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BOOK III
THE COUNCIL OF BASEL
1419-1444.
CHAPTER X.
EUGENIUS IV AND FELIX V.
1440—1444.
The German Electors heard at the same time the news of
the death of Albert II, and of the elevation of Amadeus to the Papal dignity.
They refused to receive either the envoys of Eugenius IV or of Felix V, and
renewed their declaration of neutrality. Everything urged them to hasten their
election to the Empire, and on February 1, 1440, they unanimously chose
Frederick, Duke of Styria, second cousin of the deceased king and head of the
house of Austria. Frederick was a young man, twenty-five years of age, whose
position was embarrassing and whose responsibilities in Germany were already
heavy. He was guardian of the county of the Tyrol during the minority of
Sigismund, son of that Frederick who had played so luckless a part at
Constance. Moreover, Albert II died without male heir, but left his wife
pregnant; when she gave birth to a son, Ladislas, Frederick became guardian
also of Bohemia and Hungary. At his election Frederick was held to be sagacious
and upright; but he was not likely to interfere with the plans of the electoral
oligarchy. Representatives of the two Popes at once beset both Electors and
King. Frederick III, unlike his predecessor, was not committed definitely to
the policy of neutrality, and only said that he proposed at the first Diet to
confer with the Electors about the means of amending the disorders of the
Church. He took no steps to hasten the summoning of a Diet, which met at Mainz
a year after his election, on February 2, 1441. Even then Frederick III
did not appear in person.
Meanwhile Felix V had received the adhesion of a few
of the German princes. In June, 1440, Albert of Munich recognized him, and in
August Stephen of Zimmern and Zweibrücke came to Basel with his two sons,
and did him reverence. Albert of Austria, brother of Frederick III, followed,
as did also Elizabeth of Hungary, widow of the late king. On the other hand,
Felix met with a decided rebuff in France, where a synod was held at Bourges to
hear ambassadors of both Popes. On September 2 answer was made in the King’s
name that he recognized Eugenius IV, and besought his relative, “the lord of
Savoy” (as he called Felix), to display his wonted wisdom in aiming at peace.
France had no reason to deviate from her old policy, especially as Eugenius IV
maintained the cause of René of Anjou in Naples. The Universities, especially
those of Vienna, Koln, Erfurt, and Krakau, declared themselves in favour of
Felix. It was but natural that the academic ideas, from which the conciliar
movement sprang, should accept the issue which followed from the application of
their original principle. The Council was especially anxious to gain the
adhesion of the Duke of Milan, and Felix consented to pay a large subsidy in
return for his protection. But Filippo Maria Visconti merely played with the
offers of Felix. He promised to send envoys, but nothing came of it. In like
manner Alfonso of Aragon adopted an ambiguous attitude. Both these princes
wished to play off Felix V against Eugenius IV in Italian affairs, but saw
nothing to be gained by committing themselves too definitely.
Thus Felix V was supported by no great power, and the
schism had little influence on the mind of Europe. Felix represented only the
new-fangled ideas of the Council—ideas which had long deserted the sphere of
practical utility, and so had lost their interest, Felix and the Council were
indissolubly bound together. The Council, in electing a Pope, had taken its
last step. Felix could not dissolve the Council against its will, and was
helpless without it. Yet, in spite of their close connection, it was difficult
to regulate the relations between the two. There was at the outset a difficulty
about money. The Council had elected the Duke of Savoy as a man who would spend
his money in its behalf. Felix demanded that the Council should make due
provision for its Pope and his Cardinals. This could only be done by granting
to Felix V what had been taken away from Eugenius IV. The reforming Council
must admit that it could not afford to carry out its own reforms; there was no
escape from this admission. On August 4 a decree was passed giving the Pope for
five years a fifth, and for the succeeding five years a tenth, of the first
year’s revenues of all vacant benefices. It is true that the reason assigned
for this special grant was to enable him to rescue from tyrants the patrimony
of S. Peter. None the less it awakened opposition from the Germans in the
Council, and was defended only by the fact that it was practically inoperative
except in the dominions of Savoy. It brought little money; and when, on October
12, Felix, at the instance of the Council, nominated eight Cardinals, amongst
whom were the Patriarch of Aquileia and John of Segovia, the question of their
revenues again became pressing. On November 12 six Cardinals were created to
conciliate France. It was necessary to have recourse to the old system of
provisions of benefices to supply them with revenues. Felix chafed under the
restraints which the Council laid upon him, and took advantage of the absence
of the Cardinal of Arles in November to preside over the Council, and pass some
decrees which awoke much comment. When he asked to have the same rights granted
to him over ecclesiastical benefices in Savoy as the Pope exercised in the
States of the Church, the Council refused the demand.
