FREDERIC.

From an Etching, 1777.

# FREDERIC THE GREAT

AND

# KAISER JOSEPH

## AN EPISODE OF WAR & DIPLOMACY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

BY

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# PREFACE

THE following study had its origin nearly five years ago at the Record Office. Incidentally I happened to have occasion to refer to some unpublished despatches from Berlin and Vienna in the years 1776–79. As I read them I perceived that the attitude of English statesmen towards Berlin was a relatively impartial and detached one, and that the incidents relating to the Bavarian Succession involved nearly all the typical elements of eighteenth century diplomacy: the intense personal influence of rulers, naked aggression veiled by genealogical pedantry, the struggle for the "balance of power," the assertion of *raison d'état* as a plea for all crimes, the rapier play of contending forces, the ruthless crushing of small or neutral Powers by the military aggression of larger ones. In a word, here was an episode of war and diplomacy which seemed to me to have great typical significance. Clausewitz maintained that, in war, more could be learnt from a detailed study of a few operations than from a

broad general knowledge. I believe the same can be said of diplomacy in this instance, and it is greatly to be regretted that Carlyle, in his great study of Frederic, practically laid down his pen after 1763.

The view taken by English diplomatists of the events of 1776–79 was, on the whole, a detached and impartial one, for it was to the interest of England to be neutral. In previous years she had been very hostile to Frederic, but now she became reconciled. Hence in these few years the English diplomatic despatches have something of the value which Ranke has claimed for those of Venice at an earlier date. They seize the central line of diplomatic tendency and show the direction in which Europe as a whole was moving. Every other source —French, German, Russian, Austrian, Saxon, Bavarian—has been explored by one foreign historian or another, but the English comment still remained practically unknown to them. It seems to me that these despatches complete the picture and place the episodes of the time in their true relation to one another.

The despatches of Keith, Harris, and Elliot abound in vivid portraiture and characterization. All of them have passages which light up even the dreariest byways of diplomacy with a flash of wit or insight. Each studied his sovereigns carefully, and there are no more striking characterizations of the great person-

alities or events of the period than Harris's brilliant sketch of Frederic and Catherine, or Elliot's indictment of Bavarian foreign policy. Keith is a more sober writer but not without humour and satire, and the interview in which he relates how Kaiser Joseph told him his opinions of Catherine shows considerable literary art. Nor can any despatches be more interesting than the little touches by which he gradually builds up a full-length portrait of Kaiser Joseph—that most unfortunate and fascinating of Austrian rulers.

The moment at which this book appears, and the subject-matter which it treats, lay it open to the charge of being written for the occasion. As the reader may easily find a dozen curious analogies between the Prussian militarism of the great Frederic and that of his imitator and successor, it may be well to forestall criticism. The book itself has been written for some time, but the need of verifying details from the enormous mass of monographic literature and of constructing a proper *apparatus critici* has delayed its appearance until now. But the process was largely a technical one, and the amendments purely those of detail and minutiae. In point of fact all the chapters except the last were written in the Royal Library at Berlin more than three years ago. At that moment I was enjoying the great facilities to historical students afforded by the

Prussian Government, and was deeply conscious of my obligations to German scholarship. Under such circumstances the opinions that were then expressed were not likely to be biased by any views that may be prevalent in 1914.

One word more: it has never seemed to me the business of the historian to be non-moral any more than it should be his pleasure to be dull. But where I have pronounced judgment I have tried to give my reasons for so doing, and to give ample references to contrary opinions. I have sought also to give a truthful presentation of the episodes selected for treatment, with the comment of relatively detached contemporaries, and the criticism of modern historians.

My best thanks are due to the Marquess of Lansdowne for permission to publish General Burgoyne's valuable report on the Prussian and Austrian military systems, of which two copies are in the MSS. at Lansdowne House. The poem in Appendix III. is from an old Czechish broadside, preserved in the National Czechish Museum at Caslar, and lent to me for purposes of translation by the curator, Dr. Felix Kalm. I have to thank my old friend Professor Henrik Marczali for the gift of a valuable original manuscript, written in 1780 by Francis Katalay, the confessor of Kaiser Joseph, which throws considerable light on the Emperor's personal character.

My general acknowledgments to friends are so great that I must make many in the mass. I should like, however, to select first and foremost Sir A. W. Ward, Master of my own College, for the patience and care with which he read the proofs and for invaluable criticism and comment. I have to acknowledge much assistance from those in other lands, most of all from Professor Henrik Marczali of the University of Budapest; from Professor Paul Mitrofanov of the University of Petrograd; from Professor Delbrück of the University of Berlin, and from Professor R. H. Lord of Harvard University, U.S.A. I owe much also to encouragement or advice given me by Professor J. B. Bury, by Mr. G. P. Gooch, by Mr. D. A. Winstanley, Fellow of Trinity College; my old pupils, Mr. J. E. S. Green, now Fellow of Trinity Hall, and Miss Kate Hotblack, late of Girton College. To Mr. W. F. Reddaway, the Censor of Non-Collegiate Students at Cambridge and biographer of *Frederic the Great*, I owe my first stimulus and interest in the Prussian King, which came to me as we tramped his Silesian battlefields together.

In the purely military part of my study I have to acknowledge my obligations to my brother, Captain A. C. Temperley, now Brigade-Major to the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. The study of the Prussian military system, the account of the Frederician strategy, and the

narrative and criticism of the campaign of 1778 raised problems which are still of considerable interest and which could only be attempted with the aid of practical military experience. It is I hope needless to repeat that this advice was given without reference to present events, and was in fact embodied in a memorandum now more than three years old.

While expressing my great obligations to all those who have aided me, I should like to make it clear that they must in no way be held responsible for any statements contained in this little book.

HAROLD TEMPERLEY,
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FENSTANTON,
*Nov.* 21, 1914.

# CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE . . . . . vii-xii

I. INTRODUCTION TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY . . . . . 1-12

Its motives and aims—Importance of commerce—"The balances of trade and of power."

II. AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA (1763–77) . . 13-48

*Prussian Internal Resources* (pp. 15-23).—Results of the "Seven Years' War"—Personal character of Frederic—As "Philosophic Despot"—Evils of his despotism.

*Austrian Internal Resources* (pp. 23-36).—Diversity of peoples—Reforms in finance—Character of the "Three Kings of Vienna," Maria Theresa, Prince Kaunitz, Kaiser Joseph—Reforming efforts of Joseph.

*The Diplomatic Situation* (1763–77), pp. 36-48.—The Polish problem—Frederic's Treaty with Catherine (1764)—His meetings with Joseph (1769–1770)—Austrian claims on Poland—Frederic's remedy—The "Partition of Poland"—Value of acquisitions to the partitioning Powers—Joseph annexes Bukovina—Will he annex Bavaria?

III. BAVARIA BEFORE THE STORM (1763–77) . 49-80

(1) *The Last Elector of Bavaria and his Rule* (pp. 49-72).—Mediaevalism of Bavaria—Hugh Elliot's report on (1776) criticism of Max Joseph—Max Joseph's reforms and enlightenment—Hugh Elliot on his foreign policy—Joseph's designs on Bavaria—

PAGE

Austrian intrigues in Munich : Max Joseph's hatred of, and attempts to subvert—Death of Max Joseph, December 30, 1778.

(2) *Claim and Counterclaim on the Inheritance of Max Joseph* (pp. 72-80).—Keith and Elliot on probable claimants to Bavaria—History of Karl Theodor's rights—Claims of Joseph—Max Joseph's attempts to multiply them.

IV. THE STORM BURSTS . . . . . 81-112

Effects of Max Joseph's death.

*Kaiser Joseph* (pp. 83-95).—Kaunitz negotiates the Partition-Treaty of January 3 with Ritter—Karl Theodor accepts it—Maria Theresa's delight—Joseph's hopes of France—Louis XVI. and Vergennes refuse to recognize a *casus foederis*—Consternation at Vienna.

*King Frederic* (pp. 95-112).—Frederic and Hugh Elliot—The Alliance with Saxony—Frederic decides on war.

V. THE PLUM AND POTATO WAR . . . . 113-150

The reorganization of the Austrian army by Lascy and Kaiser Joseph—Prince Henry of Prussia as a general—The Frederician strategy—The Austrian plan of defence in 1778—Laudon's proposal to crush Frederic.

*The Western Campaign* (pp. 125-134).—Prince Henry advances and seizes Tollenstein (July 31)—Laudon's hurried retreat.

*The Eastern Campaign* (pp. 135-142).—Frederic's advance (July 5)—His refusal to force the Austrian lines—Retreat of the two Prussian armies—Criticism of Frederic and Prince Henry, and of Laudon—Credit due to Kaiser Joseph and to Lascy—Lord Sydenham on the strategic importance of the "Plum War."

VI. A NEUTRAL STATE IN AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WAR: BAVARIA DURING AND AFTER THE WAR (1778–79) . . . . . 151-175

Unfortunate position of Bavaria—Character of Karl Theodor—His first appearance at Munich—

PAGE

His attempts at financial and military reform—Refusal of Charles Duke of Zweibrücken to accept the Partition-Treaty—Goerz sent by Frederic to Bavarian patriots—Eden on the distress of Karl Theodor—Lehrbach tries to force him into the war—His refusal—Difficulties of Karl Theodor at the Peace of Teschen—His quarrel with Zweibrücken—Karl Theodor arrests and banishes the three patriots—Consternation in Munich—Unpopularity of Karl Theodor and admiration shown for Frederic in Bavaria.

VII. The Peace of Teschen and Russia's Entrance into Germany (1778–79) . . 176-212

Maria Theresa's intervention—The Braunau negotiation—Her appeal to the Diet—Frederic's attitude towards Russia—French and Russian mediation—Hugh Elliot denounces the "Balance of Power" as the basis of negotiation—Catherine's policy—Her instruction to Prince Repnin (October 22, 1778)—Prince Repnin reaches Breslau and negotiates with Frederic—Attitude of Frederic—Mediation of France in conjunction with Russia—Frederic criticizes Russian diplomacy to Prince Henry—"La Vieille Venus" at Teschen—Conclusion of Peace, May 13, 1779—Diplomatic results of the Treaty: its real significance—Russia's entry into Germany—Moltke on the fear of Russia—The end of the old regime.

## APPENDICES

I. James Harris (1st Earl Malmesbury) and Hugh Elliot on the Character and Court of Frederic the Great (*Record Office MSS.*) . . . . . 214-223

II. General Burgoyne's Report on the Prussian and Austrian Armies (1766–67) (*Marquess of Lansdowne's MSS.*) . . . 228-225

PAGE

III. KAISER JOSEPH'S IMPRESSIONS OF THE EMPRESS CATHERINE THE GREAT (1780–82) (*Record Office MSS.*) . . . . . 225-228

IV. GRATITUDE TO KAISER JOSEPH (Czechish Poem) 228-230

V. VOLTAIRE ON THE CAUSES OF WAR IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY . . . 230-232

NOTES . . . . . 233-251

LIST OF BRITISH DIPLOMATISTS MENTIONED IN THE PERIOD . . . . . 253-254

NOTE ON PUBLICATIONS OF THE PAPERS OF BRITISH DIPLOMATS OF THE PERIOD . . . . 254-255

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE ENGLISH DIPLOMATIC DESPATCHES OF THE PERIOD (1776–80) . . 255-265

INDEX . . . . . 267-273

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# ILLUSTRATIONS

FACE PAGE

FREDERIC . . . . . *Frontispiece*

MARIA THERESA . . . . . 13

JOSEPH . . . . . 81

LAUDON . . . . . 113

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE WAR IN BOHEMIA . . 135

BAVARIA AND THE PALATINATE . . . . 151

# I

## INTRODUCTION TO EIGHTEENTH CENTURY DIPLOMACY

THE motives of war and the aims of diplomacy in the eighteenth century have been drawn for us by a prophetic and ironic genius. "Sometimes the quarrel between two princes is to decide which of them shall dispossess a third of his dominions where neither of them pretend to any right. . . . Sometimes a war is entered upon because the enemy is too *strong*; and sometimes because he is too *weak*. Sometimes our neighbours *want* the things which we *have*, or *have* the things which we *want*; and we both fight till they take ours or give us theirs. It is a very justifiable cause of a war to invade a country after the people have been wasted by famine . . . or embroiled by factions among themselves. It is justifiable to enter into a war against our nearest ally, when one of his towns lies convenient for us, or a territory of land, that would render our dominions round and compact . . . *poor* nations are hungry, and

*rich* nations are proud; and pride and hunger will ever be at variance. For these reasons the trade of a soldier is held the most honourable of all others." How many have turned Swift's page with a smile and dismissed it as the discharge of the venom of one whose malignant temper and misfortunes made him the enemy of the human race!

None the less—as a summary of diplomatic motive and military aim in the eighteenth century it cannot be held a mere fantasy. The injustices inflicted upon the nations that were poor and weak—upon Spain, Austria, Poland, and Turkey; the pride and tyranny of the nations that were strong—of France, Prussia, Russia, and England,—these were grim realities. The seizure of Silesia, the Partition of Poland, the attempted Partition of Turkey, are but the three most sordid incidents in a whole epoch of duplicity and selfishness, and a long array of state papers reveals an indictment of the unparalleled avarice, corruption, and self-seeking of the age, that is almost as damning as any which Voltaire or Swift may have drawn. The historian has only to consult the acts of eighteenth century rulers, in order to justify the satirists.

But while it is unnecessary to prove the unscrupulous character of eighteenth century policy, it may be desirable to explain and, in some degree, to extenuate it. The different

epochs of human history have a certain underlying unity, the texture is the same, though the patterns on it are different, and for this reason it is well to bring the eighteenth century so far as possible into comparison with our own age. It is true that the eighteenth century was the age of kings and dynastic wars, and the nineteenth the age of peoples and national wars. But though it is not always the kings who now dream of war, the people seem almost as ready as they were to sacrifice justice to expediency, and in this fact if in nothing else we are enabled to perceive an essential unity between the ages. In the nineteenth or twentieth century persuasion rather than force is the rule for internal government, and even a despotically minded sovereign finds it expedient to flatter popular passions and ideals. In the eighteenth century the sovereign, who possessed a strong mercenary army and a submissive and inarticulate people, was not afraid of taking action far in advance, or flatly in defiance, of the latter's wishes. In no age perhaps has power been concentrated in so few hands, and in no age has the result been more momentous. During the mid-eighteenth century Europe was bound in thought by the ideas of a few resolute and logical individual thinkers, with Voltaire at their head; in action she was equally bound by a few determined and fearless individual rulers—led by Voltaire's friend, enemy, and hero, Frederic the Great.

Clear thought produced clear action, and power vested in a few irresponsible rulers delivered the fortunes of states to the mercy of individual prejudices and passions to a degree unknown in previous history.

But though half a dozen persons controlled the destinies of Central Europe, it would be a great error to suppose that their policy was always subservient to personal or dynastic ends. The orators of the French Revolution delighted to exhibit the tyranny of kings, to whom peoples were sacrificed, to point to the wars produced by the smiles of mistresses and to the peaces concluded by the bribery of courtiers. Such a picture has its true side. In the eighteenth century a prince dealt with his own principality as a landlord with his land. It was an age when a system not of states but of estates prevailed in Europe, when kings resembled tyrannous country squires. It involved no violation of current feeling or established right that a ruler should exchange Bavaria for Belgium, or Lorraine for Tuscany, without consideration for the wishes of the inhabitants, who were handed over to an alien ruler as freely as they were hired out to be killed under a foreign general. For a prince could lend his army to a foreign ruler without committing his own state to warfare, or despatch thousands of patient mercenaries to shed their blood in alien lands in quarrels for

which neither he nor they cared anything. Even with the most enlightened rulers of the age, the claims of their subjects and the true interests of their states often weighed somewhat little in the balance against their personal wishes. Catherine, "the most liberal of rulers," habitually chose her generals from among her lovers, and Frederic, the "first servant of the state," imprisoned the Venetian ambassador that he might force the Doge of Venice to send him a dancing-girl for his new opera at Berlin!

Such incredible instances might justify impassioned rhetoric, and explain the savagery of the hatred towards kings at the moment of revolutionary vengeance. It is none the less true that personal vagaries were not seldom subordinated to state interests, and that most rulers in the mid-eighteenth century, despite occasional lapses, sought the real happiness of their countries. For example, though personal influences counted for much, dynastic ones availed relatively little. The interests of Spain were not sacrificed to those of France because Philip V. was a kinsman of Louis XV., nor was Prussia the ally of England because Frederic was the nephew of George II. It is easy to single out personal influences which deflected policy in the eighteenth century, hard to discover dynastic ones; Swift is as near the mark when he says that "Alliance by blood, or

marriage, is a frequent cause of war between princes, and the nearer the kindred the greater is their disposition to quarrel," as are those historians who ascribe the union of the House of Bourbon purely to the ties of blood, and delight to contrast the dynastic policies of the eighteenth century with the national ones of the nineteenth. The differences in the two ages —despite the far greater influence of the personal views of individual rulers in the eighteenth century—are in truth more apparent than real. The diplomatic language of the eighteenth century is dynastic in tone. We are bewildered by fantastic claims of sovereign right which are alleged to be the origin of long and bloody wars of succession or inheritance. But the fancifulness of these claims need not disguise the reality of facts or deceive the historian. Eighteenth century monarchs used dynastic claims as pretexts for advancing the substantial interests of their countries, and claimed territory in virtue of the private rights of a wife, a niece, or a cousin, as the modern statesman claims it in virtue of the public rights of nationality, of humanity, or of necessity. The pirate ship steers the same course with a new figurehead in the bow and with different colours at its masthead; the essential objects are the same, only the pretexts are different. No historical claims can be more flimsy than those which Frederic asserted in favour of his claims on

Silesia, or which Joseph brought up to defend his Partition of Poland, yet it was not from the Heralds' College that they derived their real arguments, but from the need of rounding off territory, the redress of the balance of power, the right of force. Fantastic antiquarian arguments were the fashion of the day and the decorous screen for aggression, injustice, or necessity. No one at least would be more amused at our generation, which defends so many acts of the eighteenth century on the plea of history, than Frederic of Prussia, the cynical philosopher of Sans-Souci, who wrote, as he was leaving to capture Silesia, "the question of right (*droit*) is the affair of the ministers," and, at a later date, "the jurisprudence of sovereigns is commonly the right of the stronger." *

The dominant thoughts, by which rulers like Frederic the Great of Prussia and Joseph II. of Austria were inspired, were those of intellectual rationalism. Mysticism, sentimental religious scruple, obtrusive morality, these were for women and for priests. Prejudice, tradition, prescription, the whole fabric of established order crumbled in the crucible of reason. "When one has an advantage," said Frederic, "is he to use it or not?" And on the hardest

* Compare the eighteenth century historian with the ruler—"For every war a motive of safety or revenge, of honour or zeal, of right or convenience, may be readily found in the jurisprudence of conquerors" (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, chap. lxv.).

ground of rationalism his question was unanswerable. Before these mechanical philosophers the precepts of international law, the respect for the neighbour's landmark, the sacredness of treaties, the rights of independent states and universal morality had little chance. Reason dictated not an obedience to vague and mystic conceptions of international good, but a clear calculation of individual interests. Reason denounced not an infringement of treaties, but an infringement of treaties which brought no advantage to the perjurer; success was the best demonstration as it was the only canon of right. This mental attitude will explain many of the most questionable acts of the period, Frederic's seizure of Silesia, Joseph's unprovoked attack upon Turkey, or the long record of Catherine's treachery towards Poland.

But there were causes other than those of a scepticism sapping morality, which pushed forward eighteenth century rulers to many acts of aggression and perfidy. There existed economic, physical, political forces which the rulers could hardly control, causes which they but dimly apprehended, pressures against which they could hardly strive—even if they often strove but feebly. With Louis XIV. and Leopold I. had perished the last rulers whose ideas were coloured and whose policy was directed by genuine religious influences; the

influences of the mid-eighteenth century were rather commercial or political. Rulers went to war not over questions as to "whether flesh was bread or the juice of a berry blood," but as to whether the wine-tariff should be raised or the herring-duty lowered. In those days the tariffs or the trading companies of other nations could only be reduced or abolished by an appeal to the sword. The mercantilist creed of the age—a creed held with an intensity and force wholly wanting to more orthodox beliefs—declared that foreign commerce and internal trade were the very blood and sinews of a nation, the source alike of wealth and of power. To injure commerce was to drain away the life-blood of the state, and any hostile power, which attempted to do this, was a species of vampire whom it was needful immediately to destroy. Trade motives influenced all the Powers of Europe towards war, especially the maritime nations —the Dutch, French, and English, whose wars in Europe are often but an incident in struggles for the Indies of the East or of the West. The motive, more dominant among more purely continental Powers, like Austria, Prussia, and Russia, is the need or desire for territory.

At first sight there seems little connection between the struggle for the balance of trade and the struggle for the balance of power; the unity becomes more obvious when we realize that increase of territory in Europe meant as

much wealth to a land power, as increase of trade in America or the Indies did to a maritime one. Colonization was even more promoted by territorial annexation than by trade. Montcalm began by nailing *fleur-de-lys* on to tree trunks in the Mississippi valley and Kaiser Joseph by advancing boundary posts topped by Austrian eagles into the Zips district. When once the annexation was complete more settlers followed Joseph into Poland than followed Englishmen into Canada. During most of the eighteenth century colonization was in fact more active and successful in North and East Europe than in North America. In Europe the increase of territory was thought to be always an increase of strength because, if well managed, it meant increase of population and wealth. The sovereign who added province to province felt as great an addition to his wealth as does the landowner who piles estate upon estate; and the thirst for adding field to field possessed every ruler in Central Europe, from the pettiest German prince up to King and Kaiser. But it was produced by necessity as well as by greed. The strategic position of Prussia, its scattered territories, its piecemeal provinces, forced its ruler to maintain an enormous army, kept him constantly on the alert and almost compelled him (had he needed compulsion) to profit by his neighbour's necessities. The case of Austria, whose possessions lay promiscuously along the

Danube and the Rhine, and stretched from Baltic and North Sea to Adriatic, was an even more obvious case of geography making conscience impossible. The smallest change in Central or Western Europe was likely to affect or to threaten one or other of the sporadic possessions of the Habsburg. Territorial increase was the eighteenth century measure of safety, and Frederic was deemed to have attained that security for Prussia by wresting from Austria the rich and fertile province of Silesia (1740). It mattered not that its possession divided Frederic's dominions even more than before; that disadvantage was outweighed by the solid increase of sixteen thousand square miles of land and over a million subjects. In exactly the same proportion the position of Austria had been rendered unsafe, and the territorial balance of power endangered. It was no advantage that Austria severed a huge district from the dying Polish state in 1772, for Prussia also exacted her share of Polish spoils. Until it had measured out for itself with rule and line a piece of territory equal to the Silesian province which Frederic had torn from it, the House of Habsburg deemed itself, and was deemed to be, unsafe.

Hence it was that Austrian statesmen cast longing eyes on Bavaria—the great Catholic state of South Germany, whose territory rounded off the south-western corner of Austria—

MARIA THERESA.

# II

## AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA
### (1763–1777)

*Das alte Heilige Römische Reich*
*Wie hält es noch zusammen.*

GOETHE.

IN the winter of 1777 the chances of a European War depended on the skill of a Bavarian physician. If the Elector of Bavaria died under his hands, his blunder would give the signal for a disputed succession and a European War. For Kaiser Joseph would march his Austrian troops into the south of Bavaria, and King Frederic would begin to drill his grenadiers on the Potsdam parade-ground. It was true that the succession ought to have been undisputed, and that by rights the Bavarian inheritance and possessions fell to Karl Theodor, Elector Palatine. But undisputed successions were not common in the eighteenth century. Legal rights were of less avail than naked force, and a good army always justified a bad claim. The eighteenth century had been an age of disputed successions: from 1702 to 1713 was the War

of the Spanish Succession (and indeed of the English also); from 1733 to 1735 the War of the Polish; from 1740 to 1748 the War of the Austrian Succession; in all of which history shows the right of the stronger to have been invoked against equity and justice. Now it was the turn of Bavaria, and as Joseph, the Roman Caesar, had many legions, and Karl Theodor, the Elector Palatine, had but few, it was not surprising that Austria should erect a claim to the succession. It was clear that Austria was ready to fight, the only question was whether the Elector Palatine was ready to resist. As his own resources were negligible, his only hope lay in an appeal to the justice of Europe, or—more properly—to the interests of other states. Yet it so happened that only two Powers in Europe could, by any possibility, interfere. England was engaged in a death-grapple with her revolted colonies, and France was already certain to be drawn into that struggle; Turkey was too distant and too weak to exercise influence, Poland was helpless, in a state of guaranteed and consecrated anarchy, and the opposition of lesser German states was either not to be expected or not to be feared. Of the other important Powers there remained only Russia, which was just recovering from the severe strain of a Turkish war, and Prussia. Joseph had an "advantage" and was justified in using it by Frederic's logic, though it by

no means followed that the logician would approve of his pupil's application. All eyes were therefore turned towards Prussia, for it was obvious that, in case of war, she would be protagonist in the struggle with Austria, and that upon the action of her king depended the fate of Bavaria and the future of Germany.

## 1. Internal Resources

### (*a*) *Prussia*

To estimate how far the conditions between Austria and Prussia were equal, towards what issue destiny seemed to point, some glimpse of the previous history of each state, of their existing resources and of the personalities controlling them, becomes necessary. Ever since his accession in 1740 Frederic II. of Prussia had been the disturbing genius of Germany. No one had taught the age so many lessons in war or policy, none had equally surprised, terrified, and confounded it. In the winter of 1740 he had first attacked Austria, and conquered by force of arms that province of Silesia, which no confederation of foes, no disaster in the field, and no defeat in diplomacy could ever persuade him to relinquish. It was not that in this and in other enterprises Frederic did not commit many errors, but that his resolute will, his infinite resource, and his matchless energy always enabled him to repair them. In 1746 Silesia

was ceded to him in full sovereignty, and he retired from a war in which every important European Power had been engaged, but from which none but he derived substantial profit. Such dazzling success was dangerous, for it set other Powers against him, and during the next decade Nemesis was gathering for Frederic. The King, whom no Power trusted, soon found all continental Powers united against him, and was called upon to face a vast coalition, which eventually included Austria, Russia, France, Sweden, Saxony, and the Germanic Empire as a whole. Conscious of the gathering danger, Frederic was able only to strengthen himself by an offensive and defensive alliance with England, before the storm burst. The new and gigantic struggle of the Seven Years' War (1756–63) was to reveal him in a new light, to show him tried by every adversity of fortune and yet equal to every danger, often defeated but always drawing victory itself out of disaster. Before 1757 Frederic was known to be a skilled commander, and his army believed to be superb, after that it was known that he or they could baffle and defy the united hosts of Europe. No numbers could daunt the soldiers who had won victory at Rossbach, no General could compare with the leader who had dazzled the world by his exploits at Leuthen. Even the disasters of the later period of the Seven Years' War could not dim his fame or eclipse his

terrible renown. When he emerged from the war—exhausted but triumphant—he had acquired an authority to which no German ruler could pretend since the days of Charles V. He had shattered the Austrian armies, he had driven the French beyond the Rhine; and in these two exploits he had foreshadowed the future of Germany.

The personal character of Frederic shaped so much of his system of administration, of diplomacy, and of warfare, that even the most minute research into it may be illuminating. The portraits that we see of him differ so amazingly from one another that it is difficult to believe that they are those of the same man, and that fact is no bad index to his strange personality. In the most authentic likenesses the famous large blue-grey eyes light up the whole expression, and lend the only touch of softness or of human weakness to the grim iron face. They are all that make possible to us the story that he let street-boys ride on his horse, that he patted grenadiers on the shoulder and asked them to call him "Old Fritz," or that nobler tale of how he burst into tears at the *Te Deum* at Charlottenburg after the close of the war. From the hard satiric lines, from the iron-bound jaw, from the air of ruthless energy pervading his face, we can read a hundred confirmations of his bitter jests against religion, of his revolting meanness towards old friends, of his cold

brutality towards one of his brothers and many of his veterans. Despite some acts of kindness he was not a generous man, despite life-long devotion to the public service he was in few senses a good man, yet he is incontestably a very great one. He would have fulfilled Burke's idea of one of the "great bad men of history" better than any man of his generation, and, though he lacked the profound insight of a Richelieu or the magical inspiration of a Pitt, in all the qualities which secure immediate practical success he has had few rivals in his own or in any age.

Frederic is important not only for his achievements in war but for those in internal reform and administration, and because he created that type and model of the mid-eighteenth century ruler—the Philosophic Despot. He gave the world the best, though not the first, example of the enlightened ruler, who lived in Spartan simplicity, banished harlots and luxury from his courts, and worked for the general interests of his whole land irrespective of creed, party, or privilege. The creation of a justice which should be equal for rich and poor, and should be without the degradations of torture; the codification of the law; the extension of toleration to civil and religious opinion;—these were reforms which he introduced or immensely popularized throughout Europe. The administrative machine, which

he improved though he had not fashioned it, was unparalleled for efficiency, smoothness, and economy. Prussia under Frederic seemed to Hegel the ideal of what a state should be, and no land-agent ever knew the capacities of an estate, or lent more effort to developing them than Frederic gave to his kingdom. The King himself took as eager an interest in the raising of chickens, the price of coffee, and the manufacture of porcelain, as in increasing revenues, in manœuvring armies, or acquiring provinces. A hierarchy of officials, entirely subservient to the King, interfered in every activity of life, originated or developed manufactures, introduced immigrants, founded colonies in waste places, drained marshes, cultivated deserts, built roads, cut canals, relieved poverty, encouraged thrift and punished idleness. Nor did less material interests suffer. Frederic, said Voltaire, was Spartan in the morning, Athenian in the afternoon. Though he erected barracks and fortresses without number, he also built palaces for himself and academies of learning for his subjects, attracted men of letters to Berlin, built opera-houses, encouraged art and patronized literature. The state still remained in a sense feudal and mediaeval; the nobility still enjoyed great social and political privileges, such as exemption from taxation and the monopoly of posts in the army; the mass of the agricultural population still remained serfs

burdened with heavy imposts. But what the people gave in one way was returned to them in another, for organization and discipline had made the nobles obedient servants of the crown. No land was safer against assailants from without, no peasants were more certain of justice from within. Nowhere were peace and order better maintained, communications more rapidly improved, or material resources more speedily developed. One great advantage Frederic had over almost every other state: his economy was so great, his stewardship so careful that even in the strain of war he had never resorted to loans. England's subsidies and his own parsimony had enabled him to pay for everything as it fell due. Hence, though the Seven Years' War imposed gigantic sufferings on Prussia, it did not tax or mortgage her resources in the future. At the moment when Austria was labouring under mountains of debt, Prussia, owing to Frederic's system of making income balance expenditure, was encumbered by no tax on posterity. Frederic likened Prussia at the close of the war to a man bleeding from a hundred wounds, but when once he had staunched the flow of blood, there was no festering sore, no rankling wound, which might reopen.

The real fault of the civil administration lay in its success, the machine worked so perfectly that it rendered everything mechanical.

So long as the hand of Frederic controlled the machine, his mighty energy inspired and vibrated through every part of it, but there were not wanting signs towards the end of his reign that even his strength was unequal to the task, and that no single brain could foresee the needs and anticipate the wishes of millions. Prussia was stereotyped in its routine, its very energies were mechanical, its creative power was gone, and this exhaustion of strength was already perceptible about the time at which our narrative opens (1777). It was in that year that Hugh Elliot wrote of it: "The Prussian monarchy reminds me of a vast prison in the centre of which appears the great keeper occupied in the care of his captives." *

The defects in Frederic's civil administration, the inelasticity of the system, the rigour which was stifling individual energy and natural force in the state as a whole, was even more injurious to the army. Frederic had inherited from his father, Frederic William I., the most perfectly drilled infantry in the world, and had shown that he could manœuvre them in battle as easily as upon the Potsdam parade-ground, but it can hardly be said that he had improved

* Lady Minto's *Memoir of Hugh Elliot*, p. 105. Practically the same phrase is used by Wraxall, November 9, 1777, who visited Potsdam and Berlin in that year. He knew Elliot well, and the reader may determine for himself the true authorship of the phrase; cp. Wraxall's *Court of Berlin, etc.*, vol. i., London, 1799, p. 265.

their spirit or their discipline. During his later years his absolutism grew, and whereas he had once extended a wise discretion to his marshals and generals, he gradually became jealous of any show of independence or originality. His favourite leaders were those who meekly executed his general orders without reference to particular circumstances, or who readily assumed blame for disasters which they themselves could have averted. The individual had become an automaton in the grip of a merciless machine directed by a single intelligence. The logical and inevitable result of such a system was that the generals deteriorated in intellect, the troops in vigour and resource. Their mechanical drill, their automatic perfection was still as great as ever, but the spirit, which had inspired his soldiers at Leuthen, the training, which had made generals like Schwerin or Seydlitz possible, were absent from his armies in 1778. Everything in Prussia depended upon the King, but Frederic was no longer the Frederic of old, and possessed neither in himself nor in his soldiers the vigorous and buoyant strength which had brought them both safe through so many disasters in the past. Prussia was still strong in her traditions, in her discipline, in her sovereign's immeasurable renown, but it was the strength of one whose muscles are still powerful when the internal vigour is decaying. Frederic's civil adminis-

tration and his military fame were yet the admiration of Europe, but

> Power, unto itself most commendable,
> Hath not a tomb so evident as a chair
> To extol what it hath done.

### (*b*) *Austria-Hungary*

No contrast could well be greater than that between the mechanically drilled, uniform, and united Prussia of Frederic the Great in 1778 and the mediaeval and disorganized Austria-Hungary of Maria Theresa in 1740. Maria Theresa succeeded to a realm whose possessions were even more scattered than those of Prussia, and some of whose inhabitants were sunk in a barbarism compared with which the ignorance of Prussian serfs was enlightenment. Her possessions in the Netherlands and Italy, her territories scattered like dust over South and West Germany, were a source of danger rather than of strength, as they offered temptations to the greed of Spain or France. In Austria-Hungary itself the most extraordinary diversity of custom and administration prevailed, nowhere was mediaevalism so apparent nor order so frequently the exception. In truth Austria-Hungary is, and always has been, not a country but a continent in itself, and there was as much difference between the noble of Vienna and the peasant of Transylvania as between the grand seigneur of Paris and the serf of Russia. The

contrasts of race, of climate, and nationality, as well as of wealth and culture, were (and still are) amazing. The Archduchy of Austria, Styria and Carinthia, and the Tyrol and Silesia were mainly German in population, and consequently were the easier to rule by German methods and on uniform principles, while their inhabitants were the most prosperous and intelligent throughout Austria-Hungary. Bohemia and Moravia offered totally different problems for solution, their soil was poor, the people were Czechs, who were wretchedly ignorant and rebellious towards their tyrannical German landowners. In Illyria was a barbarous and ignorant population, whose habits and manners were as low as or lower than those of Russian serfs. There was a wide and deep distinction between all these districts (united under the general title of Hereditary Provinces) and the Hungarian Kingdom. Hungary was an independent kingdom, strong and self-centred, ruled by the proud and passionate Magyar aristocrats, who claimed the right to tax and to govern their own country, and to exclude foreigners (*i.e.* Germans) from its borders. A perfect type of a feudal aristocracy had been, as it were, embalmed and preserved in this country, and mediaeval Hungary contrasted as markedly with eighteenth century Austria as did the Hungarian noble with his feathered kalpag, his furred dolman, crooked

scimitar, fierce moustache and long hair, with the smooth-shaven, periwigged, and silk-clothed aristocrat of Vienna. It was this hopeless complexity of strangely associated states that the various European Powers, with Frederic at their head, came to partition and despoil in 1740. The result was the loss of Silesia, and—bitter as was the blow—perhaps a gain to the House of Habsburg.

The very greatness of the disaster, the terrific impact of modern organizations and ideas upon a system that was hopelessly mediaeval, produced changes that were highly beneficial to Austria-Hungary as a whole. If they were to escape similar disasters in the future the Habsburgs must make the most drastic and strenuous efforts to adapt their states to modern conditions. By inclination Maria Theresa was strongly conservative, but she pushed on the work of regeneration with resolute determination after 1748, in especial the work of military reform. Her efficient professional army, which confronted Frederic during 1756–63, was by no means equal to his own, but it was immeasurably superior to the hired mercenaries, the rude feudal levies, or the gallant irregulars who had served her in the first Silesian War. A transformation had likewise been effected in the internal government of the state, the finances were revised, methods of taxation improved, and the ad-

ministration rendered more efficient. A council of state—erected in 1758—brought the hopelessly conflicting mass of executive boards, committees and councils, into something like order, and the same idea of co-ordination and centralization was cautiously but systematically extended throughout the Austrian domains. In Hungary, partly from gratitude for her loyalty in the dark days of 1740, partly from prudence, Maria Theresa was too wise to attempt far-sweeping change. Hungary remained an independent unit governed by her backward and patriotic nobles, though not entirely unaffected by the breath of reform. The proud Hungarian noble was flattered, was attracted to the court of Vienna, and induced to learn German and forget his patriarchal usages, but no serious effort was made to tarnish or to dim the *aurea libertas* which he cherished. In Bohemia and Moravia the nobility was mainly German and the task of centralization easier. Accordingly these districts, instead of enjoying a quasi-independence under the sleepy rule of petty councils of local tyrants, were brought within the reach of the efficient bureaucracy of Vienna. The civil service became more public-spirited and energetic, organization and discipline passed from ideal into reality, increased administrative efficiency doubled the yield from the taxes, and Austria-Hungary, which, under Charles VI., had been governed

as badly as Poland, was governed in the last years of Maria Theresa at least as well as France.

Austria-Hungary, like Prussia, was governed by a dynasty whose rule was intensely personal. Yet, as was often reported after 1765, there was only one king at Potsdam, but there were three at Vienna. These were Maria Theresa, the Empress-Queen; Joseph, her son, Holy Roman Emperor; and Kaunitz the Chancellor, almost the Grand Vizier, of Austria-Hungary. Among the long gallery of faces, cynical or coarse, voluptuous or depraved, that confront us in the mid-eighteenth century, Maria Theresa's womanly face exercises an indescribable fascination. The brow is broad and noble, the mouth firm yet sensitive and kind, the eyes direct, clear and true, the whole expression one of innocence, sincerity, and strength. The air is noble and commanding, and yet the dignity of the queen in no way lessens the sweetness and motherliness of the woman. That her face could remain thus, after the revelations of the private vices and public crimes almost daily forced upon her, is one more testimony to the exquisite purity and strength of her character. Without perhaps the highest gifts of statesmanship, she possessed the power of awaking enthusiasm, a resolute will, unshaken courage at a crisis, and an unerring practical insight. Despite an unfaithful

husband, a vicious court, and a corrupt administration, she contrived to win the respect of her enemies for her womanliness, her courage, and her statesmanship, to be the one Habsburg loved by Austrians and Hungarians alike, and to impart to her reign the aspect of a golden age of happiness and renown. During her reign the province of Silesia was lost, during the rule of her father the Netherlands had been added to Austria ; but no one has ever ventured to compare his reign with hers in respect of splendour or prosperity.

No contrast could well be greater than that portrayed in the characters and the portraits of Maria Theresa and of her Minister, Kaunitz. His lean, hard, mask-like face contrasts as markedly with her open, generous, and handsome one as did the exquisite finesse, the subtlety and craft of his policy with her unaffected simplicity, her piety, and zeal for truth even in diplomacy. Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian Chancellor, who exercised such sway over his mistress, was a typical mid-eighteenth century statesman, foppish and aristocratic to the finger-tips, his hair always powdered and his coat laced in the latest fashion, his manner suave, urbane, and polished. No one knew so well how to make frivolity and diplomacy serve one another; some of his most important confidences were made in the billiard-salon or the ball-room; many of his diplo-

matic triumphs were achieved by means which only a libertine could have used. He was too much a son of his age, had too great a scorn of humanity, and too much natural cynicism, not to have imbibed the cool philosophy which denounced priests as hypocrites and religion as superstition. His respect for Maria Theresa caused him to conceal the extremes of this tendency during her reign, but no statesman of any country showed himself at heart more resolutely anti-clerical. As a reformer of the internal administration he suffered too much from the prejudices of his class, from his anti-popular views, from his easy disbelief in human nature, to effect very much. But as a diplomatist he had many of the highest qualities: cynical self-possession, ready resource, unfailing suavity and grace, an intelligence that was clear if not profound, an ingenuity that was real if somewhat fantastic. He was the chief architect of that diplomatic masterpiece, the coalition of Austria, Russia, and France, which so nearly destroyed Frederic in the Seven Years' War. But Kaunitz built too much on coalitions, on finesse, and on diplomacy; if, indeed, these could have been decisive, Frederic would have been overthrown. The practical realities of the situation mocked at the airy conceptions of Kaunitz, and the result of the struggle brought enhanced glory to the Prussian king, and somewhat dimmed the reputation

of the Austrian diplomat. Austria had incurred an enormous debt, had strained her resources to breaking-point, and had failed to recover Silesia. That was the result of the Seven Years' Struggle which ended in 1763. At such a time it was not unnatural that Maria Theresa might be willing to listen to other counsels than those of her Chancellor.

It was about the year 1765 that Joseph first came into prominence, and Austrian policy henceforward assumes a new character for vigour and reforming zeal, partly owing to the pressure of events, and to the impulse of the Empress and the Chancellor, but in no small degree also to Joseph. His early portraits have a deep and even a melancholy interest, for they enable us to trace in his countenance the qualities which made him at once the best-loved and the best-hated of his race, which caused him to be adored by philosophers and detested by priests, which won him the love of all German-speaking folk and the hatred of all Hungarians. Some have accounted for his striking gifts and his no less amazing defects by declaring that he was a Lorrainer, the child of his father, the Emperor Francis I., and no true son of Rudolph or Maximilian. But, while the contour of his face is unlike that of the Habsburgs, the eyes are characteristic of Maria Theresa. His early portraits show a smooth

oval face, open and pleasing, a mouth full, mobile, and sensitive, the expression frank, generous, and engaging. But his real character is seen in those large liquid blue eyes, which were the admiration of all Vienna; whose expression of passionate sympathy, of warm humanity, of thoughtless eagerness, reveal the true man. Joseph's faults were many, some fickleness and confusion of thought, great recklessness and misdirection of energy, much harshness towards subordinates; but none can deny him as warm a zeal for his people, as genuine a care of the poor and degraded and weak, and a heart as tender as ever beat in the breast of a sovereign. The history of his devoted efforts, of his pitiful failures are written in those passionate eyes and upon those tremulous lips.

