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CHAPTER XLIV.
THE AFFAIRS OF
POLAND AND TURKEY,
1733-1740
THE peace of
Europe was next disturbed by what has been called the “War of the Polish
Succession”. The throne of Poland was rendered vacant by the death of Augustus
II, February 1st, 1733. It had been foreseen that on this event Louis XV would
endeavor to restore his father-in-law, Stanislaus Lesczinski,
to the throne of Poland, a project which Austria and Russia had determined to
oppose. With this view they selected, as a candidate for the Polish Crown,
Emanuel, brother of John V, King of Portugal; and they engaged Frederick
William I of Prussia to support their designs by a treaty drawn up December
31st, 1731, and called the Treaty of Lowenwolde,
from the name of the Russian minister who had the principal hand in its
negotiation. The Duchy of Berg, the grand object of Frederick William’s
ambition, was to be assured to him, and Courland to a prince of the House of
Brandenburg, upon the death of the last reigning Duke of the House of Kettler.
This article, however, was unacceptable to the Court of St. Petersburg. The
Empress, Anna Ivanowna, wished to procure
Courland for her favorite, Biron; she accordingly refused to ratify the
treaty, and matters were in this state on the death of Augustus II.
When that event
occurred, Frederick Augustus, the son and successor of Augustus II in the Saxon
Electorate, also became a candidate for the Polish Crown; and, in order to
obtain it, he sought the assistance of the Emperor Charles VI, which he hoped
to gain by adhering to the Pragmatic Sanction. In the previous year the Emperor
had brought that matter before the German Diet, when a great majority of the
States had ratified and guaranteed the Act (January 11th, 1732). The Electors
of Bavaria and Saxony and the Count Palatine had, however, protested against
it. The Elector of Bavaria and the son of the Elector of Saxony, the prince now
in question, had married daughters of the Emperor Joseph I, whose eventual
claims to the Austrian succession, as children of the elder brother, might be
considered preferable to those of the daughters of Charles VI; and, on July
4th, the two Electors had concluded, at Dresden, an alliance for the defence of their respective rights. But Charles VI availed
himself of the ambitious views of Frederick Augustus to obtain from him a
renunciation of his pretensions; and the new Elector now solemnly acceded to
the decree of the Empire regarding the Pragmatic Sanction, and agreed
personally to guarantee it, the Emperor, in return, engaging to assist him to
the Polish throne. In the treaty concluded between them Charles VI promised his
unconditional aid in excluding Stanislaus, or any French candidate; while he
undertook to afford Frederick Augustus every assistance for the attainment of
his object that might be compatible with the constitution of the Polish
Republic; but on condition that the Elector should consult the wishes of the
Empress of Russia and King of Prussia. When he should have done this, Charles
promised to furnish him with money to procure his election, and to support him
in it with arms; that is, first to corrupt, and then to constrain the Polish
nobles. In consequence of this arrangement, a treaty was made in July, 1733,
between the Elector of Saxony and the Empress of Russia, by which the agreement
to elect a Prussian Prince to the Duchy of Courland was set aside; and it was
agreed that when the anticipated vacancy should occur by the death of Duke
Ferdinand, resort should be had to an election; doubtless of much the same sort
as was now to be accorded to the unhappy Poles. The Empress promised to support
the election of Frederick Augustus in Poland not only by negotiation and money,
but also by arms, “so far as could be done without violating the liberty of
election”; a clear impossibility. Thus the interests of the Portuguese Prince,
who was, indeed, personally unacceptable to the Poles, were entirely
disregarded. After the withdrawal of this candidate, the King of Prussia would
have preferred Stanislaus to the Elector of Saxony for King of Poland, as less
dangerous to Prussian interests; but he coquetted alternately with the French
and Imperial Courts, and ended with doing nothing.
This conjuncture
is principally important from the position now definitively taken up by Russia
as a European Power. It had always been the policy of Peter the Great to
nourish, under the mask of friendship, the elements of discord existing in the
Polish constitution, and thus to render Poland’s escape from foreign influence
impossible. It was only through the Tsar that Augustus II had been able to
maintain himself on the throne. Russian troops almost continually occupied
Poland, in spite of the remonstrances of the people, and Peter
disposed as arbitrarily of the lives and estates of Polish subjects as if they
had been a conquered people. Thus, for instance, when he was celebrating the
marriage of his niece, Catharine, with the Duke of Mecklenburg at Danzig in
1716, his fleet threatened that town in the very midst of the solemnities, and
he compelled it to make a contribution of 150,000 dollars towards his war with
Sweden. This was done under the very eyes of King Augustus, who was present in
the town. The Poles owed their misfortunes, as we have said, to their
constitution, but also to their own faults. Frederick II, speaking of Poland
shortly after this time, says : “This kingdom is in a perpetual anarchy. All
the great families are divided in their interests; they prefer their own
advantage to the public good, and only unite for the cruel oppression of their
subjects, whom they treat more like beasts of burden than men. The Poles are
vain, overbearing in prosperity, abject in adversity; capable of any act in
order to obtain money, which they throw out of window immediately they have got
it; frivolous, without judgment, equally ready to take up or abandon a cause without
any reason. They have laws, but nobody observes them, because there is no
executive justice. When many offices become vacant, the power of the King
increases in proportion, since he has the privilege to dispose of them; but the
only return he meets with is ingratitude. The Diet assembles every three years,
either at Grodno or Warsaw; when it is the policy of the Court to procure the
election of a person devoted to it as Marshal of the Diet. Yet, during the
whole reign of Augustus II there was but one Diet which lasted. This cannot be
otherwise, since a single deputy can interrupt their deliberations. It is the
Veto of the ancient tribunes of Rome ... The women conduct political intrigues
and dispose of everything, while their husbands get drunk ... Poland maintains
an army of 24,000 men, but they are bad troops. In case of need it can assemble
its arrière-ban; but Augustus II in vain invoked it against Charles
XII. Hence it was easy for Russia, under a more perfect government, to profit
by the weakness of its neighbor, and to gain an ascendant over it”.
