

**THE RISE OF  
THE SPANISH EMPIRE  
IN THE  
OLD WORLD AND IN THE NEW  
PART ONE  
THE MIDDLE AGES  
&  
THE CATHOLIC KINGS**



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## PREFACE

THE history of Spain is one of the most attractive fields that lie open to the historical student. Its variety is infinite, and the possibilities of new and important discoveries are unexhausted. To most Americans the principal interest of the subject will inevitably center around Spain's activities as a great conquering and colonizing power; for the increased importance of the countries of Iberian origin has been perhaps the most remarkable political and economic fact in the recent development of the Western Hemisphere. Popular attention has been focused as never before on their language, government, and commerce during the past twenty years; and much progress has also been made in the line of historical investigation. The labors of writers and students, however, have thus far been directed chiefly to the more recent periods of the Revolutions and of national independence. The long centuries of colonial administration have been less thoroughly explored, and the history of Spain herself, which forms the background for the entire picture, has not hitherto been considered from the standpoint of the great Empire which sprang from her.

The following pages are an attempt to supply this deficiency. It is my purpose to carry the story, in four volumes, down to the death of Philip II, under whose rule the Spanish Empire attained its greatest territorial extent, through the annexation of Portugal and of her dominions. The long period of 'decline and fall' I am content to leave to others, the more so because the tendency to regard Spain and the Spanish administration as synonymous with inefficiency and decadence is so common that it is a pleasure to emphasize the other side. The reader must not be surprised to find that practically the whole of the first volume is devoted to the mediaeval period. If he is willing to accept the first and most fundamental of my theories in regard to the development of the Spanish Empire, he will readily agree that a knowledge of the early stages of its development is indispensable to any real comprehension of what follows.

The original plan of the chief divisions and the principal chapters of the book was drawn up nine years ago, in general accordance with the scheme of a course of lectures at Harvard University which I had been giving intermittently since 1903. Although there have been some changes of detail, the main features of that plan have never been altered. The first two volumes, published herewith, are almost exclusively based on printed sources and standard secondary works. Manuscript material has been utilized in Chapters IV, V, XV, and XVI; but most of the unpublished documents that I have collected deal with the period of Charles V and Philip II, and therefore concern only my last two volumes. It would have been by no means difficult to find more manuscripts in the archives on the mediaeval period and on the reign of the Catholic Kings, but the field to be covered was so vast and so little known outside of Spain, that I felt that I could employ my time to better advantage in a thorough exploration of the material already in print. The fact that an unusually large number of documents, edited by Spanish scholars, have remained almost unutilized by historians, confirmed this decision.

My thanks are due to the editor of the *American Historical Review* for permission to reprint several paragraphs of an article on "The Cortes of the Spanish Kingdoms in the later Middle Ages" which I published in the issue of April, 1911 (Vol. XVI, No. 3).

The list of friends and scholars both here and in Europe who have aided me in my work is very long; for the ramifications of my subject have been so divergent that I have been obliged to depend, to an unusual degree, on the knowledge and counsel of others. The names of Professor Edward Channing of Harvard and of Professor Henry Morse Stephens of the University of California come at the head of the list; for without their advice and encouragement I should hardly have ventured even to undertake the task. Their methods of exhortation have been characteristically different; but they have always pointed in the same general direction, and the

measure of my gratitude to them both is difficult to express. I have had the great privilege of discussing some hard problems with Professor Rafael Altamira of the Universidad Central at Madrid, and with Professor Alfred Morel-Fatio of the College de France; and the help which they have freely given me, both in letters, and by word of mouth, has shown the way to the solution of many difficulties. My Harvard colleagues have been unfailingly generous in placing at my disposal the results of their learning and experience, and I would gratefully acknowledge my deep obligations to them ; particularly to Professor C. H. Haskins for invaluable assistance on the chapters on mediaeval constitutional history; to Professor A. C. Coolidge for helpful suggestions in regard to North African affairs and matters of foreign policy; to Professor J. D. M. Ford for answering perpetual questions in regard to Spanish literature, language and accentuation, and to Professor J. R. Jewett for guidance in the spelling of Moorish names; to Mr. G. P. Winship for his criticisms of the chapter on the Indies; and to Professor C. N. Greenough for advice in regard to style. Mr. G. W. Robinson of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences has not only made the index and helped me to prepare the manuscript for the press; he has saved me from numerous errors of fact and faults of expression, and he has offered a number of positive suggestions of the highest value, particularly concerning the field covered by the Introduction and the earlier chapters of Volume I. Finally I cannot forbear to pay tribute to the constant and devoted assistance of my wife; she has gone over my work again and again at the various stages of its progress, and has never failed to improve it.

When one's knowledge of a subject is largely derived from the teaching of it, one must not forget to render thanks to one's pupils. Certainly my indebtedness to four friends who have studied Spanish history with me at Harvard in the course of the past twelve years is fully as great as any services that I may have rendered them. The researches of Professor C. H. Haring of Yale have furnished a large part of the material for my account of the early administration of the Indies; and those of Dr. Julius Klein of Harvard form the basis for my paragraphs on Castilian economic history, and more especially on the Castilian Mesta. The investigations of Professor J. G. McDonald of the University of Indiana have been of material assistance to me in studying the office of the *corregidor*; and Dr. C. E. McGuire of the International High Commission at Washington has indicated the solution of several puzzling problems, by giving me the benefit of his wide knowledge of mediaeval ecclesiastical history and institutions. All these gentlemen, moreover, have helped me with suggestions concerning passages not directly connected with their special fields. Their criticisms, always unrestricted, and often severe, have afforded me the highest satisfaction that a teacher can enjoy, namely the knowledge that his pupils have gone beyond him.

Eighty-one years have now elapsed since William Hickling Prescott published the first edition of his "History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella." Much new material has been discovered since that day, and the fashions of historical writing have greatly changed; but Prescott's work still remains the standard authority on the reign of the Catholic Kings. For fifteen years I have had the rare privilege of using his books and manuscripts in the Harvard College Library; I have scrutinized the passages he underscored and read his penciled notes in the margins. I have thus had the opportunity to follow, step by step, the process of the composition of his masterpiece, and can testify to the profound learning, deep insight, and above all to the unfailing honesty with which his work was done. Such errors as he made were due to lack of material, and to a really noble inability to comprehend a policy of treachery or deceit. My debt of gratitude to him is the deepest of all; and his granddaughter has kindly permitted me to give expression to it, by dedicating these volumes to his memory.

R. B. M.

CAMBRIDGE, March 10, 1918.

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
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# VOLUME I

## THE MIDDLE AGES



## INTRODUCTION

THE Spanish Empire of Ferdinand and Isabella and their successors has its origins in the earliest periods of antiquity. Far more than the British Empire, to which it has often been compared, it is linked with the history and traditions of the past. England's insular position, which ultimately forced her into a maritime career, is of course the fundamental explanation of her modern imperial domain; but this insular position did not actually bear fruit in voyages of distant exploration and conquest until after she had practically relinquished her mediaeval ambitions to win land on the European continent from France. The Tudor period, which witnessed the beginning of the one and the abandonment of the other, forms a sharp dividing line in English history; and it is possible to make an intelligent study of the British Empire without going back of the sixteenth century. But the story of the empire of Spain is at once more complicated and more continuous. The geographical position of the Iberian Peninsula tempted its inhabitants to expand both by land and sea. From the very dawn of history its fate has been closely associated with that of North Africa, southern France, and the islands of the western Mediterranean. At times it has formed a portion of empires which controlled all these territories, either wholly or in part; and at times its own rulers have, in turn, dominated large portions of them. The European lands outside the limits of the peninsula which acknowledged the rule of Spanish sovereigns in the year of the discovery of America were already extensive, and they were to be substantially increased during the first century of the conquest and exploration of the New World. At the greatest crises of her imperial career Spain has been confronted by a bewildering array of irreconcilable opportunities. In her refusal to choose between them, in her heroic but misguided attempts to utilize them all, lies the explanation of some of her most disastrous defeats. The present chapter will endeavor to trace some of the earlier geographical and historical antecedents of this intricate imperial development.

Whoever glances at the map of the Iberian Peninsula with a view to investigating the history and civilization of the different peoples who have occupied it will first be impressed by the apparent definiteness of its external limits. On three sides and more than one half of the fourth it is bounded by the waters of the Mediterranean and of the Atlantic. Across the greater part of the remaining portion of its perimeter is built the mountain barrier of the Pyrenees, whose loftiest summits reach a height of over ten thousand feet. For the casual observer Iberia seems to be almost as completely shut off from contact with the outside world as if it were an outlying island.

More careful scrutiny, however, reveals a number of facts which considerably modify this original impression. First let us glance to the southward. One of the most important things for every student of Spanish history to bear in mind is the narrowness of the Straits of Gibraltar, the ease with which they may be crossed, and the essential similarity of the coasts of Spanish Andalusia and Morocco. The well known phrase "Africa begins with the Pyrenees" should always be interpreted to mean rather that Spain and North Africa are one, than that Spain and France are divided. The fact that Spain and Morocco are today regarded as belonging to two different 'continents' has blinded many people to the intimate connection that exists between them. In times comparatively recent, geologically speaking, they were probably joined. The flora and fauna of Spain resemble those of Africa rather than those of France. The hilly coasts of both sides of the Straits are very much like one another; a glance over the intervening waves suggests, rather than discourages, the idea of crossing. The Pillars of Hercules were indeed the western barrier of the ancient world, but the water that flows between them has never offered serious hindrance to peoples who have been desirous of travelling north and south.

From the very earliest times we encounter many evidences of this. Controversy still rages so hotly over the primitive inhabitants of Spain that it would be the height of folly for a layman to



step in where specialists fear to tread; but from all the welter and confusion of polemic a few fundamental facts emerge unscathed. The ancient inhabitants of Spain and North Africa are unquestionably branches of the same Mediterranean race, far more closely allied to one another than were the Iberians with the primitive inhabitants of the greater part of France. On both sides of the Strait we find the same generally dolichocephalic type—predominantly brunette, but with an appreciable element of blondness, which gradually diminishes on the African side as one moves east. Some of the Riff Berbers today can only be distinguished from Europeans by their slightly curlier hair, which is doubtless to be ascribed to intermixture with the negro tribes south of the Sahara. Many recent scholars incline to favor the theory that the Berbers were not indigenous, but migrated to their present territory from Europe (probably about 1500 B.C.); or, at least, that the indigenous Libyans were powerfully affected by such a European immigration. Others maintain, on the contrary, that the current flowed chiefly in the opposite direction, and that the Iberians, who are generally regarded as the primitive inhabitants of Spain, originated in North Africa and crossed over thence into Europe. For our purposes it is immaterial whether the trend was north to south, or south to north; but it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the fact that Abyla and Calpe were in constant and intimate relations with one another throughout this early period.


The primitive inhabitants of Spain were also closely in touch with those of the eastern Mediterranean lands at a very early date, and these relations led, indirectly, to the first incorporation of the Iberian Peninsula in an empire whose seat was in North Africa. It is not necessary to take seriously the opening sentence of Stevens's translation of Mariana's famous history, to the effect that "Tubal, the son of Japheth, was the first man that peopled Spain after the Flood"; yet its incessant repetition for several centuries past has unquestionably invested it with a very real importance. The Tarshish of the Old Testament is generally understood to signify Spain; though the "navy of Tarshish" which brought to King Solomon "gold and silver, ivory and apes and peacocks" was a general term used to designate any large vessels built for distant voyages, rather than those specifically limited to Spanish ports. The date of the Biblical reference to Tarshish is usually given as approximately 990 B.C.; but it was probably more than a century earlier than that when the Phoenicians first visited Spain, set up trading posts, and pushed through to the shores of the Atlantic, and certainly less than three centuries later that the Greeks made their first appearance there. Archaeological discoveries, and the persistence in Spain of certain eastern mythological legends, have done something to illuminate the history of this obscure period, and it is abundantly clear that the new visitors were intent rather on commerce and the search for metals than on colonization or conquest; certainly, they made no effort to subjugate the original inhabitants, or to penetrate into the interior.

For us the main importance of the occupation by the Phoenicians lies in the fact that their presence in Spain ultimately paved the way for a new union of Iberia and North Africa. In 585 B.C. Tyre, the centre of the Phoenician empire in the east, was overpowered by Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, after a siege of thirteen years, and the heiress of Tyre was Carthage in North Africa, originally a Phoenician colony, but now fast rising towards the zenith of her fame and destined to control the entire western Mediterranean. The Carthaginians had already established a small colony in the island of Iviza in the year 654; less than a century later they had ousted the Greeks from the western portion of the island of Sicily; about the same time, they occupied Sardinia, Majorca, and Minorca, and seized Malta and Gozzo. To complete their great political and economic system, to make the western Mediterranean a Carthaginian lake, the control of Spain alone was lacking. Here they would have to deal with their kinsmen, the Phoenicians, as well as with Greeks and natives, but that did not deter them. Indeed, the historian Justin tells us that it was an appeal by the Phoenician colonists of Cadiz, for aid in repelling an assault by the primitive inhabitants, that gave the new conquerors the needed excuse for interference. At any

rate, the Carthaginians entered the peninsula, attacked and defeated both the natives and the Phoenicians there, and finally established themselves as lords of Cadiz, the key to southern Spain and to the commerce of the far West. They subsequently extended their sway over most of the neighboring settlements, and they also engaged in sundry rather unsuccessful conflicts with the Phocæan Greeks, whose headquarters were at Marseilles, and whose chief settlement in Spain was at Ampurias, north of the Ebro. Like the Phoenicians before them, they were apparently unable to advance into the interior of the peninsula, at least down to the time of Hamilcar Barca; but they controlled the entire coast from Cadiz to Mastia (the modern Cartagena), and also the opposite shore of North Africa. The position they had won for themselves gave them unchallenged predominance in the western basin of the Mediterranean. And it is interesting to note several curious parallels between the way in which the Carthaginians regarded and treated Spain, and that in which Spain subsequently regarded and treated her American colonies. In both cases the metropolis looked upon the colony primarily as a place from which to derive revenue: Carthage expected Spain to furnish funds for the prosecution of her wars, just as Spain, two thousand years later, strove to utilize the Indies for a similar purpose. Both powers also made strenuous efforts to maintain rigidly monopolistic control of the territories they had won, and to exclude all outsiders from participation in their profits. Eratosthenes tells us that the Carthaginians made it a practice to “drown any strangers who sail past on their voyage to Sardinia or to the Pillars; hence much of what is related of the parts towards the west is discredited”.

The transference of Spain from Carthaginian to Roman domination was simply part of a larger movement which embraced the entire western Mediterranean world, both north and south of the Straits of Gibraltar. There was a change of masters, indeed, and the capital to which men owed allegiance was shifted to southern Italy; but Spain, North Africa, and the other neighboring lands all ultimately shared the same fate; the combination was virtually unbroken. The ensuing period of the Roman occupation of the peninsula lasted roughly six centuries, of which the first two were marked by a series of desperate conflicts, and the last four by comparatively uninterrupted peace. It was a far more serious occupation than that of the Phoenicians or Carthaginians. The newcomers were not satisfied with mere commercial control. They were determined to make themselves the real masters of the land, and thoroughly to Romanize its inhabitants. They left their stamp on the peninsula in a way that none of its previous or subsequent invaders were able to do. Not until the reign of Augustus was the process really complete, but in the course of the long struggle the native Spaniard and the invading Roman learned to respect one another; the terrible war was succeeded by a lasting reconciliation, and the victors and the vanquished fraternized and intermarried. The Romanized native type that emerged furnished the empire with some of her most distinguished men; it gave her Trajan, Hadrian, and Theodosius, and almost all the great names of Roman literature from Ovid to Martial. It subsequently imposed a large share of its civilization and culture on its Visigothic barbarian conquerors. Under Roman domination, then, the native Spaniard cannot be regarded, as under the Carthaginians, in the light of a mere passive spectator of the development of the empire of which he formed a part. He was conquered, indeed, but respected and finally taken up into the life of the great system to which he had given his allegiance. He bore his share in guiding and controlling it. He was given the elements of an imperial education.





The development of the provincial divisions of Roman Spain presents certain interesting features. At first, Spain was treated as an entity by itself; its political boundaries were drawn to coincide with its natural ones; it was separated from North Africa and from Sardinia and Sicily. From 197 B.C. to 27 B.C., except for a short period before 167, it was divided into two provinces: Citerior and Ulterior, the boundary between them being the Douro from its mouth to the modern city of Toro, and an irregular line drawn thence in a southerly and southeasterly direction, through Villanueva de la Serena and Jaen, to the mouth of the Almanzora in the Mediterranean. In 27 B.C. Hispania Ulterior was divided into two parts: Baetica to the south, with the capital Corduba (Cordova), ‘the patrician colony’, and Lusitania to the west, with Augusta Emerita (Merida) as its capital. Hispania Citerior, or Tarraconensis, as it was sometimes called from its capital Tarraco (Tarragona), was partitioned also, but not until much later; in 216 or 217 A.D., the northwest portion of the peninsula was marked off from it as a fourth province, called Asturias and Gallaecia, or Hispania Nova Citerior. Meantime, from at least as early as the second half of the second century, the rich lands of Baetica, on the south, had been constantly raided by pirates from Mauretania Tingitana, the westernmost of the two new provinces on the opposite North African shore, which the Romans had somewhat neglected since it had fallen into their hands. No convenient land route connected Mauretania Tingitana with its eastern neighbor, Mauretania Caesariensis. The journey was a voyage of over two hundred miles along the desolate and insubordinate coast of the Riff, while Baetica was not only nearer, but also much more important to keep in touch with, on account of the hostile incursions that surged to and fro across the Strait. Of all these facts the Emperor Diocletian took full account when he reorganized the empire in 293, and erected Hispania into a diocese of the prefecture of Gaul.

To the four provinces already existing, three more were added. One, Carthaginiensis, was carved out of the southeast of Tarraconensis, as Gallaecia had previously been carved out of the northwest. A second, established between 369 and 386, comprised the Balearic Islands. The last

was the African province of Tingitana, whose union with the diocese across the Strait was, in Mommsen's words, "only the outward carrying out of what in reality had long subsisted. It was for Baetica what Germany was for Gaul; and, far from lucrative as it must have been, it was perhaps instituted and retained for the reason that its abandonment would even then have brought about an invasion of Spain similar to that which Islam accomplished after the collapse of the Roman rule". Such was the organization of Spain in the last century before the barbarian invasions. It bore striking witness to the closeness of its natural association with North Africa and the adjacent islands of the Mediterranean; and the memory of it endured, so that its influence can be plainly traced at many subsequent stages of the development of the Spanish Empire.

During the fifth, sixth, and seventh centuries Spain, like the rest of Western Europe, was inundated by barbarian hordes. First the Suevi, Alans, and Vandals poured over the peninsula; then came the Visigoths, whose rule attained some measure of permanence, but was at best little more than that of a dominant minority, which gradually lost its power and ended by adopting the religion, the language, and a great measure, of the law of the Romanized natives already on the ground. In such turbulent times it was inevitable that many of the political bonds which had previously united the peninsula with the rest of the Mediterranean world should be snapped; but the tie with North Africa was strong enough at least partially to survive the shock. Certainly, the Visigoths had their eye on Morocco from the moment of their first occupation of Spain. King Wallia (415-419) attempted to supply the agricultural deficiencies of the Peninsula by an expedition to North Africa in search of corn; King Theudis (531-548) made a strenuous though not permanently successful effort to cross the Strait and capture Ceuta, in which he recognized, like the Romans before him, an indispensable bulwark for southern Spain. In this enterprise he encountered the East Romans, who had already conquered the Vandals in North Africa (533-539), overrun southern Italy and the islands of the western Mediterranean, and were now, like others who had possessed the adjacent lands before them, beginning to cast longing eyes at the Iberian Peninsula. An internal war among the Visigoths, in which one of the parties called on their Byzantine neighbors for aid, furnished the needed pretext, and the Emperor Justinian seized upon it at once. In 554 Liberius, governor of Africa, was ordered to cross the Straits with a large force. After uniting with the party that had invited him into Spain, he defeated the rival army, whose chief was soon after murdered. But the Visigothic faction who had summoned the East Romans to the peninsula soon discovered that their guests were by no means anxious to depart. The orthodox natives welcomed them; and although they were sometimes defeated in the open field by their Visigothic rivals, they clung closely to the walled towns, and soon commanded a strip of the southern coast of Spain extending from Cape St. Vincent to the mouth of the Jucar in the Mediterranean. Had it not been for internal trouble in Constantinople, and the invasion of Italy by the Lombards, it is probable that the entire Peninsula would have been conquered and the days of the Roman occupation renewed. As it was, the East Romans were not expelled from Spain until the reign of the Visigothic king Swintila (621-626); and it is not impossible that certain Spanish ports were subsequently reconquered by them from the Visigoths in the end of the seventh century.

The decisive event in mediaeval Spanish history is the great Moorish invasion of 711; it determined the lines of the development of the Peninsula during the next five centuries, and explains, more than anything else, the special features which differentiate Spain and Portugal from the other European states. The Arabs, who had become masters of Egypt before the middle of the seventh century, began, soon afterwards, to send out conquering expeditions into the regions farther west. In 670, Okba, the son of Nafi, founded the city of Kairawan south of Tunis, and carried the standard of the Prophet to the eastern confines of modern Algeria. In 682 he penetrated to the Atlantic and rode his horse into its waves; but this expedition was only a raid, and left no enduring traces. The native Berbers remained unsubdued and unconverted; indeed, in

the following year they slew Okba in battle, and even recaptured Kairawan. The next four decades were full of furious fighting. When the Arabs were victorious in the field, the Berbers had recourse to the weapons of famine and devastation. Under the leadership of the savage queen El Kahgna, 'the African Pythoness', they turned what was once a prosperous country into a howling wilderness. Not until the arrival in 705 of the famous Musa Ibn Nusair, with the title of Governor of Ifrikiya, were the invaders able definitely to extend their conquests to the shores of the Atlantic. Even after that date we cannot regard the Berbers as fully subjected to Oriental domination and civilization. In government they were still virtually independent, while in religion—if anything more important—they were no sooner converted than they became fanatics, distrustful of the more skeptical Arabs, and even hostile to them. An excellent foundation had been already laid for the various subsequent revolts which prevented the eastern caliphate from exercising any effective domination over northwestern Africa, and were ultimately to exert a decisive influence on the future of both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar.

The history of the events that led to the crossing of the Saracens into Spain will probably never be accurately known. That the Gothic empire was tottering to its fall and furnished a tempting quarry is certain; that the representations of oppressed Israelites hastened the inevitable is highly probable. The famous story of Count Julian and Florinda la Cava is scarcely more than a legend; some authors have gone so far as to deny the existence of Count Julian; and if there ever was such a person it seems more likely that he was an East Roman or a Romanized Berber than a Goth. But it is somewhat curious that historians should have been at such pains to search for the cause of an action which, to anyone who has been on the scene and has known its earlier history, must inevitably seem perfectly natural—so natural, indeed, as not to require any explanation at all. The barrier between Spain and Morocco, as we have already observed, is far more imaginary than real; one cannot possibly stand on either side of the Strait without feeling an impulse to cross it. Lastly, we must never forget that what is often somewhat misleadingly designated as the 'Arab invasion of Spain' was in reality to a far greater extent an incursion by North African Berbers such as the Iberian Peninsula had several times experienced before. The relative numbers of Arabs and Berbers under Tarik's command in 711 have been very variously estimated. Some authorities place them at 17 and 7000; but, in any case, it is clear that the latter were enormously preponderant, so that the conquering army may, in effect, be regarded as an essentially North African force.

The story of the subsequent development of the political and administrative relations of Moorish Spain to North Africa and the East further emphasizes this point. In theory, during the years immediately following the conquest, the so-called dependency of Andalusia (including the Iberian Peninsula, Gascony, Languedoc, and part of Savoy) was an integral part of the caliphate, and its governor was appointed from Damascus. Practically, however, during this period Spain was regarded as a subordinate dependency of Ifrikiya, and the viceroy of Kairawan usually nominated the governors of Andalusia, without sanction from the capital. Sometimes, when there was not time even to apply to Kairawan, the ruler of Spain was elected on the spot by the army. Such was the case when Yusuf, a descendant of the conqueror Okba, was chosen in 745-747, as a sequel to a series of bitter factional struggles; and this event is taken by some historians to mark the beginning of Spain's virtual independence of all connection with the East. Whatever the final verdict on this point may be, it is certain that the control of Spain by Damascus was definitely terminated a few years later, with the fall of the Omayyad caliphs in the East at the hands of their rivals, the Abbassides. One of the members of the deposed dynasty was fortunate enough to escape the vengeance of his triumphant foes; he was a son of the Caliph Hassan and bore the fortunate name Abd ar-Rahman. After a series of romantic adventures and hairbreadth escapes he found refuge at last among the hospitable Berbers of Morocco, crossed the Straits, and possessed himself of Spain, where he founded a dynasty that endured until the eleventh

century. A formal declaration of independence of the caliphate followed; prayers in the mosques were no longer offered for the Abbasside ruler in the East, but for the new Omayyad upstart in Spain; in 763 an attempt of the Abbassides to reassert their supremacy suffered disastrous defeat, and the heads of their generals, preserved in camphor and salt and wrapped in the black banner of the Abbassides, were sent scornfully back to the Caliph at Bagdad. Finally, in 929, when the Abbasside dynasty had reached the nadir of its fortunes, the greatest of the Spanish Omayyads, Abd ar-Rahman an-Nasir, dared openly to take to himself the title of Caliph; thus, incidentally asserting his Abbasside rival to be a pretender, and Cordova to be the centre of the Moslem world.

We revert to the relations of Spain and the Moorish powers in North Africa. As long as the Berber states continued to acknowledge their dependence on the Abbasside Caliph, they were naturally committed to an attitude of semi-hostility towards the Spanish Omayyads; and at first they made some small show of aiding the efforts of the Abbassides to reconquer the Iberian Peninsula. They soon found, however, that nothing was to be gained by fighting the battles of a distant overlord against their immediate neighbors; before long they reversed their policy, and, following the example of their coreligionists across the Straits, declared their independence of the caliphate of the East. First in Morocco, in the year 788, the founding of the Idrisite kingdom ended the rule of the Abbassides there and gained for western Mauretania complete autonomy. Twelve years later, in 800, the Abbasside Caliph, Harun al-Rashid, in return for an annual grant of forty thousand dinars, ceded to Ibrahim, the founder of the Aghlabid dynasty, hereditary possession of Ifriquia, which thenceforth also became an independent principality. But the Aghlabites retained possession of Ifriquia for little more than a hundred years. In 909 they were themselves dethroned by a new dynasty, the Fatimites, who shortly afterwards made a determined effort to oust the Idrisites from Morocco. In 920 they besieged Fez, forced the Idrisite ruler there to recognize their sovereignty, and would probably have ultimately annexed all his lands, had it not been for the interference of the Omayyad Caliph in Spain, Abd ar-Rahman an-Nasir, then at the summit of his power. From private information Abd ar-Rahman was convinced that the Fatimite conquerors entertained aggressive designs on Spain, and he fully realized that the possession of the southern shore of the Strait would afford an admirable vantage ground, as it had so often done before, for a descent on the Iberian Peninsula. It scarcely seemed worth while to bolster up the tottering buffer state of the Idrisites, after the proofs of incompetence which they had already given. Abd ar-Rahman had been helping them since 917, but they had proved far too feeble a barrier to arrest the Fatimite onslaught. The corollary was obvious. If Spain was to be safe, Abd ar-Rahman must possess himself of the strong places on the North African coast. In 926, accordingly, he sent over a large force to attack and take Melilla. Shortly afterwards he made common cause with an independent Berber tribe, which had shown more ability than the Idrisites in resisting the Fatimites and persuaded it to conquer for him the whole strip from Tenes to Oran. Five years later the Caliph himself intervened and seized Ceuta. His mind was cast in an imperial mould; and had it not been for internal revolts in Andalusia and the Christian advance in northern Castile, he would doubtless have devoted all his energies to this campaign and driven back his foes to the boundaries of Ifriquia. As it was, a long and desultory struggle was waged in Morocco between the Omayyad and Fatimite powers, in which the dwindling faction of the Idrisites espoused first one side and then the other, according to the ebbs and flows of victory and defeat. Finally, in 973, the Fatimites renounced all efforts to maintain themselves in Morocco and departed to the eastward. The Omayyads thereupon redoubled their efforts, defeated the last remnants of the Idrisites, repelled several invasions from Ifriquia, and gradually secured the submission of the independent Berber tribes. Thenceforth they were unquestionably the leading power in Morocco down to the dissolution of their empire in the eleventh century; though they probably never exercised effective political control there, in the modern sense of the term. The pressure of the Christians in northern Spain prevented the Omayyads from giving their exclusive attention to the African problem, and forced them, against their will, to follow the policy



of utilizing the more powerful of the Berber chieftains as the representatives of their own overlordship. Very often these Berber viceroys renounced their allegiance to their masters across the Straits; sometimes they even took the leading part in revolts against the sovereign power at Cordova. It would be quite useless to attempt definitely to fix the boundaries of the lands in North Africa which theoretically acknowledged Omayyad suzerainty during this period; but it is doubtful if Spain has ever claimed sway over an equally large extent of territory in that region, though her power may have often been more effective within the limits of the places she has held. Abd ar-Rahman an-Nasir deserves an honorable place in the long list of rulers who have pointed the way to the foundation of the modern Spanish Empire.

The fall of the Omayyad caliphate in the first part of the eleventh century put an end to the power of Spain in North Africa for many years to come. None of the twenty-eight states into which the Iberian Peninsula was divided after the central authority had broken down could possibly hope to control any territory in Morocco, where anarchy reigned supreme. But the eleventh century was not to close without seeing Spain and North Africa once more reunited under another empire; this time, however, the center of gravity was to be in the south. The Berbers of the Sahara had been converted to the Moslem faith in the ninth century, and as usual had developed rapidly from converts into fanatics. They were inspired and led by holy men, or Morabitin; hence the name Almoravides, by which they are known to history. Their religious enthusiasm soon made them a mighty conquering power; by the middle of the eleventh century, they came into hostile contact with the scattered Berber tribes in southern Morocco and Algeria. Then arose the great leader who was to become the real founder of their empire—the famous Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, simple, austere, devout, warrior and mystic combined. In 1063 he seized Fez. Shortly afterwards a revolt against his power gave him the pretext for an atrocious massacre, by which he rid himself at one blow of all possible rivals to his authority. In 1084 he pushed through to the shores of the Mediterranean and took Tangiers and Melilla; meantime one of his lieutenants farther eastward conquered Tenes and Oran, and besieged Algiers. But the prospect to the north, on the other side of the Strait, was far more alluring to Yusuf than the extension of his dominions in North Africa, and the distance between the headlands was not sufficient to deter him from crossing. On June 30, 1086, he landed at Algeciras. With reinforcements furnished by the Emir of Seville, he pressed forward to meet the army of Alfonso VI; and on October 23 he utterly routed his Christian foes at Zallaka, near Badajoz. Troubles in Morocco soon recalled the conqueror to North Africa and enabled the Christians to maintain their southern boundary at the Tagus, but the petty Moorish states in the south of the peninsula were forced to submit to the harsh domination of their arrogant guests. Yusuf's Puritan spirit had been shocked by the luxury of his coreligionists in Spain; at Zallaka, indeed, he apparently rejoiced in their slaughter, on the ground that they were his enemies as well as the Christians. One by one they were dethroned and replaced by the faithful adherents of the North African zealot. By the year 1095 the whole of Moorish Spain was in the hands of the new invaders, forming an integral part of a vast empire whose center of gravity was in Morocco, and whose southern limit was in Senegal.

Yusuf died in 1106, and the empire that he had founded rapidly crumbled away; but it was almost immediately succeeded by another of a very similar sort. About the year 1120 a new movement, that of the Al-Muwahhidin, Almohades, or Unitarians, arose in the mountains of Morocco, its aim, like that of the Almoravides which preceded it, being to bring back pure religion to the Moslem world. Its founder, Ibn Tumart, was an Arab who had been adopted by one of the Berber tribes; but the real source of the greatness of the new sect, and one of the most notable figures in the entire history of North Africa, was his chief lieutenant and successor, Abd al-Mumin. For several years the struggle between the Almoravides and the Almohades for the domination of Morocco hung in the balance; in 1143, however, the death of the son of



Yusuf the Almoravide turned the scale. The Almohades promptly overran the whole of Mauretania, making a clean sweep of the Almoravide rule there; in 1149 they crossed to Spain. The Christians of the north had meantime improved the opportunity afforded by the dissolution of the Almoravide empire and advanced again into Andalusia, but they were powerless to resist the onslaught of the new invaders. In various minor encounters the Almohades drove them back, and at the same time they reduced the remaining Almoravide governors to obedience. By 1157 nearly half of the Iberian Peninsula recognized their rule. Curiously enough, their most notable military victory over their Christian foes did not occur until July 19, 1195, at Alarcos, after their empire had reached its zenith. In fact, that great battle may be justly regarded as the event that gave the signal for their decline. It caused the Christians in the north to forget their internal quarrels, and, uniting in an effective advance against the common foe, to win the final and decisive victory of *Las Navas de Tolosa* in 1212. In the succeeding years “the whole of Andalusia became a prey to civil war”, and the Christians, pouring down from the north, reaped a rich harvest out of the quarrels and selfishness of the Moslem chiefs. One only of the Moorish rulers showed sufficient ability to withstand them—Ibn al-Ahmar, ‘the Conqueror through God’, who, by a mixture of military skill and political astuteness, finally succeeded in possessing himself of Granada and the adjacent lands, and in welding them together into a little kingdom which defied the efforts of the Christians to conquer it for two and one half centuries to come. A little later the authority of the Almohades across the Straits was challenged by that of a new rival, the Merinites, who established themselves at Fez in 1248, and completed the conquest of Morocco in 1269; the king of Granada, moreover, immediately sought and obtained the alliance of the new dynasty, just as his predecessors had gained that of the Almohades. In a subsequent chapter we shall see that throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the different powers to the north and south of the Straits were constantly in relation with one another in a multitude of different ways. The destinies of Spain and Morocco had been too often and too closely linked in the past to be permanently separated, even though the Christian conquest of the peninsula was virtually complete. During at least three stages of her history—under Carthaginians, Almoravides, and Almohades, and, occasionally, during the half century which immediately followed the first Moorish invasion—the whole or part of Spain had been more or less completely controlled by powers whose seat was in North Africa. Under the Romans, possibly under the Visigoths, and certainly in the reign of Abd ar-Rahman an-Nasir, Spain had held considerable possessions in Morocco. North Africa was perhaps the most normal and natural field for her expansion, when the days of her internal union and imperial greatness should come.

The historical bonds that united Spain with North Africa are in some degree rivalled by those which connected her with the islands of the western Mediterranean, and particularly with Majorca and Minorca. The Carthaginians had controlled western Sicily, Sardinia, and the Balearics, as well as the Iberian Peninsula, and the Romans succeeded them in all; moreover, the Balearics, from the time of their conquest by Quintus Caecilius Metellus in 123 B.C., were regarded as part and parcel of Spain, and in the fourth century, as we have seen, they were definitely erected into a province of it. The Vandals, who entered Spain in 409, mastered Majorca and Minorca before they left it, and subsequently united them with Corsica and Sardinia under a single government. Whether or not the Visigoths followed them in the Balearics is still a matter of dispute, but it is certain that the East Romans made their presence felt in those islands and all the others of the western Mediterranean, as well as on the southern coast of Spain. The Arabs crossed over to Majorca and Minorca soon after their arrival in the peninsula, and established there a pirates’ nest; in the course of the ninth century it appears that both islands were for a time definitely subjected to the authority of the Moorish king of Bona in North Africa, so that we find the bishoprics of Majorca and Minorca assigned to the ecclesiastical province of Mauretania in a clerical schedule

of the period. Meantime Corsica and Sardinia were constantly raided by Moslem corsairs who sidled from Iberian ports; the conquest of Sicily for the Crescent was also in some measure accomplished through the efforts of invaders who came from Spain. Even Crete was seized about the year 823 by certain Moorish adventurers who had been expelled from Andalusia by the Omayyad Caliph of Cordova. They were evicted by Nicephorus Phocas in 960, and their coreligionists in Sicily shared the same fate a century later at the hands of the Norman Roger; but during a long and important period it is not too much to say that the Spanish Moslems exercised a dominant influence over the destinies of all these islands. As to the Balearics, despite incessant Christian raids, and their temporary association with Africa, they soon fell back completely into the control of the Moors of the Iberian Peninsula. The Almoravides took them from the Saracen chieftain who was in possession soon after their advent in Spain but were ousted in turn by the Almohades in 1187. Clearly there were abundant precedents in the previous history of the Iberian Peninsula for the acquisition by Aragon of the islands of the western Mediterranean in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries.

From the Straits of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, on the south and east, we now turn to the mountain wall on the north, whose importance as a natural boundary, or rather as an historical barrier, in the development of the Iberian Peninsula has also been somewhat overestimated. It has been justly said that the idea contained in the phrase already cited, "Africa begins at the Pyrenees", may be equally well expressed by the formula, Europe ends at the Sahara. The famous words, "Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées," which Voltaire placed in the mouth of Louis XIV in 1700, when his grandson, Philip of Anjou, was recognized as heir to the Spanish realms, might have been spoken with even greater truth at various earlier stages of the history of Iberia.

We must observe at the outset that the mountain chain of the Pyrenees does not extend unbroken all the way across the neck of land that connects France and Spain. There are passes to the westward and in the center, and the whole range gradually fades away as it approaches the Mediterranean, so that its eastern end is comparatively easy to cross. Of the first occasions on which men availed themselves of these breaks in the mountain chain we have no definite information. It seems reasonably certain, however, that the Celts, who arrived in Spain at a very early date and mingled with the primitive Iberians there, came into the peninsula from France, and traversed the mountain barrier, probably to the westward. In the days of the conflict of the Carthaginians and the Romans the armies of both sides crossed and recrossed the Pyrenees at the other end, over the foothills near the Mediterranean Sea. During the subsequent struggles between the Romans and the native Spaniards, there are at least two occasions when parts of southern France were administratively joined to Spain. When Pompey was sent to invade the peninsula, in 76 B.C., he appointed one of his subordinates as governor of Narbonese Gaul. Again, from 43 B.C. until after the battle of Philippi, the province of Narbonese Gaul was united with Hispania Citerior and Ulterior under the direct command of the triumvir Lepidus. Of course, these were extraordinary and exceptional arrangements, justified by the unprecedented conditions of the time. But the fact that it should ever have been found convenient to unite the political destinies of Spain and France at this period is not without interest in its bearing on the future.

The Visigoths, at the time of their arrival in Spain, were already in possession of southern Gaul; and though they were seriously threatened there by the armies of the Emperor Honorius, they succeeded in retaining and increasing their lands north of the mountains, while they subdued or expelled the other barbarian tribes who had preceded them in the Iberian Peninsula. In the second half of the fifth century, under the mighty Euric, the Visigothic kingdom attained its greatest extent. It stretched from the Loire on the north, to Gibraltar on the south, from the Rhone and the Mediterranean on the east, to the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic on the west; its capital and center of gravity was on French soil, at Toulouse, Bordeaux, and Narbonne. But the bulk of the Gallic portion of it was soon to be lost. It is curious to think of Spain, whose loyalty to

the faith in later times was so potent a cause of the increase of her imperial domain, as being ruled by sovereigns whose espousal of the heretical side of one of the first religious wars of Europe resulted in a serious limitation of her territories. Yet such was the undoubted fact. King Clovis of the Salian Franks, recently victorious over Romans and Alamanni, was the hero of the hour in northern Gaul. He burned with jealousy of his Visigothic neighbors to the south of him; he longed to extend his territories at their expense; a pretext for an aggressive campaign alone was lacking, and Clovis finally found it in the fact that the Visigoths clung to Arianism, while he was ardently, though recently, orthodox. In the year 507 he defeated the armies of his Visigothic rival Alaric II in a terrible battle on the Campus Vocladensis, near Poitiers, slew the king, and drove his forces in headlong flight. Had it not been for the intervention of Theodoric the Ostrogoth, grandfather of Alaric's son and successor, Amalaric, the Frankish conquest would scarcely have stopped short of the Pyrenees. As it was, the Visigoths were finally able to preserve a strip extending along the Mediterranean coast of France eastward from the end of the mountain range to the Rhone, known as the province of Narbonne, or Septimania, and sometimes as Gothia. In the succeeding years the Franks appeared before Narbonne, besieged it, and strove at every favorable opportunity to drive the Visigoths south of the Pyrenees; in 532-533 they actually crossed the mountain barrier farther westward, and occupied Pamplona. The center of the Visigothic realm was indeed transferred to Spain, and Toledo became its capital before the middle of the sixth century; but Septimania continued to form a part of it down to the Moorish invasion of 711. The region was doubtless difficult to administer, and was the theatre of dangerous revolts, the most serious of which occurred in the reign of the famous King Wamba and required royal intervention to put it down. It was not, however, till a thousand years later that the last portions of it were finally reunited to France.

The Moorish invasion did not stop at the Pyrenees. Recklessly ignoring the small band of Christians who had intrenched themselves in the mountain fastnesses of the northwest of Spain, the Saracens began within eight years of their arrival in the peninsula to carry their raids into southern Gaul. In 720-721 the conquest of France was systematically taken up. Narbonne was besieged and captured, and Toulouse only rescued at the last extremity by Duke Eudes of Aquitaine. A subsequent expedition under another leader saw the invaders follow up the valleys of the Rhone and the Saône into Burgundy. After another interval of five years a new viceroy, Abd ar-Rahman al-Ghafeki, having set the peninsula in order, marshalled all his available forces and once more crossed the mountains by way of Navarre. First he crushed the army of the Duke of Aquitaine, which attempted to oppose his passage of the Dordogne; then, turning westward, he seized and plundered Bordeaux. He then advanced northward, ravaging and devastating as he went, finally to encounter the hosts of Charles Martel in October, 732, in the famous battle of Tours. The Frankish victory there was rendered more decisive by the death of the Arab leader; a rapid retreat of the Moslem army, and the loss of the bulk of their recently won possessions north of the mountains were the inevitable consequences, though the army of the conqueror was at first too exhausted to pursue. The region of Septimania, however, still remained for a time in Moorish hands; nay more, its limits were temporarily somewhat extended by several subsequent invasions from the south, one of which reached so far eastward as to threaten the Lombard kingdom in northern Italy. It was not until the year 759 that Pippin, the father of Charlemagne, succeeded in taking Narbonne and permanently driving the Moors to the south of the mountain range.

The Frankish conquest did not stop at the Pyrenees. Expeditions by Charlemagne and his son Louis the Pious carried their armies southward as far as the Ebro. Saragossa they were unable to win; but along the Mediterranean shore they had better fortune. Barcelona was permanently taken in 801; Tarragona and Tortosa were besieged and temporarily captured in the immediately succeeding years. The last two were soon retaken by the Moors, and the limits of the Frankish

territories were pushed back nearly as far as Barcelona; but the northeastern corner of the peninsula remained in Christian hands, and was connected, politically and administratively, for three quarters of a century to come, with a greater or lesser portion of the south of France. At first the Spanish conquests formed an integral part of the great duchy of Aquitaine, owing to the fact that the bulk of them had been gained by Louis the Pious, who was established during his earlier years in the Aquitanian capital, Toulouse. In 817 this connection was severed, but when the break occurred the nearer Septimanian territories followed the lead of the Spanish lands with which they had previously been so long united, and together with them were erected into the so-called county of Barcelona, or Catalonia. For a time, the county owed feudal allegiance to the crown of France, so that French rule continued, in theory at least, to prevail south of the Pyrenees; but before many years had elapsed the situation was exactly reversed. The weak Carolingians found it impossible to exert any real authority over territories so remote. The counts whom they appointed as their local representatives were for the most part able men, ambitious to attain complete autonomy; finally, towards the close of the ninth century, the inevitable occurred, and Catalonia declared and vindicated its independence. Most of the territories north of the mountains had been meantime stripped away through the efforts of Charles the Bald; but now that independence had been won, the counts of Catalonia set themselves busily to work to regain them. In this task they had history and tradition on their side and were extraordinarily successful. An excellent start was made by Ramon Berenguer I (1035-76) who was able to leave to his son Carcassonne, Redes, Lauraguais, and "all that he had in the county of Toulouse, in Minervois, in Narbonne, in Foix, and in Comminges". The bulk of the work, however, was done by Ramon Berenguer III (1096-1131), partly through skilful diplomacy and superior military power, but still more by a policy of advantageous marriage. His most important acquisition was the county of Provence, together with Millau and Gévaudan, through his union with its heiress Dulce in 1112; other adjacent territories followed under his immediate successors, so that in the early years of the thirteenth century the influence of Catalonia (which had meantime been strengthened south of the Pyrenees by its union with Aragon in 1137) may be justly described as preponderant in the south of France. The story of the loss of the greater part of these territories in the reigns of Pedro II and James the Conqueror will be told in another place. Yet in the present connection it is well to remember that, even after James the Conqueror had been forced, at the treaty of Corbeil in 1258, to give up the bulk of his French holdings and renounce forever his grandiose plan of founding a single Romance state which should extend from the Durance to the Segura, the boundaries of Catalonia were not driven quite back to the line of the Pyrenees. Montpellier was not wholly lost until 1349, and Cerdagne and Roussillon, save for one brief interval at the end of the fifteenth century, remained in Spanish hands until the days of Louis XIV. Though territorially insignificant, stirring memories were sure to be roused by the mention of their names, and later Spanish kings went to desperate lengths to retain them. They remained for many years to come a possible nucleus for further conquests in the north, a lure to induce the descendants of the ancient counts of Catalonia to emulate the deeds of their ancestors and to enlarge their holdings beyond the mountain range.

The early history of the little saddlebag kingdom of Navarre may also be adduced as evidence that the Pyrenees do not set so formidable a barrier between France and Spain as might at first sight appear. Navarre lay partly to the north though mostly to the south of the range; its passes were a frequent route of invasion in both directions; previous to its division in the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic, its sovereignty had been held for long periods on both sides of the mountains. It was a link, as well as a bone of contention, between Spain and France, and furnished a medium of institutional exchanges between the two countries. The fact that Basque is spoken today on both slopes of the Pyrenees, and the close linguistic affinity between Valencia, Catalonia, and Provence are also significant in the same connection. Not only, then, to the south, on the Straits of Gibraltar, nor to the east, in the Mediterranean Sea, but also to the

north, across the Pyrenees, did Spain inherit precedents for expansion beyond her natural boundaries. Small wonder if, at the time that the daring and faith of Christopher Columbus opened up a new and far greater field of development, the possibilities of which were at first but remotely conceived, she should tend in some respects to neglect it, in favor of other enterprises nearer at home, and sanctioned by some of the strongest precedents of Spanish history and tradition.

We have thus far considered some of the external geographical features of Spain, and also certain events of her ancient and mediaeval history, with reference to her capabilities for external expansion, and her fitness for the possession of an imperial domain. But before the background for the foundation of the Spanish empire can be regarded as complete, we must supplement what has gone before with a few words concerning some of the most salient internal peculiarities of the peninsula—peculiarities which, though at first sight they may seem of slight importance in moulding Spain's imperial career, were destined ultimately to exert an influence fully as great as the external ones.

Of these internal peculiarities the first, and by all odds the most fundamental, is the tendency towards diversification and separatism. It is almost impossible to exaggerate its importance; even more than is the case with Germany down to the nineteenth century, the whole history of Spain “may be summed up in the one word ‘Particularismus’”. Geographical and climatic conditions form the basis of it. Racially, historically, socially, and economically the effect of the separatist trend may be traced from the beginning to the end of the story. Its influence has been deep-seated and permanent. It is the key to many of the most important problems with which the Spaniard is confronted today.

Let us take, in the first place, the geographical features of the peninsula. The average altitude of Spain is very great; in fact, it ranks next to Switzerland among the European countries in this respect. The whole of the north central portion forms a high, arid plateau, which slopes off somewhat abruptly toward the Mediterranean on the east, and more gradually toward the Atlantic on the west. On the eastern half of the northern side, it rises rapidly into the mountain chain of the Pyrenees, while on the western it merges into the rainy pastures of Asturias and Galicia. On the south it falls away quite suddenly, but far inland, leaving the wide, rich Andalusian plain, watered by the Guadiana and Guadalquivir, and cut off in turn from the Mediterranean by the snowy summits of the Sierra Nevada, whose loftiest peak (Mulhacen) exceeds in altitude the highest of the Pyrenees. Then, in addition to these general physiographical differentiations, the peninsula is subdivided by a number of minor mountain chains, which run for the most part in an east and west direction and form the valleys of the five principal Spanish rivers—the Ebro, on the east, and the Douro, Tagus, Guadiana, and Guadalquivir, on the west. A river may be either a highway for those who desire to travel along its course, or a barrier for those who wish to cross it; but the Spanish rivers, with the possible exception of the Guadalquivir, are emphatically the latter rather than the former. Since they all rise on the high north central plateau, their current is for the most part so swift as to render it impossible for those journeying east and west to navigate them, while the same fact renders them the more difficult to ford for travelers going north and south. By its rivers and mountain chains, as well as by its high north central plateau, low-lying coasts, and Andalusian plain, the Iberian Peninsula is parceled out into a number of sharply separated districts, each of which naturally tends to lead a life of its own.

Peculiarly and widely divergent climatic conditions follow as an inevitable corollary of these physiographical facts. Moisture is never evenly distributed in a mountainous country, and Spain is no exception to the general rule. The long and parching droughts, followed by sudden inundations, which are a familiar feature of the great plateau, result from a concentration of the rains among the mountain peaks, and the sudden flooding of the swiftly rising streams,



which either carry the water off to the sea before it has had any opportunity to benefit the surrounding lands, or else, if the rain has been unusually heavy, overflow their banks. Sudden alternations of heat and cold are another characteristic feature of the high north central plain or *meseta*. These unfavorable conditions, however, do not obtain on all the coasts, while in Andalusia moisture is abundant and the temperature warm and even. In the extreme northwest, in Galicia and Asturias, the action of the Gulf Stream brings equable weather, though it is also unusually wet. In Spanish climatic as well as physiographical conditions, variety is again the dominant note.

Let us turn for a moment to some of the effects of this internal geographical and climatic variety and separatism on the historical development of the peninsula. The earliest writers on Spain were struck by it. There are even faint traces of it in the Carthaginian *Peripli*, or accounts of the earliest voyages along the coast, and Strabo's famous treatise may be described without exaggeration as an extended commentary thereon. It is evident that the number and variety of the tribes which inhabited the peninsula made a profound impression on all observers. The prolonged and heroic resistance of the native Spaniard to the Roman legions in the last two centuries B.C. would have been impossible in a less mountainous and divided land; the Lusitanian shepherd Viriathus and his followers won their greatest victories by skillfully taking advantage of the deep ravines and rocky summits of the west. "The Romans", says Strabo, "lost much time by reason of the number of different sovereignties, having to conquer first one, then another". That the victors, after their conquest was complete, found it convenient to exchange their original partition of the land into Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior for a division into three, four, and finally seven provinces is certainly significant, as is the difficulty which the Visigoths subsequently experienced in subjecting the remoter part of the land to their control, and in blotting out the various distinctions which separated them from the mass of the Hispano-Roman inhabitants. The whole internal history of Moorish Spain may be said to center around the efforts of the sovereign power to check its subjects' natural proneness to dissolve themselves into a number of petty states, and the tendency to division and subdivision among the Christian rulers in the north is the key to many of the most difficult questions in the mediaeval period. The common statement that the history of united Spain begins with the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabella of Castile is in some respects very misleading. The particularistic trend was much too strong to be eradicated by mere personal union of the crowns. Through Hapsburg and Bourbon days it continued to mold the destinies of the Iberian Peninsula; and it presented one of the most serious problems which confronted the builders of the Spanish Empire.

The results of the peculiar geographical features of the Iberian Peninsula are also plainly visible in its constitutional, social, and economic life. Variety and differentiation are the dominant features of the national assemblies, of the municipal *fueros*, of the ranks and classes of men, and of their multifarious interests and occupations. The difficulty of communication between the different parts of Spain has always discouraged internal commerce, and accounts in some measure for the average Spaniard's marked economic incapacity and his proverbial aversion to a business career. Generally excellent harbors, on the other hand, furnish admirable opportunities for maritime intercourse with other lands, of which the inhabitants of the Mediterranean coast took advantage at an early date. On the Atlantic seaboard, however, the rise of Portugal as an independent kingdom in the twelfth century deprived Castile of her best ports, crippled her foreign commerce, and probably postponed for at least a century her brilliant career of foreign discovery and exploration. The climatic and physiographical conditions within the peninsula are especially favorable to pasturage—perhaps the principal national occupation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The rainy slopes of the Asturian mountains afford the best of summer grazing grounds, and the sunny regions of Andalusia are correspondingly valuable in winter. On the other hand, the barrenness of the Meseta is profoundly discouraging to the agriculturist; it goes

far to explain, if not to palliate, the prevalence of the sentiment expressed in the phrase “deshonor del trabajo;” it is one of the principal reasons why the Spaniard has always tended to concentrate in cities. It is true that this agricultural poverty is in some measure compensated by a plentiful supply of running water and considerable mineral wealth. But the full significance of the first of these natural advantages was not perceived until very recent times, and foreigners fully as much as Spaniards have been the ones to profit by it; while the second, at least in the influence which it indirectly exerted on the Spanish fortunes in the New World, was certainly not an unmixed blessing. The mineral richness of the peninsula was not sufficient to make the search for it a national occupation, but it was so much more considerable than its agricultural possibilities that it led the inhabitants to neglect to till the soil, and to confuse real wealth with its outward and visible symbol. It partly accounts for the proverbial thirst for gold which was the bane of the Spaniards in the New World, and for their inability to realize that agriculture is the most permanent and stable source of a new country’s material prosperity. Some of the most disastrous blunders in the Spanish administration of the Indies are in large measure to be attributed to the peculiar conditions under which the conquerors had been reared in the peninsula.

Everything considered, then, Spain is a country whose natural advantages for the life of mankind have been fully counterbalanced by its disadvantages. There have always been a number of unfavorable and hostile facts to be wrestled with and overcome, and the age-long struggle against these hostile conditions has powerfully affected the character of the inhabitants, and their fitness for the difficult and arduous task of building an empire. The internal divisions of the peninsula, and the tendency of each portion of it to live a life apart from the rest, reacted most unfavorably upon the development of Spain’s external possessions. They have kept the inhabitants of the peninsula as a whole from concentrating their efforts in any one direction. They are the fundamental explanation of the extreme complexity and diversity of interests, which prevented even the powerful monarchs of the sixteenth century from endowing their immense and widely scattered territories with that unity which is the best result of absolutism. They account in large measure for the essentially decentralized character of Spanish imperial administration. On the other hand, we may be sure that the inhospitality of the Meseta was an important element in encouraging the Spaniards to seek pleasanter lands abroad; and it is hard to conceive how any explorer born and brought up in a more smiling country than the desolate plains of Old Castile could have persevered in his advance across the yellow wastes of Arizona and New Mexico, which bear such striking resemblance to them. Certainly, the predominantly unattractive interior of the peninsula helped to make its earliest inhabitants perceive the advantages of a seaboard existence, the first step on the road to empire. From the days of the Phoenicians and Carthaginians the coasts have been the most rich, populous, and progressive portions of the land. Spain is, in fact, one of the classic examples of the truth of the famous dictum of Plato that “men tend to establish themselves on the shore of the sea, like frogs on the edge of a pond.”

# BOOK I

## CASTILE

### CHAPTER I

#### THE RECONQUEST

THE mediaeval history of Spain is first and foremost the history of a crusade. For nearly eight centuries the Christians of the North devoted themselves to the task of expelling the Moors from the Peninsula. It was in the accomplishment of that task that the different Spanish kingdoms were gradually evolved, and the final victory at Granada in 1492 celebrated the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile. Many of the distinctive features of modern Spain are to be directly traced to the influence of this age-long struggle, and it powerfully affected the destinies of the Spanish Empire. In fact, the reconquest of the peninsula and the conquest of an imperial domain beyond the sea really form two intimately connected chapters of the same story. From the cave of Covadonga to the annexation of Portugal and her dominions in 1580, which carried the Spanish Empire to its greatest territorial extent, the process of expansion is continuous.

We have seen that the Iberian Peninsula had been ruled both in ancient times and in the early Middle Ages by sovereigns who had also dominated parts of northern Africa, southern France, and the Mediterranean islands. Spain's connection with all these territories was traditional, natural, and intimate. When, therefore, the mediaeval Spaniard looked back at the previous history of his native land, he did not see her boundaries as we see them today. After the Reconquest had reached the shores of the Mediterranean and of the Atlantic, he saw no reason why it should stop. Expansion overseas had in fact begun even before the peninsula was clear of infidels. James I of Aragon captured the Balearics before he took Valencia. Castile won the Canaries before Granada fell, and the year of the surrender of that stronghold was the year of the discovery of America. The foundations of the Spanish Empire were thus laid before the mother country was wholly in Christian hands. Moreover, the interlocking and continuity of the two movements are as easy to recognize in the spheres of constitutional and social development and of national ideals as they are in that of political affairs. The early divisions of the Christian kingdoms have their counterpart during the sixteenth century in the regulations limiting the participation of the Aragonese in the affairs of the Indies; they are vividly recalled by the difficulties which the Hapsburgs experienced in bringing the institutions of the Mediterranean states into alignment with those of Castile. The same religious fervor with which Archbishop Roderic of Toledo strove to inspire the Christians to do or die on the bloody plains of Las Navas de Tolosa was invoked by Hernando Cortez when he burned his ships on the shore of Vera Cruz, and planted the symbol of the Faith above the reeking altars of the Mexican war god; it was utilized by Francisco Pizarro in justification of his ruthless slaughter of the Incas. The Cross of Christ was alike the emblem of reconquest and of conquest; Santiago was the Spanish battle cry in the old world and in the new.

No apology, then, is needed for beginning the story of the foundation of the Spanish Empire in the earliest days of the Reconquest. During the entire period of the Middle Ages, however, it is important to observe that the allied tasks of expelling the Moors from the peninsula, and of winning new territories beyond it, were very unevenly distributed between the eastern and western parts of Spain. It was Castile on the westward that assumed the lion's share of the work of recapturing Spain from the infidel, while the realms of the Crown of Aragon to the eastward took the lead in the great work of expansion in the Mediterranean Sea. The relative geographical extent of the lands held by Castile and Aragon within the peninsula and without it at the accession of the Catholic Kings bears striking testimony to this. While Castile and Leon occupied more than three times as much territory as did the Aragonese realms in Spain, their sole external possession, the Canaries, was less than one seventeenth the size of the Mediterranean islands and Italian lands that had been won by the eastern kingdoms. The mediaeval Castilian background of the Spanish Empire is primarily, therefore, a history of internal expansion, while that of the realms of the Crown of Aragon deals for the most part with the conquest of realms abroad; and this fundamental difference in national occupation and object was to give rise to an enormous number of subsidiary ones in a multitude of other respects. Two very divergent currents united under Ferdinand and Isabella to form Spain and the Spanish Empire, and much study will have to be devoted to the growth and development of each, before any adequate appreciation can be gained of the nature and complexity of the problems with which the Catholic Kings and their successors were confronted. The present chapter will deal with the narrative history of Castile during the first five and a half centuries after the Moorish invasion.

Time-honored tradition, so often more significant and important than established historic fact, assigns of the Christian reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula and of the modern Spanish Empire to the cave of Covadonga in the Asturian mountains. To this cave a small band of Christians, led by a certain Pelayo, who gave out that he was a descendant of the ancient line of Visigothic kings, retired before the advancing hosts of one of the Arab chieftains; and, favored by the mountainous character of the country, offered desperate resistance to the overwhelming forces of the invaders. The date usually assigned to this episode is the year 718, and the ancient Spanish historians vie with one another in telling of the marvels that were there performed. "The Infidels", says Mariana, "attack'd the mouth of the Cave, pouring in a Shower of Stones and Darts. Here the Hand of God appeared in defence of the Christians; for all the Weapons cast against them, flew back upon the Moors, with great slaughter of them. At this *Miracle* the Infidels stood astonished, and the Christians taking heart, rushed out upon them; the Fight was Disorderly, but the Enemy amazed at what they had seen, turned their Backs and fled. 20000 were killed in the Battle and Pursuit". If we cannot accept this astounding story word for word, we may well believe that a desultory guerilla warfare was waged in the Asturian highlands, and that the Moors, discouraged by the difficulty of the country, and thinking perhaps that the Christian forces were too insignificant ever to cause them serious trouble, finally decided to withdraw without crushing the last embers of resistance. It was a terrible mistake, as they were afterwards to learn to their cost. "Would to God", exclaims the Moorish historian Makkari, "that the Moslems had then extinguished at once the sparks of a fire that was destined to consume the whole dominions of Islam in those parts."

Slowly Pelayo and his little band increased their territories, and gradually other scattered groups of neighboring Christians joined with them. Before long their united holdings came to be known as the kingdom of Asturias; and the capital which Pelayo had established at Cangas de Onis was transferred before the end of the eighth century to Oviedo. The boundaries of the little realm in this period are impossible definitely to determine. They varied from day to day, though in general the Christians gained more than they lost, particularly during those times when the Moorish part of Spain was in confusion, as in the years immediately preceding the arrival of

the first Omayyad. Most of the fighting in the eighth century occurred in the Douro basin; but the limits of the Christian kingdom did not extend so far south as that river, nor those of the Moorish territories so far north. Whenever the infidels withdrew from a district they deliberately devastated it, so as to prevent their foes from following close upon their heels; they thereby created a wide neutral zone or 'No Man's Land', which, coupled with the natural poverty of the great Meseta, opposed the most effective barrier to the Christian advance. These intermediate devastated regions were constantly raided by both parties, but they could not permanently support large armies, hence the desultory haphazard character of the wars of the Reconquest, and the notable absence of important pitched battles. The progress of the Christians was also considerably impeded, during this early period, by the unwillingness of these sturdy warriors to permit their monarchs to enter into any alliance with the Emperor Charlemagne against the Moors, lest the terms demanded should imply a derogation of Spanish autonomy, and possibly connote some measure of inferiority to foreign imperial power. The famous legend of Bernardo del Carpio, voicing the national disapproval of such external entanglements, is no longer accepted, but its constant repetition for many generations is a striking proof of the haughty pride of independence and bitter hatred of every kind of restraint, which are traditionally associated with the ancient Spanish aristocracy.

Before the middle of the ninth century, however, several causes had combined to endow what had begun as a mere struggle for existence with a new aim and purpose, and to strengthen the foundations of the Spanish Empire with the sanction and blessing of the church. In the first place the Christians who flocked to the standard of Pelayo and his successors brought with them all the later Visigothic traditions of ecclesiastical power in the government, so that there was fruitful ground ready prepared for the perpetuation of theocratic rule. Secondly, the kings of Asturias soon began to realize that under the peculiar circumstances in which they found themselves the clergy could readily be converted into priceless allies in the task of expanding the boundaries of their little state. The churchmen could easily be induced to represent the work of driving back the Moor as a sacred duty obligatory on all, in fact even to threaten with ecclesiastical censures those who held back, and thus to contribute directly to the enlargement of the territories of the Christian king. In return for this favor the Asturian sovereigns would hand over to the church a generous share of the lands they conquered—the more readily since the clergy was a far less dangerous foe to the monarchy than the proverbially restive nobility; they would further the building of churches, cathedrals, and monasteries, and maintain as far as possible ecclesiastical influence in the government of the realm. It was a remarkably harmonious case of mutual and reciprocal aid: king and clergy played into one another's hands to a very unusual degree. The credit for originating this practice of alliance with the church in the cause of territorial expansion is usually given to Alfonso I (739-757), of whom the Moorish chronicler tells us "that he slew tens of thousands of the Faithful, burned houses and fields, and that no treaty could be made with him". His services to his country and to Christendom have earned him the appellation of 'the Catholic'; and though the policy which he inaugurated seems to have perished temporarily at his death, it was subsequently revived and continued, and in the ninth century received additional impetus from the birth of the national Spanish legend of Santiago.

The story of the miraculous discovery of the remains of St. James the Greater in the rocky fastnesses of Galicia is picturesquely related in the following words by the translator of Mariana's famous history:

"Theodomerus, Bishop of Iria Flavia, hearing great Lights were seen in a wild part of a Mountain, went thither, and causing the Bushes and Briars to be cut down, and digging up a heap of Earth, found the holy Body in a Marble Sepulcher. Overjoy'd at this, he went to Court to acquaint the King, who in Person repair'd thither, and caus'd a Church to be erected in that place, dedicated to St. James, but mean, as having only mud Walls. He also instituted Benefices



belonging to it, and assign'd them Revenues. The Fame of it being spread abroad, brought People from all parts of Christendom; and to this day it is one of the most frequented Pilgrimages in the World. Some grave and Learned Persons have made a doubt, whether St. James the Apostle ever was in Spain, and consequently of the Invention of his Body. I will not undertake to discuss the point but must confess I think the general consent of all Christendom in this behalf appears to me more convincing than all the Arguments they can bring to oppose it".

It is the last sentence in this account that contains the gist of the whole matter. The story spread and was universally believed. A noble church was erected on the sacred spot and consecrated in 899. During the succeeding centuries it became the goal of pilgrims so numerous that Spaniards use the phrase 'the road to Santiago' to express the myriad of stars that compose the Milky Way. But the effect of the legend within the peninsula and the empire subsequently to be controlled from it was far more important than Santiago's distinction as the Mecca of the pilgrims of the West. Arising as it did just as the kingdom of Asturias was completing the first century of its troublous existence, it furnished an inspiration, an ideal, a battle cry, which committed the Christians to a steady continuance of their advance up to and beyond the borders of Spain. It gave the vigorous but disconnected efforts of the Asturian warriors the added inspiration of a crusade. It cemented the alliance of church and state in the sacred duty of reclaiming the peninsula for the faith and of carrying that faith beyond the seas. It linked the Reconquest to the Empire and emphasized the continuity of their development. Never was national legend of deeper and more lasting significance.

Powerful as was its influence for the advance of the Christian arms, the legend of Santiago was unable to endow the Asturian realm with the internal unity which was essential for lasting success. The clergy, indeed, had been brought into line, though the grants which rewarded their loyalty played havoc with the royal patrimony; but the nobles, whose existence did not depend on the success of the crusade, grew steadily more restive and uncontrolled. The tradition of elective kingship, inherited from Visigothic days, had not been forgotten, and served to keep the central power weak. Often the haughty barons revenged themselves for fancied insults at the hand of their monarchs by deliberately taking sides with the infidel, who suffered them to enjoy complete religious liberty and a considerable measure of political autonomy as well. The fact that the Cid, the most faithless of them all, could so easily attain the position of national hero shows that such betrayals were not generally regarded as in the least reprehensible. The nobles moreover were continually fighting among themselves; and the deadly feuds, sometimes prolonged for centuries, between the different aristocratic houses of the West Spanish realms, were the most fruitful of all the sources of internal anarchy and unrest, and of impotence abroad. From the earliest days of the Reconquest to the times of Ferdinand and Isabella, the management and control of the baronage was much the hardest problem with which the West Spanish sovereigns were confronted, harder by far than the crusade against the Moors.

It is a singular fact, in view of these tendencies toward decentralization, that the monarchs themselves, whom every consideration would naturally urge to work for the unity of their kingdom and the increase of their own power, deliberately adopted the ruinous policy of parceling out their realms among their children at their deaths. The first instance of this disastrous practice occurred in the end of the reign of Alfonso the Great, who died in 910, and whose long rule of forty-four years had witnessed a considerable extension of the Asturian state. Victorious against the infidel, the old king was not master in his own house; sick at heart over the revolts of his turbulent children, he finally determined to renounce the throne. Plainly foreseeing, however, that his sons, who had previously joined forces against him, would not, after his abdication, permit the elevation of any one of their number to a position of supremacy over the rest, he weakly attempted to satisfy them all by dividing his inheritance between them. To the eldest and most ambitious, named Garcia, he left the southerly territories of León, relatively newly won, and

probably carrying with them a certain measure of suzerainty over the rest. To the second, Ordoño, he gave the western lands of Galicia and northern Lusitania, and to the third, Fruela, the parent kingdom of Asturias; while he himself retired to the town of Zamora, stipulating that it should remain in his hands till his death, which occurred shortly afterwards. During the next four years the energy of Garcia, king of León, which was chiefly directed toward the re-peopling of the devastated lands, carried all before it, and made his portion unquestionably the center of gravity of the Christian state. The capital was definitely transferred from Oviedo to León, which had the advantage of Roman fortifications, and the name León began gradually to be adopted as the general designation of the Christian kingdoms of the northwest. But in 914 Garcia died, leaving no children, so that his younger brother Ordoño, to whom his father had assigned Galicia, succeeded him in Leon as well; and ten years later Ordoño died also. In his case there was no lack of surviving sons, but it seems that the nobles, to whom considerable influence in the choice of monarchs still belonged, determined that none of these was so fit to rule as Ordoño's younger brother Fruela, the heir of Asturias, whom they accordingly elevated to the throne of León. The kingdoms of the northwest, deliberately separated into three parts by Alfonso the Great, were thus after fourteen years reunited. The episode is of no special importance in itself, but the process of division was constantly repeated, and had not a considerable number of the early monarchs died leaving only a single son, there is no telling where it would have ceased. Whenever such partitions occurred, defeat by the Moors was the inevitable consequence; but the fact that repeated disasters did not lead to the abandonment of the practice shows how deeply the trend toward separatism was ingrained in the character of the mediaeval Spaniard. Certainly, the sort of *divide* which he practised was not calculated to produce *impera*.

The tenth century witnessed important events on the eastern frontier of the kingdom of León, which were destined to give wider scope to this same tendency toward division. The Leonese kings had found it advisable to entrust the government of the eastern portions of their domains to vassal counts who resided there, and would consequently be interested for their own sakes both in repelling the raids of the Moors and in winning new territories at their expense. The plan worked well, at least in the ninth century: under the leadership of their counts, the inhabitants of these eastern regions made steady advances to the southward. In 860 their capital was at Amaya; in 884 it had been moved forward to Burgos. During the succeeding years still further progress was made; even León to the westward was outstripped, and the Christians came in sight of the Guadarramas. But the Moorish resistance was fierce; every mile was stubbornly contested, and conquered territory was likely to be immediately retaken. The inhabitants were therefore constantly under arms, and, in order to protect themselves against sudden raids, they covered the land with castles, so that it soon became known as Castile. Consciousness of military power naturally begat aspirations for autonomy, and the counts of these eastern regions gradually became restive under the control of the Leonese kings. The nature of their relationship in this early period is impossible accurately to define. The principle of hereditary succession in the countship had not yet formally prevailed over that of royal appointment; but it is evident that at an early date son often followed father without interference from León. It seems probable, moreover, that the counts of Burgos soon established a certain right of suzerainty over the less ambitious lords of the territories adjacent to them. They occasionally refused to obey their sovereigns' summons to military service, and we are even told that they sometimes nominated judges on their own authority, thus arrogating to themselves what had been invariably regarded as a royal prerogative. Out of the different and variously authenticated statements that have come down to us one fact emerges clear. By the end of the first quarter of the tenth century the counts of Burgos were aiming to secure complete independence of the kingdom of Leon and absolute control over their own dominions. It was only a question of time when a man should come to the head of affairs at the Castilian capital with sufficient ability to realize these ambitions.