The dominating characteristic of Joseph was the union of strong humanitarian impulses with a rigid and mechanical logic. He was half a warm-hearted philanthropist, who sacrificed everything to impulse and sentiment, half a ruthless bureaucrat, who carried out pedantic ideas with military precision and force. It is in the former character that posterity has regarded him, and legend has been as busy with him as with Haroun-al-Raschid. He loved to travel into the remote corners of his wide dominions, unannounced and with a scanty escort, wearing a plain black coat and assuming

the pseudonym of Count Falkenstein ; preferring to sleep in the village inn rather than in the castle on the hill, to fraternize with the peasants, and to see everything with his own eyes, like a true father of his people. Once at an inn near Kolin he entered hastily, dirtying with his boots the damp brick floor which the maid was scrubbing. "Go away!" screamed she furiously, but the tall young stranger smiled and gave her a ducat. Who could throw away so much money but the great—nay the greatest —the Kaiser himself? So thought the maid, inquired accordingly, found it was he, and was properly abashed.* On another and more famous occasion near Brünn, taking the plough from the hand of a Czechish peasant he drove a furrow with it, to show his love for the peasant and for the noblest of all industries.† In the hearts of peasants, at least, Kaiser Joseph found his reward, however statesmen or historians judged him. His portrait hung in their huts beside that of the Virgin, and a thousand legends and songs enshrined the memory of the good Emperor, of the Peasants' Kaiser who sought to free the peasants from serfdom, who brought to so many of them the first gleams of hope and of sympathy, and who wished

* This story came to me from the lips of an old Czechish schoolmaster well versed in folk-tales.

† This is the most famous of all the stories about him, and the original (?) plough together with a portrait of the peasant is still shown in the Museum at Brünn.

himself to be known as "Der Schätzer der Menschen" (The Lover of Mankind).

On the death of his father in 1765 Joseph, being already King of the Romans (1764), was chosen as Holy Roman Emperor. He thus became recognized head of the Germanic Body and titular ruler of Christendom, but his power as Emperor over Germany was almost as small as his more indefinite lordship over the civilized world. With his usual impetuosity he endeavoured to infuse some energy into the withered and worm-eaten structure of the Empire, but was met by the most humiliating rebuffs. The organs for the common government of Germany, the Aulic Council (Reichs-Hofrath), the Imperial Court of Justice (Hofgericht), and Reichskammergericht, were outworn, inefficient, or corrupt. Joseph's efforts to evoke some common order and unity in the lumbering machinery of Empire not only failed, but actually produced strong and not unjustifiable suspicions that he was merely trying to use his Imperial position to further Austrian aims.

Foiled in these designs, Joseph turned his attention to the internal development of Austria, which he had been co-regent since 1765. His youthful impetuosity soon broke against the experience of Kaunitz and the caution of Maria Theresa, but, none the less, he effected important reforms. Joseph was chiefly instru-

mental in promoting economy and reform of the finances, measures most urgently needed. The one constant feature of Austria in history has been the ever-threatening peril of bankruptcy; and after this war the situation for a time almost portended ruin. But in 1775 the rigour of the economies actually made it possible for a genuine surplus of revenue over annual expenditure to be triumphantly announced. To obtain this result Joseph had subjected the Court to the most rigid economies, had handed over twenty million gulden of his private fortune, and pledged his numerous estates in Bohemia, Moravia, Austria, and Hungary, finally even his Duchy of Teschen, to support the credit of the State. By these means the interest on the State debt was reduced from a 6 and 5 to a 4 per cent average, and at last credit and expenditure actually balanced one another. It can hardly be denied that these measures, and these measures alone, saved the State from bankruptcy, and that this inestimable boon was due to Joseph more than to any one else. It was not his only service. Measures for the amelioration of the prisons, for the humanizing of the criminal code by removal of the more barbarous forms of torture, for the promotion of education, and for the abolition of serfdom in the Austrian lands, owed much, if not everything, to his eager advocacy.

Considering that many of Joseph's ideas

were wholly impracticable, owing to the doctrinaire precision of his mind and to his ruthless disregard for tradition and precedent, Kaunitz and Maria Theresa were right in resisting a considerable number of them. But such an opposition could hardly be maintained without bitterness against a young man as ardent and impetuous as Joseph, even though he was a most dutiful son. It was therefore with the view of diverting his attention from other matters that Maria Theresa placed the sole direction of the army in his hands (1765). The idea was ingenious but unfortunate, for no species of administration could have been more likely to encourage arbitrary and domineering tendencies in him. The study of military affairs strengthened him in the belief that peoples could be taught to move in a given direction as easily as regiments, that laws could be framed and executed with the precision of military commands, and that force availed against every species of opposition. His energy, combined with the skill of his friend Marshal Lascy, led, as we shall see, to many improvements in the personnel and the material of the army. As with the army, so with the State as a whole. Austria-Hungary, which had been mediaeval in 1740, was by no means modern in 1778, but she had advanced with great rapidity, her resources had been greatly developed, her administration, as com-

pared with previous periods, was at least relatively efficient, uniform, and centralized. She had neither the technical perfection nor the immense moral prestige of Prussia, but she was not so tied to old traditions nor so hampered and stereotyped by success; and the two countries, if not equal, were at least far more evenly balanced than at any previous time in Frederic's reign. It only remains, therefore, to inquire into the history of the years that followed 1763, to see how far the diplomatic situation favoured one or the other.

## 2. The Diplomatic Situation, 1763–77

In foreign policy Frederic had the great advantage of exercising undisputed sway, whilst the control of the external affairs of Austria-Hungary was shared among three persons. Maria Theresa was pious and honourable in all things, and her regard for international morality was often as much outraged by the suggestions of both Joseph and Kaunitz as her practical good sense was offended by the impetuous rashness of the Kaiser or the fantastic ingenuity of the minister. In the control of the internal affairs of Austria she managed to hold her own, and to dictate her policy to her two chief advisers, but in foreign policy the case was otherwise. The position of Joseph as head of the army and his rank as Emperor gave him

great advantages for influencing foreign policy, and when his views were supported by the vast diplomatic experience of Kaunitz, their union often carried the day against Maria Theresa. Frederic, on the other hand, treated his advisers as mere clerks, and was able to impart complete unity and decision both to the conception and execution of his designs.

The situation of Austria and Prussia after the Seven Years' War was, in each case, critical. Each had been abandoned by her ally; Austria by Russia, Prussia by England. These two defections determined the diplomatic situation of Central Europe for the next twenty years. Without an ally each of the German Powers was unsafe. Austria clung to France, who was pledged to her by treaty, and still a friend if a wavering and uncertain one. Russia under Czar Peter III. had actually deserted Austria, and entered into an offensive alliance with Prussia (1762). Catherine II., his murderess, widow and successor, had withdrawn from the Prussian alliance, but had remained neutral, and so enabled Frederic to close the war triumphantly, without the loss of an inch of Silesian territory. Events in Poland were, however, soon to force Catherine into closer relations with Prussia. On October 5, 1763, King Augustus III. of Poland died. As the Polish throne was elective, and as the Polish nobles were influenced by bribes and threats from outside,

there was the certainty of a disputed succession and the prospect of a long and bloody war. Catherine, fearing that the Franco-Austrian alliance would be hostile to her design of placing her own nominee on the Polish throne, turned to Frederic. A treaty was signed on April 11, 1764, between Frederic and the Czarina, which included an eight years' offensive and defensive alliance between the two Powers, and a regulation of the Polish Succession according to their wishes. The results were startling: Russian battalions promptly terrorised the Polish nobles, and on September 7, 1764, set Stanislas Poniatowski, Catherine's old lover and new servant, upon the throne of Poland. This move was made with the moral support of Frederic. So serious was the blow to Austrian prestige that Kaunitz would have advised Maria Theresa to declare war had not the internal condition of Austria imperatively forbidden any such design. Worse difficulties were to come: the Catholic reactionary Poles rebelled against their tolerant and apparently Russian King Stanislas. Catherine supported her lover with arms, and drove his opponents into Turkish territory. The remonstrances of the Russian Ambassador with the Grand Vizier as to the harbouring of these refugees produced his own imprisonment in the Seven Towers at Constantinople and a declaration of war upon the Sultan from the

Czarina. Thus the direct result of the Polish disturbances was a dangerous war between Catherine and Turkey. The prentice clumsiness which Russian and Turkish generals proceeded to show in the war amused that supreme military artist, King Frederic, as much as the diplomatic dangers distressed him. In 1769 Russia—after giant sacrifices of men and money—had conquered and occupied all Moldavia, and this alteration of the balance of power not only seriously disturbed Frederic, but almost compelled Austria to interfere. Under these circumstances, Austria and Prussia began to regard one another more favourably. Kaunitz revived a project—as old as 1766—for securing a meeting between King Frederic and Kaiser Joseph, and on August 25, 1769, their world-famous meeting took place at Neisse in Silesia. The meeting of the old hero of Prussia and the young hope of Austria, the soldierly familiarity with which Frederic treated Laudon the Austrian hero of the Seven Years' War, the ease with which Joseph waived his Imperial dignity to show his respect for the old King, all these details made the meeting of Neisse famous. But what seemed a world-event to contemporaries was in reality but a picturesque incident. Joseph wrote to his mother that the King was a genius but a rascal, and that he thought his ideas peaceful at the moment merely because he dared not venture upon war;

Frederic wrote to his Minister saying the Kaiser was full of energy and rashness, and a firebrand who would set Europe aflame when he had the power. The meeting had no result in drawing the two rulers closer together, but it frightened the Czarina, induced her to sign a new treaty with Frederic on October 23, 1769, and produced a Russo-Prussian Alliance which lasted until March 1780.

A second meeting between Frederic and Joseph at Neustadt (Moravia) at the Austrian manœuvres on September 30, 1770, had really more important results than that of Neisse. It was memorable because Kaunitz, who had not seen Frederic for a generation, clasped hands with the man who had so often baffled all his diplomatic finesse. Frederic spoke freely to Kaunitz of the dangers created by this "cursed Turkish War." Each agreed that the aggression of Russia formed a serious danger, and, while not abandoning their respective allies, each arranged to urge moderation on the Czarina. Prince Henry of Prussia went on a mission to Catherine at the end of 1770, and heard from her that she would insist on the Russian occupation, or at least on the complete independence, of Moldo-Wallachia. The news of this made Frederic write to his brother that he disapproved the terms, and was not going to support Russia in her aggression, in order finally "to be spitted like Polyphemus." The

Austrian trio were of the same opinion—but distrusted Frederic as much as Catherine.

The means by which this mutual distrust among the three Powers was removed, and the Turkish difficulty adjusted, were extraordinary. It was by the Partition of Poland.

The state of anarchy in Poland had already caused an Austrian corps of observation to be stationed on its borders, and Joseph without opposition from Stanislas had already carried out a delimitation of boundaries. He had included Zips in Austria, a district mainly German in speech, which had hitherto been regarded as Polish territory. It had been pledged to Poland by Sigismund, King of Hungary, in 1412, and the Hungarian Diet had declared in favour of its re-incorporation in Hungarian territory on many occasions and last of all in 1756. As Poland's claims to it were possibly disputable, King Stanislas not only allowed, but even requested Kaiser Joseph to annex Zips (May 1769). But it was ill making concessions to Kaiser Joseph, for he took the opportunity not only to occupy Zips, but to claim also Sandez, Neumarkt, and Csorsztyn, to march troops into them, and to surround them with boundary posts topped with Austrian eagles. Whatever may be thought of the occupation of Zips, it can hardly be denied that this other unjustifiable act of aggression gave the first direct sug-

gestion for immediate annexation on a larger scale. If Austria had already acquired by ells, why should not Frederic and Catherine by miles ?

To Frederic in 1771 the situation seems to have shaped itself as follows : " Russia occupies a large part of Turkish territory and threatens Poland, Austria holds a part of Polish territory and threatens yet more. Each appeals to me against the other, and at present I am in the situation of an arbiter, who possesses no equivalent of land to balance their proposed acquisitions." His remedy was ingenious and characteristic, and as early as February 1771 he was instructing Prince Henry to suggest to Catherine a partition of Polish territory among the three Powers. By such acquisitions each Power could deal fairly with the other, Russia could relinquish too extensive a spoliation of Turkey, Austria could increase her Polish gains, and Frederic himself be satisfied with that modest remnant, Polish West Prussia. He made it quite clear that Prussia could not allow Austrian expansion in Poland, or Russian expansion in Turkey, to proceed unchecked. He was prepared to resist them to the last extremity except upon these terms which he laid down. Catherine was unwilling to relinquish her hold either upon Poland or Turkey, but it was clear that persistence in her single-handed attempt to despoil the Poles meant war

with Prussia, while to rob the Turks meant war with Austria. It was only at the expense of Poland that Prussia, Austria, and Russia could alike gain accessions of power, and the only solution acceptable to all three parties, the sole way out of this maze of conflicting interests, was to guarantee the integrity of Turkey by securing the dismemberment of Poland.

Whatever may be thought of the morality of these transactions it was the policy of them alone that seems to have been considered by Frederic and Catherine. Neither do Kaunitz and Joseph appear to have troubled their consciences, for much as the latter loved justice to be done to peasants he cared nothing about it for princes. Still one obstacle remained in the way of these heartless intriguers, the conscience of Maria Theresa. Her old-world piety, her sense of honour and of international fair-dealing, were outraged by this shameless proposal to prevent the destruction of one independent state by proceeding to the dismemberment of another. But in truth her opposition was hopeless, Joseph's seizure of Zips and Neustadt—however insignificant in size as compared with the wholesale acquisitions proposed—had been the halloo which started the chase. It was useless to call off the hunters now that hounds were in cry and the quarry at view. Therefore with sighs and tears

and protestations, and with warnings of the penalties which awaited international perjurers, she gave way.

"She took though she wept," sneered Frederic. "She carved territory from Poland with one hand and used her handkerchief with the other," laughed the French ambassador at Vienna. This heartless ridicule of her motives and attitude shows how little old-fashioned virtue was impressive, or even intelligible, to the diplomatist of the day. The fact that England showed no indignation against the partition when once commercial advantages were secured to her, and that France made but a feeble remonstrance, proves the stagnation of international morality.

Hence arose the famous, or rather the infamous, Partition of Poland among Austria, Russia, and Prussia. On August 5, 1772, the treaty of partition among the three Powers was signed, and in September the project was revealed to the world. The historical claims, by which the three Powers masked their aggression and which were solemnly put forward in this document, have deceived no one except some historians of the nineteenth century. Even apart from the fact that, in advancing hereditary claims, they only adopted a typical eighteenth century device, the previous negotiations show that their case was entirely based on expediency. Apart from the injustice of

the original seizures, the portions were equitably adjusted, the balance was held with an equal hand. Frederic gained only an addition of 644 square geographical miles with 600,000 inhabitants, but the acquisition of West Prussia to him, by strengthening and knitting together his scattered dominions, was of immense strategic importance. Catherine acquired part of White Russia — 1975 square miles — with 1,800,000 inhabitants, the lion's share in acreage; Austria but 1400 square miles (including Zips), yet with a population of 3,000,000 inhabitants, and with control over the rich salt-mines of Wieliscka, whose vast extent and wealth still win admiration from the modern traveller. In short Prussia had the advantage in strength, Austria in wealth, Russia in quantity, and on these grounds Frederic, with amusing cynicism, appeared to regard the transaction as inaugurating a new era of international justice and good feeling. The honour, found among even less princely robbers, was at least present in the dealings of these rulers with one another. The worst accusation against them indeed is not that they dismembered Poland, but that they guaranteed to her the old anarchic constitution, and thus provided themselves with an excuse or opportunity for further dismemberment.

These transactions can only be incidentally noticed here, so that their bearing on the general situation may be seen. They had decisively

shown that the diplomatic cards were again being shuffled. Austria was no longer passive or pacific; the ardent Kaiser Joseph and the restless Kaunitz had obviously increased their influence over Maria Theresa, and had become the chief directors of Austrian policy. Russia was, for the time being, somewhat estranged from her ally Prussia; for Frederic had done much to cause the Polish partition and had thus checked the Russian absorption of Poland. For the next few years there was some revival of good feeling between the two German Powers, greatly to the benefit of Austria. Their union had already compelled Catherine to share her Polish spoils; it was now to force her to disgorge many of her Turkish ones. In 1771 Austria had concluded a convention with Turkey by which, in return for permission to occupy Little Wallachia and for commercial advantages, Austria had agreed to modify the Russian demands. In 1772 a united attempt by Austria and Prussia to summon a congress for the settlement of Eastern affairs resulted in failure, but at last in 1774, after a series of disastrous defeats, the Turks signed the Treaty of Kustchuk Kainardji under Austro-Prussian mediation. Along the Black Sea Russia gained largely at the expense of Turkey, but, in return for a species of protectorate over Orthodox Christians in the Turkish dominions, she withdrew from Moldo-Wallachia. This evacuation

was the point about which Joseph and Frederic cared most, for it was here that the balance of power was really most endangered. How little either regarded the Turk as such is shown by the fact that Joseph refused to withdraw from the Bukowina, the north-west part of Moldavia —on the specious plea that he had carried out the convention of 1771 by forcing Russia's evacuation of Moldo-Wallachia (1775). This military occupation of the Bukowina continued till 1786, when it was formally annexed to Austria. This addition to Austrian territory was not formally opposed by Frederic but was viewed by him with the greatest suspicion. Kaiser Joseph was ruling the other two "Kings" at Vienna, and the firebrand was already threatening Europe.

The questions of the East had for the moment been settled, Poland was helpless, Turkey quiescent, and Joseph and Kaunitz had adroitly used circumstances to filch territory from both. But Prussia and Russia were still allies, and now that the Polish and Turkish problems were adjusted for the moment Austria looked westwards. From 1775 onwards Joseph's attention was turned to Germany, where he again attempted to breathe life into the old and nerveless Imperial machinery, in order to further Austrian designs. But here again he failed as he had failed before, he set Catholic and Protestant states against one

another in the Chambers of the Diet, threatened to impose arbitrary decisions upon them, and frightened every one with his imperious ways and impetuous energy. No real advance and much genuine suspicion were inspired by these efforts. It was natural that, in the awakened strife between Catholic and Protestant states, Joseph should pay attention to Bavaria, the most powerful Catholic state in Germany after Austria itself. With the death of the Elector in December 1777 the whole prospect opened, and Joseph promptly occupied the south-east part of Bavaria with troops. From 1763 onwards Austrian policy had been marked by a good deal of aggression and thirst for territory, gratified first at the Polish expense and then at the Turkish. Frederic had balanced Austria's gain in Galicia by his gain in Prussian Poland, he had been unable or unwilling to check the acquisition of the Bukowina. Would he now suffer Germany to be partitioned like Poland or Turkey ?

# III

## BAVARIA BEFORE THE STORM
(1763–1777)

### 1. The Last Elector of Bavaria and his Rule

In the earlier part of the eighteenth century two different kinds of State and two opposed ideals of government were visible in Germany. One was Catholic, indolent, and agrarian, the other military, energetic, and Protestant. Progressive states like Prussia under Frederic William I. sacrificed everything to efficiency, dressed ambassadors and ministers in rags in order to put soldiers in uniform, and levelled everything as flat and as bare as the Potsdam parade-ground. Mediaeval states, like Austria under Charles VI., surrendered everything to indolence and dignity, wrung money from their peasants for the splendours of the Court, and dreamt only of "playing burst frog to the ox of Versailles." By the mid-eighteenth century Prussia and Austria had changed all this; Frederic had united the arts with arms, and

the Habsburgs had ceased to be mediaeval. In the lesser German States, however, fidelity to each respective type had been sternly maintained, the military efficiency of some was still great, the slumbers of others were still profound. In its mean ambitions and gigantic extravagance, in the pettiness of a policy which impoverished a whole people to build a capital of Dresden china, Saxony clung to a vanishing ideal. In this respect even Bavaria was not so representative; its capital at least felt a breath of the new age, if the country as a whole showed more of the mediaeval atmosphere than any other German State. In the sunny valleys the peasant ploughed his land, the forester shot his deer in the woodlands, the robber waylaid the traveller on the highways, the official pocketed his gains in the Chancery, just as in the immemorial past. There were mutterings of a storm, there was stirring and movement of uneasy limbs, but none the less an enchanted sleep seemed still to hang over prince, court, and people.

At this very moment (1776) the English Foreign Office demanded information as to the condition of Bavaria. Their request was answered by a report, dealing with the history, constitution, and resources of Bavaria, and presenting a picture which would read like a satire to any one unacquainted with the possibilities of government in the eighteenth

century.*[1] The constitution of Bavaria—the report declares—was mediaeval in type, and the ruler was in theory restrained by a parliament of three estates or orders. In fact a full meeting of the three estates had not been called since 1669, and, though a committee with representatives from each order met every year to supervise the administration, their duties were perfunctory and their protests frequently disregarded. The Elector might be a limited monarch in theory, but "the restraints on his power are at present to be traced only in the authors who have written concerning the Bavarian constitution." The Elector imposed taxes, legislated, and acted without limitation or restraint. He had a Cabinet Council of chief officials for great affairs of policy, but only consulted them when he wished; he directed the army with the advice of such councillors and officers as he chose to select, and was confronted with no body which could act as an effective check upon his will. Nowhere was power more absolute, nowhere were its results more disastrous. As to the army—which within the last century and a half had been made the terror of Christendom by one Duke and the scourge of Islam by another—it had become a laughing-stock. "I must own they (the

* *Memorial, S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 111, *sub fin.* The report is dated 1776 and unsigned, but based on excellent information and apparently written by Hugh Elliot (*vide S.P.F. Bavaria*, vol. 113, July 10, 1778, Eden to Suffolk).

Bavarian troops) are upon the worst footing of any I have seen in Germany," wrote Hugh Elliot.* The memorial gave further details, it put the standing army at some 9000 men on paper and at about 5000 in reality, the militia at a nominal figure of 60,000, of whom one-tenth only could be raised within a short space of time. The artillery was "ill-constructed and indifferently served," the troops were "in bad order," and while the establishment "is loaded with supernumerary officers of all denominations, there is not one name known to the rest of Europe who has distinguished himself in real service"; after which it was not very consoling to learn that the small-arms were numerous and in good order.† [2]

With regard to finance, of which the Elector had again complete control, the situation was very grave. Revenues were scarce, it was only pensions that were abundant. There could be little doubt that expenditure exceeded income, and that the Elector had mortgaged all the possessions he could alienate; there was a general feeling that he was "avaricious," and that the country was oppressed and "impoverished by the exactions of the Court." In

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 111, Ratisbon, April 1, 1776. Elliot to Suffolk, Private and Secret.

† These statements do not appear irreconcilable with the evidence from Bavarian sources. *Vide* F. Münnich, *Geschichte der Entwickelung der bairischen Armeen seit zwei Jahrhunderten*, München, 1863, pp. 79-115.

fact, the chief intelligence shown by the government's management of finance was in its refusal to produce its accounts. Certain figures had indeed been published, but these were illusory, for the Elector and his finance minister "are alone acquainted with the real amount, and" (quite intelligibly) "think their interest engaged to conceal it." At such hands commerce fared no better than finance, despite the fact that the soil and resources of Bavaria afforded exeellent opportunities for producing raw materials "were the wisdom of the government or the interest of the people equal to *any* commercial enterprise." So little had been done for internal manufactures that some of those which had been inaugurated had been abandoned; so unskilful was the management of the customs that they produced hardly any revenue.[3]

After these instances of governmental mismanagement, it may not be surprising to learn that the writer of the report considered the character of the ministers to be distinguished only by their situation; one was idle, another extravagant, a third of low birth, and a fourth, Kreittmayr, the Chaneellor, being remarkable for candour, integrity, and a mind enlarged by study, was (not unnaturally) disgusted with the rest of them. As for Max Joseph the Elector, he was reputed to be weak, unsteady, and avaricious, though the reporter adds discreetly: "Separated from the ordinary intercourse of

society, Princes are only seen through the medium of public transactions . . . certain it is that those who approach the Elector of Bavaria in his private moments will discover many accomplishments and more virtues." * His public conduct is thrown into a strong light by the following incident. "The inhabitants of a small town, called Osterhoven, situated near the banks of the Danube, have long exercised a right of pasturage upon an adjacent common of considerable extent. This spot, which is at present in a state of nature, was represented to the Elector as capable of improvement, and he ordered a division of it to be made among the people of the place. They complained both of the general hardship of the measure and of the particular injustice of the person entrusted with the execution of it—Count Bercheim, bailiff of the district—who, it was affirmed, had assigned the largest and most fertile portion of it to one of his own family. They even went so far as by open violence to impede the partition, and to throw down the fences that were attempted to be raised. Upon this, the Elector ordered a *Military Execution*, which was rigorously put in force. Last week a number of the sufferers came to

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 111, Elliot's *Unsigned Report on State of Bavaria*. Liston describes in a private letter an instance of how Elliot approached the Elector "in his private moments" and made him drunk with punch (Minto's *Memoir of Hugh Elliot*, p. 35).

Munich, with ropes about their necks, threw themselves upon their knees before the gates of the Palace, and implored, from the justice of the Elector, either the redress of their grievances or an immediate death. His Electoral Highness thought proper to dismiss them, with a promise to enquire into the state of the case, and *in the meantime has ordered matters to remain upon the old footing.*" *

Beside this grim picture we can place an enchanting one, for indolence in government was balanced by energy in pleasure. Hugh Elliot admitted that " in music and debauchery " at least the Court was " on a par with the rest of Europe." Nymphenburg, the summer palace of the Elector, was a miniature Versailles, a world of Watteau and Dresden china. There, driving through the woods by moonlight in phaetons, floating on the lake in gilded gondolas, or wandering through the frescoed galleries, the Elector and his gay court spent their time, Hugh Elliot the gayest and most scandalous of them all. In Munich the scene was equally bright, and there was the additional joy of a French opera and of card-parties at which huge

* *Vide S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 111, April 27, 1776, Munich, Liston to Eden. Italics my own. Even Liston was shocked by this action, and pointed out that the exertion of such a right by the Elector might involve all uncultivated lands in his domains, as the rights to them were only held by immemorial possession; the amount thus possibly involved was said to amount to nearly a fourth of the whole Electorate.

sums could be lost. Sometimes religion overwhelmed the Court, and the Electress, who so often led the revels at Nymphenburg, would direct the pieties of the capital. In company with her chief ladies, and attended by twelve poor girls of the town, she would lead a penitential procession (entitled with a certain irony the "Slaves of Virtue") and visit all the churches and chapels of Munich on foot. The fair pilgrims assumed white dresses like those of nuns, to show their pious simplicity, though some of them so far remembered the world as to wear rouge upon their cheeks. In such a court and company it was hard to be serious save in pleasure.[4]

To German historians the verdict of Elliot in 1776 may seem somewhat surprising, for the reign of Max Joseph (1745–77) is always regarded as the beginning of the age of enlightenment, and the ruler as one of the Philosophic Despots. To Elliot's pictures of an indolent and luxurious tyrant they have added another which shows him as a man of feeling heart. During the terrible famines of 1770–71 Max Joseph was sedulously kept in ignorance of the sufferings of the people by his Ministers. But one day as he drove from his palace gates, a crowd of wasted and famished wretches surrounded his carriage, shrieking for food. The kindly Max burst into tears: "Your children shall have bread," he exclaimed to the

crowd, and he kept his word. Two million gulden of his private fortune were spent in importing corn from Italy to relieve the sufferers, and two corrupt officials were sentenced to death.[5] This action, as well as the fact that he was the last Bavarian Wittelsbach, earned him the title of "Vater Max" and "Der Vielgeliebte" (Much-beloved). But history is a sharp inquisitor, and she cannot permit an amiable character or isolated examples of benevolence to excuse a ruler whose policy tended to be harsh, indolent, or corrupt.

Elliot's verdict on the ruler appears indeed in some senses to be too stern. No one could accuse Max Joseph of not loving pleasure, but he had some sense of restraint and economy in its pursuit, and never imitated the Oriental extravagance of a Saxon Augustus or a French Louis. Considerable efforts to reduce expenditure had been made, though unfortunately most of the retrenchment was at the expense of the army. Still most of the Court offices had been made honorary posts, and the general Court expenditure, as compared with that of other German states and previous Bavarian rulers, was moderate. The chief item open to criticism in Court expenditure was the pensions, which cost two hundred thousand florins a year. The largest part of this sum consisted of pensions granted to his very numerous bastards by Max

Joseph's father—the Emperor Charles VII. The pensions actually granted by Max Joseph himself were moderate, but the pension list as a whole was unjustifiably large, and it was much curtailed by Max Joseph's successor.[6] Any one who studies either the portraits or the policy of Max Joseph can see these characteristics at once in the mild, weak, pleasant face of the prince, or in the careless, well-intentioned disorder of his rule. Yet Max Joseph is not one of the apes of Versailles, he is entitled to a place among the enlightened despots, though he was less enlightened and more despotic than most of them. The beginning of his reign has perhaps justly been regarded by Bavarians as the dawn of a new day; its end and outcome, as pictured by Elliot, forms a rather tragic contrast. None the less real efforts and some progress had been made. During the years 1751–56 Max Joseph caused his Vice-Chancellor Kreittmayr to draw up a complete civil and criminal code upon the approved principles of the age.[7] Kreittmayr executed the project with applause, and Max Joseph took rank as the Bavarian Justinian. In imitation of the *Codex Fridericianus* this code was termed *Maximileanus*, and thus betrayed the source and origin of its inspiration. Max was not above taking a hint from the King of Prussia in other respects. Frederic once called Bavaria "a land fair as Paradise in-

habited by fiends," and the denizens of his Inferno were the Catholic clergy. Max Joseph did something to restrain the excessive power of Jesuits and priests in his land, and in the teeth of their opposition he founded his famous Electoral Academy of Sciences (1759).[8] He also did something to introduce a scientific spirit into education, and to improve the high schools and Universities, and in especial to benefit poor scholars. In 1771 he went further, and instituted a universal system of compulsory education.*[9] The funds necessary for so great a project were supplied by appropriations from the property of the Jesuits, who were dissolved as an Order in 1773. All these reforms were worthy of the highest praise, but they were sketches rather than realities, and their influence and effect were not apparent at once. Under happier auspices indeed the remembrance or the preservation of these ideals enabled them to be translated into reality, and in the earlier years of the nineteenth century Bavaria became a genuine centre of enlightenment. The liberality of the clergy had become equal to the learning of the scientists, and Munich derived equal lustre from her theology and her Academy. From this elevation Bavarians looked back and paid a too-generous homage to the memory of Max Joseph.

* It is rather amusing that Elliot should criticize Bavarian education as old-fashioned. In this particular respect Bavaria was exactly a century in advance of England.

In truth that ruler was happier in ideals than in achievements, and it is the latter which are criticized by contemporaries. Judged by any practical or material standard a contemporary might well think that Bavaria had not awakened, that she had only stirred in her sleep. In one respect Max Joseph indeed deserves his fame; the enlightened ruler who humanized the law and instituted a state-system of education at such a period, deserved well both of Bavaria and humanity. At the moment, indeed, the results of this policy were not apparent, for the fruits of education ripen slowly, though they bear a hundredfold at the last. Apart from education, the bitter verdict of Elliot had much truth, despite the good intentions and occasionally well-directed efforts of Max Joseph. In manufactures and state control of industry there was little practical improvement; among the people and in the government offices there was little diminution of corruption, of expense, or of misery. Perhaps one reason of the failure was the brutish ignorance and suspicion of the Bavarian peasants, and the obscurantist opposition of the clergy. But no far-reaching reforms were carried in any land at this time without serious opposition, and the blame of failure rests to some extent on Max Joseph. What really able and energetic ruler would have waited to be stirred into action by the horrors of a starving

multitude, or by the sight of wretches with ropes round their necks? What would not a stern practical Frederic, or an ardent Kaiser Joseph, afire for the betterment of his people, have effected in Bavaria? Ignorance of the people may be an excuse for despotism, but a tyrant, who lacks perseverance, destroys the justification of his power. It may, indeed, be pleaded that Max Joseph failed by attempting too much rather than too little, and that his very enlightenment proved his failure. Yet everywhere else the enlightened despot introduced energy into the administration and economy into the finances, and greatly strengthened the military forces of his state. Max Joseph did little to stir his sleepy and corrupt bureaucracy into action and, though he effected a slight improvement in the financial system, only did so by utterly destroying the military one. It is difficult to see how any prince of intelligence could have permitted his army to dwindle and to rot at a moment when he knew a disputed succession to be inevitable in a few years. A powerful or well-organized force would have given Bavaria some status and consideration in the eyes of Europe. Without this Bavaria could have no voice in settling her own affairs when the succession was disputed. At no time and in no state was a strong army more needed to preserve national independence and

dignity, and the failure to provide it actually lured on ambitious Powers to dismember the country. Judged by that iron test Max Joseph cannot be held to have deserved well of Bavaria.

A land so governed invited annexation; a prince, who ruled thus in the age of philosophic despots, deserved to lose his power. Premature attempts at enlightenment had not wholly failed, but for the moment served only to reveal the stagnation. Ideals may be stronger than armies, but as yet the soldiers were at hand and the ideals afar off; Bavaria seemed the very land for an ambitious neighbouring ruler to covet, or to browbeat, to threaten, to conquer or annex. Was not the rule of the ardent Kaiser Joseph—with his thousand schemes for freeing the serf, for developing commerce and industry—likely to be more merciful and more just than that of their Elector, amiable and enlightened though he was?

If the internal situation of Bavaria was bad, the external aspect of her affairs was infinitely worse. Indeed the fact that the English Foreign Office asked for a report and information as to the internal condition of Bavaria was, in itself, highly alarming. The England of that day had no commercial concern with a state which only received £3000 worth of her goods, and had no interest in her whatever from the abstract or antiquarian standpoint. English interest

was not excited by Bavaria herself, but because Bavaria's Elector was the last of his race, and because his territory was likely to be parted among the Powers on his death. On January 6, 1776, Hugh Elliot, perhaps the acutest English diplomatist then living, who had been sent to watch the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon (Regensburg), reported that it was the opinion of most members of the Diet as well as his own "that we are upon the eve of some great change in the political state of Germany." * The attempts of Joseph to revive and re-inspire the Empire had only shown its weaknesses, and the result of the Diet of 1776 had divided the different states more than ever. It had served to reveal Austria, at the head of one body of states, bitterly opposed to Prussia at the head of another, and each alike unchecked by the old traditions of law and order and respect for the Germanic body. Where law had lost its force, force would have its law. When the two powerful states were at variance it was time for the smaller ones to tremble, especially when the Bavarian Succession came up for settlement at the Germanic Diet. It seemed unlikely to English diplomats that this, or one or two other successions pending, would be settled peacefully at the Diet. Should no such arrangements be made "the Courts of Vienna

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 111, Elliot to Suffolk, January 6, 1776.

and Berlin will either prosecute their separate claims by the sword and involve Germany in war, or they will even extend the same system of partition into the Empire that proved so irresistible in Poland." * "It was of the utmost importance to Europe as well as to Germany to set bounds to the hardened ambition of a monarch grown old in the arts of conquest and acquisition, to check the aspirations of a young prince fired with ideas of military glory and aggrandisement." † But unfortunately no power existed that could impose these bounds on Frederic or Joseph, for England had her eyes on America, and France had her eyes on England. To the clear judgment of Elliot it was apparent therefore that the struggle in Germany must come soon, and must centre round Bavaria. "Nothing could better serve the purpose of extending, and at the same time uniting, the dominions of the House of Austria than its acquisition." The statesmen of Vienna—with Kaunitz at their head—were of no other opinion.

On military as well as political grounds Kaiser Joseph realized the unspeakable importance of Bavaria to Austria. In the wars of 1703–4 and of 1741–42 it was from Bavaria

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria,* vol. 111, *Memorial on the Diet of Ratisbon,* 1776. That the authorship of this report also is almost certainly Elliot's is proved by *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria,* vol. 113, July 10, 1778, Eden to Suffolk.

† *Ibid.*

that Vienna had been threatened; within the last seventy years it had been twice proved that a hostile Bavaria could endanger the very existence of the Austrian State. Yet the politics of Munich were so unstable that her friendship could not be trusted, least of all in the decade before 1778. Hence, if the danger from this side was to be averted, it could only be by annexation of Bavaria, or at any rate of a part sufficient to give strategic safety to Austria. Command of the lands round the Inn would allow Austria to control the Upper Danube; Passau would become the bridgehead, the Janiculum of Vienna, and a broad band of German territory would bind Bohemia to the Tyrol, thus increasing the Teutonic population of Austria. On every ground the annexation, or at least the partition, of Bavaria appeared to be a vital necessity to Kaiser Joseph.[10] The diplomatists of Europe had all realized the danger probable on the death of the now ageing Elector. As early as 1760 Kaunitz and Frederic had been glancing towards Bavaria. During 1776 English diplomatists were speculating on it, and drawing up lists of possible claimants, France and Prussia were watching, and every German Court was eagerly expectant for the first signs of the opening storm. Only the Court which was most affected seemed to be least disturbed. "Munich," wrote Hugh Elliot, "is perhaps the Court in Europe the

least acquainted with its own interests or the designs of others." *

Thus in the opinion of all statesmen, the horrors of a disputed succession were soon to hang over Bavaria, the stormy waters of diplomacy were soon to turn a sleepy hollow into a whirlpool, but the Court at Munich slumbered still. Even though its army and resources were contemptible, a wise and firm diplomacy and a knowledge of German politics might have given Bavaria a prominent position. But the Elector and his council could not be aroused from their lethargy to take any interest or active share in politics, even by Kaiser Joseph's attempts to revive the vitality of the Empire, by all his visitations and appeals, by his schemes and his threats. So little did the Elector and his council know of the laws of the Empire, that they imposed customs-duties in direct contravention of them (1763 and 1770). Then when the other German States protested, instead of allowing the matter to be settled at the Diet, the Bavarian Elector appealed directly to the Emperor for his arbitration, "a step which equally betrayed a want of resolution and of good policy." †

Kaiser Joseph decided against him and

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 112, April 3, 1776, Munich, Elliot to Suffolk.

† *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 112, Munich, April 14, 1777, Private, Eden to Suffolk; also vol. 111, *Memorial on the Diet of Ratisbon*, 1776, pp. 55.

ordered him to withdraw the new customs-dues. The Elector protested, shuffled, refused, but was finally frightened into submission by a show of force (1771). "It were to be wished," adds Eden sardonically, "that this was the only instance wherein the real solid interests and happiness of this country are sacrificed to the pride and pique of the moment." * Henceforth the Elector and his ministers distrusted Austria and pursued towards her a policy of mingled servility and duplicity, though without showing any more diplomatic wisdom than before. Even when contentions ran high at the Diet over Kaiser Joseph's reforms, when deputies from all Germany intrigued, fought, and baffled one another, Bavarian ministers took no active, intelligent part in the politics of the Diet, though it met on Bavarian soil. Their influence was used blindly upon the Austrian side without inquiry into the merits of the disputes and without exacting conditions of support.

The Elector himself, though accorded the rights of a sovereign prince, degraded himself to Austria "by making the Imperial Ambassador a visit and giving him the hand in his Palace, which certainly no crowned head in Europe would do." So reported Stormont on January 16, 1765; Elliot and Eden gave

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 112, Munich, April 14, Eden to Suffolk.

equally bad reports in 1776–77. Count Hartig, the Austrian Commissary in Munich, displayed an almost regal ostentation and magnificence, and dazzled the Elector and his Court. To the irreverent Elliot he appeared only as a "little decrepit man." However that was, Hartig spared no effort or entertainment to please the Bavarian nobles, employing spies and bribes without number to form an Austrian party among them. Austrian ideas had begun to enter Munich, Austrian nobles were encouraged to spend their money there. A Viennese merchant had improved the manufacture of saltpetre, Viennese bankers were ready to accommodate Elector or courtiers with loans, Austrian enterprise was evidently benefiting the country. More significant even than these efforts were the attentions bestowed by the Austrian dynasty upon Bavaria. The Emperor Joseph II. married Josepha the Elector's sister in 1764, and though she died in 1767 the Austrian influence was maintained. The fat and amiable Archduke Maximilian visited Munich in 1775, causing some scandal by promoting festivities in Lent and some amusement by the bourgeois decorum of his behaviour. Then in the spring of 1777 came Kaiser Joseph himself on one of his usual mysterious visits, wearing his plain black coat, bearing the pseudonym of Count Falkenstein, bringing a train of only twenty-eight persons, lodging as usual at the principal

inn, but so far condescending to etiquette as to dine every day with the Elector.* No doubt all that Joseph heard and saw tended to confirm him in his design to make Bavaria in name what it already appeared in fact—a province of Austria.

