ANCIENT HISTORY LIBRARY

THE

BATTLE OF KADESH

A STUDY IN THE EARLIEST KNOWN MILITARY STRATEGY

(Pharaoh Ramses II versus Muwatallish, king of the Hittites, one says in the year 1274 BC, some says in the year 1296, others in the year 1300 BC)

BY

JAMES HENRY BREASTED

The beginnings of military strategy in all books upon the subject are passed over with a few general remarks. Students of the subject are not orientalists and their discussions begin with Greek sources. Although the present writer, it is needless to say, is totally without special knowledge of the subject, it has seemed to him that the most notable of the materials from the early Orient should be studied from this point of view, and made accessible to the student of military history.

We shall never possess sufficient data on the wars of Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria to build up a work like that of Kromayer on the battlefields of Greece, but the surviving materials, which carry our knowledge of military strategy a thousand years back of Greek times have never been employed for this purpose at all; and this essay is designed to furnish a beginning, at least, in the explanation of these materials.

As it is hoped that this contribution may be used by many who are not orientalists, I must ask my fellow Egyptologists to excuse the translation and explanation of some things which, however obvious to them, must be made clear to those not familiar with Egyptian. For the same reasons I have also withheld almost all grammatical discussion. It should also be further said that the following essay does not intend to discuss the political aspects of this battle, either in the conditions which led up to it, or those which resulted from it. My purpose is only to make clear the military maneuvers involved in the battle. The exact method of deploying troops in action I have also not intended to discuss, It will be evident from the reliefs that well-disciplined battle lines were maintained, and that disorganized, hand-to-hand fighting resulted only when the enemy's line were broken. This last question needs special investigation.

The fundamental difficulty in the study of the military operations of the earlier pre-Hellenic world is lack of data. How large, for example, were the armies with which Assyria and Egypt were wont to plunder Syria? What was the disposition of the armies at the battle of Carchemish? How did an Assyrian commander marshal his forces upon the field? What were the methods of attack? We cannot answer one of these fundamental questions. In Egypt, as we shall see, the case is slightly better; but there are only two battles of which the dispositions are indicated. In all others the records are such that we should be utterly unable to affirm that the commanders had yet learned the value of clever manipulation of forces. These two battles are Megiddo and Kadesh. At Megiddo, already in sixteenth century before Christ, we find Thutmose III disposing his troops as in modern times, with a center and two wings, or "horns" as he calls them, of each of which he gives the exact location. His enemy also was drawn up in the same way. But Kadesh is still more instructive because here we can follow the shrewd maneuvers of the Asiatics, which preceded the battle.

No incident in Egyptian history is so impressed upon the mind of the traveler in Egypt as this battle between the forces of Ramses II and those of the Hittites at Kadesh on the Orontes, in the fourteenth? century before Christ. The young king's supreme effort to save himself and his army from destruction is so often depicted and in such graphic pictures upon the walls of the great temples, that no visitor, not even the most blasé "globe-trotter" can ever forget it. Yet this dramatic event, so prominent that it attracts the attention of even the most casual visitor over and over again, has never received any exhaustive study. It is the earliest battle in history, the strategic of which can be largely determined in detail; and yet this has never been done.

After Champollion's first recognition of the nature of the so-called poem on the battle, the first study of the poem was that of Salvolini in 1835, which was necessarily primitive. Then followed a study of the battle by Lenormant, in 1858, which contained fatal errors, due to the exclusive use of the Abu Simbel version. These errors were immediately exposed by Chabas with caustic comments, which, addressed by a wine merchant to an academician, must have been exceedingly galling. But the admirable Chabas accompanied his remarks by irrefutable data, drawn from the "Record" inscription, of which he built up a text by combining the Ramesseum and Abu Simbel versions in a manner that is almost modern for thoroughness. Yet oddly enough, the only elaborate treatment of the battle in a modern history is hopelessly astray from the same cause which misled Lenormant, viz., the exclusive use of the Abu Simbel version, the omissions of which were pointed out by Chabas nearly fifty years ago.

But Chabas was necessarily in his day too much occupied with buttressing his renderings to give any attention to the character of the battle. De Rougé’s admirable study of the so-called poem on the battle to which we owe our first full knowledge of it was likewise not intended as an investigation of the battle, but purposed only the determination of the text and proper translation. It was a textual and literary study.

Brugsch gave an elaborate presentation of the sources in German, but made no attempt to digest them or follow the details of the battle.

Rev. H. G. Tomkins's study of this battle was unfortunately made without all the data to be gained from the texts, but shows good use of what he had. Failure to observe the sequence of events made any clear outline of movements impossible.

Erman purposed only a description of the incidental occurrences and of the life depicted in the reliefs, rather than a study of the dispositions of the armies.

E. Meyer, with his usual acuteness, indicates in three lines the real nature of the Hittite attack. But he does not go into the preliminary maneuvers by which the attack was made possible.

W. M. Mailer's brief reference to the battle, was evidently not intended as a study of the battle, but merely to contribute to his investigation of the geography of Kadesh and vicinity.

Finally Maspero in his Struggle of the Nations offers an elaborate study of the battle. Already in 1875, in his excellent little Histoire he had correctly perceived the essential maneuvers which led up to the battle, and was the first one to perceive them. In his latest study, however, his first discussion is either forgotten or intentionally replaced by totally different results, according to which Ramses is represented as in camp at Shabtuna, far south of Kadesh, when the battle took place, while his troops have already left for the north. Yet the sources several times state that Ramses had arrived on the northwest or north of Kadesh, and that he had camped there before the battle; the relief of the battle is accompanied by an inscription beginning: "The stand which his majesty made, while he was camping on the north­west of Kadesh"; and one of the divisions, that of Re, which, according to Maspero, had left the king for the north, fled, when attacked, "northward to the place where his majesty was". How troops, which had already marched off to the north from the king's camp, could then flee northward to the king, does not appear. Thus this study puts Ramses south of Kadesh, while the sources clearly place him on the north of Kadesh; it puts his army on the north, viz., in front of him, while the sources unequivocally place it on the south of, viz., behind him. In short, Maspero's presentation completely reverses the order of forces as well as of events presented by the sources and formerly by himself also. The error to which this confusion is due was pointed out and corrected by Chabas nearly fifty years ago.

There is a good deal of misunderstanding regarding these sources, and it will be necessary, therefore, to offer a brief statement of them here. They are threefold:

(1) The familiar so-called Poem, so long known as the "Poem of Pentaur," until Erman showed that Pentaur was only the copyist and not the author of the composition; we shall refer to the document as the Poem.

(2) A brief RECORD of the campaign, engraved over the temple-reliefs, which depict its events; we shall refer to it as the Record.

(3) The Temple-Reliefs depicting the campaign, together with the accompanying short explanatory inscriptions.

1. Of the three the most valuable is the Poem, which fortunately for us is, for the first twenty-five lines, a sober and careful prose account of Ramses's departure from Egypt, his march to Kadesh and the position of his four divisions up to the moment of the Asiatic attack. The entire so-called Poem does not differ in form from the Record and is not, in the opinion of the present writer, essentially different from the accounts of their victories left by other Pharaohs, such as those of Merneptah and Ramses III, all of which, like the Poem, show no poetic form, but in style are poetic, florid, and highly colored — a style which may be traced in similar prose reports of victories as far back as the twelfth dynasty.

It has survived in two forms; hieroglyphic and hieratic. The texts of the hieroglyphic form are said by Brugsch to be found in the Ramesseum twice, in Luxor, in Abu Simbel, and Bet el-Walli. Maspero also says: "This Epic reappears everywhere in Nubia and in the Said, at Abu Simbel, at Beit Wally, at Derr, at Luxor, at Karnak." It is, however, not found at all in Nubia, nor at the Ramesseum, but has survived in three copies: on the temple walls at Luxor, Karnak and Abydos; while of the hieratic text but one manuscript is known, a roll which is now in two parts: Papyrus Raifet (Louvre), the beginning; and Papyrus Sallier III (British Museum), the remainder. As J. de Rougé's composite text omits all reference to the Abydos copy, I arranged all the texts, both hieroglyphic and hieratic, in parallel columns, and the whole was then exhaustively collated with the original of tho Sallier Papyrus, now in the British Museum, by Prof. Erman. This material, which was prepared for the Berlin Dictionary I am able to use here by the kind permission of Prof. Erman. This collation of the Sallier Papyrus, the introduction of the hitherto unused Abydos text, and the lower ends at Luxor, and the collation of the Karnak photographs have filled a number of serious lacunas and given us for the first time an almost complete text.

