BOOK VI.

THE LEAGUE AND THE ARMADA.

 

CHAPTER I.

SPAIN AND THE LEAGUE.

 

Philip II meanwhile was occupied with larger schemes for the aggrandizement of the Spanish monarchy. At the beginning of the revolt of the Netherlands his cautious temper had led him to resolve to overcome the rebel provinces before proceeding to his greater undertakings. Now that the Prince of Orange was removed, and Alexander of Parma was winning town after town, it seemed to Philip that the revolt must soon be extinguished. The only hope of the Netherlands lay in foreign assistance. Elizabeth was not prepared to help them; but they still had hopes from France. In the beginning of 1585 an embassy from the United Provinces appeared at the French court, and offered to Henry III the sovereignty as it had been exercised by Charles V; they begged to be united to the French crown. Henry listened to their request, but at last declined it. Still his conduct was alarming to Philip II. Moreover, Catharine de' Medici had brought forward claims to the throne of Portugal, for which she demanded satisfaction from Philip. Philip was of opinion that the best thing he could do to advance the power of Spain was to check the power of the French court and obtain an influence over French affairs.

The state of things in France invited him to interfere. Henry III himself was unpopular amongst his nobles. He surrounded himself with worthless favorites, and spent his days in effeminate amusements with these mignons of the court. He delighted to appear in public in feminine robes of great magnificence, with pearls hanging from his ears in a style of Oriental profligacy and luxury. He had no children, and the death of the Duke of Anjou excited men’s minds about the question of the succession. The nearest heir of the blood royal was Henry, king of Navarre, whose marriage with the king’s sister Margaret had been the occasion of the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day. Henry of Navarre was a Huguenot, and the possibility of his succession was alarming to the French Catholics, and equally so to Philip of Spain.

The religious struggle, as we have seen, was more violent, and offered sharper contrasts in France than did in other countries. The French Catholics saw with daily increasing disgust the toleration given to the Huguenots; the idea of a Huguenot king was intolerable to them. The Catholic party gathered round the Duke of Guise, and it was easy for Philip to stir it into activity. The alliance between Philip and the Guises was formed in January 1585. It is known as ‘the League’. Its object was to prevent a heretic from becoming king of France by securing the succession of the Cardinal of Bourbon, a younger brother of King Anthony of Navarre, and so uncle to Henry of Navarre. Further, they agreed to extirpate Protestantism, not only in France but also in the Netherlands. In April the League published its manifesto, setting forth that subjects are not bound to recognize a prince who is not a Catholic. The interests of the nobles, the clergy, and the towns were all provided for. The Guises enlisted against the government the selfish feelings of every class.

Had Henry III possessed any force of character or any power of political insight, he would have made common cause with the Huguenots and the Netherlanders to repel this outrage upon the crown. As it was, however, his religious feelings overpowered all others; he became a confederate with the Guises, and revoked (July 1585) the edicts of toleration to the Protestants. There was no longer any hope to the Netherlands of putting themselves under the protection of France.

Meanwhile Alexander of Parma had been steadily advancing in his plans. On the result of the siege of Antwerp depended the fate of the provinces of Flanders and Brabant. Parma strained every nerve to ensure its surrender, and earned out his plans for its capture with a perseverance and resoluteness which nothing could shake. The siege of Antwerp was long memorable in the annals of sieges. Antwerp, the great commercial capital of Europe, stands at the mouth of the Scheldt, where the river broadens into an estuary of the sea dotted with small islands. The strong places on the landward side were in Parma’s hands. But Antwerp was too well fortified to be taken by storm, and it was impossible to blockade it so long as the river remained open. The flat-bottomed boats of the Hollanders could take advantage of any condition of the tide and bring supplies to the beleaguered city. Parma, however, made himself master of the banks of the Scheldt and built forts at such places as secured him the command of the navigation of the river. He then proceeded, during the winter of 1584, to build a bridge across the stream. The Scheldt was here 60 feet deep and 8oo yards broad; to bridge such a channel seemed to the besieged an impossible folly. But the Spaniards, beginning from either bank, slowly drove in their piles so firmly that their work withstood the huge blocks of ice that in the winter months rolled down the stream. When the piers had been built as far as was possible, the middle part was made sure by a permanent bridge of boats. In February 1585 the Scheldt was closed.

In Antwerp, however, lived an Italian engineer, Giambelli, who proposed a means of breaking through this barrier. He took two ships, in each of which he built a marble chamber, filled with gunpowder, over which was placed a pile of every kind of heavy missile. These ships were floated down the Scheldt, but their meaning was disguised by some small fire-ships which sailed in front of them. The Spaniards spent their energies in warding off the fire-ships, and the other two struck against the bridge; in one the match burnt out without reaching the powder, but the other took fire with a terrific explosion. A thousand Spanish soldiers were hurled into the air, and a breach of two hundred feet was made in the bridge. Confusion and panic terror struck the hearts of the Spaniards. But the men of Antwerp could not use their success; the signal was not given to the Zeeland fleet which was waiting out at sea. No relief came, and Alexander of Parma, recovering at once his presence of mind, set to work with desperate energy to repair the breach. In three days the blockade was again established, and Parma awaited the end. Another desperate sally was made by the Netherlanders, who succeeded in carrying one of the Spanish forts; but they could not maintain themselves there against the valor of the Spanish troops when they were under their heroic leader’s eye. The Netherlanders were driven back, and with their failure Antwerp’s last hope was gone. The city capitulated on August 17, 1585; there was to be a general amnesty, but only the Catholic religion was to be tolerated; those who refused to conform were allowed two years to wind up their affairs and quit the city.