Austrian diplomacy certainly did not underrate the weakness and ignorance of Bavarian ministers, it understood that they were always amenable to threats or to bribes, but it had forgotten to consider one important factor—the Elector himself. His own personal pride had been cruelly wounded by the humiliations of 1771, and for that reason, as well as for family ones, he wished to hand down the whole of his territory unimpaired to his heir, Karl Theodor, the Elector Palatine. Therefore he hated Austria and, though afraid to show his resentment, he sought everywhere for allies against her. It was useless to turn to France, once a faithful friend; she was now an Austrian ally and took so little interest in Bavaria that she did not even always have a minister there. For a moment the Elector thought of turning to England, and—conscious that she was thinking of hiring German mercenaries to quell the American disturbances—sought out Hugh Elliot and offered him his ragged tatterdemalions for hire. The astute British representative, who

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 111, despatch of July 6, 1776. *Vide* also *Memorial, ibid.* vol. 112, Munich, Eden to Suffolk, April 6, 1777.

knew the worthlessness of the Bavarian troops, replied with polite ambiguity. "With a view to sound the Elector's connections with Austria and France I pretended surprise, and said that I had considered His Highness as too closely united with other Powers to have been at liberty to dispose of his troops without their concurrence." This subtlety roused His Highness effectually, induced him to declare his perfect liberty to dispose of his own troops as he would, and led him to speak "of the conduct of the Court of Vienna with great bitterness and enmity." His sister's (Josepha's) marriage with the Emperor had only served as a pretence for loading him (the Elector) with accumulated mortifications and indignities. "He particularly dwelt upon his certainty that the Emperor sought for an opportunity of extending the same system of *envahissement* into Germany which had been so successful in Poland. The Elector then added with great seriousness that what he said to me upon this occasion might convince his (British) Majesty of his confidence and trust in him, as the Court of Vienna would not fail to revenge itself of such language were it ever to transpire. The Elector concluded by strongly recommending to me not to mention to any of his ministers his having shown a desire to enter into subsidiary treaties with His Britannic Majesty; as he did not choose to be exposed to the *désagrément* of having it

known, without a prospect of reaping some advantage from it." *

Such was the hapless plight of the Elector, hating Austria, trusting no one around him, "in a Court so evidently sold to Austria and France that the Prince himself thought it proper to warn me against his own ministers." But, weak as the Elector may have been, it was an element of strength to him that he knew his own weakness and that of his ministers. Already, as a matter of fact, he had drawn up a will, leaving everything that he could leave to the Elector Palatine—his nearest legal heir. He at least had enough attachment to his nearest relative to wish to hand down his territories undivided, and so far as possible he made State-morality and treaty-obligation stand sentries for the due observance of his wishes. Having made his will he sought, and, as we have seen, vainly, to get allies who might possibly support it. During 1777 he was pushed hard by the Austrian Minister to make some arrangements for partitioning his territory, but he was able to procrastinate and delay till the end. This was not far off; on December 14, 1777, Eden the British resident reported a slight indisposition in the Elector—measles—

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 111, Ratisbon, April 1, 1776. Ratisbon—Elliot to Suffolk, private and secret. Elliot adds a P.S.: "I hope this letter will not appear in my official correspondence," of which, fortunately, no notice was taken. Part of this letter is printed in F. Kapp, *Der Soldaten-Handel Deutscher Fürsten nach Amerika* (*1775–83*), Berlin, 1864.

and "those of the most favourable sort" (that is, presumably native and German). But the physician had blundered, for it was not measles but smallpox; his remedies were inappropriate, and the Elector sank rapidly. On December 30 he said to his confessor, "I dreamt that I shall die to-night and it will be so. Good-bye, dear and beautiful Bavaria; beloved wife, farewell; dear subjects, farewell, I will pray for you the blessing of God."* These were the last words of this amiable Prince. Eden recorded bitterly, "It will not be too harsh a judgment to pronounce that the life of this prince has been sacrificed to the bigoted ignorance of his confidential physician, who would not at first allow his indisposition to be — what it really was—the smallpox; and who, even after being convinced of it, still refused to aid the efforts of his constitution by any assistance, of any kind—internal or external."† But more than the life of the Prince had been sacrificed. The untoward suddenness of his death imperilled the destiny of Bavaria and the future of Germany.

## 2. Claims and Counter-Claims to the Inheritance of Max Joseph

While Bavaria stands hushed at the death-bed of Max Joseph we may turn aside and

* Buchner, ix. 279.

† *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria,* vol. 112, Munich, December 30, 1777, Eden to Suffolk.

imitate the publicists and statesmen of Europe in considering the possible claims and claimants of the inheritance. Of these far the most important were Kaiser Joseph, who claimed portions of Bavaria both as Holy Roman Emperor and as Austrian heir, and Karl Theodor, Elector Palatine, who claimed the whole inheritance in virtue of hereditary right. Karl Theodor's claims were embarrassed by the pretensions of his nephew and heir, Charles Duke of Zweibrücken (Deux-Ponts). If he consented to abrogate a portion of his rights to other claimants, it by no means followed that Zweibrücken would do the same, and it is on the disputes between these two that a good deal of the Succession turns. Besides these principals, there were minor claimants to portions of the inheritance, the Elector of Saxony and the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, but these were not, in the real sense, important and need not for the moment detain us.

It needs no plunge into dusty folios nor turning of yellow parchments to decide on the merits of the claimants. One German historian has reckoned that 288 contemporary books were written on the subject at the time, since when the learned dissertations upon it have not been few.[11] It is, however, difficult to conceive any research less fruitful and more purely antiquarian in interest. The British records preserve two reports on the probable

claimants to the inheritance—each written by an acknowledged master of diplomacy.[12] Keith our Austrian and Elliot our Bavarian ambassador both drew up reports in 1776, before the actual claims were put forward, and their judgment on the whole question has therefore an unusual impartiality. It is worth noting that, though the insight of one of these men discovered the tract of territory that Kaiser Joseph was to claim, all his learning had not revealed to him the actual nature of the claim. That fact is no bad commentary on its intrinsic value.

Lower Bavaria was the chief territory claimed by Kaiser Joseph, and the claim first appears in the Treaty of Partition of January 3, 1778, concluded between representatives of Karl Theodor and Joseph, which will be described later. There it is stated that Austria claimed the districts round the Inn and a great part of Lower Bavaria, in virtue of the letter of investiture given by the Emperor Sigismund to Duke Albert V. of Austria in 1426.[13] Keith wrote acidly that such a claim was manifestly open to contestation, as in 1430 the Emperor gave a final decision, which divided the succession amongst the remaining branches of the Bavarian House to the exclusion of Albert. It was also singular that in the two "great wars of 1700 and 1740 when all Bavaria (for a time) was possessed by the Austrians no mention was made of such a Right." Subse-

quently it was discovered that Albert had actually made an Act of renunciation of his right in 1429. Even if this last Act was not a forgery, as the Austrians declared it to be, the original claim had lain dormant three hundred and fifty years. It was in any case singularly weak. Maria Theresa does not appear to have believed in it, and—irony of ironies—Frederic himself seems to have had a better claim, had he wished to urge it![14]

Elliot gives the best commentary on the whole tangle of genealogical confusion. "In this age the cabinets of the greater Powers dispose of the territories of the less without much previous negotiations." . . .* "In an age marked with the violence of military usurpation the future state of the Electorate is more likely to be decided by the Political arrangements of its powerful neighbours than by the legal sentences of a tribunal of Justice." † The real claims rested on the strength of Joseph's army and on Frederic's view of the necessities of the balance of power; the real tribunal was the battlefield.

None the less parchments and precedents were never without some effect in the eighteenth century; in 1772 Joseph and Frederic had called up historical ghosts from the records to justify

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 111, Elliot to Suffolk, April 3, 1776.

† *Ibid.* Memorial on Bavaria, 1776.

even the Polish Partition. When it concerned succession to a part of the Germanic Empire this process was much more necessary, and Austrian and Prussian publicists speedily marshalled their pale armies of precedents. For the further understanding of the negotiations the nature of these claims must be stated. Otto I. —the first Wittelsbach Duke of Bavaria—had acquired the Duchy in 1180; his grandson Otto II. likewise acquired the Electorate of the Palatinate by marriage. In 1329 these territories were divided among two branches of the family, by an arrangement known as the Treaty of Pavia. The elder or Rodolphine branch of the family (from which Karl Theodor was descended) took the Lower and Upper Palatinate with Sulzbach, the younger or Wilhelmine branch (from which Max Joseph was lineally descended) taking Upper Bavaria and Neuburg. Lower Bavaria is not mentioned specifically in the treaty, because it was inherited separately by the Emperor Lewis, who was the Wilhelmine representative in the Pavia Treaty. But by custom, usage, and the practice of agnation it appears to have become well understood that neither branch of the line could alienate their estates without consent of the other, and that the whole territories would, in the case of the extinction of either line, revert to the other.[15] One subsequent alteration had been made in these arrangements by

the consent of the Germanic Diet in 1623, and confirmed at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648—the Upper Palatinate had been transferred from the Elector Palatine to the Elector of Bavaria, but it had been specially provided that this province should revert to the Rodolphine line if the Wilhelmine line became extinguished. On these principles the claims of the Rodolphine Karl Theodor—Elector Palatine—to the Wilhelmine lands of Max Joseph are clear enough. By the Treaty of Pavia he was entitled to Upper Bavaria Neuburg, Sulzbach, and the Lower Palatinate, to the Upper Palatinate by the Treaty of Westphalia; Lower Bavaria he claimed by the doctrine of agnation. With regard to these dominions his rights seemed indisputable, the only one admitting of any question being his claim on Lower Bavaria. But with regard to other parts of the Bavarian dominions, not thus mentioned, the claims of Karl Theodor were much more dubious. Since 1329 there had been a large number of acquisitions and accretions made by the various Dukes of Bavaria at different times, of which the disposal had not been expressly regulated by law. Some of these acquisitions were Imperial Fiefs, which might fairly be held to escheat to the Emperor on the death of the last male heir of the Wilhelmine line; others were allodial properties which might be considered to descend to the nearest female relative.

The heiress to these allodial properties was the Dowager Duchess of Saxony, who had made over her rights to her son, the Saxon Elector. They were not, however, very numerous or important, and from the very beginning it was thought that this claim might be settled by monetary compensation and small concessions. The question of the Imperial Fiefs was a different and more serious one. By custom all feudal questions of this kind came before the Aulic Council, but the Aulic Council could be controlled by the Emperor, and Kaiser Joseph was likely to give decisions on the questions of the Imperial Fiefs in a purely Austrian sense and interest.* The question as to what were Imperial Fiefs might be applied to various towns and districts, such as Mindelheim, once the principality of the great Duke of Marlborough, some fiefs in the Upper Palatinate, and the like. But the whole question of the lordship over these fiefs, and their acquisition by Kaiser Joseph would not be of great importance. The real point was whether he could advance any title to Lower Bavaria.

Max Joseph was determined to put Austria legally in the wrong on all points. Even if he could not hand down his possessions unimpaired to Karl Theodor, he could at least give him the best moral claim to them. In 1766

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria,* vol. 111, Anonymous Report (Elliot).

Max Joseph had concluded a secret family compact with the Elector Palatine, reaffirming the union of Wilhelmine and Rodolphine possessions on his death. In 1769 he drew up a formal and definite will on the same basis, which was known only to a few Bavarian ministers and to Karl Theodor and one of his Palatine councillors.[16] In 1771 and 1774 Max Joseph concluded fresh compacts on the same basis, and renewed the old treaties. To strengthen these bonds Karl Theodor made an agreement with Charles Duke of Zweibrücken, his own nephew and heir, on August 5, 1777, each party agreeing to do nothing with regard to the succession without the consent of the other. Just at this moment Zweibrücken informed Max Joseph that Karl Theodor was negotiating secretly with Austria. The news caused the greatest agitation to Max Joseph, and he was looking everywhere for support against the hated Austrian and the treacherous Elector Palatine, when death overcame him.

By the death of Max Joseph, Zweibrücken, the next heir after Karl Theodor, was left deserted, and it appeared that his future possessions might now be dismembered. Such a project he was resolved to resist, and he looked around everywhere for support. The day after Max Joseph's death the Duchess of Zweibrücken, who was residing at Munich in the absence of her husband, received a visit

JOSEPH

# IV

## THE STORM BURSTS

*Allein ein Pergament, beschrieben und beprägt,*
*Ist ein Gespenst, vor dem sich alle scheuen.*

GOETHE.

*(Nathless—a will bescribbled and close-sealed*
*A phantom is from which all shrink in terror.)*

THE death of a sovereign always produces an excitement quite unequal to the importance of the event itself. That of Max Joseph, since he was the last of his race and had left a succession in the highest degree uncertain, caused a confusion and amazement that were indescribable. Crowds thronged the churches and wept in the streets of Munich fearing for the future and bewailing their lost Prince. Some hours after his death the Bavarian ministers assembled to take counsel together. Rumours had already begun to fly, but to the Austrian party among the ministers, at any rate, the reality was to be more surprising than any conjecture. To the universal amazement Count Seinsheim and the Chancellor produced the will of 1769, of whose existence scarcely any one had known. Hardly had the councillors recovered from their surprise at the existence of

the will, when they perceived that a codicil on the exterior forbade it to be opened until the arrival of the Elector Palatine. For the moment all were astonished and embarrassed. Suddenly the Palatine-Resident at Munich (who was in the secret) appeared before the Bavarian ministers and produced orders signed by their dead and by his living master. These required the ministers to proceed immediately to the proclamation of Karl Theodor, and to exact the oath of allegiance from the civil and military. The Austrian intriguers were baffled, and the Elector Palatine was exultantly proclaimed successor to the whole Bavarian inheritance.[1] For the moment the stroke had succeeded. Max Joseph had been more powerful in his death than his life, and his nearest relative was legally and formally installed in his full possessions. But unfortunately legal and moral claims in the eighteenth century were not always the strongest of titles. The shadow of Austria already darkened the future. No one doubted that Kaiser Joseph would send his Whitecoats into Bavaria, all that they wondered was when and how he would do it. So from the first of January 1778 onwards there was breathless expectation in Munich. Court and beerhouse alike buzzed with incredible rumours, couriers rode hourly through the streets with messages, and sentinels watched anxiously from the walls of Braunau and Straubing for the

first glimmer of steel upon Austrian bayonets over the border.

## 1. Kaiser Joseph

*By whose proud side the ugly Furies run*
*Hearkening when he shall bid them plague the world.*
Marlowe, *Tamburlaine.*

Great as may have been the anxiety, hope, and bewilderment at Munich, it was hardly less at Vienna. "The first accounts arrived on Thursday, during the drawing-room of New Year's Day." The whole nobility was present and "the Court at Galla" (*sic*). Kaiser Joseph was suddenly accosted by an attendant and left the room. Returning in a few moments, he went straight up to the table at which Maria Theresa was playing, leant over and whispered in her ear that Max Joseph was dead. "She instantly let fall the cards, and rising up with evident marks of emotion, quitted the apartment. The painful impression made on Maria Theresa was visible to everybody." Merriment ceased abruptly to be succeeded by "fermentation," and since then a "thousand various conjectures have furnished occupation to the politicians of this capital." * It was not till the next morning that the astonished

* *S.P.F. Germany, Europe*, vol. 220, January 3, 1778, Vienna, Sir R. M. Keith to Earl of Suffolk; Wraxall, *Court of Berlin*, etc., 1799, vol. i., pp. 306-7. Both were present and I mingle their impressions of the moment. The incident is alluded to in F. v. Raumer, *Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1839, Bd. v. pp. 301-6.

courtiers learnt the cause of Maria Theresa's agitation. Clever Murray Keith, the English Ambassador, at once sought counsel with the Saxon minister, whose master had some minor claims on the inheritance. But he had to confess himself baffled in this as in other directions; he could see couriers riding post-haste, troops drilling, he could hear abundant rumours at every street corner, but for the space of almost three weeks he found no real information from diplomatic sources. "Upon this (as well as upon some former occasions)" Prince Kaunitz threw an "unsurmountable bar in the way of all ministerial curiosity by refusing to give any answers to questions put to him, without express orders (from above) and (with still more discretion) by never admitting the word Bavaria in his public conversation." * At last, however, on January 20, the Austrian Chancellor sent a communication to Keith, revealing the course of events that had occurred at Munich.

The news was even more surprising than could have been imagined. The death of Max Joseph, though unfortunate and unexpected in its suddenness, was an event for which Austrian statesmen had been preparing. Kaiser Joseph and Kaunitz had long been determined to seize part of Bavaria by one

* *S.P.F. German Empire*, vol. 220, Vienna, January 19, 1778, Keith to Suffolk.

means or another, they had realized the obstinacy of the late Elector, and were already communicating with his future successor the Elector Palatine. Karl Theodor was a weak and spiritless man, without enthusiasm for the Bavarian land or people whom he was in future to govern. His own real anxiety, though natural, was not entirely creditable; he wished to leave ample provision after his death for his numerous illegitimate children. On this weakness Austrian statesmen could work, and, in return for the cession of a large part of Bavaria, they were willing to guarantee large sums to support Karl Theodor's natural family. It is difficult to see how even eighteenth century ethics could justify a transaction, which sacrificed a large territory and the interests of thousands of Bavarians to bastards born in the Palatinate. An arrangement, by which one ruler bargained for territory and another for bastards, is, in fact, the *reductio ad absurdum* of the principle of personal rule in the eighteenth century. None the less a treaty in this sense was being negotiated at Vienna during the winter of 1777 between Prince Kaunitz and Ritter, the Plenipotentiary of the Palatinate Elector. Now it was suddenly and most unfortunately interrupted by Max Joseph's death. Well might Maria Theresa look grave at the news, and Kaunitz decline to mention the word Bavaria in public.

Kaiser Joseph thought at first that the whole fruits of weary months of diplomacy would be lost. It seemed that the Elector Palatine had been deluding them, for in Max Joseph's will, to the signature of which he had been privy, Karl Theodor was assigned the undivided Bavarian dominions. By his proclamation and by his solemn acceptance of the will, Karl Theodor had secured the moral advantage; if he was to be made to acquiesce in the scheme of partition, there was no time to be lost. As it happened a treaty on these lines had already been drafted by the plenipotentiaries in Vienna.[2] Accordingly on January 3, 1778, the day after the Elector's arrival at Munich, Ritter, his plenipotentiary, signed at Vienna a treaty of Partition with Kaunitz, a treaty subsequently ratified by Karl Theodor on January 14 at Munich. By the terms of the treaty the Emperor Joseph and Maria Theresa recognized Karl Theodor's succession to Bavaria but at a terrible loss to that ruler. He was forced to agree that the lands granted to Albert V. of Austria in 1426 should come into the possession of the Austrian House. These included nearly all Lower Bavaria and Straubingen. With regard to territories involving the rights of the Imperial or Bohemian crown, such as Mindelheim and certain other small fiefs and territories, Karl Theodor agreed to submit to the Emperor's judgment in the

matter. This last concession was damaging enough, because it opened the door for adjustment and exchanges of territory in the Austrian interest. But in regard to Lower Bavaria and Straubingen the Austrian gains were even greater. Rather more than one-third of Bavaria fell to Austria, and the value of this concession far exceeded its actual size. The new acquisition not only rendered Vienna safe from attack in the future but gave a strategically defensible frontier to Austria. It was also the most valuable and fertile part of Bavaria—there were situated the rich salt mines of Reichenhall, there was grown the corn that fed most of the land. The arrangement rendered Bavaria entirely subservient to Kaiser Joseph, alike in a strategic, political, and economic sense.

Rumours as to this treaty had already been busy in Vienna even as early as January 6. These were confirmed by Kaunitz to Keith upon the 20th, though he only informed him that an amicable treaty involving cession of territory to Austria had been signed, without giving any precise details.[3] Meanwhile it was necessary to support paper by iron and to enforce treaties by the sword. On January 15, one detachment of Austrian troops advanced and occupied Straubing, thus holding the line of the Danube and the Inn, and threatening both Regensburg, the seat of the Imperial Diet, and Munich, the capital of Bavaria. Other

detachments occupied the Upper Palatinate, the Bavarian troops retiring in each case before them with protests but without firing. An Austrian manifesto was published to the effect that these troops were only occupying the territory until an amicable settlement could be adjusted. No one believed this manifesto, every one recognized that the unscrupulous readiness of Kaiser Joseph and Kaunitz had won the first point in the game. Despite Max Joseph's will Karl Theodor had been forced into a scheme of partition, which not only violated all his own professions but which realized all Austria's hopes. In addition Austrian troops were already in possession of important strategic points in Bavarian territory. The Austrian troops occupied a part of Lower Bavaria, the granary of the whole country, in which were situated the estates of many of the prominent Bavarian nobles and ministers. Hence by the threat of forbidding the export of corn, or of ravaging the territory he held, Kaiser Joseph could put pressure alike on the people and on the Court at Munich. Time and circumstance, everything indeed except one man, seemed to favour Kaiser Joseph.

For the moment even Kaiser Joseph's thirst for territorial aggrandizement was satisfied, and he boasted that he had seized an opportunity which might occur but once in a hundred years. Acting with the agreement of Kaunitz

he had overborne the womanly fears of Maria Theresa and the womanish cowardice of Karl Theodor. The strong hand seemed to have prevailed, for Karl Theodor (who had at first demurred to the Partition-Treaty) yielded to threats and ratified the Treaty with reluctance on January 14. This news made even Maria Theresa forget her fears and write to Kaunitz that the result was due to him. Europe will have to confess that "I possess its greatest statesman." On January 26 Joseph was writing to his brother Leopold, Duke of Tuscany: "Our decision was a good one, and will bring as much solid advantage to us as honour and renown." The Grand Duke, surveying the diplomatic world from his little duchy with calm, wise eyes, may well have smiled to read the Kaiser's thoughtless paean.

We may anticipate events a little on the Austrian side to show the diplomatic situation with more clearness, and to explain the jubilance of Joseph. The point of most importance to the Kaiser was to make allies or friends of Karl Theodor, of the Saxon Elector, of the French King, and the Russian Czarina. The Elector of Saxony was indeed a claimant to part of the Bavarian inheritance, but Joseph expected to win him over to the Austrian interest. With regard to the two great Powers he was hopeful. Russia—Frederic's ally—had just received an ultimatum from Turkey and

was therefore incapable of active or immediate interference. The situation of France—his own ally—convinced Joseph that he had taken the chance of a century. On January 29 he writes to Leopold, his brother, in Tuscany: "France has not yet declared herself quite clearly; but even if she is really angry I do not see what she can say or do, as she finds herself on the eve of a war with England. The King of Prussia has still said no word; he is very much distressed and knocks at every door to find some one to make common cause with him; but when he finds himself universally repelled he will have to suffer alone, as he will not dare to go forward by himself. So, unless I am mistaken, this matter, to every one's astonishment, will be settled very peacefully." It was not the world that was to be astonished, nor the Kaiser who was to be right.

France had been made the ally of Austria by Kaunitz, and, as the pledge of that alliance, Marie Antoinette, daughter of Maria Theresa, had become Queen of France. But Louis XVI. was not yet the slave of his Austrian wife, and his devotion to purely French interests was strengthened by his foreign minister Vergennes, the last considerable statesman of the old regime. Dynastic considerations weighed little with one who had seen and feared the ambitions of Joseph, and who had long ago expressed the view that it was to the interests of France that

Germany should be kept tranquil by maintaining an even balance between Austria and Prussia. These considerations of Vergennes were strengthened by recent events, especially the paramount one that France was about to declare war with England. Further, he had recent grievances against Austria, who had revealed very little to France of her negotiations with Karl Theodor in 1777. About the destinies of the Palatinate France was naturally sensitive, and the secrecy of the Austrian intrigues had excited in her a natural suspicion. France had her own intrigues with Zweibrücken, and nothing that she heard from him was favourable to Austria.[4]

In a moment of generosity Kaunitz had once declared that one ally ought not to receive an accession of power or territory without equivalent compensation to the other. Yet on January 8, 1778, when he announced the substance of the Partition-Treaty to Breteuil, the French ambassador at Vienna, Kaunitz said nothing of benefits to France. These actions were not likely to remove the deep-rooted antipathy and suspicion of Vergennes.

To explain a dubious transaction, to atone for a want of frankness, to persuade an ally against his best interests, were tasks to baffle even "Europe's greatest statesman." Is it wonderful that Kaunitz did not succeed, especially as Kaiser Joseph was pushing him on at

every step with thoughtless cagerness? The cold and practical Vergennes was impervious to blandishment; he received the Austrian statements with courtesy but refused to declare himself further. Finally he was stirred into action by the circular issued by Austria on January 20, declaring her intentions as regards Bavaria, and by her verbal explanations that these met with the goodwill of her ally. On February 2 Vergennes drew up a memorandum for circulation to the Powers, in which he explicitly denied that France had any share in supporting the Austrian pretensions to Bavaria. Joseph then played his trump card and tried to deflect French policy by the influence of his sister Marie Antoinette. The tears of a beautiful woman might effect what the Kaiser and Kaunitz had sought for in vain. On February 14 Marie Antoinette sought out her husband at Versailles, and begged his aid. "I beg you," said she, "to put an end to the unrest in Europe." To her amazement Louis answered coldly and sternly, that the unrest of Europe was due chiefly to her relatives, and that at this very moment France was about to inform the continental courts that she disapproved of the Partition of Bavaria, which had taken place against her wishes. On February 26, just one month after his paean, Kaiser Joseph wrote again to Leopold that affairs had an ill outlook on all sides, that nearly all hope of

peace had vanished, and that courage was needed to meet the crisis.

By February 20 Vergennes had practically won over his royal master to declare France neutral in the Bavarian dispute.[5] This decision was all the more necessary as war with England had already been decided on, and as its actual outbreak may be dated from March 13. It was more necessary than ever to encourage Frederic to resist Austria, and to secure an even balance in Germany. French negotiations with the King of Prussia had already been initiated, but Vergennes did not mean to risk anything or to allow Frederic to improve the occasion. On March 10 he informed the Prussian ambassador at Paris that France intended to be neutral in the Bavarian question, but that, while friendly to Frederic, she positively declined any close or separate alliance with him.

Of this Joseph and Kaunitz knew as yet nothing, but their ambitions actually grew while their hopes of peace were lessening. Not only were they about to ask France to give them active assistance in case of war with Prussia, but were going to ask her consent to a new and very ambitious project of exchange. By this arrangement Karl Theodor was to hand over all the rest of Bavaria to Joseph, and to obtain the Austrian Netherlands in exchange.[6] These proceedings were sharply checked. Kaunitz got very little encouragement for

his schemes from Breteuil, the French Ambassador at Vienna; so he renewed direct representations to Louis, demanding the assistance of 24,000 French troops in accordance with the Treaty of 1756, and requesting France to sanction the new exchange-project. The answer was slow in coming and Vienna was excited. Maria Theresa was already writing piteous letters to her son Joseph, the Kaiser was ordering out the reserves, drilling troops, and sleeping already in his camp-bed. Slumber forsook him at nights, but he carried a bold face by day. "I run no danger," said he, "if it be my misfortune to undergo a defeat, that has always come at the hands of the hero of this century, but if I have success it will be so much the more glorious for me." Kaunitz naturally grew anxious, and pressed hard for a definite reply to his French overtures. On March 22 at Vienna, when Breteuil hinted pretty plainly to him that France would be neutral, the "greatest statesman of Europe" grew warm, refused to take any such assurance save in writing, and parted from Breteuil in wrath. The polite Kaunitz might well show passion when the Franco-Austrian Alliance, that masterpiece of his diplomacy, was dissolving under his very eyes. On March 24 Mercy at last brought Vergennes to explanations at Versailles, and learnt that France declined to recognize an obligation under the 1756 Treaty, and not

only refused active assistance to Austria in case of war, but declared her intention of observing a strict and inflexible neutrality. This decision was a great blow both to Kaunitz and to Kaiser Joseph. It not only made the grandiose project of exchanging all Bavaria for Belgium impossible at the moment; it rendered the Partition-Treaty and the hold on Lower Bavaria precarious in the future. The fairest part of the dream had then vanished; Maria Theresa was wringing her hands, "Europe's greatest statesman" was sitting mournfully among the ruins of his famous alliance, and the Kaiser, tossing at nights on his camp-bed, was indulging a last desperate hope that Frederic might not take the field in person.

## 2. King Frederic

*Who treadeth Fortune underneath his feet*
*And makes the mighty God of Arms his slave.*
Marlowe, *Tamburlaine.*

The eyes of Europe, which had been fixed upon Munich in the last fortnight of the Old Year, upon Vienna in the first fortnight of the New Year, turned towards Berlin at the end of January 1778. Unless Frederic moved, Kaiser Joseph's bid for Lower Bavaria had succeeded, and for nearly a month all Europe waited in breathless expectation for the decision of the grim Prussian King. Hugh Elliot was now British Ambassador at Berlin, and it is from

his despatches that we gather the breathless suspense that prevailed from day to day, how every look, word, or gesture of the old King was noted, how rumour outdid rumour in extravagance, and how all the while soldiers went on drilling on the Potsdam parade-ground. On January 17 Hugh Elliot reported Frederic "in high spirits, almost unnaturally so," and this was just after the Austrians had marched into Bavaria. Was it that the old hero was scenting battle, and that his spirit rose with danger? Hugh Elliot had a rather more prosaic explanation: "There are not wanting persons who ascribe this unusual appearance to the effect of the quantity of wine (!) mixed with too great a proportion of spice, which the King of Prussia takes as remedy for the gout." * In spite or because of the remedy Frederic had an attack of gout about this time, so serious that it was believed at one time to threaten his life. Again the fate of Bavaria depended not so much on physicians — for Frederic despised and often repulsed them—but on the health of a man of advanced age. Yet the danger passed, Frederic recovered and set his ministers examining the Austrian claims. So early as February 3 Hugh Elliot—from whom few diplomatic secrets were hid—judged it to be the intention of the King of Prussia "to

* *S.P.F. Prussia*, 102, Hugh Elliot to Suffolk, Berlin, January 17, 1778.

take the field in the Spring," though he could not decide whether Frederic meant to attack Austria, or merely "to seize on neighbouring territory as an equivalent."

By consummate diplomacy Hugh Elliot, the Ambassador of a Power to which Frederic cherished an undying hatred for abandoning him in 1762, managed to penetrate the designs of the old King and to advance the English interests. Frederic had been secretly urging France to support the rebellion against England in America, and William Lee, a diplomatic agent of the revolted Americans, was already in Berlin. No situation could well be more unfavourable to the new Ambassador, but Elliot characteristically turned to his advantage the moment of the Bavarian Elector's death, which made England's assistance important to Frederic in Germany. Having been coldly received, he applied for leave of absence, a request which brought him an immediate visit from Prince Henry (King Frederic's brother). The Prince paid him compliments, but let out the reason of them by expressing a fear that Elliot's request for absence was made with an intention not to return. Elliot pleaded the coldness of the King, but the Prince replied—"que j'agissois avec trop de vivacité." Elliot begged leave to substitute "sensibilité." Prince Henry tried to smooth matters over, saying the coldness was not personal but was due to

England's conduct in the last peace (1763). Elliot replied that this was long passed, and that he knew of these matters only from history. To the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, one of Frederic's favourites, he used even stronger language, saying the presence of a rebel agent (Lee) made "forbearance difficult," and so on.* Hugh Elliot's language was strong, but he knew his man; concession was useless to Frederic, who showed "ill humour" when it could be shown "with impunity," but was always impressed by courage. By the middle of February (12th) Frederic saw pretty clearly that France was not going to interfere on the Austrian side, and that the friendship of England was too important an asset in the Bavarian affair to be sacrificed. This fact and Hugh Elliot's bold front secured two important declarations from Frederic, first that he would have no more to do with the American rebels, second that, in case of war in Germany, he would respect the neutrality of Hanover.[7] Russia, being at the moment afraid of war with Turkey, was apparently

* *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 102, Berlin, February 22, 1778, Hugh Elliot to Suffolk. Hugh Elliot's "forbearance" had been shown shortly before this by breaking open the house of the said "rebel agent," stealing his papers and returning them only when the important ones had been copied under his direction. He repaid the "coldness" of Frederic by a well-known repartee. King Frederic: "Qui est ce Hyder Ali qui sait si bien arranger vos affaires aux Indes?" Hugh Elliot: "Sire, c'est un vieux despote qui a beaucoup pillé ses voisins, mais qui, Dieu merci, commence à radoter." *Vide* Minto's *Elliot*, p. 228.

going to stand aloof, so King Frederic and Kaiser Joseph were brought face to face.

The problem before Frederic was certainly not settled by research into musty parchments—that was the affair of his ministers; he decided by facts and Prussian interests, setting others to make out the case from history and precedent. To Frederic himself there were only two choices open: either Austria must be satisfied with far less important acquisitions than those she had attained, or she must share some of the spoil with Prussia by means of a partition. Poland's Partition cast a sinister shadow, and this last design was suggested by Elliot as the probable solution of the difficulty.[8] We cannot tell whether Frederic ever seriously considered it, but it is obvious that no Bavarian Partition could give to Prussia more than an isolated piece of territory, which it would be hard to defend. It would be impossible to acquire anything to act as a real balance to the increased strength of Austria, and this fact may have weighed with Frederic. The only alternative was for him to insist upon Austria renouncing all such claims to Bavarian territory as gave her any considerable advantage or accession of power. Now this last meant nothing else but war, and it was natural that Frederic should ponder its chances. His own advanced age, the possibility of defeat, and the dangers of war spreading over the Continent were all considerations

of importance, and explain why his brother Prince Henry vigorously counselled moderation. On the other hand, Frederic's prestige would suffer, he would obviously become the second power in Germany if Austria, which he had so humbled, was at last to be triumphant.

Whether or no Frederic was to go to war the immediate objects were clear to him; it was of great importance to turn the moral opinion of the Empire and of Europe against Kaiser Joseph, and it was an absolute necessity to cut him off from all possible allies in Germany. The first object was best secured by inducing Zweibrücken to repudiate the action of Karl Theodor, and to decline all agreement with the Partition-Treaty. In order to secure this Frederic sent off an envoy incognito and post-haste to assure Zweibrücken of Prussian support. The romantic history of that negotiation will be related elsewhere; it is sufficient here to describe its success. On February 8 the Prussian envoy knew that Zweibrücken would refuse to endorse the Partition-Treaty, and sent off a letter to Frederic to that effect. Ironically enough, the messenger who delivered it was one of the Bavarian "fiends" (*i.e.* a monk), a fact which caused the royal sceptic some amusement.[9]

It remained for Frederic to secure allies. Karl Theodor was hopeless—he was Joseph's, body and soul. Something, however, might

be done with Frederic Augustus, Elector of Saxony, the third most powerful of the Princes of Germany. Saxony was very near to Bavaria, and her Elector might well fear a similar fate from Kaiser Joseph in the future. But he stood in awe and suspicion of King Frederic as well. Dresden, with its noble river and splendid rococo palaces, had been the seat of a great civilization under Augustus's magnificent ancestor, who had there entertained Frederic when Crown-Prince of Prussia with more than Oriental profusion. In return Frederic had treated both the land and its inhabitants with merciless brutality during the Seven Years' War. He had bled and impoverished the people with his requisitions, had impressed the Saxon troops to serve in his army, brutally carried off Saxon women to people his Silesian colonies, and even kidnapped Saxon potters from Meissen and forced them to disclose the secrets of Dresden china to the factories of Potsdam.* Frederic Augustus had forgotten such unheard-of rigour in view of more recent wrongs and insults from Austria. In 1777 he had had a painful dispute with Austria over the Schönburg inheritance, which culminated in the Austrian troops forcibly expelling the Saxon ones from the lordships of Glauchau, Waldenburg and Lichten-

* It is characteristic that, while Frederic issued these commands from Dresden, he went every day to look at Raphael's "Madonna di San Sisto."

stein, and fencing in the disputed territory with eagle-topped boundary posts. Frederic Augustus could with some justice complain that the action was arrogant and high-handed.[10] He was naturally alarmed at Karl Theodor's Partition-Treaty, which referred all the disputed claims on the Bavarian Succession to the award of the Emperor. After Schönburg even a less suspicious man than Frederic Augustus might be forgiven for doubting whether the Emperor's judgment would be impartial or disinterested. His applications to Vienna were met with such dark and discouraging answers that he at once turned to Frederic.[11]

At Dresden the English *chargé* noted "the greatest consternation and very great confusion" throughout January. But even diplomatic dangers could not interrupt the revels of Dresden and its ruler. On February 25 we learn that "His Electoral Highness" was "indisposed with a violent cold occasioned (being very fond of dancing) by over-heating himself this carnaval." The same despatch shows that serious business had already begun: "A stranger arrived here last week from Leipzig, who it is assumed is incognito at the Prussian Minister's. It is certain from the time of that Gentleman's arrival the Prussian Minister has been locked up under the Pretence of being ill, and receives no one." Some said the mysterious stranger was Prince Henry of Prussia, but

in the end it turned out to be a Prussian general, who had been sent by Frederic to reconnoitre the ground between Dresden and Bohemia, and to give expert military advice to the Elector. This and other evidence led the English *chargé* to the correct conclusion: "In case of a rupture Saxony enters into a Treaty of Alliance with the King of Prussia. This is a matter of fact." * It was indeed; on March 14, the rupture seeming imminent, Frederic despatched an envoy with full powers, and on March 18 a Convention was signed between Prussia and Saxony, which pledged them to mutual support, and was equivalent to a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance.[12]

By the end of February Frederic had readily guessed that he could count on Saxony, that is on an army of 30,000 men, in case he went to war. He was, as he said, "no Don Quixote," to sacrifice himself for petty princes, whose troops consisted chiefly of the gentlemen of their ante-chambers. But the aid of the strongest army in Germany (after his own and the Austrian) made his task relatively simple. England, France and Russia stood aside; Saxony was his. It remained to see what he could make of the other German princes. Joseph had already frightened these gentry —he had treated the unfortunate Karl Theo-

* *S.P.F. Poland (Saxony)*, vol. 115, Dresden, February 25, March 8, June 21, 1778, J. Milliquet to W. Eden.

dor with offensive callousness, had not even troubled to observe the conditions of the Partition-Treaty with any strictness, and had allowed his troops to occupy parts of Bavaria not mentioned in that agreement.[13] Meanwhile, Zweibrücken, with the open favour of Frederic and the secret support of France, was trumpeting his grievances to the Diet of the Empire. An early communication from Frederic to Vienna protested against the occupation of Bavaria by Austrian troops. Later ones—the most important that which reached Kaunitz on March 9—disavowed the Partition-Treaty and pointed out the genealogical flaws in its provisions. Finally, on March 16 the substance of this letter was communicated to the Diet of the Empire at Regensburg. The representatives of Zweibrücken and the Saxon Elector supported the protest eagerly, and the other German princes learnt with undisguised pleasure that Frederic had taken his stand against the Kaiser in defence of the Liberty of Princes and the Rights of the Empire. Kaunitz replied by shelving (as well he might) the discussion of claims, and spoke of Austria's desire to satisfy every one, but refused to admit the King of Prussia as the " umpire of her claims." *

March 16 has been called a memorable day in the history of the Empire: it certainly had

* *S.P.F. Germany, Empire (Austria)*, vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, March 14, 1778.

the result of fixing the eyes of all Germany and of Europe upon Frederic. But for him, the laws of the Empire would have been defied, the wishes of German princelings disregarded, and the rule of Austria insolently enforced by the threat of an appeal to the sword. Once more Frederic appeared as holding the balance, once more he seemed the arbiter of Germany, but now he was more popular and powerful than ever; Saxony was at his side, Hanover was favourable though neutral, most Princes of the Empire saluted him as the guardian of legality and right. To Frederic the part he played must have seemed new and stimulating, for no one had done more than he in his young days to injure state morality and to break up the Germanic Empire. Just now, however, it was to his interest to appear disinterested, and his pose as the benign defender of law and order throughout the Empire was of the highest importance, in branding Austria as an aggressor and in teaching the other German States to regard Prussia as their natural leader. "The hasty conduct" of the Court of Vienna "must at the first view be extremely alarming. If claims of obsolete date are, in the first instance, to be decided by the Law of Arms, there can be no security for the weaker members of the Empire whose territories may unfortunately be situated in the neighbourhood of powerful Princes, and the Constitution

of the Empire will only exist in the Records of the Diet." *

Even to England Frederic now became a tolerable person. From 1762 till the beginning of 1778 the despatches of English ambassadors had frequently consisted of unbounded diatribes against the Prussian King, now they began to speak of his virtues, and the pious King George even exchanged compliments with him. If anything shows the moral advantage gained by Frederic more clearly than the approval of England it would be that of the Catholic Powers of Germany ("his fiends"). Eden records—with a certain unction indeed—that "Protestant Powers as usual" are "favourable to the cause of Justice and Liberty," and adds, "The Catholics are indeed favourable in the present case—though their dependence on the Court of Vienna prevents them declaring themselves openly." [14] This last consideration made Frederic dream of a League of German Princes, which should include Catholics and Protestants and should exclude Austria. In the first week of April he commanded his Ministers to consider such a project, and to form a League of Princes under Prussian headship. For one delirious moment a foreshadow-

* *S.P.F. German States* (*Bavaria*), vol. 113, St. James, Suffolk to Eden, April 7, 1778; Munich, Eden to Suffolk, April 30, 1778; *vide* also *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 102; Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, March 3, 1778; St. James, Suffolk to Elliot, April 7, 1778; Berlin, May 30, Elliot to Suffolk.

ing of Bismarck's Germany hovers faintly upon a far horizon. But the project was premature, Frederic was above all things practical, and, as Catholic Princes would not openly declare against Austria, he postponed these dreams till a time when they could have a better chance of realization. The reason lay, not in him, but in those other Princes, who were "all fear without energy," "the shame of the century," and who made him "blush" for Germany.*

For the rest the eulogies on his conduct amused no one more than the cynical old King. He had of course no objection to being worshipped by the minor Princes as a Don Quixote of legality, and he took pains to sustain that part in public, "Je ne préférerai pas mon intérêt personnel à celui de tout l'empire." † In private he let fall the mask and candidly confessed to his brother that in the whole affair he pushed the Prussian interest alone.

Though Frederic made his decision, and adhered to it subsequently with inflexible firmness, he did not make it easily, and he delayed pushing matters to a crisis as long as possible. Something in this tardiness may

* Frederic's expressions are from a letter to Prince Henry of March 3, Schöning, *Der Bayerische Erbfolgekrig*, p. 20; cp. Reimann, *Pr. Gesch.* ii. 78-79.

† Frederic to Sohms, Prussian Ambassador at Petrograd, March 24, 1778, Reimann, *Preuss. Gesch.* ii. 43; to Prince Henry, March 9, *ibid.* ii. 77.

perhaps be ascribed to conscious art, since he wished to appear forced into war, but something more to genuine reluctance, and to the approach of age, which had dulled even his fire. He set on his publicists, with his minister Hertzberg at their head, to produce the pamphlets, proclamations, and letters needed for the occasion, and a brisk paper campaign —in which official despatches stood for the heavy guns and pamphlets for the sharpshooters—preceded and did something to occasion the real war. Hertzberg was a fanatical Prussian, rash and impulsive, but also able and determined. He possessed considerable knowledge of genealogy and history, and in the main the pamphlet-literature, which he inspired, was superior in argument and weight to the Austrian. Kaiser Joseph took little means to conciliate Frederic or to divide his enemies by diplomacy. Violent pamphlets against the Prussian King were issued in Vienna, and it was known "that hardly a word on the Bavarian Succession went to Press in the Austrian Capital without being cautiously examined in the Chancery." *

After the storms of March came a lull during April; neither side was ready for war, both were making ample preparations for it. Prussian troops were pushing beyond

* *S.P.F. Germany, Empire*, vol. 220, Vienna, May 23, 1778, Keith to Suffolk.