France also
employed money to secure the election of Stanislaus; but in fact, as a native
Pole, he was the popular candidate, as well as by his personal qualities; and,
had the Crown, nation been left to itself, and that liberty of election allowed
to it which the Eastern Powers pretended to secure, he would have been the
undisputed King of Poland. But as Austrian troops were massed in Silesia, while
a Russian army was invading Poland from the east, it was necessary for
Stanislaus to enter the Kingdom by stealth, in order to present himself to the
electors. Had Cardinal Fleury, the French Minister, been more active, this
necessity might have been averted; but he kept Stanislaus several months in
France, and to insure his safety it became necessary to resort to an artifice.
A person simulating Stanislaus was sent to Danzig with a small French squadron
having 1,500 troops on board; while the real Stanislaus proceeded to Warsaw by
way of Berlin, in the disguise of a merchant. He was a second time elected King
of Poland on the plain of Vola by a great majority of the
electors—60,000 it is said; and his election was duly proclaimed by the Primate
of the Kingdom, Theodore Potocki, September
12th, 1733. Some 3,000 of the Palatines, however, gained by the Elector of
Saxony, and having the Bishop of Cracow at their head, quitted the field of
election, crossed the Vistula to Prague, and elected Frederick Augustus, who,
being supported by the Russian army, was proclaimed King of Poland, with the
title of Augustus III (October 5th), and was immediately recognized by the
Emperor Charles VI.
Louis XV made some
vain remonstrances to the Cabinet of Vienna. The junction of the
Russian and Saxon troops compelled Stanislaus to fly from Warsaw, and take
refuge at Danzig, where he was besieged by the Russians. That place, after a
brave and obstinate defence, was at length compelled
to surrender, June 28th, 1734. Stanislaus had previously escaped in the
disguise of a peasant to Marienwerder, and
thence to Konigsberg, where the King of Prussia afforded him protection. Thus
Frederick William seemed to play an equivocal part; for while he sheltered
Stanislaus, he sent 10,000 men to join the Imperial army which was to fight
against his cause, but which did nothing but rob and oppress the people among
whom it was quartered. The Crown Prince, afterwards Frederick the Great,
accompanied these troops, and is said to have acquired some useful knowledge,
by observing the bad discipline of the Austrians. All that the French did
in favour of Stanislaus was to send a
paltry expedition, consisting of three battalions, to Danzig, which landed on
May 10th and reembarked on the 14th. These troops, on their return,
touched at Copenhagen. Count Plelo, who was then
French Ambassador in that city, was so indignant at their conduct that he led
them back to Danzig ; but only to his own destruction and that of the greater
part of his companions. This was the first encounter between the Russians and
French. After these events, the Russians and Austrians began to dictate in
Poland, and the seat of government seemed to lie rather at St. Petersburg than
Warsaw.
The French Court
seemed more intent on gaining advantages in the west than on supporting
Stanislaus and the “dignity” of his son-in-law, Louis XV, or maintaining the
balance of power. This last motive was indeed assigned in a secret treaty
concluded between France and Sardinia, September 23rd, 1733, for the
purpose of an attack upon the Emperor’s Italian provinces. The balance of power
seemed rather to depend on the fate of Poland. Russia, however, notwithstanding
her recent advances, does not yet appear to have inspired much alarm in Europe;
at all events, France could gain little benefit from a war with that country.
The Sardinian sceptre had now passed to
Charles Emanuel III, through the abdication of his father, Victor Amadeus II,
in 1730. It was the custom of the House of Savoy to make peace or war according
to its political convenience; and in the secret treaty with the French Crown it
was agreed that the Milanese should be attacked, and, when conquered, annexed
to the Sardinian dominions. By a particular convention, when the King of
Sardinia should also acquire Mantua, Savoy or Sardinia was to be ceded to
France. The Austrian Netherlands were not to be attacked, unless the conduct of
the Powers interested in their preservation rendered it necessary. So also
the Empire was to be distinguished from the Emperor.