2. The Record was possibly an official report of the campaign. It is not as full as the Poem on the marches and dispositions of the two armies, but it narrates fully the inside history, which led Ramses to make his incautious advance to the north of Kadesh, furnishing an account of the earliest military ruse known in history. On this last, the Poem is discreetly silent. The Record is preserved in three copies; on the temple walls at Abu Simbel, the Ramesseum and at Luxor. Many years ago the Abu Simbel and Ramesseum texts were combined and published by Chabas from the old publications, but his work seems to have been mostly overlooked. I have made my own composite text, also, for which I had photographs of Abu Simbel kindly placed at my service by Steindorff. These and the insertion of the hitherto unused Luxor copy made a text for the first time practically complete.

3. The Reliefs furnish many vivacious incidents which enliven our impressions of the battle and some important inscriptions which we shall employ, but the different copies are so totally inconsistent with each other, that the course of the battle must be determined in independence of them, before they can be safely employed. This is due to the well-known inability of the Egyptian artist to preserve the proper ground-plan relations of the different parts of a scene, demanding a knowledge of perspective for their proper representation. And not only the actual relations of the different fields upon the ground, but also those of different moments of time are disregarded, as we shall see later on. As far as we know, these reliefs were engraved upon the temple walls seven times by the artists of Ramses II: Abydos, the Ramesseum (twice), Karnak, Luxor, Abu Simbel, and Derr. Those at Abydos have almost and those at Derr completely perished.

All these sources suffer from a common defect, viz., their main object was to portray the personal prowess of the king. Only the facts which will serve this purpose are used and the movements of the army, if referred to at all, are mentioned only as they serve to lead up to and explain the isolation of the king, which necessitated his desperate attack upon the enemy. Once this supreme moment is reached, the king receives the entire attention and the army is only referred to in order to use their flight and cowardice as a foil against which to contrast the splendid courage of the king. From this point on, moreover, the Poem is the only full source, and it is from this point on that sane criticism must declare it a source to be used with the greatest caution. Further indications of the comparative value and character of the sources will be found in the course of their use, as we proceed.

The conditions which led up to Ramses II's great war with the Hittites have been cleared up by the discovery and study of the Amarna letters, and cannot occupy us here. The Hittites have now reached the upper course of the Orontes, in their advance southward between the Lebanons, and have collected their forces in the vicinity of Lake Homs.

Already in his fourth year Ramses had secured the Phoenician coast on his first campaign as far as the vicinity of Beyrut, and erected his boundary stela on the banks of the Nahr-el-Kelb. It has often been stated that this campaign was in the year 2. It is true that one of the three stelae of Ramses II at the Nahr-el-Kelb is published by Lepsius as dated in the year 2; but Lepsius himself states that this date is uncertain; that of the fourth year is however, certain. Now there cannot have been two campaigns before that against Kadesh in the fifth year, which is called the second campaign. Hence the uncertain date of the year 2 is to be rejected with entire certainty, in favor of the year 4. Following up his move of the year 4, Ramses now prepares to meet the Hittites themselves.

Of the size of his army we have unfortunately no direct data. The Egyptians occasionally give the exact number of men engaged in less important expeditions, like those to the mines, or to Nubia; but never, in any surviving record of their great wars, have they left any statement of the size of the army which they put into the field. The numbers for this expedition given by Diodorus, 400,000 foot and 20,000 horses, are of course absurd. The meager data bearing on the question, as furnished by contemporary documents, are the following. In the Old Kingdom (third millennium BC) the nobleman Una mustered an army for an expedition into Sinai and Palestine, of "many ten thousands." This vague and suspicious datum is not corroborated by subsequent records. For an expedition to Hammamat for quarrying purposes in the eleventh dynasty (about 2100 BC), King Nibtowere-Montuhotep mustored an army of 10,000 men from the southern nomes, and 3,000 sailors from the Delta, making a total of 13,000 men, the largest body of which the exact number is furnished by the inscriptions. In the same dynasty, King Senekhkere sent to the same quarries an expedition of 3,000 men. The contingent which a local baron dispatched to these quarries in the twelfth dynasty (about 2000 to 1800 BC) was only 200 men, while another, Ameni of Benihasan, sent to the Nubian wars 400 men, and as a convoy for the gold caravan to Coptos, 600 men. Amenemhet III, of the same dynasty, sent out an army of 2,000 men to the Hammamat quarries accompanied by 30 quarrymen, 30 sailors, and 20 necropolis gendarmes. He likewise dispatched a force of 734 troops to the mines of Wadi Maghara in the peninsula of Sinai. Of the eighteenth dynasty we have no such data, but in the nineteenth (about 1600 to 1400 BC), Ramses II sent an army to Hammamat, which was made up entirely of foreign mercenaries in the following proportions: "Shardana, 1,900; Kehek, 620; Mashawasha, 1,600; Negroes, 880; total, 5,000."

In Merneptah's Libyan war of his fifth year (thirteenth century BC), he slew "9,376 people," and possibly took as many more prisoners. Ramses III (twelfth century BC), in a similar Libyan war (year 5), slew 12,535 of the enemy, but in his second Libyan war (year 11) he slew only 2,175 and captured 2,052 (of whom only 1,211 were men). The same king sent an expedition to the quarries of Gebel Silsileh, consisting of 3,000 men, of whom 2,000 were soldiers; but of course these were not intended for military duty, but only to assist in the work of transportation, as at El Bersheh in the middle kingdom. Ramses IV sent an expedition to the Hammamat quarries, of no less than 8,368 men, of whom 4,000 were soldiers. Here, also, the troops were expected to aid in the transportation as well as furnish protection to the expedition. The only other contemporary sources are the Amarna letters, in which the numbers of the troops mentioned are absurdly small. It is only the classic sources which contain large numbers; but the numbers of such historians as Herodotus and Diodorus are of course not trustworthy. For the Ptolemaic period we possess no data, and the Old Testament numbers cannot be accepted.

It will be seen that the above data, while very limited, show clearly that the armies of early Egypt were not large. The armies of the invading Libyans, judging from the numbers of dead and captured, may have been larger than those of Egypt; but the maximum army of the Pharaoh, doubtless, did not exceed 25,000 or 30,000 men. Ramses II's army consisted of four divisions, of whom some were Shardana, who furnished heavy infantry. How large a proportion of the army they formed it is impossible to say. Nor of the native Egyptian forces are we able to determine what proportion were infantry, and what proportion chariotry. Maspero has computed the forces of the Hittites and their allies as about 20,000 men, and this total seems to me tolerably certain. Ramses II could hardly have invaded the enemy's country with less; and thus his four divisions will have contained about 5,000 men each. If he was able to send 5,000 mercenaries to Hammamat, he certainly was able to muster 20,000 of all arms for the critical war in Syria; but the issue shows that his force could not much have exceeded that of the Asiatic allies in strength. I should estimate his force, therefore, at possibly a little over 20,000 men, and regard the estimate as very uncertain. Maspero estimates it at about 15,000 or 18,000 men.

About the end of April, in the fifth year of his reign, Ramses II marched out of Tharu, on his northeastern frontier, at the head of the above force, in four divisions. The division of Amon under the immediate command of the Pharaoh constituted the advance, while the divisions of Re, of Ptah, and of Sutekh, followed in the order given. What route they took in Palestine is not known, but when they were in southern Lebanon they were marching on the sea road, for in the midst of later events the Poem reverts to the fact that "his majesty had formed the first rank of all the leaders of his army, while they were on the shore in the land of Amor." As Meyer has noted, the "shore of Amor" is the Mediterranean coast, which he had secured the preceding year, at some uncertain point in southern Lebanon, where Ramses left the sea. Somewhere in this locality a city named after the Pharaoh was reached; for the Poem states: "Now after many days after this [the departure from Tharu], behold his majesty was in 'Wosermare-Meriamon, the city of…" (the conclusion being unfortunately lost). This city was evidently Ramses's base on the coast, which he had established for this purpose the year before, and it may have been at or near the mouth of the Nahr el-Kelb, where his stela of the year before is located. At the end of the above lacuna is the word "cedars," evidently a reference to the cedars of Lebanon, through, or beside, which the army was now passing, after leaving the city on the coast. Just thirty days after leaving Tharu, Ramses was in camp on the south of, having marched northward to that point down the valley of the Orontes."

We shall not be able to follow Ramses into the battle which awaited him at Kadesh without looking into the geography of the vicinity in some detail. In such a study we are immediately confronted with the embarrassing fact that, while the geography and topography of Palestine have been very fully studied, such researches are still in their infancy in North Syria. Robinson's above map of fifty years ago, which serves well enough for the relative location of main points, is totally insufficient for the details of a limited district like that around Kadesh with which we are to deal. Sachau's map, which adds much to that of Robinson, offers very little for this particular region. Until Blanckenhorn's map appeared in 1891, even the exact location of so well known a point as Aleppo was uncertain. But his map has done much in determining the course of the Orontes above and below Kadesh, and is therefore the chief source for our map of this locality. It is especially useful for its full indication of elevations (in meters); while for details of topography I have been dependent upon the notes of modern travelers.