Breslau to the border, Saxon troops were concentrating at Dresden, and Austrian soldiers were nearing the frontiers both of Silesia and Saxony. Every day Keith saw troops hurrying through Vienna—Croats, Hussars, Italians, Hungarians—accompanied by waggons containing vast stores of meat, corn, and ammunition. On April 11 Kaiser Joseph and his brother, Archduke Maximilian, left the capital and proceeded to Olmütz to direct operations for the coming war. The Kaiser was in the field, and on the 13th, writing as it were from the saddle, sent a letter in his own hand to Frederic, appealing to him to avoid war. If Frederic would recognize the Partition-Treaty of January 3, Austria would endeavour to compensate the other competitors and would recognize the succession of Frederic to the Margravates of Ansbach and Baireuth. The letter reached Frederic in camp at Schönwalde on the 14th, where he was surrounded by officers instead of by ministers. He answered shortly "as an old soldier," disavowing any desire for war, but declaring it impossible to accept the Kaiser's basis of negotiation. His own succession to Ansbach-Baireuth had nothing whatever to do with Bavaria or Austria, besides, as he added ironically, "our rights *here* are so unassailable that none can dispute them." To accept the Partition-Treaty was to acknowledge that the Kaiser was a despot

in the Empire, and Frederic was personally resolved to defend the Laws and Liberties of Germany. Joseph answered smartly on the 18th that the Partition-Treaty was a friendly arrangement, which he had concluded, not in his capacity as Kaiser, but as Elector of Bohemia and Archduke of Austria. This kind of personal dispute between royalties was hardly dignified and, after a third letter and answer, plenipotentiaries on each side took up the negotiation. It is hardly worth while to detail their course, because neither Joseph nor Frederic seems to have entertained any real hope of their success. Each of the principals seems to have intended them as a means of deluding his opponent until the time for action was ready. Only the influence of Prince Henry of Prussia on the one hand and the agonized anxiety of Maria Theresa on the other prolonged the make-believe for two months. For a moment, indeed, there was a hope, as Kaunitz was willing that Frederic should receive Lusatia in exchange for Ansbach-Baireuth if he would recognize Austria's claim on Lower Bavaria. Frederic saw the value of Lusatia, which would knit his dominions together in much the same way as Lower Bavaria would unite the Austrian. But he kept his head cool and was statesman enough to realize that he must not throw away his newly found asset as guardian of law and morality. He had already been negotiating

on this very matter, and had made it clear that he would only agree to this arrangement if the Saxon Elector gave a free consent; Hertzberg soon convinced Frederic that this was wholly out of the question, and so the project dropped and with it all chances of real accommodation (May 24).[15]

The English watchers at Berlin, Vienna, Dresden, and Munich had decided that peace was already hopeless by the end of May. But war had been averted so long that hopes still lingered throughout June. Even on the 22nd Joseph was writing to Kaunitz that a firm front might still carry the day.[16] But negotiation was really impossible, for Frederic never swerved from the terms of his first letter to Joseph. On June 27 Frederic in his camp at Schönwalde received a final despatch from Kaunitz and resolved on war. On the same day the learned and masculine but over-conscientious Hertzberg sent Frederic a last new plan of ingenious paper-exchanges and genealogical calculations. This plan he begged Frederic to study before he "crossed the Rubicon." But the die was already cast, and the old King was not merciful to his *Monsieur de la timide politique.* He returned Hertzberg's communication with the following endorsement: "*Allez vous promenér* (*sic*) *avec vos Indignes plans, vous etes* (*sic*) *fait pour estre* (*sic*), *le Ministre de gens coujons comme l'Electeur de Baviere, mais non*

LAUDON.

# V

## THE PLUM AND POTATO WAR *

*O selig der, dem er im Siegesglanze*
*Die blut'gen Lorbeern um die Schlafe windet.'*—GOETHE.

*Happy the man in victory's golden moment*
*When Death with bloody laurels binds his brow.*

IN the war which now began the outlook for Austria was not so gloomy as was imagined by many, and especially by Maria Theresa, whose heart was sad because she had sent three sons to the front. In military resources the two Powers were not very unequal, though the Prussian army had also the Saxon one to back it. In all the details of military equipment, transport, commissariat, and drill, the energy of Joseph and the organizing skill of Lascy had produced a real revolution in the Austrian army. Already in the Seven Years' War there had been evidence of more science, more skill, and more thought, and this change had been carried much further during the years 1763–78. There had been revolutions in every direction,

* The best modern maps of the ground are the *Karte des Deutschen Reiches*, Bureau des Königl. Sächs. Generalstabes, 1880, sheets 444-7. There is a very fine old map, *Carte chorographique et militaire de la partie de la Saxe et de la Bohème où sont entrées les Armées combinées . . . aux Ordres de S.A. Prince Henri de Prusse en* 1778, which marks the positions of Prince Henry's army throughout the campaign.

improvements or changes in everything, great and small. The erection of studs for producing cavalry chargers, of schools for educating soldiers' children, of hospitals for invalids and veterans, of military academies for training young officers, all attested the diverse activities of the new military reformers. The troops had been constantly exercised on parade and in manœuvres, fortresses had been remodelled or rebuilt, magazines formed, vast quantities of food and ammunition collected, while Kaiser Joseph had been indefatigable and ubiquitous, inspecting barracks, paying surprise-visits to distant garrisons, and endeavouring to infuse energy and vigour everywhere. Defects there undoubtedly were, some of the reforms were too hasty or ill-considered, others failed owing to the corruption always latent in the Austrian bureaucracy, or to the nepotism prevalent among its aristocracy.[1] Hereditary custom placed most of the high commands in the hands of nobles, to whom war was not a profession but a superior kind of sport, and this privilege of paying the tax of blood was one of which even Joseph dared not entirely deprive them. But when a soldier of fortune like Laudon could rise to high eminence, and when princes like Liechtenstein and de Ligne could reach a high degree of professional skill, the practice was not as harmful as at first sight might appear. Any ill effects were further

counteracted by the fact that Austria now for the first time really possessed a well-organized general staff, whose efficiency was to be proved both in this and in subsequent wars. In the lower ranks of command there were many Austrian veterans of distinction, and their training, even if unequal to the Prussian, was not such as to deprive them entirely of initiative and resource. On the other hand, Frederic's chief generals were dead, and their successors, like his more subordinate officers, had been trained to a perfectly mechanical rigidity and precision. What had always been a serious fault with Frederic had now become almost a mania. Under such circumstances the Prussian officer's superiority in technical skill might well be balanced by the greater sense of independence which the Austrian officer possessed.

The Austrian army showed a better spirit, organization, and training than at any time in the Seven Years' War, but it undoubtedly had one serious defect. Though a professional army in the main, its character was miscellaneous and polyglot.[2] For example, while the regular army was trained and organized in ordinary fashion, there were other forces which were not. The Hungarian nobles voted and equipped at their own expense levies of "insurgents," as they were called, which joined the regulars. At this time there was no system of conscription in Hungary, and the majority

of its troops were still feudal levies officered by hereditary commanders. Bravery they possessed indeed, but the Magyar feudal leaders mixed as hardly with the German officers of Vienna as did Prince Charlie's Highland chiefs with his French officers. Then, again, the Croats, who appeared to Keith "as hardy and active soldiers as I have seen," were gallant irregulars, but almost as hard to combine with ordinary troops as if they had been Red Indians. In spite of all Lascy's labours there was still something of the air of a feudal host about some component parts of the Austrian army. It is true that it would not be easy to organize the Prussian and Saxon armies as a unit, but it was an infinitely harder task so to organize the Austrians. Still the latter was a well-appointed force, and its inferiority to the Prussian was one of degree not of kind. Had it been as boldly handled as it was well trained it might have done much. As it was, it was the only Austrian army between the days of Prince Eugène and of the Archduke Charles which engaged in a war without suffering a disastrous defeat.

As numbers, war material, and fighting qualities were approximately equal, the real decisions of the campaign rested with the chief leaders. Here also at first sight the advantage would appear to rest, though not very decisively, with the Prussians. Bohemia was to be invaded from two sides, from the Silesian

side by King Frederic, from the Saxon side by Prince Henry of Prussia, the brother of the King. Lascy and Kaiser Joseph were to face the King, Laudon to command against the Prince. Prince Henry had been well known in the Seven Years' War. In 1759, at the most tragic moment of Frederic's fate, his admirable manœuvres had restored confidence to his brother and perhaps saved the existence of Prussia. Even Frederic, who practised economy in compliments, once pointed out Prince Henry to his generals, saying: "There is only one of us who never made a mistake." Napoleon, whose military judgment overtops even Frederic's, was of opinion that Prince Henry had occasionally to thank his opponents for not revealing his mistakes, especially in the year 1759. "The faultless general" was, none the less, a soldier of great renown, much experience, and high professional skill. He was the only Prussian general, except the great King himself, who had led Prussian troops to victory in a pitched battle in the Seven Years' War. His judgment was at once superlatively clear and exquisitely cool, and he—alone of all Prussian generals then living—dared to face Frederic, and declined to sacrifice his independence or his troops at the royal command. His fault was perhaps that he balanced just a thought too nicely, and complimented his opponent a little too much in thinking that he judged as accu-

rately as himself.[3] For Laudon, though no contemptible opponent, was endowed with erratic genius rather than with steady talent. Alone of all Austrian generals in the Seven Years' War he had shown himself capable of a daring initiative, had inspired his troops with dash and spirit, and had wrung compliments as to his military capacity even from Frederic himself. At his best, as at Kunersdorf, he had known how to defeat even Frederic himself; at his worst he would be unequal to Prince Henry.

The invasion from Silesia promised less decisive results; Frederic needed no early success to add to his immeasurable renown, and an early reverse might detract from it. Moreover, the great Prussian king was sixty-six years old, prematurely aged by hardship and labour, tortured with gout so that he could barely mount his horse. Old friends who saw him were shocked at his broken-down appearance, at his wrinkles and his grey hair; it was only in the wonderful eyes that they saw a trace of the old energy and fire. On the Austrian side the character of Lascy, who exercised great influence on Kaiser Joseph, was not one to induce him to stake all on a battle with so great a warrior as Frederic. Lascy's great administrative and organizing talents suited him admirably for a commander-in-chief or chief of staff, but he trusted too much to the slow evolution of long-formed plans, and lacked the

elasticity and resource, the sudden divination, and the instant decision needed by a commander in the field. Kaiser Joseph had indeed some of these qualities which Lascy lacked, some personal magnetism, something of initiative and of quick, imperious resolve, but his inexperience in war, and his regard for his peasants' and his soldiers' welfare, disinclined him to stir Lascy into activity. Indeed Lascy's whole train of thought dissuaded him from fighting great battles, for he had been brought up by Daun, in that Austrian School which was to have its greatest exponent in the Archduke Charles, and which maintained that the holding of fortified places, the manœuvre and counter-manœuvre for favourable ground, were the supreme ends of war. That more modern and decisive school of strategy, which teaches that the real object is the destruction of the enemy's army in the field, was alien to Lascy from military training and conviction, and to Kaiser Joseph also for political reasons.[4]

On the other hand, Frederic had until now been the most strenuous disciple, if not the originator, of a very different military doctrine, which was afterwards to have its ablest exponent in Napoleon. In the Seven Years' War no one had more brilliantly proved than Frederic how much depends on a bold initiative, how often a thrust is the best parry in warfare, how far more important it is to destroy an army

even at a great loss than to secure a position at a small one. That to a numerically inferior force a daring aggression is the best defence, had ever been one of his cardinal maxims.[5] Now when his forces were, what they had very seldom been in the past, approximately equal to the Austrian, would Frederic uphold his own maxims? If he forswore them, there would be no fighting worth mentioning on the Silesian side, for the game would become one of stalemate.

If the two opposing armies appeared fairly balanced in leaders and in men, the same might be also said of the natural conditions of the ground in which the armies were to operate. Bohemia—the scene of the campaign—is a fortress enclosed within mountain walls which stand four-square to every wind of battle. On the two sides from which she was now open to an attack, from the Saxon or western side and from the Silesian or northern one, her barriers of rugged rock and dense forest are exceptionally strong. Yet from these two sides Bohemia, by universal concession and experience, is "easy to invade." A glimpse into the Middle Ages serves better to explain this paradox than the dissertation of a modern tactician. Mediaeval robber-barons had a keen eye for planting castles upon inaccessible crags, whence they could sally out upon unsuspecting foes or upon peaceful merchants, and we may trust their instinct to find the real sluice-gates,

where the rich slow-moving streams of commerce, or the roaring tides of war, could be dammed or let through—at a price. There are three gates in these Bohemian mountain walls, two on the Saxon side, at Königstein-Lilienstein and at Tollenstein, and one on the Silesian side, at Nachod. Each of them was guarded by a castle in the Middle Ages. South from Dresden down the Elbe ran a road which was blocked by the twin castles—Königstein-Lilienstein (twin eagles' nests on opposite crags!); from Lusatia south over Rumburg the second road was guarded by the romantic keep of Tollenstein; the third ran south from Silesia over Glatz and was closed by the castle of Nachod. Those castles—once the toll-houses of these three entrances—were now their sentry-boxes. If they were to be defended in the eighteenth century it must be by living and not by dead walls, a fact which serves to testify to the eternal sameness of the principles of strategy, and to their infinite difference in application.

The broad outline of the attack and defence will be found to be simple when these facts are realized. It was known that King Frederic was preparing to lead the Silesian Army, Prince Henry the Saxon one, each with a striking force of some 80,000 men.* Therefore the Austrian

* The exact numbers of the striking force were, on July 1, 1778—Frederic, 80,000 men, 433 guns; Kaiser Joseph, 128,000 men, 423 guns; Prince Henry, 80,000 men, 433 guns; Laudon (afterwards reinforced), 70,000 men, 252 guns.

plan was to make a concentration, and to keep all their forces within as small an area as possible, in order to strike either way at the invader. The whole Austrian Army of about 190,000 men was to be collected in a triangle, of which the base rested on Niemes and Jaromer, and the apex on Zittau. The left or Saxon wing was concentrated under Laudon at Niemes, the centre under Lascy at Jičin, the right under Hadik at Jaromer, the whole being under the command of Kaiser Joseph. By this arrangement all the armies were within three or four marches of one another, and any threatened points could be effectually reinforced at very short notice. So long as the Austrian forces remained unbroken Prince Henry could not push past Niemes and on to Prague, or Frederic past Jaromer to Königgratz. It was from Silesia that the Austrians expected the real danger. Frederic would, of course, enter Bohemia through the Nachod gate, and display his far-famed capacity for marching swiftly and for striking heavy blows early in the campaign. Speaking of this, Kaiser Joseph is reported to have said: "When it is a question of fighting he (Frederic) rises up earlier than other people, but he shall never find me asleep." * With a view to receiving his attack the ground behind Nachod from Arnau to

* Calonne, *Notes sur la vie de Josef II*, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 27487.

Jaromer had been carefully fortified against the Prussian attack. Here lay the post of danger, here the greatest crisis would come, thought Kaiser Joseph. When on July 5 Frederic passed over the border at Nachod, the Arnau-Jaromer line was immediately manned, the Austrian armies of the centre and the right were at once united under the command of Lascy and the Kaiser. It was decided to entrust Laudon with the army of the left as an independent command, in order that he might make head against Prince Henry. Thus there were now only two Austrian armies. Joseph with the Eastern was defending the Nachod gate against Frederic, Laudon with the Western was to hold against Prince Henry the mountain gate of Tollenstein and the river gate by Aussig.

In actual result—for reasons that will subsequently appear—the danger was to be for Laudon, and during the first six weeks of the war the interest of the campaign shifts entirely to his army. On July 5 Laudon lay with his main force at Niemes, where he received the one dazzling inspiration which came to him in this campaign. Frederic was within two or three marches of Jaromer and Joseph, but Laudon knew that Prince Henry's army was located at Dresden, a good ten days' march from any seemingly threatened point on his side. Before finally deciding to go westwards Laudon devised a brilliant scheme. He wrote

from Niemes to Kaiser Joseph on July 7 pointing out that the Austrian armies had still the advantage of interior lines, and could move more quickly than the widely severed Prussian armies. Prince Henry's movements were necessarily slow and, according to the best information, Laudon thought that he personally could have nothing to fear until about the 15th. So the thought came to him whether he could not profit by this interval and with united force (that is, by concentrating our Western and Eastern armies) set off at King Frederic himself and attack him, unless he stood in an entirely unassailable position. He thought that within four days the two armies would be united.[6] Laudon himself would bring some 42,000 men to Arnau, making the forces there up to 55,000 in all, and with these crush the King of Prussia's right wing. Meanwhile Kaiser Joseph with 72,000 men could sally out against the Prussian left and centre. Frederic with 80,000 would be caught by 120,000 men, and would be outnumbered and crushed between the two Austrian armies. The plan was a great one, resembling that of the Metaurus or Blenheim, though upon a smaller scale. It meant the leaving of a skeleton force before the first enemy who could not readily take the offensive, and the sudden union of two armies to destroy the second. Had it been followed it might have resembled Blenheim yet more, in transferring

the scene of action to the enemy's frontier, in conquering a duchy in a day, and in destroying a long and hardly earned reputation for victory. But so bold a plan was not for the Kaiser and for Lascy. It was unsafe to take liberties with Frederic, and the cautious Joseph refused this suggestion. Laudon—after this brilliant flash of intuitive insight—turned to the work of defence, in which he was to prove prosaic enough.

Laudon had been allotted the most difficult task in the defence of Bohemia. In the first place he had two gates to defend, not one like Kaiser Joseph, and in the second place he had not in his hands the crags of Königstein-Lilienstein, but had to content himself with Aussig as a post from which to bar any advance up the Elbe. Again, the area of defence was much more extensive than that assigned to Kaiser Joseph; to hold both gates Laudon had to cover a line stretching from Aussig to Zittau, a region covered with hills and forests in which scouting was difficult. It was therefore possible for the enemy, manœuvring secretly behind the lofty curtain of mountain and wood, to fling overwhelming force upon one gate by Aussig or on the other by Tollenstein, before Laudon could divine their intention. Laudon's best plan would have been to concentrate his army at Hirschberg, to hold Aussig in force, and to send a sufficient detachment to bar the gate of Tollenstein. The Hirschberg

concentration would have masked his dispositions, prevented Prince Henry from discovering his real intentions, and enabled Laudon to block both entrances. As it was, he assumed that Prince Henry was advancing down the Elbe—the most probable line of approach—and neglected to place more than a few skirmishers at Tollenstein. Now, if Prince Henry was a general whom a stroke of genius might have deceived, he was not one in whose presence it was safe to make any ordinary blunder.

After moving out his Saxon-Prussian Army from Dresden Prince Henry made feints in several directions, especially towards Dippoldiswalde, with the view of deceiving Laudon. Then on July 28 he crossed the left bank of the Elbe on three bridges just above Pirna. His intelligence—such as it was—confused and perplexed Laudon, and made him believe that Prince Henry was coming down both sides of the Elbe at once. Hence he began to concentrate his forces at Bleiswedel, from which town he could cover both sides of the stream. There let us leave him for a time, waiting in anxious expectation.

Instead of going down the Elbe Prince Henry advanced through the forests on its right bank (July 28), and made straight for Rumburg. Using this town as a base he purposed to seize Tollenstein Pass, where was the only gap in Bohemia's armour of forest and hill. The

enterprise was bold in that he advanced over roads unused to heavy traffic and streaming with mud from the rain, and into a country whence he could only retreat with difficulty in case of failure. On the 30th, some Prussian cavalry with Löthosel's infantry surprised and routed a hundred Austrian cavalry at Rumburg, and pursued them to the first wood-patch outside the town. There fifty Austrian chasseurs came to their aid, but the Prussian infantry came on again, Prussian guns hurried up from Rumburg, and the Prussian cavalry took them in flank. The Austrians gave way again and were pursued four good miles as far as Georgenthal, where the Prussian cavalry bivouacked. Meanwhile the advance guard of the Prussians had filed into Rumburg, and all night long further reinforcements kept arriving.

From Rumburg to Tollenstein there is a rift in the mountains, a series of gentle slopes studded with thick patches and clumps of dark firs. Across this wooded plateau infantry could advance and seize the Pass of Tollenstein. On the next day, July 31, an advance was made in four columns, General Belling's column marching over Georgenthal to Tollenstein to seize the key of the whole position. Let us advance with General Belling. The way from Rumburg to Tollenstein lies over broad downs, yellow with the harvest of oats or green with

other crops, now somewhat draggled in the rain. Here and there Belling's column marches between dark fir-forests, varied by more open country towards the east. On presses the column in hot haste, past the low-browed huts of Schönlinde down to Georgenthal, which lies low and flat in the valley, where the Prussian cavalry were already awaiting them. As Belling looked up and ahead he could see westwards (to the right) the dark impenetrable forests, through which another Prussian column was hastening. Straight in front of him—not four kilometres farther on—is the goal of his hopes. A great ruined keep frowned at him from the grim rock of Tollenstein, a pass winding amid stunted hills on one side of it, on the other the tall fir-clad mass of Tannenberg Hill, a gigantic sentry guarding the defile that is the key of Upper Bohemia. Behind it again rolled back a seemingly endless and impenetrable sea of fir-clad summits. Those dark masses of hills might conceal any number of troops; at any moment hot Laudon and his hussars might be rushing to the rescue. There was no time to lose; Belling gave the word for advance, the cavalry swept swiftly forward towards the Pass, surprising a few Austrians by the way but scattering them easily right and left. They clattered under the keep of Tollenstein, finding Austrian infantry in the Pass. On come the Prussian Grenadiers for a time easily up gentle

slopes, then up steeper ones, as they draw near the Keep of Tollenstein, frowning from the crest of its hill. A few minutes more and they sweep round the base of the hill while shots splutter and kill one or two in the ranks. What matter! The handful of Austrians fly before the Grenadiers and the Prussian cavalry sweep at last round the base of the hill. The keys of Bohemia have fallen from the girdle of Laudon!

All the night of the 31st two companies of Grenadiers stood to arms in the Pass to guard against surprise, while Prussian cavalry pursued the Austrians into the depth and darkness of the woods beyond. But the precantiou was needless, for on the fateful 31st three other Prussian columns, marching on parallel lines, emerged at different points and secured the route for Belling. The most important of these, under Möllendorf, had marched to the west through the thick forests and over the higher slopes past Nixdorf. The woods around there were said to be haunted and to hold strange beasts within their depths, but they surely never held more dreadful monsters than Möllendorf met, fierce Croatian Irregulars. Möllendorf pressed on through the woods over three abattis, and, despite fierce sporadic fighting with the Croats, reached open country beyond Dittersbach. There he encamped for the night, having pushed on farther than any of

the three other columns. The parallel movement of the other columns rendered everything safe, and in the next few days Prince Henry with the main army advanced easily over this ground towards Gabel. The whole had been achieved with very small loss. At Rumburg and Tollenstein the Saxon-Prussian army lost but four dead and a dozen wounded, the Austrians seventeen dead and thirty-two wounded or prisoners. Fighting there was in this war in which there were far more losses than this, but for importance in result there is nothing to equal it.

At Rumburg Prince Henry, when he heard of the capture of Tollenstein, must have smiled to think that he had out-generalled the best Austrian leader by a move that was at least as daring as it was unexpected.* His own confession shows his appreciation of the feat. "Considering the impracticable roads that we traversed, such as no army ever crossed yet, this expedition might seem rash. That was the very consideration that determined us to undertake it, on the supposition that Marshal Laudon would never believe we would wish to attempt it. This supposition cannot indeed do any wrong to the intelligence we recognize in that Marshal. If the post of Tollenstein had been held by only two battalions, that

* It is of some interest to note that, in 1866, the Prussian army of the Elbe advanced from Dresden, and did not descend the Elbe, but followed Prince Henry's route over Rumburg.

would have prevented the army from entering." [7] Indeed it seemed a great Prussian triumph and appeared to have opened a way to the heart of Bohemia.

Just at this very moment poor Maria Theresa was writing in exultation to Marie Antoinette in France that " our cruel enemy " the old King Frederic had been checked for a month, " whilst from Zittau to Aussig from the side of Prince Henry there is nothing to fear." * The news that Prince Henry had accomplished the unwonted march by Tollenstein and was threatening his flank, not only bewildered Maria Theresa, it almost unmanned Laudon himself. Impetuous in action like a true cavalry soldier, he reasoned quickly as to Prince Henry's designs. The Prince's main army was now in or near Rumburg; his own position at Bleiswedel was now untenable, so that he must evacuate the line of the Elbe altogether and fall back behind the Iser. Prince Henry's advance was cautious and Laudon's retreat speedy, so that the new positions were occupied without much bloodshed. On August 2 the main body of Laudon's forces reached Hirschberg, on the 4th it crossed the Iser and concentrated at Kosmanos. Prince Henry's columns—creeping through the woods from Tollenstein like swift serpents—seized upon all

* August 3, 1778. *Maria Theresa und Marie Antoinette*, Von Arneth, Wien (1865), p. 252.

the positions Laudon evacuated, and were presently gazing at the Austrians over the Iser. Laudon was still nervous and wrote to Joseph in great anxiety, stating (erroneously) that he was outnumbered, and that he had to defend the line of the Iser, a distance of some 90 kilometres, with 70,000 men. He thought this feat impossible and complained to Joseph, asking to be relieved or reinforced. But for once Kaiser Joseph proved the better military adviser, and, judging the situation more correctly, wrote with masterly firmness: "Since you have lost Tollenstein, the key-point of your new position is Turnau. Hold that—and both you and we are safe. Lose it—and Prince Henry has everything; he will join hands with his brother the King, drive you back one way, and us another, and ruin all. After all, too, your (Laudon's) estimate of Prince Henry's numbers is doubtful, a strong Saxon corps has remained behind in Dresden, and eight new Austrian battalions will be sent to reinforce you, and enable you to hold the Iser from Turnau to Semil—at all costs." * Thus Kaiser Joseph directed the dispirited Laudon, both wisely and confidently, in the first week of August, showing alike the great importance of the loss of Tollenstein and of the retention of Turnau. On August 11 the Kaiser actually

* In fact Prince Henry had only 65,000 effectives while Laudon had 70,000. Criste, *Kriege*, p. 102, prints the letter here summarized.

visited Laudon in his headquarters at Münchengrätz, found him in great dejection, and came back criticizing both general and army.[8]

During the second week of August, just after what Frederic called this "pretty début" of Prince Henry, diplomacy suddenly intervened. But as this negotiation was made behind the back of the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, and hardly affected the military situation, it can be noticed later. On August 15 Frederic ended the diplomatic interlude, and all parties braced themselves afresh to a rougher game. There is something rather ludicrous in Laudon's attitude of agonized apprehension behind one bank of the Iser, especially as Prince Henry showed remarkable caution on the other. The latter was sensible as to the great advantage he had gained in the past, but speculative as to the future. He feinted towards Budin, to pretend that he was threatening Prague, but he intended to take no risks. Even as it was, he put Laudon in great apprehension, caused him once more to send piteous appeals for reinforcements, and nearly induced him to abandon Münchengrätz and the Iser. Indeed Laudon actually issued orders to this effect on August 29, and only recalled them when he found the Prussians were retiring.[9] Prince Henry's main object was defensive, to prevent Laudon retaking Gabel (and with it Tollenstein). "Once we lose the roads leading to Lusatia retreat is impossible.

One does not pass through this neighbourhood unpunished twice." * Prince Henry judged the situation as usual with exquisite accuracy; he had already risked his army once and achieved an important success. He would not endanger it once more, though it is clear from Laudon's actions from August 26-29 that a slightly more determined action on the part of Prince Henry would have forced the passage of the Iser. But Prince Henry would risk no more: he resolved that any further move must come from Frederic, and this determination shifts the interest to the Prussian King and the Austrian army opposed to him.

The situation in which Frederic found himself was indeed a difficult one, and this fact may explain why he had remained for five weeks, arms crossed and immovable, glaring at the Austrians over the river, admiring though not emulating the fine exploits of his brother. The King had marched on July 5 through the gate of Nachod, just as Crown Prince Frederic did in 1866, only to find himself checked by a counterscarp immediately behind it. The old King seems to have been much astonished to find resistance so soon, and in fact appears to have thought that the Austrian concentration was at Olmütz. In any case, he moved with great slowness in his advance, and his delay of

* Prince Henry to Frederic, Niemes, August 17, 1778, quoted in Criste, *Kriege*, p. 97.


Map to illustrate the
WAR IN BOHEMIA
in 1778
Kilomètres
10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50
Heights are given in mètres
SAXONY
PRUSSIAN SILESIA
BOHEMIA
Dresden
R. Elbe
Neustadt
Pirna
Königstein
359
Dippoldiswalde
Lilienstein
441
Nixdorf
Rumburg
555
Schönlinde
Georgenthal
Zittau
267
Dittersbach
Tollenstein
Zwickau
Gabel
POSITION
Aussig
Teplitz
835
LAUDON'S
1ST
Bleiswedel
Niemes
Huhnerwasser
Leitmeritz
Hirschberg
Munchengratz
Lobositz
Budin
Kosmanos
LAUDON'S
2ND POSITION
Turnau
R. Iser
Jičin
Schatzlar
Hohenelbe
1125
1502
1695
Schnee Koppe
R. Elbe
Arnau
Oels
Soor
Burkersdorf
Trautenau
Braunau
KAISER JOSEPH
AND LASCY
Königinhof
Náchod
To Glatz
Jaromer
Josefstadt
Königgratz
R. Elbe
R. Iser
R. Moldau
R. Elbe
To Czaslau
Prague
Boundary lines
Advance and Retreat of Prince Henry and the Saxon-Prussian Army
Austrian troops and positions
Original positions of Laudon's troops
Emery Walker Ltd. sc.

two precious days enabled the Austrians to strengthen still further their lines before the first Prussian reconnaissance. "Both (Hohenelbe and Arnau) would in all probability have fallen had not the march of the troops, intended to attack them, been too much retarded." *

From Arnau to Jaromer stretched a long fortified line held by Austrian troops. The line was less strongly defended between Arnau and Königinhof, but from the last village to Jaromer stretched a perfect wall of entrenchments. By Königinhof the Elbe is very near its source; it is no wide stream, and its course is not always discernible even from a short distance. Though now fouled by factories, it was then a clear thin silver stream fordable at many points, and flowing between banks which are generally flat and low. It would have been easy for a Prussian force to cross the stream, but it would have been extremely difficult to secure their landing. From the wooded heights, which rise at a distance of about half a mile on the Austrian side and stretch right from Königinhof to Jaromer, well-placed cannon could riddle any landing parties. The dark curtain of wood on the Austrian side completely concealed guns and positions, and Frederic knew that the pupils of Daun understood the art of entrenchment. All that skill in choosing

* *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 102, Berlin, December 1, 1778, Elliot to Suffolk, relying on the evidence of officers taking part in the campaign.

and fortifying positions, of which Lascy was an acknowledged master, had been lavished upon this one.

*"The walls made high and broad;*
*The bulwarks and the rampires large and strong,*
*With cavalieros and thick counterforts."*

Cannon were planted all along the lines, trenches dug, abattis and palisades erected at threatened points, whilst those parts of the river where landings could be effected were defended by triple lines of trenches and by a specially concentrated artillery fire. The whole line had been linked together by special roads running parallel with the stream, an arrangement of very great importance, as the roads ran perpendicular to the stream on the Prussian side. Hence, in the case of any attempt to force their lines or turn their position, the Austrian guns, troops, and war material could be moved to a threatened part with the greatest ease, the Prussian only with difficulty. In fact the Elbe—though small in volume—was almost a better defence than the mountains behind it, and this thin silver ribbon of a stream checked the old King even more effectually than the Iser restrained his brother. For six weeks now the two armies had been watching one another, separated by only a kilometre or two of ground, so near that bullets and cannon balls were frequently whistling and humming across,

while in the day-time the glint of steel was visible, and at night the hundred watch-fires sparkled like fireflies from opposing heights.

Frederic was never renowned for patience, and he now played the waiting part with a very bad grace to the accompaniment of much profanity, silent on the part of others, vocal on his own. He censured his officers severely, taught one how to form a camp, with many pungent criticisms, and said, "Go to the devil!" to a second, who wished to measure a distance by trigonometry instead of by the eye. All shrank from crossing or offending the venomous old King, and his nephew and heir, Frederic-William, now on his first campaign, earned much commendation for his ridicule of his great kinsman as "old Sourface." To his occupation of reprimanding or satirizing his officers Frederic added others not less characteristic. By his orders the soldiers were given bread and meat gratis in addition to their usual pay, twice a week they were sold beans very cheaply, and other provisions were on sale at or nearly at cost price. At the same time he increased the already iron rigour of discipline. Later in the campaign, in the camp at Schatzlar, he showed his Athenian side as well, and composed an *Eloge de Voltaire*, just dead at Paris, whose enmity and friendship alike had contributed so much to his own renown. The dead satirist himself could not have drawn a character in

fiction more strange or complex than that revealed by Frederic at this moment—the first ruler and soldier in the world, brought to a check by leaders of but ordinary talents, and beguiling his time now by cursing his officers, now by handling a secret negotiation, now by improving the food of his men, now by increasing their punishments, yet again by writing a copy of bad French verses. His inaction had much effect on both officers and men, to whom "Der Alte Fritz" had been the model of daring and celerity in war, and there was a "great diminution of that confidence in his abilities and enthusiasm for his person which inspired the troops at their outset." * The news of Tollenstein and the final rupture of the negotiation with Austria (August 15) at length forced Frederic into action. Unless he now took the initiative the position must become one of stalemate. So long as Kaiser Joseph and Laudon could pivot their forces round the two points of Turnau and Arnau, the Austrians had the advantage of interior lines; their two armies were safe until the hinge between these two points was broken down. As Prince Henry had declined to cross the Iser to seize Turnau, Frederic must seize Arnau—the

* *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 102, Berlin, Hugh Elliot to Suffolk, December 1, 1778; *vide* also vol. 103, *ib.* to *ib.* January 12, 1779. In each case Elliot's accounts are based on reports of participants in the campaign. Until the end of 1778 his knowledge of the campaign had been small; *vide* Minto, *Memoir of Hugh Elliot*, p. 164.

weakest point of the Austrian lines—or abandon the campaign. To Frederic, the forcer of so many lines, the victor over so many odds, delay in the field had always been distasteful. But though he now (August 15) decided to move, it was not with the old matchless rapidity and energy. He moved cautiously and slowly, very careful of his laurels and (in a nobler wise) careful also of the lives of his men.[10] But that proud confidence in himself which had led him to so many triumphs or sacrifices in the past was no longer with him.

On August 15 Frederic encamped at Burkersdorf not far from the historic field of Sohr, where long ago he had beaten the Austrians by the happiest combination of daring and fortune. The very ground might have given him inspiration. On the 16th he thought of forcing Arnau, writing to Prince Henry that his move—if successful—would compel the Austrians to evacuate their lines and fall back on Czaslau, and that he was almost certain that the Kaiser's army had been forbidden to fight (of course by Maria Theresa) so as not to endanger Joseph's person.[11] Frederic's move was not unobserved, Austrian forces at Arnau were hurriedly strengthened, Kaiser Joseph himself came riding up to the post of danger. Frederic saw the reinforcements advancing, judged the task too arduous, and held his hand, writing to his brother that "this place is the

most devilish of the whole neighbourhood." Again there was manœuvre, march and countermarch, and on August 27 the two armies faced one another near Oels, Frederic with 60,000, Joseph with 70,000 well entrenched. Once again the old King declined battle.

After these happenings there was only one thing possible for either Prussian army. Neither leader was willing to risk his men in any further venture, but retreat was a sore humiliation for both. The country could afford no further sustenance for either army, disease was working sad destruction, Frederic had already lost over 10,000 men by sickness or desertion.[12] In September retreat became inevitable for both, and in this hard decision Prince Henry again took the lead. At the beginning of the campaign Frederic had suggested that the Prince's line of retreat should be by Leitmeritz and up to the Elbe, thus enabling him still to live at the enemy's expense. Later the King had indicated the more direct retreat over Zittau as desirable, but Prince Henry now adopted the original suggestion. The retreat by Leitmeritz was, to use the military term, an eccentric one, and involved a change of base. It had the advantage of still further exhausting the enemy's country, of eating it bare. It was not very hazardous in any case, and its unusual character might deceive Laudon. On September 10 the main force of Prince Henry

began its retreat, yet, though he executed it with skill, his movements were not those which should have been unnoticed or unharassed by a leader of unshaken nerve.* There were extraordinary difficulties to encounter; the weather was stormy, and the roads, at no time good, were now streaming with mud and almost impassable, so that horses sank to the hocks and waggons to the axle. Heavy guns frequently stuck in the morasses, and the labourers of the country-side were requisitioned to haul them out with ropes and cart-horses, the cavalry had to dismount and lend their chargers. Hundreds of putrefying horses, scores of men dead or fallen from exposure, shattered waggons, and abandoned weapons marked the line of retreat. When Prince Henry reassembled his forces at Dresden, he found that he had lost in the campaign, of which the most important engagement counted 16 casualties, nearly 8000, or about one-eighth of his complete force. Information or presence of mind must have been terribly lacking to Laudon at this time, for he completely neglected the opportunity of displaying his old vigour in harassing Prince Henry's retreat.

The retirement of Frederic was not so difficult, since his route was very much shorter and more direct. It began on September 8,

* The Saxon part of the army retreated by way of Zittau, whither Laudon followed them, thinking them the main army.

but Frederic halted near Schatzlar and remained there composing his ode to Voltaire, until he received news that Prince Henry had reached Saxony. Again the Prussian retreat showed the same difficulties and losses in execution, the Austrian advance the same hesitation. Several rearguard fights took place, in which Wurmser on the one side and Prince Frederic-William on the other distinguished themselves much, but, despite the entreaties of Hussar Officers and the almost open murmurs of his troops, Kaiser Joseph sternly forbade all determined attempts to harass the retreat. After all, the great general might be luring the Austrians to their destruction, and the *genius loci* was unfavourable in a neighbourhood where the Prussian King had vanquished Austrian armies in the past. The terrible renown of Frederic, garnered on a hundred fields, still protected him in failure as it had once done in success.

Though some of the troops murmured at the close of the campaign, it was no small triumph for an Austrian army, unaided by any other Power, to have rendered it impossible for the greatest of living generals to winter either of his armies in Bohemia. During all the wars of the last forty years Austria had never by herself forced an enemy to evacuate her territory in the first year of invasion. Kaiser Joseph perhaps did not think of this feat as

a triumph, for he was almost in despair at the cruel sufferings inflicted on the peasants in the country occupied by the Prussians. In the matter of requisitions Prince Henry and his grim brother "did not their work negligently."[13] But, deeply as Joseph felt for his peasants, it may be doubted whether their sufferings were not avenged by the blow to Frederic's military renown. As, with curses on his lips and rage in his heart, the old King turned his back upon Bohemia, he at least had lost much of what was as dear to him as was his cottage to a Czechish peasant. He who had always been first in the field and famed for his lightning speed in action had at last been brought to a standstill by the pupils of Daun, that general he had so often derided and defeated. The astonishment of the world was immense, the Arnau-Jaromer lines anticipated Valmy, and first taught Europe that Prussian grenadiers could be resisted.

Skirmishes of one kind or another went on through the winter, and till the beginning of March of the next year, but for all practical purposes the war ended with the retreat of Frederic from Bohemia. It is not altogether easy to criticize the chief movements of the campaign because so little was actually accomplished. The initial blunder seems to have been made by Frederic in dividing his two armies in about equal parts. The result was

that both he and Prince Henry were opposed by armies whose numerical strength was almost on an equality, while they had the great additional advantage of acting upon interior lines. By a brilliant manœuvre Prince Henry succeeded in turning Laudon's flank and forcing him back on the Iser, but even this stroke did not relieve the pressure on Frederic or deprive the Austrian armies of their advantages of position. The fact is that Frederic's original plan seems to have been based on the idea that one part of the Austrian force intended to advance on Lusatia—and so to threaten Berlin.[14] To prevent this design he sent Prince Henry into Saxony with a sufficiently strong force to take them in flank. It was not till after the opening of the campaign that Frederic discovered his mistake and found the main Austrian army entrenched within a few miles of the Silesian frontier, instead of dispersed over a line from Königgrätz to Moravia. As he very early discovered the difficulty of forcing the lines at Arnau, his only real chance would have been either to effect a formidable diversion in Moravia, or to spur Prince Henry on to further efforts against Laudon. Eventually he did neither, he sent only detachments to Moravia and good advice to Prince Henry.

In spite of his brilliant exploit Prince Henry is really open to some criticism, for Laudon's orders for evacuating the Iser line on August 29

show that a bold offensive on his part would have been successful. If Laudon had been forced from the Iser, the position of Kaiser Joseph at Arnau-Jaromer would have become untenable, and decisive results for Prussia must certainly have followed. The risk in such a move is admitted, but it was the risk that a commander of genius would have taken. The difference between the ideas of Prince Henry and Frederic on such a question are admirably seen in a correspondence between them in January 1779. Prince Henry then remonstrated with Frederic on some of the dispositions for the coming campaign as rash, calling up precedents of the fatal temerity of Villeroi at Ramillies, of Cumberland at Fontenoy, and of the Austrian Prince Charles at that *victoire la plus inouïe* of Leuthen. Frederic replied tartly that it was not rashness but bad dispositions of troops or bad choice of ground which made these commanders fail. "La guerre et la nobless (*sic*) ne vont pas ensemble; quiconque n'entreprend rien après avoir bien réfléchi sur sa besogne, ne sera jamais qu'un pauvre sire. Voilà ce que nous dit l'expérience et l'histoire de toutes les guerres. C'est un grand jeu de hazard, où celui qui calcule le mieux gagne à la langue." * The two letters outline sharply the difference between a general

* Schöning, pp. 252, 254. Letter of Prince Henry, February 17, of Frederic, February 19.

of talent and one of genius. It would be difficult to better Frederic's teaching, but in this campaign the leader had done nothing at all, and Prince Henry had won fresh laurels, though he had declined to make just that last bid for victory which would have given him immortal fame. He had not done what Frederic would infallibly have done, had he been in his place and a few years younger. Frederic now was content to utter wise military saws after the time for decisive action had passed.