Nothing was to be done to the prejudice of the former; and the King of
Sardinia, when in possession of the Milanese, was to acknowledge that he held
it as an Imperial fief. These arrangements were intended to prevent Holland and
England from interfering on the ground of the Barrier Treaty, and to bring some
of the German princes into the alliance. Further, by separate articles, it was
agreed that it would be advisable to drive the Emperor from Naples and Sicily
and the Tuscan ports; that is, to expel him entirely from Italy, when his
Italian possessions were to be made over to Don Carlos and his heirs male, or,
in their default, to the next sons of the Queen of Spain, and their male
descendants, in the order of primogeniture; and, failing all male heirs, they
were to be reunited to the Spanish Crown, and Charles Emanuel also stipulated
that Spain should be confined to the Two Sicilies and
the Tuscan Presidi or ports, and
Fleury promised the unconditional adhesion of Spain to this treaty.
In consequence of
this treaty, Louis XV declared war against the Emperor, October 7th, 1733. The
Queen of Spain seized the occasion to push the interest of her family. She
longed to see Don Carlos on the throne of Naples; and her pride
was hurt by the ancient forms of vassalage which bound him, as Duke
of Parma and Tuscany, to the Emperor. She had also another son to provide for.
By the skillful administration of Patino, called
the Colbert of Spain, the army and navy had been brought into a flourishing
condition; the former numbered 80,000 men, flushed with recent victories over
the Moors in Africa. As soon as a rupture between France and Austria was
certain, a defensive alliance was secretly concluded November 7th, at the Escurial, between France and Spain. The two Bourbon Powers
mutually guaranteed their possessions which they held or claimed. While Spain
declared that she would abrogate all exclusive privileges to the English,
France undertook to attack Gibraltar if necessary. Thus the Treaty of the Escurial, though openly directed against the Emperor was in
reality equally hostile to England. The Emperor endeavored to draw England and
Holland on his side; but these Powers determined to remain neutral, provided
France abstained from attacking the Austrian Netherlands. The English Ministry,
embarrassed by domestic affairs, and engrossed by the prospect of a general
election, contented themselves with offering their mediation, and, on November
24th, 1733, a convention was signed at the Hague, by which Louis XV engaged not
to invade the Netherlands.
France began the
war by seizing Lorraine, whose Duke, Francis Stephen, was destined to marry the
Archduchess, Maria Theresa, and thus to become the founder of a new House of
Austria. Marshal Berwick crossed the Rhine and captured Kehl, October 9th, 1733; but as this fortress belonged to
the Empire, Louis, in order not to embroil himself with that body, declared
that he would restore it at the peace. The conquest of the Milanese was
entrusted to Marshal Villars, and, with the aid of the Piedmontese,
was virtually effected in three months. Mantua, however, the stronghold of
Lombardy, remained in possession of the Austrians, who were assembling in large
masses in Tyrol. Villars besought Don Carlos and the Duke of Montemar, who
had arrived in Italy with a Spanish army, to assist him in dispersing the
Austrians; but they preferred marching to Naples, and in February, 1734,
quitted North Italy. The German Diet, by a decree of February 26th, declared
that France had violated the Peace of Baden by invading the Empire and the
Duchy of Milan, as well as by levying contributions in the Circles; but the
Electors of Bavaria, Cologne, and the Palatine remonstrated against this
declaration, and determined to preserve a strict neutrality. In the campaign of
this year, Berwick detached Count Belle-Isle against Trèves and Trarhach, which he took, while Berwick
himself, with the main body, undertook the siege of Philippsburg,
where he was killed in the trenches, June 12th. The command now devolved on
Marshal d'Asfeld, to whom the place surrendered,
July 18th. The Imperial army, under the command of the aged Eugene, now only
the shadow of his former self, looked idly on during the siege. In Italy, the
principal theatre of the war, the allies were everywhere successful. The conquest
of the Milanese was completed by the capture of Novara and Tortona. The joy of these successes was damped by the death
of Villars at Turin, June 17th, within a few days of that of Berwick. They were
the last of the great commanders of the reign of Louis XIV. The Imperialists,
worsted near Parma, June 29th, gained indeed some advantage over Marshal
Broglie, near Quistello, but were completely
defeated September 19th, between Guastalla and Suzzara. Charles Emanuel had, however, consistently refused
to undertake the siege of Mantua, unless it was assigned to the Elector of
Bavaria, or retained in return for concessions to France. He was determined to
prevent it from falling into the hands of Spain. So Mantua was still untaken at
the end of 1734.
The affairs of the
Emperor went still worse in Southern Italy. Don Carlos and Montemar entered
the Neapolitan dominions in May, 1734, and marched without resistance to the
capital, which immediately opened its gates; for the Austrian sway was highly
unpopular. Instead of meeting the enemy in the open field, the Emperor’s forces
had been weakened by being distributed into garrisons; the only considerable
body of them which had been kept together consisted of 9,000 or 10,000 men,
entrenched at Bitonto, in Apulia, who were
completely defeated by the Spaniards, May 25th. This victory decided the
conquest of all Naples. Montemar then passed into Sicily and speedily
reduced the whole of that island. Don Carlos was crowned King of the Two Sicilies at Palermo, July 3rd, 1735, with the title of
Charles III. He was an enlightened Prince, and, under the guidance of his able
minister, Bernardo Tanucci, a professor of
jurisprudence at Pisa, the reign of the Spanish Bourbons in Italy began with a
promise which was not subsequently realized.
