HISTORY OF JAPAN LIBRARY |
JAMES MURDOCH' HISTORY OF JAPAN FROM THE ORIGINSTO THE ARRIVAL OF THE PORTUGUESE IN 1542 ADCHAPTER XI.
THE GREATNESS OF THE TAIRA.
FOR the maintenance of order in the capital and in the
Empire at large, the Court had come to be entirely dependent upon the strong
arms and trenchant blades of the Minamoto and Taira warriors. In this situation
lurked, not one, but many elements of danger. Not the least of these was the
possible appearance of chieftains strong enough to weld the various discordant
septs of their houses into a single unit promptly obedient and readily
responsive to the behests of the autocratic will of the head of the clan. It
might safely be predicted that in the event of any such contingency, civil war
would be the infallible result. It would then become a question as to which
chief and which house—Taira or Minamoto—was to play the part of Protagonist on
the political stage; and such a question could be settled by nothing but the
sharp arbitrament of sword. And with the Imperial power and the civil
administration fallen into such decrepitude, the result of any such contest
would be to make the victor the real master of the Empire.
Whether the mind of Taira Kiyomori really grasped that
fact it is impossible to say. The probabilities are that it did not,—for
Kiyomori, like Nobunaga, his descendant in the twentieth generation, was more
remarkable for strength of will than for intellectual subtlety or originality.
The minds of Kiyomori and Nobunaga on the one hand, and of Yoritomo and of
Hideyoshi on the other, were cast in vastly different moulds—Kiyomori and
Nobunaga were Japanese of the breed of Attila; Yoritomo and Hideyoshi—the latter
especially— have claims, both as statesmen and warriors, to be placed in a much
higher class. Both of these were richly endowed with that constructive
imagination the lack of which renders the achievement of any great and lasting
work in the domain of statesmanship well-nigh impossible. Whatever may have
been the mental endowments of Taira Kiyomori, this supreme gift of the
constructive imagination never became conspicuous among them.
When Kiyomori (1118-1181) succeeded his father,
Tadamori, as Chieftain of the Ise Heishi in 1153 he was in the very prime of a
vigorous manhood. Long before this, those elements of dissension and unrest
that were to precipitate the great explosion of 1156 had been accumulating and
multiplying apace. There were dissensions in the Imperial family, and there
was yet another set of dissensions in the great Fujiwara household.
In 1123, Toba Tenno had abdicated in favour of his
son, Sutoku Tenno, then an infant of five. There were thus two ex-Emperors,—a
great-grandfather (Shirakawa) and the father (Toba) of the titular sovereign.
In 1129, the great-grandfather died, and the father (Toba) at once stepped into
his position and assumed the supreme direction of the affairs of the Empire.
This, as has been already said, he continued to wield down to his death in
1156,—his most trusted henchmen being Taira Tadamori, and after the death of
the latter, in 1153, his son, Taira Kiyomori.
About the date of the death of his grandfather, in
1129, the ex-Emperor Toba made four or five additions to the number of his
secondary consorts. On one of these, the Lady Bifuku Mon-in, he lavished the
greater part of his affections. The first issue he had by her were daughters;
but, in 1139, she at last presented him with a son. Six months later, this baby
was proclaimed Heir Apparent to the throne; and in 1141 the intrigues of the
ex-Emperor Toba and his consort, the Lady Bifuku Mon-in, drove Sutoku Tenno,
then 22 years of age, to abdicate in favour of this infant, who actually
reigned for some fourteen years—down to 1155—as Konoye Tenno. From 1141 down to
1156 there were again two ex-Emperors,—a father and a son. Between these,
relations were a good deal more than merely strained,—for Sutoku lived in
constant dread of his life on account of the machinations of the titular
sovereign’s mother, the Lady Bifuku Mon-in. Thus at last appeared what was
above all to be dreaded by the Insci system.
It was not indeed an Emperor’s and an ex-Emperor’s party; but it really
amounted to that in substance, for the titular sovereign, Konoye, who died at
seventeen, after a nominal reign of fourteen years, was never of the slightest
consequence—except as a convenient puppet or figure-head. Meanwhile the young
ex-Emperor Sutoku had begat progeny of his own; and he was not minded to have
his beloved son, the Prince Shigehito, debarred from his rightful position of
sovereign of Japan.
Here, indeed, were all the elements of yet another
deadly succession quarrel. But the situation was still further complicated by
discord in the house of Fujiwara, with which the Imperial family was still very
intimately connected. Although, during the Insci rule, the Fujiwara Regents and Kwampaku and Chancellors wielded no real
authority, these positions were still eagerly coveted, for, though they were
little better than empty titles as far as the work of administration was
concerned, they yet continued to confer the highest social prestige upon their
occupants. At the accession of Toba Tenno in 1108, Fujiwara Tadazane
(1078-1162), who had been Kwampaku since 1105, was made Regent; and when Toba
attained his majority in 1113 Tadazane was again made Kwampaku, while he was
also invested with the Chancellorship of the Empire. Eight years later on, he
had the ill fortune to come into collision with the old ex-Emperor Shirakawa.
The result was that he had to abandon official life and retire to his mansion at
Uji, his eldest son, Tadamichi (1097-1164), then 24 years of age, replacing him
as Kwampaku. Two years later, in 1123, on the accession of the infant sovereign
Sutoku, Tadamichi became Regent; and in 1130, he became the youthful Emperor’s
father-in-law. Meanwhile his protector, the old ex-Emperor Shirakawa, had died
in 1129; and the ex-Emperor Toba then became the real ruler of Japan. Toba very
soon had reason to be dissatisfied with Tadamichi; and so Tadamichi was
relieved of office, and replaced by his father, who continued to act as
Kwampaku down to 1140. One consequence of all this was that the relations
between Tadazane and his son Tadamichi became the reverse of friendly.
Meanwhile, in 1120, another son had been born to Tadazane; and on this
child,—Yorinaga,—Tadazane lavished all his affection. As he grew to manhood
Yorinaga was rapidly promoted from one great office to another; and, in 1150,
at the age of thirty, he became Minister of the Left. In this year his adopted
daughter, Masuko, became the consort of the boy Emperor Konoye, then eleven
years of age. A little later on, Konoye Tenno married an adopted daughter of
Yorinaga’s elder brother, Tadamichi. The brothers had been on bad terms before;
but this struggle for ascendancy in the Imperial harem,—or, to speak more
correctly, in the Imperial nursery,—seriously embittered the quarrel. The
father, Tadazane, threw all his influence against his own first-born, and
actually went so far as to deprive him of the family heirlooms that were always
entrusted to the prospective head of the great Fujiwara Clan.
Suddenly, in 1155, Konoye died at the age of sixteen.
It will be remembered that Konoye was the son of the ex-Emperor Toba, by his
favourite, the Lady Bifuku Mon-in. Her ladyship openly declared that her son,
Konoye Tenno, had been poisoned at the instigation of his half-brother, the
ex-Emperor Sutoku. During the last thirteen years, Sutoku’s position had been a very unpleasant one; he now went about in abject fear of
his life.
The Lady Bifuku Mon-in had extorted a promise from the
ex-Emperor Toba that one of their daughters should ascend the throne on the
death of their brother, Konoye Tenno; but the record of the Empresses of the
Nara period bad not been forgotten, and the national sentiment was found to be
entirely averse to any more experiments in the matter of female Sovereigns,
reigning in their own right. The succession question now narrowed itself down
to a contest between three male candidates; or rather to two, for the
ex-Emperor Sutoku was indifferent as to whether he or his son, the Prince
Shigehito, should occupy the Imperial seat. Baulked in his project of making
the Lady Bifuku Mon-in’s daughter Empress in her own right, the old ex-Emperor,
Toba, now wished to have his fourth son, Masahito, proclaimed Sovereign. In
this aim he was supported by the Kwampaku Tadamichi. This fact alone sufficed
to induce Tadamichi’s brother, Yorinaga, and their aged father, Tadazane, to
support the rival cause with all the influence, and all the resources, at their
command. Their efforts proved abortive, however; and Masahito duly ascended the
throne as Go-Shirakawa,—or Shirakawa II. At the same time his son Morihito, then twelve years of age, was proclaimed Prince
Imperial.
This turn of affairs proved to be a serious blow to
the prospects and projects of Yorinaga. He had asked to be entrusted with the
education of the Crown Prince; but not only was his request rejected, but he
was further deprived of his post of Noiron in the
following year, 1156. In consequence of this, he attached himself still more
closely to the interests of the ex-Emperor Sutoku, and sedulously endeavoured
to fan his ex-Majesty’s discontent into a flame.
Just at this juncture, the old ex-Emperor, Toba, died
(July 20,1156); and when Sutoku went to attend the solemn funeral service that
same night he was met at the entrance and informed that according to the dying
instructions of his father, no place could be found for him there. Mortally
offended by this deadly public insult, Sutoku hurried back to his palace, sent
for Yorinaga, and at the instigation of the latter, forthwith determined to
repossess himself of the throne by the strong hand. Urgent orders were at once
transmitted to the landed gentry in the neighbouring provinces and to the monasteries
of Nara to move troops up to the capital with all possible expedition.
Intelligence of this was not long in reaching the ears
of Shirakawa II and his advisers. During the last illness of Toba there had
been rumours afloat to the effect that an attempt at a coup d’État might be expected upon his demise; and he had
taken the precaution of sending for ten of the leading captains then in the
capital, and making them subscribe to a bond pledging their loyal support to
the Lady Bifuku Mon-in. The most prominent among these captains was the
Governor of Shimotsuke, Yoshitomo, the eldest son and
heir of Tameyoshi, the actual head of the house of Minamoto. Yoshitomo was now
summoned in all haste; and he at once placed himself and a body of 400 picked
men at the disposal of the Court. At the same time, troops under Minamoto,
Taira, and Fujiwara captains were dispatched to seize strategic positions on
all the avenues of approach to the capital, and there block the expected
advance of the Nara Temple forces and the local samurai summoned to the support
of Sutoku. On July 29, Taira Kiyomori (Governor of Aki) and his followers
joined the Minamoto force under Yoshitomo.
Meanwhile two days before (July 27), Sutoku and Yorinaga
bad betaken themselves to the old palace of Shirakawa II,—the vast enceinte of
which they hastily strengthened as best they could. It was garrisoned by no
more than a few hundred men,—less than 150 Minamotos, and about an equal number
of Tairas, perhaps. The Tairas were under the command of Tadamasa, the uncle of
Kiyomori, who led the Taira in the opposing camp. As for the Minamoto, they
consisted of the younger brothers of Yoshimoto and their adherents, the whole
body being under the direction of Tameyoshi (Yoshimoto’s father), the head of
the clan.