But if Frederic was no longer the Frederic of Leuthen, still less had Laudon proved the Laudon of Kunersdorf. Always a little uncertain, Laudon had now been almost contemptible, and no one can be surprised at the comparative neglect into which he fell for a decade. Maria Theresa had even wished to dismiss him, but this action had been prevented by Kaiser Joseph.[15] Prince Henry alone of the old heroes of the Seven Years' War had enhanced his reputation. Never losing a chance, nor risking too much, this man of exquisite talent had outshone the two men of genius. As for Lascy and Kaiser Joseph their parts had been simple but creditable enough, and if they were no more than respectable tacticians they had proved at least excellent administrators. The troops had been well organized and handled, the provisions good, the entrenchments strong, the enemy's loss

must have been well over 20,000 men. For all this the main credit rests with Lascy, but something also falls to the Kaiser, until then untried in the field.[16] However much he deferred to the judgment of Lasey in military affairs, Joseph could not, from his very nature, be a mere cipher, and, in any case, he had done much to restore the nerve of Laudon at the critical moment after Tollenstein, and shown discretion and judgment by insisting upon the retention of the Iser and of Turnau. That he was over-anxious about exposing the homesteads of his peasants and the persons of his soldiers to danger was an amiable weakness, which is explained by his regard for the welfare of both.[17] Moreover, even though the army grumbled at the close of the campaign, Joseph had done much to break the tradition of Austrian defeat and to restore the military spirit. If he feared to expose his men, he at least did not fear to expose himself, and when men saw a Kaiser sleeping on the bare ground covered only with a cloak, found him fraternizing with his men and sometimes sharing their food, or saw him riding boldly where bullets were whistling, their general feeling was voiced by the soldier's utterance, "Why should I fear when the crown of my sovereign is as exposed as my cap?" *

On the whole the campaign well earned its

* Cf. a similar saying of Joseph's officers about their Kaiser's conduct under fire in this campaign in Calonne, *Notes sur la vie de Josef II*, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 27,487.

nickname of the Potato or Plum War, because the soldiers of each side devoted more time to stealing and deserting than to fighting, and Joseph spoke with as much truth as wit when he said in August, "The King of Prussia stays here to forage and I to recruit." It is the classic instance of the war of positions, of manœuvre and counter-manœuvre. None the less it was destructive to the Prussian army, and, though no battles were fought, the story of Prince Henry's bold seizure of Tollenstein and the mystery of Frederic's inaction are well worthy of military study. It is the more to be regretted that Laudon's superb intuition at the beginning of the campaign was not put into practice. His design to join forces and crush Frederic in the early days of the campaign was a dazzling opportunity, but, considering all, perhaps one which the cautious Lascy and the Kaiser were right to reject. When had Frederic ever cared till now for superiority of numbers, above all, what reinforcement to the Prussian army was the renown of Frederic himself at the beginning of this campaign? Napoleon estimated his personal presence on the battle-field as equal to a reinforcement of 40,000 men, and the cautious Wellington endorsed this view.[18] When one remembers how often Frederic had triumphed over odds, how his name was one of fear to all Austrians and of pride to all Prussians, it seems hard to estimate

it at much less. At least, at the beginning of the campaign his soldiers would not have done so, when they learned that battle was at hand, and watched the old King riding down the lines in his faded blue and red uniform, the bent figure still firm in the saddle, the famous crook-stick in his hand, and the thin old eagle-face once more alight with the glow of battle.

Prince Henry had done enough in this campaign, King Frederic far more than enough in a score of others, for the assurance of their renown, and for them were to be no more the chances of defeat or of victory. For Lascy and Kaiser Joseph, as by a sort of tragic retribution for their momentary success, the near future held military disgrace and shame. As for Laudon, the man of genius whose reputation had sunk most in this campaign, he was to know once more the joy of battle and the rapture of victory, and gloriously to redeem his fame. Ten years from now, when Austria's hopes were at their lowest, and when his head was already white, Laudon was to rival the most famous exploit of Eugène, and to enter Belgrade amid the thunder of guns and the triumphant shouts of his soldiers. Te Deums in countless churches, the prayers and the blessings of thousands were to be his, and the humbled and dying Joseph was to salute him as the Generalissimo of all his armies. But




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# VI

## A NEUTRAL STATE IN AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WAR

### BAVARIA DURING AND AFTER THE WAR (1778–1779)

*Der Ehre schöne Götterlust,*
*Die, wie ein Meteor, verschwindet.*
GOETHE.
*Honour's godlike joy,*
*The meteor that a moment dances.*

THE story of Bavaria from December 30, 1777, to the Peace of Teschen is the story of her Elector Karl Theodor, whose shifts, turns, and doublings exhibit the hapless condition of a minor state and ruler when forced into the current of great events by the action of great Powers. The diplomatic morality of an age is most apparent in the treatment accorded to minor states, for a great state always has some claim to justice because it has some show of force behind its pretensions. In the eighteenth century the ruler of a minor state found it difficult to retain his own conscience, or to hold any one else to an obligation; and ever since December 30, 1777, the impossibility of

doing either of these things had become apparent to Karl Theodor.

Though destiny was to expose him to the ridicule of mankind, Karl Theodor was not without merits either as a man or as a sovereign. His portrait shows his character—the forehead high, the nose hooked and prominent, a chin coarse and sensual, but redeemed by a tolerably firm mouth and by sharp kindly eyes which peep from beneath high black brows. His face is the very image of an artistic epicurean, who took life easily and yet like Chesterfield could be serious when occasion demanded. Though his supper-parties were as gay as those of Louis Quinze, though his admirers called him "the first cavalier in the Holy Roman Empire," he was no trifler in the science of government or in the patronage of the arts. He had introduced business methods and strict supervision into the finances of the Palatinate, and was a methodical and skilful administrator. He had devoted the money thus saved to industry, to learning, and to the arts. He had encouraged commerce by cutting canals, by improving the roads and by starting a porcelain factory. He was himself well read in the classics, the patron of such men as Lessing and Schiller, the devoted friend of learning, and the founder of an Academy of Science and Literature at Mannheim (1766). As Heidelberg had been ruined by the wars, he had fixed his capital at

Mannheim, which he embellished with fine buildings, and sought to make the home of the arts and the Athens of the Rhine. Landscape gardens, pictures and statuary abounded in the capital, but it was for music that it was most renowned. The opera was famous, the ballet and the orchestra were the best in Germany, and both owed nearly everything to the personal supervision and support of Karl Theodor. He was a well-read, polished and refined man of the world, and though a strict Catholic by no means a bigot. His subjects had long ago acknowledged their obligations to his learning and taste, and he had certainly governed the Palatinate with more discrimination and success than Max Joseph had achieved in Bavaria.[1] In foreign policy both princes were ineffective, but it is an irony of history that the internal policy of the last Bavarian Wittelsbach should be acknowledged as admirable, while that of his able and more cultured successor is forgotten or denounced.

Whatever had been the abilities or character of Karl Theodor, his situation after December 30, 1777, was one in which even the profound politician might have failed. His choice lay between a balance of opposite humiliations. There was the menace of Austria on one side, on the other that of Zweibrücken—backed by Frederic. Worst of all, each side had incriminating documents by which they could publicly

prove his duplicity; in particular Zweibrücken had a whole array of family compacts and agreements by which he could establish that Karl Theodor had sworn to keep Bavaria indivisible. In 1766, 1771, 1774, as also in connection with the will of Max Joseph, Karl Theodor had solemnly pledged himself to the late Elector in writing not to alienate or cede any part of Bavaria—when he inherited it. On August 5, 1777, Karl Theodor had made a similar written agreement with Zweibrücken, in which each party agreed to do nothing without the other. Immediately afterwards Karl Theodor began secretly negotiating with Kaiser Joseph and Kaunitz in an exactly opposite sense.[2] The death of Max Joseph revealed these numerous perfidies. On December 30, 1778, Karl Theodor's representative at Munich made a solemn oath and proclamation that his master would accept the Bavarian heritage undivided. Four days afterwards his representative at Vienna signed an equally solemn agreement with Kaunitz to divide it and to cede a third of that heritage to Austria. On January 4 Karl Theodor arrived in Munich and was invested with the whole Bavarian heritage, which he swore to keep intact. On January 14, after a show of reluctance, he agreed to divide it by ratifying the Austrian Partition-Treaty. On January 15, Austrian troops invaded Bavaria without meeting any

resistance from his soldiers. Rumours of the Partition-Treaty (details of which were not public till the third week of February) had greatly excited the people in Munich. Even that pitiful mediaeval shadow, the Committee of the Estates, remonstrated with the new ruler, and seathing pasquinades attacked his ministers as well as the Emperor, whose slave Karl Theodor appeared to be. When he accepted the Golden Fleece from Kaiser Joseph, it was regarded as the badge of disgrace and the price of treachery. Despite severe punishments the satires redoubled, and at least one really humorous piece of doggerel appeared:

"In other times the woolly Fleece
Was profit to the Shearer,
The Sheep from Shearer gains increase
In our quite novel era."

One of Karl Theodor's first measures had been to expel almost all the Bavarian ministers and introduce Palatine ones, the chief being Vieregg, a man of whom "even his friends rather choose to dwell upon the praise of his private virtues than public capacity." * Neither such measure nor such ministers were calculated to win Bavarian hearts. Karl Theodor's unpopularity was unhappily promoted as much by his good actions as by his

* Vieregg appears to have been appointed by Karl Theodor to the direction of his foreign policy, because he was a pliant man who could be easily controlled; *vide* Karl Obser, *Mitt. für Öst. Gesch.* Bd. xviii. 489, xix. 344.

bad ones. He had brought with him De Hompèche, who was made President of the Chamber of Finances. This individual was "said to have merit as a Financier, he was soon proved to possess all the unfeelingness of one . . . by his little ménagement of individuals in the regulations which have taken place. Reforms without doubt were necessary, but they might have been made with a more distinguishing hand. Many Families being now reduced to Misery; the Pensions granted by the late Elector to some of his Favourites withdrawn, and even those given to the Natural Children of the Emperor Charles VII. greatly diminished." * Considering that Karl Theodor had bartered a third of Bavaria for a pension to his own bastards, it was unfeeling to be niggardly to those of his predecessors. Further projects for a more equitable scheme of taxation thoroughly alarmed the nobles of Bavaria, who were to be made to share some of the financial burdens with the people. Even the people were not conciliated, because they were threatened with a system of universal military service. So great was the alarm occasioned by these wider plans that even trifling reforms were viewed with suspicion. An effort to reform the discipline of the troops caused frequent desertions and general dissatisfaction.

* Quoted from *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 113, Munich, January 22, 25, 29, February 12, 22, April 23; Ratisbon, July 10. Eden to Suffolk.

Discontent was apparent everywhere, and the national and popular resentment at Bavaria's humiliation was greater than could have been imagined.[3]

Unfortunately for Karl Theodor his arbitrariness at Munich could not conceal his subservience at Vienna, and even the most unobservant noted his deference to the Imperial Commissary. Kaiser Joseph had indeed sent him the Order of the Golden Fleece, but otherwise treated him with great contempt. Joseph began by violating the Treaty of January 3, and sending Austrian troops into parts of the Bavarian territories not ceded in that agreement. In February he for a moment showed a desire for still more ambitious projects of exchange than that in the Partition-Treaty, and dangled before Karl Theodor's eyes the prospect of a crown and kingdom in Galicia, in return for further Bavarian territory to Austria. When this scheme dropped, the Kaiser, who had previously guaranteed neutrality to Karl Theodor in case of war, actually tried to force him to join Austria at the end of April. This proposal was more than even Karl Theodor could endure, and he refused in spite of the severe pressure which was put upon him. Perhaps he was not altogether uninfluenced by the fact that his soldiers would probably have refused to fight for the Austrians.[4]

Karl Theodor quite realized the importance

of gaining over his nephew and heir, Charles of Zweibrücken, to his Partition-Treaty. Accordingly on January 22 he wrote a private letter to the Duke of Zweibrücken, informing him that he had done the best he could for the honour of himself and the safety of his country, and that, in accepting the Treaty of January 3, he had yielded to superior force. With a judicious disregard of the pensions to his bastards, he declared that he had paid more attention to the common interest than to his own, and finally urged his nephew to forgive him.[5] It remained to be seen whether his nephew would accept this explanation.

A great deal of high policy was now to depend upon the decision of an obscure country squire, whose chief occupation was hunting, and who ruled a territory no bigger than an English estate. Zweibrücken had his own plenipotentiaries with the great Powers, and his favour was courted by three great sovereigns. It was to the King of France that he inclined, for a long residence in that country had made him an ape of its methods and ideas. He wished to turn Zweibrücken into a miniature Versailles, and had chosen a petty Du Barry for himself in the shape of Madame d'Esebeck, the wife of his chief adviser. He copied Louis XV. both in vice and in extravagance, and for the last reason became not only the imitator but the pensioner of France. The receipt of an annual

income from Louis XVI. of 300,000 livres made him a political as well as a financial subordinate. But, though idle and extravagant, he was not entirely contemptible. His portraits show a stout, dark-eyed man, with a sensitive mouth and chivalrous bearing. He was admitted to have a sense of honour that was high in that age, and he was to show considerable firmness in the crisis.

The news of Max Joseph's death reached him on January 31, 1778, while out hunting at Zweibrücken, but he did not immediately come to Munich. The initiative was taken by the all-observant Frederic, who at once sent off an emissary (Count Eustace Goerz) first to Munich to see Karl Theodor and, if possible, to wean him from Austria. If that scheme failed Goerz was to work on the elements of opposition in Munich, and to use every effort to prevent Zweibrücken acceding to the Partition-Treaty. Goerz divided his time between Regensburg and Munich. In the latter city he found a congenial ally in Maria Anna, the Dowager Duchess of Bavaria, who had been bitterly opposed to any partition of the country, and was ready to use any means to defeat and discredit Karl Theodor.* She possessed

* This Dowager Duchess is not to be confounded with Max Joseph's widow, the Dowager Electress. Maria Anna was a daughter of the Palsgrave Karl von Sulzbach, and had married (aet. 15) Duke Clement of Bavaria. The latter had been nearest heir of Max Joseph, but had died in 1770 at the early age of forty-one.

valuable advisers in three Bavarian patriots, André, her confidant, and Obermayer and Lorij, who were both Privy Councillors. These communicated much secret intelligence to Goerz, which was of the greatest value to him at this crisis.[6]

On February 6 Goerz suddenly returned to Munich *incognito*, and took up his residence in a summer-house in the grounds of the Duchess. That evening he held a secret consultation with her and with Zweibrücken, who had just arrived in the capital. On February 7 Zweibrücken, primed by their instructions, went to see Karl Theodor at his palace, and discussed the Partition-Treaty in the presence of the Austrian minister Lehrbach. The interview was satisfactory to neither party, and on February 8 Goerz, from his hiding-place, wrote exultantly to the Dowager that Zweibrücken was safe, and would do nothing without consent of France or Frederic. Events followed fast; on February 14 Zweibrücken politely declined the Golden Fleece, which Kaiser Joseph had sent him; on the 28th he definitely refused to sign the Partition-Treaty.* Early in March he submitted a lengthy appeal to the Diet, in which he proved that Karl Theodor had been false to four separate agreements, that the

* On the day before (February 27) Zweibrücken had received a friendly letter from Louis XVI., confirming him in his resolution and promising the continuance of his pension. Cp. Reimann, *Preuss. Gesch.* ii. 74-75.

Partition-Treaty was in defiance of the peace of Westphalia, and that the Kaiser was assailing the liberties and rights of Bavaria. On March 16, in full session of the Germanic Diet, King Frederic added to Zweibrücken's claim the formal weight of his authority and the real support of his sword.[7]

As has already been described, the effect of these manœuvres was to give the complete moral victory to Frederic. During the summer this advantage was mercilessly pressed home by the Bavarian Dowager, by Frederic, and by Zweibrücken, who incessantly inspired Bavarian discontent with Karl Theodor, and sent anti-Austrian pamphlets and protests to the Diet. The account of these communications may be shortly summarized. In December 1778 Frederic published a copy of the secret letter of Karl Theodor of January 22, 1778, to Zweibrücken (in which he admitted that he had signed the Treaty of January 3, 1778, under compulsion). An even more deadly blow was dealt on the advice of the Dowager and her Bavarian councillors. Austria claimed Lower Bavaria in virtue of Albert's Investiture of 1426. Frederic now published to the Diet that Albert had formally renounced this claim in 1429, and that the original Act of Renunciation still existed. If it did not, Zweibrücken asserted that the Austrians had destroyed it. This was a bombshell. It was in vain that the

Austrian ministers shuffled and declared at the Diet that the Act of Renunciation was a forgery. The Dowager Duchess and her advisers had plausible proofs that the Act had existed: two highly respectable witnesses were brought forward by them to swear to its existence, or at any rate to the existence of authentic copies but a few years before. Clear evidence was advanced to show that the archives at Munich had been badly kept of recent years, and strong suspicion was levelled against Austrian diplomats of having purloined or destroyed the original document. Heathcote did not scruple to suggest that Austria would have purloined the original if it had been to advantage; Suffolk, with less insinuation, mildly described the Prussian arguments as "unanswerable".* [8] Unquestionably, the Dowager and her advisers had worked behind the scenes with deadly effect. Throughout the whole period Zweibrücken stood firm claiming his inalienable rights, while Frederic's representatives at the Diet and in the press brought forward their solemn and convincing proofs of the utter worthlessness of Austria's claims, impugned her good faith, and injured her reputation. All the evidence was not marshalled till the beginning of 1779, but in the first half of 1778 there was already enough to

* *S.P.F. Archives*, vol. 45, Ratisbon, July 26, August 5, 23, September 6, 13, 23, Heathcote to Fraser.

bring deep discredit alike upon Karl Theodor and Kaiser Joseph. On October 21, 1778, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna dared to tell Prince Kaunitz that the Russian Government adhered solely "à l'opinion généralement repandue et accréditée du peu de validité des prétentions de la Cour de Vienne." * The Dowager had aimed her shaft well.

It is time to return to Karl Theodor. Difficulties of all kinds threatened the hapless Elector, nor is it at all surprising that he proved unequal to the crisis. Even Morton Eden, forbidden by the "respect due from individuals to persons of his elevated rank" to coincide in the many censures passed on his conduct, could not find that in a "political light" his character bore "any marks of qualities either good or striking." Under the stress of his anxiety the spirits of poor Karl Theodor had already given way by April 23, 1778; he "grew pale and his legs swelled." By November 1 not only "his body but his legs and his hands considerably swelled." [Truly a plague of sorrow and sighing it blows a man up like a bladder.] "He shows an aversion to business (which yet he formerly loved) . . . he is haunted by a perpetual anxiety; . . . he drinks every evening to excess." It is small wonder that he sought to dissipate his cares, but it is rather surprising that at this stage

* Martens, *Sbornik*, lxv. 76.

there should have come to him "a kind of *dawning* conviction that he has acted with imprudence and precipitation, if not even with weakness and impropriety." "His Electoral Highness appears to regret the lost affections and confidence of his subjects, he finds himself coldly served by his ministers; and, above all, he is said to be extremely concerned at that silent contempt, with which he is treated by the very Monarch (Frederic), who has drawn the sword in his cause.* By this last circumstance he is more particularly affected, as it is not alleviated by any attention shown either to his person or sentiments (even at this critical conjuncture) by the other Powers of Europe. I am assured, that he has very lately in confidence complained of this neglect with great bitterness, adding these strong expressions: 'Je ne désire pas mieux, que de sortir de l'embaras [*sic*], où je me trouve—mais que faire? on me laisse seul.' This article of being left alone (by which His Electoral Highness means the not having any foreign minister near him to whom he could explain himself, and who should be authorized to hear him), joined to the impolitic insolence of behaviour adopted by

* Frederic's comment to Goerz was, "Quant à l'Electeur Palatin, il faut l'abandonner entièrement à son sort, c'est son propre ouvrage . . . après l'extrême foiblesse qu'il a eue de se laisser embéguiner par la Cour de Vienne, ce, seroit [*sic*] peine perdue que de vouloir seulement tenter de la ramener."—February 12, 1778, Goerz, *Mém. Hist.* Frankfort, 1812, p. 109.

the Austrian minister (Lehrbach) at Munich, has principally contributed to open his eyes to the error of his conduct. Add to all this, that the total disregard paid by the Imperial Court to his repeated representations relative to the one and twenty bailliages (the keeping possession whereof is a manifest injustice even upon the principles of the Treaty of the 3rd of January) has made him tremble for the certainty of that establishment of his natural children, to secure which was perhaps one of his principal motives, which induced him to sign it. I ought not to omit remarking, that it is on this side undoubtedly, that the Elector Palatine is the most vulnerable; and the only person, to whom, during my stay at Munich I saw him address himself with any appearance of pleasure, was his (illegitimate) daughter the Princess Isembourg." * The whole scene would be one of comedy were it not for a certain pathos running through it, which makes it a classical illustration of the way in which great Powers may deprive small states and their rulers first of territory, then of dignity, and last of respect.

After operations in the field closed indecisively in September 1778, Kaiser Joseph sought help on every side for the ensuing campaign of 1779. Accordingly, in the third week of November Lehrbach, the Imperial

* *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 113, Eden to Suffolk, July 10, 1778. *S.P.F. For. Arch. Bavaria*, vol. 45, Ratisbon, November 8, 1778, Heathcote to Fraser.

minister at Munich, again renewed the question of Bavaria's neutrality and tried to force the Elector to depart from it. Lehrbach's arguments were of the simplest. He produced statistics (not in point of fact accurate) to show that in the coming campaign Prussian forces would be greater than those of Austria, *ergo* Bavaria must join the latter and violate her neutrality. This demand Karl Theodor had again firmness enough to refuse, but Lehrbach then pressed him to vote in the forthcoming Diet against the reunion of Ansbach to Prussia. To this request the Elector at first yielded.[9] Then after consideration he began to doubt, he had already repented his partiality to Austria, and now she was evidently weaker than before. At last he came under the influence of better counsels, of the polite Vieregg who had at length become anti-Austrian, and of Kreittmayr the Chancellor, who had always held these views, though he had been afraid to express them until now. Finally, Karl Theodor revised his decision, and informed Lehrbach, with some firmness, that he would take his own course without previous engagement or pledge.

Though he had not been free from vacillation or weakness even in this last negotiation, Karl Theodor emerged from it without much loss. He had only broken one promise, had shown relative dignity, and for a moment must have

enjoyed an unwonted feeling of self-respect. But the negotiations for peace, which began to be seriously discussed at the end of the year, forced him in the end to drink even deeper draughts from the cup of humiliation than those to which his misfortunes had driven him of evenings. His conviction that he had been the dupe of Austria led him to play a more independent part; he succeeded only in making an original and characteristic, though by no means an impressive, appearance. First of all his representative arrived at Teschen without powers and instructions, and the whole Peace Conference was kept waiting while a special courier was despatched to Munich to procure them. The instructions which arrived were startling enough, because they contained Karl Theodor's refusal to satisfy the allodial claims of Saxony by a payment of four million florins, and asserted that he would not pay more than one million. This resolution very nearly broke the Congress, because Frederic thought that Karl Theodor took this bold stand with the collusion of Austria, and possibly of France. The chancelleries were alarmed, peace hovered in the balance, and Frederic despatched a courier to Vienna demanding a categorical answer as to whether or no the Viennese Court would guarantee the Saxon claims to the four millions. Their Imperial Majesties at Vienna replied evasively to Frederic, approving though

not guaranteeing the Saxon claim, and decisively dissociating themselves from any concert with Karl Theodor. The last part of this answer sufficed once again to discredit the unfortunate Elector. For a moment he had impressed the Congress, because it was thought that one, or even two, great Powers stood behind him. Directly it was realized that only his own opposition was in question he was disregarded.[10]

The difficulty, which was raised by Karl Theodor in this case, was probably due to the fact that he had not been sufficiently consulted in the settlement of the preliminaries, in which there was another article that he was prepared hotly to contest with his nephew of Zweibrücken. This was the arrangement by which Austria yielded up her pretensions to Bavaria, on condition of the cession of Burghausen to her. As Karl Theodor had signed an agreement in 1778 to cede one-third of Bavaria to Austria it seems a little difficult to see why he should refuse to sign one in 1779 which ceded only one-sixth of his territory. His heir, the Duke of Zweibrücken, had indeed more reason for his protest and his indignation, and the Duchess Dowager of Bavaria now advised him to refuse consent to the cession of Burghausen and appealed to France. Zweibrücken's friends drew up a plan to regulate his conduct at Teschen, which described Karl Theodor as

the slave of Austria, and insisted on the indivisibility of Bavaria. The paper was sent by Zweibrücken to the French and Russian representatives at the Congress. Both replied evasively, advising him to "apply to the Elector Palatine for some gratification, by way of indemnifying the loss, which a country, where His Highness was the presumptive Heir, was going to suffer by the Cession to be made to the House of Austria: promising in case of necessity . . . mediation and support"! The Duke decided to ask Karl Theodor for the Principalities of Neuburg and Sulzbach, "or, if that was thought too exorbitant . . . the sum of 300,000 German Crowns, and demanded these by a Courier who arrived in Munich on April 6th." "The Elector received this despatch whilst at dinner, and, for the first time throughout the whole business of the Bavarian Succession, betrayed strong marks of surprise and indignation." His nephew had already plagued and insulted him sufficiently, and poor Karl Theodor seems to have thought it the worst insult of all, that the Duke—after objecting to a division of Bavaria among foreigners—should wish to divide it among legitimate kinsmen. At any rate he returned, the very same afternoon, in a letter "couched in language sufficiently warm, a flat and positive refusal to comply with so unreasonable and ill-timed a request." [11]

Karl Theodor was in future so indignant with Zweibrücken that it was thought extremely probable that, despite all his numerous pledges to the contrary, he might "dismember the remainder of the Bavarian Succession in favour of his illegitimate children." So Zweibrücken spared no pains to get an article inserted in the Treaty of Teschen, which would bind the elastic Karl Theodor to fulfil the pledges of the Pacts of 1767, 1771, and 1774, and leave his estate indivisible. This object he eventually attained, and an article to that effect was inserted in the Treaty,[12] so that even if Karl Theodor broke his thrice-pledged word, he could be brought to order by the two foreign guarantors of the Peace of Teschen, and by the Germanic Diet as a whole. Such an obligation even Karl Theodor was unable to elude, and the solemn treaty compulsion laid upon him yet one more humiliation. It had needed all the German States and two foreign Powers to reconcile the two kinsmen to an arrangement to which they had both agreed on August 5, 1771. Never was there greater justification of Swift's savage epigram: "Alliance by blood or marriage is a frequent cause of war between princes, and the nearer the kindred the greater is their disposition to quarrel."

After the end of the negotiations at Teschen it might have been thought that the Elector would sink into insignificance, but he was

destined, for a moment, again to startle the diplomatic world. In June 1779 the great Powers learnt with astonishment that three distinguished Bavarians had been seized, and imprisoned under the authority of *lettres de cachet* issued by Karl Theodor.[13] Of these André, the special confidant and friend of the Dowager Duchess of Bavaria, was conducted as a prisoner of state to the castle of Rothenburg; Obermayer and Lorij, also her advisers and both Privy Councillors, were deprived of their rank and emoluments, their papers seized, and the one exiled to Amberg, the other to Neuburg. All Munich was thrown into consternation and alarm by this act, and Prussia immediately and peremptorily remonstrated. However, for once Karl Theodor stood on firm ground; he was not to be intimidated, and treated Frederic's angry remonstrance with indifference. He punished the three offenders in question, because they had principally contributed to the discrediting of Austria's claim to that part of Bavaria ceded to her in his Treaty of January 3, 1778. It was they also who had encouraged Zweibrücken in his attitude of stern and steady condemnation. One of the many ironies which befell Karl Theodor was that he was now punishing the men who had discredited Austria in 1778, though he himself was bitterly at variance with her in 1779. The simple truth is that he punished somebody in

order to gratify his general resentment at the hundred humiliations to which he had been subjected. It must have been some satisfaction to him to hurt the feelings of the Dowager, to insult Zweibrücken, and to defy King Frederic. Towards André, the special confidant of the Dowager Duchess, Karl Theodor soon showed signs of relenting, perhaps from fear of Prussia. He released him speedily, and allowed him to go to a country house of the Duchess near the Tyrol. However, André was soon recommitted, because some of his papers fell into the hands of Karl Theodor and revealed the extent of his secret transactions. The last mention of the fate of these men is on September 19, 1779; André's sentence, it was thought, would be irrevocable, Obermayer and Lorij still remained in enforced banishment.* [14] Having accomplished all which Karl Theodor set off for the Rhine, to visit his opera and his ballet-girls at Mannheim, very glad to leave the new dominions where he had experienced so much degradation, unpopularity, and failure.

As he left Munich for Mannheim Karl Theodor might well have reflected upon the

* *S.P.F. For. Arch.* vol. 45, Heathcote to Fraser, September 19, 1779. Lorij had much to do with founding the Academy of Sciences at Munich. After his exile, when asked by the Government to write an historical introduction to a book on coins, he replied that he could only do so if he consulted archives at Munich. He never saw his beloved city again and died at Neuburg in 1787.

very singular result which his latest action would produce upon his Bavarian subjects. For the three men whom he had imprisoned or exiled were precisely the three most popular men in Bavaria. They had done more than any other Bavarians to expose the designs of Vienna, to avert the Partition, and to reduce Austrian acquisitions from one-third to one-sixth of Bavarian territory. Their reward for these services was imprisonment, exile, or disgrace, from the hand of one who had sacrificed the interests of Bavaria to those of Palatine bastards. To this unhappy pass was the small state in Germany brought by the weakness of a ruler and the injustice of the great Powers. On the whole situation the words of the English representative may serve as a fit comment and conclusion, in the style of the old Greek chorus: "Well may it therefore create just matter of astonishment, that they, whose labours have so principally contributed to save their country from ruin, should meet with a recompense, which the rectitude of their intentions gave them so little reason to expect."

"It is impossible to describe the consternation and discontent, which the issuing of these *lettres de cachet* has occasioned at Munich. No one is secure of his liberty a moment; and by a combination of circumstances, strange to conceive, each individual feels himself obliged to tremble for his safety, in proportion as he

thinks he has discharged the duty of a faithful servant to his Master." [15]

Any one in high position who was known to be opposed to Karl Theodor became popular with the Bavarians. The Dowager was saluted as a heroine and her name was blessed throughout the land, while her councillors became the martyrs of the people. Zweibrücken was praised for his firmness and applauded whenever he came to Munich. King Frederic even attained the dignity of a saint in the land which he had declared to be peopled by fiends and swine. On one occasion the Watch stopped and presented arms before Frederic's picture in a shop window; the anniversary of his birthday was celebrated in Munich with illuminations, dinners, and dances. Peasants in the country erased the last name in the famous prayer beginning, "Jesus, Maria, *Joseph*," and replaced it by that of Frederic, and prayed before his picture as before that of the Virgin. The passionate national feeling of the Bavarians found its output in these strange ecstasies, because it could have no reverence for their foreign prince, whose refined tongue could not be reconciled to their speech, and whose foreign policy was so ominous for their future. It was an obvious expedient to lay all the blame on the shoulders of Karl Theodor. Yet this execrated ruler gave to Munich the most beautiful of its gardens, and

to Bavaria an improved system of finance and the beginnings of a national army. But despite everything the Bavarian people suspected, and rightly, that Karl Theodor did not care for them, and would exchange Bavaria for the Netherlands without a pang, if ever the opportunity came. Therefore the nation loaded his name with curses, mourned the less competent Max Joseph as a great ruler, and made a Joan of Arc out of Maria Anna, and a Barbarossa out of Frederic. A score of years later, when the hapless Karl Theodor lay gasping on his deathbed, the churches remained empty, and the news of his death was the signal for public rejoicings. For it was a son of the steadfast Zweibrücken who now became Elector, and who was one day to be the first King and the most popular ruler that the Bavarian land had known.

# VII

## THE PEACE OF TESCHEN AND RUSSIA'S ENTRANCE INTO GERMANY

(1778–1779)

*Solemn Majesties all . . . on thrones rich as Ormuz with their treaties, war-treaties . . . and finance-schemes . . . not to speak of innumerable little German Dukes, with their sixteen quarterings, their stiff Kammer Herrs and thick quilted ceremonials,—Good Heavens, they are gone like ghosts and with an unmusical screech.*—CARLYLE.

To a war which had produced no decisive results succeeded a peace which was to bring forth many. The first essays at negotiation had been originated by the womanly fears of Maria Theresa, even before the war had well begun, and with unhappy results. In the direction and control of war those women who have been great rulers have rarely showed to advantage, however great their subtlety or wisdom in time of peace. Elizabeth of England sent at least one worthless lover to command her armies, Catherine of Russia sent many, Maria Theresa — no unworthy rival of either in greatness—outdid them also in littleness.

Having entrusted her darling son with the command of her army, she first suggested that it should not fight a battle so as not to endanger his person, and then negotiated secretly behind his back with the enemy. Criticism of Maria Theresa's statesmanship in this or any particular might be reckless, were it not for the fact that she is herself her sternest judge. In her agonized letters to Marie Antoinette during this time she over and over again confesses that her mother's love, her anguish and foreboding for the fate of Joseph and his two brothers, now confronting the "wicked man"—"our cruel enemy"—have completely robbed her of all statesmanlike instincts. Her sole anxiety is to see her darling sons safe back from the war, and to this consideration she has sacrificed everything. "I draw on myself the shame of great pusillanimity—I confess it, my head turns; my heart is long since already withered." * It was indeed only ten days after the war began that she wrote with her own hand to King Frederic, without the knowledge of Joseph, offering terms of peace, and making a personal appeal to his honour. It was on July 16 that she wrote this appeal to the honour of one of whom she had written but two months before (May 17) that "no prince in Europe had escaped his perfidies." Frederic

* *Maria Theresia und Marie Antoinette*, Briefwechsel von Arneth (Paris, 1865), p. 254.

was not unwilling to negotiate, but he was not the man to be generous, to fail to take advantage of divided counsels, secret negotiations, of a mother's love or a son's ignorance. In the interval preceding direct negotiation Prince Henry obtained his startling success at Tollenstein, and Kaiser Joseph learned of Maria Theresa's secret diplomacy with mingled wrath, amazement, and despair. The Austrian negotiator appointed to discuss definite terms with Frederic was Baron Thugut — a favourite of Maria Theresa's and one day to be Chancellor of Austria—" plain, unaffected, and steady," said Keith, but hardly tactful enough for so delicate a negotiation. The terms which he eventually offered to Frederic at the conference of Braunau (August 13–15) were that Austria should retain a part of the Bavarian Succession productive of about a million florins revenue a year,* give equivalents for any further claim, and arrange due settlement for the whole in the Aulic Council. In return the Austrian Court promised to make no opposition to Frederic's succession to the Margravates of Ansbach and Baireuth. These proposals were not such as Frederic was likely to favour; he was resolved to settle the question of the succession of Ansbach entirely without reference to Austria.

* This was interpreted by Thugut as a line stretching from Kufstein along the Inn to Wasserburg over Lankvat, Mildenau, and Retz to Waldmünchen. Possession of this territory would have united Austria to the Tirol and Italy.

It was not only that the raising of this question was inconvenient for Prussia, but that, by doing so, she would confess that the Bavarian Succession was to be regulated, not according to principles of law but according to the doctrines of bargains and equivalents. Therefore to Frederic, either as Prussian King or as defender of the rights and liberties of the Germanic body, this proposal was inadmissible. As for Austria's existing claim to Bavaria, he saw no real alteration in her demands; she still desired the strategic command of too large a part of Bavaria. Last of all, being already in the field, Frederic thought himself justified in insisting upon more, rather than upon less, of his original demands.[1] Accordingly, on August 16 he broke off further negotiations, and Thugut returned to Vienna. It is by no means clear that Frederic's action was wise, because Austria had more to lose over the whole matter by delay than he had. Joseph was naturally enraged, so that it led to a breach with his mother—"a little humour" as she very euphemistically called it to Marie Antoinette. The whole negotiation had been a complete failure, and Maria Theresa bewailed in secret to her sympathetic daughter how much this step of directly addressing "our cruel enemy" had cost her.*

The negotiation at Braunau, though ill-

* *Maria Theresia und Marie Antoinette*, Arneth, p. 258.

timed and rash, marks a highly significant stage in Austrian policy. Ever since the Partition of Poland (1772) the influence of the unscrupulous Kaunitz and the autocratic Joseph had been the main forces in the foreign policy of Vienna. The proceedings at the Diet of 1776, the negotiations over the Partition-Treaty of January 3, 1778, and the subsequent diplomacy until the end of June evidently bear the impress of the ruthless diplomat and the impetuous Kaiser. Now, for the first time since 1772, comes a revolt on the part of Maria Theresa, and with it a return to less harsh methods, a recognition of the moral opinion of Europe, of the rights of treaties and obligations, which is quite foreign to the policy which had intimidated Karl Theodor. The concessions offered and the attitude assumed at Braunau conspired with the logic of events to support Maria Theresa. Had France shown any desire to assist, had Kaiser Joseph won a decisive victory in the field, he and Kaunitz might have recovered their ascendancy, readopted their drastic methods of settling the Bavarian Succession, and adhered to the Partition-Treaty of January 3. The result of the campaign was not indeed discreditable to Austria, but it was not such as to permit her statesmen to adopt this attitude of proud assertion. The policy of force had failed, and with it fell the Partition-Treaty of January 3.

During July, August, and September relations between Austria and Prussia had been further embittered by an angry wrangle at the Diet, which had continued to sit at Regensburg during the war. The dispute concerned Albert's Act of Renunciation of Lower Bavaria, which the representatives of Austria pronounced with passion to be forged, and that of Prussia asserted, with reason, to be genuine. After the Braunau negotiations and the indecisive campaign, Austrian policy entered a new phase. The first results were secret and were seen in an appeal to France to act as mediator. On August 20 the Cabinet of Versailles addressed a letter to their minister (M. Haussen) at Berlin, which outlined a scheme and offered French mediation to secure it.[2] Frederic replied unfavourably, and a month afterwards Austria disclosed the course of negotiations and renewed her offer to Germany as a whole. On September 23 the members of the Diet received a Representation and Request from Austria. The Imperial Court described the Braunau negotiations, and mentioned their desire for a satisfactory peace, and their willingness to submit their claims to the judgment of the Diet. It then explained its new proposals (which had already been made to Prussia by French mediation). For the sake of public tranquillity, Austria formally renewed the offer to the Germanic Diet as a

whole. The Imperial Court was ready to restore and evacuate all Bavarian territories, to abrogate the Partition-Treaty, provided that there the Prussian King renounced the succession to Ansbach and Baireuth. Finally, the Diet of the Empire was asked to interpose its good offices to persuade Frederic to accept these terms.[3]

The Josephine policy of force, which rode roughshod over existing rights, was thus succeeded by the Theresan one of conciliation and respect for the old order. At any rate this was the first impression upon the members of the Diet. All the minor states naturally desired peace, because, so long as there was war, their neutrality and their existence were equally endangered. The Austrian "Representation" now suggested to them that it was Frederic, and not Joseph, who was now standing in the way of peace, and therefore it was regarded as a "Master stroke in Politicks" at Vienna, and such for the moment and for the Diet it was. Frederic, who had risked so much for the general interest, now seemed to be acting adversely to it by refusing to negotiate on these terms. In truth he was somewhat hardly used, for his succession to Ansbach had no direct bearing on the Succession to Bavaria, but Austria had manœuvred so cleverly as to bring it under discussion. The proposal was indeed hardly ingenuous, because, if Frederic were

induced to resign his claim to Ansbach it would be by moral pressure, whereas force alone had induced the Court of Vienna to resign its claim to Bavaria. Frederic had sacrificed much for the common cause, yet, if he did not give up Ansbach, he might incur the full odium and blame of prolonging the war and seeking his own ends. "After having announced himself as the Protector and Defender of the Germanic System, he may (over and above the expenses he has incurred) find himself reproached, deserted, perhaps attacked (*sic*) even by his friends, as the grand enemy and disturber of the Publik Tranquillity." A curious reversal had taken place in the parts which he had played as the Defender, and Kaiser Joseph as the Invader, of the Rights of the Empire.[4]

Thus, by a clever diplomatic manœuvre, Austria had placed Frederic in a somewhat dangerous situation. However, he was not without resources or sympathy, his combinations had already been working for his advantage, and he was to be rescued from this quandary by his ally, who had deserted him at the beginning of the war. He had felt strong enough to reject the French mediation in August, for the French army was not to be feared. There was only one Power in Europe which could intervene with effect at the moment—a Power already gaining vastly in importance, still more in its sense of importance, under the direction of the

most whimsical, vicious, and brilliant woman then living. Catherine the Great of Russia was herself a German princess by birth, and her friendship and alliance with Frederic had heightened her interest in German affairs. During the early months of 1778 she had been daily expecting an ultimatum from Turkey, and therefore had neither the power nor the desire to interfere in Germany. By the middle of the year this danger had passed, and she had leisure to contemplate the politics of the West. France was now at war with England, and therefore unable to interfere in Germany with effect, so that a dazzling prospect opened for Catherine. Campaign and negotiation had each failed to produce any real change in the balance of power between Austria and Prussia, but, if Catherine intervened and offered her good offices to bring about peace, she might be the mediatrix of Germany and the arbitress of the West. Half a dozen years before, Austria and Prussia had interfered with her regulation of Poland; it would be a fine return to interfere with their regulation of Germany. The glory of the part she designed to play, the consciousness of the strength given her, alike by her armies, by her reputation, and by the voices of her flatterers, strengthened her desire for fame and her confidence of success.[5]

The idea of a Russian mediation had crossed the minds of diplomatists before the outbreak

of war, and, singularly enough, it had been stimulated, perhaps even suggested, by a diplomatic ruse on the part of Frederic. Catherine and her ministers had denied that the war with Austria formed a *casus foederis* in their alliance with Prussia, but had openly expressed their sympathy with Frederic's attitude in the Bavarian question. To the general surprise Frederic had shown himself averse from their interference, and had even dropped his usual practice of communicating to them his diplomatic plans—more especially those relating to the negotiations of Bavaria. The vanity of Catherine, and of Count Panin her minister, was stung by this apparent neglect and clumsiness on the part of Frederic. In reality the shrewd old King had played a master-stroke, apparently with full intention and calculation. His inattention commanded attention; roused their activity and directed their immediate glance to Germany. In the meantime Frederic won over to his side by many promises—and "lured" on Prince Potemkin with the expectation of the Duchy of Courland—the brilliant and powerful favourite of Catherine. Frederic had also an ally in the Grand Duke Paul, Catherine's son, who maintained a great admiration for him, while the tears of the Grand Duchess, and the persuasions of Potemkin, helped to decide Catherine and Panin upon interference.[6]

The result of these manœuvres soon ap-

peared. Prince Kaunitz had been living in a fool's paradise, for he had been assured at the beginning of the campaign that Russia did not regard the Bavarian War as a *casus foederis*. Hence he communicated the Representation and Request to Petrograd, and asked for the good offices of Russia, in conjunction with those of France. His suggestion coincided —or rather actually interfered—with Russia's design for intervention, and Panin showed his annoyance. He answered the Austrian overture at first ungraciously, hinting pretty strongly that, under certain circumstances, Russia might become a party in the war herself.[7] Shortly afterwards a corps of 30,000 Russians was ominously moved into West Poland in the direction of Austria. Before Kaunitz had done wondering at this startling move of Russian diplomacy, Frederic had turned not only his own but Austria's ally to good account. "Not content with having secured to himself the certain assistance of Russia, in case of a continuation of the war, he attempted a step still more difficult, but in which it should appear he has proved equally successful: that of creating a mistrust between France and Austria, and renewing the coolness which had so long subsisted between France and Russia. For this purpose, he took advantage of the sentiments the Court of Versailles expressed to him in the month of August, and in answer to their

offer of becoming mediators, said he was ready to accept their mediation, as he should be that of the Empress of Russia, in case she should think proper to propose it. France, convinced that the King of Prussia acted on sure grounds, and desirous, from every kind of reason, of drawing towards this Court, immediately made here (Petrograd) the proposals of the joint-mediation, and as in consequence of the King of Prussia's advice a similar offer had been sent from hence to Paris (the two couriers actually crossing on the road), it was accepted without hesitation ; no time was lost in making their mutual intentions known to the Court of Vienna."[8] With the exception of the last sentence Harris's account may serve as a true picture of Frederic's feat, and shows the cleverness with which this old King, though brought to a dead halt in war, found his way out of his difficulties by diplomacy. Some time necessarily elapsed before the joint-mediation could be arranged; Kaunitz, baffled and furious, was a little brusque in his communications with Petrograd;[9] Catherine and her foreign minister Panin were not on the best terms with Versailles. Catherine, womanlike, showed a good deal of caprice, impatience, and hesitation, according as her fancy favoured Panin the lukewarm or Potemkin the ardent friend of Frederic. However, she was clear-sighted enough to see that France could not be very

effective as a mediator if she was engaged in war with England, and that the real glory of intervention would belong to Russia. In the first week of November France made known to Petrograd her willingness to act as co-mediator.[10] The only stipulation which she made in consenting to act as co-mediator, was that each mediating Power should act as umpire, not as ally. The stipulation was to be fairly observed by France but hardly by Russia; the one was to be a weak judge, the other a strong advocate.