In Northern Italy,
the campaign of 1735 was as favourable to
the allies as that of the preceding year. The Imperialists were driven out of
Austrian Lombardy, with the exception of Mantua, and even this they preserved
only through the dissensions of the allies. As Spain claimed Mantua for Don
Carlos, and would give Charles Emanuel no guarantee for the possession of the
Milanese, that Prince was unwilling to forward the reduction of Mantua. France
also, satisfied with the possession of Lorraine, did not wish Spain to reap any
further advantages; and by refusing to supply battering artillery and by other
means, endeavored, in concert with the maritime Powers, to obstruct the
progress of the Spanish arms. Nothing memorable occurred on the Rhine.
Marshal Coigny held Eugene in check, and
prevented him from crossing that river, though he was supported by a corps of
10,000 Russians under Count Lacy and General Keith.
The appearance of
this corps, however, hastened the negotiations between Austria and France,
which had already been commenced. The reverses experienced by the Emperor led
him to desire peace, while England and Holland offered to mediate. Their
proposals were in the Emperor’s favour, and he
seemed at first disposed to accept them. The proffered mediation was rejected,
not by him, but by the allied Crowns ; though Charles was indeed displeased
with England and Holland, thinking that they had not afforded him that help
which they were bound to give by the Second Treaty of Vienna. He listened,
therefore, not unwillingly to the secret proposals of France, which were made
to him at the instance of Chauvelin, the French
Minister for Foreign Affairs; and preliminaries were signed at Vienna, October 3rd,
1735. France not only abandoned the cause of Stanislaus, the pretended object
of the war, but also deserted Spain, whose subsidies she had received. A
cessation of hostilities took place in November, but the signature of a
definite treaty was delayed more than three years.
THE TIRD TREATY OF
VIENNA, 1735-1738.
The Spanish
Sovereigns were naturally indignant at the conduct of France; but the arming of
the maritime Powers, and the appearance of an English squadron on the coasts of
Spain, induced them to accept peace (May, 1736). By the Third Treaty of Vienna,
November 18th, 1738, it was arranged that King Stanislaus should abdicate the
Crown of Poland, but retain the Royal title. Augustus III was to be recognized
in his stead, while the Polish Constitution and liberty of election were
guaranteed. Tuscany, on the death of the Grand Duke, was to be assigned to the
Duke of Lorraine, whose duchies of Bar and Lorraine were to be transferred to
Stanislaus; the former immediately, the latter so soon as the Duchy of Tuscany
should become vacant. Stanislaus was to hold these duchies for life; and upon
his decease they were to be united to the French Crown. The County of Falkenstein, however, a small district separated from
Lorraine, and situated at the foot of Mount Tonnerre,
was reserved to the Duke Francis Stephen, in order that he might hold a
possession under the Empire, and that it might not be objected to him, when he
should hereafter aspire to the Imperial Throne, as son-in-law of the Emperor
Charles VI, that he was a foreign Prince. The Diet subsequently agreed that the
vote which the Dukes of Lorraine had hitherto enjoyed in their quality of
Marquises of Nomeny should be attached to
the County of Falkenstein. Naples and Sicily,
with the Tuscan Presidi, were to remain in the
possession of Don Carlos. The King of Sardinia to have the Novarese and Vigevanese,
or the Tortonese and Vigevanese, or the Novarese and Tortonese, according to his option. Parma and Piacenza were
to be assigned to the Emperor. France guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, and
acquiesced in the marriage of the Duke of Lorraine with the Archduchess, Maria
Theresa—a union which had hitherto been opposed by France, because Lorraine
would thus have been ultimately added to the Austrian dominions. The King of
Sardinia acceded to this treaty, February 3rd, 1739 ; and the Courts of Madrid
and Naples in the following April. Thus terminated a war for which the question
of the Polish Succession afforded only a pretence.
The Emperor was
the chief loser by this treaty; yet, though Naples and Sicily were wrested from
his dominion, he recovered, on the other hand, nearly all the possessions which
had been conquered from him in Northern Italy, besides acquiring Parma, and,
indirectly, through his son-in-law, Tuscany. The recognition of the Pragmatic
Sanction by France was also no slight advantage to him. The loss of Lorraine
did not concern him directly, but merely in its quality of an Imperial fief;
whilst, on the other hand, it was a direct and very important acquisition for
France. It was finally united to the French Crown on the death of Stanislaus,
in 1766. England and Holland looked quietly on. The Spanish Sovereigns were
highly discontented with the Treaty, though Naples and Sicily were hardly a bad
exchange for Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, the last
of the Medicis, died July 9th, 1737; and thus,
on the signature of the treaty, there was nothing to prevent the immediate
execution of its provisions. Stanislaus had abdicated the Crown of Poland by an
act signed at Konigsberg, January 27th, 1736, and Russia signified her Augustus
adherence to the provisions about Poland in May. The peace finally
arranged at the Diet at Warsaw, July 10th, 1736, between Augustus III and the
Polish States, provided for the maintenance of the Roman Catholic religion, and
the right of the Poles to elect their Sovereign. The Saxon troops were to leave
the Kingdom in forty days, except the body-guard of the King, consisting of
1,200 men. The Russians were to evacuate the kingdom at the same time.