In order to understand the maneuvers which preceded the battle we must now determine the relative location of the points, by means of which the Egyptian documents locate for us the positions of the two armies and their parts. These points are: (1) Kadesh; (2) "The Height South of Kadesh;" (3) Shabtuna; (4) Aranami.

1. Kadesh.—When we remember that Ramses marched northward along the Orontes to reach Kadesh, and that the name was still attached to the lake of Homs in Abulfeda's time, it is evident that we must seek the city on the Orontes in the vicinity of this lake. This has already been done by Brugsch, following Julius Braun, who placed it at Homs. As Muller has shown, the city could not have been north of Emesa (Homs). It is difficult to understand how modern students ever came to locate the city in the lake itself, for in addition to the incongruities noted by Muller, there is not a scrap of evidence to show that the lake is older than Roman times. It is an artificial body of water six miles long and from two to three miles wide, created by a dam at its north end. Conder says: "The existence of the lake is mainly, if not altogether, due to the construction of this fine engineering work." Of the age of the dam he says further: "The general impression obtained, by comparing the masonry with other monuments I have examined in Palestine, is, that the whole structure is Roman work; and the Talmudic story, which attributes the dam to Diocletian, may perhaps be founded on fact". With this testimony Robinson agrees; he states: "The lake is in great measure, if not wholly, artificial; being formed by an ancient dam or embankment across the stream." Besides the testimony of the Talmud cited by Conder above (which I have not verified) there are only two ancient references to the lake, and possibly only one. Abulfeda, writing early in the fourteenth century, nearly six hundred years ago, describes the lake somewhat fully, as follows:

"The Lake or Qades.— Now it is the same as the lake of Homs; its length from north to south is about a third of a day's journey, while its width is the length of the dam which we shall presently mention. It (the lake) is artificially constructed upon the river Orontes, for there has been constructed at the north end of the lake a dam of stone, of ancient workmanship, which is attributed to Alexander (the Great). In the middle of the said dam are two towers of black stone, and the length of the dam from east to west is 1.287 cubits, while its width is 18 1/5 cubits. This it is which holds all those mighty waters, but should it be destroyed, the water would flow away and the lake would be destroyed and would become a river. It is in a flat region, and is distant from Homs part of a day's journey on the west side of the city. Fish are caught in it" [Abulfeda]

He mentions the lake again in describing the course of the Orontes.

The mention of lakes and marshes in the vicinity of Laodicea ad Libanum by Polybius, even if it refers to this lake, does not carry the origin of the lake appreciably farther back. Moreover, there are other small lakes and pools in this region at the present day, to which his remark may refer. There is, therefore, not a shred of evidence that the lake existed in Ramses II's day, a thousand years earlier. Finally, the only other argument that can be advanced for the location of Kadesh in the lake is the fact that in the early fourteenth century it was still called the lake of Kadesh. But it should be noticed that it was also called the lake of Homs by Abulfeda, and Homs lies neither in the lake, nor even upon it, but several miles distant from it. There is, therefore, no occasion to consider the lake at all in our study of this battle; bat its name is useful as showing that Kadesh is to be sought in its vicinity.

But there is classical evidence that the city depicted in Ramses's famous reliefs was on a river. Hecataeus's Egyptian informants, whether they were acquainted with the actual city of Kadesh or not, certainly regarded the city in the reliefs as located on a river. Furthermore, there is hitherto unnoticed evidence that early in the last century there was a place still bearing the name Kedes, on the south of the lake. An old map, published in 1810, accompanies an account of a journey down the Orontes valley by Lieutenant Colonel Squire in 1802. Squire's data have not been employed in drawing the map, for it shows amusing errors on points about which Squire's notes prove that he was fully informed. The map is therefore probably much older than Squire's time, and was the best which the editor of his papers found available. But the editor offers no hint of the source whence he obtained the map, or of the data from which it was made. I am therefore unable to determine what early English or other traveler it was, who found on the south of the lake a village of 'Quadis," which can be no other than Kedes. Its location on the wrong bank a little too far south is, of course, a trifle of no moment on a map which makes the lake twenty miles long and separates its lower end from the river entirely, besides the most amusing errors in the mountain ranges. It must not be forgotten that this map was published long before the decipherment of the hieroglyphic and the resulting knowledge of the city of Kadesh, which later led scholars to look for it in this locality. Hence Conder's claim that the natives in his time commonly applied the name Kedes to the south side of the Tell Nebi Mendeh gains irresistible confirmation.

Conder's use of topographical data is, however, not so fortunate. It is over three thousand years since the battle which we are to study took place. The topographical changes wrought in three thousand years by a stream subject to heavy freshets in the rainy season are very considerable. These do not seem to have been at all considered by Conder, who lays the greatest importance on purely ephemeral topographical features. He seems to base his identification of Kadesh with Tell Nebi Mendeh largely on the presence of a late dam forming a pool in the Orontes on the east side of the tell; and a small earthen aqueduct, forming with the brook El-Mukadiyeh, a kind of double moat on the west of the tell. Certainly such things as these, which might be swept away by a freshet any day, offer no substantial basis for the topography of the place over three thousand years ago. Moreover, when Conder visited this region, he was supplied with totally inadequate data from the inscriptions; it was therefore impossible for him to consider all the requirements of the sources, and be was naturally quite unaware at the time how insufficient were the data furnished him. But Conder's notes on the place are fuller than those of any earlier visitor then; they furnish some exceedingly useful observations; and, as we shall see by the observation of more permanent topographical features than small and ephemeral earthen aqueducts, that the city must have been located in this immediate vicinity, the presence of the name Kedes, and the importance and unrivaled extent of Tell Nebi Mendeh make Conder's identification very probable.

In modern times the place was first visited by Mr. Thomson, who touched it in a journey from Hamah to Ribleh in 1846. In Robinson's book, he describes it as follows:

The Tell is on the tongue of land between the Orontes and its tributary, el-Mukadiyeh, above the junction. A ditch drawn from one stream to the other made the Tell an island. Around the southern base of this largo Tell are spread the remains of an extensive ancient city. They consist of numerous columns, foundations, and small portions of the original wall; the rubble work of which was Roman brick. Mr. Thomson says: "I found the people of the Tell breaking up the columns to burn into lime; and as, in this trap region, limestone is scarce, this process of destruction may have been going on for a thousand years; and the wonder is that such a number of columns have escaped their barbarous sledges."

Robinson himself states that Tell Nebi Mendeh ("Tell Neby Mindau") is located "on the left bank of Orontes, somewhat more than two hours "north of Ribleh," and distant one hour from the lake of Kades." He adds that it was so high as to be visible from Ribleh, and as he journeyed from Ribleh northwest to Kalat el-Hosn, it was visible for several hours.

Conder also remarks on the tell as "remarkably conspicuous from all sides," and describes it as “a great mound without any trace of rock—so far as we could see—extending about 400 yards in a direction about 40° east of true north. The highest part is on the northeast, where is a Moslem graveyard looking down on gardens in the flat tongue between the two streams. The height is here perhaps 100 feet above the water. On the southwest the mound sinks gradually into the plough land. The village is situated about the middle of the Tell. On the southwest is the Tahunet Kades, a modern mill. The principal ruins are on the flat ground east of the mill”.

These evidently later ruins, which were also noticed by Sachau above, the unparalleled size of the mound, and the agreement of its location with the itineraries, led Robinson to identify it with Laodicea ad Libanum. Robinson says that in searching for Laodicea in this region he could find no mound "deserving any attention, except the high mound known as Tell Neby Mendeh."

It will be evident therefore that Tell Nebi Mendeh is the most prominent and important mound in this region, where the survival of the name forces us to locate Kadesh. Let us now see how this location is related with the data furnished by the accounts of Ramses II's campaign against the city. Ramses states that his last camping place before reaching Kadesh was "on the height south of Kadesh." His statement is as follows:

"Behold his majesty was in Zahi on his second victorious campaign; the goodly watch (camp), in life, prosperity, and health, in the tent of his majesty, was on the height south of Kadesh. The king proceeded northward; his majesty arrived on the south of the city of Shabtuna. His majesty proceeded northward and arrived on the northwest of Kadesh". (Record, 11. 1-8, with omissions.)

This same march is stated in the Poem as follows:

"His majesty proceeded northward and he arrived at the height of Kadesh. Then his majesty marched before… He crossed the ford of the Orontes, having the first division of Amon with him. Then his majesty arrived at the city" (Kadesh) (Poem, I, 12,with omissions).

It will be seen that he is advancing northward along the Orontes through the Bukaa. On the way he camps upon "the height south of Kadesh." This is, we repeat, his last camp before reaching Kadesh. We can, therefore, determine roughly the distance from the "height" to Kadesh; for on leaving the said "height" he makes the march to Kadesh and fights the famous battle in one day. But as it is evident that this day's march was a very rapid one on the Pharaoh's part, so that his army was unable to keep up with him, and as it is further evident that the battle was a short one, the distance from the "height" to Kadesh must have been at least a day's march.