This Tameyoshi bad some reason to repine about the lot
that had befallen him. Grandson of Hachiman Taro, and son of that stormy-petrel
Yoshichika, who had perished as a rebel in 1117, lie had been constrained to
take the field against his grand-uncle Yoshitsuna at the age of thirteen
(1109). His victory in this family feud made him Chieftain of the great
Minamoto clan. In 1123 he was made Kebiishi for the express purpose of
dealing drastically with the turbulent monks of Hi-ei-zan. His reward for this was the lower division of the
fifth rank,—a very modest recompense indeed. And this was the end of his
official career. He had aspired to the Governorship of Mutsu; but this office
was bestowed on that local Fujiwara magnate who was then engaged on
consolidating the greatest fief in contemporary Japan. Since then, for a whole
generation, Tameyoshi bad been left in neglect by the Court; and now, in 1150,
his brilliant son and heir, Yoshitomo, had outstripped him in the official
hierarchy. Yet there is nothing going to show that the very able, though
neglected, Minamoto chieftain and his eldest son and heir were on bad terms
with each other. Besides Yoshitomo, Tameyoshi had eight or nine younger
sons,—nearly all masterful, reckless, turbulent daredevils. In the year before
this (1155) one of these, Yoshikata, had been slain in battle by his nephew
Yoshikura (a son of Yoshitomo), a boy of fifteen! The precocity of these
Minamotos in the art of war, and in a minor degree in statecraft, is perhaps
best illustrated by the instance of Tameyoshi’s eighth son, Tametomo. While still a mere boy his immense physical strength and
his rough unruly ways made him a terror to the household, and so his father was
constrained to get rid of him, and sent him away to Kyushu. This was in 1152,
when Tametomo was no more than thirteen years of age. Arrived in Bungo he
promptly set to work to attract followers, arrogated to himself the title of Sotsuibushi or General Superintendent of Police, and
opened hostilities against some of the most prominent local magnates,—the Haradas of Hizen and the Kikuchis of Higo among others. His
chief ally and supporter was Ata, the Acting-Governor of Satsuma, whose
daughter he married. Most of the former supporters of his grandfather, the
turbulent rebel Yoshichika, also rallied around him. For a few years the
greater part of the Nine Provinces was kept in an unceasing turmoil. At last
the Court interfered, and sternly called upon Tameyoshi to recall this enfant
terrible of his. Tametomo, however, paid no heed to his father’s instructions,
and as a consequence Tameyoshi was stripped of such modest rank and office as
he held. Thereupon Tametomo. taking with him eight and twenty picked men,
hurried up to Kyoto, and arrived there just in time to be able to join his
father and his brothers in defence of the old palace of Shirakawa I. At that
date he was only seventeen years of age; but even then he had attained a
stature of seven feet, while his muscular development was prodigious. It took
three or four ordinary men to bend the bow he used—a huge weapon 8ft. Gin. in
length. His left arm was four inches longer than his right, and this enabled
him to draw a bow-string eighteen handlengths (about
5ft.) and to release his bolts with terrific force.
In the council of war held on the 29th, Tametomo had adocated a night attack on the headquarters of the
Emperor’s adherents. But Fujiwara Yorinaga negatived the proposal. Meanwhile
Yoshitomo and Kiyomori, on their side, had determined on a night-attack; and
presently Sutoku’s supporters found themselves
invested by a force of 1,700 men. Tametomo with his eight and twenty men were
holding the Western Gate, and it was against this portal that Yoshitomo
advanced. He was warned off by Tametomo, who shot off one of the silver studs
ornamenting his helmet, the bolt burying itself in the gate-post. Presently
Taira Kiyomori launched his troops at the position held by Tametomo, with the
brothers Kagetsuna at their head. Tametomo shot one
of them through the body, the shaft being sped with such force that it went on
and mortally wounded the other. The garrison, though outnumbered by five or six
to one, made a most obstinate and gallant defence; and it was not until
Yoshitomo succeeded in firing the wood-work that the assailants could make any
headway. There had been no rain for some time previously and the attack had
been delivered in a terrific dust-storm raised by a strong west wind. The
buildings caught like tinder, and the flames spread rapidly, lighting up the
city for miles around with their lurid glare, while at the same time the palace
of Sutoku, the great mansion of Yorinaga, and twelve other houses of the conspirators
were blazing furiously. Presently the only resource left to the defenders was
flight.
Yorinaga had fallen, struck by a stray arrow; but most
of the other leaders escaped and went into hiding. It was announced that they
were to be banished ; and then many of them shaved their heads and came out and
gave themselves up. Among these was Tadamasa, Kiyomori’s uncle. The Emperor
thereupon ordered Kiyomori to kill Tadamasa, and Kiyomori made no difficulty
about carrying out his instructions. Yoshitomo was at the same time commanded
to kill his father. But this Yoshitomo refused to do; and then the Emperor
threatened to entrust the commission to Taira Kiyomori. Thereupon one of
Yoshitomo’s retainers pointed out that it would be a great disgrace to the clan
if its head was executed by a Taira; and so at last, Yoshitomo allowed this
retainer to carry out the Imperial commands. Altogether, about seventy of Sutoku’s supporters were sent to kneel at the blood pit.
Since the revolt of Fujiwara Nakanari in 810,—that is for a period of 346
years—the death penalty had ceased to be inflicted on Ministers and officers of
the Court. What especially intensified the general revulsion occasioned by
these wholesale executions was the fact that they took place during the
mourning for an Emperor and an ex-Emperor, for it was contrary to all precedent
to exact the extreme penalty of the law at such seasons. The man who was
chiefly responsible for the severity shown on this occasion was Fujiwara
Michinori, whose wife had been the Emperor’s nurse, and who now enjoyed the
full confidence of the Sovereign. On the other hand, one act of clemency has to
be imputed unto him for righteousness on this occasion. The old Fujiwara chief,
Tadazane, was to be rigorously dealt with, but Tadamichi induced Michinori to
intercede for him. The long standing breach between father and son was thus
healed at last and thenceforward they
lived on the most affectionate relations.
Sutoku was banished to Sanuki, where he died in 1164
at the age of 46. His son, Prince Shigehito, was compelled to become a priest.
Yorinaga’s sons and about twenty other members of his household were banished
to distant parts of the Empire. Tametomo’s bravery
had excited the wonder and admiration of the Court; so when arrested he was not
decapitated, but merely exiled to the islands of Idzu,
the sinews of his arm being cut as a precautionary measure.
It will be remarked that at this crisis each of the
three Great Houses of Fujiwara, Minamoto, and Taira alike found itself a prey
to divided counsels and split into rival factions arrayed in opposing camps. We
are sometimes told that all the Minamoto except Yoshitomo supported Sutoku.
This is glaringly incorrect. What is true is that Tameyoshi and all his
surviving sons except Yoshitomo did cast in their lot with the ex-Sovereign.
The exception is all important, for it was on Yoshitomo the Minamoto clansmen
in the wider sense of the term placed all their hopes and reliance. His
following in the famous night-attack of July 29 was three or four times as
numerous as that of his father; and among his officers were many subordinate
Minamoto chieftains of high prestige and great ability. One of his lieutenants
was the founder of the great house of Ashikaga, and another was that famous
scholar and soldier, Minamoto Yori- masa, who twenty-four years later on was
destined to make the Empire ring with the gallantry of a more than septuagenarian
warrior. As regards the Taira, Tadamasa carried with him some of the best and
most influential captains among the Ise Heishi. Thus the conflict was by no
manner of means a contest between Minamoto and Taira as such. That was to come
three years later on.
To all outward appearances, now firmly seated on the
throne, Shirakawa II took a firm hold on the reins of government. A determined
attempt was made to revive, or revert to, the ordinances and machinery of Sanjo
II. But Sanjo II and Shirakawa II were very different men. Shirakawa II had
indeed a strong will; but his likes and dislikes, and the indulgence of his
personal caprices, were of far greater consequence to him than were the genuine
national interests committed to his charge. He was the most devout of
Buddhists; but the intensity of his devoutness soon proved to be not
incompatible with disordered morals and a profligate life. He quickly wearied
of the irksomeness of the Imperial office, and in 1158 he abdicated in favour
of his eldest son (Nijo Tenno), then sixteen years of
age. Before his death, thirty-four years later on (1192), he was destined to
see no fewer than five sovereigns ascend the throne,—two sons and three
grandsons of his own. Some of these were nothing more or less than puppets of his
own; but it was only during the first eight or ten years after his abdication
in 1158 that his influence in administrative affairs was preponderant. The Insci system had indeed been of value as a
makeshift; but with his ex-Majesty Shirakawa II. it got swept into the limbo of
the expedients which have been tried and found wanting.
During Shirakawa II’s brief reign of two or three
years (1155-1158) the real power behind the throne was that Fujiwara
Michinori—(also known by his ecclesiastical name of Shinsai, for he had taken
the tonsure in 1140)—whom we have seen urging the ruthless execution of Sutoku’s partisans even in a season of national mourning
for a deceased sovereign. Taira Kiyomori’s prompt execution of his uncle Tadamasa
had recommended him to Michinori. Minamoto Yoshitomo’s efforts to evade the
invidious task of butchering his own father in cold blood had earned for him
Michinori’s aversion. Hence, as it was really by Michinori’s advice that reward
and punishment, promotion and degradation were meted out, Yoshitomo had to
content himself with the modest recompense of the command of the cavalry in the
Imperial Guard, while Taira Kiyomori was invested with the Governorship of Harima,
and with the still more important office of Acting Viceroy of Kyushu. From this
moment a struggle between Taira Kiyomori, then thirty-eight years of age, and
Minamoto Yoshitomo, five years his junior, began. It is only the suppliant who
competes; and Yoshitomo was weak enough to put himself in the position of a
suppliant. Furthermore this gallant and chivalrous warrior—for such indeed he
was—bemeaned himself so far as to resort to the hackneyed Fujiwara device of
making merchandise of his female offspring; and sent a middleman to offer his
daughter in marriage to Michinori’s son. The proffered alliance was rejected;
and Yoshitomo’s well-earned chagrin was presently intensified by hearing of the
sumptuous banquet that was given in honour of the nuptials of a son of
Michinori with a daughter of Taira Kiyomori.
Just at this juncture Yoshitomo met his evil angel in
the person of a certain Fujiwara Nobuyori. This Nobuyori, a descendant of Michitaka (who had been Regent and Kwampaku from 990 to
995), was then a handsome and graceful young man of six and twenty, with
qualities, showy indeed, but entirely superficial. Thanks to the favour he had
found in the eyes of Shirakawa II, he had early been invested with important
offices both civil and military; and promotion had succeeded promotion with
startling celerity. But the avidity and ambition of this spoiled child of
fortune knew no bounds; and he was now importuning the ex-Emperor for the title
and post of Commander in-Chief of the Guards. The ex-Sovereign was inclined to
gratify his favourite and was indeed on the point of expediting the patent when
Fujiwara Michinori adduced such cogent reasons for staying his hand, that Nobuyori’s hopes were blasted at the eleventh hour. Deeply
chagrined at this. Nobuyori feigned illness, (eased appearing at Court, and devoted
all his energies to knitting together a party strong enough to enable him to
make away with Michinori and realise his prospects by main force. He found
ready confederates among his own fellow-clansmen, the Fujiwara; but it was the
services of the warlike Minamoto that he was most eager to enlist. Michinori
and Taira Kiyomori were now hand-in-glove; Minamoto Yoshitomo had abundant
reason for being dissatisfied with both of them. Accordingly Nobuyori used
sweet words to Yoshitomo whenever they met; Yoshitomo was informed that in an
alliance with Nobuyori lay the road to rich manors, high rank and office for
himself and his sons, and a brilliant match for his daughter. An understanding
was speedily arrived at, and the plot rapidly matured. At last all that was
wanted was a favourable opportunity for action.