Dissidents were to enjoy security of person and property; but they were not to
be admissible into the public service, nor to the dignities of Palatines
and Starosts; nor were they to be allowed to seek the protection of
foreign Powers.
One motive which
had induced the Emperor to accede to the terms offered by France was the
prospect of indemnifying himself for his losses by a war with the Turks, which
he had entered into, in conformity with treaties, in conjunction with Russia.
Peter the Great
had never forgotten his humiliation at the Pruth,
nor abandoned his favourite schemes for
extending his Empire; but, so long as he was engaged in the Northern War,
nothing could be done in the direction of Turkey. In contemplation of an
expedition into Persia, which rendered peace with the Porte indispensable, he
had renewed, in 1720, the treaties of the Pruth and
Adrianople; and, in spite of the opposition of the English resident, Stanyan, he obtain id two important concessions, viz., the
privilege of having a resident minister at Constantinople, and the abrogation
of the yearly present or tribute made to the Tartar Khan of the Crimea. It is
remarkable that on this occasion both the contracting parties guaranteed the
Polish Constitution, and declared that none of its territories or towns should
be severed from Poland. Hence, when the Russian troops entered that country in
1733 to support Augustus III, the Porte remonstrated against it as a breach of
treaty; but being occupied with domestic dissensions, as well as with a Persian
war, took no steps to prevent it.
It was the Tsar’s
expedition into Persia, in 1722, which ultimately brought Russia into collision
with the Turks. Persia was then in the throes of a revolution. The Throne of the Sefi Dynasty, which had reigned upwards of two
centuries, was shaken by a revolt of the Afghans, and Hussein, the last of that
Dynasty, was deposed by Mir Mahmoud in 1722. Peter complained of wrongs done to
Russian merchants, and not being able to obtain the redress he demanded,
declared war. In the summer of 1722 Peter embarked at Astrachan, and
traversed the Caspian Sea, which he had previously caused to be surveyed, with
a fleet carrying 22,000 soldiers. His real object was to obtain possession
of Daghestan, and he captured and
garrisoned Derbent, the capital of that
province. He renewed the war in the following year, in spite of the remonstrances of
the Porte, and made himself master of Ghilan and Bachu, while, on the other side, the Pasha of Erzerum broke into Georgia and seized Tiflis, the
capital. A treaty with Turkey for the partition of Persia, and the restoration
of some part of it to Shah Thamasp, Hussein’s
son, was one of the Tsar’s last political acts. He died on February 10th, 1725,
in the fifty-second year of his age. A man of the wildest and most savage
impulse, yet capable of deep reflection and indomitable perseverance;
submitting himself voluntarily, for the sake of his country, to all the
hardships and privations of a common mechanic; bred up in what are perhaps the
most obstinate of all prejudices, those of a half-civilized people, yet one of
the most remarkable reformers of any age, and in the space of his short reign,
the real founder of the Russian Empire.
Peter’s son
Alexis, by his first wife, Eudoxia, had died in 1718,
in a mysterious manner. The conduct of Alexis had never been satisfactory to
his father. He was averse to all military exercises, the slave of the priests,
and the tool of the Old Russian Party, which hated and opposed all Peter’s
innovations and reforms. Hence, at an early period, the Tsar had seriously meditated
depriving him of the succession and shutting him up in a convent. Peter, during
his absence in the war of 1711, had left his son nominal Regent; but was so
little content with his conduct that, in a memorable letter addressed to the
Senate, he directed them, in case of his own death, to elect “the worthiest”
for his successor. His discontent with his heir went on increasing. During
Peter’s journey to Holland and France, in 1717, Alexis had fled for protection to the Court of Vienna. After a
short stay in that capital, and afterwards in the fortress of Ehrenberg, in
Tyrol, he proceeded under a false name to Naples, and found a refuge in the
Castle of St. Elmo. His hiding-place was, however, discovered; the Viceroy gave
him up on the demand of the Tsar’s envoys; and on February 3rd, 1718, he was
brought back to Moscow. On the following morning he was arraigned before a
great council of the clergy, nobles, and principal citizens of Moscow, in whose
presence he was compelled to sign a solemn act of renunciation of the Crown.
The confessions which Alexis made on this occasion led to the discovery of a
plot which had been hatching seven years, and in which some of the leading
Russian nobles were implicated. The objects of it were to massacre, after the
accession of Alexis, all the chief Russians and Germans who had been employed
in carrying out the reforms of Peter; to make peace with Sweden, and restore to
that Power St. Petersburg and the other conquests which had been gained from
it; to disband the standing army, and restore the soldiers to their original
condition of peasants. On May 26th, 1718, a large assembly of the clergy, and
of the highest civil and military officers, found Prince Alexis guilty on these
charges, and pronounced sentence of death. The young Prince died on the
following day, but the exact cause of his death is unknown.
Alexis had
left two children: a daughter, Natalia Alexejewna,
born July 23rd, 1714, and a son, Peter Alexejewitsch,
born October 22nd, 1715. These were his offspring by his consort, a Princess of
Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, whom he hated because she was a Protestant, and is said
to have treated so ill as to cause her death after her second lying-in.