Meanwhile Frederick III gave no signs of his
intention. This indecision, which was the result of indolence and infirmity of
purpose, passed at first for statesman- like reserve. Both parties looked to
the Diet at Mainz for an opportunity of achieving a signal victory. They were
disappointed to hear that the King found himself too much engaged with
difficult matters in his own States to undertake in person the affairs of
Germany. He sent four commissioners to Mainz, who were to hear the arguments of
the rival claimants. Eugenius IV had learned wisdom by former experience, and
sent as his representatives two men skilled in affairs, but not of high
dignity, Nicolas of Cusa, a deserter from the Council, who well knew the temper
of Germany, and John of Carvajal, a Spaniard of great personal piety and worth,
a trained official of the Papal court. The Council, on the other hand, sent its
highest dignitaries, Cardinal d'Allemand and three of the new Cardinals, chief
of whom was John of Segovia. John claimed to appear as Papal Legate; but when
he was entering with pomp the Cathedral of Mainz the Chapter met him, and
declined to admit his legatine authority, so that he was obliged to retire. The
Diet decided to hear him as an ambassador of the Council, but not to recognize
on either side the claims of any dignity which had been conferred since the
declaration of neutrality. When the Council’s representatives tried to resist
this decision, they were told by the citizens of Mainz that their safe-conduct
would be revoked within eight days if they did not submit to the demands of the
Diet. They were driven sullenly to give way, and only the Cardinal of Arles
received the honor due to his office.
On March 24 d'Allemand appeared before the Diet, and
pleaded the cause of the Council, while his colleagues remained sulkily at
home. Next day Carvajal and Cusa answered him, and seemed to
produce considerable effect upon those present, the Electors of Trier and
Mainz, the king’s commissioners, the ambassadors of France, and a few German nobles.
Stung by the success of Cusa, John of Segovia laid aside his pride, assumed a
doctor’s robes, and with great clearness and cogency restated the Council’s
position. He produced a vast treatise, divided into twelve books, in which he
had argued out at length the various points raised by his speech. Carvajal and
Cusa replied. When John of Segovia wished to return to the charge the Diet
ruled that it had heard enough. It is no wonder that it quailed before John of
Segovia’s treatise, especially as the matter in dispute was one in which
Germany took a political, not an ecclesiastical, interest. A paper was
circulated amongst the members of the Diet, most probably the work of Jacob,
Archbishop of Trier, urging the acceptance of whichever Pope would summon a new
Council, to be organized by nations, and would guarantee to the German Church
the reforms which it had claimed for itself. In accordance with this plan the
Diet laid before the rival parties the old proposal that a new Council should
be summoned in some neutral place with the concurrence of the kings of Europe.
Six places in Germany and six in France were submitted for choice, and
Frederick III was to negotiate with the two Popes further arrangements for this
new Council, which was to meet on August 1, 1442.
Both parties retired from Mainz disappointed, and
beset Frederik with embassies. Frederick, who was rapidly showing himself
to be a master of the art of doing nothing, said that he proposed to hold
another Diet at Frankfort next year, when the question might be again
discussed. He was not altogether satisfied with the policy adopted by the Diet.
The Diet was ready to recognize the Pope who would grant to the German Church
such reforms as suited the Electors; Frederick III, was desirous to recognize the
Pope who was generally held to be legitimate, especially if in so doing he
could further his own interests.
Pending the next Diet, the fathers at Basel composed
and disseminated statements of their cause. Their proceedings otherwise were
not very harmonious. There was the old difficulty about money. Felix complained
that he incurred great expenses in sending out embassies and the like, while he
received little or nothing. The Cardinals clamoured for revenues, and the
officials of the Curia claimed their share of such money as came in. The
Council granted to Felix a bishopric, a monastery, and one benefice in Savoy
till he should recover the States of the Church. An outcry was raised against
the excessive fees of the Papal Chancery; the officers answered that they only
exacted the dues recognized by John XXII. Want of money led to a strict inquiry
into the conduct of the financial officers of the Council; and this caused
great bitterness. Felix sent the captain of his guard to imprison some who were
accused of malversation. The Council loudly complained that their liberty was
infringed, and called on the citizens of Basel to maintain their safe-conduct.