When France had refused all help to the Netherlands and had admitted Spanish influence within its borders, it became evident to Elizabeth and her ministers that English help could no longer be refused. It was clear that England would soon be attacked by Philip II, and that every effort must be made to keep him employed. The States offered the sovereignty to Elizabeth, as they had done before. She would not however, accept this, as she would not openly countenance rebellion; she rather wished to give the States only just as much assistance as would enable them to maintain themselves against Spain, and she wished to help them at as little cost as possible. Months were spent in haggling between the two powers. At last Elizabeth, though she refused even the title of Protector of the Netherlands, agreed to furnish 5,000 footmen and 1,000 horse, but demanded the surrender of Brill and Flushing into her hands as guarantees for the payment of her expenses. The Netherlanders were compelled sadly to submit to these hard terms, and at the end of 1585 the Earl of Leicester landed in Holland as leader of the English troops.

Leicester was not, however, fit to oppose so skilful a general and politician as Alexander Farnese. He committed a blunder immediately after his landing, by transgressing the queen’s commands and accepting the supremacy over the government of the Netherlands, under the title of governor-general. Elizabeth was highly indignant, and wrote angry letters to the States. Parma, to gain time, had opened negotiations with Elizabeth. It is certain that the queen was not indisposed to peace with Spain, and could she have secured it would have sacrificed the cause of the Netherlands. She listened to proposals for handing over the cautionary towns to Parma. Rumors of these negotiations spread among the Netherlanders and kindled doubts of Elizabeth’s sincerity. Men were afraid that their experience of the Duke of Anjou would be repeated in Elizabeth.

The negotiations came to nothing; but they prevented England from helping the States with vigor, and gave Philip time to prepare for a great blow against England. This was made more necessary by the bold exploits of Sir Francis Drake, who at the end of 1585 set sail with a fleet of 25 vessels for the Spanish main. There he captured, plundered, and destroyed the wealthy and important cities of San Domingo and Carthagena; he coasted along the shores of Cuba and Florida, plundering as he went, and in July 1586 returned to England laden with booty. The Spaniards exclaimed, “Drake has played the dragon”. Philip was alarmed for the security of the Spanish trade with its colonies in the New World, on which much of the resources of Spain depended. It was of the highest importance to him that this English aggression should be checked. His plan was a great naval invasion from Spain and the Netherlands at the same time. The English Catholics, he calculated, would rise on behalf of Mary. Under such a general as Parma the capture of London would be easy; Elizabeth was to be put to death; Parma could marry Mary, and govern England in the interests of Spain and Catholicism.

While Philip was revolving this design, Leicester was doing nothing to cause a diversion in the Netherlands. In spite of his presence Parma captured Grave and Neuss. Leicester laid siege to Zutphen, and Parma marched to its defence. In the battle that ensued, Leicester’s nephew, Sir Philip Sidney, received a wound of which he died. Great was the grief of Europe at his death, and men of every nation mourned for him. Though he died at the early age of thirty-two, his pure and noble spirit had left its mark upon his times. He was a brave warrior, an accomplished gentleman, a famous scholar, a wise politician. He was a man of lofty soul and deep religious feelings. All who met him owned the charm of his manner and his ready appreciation of every kind of excellence. He was the common rendezvous of worth in his time. His character still stands out as the type of English chivalry in Elizabeth’s England.

Leicester achieved nothing in the Netherlands. The States were dissatisfied with him, and he returned to England in November 1586. Elizabeth needed all her counselors around her. Philip II had secured France by the complications of her internal affairs, and was now threatening England in earnest. The Netherlands seemed to be giving way to the Prince of Parma. England was fearful of Catholic plots, and the adherents of Mary were raising their heads in expectation of the promised help of Spain.

 

CHAPTER II.

THE SPANISH ARMADA.

 

To meet the threatened danger Elizabeth took the only steps she could. She supplied Henry of Navarre with money to enable him to make head against the League in France, and she made an alliance of ‘stricter amity’ with the Scottish king, whereby both powers bound themselves to maintain the cause of Protestantism and help one another in case of an invasion.

But though the open conflict was drawing near, the secret war of plots and assassinations did not abate is vigor. A plot for the queen’s death was hatched in the Seminary at Rheims, and was communicated to the Spanish ambassador in France. In England Anthony Babington was charged with carrying out the scheme, and he soon gathered round him a band of Catholic fanatics. Their object was to kill Elizabeth, set Mary free and make her queen by Spanish help. The plot was communicated to Mary and received her sanction and approval. The conspirators, however, had not conducted their plans with sufficient secrecy. The plot was known to Elizabeth’s watchful secretary, Sir Francis Walsingham. Few things are more surprising in the history of this period than the dexterity with which both Walsingham and William of Orange organized a system of spies and obtained information of their opponents’ measures. Walsingham had his creatures in every court of Europe; even in the Jesuit Colleges he had men in his pay. The perilous state of affairs and the unscrupulous diplomacy of the time had made a system of espionage a necessary part of statesmanship. When hypocrisy and deceit formed so great a part of politics, they could only be met by more profound and elaborate dissimulation.