French diplomacy was not content with a stipulation for guiding the mediators, it laid down also a principle for guiding the mediation, which is so characteristic of the age as to deserve attention. In the present state of affairs in Germany, when Force is opposed to Force, the original rights can have no effect, and any discussion of them could only tend to prolong the war: "Que la Convenance et non les Droits réels des Parties intéressées devroit faire la Base de la Négotiation." "A most extraordinary principle to be laid down by the chief guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia," rightly commented Elliot.[11] Austria seems quite willing to have adopted this view, indeed, by introducing the Ansbach question into previous negotiations, had expressly committed herself to doing so, and Prussia, though more hesitatingly, seems to have acceded. It was just as well that some protest should be made

against principles, which appeared to dissolve society into its natural elements in order to rearrange them according to the system of the Balance of Power. To France the dissolution of the Germanic Empire, which she had done so much to accomplish in the past, could hardly appear an evil, but to both England and Hanover it was naturally the worst of calamities, for it endangered the security of the one and the existence of the other. Hence English diplomacy was induced to adopt a line in accordance with high international morality, a line, it must be admitted, not always to be discerned in her policy at this period. From the English representative at Regensburg came an even more impressive indictment than had come from Elliot.* "Much reasoning has been advanced . . . derived from the notion of a certain Ballance of Power. The partizans of the Imperial Court have continually urged the necessity of setting bounds to the aggrandizement of the House of Brandenbourg, those of Prussia have not less insisted on the same necessity against that of Austria; and both have been forward to hold forth this mode of argument, as more conclusive and more likely to influence the general vote, than any plea of real right founded in the justice of their respective pretensions. This language has been

* *S.P.F. Archives, Bavaria*, vol. 45, Ratisbon, Heathcote to Fraser, November 15, 22, 1778.

heard with too much complacency. It has been forgotten, that the Germanic Body is a Political System, whose basis rests on Laws and Treaties; Laws, made by universal consent, and Treaties guaranteed by some of the principal Powers of Europe, and that consequently it is to these Laws and these Treaties, and to these only, that all reasoning relative to this System, is to be referred, and, by which every Dispute arising therein ought to be decided. From this just and only true point of view the States of the Empire have been artfully diverted; and, wandering from the remembrance of their own inherent consequence, have been led to think and act, as if the only object they had or ought to have in view was to ballance the Court of Berlin against that of Vienna. But this is surely a Doctrine by no means adapted to the spirit or the interests of the Germanic Constitution, for it not only exposes the members of this Constitution to be the indiscriminate supporters or opposers of any cause whatever, whether just or unjust, but is utterly subversive of every principle and every tie, on which their Political Dignity and even Existence ultimately depends. Its influence, however, notwithstanding this obvious reflection, has been but too general; so much so, that when the Empress-Queen in her last Negotiation with the King of Prussia offered to keep possession of such an extent of

territory *only*, as should produce a revenue of one million of florins per annum, and that *by way of equalling* the acquisition which the Prussian Monarch would make in the Margraviates of Ansbach and Baireuth, many did not scruple on that very account to pronounce the proposal reasonable." [12] It is so unusual to hear the wind of moral indignation sweeping through the diplomatic chancelleries in the eighteenth century, that such sentiments deserve emphasis. They were adopted by the Home Government, and so far as England's weight went—unfortunately no great distance—it was flung into the scale of establishing rights by law and by precedent, not by pretension and power.

The adoption or rejection of the sentiments of morality depended apparently on the joint-mediators, but in fact upon Russia. France was a guarantor of the Treaty of Westphalia, but at war with England at the moment; Russia was for the first time introduced into German affairs, and behind her negotiators stood the vast mass of the Russian army. France could not go to war for her ally Austria, Russia could for her ally Frederic. Breteuil, the French negotiator, was a shrewd and able diplomat, with moral force only behind him; Prince Repnin was not only the Russian Plenipotentiary, but had 30,000 troops under his command. That fact was the essential differ-

ence between the two mediators. Catherine, herself one of the finest of diplomats, thoroughly understood the situation, and used every art to enhance the Russian influence and procure the Russian triumph. Her sentiments were seen in her long instruction sent to Prince Repnin (October 22, 1778), whom she had chosen as Russian Plenipotentiary in the coming Congress. Catherine showed a strong Prussian bias, denounced the claims of Austria as against law and justice, blamed Joseph for his violence in invading Bavaria, and for the shock given to all the smaller Powers, and praised Frederic for his attempt to maintain the rights and liberties of the Germanic Empire. Panin had already written that "Germany, as much by its position as by its power, is the centre of all the affairs and all the interests of Europe," and that every change in its constitution consequently affected all other nations. Catherine drove home this view in her instruction, and added that the maintenance of the existing Germanic Constitution accorded with Russian interests. Austria must therefore be informed that Russia could no longer remain an indifferent spectator. Catherine did not intend to enter too deeply into juridical questions, though she thought a general support and flattery of the minor German potentates was desirable. Neither England nor France, at war with one another, could well oppose the

Russian lead. "In this way we shall have the honour, in the eyes of all Germany, of having produced the necessary denouement, and perhaps even of having united many princes in one system. This result will produce for Russia the advantage it has so long desired, of being named Guarantor for the future of the Germanic Constitution, a position to which France owes its preponderant influence in affairs." As, however, it was dangerous to allow the war to continue, and as flattery and moral sentiments might not stop it, Russia was prepared to give substantial aid to Frederic, and to enforce peace by sending an auxiliary army to assist Prussia in the spring. Nothing, however, was to be risked, for Catherine still feared a Turkish invasion. The Russian army was not to join Frederic in Silesia, but would only make a diversion in Galicia and Lodomeria.[13] The whole instruction is a masterly state-paper, full of shrewd insight and cool calculation. It must have given Catherine exquisite pleasure to think that she, the once despised petty German princess, was now as Russian Empress about to mediate between the two greatest of German sovereigns.

A subsequent confidential note from Panin to Repnin made it quite clear that Russia was determined to exact a price for her aid. Panin said Frederic had rejected too sharply Kaunitz' suggestion that Austria should make her with-

drawal from the Partition-Treaty contingent on her recognition of Frederic's succession to Ansbach-Baireuth. Austria must receive some slight compensation to soothe her vanity. Repnin was to start from "the principle of giving something," and not tôo much, and always, be it carefully understood, in return for the confirmation of Frederic in the Ansbach-Baireuth Succession.[14] The policy of high virtue and justice was thrown over altogether, that of equivalents and expediency was dominant. It looked as if it was to be one of the old Congresses, where

> "Diplomats' dinners take place in fine weather,
> And they cut up their mutton and Europe together."

In fact, the whole negotiation was to turn on the question of how large a slice of Bavarian mutton Joseph was prepared to accept.

On November 19 Prince Repnin, as representing the Czarina, left Petrograd; he reached King Frederic at Breslau in December. On the 19th he opened negotiations on the basis outlined by Catherine, and promised the support of an auxiliary Russian corps in the next campaign. Prince Repnin had been commander of the 30,000 Russians who had been moved in the direction of Lublin by the Austrian border in November. He now left his army behind, but had the same policy as then, for his character was "by no means gentle." Frederic took care to flatter him much, but he could not have

found all his communications agreeable, though glad to find that Repnin held the Austrian demand for over a third of Bavaria to be untenable. But if Frederic was a little annoyed with his ally, his resentment was as nothing to that which Austria had for France. Throughout the war the French policy had been not unjustly suspected by Austria, and as was now to be seen the French plan of pacification was unquestionably unfriendly to Austria.[15] Their memorial (January 21), which was agreed to by Russia, proposed, in substance, that Austria should limit her pretensions to the triangle formed by the junction of Inn and Danube, including Neuburg, Braunau, and Burghausen, but excluding the salt mines of Reichenhall. Austria was to recognize the complete rights of Karl Theodor to the whole Bavarian territory apart from this district, and to Mindelheim, and to arrange for a monetary compensation to the allodial heir, the Elector of Saxony. She was also to recognize the rights of Frederic to the eventual succession of Ansbach-Baireuth. These articles, which were to be ratified by the Imperial Diet, formed the basis of the Preliminaries. The formal peace was to be arranged by a conference of Principals and mediators at Teschen.[16]

These Preliminaries could hardly cause satisfaction at Vienna. On New Year's Day, 1779, the Empress-Queen, as on the previous anniver-

sary, showed marks of anxiety and depression, while "care and dissatisfaction" marked the brow of Kaunitz.[17] Keith did not note the expression of Kaiser Joseph, but it was certain that the whole negotiation had caused him intense mortification. However, the pressure was too strong, the French ally had proved faithless to them, the Russian ally but too faithful to Frederic, and the "three kings of Vienna" were not in a position to resist. The cautious eye of Keith noted a slackening of military preparations, which served as a political barometer. On February 16, 1779, the Court of Vienna declared its acceptance of the Preliminaries, to which Frederic and the two mediators had already agreed, and peace appeared upon the horizon. The consent of Karl Theodor, Elector of Bavaria, and of the Duke of Zweibrücken, had not been formally obtained, but the protests of these distinguished potentates, in so far as they affected their family affairs, have already been related. Karl Theodor's objections to the compensation to be paid to the Elector of Saxony for a moment attained international importance, but in general their complaints and objections ruffled the surface, without diverting the current, of the streams flowing towards peace.

While it is not needful to discuss in detail the actions of the smaller Powers at the Congress of Teschen, some attempt must be made

to estimate the motives of the great Powers. With so many contracting parties, and with so much disputable matter, the Congress could not pass off in complete harmony. The Austrian attitude does not need much further outlining; the diplomacy of the Court of Vienna had made the essential concession, agreeing to abrogate the Partition-Treaty in return for the district of Burghausen, but it had made it with a bad grace. Kaunitz and Kaiser Joseph had not yet done wondering at the unfriendly attitude of Russia, they felt that they acted under coercion from the mediating Powers, and accordingly they were not conciliatory or obliging in the subsequent negotiations.

The objects and policy of Frederic—after the Preliminaries—had become perfectly simple and precise. In September the Austrian offer of restitution had for a moment made him appear an aggressor. But his skilful manœuvres brought Russia and France so quickly to his aid that he had been able once more to expose Austria to defeat. He was determined to restrict Austrian pretensions to Bavaria to the insignificance of the Inn-Danube triangle. He steadfastly refused to yield his own pretensions on Ansbach, and was unshaken either by the Austrian threat of refusal to recognize them or by her offer to consent to that succession at a price. At the same time he was acute enough

to leave the game to be played by the two mediating Powers, and practically to limit his action to promoting their union. Now and again he interfered, sometimes with a compliment, sometimes with a threat, sometimes by demanding a categorical answer from Vienna, or even by an order to set his troops in motion. But, for the most part, he stood as he had done opposite Arnau, not himself attacking the enemy, but with arms crossed and immovable, admiring the fine exploits of some one else. In diplomacy this masterly inaction was as successful as it had been fruitless in the field.

Of the two negotiating Powers France had by far the most difficult part to play, and Vergennes, her minister at Paris, and Breteuil, her Plenipotentiary at the Congress, would have found it hard in any case to act without duplicity. France was the ally of Austria, but she had almost openly sympathized with Zweibrücken's claims, and had not remonstrated with Frederic for going to war. Her reason was that, locked as she was in a death-struggle with England in the New World, France could not intervene with effect or with commanding force in the Old. Under these circumstances her interests were best served by the smallest possible disturbance to the existing arrangements in Germany. Such were the views of Vergennes at Paris and the instructions of Breteuil at Teschen, and both

were carried out with dexterity and effect. Vergennes smoothed the way for Russian diplomacy at Constantinople by mollifying the Turks, and sent the French plan of pacification for Germany to Petrograd in company with flattery of the most subtle and agreeable kind.[18] So successful was this policy, so gratified was Count Panin by the flattering unction so freely poured forth, that he even extolled French diplomacy and politeness in unmeasured terms to the British Ambassador at Petrograd. Harris listened in great disgust, and, when he replied by hinting some doubts as to French good faith, Panin overwhelmed him "by a long Reasoning, drawn, I am convinced, from His Prussian Majesty's Letters." At any rate, it embodied Frederic's favourite idea of a union of France, Russia, and Prussia, though discreetly omitting the latter from the argument. "The Purport was that France would ever be jealous of the aggrandizement of the House of Austria; and that, as long as it was in the power of Russia to assist France in keeping the Court of Vienna within bounds, they always should have an influence over that of Versailles. He (Count Panin) talked as if he had entirely forgot that France was at war with us, and as a person who, with one favourite object in his head, makes all others subservient to it."

The note struck in this passage is entirely characteristic of Russian diplomacy at the

moment. Catherine and Panin were so intoxicated by the splendour of their position, by the alternate flatteries of Frederic and Vergennes, by the submission of Austria, that they dreamed a " golden dream " of a humbled Germany receiving peace from the hands of the Empress of the East. In the beginning their interest in the negotiation was absorbing; " the small proportion of time Count Panin devotes to Business is wholly employed on this subject," and Catherine, between one flirtation and another, looked " with uncommon satisfaction " on the progress of a pacification of which she regarded herself as the sole promoter.[19] The result of this conduct was to make lookers-on, even the most acute of them, imagine that Russian diplomats misused their opportunities—even Frederic thought they suffered by comparison with the French. " Les Français sont foibles, mais ils agissent rondement. . . . Les Russes sont d'une gaucherie dans les affaires, comme si les négociations ouvraient pour eux une carrière toute nouvelle. Soyez persuadé que ce n'est pas le moindre de mes embarras, que celui de leur désiller les yeux et de les empêcher de faire des sottises." * Frederic flattered himself too much, Catherine's instruments were Russian and did not always behave in a Western and diplomatic fashion.

* Schöning, p. 226, Frederic to Prince Henry, Jan. 10, 1779; cp. June 3, 1779, Harris to Weymouth.

Panin could be boastful, Repnin could be crude in his diplomatic methods. Yet if their diplomatic technique was at fault, the main purpose and object of Russian policy was grasped by them with masterly firmness. Behind Panin was Catherine, and behind Repnin were thirty thousand men, a combination which proved irresistible in the end.

It was not to be expected that, even after the signature of the Preliminaries, the Court of Vienna could submit without a struggle. Even though Kaunitz and Joseph had been forced to abandon their original design of getting Lower Bavaria, they intended to pursue their subtle attempt to drag in the question of Frederic's claim to Ansbach. Therefore they had no intention of making the cause of mediation easy, or of giving way on minor points during the negotiations leading to the final peace. Keith watched their movements with the greatest attention, feeling their pulse almost from day to day. The activity or otherwise of military preparations was his great political barometer, and on February 20, four days after the acceptance of the Preliminaries at Vienna, he noted with great satisfaction that the "Mules from Italy, the Insurgents from Hungary, and all the Levies from Transylvania and the other distant provinces are countermanded." This might have seemed decisive, but on March 3 he was again

alarmed by rumours: "Never did there exist so strange a mixture of warfare and negotiation." [20] As late as February 28 a skirmish took place along the frontier, and till March 7 no truce was proclaimed. The Congress did not meet at Teschen till the second week of March; Frederic described it as follows: "Teschen n'est pas le lieu le plus agréable. C'est un triste séjour dont une vieille Vénus de soixante-dix ans, fait tous les délices. M. de Breteueil s'en est exposé, et cette divinité préside à toutes leurs assemblées" (Schöning, p. 268). These not very thrilling diversions were stimulated by some diplomatic excitements. The Court of Vienna had indeed ceased to co-operate with Karl Theodor, but it showed him just sufficient countenance to make the other Powers suspect a secret understanding without giving him sufficient support to achieve any substantial result. In the same way it lent some countenance to a host of minor claimants, who hastened to put in their pretensions before the whole question of the inheritance was definitely decided at the Congress. Such pretensions were in any case unlikely to be granted, because the Preliminaries had already marked the limits of distribution. But none the less, the Duke of Würtemberg, the Archbishop of Salzburg, and the Bishop of Augsburg produced claims, none of which were very good either in law or fact. Heathcote satirically remarked

that the claims of the last named on Mindelheim were much inferior to those which the existing Duke of Marlborough might have put forward. Other pretensions were on the same level, and all were regarded as "so many secret engines employed by the Court of Vienna in order to perplex the question of the Bavarian Succession." [21] However, these claimants and this opposition were gradually swept aside by the strong forces compelling peace. There was none the less much suspicion and frequent alarm. At last Keith was cheered by the sight of the Croatian regiments returning home through Vienna, and this time the barometer was not at fault. Peace was finally signed on May 13—Vienna rejoiced, Te Deums were sung —and Prince Repnin and Breteuil, the two representatives of the mediating Powers, each received from Maria Theresa her picture "very magnificently set round with Diamonds."*

The final arrangements did not materially differ from the Preliminaries, despite the opposition of Austria, the resentment of Karl Theodor, and the angry buzzing of the swarm of minor claimants. Austria received Burghausen, and renounced any further rights on Bavaria. The Elector of Saxony in compensation of his claims as allodial heir obtained the Principality of

* Frederic gave Repnin his picture "very richly set (to be worn at the buttonhole) estimated at 20,000 dollars," and Breteuil "a very fine box but not of equal value."—*Letters of Earl Malmesbury* (1870), i. 407.

Mindelheim and four million florins. The rest of the Bavarian dominions were guaranteed to Karl Theodor, Elector Palatine, and by the eighth article the whole was to descend indivisibly to his nephew and heir, the Duke of Zweibrücken. The King of Prussia triumphantly asserted his rights to the direct succession to Ansbach, and in return Austria was recognized as having some reversionary rights on Lusatia, in case of the extinction of the Saxon Line. These arrangements were accepted by Austria and Prussia, were to be supported by them for ratification in the Diet of the Empire, and were solemnly guaranteed by France and Russia. Every species of legality was pressed into the service to defend them: Prussia and Austria supported the tottering fabric of the Empire like two pillars against danger from within; it was defended from without by two buttresses in the shape of Russia and of France.

Diplomatically the results of the peace must be considered a triumph for Frederic, whom Joseph called the "Anti-Kaiser, supported by Russians," though his gains were negative in character. At the beginning of the dispute he had disavowed any idea of acquiring territory at the expense of the Empire, a disclaimer that was as astonishing as it was new from the invader of Silesia and recent partitioner of a foreign country. He had taken up arms, ostensibly to prevent any acquisition

of territory within the Empire by a Power without consent of the Diet and regard for the Law, really to prevent the disturbance of the balance of power. In either case he had kept his word and achieved his object. He had not gained his way by arms — his soldiers had done nothing but steal plums; but his diplomacy had prevented Austria stealing provinces. Alone and unaided, save by Saxony, he had first asserted the rights of the Empire to limit the pretensions of Austria, and then induced other Powers to intervene, who had solemnly confirmed and supported his actions. At the end also he had stubbornly held out for full compensation for Saxony; privately convinced that it was unwise to abandon Prussia's only German ally, and publicly asserting his zeal for the Laws of the Empire. It is true that the respect for Germanic Liberties and the Diet was more apparent than real, for the solid arrangements dated from the Peace of Teschen, not from its confirmation by the Imperial Diet. None the less, the Diet was treated with far more respect than it had been at other times and other seasons by Frederic himself. The minor states, as a whole, were grateful to Frederic for upholding their rights and standing forth as their champion, and their moral support was of the greatest possible value to him. Weymouth, at the English Foreign Office, spoke of "the

very noble, dignified, and disinterested manner in which His Prussian Majesty has acted." [22] Peasants in Bavaria hung his portrait in their huts beside those of the Virgin and lighted a candle before each; it would be difficult to say whether the tribute of minister or rustic was the more spontaneous or important as marking the achievement of Frederic.

In future Frederic was able to point to Kaiser Joseph as the tyrant who wished to crush the ancient Liberties of Germany, and to himself as their defender. In this peace and in this attitude is to be found the strength of Frederic in the last years of his life, which enabled him to defeat every scheme of Kaiser Joseph to secure further territory in Germany. The formation of the Fürstenbund (the League of Princes) to resist Joseph in 1785, the last diplomatic achievement in Frederic's life, has its origin in the events of 1778–79. But it was not only in Germany that Frederic had succeeded in isolating Joseph, though such a success would have been quite serious enough in itself. Frederic had isolated Austria in Europe as well as in the Empire, and his action was to be the problem and the pivot of European politics in the immediate future.

The general moral influence and aspect of the Treaty of Teschen is perhaps of most interest, for it marks the decisive defeat of an attempt at Partition which had few parallels

even in eighteenth century history. The Partition of Poland—the most typical of the age—had indeed exhibited the unscrupulous lengths to which diplomats could go. But at least there was the excuse that there was anarchy in Poland, that the sense of nationality was dead, and that the Act violated only the general obligations of international right. None of these excuses could be advanced for the Treaty of Partition by which Kaiser Joseph was to obtain Lower Bavaria. No plea that Bavaria was in a state of anarchy or that its people were incapable of resenting foreign occupation could apply to this case. Here there was no vague injury to the vague and indefinite sanctions of international obligation, but a precise one to the sharp and defined rules and Laws of the Germanic Empire. The Kaiser —the Head of the Law and the Empire— was deliberately assailing both, with dubious genealogies as his sole excuse. A dozen Laws and a dozen Treaties were deliberately torn up, and a peaceful territory invaded, by the soldiers of the Kaiser. It is difficult to conceive any case in which the restraint of law was less operative and the licence of force more evident. The rules which the Kaiser applied to the territory of a German prince were such as a modern European Power might apply to that of a native African chief. Desiring to increase or round off its possessions at his

expense, it would offer him the option of war or of cession of the desired territory, and confirm its rights by a treaty published to the world. This was precisely the method of Kaiser Joseph, except that he veiled his aggression by a claim, dug from the mediaeval records, which deceived few, least of all himself. Such actions have their precedents, but not their justifications, in Europe.

A Partition of Germany on the lines of the Partition of Poland had been constantly feared. To this such a measure as the Partition of Bavaria was the obvious prelude, and it was in fact averted by two of those very Powers which had taken their share of Polish spoils. That Catherine and Frederic were hardly the rulers best calculated to protest against partitions and infractions of international morality mattered little; that they did actually so protest and enforced their argument by arms or by the threat of them mattered infinitely much. Whatever may have been their private reasons, Catherine suffered something and Frederic much for a cause in which they appeared disinterested. England, which in this matter may seem fairly impartial, gave unstinted praise to the way in which they had supported the liberties of Germany and the law of nations. In this way some real advance was made, because the whole tendency of the diplomacy was to demonstrate that Austria had gone too

far in her aggressive schemes. Kaiser Joseph is indeed interesting for this very reason, that he always represented his age in its extreme tendencies. In the Partition-Treaty of January 3 and the subsequent diplomacy he displayed the qualities of cynicism, of aggression, of thirst for territory in their most naked form, and the logical tendency of his mind gave a memorable completeness to this policy. It was for this reason that he was defeated. Logic went too far, boldness overreached itself, and the stretched bow broke. That there were limits even to the scruples of diplomacy under the old regime, it was the fate of Kaiser Joseph to establish.

If traced to the root, the objection to the action of Kaiser Joseph will be found to have consisted far less in the violation of right than in the acquisition of power which he purposed for himself. Frederic and France acted as they did because the Balance of Power was endangered, England approved their action for the same reason, Russia acted both from reasons of state and for glory. None the less at the Congress the phrases of morality and fair dealing were on the lips of all, and their reality was occasionally present. The Peace of Teschen did not deal absolute justice: it gave Austria part of the disputed territory in virtue of claims that were flimsy, but it stopped the more marked display of force. It protested with

effect against unbridled aggression. The helpless Bavaria had received some justice, the stronger Austria some condemnation, from the "jurisprudence of princes." For Germany the ominous sign was that even the strength of Prussia had not availed to protect her against Austria. Frederic had at last been baffled in war, and, though he attained success in diplomacy, the price was a dreadful one. It was the diplomatic introduction of Russia into Germany, and it brought before Germans that terrible unknown power which has remained a standing menace to Teutonism ever since. "An English officer once congratulated Moltke on the splendid army which he had created and led. The marshal shook his head, and replied that the German army was a terrible burden on the country, but that the long Russian frontier made it a necessity." * The Treaty of Teschen for the first time revealed that danger, and it was brought about by the great predecessor of Moltke.

* * * * * *

Whatever its shortcomings, the Peace of Teschen was one of the few Treaties in that—or indeed any—generation which provided for the restoration, and not for the division of territory, which was summoned to compel restitution and not to sanction annexation. For that distinct achievement, even without its vaguer and more

* Acton, *Modern History*, p. 195.

indefinable influences, it was and deserved to be, memorable.

In the story of the settlement of the Bavarian Succession almost every element and motive typical of the old regime appeared. The personal force of rulers, dominating their peoples, is seen in Frederic, Joseph, and Catherine; the shameless claim, backed by forgeries and supported by arms, the resistance to it by one who had dismembered the Empire of old and who now posed as its champion; the war which ruined the peasants of Bohemia for objects of which they knew or cared nothing, the peace which made half-Oriental Russia a guardian of the sanctity of Germanic treaties; last of all the piteous spectacle of Bavaria herself, ruled by one ready to betray her, hurled this way and that in the eddies of diplomacy, unable or afraid to lift a sword in her own defence at the moment that her very existence was in the balance. It was such incidents and such rulers that caused the shame and the splendour, the glory and the misery, of the old regime.

The days of the old regime were indeed already numbered. The despots were soon to prove themselves unable to stem the tide of revolutionary vengeance, and the armies which Frederic and Joseph had trained were to go down in utter ruin before the *Marseillaise* and the ragged volunteers of France. Already, too,

there was playing among the Corsican rocks a boy who was to teach the world that it was not only the despots who dreamt of war, and that the armed champion of the rights of the people could plan partitions more shameless than those of Poland and conquests more extensive than those of Bavaria.

# APPENDICES

I HAVE ventured to print some extracts from the British despatches, a report from the Lansdowne MSS. on the Prussian army, and a poem on Joseph, found by me at Czaslau in Bohemia, which I had translated from the Czech. These all afford excellent contemporary views of the personalities in question. Sir James Harris and Hugh Elliot in their three despatches give a living picture of Frederic the Great and of his nephew and heir, Frederic-William, afterwards King Frederic-William II., and of their surroundings literary and social. Burgoyne's report shows the condition of the Prussian and Austrian armies. In Keith's despatch Kaiser Joseph tells his impressions of Catherine the Great; whilst a Czech peasant's poem reveals the popular impression of Kaiser Joseph.

I. Sir James Harris (Lord Malmesbury) and Hugh Elliot (Lord Minto) on Frederic the Great—his character and court.

(*a*) March 18, 1776. Character sketch of Frederic the Great and his successor.

(*b*) May 13, 1780. Hugh Elliot on Frederic's literary diversions.

(*c*) August 13, 1776. Harris on the visit of the Grand Duke Paul of Russia (afterwards Paul I.) to Berlin.

II. General Burgoyne's report on Austrian and Prussian armies, *c.* 1766–67.

III. Kaiser Joseph's impressions of Catherine the Great, 1782.

IV. A Czechish peasant's impressions of Kaiser Joseph, 1785 (?).

## APPENDIX I

### (*a*) Sir James Harris (Lord Malmesbury) on the Character and Court of Frederic the Great.

Berlin, *Monday*, 18*th March* 1776.

*Harris to Suffolk*

The Basis of His Prussian Majesty's Conduct, from the Time He mounted the Throne, to this day, seems to have been the considering Mankind in general, and particularly those over whom He was destined to reign, as Beings created merely to be subservient to His Will, and conducive to the carrying into execution whatever might tend to augment His Power, and extend His Dominions—Proceeding on these Grounds, He has all along been guided by His own Judgment alone, without ever consulting any of His Ministers or superior Officers; not so much from the low opinion He entertains of their abilities, as from a Conviction, from His own Feelings, that if He imployed them otherwise than as simple Instruments, they would in time assume a Will of their own; and instead of remaining Accessories, endeavour to become Principals. To persevere in this System, it was necessary for Him to divest Himself of Compassion and Remorse; of course of Religion and Morality. In the room of the first, He has substituted Superstition; in the place of the latter, what is called in France *Sentiment*; and from hence we may, in some

measure, account for that motley Composition of Barbarity and Humanity which so strongly mark His Character. I have seen Him weep at Tragedy; known Him pay as much care to a sick Grey Hound, as a fond Mother could to a favourite Child: And yet the next day, He has given Orders for the devastating a Province: or by a wanton increase of Taxes, make a whole district miserable; and what will perhaps appear still more contradictory, contribute to His own Brother's Death [August-Wilhelm, father of King Frederic-William II.], by continuing to him Marks of His displeasure the whole Time of his last Illness. Again, He is so far from being sanguinary, that He scarce ever suffers a Criminal to be punished capitally, unless for a most notorious Offence: Yet, the last War, He gave secret Orders to several of His Army Surgeons, rather to run the risk of a wounded Soldier's dying, than by the Amputation of a Limb, increase the Number and Expence of His Invalids. Thus, never losing sight of His Object, He lays aside all Feelings, the moment that is concerned: And although as an Individual, He often appears and really is Humane, Benevolent, and Friendly; yet, the Instant He acts in His Royal Capacity, these Attributes forsake Him, and He carryes with Him, desolation, Misery and Persecution, where ever He goes. From an easy Transposition of the same erroneous principle, to the internal Government of His Dominions, we may easily see, why He never can be taught to believe, that a large Treasure laying dormant in His Coffers impoverishes His Kingdom. That Riches increase by Circulation; That Trade cannot subsist without reciprocal Profit; That Monopolies, and exclusive Grants, put a Stop to Emulation, and of course to Industry; and in short,

that the real Wealth of a Sovereign, consists in the Ease and Affluence of His Subjects. These Errors, however capital they are, have rather served to augment the Misery of these Subjects, than impede the Progress of His own Grandeur: If He has failed in several points, Resolution and Cunning, imployed as the Occasion required, and always supported by great Abilities, has carried Him, with Success, through almost every important Undertaking He has attempted. We have seen Him end a War, with almost all the great Powers of Europe, by an advantageous Peace: And since We have seen Him gain such an Ascendency over those who were His most natural Enemies, as to make them contribute to the Execution of His ambitious Projects. His immense increase of Revenue, the gigantick Army He maintains; And the wonderful preponderance He bears in Europe, will, in future History, appear incredible. He found, on His Father's Death a Revenue of 13,000,000 of Crowns; a Treasure of 16,000,000; no debts; and an Army of 50,000 Men [in fact it was nearer 100,000]; And, at the time, this was reckoned as the greatest Effort of Oeconomy. He has now an Income of 21,000,000 of Crowns; three times that Sum, at least, in His Coffers; and near 200,000 effective Men. He undoubtedly owes this, in great measure to His superior Talents; Yet, I think, We may find another Cause, in the Character and position of His Subjects. In general they are poor, vain, ignorant, and destitute of Principle: had they been rich, His Nobility could never have been brought to serve as Subaltern Officers, with Zeal and Ardour: Their Vanity makes them think, they see their own greatness in the Greatness of their Monarch; Their Ignorance stifles in them every notion of Liberty and

Opposition; And their want of Principles, makes them ready Instruments to execute any Orders they receive, without considering whether they are founded on Equity, or not.—His Prussian Majesty has well known how to take advantage of this Character, by keeping them at a most awful distance: They consider a Word or a Smile from Him as a Boon, and by never rewarding them according to their Merits, they are taught to believe they have no merit at all. The superior Indowments Nature has given Him over them, and the Preeminence which He constantly affects, makes them look up to Him as a divinity; And although they feel the Rod of Iron with which they are governed, yet few repine, and none venture to murmur. At those moments when He lays aside the Monarch, and indulges Himself in every kind of debauchery, that a depraved Imagination, and worn out Constitution, can devise, He never suffers the Instruments, or partakers of these Excesses, to have the smallest Influence over Him, some few He has rewarded, discarded several, but left most of them in the Situation He found them. Having said thus much, it is perhaps less wonderful than it generally appears, that such a Sovereign, governing such a people, should have raised to so great a pitch of Glory, a Country which, from its geographical Position, its Climate, and its Soil, seems to have been calculated to act a very secondary Part amongst the European Powers; And it is not very difficult to foresee, on its changing Masters, that its preponderance will greatly sink, and as this Event is certainly not very distant, I hope I shall not trespass on Your Lord's time, in turning my Thoughts, for a moment, to the future State of these Dominions.

Having already spoken to Your Lordship very

fully to the Character of the Prince of Prussia [afterwards King Frederic-William II.], I can now only add, that I am confirmed in what I then wrote. His style of Life, at the Moment when He was at the Eve of becoming King, convinces me that when He actually is so, He will never change it, of course that He will neither be an active Monarch, or His own Minister; That He will look upon Business as a Task, and seek pleasure with avidity. The Nation aware of this turn, have been in a constant Ferment, from the Moment His Prussian Majesty's Illness has carried with it a serious Aspect; and there is not an insignificant *Conseiller de Province* who does not aspire to some important post under the new Reign. Unused to be allowed to think or reason for themselves, the Art of intriguing and forming Court Cabals sits very awkward on them: The Apprehension they are under of incurring the King's displeasure, by paying open Court to the Prince of Prussia, and that of offending the Prince by behaving to Him as they have hitherto done, makes it difficult to follow their Motions or to know exactly what they would be at.

On the whole, however, I think we may divide those who expect to be future Ministers, with any degree of probability, into three Sets. At the head of the first is Prince Henry, whose Creatures are Kniphausen who was in England; The Wruch Family, and several Favourites of His Royal Highness, who have no other Merit than their fair Complexion, and extreme good nature. The second is composed of M^r. de Hertzberg, one of the present Ministers of the foreign Department, a Man of great Application and sound Sense; M^r. de Schulembourg, who has the direction of the Bank, also a Man of Parts, and their

dependants; and this is undoubtedly the Party the best calculated to constitute a Ministry, adequate to the Government of this Country. The most likely to succeed, however, though they, by no means, come under the same description, are those who look upon themselves as the Prince's Favourites; Amongst the first of whom stands Mr. de Humboldt, formerly a Commissary in the Allied Army, afterwards Chamberlain to the Princess Elizabeth now at Stettin; a Man of plain Understanding, and fair Character, and who owes the good Will the Prince bears him, to the Assistance he has given His Royal Highness in pecuniary Matters; Mr. de Horst, whom His Prussian Majesty lately dismissed from the Head of the Department of Trade, an enterprizing Genius, lively Parts, but totally void of Judgment; and a Number of young Officers, partakers of His Royal Highness's Pleasures, who, tho' they have no desire to become active Ministers, all expect Employments, Decorations, or Pensions.

It is easy to be foreseen, that whichever of these Sets should come into place, or even supposing what is next to impossible, that the future Sovereign of this Country should take the Reins of Administration into His own Hands, that the essential difference there will be in the first case, between its being governed by many Ministers, who necessarily must be biassed by private Views and family Connexions; and in the second, by a young Prince, scarce known in Europe but by His Pleasures, instead of having at its Head a Monarch of tryed Abilities, and good Reputation, that it will be no longer the same great Nation, formidable to its Neighbours, and whose Alliance is almost universally courted; It will gradually sink to its natural Bulk, and, in the course of a few Years, have

no right to be reckoned amongst the leading Powers of Europe.

### (*b*) Hugh Elliot on King Frederic's Literary Diversions

Berlin, 13 *May* 1780.

*Elliot to Stormont*

Notwithstanding the assiduity with which the King of Prussia continues to preside over every Department of the State, His Majesty still finds opportunities to cultivate Letters and the Conversation of men of genius. Ever attentive to attach to His service those whose talents may be profitable or ornamental to His Court, He admits to private Interviews the Strangers who frequent it, and has, in several instances during the course of His reign, selected those of the greatest celebrity for the Companions of His leisure hours.—His Majesty has of late made choice of the Marquis of Lucchesini, an Italian, to attend His person at Potsdam.—To an extensive knowledge and agreeable address this Gentleman is said to add a strong resemblance to the late Count Algarotti, and to have attracted the King's attention by this circumstance. He was last week named one of His Majesty's Chamberlains, with a Pension of 2000 Crowns a year and is since gone to Potsdam.

Out of Cypher it would be imprudent not to approve of His Prussian Majesty's Choice though in reality it is considered as the Effect of Whim and Caprice. The Marquis Lucchesini is a young Man, and rather possessed of a plain sound understanding, and happy Memory, than of any bright Genius, or entertaining Talents. There are few of His Prussian Majesty's

unemployed Subjects of the same Rank in Life, who are not hurt at the Preference shewn to a Stranger, whose Name is hitherto unknown to the Publick.

Mr. Liston has been upon an intimate Footing with the Marquis, before my arrival; and I may reap some Benefit from his near Approach to the King.

Since the Company of professed Men of Letters seems to be as necessary to the King as Connections of a different Nature to the Heir apparent, it is perhaps not unfortunate that neither of these Places are, as usual, occupied by French Subjects; for the Prince has of late frequented an Italian Mistress. If however any Conjecture may be formed from prior Examples, neither of the Favourites can flatter themselves with a long Reign, as it is difficult to determine, whether the King of Prussia is more inconstant to His learned Friends, or The Prince to his female ones.

The only Circumstance of any Importance, that has come to my Knowledge, since I had the Honour of writing to Your Lordship, is, that it is intended, that The Prince of Prussia shall make a Journey to Petersburg, in the Month of October.

### (*c*) Harris on the Visit of the Grand Duke Paul (afterwards Czar Paul I.) to Berlin

*Private.* Berlin, *Aug.* 18, 1776.

*Harris to Eden*

I am heartily glad our bustle is over, I have now leisure to write to you, and it has furnish'd me with Materials to make my letter less insipid than usual. I forbore in my Official Correspondence, giving a circumstantial Account of our Magnificence and Splendour, not only from such Festivitys being much less delightful in description than in reality, but

because I felt my Pen would be greatly inferiour both in style and accuracy to those of the Gazettees *du bas Rhin* and other Continental news-writers: I must indeed do them the justice to say that on this occasion they have been very exact, and as far as regards the descriptive part of the Ceremony have scarce in a single instance deviated from the truth: I shall therefore not interfere in their department, but mention only such collateral facts as may have escap'd their observation.

Paul Petrovitch were names as you may suppose written on every triumphal arch—that must be wrong says the Mayor of a Bourg in Pomerania, the Grand Duke is certainly a Gentleman—put Paul *von* Petrovitch.