The magistrates interfered, restored peace, and fined the Pope’s captain. The
Council urged on Felix to send embassies on all sides to set forth his cause.
Felix answered that embassies were costly things, and as yet he had got little
for his money spent on them. The Council, believing in the power of
plausibility, commissioned the Archbishop of Palermo to draw up a letter to be
presented to Frederick III. When he had done his work it did not satisfy them,
and the facile pen of Aeneas Sylvius was employed to put it into a more
seductive form. The time for the Diet of Frankfort was drawing near, and Felix
was prevailed to send another embassy. His Cardinals at first pleaded their
outraged dignity, and refused to go. Felix bade them disregard their clothes in
the interests of truth and justice. The Cardinal of Aries, the Archbishop of
Palermo, and John of Segovia accepted the office and set out in May, 1442.
Eugenius IV meanwhile had asserted his authority by
decreeing, on April 26, 1441, the transference of his Council from Florence to
Rome, on the ground that Rome was a better place to receive the ambassadors of
the Ethiopian Church, who were conducting an illusory reconciliation with the
Papacy. It was a proud assertion of Papal superiority over Councils. An attempt
was made by the more decided of the Electors to obtain the assent of Eugenius
IV to the policy which they had put forward at Mainz. A learned jurist, Gregory
Heimburg, was sent to Florence with the proposals of the Electors, drawn out in
the form of two bulls, one dealing with the new Council, the other with the
liberties of the German Church. Eugenius gave no definite answer, as Heimburg
brought with him no credentials. He deferred his answer to the Diet at
Frankfort. But this negotiation showed a disposition on the part of the German
princes at this time to take the matter into their own hands, without waiting
for Frederick, whose dubious attitude was probably due to a hope of winning
back from the Swiss cantons some of the Hapsburg possessions, with which view
he did not choose to quarrel with Basel or with Savoy.
On May 27 Frederick arrived in Frankfort with the
three ecclesiastical Electors, the Count Palatine, and the Duke of Saxony. The
Council was represented by its three Cardinals; Eugenius IV by Carvajal and
Cusa, as before. But they were not permitted to air their eloquence before the
King. He decided, before entering the troubled sea of ecclesiastical disputes,
to secure his position by the prestige of a coronation, and announced his
intention of going to Aachen for that purpose. In his absence commissioners
would hear the arguments of the rival envoys, that on his return he might
not find them contending. The Cardinal of Arles, as a prince of the Empire,
accompanied the King; but at Aachen he was shut out of the cathedral by the
bishop as being excommunicated. At Frankfort the Archbishop of Palermo
harangued the royal commissioners for three days, and Cusa, not to be outdone,
did the same. The weary commissioners asked that the arguments might be reduced
to writing, which was done. On Frederick’s return, July 8, they were laid
before him, and the business of the Diet commenced. The plan of the five
Electors for recognizing Eugenius was, under Frederick’s influence, laid aside.
At Aachen he had signed a treaty with Zurich to help him to recover his
ancestral domains. The Electors agreed to stand by their King, and leave in his
hands the decision of the ecclesiastical question.
The policy adopted at Frankfort did not in its
contents differ from that previously followed. Envoys were to be sent to
Eugenius and to Basel, urging the envoys summons of an undoubted Council. But
the object the two of this new embassy was the glorification of the new King of
the Romans. Six places were proposed for the Council, all in Germany, because
in Germany was greater liberty and security than in other kingdoms, where war
prevailed and scarcity was felt. Punctilious orders were given to the
ambassadors as to the manner in which they were to observe the neutrality.
Eugenius IV was to be treated with the ordinary respect due to the rank which
he had held before the declaration of neutrality. Felix V was not to be treated
as Pope. Everything was done to convince both parties that they must submit
their cause to the decision of the German King.