This presently offered itself when, on January 14,
1160, Taira Kiyomori and his eldest son, Shigemori, set out for Kumano with a
few attendants. Five days later, on the night of January 19, 1160, the
confederates, with 500 men, assailed the palace of the ex-Emperor, took
possession of his person, cut down the guards, killed many of the inmates and
finally fired the building and burned it to the ground. The ex-Emperor was
taken to the Great Palace, while the Emperor Nijo was
presently interned in the Palace of Kurodo and a strict guard set at all the
exits. Next day Michinori’s mansion was burned, and his consorts and concubines
and female attendants ruthlessly massacred. As for Michinori himself, he had by
a lucky chance got a timely hint of what was to be expected. He at once rode
off post-haste to the Emperor’s Palace; sent in a warning by one of the maids
of honour, and then whipped his horse off into the darkness of the night. He
reached Nara, and hid in a cavern there; but his lurking place was soon discovered;
and a day or so later his head was on the public pillory in front of the prison
in the capital.
With the Sovereign and the ex-Sovereign safely in
their power, the conspirators at once began to carry things with a high hand.
Nobuyori appointed himself Chancellor and Commander-in-Chief; Yoshitomo was
advanced in rank and made Governor of Harima, while all the subordinate chiefs
received more or less important offices. Of course, they gave out that they
were acting in accordance with the Imperial instructions, and it was not difficult
for them to get the Sovereign to set his seal to the documents placed before
him, for his refusal to do so would infallibly have cost him his throne.
Everything seemed to bid fair for the success of the coup d’état, when the
prospects of the conspirators were dashed by a very dramatic incident. They had
issued a summons to all the chief officers to assemble for discussion on the
29th, failure to attend involving the penalty of death. Fujiwara Mitsuyori, the
elder brother of Korekata, one of Nobuyori’s most
important lieutenants, and before the revolt Nobuyori’s superior officer in the Guards, put on his ceremonial robes, and made his way
into the Council Chamber. “There he found Nobuyori occupying the chief seat,
and all the other officers not in their usual places. He at once stopped and
called out loudly: “How is it that you are all out of your places, and that the
proper order of the Court is not observed?”. He then passed on, and boldly took
his seat above Nobuyori, who quailed at this fine display of moral courage.
Mitsuyori, on seating himself, asked in a loud voice what the meaning of all
this was. No one ventured to reply. Thereupon Mitsuyori threw back his dress,
and standing upright turned to his younger brother Korekata and angrily asked
him why he had joined the rebels, and assured him that swift punishment would
overtake all concerned in the wretched business Then with a few more blunt and
bitter words, he passed out, none daring to stay him or to raise a hand against
him. Six days later (February 4) the great effect of Mitsuyori’s bold front on this occasion became only too apparent.
Meanwhile the all-important question had become what
were the Tairas doing. On their way to Kumano, Kiyomori and his son had learned
of the outbreak, and with the aid of the Betto of Kumano they succeeded in
getting about a hundred men together. With these they were on the point of
returning to the capital, when it was reported that Minamoto Yoshihira was at
hand with 3,000 troops. This Yoshihira (another Japanese Hercules), then 20
years of age, was Yoshitomo’s eldest son, born when his father was a youth of
eighteen. At fifteen Yoshihira had had to take the field against an uncle of his
own in Musashi and, as already stated, had defeated and killed him. He had now
hurried up from Kamakura; and at a council of war had asked to be entrusted
with troops to waylay and kill the two Tairas. His request had been refused by
Nobuyori; but the false rumour of his approach seriously disconcerted Kiyomori,
who then thought of retiring into the Western Country to muster men there. But
Shigemori would have none of this; they would certainly be outlawed as rebels
if the conspirators were left to consolidate their position. So the Tairas,
with their handful of men, boldly hastened back to the capital, and posted
themselves in their Rokuhara mansion. Here they were presently joined by the
nobles and functionaries in crowds, while their armed following soon assumed
respectable proportions. And on the night of February 4, the Emperor,
disguised as a maid of honour waiting upon the Empress, was borne along with
her into the Taira stronghold! Fujiwara Korekata, overawed by his elder
brother’s reproaches at the memorable council of January 29th, had resolved to
do something to atone for his conduct, and had succeeded in bringing the
Sovereign safely through the gates and guards of his Kurodo prison. Almost at
the same time the ex-Emperor made good his escape; and the conspirators’ doom
then became almost assured.
In the Kurodo Palace the flight of the Sovereign was
soon discovered. But when it was communicated to Nobuyori, he was drinking
deeply, if not actually drunk; and so he paid no attention to the
communication. Next morning he speedily realised the extent of the disaster;
and then he entirely lost his head. Yoshitomo kept cool, however; and ordering
the matter to be kept secret he at once threw himself into the Great Palace to
await the inevitable Taira attack there. In two or three hours it came. A body
of 1.000 men in two corps, headed by Shigemori and his uncle Yorimori respectively,
were launched against two of the gates. Shigemori at first had some success
against Yoshihira; but after penetrating some way into the enclosure he was
beaten out again. Yoshitomo was more than holding his own against Yorimori,
when a feigned flight of the Tairas drew the defenders of the gate after them.
Then all at once the Taira men turned, rushed through or past the pursuers,
poured into the Palace, and occupied the gate. Thus dislodged from the Palace,
the Minamoto assailed the Rokuhara. But just at this moment, Minamoto Yorimasa
with his command of 300 men. hitherto camped outside the Palace, refused to
move, and on being assailed by Yoshihira, passed over to the Tairas. The
assault on the Rokuhara was a disastrous and bloody failure; and the Minamoto
leaders had no course then open to them but to evacuate the capital.
In their retreat they found the road strongly held by
the armed monks of Hi-ei-zan;
and in this encounter the Minamoto lost heavily before they succeeded in
breaking through. On reaching Seta, Yoshitomo ordered his men to disperse, and,
attended by his sons Yoshihira, Tomonaga, and Yoritomo, and three or four
followers, made his way through the storms and snowdrifts to Aohaka in Mino.
Hence he dispatched his two eldest sons to raise fresh troops in Shinano and Kai; but his second son, Tomonaga, had been
severely wounded in the encounter with the priests, and had to return.
Yoshitomo then threatened to abandon him; but Tomonaga begged his father to
kill him rather than to let him fall into the hands of their foes; and Yoshitomo
actually complied with the request. Tomonaga was then a mere boy of fifteen. A
little later his corpse was exhumed by Taira Munekiyo, who cut off the head,
and sent it to be pilloried in the capital, along with that of Yoshitomo, who
had meanwhile met his fate. He had got as far as Owari, on his way to raise a
force in the Kwanto, when he was assailed and slain
in his bath, by a retainer of his own who had proffered him a treacherous
hospitality. This was on February 12, only twenty-three days after the assault
on the ex-Emperor’s Palace.
On learning of the death of his father, Yoshihira
abandoned his mission to Shinano and returned to the
capital with the intention of assassinating the Tairas. His host betrayed him,
and 300 men were sent to effect his arrest. But he cut his way through them and
escaped,—only to be caught two or three days later on in Omi. On March 3, he
was publicly decapitated on the Rokujogawara execution ground in the capital.
Meanwhile the headsman had been very busy, for thirty
or forty of the conspirators had had to pay the extreme penalty. Among them had
been Fujiwara Nobuyori; and he, the prime instigator of the whole disturbance,
had made a pitiable appearance indeed. In the defence of the Great Palace, he
had at once quailed at the stern clash of arms, and blenching before the Taira
onset had precipitately abandoned the position entrusted to him and sought
safety in the rear of Yoshitomo’s command. On the retreat of the Minamotos,
Nobuyori, instead of accompanying them, hastened to the Ninnaji, forced himself
into the presence of Shirakawa II, and with much weeping and moaning abjectly
implored the ex-Sovereign to obtain a pardon for him. Shirakawa at once sent a
note to the Emperor beseeching mercy for the suppliant; but no reply was
returned to it. Meanwhile Taira troops arrived, seized Nobuyori and took him
away to the Rokuhara, where Kiyomori, after upbraiding him bitterly, promptly
consigned him to a richly merited doom.
This émeute of 1160 was of even greater
consequence in the history of the Empire than the great disturbance of the Summer
of 1156. It was the events of 1160 that finally opened the way to the
establishment of a military despotism in Japan. It will be noted that in
neither of the two outbreaks had the military class been the prime movers. The
war of 1156 had been occasioned by a disputed succession to the throne, by
dissensions in the Fujiwara House, and by the mortified vanity and thwarted
ambition of a Fujiwara chief. The struggle of 1160 was mainly the outcome of a
quarrel between two Fujiwara favourites. In both conflicts alike, the military
men had been merely the tools, or, at best, the auxiliaries of ambitious and
mutually jealous civilians. The contests had been by no manner of means
contests of the pen with the sword; for the great warlike clans, so far from
being able to combine and present a united front against the civilian
authorities and magnates, were hopelessly at variance. And not only were
Minamoto and Taira not in unison with each other; both clans were dogged by
that curse of internal dissension which had proved the bane of the great bouse
of Fujiwara, and eke of the Imperial line itself. In 1156 it had been a case in
the Imperial House of brother against brother, of Sovereign against Sovereign;
among the Fujiwara of son against brother and father; among the Tairas of uncle
against nephew; and among the Minamotos of son against brothers and father. In
that dire contest, the Tairas had been the chief gainers, for the death of
Tadamasa, Kiyomori’s jealous rival, had made the latter undisputed head of the
Ise Heishi, and removed a fruitful source of disunion and weakness in the
counsels of the clan. On the contrary, Minamoto Yoshitomo was on the best
relations with his father and brothers who perished on that fateful occasion;
and the Minamotos had lost quite as much as the Tairas had then gained. Still
the two great warlike clans remained fairly well balanced in strength and
resources; and while this was so, any unquestioned domination of a military
chief in the councils of the Empire was a virtual impossibility.
All that was altered by the events of 1160. When the
heads of Yoshitomo and his two eldest son had been placed on the public pillory,
the Taira had good reason for believing that they had nothing more to dread
from Minamoto rivalry, for with the ablest surviving adult Minamoto, the
illustrious scholar and soldier Yorimasa, Kiyomori was on the best of terms,
and could readily count on his loyal support. The Emperor Nijo,
while by no means a mere puppet, had to bend to the will of his father, the
ex-Emperor Shirakawa II; and with Shirakawa II Kiyomori’s relations had always
been satisfactory. Hitherto, behind his ex-Majestv Shirakawa II had stood Fujiwara Michinori, a very able, very astute, and—when
reasons of State demanded it—a somewhat unscrupulous statesman, ready in case
of emergency to deal with opponents by the drastic methods of a Richelieu or an Ii Kamon no Kami. Michinori’s head had lately been
inspected on the public pillory by his chief rival in the affections and regard
of Shirakawa II, Fujiwara Nobuyori, to wit; and now, in turn the skin was
gradually peeling from the grisly lineaments of what had once been the handsome
features of that very Nobuyori whose head had replaced the head of that rival he
had “inspected’’ with such well-bred and insouçiant contempt. Where was his ex-Majesty now to turn for counsel? Without Michinori
as Achitophel, Shirakawa II could scarcely hope to restore and maintain the
system and institutions of his great-great-grandfather, Sanjo II. As for the
Fujiwaras, they were not now especially dangerous; for their chief, the
Kwampaku Motosane, instead of being an old, experienced, and rusé politician as had been the wont in the heyday
of the fortunes of the great house, was a callow youth of sixteen summers. To
this young man, who held office from 1159 to his death at twenty-four in 1166,
the Tairas were careful to show a becoming measure of deference and respect.