Such a man was found at last in the valorous Fernán Gonzalez, who was established at Burgos about 930, and was master of the destinies of the Castilian lands till his death in 970. Legend has been very busy with his name, and many of the main facts of his career are still in doubt. We do not even know how he succeeded in gaining his place; but it seems likely that his own efforts were quite as important in effecting this result as any appointment by the king of León; and he was apparently the first definitely to assume the title of 'count of Castile'. He was a bold, resourceful man, equally proficient at plotting and at war, and it was by skillful and unscrupulous utilization both of the internal broils of the Christians in the north and of the ebbs and flows of the war of the Reconquest that he finally achieved Castilian autonomy. A disastrous expedition of his Leonese overlord Ramiro II against the mighty Caliph Abd ar-Rahman III, in 939, gave Fernán Gonzalez his first opportunity. Instead of aiding his liege lord against the infidel he began by remaining neutral; then later, when Moorish bands began to penetrate the Christian territories, he joined forces with the invader and broke out into open revolt. On the field of battle Fernán Gonzalez was defeated and taken prisoner; but Ramiro was so hard pressed by the troops of the Caliph that he dared not reap the fruits of the victory he had won, and, yielding to the almost unanimous demands of the Castilians, soon sent back the rebel to his own dominions. Nay more, he even sought to cajole his turbulent vassal into friendship and alliance by arranging a marriage between the latter's daughter Urraca and his own son Ordoño. Small wonder that Fernán Gonzales was not won over by methods like these. Rightly regarding the match that had been made as a confession of Ramiro's weakness and of his own strength, he promptly returned to his plots with greater zest than ever. The history of the period that follows is one long chronicle of anarchy and intrigue. Fernán Gonzalez permitted Abd ar-Rahman to use Castile as a base for new attacks on León, and continually interfered in the internal affairs of that kingdom. When, in 950, his son-in-law Ordoño III succeeded Ramiro there, he supported against him his younger half-brother Sancho the Fat; then, six years later, when Ordoño died and Sancho ascended the Leonese throne, Fernán Gonzalez reversed his policy and made common cause against the new monarch with his cousin, Ordoño IV. The situation was also complicated at this critical moment by the entrance upon the scene of the king of the little realm of Navarre. The Navarrese monarch was uncle to King Sancho of León, and warmly espoused his cause: but even his help was not sufficient to enable his ally to recover his throne, still less to bring the terrible Fernán Gonzalez to his knees. The intrigues of the count of Castile were shaking all the realms of Christian Spain to their foundations.

There was only one method by which the wretched Sancho could possibly hope permanently to extricate himself from his difficulties. No combination of Christians had so far been successful in vanquishing Fernán Gonzalez: the only chance of bringing him to book was to outbid him for the friendship of the great Caliph in the South. A strictly personal reason, moreover, confirmed the Leonese king in his resolution to apply for aid to Abd ar-Rahman. His corpulence was so excessive that it amounted to a serious infirmity and made him a jest in the mouths of his subjects; his sole hope of being cured rested in a Jewish doctor, named Hasdai, residing in Cordova, whom Abd ar-Rahman would not permit to go to Leon. The Caliph, however, was only too glad to have Sancho come to the Moorish capital for his treatment: he also was not averse to a political alliance, and before long the two sovereigns came to terms. Sancho journeyed southward to Cordova, where Hasdai's cure was highly successful; Abd ar-Rahman gave him Moorish troops to aid him in the recovery of his dominions, in return for the surrender of ten fortresses; in 959 he was able to regain possession of his realm. His triumph, however, was but short. It had by this time become the fashion for dispossessed Christian kings to seek reinstatement through alliance with the infidel: Sancho had used that weapon against Fernán Gonzalez, and now his cousin, Ordoño, the protégé of the count of Castile, determined to use it against him. The death of Abd ar-Rahman and the succession of Hakam II at Cordova (961) made the reversal of policy all the easier, and the remaining years of Sancho the Fat saw León constantly raided by Moorish troops.

Ordoño did not live to reap the reward of his treachery, but the indefatigable Fernán Gonzalez utilized the result of it for his own purpose—namely, the winning of Castilian independence. The details of the story are wellnigh impossible to follow. We can only be sure that during the last years of the life of Sancho the Fat, who died in 966, and still more during the minority of his infant son, Ramiro, the count of Castile was unceasingly active; and that at his death in 970, his title was recognized as hereditary in his house, and passed to his son Garcia Fernández without interference from León.

Castilian autonomy had thus been attained, in practice at least, if not in theory; but greater things were soon to come. The countship was ultimately destined to dominate and virtually to absorb the land that gave it birth. During the half century after Fernán Gonzalez's death several marriage alliances were made between the ruling families of León, Castile, and Navarre—an incidental evidence that the middle countship was now recognized as of equivalent standing with the kingdoms to the west and east of it. In 1029 these alliances resulted in a close union of Castile and Navarre under a certain King Sancho the Great, who thereafter attempted to carry his power even farther into the west and to possess himself of the kingdom of León. This ambitious project he was unable completely to accomplish before his death in 1035; furthermore, he followed the evil example of many of his predecessors and divided his realms between his different children at his death. But his ambitions to conquer Leon survived in his second son Ferdinand, who succeeded him in Castile, defeated and slew the Leonese monarch on the field of battle in 1037, and finally celebrated his triumph by assuming the royal title in the eastern countship, so that he ruled over both states as king of Castile until his death in 1065. The two realms were again separated from 1065 to 1072, reunited from 1072 to 1157, and separated for the last time from 1157 to 1230, only to be finally reunited under St. Ferdinand. At the lime of their last amalgamation in 1230 the younger kingdom had begun to prevail over and swallow up the elder, and as time went on, it continued increasingly so to do.

The rise of Castile as an independent countship and kingdom thus ended, fortunately for the cause of Spanish progress, with its union on somewhat better than even terms with the realm from which it sprang. In the early twelfth century there arose on the western confines of the kingdom of León another state, whose independence of the parent realm, attained with considerably less difficulty than was Castile's, has endured, save for one short interval of about sixty years, until today. The creation of the kingdom of Portugal was an event of the gravest import for the development of the Spanish Empire.

The eleventh century had been on the whole a period of rapid Christian advance. The realms of Castile and León were much less often at odds than in the stormy days of Fernán Gonzalez. From 1037 to 1065 and from 1072 to 1157, as we have just seen, they were united under a single king. Among the Moors, on the other hand, everything was in anarchy and confusion. The most glorious days of the Caliphate were gone with the death of Abd ar-Rahman III in 961; for a few years the versatile Almanzor revived its splendors, but when in 1002 he died (“and was buried in Hell,” as the *Chronicon Burgense* tersely puts it), the central power began visibly to crumble away. For a few years more the farce of maintaining a puppet Caliph in the Golden Palace of Az Zahra was continued; but soon that hollow mockery was abandoned, and in 1031 Moslem Spain became in name what it had been in fact since the death of Almanzor, a group of petty independent states. The Christians of the north, temporarily united, were quick to seize the advantage afforded by this favorable turn of affairs. Their southward march was resumed, and the ever-shifting boundary, which had hitherto advanced and receded along the general line of the valley of the Douro, was now carried forward towards the banks of the Tagus. The capture of Toledo by Alfonso VI in 1085 marked the culmination of the Christian success. French, German, Norman, and Italian warriors were enrolled in the Castilian army which received the surrender of the

ancient Visigothic capital. For a moment it seemed as if a united Spain, supported by allies from north of the Pyrenees, would drive the infidel across the Straits of Gibraltar.

Then suddenly came the inevitable reaction, and the horizon darkened in every quarter. The year after the fall of Toledo saw the fanatic Berber Almoravides cross the Strait and win a smashing victory over the Christian hosts at Zallaka near Badajoz. Farther advance by the Castilian armies to the southward was effectively checked. That Toledo was not retaken by the infidel was solely due to the failure of the Almoravide leader vigorously to follow up his initial success. More ominous still, disunion, anarchy, rebellion, and treason broke out in Castile; for the time being the royal authority was virtually extinguished. But so little did Alfonso VI comprehend the necessity of concentrating such resources as remained to him, that he actually contributed to the increase of the confusion by deliberately rewarding several of his military followers from France and Germany with large territorial grants in the north of his own dominions. Among these followers, the two most prominent were Henry, a younger brother of Eudes, duke of Burgundy, and his cousin Raymond, count of Amaous, who was descended from the collateral line of Burgundian counts. Both had speedily attracted the favorable notice of the Castilian sovereign, who was himself connected with them by marriage, and their services in the siege of Tudela were recompensed with unusual lavishness. To Raymond, Alfonso gave in marriage his only legitimate daughter Urraca, in the year 1093, together with the governorship of Galicia; their son Alfonso VII was subsequently to occupy the Castilian throne, and their granddaughter Constance became the wife of King Louis VII of France. Henry of Burgundy was meantime wedded to Alfonso's natural daughter, Teresa, and received at the same time certain lands on the west coast of the Peninsula between the valleys of the Minho and the Tagus; these regions had anciently formed the southern part of the kingdom of Galicia, but were now erected into a separate county, with the name of Portucalia or Portugal. At the outset it appears that Count Henry was in some degree subject to his cousin the ruler of Galicia, and that, in consequence, the relations between them were considerably strained in the ensuing years. Each distrusted the other and wished to absorb the other's dominions in his own. Both, however, were united in a common jealousy of their father-in-law and feudal suzerain Alfonso of León and Castile, whose lands they both coveted, and of whom they were resolved to render themselves independent. A long and bitter struggle ensued, and Portugal in the end was the only power to reap any permanent benefit from it.

The conflict began in earnest with the death of Alfonso VI in 1109. Though five times married, he left no legitimate male children, and was succeeded in both Leon and Castile by his daughter Urraca, whose Burgundian husband Raymond, the ruler of Galicia, had died two years before, leaving her with an infant son Alfonso. But Urraca was not long to remain a widow. Partly owing to the pressure of the nobles, who did not wish to see an unmarried woman occupy the throne, and partly because she dreaded the consequences of refusing him, she accepted, as her second husband, her kinsman, Alfonso the Warrior, the restless and ambitious sovereign of Aragon, who looked with covetous eyes upon the Leonese-Castilian inheritance. At first it was hoped that the union of all the Christian kingdoms of the north, effected by this marriage, would bring peace and quiet to the land, and bear fruit in glorious Christian victories against the Moors; but precisely the reverse was the case. Urraca profoundly disliked her Aragonese husband, whom she had married rather from fear than from inclination. She dreaded his ambition to make himself king of Leon and Castile. Open quarrel soon broke out between them. It was clear that the queen desired a divorce; and in this she was supported by the mass of the clergy, who had always protested against the Aragonese marriage on the ground that the parties were within the forbidden degrees of kinship. The Galicians also, who hated the thought of the intrusion of the Aragonese sovereign in their affairs, took sides at first with Urraca, and, under the lead of the famous Diego Gelmirez, archbishop of Compostela, supported the claims of Alfonso her son



against those of Alfonso her husband. In 1113 a solemn decree of a church council at Palencia annulled the marriage of Urraca and Alfonso of Aragon but did not thereby eliminate the latter from the affairs of western Spain. A furious war broke out between the divorced husband and wife; and the situation was further complicated by the fact that Urraca also became involved in a conflict with Alfonso her son, whose Galician supporters had previously aided her in getting rid of Alfonso her husband, but in whom she now recognized a dangerous rival to her own power.

The prevailing confusion afforded the rulers of Portugal a golden opportunity to win their independence, and they did not neglect it. Vigorous campaigns were launched in León and in Castile, invariably directed against whichever of the parties in those unhappy realms threatened to become predominant: even when, for one brief interval, Urraca and her son united their forces against the powerful rebel to the west of them, they were forced to agree to a peace which granted their foes a large addition to their territories. At one moment it almost seemed as if Count Henry's ambition would not be satisfied with the mere winning of freedom but would extend as far as the conquest of the thrones of León and of Galicia; but after his death in 1114, the separatist forces in Portugal once more gathered headway, and independence rather than the annexation of adjacent realms became the national watchword. For fourteen years Teresa, the widow of Count Henry, ruled in the name of her son Affonso Henriquez, and tided Portugal over one of the most critical periods of her existence; in 1128, however, she was forced to retire in favor of the Infante, who, though but seventeen years of age, refused to be kept longer in tutelage. In 1130 he invaded Galicia; and after a struggle of varying fortune, was obliged (1137) to sign a peace with Alfonso, the son of Urraca, in which he specifically acknowledged the condition of feudal vassalage which it was his object to shake off. But this state of affairs was not destined to endure. The restless Portuguese ruler could not stay his hand from fighting. If he could gain nothing at the expense of his Christian neighbors to the north and east, he would enlarge his dominions by attacking the infidel. In 1139 he won a creditable victory over the Moors at Ourique, far to the southward, and then returned with enhanced prestige to Galicia. After an indecisive battle, in which the Portuguese king was slightly wounded, it was apparently agreed, in accordance with the customs of chivalry, to commit the question of Portuguese independence to the issue of a tourney, between picked knights of the two opposing hosts, in the historic meadow of Valdevez. From the encounter the Portuguese emerged victorious, but long delays ensued before full acknowledgment of their freedom could be extorted from the king of Castile; for though the latter recognized his rival's right to the royal title, he craftily arranged to cede him certain Castilian lands to be held by him in feudal vassalage, and thus in some measure to preserve the relation of dependence which had previously existed. To elude this danger the king of Portugal approached the papacy and asked permission to hold his kingdom as vassal of the Holy See. This plan of playing off the pontiff against the king of Castile was not immediately successful; there were further difficulties about titles and tributes; but all the time the position of Affonso Henriquez grew steadily stronger. He was greatly helped by the conquest in 1147, with the aid of foreign crusaders, of the town of Lisbon. Finally, in 1179, Pope Alexander III not only acknowledged the validity of his title as king, but also the independence of his realm, and thenceforth the result of the struggle was a foregone conclusion. Whatever the claims of his rival in Castile, the king of Portugal had won virtual autonomy for his kingdom, and in the immediately succeeding centuries, while the tendency of the other peninsular realms was on the whole to coalesce, its destinies continued to remain separate from them.

A few comments on the significance of the attainment of Portuguese independence for Spain and for the Spanish Empire will not be out of place. The fact that it could be attained and maintained at all is, of course, the strongest evidence of the intensity of Spanish particularism, and of the weakness of the central power in León and Castile. There was almost no natural or geographical reason for it. The rivers and mountain chains run on the whole east and west, and

consequently form no barrier between Portugal and Spain. Though the character of the country changes somewhat as one crosses the present frontier, "it is impossible to find an adequate explanation of the separate existence of the two nations in the land: history furnishes the only key to this phenomenon". And the results of Portuguese independence are of even more immediate interest to us than its causes. That another nation held the greater part of the western coast of the Iberian Peninsula retarded the process of Spanish expansion in the Atlantic, and, when it finally came, probably altered its direction. The Portuguese sailed south and east before they sailed west, and thus forestalled Spain in Africa and India. Had Portugal not been there, Spain would probably have won extensive lands in these regions before she was tempted out into the western seas. On the other side of the peninsula also the effects of Portugal's presence are distinctly traceable. Had the western seacoast been free for the use of Castile, it is difficult to believe that she would have been so completely outstripped by the realms of the Crown of Aragon in maritime expansion during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Imperial experience would have been much more evenly divided between the two component parts of Spain before their union; and the Mediterranean possessions would not have been suffered to divert so large a share of her attention from the Indies. The course of Spain's imperial development was thus largely moulded by the fact that Portugal had won her independence; and when at last, in 1580, the destinies of the two nations were temporarily joined, the divergences of over four centuries proved ineradicable, and the union was really never more than a union in name.

The progress of the Reconquest was naturally much impeded by the constant recurrence of quarrels such as we have just described among the Christians of the north. That it progressed at all is indeed a wonderful tribute to the energy and valor of the mediaeval Spaniard, whenever he could spare time and attention from his particularistic strivings to aid in the completion of the national task. Obviously also, the rapidity of the Christian advance, besides being dependent on the state of internal affairs in Castile and León, was bound to vary in inverse proportion to the strength and unity of the Moslem foe to the southward. The Douro valley had been attained during the period of confusion in Moorish Spain which preceded the arrival of the first Omayyad. The boundary was pushed forward to the Tagus in the days when the infidels were divided into a number of petty states. The third great forward movement by the Christians, which was to limit the foe to the little kingdom of Granada, coincides with the gradual disintegration of the Almohade empire in the first part of the thirteenth century. In the long intervals that elapsed between these advances there was a constant series of raids and forays by both combatants, in which the offensive was naturally assumed by whichever side had temporarily attained preponderance. Under Abd ar-Rahman III and Almanzor, in the latter part of the tenth century, when the general line lay just south of the Douro basin, Moorish expeditions were constantly penetrating to the Galician and Asturian mountains and even to the Bay of Biscay. In 997 Almanzor removed the bells from the great church of Santiago de Compostela and carried them south to Cordova, to make lamps for the ceiling of the Mezquita there. On the other hand, Alfonso VII of Castile and León, seizing the favorable moment which succeeded the decline of the Almoravides and immediately preceded the arrival of the Almohades (1144-47), carried fire and sword throughout Andalusia, and finally crowned his achievements by temporarily capturing the town of Almeria with the aid of the fleets of Catalonia and Genoa. Whenever to the rare and happy circumstance of domestic peace and unity in León and Castile there was added the still rarer one of aid and succor from the realms of the Crown of Aragon, progress was invariably rapid and decisive. Aragon and Castile tended normally to diverge. The Aragonese with their more limited possibilities of territorial expansion in the peninsula naturally took far less interest in the task of the Reconquest than did their neighbors on the west. But in supreme crises they

stood loyally by their Castilian coreligionists and bore them precious aid in advancing the cause of Christendom.

Such a crisis was occasioned by the Almohade victory at Alarcos, on July 19, 1195, over the forces of Alfonso VIII of Castile. The Christians in the north had been lulled into a false sense of security by the fact that the Almohades had been in the Peninsula since 1149 without achieving any notable military success. They felt no fear of the infidel, and in time-honored fashion were quarreling among themselves. Portugal and Navarre were too much occupied with their own affairs to think of bearing aid to the king of Castile in his distress. The sovereign of León was actively hostile and permitted some of his most prominent warriors to serve in the armies of the infidel leader, while others ravaged the Castilian lands. In 1197 an attempt was made to secure peace between the two realms by the marriage of Berengaria, the daughter of Alfonso VIII of Castile, to Alfonso IX of León; but the union was declared void on the ground of consanguinity by Pope Innocent III. The pair were commanded to separate, and, on their refusal to yield, were promptly excommunicated, while the kingdom of León endured for seven years all the horrors that accompanied a thirteenth-century interdict. But the haughty pontiff was concerned for the welfare of Christian Spain, as well as for the observance of the laws of the church. When Berengaria and Alfonso acknowledged their fault and the invalidity of their marriage, he consented to legitimize their offspring: so that the eldest of their children, known to history as St. Ferdinand, was able in 1230 to ascend the united thrones of Leon and Castile. Furthermore, Innocent promised to excommunicate any Iberian potentate who should refuse to bear a part in the crusade on which the salvation of the Peninsula depended, and which was preached with feverish energy by the clergy throughout the length and breadth of the land. By threats and concessions, the kings of Portugal and Navarre were brought into line. Pedro of Aragon was enthusiastic for the cause. Only the jealous king of León held aloof, but his opposition was enough to cause disastrous delays; in 1211 an expedition into Andalusia had to be given up because Alfonso did not dare to leave his realm. Finally, however, in the spring of 1212 all was ready. Toledo was the rendezvous, and thither the knights of all the Iberian realms as well as crusaders from southern France and other European lands flocked for the great adventure. On June 20 the united forces turned southward. Whether they were discouraged by the long hot march across the desolate plains and by the lack of plunder, or whether treachery again was rife in the ranks, it is hard to tell; but the fact remains that despite all that clerical exhortation could do to prevent it, there were numerous desertions, particularly among the foreigners from north of the Pyrenees, who ravaged the Castilian lands in the course of their retreat, and were justly rebuked for their disgraceful conduct by being refused admission at the gates of Toledo. But the bulk of the Spanish levies remained loyal to the cause. The enemy, in superior numbers and confident of victory, permitted the Christians to occupy the chief passes of the Sierra Morena, and, guided by shepherds, to issue out into the great plain of Las Navas de Tolosa. The battle that ensued there on July 16 was the greatest of the Christian victories over the Moors recorded in the long annals of the Reconquest. Prodigies of valor were performed by King Alfonso of Castile, and also by Archbishop Roderic of Toledo, who animated the spirits of the Christian troops and has left us a personal description of the fight. A sudden and desperate rush of the Castilians against the silken tent of the Moorish leader was the crucial event of the day. The Christian losses were apparently small, while those of their foes are reported in all the contemporary chronicles to have been enormous: the figures given are obviously absurd, but there is every reason to think that the infidels suffered very heavily in the battle and still more in the flight that ensued.

Las Navas was unquestionably a glorious triumph; but it proved absolutely impossible for Alfonso to hold together his heterogeneous forces long enough to reap all the fruits of it. No sooner was the Moorish danger past than the allies began quarrelling among themselves, and the Castilian king spent the last years of his life in vain attempts to reconcile their differences. Then

on his death (1214) all the elements of anarchy and discord broke forth afresh. Henry, the son and heir of Alfonso, was a boy of ten; a regency was installed first under his mother and then, on her death a month later, under his sister Berengaria, the divorced wife of Alfonso, king of León. The Laras disputed the control of the government and were supported by the Leonese monarch; nay more, when in 1217 Henry was killed by the fall of a tile, and Berengaria, chosen queen in her own right, abdicated in favor of her son Ferdinand, the king of Leon forgot that Ferdinand was his son also, and prepared to wage war on Castile. The rebel barons aided him, and the wretched strife began anew. The father fought the son, and the son was supported by his mother. But Ferdinand had the better cause, and Berengaria proved the wisest of counsellors. All the hostile coalitions were put down. The Laras were forced to flee to the Moors, and Ferdinand strengthened himself by his marriage to Beatrice of Swabia, cousin of the Emperor Frederick II. In 1230 Alfonso died, and although he attempted in his will to oust Ferdinand from the succession in Leon, the energy and skill of Berengaria prevented this catastrophe, so that the two kingdoms were finally brought together under her son, never again to fall apart. And even before this happy consummation of his hopes, the new sovereign had signalized his advent to power by an outburst of renewed activity against the Moors.

Peace had been made between Castile and the infidels in December, 1213, just before the death of Alfonso VIII; and eleven years later, the uprisings of a number of local Moorish rulers rang the death knell of the empire of the Almohades in Spain. The opportunity was most favorable for Ferdinand of Castile; he made common cause with the principal one of the rebel chieftains and carried fire and sword through the upper valley of the Guadalquivir. The ruler of the Almohades crossed over shortly afterwards to Morocco, where another insurrection had broken out against his power; nay more, he even applied to the Castilian king for aid in suppressing it. Ferdinand was fully alive to the importance of establishing the Christian faith on the North African coast, and though the conquest of Andalusia was far from complete, he hastened to take advantage of the embarrassments of the Moorish ruler across the Strait. He promised the latter the military aid which he desired, but demanded in return a money payment, the cession of ten Andalusian fortresses, and finally the right to construct a Christian church in Morocco, where Spanish soldiers could worship undisturbed, and the bells announce the hours of service. These conditions were fully carried out. The Almohade power was reestablished in Morocco for the time being, by the soldiers of the king of Castile; the price of his intervention was duly paid; the church was built, and in 1233 a bishopric of Fez and Morocco was established by Pope Gregory IX—its first incumbent being a certain Agnellus. It continued to exist under the Merinite dynasty, which soon replaced the Almohades in Morocco. Its flock was composed of Christian soldiers serving in the Moorish armies, of Christian captives, and of Christian merchants established in the North African ports; but it finally perished after the fall of its Merinite protectors in the early years of the sixteenth century.

Meantime in Andalusia the Castilian conquests advanced apace. The departure of the Almohades for Morocco had left three principal centres of Moorish influence in Spain, each of which acknowledged the sway of a different ruling family. With the first of these, Valencia, we shall deal when we come to take up the affairs of the kingdom of Aragon. The other two, at Murcia and at Jaen, were reserved by King Ferdinand for Castile. Of these the former, under the dynasty of the Beni Hud, was at this time the more important. Though its capital lay to the eastward, its domains stretched right across the peninsula and included Cordova and Seville; clearly the Castilian king would have to attack and subdue it before any further advance to the southward could be made. An intermittent warfare, interrupted by a three years' truce during which Ferdinand and his foe made common cause against the Emir of Jaen, culminated in the capture of Cordova, which fell after a prolonged siege on June 29, 1236. It was a notable triumph for the Christian arms, not only for sentiment's sake, but because it opened up the entire valley of the

Guadalquivir for future operations; and Moorish captives were obliged to carry back on their shoulders to Santiago de Compostela the bells which had been taken by Almanzor in his famous raid of 997. The murder of the leader of the Beni Hud shortly afterwards caused Seville on the west to renounce its allegiance to that family and place itself under the suzerainty of the Almohade ruler across the strait, while to the eastward it enabled the armies of Ferdinand to penetrate to Murcia, whose submission was received in 1241. The Moorish ruler there was permitted to remain for some time longer and to exercise most of his functions, but as he paid one half the state revenues to the king of Castile, and specifically acknowledged his overlordship, he can scarcely be regarded as more than a viceroy. Ferdinand had thus carried the confines of his realm to the Mediterranean and cut off Aragon from the possibility of further expansion in the peninsula at the expense of the Moor.

Finally, in 1246, Ferdinand turned on Ibn al-Ahmar, the Nasride Emir of Jaen. The siege was well under way when the Moorish leader deemed it prudent to surrender his capital to the Castilian king, in return for permission to retain the bulk of his lands to the south of it in feudal vassalage to his victorious foe, and under payment of an annual tribute; he thereupon removed the seat of his authority to Granada, where he and his successors were to maintain themselves for two centuries and a half. One clause in the treaty between the Christian sovereign and the Granadan Emir stipulated that the latter should bear aid to his liege lord in besieging Seville, which, with the support of its Almohade sovereign across the Strait, now prepared to make a last desperate resistance. Situated as it was near the mouth of the Guadalquivir, where it could easily be relieved by its Moroccan master, it was plainly essential that the besieging army be supported by a fleet; and this was furnished for Ferdinand by a certain Ramón Bonifacio, a native of Burgos, and a well-known naval enthusiast and connoisseur, who managed to collect no less than eighteen vessels for the purpose in the Biscayan ports, hitherto the center of the shipping interest of western Spain. With these vessels he contrived to defeat a Moorish squadron off the mouth of the Guadalquivir; and he followed up this achievement by launching two of his victorious ships, on a favoring wind and tide, against a bridge of boats, which had enabled Seville to recruit its forces and replenish its provisions from the town of Triana across the river. The destruction of the bridge settled the fate of the city, which finally capitulated after a heroic resistance on November 23, 1248. With its fall the reconquest of southern Spain was practically complete, save for the Nasride realm of Granada, which stretched from Tarifa to the mouth of the Almanzora on the seacoast, and inland as far as Antequera and the upper waters of the Guadalquivir. Had Ferdinand turned at once on the Emir of Granada, he probably could have conquered that kingdom then and there, and anticipated by nearly two centuries and a half the work of Ferdinand and Isabella. But as Ibnar al-Ahm had loyally supported him against Seville, he saw no reason to break his treaty with him, and turned his attention instead to making ready a great expedition against Morocco, where the Merinites had supplanted the Almohades soon after the fall of Seville, and had furnished him an excuse for intervention by their incomplete fulfilment of the stipulations concerning the Christian bishopric at Fez. In the midst of his preparations, however, the king was overtaken by an untimely death (May 30, 1252)—one of the noblest figures in the history of the Spanish Empire, and deservedly venerated by his successors and their subjects long before he was canonized by Pope Clement X in 1671. He had dedicated his life with singlehearted devotion to the work of the Reconquest: he was valiant in war, generous in victory, loyal in the observance of his plighted word.

The first paragraph of the present chapter attempted to emphasize the continuity of the story of the reconquest of the Peninsula from the infidel and that of the conquest of an imperial domain beyond the sea. But like every long and complicated development, it naturally divides itself into a number of different stages, and the end of the reign of St. Ferdinand is one of the obvious places



for such a division. It marks the close of the most glorious and fortunate phase of the Reconquest, of the period when the national energies, save when dissipated by internal strife, were chiefly concentrated on the advance against the infidel. Before passing on to the more complicated period which follows the death of St. Ferdinand, a few general observations may be properly inserted in regard to the achievements of the preceding age.

Of course, the constant pressure of the war against the Moors preserved and stimulated all the fighting qualities for which the Spaniard has always been justly famed. The profession of arms was the most highly esteemed of all; it was the typical gentleman's occupation; the only others that could compare with it were the church, the navy, or the service of the crown. The fact that the Reconquest was preeminently a war of raids is moreover reflected in the military methods and armament of the time. The mediaeval Castilian soldier, as we shall later see, was in general much more lightly armed and better equipped for guerilla warfare in difficult country than the contemporaneous warriors of other European states. Two other distinctively Spanish characteristics, which took their rise in the physiographical peculiarities of the Peninsula, were greatly accentuated by the war against the Moors: namely, aversion to agriculture and concentration in cities. The devastation caused by the interminable incursions of hostile troops rendered the naturally infertile Meseta more barren still, and discouraged men from any attempt to till the soil; moreover, when any region changed hands, the complete or partial displacement of the local population could not possibly be accomplished without immense economic loss. Fear of a Moorish raid also contributed to cause men to desert the open country; they simply dared not live scattered in the fields where they would be at the mercy of a sudden attack, and the same consideration fostered the development of the cities, whose moats and walls alone furnished adequate protection. The immense importance of the municipalities in the history of Castile, as well as the absence of that concomitant of a predominantly agricultural existence—a full-fledged feudal system—are primarily explained by the ceaseless struggle against the infidel. The fact that the western Spanish realms counted for so little in the affairs of mediaeval Europe is also largely traceable to the war of the Reconquest. They were too much occupied at home to care what was going on abroad; and though their isolation was somewhat diminished in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the effects of it were sufficiently permanent to instill into their inhabitants a spirit of dislike and suspicion of foreigners, which powerfully affected the destinies of Spain and the Spanish Empire at a later day.

The nature of the relations of Christians and Moors during the wars of the Reconquest also calls for some explanation. We have already characterized the history of mediaeval Castile as first and foremost the history of a crusade; we have emphasized the fact that the reconquest of the Peninsula and also the conquest of an imperial domain beyond the sea were both undertaken in the name of the Christian faith. But in view of what we know of the relations of the Moors and Christians during most of the Middle Ages, it cannot be maintained that religious enthusiasm was as much of an actual motive force in the Reconquest as it was in the struggle for the dominion of the New World. It was constantly invoked as a means to an end; it was called upon to furnish symbols and war cries; but it was not until the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella that the Spanish soldier became a real religious zealot, and the resolve to propagate the Christian faith a dominant factor in his life. We have already met with numerous instances when Leonese and Castilian sovereigns sought the alliance of their infidel foes against their Christian rivals and rebel subjects at home. When cities and territories were captured by a Christian advance, it was the usual thing for the conquered Moors to remain there in the enjoyment of their own religion, laws, and property, and under the rule of their own local magistrates.

They were generally and rightly regarded as a most valuable portion of the population from a financial and industrial point of view; they bore priceless aid to the Christians in restoring some measure of prosperity to the devastated lands. Down to the middle of the thirteenth century it is

scarcely too much to say that they were not only gladly tolerated but highly esteemed. Many of the early Castilian monarchs deliberately strove to render the lot of the Moors who resided on their domains more agreeable than that which would have been their fate had they remained in the territories of the infidel. Any attempt to persecute them was vigorously resisted; they were protected, and often actively favored. After the early years of the fourteenth century, when the Pope and the ecclesiastical authorities began deliberately to inculcate intolerance, there is, as we shall later see, a different tale to tell; but during the period with which we are at present concerned, the history of the relations of the two faiths remains as an eternal refutation of the still too common statement that the Spaniard has been a bigot and a fanatic at every stage of his development. He has always shown a tendency in that direction; his religious antipathies have always been easy to rouse; and he has unquestionably won his most notable victories when inspired by the conviction that he was fighting the battle of the Cross. But it would be mistaking the outward symbol for the actual substance to assert that the reconquest of the peninsula was primarily due to zeal for the faith, as many of the victories of Spain in the sixteenth century unquestionably were. "A Spanish knight of the Middle Ages fought neither for his country nor for his religion; he fought, like the Cid, to get something to eat, whether under a Christian or a Moslem prince". What had been a means to an end in the Middle Ages first became under Ferdinand and Isabella an end in itself. In their efforts to instill the largest possible measure of religious fervor into their subjects, the Catholic Kings and their successors had the inestimable advantage of being able to utilize ancient battle cries, and thus to make their program of militant Catholicism seem the logical consequence of what had gone before. Yet the continuity between reconquest and conquest, so striking in a multitude of ways, is in this single respect perhaps more apparent than real.

One other phase of the period we are considering demands passing comment—namely, the occasional use of the title of Emperor in Spain and the gradual development of the imperial idea during the first five centuries of the war of the Reconquest. We have repeatedly pointed out that progress Against the Moors was constantly being hindered by the rivalries of the different kingdoms in the north: if, therefore, any Christian sovereign should succeed in attaining sufficient preeminence over his fellow monarchs to justify him in proclaiming it to the world by the assumption of the imperial title, he would further the cause of Spanish unity and the advance of the Cross against the Crescent. The first of the Castilian kings to do this was Alfonso VI, the conqueror of Toledo, who took the title of Emperor as a means of asserting his superiority over the other Christian kings in the peninsula. It even appears that he went so far as to style himself '*Emperador de los dos cultos*' in order to emphasize the fact that some of the Moorish kings in the south had declared themselves his vassals. But the imperial title and idea were developed much further in the reign of Alfonso's grandson, usually reckoned as Alfonso VII, whom we have already encountered as a protagonist in the terrible conflicts of his mother Urraca, his Aragonese stepfather Alfonso the Warrior, and the early rulers of Portugal. By the year 1135 he had extended his power over all the West Spanish realms; many of the Moorish kings of the peninsula paid him tribute; in fact his authority reached so far that Aragon and Catalonia and even some of the counts and dukes of the south of France acknowledged his overlordship. In token of his greatness, he elicited from a church council at Leon a solemn declaration that as King of Kings he should assume the imperial title.

A coronation ceremony of unprecedented magnificence ensued: it was repeated at Toledo (which thenceforth took the name of the Imperial City) and also at Santiago de Compostela. Over and above all this, Alfonso demanded and obtained from Pope Innocent II permission to style himself King of Kings; and it is by no means fanciful to suppose that this new dignity was intended to connote some measure of derogation of the vague overlordship claimed by the Holy Roman Emperors, with whom Innocent was not on the best of terms.

Certainly, Alfonso VII had carried the whole imperial idea much further than his grandfather before him. His assumption of the imperial dignity had been so much more formal and conspicuous than that of the conqueror of Toledo that it made a far deeper impression on his subjects: he is, in fact, usually known as Alfonso the Emperor in the interminable list of Spanish kings. Furthermore, his negotiations with Innocent II had invested the title with a new significance. What had hitherto been employed merely as establishing a claim to preeminence over the other kings of Spain could henceforth also be interpreted as an assertion of independence of any sort of subordination to any outside power, a matter on which the Spaniard had been proverbially sensitive since the days of Bernardo del Carpio. From the time of Alfonso VII, however, the imperial title gradually drops out of sight. St. Ferdinand, who so greatly enhanced the extent and prestige of Castile, was most anxious to revive it, and was unusually well fitted to do so, both by his character and by the circumstances of his reign; but he did not live to realize his ambition, and the subsequent attempt of his scholarly son to win for himself the crown of the Hohenstaufen was destined to result in a most miserable fiasco. Still the imperial tradition had been too firmly planted in mediaeval Castile to be entirely forgotten. Coupled with her greater geographical extent, it gave the western kingdom a certain preeminence over the realms of the Crown of Aragon, which is significantly revealed in the fact that her monarchs were not seldom loosely spoken of as 'Kings of Spain' long before the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella. When the imperial dignity was finally revived under Charles V, it was bound to arouse many stirring memories, and the glories which the Spaniards had never ceased to associate with it went far to reconcile them to the government of a foreign dynasty.

CHAPTER II  
FROM ALFONSO THE LEARNED TO THE CATHLIC KINGS

The two centuries of Castilian history which elapse between the death of St. Ferdinand and the middle of the fifteenth century form a period of transition, in which the national energies, hitherto principally occupied with the work of the Reconquest, begin to expand in other directions. Measured by the progress which it sees made against the infidel, it is very disappointing. Though often attacked, and somewhat diminished in extent, Granada remained in Moorish hands till after the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile. But there are brighter if less immediately obvious sides to the picture. The foreign relations of the kingdom, not only with the other states in the peninsula, but also with England, France, and the remoter European nations, developed rapidly and assumed an importance which they had never attained before.

In the early fifteenth century Castilian ambassadors penetrated beyond the steppes of Bokhara, and Castilian conquistadores to the islands of the Atlantic. Rapid social and constitutional development is also a notable feature of this period. The growth of the territory and population of the kingdom rendered necessary the creation of new institutions to deal with the problems which arose in connection with it, and a very large portion of the story of this stage of the national development will be found in later chapters on constitutional affairs. The narrative history may, in the meantime, be conveniently treated in topical fashion. Only certain phases of it are essential to a comprehension of the development of the Spanish Empire, and we can therefore omit entirely many subjects which would unquestionably deserve space in a history of Spain. The present chapter will deal with the internal affairs of Castile and her relations with her European neighbors, while the next one will be devoted to an account of her earliest ventures overseas.

Anarchy and disruption at home—the inevitable result of the inability of the majority of the Castilian kings to control and dominate their rebel baronage—are the most prominent features of the history of the time. The struggle which raged between the Castilian crown and the nobles during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has its parallel in contemporary England and France and indeed over all Europe, but it is doubtful if the English monarchs in the darkest days of the Wars of the Roses, or the French during the evil years of the Armagnacs and Burgundians, ever reached such a depth of degradation as was the lot of some of the Castilian sovereigns in the epoch between St. Ferdinand and the Catholic Kings. It is happily unnecessary to describe in detail the ebbs and flows of this paralyzing internal strife: we need only bear in mind that it was almost uninterrupted, and touch briefly upon its course at those points where its history becomes relevant to the matters which more immediately concern us. Yet it may not be amiss to say a word or two about the reasons for it, and to try to explain why the anarchy should have been so unrestrained. Over and above the general tradition of separatism and disunion, always dominant in the Iberian Peninsula, over and above the immediate memories of the humiliation of previous Castilian monarchs at the hands of insubordinate vassals like the Cid, there were several special causes which go to explain the pitiable weakness of the Castilian crown during the period at present under review.

In the first place the fact that the Reconquest was virtually accomplished was inimical to the interests of the monarchy. The energies of the nobles, hitherto largely employed in crusades against the Moors, now found vent in internal rebellion. The fact that Granada remained so long

unconquered was also probably more harmful than favorable in its effect. The Moorish realm was not powerful enough to evoke an immediate, united effort to destroy it: yet it constituted a perpetual annoyance, sufficient to prevent Castile from embarking wholeheartedly on any other great national enterprise, which might have served to divert the attention of the nobles from their internal grievances.

Secondly, the period we are considering saw an unusual number of minorities, no less in fact than four out of ten reigns. Ferdinand IV became king at nine, Alfonso XI at one, Henry III at eleven, and John II at two. “Woe to the land whose king is a child”. Moreover, when there was not a minority, there was often a disputed succession. Despite the law of *Las Siete Partidas*, the grandchildren of Alfonso X were despoiled of their just inheritance by their uncle Sancho: though their rights were never recognized, their claims were not speedily forgotten, and constituted a rallying cry for malcontents until well into the fourteenth century. The whole reign of Pedro the Cruel (1350-69) is one long struggle of the king to maintain himself against his illegitimate but more attractive half-brother, Henry of Trastamara, who finally emerged victorious after the bloody drama of Montiel. During the entire conflict, in which the Castilian nobles took opposite sides, and France and England intervened, the nation was in confusion and uproar, and the claims of the legitimate monarch were not satisfied till the marriage of Henry the Invalid to the daughter of John of Gaunt in 1388. Even Isabella the Catholic had to fight for her throne against a rival candidate—La Beltraneja—whose legal claims were stronger than her own, and who was supported by King Alfonso the African of Portugal. Under such circumstances no monarchy could expect to thrive.

In the third place, the characters and policies of most of the Castilian kings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were certainly not calculated to hold the aristocracy in check. The average level of the ability as rulers of the ten sovereigns between St. Ferdinand and Ferdinand and Isabella was not high. Alfonso X’s remarkable talents were scientific and literary rather than political. Of his nine successors only Alfonso XI, Henry III, and possibly John I have any claim to greatness, while kings like John II and Henry IV were merely the sport of factions, and moved along the line of least resistance, incapable of following any policy of their own. Lavishness in gifts of land and money was also a besetting sin. While the Reconquest was in full blast, there was ample reason why a successful monarch should reward his faithful followers with grants out of the territories that he had conquered, more especially as he would naturally be desirous to repopulate the areas devastated by the war; but now that the boundaries of the realm were approximately fixed, the continuation of such gifts could only mean that the sovereign was obliged to bid for the loyalty of his powerful subjects, which he could not command. Alfonso X distributed his favors without reserve in order to bribe his nobles to support his versatile but ineffective foreign policy. Henry of Trastamara was so eager to reward the supporters of his newly established dynasty that he has gone down to history as *El Dadivoso*. In neither case did the misplaced generosity of the monarch attain the desired end. The nobles who had enjoyed the largest measure of the royal munificence were almost invariably the leaders in the next revolt. In addition, then, to being crippled by minorities and disputed successions, the Castilian sovereigns were on the whole singularly unfortunate in their methods of handling the principal problem with which they, like other mediaeval monarchs, were perpetually confronted—that of controlling a rebel baronage.

Finally, there can be little doubt that all the disruptive and anarchical tendencies of the time were enormously accentuated by the lamentable inefficiency of the very notable scholar who succeeded St. Ferdinand on the united thrones of Leon and Castile. The reign of Alfonso X saw the Castilian nobility gain a vantage point in its age-long struggle with the Castilian monarchy which it was not forced to relinquish until the time of Ferdinand and Isabella. It also witnessed the beginnings of some of the most significant external developments of Castile during



the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It came at a most critical moment in the national development, when the Reconquest had been virtually accomplished, when Leon and Castile had been permanently united, when the nation was easily amenable to new influences and unusually ready to follow whithersoever it was led. To the character and career of Alfonso the Learned many of the mightiest currents in the subsequent history of Spain and the Spanish Empire are directly traceable. It is therefore essential that we should become familiar with the principal events of his reign.

It has been well said of Alfonso X that he would have had more success in any other role than that of a king. His intellectual gifts were of the highest order: he was famous for his *sabiduria* to the ends of the earth. As a lawgiver and codifier, he was unsurpassed. His astronomical tables were a distinct improvement over those of Ptolemy; his historical and poetical contributions to the literature of his native land place him in the front rank of mediaeval Spanish authors. "If I had been present at the Creation", he is reported to have said, "I could have arranged the world better". The same extraordinary versatility which marked his activities as a scholar was at once the distinguishing feature and the ruin of his career as a monarch. He closely resembled the Emperor Maximilian I of Germany in his fondness for prosecuting a number of inconsistent projects at the same time, and in his complete inability to carry any one of them to its definite logical conclusion. In this respect he forms the sharpest possible contrast with most of his predecessors, who had usually been so completely absorbed in expelling the Moors from the peninsula, and in dominating their rebel subjects, that Castile had often been completely isolated from the rest of Europe. It was under Alfonso X that the nation began to have more irons in the fire than it could handle, to be launched on a career more ambitious than was warranted by its resources, a foretaste of the imperial days of the sixteenth century.

From his father, the Scholar King had inherited the project of carrying the Christian arms across the Straits of Gibraltar—certainly a logical path of development, though it might have been wiser to finish with Granada first. Armies and a fleet were prepared; the papacy promised support; but before the expedition could get under way, Alfonso's attention was distracted by other cares, and the whole affair had to be abandoned. The internal state of the realm gave the gravest cause for alarm. In addition to impoverishing himself by lavish grants to the *ricos hombres*, Alfonso had debased the coinage under the delusion that he could thus alleviate the pitiable poverty of the third estate. Naturally the remedy proved worse than the disease; the evil was increased instead of diminished. Though the king of Granada was, for the time being, friendly, chiefly owing to the fact that Alfonso at his accession had voluntarily diminished by one sixth the tribute annually paid him by his Moorish vassal in recognition of his overlordship, the Scholar King's relations with all his Christian neighbors were in a most parlous state. With James the Conqueror of Aragon he had already had his difficulties before his accession, over the frontiers between their realms in the region of Murcia and Valencia. To this ground for hostility, others were added by the two kings' treatment of their respective wives, and by the fact that both were ambitious to control the destinies of the little realm of Navarre, which had recently fallen to the family of the counts of Champagne. Though naturally anxious above all to safeguard their own independence, the Navarrese were less averse to Aragon's domination than to that of Castile; and shortly after Alfonso's accession, a marriage had been arranged between the young Navarrese sovereign, Teobaldo, and Constance, the daughter of James the Conqueror, with an implied agreement that the king of Aragon should protect his son-in-law in case of a Castilian attack. Alfonso was not the man to disappoint them, and desultory hostilities along the Navarrese frontier ensued till 1257, when peace was made without advantage to either party; but the whole affair had served to distract Alfonso's attention from other far more important matters, and to draw off troops which might much more profitably have been elsewhere employed.

Another madcap adventure of the Scholar King carried him across the Pyrenees into France. His great-grandfather, Alfonso VIII of Castile, had been married in 1169 to Eleanor, the daughter of Henry II of England, and his wife had brought him the duchy of Gascony as her dowry. In 1204 Alfonso VIII had failed in an endeavor to substantiate his claims to the territory in question; but they had not been forgotten, and in 1253, taking advantage of the fact that the Gascons were in revolt against their English suzerain, Alfonso X determined to revive them. He prepared a large army, which apparently was in great measure composed of Moorish troops. Not satisfied with the mere prospect of taking Gascony, he laid plans for the invasion of the British Isles. But Henry III of England was in no mood to fight, and at the last moment Alfonso listened to his overtures for peace. Prince Edward of England was married to the 'good queen' Eleanor, Infanta of Castile, in the cathedral of Burgos, on October 18, 1254; and was knighted on the occasion by his erratic brother-in-law, who also seized the opportunity to renounce all Castilian claims to Gascony without any countervailing advantage. Episodes of this kind were not calculated to raise the Scholar King's prestige with his own subjects.

With Portugal also, Alfonso had his difficulties; and their history goes to show that in addition to embarking on remote and hazardous adventures in which he had no reasonable chance of success, the Castilian king not seldom made the complementary error of failing vigorously to pursue more valid claims in matters nearer at home. After being driven back across the Tagus by the Almohades, the Portuguese had again advanced to the southward, hand in hand with their Castilian brethren to the east of them, during the first half of the thirteenth century. Whether or not any boundary between the conquests of the two Christian kingdoms had been agreed on beforehand seems doubtful; the current of the Guadiana was certainly the logical line of demarcation, but it is clear that the Portuguese, as they advanced, captured a number of towns on its eastern bank without the slightest protest from Castile, and they finally drove a wedge through to the sea at the Guadiana's mouth which included places on both the Castilian and Portuguese sides. In the course of their conquests, moreover, they made extensive territorial grants on both banks of the stream to the Hospitallers and other orders of military knighthood who had borne the brunt of the campaign, thus further increasing complications already great. Meantime, in 1248, St. Ferdinand had captured Seville. Since its sovereign had considered himself overlord of the whole Moorish province of Algarve, which stretched westward along the southern shore of Portugal to the Atlantic, the Castilian king not unnaturally maintained that he had inherited this distinction; and his claim derived additional strength from the fact that his vassal, the Moorish king of Niebla, who had been permitted to retain his kingdom on acknowledgment of the suzerainty of Castile, also strenuously asserted that western Algarve fell within the limits of his dominions. In fact, it was on the pretext of safeguarding the rights of the king of Niebla that Alfonso, while still Infante, made the first move to prevent the Portuguese occupation of the territory in question. For some time, the matter hung fire, owing to the reluctance of St. Ferdinand to quarrel with a coreligionist; though it seems probable that Castilian troops had several times penetrated into western Algarve before the accession of Alfonso X. After he had become king, however, the campaign was prosecuted with greater vigor. The claims of the king of Niebla had by this time fallen into the background; the disputed territory was obviously destined to become either Portuguese or Castilian; and several towns had fallen before the assaults of the soldiers of the Scholar King, when the representatives of Pope Innocent IV, who wished to see the rival nations cooperate in a crusade against the Moor, induced their respective sovereigns to make peace. In June, 1253, it was arranged that Beatrice, the natural daughter of Alfonso X, should wed Affonso III, king of Portugal, in order to unite the warring dynasties; but there is the widest discrepancy among different historians as to the political conditions which accompanied the marriage. It seems probable, however, that the agreement was that Affonso of Portugal should cede to Alfonso of Castile the usufruct of Algarve, including all the lands conquered by Portugal east of the Guadiana, for a certain specified time, at the expiration of which the entire territory

east and west of the stream, including Moura and Serpa, and even Aroche and Aracena, should revert to Portugal.

But Affonso of Portugal was not willing even to allow Alfonso of Castile to enjoy in peace the rights in Algarve which the treaty of 1253 had vouchsafed to him. Taking advantage of the many outside affairs which constantly distracted the attention of the Castilian king, he set himself to work to elbow him gradually out of the disputed territory. For a time, Alfonso X tamely submitted to this invasion of his lawful rights; he even ceased to call himself king of Algarve; but finally, in 1257 a revolt on the part of his quondam protégé, the king of Niebla, induced him to make a fresh effort to assert his claims. In alliance with the king of Granada, he attacked Niebla, and after a nine months' siege (in which it seems possible that explosives of some sort were used for the first time in the peninsula) captured it. Its surrender included that of the neighboring territories over which its ruler held sway, and also apparently such claims as he exercised over Algarve; certainly, the hold of the Castilian king on the towns claimed by Portugal east of the Guadiana was immensely strengthened by the victory which he had won. It is possible that Alfonso might have pushed his victory further across the river into western Algarve in the succeeding years, had not his ally, the king of Granada, deserted him and broken out into revolt. But in order to deal with this new foe, he needed peace with his rival in the west; so, on April 20, 1263, he appointed delegates to arrange with representatives of Affonso III for the drawing of a permanent boundary between the two realms. In September 1264 a treaty was made in which the whole of western Algarve was definitely ceded to the king of Portugal in return for the latter's promise to aid his brother of Castile either in money or in men in his war against the infidel. Three years later, in 1267, at a fresh treaty at Badajoz, this last condition, which possibly carried with it some slight implication of feudal inferiority, was voluntarily removed by Alfonso X in a burst of family gratitude and affection occasioned by the sending to the Castilian court of his little five-year-old grandson, Diniz (the son of Beatrice and Affonso of Portugal and heir to the Portuguese throne), to receive at the hand of his famous grandfather the honor of knighthood. The Scholar King also apparently seized the occasion to renounce the title of king of Algarve and "ceded to Affonso III without any restriction all right which might belong to him in that region in virtue of any former treaty or in any way". This cession, however, can only be construed as applying to those parts of the ancient Algarve lying west of the Guadiana, for the Castilian conquest of the territories of the king of Niebla and the Portuguese surrender of the castles of Aroche and Aracena confirmed the title of the Scholar King to the territories to the east of it. The natural river boundary between the two realms was thus established from the confluence of the Caya and the Guadiana to the sea, save for the small triangle in which the towns of Moura and Serpa lay. These places were in the hands of the Portuguese Knights Hospitallers, and long negotiations were necessary before Alfonso finally managed to get a temporary hold on them in 1281. The Castilian tenure of them, however, was but short: the Portuguese held that they were included in the dowry of Beatrice under the treaty of 1253 and were determined to get them back. The opportunity came during the minority of Ferdinand IV, when Castile was so weakened by internal confusion that the Queen Regent Maria was glad to purchase immunity from a Portuguese invasion by the surrender of the disputed lands.

With this arrangement the Castilian-Portuguese boundary in this region was finally fixed on the line which it has retained without substantial alteration until this day. It may seem as if Alfonso X lacked adequate justification for a more strenuous assertion of his claims to western Algarve. Geographical considerations were clearly against him, for the channel of the Guadiana was certainly the natural boundary between Portugal and Castile. On the other hand, the history of the previous relations between the two realms, the need of Castile, which Alfonso fully appreciated, for a more extended seaboard on the Atlantic, and finally the fact that, as conquerors of the kings of Seville and of Niebla, the Castilian sovereigns had a right to consider

themselves the heirs of their claims, may all be urged in support of the view that in this matter he was unwarrantably slack in enforcing his just rights. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that if he had pursued a more vigorous policy in regard to the land in southern Portugal, the subsequent loss of Moura and Serpa and the territories east of the Guadiana, to which the western kingdom had far less valid title, might have been effectually prevented. In any case, Alfonso's rights in this whole Portuguese affair were certainly far better worth insisting on than his pretensions to Navarre or Gascony; but the very fact that they were nearer and more obvious was probably what caused him to neglect them. That his successors continued after his death to bear the title of kings of Algarve showed plainly that they never wholeheartedly approved of his renunciation.

From Alfonso's dealings with Portugal, it is natural to turn to his relations with Ibn al-Ahmar, the king of Granada, who at first had supported him in his struggle for Algarve, but subsequently became a thorn in his side. The Granadan ruler had loyally, though somewhat reluctantly, obeyed the summons of his Christian suzerain to aid him in suppressing a revolt of the Moorish town of Jerez, which lay within the limits of Castile, during the early years of Alfonso's reign; but it seems highly probable that on that occasion, as well as in the subsequent operations against the king of Niebla, Ibn al-Ahmar had taken the measure of the inefficiency of the Castilian king, and began to plan to rebel against him when opportunity offered. Cautious by nature, however, he determined to put on others the responsibility for the initial step. He secretly encouraged a new revolt at Jerez, and secured money and troops to support it from Yusuf, the Merinite ruler of Morocco across the Strait; he even waited until the rebellion spread eastward into Murcia (where it will be remembered that St. Ferdinand had permitted the local Moorish ruler to remain in the enjoyment of a considerable measure of autonomy) before he was willing openly to join the insurgents. Even then his loyalty to his coreligionists was but evanescent. The power of the king of Castile was still considerable, as was proved by his surprise and capture, on September 14, 1262, of the important town of Cadiz, which the Moors had neglected to defend. James the Conqueror of Aragon, moreover, effectively supported the Scholar King on the eastward by invading the rebel kingdom of Murcia, and finally taking the capital in January-February, 1266; according to previous agreement he loyally handed over his conquest to Alfonso of Castile, who lost no time in definitely incorporating it into his dominions. The significance of these events was not lost on Ibn al-Ahmar, who was the last man in the world to be caught on the losing side. He was jealous, moreover, of the extent of the authority of Yusuf of Morocco, which he feared might ultimately prove, inimical to his own; while, on the other hand, he seems to have been considerably impressed by the news of an understanding which had been reached between Alfonso X and the king of Tlemcen against the Merinite. The net result was that in 1265, even before the final fall of Murcia, the Granadan Emir deserted his allies, and made peace with the king of Castile, declaring himself once more the latter's loyal vassal, in return for Alfonso's promise not to aid the wadis of Guadix, Malaga, and Comares, who had recently broken out in revolt against him.

During the next few years, the scene shifted again. In the latter part of the reign of Ibn al-Ahmar, who died in 1273, and in the earlier years of that of his son and successor, Mohammed II, a number of important Castilian malcontents and rebels had found refuge at the Granadan court. At first, they were utilized by the Emir to drive Yusuf the Merinite out of Spain, but finally they persuaded their new lord to reverse the process, and, taking advantage of a temporary absence of Alfonso from the peninsula, to call back the Moroccan sovereign to cooperate in a joint attack upon Castile. Tarifa and Algeciras were surrendered to him to facilitate his landing; in 1275 Yusuf arrived with a force of seventeen thousand men, and, in alliance with the Emir of Granada, carried fire and sword into Christian Spain. The Castilian troops which opposed him were not on the whole effectively led; the only pitched battle of the campaign—at Ecija—was a

Moorish victory, and in 1276 Yusuf returned, gorged with booty, to Morocco. In 1277 he came again, followed by his son with reinforcements, and from that time onward, till after the end of Alfonso's reign, incessant fighting took place by land and sea up and down the southern coasts of the peninsula. But it must not for one moment be assumed that in these combats the sides remained the same: quite the contrary, they changed from day to day. A new element was introduced by the alliance of the Emir of Granada with Sancho, the younger son of Alfonso X, who desired to oust his nephews, the Infantes de la Cerda, from their just inheritance. On the other hand, Mohammed's jealousy of the power of Yusuf, whenever the latter's star was in the ascendant, prevented any very effective cooperation between the two Moorish sovereigns. Each was quite as often in alliance with Castile against the other, as he was with the other against Castile. Peace was finally made in the first year of the following reign. Yusuf the Merinite, by all odds the ablest of the combatants, was the only one who could boast that he was any better off than when he began. Tarifa, Algeciras, Ronda, and Guadix remained for the time being in his possession, and a number of precious Arab books and works of art, which had fallen into Christian hands at the capture of Cordova and Seville, were delivered over to him. The whole course and final issue of the conflict affords a significant illustration of the fact that Granada during this period owed a large share of its power, and perhaps even its continued existence, to the protection which was from time to time extended to it from across the Strait.

All the various plans and projects of the Scholar King which we have thus far examined concern themselves with the affairs of the peninsula, or at least with those of the lands directly adjacent to it. But Alfonso was also much involved with the other states of Western Europe. Rightly or wrongly, he was convinced that the name of Castile was not sufficiently often heard beyond the Pyrenees. He was exceedingly anxious to gain for his nation a more considerable place in the eyes of the other sovereigns of the time. He married his half-sister to one of the greatest of English kings, and his eldest son to the daughter of Louis IX of France. His cousin was the wife of the Latin Emperor of Constantinople, and when she came to beg his aid in ransoming her son Philip from the hands of the Venetians, Alfonso granted her thrice the sum she asked for—a proceeding which evoked the bitterest complaint from his people and foreshadowed the way in which Spain was to be drained of its wealth for totally non-Spanish objects in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But there was another opportunity to advance the dignity and preeminence of the Castilian name beyond the borders of the realm which appealed more intensely to the Scholar King than all the rest. Through his mother, Beatrice of Swabia, he was near of kin to the Hohenstaufen emperors, whose dynasty in Germany had come to such an unhappy end only two years after he ascended the throne. The imperial title, as we have already seen, had a certain tradition behind it in Spain, and had been actually assumed, though with a somewhat limited and special significance, by two of Alfonso's predecessors and namesakes on the Castilian throne. It is not difficult to understand why a man of Alfonso's peculiar makeup should have hit upon the idea, in the prevailing uncertainty which followed the death of Conrad IV, of putting himself forward as a candidate for the succession in the Empire. The rank and file of his subjects opposed the plan quite as vigorously and for very much the same reasons as their descendants two and a half centuries later opposed a similar attempt by the first Hapsburg sovereign of Spain; but while Charles V silenced complaints by his success, Alfonso only increased them by his failure. It is happily unnecessary for us to enter into the details of the Scholar King's efforts to win the imperial crown; they continued intermittently for a score of years. He had on the whole the support of France and of the Ghibelline princes in Italy and Germany, and he was lavish in spending money to bribe the electors. On the other hand he had to reckon, save at the very outset, with papal opposition, which became open and pronounced under Pope Gregory X. But the fact that he did not appear personally in the Empire was the fundamental cause of his ill success. Though he held more votes in the electoral college than his nearest competitor, Richard of Cornwall, and was actually proclaimed Emperor, he



suffered his rival to come to Aix-la-Chapelle, to be crowned there on May 12, 1257, and to perform various acts of imperial authority, while he himself remained passive in Castile. When Richard died in 1272, Alfonso returned to the charge, only to see the elusive crown once more escape him with the unanimous election of Rudolph of Hapsburg in October, 1273; and a subsequent interview with Gregory X at Beaucaire, in which he protested against the setting aside of his just claims, only served to reveal the full measure of his impotence. He aspired to be emperor, though he was not even able to play the king. He had tried to increase the dignity and preeminence of Castile in Western Europe, but he only succeeded in abasing it, and the chief result of his lamentable failure was to give excuse and opportunity for the great rebellion of his subjects under the leadership of his son which was to bring down his gray hairs with sorrow to the grave.

Alfonso's eldest and favorite son, Ferdinand de la Cerda, who had married the daughter of St. Louis, had died in 1275 during the campaign against the Moors, and had left two children, Alfonso and Ferdinand, the so-called Infantes de la Cerda, who, under the law of *Las Siete Partidas*, were the legal heirs to their grandfather's throne. But Alfonso's second son, the Infante Sancho, restless and ambitious, determined to claim the succession for himself on the ground of the inexpediency of placing the crown on the head of a child. Taking advantage of the general disgust caused by Alfonso's imperial adventure, he gathered round himself a large party of malcontents. His two younger brothers also sided with him. So powerful was the Infante, that Alfonso, on his return from his interview with Gregory X at Beaucaire, weakly yielded to his importunities, reversed the order of succession established in *Las Siete Partidas*, and caused Sancho to be recognized as the heir to the throne. Furious at Alfonso's failure to support his grandchildren's claims, the widowed French mother of the Infantes de la Cerda fled with them to Aragon, where she hoped to receive aid from Pedro III; but the latter, besides being anxious to have hostages for the good behavior of France and Castile during his projected expedition to Sicily, had already been won over by Sancho, and the final result was that the Infantes were confined for the next ten years in the fortress of Jativa. Philip III of France, however, came forward to support his nephews. At his instance Alfonso hit upon the fatal idea of dismembering his realm in order to satisfy both parties; he proposed to erect the city of Jaen and the neighboring territories into a separate kingdom for the Infantes, and to leave the rest to Sancho; but the latter would not accept the compromise, and war ensued between father and son. Castile and Leon supported almost unitedly the cause of Sancho; in 1282, the Cortes were summoned by the latter at Valladolid, and Alfonso was declared deposed. In the following year Alfonso humiliated himself to the extent of begging aid from Yusuf the Merinite against his own subjects and children, and even sent him his royal crown as security for a loan of sixty thousand *doblas*. Such a shameful spectacle provoked the inevitable reaction. Sancho's party was weakened by desertion. The Pope placed him and his adherents under an interdict, and the cause of Alfonso was by no means hopeless, when he fell ill, and died at Seville on April 4, 1284; the device which is still borne on the city's shield commemorates its loyalty to its unfortunate sovereign. Alfonso's last will and testament disinherited Sancho and left the crown of Castile to the Infantes de la Cerda, but it also provided that two separate kingdoms—Seville and Murcia—be carved out of the realm for the benefit of his two younger sons, John and James, with whom he had become reconciled at the last. This arrangement was, of course, in flat contradiction to the fundamental laws of the monarchy, which expressly forbade the dismemberment of the realm; a fact which doubtless made it easier for Sancho to ignore it as well as the provision which disinherited him. At any rate, he succeeded his father on the throne of Castile. The laws and will which the Scholar King had made remained a dead letter for many years to come.

The period of Alfonso X was thus a great turning point in the history of Castile. It saw her launched for the first time on a number of different lines of development which were ultimately

destined vitally to affect the fortunes of the Spanish Empire. During the reigns of the nine monarchs who ruled between the Scholar King and Ferdinand and Isabella, the nation moved further along these lines, but undertook little that was new; so that, save for the two great ventures overseas which are recorded in the next chapter, the narrative history of Castile in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries may be adequately covered by following up the results of the policy and impolicy of Alfonso. Of these, as we have already seen, baronial anarchy and monarchical impotence were at once the most important and the worst, but further than that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon them here. The relations of Castile with Aragon, with Portugal, with Granada and North Africa, with France and with England, demand more extended treatment, and we can take up the story in each case at the point where we left it in the reign of the Scholar King.

It would perhaps be natural, in examining the relations of Castile and Aragon during the two centuries which precede the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, to look for some evidence of the gradual growth of a policy and sentiment of union between the two realms, especially on the part of Castile, whose final amalgamation with Leon in the reign of St. Ferdinand might have been expected to stimulate an ambition to repeat the experiment on a larger scale. Some Spanish historians have thought that they have found such evidence. They harp on the precedents of Sancho the Great and Alfonso the Warrior. They lay strong emphasis on the reign of the 'good regent' Ferdinand of Castile in Aragon from 1412 to 1416, as a foreshadowing of that of Ferdinand and Isabella, and speak as if the union of the crowns had been inevitable from the very first. But an impartial examination of the relations of the two kingdoms during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which does not assume foreknowledge of what had not yet occurred, reveals few traces of anything like a consistent policy of Castile towards her sister kingdom on the east. If her union with Leon furnished a precedent for union with Aragon, the powerful current of Spanish separatism exercised a strong influence in the other direction. The elimination of serious danger from the Moors removed the strongest force which had hitherto served to draw Christian Spain together. It is difficult, in fact, to find any thread on which to hang the story of the dealings of Castile and Aragon during this period, save perhaps the proneness of each to make the most of the internal dissensions of the other. Their relations resolved themselves for the most part into a number of isolated, and on the whole unedifying, episodes, which doubtless demonstrated the need of union, but did not betoken the presence of any consistent effort to attain it.

When Alfonso X died in 1284, his grandchildren, the Infantes de la Cerda, were still retained in honorable captivity at Jativa by his brother-in-law, Pedro of Aragon; and when Sancho IV succeeded him, he naturally made every effort to have them kept there. Very soon, however, the situation changed. France and Aragon were by this time at open war and vied with one another for the alliance of Castile; and Sancho, on the advice of his counsellors, determined in 1287 that, despite the ties which united him to Aragon, he could gain the most by taking sides with France. The inevitable band of malcontents at once sprang up and took refuge at the Aragonese court, where the new sovereign, Alfonso III, promptly adopted the obvious method of defence against his treacherous neighbor by liberating the Infantes de la Cerda from their captivity, proclaiming the elder of them lawful king of Castile, and finally (in 1289) heading an invasion of that country to vindicate the just rights of his protégé. No serious fighting, however, occurred. There were raids and counter-raids, but neither side was willing to risk a pitched battle. Desultory hostilities, nevertheless, continued into the reign of Ferdinand IV of Castile; both France and Portugal being occasionally involved, first on one side and then on the other. Finally, in 1304, the warring nations agreed to submit their difficulties to three arbitrators, of whom the chief was the king of Portugal. Their verdict was that the Infantes de la Cerda should renounce all claim to the throne of Castile and receive in return a liberal compensation in money and lands; at the same time the southeastern

boundary between Castile and Aragon, which had given so much trouble in the past, was finally fixed on the general line which, though often temporarily changed by subsequent quarrels, it has for the most part followed ever since. The two kingdoms celebrated this reestablishment of friendship, which is generally known as the peace of Campillo, by a joint attack against the Moors on land and sea; but the results of the campaign, which we shall examine in another place, were hardly commensurate with the expectations that had been entertained of it.

The next period offers little of interest. Peace was preserved till 1327, when Don Juan Manuel, the arch disturber of Castile during the minority of Alfonso XI, allied himself with the kings of Aragon and Granada to raid and harry his native land; but friendship was restored again in the following year by the union of Alfonso IV of Aragon to Eleanor, the Infanta of Castile. When Alfonso of Aragon died in 1336, he was succeeded by his redoubtable son Pedro the Ceremonious, who, being the issue of an earlier marriage, dreaded an effort by his stepmother to disinherit him in favor of her own children, and consequently looked askance at the land from which she came. The need of union between the two realms to oppose the last great effort of the Moors to reconquer the peninsula in 1339-40 prevented any open breach till the accession of Pedro the Cruel of Castile in 1350; but with two such violent kings as he and his namesake of Aragon in power at the same time, it was utterly impossible permanently to preserve peace. In 1356-57, the inevitable war broke out, Pedro of Aragon taking the obvious step of allying himself with his rival's half-brother and enemy, Henry of Trastamara. It continued by land and sea till the latter's accession in 1369 and was followed by a period of bickering which arose out of the unwillingness of the Aragonese king to recognize the validity of the Castilian title to Murcia. Finally, in 1375, terms of peace were arranged, and cemented by the marriage of John, the son and heir of Henry of Trastamara, to Eleanor, the daughter of Pedro of Aragon—a match which deserves notice as the first step towards the ultimate union of the two kingdoms. Another era of good feeling ensued during the succeeding years, largely owing to the fact that the attention of Castile was chiefly turned towards Portugal, while Pedro's successors on the throne of Aragon were lazy and unambitious. On the termination, in 1410, of the old Aragonese royal line, which was descended from the counts of Barcelona, the nine commissioners appointed to decide upon King Martin's successor gave their verdict in favor of Ferdinand of Antequera, uncle and regent of John II of Castile, who accordingly ascended the Aragonese throne in 1412. This judgment, however, does not indicate any settled policy of union on the part of the commissioners, for their decision, as we shall subsequently see in more detail, was rendered on judicial and not on political grounds. Ferdinand was chosen because of his hereditary claims and not for any reasons of expediency. Had another candidate been selected, the great work of the Catholic Kings would in all probability have never been done; but the commissioners were not primarily thinking of plans for the unification of the peninsula when they chose him, and they could not have foreseen the future.

Despite the fact that John II of Castile married the daughter of his uncle, Ferdinand of Aragon, and Alfonso the Magnanimous of Aragon the daughter of Henry III of Castile, trouble broke forth again between the two kingdoms toward the middle of the fifteenth century, owing to the ambition of John II of Aragon to possess himself of the neighboring realm of Navarre. His efforts in this direction were constantly thwarted by the king of Castile, and he naturally revenged himself by interfering in the internal affairs of that kingdom, where his large estates furnished him a pretext for meddling. The marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabella of Castile in 1469 did not come as the inevitable sequel and logical climax of a long series of antecedent; it is rather as a divergence from the normal trend of the development of both nations that the event which produced united Spain should be regarded.

With Portugal, on the other hand, there is a different tale to tell. Castile had never forgotten the history of the attainment of independence by the smaller country, and continually longed to

reconquer it. From Alfonso X onward there is abundant evidence of a settled policy on her part to reannex the western kingdom, until finally, under Philip II, her efforts were crowned with success. Four times, during the period under review (1250-1450), did Castilian kings marry Portuguese princesses, and three times were Castilian princesses united to Portuguese kings; the corresponding figures for Castile and Aragon are three and two. Castile turned her attention during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to the westward rather than to the eastward, and if we look at her problems through the eyes of the statesman of that time, we shall probably agree with him that she was right in so doing. But if her policy in this respect was wise, the ability to carry it out was pitifully lacking. So weak were her kings and so feeble their resources that sometimes it almost seemed as if Portugal would conquer Castile. To this point matters did not actually go, but down to the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella there can be no doubt that Portugal had the best of the exchanges.

We have already seen how Alfonso X's ambitions to possess Algarve were thwarted by his Portuguese contemporaries; we have also seen how the latter even succeeded in making good their hold on rich territories east of the Guadiana. Even after he had received these lands from the Castilian Regent Maria de Molina in 1295 in return for a promise of peace, the king of Portugal joined hands with the king of Aragon and invaded Castile in 1297. He raided the realm as far as Valladolid and refused to retire permanently until a double marriage was arranged to unite the rival dynasties—Ferdinand IV of Castile to Constance, the daughter of King Diniz, and Alfonso IV of Portugal to Beatrice, the sister of Ferdinand. Castile was distinctly on the defensive during this period. The alliance of Portugal and Aragon against her had proved irresistible and had forced her to sue for peace at the hands of the state which it was her ambition to annex. The policy of fostering union by marriage was continued in the next generation; in 1327 Alfonso XI of Castile wedded Maria the Infanta of Portugal. This alliance, however, had the opposite effect to that which had been hoped for; it actually provoked another war. For after Maria of Portugal had borne to her Castilian husband a son, the redoubtable Pedro the Cruel, Alfonso XI shamefully neglected her, and devoted himself exclusively to the famous Eleanor de Guzman, the ancestress of the house of Trastamara. Naturally the Portuguese could not brook such an insult to their dynasty. Allying themselves once more with Aragon under Pedro IV, and with some of the rebellious Castilian baronage, they suddenly attacked Badajoz in 1336. But Alfonso was more ready for them than was the wont of the Castilian kings. Not only was the assault on Badajoz vigorously repulsed, but the Castilian fleet won a useful victory over its Portuguese adversaries off Cape St. Vincent in the summer of 1337—a foretaste of the long maritime and colonial struggle in which the rivalry of the two realms was soon to find wider expression. Two years later, however, peace was once more restored, owing to the need of union to repel the great Moorish invasion which ended at Rio Salado; and it was in that battle, that Alfonso of Portugal so distinguished himself by his valor that he won the title of 'the Brave.'

