrongly took great offence at the conduct of Pericles. Dracontides scented
corruption in the public expenditure ; Dio-peithes was convinced that the doctrines of Anaxagoras must lead to the overthrow of
all sound religion, and bring on the city the dire vengeance of the
gods ; others saw in Aspasia, the Milesian friend of Pericles, the
destruction of Athenian domestic life. These various sections were drawing
together, and if they could not reach Pericles himself, they could,
when the right moment came, attack him through his friends. For the
present they contented themselves with abuse. Aspasia was spoken of as the new Omphale, as the Hera of the Olympian, the child of
corruption, an impudent mistress. Pericles was the prince of satyrs, his house was an office for
the corruption of female honour. Pheidias was a
thief, Anaxagoras an atheist.
While the storm was gathering at home, Pericles was extending the influence of Athens in the West as well as in the north. We have seen how anxious he had been before the peace in 445 B.C. to secure a firm footing at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, and the subsequent foundation of the colony at Thurii proves that he had not lost sight of his old policy. A favourable opportunity soon offered for renewing it. On the shore of the bay of Ambracia lay the city of Argos Amphilochicum, so called from the founder, Amphilochus of Argos, who, according to a tradition preserved by Thucydides, founded the city on his return from Troy. It was the greatest city in that region. At a date which we cannot fix, the Amphilochians, being in great distress, invited their neighbours, the Ambraciots, to join in the settlement. The Ambraciots came and after a time, finding themselves the stronger, drove out the Argives and took possession of the city for themselves. The Argives now sought the protection of the Acarnanians and both together appealed to Athens. A fleet of thirty ships was sent under the command of Phormio, who had recently served in the war with Samos. When Phormio arrived, Argos was taken by storm, and the Argives and Acarnanians dwelt together in the place. This was the beginning of the alliance between Athens and Acar-nania, which we find subsisting at the time of the Peloponnesian war. The acquisition of
a friendly port on the shore of the Ambracian Gulf
was of great advantage to Athens in keeping up a communication with
the west. We hear of an alliance between Athens and the Messapians and of the presence of an Athenian admiral, Diotimus, at Naples, and though we have
no evidence on which to fix the date of either, it has been
conjectured with some reason that they were connected with that advance of
the Italian tribes to the west and south which about this time threatened
the cities of Magna Gracia. In the Greek cities
also of Italy and Sicily affairs had taken a turn which could not fail to
attract the attention of Athens. From the first the new colony of Thurii had aroused the jealousy of Tarentum ; war had
broken out, and though no decisive result had followed,
the Tarentines had acquired an equal share in a new colony on the
site of Siris, which the Athenians in the days of Themistocles claimed for
themselves. This was a gain for the Dorian element in Italy; it was
hardly less so that the Thurians had been led in
their defence by Cleandridas,
the Spartan exile, the father of the famous Gylippus.
In Sicily also the Dorian cities of Syracuse an Agrigentum had recently made such progress that the Ionians had reason to be
apprehensive. It may have occurred to Pericles, that if he could not place
Athens at the head of Greece in a combination against Persia, she
might at least come forward as the defender and supporter of the
Ionians, and he could hardly fail to see that a war of Athens with Sparta
meant also a war of Ionians with Dorians, in which the cities of the
west would be called upon to furnish ships to their kinsmen in the east.
So much the more important Was it that Athens should be in a position to
control the passage from Syracuse to Corinth.
Thus we see Athens
repairing the loss which the peace inflicted upon her by drawing more
tightly the reins with which she governed the confederacy, and by
strengthening her communications with the north and the west. It was from
these quarters that the storm finally broke.
CHAPTER XII.
CAUSES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.
THUCYDIDES informs us that the real cause of the
Peloponnesian war was the growing dread and jealousy of the Athenian power; but
the avowed cause was the part which Athens took in the affairs of Epidamnus and Potidaea. The contemporary comedians
attributed the war to corrupt personal motives on the part of Pericles—his wish
to shield his own peculations and those of Phidias, or to avenge some insult
done to Aspasia. Ephorus, the historian who flourished in the fourth
century BC, fixes the blame on Pericles, on the ground that he wished by
this means to extricate himself from the difficulties into which his
appropriation of the public funds had brought him. In a time of distress the
people would forget to prosecute enquiries, and the need of their great leader
would be felt more severely. But all writers agreed that the immediate cause of
the war was the refusal of the Athenians to rescind a decree which excluded
the Megarians from trading in the markets of Athens or her allies,
and that Pericles, who was the author of this decree, persuaded the Athenians not
to rescind it.
That such a trifling matter would never have brought
about hostilities between two allied nations without other and more grave
causes of ill feeling, is obvious; nor would Pericles have been so peremptory
in his refusal to make a slight concession if he had not been persuaded that
war was the best policy.
Whatever the immediate cause of the struggle, the
question of war or peace was first opened before the Spartan confederacy, and
it was opened by Corinth. Ever since the Persian war Corinth had felt that the
Athenian fleet was vastly superior to her own, and for years past she had had
reasons to fear that Athens would become a dangerous rival in the trade to the
west. Before the Thirty Years’ Peace, Pericles had endeavored to acquire the
control of the Corinthian Gulf by the settlement of the Messenians
at Naupactus, by attacks on Oeniadae and
Sicyon, by occupying the Megarian harbor of Pegae,
and by entering into friendly relations with Achaea. When compelled to withdraw
from Achaea and Pegae, he had helped to found
the colony of Thurii, and still later he had
entered into an alliance with the Messapians of
Italy and the Acarnanians of Western Greece. These movements were sufficiently
alarming to a city conscious of declining power, as Corinth was, and an
incident now occurred which made the intentions of Athens still more clear.
The island of Corcyra had been colonized by the
Corinthians in the eighth century BC. The island—the modern Corfu—enjoyed
a most fortunate situation. It was sufficiently distant from Greece to lie
outside the currents which disturbed the politics of the peninsula; and yet it
formed a convenient station in the route from Corinth to the west. For almost a
generation after the founding of the city, Corcyra and Corinth were on the
usual terms of colony and mother-city; but as the colony grew in power,
quarrels arose between them. Before the middle of the seventh century Corcyra
had shaken off her allegiance and conquered the Corinthians in a great naval
engagement. It was in vain that Cypselus, the
first tyrant of Corinth, strove to bring the island into subjection; the utmost
that he could do was to check the extending commerce of the Corcyraeans by establishing rival colonies on the shore of Acarnania. His son Periander was more successful; he brought the rebels
back to their allegiance; but on his death they established their independence
once more. These conflicts left bitter memories behind them. In their common
festivals the Corcyraeans would not allow the
Corinthians the customary privileges of founders, and at their sacrifices they
denied to a Corinthian the right of receiving first the lock of hair cut from
the head of the victim. Such conduct on the part of a daughter city was
equivalent to the renunciation of the bond which linked her to the source from
which she sprang.
At the time of the Persian invasion the Corcyraeans were in possession of sixty ships, while the
Corinthians had but forty; in the next fifty years they had increased the sixty
to one hundred and twenty, a number far in excess of any navy in Greece but that
of Athens. When invited to assist in the deliverance of Greece they had played
a double game—promising assistance to the patriotic side, but delaying to send
it, and waiting for the event. In the subsequent quarrels between Athens and
Sparta they had taken no part they were allies of neither side. They considered
that their position enabled them to stand alone, and it was not their interest
to favor one party more than the other.
From Corcyra a colony had been sent out (625 BC)
to Epidamnus on the Illyrian coast. The
leader of the emigrants was Phalius,
a Heraclid of Corinth, for it was the custom, when a colony sent out
an off-shoot, to renew the connection with the ancient mother city by bringing
thence a founder for the new settlement. The colony was valuable to the Corcyraeans, because it secured their trade with the
interior of Illyria and Epirus. It rapidly became a wealthy and populous town.
The government was a close oligarchy, the supreme council being formed by the
heads of the tribes, of whom one was chosen annually to be the President of the
city.
This constitution was subsequently modified by the
creation of a less exclusive council, and finally, about the year 435 BC,
the people succeeded in driving the oligarchs out of the town and establishing
a thoroughly democratic form of government. The exiled oligarchs at once united
with the neighboring barbarians, with whose aid they plundered the property of
their opponents. So severe was the damage inflicted, that the Epidamnians were at length compelled to send to
Corcyra for assistance. Their request was received with the greatest apathy;
the Corcyraeans showed no inclination to enter into
the domestic quarrels of Epidamnus. In their
distress, the Epidamnians sought the advice
of Delphi. Should they apply to Corinth, the home of their founder, for the
help which Corcyra denied? The oracle approved the suggestion, and to Corinth
they went, repeating the command given at Delphi, and offering to place their
city in the hands of the Corinthians. Their overtures met with a ready
response. The Corinthians were not inclined to forego any claim which
they had upon Epidamnus, and their hatred of
Corcyra was an additional motive for securing the colony. Without consulting
the wishes of Corcyra, they at once invited any Corinthian who pleased to
settle at Epidamnus, and a force of troops was
sent to protect them in the city.
Upon this the exiled oligarchs went to Corcyra, and
entreated the city to restore them. The appeal came at the right moment. When
the Corcyraeans found that their colony had gone over
to Corinth, and had admitted Corinthian troops and settlers, they were highly
indignant. Taking the exiles with them they set sail at once for Epidamnus, and demanded that they should be taken back. The
demand was, of course, refused, upon which they set about investing the city,
with the aid of the exiles and neighboring Illyrians.
The Corinthians were not less active; they
no sooner heard of the investment of Epidamnus,
than they proclaimed a new colony to the town. Any Corinthian who chose might
go, and he would be an equal among equals in the new city; those who found it
inconvenient to leave Corinth at once could secure a place by depositing a sum
of money. Appeals were also sent round to friendly cities for ships and money.
A large force must be dispatched, and a large fleet would be required as a
convoy. The Corcyraeans now repaired to Corinth,
complaining loudly of the injustice done to them. The Corinthians, they said,
had no interest in Epidamnus, which was a Corcyraean colony. Let them choose any Peloponnesian
state to decide between them; or let the matter be referred to Delphi. Before
going further the Corinthians demanded the withdrawal of the Corcyraean troops from Epidamnus.
The Corcyraeans replied with a similar demand. But
all negotiations were useless; the Corinthians were resolved upon
war, and sent their fleet to sea. A great battle was fought at the mouth of
the Ambracian Gulf, seventy-five Corinthian
ships against eighty Corcyraean, in which the
Corinthians were entirely defeated, with a loss of fifteen ships. On the same
day, Epidamnus was compelled by the
besieging force to capitulate. Such disasters were overwhelming, and though
hostilities went on for the rest of the year (435 BC), the Corinthians did
not venture on a second engagement.
The old feud had broken out once more; once more the
mother-city had been defeated by her ungrateful daughter. The humiliation was
intolerable. The Corinthians were filled with a desire for revenge.
All through the year 434 BC and for part of 433, they were busy with building
ships and preparing to renew the struggle. The Corcyraeans became alarmed. They were alone, and without allies, while
the Corinthians were members of a great confederacy. It was necessary
to seek assistance from the second great power in Greece.
In 433 BC Corcyraean envoys
appeared at Athens asking that the island might be admitted into the Athenian
alliance. Their position was difficult, for they had to clear themselves of the
two charges to which their conduct was open. Was it not inconsistent for a
state, which had refused to become the ally of others, to be now seeking an
alliance? Was it not ungrateful for a colony to be engaged in war with her
mother-city? They confessed that they had made a mistake in standing apart from
an alliance with the Grecian cities; but a mistake was pardonable when it
proceeded from no bad motive. And it was now impossible to adhere to a policy
which left them alone, while the Corinthians could bring all the Peloponnesus
against them. The war with Corinth had been forced upon them, in spite of their
appeal to arbitration. It was the duty of a colony to treat her mother-city
with all proper respect and deference, but she could not submit to injustice.
The colonists were the equals of those whom they had left behind; and it was
the duty of a mother-city to treat them as such. After this justification, the Corcyraeans attempted to show that the Athenians would not
be guilty of a breach of the treaty with Lacedaemon, in accepting them as
allies. Technically this was true; by the treaty it was open to either side to
receive as allies states who were as yet the allies of neither. But
the slightest reflection was enough to show that a mere alliance was not what
the Corcyraeans wanted. They wanted help, and how
could the Athenians help them without coming into collision with the
Corinthians? This difficulty was perhaps forgotten when the Corcyraeans pointed out that war between Athens and Sparta was inevitable and even
imminent. Let the Athenians choose whether they would enter into the war with
the navy of Corcyra—the second largest navy in Greece—as an ally or an enemy.
From Corcyra too more conveniently than from any other state they could control
the route to Sicily, if it should prove important to send ships thither, or to
cut off those which came from the west.
In reply to these arguments the Corinthians, who had
at once sent an embassy to Athens to oppose the request of their enemies, had
much to say of the iniquity of the Corcyraeans, both
in their general conduct and in their treatment of their mother-city. They had
of course to veil as best they could their own refusal to submit the points at
issue to arbitration; but on the other hand they had no difficulty in showing
that an alliance between Corcyra and Athens must lead to a breach of the peace
between Athens and Corinth. They could not deny the great advantage which
Athens would gain by the addition of the Corcyraean navy
to her own, but the war in which this navy was to be of such signal service was
still in the future; there was no reason why it should come soon; and it might
not come at all. They reminded the Athenians that they had restrained the
Peloponnesians from interfering to help the Samians against Athens;
let the same principle be maintained now. Whatever the balance of
immediate advantage in the long run an honest and consistent policy was the
best.
The Athenians were at first inclined to listen to the
Corinthians, who, whatever their conduct to Corcyra, had justice on their side
in opposing the alliance. But on further consideration they resolved to enter
into a defensive alliance with Corcyra. They believed that war with Sparta
would come, and, with that danger before them, they wished to have Corcyra on
their side. They also felt that Corcyra was an important station on the way to
Sicily and Italy—a station which they could not allow to fall into the hands of
their rivals and enemies. It Was at once determined to send ten ships
to Corcyra with orders not to attack the Corinthians, but to act with the Corcyraeans, if any attempt were made to land on their
island, or on any territory belonging to them. For in this case the Corinthians
would be the assailants, and the Athenians would be merely defending allies,
whom they had a right, under the treaty, to receive. Soon afterwards, feeling
that ten ships were an inadequate force, they sent off twenty more. The first
squadron was under the command of Lacedaemonius,
the son of Cimon, and two others.
From this narrative, which has the authority of
Thucydides, we can hardly avoid drawing the conclusion that there was a great
diversity of opinion at Athens about the Corcyran proposal.
Pericles was no doubt strongly in favor of accepting it; he would employ all
his eloquence to put in the most striking light the two reasons which
eventually determined the choice of the Athenians. But the opposition was also
very strong—that is, there was a large party at Athens, which did not believe
that war with Sparta was imminent, or perhaps inevitable, which wished to
restrain Athens from any conduct likely to bring on a war, and which still
cherished the hope that the international relations of Greece might be guided
by principles of equity rather than expedience. How small was the encouragement
given to Pericles is shown by the fact that Lacedaemonius—the
son of his old opponent—was put in command of the squadron; and that the
squadron was so insufficient. Lacedaemonius might
be trusted to do nothing, if he could help it, which would irritate the
Spartans, and with so few ships he could neither alarm the Corinthians into
acquiescence nor render any real service to Corcyra. Indeed both parties seem
to have felt that the dispatch of such a force was ludicrous. It was one of
those half-measures which always entail fatal consequences.
The Corcyraeans and
Corinthians now prepared for battle. The Corinthians equipped ninety ships of
their own, and obtained sixty more from their allies. With those they sailed to
the mainland opposite Corcyra, where they pitched a camp near the promontory
of Cheimerium. The Corcyraeans met them with one hundred and ten ships and the ten Athenian vessels. A severe
engagement took place the most severe which had yet been fought between two
Hellenic fleets. The Corcyraeans were successful on
their own left wing, and not only drove the Corinthian allies to shore, but
even landed and destroyed the vacant tents; but on their right, where they were
engaged with the Corinthians themselves, they were defeated. Unhappily it was
at this point that the Athenian ships were stationed. For a time they
endeavored to abstain from any actual collision, “but when the Corcyraeans fled outright and the Corinthians pressed them
hard, then every man fell to work; all distinctions were forgotten; the time
had arrived when Corinthian and Athenian were driven to attack one another”.
The Corinthians pursued their enemy to the shore, and
then began to collect their own wrecks and dead. These they conveyed to the
mainland, where the barbarian allies were at hand to protect them. They then
formed afresh for a second attack, and the Corcyraeans sailed to meet them. The war-cry had already been sounded, when the Corinthians
suddenly retired. Twenty vessels were seen sailing up, which proved to be the
second squadron from Athens. These joined the Corcyraean fleet.
The next day the Corinthians did not venture to renew
the attack. Enough if they could get away with their prisoners without being
captured by the Athenians, whom they now regarded as declared enemies. In order
to ascertain what opposition would be offered, they sent a few men in a boat to
the Athenians, upbraiding them with their action, and calling upon them, if
they were at war, to take the crew of the boat and deal with them accordingly.
But the Athenians merely replied that they were defending their allies; if
the Corinthians were going to sail against Corcyra, resistance would
be offered, but not otherwise. The Corinthians then set up a trophy in honor of
victory, and sailed home. Among their captives were two hundred and fifty of
the most influential men at Corcyra. These they treated with great
consideration, in the hope that by their influence the city might yet be won;
the remaining captives, who were slaves, they sold.
“Thus the war ended to the advantage of Corcyra, and
the Athenian fleet returned home. This was the first among the causes of the
Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians alleging that the Athenians had taken part
with the Corcyraeans, and had fought against them, in
defiance of the treaty”.
What was the result of the Corcyraean victory
at Epidamnus, we are not informed; nor what
became of the Corinthian captives there. But the Corinthians must have seen
with intense irritation the fruits of their final victory over the Corcyraeans snatched from their hands by the appearance of
the second Athenian squadron; and their anger would not be lessened when they
found that Athens followed up the alliance with Corcyra by giving favorable
audience to envoys from Leontini and Rhegium (Chalcidian towns in Sicily and Italy)
and entering into an alliance with Zacynthus.
The influence of Corinth in the West was in greater danger than ever.
Another cause of quarrel soon arose, and in this case
also it was the Athenians and Corinthians who were brought into collision.
Potidaea, a Corinthian colony on the isthmus of Pallene, was a tributary
ally of Athens, but governed by magistrates sent annually from Corinth. The
Athenians, aware of the hostile spirit which now prevailed at Corinth, were
afraid that the Potidaeans might be induced to
revolt. They had the greater reason for alarm, because Perdiccas, king of
Macedonia, their former ally, had now become their enemy, and was doing all
that he could to kindle war between Athens and Sparta. The revolt of Potidaea,
under such circumstances, would be followed by the revolt of Chalcidice. To
prevent this disaster, the Athenians called on the Potidaeans to raze their walls, and give hostages for good behavior; and, in order to
secure the execution of this demand, they directed the generals of an
expedition, which they were about to send against Perdiccas, to put in at
Potidaea. The Potidaeans in their distress sent
envoys to Athens to obtain if possible some remission of the demand. The
Athenians were inexorable, and when the envoys found that negotiations were
useless, they passed on to Lacedaemon, where they received a promise that, if
the Athenians attacked Potidaea, the Peloponnesians would invade Attica. When the Potidaeans heard this, they determined to revolt.
They were joined by the Chalcidian Greeks and the neighboring Bottiaeans, and on the advice of Perdiccas,
the Chalcidians even abandoned their small settlements on the coast,
and gathered at Olynthus, which they formed into a strong city. Aid was also
sent from Corinth to support the rebellion. The Athenians on their part
reinforced their former expedition, which had abandoned the hope of reducing
Potidaea, and was occupied with Macedonia. A peace was made
with Perdiccas—who had no sooner got the Athenian army out of his country
than he reverted to his old position, and sent two hundred horse to aid the
rebels—and the whole force moved upon Potidaea. A successful engagement enabled
them to drive the Potidaeans and Corinthians into the
walls of the city, which they at once cut off from the mainland. With the aid
of subsequent reinforcements they cut off the other side also, towards the
isthmus, and the ships prevented any communication from the sea. Though Athens
and Corinth were nominally at peace, the Athenians were now blockading a
Corinthian garrison in a Corinthian city.
The excitement at Corinth was great; it was
unfortunate for the peace of Hellas that, of all the cities of the confederacy,
it was Corinth which Athens had injured. For a long time past the city had
cherished a deadly hatred of her neighbor, and in energy and capacity she was
quite the leading city of Peloponnesus. Aegina and Megara had felt the weight
of Athenian oppression, but they had taken no active steps to obtain redress,
and might have taken none, had not the Corinthians set the example.
They invited the injured allies to meet at Sparta and
inveighed against the Athenians, declaring that they had broken the treaty by
their proceedings at Corcyra and Potidaea. They called on the Spartans to
rescue the cities of the confederacy which looked to them for help. The
Spartans had no special reason for going to war. Athens had in no way injured
them, nor shown the least inclination to attack the Peloponnesus. But it was
impossible to turn a deaf ear to the complaints of so important a city as
Corinth. They summoned any other allies, who had similar charges to make, and
calling their own ordinary assembly bade them speak before it. Among others,
the Megarians came forward, declaring that they had been excluded
from dealing in the Athenian markets, contrary to the provisions of the Thirty
Years’ Peace. The Aeginetans did not
venture to send envoys openly to the conference, but in secret they complained
bitterly of their lost independence. Others followed with the story of their
wrongs, and at last the Corinthians, trusting to the indignation which these
tales of oppression had excited, came forward. In the speech which Thucydides
has put into their mouths on this occasion, they treat the question from a
general point of view. They reproach the Spartans with their inactivity, which
allowed the Athenians to enslave one Grecian community after another. The
crimes of the aggressor were no secret, yet no measures had been taken to
counteract them. Sparta trusted that her reputation alone would save her
allies, but Athens was active and restless. “Of all the Hellenes,
Lacedaemonians, you are the only people, who never do anything. Instead of
attacking your enemy, you wait to be attacked”. The Corinthians then drew an
elaborate parallel between the Spartan and Athenian character, a comparison
which is one of the most famous passages in the history of Thucydides, bringing
before us in the clearest light the nature of the two forces which were about
to meet in deadly conflict :
“You have never considered what manner of men are
these Athenians with whom you will have to fight, and how utterly unlike
yourselves. They are revolutionary, equally quick in the conception and in the
execution of every new plan; while you are conservative—careful only to keep
what you have, originating nothing, and not acting even when action is most
necessary. They are bold beyond their strength; they run risks which prudence would
condemn; and in the midst of misfortune they are full of hope. Whereas it
is your nature, though strong, to act feebly; when your plans are most prudent,
to distrust them; and when calamities come upon you, to think that you will
never be delivered from them. They are impetuous, and you are dilatory;
they are always abroad and you are always at home. For they hope to gain
something by leaving their homes; but you are afraid that any new enterprise
may imperil what you have already. When conquerors, they pursue their victory
to the utmost; when defeated, they fall back the least. Their bodies they
devote to their country as though they belonged to other men; their true self
is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service. When
they do not carry out an intention which they have formed, they seem to have
sustained a personal bereavement; when an enterprise succeeds, they have gained
a mere installment of what is to come; but if they fail, they at once conceive
new hopes and so fill up the void. With them alone to hope is to have, for they
lose not a moment in the execution of an idea. This is the life-long task, full
of danger and toil, which they are always imposing upon themselves. None enjoy
their good things less because they are always seeking for more. To do their
duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet of inaction to be as
disagreeable as the most tiresome business. If a man should say of them, in a
word, that they were born neither to have peace themselves, nor to allow peace
to other men, he would simply speak the truth”.
In the face of such an enemy delay was fatal. Let the
Spartans at last shake off their lethargy, and go with the stream. They must
invade Attica and relieve Potidaea as they were pledged to do. They could not
expect loyalty from their allies, unless they came to their help in a time of
trouble.
Some Athenian envoys who happened to be at
Sparta at the time, on other business, were allowed to reply to the charges of aggression
which the Corinthians had made against their city. Their empire, they said, was
the growth of circumstances; it was administered wisely, as the Greeks would
discover if the Lacedaemonians were placed in a similar position. The ruling
power, whatever it was, was always disliked; the Lacedaemonians now enjoyed the
good-will of Hellas, but they would lose it, if they succeeded to the Athenian
empire. Let the matters in dispute be settled by arbitration; war was a
calamity of which the end could not be foreseen, and all cities should shrink
from bringing it upon Hellas. When the allies had stated their case, the
Spartans bade them retire, and discussed the question among themselves.
There was a difference of opinion. King Archidamus was
strongly opposed to immediate war; he considered that the confederacy in its
present condition was no match for the Athenians. For nearly fifty years Sparta
had remained stationary, while Athens had pressed forward with rapid strides.
Delay was necessary to restore the balance. Let them send and remonstrate with
the Athenians, and while negotiations went forward, put themselves in a state
of preparation. Such a course was wise and not unworthy of Sparta. On the other
hand, the ephor Sthenelaidas, who came
forward last of all, was for immediate and open war. The alliance must be kept
together; and the oppressor must be resisted, not by words but by deeds. The
honor of Sparta demanded prompt and immediate action. The question was then put
to the assembly, whether or not the Athenians had broken the treaty. It was the
custom at Lacedaemon to decide by acclamation and not by votes, but on this
occasion, under the pretence that he could not
distinguish which was the louder cry, Sthenelaidas divided
the assembly by directing those who said "Aye" to go to one side, and
those who said "No" to the other. The result was thus placed beyond
doubt. A large majority voted that the treaty had been broken. The decision was
at once communicated to the allies, but before further steps were taken it was
resolved to summon a general meeting of the confederacy at Sparta, and ask the
allies to vote separately for peace or war.
Meanwhile the reaction against Pericles at Athens was
becoming more and more powerful. He had never been without enemies, but they
had been powerless so long as the people were with him, and the people were
with him as long as he courted their favor. But when he began to control them
and resist their will, another feeling prevailed. Pericles was no longer their
idol; they looked round for other leaders who would go further on the path
which he seemed to have deserted. For Pericles had roused a spirit which
he could not quell, without resorting to extreme measures. This “demos”,
on which he had risen to power, was insatiable; and when its demands were
refused, it was ready to turn upon the man who had hitherto ruled it. Another
class of enemies consisted of the old aristocratical party, which
viewed the entire policy of Pericles with dislike, and had opposed it as long
as opposition was possible, first under Cimon, and afterwards under Thucydides.
Between the two sections, the demos and the aristocrats, there was of course no
real sympathy; yet they were now drawn together by common opposition to
Pericles. Without the demos the aristocrats were powerless; with it they might
at least get rid of the man who had so long kept them in subjection. In this
coalition they were also joined by those who were offended at the presence
of Anaxagoras and Aspasia at Athens. Thus, by a momentary combination of
parties, a power was brought to bear upon Pericles which rendered his position
insecure. He found first his friends, and then himself exposed to
attacks; and in more than one instance the vote was given against him.
The first attack was made against Phidias. The great
sculptor had been the adviser of Pericles in erecting the stately buildings
which adorned Athens. Phidias therefore was peculiarly obnoxious to those who
had opposed the expenditure of public money on these objects. If the people
could be induced to condemn him it would be an indication that they sympathized
with the party which had endeavored to check this expenditure. The first charge
was one of embezzlement. Some years previously Phidias had constructed the
famous statue of Athena of ivory and gold. He was accused of keeping back part
of the materials assigned to him for the purpose by the people. This accusation
he was able to repel. On the advice of Pericles the statue had been so constructed
that the gold and ivory could be removed without injury to the work. It was now
taken off and weighed and no deficiency was discovered. Such evidence was
conclusive, and Phidias was triumphantly acquitted. The accusers were foiled,
but they were not silenced. The public mind had already been disquieted
by Diopeithes and his friends on the
subject of religion; a charge of impiety might succeed where the charge of
embezzlement had failed. It was found out that in the figures which Phidias had
depicted on the shield of Athena, he had inserted portraits of himself and
Pericles. This was interpreted to be an offence against the goddess. Phidias
was at once thrown into prison, and all the efforts of Pericles to procure his
release were in vain. Before the day of trial arrived he was found dead. There
was a strong suspicion that he had been poisoned, but the truth was never
known. Some even suggested that Pericles himself had made away with the man who
had been the instrument of his own peculation. Such was the end to which party
strife brought the great artist who had made Athens the wonder of the world.
Another object of attack was Anaxagoras. Of all his
associates, this man seems to have exercised the most influence on Pericles. He
was a native of Clazomena, and belonged to the
Ionian school of philosophers. Like Thales of Miletus and Heraclitus of
Ephesus, he endeavored to find a cause for physical phenomena, but, unlike
them, he did not seek the cause in any single physical element, but in a
guiding and uniting force. This force was Mind or Intellect; “all things were
together in confusion, and were brought into order by Intellect”, was his
maxim. On this principle Anaxagoras sought to eliminate chance from everything,
and to substitute natural causes for supernatural.
Plutarch tells an amusing story of the different
explanations given of a supposed portent by Anaxagoras and his
contemporary Lampon, the great soothsayer of the
age. A ram with one horn was brought to Pericles. When Lampon saw
it, he at once interpreted the meaning of the malformation. As the ram had one
horn, instead of two, so would the two parties which now divided the state
disappear, and the whole power pass over into the hands of Pericles.
But Anaxagoras had the ram’s head opened, and showed that the single horn was
the result of natural causes. For the moment the philosopher seemed to have
triumphed over the soothsayer, but the subsequent fall of Thucydides created a
reaction in favour of Lampon. A man whose mind was ever directed to the search
for natural causes was of course raised above many of the fears and
superstitions of his time. Among the multitudes of prophets, who swarmed in
Greece, he could pursue a calm and even path. From Anaxagoras Pericles is said
to have learned much of the stately reserve which was so remarkable a trait in
his character. From him also he learned to differ from the common opinion of
his day, which was ever on the watch for portents and omens, and was content to
be guided in the most important affairs of life by the flight of birds or the
monstrous births of animals.