According to the laws of hereditary succession, the son of Alexis, now nine years
old, was entitled to the Crown on the death of the Tsar. But by a ukase,
published in February, 1722, before proceeding on his expedition into Persia,
Peter had asserted his privilege to settle the succession of the Crown; and, in
May, 1724, he had caused his wife Catharine to be solemnly crowned in the
cathedral at Moscow—a ceremony which he intended as no vain and empty pageant,
but as an indication and pledge that she was to succeed him in the Imperial
dignity. He does not seem, however, to have made any formal nomination of her;
and after her coronation he appears to have discovered that she had been
unfaithful to him. Catharine’s elevation to the throne was effected, partly
through corruption, partly by force, by her partizans,
the New Russian Party, in opposition to the Old Russian faction. The only
evidence produced in favour of her claim to
the Crown was Peter’s verbal declaration that he would make her his successor.
Nothing of much importance occurred during the two years of Catharine’s reign,
with the exception of a treaty made with Austria in 1726. She died May 6th,
1727. Soon after her accession she had married her eldest daughter, Anna Petrowna, then seventeen years of age, to the Duke of
Holstein.
When Catharine I
lay on her death-bed, an assembly of the great civil and military officers of
the Empire determined that the Crown should be given to Peter, the son of
Alexis. This grandson of Peter the Great was now in his twelfth year, and the
assembly fixed his majority at sixteen. During his minority the Government was
to be conducted by the Supreme Council, under the presidency of the Duchess of
Holstein and the Princess Elizabeth, second daughter of Peter and Catharine.
This arrangement, however, was somewhat modified by a pretended will of
Catharine’s, which appears to have been manufactured by Prince Menschikoff and Count Bassewitz,
and bore the signature of the Princess Elizabeth, who was accustomed to sign
all documents for the Empress. It contained not, like the resolutions of the
Assembly, any indemnity for the judges who had condemned Alexis. The decision
of the Supreme Council was to be governed by the majority, and the Tsar was to
be present at their deliberations, but without a voice. The Government was to
effect the marriage of the Tsar with a daughter of Prince Menschikoff’s. Should Peter II die without heirs, he was to
be succeeded, first, by the Duchess of Holstein and her descendants, and then
by her sister, the Princess Elizabeth, and her descendants. Failing heirs of
all these, the Crown was to go to Natalia, daughter of Alexis.
In spite of these
regulations, however, Menschikoff, who was so
ignorant that he could hardly read or write, virtually seized the Regency, and
exercised a despotism even more terrible than that of Peter the Great. He was
immediately made Generalissimo, and betrothed the Tsar to his eldest daughter,
Maria. The only other member of the Council who enjoyed any share in the
Government was Baron Ostermann, the Vice-Chancellor. The Duke and Duchess
of Holstein lost all influence, and to avoid Menschikoff’s insolence,
proceeded to Holstein, where the Duchess died in the following year, a few
months after giving birth to a son, who, in course of time, became Peter III.
But the overbearing conduct, the avarice and corruption of Menschikoff became in a few months so intolerable,
that the youthful Tsar summoned courage to banish him to Siberia (September,
1727), where he died two years afterwards. Ostermann continued to
retain his influence, and a struggle for power took place between the Golovkins, the Dolgoroukis,
and the Golitsyns. Peter the Great’s first wife, Eudoxia, had returned to Moscow after the accession
of her grandson, but she obtained no influence. There is nothing memorable to
be recorded during the reign of Peter II, whose only passion was an extravagant
fondness for the chase. He died of the small-pox in January, 1730, just as he
was on the point of being married to the Princess Catharine Dolgorouki. His sister, Natalia, had preceded him to the
tomb. The Russian nobles now selected Peter the Great’s niece, Anna Ivanowna, the widowed Duchess of Courland, to succeed to
the throne, but on condition that she should sign a capitulation by which she
engaged not to marry, nor to name a successor, besides many other articles
which could have rendered her only an instrument in the hands of the Dolgoroukis and their party. But soon after her
accession, with the assistance of the nobles who were opposed to that party,
she cancelled this capitulation, and sent the Dolgoroukis into
banishment. Baron Ostermann became the chief counsellor of
the Empress Anna; but she was principally ruled by her favorite, Biron,
the son of an equerry.
Under the reign of
this Empress, the schemes of Peter the Great against the Ottoman Empire were
revived. In consequence of the restoration of Azof and Taganrog to
the Porte, and the destruction of the Russian forts, the Crim and Nogay Tartars had again become troublesome, and made
incursions into the Russian territories; while disputes had also been going on
respecting boundary lines on the Caspian and Black Seas and in the Ukraine. The
Persian conquests of Peter the Great were, however, almost entirely abandoned.
Besides the enormous sums required for their defence,
these provinces were found to be but the grave of brave officers and soldiers.
A treaty was, therefore, concluded in January, 1732, between the Empress Anna
and the celebrated Taehmas Kouli Khan, by which a great part of the Russian
conquests in Persia was restored. On the other hand, it was resolved to
recover Azof and to chastise the Tartars; but this object was
retarded a while by the Russian interference in the affairs of Poland, already
recorded.