From Frankfort Frederick III made a kingly progress
through Alsace and the Swiss Cantons, which received him with due
respect. He was accompanied by the Cardinal of Arles, and proposals were made
to him for a marriage with Margaret, the daughter of Felix V, and widow of
Louis of Anjou. Frederick III does not seem to have rejected the proposal. It
suited him to take no decisive steps. He promised to visit Basel, but demanded
that first his ambassadors should be heard, and an answer be returned by the
Council, which, sorely against its will, was driven to consider the proposals
of the Diet. After many discussions and many complaints, the Council answered
that, though they were lawfully assembled and enjoyed full security at Basel,
and would run many dangers in changing their place, still, in their desire for
peace, they were willing to agree to the King’s proposal, provided the King and
princes would promise obedience to all the decrees of the new Council, and also
would agree to choose the place of its meeting from a list which the fathers in
Basel would submit. It was clear that such reservations made their concession
entirely futile.
On receiving this answer Frederick III entered Basel
on November 11, and was honorably received by the Council. He maintained,
however, an attitude of strict neutrality, and visited Felix V on the understanding
that he was not to be expected to pay him reverence as Pope. The interview took
place in the evening. Felix V appeared in Papal dress, with his nine Cardinals,
and the cross carried before him. The Bishop of Chiemsee on Frederick’s behalf
explained his master’s attitude, and was careful to address Felix as “your
benignity”, not “your holiness”. Nothing was gained by the interview. Frederick
was respectful, but nothing more. The marriage project did not progress, though
Felix is said to have offered a dowry of 200,000 gold ducats provided he was
recognized as Pope. Frederick left Basel on November 17, saying, “Other Popes
have sold the rights of the Church; Felix would buy them, could he find a
seller”.
The German envoys to Eugenius IV were referred to a
commission, chief amongst whom was the canonist, John of Torquemada, who raised
many technical objections to their proposals. But Eugenius IV refused to take
advantage of the technicalities of the commission. On December 8 he gave a
decided answer. He wondered at the demand for an undoubted Council, seeing that
he was then holding a Council which had done great things for Christendom, and
to call it doubtful was nothing less than to oppose the Catholic faith. He did
not call Frederick by his title of King, but spoke only of “the Electors and
him whom they had elected”. He was willing to summon more prelates to his
Council at the Lateran, and leave them to decide whether any further steps were
necessary. The answers of the Pope and the Council were formally reported to
the envoys of the King and some of the princes at Nurnberg on February 1, 1443.
They deferred their consideration to a Diet to be held in six months; but they
fixed no place for its meeting. In fact, the German Electors were rapidly falling
away from their mediatorial attitude, which had never been very genuine. No
sooner had Frederick III succeeded in checking their league in favour of
Eugenius IV than a new league was formed in behalf of Felix V. The personal and
family relationships of the House of Savoy naturally began to tell upon the
German princes. A man who had a dowry of 200,000 ducats at his disposal was not
likely to be without friends. In December, 1442, negotiations were set on foot
for a marriage between the son of the Elector of Saxony and a niece of Felix V.
The Archbishop of Trier was busy in the matter, and stipulated for his reward
at the expense of the Church. The Archbishop of Koln was a declared adherent of
the Council. These Electors were indifferent which Pope was recognized; they
only bargained that the victory should be won by their help, and that they
should be rewarded by an increase of their power and importance. It was
hopeless to attempt to secure for Felix V universal recognition; but it would
answer their purpose if he obtained by their means a really important position.
A league in favour of Felix V was definitely formed, and its success depended
upon obtaining the support of Frederick III or of the French King.
The plan dearest to Frederick III was the recovery of
the possessions of the House of Hapsburg from the Swiss Confederates. His
alliance with Zurich and his march through the lands of the Cantons was
regarded by Frederick III as an important step.
But the jealousy of the Confederates was easily
aroused, and the quarrels which had urged Zürich to seek alliance with
Frederick soon revived. Zürich was called upon to renounce her alliance with
Austria, and on her refusal was attacked. The war was waged with savage
determination. Zürich was overmatched in numbers, but trusted to Austrian help.