Walsingham knew of the plot at once; but he saw in it a means of implicating Mary and involving her in treasonable practices. He did not immediately apprehend the conspirators, but allowed them to go on till he could get clear evidence of Mary’s complicity into his hands. In this Elizabeth agreed; she had the courage to expose herself to the dangers of this conspiracy, which might at any moment break upon her, in order to give Walsingham time for his discoveries. The conspirators communicated with Mary by means of a man who was in Walsingham’s employ. Letters passed between them concealed in beer barrels which were carried in for the use of Mary’s household; but a copy of every letter was taken by Walsingham’s secretary on the way. At last when proof enough had been obtained, Walsingham’s toils closed round the plotters ; they were taken prisoners and confessed.

Mary was kept in ignorance of their fate. During her absence from her room her papers were all seized, and evidence of her restless plotting was laid before Elizabeth. Babington and his companions were executed in September 1586. As to Mary, Elizabeth’s ministers were determined to be rid of her, and free the country, before the hour of its extremest peril, of the danger which her presence had always brought. Elizabeth was hard to manage in this matter; she was willing to be rid of Mary, but shrank from the odium which Mary’s death would bring upon herself. At length a commission of forty-six privy counselors and noblemen was appointed to try Mary, ‘commonly called Queen of Scots’, under the provisions of the act passed two years before for Elizabeth’s protection. Mary was taken to Fotheringay Castle in Northamptonshire, and the trial began. At first Mary refused to answer, saying that she did not acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court over a queen; but she at last consented to plead. The evidence was heard, and on October 25 sentence was pronounced against Mary on the ground of privity to Babington’s plot “for the hurt, death, and destruction of the royal person”.

Mary had been condemned; but Elizabeth hesitated to order the execution of a queen, a near relative to herself, who had sought refuge in her kingdom, and whom had kept for nineteen years in confinement. Parliament petitioned that the sentence should be carried into effect, and that the “seed plot of so many conspiracies” should be removed. Elizabeth paused before she could resolve; she even made overtures to have Mary privily put out of the way, that so she might avoid the responsibility of a decision. At last she signed the warrant for Mary’s execution, but gave no orders that it should be carried into effect. Her secretary, Davison, at once took action upon it, and Mary was beheaded in Fotheringay Castle on February 8, 1587.

It is impossible not to feel a certain amount of sympathy for Mary, round whose personal history so much romance has gathered. Yet her death was necessary for England’s safety. She had not spent her years of confinement as a pining captive; her days were passed in constant intrigues and plottings; she was not merely a passive but an active enemy to Elizabeth and to England. She represented in her own person all that was opposed to Elizabeth’s quiet, and to the peace of Protestant England. Of this fact she was always conscious, and hoped at every turn of affairs not only for liberty but for the English throne. So long as she lived, England could not offer a united front to foreign foes. When she died the citizens of London kindled bonfires and rang merry peals of bells. A weight was lifted from men’s minds, and they began to breathe more freely.

Elizabeth’s conduct was most unworthy, but was extremely characteristic. She professed that she had never intended the warrant to be carried into effect. She expressed the greatest indignation against Davison, who was brought to trial for contempt, was severely fined, and never afterwards received into the royal favor. She put on mourning for Mary, and sent excuses to James VI of Scotland. She hoped in this childish way to reap the advantage of the deed which had been done, and to avoid the responsibility of the blame which it brought.

Mary’s death was a distinct defiance to the Catholic powers. Pope Sixtus V expressed boundless indignation; he made Dr. Allen, the founder of the Seminary, a cardinal; he offered Philip a large sum of money to help him in his invasion of England. On his side, Philip slowly bestirred himself; he furbished up claims of his own to the English throne. Mary’s death had increased his eagerness to attack England by giving him a greater interest in the result; so long as Mary lived he must fight in her name; now he might fight in his own.

He was, however, restrained during the year 1587 by the unfavorable aspect of affairs in France. The League had not prospered so well at first as Philip had wished. Henry III’s submission to it had been too prompt. It was probable that the moderate Catholics might still win the day under the king’s leadership. Their policy was to convert Henry of Navarre, the heir-presumptive, to Catholicism, and so to unite France under one religion into a powerful kingdom. This was opposed entirely to the views of Philip and the Leaguers. They wished for the absolute triumph of Catholicism under the protection of the King of Spain; they aimed at excluding Henry of Navarre and entirely destroying the Huguenots. Until it had been decided which of these parties should carry the day, Philip could not withdraw his attention from France.