Turkey was now
exhausted by her long war with Persia, as well as by the revolution which had
taken place at Constantinople, and the consequent efforts of the Government to
extirpate the Janissaries. These troops, alienated by the heavy taxes and the
dearness of provisions, and more especially by the reluctance displayed by
Sultan Achmet III to prosecute a projected
expedition against Persia, had, in September, 1730, organized a revolt, under
the conduct of an Albanian named Patrona Chalil, one of their body, and a dealer in old clothes;
who, having spent his money in fitting himself out for the war, was vexed to be
disappointed of his expected booty. Weak, luxurious, and good-tempered, Achmet negotiated with the rebels, and delayed till it
was too late to strike a decisive blow. The rebels seemed to receive his
proposals favourably; they wished him all
prosperity, but required satisfaction of their demands and the surrender of
those persons to whom they imputed the public distress, including the Mufti,
the Grand Vizier, Ibrahim, the Sultan’s sons-in-law, and others. Finding that
nobody would fight in his cause, Achmet caused
the persons demanded to be strangled, and delivered to the Janissaries. But
even this would not satisfy them. They had stipulated that their victims should
be surrendered alive, and they pretended that the bodies of some slaves had
been substituted for those of the persons they had demanded. Achmet was now compelled to abdicate in favour of his nephew, Mahmoud, son of Mustapha II.
Nevertheless, Patrona Chalil continued
several weeks to be the real Sovereign of Turkey. At first he affected the
purest disinterestedness. He caused the treasures of the Grand Vizier and other
victims to be fairly divided among his confederates, and he demanded the
abolition of all the new taxes. But having incurred the suspicion of accepting
bribes, he lost the confidence of his associates, and the Government was
enabled to effect his destruction. Patrona was
admitted to attend the sittings of the Divan; and on one of these occasions, he
and two other of the principal ringleaders were put to death in the midst of
the assembled ministers. After this, with the assistance of the citizens, the
revolt was gradually extinguished.
The war with Persia,
however, still went on. In 1733 and 1734 the Osmanlis made two most
unsuccessful campaigns against that country, so that they confessed themselves
“that they were never more embarrassed since the establishment of their
monarchy”. The fate of the Turkish Empire had already become an object of
solicitude to the statesmen of Europe. It was remarked that the Osmanli Dominion
was supported, not by its own intrinsic power, but through the jealousy of
Christian princes, who did not wish to see the States of others aggrandized by
the partition of its provinces. It was at this time that Cardinal Alberoni amused his leisure hours by drawing up a scheme
for the annihilation of Turkey as an independent Power, which is worth
mentioning here only as a proof of the interest excited by the fate of Turkey
among the politicians of that day. It does not appear, however, that any
jealousy then existed of Russia aggrandizing herself at the expense of Turkey.
The French,
opposed to Russia in the affairs of Poland, were seeking to incite the Porte to
a war with that country through their resident Villeneuve and the renegade
Count Bonneval, who had turned Mahometan,
and become Pasha of Bosnia. England and Holland, on the contrary, endeavored to
maintain the peace. These Powers desired not the ruin of the Turks, who were
their best customers for cloths and other articles; nor did they wish to see a
Russian commerce established in the Mediterranean through the Black Sea, which
could not but be injurious to their trade.
The pretence seized by the Russians for declaring war
against the Porte was the passing of the Tartars through their territories when
marching to the war in Persia. Field-Marshal Münnich was appointed to command the army destined to operate against the Crimea
and Azof. The first expedition took place in 1735, when the Russians
penetrated into the Steppes, but were compelled to return with great loss. In
the following year Münnich captured Perekop, forced the lines which protected the Crimea, and
overran that peninsula, but was compelled to evacuate it again in the autumn.
In the same campaign, Azof surrendered to Field-Marshal Lacy (July
1st). The operations of 1737 were directed more against the proper dominions of
Turkey. Ochakov was taken, and Münnich entered the Ukraine.
Meanwhile the
Emperor Charles VI had also begun to take part in the war, from causes which
demand a few words of explanation.
The relations
between Austria and the Porte had not been essentially disturbed since the
Peace of Passarowitz; though Turkey, who thought
that he had been injured by Austria, and who had leagued himself with the
Transylvanian Prince, Joseph Ragotski, son of
Francis Ragotski, used every endeavor to incite
the Porte to an Austrian war. But, on the other hand, Russia claimed the
assistance of Austria, under an alliance which had been concluded between them
in 1726, the occasion of which was as follows. The Empress Catharine had, in
1725, demanded from Denmark the freedom of the Sound, and the restitution of
Schleswig to the Duke of Holstein, and seemed preparing to enforce these
demands by a war. The King of Denmark hereupon appealed to George I for help,
according to the treaties existing between them; and early in 1726 a large
English fleet, under the command of Admiral Wager, appeared in the Baltic. As
it was suspected that the real design of the Russian Court was rather to
support the partisans of the Duke of Holstein in Sweden than to invade Denmark,
Admiral Wager informed King Frederick that he came to maintain peace in the North,
and to protect Sweden against the enterprises of Russia. The Russian fleet did
not venture to leave port. Catharine I, incensed by this conduct, joined the
Alliance of Vienna by the Treaty of August 6th, 1726, already mentioned. It was
under this treaty, by which Austria and Russia, besides guaranteeing each
other’s possessions, had agreed in case of war to assist one another with
30,000 men, that Russia demanded the aid of Austria in her war with the Austria
Turks. The latter Power sent the stipulated quota into Hungary as a corps of
observation, and, in January, 1737, the treaty of 1726 was renewed. Austria
undertook to furnish 50,000 men; with the aid of the Empire an army of 120,000
men was ultimately raised, and placed under the command of Count von Seckendorf, with whom the young Duke Francis Stephen of
Lorraine, son-in-law of the Emperor, was nominally associated as
commander-in-chief.