Frederick III could raise no forces in his own dominions, where he had troubles
on every side. The German princes refused to send troops to prosecute a private
quarrel of their King. A crushing defeat on July 22, 1443, threatened Zürich
with destruction, and Frederick III, in his desire for aid, turned to the
French King, and begged to have the loan of some of the disbanded soldiers, who
were the miserable legacy to France of the long English war. These Armagnacs,
as they were called after their former leader, were a formidable element in the
French kingdom, and Charles VII was willing enough to lend them to his
neighbors. But he also was ready to fish in troubled waters; and the
embarrassments of the Empire suggested to him that he might extend his frontier
towards the Rhine. Instead of 5000 troops, as Frederick III demanded, he sent
30,000; instead of sending them to the Austrian general, he sent them under the
command of the Dauphin. Eugenius IV tried to use this opportunity for his own
purposes. He conferred on the Dauphin the title of gonfalonier of the Church,
with a salary of 15,000 florins, in hopes that he would attack Basel and
disperse the Council. In August, 1444, the French marched through Alsace,
took Mümpelgard, and, spreading devastation in their way, advanced towards
Basel. In a bloody battle on the little river Birs, by the cemetery of S.
Jacob, not far from the trails of Basel, a body of 1500 Confederates fought for
ten hours against the overwhelming forces of the French. They were cut to
pieces almost to a man; but the victory was so dearly bought that the Dauphin
made no further attempts to conquer Basel, or to fight another battle against
the troops of the Cantons. He made peace with the Confederates through the
mediation of the fathers of the Council, and retired into Alsace, where
his troops pillaged at will.
This was the state of things when, at the beginning of
August, 1444, Frederick III at last arrived at Nurnberg, to be present, as he
had so often promised, at a Diet which was to settle the affairs of the Church.
He had during the past year sent letters to the princes of Europe, begging them
to consent to a General Council, which he, following the example of the
Emperors Constantine and Theodosius, proposed to summon. He received dubious
answers; it was clear that such a Council was impossible. The French King, in
his answer, said that it would be better to drop the name of a Council, and
bring about an assembly of secular princes; where were the princes there was
also the Church. Aeneas Sylvius expresses the same opinion still more forcibly:
“I do not see any clergy who would suffer martyrdom for one side or the other.
We all have the same faith as our rulers, and if they were to turn idolaters we
would do so too. We would abjure not only a Pope, but Christ Himself at their
bidding. For love has waxed cold, and faith is dead”. Fortified by the
proposition of the French King, Frederick III put off his presence at a Diet
till the need had grown urgent. He went to Nurnberg more interested about Swiss
affairs than about the position of the Church.
On August I Frederick III arrived in Nurnberg, where
the Electors of Trier, Saxony, and Brandenburg awaited him, and were soon
joined by the Archbishop of Mainz. Many of the chief German princes were also
there. Frederick’s first desire was to get help from the Diet against the Swiss
Confederates; but in this he was coldly listened to, and when the news of the
battle on the Birs reached Nurnberg the King was placed in a sorry predicament.
The hungry bands of France had ravaged the possessions of the Empire, and the
Dauphin was already negotiating peace with the enemies of Austria, whom he had
been summoned to overthrow. Frederick, crimson with shame, had to listen to reproaches
which he could not answer. The only lesson which he learned from them was not
to face another Diet, a lesson which for the next twenty-seven years he
steadfastly practised. The Diet appointed the Pfalzgraf Lewis general of the
army of the Empire against the strangers from France. Frederick III, by his
supineness, had lost his control over the German princes. A proposition which
he put forward about ecclesiastical matters—to extend the neutrality for a
year, and proclaim a Council to meet on October 1, 1445, at Constance,
or, failing that, at Augsburg—was not accepted. The Diet separated without
coming to any joint decision. The discord between the King and the Electors had
at length become manifest.
Moreover, at Nurnberg the Pfalzgraf Lewis had been won
over to the side of Felix V by a marriage contract with Margaret, the daughter
of Felix, whom Frederik had refused. Four of the six Electors were now
leagued together in favour of Felix. It was a question how far they would
succeed. The dispute between the two Popes had passed into the region of mere
political expediency and personal intrigue. The whole matter was felt to centre
in Germany, and in the midst of these political intrigues the Council of Basel
sunk to insignificance. Felix V had found that the Council was useless to him,
as well as irksome. Towards the end of 1443 he quitted Basel on the ground of
health, and took up his abode at Lausanne. There he might live in peace, and be
rid of the expense which the Council perpetually caused him. Forsaken by the
Pope of its own choice, the Council became a mere shadow. Its zeal and energy
had been expended to little abiding purpose. After a glorious beginning, it had
gone hopelessly astray, and had lost itself in a quagmire from which there was
no escape.