The next stage in the relations of the two realms is exceptionally complicated and difficult. It turns chiefly upon the simultaneous dynastic struggles with which both were convulsed. Portugal naturally sided with Pedro the Cruel, whose mother was a Portuguese princess, in the successional quarrels in Castile, and on Pedro's death in 1369, Ferdinand the Handsome, the last of the ancient line of Portuguese kings, claimed the Castilian throne against Henry of Trastamara. Like his predecessors, he pursued the obvious policy of making common cause with the king of Aragon, who also had his grudges against the Castilian royal house; the sovereigns of Navarre, Granada, and England also took part; there were combats by land and sea. In 1371 the papacy intervened in the hope of restoring peace, and made the Portuguese monarch promise to wed the daughter of his Castilian rival; but Ferdinand, flighty and amorous, refused to abide by his plighted word, and married his mistress, the famous Donna Leonor. To avenge this insult, the army of Castile invaded Portugal and burned part of Lisbon. During the next ten years, the

Portuguese king, unable to fight his own battles, endeavored to make the English fight them for him, at least on land. The marriage of John of Gaunt to the daughter of Pedro the Cruel had made the Plantagenets the natural enemies of the Trastamaras. The Earl of Cambridge was sent to Lisbon with a considerable force, but he accomplished little, while the Castilian fleet again defeated that of Portugal. A second Castilian invasion caused Ferdinand to desert his allies, and, after some delay, peace was again made between the two realms at Salvatierra on April 2, 1383. The treaty was celebrated by the marriage of John I of Castile, then a widower, to Beatrice, the daughter and heiress of Ferdinand of Portugal, with the arrangement that if Ferdinand should die without male heirs, his daughter's children should inherit the Portuguese throne. It was a long step toward Castilian annexation of the western kingdom—too long by far to suit the Portuguese. On Ferdinand's death, October 22, 1383, they rose in revolt under John of Avis, the illegitimate half-brother of the late-king, against the prospective Castilian domination and the detestable widow regent Donna Leonor, who at that moment supported it. John of Avis was proclaimed protector of the realm, and finally, on April 6, 1385, king. He once more sought the alliance of England and received a force of five hundred men. Meantime Donna Leonor fled to the court of Castile, and urged an invasion of Portugal. The king prepared an army, in which a number of French adventurers were enrolled, crossed the frontier at Badajoz, and finally, on October 14, 1385, encountered his enemies near the little village of Aljubarrota, some forty miles due north of Lisbon. The Portuguese forces, inferior in numbers, occupied an almost impregnable position on a hill, and successfully repelled two great assaults which the impetuous king of Castile forced his army to deliver without adequate preparation and too late in the day. Froissart has left us a glowing description of the battle, which, as the evening shades began to fall, was converted into a rout; John of Castile was fortunate to regain unharmed his own dominions. Aljubarrota was a glorious confirmation of the independence which Portugal had first won over three centuries before; it ended for many years to come Castile's hopes of annexing it. During the next few years, in fact, the Portuguese and English armies invaded and ravaged Castile, which was saved rather by the outbreak of disease in the ranks of its assailants than by any efforts of its own. The English claims to the throne of the Trastamaras were finally disposed of in 1389, as we shall see more fully in another place; while the Portuguese monarch, convinced at last that he could gain no permanent foothold in Castile, finally consented to a truce, which, though occasionally broken, was renewed periodically till 1411, and finally converted into a definitive peace.

During the first half of the fifteenth century, the story of the relations of Portugal and Castile is comparatively unimportant. Peace virtually uninterrupted was preserved between the two realms; the marriage in 1450 of John II of Castile to Isabella of Portugal, who became the mother of Isabella the Catholic, is an evidence that they were, ostensibly at least, on friendly terms. Not that either state had ceased to be jealous of the other—far from it; but both were chiefly occupied with other affairs: Castile with her internal troubles, and Portugal with the fascinating career of maritime exploration and conquest which had been opened for her by the efforts of Prince Henry the Navigator. Yet in this latter fact, namely that Portugal had got a start on Castile in the race for empire, lay the seeds of important developments for the future. The rivalry of the two realms was not dead, but simply temporarily in abeyance; it was soon destined to burst forth again and involve far wider areas than ever before. What had been in the past a purely local matter of Iberian politics, was to develop in the near future into a competition of world empires.

The story of Castile's relations with Granada and the Moorish states of North Africa from Alfonso X to Ferdinand and Isabella is also extremely complex, and little of permanent importance was accomplished by either side. Christian and Moor were found in alliance, and coreligionists at war, even more frequently than in the preceding age. Each party strove chiefly to attain its own immediate political ends; in selecting its allies each regarded considerations of



practical utility alone; and since the fortunes of the struggle changed with incredible rapidity, the combinations were to the last degree evanescent. The fact that the kings of Castile, Granada, and Morocco all possessed numerous rebel vassals, who were ever ready to stretch out the hand of welcome to hostile invaders, naturally served to make confusion worse confounded. All these features had, of course, been present in the struggles of the earlier period, but never to such a considerable extent. Down to the middle of the thirteenth century, it had usually been possible to arouse enough crusading spirit at dangerous crises to dominate the disruptive tendencies. Now, save for one great outburst at the middle of the fourteenth century, religious fervor is almost completely obscured by other less noble aims, until its final revival by the Catholic Kings supplied the impetus for the glorious conquest of Granada.

The three-cornered peace which had been made between Castile, Granada, and Morocco in the first years of Sancho IV lasted till 1290. As it had left several towns, hitherto subject to the king of Granada, in the hands of the Emir of Morocco, it had never been acceptable to the former, who sought the alliance of the king of Castile against his quondam ally across the Straits, and prepared to wage war on the Merinite. The Moroccan sovereign promptly came over to Spain in quest of revenge; but his operations were hampered by the Castilian fleet, and in 1292 one of his remaining strongholds in the peninsula, the town of Tarifa, fell before the combined assaults of the troops of Granada and Castile. In violation of solemn promises to his ally, King Sancho retained the captured place; but the Granadan Emir consoled himself for its loss by buying back Algeciras from his Moroccan coreligionist, who no longer had any ambition to retain his Iberian possessions.

The next act in the drama brought a complete rearrangement of parties. A new Emir, Mohammed III, had ascended the Granadan throne in 1302. At first he sought aid from Morocco against Castile; but finding that he could gain nothing by this manoeuvre, he made peace with his Christian overlord. Then, seizing the opportunity afforded by the Moroccan ruler's absence on a campaign against Tlemcen, he evened up old scores by possessing himself of Ceuta across the Straits. This town, which had had a most checkered history in the previous century, remained in his hands till 1309, when the aid of the fleet of the king of Aragon enabled the Moroccan Emir to retake it; but the fact that a Spanish ruler, even though he was an infidel, had been able to maintain himself there for seven years was a significant omen for the future. For the present, however, we are more immediately concerned with contemporaneous events in Spain, where Aragon and Castile, temporarily at peace after the settlement of their territorial disputes in 1304, made a somewhat futile joint attack upon Granada. The king of Aragon failed to capture Almeria; while the king of Castile, though he succeeded in taking Gibraltar by a sudden assault yet wasted so much time before the walls of the then more important town of Algeciras that his army was decimated by disease, and he finally raised the siege of that town in return for the cession of Bedmar and Quesada. That Granada escaped so cheaply from the combined attack was largely due to the fact that the Emir of Morocco, impressed by the temporary union of the Christian kings of Spain, forgave his coreligionist for the various injuries he had received at his hands and sent him timely reinforcements in his hour of need.

The reign of Alfonso XI began with renewed confusion but ended with a glorious repulse by the united Christian kingdoms of the last great effort of the Moors to reconquer Spain from North Africa. Hostilities broke out in 1327 between Castile and Granada; and in the midst of them there occurred a Moroccan invasion from across the Strait. The king of Granada was this time equal to the occasion. He utilized the Moors against Castile; then, turning his arms against his allies, he expelled them from the peninsula. The habit of invasion, however, once acquired, was not easily forgotten; and when a few years later the Granadan Emir, again attacked, and this time defeated by Castile, begged aid and succor of the Merinite, the latter returned to the onset, and in 1333 recaptured Gibraltar, which Alfonso was unable to retake. A lull followed during the next six

years, but it was emphatically a lull before the storm. The Moroccan Emir yearned to reconquer Spain. The fiery king of Granada lent himself to his plans. Their alliance presaged the revival of the Holy War as it had been waged in the palmy days of Islam in the Peninsula and evoked a counter-alliance among the Christian kings of Spain. Castile and Aragon forgot their quarrels and made common cause against the invader by land and sea. Though the Castilian admiral sought and found a heroic death in a desperate dash into the center of the Moorish galleys, he failed to offer any effective resistance to the landing of the Moroccan invader, who promptly joined forces with his Granadan ally and laid siege to Tarifa. The town, however, was able to hold out, largely because of the aid of a fleet of Genoese galleys which Alfonso of Castile had bought for the purpose; and the delay before its walls gave the Christians time to advance against the infidel with an army which is usually estimated at twenty thousand men. The inevitable battle finally took place on the banks of the little stream called the Rio Salado, just north of Tarifa, on Monday, October 30, 1340. Countless acts of heroism were performed by the Christian forces, most of all by the young king of Castile, who was only prevented from plunging single-handed into a group of his foes by a gentle warning from the Primate. A sortie by the garrison of Tarifa against the rear of the Moorish forces finally decided the day. The Christian victory was by all odds the most important that had been won in the peninsula since the days of Las Navas de Tolosa, of which it has been rightly called a fitting pendant. It marked the complete defeat of the last serious effort to invade Spain from North Africa. The Merinite ruler retreated with the remnant of his shattered forces to Morocco, and the vigilance of the Christian fleet which guarded the Strait prevented a repetition of the attempt.

Two years later the triumphant Castilian monarch laid siege to Algeciras, which with Gibraltar and Ronda had been left after the battle of Rio Salado in Moroccan hands. So great was the fame of Alfonso's previous exploits that all Western Christendom listened to his appeal for men to come and aid him close the last door open to invasion from the South. Many valiant sons of France and Italy rallied to his standards: Henry of Lancaster, great-grandson of Henry III, came on from England with the Earl of Salisbury; it will be remembered that Chaucer's "Gentle Knight" was "at the siege of Algezir". Finally, after a struggle of more than twenty months, the town capitulated on March 26, 1344. A truce of five years' duration ensued; but in August, 1349, Alfonso was able to continue the task that he had so well begun, by laying siege to Gibraltar. Had his life been spared he would infallibly have captured it; as it was he fell a victim to the Black Death, before the walls of the great fortress, in March, 1350, cut off in the midst of his labors at the early age of thirty-nine. The fact that the siege was raised immediately after his death shows what a factor he had been in the victories already won. Even among his enemies he was held in high esteem. Yusuf of Granada and all his court wore mourning for him, and many a Moor went unarmed to the Christian camp in order to attend his funeral. Alfonso was unquestionably the greatest of the Castilian sovereigns between St. Ferdinand and Queen Isabella; he is even worthy, though on a somewhat smaller scale, of comparison with St. Louis.

From 1350 onward the nature of the struggle changes and on the whole degenerates. The battle on the Salado ended forever all chances of Granada's receiving effectual aid from the Merinites. In the succeeding years the latter not only lost all their holdings in the peninsula, but even saw their own ports temporarily occupied by Spanish Moors and Spanish Christians. The strife between Castile and Granada is no longer complicated by Moroccan interference as before and resembles rather the quarrels and bickerings between a suzerain and his rebel vassal on questions of overlordship and tribute than a struggle between Christian and infidel. During the reign of Pedro the Cruel both realms were paralyzed by successional quarrels; but the king of Granada was on the whole loyal to Pedro, and consequently hostile to Henry of Trastamara, from whom, in the first year of his reign, he wrested Algeciras. Rightly believing that he would be unable to maintain himself there against a hostile attack, he determined to destroy the town,

and this he so effectively accomplished that it figured no more in the struggles of the time. The remaining thirty years of the fourteenth century saw both Granada and Castile cany their arms across the Strait. The former was in possession of Ceuta during much of the time previous to the Portuguese occupation of it in 1415; and in 1399 Henry III of Castile, who had visions of crusades which his untimely death left him small opportunity to realize, sent over a fleet which seized Tetuan and carried off most of its inhabitants to Spain. During the early years of John II, under the regency of his uncle Ferdinand, some progress was made by Castile at the expense of Granada, from which Antequera was taken in 1410; but in 1411 Granada recouped itself for this loss at the expense of the Merinites by capturing Gibraltar, their last holding in the peninsula. The fortress, however, was not long to remain in the hands of the Spanish Moors. The news of the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 had filled the Emir of Granada with such reckless enthusiasm that he boastfully hurled defiance at the king of Castile and refused to pay the tribute, which was the token of his vassalage, thus giving the latter an excuse for waging war on him; and nine years later an internal revolt in Granada itself furnished the Christian monarch with the desired opportunity. In 1462 Gibraltar was attacked and taken and has remained ever since in Christian hands. In the following year the town of Archidona to the northward also fell before the Castilian armies, and the payment of the ancient tribute was soon after renewed.

The territorial results of this desultory strife were certainly meagre; and the fact that Granada was able to maintain itself practically undiminished for so long affords the strongest possible proof of the weakness and inefficiency of Castile. The feudal relationship between the two realms, and the tribute, which of course ceased at every declaration of war, only to be renewed again, though in varying amount, at every conclusion of peace, were a perpetual bone of contention; it seems little short of marvellous that the situation should have been tolerated for so many years. One of the most important results of these two centuries of intermittent warfare was that they served to keep the attention of Castile fixed on events across the Strait. The affairs of Granada and Morocco were so closely related that the former served in a sense as a bridge between Christian Spain and North Africa. When it fell, it was the logical and inevitable consequence that Ferdinand and Isabella should carry their arms across to the opposite shore, which possessed so much in common with the Iberian Peninsula.

The dealings of Castile with France and England during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries claim our attention for a few moments; for it is important that we should know something of the early history of her relations with the two great states whose enmity was to be the principal factor in preventing the full realization of Spain's dreams of world dominion in the crucial years of the sixteenth century. In general it may be said that it was the desire of the Castilian king to live in peace and amity with both these nations. They had plenty to do south of the Pyrenees without interfering to the north of them. Even the versatile Alfonso X, as we have had occasion to observe, sought to cultivate good relations with both England and France by marrying his half-sister to Edward I, and his eldest son to the daughter of St. Louis. But as things fell out, it proved ultimately impossible to maintain an equally close friendship with both powers at the same time. The Hundred Years' War broke out in 1338; both France and England sought the alliance of Castile; and it was ultimately France that won it. For the next hundred years the friendship of France and Castile was virtually uninterrupted. It became a tradition of national policy on both sides; it was renewed at the beginning of each reign; there are in fact few examples in all history of a continuance of friendship between two states more cordial and more prolonged. Yet all this time Castile strove her hardest to avoid being drawn into war with England on account of her friendship with France. She had no real cause of quarrel with England, and when, in spite of all her efforts, she was forced to open hostilities against her, she seized the first honorable opportunity to

terminate them. Such are the main lines of the picture; it now remains to fill in the most important details.

At the death of Alfonso X, the good relations between France and Castile were temporarily clouded by the disinheriting of the Infantes de la Cerda. The French kings, however, were so much more interested in ousting the Aragonese from Sicily than in defending the rights of their kinsmen in Castile that no open breach ensued. Even before the affairs of the Infantes were finally settled by the agreement of 1304, France sought the friendship of Sancho IV and his successor in order to be able to concentrate her energies upon Aragon. In 1317 it was arranged that Alfonso XI of Castile should wed Isabella, daughter of Philip V of France, as soon as she should have attained suitable age, and that a lasting peace should unite the two nations. Though the marriage project was subsequently abandoned, and though there is no further record of any relation between the two states for a number of years, there is every reason to think that their friendship was uninterrupted. But with the opening of the Hundred Years' War matters entered upon a much acuter stage. The contiguity of Castile to the English lands in the south of France made her friendship of paramount importance to both Edward III and Philip VI, who promptly engaged in a diplomatic duel to obtain it. Alfonso XI fully appreciated the strength of his position and did his best to keep the two rival monarchs bidding against one another for his alliance. In 1336 and in 1345 he signed two treaties with France, the second of which was distinctly anti-English in character; yet in 1346 he strove to secure himself against the hostility of the Plantagenets by arranging for the marriage of his son, Pedro, to Jane, the daughter of Edward III. As the princess, however, died suddenly at Bordeaux on her way to Spain, the union never took place. It is worth noting that no treaty of alliance had been spoken of in connection with it; in fact, at the very moment that it was being agreed upon, the king of Castile was actually furnishing ships to France to aid her in liberating Calais from its English besiegers. In other words, Alfonso was still endeavoring to preserve good relations with both countries, though events were gradually tending to drive him more and more into the arms of France.

The beginning of the reign of Pedro the Cruel saw the Franco-Castilian treaties formally renewed; and on June 3, 1353, the young Castilian monarch married Blanche, the daughter of Pierre de Bourbon. But this match, instead of strengthening the ties that united the two realms, almost resulted in severing them, for Pedro's maltreatment of his bride was so outrageous that no considerations of political expediency could prevail upon the French king to ignore it. At the time of Blanche's arrival in Spain, Pedro had fallen a victim to the charms of Maria de Padilla. He was only with difficulty prevailed upon to go through with the ceremony of marriage with Blanche; almost immediately after it he left her, to return a little later for another visit of two days, after which he never saw her again. No wonder that the Franco-Castilian alliance was shaken by such an episode as this; and had Pedro succeeded in preserving the throne of Castile, the whole history of the relations of the two realms would in all probability have been changed. But France's need of Castile's friendship was so pressing that she could afford to neglect no honorable means of retaining it, and when Pedro's wild career of crime and outrage in Spain evoked a counterclaimant to his throne in the person of Henry of Trastamara, she was quick to seize her opportunity. She made common cause with the pretender and sent him a host of marauding mercenaries under the famous Bertrand du Guesclin, this the more willingly since a temporary peace with England made her anxious to be rid of these turbulent soldiers of fortune. She enlisted the support of Pedro, king of Aragon. Meantime Pedro of Castile threw himself for protection into the arms of England, taking refuge at the court of the Black Prince at Bordeaux, together with his two daughters, one of whom was later to become the bride of John of Gaunt. The dramatic story of the successional struggle which followed in Castile does not directly concern us, save to note that it was France that had espoused the winning cause. When Pedro fell a victim to his brother's dagger in 1369, and Henry of Trastamara mounted the Castilian throne, the Franco-Castilian alliance which the

reign of Pedro had threatened to break emerged stronger than ever before. It was by French aid that the pretender had been set on the Castilian throne; and in the succeeding generations he and his descendants were to repay the debt with interest by supporting their ally against the common enemy, England.

The naval side of the ensuing struggle was chiefly entrusted by France to Castile, whose attacks on England in the fourteenth century furnished a number of interesting precedents for the days of the Spanish Armada. Certainly, far more damage was done on this occasion than was effected two centuries later. It seems probable that the French, knowing that Castile had already made great progress in maritime affairs, and realizing from the very first their own inferiority in this respect, approached Henry of Trastamara with a definite request for naval aid in August 1371. It was by a Castilian fleet that the Earl of Pembroke was decisively defeated on June 23, 1372, in the harbor of La Rochelle, his landing prevented, and his ships destroyed. In 1373 the English strove energetically but unsuccessfully to detach Castile from the French alliance: several indecisive actions and a truce of one year's duration ensued; but finally, the French and Castilian fleets made a joint demonstration off the southern shore of England in the summer of 1377. The Isle of Wight was overrun and put to ransom; Winchelsea was saved by the efforts of the abbot of Battle; but Hastings and Rottingdean were sacked, and the prior of Lewes was carried off. Most of the contemporary English chroniclers represent these raids as a purely French affair, but there is little doubt that Castilian ships did the lion's share of the work. The climax was reached in the spring of 1380 when the Castilian Admiral Fernán Sanchez de Tovar sailed up the Thames with twenty galleys, burned Gravesend, and penetrated almost to the city of London, "whither hostile ships had never attained before". This raid was obviously regarded as a feat of unparalleled audacity at the time and stands out in striking contrast to the fate of the Spanish Armada.

In return for the naval aid, he brought his ally, the king of Castile not unnaturally expected help on land from the French. By this time, too, there was serious need of it, owing to England's support of Portugal in the campaign of Aljubarrota, and to John of Gaunt's subsequent claiming of the throne of Castile by virtue of his marriage with the daughter of Pedro the Cruel. To substantiate this claim, the Duke of Lancaster sailed from England in the ships of the king of Portugal, with more than three thousand soldiers and vast quantities of provisions and stores: for, as Froissart shrewdly remarks, "the English do not willingly go unfurnished with such things". They finally landed at Corunna on July 25, 1386; but were unable to take the town. Hunting rather than fighting was their chief preoccupation, but they finally succeeded in establishing themselves at Santiago, which surrendered without resistance. Meantime Charles VI of France had great difficulty in raising troops to succor his ally. Heavy taxes were imposed for the purpose, but men grumbled at being obliged to pay "in order to comfort the king of Castile and expel the English from his dominions". In 1387, however, an advance guard of two thousand men entered the peninsula, and their arrival was enough to cause the army of John of Gaunt to scatter to the four winds of heaven. Clearly the continuance of the semblance of war, at least on land, would be little more than a farce; and the king of Castile, whose only desire was to rid his realm of the presence of his foes, made haste to treat of peace. In return for a liberal money compensation, John of Gaunt agreed to evacuate Galicia and renounce all claims to the throne of Castile; it was further arranged that his daughter Catharine should marry the heir to the Castilian throne, so as to put an end to the successional struggle between the descendants of Pedro the Cruel and Henry of Trastamara, as well as to the quarrel between Castile and England. The treaty was arranged without consulting the court of France, which was naturally furious when it heard the news: the Admiral Jean de Vienne was sent to express to the Castilian monarch France's opinion of his conduct, and to warn him to do nothing in prejudice of his alliance with France; and so vigorous was his language that when the king and his council heard him they were all "abashed,



and eche of them loked on other; there was none that gave any answeire but sattu stylle.” The French king, however, had no reason to be alarmed. The Castilian government had not the slightest intention of breaking with him, and the alliance of the two nations was formally renewed, as the custom was, at the beginning of the next reign.

Henry III, however, was exceedingly careful that alliance with France should not again bring his country into open conflict with England. When the French king sent him a fresh demand for a fleet, he was slow to reply, took advantage of every possible opportunity to delay its preparation and departure, and when it finally did set sail, gave it instructions which condemned it to ineffectiveness. Under all the circumstances it is not surprising that the first half of the fifteenth century saw a considerable loosening of the bonds of the Franco-Castilian alliance. Formally it was continued until after the middle of the reign of Henry the Impotent, despite an attempt of Henry VI of England in 1430 to break it, but the Castilian kings were unwilling, and also too weak, to give France any effective help in expelling their foes, and the French kings revenged themselves by refusing to aid their Castilian brethren against their rebel barons and the Aragonese. The palmy days of the alliance were in fact over. Interest and enthusiasm for it had visibly cooled on both sides. Whatever the letter of the treaties might say, the Castilian monarchs were obviously determined to live at peace with England, so that the advantages which France could draw from their friendship were but slight. Finally, in 1467, two years before the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, Edward IV of England won away the Castilian alliance from France, and though eleven years later Louis XI succeeded in temporarily regaining it, the old cordiality of feeling was utterly gone, and the way had been already opened for that great regrouping of the powers which bore fruit in the Italian Wars of the sixteenth century. All this, however, may be more profitably considered in connection with the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. For the present we need only remember that Castile had an unusually long and uninterrupted tradition of amity, during the later Middle Ages, with the nation which was to be her principal foe in the days of the Catholic Kings and of Charles V; while with England, who was to deal the death blow to her imperial ambitions in the reign of Philip II, her relations had on the whole been more friendly than the reverse.

CHAPTER III  
CASTILE IN THE ATLANTIC AND IN THE ORIENT

DESPITE her manifold activities at home and abroad, despite also the limitation of her coastline by Portugal's attainment of independence, Castile did not emerge from the Middle Ages without giving the world a slight foretaste of the tremendous development of her dominions beyond the seas which awaited her under Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs. During the reign of King Henry III (1390-1406), whose instincts were far more cosmopolitan than those of most of his predecessors and successors, the conquest and colonization of the Canaries were begun, and a long step incidentally taken on the road to the discovery of America. At the same time the name and fame of Castile were borne eastward to the plains of Central Asia, as far as the court of the redoubtable Tamerlane at Samarcand.

The existence of the Canary Islands was well known to the ancients. Situated in the ocean, which the Homeric poems treated as the barrier between the known world and the Elysian Fields, they were popularly supposed to be the habitation of the blest, hence the classical name of *Insulae Fortunatae*. Their primitive inhabitants—the so-called Guanches—were almost certainly of Berber stock. All the testimony to be derived from physical aspect, language, religion, and customs, seems to point to that conclusion, and the fact that the islands can be seen from the western extremity of Mauretania (as Strabo was the first to observe) tends to strengthen it still further. Plutarch tells us that Sertorius, in his flight from the ships of Annius, fell in with some Lusitanian sea captains who had visited them, and was almost persuaded by their glowing descriptions to withdraw thither and seek repose from the cares of military life. Fuller and more definite information is to be found in the pages of Pliny, who got hold of a vague itinerary drawn up by a certain Statius Sebosus in B.C. 52 from accounts of navigators of his time; and, still more important, has preserved to us a fragment of a report from King Juba of Mauretania to the Emperor Augustus of an expedition which he had sent out for the express purpose of exploring the archipelago. Finally, the Arab geographer, Edrisi, who finished his famous description of Spain and Africa at the court of King Roger of Sicily in the year 1154, tells at length of a journey of certain Moorish adventurers from Lisbon, to islands whose description tallies closely with what we know of the Canaries. This account has been regarded as apocryphal by the majority of writers, but the naiveté and realism of the story make it seem unlikely that the tale was invented out of whole cloth. In general, however, Europe's knowledge of the Canaries can only be regarded as vague and scanty to the last degree down to the period of the Renaissance.

With the fourteenth century, however, we emerge on firmer ground. A passage in Petrarch and several contemporary maps of Genoese, Venetian, and Catalan authorship indicate the presence of Genoese sailors on the island of Lanzarote, the easternmost of the archipelago. Far more important than this was an expedition sent out to explore the Canaries by King Affonso IV of Portugal in 1341, which is interestingly described by Boccaccio. It was composed chiefly of Portuguese and Castilians, but Florentines and Genoese took part in it, and it had a Genoese pilot. The adventurers made no attempt to settle in the islands, but they gained a good deal of knowledge of them and of their inhabitants, and certainly accomplished enough to give Portugal a strong claim to priority of discovery and possession against any other European power. Indeed, the expedition of 1341 furnished the basis of Portugal's later refusal to acknowledge the validity of Castile's occupation of the Canaries; it was the origin of the first of a long series of quarrels

between the two nations concerning the limits of their overseas possessions. But the Portuguese were not aroused to the importance of vigorously prosecuting their claims until it was too late. When, in November 1344, Luis de la Cerda, great-grandson of Alfonso the Learned, was invested by the Avignonese Pope Clement VI with the lordship of the Canaries as a fief of the Holy See, they did indeed object, on the ground of their expedition of three years before, and of the fact that the archipelago lay nearer to Portugal than to Castile. No one, however, seems to have paid much attention to them, and though Luis himself made no serious efforts to realize his sovereignty, “the theory of a Spanish right to the Canaries was established” from that moment, “and all that was done in the remaining years of the fourteenth century for the conquest, exploration, and Christianizing of the *Fortunatae* seems to have been the work of Castilians.” In fact, she “considered that she had earmarked the Canaries through Don Luis”; and when, years later, she prepared to take real possession of the archipelago, Portugal discovered that her opportunity was gone, and that “it was too late to put back the hands of time.”

We now come to the famous expedition of the year 1402, which will always be associated with the names of the Norman, Jean de Bethencourt, and of the Poitevin, Gadifer de La Salle. Both were filled to the brim with instincts of maritime adventure and piracy; both had taken part in a Genoese expedition against Tunis in the year 1390; both were keenly desirous to embark in some fresh enterprise, where all the risks and profits should be their own. Joining forces accordingly at La Rochelle, they set sail thence on the first of May, 1402, “for the lands of Canary, to see and explore all the country, with the view of conquering the islands, and bringing the people to the Christian faith. After an adventure at Corunna, indicative of somewhat loose notions of the rights of property, and a brief detention at Cadiz and Seville, from which they were liberated by order of the Royal Council, they continued their voyage; finally, in July, they landed at the island of Lanzarote, and built a fort and called it Rubicón. Most of the inhabitants were very friendly and listened attentively to the priests’ instructions in the elements of the Christian religion, but a few held off in fear and half-hostile suspicion. Soon afterwards Bethencourt and Gadifer passed over with some of their followers to the island of Fuerteventura, where the inhabitants fled before them; but lack of provisions and fears of a mutiny soon obliged them to return without having accomplished anything. At Rubicón, moreover, they found things in evil case. Many of the sailors were discouraged and longed to get away; clearly the conquest of the archipelago was going to prove a far more difficult and serious undertaking than had at first been supposed. The two partners must renounce their original idea of an independent realm. Help from some European sovereign would be indispensable to success, and help would plainly not be given without recognition of overlordship in return. Nothing was to be hoped for from the king of France, for Charles VI, already a victim of insanity, had too many troubles at home to think of such remote possessions; consequently, the adventurers were thrown back on the king of Castile, whose government had on the whole treated them generously at Seville earlier in the year. Leaving Gadifer, therefore, in charge of Rubicon, and taking with him such followers as were most anxious to return, Bethencourt set sail in October and landed soon after in Spain. At the Castilian court he was most cordially received, as soon as his errand was known. Henry the Invalid was not likely to neglect such a favorable opportunity to consolidate and reinforce the vague claims to the Canaries which Castile had maintained since the days of Luis de la Cerda. Fair and complimentary words were exchanged between sovereign and adventurer, with much discussion of the advancement of the Christian faith. Bethencourt begged the king to be permitted to do him homage for the islands. The king congratulated him on his bravery and enterprise and assured him that he showed an admirable disposition in coming to do him homage for a land which as far as he could make out was more than two hundred leagues distant, and of which he had never heard before. The account really sounds as if the first outpost of Spain’s Western Empire was almost forced upon the crown of Castile; certainly, her first effective acquisition of the sovereignty of the Canaries cost infinitely less trouble than the retention of it. At any rate King

Henry accepted the good fortune which chance had thrown in his way. He received Bethencourt's homage for the archipelago and granted him the right to appropriate to his own use one fifth of all merchandise brought thence to Spain, the privilege of coining money there, and of preventing any one from landing in the islands without his leave. Finally, Bethencourt made the most of his partner's absence to secure all these important concessions in his own name, and thus to relegate Gadifer to a position of inferiority to himself. In fact, the Norman lord was fully as much occupied in feathering his own nest at the Castilian court as in securing the support and protection of King Henry III. He had promised to return to the archipelago at Christmas, 1402, but he did not actually arrive there till April 1404, and in the intervening months he had contrived so to arrange matters that the game was left completely in his own hands.

Meantime poor Gadifer in Lanzarote had not only been experiencing grave difficulties with the Guanches but had also been weakened by the outbreak of rebellion and mutiny among his own followers. One of the most prominent members of Bethencourt's company, a certain Berthin de Berneval, irritated by the fact that the expedition had not been a more pronounced success, determined to recoup himself for the funds he had invested in it by capturing a number of natives and taking them to Europe to be sold as slaves. Availing himself of a temporary absence of Gadifer, he gathered a small faction of malcontents, pillaged the castle of Rubicon, seized a number of the Guanches, and finally escaped to Spain in a ship that chanced to touch at Lanzarote, together with his confederates, and prisoners to the number of twenty-two; these he handed over to the ship captain and sailors, as the contemporary chronicler says, "after the example of the traitor Judas Iscariot, who betrayed our Saviour Jesus Christ, and delivered Him into the hands of the Jews to crucify Him, and put Him to death". Some of Berthin's accomplices, whom he abandoned at the last moment, were so fearful of the wrath of Gadifer that they attempted to escape to the coast of Africa, where they perished miserably or were enslaved. Meantime Berthin himself was arrested and imprisoned at Cadiz, while the master of the ship in which he had sailed made off to Aragon with his Canarian captives and sold them there. Berthin's misdeeds, however, had an important effect on Gadifer's colony, for they convinced the Canarians that those who had advocated friendship with the Europeans were mistaken, and that a war of extermination must be waged against the invaders. Under the leadership of a certain native by the name of Asche, who aspired to the throne of Lanzarote, a double plan was laid. Asche was to attempt to utilize Gadifer in getting rid of the reigning king, with the intention of turning on his ally and the foreign intruders who had come with him, when the first part of the programme had been accomplished. But the plot ultimately recoiled on the head of its originator. With the aid of Gadifer the king was duly captured, and Asche, thinking that he had the game in his own hands, rashly attacked one of the followers of the Frenchman before putting his prisoner to death; the latter escaped from confinement, gathered his friends, seized the treacherous Asche, and had him stoned and afterwards burned. Gadifer and his men also took summary vengeance on the party of his quondam ally, so that many of the Canarians fled to the caverns in the hills, and more than eighty were terrorized into being baptized at Pentecost, "with a good hope that God would confirm them in the faith and make them a means of edification to all the country round about". The whole story would fit well into the history of Cortez in Mexico or that of Pizarro in Peru.

The next chapter of the story witnesses the culmination of the inevitable quarrel between Bethencourt and Gadifer. After the rebellion of Asche had been put down, Gadifer started on an exploring expedition among the western islands of the archipelago, accompanied by a number of Castilians who had just been sent out by Bethencourt. Fuerteventura, the Grand Canary, Gomera, Ferro, and Palma were visited; but the explorers apparently did not dare land at Teneriffe, because of the tales of the strength and ferocity of its inhabitants. On their return to Rubicon in the autumn of 1403, it was found that the garrison had virtually completed the conquest of the Guanches of Lanzarote, and in February, 1404, the king of the island and a large majority of his subjects

accepted the Christian faith and were baptized. The ‘instruction’ which was drawn up for their guidance by the priests Bontier and Le Verrier is a marvelously inaccurate farrago of some of the most famous passages in the Pentateuch and the Gospels; whether its divagations were due to the ignorance of the authors or to their desire to be intelligible and interesting to the natives it is difficult to say. At this juncture (April 19,1404) Bethencourt finally arrived from Spain. He showed no gratitude for what his partner had accomplished in his absence and did not hesitate to let him know that the chief result of his own negotiations at the Castilian Court had been to deprive Gadifer of all authority and interest in what had been originally organized as a joint enterprise. He entirely refused to accede to Gadifer’s very reasonable request that some of the islands be given to him as a reward for all that he had done, so that the latter, failing to get immediate satisfaction, threatened to abandon Bethencourt and return to France. Discussions of the feasibility of a settlement on the adjacent African coast, and unsuccessful expeditions and slave hunts in Fuerteventura and the Grand Canary, postponed for a time any open breach; but the interests of the two adventurers had now become irreconcilable, and late in the summer of 1404 they went back to Spain to settle their disputes, travelling, however, by different ships. The result was naturally a complete triumph for Bethencourt, who was already well known and popular at the court and was solemnly reinvested with the islands; Gadifer’s just claims were scornfully set aside, and shortly afterwards he retired to France. The struggle between the two leaders, however, had a far deeper significance than a mere personal quarrel; its most permanent result was to secure the Spanish hold on the archipelago. Throughout the dispute, Bethencourt had been continually reinforced by ships which brought men and provisions from Castile; his own original following of Frenchmen was by this time far outnumbered by the later Spanish arrivals. He had gradually become, in fact, the representative of the king of Castile, while Gadifer, who had not accompanied him on his first expedition to Seville, naturally tended to hark back to the early days of their partnership, and perhaps feebly to cling to the idea of holding the islands as a fief of France. But he had neither the ability nor the resources to carry his plans into effect. Bethencourt remained at the head of affairs, and for the time being reaped all the rewards; and his triumph was the triumph of his patron, King Henry the Invalid of Castile.

In October,1404, Bethencourt returned again to the archipelago. During the next three months he devoted himself to the subjection of Fuerteventura, an enterprise whose difficulty was enormously enhanced by the not unnatural ill will of the remnant of Gadifer’s party, led by the latter’s illegitimate son, Hannibal. In January 1405, Bethencourt went back to France to fetch supplies and colonists, and was highly successful: about one hundred and sixty men accompanied him on his return, of whom twenty-three brought their wives; among them were knights, mechanics, handicraftsmen, and laborers. All of them, however, came on their own initiative. There is no evidence of support by the French government or even of a request for it; Bethencourt obviously was determined to stand loyally by his liege lord, Henry of Castile, and to hold the Canaries as his vassal. In May he arrived triumphant at Lanzarote, where he was accorded a reception so enthusiastic that “God’s thunder would have been drowned in the noise of the music that they made”. This time Fuerteventura also received him with open arms and gladly acknowledged his supremacy. But when Bethencourt attempted to extend his dominion to the rest of the archipelago, he met with many misfortunes. Expeditions against the Grand Canary and Palma were repulsed by the valor of the natives after a number of bloody encounters. At Gomera the invaders had a comparatively friendly reception; but at Ferro the clamorings of his followers caused Bethencourt to exchange his schemes of conquest for an attempt to capture slaves. The native king and one hundred and eleven others were decoyed, unarmed, into an ambush and taken prisoners, but almost no progress was made towards the subjugation of the island. Lust for slave hunting was, in fact, one of the most serious difficulties with which the conqueror had to contend. He was by no means entirely superior to it himself, but he was not one to let it interfere with larger aims. With most of his followers, however, it soon took the precedence of everything



else. It not only crippled their efficiency in effecting the conquest of the islands; it also constantly diverted their attention to the adjacent African coast, where the opportunities for slave hunting were much more favorable. A great expedition for the purpose was sent over to Cape Bojador in the months immediately succeeding Bethencourt's arrival at Lanzarote. The inhabitants fled at its approach, but a number of them were captured and sold in the slave markets of Spain.

After these various attempts to enlarge his own territories and to satisfy the cupidity of his men, Bethencourt returned to Fuerteventura, and there established his headquarters. He next occupied himself with drawing up regulations for the government and administration of the islands which acknowledged his authority. The land was divided up between the loyal natives and the conquerors, the latter receiving the lion's share and the control of all fortified places. Over each of the larger islands two judicial and administrative officers were set, who were to be aided in the discharge of their duties by an assembly of prominent men; "the customs of France and Normandy" were to be observed as nearly as possible "in the administration of justice and all other points." Everyone except Bethencourt's Norman friends, who were exempted from all taxation for nine years, was to pay annually one fifth of all his income of whatever sort to support the government: but the most valuable product of the island, the orchil, Bethencourt reserved for himself; no man might sell any without his express permission. The interests of the church were to be scrupulously guarded. Finally, Bethencourt installed his nephew, Maciot, who had come out with him from Normandy in 1404, as his representative with full powers. On December 15, 1405, amid protestations of loyalty and gratitude from natives and followers, he sailed for Spain, partly to get more men and munitions of war with which to complete the conquest of the archipelago, and partly to secure from the Pope the appointment of a bishop of the Canaries who would aid him to bring the inhabitants to the Christian faith.

Bethencourt, however, was not destined to visit the Canaries again. He was received with royal pomp at the Castilian court at Valladolid. King Henry entered warmly into his plans for establishing a bishopric in the islands, and recommended for the purpose a Franciscan, of noble Castilian family, by the name of Albert de Las Casas; for he doubtless fully realized that the appointment of a Spaniard as the chief ecclesiastical authority in the archipelago would incidentally serve to strengthen his own claims to it. To secure the bulls for the new bishop, Bethencourt betook himself to the papal court. The needed formalities were soon completed; and a little later Las Casas was solemnly received in the Canaries, and his see established at Rubicon in Lanzarote. Meantime Bethencourt returned to his Norman home, where he became the victim of successive misfortunes. The last years of his life were embittered by family quarrels and bereavements, the loss of rich cargoes of merchandise from his island realm, and the total failure of his plans for collecting a large military force with which to return and complete the subjugation of the archipelago. One authority says that he maintained close relations with the Castilian court, and actually journeyed there in 1412, to renew his homage for the Canaries to the unfortunate king, John II; but the story lacks confirmation. The year of his death is usually given as 1422, but some authorities put it in 1425, and an inscription, placed in 1851 in the church at Grainville where he lies buried, adopts the later date.

For years after Bethencourt's departure in 1405, the history of the Canaries is utterly confused and of little significance. Its salient features are the ebbs and flows of Castilian control, and the challenging of it by the Portuguese. Bethencourt, as we have seen, had always upheld the overlordship of Castile, and his brother Reynauld, to whom he bequeathed his conquests, did nothing to alter the situation. But meantime Bethencourt's nephew, Maciot, whom he had left in the archipelago as his representative, began to plot to emancipate it from Castilian overlordship and to place it under the protection of the crown of France. His conduct naturally provoked the resentment of the Queen Regent Catharine of Castile, who at once sent out three war caravels under Admiral Pedro Barba de Campos to force him to return to his allegiance. Resistance was

obviously out of the question; so Maciot, coolly ignoring the fact that the Canaries were not his to dispose of, first ceded them to the admiral, and then fled to Madeira, where he sold them to Prince Henry the Navigator of Portugal. This highly fraudulent proceeding, coupled with the memories of the claims and counterclaims of the fourteenth century, reawakened the long dormant conflict between Castile and Portugal over the possession of the islands. It continued for many years and became inextricably interwoven with other matters which embroiled the two realms. Prince Henry vigorously prosecuted the rights that he had acquired, the more so because the possession of the archipelago would obviously strengthen and facilitate Portuguese progress down the West African coast. Powerful expeditions were sent out in 1424-25 and again in 1445-47; but, owing to the valor of the native resistance and the protests of the king of Castile, they met with no success. The Venetian, Alvisi Cadamosto, also visited the islands in 1455, while in the service of Prince Henry the Navigator, and has left us a most interesting account of them. Meantime on the Spanish side the title which Maciot had turned over to Barba de Campos was passed around with bewildering rapidity among a number of prominent Castilian families—the best possible evidence of the small amount of importance that was attached to it—until finally, in 1443, it fell to Ferdinand, a scion of the ancient house of Peraza. Under this Ferdinand Peraza, and still more under his son-in-law, Diego de Herrera, who inherited his claims, renewed attempts were made to effect the subjugation and conversion of the western islands. But the old lust for slave hunting continued to cripple the efforts of the leaders. Heroic resistance by the natives prevented any effective success in Palma and the Grand Canary; and though the Guanches of Teneriffe showed themselves amenable to gentle treatment at the outset, a subsequent experience of Spanish treachery led to the expulsion of the invaders. Only in Lanzarote and Fuerteventura was Herrera's dominion in any sense fully established.

The solution of all these rival claims was reached in a most unexpected manner. In 1455 King Henry the Impotent of Castile increased complications already great by disregarding Peraza's title, and conferring the islands on the Count of Atouguia, who had brought him his Portuguese bride; the latter sold them to the Marquis of Menisco, who promptly resold them to the Infante Ferdinand of Portugal, younger brother of King Affonso the African. In 1466 an expedition was fitted out under the Portuguese count, Diego da Silva, to substantiate the claims of the Infante; but Diego de Herrera was on hand to oppose him with a force so impressive that da Silva took refuge in negotiations, which were measurably advanced by the fact that he fell promptly in love with Herrera's daughter. The two were shortly afterwards betrothed, and Spaniards and Portuguese jointly attempted once more to carry their conquests to the western islands; but after various failures and repulses, Silva and his Portuguese followers tired of such a strenuous campaign and longed to return to their native land. Herrera was not sorry to be so cheaply rid of one who, though at present friendly, might easily develop into a dangerous rival. The wedding of his daughter to Silva was celebrated at Lanzarote, and the happy pair departed for Lisbon, whither Herrera soon after followed them for the purpose of extinguishing any surviving Portuguese claims to the archipelago. Meantime, on December 11, 1474, King Henry the Impotent died, and was succeeded by his sister, Isabella, who five years previously had married Ferdinand of Aragon. In addition to effecting the union of the crowns and expelling the Moors from Granada, the royal pair were keenly desirous to carry their conquests across the straits to Africa; and for this end they recognized, as the Portuguese had done before them, the great advantages of a firm foothold in the Canaries. A series of complaints against the administration of Herrera arrived most opportunely for their purpose; and the latter, realizing that the cards were stacked against him, saw the necessity of coming to an agreement. It was finally arranged that he and his heirs should be secured in the possession of Lanzarote and Fuerteventura, which had been thoroughly conquered, and of Ferro and Gomera, which were at least partially so; but that they should yield to their Catholic Majesties, for the sum of 5,000,000 maravedis, all right to the as yet unsubjugated islands of Grand Canary, Palma, and Teneriffe. This treaty, which marks the

inception of the formal taking over of the archipelago by the Castilian government, was signed at Seville, October 15, 1477. Herrera consoled himself for his losses by organizing a series of terrible slave, camel, and cattle hunts on the adjacent West African coast northward from Cape Bojador. A fort was erected, attacks by the local Sherif and his followers were repulsed, and raids were organized far into the interior. It is said that the Berber who served as Herrera's guide on these expeditions died at Lanzarote in 1591 at the age of one hundred and forty-six.

Though it seems a far cry from the Canaries to Central Asia, the spirit of foreign adventure and exploration which swept over Castile during the reign of Henry in sufficed to bridge the gap. Hitherto Spain had taken practically no part in that extraordinary series of travels and missionary enterprises which immediately followed the age of the Crusades and gave to the states of Western Europe their first knowledge of the Far East. The period of the Polos and of Sir John Mandeville saw her too fully occupied with internal troubles to think of Asiatic exploration. Yet she was to contribute one last stirring scene to the first act of the great drama of the unveiling of the East, before the outbreak of anarchy beyond the Euxine and Caspian and the obstruction of the ancient trade routes by the advance of the Ottoman Turks caused the curtain to fall for another hundred years. The famous mission of Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo to the court of the great Mongol conqueror Tamerlane deserves an honorable place in the history of Spanish enterprise beyond the seas.

A nation whose life work had been dedicated to the task of driving back the Saracens in the West, could not fail to regard with sympathetic interest the rise of a great empire to the eastward which was hostile to the Ottoman Turk. For nearly half a century the mighty Tamerlane had been building such an empire in the steppes of Asia on the ruins of different kingdoms which had been conquered by his barbarous Tartar hordes, and he was now advancing against the easternmost of the possessions of Bajazet I. Agreement in religion could obviously not long postpone the clash that was necessitated by the rival territorial ambitions of the two 'scourges of God'; and Henry III of Castile determined to inform himself concerning the power and intentions of the great Asiatic potentate whose advent on the confines of the western world promised, temporarily at least, to divert and check the onset of the more immediately terrible Turk. For this purpose he sent two knights, Pelayo de Sotomayor and Hernan Sanchez de Palazuelos, into Asia Minor, where they witnessed, on July 20, 1402, the famous battle of Angora, in which Tamerlane conquered Bajazet and took him prisoner. After the fight Tamerlane learned of their presence and summoned them before him. Equalling Henry III in his appreciation of the value of a possible ally on the other side of the domains of his principal enemy, the Turk, he surpassed him in his curiosity concerning remote lands and the customs of their inhabitants, and eagerly availed himself of the opportunity to gratify it. The Castilians were most honorably entertained, and dismissed with gifts; and on their departure, they were accompanied by a Tartar ambassador bearing messages of admiration and friendship for Henry in, and by two lovely Christian ladies who had been rescued by Tamerlane from the harem of his Turkish rival.

Henry III promptly responded to these amicable overtures by despatching direct to Tamerlane's court his chamberlain Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, a nobleman of Madrid, accompanied by two other persons, and also by the ambassador whom Tamerlane had sent to him. As the latter had retired eastward after his victory at Angora, and was finally found by Clavijo beyond the Oxus at Samarcand, the journey of Henry's representatives turned out to be considerably longer and more arduous than was expected. It has in fact been rightly designated as the "earliest important venture of the Spanish people overland". It started from St. Mary's Port, near Cadiz, on May 22, 1403; it returned to San Lucar on March 1, 1406.

Clavijo kept a careful journal of his experiences, and his descriptions of the places through which he and his companions passed constitute one of the most precious narratives of travel that have come down to us from the Middle Ages. They journeyed by sea as far as Trebizond, touching at Malaga, Naples, Messina, Rhodes, Mitylene, Constantinople, and Sinope by the way. From Trebizond their route lay overland through Erzingan, Tabriz, and Teheran, over the Murgab and the Oxus, which they crossed on a huge bridge of boats constructed by Tamerlane “for the passage of himself and his host”. On Monday, September 8, 1404, they reached Samarcand and were summoned into the presence of Tamerlane, whom they found “seated in a portal, in front of the entrance of a beautiful palace... Before him there was a fountain, which threw up the water very high, and in it there were some red apples... He was dressed in a robe of silk, with a high white hat on his head, on the top of which there was a spinal ruby, with pearls and precious stones round it... Three Meerzas, who stood before the lord, and were his most intimate councillors... came and took the ambassadors by the arms, [doubtless as a precaution in case they should prove to be assassins] and led them forward until they stood together before the lord.” Tamerlane then asked after the Castilian monarch, saying, ‘How is my son the king? is he in good health?’. When the ambassadors had answered, Tamerlane turned to the knights who were seated around him, and said, ‘Behold! here are the ambassadors sent by my son the king of Spain, who is the greatest king of the Franks, and lives at the end of the world. These Franks are truly a great people, and I will give my benediction to the king of Spain, my son. It would have sufficed if he had sent you to me with the letter, and without the presents, so well satisfied am I to hear of his health and prosperous state’. The ambassadors were then taken to a room, on the right-hand side of the place where the lord sat; and the Meerzas, who held them by the arms, made them sit below an ambassador, whom the emperor Chayscan, lord of Cathay, had sent to Tamerlane to demand the yearly tribute which was formerly paid”. This tribute, however, had been suffered to lapse for nearly eight years, and Tamerlane was profoundly irritated that the Cathayan emperor should have dared to demand its renewal; moreover, he was quick to seize an opportunity for dramatic effect, and realized that by publicly setting Clavijo above the representatives of his Eastern overlord he could pay a most welcome compliment to his ‘Western son’. “When the lord saw the ambassadors seated below the ambassador from the lord of Cathay, he sent to order that they should sit above him, and he below them. As soon as they were seated, one of the Meerzas of the lord came and said to the ambassador of Cathay, that the lord had ordered that those who were ambassadors from the king of Spain, his son and friend, should sit above him; and that he who was the ambassador from a thief and a bad man, his enemy, should sit below them; and from that time, at the feasts and entertainments given by the lord, they always sat in that order. The Meerza then ordered the interpreter to tell the ambassadors what the lord had done for them.”

Many and wonderful are the tales related by Clavijo concerning his experiences at the court of Samarcand. The feasts were horrible orgies: “sometimes the company drank wine and at others they drank cream and sugar”. Caño, the wife of Tamerlane, “called the ambassadors before her, and gave them to drink with her own hand, and she importuned Ruy Gonzalez for a long time, to make him drink, for she would not believe that he never touched wine. The drinking was such that some of the men fell down drunk before her; and this was considered very jovial, for they think that there can be no pleasure without drunken men.” At one of the festivals, there were several terrible executions; “the custom is, that when a great man is put to death, he is hanged; but the meaner sort are beheaded”. Tamerlane had fourteen elephants, each one “equal in size to four or five great bulls, and their bodies were quite shapeless, like a full sack. Their legs were very thick, and the same size all the way down, and the foot round and without hoofs, but with five toes, each with a nail, like those of a black man.... They had much entertainment with these elephants, making them run with horses and with the people, which was very diverting; and when they all ran together, it seemed as if the earth trembled”.

Clavijo's embassy to the court of Tamerlane is usually regarded by Spanish historians as an isolated event. It occurred, as we have already pointed out, at the very end of that long series of eastern travels initiated by the Polos almost one hundred and fifty years before and had no immediately tangible results.

Yet on the other hand, if taken in conjunction with the precisely contemporaneous expedition of Bethencourt to the Canaries, it certainly indicates that the tide of enthusiasm for foreign discovery and exploration was running strong in Castile in the opening years of the fifteenth century. What set the tide in motion, is difficult to tell; but the example of Portugal and possibly of Italy, who were already in the field, was doubtless responsible for much. Why it did not continue is, perhaps, an even harder problem; but the internal anarchy and confusion of the reigns of John II and Henry IV furnish the most obvious answer: Spain was too much disrupted at home to think of the prosecution of foreign colonization and conquest till the days of the Catholic Kings. Whatever the final explanation of these different problems, the embassy of Clavijo will always be remembered as an early proof of the Spaniard's passion for adventure in distant lands—of the quality which furnishes the key to his later conquests in the New World. It showed that he had the stuff in him of which empire builders are made. It also afforded an interesting precedent for the attempts which were to be made in the reigns of Charles V and of Philip in to establish relations between the kings of Spain and the shahs of Persia.



CHAPTER IV  
THE MEDIAEVAL CASTILIANS

From what has been already said concerning the predominant Spanish tendency towards internal separatism and differentiation, it will be readily inferred that the task of portraying the social, constitutional, and economic condition of the Iberian Peninsula at the close of the Middle Ages is unusually difficult and complex. The only generalization which can be made with absolute accuracy is that generalization is impossible. In every realm of life diversity and variety are the invariably conspicuous facts. There are, in the first place, innumerable lines of cleavage between the two great component parts of Spain—between Castile on the west, and the realms of the Crown of Aragon on the east. In their aims and ideals, in the character and aspirations of their inhabitants, in their social, institutional, and economic life, the two kingdoms were utterly divergent. Then again, within each of the two realms the process of differentiation continues, until the student finds himself confronted with a vast number of apparently unrelated petty units—social, geographical, institutional, and economic. Indeed the process goes so far that the units ultimately become almost indistinguishable from individuals. Another kindred fact which greatly enhances the difficulty of our problem, particularly in Castile, is the wide gulf which separated theory from practice. To read in *Las Siete Partidas* one might imagine that the mediaeval Castilian government was an effective royal absolutism, tempered perhaps by an unusually large measure of democratic power in municipal affairs, and of popular participation in the Cortes. As a matter of fact, both king and third estate were practically dominated by the rebel aristocracy during most of the two centuries previous to the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella—that is, during the period when the institutional development of the realm made its most rapid strides. In other words, the character of the subject before us does not lend itself to the summarized treatment prescribed for a book which attempts to cover as wide a field as does this. Abridgment, though necessary, is even more than usually likely to give rise to misconceptions.

Let us begin our inquiry by taking up the different ranks and classes of which mediaeval Castilian society was composed, and the conditions under which they occupied the land.

Next below the king, whose positions and powers may best be described in another place, there come, first of all, the nobles. As a class they had inherited high traditions of independence and power from later Visigothic days. Throughout the age of the Reconquest they had improved the various periods of weakness of the monarchy to intrench themselves firmly in the enjoyment of their innumerable privileges and immunities; and in the period just previous to the accession of the Catholic Kings they reached the summit of their power. Neither sovereign above, nor burgess below could withstand them; and they made the continuance of peace and efficient government impossible throughout the land. Of these nobles there were, broadly speaking, three different categories: the *ricos hombres*, or, as they came to be called in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, *grandes*; the *infanzones* or *hidalgos*; and the *Caballeros*. Authorities differ widely as to the precise meaning to be attached to these different distinctions, but their divergent conclusions may perhaps be roughly summarized as follows. The title of *rico hombre* or *grande* at the head of the list, though it might occasionally be given in recognition of notable services or as a meed of valor, was primarily indicative of ancient and noble lineage ‘beyond the power of the king to confer’. That of *hidalgo*, on the other hand, though its very name connotes distinguished ancestry, came gradually to be granted as a reward of merit, or of wealth, and was

sold so frequently by the crown as to lose its original significance, and to become the broad general term most frequently used to indicate the rank and file of the Castilian aristocracy. The title of *Caballero* also, though it was at first only applied to men of noble birth, was afterwards conferred on chosen warriors who went forth to fight equipped with arms and a horse at their own expense—thus indicating how from an early date the career of a soldier was held to be a sure road to social distinction in Castile. Along with these general categories, the special titles of duke and count make their appearance in the twelfth century, and that of marquis in the fourteenth. The first two were of Visigothic origin and were revived after a period of temporary desuetude by Henry II and Alfonso XI; that of marquis was granted for the first time by Henry II. Recipients of these dignities, though often deficient in ancientness and nobility of lineage, were for all practical purposes on a par with the *ricos hombres* or *grandee*. The hereditary character of these last three titles was only gradually established; originally they were held for the lifetime of the recipient, and the remembrance of that fact not infrequently enabled later kings on flimsy pretexts to revoke hastily granted donations and to interrupt lineal successions.

We pass from these different grades to the privileges which they conferred. All the rank and file of the Castilian aristocracy held themselves to be generally exempt from direct taxation; from imprisonment or seizure of property for debt; from derogatory punishment such as chastisement with rods or death by the hangman; and save in cases of treason and a few other exceptional crimes from torture. In theory they were preferred over the burgesses in the distribution of offices and other royal favors; they had a separate place in processions; and, if arrested, they were confined in a separate prison. They all were entitled to the *riepto* and *desafio*, that is, to the right to avenge an injury or insult and to prove their valor in a formal judicial duel in the presence of the king and twelve of their peers. But the special privileges inherent in the upper ranks of this curiously subdivided baronage go much further still. The *rico hombre*, at the head of the list, could display a standard and a cauldron, as emblems of his cherished right to raise and maintain an army at his own expense. He had the undoubted prerogative of renouncing his obedience to his king and sovereign without further ceremony than sending a follower to make declaration thereof as follows: “Sir, for so and so I kiss your hand, and from henceforth he is no longer your vassal”. He possessed, theoretically at least, an important place in the royal councils; he could remain seated and retain his hat in the royal presence; when he entered the royal chamber the queen rose to receive him. Within his own domains he often exercised criminal and civil jurisdiction; saving always the high justice of the king he levied taxes, and even granted *fueros*, which were usually confirmed by the crown; in some cases the royal officers were forbidden to enter his lands to collect revenue, punish criminals, or attach their goods. Next below him, the *hidalgo* was considerably less fortunate, especially in the measure of his authority and jurisdiction within his own estates; and the *caballeros* in turn lacked much which the *hidalgos* possessed. Still, taken as a whole, it is impossible to deny that the Castilian aristocracy was possessed of privileges thoroughly incompatible with orderly or centralized government and inimical to the best interests of the state. The strange jumble of the trivial and the important in this long list of baronial prerogatives is particularly significant. It shows that the Castilian nobles could not distinguish the form from the substance of power, and that they knew not how to make a modest use of their liberties; it indicates little political sagacity, but unlimited *amour propre*. Yet it would be an error to regard them as totally deficient in good qualities.

They certainly formed the backbone of the Castilian armies in the great struggle of the Reconquest, to which the *hidalgos* proudly boasted that they went of their own free will, at the invitation and not at the orders of the crown. They kept alive more than anyone else the military qualities of the Castilian nation, and the high traditions of the profession of arms. If they were a constant menace to their sovereign at home, they were to prove exceedingly valuable in winning new realms for him abroad, in the age of imperial expansion which was so soon to come.

In other countries of mediaeval Europe we are accustomed to attribute the excessive power of the nobles to the opportunities afforded them by the feudal structure of society; it may, therefore, seem difficult to reconcile the extraordinary rights and privileges of the aristocracy of Castile which we have just enumerated with the fact that there was never a fully developed feudal system there. Local conditions—particularly the constantly shifting boundary and the agricultural poverty of the Meseta—were distinctly unfavorable to it: “Castile yielded to the current that pushed the world towards feudalism indeed, but did not abandon herself to it”. Like Anglo-Saxon England, she possessed “much feudalism but no feudal system”. For the act of alienating land by lord to vassal was not *regularly* accompanied in mediaeval Castile by the setting up of the same complicated array of reciprocal rights and obligations by which, under a thoroughly organized feudal system, the two parties to the bargain were almost inextricably bound together. The process here was, in theory at least, much more simple. Ownership as a general rule was granted fully and unreservedly with land, but the crown usually managed to avoid the alienation of political authority with it; so that the vassal was seldom legally entitled to anything like the same measure of jurisdiction over the inhabitants of his domains that he would have had in a thoroughly feudal country like France. To this latter rule there are of course numerous exceptions. The various rights granted to the *ricos hombres*, as described in the preceding paragraph, show that the monarchy occasionally permitted its greatest vassals to exercise powers on their own estates which were wholly incompatible with the maintenance of effective political authority in the hands of the crown. A few instances have even been found in Castile of conditions which possibly justify the statement that the only difference between feudalism there and in other countries is a difference in quantity, not in quality. But it is scarcely fair to argue from special cases such as these. As a general rule the ties that united suzerain and vassal in mediaeval Castile were much too loose and too impermanent to be comparable with those created by a full-fledged feudal system. They could be broken, as we have already seen, at the shortest possible notice. There was no feudal hierarchy. On the basis of the powers which they possessed under the codes, the Castilian aristocracy should have been far less turbulent and troublesome for the central government than the nobles of a country where feudalism was firmly established; it was only the weakness and lack of statesmanship of the majority of the monarchs that permitted the magnates to usurp authority and privileges to which they had no just title, and thus to become a menace to all law and order in the land. Moreover, the evil increased after the middle of the thirteenth century, at the very moment when with the gradual breakup of feudalism in Western Europe it began elsewhere to diminish. There are two chief reasons for this. In the first place the slackening tide of the Reconquest deprived the barons of an outlet for their restless energies in foreign war, and thus increased their proneness to internal revolt. In the second, the power of the aristocracy was enormously enhanced by the institution in the reign of Alfonso X of the *mayorazgos* or great entailed estates. Originally, like their monarchs above them, the nobles had weakened themselves by dividing their domains among their children. Now at last they had perceived their error; and by establishing the principle of primogeniture they handed on their lands undiminished to their heirs, thus perpetuating from generation to generation all the various powers and prerogatives which inevitably went with them.

Next after the nobles come, of course, the clergy, whose valuable services in preaching and supporting the crusade against the Moors as a sacred duty obligatory to all had been rewarded since the earliest days of the Reconquest by numerous grants and privileges. Like the nobles, they were exempt from the payment of regular taxes; in fact, there were certain local levies to which the nobles contributed which the clergy refused to pay. Many of the other privileges of *hidalguía*, such as immunity from certain penalties, or the right to the sum of fifteen hundred *sueldos* as an indemnity for a blow, were conferred on different groups of clerics at different times by

different kings. Often these privileges were gradually extended so as to be enjoyed not merely by their original recipients, but also by their servants, dependents, and relatives. Meantime the landed possessions and personal property of the clerics increased by leaps and bounds. They were the beneficiaries not only of the royal munificence, but of that of every other estate in the realm as well. Many of the bishops became virtually kings in the territories immediately adjacent to their sees, for the monarchs deliberately divested themselves of their sovereign rights in their favor, and even suffered the episcopal power to extend to the maintenance of special armies to defend the ecclesiastical lands against attacks from neighboring nobles and foreign foes. There can be no doubt that the church rendered numerous services—economic and administrative, as well as military and religious—in return for the privileges which it received from the government. There are constant references in the charters and chronicles of the early periods of the Reconquest to the skill and energy of the clergy in reclaiming the devastated lands, and in tilling the arid soil of the Meseta. But the very fact that the interests of the clerics had become so miscellaneous necessarily encroached upon their ecclesiastical activities, and, as time went on, considerably diminished their prestige in the eyes of the mass of the people; certainly their wealth, power, and luxury were a constant source of complaint from the Cortes of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. A large portion of the laymen, however, preferred to accept the situation as it was, and if possible to make capital out of it for themselves. So valuable was the possession of ecclesiastical privilege from a purely mundane point of view, that many essentially non clerical persons obtained admission to the ranks of the churchmen, and then, having secured to themselves all the rights and immunities inherent in that status, continued to devote themselves to business, law, and even to the occupations of mountebank and buffoon, thus bringing into contempt and disrepute the sacred calling which they had outwardly embraced.

The ecclesiastical hierarchy of archbishops, bishops, and their subordinates was substantially the same in Castile as in other Western European lands. As elsewhere, too, there was a prolonged contest between king and clergy over their respective shares in the important matter of ecclesiastical appointments; and in the early fourteenth century this struggle became three-cornered through the papal claim to the right to ‘provide’ to certain benefices—a pretension which was resented the more in that it was usually exercised in favor of foreigners, “to the great prejudice of our people and the common weal”. The Cortes made vigorous complaints against this practice, which naturally increased apace during the period of the Babylonian Captivity and the Schism, but the monarchs failed effectively to press the national cause at the papal curia. The matter remained in an unsettled and highly unsatisfactory condition down to the accession of the Catholic Kings.

The members of the great orders of military knighthood demanded for themselves the privileges of the clergy and of the aristocracy as well. The ever-present necessity of driving back the Moor rendered the soil of mediaeval Spain particularly favorable to the growth and progress of these institutions: some of which were indigenous, while others, like the Templars and the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, were merely branches of orders which had been instituted abroad. Those of purely Castilian origin were three in number. The oldest was that of Calatrava, founded in 1158 and confirmed by the Pope in 1164, in celebration of the fact that certain soldier monks had successfully defended the town and fortress of that name, which the Templars had been unable to hold against the Almohades. The beginnings of the order of Santiago are more obscure; despite the fact that it disputed the priority of that of Calatrava, there seems no question that its formal establishment must be placed at least a decade later. It apparently arrogated to itself the special duty and privilege of protecting the pilgrims who journeyed to the shrine of Compostela. The order of Alcantara originated in an attempt of Ferdinand II of Leon to introduce that of Calatrava (which was founded in Castile) within his own realm. The members of the new branch, however, were unable to endure the idea of subjection to a body which

originated in another state; and before long they obtained from Lucius III (in 1183) the privilege of complete independence, and adopted the name of the town of Alcántara, which the king of Leon had conferred on them as their headquarters. Down to the middle of the thirteenth century these orders did noble service against the Moors and were rewarded by a constant stream of privileges and dignities and donations in money and land, by dint of which they were able to constitute themselves veritable *regna in regno*. But the coincidence of this immense accretion of wealth and power with the virtual cessation of the crusading work which they had been called into existence to perform subsequently converted them into a grievous menace to the state. They exchanged the high ideals of their earlier days for the selfish ambitions characteristic of the mass of the Castilian aristocracy; and their power and the extent of their lands made them a rallying point for malcontents. The extinction of the Templars in Castile in 1312—sequel and counterpart of their abolition four years previously in France—was indubitably a heavy blow to the morale of the other orders, whose internal discipline and condition deteriorated rapidly in the succeeding years. They had in fact outlived their usefulness and were devoting their energies to unworthy ends. The grand master of each one of them was a serious rival to the monarchy; a combination of them all might conceivably overthrow it. One of the very first measures adopted by Ferdinand and Isabella to bring order out of chaos, and to cause a strong central government to prevail in the land, was to terminate the independence of these ancient and powerful institutions.

We now turn from the upper ranks of society to the middle and lower classes. These were subdivided, like every group of the population of Castile, into a bewildering number of different categories and varieties, but for our purposes it will be most convenient to classify and consider them under two main heads—rural and urban.

The conditions of the rural portion of the third estate were largely moulded, like those of the clergy and baronage, by the peculiar circumstances of the war of the Reconquest. The repopling of the devastated lands, as the Christians gradually advanced to the southward, constituted a most difficult problem, and reacted on the whole unfavorably upon the enfranchisement of the lower classes; for the dangers of living in a spot exposed to Moorish attack were so obvious and imminent that few could be induced to settle there without the promise of protection from nobles or king. Protection would not be accorded without demanding service in return; so that the mass of the agricultural population remained in varying degrees of slavery, semi-slavery, or dependence upon the magnates as the price of the latter's support. Down to the end of the twelfth century, at least, they not unnaturally considered their safety first, to the detriment of their aspirations towards liberty. Gradually there emerged, however, groups of men who were willing to settle in dangerous territory in return for a larger measure of autonomy. They were by no means ready as yet entirely to dispense with royal or baronial protection, but they demanded at least the privilege of selecting their own lord. Thus originated the *benefactoria* or *behetrias*, as they were called, of which there were two kinds—the *behetrias de linaje* or *de entire parientes*, which were obliged to choose their protector from the members of one family, and the *behetrias de mar*, which could select him anywhere within the boundaries of the realm. The latter, if the master that they had chosen failed to give satisfaction, had the right to change him, and even to repeat this process “up to seven times in one day”. Below these were the various grades of the *tierras de señorío*. The *cultivadores libres* paid tribute to the king or one of the great feudal lords, in return for the permission to till a portion of their territories and make their living thereon; they might abandon their master if they chose to do so but lost their lands in consequence. The serfs below them were subdivided into various minor categories. They enjoyed some personal rights and privileges, but, generally speaking, were *adscripti glebae*—that is, inseparable, either by their own volition or the act of their masters, from the land on which they worked. The slave at the bottom of the social structure could hold no property of any kind; but his master, even in the



darkest periods, was not entirely absolved from responsibility for the elementary needs of his existence.

Such in brief was the very complicated situation which obtained among the lower and middle classes on the agricultural lands in the period of the height of the Reconquest. In the last two centuries before the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella, however, numerous changes and improvements had occurred. In the first place, a general movement of emancipation of the slaves had taken place; the influence of the church, the increasing need of free men to repopulate the conquered lands, the efforts of the slaves themselves, and the fact that the cities almost invariably granted aid and protection to fugitives, combined to bring about this happy result. Save for captives taken in the Moorish wars, or in expeditions to unknown lands like the Canaries, there was probably no one left in fifteenth-century Castile who had not succeeded in winning complete *personal* freedom; so that slavery in the full sense of the term had virtually ceased to exist there. Moreover, the lot of the *solariegos* or serfs improved immensely at the same time. Both economically and socially their condition was generally ameliorated by (1) the increasingly strict definition and limitation of the tributes due from them to their masters, (2) the loosening of the ties which bound them to the land on which they worked, and (3) the frequent recognition of their right to many without their lords' consent. It is, however, even more dangerous than usual to lay down any general rules in this matter; and we must not for one moment imagine that the privileges just mentioned attained anything approaching universal application. In the fourteenth century, when there are numerous evidences of a reactionary movement, it was maintained in certain districts of Castile, notwithstanding all laws to the contrary, that the lord "had the right to take the body of his serf and all that he has in the world". But certainly the status of the servile classes in Castile during this period was distinctly preferable to that of the corresponding portion of the population in Aragon, as will be more apparent in subsequent pages. The most salient characteristic of the mediaeval Castilian has often been described as impatience of restraint and desire to shake off all authority. As manifested in the upper ranks of society, this trait was productive of many evils, and rendered order and strong government impossible. It may, however, be plausibly argued that lower down in the scale it engendered aspirations towards liberty, which survived the absolutism of the Hapsburgs and the early Bourbons, and proved the salvation of the national fortunes in a later age.