Fifteen miles make a good day's march for an army in the Orient; twelve or thirteen miles are a fair average. A glance at the data of travelers which we shall presently adduce, show that the high valley between the Lebanons, called the Bukaa, drops gradually as it approaches Ribleh from the south and ceases entirely at that point. It can only be the northern terminal heights of the Bukaa, which Ramses means by "the height south of Kadesh." Indeed, it is pretty evident that he has in mind a particular summit.

The Orontes flows through a narrow rocky gorge several hundred feet deep till it reaches Ribleh, where the rock walls, after gradual depression, drop entirely. On either side of these high walls, the heights rise to much greater elevations. On the east side, where Ramses was marching when he made his last camp, there is a notice­able elevation, called from a monument on its summit, Kamuat el-Harmel. This summit is 733 meters above sea-level, about 600 feet above the river at the neighboring "Red Bridge" (Jisr el-Ahmar) and some 780 feet above the level of the lake of Homs. To the eye of the traveler who has left it behind him as he passes northward, it forms the last and a very conspicuous elevation at the northern end of the Bukaa. Robinson calls it "a high mound projecting far out into the great valley from the west, and it is thus seen for a great distance in every direction." Conder says of it: "The Kamua (Monument) is perhaps the most conspicuous landmark in Syria, standing on the summit of swelling downs of black basalt, with a view extending northwards in the vicinity of Homs, and southward in fine weather to Hermon."

Again, in describing the view from the summit of Tell Nebi Mendeh he says: "On the south the plain of the Bukaa is visible, stretching between the Lebanon and Antilebanon, as far as the ridge or shed on which the Kamua stands up against the sky line." The hill of the Kamua, therefore, is the most prominent height at the northern termination of the high plain of the Bukaa; from this point northward the country grows lower and lower till on reaching Ribleh, says Robinson, "a vast plain stretches off in every direction, except the southwest" He further remarks in going from Kamua to Ribleh: "The hills gradually disappeared, and the country grew continually lower as we advanced." The hill of the Kamua, therefore, as the first prominent height on the east of Orontes, south of Lake Homs, is certainly Ramses's "height south of Kadesh." I think it will be clear that we have here gained a fixed point in our topography from which we may work with certainty. Kadesh must now be sought a fair day's march to the north of the Kamua. The lake, which is eighteen miles away, is decidedly too far; but the Tell Nebi Mendeh, which is about fifteen miles from the Kamua, very strikingly meets the requirements of distance involved in our problem. We shall further see in the study of the other places mentioned, how admirably the place fulfils all other conditions.

Kadesh thus occupied a most important position. It commanded the entrance to the Bukaa on the south, and every army advancing southward in inner Syria would have to reckon with it. Being at the northern terminus of both Lebanons it commanded also the road from the interior to the sea, through the valley of the Eleutheros, as well as the road from the Bukaa, westward around the northern end of Lebanon, to the sea. It was therefore located at perhaps the most important "crossroads" in Syria. We shall understand therefore why every Pharaoh made it an objective point. It consumed eight years of campaigning before Thutmose III had mastered it, and it later formed the center of an alliance against him, after his nearly twenty years of warfare in Syria—an alliance which he only conquered by the capture of the city, after a serious siege. The Hittites and their allies, when they had pushed southward from Asia Minor at the close of the eighteenth dynasty, naturally took possession of it as an advanced post of the greatest strength, and when Ramses II advanced upon it in his fifth year, they were ready to stake all on a battle for its possession.

2. "The Height South of Kadesh."—The location of this point was involved in the discussion of the location of Kadesh, and settled above as the hill of the Kamuat el-Harmel.

3. Shabtuna.—The location of this town at Kalat el-Hosn by Conder" (following the Frenchman, Blanche), is so totally at variance with the data from the inscriptions, as will be presently apparent, that we need not discuss it at all. An examination will make it clear that Shabtuna must lie between "the height south of Kadesh and Kadesh, for on the march from the "height" to Kadesh, he passes Shabtuna. Moreover, it was either very close to or on the river, for in the Poem we find the following:

The division of Re crossed the ford (Orontes) on the south side (variant on the west) of Shabtuna (Poem, 1.17).

The road leading down the Orontes valley out of the Bukaa on the east side of the river, and sweeping westward around the northern end of Lebanon by Kalat el-Hosn to the sea, crosses the Orontes to the west side at Ribleh. There is every reason why an army marching northward from the Kamu'a should not cross to the side before reaching Ribleh. The rock-walled gorge of the Orontes, several hundred feet deep, is practically impassable for chariots above Ribleh. Once over, there is no road on the other side leading down river, for the river flows close under the precipitous shelves of the eastern slope of Lebanon. Several tributaries to the Orontes on the west side, between Jisr el-Abmar and Ribleh, also obstruct the way. It is evident, also, that to go beyond Ribleh is to make an unnecessary detour to the east around the eastern end of a great bend of the Orontes, involving also the crossing of a considerable tributary at the apex of the bend. This bend can be cut off by crossing at Ribleh, and all travelers going directly north (not to Homs) or to Kalat el-Hosn, or to the sea, cross the Orontes at this point, as did Robinson, Sachau, Conder, and Blanckenhorn. Robinson says that the surface of the ground here is "only six or seven feet above the water." He adds:

"The course of the river was here from west to east, apparently a long reach; but it soon swept round to the north, in which direction it continues in a winding course. Ribleh is situated at the elbow. Our tent stood near the ford of the river. The bottom is hard; and such is said to be the case throughout the region. The water at this time [June 11] hardly came up to the horses' bellies." There was much crossing in both directions; horses and donkeys, old and young, many of them loaded; men and women wading through, the latter often with bundles on their heads; all going to make up a lively scene."

Robinson's description" shows that the ford was just above Ribleh, that is, west of it. One of our inscriptions says that the crossing was west of Shabtuna, and the other says south of it. To an Egyptian whose term for "south" is "up river," a ford which is above a town on the northward-flowing Orontes would naturally be called "south" of it; while a more accurate scribe would correctly say "west," in this particular reach of the river. There can be no doubt but that Shabtuna is to be located at Ribleh, and we have thus gained the earlier name of a place well known in later Palestinian and Syrian history. It was a strategically important crossing of the Orontes, and it became the headquarters successively of Necho in 608, and of Nebuchadrezzar twenty years later.

4. Aranami.—The location of this town is thus indicated in the inscriptions. In an enumeration of Ramses's forces from front to rear, that is, from north to south, we find that just after two divisions of the army have crossed the Orontes at Shabtuna, the division of Ptah is south of Aranami.

Later, when the battle began, Ramses hastily summoned this division, as stated by the Record thus:

"Then one gave orders to the vizier to hasten the army of his majesty, while they were marching on the south of Shabtuna" (Record, 11.18,19).

This refers to the division of Ptah as is shown by the following note in a relief:

"The scout of Pharaoh, L. P. H., coming to hasten the division of Ptah" (Abu Simbel Relief, Champ., Mon. 18 = Rosell., Mon. stor., 95).

On their way northward, after leaving the hill of the Kamua and before reaching Shabtuna, they passed or were south of Aranami, which must therefore lie on the line of march between the hill of the Kamua and Shabtuna. Just where, it is impossible to determine, but there is a hint in the variant of Extract No. 4 above, where instead of "south of Aranami" we have "opposite [them?]," probably meaning the division which crossed the river before them (the division of Ptah). In that case Aranami will not have been very far south of the ford; otherwise the troops south of Aranami would have been too far west to be "opposite" their comrades who have just crossed. But this is uncertain.

In addition to the location of these points, we must call attention to the local conditions. We have already seen in Robinson's remarks that the level plain begins at Ribleh and extends northward from it. After leaving Ribleh by the above described ford, and going northward till ho struck the Orontes again (I suppose near the bridge), Robinson says: " The plain was a dead level; the soil hard and gravelly, and fertile only in the vicinity of the canals led through it from the river, of which we passed several." The plain around Kadesh therefore was the best possible place for a battle of chariotry such as we are to study. Moreover, a reference in Extract No. 18 shows that there was a forest between Shabtuna and Kadesh, on the west side of the river, and the skillfully masked maneuvers of the Hittite king would indicate that there must have been a good deal of forest in the plain around Kadesh.

We are now prepared to take up the successive positions of the two armies.