All the Domesticks belonging to the Imperial Family in Russia have military rank—the Grand Duke's Coachman and He of His Prussian Majesty going one evening to drink together a dispute arose about Precedence—"What is your rank?" says the Prussian. "Lieutenant Colonel," says the other. "Ah! but I am a Colonel," answers the German and walks first into the Alehouse. The Fact came to y^e^ King's ears—the Colonel was sent for three days to Prison to receive fifty *Coups de Canne.*

When the Grand Duke left Berlin it rain'd and thunder'd—Cannons were continually firing—a German Poet with an Imagination bolder than that of the Frenchman, remark'd, that Angels join'd their tears to those of the People for the departure of H.I.H., and that Jove and Frederick accompany'd him with their Thunder.

Seventy thousand Horses and thirty thousand Peasants were employ'd to convey the Grand Duke from Memel to Berlin. Prince Henry in talking to

one of them said, "You certainly cannot join in the publick joy, but impreeate a journey which takes you from your Harvest and other necessary occupations." "No," replied the courtierlike boor, "we are all happy to be employed on this occasion, since we foresee it will prevent us and our horses from being kill'd in future times by dragging Artillery and other complements of war."

Formey the Honest *Secretaire perpetuel* of the Academy of Sciences in haranguing the Grand Duke made use of this expression, "*C'est l'homme bien plus que le Prince que nous admirons et ce a qui l'entree de nos cœurs est bien plus ouverte que celle de ce lieu*"—the entry of the Academy is a *Porte cochere*—for the rest of the Bathos in this speech, I refer you to the original which I enclose; this same good Formey on the death of the late King of Sardinia said in one of his Academical discourses, "*Mettons plus de ferveur que jamais dans nos prieres pour la conservation des jours de Notre auguste Souverain—il est devenu le doyen des Rois il est dans la breche—L'ange de la mort tient le glaive suspendu sur sa tete.*" You may guess whether such a language however well intended gave pleasure.

## APPENDIX II

OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRESENT MILITARY STATE OF PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA BY GENERAL BURGOYNE, *c.* 1766–67 ("SHELBURNE PAPERS," LANSDOWNE MSS. vols. 42 and 137).

The excellence of the Prussian troops appears the more extraordinary when we consider the disadvantages attending them unknown to other States. The

ranks are filled up perhaps more than a third part with strangers, deserters, prisoners, and enemies of various countries, languages, and religions. They cannot therefore be actuated by any of the great moving principles which usually cause extraordinary superiority in armies; they have neither national spirit nor attachment to their prince, nor enthusiasm nor hopes of fortune, nor even prospect of comfortable old age to inspire them.

In an army thus composed it is wisdom and sound policy to sink and degrade all intellectual faculties, and to reduce the man as nearly as possible to mere machinery, and indeed as nature has formed the bulk of the King of Prussia's subjects that is not very difficult . . . many of his disciples suppose his necessity to be his choice . . . the vigour of the army is in the subalterns and non-commissioned officers who undoubtedly are the best in the world. It seems to decline as the ranks ascend, and as other qualifications than those of mere execution become requisite.

The greater part of the present set (of generals) have recommended themselves by their assiduity on parade, and are men of very confined education.

Prussian officers by length of time and experience only become more expert artificers to prepare and sharpen a fine weapon, diligent and proud to deliver it into the hands of their master in perfect order, awkward and ignorant if compelled to employ it themselves.

If this survey of the Prussian army is just it will be found . . . that its most formidable power exists in the King or in his Brother, Prince Henry. All the energy of action and expedient is in them; and whenever they fail and the direction of that stupendous

machine falls to Princes of the common Cast, it must soon appear that immediately the principles of decline are extended and interwoven with its apparent strength.

The army is more harassed with precautionary guards against their own soldiers than against the enemy.

Desertion in peace supposed to = a fifth; after defeat "the number missing usually trebles the number to be accounted for by death or capture."

The Emperor's army shows all the natural advantages the Prussians want: the sources of men and money are great and natural, the officers have liberality, the soldiers have national spirit. There is sufficiency and excellency in every part of the basis—it is the superstructure alone which has hitherto been defective.

[Burgoyne ends by commending Lascy and praising Laudon.]

## APPENDIX III

### Kaiser Joseph's Impressions of the Empress Catherine the Great (1780–82)

Two years after his famous visit to Catherine, a characterization of her was given by Kaiser Joseph. "Walking alone in the Augarten (at Vienna) on August 19, 1782," he confided to Keith the British ambassador his own impressions of Catherine and Russia*: — The Emperor asked me who was the

* *Foreign Office, Austria*, vol. 5, Vienna, October 19, 1782, Keith to Grantham, "most secret and confidential." Keith writes in the first person and calls the reported conversation "a faithful extract of my notes."

successor of Sir J. Harris at that court (St. Petersburg), I said I had every reason to believe that he would remain there.—*Kaiser Joseph.* Your Ministry judge well. Sir James (Harris) possesses the Talents, Activity, and Adroitness which qualify him for that Mission, and I fancy that his situation at Petersburg has of late grown much more comfortable.—*Keith.* I hope so, Sir, but the part a Foreign Minister has to act there, is accompanied with great difficulties, owing to the continual fluctuation of Politicks in that Cabinet.—*Kaiser Joseph.* Yes and No. The great Art is to enter into the Empress's Character, and to humour it. She is no doubt a Princess of distinguished Genius, but she cannot do everything. Whoever has to deal with her must never lose sight of her sex, nor forget that a woman sees things and acts differently from one of our sex. I speak from experience in saying the only way to keep well with her is *ni de la gâter ni de la heurter de front*; to give her her way in matters of little consequence, to render every necessary Refusal as palatable as possible, to let her perceive a constant desire of pleasing, yet at the same time a firm adherence to certain essential Principles, and a just sense of one's own Right. When She expresses a wish for a thing that can be granted without departing from these Principles, to indulge her with that complaisant Attention which is ever due to a Lady, but when She insists on what ought not to be complied with, to make her sensible that tho' She may often lead, She cannot drive. In this manner one may hope to live upon a fair footing with her, guarding against the Heat and Impetuosity of her feelings, and convincing her that in essential Points, every sovereign has an unquestionable Right to draw the great line of his own Conduct, and to adhere to it strictly.

The singular Misfortune of the Empress is that of having no Person about her who dares to restrain, even to repress, the first effusion of her Passions. Count Osterman (Vice-Chancellor) is *un homme de Paille*; he does nothing, and has no weight. As to M. Besborodko,* he is an Upstart; he was a low scribe, a mere Interpreter, under M. Romanzow, and he retains the Sentiments of that class of Men. Together with some Ability he possesses the routine of his own Business, but he has read little and knows nothing of the great Scale of Politicks, or of the permanent Interests of Princes. When his Sovereign calls for his Pen and dictates the Strongest and often the wildest expression of her feelings of the moment, the Secretary has not the Firmness, and perhaps not the Inclination, to repress her hasty effusions, but writes down in their full Energy all her crude Ideas, and probably says to himself, "*Ce n'est pas mon Affaire de peser ou de remontrer sur des Conséquences. Que le Roi de France, de l'Angleterre, ou l'Empereur se tirent de ce mauvais pas comme ils pourront.*" This is the case with the Empress, and whoever is engaged in any important Transaction with her, must keep these circumstances in his mind.

*Keith* [*con expressione*]. It is an unhappy thing for Princes that they are forced to give their confidence to men of low Birth, sordid Education and loose or timid Principles; but has not the Empress Prince Potemkin for a Confidential Counsellor, since the Disgrace of Count Panin?—*Kaiser Joseph.* O Yes, and a very insufficient Counsellor he is. He has little knowledge, joined to great Indolence, and even the Empress affects to treat, or at least to speak of him as a Scholar of her own in Politicks, and con-

* Alexander Andrejevie Besborodko, first secretary to Catherine.

sequently as a man who is more likely to need a Guide than to become one. It is a favourite Phrase of hers to say, "*Il est mon élève. C'est à Moi qu'il doit toute la Connoissance des Affaires.*" You will easily Conceive that when the Empress talked in this manner, the Person She spoke of did not push his frankness so far as to say, "*Oui, Madame, il est votre Élève, et en vérité il vous fait très peu d'honneur.*"

*Keith.* Does it then appear, Sir, that Prince Potemkin's Weight and Influence are diminished?—*Kaiser Joseph.* Not at all, but in Politicks they have never been what the World imagined. The Empress of Russia does not wish to part with him, and from a thousand Reasons, and as many Connections, of every sort, She could not easily get rid of him; if even She harboured the wish of doing so. One must have been in Russia to comprehend all the particulars of the Empress's Situation.

[Compare with this Joseph's conversation with Verac, in Corberon, *Journal* (Paris, 1901), 257 *n.*]

## APPENDIX IV

### Gratitude to Kaiser Joseph

Poem by a Czechish Peasant (written about 1785)

Thanksgiving to the great and illustrious father of our dear Country—to Joseph the Second.

Gratitude from an unworthy subject, Wojtec Kotéra; written in the year of our Lord, 17[85?], and printed by Frantisek Vinience Korec at Kutna Hora [Kuttenberg].

Rejoice with me you nations and listen to the many truths and thanksgiving, that I am going to tell you,

in praise of the wisdom from which sprang blessing and joy in our country, and which has done away with many sufferings.

When our great monarch, Joseph the Second, succeeded to the throne as the ruler of our country, he reigned wisely, guided by wisdom, love and righteousness, all over the world; but especially over his dear subjects.

As an eagle tries to soar towards the sky, so his heart longed for righteousness and wished to do away with many wrongs, and this hope strengthened his heart.

He hoisted the flag of the Imperial Eagle, visited all the departments of state in person, and degraded many officials whom he found unworthy of their office.

His zeal for justice was not to be deceived, his sharp eye saw in the darkness, he made many changes among the evil-livers and well rewarded the righteous.

He walked among his subjects with a loving heart, and enchanted all of them with his kindness. People laid before him the wishes and desires of their hearts, and all found support in his mighty spirit of goodwill.*

Many a poor tradesman could have found his fortune had he sought it in another district, but could not leave as he must redeem his bondage from his lord. How grateful then were they to their sovereign, when they were permitted to go freely wherever they could find their living.†

This good-hearted monarch considered all the taxes, for he wished to tax all equally, and found out him who tried to conceal his riches or to speak falsely about his estates, and also him who oppressed his fellow-men.

* In the Controlor-Gang in his Imperial Palace at Vienna Joseph received all his subjects without distinction.

† Refers to the Emancipation of Serfs in Austria and the break-up of the Gild-system.

Oh, who would not submit to such good teaching, the aim of which was to survey the land. God was pleased with our sovereign's penetrating eye, with his judgment, his zeal for learning and his enlightenment.

The numerous schools which he built show with what attention this loving father sought to awake his peoples to better morality. Mindful was he that teaching should progress, especially that little children should learn.

In old times people spent long in learning, yet when they grew up knew not why they came into the world. And, even if they learned to read, understood not what they read, and remained in darkness as before.*

Princes came from all quarters of the earth to give him honours, and to meet him in his splendid palace.

Take my thanks, O mighty sovereign, for thou lovest the simplicity of my speech more than fine art. I invoke the blessing of our Lord and His protection for our dear Emperor—Joseph the Second!

## APPENDIX V

### VOLTAIRE ON THE CAUSES OF WAR IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

(Article "La Guerre" in *Dictionnaire philosophique.*)

[This marvellous effort of wit was originally written in 1764, as a reflection on Frederic's conduct in the first Silesian War, which caused that monarch considerable annoyance. As, in fact, it might serve

* An attack on the Jesuit educational system, which Joseph supplanted.

as a history of the War of the Bavarian Succession, I have inserted it here.]

"Un généalogiste prouve à un prince qu'il descend en droite ligne d'un comte dont les parents avaient fait un pacte de famille, il y a trois ou quatre cent ans, avec une maison dont la mémoire même ne subsiste plus. Cette maison avait des prétentions éloignées sur une province dont le dernier possesseur est mort d'apoplexie : le prince et son conseil concluent sans difficulté que cette province lui appartient de droit divin. Cette province, qui est à quelques centaines de lieues de lui, a beau protester qu'elle ne le connaît pas, qu'elle n'a nulle envie d'être gouvernée par lui ; que, pour donner des lois aux gens, il faut au moins avoir leur consentement : ces discours ne parviennent pas seulement aux oreilles du prince, dont le droit est incontestable. Il trouve incontinent un grand nombre d'hommes qui n'ont rien à faire ni rien à perdre ; il les habille d'un gros drap bleu à cent dix sous l'aune, borde leurs chapeaux avec du gros fil blanc, les fait tourner à droite et à gauche, et marche à la gloire. Les autres princes qui entendent parler de cette équipée y prennent part, chacun selon son pouvoir, et couvrent une petite étendue de pays de plus de meurtriers mercenaires que Gengis-Kan, Tamerlan, Bajazet, n'en traînèrent à leur suite."

That there is no undue satire in the description of the claims advanced by a sovereign is shown by the Bavarian Succession, as well as the following delightful extract, which satirizes Joseph as much as Voltaire satirized Frederic. "Advices from different Quarters continue to give Hints and to mention Circumstances, which suppose ambitious projects on the part of the Emperor (Joseph), and an intention sooner or later to disturb the tranquillity of the Empire. From

Vienna we are told that His Imperial Majesty has lately adopted the Plan long in Contemplation by Prince Kaunitz, of extending his Dominions towards the South, *and that the Archives have been searched anew, and Titles made out to different territories of the Republick* [*sic*] *of Venice.**

* *S.P.F. Prussia,* vol. 103, Liston to Fraser, Berlin, November 30, 1779.

# NOTES

## ABBREVIATIONS

*S.P.F.* State Papers Foreign—unpublished foreign correspondence preserved at the British Record Office.
*Ad. MSS.* Additional Manuscripts preserved at the British Museum.
*Sbornik.* Russian Imperial Historical Society Publication of Archives.

## CHAPTERS I AND II

These two chapters are based on material so familiar to historians that I have not thought it needful to give detailed references. For these chapters, as for the whole period, the best general bibliography is Dahlmann-Waitz, *Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte*, 8te Auflage, Leipzig, 1912.

It may be worth while to mention a few of the main works below.

**Austria.** ARNETH. *Maria Theresia.* 10 Bde. Vienna, 1879.

**Hungary.** MARCZALI, H. *Hungary in the Eighteenth Century.* Cambridge, 1910.

The most up-to-date documentary study on Joseph II. is that by P. V. MITROFANOV. 2 Bde. German translation. Vienna and Leipzig, 1910.

**Prussia.** KOSER, R. *König Friedrich der Grosse.* 2 Bde. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1903 and 1913.

REIMANN, E. *Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates* [*Gesch. der europ. Staaten*]. 2 Bde. Gotha, 1888.

A very suggestive comparison of Austrian and Prussian administrative methods may be found in

HINTZE, OTTO. *Der österreichische und der preussische Beamten-Staat. Historische Zeitschrift.* Bd. I.

**General.** RANKE, L. *Die Deutschen Mächt eund der Fürstenbund*, 2 Bde. Leipzig, 1871–72.

## CHAPTER III

[1] *Memorial S.P.F. German States, Bavaria,* vol. 111 *sub fin.* The date is 1776 and, though unsigned, the report is based on good information. It is undoubtedly written by Hugh Elliot. Cp. *S.P.F. Bavaria,* vol. 113, July 10, 1778, Eden to Suffolk.

[2] These statements of Elliot's should be compared with those

of Schreiber, *Max Joseph III.*, München, 1863, pp. 193-98, and of Münnich, *Geschichte der Entwickelung der bairischen Armee*, München, 1863, pp. 79-115. Both writers base their evidence on the archives, which witness to the numbers, but not to the efficiency, of the army. Heigel, whose works are an honour to Bavarian history, touches only briefly on this period. The best modern account is in Doeberl, *Entwickelungsgeschichte Bayerns*, München, 1912, ii. pp. 254-331, with good general bibliographies. It should be remembered that I am not concerned solely with Max Joseph's internal policy, and that my criticism of him is largely based on the fact that he had no external policy worth the name.

[3] See Elliot's unsigned *Memorial, apud* 1776. *S.P.F. German States*, vol. 111 (*passim*). I have softened the rhetoric of some of his denunciations, but its conclusions seem on the whole sound.

Buchner, *Geschichte von Baiern*, München, 1853, Bd. ix. 241, followed by Hoffman, pp. 149-69, mentions instances of some improvement in the principles of taxation. Buchner, ix. pp. 250-51, ascribes the failure to improve the agriculture to the suspicion of the peasants, and blames the ignorance of the Bavarian populace for the relative failure of the attempts to start factories and introduce foreign artisans. Only one manufacture, that of beer, responded to the enlightened policy of the princes, especially under Maximilian the Great. That worthy is usually renowned for his acquisition of the Upper Palatinate and the Electoral title in 1623, but his encouragement of beer is his chief merit in the eyes of an anonymous writer. For that "the Elector can glorious be, and the whole land will reverence his undertaking so long as the world lasts. Nowhere now save in this land does one drink such good and health-giving beer." Indeed Munich still holds its reputation. (Emil Struve, *Entwickelung des bayerischen Braugewerbes in XIX.* [Schmoller, ii. Heft 1, p. 11].)

For general economic conditions, see J. Kaizl, *Der Kampf um Gewerbereform und Gewerbefreiheit in Bayern* (1799–1868), Leipzig, 1880, p. 47, where he accounts for the failure of Bavarian industries in the eighteenth century by the exhaustion produced by the wars.

L. Hoffman, *Ökonomische Geschichte Bayerns unter Montgelas*, Erlangen, 1885, gives a study of later economic developments with a useful retrospective sketch.

On the extraordinarily primitive conditions of the Bavarian peasants in the country districts, see Wraxall, *Memoirs of the Courts* (1777–79), London, 1779, vol. ii. p. 199. He considers them very inferior to the Saxons in intelligence, wealth, and physique. Like so many backward races — compare the Slavs in the Balkans of to-day — the Bavarian peasant possessed a natural and beautiful peasant art, as the remains in the Bayerische National Museum still show.

[4] Minto's *Memoir of Hugh Elliot*. F. J. Lipowsky, *Max Joseph*, pp. 188-93, shows that the charitable efforts were not wholly spectacular. He gives instances of the founding of hospitals for waifs and strays; and Buchner, pp. 252-53, mentions the allowances made to poor students at the universities.

A good study of Nymphenburg, in its historical and artistic aspects, is given by K. T. Heigel, *Neue hist. Vorträge*, Munich, 1883, pp. 287-308.

[5] The incident is related by Buchner, *Geschichte Bayerns*, ix. pp. 254-55; other amiable traits of Max Joseph are given on p. 246. Compare Rothammer, *Leben Max Joseph von Bayern*, München, 1785; L. Westenrieder, *Gesch. von Baiern für das Jugend und das Volk*, ii. pp. 660-70, München, 1785; F. J. Lipowsky, *Leben und Thaten Max Joseph*, München, 1833 (well written, but based chiefly on official acts), esp. ii. pp. 228-30.

The work based on most modern research is that of F. A. W. Schreiber, *Max Joseph III.*, Munich, 1863.

For reasons given in the text, I find myself unable to agree with Buchner's view or with that of more recent historians. The study which holds the scale most evenly is L. H., *Pfalz-Baiern gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts* [F. v. Raumer, *Hist. Taschenbuch*, Leipzig, 1864]. Doeberl is the best among recent historians.

[6] Krenner, Fr. von. *Finanzzustand in den Jahren 1777, 1792, 1798–99, 1880*. München, 1803.

Buchner, ix. pp. 253-55. Cp. Lipowsky, *Max Joseph*, pp. 165-67, 279-81.

Seyfried, J. E. von. *Gesch. der standischen Gerichtsbarkeit in Bayern*. 2 vols. Pest und Leipzig, 1791–98.

S[eyfried], J. E. von. *Zur Geschichte bairischer Landschaft und Steuern*. München, 1800.

Elliot (*Memorial*, 1776, *S.P.F. German States*, vol. 111) reckons the average income at 3,376,000 florins (excluding the customs, which brought in little in his day), but expressly adds that these are "ordinary computations," and that the Elector concealed the real state of the finances, though expenditure certainly exceeded income.

In 1803 a Bavarian balance-sheet of the year 1777 was published by Franz von Krenner, an old financial official. According to him the income was 4,381,427 florins, the expenses 4,458,379 florins, and the deficit, therefore, 71,932 florins. The Court cost 729,822 florins, of which 173,976 florins went in pensions. Buchner put the pension item at 200,000 florins. As German rulers went at this time, the expenditure of the sixth of the total on the Court was moderate. Times change, and between 1861 and 1867 the expenses of the Bavarian Court were reduced to one-fifteenth of the national income. Other financial statistics of Bavaria under Max Joseph are quoted by L. H.

in *Pfalz-Baiern gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts* [F. v. Raumer, *Historisches Taschenbuch*, 4te Folge, 5ter Jahrgang, Leipzig, 1864, 314-15 *sqq.*).

No one will deny that Max Joseph made some financial improvements (Buchner, ix. 233-35, 241; Elliot, *Memorial*). The most important of these was the establishing of a Sinking Fund, which reduced the debt from forty million florins to sixteen. None the less, the evidence seems to me conclusive that Max Joseph was less skilful as a financier than Karl Theodor. By 1792 the latter had wiped out all deficits, and had a surplus of over fifteen thousand florins. See on the whole subject Ludwig Hoffman, *Geschichte der direkten Steuern in Baiern xiii.-xviii.* [Schmoller's *Forschungen*, Bd. iv. Heft 5, Leipzig, 1883, pp. 149-218, with Bibliography].

[7] Cp. Schreiber, *Max Joseph III.* 135-53. On the code and judicial system see A. von Bechmann, *Kreittmayr, Der oberbayerische Kanzler*, Festrede, München, 1896. This lecture deals chiefly with his legal reforms. Compare the biography in *Deutsche allgemeine Bibliographie*. The French commend him for his talents, *Recueil des instructions, Bavière Palatinat, Deux Ponts*, André Le Bon, Paris, 1899, pp. 322, 331, and *pension* him for his services, p. 345. Elliot does him full justice in the English despatches (*e.g. Memorial*, 1776, *S.P.F. German States*, vol. 111), where he says he "is not more remarkable for a mind enlarged by study, than for candor and integrity, occupied with the duties of his office, perhaps disgusted with the men in power, or averse from the measures prescribed, he meddles little in political business"). We shall see later on that when he did so meddle the part he played was fairly creditable.

[8] Buchner, ix. 258. Compare L. Westenrieder, *Geschichte der Akademie der Wissenschaft*, Bd. i. 196-218; "Aus den Handschrift nachlassen L. W." (*Abhand. der Münchner Akademie*, Bd. xvi.). Westenrieder, a critic partial to Bavaria, admits that its general level of culture (*c.* 1770) was poor. Cp. Schreiber, *Max Joseph*, pp. 226-53.

[9] Lipowsky, *Geschichte der Schulen in Bayern* (1825); Buchner, ix. 271 *sqq.*; August Kluckhohn, "Der Freiherr von Ickstatt und das Unterrichtswesen in Bayern unter dem Churfürsten Max Joseph III." (*Vortrag in der öffentlichen Sitzung der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften am 25. Juli 1868*), München, 1869. The ecclesiastical and educational reforms are shortly described in Schreiber, *Max Joseph*, 199-252. Max Joseph displayed a certain amount of liberality with regard to the press-censorship, and inaugurated a freedom, strictly qualified indeed, but one which was a great innovation on the previous Press restrictions. Cp. K. T. Heigel, *Neue historische Vorträge und Aufsätze*, München, 1883, 236-45.

[10] That, after 1772, the main initiative in the designs on Bavaria lay with Joseph and not Maria Theresa is abundantly clear

from Arneth, *Geschichte Maria Theresias*, Vienna, 1879, Bd. x. 291 *sqq*. It seems needless to prove a universally obvious proposition. The most important single documents are Kaunitz, "Denkschrift über Baiern, Dezember 22, 1776," *Archiv für öst. Gesch.* Bd. xlviii., Vienna, 1872. Frederic's views may be found in *Œuvres* (edition, 1789), vol. iii. *passim*, and Nugent reports an interview with him on the subject on May 6, 1770, to Maria Theresa (May 25, 1770); see Arneth, *Maria Theresia*, viii. 573-76, and E. Reimann, *Preuss. Gesch.* ii. 693. The instruction of Vergennes to the Chevalier de la Luzerne, French envoy extraordinary to Bavaria, of December, 1776, is a masterly summary of the situation at the very moment before the crisis (see *Recueil des instructions, Bavière Palatinat, Deux Ponts*, par André Le Bon, Paris, 1889, pp. 366-78).

[11] Cp. *Sbornik*, lxv. 301-14, which gives the view of Zweibrücken. The best modern discussion of the claims is to be found in E. Reimann, *Geschichte des bairischen Erbfolgekrieges*, Leipzig, 1869, pp. 101-108, with more modern treatment in his *Neuere preussische Geschichte*, Bd. ii., Gotha, 1888. His view is generally favourable to Prussia. A good study of the Pact of 1724 is in K. T. Heigel, *Geschichtliche Bilder und Skizzen*, München, 1897; *Die wittelsbachische Haus-Union von 1724*, pp. 141-74 (*vide infra*, nn. 11, 13, 14, etc.); and Bitterauf, *Die wittelsbachische Haus-Union von 1746–1747*, Munich, 1903. A. Beer, "Zur Geschichte des bairischen Erbfolgekrieges," *Hist. Zeit.* Bd. xxxv., [1876], is anti-Austrian.

[12] *S.P.F. German States*, Bavaria, vol. 111, Elliot to Suffolk, April 3, 1776; see also *Report on Bavaria* by Elliot. The second report is by Sir R. Murray Keith, British Ambassador to Vienna, and is contained in *S.P.F. Germany*, vol. 218, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, December 22, 1776. Keith plumes himself much on the learning of his essay and the accuracy of his forecasts, cp. *S.P.F. Germany*, vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, January 3 and 21, 1778. Cp. Vergennes, *Instructions à De la Luzerne*, December 1776, *Recueil des instructions, Bavière*, Paris, 1889, pp. 367-78.

[13] *S.P.F. German Empire*, vol. 220, Vienna, January 6, 1778, Keith to Suffolk; see also 1776 Elliot's report, *S.P.F. German States*, vol. 111.

[14] For Maria Theresa's view see Arneth, *Maria Theresia und Joseph II. Ihre Korrespondenz*, Bd. ii. Vienna, 1867, p. 171, M. T. an Joseph, January 2, 1778; "Si même nos prétentions sur la Bavière étaient plus constatées et plus solides qu'elles ne sont, on devrait hésiter," and so on in the same strain. See also *Briefe, Maria Theresia an Ihre Kinder und Freunde*, M. T. an Leopold, March 12, 1778, Vienna, 1881, Bd. i. pp. 88: "Nous ne pouvons . . . avouer notre faute." Hertzberg's views on the superior justice of Frederic's claims may be found in A. Unzer, *Hertzberg's Anteil an der preussisch-öster-*

*reichischen Verhandlungen, 1778–1779*, Frankfort a. M., 1890, 26, 130-31.

[15] Definite family compacts, laying down the principle of reciprocal inheritance between the Wilhelmine and Rodolphine branches, had confirmed this practice at different times [1524, 1618]. It had also been ratified by several Emperors and by the Peace of Osnabrück (1648). The Family Compacts had been renewed in 1673, 1724, and in 1766, 1771, and 1774, during the lifetime of Max Joseph. See Keith's *Report* and K. T. Heigel, *Die wittelsbachische Haus-Union von 1724* (*Gesch. Bilder und Skizzen*, München, 1897), pp. 141-74, and *Sbornik*, lxv. 301-307, note of Hohenfels "touchant la garantie des traités et pactes de famille de 1766, 1771, et 1774."

[16] Text of will is in Buchner, ix. 280. A more detailed history of these negotiations may be found in Chapter VI.

## CHAPTER IV

[1] For the whole account here, see *S.P.F. German States*, Bavaria, vol. 112, Munich, January 1, 1778, Eden to Suffolk. It is not altogether fanciful to compare this succession scene with that by the bedside of Queen Anne in England in 1714. There was the same baffling of intriguers, the same excitement and confusion, the same dramatic close. Note, Karl Theodor, being already Elector Palatine, was not allowed at the subsequent Peace of Teschen to assume the title of Elector of Bavaria, and Bavaria's Electoral vote was abolished.

[2] The transaction with Karl Theodor is obscure. Ritter's full powers were signed by Karl Theodor on November 29, 1777, and on December 14 he appeared in Vienna. He appears to have been ignorant of the Pacte of 1774 between Max Joseph and Karl Theodor. See A. Unzer, "Die Entstehung des Pfalz-österreichischen Konvention, Januar 3, 1778," *Mitteil. des Instituts für österreichische Geschichte* Bd. xv., Vienna, 1894, p. 102, and the whole article for detailed study. The leading general authorities are: Austrian, Arneth, *Maria Theresia*, Vienna, 1879, Bd. x. pp. 294-318; and Prussian, E. Reimann, *Neuere Geschichte des preussischen Staates* (*Gesch. der europäischen Staaten*), Gotha, 1888, Bd. ii. pp. 23-33, and Appendix, 681-98. Reimann criticizes Arneth somewhat severely, but has pointed to some positive errors of fact both in his account and that of Beer. There is some useful criticism of Arneth in A. Erhard, "Herzogin Maria Anna von Bayern und der Teschener Friede," *Oberbayrisches Archiv für vaterlandische Geschichte*, Bd. xl. pp. 6-8. The public documents connected with this whole crisis are most of them given in E. F. v. Hertzberg, *Recueil des déductions manifestes traités etc., publiés par la cour de Prusse*, 3 vols., Berlin, 1789.

[3] The full text was only published on February 19, see *S.P.F. Bavaria*, vol. 113, Eden to Suffolk, February 22, 1778. The pensions to the bastards of Karl Theodor were not specifically named in the treaty, but may reasonably be inferred from the evidence. See *S.P.F. Bavaria Archives*, vol. xlv., Ratisbon, November 8, 1778, Heathcote to Fraser, see Frederic, *Œuvres posthumes* [1789], iii. p. 314. His information was based on Goerz (letter to Frederic, April 1778, *Mitt. des Inst. für öst. Gesch.* xviii. p. 489) and on the evidence of Duchess Maria Anna, February 6, 1777, quoted in Goerz, *Mémoire historique de la négociation en 1778 pour la succession de Bavière*, Frankfort, 1812, pp. 78-79. Cp. Edelsheim to Finckenstein, January 10, 1778: "Quant à l'Electeur il ne paraît rien avoir plus fortement à cœur que l'établissement de 7 bâtards déclarés auxquels il souhaite de pouvoir assurer un sort brillant après sa mort. S'il est vrai qu'il se propose d'en reconnaître deux autres dans peu ses embarras à cet égard n'en feraient qu'augmenter davantage," K. Obser in *Mitt. des Inst. für öst. Gesch.* Bd. xix. p. 345.

[4] Ritter and Karl Theodor had, in fact, revealed most of the negotiations to Vergennes, see A. Unzer, *Friede von Teschen*, Kiel, 1903, pp. 36-41. Karl Theodor's letter to Zweibrücken, admitting the compulsion under which he had signed the treaty, was not known to Russian diplomats until December 1778. See Imperial Russian Historical Society Archives (*Sbornik*), vol. lxv. pp. 84-85, Dolgorukov (Berlin) to Bariatinsky, Paris, December 13, 1778.

[5] For the neutrality of France the best general account is A. Unzer, *Der Friede von Teschen*, Kiel, 1903, pp. 1-101; see also Tratchewsky, "La France et l'Allemagne sous Louis XVI," *Revue historique*, tome xiv. Breteuil's news can be found in F. von Raumer, *Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1839, Bd. v. pp. 301-46; for those of Vergennes, see Flassan, *Hist. générale de la diplomatie française*, ii. 189 *sq.*, vii. pp. 132-40 (2nd edition); see also Bailleu, *Revue critique*, No. 31, 1881; and *Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France, Bavière Palatinat, Deux Ponts*, A. Le Bon, Paris, 1889, pp. 366-78, 527-30. For the Austrian view of French policy, see Arneth, *Maria Theresia*, x. pp. 41-48, 563, 665; and Arneth et Flammermont, *Correspondance secrète du Comte de Mercy-Argenteau avec l'empereur Joseph II*, tome ii. pp. 520-26; Arneth et Geffroy, *Correspondance secrète entre Marie Thérèse et le Comte de Mercy-Argenteau*, iii. 16-18, 151-53; Arneth, *Maria Theresia und Marie Antoinette, Ihr Briefwechsel 1777–1780* (Paris and Vienna, 1865), pp. 215-50.

[6] Frederic and France, see the short notice in Frederic, *Œuvres posthumes*, iii. pp. 316-19, and Unzer and other authorities as before, with the addition of Kozer's classic *Biography* of Frederic, Berlin, 1903, Bd. ii. 517-39, and Reimann, *Neuere Geschichte des preussischen*

*Staates*, Gotha, 1888, Bd. ii. Frederic's *Politische Korrespondenz* has as yet been published only till 1774.

[7] Frederic seems to have cherished a hope that Hanover might actively assist Vienna as late as June 28, K. W. v. Schöning, *Der bayerische Erbfolgekrieg*, Berlin, 1854, p. 57.

[8] *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 102, Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, February 3, 1778. Cp. *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 112, Ratisbon, January 9, 1777, Liston to Eden, and Max Joseph's utterance to Elliot, April 1, 1776 (*vide supra*). Frederic's letter, February 16, 1778, to Prince Henry disclaims all aggrandizement or acquisition (Schöning, p. 16), and indicates a line of action which was consistently adhered to.

[9] O. Eustache de Goerz, *Mémoire historique de la négociation en 1778*, Frankfort a. M., 1823, pp. 83-84, and *vide infra* Chap. VI. *passim*.

[10] Over the Schönburg affair, cp. Arneth, *Maria Theresia*, Vienna, 1879, Bd. x. pp. 278 *et seq.* and note 11, *infra*. Alvensleben (Prussian ambassador to Saxony) writes to Frederic, March 6, 1778: "C'est vraiment depuis ce moment (the raising of the Schönburg question) que je date le changement de la Cour et de la Nation en faveur de votre Majesté, car jusqu'à cette époque ils nous craignoient," quoted by E. Reimann, "Friedrich August III. and Karl Theodor," *Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte* (Dresden, 1883), Bd. iv. p. 316.

[11] *S.P.F. German Empire* (Austria), vol. 220, Vienna, January 28, 1778, Keith to Suffolk; A. Beer, "Zur Geschichte des bayrischen Erbfolgekrieges," *Hist. Zeit.* Bd. xxxv. (1876); see also E. Reimann, "Friedrich August und Karl Theodor," *Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte und Alterthumskunde*, Dresden, 1883, Bd. iv. pp. 316-39. The last pages contain a severe criticism of Arneth, who is charged with "grosse Parteilichkeit."

[12] Saxon-Prussian Alliance, see *S.P.F. Poland* (*Saxony*), vol. 115, Dresden, February 25, March 1, 8, April 8, 12, J. Milliquet to Eden. Cp. E. Reimann, "Friedrich August III. und Karl Theodor," *Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte*, Bd. iv., Dresden, 1883; *vide* also A. Unzer, *Hertzberg's Anteil an den preussisch-österreichischen Verhandlungen 1778-1779*, Frankfort a. M., 1890, pp. 10-11, 15, 19-20, and A. Beer, *Hist. Zeitschrift*, Bd. xxxv. p. 110.

[13] *S.P.F. Bavaria Archives*, vol. 45, Ratisbon, November 8, 1778, Heathcote to Fraser, see also December 16, 1778, which gives Karl Theodor's letter of January 22, 1778 to Zweibrücken on this very subject.

[14] *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 113, Ratisbon, Morton Eden to Suffolk, July 10, 1778. Further evidence of this fact is to be found in *Germany* (*States*), *Cologne*, vol. 155, April 6, 1778, Bonn, Cressemer to Lord Suffolk, "By what I learn in Discourse with the Elector (of Köln) most of the Electoral Princes and

States of the Empire secretly wish the House of Austria may not keep what they have taken of the Succession of the late Elector of Bavaria, as that would render the Emperor too powerful," etc. etc., cp. Reimann, *Preuss. Gesch.* ii. 78-79.

[15] Reimann, *Preussische Geschichte*, ii. pp. 92-94; A. Unzer, *Hertzberg's Anteil*, pp. 39-41; *ibid.*, *Neues Archiv für sächs. Gesch.* iii. 325-6; A. Beer, *Hist. Zeit.* Bd. xxxv. p. 145. Cp. Frederic in *Œuvres posthumes* (1789), tome iii. pp. 321-22; the correspondence between Frederick and Joseph is given on pp. 365-80. Note *S.P.F. Archives*, Heathcote to Fraser, July 12, 1778.

[16] A. Beer, *Hist. Zeit.* Bd. xxxv. p. 141. I should not like to give the impression that Hertzberg was worthy of the contempt here bestowed on him by Frederic. He was a fanatical Prussian, and at times too rash and eager, but he was a resolute and thoughtful statesman, whom Frederic esteemed as well as derided. See Study by Bailleu, *Hist. Zeit.* Bd. xlii., and *Leben*, by A. T. Preuss, Berlin, 1908.

## CHAPTER V

[1] Calonne, *Notes sur la vie de Josef II*, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 27487. Cp. Oskar Criste, *Kriege unter Kaiser Josef II.*, Wien, 1904, pp. 8-15. Nosinich, *Kaiser Josef als Feldherr*, Wien, 1885, is less *documenté* than Criste. Cp. a very important MS. report in Lord Lansdowne's MSS. vol. xlii., by Burgoyne (of Saratoga), Appendix II., which criticizes the Prussian army on the lines mentioned in the text, and praises the Austrian. See also *S.P.F. Empire*, vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, February 15, 17, 1778.

[2] *S.P.F. German Empire*, vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, April 8, 1778. There is a good deal of information as to the reorganization of the Austrian army between 1763 and 1778 scattered through Keith's despatches. In a Memorandum written after the war Laudon (see Janko, *Laudon's Leben*, Wien (1869), 394-97) criticized the Austrian War Office for not having built enough fortresses in Bohemia, for a shortage in hospital requisites, for the absence of a properly organized general staff, and for a deficiency in light troops.

[3] The military ability of Prince Henry deserves more study and attention than it has received. As a strategist he appears on the whole as an advocate of the Austrian School (*vide nn.* 4 and 5). There is no first-rate modern study of the Bavarian War from the German side. Schöning, *Der bayerische Erbfolgekrieg*, Berlin, 1854, is antiquated, but valuable for the correspondence of Frederic and Prince Henry. R. Koser, "Prinz Heinrich und General Möllendorf im bayrischen Erbfolgekrieg" (*Forsch. z. brand. und preuss. Gesch.*, vol. xxiii.). There is a fairly good anonymous account in *Kampagne*

*des Prinzen Heinrich*, 1778–79, Bde. lxiv., lxv. [*Zeit. für Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte des Krieges*, Berlin, 1845].

[4] The Austrian School was at least intelligible and consistent in applying the principle that fortification, choice of ground, and manœuvres for position were the real ends of war. These contentions were strengthened by the natural caution and indolence of the Austrian temperament, and by the exercise of control over armies in the field by the War Office at Vienna. It is worth noting that the most successful Austrian generals of the eighteenth century, Eugene and Laudon, were those who paid least attention to Vienna, and who were least bound by the traditional Austrian tactic and strategy. The typical Austrian general of the mid-eighteenth century is Daun or Lascy. Between the latter and Laudon an interesting comparison was made in 1778 by Wraxall, *Mem. Courts of Berlin, Vienna, etc.* (1799), vol. i. pp. 331-44.

[5] In these sentences I raise the whole question of the strategy and tactics of the Frederician period. The extreme view is put thus by Lord Acton:

"Even in his own army, on his own staff, in the royal family, there were two opinions. There was a school which taught that actual fighting must not be resorted to until the use of brains has been exhausted, that the battle comes in when the manœuvre has failed, that the seizure of a strategic position, or a scientific retreat . . . is the first defence of armies, so that a force which is tactically inferior may be strategically superior. Frederic was, I believe, the first great soldier to reject this doctrine, and to act on the principle that nothing can destroy the enemy except a pitched battle, and that the destruction of the enemy, not the weakening of the enemy, is the right object in war. His battles were very numerous and very sanguinary, and not always decisive. Napoleon followed in his footsteps, manœuvring less, as he grew older, and fighting more. It is the adopted teaching of the Prussian School, since Clausewitz and Moltke."—Lord Acton, *Lectures on Modern History*, London, 1906, p. 298.

The assumption appears to be that Frederic emancipated war from the theories of what I may call the Austrian School (the school which advocated warfare of manœuvre for positions), and initiated the theory of the Clausewitz School, in which the supreme object of the campaign is to lead up to a decisive battle and to ensure the destruction of the field-army of the enemy.

The question has been hotly discussed in Germany by historians and military experts. The controversy is well summed up by Professor Hans Delbrück in his articles "Über die Verschiedenheit der Strategie Friedrichs und Napoleons," and in "General von Clausewitz" (*Historische und politische Aufsätze*, 2te Auflage, Berlin,

1008, pp. 205-301). His main contention is that in the eighteenth century (*i.e.* before 1789) certain fundamental differences prevented the waging of a campaign on the lines favoured by Napoleon or by Clausewitz. These differences are (1) the much smaller number of troops which could be concentrated in a single theatre of war. In such concentrations Frederic never assembled more than 100,000, Napoleon often three or four times that total. (2) The heterogeneous character of the troops, half of Frederic's being non-Prussian, and pressed or hired men with no special enthusiasm. This necessitated an iron discipline, for to many of the troops appeals to nationality and national pride would be meaningless. The stick and not the flag was therefore the military symbol, and Frederic himself lays down that it is necessary to make troops respect the bâton and fear their own officers more than the enemy. This rigid discipline necessitated close linear formations and prevented the use of tirailleurs. (3) The difficulty of procuring supplies for the troops under Frederic contrasts strongly with the Napoleonic method. Under Napoleon large portions of a French national army could be detached to make "requisitions." Under Frederic only a few trusted regiments could be allowed to forage, the main body being concentrated to prevent escape or desertion on the part of any of the heterogeneous troops. Accordingly, the Frederician host was strictly tied to a long line of communications and magazines. Its movements were slow in proportion, victories could not quickly be followed up, nor retreats rapidly accomplished. The Frederician army was like a diver in the sea, its movements strictly limited and tied by the long, slender communicating tube which gave it life.