Meantime, while the emancipation of the lower orders had been progressing, the condition of the inhabitants of the *behetriás* tended to deteriorate. No more striking example could be desired of the wild confusion of titles and jurisdictions which characterized land tenure in mediaeval Castile than that afforded by the situation in these holdings in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The unrestricted right of the *behetriás de mar* to change and choose their protectors at their own discretion gave rise to numerous dissensions and clashes. In the *behetriás de linage* the rights and privileges of the overlord were often divided up among the different members of his family, so that, instead of one master, the *behetría* not seldom had three or four. When the king intervened to remedy these difficulties, the usual result of his efforts was to add himself to the already excessive number of suzerains which he was attempting to diminish. manifold difficulties also resulted from the fact that many *pueblos de solariego*, or groups of serfs, attempted to convert themselves into *behetriás*, or at least to seek annexation to them, thus rendering confusion worse confounded. The *Becerro de las Behetriás*—a sort of Domesday Book of the time of Pedro the Cruel—describes this curious network of conflicting rights and jurisdictions in great detail. Certainly things had reached such a pass that reform was quite impossible. Nothing short of abolition by royal command, or extinction through internal decadence, could really remedy the situation which had come into being. It was the second of these two possibilities that actually occurred. The prevailing anarchy and confusion of the period immediately preceding the accession of the Catholic Kings made protection more desirable than

autonomy, and the nobler aspirations of earlier days sank temporarily into the background. The comparative freedom of the *behetrias* was no longer attractive, and we find constant petitions from their inhabitants to be converted into *pueblos de solariego*. The close of the Middle Ages, then, saw a meeting of the extremes of the long list of categories into which the bulk of the agricultural population had in previous centuries been divided. A general levelling and simplifying process had in fact taken place, from which the large majority of the persons concerned had unquestionably derived advantage. The situation, however, in this as in other matters was far from satisfactory, and was bound to remain so until the overpowerful magnates were curbed and prevented from transgressing the laws of the land.

Far more interesting and important than the development of the agricultural communities is that of the Castilian cities. We have already seen that the natural conditions of the Iberian Peninsula favored the tendency to concentrate in urban communities. In Roman and in Visigothic days the cities had attained a high degree of importance—the constant state of war contributing still further to foster the natural inclination of the population to seek safety by gathering together behind fortified walls. Whether the constitution of the mediaeval Spanish municipality can be directly traced back to Roman or even to Visigothic days is perhaps the most eagerly debated question in mediaeval Spanish history. Whatever the final verdict on the question of lineal descent may be, we cannot doubt that the high traditions of municipal organization inherited by the mediaeval Castilian from his predecessors favored the evolution of a type of urban constitution which, at its height, gave scope to all that was highest and best in the political life of the time.

Before proceeding further in our consideration of the Castilian municipalities, we must pause to explain some of the principal meanings of a word which one encounters in every phase of mediaeval Spanish history—namely, the term *fuero*. It is descended from the Latin *forum*, one of whose meanings is a tribunal or court, but in Spanish its primary significance is a constitution or code of laws. A *fuero*, however, was quite as frequently a law of special as of general application; the *Fuero Viejo*, for instance, purported to be a code of privileges of the aristocracy. More often still, a *fuero* might be granted to the inhabitants of a certain locality, and thus become, in effect, a constitution or set of privileges for that particular spot, which the inhabitants invariably defended with the utmost resolution, down to the minutest detail, against encroachment by crown or magnates, in spite of the fact that it was often in manifest contradiction to the provisions of the general law of the land. The number and variety of these local *fueros* which were given out at different times by different sovereigns, and also, through delegated or usurped authority, by the greater lords and higher clergy, was probably the most fruitful cause of the social and constitutional diversity of mediaeval Castile. Though not infrequently granted to rural communities, they were principally employed to encourage the founding of cities, and it is in that connection that we have to consider them here.

The problem of repopling the conquered lands was in reality far more urban than rural. The boundaries were continually shifting; land which had been captured one day, was likely to be raided and possibly recaptured by the enemy the next. The ‘neutral zone’ between the rival forces could not possibly be occupied by a scattered and consequently defenceless agricultural population; it was essential for those who ventured to take possession of it to concentrate and intrench themselves in compact groups—in other words, to found cities. Even with this precaution, the sovereigns had to offer strong inducements to persuade their subjects to settle in these outposts of Christendom; and the most obvious of these inducements was to grant to them, as to the agricultural communities which followed on behind, a considerable measure of autonomy in return for the risks which they ran. Consequently, the *fueros*, constitutions, or charters of the newly founded Castilian cities contained from the very first a greater or lesser number of concessions of the right of self-government. The sovereign voluntarily divested

himself in their favor of certain political and judicial powers which normally belonged only to the crown. The measure of their autonomy was obviously, *ceteris paribus*, the degree to which the position which they occupied was exposed; and the terms of their different fueros varied, in general, accordingly. At first the diversity of these fueros was absolutely unchecked; there was a new constitution for each new town; but they all had certain features in common, and as time went on it became the practice to make increasingly frequent use of certain model charters—to grant to a newly founded municipality, for example, the Fuero of Leon or of Sepulveda—and thus, in some small measure at least, to standardize the methods of local government. Variety rather than homogeneity was doubtless still the rule; but there is at least a sufficient degree of family resemblance between the various municipal constitutions to warrant an attempt to summarize their most striking features.

Almost all the municipal fueros began by granting the inhabitants the right to form a general assembly, *concilium* or *concejo*. It was ordinarily composed of the *vecinos*—heads of families or property owners—and often included many who resided outside of the city walls, for the territory covered by the fuero usually extended some distance into the surrounding country. In this essentially democratic body the chief municipal officers were annually chosen. The methods of their selection varied widely. What we should now call a ‘free election’ did not invariably prevail even in the most flourishing periods of municipal independence. Ancient local and aristocratic privileges had often to be considered, and a fondness for drawing lots and for a system of rotation in office manifested itself at an early date; still we may fairly say that the municipal magistrates were invested with their several offices under the auspices of the popular assembly, which could thus justly claim for itself the supreme local authority within the town. Of these magistrates the following were the most important. The *regidores*, whose numbers varied from eight to thirty-six, were general administrative officials, whose duty it was to oversee and give advice concerning the management of municipal affairs. They were usually drawn in equal numbers from the ranks of the burgesses and of the Caballeros. The municipal *alcaldes* were judges with criminal and civil jurisdiction, and usually fell into two categories—*majores* and *ordinarios*. Some cities had two, others four, six, or even ten. The *alguacil* was a police officer or bailiff; the *alguacil mayor* led the municipal levies in war; the *alférez* carried the standard. The term *fieles* was used to describe minor functionaries with various duties who acted as secretaries of the *concejo*, as inspectors of weights and measures (*fieles almotacenes*), or as superintendents of the public lands and properties of the municipality; sometimes they were employed to prevent merchants from charging excessive prices for the necessaries of life. The *alarifes* took charge of the erection and preservation of the municipal buildings, and of the status of the workmen employed thereon; *andadores* and *mensajeros* carried messages for the *concejo*; and *veladores* kept watch over the city at night. The whole body of these local municipal magistrates, selected in the *concejo* and exercising their functions in its name, was generally known as the *ayuntamiento*.

But the powers of the *concejos* did not cease with the appointment of the principal municipal officers. Regulations for the internal administration of the city, for the raising and collection of its revenue (which was derived from contributions in money and in labor, from fines, and from the income of public lands), for the policing of the streets, for the management of the municipal food supply, and for the punishment of minor delinquents, etc., etc., emanated in the first instance from the general assembly of the citizens. The *concejo*, in other words, both laid down the lines on which the city should be governed and appointed the magistrates who were charged with the execution of its will. Questions of external, as well as of internal policy were also frequently submitted to it, such as whether or not the city should send its levies on a raid into Moorish territory, or wage war on some overpowerful baron. Some of the Cantabrian cities even went so far as to intervene on their own initiative, without sanction of the central government, in

the desultory struggle between France and England during the first half of the thirteenth century; on one occasion their boldness in seizing English ships evoked a vigorous claim for reparation from King Henry III to St. Ferdinand. Finally, the *concejos* enjoyed, in theory, at least, the right to elect the *procuradores* or municipal representatives to the *brazo popular* or third estate in the Cortes; though we shall later find that here, as in the case of the local magistrates, the methods of choice were too various to permit the full realization of this privilege.

We have here all the appurtenances of a thoroughly democratic regime, and from the middle of the twelfth to the middle of the fourteenth century, when the development just outlined attained its climax, the vigor and liberty of the municipal government of Castile was probably unsurpassed anywhere in Western Europe. Even after the virtual accomplishment of the Reconquest had freed the monarchy from the necessity of seeking the alliance of the cities as outposts in the campaign against the infidel, the value of their friendship in the internal struggle against the turbulent nobles was at once perceived by all the ablest kings. The advice of James the Conqueror to Alfonso the Learned, to court the favor of the municipalities, embodied one of the best recognized principles of strong monarchical government. Fears lest the aspirations of the Castilian cities for democracy and autonomy might someday prove a bar to the progress of the power of the crown, were on the whole far exceeded by the dread of the overweening ambitions of the aristocracy which threatened both. *Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos* was the motto of the monarchy, though it was not always carried out; and the confidence and favor of the crown were often rewarded by the cities undertaking on their own initiative to aid it in suppressing the outbreaks of their common foe. When the days of monarchical absolutism arrived and the nobles were crushed, the triumphant kingship avoided the danger of democratic opposition by a clever utilization of the ever-potent forces of Spanish separatism. But that is another story, which does not for the moment concern us. During the period at present under review, royal favor and Spanish impatience of restraint combined to give the Castilian cities a measure of independence and self-government which goes far to justify the claim that Spain was in some respects the most democratic country in mediaeval Europe. Her democracy was, of course, rather local than national in its scope. It manifested itself in characteristically various ways, not only in the different kingdoms of the peninsula, but also in the different parts of each of those kingdoms and could not make itself fully felt as a national ideal for many centuries to come. No one, however, can study the history of the Castilian municipality without recognizing the high character of the spirit with which it was animated. On the walls of the great staircase of the town hall at Toledo, the visitor may still read the lines of a fifteenth century Castilian poet, Gomez Manrique, which express a lofty conception of the duties of a municipal magistrate:

“Nobles discretos varones  
Que gobernáis en Toledo  
En estos escalones  
Desechad las aficiones  
Codicias, amor y miedo.  
Por los comunes provechos  
Dejad los particulares  
Pues Dios os hizo titulares  
De riquísimos techos  
Estad firmes y derechos”

Modern democracy cannot fail to be stirred by admiration and sympathy for the ideal which these words proclaim.

One of the most significant proofs of the power and prestige of the Castilian municipalities is afforded by the *hermandades* or brotherhoods which they formed for the maintenance of their privileges and the law of the land. Faint traces of such organizations are discernible in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, but it is at the end of the reign of Alfonso X that they first emerge as an important factor in the life of the state. In 1282, at the height of the successional struggle between the Scholar King and his rebellious son, an association of the cities of the kingdom of Leon was formed at the instigation of the latter to help him dethrone his father. Two years later, on discovering that the evils of the time had been rather increased than diminished by the change of rulers, the league which Sancho had called into existence reversed its policy and directed its efforts against him. This *hermandad* of 1282, however, differs from those which followed it in two respects. In the first place, it was formed, not spontaneously, but as a result of a plot of the pretender to the throne of Castile; in the second, it was avowedly anti-royal in its aims. A *hermandad* which was created by the cities of Castile in a meeting at Burgos in the first year of the reign of Ferdinand IV was, however, much more typical. It was a voluntary association of the representatives of the different municipalities, who, recognizing the dangers of a royal minority, banded themselves together “for the honor and security of the king and his successor and for the honor and safety of the land”; and another *hermandad* of the towns of Leon and Galicia, which was formed simultaneously at Valladolid, proclaimed the same intentions. Both of them pledged themselves to protect the lives and property of their members, to maintain justice, and to prevent illegal taxation. Their constitutions were solemnly confirmed by the king in 1295 and again in 1297. But it is clear that they were not intended to be in any sense permanent. After having tided over the crisis which had evoked them, it was expected that they would cease to exist. Each one had a central deliberative assembly of the representatives of the different cities that composed it, to decide on its method of action. Its expenses were defrayed from a common fund; its letters were dispatched under a common seal. Other smaller *hermandades* appeared in the same period in Murcia, Cuenca, and elsewhere, for purposes similar to those of Leon and Castile, and there were also special ones with definite objects of local and particular interest. Among these may be mentioned the famous *Hermandad de las Marismas*, composed of the principal towns on or near the Biscayan coast, which had been given special privileges since the time of Archbishop Diego Gelmires to stimulate their interest in naval affairs. In this region the tradition of autonomy and independence was so strong that the *Hermandad de las Marismas* could not help being affected by it. Its members refused to trade with the interior of Castile, if their local privileges were not observed; it inaugurated what amounted to a separate independent foreign and commercial policy of its own with Portugal, France, and England, and it sent its own representatives to deal with these countries.

We are, however, principally interested in the larger and more general *hermandades* whose primary object was the maintenance of law and order in the realm, and which consequently tended to gravitate towards the monarchy, as the symbol of the governance which Castile so sadly lacked. The long minority of Alfonso XI gave them an admirable opportunity to demonstrate their usefulness. When a new *hermandad*, including “Leon, Castile, Toledo, and Estremadura”, was formed in the Cortes of Burgos in 1315, the regent, Maria de Molina, made haste to confirm it, as the best possible means of strengthening the throne. In the century that elapsed between the accession of Pedro the Cruel and the death of John II, the *hermandades* were much less conspicuous. The frequent meetings of the Cortes during this period gave the municipal representatives of the cities a better opportunity than they had previously enjoyed of laying their demands before the king; moreover, the sovereigns of the time, though they did not cease to recognize the value of the *hermandades* in cases of special stress and emergency, had also begun



to realize that if suffered to establish themselves permanently they might ultimately be converted into a menace to the royal power. The fact that similar associations of nobles and magnates for less patriotic purposes had already begun to make their appearance furnished an additional cause for the misgivings of the crown. During the reign of Henry IV, the *hermandades* again emerged into great prominence, but we can more conveniently consider their development under that monarch in connection with the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella.

The diminished importance of the *hermandades* which is observable after the middle of the fourteenth century is accompanied by the beginnings of decay in the internal government of the cities that composed them. Royal interference and desire to control, which had adversely affected the development of the one, were also the obvious and immediate causes of the contemporaneous decline of the other; but it is a nice question how far the king's meddling in the internal affairs of the municipalities was caused by his dissatisfaction with the rule of the *concejos*, and how far by his fear that unless the crown stepped in to protect and control them the city governments ran grave danger of being subjected to the domination of the rebel baronage. The constant complaints in the proceedings of the Cortes of violent internal upheavals within the city walls seem at first to lend color to the belief that the progress of municipal liberty had outrun administrative order; but when one comes to look beneath the surface, one finds that most of these broils were rather the result of baronial incursions and ancient family feuds than of any abuse of their privileges by the *concejos*. The fact that many of the cities petitioned the crown for *cartas* forbidding the nobles to enter their domains is also significant and indicates that many of the municipal revolts were but a by-product of the excessive powers of the aristocracy.

Whatever the cause of their action, the Castilian sovereigns, from Alfonso XI downward, did their utmost to undermine the independence of the cities of their realms. From open violations of the *fueros*, the wiser of them shrank. They preferred to work by stealth whenever possible; but their principal methods of operation are reasonably clear. The most important was unquestionably the institution of the *corregidores*, royally appointed officials sent down to the *concejos* to cooperate with, and ultimately to supersede, the locally elected magistrates; as these magistrates, however, were primarily representatives of the central administration, they can most conveniently be considered in connection with it. But the changes which were effected within the municipalities are almost as notable as the authorities which were superimposed upon them from without. On all sides we have evidence that the cases of free and open annual election to offices by the *concejo* steadily diminished. Life tenures, royal appointments, and declarations of the hereditary character of this or that function are encountered with increasing frequency. When the sovereign found that a city obstinately refused to permit the abrogation of the traditional methods of election of existing magistrates, a host of new positions were often created, and their holders, invariably royal appointees, gradually elbowed aside their municipally elected colleagues. Multiplication of officials and great increase of the funds that had to be raised to pay their salaries are accompanying phenomena of this method of procedure. In the reign of John II occurs the first case of the sale of a municipal post by the crown as a means of replenishing the royal treasury, an event the significance of which it is unnecessary to emphasize. And royal interference extended to other things than the appointment of city magistrates. Sometimes all the local ordinances of the *concejo* for the government of the city were so radically reformed by the royal minions as to retain little or nothing of their original meaning. The *concejos* in fact had little left to do. All the real power had passed from their hands into those of the *ayuntamiento* of officials, which now no longer represented the voting body of the inhabitants. Small wonder if the ancient municipal traditions were forgotten and the spirit of the earlier centuries died away. Doubtless the cities themselves were much to blame. The early fifteenth century is in every respect a dark period in the history of Castile, and even if the crown had left them alone, it is doubtful whether the municipalities could have preserved their ancient ideals intact in view of

the universal deterioration which was in progress all around them. But their decadence was certainly accelerated by royal intervention; for though the king's interference may have been helpful at the outset, as a means of protection against baronial control, it ultimately served to undermine the foundations of the finest and freest life in mediaeval Castile. The complaints of the Cortes of John II and Henry IV concerning the infringement of the ancient *fueros* showed that some men realized the meaning of the change even at that early period; and a century later its results were evident to all.

It must not be forgotten that the nobles and higher clergy, who had been granted or else usurped the right to issue *fueros*, founded cities on their own domains as well as the king. These cities never attained at all the same measure of autonomy as did those which received their charters from the crown, and their decline in the fifteenth century was considerably more rapid. Hardest of all was the lot of the town whose lordship was disputed by two hostile magnates. It was invariably a storm center of disturbance, and its streets frequently ran with the blood of opposing factions.

A few words remain to be said in regard to the status of the two non-Christian portions of the population of mediaeval Castile—the Jews and the Moors. We have already seen that the Moors who remained on the territories which had been won for the Cross were treated, down to the close of the thirteenth century, with a very remarkable degree of tolerance and liberality by their Christian conquerors; and the same may be said of the Castilian Jews. The reign of Alfonso X marks the culmination of the prosperity of both races under the sovereignty of the kings of Castile. The *Partidas* contain numerous laws describing their rights and privileges. Both races were segregated in special communities (*aljamas*) surrounded by walls (*barrios*) in the principal cities, and the Moors, or Mudejares, as they were generally called, were sometimes given exclusive possession of smaller towns, which Christians were forbidden to enter. They retained their local officials, their minor courts, and their law codes; and as the Moors came gradually to forget their native language, their law books were translated into Spanish so as to be available for general use. The Christians were strictly forbidden to vex or oppress them, or to force them into acceptance of baptism; no Jew could be summoned to attend court on Saturdays, nor might his religious observances be interfered with in any other way. The value of both races as economic assets was early recognized. In addition to all the regular taxes, they paid a number of special imposts peculiar to themselves; moreover, the management of the capital and commerce of the realm was in large measure intrusted to them; and many of the royal *almojarifes* or tax gatherers were Hebrews. Yet on the other hand, even in the time of the Scholar King, the government made every effort to keep both Jews and Moors from consorting with Christians, and to preserve and accentuate the barriers that kept them apart. In addition to their segregation in separate quarters, they were forbidden under pain of heavy penalties to eat, drink, or bathe with Christians, while sexual intercourse between the different races was punished with terrible barbarity. Finally, regulations insisting that the Jews or Moors wear some distinctive dress or badge, or cut their hair in some peculiar fashion, so as to render them easily recognizable, are found throughout the thirteenth century codes, though the records seem to show that the regulations to this effect were by no means universally observed. Precisely what factors combined, and in what proportions, to alter these generally satisfactory conditions for the worse in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is not entirely clear. That the church pointed the way towards persecution is evident; but it is hard to believe that its attempts in that direction would have met with much success, had they not been supplemented by the great jealousy which the wealth and prosperity of the Moors and Jews aroused throughout the length and breadth of Castile. The association of the Jews with the proverbially unpopular occupation of money-lending rendered them particularly obnoxious, and is probably the chief explanation why they suffered so much more acutely than the Mudejares in

the century preceding the accession of the Catholic Kings. Against the Moors, indeed, a number of laws were passed to restrict their acquisition of Christian property, to limit the jurisdiction of their tribunals, and even to increase the facilities for their conversion; but it does not seem to have been possible to enforce these regulations, and it is significant of the continuance of friendly relations between the two faiths, that in 1410 the Mudejares of Cordova and Seville had contributed to the expense of the campaign of the Infante Ferdinand against the Granadan outpost of Antequera. There was, moreover, a notable increase of Mudejarism in the third quarter of the fifteenth century during the reign of Henry the Impotent.

With the unfortunate Israelites, however, the situation was very different. An evil tradition of Hebrew persecution inherited from Visigothic days had not been entirely forgotten, and lay hatred was far easier to stimulate against the Jews than against the Moors. In the Cortes of Burgos in 1315 a number of galling restrictions were imposed upon them. All laws permitting usury were revoked, and many of the provisions by which the Jews had been guaranteed fair treatment in the courts were abrogated. Other privileges were successively removed in the following years, and the fact that the ravages of the Black Death were popularly attributed by superstitious persons to the malign influence of the Hebrews served still further to increase the hardness of their lot. Finally, in the reign of John I, ecclesiastical denunciations and appeals to fanaticism and greed had their inevitable effect. Furious crowds entered and sacked the *aljamas* of the different cities of Castile and massacred hundreds, if not thousands, of the inhabitants; the only sure way to escape death was to submit to compulsory baptism. Thus, emerged the class of so-called *Marranos* or *Conversos*—converted Jews, some of whom for a time were not ashamed to lend aid to the Christians against the loyal Hebrews who had refused to abandon the faith of their fathers. By perseverance and efficiency they succeeded in regaining for themselves all the power, wealth, and privileges of which their ancestors had been deprived; but as soon as their position was secured their loyalty to their adopted religion began to waver, so that by the middle of the fifteenth century we find numerous complaints that they were Christians only in name.

How far these complaints were justified by the facts, it is difficult to say. Forced conversions are notoriously insincere, and it is altogether probable that a large proportion of the *Conversos* secretly yearned for the faith of their fathers. On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that by this time “the hatred which of old had been merely a matter of religion had become a matter of race”. Detestation of the Jew had been so deeply implanted in the heart of the average Castilian that he was very apt to make groundless accusations of apostasy against the objects of his dislike. Sometimes the kings, fearful of the financial effects of attacking the *Conversos*, feebly attempted to extend to them their protection; but the mass of the population, and the bulk of the *grandees*, who dominated the royal policy, were consistently hostile, with the result that there were frequent riots and unpunished murders of the *Conversos* throughout the reigns of John II and Henry IV. Meantime the professing Jews who had not been killed or exiled and had not sought refuge in baptism to escape from persecution, lived on, sadly reduced in numbers and wealth, till their expulsion by the Catholic Kings. A schedule, drawn up for purposes of taxation in the year 1474, shows that there were only about twelve thousand families of them left in Castile at that time, and that the large revenues which the Jewish communities or *aljamas* had annually rendered two centuries previously to the Castilian monarchs had by that time dwindled almost to nothing.

The seeds of the evil plant of racial and religious hatred, which was to bear such fearful fruit under Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs, had thus been thoroughly sown in the immediately preceding age. Yet the comparatively liberal and enlightened policy which prevailed in the earlier centuries of the Reconquest should not be forgotten. It shows that the spirit of persecution and intolerance is not a necessary and ineradicable characteristic of the Spaniard, as the modern student is often prone to assume. The fact that the climax of its revival coincided with

the age of Spain's unification and expansion was destined, as will subsequently appear, to carry the Spanish reputation for bigotry and fanaticism to the uttermost parts of the earth; but in this, as in the kindred matter of the religious and crusading enthusiasm of her warriors, there is less real than apparent continuity between the periods of Reconquest and of Empire.

CHAPTER V  
THE INSTITUTIONS OF MEDIAEVAL CASTILE

From the different ranks and classes of mediaeval Castilian society we pass to the various organs of the central government, and take up in the first place the king, at the apex of the political structure of the realm.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and afterwards the kingship of Castile was unquestionably hereditary; but certain explanations and amplifications of this apparently simple statement are essential to a full understanding of it. The Visigothic monarchy, from which the Castilian was descended, was partly hereditary and partly elective. Theoretically, indeed, the elective principle was predominant, for though strong men occasionally seized the throne by deeds of violence, and having obtained it, sometimes contrived to hand it on to their descendants, such actions were always recognized to be at variance with the laws of the land. The practice of election, moreover, was continued in the earliest days of the Reconquest in the kingdom of Asturias. The legend that Pelayo was descended from the ancient Visigothic monarchs was merely a subsequent invention to strengthen the title which he had derived from the consent of his people on account of his success in war. On the other hand, we may well believe that the circumstances of the time, especially the pressure of the Moorish war, tended strongly to promote the counter development of the practice, if not the principle, of hereditary succession. The very existence of the little state was so frequently threatened by external dangers that constitutional purism had to yield to the paramount need of the moment the continuity of an efficient executive. Opinions differ widely as to the precise epoch when the practice of hereditary succession can be regarded as definitely established in the kingdom of Leon; but the preponderance of authority tends to favor the reign of Ferdinand I (1037-65), who first united the realms of Leon and Castile. This new method of determining the succession, however, rested as yet on no law or ordinance. The *Fuero Juzgo*, which remained valid down to the time of Alfonso X, upheld, in theory at least, the elective principle. It was in *Las Siete Partidas*, for the first time, that a definite law of inheritance of the throne was laid down. This law provided for the succession of all descendants in the direct line, male and female, before collaterals; and though it was transgressed by the succession of Sancho the Bravo in 1284, it was confirmed in the *Ordenamiento* of Alcalá in 1348, and remained valid thenceforth till the advent of the Bourbons in the eighteenth century. From the year 1388, when the future Henry III of Castile was betrothed to the daughter of John of Gaunt, the heir of the Castilian throne took the title of Prince of Asturias.

These different declarations and legalizations of the hereditary character of the Castilian succession were fortified with elaborate assertions of the divine origin and right of kingship, and with lengthy disquisitions on the way in which a monarch should be treated and honored by his people. They abound in statements of the rights, powers, and prerogatives inherent in the crown. But enough of the remembrance of the days of elective kingship was preserved to make it impossible accurately to speak of the sovereigns of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Castile as absolute, even in theory, still less as tyrants. There was a distinct understanding that the monarch must not abuse his power; that he must govern according to equity and righteousness. It was perhaps not enough to warrant the statement that there was an actual contract between sovereign and subject, or to justify the deposition of an unjust king; but it was perfectly adequate as a basis of a protest against arbitrary uses of royal power. Various passages in the *Partidas* show this; particularly noteworthy is the declaration by which the king grants to



his people a certain right of inspection of his political conduct, and the privilege of guarding him from evil by word and deed—a privilege which the rebel nobles attempted to utilize for their own selfish advantage in the fifteenth century, thereby evoking an angry protest from the Cortes of Olmedo in 1445. The kingship had become hereditary and the succession fixed before the close of the Middle Ages; the turbulence of the times demanded this as the first and most essential condition of necessary centralization. On the other hand, it was impossible for either subjects or sovereign to forget the past, or the limitations on monarchical absolutism which the days of the elective kingship implied.

Yet it was not chiefly the theoretical restrictions of the royal authority that prevented the strong governance which mediaeval Castile so sadly lacked. The powers with which the *Partidas* endow the king, if not enough to create a tyranny, are at least sufficient to satisfy the demands of a strong and efficient sovereign. He is there declared to be the chief lawgiver and judge of the land. He is vested with supreme administrative and executive authority; he is the head of the army and the arbiter of the policy of the realm at home and abroad. In at least one place he is conceded the right to dispose of or alienate any portion of his realm at will as if he possessed all its territories in full ownership; for the distinction between the private domain of the monarch (*patrimonio privado del rey*) and the revenues which came to him as head of the state (*patrimonio real*) was not always sharply drawn in the mediaeval codes, and their confusion was not seldom utilized by the monarchs to their own temporary advantage, and the ultimate impoverishment of the kingdom. According to the laws of the land, the royal position was quite strong enough; the trouble lay not with the codes, but with the impossibility of enforcing them. Our examination of the narrative history of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Castile has revealed some of the special circumstances which account for the turbulence of the times: the weak character of the monarchs, the numerous minorities and regencies, the prevalence of the trend toward separatism, and above all the conduct of the rebel nobles. But this description needs to be supplemented on the constitutional side before the picture can be regarded as complete. As the king obviously did not exercise in fact the rights with which the law theoretically invested him, it will be necessary for us to take up one by one the organs of the central government and discover what measure of political power (in so far as it was not entirely dissipated by baronial anarchy) was enjoyed by each. In theory they were all created to aid the king in the discharge of his numerous functions, but as time went on, they often used the authority delegated to them not so much to help the sovereign to govern, as to enable themselves to govern in his stead.

Like all the monarchs of mediaeval Europe, the kings of Castile surrounded themselves with a coterie of intimate friends and counsellors, whose titles carry us back to the earlier days when each was assigned some special function in connection with the management of the royal household. Such were the *capellán mayor* or royal chaplain, the *camarero* or chamberlain, the *apostador* or superintendent of lodgings, the *portero* or door keeper, the *mayordomo* or steward, and a host of others. All of them continued, in theory at least, to discharge the duties indicated by their names; they were also entrusted with minor secretarial and administrative offices in connection with the government of the realm. The *canciller* or chancellor, who was almost invariably a cleric, had charge of the royal correspondence and the promulgation of the royal orders, “so that he represented the living law, and was the faithful guardian of tradition”. His signature or seal was generally required to give validity to the king’s decrees; he was naturally cognizant of all the different branches of the government’s service; a large number of *notarios* and *escribanos* aided him in the discharge of his various duties. The *adelantado del rey* or *sobrejuez* represented the king in his capacity as supreme judge, when the monarch was unable to serve. He also had the duty of supervising, supporting, and, if necessary, of removing the minor judicial officials of the kingdom. The *condestable* and *almirante*, instituted respectively by John I and Ferdinand III, were the heads under the king of the army and navy of Castile; both offices

gradually became hereditary, the one in the family of the Velascos, the other in that of Enriquez. The collector of the royal taxes was originally known as the *almojarife mayor*, but the popular wrath at the frequent conferring of this office on a Jew extorted from Alfonso XI a promise that his revenues should in future be gathered by Christians, and that the collectors should no longer be called *almojarifes* but *tesoreros*. Hebrews, nevertheless, were soon appointed to the new office, and it was not long before the *tesorero mayor* was replaced in turn by a *contador de Castilla*; under John II there were two of these, and under Henry IV three. The struggle over the incumbency of this high financial position is very significant. The sovereigns strove their hardest to prevent it from following the lead of those of the constable and admiral and becoming a hereditary possession in some baronial family which would infallibly abuse ill; but the tendency of the time was strongly in the other direction, and the royal revenues suffered woefully at the hands of those who administered them in the dark days of the fifteenth century. The kings of Castile were too weak to control even those officials whose duties brought them most closely under the shadow of the throne.

The early development of the *Consejo Real* or Royal Council next claims our attention. The subject is of the utmost importance, for the Council was to become under Ferdinand and Isabella the principal organ of the central government, and the cornerstone of the great administrative system of Spain and the Spanish Empire.

In Visigothic times, and during the earliest days of the Reconquest, the sovereigns of the different Iberian realms usually sought the advice of counsellors of proved wisdom and sagacity whenever any important political or judicial decision was pending. This was indeed the universal custom in all the states of Western Europe. But there is no evidence of the existence of any permanent body of royal counsellors in that remote period. When the king felt in need of advice, he asked it of those who seemed to him best qualified to give it, but any 'meetings of counsellors' which took place were purely accidental in their nature and were composed on each occasion as the monarch should direct. Even the famous *doce sabios* of the reign of Ferdinand III, in whom Salazar de Mendoza and the learned Padre Andrés Marcos Burriel thought they discerned the origin of the *Consejo Real*, have now been shorn of that distinction. They were apparently rather a body of scholars who occupied themselves principally with discussions of ethical questions, and definitions of "loyalty, covetousness, generosity, piety, and justice", and the office which they held was but temporary. The King's Council had not yet attained definite existence. Its functions were still fulfilled by a vague, accidental, amorphous body of advisers, composed and summoned at the royal will.

The century that followed the reign of St. Ferdinand saw the *Consejo* emerge on firmer ground. The creation by Alfonso X of a central tribunal, or royal court, relieved it of a large share of its judicial functions, and enabled it to concentrate its attention on political affairs. Legists and *hombres buenos* from the third estate were summoned with increasing frequency in this period to take their places beside the magnates; their 'approximation', as Torreánaz cautiously terms it, to the Royal Council coincides with their advent to power in the Cortes'. The long periods of royal minorities in the fourteenth century were also highly favorable to the increase of the power and permanence of the *Consejo*, and to the development of the representativeness of its membership. During the minority of Ferdinand IV, his mother, Dona Maria, turned to the cities for help, in order to counteract the influence of the Haros and of the Laras in the government; and accordingly those of the cities gave her twelve *hombres buenos* to serve and advise the king and his guardians in matters of justice, finance, and all other affairs of the land. The phrase in the *cuaderno* is far too vague for us to estimate with any certainty the method by which these 'good men' were chosen; but it seems fair to assume that the inhabitants of the municipalities had a

considerable share in selecting them. In the early years of the reign of Alfonso XI, moreover, while the king was yet a child, we find the government being carried on with the advice of four prelates and sixteen caballeros and *hombres buenos*, “without whose consent nothing might be done”. Apparently these sixteen were chosen on a basis of geographical distribution—four from each of the four quarters of the realm; and a similar method of procedure was adopted by Henry of Trastamara during the stormiest period of his struggle with Don Pedro. When normal times returned, however, the sovereigns continued to choose their advisers, as in earlier days, irregularly, occasionally, and at their own discretion, so that the body of royal counsellors lost much of the stability that it had gained during royal minorities and in the days of civil war.

It was in the reign of John I that the Royal Council became established for the first time on a definite and permanent footing; indeed that sovereign merits the title of the founder of the institution. On his departure in 1385 for the invasion of Portugal, which ended so disastrously at Aljubarrota, he put forth a sort of political testament, in which he stated that “the most necessary of all things is to have a great and good council composed of all sorts of persons, especially of those who bear the burden of the charges and good government of the realm”. After his defeat on the field of battle, he returned to Castile and began to give effect to this proposal, by creating in the Cortes of Valladolid (December 1, 1385) a Council composed of twelve persons—four prelates, four nobles, and four citizens—all of whom were named in the royal ordinance. All traces of any principles of popular election or representation of geographical divisions now disappear; the crown reserved to itself full power to choose its own advisers, though it actually did select them equally from the three estates of the realm. The functions of the body thus composed were theoretically wellnigh all-inclusive. It was supposed to deal with all the affairs of the realm, save the administration of justice and certain specified matters—chiefly appointments—which the sovereign reserved for himself; and even in these he promised not to act without the *Consejo*'s advice. The organization was further amplified and elaborated in the Cortes of Briviesca in 1387, but the *cuaderno* of the petitions of this body clearly shows that the composition of the Council did not in fact follow the lines laid down for it, and that the representatives of the third estate did not actually take their seats there. At the end of the reign of Henry in, the king provided that the number of councillors should be sixteen “prelados, condes, Caballeros y doctores”, thus indicating that the place of the *hombres buenos* or *ciudadanos* had now been taken by the *letrados*. Clearly the institution had by this time come to stay. Its composition had not been permanently determined, but it had been invested with powers so extensive that it could never again be crushed out of existence.

During the reign of John II and Henry IV the Council fell once more on evil days. It was a period of reaction and retrogression in every respect, and the *Consejo* shared the common lot. The entire reign of John II was dominated by the masterful personality of Alvaro de Luna, the first of the great *privados* or *validos* of Spanish history; and it was not that magnate's intention to have his omnipotence limited by any regular body of advisers, who might conceivably refuse to follow his lead. In various ways he contrived to diminish the prestige and importance of the Council. Places in it were distributed with reckless prodigality. In the year 1426 there were no less than seventy-five councillors, many of whom drew fat salaries without rendering any corresponding service, and the distinction which anciently attached to that office was consequently lost. Men complained bitterly of the financial burden which resulted; and finally Alvaro, taking advantage of the revulsion of public feeling, forced the weak king to expel from his court all the magnates, “even though they were of the Consejo”, except a small group of his own immediate adherents; so that thenceforth the Council became merely a docile instrument of the favorite's ambition. During the temporary retirement of Alvaro from 1441 to 1445, an attempt was made to reestablish matters on the ancient footing, but without permanent success. After the battle of Olmedo, the *valido* returned to office; and until his execution eight years later, the composition and functions

of the *Consejo* were once more completely dependent on his will, just as they had been on that of the sovereigns of the early days of the Reconquest. The next reign brought no real improvement. In 1459 an effort was made to return to the better ways of the previous century by ordaining that the Council should be composed of twelve persons—two bishops, two knights, and eight legists—who were named in the decree; but a glance at the petitions of the Cortes of the period proves that these men did not fulfil the hopes that had been reposed in them. Another attempt at reconstitution in the beginning of 1465 met with no better success—in fact, the king never permitted it to have a fair trial, for fear that it would put too much power in the hands of the most turbulent of his vassals, the Marquis of Villena. Before the year was out, however, the control had been suffered to fall back into the hands of that unruly magnate, who, with Diego de Arias and Alfonso Carrillo, archbishop of Toledo, exercised all authority, in the name of a new council of ten persons which was called into existence chiefly in order to give a show of legality to his usurpation. Certainly, the *Cortes* regarded the crown as having capitulated to the baronage and as having abdicated all pretensions to the exercise of royal power. “Your Highness has placed in the Council certain persons, more for the purpose of granting them favors and honor and of acceding to their requests than for that of strengthening the government, with the result that the office of councilor, which used to rank so high, has now fallen into disrepute... Your commands which emanate from such Councilors are neither fulfilled nor obeyed”. In these trenchant words the *procuradores* of the Cortes of Ocaña in 1469 told King Henry their opinion of his government; but the evils of which they complained were irremediable, until strong monarchs should come to rescue the royal power from the slough of despond into which it had fallen.

The *Consejo* had passed through so many vicissitudes that Ferdinand and Isabella could not be at a loss to find precedents for remodeling it along any lines that should seem to them desirable. Since the middle of the thirteenth century it had at one time been recruited, theoretically at least, according to the principle of popular election; at another the notion of equal geographical distribution of the councilors had prevailed. After it had become permanently and regularly established under John I, the king reserved to himself the choice of his advisers, but for a time he selected them equally from the three estates of the realm. Subsequently the *hombres buenos* had given way to the *letrados*, and, last of all, the entire body had been dominated by one or more ambitious nobles. The functions of the Council had also varied from reign to reign, almost as often as its composition; but it never forgot that, with its various political attributes, it had also inherited from the days of St. Ferdinand and his predecessors a claim to be regarded as the highest court in the land. During one of its many remodeling in the reign of John II, it was temporarily divided into two *salas*—a *sala de gobierno* and a *sala de justicia*. The Catholic Kings were in no sense violating tradition when they determined to utilize the Royal Council as a means of concentrating the administration of justice in their own hands.

The Royal Council during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had certainly given little promise of the mighty future that awaited it in the sixteenth and seventeenth. We have studied it not so much for what it actually was at the close of the Middle Ages, as for what it was subsequently to become. But with the Castilian Cortes, which come next in order, the picture is precisely reversed. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries see the culmination of their power and prestige; under Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs they rapidly decline. Yet even though our examination of the Castilian constitution at the close of the Middle Ages is chiefly important as furnishing a background for what was to follow, it is essential to the truthfulness of the picture that careful attention be given to this very notable national assembly. Its numerous rights and duties afford the best possible evidence of the strong tendency towards democracy characteristic of mediaeval Castile. Its records and petitions furnish an excellent guide to the aims and aspirations of the third estate. Even after it had been deprived of all real power,

the history of the realm is in large measure to be read in its proceedings. Like the other organs of the central government, it was first summoned to aid and advise the king in the discharge of his various duties; but also like them, it gradually developed a measure of independent authority, and ultimately limited in a variety of ways the extent of the royal prerogative.

It is generally agreed among Spanish historians that the origin of the Cortes of Castile and Leon is to be found in the powerful Councils of Toledo, composed of nobles and clergy, which played such an important part in the government of church and state during the last century and a quarter of Visigothic rule in the peninsula, and survived the shock of the Moorish invasion. Soon after their reappearance in the Christian kingdoms of the north, however, the ecclesiastical functions of these councils began to pass to special assemblies of the clergy alone, so that the attributes of the older body were gradually restricted to temporal affairs. The culmination of this secularization of the functions of the old Visigothic councils is reached in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the kings, discerning in the third estate the strongest possible support against the preponderant power of the nobles, began to summon the representatives of the municipalities to the national assembly—in Leon at least as early as 1188, in Castile probably not till 1250, but in both cases considerably before the corresponding event took place in England. At the same time the name of the institution changed; the older title of *concilio* (and sometimes *curia*) disappeared, and was replaced by that of Cortes, which, though sometimes loosely used to designate assemblies of the earlier sort, is in strict accuracy applied only to those bodies in which the third estate was present. After the final union of Castile and Leon under St. Ferdinand (1230-52) the custom of holding separate Cortes for each of the two kingdoms gradually fell into disuse and was replaced by the practice of summoning a common assembly composed of the representatives of both. For the purpose of the present inquiry, therefore, it will suffice to describe the united body.

No one had a right to sit or be represented in the Castilian Cortes during this period; in this respect the national assembly of the western kingdom forms the sharpest possible contrast to those of the realms of the Crown of Aragon. The Castilian Cortes, being, in theory at least, a council of the king, were composed as the king desired, and varies from session to session accordingly. No two Cortes of this period were composed in exactly the same way. Neither the same prelates nor the same nobles were invariably summoned, nor were the same towns ordered to send procuradores. The clergy were represented by archbishops, bishops and the grand masters of the military orders selected by the monarch. Custom indeed prescribed the presence of the archbishop of Toledo, and such of the higher churchmen were resident at court; but even these the king had the unquestioned right to omit to summon if he wished. The representation of the nobles was similarly irregular and was determined on each occasion by the royal will. All the various ranks of the nobility, down to the *Caballeros* and *escuderos*, were apparently eligible for summons to the estate, as were also the great officers of the crown, and after it had been definitely established in the reign of John I the members of the Royal Council; but the king selected whomsoever he pleased on each occasion. Subject kings of the crown of Castile were also expected to attend or send representatives, if asked to do so; when the king of Granada acknowledged himself the vassal of Ferdinand III, he promised to come to the Cortes with one of his *ricos hombres*, and the name of 'Don Mahomat Abenazar, rey de Granada, vasallo del Rey', heads the list of those who confirmed the ordinances of Ferdinand IV in the Cortes of Medina del Campo in 1305. Attendance, when a summons had been received, was absolutely obligatory in this estate; failure to appear, if not excused, was tantamount to a declaration of revolt.

In theory at least, the representation of the third estate was inseparably attached to the municipalities; as the urban limits, however, did not stop at the city walls, but included neighboring hamlets and isolated houses, the rural communities were not really excluded. During this period, the king selected for summons on each occasion as many towns as he pleased, and



whichever he pleased; but the tendency was steadily towards a diminution in the number. In the Cortes of Leon of 1188, of Seville in 1288, and of Alcala in 1348, there is reason to think that all the towns in the realm were called on to send representatives. In the Cortes of Madrid in 1391, forty-nine municipalities sent procuradores; in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the number was finally fixed at eighteen. The causes which combined to bring about this decrease were very numerous and may be profitably compared to those which effected a similar result in contemporary England. We have not space to examine them here, but we may observe, in passing, that the blame for this unfortunate development is to be laid less at the door of the kings than of the towns themselves, which not only lost their early privileges by failing to insist on their observance, but also actually labored, in a spirit of local antagonism eminently characteristic of Spain, to exclude one another from the right of representation.

The number of representatives or procuradores that each town could send varied, until it was fixed at two by a law of John II at the request of the Cortes of Madrid of 1429-30. Another law of the same period specifies that the procuradores must be persons of quality, and not manual laborers. The methods of choice of the procuradores varied according to the fuero or charter of the town that sent them and were for the most part in general consonance with the methods of selection of the local municipal officers. Usually the matter was determined by lot; sometimes by election by a more or less restricted number of inhabitants; sometimes by a system under which certain leading citizens served in turn; sometimes by a combination of these methods. Whatever the local practice, it seems clear that down to the second quarter of the fifteenth century the choices were fairly made, without royal interference; but it is equally obvious that from the beginning of the dictatorship of Alvaro de Luna to the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella there were increasingly scandalous corruption and intimidation by the crown and the magnates, until in the reign of Henry the Impotent the king on several occasions actually gave away outright the privilege of representation.

Every city represented in Cortes gave its procuradores credentials and letters of instruction and guidance, or *poderes*, as they were called. These were carefully worded and the procuradores were forbidden to deviate from them in the slightest degree. If some unexpected question arose in the Cortes, the procuradores usually consulted their constituents before giving their votes, and they attempted, though unsuccessfully, to wrest from the king the right of interpretation of the *poderes*, in case there was some doubt as to their meaning. Until the character of these *poderes* was modified in the sixteenth century, their comprehensiveness and definiteness, and the strictness with which they were obeyed, constituted one of the most important safeguards of Castilian parliamentary liberty. The salaries and journey money of the procuradores were paid by the towns that sent them, down to the latter part of the fourteenth century. Under John II the salaries began to be paid by the king, but in the sixteenth century, as we shall later see, it came to be the practice for the Cortes regularly to add a fixed sum for that purpose to the amount: which they granted to the crown for the expenses incident to their sessions.

The right to summon the Cortes was inherent in the crown, an inalienable royal prerogative; in case the king was absent, ill, or under age, it was exercised by his representatives in his name and not of their own right. Time and place of meeting were left absolutely to the royal discretion; there was no rule as to the frequency of sessions, or the size, locality, or importance of the place where they occurred; on one occasion the Castilian Cortes met at Bribiesca in Aragon. At the opening session, which was attended by the king and all three estates, the first business was the presentation of the *poderes* by the procuradores. Then followed the speech from the throne, in which the purposes of the meeting were set forth, and formal replies were made by each estate: the head of the house of Lara answering first, for the nobles; the archbishop of Toledo next, for the clergy; and finally the city of Burgos for the third estate. These formal proceedings over, the estates usually separated for deliberation, but communicated with one another by messengers. Of

the nature of the debates, it is almost impossible to learn anything, but it seems probable that they were very quiet and generally ineffective and disorganized. The session lasted till the business was done, but there is no record during this period of prolonged meetings such as took place in the time of Philip II. Lastly occurred the presentation of petitions by the estates to the crown. There was apparently no final meeting of the king and the three estates for formal ratification of what had been done. The estates usually separated without any guarantees that their wishes would be respected, though it was the usual custom for the government to send back to the cities, and sometimes to the bishops and nobles, full copies of the *cuadernos*, or lists of petitions, with the royal answers.

Parliamentary privilege in the Castilian Cortes stood very high. In 1302 and 1305 complete security and freedom from arrest and seizure of property were promised the procuradores during sessions of the Cortes and while they came and went; and in 1351 this promise was confirmed, save in a few exceptional cases, though subsequent petitions would seem to indicate that the rule was not always enforced. By an ordinance of 1379, the procuradores were granted the same entertainment which *Las Siete Partidas* accorded the king and his immediate followers—a privilege which, again, was by no means invariably realized in fact. There was apparently no restriction whatever on freedom of speech during sessions in the period which at present concerns us. The sole recorded instance in which the king attempted in any way to rebuke or punish a *procurador* for his conduct was that of Mosen Diego de Valera, who wrote a most insolent letter to John II, “on account of which he was in great peril, and it was ordered that nothing which was due him from the king should be paid him, not even his wages”; but this was for an act done outside the Cortes, not a part of his official functions.

The powers of the Castilian Cortes in this period may be classified under three heads—financial, legislative, and miscellaneous.

From at least as early as the middle of the thirteenth century, it was a recognized custom that when the king desired an extra grant, or *servicio*, over and above what came to him regularly of his own right, he must ask it of the national assembly. In 1307 this custom passed into written law and was confirmed as such in 1329, 1391, 1393, 1420, and afterwards. At the close of the fourteenth century, when the Cortes were at the height of their power, this important privilege was fortified by several temporarily successful demands for an audit, and occasional insistence on a reduction of the sums the king required. Three times the Cortes even secured a partial right of appropriation of the sums they voted, and once they forced the king to deposit their grant with two persons, with the stipulation that nothing should be taken from them save for the Moorish war, for which it had been given. This seemingly impregnable financial position was, however, seriously weakened in two different ways. First, the fact that the nobles and clergy were generally exempt from taxation (despite several attempts to subject them to it) left the procuradores to bear alone the brunt of every financial struggle against the crown, so that they usually submitted tamely to the royal demands, as the records plainly show. Secondly, by utilization of loans, invention of new imposts, and above all by perpetually postponing the definite settlement of the difficult question as to whether or not certain taxes (especially the blighting *alcabala*) could be levied without the consent of the national assembly, the crown was able to gain alternative means of supply, and thus to circumvent the opposition which it might occasionally be unable to overthrow. Their failure to make the most of their financial rights naturally undermined the position of the Castilian Cortes in other respects.

The share of the Castilian national assembly in legislation rested on a somewhat different basis. The power to make laws, as we have already seen, resided exclusive in the crown. According to an ordinance of 1387 the consent of the Cortes was necessary for the revocation of a valid law, though it is by no means clear that this enactment was rigidly enforced during this

period; certainly it was not in the sixteenth century. The most important part of the Cortes' share in legislation, however, lay not here, but in their right to draw up a set of petitions to the crown, which if accepted became the law of the land. This practice, begun in 1293, became fixed in 1317, and was utilized sometimes by the nobles and clergy, though most frequently, of course, by the third estate. The petitions range over the very widest diversity of topics—administration of justice, measures of police and public safety, dealings with Moors and Jews, granting of letters of naturalization, standards of weights and measures, *barraganía*, or licensed concubinage of the clergy, etc.; some were of general, some of local, import. Though the Cortes had no means of enforcing compliance with these requests, they were often accepted and acted upon. That the Castilian assembly was unable to turn this right of petition into a right of legislation (as did the English Parliament in this period) was due to its ineffective procedure, to its failure to make redress precede supply, and to the general lack of cooperation and of political opportunism which characterized its members.

Though based on royal promises and valid ordinances, most of the powers of the Castilian Cortes not included under legislation or finance were really only exercised according to the discretion of the crown. Such was the case in respect to their control of the foreign policy, and the provision that they must be consulted in matters of importance to the wellbeing of the realm. Their share in the recognition of a new sovereign, however, demands more careful definition. The theory of the older historians, that the validity of a king's accession depended on his recognition by the Cortes and on his oath in their presence to observe the established laws, can certainly no longer be maintained. It was customary, indeed, for the national assembly to meet when a king died, to swear to the heir and receive his oath, but this was by no means indispensable to the making of a new monarch. In the case of the accession of a king under age the powers of the Cortes were somewhat more extensive, and included considerable influence in the nomination of regents and their exercise of power; and they usually recognized the heir to the throne during the lifetime of his predecessor, and were empowered to accept royal abdications.

Allowing for all limitations, the composition and powers of the Castilian Cortes in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries indicate, in theory at least, a very high degree of parliamentary development for that period. Whether their authority would have been greater or less, had the realm been in order and the aristocracy controlled, is a question which it is easier to ask than to answer. Certainly they were to furnish priceless aid to Ferdinand and Isabella in deposing the rebel nobles from the high place they had usurped; but after the common enemy had been subdued, they were to show themselves pitifully unable to reap any of the rewards of the victory they had helped to win.

The contrast between theory and practice, which we have already encountered in so many different branches of the government of mediaeval Castile, is particularly evident in the administration of justice. All the various codes, from the *Fuero Juzgo* down, declare the king to be the highest judge in the land; they provide for a complete hierarchy of courts, all of them directly or indirectly dependent on the royal authority; they proclaim all the principles of a perfectly centralized judicial system. But as a matter of fact, the condition of mediaeval Castile in this respect was utterly chaotic. More perhaps than in any other branch of the government service was the weakness of the monarchy reflected in the shortcomings of the law courts.

Let us begin at the top of the ladder with the highest judicial bodies. Down to the middle of the thirteenth century, it is impossible to discern any trustworthy evidence of the existence of a regularly organized royal court. When the king meted out justice, he surrounded himself with a number of magnates whose advice he valued, and the tribunal thus constituted soon came to be known as the *Curia* or *Corte*, but it was not always composed of the same persons; its authority

was purely consultative; and no clear line of demarcation was as yet drawn between it and the equally irregular and amorphous Royal Council. Under Alfonso X, however, whose zeal for the creation of the forms of strong monarchical government was only exceeded by his inability to invest them with any real vitality or power, the first steps were taken toward the definite, permanent, separate organization of a central royal court. By an ordinance of the Cortes of Zamora in 1274 he created a supreme tribunal, composed of twenty-three *alcaldes de corte*—nine of them from Castile, eight from Leon, and six from Estremadura—some of whom were to be always present in the royal household to administer justice continually. In addition to these twenty-three *alcaldes*, the Ordinance of 1274 also provided that there should be three special judges, “good men who knew and understood the *fueros* of the land, to hear appeals”; it also laid down rules for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and enumerated the cases of which the king claimed cognizance in the first instance. At the outset Alfonso promised to sit in person three days a week for the administration of justice; but as time went on, the pressure of other business limited the royal presence to Friday, which became and remained from thenceforth the special day for the sovereign to exercise his function as the highest judge in the land. When the king was absent, the *alcaldes* sat in judgment under the leadership of the *adelantado del rey* or *sobreyuez*; in other words, the central court, whose function had hitherto been solely advisory, was gradually beginning to acquire a jurisdiction and authority of its own.

From the death of Alfonso the Learned to the accession of the house of Trastamara, the royal tribunal fell on evil days. During the reign of Sancho the Bravo, who owed his throne to the support of the aristocracy, it practically ceased to exist. Under Henry II and his son John I, however, it was reconstituted on a more permanent basis and came to be known as the *Audiencia* or *Cancillería*. At first it held its sessions at the court of the king; in 1387 it was ordered to divide its time equally between Medina del Campo, Olmedo, Alcalá de Henares, and Madrid; in 1390 it was set up at Segovia; in 1405, at Valladolid; but the constant complaints of the Cortes show that when separated from the monarch it was not seldom terrorized by the aristocracy into neglecting its duties. During this period and subsequently its composition varied again and again. Its judges were of course exclusively recruited from the ranks of the clergy and of the *letrados*; and efforts were made to apportion them fairly among the different quarters of the realm. By 1433 the *Audiencia* was divided into two main *salas* for civil and criminal suits; the judges in the former were generally known as *oidores*; those in the latter as *alcaldes*. There was also a special *sala de los hijosdalgo* for the adjudication of baronial suits, and a *procurador fiscal*, or special prosecutor on behalf of the crown. From the verdicts of the *Audiencia* there was, generally speaking, no appeal; but the records show that the king not seldom inhibited it from proceeding with the more important cases that came before it, in order that he might deal with them himself. The complaints of the *procuradores*, as well as the frequency with which changes occurred in the composition and powers of the tribunal, furnish ample proof that the institution was not working satisfactorily in the period immediately preceding the accession of the Catholic Kings.

Below the *Audiencia* was a whole hierarchy of minor local courts, presided over for the most part by *adelantados menores* (*de comarca* or *fronterizos*) and *merinos*. These functionaries were originally crown appointees, but from the thirteenth century onward their offices, particularly that of the *adelantados*, tended to become hereditary in certain prominent families, greatly to the prejudice of the effective administration of justice in the districts committed to their charge. They possessed executive and military as well as judicial powers; one authority describes the *adelantados* as “captains rather than magistrates”, and the *merinos* as “magistrates rather than captains”. They often lost touch, however, with the central power they were sent out to represent, and their tribunals were frequently overawed by the aristocracy. At the bottom of the ladder came the municipal *alcaldes*, whose selection had usually been delegated by the sovereign to the *Consejo* in the local charter or *fuero*; there were, moreover, a certain number of minor judges

whose appointment had been usurped by the great lords in defiance of the rights of the crown. Numerous conflicts of jurisdiction were the natural result. In certain exceptional cases the lesser authorities claimed the power of overriding the decisions of the central government; but, generally speaking, the theory was that appeal lay from the locally appointed magistrate to the lowest crown judge, and from him through the successive grades of *merinos* and *adelantados* to the Audiencia and the king.

This apparently adequate system of local judicial officers, however, broke down in practice even more completely than the central court, or Audiencia, above it. Very significant in this connection are the numerous efforts of the kings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to strengthen and protect their minor judges in the faithful performance of their duties. Royal inspectors, called *pesquisidores*, were frequently sent out to inquire about them, and to report on their work at headquarters. The name of these officials recalls the fact that there was inaugurated, in this period, a new form of judicial procedure called the *pesquisa*, by which the king or his judges were empowered to bring action, *motu proprio*, against any notorious delinquent, without waiting for specific accusation by a regular plaintiff. Henceforth this new method gradually began to supersede the older forms of public and oral trial, which had often resulted in the past in the escape of powerful hidalgos whom lesser men dared not openly accuse. More important still was the sending out of the first *corregidores* in the reign of Alfonso XI. These were royally appointed magistrates imposed upon the municipalities for the purpose of aiding and ultimately of superseding those who had been locally elected. They may be regarded as the successors of the so-called *jueces de salario*, whom we find mentioned in the Cortes of 1293, and were intended, like them, to carry the king's authority and jurisdiction into every corner of the realm. The *corregidores*, however, soon attained a measure of authority which their predecessors had never known. In addition to their judicial functions, they rapidly developed wide powers in administration and in finance. They were not merely judges; they soon converted themselves into the 'state's men of all work'. For the present the possibilities of their office were not evident to the world at large, because of the abasement of the central power which they represented. But when the monarchy had emerged triumphant over the factions, and the crowns of Castile and Aragon had been united, the *corregidores* were to become the cornerstone of the administrative edifice of Spain and of the Spanish Empire.

It must not be imagined that the municipalities endured these invasions of their liberties and privileges without a protest. The procuradores in the Cortes steadily maintained that no *corregidor* could be imposed on any town without a definite request from the inhabitants, on the ground that such action was a breach of the *fueros*. The constant recurrence of petitions to this effect is doubtless an indication that the principle was not always fully observed, but there were certainly many cities which succeeded in preserving their immunity. The *cuadernos* are filled with requests that the *corregidores* be not permitted to hold office for more than one year, that they be selected, not among the minions of the king, but from the inhabitants of the region over which they are set, and that they be men of character and ability suitable to their exalted functions. In the weak reigns of John II and Henry IV we find many complaints that they abused their authority, increased the evils that they were sent out to suppress, and, above all, that they were scandalously corrupt, and cared only for the money that they could make out of their positions. And finally, as a means of controlling the acts of wicked appointees, the procuradores demanded of the crown, at least as early as the year 1419, that *corregidores*, at the expiration of their term, be obliged to remain for at least fifty days in the region where they had held office, so that anyone who believed himself to have been wronged by their verdicts might state his case and have justice. This seems to be the first intimation in Castile of the institution of the *residencia*, which was to be developed so much further under the Catholic Kings. All these items show that the *corregidores* were far from popular among the mass of the people; but the fact that most of



the complaints occur during the reigns of the weaker kings is an indication that the protests were evoked quite as much by the unworthy character of the officials themselves and of the monarchs they served, as by the principle of centralization which they represented. Certainly local conditions were bad enough to demand a remedy, provided one could be discovered that was not worse than the disease.

It will be evident that the different institutions described in the preceding paragraphs represent rather the longings and aspirations of the Castilian kingship for a more efficient central government than any accomplished result. Nothing permanent could be effected until order had been reestablished by the strong hand of the Catholic Kings; and the chief significance of the constitutional experiments of their predecessors lies far less in what they achieved at the time, than in the fact that they afforded Ferdinand and Isabella precious material to work with, when at last the opportunity came. Confusion remained the salient feature of the Castilian judicial régime throughout the period at present under review; and if we are to appreciate the full extent of it we must supplement our examination of the hierarchy of courts and judges with a brief account of the various legal codes which they were supposed to administer. Of all the nations of Western Europe, Spain traces her legal system back to that of Rome in most direct descent; but the struggle between the Roman and Visigothic elements was long and bitter and was immensely complicated by the incorrigible particularism which caused each class and each locality to lay claim to a special law of its own. In the twelfth century, at the time of the great revival of Roman law in Western Europe, Castilian students visited the famous schools of northern Italy and southern France and brought back the knowledge they had gained there to their native land. This furnished a foundation for Alfonso the Learned to build on, so that he was enabled to infuse the Roman principles into the greatest and most notable of his law books, and to evoke some measure of order from the wild confusion which had reigned in earlier years. But precedents in the legal history of his native land were as essential to the great legislative work of the Scholar King as were the teachings of the glossarists of Bologna; and in order to discover what these precedents were, we must briefly trace the development of legislation in Leon and in Castile from the time of the barbarian invasions.

When the Visigoths arrived in Spain, in the early fifth century, they brought with them all their barbarian customs, which were subsequently written down by King Euric. The native Hispano-Romans, however—numerically by far the largest portion of the population—were suffered to retain their own laws, which were, of course, almost exclusively Roman in origin. Nay more, Alaric II in the year 506, before his departure for the battle of Vouillé, took pains to codify and arrange these Roman laws for the use of the conquered population in the famous Breviary of Alaric or *Lex Romana Visigothorum*, based chiefly on the Theodosian Code, the Institutes of Gaius, and the *Sententiae* of Paulus. But the Visigoths did not long remain content with this double system of law, which divided them from the subject population. Of all the barbarian nations they were the most inclined to imitate the ways of imperial Rome, whose superiority they clearly discerned. As long as the barrier of religion separated them from the native Spaniards a complete fusion of the two legal systems was out of the question; but with the conversion of Reccared in 587, the way was opened for a new code, which should be valid for both portions of the community. Such a code was put forth in the seventh century, chiefly through the instrumentality of Kings Chindaswinth and Recceswinth; and it is commonly known as the *Fuero Juzgo*. Dispute rages hotly over the relative strength of the Visigothic and Roman elements in it, but the weight of opinion seems to favor the view that the latter was distinctly predominant. Whatever the facts may be in this particular, it is certain that the *Fuero Juzgo* remained the law of most of Christian Spain down to the middle of the thirteenth century, except in so far as it was contradicted or superseded by local fueros.

The importance of this last exception, however, is almost certain to be underestimated by anyone who has not studied in detail the history of mediaeval Spain. In addition to the struggle for mastery between the Visigothic and Roman systems, the traditions of Spanish separatism rendered impossible, for centuries to come, the observance of any universally binding central code. In the first place, each locality had its own *fuero*, or custom, which was not seldom invoked to the prejudice of the law of the land. In the second, each class of society had its often special privileges and immunities. Those of the nobles were naturally of first importance; they were apparently written down and codified at the so-called Cortes of Najera in 1137. Exactly to what extent and for how long they were valid are disputed questions; but they were certainly regarded as a basis for the definition of the rights of the aristocracy in later codes of undoubted authenticity. Those of the clergy and of the monasteries, and of special corporations like the *Mesta*, were scarcely less extensive. Many communities recognized no law whatsoever and were governed merely according to local custom and tradition, and the judgments of arbiters selected among the inhabitants, “por hazañas, albedríos, y costumbres” as the phrase ran. All these incongruities were considerably less abhorrent to the mediaeval jurist than they would be to his successor of today; but even contemporaries realized the crying need of unification and reform.

St. Ferdinand cherished plans of far-reaching improvements, but death cut him off in the midst of his labors, and he bequeathed the unfinished task to his learned son. No better illustration could be desired of the many contrasts and contradictions in the character and career of Alfonso X than is afforded by the history of his various legislative enterprises. Whatever their faults and the inability of the monarch to enforce them, they entitle Alfonso to a fame as a lawgiver which will long outlive his reputation as a king. In general, the codes which he put forth fall into two fairly distinct groups. The first includes those in which the national Visigothic features predominate; the second comprises those in which the influence of Roman law is supreme. To the first belong the *Fuero Real* and its various special supplements and the mass of municipal charters; to the second, the *Especulo* and *Las Siete Partidas*.

The *Fuero Real* or *Fuero de las Leyes* was promulgated in 1254-55, and is in effect a summary, codification, and reconciliation of all existing *fueros*, whether of local or national scope, from the *Fuero Juzgo* down—an attempt to substitute one law book for the many partially conflicting ones previously in force. In the *Prólogo* we find the statement that the king, having taken counsel with his advisers and those learned in the law, had determined to give the people this *fuero* to be judged by at their own request. Pursuant to this intention, the *Fuero Real* was adopted as law by the royal courts; it was granted as a local municipal *fuero* to a number of important towns; for seventeen years it apparently even superseded the aristocratic privileges promulgated at Najera, until their reestablishment in the Cortes of Burgos in 1271. In general, it may be said that the *Fuero Real* remained the principal law book of the realm for nearly a century after its promulgation, and was actually observed whenever it did not conflict with the established custom of this or that locality or place. This is perhaps an unsatisfactory definition of the state of affairs; but in view of the facts as they have come down to us, it is impossible to be more specific. The national tendency towards diversity and variety—more noticeable perhaps in the domain of law than anywhere else—was destined to withstand for many generations to come all the strivings of the monarchy for unification.

The minor codes supplementary to the *Fuero Real* are chiefly important as indicating the immense range of Alfonso's knowledge and interest in matters of legislation; they also show the difficulties which the central government experienced in obtaining any general observance of the *Fuero Real*. The *Leyes Nuevas* deal with questions of usury and debt, inheritance, and the relations of Christians and Moors; in their *Prólogo* they frankly state that the judges cannot determine how these matters are to be treated under the *Fuero Real*, and that additional regulations are necessary to enlighten them. The *Leyes del Estado* are rather a statement and explanation of

the law by eminent jurists than a code in the proper sense of the word. They comprise two hundred and fifty-two *capítulos* and attempt to reconcile the differences between the Fuero Real and the many local laws with which it came into conflict. The *Leyes de los Adelantados* consist of a set of five ordinances concerning the rights and duties of these magistrates. Of another character was the *Ordenamiento de las Tafurerias*, or ordinance concerning gaming houses, which paid the state a tax in return for the permission to remain in existence, and which had not been adequately regulated in the earlier codes.

The other side of Alfonso's legislative work—including the *Especulo* and the *Partidas*—shows foreign Roman influence as plainly as the Fuero Real shows the national, and represents far more accurately the real leanings and theories of the Scholar King. The *Especulo* or *Espejo de todos los derechos*, which is generally regarded as the first legislative work of Alfonso in point of time, has been only partially preserved. Its preface states that it comprises a choice of all the best fueros of the land, made with the advice and consent of the ecclesiastical authorities, *ricos hombres*, and juriconsults, and given to the people to be ruled by; but there is no evidence that the latter part of this programme was ever actually carried out. The *Especulo* was in fact only the first attempt of Alfonso radically to alter legislation in Castile by the introduction of Roman principles; it served as “a preliminary sketch of the *Partidas*” and was “intended to pave the way for the greater code, to which, as Alfonso plainly foresaw, there was bound to be strenuous opposition”. It never was recognized as the law of the land, but was doubtless utilized by the jurists of the period as a book of reference and consultation.

We are thus brought to the last and greatest of the legislative works of the Scholar King, the *Libro de las Leyes*, or *Las Siete Partidas*, as it is usually called on account of the seven great sections into which it is divided. It seems probable that it was begun in 1256 and finished in 1265 by a number of jurists whose names have not come down to us, under the supervision and direction of the king himself. Its sources were: (1) the fueros and good customs of Castile and Leon, such as the *Fuero Juzgo* and *Fuero Real*, and the principal municipal charters; (2) the canon law as set forth in the Decretals; and (3) the Pandects of Justinian and the commentaries of the most famous Italian jurists thereon.

Of these three elements the last two were unquestionably predominant, so that the *Partidas* may justly be described as an attempt to unify the laws on a Roman basis; but the principles of the older Castilian legislation were by no means entirely forgotten. Alfonso knew that his people could never be induced to abandon their ancient laws and customs at once; and every now and then one encounters passages in the *Partidas* which betray a defiantly Germanic origin utterly at variance with the Romanist ideals of the Scholar King. One illustration will suffice: “If a father is so closely besieged in a castle which he holds for his lord, as to be utterly deprived of all food, he may kill and eat his son without prejudice to his honor, rather than surrender the castle without his lord's command.”

But the *Partidas* are much more than a mere compilation of laws. They contain a number of moral and philosophical reflections of a legal nature, a quantity of political maxims, and many disquisitions on the qualities and characteristics which ideally perfect rulers and institutions should display. A few titles may be cited by way of illustration. “How a king should be moderate in eating and in drinking”; “How the children of a king should be trained to be well dressed and cleanly”; “How doctors and surgeons who represent themselves as learned and are not so, deserve to be punished if anyone dies through their fault”; “That no monk should be permitted to study physic or laws.” And this curious medley of apparently incongruous elements naturally leads us to inquire what was the real purpose of Alfonso in preparing this great code. Was it intended to be a great legal encyclopaedia, a guide to the basic principles of legislation, for use by the king and great jurists of the realm. Or, did the Scholar King intend to put it at once

into practice as the common law of the land to the prejudice of the *Fuero Juzgo*, the *Fuero Real*, and the different local charters? The Chronicle of Alfonso X states that the king commanded all his subjects to accept the *Partidas* as their law and *fuero*, and ordered his judges to decide cases accordingly, and there are passages in the code itself which support this assertion; yet on the other hand, the prologue to the *Partidas* describes them as a ‘book for the instruction of kings’, while a royal order to the *alcaldes* of Valladolid, of August, 1258, specifically prohibits the use of Roman law in Castile. Besides, if the *Partidas* were intended to be observed as the law of the land, why, in addition to promulgating the *Fuero Real*, did Alfonso continue to confirm ancient local charters and also to issue new ones almost down to the day of his death? Was it understood that these local charters should be valid save when they conflicted with the law of the land? These questions are scarcely susceptible of definite answers; they will probably long remain among the unsolved problems in which the career of this strange sovereign abounds. A possible explanation may be offered by the theory that though the king himself preferred the absolutist principles of the Roman law, he realized the intensity of his people’s attachment to the national codes, and catered to their prejudices by compiling, simplifying, and confirming these at the same time that he drew up another law book inspired by the ideas in which he believed.

Whatever the final verdict on these matters, the fact remains that *Las Siete Partidas* were never formally declared to be the law of the land during the lifetime of the Scholar King; not until the famous enactment known as the *Ordenamiento de Alcalá* in 1348 did they attain even theoretical validity. During the eighty-three years which elapsed between their completion and their definite acceptance, the *Fuero Real* and the municipal charters remained in force. On the other hand, it would be a great mistake to suppose that *Las Siete Partidas* exerted no influence during this period. Though technically invalid, they were being constantly consulted by lawyers, legal professors, and students at the universities. They turned a generation of jurists to the study of the Roman law—the predecessors of the *letrados* who were to render such invaluable service to the monarchy in the days of the Catholic Kings. Some of their principles were undoubtedly introduced into the actual practice of the courts; the *Ordenamiento de Alcalá* itself speaks of the conflicts of jurisdiction which arose as a result of this. We may well believe that Alfonso XI, who was as ardent a believer in royal absolutism as his namesake had been before him, and far more capable of carrying his ideas into practice, was not slow to seize an opportunity to strike a blow for the code which formed the basis for his own theories of government. If, without formal promulgation, *Las Siete Partidas* could vindicate themselves to the extent that they had already done, might they not hope to take precedence of all other codes and charters, when supported by a solemn declaration of their validity by the king. At any rate, Alfonso XI thought it worthwhile to give the plan a trial; and in the year 1348 he accordingly established *Las Siete Partidas* as the law of the land, save where they were contradicted by the *Fuero Real*, the municipal charters, and the privileges of the aristocracy; the great code was thus formally declared for the first time to be in force in Castile, though it was relegated to a subordinate position. Several important modifications in the *Partidas* were introduced at the same time—most of them in the direction of concessions to the national *fueros*—which served to increase their popularity. The legislative activity of the kings and Cortes of the period further strengthened the forces of unification and centralization; while the increasingly absolutist sentiment of the age all over Western Europe furnished an invaluable support for the tendencies which Alfonso desired to promote. To imagine that variety, diversity, and confusion ceased to be the distinguishing features of Castilian law after the *Ordenamiento de Alcalá*, would be a grievous misconception; but the period which elapsed between Alfonso XI and Ferdinand and Isabella saw them sensibly diminish and the *Partidas* emerge “from the position of a subordinate and supplementary law to that of the principal law of the land”. During that long interval there was in theory no alteration in the relative position of the different codes established in the *Ordenamiento de Alcalá*, but as a matter of fact the *Partidas* steadily increased in prestige and popularity, and the national *fueros*

correspondingly declined. The extreme turbulence of the times prevented the meaning of this change from being entirely apparent to contemporaries, but it is doubtful whether Ferdinand and Isabella could have found an adequate legal basis for their absolutism, had it not been for the various legislative reforms of their predecessors.