But it was instinctively recognised by them that it was the whims and caprices
of his ex-Majesty Shirakawa II that had above all to be studied and
consulted,—for the time being, at least. About the beginning of 1161 discord
broke out between the ex-Emperor and his son, Nijo Tenno; but just when the son was attaining to years of discretion he died in
1166, and was succeeded by his son (Rokujo Tenno), an
infant of two years! Three years later this baby Sovereign was virtually
deposed by his grandfather (Shirakawa II), who then placed his own favourite
son on the throne as the Emperor Takakura. The new Sovereign was only eight
years of age, and he occupied the throne for eleven years,—down to 1180, the
year before his death. Now, the mother of the new Sovereign was Kiyomori’s
sister-in-law; and the Taira chieftain presently showed that it was his purpose
to rise to supreme power by the exercise of traditional Fujiwara devices,
backed by the substantial support of a now practically united military class.
As a reward for his services in February 1160,
Kiyomori had been made Sangi and raised to the first grade of the third
rank,—an exceptional measure of Court favour for a mere military man. At the
same time, some of his sons and brothers were invested with Provincial
Governorships; an office now of little or no consequence to mere civilians, but
of great and increasing importance to military men, whose influence depended
not so much on mere Court rank as on the number of swordsmen and mounted
archers they could bring into the field, when occasion demanded. The chief
competitors of the Tairas for these posts had been the Minamotos; now the Minamotos
had, to all appearance, been annihilated; and hence the Ise Heishi could lay a
wide foundation for their power. Before the death of Kiyomori in 1181, more
than thirty of these gubernatorial positions had passed into the hands of members
of the clan,—mostly in Central, Western, and Southern Japan. What it is
all-important to observe is that what was to become a noted feature of feudal
Japan—the confusion of administrative with proprietary rights—was now beginning
to make itself apparent, if not actually conspicuous. Hence these thirty odd
Taira Provincial Governorships were really so many feudal principalities in the
germ.
If Kiyomori had followed his natural promptings and utterly
exterminated the progeny of Yoshitomo in 1160 the course of the social and
political development of the Empire would have been very different from that
which the historian has to record. But in 1160, in the person of Yoritomo, the
fourteen-year-old third son of Yoshitomo, Kiyomori spared not merely a deadly future
rival, but what he himself was emphatically not—a master of statecraft of
nearly, if not entirely and absolutely, of the very first rank.
This Yoritomo had an exceptional share of the
traditional Minamoto precocity. Just before the struggle of 1160, he had gone
through the gembuku ceremony,—the old Japanese analogue of the
assumption of the toga virilis among the Romans, —had
taken his place in the ranks, and in the defence of the Great Palace and in the
subsequent encounters had fought like a seasoned veteran. At Aohaka, when
Tomonaga, unable to execute his mission to raise fresh troops by reason of his
rankling wound, returned to be killed by his father, among the many bitter
things then said to him, perhaps the bitterest of all was that he should profit
by the example of his younger brother Yoritomo. and try to play the man!
Shortly after the assassination of his father, Yoritomo fell into the hands of
that Taira, Munekiyo, who broke into Tomonaga’s tomb in order to take his head
and send it to be pilloried in the capital. Arrived in Kyoto with his captive,
Munekiyo was ordered to keep him in ward for the present; in a short time he
would be publicly executed. Meanwhile Yoritomo’s grave demeanour had excited
the compassion of his captor, who had asked him if he would like to live.
“Yes,” was the reply; “both my father and elder brothers are dead; who but
myself can pray for their happiness in the next world?”. Struck by his filial
answer, Munekiyo went to the Lady Ike no Gozen,
Kiyomori’s stepmother, who had become a nun after the death of her husband,
Tadamori. She had borne one son of great promise, called Uma, on whom she had
lavished all her affection, and whose early death had been the great affliction
of her life. So, when in the course of his story Munekiyo told her that Yoritomo
was the very image of what Uma would then have been had he lived, her feelings
were deeply stirred, and her profoundest sympathy enlisted. She at once hurried
off to Kiyomori to implore mercy for the youthful captive, lying under sentence
of death. It was only after most importunate pleading that Kiyomori yielded,
for he had counsellors about him who insistently urged the utter extermination
of the whole turbulent Minamoto brood. At last, however, he reluctantly
consented to mitigate the death penalty one degree: and so Yoritomo was
banished to the wilds of the Idzu peninsula. Here he
was placed under the strict surveillance of Taira partisans, on whose implicit
fidelity Kiyomori flattered himself he could surely rely. In little more than a
score of years it was to become abundantly manifest that the tears shed by the
Lady Ike no Gozen on this occasion were destined to
prove a veritable fount of calamity to the house of Taira.
Just at this juncture an incident occurred clearly
indicating that the rough ferocity of Kiyomori’s nature, the reputed inflexibility
of his will, and the soundness of his judgement, were all alike liable to be
affected by the charms of female beauty, no less than by maternal importunity.
The lady Tokiwa, Yoshitomo’s concubine, was perhaps the loveliest woman in the
capital. She was the mother of three boys, all young,—in fact the last of them
had been born only a few months before the great outbreak that proved so fatal
to their father and their two eldest brothers. Tokiwa had got timely warning of
the defeat and proscription of her lord and all his household; and with her
youngest babe in her bosom, another strapped to her back, and with the eldest
clasping her hand, she hurriedly passed out through a postern into the snowy
roadway under the friendly cover of the blinding whirl of fleecy flakes.
Instead of following her husband towards the North, she daringly set her face
to the South, passed the great Taira mansion of Rokuhara with its flaring
lights, and made for Fushimi. After untold hardships and a series of romantic
and thrilling adventures, she at last safely reached the village of Ryumon in Yamato, and went into hiding there. Kiyomori’s
eager search for her was utterly in vain; so he seized her mother, and
threatened to kill her unless Tokiwa appeared with her offspring. When Tokiwa
heard of this, there was a keen and painful conflict between maternal instinct
and the teachings of the Classic of Filial Piety. The latter conquered, and
Tokiwa presented herself before Kiyomori, who was so overcome with her dazzling
beauty that he at once resolved to make her his concubine. She at first
absolutely refused; but her mother, weeping floods of tears, dwelt on the
misery of disobedience and on her future happiness; and Tokiwa at last yielded,
on condition that the lives of her children were spared. Again the Taira
vassals were all for ruthless and unrelenting measures; but against Tokiwa,
supported by the pleadings of the Lady Ike no Gozen,
they were powerless. All three boys when grown were to be sent to a monastery
to be trained for the priesthood,—such was the compromise arrived at. As a
matter of fact, Tokiwa’s relations with Kiyomori were comparatively brief;
after bearing him a daughter, she became the spouse of a Fujiwara nobleman,—the
Minister of Finance. It was an evil day for the Taira when the life of Tokiwa’s
youngest child was spared, for the brilliant military genius of Yoshitsune contributed as much to the fall of the Heishi as
the statecraft of his elder half-brother Yoritomo did.
But all these were things of the future never for a
moment thought of or dreamt of by Kiyomori. For long years the sole and single
Minamoto that caused him any disquietude was that redoutable archer of seven feet stature and four men’s strength, Tametomo, who had been
banished to the isles of Idzu in 1156, after having
had the sinews of his arm cut. Nine years afterwards, in the spring of 1165 (we
are informed by the Japanese annalist), “Minamoto Tametomo set out with some
vessels for Onigashima (the Isle of Demons) and took
possession of this island.” Tametomo had opened up communication with Ata, his
father-in-law, Acting Governor of Satsuma, and with his help had been able to
make his way to the Luchus. Here he married the
younger sister of one of the Anzu or territorial magnates who were then
becoming too powerful to be controlled by the King of the group, and were
fighting among themselves; and by this lady he became the father of the founder
of the new dynasty of Luchu sovereigns. Three or four years later he made his
way back to Oshima; and from this base he began to harry the shores of the
opposite peninsula, and to levy blackmail upon the lieges. He was simply
repeating the record of his grandfather Yoshichika and his own early record in
Kyushu, and endeavouring to carve out a principality for himself in Eastern
Japan. In 1170, the Vice-Governor of Idzu, Kudo
Shigemitsu, was commissioned by the Court to make an end of him. The Kwanto troops were got under arms on the fourth month and
attempted to carry his camp by surprise; but he defended himself valiantly with
his archers. At last after most of his craft had been taken or sunk, and almost
every one of his followers killed, he disembowelled himself at the age of
thirty-three. This bald entry is unusually interesting inasmuch as it is the
first authentic notice I have so far met with of that practice of hara-kiri,
the “happy dispatch,” which was presently destined to become one of the most
distinctive institutions of the feudalism of Japan.
Meanwhile with all dread of possible Minamoto rivalry
thus thoroughly removed, Kiyomori found the ground cleared for a contest with
the civilian Fujiwaras. For some time he abstained from any overt acts of
hostility against them; his immediate intention being to work through and by
them by means of that very device by which they had contrived to hold the
titular Sovereign in their hands for generations. The circumstances of the time
were highly propitious for such an attempt on Kiyomori’s part. The Kwampaku, Motozane, the chief of the clan, was, as has been said, a
stripling of sixteen when he was invested with this high office in 1159. He had
married a Fujiwara lady; but Kiyomori presently succeeded in giving her a rival
in the person of his own daughter. In a short time Kiyomori’s ascendency over
his youthful son-in-law was complete. Then suddenly, in 1166, Motozane died, at the age of twenty-four, leaving only one
infant son, the offspring not of Kiyomori’s daughter, but of his Fujiwara
consort. The boy was greatly attached to Kiyomori’s daughter, however. By the
right of primogeniture, so far as it was recognised, he was the head of the
clan. But then it had become the custom of the Fujiwara house to regard that
member of it who became Kwampaku or Regent as its head,—or Uji-Choja.
But to invest a mere baby with the Regency of the Empire was at this date still
a moral impossibility; in fact Motozane’s investiture
with that great office at sixteen had given rise to much adverse criticism
among the Court nobles, who still, to a great extent, formulated the public
opinion of the times. So, on Motozane’s death, his
half-brother Motofusa, then twenty-two years of age, was made Regent. According
to use and wont he should have become Betto of all the ancestral temples and
shrines, and of the great family college, while the treasured heirlooms of the
house and all its numerous manors should have been at once transferred to him.
But just at this point Kiyomori, at the instigation of a certain Fujiwara
Kunitsuna, thought fit to interfere. Motozane’s five-year-old son, Motomichi, was entrusted to the care of Kiyomori’s daughter;
and both were installed in a new mansion, which was entrusted to the watch and
ward of stout and staunch Taira henchmen. The Regent, Motofusa, was deprived of
the protectorship of certain of the ancestral temples
and shrines, of all the Fujiwara manors in the west of Japan, and,—most
important of all,—of the cherished family heirlooms and records which were
invariably entrusted to the keeping of the Uji-Choja. All these were now
transferred to the infant Motomichi, who was entirely in Kiyomori’s hands. Divide
et impera,—that was Kiyomori’s policy towards the
Fujiwara,—an astute policy enough, perhaps, but a policy for which his own
unaided commonplace brain was not to be held accountable.