In 1587 troops were sent by the German and the Swiss Protestants to the aid of the Huguenots. The three campaign that followed has been called the ‘War of the three Henrys’, for Henry III, Henry of Navarre, and Henry of Guise each led his own army into the field. Henry of Navarre was successful at Coutras in defeating the army sent against him under the command of the Duke of Joyeuse. It was the first battle the Huguenots had as yet won, and filled them with hopes of their young leader. The French and German troops were cut off from joining the Huguenots by the army under Henry III, who, being anxious to settle the war peaceably, prevailed upon them to withdraw, and carry on no further enterprise against the French crown. The Germans projected an attack on Guise, who had his own army under his command. Guise was however too strong for them; they were defeated at Auneau, and driven with great slaughter out of the kingdom.

Thus then the Huguenots had been successful, and the violent Catholics had also been successful; but the moderate policy of the king seemed to be only half-hearted, and on his return to Paris he met with a cold reception from the people. His position was indeed a false one, as each of the two powerful parties in the kingdom had its determined supporters, while the king could not make up his mind to ally himself with either. He had the confidence of neither party, and in Paris an association of the citizens was formed for the aid of the Catholic princes. The people of Paris were fanatically Catholic; they had been trained by the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day, and were ready again to act with decision in support of their beliefs. Henry of Guise was their idol, and he was a man well fitted to be a popular leader. He was an accomplished cavalier and a brave soldier; his appearance was commanding, and he had a rare combination of bodily and mental vigor. By his frankness and geniality he attached his soldiers to himself in the camp; by his geniality, affability, and courtesy, he won the hearts of the people in the city.

The king felt that he was without influence in Paris, and that plots were being laid against him. He threatened vengeance, and the people summoned the Duke of Guise to come to their protection. Against the king’s orders Guise entered Paris (May 9, 1588). The king ordered his Swiss guards, who were quartered in the suburbs, to enter the city. The citizens, indignant at the threat, rose against them; the streets were defended by barricades, and the dismissal of the troops was demanded. Six thousand guards were useless against the fury of half a million of people. The guards were driven out, and the king fled from the city. Guise was left master of Paris (May 12, 1586), and the king found himself again obliged to undertake the destruction of heresy, and to make Guise lieutenant-general of the kingdom. When Philip II’s party had won this decisive victory in France, he felt that he was free to make his attempt upon England.

Moreover the daring of English seamen made it necessary for him to take some decided step to vindicate the power of Spain at sea. In April 1587 Drake sailed from Plymouth with a fleet of twenty-five vessels, and entered the harbor of Cadiz. He defeated the ships sent against him, and destroyed some forty or fifty vessels, besides an immense store of provisions which Philip was preparing for his expedition against England. When he had done all the harm he could he went on to Cape St. Vincent, where he again did much damage to the ships and stores. He meant to have continued his voyage to the Azores to wait for the Spanish ships coming home from the Indies, but his fleet was dispersed by a storm. However, he was still able to capture one of the largest of the Spanish ships, the San Filipe, laden with treasures from the Indies. With this rich prize he returned to Plymouth on June 26. He certainly had done his best to ‘singe King Philip’s beard’, as he had vowed to do. The spoil of the San Filipe alone paid for the expenses of the expedition, and gave good profits to those who had ventured their money to equip it. It was intolerable to Philip that these indignities should be endured. His preparations were thrown back for a time: but in the end of May 1588 his fleet for the conquest of England put to sea. “The most fortunate and invincible Armada”, as it was called, consisted of a fleet of 132 ships, manned by 8,766 sailors and 2,088 galley slaves, and carrying 21,855 soldiers, as well as 300 monks, priests, and officers of the Inquisition, who were to begin their work of the conversion of England the moment the landing was effected. The plan was that Alexander of Parma was to join them somewhere in the Channel with 17,000 Spanish troops from the Netherlands. There would thus be an army of 50,000 men for the invasion of England. Elizabeth’s preparations were sadly deficient. Though she had seen Philip’s preparations, she had been lulled into security by feigned negotiations of Alexander of Parma. She seems to have refused, until the danger was actually upon her, to contemplate the possibility of an actual encounter with Spain. She hoped till the last moment that she might make peace for herself by abandoning the Netherlands to Philip. When she discovered her delusion preparations were still slowly and sparingly made. Neither fleet nor army was properly raised or equipped. There were only thirty-four ships of the royal navy, containing 6,279 men. But the sea port towns sent out their vessels, and noble-men and gentlemen on every side manned all the ships they could and placed them at their country’s service. With one mind and one purpose England met its peril. If Philip’s invasion had come earlier, when Mary of Scotland was still alive, it might have found England distracted. Now that Mary was dead, Philip had no longer any plea by which he might appeal to the English people. His invasion bore no religious character; it was regarded merely as an act of foreign aggression. Catholics as well as Protestants gathered round the queen and armed themselves for her defence.

The Armada was long in reaching England. Its ‘galleons’ and ‘galeasses’ were huge unwieldy vessels, magnificent for a pageant, but hard to manage either in a storm or a fight. They expressed the stately grandeur of the Spanish character, as well as its inability to learn from the teaching of experience. Three weeks were spent in sailing from Lisbon to Cape Finisterre. Not till the middle of July were they seen off the Lizard point.