A number of changes in judicial procedure and penalties were also effected during the two centuries between Alfonso X and the Catholic Kings. In addition to the use of the *pesquisa*, which we have already noticed, and the corresponding decline in the practice of oral accusation, all the so-called *pruebas vulgares*, such as judicial combat and the ordeal, were definitely abolished after the early fourteenth century, excepting the *rieptos* or duels of the aristocracy, which Alfonso X and his successors wisely judged it to be impossible to do away with, and therefore attempted to regulate. The legislation on this subject in the various codes is extremely interesting, and gives a vivid picture of the spirit of the Castilian aristocracy. The cruel and ferocious punishments of earlier days were little abated, if at all. One section in the *Partidas* forbids branding in the face, cutting the nostrils, exoculation, lapidation, crucifixion, and throwing over a precipice; but these regulations were not observed, and some of them were specifically contradicted in another part of the same code. The use of torture continued, but was strictly limited to certain types of criminals, and was only permitted in the presence of witnesses. Cognizance of the crime of heresy, which was regarded as a heinous form of treason, was vested by the *Partidas* in the bishops; if found guilty, the culprit was handed over, as in other lands, to the secular arm for punishment. Death by the fire was the penalty prescribed in the Alfonsine codes; and at an earlier date St. Ferdinand caused several heretics to be boiled alive.

Still another illustration of the wide gulf that separated theory from practice in the institutional life of mediaeval Castile is presented by the state of the national finances at the close of the period under review. The number and variety of the revenues to which the king was in one way or another legally entitled were enormous; elaborate machinery had been devised, and numerous officials appointed for their collection, and yet the poverty of the Castilian monarchs was a jest in the mouths of their subjects. Undoubtedly a similar condition obtained in the treasuries of all the sovereigns of Western Europe during the period of baronial anarchy immediately preceding the establishment of absolute monarchy. The emptiness of the royal coffers was everywhere the measure of the impotence of the central government. The situation in Castile, however, was probably much worse than the average, just as the abasement of the royal power was more complete; and it presents a number of features of special interest.

In the early days of the Reconquest, the royal revenues were largely derived from contributions of a preeminently feudal nature. These did not vary essentially in number or variety from those prevalent in mediaeval times in other lands. The *petitum* or *moneda*, a special contribution levied by the crown on occasions of special importance, such as the marriage of a member of the royal family; the *conducho* or *yantares*, that is, the royal right of purveyance and entertainment or its pecuniary equivalent; the *fonsadera*, or indemnity for exemption from military service; and the *calonna*, or fine incident on a locality for permitting a crime to go unpunished within its limits, may be cited as typical examples. But as time went on, and the framework of a regular central government gradually made its appearance, these feudal dues began to fall into the background and to be supplanted by a more modern set of revenues. In other words, a system of national taxation began to emerge. Sometimes the feudal due was itself converted into a national tax, as, for instance, the *moneda*, which was at first levied on special occasions, but after the thirteenth century apparently became a regular annual contribution, until it was abolished in the reign of Henry III. The *moneda forera* also, which was originally a lump sum paid by the municipalities for exemption from all feudal dues, except from



the *fonsadera* and the *yantares*, appears in the sixteenth century as a septennial levy incident on all men in recognition of the sovereignty of the crown. Often the feudal due was gradually suffered to fall into abeyance and the newer types of taxation permitted to replace it. Of these the most important were as follows.

1. The *capitación* incident on Moors and Jews who were permitted to remain in Christian territory. A petition of the Cortes of Valladolid in 1312 indicates that the standard rate was six thousand maravedis per day from each *aljama* or community in the realm; but there were numerous local variations, and even complete exemptions, which were the cause of constant complaint. In Segovia it appears that the Jews paid annually thirty *dineros* apiece as a perpetual reminder of the sum for which Christ was betrayed, but as this impost was collected by the bishop, it seems probable that it was a special local levy in excess of the regular capitation.

2. The *servicio*, or special tax, which could be voted only by the Cortes, and has already been considered under that head. The procuradores made strenuous, though not always successful, efforts to subject forced loans or *empréstitos* to the same condition.

3. The *sisá*, or tax on food stuffs, first established by Sancho IV, but withdrawn, owing to its intense unpopularity, by his widow Doña Maria during the minority of Ferdinand IV. It was, however, to reappear.

4. Revenues from mines and salt pits. Laws of Alfonso X and Alfonso XI declared these to be a part of the royal domain and their products the property of the crown. In the case of the mines, the demands of the monarchy were apparently often satisfied by an arrangement that a fraction of their output should be handed to it; with the salt pits the royal monopoly, theoretically at least, was maintained in full.

5. The so-called *tercias reales*, or royal thirds of the tithe that was due to the church, which the kings retained on the pretext that the clergy ought to contribute directly to the crusade against the Moors. This right, which was only provisionally recognized by the ecclesiastical authorities in the Middle Ages, became regular and permanent in the days of Ferdinand and Isabella. As the government usually handed back one third of the third received, for the benefit of the buildings of the parish churches, its share was ultimately reduced to two ninths.

6. National customs duties, or *derechos de aduana*. From the thirteenth century onward, all commodities were subject to the payment of a duty on entering and leaving the realm. The rate was ordinarily one tenth the value of the commodity in question, which doubtless accounts for the fact that the word *diezmo* was often used to denote it as well as the ecclesiastical tithe. This duty was levied in return for the protection given to the traveler or merchant and his goods; and it is worth noting that the treatment which strangers were accorded at the frontiers of mediaeval Castile contrasts favorably with that meted out in many European and American custom houses today. The personal effects of the average traveler were exempt from payment; the oath or declaration of the merchant was accepted in regard to the content of the cases he brought with him, which he was not obliged to unpack; but if an intent to defraud was discovered, the penalty was death and the confiscation of the goods. Some commodities could not, in theory, be exported at all, especially silver and gold; and there were an infinite number of local exceptions and exemptions. Theories of protection of national industries, however, were not yet fully developed, and the revenues from the *aduanas*, though considerable, were not comparable to the income derived from this source by Ferdinand and Isabella and their successors.

7. Local customs duties. The traditions of Castilian separatism favored the maintenance of internal tolls. The foreigner who had passed the frontier found other barriers awaiting him within the realm, and those Castilians whose business took them from one end of the country to another were obliged to pay dearly for that privilege. The terms *portazgo*, *pontazgo*, and

*montazgo* indicate the sums levied for the right to pass with one's belongings through the gates of a town, over a bridge, or across a wooded pasture (*monte*). Their meanings varied, however, as time went on, and *portazgo*, and still more *montazgo* came to be used almost exclusively of the heavy imposts levied on the great flocks of sheep which annually migrated from the rainy pastures of Galicia to the sunny plains of Andalusia and back again.

8. The *alcabala*, or tax on commercial transactions, the most lucrative of all, but also the most disastrous in its ultimate effects on the economic welfare of Spain. This source of revenue, which is generally believed to have been borrowed from the finances of the Moors, was first regularly established in the reign of Alfonso XI, though there are occasional and local traces of its existence at an earlier date. It was apparently imposed in 1342 to provide for the special needs of the campaign against Algeciras, with the distinct understanding that it should cease when peace was made. The rate was one twentieth the value of the transaction, and there is no evidence that the Cortes formally sanctioned it. But instead of ceasing when the war was over, it continued, and the rate was increased in 1366 to one tenth. The Cortes apparently had not yet entirely relinquished all claim to control it; in 1388 they granted it for special purposes for a period of two years, and again, three years later, for one. In 1393 they granted a *servicio* on the express understanding that the *alcabala* should not be levied again without the consent of the three estates of the realm; but the lack of any adequate machinery for enforcing the bargain rendered their action nugatory. Meantime, the kings continued to treat the new impost according to their own desires. During the minority of Henry III, the rate was once more dropped to one twentieth; but when the young monarch took the reins of government into his own hands, it was restored to one tenth and there remained. This tax, which had originated in such irregular fashion, was to become a cornerstone of the royal finances in the succeeding centuries and was bound to operate unfavorably to the general economic welfare of a nation which had little natural aptitude for trade. Exactly how blighting its effects were, cannot be accurately determined, till far more minute and painstaking research has been accomplished in the still almost totally unexplored field of Spanish economic history.

In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a royal treasury (*hacienda*) was gradually organized for the collection and administration of these revenues. At the head of it was the *almojarife* or *tesorero mayor*; under him were a number of subordinates—*diezmeros*, *cojedores*, etc.—each of whom was charged with the collection of the revenue of the source or locality committed to his care, and its keep track of these officials and to check up their results. Nevertheless, there were constant complaints by the Cortes of the period concerning the harshness and corruption of the royal tax-gatherers. The procuradores doubtless exaggerated the extent of the evil, but their grievances were certainly not imaginary, particularly under the weaker kings. Curiously enough, the turbulent reign of John II witnessed several efforts to estimate the yield of the different sources of revenue. Schedules of rates for the various customs houses were prepared in 1431 and 1446; and in 1429 a sort of budget was drawn up, in which the total annual income of the Royal Treasury was estimated at 60,812,930 maravedis. Payments were ordinarily made in money during this period, though contributions in kind were not wholly unknown.

Theoretically, then, the revenues to which the sovereigns of Castile were legally entitled were amply sufficient to provide for the needs of their government. Of all the sources of income which we have described, only one, the *servicio* was entirely within the control of the Cortes; the status of the *empréstito* and *alcabala* was possibly doubtful; but the levy and rate of the others remained entirely in the hands of the crown. The almost proverbial emptiness of the Castilian treasury thus demands some explanation; and the causes which combined to account for it may be briefly summarized as follows.

1. Exemptions. The payment of taxes was essentially an affair of the third estate—so much so, in fact, that the word *pechero*, or taxpayer, connoted an absence of social distinction. The exemption of the nobles and clergy was not in any sense complete; they were subject to many of the indirect taxes, notably (despite violent protests) to the *alcabala*, and to certain minor contributions for the upkeep of roads and bridges, and for the destruction of grasshoppers. Alfonso X, moreover, protested against the canons of the Lateran Council declaring all payments of imposts by the clergy to be of a voluntary or exceptional nature; and strenuous efforts were made by various Castilian sovereigns to prevent lay property from passing into clerical hands, and, in case it did so, to provide that it should continue to be taxable as before; still there is no denying that the wealthier portions of the community got off much more cheaply than they deserved. Local as well as class exemptions were not infrequent. Cities whose position exposed them to Moorish attacks were often granted immunity from certain imposts. Sometimes the crown handed over directly to the municipal treasury the product of some of the national taxes levied in that locality. And there were also countless special cases and individual immunities which defy classification. Certainly the incidence of national taxation was far from general or uniform.

2. The lavishness of the crown in grants and donations, of which we have had constant examples from the earliest days of the Reconquest. Since these grants were originally a product of the circumstances of the Moorish war, they might have been expected to cease when the enemy was limited to the little kingdom of Granada. Unfortunately the Castilian monarchs found the nobles at home even more difficult to cope with than the infidel abroad; and it was by the continuance and increase of ill-considered munificence that most of them purchased immunity from baronial revolt. Alfonso X started the ball rolling in the wrong direction, and Henry of Trastamara made matters much worse. In the reigns of John II and Henry IV the central power was so deeply abased that the barons scarcely waited for the crown to give but seized what they desired for themselves. Moreover, the confusion which had been suffered to grow up between the private personal patrimony of the king, and the national property of which he was the trustee, extended the scope of these royal donations. The monarchs disposed of both with equal freedom in this period, to the ruin of the national fortunes.

3. Last, but not least, the general state of anarchy, which marked the end of the Middle Ages in Castile, was incompatible with the prosperity of the national finances. It was literally impossible, under the conditions which actually prevailed, to collect the sums due to the crown. The restoration of the national resources in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella was not brought about by the invention of new imposts. It was not primarily due to the great Act of Resumption or to the annexation of the grand masterships. The fundamental explanation of it was the reestablishment of peace and strong government, which enabled the central power to make itself felt in every quarter of the realm, and made possible an approximation between the amount theoretically due to the crown and the sums which it was able to gather in.

Warfare was one of the principal occupations of mediaeval Castile, and the special function of the aristocracy; the caballero who was unable to provide himself with arms and a horse soon fell back into the social limitations of the 'pecheros'. The first duty of all the nobles was to follow the king's banner when called upon, with whatever forces they could muster; the privileges of the *ricos hombres* might entitle them to an invitation rather than a summons from the king to go to war, but they were supposed invariably to accept it. The higher clergy too were expected to accompany the monarch in his campaigns against the Moors, or if not, to send someone in their place; a kind of scutage was apparently paid by those who were unable to join the royal forces. The obligations of the municipalities were far less clear. Their fueros often entitled them

to exemptions of one sort or another; but since every city was intensely proud of its standard—the emblem of its fitness to engage in the noble profession of arms—and profoundly anxious not to be outdone by its neighbors in this respect, the municipal levies not seldom attained considerable proportions. But if the numbers of the host were not inadequate, its lack of unity and discipline was deplorable. In the first place, there was every probability that many contingents would desert at the outset, if the campaign did not meet with their approval, or if the prospect of booty was small; indeed, the monarch would have reason to think himself fortunate if none of his forces were ultimately found in the ranks of the foe. Even in the rare cases when all the army was loyal to its sovereign, the number and inequality of its different units, the immense variety in their methods of waging war, and the lack of any regulated scale of authority among its leaders were fatal barriers to any real efficiency. The only reason that won its fair share of victories was the fact that its foes were usually in a similar plight. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, indeed, some efforts were made to introduce order and discipline. The crown succeeded in superimposing on the feudal levies a number of trained commanders (*adalides*); and in the reigns of Alfonso XI, John I and II, and of Henry IV, a permanent, regularly paid royal guard occasionally made its appearance—the nucleus for a standing army. The creation, in the reign of John I, of the office of *Condestable de Castilla* marks another step along the road to a more efficient military organization. Still, down to the days of Gonsalvo de Cordova, the rate of progress towards the desired goal was very slow. The best asset of the mediaeval Castilian forces was the valor of the individual soldiers a quality in which the Spaniard has never been deficient, but one which, if unsupported by discipline and effective leadership, was bound to be decreasingly important in proportion to the progress of military science.

The armament and fighting methods of the mediaeval Castilian soldier offer certain peculiarities, which are to be attributed to the fact that he had been chiefly occupied in fighting the Moors, and that he had seen almost no service north of the Pyrenees. He was trained and equipped to wage the sort of warfare that the nature of the Reconquest imposed—that is, a war of rapid raids and counterraids in a mountainous and difficult land. For this purpose cavalry was of the first importance, and we consequently find that the Castilian armies were largely composed of horsemen. But most of these horsemen were not heavily armed like those of France and England. The nobles and the military orders furnished a nucleus of mailed knights of the standard mediaeval pattern (though their steeds were unprotected by armor), but the greater part of the Castilian cavalry consisted of *genetes*, so-called from the jennets or light coursers which they rode. They were equipped with a steel cap, shield, and quilted jacket for defence, and a couple of darts or javelins which they hurled at their foes. Their favorite manoeuvre was to hover around and harass their opponents, in the hope of breaking their formation and gaining an opportunity for a swift charge. Against the Moors, who were similarly armed, these troops were fairly successful; but against a combination of knights and bowmen, such as had been evolved in the first half of the fourteenth century in England, they were almost powerless, as the battle of Navarrete (1367) was to prove. Unfortunately, the Castilians did not profit at once by the lessons of that fatal campaign. Heavier armor was only gradually and irregularly adopted by them in the succeeding century, and missile weapons did not make any notable progress till the days of Gonsalvo de Cordova; but on the other hand, the tradition of speed and mobility, inherited from the earliest times, was not forgotten, and was to be cleverly utilized by the Great Captain when he recreated the military forces of the Catholic Kings. The date of the introduction of gunpowder and cannon in Spain is a much-disputed point, but it is safe to say that neither attained any great importance until the final siege of Granada. For the capture of walled towns, huge catapults, movable wooden towers, and battering rams were usually employed. Tactics and strategy were practically nonexistent; only in the perennial occupation of devastating the enemy's lands and terrorizing their defenceless population was there any sort of system. Yet even for these rudimentary stages of the development of the military art, a number of rules and regulations were

evolved. The second of the *Siete Partidas* and the earlier *Fuero Viejo de las Cabalgadas* lay down laws for the conduct of campaigns and describe the military methods of the day.

The mediaeval Castilian navy was by no means equal to that of the realms of the Crown of Aragon; the fact that Castile had been deprived of the best part of her sea-board by the declaration of Portuguese independence is probably the best explanation of her backwardness in this respect. From the middle of the ninth to the middle of the eleventh century, the Galician, Cantabrian, and Asturian coasts were frequently raided by Scandinavian and occasionally by Moorish pirates. In 970 the former penetrated inland and sacked Santiago de Compostela; and, by a bit of poetic justice, it was one of the most famous archbishops of that ancient see—the restless Diego Gelmirez—who afterwards took the lead in providing his native land with a navy adequate for her defence. As there was no one in Spain at that time who understood the art of naval instruction and navigation, he applied to the maritime republics of Italy for aid; and about the year 1120 he induced a Genoese master shipwright named Ogerio to come and visit Galicia. A dockyard was prepared at Iria; shipbuilding began; and before the end of the twelfth century a Christian fleet had fought the Moors on the sea. We must not suppose, however, that anything like a regularly organized Castilian navy existed at this early period.

The ships were owned by private persons or by the municipalities; if the sovereigns needed them for national purposes, they simply summoned them to their aid like the feudal array. The chief center of Castilian maritime affairs remained in the Biscayan ports down to the middle of the thirteenth century, when the scene of interest shifts to Seville. When St. Ferdinand captured that town with the aid of Ramón Bonifacio of Burgos, he rewarded the followers of his victorious admiral by granting them a special quarter of the conquered city, with special privileges and a special jurisdiction, and a number of naval men from the northwest migrated thither in the succeeding years. The office of *almirante*, as we have already seen, was created by Ferdinand III. From that time onward, Seville and the Guadalquivir became the naval center of Castile. Alfonso X, whose zeal for maritime affairs fully equaled that of his father, established a shipyard and arsenal there, and took the first steps towards the creation of a permanent royal navy for purposes of war. The capture of Cadiz from the Moors (September 14, 1262), which greatly enhanced the security and importance of Seville, may be regarded as the first signal triumph of the king's ships. Meantime Alfonso also strove to keep alive the naval interest in the Biscayan towns. Whether new shipyards were constructed there is not certain; but a sort of subsidiary admiralty was created at Burgos to stimulate and direct the shipping of the northwestern ports, and the Castilian contingents which cooperated with the French against the English in the naval struggles of the Hundred Years' War were chiefly recruited in that region. Altogether, the prestige of the Castilian navy, both in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, was distinctly high during the two centuries following the death of St. Ferdinand. Even England was not ashamed to take hints from it in the construction of ships, and in battle she treated it with marked respect. The naval foundations for Castile's future career of imperial expansion to the westward were firmly laid before the close of the Middle Ages. One of the most essential links of the chain that bound the Reconquest to the conquest had been forged previous to the accession of the Catholic Kings.

The ships were of various sorts and sizes and depended for the most part on both oars and sails for their propulsion. The two principal types were the lighter vessels called *cocas*, which were introduced by the Cantabrians but chiefly used in the Mediterranean, and the heavier galleys or *naves gruesas* such as were employed in the Hundred Years' War; the largest of these had complements of over two hundred men. There was no very notable variation in the general lines of construction during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, though there were a number of minor improvements, and the size tended steadily to increase. Fighting was almost exclusively done in close contact by ramming and boarding; there is some reason to believe that Alfonso XI began to use artillery in his ships in his wars with the English navy, but it is by no means certain.



The *Partidas* devote an entire chapter to “La Guerra que se faze por mar,” explaining in detail its rules and conditions, the number and quality of the men and the armament, and the ranks and duties of the different officers.

During the first five centuries of the Reconquest the conditions of existence rendered wellnigh impossible any considerable development of agriculture, pasturage, industry, or commerce; but when the Moors were at last driven back to the confines of Granada the earlier difficulties were largely removed, and serious efforts were made to develop the resources of the land. The agricultural problem was, of course, by far the most discouraging. Some progress was made, but not sufficient to enable the fields to support the population or to render their tillage generally profitable or successful. The lists of foodstuffs imported into the realm during this period plainly indicate its agricultural shortcomings; the natural infertility of the bulk of the land, coupled with the devastations of the war of the Reconquest, were a constant discouragement to activity in this direction, and stamped on the average Castilian an aversion to labor in the fields which has dung to him ever since, and was to affect most adversely his imperial ambitions at a later day. Pasturage, on the other hand, had flourished in the peninsula from the time of the Romans, and during the later Middle Ages made rapid strides. The rainy valleys of the northwest furnished admirable facilities for grazing sheep in the summers, as did the warmer plains of the south in the winters; during the intermediate seasons vast flocks were driven back and forth across the intervening lands along certain well-established routes called *cañadas*. Since the passage of the sheep could not fail to injure the agricultural interests of the localities which they traversed, there was a constant series of quarrels between farmers and graziers. The latter, in order to protect themselves against the complaints of their enemies, obtained permission, at least as early as the reign of Alfonso the Learned, to form themselves into an association or gild, called the ‘Mesta’, which secured from the crown, particularly under Alfonso XI, a number of important privileges, jurisdictions, and immunities, and a regular code of laws defining them. The policy of favoring pasturage at the expense of agriculture, which was to be continued and carried much further under the Catholic Kings, was another contributory cause of Castile’s poor showing in the latter field.

The industrial and commercial organization of mediaeval Castile was naturally of a preeminently local type—far more so in fact than that of the other Western European states of the period, for the separatistic character of the country revealed itself in economic as well as in political affairs. The products of the different towns of the realm varied widely, as did the organization of the various gilds which controlled their output, and the lines of local custom houses discouraged communication between the different parts of the realm. The crown favored the establishment of annual or biennial fairs of two to four weeks’ duration in the principal cities, in order to facilitate the exchange of commodities. Those of Seville, Medina del Campo, and Murcia were perhaps the most important, but they did not suffice to break down or even seriously to lower the economic barriers by which the land was internally divided. Endless confusion in money, weights, and measures was an accompanying phenomenon of the times. Several different types of currency were in circulation, and also much debased coin; it will be remembered that the Scholar King himself set his subjects an evil example in this respect. The foreign commerce of the realm was in somewhat better case. The Castilian merchant marine developed rapidly during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, hand in hand with the Castilian navy, and Castilian traders were to be found in all the great markets of Western Europe. There was a gild of Biscayan pilots, established at Cadiz soon after the capture of the town from the Moors, and consuls were appointed every year to settle all questions which came up in connection with navigation and commerce. The idea of helping the nascent industries of the realm by the imposition of protective tariffs appears plainly in different places in the Alfonsine codes,

and various *aranceles* or schedules of the period bear witness to the crown's desire to regulate the commercial activities of the realm in accordance with universally applicable standards. The royal interference in this matter, however, was nothing in comparison with what it was to become in the days of Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs. Fishing, also, received the royal attention and encouragement from an even earlier date, and was expected to yield a portion of its profits to the crown; in a fuero which he granted to the little Biscayan town of Zaraus in the year 1237, St. Ferdinand provided that whenever the inhabitants succeeded in capturing a whale, they should give him a strip of its flesh the length of the body.

The intellectual life of Castile during the later Middle Ages was naturally somewhat stunted by the turbulence of the times. At the time of the accession of Alfonso the Learned, there was only one university in the realm—that of Salamanca—which had been projected in 1230 by Alfonso IX of Leon and was really founded twelve years later by St. Ferdinand. The Scholar King's zeal for learning led him to draw up extensive regulations for it, and to confer upon it numerous privileges; and a long section in the *Siete Partidas* dealing with the organization of study in the realm bears further witness to Alfonso's interest in education and to his determination to keep it under royal control. Without doubt he expected that other universities would soon spring up, and in 1293 his successor Sancho IV took the first measures to found a *studium generate* at Alcalá, which was to become under Ferdinand and Isabella the foremost centre of learning in Spain. But from Sancho's reign to that of the Catholic Kings not a single new university was established in Leon or Castile, a fact which is the more remarkable when we consider that no less than six similar institutions were set up within the same period in the much smaller realms of the Crown of Aragon. Lack of governance was, as usual, the underlying cause. The kings, some of whom were really interested in education, and whose authority and control were, in theory at least, more dominant in university affairs than was the case in any other country in Europe, were too completely in the hands of the rebel baronage to be able to carry their plans into effect.

Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that Castile was so completely wrapped up in its own internal troubles during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as to be incapable of literary, artistic, or scientific productivity, or deaf to the intellectual influences of other lands. In art, architecture, and literature one can easily find traces, all the way from Alfonso X to Ferdinand and Isabella, of the fashions of the other states of Western Europe, especially of Italy, with which Castile had numerous opportunities to become intimate owing to the Aragonese expansion in the Mediterranean. In painting, the style of Giotto was carried over to Castile by the Florentine artist Gherardo Stamina during the years 1380-87; a sort of 'Giotto School' was subsequently set up at Seville, but the attempts of the native Castilian painters to imitate the foreign models which had been set before them were not remarkably successful. In the reign of John II, a certain Nicolao Fiorentino, who was almost certainly none other than Dello Delli, visited Spain; the mural paintings in the apse of the old cathedral of Salamanca furnish perhaps the best existing examples of the work that he did there. Flemish influences are also traceable in Castilian painting of the fifteenth century. The famous journey of Jan Van Eyck to the peninsula in 1428-29 was probably the origin of them, though their results were not evident in the work of the native artists till some thirty years afterwards.

In sculpture and architecture Gothic models began to be introduced from France in the course of the twelfth century, and gradually took their place beside the native styles; the cathedrals of Burgos, Toledo, and Leon (all begun in the thirteenth century) exhibit them at the climax, of their power, and the wonderful towers of the first named, which is usually considered the most beautiful church in Spain, were apparently the work of a fifteenth-century German, Meister Hans

of Cologne. In architecture, however, the national and Moorish fashions were by no means forgotten. 'Mudejar' buildings of various sorts were constantly being erected in Castile till well into the sixteenth century. Indeed, traces of Arab influence keep continually cropping out even in edifices built by architects who had been imported from north of the Pyrenees. There was certainly no 'pure' style of any kind in the Castile of the later Middle Ages.

In the domain of literature Italian influence again comes to the fore. From the end of the fourteenth century onward, we find numerous writings which evince a keen appreciation and understanding of Dante, and a lively interest in Boccaccio; at times it almost seems that the popularity of the older literary works of the distinctively national type, like the *Poema del Cid*, was quite overshadowed by that of the new importations. Francisco Imperial, the son of a Genoese jeweler established at Seville, is generally regarded as the first of these Italianate Castilians; the famous Marquis of Santillana, Enrique de Villena, and Juan de Mena, carried the new fashion considerably further a half century afterwards. English literature also had some few followers in Castile during this period. Robert Gower's *Confessio Amantis* was translated into Spanish by a certain Juan de Cuenca in the reign of John II, whose chief title to fame was his passion for learning and letters.

Altogether it is evident that in her intellectual as well as in her political life, Castile was no longer cut off from the rest of Western Europe, as she had been before the virtual accomplishment of the Reconquest by St. Ferdinand. The great national task on which the full force of her energies had been concentrated for five centuries was practically finished; she was beginning to reach out into new fields. Internal chaos prevented her from accomplishing anything very great in these new spheres of activity until the advent of strong government under the Catholic Kings, but at all events she had succeeded in immensely broadening her horizon. In every phase of the national life, the two centuries which followed the accession of Alfonso the Learned are a period of necessary transition between isolation and empire.

## BOOK II

### THE REALMS OF THE CROWN OF ARAGON



CHAPTER VI

ARAGON AND CATALONIA IN FRANCE, SPAIN, AND NORTH AFRICA

The interest of the mediaeval history of the realms of the Crown of Aragon lies quite as emphatically on the side of external expansion, as does that of the contemporaneous development of Castile in internal affairs and the war of the Reconquest. The Spanish Empire was even more preponderantly Aragonese in the Middle Ages, than Castilian in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We must therefore deal with the growth of the eastern realms in the Iberian Peninsula and the adjacent lands as rapidly as possible, in order to have more space to devote to their conquests overseas.

The origins of the little kingdom of Aragon are even more obscure than those of Asturias. It appears in the first place as a countship, rather than as an independent realm, and its original territories lay along the banks of the river Arago, from which it took its name. In the ninth century its capital was at Jaca; and it subsequently extended its dominions at the expense of the Moors in the regions of Sobrarbe and Ribagorza. In these early years of its existence, however, the question of its independence or subjection to foreign overlordship was far more important than the speed of its progress against the infidel. At first it seems to have been often under the suzerainty of the Frankish monarchs; at times, in all probability, it was virtually autonomous; but as the years went by it gradually fell more and more completely under the control of Navarre. This kingdom, by the middle of the ninth century, had successfully vindicated its independence of the domination of Charlemagne's successors, thus greatly enhancing its own prestige, and incidentally weakening the Frankish hold over Aragon. The latter, on the other hand, was still too small and weak to be able permanently to dispense with outside protection and support; so that the Navarrese monarchs naturally fell heirs to all the authority over its rulers which they had forced the Carolingians to relinquish. For a time it was overlordship: later, owing to deaths, marriages, and unwise divisions of inheritances, it became considerably more. By the end of the tenth century Aragon had lost all claims to existence as a separate state; she had been practically absorbed by the kingdom of Navarre.

The next period saw Navarre take the lead of all the Iberian states, and for one brief moment unite them under her sceptre. The hero of this most glorious epoch of his country's history was King Sancho the Great, who ruled from 970 to 1035. Already master of his own realm and of Aragon, he skillfully alternated and combined the time-honored methods of matrimony, intrigue, and war, to win for himself the succession in Castile, and the effective occupation of most of Leon. At the close of his life he ruled over an uninterrupted expanse of territory which stretched from the mountains of Galicia to the confines of the county of Barcelona. But it was not possible for such an extended realm to remain long united in mediaeval Spain. The reign of Sancho was a final and most brilliant outburst of the flame of Navarrese power south of the Pyrenees; but the succeeding period witnessed its virtual extinction. At his death in 1035 the great king divided his realms. To his eldest son, Garcia, he gave Navarre. To his second, Ferdinand, he left Castile and his claims to Leon, which the latter subsequently prosecuted with such vigor that the two kingdoms were united under his rule in 1037. To the third, Gonzalo, he gave Sobrarbe and Ribagorza, and to the fourth, Ramiro, the original territory of Aragon; as Gonzalo, however, soon after died and left no heirs, Ramiro was able to gather in his inheritance. The latter also increased his dominions by conquests to the south, and on his death in 1063 was able to leave to



his son an Aragon territorially more extensive than ever before, and, for the first time, completely independent of foreign sovereignty.

From 1063 to 1134, the history of Aragon offers the usual spectacle of internal confusion, intrigues with the neighboring realms, and sporadic progress against the Moor. In 1076 the murder of the Navarrese king gave it an opportunity to turn the tables on the realm which had previously absorbed it; for fifty-eight years after that date Navarre was annexed to Aragon. The most famous monarch of this stormy period was Alfonso the Warrior (1104-34), whom we have already encountered as the second husband of Urraca of Leon and Castile, and a notable disturber of the peace of those kingdoms. His victories over the Moors have entitled him to a fairer fame. Under his leadership the Christian arms were carried across the Ebro. In 1118 Saragossa was taken—an event which, for Aragon, is comparable to the capture in 1085 of Toledo for Castile; the surrender of many minor places to the south of it followed shortly afterwards, and raids were made into Valencia, Murcia, and Andalusia, as far as the shores of the Mediterranean. Unfortunately Alfonso had no surviving children to whom he could leave these conquests; he therefore provided in his will that his dominions should be parceled out between the Templars and the Knights Hospitallers. As this arrangement, however, was highly distasteful to his subjects both in Aragon and in Navarre, they coolly ignored it, and both states chose new rulers to suit themselves. The Navarrese, who were above all anxious to regain their autonomy, elected as their sovereign a grandnephew of their king who had been murdered in 1076; from the descendants of this monarch the realm finally passed, in 1234, into French hands for more than two centuries, so that we lose sight of it henceforth for a long time to come.

The Aragonese, in the meantime, dragged from a monastery in Narbonne a brother of their late king, named Ramiro, and set him on their throne. Nay more, in order to make the succession safe, they persuaded this Ramiro to procure a papal dispensation from his vows of celibacy, and to marry a sister of the duke of Aquitaine. But Ramiro had no desire or talent for reigning. The nobles were restless at home. The Moors harried his frontiers. Navarre and Castile on the north and west clamored for revenge for the insults and humiliations to which they had been subjected by the late king. Alfonso the Emperor actually invaded the realm, and temporarily incorporated Saragossa and other towns in the domains of the crown of Castile; only by recognizing his feudal overlordship was it possible to check his advance. Ramiro was only too glad to acknowledge himself incompetent to cope with all these dangers, and when, in 1135, his Aquitanian wife presented him with a daughter, Petronilla, he saw a way out of his difficulties. The little princess was betrothed while still in the cradle to Ramon Berenguer IV, the reigning count of Catalonia, with a provision for the latter's succession to the Aragonese throne in case Petronilla should die without issue. The important support of the powerful eastern countship was thus secured against the manifold dangers which threatened Aragon at home and abroad, and the continuance of that support was guaranteed in the future by the assured prospect of the union of the crowns. Ramiro, on his own confession incapable of reigning, had probably done more for his native land than a powerful monarch could have accomplished. In 1137 he retired into a monastery, leaving his infant daughter under the guardianship of her future husband. He had certainly earned his rest.

The separation of Aragon from Navarre, and its union with the county of Catalonia, are epoch-making events in the history of Spain and also of the Spanish Empire. Ramiro could not possibly have foreseen the consequences of his work. He had sought union with the eastern state as a means of protecting Aragon against foreign and internal dangers. What he had really accomplished was far more than that; he had changed the whole current of his country's development and laid the basis for her imperial domain. Hitherto her history had been, like that of Leon, Castile, and Navarre, an alternation of internal feuds and Moorish raids. Her attention had never been directed to events beyond the limits of the peninsula. She was narrow, self-

absorbed, and totally without cosmopolitanism or ambitions for empire. Now, all at once, her destinies were permanently linked with a state of Frankish origin, whose boundaries crossed the Pyrenees, which was possessed of a long seacoast and splendid harbors, and whose fleets had already begun to cruise in the Mediterranean Sea. An entirely new and dazzling prospect was suddenly opened before her. Naturally she could not abandon and forget all her ancient traditions in a moment. On the contrary, she clung to them tenaciously, and the fact that she maintained her separate institutions (despite the union of the crowns) gave her an opportunity to assert herself which she did not neglect. Still, the operation of Catalonian influence, however strongly resisted, was bound ultimately to make itself felt; and though the name of the kingdom prevailed generally over that of the county in designating the united realms, the triumph of the maritime, commercial, and imperial influence of the latter is evident in the diminishing effectiveness of the Aragonese opposition to the great ventures of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries which emanated from Catalonia. The coincidence that Castile was partially shut off from access to the sea by the declaration of the independence of Portugal, at almost precisely the same moment that Aragon acquired it by union with Catalonia, produced results of lasting importance. It explains why Spain's first imperial ventures were made to the eastward, in the Mediterranean Sea, rather than to the westward in the Atlantic. Had the positions been reversed, the history of the two chief states of the peninsula in the next three centuries would in all probability have been utterly different, and the policies of the empire which arose from their united resources more different still.

In an earlier chapter we have had occasion to speak briefly of the Frankish origin of the county of Catalonia, of its attainment of independence of French control in the end of the ninth century, of its subsequent turning on the land that gave it birth and annexing, at its expense, important territories north of the Pyrenees. At the time of its union with Aragon in 1137, these territories included Cerdagne and the greater part of Provence, Millau, and Gévaudan—the lion's share of the country of the Languedoc—a generous portion of the south of France. In the next two generations these Catalonian holdings were further augmented by the addition of Roussillon (1172), and, under foreign suzerainty, of Montpellier (1204), by the acquisition of the overlordship of Foix, of Nîmes, and of Beziers (between 1162 and 1196), and by temporary extension of direct authority over the county of Urgel. But the counts of Catalonia were also interested in expansion in other directions than across the Pyrenees in France. They bore their share in expeditions to the southward against the Moors. Though their gains in that direction were not very permanent, they had raided the lands of the infidel as far as Murcia before the end of the eleventh century. Last but not least, they had already evinced a lively interest in maritime affairs. In 1114-15, in alliance with the Pisans, they had made an expedition against Majorca and Iviza. Its success in its main objective was but evanescent, as the Moors soon retook the islands, but it led indirectly to the permanent occupation of Tarragona and the neighboring coast, which had not hitherto been safe from Moorish attack. Maritime commerce also began to flourish. Barcelona was already known as a seaport of real importance. Clearly, then, at the time of its union with Aragon, the Catalonian state was confronted with a large variety of opportunities for growth and expansion in at least three different directions—northward in France, southward in Spain, eastward in the Mediterranean Sea. Vital, ambitious, and cosmopolitan, reinforced and encouraged by the acquisition of Aragon, the descendants of Ramon and Petronilla began to push their fortunes with equal vigor in all these fields at once, but with very different success. In France, after heroic efforts, the tide turned against them and they had to acknowledge defeat. In the south, against the Moors, under the leadership of Aragon, they succeeded in annexing those portions of the peninsula in which they had not been forestalled by their neighbors on the west. The capture of Valencia was the crown and fine flower of the Reconquest on the eastward, but, as we have already seen, the glory of driving the Moors out of Spain is preeminently the glory of Castile. It was to the eastward, in the Mediterranean, that the destiny of the Aragonese-Catalonian state really lay; and even before the possibilities of expansion by land had been entirely exhausted,

on the north by failure, and on the south through accomplished success and the fact that there was no more territory to regain, Catalonia had perceived that the future of the eastern kingdoms was on the sea. From that moment onward she proudly led the way, with Aragon rather reluctantly tagging at her heels.

Everything which it is essential for us to know in the narrative and external history of the realms of the Crown of Aragon down to the middle of the fifteenth century may, in fact, be most conveniently summarized under these three heads: the loss of the French lands; the completion of the Aragonese reconquest in Spain and the ensuing relations with the Moslem powers of Granada and North Africa; and the acquisition of an empire in the western basin of the Mediterranean. The first two were virtually accomplished before the end of the reign of James the Conqueror in 1276, and may, therefore, be dismissed in short space in the present chapter. The history of the third, on the other hand, is exceedingly complicated and difficult, and prolongs itself not only to the close of the mediaeval period but beyond. The study of it will, therefore, necessarily demand more space, and will involve some investigation of the principal events of the different reigns in chronological order; for, with a single possible exception, every one of the Aragonese kings from James the Conqueror downward was more or less intimately concerned with the development and increase of the Aragonese possessions beyond the seas. But though, for the sake of convenience, we shall take up these different lines of development one by one, it would be the greatest possible mistake to conceive of them as unconnected with one another or as succeeding each other in any strict chronological order. In the critical period of the thirteenth century, they were all closely interdependent and synchronous. The loss of the French lands, though chiefly caused by the events of the reign of Pedro II (1196-1213), was not formally legalized till the treaty of Corbeil in 1258, twenty years after the conquest of Valencia had virtually completed the reconquest of the eastern part of the peninsula. The conquest of Valencia was undertaken largely in deference to the demands of the kingdom of Aragon, which had been somewhat offended by the fact that King James had given precedence to the maritime ambitions of his favorite Catalonians, and had sent out the first expedition against the Balearics nine years before. It was only after the Conqueror's death that the Mediterranean program of the East Spanish realms began to eclipse their activities in other directions.

The story of the gain and loss of the lands north of the Pyrenees was largely determined by the fact that the Aragonese-Catalonian sovereigns, like their Castilian contemporaries to the westward, were often unable to resist the temptation to divide their inheritance by will between their different children. Though well-planned marriages, assertions of feudal suzerainty, and fortunate extinctions of collateral lines not seldom served to draw the errant portions of their extended domains together, the Aragonese sovereigns were so addicted to the practice of division that any hopes of permanently welding all their lands into a single homogeneous realm were necessarily foredoomed to failure. Ramon Berenguer III (1096-1131), who, as we have already seen, was one of the founders of the territorial greatness of Catalonia north of the Pyrenees, was also one of the most flagrant offenders in this regard. To his eldest son, Ramon Berenguer IV, the husband of Petronilla of Aragon, he left only the lands south of the mountains; the French territories, which he had labored so hard to augment, passed to a younger son, Berenguer Ramon. Fortunately, instead of flying at one another's throats in fratricidal strife according to the Castilian fashion, the two sons of Ramon Berenguer III maintained most cordial relations with one another. Nay more, when the younger was threatened in the possession of his domains in France, the elder, in alliance with the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, successfully maintained him and his heirs in the possession of their lawful inheritance. A happy result of this act of fraternal loyalty was the temporary reunion of all the territories north and south of the Pyrenees under Alfonso II, the son and heir of Ramon Berenguer IV, who possessed himself of Provence on the death without

male heirs of his cousin, the son of Berenguer Ramon, and subsequently defended himself there against the attacks of the count of Toulouse. But unfortunately the old mistake was once more repeated in the next generation, and in a manner which prepared the way for the final loss of the French holdings in the thirteenth century. Alfonso II (1162-96), who had inherited all the lands on both sides of the mountains, was also successful in increasing them. We have already seen that Roussillon and the feudal suzerainty of Nimes and the adjacent lands were acquired under his rule. To the south, also, he made notable advances against the Moors, taking from them the territories about Caspe and Albarracin, and founding the city of Teruel. In 1177, moreover, he captured Cuenca for his ally, the king of Castile, who, in gratitude for this notable service, withdrew the claim of feudal overlordship over Aragon which Castile had maintained, in theory at least, since the days of Alfonso the Emperor. But it was probably this very preoccupation about Spanish affairs that led Alfonso of Aragon to turn over the administration of Provence to his brothers Ramon Berenguer and Sancho, and finally, in 1193, to his second son, who bore his father's name. On the elder Alfonso's death in 1196, this second son inherited Provence and some of the smaller territories adjacent to it, under the feudal suzerainty of his elder brother Pedro; while the latter succeeded his father as ruler of all the Spanish lands south of the Pyrenees, together with Roussillon, and later acquired Urgel and the fief of Montpellier. But Provence had once more passed out of the direct possession of the kings of Aragon, and this time it never really returned.

The confusion and disunion which reigned in these Aragonese-Catalonian holdings north of the Pyrenees were greatly increased, at the close of the twelfth century, by the progress of the heresy of the Albigenses. Alfonso of Provence strove hard, and for a long time successfully, to prevent his lands from being involved, but numerous converts were made within the French territories of his brother and feudal suzerain Pedro of Aragon; while Raymond, count of Toulouse, who had married Pedro's sister Eleanor, was the staunch friend of the heretics from the beginning, and did his utmost to enlist the sympathies of the Aragonese monarch in their behalf. But King Pedro was still a most devoted son of the church. In November, 1204, he actually went to Rome to receive the crown of Aragon at the hands of Innocent III, declaring himself at the same time the faithful vassal of the Holy See, and even promising the payment of an annual tribute. Eight years later he played a prominent and heroic part in the battle of *Las Navas de Tolosa* against the Moors, and Innocent III doubtless felt that when the affair of the Albigenses should finally come to a head he could count on the active support of the king of Aragon. During the early years of the thirteenth century the crisis gradually approached. Despite the thunderings of St. Dominic, the heresy increased so fast as to constitute a real menace to the Church; and at last the murder of Pierre de Castelnau, the papal legate, on January 15, 1208, gave the signal for an army of crusaders to collect under the banner of Simon de Montfort, and carry flame and sword throughout the Albigensian lands. For four years more, until after the campaign of Las Navas had been concluded, Pedro abstained from taking arms, and did his best to mediate between the belligerents. But in the year 1213 his hesitations came to an end. The Moorish danger was past. The Pope had refused his offers of mediation. His subjects, who had suffered cruelly from de Montfort's armies, begged him to intervene. His brother-in-law, the count of Toulouse, came and threw himself on his protection. Honor, and loyalty to his relations and vassals, forbade him any longer to withhold his hand. First he made sure that the king of France would hold aloof. Then, after signing an offensive alliance with the counts of Foix and Toulouse, he gathered his armies and declared war on Simon de Montfort. Finally, on September 12, 1213, the rival forces met on the plain beneath the ramparts of Muret. The battle there was brief and decisive. The generalship of de Montfort and the exhortations of St. Dominic rendered the charge of the crusaders irresistible. Their victory was speedy and complete, and the body of King Pedro was found among the slain.

The results of the Albigensian crusade presaged the ruin of the power of Aragon in the south of France. The war kept on during the minority of Pedro's son James, Simon de Montfort continuing to advance until his own death in 1218. His son Amaury inherited his claims, but, being unable to substantiate them unaided, finally made them over to Louis VIII, king of France, who captured in rapid succession Avignon, Nimes, and Carcassonne (1226), and all the country up to the walls of Toulouse. By the peace of Paris in 1229, Nimes, Beziers, and Carcassonne were ceded to the French crown, without regard to the Aragonese claims of feudal suzerainty; and in the succeeding years the count of Toulouse further complicated matters by turning around on the ancient allies of his house, attacking the count of Provence, cousin and feudal vassal of the king of Aragon, and even attempting to oust the latter from the tenure of Montpellier.

By this time James the Conqueror, the son and successor of Pedro the Catholic, had reached man's estate and was firmly seated on his throne. In 1226 also St. Louis had become king of France; so that the claims of the two states were worthily represented wherever they came in conflict. Of the two monarchs James was decidedly in the less advantageous position, and his only hope of complete success lay in uniting the rival counts of Provence and Toulouse in amity with one another and in joint allegiance to himself. To this truly Herculean task he bent his efforts during the crucial year 1241, but without success. Divorce and remarriage were to be the means to the end. The count of Toulouse was to be separated from his wife in order that he might be wedded to Sancha, the third daughter of the count of Provence; it was doubtless James's ultimate intention that the issue of this union should someday marry one of his own descendants, and thus pave the way for the reunion of all the Aragonese holdings south and north of the Pyrenees. The divorce was duly secured; but the long interval which elapsed between the death of Pope Gregory IX and the election of his successor caused fatal delays in securing the dispensation for the count's second marriage, and in the meantime the lady who had been selected for him became the bride of Richard of Cornwall. With Sancha thus disposed of, the Conqueror centred his attentions on her younger sister Beatrice. It seems probable that he favored a scheme of substituting her for her sister as the bride of the count of Toulouse in the early part of 1245: but when her father died on August 19 of that year, he suddenly changed his tactics, and advanced to Aix in the hope of seizing her for himself; had he been successful in so doing, there is little doubt that he would have found means of making her his wife. But he had not a sufficient number of troops to enable him to carry out the attempt, and on January 31, 1246, he was once more forestalled by the celebration of the marriage of Beatrice to the redoubtable Charles of Anjou. With this, all hope of Aragon's retaining Provence vanished forever. All that the Conqueror could hope for hereafter was to retain the scattering bits of French territory which he continued to claim or hold farther westward, some as feudal suzerain, some as vassal, and others in full ownership.

Of these the most important and also by far the most troublesome was the county of Montpellier, which had been acquired in 1204 by the marriage of its heiress, the granddaughter of the Eastern Emperor Manuel Comnenus, to James's father, Pedro the Catholic. Its suzerainty, however, had been retained by the bishops of Maguelonne, who were almost never on good terms with the kings of Aragon and tended to support against them the counter claims of the kings of France. On the other hand, the ancient pretensions of the French monarchs south of the mountains, in the county of Barcelona or Spanish Mark, had never been entirely forgotten; and they had been recently revived, doubtless in retaliation for James's intrigues with the counts of Provence and Toulouse. There were, moreover, an enormous number of conflicting claims of a minor nature, provocative of ill will and of occasional acts of violence. Obviously, from every point of view, the time was ripe for a definite and permanent settlement of all these outstanding questions. At last, on March 14, 1258, at Tortosa, the king of Aragon appointed three commissioners to take up the whole series of problems with France, and also to arrange, if possible, a marriage between his daughter Isabella and Philip, the second son of Louis IX. These representatives



finally found the French court at Corbeil, near Paris; and there, on May 12, signed a treaty in which the king of France renounced all claim to Barcelona, Urgel, Besalti, Ampurias, Gerona, and Osona, south of the Pyrenees, and to Roussillon, Cerdagne, and the subsidiary territories of Conflans and Valespir, to the north of them; while the commissioners for the king of Aragon gave up his rights in Carcassonne, Agde, Foix, Beziers, Nimes, Albi, Redes, Narbonne, Toulouse, Millau, and Góvaudan, and all other territories north of the mountains over which he pretended to authority or jurisdiction, save Montpellier, which he retained under the suzerainty of the king of France. The marriage contract of Philip and Isabella was drawn up at the same time, and both treaties were confirmed on July 16, 1258, by James the Conqueror at Barcelona; and on the following day the king of Aragon solemnly divested himself of any last shadow of a title to the possession of the suzerainty of Provence, by making over all his claims to that territory to Margaret, the eldest daughter of the late count, who had married Louis IX.

In general the king of Aragon was undeniably the loser in this treaty. The rights to the lands south of the Pyrenees which Louis IX renounced may have been historically and theoretically valid in the eyes of a feudal lawyer, but they were for all practical purposes obsolete; while the Aragonese claims to Provence and most of the other French possessions which James the Conqueror gave up rested on far more recent and solid foundations. Geographically, however, the facts were on the whole against him, as was also his constant preoccupation with outside matters; though we may incidentally observe that his sporadic though unsuccessful efforts to acquire Navarre<sup>1</sup> may be regarded as an attempt to indemnify himself for his losses at Corbeil. On the other hand, we must remember that the Conqueror's territorial losses in France, though heavy, were as yet by no means absolutely complete. Cerdagne and Roussillon and Montpellier (the latter under French suzerainty) still remained, and, in pursuance of the ineradicable Spanish practice of dividing royal inheritances, were erected, together with the Balearic Islands, into a separate realm with the title of the kingdom of Majorca; this kingdom was conferred at the Conqueror's death on his younger son James, under the suzerainty of the latter's elder brother, the heir of Aragon. The relations of the subsidiary dynasty thus set up with the sovereigns of the older line were distinctly the reverse of cordial, and finally, in the reign of Pedro IV, gave way to open war, with the ultimate result that Cerdagne, Roussillon, and the Balearics were reunited to the Crown of Aragon, and Montpellier was sold by its despairing sovereign to the king of France. The lopping off of that rich fief, however, put a term to the losses of the Crown of Aragon north of the Pyrenees for over three centuries to come. Cerdagne and Roussillon, save for a temporary cession to France in the end of the fifteenth century, continued to remain in Spanish hands until the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659.

From the story of the loss of the Aragonese lands in France, we pass to that of the completion of the Aragonese reconquest in Spain and its results, and therewith return once more to the reign of James the Conqueror. His grandfather and father before him had set him a glorious example by their victories against the Moors; the battle of *Las Navas de Tolosa* had been fought when the Conqueror was four years old, and the story of it may well have been the delight of his childhood hours. But the memory of that great campaign served not only to recall past triumphs to the mind of the youthful king; it also spurred him on to seek new ones. Though it had been won by the united armies of Christian Spain, its fruits had been reaped almost exclusively by Castile. The eastern realms had gained much glory but little land; and James was determined to right the balance, and increase the extent of his peninsular dominions.

It was some time, however, before the young king could give his attention to foreign conquest. He had not completed his sixth year, when his father's death before the walls of Muret left him heir to a realm with sadly diminished prestige; indeed, he remained a prisoner for several

months in the hands of Simon de Montfort, before a stern mandate from Pope Innocent III procured his release. Suppression of internal rebellion occupied all his energies during the next fourteen years. Everyone seized the opportunity afforded by the weakness of the monarchy to compass his own advantage; not until the year 1228 could the young king call his throne his own. By this time his character had fully developed. Warmth and intensity of passion, both good and bad, formed its basis; restraint and self-control had no part in it at all. Waves of ferocious anger and tender pity succeeded one another like the showers and sunshine of an April day. In the heat of a terrible campaign against the Valencian Moors, when it was essential for him to be everywhere at once, he found that a swallow had made her nest by the roundel of his tent, and “so I ordered the men not to take it down till the swallow had taken flight with her young ones, as she had come trusting in my protection”. None could punish or avenge more cruelly; none, on the other hand, could be more generous or loyal to his friends. His valor in war was famous throughout Western Europe; yet he could not bear to sign a death warrant, “and when it was necessary to let justice take its course, he bewailed the heavy responsibility of being forced to cause a man to die”. He was a scandal to Christendom for his licentiousness; “but the fault seemed the less, when allowance was made for his unrivalled beauty and his noble and gentle mien, which caused all women to cast longing eyes upon him, so that his only problem was to choose between them”. His genius was preeminently military. He inherited notable ability in this respect from his maternal great-grandfather, the Emperor Manuel Comnenus, and it is as a warrior and conqueror that he won his most enduring fame; but as a statesman, administrator, and lawgiver he stood very high, while his various literary productions, as well as those of his descendants, have earned for the sovereigns of the house of Barcelona an honorable place in the history of mediaeval poetry and prose. With such energy and versatility, it was obvious, now that the factions had been dominated at home, that the new king would not long rest content without embarking on conquests abroad. The rich kingdom of Valencia still remained in Moorish hands, and offered a tempting prey. The heart of the kingdom of Aragon was set on acquiring it, and, after the conclusion of the Balearic campaign in 1229-30, James determined to concentrate his efforts on the attainment of that end.

Some preliminary measures had, in fact, already been taken. As early as 1225, three years before the flames of civil war had been entirely extinguished within the realm, a strong force had been launched against the fortress of Peñíscola, a miniature Gibraltar, some forty miles south of Tortosa. The campaign was unsuccessful; but when word came of renewed preparations in the following year, Abu Zeid, the Moorish king of Valencia, took alarm and offered to pay tribute to the extent of one fifth of his revenues as the price of peace. James gladly accepted these terms, the more so as the success of his projected campaign was, for the time being, more than dubious; but three years later, on the very eve of his departure for the conquest of Majorca, the whole affair was reopened by the dethronement of Abu Zeid, who fled to the court of Aragon to demand the Conqueror’s aid in the recovery of his realm. All that James could do for the moment was to conclude a most advantageous treaty with the Moorish sovereign, in which he promised the latter the military aid he desired in exchange for an extensive territorial compensation. Abu Zeid, however, was unable to regain his kingdom, so that in 1232, on his return from his third visit to the Balearics, the Conqueror prepared to take up the question of the Valencian campaign and press it vigorously himself. Adequate pretexts for war were not lacking. The new Valencian ruler who had displaced Abu Zeid was contemptuous and belligerent; he refused to pay all the tribute due to Aragon since James’s treaty with his predecessor, and even raided the Christian lands. Funds were granted by the Cortes of Aragon and Catalonia. Abu Zeid, going beyond the terms of the treaty of 1229, now transferred to the Conqueror all his claims to his former kingdom. A bull of Pope Gregory IX, declaring the forthcoming campaign to be a crusade, was published with due solemnity at Monzón. In January 1233, the campaign began, interest centering in the siege of the little town of Burriana on the seacoast north of Valencia. The forces engaged on both

sides were apparently very small, despite the exaggerated estimates of earlier writers, but the resistance was heroic, and the place did not fall till midsummer. In the succeeding months, most of the towns northward from Burriana to the Catalonian border, including Peñíscola, surrendered to the forces of the king of Aragon.

The years 1234 and 1235 saw a lull in the Valencian campaigns, the Conqueror's attention being chiefly occupied with his marriage with Violante of Hungary, and with disputes with the sovereigns of France, Castile, and Navarre. In 1236, however, he returned to the attack and possessed himself, after considerable resistance, of the fortress of Puig de Cibolla, twelve miles north of Valencia, and two miles from the coast, valuable as a base of operations against the Moorish capital. During the next year and a half, the king's attention was again distracted by other problems in the northern part of his dominions. The unpatriotic conduct of the Aragonese nobles, who placed the maintenance of their privileges before the welfare of the realm, gave him constant cause for alarm. In the summer of 1237, the Moorish sovereign of Valencia attacked Puig with a large force and was only with great difficulty beaten off. Finally, however, in January 1238, all other difficulties were cleared away, and the Conqueror led his armies to the southward, swearing a solemn oath not to return to Catalonia or to Aragon until Valencia was in his hands. A proposal of the Moorish sovereign to hand over a number of strongholds and to pay an annual tribute of 10,000 byzants in return for peace, elicited from James the ominous reply that 'he intended to have both the hen and the chickens'; and so deeply were the Moors impressed by the vigor of his preparations, that before the end of April the most of the country north of the Guadalaviar surrendered itself at discretion. The siege of the city of Valencia now began. At first James's army did not exceed 1500 men, but subsequent reinforcements, some of them from foreign lands, brought it up to several times that number. At one time, a fleet of twelve galleys arrived from Tunis to succor the beleaguered town, but it sailed away without accomplishing anything. The details of the siege are of the characteristic mediaeval sort. They exhibit the Conqueror's military skill, and occasionally the ferocity of his vengeance against those who resisted him. When the defenders of one of the city's towers refused to yield, the tower was set on fire and its inmates burned alive, despite subsequent offers of surrender. In September it became obvious that the town could hold out no longer, and generous terms of capitulation were finally granted by James, who permitted the inhabitants to depart with their goods, and promised them an escort as far as Cullera, some twenty-five miles to the southward. The bishops and nobles, when they learned of this arrangement, "lost color, as if someone had stabbed them to the heart", so disappointed were they at being deprived of an opportunity to enrich themselves; but the king was undeterred by their grumblings, and actually executed some of his own soldiers who dared to offer violence to the departing Moors. The surrender of Valencia virtually placed in James's hands all the towns north of the Jucar, except Denia and Cullera, which remained temporarily in Moorish control; and five years later an infidel raid into the conquered land gave him a pretext for attacking the strip of territory which lay between the Jucar and the confines of Murcia. Jativa and Biar alone offered effective resistance, but the first surrendered in June, 1244, and the second in February, 1245; and with the expulsion of the Moorish king from Cullera and his voluntary surrender of Denia the triumph of the Conqueror was complete. His difficulties had not been lessened during the campaign by the fact that representatives of his future son-in-law, Alfonso the Infante of Castile, constantly hovered around with the obvious intention of picking up whatever territories they could for their master—a performance which the entirely indefinite state of the boundaries rendered less difficult than might have been supposed. Though furious at this invasion of his rights, the Conqueror saw that he could not afford, at that moment, to quarrel with Alfonso; and in March, 1244, a temporary arrangement for the division of the disputed territories was made between the two realms. The line then adopted, however, was soon destined to be rectified to the advantage of the king of Aragon, as the sequel will show.

During the next eighteen years James was so busy with other cares that he did not push his conquests against the Moors any further in the Iberian Peninsula. In 1263, however, a fresh opportunity came, when the Moorish ruler of the province of Murcia, who had been suffered by his Castilian conquerors to remain and to retain some measure of autonomy, was incited by the Emir of Granada to break out in revolt. Alfonso X had, as usual, far too many irons in the fire himself to undertake the task of quelling the insurrection; he therefore sent his wife to beg aid of his father-in-law, who with wise generosity determined, against the advice of his counsellors, not to refuse it; for “if the king of Castile happen to lose his land”, he shrewdly remarked, “I shall hardly be safe in mine”. An exhortation from Pope Clement IV contributed to whet his crusading ardor; and in 1265 the Conqueror invaded Murcia. Until he sat down before the capital of the realm in 1266, his advance was little more than a triumphal procession. Most of the towns gave up without striking a blow, though the surrender of Elche had to be accelerated by a brief interview with one of its notables, during which James seized the opportunity to drop “into the sleeve of his gown 300 byzants”, at which “he was delighted, and promised on his Law that he would do all he could for my advantage.” A month’s siege was necessary before the city of Murcia would consent to treat, but in February, 1266, it bowed to the inevitable, and with its fall the resistance of the surrounding country was at an end. When James returned to Valencia in the following April, he left 10,000 men behind him to prevent a recurrence of the revolt. A number of Catalans, moreover, were subsequently transplanted to Murcia and settled there, and lands were freely distributed to some of the Aragonese nobles who had aided in the conquest. The possession of the entire territory, however, was definitely given over by the Conqueror to Castile, in loyal fulfilment of his plighted word; and Alfonso the Learned lost no time in formally incorporating it in his own dominions. The boundary between it and the Aragonese kingdom of Valencia remained in doubt until the year 1304, when it was finally drawn under Portuguese arbitration, as we have already seen, considerably to the south of the line fixed by James and Alfonso in 1244? The resulting enlargement of the lands of the king of Aragon may be fairly regarded as a recognition of the fact that James had done the lion’s share of the work of subjugating the Murcian realm and deserved some territorial reward an important turning point in the history of the realms of the Crown of Aragon. From henceforth they were no longer contiguous at any point to land held by the infidel; and this fact exercised an important influence on the development of their national ambitions and ideals. On the one hand, it naturally caused them to lose interest in the great task of expelling the Moors from the peninsula, because they could no longer hope to reap any territorial reward from its accomplishment. When Granada should fall, Castile, which completely encircled it on the land side, would obviously be the sole beneficiary; the western kingdom, therefore, now became more than ever the land of the Reconquest *par excellence*. But there were other sides to the picture as well. If Granada was ‘a hope for Castile’, whose capture would bring a great reward, it was also, until that capture should be effected, very much of a thorn in her side. Aragon had no such thorn, and could, therefore, concentrate freely on other things—especially on her career of maritime expansion to the eastward—in a way that was impossible for her western neighbor. Moreover, in that career of expansion and in other matters, she needed no longer to feel herself burdened, as Castile, in theory if not in practice, still was, by the weight of mediaeval crusading traditions. She was comparatively free to deal with the Moorish states of Granada and North Africa on the same basis as she would with any foreign land—to make commercial treaties and traffic with them, to forget that they were the ‘hereditary foe’. What she lost in possibilities of territorial aggrandizement within the peninsula, Aragon more than regained by increased freedom of action outside of it. All these different considerations go far towards explaining the wide divergence between the paths travelled by the eastern and western portions of Spain during the period previous to their union.

The points that have been made in the preceding paragraph are well illustrated by the story of the relations of Aragon to Granada and the Moorish states of North Africa during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Towards Granada her attitude was primarily determined by the ebbs and flows of her policy in regard to Castile and Morocco. It was during the reign of James II (1291—1327), who made more treaties with Moorish rulers and enjoyed greater prestige in the Moslem world than any other sovereign of his house, that the two realms came into closest contact. James had inherited from his two predecessors a tradition of friendship rather than of hostility to the Moorish realm; and he continued it by signing, on May 16, 1296, a treaty with the Granadan sovereign which may be regarded as the norm for subsequent agreements between the two states. It provided for the protection in each of the subjects of the other and declared that each would remain neutral in case the other were attacked by a third party. Obviously, the king of Aragon desired to guard against the hostility of Granada in case his smoldering disputes with the king of Castile should burst into flame; and the state of his relations with the king of Morocco also dictated the advisability of preserving friendship with the latter's coreligionist across the Strait. But a few years later all was changed. A new king, Mohammed III, ascended the throne of Granada in 1302, and, reversing the policy of his predecessor, crossed over and seized Ceuta from the Merinites; while, two years later, the settlement of the Murcian boundary removed all cause of hostility between Aragon and Castile. The natural result of these developments was that the king of Aragon made common cause with the king of Morocco against Granada, and sent him a fleet, with the aid of which he was able to expel the latter from Ceuta; then, joining forces with the king of Castile, the Aragonese monarch attacked the Emir of Granada in his own dominions. But the results of the campaign were disappointing. The capture of the town of Almeria had been assigned as his share to James of Aragon, but though he remained four months and three days before the town, and won a notable battle outside its walls, he was unable to take it. The siege was raised on January 26, 1310, and though peace was not finally made between the two states until thirteen years later, James's failure before Almeria may justly be said to mark the last appearance of Aragon as a 'reconquering power'. Thenceforth her relations to Granada were determined solely by the political exigencies of the moment. They varied almost from year to year, but it is not worthwhile to follow them in detail. That they were preponderantly friendly was due chiefly to the fact that Aragon was so often in difficulties with Castile that she could not afford to neglect any obvious opportunity to make trouble for her; and the desire of Aragon to maintain mercantile relations with Morocco also doubtless contributed to the same result. The only notable deviation from this policy occurred in 1340, when Aragon made common cause with Castile to repel the last great Moorish invasion from across the Strait, which was supported by the Granadan king. The fate of that expedition has already been recounted. It only remains to observe that the king of Aragon hastened to make peace with both Morocco and Granada at the earliest opportunity, in 1345, leaving Alfonso XI of Castile to conduct alone his final campaign against the infidel.

If Aragon, in this period, was far less deeply involved with Granada than was Castile, she was much more intimately concerned than was her western neighbor with the Moorish states of North Africa. Castile, as we have already seen, was frequently brought into contact with the Merinite rulers of Morocco through her bickerings with the Emirs of Granada; and the North African lands to the west of the Muluya River were specifically assigned to her as a field for conquest under an arrangement between Sancho IV and James II of Aragon in 1291. But at the same time that she obtained recognition of the priority of her own rights in the territories to the west of the Muluya, Castile conceded to Aragon the same privileges in those to the east of it; and the majority of the Aragonese sovereigns strove their hardest to make the most of them. They aspired to commercial predominance in all the North African ports; and, except in Morocco, where Castile had forestalled them, they also cherished the ambition to demonstrate their military and political superiority over the different Moorish rulers, and whenever possible to



collect tributes in token of it. Their political dealings with Tlemcen, Tunis, and the occasionally independent state of Bugia form a significant if subsidiary chapter in the history of their foreign policy; while their commercial activities in these states, and also in Morocco, give us an admirable illustration of their keen interest in economic advancement.

Before entering upon the story of Aragon's relations with each one of these different realms, it is worth noting, as a striking evidence of the complete extinction of the ancient religious animosities between them, that large numbers of Aragonese and Catalonian mercenaries were enrolled during this period in the armies of the various emirs. The king of Morocco had at one time as many as ten to twelve thousand Christian soldiers in his service, while the rulers of Tunis and Tlemcen each maintained a force of two to three thousand. And it must not be supposed that the men who composed these levies were all, or even chiefly, renegades. Their recruitment and employment by their Moorish masters were specifically approved by various Christian kings, and even by the Popes. Pedro III of Aragon set the example by a treaty with the king of Tunis on June 12, 1285. The practice spread rapidly to Italy, France, Germany, and even England. Castilians also occasionally enrolled themselves among these foreign mercenaries, but the majority of them invariably came from the East Spanish realms. They almost always retained their own banners while on service in the North African forces; they were also usually subject to recall at the will of their lawful sovereigns; but they were highly esteemed and eagerly sought for by the Moorish rulers, who generally used them as a sort of rampart to give solidity to their more lightly armed and mobile native troops. There were also considerable numbers of Berber soldiers serving at various periods, and on a more informal basis, in the armies of the Christian kings of Spain; they were, for the most part, cavalry, and were used for scouting duty and for sudden raids.

Coming now to the relations of Aragon with the individual North African states, we find that in Morocco, where the interests of Castile were recognized as paramount, the story is principally economic. In the early years of the thirteenth century Catalan merchants were established at the town of Ceuta, and in 1227 James the Conqueror, jealous of the competition of the Genoese, put forth an ordinance providing that no merchandise of Aragonese origin should be borne to that port in foreign vessels as long as national ones were available for the purpose. In 1274 the Merinite sovereign successfully appealed to the king of Aragon for military aid in suppressing a revolt of the inhabitants of the town; and in 1309 another Aragonese army earned his gratitude by expelling from Ceuta the troops of the king of Granada, who had seized it seven years before. During the next three decades there was a violent reaction, owing to the fears awakened by the sudden increase of the power of the Merinites, which gave them temporary preponderance over the other North African states, and finally led to the last great Moorish invasion of Spain in 1340. But as soon as that danger was past, the kings of Aragon made haste to return to the policy of their predecessors. In 1345 Pedro the Ceremonious formally renewed friendly relations with the Moroccan ruler, and twelve years later concluded with him a most complete and inclusive treaty, political and commercial, against their common enemy, Pedro of Castile. In this case there is no evidence of any effort to assert any kind of political superiority. Peace, in order to facilitate commerce, was the main object on both sides, and was thenceforth for the most part preserved.


With regard to the kingdoms of Tlemcen and Bugia, on the other hand, there is a different tale to tell. Lying east of the River Muluya, they fell within the Aragonese sphere of influence; smaller and weaker than their neighbors, and perpetually at odds with one another, they offered a much more favorable opportunity for the exercise of some measure of political domination. During the reign of James II (1291-1327), who took the liveliest interest in North African affairs, vigorous efforts were made to obtain specific acknowledgement of overlordship from the kings of both these realms; and if no formal or explicit recognition of vassalage was ever received, a certain amount of tribute of an irregular sort was unquestionably collected. James utilized every chance to play off Bugia against Tlemcen, and vice versa; his warships were constantly present in

the ports of both nations and exercised no inconsiderable influence on the ebbs and flows of their rival powers. All these efforts to attain political dominance could not fail to react unfavorably on the commercial activities of Aragon in this part of North Africa. The economic side falls distinctly into the background here; though this is partly explained by the fact that the trade of Tlemcen and of Bugia was less valuable than that of their neighbors.

In Tunis, as in Tlemcen and in Bugia, we find a conflict between the political and the commercial objects of the Aragonese monarchs, in which the former, at least during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, remain distinctly to the fore. As that side of the story, however, is much more intimately bound up with the Aragonese power in Sicily than in Spain, it may be most conveniently reserved for consideration in that connection. But the economic relations of the two states were also of considerable importance. Tunis was unquestionably the chief center of European trade in North Africa, and regular Aragonese factories and consulates were set up there during the reign of James the Conqueror. Vigorous competition not unnaturally ensued with the Genoese, Florentines, Venetians, and other Italian powers who were already on the ground; but the Aragonese were generally able to hold their own? During its brief period of separate existence, moreover, the kingdom of Majorca possessed its own factories and officials in Tunis, and also in Tripoli and Alexandria. It signed commercial treaties with the Moorish kings and threatened to enter upon a really serious rivalry with its parent realm. There was an elaborate set of duties and tariffs on this thriving trade; but in return the European merchants were most effectively protected against fraud or maltreatment in the North African ports. Most of the custom houses there employed a Christian scribe, selected by the European residents; moreover, the chief Moorish officials, who were invariably men of rank and importance, often performed the functions of consuls, and acted as guardians and protectors of resident and transient Christians in all their dealings with the native inhabitants. Much of this admirable organization was directly traceable to the needs and demands of the merchants of the Aragonese realms, whose preeminence among the various foreign traders in the North African ports was unquestioned for a brief period during the first half of the fifteenth century.

In dealing with the various North African activities of Aragon, we have used that name in its larger sense, as the sole convenient means of designating all the three realms which were ruled by the Aragonese kings; strictly, it would have been much more accurate if we had spoken instead of Catalonia. For Aragon, in the more limited meaning of the word, had little or no interest in such distant things. It was at Barcelona that all the foreign and naval activity of the realm, both political and commercial, was centered; it was the Catalans who built the ships and manned them; it was the Catalans who cherished visions of expansion and a maritime career. When, therefore, just after the middle of the fifteenth century, the county was paralyzed by internal revolt and civil war, their effects were promptly felt in North Africa. After a period of unexampled strength and prosperity, the commercial relations of the East Spanish kingdoms with the Moorish states began rapidly to dwindle and decay; and before any real recovery could take place, the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella united the crowns of Aragon and Castile, and altered the whole course of the development of the Iberian realms. North African projects were by no means abandoned in the succeeding age, but they were pursued under different auspices, with changing methods and divided aims, and they were subordinated, even more completely than before, to the prosecution of other schemes. One of the most logical and hopeful paths of Iberian development was gradually suffered to fall into desuetude, owing chiefly to the multitude of new interests which presented themselves in the age of Ferdinand and Isabella and the Hapsburgs.