War was publicly
declared against the Turks, July 14th, in 1737, after a solemn service in St.
Stephen’s Church at Vienna. It was ordered that the Turks’ bell should be rung
every morning at seven o'clock throughout the Empire, when all were to offer up
their prayers for the success of the Christian cause. The Austrian arms were at
first successful. Nissa capitulated June
23rd, and another division subdued Possega and Kassova. But the fortune of the Imperialists now began to
change. Seckendorf had divided his forces
too much; an attempt on Widdin entirely
failed, and in October the Turks recovered Nissa. Seckendorf, who was a Protestant, was now recalled,
subjected to a court-martial and imprisoned, and Field-Marshal Philippi was
appointed to succeed him.
The campaign of
1738 was unfavourable both to the Russians
and Austrians. The Russians again invaded the Crimea with the design of
taking Kaffa, but without success, and Münnich’s campaign of the Dniester was equally
fruitless. The Imperialists, under Counts Wallis and Neipperg,
defeated the Turks at Kronia, near Mehadia, but with great loss on their part; while the Turks
soon after took Semendria, Mehadia, Orsova, and Fort
St. Elizabeth; when the Imperial army withdrew behind the walls of Semlin and Belgrade. The unsatisfactory issue of this
campaign, both for Russia and Austria, produced a coolness between those
Powers. The Cabinet of Vienna complained that Münnich had not carried out the plan agreed upon by attacking Bender and Choczim; also that he had hindered a Russian corps of
30,000 men from joining the Imperial army in Hungary. Both Powers now began to
meditate a separate peace, and Sweden and Prussia offered their mediation. The
events of 1739, however, gave a new turn to affairs. Münnich crossed the Dniester, stormed and took the Turkish camp at Stawutschane (August 28th), and captured Choczim. Then passing the Pruth,
he entered Jassy, while the Bojars of
Moldavia signified their submission. His intention now was to march on Bender,
and in the following year to penetrate into the heart of the Grand Signor’s
dominions, when he was arrested by the unwelcome news that a peace had been
concluded at Belgrade.
The fortune of the
Austrians this year had been as ill as his own was good. On July 23rd, they had
been totally defeated at Grozka with a loss
of more than 20,000 men, and had abandoned the field in panic flight. The
Turks, who compared their victory to that of Mohacs, now laid siege to
Belgrade. The Imperial Cabinet saw no hope of safety except in making a peace
by submitting to some losses, and Neipperg was
commissioned to treat. The Empress of Russia, against the advice of Ostermann,
and at the instigation of her favorite, Biron, now Duke of Courland,
accepted, in conjunction with Austria, the mediation of France, through
Villeneuve, the French ambassador at the Porte. This step is attributed
to Biron’s envy of Münnich, and fear of the
Old Russian Party, which was again raising its head, and necessitated peace
abroad. On September 1st, 1739, Neipperg signed
preliminaries in the Turkish camp, by which he engaged to surrender Belgrade
and Schabatz, to evacuate Servia, Austrian
Wallachia, and Orsova, and to raze Mehadia as well as the new works at Belgrade. These
preliminaries were guaranteed by France. Villeneuve, it is said, had had the
less difficulty to persuade Neipperg to
surrender Belgrade, because he knew the Duke of Lorraine and Maria Theresa
wished for peace at any price, lest, at the anticipated death of the Emperor,
and through the troubles which were likely to ensue thereon, they should be
hampered by this war. The Austrian Cabinet repented when it heard of Münnich’s victory at Choczim,
but did not withhold its ratification of the definitive treaty, which was
signed September 18th, and known as the Treaty of Belgrade. By the peace
concluded between the Porte and Russia on the and same day, Azof was
assigned to the Russians; but the fortifications were to be razed and the
country around it wasted, in order to serve as a boundary between the two
nations. Russia was authorized to build fortresses on the Don, and the Porte to
do the same on the borders of the Kuban. The fortifications of Taganrog were
not to be restored. Russia was to maintain no fleet either on the Sea of Zabach (or Azof) or on the Black Sea, and her
commerce was to be carried on only in Turkish vessels. Münnich,
irritated at this peace, which was partly due to the fear of a conspiracy in
St. Petersburg, partly to the threatening attitude of Sweden, in contravention
of orders from the Russian Court, continued the war a little while, and
cantoned his troops in Poland and Moldavia; it was only on a repetition of the
command to withdraw that he at length retired into the Ukraine.
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