Such a philosophy of necessity came into collision
with the cherished religious beliefs of the Greeks. There was no room in it for
that gay variety of powers, with which a lively imagination had peopled earth
and sea and sky. The sun, in the eyes of the Greeks, was a holy god, a living
personal deity, who traversed the heaven daily from east to west in his bright
chariot. Anaxagoras openly taught that the sun and stars were nothing more than
red-hot stones.
To those who held the old beliefs, and entered heart
and soul into all the various forms of worship with which the old gods were
celebrated, such tenets were “flat blasphemy”, and the author was a dangerous
man.
On these grounds Diopeithes,
a friend of the orthodox Nicias, so well known to us
from the pages of Thucydides, brought forward a proposal that those, who
disbelieved in deities, and passed their time in discussing the nature of the
heavenly bodies, should be impeached before the assembly. This general
proposition was accepted—but whether Anaxagoras was attacked personally
by Diopeithes is not known. A late writer
informs us that Cleon brought an accusation against him for impiety; or, as
others said, Thucydides, who had returned from his ostracism, attacked him for
treachery. Whatever the precise nature of the charge and the process, it is
pretty certain that Anaxagoras was condemned. He was thrown into prison. In a
short time he either escaped or was allowed to go free, and a few years later
he died an old man at Lampsacus.
The ferocity of party strife was not satisfied with
attacking two of the most intimate friends of Pericles. A still more savage
blow was aimed at one with whom his domestic happiness was inseparably
connected. Aspasia of Miletus belonged to the class of women whom the Greeks
called Hetaerae, or companions. We can only describe them as adventurers, who
attached themselves to any man willing to spend money upon them.
Such relations were openly tolerated in Greece—where
society was more masculine than among us,—but they were not approved. No man
could associate with a “companion” without some loss of reputation; no
thoughtful citizen for a moment confounded the marriage relation with such
connections. There was no greater outrage on social feeling than to bring the
members of an Athenian family into the society of “companions”. For the
hetaerae themselves we must allow that the tolerance with which they were
regarded saved them from the degradation into which the outcast of modern
society is plunged. Whatever the misery of their lives might be, they were not
hunted or starved into suicide, and as slaves, for most of them were
slaves, they were too valuable to be murdered or injured with
impunity. For such women it was necessary to be attractive. They had recourse
to the various feminine arts in order to beautify their persons, and some at
least sought to improve their minds and conversation. In this last respect more
especially they had the advantage of the Greek matrons, who knew nothing of
society, and were uninstructed in anything beyond the duties of the house.
Aspasia then was a “companion”, but she was the first
of her class. Ancient writers agree about her beauty and her intellect. Her
circle was the first circle in Athens. How and when she attracted Pericles we
do not know; we cannot say whether she drew him from his wife, or whether the
short and somewhat unhappy years of his married life were ended before he made
her acquaintance. What is certain is that he entered into a close relationship
with her, which continued for the rest of his days. That she ever became his
wife, as recent writers assume, is not asserted by any ancient author of
credit; her son was certainly regarded as illegitimate, and the attacks of her
enemies imply that she held a position which was at the best dubious. But
whatever her position, the bond which united her with Pericles was very close.
The two lived together in perfect harmony; their tastes and sympathies agreed.
In the company of this cultivated woman Pericles found the relaxation which he
never so much as sought in ordinary society. Once, and once only, as Plutarch
relates, was the great statesman present at an evening entertainment, and even
then he went away early. But he never left his house to go to his daily duties
without taking a tender leave of Aspasia.
The comedians had long made merry with the character
of Aspasia. The worst charges were brought against her. That married Athenian
women visited her salon—if we may use the term—was a proof that she corrupted
women as well as men. That Anaxagoras and Socrates were seen in her company was
a proof that she sympathized with godless and atheistical sophists.
Was it not she who in the past had brought on the Samian war, by persuading
Pericles to aid Miletus? Was it not she who had procured
the Megarian decree, to revenge the loss of two of her shameless
women? And now Hermippus, a comedian whose power
lay in the coarseness of his satire, weary perhaps of his
own abuse, or believing that the ground was well prepared, determined
to bring her to trial. In this case also the charge was impiety, but it was
united with a more odious accusation. Aspasia was represented to the court as
an atheist and a procuress. Her position as an alien did not give her the right
of appearing at the trial; and she might confidently leave her cause in the
hands of Pericles. He came forward in person to defend her. For the first time
the Athenians saw their great statesman overcome with emotion, and pleading as
men plead for their lives, with the entreaties and tears which Greek manners
permitted in a court of law. The judges were stirred by such an exhibition, and
Aspasia was acquitted.
The attack was no doubt made in the interests of a
party, but it probably commanded the sympathy of a great many honest citizens.
Such a character as Aspasia was out of place in a Greek community, and the more
out of place, as the relation between her and Pericles approached the nature of
lawful union. There was no room at Athens for women educated to live the life
which Aspasia lived in the house of Pericles; and there could be no room, until
the whole structure of society was altered. Greek society was emphatically a
society of men; as men they met in the assembly or the marketplace; as men
they raced, or talked, or fought. Their homes were isolated; and family life
came into little or no relation with social life. No doubt Greek society
suffered by the absence of women; and the Greek nature would have been improved
had their women been better educated. There are writers who would have us
believe that Pericles endeavored by means of Aspasia to give Greek women an
insight into their true position. Without admitting this, we may allow that he
was conscious of a great defect in Athenian life. But it is easier to detect an
evil than to devise a remedy. Even Lycurgus was baffled when he attempted to
reform the Spartan women!
The acquittal of Aspasia was merely a concession to
the personal influence of Pericles. His enemies were defeated, but the victory
did not strengthen his position. On the contrary, he had been compelled to
appear in open court to defend the mistress of his household from charges which
could not even be breathed against an honest woman. His behavior at the trial
had made it clear that he was sensible to the attacks made upon him, and this
was an additional reason for continuing them. His opponents now ventured to
bring a direct charge against the statesman himself. Dracontides proposed
in the assembly that Pericles should give, before the Fifty Prytanes, an
account of his expenditure of the public money, and that in this case the
judges should give their votes in the most solemn manner on the altar. The
proposal was subsequently altered, and Pericles was to be brought before a
jury of fifteen hundred men, voting in the usual way by dropping pebbles into
an urn.
The proposal probably referred to some extraordinary
payments of Pericles; at least it is difficult to understand how he could be
called upon to give an account of transactions which had been examined and
passed by the financial officers at Athens. Such extraordinary payments were
sometimes made for objects which it was not convenient to announce openly; they
were in fact secret-service money. In 445 BC Pericles had paid away a
sum of ten talents, and when required to account for it had merely replied that
it was spent “on a necessary purpose”. The answer was accepted in the days when
he had the confidence of the people, but now a different temper prevailed. Was
it so certain that the necessary purpose was a public purpose? In any case it
would be difficult for Pericles to prove it. Secret-service money is secretly
paid, and without acknowledgment. It is an expenditure in which absolute faith
must be reposed in the honor of the man who makes it, and to call for the
details of the payments is a breach of the conditions upon which they are made.
But the opponents of Pericles had no scruples of this kind, and the people were
in a mood in which Pericles could not trifle with them. It was necessary for
him to find some answer to the charge or divert the attention of the Athenians
into another path. Plutarch tells a story which at least puts the situation in
a dramatic form. Pericles was discovered one day by Alcibiades in deep and
anxious thought. Alcibiades enquired what was causing him so much trouble. He
was thinking, he replied, how he could best render the Athenians an account of
the public money he had spent. Would it not be better, rejoined Alcibiades, to
think of a plan, by which you need not give them any account at all?
Such was the position of affairs external and internal
at Athens in the years 435-431 BC. Among their own allies the Athenians
were an object of dislike, and some were in open revolt. Among those of the
Peloponnesians who had been brought in contact with them they were regarded
with hatred; the Corinthians more especially were prepared to go to
any extremity in order to bring about a war between Athens and Sparta. At the
same time Pericles was losing ground; it was greatly to his advantage to
distract the attention of the people from the matters which now occupied them,
and to break up the coalition which had formed against him. A war with Sparta
would accomplish both these objects. It would naturally fill the public mind,
and it would divide the oligarchs who clung to Sparta from that advanced
section of the demos who attacked Pericles because he would not satisfy their
demands. In the next chapter we shall see that at the last moment the Peloponnesian
confederacy hung back, and endeavored to avoid an open breach, while Pericles
insisted that no concession whatever should be made. The guilt of the final
outbreak lies decisively at his door. Had the Athenians refused to
follow his lead, the war could have been postponed, if it could not have been
averted.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR
AFTER passing the vote in their own assembly that the
treaty had been broken, the Lacedaemonians still delayed to enter upon active
measures. They consulted the deity at Delphi, who replied that if they did
their best in the war they would gain the day, and he would himself be on their
side, invited or uninvited; but even this favorable reply did not lead to
immediate action. Wishing to implicate the whole confederacy in their policy,
they again summoned the allies to Sparta, where the question of peace and war
was put before them. Here, as everywhere, the Corinthians were most
energetic; they did their utmost to excite the allies; and, when all had made
their complaints, they came forward and insisted that immediate war was
necessary to put an end to the growing power of the Athenians. There was every
prospect of success. On land the Peloponnesian confederacy had greater numbers,
superior skill and organization.
The Athenians, it was true, had money and ships in
abundance, but the allies could contribute or borrow funds from Olympia and
Delphi; and when they had money, it would be easy to build ships and buy up the
foreign sailors who rowed in the Athenian fleet. Or the allies of Athens might
be induced to revolt. At any rate, the risk must be run, for submission implied
slavery. “The tyrant city, which has been set up in Hellas, is a standing
menace to all alike; she rules over some of us already, and would fain rule
over others. Let us attack and subdue her that we may ourselves have safety for
the future, and deliver the Hellenes whom she has enslaved. We are not the
aggressors; we have justice on our side, and the god has promised his help”.
When all had spoken, the Lacedaemonians put the question to each ally—great and
small,—and the majority were in favor of war. But so slow and ill-prepared was
the confederacy; so unwilling, we may perhaps add, were the Spartans
themselves, or at least a large party among them, to take any active
measures—for no wrong had been done to them by the Athenians—that nearly a year
passed before open hostilities broke out. In the meantime, embassies went to
and fro between Sparta and Athens in the hope that
peace might still be maintained, or, if this were impossible, that there might
at least be a definite cause for war. For in all the quarrels of the Greeks,
whether public or private, each side was at all times eager to prove that he
was not the aggressor.
The Spartans were anxious by every means to put the
Athenians in the wrong. First they called on them to banish the accursed of
Athena—by which were meant the Alcmaeonidae, the great family with which
Pericles was connected. Had the Athenians agreed to this demand, Pericles must
have gone into exile, and the greatest opponent of Sparta and of peace would
have been removed. But so far from yielding, the Athenians retorted by bidding
the Spartans expel the “curse of Taearus”, and
the “curse of Athena of the Brazen House”. In a second demand the Athenians
were asked to raise the siege of Potidea and
restore Aegina to independence. They could reply that the allied states of
Sparta had already agreed to the principle that each confederacy should deal as
it chose with its own allies; and the position of Aegina was precisely what it
had been when the Thirty Years’ Peace was concluded. Once more, the Spartans
insisted that the decree which excluded the Megarians from trading in
the markets of Athens and the Athenian empire, should be rescinded.
To this the Athenians answered : first, that the Megarians had tilled
the border-land between the two countries, and received Athenian slaves;
secondly, that there was no agreement in the terms of the peace stipulating
that the Megarians should trade with Athens; and that the Spartans
were in the habit of expelling strangers from their own city. A final embassy
came with a demand which swept away these small differences in one
general stipulation : The Lacedaemonians, they said, desire peace,
“and peace there will be if you restore independence to the Hellenes, if not,
there will be war”.
This broad demand appealed to the sympathy of Hellas.
It enabled the Spartans to call on their confederacy for help, and supplied a
common motive for war. Allies might ask: Why should they go to war for the
interests of Megara, or Aegina? What was the siege of Potidaea to them? But if
the Athenians refused to restore independence to the Hellenes, their
empire was placed in its most odious light, and the danger threatened
all alike. On the other hand, such a request was calculated to strengthen the
hands of Pericles at Athens. He could now point out what the design of Sparta
really was. It might seem preposterous to enter upon a great war merely to
keep the Megarians out of Athens, but now it was clear that the
existence of the empire was at stake. The form in which the demand was thrown
was even worse than its substance. The Spartans were in no position to dictate
to Athens, and Athens could not accept such orders without admitting the claim
of Sparta to act as a sovereign city. All the hatred and suspicion which for
years past Pericles had been laboring to implant among the Athenians against
their great rivals would be called into new activity by this sweeping demand.
Pericles at once availed himself of the situation, and
employed to the utmost his powers of eloquence to induce the Athenians to be
firm for war. He pointed out that the Spartans enforced their demands by the
threat of arms; there was no talk of arbitration. But in the treaty it was
arranged that any differences which arose were to be settled by arbitration,
each side in the meanwhile retaining what it possessed.
The Megarian decree was a mere pretext, veiling further claims, and,
even if it were not, concession was impossible. No matter how small the point
at issue, the principle involved was the existence of Athens. For “any claim,
the smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neighbor and an equal, where
there has been no legal award, can mean nothing but slavery”. Such arguments
were sufficient to prevail with his audience; but they could hardly have
prevailed with Pericles himself, if he had not wished to make peace impossible.
The Spartans had declared that there would be no war, if
the Megarian decree were cancelled; was it not worthwhile to try the
experiment? Fourteen years before, Pericles had purchased peace by enormous
concessions to Sparta, without in the least injuring the position of Athens in
the Delian confederacy. Why was concession so fatal now? There was,
as Pericles well knew, a powerful peace party at Sparta. Had he acted in concert
with Archidamus, his own personal friend, in this
matter, a better feeling might have prevailed between the two cities. As it is,
we see the greatest statesman of the day putting logic in the place of policy;
and if he does not drive his nation into war with the rude brutality of a
Spartan ephor, the reason is that as an Athenian he has learnt the art of
calling in general principles to support his views.
Pericles gave the Athenians ground for hoping that
they would be successful in the war. And here again his love of a principle
misled him. The wealth of Athens was doubtless an enormous advantage, which
enabled her to keep control of the sea; and so long as she was mistress of the
sea, the Spartan confederacy could not touch her. The walls of Athens were
impregnable; whatever damage the Peloponnesians might do to Attica,
they could not enter the city or break the communication with the Piraeus. But
on the other hand ships will wear out, and money is quickly spent. A very few
years of war served to empty the Athenian treasury, and she was thrown back on
her yearly income, no less than the Spartans and their allies. It is true that
she received the contributions of her subjects, but these could not be
collected without a force; and there was the constant fear that they might
revolt. From these defects the Peloponnesians were free. Their soldiers were
citizens who fought without pay; if there was any want of action, it was not
for want of money, but for want of leisure. Their operations were limited, no
doubt, but they were effective as far as they went. Pericles himself was driven
to confess that on land the Athenians could not risk an engagement with the
Peloponnesians. The indomitable spirit of the citizen-soldier is something
which money cannot buy, and it was with this spirit that Pericles was going to
war. He might destroy the Corinthian navy, but what hope had he of ever
conquering the Boeotian and Spartan infantry? His treasures would be exhausted
long before the spirit of his enemies was broken. At the best, such a war as
that which he contemplated would go on indefinitely, each side being superior
to the other on its own element, but neither able to inflict irreparable
damage. Only when one or other struck out a new line or committed a fatal
mistake, could the end come.
The Athenians were persuaded by Pericles, and answered
the Laconian envoys as he wished. They would do nothing upon
compulsion, but were ready to settle the differences by arbitration upon fair
terms according to the treaty. The ambassadors returned; the treaty was
practically suspended; but neither party would commence hostilities.
Suddenly, in an unexpected quarter, a decisive step
was taken. The Thebans were in no way concerned in the dispute which had
brought about the suspension of the treaty, but they were allies of the
Spartans, and for three-quarters of a century they had cherished a deep-seated
hatred of the Athenians. About the time when the Pisistratidae were
expelled from Athens, the inhabitants of Plataea, a city on the northern slopes
of Cithron, had applied to Cleomenes, the king of Sparta, for protection against
Thebes. Afraid of the aggression of their neighbor—Thebes is six or seven miles
to the north of Plataea, beyond the Asopus—they
wished to break loose from the Boeotian confederation, of which Thebes was now
the head, and attach themselves to Sparta. But Cleomenes pointed out that his city lay at a great
distance from Plataea; before assistance could arrive from the Peloponnesians,
the Thebans could lay waste the Plataean territory and enslave the city twice over. He recommended the Plataeans to apply to Athens, their next neighbor, who
would be able to protect them. The Plataeans acted on
this advice, and, finding a ready response, placed themselves under Athenian protection.
A quarrel with Thebes was the immediate result, and though the Corinthians, who
were called in to decide the matter, decided that Plata should choose her own
alliance, the Thebans never acquiesced in the arrangement. They looked on Plataae as a part of Boeotia, and only waited for an
opportunity to assert their claim.
Such an opportunity seemed now to have arrived. At the
beginning of spring, in the year 431 BC, a force of over three hundred
Thebans, under the command of two of the Boeotarchs,
as the officers of the Boeotian confederacy were called, entered Plataae by night. No watch had been set, for as yet
war had not been openly proclaimed, and the Plataeans had no reason to apprehend an attack. But the Thebans did not stand on
ceremony, and here, as was always the case in Greece, treachery had been at
work. There was a party in Plataea which hoped, by detaching the city from
Athens, to get the chief power into their own hands. With this view they
negotiated with an eminent Theban for the dispatch of the force, and, when it
arrived, they opened the gates and received it into the city. Their desire was
to cut down their enemies at once, and so clear the ground for their own
advancement; but the Thebans took a more conciliatory course. Grounding their
arms in the market-place of the city, they called on those who wished to return
to the ancient constitution of Boeotia to join them, and become their allies.
It was not in the interests of a party, but in the interests of Boeotia, that
they wished to recover Plataea.
The delay was fatal. At the first entrance of the
Thebans, in the darkness of night, the Plataeans were
panic-stricken; they could form no estimate of the number of the enemy, and, in
the belief that they were much more numerous than they really were, they
listened to their proposals. By degrees they discovered that the force was not
overwhelming, and as the Plataean people were
strongly attached to Athens, they resolved to attack the invaders, and drive
them out. They reflected that the Thebans were strangers in the city, of which
every street, house, and gateway was familiar to themselves. It was easy
to surprise them, if the attack was made in the dark. The plan was carried out.
Just before daybreak a furious onset was made, and though for a short time the
Thebans were able to resist, they were soon driven in confusion along the
streets, seeking their way out of the city. All the gates save that by which
they entered were closed; the Plataeans met them at
every turn. Even the women from the house-tops threw tiles and stones upon
them, and when day returned, the force which had entered so
easily, was annihilated; one hundred and eighty Thebans, including
the leader, were taken captive; of the rest, the majority had been killed.
It had been arranged that the main body of the Theban
army should march out in support of the attack. But a heavy rain had caused
the Asopus to rise in the night, and it
could not now be crossed without difficulty. Before the Thebans reached the Plataean territory, they were met with the news of the
disaster which had befallen their countrymen. They pressed on, hoping to seize
men and property as a compensation for their own citizens, who were in the
hands of the Plataeans; the Plataeans,
however, warned them by a herald that, if any damage were done to their
property, the Theban captives would be put to death; if they retired, the
captives would be given up. On this the Thebans went back into their own
country.
The Plataeans at once set
about bringing in their property from the fields, and, as soon as all was
secured, they slew the whole of their prisoners. News of the attack had been at
once conveyed to Athens, and a second messenger had reported the capture of the
Thebans. The Athenians at once arrested all the Boeotians who happened to be in
Attica, and dispatched an envoy to Plataea, requesting that the prisoners
should be kept for further instructions. The request unhappily came too late.
The prisoners were already dead when the envoy arrived, and the Plataeans were busy preparing their city against further
attacks.
Such was the first act in the great drama. It forms a
striking instance of the insecurity of Greek life, and the furious passions to
which this insecurity naturally gave rise. In Plataea there is a party of
traitors, waiting for an opportunity to cut the throats of their opponents; the
Thebans attack a city secured by treaty, without waiting for any formal
declaration of war; the Plataeans, in spite of the
promise by which the Thebans were induced to retire, put all the captives to
death. The question was indeed debated whether the promise was or was not
confirmed by an oath. Their cruelty and perfidy the Plataeans could not deny, but they resented the charge of perjury; a refinement which
merely proves the superstition and sophistry in which the Greeks of the time
were sunk. A hundred years had still to pass; Plataea had twice to be leveled
to the ground before this neighborly quarrel was finally settled by the utter
destruction of Thebes at the hands of Alexander.
The Thirty Years’ Truce had now been openly broken.
Had the Plataeans preserved their prisoners alive,
the Thebans might have been brought to terms; Sparta might have disowned the
action of her ally in violating the treaty. But the murder of one hundred and
eighty Thebans made it impossible to draw back. On both sides preparations were
made for immediate war. The enthusiasm was great,—the greater because it was
intended that the struggle should be final. The Peloponnesians, aware of their
deficiency on sea, requested their allies in Italy and Sicily to build
additional ships and contribute money; in their ambition they dreamed of a navy
of five hundred vessels! The Athenians sent to their allies in the Ionian Sea,
Corcyra, Acarnania, and Zacynthus, with
whose assistance they hoped to enclose the Peloponnesus and cut off all
communication with the west. There were doubtless many who hailed the outbreak
as a relief from an intolerable tension; many more who, from mere ignorance and
love of change, were weary of peace. “The youth of Peloponnesus and the youth
of Athens were numerous, and neither of them had ever seen war”. Prophecies and
oracles passed from mouth to mouth, and the ingenuity of diviners was tasked to
the utmost. Every uncommon phenomenon of nature was noticed and recorded.
The Delians announced that their sacred island had been “shaken” for
the first time in the memory of man.
Whatever the faults of the Peloponnesian confederacy,
it seems to have answered to the ideas which the Greeks formed of federation.
The allies had the right of making themselves heard at Sparta, they were not
harassed by constant requisitions; and though Pericles asserts that Sparta
insisted on a form of government among her allies which was suitable to her own
interests, it is difficult up to this time to produce an instance of any
interference on her part with the politics of her allies. She had of course
reduced Laconia and Messenia to submission, but this was accepted by the rest
of Greece with the same acquiescence as the union of Attica, or the federation
of Boeotia. These were changes which, whether the result of just or unjust
dealing, were regarded as final. But Athens was a conquering state, engaged at
the moment in consolidating an empire, and exposed to the bitterness now
present in the hearts of men who were conscious of lost independence. Some
longed to be delivered from her control; others were afraid of falling under
it.
The Athenians had taken no very active part in the
incident of Plataea; no additional complaint could be brought against
them on this ground, except the arrest of the Boeotians in Attica, which was
merely a measure of precaution. Sparta was still without any clear and
well-defined casus belli, so far as she herself was concerned. But the spirit of
war had been aroused, and even those who deeply regretted the outbreak of
hostilities were compelled to go with the stream. Immediately after the affair
at Plataea, the ephors of Sparta, who were practically the executive
of the confederacy, sent round to the allies bidding them furnish troops
equipped for a foreign expedition; and at the time appointed, a little before
midsummer, the various states met at the Isthmus of Corinth, each with
two-thirds of her whole force, for the invasion of Attica. Each contingent was
commanded by its own generals, but the whole expedition was under the command
of Archidamus, king of Lacedaemon.
Archidamus, as we have seen, had attempted to dissuade the
confederacy from open war; even now he cherished the hope that the last and
irrevocable step might be avoided. He impressed his army with the necessity of
caution in attacking so powerful an enemy, who might at the last moment be
stung into desperate resistance; and even dispatched a Spartan envoy to Athens,
in the hope that some concession might yet be made. But the Athenians were
resolute. The envoy was not even admitted into the city, for Pericles had
induced the people to refuse to listen to any overtures, so long as the
Lacedaemonians were in the field. He was sent away without a hearing, and told
that he must cross the frontier before sunset; if the Lacedaemonians wished to
negotiate with the Athenians, they must disband their army and go home. When he
arrived at the frontier, and was about to take leave of the escort which had
accompanied him, the envoy, impressed with the greatness of the struggle which
was now inevitable, uttered these words of melancholy prophecy: “This day will
be to the Hellenes the beginning of great calamities”. On learning that no
concessions would be made, Archidamus gave the final
order and prepared to enter Attica.
Meanwhile Pericles had taken measures for the safety
of the Athenians. He was well aware that he could not meet the Peloponnesians
in the field, or prevent them from laying waste as much of Attica as they
chose. He must place his city in a state of siege, and concentrate Attica in
Athens. Within the walls of the city, and Piraeus, and the long walls which
connected the two, the whole population of the country could be secured; and the
damage which might be done to the country would be a trifling matter so long as
the city retained her ships, her money, and her allies.
His authority prevailed; the country people left their
pleasant homes, and cultivated farms, and came to Athens with their wives and
children, their household goods, and even the woodwork of their houses, which
in Attica was far more valuable than stone or brick. But the removal was not
accomplished without much discomfort and vexation. Many families had lived in
the country for generations; the town and town life was quite strange to them;
they were leaving the tombs of their race, the temples where they worshipped.
And when they arrived in the city, there were no houses to receive them. They
had to obtain such shelter as they could in vacant spaces, or temples and
shrines, or the turrets of the walls. Afterwards they spread down the long
walls, and into Piraeus, but for a time the sudden influx of so large a
population caused the greatest disorder. The sanitary conditions created by the
change must have been little less than revolting. That Pericles should have
contemplated the removal of such numbers into the city without making due
provision for them was of course a gross oversight,—an oversight of which no
shrewd practical man would ever have been guilty. He could discuss physical
phenomena with Anaxagoras, and arrange with Phidias and Ictinus for the
construction of beautiful buildings, but the prosaic details of life were
forgotten. The day of vengeance was not long in coming.
At the same time that he called on the Athenians to
make this great sacrifice, he cheered them with hopes of victory. Still
insisting on his old maxim that war was mainly an affair of money, he pointed
to the large revenues and accumulations at the disposal of the Athenian state.
From the allies the income was 600 talents a year; in the treasury of the
Acropolis there was a reserve of 6,000 talents of coined money. The offerings
and sacred vessels and the like were worth 800 talents more, and in a great
extremity the gold, 40 talents in weight, could be taken from the statue of
Athena, and converted into money. Sacred as many of these objects were, it was
proper to use them in self-defense on the understanding that they would be
replaced at a future time. Then he passed in review the forces of Athens. Her
heavy-armed soldiers amounted to 13,000, besides the 16,000 engaged in garrison
duty at Athens or in the various fortresses of Attica. The cavalry numbered
1,200, including mounted archers; of foot archers there were 1,800; the
triremes were no fewer than 300. Such an array of forces was imposing, and
Pericles left it for others to point out that the heavy-armed soldiers were of
little use, if they could not be put in the field, while the constant
desolation of Attica by the Peloponnesians must inevitably impoverish the class
from which the trierarchs, so necessary for the
equipment of the fleet, were taken. Nor did he make it clear how Athens, even
if she obtained the most brilliant victories by sea, could ever keep a hold on
the Peloponnesus. That was impossible without a large army of soldiers, strong
enough to occupy a number of fortresses in Laconia and Elis. If the Spartans
were in perpetual fear of the Helots, whom they had held in subjection for two
centuries, what would have been the position of the Athenians with rebellious
Spartans round them? In their dreams of empire they never spoke of restoring
Messenia to independence. Yet such a restoration, and perhaps the entire
extirpation of the whole Spartan race, would have been the only conditions on
which Athens could have ruled the Peloponnesus. Nevertheless, the Athenians
were full of spirit, and set about preparing a fleet of one hundred ships, with
which to sail round the Peloponnesus, and make reprisals for any damage which
might be inflicted on Attica.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE FUNERAL SPEECH.
THIRTY-THREE days had now elapsed since the Thebans
entered Plataea. Even Archidamus could delay no
longer. Leaving the Isthmus, he led his forces over Mount Geraneia into the territory of Megara, where two
routes lay before him: he might turn to the right, and pursue the coast road to
Eleusis; or he might continue his march in a north-easterly direction till he
reached the confines of Boeotia, and then strike into the direct road which
connects Thebes and Athens. He chose the second, and when we next hear of him,
he is besieging Oenoe, the fortress which secured the
communication of Athens with Plataea. In taking this course he may have acted
on the advice of his Boeotian allies, for, if this fortress were in his hands,
the Thebans would not only be able to pass in and out of Attica as they
pleased, but Athens would be prevented from coming to the aid of Plataea. At
the same time he would open a more easy and convenient road between the
northern and southern halves of the Peloponnesian alliance, than the usual
route by Aegosthena and Creusis.
The fortresses which commanded the various passes into
Attica were held by garrisons formed chiefly of young men in the earliest years
of military service. Of the fortifications of Oenoe we know nothing, but, whatever they were, they were sufficient with the natural
strength of the place to enable such a garrison to bid defiance to the whole
strength of the Peloponnesian army. After a waste of time, which brought on him
the suspicion of intentional delay, Archidamus found
himself compelled to leave the fortress in his rear. Descending down the valley
of the Eleusinian Cephisus, he ravaged Eleusis
and the Thriasian plain, from which he
advanced over the ridge of hills to Acharnae, the
largest of the ‘demes’ of Attica, and barely seven miles from the city.
Here he encamped for some time, ravaging the immediate neighborhood, but not
entering the central plain.