CHAPTER VII  
THE FIRST CONQUESTS OVERSEAS



In the subsidiary phases of the external history of the Crown of Aragon during the later Middle we turn for the next three chapters to the study of conquests in the Mediterranean. This remarkable of territorial expansion deserves the most prominent in the mediaeval portion of any history of the Spanish realm. It laid the foundations for Spain's preeminence during the sixteenth century. It directed her aspirations to the eastward before the discovery of America diverted them to the west. It made the conquest of the Canaries by Castile seem almost insignificant, must we forget that the glory of taking the lead in this outburst of maritime and territorial expansion in Mediterranean—even more than in the contemporaneous activities of the realms of the Crown of Aragon in North Africa—is essentially the glory of Catalonia. Not only was through Catalan energy and valor that the necessary expeditions were made possible and the majority of land and battles fought; it was in deference to Catalan traditions that the movement was first begun. In the early twelfth century, as we have already seen, the Catalans had made joint attacks with the Pisans on the Moors of Majorca and Ivisa; and from that time onward they never ceased to cherish the ambition to repeat the experiment on a larger scale. The Balearics had formed a part of Spain under the Carthaginians, the Romans, and possibly under the Visigoths: their reconquest for Christendom was, therefore, quite as obvious a duty as that of Valencia; for the Catalans, indeed, there was no question that it should have precedence. James the Conqueror shared their feelings, and his determination was further strengthened by the fact that his Catalan subjects had given him far less trouble than the Aragonese during the stormy years of his minority. To reward them, he initiated his reign with the expedition in which they were preeminently interested: if the Aragonese supported the Balearic campaign at all, they did so as the king's feudatories and not by national sanction.

The Almohades had taken the Balearics from the Almoravides in the year 1203; and though they had been unable after Las Navas to retain complete control of them, they maintained in the islands a pirates' nest which menaced the commerce of the entire western Mediterranean. The seizure of two ships of Barcelona had evoked from James the Conqueror a demand for reparation, and when the ruler scoffingly inquired, "Who is the king who makes this request?" he promptly received the minatory reply, "The son of that king of Aragon who won the battle of Las Navas". When the subject of an attack on the Balearics was broached at a meeting of the Catalan Cortes in December 1228, the three estates responded with enthusiasm; and though the Aragonese held back, and urged the superior advisability of an expedition against Valencia, King James pushed forward his preparations vigorously in the early months of 1229. Realizing the importance of clothing the enterprise of which he was to reap the benefit in the panoply of a crusade, the king received the Cross with his followers at the hands of the papal legate; and on September 5, 1229, they set sail from the harbor of Salou with 155 ships, including those contributed by Genoa, Provence, Marseilles, and Narbonne, carrying probably some 15,000 foot and 1500 horse.

The expedition arrived in the nick of time, for the Moorish king, Abu Yahya, had not yet received the reinforcements which he had solicited from North Africa, and he was also threatened by rebellion at home. Nevertheless, the Balearic sovereign was able to prevent the Christians from landing at Palomera near the western extremity of Majorca, where they first cast anchor. A hot race for the harbor of Santa Ponza then ensued; but King James, with a detachment of his swiftest ships, outstripped the Moors on shore who attempted to head him off, so that he was able to land his men in spite of some resistance from the advance guard of the Saracens. The young king slew four or five of his enemies with his own hand and was gently rebuked by his followers for his rashness. On Wednesday, September 12, a pitched battle was fought, in which the Moors were finally forced to abandon a strong position on an eminence above Santa Ponza. The victory, however, was dearly bought by the death of James's trusted friends and counsellors, Ramon and Guillen Moncada, whose loss drew from the Conqueror a flood of tears. Meantime the other



ships had brought up the rest of the troops, and the reunited Christian forces advanced to the attack of the city of Palma. For three and a half months the siege continued. All the regular mediaeval engines for attack and defense were employed—mines and countermines, windlasses and catapults, mantlets and trebuchets. At one time a Moorish detachment on the hillside above the Christian camp cut off the stream that supplied it; but the hostile party was eventually dislodged and captured, and the head of its leader was slung over the walls of the town. On a later occasion fortune unexpectedly came to the rescue of the Christians, when a disloyal Moorish chieftain brought them an “angel’s present” of supplies. Twice did the besieged attempt to buy off the besiegers, but in vain; a savage lust for slaughter animated the army of the Conqueror, who finally, on December 31, marshalled all his forces for a grand assault. After a violent struggle the Moors gave way. Their king was found hiding in a house and was made prisoner. A ruthless butchery of the inhabitants ensued; though it would be foolish to accept literally the figures of the contemporary chroniclers, there can be no doubt that the horrors of the surrender were unusual even for that barbaric age. Indiscriminate looting followed; and afterwards there was an auction of the prisoners and booty taken, at which everyone bought but refused to pay for his purchases. Discontent and quarrelling were the natural result, until James interfered: “I will first hang so many of you in the streets”, he threatened the rioters, “that the town will stink of them”. A systematic pursuit of the Moors in the mountain country now began. The enemy took refuge in huts and caves hewn out of the face of a high cliff; from these they were finally expelled by a Christian soldier who was lowered on a rope over the face of the rock, with fire brands which he hurled among the foe; “and I was very glad,” as the Conqueror naively records, “to see the fire as I was eating.”

The Moors now began to surrender in large numbers. The conquered land was divided into allotments between the king and his nobles; and after the arrival of reinforcements sufficient to remove all chance of any hostile outbreak, the Conqueror returned to Spain in the end of October, 1230, after an absence of nearly fourteen months. A rumor that the Hafside king of Tunis was preparing a fleet for the recovery of Majorca caused him to revisit the island in 1231. The alarm proved false, but James persisted with his expedition, and gained the submission of a number of the mountain Moors. In the following year the Conqueror returned to the island for the third time to receive the surrender of the last bands of his enemies; by the use of an ingenious stratagem, he also secured the recognition of his overlordship by the king of Minorca on this occasion. More than three hundred bonfires were lighted at Cape Pera on the Majorcan shore, and the Minorcan ruler was thus led to believe that a mighty host was preparing to attack him, whereas in reality, as James assures us, “I had with me only six knights, four horses, one shield, five esquires to attend on my person, ten servants and some scouts.” In 1235 the Sacristan of Gerona, who was primate elect, aided by the Infante of Portugal and other knights, took possession of Iviza and Formentera (the latter of which was uninhabited), and the reconquest of the islands was therewith complete.

Most of the Moors who had offered to surrender in Majorca were made slaves and distributed among the various estates into which the island had been divided. Colonists from the seaboard cities of Catalonia and also from Marseilles were imported in great numbers, and freedom from customs duties was granted alike to all classes of the inhabitants, so that the population of Palma became “the most honorable and cultured in the world”, and “its liberties and franchises superior to those of any other city.” In Minorca, on the other hand, where there had been no conquest but merely a recognition of overlordship, the Moorish inhabitants were left practically undisturbed in the enjoyment of autonomy and independence, save for the payment of an annual tribute to the king as feudal suzerain, and the cession of the town of Ciudadela and all the forts of the island. The results of this liberal treatment were, however, apparently unfortunate; for Minorca revolted against the Aragonese domination in the succeeding reign and had to be reconquered afresh by Alfonso III.



Though virtually completed so early in his career, the capture of the Balearics was the last great venture overseas which was undertaken by James the Conqueror. During the remaining forty years of his life, his attention was constantly distracted from the work of maritime expansion, which was nearest his heart, by the pressure of other and less welcome cares. Still, it is as a conqueror and a crusader that the great king deserves chiefly to be remembered, for to the day of his death his mind was filled with schemes for different expeditions beyond the boundaries of his realm. A project for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre was entertained in 1260, and the king actually set sail, only to be driven back by a storm. Again, in 1268-69, invitations from the Khan of Tartary and from the Emperor Michael Palaeologus urged him for a last time to the East: again he embarked, and again a gale forced him back into the port of Aigues Mortes, so that he finally returned to Aragon. "It seems to me", so he said to his knights, "that it is not our Lord's will that we should go beyond sea, as once before when we had prepared". Events which paved the way for the Aragonese acquisition of Sicily and southern Italy in the succeeding reigns took place during his lifetime, but the Conqueror did not live to see the results of them. In 1276 he died at Valencia, worn out by his ceaseless activities, in the sixty-ninth year of his life and the sixty-fourth of his reign—a great hero of the Reconquest, and one of the principal founders of the Spanish Empire. But so deeply was this mighty monarch imbued with the separatistic traditions of his native land, that he endangered the fabric that he had reared with so much difficulty by dividing his realms at his death. By his first wife Eleanor, daughter of Alfonso VIII of Castile, he had a son, Alfonso; by his second, Violante of Hungary, four sons and six daughters; he also had several bastards by various mistresses. Beginning in the year 1229, he had made a number of different wills disposing of his inheritance, dividing it and subdividing it as the number of his children increased. By his testament of 1250, his dominions were actually parceled out among all five of his legitimate male heirs. Of these five, however, Ferdinand, a younger son of Violante, died in 1251, and Alfonso, the son of Eleanor, in 1260; while another, Sancho, who had entered the church, became archbishop of Toledo in 1268. With the number of his male heirs reduced to two, James, in 1270, made his last will and testament, by which Pedro, the eldest son of Violante, was declared his successor in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia; while James, his younger brother, was assigned the Balearics and the lands north of the Pyrenees which had remained to the Conqueror after the treaty of Corbeil. The unhappy result of this unwise division of the Aragonese inheritance was corrected in the succeeding century, when the Majorcan realm was reincorporated with the rest of the kingdom; but the bad example was followed by James's successors in the disposition of the later Italian conquests, to the grave prejudice of the unity of the Aragonese empire.

The importance of the long reign of James the Conqueror, both in the internal and the foreign history of his native land, is equaled if not exceeded by that of the brief rule of his elder son and successor, Pedro, who amply deserves the appellation of the Great. At home, the constitutional struggle which accompanied and profoundly influenced the course of external affairs reached its climax; while abroad, the mounting energies of Pedro's subjects were given a new direction by the acquisition of Sicily. To the origin and early phases of this great drama of foreign conquest we now turn. It irrevocably committed the realms of the Crown of Aragon to the career of territorial expansion in the Mediterranean on which they had been already launched. It ultimately paved the way for that long struggle between the royal houses of France and Spain, around which the whole development of the Spanish Empire.

The source of the Aragonese claims to Sicily and southern Italy lies in Pedro's marriage on June 13, 1262, to Constance, daughter of the Hohenstaufen Manfred, and granddaughter of the Emperor Frederick II. On the Hohenstaufen side the match was arranged primarily as a means of support against the hostility of the Holy See, possibly also against the imperial ambitions of

Alfonso the Learned of Castile. For Aragon, it offered far reaching visions of external conquest, the more welcome because of the recent defeat at Corbeil of James the Conqueror's plans of expansion in southern France. Against the allies was arrayed the might of the papacy and Charles of Anjou, who came and slew Manfred at Benevento in 1266, and received the kingdom of Sicily as a fief of the Holy See. Two years later, Manfred's nephew Conradin, last scion of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, was defeated by the terrible Angevin at Tagliacozzo, and soon after suffered a traitor's death, with heroic fortitude, on a scaffold overlooking the bay of Naples. Tradition tells us that, before he bowed his head to the executioner's axe, the youthful victim took off his glove and tossed it down to the crowd below, where it was picked up and carried overseas by an Aragonese knight and delivered to Conradin's cousin, the Lady Constance. It was a royal gage that cried for vengeance, but James's hands were tied by the recent treaties with Louis of France, and by his fears of the hostility of Castile and of internal rebellion. Not until the Conqueror had been six years in his grave was Conradin's death avenged.

Meantime the kingdom of Sicily groaned under the cruel and oppressive rule of its new sovereign. The rights and privileges of the inhabitants were consistently ignored. Frenchmen were preferred for almost every office. Complaints were answered by barbarous executions. Charles cared little or nothing for the wishes of the people over whom he ruled. His entire attention was centered on conquests in the eastern Mediterranean, and he regarded his Sicilian realm chiefly as a means to provide funds for that end. Only from Aragon could the oppressed inhabitants have any hope of redress. While James the Conqueror was still alive, John of Procida, the friend and counsellor of the last of the Hohenstaufens, arrived at the Aragonese court, and begged for aid; together with Roger de Lauria, foster brother of the Princess Constance, he besought the heir to the throne to devote himself to the recovery of his wife's inheritance. The result of these efforts was plainly evident when Pedro succeeded his father in July, 1276. The young sovereign burned to distinguish himself in the field of foreign conquest. For a long time he had been obliged to restrain his martial ardor in deference to the cautious policy of the Conqueror's later years; now, at last, his chance had come. But first it was essential to make sure of the attitude of Castile and of France. In the former kingdom the struggle between Alfonso the Learned and Sancho the Bravo was reaching its height, and in January, 1278, Pedro took the decisive step of seizing and imprisoning the Infantes de la Cerda, thus putting himself in possession of hostages for the friendship of both factions in the western realm and also for that of Philip of France. Protracted negotiations with all three parties followed: the Aragonese king utilizing his advantage to the utmost, alternately betraying Alfonso and Sancho into advantageous territorial concessions, and hoodwinking Philip III. Treaties were made with the king of Portugal and with Edward I of England, whose daughter Eleanor was subsequently betrothed to Pedro's son and heir, Alfonso. An alliance was also concluded, through the instrumentality of John of Procida, with the Eastern Emperor Michael Palaeologus, who was threatened by the projects of Charles of Anjou.<sup>1</sup> Meantime Pedro used all possible efforts to provide himself with an adequate fleet, men, and armaments. He was resolved no longer to be dependent on aid from Genoa and Pisa, as his predecessors had been whenever they undertook a naval campaign in the Mediterranean. At all the ports in his realm there was feverish activity and excitement. At Collioure the blacksmiths forged nothing but anchors; ships were constructed in all the coast towns as far south as Valencia. Even the inland cities occupied themselves with the manufacture of arms and munitions of war; provisions were plentifully supplied by the country districts; all parts of the king's dominions seemed anxious to do their share.

Pedro's subjects, however, were not enlightened as to the true object of all these preparations; for the king had spread it abroad that he intended to use them for a campaign against the Moors. It is not difficult to discern the policy that lay behind this announcement. War against the infidel was sanctioned by the most ancient of national traditions. Enthusiasm for fighting on purely

religious grounds was doubtless practically dead, but interest in possibilities of territorial and commercial conquest at the expense of the Moslem ran higher than ever and would unquestionably evoke far more unanimous support from Pedro's subjects than an expedition against a protégé of the church. Moreover, the particularistic Aragonese, cut off from the sea and intensely jealous of the Catalans, might very likely have opposed a plan for the conquest of Sicily, which, if successful at all, would inevitably redound chiefly to the advantage of their maritime neighbors; of a crusade, however, even though they might not be precisely informed of its destination, they would find it almost impossible to complain. Most important of all would be the effect of King Pedro's announcement upon Pope Martin IV, a Frenchman through and through, and the servile instrument of his terrible Sicilian vassal. However great his hostility to the king of Aragon, the head of the church could scarcely refuse to approve of his plan for attacking the infidel. He doubtless guessed what Pedro's real objective was, and it is significant that he forbade him to appropriate the tithes of the province of Tarragona for the purposes of the holy war. Nevertheless, the king of Aragon had publicly proclaimed his zeal for the welfare of the Church of Christ in a way that could not easily be forgotten and would stand him in good stead when the moment for his attack on the kingdom of Sicily should finally arrive.

It will readily be conceived that Pedro of Aragon was not the man to announce his intention of going on a crusade without being able to carry out the pretense in deeds as well. Fortunately for his purposes, the situation in one of the Moorish kingdoms of North Africa was such as afforded him an admirable opportunity to do this, and at the same time to realize his original plan for the conquest of Sicily. From at least as early as the year 1180, the Moslem rulers of Tunis had maintained good relations with the Norman and Hohenstaufen sovereigns of the court of Palermo, and had paid them, with some measure of regularity, a small annual tribute, as a guarantee of immunity from attacks by Sicilian pirates and of access to Sicilian ports for the purpose of buying grain. But when Charles of Anjou was invested with the Sicilian crown in 1266, the Hafside sultan across the sea refused to recognize him as the rightful heir of his Hohenstaufen predecessors. The tribute ceased, and hostilities threatened to break forth. Tunis became a place of refuge for the Angevin's enemies, and it was largely Charles's cries for revenge that led his brother, Louis IX, to divert the crusade which he was preparing for the Holy Land into an expedition against the North African port. But the followers of the French king found the Saracen ruler admirably prepared for resistance and ably supported by the Christian enemies of Charles of Anjou; a pestilence decimated their ranks and finally carried off their royal leader. They therefore determined to treat for peace and secured it on terms notable for the advantages which they granted to the king of Sicily, whose enemies were ordered out of Tunis, while the arrears of the tribute, which had not been paid since 1265, were fully made up, and the amount of it doubled for the future. The whole course of events, however, had been carefully noted by Pedro of Aragon and its lesson taken to heart. Long before the death of his father, he had cherished plans for the conquest of Sicily; and in Tunis he saw numerous possibilities for a vantage ground from which to launch an attack whenever the time should be ripe. His father had carefully cultivated friendly relations with the Hafside sultans; from the time of his accession he himself had interfered, whenever possible, in Tunisian affairs; in fact he received a considerable annual pension from the Tunisian ruler as a reward for his surveillance of the latter's rebel brother, who had taken refuge at his court. After the death of El Mostancer (1277), Pedro reversed his policy, and supported the brother against the legitimate heir, who had refused to continue the pension which had been paid by his father; and later still (1281), when the brother made a similar error, the king of Aragon took sides against him with Abu Bekr, the governor of Constantine, who desired to win independence of Tunisian control. Various advantageous concessions were gained by Pedro in return for this alliance. He was thus enabled to get his fleet and his army into convenient proximity to his real objective, Sicily; and, at the same time, to appear to redeem his

pledge to undertake a crusade. In fact it may well have been the situation in Tunis that suggested the announcement which so well suited his plans in other ways.

A diligent German scholar has conclusively shown that the old idea that Pedro of Aragon bore a part in the conspiracy leading up to the famous massacre of the Sicilian Vespers, which began in Palermo on March 30, 1282, is no longer tenable. News of the massacre reached him in Valencia probably about April 20, and was almost certainly unwelcome, because the rebels at the outset put themselves under the protection of the Holy See, thus threatening to render doubly difficult a conquest by the king of Aragon. Pedro had, however, by this time gone too far to draw back; and he fully realized the advantages of a foothold in Tunis for the purpose of negotiating with the insurgents. In early June of 1282, therefore, he set sail with a considerable force, which was apparently in ignorance of its destination, and landed on the twenty-eighth of the month at Collo on the North African coast. On his arrival he found that his protégé, Abu Bekr, the governor of Constantine, had already been defeated. A few encounters with the Saracens sufficed to save his reputation as a crusader and to keep his army in fighting trim; but his attention was chiefly directed towards Sicily and her affairs. Negotiations with the rebels there began at once; the conditions under which the Aragonese monarch should govern the realm were discussed at length; in early August, at Palermo, the Sicilians definitely decided to summon Pedro to be their king. Four knights and four burgesses were sent across to the Aragonese ruler, to tell of the woes they had suffered under Angevin rule and to beg him to hasten to their rescue. The envoys, clad in deep mourning, were conveyed in ships with black banners and black sails. After hearing their story, Pedro hesitated no longer. He utilized the Pope's refusal of help for his crusade to persuade some of the more reluctant of his followers that he was justified in accepting the proffered throne. In late August he left the North African coast. On the thirty-first he arrived at Trapani. On September 4 he was welcomed at Palermo by the enthusiastic plaudits of the rejoicing populace, assumed the crown of Sicily in the cathedral there, and sent a formal defiance to Charles of Anjou, who was already besieging Messina. An insolent reply caused Pedro to make ready for battle, and the Sicilians, seeing his preparations, asked what he intended to do. "I go", said the Aragonese monarch, "to attack King Charles". "In the name of God", replied the Sicilians, "take us with you and do not leave us behind".

A detachment of 2000 light-armed troops was sent on in advance to prevent the fall of Messina before the king's arrival. They slipped through the besieging forces of Charles of Anjou by night, and subsequently made a sortie which wrought havoc among their foes, so that the Messinians, who had been at first unfavorably impressed by their beggarly equipment, took courage and prepared to resist to the last. The time of their deliverance, however, was now at hand. The king of Aragon came on from Palermo with all his available troops. Every male Sicilian between the ages of fifteen and sixty had been summoned to join him; while the Aragonese fleet advanced along the coast, ably led by the gallant Roger de Lauria, "the most illustrious of those great seamen whom Pedro had attracted to his service by permitting them to enjoy at once the authority of an admiral, and the liberty of a corsair". Their united forces were plainly irresistible, and Charles of Anjou did not await their onslaught, but transferred himself with as many of his followers as possible to Reggio on the mainland. Those that were left behind, together with an enormous quantity of provisions and booty, fell into the hands of Pedro's army; and "so great", says Muntaner, "was the loot, that Messina became rich for evermore, and florins were as plentiful as coppers". The Aragonese fleet was meantime sent in chase of the Angevin ships in the strait; they were but twenty-two against one hundred and fifty, if the figures of the contemporary chroniclers are to be believed, but they won a glorious victory and captured forty-five of the foe. Apparently the Messinians could not believe their eyes when they saw the returning vessels, and thought, at first, that Charles was coming back with reinforcements to take a terrible revenge. But for the moment at least the Angevin was reduced to impotence. From the

shores of Calabria he had witnessed his rival's triumph without being able to lift a finger to prevent it; in fact some of Pedro's forces even succeeded in crossing the strait and sacking Nicotera, almost under his very eyes. Charles, however, was by no means at the end of his expedients. Defeated in open war, he determined to try his fortune in other fields, and as a preliminary sent a challenge to his rival to meet him, each with a hundred knights, in a battle *d'outrance*, in closed lists at Bordeaux on English ground, June 1, 1383—the issue of the combat to determine the fate of Sicily. Pedro, though by no means blind to the advantageous position he had already won, was chivalrous enough to accept; and the two rivals, leaving their sons to represent them in Sicily and Italy during their absence, departed for their respective countries to prepare for the coming encounter.

It is more than doubtful whether either of them had ever taken it seriously or thought that there was any likelihood of its actually occurring. For Charles of Anjou it was probably but a pretext to enable him to gain papal aid, and possibly to obtain possession of the person of his rival; and it was not long before Pedro was informed of the Angevin's plots. On his way back to France, Charles passed through Rome and obtained the support of Pope Martin IV, whom he persuaded to forbid the combat at Bordeaux, to declare that Pedro had forfeited his dominions as penalty for his interference in Sicily, to preach a crusade against him as the enemy of the church, and to place his realms under an interdict. It was, in a sense, the age-long struggle between the empire and the papacy that threatened to break forth afresh. The mantle of the Hohenstaufen had fallen on the shoulders of the king of Aragon, whose offence was doubtless aggravated by the memory of the way in which his grandfather—another Pedro—had championed the cause of heresy against the church. Clearly, Rome could not rest quiet till the dynasty was brought to its knees. Charles of Anjou was to be used as the chief instrument for the attainment of that end and could rely at the outset on the support of Philip of France, who longed to carry further the work that his father had begun at the treaty of Corbeil and make new conquests to the south of the Pyrenees. Altogether, the king of Aragon was confronted by a most formidable array of foes; but he never faltered. Returned to Spain, he set about the selection of the hundred knights who were to accompany him to Bordeaux; but on learning, in the midst of his preparations, that the king of England would not undertake to guarantee him a fair combat in closed lists, and that if he appeared with his followers, he ran grave danger of capture and death, he changed his plans. Disguised as the servant of a horse dealer, he crossed the mountains, and three days later arrived at Bordeaux. He made known his identity to the English seneschal, formally demanded that the combat which had been arranged should take place, circled the lists on horseback, with his lance in rest, and finally, after repairing to a church, solemnly and publicly to thank God for His support and protection, regained his own dominions in safety, having loyally fulfilled his plighted word as a gentleman and a king.

When this romantic but inconclusive farce had been terminated, the forces of the rival monarchs began to struggle with one another again. Roger de Lauria defeated the French fleet off Malta, which he finally captured in June, 1284, and subsequently won another victory in the Bay of Naples. On this occasion the young Prince of Salerno, son of Charles of Anjou, was taken prisoner and condemned to death, as retribution for the execution of the youthful Conradin in 1268; but the Infante of Aragon relented at the last moment and preserved his life. On the sea there could be no question which of the two rivals was superior. The Aragonese fleet was already triumphantly asserting its control of the entire western Mediterranean—a long step towards the upbuilding of the Aragonese empire. Charles of Anjou led an army into southern Italy, in the hope of retrieving his fortunes by land, but death overtook him before he could accomplish his purpose (January 7, 1285). Meantime, however, in France and Spain there was another tale to tell. The papal sentence hung like a dark cloud over the Aragonese realms. The king of France had collected a formidable army to give effect to it. Worst of all, a terrible rebellion against King



Pedro had broken out in the kingdom of Aragon. We shall have occasion to follow the course of this great revolt in another place; for the present we need only observe that one of its chief causes was the resentment of the Aragonese at Pedro's absorption in enterprises overseas, for which they had no interest or enthusiasm, and that its principal result was temporarily to paralyze the efficiency of the resistance to the French invasion. And to cap the climax of the king's misfortunes, his younger brother, James of Majorca, who had been left by his father in possession of Cerdagne, Roussillon, Montpellier, and the Balearics, turned traitor and joined forces with Philip of France. On January 20, 1279, Pedro had forced him formally to acknowledge himself his feudal vassal; and James, who had never forgiven his brother for refusing to recognize his independence, seized this opportunity to take his revenge.

But Pedro was one of those from whom the most desperate crises evoke the most splendid efforts. A dash at Perpignan failed to capture the wretched James, who fled away under cover of night; but when the invading French army reached the mountains, they were exposed to all the hazards of a guerilla warfare with which they knew not how to cope. Night attacks decimated their forces. Stones were hurled down on them from the cliffs above. Singly or in small companies they were lured away into devious paths and cut off. Finally, after having crossed the range, they made the grievous error of waiting to lay siege to the comparatively unimportant fortress of Gerona, instead of pushing straight on and striking at the Catalonian capital. Meantime the courage of Pedro and his adherents was roused by the news of a fresh naval victory near Rosas, won by the few ships which he had kept in Catalonian waters over the much larger fleet that had been sent to cooperate with the army of the king of France. Even the rebel Aragonese, who had hitherto stood aloof from the contest, came forward, in July, 1285, with offers of aid, when they saw the heroic fight which their king was making against tremendous odds. Finally, after a magnificent resistance of two months and a half, Gerona fell; but the long delay before its walls had given Pedro time to organize the defense of the country to the south of it, so that the French could advance no farther; and in the meantime the arrival of Roger de Lauria from Sicilian waters served to complete the destruction of the French fleet, and necessitated the retreat of the invading army which it supplied. The retirement of the French forces was to the last degree disorderly. Pedro's troops hung mercilessly on their rear and pillaged their baggage train; not until they had reached the shelter of Perpignan and the protection of the forces of the king of Majorca could they feel that they had escaped from the 'gates of hell'. For King Philip the issue of the conflict brought complete though tragic disillusionment. During the long and weary retreat, the conviction forced itself upon him that he had been throughout merely a tool in the hands of Rome. More and more harshly did he reproach the papal envoy who accompanied him for all the disasters that he had suffered; more and more bitterly did he bewail the loss of the "noblest army that had ever followed the Oriflamme". Under the circumstances his death at Perpignan, on the fifth of October 1285, doubtless came to him as a deliverance: he had no ambition to outlive his defeat.

The same year, 1285, saw, in fact, a clean sweep of all the protagonists in the great drama which had arisen out of the Aragonese conquest of Sicily. Besides Charles of Anjou and Philip of France, Pope Martin IV had died on March 29, and on November 11 Pedro of Aragon, the best and greatest of them all, followed his rivals to the grave. The moment that the French army had been driven, from his realms, he had planned to punish his traitor brother, the king of Majorca, who had given Philip free passage through Cerdagne and Roussillon and had otherwise aided and abetted him. He had determined to strike his first blow in the Balearics: he had already gathered together a fleet and an army for the purpose, when he was seized with a chill and fever, to which he soon succumbed. His son Alfonso, who was to have accompanied him, hastened to his bedside, only to be sent off to carry through the Balearic campaign alone. "Who told thee to come hither, Infante?" queried his dying father; "Art thou a doctor that canst cure me? Thy presence here can do no good. Depart at once for Majorca; for God wills that I should die, and neither thou nor

anyone else can prevent it.” Reverently and obediently the Infante kissed his parent on the hands and feet, and Pedro kissed him on the mouth and gave him his blessing; “and the Infante went forth with the grace of God.” Anxious to see his realms reconciled with the Holy See, the king, in his last moments, persuaded the archbishop of Tarragona to raise the interdict which Pope Martin had placed upon his dominions, in return for an admission by Pedro of his fault, and for his promise to do all in his power to have Sicily restored to Rome. This was obviously, however, merely a case of deathbed repentance, whose sincerity was more than doubtful; moreover it was in flat contradiction to the will which Pedro had previously made, and which was accepted as valid by his successors. By that will the king bequeathed to his eldest son, Alfonso, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, with the suzerainty of the Balearics and the French lands pertaining to them; and to his second, James, the kingdom of Sicily and all his conquests in Naples. Two younger sons were left, for the time being, without inheritance; but the death of Alfonso without male heirs, and the subsequent succession of James to the Spanish realms, was ultimately to bring the elder of them, Frederic, to the Sicilian throne? The fatal tendency to division had not, in this case, been permitted to go to its customary extremes, though the cutting off of the newly won realm of Sicily, under a separate king, indicated that it was by no means extinct. The history of Sicily during the succeeding century, however, makes it very doubtful whether any other arrangement would have been practicable under the existing circumstances.

Pedro was one of the greatest of mediaeval kings. Many of his predecessors, both in Aragon and Castile, had been either heroes or saints; but Pedro was almost, if not quite, the first in whom the virtues of valor and discretion were so mingled as to entitle him to be regarded as a statesman. Dante’s verdict upon him goes, as usual, straight to the heart of the whole matter:

“D’ogni valor portò cinta la corda.”

When we come to the examination of the internal history of his reign, we shall perhaps conclude that he died at the most fortunate moment for his reputation. Be that as it may, there can be no question of the importance of what he accomplished in the brief nine years of rule that were allotted to him. Pedro was the first mediaeval Spanish sovereign to make his influence deeply felt in the settlement of problems of Pan-European importance. Hitherto the Iberian realms, chiefly occupied by the Reconquest, had been largely ignored in the regulation of international affairs; but henceforth Aragon at least would have to be reckoned with as an important power. The conquest of Sicily had opened for her a splendid imperial vision, whose realization was to be the glory of the succeeding age. Lastly, it is important to remember that this first important entrance of the East Spanish kingdoms into the international arena brought them at once into the sharpest conflict with Rome. Like his grandfather and namesake before him, Pedro did not shrink from battle with the Holy See when the interests of his people demanded it. Together with the crown of Sicily, he gladly assumed the arduous task of carrying on the great struggle against papal supremacy from the point where his Hohenstaufen predecessors had laid it down; in the long list of champions of the temporal power against the spiritual he deserves an honorable place. His reign forms the indispensable link between those of the Emperor Frederick II and of King Philip the Fair. It was a step on the road to Anagni. That a French monarch ultimately reaped the rewards of his efforts in this direction, and perhaps abused his triumph, is one of the ironies of history, but it must not be suffered to dim the glory of King Pedro. Whatever the Spanish Empire of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became, its Aragonese progenitor was certainly not conceived in subservience to Rome.

The history of the Aragonese realms, both internal and foreign, continues to unfold itself in dramatic fashion during the brief six-year reign of Pedro’s son and successor, Alfonso III. The new king was by no means the equal of his father. All the contemporary accounts unite in praising

his personal bravery and energy in war, but he lacked the statesman's power of determining in advance the main aims and methods of his policy, and of resolutely adhering to them. He never seemed quite to know his own mind and was consequently too much swayed by the advice of others. At home his rule witnessed a further humiliation of the monarchy by the rebel baronage; while abroad, though the story of territorial expansion and political development becomes steadily more intricate and confused, the power of Aragon makes little permanent progress.

The principal achievement that stands to Alfonso's credit is the completion, in 1287, of the conquest of Minorca, which had never been captured from the Saracens except in name. Its subjugation was the logical sequel to the expedition against Majorca, on which he had gone forth, obedient to the wishes of his dying father, in the autumn of 1285. Contemporaries would have us believe that he experienced little difficulty in winning away the larger island from his treacherous uncle, James: the latter had never been popular in the Balearics and was frequently absent in Montpellier and Roussillon. It seems, however, that considerable resistance was encountered and overcome before Alfonso, who was powerfully seconded by the fleet of Roger de Lauria, could enter Palma on December 19, and receive the oath of allegiance from its citizens. Had he not been recalled to Aragon by the news of his father's death, he would probably have attacked Minorca then and there. Certainly he had ample justification for so doing, because the *arraez* or local Moorish ruler, who had been permitted to remain there, virtually supreme under the suzerainty of Aragon, had lent treacherous aid to the North African enemies of Pedro III at the time of his expedition to Tunis, and still remained unpunished. But for the time being Alfonso was obliged to content himself with a smaller expedition to make sure of the loyalty of Iviza; the more arduous Minorcan campaign was postponed for a more favorable opportunity. This came at last in the autumn of 1286, on the conclusion of a temporary truce with France which afforded a brief respite from the never-ending cares and worries of the Sicilian problem; and Alfonso made the most of it. He sought and obtained a special grant of funds from his Catalan subjects. He collected a large fleet of his own, and again received aid from the ubiquitous Roger de Lauria. On November 22, 1286, he left Salou. Two days later he arrived at Majorca, where he levied a tribute in money and kind on the inhabitants and sent a declaration of war to the Minorcan ruler. Tempests and cold of unusual severity delayed him and scattered his fleet. When he finally arrived at Port Mahon, on January 5, 1287, he had only twenty ships with him; but after eight days' fruitless waiting for the rest to arrive, he determined to risk a battle against superior numbers, and marshalled his forces for the attack. The Minorcans had meantime received considerable reinforcements from North Africa, and apparently made a desperate resistance; but when a decisive battle ensued on January 17, they were unable to withstand the onslaught of the Catalans and Aragonese and retreated to the shelter of the castle of Port Mahon. On January 21, the capitulation was signed. Minorca was handed over to Alfonso. The *arraez* and his immediate following were given free transportation to the Barbary coast, while the rest of the Moorish inhabitants were declared slaves of the crown, and sold as such in Catalonia and Sicily. Catalan colonists were soon established in the island, and concentrated in the neighborhood of Port Mahon, which increased rapidly in prestige and importance, and soon became an invaluable halfway station for the ships which plied between Spain and Sicily. All the Balearics remained in the possession of the Crown of Aragon till after Alfonso's death, though his uncle, James of Majorca, succeeded in maintaining himself in Montpellier, Cerdagne, and Roussillon. It was not till 1298 that the latter was at last restored, under Aragonese suzerainty, to his island realm, where he and his successors continued to hold sway until the separate existence of the whole Majorcan kingdom was finally terminated in the middle of the following century.

But the affairs of the Balearics were by this time scarcely more than a side issue. The crux of the situation lay in Sicily. Alfonso's younger brother, James, had been crowned there, at Palermo, on February 2, 1286, in accordance with the wishes of his father; but from the first

moment of his reign he was threatened by internal rebellion, foreign attack, and above all by the bitter hostility of the new Pope, Honorius IV, who promptly excommunicated him and ordered him out of his dominions. Everything depended on the attitude of the new king of Aragon. Would he take advantage of his father's dying promise to do his best to restore Sicily to the papacy as an excuse for abandoning his brother. Or would he choose the harder part, follow his father's political testament and the career of empire and expansion to which his country had so recently been committed, and support James against every foe in his own dominions? It was a momentous question, and it is greatly to the credit of Alfonso that he chose the latter alternative. There were strong inducements for him to decide the other way; for though the papal legate in France had published his excommunication, and preached the holy war against Aragon, Honorius used every pretext to postpone any definite action against him. The Pope obviously drew a sharp distinction between the positions of the two sovereigns. With James there could be no possible reconciliation, but for Alfonso, if he would abandon his brother and acknowledge his fault, the road to forgiveness was still open; it was the papal policy to separate and, if possible, to embroil the two kings. But Alfonso, for the time being, was staunch. What his father had won at so much labor and cost, he could not bear to let go. With the fleet of Roger de Lauria he held unquestioned command of the western Mediterranean, and could therefore easily communicate with his brother in Sicily. An alliance for mutual defense in their respective possessions was made between them on Christmas day, 1285, and confirmed on February 12, 1286. They were also both encouraged by the increasingly obvious fact that Philip the Fair, the new king of France, was far less enthusiastic than his predecessor for the prosecution of the papal and Angevin claims, and if anything desirous of an excuse to withdraw from the conflict. But even without him the array of foes with which the two brothers were confronted was extremely formidable. The bitterness of the papal hostility was increased rather than diminished when Nicholas IV succeeded Honorius in February, 1288. The Angevins in Naples were still exceedingly powerful. James of Majorca was hand in glove with any combination which promised to injure his Aragonese kinsman; while Castile, under Sancho the Bravo, was eager to deprive Alfonso of those invaluable political pawns, the Infantes de la Cerda, and lent a willing ear to the summons of his foes. It is needless to add that both sides sought aid from the Moorish states in North Africa. At one stage in the proceedings, James and Alfonso made an alliance with the Soldan Kelawun of Egypt against their Christian foes.

We need not follow the story of the desultory fighting by land and sea which continued intermittently during the rest of the reign. No military or naval action of decisive importance occurred, and hostilities were constantly interrupted by negotiations, truces, and temporary peaces, arranged through the mediatorial offices of Edward I of England but never loyally observed. On at least two occasions, Alfonso could have had satisfactory terms as far as Aragon and his own reconciliation with the papacy were concerned; but the question of Sicily, "which no one seemed willing to renounce", remained apparently insoluble. Finally, in November, 1288, the Prince of Salerno, son and heir of Charles of Anjou, who had remained in the hands of the king of Aragon since 1284, was set at liberty, on the understanding that he should bring about a three years' peace within two months, or else return to captivity. In March, 1289, he departed for Rome on this errand, together with certain Aragonese ambassadors, but he did not fulfil his promise. Whether he had ever intended to do so is more than doubtful; in any case it is certain that he was but wax in the hands of Nicholas IV, who soon converted him into a servile instrument of papal policy, and finally crowned him king of Sicily on May 29, 1289. The crusade was thereupon preached against his rival James from one end of Italy to the other. Alfonso's excommunication was proclaimed afresh. All the treaties previously concluded with him were declared null and void; and Philip the Fair was granted the ecclesiastical tithes within his realms to finance an invasion of Aragon. Of the two brothers, James was unquestionably threatened the more seriously; but he put a bold face upon the situation and proceeded to besiege Gaeta so vigorously



that his rather inefficient adversary soon agreed to a two years' truce. Alfonso, on the other hand, was by this time heartily tired of fighting over the interminable question of Sicily. The internal situation in Aragon and the necessity of dealing with Sancho of Castile imperatively demanded his attention. Everything dictated the wisdom of seeking reconciliation with Rome. Yet on the other hand he did not intend absolutely to abandon his brother if he could possibly help it; most anxiously did he seek for some middle way, which should offer to all parties concerned an honorable escape from an intolerable situation. Throughout the latter part of 1289 and most of 1290, matters trembled in the balance. Alfonso kept sending messengers to Rome to induce the Pope, if possible, to consent to a discussion of terms, while James in Sicily bravely attempted to make his policy keep time with the ebbs and flows of that of Aragon. A touch of comedy was supplied by Charles of Salerno, who, on the expiration of the time within which he had promised to secure peace, presented himself for reincarceration in fulfilment of his plighted word; but took great care to come so well guarded by Majorcan troops, and to select so discreetly the time and place of his appearance, that no jailer was on hand to receive him. Finally, with the aid of the pacificatory efforts of Edward I, the Pope was induced to send two cardinals to France to discuss a peace; after protracted negotiation, a treaty was signed at Tarascón, in February, 1291, between all the parties concerned in the Sicilian quarrel, except James, on terms which most historians have agreed in regarding as humiliating to the dignity of Aragon. The provisions which affect the king of France do not concern us here; the Aragonese-Castilian quarrel was suffered to run its course; the main lines of the settlement of the affairs of Aragon and Sicily were as follows.

In return for a formal acknowledgment of his faults and a request for forgiveness, to be subsequently repeated in a personal interview between Alfonso and Nicholas, the former's excommunication and the various papal edicts against his realm were to be revoked, and he was to be recognized as lawful sovereign in his dominions, including the Balearics. The king, furthermore, promised to take the Cross at the Pope's behest, with 5000 foot and 200 horse, for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre, in formal ratification of their reconciliation. Thus far the text of the treaty, which contains no word of any promise to pay tribute to Rome, nor any mention of Sicily; to judge by it alone, James was simply left to his fate, while the Aragonese difficulty was solved on terms generally favorable to the king. But in all the histories, from the usually trustworthy Zurita down, we find it recorded that the king bound himself to pay to Rome an annual revenue of thirty ounces of gold, in token of the vassalage of his realm, as in the days of Pedro II; and also, if necessary, to lend armed support for the expulsion of his brother from Sicily and the restoration of the Angevins there. Obviously the final verdict on Alfonso's reign must depend on whether or not the statements of these historians are true. On the one hand, it does not seem likely that so many writers would have asserted that such humiliating conditions were imposed on the Aragonese king without some basis in fact; on the other, all that we know of the earlier history of Alfonso's reign is in flat contradiction to such an unworthy abandonment of his brother and the Sicilian inheritance, as are also the provisions of his will. The difficulty of the problem is, of course, greatly enhanced by the fact that Alfonso outlived the treaty of Tarascón but four months; had he been granted a longer life his subsequent actions would have spoken for themselves. His most recent historian strongly inclines to the opinion that, whatever concessions he may have made at Tarascón, it was Alfonso's ultimate intention to arrange an acceptable peace for his brother in Sicily; certainly he wrote to James and also to the king of Granada to that effect. Possibly he may have had some plan of directing the crusade, which he had bound himself to undertake, against Sicily rather than the Holy Land; such things had often been done before, and at times when crusading enthusiasm was at a far higher pitch than at the end of the thirteenth century. Clearly matters were still far from their final solution, when everything was upset and all the work of the reign thrown into the melting-pot again by the sudden death of the king, at the early age of thirty-seven, on June 18, 1291. Unmarried and childless, he left his throne and that of Majorca to his brother James, with instructions that the latter should hand over Sicily to his



younger brother, Frederic. If James should die childless, Frederic was to succeed him in Aragon and in Majorca, and Sicily was to go to Pedro, the youngest brother of all. Under no circumstances were Aragon and Sicily to be united under a single monarch.

The new king, however, was energetic and ambitious, and at first saw no reason why he should renounce Sicily as the price of his succession in Aragon. In sharp contrast to his father and brother, who had appreciated the difficulties in the way of uniting the two realms under the same ruler, he fully believed that he could retain them both. When the news of Alfonso's death called him across to Aragon to receive the homage of his subjects there, he summoned the Sicilian estates to Messina, and as a pledge of his future intentions presented to them his younger brother Frederic, not as their king but merely as his own lieutenant and representative. This policy, however, did not have the effect that was expected of it. The hearts' desire of the Sicilians was national autonomy and independence. They had no mind to remain subjects of a sovereign whose principal possessions lay in another part of Europe. They had aided the Aragonese to expel the Angevins, because they had been encouraged to believe that they would ultimately be permitted to have a king of their own; and the events of the reign of Alfonso III had naturally served to strengthen this expectation. But now that it was apparent that James of Aragon intended to retain Sicily in his own hands, to convert the island into a portion of the Aragonese empire, and to stifle all aspirations for independent national existence, the enthusiasm of the Sicilians for their Aragonese liberators was exchanged for enmity and distrust. A patriotic party, recruited largely among the more highly educated citizens, began to take shape; and it gained added strength day by day from the fact that the young Frederic steadily gravitated towards it. The latter had lived long enough in Sicily to have become imbued with all the native aspirations for autonomy. He naturally was ill pleased with the way in which he had been deprived of the kingship of the island in defiance of the will of Alfonso. He was not, indeed, openly at odds with the king of Aragon; ostensibly they maintained friendly relations, and James repeatedly professed himself to be most solicitous to safeguard his brother's interests. But, on the other hand, it must have been increasingly plain, as time went on, that the permanent retention of both realms under a single sovereign was impracticable, as long as the enemies of the house of Aragon remained so numerous and powerful.

It was, indeed, the attitude of the outside powers that ultimately proved to be the determining factor in the situation, and finally convinced James that his original plan could not possibly be carried out. His attempts to retain Sicily and incorporate it into the Aragonese empire had nullified all the efforts of his predecessors to secure a durable peace. The treaty of Tarascón was a scrap of paper; and the enemies of the king of Aragon began to arm themselves for a fresh trial of strength. But no military events of decisive importance occurred either on land or sea. 'Glorious victories' were constantly reported by both sides, but in reality there was little fighting; the solution, if it came at all, was obviously going to be reached by diplomacy and not by war. For four long years, by constantly shifting his methods of defense, James managed to hold his various enemies at bay. He succeeded for a brief moment in relieving himself of the hostility of Sancho of Castile by abandoning the cause of the Infantes de la Cerda. He was fortunate, also, in having a temporary respite on the side of the papacy, his bitterest foe; for Nicholas IV died in April, 1292, and the cardinals were unable to elect a successor till July, 1294. The absence of leadership in Rome was significantly reflected in the evanescence of the political combinations of the period, and James took advantage of it to stave off his inevitable defeat as long as possible. His period of grace was prolonged for five months beyond the end of the interregnum at Rome by the pitiful pontificate of Celestine V, but finally the foes of the king of Aragon got the leader for whom they had looked so long by the election, on Christmas Eve, 1294, of the redoubtable Boniface VIII, masterful and dominant, raised to the papacy by the votes of the French cardinals and the support of the son of Charles of Anjou—a truly strange introduction for the pontiff who was to be smitten

by Sciarra Colonna at Anagni. But if nine short years sufficed to send France all the way from the extreme of intimate alliance with the Holy See to that of open defiance of it, an even briefer space was enough to swing Aragon an equal distance in the opposite direction. Ever since the reign of Pedro II, and more especially since that of his grandson, she had struck out a line of policy notable for its attitude of independence and even hostility toward Rome. She had picked up the torch of Ghibellinism where the Hohenstaufens had set it down, and had borne it bravely forward; but now her turn to relinquish it had come. For in Boniface James of Aragon recognized a power with whom he could not hope to contend—another Hildebrand or Innocent III—no servile tool of princes and potentates, but an arbiter of the destinies of monarchs and of realms. The new Pope had obviously resolved to restore peace in Christendom on his own terms. At the very beginning of his pontificate he had taken the decisive step of opening negotiations with Frederic, offering him a marriage with Catharine of Courtenay, daughter of the titular Emperor of Constantinople and niece of Charles of Anjou, together with her claims to the succession of the Empire of the East, in return for his abandonment of Sicily. Frederic did not accept this proposal. His increasing love and respect for his Sicilian subjects, as well as a natural scepticism concerning the Pope's ability to perform his promises, held him back; but he at least consented to negotiate, and thus gave Boniface a chance to make overtures to Aragon, France, and Anjou. It is probable that James, before this time, had been convinced that his original plan of retaining Sicily could not be carried out; and provided territorial compensation was elsewhere forthcoming, he did not propose to stand by Frederic. He had, moreover, for some time past been secretly negotiating with France, with a view to indemnifying himself for a loss which he foresaw was inevitable. He had even gone so far as to offer to marry the daughter of Charles H of Anjou on condition that the Pope should grant him Sardinia; and he had also spoken of a match between himself and that Catharine of Courtenay whom Boniface had offered to his brother, in the hope of gaining the succession to the Latin Empire of the East. All this made it comparatively easy for Boniface to carry out his plans for the settlement of the Sicilian question. The representatives of Aragon, France, and Anjou were accordingly summoned by him to Anagni in June, 1295, and they there evolved a most comprehensive treaty, of which the following stipulations concern us here.

James renounced all his rights and titles to Sicily, which was to be restored to the Holy See for the house of Anjou. The king of Aragon agreed to marry the daughter of his Angevin rival as sign and seal of their reconciliation, and there was to be a mutual surrender of captives and hostages. The excommunication and interdict against James and Frederic and their dominions were to be raised, and the king of France renounced all right and pretension to the realms of the Crown of Aragon. At the same time, a papal bull commanded in categorical terms that the Balearics be restored to James of Majorca, under the suzerainty of the Aragonese king—a sentence which, however, was not fully executed till three years afterward. Lastly, we may be reasonably sure that the cession to the Aragonese king of Corsica and Sardinia, as indemnification for his renunciation of Sicily, was at least fully discussed at Anagni. James had had his eye on these islands for some time past, and was exceedingly anxious to annex them to his dominions. They were held at the time by the Pisans and Genoese, but the church had claimed the overlordship of them since the end of the eleventh century, and Boniface, who bore no love to their actual occupants, was not averse to handing them over to James, to conquer if he could on his own resources, and to hold at an annual tribute of two thousand silver marks under the suzerainty of Rome. The matter was not settled till January 1296; the formal ceremony of investiture was deferred till April 3, 1297; and it was many years later before the king of Aragon was able to enter into possession of his new dominions. The first military expedition against them was not launched till 1323 and must be reserved for examination in another place; but there seems every reason to think that their cession was virtually arranged in 1295.

Altogether, the peace of Anagni was only a partial triumph for Boniface VIII. He had succeeded, it is true, in wresting Sicily from the possession of James and in settling for the time being the quarrels of Aragon with France and Majorca. But he had by no means put an end to the war to which the Sicilian question had given rise; he had rather altered and perhaps enlarged its scope and changed the personalities of the combatants. For the Sicilians found in Frederic a worthy champion of their independence, so that the struggle in that quarter continued with unabated violence; while the contest for Corsica and Sardinia and the campaigns of the Catalan Grand Company in the eastern Mediterranean simply served to transport the war to other lands. The current of Aragonese imperial ambition had begun to run so strongly that even Boniface VIII was powerless to stop it. Checked in one direction, it promptly burst forth in others, constantly gathering headway, and seeking for new worlds to conquer.

From 1295 to 1327, that is, during the remainder of the reign of James II, the history of the expansion of Aragon in the Mediterranean Sea falls into three separate divisions, which correspond to the three principal ramifications already noted of the war over the question of the Sicilian inheritance. The first is the struggle of Sicily under Frederic to maintain itself against the assaults of Pope and Angevin. The second is the beginning of the conquest of Sardinia. The third is the origin and early progress of the Aragonese domination in Greece. The affairs of Sicily and of Sardinia, down to the end of the reign, can conveniently be recounted in the immediately succeeding pages, while the rise and fall of the Catalan duchy of Athens forms an episode so remote from the rest of the Aragonese Empire in the western basin of the Mediterranean that it will be easier to describe it in a separate chapter.

In Sicily there was consternation when the news of the peace of Anagni was known. Ambassadors were sent to the king of Aragon to beg him to reconsider his decision. On their arrival at Barcelona, they found preparations being made for the marriage of James to the Angevin princess, ‘the Queen of the Holy Peace,’ which they regarded as the sign and seal of his dishonor; when they learned that the king of Aragon had already abandoned all his rights in Sicily to Charles of Naples, “they grieved like men who have received sentence of death,” and caused the sails of the ships that bore them home to be painted black. But the valor of the Sicilians was proof against the desperate circumstances in which they were placed. Their desertion by the king of Aragon was perhaps a calamity; but it also could be converted into a great blessing, if only they could maintain themselves against the papacy without his aid; for in case of triumph their reward would be the greater—namely, the national autonomy of which they had so long dreamed, instead of continued subjection to a foreign prince. Young Frederic, brave, handsome, and beloved, was by this time completely won over to the cause of Sicilian independence. On December 11, 1295, the Sicilian parliament conferred on him supreme power, with the title of ‘Lord of the Island’ and received in return his pledge to defend his subjects with his life and his substance. On May 25, 1296, followed the more solemn act of his coronation and anointing as king of Sicily, in the cathedral church of Palermo; and this was accompanied by an extensive remodeling of the Sicilian constitution, which remedied sundry abuses, strengthened and confirmed individual liberties and franchises, and increased the power of the national estates.

Having thus made doubly sure of the enthusiastic loyalty of his Sicilian subjects, Frederic persuaded a large proportion of the Aragonese troops in the island to enroll themselves in his service, and to ignore the missives which James sent forth to summon them home. He then turned his thoughts to war. Comprehending the immense advantage of seizing the initiative, he promptly crossed the strait of Messina with a considerable force and began to ravage Calabria and Apulia. The feeble Angevin levies of the indolent Charles of Naples were quite unable to stem the onrushing tide; and Boniface saw that immediate measures would be necessary to save his

protégé. The most obvious plan was to draw closer to James of Aragon, who would be more than ever anxious to please the Pope in order to ensure the satisfaction of his ambition to annex Conics and Sardinia; to call on him as a loyal son of the church to aid in effecting the subjugation of Sicily, and even to take arms if necessary against his own brother. Negotiations for this purpose were prolonged throughout the latter part of 1296 and 1297. James, who, not unnaturally, was reluctant to comply with the papal mandates, used every effort to persuade Frederic to come to terms. The latter, however, proved obdurate, and as Boniface possessed a strong hold over the king of Aragon through his control over the as yet unsettled question of Corsica and Sardinia, James finally came to Rome early in 1297, prepared to enlist in the papal service. The next weeks were occupied in winning away the all-powerful admiral, Roger de Lauria, from the service of Frederic, who had been unable to avoid disagreements with this haughty and independent spirit; and when Lauria finally passed to the papal side, the naval preponderance passed with him. In the summer of 1298 there assembled under his leadership, in the harbor of Naples, one of the most formidable fleets that had ever sailed the seas—upwards of 100 galleys—to which most of the Western Mediterranean states had furnished their contingents. The undaunted Frederic did not hesitate to appear at the mouth of the harbor with an inferior force, but soon after deemed it prudent to retire to Sicily without a battle; according to a contemporary historian, his withdrawal was caused by the receipt of a secret warning from his brother, who had not really desired to fight him, and hoped to fulfil his obligation to Boniface without a serious conflict. A series of inconclusive operations followed; but finally, on July 4, 1299, the king of Aragon and the admiral won a bloody victory off Cape Orlando, which ended the resistance of the Sicilians on the sea. Frederic, however, managed to effect his escape with nineteen galleys. Far from discouraged at his defeat, he and his followers gloried in the fact that they had so long held at bay the fleets of the principal maritime state of the time, and they were more than confident that they could retrieve their fortunes by land at the expense of the armies of the prince of Naples. Their hopes were justified by the event. At Falconaria, on December 1, 1300, Frederic's infantry, by an impetuous charge, drove the horsemen of their foes in headlong flight, and vindicated the honor of a noble cause.

The effect of the desperate resistance of the Sicilians was enhanced by the fact that after the naval battle off Cape Orlando, James of Aragon had departed for Spain. He had accomplished the task which had been assigned to him, and though still in much terror of Boniface, he felt bitterly ashamed of the part he had been made to play. The Pope was hard put to it to find a champion for his cause. Charles of Naples had already proved a broken reed, and the Count of Valois, to whom Boniface next applied, lost the bulk of his forces through a pestilence before Sciacca. No one else seemed to be immediately available, and the final result was the signature of a peace at Caltabelotta in August, 1302, which finally terminated a struggle of twenty years' duration, and rewarded Frederic for his splendid fight against overwhelming odds. He was recognized as king of the island of Sicily during his lifetime, in absolute sovereignty, independent alike of Naples and of the Pope, and all previous papal sentences against him and his subjects were revoked. His Angevin rival retained the whole of Naples on the mainland, including Calabria, and there was a mutual restoration of conquered places on both sides of the strait of Messina, so that the historic kingdom of Sicily was henceforth divided. Frederic further agreed to marry Eleanor of Anjou, the daughter of his foe, in token of the reconciliation of the rival houses; and there was further inserted, to save the papal dignity, a clause which, as everyone must have realized, stood little or no chance of fulfilment, to the effect that after Frederic's death Sicily should revert to the Angevins, in return for an indemnity to his children of 100,000 ounces of gold. Even with these concessions, however, the peace of Caltabelotta proved too bitter a humiliation for Boniface to accept. Before he would consent to ratify it, he obliged Frederic to exchange the full and complete sovereignty over Sicily, which had been conferred upon him by the original treaty, for an arrangement by which he should consent to acknowledge the feudal

supremacy of Rome and pay 3000 ounces of gold in recognition of it. “The terms honorably obtained by the sword,” says Amari, “were thus defaced by negotiation.”

Despite all these modifications and reservations, it is undeniable that at Caltabelotta the papacy suffered an important loss of prestige. Seven years before, at Anagni, James of Aragon had forsaken the ways of his fathers and bowed the knee of submission to Rome; but Frederic had proved more obstinate and was finally rewarded with the recognition of the virtual independence of his kingdom. More than a century later the separate line of Sicilian sovereigns which had been founded by Frederic died out, and the island was finally and formally incorporated in the Aragonese Empire; but nothing in the checkered course of Sicily’s later history should cause us to forget that its first acquisition by a Spanish monarch was effected through open defiance of the Holy See. In the conquest of Sardinia, however, which next claims our attention, we shall find Aragon and the papacy in alliance.

We have already seen that in 1296-97 Pope Boniface had granted to King James of Aragon, as a part of the price of his abandonment of his brother Frederic, the right to conquer and hold the islands of Corsica and Sardinia, under the suzerainty of the see of Rome. This apparently magnificent papal donation, however, was emphatically of the sort that it is more blessed to give than to receive. Bitterly *as* he detested the rival republics of Genoa and Pisa, which were actually in occupation of the two islands, Boniface realized that he did not possess the military power to expel them; he was, therefore, only too happy to find a sovereign amenable to his authority who would engage, on his own resources, to do so for him. It is also quite clear that the king of Aragon fully realized the difficulty of the task he had undertaken. He postponed action again and again, until the pressure of other more immediate problems had abated, and thus gave Boniface and his successors an opportunity to prepare the way for the final military campaign by ecclesiastical admonition and diplomatic intrigue.

The existing conditions in both islands, more particularly in Sardinia, furnished an admirable opportunity for the exercise of the papal talents in this direction. Not only were Pisa and Genoa at odds with one another over the possession of them; but both, in different ways and degrees, were exceedingly unpopular with the natives. They had been called over from Italy in the eleventh century to expel the Saracens from the islands; having successfully accomplished that task, they felt that they were entitled to remain, and this the inhabitants not unnaturally resented. In Sardinia, the latter had been governed since very ancient times by four *giudices* or judges, each of whom was virtually a king in the district committed to his charge; at the period with which we are dealing the most powerful of them was unquestionably the Judge of Arborea, whose domains occupied the southwestern quarter of the island. The Pisans, who were dominant in that region, had irritated these magistrates by sundry exactions and demands. They were generally unpopular also because of their intense Ghibellinism, and since their power in both Corsica and Sardinia was distinctly on the wane (the Genoese held practically all of one and the bulk of the other) the Pope and the king of Aragon determined to concentrate their efforts against them. At first they strove to widen the breach between the Pisans and the Judges of Arborea, and with excellent results. Secret negotiations were opened between Hugo, Judge of Arborea, and the king of Aragon in 1321; they terminated in an arrangement by which the former was given assurance that he would be maintained in all his dignities and titles, in return for his support against the common foe. Next King James approached the Genoese in Sardinia and made sure that they would not actively support the Pisans. The powerful families of the Dorias and the Malespini, the greatest feudatories in the island, were even won over to the cause of Aragon; while in the commune of Sassari, where the Genoese showed some signs of taking the other side, the inhabitants rose and expelled them. Only in Iglesias and Cagliari did the Pisans keep the upper



hand, and even there signs of the presence of an Aragonese party kept constantly cropping out; one man was beheaded for having been heard to exclaim, "Please the devil that those Catalans come!" Meantime the papacy, transferred to Avignon in 1309, continued to do everything in its power to emphasize its ancient claims to the overlordship of both Corsica and Sardinia, and its consequent right to dispose of them; it also interfered on all possible occasions in the affairs of the Sardinian clergy, in order to assure itself of their loyalty and support. In Italy, too, matters shaped themselves in a way favorable to the Aragonese invasion. Pisa was weak, distracted by internal broils, and discouraged by the death, in 1313, of the Emperor Henry VII; on the other hand, all the Guelf powers in the peninsula supported the Pope and the king of Aragon. The king of Naples formally approved of the enterprise, while Frederic of Sicily, unable to prevent it, vainly attempted to mediate between his brother and the Pisans.

By the time, then, that King James was ready to begin military operations, the diplomatic foundations for them had been pretty thoroughly laid. Meantime, no precautions had been neglected in Aragon and Catalonia that would serve to insure success. The Infante Alfonso was placed in command of the expedition, and was furnished with a fleet so great, says Muntaner, "that the whole world trembled every time that the eagle of Aragon made ready to fly." The names of those who rallied to Alfonso's standard included all the best and bravest in the realm, and such was the enthusiasm for the enterprise that no less than 20,000, according to the contemporary chronicler, were forced to remain behind. At the very last moment the Avignonese Pope, John XXII, grew fainthearted and attempted to draw back, reminding King James "that there were already wars and tribulations enough in Christendom"; but the latter was not thus to be diverted from his purpose. On May 31, 1323, the Aragonese fleet left Portfangos under the orders of the valiant admiral Francisco Carroz, with upwards of 10,000 soldiers under the Infante. A small detachment furnished by the kingdom of Majorca joined them at Port Mahon. On June 12 they anchored in the Gulf of Palmas, as had previously been arranged with Hugo of Arborea. After the latter had met them and solemnly recognized the overlordship of Aragon, preparations were made to attack the two chief Pisan strongholds, Iglesias and Cagliari. The first-named was considerably the less formidable, but it required a four months' siege by the bulk of the invading forces before it yielded, on February 7, 1324, to starvation and thirst. After its surrender the Infante was able to concentrate his army and navy before Cagliari, where Admiral Carroz had already preceded him. As an earnest of his determination to capture it at any price, he proceeded to construct directly in front of it a fortified town and castle, which he called Bonayre, so placed that it enabled him immediately to detect any attempt at a sortie of the garrison or at relief from without, and there awaited developments. A Pisan squadron, reinforced by a detachment of Germans, which attempted to break through the blockade, was beaten off with great slaughter, and the expected sortie of the garrison of Cagliari met with a similar fate; the invaders were, moreover, still further strengthened by the arrival of a fresh fleet from Aragon. On the other hand, the forces of the Infante had been decimated by the ravages of the terrible 'intemperia' or Sardinian fever, which had made the climate of that island the synonym for death since Roman times. Bonayre, as its name implies, was far less destructive than the region of Iglesias in this respect, but Alfonso's losses were quite sufficient to make him think twice before refusing terms somewhat less favorable than he had originally hoped to obtain. Through the mediation of Bernabé Doria and Hugo of Arborea, a treaty was finally arranged on June 19, 1324, by virtue of which the Pisans surrendered to the Infante all their possessions in Sardinia, except Cagliari, and promised to hold that as a fief of the Crown of Aragon, at an annual tribute of 3000 lire.

This somewhat lame and halting peace served rather to postpone the end of the struggle than to terminate it. Cagliari became a center of Pisan intrigue; the Genoese, reversing their policy, now joined forces with their quondam foes. It was not until Admiral Carroz, a year and a half later, won a decisive victory over their combined fleets in Sardinian waters that the town was finally

delivered up, and the king of Aragon could boast that he was really master of the whole island. According to Muntaner, the treaty of 1324 led the inhabitants of Corsica, which was practically entirely under the control of Genoa, to follow the example of their brethren in Sardinia and acknowledge the suzerainty of King James; but Zurita offers a number of excellent reasons for doubting this statement, the chief of which is the fact that King Pedro IV of Aragon, who afterwards did much fighting in Sardinia, makes no mention of the matter in his chronicle. Certain projects which were broached, though not accomplished at the time, for the invasion and conquest of Corsica seem to afford additional evidence that the claims of the Aragonese monarch to the overlordship of that island can in no sense be regarded as established, despite the fact that he undoubtedly continued to style himself the king of it in virtue of the papal donation of 1297.

A few other scattering events of this important reign remain to be mentioned, all of them indicative of the spirit of foreign enterprise and expansion that animated alike the sovereigns and subjects of the realms of the crowns of Aragon and Sicily; in some respects it never rose so high again. The most significant of these was the struggle over the possession of the little island of Gerba, just west of Tripoli, and close to the North African coast. Captured from the Moors, first by the Normans and later, in the end of the thirteenth century, by the Admiral Roger de Lauria, it was defended with difficulty by the heirs of the latter against repeated infidel assaults. Outside aid was indispensable to its permanent retention in Christian hands, and in 1310 Frederic of Sicily sent the chronicler, Ramon Muntaner, who had abundance of military experience, to organize and maintain its defence. The latter accomplished his mission so effectively that he was rewarded by his grateful master with a three years' grant of the lordship of Gerba and also of Kerkeni, to the northwest of it, under the suzerainty of the Sicilian crown. At the expiration of his term he went back to Spain, leaving the island in the possession of Frederic; for the farce of continuing to recognize the rights of the heirs of Roger de Lauria had by this time been given up, so completely incapable were they of enforcing them. A score of years later, in 1335, the Saracens won Gerba back, and the subsequent attempts of Genoa and Sicily to recapture it for Christendom were not attended with permanent success. The little island of Pantellaria, however, was reconquered in this period from the Saracens, and subjected to the payment of a tribute by King Frederic. After numerous vicissitudes it passed to the Crown of Aragon in the early fifteenth century, and in 1492 it was conferred on the great family of Requesens, which continued to Administer it as a hereditary possession for three hundred years.

The struggle over Gerba brings us back to the question of the status of the tribute to Aragon from the king of Tunis, of which mention has already been made. Certain sums had been irregularly paid by the Hafside sultans to the Aragonese kings during the previous century, in return for the Christian soldiers whom the latter had permitted to serve in the Moorish armies. In 1285, moreover, Pedro III had established a claim for himself and his successors to a more permanent contribution from the same source, when the Tunisian sovereigns recognized him as lawful king of Sicily, and as heir to the annual tribute which the rulers of Tunis had anciently paid to the Sicilian crown. But when on Pedro's death Sicily was separated from Aragon under an independent line of kings, this Tunisian tribute naturally became an object of competition between the two rulers. The Angevins in Naples also refused to abandon their claim to it; and the triple controversy thus aroused finally resulted in a complete cessation of the disputed revenue, pending its settlement. In 1309, after King James of Aragon had abandoned all rights to Sicily, he was selected as arbiter between the two remaining claimants, and finally gave his verdict in favor of the king of Naples, on the ground that the exact title of his brother Frederic was only king of Trinacria. As the Angevin, however, was totally unable to enforce his claim, the sentence remained practically inoperative, and the king of Aragon subsequently acknowledged the right of Frederic of Sicily to collect a fresh tribute from the king of Tunis, if he could do so,

by force. The fact that the Christians were established in Gerba, where they could menace the Tunisian coast, apparently enabled Frederic to accomplish this, down to the recapture of the island by the Saracens in 1335; it seems that the king of Aragon was also in receipt of an annual contribution of 5000 *doblas* from the Hafside ruler during this period, on the old ground that the latter had Christian soldiers in his service. Other evidences of the interest and enthusiasm of King James for the extension of the power and prestige of Aragon in distant lands are his second marriage in 1314 with Mary, the sister of Henry of Lusignan, king of Cyprus, and his sending of an embassy, apparently with the most successful results, to the Soldan of Cairo, to ransom all the Aragonese and Catalan crusaders and merchants who were prisoners within his domains? His reign marks an important epoch in the development of the Aragonese Empire. James was neither great, save possibly as a legislator, nor beloved, and it is hard to forgive his treatment of the Sicilian question and his abandonment of his brother Frederic; but he profited by his early errors and did not repeat them, and as time went on, he gave evidence that he possessed caution and determination, quickness to seize his opportunities, and many of the other qualities of statesmanship.

CHAPTER VIII  
THE CATALAN GRAND COMPANY

Before proceeding further with our study of the development of the Aragonese empire in the western basin of the Mediterranean, we must devote one short chapter to the story of a much remoter outpost of it, which was won and lost during the fourteenth century in the Levant. The history of the Catalan Grand Company and of the duchy of Athens under its dominion is one of the dramatic episodes of the Middle Ages and has been described from many different points of view; but as the whole affair exercised no lasting influence on the fortunes of the Spanish Empire, it need only be dealt with briefly here. We shall also find it convenient to carry the story through to its conclusion in the present chapter, even though by so doing we shall be taken somewhat beyond the point which we have reached in the development of the more permanent portions of the Aragonese Empire farther westward. The matter is episodic rather than fundamental for our main purpose and may therefore best be considered by itself.

The terrible confusion into which Greece had been thrown by the Fourth Crusade had been in no wise diminished by the reconquest of Constantinople by the Emperor Michael Palaeologus in 1261. The domains of the reestablished Empire of the East were small and scattered, “a feeble, crippled body, which could ill support its enormous head.” The bulk of the Grecian peninsula remained more or less completely independent of it, split up into a number of 368 minor principalities, most of which acknowledged the sway of Western rulers. Even the parts which remained nominally under Byzantine control were in reality managed by rival Genoese and Venetian mercenaries and colonists, who were practically masters of the situation. The way in which Charles of Anjou contrived to extend the dominion of his house into this sadly disrupted land need only be briefly touched on here; we have already seen that the possession of an empire in the East had been the goal of his ambition from the very first, and, indeed, that he regarded the conquest of Sicily chiefly as a stepping-stone to that end. He began in 1267 by seizing the island of Corfu, which had belonged to his rival, Manfred of Sicily. In the same year a treaty with Baldwin II, the deposed Latin Emperor of Romania, gave him the suzerainty over the great principality of Achaia, which was held by William of Villehardouin and comprised the bulk of the Peloponnesus; and soon afterwards a marriage between his second son and William’s daughter converted the Angevin suzerainty into virtual possession. The rich duchy of Athens also, comprising ancient Attica and Boeotia, and ruled over from 1205 to 1308 by the French house of de la Roche, specifically acknowledged the authority of Anjou; even in Cephalonia and Epirus Charles considered himself to be overlord. “In almost every part of the Greek world the restless Angevin had a base for his long-projected attack on Constantinople”; and the Emperor Michael Palaeologus and his son, Andronicus II, had fully as much cause to dread the assaults of the fierce Frenchman on the west as those of the infidel Turk on the east.

It was entirely natural that in seeking aid to ward off the threatened danger, the Byzantine emperors should look to the house of Aragon. That dynasty was already at swords’ points with the Angevins in the western Mediterranean, and it had also been in close touch with Oriental affairs ever since the marriage of Pedro II to the granddaughter of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus in 1204. During the reign of James the Conqueror, Aragonese traders had frequently made their appearance in the Levant; and just before the Sicilian Vespers the rulers of Aragon and Constantinople had been drawn nearer than ever together in common enmity to Charles of Anjou, through the instrumentality of John of Procida.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, the famous

ravaging expedition of Roger de Lauria into Grecian waters in the year 1292 must have made the Byzantine emperors think twice before employing the warriors of the West. Plunder, ransom “enough to satisfy five armies,” and indiscriminate slaughter, sufficient, according to Muntaner, to explain the lack of good men to defend the Morea at a later day, were the sole objects of Lauria’s men; and apparently the territories of the Byzantine emperor suffered quite as severely as those of his Angevin foe, for the admiral justified himself in attacking the former on the ground that Andronicus had failed to pay the king of Aragon a subsidy promised to the father of Pedro the Great. The expedition, however, certainly served the purpose of reminding these western marauders of the glories of the East, whatever it may have caused the East to think of them. It had indicated to them an unrivalled opportunity for booty and spoil, and when the chance came they would not fail to take advantage of it.