The hopes of Felix V entirely rested on Germany.
Eugenius IV relied upon the revival of his prestige as sure to tell upon
Italian politics, in which the Papacy was a necessary element to maintain the
balance of power. In Italy Eugenius IV had been slowly gaining ground. In 1434
the condottiere bishop, Giovanni Vitelleschi, had taken possession of Rome in
the Pope’s name, and ruled it with severity. Francesco Sforza had, however,
gained a firm hold of the March of Ancona. The Duke of Milan encouraged Bologna
in 1438 to throw off the Papal yoke and declare itself independent; its example
was followed by Faenza, Imola, and Forli. The condottiere general, Niccolo
Piccinino, in league with the Duke of Milan, beguiled Eugenius IV into a belief
that he was going against Sforza in the March. Suddenly he showed himself in
his true colours, and prepared to enrich himself at the Pope’s expense.
Moreover, he planned an invasion of the Florentine territory, and was
supposed to have drawn to his side the Papal general, Vitelleschi. Vitelleschi
with a strong hand introduced order into Rome and the neighborhood; he even
waged war against Alfonso in Naples. He enjoyed to the full the confidence of
Eugenius IV, over whom he had greater influence than anyone else, and by whom
he was created Cardinal in 1437. Vitelleschi was a condottiere influenced by
the same ambitions as Sforza and Piccinino, and in Rome he held an independent
position which tempted him to act on his own account. He was known to be
bitterly hostile to Sforza, and was negotiating with Piccinino for the
overthrow of their rival. When Eugenius IV summoned to the aid of the
Florentines the Pontifical forces under the leadership of Vitelleschi, the
cautious Florentine magistrates were alarmed lest the understanding between the
two condottieri might prove stronger than Vitelleschi’s obedience to the Pope.
They laid before Eugenius IV intercepted letters of Vitelleschi to Piccinino.
The favorite had many foes among the Cardinals, who succeeded in persuading the
Pope that Vitelleschi was a traitor. But Eugenius IV dared not proceed openly
against a powerful general. Secret orders were sent to Antonio Redo, captain of
the Castle of S. Angelo, to take him prisoner. On the morning of his departure
for Tuscany Vitelleschi came to give his last orders to the commander of the
Castle. Suddenly the drawbridge was raised; Vitelleschi was attacked by
soldiers and received three severe wounds. He was made prisoner, and resigned
himself to his fate. When he was told that his captivity would be brief, as the
Pope would soon be convinced of his innocence, he answered, “One who has done
such deeds as mine ought either never to have been imprisoned, or can never be
released”. He died on April 2, 1440, and the rumour spread that his death was
due to poison, and not to his wounds.
At all events, the Florentines were glad to be rid of
Vitelleschi, and managed to persuade the Pope to appoint as his successor a man
whom they could trust, Ludovico Scarampo, who had formerly been Archbishop of
Florence. In June, 1440, Eugenius IV conferred on Scarampo and his own nephew,
Pietro Barbo, the dignity of Cardinal.
The fall of Vitelleschi freed Florence from the fear
of Piccinino, for it restored the balance between him and his rival Sforza. But
the Duke of Milan was growing weary of the indecisive war which he had been
waging against the League of Venice, Florence, and the Pope. Sforza and
Piccinino had won all that for a time they were likely to hold. All parties
wished for peace, which was concluded at Cremona in November, 1441, on the
usual terms that each should keep what they had won. Sforza also received in
marriage the illegitimate daughter of the Duke of Milan, Bianca, whose hand had
often been promised him, and often refused. Eugenius IV alone was discontented;
for Sforza was left in possession of the March of Ancona and other conquests in
the States of the Church.