Meanwhile, this new arrangement had interfered with
certain plans and projects of that ruse politician, the ex-Emperor Shirakawa II;
and his ex-Majesty had been injudicious enough to give his tongue free rein.
A year before, the Emperor Nijo,
that son with whom Shirakawa II had been on notoriously bad terms, had died a
month or two after his abdication in favour of his baby son of two years (Rokujo Tenno). At his obsequies there had been a collision
between the monks of Hi-ei-zan and those of the Kofukuji of Nara over the very worldly question of place and
precedence at the ceremony, with the result that they had appealed to arms and
fought it out in the streets, several subsidiary fanes being then fired and not
a little ecclesiastical blood spilt. Even before the monks and their retainers
had appeared in mail, there had been rumours afloat to the effect that the
priests had been commissioned by the throne to chastise the insolence of Taira
Kiyomori. The net result of all this was that his exMajesty Shirakawa II had to present himself before the redoubtable Kiyomori in what was
virtually the guise of an abject suppliant! And Shirakawa II, in some respects,
was remarkably astute, while Kiyomori was, if we read him right, exceedingly
puzzle-headed. The stars in their (capricious) courses were fighting valiantly
for Kiyomori.
One thing that induced his ex-Majesty to pay such
undue deference to the humours of Kiyomori was that the younger sister of
Kiyomori’s wife was the mother of Shirakawa II’s favourite son, and that the
ex-Emperor was bent on placing that son on the throne at the earliest
opportunity. In November 1166, three months after the death of the Emperor Nijo, and four months after the accession of his infant
son, Rokujo (1166-1168), this lad, then six or seven
years of age, was proclaimed Prince Imperial. A few weeks later, Kiyomori was
named Naidaijin; and then, on the 4th March, 1167, without passing through the
posts of Minister of the Right and Minister of the Left, he rose at a single
bound to the Chancellorship of the Empire and the Junior Grade of the First
Rank! For such extraordinary promotion there had been no more than one single
solitary precedent among the proud civilian Fujiwaras; and, of course, for a
mere military man to obtain such office, and such rank, was so utterly
unprecedented as to be revolutionary! The most illustrious warrior of whom
Japan could boast, Saka-no-Uye no Tamura Maro, had
reaped the richest meed ever bestowed upon a soldier;
and he had been amply satisfied with the Third Rank and the post of Dainagon.
Naturally enough, this astounding rise of a mere military parvenu (as they held
Kiyomori to be) gave the deepest umbrage to the Fujiwara clansmen, whose
material resources he was in a measure appropriating, and whose position he was
sapping by the exercise of the traditional Fujiwara device of making
profitable merchandise of the daughters of the house, backed by the strong and
unanswerable argument of the sword.
Kiyomori had many moral and intellectual weaknesses,
but what is often regarded as venial, although really deadly unless redeemed by
a wholesome sense of humour, often indeed as fatal to greatness as his heel was
to Achilles—vanity, to wit —was not particularly conspicuous among them.
Accordingly he made his tenure of the great office of Chancellor a brief one,
and resigned it in the course of three months. But a few weeks afterwards he
was rewarded by the baby Emperor with the gift of immense tracts of Koden in
the provinces of Harima, Hizen, and Higo. As has been already explained, these
Koden were tax-free rice-lands granted as a reward for distinguished national
services. Those Kiyomori now received belonged to the first of the four classes
into which Koden were divided; in other words, the vast and fruitful domains
then bestowed on, or extorted by, the first Military Chancellor of the Empire
were to be hereditary. Gifts of such Koden had indeed been not infrequent; but
they had been of comparatively limited extent, and their recipients for the
most part had been civilian Fujiwara Ministers or courtiers. What was peculiar
in this grant to Kiyomori was, in the first place, the extraordinarily spacious
dimensions of the tracts then assigned him; and, secondly, the fact that it
marked a not unimportant step in the development of Japanese feudalism. The
Fujiwara manors had been tilled by serfs and peasants superintended and governed
by civilian stewards, whose chief duty it was to forward the revenues of the
estates under their charge to the capital for the support of the civilian
Fujiwara owners. These vast estates now bestowed upon, or extorted by,
Kiyomori, were to a great extent portioned out among a fierce brood of stalwart
fighting men as the guerdon of the armed support of themselves and their
dependents in seasons of emergency. Here we meet with some of the most
important notions of feudalism,— an element of contract, tenure of land by
military service, and sub-infeudation. Moreover, the vast extent of these fiefs
in the germ—for such indeed these estates were—and the formidable military
power so unscrupulously wielded by their owner or his tenants, gave a fresh
impulse to that tendency to “commendation” which it had been one of the chief
concerns of the Kyoto government to check, a generation or two before.
Just at this point, a word of caution is necessary.
This was by no means the beginning of the feudal system in Japan; it was only a
very important step in its development in the West and South-West of the
Empire. At the conclusion of the Three
Years’ War” in Northern Japan against the Kiyowara (1089), we have seen
Minamoto Yoshiiye rewarding his troops with grants of land from his own
estates, being constrained to this unusual step by the fact that the Court,
insisting that the whole contest had been a private quarrel, had refused to
recognise the services of the victors in any way. Minamoto Yoshiiye, however,
was far from being a rich man; and such rewards as he could bestow, when fairly
partitioned among his many deserving henchmen, must have been exceedingly
moderate. It was not the extent of the material benefits they then received
that Yoshiiye’s devoted followers chiefly took into
their consideration, however. The large-souled generosity of the act appealed
so strongly to the imagination of the military class that the tendency to “commend”
themselves to the Minamoto chieftains received a great impulse on this occasion.
As has been said, about this time there was only one really great fief in
Japan,—that of Mutsu,—and it belonged neither to the Tairas nor to the
Minamotos. At the other extremity of the Empire in Kuyshu,
the feudal system was also spreading. In Chikuzen were the great houses of
Harada and Munakata; in Hizen, those of Takagi and Matsuura; in Higo, the
Kikuchi and the Ako; in Bungo, the Usuki, the Saeki, and others; in Osumi the Kimotsuki; and in Satsuma the Ata.
In the following year, Kiyomori’s position was still
further strengthened. The ex-Emperor Shirakawa II was bent on deposing his
infant son Rokujo (5 years of age), and replacing him
by his own favourite son, only three years older. For this step Kiyomori’s
support was necessary; and it was readily enough promised, since the young
prince’s mother was Kiyomori’s sister-in-law. Accordingly, in March 1168, Rokujo was deposed and his uncle, Takakura Tenno
(1168-1180), ascended the throne.
In the following December, Kiyomori became seriously
ill, and fancying himself to he at death's door, “he shaved his head and
entered religion.’’ The remedy proved effectual, and Kiyomori presently
recovered. He had still thirteen years of life before him, and during that
space of time he gave abundant indications of how very loosely his “religion’’
sat upon him.
“When the Devil was sick,
The Devil a monk would be;
When the Devil was well.
The devil a monk was he !”
It very soon became plain to the intelligence of
Shirakawa II that he had made a serious mistake in placing a relative of
Kiyomori’s on the throne, for in the household of the new boy sovereign, as in
the administration at large, it was Kiyomori who really laid down the law.
Mortified and chagrined in scores of affairs, Shirakawa II shaved his head, and
became Ho-O, or Cloistered Emperor, in 1169,—six months after Kiyomori had
taken the tonsure very much as he might have taken pills.
It was not for nothing that Kiyomori kept such a
vigilant eye upon the youthful Sovereign and his entourage. We have already
seen how very adroitly an elder daughter of Kiyomori’s was utilised to
partition the prestige and vast resources of the head of the Fujiwara house,
and to put the greater part of his manors at Kiyomori’s disposal. A still
loftier destiny was in store for her younger sister, the Lady Toku. On February
9, 1171, Takakura Tenno, then eleven years old, was declared of age; and ten
days later the Lady Toku, four years his senior, became his consort. Thirteen
months after this (March 1172), she was proclaimed Empress of Japan!
This was indeed a terrible blow to the Fujiwaras. With
the exception of a few of the favoured Fujiwara adherents of the Lady Toku’s
elder sister, the Fujiwaras were carefully excluded from the household of the
Empress, in which nearly all the offices were now assigned to Tairas. In 1178,
the pregnancy of the Empress was announced, and she was then removed to the
mansion of her eldest brother, Taira Shigemori, where, on December 22, she was
delivered of a son. “The Cloistered Emperor, the Kwampaku (Fujiwara Motofusa),
and all the officers of the Court proceeded to the Rokuhara to felicitate
Kiyomori upon the auspicious event.” No great fetch of the imagination is
necessary in order to figure to oneself what the intensity of the heart-burning
must have been with which they proceeded to fawn and smile upon the upstart
swaggering military parvenu, whose heavy yoke this “auspicious” event had done
much to rivet upon every one of their necks. The whole thing was “mouth honour,
breath which the poor heart would have fain denied but dared not”; and behind, what
corresponds to vigorous tail-wagging in the canine world when a stronger dog or
the wrath of a master with a stick has to be appeased, were “curses not loud
but deep,” very deep. A fortnight or so later the Lady Toku’s babe was formally
proclaimed Heir Prince. Then in 1180, when the Emperor Takakura abdicated in
favour of the Lady Toku’s child of two years of age, Taira Kiyomori found
himself in the proud and powerful position of grandfather of the reigning
Emperor of Japan! The blue-blooded Fujiwara had, indeed, been very effectually
hoist with their own petard!
But long before this Kiyomori’s conduct towards his
quondam patron and ally, Shirakawa II, and the Fujiwaras had been so
outrageously insolent and aggressive that it was now generally felt the
situation had become intolerable. In 1170, Sukemori, the son of Kiyomori’s
eldest son, Shigemori, had gone out hawking, and on returning had met the Sessho
Motofusa and his cortège. Since Sukemori did not dismount as etiquette
demanded, he was summarily pulled from his seat. On hearing of the incident,
Kiyomori flew into a terrible rage. “Who dares to lay a hand upon the grandson
of the man that holds the position I now hold?” he shouted. And straightway he
sent a body of his men to meet the Sessho, drag him from his carriage, smash
the vehicle to atoms, and to cut off the cue of every member of his escort. In
1177, the office of General of the Left became vacant. The post of General of
the Right was then held by Shigemori, Kiyomori’s eldest son; and Shigemori was
at once promoted to the senior command, while his former position was bestowed
upon his younger brother, Munemori. Meanwhile no fewer than three Fujiwaras had
been emulously striving and intriguing to obtain the appointment, and their
resentment at being passed over was profound. Especially deep was the chagrin
of one of them, Narichika. This Narichika, then a young man of twenty-two, had
been one of the ringleaders in the great plot of 1160; and it was mainly owing
to the fact that he was connected with Shigemori by marriage that his life was
spared on that occasion. Returning after a brief term of exile, he quickly
ingratiated himself with Shirakawa II, by whom he was promoted from one rather
important office to another, till, in 1177, he was Dainagon. Among the priests
by whom Shirakawa II was constantly surrounded, it was a certain Fujiwara Moromitsu, known as Saiko, who was deepest in his
confidence; and with this Saiko Narichika had become very intimate. At this
juncture these two and a few others determined to attempt the overthrow of the
Tairas. The seat of their plottings was a villa in Shishigadani, one of the sequestered recesses of
Higashiyama. According to some accounts these conferences were once or twice
attended by Shirakawa II; according to others he was on the point of proceeding
there, when he was dissuaded from going by his counsellors. What is perfectly
plain is that his exMajesty knew very well what was
in train in that lonely mountain retreat. In an evil hour for their fortunes
the plotters invited a certain Tada Yukitsuna, a
Minamoto, to join them. Yukitsuna very soon perceived
that the success of the enterprise was hopeless, and that yet he could make
exceedingly good capital out of it for himself.