In thus holding his hand while within sight of the
city he sought to draw the Athenians out of the walls. He had hoped, though in
vain, that they would come to meet him at Eleusis, and when he encamped within
sight of Athens, in a town which furnished no fewer than 3,000 heavy-armed
soldiers to the Athenian army, he confidently expected to reap one of two
advantages. Either he would exasperate the enemy into fighting in the open
field; or the Acharnians, knowing that their own
property was destroyed, would be less eager to fight for that of others, and Archidamus would be at liberty to ravage Attica as he
pleased.
His plans were not ill-laid, but they were frustrated
by the strong personal ascendancy of Pericles. So long as the Peloponnesian
army lay at Eleusis, the Athenians still cherished the hope that the rest of
the country would escape. Those who knew the history of the past would call to
mind that Cleomenes, the famous king of Sparta,
had once led a Peloponnesian army as far as Eleusis, only to see it disperse.
And many would remember that fourteen years before the present
invasion Plistoanax had reached the Thriasian plain, and then retired. But when the
invaders were actually in sight, and the fairest possessions of Attica were at
their mercy, the situation seemed intolerable. The whole people, and more
especially the younger men, were eager to go out and put a stop to it. The
sight was new to them, and they had little experience of the Spartan soldiers’
courage and skill. Men gathered in the streets, abusing Pericles and his
cowardly policy; the excitement was increased by all kinds of oracles invented
or remembered for the occasion. The Acharnians, as
was natural, were in the last stage of exasperation. They were a hardy race,
the colliers of Attica, who got their living by manufacturing charcoal, “hearts
of maple”, stiff and sturdy as the logs they burned. Forgetting all the
counsels of Pericles, the whole people called on him to do his duty as a
general. The situation was difficult, but Pericles did not flinch. He seems at
this time to have enjoyed an extraordinary degree of authority, and in virtue
of this power he abstained from summoning any public meeting at which the
popular excitement might find expression. He did what he could to soothe the
prevailing irritation; and meanwhile sent out parties of horse to prevent the
invaders from coming too close to the city walls. The Thessalians, true to
their old alliance, had sent cavalry to the aid of Athens, and these with the
native horse proved themselves at least a match for the Boeotians in
the Peloponnesian army.
These measures seem to have had some effect upon Archidamus. It is at any rate remarkable that when he broke
up from Acharnae on finding that the Athenians would
not come out against him, he directed his course to the north, and contented
himself with ravaging the country between Mt. Parnes and
Mt. Brilessus. Here his provisions began to
fail, and he found it necessary to retire. Passing through the coast land
near Oropus, to the north-east of Parnes, and wasting the country as he went, he entered
Boeotia by the route past Tanagra. The invasion had lasted about five weeks.
The successful defense of Oenoe had shown that the army of the Peloponnesus was powerless against an
insignificant fortress. Athens, therefore, was absolutely safe behind her
walls, and though the Athenians suffered severely by the invasion, Pericles
found means in the course of the year to compensate many of the sufferers. In
spite of opposition he held on his way. His plans for the war were still
accepted as the best, and in the conviction that Athens, and not Attica, was
the vulnerable point of the state, a decree was passed that a thousand talents
should be set apart out of the reserve in the treasury, and a hundred of the
best triremes selected every year, with trierarchs appointed
for each, to be ready for use in case an attack was made on the Piraeus. So
earnest were the people in the matter, that the proposal to use the money or
ships for any other purpose was made a capital offence. Measures were also
taken for securing the safety of the country from unexpected attack by
establishing guards on the frontiers.
While the Lacedaemonians were still in their country
the Athenians took steps to revenge themselves. A fleet of a hundred vessels
was dispatched to ravage the shores of the Peloponnese. They were joined by a
contingent of fifty ships from Corcyra, and a combined attack was made on Methone, a fortress on the coast of Messenia, a little to
the south of Pylos (Navarino), which, in the days of Tolmides, had been captured and again abandoned by the
Athenians. Had the attack succeeded, the Athenians would have anticipated in
some degree the position which they obtained six years later by the capture
of Pylos. They would have established a support in Messenia for any Helots
who could find an opportunity of joining them, and a convenient station for the
union of the contingents coming from east and west. But the attempt failed. In
this, their very first landing on the shores of the Peloponnesus, they were
confronted by a Spartan, whose courage and genius were more than a match for
the plans of Pericles and the power of Athens—Brasidas, the son of Tellis. He happened to be on guard in the neighborhood—for
the Spartans sent out parties of their citizens to keep watch on the outlying
districts of their dominions,—and knowing the weakness of the place, he came to
the rescue with a hundred men. Without a moment’s delay he broke through the
scattered troops of the Athenians, and secured the town for Sparta. Thus
repulsed the Athenian fleet sailed on to Elis, where it was joined by a few
ships from Naupactus. Some successes were gained at Pheia, near the mouth of the Alpheus, but on the approach
of the Elean army the Athenians
re-embarked. More important by far was the conquest of Sollium, a Corinthian town near Leucas, and the
acquisition of the whole of the island of Cephallenia for
the alliance. This success was achieved without a single blow, and not long
afterwards the fleet returned home. No attempt appears to have been made by the
Peloponnesians to intercept the progress of the Athenians or to meet them on
the seas; but after their return the Corinthians ventured out as far as Astacus in Acarnania. The town had been captured
by the Athenians, who had expelled Evarchus the
reigning tyrant, and added it to their confederacy. It now fell back into the
hands of Corinth, and Evarchus was restored
to his throne. An attempt to recover Cephallenia turned
out a complete failure.
While thus engaged on the shores of the Peloponnesus,
the Athenians were able to send a smaller fleet into the Euripus, to cruise
off Locris and keep watch over the island of Euboea. The expedition
was successful; the Locrian coast was ravaged, the town of Thronium was captured, and the Locrians defeated in an attempt to relieve it. To
secure their good behavior a number of hostages were taken, and the island
of Atalante, which had hitherto been uninhabited, was fortified and held
by an Athenian garrison. By these measures any designs which the Locrians or Phocians may
have had upon Euboea were entirely frustrated.
These successes were accompanied by others nearer
home, from which the Athenians reaped a more definite and tangible advantage.
Soon after the return of the Peloponnesian army from Attica the Athenians
crossed over to Aegina, and, on the plea that the Aeginetans had been the main cause of the war, entirely expelled the inhabitants from the
island. The long quarrel between the cities was drawing to a close, though
unhappily even this severe punishment did not fill up the measure of Athenian
hatred. Most of the Aeginetans were received by the
Lacedaemonians and settled in the Thyreatis—the
beautiful coast-land on the western shore of the bay of Argos, which so long
formed a bone of contention between that city and Sparta. From this point they
continued to sail out and harass the Athenians, until at last, in 424 BC,
a descent was made on the country and they were cut down to a man. After
expelling the inhabitants from Aegina, the Athenians divided the farms, houses,
and other property in the island among their own citizens, who now occupied the
island as colonists (cleruchs).
Later in the summer, Pericles led out the entire force
of the city into the territory of Megara to ravage the country. The army was
joined by the fleet, which had just returned from Western Greece, and by this
union of forces, the largest force which Athens ever had in one place, was
occupied in devastating the fields of an unresisting and insignificant
adversary! The same display, though on a small scale, was repeated twice a year
for the next seven years. The exasperation of Athens against Megara was
extreme, even beyond the measure of neighborly hatred in Greece. It was no
doubt vexatious to find so small a state so obstinate in its attachment to the
Peloponnesian cause; the more so as Megara had once been the friend of Athens.
Her forts had been garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; her long walls had been
built by Athenian citizens, even before Athens had long walls of her own. While
Megara was the ally of Athens the route from the Peloponnesus to Attica was
closed, and Pericles was not likely to forget that in the day of danger Megara
had thrown Athens over and opened the Isthmus to Plistoanax.
Indeed his feeling towards the Megarians amounted to a personal
animosity. Not only had he refused to cancel the decree which excluded
the Megarians from Athenian ports, even at the cost of a war with
Sparta, but at his instigation a second decree was passed on the motion
of Charinus, declaring truceless and
eternal war against Megara. Every Megarian found on Athenian soil was
to be put to death at once; and twice in every year the Athenian generals were
compelled to invade the country. These savage measures were excused by
historians on the plea that the Megarians had murdered Anthemocritus, a herald sent to them from Athens, while
protected by the sanctity of his office; and explained by comedians as the
vengeance demanded by Aspasia for the loss of three courtesans who had crossed
the border! From Megara, where no defense could be offered, the army returned
home with such spoil as the country afforded, and this, like the property of
the Aeginetans, was no doubt consumed in soothing the
irritation of the Athenians at their own losses and privations.
In addition to these expeditions Athens had been
sustaining for the whole year the burden of the siege of Potidea, where no fewer than three thousand of the citizen
soldiers were permanently encamped, besides a large additional force, subsequently
dispatched under the command of Phormio. The
invasion of Attica had not caused the Athenians to withdraw a single man, and
nevertheless, in spite of strenuous exertions, the city itself held out, and
not one of the revolted Chalcidic towns
returned to its allegiance. In these circumstances it was tempting to try what
could be done by negotiation with the princes of the Barbarian nations in the
neighborhood. Could they be induced to assist the Athenians against their
rebellious subjects? With this object a citizen of Abdera, Nymphodorus by name, whose sister Sitalces, the king of the Odrysian Thracians,
had married, was appointed by the Athenians their representative
at Abdera, and invited to Athens in order to negotiate an alliance with
his brother-in-law. Sitalces was willing
enough to avail himself of the support of the Athenians in extending and
strengthening his kingdom; the Athenians were not less willing to obtain his
alliance against Chalcidice. Their expectations were fulfilled. Nymphodorus not only brought about the desired
alliance, but also set on foot a peace between Athens and Perdiccas, the
king of Macedonia, a crafty and unscrupulous barbarian, without courage or
honor, whose sole guide was the advantage of the moment. For some time past he
had been at war with the Athenians, but now he joined Phormio,
the Athenian general, in fighting against the Chalcidians. That the
alliance with Sitalces might be the more
lasting, the Athenians gratified the wish of Sadocus the
son of Sitalces, by making him a citizen of
their city. Further and more brilliant promises which Nymphodorus held
out during his stay at Athens—that Sitalces would
send forces to Chalcidice, and bring the war to an end—were only partially
fulfilled.
So the year ended, the first year of the terrible
conflict in which Pericles had involved his city. The Athenians had acquired
some distant and uncertain allies; they had secured the shores of Euboea from
attack; they had repulsed the Peloponnesian army at Oenoe;
they had acquired Cephallenia for the
alliance, and they had gained some successes at the mouth of the Corinthian
gulf. On the other hand the Peloponnesians had defeated the attack on Methone; they were in as good a position at the end of the
year as they had been at the beginning; and they had desolated a great part of
Attica. We can imagine with what bitterness the country people revisited their
ruined homes and desolate fields. Their vexation was the greater when they
reflected that the same thing would happen from year to year without any end.
What was gained, they asked, by such a sacrifice? The empire must be
maintained, no doubt, but why force matters to such an extremity with Sparta?
The two cities had drawn together in old days; why should there not be mutual
concessions now? Sparta had shown a great desire to avoid war; why should
Athens insist on it?
The custom of the Athenians furnished Pericles with an
opportunity of stating at length his view of the issues which were really at
stake. The bones of those who perished in the service of their country were
always brought home to be buried at the public expense, in the Ceramicus, or Potter’s Field, the most beautiful suburb of
the city, and a day was appointed in the winter, when military operations were
over, for the funeral. The strictness of Athenian habits was relaxed on the
occasion; the funeral procession was accompanied by anyone who chose, whether
citizen or stranger, and the female relatives of the dead were present at the
sepulchers to make lamentation. When the remains had been laid in the earth
some man “of known ability and high reputation” was chosen by the city to
pronounce an oration over those who had fallen in her cause. In accordance with
this custom Pericles was chosen to speak over those who were first buried in
the war; and Thucydides has availed himself of the opportunity to put into his
mouth a sketch of Athenian life and institutions, which the world accepts as
the ideal description of democratic government.
He began with deprecating the custom which demanded a
speech on such an occasion. Those who had acted nobly should only be honored by
noble acts—such as were the funeral rites paid by a grateful country. Their
glory should not be risked upon the eloquence of one man, who might speak well
or ill, and who would certainly be thought to say too much or too little. But
such was the law, and he must obey it.
Then he spoke of those who in past days had been
brought to their rest in the Ceramicus. Their
ancestors had possessed the land from immemorial antiquity, handing it down
from generation to generation unstained by foreign conquest, the home of
freedom. Their fathers had beaten back the tide of foreign and Hellenic war,
and after many a struggle had transmitted to their sons the great empire which
they now enjoyed. And those who were assembled there, most of them men in the
prime of life, had improved their inheritance and endowed the city with all
that she needed to enable her to stand alone in peace or war. “Let me dwell”,
he continued, “on the principles of action by which we rose to power; on the
institutions and manners which have brought our empire to this pitch of
greatness. Such thoughts are a fitting prelude to the praises of those who have
died for Athens; and there is no one here, whether citizen or stranger, who
will hear them without profit.
“Our institutions are not borrowed from those around
us; they are our own, the creation of Athenian statesmen; an example, and not a
copy. In the political language of the day we are called a democracy; and the
name is true and not true. It is true, because the administration of our city
is in the hands of the people; and there is one law for rich and poor; it is
not true, because, above all states, we recognize the claims of excellence. In
this sense we are an aristocracy; not of birth, for among us there is no
privilege; not of wealth, for poverty is a bar to none; but of merit; a state
in which every one who can benefit the
city may do so without let or hindrance.
“Such is the freedom of our political life, and in
society we are equally without constraint. Everyone does what he pleases,
without suspicion or offence. There is nothing modish, nor exclusive, in our
habits; we do not banish a man from our company because his ways are different
from our own. But along with this unconstrained liberty there goes a spirit of
reverence, which pervades every act of our public life; authority is
maintained; the laws are obeyed, not from fear of punishment, but from
principle; and of all ordinances the most sacred in our eyes are those which
protect the injured, who cannot retaliate; and the unwritten laws, which,
though enforced by no legal penalty, bring reproach to the transgressor.
“First, then, we have striven to be free, and we seek
to be happy. We have provided ourselves, in a greater degree than any other
city, with festivals and public games, to be a rest and refreshment after toil;
in our own homes we are surrounded by elegance and refinement, as a charm
against melancholy; and owing to the greatness of our city, to which the
produce of all the earth is brought, we are as familiar with the gifts of the
most distant regions, as we are with the fruits of Attica.
“In the same spirit we approach the severer duties of
the citizen’s life. Our resources are not a mystery to be concealed from every
eye, but anyone may visit our city and learn from us what he can. We do not
afflict ourselves with laborious training, and yet, in the hour of trial, our
courage does not fail. Free and light of heart, trusting to habit rather than
law, we are yet as ready for action as those who spend their lives in
anticipating danger and preparing to meet it. So much the greater is our gain.
“Once more: we dare to think as well as act; we live
for ourselves, while living for the state. With us a love of what is beautiful
is consistent with economy, and a man is a man, though he cultivates his mind.
.Yet we do not separate the citizen from the statesman; when a man has no time
to give to state affairs, we do not merely say that he is minding his own
business, but we call him an unprofitable servant. If we cannot always set a
policy on foot, we can form a good judgment about it, for we look on discussion
as the best preparation for action; our courage is not due to ignorance, or
stupidity, but we go into anger with our eyes open, and counting the cost. And
yet our policy is not a mere calculation of self-interest. More than any other
nation, we have drawn our friends to us by kindly actions, and we have assisted
others, without hope of advantage, in the confidence of freedom. From such a
city the Hellenic world may take a lesson. Of all men, the Athenian citizen is
the most accomplished and versatile; his parts are many, and he is admirable in
each. Of all cities, Athens alone is even greater than her fame. She needs no
poet to sing her praises; every land and every sea can furnish proofs of her
enterprise and success. Her enemies, when defeated, are not disgraced; her
subjects confess that she is worthy to rule them.
“Such is the city for which these men have given their
lives, whose obsequies we have met to celebrate. Her praises are theirs, for it
is they, and such as they, who have made her what she is. What can be more
glorious than such a fate as theirs, which, whether early or late, the first
indication or the final seal of virtue, is the ‘true assurance of a man’.
Neither hope of the future, nor desire to redeem the past; neither
wealth, nor poverty, checked them in their noble race. Their hearts were set on
vengeance and honor, and when the final moment came, it was in the glory of
victory, not in the terror of flight, that they fell.
“Let us, who remain, endeavor to follow their example,
while praying that our days may be longer in the land. I will not stir your
hearts by speaking of the blessings which are secured to those who defeat their
country’s enemies, for we have other and higher reasons for our devotion. Look
round on this glorious city; think of her mighty empire. Let the love of her beauty
sink into your souls, and when you contemplate her greatness, remember that it
was by the daring deeds of her citizens, done in the cause of duty and honor,
that she was raised to this glorious height. Even when their efforts failed,
they remained faithful to the death, giving their lives, when nothing else was
left to give. Their reward is worthy of them. Their glory shall never die; the
whole wide world is their sepulcher; their epitaphs are written in the hearts
of mankind; and wherever there is speech of noble deeds, their names are held
in remembrance.
“To men who fall as they have fallen death is no evil.
And therefore, while I sorrow with the parents of the dead, I will also remind
them of the changes and chances of life, in which his lot is fortunate whose
days, though short, are days of happiness and honor. I know that the lesson is
hard to learn, especially for those who see others in the enjoyment of
blessings which they have known and lost. Still I say : Be not
broken-hearted, but endure. With some of you other children will take the place
of the dead, filling the void at home, and making good the loss to the city.
And those to whom this hope is denied may comfort themselves with the thought
that their years are drawing to a close. The better part of life has been the
longer part ; and for the brief remainder they will enjoy the honor
and reverence which are at once the solace and the glory of old age.
“For those of you who are the children or brothers of
the dead an arduous struggle is in store. While men live they are but men; but
when they die their deeds become superhuman. What a task for you to emulate
virtue, which is beyond the reach of malice and calumny!
“To the wives, who will henceforth live in widowhood,
I will speak, in one short sentence only, of womanly virtue. She is the best of
women who is most truly a woman; and her reputation is the highest whose name
is never in the mouths of men for good or evil.
“There is nothing more to be said, and what remains to
be done will be the care of the city, which will bring up to manhood the
orphans of those who have fallen in her defense, for this is the prize, with
which, as with a garland, she crowns the virtues of her citizens. Wherefore,
when your lamentations are ended, you may depart”.
CHAPTER XV.
THE LAST YEAR OF
PERICLES.
WITH the return of
spring (430 B.C.) the Peloponnesians were again in Attica. After
desolating the central plain they passed on towards Sunium,
laying waste the coast land on either side of the promontory ; but before many
days had passed they received the news that the plague had broken out at
Athens, and it is said that their invasion was cut short on this account.
However this may be, they remained not less than forty days, the longest
stay they ever made, and ravaged the entire country. During the whole of
the time the plague was raging in the ill-fated city.
This new and
terrible disaster, the like of which is not recorded in Grecian history, came,
as such disorders commonly do, from the East. It first appeared in the
Peiraeus, from which it spread rapidly to the upper city. For a time it
was supposed that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the water-tanks,
but the disease was soon discovered to be of an infectious nature,
utterly unknown to the Greek physicians, and beyond the reach of help,
human or divine.
Athens was ill
prepared for such a visitation. The city was crowded with the inhabitants who
had been brought in from the country, and, as they had no houses of
their own, the new-comers were closely packed together in stifling huts,
among which the disease raged with terrible effect. The dead lay
in heaps ; the dying wallowed in the streets or crawled round the
fountains. The very temples were filled with corpses. There was no organised service for the removal of the dead ; each
man buried his own as he could, and often the survivors, overcome
by the number of the corpses, made use of burial-places not their
own, or threw the dead on funeral pyres which were burning for others.
Great and terrible
as were the physical evils of the plague, the moral evils which it wrought were
greater still. There were men at Athens, as there are everywhere, who
found it convenient to conform to the decencies of life, though without
moral principle; there were still more who were only deterred from crime
by the fear of punishment. Of both these classes of men the conduct was
now entirely changed. Those who had concealed their pleasures threw
the veil away, and the criminal was no longer terrified by any fear
of God or man. The divine law was disregarded, when good and evil perished
alike, and the human law was superseded by the terrible sentence which
seemed to be passed on the whole city.
In the
Peloponnesus the plague did little harm. That it appeared in the peninsula we
know from the statement of Thucydides, but we do not hear of it in
any of the great cities. Only in the remote town of Phigalea,
in the south-west corner of Arcadia, have we any record of its presence.
Here, in the glen of Bassae, surrounded by rocks
and old knotted oaks, stands the temple of Apollo the
Healer,—-the most perfect ruin in Greece next to the “ Theseum ” at Athens,—which was built as a thank-offering for the assistance
rendered by the god when the plague raged at Phigalea.
The horrors with
which he was surrounded did not turn Pericles from his purpose. Even in
the early days of the invasion, before the Peloponnesians had left the
central plain for the coast, he equipped a fleet of one hundred vessels,
on which were placed no fewer than four thousand Athenian hoplites. A
number of old ships were also converted into transports, for the conveyance of
three hundred horses, a new feature in the naval equipment of Athens. The
armament was then joined by fifty vessels from Chios and Lesbos. At the
head of this imposing force, Pericles set sail for the Peloponnesus to
make reprisals for the damage done to Attica. From the coast land, into
which they had now moved, the Peloponnesians would see the enormous
fleet standing out across the bay, a convincing proof that Athens was not yet
crushed by her misfortunes.
Arriving off the
coast of Argolis, the fleet attacked Epidaurus, but, though the country was
laid waste, the town could not be taken. Similar descents were made
at Troezen, Halieis, and
Hermione, cities on the same coast, which were allies of Sparta,
and with a similar result. At Prasiae, an
insignificant place on the coast of Laconia, the expedition was so
far successful that it took and destroyed the town, besides ravaging the
country round, but no attempt at permanent occupation seems to
have been made. The fleet then returned to Athens, whence it was
immediately sent out again, under the officers who had served with
Pericles, to take part in the siege of Potidaea. It had hardly
arrived at its destination before the plague broke out among the
troops, spreading from the new-comers to the soldiers previously engaged
in the siege, and as every attempt to take the city failed, the
fleet returned to Athens, after a stay of forty days, with a loss of
more than a fourth of the four thousand hoplites.
No wonder that a
change came over the spirit of the Athenians. In the city the plague was
raging; and no one could deny that its effects were greatly increased
by the policy which kept the Athenians confined within the walls. Had they
been scattered over Attica, the danger of infection, at any
rate, would have been greatly reduced. Outside the walls the whole of
Attica from Athens to Sunium, from Sunium to Marathon, from Marathon to Eleusis, was
utterly laid waste. Every proprietor and farmer was cut off from the
income which his lands might have brought him. At the same time, the
richer men, on whom the chief burdens of the navy and cavalry fell, had
been called upon to furnish an enormous force, which cannot have been at sea
for less than two months. And what had the force accomplished ? A few
patches of coast-land had been ravaged in Argolis; a Laconian hamlet
had been destroyed. At Potidaea the expedition had not only failed,
but had carried the plague into a healthy army.
The first effect
of the change of feeling was seen in the despatch of
envoys to Sparta with proposals for peace. But the Spartans, who probably
had received very exaggerated accounts of the plague, and looked on
Athens as hopelessly ruined, would listen to no overtures. Or they may
have distrusted proposals which did not come to them with the authority of
Pericles. Whatever the reason, the envoys entirely failed in their
mission. The greater was the exasperation against the author of the war.
Pericles found himself the object of a furious outbreak of popular
odium. He had hitherto done his utmost to prevent the people from meeting
for the discussion of public affairs, but he now found it necessary to
summon an assembly, and endeavour to bring them
into a better mood. He had no confessions of error to make ; it was the
people, not himself, who had changed; with the exception of the
plague, which was beyond human foresight, nothing had happened of
which they had not been forewarned. If they had been right in resolving
upon the war, they were wrong in wishing now to discontinue it. The
change was indeed unworthy of them, and more unworthy still was the
determination to make one man responsible for a policy to which all
were pledged. War was a great evil, which no city would bring upon
herself, if it could be avoided, but loss of independence was a greater
evil by far, and, when the choice lay between the two, there could
be no room for hesitation.
Pericles then
pointed out that the evils which had overtaken the Athenians, however
disastrous to individual citizens, left the strength of the
city unimpaired. Their chances of victory were as good as ever. Their
navy was still the greatest in the world ; they were absolute masters of
the sea; and not even the Great King could prevent their vessels from
sailing wherever they chose. What was the loss of houses or lands to men
who possessed such a power ? So long as they preserved their
freedom, they could quickly recover what had been lost; but if they
became the servants of others, they would lose not freedom only, but all
that freedom brings with it. Their ancestors had won a great
empire, were they unable even to maintain it? Far be such a disgrace
from them !
It was the
possession of this great empire which made the position so critical. “ Do not
imagine,” Pericles said, “that you are fighting for a simple issue,
freedom or slavery. You have an empire to lose ; you are exposed to the
hatred into which your imperial policy has brought you. Your empire is
a 'tyranny, which in the opinion of mankind has been unjustly
acquired, and which you cannot safely surrender. It is too late to play the
honest man ; and those who advise such a policy will bring the
state to ruin.”
“ No ! we must
hold on our way, and tread the path of glory. Our city has the greatest name in
all the world because she has never yielded to misfortunes, but has sacrificed
more lives and endured severer hardships in war than any other;
wherefore also she has the greatest power of any state up to this
day, and the memory of her glory will always survive. Even if we shall be
compelled at last to abate somewhat of our greatness (for all things
have their time of growth and decay) yet will the recollection live, that
of all Hellenes, we ruled over the greatest number of Hellenic subjects,
that we withstood our enemies whether single or united, in the most terrible
wars, and that we were the inhabitants of a city endowed with every sort
of wealth and greatness. The indolent may indeed find fault, but the
man of action will seek to rival us, and he who is less fortunate will
envy us. To be hateful and offensive has ever been at the time the fate of
those who have aspired to empire. But he judges well who accepts
unpopularity in a great cause. Hatred does not last long, and, besides the
immediate splendour of great actions, the renown of
them endures forever in men’s memories. Looking forward to such
future glory and present avoidance of dishonour, make
an effort now and secure both. Let no herald be sent to the
Lacedaemonians, and do not let them know that you are depressed by your
sufferings. For the greatest states and the greatest men,
when misfortunes come, are the least depressed in spirit, and the
most resolute in action.”9
We cannot but
admire the undaunted spirit of the man who, in the teeth of a powerful
opposition, amid the ruin and desolation of Attica, with the groans
of the dying almost sounding in his ears, could present such a front to
his enemies. Of such stuff the rulers of the world are made. And yet this
last speech of Pericles is a terrible speech—breathing in every
line a love of domination which threatened the freedom of Greece.
Beyond the walls of Athens such words would be received with fierce
denunciation; and within the city they nourished the most
selfish passions of the Athenian people. The Athenians had long been
taught to regard the money of the allies as their own, and the Delian
confederacy had been reduced to submission by the contributions which
were made to ensure its freedom. Now they were taught that Athens was a
tyrant city, hated like a tyrant, and compelled like a tyrant to rely
upon force for protection. “ Necessity, the tyrant’s plea,” was laid
upon her ; and glory, the conqueror’s idol, was held out as the final goal
of ambition. Not only were the interests of Hellas regarded as subordinate
to the interests of Athens, but honesty was confessed to be a ruinous
policy. Such was the dangerous eminence to which Athens had been
raised by the policy of Pericles, a policy which he sought to defend
by sophistry and exaggeration. It was an exaggeration to say that peace
with Sparta involved the slavery of Athens, for even at the close of
the war, Athens was not enslaved. It was sophistry to separate the
misfortunes of Athens from the misfortunes of her citizens. What sort of spirit
was likely to arise in men who were bidden to “ die like sheep
” behind the city walls, rather than face their enemy in the field ?
What was the value of an invincible fleet, when it failed at Epidaurus and
Potidaea?
The Athenians were
so far moved by the advice of Pericles, that they sent no more embassies
to Sparta, and resumed with eagerness the prosecution of the war. Yet
the opposition was not only strong enough to secure the deposition of
Pericles from his post of general, but also his condemnation in
a court of law, on a charge of embezzlement. He was sentenced to a
fine of fifty talents. As we find his old opponent Cleon among the leaders
of the prosecution, we may assume that the extreme democrats, who
were in favour of the war and yet opposed to
Pericles, proved stronger than the oligarchical party, who would have
combined his overthrow with negotiations for peace. The inhabitants of the
country, who were the worst sufferers by the plague and the war, seem to have been
unable to turn the scale. The condemnation was of course a party stroke,
for embezzlement was of all offences the one which could not be proved
against Pericles. But it was an offence readily believed of all
public men at Athens, and that was enough.
For the first time
for fifteen years Pericles was without public office ; he was compelled to look
idly on while the management of the state passed into the hands of
others. The bitterness of his fall was rendered more acute by the private
misfortunes which gathered thick upon him. In his youth he had
married the wife of Hipponicus, who seems
to have been transferred to him from her husband by some arrangement,
which caused neither a scandal nor a feud. By her he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. Xanthippus had long been on bad terms with his father
owing to his own worthless character, and that he fell a victim to the
plague was perhaps no reason for regret. So much the deeper was the
affection lavished on Paralus, and when he also
was carried off by the remorseless pestilence, Pericles was entirely crushed by
the blow. As he placed the funeral crown on his son’s head, he broke
into loud lamentations at the doom which had left him desolate. The
Athenians were so greatly moved by his calamities that a decree was
passed, under which his son by Aspasia, Pericles the younger, was
made an Athenian citizen, and by this expedient his house was saved from
extinction.