FIRST Positions.— After camping on "the height south of Kadesh," Ramses marched northward on the east bank of the river. The disposition of his troops was probably not different from that which we find immediately after, in the second position, that is: Ramses led the way with the division of Amon, the other divisions following at intervals. Day after day his officers had reported to him their inability to gain any knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy, and their impression that he was still far in the north (Record, 11. 13-15). As Ramses reached the ford just above Shabtuna (No. 1), he was met by two Beduin who informed him that they had been sent by their countrymen, now with the Kheta, to say that they desired to forsake the Kheta for the Egyptian cause, and that the king of the Kheta had retreated far to the north, to Aleppo, "on the north of Tunip." This incident is thus narrated:

"When the King proceed northward and his majesty had arrived at the locality south of the town of Shabtuna, there came two Beduin to speak to his majesty as follows: 'Our brethren who belong to the greatest of the tribes of the vanquished chief of Kheta have made us come to his majesty to say: We will be subjects of Pharaoh, L. P. H., and we will flee from the vanquished chief of Kheta, for the vanquished chief of Kheta sits in the land of Aleppo, on the north of Tunip. He fears because of Pharaoh, L.P.H., to come southward'. Now these Beduin spoke these words, which they spoke to his majesty, falsely, (for) the vanquished chief of Kheta made them come to spy where his majesty was, in order to cause the army of his majesty not to draw up for fighting him, to battle with the vanquished chief of Kheta" (Kecord, 11. 4-6, beginning above in No. 1).

The Kecord now proceeds to give the real position of the Asiatics, in contrast with the false information of the two Beduin.

"Lo, the vanquished chief of Kheta came … and stood equipped, drawn up behind Kadesh, the deceitful, while his majesty knew it not" (Record, 11. 6, 7).

"Behind Kadesh" is, of course, with reference to Ramses's present position at Shabtuna; that is, the Asiatic allies are stationed somewhere north of Kadesh. Their exact position as given later was on the "northwest of Kadesh" (No. 11).

Second Positions.—Completely misled by the failure of his scouts to find the enemy and by the false report of the Beduin, Ramses immediately sets forward for Kadesh. This is stated by the Poem (already partially quoted above, No. 2, p. 18) thus:

"Then his majesty, L. P. H., marched before...... He crossed the ford of the Orontes, having the first division of Amon with him" (Poem, 1.12); then follows the position of the Asiatics as below, No. 10; and then that of Ramses's southern divisions, thus:

"Lo, his majesty was alone by himself, without another with him (Var.: [without] his followers): the division of Amon was marching behind him; the division of Re was crossing over the ford on the south (Var. west) side of the town of Shabtuna at the distance of an iter from the [division of Amon]; the division of Ptah was on the south of the town of Aranami; the division of Sutekh was marching on the road" (Poem, 11. 17,18).

It will be seen that Ramses is pushing rapidly forward. Even the division of Amon can no longer keep pace with him, and he is accompanied only by his personal attendants. The other divisions are already far outdistanced; there is a gap of about a mile and a half between the division of Amon and that of Ptah, while the rear of the column, the division of Sutokh, is straggling so far behind that the author of the document, not knowing where it was, can only say it was marching somewhere "on the road."

Meantime the position of the enemy has not essentially changed, and is given by the Poem with greater exactness than before. Following the statement of Ramses's crossing of the Orontes (No. 8) it says:

"Lo, the wretched, vanquished chief of Kheta came" (Poem, 1.13).

Enumeration of his allies follows; then:

"and stood drawn up for battle, concealed on the northwest of the city of Kadesh". (Poem, 11. 16,17).

Third Positions.— Ramses had evidently determined to reach and begin the siege of Kadesh that day, for he pushed rapidly and boldly on until he reached the city. The Poem refers by anticipation to his arrival long before the course of the narrative actually brings him there:

"His majesty arrived at the city" (Poem, 1.12);

then follow Nos. 10 and 11. In the proper sequence of the narrative (after No. 11) it is again stated thus by the Poem:

"Lo, his majesty had halted on the north of the city of Kadesh, on the west side of the Orontes" (Poem, 1. 21).

The same facts are stated briefly and clearly by the Record after the incident of the spies on the south of Shabtuna and the position of the Asiatics (No. 7):

"His majesty proceeded northward and arrived at the northwest of Kadesh; the army of his majesty camped there, and his majesty seated himself on a throne of gold (Record, 11. 7,8)".

Where the Poem states that Ramses "halted" on the "north of the city," the Record states that he "arrived " on the "northwest of the city" and that he "camped there," a slight discrepancy which only increases our confidence in the two sources by showing that they are independent of each other. The reliefs depict both the incidents mentioned in the last two phrases; the arrangement of the camp is accompanied by the words:

The first division of Amon, (called) "He Gives Victory to Wosermare-Setepnero (Ramses II), Given Life," with which Pharaoh, L. P. H., was, in the act of setting up camp.

In the same relief Ramses is shown sitting on the throne of gold. Later on, after the beginning of the battle reference is made in an inscription over the relief of the battle to Ramses's location in camp:

"The stand which his majesty made while he was sitting on the northwest of Kadesh."

This is again corroborated by a remark in an inscription over newly arrived infantry, to which are added other important statements:

His majesty was camping alone, no army with him: "his — and his troops had [not yet?] arrived, and the division with which Pharaoh, L. P. H., was had not finished setting up the camp. Now the division of Re and the division of Ptah were (still) on the march; they had not (yet) arrived and their officers were in the forest of Baui (B'wy)".

These statements hardly need any comment. Ramses, with the division of Amon, has passed along the west side of Kadesh and gone into camp early in the afternoon on the northwest of Kadesh. Of his other three divisions the Egyptian-scribe only knows that Re and Ptah are somewhere on the march, with their officers evidently separated from them in the forest south of Kadesh; while of Sutekh he knows nothing. He does not refer to it again, nor do any of the other documents, so that it no longer plays any part in the problem, being evidently too far away. It is evident that Ramses's rapid march left them all far behind; Re has reached the city later when the battle begins, but the others are still south of Shabtuna at the time of the Asiatic attack. Ramses evidently kept in touch with Re and was able to hasten its march, but Ptah and Sutekh were far beyond his immediate commands.

Meantime, as Ramses has himself now occupied the very position held shortly before by the Asiatics, it is evident that they have removed their army to some other point. This move and the proximity of the enemy Ramses himself now learns in the following manner, as narrated by the Record: "There arrived a scout who was in the following of his majesty, and he brought two scouts of the vanquished chief of Kheta" (Record, 11. 8, 9). Their arrival is noted in the reliefs in a short inscription: "The arrival of the scout of Pharaoh, L. P. H., bringing the two scouts of the vanquished chief of Kheta before Pharaoh, L. P. H." They are being beaten to cause them to tell where the vanquished chief of Kheta is. This preliminary, graphically depicted in the relief (to which the Record makes no reference), being over, the following conversation occurs:

"His majesty said to them: "What are ye?" They said: "As for us, the vanquished chief of Kheta has caused that we should come to spy out where his majesty is." Said his majesty to them: "He! Where is he, the vanquished chief of Kheta? Behold, I have heard that he is in the land of Aleppo."

Said they: "See, the vanquished chief of Kheta is stationed together with the many countries which he has brought with him. See, they are stationed drawn up for battle behind Kadesh, the Deceitful" (Record, 11.10-12).

The phrase, "behind Kadesh" is, of course, used with relation to Ramses’s position on the northwest of Kadesh, which would put the Asiatics on the southeast of the city. This position accords exactly with the position from which they presently emerged to attack the advancing division of Re, and there can be no doubt of its correctness. As Ramses and the division of Amon marched northward along the west side of the city, the Asiatics have quickly shifted their position across the Orontes, and southward along the east side of the city. They have literally played "hide and seek" with Ramses around the city. They have gained a most advantageous position on his right flank (for we must regard him as fining northward), and all too late he now learns of the fatal snare into which he has fallen.

Fourth Positions.—The instant has now come when the Hittite king must take advantage of the position which he has gained. The sources recount the catastrophe very clearly. They first indicate the nature of the attack; it was to be executed by the chariotry:

"Behold, the wretched chief of Kheta was stationed in the midst of the army which was with him; he went not forth to fight, for fear of his majesty; but ho made to go the people of the chariotry, an exceedingly numerous multitude like the sand (Poem, 11.18,19)".

The reliefs show the Asiatics using chariotry alone, and it is here clearly stated that the Hittite king employed only chariotry. The reliefs, as we shall later notice more fully, corroborate the statement of the Poem that the Hittite king did not go into the action himself, but remained in the midst of his "army," a word which may here be equally well rendered "infantry." The Poem then proceeds with the attack of the chariotry thus:

"They came forth from the south side of Kadesh and they cut through the division of Re in its middle, while they were on the march, not knowing, nor being drawn up for battle" (Poem, 11. 20, 21).

The same facts, with some important additions, are given by the Record, following the Pharaoh's interview with the scouts:

"Then the vizier was ordered to hasten the army of his majesty, while they were marching on the south of Shabtuna, in order to bring them to the place where his majesty was. Lo, while his majesty sat talking with his nobles, the vanquished chief of Kheta came, together with the many countries which were with him. They crossed the ford on the south of Kadesh and they charged into the army of his majesty, while they were marching and not knowing". (Record, 11. 18-21.)