The Lord High Admiral, Charles, Lord Howard of Effingham, at once put out from Plymouth harbor with sixty ships. Charles, Lord Howard, though by no means the most experienced sailor at Elizabeth’s command, was well fitted for his post. He was popular amongst the sailors, and was both bold and prudent. Moreover, “he had skill enough to know those who had more skill than himself, and to follow their instructions, so that the queen had a navy of oak and an admiral of osier”. Under him served such daring and experienced seamen as Hawkins, Drake, and Frobisher, men whose names were already a terror to the Spaniards, and who had borne round the world the fame of English seamanship and courage.

The English watched the huge Spanish fleet pass by, “very slowly, though with full sails, the winds being, as it were, weary with wafting them, and the ocean groaning under their weight”. Howard allowed it to pass on its way up the Channel t0 join with Parma. His tactics were to hang upon its rear and take advantage of its mishaps with his smaller and lighter vessels, which sailed twice as fast as the clumsy Spanish ships. The Spaniards wished to force an engagement, in which they trusted to their superior weight and numbers; but the English could choose their own time to advance or retreat. From Saturday, July 20, to Saturday, July 27, the English followed the Spaniards on their way to Calais roadsteads, inflicting on them many losses, cutting off their stragglers, and taking advantage of all their mistakes. On Sunday, July 28, the two fleets faced one another. The Spaniards lay off Calais, waiting for the arrival of Alexander of Parma; over against them lay the English fleet, increased now to about a hundred and forty sail, though the ships were much smaller than the heavy Spanish vessels.

It was no longer possible for the English to put off an engagement. If the Spanish fleet were to advance to Dunkirk, drive back the ships of the Hollanders, which at present guarded the coast of the Netherlands and prevented the egress of the Duke of Parma, the peril of England would indeed be great. This must be prevented; but the English commanders felt how difficult it was for their small ships to destroy he huge Spanish galleons.

“Considering their hugeness”, said Sir William Winter, whom the Lord Admiral asked for counsel, “it will not be possible to remove them but by a device”. The device was soon contrived; six of the oldest vessels in the fleet were converted into fire-ships, and on Sunday night were despatched against the Armada. A wind sprung up which drifted them successfully to their destination. A panic seized the Spaniards, some of whom had been present at the siege of Antwerp, and shuddered at the thought of the explosion of Giambelli’s infernal machine.

A cry was raised, “The fire-ships of Antwerp! the fire-ships of Antwerp!”. The terrified sailors cut their cables in their eagerness to escape, and the ships fell into confusion. Some came into collision, some were burnt by the fire-ships, the rest were driven by wind and tide northwards along the Flemish coast.

The English pursued, and on Monday, July 29, there was a hot engagement off Gravelines. The English ships refused to come to close quarters, but poured showers of musketry on the Spanish vessels, while the Spaniards on their part shot badly, and inflicted little loss on the English. The Armada suffered severely, and as the gale increased became more and more helpless before it. The English had soon spent all their ammunition, but still gave chase, while the Spaniards were driven on up the North Sea. At last Lord Howard, who had neither powder, shot, nor provisions, thought that he had “put on a brave countenance” long enough. As he returned on Sunday, August 4, there blew a tremendous gale, which scattered his fleet for a while, but they all arrived safely in Margate roads at last. The Spaniards fared more severely in the northern seas. Some were driven on the shores of Norway, some were wrecked on the coast of Scotland, some on Ireland. The miserable remnant of the fleet, after being driven by the tempest round the Hebrides, at last reached Spain early in October. Fifty-three ships only out of the hundred and thirty-two 10,000 men out of the 30,000, found their way home.

Philip’s projected invasion had hopelessly failed, mainly because no steps were taken to secure the junction between the troops of Parma and the fleet 0f Medina-Sidonia. The enterprise was skillfully devised, but it was ponderous, and admitted of no modification if any calculation failed. It fell in pieces before the bold and rapid attacks of the light English vessels and the fury of the elements, neither of which it was adapted to face. If the Armada had effected a landing, and had conveyed Alexander of Parma to England, it is impossible to say what would have been the result. Elizabeth’s land forces had gathered at Tilbury, under the command of Leicester, to defend London; but they were only raw recruits, ill-fitted to face the veterans of Spain under such a general as Parma. Elizabeth in the hour of need showed true Tudor spirit. She went herself among her troops, and when her counselors, through fear of Catholic plots, begged her not to show herself in public, “Let tyrants fear” she answered; “I have always so behaved myself that, under God, I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects; and therefore I am come amongst you, as you see, resolved in the midst and heat of battle to live or die amongst you all. I know that I have the body but of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart of a king, and of a king of England too”. The volunteers at Tilbury were stirred to deep enthusiasm; but it was well that England’s fleet saved her from the risk of trusting to Leicester’s generalship and the undisciplined valor of recruits.

The Armada had failed, and its failure, marked a decisive moment in the history of Europe. It told that the power of Spain was declining, and that England had again risen to be a great power in Europe. But this was a result not seen at once. Philip himself received the news of the fate of the Armada with his usual constancy; he did not change countenance. “I sent it”, he said, “against man, not against the billows. I thank God, by whose generous hand I am gifted with such power that I could easily, if I chose, place another fleet upon the seas”. He did not give up his design, but only resolved to make the next attempt more wisely. But there is a tide in the affairs of men, and Philip was never destined to have leisure or means for another attempt. Affairs in France claimed his attention. A reaction against the power of Spain set in throughout Europe. England could wreak on Spain a ruinous revenge, and Philip dragged Spain into hopeless bankruptcy by his great schemes, which were always on the verge of succeeding but always missed that complete success which alone was worth having.