From July 430 to
July 429 B.C., Athenian policy was not controlled by Pericles. The war went
on as before. The operations were chiefly in Western Greece. The
Lacedaemonians endeavoured to make reprisals for
the Athenian expedition round the Peloponnesus, by sending a hundred ships
against Zacynthus, the ally of the Athenians,
but though the island was ravaged, the Zacynthians could not be brought to terms. Later on in the year the Ambraciots summoned a force of Chaonians and other barbarians to their aid for an attack on the city of Amphilochian Argos, with which they had been on bad
terms for years, but in this case also the city could not be taken, and
after ravaging the country the army dispersed.
These movements
naturally attracted the notice of the Athenians, who were allies of the Argives
and Acarnanians. An expedition of twenty ships was despatched to Naupactus under the command of Phormio, one of the generals of the year.
The appointment was a most happy one. Some years before, Phormio had delivered Argos from the aggression of the Ambraciots ; he was well known in the West, and was
soon to prove himself the ablest naval officer at Athens. In the North
affairs were favourable to the Athenians. A
number of envoys from the Peloponnesus with Aristeus of Corinth at their head—a man whom the Athenians considered to be
the cause of all their troubles in Chalcidice— had been despatched to Asia in the hope of persuading the king of
Persia to take part in the war. On their way they went to the court of the Odrysian king, Sitalces,
thinking that he might be induced to throw the Athenians over, or at least
to convey the envoys across the Hellespont. The visit proved a fatal
mistake. Two Athenians who happened to be with Sitalces at the time persuaded his son Sadocus to seize
the envoys as they were about to cross the straits and deliver them into
their hands. The captives were at once carried to Athens, where they were
put to death on the very day of their arrival, without any trial, and
their bodies thrown down precipices. This _savage act —which
might not have occurred had Pericles been in power—was justified as a
retaliation on the Lacedaemonians, who, at the beginning of the war,
slaughtered every one captured at sea, whether he was an ally of the
Athenians or a neutral. A bad act cannot justify a worse, but it was
certainly a gain to the Athenians to have got rid of Aristeus and to have put a stop to Spartan negotiations with Persia. The alliance
with Sitalces was not without results.
More important was
the surrender of Potidaea, which took place towards the end of the year 430
B.C. For more than two years the heroic defenders had held out
against the utmost efforts of Athenian skill and energy. But the invasions
of Attica, from which so much was expected, had brought no relief, and at
last supplies ran short. Even then the city held out, and it was not until
the extremity of famine, “ even to the eating of human flesh,”
had been endured, that the final overtures were made. On the other
hand, the besiegers had suffered much, and they had before them the
prospect of a third winter in their exposed situation, while the expenses
of the siege had run up to ,£400,000 of our money. On both sides,
therefore, there was an eagerness to bring the long drama to an end,
and the terms proposed were accepted by the Athenian generals. The Potidaeans with their wives and children, and even the
foreign troops, came out of the city, the men with one garment, the women
with two ; besides which they received a certain sum of money for
their journey. They dispersed among the cities of Chalcidice or wherever
they could find a home, and Potidaea was henceforth occupied
by Athenian colonists.
In the spring of
the following year (429 B.C.) the Peloponnesians did not invade Attica. They
may have been afraid of the plague, or they may have left so little
behind them in the previous year that invasion was useless. At the request
of the Thebans, they marched upon Plataea, and endeavoured to detach the city from Athens, or at least to insure its neutrality. On
applying to Athens for advice, the Plataeans were urged to hold out, the Athenians declaring that they never had
forsaken them and never would, but would assist them to the utmost
of their power. On this assurance they refused to enter into any
negotiations with Archidamus, and prepared to
resist his attack. All the resources of engineering skill were brought to
bear upon the city, but in vain; when a huge mound was raised against the
wall, the Plataeans rendered it useless, partly
by raising the wall, partly by removing the earth through a mine, but
most of all by building a second wall within that part against which the
mound was raised, so that, if it were captured, the city would still
be defensible. When battering-rams were brought up, they broke off the
heads by dropping heavy beams upon them. The Peloponnesians
then attempted to set the town on fire, but the plan failed of
success, owing to the stillness of the weather and an opportune storm of
rain. Finding his efforts useless, Archidamus was driven to invest the city; a double wall was built round it,
and garrisoned partly with Peloponnesian, partly with Boeotian
soldiers.
These operations
occupied the Peloponnesians from May to October. During the whole of
this time Athens took no steps whatever to deliver those who had
allowed their country to be ravaged in reliance on promises of Athenian
help. For these promises Pericles was not himself responsible,
but those who gave them must have been aware that they could not
assist the Plataeans without meeting the
Boeotians, at least in the open field—a policy which had been renounced in
the very beginning of the war. The abandonment of Plataea to her
fate, for so we must call it, was the inevitable result of the line
taken by Pericles since the peace of 445 B-C. Nothing but
an effective Athenian army could have saved the town, and the Athenian
army in the hands of Pericles became eminently ineffective. Some
years after his death, the Athenians tried their strength against Boeotia
in the battle of Delium (424 B.C.), but only to
meet with a most disastrous overthrow.
While their
faithful friends and allies were being shut up to destruction on the borders of
Attica, an Athenian army, which had been sent out to Chalcidice, was
severely defeated at Spartolus. The victory was
chiefly due to the superiority of the Chalcidic horse and targeteers, or light-armed troops, who
now appear for the first time as an efficient force against heavy-armed
soldiers. About one-fifth of the Athenian force and all the three generals
in command were slain.
The news of this
defeat seems to have caused a reaction at Athens in favour of Pericles. At the next election of generals he was chosen into his
old place, and “ all things were put into his hands.” But the
reaction came too late. At the time when he returned to office he was
already perhaps stricken with the disease which in two or three
months brought him to the grave, and under such circumstances he can
hardly have taken any very active part in public affairs. Nevertheless,
his last days were cheered by reports of the most brilliant exploits ever
achieved by the Athenian fleet.
Though the Ambraciots had failed to take Argos Amphilochicum in the preceding summer, they had not abandoned their designs on the city.
On the contrary, they now came forward with a plan for subjugating
the whole country of Acarnania, and detaching it from the Athenian
alliance. A combined attack was to be made by land and sea, so that the
Acarnanians might be unable to unite their whole forces for resistance.
With this view, the Ambraciots called upon the
Lacedaemonians to send them a fleet, with a thousand hoplites on
board. On their own part, they would bring into the field their army,
and also obtain the help of the barbarian tribes of Epirus. If the plot
succeeded, Zacynthus and Cephallenia,
and perhaps even Naupactus, would fall into the hands of Sparta, and it
would no longer be easy for the Athenians to cruise round the
Peloponnesus.
The scheme was
eagerly taken up at Sparta. Cnemus, the admiral who
had conducted the attack upon Zacynthus in the
previous year, was at once despatched with a
thousand hoplites in a few ships to Ambracia; a
larger contingent of vessels from Sicyon and Corinth, which, as the
mother-country of Ambracia, warmly espoused her
cause, was to follow as soon as ready. When he reached Leucas, Cnemus was joined by the ships furnished from Leucas, Ambracia, and Anactorium, with
which he at once crossed the sea, unperceived by Phormio, the
Athenian officer at Naupactus. On landing, Cnemus found a large force of Chaonians and other
barbarians ready to obey his orders, and as he felt himself sufficiently
strong to open the game without waiting for the ships from Corinth,
he at once began his march. His route lay along the eastern edge of
the Ambracian gulf, through the territory of
Argos, to Stratus, on the Achelous, which was the largest city in
Acarnania.
The Acarnanians at
once sent to Phormio for help ; but as Phormio was daily expecting to see the Corinthian fleet
sail down the gulf, he could not leave Naupactus. Meanwhile the combined
forces were approaching the town. They came on in three divisions, of
which the barbarians formed the centre. The
Hellenic soldiers marched in good order as they had been trained to do,
but the barbarians rushed on at full speed, thinking they had only to be
first on the scene to capture the town. The Stratians saw their opportunity ; if they could destroy the barbarians before the
Greeks came up, the whole expedition would receive a very sensible check.
They placed some of their soldiers in ambuscades outside the city,
and when the barbarians were close to the walls, a combined onset was made
from the city and from the ambuscades. The Chaonians were at once seized with a panic; many were slaughtered ; the rest,
carrying the other barbarians with them, rushed back to the Greeks, who
received their first news of the battle from the defeated fugitives. Here a
stand was made for the remainder of the day, but when night came on Cnemus began his retreat to Oeniadae.
The invasion was at an end before the Acarnanians could assemble all their
forces, and the plan which promised so fair turned out an
utter failure.
And this was not
the worst. Almost on the very day of the battle of Stratus the fleet from
Corinth, which should have co-operated with Cnemus and the land army, was utterly defeated by Phormio at the mouth of the gulf. From his station at Naupactus the Athenian
commander saw the ships moving along the Peloponnesian shore; they had no
intention of attacking him, for they were not equipped for a battle, but
for the conveyance of troops, and that Phormio would attack their forty-seven vessels with his twenty never occurred to
them. Suddenly they saw the Athenian ships moving along the opposite coast
of Aetolia, and when in the dim light of morning they attempted to cross
over from Patrae in Achaea towards Acarnania
they were met by Phormio bearing down upon them from
the mouth of the Evenus. It was impossible to
avoid an engagement.
The Corinthian
commanders knew that their seamen were not a match for the Athenians in point
of skill. To be forced into an engagement was bad enough ; to be attacked
in the open sea where there was room for every manoeuvre was still worse. They resolved to arrange their fleet in such a manner
that the ordinary tactics of sailing through the lines of vessels and
then charging from the rear would be impossible. With this object they
drew up their ships in a circle, turning the prows outward, and
keeping them sufficiently close to avoid any inlet. The smaller craft
were gathered in the central space, where also were placed five of their
swiftest triremes ready to run out at any point, which the
enemy attacked.
On seeing this
formation Phormio at once took his measures.
Arranging his vessels in a single line, he bade the sailors row round the
enemy’s fleet in ever narrowing circles. By this means he brought
their ships into the smallest possible compass, and kept them in
constant expectation of an attack. He continued this manoeuvre till the moment when the morning breeze came down from the Corinthian
gulf —as he knew that it would—and made it impossible for the
Peloponnesian vessels to remain steadily in their places. Ship began to
dash against ship ; the attention of the sailors was occupied in keeping
them clear of each other, the more so as the rough water made rowing
difficult for the unpractised oarsmen. Then Phormio gave the signal for attack. The first vessel
sunk was one of the admirals, but soon the havoc was universal; no
resistance could be made ; in wild disorder the whole fleet ran for the
Achaean coast, hotly pursued by Phormio, who
captured twelve vessels with most of their crews. The rest escaped to
Cyllene in Elis, where they were joined by Cnemusand the ships from Leucas.
At the news of
this disaster the Lacedaemonians were highly indignant. They did not indeed recall their
admiral and condemn him to death, as the Athenians would have done under
similar circumstances, but while sending him orders to fight again, they
also sent three commissioners, one of whom was Brasidas, to advise with
him. They could not understand how a few ships could defeat so many, or recognise that their own fleet was so vastly inferior
to the Athenian, as the battle had proved it to be. When the
commissioners arrived at Cyllene, Cnemus sent
round to the Peloponnesian allies for more vessels and refitted those
which had been damaged in the engagement.
Intelligence of
their movements was conveyed to Phormio. He at once
sent to Athens for reinforcements ; a battle might take place any day, in
which he would have to meet the whole Peloponnesian fleet with only
twenty vessels. From Corcyra, whose fleet was to be of such advantage to
Athens in operations in Western Greece, not one vessel had been sent,
either to the aid of Argos or Acarnanian Phormio,
who was left entirely to his own resources or help from Athens. The
greater is our astonishment to find that the reinforcement decreed
at Athens amounted only to twenty vessels, and that even these,
though every day was of great importance, were bidden to sail to Crete before
they went r to the west! Who was responsible for this
extraordinary order we do not know ; the Athenians could have gained
nothing by the most brilliant success in Crete—which, so far as we know,
they never revisited in the course of the war ; while on the other hand the
position of Athens in Western Greece was in peril, It was a grave blunder,
and nothing but the wonderful skill of Phormio saved Athens from irretrievable disaster.
When all was ready
the Peloponnesian fleet left Cyllene for Panormus in Achaea,
where the land forces were assembled to support it. Phormio meanwhile, who was resolved not to fight in the narrow channel, if he was
compelled to fight at all, sailed from Naupactus to the promontory of Antirrhium, where he anchored. The Peloponnesians, who
were as anxious to fight in the gulf as Phormio was to fight out of it, met him by moving to a point exactly opposite,
where the gulf was not more than a mile broad. The number of their vessels
was seventy-seven, while Phormio had no more than his
original twenty. For six or seven days the two fleets lay opposite
each other. At length Cnemus and Brasidas, finding
that Phormio would not return within the strait,
determined to draw him into it. Forming their vessels four deep, they
fronted north-east or east and sailed along the Achaean shore into
the gulf, twenty of their fastest vessels leading the way. Phormio at once saw the danger; he had left Naupactus
without any guard, for even the Messenians of the town had followed him on
shore, to support his vessels, and if the Peloponnesian fleet got
ahead, they would reach the place before he could save it. He at once
embarked, and bidding the Messenians follow sailed in single file along
the coast with all speed for Naupactus. This was exactly what Bras-idas wished ; the Athenian ships had now no room for
any exhibition of their dreaded skill. Changing front, he suddenly brought
his whole line, four deep, upon the flank of Phormio’s vessels. It was an excellent manoeuvre, and well
carried out; but owing to the superiority of the Athenians in rowing, it
was only partially successful. Eleven of Phormio’s vessels escaped the swiftest Peloponnesian ships; the remaining nine were
forced aground, and one ship was already taken with its crew, when the Messenians
dashed into the water and saved the rest.
So far, the
victory was on the side of the Lacedaemonians, who might reasonably have
thought that they had redeemed their previous failure. But half the
Athenian fleet still remained. Of the eleven ships which escaped the
attack, ten reached Naupactus and ranged themselves in a position of defence should the enemy attempt to force them to
shore. One remained behind, unable to keep up in the race. In their
wake came the twenty Peloponnesian vessels, of which one, far in advance of the
rest, was chasing the Athenian laggard. It chanced that in the deep
water off Naupactus a merchantman lay at anchor in the line of pursuit.
The Athenians saw their opportunity. Quick as thought they sped round the anchored vessel, and bearing down on the ship by
which they were themselves pursued, struck her amidships and sent her to
the bottom. Such a splendid feat of audacity and skill filled the
Peloponnesians with dismay. They had come on in loose order singing the
paean of victory, but their temper changed in a moment, and checking their
pursuit, they waited for the body of the fleet to come up. The delay
was fatal ; the Athenians, cheered by the brilliant success of their ship,
and seeing the disorder of the enemy, sailed out and fell upon the
Peloponnesian fleet, which was without any settled plan of battle. Some of
the sailors, ignorant of the locality, had run their vessels ashore ; all
were expecting the fate of the Leucadians. After a short resistance
the whole fleet fled to Panormus, whence they
had started, with the Athenians after them, eleven ships in chase of
more than seventy! On the following night the Peloponnesians stole away to
Corinth.
This was perhaps
the last event of which the news was brought to Pericles. It was a great and
decisive victory won by an old comrade of his own—a victory which
confirmed his policy and proved the incomparable superiority of the Athenians
on the sea. But the eye which in days gone by would have brightened
at such achievements was growing dim; the eloquent voice which would have
bestowed on them their due reward of praise was silent.
Though Pericles had escaped the first virulence of the plague, he was
seized by the disease in an insidious form, and in the late summer of 429
B.C., two years and a half after the outbreak of the war, he lay on his
deathbed. The misfortunes of the year had broken him, and when the final
illness came, there was little strength of body or mind to resist it. The
master spirit was laid low ; half conscious of his weakness, he would
shew to the friends who visited him the amulets, which the women of the
household had tied about his neck in the vain hope of checking
the progress of his sickness. Yet something of the old Pericles
remained ; a few days before his death, when friends were praising his
deeds, thinking perhaps that he was unconscious of their words,
he murmured that in all the past nothing gave him so much
satisfaction as the thought that no Athenian had by any act of his put on
the robe of mourning! The boast was true. Himself the constant object
of calumny and attack, he had never abused his power to pursue an
enemy to the death.
He died in the
sixty-fifth year of his age.
CHAPTER XVI.
THE ATHENS OF
PERICLES-THE GOVERNMENT, HOME AND FOREIGN.
FROM the days of
Solon Athens had been a democracy, and from the days of Clisthenes the
people had been conscious of their power. But the democracy of Pericles was
widely different from that of Solon or Clisthenes ; and the change was
partly in form and partly in spirit.
During the Persian
wars, and for some time afterwards, the influence of the great families, or at
any rate of the great men among them, was still dominant at Athens.
However deeply attached to the blessings of freedom and “ equal speech,” the
Athenian people had not yet cast aside the habit of
deference 258 to those who for generations had been their
leaders in all matters of public importance—a habit almost natural in
the ignorant and inexperienced. So long as this habit existed, the
sovereign people were more or less guided in the exercise of their
sovereignty by the will of a few great men ; when it ceased to
exist, the majority of the moment became supreme.
This spirit of
deference may have been shaken to some extent by the quarrels between the
great families, though we know from our own history that Whig and
Tory may carry on an almost internecine strife without damaging in any
serious degree the prestige of the aristocratic members of either
party. Something was also effected, no doubt, by the constant attacks
of Ephialtes on the aristocrats who abused their position in order to make
a profit for themselves. But the change of feeling which created the
Periclean democracy seems to have been principally due to the overthrow of the
Areopagus and the development of the popular jury-courts. The successful
attack upon an ancient and venerable institution taught the people that there
was nothing, however sacred, which their power could not remove, and the
constant combination of the citizens into juries not only gave them a new
idea of their importance, but taught them to act together for their
own ends.
The far-famed
training of Sparta was not more characteristic of that city than these
jury-courts were of the Athens of Pericles. Several thousands of the
citizens—men over thirty years of age—spent their time in deciding the
differences which arose between Athenians or between Athenians and
foreigners. All offences except murder, arson, and one or two more, which
were left to the cognisance of the Areopagus,
were decided in these courts, which without any direct participation in
politics exercised by this means a great influence on the policy of
the Athenians. Did a general fail in an expedition, he was brought
before a jury and fined or condemned to death. Was a public officer inaccurate
in his account of the money which had passed through his hands, he
was brought into a court. Did a citizen propose a decree which was contrary to
an existing law, no matter how beneficial the object he had in
view, he was brought before a court. If any allied city complained of
the amount of tribute imposed upon her by the assessors, the question was
referred to a jury; and most of the more serious offences, civil or
criminal, throughout the Athenian empire were brought to Athens to be
judged by Athenian citizens. It was through the law-courts that
Athens, in the days of Pericles, maintained her authority over the
executive of the government, an authority enforced by the severest
penalties and extending to the most minute details. It was through them
that she controlled the trade of her great empire. And from the
decision of these courts there was no appeal. The public Assembly often
referred matters to the decision of the court, but the converse
process was unknown. Nor was any decision of a law-court ever
cancelled or revised. The jurors were exempt from all responsibility—a
privilege which they shared with the public Assembly and with that only.
They were also the
only power capable of enacting new laws. We are very ill informed about the
process by which new laws were passed at Athens in the time of Pericles,
but we may certainly affirm that the power of making them rested with the
jurors, and not with the Assembly. The utmost that the Assembly could do,
except in rare and exceptional cases, was to pass a decree, which, if it
was not contrary to any existing law, was valid for the current
year. The Assembly was competent to change the whole constitution of
Athens ; it could decide whether the laws of Solon should be maintained or
superseded by a new code; it could close the law-courts; it
could give permission for new laws to be passed, or withhold it, but it
had not the power, by a mere resolution, to add to the statute-book.
Lastly, an
Athenian juror was both judge and juryman. Though an archon presided in the
courts, he merely introduced the case; he did not explain the law to
the jury or check the contending parties in their statements. It was
indeed forbidden under pain of death to quote the law falsely in a
court, but the interpretation of the law, on which so much depends in
the administration of justice, was within the competence of the juror. It
was also for him to decide whether he would insist on the letter of
the statute, or allow himself to be moved by pathetic appeals and
extenuating circumstances.
The technical name
for the whole body of jurors was the Heliaea. It is
probable that a Heliaea existed in some form at
Athens, from the time of Solon onwards, and that appeals could be made
to it from the sentence of the archons, who in those days had a good
deal of judicial power. But it was not till the time of Pericles that the Heliaea acquired the position which we have described.
So long as the Areopagus retained its extensive powers, the Heliaea could hardly be more than a court of law in
the stricter sense ; and until the jurors were paid, their functions could
not be very engrossing. It was Pericles, as we have seen,
who overthrew the Areopagus; it was he who caused the jurors to be
paid. With him, therefore, the reign of the Heliaea must have begun. We cannot indeed trace the steps by which the system
was built up, but we know from the plays of Aristophanes that it was in
full working order before the death of Pericles. For good or for evil,
the Heliaea, as we find it in the “Wasps,” is
his contribution to the public institutions of Athens.
By the development
of these courts at the expense of the Areopagus, he withdrew important
functions from a section of the community and conferred them on all
Athenians of full age, who could prove that they were fit to receive it.
Above all, he established the majesty of law, and claimed for it the
support of the whole nation. Every Athenian had now a direct reason
for knowing what the law was, and for helping to maintain it. The reign of
the Heliaea was the reign of law. The Athenians,
as a body, had probably a better acquaintance with their laws than
the citizens of any other state, equally large; and even in moments of the
greatest political excitement, they were to an unusual degree
a law-abiding nation. The laws were simple and clear, and lay within
the comprehension of every citizen. There was no “bar” at Athens, nor
indeed anything which could be called a legal profession, though a
few men of a special aptitude wrote speeches for their clients to deliver,
and others, owing to their special knowledge of law and custom, were
able to advise men in difficult circumstances. Every man was his own
lawyer. In none of the great cities of the world has the interpretation
of the law occupied so small a space as at Athens; and in none has
the administration of it occupied so large a space.
Other results
which followed from the change were by no means so satisfactory. In the first
place, Pericles destroyed a time-honoured institution, and erected in its place an arrangement which had nothing
dignified or majestic about it. This was in itself a great evil. In all
departments of government, customs and institutions are needed
which arouse a sense of awe and reverence; and in the administration of
law such customs and institutions are peculiarly necessary. The ermine
robes, the black cap, the antique foppery of wigs and gowns, are not
without a real value. They awake wonder, and shew that something unusual
is going on. In the jury-courts of Athens these elements were wanting,
and the respect for the administration of justice suffered in consequence.
Of the same sort was another evil, inseparably connected with
the institution. The jurors could not be the best and most
influential citizens at Athens. No man living in the country could be a
juror, for the duties demanded his constant presence at Athens;
no one engaged in any occupation, even moderately remunerative, would
care to spend his time in a court for a payment of about a day; no
one serving in the army, no senator, no public officer, could spare
time for the duties of a juror. There remained two classes of men: the old
or infirm, who could sit in a court, when they could do nothing else;
and the idle or nefarious person, for whom the court offered amusement or
occupation.
The spirit of
litigation, to which such courts gave rise, was in itself a great evil, but it
became worse when the courts were composed of men who looked to them
for a living. We are told that speakers sometimes warned the courts that
if they were slow in the work of fining and confiscating, the funds
out of which their payments came would fall off; and whether this be
true or not, it is obvious that the rich offered the most tempting victims
to courts largely composed of the very poor. The establishment of such
courts was a step onwards in the development of class-hatred, ranging the
rich and poor on opposite sides; for though the law was the same for
all, the administration of it was now as entirely in the hands of the
poor, as it had once been in the hands of the rich. And along with
this inequality went the degradation of moral sentiment, which could
not fail to arise in men who were engaged from morning to night not only
in listening to legal quibbles, or falsehoods, but in deciding for
hire on the lives and properties of others without the least
responsibility or control.’"
For a time these
evils did not appear. Cimon lived for eleven years after the fall of the
Areopagus, and his party survived his death; a party which preserved
old traditions, and looked back on the past with reverence. Pericles, too,
though he established the courts, stood aloof from them. He kept up
the majesty of the state, partly by his own reserved and dignified habits,
partly by the splendid buildings with which, following the policy of
Cimon, he adorned the city. But when Pericles had passed away, the
orators of the law-courts came to the front, and the tone of political
life was changed. Unhappily for Athens, the change came at a time when
a captious sophistry was destroying the intellectual no less than the
moral fibre of the nation.
In all that concerned
the administration of the state, home or foreign, the supreme authority
was vested in the Assembly, or Ecclesia, as the Greeks called it.
Every Athenian of full age—that is, every Athenian who had attained his
eighteenth year, was a member of the Assembly, and could record
his vote on any question brought before it. He had also the right of
addressing the Assembly and proposing any measure he pleased on the
subject under discussion ; but in practice the younger citizens were expected
to wait till the elders had said their say, if indeed they spoke at all.
Yet even a young man, if he possessed the gift of persuasive speech,
quickly became a power in the Assembly; his friends and supporters would gather
round him to applaud what he said, and cry down everything which came
from the opposite side. In earlier times, and down to the death of
Pericles, the general was, as a rule, the politician, and the Assembly
trusted for information and guidance to those who were chiefly responsible
for carrying its wishes into effect, but after his death the “ speaker ”
became almost synonymous with the statesman. This was more especially
the case when sophists and rhetoricians had established themselves in the
city, teaching men how to “ make the worse the better cause,”
and reducing the management of politics to general rules, to the
great disparagement of experience and knowledge.
There were four
stated meetings of the Assembly in each of the ten divisions into which the
civic year of the Athenians was divided ; and, if occasion required
it, extraordinary assemblies could also be summoned. Early in the morning
a flag was raised at the place of meeting; the people gathered
from all parts, and took their seats, without any order or division
of tribe or demes. Here they remained in eager expectation till the Councillors appeared and opened the business of the
day. Before they entered on their duties, the blood of sucking-pigs was
carried round the assembled people as a purification; and a solemn
curse was pronounced upon any one who should seek to mislead the Assembly
for private ends. Then the Councillors brought
forward their proposals on the subject of the day, and the
people were invited to discuss them. After the motion of the Council,
which was always brought in in writing, had been read, the herald first asked
if any citizen over fifty years of age wished to speak ; and
when these had given their opinions, the turn of the younger men
came. The resolution of the Council might be rejected and replaced by a
new one, or it might be amended, or simply accepted. The people gave
their votes by holding up their hands, and the chairman pronounced on
which side the majority lay. For this reason no sitting of the
Assembly could be prolonged till an hour at which it was no longer
possible to see the hands held up. And if any untoward sign occurred which
seemed to indicate the displeasure of the gods, such as an earthquake, or
thunder or lightning, or even rain, the sitting broke up at once.
In his play of the
“ Acharnians,” Aristophanes has given us a picture of
a meeting in the Ecclesia. Dicaeopolis, an
honest farmer, who has been driven into Athens by the war, is discovered
in his place in the Pnyx, where the meetings
were held, in the early morning, waiting impatiently for the arrival of
the Prytanes, or presidents.
Dicceopolis. Ah
there !
The presidents at
last ; see, there they come ! All scrambling for their seats—-I told you so
! Herald.
Move forward there
! Move forward all of ye !
Further! Within
the consecrated ground.
Amphitheus.
Has anybody spoke
?
Her. Is anybody
Prepared to speak
?
Amp. Yes,
I.
Her. Who
are you and what ?
Amp. Amphitheus the demigod.
The gods moreover
have dispatched me here Commissioned specially to arrange a peace, Betwixt
this city and Sparta—notwithstanding I find myself rather in want at
present Of a little ready-money for my journey.
The magistrates
won’t assist me.
Her. Constables
I
Die. You
presidents, I say ! you exceed your powers ;
You insult the
assembly, dragging off a man That offered to make terms and give us peace.
Her. Keep silence
there.
Die. By
Jove, but I won’t be silent.
Except I hear a
motion about peace.
Her. Ho there !
the Ambassadors from the King of Persia. Die. What King of
Persia ? What Ambassadors ?
I’m sick of
foreigners and foreign animals. Peacocks and coxcombs and Ambassadors.
********
Amp. We’ve
brought you here a nobleman, Shamartabas
By name, by rank
and office the king’s eye.
Dic. God send a crow to peck
it out, I say.
And yours the
Ambassador’s into the bargain.
********
Her. Silence
there ! Keep your seats !
The council have
invited the King’s eye To feast with them in the Prytaneum.
Dic. There—
Ain’t it enough to drive one mad ? To drive one To hang
himself? To be kept here in attendance, Whilst every door flies open to
these fellows.
*******!*
The Thracians that
came hither with Theorus Let them come forward !
Dic. What the plague are
these ?
Theorus. The Odomantian army.
Dic. The Odomantians !
Out, out upon it!
I’m a plundered man,
I’m robbed and
ruined here with the Odomantians.
They ’re seizing
upon my garlic.
You magistrates,
have you the face to see it
With your own
eyes—your fellow-citizen Here, in the city itself, robb’d by barbarians?
—But I forbid the
assembly. There’s a change
In the heaven ! I
felt a drop of rain 1 I ’m witness !
Her. The
Thracians must withdraw, to attend again
The first of next
month. The assembly is closed.
Thus the sovereign
power of Athens rested with a gathering which might be composed of the whole,
or of but a small portion, of the citizens, and the votes were given
under the immediate influence of the speeches made on the occasion. By the
Assembly the whole of the executive officers of Athens
were immediately and directly controlled. It is characteristic of
democracies, at any rate of city democracies, to be exceedingly jealous of
their servants: either they allow them to hold office for a very
short time, as at Florence; or they retain the right of discharging
them at a moment’s notice. At Athens the magistrates held office for a
year, but once in every prytany—i.e., ten
times in the year—the question was put in the Assembly whether
they should be continued in office or superseded. If anyone among
them was held guilty of any offence, he was at once superseded and
delivered over to the mercies of a law-court. By the Assembly also
war was declared, expeditions sent out, and conquered states reduced
to slavery; and if a general was sometimes trusted so far as to carry out
the details of a campaign, he often received minute and
precise instructions to guide his conduct. Any change in the
constitution of Athens, such as the restriction of the powers of the Areopagus
and the admission of the fourth Solonian class to office, could only
be made in the Assembly.