Nearly a score of years before this Kiyomori had begun
to erect his mansion of Fukuwara, where the city of Hyogo now stands, and as he
rose to greatness it began to assume the aspect of a magnificent palace. Hither
he had retired upon laying down the Chancellorship, and here he was now living.
His visits to the capital were only occasional, but nevertheless there was but
little that went on there, or indeed throughout the Empire at large, of which
he was not speedily apprised. In the huge following he maintained were three
hundred young pages whose special duty it was to keep him duly informed of
everything they heard or saw; and besides these he had an elaborately organised
secret service whose mysterious underground ramifications were everywhere. To
elude the keen scent of Kiyomori’s invisible sleuth-hounds had come to be
regarded as next door to an impossibility. And yet, notwithstanding, the
conspirators in the lonesome villa in the secluded recesses of Higashiyama had
succeeded in doing so most effectually. In this circumstance Minamoto Yukitsuna saw a great opportunity for the advancement of
his own interests. Stealthily making his way to the Fukuwara, and there obtaining
an interview with Kiyomori, he divulged all he knew about the Shishigadani conferences.
A day or so afterwards Kiyomori was in his Kyoto
mansion,—the Rokuhara,—whence he at once dispatched his men to bring the priest
Saiko into his presence. His Reverence at first professed entire ignorance of
the Shishigadani assemblies, but on being subjected
to “forcible examination,” or, in plain language, to the torture, his fortitude
gave way, and he dictated and set his seal to an accurate and exhaustive
statement of all he knew about the plot,—which was, in short, everything. Kiyomori’s
next step was to send courteously worded invitations to Narichika and each of
his fellow-conspirators to meet him in the Rokuhara, as he wished to have the
pleasure of consulting them on some rather important business. Without the
least suspicion of Yukitsuna’s treachery, and knowing
nothing of Saiko’s arrest, much less of his damning confession, Narichika and
most of his confederates hurried off to fawn upon the insolent upstart they
hated with an unspeakable loathing and whose downfall they were sedulously
plotting, with studied expressions of simulated delight. As soon as they made
their appearance they were seized and bound. Then, after an anxious period of
suspense, the dreaded Kiyomori came swaggering into the room, and addressed
himself to Narichika: “ In 1160 you aided and abetted Fujiwara Nobuyori, and
for doing so your life was justly forfeited. But thanks to my son Shigemori’s
earnest entreaties your life was spared. After that you obtained governorships
and manors, and have again become a great personage. What precisely is the
grievance that has made you plot the ruin of my house?”. Narichika thereupon
bowed his head to the ground, and by way of apology said: “Of course, I have no
resentment against the Prince (Kiyomori). This must be some secret slander of
some unknown enemy of mine.” Thereupon Kiyomori produced the priest Saiko’s
confession from the folds of his dress, read it out in a loud voice, and after asking
Narichika whether he was not ashamed to be found out practising such deception,
struck him across the fate with the document, and then ordered some of the
attendant Samurai to take him out and cut off his head.
Meanwhile intelligence of what was toward had been
transmitted to Shigemori, Kiyomori’s eldest son, then Great General of the
Left,—that is, under the Emperor, the Commander-in-Chief in Japan. He at once
hurried off to the Rokuhara, where he arrived just in time to be able to save Narichika’s life on a second occasion. However, Shigemori’s
intervention did not prove of any very ultimate advantage to Narichika, who,
sentenced to be banished to Kojima in Bizen, was
there put out of the way by special emissaries of Kiyomori a few months later
on. Little commiseration can be extended to him; he was vain, pretentious,
ungrateful, and, like Nobuyori (1160), at bottom that most despicable of all
things in a man who aspires to political eminence, a thorough coward. He resorted
as readily to the supreme argument of the weakest section of womankind—tears,
to wit,—as Nobuyori did in 1160. Besides he proved himself to be deceitful and
an arrant liar. To sympathise with the swaggering Kiyomori with his limited
outlook upon life and upon the crying needs of the time is a difficult task; to
sympathise with such adversaries of Kiyomori as the poltroon Narichika is
absolutely impossible.
As for his Reverence Saiko, the especial confidant of
his ex-Majesty Shirakawa II, his stature was minished by the length of his
shaven pate. His two sons shared his fate, while all the other habitués of the Shishigadani villa found themselves confronted
with all the sentimental horrors and real hardships of distant exile,—a lucky
turn of the wheel of fortune for men of the true metal such as Fujiwara Hidesato, Minamoto Yoritomo, his uncle Tametomo, and
Minamoto Yoshikuni among others, but deadly fatal to
such hot-house plants as Sugawara no Michizane, and the average, commonplace,
pampered Court grandee.
Kiyomori sent an official report of the whole affair
to the Emperor; and then putting on his travelling attire he started on his
return to his Fukuwara retreat. On his way, in the most unceremonious and
nonchalant fashion, he stopped at the portals of the Cloistered Emperor’s
palace, and sent in a message by the officer on duty there that what he had
just done had been done in the interests of the State and the Sovereign
primarily; his own life was a secondary consideration. At first it had not been
Kiyomori’s intention to let Shirakawa II off so lightly as he did; in fact he
was on the point of proceeding at the head of an armed force to seize the
Cloistered Emperor when Shigemori appeared on the scene and made him desist.
Kiyomori had a wholesome dread of his eldest son, and when Shigemori was
announced on this occasion, his father hastily threw his priest’s robes over
his armour to conceal it. But as be moved, his clothes kept opening, and so he
had to explain why he was in war harness. He was then told if he must needs
perpetrate such an outrage as he was contemplating he had better first take
Shigemori’s head before attempting it. “I am an old man, and I was doing all
this to see what metal my children were made of. If it seems to you that what I
have done is bad, then take what measures you please to put it to rights.” When
their father left the room Shigemori sharply rebuked Munemori and his other
brothers for lending themselves to any such enterprise.
Shigemori’s regard for the law of the land, for truth,
justice, and duty was as profound as was Kiyomori’s contempt for all such
considerations. Over and over again the son found himself called upon to
remonstrate with the father, and to curb the latter’s tendency to unbridled
lawlessness and outrage. Of the two, Shigemori was really in several respects
the stronger man. When Kiyomori’s nerve failed him on hearing of Nobuyori’s attempted coup d’état in 1160, it was the
youthful Shigemori’s resolution that saved the situation for the Tairas. Again,
it was Shigemori who led the attack on the Minamotos in the Great Palace, while
his father remained safely behind in the Rokuhara. When the Minamotos,
dislodged from the Palace, made their abortive assault on the Rokuhara, whither
the Sovereign had fled, Kiyomori lost his presence of mind utterly, and became
so flustered that he put on his armour with the back part in front. When this
was pointed out to him he said that it was perfectly right; as the Emperor was
coming behind he had put on his harness so as to have the front part facing his
Majesty; since it would be improper to have the back part of the armour turned
towards an Emperor. When Kiyomori lost his head, as he not unfrequently did,
his shifts and excuses, while not exactly Falstaffian, were certainly amusing
in their way. In crises of personal peril we never hear of Shigemori quailing
or losing command over himself.
Yet withal Shigemori’s character was not without a
strain of weakness, while in certain matters his words and deeds exposed him to
the reproach of narrow-mindedness. A week or so after the punishment of the Shishigadani conspirators, he retired from the command of
the Guards, and early in 1179 he resigned the post of Naidaijin. He allowed
himself to be beset with a haunting dread of what his father might do next, and
of the probable consequences of the outrageous behaviour of the terrible old
man, every year getting worse and worse. In the summer of 1179 Shigemori went
to Kumano to supplicate the gods for—a speedy death! Such was the despairing
view that he took of the situation. As if in answer to his petition, he
contracted a malignant fever upon his return to the capital, and of this he
died on September 3, 1179. A famous Chinese physician had just then arrived in
Japan, and Kiyomori urged his son to send for him. But Shigemori stubbornly refused
to do so, on the ground that if he were cured by a foreign leech when Japanese
doctors had failed, it would be bad for the reputation of the Empire at large
and of the Japanese medical faculty in particular. Besides, a mere roving
vagrant foreigner should not be lightly admitted into the presence of one who
had attained the rank of Minister of State!
“Shigemori was only 42, and he was greatly regretted
by the Cloistered Emperor and by everybody.” Such is the entry in the record.
Yet all the poignancy of Imperial priestly regret for the memory of Shigemori
did not prevent his ex-Majesty from very promptly confiscating all Shigemori’s
manors in Echizen! Moreover, just a month before Shigemori’s death, that sister
of his whom Kiyomori had used so adroitly to partition the power and resources
of the Fujiwaras, died; and, in collusion with the Kwampaku Motofusa, Shirakawa
II had seized all her estates and the manors assigned to her adopted infant son, Motomichi, in 1166. Meanwhile
this Motomichi, now 20 years of age, had been wedded to another of Kiyomori’s
very serviceable daughters! Motomichi had been made Uji-choja,
or Chieftain of the Fujiwara clan; but Moroiye, the 12-year-old son of his
uncle Motofusa, was now promoted to the office of Chunagon,
to which Motomichi vainly aspired although backed by the strenuous support of
Taira Kiyomori. With so much of preliminary explanation by way of a setting for
it, the following entry in the “Annals” should have no difficulty in speaking
for itself in a sufficiently intelligible manner. “In December 1179 Kiyomori
came up from the Fukuwara to the capital and gave the Cloistered Emperor to
understand that he was greatly displeased with several matters. In consequence
of his complaints the Kwampaku, Fujiwara Motofusa, was banished to Bizen, the Chancellor of the Empire, Fujiwara Moronaga, to Owari, while the Dainagon, Minamoto Sukekata, and 13 officers of the Emperor were stripped of
their ranks and discharged from their posts. On the same occasion Kiyomori
obtained the promotion of his son-in-law, Fujiwara Motomichi. He then held the
rank of Lieutenant-General of the Second Class; at a bound he rose to the great
posts of Naidaijin and Kwampaku, although he was only twenty years of age. . .
. Kiyomori caused the Cloistered Emperor to be conducted to the Toba Detached
Palace. He confided the ward and surveillance of the capital to his son (and
heir) Munemori, and then returned to the Fukuwara. All these evil designs of
Kiyomori would have been carried out long before, but Shigemori had constantly
opposed them. After his death, Kiyomori, seeing that nobody any more resisted
him, had respect for nothing, and acted entirely upon his own caprice.”