Under the circumstances, then, we need not wonder that when the peace of Caltabelotta closed the war in Sicily, the soldiers in Frederic’s armies cast longing eyes to the eastward, in the hope of finding fresh employment there. Clearly Frederic wanted to get rid of them, so much so, in fact, that he recked little where and how they found service; for despite the traditional friendship of his house with the Palaeologi, he apparently began by offering them to Charles of Valois, husband of that Catharine of Courtenay to whom Boniface VIII had once planned to marry him, to be used against Andronicus II. This project, for a number of reasons, fell through, but Roger de Flor, the most redoubtable of Frederic’s generals, who had set his heart on getting to the Levant, did not propose to be balked by the ebbs and flows of diplomatic negotiation; and it occurred to him that the easiest way to effect his purpose was to offer his services to the very emperor whom he had previously expected to attack. Andronicus, hard pressed by the Turks, accepted his proposal, even though he must have been fully aware of the exceedingly unstable character of his new allies. Roger was given the title of ‘Grand Duke,’ the hand of the Emperor’s niece, and a promise of double pay for his men—four months of it in advance. On these terms he sailed for Constantinople in the summer of 1303, with 36 ships and about 6500 men, most of them light-armed infantry skirmishers, or Almogavares, as they were called; a number of whom brought with them their wives, mistresses, and children. The expedition at its inception cannot be regarded as indicating any real intention on the part of the Aragonese rulers, either in Spain or in Sicily, to extend their empires into the Levant, or to continue in that region their struggle with the Angevins, which had been interrupted in the West by the peace of Caltabelotta. Roger de Flor’s enterprise originated as an accidental and independent venture and might just as well have been undertaken in opposition to the ancient Byzantine friends of Aragon as in alliance with them. On the other hand, as we shall later see, the home government was not unwilling to turn the issue of the expedition to its own profit and advantage, when the course of events had sufficiently demonstrated the power of the Almogavares.

The latter did not wait till they got to Constantinople to show the stuff they were made of: they incidentally ravaged the Angevin island of Corfu as they passed. At Constantinople there were great rejoicings over their arrival. Roger was solemnly invested with the promised title of Grand Duke, and married, with ceremonies of the utmost magnificence, to the Emperor’s niece. But in the midst of the festivities a violent quarrel broke out between Roger’s troops and the Genoese, who had dominated Constantinople for some years past, and hated the sight of the Emperor’s allies. Furious fighting ensued, and Muntaner tells us that over 3000 Italians were found dead in the city streets. Andronicus, angered beyond expression by the ‘insolent Latin vagabonds’ whom he had enthusiastically welcomed so shortly before, was now all on fire to get rid of them, and the threatening approach of the Turks on the other side of the Bosphorus gave him the desired excuse. In January 1304, Roger and his warriors were induced to cross over into Asia Minor, nominally for the purpose of fighting the battles of Andronicus against the infidel, practically as an independent and wellnigh irresistible band of marauders, whose savage bearing



had already cowed their titular master into sullen submission. After a bloody encounter with the Turks, from which they emerged victorious, the Almogavares settled down to pass the remainder of the winter at Cyzicus, where they gave themselves up to every sort of orgy and outrage. With the coming of spring they were once more on the march. Southward across the great plain of Anatolia they took their way, forcing the Turks to raise the siege of the ancient city of Philadelphia, but subsequently levying a war contribution of such immense proportions on the inhabitants that the latter's joy at their deliverance was speedily exchanged for mourning. It was much the same story in the succeeding weeks at Magnesia, Thyraea, and Ephesus. Meantime the company kept receiving numerous reinforcements from Constantinople and from the West; for the fame of its exploits had spread far and near, and all the adventurers of Europe longed for a place in its ranks and a share in its spoils. In midsummer, with strengthened forces, the Almogavares penetrated south and east to the famous Cilician Gates, which connect the mediaeval Armenia and Anatolia, and there, on St. Mary's day, under the scorching rays of an August sun, drove a huge army of hostile Turks in headlong-flight. Only the prudence of Roger de Flor prevented the band from pushing on to the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. As it was, they returned by slow stages, impeded by their enormous booty, to Magnesia, where Roger had left the spoils which had been captured in the previous spring. But the town was now in full revolt against him. The Emperor Andronicus, who had by this time begun to hate the Catalans "even worse than the double procession of the Holy Ghost," had doubtless inspired the uprising, as a means of putting a spoke in the wheel of his too powerful allies; and when the Almogavares sat down to a siege, he at once intervened and recalled them to Constantinople, on the pretext that he needed them to defend it against a threatened attack by the Bulgars; permission to remain longer in Asia Minor could not fail to render them absolute masters there. With no very good grace, Roger decided to obey, the more readily because of the stout resistance of the Magnesians. It doubtless cost him many a pang to abandon his dream of an independent realm, which had come so near to being realized, but some of his men were getting out of hand, and the risks of staying where he was were very great. In the autumn of 1304, accordingly, the whole Company crossed the straits, and went into winter quarters on the Gallipoli peninsula, which Muntaner describes as "the most delightful cape in the world, with good bread, good wine, and all the fruits in great abundance."

It will readily be believed that the winter of 1304-05 was largely occupied with wrangles between the Emperor and the Catalan leader over the question of pay; Roger kept going back and forth between Constantinople and the Gallipoli peninsula to settle them. Meantime, matters were greatly complicated by the arrival of a fresh detachment of Catalans, under the famous Berenguer de Entença of ancient Spanish lineage, "in every way Roger's equal as a warrior and plunderer, and his superior in insolence and pride". Very reluctantly, Roger was obliged to recognize the new arrival; he finally passed over to him his title of Grand Duke, though not until he himself had been given permission to assume the still more resounding one of Caesar. But Roger's days were numbered. His negotiations with the Emperor concluded, on terms generally satisfactory to himself, he prepared, in April, 1305, to cross over once more to Asia Minor. Before his departure, however, he visited Constantinople to bid farewell to Michael, the son and colleague of Andronicus, who was vastly less yielding than his father, and was angered beyond measure at the concessions that the Catalan leader had already obtained. The only way to rid himself of the man whom he detested and feared was by murder, but Michael did not shrink from it. A great feast was tendered to Roger at the palace; at the conclusion of it a band of soldiers rushed into the hall, and cut down the guest of honor and his companions.

Furious at the murder of their chief, the Almogavares, under the leadership of Entença, intrenched themselves at Gallipoli and sent a formal defiance to Michael; but the latter put the envoys to death, and ordered the massacre of all the Catalans that could be found in

Constantinople. The ranks of the Company were further depleted by numerous desertions, but several thousand still remained; and as the old lust for conquest and rapine burned stronger than ever within their breasts, they improvised a fleet, and began a wild career of piracy in the adjacent waters. They were no less efficient on sea than on land. A number of victories were won against superior forces, till finally Entença and his followers were induced to board a Genoese galley under a safe conduct, which was promptly violated. The Catalan fleet was dispersed, and Entença was held by his captors for an enormous ransom, first at Trebizond, and finally at Genoa. But even now the courage of the Almogavares never flagged. Berenguer de Rocafort, a soldier of humble origin, was chosen captain of the band in solemn council. With his election all traces of aristocratic influence in the Company's organization disappeared. An ultra-democratic form of government was gradually installed, in which military efficiency was the only road to authority, the supreme power being vested in a council of twelve captains. In vain did the Greeks besiege the Gallipoli peninsula. A handful of men sufficed to hold at bay the entire Empire of the East. Catalan ravaging expeditions into Thrace and Macedonia invariably returned laden with booty and captives, which were sold at enormous profit. From 1305 to 1307 Gallipoli became in fact the great slave market of the East, and a source of supply for the harems of the emirs of Asia Minor. In the midst of all these activities, Entença returned, liberated at last from his Genoese prison through the efforts of James of Aragon, to whom the Company had thrice applied for the purpose; as he could not possibly get on with the plain, blunt Rocafort, the Company soon split into two independent bands. The inevitable quarrel between them broke out in the end of the year 1307, and resulted in the death of Entença, Rocafort being left for the time the dominant personality in the situation. At about the same time the Company, having exhausted the possibilities of Gallipoli, moved across to the mainland of Thrace and Macedonia, where its previous devastations had convinced the inhabitants of the futility of resistance.

And now new factors came into play, which were destined to terminate the wanderings of this strange marauding band. Even in its palmiest days, it had never abandoned the pretence of being in the service of King Frederic of Sicily. Officially all its acts were accomplished in his name, and it carried the banners of Sicily and of Aragon with it into battle. All this made it natural that the Sicilian monarch should attempt to recover effective control of it and of the territories which it had conquered; and as a preliminary step toward this end, he sent out his cousin Ferdinand, a younger son of King James I of Majorca, to take command of it. But Rocafort, who had tasted the sweets of independent power and had no mind to surrender his leadership to this scion of Aragonese royalty, plotted against him from the moment of his arrival, and forced him to return with his mission unaccomplished; then, realizing that his action amounted to a declaration of revolt against his sovereign, he anxiously cast about him for means of support in case his authority should be challenged again. In so doing he naturally turned his attention first of all toward the potentates of the Grecian peninsula, to whose domains he was being brought nearer and nearer every day, as the Catalans pursued their spoliations in Macedonia and Thrace; and he finally opened negotiations with the last of the de la Roche dukes of Athens, who had been established there as a result of the Fourth Crusade. There were plans of a marriage between the Catalan leader and a kinswoman of the duke, and of joint action against their various foes; but before matters could come to any definite conclusion a strong faction in the ranks of the Company itself, irritated at Rocafort's dealings with outside powers, and suspicious of his personal ambitions, rose in revolt, and finally handed him over to the custody of a French noble, Thibaut de Chepoy; the latter surrendered him to the tender mercies of the Angevin king of Naples, and he died shortly afterwards of starvation in the dungeons of Aversa. But the elimination of Rocafort did not terminate the dealings of the Company with the Athenian authorities. The Catalans were by this time ravaging Thessaly with a vengeance; but that warlike country yielded them more hard knocks than booty, and the fierce inhabitants pointedly assured their unwelcome guests that better opportunities for plunder awaited them in Boeotia and Attica. Obviously the Company was

destined to appear in the neighborhood of Athens before many months elapsed; obviously, also, it would depend on the attitude of the authorities there whether it came as friend or foe. Meanwhile the last of the de la Roche dukes died (October 5, 1308) and was succeeded by his cousin, Walter de Brienne; and the latter, who had taken the measure of the Catalans and did not relish the prospect of having them any nearer to himself than was absolutely necessary, offered them a substantial reward to remain in Thessaly and complete the conquest of it in his name. This programme was successfully carried out in the summer of 1310; but its accomplishment was followed by a violent quarrel between the Athenian duke and the Company, because of the latter's unwillingness to vacate the territories it had won. On the insolent refusal of the Catalans to depart, Walter contemptuously announced that he would expel them, and summoned all the great princes of the Morea to rally to his standard. The friendly Angevins in Achaia, for whose cause he had fought in Sicily, gladly sent him a large contingent; the Venetians in Negropont supported him: whether we accept Muntaner's estimate— 24,700— that of the Chronicle of the Morea—6000— as the size of his army, we may rest assured that it was the mightiest host that had ever assembled under the banner of a duke of Athens, brimful of confidence, and eager for victory. But the savage Catalans were more than equal to the occasion. Issuing out into the great Boeotian plain, they took up their position in some marshy ground, which they further extended by diverting the waters of an adjacent stream, hard by the spot where Philip of Macedon, more than sixteen centuries before, had won "that dishonest victory of Chaeronea, fatal to liberty"; and there they awaited the onslaught of the chivalry of Frankish Greece. On March 15, 1311, the battle of the Cephissus took place. Walter's horsemen plunged all unsuspecting into the treacherous morass; stuck fast in the clinging mud, they were ingloriously shot down or stabbed by their crafty foes; Walter and the great majority of his knights were numbered among the slain. Like the battle of Courtrai, nine years before, it was one of the earliest and most striking demonstrations of the superiority of infantry, properly handled, over cavalry; of a democratic over an aristocratic fighting machine. Thus at last, after a life of a hundred and six years, the French duchy of Athens came to a sudden and tragic end.

By this time the Catalans were ready to abandon their roving life, and they accordingly determined to settle down and establish themselves permanently in the territories they had won. With the adoption of a sedentary existence, however, they began to feel the need of outside recognition and support. They were surrounded on every side by foes whom they could not, unaided, hope permanently to withstand; they consequently reversed the policy of Rocafort, and applied to Frederic of Sicily to send them one of his children, to be their leader in peace and war. Frederic was only too glad to avail himself of this opportunity to extend his dominion over the conquests of the Almogavares. As his oldest available son, Manfred, was still too young to assume the Company's leadership, he sent out Berenguer Estañol, a knight of Ampurias, to govern for the time being as Manfred's representative. From the date of Berenguer's arrival, we may justly regard the duchy of Athens as formally connected with the kingdom of Sicily, and therefore as a semi-independent eastern outpost of the Aragonese Empire. On Estañol's death in 1316, King Frederic appointed his illegitimate son, Alfonso Fadrique, in his stead; since Manfred, whose representative the latter theoretically was, died in November, 1317, Alfonso Fadrique governed Athens in the name of Frederic's third legitimate son, William, who was likewise a minor, until his retirement in 1330. In the following period the duchy continued to be ruled by a series of governors in the name of the successive descendants of King Frederic, who one after another inherited the title of duke of Athens, though they never visited Greece. In 1355 the Catalan conquests in the East were bound for the first time in personal union to Sicily, through the deaths of all Frederic's legitimate offspring except one grandson, who bore his name, and fell heir to all his dominions. At the death, twenty-two years later, of this Frederic—whose feeble rule in Sicily was painfully reflected in the incompetent government of his representatives in Athens—he left all his domains to his daughter Maria. The Sicilians accepted her, but the Catalans

in the East refused. Knowing that they stood in need of more vigorous outside aid against their many foes than Maria would be able to accord, they offered their sovereignty to Pedro IV, the mighty king of Aragon, who promptly accepted it, and promised to send out a governor to represent him on the ground. Thus at last was the duchy regularly incorporated in the empire of Aragon itself, the ancient Sicilian connection which it had maintained for so long being definitely and permanently broken. Many years earlier than this, moreover, the papacy, which had originally visited the Catalans with excommunication, decided that it would be wise to absolve them, and permit them to be reconciled with Mother Church. They might be ‘sons of perdition’, but they were also a bulwark against the Turks. Now that they had won for themselves a permanent habitation, it was possible to give them official recognition as respectable members of society.

At the same time that their status was being secured with the outside world, the Catalans proceeded to remodel the internal government of the duchy of Athens. Beginning under the rule of Estañol, they gradually evolved a constitution, closely resembling that of Catalonia, for their new domain, of which Thebes, not Athens, was the capital. There were a vicar-general and a marshal, appointed by the king’s representative, and holding under him the chief political and military powers in the state; there was an elaborate system of local government under *veguers*, *Castellanos*, and *capitans*; there was a large measure of popular liberty, and a sort of parliament, or meeting of the *sindici*, representing the principal towns and villages. No offices were to be granted to any outsiders, not even to Sicilians or Aragonese; Attica was to be for the Catalans who had taken it and their descendants—the ‘Conquistadores’, as they called themselves, like the later Castilian empire builders in America. ‘The Usages of Barcelona’ supplanted the ‘Assizes of Romania’, and Catalan became the official as well as the ordinary language. The conquered Greeks were treated as a subject race; they were excluded as a rule from the enjoyment of civic rights, and the Greek church was relegated to a position of inferiority to that of the West. During the early part of their rule, moreover, the Catalans continued to extend their conquests. After successfully repelling an attempt of the heirs of Walter de Brienne to recover the duchy, they attacked the Venetians in Negropont, and would probably have conquered the island had they not been ordered by Frederic of Sicily to desist. In 1318, on the extinction of the reigning dynasty in Thessaly, they promptly occupied the southern part of that country and erected it into the Catalan duchy of Neopatras, whose title was proudly borne, together with that of Athens, by Sicilian kings and Aragonese sovereigns long after the effective domination of the Catalans in the Near East had passed away. But it is interesting to observe that the subsequent years of the Catalans’ dominion in Athens saw no further extension of these easy conquests. The period of the rule of Alfonso Fadrique (1316-30) witnessed the zenith of their power; from that time onward they began to lose those magnificent fighting qualities which had won them their place in the world. Despite occasional raids into hostile territory to kindle enthusiasm for war, the life of Thebes and Athens bore little resemblance to that of the Anatolian plains and the peninsula of Gallipoli. Discipline could no longer be maintained; luxury and corruption crept in; the drunken descendants of the hardy victors of the Cephissus surrendered themselves to a life of sloth and debauchery on their great estates. By the time that the Catalan duchy had transferred itself (1377) from Sicilian to Aragonese obedience, its occupants were no longer invincible. Their dominion was approaching its end.

The power that was ultimately destined to oust the Catalans from their possessions in Attica and Thessaly was an upstart family of Florentine ‘steel kings’ and bankers, called the Acciajuoli, who had long been attached to the Angevins in Naples, and, while furthering their patrons’ ventures in the Morea, financially and otherwise, had incidentally managed to acquire territory there for themselves. In 1358 they got Corinth, and in 1373 Megara—this last on the ground of the refusal of the Catalans to hand over to them certain fugitive vassals—and thus possessed



themselves of the high road into the Athenian duchy from the south. Further than this they did not venture for the present to advance, for the Catalans were still regarded as formidable foes more formidable by far than they actually were—and the Acciajuoli did not dare to attack them until the assaults of other enemies had weakened them still more. This necessary preliminary, however, was speedily accomplished by the famous Navarrese Company, composed, like its Catalan predecessor, of a host of professional soldiers, whom the peace of Bretigny had permitted their original employer, the notorious Charles the Bad, to dismiss from his service, but whom Jacques de Baux, a claimant of the duchy of Achaia and also one of the numberless titular Emperors of Constantinople, had determined to utilize for purposes of his own. As a preliminary to the conquest of Achaia, de Baux launched these Navarrese mercenaries against the Catalan Grand Company from the northward; in 1380 they advanced triumphantly across Boeotia, but were finally stopped by the defences of the Acropolis. The delay before the walls of the Athenian citadel gave the Catalans time to meet and memorialize their absent sovereign, Pedro IV of Aragon. In a petition which clearly indicates how completely their pristine vigor had been sapped, they begged him to send them a vicar general who would protect them from the invaders. After some delay, the king complied, and finally despatched to Athens Philip Dalemar, Viscount of Rocaberti; the latter arrived in the autumn of 1381, and, turning on the Navarrese Company, speedily drove it out of the duchy into the Peloponnesus, where it subsequently established itself in Achaia. But the expulsion of the Navarrese was only a preliminary to a fresh invasion of the Acciajuoli. The latter had keenly watched from their outposts at Corinth and Megara the gradual disintegration of the Catalan state, and realized how completely the expulsion of the Navarrese had exhausted it. When at last Rocaberti fell into disfavor with King Pedro and was recalled, they saw that their chance had come. The scornful rejection by the chief heiress of Catalan Athens of an offer of marriage from the leader of the Acciajuoli served as the pretext for launching the long-postponed attack. The details of the invasion are almost unknown to us. It probably began in 1385, but the conquest was not finally accomplished till May, 1388, owing to the resistance for sixteen long months, after the rest of Athens had surrendered, of a handful of men in the Acropolis. Frequent embassies were despatched to the home government to beg for relief; but Pedro, though his enthusiasm for the architectural glories of ancient Greece was outspoken and unbounded, was unable to render any practical aid in the defence of his distant dominions. With the fall of the Acropolis in 1388, the Catalans disappeared from the soil of Attica like clouds in the rays of a summer sun. Whither they all went, and how they were so rapidly dispersed, it is impossible fully to explain. Many took ship and sailed westward to Sicily or Barcelona; others lingered on in the East, but there was no element of permanence in their conquests. Few, if any, traces of their presence can be detected in Athens today; and the fact that the word ‘Catalan’ was long used there as a term of opprobrium and reproach sufficiently indicates the general impression they left on the native Greeks. The sister duchy of Neopatras fell to the Acciajuoli with that of Athens, but the Catalans managed to maintain themselves in the adjacent county of Salona till 1394, and their pretensions to the island of Aegina were not entirely abandoned until 1451.

It is not easy to pass judgment on this curious episode in the development of the Aragonese Empire. However remiss they may have been in failing to take practical measures to prevent the loss of their possessions in Greece, it is certain that the Aragonese and Sicilian sovereigns, their successors, and their subjects were intensely proud of their brief connection with the home of classical civilization. The humanist Alfonso the Magnanimous actually made an abortive attempt to recover the lost duchies, and the titled to them continued to figure among the dignities of the Spanish crown down to the end of the seventeenth century. But whether or not it would have been ‘practical politics’ for Pedro IV to have attempted to retain them, in the circumstances that obtained in the end of the fourteenth century, is quite another question. They were, after all, remote, and isolated amidst hostile states; moreover, since they had been acquired as it were



accidentally, rather than by a regularly organized national effort with the support of the home government, there was comparatively little of other problems, of greater importance and far nearer home, and could ill afford to dissipate their energies. When one remembers how the Spanish Empire suffered in later days from the wide dispersion of the territories that composed it, one is inclined to applaud the restraint of the monarch who declined to exhaust his resources in the endeavor to preserve a dominion so remote.

CHAPTER IX  
A MEDITERRANEAN EMPIRE

WE now return to the realms of the Crown of Aragon and their dependencies in the western basin of the Mediterranean, which we left at the death of James II in 1327. The brief and generally unimportant reign of the latter's son and heir, Alfonso IV, is little more than a transition period. As far as the history of Aragonese expansion in the Mediterranean is concerned, it is absolutely without significance, save for a serious revolt in the newly conquered island of Sardinia. In this the lead was taken by the Genoese, who had now turned their arms against their quondam allies from Aragon, and attempted to expel them from the island. The rebellion began at the instigation of the Dorias, who had come into conflict with the Aragonese officials in the commune of Sassari. As the viceroy who represented Alfonso in the island was unable to maintain himself alone, it became necessary to send him reinforcements; and in order to obtain these in sufficient numbers the king was obliged to desist from a campaign which he had begun against the Moors of Granada. Meantime the Genoese redoubled their efforts. A furious struggle blazed up all over Sardinia and in the adjacent seas as far as the coasts of Italy and Catalonia. On land, the Genoese had emphatically the better of the argument. In a few years they mastered all the island except Sassari, Cagliari, and Iglesias; and these might well have fallen also, had not Alfonso opened negotiations for a treaty, which was not concluded till after his death, and was in general so lame and ambiguous as to make it little more than the prelude to another war. On the sea the contest was somewhat more even, and the fighting violent in the extreme; so much so, in fact, as to suggest that there was more at stake between the rival powers than the possession of an unprofitable and unhealthy island. As a matter of fact, the conflicting economic interests of the two powers were the underlying cause of their hostility. Both aspired to the commercial hegemony of the western Mediterranean, and were determined to go to any length to attain it. They had already encountered one another in North Africa and in the Levant, and now the Sardinian question had brought them more openly into collision than ever before; but the title to the island was, after all, rather a pretext than a cause of their strife. The struggle between them went on intermittently throughout the remainder of the fourteenth century and beyond, until the decline of Genoa made it impossible for her to continue it; and it was in Sardinia that she contrived with the aid of the native population to maintain the fight the longest. The island was not wholly conquered by the Aragonese, as we shall later see, till 1421.

Alfonso IV was twice married, first to Teresa de Entença, a noble dame of Aragonese birth, and second to Eleanor, sister of Alfonso XI of Castile. Each wife bore him two sons: those of the first were called Pedro and James, and those of the second Ferdinand and John; and the last years of Alfonso's life were clouded by a bitter feud between Queen Eleanor on the one side and the Infante Pedro on the other. For us the main interest of the conflict, in which at one time it seemed probable that Eleanor would win for her children the crown that was unquestionably Pedro's by hereditary right, lies in the fact that it served to develop at a very early age the character and ability of the Infante. When in his twentieth year he finally succeeded to the throne of his father—Eleanor and her children having fled to Castile at the last moment—he had already reached maturity. Within a frail and sickly body he concealed a bold, crafty, rancorous, and defiant heart. To reign in fact as well as in name was his life's study and object, relentlessly pursued through all the vicissitudes of fortune. Neither family ties nor friendships held him back. The attainment of the end justified in his eyes the use of any and every means. He was most dangerous when

seemingly impotent, and a past master of sheltering himself in his most atrocious acts behind the technicalities of the law. He has often been compared to Louis XI of France; but he differed sharply from that monarch in his fondness for pomp and outward magnificence, and in his implicit belief in their value as a means to impress the multitude. He is known in the long history of the Aragonese kings as the 'Ceremonious'; he was the author of a special treatise on the duties and privileges of the officials of his court; and like King Frederick I of Prussia, and in defiance of ancient precedent, he insisted on crowning himself at his accession, "to show that he held the throne of God alone and of no earthly power."

The main interest of his reign lies in domestic affairs, in his successful efforts to raise the monarchy from the depths of degradation to which baronial revolt and constitutional limitations had consigned it; and all this we shall examine in another place. Abroad, however, he was by no means inactive, and in the fifty-one years during which he occupied the throne he succeeded in strengthening in three different directions the position which Aragon had already won beyond the seas. He put an end to the separate existence of the kingdom of Majorca, and incorporated the greater part of it in his own domains. He kept alive the power of Aragon in Sardinia through a difficult and turbulent period. He prepared the way for the reunion with Aragon of Sicily. We will take up these different phases of Pedro's activities in the order named.

At the time of Pedro's accession in 1336, the throne of the Majorcan realm had been occupied for twelve years by the third of the separate line of kings—James, the grandson of that James of Majorca who had been expelled from the Balearics by Alfonso in, but had been subsequently restored to them under Aragonese suzerainty in 1298, as a sequel of the treaty of Anagni. In addition to Majorca, Minorca, and Iviza, it will be remembered that his realms also included Cerdagne, Roussillon, and Montpellier on the mainland; but over the last of these three territories the suzerainty of the king of France had been recognized since the middle of the thirteenth century, while a small part of the town of Montpellier, commonly called Montpellieret, had been ceded, in 1293, in full ownership to the French monarch, and formed an integral part of the royal domain. It will readily be understood that the relationship between the sovereigns of France and Majorca which this complicated situation in Montpellier created was delicate in the extreme. The Majorcan rulers often entirely disregarded the rights of the French kings in the districts in question and insisted on exercising all the jurisdiction and privileges of full ownership; the French kings equally resolutely refused to be elbowed aside. So irksome, indeed, was the position during part of the reign of the comparatively pacific Sancho (1311-24), the second king of the separate Majorcan line, that the latter forgot his grudges against his cousin, the king of Aragon, who was his feudal suzerain in the rest of his dominions, and sought to make common cause with him against the king of France. It was, in fact, by a skilful process of playing off their two overlords, the French and Aragonese monarchs, against one another, that Sancho and his father had managed to preserve the separate existence of their scattered domains; but when in 1324 the second King James, nephew of Sancho, ascended the Majorcan throne, a bolder but ultimately fatal policy was inaugurated. James of Majorca was the equal of his cousin and brother-in-law, King Pedro of Aragon, in violence if not in craft. Nothing short of absolute autonomy in his domain would satisfy him, and he rashly defied both his suzerains at once. He openly flouted the representatives of Philip of Valois in Montpellier, and eagerly availed himself of every possible opportunity to pour contempt upon his overlordship. At the same time he scornfully ignored the repeated summons of Pedro of Aragon to come and do him homage for the Balearics, and intrigued with the latter's worst enemies in Castile, in Naples, and in Morocco. In the year 1339, indeed, he had a change of heart. Yielding to papal entreaties, he crossed to Barcelona to acknowledge formally the suzerainty of his brother-in-law; but the ensuing ceremony was such as served to increase rather than to diminish the friction between the two monarchs. The Aragonese king apparently took a malicious pleasure in causing James to remain standing

for a quarter of an hour, while he solemnly discussed with his counsellors whether or not it would be advisable to provide him with a cushion to sit on; and when the question was finally decided in the affirmative, it was observed that the cushion which was brought was conspicuously lower than that of Pedro. A subsequent clash between the attendants of the two sovereigns angered the king of Aragon so terribly that he was only prevented from killing James on the spot by the fact that the sword of state which he was wearing and attempted to draw could not be extracted from the scabbard. Memories of the past faithlessness of Majorcan monarchs surged up in the mind of the rancorous king of Aragon, and he resolved, then and there, to seize the first possible chance to correct the error of his ancestor James the Conqueror in dividing his inheritance, and definitely and finally to incorporate the Balearic realm and its continental dependencies into his own dominions.

The opportunity which he sought was not long in presenting itself; and it was the direct result of James's reckless dealings with King Philip of France. In the year 1341 their quarrel in Montpellier came to a head. The Majorcan king had recently strengthened himself by a treaty with Edward III of England, whose armies had already made their appearance in Normandy. More confident than ever in the support of this new ally, he gloried in publicly defying the behests of his French overlord? The culmination of his rebellious deeds was reached in the month of March, when, after publicly protesting that he no longer recognized the suzerainty of France, he presumed to organize and celebrate a tournament at Montpellier, in direct violation of Philip's commands, and further, on the attempt of the royal representatives to interfere, caused the king's scutcheons in the city to be torn down and the king's officers and notaries to be expelled. Open hostilities were sooner or later inevitable, and James, foreseeing them, approached the king of Aragon; for so completely had his last quarrel with the king of France obliterated the remembrance of his earlier broils with Pedro, that he now hoped to convert the latter into an ally. But Pedro had a longer memory than his rash brother-in-law, and a statesman's ability to discern that the moment for which he had waited so long had at last arrived. To James's petitions for aid he replied with deceitful counsels to avoid hostilities, and thus furnished the French king an opportunity to occupy Montpellier. Having thus increased rather than diminished his brother-in-law's perplexities in one quarter, he subjected him to fresh humiliation in another by convoking the Catalan Cortes at Barcelona and summoning James to appear at once, under threat of a declaration of feudal felony and forfeiture if he refused. Against methods like these the king of Majorca was powerless; on his failure to arrive at the appointed time, King Pedro, in February, 1343, declared that his domains were reunited to the Crown of Aragon. When, too late, James finally did appear, Pedro falsely accused him of plotting against his life, and thus provoked him into a defiance which gave an excuse for carrying the sentence into effect. Needless to add, every preparation had been already made. Tithes which had been wrung from the clergy to be used in a crusade against the Moors in North Africa were diverted to furnish a fleet to attack the Balearics; the king himself was in command of it, while his brother led a simultaneous expedition against Cerdagne and Roussillon. The Balearic campaign lasted only one month. The population was probably less hostile to James than is usually represented, and many isolated deeds of valor were performed in his cause; but the Majorcans stood no chance against the disciplined soldiers of the king of Aragon, and after a feeble attempt to dispute his advance on the heights above Santa Ponza, resistance was virtually at an end. Minorca and Iviza promptly followed. The Pope, who dreaded the increased power of the king of Aragon, attempted to effect a compromise, but only postponed the inevitable. The incorporation of the islands into the realms of the Crown of Aragon was virtually complete by the end of June, and James of Majorca confessed it by fleeing overseas to Cerdagne and Roussillon, whither he was immediately followed by his implacable brother-in-law.

The struggle over the continental portions of the Majorcan realm was much more prolonged. A campaign of devastation, vigorously pursued, finally resulted in the submission of all Cerdagne and Roussillon, except the fortress of Perpignan, which defied every assault of Pedro's Almogavars; but when his military forces were inadequate, the king of Aragon was more than able to supply their deficiencies by masterful diplomacy and intrigue. On July 15, 1344, he held an interview with his brother-in-law under the walls of Perpignan, which Pedro describes in his chronicle in terms of haughty satisfaction? It resulted in an arrangement by which James gave up Perpignan and all the other strong places in the counties to Pedro, in return for the latter's pledge "to treat him with pity and grace"—a phrase which was certainly susceptible of many interpretations, but which James, in view of certain preliminary negotiations, was fully justified in regarding as a promise of pardon, peace, and recognition of his royal title. Needless to add, Pedro had no intention of redeeming his pledge in any such way as this; but for the present his treachery had served its purpose. The keys of Perpignan were handed over to him; the garrison welcomed him within its walls. After an entry characterized by all the pomp and magnificence which were so dear to his heart, he proceeded to the church of St. John, and there, on the twenty-second of July, solemnly proclaimed and confirmed the annexation of Cerdagne and Roussillon to the rest of his hereditary domains. The struggle was not, as a matter of fact, quite over, either here or in the Balearics, but the invader had gained a hold on his prey, and was not destined to relinquish it.

It did not take James of Majorca long to discover that the hopes which he had built on Pedro's promises were the merest castles in the air. His first disillusionment came in the shape of a contemptuous offer from his brother-in-law of a miserable pension of 10,000 livres, in return for his renunciation of all title to Cerdagne and Roussillon and the Balearics, coupled with a scornful promise to recognize his rights in Montpellier, which Pedro, on account of its remoteness and predominantly French sympathies, had wisely determined to leave alone. Stung to madness by this insulting proposal, so different from what he had anticipated, James gathered a few faithful followers around him and fled to France. On the way he passed through a corner of Cerdagne, where the inhabitants, who still cherished some devotion to him, offered their support in an attempt to regain his lands; but the affair was so badly managed and Pedro so keenly on the watch, that after a few encounters, in which James had all the worst of it, the royal fugitive was driven to seek safety in Montpellier. There the representatives of Philip VI received him cordially. The king of France bore no lasting grudge against him for his former conduct, and dreaded the progress of the armies of the king of Aragon north of the Pyrenees. Had it not been for the fact that the war against England, which was going badly, occupied all his attention in the North, it is more than probable that Philip would have actually supported James against Pedro. But as things were, it would have been madness for him to offend the powerful king of Aragon, who, though he was too prudent to attempt to win Montpellier for himself, had determined that the French monarch should not give shelter to his enemy, and loudly complained of an attempted expedition for the recovery of the Balearics, on which James, with French support, embarked in 1347. Finally in the spring of 1349, as the easiest way out of an intolerable situation, Philip purchased all the rights of the king of Majorca in Montpellier for 120,000 *écus d'or*, thus terminating the separate existence of the only portion of the Majorcan realm which had escaped the clutches of Pedro by annexing it to the lands of the crown of France. The unfortunate James utilized the funds which he had received from this sale to fit out a final expedition for the recovery of the Balearics. He managed to effect a landing at Majorca, but was completely defeated there on October 25, 1349, in a pitched battle between Palma and Luchmayor, by Pedro's Almogavars. The latter had been instructed beforehand to secure at all costs, either dead or alive, the body of the Majorcan king; and when one of them, cutting his way through the densest of the *mêlée*, attained his object and held up James's severed head to the gaze of the combatants, the



battle ceased as if by magic. It was a fitting end for a prince whose dauntless courage redeemed a multitude of faults.

Pedro's new possessions caused him considerable difficulty during the remaining years of his reign. The old desire for independence in the different portions of the Balearic realm was by no means extinguished, and when the son and namesake of James of Majorca, who had been taken prisoner by Pedro's Almogavares in the battle of 1349, escaped, thirteen years later, from his jailers, and married, as her third husband, the notorious Joanna of Naples, he managed to breed constant trouble for the king of Aragon until his death in 1375. He played a considerable role in the war with Castile, was the ally of Pedro the Cruel and Edward the Black Prince, and a prisoner of Henry of Trastamara; in the last year of his life he vainly attempted a descent on Catalonia through Cerdagne and Roussillon on the north. His claims passed at his death to his sister Isabella, and from her to Duke Louis of Anjou, who made some show at an attempt to enforce them but failed to accomplish anything. Finally, in 1390, a marriage treaty was arranged between the latter's son Louis and Pedro's granddaughter Violante, in which the latter received a large dowry in return for a complete renunciation for herself, her husband, and her successors of all right and title to the Majorcan realm.

Such were the last phases and aftermath of a conquest which had been initiated more than a century and a half before. That the end was delayed so long is simply another testimony to the intensity of the passion for autonomy which characterized the inhabitants of the territories concerned. Most of the historians of Majorca exhaust themselves in invectives against the outrageous means by which James's spoliation was effected, and emphasize the happiness of the Balearic kingdom under its separate line of sovereigns; but however dastardly his methods, it is impossible to doubt that Pedro's resolve to terminate the separate existence of the subsidiary realm was justified by every consideration of statesmanship. James the Conqueror V had made a grievous error in severing it from Aragon, with which it had been traditionally united since ancient times; and since Aragon after his death had blossomed out into a great Mediterranean power, the wisdom of reannexation was more obvious than ever. During the period of its autonomy it had really been a hindrance to the growth of the Aragonese empire, whereas it ought to have served as an invaluable stepping-stone to the remoter possessions to the eastward; nor was its case for one moment comparable to that of Sicily, for whose independence there were a host of reasons, both geographical and historical, that did not apply in the Balearics. And we must not omit to pay tribute to the practical good sense of Pedro IV in refraining from any serious effort to take Montpellier. Save for Cerdagne and Roussillon, the ancient holdings of Catalonia north of the Pyrenees were gone forever, and it would have been the height of folly to have attempted to maintain an isolated outpost which was so completely at the mercy of the king of France. The solution of the whole matter was probably, in fact, by far the best that could have been devised; and as we shall later see, those portions of the Majorcan realm that were reannexed to the domains of the Crown of Aragon were to some extent consoled for their loss of a separate line of kings by being permitted to retain a very considerable measure of institutional autonomy. Spanish particularism was indeed proof against such trifles as the extinction of a local dynasty.

The Majorcan affair, the pressure of his relations with Castile, and above all his bitter internal struggle with the forces of the Union, which we shall consider elsewhere, prevented King Pedro from seriously attacking the difficult problem of Sardinia during the first fifteen years of his reign. The Aragonese garrisons in the island were only partially and tardily reinforced, while the Genoese, spasmodically aided by the Pisans, utilized every opportunity to solidify and increase the gains they had made in the period of Alfonso IV. They had all the best of sundry desultory military and naval operations in 1347-48, so that by the middle of the fourteenth century

the Aragonese power in the island was perilously near extinction. Corsica, despite the papal donation, had never been conquered by Aragon except on paper. Altogether it was only too obvious that Pedro would have to bestir himself vigorously, if he wished to reap the fruits of the labors of his predecessors in these islands.

For this purpose the king of Aragon sought and obtained in 1351 an alliance with the powerful maritime republic of Venice, which shared his hostility to the Genoese. The united fleets pursued their foes to the eastern waters of the Mediterranean, finally overtaking them in the Bosphorus, where on February 13, 1352, there took place one of the fiercest conflicts of the age. At the last moment the Aragonese and Venetians received a reinforcement of nine galleys from the Emperor at Constantinople, and with their aid barely managed to defeat the Genoese; but the losses which the latter inflicted on them were so terrible, both in ships and in men, that they also claimed the victory. No prisoners were spared on either side—all captives being either drowned or starved to death. The battle was, however, totally without effect on Sardinian affairs. The Genoese refused to surrender a single one of their possessions there and were even encouraged to further resistance by the fact that Mariano, son and successor of that Hugo of Arborea who had been one of the staunchest adherents of the Aragonese cause during the reign of James II, abandoned the ways of his father, and rose in rebellion against the authority of Pedro. For two years matters hung in the balance, a continuation of Pedro's naval victories being more than equalized by Genoa's diplomatic success in stirring up Mariano of Arborea to make trouble for their common foe by proclaiming Sardinia independent. Finally, in the summer of 1354, the king of Aragon, at the head of one of the most formidable fleets that his country had ever sent forth, crossed over to Sardinian waters and laid siege to the town of Alghero in the northwestern corner of the island. Despite the assistance of Venice, however, he was unable to take it; disease decimated his forces, and negotiations followed, in which the new Judge of Arborea steadily strengthened his own position and the cause of Sardinian independence by playing off Aragon and Genoa against one another. On November 9, 1355, an arrangement was concluded by which the Genoese were permitted peacefully to evacuate Alghero, and Pedro to enter into possession of it; and from that time onward the power and interest of the former in the island steadily waned. They continued to interfere there sporadically, it is true, for many years, but rather with the idea of making trouble for the Aragonese than of gaining control for themselves.

Henceforth the possession of Sardinia lay between the rival forces of the king of Aragon and the natives under the Judges of Arborea. Clear through to the very end of the reign and beyond they continued their inconclusive strife. In the sixties the Aragonese cause was seriously weakened by the hostility of the Avignonese Pope, Urban V, who was angered at Pedro's appropriation of the clerical possessions in Aragon to furnish funds for his Castilian wars, and attempted to punish him by depriving him of the title to Sardinia; this naturally encouraged the natives to renewed efforts. During the last years of the reign there was a particularly violent outburst of hostilities between Pedro and Eleanor, daughter of Mariano of Arborea, who had strengthened herself against him by a marriage alliance with the famous Genoese knight, Brancaleone Doria; this quarrel was terminated by a treaty, in August, 1386, in which the king of Aragon had distinctly the worst of the bargain. One cannot help feeling a curious lack of enthusiasm on the part of Pedro in reading the weary story of his Sardinian campaigns. He certainly did not exhibit in them anything like the same sustained and relentless energy which characterized his operations elsewhere. Whether it was a haunting memory of the somewhat ignoble origin of the Aragonese claim to the island, or the unexpected tenacity of the natives, or, as seems most probable, the horrible ravages of the detestable climate—a foe more potent than the mightiest army—it is impossible to say; but whatever the cause, it is a noteworthy fact that the king of Aragon consistently postponed the vigorous prosecution of Sardinian affairs in favor of every other problem, internal or foreign, that presented itself for solution. Certainly the

completion of the Aragonese conquest of the island cannot be regarded as any nearer at the end of his reign than at the beginning; and under a less energetic king it might well have been abandoned. The reign had seen Genoa eliminated as a serious competitor for the prize; but on the other hand, it had also witnessed the conversion of the natives from alliance and benevolent neutrality to active and effective opposition. From Pedro's point of view, the change was not altogether favorable; and the most that can be claimed for the Sardinian policy of the 'Ceremonious' monarch is that it tided over a danger point in the history of the Aragonese occupation of the island.

The history of Pedro's policy in Sicily occupies a distinctly minor place in the history of the reign, at least until the very close. Its principal object was to pave the way for the ultimate incorporation of the island in the Aragonese dominions, as soon as the opportunity should present itself through the extinction of the line of monarchs established there by Frederic III. One obvious way to accomplish this was to secure the good will of the Sicilian kings and their subjects by lending them military aid in the interminable struggle with the Neapolitan Angevins which chiefly occupied their reigns; another was to strengthen the ties that united the two dynasties by a series of marriages. Such assistance as Pedro gave his cousins in their difficulties with the sovereigns of Naples cannot be described as generous. Several times Sicilian petitions for help went absolutely unheeded. In 1360 a fleet of galleys was sent to escort his daughter Constance on her way to marry Frederic IV of Sicily (1355-77), and aided in inflicting a timely defeat on the forces of Joanna of Naples; but further than this little or nothing was done. On the other hand the policy of matrimonial alliance between the two realms was vigorously pursued. In addition to the above mentioned marriage of Constance and Frederic, Pedro himself wedded, as his third wife, Frederic's sister Eleanor, thus becoming the uncle as well as the grandfather of Frederic's only legitimate child, Maria. The relationship between the two dynasties was now so close, that when, in 1377, Frederic died without male heirs, Pedro came boldly forward and claimed the Sicilian throne for himself, in virtue of a provision in the will of Frederic III which excluded females from the succession. Papal opposition, the threat of an interdict, and the fact that the liberty-loving Sicilians were as yet in no mood to tolerate annexation to Aragon prevented Pedro, however, from pressing the claim on his own behalf. He prepared a huge fleet, and kept the whole western Mediterranean in suspense for at least two years by threatening a raid on the Sicilian coasts; but his counsellors were almost unanimous in opposition, and the king himself was far too practical a statesman to strike when there was so little hope of success. Yet though he recognized that the moment was scarcely ripe for the actual reunion of the two realms, Pedro was determined to do his best to prepare the way for it. In the year 1380, accordingly, he made over his rights to the kingdom of Sicily to Martin, his second son by Eleanor, the sister of Frederic IV, granting him, in effect, full authority over the island, with the title of vicar general, and merely reserving to himself, during his lifetime, the title of king. The result of this donation was, of course, to establish another collateral line of Aragonese sovereigns in the Sicilian realm, since Martin's elder brother John was the heir of his father in all his other dominions; it had thus the advantage of placating the Sicilians by securing them a continuance of their separate line of kings, yet on the other hand it brought the two dynasties closer together than they had been for three generations, and consequently facilitated reunion whenever issue should fail in either one. As the Sicilians were at that time divided into various factions, each of whose leaders, as Zurita says, "desired to seize the Infanta Maria, and by marrying her, to acquire the realm," Pedro deemed it essential to the success of his plan to possess himself of her person and thus forestall all opposition; and in the year 1382 this end was accomplished for him by the Viscount of Rocaberti, of Athenian fame, who, on his way back from the Catalan duchy in Greece, kidnapped the Infanta and had her brought by way of Sardinia to Barcelona. We shall soon see how an unexpected series of deaths without issue among the descendants of Pedro IV effected the incorporation of Sicily in

the realms of the crown of Aragon, far earlier than the 'Ceremonious' monarch could reasonably have ventured to hope.

The relentless energy and perseverance which formed the basis of the character of Pedro IV were conspicuously absent in that of his son and successor John, who, after issuing triumphant from the throes of the inevitable successions! quarrel with his stepmother, Sibylla of Forcia, abandoned himself to the pleasures of music and the chase. The most notable singers of the day flocked to his court. He possessed the finest collection of falcons in Europe. The grave Aragonese disapproved of these pastimes; the Cortes spoke their mind about them with characteristic frankness, and talked of cutting off the royal revenues if the king did not mend his ways. Their protests, however, were of little affect, for John remained to the end of his days a 'carefree hunter', who consistently neglected the direction of the affairs of state. The natural result was that the foreign policy of Aragon, which under Pedro had been so vigorous and well defined, was suffered for a time to drift aimlessly whithersoever the more dominant forces of other powers combined to impel it.

Curiously enough, however, the outside influence to which Aragon first succumbed was exerted in such a way as to lead her into active continuance of the Sicilian policy of the late king. The Babylonian Captivity of the papacy had by this time given place to the Great Schism of the West; and the Avignonese Pope, Clement VII, conceived that the best possible way to breed trouble for his Roman rival would be to unite those ancient foes, the houses of Anjou and of Aragon, in a common hostility against him. In 1390, accordingly, he arranged a marriage between John's daughter Violante and Louis of Anjou and Provence, who had claims on the kingdom of Naples against Ladislaus of Durazzo, the actual occupant of the throne. He also made a match between Maria, the captive heiress of Sicily, and Martin, nephew of King John, and son of that Martin to whom Pedro IV had granted his rights to the island; he thus brought sensibly nearer the ultimate annexation of Sicily to Aragon, which had been the aim of the late king's policy from the very first. In March, 1392, the two Martins, father and son, passed over to Sicily, which had been rent by internal anarchy and rebellion ever since the departure of Maria, to try to make good their pretensions to the realm. It was a difficult task. The Roman Pope, Boniface IX, was violently in opposition, and did not scruple to bring the papal weapons of interdict and excommunication to bear. Ladislaus of Durazzo in Naples, jealous of the claims of the younger branch of his family, which was now united to the Aragonese by the marriage of Louis of Anjou and Violante, showed himself consistently hostile. The Sicilians themselves plainly foresaw that the acceptance of Martin as their king would ultimately mean the end of their independence, which they were determined at any cost to defend; and when they succeeded in blocking up the chiefs of the Aragonese expedition in the castle of Catania, King John was so slow in sending reinforcements to deliver them as to lend color to the belief that his jealousy of his brother took precedence of his solicitude for his success. Had it not been for the energy of the Aragonese admiral, Bernaldo de Cabrera, the real hero of the enterprise, the whole affair might well have ended in disaster. As it was, the struggle continued without any decisive results until the death of John of Aragon, on a hunting party, in May, 1395. As the king left no male heirs, the crown of Aragon devolved on his younger brother Martin, who, after a year's delay in Sicily, returned to claim it, leaving his son Martin, with his bride Maria, to continue as best he could the struggle for recognition as king of that turbulent island. The fact that the Aragonese Cortes recognized the younger Martin as heir to the Aragonese throne at the same time that they swore allegiance to his father as their sovereign, shows that the fears of the Sicilians for the loss of their independence were by no means groundless. The end of it, however, was to come in a way which none of them could have anticipated.

King Martin of Aragon was a kindly soul, but scarcely more efficient as a monarch than his predecessor. He succeeded in rendering valuable aid to his son in reducing Sicily to obedience, both by the support he gave him before his departure, and still more by despatching a fresh expedition from Barcelona to bear a hand in quelling the last revolt in 1397; but save for this he soon subsided into comparative insignificance. The younger Martin of Sicily, however, was a man of different stamp. With the same restless activity that had characterized his grandfather, he coupled a knightly bearing, and a personal solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, which speedily won for him their devoted affection. As soon as he had secured himself in Sicily against the attacks of internal rebels and foreign foes, he launched boldly forth on a vigorous campaign in North Africa, which resulted in a temporary reconquest of the island of Gerba, and the reopening of the interminable question of the political, financial, and commercial relations of Aragon and Sicily with Tunis. Nay more, as an evidence of his keen interest and solicitude for the welfare of the Aragonese Empire as a whole, the heroic young prince undertook to deal with another problem which properly belonged to his father, but was obviously far beyond the latter's capabilities—namely, the suppression of a revolt in Sardinia which had been suffered to go on unchecked since the reign of King John. In 1408 the opportunity for this was exceedingly favorable, for the last of the rebel Judges of Arborea, Mariano V, had died in the previous year, and William of Narbonne, whom the natives chose as his successor, was clearly unequal to the task. Martin of Aragon sent reinforcements to his son; the Genoese, as was their custom, supported the Sards; a furious battle between them finally took place near Cagliari on June 26, 1409, from which the Sicilian king, though greatly outnumbered, issued victorious. During the next few weeks the young conqueror passed from one town to another as if on a triumphal march. Resistance seemed at an end, and the Aragonese possession of Sardinia no longer a dream but a fact, when suddenly, on July 24, 1409, the hero of the hour fell ill and expired, in all probability a victim to the Sardinian fever. His death was the signal for new things. His first wife Maria and her son Pedro had predeceased him; his second, Blanche of Navarre, had no children who survived; so that the crown of Sicily passed on his death to his father, and all the scattered dominions of the Aragonese Empire were at last reunited in one hand. But old Martin of Aragon himself was now childless and a widower, so that the future was doubtful and dark. Unwilling to neglect any opportunity to secure the succession, he married again, in September, 1409; but his hopes were disappointed, and in the following May he also passed to the grave—the last of the old line of the counts of Barcelona, which was assuredly one of the most remarkable dynasties in the history of mediaeval Europe. Its most illustrious names challenge comparison with the best and greatest monarchs of any nation. Its average level was exceedingly high; and if the reigns of its last two representatives in Spain were an anti-climax, all its pristine splendors were gloriously revived in the heroic young Martin of Sicily, flaming up in added brilliancy for one fleeting moment, like the light of a lamp before it expires.

A stormy interregnum of two years' duration followed, and was finally terminated on Tuesday, June 28, 1412, by the selection of Ferdinand of Antequera, brother of Henry III of Castile, as the successor of King Martin in all his dominions. The story of these events is complicated and very interesting, but as it belongs rather to the history of Aragon than to that of the Aragonese Empire we cannot linger over it for long. It is, however, important to observe that the nine magnates who met at the little town of Caspe on the lower Ebro to settle the question of the succession were not 'electors' in the true sense of the word, but rather judges; and their function was not to choose one of the rival candidates on the basis of his merits and deserts, but to determine which of them had the best legal claims, according to the Aragonese law of hereditary succession. The question which lay before them was, in other words, not political but judicial: strictly speaking, Ferdinand of Antequera was selected not because of the admirable qualities



which he had displayed as regent for his nephew, John II of Castile, but because, through the fact that his mother was the sister of the last two kings of Aragon and the daughter of Pedro IV, he was lineally nearer the throne than any of the other competitors. The violent invectives that the older Aragonese and Catalanian historians have hurled against the magnates of Caspe, on the ground that their decision was a shameful signing away of the independence of the realm and a bringing in of Castilian bondage, are thus totally without foundation. This important step toward the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile under Ferdinand and Isabella was based on strictly legal grounds; indeed, it is more than doubtful whether a verdict so contrary to the ineradicable tendencies of Spanish separatism could otherwise have survived. But the 'Nine of Caspe', conscious of the justice of their case, were strong enough to ignore the menaces and cajoleries of the political factions that stormed around their quiet retreat. It would be idle to deny that their position was immensely strengthened by the spotlessness of Ferdinand's record, and by the violence of his chief rival, the count of Urgel; but it needed all the majesty of the law and the claims of hereditary right, in a land where respect for the law was ever a dominant characteristic, to bring a scion of the house of Trastamara to the throne of James the Conqueror and Pedro the Great. Zurita has left us a memorable description of the ceremony of the publication of the verdict. From a lofty dais outside the church of Caspe a sermon was preached and the sentence of the 'Nine' read to the vast concourse of people by St. Vincent Ferrer. The royal standard was displayed before the altar in Ferdinand's name; and the multitude, in the fulness of their gratitude at the termination of their long suspense, burst forth into a splendid hymn of praise and thankfulness to God.

From the moment of his accession the new king was naturally confronted with great difficulties in each of his new dominions. His four years' reign was so brief that he could not possibly deal with them all; the only wonder is that he managed to accomplish what he did. In his Spanish lands he found difficulty in accommodating himself to the various limitations of monarchical power which the Aragonese constitutions imposed: brought up in a land where kingship was, in theory at least, omnipotent, and himself endowed with the highest possible conception of the duties and privileges of the royal prerogative, he could not restrain his impatience at the checks he received from the national and municipal assemblies and the law courts. The hostility of his unsuccessful rival James of Urgel demanded serious measures; it was not till the latter part of 1413 that the pretender was willing to admit defeat and humbly to accept the royal offer of perpetual imprisonment in lieu of execution. The king was also much preoccupied with the termination of the Triple Schism which had resulted from the Council of Pisa. Gregory XII and John XXIII had been disposed of at Constance; but the Avignonese pontiff, Benedict XIII, a scion of the ancient Aragonese house of Luna, had refused, with truly Spanish obstinacy, either to abdicate or even to recognize his deposition. Since 1403, when he broke with the king of France, he had been established in Catalonia, where he had exerted his influence in favor of the choice of Ferdinand at Caspe; he now expected a return, with interest, of this act of amity, and demanded that the king of Aragon should support him and his claims to the papacy against the steadily increasing opposition of the bulk of the rest of Western Christendom. For a long time Ferdinand stood loyally by Benedict; but finally, foreseeing that complete isolation from the rest of Europe would be the inevitable result of persistence in this attitude, he consented to meet the ubiquitous Emperor Sigismund and the refractory pontiff at Perpignan, in the autumn of 1415, in the hope of arranging a compromise. Benedict, however, was so utterly unreasonable in his demands that Ferdinand bowed to the inevitable and finally withdrew his allegiance, and the haughty prelate, gathering around him such adherents as he could muster, retired to the lonely fortress of Peñíscola, a possession of his family overlooking the Mediterranean, and there continued to defy authority, both temporal and spiritual, till his death at the age of ninety, in 1424. The whole episode, so thoroughly characteristic of the

persons concerned in it, forms a curious chapter in the ever-changing history of the relations of the Aragonese kings and the Popes.

In the Mediterranean, the immediate attention of Ferdinand was naturally centred on Sardinia and Sicily, both of which had seized the opportunity afforded by the confusion of the interregnum to rise in revolt. In Sardinia it was the viscount of Narbonne, heir to the Judges of Arborea, that sought to overthrow the authority of the Aragonese representatives in the island; he was supported, as usual, by the Genoese, and was in close touch with James of Urgel in Aragon. But after Ferdinand's accession the latter was defeated, and the former made a five years' truce with the king; so that in 1414 the viscount of Narbonne, recognizing the futility of further resistance, offered to sell to Ferdinand all his holdings in Sardinia for 153,000 florins of gold. The price was so high that Ferdinand, who realized that he had the game in his own hands, refused to pay it, and negotiations dragged on between the two parties until the following reign; but the final consummation of the Aragonese conquest of the island, which was reserved for Alfonso the Magnanimous, was inevitable from the time of Ferdinand, if not from that of the expedition of Martin the younger in 1409.

Sicily, too, "ever longing to possess a king who would find her crown so fair that he would not desire any other", made one last bid for independence in 1410. Against Blanche, the widowed queen of the younger Martin, who had been left in the island as the representative of the Crown of Aragon, two hostile parties arose. The one was led by the Admiral Bernaldo de Cabrera, who had hitherto been the most ardent and efficient champion of the Aragonese cause, but now, according to Lorenzo Valla, aspired to the Sicilian throne and the hand of the regent; the other was composed for the most part of Sicilian barons, who desired to place the crown on the head of Martin's illegitimate son Fadrique. In the three-cornered struggle that ensued the admiral had the best of it, until at last, in 1412, an accident delivered him into the regent's hands, and he was thrown into prison; in the following year he was released by the orders of Ferdinand, on acknowledgment of his offence, payment of an enormous fine, and a promise to leave Sicily forever. With Cabrera eliminated, the warring elements subsided. The party of Fadrique saw the uselessness of continued resistance, and somewhat sullenly accepted defeat. Ferdinand, moreover, had the wisdom to use his victory with moderation, and flattered Sicilian pride by ordering that one half the members of the council which aided the Regent Blanche should be natives. The Sicilians now directed all their efforts towards persuading Ferdinand to let them have his second son John as their king, probably in the hope of making ultimately possible the reestablishment of an independent line of sovereigns; and finally, in 1415, Ferdinand yielded to their entreaties to the extent of sending him over to them as his lieutenant. His real reason for taking this step, however, was probably his hope that by so doing he might pave the way for the annexation of the Angevin kingdom of Naples to the Aragonese domains—an end which had not been lost sight of since Pope Clement VII, in 1390, arranged the marriage of King John's daughter Violante and Louis of Anjou. In January, 1415, before John set sail for Sicily, he was betrothed, at the age of eighteen, to Queen Joanna II of Naples, forty-five years old, sister and successor of Ladislaus of Durazzo, who had died a few months before. According to the accompanying agreement, the Aragonese Infante was to share the throne of his bride, and retain it alone if he survived her. But the fickle Joanna changed her mind while her youthful lover was crossing the seas, and upset everything by marrying instead the Count de la Marche, who was ardently supported by France, Genoa, and the other foes of the house of Aragon, though bitterly unpopular with the queen's own subjects. Clearly the time was not yet ripe for the Aragonese to win Naples by gentle means, and John was not ready or able to assert his claims by force. He therefore wisely devoted himself to solidifying his power in Sicily and putting out the last embers of revolt, until, a year later, he was recalled to Spain. But Aragon had by this time gone too far with her Neapolitan plans to desist from them. Alfonso the Magnanimous and Ferdinand the Catholic

were to carry on and finish the work which had already been begun, and were thereby to give an entirely new complexion to the foreign and imperial policy of the realm.

Ferdinand died on April 2, 1416, at the age of forty-three, and in his final will and testament left all his realms to his eldest son, Alfonso, thus ending John's hopes of the succession in Sicily, and those of the Sicilians for an independent line of kings. The new monarch was active and energetic, a diplomat of high merit, and a passionate lover of the art and learning of the Renaissance. He lacked his father's high sense of royal duty, and vastly exceeded him in his detestation of Aragonese constitutionalism. From the moment of his accession he longed to exchange the stem landscapes of his native Spain for the fertile fields and sunny skies of Italy; and the fact that his father had forsaken the testamentary example of his predecessors, and left him to rule over all of his dominions, ultimately gave him the opportunity to gratify his heart's desire. Nearly all the early acts of his reign may be regarded as paving the way for this change of abode. He at once recalled his brother John from Sicily, and in 1419 married him to the widowed Blanche of Navarre, who had preceded him as regent there; he thus rid himself of all possible rivals for the Sicilian crown, and diverted the ambition of the turbulent Infante in the direction of the little Pyrenean kingdom. One of the last acts of the previous reign had been the arrangement of Alfonso's marriage to his cousin, Maria of Castile; and in 1418 the new king strengthened the tie by making a match between his sister Maria and his wife's brother John, which he vainly hoped would forestall the possibility of trouble with the western realm and leave him free to pursue his Italian policy undisturbed. Clearly the young monarch, the first to have a really fair chance to try the difficult experiment of ruling all the scattered territories of Aragon from a single throne, was contemplating a departure which would necessarily give a totally new direction to the activities of that mighty empire: he would make Italy rather than Spain the head and centre of his dominions.

But before he could hope to set foot in the land of his aspirations, it was essential that he should make certain of the Mediterranean possessions which he already had. Sicily, exhausted by ceaseless anarchy and civil war, had no longer either the power or the wish to oppose him; but in Sardinia the fact that the late king had not been able to come to terms with the viscount of Narbonne gave rise to a most difficult situation. Neither side trusted the other; the forces of rebellion had been checked but not crushed; the presence of the young king at the head of a powerful army was clearly essential to the establishment of a durable peace. On May 13, 1420, accordingly, Alfonso set sail with a large fleet of galleys and transports, which was strengthened by an additional detachment from Majorca on the way. On his arrival all signs of resistance vanished, and Sassari, where he had anticipated violent opposition, opened its gates to him on August 11. The rights of the viscount of Narbonne were finally bought off for 100,000 florins—a sum less than two thirds the size of that which he had offered to sell them for in the previous reign—and were soon after granted out to the family of Cubello, which was remotely connected with the old line of the Judges of Arborea. These Cubellos remained in possession of the Arborean territories till 1478, with the title of Marquises of Oristano; and as they were from first to last loyal supporters of the authority of the kings of Aragon, no further trouble was experienced from that quarter. The summoning to Cagliari, in 1421, of the representatives of the three estates of the realm, to form a national assembly on the model of the Catalan Cortes, may be regarded as the culmination of Alfonso's success. From that time onward, the Aragonese mastery of the island was assured.

It was but natural that Alfonso should think of following up his triumphs in Sardinia by an attempt to realize the Aragonese claims to Corsica. These dated, it will be remembered, from the donation of Boniface VIII in 1297; but they had been so utterly neglected that, according to at least one account, the papacy had actually regranted the island to the Genoese. In any case the latter had been in full possession there since the middle of the fourteenth century; but their rule

had so alienated many of the principal inhabitants that Alfonso, from his coign of vantage in Sardinia, had little difficulty in persuading one faction among them to deliver up to him the important town of Calvi. Thence he proceeded in October, 1420, to lay siege to the fortress of Bonifacio, which commanded the strait between Corsica and Sardinia. The place was too strong to be taken by assault, but a strict blockade by land and sea had almost effected its surrender when a rescuing squadron, sent by Genoa, broke through to the inner harbor and delivered it. After this mishap Alfonso apparently lost heart, and abandoned the Corsican campaign, so that the island remained thenceforth in the hands of the Genoese. Whether he had ever been really in earnest about it may well be doubted. Certainly he cared far less for it than for the prospect of gaining a foothold in Italy; and it was probably the arrival of an urgent message from Queen Joanna of Naples which really accounts for his sudden raising of the siege of Bonifacio in the winter of 1420-21.

Alfonso had kept a sharp watch on Neapolitan affairs from the moment of his accession. The unspeakable Joanna, who had so unexpectedly thrown over the marriage which had been arranged for her with his brother John, had already cast off and ultimately exiled James, Count de la Marche, the husband of her choice; she was now giving free rein to the adulterous instincts which formed the basis of her character. The condottiere Muzio Attendolo Sforza and the seneschal Giovanni Caracciolo were the principal rivals for her favors and the political power that would naturally go with them; and when the influence and prestige of the former began to wane, he sought to recover them by making common cause with Louis III of Anjou, the son of Violante of Aragon, whom he proposed that Joanna should make her heir. Joanna, under the influence of Caracciolo, refused to entertain this proposal; and both parties, foreseeing the need' of further support for their respective causes, simultaneously applied for it to Alfonso of Aragon in 1420, at just the moment when he had completed the conquest of Sardinia. That monarch, who discerned in the situation an admirable opportunity to advance his own designs, made haste to adopt the cause of Joanna; for the succession of Louis of Anjou, though he was descended on his mother's side from the old line of Aragonese kings, would in no way further the actual interests of Aragon in Naples but rather defeat them, while support of Joanna might ultimately be rewarded by the Neapolitan throne. Moreover Alfonso wisely decided that it would be well to back up his promises with a show of military force. Before his departure for Corsica he detached a portion of his fleet for service in Neapolitan waters; in early September the Aragonese ships appeared off Capri. Sforza and the Angevins mustered their forces to oppose them; and the Aragonese leaders, perceiving that decisive action was inevitable, landed and requested an interview with Joanna in order to make certain of her adherence. The ensuing conference terminated in an arrangement by which the Neapolitan queen agreed to adopt Alfonso as her son and heir, "seeing that the Kings of the House of Aragon had ever been renowned for their justice and clemency, and were known as most Christian and glorious sovereigns"; she furthermore invested him with the duchy of Calabria. In return for these favors it was understood that the king of Aragon should come and deliver the licentious queen from the factions who were striving to control her. The moment that Alfonso learned of her decision, he broke camp before Bonifacio, and at once betook himself to Sicily with all the forces at his disposal. Thence in the spring of 1421 he crossed to the mainland and engaged the power of his Angevin rival by land and sea. Fortune seemed to smile on him at every turn. His adversaries, Sforza and Louis of Anjou, retreated before him. Joanna welcomed him at Naples, perhaps rather in fear than in love; but she at least delivered up to him the castles that dominated the city and the bay. Meantime the Aragonese fleet defeated the Genoese, who had come to the rescue of the Angevins. Pope Martin V, alarmed at the rapidity of Alfonso's progress, was induced to confirm his adoption and conquest by a threat of the king of Aragon to support Benedict XIII, who was still alive at Peñíscola. At the end of the year 1422 Alfonso was to all intents and purposes in full control of the lovely kingdom which he longed to possess.

But the victories which the Aragonese monarch had won on the field of battle were lost in the heart of the queen. A coolness sprung up between them when Joanna discovered that her adopted son was to be no mere puppet in her hands, and it soon developed into a bitter hate. Joanna longed for the return of Sforza; she loudly proclaimed that Alfonso was practically holding her in captivity; and the fact that each lived in a separate and strongly fortified castle, whence they issued only on rare occasions, and under strong guards, to pay one another formal visits, lent color to the pretence. Finally, in 1423, a battle was fought outside of Naples between the Angevin and Aragonese forces, in which the latter were defeated; and soon afterward Sforza succeeded in carrying off Joanna to Aversa. Liberated from the tutelage of Alfonso, there was little doubt what the fickle queen would do. She revoked her adoption of the Aragonese monarch, and announced her intention of taking his rival, Louis of Anjou, as her son and heir in his stead. Without an overwhelming military and naval preponderance, the king of Aragon was powerless against such treachery as this; and though the issue of such combats as occurred between the rival forces was on the whole favorable to his cause, he determined to retire for the time being to Spain and watch events. Leaving his brother Pedro with a small army to defend as best he could the places which he still retained, he set sail in October, 1423, for Barcelona, taking a mild revenge on his enemies by plundering the Angevin town of Marseilles on the way.

It was nine long years before Alfonso got an opportunity to return to the land of his choice. During that interval his brother was gradually driven from one fortress to another, and finally obliged to take refuge in the Castello dell' Ovo in Naples, the only place which remained to him. In the diplomatic field, however, fortune veered around in favor of the king of Aragon the moment that he had departed from Italy. Pope Martin, like all the pontiffs of the period, had no desire to see the existing powers in Naples too strong, and had tended in the days of Alfonso's prosperity to support Anjou and Sforza; but now that the circumstances had changed, he was easily induced to assume an attitude of benevolent neutrality. In Henry VI of England, too, Alfonso found a useful ally. He also made successful overtures to the duke of Milan. Even in Naples sentiment began to declare in his favor. The duke of Anjou, relegated to the duchy of Calabria, enjoyed no real authority. The seneschal Caracciolo was the true sovereign of the realm under the queen, and consequently incurred the jealousy and hatred of the Neapolitan baronage. He knew that his power could not possibly be perpetuated beyond the term of his mistress's life, if indeed as long, unless he obtained outside support. Consequently in the year 1431 he began to make secret overtures to the king of Aragon.

Encouraged by these fresh developments, Alfonso began to prepare a new fleet and army for a fresh campaign against Naples. Since he was somewhat uncertain, however, as to the exact position of the different parties there, he took a leaf out of the book of his illustrious predecessor, Pedro the Great, and gave out that he was embarking on an expedition against Tunis. As usual, pretexts were not lacking: the most obvious being the interminable quarrel over the islands of Gerba and Kerkeni, which, despite an Aragonese ravaging expedition from Sicily in 1424, had fallen back once more into the hands of the Hafside sultans. In August, 1432, Alfonso landed with a considerable force at Gerba, and defeated the forces of the Tunisian sovereign in a battle, which Zurita describes in glowing terms, and in which many splendid trophies were doubtless won. Of permanent political results, however, this victory was absolutely barren. The Moors entirely refused to give up the island, and Alfonso, convinced of the futility of attempting to capture and hold it, soon abandoned all thought of fighting the North African powers. This expedition was in fact the last military enterprise of Spain against Tunis till the time of Charles V. It marks, in other words, the abandonment for one century of the schemes of political domination of the Hafside realm which had occupied earlier kings of Aragon, and the beginning of a period in which commercial relations take precedence of everything else.



But it was Naples, not Tunis, that really interested Alfonso; so that he desisted with but little regret from the North African campaign. In September, 1432, the king of Aragon crossed over to Sicily, where he learned of the sudden fall and death of the favorite Caracciolo; Queen Joanna had cast him off and he was soon after assassinated. As no one paid much attention to Louis of Anjou, the elimination of the grand seneschal paved the way for negotiations between Joanna and Alfonso; and, thanks to the skill with which the Aragonese agents manipulated the Neapolitan baronage, an arrangement was made in December, 1433, by which Joanna's adoption of Louis of Anjou was annulled, and Alfonso reinstated in the position which he had occupied twelve years before. But, as on former occasions, the moment of Alfonso's apparent triumph was the moment of his greatest danger. Pope Eugenius IV refused to ratify his recent treaty with Joanna, and soon after formed a league with the Emperor and the North Italian states to put him out of the peninsula. Before the year was over, Alfonso saw himself again obliged to retire to Sicily. In 1434 Louis of Anjou died, and his decease was followed, in February, 1435, by that of Queen Joanna herself; treacherous to the very end, she again disinherited Alfonso in her final will and testament, and left her throne to René, the younger brother of Louis of Anjou, who was at that time a prisoner in the hands of the duke of Burgundy. With the chief counterclaimant temporarily powerless, Alfonso promptly put forward a bold assertion of his rights to the kingdom of Naples, basing them on his adoption by Queen Joanna and on his descent from Constance, the wife of Pedro the Great. The immediate effect of this declaration, however, was to draw down upon the king of Aragon the heavy displeasure of the Pope. Eugenius demanded Naples as a fief of the Holy See, and, supported by the Genoese and the Visconti) made every preparation to fight for it. Alfonso opened the inevitable contest by besieging the town of Gaeta; the inhabitants were about to surrender when a Genoese fleet appeared to relieve it. As the king of Aragon had an enormous numerical superiority in galleys, he offered battle with absolute confidence, despite a considerable inferiority in lighter vessels; but in the ensuing action, August 5, 1435, which is usually known as the battle of Ponsa, the Genoese fought with unusual skill and a truly desperate fury, and were completely victorious. The king and the majority of his forces were captured, his brother Pedro being the only one of prominence who escaped. Most of his ships were taken and burned before his eyes. It was a terrible setback for the power which had been generally and justly regarded as supreme in the western Mediterranean for more than one hundred years.