In Naples also the Angevin party, which Eugenius IV,
supported, was gradually giving way before the energy of Alfonso. In 1442 René
was driven into enters Naples and there was besieged. His only hope June,
was to gain assistance from Sforza; but the Duke of Milan, jealous of his
powerful son-in-law, set Piccinino to keep him in check, and Eugenius IV, who
now saw in Sforza his chief enemy, was only too glad to do his part of
fulminating against him. Alfonso pressed the siege of Naples, which he entered
on June 2, 1442. René was driven to flee from the Castel Nuovo, where the
superb triumphal arch in the inner doorway still stands to commemorate the
entrance of Alfonso. René fled on board a Genoese galley to Florence, where he
received the Pope’s condolences, and afterwards betook himself to his county of
Provence.
The fall of the Angevin party in Naples greatly
affected the policy and position of Eugenius IV. He had little to expect from
France, whose position towards the Papacy was now declared. On the other hand,
he had much to gain from Alfonso, and Alfonso had shown by his dealings with
the Council of Basel that his chief object was to bring the Pope to terms. By
an alliance with Alfonso, Eugenius could obtain help against Sforza, and could
also pave the way for a peaceful return to Rome. He had begun to feel that in a
contest against a pretender the establishment of his Curia in Rome would add to
his prestige. He had already decreed the adjournment of his Council from
Florence to the Lateran, and it was worthwhile to make his hold on Rome secure.
Moreover, he had gained little by his alliance with Florence and Venice; in the
peace of 1441 they had regarded only their own interests and had paid no heed
to his desires. Accordingly Eugenius IV negotiated with Alfonso to recognize
him in Naples, and legitimatize his son Ferrante, on condition that Alfonso
helped him against Sforza. As this was a step alienating himself from the
League and from Florence, Eugenius IV found it desirable to leave Florence on
March 7, 1443. The Venetians urged the Florentines to keep him prisoner, and
only on the morning of his departure did the Florentines determine to let him
go. Yet the final departure was courteous on both sides, and Eugenius IV
thanked the magistracy for their hospitality. He betook himself to Siena, a
city hostile to Florence, and, by so doing, gave a clear indication of his
change of policy.
In Siena Eugenius IV was honorably received, and
concluded his negotiations with Alfonso. He also had Eugenius an interview with
Piccinino, and doubtless devised with him schemes against their common enemy
Sforza. On September 13 he set out for Rome, where he arrived on September 28,
after an absence of eight years. The Romans received their Pope with
acquiescence, but without enthusiasm. Eugenius IV settled down quietly into his
capital, and proceeded at once to open his Council in the Lateran. But the
Council of the Lateran was an empty form maintained against the Council of
Basel, which was now weakened by the defection of Scotland and Castile, as well
as Aragon. Eugenius IV trusted to diplomacy to destroy the last hope of Felix
V, by driving Frederick III to abandon the German neutrality. Meanwhile in
Italy he had important work to do in using his new allies as a means of
recovering from Sforza his possessions in the States of the Church.
In Italy circumstances favored the Pope’s policy. The
suspicious Duke of Milan was always jealous of his powerful son-in-law, and
wished to keep him in check. Alfonso of Naples was true to his agreement with
the Pope, and in August, 1443, marched against Sforza. He was joined by
Piccinino, and their combined army is said to have numbered 24,000 men, against
which Sforza could only command 8000. Sforza resolved to act on the defensive
and secure his chief cities by garrisons; but many of the leaders in whom he
trusted betrayed his cause. His ruin seemed imminent, when suddenly the Duke of
Milan interposed on his behalf. He wished to see his son-in-law humbled, but
not destroyed, and so prevailed on Alfonso to withdraw his troops. Sforza was
now a match for Piccinino, and succeeded in defeating him in battle on November
8. But Piccinino was rich in the resources of Eugenius IV, while Sforza
suffered from want of money. Both sides retired into winter quarters, and as
spring approached Piccinino had a superior force at his command. Again the Duke
of Milan interposed, and invited Piccinino to a conference on important
affairs. No sooner was Piccinino absent than Sforza hastened to seize the
opportunity. He gathered together his starving troops, and told them that now
was their last chance of wealth and victory. His skillful generalship
outmatched Piccinino’s son, who, with the Papal legate, Cardinal Capranica, was
left in charge of the troops of the Church. Piccinino, already an old man, had
gone to Milan with sad forebodings; he was so overwhelmed with the news of this
defeat, that he died of a broken heart on October 25, 1444. He was a marvelous
instance of the power of genius over adverse circumstances. Small in stature,
crippled through paralysis so that he could scarcely walk, he could direct
campaigns with unerring skill; though devoid of eloquence or personal gifts, he
could inspire his soldiers with confidence and enthusiasm. He was impetuous and
daring, and showed to the greatest advantage in adversity. But he lacked the
consistent policy of Sforza, and saw, in his last days, that he had founded no
lasting power. With his death his army fell in pieces, and no captain was left
in Italy to match the might of Sforza.