Immediately following the interview with the scouts, Ramses had bitterly chided his officers for their inability to inform him that the enemy was near (Record, 11. 12-18). The reliefs show his discomfited officers bowing in his presence during this rebuke. It is this address to his officers which is referred to in the above remark: "while his majesty sat talking with his nobles." This is important, as showing that the attack of the Asiatics, the discovery of their real position, and the dispatch of the messenger southward, were all three practically simultaneous. The messenger sent by the vizier is shown in the reliefs, after he has made his way successfully around the intervening lines of the attacking enemy, southward to the division of Ptah. He is accompanied by the words: "The scout of the army of Pharaoh, L. P. H., going to hasten the division of Ptah, saying: 'March on! Pharaoh, L. P. H., your lord, stands". In addition to this messenger, it is probable that the vizier, realizing the gravity of the danger, himself went in a chariot to meet and bring up the division of Ptah. In any case, the reliefs show another messenger in a chariot; and as we shall later see, the vizier eventually brings up the reinforcements in person. Ramses has not yet grasped the desperate character of the situation. It should be noted that he orders the vizier to hasten his forces which are still on the south of Shabtuna; he evidently has no suspicion but that the division of Re is within a half-hour of his camp, ready to be called into instant service. In other words, he thinks his available force consists of half his army. As a matter of fact, the division of Re is at that moment being totally disorganized and cut to pieces, as it marches north­ward in Ramses's footsteps, past the southwest corner of Kadesh. The reliefs at the Ramesseum and at Abu Simbel, show the Asiatic chariotry crossing the river south of the city for the attack, though probably at a little later stage in the battle.

Fifth Positions.—The following movements complete the appalling disaster which faces Ramses. He is totally cut off from the mass of his army and surrounded by the enemy, as the documents graphically depict. Following the statement of the Asiatic attack the Poem has the following:

"The infantry and chariotry of his majesty, L. P. H., fled before them". Then follows the location of Ramses:

"Lo, his majesty had halted on the north of the city of Kadesh", etc.; after which the Poem states:

"Then went one to tell it to his majesty".

This messenger sent by some officer of the division of Re must have reached Ramses after his dispatch of the messengers to the southern divisions, else he would not have been obliged to torture the Asiatic scouts in order to learn the location of the enemy. Ramses has now learned the full extent of the disaster which his rashness and credulity have brought upon him. Opposite him, on the other side of the river, he could see the Hittite king drawing up 8,000 infantry to cut off his retreat in that direction. Furthermore, the messenger from the division of Re had certainly not long reached his lord's tent, when Ramses received ample corroboration of his message; for the Record says, in continuation of the Asiatic attack on the division of Re:

"Then the infantry and chariotry of his majesty fled before them, northward to the place where his majesty was. Lo, the foe of the vanquished chief of Kheta surrounded the attendants of his majesty, who were by his side".

The division of Re, all unprepared as it was, was struck so hard by the Asiatic chariotry that it crumbled before them. The southern portion or rear of their column must have been scattered in the neighboring forest, with the loss of many prisoners, chariots, and weapons. Some may have escaped to the division of Ptah. But of this rear of the column the sources say nothing. They are more interested in the front of the column, which, broken and disorganized, having of course lost many prisoners and all their equipment, fled in a rout northward to Ramses's camp, where they must have arrived upon the very heels of the messenger, who brought Ramses the news of the disaster. They are hotly pursued by the Asiatic chariotry, who on reaching Ramses's camp spread out and infold it within their extended wings. The Record states that only Ramses and his "attendants" were thus surrounded; Ramses, moreover, after the battle, rebukes his army for having forsaken him in his hour of need. It is certain, therefore, that the fleeing horde from the division of Re carried with them in a common rout the division of Amon, which was camping with Ramses. The reliefs have preserved one incident of this pursuit by the Asiatic chariotry, which is important because it shows at what point the pursuit struck the camp. They all show the most notable of the pursued bursting through the barricade of the camp with the Hittite chariots in hot pursuit; but as at present published the incident is intelligible only in the Ramesseum reliefs. Here we see that the fugitives are no less than two royal princes, each in his chariot, a royal sunshade-bearer, and a fourth important official. The name and titles of the first are lost; those of the second are given as: "Fan-bearer at the king's right hand, king's scribe, general of his majesty, Prehirunamef." This general was the fourth son of Ramses, and the "first charioteer of his majesty;" his presence in this battle has been heretofore unnoticed, and very strikingly confirms the remark of Diodorus, that Ramses's sons were appointed by him as commanders of this army. Over the fourth of the fugitives is an inscription which seems to belong to the whole group; it begins: "The arrival of the Pharaoh and the royal children together with the divine mother." Then after a short lacuna, follows:

 “Fleeing on the west side of the camp before the foe”.

The pursuit therefore entered the camp from that side; the first comers, as the relief vividly shows, were received by the Pharaoh's heavy infantry guard, stationed around the camp, who pulled them from their chariots and dispatched them with short swords and spears. Taken with but short shrift for preparation, Ramses hesitated not an instant in attempting to cut his way out, and to reach his southern columns. With only the household followers and officers who happened to be at his side, he mounted his waiting chariot, and boldly charged into the advance of the Hittite pursuit as it pushed into his camp on the west side. This is narrated by the Poem thus:

"His majesty halted in the rout, then he charged into the midst of the foe of the vanquished of Kheta, while he was alone by himself, without another with him. When his majesty, L. P. H., went to reconnoiter behind him, he found that 2,500 spans of chariotry had surrounded him on his way out, being every warrior of the vanquished of Kheta". (Poem, 11. 22-4.)

His unexpected onset thus brought him an instant's respite, during which he pushed out a few paces on the west or south of his camp, perceived how he was infolded by the enemy's wings and must have instantly understood that further onset in that direction was hopeless. The enemy, strong at this point for that very purpose, must have immediately driven him back again, when he, of course finding the eastern wing of the enemy's chariots much thinner than the center which he had just assaulted, turned his assault eastward toward the river. The Record, which omits all reference to his attempt on the enemy's center, makes short work of the whole battle thus:

"When his majesty saw them, he was enraged against them like his father, Montu, lord of Thebes. He seized the adornments of battle, and arrayed himself in his coat of mail. He was like Baal in his hour. Then he betook himself to his horses, and led quickly on, being alone by himself. He charged into the foe of the vanquished chief of Kheta, and the numerous countries which were with him". (Record, 11. 22-4.)

The result of this charge, as the Record continues, was that:

"His majesty hurled them down headlong, one after another, into the waters of the Orontes".

The inscription over the battle likewise, besides showing clearly where the struggle took place, states little beyond the fact given in the Record. It is as follows:

"The stand which his majesty made while he was camping on the northwest of Kadesh. He charged into the midst of the foe of the vanquished of Kheta while he was alone, without another with him, and he found that 2,500 spans of chariotry had surrounded him in four bodies on his every side… He hurled them down, one upon another, into the waters of the Orontes".

Had the enemy now quickly pressed in upon him from the west he must inevitably have been likewise pushed back upon the river. He certainly had not more than a few hundred troops, but these were the best of his army, and with these he repeatedly charged impetuously down to the river. Meantime his camp had of course fallen into the hands of the enemy, as we shall see, and it was certainly this which saved him. The weakness of oriental armies in the matter of plunder is well known. Thutmose III would have captured Megiddo on the day of his battle there, as he himself says, had his troops not been lured from the pursuit by the plunder on the field. Mohammed would have won the battle of Ohod, had his troops not thrown discipline to the winds and given themselves to the pillaging of the enemy's camp, which they had taken at the first assault. Such occurrences are legion in oriental history. The battle of Kadesh is but another example. While Ramses's unexpected and impetuous offensive has swept the enemy's right into the river, their center is diverted by the rich plunder of the camp. It is the offensive of Ramses at this stage of the battle to which the reliefs give so much attention. They depict him at the moment when he drove the enemy's right into the river, with great vivacity and realism, introducing lively incidents which it would here delay us too long to discuss.

A body of troops, which it is difficult to connect with any of the four divisions, now unexpectedly arrives and begins Ramses's rescue. They are the first infantry which plays any important part in the battle, but they have also chariotry; they are depicted in all the reliefs, arriving at the camp in perfect discipline, with the following inscription over them:

 “The arrival of the recruits of Pharaoh, L. P. H., from the land of Amor. They found that the vanquished of Kheta had surrounded the camp of Pharaoh L. P. H., on his (or its) west side, while his majesty was camping alone, without an army with him .... (portion omitted = No. 18). The recruits cut off the vanquished, wretched foe of Kheta, while they were entering into the camp. The officers of Pharaoh, L. P. H., slew them, and let not one of them escape. Their heart was filled with the great valor of Pharaoh, L. P. H., their good lord”.