If these fundamentals be granted as to (1) The smallness of the Frederician armies in actual numbers, (2) their denationalized character, (3) their difficulties as to supply, certain conclusions necessarily follow. Under Frederic there could not be the same available margin for risks, the same power of inspiring the masses with enthusiasm, or the same power of rapid advance and concentration as under Napoleon. Accordingly for the Prussian a battle was neither as necessary nor as decisive an incident in a campaign as it was for the French emperor.

Considerations like these solve the question of the differences between the warfare of the mid-eighteenth century and that of the early nineteenth. The Austrian military school under Daun understood these considerations to impose great caution on a commander. They made warfare chiefly an affair of capturing fortresses and convoys, and forbade him to risk a battle except when he was certain to win. Frederic's utterances on the subject are not altogether consistent; he can be quoted as lending some support both to the Austrian School and to the Napoleonic. He understood, as Clause-

witz did not, the real conditions of eighteenth century warfare, and knew that for armies such as he led, the lightning advance, the unexpected concentration, the decisive battle, and the fall of the enemy's capital were only ideals. Where Frederic differs, and differs decisively from Prince Henry, Daun, Lascy, and other commanders of his age, is in recognizing the moral advantage of inspiring troops with enthusiasm, and the unique opportunity which a battle gives for this purpose. The Frederician method is illustrated best by the battles of Rossbach and Leuthen, when he frankly appealed to the nobler instincts of his soldiers and boldly resolved on a decisive battle. In significant contrast, however, to Napoleon, Frederic manœuvred more and fought less as he grew older, as is markedly seen in the 1778 campaign.

The general result of his investigation may be summed up as follows. The Austrian School advocated the scientific manœuvre for position, and regarded the supreme object as the destruction of hostile supplies and the occupation of strategic points. The school of Napoleon and Clausewitz has since advocated the scientific manœuvre in order to force a decisive action, regarding the supreme objective as the destruction of the hostile army in the field. The ardent genius of Frederic drove him in the direction of Clausewitz, but his common-sense recognition of the limitations which a semi-mercenary army and the difficulties of supply imposed on him, prevented any complete acceptance of that strategy. He fought battles oftener than the Austrian School considered right, and less decisively than Clausewitz would have expected. The explanation is to be found in the conditions of the age, which did not allow Frederic to revolutionize the art of war, though his genius broke through the precise rules of the existing school, and formulated military axioms for another age to carry out. (The subject may be further studied in R. Koser, "Preussische Kriegführung im 7jährigen Kriege," *Hist. Zeit.* xcii.; F. Bernhardi, *Delbrück, Friedrich der Grosse und Clausewitz*, Berlin, 1892; Bonnal, *L'Esprit de la guerre moderne*, Paris, 1903; Treitschke, c. 23, *Politik*, Eng. trans., 1914.)

[6] Criste, 83-84. Judged by a *modern* military criticism, Laudon's suggestion would be sound and right, but not entitled to the special commendation given in the text. I think, however, a study of the conditions of contemporary warfare (cp. *n.* 5 and Delbrück) shows that the enterprise was a daring one for any eighteenth century commander to propose. It was specially daring in an Austrian general, and in an enterprise directed against the Prussian master of warfare.

[7] *S.P.F. Prussia*, 102, Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, August 4, 11, 1778. This letter of Prince Henry's is not printed elsewhere, but the positive affirmation of Elliot leaves no doubt as to its genuineness

(cp. one from Henry to Frederic of August 3, quoted by Schöning, *Der bayerische Erbfolgekrieg*, Berlin, 1859, 103). Elliot speaks of the whole as a "march that does honour to the military talents even of Prince Henry."

Cp. "Kampagne des Prinzen Heinrich (1778–70)," *Zeitschrift für Kunst, Wissenschaft und Geschichte des Krieges*, Berlin, 1845, Bd. lxiv., pp. 162-68, which gives details of the difficulties of the march. Consult also Graf Lippe on Möllendorf, *Jahrbuch für die deutsche Armee*, Bd. cix.

[8] Criste, 90-96, 97, 102. The defence of Laudon is undertaken by W. E. von Janko, *Laudon's Leben, nach Original-Acten des K. K. Haus- Hof- Staats- und Kriegs-Archivs, Correspondenzen und Quenen*, Wien, 1869, pp. 373-98. G. B. Malleson's *Life of Laudon*, London, 1887, is merely a summary of Janko. Both speak of "masterly manœuvres," on the part of Laudon, but neither attempts to defend his neglect to strengthen Tollenstein. Note review of Janko by Schaefer, *Hist. Zeit.* Bd. xiii.

[9] Criste, 103-4, 132-33; Janko, 383, 390-91. Laudon's action in ordering this retreat puts the finishing touch on his feebleness in this campaign. In justice to him it should be mentioned that his information appears to have been very imperfect, and in his subsequent memorandum on the campaign (Janko, 394), Laudon emphasizes the inadequacy of the scouting system and the absence of a general staff.

[10] Reimann, *Preussische Geschichte*, ii. 166.

[11] Schöning, *Der bayerische Erbfolgekrieg*, 115-16.

[12] The losses of the Prussian army have been variously reckoned, and it is difficult to separate those of Prince Henry from those of Frederic. Prince Henry admits a loss of 2000 men by September 30 (Schöning, pp. 159-64). Janko, *Laudon's Leben*, p. 383, puts Frederic's losses alone up to September at 12,000 killed, wounded, and sick; Nosinich (p. 189) at 14,000; Janko puts losses of both Henry and Frederic at 20,000. Criste, p. 111, puts the total Prussian losses at 18,000, and Nosinich, p. 241, reckons the Austrian losses at about the same. There are only two relatively impartial estimates—that of Prince Charles of Hesse, himself a general and a volunteer in this campaign, though not an absolutely trustworthy witness, who puts Frederic's losses alone at over 20,000 (*Mémoires*, Copenhagen, 1861, pp. 80, 86, 106); and that of Sir John Stepney, British Minister at Dresden, who, on the strength of authentic knowledge, puts Prince Henry's losses at 7000 to 8000 men. (*S.P.F. Poland* (*Saxony*), vol. 115, September 23, October 28, 1778, Stepney to Suffolk.) I think, therefore, that we may reckon Prussia's total loss at at least 25,000, or about one-seventh of her forces.

[13] In a speech to his officers on April 5, 1778, at Berlin, Frederic

enjoined "humanity to unarmed enemies," as a "most sacred duty . . . in every situation," but he certainly did not spare their property. Here are one or two illustrations. Requisitions of 10,000 rixdales from the sciginory of Neuschloss; beer, wine, and provisions from the district. From Reichenberg-Kuhendorf, 200 ducats, 80,000 rixdales, 2500 boisseaux of corn, and the same of forage; 80 fat bullocks, 100 oxen, 150 cows. From the circle of Satz, requisition of 132,000 florins (*Supp. Extre. à la Gazette de Vienne*, August 10, 1778). There is an interesting account of the treatment of the small village of Kuesdorf in this war. According to the village schoolmaster all the potatoes were dug up; the young shrubs cut down, and much firewood requisitioned; 136 beasts (horses, oxen, and cows) were taken; and the total damage done was estimated at 60,712 fl. ½ kr.; while some men of the village were held to ransom and others requisitioned for service ("Zur Geschichte des Kartoffel-Krieges," *Mittheilungen des Vereins für Geschichte der Deutschen in Böhmen, Prag, Leipzig, and Wien*, 1879, pp. 58-61). There is no better account of the sufferings of peasants in eighteenth century warfare, and it reveals a striking absence of patriotic Austrian feeling, *vide n.* 17.

[14] See the April campaign scheme of Frederic quoted in Nosinich, *Kaiser Josef* (Wien, 1885), 109. Frederic's omission to plan any real advance into Moravia seems to have been due to a belief in the speedy intervention of Russia, to which he clung with much persistence. See Schöning, 132; Reimann, *Preuss. Gesch.* 144, 161; Unzer, *Friede von Teschen*, 151 *sqq.*

The scheme quoted above throws the best light on the whole action of Frederic in this campaign, which is still somewhat of a mystery, and not cleared up by his own account or utterances. There can, however, be no doubt that he intended originally to attain decisive results and not to play a game of mere inaction. Prince Charles of Hesse, not altogether a trustworthy witness, declares that Frederic explained his inaction at Oels by the gout (*Mémoires de mon temps*, p. 109). There can be no doubt that the Braunau negotiations and political conditions generally hampered Frederic's military decision. But age, illness, and a very curious political situation are hardly sufficient to account for his inaction. The effort made by Frederic to increase the mobility of the army after 1778 shows that the slowness of the movements of the troops may have been a contributory cause, and this is borne out by evidence from Elliot, *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 104, June 4, 1780.

Of one military criticism that is sometimes made it is best perhaps here to dispose. It is stated that Prince Henry might have joined forces with Frederic by marching north of Turnau. He could then have broken through the Austrian centre, and forced the evacuation

of the Arnau-Jaromer line. It appears, however, certain that bad roads, hill, and forest rendered it impossible to transport guns through these regions, and decisively vetoed the project as a whole.

The best modern technical critique of the war and its military lessons is in Nosinich, pp. 240-45, though there is more detail in Criste.

[15] Criste, 101. Older authorities, *e.g.* Janko, 385, say that Laudon wished to harass Prince Henry's retreat, but was forbidden by Joseph. Criste, 133, appears to discredit this view, and makes Laudon responsible for his own inaction.

[16] The modern military critic would assail the whole of Lascy's scheme on the ground that it was one for defence and not for victory. This charge is unquestionably true, as may be seen from the *Defensionsplan* drawn up by Lascy, April 28, 1778 (given in Criste, 260-62). The whole plan was in accordance with the traditional Austrian strategy, and its adoption explains why Joseph refused to allow Laudon to join forces with him to crush Frederic at the beginning of the campaign, and also to permit serious rearguard actions at the close.

[17] Lascy was undoubtedly the most important military influence on the Austrian side. Prince Charles of Hesse (*Mémoires*, 109) quotes an instance of the confusion into which Joseph was thrown by having to take a decision in the absence of Lascy. Lascy seems to have reaped the chief credit at Vienna among the populace. Laudon was still the hero of Bohemian peasants, who received him with shouts of joy and passed by Joseph and Lascy in silence (Janko, 377). Joseph was regarded by these peasants with mingled feelings, as was shown when he went on an expedition to Maxen in disguise with four officers at the end of 1779. "On their return His Imperial Majesty, being very inquisitive, got into a dispute at Guisuble (Giesshübel) with some Peasants of that Place, and without the very mild and prudent interposition of one of the Company it would have ended in blows. That part of the Country having suffered greatly during last Year's Campaigns, the Common People of course are much exasperated against the Emperor; they knew him, yet would have used him very ill, under the Pretence of being ignorant who those five officers were." Could irony or ingratitude further go? *S.P.F. Poland*, vol. 115, Dresden, December 29, 1779, Milliquet to Fraser.

[18] Acton, *Lectures in Modern History*, p. 298. "During the French campaign of 1814 Napoleon said to Marmont, 'We are still 100,000.' 'No,' said the marshal,' 'only 60,000.' 'Exactly,' Napoleon replied, 'and myself, that is 100,000.'" Cp. Croker, *Diaries*, vol. iii. p. 277. Wellington endorsed this estimate with his usual cautious reservations. See Stanhope, *Conversations with Wellington*, 9, 81-83.

For evidence of dissatisfaction of Prussian troops at the close of the campaign, see Koser, 534; Criste, 111; Arneth, x. 534.

## CHAPTER VI

[1] The chief work on Karl Theodor as a ruler is *K. T. dessen Leben und Taten*, F. J. Lipowsky, Sulzbach, 1828. This is antiquated, as is A. Buchner, *Geschichte von Baiern*, Munich, 1853, Bd. ix. Häusser, *Geschichte der Rheinpfalz*, 2 Bde., 1868; and *Pfalz-Baiern gegen Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Raumer's *Historisches Taschenbuch*, 1865), give general histories of the Palatinate. Consult also K. Hauck, *Karl Theodor Kurfürst von Pfalz-Baiern*; Mannheimer, *Geschichtsblätter*, i.; K. T. Heigel, *Neue hist. Vorträge*, Munich, 1883, pp. 304-6, is one of the few Bavarian historians who gives credit to Karl Theodor for throwing open the artistic treasures of Munich to the people, and who compares him, not unfavourably in this respect, even with the beloved Max Joseph. Cp. also Heigel, *Geschichtliche Bilder* (Munich, 1897), p. 373. Doeberl, *Entwickelungsgeschichte Bayerns*, vol. ii. p. 295, *n.* 2, quotes the evidence of courtiers who favoured Karl Theodor.

[2] *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 113, April 30, 1778, Eden to Suffolk; cp. Chap. IV. *n.* 3, for authorities. The chief are A. Unzer, "Die Entstehung der Pfalzkonvention," *Mitt. des Inst. für öst. Gesch. Forsch.*, Innsbruck, 1894, Bd. xv., and E. Reimann, "Karl Theodor und Karl August," *Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte*, Bd. iv. pp. 316-39.

[3] Karl Theodor's own defence of his conduct in these negotiations was that Bavaria had no army, and that his measures prevented it becoming the seat of war. See his account in Buchner, *Geschichte Baierns*, Bd. ix. pp. 128-31.

The characters of Vieregg and Hompèche are also described in the despatches of Edelsheim to Finckenstein, see Karl Obser, *Mitt. für öst. Gesch.* Bde. xviii. and xix., where Vieregg is represented as having been appointed to direct foreign policy because he was pliable and easily controlled.

[4] *S.P.F. German States, Bavaria*, vol. 113, Munich, January 22, 25, 29; April 23; Ratisbon, July 10, 1778. Eden to Suffolk.

[5] *S.P.F. Bavaria Arch.* vol. 45. Heathcote to Fraser, June 6, 1779. Karl Theodor's letter to Zweibrücken (January 22, 1778) is in *id.* to *id.* December 16, 1778. Cp. comment of Prince Dolgorukov (Berlin), December 2, 1778, *Sbornik*, vol. lxv. pp. 84-85.

The chief authorities on the mysterious and complicated negotiations between Zweibrücken and Frederic, the Dowager Duchess, and Karl Theodor are as follows: A. Eckhart, "Graf du Moulin, Zwei-

brücken und Versailles," *Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, Bd. v., 1894; Th. v. Heigel, "Die Beziehungen Karl August und Max Josef und Zweibrücken zu Preussen," *Preuss. Hist. Vierl.*, Leipzig, 1900, Bd. iii. pp. 27-48; Goerz, Ct. Eustache von, *Mémoire historique de la négociation en 1778 pour la succession de Bavière*, Frankfort a. M., 1823; A. Erhard, "Maria Anna von Bayern und der Teschener Friede," *Oberbayrisches Archiv*, Bd. xl. (cp. also *Allgem. Zeitung*, 1882, No. 302) has a useful bibliography; H. Meissner, *M. A. v. B. und der preussischer Reichsgesandter von Schwarzenau*, Jauer, 1890 (contains little save an important letter of Goertz, February 8, 1778). Cp. also A. Unzer, "Zweibrücken und die Sendung des Grafen Görtz," *Mitteilung des Inst. für österreichische Geschichte*, Bd. xviii., and K. Obser, "Zur Sendung des Grafen Görtz an den Zweibrücken Hof," *ib.* Bd. xix.

[6] v. Goerz, *Mém. Hist.* 83-109; Meissner, *M. A. v. B. und Schwarzenau*, p. 9; A. Erhard, *M. A. v. B. und der Teschener Friede*, pp. 10-11.

[7] Reimann, *Pr. Gesch.* ii. 63-67.

[8] *S.P.F. Archives Bavaria*, vol. 45, Ratisbon, July 26, August 5, 23, September 6, 18, 23, Heathcote to Fraser.

[9] *S.P.F. Arch.* vol. 45, November 22, December 6, 1778, Heathcote to Fraser.

[10] *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 103, Berlin, March 27, April 7, 1779, Elliot to Weymouth. For a sketch of the conduct of Karl Theodor during the period see *Sbornik*, vol. lxv. pp. 362-63, Galitzin to Repnin, March 23, 1779.

[11] *S.P.F. Arch.* vol. 45, April 11, 1779, Heathcote to Fraser, and *Sbornik*, vol. lxv. pp. 497-98.

[12] Article VIII. of the Traité de Paix between Maria Theresa and Frederic, Martens' *Recueil des Traités*, Petrograd, 1875, p. 70.

[13] *S.P.F. For. Arch.* vol. 45, Heathcote to Fraser, June 16, 1779; see *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 103, Berlin, August 1, 1779, Liston to Fraser.

[14] *S.P.F. For. Arch.* vol. 45, September 19, 1779, Heathcote to Fraser.

[15] *Ib.* June 16, 1779, *id.* to *id.*

## CHAPTER VII

[1] *S.P.F. Russia*, vol. 102, Petrograd, Harris to Suffolk, August 14, 1778; *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 102, Berlin, Elliot to Suffolk, September 8, 1778; Adolph Beer, "Die Sendung Thuguts an Braunau und der Friede zu Teschen," *Hist. Zeitschrift* (1871), Bd. xxxviii. pp. 421-48.

For general study of the whole negotiations, consult Martens, *Papiers du Prince Repnin*, in *Sbornik*, vol. lxv., Petrograd, 1888; and A. Unzer, *Der Friede von Teschen*, Kiel, 1903. The former gives the papers from the Russian Archives; the latter the results of the latest study of the archives of Berlin, Dresden, Munich, Vienna, and Paris. The papers of the British diplomats, which are quoted in the present volume, are the only considerable source yet unexplored. The text of the Treaty is in Martens, *Traités et conventions conclus par la Russie*, Petrograd, 1875, tome ii. pp. 61-96, with useful comments. Note for French policy *Journal de Corberon*, par L. H. Labande, Paris, 1901, esp. ii. 200 *n*.

[2] *Sbornik*, vol. lxv. pp. 120-27. Some valuable extracts from Breteuil's despatches are in "F. v. Raumer, 1763–83," *Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1839, Bde. iii.-v.

[3] *S.P.F. Archives*, vol. 45, Ratisbon, September 27, 1778, Heathcote to Fraser.

[4] *S.P.F. Archives*, vol. 45, Ratisbon, September 27, Heathcote to Fraser. *S.P.F. German Empire*, vol. 220, Vienna, September, 30, 1778, Keith to Suffolk.

[5] Solms attributed the Russian intervention to Potemkin and the tears of the Grand Duchess Paul, see Harris to Suffolk. *S.P.F. Russia*, vol. 102, October 2/13, 1778.

[6] *S.P.F. German Empire*, vol. 220, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, June 24. *S.P.F. Russia*, vol. 102, Petrograd, Harris to Suffolk, August 3/14, October 2/13, December 20/31, 1778; Harris twice states that Frederic won over Potemkin. Cp. Unzer, *F. von T.*, 208; Arneth, *Maria Theresia*, x. 598; and *Sbornik*, lxv. *passim*.

[7] *S.P.F. Russia*, vol. 102, Petrograd, September 21, October 2, October 2/13, October 5/16, 1778, Harris to Suffolk.

[8] *S.P.F. Russia*, vol. 102, Petrograd, Harris to Suffolk, October 2/13, December 20/31, 1778; *Sbornik*, vol. lxv., November 10/21, 1778, Vienna, Galitzin to Panin.

[9] *Sbornik*, vol. lxv., Vienna, Galitzin to Panin, November 10/21. On November 19 at an interview with the Russian ambassador, Prince Galitzin, he showed "extreme embarrassment" and "extraordinary perplexity and agitation." Prince Galitzin spoke of the *peu de validité* of the Austrian pretensions to Bavaria, to which Kaunitz replied his Court must choose between an entire sacrifice of its dignity or run the risks of a murderous and perhaps general war. *Galitzin*: "It would be infinitely glorious for the humanity of the Empress Queen to renounce *even* evident and legitimate rights to spare effusion of blood."

[10] *S.P.F. Russia*, vol. 102, Petrograd, October 5/16, November 6/17, 1778, Harris to Suffolk.

[11] *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 102, Berlin, November 24, 1778, Elliot

to Suffolk. Cp. Kaunitz' angry reply to Breteuil's reflections of October 18: "Ce n'est pas sur des convenances sur des titres et des droits que la maison d'Autriche s'est arrangée," etc.

[13] *S.P.F. Foreign Archives*, vol. 45, Ratisbon, November 15, November 22, 1778, Heathcote to Fraser.

[14] *Sbornik*, lxv. pp. 30-46; Catherine's report is dated October 27; for Panin's letter to Galitzin of September 21, see p. 166.

[15] *Sbornik*, lxv. pp. 30-50.

[16] *S.P.F. German Empire*, Vienna, vol. 220, Keith to Suffolk, December 29, 1778. *S.P.F. Archives*, Bavaria, vol. 45, Munich, Heathcote to Fraser, January 21, 1779.

[17] *S.P.F. Archives*, Bavaria, vol. 45; Munich, January 21, 1779, Heathcote to Fraser.

[18] *S.P.F. German Empire*, vol. 221, Vienna, January 2, 1779, Keith to Suffolk.

[19] Impression had already been made before the Preliminaries, see Panin to Bariatinsky, Russian ambassador at Paris, December 8, 1778. *Sbornik*, lxv.

[20] *S.P.F. Russia*, vol. 103, Petrograd, December 28, January 8, 1778–79, Harris to Suffolk. See also December 20/31, 1778; January 11/22, 1779; last two quoted in Malmesbury's *Diary*, 220-26.

[21] *S.P.F. German Empire*, vol. 221, Vienna, Keith to Suffolk, February 20, March 3, 1779. Cp. Frederic to Prince Henry, February 24, 1779, Schöning, p. 257.

[22] *S.P.F. Archives*, vol. 45, April 4, 1779, Heathcote to Fraser. *S.P.F. German Empire*, vol. 221, Vienna, May 19, Keith to Weymouth.

[23] *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 103, St. James's, May 28, 1779, Earl of Weymouth to Elliot. Weymouth was acting for Suffolk, being the other principal Secretary of State.

## LIST OF BRITISH DIPLOMATISTS MENTIONED IN THIS PERIOD

### Principal Secretaries of State

1775–82. *Northern Department.*—Thomas, 3rd Viscount Weymouth (afterwards Marquis of Bath).

1771–79. *Southern Department.*—Henry Howard, 12th Earl of Suffolk and Berkshire.

1779–82. *Southern Department.*—David Murray, Viscount Stormont (afterwards Earl of Mansfield).

1779–82. *Under Secretary* (*Southern Department*).—William Fraser.

### Ambassadors

*Austria and Empire—*

1763–72. David Murray, Viscount Stormont.

1772–92. Sir Robert Murray Keith, K.C.B.

*France—*

1772–78. David Murray, Viscount Stormont.

### Other Ministers and Envoys

*Russia—*

1771–76. Robert Gunning (afterwards Sir R.) (envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary).

1776–83. J. Harris (afterwards Sir R. and Earl Malmesbury) (minister plenipotentiary).

*Prussia*—

1772–76. James Harris (afterwards Sir R. and Earl Malmesbury) (envoy extraordinary).

1776–82. Hugh Elliot (envoy extraordinary).

*Saxony*—

1775–83. Sir John Stepney (envoy extraordinary).

*Bavaria*—

1773–76. Hugh Elliot (afterwards Sir H.) (minister plenipotentiary to Bavaria and minister to Diet of Ratisbon).

1776–79. Moreton Eden (afterwards Sir M. and Lord Harley) (minister plenipotentiary to Bavaria and minister to Diet of Ratisbon).

1779. Richard Oakes (minister to Diet of Ratisbon).

1780. Hon. J. Trevor (minister plenipotentiary to Elector Palatine and minister to Diet of Ratisbon).

1781–83. Ralph Heathcote (minister plenipotentiary to Elector of Köln).

1773–76. Robert (afterwards Sir R.) Liston (*chargé* at Munich, 1776–79 at Berlin).

## NOTE ON PUBLICATIONS OF THE PAPERS OF BRITISH DIPLOMATS OF THE PERIOD

Elliot, Hugh, Memoir of. By Lady Minto. London, 1853.

Keith, Sir Robert Murray, Memoirs and Correspondence of. Ed., Mrs. Gillespie Smith. 2 vols. London, 1849.

Letters of the 1st Earl of Malmesbury to Family and Friends. Ed., Earl of Malmesbury. 2 vols. London, 1870.

Political Diaries and Correspondence of 1st Earl of Malmesbury. Ed., Earl of Malmesbury. 4 vols. London, 1844.

Memoirs of the Courts of Berlin, Dresden, Warsaw, and Vienna, 1777–79. N. W. Wraxall. London, 1799.
Flight to Varennes and other Historical Essays. Oscar Browning [contains two good essays on Hugh Elliot].

Of the above works the first three are largely personal in character. The Political Diaries of Lord Malmesbury include some political information mixed up with still more personal gossip and scandal. They contain a picture of Catherine and her Court, overdrawn and yet alive and interesting. The work of Wraxall, who knew Keith, Elliot, and Harris, is of the same kind, but of a lower order of merit. It has, however, far greater value than the English Memoirs associated with his name.

## A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE ENGLISH DIPLOMATIC DESPATCHES OF THE PERIOD (1776–1780).

There has not often in our history been a trio of abler British ambassadors than Keith, Elliot, and Harris. It is certain that at no time in English diplomatic history did such a distinguished trio of ambassadors narrate and criticize the same series of events, and it is upon their despatches that our commentary on the Bavarian Succession and the Russian Mission is mainly based.

Each of these three ambassadors had already made his name known to the world by a striking feat of diplomacy before 1778. Keith was in Denmark at the time of the grim tragedy of the fate of Queen Caroline Matilda (George III.'s sister), and it was only his powerful influence, exerted under circumstances of dramatic force, that saved the Queen from life-long imprisonment and perhaps even a darker fate (1772). This feat won Keith a K.C.B. from George III. and the admiration of all England. Harris was already renowned for a great diplomatic coup in 1770, when his admirable firmness at

Madrid averted war between England and Spain. Hugh Elliot had startled the world in 1777 by secretly purloining the papers of the American agent Lee from Berlin, copying them and returning them to the owner under cover of darkness. But none of their exploits ended here. Keith was to raise both his own fame and that of his country to the highest pitch by the peace of Sistova, 1791, the fitting cover to a long diplomatic career. Hugh Elliot was to be the hero of wild and daring exploits, yet again to break his cane over Kuyphausen and fight a duel with him, to deport the Court of Naples to Sicily despite Queen Caroline of Naples, and to be assured by Gustavus III. that he alone had been the saviour of the Swedish Monarchy. Harris was to be the chief inspirer of the foreign policy of Pitt, the architect of the Great Triple Alliance of 1787, and to close his career as the Nestor of English diplomacy, at whose feet the greatest of English foreign ministers, George Canning himself, was to sit. Enough has been said to show that their exploits and their reputation were, in each case, remarkable, and to indicate that their commentary on the diplomatic events of 1777–80 is likely to be of interest.

In order to estimate the probability of bias in their narratives, a close examination of their individual temperaments is needed. During the period 1777–80, Harris and Elliot were still young men, the first in the thirties, the latter actually yet in the twenties. Their despatches have, therefore, an interest and a fire, which is quite unusual among diplomatists. Their private correspondence, in each case, is filled with mirth, satire, and pungency, which often overflows into their diplomatic communications and profanes the solemnity associated with despatches. Harris has more brilliancy of literary style, Elliot more mordancy of wit; the one has more epigram, the other more knowledge. Each was an adept at diplomatic intrigue, and knew how to extract a secret by a judicious bribe or confidence. Elliot, however, was less scrupulous than Harris, and his reckless courage and

biting tongue sometimes placed him in awkward situations. He was never afraid of provoking a crisis, of exceeding his instructions, or of abandoning orthodox methods. Thus he was occasionally rebuked from home, he was publicly censured for copying Lee's papers (though privately praised and rewarded with £500), and his repartees to King Frederic can hardly always have benefited his country. Harris, on the other hand, erred in exactly the opposite way: though in private his opinions were expressed with extraordinary freedom, he was always discreet and polished to the highest degree in public or to officials. He also had a strong will, but he trusted to adroitness and flattery rather than to boldness, to carry him through a diplomatic crisis. Thus, while the results Elliot secured were great or disastrous, those of Harris were neither, and he failed in his great object of winning Russia over to an alliance with England during these years (1778–80), for all his cleverness and despite his great personal triumph at the Court of Petrograd. The truth is that in diplomacy it is possible to be too diplomatic, and brusqueness of manner is sometimes more effective than suavity. The general result of the difference between Harris and Elliot seems to be this: Harris is unsurpassed at unravelling an intrigue, Elliot at judging a diplomatic situation. Each has great political insight, but the one excels in finesse, and the other in force. For this purpose they could hardly have been better placed than in Berlin and in Petrograd, the one to estimate the iron nature of Frederic and the adamantine strength of his policy, the other to follow the caprices and intrigues of Catherine through all their labyrinthine windings. Elliot judged the general situation of the Bavarian Succession and the actions of Frederic in most masterly fashion, he realized more clearly than any one that the claims of Austria or Bavaria were not a question of right but of force, he divined sooner than any one that Frederic would fight rather than yield to them. In general his judgment on the dynamics of the

situation during the war, and of the readjustments made by the Peace of Teschen, are of the highest value. On the other hand, for estimating and discovering the importance and narrating the course of such a diplomatic intrigue as the Mission of Count Falkenstein and of the Prince of Prussia, Elliot was not the equal of Harris, who understood better than any one the secrets of the backstairs and the closet. The genius of the one was for estimating a situation, of the other for describing a court. It is not an accident that the commentary of Harris on the German events of 1778, and that of Elliot on the Russian events of 1780, is relatively of more importance than the rest of their despatches. It was the natural result of the temperaments and gifts of each individual. The difference is, however, only relative, for each had many of the best diplomatic qualities.

Their relative accuracy is hard to estimate, each was occasionally led into exaggeration by desire for epigram or effect; one cannot believe Catherine so foolish or Frederic so cruel, nor their courtiers or ministers such blockheads as one or the other sometimes pictures them to be. But, on the other hand, the general accuracy of their estimates is hard to dispute. Harris unquestionably had the most varied sources of information, but was by no means always able to distinguish between gossip and act.* He had not a mind entirely accurate in detail, and he rather subordinated particular facts to general descriptions.

The diplomatist who sentences or characterizes individuals or events on the evidence of the day with precision and an air of finality has more claims on our sense of pleasure than on our sense of belief. It is hardly possible

* We may quote here one example of his inaccuracy, *e.g. Malmesbury Diaries*, i. p. 2. He tells us (1767) that Frederic raised the army of Prussia from 70,000 to 150,000, and (1776) p. 143, gives the figures "50,000 to near 200,000." The inaccuracies are relatively slight in the first (and for us most important) volume but they abound in the fourth.

to accept judgments of this kind as we do those of the historian, writing from the accumulated testimony of years. While for living interest and vivid power of narration few despatches can compare with those of Harris, a word of caution must be addressed to accepting their confident pronouncements. He is too resolved to find chaos, caprice, and corruption everywhere not to succeed in his wish. Still he had access to so many sources of information, was a man of such strict honour and integrity, so incapable of misrepresenting what he believed to be facts, that even when we differ from him we must always do so with great diffidence. His biases are obvious—he hates and despises the Russian Court for its alien French levity and its native Slav barbarism, he is shocked by its moral laxity, and scornful of its notions of statesmanship, and he is induced by his literary skill to make the most of these contrasts and defects. In addition he has a fierce hatred of Prussia and all its influences at court and an easy tolerance of Austria. When we allow duly for these biases, and for an occasional inaccuracy of detail, or over-emphasis of phrase, we are in a position to form a picture of the Russian Court and policy, in a detail and with an accuracy that it is quite unusual to obtain from diplomatic communications.

Elliot's sources of information at Berlin were by no means so ample as those of Harris at Petrograd. He never slipped out from a ball to talk politics with Frederic in a dressing-room, nor was he in the habit of calling upon Finckenstein or Hertzberg when they were in bed. Prussia and its chief personages, both from their hatred of England and from remembrance of his celebrated *coup* in copying Lee's papers, regarded Elliot with by no means unjustified suspicion. But Elliot triumphed over many difficulties. With the king he could never hold any really cordial relations, and they hardly ever met save on public and formal occasions, when their conversation was chiefly limited to repartees in which the king was not always the

winner.* In the eighteenth century it was of the greatest possible importance to obtain direct knowledge of the ruler from personal intimacy and acquaintance, and the greatest triumphs of Keith and Harris were achieved by this means. It was of more importance to know Frederic with intimacy than any other sovereign, for no ruler was so independent and so uninfluenced by others. As he was unable to do this, Elliot started with a serious disadvantage, which he parried as well as he could. He bribed some of the body-servants of the king, who gave him valuable information; his attaché Liston knew intimately at least one savant who was a royal confidant. Elliot himself knew well Keith, Earl Marischal of Scotland —the Jacobite transplanted to Berlin—than whom none was more intimate with the old king. With Frederic-William, Prince of Prussia, and Prince Henry, he was as friendly as it was possible to be with princes, but less with the former than the latter. He also knew well the Hereditary Prince of Brunswick, who "enjoys the ear, the favour, and the confidence" of Frederic.† Both Elliot and his friend Liston were intimate with Hertzberg, whom the latter visited on his estate, and found in all his glory a true Prussian Junker, like a "Cincinnatus from the plough," wearing a round hat and unpowdered hair, selling his own milk to peasants, and pressing strong brown beer of his own brewing upon visitors.‡ Elliot's irresistible address in society gained him many advantages also, and he drew valuable military information from officers who were friends of his. In a country which depended so absolutely on its monarch, the most skilful

* *E.g.: Frederic.* What do they think of my new ambassador in England? (a notoriously objectionable man).

*Elliot* (bowing). Digne réprésentatif de votre majesté. [etc. etc.]

† See especially *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 102, Berlin, February 22, "private and secret," and another "secret"; for relations with Prince Henry, see *ib.* May 30, June 2, all Elliot to Suffolk; for relations with Prince Frederic-William, see *ib.* 104, Elliot to Stormont, 1780.

‡ See for above details Minto's *Elliot*, p. 191.

diplomatist was at a disadvantage when he was not only not intimate with the ruler, but when that ruler's whole influence was exerted to deprive him of adequate sources of information. The character of his disclosures, therefore (despite his great *coup* in purloining the papers of Lee) is not in general as striking as that of Harris. He confessed himself (September 13, 1780), "I cannot pretend to any direct knowledge of the secrets of the Cabinet of Potsdam." He did not discover any signs of Joseph's mission to Russia in 1780 till long after it was known to Harris; his information on the affairs of Bavaria in 1778 was inferior to that of Keith. On the other hand, his knowledge of German courts and diplomacy was wide and deep; he had delved in charters and chronicles to elucidate Joseph's claims on Bavaria. From personal knowledge he thoroughly understood the working of the Imperial Diet at Ratisbon. The extent of his actual knowledge, combined with the accuracy of his judgment, often supplied the place of more precise information. To give an example or two. It was on February 3, 1778, that he judged that Frederic would fight Joseph, anticipating accurately the decision which the Prussian king himself made later. Again, when he makes the general statement in discussing Bavarian claims that in this age force, not justice, decides questions of prescriptive right, his evidence as characterizing the diplomacy of the age is of great and unusual weight, for in such matters it surpasses the more partial insight of Harris or the massive common sense of Keith. In the same way the various reports (which are certainly his) upon Bavaria, and upon the Imperial system in the year 1776, are masterly state-papers, models of lucidity and wisdom, and his criticism of Frederic's internal administration is admirable.

The bias of Elliot is equally obvious, though not as great as that of Harris. The latter described the Russian nobles as "monkeys grafted on bears"; the former said that in Prussia he found "nature plunged in sand and

mankind in slavery." He found the men of the country, for the most part, rude, and even the women seemed to him grenadiers. He had sufficient of eighteenth century sentiment to protest against the rudeness and coarseness of the life around him, enough of English feeling to resent a despotism however liberal and intelligent. Moreover, he was convinced that England's interests had suffered in the past by showing too much deference to Frederic's feelings and by supineness to his repeated attempts to do her an ill turn. All these feelings infected his despatches, and made him darken the colours in which he portrayed Frederic, in order that he might stir his own Government to more vigorous action and to approval of his own determined policy. Elliot's character was hardly so scrupulous or honourable as that of Harris, and we may suspect an occasional over-emphasis that is not quite unintentional. He denounces the "restless ambition" of the Prussian king, his "deep-rooted ill-will" and "most violent dislike," "implacable and unprovoked resentment" to Great Britain, such that he refuses "to repeat the expressions he (Frederic) is sometimes heard to let fall." At the same time he pronounces him "precipitate," and denies him "any regular plan of politics." He was continually enraged by Frederic's "evident predilection for France." * All this did not induce him to favour Frederic. At the same time, he is sometimes driven to admit that Frederic worked ceaselessly for the welfare of his people, and even in diplomacy he testifies to the strength of his will, the ingenuity of his devices, and his extreme resourcefulness. He attributes endlessly base motives to Frederic at different times, but he by no means succeeds in always bringing them home to him. Yet in the incidents of our period Frederic is treated with much less partiality than at a later date. Owing to the limitations of his knowledge Elliot's accounts are seldom complete; owing

* *S.P.F. Prussia*, vol. 102, Berlin, January 10, February 22, November 7, 1778; vol. 104, May 13, June 4.

to his bias they are sometimes unfair to Frederic, but as summaries of the events of diplomacy during these years, as judgments of political situations by a contemporary these despatches have rare and unusual merits.

The despatches of Liston, Elliot's friend and cicerone, have similar qualities and defects, though they are more dull and detailed, and show somewhat less masterly grasp. The replies to the despatches of both, by the Secretaries of State at St. James's, are occasionally of some interest. Stormont was a really learned minister, who knew diplomacy abroad as few men of that day did, and his judgments are often of the greatest value and weight, but they agree, on the whole, with the sentiments of Elliot and Harris. Those of Suffolk, "the Arch Pecksniff" of diplomacy, are perhaps of more interest, because his knowledge appears to have been slight, and accordingly his judgments are interesting and unaffected by preconceptions. They record the opinions of a fairly able man, relatively ignorant of continental affairs, who, while condescending to adopt a tone of unction in certain respects, usually judges with a singularly unbiased mind. In its way his judgment on the Austrian claims to the Bavarian Succession is a masterpiece of grave and half-conscious irony—"I am not sufficiently versed, either in Imperial Genealogies, or German Law, to remove the Difficulties you find in conjecturing the Grounds on which the Court of Vienna may have formed its Pretensions," nor, he naïvely adds, "will this difficulty be removed by the manifesto—proclaiming their rights—that has just been received." *

It would be a gross injustice to Keith to compare him to Suffolk, either in point of knowledge or in diplomatic capacity. But, in fact, his massive solid understanding has more in keeping with that of the heavy Earl than

* *S.P.F. German States* (*Bavaria*), vol. 113, St. James's, Suffolk to Eden, February 3, 1778. Eden's despatches are valuable and accurate. For the general sketch of Bavaria, see *passim*.

with those of the volatile Harris or the witty Elliot. Keith had not the brilliance and the natural abilities of either, but his industry and persistence, his immense diplomatic experience (he was at Vienna twenty years), his strong will and sound judgment eventually carried him as far as either of the others. His task was almost equally difficult with that of Elliot, for Kaunitz feared and hated England almost as much as Frederic did, and it was only by personal acquaintance with Kaunitz, Joseph, and Maria Theresa that Keith could hope to learn much of the secrets of Austrian policy, then the most closely guarded in Europe. Much could be learnt from actual indiscretions of utterance from Frederic or Catherine; at Vienna Keith had to form his judgment from the frowns or smiles of Joseph or Maria Theresa. He does not seem to have been specially acquainted with nobles of the Court, the Prussian and French ambassadors naturally avoided him, from the Russian he could learn little, and he depended on the envoys of minor courts, such as that of Saxony, on spies, and on the public newsletters and journals for much of his information. Accordingly his despatches of the years 1778–80 must be held as on the whole inferior in interest to those of Harris or Elliot. He had not the youthful enthusiasm, which led each of the others occasionally to summarize the whole diplomatic situation or characterize the Court to which they were accredited, and (comparing the relative ease of his position for obtaining information) the actual amount of information he got was less. Both Harris and Elliot criticized and described the earlier and later stages of the Bavarian Succession negotiation with more relative fulness of detail. On the other hand, when Keith does utter a judgment or opinion it is usually of weight, and small as were his opportunities of obtaining information on passing events as compared with his colleagues, its quality sometimes far exceeded their quality. Of this we have an excellent test in the matter of the famous Russian mission

of Joseph in 1780. Of this event Harris gave a full diary, and Elliot a far more circumstantial account than Keith, while each speculated much on its result. Yet the contribution of either to the knowledge of that event can hardly compare with Keith's communication to the Foreign Office of Kaiser Joseph's own verbal narrative of the whole affair (*see* Appendix II.). It is true that it was not obtained till two years after the event, but the whole conversation threw a most valuable light on the future policy of Czarina and Kaiser as well as on the past. The steady patience of Keith enabled him to accomplish much, and finally to gain confidential personal interviews with both Maria Theresa and Joseph, which, though few in number, were often of the greatest service.

All these diplomatists quoted sometimes make admissions as to Prussian policy, which show that the interests of England required a certain impartiality of view at this time. The result is that, despite the hatred which Prussia and England had felt for one another since 1763, the English despatches of 1776–80 give the decisions of a relatively neutral umpire. Frederic is probably more fairly judged at this time by English diplomats than at any other period of his career. On the whole their diplomatic judgments on the merits of the Bavarian Succession are the most impartial that we find in the Archives of any great Power. And of all these despatches the weightiest in judgment are certainly those of Sir Robert Keith.