When the fortunes of war had begun to turn against the
Pope, Venice and Florence joined with the Duke of Milan in urging peace, which
was accepted on condition that each party should retain what it held on October
18. Sforza employed the eight days that intervened between the conclusion of
the peace and the date for its operation in recovering most of the cities which
had been won for the Pope. Eugenius IV only retained Ancona, Recanati, Osimo,
and Fabriano, and they were to remain tributary to Sforza. His first attempt
against the powerful condottiere had not met with much success. Next year,
however, he was again prepared to take advantage of another quarrel which had
arisen between Sforza and the Duke of Milan, and war again broke out. Bologna,
which had been in the hands of Piccinino, proclaimed its independence under the
leadership of Annibale Bentivoglio; but the Pope and the Duke of Milan both
looked with suspicion on the independence of a city which each wished to bring
under his own sway. In June, 1445, a band of conspirators, supported by the
Duke of Milan, assassinated Annibale Bentivoglio after a baptism, where he had
been invited to act as godfather to the son of their ringleader. But their plan
of seizing the city failed. The people were true to the house of Bentivoglio,
and slew the assassins of Annibale. Florence and Venice came to their help. There
was again war in Italy with Sforza, Florence, and Venice on one side, the Pope,
Naples, and Milan on the other. Again Sforza was hard pressed, and the Papal
troops overran the March of Ancona. In June, 1446, Sforza made a raid in the
direction of Rome, and penetrated as far as Viterbo. But the cities shut their
gates against him, and he had no means of besieging them. Sforza’s ruin seemed
certain; Jesi was the only town in the March which he held. But, luckily for
him, the Venetians took this opportunity to attack the Duke of Milan, who,
being ill provided with generals, needed the help of Sforza, whose ambition was
henceforward turned to a nobler prize than the March of Ancona, which fell back
peaceably into the hands of the Pope.
Thus Eugenius IV, by stubborn persistency, succeeded
in repairing the mischief of his first political indiscretion, and obtained
again a secure position in Italy, while the mistakes of the Council had done
much to restore his ecclesiastical power, which had been so dangerously threatened.
The leading theologians of the Council had been driven to quit it, and range
themselves on the side of the Pope; only John of Segovia and John of Palomar
remained true to the principles with which the Council opened. It is noticeable
that the great advocate of the Council’s power, Nicolas of Cusa, was now the
chief emissary of Eugenius IV. Cusa had been taught in the school of Deventer,
and came to Basel deeply imbued with the mystic theology of the Brethren of the
Common Life. His work, De Concordantia Catholica, written in 1433,
represented the ideal of the reforming party, a united Church reformed in soul
and body, in priesthood and laity, by the action of a Council which should
represent on earth the eternal unity of Heaven. Cusa’s work was the text-book
of the Council; yet its author was disillusioned, and found his theories fade
away. He quitted Basel with Cesarini, and in common with others who felt that
they had been led away by their enthusiasm, laboured to restore the Papal power
which once he had striven to upset. The Council of Florence gathered round the
Pope an extraordinary number of learned theologians, whose efforts were now
devoted to the restoration of the Papacy. Again, after the interval of a
century and a half, the pens of canonists were engaged in extolling the Papal
supremacy. John of Torquemada, a Spanish Dominican, whom Eugenius IV raised to
the Cardinalate, revived the doctrine of the plenitude of the Papal power, and
combated the claims of a General Council to rank as superior to the Pope. Now,
as in other times, the immediate result of an attack upon the Papal supremacy
was to gather round the Papacy a serried band of ardent supporters; if the
outward sphere of the exercise of the Papal authority was limited, the
theoretic basis of the authority itself was made stronger for those who still
upheld it.
These labours of
theologians were to bear their fruits in after times. The immediate question for Felix V and Eugenius IV was the attitude of Germany towards their conflicting claims. Germany was to be their battlefield, and diplomacy their arms
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