 

CHAPTER III.

REACTION AGAINST SPAIN.

 

Philip’s schemes were destined to similar failure in France. We have seen how entirely the power of the League had won the day at the beginning of 1588. Henry III was obliged to summon the Estates at Blois, and to submit to many limitations upon the royal power; war was to be resumed against Henry of Navarre. The king found himself merely a tool in the hands of the Duke of Guise and his party.

This position was intolerable to him, as a similar position had been intolerable to his mother, Catharine, when the Huguenot, Coligny, was endeavoring to mould the policy of the French monarchy. Henry resolved, as his mother had done, to free himself of his dangerous rival by assassination. On December 23, 158S, Guise was summoned to the king’s chamber, and was murdered on entering it by some of the king’s body-guard, while the king awaited the accomplishment of the deed. Great was the fury of the people. Paris took the first step, and refused any longer to recognize a king who had broken his word to the harm of the Catholic faith. All the great towns of France followed the example of the capital, and the Duke of Mayenne, brother of the murdered Guise, placed himself at the head of the confederates. Open war broke out between the king and the League.

Henry III by himself would have been powerless against this opposition; but Henry of Navarre with his small army of well-trained soldiers marched to his aid. Tolerance to the Huguenots was again proclaimed by the king. The Catholic royalists slowly gathered round him, and the contest lay between the principles of monarchy and tolerance on the one side, and the exclusive principle of Catholicism on the other. In July 1589 Henry III found himself strong enough to lay siege to Paris. The League trusted to assistance from the Duke of Parma in the Netherlands; for Philip’s cause was so closely allied with it that the subjugation of the Netherlands was now secondary to the success of his scheme in France. But the assassination of Guise was to produce its fruits. A fanatical Dominican priest, Jacques Clement, was so moved by a papal admonition denouncing Henry III, that he decided it was no sin for a priest to kill a tyrant. On August 2, 1589, he obtained an interview with the king, and stabbed him.

The question of the succession to the French throne was now a matter of supreme importance. The heir-presumptive was the Huguenot Henry of Navarre; against him was brought forward the candidate of the League, the Cardinal of Bourbon. If it was worth Philip's while to interfere before in French affairs to gain influence for Spain, it was now a matter of vital importance for him to prevent the accession to the French throne of a man not only opposed to him in religion, but also an hereditary foe to the Spanish house. Henceforth to the end of his reign Philip’s energies were directed to the repression of Henry of Navarre.

But it was now England’s turn to assume an attitude of aggression against Spain. The spirit of naval adventure, which had already grown high in England, received fresh vigor from the results of the Armada fight. Hostility to Spain became a passion in adventurous minds, and any plan for an attack upon the Spaniards was received with enthusiasm. Early in 1589 an expedition against Spain was sent out under the command of Sir John Norris and Sir Francis Drake. Don Antonio, the pretender to the crown of Portugal, accompanied them, for he hoped that his presence would stir the Portuguese to revolt against Philip. The fleet, consisting of some 50 vessels and 15,000 men, landed first at Corunna, where they burned the ships in the harbor and then proceeded to besiege the city; the lower town surrendered, but the upper town was too strongly fortified to be taken by storm. Moreover a Spanish army of 15,000 men marched to the relief of the town; the English, 7,000 strong, met them about five miles from Corunna, and after a short but sharp encounter repulsed and pursued them with great slaughter.

These exploits were brilliant, but fruitless for the main object of the expedition, and Elizabeth was angry that Drake had not at once proceeded to Lisbon. At length, however, he passed on thither, being joined on his way by transports, with which came a noble volunteer, the young Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, then at the age of twenty-two. Essex was now Elizabeth’s chief favorite; he had been commended to her by Leicester, who was afraid of the growing influence of Sir Walter Raleigh. After Leicester’s death, which took place immediately after the repulse of the Armada, Essex held the chief place in the queen’s affections. But the ambitious youth of twenty-two found it hard to curb his high spirit within the narrow bounds required to pay court to a mistress who was approaching the age of sixty. He had longed to join this expedition, but had been prevented by the queen’s express commands to Drake and Norris to send him back from Plymouth. He had, however, managed after all to elude the royal vigilance and go forth upon his quest for martial glory.

Norris landed in the middle of May at Peniche, about forty miles from Lisbon. Drake sailed up the Tagus to join him against Lisbon. But Norris found it hopeless to take Lisbon. His troops were suffering from sickness, brought on by intemperance at Corunna; the Portuguese did not rally, as had been expected, round Don Antonio, whose name brought only a few unarmed peasants : the English had no cannon to batter the town. Norris marched back and joined Drake at Cascaes, at the mouth of the Tagus, where they took the fort and seized sixty vessels belonging to the Hanse Towns that lay in the harbor laden with provisions. After some more pillage along the coast the English returned home.