These troops do not belong to the divisions of Re or Ptah, for they are clearly distinguished from them in the section above omitted. They are possibly a portion of the fugitive division of Amon, now returning on finding that they are no longer pursued by the enemy. In this case it is difficult to understand why they should be designated as just arriving "from Amor," farther south. They arrived just as the enemy were taking possession of the abandoned camp of Ramses from the west Taking the now dismounted Asiatic chariotry, at the moment when they were beginning the pillage of the camp, the "recruits" surprised and easily cut them to pieces. They would, of course, immediately reinforce Ramses, and together with the rallying fragments of the division of Amon, which might now come in on the west, considerably augment his strength." Seeing this the Hittite king made another desperate attempt to destroy Ramses before the arrival of the letter's reinforcements. It is related by the Poem as follows:

“Lo, the wretched, vanquished chief of Kheta stood in the midst of his infantry and his chariotry, beholding the battle of his majesty, while his majesty was alone by himself, not having his infantry with him, nor chariotry. He stood turned about for fear of his majesty. Then he caused to go numerous chiefs, each one among them having his chariotry, and being equipped with the weapons of warfare: the chief of Arvad, him of Masa, the chief of Yawen (Ionians), him of Lycia, the chief of Dardeny, him of Keshkesh, the chief of Carchemish, the chief of Kerkesh, him of Aleppo, (being) all the brethren of him of Kheta, united in one body, being 1,000 spans of chariotry”.

The Poem then narrates in highly colored language the overthrow of these reinforcements, without indicating where they were thrown in, or how they were used; but Ramses must now have had sufficient troops to hold his own against them. He must have maintained the unequal struggle in all for about three hours, when he finally led at least six assaults against the enemy, the last of which seems to have been especially successful; for after the battle has been raging for some time, the Poem says:

“Then his majesty advanced swiftly and charged into the foe of the vanquished of Kheta. At the sixth charge among them, being like Baal behind them in the hour of his might, I made slaughter among them, and there was none that escaped me”. (Poem, 11. 58, 59.)

While this passage does not at all explain the direction or place of the assaults, it indicates what was evidently the fact during the long three hours of desperate fighting, viz., that it was only by prodigies of personal valor that Ramses held his scanty forces together. Of this three hours' combat we have been able above to follow little more than those incidents which exhibited the splendid personal courage of Ramses in his almost single-handed struggle; for, I repeat, it is in these that the sources are chiefly interested. As soon as the reinforcements arrive, and the action becomes more general and extended, no longer centering in the Pharaoh's onset, the court narrators, whose function it is to immortalize the deeds of their lord, have no occasion to record it. Hence neither the Poem nor the Record makes the slightest reference to the arrival of Ramses's reinforcements, and we are unable to present any plan of the battle from this point on.

As far as we know, the Hittite king made no attempt to prevent the division of Ptah from reaching the field. Neither the Poem nor the Record refer to its arrival in any way, and the only record of its coming is preserved in the reliefs at Luxor. Among the approaching reinforcements, hastening up in the rear of the Hittites, appear the words: "Arrival of the vizier to [assist?] the army of [his majesty]". The vizier thus leads the reinforcements into action. The Asiatics, caught between the opposing lines, were driven into the city, probably with considerable loss. The Luxor relief shows them fleeing into the city, but none of the other sources offers the slightest reference to the movements of the troops at the close of the battle. The Record closes all such narrative by simply averring that Ramses hurled them all into the river; while the Poem goes on from that point, chiefly to enlarge upon the Pharaoh's personal prowess, with picturesque and telling incidents, but gives little of the character of the subsequent battle as a whole. We should have supposed that rather than allow Ramses to escape from the snare so cleverly laid for him, the Hittite king would have thrown in every man of the eight thousand infantry in the midst of which he stood on the east side of the river watching the battle". But with the exception of the incidents in the camp the entire battle was one of chariotry; and as we know nothing of the relative or comparative effectiveness of infantry and chariotry at this early period, there may have been reasons why the Hittite king could not employ his foot against the Egyptian chariots. So clever a strategist as the Hittite leader had shown himself to be would not have held back a great body of infantry without what seemed to him a good reason, however it might seem to us.

When evening drew on the enemy took refuge in the city, the battle was over, and Ramses was saved. The Poem goes on to describe how the scattered Egyptian fugitives crept back and found the plain strewn with the Asiatic dead, especially of the personal and official circle about the Hittite king. This was undoubtedly true; the Asiatics must have lost heavily in Ramses's camp, on the river north of the city, and at the arrival of the division of Ptah; but Ramses's loss was certainly also very heavy, and in view of the disastrous surprise of the division of Re, probably much greater than that of his enemies. What made the issue a success for Ramses was his salvation from utter destruction, and that he eventually also held possession of the field added little practical advantage.

In conclusion we must note briefly, but more fully than was possible above, the more important characteristics of the reliefs, as bearing upon the questions of place and time above discussed. As I have already stated, we much need an accurate and exhaustive publication of these scenes. The drawings of Weidenbach are so out of proportion that they cannot be joined, and I have been obliged to separate the different plates by an interval. The earlier publications, though the plates fit together more accurately, are much more inaccurate than Weidenbach. But they are all sufficient inaccurate to determine the movements of troops, as far as they are represented in these scenes. A careful examination shows that these reliefs ignore entirely or consider only loosely relations both of time and place. Those of time are so disregarded that the pictures become progressive, representing successive incidents, like those found in later European painting, as late as the seventeenth century. But our reliefs become very confused at this point, because they also neglect relations of place. This may be best seen in Abu Simbel. In the lower half are the camp and accompanying incidents; while the upper half contains the scene of Ramses charging. At the right end of the camp we have the pursuing Hittites driving in the royal princes. At the other end are the incoming "recruits" who later in the battle slew the Hittites in the camp. Now both these incidents took place at the west end of the camp as the accompanying inscriptions show; in order to represent them correctly, the artist would have been obliged to make two drawings of the camp: one, the earlier, showing the fugitive princes at the west end; and another, the later, showing the incoming "recruits" likewise at the west end. But the artist does not do this. He draws the camp and describes it in a short inscription as in process of erection. This is the earliest instant. He then adds the other successive incidents: at the right the Pharaoh's session with his officers and the beating of the Asiatic scouts; then, also at the right, and coming from nowhere apparently, the princes fleeing into the camp; and finally the arrival of the "recruits," at the other end, the only place where he had room. Thus, with but little regard for time or place, various incidents are loosely grouped about some more important center. As is of course well known, this is only in accord with the fundamental characteristic of Egyptian drawing: inability to represent things or their parts, in their proper local relations to each other. So complicated a scene as that of a moated city on a river, with a battle raging about it, comes out remarkably enough when depicted after this manner. At one end is Ramses receiving prisoners and trophies after the battle; at the other end he charges the enemy's right early in the action. As in the lower row we can only affirm that these two incidents took place near the city. The charge we know from the inscriptions was north of the city, and the reception of prisoners in all probability likewise took place there. Under these circumstances it is a priori clear that safe topographical conclusions can hardly be made from the reliefs.

But let us nevertheless make the attempt.

According to the inscriptions, Ramses was northwest of Kadesh when the battle took place. Looking at the Abu Simbel reliefs we shall see, then, that the left end is therefore the north. This coincides, too, with the direction of the messenger (extreme right) as he goes southward to bring up the southern reinforcements, and also with the position of the advance lines of the division of Ptah. This is also in accord with the direction of the river. The north and south axis is apparently all in order; but not so the east and west axis; for Ramses is here shown on the east of the river, whereas the sources clearly state that his camp was on the west side of the river, and by his camp these charges of Ramses took place. Or granting that he is on the west of the river, ho would then be south of the city, which is again directly contradicted by the inscriptions. The topography of the relief therefore cannot be harmonized with the data of the inscriptional documents. But more than this: the reliefs flatly contradict each other. Looking at the Luxor relief, we see Ramses charging on the right of the city. If he is here north of the city, as he must be to accord with the inscriptions, he is then on the west of the river. Or granting that he is on the south of the city, he is then on the east of the river. In either case his position is diametrically opposite to that shown in the other reliefs. It is out of the question to suppose that Abu Simbel and the two Ramesseum reliefs represent a different stage of the conflict and a different position from that shown at Luxor. The Luxor relief shows Ramses surrounded by four bodies of Asiatic chariotry, a situation which arose at his camp early in the battle; the other reliefs all depict exactly the same situation and therefore the same place. In all, Ramses is in or beside his camp. The cause of the contradiction is not far to seek. The artist was obliged by his own limitations to begin by laying down the river horizontally along the middle of his horizontal field. This done and the city located, he was ready to put in Ramses and the combatants. When we remember that Ramses hurled his foes down into the river, there is no place to put Ramses except over the river. Otherwise, in such primitive drawing, the enemy before him would have had to fall up into the river. Hence whether Ramses is placed on the right or the left of the city, ho must necessarily be placed above the river, and his position on that side of it has no topographical significance whatever.