This sovereign
power, so comprehensive and yet so minute in its operation, could not be left
without checks upon its action. Of those which existed in the time of
Pericles some dated from the days of Solon, while others must have been
introduced, or at any rate increased in force, by Pericles
himself. Solon established the law that the Assembly could only
discuss and decide on business brought before it by the Council. It had
not the power of simple initiation. No citizen could get up and propose
a measure without regard to the action of the Council. The utmost
latitude allowed, if indeed so much was allowed, permitted him to suggest
a measure for the consideration of the Council, and the measure
thus suggested was included by the Council in the programme of business at the next meeting. Or a clause might be inserted in a
decree, compelling the Council to bring forward the business to which
it referred, or to introduce envoys within a certain time. In the
settlement with Chaicis (p. 131), the prytanes
are pledged to bring any envoy from Chal-cis before
the Council and people within ten days of his arrival. And in another
decree, concerning the first-fruits at Eleusis, Lampon the seer is to report to the Council in the ninth prytany,
and the Council nolens volens must bring the matter forward before the
Assembly. The insertion of these clauses shews that it was in the power of
the Council to delay, or even to quash, at least for their year
of office, any measures to which they were opposed, and the only
safeguards against an abuse of this power, except such peremptory orders,
were the numbers of the Council, and the “ scrutiny ” at the close of
the year of office.
Another check or
limitation of the power of the Assembly was the separation of the judicial
and legislative from the administrative functions. The Assembly was
indeed a sovereign power, but, as we have said, it could not, except in
peculiar circumstances, make a law, or pass a legal sentence. Nor could it
revoke a sentence when passed by a lawcourt. In its own sphere it was absolute;
it could bring forward for discussion a matter on which a vote had
been taken; it could cancel a previous decree ; it refused, in fact, to be
bound by its own acts; but over it was the law, and the administration of
the law. This limitation—which is honourable to the Athenian democracy—was so strictly observed that on the few
occasions when the Assembly became a court of law, it met, as a rule, under
peculiar conditions. The place of meeting was the marketplace, and not the Pnyx; the citizens voted by their tribes, and
not promiscuously ; the votes were given by ballot; and in order to be
valid, the decision must be supported by no fewer than six thousand votes.
The supremacy of
the law over the Assembly was probably maintained by the Areopagus, so long
as that court was in possession of its ancient privileges. With the
development of the paid juries a peculiar form of process replaced the
supervision of the Court. It was open to any citizen in the Assembly to
declare that the motion brought forward was contrary to the law of the
land, and by pledging himself to indict the proposer for “ illegality,” he
at once secured the suspension of the motion. The case was then tried
in a court. If the proposal was found to be illegal, the mover was
punished more or less severely; if the attack turned out
frivolous, the accuser was fined one thousand drachmae (about £3 5).
This process was the “graphe Paranomon,”
the great engine by which the daily working of the constitution was kept
in harmony with its established principles. So long as this was in
force, the decrees of the Assembly could not over-ride the
laws or institutions of the State.
Once more, it
seems that the presiding officer in the Assembly had the power to refuse to put
a motion to the vote, if he considered it to be plainly illegal. On
the famous occasion, when it was proposed to condemn six Athenian generals to
death by a single vote in the Assembly, instead of trying them
separately, Socrates was the chairman for the day, and he refused to put
the proposal to the vote. As it was carried in spite of him, the
opposition must have been in some way overcome ; but unfortunately our
meagre information does not allow us to explain how this was done.
It was also a
limitation, not on the power of the Assembly, but on the use of it, that anyone
who came forward with a proposal was regarded as responsible for what he
proposed, even when he was strictly within the law. In all states, and
under all forms of constitution, treachery and corruption are the
just objects of severe punishment, but the Athenians went further than
this. They brought to trial for “ misleading the people ”
anyone whose advice had caused disaster to the state. The evil of the
custom was as great as the good, and perhaps greater. For if on the one
hand it checked any inclination to make reckless proposals in the
Assembly, it tended on the other to make a single individual suffer for
acts done with the approval of a majority. We find Pericles himself more
than once speaking in severe condemnation of this unwillingness of the
Assembly to accept the responsibility of its own acts; and after his
death the mischief became worse. Successful orators knew how to turn
the indignation of the people at the failure of measures, which they had
proposed, on the heads of the unfortunate generals who had failed to
execute them.
The Council, whose
preliminary action was necessary to legalise any
decree passed by the Assembly, was an institution founded by Solon, but altered
and developed by Clisthenes. In the time of Pericles it consisted of
five hundred members, fifty from each of the ten tribes. They were men of
thirty years of age or more, chosen by lot to hold office for a
year. Before admission each candidate had to undergo a public
examination, touching his life and character, 18 at which every
Athenian was at liberty to put what questions he pleased. If approved, the Councillors entered on their office with solemn
ceremonies, binding themselves by an oath to discharge their
functions honestly, and at the end of the year of service the whole
Council and each member of it were held responsible for their conduct. During
their year of office the Councillors were
relieved from certain burdens, which fell upon the ordinary citizen;
they could not, for instance, be called upon to serve in the army.
They received a drachma (8T.) a day as payment for their services—a
payment which, like the half-drachma of the jurors, was probably
established by Pericles.
The Council met
daily, with the exception of festivals and days of ill omen. In times of
great distress or excitement it sat continuously, ready to act at a
moment's notice. A special chamber in the market-place was known as the
Council-chamber, but this did not prevent the Council from assembling at
any convenient place. If, for instance, they had naval business in hand,
-they assembled at the dock-yards ; if the subject concerned the
Mysteries, at the Eleusinium. The meetings were
so far open to all that the public were only separated from
the Council by a cord drawn round the meeting, and could easily hear
all that was said, though private persons could not communicate with the
chamber unless permitted to do so by a decree of the Assembly or the
Council. Nothing would have created greater alarm and suspicion than a
sitting of the Council with closed doors.
Besides its duties
as a preparatory assembly, the Council was the great agent in carrying out the
decrees of the people. It formed the connecting link between the Athenians
gathered in the Assembly and the individual officer or magistrate. The
details of measures were often left to the Council, which was
empowered to supplement what was wanting in the decree of the Assembly by
decrees of its own, or it received authority to investigate any matter
of public importance, such as the famous mutilation of the Hermae,
which took place just before the Sicilian expedition. It was especially
charged with the maintenance of the fleet;—a Council which during its
year of office had not built a single trireme, would not venture at the
close of it to ask for the crowd which it was usual to bestow as a mark of honour for a proper discharge of its duties. To it
also were brought all matters concerning foreign policy and the
league. Above all, the Council managed the finances of the state,
receiving money, and confirming by its presence the acts of the financial
officers.
It is obvious that
so large a body as five hundred men could not be kept constantly at work.
However important it might be to have the whole number at hand when
wanted, it was necessary for practical ^purposes to subdivide it. For this
object the fifties elected from each of the ten tribes were kept
apart; and the Greek year of 354 days was also divided into ten
periods of 35 or 36 days. Then one of the ten tribes was allotted to each
of the ten periods, to be in office constantly during that time. The
periods were called “prytanies” or presidencies
; the tribe in office was the
“ presiding tribe”; and the members of it were the “ presidents.” Out of
the fifty presidents, one was chosen by lot to be the chairman for
each day and night in the term of office, and, as the same person
could not be chosen twice, thirty-five or thirty-six out of the fifty would
hold the office of chairman. During the day of office, the chairman “ took
the chair,” as we should say, in the Council and the Assembly, if an
Assembly were held ; he also kept the state seal and the key of the state
archives. To the presidents all business of immediate importance was
at once conveyed, and the generals and the officers chiefly responsible for the
peace of the community were in constant communication with them. In the “
Knights ” of Aristophanes, Cleon, who is one of the generals of the year,
attempts to forestall the attack of the Sausage-Seller by hastening to
the Council :
“ I ’ll set off
this instant to the Council,
To inform them of
your conspiracies and treasons,
Your secret
nightly assemblies and cabals, Your private treaty with the King of
Persia, Your correspondence with Bceotia, And
the business that you keep there in the cheese press, Close pack’d, you think, and ripening out of sight.”
Of the numerous
officers at Athens the Generals were the most important. In the earliest times
the third archon, or Polemarch, was the commander-in-chief of the Athenian
army, but after the reforms of Clisthenes, ten Strategi, or generals, were
elected, one for each tribe, with whom the polemarch was associated. This
was the system in existence at the time of the battle of Marathon. On that
famous ' occasion each of the ten tribes of Athens furnished
a contingent to the army, and each contingent was commanded by a general,
who in his turn became commander-in-chief of the whole army, the
polemarch retaining a nominal control and commanding on the right
wing, but with little real authority. Each general belonged to the tribe which
he commanded, but he was not chosen by the tribe ; the election was the work
of the whole Athenian people assembled for the purpose in the Pnyx, under the control of the archons. In the next
ten years we find a great change taking place in the duties of the
generals ; one of the body was chosen commander with full powers, and
the rest were subordinated to him, while the polemarch disappears
entirely. In this capacity Themistocles commanded at Salamis, Aristides at
Plataea, and Xanthippus at Mycale. Under these
circumstances the generals could not any longer be the commanders
of their tribes, and we sometimes find two generals belonging to the
same tribe. The tribes were now commanded by the Taxiarchs,
the generals being set free for executive functions of a
higher nature. They were, in fact, the chief executive officers at Athens.
Not only the management of the army, whether on land or sea, but the
management of public business generally, was in their hands.
They were, as we have said, in constant communication with the
Council, to which they conveyed information and made proposals for meeting any emergencies which
arose.
As the office was
one which required special knowledge and capacity, the generals were chosen by
show of hands, not by lot. For the same reason an efficient officer was often
re-elected ; Pericles, for instance, was a general for fifteen years after the
peace of 445 B.C. Such constant re-election was of course the
strongest proof of popular confidence; a man so favoured was not only the most influential member of the board of generals, but he
was the foremost man in the city. In order to retain such a
position it was necessary that he should be something more than a
good captain and a clever administrator; he must also be a clear and
eloquent speaker, able to explain his policy to the people, and convince
them of its merits. Such a combination of qualities was rare,
especially when rhetoric became a passion with the young Athenians who
haunted the Assembly. The orator and the general then parted company
; one was supreme in the Assembly, the other in the field ; and
nothing delighted the Athenians more than a passage of arms between the
two.
It is not
necessary here to go into the working of the board of ten generals. That they
could not always act together is obvious. As a rule they were sent
out in such numbers as the importance of the expedition required, and
possibly one of the number was placed in some sort of authority
over the rest. At the end of the year they, like all other officers
at Athens, had to give an account of their office; more especially of the money
which passed through their hands. Very often the Athenians, without
waiting for the end-of the year, condemned their generals to death, or exile,
for failing to carryout in a satisfactory manner the instructions
given them. In fact the position of a general was by no means an easy
one; his conduct was judged, not by a committee of experts, who could form
a sound opinion of the extent to which there had been a want of
honesty or of capacity, but by an irresponsible mob, led by an orator who was
only too anxious to make good the position of his party, or to
throw the blame of mistakes made by the people on those who had to
carry them out.
As we have seen,
the Athenians deposed Pericles from the office of general in the year 430 B.C.
But in the years 431 and 429 B.C. he seems to have occupied a
position of extraordinary authority. Thucydides informs us that he
prevented the Athenians, when shut up in Athens, from meeting together to
express their discontent at his plans, “ being still general ” ; and
that after his re-election, “ all things were committed into his hands,”
expressions which imply a far greater power than was commonly exercised
by a general.
Among the civic
magistrates of Athens, the archons held the first place. They were nine in
number, elected annually, like the generals, but elected by lot. The
office was one of the oldest in the city, the archons being in fact the
successors to the power of the kings who had once ruled the people. But
the creation of the board of generals detracted largely from their
executive powers, and when the lawcourts were established—if not earlier—their
judicial functions were confined to a preliminary examination of the cases
brought before them. The first archon gave his name to the year; he was
also in a sense the pater patrice, under
whose care were all orphans requiring protection, and other
matters connected with family rights and duties. The second was the
King archon ; he was in charge of the religious observances of the city,
and before him were brought, in the first instance, all charges
of murder and homicide. The third archon was the polemarch, or
general-in-chief, of whom we have already spoken. The remaining six were
called the Thesmothetae, or “makers of
ordinances” ; they were concerned with the administration of justice, and
in old days, when there were no written laws in existence, they must have
been to a large extent the administrators and repositories of law, in all
those cases which did not come under the Areopagus. When the
law-courts came into vogue, the thesmothetae were
occupied in allotting the juries and bringing cases before them. Their
functions in this respect were purely formal. They were not
judges, and they gave no votes. They merely provided that the
proceedings of the courts should be legal and orderly.
Before entering
office the archons had to be approved as fit and proper persons for the
duties which fell upon them, and at the end of the year they had to
undergo the usual “ scrutiny.” When this was satisfactorily passed they
took their seats in the Areopagus, where they continued for the rest
of their lives. No citizen could be elected archon a second time.
Besides these
officers there was a host of others, some charged with keeping order in the
market-place, others with the care of the public buildings,
others with the exportation of corn, etc. There were stewards and
treasurers and collectors and clerks, all of whom were only elected after
a formal approval, and only released from office after a formal scrutiny ;
liable at any moment to be suspended by a decree of the Assembly and
brought to trial before a law-court. Most of these officers were united in
boards, usually of ten, for it was the exception to trust anything
to the care of an individual. Never, we may say, was there a state
more suspicious of her public servants than Athens; never was there a
state which held them responsible for their actions with
greater severity. Where other governments, perhaps too blindly, have
trusted to personal honour and esprit de
corps, the Athenians insisted on a public approval of character
before entering office, and a formal discharge on leaving it, and the ever
present fear of punishment for misconduct. And never, we
are compelled to add, was there a state in which the belief in the
corruption of public servants was more universal.
We turn now from
Athens to the Athenian empire. The sovereign power was of course the same
in both, but we have to examine the manner in which that power acted upon
the allies and subjects throughout the wide dominion where it was
the ruling force.
In the fourth
chapter we have pointed out the causes which tended to transform the Delian
league into the Athenian empire. The subjugation of Naxos, the first
act of aggression which brought home to the confederates the true nature
of their position, was followed by the splendid victories of
the Eurymedon, whereby the limits of the league were widely extended,
and the management of Athens was justified, so far as success could
justify it. Not long afterwards, twelve years at the latest, the
chest of the league was brought from Delos to Athens, and whatever
the reasons for the change may have been, the result was inevitable. The
last vestiges of the Delian synod disappeared ; Athena, and
not Apollo, became the presiding deity of the league, and the
management of the common fund, which had from the first been collected by
Athenians, now fell wholly under Athenian control. It was no
longer the representatives of the allies, of whom we never hear, but
the Athenian Assembly, which decided on the outlay of the accumulated
treasures.
From the year 454
B.C. onwards, the evidence of inscriptions enables us to speak with some
certainty about the arrangements of the league, or of the empire, as
we might more justly call it. We see that the payments made by the cities
were frequently revised ; sometimes they were raised, sometimes
they were lowered. The amount was generally fixed by the Council,
after consultation with certain officers called “ Assessors ”—who were
sent, when necessary, to visit the various cities, — but any city could
appeal from the decision of the Council, if it appeared unjust. The case
was then tried in a law-court, whose award was final. Other cities are
registered in inscriptions as fixing their own tribute ; in others the amount
seems to have been fixed by private persons on the part of
the community. The assessment took place at the Panathenaea at the
beginning of the Attic year, but the payments were brought to Athens at
the time of the great Dionysia in the following spring. They were
received by the Hellenotamiae in the presence of
the Council, and, after one sixtieth had been deducted as the share of Athena,
the residue was paid over to the public chest of the city.
The three great
islands of Lesbos, Chios, and Samos never paid any tribute. Chios to the last,
and Lesbos till the revolt of 427 B.C., continued to be independent
allies, who furnished ships and crews to the service of Athens. After the
great revolt of 440 B.C., Samos was deprived of her fleet, and
compelled to pay an indemnity for the expenses of the war. She was
reckoned among the subject and tributary allies, but her name never
appears in the tribute lists.
Beyond this great
distinction, that a few supplied ships as independent states and the majority
paid tribute as subjects, we cannot lay down any general rules about
the relations prevailing between Athens and the allies. They differed in
each case. In some instances Athens fixed the constitutions of the subject
cities, as at Erythrae and Chaicis ; in others they were left very much to themselves. But the
system of laissez-faire extended only to their internal
politics ; in the administration of law, Athens interfered to a
considerable extent. Not only were the allies compelled to come to Athens
to answer any charge touching their allegiance to the league, but any
cases involving the life of a citizen were tried at Athens ; even
civil suits, if the amount at issue exceeded a certain sum, were brought
before Athenian courts. This was doubtless regarded as a great burden
and expense ; men would much prefer to fight out their own quarrels,
than to feel that their lives and properties were at the mercy of the Athenian
jurors. But these regulations, which seem to us so extraordinary and
even tyrannical, were not an invention of the Athenians. In very early
times, when the island of zEgina was a
dependency of Epidaurus, the inhabitants were compelled to take their suits to
Epidaurus for settlement.
If we attempt to
balance the good and evil, the justice and injustice, of the conduct of Athens in
the Delian league, we must admit that the Athenians delivered the allies
from the power of Persia, and that they kept the zEgean free of pirates ; the amounts which they exacted from the cities were
not large, and, so far as we know, they imposed but few restrictions on
their trade. We must also allow that Athens was elected to be president of
the league by the voluntary choice of the allies, and that it is the duty
of a president to keep a league in order and prevent it from falling to pieces
through the inactivity or carelessness of the members. Nor can we justly
blame the Athenians for the decay of the Delian synod, or for acceding
to the wish of the allies to pay money instead of sending ships. These
changes were indeed fatal to the equality of the league, but they were not
fatal to its efficiency. Nevertheless, when the allies found themselves the
helpless subjects of a tyrant, instead of equal allies led by a
president, they could not fail to resent the change ; they felt that
their contributions, though small, amounted in the aggregate to a sum
which in Athenian hands maintained a fleet sufficient to overpower
their utmost resistance. Their contributions were no longer voluntary,
but exacted whether they would or no; the expenditure was beyond their
control, and not less so the disposition of the forces which
they were compelled to supply. The necessity of carrying their law-suits
to Athens was a proof that their independence was gone, and in some cases
the loss was made more evident by the presence of Athenian garrisons
and overseers in their cities. The growth of Athens, the adornment of the
city out of funds intended for other purposes, while it tended to
make the city more and more the centre of the
Grecian world, attracted thither an ever increasing amount of trade
to the detriment of other ports in the Aegean. The allies could not but
feel that the interests of Athens were distinct from their own, and often
opposed to them; and Athens did nothing to soothe the irritation. As she
felt her greatness depending on her empire, she resolved to maintain it at
all costs; and for this purpose it was easier to employ force than
policy. Indeed a Greek statesman would never have attempted to form an
United State on the only basis on which it could last—by destroying
the political isolation of the units and fusing them into a larger
whole. Had Pericles proposed to make all the members of the alliance
citizens of Athens, the Athenians would not have permitted it, and
the allies themselves would have resisted to the death.
Besides the
members of the confederation, the Athenian empire included all the various
cleruchies, or colonies composed of Athenian citizens. These, as we
have seen, were part and parcel of the Athenian state, and pledged to
support her interests to the death. They were chiefly founded
by Pericles, and were intended to support the power of Athens in
Euboea and the Aegean, especially in the northern part of it. The Lemnian and Imbrian troops
fought in the Athenian armies, and the colonists were in fact Athenians,
members of Athenian tribes. But the gain was counterbalanced to some
degree by the suspicion which these colonies excited in the rest of Greece
; they were evidence of an appropriation of territory, which
was neither forgotten nor forgiven.
Lastly, Athens had
a number of allies outside the circle of the league, through whom her
influence was extended to the remoter parts of Hellas. She was on
friendly terms with Thessaly in the North of Greece, though we must admit that
on more than one occasion the Thessalians shewed themselves to be
untrustworthy allies. The reigning monarch of Macedonia, Perdiccas, was so
perfidious that it was difficult to say whether he was a friend or
foe, for he became one or the other as it suited his immediate policy. The
alliance with Sitalces, the king of the Odrysian Thracians (p. 227),was of more value, chiefly
because it prevented any attacks by the natives on the Athenian
possessions in the Chersonese. More important still, from a commercial
point of view, were the relations which united Athens and the powerful
princes in the Greek cities on the northern shore of the Euxine.
These cities were the granaries of Athens, from which, even in the
beginning of the fifth century, Greece was supplied with corn, and with
the increase of the city Athens became more and more the centre of the corn trade.
With the remote
east Athens had little connexion. Egypt was, of
course, wholly in the hands of Persia. We have seen that Pericles refused
to send aid to the rebellious king, though he accepted the cargo of
corn which was given in the hope of securing Athenian assistance. Of Cyprus we
hear little or nothing after the victory of 449 B.C. Relations were
kept up with Crete, but they led to no result. The island was once visited
by the Athenian fleet during the Peloponnesian war, and we hear of
Cretan mercenaries in the Athenian army; but Crete was never
connected, even remotely, with the Delian confederacy.
In the west,
Athenian influence was widely felt. An Athenian general, Diotimus,
is said to have instituted a torch race at Naples, and traces
of Athenian pottery are abundant in Campania. Of the colony of Thurii we have already spoken (p. 146), and of the
alliances with Rhegium and Leontini.
It seems to have been a part of the Periclean policy to develop the connexion with the west, and by every possible means
to raise the condition of the Ionic cities of Sicily and Italy as a
counterpoise to the Dorian power in Tarentum and Syracuse. Of the
relations of Athens to Carthage, we can say nothing but that she
traded with the Etruscans, either directly or indirectly, is proved by the
Athenian vases found in Etruria. The day of Rome was not yet come.
Nearer home Athens
was on friendly terms with Acarnania, which looked to her for help against
the aggression of the neighbouring city of Ambracia. Corcyra was received into alliance in 433
B.C., and Cephallenia was gained in the first
year of the war. In the Peloponnesus she could count in the neutrality of
Argos and Achaea.
Thus at the time
of her greatest power, the influence of Athens extended from the Crimea to
Crete, from Miletus to Sicily and Naples; and she could place upon the sea
a fleet incomparably superior to any force which could be brought against
her. It was a great empire, and it was the greater because it included
within its circle the most active and civilised states
in the world. But from the first it was doomed to failure. The Greeks
could never be induced to accept the principle on which it was founded. At
the moment when the Delian synod ceased to exist, the Athenian empire
became a tyrannis, and the strongest sentiment which
could animate a Grecian breast—the love of independence —was aroused
against her,
CHAPTER XVII.
THE ATHENS OF
PERICLES : ART AND LITERATURE.
HE early stages of
civic freedom, the attempt to found an empire in the most civilised people of antiquity, the methods by which a
democracy sought to govern itself and carry , on a vigorous foreign
policy, will always have an interest for mankind, however small may
be the scale on which these events took place, but no one will deny that it is
the Art and Literature of the time of Pericles which have won for it
the title of the “Golden Age of Athens.” In his treatise on the “Glory of the Athenians,”
Plutarch endorses the criticism of the Laconian who declared that the
Athenians spent on amusement the funds which ought to have gone
to more serious objects. “ If we were to calculate,” he says, “the
cost of the various plays, we shall find that the Athenians laid out more
on “Bacchae” and “Phoenisae,” on “Oedipuses and Antigones,” on
the woes of Medea and Electra, than was spent on the wars which they waged
against the barbarians for empire and freedom.” Time has justified
the Athenians in their expenditure ; the money which they lavished on
amusements has turned out an imperishable investment, a source of instruction
and delight throughout the civilised world.
When the Persians
retired from Athens in 479B.C., they left behind them a ruined city. The walls
and houses were destroyed ; the temples blackened and burnt. Fifty
years later, at the death of Pericles, Athens was incomparably the most
strongly fortified and the most beautiful city in Greece. It is
indeed true that the houses even of the richest inhabitants were of a
modest size and appearance, and the streets were narrow and irregular
owing to the haste and disorder in which the city was rebuilt.
This defect could not be remedied without a reconstruction of the city.
But the walls were impregnable, those of the port were stronger still, and
the two were connected by the Long Walls, or “ Legs,” and the Phaleric wall. The new town of Peiraeus was laid out
with straight and spacious streets by Hippodamus;
while the spoils of Persia and the contributions of the allies were
lavished on the adornment of the ancient city.
The probable
direction and extent of the city walls in the time of Themistocles are shewn in
the accompanying map. From Thucydides we learn that the circuit of
the city, excluding the space between the Phaleric wall and the outer of the two “ Legs,” was somewhat more than five miles.
Of the walls subsequently built, the Phaleric wall was more
than four miles long ; the Peiraeic, five, the total
circuit of Peiraeus and Munychia was about
seven miles and a half. Thus, without counting the inner of the two
“Legs,” or the length of the city wall between the Phaleric and the outer “ Leg,” we have no less than twenty-one miles of
fortification. Of part of these walls we are told that, though
the height was only half that intended, the width was such that two
wagons could pass each other, and the whole wall was made of large stones
hewn square and clamped together on the outer faces with iron and
lead.
In the most
ancient times the city of Athens included the Acropolis and the land to the
south as far as the Ilissus, and to the last, the
shrines and sacred places, with the exception of the Areopagus and
one or two others, lay in this district. In the citadel itself were
the temples of Athena and Poseidon, who were said to have striven for the
possession of the place. In the low lands by the banks of the stream was
the temple of Dionysus, and farther to the east the temples of Zeus and
Apollo. Here, too, was the fountain of Callirrhoe, the water of which was
always used “ on great occasions, at marriage rites and
other ceremonies.” But long before the fifth century, the city had
spread to the west and north of the citadel, and by the time of
Themistocles a part of the Ceramicus, or
Potter’s Field, was included in the circuit of the wall. This was in fact the
busiest part of the town, lying as it did between the great
western gate of the city and the market-place ; and when Cimon began
to adorn the city with the spoils of his great victories, it was still
possible to make alterations in this quarter. Outside the large
double gate (Dipylon) by which the city was
entered, a road ran in a north-westerly direction, to the groves of
the Academy, where amid shady recesses the waters of the Cephisus preserved a verdure even in the glare of an
Attic summer. In this pleasant place a gymnasium was built, at which the
Athenian youths ran and wrestled, or sat beneath the planetrees which
Cimon had planted. To the west from the gate ran the “ Sacred Way,” along
which processions passed to Eleusis at the time of the Mysteries, and towards
the south a broad road carried the traffic between the city and Peiraeus.
On either side of these roads were placed the monuments, which reminded
the Athenians of the mighty dead who had fallen in the service of their
country (p. 228); the district was in fact the public cemetery of
the city, where even in the second century A.D., Pausanias the traveller could still see the tombs of Pericles and Phormio. Within the gate a broad road—the Dromos or
Corso—led to the market-place, in which were grouped the public buildings
of the city, the offices of the archons, the Council-Chamber, and the
Dome or Rotunda, in which the Prytanes were to be found during their term
of office. The eastern end was occupied by the Painted Porch, which
was erected by Peisianax, a friend of Cimon, and
adorned with pictures by Polygnotus and
others; on the northern side, where the Dromos entered, were Hermae
or pillar-statues, some of which were erected by Cimon, and inscribed with
records of his victories in Thrace; the centre was
made shady with trees, which also were due to the care and liberality of
Cimon. In the neighbourhood was the Theseum, a shrine built to receive the bones
of Theseus, and on a terrace to the west rose the beautiful
temple—whether sacred to Heracles or Theseus is uncertain—which now
remains the most perfect among the ruined temples of Greece.
The east of the
city presented a strong contrast to the west. Here all was quiet and seclusion,
for the overland traffic from Euboea was carried past Decelea and Acharnae to the northern gate of the
city. Outside the walls, near the Ilissus, were
two gymnasiums, one at the Lyceum, which was built by Pericles, the other
at the Cynosarges (p. 24). Within the city, on a
low terrace, rose the pillars of the temple of Olympian Zeus, a temple
which was begun by Pisistratus on a scale far exceeding that of
any other, but which was never finished, perhaps because the memory
of the tyrant was too closely connected with it.
On the south-east
slope of the Acropolis was the great theatre of Dionysus, at which dramas
were acted twice a year, in the winter at the Lenaea, or festival of the wine-press ; in the spring
at the Great Dionysia, the festival at which the allies came
to Athens with their tribute. The theatre was not begun by Pericles, nor
was it finished till long after his time, but we cannot doubt that he
carried on the work, and did much to adorn it. Not far from the theatre
Pericles built an Odeum, or Music Hall, which is said to have been a copy
of the tent of Xerxes, and some writers add that the woodwork was
made out of the masts of the ships which fought at Salamis.
But the adornment
of the Acropolis was the highest object of Athenian ambition. The rugged rock,
precipitous on all sides but the west, rises to a height of 156 metres from the sea level; in length it is about 300 metres; in breadth at the broadest, 140 metres. As the level of the orchestra in the theatre of
Dionysus is 91 metres, and the level of the Ilissus about 40 metres above the sea, we get a rise from the river to the lowest part of the
theatre of about 150 feet; and again from the theatre to the
summit of the citadel, of about 200 feet. The surface of the rock is
far from being level, rising considerably towards the eastern end, and
being higher in the centre than at the sides,
for which reason sub-structures of considerable extent were required
before the temples could be erected. In the sixth century B.C. the
Acropolis was the fortress of Athens ; the place which was always seized,
as a first step, by anyone who wished to obtain control of the city.