It only remains to supplement this account by saying
that Kiyomori did not go up from the Fukuwara to the capital alone, but at the
head of several thousand armed men; and that he had then made his old friend
and patron, the Cloistered Emperor Shirakawa II, a close prisoner, severely
separated from all his usual attendants, except one single concubine, a single
priest, and two or three menials.
The young Emperor Takakura took his father’s unfortunate
position very much to heart, and by way of placating Kiyomori’s wrath he
abdicated early in 1180, in favour of his own son and Kiyomori’s grandson (Antoku Tenno), then a child of three. After his abdication
it was customary for the ex-Sovereign to proceed in state to some one or all of
the shrines of Iwashimidzu, Kamo, Hiyoshi,
or Kumano. These all belonged to one or other of the great monasteries of Hi-ei- zan, Miidera, or Kofukuji,
whose priests profited by the Imperial largesses on
such occasions. Great was the indignation of the bonzes of these temples when
they learned that the new ex-Emperor had signified his intention of proceeding
to worship the gods of Itsukushima or Miyajima, the lovely island in the Inland
Sea some few miles distant from the city of Hiroshima. This unusual step was
also prompted by the wish to conciliate Kiyomori, for the gods of Itsukushima
were his tutelary divinities. As a young man of 28, Kiyomori had acted as
Governor of Aki, in which province Miyajima lies; and during the third of a century
that had elapsed since then (1146), he had continued to shower favours upon the
shrine of the deities to whose gracious influence he mainly attributed his
extraordinary good fortune. Ilis visits to the island were frequent; to
facilitate his goings and comings he had caused much money and labour to be
expended upon increasing the conveniences of the sea route between the Fukuwara
and Hiroshima, the excavation of the Ondo channel being an important feature in
the work. The honour of the visit of a new abdicated Emperor to the abode where
his tutelary deities were enshrined,—an abode on which he had lavished so much
of his great resources,—delighted Kiyomori beyond measure. But just then, in
the midst of all the joyous bustle of preparations for the journey, the priests
of the three great monasteries, with their mercenaries in arms, and all the
usual sacerdotal paraphernalia of a ‘‘clamorous appeal,”—their divine trees,
their sacred cars, and what not,—poured into Kyoto determined to keep the
ex-Emperor in their midst. Kiyomori sent emissaries to “reason with them.”
After much parleying he finally did succeed in having his way; and he and his
son Munemori with a great train of armed followers escorted the young exSovereign to Miyajima and back again.
But this deviation from the traditional use and wont
of confining the solemn progress of a newly abdicated Sovereign to shrines
under the control of the three Great Monasteries of Hi-ei-zan, Miidera, and the Kofukuji of Nara, and the admission
of the upstart interloping family gods of the Taira to a share in the function
and its substantial emoluments, had given dire offence to what when united was
one of the three greatest military powers in Japan. At this time, of these the
Tairas seemed to be easily the greatest; but as a matter of fact the Fujiyara of Mutsu in the extreme North could have very well
held their own against Kiyomori and all his following in any armed strife,
provided the Fujiwara of Mutsu acted on the defensive,—or rather on the
defensive-offensive. Next in order came the Great Monasteries,—Hi-ei-zan, or the Kofukuji of Nara,
the strongest among them,—but Miidera near Otsu not so very much the inferior
of the two older fanes in wealth and military prestige. The weakness of these
great priestly powers was that so far from acting in unison they were generally
deadly rivals frequently at open war with each other. But for once this
unwonted Imperial progress had united them by a common grievance; and all alike
now cherished a grudge against Kiyomori and the Tairas, by whom indeed some of
them had been not over-gently handled in 1177, and on other occasions.
And just at this very time a great plot for the
overthrow of the Tairas was being woven under their very eyes,—as if in mockery
of Kiyomori’s omnipresent and omniscient secret service. We have already seen
Minamoto Yorimasa acting with Kiyomori in 1156, and deserting to the Taira side
on the Held of battle in 1160. Yorimasa enjoyed a large measure of Kiyomori’s
favour and confidence; in short it was to Kiyomori’s influence that Yorimasa
owed his promotion to the third degree of Court rank early in 1179. At that
date he had entered the priesthood. But in spite of his intimate relations with
the Tairas and the favours he had received from Kiyomori, Yorimasa had for
years been secretly brooding over the fallen fortunes of the Minamotos, and had
long made up his mind to deal their hated rivals and oppressors a deadly blow
before he died. He was now 75 years of age; the discontent of file armed monks
furnished him with an opportunity he had long been eagerly looking for.
However, nothing was said to them at first; it was to Mochihito, Shirakawa II’s
fourth son and Takakura Tenno’s elder half-brother, that Yorimasa opened his
mind. Mochihito’s mother was of humble birth, and so
although now thirty years of age he had never been made a Prince of the Blood—he
was merely a Prince. Diviners, fortune-tellers, exorcists, and all that brood
were in great credit in those days; and a certain Shonagon who enjoyed an extraordinary reputation as a physiognomist had told Yorimasa
that Prince Mochihito had the face of one who would surely be Emperor some day.
Yorimasa now came to an understanding with the Prince. The former would summon
all the Minamoto to rise and exterminate the Taira, and Mochihito would then be
placed on the throne.
Early in May 1180, Yorimasa made his son Nakatsuna
draw up and send out a summons to all the Minamotos in the Tokaido, Tosando,
and Hokurikudo to rise and chastise the Tairas. The three Great Monasteries
were now appealed to, and they all readily promised their co-operation. But
within a month Kiyomori got to know something of the plot; on his way to the
East with the summons, Minamoto Yukiiye had stopped
at the shrines of Kumano in Kishu, where some of the priests were in the Taira
secret service. One of these spies hurried off to the Fukuwara with the
intelligence that there was an intrigue afoot in the capital, in which Prince
Mochihito was involved. Kiyomori was promptly on the road to Kyoto at the head
of several thousand men. His first step, on arriving there, was to convey the
person of the ex-Emperor Shirakawa II from his Toba prison into the city, where
he was strongly guarded. Prince Mochihito was stripped of his name and rank,
made a Minamoto, and sentenced to distant banishment. One of the officers sent
to effect his arrest was Yorimasa’s son Kanetsuna;
and he was careful to give the Prince time enough to make his escape. His
attendants made a stout defence; and when they were seized and “forcibly
examined ” they disclosed absolutely nothing. Presently the Tairas learned that
the Prince had taken refuge in the monastery of Miidera; and troops were sent
to bring him into the capital. But they were beaten off by the monks, who stood
to their arms and refused to allow the Prince to be taken away. Kiyomori then
determined to storm the temple.
How much, or rather how little, lie really knew of the
plot thus far, may be judged from the fact that it was no other then the
arch-conspirator, the real ringleader in the whole affair, his trusted friend
and protégé, Minamoto Yorimasa, that he now appointed to the supreme command of
the attacking force! Of the real true actual situation of affairs Kiyomori had
no inkling, until suddenly, on June 16, Yorimasa, his two sons, and fifty
retainers threw themselves into Miidera. Even then, for three or four days
more, Kiyomori failed to grasp the position. The only thing he did was to
conciliate the Hi-ei-zan monks by bribes and promises; the result being that they detached themselves
from their league with Miidera and the Kofukuji of Nara. This step was taken
just about the time Yorimasa and his band threw themselves into Miidera; and
when Miidera presently sent up argent messengers requesting immediate
reinforcements from the great mountain monastery, Yorimasa was terribly
disconcerted by learning that the request had been curtly and peremptorily
denied. To hold Miidera against the Tairas backed by Hi-ei-zan was impossible,—so much was plain. At the council of
war held at this point, Yorimasa advocated a sudden inrush into the capital and
firing it—at that very time there was a strong wind blowing—and seizing the
persons of Kiyomori, Munemori, and the other Taira chiefs in the midst of the
resulting confusion. This daring counsel of the old man of 75 was received with
the silence of disapproval; and it was resolved to evacuate Miidera and hurry
southwards to effect a junction with the formidable forces of the Kofukuji of
Nara.
So, with Prince Mochihito in their midst, a band of
three hundred Miidera mercenaries, together with Yorimasa’s fifty odd retainers, set out for the South. At Uji, destined to become the
centre of the tea-growing industry of Japan, the Uji-gawa,
which connects Lake Biwa with the Inland Sea, was spanned by a bridge which was
of great strategic importance in those and indeed in subsequent days. In Uji
also, on the southern side of the stream,—that is on the Nara, and not on the
Kyoto side,—stood the Byo-do-in, a Fujiwara
chieftain’s country villa converted into a monastery in 1052. It had passed
into the hands of the Abbot of Miidera shortly afterwards, and it was now one
of the branch fanes of Miidera. Here Prince Mochihito and his train rested on
their way to Nara. Meanwhile Kiyomori in Kyoto had mobilised some 20,000 men
and issued an Imperial Decree appointing his sons Munemori and Shigehira commanders to smite the rebels. While Yorimasa
and his small band of 350 men had been rapidly traversing the distance between
Miidera and Uji, this force of 20,000 men had been advancing from the capital.
As things turned out, Yorimasa had been lucky enough
to get across the Uji River before the Taira van arrived. Arrived, not
appeared, I say advisedly, for the morning was one of impenetrable fog, where a
man’s body at three paces’ distance was nothing more than a mere blurred
outline which might have been mistaken for anything. Yorimasa, then 75 years of
age, be it remembered, had been vigilant in seeing to it that outpost duty for
his little band of priest mercenaries and household followers had been duly done,
and so was promptly apprised of the approach of the Taira host. He ordered the
planking of the greater portion of the bridge to be removed; and about 200
Taira horsemen galloped into space and were mostly killed by the fall.
Presently a youth of sixteen, a certain Ashikaga Tadatsuna,
succeeded in fording or swimming the stream at the head of three hundred of his
Kumano retainers, and arrived in front of the Byo-do-in.
Here there was a terrific encounter, and while it was in progress, the main
host of the Tairas began to find its way across. Yorimasa’s chief concern soon became to get the Prince out of danger. The latter was able
to slip off unperceived, Yorimasa acting as his escort. But they had not gone
far before the old warrior was struck by a stray arrow.
Dragging himself back into the Byo-do-in,
he stripped off his armour, and, seating himself upon his iron fan, he calmly
disembowelled himself,—the second authentic instance of hara-kiri I have so far
been able to find in the annals. His two sons also perished here, while his
followers fell almost to a man. Prince Mochihito never reached Nara; he was
likewise hit by a stray arrow and fell into the hands of his pursuers, who at
once cut off his head and sent it to Kyoto. Meanwhile an army of 30,000 temple
mercenaries had set out from Nara to join Yorimasa; on learning of the death of
the Prince they returned.
The strange thing is that so very little was done to
punish the monasteries for their part in the rising. When the matter was
debated in the Supreme Council, the Fujiwara courtiers insisted that Miidera
and Kofukuji should be left alone; and all that Kiyomori could do was to
suspend their Abbots, confiscate certain of their manors, and deprive them of
the control of some of their branch temples. And this was only a temporary triumph; in two months the clamour over this became so loud that Kiyomori had to give way and restore matters to
their former position. It is true that Miidera was actually sacked and burned
by Kiyomori's son Tomomori, while Tomomori's brother, Shigehira, at the same time fired the
Kofukuji and Todaiji of Nara and executed 200 of the
monks there. But this did not take place until December 1180, a full six months
after the affair of Uji Bridge and the death of Yorimasa. In the meantime, Yoritomo
had risen in the Kwanto and was making such headway
there that Minamoto partisans in other parts of the Empire were emboldened to
appear openly in arms. In Omi, they had attacked the Taira, and Miidera had
given them support. It was this fresh offence that brought its fate upon the
great monastery by Biwa strand.