The expedition had been a failure in its main object, and there had been great loss of life through sickness. Yet the English had shown how vulnerable Spain was, and had defeated a Spanish army on its own ground. The name of Spain was no longer a terror to the English mind; it was rather a symbol of everything that Protestant England condemned. A crusading spirit against Spain and the Inquisition was mingled with a desire for glory and a thirst for gain, and sent the English youth to seek adventures in irregular warfare. Private adventurers, merchants, and gentlemen, all fitted up vessels for this fierce naval war, and the daring deeds of English seamen filled the Spaniards with surprise that soon gave way to alarm. The Spanish waters were no longer safe. In 1590 ten English merchantmen, on their way home from Venice, defeated twelve huge Spanish war galleys which had been sent against them in the Straits of Gibraltar. The merchant ships of England were more than a match for the war ships of Spain; Spanish galleys and merchantmen alike were at the mercy of English privateers, which scoured the seas at their will.

The noblest of these privateers was George Clifford, Earl of Cumberland, who strove by ventures at sea to repair his fortunes, which he had shattered by prodigality. He was renowned for knightly prowess in tournaments, and once as he kneeled before the queen to receive the prize she dropped her glove, which he thenceforward wore as a favor, encircled with diamonds; but in spite of this royal graciousness he refused to borrow the queen’s ships for his expeditions, as he knew the thrifty Elizabeth would reckon hardly with him for any losses.

The queen indeed never failed to demand from these adventurers that their expeditions should be directly profitable to the royal coffers. When in 1590 Hawkins made an unsuccessful voyage, so that his prizes did not pay for the expenses, he made a humble apology to the queen, in which he said, “Paul might plant and Apollos might water, but it was God only that gave the increase”. “This fool”, testily exclaimed Elizabeth, “went out a soldier, and is come home a divine”.

This temper of the queen was reflected in all others who engaged in naval adventures. When the first fear of Spain had passed away, these expeditions took too exclusively the character of free-booting, and lost their more definite political significance. The desire for gain outweighed with the younger generation of English seamen the desire of crippling Spain. There was, however, one man, Sir Walter Raleigh, who represented throughout his life the principle of statesman­like opposition to Spain in its distant colonies. This principle he always urged in Parliament, and brought forward fresh schemes of colonization in opposition to Spain. He it was who first colonized Virginia (1584), though the settlement failed for want of proper management and proper support. In 1592 he penetrated to the isthmus of Darien; but his plans were stopped by a message from the queen ordering him to return. Elizabeth disgraced her favorite for having dared to marry secretly one of her maids of honor, Elizabeth Throgmorton. In 1595 he made an expedition to Guiana in search of El Dorado, the fabled land of gold. His persistent hostility to Spain made his death a peace-offering; which the pacific policy of James I did not hesitate to make.

The temper of these English seamen may be illustrated by the conduct of Sir Richard Grenville. His one ship, the ‘Revenge’, faced a Spanish fleet of fifty vessels, nearly all of them twice as large as his own. From three o'clock in the afternoon till daybreak next morning did Grenville hold out against them all. Time after time a huge Spanish ship attempted to board him and was driven back. At last all his powder was spent, the pikes all broken; of his crew of a hundred men forty were killed and the rest all wounded. Grenville could fight no more, but he would not surrender. The Spaniards offered honorable terms, and Grenville was taken on board the Spanish admiral’s ships, saying” that they might do with his body what they list, for he esteemed it not”. In a few hours he died, amid the respectful cares of the Spanish nobles, saying, “Here die I, Richard Grenville, with a joyful and a quiet mind, for that I have ended my life as a good soldier ought to do, who has fought for his country and his queen, for honor and religion”.

This was the spirit which opposition to Spain awoke in England, the spirit which beat back Philip and filled England with a strong and vigorous national life.

Meanwhile Philip’s interest was fixed upon affairs in France. The death of Henry III had opened out a wide prospect for the aggrandizement of Spain. The League in its fanatical attachment to Catholicism had almost entirely lost the feeling of nationality. Its members looked to Philip as the head of the Catholic party in Europe. They proclaimed the Cardinal of Bourbon king under the title of Charles X; but Philip was to be recognized as Protector of France. Here was a prospect peculiarly suited to Philip’s policy; France might be absorbed as a province in the Spanish monarchy, which would then be a great organization for the entire re-establishment of Catholicism throughout Europe.

In opposition to the League Henry of Navarre assumed the title of King Henry IV. He was of course supported by the Huguenots; but the Catholics who had adhered to Henry III were sorely perplexed. They did not wish to give up the hereditary rights of the monarchy, but they could not consent to see the monarchy severed from Catholicism. Henry IV gave them to understand that he was not obstinate in his adherence to Protestantism; he was willing “to be further instructed”. Henry was not a man of deep religious principle. He had been brought up by his mother as a Huguenot; after the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day he had conformed to Catholicism, and had lived a gay, careless life at court. When things were a little more favorable he had again joined the Huguenots. So long as he was a prince of the blood he thought he had a right to hold his own opinions and to enjoy his political rights at the same time. But new that the rights of the monarchy had descended to him, things were changed. His first duty, he conceived, was to save the French crown, and again to unite the French nation. He looked upon religion with the eye of a statesman; if the principle of Catholicism were held by the French people to be a necessary element in the monarchy, he must not lightly set up against their wish the traditions of his early education.