So far as we can ascertain, a wall ran round the summit, along the
edge of the rock, and a second wall round the base, at some little
distance from the foot of the precipitous rocks. This second wall was
called the “ Pelasgic fortress,” because it was
supposed to have been built by Pelasgians, and the name spread to the
space between the precipices and the wall. Pisistratus, and his sons after
him, had their palace on the citadel, and in the final struggle, when
the Spartans came to expel him from Athens, Hippias prepared
for a siege in the “ Pelasgicum.” The entrance to the
Acropolis was then, as' always, at the western end, which was, no doubt,
secured by fortifications. At this time there were two temples in the
citadel—the ancient Erechtheum, at the northern edge, and a larger temple,
apparently built by the tyrants, which occupied the centre.
In the Persian
invasion of 480-479 B.C. all the buildings on the Acropolis were utterly swept
away; the Pelasgic wall was entirely destroyed ; the
temples were levelled to the ground. For a time the ruins
were allowed to remain as mute evidence of the outrages of the
impious foe, or perhaps because Themistocles urged the imperative duty of
securing the city from attack; but when Cimon brought home the spoils
of Persia from the Eurymedon he resolved to spend a part of them in
rebuilding the shrine of the guardian goddess. As the whole city was now
surrounded by an enormous wall, it was no longer necessary to treat
the Acropolis as a fortress. No attempt was made to restore the Pelasgic wall. But in order to obtain a sufficient
area for the new temple which he contemplated, Cimon not only rebuilt on a
larger scale the southern wall of the citadel, but he
carried substructures oyer the depressions in
the native rock for the support of his heavy pillars and walls. But
the work was never carried out as Cimon planned it. When Pericles became
leader of the city, the matter passed into his hands, and it was under
his authority that the great temple, which is the wonder of the
world, was carried out by Ictinus the architect (aided by Callicrates) and Pheidias the sculptor.
The form and
position of the Parthenon will be best understood from the plan of the
Acropolis, which is taken from that of Dr. Kaupert.
The Doric pillars
rose on a base of three receding steps; at each end there were eight, on each
side seventeen, counting the corner pillars twice. The total length
was 69.51 metres; the width, 30.86 m., a
proportion of 9 to 4. Each pillar was 10.43 m in height, and
1.905 m. in diameter; the distance between them was 2.4 m. The pillars
were channelled in the Dorian manner, each with
twenty grooves.
The lines of the
temple were not rigidly straight. The “ stylobates,” i.e., the
courses of stones on which the pillars were placed, were higher in the
middle than at the corners, and the pillars were slightly diminished
as they rose; they also inclined inwards.
Within the rows of
pillars was the temple in the stricter sense, consisting of four parts : the
Pronaos, fronting east ; the Celia ; the Parthenon ; and the Opisthodomus. The Pronaos and Opisthodomus were
porticoes. The Celia (also called the Heca-tompedos because it was just one hundred Attic feet in length) contained the great
chryselephantine statue of Athena. It was divided by two rows
of pillars into three “ naves,” of which the central nave was closed
at the end opposite the entrance by pillars, and separated from the
Parthenon chamber by a wall, without any door, so that the temple
was really divided into two parts, one entered from the west, the
other from the east. The Parthenon chamber was the treasure-house of Athena, in
which a part of the furniture and sacred vessels belonging to the temple were
kept.
Within and without
the whole temple was adorned with sculptures and ornamentation and colour. The sculptures are of three kinds: those
contained in the “ pediments,” or triangular spaces formed by
the gables of the roof at either end of the temple ; those on the “
metopes,” i.e., on the flat slabs which, alternating with
grooved slabs (or “ triglyphs ”), ran outside the temple
between the architrave, which immediately rested on the pillars, and the roof;
and the “ frieze,” which ran round the whole of the wall of the inner
temple above the architrave.
In the pediments
the sculptor had to deal with a triangular space in which the figures must be
arranged according to their size. In the centre there was room for figures standing erect; towards the angles
the figures must appear as sitting or recumbent. The subjects
represented were the-birth of Athena, which was depicted in the eastern
gable, and the strife of Athena and Poseidon for the possession of
Attica, which occupied the western gable, looking towards the Propykca.
The figures of
these sculptures were removed from their places and brought to England by
Lord Elgin, but drawings have been preserved, which enable us to realise their position before removal, though even
then the eastern gable had suffered severely, the central group being
destroyed. At the left or southern corner of this pediment the
horses of the sun were seen rising from underground ; at the right or
north they sank down again into the darkness. In the centre was a group which represented Zeus, Athena, and Hephaestus ; between
the two were the seated sisters or “ Fates,” and the reclining figure
which is sometimes called Theseus and sometimes Olympus, statues which are
the ne plus ultra of the sculptor’s art. The figures on
the western gable are not so striking, and the identification of them is
very doubtful.
All the figures in
these pediments were of colossal size, but each, without exception, was
finished with the most minute accuracy. Even those parts which were
hidden from view by being turned to the surface of the pediment were worked out
with the same finish as the parts turned to the spectator. Man has
here striven with nature to produce perfect work regardless of the eye
which sees it.
Of the metopes
each contained two figures, which were represented in conflict; and they were
so arranged that the figures on the four sides of the temple formed
four separate groups. Originally there were ninety-two metopes in all,
fourteen at each end and thirty-two on each side. A great number
were destroyed in the explosion of 1687, but fifteen have been
brought to London, one is at Paris, three in the Museum at Athens, and
some fragments of others remain in their original position. The metopes
at the eastern end represented the contest of Athena with the Giants;
those at the western end, the contest of Theseus and Heracles with the
Amazons; on the north was depicted the capture of Ilium; on the
south, where the sculpture has been best preserved, the conflict of the Lapithae and Centaurs.
The frieze is not
less than 159.42 metres in length. The whole of this
splendid work, strange to say, received no direct light whatever ; it was
only illuminated by the reflected light which, streaming through the
pillars, struck the white marble floor beneath. The sculpture represents
in all its details the great Panathenaic procession, which took place
every fourth year in the month of July. The frieze at the western
end, which exhibits the preparation for the procession, is still in its
original place; of the remainder, fifty-three slabs are in the British
Museum and one at Paris.
The Parthenon and
all the sculptures upon it are throughout of Pentelic marble, obtained from
quarries in the north of Attica, a stone distinguished by its fine grain
and the yellowish tinge which, deepening with time, has contributed in no
slight degree to the almost magical colouring of
the glorious temple.
The crowning work
of the genius of Pheidias at Athens was the statue of the goddess, of gold
and ivory, which was placed in the Celia of the temple in 438-437
B.C. The oldest statues—and often the most sacred—in Greece were rude
idols of wood. Then stone and bronze were adopted, and, finally, in
the hands of the ’great artists of the fifth century, gold and
ivory—ivory being used in the parts where the flesh was allowed to appear,
while the robes and attributes were of gold. Of course no relics of
these costly and perishable materials have come down to us, and our ideas
of the statue of Athena must be derived from copies of the great original.
In 1879 a marble statuette was found at Athens which is thought to be
a copy of the Parthenos, more accurate than any hitherto known. The
goddess, who is heavily draped in chiton and diplois,
wears her helmet and aegis ; on her right hand, which is supported by a
pedestal, rests a winged Victory; her left hand holds the upper rim of her
shield, within which coils a serpent, the emblem of Erichthonius.
From this copy we may gain some idea of the outward form of the work
of Pheidias, but it will always be difficult to realise the difference between the marble and the more .delicate material.
Moreover, the statue ’’ of Pheidias was coloured.
It was a supreme work of art, the pride of the temple and the city, representing
the goddess in all the majesty of complete victory. All strife is now
ended ; peaceful and powerful she protects the nation which has built the
glorious shrine for her use.
Besides the
Parthenon, there was another temple on the Acropolis—the Erechtheum, which
Athena shared with Poseidon. This was the older and more sacred
temple of the two ; in it was preserved the wooden block, which in the
minds of the Athenians was the most holy idol of their goddess.
The central parts of the shrine seem to have been restored and
enlarged not long after the Persian war, and before the building of the
Parthenon (447-438 B.C.) it was perhaps the treasury of
the Athenians; but the beautiful colonnades on the north and south,
which form the chief attraction of the Erechtheum, were not finished till
after Pericles’s death. The temple differs from the Parthenon
in being very small; it is also built in the Ionic, not in the Doric
style. Though it has suffered severely at the hand of time, it is sufficiently
perfect to allow us to judge of its beauty. The slender Ionic pillars are
in their places, though the gable and pediment are gone. The porch of
the Caryatides, i.e., the porch looking to the south at
the western end, and furnished with draped female figures instead of
pillars, cannot fail to attract peculiar attention owing to the beauty of
the statues and the boldness of the design.
As we have said,
the Acropolis can only be entered at the western end. Here, therefore, were the
great gates or Propylsea, which Pericles began
to build after the completion of the Parthenon. The architect was Menecles. The entire plan was never carried out, owing
perhaps to the enormous expense which it involved, but what was done was
executed in a manner worthy of the site on which the gateway stood.
The entrance was
formed by two porticoes, facing east and west, and separated by a wall. The
western portico was, of course, that which first met the eye of the
Athenian who was about to ascend the hill. He saw before him six massive
Dorian pillars, three on r each side of a broad path,
surmounted by a gable.
The pillars were
approached by steps, but the path was perhaps merely smoothed, in order that
horses and carriages might ascend by it. On either side of
the approach, at right angles to left and right, were
other porticoes, each with three Dorian pillars. The portico on the left
(north) was large, and formed a kind of picture-gallery; the portico on
the right (south) was contracted in order to leave room for the temple of
Wingless Victory, which occupied the southwest corner of the Acropolis. On
entering the portico, by the path, the traveller found three Ionic pillars on either hand, supporting a decorated
marble roof, and before him was a wall pierced with five openings,
one large central door which received the path, and two smaller on each
side confronting the spaces between the great Dorian columns of
the portico. Passing through the door he found himself in the inner
portico, which was a repetition of the outer, but not so deep, and without
the Ionic pillars on either side of the central path.
When he passed
beyond the pillars he was on sacred ground. Before him was the Erechtheum,
and a little to the right the Parthenon. Immediately in front, raised
aloft on a high pedestal, was the colossal bronze statue of Athena Promachus, the work of Pheidias, which was said to
have been furnished by the spoil of Marathon. On every side were
offerings dedicated either by the state or by individual citizens: the
Bull dedicated by the Areopagus; the Chariot and Four, which commemorated
the victory over Chaicis ; the Perseus of Myron
; the Aphrodite of Calamis. On every side were
inscriptions testifying to the wealth and power of Athens: lists of
the tribute, catalogues and inventories of the temples, treaties with
foreign states, records of her anger against traitors such as Arthmius of Zelea, who
first brought Persian gold into Greece, and of her gratitude to patriots;
portrait statues set up in honour of
distinguished citizens, of Xanthippus, of Phormio the great sailor, and of Pericles himself.
The Acropolis was
indeed the centre of the life of Athens. If the
Erechtheum was the home of thel guardian deities
of the city, the shrine which reminded the Athenians more than any other of
their legendary past, the Parthenon was the symbol of the city and
empire of Pericles. It was not intended in the least to replace the older
temple; it was not regarded as a dwelling-house of the goddess, but
rather as her treasury. There was no priesthood connected with the
Athena of the Parthenon, as the Praxier-gidae, for
instance, were connected with Athena Polias, and
no organised provision for worship.
The Parthenon was, if the expression may be used, the palace of the
goddess, where she received her worshippers on the day of her great festival.
It would be
tedious to continue the description of the works of art which adorned Athens at
the time when Pericles fell a victim to the plague, and no description can
give anything but a very inadequate idea of the splendour,
strength, and beauty which met the eye of the Athenian, whether he walked
round the fortifications or through the broad streets of the Peiraeus,
or along the Long Walls, or in the shades of the Academy, or amidst the
tombs of the Ceramicus; whether he chaffered in the
market-place, or attended assemblies in the Pnyx, or
loitered in one of the numerous porticoes, or watched the exercises
in the gymnasia, or listened to music in the Odeum and plays in the
theatre, or joined the throng of worshippers ascending to the great gateway
which formed the front of the Acropolis. And this magnificence was
not the result of centuries of toil; it was the work of fifty years. In
479 B.C. Athens was a heap of blackened ruins ; in 429 B.C. all the great
works of the Periclean age had been accomplished except the Erechtheum.
Athens indeed became a vast workshop, in which artisans of every kind found
employment ; all in their various degrees contributing to the execution of
the plans of the master-minds— Pheidias, Ictinus, Callicrates, Mnesicles, and others. Their productions aroused
the wonder of the Grecian world hardly less on account of their
excellence, than on account of the rapidity with which they
were carried into execution.
When we reflect on
this great achievement, we naturally ask: How did it become possible
that, within the lifetime of one man, such a series of masterpieces
could be created ? Attica could supply marble in plenty ; the surplus of
the treasury of Athena could be spent in the purchase of gold
and ivory, and in paying for the services of artists and workmen ;
but genius cannot be so easily procured ; the wealth of a kingdom may be
offered in vain for a Pheidias. We must allow that Pericles was in this respect
peculiarly fortunate. His life fell at a time when artistic genius was abundant
; a wave of inspiration seemed to pass over the sculptors and architects
of Greece, and through the liberality of Cimon and Pericles that
inspiration reached its highest level at Athens. It is true that some of the
artists employed were not Athenians at all, and that others were
trained in foreign schools, but their best work was done at Athens, and by
their efforts the city became the centre of the
art of Hellas.
The greatest
painter of the age, Polygnotus, was a native of
Thasos, and may have come to Athens with Cimon after the reduction of his
native city. We hear of his work at Delphi and Platsea;
but he seems to have settled permanently at Athens. He founded a
school, and in conjunction, with his contemporaries and pupils, he adorned the
Painted Porch at the eastern end of the market-place, the Theseum, and the chamber in the northern wing of the
Propylaea. Among the artists who came after him, there were perhaps some
who were as great, or greater, masters of technique ; but no one ever
attained the elevation of his style. He was the great painter of character
or “ morals,” an artist who could depict men as “ they ought to be.” It
was good for the young to look at his paintings, for, like
the greatest of the Italian masters, he idealised human nature, and impressed on the spectator the combination of beauty,
grace, and virtue.
Before the time of Polygnotus, the pictorial art of Greece was mainly
employed on the decoration of vases, which, however delicate and
beautiful, were productions for private use. It was otherwise with sculpture.
This art was from the first employed in the service of religion or for the
commemoration of great events and persons. Even in the sixth century
B.C.—under the rule of the tyrants,—the sculptors of Athens had attained some
eminence, as we know from the statues recently dug up in the Acropolis
(pp. 16, 34). These statues are of marble, and as we might expect in early
work in that stubborn material, they are massive and rigid, with a good
deal of conventionality in the more difficult parts, such as the hair,
eyes, and mouth. About the end of the century a new impulse was given to
the art by the use of bronze, a material which admits of greater
lightness and mobility than stone. It was in the Peloponnesus that the
great artists in bronze arose : Canachus at
Sicyon, Onatas at Aigina,
and Ageladas at Argos. And not only were they
famous for their success in metal, but the skill with which they were able
to treat the human and animal forms in that material exercised a
strong influence on work in marble. Following their example, artists
sought to produce something more vigorous, life-like, and
graceful, and pupils trained in their schools carried plastic art to
its greatest height.
Among the pupils
of Ageladas at Argos were the Athenians Myron and
Pheidias. The works of Myron were to be seen throughout all Hellas.
Like Polycleitus of Sicyon, he was a great master of the art of
casting bronze: his Ladas expiring at the moment of victory in the Olympic
race, and his Discobolus, were perhaps his most signal triumphs with the
human body; hardly less excellent, in another region, was the famous
cow which Cicero saw in the market-place at Athens. Pheidias, on the
other hand, from the time that he returned from Argos to his native city
till his departure for Olympia after the completion of the Parthenon, was
almost exclusively employed at Athens and in Attica. Among his earliest
works were the statues which commemorated the battle of Marathon,
and before the death of Cimon he had cast the great statue of Athena Promachus. When Pericles succeeded in acquiring the supreme
direction of affairs, the decoration of the Acropolis became a part of
his public policy. He did not dedicate a statue or build a temple as
a private gift or thank-offering ; he determined to use the services of art in
order to bring before the Athenians in visible form the position
of their city, and unite the whole empire under the protection of the
guardian goddess. The Acropolis was to be a fortress no more, but a sanctuary,
and Pheidias was at hand to assist in carrying out the plan.
To Pheidias,
therefore, these great achievements were mainly due. But he was well supported
by his architects ; and even in the decoration and plastic work he
must have been able to secure the services of a number of admirable
artists. The sculpture in the Parthenon, amounting, it is said, to four
thousand square feet of frieze and metopes, besides fifty colossal
statues, cannot have been the work of Pheidias’s own hand, and yet it is
all finished with the same perfect skill. We must assume that he
was able to breathe his spirit into those around him, and inspire
them with the devotion which alone can produce such masterpieces of art.
When the great work was done and the temple with the statue of the
goddess was presented to the eyes of the astonished Greeks, it was inevitable
that Pheidias should be regarded as the foremost of the sculptors of
his time. As such he was summoned to Olympia, in order that he might
do for Hellas what he had done for Athens. On a larger scale and with
still greater magnificence, he created an image of the
supreme Hellenic deity, which, by its superhuman majesty, filled
every beholder with wonder and awe.
From art we turn
to letters. In two departments of literature, the drama and history, the
achievements of the age of Pericles have never been surpassed, and in
a third, the department of philosophy, the foundation was laid for
triumphs not less splendid. The dialogues of Plato, which remain without a
rival in their beauty of form and language, belong to the generation after
Pericles; but they are due, both in manner and matter, to the influence
of Socrates, whose strange figure and still stranger habits were
known throughout Athens for some years before the beginning of the
Peloponnesian war. Of course these were not the only forms
of literature produced at this period. Epic poetry was indeed a thing
of the past, but elegiacs were still used for inscriptions, and the lyric
poetry of Pindar and Simonides, if less passionate and personal than the
poems of the Aeolian school, was distinguished by a greater dignity and
sweetness. The songs in which Pindar celebrated the Olympian victors
of his day still remain to attest the almost superhuman glory
achieved on the banks of the Alpheus; the “epigram” of Simonides on the
Spartans who fell at Thermopylae is felt to be a tribute not
unworthy even of their devotion; and the fragment of his “ Danae ”
leaves in every reader the memory of a tender and delicate grace which can
never be forgotten.
But neither Pindar
nor Simonides stands in any close relation to Pericles and Athens. Neither
poet was an Athenian ; their poetry is Hellenic rather than Attic; it
has little or nothing in common with the spirit which created the new
democracy, or the Athenian empire ; it would have been what it is
if the theatre of Dionysus had never been built, or the Peloponnesian
war had never been fought. In these respects it differs widely from the
plays of Sophocles and of Aristophanes.
It is not worth while to trace the dramatic literature of Athens back
to its earliest sources. It is sufficient to say that at the beginning of the
fifth century B.C., Aeschylus was twenty-five years old. Now Aeschylus
is the Homer of Greek tragedy, and though there is enough evidence to shew
that the Athenians were devoted to the drama before his time, there
is also enough to shew that the drama, as we know it, was his work. Of the
ninety plays which he wrote, seven only have come down to us; the
earliest in date being the “ Persae,” which was brought
out in 472 B.C., eight years after the famous battle of Salamis, which it
commemorates, and the last, the “ Orestea,” a
group of three plays, acted in 458 B.C. These dates shew us that Aeschylus
was a poet of the Cimonian rather than the
Periclean Athens, and indeed we cannot read his plays without feeling
that the spirit by which they are pervaded is the spirit of the Persian
rather than the Peloponnesian war.
Like every
dramatic poet the Greek tragedian attempted to please his audience, and in his
case this feeling was the stronger because his plays were brought out
as part of a contest, just as much as the tunes played, or the races run,
at the Panathensea. Whatever his theme, this
object must be kept in view. His plays were acted at the festival of
Dionysus, but he was not compelled to make the acts and sufferings of the
god his principal theme; it was enough that in addition to the three
plays, which he brought out as tragedies, he provided a satyric drama, in which the chorus was composed of the attendants
of Dionysus. For the rest, he might choose a historical subject as Aeschylus
did in the “ Persae,” or he might take a plot
from the myths of Theban and Trojan story.
On the other hand
there were limitations. The tragedy of the Greeks, though arising out of
the worship of the god of wine, became so severe and elevated in tone
that there was no room in it for comic or humorous scenes. It was grave
and solemn, dealing indeed with the passions of men, but dealing with them
In reference to human destiny ; it was religious, in the sense that it
carried the mind beyond the limits of visible life, and attempted to trace
the working of a divine power in the great scenes which it depicted. The
characters which it presented were intended to be typical and ideal,
far removed from the life and individuality of the common world. Even in
the “ Persae,” where events are described in
which the audience had participated, the realism is softened, partly by
the use of general terms—no Greek is ever mentioned by name in
the play—partly, by placing the action in Persia, and partly by
bringing on the stage the shade of the great Darius, a device which at
once lifts the drama above the level of a merely human victory of Greeks over
Persians.
In none of the
Greek dramatists is this elevation more conspicuous than in Aeschylus. The
spirit of the great scenes in which he took a part passed into his
soul, and received from his lips an expression not unworthy of it. The
experiences of the sixth century B.C., when the strongest thrones had crumbled
to dust, and tyrants had been hurled from the height of power and
luxurious enjoyment into the deepest abysses of ruin, had impressed on the
Greeks a deep distrust of human prosperity. That the anger of the
gods was provoked by the violent deeds of men was an old truth, but a
feeling now began to spread abroad that mere prosperity, if it exceeded a
certain limit, was regarded with jealousy by the gods and brought
down their vengeance upon men. From the first—even from Homer’s time—the
Greeks were wont to take a far from cheerful view of human existence,
and as time went on the shadows deepened. Man’s capacity for happiness was
never satisfied, and if at one moment he seemed to have triumphed over his
evil fortune, and laid up goods for many days, in the next, he was an
outcast in the world. This view of man’s condition, which is constantly
dwelt on by Pindar and Herodotus, received an immense support from the
failure of the great armament of Xerxes. The ruin of that mighty
host was a signal instance of the humiliation of those who deemed
themselves exalted above the lot of mankind. After the battle of Salamis
the instability of human greatness and the punishment of “ insolence ”
echoed as an undertone through all Greek thought.
But while other
writers were content to speak of the gods as jealous beings, who cut down the
mighty things of earth, simply because they were mighty, Aeschylus
took another view : he insisted on the justice of the divine dealings with men
; on eliminating anything like caprice or favour.
The evil which fell upon men never came without some provocation. The
race of the just is at all times prosperous; their happiness is abiding,
and passes from father to son; but if prosperity leads to evil and
impious words and acts—as in Greece it often did—it is never so great
that it can resist the vengeance which it provokes. Sooner or later, in
this generation or the next, the sentence pronounced will come to
pass, and if man will only consent to look at human nature, as it appears
“ in those pure
eyes
And perfect
witness of all-judging Jove,”
the sentence will
be found in every case to agree with the highest conception of
divine justice.
In the light of
such thoughts Aeschylus composed his tragedies, reading anew the lessons of the
old mythology for his purpose. Even when the material was most
untoward, as in some of the legends of Zeus, he endeavours to harmonise it with his central thought of
justice. In the “ Prometheus Vinctus,” which is
the most commonly read of his plays, we see the friend of man, to whom he
owes his rise from a condition lower than that of the animals,
waging an unequal contest with the youthful god, who has built up his
throne on the ruins of ancient dynasties. It is a strange allegory which
the poet presents to us ; an allegory of which we hardly know the meaning,
but expressing perhaps a consciousness of the ceaseless strife raging
between human intellect and a superhuman power, whose ways are not as our
ways. Whatever the interpretation may be, Aeschylus makes it clear
that the conflict of human aspirations with divine ordinances will find a
reconciliation in the decrees of a justice which reigns supreme over
gods and men. It is only when Zeus becomes the highest minister of
justice that his power is supreme.
In a similar
spirit the poet muses over the stories of Thebes and Troy. What was the meaning
of the curse, he asks, which rested on the sons of Oedipus and the
house of Atreus? Was it a blind impulse driving the innocent on to ruin?
He allows that it was an impulse, but it was not irresistible ; and
only when reinforced by other passions, did it carry men on to the
appointed end. The passages in which the poet describes the passions which
drive Eteocles on to meet his brother Polynices at the gates
of Thebes, and those which impel Agamemnon to sacrifice his daughter, are
masterpieces of subtle analysis. Personal ambition and inveterate hatred
are blended with the sense of an inherited curse and divinely appointed purpose.
Crimes must be punished, yet in the punishment a new crime is committed ;
and so the tragedy goes on from generation to generation, bringing
down the great and noble, whenever they allow their ambition or rage to
lead them astray.
Thus the drama
becomes with Aeschylus an attempt to interpret the conditions and limits of
human life. As much as any prophet or philosopher, he strives to establish a
firm basis upon which a man may act and think ; delivering him on the
one hand from superstitious fears, and warning him on the other
against self-assertion. It was a noble conception of poetry, and it was nobly
carried out. The grandeur of his characters has never been surpassed
: the proud defiance of Prometheus; the dauntless courage of
Clytemnestra, who seems lifted by her very crime into an avenging spirit;
and above all the prescient frenzy of Cassandra, in which every element of
pathos is rendered more pathetic by a helpless fore-knowledge of death—are
among the immortal productions of human genius. And the language of Aeschylus
is unlike the language of any other poet, ancient and modern. The lines of
Marlowe— the so-called “master of the mighty line,”—are faltering and
feeble when compared with the large and ample utterance of the old Greek
poet. Gods and heroes move before us in his scenes, and god-like are
the tones in which their words are conveyed to our ears.
The long life of
Sophocles nearly fills the whole of the fifth century. He was born about 495
B.C.; his first victory was won over Aeschylus in 469 B.C., and his
last play was brought out just after his death in 405 B.C. In that long
space of time the spirit of the Greek drama was entirely changed, for
there can hardly be a greater contrast than the contrast between Aeschylus
and Euripides, and, to a certain degree, Sophocles participated in the
change. He made improvements in the scenery and added a third actor,
for hitherto no more than two had been allowed to appear on the stage at
the same time, thus attaining a greater degree of variety in
his situations and a more vivid contrast of characters. He made each
of the three plays which, in obedience to custom, he brought out at the same
time a separate piece, unconnected with the rest; a change which
enabled him to gain a separate interest and a more rapid movement in each of
the dramas. No one who reads the “Orestea” of Aeschylus
can resist the feeling that the “ Agamemnon ” is more than half of the
whole. The plays which follow want variety and incident ; the
movement grows ever weaker as it approaches the close. This error
Sophocles sought to avoid. He perceived that concentration and unity were
among the advantages which dramatic possessed over narrative
representation, and that these advantages could not be fully realised if a single theme were spread over
three plays.
There is also
another change to be observed when we compare him with his great predecessor.
Though his dramas are filled with a religious spirit, and rest to a
large degree on the contrast of the divine and human will, they are not
conceived in the high prophetic tone of Aeschylus. He is nearer the
common thought of his time. He accepts the inevitable, and muses over
the strange sad destiny of man. What a wonderful creature is man ! he
exclaims in a chorus of the “ Antigone ”; how infinite in art and
invention ! what victories has he not won ! victories over bird and beast;
over earth and sea; over his own unsocial temper. Yet his wilfulness and pride bring him to nought.
And when a race is once doomed to ruin, the evil passes on from generation
to generation, and there is no release. With Aeschylus he agrees that
insolence or rebellion is the worst of crimes; it is the root from which
the tyrant springs, the destruction of the high laws which govern
the host of heaven—yet he sees clearly that the passions of men are
the chief agents in their undoing. The spirit of love holds an equal
empire with the most solemn ordinances—that is, it is as powerful a
motive in the actions of men. Love is invincible in battle, and none
may win a match from Aphrodite. The same deep sympathy with the passions
of life is seen in his abhorrence of old age—a truly Greek
feeling —and in the part which he assigns to women in his dramas. In
two of them the denouement is brought about by the love
of youth and maid, of wife and husband ; a motive which never appears in the
extant plays of Aeschylus. We observe the same tendency in the
situations in which we can compare him with his rival. Aeschylus keeps the
relations of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra steadily in the background ; Sophocles
brings them vividly to the front. Aeschylus makes little of the sisterly
devotion of Antigone for Polynices ; in Sophocles it is the first motive
of the play. But we must not think of Sophocles as wanting in force, or
dependent on love for a tragic situation. In the “Ajax” the love of Tecmessa merely adds a tender grace to the rugged
hero, whose noble spirit cannot survive the death of his honour, and in the “ Philoctetes ” there is no female
character at all. Nor is there any want of sterner stuff in
his plays; he never shrinks, when necessary, from the terrible
resources of his art. Ajax slays himself on the stage in the presence of
the spectators ; Oedipus staggers into sight, with his bleeding eyes,
crying for some one to support and guide him ;
Philoctetes sinks down in a swoon of intolerable anguish; we are
allowed to hear the appeal of Clytemnestra to Orestes: “ My son, have pity
on the breast that nursed thee! ” and from the lips of Electra, standing
watchful at the door, falls the crushing answer : “ Pity she had none, for
thee or for thy father.”
Yet terrible as
these scenes are, we never close a play of Sophocles with feelings shocked or
distressed. A perfect master of his art, he knows how to give the
pleasure which tragedy ought to give—the pleasure of elevated feeling
passing beyond the limits of individual nature to be engaged on
high and solemn themes, and so returning with renewed strength and
patience to the everlasting puzzle of human existence.