The Tairas were not long in finding that this burning
of the great fanes had been a cardinal mistake. So keenly was it resented by
the courtiers that they refused to appear at Court, where the most important
functions and festivals were attended by none except some Taira officials. Next
year there was a great famine, and this was followed by a terrible pestilence,
and these and other calamities were attributed to the offended deities whose
wrath should properly have fallen upon the Tairas alone.
Kiyomori's dread of the Great Monasteries constrained
him to the bold step of shifting the capital from Kyoto to the Fukuwara, where
during the previous year or two immense labour had
been expended upon improving the anchorage. The Emperor, his mother, the
ex-Emperor Takakura, his father, the Cloistered Emperor Shirakawa II, — who, by
the way, was kept a close prisoner, the whole Court, in fact, and all its
officials, except the Fujiwara Minister of the Right, who was bitterly opposed
to Kiyomori, were brought down to what is now Kobe, and housed in the Taira
villas there. Presently the recalcitrant Minister of the Right had also to join
the Court in the Fukuwara. But the whole proceeding had occasioned great and
almost universal discontent, so profound that Kiyomori was fain to abandon the
project after a six months' trial. In December 1180, the Court returned to
Kyoto, Kiyomori meanwhile taking the misguided precaution of burning the nests
of the turbulent monks he so greatly dreaded.
The temporary removal of the Court, while entailing
much needless expense upon the courtiers, had plunged Kyoto into economic
misery. The capital in these years was a sadly afflicted city. In 1177 a fire
broke out while a typhoon was blowing, and the Palate and one-third of the
citizens’ houses went up in flame and smoke, several thousand of the
population perishing in the conflagration. Two months before the removal of
the Court in 1180 a tornado had laid low every house, great and small, in three
or four of the wards. But worse was still in store. “In 1180-2,” writes Chomei
in his Hojoki, or Records of his Hermit’s Cell,
“there was a very wretched state of things caused by famine. Misfortunes
succeeded each other. Either there was drought in spring and summer, or there
were storms and flood in autumn and winter, so that no grain came to maturity.
The spring ploughing was in vain, and the labour of planting out the rice in
summer came to naught. There was no bustle of reaping in autumn, or of
ingathering in winter. In all provinces people left their lands and sought
other parts, or, forgetting their homes, went to live among the hills. All
kinds of prayers were begun, and even religious practices which were unusual in
ordinary times revived, but to no purpose whatever. The capital, dependent as
it is on the country for everything, could not remain unconcerned when nothing
was produced. The inhabitants in their distress offered to sacrifice their
valuables of all kinds, but nobody cared to look at them. Even if buyers came
forward, they made little account of gold, and much of grain. Beggars swarmed
by the roadside, and our ears were filled with the sound of their lamentations.
Amid such misery we with difficulty reached the close of the first year. With
the New’ Year, men’s hopes revived. But that nothing might be left to complete
our misfortunes, a pestilence broke out and continued without ceasing.
Everybody was dying of hunger, and as time went on, our state became as
desperate as that of the fish in the small pool of the story. At last even
respectable-looking people wearing hats, and not unshod, might be seen begging
importunately from door to door. Sometimes while you wondered how such utterly
wretched creatures could walk at all, they fell down before your eyes. By
garden walls or on the roadsides countless persons died of famine, and as their
bodies were not removed, the air was filled with evil odours. As the corpses
changed, there were many sights which the eye could not endure to see. It was
worse on the river banks, where there was not even room for horses and vehicles
to pass. Porters and woodcutters too became so feeble that firewood got scarcer
and scarcer, and people who had no means pulled down their houses, and sold the
timber in the market. It was said that a load for one man was not enough to
furnish him with food for a single day. It was strange to see among this
firewood pieces adorned in places with vermilion or silver, or gold leaf. On
inquiry, it appeared that people in their extremity went to old temples, stole
the images of Buddha, and broke up the objects used in worship, of which these
were the fragments. Such mournful spectacles it was my lot to witness, born
into a polluted and wicked world. As a matter of course, parents died before
their children. Again, infants might be seen clinging to the breast of their
mother, not knowing that she was already dead ... The numbers of those who died
in central Kyoto during the fourth and fifth months alone were 42,300. To this
must be added many who died before and after; while if we reckon those who
perished in the outlying quarters, the number has no limit. And then the
provinces!”
During the thirty-three weeks of the Great Plague of
1665 there were 68,800 deaths in the whole of London. Here in two months we
have as many as 42,300 in one section of Kyoto! Throughout the Empire at large
the mortality must have been immense and the misery profound. And during all
this time the country was in the throes of one of the greatest civil wars by
which it has ever been racked. The ravages of this all-devouring pest and the
famine by which it had been preceded and accompanied evidently go a long way to
account for the strange lull in the military operations of 1182, and of the
preceding and following month?. Plague and famine together were especially
severe in the Home Provinces and the West, the seats of the Taira power, and
made the mustering and maintenance of any overpowering force afoot almost an
impossibility. The East meanwhile appears to have escaped comparatively
unscathed, and here Yoritomo was busy establishing his position, consolidating
his power, and organising for a supreme effort.
What it is important not to overlook is that by the
priests and the people at large it was the Tairas who were regarded as
responsible for the terrible calamities with which the centre of the country
was then being so mercilessly scourged. This circumstance, coupled with the
difficulty of reasoning with the belly when empty, must have sent many recruits
to the Minamoto standard in the Kwanto, Echigo, and elsewhere.
In the meantime the Tairas had been seriously weakened
by the loss of their masterful chieftain, the terrible old Kiyomori. In March
1181 he had fallen seriously ill, and on the 20th of that month the end was
seen to be at hand. All his family and the chief retainers of the house were
assembled round the couch of the dying man, and respectfully inquired what he
would say. Sighing deeply, he replied, “He that is born must necessarily die
and not I alone. Since the period of Heiji (1159) I
have served the Imperial House. I have ruled under Heaven (i.e. the
Empire) absolutely. I have attained the highest rank possible to a subject. I
am the grandfather of the Emperor on his mother’s side Is there still a regret?
My regret is only that I am dying, and have not yet seen the head of Yoritomo
of the Minamoto. After my death, make no offerings to Buddha on my behalf; do
not read the sacred books for me. Only cut off the head of Yoritomo of the
Minamoto and hang it on my tomb. Let all my sons and grandsons, retainers and
followers, each and every one follow out my command, and on no account neglect
to do so.” With such words on his lips Taira Kiyomori passed away.
“ Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and
some have greatness thrust upon ’em.” Such measure of
greatness as may be conceded to Kiyomori would seem to be derived from each of
these sources in fairly even proportions. The merit of Tadamori and his
position of trusted henchman to the two ex-Sovereigns, Shirakawa I and Toba I,
had enabled him to lay a tolerably stable foundation for the fortunes of the
Ise Hieshi; and when he died, in 1153, Kiyomori
succeeded him as the Fidus Achates of Toba. Then came the great disturbances
of 1156 and 1160; and both of these, especially the latter, turned out to be
pieces of supreme good luck for Kiyomori. Both took him by surprise; the second
found him utterly unprepared and in an apparently hopeless position of
disadvantage. Indeed, but for the resolution of the youthful Shigemori, and the
halting counsels of the conspirators, Kiyomori would in all probability have
been ruined. As it was, the net result of the two great emeutes was the removal
of Kiyomori’s powerful rival, his uncle Tadamasa, and the virtual extirpation
of the Minamotos, the only counterpoise to the military might of the Tairas.
Henceforth for a score of years the argument of the sword was in their hands
alone; and this argument the Court and courtiers ha$ time and again to recognise
as unanswerable. With this argument in reserve, Kiyomori felt he could safely
retort upon the haughty Fujiwaras their own traditional device, and ultimately
oust them from the exercise of it. The marriage of two of Kiyomori’s daughters
to successive Fujiwara chieftains, still mere boys, and the astute counsels of
that Achitophel, Fujiwara Kunitsuna, enabled Kiyomori to shackle the great
civilian clan, and bend it more or less compliantly io his purposes. Then the
ex-Emperor Shirakawa’s fondness for his son by Kiyomori’s sisterin-law,
and his wish to place him on the throne, was another rare stroke of good
fortune for the Taira chief, whose armed support for the success of this
project was absolutely indispensable. For his services on this occasion
Kiyomori had many rewards; but perhaps the greatest of them all was the
marriage of yet another of his daughters with the boy Sovereign. When this
daughter became the mother of the Crown Prince, the fortunes of the house of
Taira seemed to be assured. Their only military rivals had, as they believed,
been virtually annihilated, and their civilian rivals, the Fujiwaras,
supplanted and reduced to impotence.
Against all this, however, at the death of Kiyomori,
in March 1181, had to be set the following not inconsiderable items. In the
first place the bitter hatred of the Cloistered Emperor, Shirakawa II; the
intense detestation of the Fujiwaras, with perhaps the exception of Kiyomori’s
tool and son-in-law the Kwampaku Motomichi, then about 20 years of age; the
deadly enmity of the Buddhist sects whose great fanes had been given to the
flames; the dislike of the citizens of Kyoto who had suffered severely by the
temporary removal of the capital; and the resentment of the superstitious among
all classes for inviting the wrath of the gods, and so afflicting the Empire
with miseries such as it had not known since the introduction of Buddhism in
the time of the Sogas. All these elements of discontent and danger were indeed
separate and distinct, and individually were perhaps each in themselves not so
very formidable after all. But once bring them to a common focus! Just at this
time, after the eclipse of a long night of twenty years, the sun of the
Minamoto had again risen resplendently in the East. With that for a focussing
point for all these elements of disquiet in the seats of the Taira supremacy,
there was serious danger ahead indeed. At the same time, the infant Emperor (Antoku Tenno) was a Taira, entirely in the hands of his
armed kinsmen, who held the capital, and controlled all it
contained,—Cloistered Emperor, Fujiwara courtiers, suffering citizens, and
vengeful hearted shaven-pated monks alike. Besides, more than thirty provinces
were governed by Taira prefects; while the private estates and military
resources of the clan, especially in the West and South-West, were immense.
Under bold and able leadership the situation of the Tairas might well be
regarded as the reverse of desperate, in spite of all the gathering, massing
elements of unrest and menace by which they were now threatened. But for this
bold and able leadership the Taira were very soon destined to find that they
were utterly and sadly to seek, for Munemori, their new chief, was at once
commonplace and poltroon. And. meanwhile, sedulously gathering into his
pitiless grasp of iron every item that might be bent to the supreme purpose of
crushing the overblown power and pride of the brood who had massacred his
father and kinsmen, and of making himself the real master in Japan, Minamoto
Yoritomo was building his great city of Kamakura and thinking out the future.
In the following chapter, we shall endeavour to trace
the course of events from a Minamoto and Eastern point of view.
CHAPTER XII.
THE FALL OF THE TAIRA.
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