Bearing in mind these facts we may now rapidly note just what important moments in the progress of the battle the reliefs show. They show us first the camp with its rectangular barricade of shields. We cannot stop to note the animated scenes of camp life within, but the reader should notice the large rectangular pavilion of Ramses in the middle. Several smaller tents of the officers are grouped about that of Ramses. On the right (Luxor, left) is Ramses, sitting, as the Record states "upon a throne of gold." This scene is, of course, supposed to take place in the Pharaoh's tent before him are his courtiers and officers, near whom (below) the unfortunate Asiatic spies are being beaten. Around them are grouped Ramses's heavy guard of foot, consisting of Egyptians (round-topped shields) and Shardana mercenaries, with round shields and horn-crested helmets. Near at hand is Ramses's war chariot, with his charioteer, awaiting his commands. It was during this scene that the division of Re was attacked, and it was thus employed that the messenger announcing the disaster found Ramses. Following closely upon the arrival of this messenger, of whom the reliefs make no mention, is the arrival of the fleeing princes who burst into the camp at the west side (upper right-hand corner; Luxor, upper left). Ramses's guards are seen pulling their pursuers from their chariots and slaying them. On the left (Luxor, right) are the newly arrived chariotry and infantry of the "recruits," who began Ramses's rescue. But this is in slight anticipation and did not occur until after Ramses himself was in action. The artist, having exhausted this horizontal field, must take another in which to depict Ramses's desperate defense, the scene for which the reliefs chiefly exist. He shows the moated city, bearing the words: "City of Kadesh". Below it the river is swelled and widened, perhaps by a dam, which backs up the water from below, with the intent of strengthening the city's defenses. The line of water at the bottom may be the brook of El-Mukadiyeh. Especially at Luxor the enemy may be seen surrounding Ramses “in four bodies, on his every side”, though this situation is evident in them all. At Abu Simbel and the Ramesseum the Asiatic chariotry may be seen still crossing the river south (to the right) of the city, though the stage of the conflict is much later than the attack on the division of Re, for which purpose the enemy first crossed there. Before Ramses the plain is strewn with the slain, among whom the accompanying inscriptions furnish the identity of a number of notable personages, among them several commanders, beside the scribe, the charioteer, the chief of the bodyguard of the Hittite king; and finally even his own royal brother, who falls at the river's brink. On the opposite shore, their comrades draw the more successful fugitives from the water, and a tall figure held head downward, that he may disgorge the water he has swallowed, is accompanied by the words: "The wretched chief of Aleppo, turned upside down by his soldiers, after his majesty hurled him into the water." In the midst of heavy masses of infantry on the same bank stands the Hittite king in his chariot, whom the Egyptian scribe characterizes in these terms:

"The vanquished, wretched chief of Kheta, standing before his infantry and chariotry, with his face turned round, and his heart afraid. He went not forth to battle, for fear of his majesty, after he saw his majesty prevailing [against the vanquished chief] of Kheta and all the chiefs of all the countries [who] were with him." The scribe has indicated at the Ramesseum that this infantry numbers 8,000; but Abu Simbel has: "Other warriors before him, 9,000". "Other" is, of course, in contrast with those fighting in the battle. Abydos merely has: "[The army?] of the vanquished chief of Kheta, very numerous in men and horses." Meanwhile, as only Abu Simbel shows, the Pharaoh's messenger has reached the division of Ptah in the south; and their arrival is noted at Luxor. Luxor and the Ramesseum also show a line of Egyptian chariots attacking the enemy in Ramses's rear. These may be the chariotry of the division of Amon, now rallying to his support.

These reliefs effectually dispose of one fairy tale frequently attached to the battle, viz., that Ramses was accompanied and assisted in the action by his tame lion. So, for example, Maspero says: "The tame lion which accompanied him on his expeditions did terrible work by his side, and felled many an Asiatic with his teeth and claws."

The story was questioned even in Hecateus's time. The only explanation for it is the fact that on the side of Ramses's chariot at Abu Simbel, Luxor, and in one of the Ramesseum reliefs there is a decorative figure of a lion. It stands in the same position on two different chariots at the same time during the council at Abu Simbel, and a moment's examination will convince anyone that the figure is purely decorative. Such decorative lions are not uncommon; thus, for example, on the seat of King Harmhab's throne at Silsileh appears a lion's figure in the same way; and on the sides of Ramses II's throne at Luxor are two lions. It would be absurd to affirm that these were living pets of the king. Ramses really did possess a tame lion, which he had with him on this expedition. The lion is shown lying with bound forepaws in the camp behind the Pharaoh's tent in all the scenes of the camp; but there is no evidence that he had anything whatever to do with the battle. There is absolutely no other basis for the tale, and in the scenes cited by Maspero only the decorative lion is to be found. 

The battle once over, Ramses has the trophies, the hands cut from the bodies of the slain, with the prisoners, and spoil brought before him. This is shown in a small corner of the Abu Simbel reliefs, where we see him standing in his chariot as the severed hands are cast down before him. None of the other reliefs shows the incident, except Abydos, where it is more fully represented than at Abu Simbel. The scene is unpublished, but the accompanying inscriptions show that Ramses commanded: "[Bring on] the prisoners which I myself captured, while I was alone, having no army with my majesty, nor any prince with me, nor any chariotry." Besides these, there were brought also captured "horses, chariots, bows, swords, and all the weapons of war."

It is unfortunate that the Abydos reliefs are still unpublished, but they are very fragmentary and Mariette gives sufficient description of them to show that they contain the identical scenes found in the others.

Mariette publishes only the following three scenes:

Plate 30: Empty chariot of Ramses held by charioteer and orderlies, as in all the other reliefs.

Plate 31: Shardana guard as at Abu Simbel.

Plate 32: Lower line of chariots and two lines of infantry from the arrival of the "recruits," as in all the other reliefs.

A hitherto unnoticed relief belonging to this series is on a palimpsest wall at Karnak. It is so injured by the later reliefs which Ramses himself had cut over them, that one can only recognize fragments of the scenes already found in the other reliefs. Comparing it with Luxor, these identical fragments are:

AA Egyptian stabbing an Asiatic before Ramses's tent

BB Guard in the council scene, lower row.

CC Beating of the Asiatic scouts.

DD Bowing officials before Ramses.

EE Head and shoulders of Ramses as seated on his throne.

FF Charioteer before him; part of felloe of chariot wheel in skirt of charioteer's garment.

GG Traces of sunshade-bearers behind Ramses.

HH Legs and feet from line of Shardana of the guard.

Below is the line of water also found at the Ramesseum and Abydos. The only variation from Luxor is that the council scene in the tent was here on the right of the camp, instead of on the left as at Luxor. But it is clear that the same incidents which we find in all the others, filled this last series. These Kadesh scenes seem to have commonly suffered alterations. Besides the total erasure of the above Karnak series, the photographs show that the camp at Luxor was placed over Ramses's charge; and the charge on the first pylon at the Ramesseum is cut over an earlier one placed much higher. It was evidently filled with cement, which has now fallen out, leaving the original lines so clear and deep that Weidenbach saw and sketched them, and they are clearly visible in a photograph.

The Poem claims that Ramses renewed the action the next morning, describes the battle in brief, vague, and purely conventional terms, representing Ramses as victorious, and then states that the Hittite king sued for peace in humble letter to Ramses. Thereupon Ramses assembled his officers, proudly read to them the letter, and returned in triumph to Egypt. To none of these alleged events of the next day do the Record or the reliefs make the slightest reference, and the narrative of them bears all the ear-marks of scribal flattery. The whole incident may have found its source in the fact that Ramses drew up a body of his troops to cover his retreat in the morning, and that they may have had to protect the rear from harassing by Hittite pursuers. However this may be, Ramses's immediate retreat to the south, admitted by the Poem, is clear evidence that he was too crippled to continue the campaign further. The Hittite king may possibly have proposed a cessation of hostilities, but this is doubtful. To state that in the battle of the second day he "was on the point of perishing," or to refer to "the surrender of Qodshu" (Kadesh) is pure romancing. For the first statement there is not a particle of evidence; and not even the Poem has the face to claim that Kadesh was captured. For sixteen years after this battle, Ramses was obliged to maintain incessant campaigning in Syria, in order to stop the Hittite advance and wring from them a peace on equal terms. Meantime he evidently found compensation in the fame which his exploit at Kadesh brought him, for he had it recorded in splendid reliefs on all his greater temples and assumed among his titles in his royal titulary the proud epithet: "Prostrater of the lands and countries, while he was alone, having no other with him."

However confused our knowledge of the latter half of this battle may be, the movements which led up to it are determined clearly and with certainty. These movements show that already in the fourteenth century BC the commanders of the time understood the value of placing troops advantageously before battle; that they further already comprehended the immense superiority to be gained by clever maneuvers masked from the enemy; and that they had therefore, even at this remote date, made contributions to that supposed science, which was brought to such perfection by Napoleon—the science of winning the victory before the battle.