In his language
Sophocles is less simple and also less grandiloquent than Aeschylus. The
majestic lines, which fall on our ears as “ thunder-drops fall on a
sleeping sea,” have disappeared, and in the place of the splendid wealth
of metaphor in which the older poet clothes—and sometimes
veils—his meaning, there is a striving after subtle combinations which
often ends in obscurity—at least for us. Nevertheless there is a beauty in
the songs and a pathos in the speeches of Sophocles which Aeschylus
has not surpassed ; he has written lines in which we seem to come near to
the utmost limits of human expression. Such are those with which
Electra closes her lament over the urn of Orestes; such, too, are those in
which the poet has chosen to paint the beauties of his own birthplace,
Colonus.
There are scenes in
Aeschylus more striking than any scene in Sophocles, but, on the other
hand, almost any play of Sophocles, taken as a whole, is a more
perfect work of art than the best play of Aeschylus. There is a better connexion of the scenes, a more even balance of the
parts. This superiority, as we have said, was partly attained by the
limitation of the subject to a single play, but it was also due to the
consummate skill of the poet in arranging his plots. In this respect the “
Oedipus Rex ” has always been regarded as the model of a perfect
play.
Euripides, who, by
common consent, stood third in the list of Greek tragic poets, was a
contemporary of Sophocles, both poets dying in the same year.
But he was a much
younger man, and the difference of age coincided with a remarkable difference
of nature and development. It is perhaps hardly too extreme to say
that the difference between Shakespeare and Euripides is scarcely greater than
the difference between Euripides and Sophocles. The conception of
tragedy is changed ; and human nature is regarded from an entirely
different point of view. The old submissive attitude, in which man is
taught to think human thoughts, and walk in reverent humility towards
higher powers, whose laws, however inscrutable, are nevertheless righteous and
form the foundation of human society, is cast aside in favour of a criticism which shrinks from
nothing, however sacred and sublime. The old myths, so simple and
stately, are dragged down to the level of a case at law; the old heroes
appear as stupid, brutal, or contemptible men ; the great dames
of story scold like fish-wives. Every illusion of epic art is
dispelled ; we are brought face to face with the absurd facts, or the
gross passions which underlie them. The very worship of the gods is shewn
to be an occasion of ruin to those who cherish it. In the excitement
of the Dionysiac possession Agave tears her son to pieces, and Artemis
cannot protect her votary from the implacable wrath of Aphrodite. Or
the politics of the day are allowed to influence the characters of Trojan
legend. Agamemnon and Menelaus are Spartans, as an Athenian
thought of Spartans in the Peloponnesian war; Helen and Hermione are
such women as Aristotle in a later generation declared that the Spartan
women were —imperious, proud, and licentious. The strife of man with
destiny, which gives such elevation to the earlier drama, has passed away;
man is now shewn contending with the base passions of his own nature.
Lying, treachery, malice, uncleanness, jealousy, rage, vengeance,
envy,—these are the instruments with which Euripides works to bring about
a tragic situation. He deals with no ideals; he is misled by no illusions
; he is softened by no pity; he will not spare us a line of the
picture; in his merciless analysis of human motives, he tears away
the tender coverings which contrition or hope or pity have spread over the
weakness of human nature ; and proclaims aloud, often in the name of
the gods, the triumph of what is evil and base.
Such is Euripides
on his sterner side—the author of the “ Hippolytus,” “ Medea,” and “ Bacchae.”
But there is also another Euripides—the author of the “ Alcestis,”
the singer of sweet lyric songs, the magician at whose touch the common things
of life become radiant with an eternal beauty,—the master of description,
telling his tale at one time with matchless simplicity and grace, at
another with a splendour of rhetoric,
unsurpassed in any literature. The dignity and graciousness of the dying
Alcestis; the glad, eager, stainless youth of Ion, who knows no home
but the temple of Delphi, no parent but-Apollo ; the songs of the “ Hecuba ”
and “ Electra,” the description of the Bacchants, the appeal of Iphigenia
to her father—these will always exercise a charm even over those who turn
from the darker scenes. And even in the darkest, it must be admitted that the
expression is almost perfect. The fury of Hecuba crying to Agamemnon to
avenge her murdered son is sublime, and not less so the wild
declamation of Cassandra, when foretelling her own and Agamemnon’s death.
A poet so wide in
his range and so daring in his departure from the antique solemnity of his art
must needs have friends and enemies. Euripides was hated and
worshipped in his own day, and the division of opinion exists to this hour. The
comedian Aristophanes condemned him as immoral, holding up to scorn
his Phaedras and Sthenoboeas,
and caricaturing his sophistry and rhetoric. On the other hand, he was the favourite poet of Socrates, and not of Socrates
only, but of the Athenians of his time, and even of those who lived far
from Athens. A story was current in antiquity that, of the
Athenian prisoners cast into the stone quarries at Syracuse, every one was allowed his liberty who could recite
a verse of Euripides. The charm has not vanished with time. Milton
and Goethe, Coleridge and Browning, have left a record of their admiration
of this “most tragic of poets.’’ Of criticism, which takes a different view,
there is enough and to spare ; and even the most devoted admirers of
Euripides must admit that his work is very unequal. Fate, which has given
us only seven plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles, has given us nineteen of
Euripides. Had the same severe selection been exercised in his case,
and nothing left but his “ Alcestis,” “ Medea,” “Hippolytus,” his “Bacchae,”
“Ion,” and “Iphigenia in Tauris,” the judgments of his readers would be
more consistent.
The difference
which divides Euripides from Sophocles must not be ascribed merely to his
personal character or genius. The two men were indeed widely different;
Sophocles was at once a poet and a man of the world, the charm of the
society in which he moved, and now and then employed in the public business
of the city ; Euripides was retired, solitary, studious, a reader of
books, which in his day were still perhaps a suspicious novelty. Under any
circumstances the two would have taken different views of life. But when
Euripides was growing up to manhood, at the time at which the imagination is
not yet controlled by experience and new ideas are most powerful to
sway the mind, a great change came over Athenian thought. The “spirit that
denies” made itself felt in every department of life, and questions
which had never yet been raised—questions touching the foundation of society
and morals —were matters of every-day discussion.
It was in the
Ionian cities of Asia that the movement first began, and it began with
enquiries into the phenomena of nature. What was the cause of existence
and growth ? How did the sun and moon and stars and earth arise ? How were
their motions regulated ? Numerous answers were given to these questions.
The elements were distinguished from their composite forms, and sometimes one
and sometimes another was thought to be the cause of the rest. Various
processes of rarefaction and condensation, of attraction and repulsion, were
supposed— one philosopher inventing a system which may fairly be
called evolution. As thought became stronger the causes of existence
became more abstract: one teacher would find the key to the puzzle of the
universe in number ; another postulated constant change as the condition
of existence ; a third demanded unity and self-existent Being as the basis
of all things. But one and all agreed in denying truth and reality to
the changing phenomena of the outward world. By degrees the same criticism
was applied to politics and ethics. The various forms of government
were discussed, and with them the object and purpose of all governments. In connexion with such enquiries it was natural to ask
what was legal and what was illegal. A contrast was established between “
nature ” and “ ordinance,” between universal and particular laws. It was
but a short step to pass on to ethical truths, and ask : What was the
measure of right and wrong? What was the value of custom ? To -what degree
was a man a law to himself ? Is truth the same for all, or does it
vary according to the circumstances and temperament of each ?
Questions such as
these cannot be raised under any circumstances without a considerable degree
of danger, and the danger was unusually great in a civilisation like that of Greece, in which morality and religion were by no means in
close harmony with each other. But so long as they are raised in
an honest desire to get at the truth, and establish the laws of
conduct and government upon a firmer basis, the good which attends the
discussion is greater than the evil. Unfortunately, this was by no
means the case in Greece. For a time, it is true, the “ sophists ”
and the philosophers were the same, and both were thoroughly in earnest in
their speculations. The great names of Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus,
and Pythagoras are never to be mentioned without respect. But when politics
and ethics came within the sphere of criticism ; above all, when the
Ionian spirit of enquiry was allied with Sicilian rhetoric, a different
spirit prevailed. Sophistry and philosophy parted company ; and while
the more disinterested seekers after truth pursued their researches
into Change and Being, there were others who made discussion a profitable
profession. They travelled through Greece as teachers, imparting
for pay their secrets of logic and dialectics, and making “the worse
appear the better reason.” Their wandering life emancipated them from the
traditions of any state, and though we cannot deny to them the credit
of great ability and great knowledge, we must allow that they made an
ignoble use of both. It is true that they stimulated the intellects of
those who came to them, but the stimulus was all in
one direction—towards the removal of restraint and the development of
personal ambition. Or they taught the art of making speeches, which,
though they would not bear examination, were brilliant enough to
carry away the feelings of a great audience.
It was in this
atmosphere that the youth of the age of Pericles grew up, and Euripides among
them. From the “ sophists " he learned to question every thing, bringing the deepest feelings of man to
the touchstone of a formal and ill-developed logic. From them he
learned to turn outwards the “ seamy side ” of Greek mythology and
religion.
The same change
was present everywhere, and to many it was a change wholly evil. We have
seen how sensitive the Greeks became at this time to attacks upon
religion, bringing charges of “ impiety ” against those of the Periclean
circle who seemed in any way favourable to the
new intellectual movement. More especially were the comedians filled with
antipathy to the sophists and their followers. They looked on them as the
corrupters of youth, whose pernicious doctrines were calculated to destroy
moral conduct and civic patriotism. Cratinus,
the first great comic poet at Athens, had a fling at the “ prying rascals
” in his play of the “ Panoptae ” ; and in one
of his earliest plays, brought out immediately after the death of
Pericles, Aristophanes contrasts the young man, as the sophists had taught
him to be, with the youth of an earlier age. In the “ Clouds,” which
appeared in 423 B.C., he selected Socrates, as the most prominent sophist
of the time, for the chief object of his ridicule. In this he was partly
right and partly wrong; he was right in pointing to the evil wrought
in the minds of the young by a crude emancipation from old beliefs and customs
; he was wrong in confounding Socrates with those who sought to make
the worse the better cause.
Socrates availed
himself of the instruments which the sophists put into his hands to destroy
sophistry. From morning to night his strange figure might be seen in
the market-place, or at some other centre of public resort; there he stood, regardless of poverty, incapable of
fatigue, asking questions of all around him in the endeavour to find some general principles of action, and awaken others to an interest
in such questions. What was the relation of virtue to knowledge ?
Could a man know what was right and do what was wrong? Could virtue be
taught, and, if so, who were the teachers and where could they be
found ? Was political government an art like medicine, and what was the
aim of the art, as health is the aim of medicine? It often happened that
his questions led to no result beyond the negative result, that the
common practice and customs of men were irrational; often they were raised
on absurd analogies, in which vital distinctions were overlooked, as the
analogy of men and animals, but they never carried him astray from the
position of a good man and an honest citizen. While the
professional sophists wandered far and wide in search of profitable employment,
he remained within the walls of Athens, or only left them to fight in the
service of his country. And though many of his numberless disciples
by no means followed in his steps—on the contrary, it was owing to the
conduct of such men as Alcibiades, Critias, and
Charmides that he was finally brought to trial for corrupting the youth of
Athens,—there was one among them on whom his spirit descended in a double
measure. Through the dialogues of Plato the name of Socrates has
become a symbol for a life passed in the service of truth and wisdom.
Aristophanes did
not see this side of the life of Socrates ; and even if he had seen it, his
business as a comedian was not to say what was true, but what was
amusing. The “ Old Comedy ” of Athens, that is, roughly speaking, the
comedy of the fifth century, presents us with a picture of Athenian life and manners;
but the picture is far from being true, and it was not meant to be true.
We cannot judge of Athenian politics and society, of
Athenian statesmen and philosophers, of Athenian men and women, from
the descriptions given by the comedians, without being unjust both to the poets
and the people.
Attic comedy was
essentially a creation of the age of Pericles; it was about the middle of the
century when the earliest comedians of any note came forward. It had its
root in the merry-makings at the vintage, when the hamlets of Attica
worshipped the wine god with indecent rites and riotous glee.
The Greeks had a passion for dramatic representation, and their
religious worship, like their poetry and even their history, tended to
take a dramatic form. Hardly any deity was worshipped without some sort
of miracle-play, or at least a procession. The village wits took the
opportunity of the festival to form themselves into a band and amuse the
audience, who gathered round, with tales of village scandal, or by imitating
the dress, style, and language of anyone who had earned the aversion of his neighbours. With the growth of democracy these
amusements, which were essentially amusements of the people, attracted
more attention, until at length they too, in a more developed form, found
a place among the dramas brought out in the great theatre at the
foot of the Acropolis. The old village stories and scandal were of course
dropped, in order to make room for scurrilous attacks on the conduct and
character of men well known in the city, but the old buffoonery and
extravagance, by which the attention of the village had been caught, the
old indecency, which symbolised the worship of
the productive power of nature, were still permitted.
Of the comedies
acted in the lifetime of Pericles, we have nothing but fragments ; but there is
no reason to suppose that they differed from the comedies of Aristophanes,
which began to appear in 427 B.C. The fragments which have been preserved,
and the little that we know of their history, allow us to assert that from
the time that comedies were acted as part of the great festival of
Dionysus, they were distinguished by three characteristics: the
direct attacks on public characters; the extravagant forms assumed by
the choruses; and the nakedness of their indecency.
We have already
spoken of the attacks made by the comic poets on Pericles and Aspasia. Even
as early as 444 B.C., Cratinus, in the “
Thracian Women,” spoke of Pericles as going about with the Odeum
on his head,—a sarcasm on his habit of wearing a helmet to conceal the
shape of his head, and on the recent erection of the music-hall. In another
play of the same author, Pericles is “ the new Zeus born of Faction and of
Cronos,” enthroned, like Zeus himself, on the destruction of ancient
order; and in yet another fragment, Hera-Aspasia is spoken of in
language of untempered vigour.
Even after the death of Pericles, Aristophanes had no hesitation in
repeating the scandal which declared that Aspasia and her runaways
and the embezzlements of Pheidias were the real cause of the Peloponnesian
war. The same measure was dealt out to others: to Cleon, the ferocious
opponent of Pericles, to Hyperbolus, and Cleophon, leaders of the extreme democracy,
who insisted on war to the death with Sparta; and, in a less degree,
to Nicias and Theramenes, who were in favour of a more moderate constitution and peace. Only
one of the great Athenians of the Peloponnesian war is allowed to escape :
Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, about whom, in spite
of much that must have been very tempting in his position and
character, Aristophanes is remarkably silent. And not the leading men
only, but the institutions of the people, and even the people—the
all-powerful sovereign Demos, —are brought forward for satire and
ridicule. The absurdities of the law-courts form the subject of
the “Wasps” of Aristophanes; the absurdities of the Demos form the subject
of the “ Knights.” When there was nothing to be made of the men, the
poets turned upon the women. Two of the plays of Aristophanes shew us
Athens under the “ regiment ” of women; a third presents a picture of the
women as they were, when left to themselves, and celebrating their
sacred Thesmophoria.
On this side Attic
comedy is not to be compared with the comedy of our own stage, but with the
pamphlets of the age of Swift, or the Rolliad, the
caricatures of Gillray and Rowlandson, and Punch. But the
comparison is only partially true. Much greater licence was allowed at Athens than with us, owing partly to the state of society
at the time, and partly to the fact that gross and licentious ribaldry was
an accepted part of some religious rites in Greece. And doubtless a
great part of the attacks were made and taken in no very serious spirit.
So long as the persons assailed were in a strong position, they cared
little for the extravagances of comic satire. Unmeasured abuse often
brings its own antidote. We know that when Fox was hurling his
denunciations upon North in the House of Commons, the recipient was
generally asleep ! So, too, with the city. So long as Athens felt her
greatness secure, she was willing to let the comedians do their worst
upon men and institutions. She was pleased with her own follies, as
Justice Shallow was pleased with the wildness of his youth, and
not the less pleased because “ every third word was a lie.” In times
of distress and danger her temper changed. She became fretful and suspicious.
Twice in the fifth century—in 440 B.C., when Samos was in revolt, and
in 415 B.C., at the time when the great Sicilian expedition was being sent
out, and the public mind was disturbed by the mutilation of the Hermae—it
was forbidden to satirise anyone by name. The
result in the second case may be seen in the comedies of Aristophanes. In
all the plays brought out before this date he is political and personal;
in the “Birds,” which appeared in 414 B.C., he never alludes directly to
the events which were occupying the minds of all. After the fall of
Athens, in 404 B.C., the character of comedy entirely changed : it
became a comedy of manners ; the allusions to politics either disappeared
or were carefully veiled.
The plays of
Aristophanes are sometimes named after the choruses which appear in them ; and
among these we find such fantastic titles as “ Wasps,” “ Clouds,” “
Birds,” and “ Frogs.” The practice did not begin with him ; he tells us
that his predecessor, Magnes, availed himself of
the same artifice to attract an audience, and from the fragments we
can see that the practice was universal in the older comedy. The
names were not without meaning; in appearance and dress, so far as
possible, the choruses in these plays were what they were called. A painting
on a vase has preserved to us a picture of men dressed to represent birds,
and though we have no right to connect it with Aristophanes, the
picture probably represents some scene from a comedy.
But why, we ask,
does the poet have recourse to these strange disguises ? We may answer the
question by saying that comedy never forgot her origin. In the village
festivals all kinds of fantastic dresses had been worn to attract
attention and excite curiosity, as well as for the sake of concealment, and
the practice thus begun was continued when comedy became a part of
the state festivals. There was also another reason. By bringing in a
chorus of Birds or Clouds, the poets were able to look at
human nature and society from an external and abnormal point of view,
as they might appear to beings who did not share the delusions of mankind.
Like the Fairies in “ Midsummer Night’s Dream,” they could watch the
stir and stress of life, and declare : “ Lord! what fools these mortals be
! ” It is the same feeling which has prompted the introduction of animals
into fables. The “ great and sane and simple race of beasts,” whose
instincts never swerve from the appointed end, have always formed an
excellent vehicle for the delivery of moral precepts and criticism. The
comic poets claimed an even greater licence than
the fabulists, for their fancy was not bounded by the animate world ;
but amid all their extravagance there ran a vein of common-sense and sound
criticism, often of vigorous personal remonstrance—especially in the form
of chorus called a Parabasis, which could only be introduced under some
sort of disguise.
Of the gross
indecency of the old Attic comedy it is impossible to speak without reserve,
and yet a few words of explanation, if not of palliation, must be
said. However strange the statement may appear to us, it is
nevertheless true, that this grossness is largely due to the nature of
Greek religion. In its essence that religion was a worship of the powers
which are at work in the universe, whatever they might be, without
distinction of higher or lower, or the exclusion of animal forces in favour of moral. Not only were there rites of a
grossly obscene nature in Greek temples, but there were festivals in which
the worshippers claimed the privilege, in language and in
symbolism, of being naked and not ashamed. This strange departure from the
ordinary manners and customs of life was found among women no less than
men; what the worship of Dionysus was to the one, the worship of
Demeter was to the other. In our eyes it forms a repellent feature in
Greek civilisation, and it was repellent to the
Greeks themselves at a later age. Aristotle and Plutarch condemn it ; in
their time the open and outrageous indecency of Cratinus and
Aristophanes had been exchanged for veiled suggestions and innuendoes. The
change may have been in the interest of good manners ; but whether it
was in the interest of pure morals is more doubtful, and at any rate we must
not be misled into harsh judgments on the morality of the age
of Pericles. These are matters in which one age cannot understand another.
In spite of the drunkenness which prevailed at the Dionysia, the
Greeks were a sober nation ; and though we have no evidence on which to
found a good opinion of the private life of the Athenians, we are at least
in possession of two facts which prove the high value placed, in
theory, at any rate, on good conduct: No nation was ever more careful than
they of the moral and physical education of youth ; none watched more
strictly to prevent the slightest insult to women of the household.
Philosophy was not
the only gift of the Asiatic Greeks to their kinsmen on the peninsula.
The same spirit of enquiry which led them to investigate the causes of
natural phenomena induced them also to examine and record the past history
of Greek cities and the customs of neighbouring barbarians. By the beginning of the fifth century Hecataeus of Miletus had written a description of the earth; maps had been
drawn ; lists had been made of priestesses and officers; genealogies had
been compiled and worked into a foundation for chronology ;
legends had been compared and assimilated ; traditions of
the founding of cities had been committed to writing. A prose
literature made its appearance beside the various forms of poetry, which had
hitherto been the only literature of Greece, and, as was natural in
an age of such mental activity, it spread rapidly. The sense of style
was awakened—a sense which could not fail to be stimulated by the
importance of rhetoric in civic life and the attention paid by
the sophists to expression. By the middle of the century Herodotus had
begun the composition of the immortal work, which forms the foundation of
our knowledge of the history of antiquity ; and at the beginning of
the Peloponnesian war Thucydides was preparing to record the struggle
which he thought the greatest of all wars ; though his history,
which he did not live to complete, was not published till after the
end of it.
We have already
seen that Sophocles and Euripides, though contemporaries in age, were widely separated
in thought and feeling. The same distinction may be observed between Herodotus
and Thucydides, though it is shown in a different way. Herodotus is
essentially the historian of Hellas; Thucydides is the historian of Athens
: the first is penetrated with the feeling of the Persian war ;
the second, with the feeling of the Peloponnesian war. Both were
great admirers of Athens and of Pericles; but one looks at them from
without, the other, as it were, from within. The spirit of criticism,
which is all in all to Thucydides, is faintly felt by Herodotus. He
repeats what he has heard, even when he does not believe it; he asserts
what he believes, even when it is against all evidence. He is wrong
when he is at the greatest pains to be scientific, as in his account
of the Nile; and right when he is merely guessing, as in his account of
the Caspian/ which he asserts to be a “ sea by itself,” i.e., closed
at the northern end. His measurements are wrong, for he makes the
Euxine twice as long as it really is ; his numbers are wrong, for he
calculates the length of life on a year of 375 days ! He describes the
pyramids of Memphis, but says nothing of the Sphinx; he travelled to
Thebes, but passed by the splendid buildings of the Ramessids without a word. His interest in history was not the interest which a
modern historian would have. Of the countries which he knew best he
tells us least, and what he does tell is often of very little historical
value. He might have said a great deal about the Greek cities
in Asia, as they existed in his own day, when they were claimed as
subjects by Athens and Persia, or about the constitution of Sparta; among
the “episodes which his work affects,” these would have found a fitting
place. Instead of these we have accounts of remote and unknown nations, foreign
criticisms on Greek myths, or popular stories about the domestic
complications of the Spartan kings, or legends of the burning of Croesus
and the invasion of Scythia ; and it is not till he settles down to the invasion
of Greece by the Persians that he pursues his theme in a settled order,
and with some attempt at chronology. The history of Thucydides is the
reverse of all this. He opens his work with a preface in which he
establishes his view that the Peloponnesian war was the greatest ever
known in Greece, and dwells on the importance of wealth in warfare,
knowing that Athens entered on the struggle incomparably richer than her
opponents. Then he traces the causes of the war, and, after a
digression, in which he relates the origin and growth of the
Athenian power, he enters on his subject, never to leave it again.
His narrative is annalistic in form, each year being divided into two
parts, a summer and a winter; he took the greatest personal trouble not
only to find out what men said, for Herodotus did that, but to find
out the precise truth of what they said, having the greatest mistrust of
poets whose business it was to exaggerate, and of “ logographers,” who
composed less with a view to the lasting value of their work than to the
immediate impression made by it. But, with all this devotion to accuracy,
he does not approach the task in the spirit of a modern historian. He
tells us little of the internal politics of Athens during the earlier part
of the tremendous struggle. Of some of the popular leaders who
played a considerable part in the drama, such as Lysicles and Hyperbolus,
he hardly says a word ; the comedians and the sophists, Sophocles and Socrates,
are never so much as mentioned. It is the war, and nothing but the
war, on which he has fixed his attention. Attica was laid waste, but we hear
nothing of the revolution in property which this must
have caused ; the education of the Athenian youth was influenced by
sophists and philosophers, but Thucydides never condescends to say whether the
issue of the war was or was not in any degree due to the decay of the fibre of the Athenian nation.
The work of
Herodotus is epic in its plan and highly religious in feeling. The episodes
which carry him almost over the whole known world may be compared
with the episodes which carry Odysseus to Calypso’s isle and to Scheria ; the strong, swift stream of narrative, which
runs through the later books of the “ Odyssey,” may have furnished a hint
to the historian in the management of the closing part of his story.
Throughout the whole he is tracing the doom which overtakes human pride
and insolence; Croesus, Polycrates, and Xerxes are all examples of
the favourite theme, that the paths of pride
lead to destruction. It is in vain that men are warned of the danger.
Croesus is warned by Solon ; Xerxes by Artabanus; Polycrates by Amasis,
but without effect. There is no way of saving a man from the anger
which is in store for him.
Thucydides, as we
have said, is annalistic,—attempting by this means to secure strictness in
chronology even at the expense of the connexion of
events,—and he is anything rather than religious.
He speaks in
contempt of signs and wonders and prophets, for any crisis will bring its crop
of such; he never alludes to any theories of divine envy or human
pride; he wishes to record things merely as they are, believing that human
life moves in cycles, and that the past may form a guide to the
future. Yet we may notice that even he cannot wholly free himself
from the idea that the plague was the work of Apollo, the god who was
pledged to aid the Spartans.
In spite of all
their differences, Herodotus and Thucydides are alike in one point : they are
both more dramatic than any modern historian would venture to be. Not
only do they introduce speeches into their works on occasions, when
perhaps no speeches were made, and relate conversations which could
not have been preserved,—this is especially the case with Herodotus, who
can tell us what Atossa said to Darius in the
silence of the royal bedchamber—but the speeches are obviously in
some cases composed with a view to the situation ; they are not a
record of what was actually said at any time. This is going further than a
modern writer would venture to do, but this is not all. In some cases
it seems very probable that Herodotus did not hesitate to ascribe to
others opinions which were really his own—at any rate it is very difficult
to understand what interest the Egyptian priests could have taken in the
story of Helen,—and Thucydides has been accused, not without some shew of
reason, of making rhetorical comments on the Corcyrean sedition.
Whatever the truth of this criticism, we shall, in any case, find it
difficult to deny that the nature and use of historical evidence was
imperfectly understood by Greek historians. Yet the two great works will
never be displaced from the position which they hold at the head of
descriptive and philosophical history, for Herodotus has never been
surpassed in the art of telling a story, nor Thucydides in his insight
into the motives of human action.
Pericles was not
content that Athens should be the centre of the
highest art and literature of Greece ; he resolved that, so far as
possible, the people should share in all the pleasure which art and
literature could give. In regard to the great artistic triumphs of
Pheidias and his fellow-workers, the end was easily attained ; the
beautiful Parthenon was there for all who chose to see; and once in
every four years, at the festival of the great Panathenaea, all Athens
went in procession through the gateway to the temple. The plays at the
Dionysia could not be so easily thrown open. The theatre in
which they were acted was leased to a manager, who charged a certain
sum for entrance to cover his expenses. The sum was not high—about threepence a day during the festival,—but even this
trifle was more than many of the Athenians could afford to spend.
Pericles met the difficulty by distributing to each of the poorest class,
out of the public funds, the amount which would enable him to pay
the fee charged for entrance. This was the celebrated “ Theoricon,” or sum given for attendance on amusements.
In the time of Pericles it was given to the very poor and only at the
Dionysia, but afterwards the word was used to cover the division of the
surplus funds of the state among the citizens.
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE ATHENS OF
PERICLES : MANNERS AND SOCIETY—CONCLUSION.
THE monuments of
Athens remain, though in ruins, to attest the splendour of the art which adorned the city in the days of Pericles; the noble works of
literature, which delighted the Athenian of his day, can be read by us
in a form not very different from that in which they first appeared.
But when we turn to matters of a more ephemeral nature, and attempt to realise the manners and society of the time, our
evidence is far more precarious. It is always difficult to judge of
an age by the literature which it produces; ideals mislead us in one
direction, and caricatures in another; or we mistake the part for the
whole in our ignorance of the extent to which literature penetrated; or,
to take another point of view, in our ignorance of the area from
which ideas and characters are drawn. We know, for instance, that all
Athens congregated in the theatre of Dionysus to hear the new
tragedies at the Spring Festival, but we cannot tell how many of the
audience entered into the spirit of Aeschylus and Sophocles. The eager
interest in knowledge, which we find among the young men who figure
in the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon, must have been confined to a
few; and when we ask what was the general level of intelligence and
culture at Athens in the best days of the city, it is very difficult to
give an answer.
The most obvious
point of difference in Greek civilisation, when we
compare it with our own, is the existence of slavery. There were slaves
everywhere; in every workshop and every household ; on the farms and
in the mines ; the police were slaves, the clerks in public offices were
slaves. This feature at once places a wide distinction between the
democracy of Athens and the democracies of modern times. The questions
which are now among the most prominent, such as the relations of labour and capital, the growth of population, or the
extension of the franchise, were hardly raised at Athens; their place
was taken by others, not less important to the welfare of the society, but
widely different: the defence of the masters
against their slaves ; the admission of the evidence of slaves in courts of
law; the rules and sanctions of manumission. On these subjects much
might be said which would not be to the credit of Greek civilisation. If we remember that twenty thousand
slaves deserted to the Peloponnesians at a time when the Public Assembly
at Athens never numbered five thousand citizens, we can understand
that there was reason to dread the combination of slaves against masters ; and
under such circumstances the measures taken for repression were not likely
to err on the side of mercy. We also know that the evidence of slaves was
never taken except under torture, more or less severe. On the other
hand, it would not be difficult to collect instances of kind and humane
treatment of slaves by their masters, or of devotion on the part of
slaves. It is also obvious that the existence of female slaves placed a
number of questions, which are among the most difficult of our day, in
quite a different light; and without attempting to decide whether the
evil was greater or less, it is at least certain that a slave, who was
always an article of value, in one way or another, was never so
utterly abandoned to her fate as the outcast of modern society. Her
death, at any rate, could be traced and avenged. But these are wide and
intricate results of slavery, on which we cannot enter here. Looking at
the matter from a more special point of view, we may ask: What was the
effect of slavery on the Athenian democracy ?