On this understanding the greater part of the Catholic royalists still held by him. But his chances seemed almost hopeless. Henry IV was, however, admirably fitted to fight a difficult game. Always good-natured, amiable, and gay, he won men’s hearts and inspired them with confidence. He was a brave and dashing soldier, to whom generalship seemed almost an instinct. Under an air of reckless good humor and unthinking jollity he hid a cool and calculating brain. While seeming to live for the moment he never forgot the end which he had before him. He believed profoundly, with an almost religious fervor, in the justice of his cause. He was determined to succeed, and knew the importance of every small success in helping towards his end. He was, moreover, entirely free from pedantry, and was prepared to make any necessary sacrifice that could help his cause. He was soon supported by the popular opinion of Europe; for Philip’s schemes awoke the profoundest alarm. The idea of the balance of power was beginning to prevail in European politics, and this idea demanded the existence of France as an independent power. Even Pope Sixtus V was not willing to see the triumph of Catholicism purchased at the price of establishing the absolute power of Spain in Europe. Philip represented a party which was more orthodox than the head of the Church.

Henry IV began his campaign in 1590 by besieging Dreux. The army of the League was led to its relief by the Duke of Mayenne, brother of the murdered Guise. The armies met in the plain of Yvry, where the royalists were victorious mainly through the desperate valor of Henry himself, who at once advanced to the siege of Paris. The city was ill prepared to stand a siege, and was almost reduced to starvation when Alexander of Parma advanced to its relief with his army from the Netherlands. He was bitterly disappointed at being stopped in his plans for the subjugation of that country by Philip’s orders to advance into France. For a while the Netherlands had time to gather together their strength, and France became the battlefield of opposition to Spain. Henry IV broke off the siege of Paris, and trusting to his cavalry, composed almost entirely of French nobles, wished to force Alexander of Parma to a battle. But Parma was a more experienced general than Henry; he outmaneuvered him and refused to fight, till the nobles of Henr’s army grew weary of waiting and his forces dispersed. Parma having done his work of relieving Paris retired to the Netherlands.

The death of the titular Charles X during the siege increased the influence of Spain. The Leaguers had no one whom they could set up as king against Henry IV; they could trust only to Spanish help. Their scheme was to confer the French kingdom on the Infanta Isabella, Philip’s daughter by his third wife, Elizabeth, daughter of Henry II of France. Philip demanded that he should himself choose for her a husband who should at once be acknowledged as king of France.

Meanwhile France seemed likely to be again split up; every province was fought for by two nobles, one on the side of the League, one of Henry IV. To help the League in Brittany Philip sent a body of 1 Spanish troops. The presence of the Spaniards on the coast opposite to England awoke the liveliest alarm in Elizabeth, and made her more ready to send troops to the help of Henry. At her urgent desire, Henry, in the winter of 1591, laid siege to Rouen; but when he seemed likely to take it, the experience of his last campaign was again repeated. Alexander of Parma marched to its relief; Henry was obliged to raise the siege of Rouen, and was again out-generalled by Alexander in his attempts to cut off his retreat. The campaign of 1591-2 had been made useless to Henry IV by the military genius of Alexander Farnese.

But in December 1592 Parma died at Arras, and Philip had no general whom he could set against Henry IV for the future. Moreover the cause of the League was losing ground in France. The public opinion of Europe was beginning to tell, and the Republic of Venice had recognized Henry IV in spite of papal admonitions. The party of the League in France itself was no longer unanimous. The question of the marriage of the Infanta Isabella raised jealousies; Philip first proposed as her husband his cousin the Archduke Ernest, brother of the Emperor Rudolph; but he was distasteful to the French, as he might one day become Emperor. Next Philip seemed to favor Charles of Guise, son of the murdered duke; but Mayenne was in no way desirous to see his nephew raised to power at his own expense. Since his brother’s death he had been regarded as the head of the League, and he was not prepared to resign that position to his nephew. Amid the difficulties which had now sprung up, the moderate party of the Politicians was daily gathering strength against the fanatical Leaguers. The Parliament of Paris sent an admonition to the Duke of Mayenne to prevent the crown from passing into the hands of a foreigner. The distance of Spain prevented it from sending efficient military help to the League. Henry IV drew nearer to the Catholics; he was prepared to change his religion for the purpose of securing his position as king of France. It was not, however, to the fierce Catholicism of the League that Henry IV could possibly go over; it was to the moderate religious views of the royalist clergy, who were willing to grant toleration to the Huguenots as a condition of winning over the king to Catholicism. On July 23, 1593, Henry was solemnly received into the bosom of the Church by the Archbishop of Bourges in the church of St. Denis. He at once reaped the fruit of his conversion; many who could never have deserted the League to join a heretic now came over to his side. The French national spirit revived and took him for its champion. In March 1594 the gates of Paris were opened to Henry, and before the end of the year the Duke of Mayenne had made terms with him. Henry had still many difficulties to face before he had made his position as king of France quite secure; but Philip’s project of making France a dependency of the Spanish crown had failed in spite of its apparent nearness to success.

 

BOOK VII.

ENGLAND AFTER THE ARMADA.