As a first and
obvious effect it allowed the citizen an amount of leisure which without it
would have been impossible. While the slave was at work, the master
was in the Ecclesia, or in the law-courts, or in the market-place, or in
one of the numerous porticoes. Without the opportunities thus
afforded, the Periclean constitution could not have existed. Had the
poorer part of the population been compelled to spend their days in laborious
occupations, the rich must have remained the governing body of the
city, but the existence of slavery, united with payment for service in the
Council and the lawcourts, placed a majority of the citizens in
the position of men who had both the means and the leisure to devote
their time to the state.
Such an
arrangement not only led to the development of an extreme democracy, but it
also gave a new turn to the old conflict between rich and poor. In
countries where the franchise depends on wealth, or the poor live on wages
paid them by the rich, democracy may degenerate into socialism. But
this is less likely to be the case in a state where all the citizens
are equal, and few, if any, are employed in the service of others. In
Athens, at any rate democracy never took a socialistic form. A man
who possessed a large fortune was expected to contribute largely to
the state ; he was burdened with heavy contributions to the maintenance of
the fleet; out of his pocket came the money necessary for the choruses,
which took part in the Dionysia and other festivals of the city. So long
as he paid these sums —and many citizens not only paid them, but
seized the opportunity to make a display of their liberality, —he was
permitted to enjoy his fortune, however large. Pettifoggers might attack
him, it is true, but they could be beaten off by their own
weapons—as Socrates advised his rich friend Crito to keep a
tame sycophant who would defend him from others of his kind ! The
jurors might bear hardly upon him in their administration of the law, for
that evil, as we have said, was inseparable from the institution
of the law-courts, but the democracy never attempted anything like a
confiscation of property, even under the severest pressure. Such measures
appear for the first time in the acts of the “Thirty Tyrants.”
The same protection was extended even to those who, though not
citizens of Athens, were residents in the city, the “resident aliens,” or metoeci. These men paid certain taxes, and liberal
gifts were expected from them, but no attempt was made to
interfere with their just gains, so long as these were made in a
manner which did not impair the wellbeing of the city. Most of the metoeci were traders, and, in fact, the trade of
Athens was largely in their hands; as a class they were probably richer
than a large number of the citizens ; their property, and even their
lives, were at the mercy of the Athenian jurors ; yet we never hear
that they were oppressed. The fact that they were politically in a
subordinate position satisfied the ambition of the citizens, whose vanity
was much in excess of their cupidity. That an alien or even a slave
was better clad and better fed than the citizen provoked no jealousy. The
citizen was the only free man in the city. He lived as he pleased,
master of his time and of his actions, and, what was more delightful
still, master of the time and actions of others. The poorest citizen, in
theory, at least, was the equal of the richest, and when he held up
his hand in the Assembly, or dropped his pebble in the juror’s box,
he felt not only that he was the ruler of a mighty empire, but that the
rich who came forward as officers of the state were in a manner his
servants. This consciousness of a superiority went far to balance the
bitterness of feeling between classes. If the poor man felt that the rich
received more than his share of the good things of the city, he could
at least say his say without reserve. He was not the servant of
another, dependent on his will and purse. It is in this spirit that Dicaeopolis expresses himself towards one of the
Athenian generals:
Lamachus.
Is this the sort
of language for a beggar
To use to a
commander such as me?
Dicaopolis.
k. beggar am I
?
Lam. Why
what else are you ?
Die. I ’ll tell
ye ! An honest man : that’s what I am,
A citizen that has
served his time in the army,
As a footsoldier, fairly, not like you,
Pilfering and
drawing pay, with a pack of foreigners. —Frere.
Slavery had also
another effect. Like every government the government of Athens had to contend
with extremes of intelligence and ignorance. On the one hand was the
citizen, who, belonging, let us say, to the circle of Pericles, was not
only trained in the best education of the time, but knew the relations
which prevailed between Athens and foreign states, and the past history of
his city ; on the other was the dull peasant whose talk was wholly of
oxen. But owing to the presence of slaves these extremes were
probably less marked at Athens than in modern states. Every citizen could,
if he chose, attend the meetings of the Assembly, where he would hear
a good deal of discussion and acquire at least an outline of the facts; he
could sit as a juror in a lawcourt and have his wits sharpened by distinguishing between
the lies and counterlies which were
prevalent there. Twice in the year he could listen to comedies ; once, at
least to the masterpieces of the great tragedians, and though books were
scarce, every citizen had been to some kind of school, and could at
least read and write. It is probable that the average intelligence of an
Athenian audience was not less than the average intelligence of artisans
in a modern city, and their knowledge of affairs was certainly
greater. It is true that they had no newspapers, but on the other hand they had
few books and no religious dogma, so that the affairs of the city,
and no doubt the affairs of the citizens also, occupied a far larger share
of attention with them than with us, and as few hours of the day were
spent in labour, they had a great deal more
leisure to bestow upon their city and their neighbours than the modern artisan.
From Aristophanes
we can borrow pictures of Athenian life which in spite of exaggeration
bring before us some leading traits of character. His sympathies are
largely with the farming class, on whom the war brought such suffering. We
have already made the acquaintance of Dicaeopolis,
the hero of the “ Acharnians.” While the
authorities are busy forming alliances with Persia and Thrace, Dicaeopolis—in the play—ventures on a private peace
with Sparta, and the reign of peace begins, at least in his household. He
revisits his country home, where he celebrates the rural festival
of Dionysus with the abundance and freedom of old days.
Die. Oh blessed
Bacchus, what a joy it is
To go thus
unmolested, undisturbed,
My wife, my
children, and my family,
With our accustom’d, joyful ceremony,
To celebrate thy
festival in my farm.
—Well, here’s
success to the truce of thirty year«!
Wife. Mind your behaviour, child ; carry the basket
In a modest,
proper manner ; look demure
And grave—
* * * Come, move on.
Mind your gold
trinkets, they ’ll be stolen else.
Die. Follow
behind there, Xanthias, with the pole,
And I ’ll strike
up the bacchanalian chant.
—Wife, you must be
spectator ; go within
And mount the
housetop to behold us pass.
—Frere.
Then he proceeds
to establish a market, in which the products of Megara and Boeotia, both
contraband during the war, are brought to him. Fish and fowl are
cooked for his table, while the miserable soldier has nothing but an onion
and salt fish. The enjoyments of Dicaeopolis are
gross and material enough, but there is an air of honesty and
straightforwardness about him which contrasts—or at least is
represented as contrasting—very strongly with the meanness and greed
of politicians and informers. Another character of the same kind is Trygaeus in the “ Peace,” who triumphantly brings down
Peace from the gods to Attica, and in his own person illustrates very
vividly the blessings of her return.
How sweet it is to
see the new-sown corn-field fresh and even,
With blades just
springing from the soil that only ask a shower from Heaven.
There, while
kindly rains are falling, indolently to rejoice,
Till some worthy neighbour, calling, cheers you with his hearty voice: “
Well, with weather such as this, let us hear Trygseus tell us What should you and I be doing? You ’re the king of all
good fellows.
Since it pleases
Heaven to prosper your endeavours, friend, and mine,
Let us have a
merry meeting, with some friendly talk and wine. In the vineyard there’s your
lout, hoeing in the slop and mud ; Send the wench to call him out, this
weather he can do no good. Dame, take down two pints of meal, and do some
fritters in your way ;
Boil some grain to
stir it in, and let us have those figs, I say. Send a servant to my house—any
one that you can spare— [There he ’ll find a brace of linnets, and beside
them] pies of hare.
There should be
four of them in all, if the cat has left them right; We heard her racketing and
tearing round the larder all last night. Boy, bring three of them to us
:—take the other to my father : Cut some myrtle for our garlands, sprigs
in flower, or blossom rather, Give a shout upon the way to Charinades our neighbour
To join our
drinking bout to-day, since Heaven is pleased to bless our labour.”
—Frere.
In the “ Clouds ”
we have a man of a similar stamp married to a lady of the highest rank. On his
side there is nothing but coarseness and thrift; on hers, finery and
extravagance. The son born to this ill-assorted pair takes after his mother,
involving his father deeply in debt by his extravagance in horseflesh and
carriages. To be rid of his creditors Strepsiades is anxious that his son should learn the new doctrine by which the “worse
is made the better cause.” The son will not hear of it. He
associate with Socrates and the god-forsaken Chaerephon!
he would lose his complexion, become pale instead of sunburnt, and
what would his companions say to him then? Strepsiades then offers himself as a pupil, but he is so old and stupid that nothing
can be made of him. To save the house from ruin the son is at length
induced to give way and study the new learning, which he does with such
effect that he beats his father out of the door!
Other pictures
bring before us the informers, who made it their business to detect any goods
introduced into Athens contrary to law; and the hardly less miserable
hierophants, who quickly appeared on the scene whenever any sacrifice was
going on, for a sacrifice meant a dinner to all concerned. Another
feature of Athenian life constantly occurring in the
comedies is the faith in omens and oracles. Oracles are quoted on every
occasion, and for any purpose. Here is a scene from the “ Knights ” of
Aristophanes :
Demos. But what are
these ?—all ?
Cleon. Oracles.
Demos. What
all ?
Cleon. Ah, you ’re
surprised, it seems, at the quantity J That’s nothing : I ’ve a trunk full of ’em at home— Sausage-Seller.
And I ’ve a
garret, and out-house both brimful. Demos. Let’s give them a
look—Whose oracles are these? Cleon. Bakis’s mine are.
Demos, to S.-S. Well
1 and whose are yours ?
5.-5. Mine are
from Glanis, Bakis’s elder
brother.
Demos. And what are
they all about ?
Cleon. About
the Athenians,
About the island
of Pylos, about myself— About yourself—about all kinds of things.
Demos. And what are
yours about ?
5.-5.
About
the Athenians,
About pease-pudding and porridge, about the Spartans, About the
war, about the pilchard fishery, About the state of things in
general, About short weights and measures in the market, About all
things and persons whatsoever, About yourself and me. Bid him go whistle.
The wrath of
Aristophanes is more especially bitter against the men who have come forward as
political leaders : Cleon the tanner, Lysicles the cattle-dealer, and Hyperbolus the
lamp-maker. As a type of the degradation to which the city was sinking, he
introduces the Sausage-Seller, who in ignorance and impudence outstrips
the rest. The fellow can barely read or write, but his future eminence was
predicted even in his boyhood, from the readiness with which he could
steal and lie.
Cleon. Answer
me truly !
What was your
early school ? Where did you learn The rudiments of letters and of music ?
5.-5. Where hogs
are singed and scalded in the shambles, There was I pummelled to a proper tune.
Cleon. Hah ! say‘st thou so ? thy prophecy begins To bite me to the soul
with deep foreboding. Yet tell me again—What was your course of
practice In feats of strength and skill at the Palaestra ?
5.-5. Stealing and
starving, perjuring and swearing. ‘
Cleon. O mighty
Apollo, your decree condemns me ! Say what was your employment afterwards ?
5.-5. I practised as a Sausage-Seller chiefly, Occasionally as
pimp, and errand boy.
Cleon. Oh misery. I
am lost and gone.
These pictures
are, of course, exaggerations, yet the contrast of country and city, the
degeneration of education and politics, were facts. In the
better days, before the war broke out, Athens was a beautiful and
well cultivated territory. There were excellent houses and homesteads in
the villages, and round them settled a contented and thriving population.
In the city, on the other hand, there was a considerable number of persons
who, while existing in a very low degree of comfort, claimed for
themselves almost the foremost place in the state. They were restless and
dissatisfied, full of suspicions of every one who undertook public office,
and anxious to make the most out of the advantages which the empire
offered. The richer citizens were helpless against them, and when Pericles
died the power passed into the hands of their nominees. For with
the war came the ruin of Attica, the confinement of the people in the
city, the impoverishment and final destruction of all whose income
depended on land. The change was an inevitable accompaniment of
the war as planned by Pericles, and it was fatal to the state. Athens
rose again after her fall; Attica was once more cultivated and prosperous,
but the old spirit never revived. The great names of the
fourth century are quite different from those of the fifth, a change
which implies that the old families had disappeared ; and the feeling which
animated public men was different too.
We have already
spoken of the presence of sophists at Athens. Under any circumstances they
would have made their appearance in a great city, which was the centre of Greek thought and intellect, but the growing
importance of public speaking for those who took a part in the affairs of
the city made them especially welcome. Among the younger men of the
richer classes, who wished to be somebody in the city, their influence was
very great, and it seems to have penetrated into the common education
of the time. In the “ Clouds,” Aristophanes pits the new education,
with its immorality, its ruthless logic and impudence, against the old
quiet, seemly, reverent training of the Attic youth ; in the “ Acharnians ” he contrasts the young man who could
speak with the old warriors who had done great things in the past.
The influence, though intellectually stimulating, was not a good influence ; it
put private interests above public, and taught the disciples to look
at everything in reference to themselves. The action of Pericles towards
the Areopagus had long ago destroyed the spirit of reverence for the
ancient institutions of public life; sophistry went farther and
destroyed it in private life. If the people were becoming more and more
impatient of restraint, until at length they insisted on doing “ what
they pleased,” regardless of the checks provided by the constitution,
the young Athenians became impatient of the general decorum which the old
education imposed upon them. Such freedom was especially dangerous in
Greece. The old sanctions which religion and moral law had supplied were
poor at the best, and it was useless to quote them when the young
retorted by appeals to the grosser side of Greek mythology, or even denied
the existence of the gods altogether.
Along with this
evil went another. In a very striking passage Thucydides has shown us
how, under the crushing influence of the war,
political considerations began to outweigh all others. “ The seal of
good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime. If an enemy, when
he was in the ascendant, offered fair words, the opposite party received 23 them
not in a generous spirit, but by a jealous watchfulness of his actions.
Revenge was dearer than self-preservation. Any agreements sworn
by either party, when they could do nothing else, were binding so
long as both were powerless. But he who, on a favourable opportunity, first took courage and struck at his enemy when he saw him
off his guard, had greater pleasure in a perfidious than he would
have had in an open act of revenge; he congratulated himself that he had
taken the safer course, and also that he had overreached his
enemy and gained the prize of superior ability.” 13 Such feelings
would co-operate with the new views of life in bringing about an
extirpation of the old patriotism which united an honest love of
country with the best traditions of domestic life and personal conduct.
The spirit of the best men was corrupted, and the spirit of the worst was
not good for much at any time. The sons of the men who had fought
with Cimon and Aristides became intriguers with Antiphon and Theramenes, and when the game fell into their hands
they came forward as the Thirty Tyrants. Their opponents — the democratical party—were first led by Pericles, then by
Cleon, then by Hyperbolus, and the like, until
at length they found themselves the prey of the Spartan commander, without
empire, without revenues, and without ships.
The tone of society
at Athens was peculiarly masculine. Men lived little at home, and much in the
market-place or the porticoes, or the barbers’ shops, or wherever they found it
convenient to congregate. Yet there, as elsewhere, the women were one half
of the whole, and, in spite of the seclusion in which they lived, a very
important half. Plutarch tells us how Themistocles spoke of his little son
as the most influential person in Athens ; “ for,” he said, “ the child
rules his mother, his mother rules me, I rule the Athenians, and the
Athenians the Greeks.” The greater is our disappointment at the few
records which have survived of the women of Athens during the fifth
century. The ribaldry of Aristophanes is of course no evidence of the
domestic life of the time. Nearer the truth is the pretty
picture which Xenophon has given in the “ CEconomicus” of
the married life of an Athenian gentleman, but such a picture, even if it
is not ideal, only gives us the idyllic side of life; it tells us nothing
of the sterner aspect; and there were times when the aspect must have
been stern indeed. In the darkest periods of the century, after the
overthrow of the great Egyptian expedition, at the time of the plague,
and after the Sicilian expedition, there can have been few houses at
Athens in which there was not one dead. What was the effect of this
constant bereavement on the minds and feelings of the women ? Were they
hardened into a stupor, or were they rendered hysterical and wild, or were
they merely indifferent ?
We cannot tell.
The only occasions on which we get a glimpse of the Athenian women are the
festivals and the funerals. From her early childhood a pretty girl might
share in the rites and ceremonies of the city ; when she grew older she
took part in the Panathenaic procession ; older still, she worshipped with
other Athenian matrons at the Thes-mophoria, and to
her lot it fell to discharge the last duties to the dead. Through these
ceremonies she was allowed to feel that she had a part in civic
life. “ It is right,” says the chorus in the “ Lysistrata ”
of Aristophanes, “ that we women should give good advice to the city
which has nursed us in splendour and softness.
At seven years of age I carried the sacred chest of Athena ; at ten I was
mill-woman to our Lady; then, clad in saffron dress, I was a bear at
the Brauronia, and once again, with a string of
figs round my neck, I bore a basket in a procession.”
There were other
occasions on which a larger scope was given to personal feelings. At the
worship of Adonis, which became common at Athens during
the Peloponnesian war, emotions long repressed found relief in wild
lamentations; and in the orgiastic festival of Dionysus—though this was Theban
rather than Athenian—the outpourings of hysterical passion were
carried to an extreme which seems almost incredible.
It is common to
speak of society at Athens in the time of Pericles as highly intellectual and
grossly immoral. We can point to great names, and we can point to great
vices. But on closer examination we shall find that it is easy to
exaggerate. There were great names in France before the Revolution— greater
than any since,—yet the mass of the people were sunk far below their present
level of intelligence ; the vices of the court of Charles II. are notorious,
but we can draw no conclusions from them about the state of the
people. So far as can be ascertained, the Athenians were extremely careful
of their children and their women, and this care cannot have failed to
exercise a great influence on the men, for most Athenians had a wife and
children. There, as everywhere, there were men who refused to live
the life of the ordinary citizen, and gave themselves up to dissolute
habits. Their excesses may have been more uncontrolled than with us, for
there were no adequate arrangements at Athens for keeping order
in the streets; they were certainly more known, owing to the greater
publicity of life. Yet if we remember that the streets in Athens were
narrow and crooked, that there were deserted houses where bad
characters could congregate, and that there were no lamps of any
kind, we shall not deny that the Athens of Pericles contrasts favourably with what we know of the state of London a
hundred years ago. And if the satire of Aristophanes is more open in
its attacks on vice, it does not exhibit a deeper acquaintance with
iniquity than the satire of Swift or Mandeville.
Such was Athens in
the age of Pericles. Let us try, in conclusion, to estimate the work which he
did for his city and for the world.
The democracy of
Athens was carried by Pericles to its highest stage of development; when he
substituted the law-courts for the Areopagus, and allowed pay to the jurors, he
removed the last traces of the aristocratic constitution. By the new
arrangement he enlisted an immense body of citizens on the side of law,
with the result that there was perhaps no city where the law was more
strictly maintained than at Athens. Whatever the law was, it was supreme ;
even the omnipotent Demos could not touch it without a formal repeal, a
process which could only take place at a particular time and with
elaborate formalities. This supremacy of the law was
chiefly maintained by the distinction drawn between decrees or acts of the
sovereign assembly, and laws or ordinances, and though this distinction is
not due to Pericles, the “ indictment for illegality,” which kept
it alive, was probably his work. The aim of Pericles was to create a
sovereign people, but to regulate their sovereignty by fixed laws. This
result he could only attain by instituting a body of jurors, or
possible jurors, so large that they were sure to command a majority in the
Assembly, if any question touching the sovereignty of law arose. And
here the evil of the system came in. The arrangements of the courts were
so cumbersome and imperfect that they did as much harm in administering
the law as they did good in upholding it. They brought together a number
of men who, without being themselves responsible to any one, were
constantly pronouncing upon the lives and fortunes of their fellow
citizens. And from the very circumstances of the case, these men were
drawn from the class of needy and useless citizens, who could least
of all be expected to forget themselves and their own interests.
To Pericles is
also due the final development of the Athenian empire. With the suppression
of the revolts of Euboea and Samos the equality which prevailed among
the original members of the Delian confederacy became a mere fiction.
The league was now an empire, existing for Athens only, and
controlled entirely by her. She was the centre of the circle ; the guardian goddess of the city was the guardian goddess
of the league. It may be said in defence of this
high-handed proceeding that Pericles merely sought to put unity in
the place of isolation, and build up a great national power out of a
number of cities, which would otherwise have been perpetually at war with each
other. He saw clearly that the want of lenity was the great defect of Hellas and
he determined, if possible, to remedy the defect. Such aims were in
themselves more than legitimate. No statesman could have rendered a
greater service to his country than the formation of a league, which
should combine the scattered forces into one focus. But here again . Pericles
adopted means which failed to bring about the desired result. His
hostility to Sparta was fatal to any attempt to unite Greece, while his
constant efforts to win the control of the Corinthian Gulf brought on
him the bitter hatred of Corinth, by far the most enterprising member of
the Peloponnesian confederacy.
The truth is that
he regarded the matter far too exclusively from an Athenian point of view.
If Greece could be united under the headship of Athens, he would accept
the position ; if not, Greece must be subject to Athens. Whether any
means could have been found in the existing state of Greek feeling,
by which the various cities, Dorian and Ionian, within Peloponnesus and
without, could have been brought into a single confederation, is
very doubtful; the love of “autonomy” was too inveterate to admit of the
smallest infraction of civic rights. But, in any case, the methods adopted
by Pericles were not likely to find favour. The
cities naturally resented the tyrannical force which compelled them to
furnish troops for wars declared without their consent, and to carry their
disputes for settlement before a jury which looked on them
as subjects of Athens. It is true that they brought their tribute to Athens
at the Dionysia, when they could admire the splendour of the city and enjoy the plays in the theatre, but these delights were a
poor compensation for the degradation which the enforced payment of
tribute seemed to entail. When Pericles spoke of Athens as the “ School of
Hellas,” he confounded the theories of the lecture-room with
the common-sense of politics. A few of the allies were attracted by
the splendours of the dominant city, but if
these were intended to create a feeling of attachment in the subjects,
they were pretty certain to fail of their object.
It was otherwise
with the Athenian people. They doubtless were proud of their city and proud of
her position as head of the empire. The “ great name of Athens ” was
a spell wherewith to charm them. The older party, who would gladly have
seen Athens less imperial, if only she could have kept on terms
with Sparta, were silenced after 444 B.C., and for twelve or fourteen
years Pericles was supreme. In this period he succeeded in instilling the
imperial policy so deeply into the hearts of the people, that when
the struggle came, they were willing to fight to the death rather
than relinquish it. In this, the crude, material side of the matter, the
Athenians were willing disciples. But the higher motives, which guided the policy
of Pericles, were little appreciated by the masses. The sights presented
to the populace at the Panathenaea and Dionysia were indeed magnificent,
and at such times the whole city might seem to be united in great acts of
worship. But dearer far to the inhabitants of Attica, than these great
displays, were the little local festivals in the country; the jovial
hospitality of neighbours, the delights
of spring-time and harvest; the “ rest on the violet-bed by the
well.” The enjoyments of the average Athenian were those of the average man ;
he did not take that delight in higher art and literature, which
caused Pericles to give them so large a share in his theory
of politics. In this matter the leader mistook his followers; he had too
little sympathy with what was commonplace in them, and failed to apprehend
how closely what was soundest in civic life at Athens was connected
with the rather limited—not to say mean —desires and aims of the Athenian
people. In seeking to carry them away from their old views by
the spectacle of something higher and more intellectual, he
aggravated some of their failings. What the Athenians needed above all
things was balance and weight. Even at the best their institutions and
beliefs were supported by sanctions which would not bear logical
examination. It was a great mistake to weaken the force of such sanctions
as were established, for it was very unlikely that anything
more intellectual would have greater force. The beauty of the city,
the great name of Athens, might flatter the selfishness of the Athenians,
but they could never become the source of a national morality.
Still more
disastrous for the future of his country was the personal government which
Pericles established. In his determination to be the foremost man in the
city, he left no room for a second. He repressed the growth of those who in the
course of nature would be required to take his place. Under his
shadow no fresh shoots sprang. He taught the people to follow a leader,
and left no one behind to lead them; he destroyed their independence—or
at least the mutual play of opposite forces,—and when he died came “the
deluge.” There was no one who could succeed him. A democracy without
great men is a dangerous form of democracy, unless it be steadied by
a very strict constitution. It is at the mercy of every wave of feeling—of
every unprincipled orator. When Pericles rose to power it would have been
possible to frame a Pan-Hellenic union, in which Sparta and Athens would
have been the leading states; and such a dualism would have been the best
guarantee for the rights of the smaller cities. When he died there was no
policy left but war with Sparta, and conquest in the West. And not only
so, but there was no politician who could adjust the relations of domestic
war and foreign conquest. The Athenians passed from one to the other, as they
were addressed by Cleon or Alcibiades. We cannot wonder that the men, who
lived in those days of trouble spoke bitterly of Pericles, holding him
accountable for the miseries which fell upon Athens.
Other statesmen had bequeathed good laws, as Solon and Clisthenes, or
the memory of great achievements, as Themistocles or Cimon, but the only
changes which Pericles had introduced were thought, not
without reason, to be changes for the worse; and he left his country
involved in a ruinous war.
But though Greece
hated him, and Athens spoke of him with mingled feelings, the debt which the
world owes to Pericles is immense. Without him and his personal
government; without the money which he lavished on shows and spectacles,
on temples and statues ; without the sophists and philosophers
whom he sheltered, we should have been the poorer by the loss of half
our intellectual life. And in his political aims, however unfortunate the
results, we can trace the outlines of a purpose which must always
be the guiding light of the greatest statesmen: the wish to give to
every citizen in and through the state, not only the blessings of peace
and prosperity, but the still greater blessing of unimpeded action
in all noble aspirations; to awaken in him such a devotion to his state as
shall prove an unerring guide in conduct; to train his intellectual and
moral powers, not with the lessons of a school, but by the experience of
life; to develop an equal balance between the individual and the citizen ;
to make duty a delight, and service an honour; to
remove the sting from poverty and the charm from wealth; and to recognise benefits to the community as the only ground
of civic distinction. Such a purpose was perhaps a distant ideal, even at
Athens, and it is far more distant now; but near or far away, it is
from such ideals that the spark is sent which kindles the flame of
our highest efforts.
A few details have
come down to us of the personal appearance and manners of Pericles. In his
looks, and still more in his voice, he so closely resembled Pisistratus
that for some time he was afraid to come forward in political life, lest
he should be suspected of cherishing the designs which made the name
of the tyrant hateful to every Athenian. His head, which was of unusual
size and shape, was a common theme of merriment with the comedians ;
they compared it to a kind of bean, called schinus, and
exercised their wits in all kinds of allusions to the heavy head of the
new Olympian. To conceal the defect, Pericles was accustomed, when in
public, to wear a helmet, a practice which, as we have said, provoked Cratinus into declaring that he went “about with the
Odeum on his head.” The suspicions which his appearance excited were not
diminished by his education and manners. His tutor in “ music,” which at
Athens included most of the intellectual part of education, as opposed
to the physical, was Damon, the “ friend of tyrants ” and a “
consummate sophist,” who, under cover of his art, was thought to cherish
designs against the democracy. Whether this view was correct or not,
Damon was ostracised from Athens.
Another teacher was Zeno, from whom Pericles learned the art of
disputation as it was practised in the
Eleatic school.
More important
still was his connexion with Anaxagoras. In the
society of this eminent man he not only acquired a knowledge and
an elevation of thought which raised him above the superstitions of
his time, but the influence extended to his language and demeanour. As an orator, Pericles was stately and
dignified, carefully avoiding anything familiar or common in his
language; calm and quiet in his delivery, and by these very qualities
producing a deep impression on his audience. His movements were at all times
sedate ; his dress was careful and becoming; he was rarely seen to
smile, and nothing could provoke him to anger. When an impudent scoundrel,
who had pursued him all day long with abuse and threats, followed him even to
his door, he merely gave orders to his servants to see the fellow home
through the dusk of the evening. He never moved in society, and was
rarely seen in any street in the city but that which led from the public
offices to his own home. He lived apart, dividing his time
between the friendships of his intimate circle and the cares of
state. Such reserve was a novel feature in an Athenian statesman, and
different interpretations were placed upon it. To some it was mere
arrogance and pride; he was the Olympian who governed Athens with his nod ;
others regarded it as a cloak for private vices, and told the
worst stories of the Periclean household. For himself he held that
familiarity bred contempt; a man so greatly occupied in public business
must beware of making himself too cheap. Like the state galley, he
must only appear when his presence was required.
His power was far
greater than that of any other man of his time. Yet he never abused it for
mean or malicious purposes. In his last utterance, as we have said,
he declared that no Athenian had ever put on mourning owing to any act of
his. With these words before him, Plutarch, no mean judge of Greek
and Roman character, pronounces sentence on the great Athenian. The Roman
selected for comparison with Pericles in Plutarch’s series is Fabius
Maximus, the opponent of Hannibal—
Unus qui nobis cunctando restituit rem.
In graciousness
and clemency, in the forbearance and patience with which they endured the
attacks of foolish and ignorant enemies, the Roman and the Grecian
were fairly matched. “ But not less admirable than his clemency was the
loftiness of spirit which prompted Pericles to utter that last noble
speech, giving the foremost place among his triumphs to the self-restraint
which had governed his exercise of supreme authority. Such a saying
changes the epithet Olympian—attached to his name by a rash and
thoughtless crowd—into a worthy and becoming title. For if indeed Olympus be a
place of radiant calm,
Where falls not
hail, or rain, or any snow,
Nor ever wind
blows loudly, a life so unruffled by the storms of state, so spotless amid the
temptations of unbounded power, may be called in the truest sense Olympian
and divine.”
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