Again, however, the spectacle of the humiliation of one side brought the inevitable revulsion of feeling in its favor, and desertion from the ranks of the other. Fifteenth century Italy, as has been often observed, was a microcosm of Europe in the succeeding age; the principle of the balance of power had begun, almost without men's realising it, to make itself felt, and this time it was the king of Aragon who was to profit by it. Moreover Alfonso's charming manners and personality stood him in good stead at this crisis. The Genoese admiral who had captured him entertained him as a guest of honor at Porto Venere, thus sparing him the humiliation of a sojourn among the rancorous Genoese. When he was handed over to Filippo Maria Visconti, who had been the leader of the coalition against him, the Milanese nobility came to the city gates to welcome him. The duchess of Milan received him on bended knees, and her husband, though at first he deemed it wise to avoid a personal meeting with his royal captive, sent word to assure him that, far from regarding him as his prisoner, he was proud to be able to place himself and his dominions at his disposal. It was a fitting return for countless examples of loyalty to friends in distress and of chivalry towards vanquished foes which Alfonso had given in the past, and which had won him his title of the 'Magnanimous.' The crafty Filippo Maria was shrewd enough to discern which way the wind was blowing, and quickly saw that it would be the height of folly for him to deprive Alfonso of his liberty. Since he could not possibly hope to conquer Naples himself, he preferred to see it in the hands of Spaniards rather than of Angevins; for the latter would be constantly passing through his own dominions on their way to and from it, while the former could

reach it by sea. It was a line of reasoning which frequently suggested itself to his Sforza successors in the course of the next hundred years, and explains many a subsequent French defeat in the peninsula. On this occasion it received additional emphasis from the popular enthusiasm for Elizabeth, the wife of the captive René of Anjou, whom that unfortunate prince had sent to represent him in Naples. She was warmly received by the inhabitants, and her husband was forthwith proclaimed king of the realm. The Aragonese surrendered one castle after another to her advancing armies, and were finally reduced to the fortress of Scylla on the strait of Messina. Obviously, if Filippo Maria did not promptly liberate Alfonso, the cause of Anjou would triumph. In the early spring of 1436, accordingly, the duke set his royal prisoner free, despite the protests of the unforgiving Genoese, who vented their anger by a revolt against their Milanese over-lord. Meantime Alfonso, joining forces with his brother Pedro, prepared once more to invade Naples. Gaeta and Terracina were taken in rapid succession; but much hard work remained to be done before the king of Aragon's triumph was complete. The proximity of his forces to the Patrimonium Petri again aroused the resentment of Eugenius IV, who strove to enlist the support of Genoa, Florence, and Venice against him, and sent a fresh army of invaders into Naples under his legate apostolic, Giovanni Vitelleschi, patriarch of Alexandria. Not until Alfonso began to negotiate with the refractory Council of Basel and the anti-pope elected by it, was Eugenius brought to terms. Angevin opposition, also, became increasingly vigorous at the same time. In 1438 Alfonso's rival René was released from captivity, returned to Naples, and received a royal welcome. The first attempt of the king of Aragon to besiege him there ended in a disastrous failure and the death of his brother Pedro; but finally, in June, 1442, Alfonso's army found a way into Naples by a subterranean aqueduct, which a tradition, accepted by Zurita, asserts was the same that was used for a similar purpose by Justinian's famous general Belisarius, nine centuries before. The capture of the town followed at once. Alfonso won golden opinions by forbidding wanton pillage and protecting the Neapolitan women from outrage by the licentious soldiery, while René of Anjou, defeated beyond the possibility of recovery, escaped on a Genoese galley from the realm over which he had aspired to rule. After making certain of the allegiance of the outlying portions of the kingdom, and as far as possible of the friendship of the papacy, the king of Aragon, on February 26, 1443, celebrated his triumph by a state entry of unparalleled magnificence into the conquered capital. Thus at last, after a struggle of twenty-two years' duration, the chief goal of his ambition had been attained, and a new realm added to the Aragonese Empire.

Alfonso the Magnanimous did not return again to Spain, but spent the rest of his days in Italy, and for the most part in Naples. He was one of the foremost figures in the wars and diplomacy of the peninsula until the day of his death. He took an active interest in the affairs of the Near East. He rivalled the Medici in his enthusiasm for humanism, and in the generosity of his patronage of the scholars and artists of the Renaissance. The most noteworthy feature of his political career in Italy was his relations with the Visconti and Sforza dukes of Milan. His consistent refusal to fight with the treacherous Filippo Maria prevailed over the latter's efforts to breed trouble for him; finally, on his death in 1447, the Milanese duke actually bequeathed to him the bulk of his lands, to the prejudice of his son-in-law, Francesco Sforza. But Alfonso, who perceived that the Milanese would not willingly tolerate the rule of Aragon, nor the rest of Italy such an upsetting of the balance of power, wisely refrained from prosecuting his rights. On March 25, 1450, Francesco Sforza entered Milan and was solemnly proclaimed and recognized as duke. The Aragonese claims, however, were not by any means forgotten. Alfonso's nephew Ferdinand subsequently attempted to revive them, and under Charles V the duchy was finally incorporated in the Spanish Empire. In the last few years of his life Alfonso had the satisfaction of humbling his ancient rivals, the Genoese, with a fleet which he had collected at the instance of Pope Calixtus III to fight the advancing Turks, and, had paid for with the tithes of the church. Genoa itself was blockaded, and was only delivered at the last moment by the withdrawal of the hostile ships

on the news of the death of the king; but the days of its greatness were gone forever, and it was henceforth relegated to the position of a satellite of France or of Milan. Outside the peninsula, also, the Aragonese king's political and diplomatic activity was incessant. He sent aid to Scanderbeg against the Turks in Albania. He might possibly have prevented the fall of Constantinople in 1453, if the other Italian states had supported him. He did his best to revive the Aragonese claims to the duchies of Athens and Neopatras. At his death, on June 27, 1458, he followed the precedent set by the majority of his predecessors, and divided his inheritance. Having no legitimate children, he bequeathed Naples to his bastard son Ferrante, while the rest of his realms, including Sicily, passed to his brother John. It was doubtless the only practical settlement under the circumstances. Aragon would not have tolerated Ferrante, and Alfonso would never have been content to leave Naples to any one else. That he did not attempt to bequeath more than the realm he loved best to the child of his love is a tribute to his political sagacity and restraint.

Altogether the reign of this brilliant monarch was fraught with tremendous possibilities for the future. It had given a new and fateful turn to the destinies of the Aragonese Empire. Alfonso had continued and carried further all the imperial, land-conquering projects of his predecessors, and he had added a host of military, diplomatic, and political responsibilities besides. Most significant of all, he had shifted the centre of gravity of the Aragonese Empire from Spain to Naples. He had refused to dwell in his native land; he either ignored it completely or else attempted to make use of it to pay the bills of his political and diplomatic ventures outside, or of his sumptuous Neapolitan court. All this was gall and wormwood to the sober Aragonese, and even the more enterprising Catalans became increasingly restless. As soon as the Aragonese Empire ceased to be directed from the realms of the Crown of Aragon their enthusiasm for it began to wane. In their eyes the fresh glories which Alfonso's reign had brought with it were no compensation for the reckless infringement of their constitutional liberties. The language used by a deputation of the Cortes of Aragon sent over to the king in 1452 is very noteworthy: "Sire, the war which has continued for seven years without ceasing has depopulated your frontiers to such a degree that men have ceased to till the soil there; Aragon, during these seven years, has expended four hundred thousand florins in the ransom of prisoners alone; all industry, all commerce is at a standstill. For such manifold evils, the country can find but one remedy—and that is the presence of its king." No words could have been more prophetic. They sum up the grievances of sixteenth-century Spain against the Emperor Charles V. They foreshadow a Spanish Empire ruled in non-Spanish interests and in non-Spanish ways. The Magnanimous King had sown the seeds of future conflict between national and dynastic interests. He had bequeathed to his successors an enlarged empire, but dissatisfied subjects. What was the solution to be? The future alone could tell, and the future was on the knees of the gods.

CHAPTER X  
THE LIBERTIES OF ARAGON

The history of the institutional development of the realms of the Crown of Aragon differs widely, as might be expected, from that of Castile. In the first place, we have here to do with a number of different states, each governed under a constitution of its own. When the Crowns of Aragon and Catalonia were joined by the marriage of Ramon and Petronilla in the twelfth century, each land retained its separate institutions, as did Valencia and the Balearics after they had been conquered. The sole tie between these realms was the fact that they possessed the same king and occasionally sent their representatives to meet in a joint Cortes; even the kingship of the Balearics, as we have already seen, was most of the time separated from that of Aragon until their final annexation in 1349. In the matter of language, moreover, there was the sharpest sort of division. The Catalan tongue is very similar to the Provençal, but quite different from the Aragonese, which is a dialect of Spanish. In Valencia a modified form of Catalan prevailed, but in a few regions which were permanently settled by Aragonese nobles, the Aragonese language maintained itself and is spoken today. The sovereigns of the house of Barcelona spoke Catalan, and were therefore linguistically at variance with their Aragonese subjects; those of the house of Trastámara, which succeeded them in 1412, spoke Castilian and Aragonese, and were therefore unintelligible to the Catalans. In addition to all this internal differentiation, the overseas possessions, Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples continued to maintain their own methods and framework of government after their conquest by Aragon; during much of the time, also, the last two were ruled by collateral lines of kings. Thus the development of Spanish separatism more than kept pace with the growth of the Spanish Empire to the eastward. There was to be no merging in the parent state; the new possessions, as they were acquired, retained their constitutional autonomy.

Each one of these different states possessed certain distinguishing characteristics which reflected themselves in its institutions and political life. In Catalonia, originally an aristocratic and agricultural country, which afterwards became commercial and democratic, we have at first the nearest approach to a full-fledged feudal system which any of the Iberian lands offers; this subsequently gave way to a most remarkable urban development—both political and economic—of which Barcelona was the centre. The Aragonese respect for law is shown by the growth and power of the Justicia—an officer of a sort which no other European state can boast. The preponderance of the city of Valencia is perhaps the outstanding fact in the government of the Valencian kingdom. The Italian and Mediterranean lands also all had their peculiarities. But, though each one of these different realms is sharply differentiated from all the rest, there is noticeable everywhere—or at least within all of the Spanish realms of the Crown of Aragon—a certain unity of purpose on the part of all classes and of the different individuals within each class which stands out in sharp contrast to the conditions prevalent in Castile, and gives to the constitutional history of these eastern realms a meaning and sequence which are conspicuous by their absence in the west. This spirit of cooperation, this sinking of individual differences for the common good, so utterly at variance with all that we have hitherto encountered in the history of Castile, makes itself principally evident in the crises of the great struggle against monarchical absolutism which raged intermittently from the reign of James the Conqueror to that of Pedro IV. The kingdom of Aragon proper was the centre of it. Catalonia and Valencia, too royalist perhaps to initiate such a revolution themselves, were yet powerfully affected by its ebbs and flows, and not ashamed to share in the spoils after the victory was won. A brief glance at the narrative history

of this mighty conflict, in which the Aragonese aristocracy constituted itself the protector of the realm against all the encroachments of the royal prerogative, will serve as the best possible background for a study of the institutions of the eastern kingdoms. It will make clear the nature of the spirit that animated them, and will illustrate, as nothing else can do, the many contrasts between the Castilians and the Aragonese. It goes to show that old Lord Brougham was not far wrong in asserting that “we meet with more strict limitations of the prerogative of the Crown in the former constitutions of some of the Peninsular Kingdoms than are anywhere to be found among the old governments of the European Continent, except perhaps in Hungary.”

The struggle begins to take definite shape in the reign of James the Conqueror. At the time of his accession he was less than six years old, and virtually a prisoner in the hands of Simon de Montfort. His father, “the most bounteous king that ever was in Spain,” had reduced the realm to bankruptcy. The land was torn by factions, in which the king’s uncles and the most powerful nobles disputed the precedence. The situation was in fact closely analogous to that which was constantly occurring in Castile, but the outcome was utterly different. Instead of seizing the opportunity for further abasement of the royal power, the warring barons at once recognized that the king’s immediate liberation and restoration were of paramount necessity to the safety of the state, and accomplished them within eight months of his father’s death. When the young monarch had been restored to his own dominions, the magnates indeed resumed their quarrels, but the aged Ximeno Cornel, “the wisest man in Aragon and the best adviser,” who “grieved for the evils that he saw so great” in the realm, devoted himself to the maintenance of the central power; the church and the cities rallied loyally to its support, and James himself, as time went on, became increasingly expert in the difficult art of reigning. After thirteen years of turbulent minority (1214-27) he emerged triumphant, largely, no doubt, through his own efforts and those of his advisers, but also because of the fact that the mass of his people were thoroughly tired of factional strife and recognized its futility. Even the baronage had apparently realized that excessive restrictions of monarchical power were bound to work out badly in the end.

Half a century later the king and the aristocracy encountered one another again, but with a very different distribution of forces. James had meantime enlarged his dominions by the acquisition of Valencia and the Balearics. Internal strife was for the moment in abeyance. The king had carried the power of the Aragonese monarchy to a far higher point than it had ever attained before. With the aid of the civilians and canonists he had modified the laws of the land by the *Fueros* of Huesca of 1247 in a sense hostile to feudal privilege. He was recognized as one of the foremost sovereigns of the day. In the hour of his strength his hapless son-in-law, Alfonso X of Castile, appealed to him for aid against the Moors of North Africa, and James deemed it expedient to grant it, even though extra funds were imperatively necessary in order to enable him to fit out a fleet. Maritime Catalonia came forward with a conditional grant of *bovage*; but when the king attempted to extort a similar tax from the Cortes of Aragon at Saragossa he was met with a stern refusal: “We do not know in Aragon what *bovage* is”, retorted one of the members. Despite all his power and prestige, the fact that James had dared to propose an unconstitutional levy had put all the Aragonese baronage up in arms; not only was *bovage* denied him but every other sort of impost as well. Encouraged by this initial success, the Cortes passed from their refusal of funds to an enumeration of their grievances. A Union or league of the nation—forerunner of a mightier Union soon to follow—was formed, and twelve articles were drawn up, in which various infractions of the power of the aristocracy by the triumphant monarchy were alleged. In reply the king tried to justify himself, promised respect for the *fueros*, and grumblingly compared his treatment by the Aragonese nobles to the persecution of Christ by the Jews? Some further concessions were granted at a Cortes at Ejea in 1265, where feudal privilege “attained the highest point it was destined to reach in the Conqueror’s reign”; but others were refused, and “the result of the struggle was a compromise, by which the nobility secured indeed the confirmation of the



privileges of their order, but otherwise failed to trammel the King's liberty of action in any vital respect." In the fact that complete abasement of the monarchy did not follow the restriction of royal encroachments lies one of the chief differences between mediaeval Aragon and Castile.

In the next two reigns the struggle reached its culmination. Under Pedro III the expedition to Sicily and its consequences served once more to light the fires of Aragonese discontent. To all the old grievances was added anger at the cost of a distant enterprise of which the Aragonese did not see the value, and from which they were sure that Catalonia would derive the real profit. There was also deep dread of the hostility of France, and of the papal interdict which had followed in its train. Altogether, the Aragonese felt that they had not been taken into the king's confidence, and that the project on which he had embarked without consulting them had ended disastrously. All these grievances burst forth at the Cortes of Tarazona, in September, 1283, after the king's return from the Sicilian expedition. So deep was the national resentment that the cities supported the nobles, and when Pedro answered their petitions for the observance of their fueros and liberties with a haughty speech, they proceeded to form a new Union for the defense of them. The members of this formidable confederation solemnly promised one another mutual support for the redress of their grievances, saving, their due allegiance to the crown. They agreed to proceed by force against any who should play them false, and to defend one another's persons and goods against any royal processes initiated without the consent of the Justicia of Aragon—holding that in such cases they were absolved from their oath of fidelity to their sovereign. They even went so far as to declare that under such circumstances they regarded themselves as free to make common cause with the Infante Alfonso, the heir to the throne, and to expel King Pedro from the realm. "They were all of them", says Zurita, "so unanimous on this point, that the *Ricos Hombres* and the Knights labored no more strenuously for the maintenance of their privileges and liberties than did the commons and the lower classes; for they all were of the opinion that Aragon existed, not by virtue of the forces of the kingdom, but of liberty, and it was the will of them all that when liberty should perish, the realm also should perish with it." The king was naturally alarmed at the seriousness of the opposition he had encountered, and prorogued the Cortes to Saragossa, promising at the same time to examine the complaints alleged. In the interim fresh demands were added to the old. The nation was obviously in deadly earnest, and in view of the threatening aspect of foreign affairs Pedro was obliged to yield. The instrument in which the royal concessions were made is known to history as the General Privilege, and it has sometimes been compared to Magna Carta. Both are singular mixtures of feudal and national claims. Both aim at putting a term to monarchical usurpations without prejudice to the position of a king who keeps within the law. Both strenuously assert that they are not innovations but a return to ancient liberties which had been infringed by the crown. But there is, of course, the widest possible divergence between the circumstances of their origin and the character of the kings from whom they were extorted. The members of the Union continued even in the moment of their triumph to preserve a respect for Pedro III which the barons at Runnymede never accorded to John Lackland. Their great seal represents the sovereign seated on his throne and the members of the Union on their knees before him, in the attitude of suppliants, as a sign of their loyalty. On the other hand, a long line of spears in the background of the picture indicates that the confederates had the means at their disposal to enforce their demands, in case the king should refuse to listen to them.

The chief provisions of this memorable act are as follows. The king swore to observe all the ancient fueros and privileges of the realm, and promised that in future no Aragonese subject should be tried or convicted without due process of law; all lands and goods confiscated during the reigns of Pedro and of his father were to be returned; all donations and grants from the royal domain to the *ricos hombres* were to be validated and confirmed; no fief was to be forfeited without the consent of the Justicia and of the royal council. All nobles were to have the unquestioned right to leave the service of the king and to seek another lord outside the realm for

any cause whatsoever; and to recommend to the king's favor and protection on their departure their wives and children, vassals and goods. No *rico hombre* was to be obliged to render military service beyond the boundaries of the realm or overseas, on the ground of any fief or honor held of the king. Representatives of all ranks and classes of society were to have a place in the royal council, and to be consulted in regard to peace and war and the general welfare of the realm. Only natives of the kingdom were to be permitted to sit as judges. No new impost or tax was to be established; the salt tax and the *quinta* were to be abolished. Finally, annual Cortes were to be held at Saragossa, and the members of the Union were to have the right to present fresh demands from time to time.

The concessions of King Pedro to his Aragonese subjects were reechoed in Valencia and Catalonia. As the operation of the *fueros* in Aragon had been specifically extended to the former kingdom in the reign of James the Conqueror, the Valencians were permitted to appropriate to themselves all the rights granted in the General Privilege as a matter of course; moreover the fact that Valencia and Valencia's affairs are constantly mentioned in the text of the instrument indicates that this had been intended from the first. A series of parallel privileges was also granted to the Catalonians—the more willingly because they had greatly aided Pedro in the conquest of Sicily, and were about to bear the brunt of an invasion from France. But it was one thing to accede to the demands of his subjects in theory and another to observe them in practice. The Valencians were bullied into a repudiation of the 'Fuero of Aragon' within a short time after they had been granted it; while the Aragonese, who discerned unmistakable signs that Pedro intended ultimately to evade his promises to them, strengthened the bonds of their Union, began to raise troops, and opened negotiations, as a sovereign power, with the king's enemies in Navarre. Whether or not they would have dared to do so much if Pedro had not been laboring under the terrible incubus of papal censure may well be doubted; but as it was, despite the royal entreaties, and the pressure of the danger of invasion from France, they continued in their revolt, and threatened to paralyze the military efficiency of the realm. The fact, however, that zeal for the assertion of class privilege was now beginning to take the precedence of patriotism in the ranks of the rebels was speedily perceived by King Pedro, who cleverly utilized the fact for his own advantage. He wisely ignored the demands of the members of the Union, in the hope that the untimeliness of their complaints would deprive them of popular sympathy, and that their rebellious ardor would cool for lack of an object to vent itself upon. In July, 1285, his foresight was justified by the event. The insurgents decided to postpone the redress of their grievances and aid the king against the French. Pedro, however, was not destined to reap the reward of his statesmanship; for at Perpignan, on St. Martin's Day, he died.

The absence of Alfonso III on the Majorcan expedition at the moment of his father's death afforded the members of the Union an opportunity to organize a fresh resistance; while the fact that the danger from France was temporarily set aside gave them an excuse for returning to their grievances. Beginning with the complaint, unjustifiable under the circumstances, that Alfonso had dared to assume the title of king of Aragon without waiting to swear to the maintenance of their *fueros*, they went on to demand the reformation of the royal household, and the banishment of all the royal counsellors of whom they did not approve. The monarch was rudely summoned to Saragossa to discuss the affairs of the nation with the Cortes, and to revoke all grants of fiefs made since the death of Pedro. The malcontents threatened to refuse all payment of taxes in case he failed to comply, and to unite to resist him by force. The king appeared, but showed unexpected firmness in refusing the Union's demands, with the result that the more fainthearted of the confederates deserted the cause. The rest Alfonso tried to win over by concessions, and was making good progress towards the desired end when he was called away on the expedition against Minorca. Then, when his back was turned, all the elements of revolt broke forth afresh. The malcontents ravaged Valencia. They sent messengers to France, to Castile, and to Granada

begging for alliances. They almost went so far as to recognize the right of the papal protégé, the French king's son, to the throne of Aragon. There could no longer be the slightest question that they had gone far beyond the widest possible interpretation of the fueros and privileges of the realm. Constitutional and feudal progress by this time had outrun administrative order with a vengeance, but the king was at present too weak to defend his just rights. All attempts at compromise failed; the Union had the power in its hands and proposed to use it. On Christmas day, 1287, Alfonso made a solemn entry into Saragossa, and there signed two documents known to history by the significant name of the 'Privileges of Union,' and described, with only slight exaggeration, as "the most tremendous power ever conceded by a king to his subjects." By them he promised not to proceed against any of the members of the Union save by sentence of the Justicia and with the consent of the Cortes, which were to be convoked annually at Saragossa; and the national assembly was given the right to elect and assign to the king certain persons who were to have seats in his royal council. Sixteen castles were handed over by the monarch as security for the observance of his promises; and finally, in case he should evade them, he formally recognized the right of the Union to depose him and to choose another king in his stead. In the following year, the members of the Union further declared that the 'Fuero of Aragon' and all the liberties and privileges which went with it were extended to the kingdom of Valencia.

Most of the provisions of the Privileges of Union, even more than those of the General Privilege which preceded them, remained unfulfilled in fact. The castles were not all handed over; the decrees and decisions of the Justicia were not executed; though the counsellors whom the Privilege of Union imposed upon the king were chosen, their advice was often ignored; and the Cortes did not meet annually. The organization of the Union, however, remained unshaken throughout the rest of the reign of Alfonso III and the first ten years of that of James II. The latter's caution and known respect for the law, and also possibly the emigration of a number of the nobles to Italy, which he secretly encouraged, prevented any open breach for a time; but finally, in 1301, the news that an outbreak similar to that of 1287 was imminent forced the king to take vigorous measures for the defense of his authority. On this occasion, however, the royal cause was completely victorious. That the Cortes and the Justicia promptly rallied to its support may be taken as a significant proof that Aragon realized that the Union had gone too far for the good of the realm. Certainly their alliance facilitated the king's triumph. James was able to pose as defender of parliamentary privilege and of the authority of the courts against the assaults of a disloyal and selfish baronage. After a brief struggle the Justicia pronounced the annulment of the Union as an illegal institution; he revoked all its acts, and delivered over all its members and their goods to the royal mercy. James had the wisdom to use his victory with moderation, and this, coupled with the fortunate circumstances under which he had won it, prevented a recrudescence of trouble for many years to come. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the most notable triumphs of the reign of this king were gained in his dealings with his rebel subjects at home. In a work on the development of the Spanish Empire they must necessarily be relegated to an inconspicuous place, but they are quite worthy of a separate volume in themselves. James's patience, perseverance, and, above all, his skillful utilization of the legists that flocked to his court, are the chief elements which combined to give him the victory; and his success in converting the Justicia into an ally of the monarchy was the outward and visible sign of his triumph. His deathbed boast was fully justified: "I have passed many a sleepless night," he protested, "in planning how to cause my subjects to enjoy the blessings of justice and peace."

The final stage of the struggle of king and barons was postponed till the reign of Pedro IV. For though the Union of James's day had been dispersed, the Privileges of Union were still extant; and as long as the Privileges remained, a new Union might at any time be created. A quarrel in the royal family over the succession to the throne gave the signal for a fresh outbreak in 1346-47. Pedro's first wife, Mary of Navarre, had borne him no male children who survived.

As the law of Aragon excluded women from the throne, the heir presumptive was Pedro's younger brother, James. Pedro, however, had many reasons to dislike and mistrust this man—particularly because of his friendship with King James of Majorca—and determined, in defiance of the custom of the land, to leave the throne to his daughter, Constance, in default of male heirs in the direct line. This decision was much resented by the mass of his subjects, not only as a violation of the fundamental laws, but also because the proud spirit of the Aragonese bridled at the thought of being ruled by a woman. The cause of James found adherents on every hand. The discontent, moreover, spread rapidly to Valencia, always closely in touch with Aragon, and especially so on this occasion since it was the regular residence of the Infante. Feeling that he could not be safe as long as his brother remained in the southern kingdom, Pedro summoned him to leave it, and conferred its governorship in his absence on one of his own adherents. But if James's departure from Valencia promised to give Pedro quiet in that quarter, his presence in Saragossa, whither he at once repaired, served to redouble the discontent there. Skillful utilization of the magic words 'liberties' and 'fueros' produced the inevitable effect. The Union, abolished in the reign of James, reconstituted itself with spontaneous and unbounded enthusiasm. The fact that the cities, with but few exceptions, unhesitatingly threw in their lot with the nobles was of evil augury for the monarchy, which was thereby deprived of its strongest support; while their accession to the ranks of the Union relieved the latter of the charge of being devoted merely to feudal and aristocratic ends. The reservation that it pursued its aims "saving its due allegiance to the crown" was also most useful as a rallying cry in a land where respect for the law has ever been very great, and at the same time it was not sufficiently specific to hamper freedom of action. And the example of Saragossa was soon followed by Valencia. Despite all that Pedro's representative there could do, another Union, modelled on that of Aragon, was promptly formed in the southern kingdom; moreover the two bodies soon came to an agreement that they should fight in unison for their common ends, and that neither should treat with the king without the consent of the other. In Catalonia alone did Pedro find support. There the principles of the Union had not penetrated; and the long-established partiality of the Aragonese monarchs for the inhabitants of this maritime and commercial province was richly rewarded in their hour of danger and distress.

Despite the support of the Catalonians, Pedro was as yet in no condition to defeat his enemies by force; but it was in just such crises as this that he invariably displayed his highest talents as a diplomat and intriguer. After demanding a safe conduct, to the great indignation of his subjects, who could not bear the thought that their honor or loyalty was doubted, he acquiesced in the rebels' petitions that he should come to Saragossa and summon the national Cortes. Having satisfied himself on his arrival that his foes had the military power to enable them to enforce whatever demands they elected to make, he acceded to most of their demands. Annual Cortes, expulsion of unpopular (Catalonian) counsellors, and acceptance of new ones selected by the Union, together with the confirmation of other concessions embodied in the second of the two Privileges of 1287, were granted one after the other. Hostages were given, and sixteen castles delivered up as security for the performance of the royal promises; Pedro himself was virtually a prisoner of the Union in his palace at Saragossa, while at the same time his presence there served to give a show of legality to the rebels' cause. But just at the moment that the king of Aragon seemed about to drain the cup of humiliation to the dregs, his fortunes began to revive. Despite all the hostages demanded of him, he had managed to retain about his person his mayor domo, Bernaldo de Cabrera, a violent royalist, whose powers of diplomacy and intrigue were not exceeded by his own. The latter began by detaching from the Union Lope de Luna, the richest noble of the three realms, whom he won over by promising him the much-desired post of governor-general of Aragon; he also opened communications with the remnant of the royalist party in Valencia. Encouraged by these signs of returning fortune, Pedro ventured roundly to accuse his brother James of treason and felony in a solemn session of the Cortes, and to challenge

him to mortal combat. The duel was declined, but a scene of extraordinary violence ensued; the crowd broke into the church where the session was being held, but the king and his adherents escaped unharmed. Not even yet, however, did Pedro feel strong enough to appeal to arms. In late October, 1347, he left Saragossa for the friendlier soil of Catalonia, after confirming all his concessions to his foes, and annulling all oaths of allegiance to his daughter Constance. But though he outwardly preserved a calm demeanor, and apparently yielded every point that his enemies demanded, the fires of fury were raging within him at the check he had received. Though seemingly powerless, he was in reality plotting busily to regain all and more than he had lost, as his enemies were soon to discover to their undoing.

The next event was the death of the Infante, on November 19, 1347, at Barcelona, whither he had gone for a meeting of the Catalonian Cortes. So convenient was his demise for the purposes of the king, that Pedro was universally believed to have brought it to pass. Of course James's death was the signal for the outburst of war both in Valencia and in Aragon; but it was in Valencia, where the Infante was deeply beloved, that the struggle was by far the most serious. The royal representative there, Pedro de Exerica, was totally unable to make head against the rebellion. The king, who rushed to his rescue with a small force of loyal Catalonians, was promptly shut up in Murviedro and forced to confirm the Valencian Union, grant the Valencians a Justicia, and exclude Cabrera and other confirmed royalists from his council. A subsequent attempt of Pedro to escape to Teruel was discovered and forestalled. Amid the threatenings of a furious crowd, the king and queen were handed over to the heads of the Valencian Union and escorted to the capital, where the populace welcomed them with jeers. A series of fresh humiliations, vividly described in the king's chronicle, followed; but even at the lowest ebb of his fortunes Pedro continued to intrigue and plot, while the indefatigable Cabrera labored night and day in Barcelona to fan the fires of Catalonian loyalty. Finally the outbreak of the pestilence gave Pedro an excuse for demanding license to depart from Valencia, where he had been kept virtually a prisoner for two months. After extorting from him a renewal of past concessions, the authorities finally suffered him to escape (June, 1348). It was a grave error, for with the king at liberty all the forces of royalism raised their head. The scene of interest shifted in the next few weeks to Aragon. Lope de Luna, the chief of the royalist forces there, prepared for a trial of strength on the field of battle; while the king, by intrigue and bribery, ably seconded his efforts, and actually succeeded in detaching hostile Castile from the ranks of his enemies, and in gaining from Alfonso XI a force of six hundred horsemen. The final encounter occurred at Epila, on the self-same spot where, seven months before, the forces of the Valencian Union had won a temporary victory over Exerica. Despite a considerable inferiority in numbers, the royalists charged with such vigor that the troops of the Union gave way all along the line. Most of the rebel chiefs remained dead on the field, though their principal leader, the Infante Ferdinand, who was wounded and taken prisoner by the king's Castilian auxiliaries, was ultimately suffered to escape to the western kingdom. On every hand the king's victory was complete (July 21, 1348)

The battle of Epila was the death knell of the Union in Aragon. Saragossa submitted at once to the royalist forces, and purchased an ignoble immunity from punishment by delivering over those leaders of the insurrection (thirteen in number) who had not taken refuge in flight. They were straightway hung at the gates of the town; and similar executions occurred in other cities of the realm. All the royal concessions of the previous months were, of course, revoked; all the acts and treaties of the Union were solemnly annulled as illegal; its seal was broken and its name formally abolished. The Privileges of Union of 1287, "the root and cause of all the evil," were destroyed in most dramatic fashion. The original parchment was produced, and in the presence of his subjects the king furiously cut and hacked it into a hundred pieces with his dagger, wounding himself slightly in the process, so careless had he become in his blind rage. "From that time forth," says Zurita, "the name of the Union was permanently abolished, and also that license



and lawlessness which men called liberty, but which, born as it was of a popular uprising and seeking to maintain itself by force of arms, perished justly by them, as is usually the case, and succumbed to the might of the power of the Crown.”

From Aragon Pedro turned on Valencia, where the insurrection had continued at full blast, undismayed by the fate of the Union in the sister kingdom. Though Pedro had a powerful fleet and an army at his disposal, though Aragon as well as Catalonia was now supporting him, and though Castile remained strictly neutral, the Valencians refused to surrender without a struggle. They withdrew within the walls of their capital, making occasional sorties to harass the royal troops, and meantime strove desperately, though ineffectually, to secure relief from without. But when they saw their fair country ruthlessly devastated by the king’s forces, and the lines of the besieging army drawn so tightly round their city as to preclude the possibility of their escape, they were convinced that “the anger of God had fallen upon them to punish them for their sins,” and prepared to treat for peace. So angry was Pedro at the resistance of the Valencians that he was with difficulty dissuaded by his counsellors from razing their city to the ground. After much argument he reluctantly agreed to accept its complete submission and an acknowledgment of his unquestioned right to dispose of all its liberties and immunities according to his own discretion. Finally he granted the inhabitants a pardon, from which all active participants in the preceding revolt were specifically excluded. Needless to add, the Valencian Union was utterly shattered by this defeat. “From that day onward,” as Pedro significantly puts it in his chronicle, “Valencia remained in our grace and love.”<sup>1</sup> But the punishment of the guilty rebels which paved the way for this happy consummation was far more frightful than that which had fallen on their Aragonese comrades a few months before. It reminds us of the horrors enacted in Valencia two and a half centuries before in the days of the Cid; clearly the king had much faith in the power of terrorism. One example will suffice: the metal of the bell which had summoned the leaders of the Union to council meetings was poured, red hot, down the throats of the condemned.

Thus ended after a struggle of more than a century this singular contest between sovereign and subject, around which the whole internal history of Aragon during the period in question revolves, in which Valencia actively participated, and to which Catalonia was not entirely a stranger. It is still too early to attempt to pronounce definite judgment upon it; much new material remains to be discovered; many doubtful points need to be cleared up. There are two fundamental questions on which the final verdict will inevitably depend. First: Can the aims of the rebels be said to have been in any sense really national in their scope, or was their uprising in effect solely a revolt of a powerful and united feudal aristocracy, bent on the assertion of its special privileges, but clever enough to associate with itself at certain stages representatives of the third estate in order to disguise the true nature of its aims, and to gain for itself the appearance of popular sanction? Second: Even granting that the Union was in some degree national in its character and aspirations, was it safe for any nation, at the stage of development which Aragon had then attained, so considerably to limit the power of its king. Would not anarchy have been the sole real result of a premature attempt to anticipate modern constitutionalism? Was not absolutism, at that period, the only sure road to peace and order, as England, France, and Castile were to learn in the next century, to their cost. Certainly the writings of patriots like Zurita and Blancas are distinctly favorable to the royal cause, and strongly assert that the defeat of the Union was for the best interest of the realm. Moreover, it is worth noting that though Pedro punished ferociously at the moment, he used his victory in later years with remarkable moderation. Against the higher nobility he remained indeed inexorable; their power was broken beyond the possibility of repair; but he extended the rights of the lesser baronage, and restored and amplified the charters of the cities that had risen in arms against him. Most important of all, as we shall see in detail in another place, he confirmed and strengthened the authority of the Justicia, who, though his appointment was now unreservedly in the royal hands, continued in the

next period to perform the work which the wannest apologists of the Union had declared to be the true function of his office—the defense of the subject against breach of privilege and sentence contrary to the law. Pedro's successors, moreover, at least down to Alfonso the Magnanimous, followed on the whole the same wise course, with the gratifying result that the history of Aragon, during most of the century previous to the accession of the Catholic Kings, presents an agreeable contrast to contemporary Castile in the general stability of its institutions, and in the absence of baronial rebellion. Yet, on the other hand, even the bitterest critic of the aims of the Union and the most ardent advocate of royal absolutism will not be prepared to deny that the cause for which the Aragonese rebels lived and died was far more deserving of our sympathy than the savage, wanton, disorganized outbursts of the self-seeking nobility of Castile.

They certainly fought for an ideal; it may have been a wrong one, but it was unquestionably higher than individual aggrandizement. The whole tone of the contest in Aragon connotes a more advanced stage of political development than the western kingdom had yet reached. It has justly been compared to the struggle for the charters in thirteenth century England; it has a meaning and sequence; it appeals to the sympathy and intelligence of the modern student, who often finds himself at a loss to account for the strivings of the aristocracy in Castile. And lastly, though the aims of the Union were not attained, the attitude of the Aragonese sovereigns after the battle of Epila plainly shows that they realized that their subjects would never let them push their victories too far, or tolerate lawless despotism. Though the Union had doubtless attempted to impose excessive limitations upon the king, it had so strengthened the spirit of resistance to unjustifiable monarchical encroachments that things could never go to the opposite extreme. Though the mediaeval Castilian barons subjected their weak sovereigns to humiliations far more degrading than any which their Aragonese contemporaries suffered, they were unable to oppose any barrier to the well organized despotism of Ferdinand and Isabella. In Aragon, on the other hand, the defenses against royal absolutism remained so strong that the Catholic Kings wisely refrained from any attempt to overthrow them by force, and instead followed the policy of leaving the eastern realms alone, in the hope that their passion for liberty would die down from lack of fuel to feed the flames.

CHAPTER XI  
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EASTERN KINGDOMS AND OF THEIR  
DEPENDENCIES

THE great internal struggle which has been described in the preceding chapter affords the principal explanation of the fact, already frequently noticed, that Aragon and Valencia held themselves largely aloof from the ambitious plans and enterprises of their sovereigns in Italy and in the Mediterranean Sea. Their attention was turned inward, not outward; they were, in fact, rather negatively than positively important in the upbuilding of the Aragonese Empire. Consequently we are justified in restricting our examination of their institutions to the smallest possible space, in emphasizing only those features which are unique and distinctive, particularly those which served to limit the royal power; for it is really almost as a hindrance to imperial development that we are concerned with them. The constitution and internal conditions of maritime and commercial Catalonia, on the other hand, will have to be more fully discussed: for it was from Catalonia that all the great adventures overseas were launched; she was the true center of the Aragonese Empire. A few words must also be added concerning the methods of governing the Mediterranean possessions as they were successively acquired. Of course the real life of the system we are about to describe was destined to be but short. After the union of the crowns under Ferdinand and Isabella, Castile so completely took the precedence of the eastern kingdoms that she swallowed up many of their institutional peculiarities, in fact at least, if not in name. Though the ancient framework of the mediaeval constitutions of the Aragonese realms and their dependencies was permitted to subsist as a matter of form, Castilian methods and principles practically prevailed after the beginning of the sixteenth century throughout every portion of the Spanish Empire. On the other hand, it would be impossible to give any adequate idea of the real nature of that extraordinary agglomeration without some account of the infinite variety of its component parts. It is therefore essential for us to familiarise ourselves with the more salient characteristics of its eastern and ultimately less important portions.

**ARAGON**

The predominance and power of the aristocracy of Aragon is the outstanding characteristic of the social structure of that kingdom. In its long struggle with the monarchy it had won for itself a position so high, that, though defeated at Epila, it never ceased to boast that it was the truest guardian of the national liberties. Other forces, moreover, had been at work from earliest times to assure its preeminence. Aragon had played so small a part in the work of the Reconquest that the need to concentrate in walled towns was not felt there to the same degree that it was in Castile. A more sedentary and rural existence was therefore possible, and a system of large, landed holdings—the first essential for a flourishing nobility—grew up and was perpetuated. There was, moreover, something more nearly resembling a regular feudal system in Aragon than in Castile; and it was considerably accentuated by the union with Catalonia—a still more feudal state—in 1137. By the second half of the thirteenth century, at the time of the Cortes of Ejea, a very real feudalism may be said to have been in existence in Aragon, where, curiously enough, it began to flourish at the very moment that elsewhere it showed signs of decadence.

Perhaps the most obvious outward sign of the power and importance of the Aragonese aristocracy lies in the fact that it comprised two great categories—an upper and a lower nobility,

each with a separate representation in the Cortes—so that there were, with the clergy and burgesses, not three but four estates of the realm. The upper nobility, who claimed descent from the first conquerors of the land, were known as barons or *ricos hombres*; of these there were but nine in the reign of James the Conqueror. They held of the king fiefs and ‘honors’ consisting of the revenues of different towns and were obliged in return to render him military service from one to three months each year at the rate of one knight for every five hundred sols of rent. They were exempt from corporal punishment, from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals of the realm, save that of the Justicia, and from the payment of regular taxes; they also possessed the unquestioned right of renunciation of allegiance to their sovereign. They could be deprived of their lands only for certain specified crimes, one of which was falsely ascribing, under oath, the attributes and privileges of noble birth to anyone who did not actually possess them.

The lower nobility were divided into three classes, *mesnaderos*, *caballeros*, and *infanzones*. The first originated in the reign of James the Conqueror, and, as their name (from *mesnada* or royal household) indicates, were specially attached to the royal person; they were supposed to be descendants in the male line of *ricos hombres*, and were only slightly inferior to them. They were vassals of the king alone, but could live without dishonor at the expense of a *rico hombre*—though only as a friend and not as a vassal. *Caballeros*, or knights, enjoyed exemption from taxation and certain other privileges of nobility, such as that no one should lay hands on the bridles of their horses to detain them. The title, however, connoted rather an acquired dignity than a status by birth, and it could, apparently, be conferred by prelates and *ricos hombres* as well as by the crown. The *infanzones*, at the bottom of the ladder, were sons of knights, and were naturally very numerous; but the possession of a number of more or less important privileges marked them off sharply from the burgesses.’ In general, one gains the impression that the kings deliberately increased the number and prerogatives of these lesser nobles as a counterweight to the excessive powers of the *ricos hombres*; but they certainly did not succeed in breeding any permanent dissension in the ranks of the baronage. The Aragonese aristocracy stood united, on the whole, in a way which furnishes a most impressive contrast with their self-seeking Castilian contemporaries; and they were not only zealous for the welfare of their order as a whole, but also for that of the entire body politic. Their division into two estates served to strengthen, not to weaken them; they thus constituted themselves one half of the national assembly and vindicated their title to the high position to which they laid claim.

The clergy and the municipalities were far less important in mediaeval Aragon than in Castile, as was natural in view of the comparatively modest part borne by the Aragonese in the war of the Reconquest. Down to the battle of Epila, the churchmen and most of the larger cities tended in general to throw in their lot with the baronage against the monarchy and sought to win for themselves privileges like those of the aristocracy; after the close of the internal struggle, both these orders made some independent gains at the expense of the defeated nobles. The fueros granted to the different cities do not offer the same variety and divergence as do those of Castile; but the capital city of Saragossa claimed and attained a practical predominance over all the other towns of the realm, to which we have no parallel in the western kingdom. It is indicated by the fact that Saragossa invariably demanded the right to represent one half the *brazo real* or fourth estate whenever a committee was appointed to do business in its name, and also by the so-called *Privilegio de los Veinte*, a sort of special constitution granted to the city by Alfonso I in 1119, which vested extraordinary powers in a body of twenty of the principal inhabitants, and conferred exceptional rights and prerogatives upon the municipality as a whole.

The mass of the rural population led a hard existence; and the lot of the Aragonese serf was even worse than that of the Castilian *solariego*. There were but few free landed proprietors, except among the ranks of the nobles; the peasants were all of them more or less at the mercy of their masters, who could “treat them well or badly, according to their own desires, and take away

their goods without appeal, without the king's having any right to interfere". So completely were some of them bound to the soil, that, in case the land on which they lived was partitioned among the sons of the lord, each of the serfs who dwelt thereon could, according to the strict letter of the law, "be divided in pieces with it."

The condition of the Aragonese Jews in the later Middle Ages is not strikingly different from that of their coreligionists in Castile. Like them, they were very numerous, and enjoyed in the thirteenth century wider freedom and privileges than were accorded to them in the other nations of Western Europe. They were segregated in special localities, or *aljamas*, in the most important towns of the realm, and their rights and prerogatives were strictly defined. James the Conqueror was particularly active in protecting them; he recognized their high economic value, and frequently employed them in the financial business of the crown. At the same time, however, the ecclesiastical authorities were mustering their forces for the campaign of proselytism and persecution which began in earnest in the fourteenth century. The Castilian massacres of 1391 had their counterparts in all the realms of the Crown of Aragon, though certainly to a much less extent in Aragon proper than in Catalonia and Valencia. Large numbers of Hebrews were slain outright; most of the rest accepted baptism—some, no doubt, because of the preachings of men like St. Vincent Ferrer and Gerónimo de Santa Fé, others in order to escape from further outrages. In one respect it seems that the lot of the *converses*, if they showed any signs of relapsing, must have been worse in Aragon than in Castile; for the papal Inquisition, though it had not been extended to the western kingdom, had been established in the eastern realms since the time of its foundation in the thirteenth century, and furnished the machinery, ready to hand, for the detection and punishment of religious backsliders. But as a matter of fact the Inquisition "had sunk into a condition almost dormant in the spiritual lethargy of the century preceding the Reformation", while on the other hand the Aragonese as a whole, and especially their rulers, were considerably more alive than the Castilians to the financial and economic value of the Jewish portions of the population, and consequently more reluctant to persecute them. We therefore find the *conversos* occupying the highest offices in the government, in the army, and at the court, and marrying their children into the foremost families of the land; while the first part of the fifteenth century witnessed a distinct revulsion of feeling in favor of the professed Jews who had remained loyal to the faith of their fathers. Many of the legal restrictions under which they lived were not rigorously enforced; by the time of the accession of the Catholic Kings they had regained, in practice, a large part of the privileges which in theory they had previously lost.

The Moors in the kingdom of Aragon were even better off, and were also more fortunate than their brethren in Castile. The intimate commercial and political relations which most of the Aragonese sovereigns maintained with the North African states had their natural counterpart in the very notable degree of liberality in their treatment of the Moorish inhabitants of their own dominions. A large measure of religious and political freedom was permitted them in return for the payment of certain special and extra imposts, and for their subjection to a number of economic limitations of which the Christian population reaped the benefit. There was virtually no attempt at proselytism or conversion; they had escaped the odium which proverbial Hebrew avarice had fastened on the Jews; there are many evidences that they were generally regarded as valuable members of society. The practice of selling into slavery Moorish prisoners captured in war practically ceased in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries with the completion of the Reconquest and the capture of the Balearics.

We pass from the different ranks and classes of society to the various organs of the central government. The Aragonese kingship was hereditary, like that of Castile, but the royal powers and prerogatives, in theory at least, were much less extensive. The king's oath before the Justicia and the representatives of the four estates of the realm to observe all the laws and privileges of the land was indispensable to the validity of his accession; and the formula of allegiance, which,



according to contemporary authorities, was still in use in the sixteenth century, clearly indicates that the sovereign was regarded rather as the servant than as the master of his people. "We who are as good as you", so it ran, "swear to you who are no better than we, to accept you as our king and sovereign lord, provided you observe all our liberties and laws; but if not, not." Here there is certainly no trace of absolutism on the one hand or of servility on the other; a contract is made between sovereign and subjects, in which deposition is openly recognized as the proper penalty for a king who seeks to override the laws. And the constitution erected a host of other barriers against the despotism of the crown. Most of them will be taken up incidentally to our study of the position and power of the other portions of the body politic. For the present we need only observe that the Aragonese monarchs were far more limited than their Castilian contemporaries by the extensive powers of the Cortes in legislation, taxation, finance, and even in the management of foreign affairs, and by the authority of the Justicia in matters of justice. Even in the appointment of their intimate advisers and counsellors, and of the officers of their royal household, they had by no means a perfectly free hand. During the period of the Privileges of Union, the Cortes exercised extensive powers in the selection of them; and even after the Privileges were abolished in 1348 there are a number of cases in which they continued to interfere. Particularly strict were the regulations to prevent the king from introducing foreigners—especially Catalonians—into the royal council in Aragon; chiefly, no doubt, for fear lest their presence should further stimulate the king's interest and ambition for foreign enterprise and expansion, which were always regarded with ill concealed hostility by the law-loving, self-righteous, and rather uncosmopolitan Aragonese.

The Aragonese Cortes differed considerably from those of Castile in respect to their composition and procedure and enjoyed much more extensive powers. The division of the nobility into two classes raised the number of the estates from three to four. The right to attend was not, as in Castile, primarily dependent on the receipt of a royal summons. Proof of rank and lineage entitled to representation in the two *brazos* of the aristocracy, while in the *brazo de las universidades*, or *brazo real*, such cities and towns as could show that they had sent representatives in the past continued to enjoy that privilege. Membership in the clerical estate was also fairly definitely fixed, so that the complexion of the whole assembly could not be changed, as in Castile, at the behest of the crown. The presence of the Justicia as 'juez de las Cortes' was absolutely necessary and constitutes another anomaly of Aragonese parliamentary practice. The clauses in the General Privilege and the Privileges of Union demanding annual Cortes were superseded by a law of 1307 providing for biennial ones: the records show, however, that neither of these requirements was actually observed. In the matter of procedure, extremely minute and careful regulation of the smallest and most unimportant details is the outstanding feature. There was a complicated arrangement for three prorogations of four days each in order to give tardy members a chance to arrive; the process of *habilitación*, or formal proving by each member of his right to sit, was exceedingly strict and almost interminable. In theory absolute unanimity of the members of each *brazo* was required on every measure, a fact which has caused some writers to exclaim that the passage of any law was a miracle in Aragon. The *solio* or final formal meeting of the king and estates—in which all the measures of the session were solemnly proclaimed and sworn to—served to prevent the sovereign from ignoring those doings of the assembly which were not to his liking; and as a further method to secure this end, a committee of the estates, or *Diputacion del Reino*, usually composed of two members of each *brazo*, was chosen to remain in session during intervals between sessions, to watch over the observance of the laws, and report to the Cortes any infraction of them. A full account of the duties and powers of this body will be found in the *fueros*. They may perhaps be summarized under three heads: (1) to oversee the administration of the public revenue (not the *patrimonio real*); (2) to deal with all infractions of the *fueros* by public officials or private persons; (3) to keep the peace, in company with the Justicia of Aragon. Finally, we may note that the consent of the Aragonese Cortes was

always necessary to the passing of all laws; the king, unlike the Castilian monarch, could not legislate without them. By them alone could an extra grant, over and above what came to the king in his own right, be made; without their consent no new tribute or duty could be imposed, nor the rate of an old one diminished or increased. The Cortes received the oath of a new king to observe the laws and recognized him as monarch; they alone could grant letters of naturalization; truces, peaces, and declarations of war were usually ratified by them; occasionally they confirmed and even nominated ambassadors. Their claim to a voice in the appointment of the principal officers of state has already been described; and we shall later see that they exercised a large measure of control over the Justicia. Lastly, they had a most extensive power of investigating, in conjunction with the Justicia, *greujes*, or wrongs done by the king, his officers, or the estates, to one another, to individuals, or groups of individuals of whatever rank, or vice versa, in defiance of the laws, and of demanding that justice be done. The procedure and other powers of the Cortes were such as insured attention to these demands.

There is no need for prolonged consideration of Aragonese finance, local government, or military affairs, interesting and important though they are; for none of them vitally affects the development of the Spanish Empire. The attempts of the Aragonese to restrict arbitrary taxation were numerous and not entirely unavailing; the General Privilege limited to eight the number of imposts to which *villeros* could be subjected, and the Cortes constantly protested against the introduction of new burdens from Catalonia. Comment on the Aragonese army may most conveniently be made in connection with Catalonia, where it was principally recruited. The efforts of the Aragonese were chiefly directed to limiting it to the smallest possible dimensions. In the domain of legislation and justice, a struggle similar to that in Castile took place between the native and Roman codes and methods; and the victory of the latter was considerably earlier and more pronounced. The famous Fueros of Huesca, compiled in 1247 by the great jurist bishop, Vidal de Canellas, correspond to *Las Siete Partidas* and the *Ordenamiento de Alcalá*, and mark the turning point in the conflict; after that time the national laws and customs, from the more or less mythical Fuero of Sobrarbe downward, fall steadily into the background. The hierarchy of royal and local courts was not widely different from that which we have found in Castile, though there are a number of peculiarities of nomenclature—e.g., the *zalmedina* or petty judge, “without jurisdiction of limbs or blood”. The *sobrejuntero* was a knight in command of a *junta* or federation of towns for police purposes—something resembling the Castilian *hermandad* on a minor scale—though indeed the small size and comparative orderliness of Aragon rendered organizations of that kind for the most part superfluous.

It remains for us to study the office of the Justicia—unquestionably the most original and interesting of Aragonese institutions, and the one which was destined in the sixteenth century to offer the sturdiest resistance to monarchic encroachments from Castile. We are fortunately not obliged to enter here into the thorny question of its origins. Certainly it did not go back to the days of the Fuero of Sobrarbe, as one of its earliest incumbents asserted; and an ingenious theory that it was borrowed from the Arabs in 1118 does not seem to have received general acceptance. Our knowledge of the office during the entire twelfth century is in fact both vague and scanty. Even in the early part of the rule of James the Conqueror it is clear that it was in no sense fully developed. Zurita, it is true, inserts an enthusiastic description of the duties and powers of the Justicia at the close of his account of the rule of Pedro II (1196-1213), referring to him as “a rampart against all oppression and a personification of the Justice from which he took his name”; but Vidal de Canellas, writing a half century later, makes it clear that at that period he enjoyed almost no independent power and was little more than the spokesman of the king, whom he obeyed, and of the magnates, whom he was obliged to consult. However, the Justicia clearly enjoyed sufficient prestige in the reign of James the Conqueror to make his alliance, or the power to control him, distinctly worth fighting for; and from that time onward to the middle of the

fourteenth century there ensued a violent struggle between king and nobles to secure this valuable prize.

From the very beginning of the conflict the king enjoyed and retained the immense advantage of the right of appointment; but even before the death of the Conqueror the barons managed, in some measure at least, to weaken the royal control over the Justicia by investing him with the right to sit in judgment in suits between the king and themselves. They also successfully insisted, at the Cortes of Ejea in 1265, that the Justicia should always be chosen among the knights, and not among the *ricos hombres*, who were exempt from corporal punishment. In the stormy days of the struggle over the General Privilege and the Privileges of Union, the attempts of the nobles to withdraw the Justicia from crown influence, and to subject him as far as possible to their own, made further progress. For a time baronial support enabled the Justicia virtually to usurp the king's position as principal judge of the realm, and even to seek, in derogation of the Roman legislation introduced by the Crown, to lead the nation back to the observance of the ancient laws and fueros; in the Privileges of Union of 1287, Alfonso III went so far as to promise not to proceed against any adherent of the Union without the mediation of the Justicia and the consent of the Cortes. But the excesses of the baronial triumph brought the inevitable reaction, and the law-loving James II cleverly took advantage of it both to enhance the authority of the Justicia and to regain his alliance for the monarchy. On every possible occasion he exalted and magnified the powers and prerogatives of the office by appointing notable men to fill it, and above all by declaring that no appeal could be lodged against its decisions; so that the authority of the Justicia, which, as Blancas says, "had hitherto slumbered like a sword in its scabbard, was drawn forth for the first time in this reign and never sheathed again". The successive Justicias, on their part, were not slow to recognize in the king the true cause of their mounting prestige, and steadily gravitated towards the monarchy; and finally, when in 1348 Pedro the Ceremonious issued victorious from his struggle with the forces of the Union, the results of the developments of the previous half century were for the first time fully revealed. The office enjoyed its greatest power and prestige in the period succeeding the battle of Epila. The nobles, who had hitherto aspired to control it, were broken, while the triumphant monarchy had wisely resolved to respect and defend the independence of the Justicia, as a proof of its own determination to uphold the laws. In the ensuing period the Justicia was recognized as 'juez superior y medio'—a superior and intermediate judge, with special powers, whom all other judicial authorities of the realm were obliged to consult in the interpretation of the laws. He was declared to be the sole judge of delinquent officials, and in such cases the royal prerogative of pardon was specifically stated to be inoperative. He was given a permanent seat at Saragossa, the capital of the realm, and two lieutenants were appointed to aid him in determining the law and in rendering his decisions. It is true that the king at the same time sought to augment his own judicial power by the organization of a special tribunal which followed him whithersoever he went; he also strengthened his control over the minor, courts of the realm. It could scarcely have been otherwise in the height of the monarchical reaction that followed the battle of Epila. There was, however, plenty of room for his own jurisdiction and for that of the Justicia also; and for many years afterwards the two did not collide.

The Justicia, as we have already seen, was always appointed by the crown. During the period of the struggle over the General Privilege and the Privileges of Union the kings had occasionally undertaken to remove refractory incumbents, but this practice was deeply resented by the Cortes, and after 1348 the national assembly strove to give the occupants of the office a life tenure, in order to render them perfectly independent of crown control. During the latter part of the fourteenth century the efforts of the Cortes in this direction were entirely unavailing; and in the early years of the fifteenth, when legislation on the subject seemed imminent, the kings attempted to forestall the effects of it by obliging each Justicia at the time of his appointment to sign a letter

of resignation, which could be subsequently produced by the monarch in case he should prove himself to be obnoxious. The famous Juan Jiménez Cerdán (1389-1420) was eliminated in this way, and one of his successors, Martín Díaz de Aux (1433-40), who refused to abide by his resignation, was subsequently murdered in prison at the behest of Alfonso V. In the year 1441, a law was finally passed rendering the Justicia irremovable by the king without the consent of the national assembly; but the victory which the popular party had won came so late that it was robbed of any real significance. The office of the Justicia had by this time passed its zenith, and henceforth became practically hereditary in the powerful and generally royalist family of Lanuza; the monarchs were generally satisfied with the attitude and conduct of the successive incumbents, and made no attempt to remove any of them for many years to come.

The efforts of the Cortes to control the Justicia's tenure of office having thus proved abortive, they centered their energies on a series of attempts to limit the scope of his authority, and to render him responsible to the nation rather than to the king. In 1461 they arranged to have the Justicia's two lieutenants drawn by lot, instead of appointed, as previously, by the Justicia himself; and in 1467 the tenure of these magistrates was reduced to one year, so that they should not get out of touch with the national will. In cases of exceptional importance, the lieutenants were empowered to call together all the legal lights of the realm in solemn conclave; and the dicta of this *consilium extraordinarium*, by which the independent authority of the Justicia was naturally much restricted, were preserved and respected to almost the same degree as the regular laws of the land. And as a final means to prevent the Justicia from becoming the tool of the triumphant monarchy, the Cortes began to appoint, from as far back as the year 1390, a commission of four members, representing the four *brazos*, to receive complaints against the conduct of the Justicia and his lieutenants and to report accordingly. In 1467, by the so-called *Forus Inquisitionis Officii Justitiae Aragonum*, this commission attained considerably fuller development. The number of its members was raised to seventeen, and the method of their selection changed to an elaborate system of *insaculacion*, in which all the four *brazos* were to be represented. The Aragonese were apparently well aware of the danger of equity being lost sight of amid the technicalities of the law; and great care was taken to prevent this important committee from being exclusively composed of legists. Elaborate regulations were also made to secure speedy and effective procedure. The net result of all these developments was naturally to diminish the Justicia's authority and independence; his office was not nearly so important at the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella as it had been a century before. The mounting prestige of the monarchy limited it on the one side; the demands of the Cortes and of the nation, though they doubtless originated in a laudable determination to emancipate the Justicia from royal control, served rather to hamper it on the other. A decline in its power and prerogatives had in fact already set in, and was to continue and increase until the final catastrophe in the reign of Philip II.

A few words remain to be added in regard to the scope of the Justicia's powers. The office was certainly unique in the countries of Western Europe. Other lands possessed magistrates with attributes which remind one of it—as, for instance, the chancellor in England—but there is really nothing to which it can be fairly or profitably compared. Its chief function was to watch over infringements of the law of the land, to protect subjects from verdicts contrary to that law, “to guarantee the rights of each against the tyranny of all, the liberties of the nation against the encroachments of the central power, the fortunes of the subject against the exactions of the tax collector, the freedom of the individual against the abuses of royal, seigniorial, or ecclesiastical jurisdiction.” These functions were chiefly exercised in two ways, namely, by the utilization of the kindred rights of *manifestación* and *firma*, which Blancas justly describes as “two shields to defend all our laws and liberties.” The first was designed to protect prisoners, particularly prisoners awaiting judgment, from violence or maltreatment by jailers or judges. Whenever anyone dreaded such maltreatment he applied to the Justicia, who sent for him

and removed him to a special prison—the so-called *corral de los manifestados*—to which the ordinary authorities were refused access; in case of resistance to such removal, the Justicia was expected to use force. This intervention created no presumption against the validity of the action under which the criminal was accused; and if it was found that it had been demanded without adequate cause, it was promptly revoked. For the purpose for which it was intended, however, it served as a most precious guarantee, which, according to the old Aragonese proverb, it was not too late for the accused to demand, even “after the hangman’s cord had been actually passed about his neck.” *Firmas*, on the other hand, were special guarantees which were granted by the Justicia to those who demanded them, and which protected their lives and their property from judgments contrary to the laws. Such a *firma* suspended the trial if it had been begun, or the execution of the sentence if it had been already rendered, until the Justicia should have had time to investigate the case and determine whether or not it had been conducted in conformity to the *fueros*; and during the period of the suspension, the person of the defendant was especially protected against ill usage of any kind. The Justicia, moreover, according to Blancas, had not only the right but the positive duty of interfering to prevent (1) the torture of any free man in Aragon save for the crime of false money, (2) the imposition of any tax without the consent of the Cortes, (3) the citation, trial, or condemnation of any Aragonese by a foreign judge or beyond the boundaries of the realm, (4) any compulsion to hospitality or entertainment, (5) alterations of the value of the coinage without constitutional sanction, (6) the entrusting to a foreigner of any castle or fortress within the realm, and (7) secret trials or imprisonments. He also was the king’s most eminent counsellor, and, as we have already seen, ‘juez superior de las Cortes.’ Finally, on the occasion of a royal accession it was the Justicia’s prerogative to administer the coronation oath, which he received, seated and covered, from the kneeling and bareheaded monarch: a ceremony, as Prescott rightly says, “eminently symbolical of that superiority of law over prerogative which was so constantly asserted in Aragon.” In the discharge of these exalted functions the Justicia occasionally found himself in the position of umpire or mediator between the king and the nobles; but this was rather an accidental and exceptional result of his more distinctive duties than a regular attribute of his office, as some authors have attempted to represent it. The conjunction of powers which he did possess, however, was certainly most impressive, and we cannot wonder that the Justicia Cerdán at the close of the fourteenth century was led to declare that his was “the greatest lay office that existed anywhere in the world.”

## VALENCIA

The internal conditions and institutions of the kingdom of Valencia need not long detain us. Though somewhat more sympathetic (largely on account of its maritime location) than was Aragon with the territorial ambitions of its sovereigns beyond the seas, its small size and the violent conflicts that raged within its boundaries prevented it from rendering any very effective aid in the prosecution of foreign conquest until the early part of the fifteenth century. From the very beginning it was a strange compound of Aragonese and Catalan influences. Conquered chiefly through the support of the Aragonese aristocracy, it had been largely colonized by burgesses from Catalonia; moreover, the policy of James I and of his successors tended generally to exalt the latter element at the expense of the former, to place the government as far as possible in its hands, and to favor the Catalan language to the prejudice of the Aragonese.

On the other hand, the Aragonese nobles were naturally quite unwilling to see themselves thus elbowed aside, and protested vigorously. They regarded Valencia as their own special perquisite, and in 1285 openly demanded that the new realm be governed by the *fueros* of Aragon. Around the conflict thus initiated the whole internal history of Valencia centered until the abolition of the Privileges of Union in the middle of the fourteenth century. In the domain of



legislation, the effects of the struggle are chiefly visible in the sharp contrasts between the two chief codes in use in the two different portions of the Valencian realm. Most of it was governed under the so-called Valencian 'Furs' drawn up by James the Conqueror in 1250 and revised and enlarged in 1271. This code was "saturated with Roman principles, especially on the civil side", but it also contained many concessions to native and Gothic jurisprudence. It was published in Provençal; it forbade any Roman jurist or advocate to plead in a Valencian court and prescribed that all disputed legal points should be settled "according to the discretion of the justiciar and good men of Valencia and the kingdom to the exclusion of canon and civil law." It sanctioned private vengeance and even private war, composition for minor offences, a liberal use of torture for non-privileged persons, and regular penalties of extreme severity and barbarity. But there were a number of regions, especially those which belonged to the aristocracy, which were excluded from the operation of this famous code and were subject to the *fueros* of Aragon. Most of them lay just north of the capital of the kingdom and opposed an insurmountable barrier to the unchallenged predominance of the Furs throughout the realm. Indeed, at certain stages of the struggle over the maintenance of the Privileges of Union, it looked as if the *fueros* of Aragon were going to prevail over the Furs. Even the city of Valencia itself became, as we have already seen, a most vigorous centre of opposition to the royal cause. But when the monarchy finally emerged victorious, the power of the Aragonese aristocratic party in Valencia began to decay. The urban, Catalan portion of the population, supported by the crown, prevailed in the field of legislation as well as in other respects; so that the lovely realm which Aragon had striven at the outset to mold according to its own laws and traditions, ultimately followed rather the lead of Catalonia, and began to play an active if subordinate part in the process of expansion in Italy and in the Mediterranean.

A few specialties of Valencian institutional history may be briefly noticed. The predominance of the capital was even more marked than that of Saragossa in Aragon. It held no less than five votes in the *brazo real* of the Valencian Cortes; and it invariably demanded that its representatives should constitute one half of the membership of that chamber, no matter how many other cities sent delegates; this exaggerated pretension, however, was not made good. The estates enjoyed the unusual privilege of meeting separately without the royal summons after the Cortes had been dissolved by the king, to deal with such matters as concerned each one, and to present petitions to the crown; and on these occasions the deputies of the capital were apparently the sole representatives of the *brazo real*, since the other towns were not permitted to send delegations without the king's command. When the estates met in this way, they took the name of *estamentos*. Several attempts were made to introduce into Valencia a Justicia similar to that of Aragon, but they were never permanently successful. The Moorish and Jewish portions of the population were very large. The former were chiefly concentrated in the rural districts, especially in the Aragonese *señorios*, where they rendered invaluable service in tilling the soil. The latter, on the contrary, were for the most part found in the capital itself. As in Aragon, the tolerant and liberal policy towards the Jews which had prevailed in earlier days was suddenly exchanged, in the latter part of the fourteenth century, for one of violent persecution; and the massacres, forced conversions, and wanton destruction of Hebrew property which ensued in the city of Valencia were in some respects more horrible and ruthless than anywhere else in the peninsula.

The climax of Valencia's power and prosperity was reached in the period of Alfonso the Magnanimous. The sunny kingdom was far more congenial to that splendor loving monarch than the barren plains of Aragon or the busy streets of Barcelona. It reminded him of his beloved Italy, and he took pleasure in favoring and beautifying it in every way. Its commercial prestige in this period mounted so high as to arouse the jealousy of the Catalans, who strove to limit its merchant marine by navigation ordinances. It was by Valencian sailors under a Valencian admiral, Juan de

Corbera, that Alfonso was enabled to force the harbor of Marseilles and sack the town in the year 1423. We have also many interesting evidences of the closeness of Valencia's connection with Italy throughout the reign of the Magnanimous King. The Borgias, who were destined to become so famous in the succeeding years, originated in the Valencian town of Jativa; they were introduced into Italy through Alfonso, and one of them was elected to the papacy, with his full approval, in April, 1455, under the name of Calixtus III. It was largely through Valencia, moreover, that the realms of the Crown of Aragon became acquainted with the art and literature of the Italian Renaissance. Ausfas March, the greatest master of the Valencian tongue, "a philosopher who happened to write in verse", was a devoted admirer and imitator of Petrarch; the "Ladies' Book" of Jaume Roig owes much to the Decameron of Boccaccio. In all these respects the fame of Valencia spread far and wide in the middle of the fifteenth century, and though its political prestige waned rapidly under the efficient absolutism of the Catholic Kings, it maintained its place as a literary, artistic, and commercial centre until a much later day.

### CATALONIA

We now come to the county of Catalonia, the real source and mainspring of the Spanish Empire in the Mediterranean, and consequently, for our purposes, the most important portion of the realms of the Crown of Aragon.

We have hitherto had occasion to emphasize the urban, commercial, and democratic features of it, and from the fourteenth century onward these tendencies were unquestionably predominant; on the other hand, it must never be forgotten that Catalonia possessed an early mediaeval, aristocratic, and feudal background, which had no parallel elsewhere in the Iberian Peninsula. Its origin was French, not Spanish; from the time of Charlemagne and Louis the Pious it had taken its customs, institutions, tradition, and language from north of the Pyrenees. On the expulsion of the Moors its territories had been parceled out among a number of nobles from the South of France, who for a long time vied with one another for preponderance in characteristically feudal fashion. By the end of the ninth century the counts of Barcelona were doubtless *primi inter pares*, but the forces of centralization operated slowly, and until the union with Aragon in 1137 their triumph cannot be regarded as assured. After that date the political power of the other Catalonian nobles was gradually broken, and the history of the county began to revolve around the struggles of the crown and the commercial plutocracy of Barcelona; but the fact that the upper orders succeeded in keeping the third estate from being represented in the Cortes until the year 1283 warns us that the change was not rapidly completed. Even in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the student is being constantly reminded of the intensely feudal and aristocratic nature of the country's origin. In the domain of legislation this feature is particularly prominent. The *Usatges*, put forth by Ramon Berenguer I in 1064-69, are the earliest known feudal code; and they survived all the efforts of James the Conqueror to supplant them, though they were indeed considerably modified in the next two centuries by different monarchs, and supplemented by the introduction of Roman jurisprudence. Economically, and territorially also, the power of the old Catalonian nobility is attested by a schedule of the year 1359 which estimates the number of houses on seigniorial land as more than double that of those situated on the royal domain; while a seventeenth-century author asserts that only twenty-five per cent of the towns and cities of the county were held directly by the crown. This last statement is chiefly explained by the great number of alienations to the nobles which the crown made in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the idea of filling the royal treasury; but the fact that such a large proportion of the soil remained in the hands of the baronage must never be forgotten, however absorbing the interest in the political and commercial development of the Catalan cities.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps the most lamentable result of the survival of the feudal and baronial control of the rural portions of

the county was the wretched condition of the Catalan serfs. Of course, their treatment varied with the different localities; but, generally speaking, they were unquestionably far worse off than the Castilian *solariegos*. As elsewhere, they were for the most part bound to the soil (*adscripti glebae*), unable to leave or dispose of the farms they held without the lord's consent; their rights over their personal property, and their privileges of marriage and inheritance, were seriously limited by seigniorial interference; and they staggered under a heavy burden of dues of various sorts, which were payable in money, labor, and kind, and were imposed in most vexatious ways. But what made the lot of the Catalan peasant peculiarly hard was the special set of exactions commonly known as the sets *malos usos*—the six evil customs. The first of these, and in a sense the foundation for all the rest, was the so-called *remensa personal*—that is, the obligation of the serf to purchase personal redemption from his status as such, at a price satisfactory to his lord, before he could be permitted to leave his land. From this the Catalan peasants took their name of *homines de redemption* or *payeses de remensa*. The second was the *intestia* or the right of the lord to a share—one third or even one half—of the goods of a peasant who died intestate. The third, the *exarquia*, gave the lord the privilege of appropriating a portion of the property of a serf who died without issue. The fourth, the *cugucia*, adjudged to him the whole or part of the property of any peasant's wife who was guilty of adultery. The fifth, the *arsina*, compelled the peasant to pay the lord an indemnity if the whole or part of his farm should be burned. Lastly, the *firma de spoli* permitted the lord to exact a contribution from a serf who desired to pledge the proceeds of his farm to the woman he proposed to wed, pending the payment of her dowry and the performance of the marriage ceremony. Over and above these *seis malos usos* there were in some localities other occasional and exceptional exactions of an even more outrageous nature. Such was the right of the lord to compel his serf's wife to leave her own child without sustenance, in order to be able to suckle his own; and his pretension to the infamous *derecho de pernada* or *jus primae noctis*, with his serf's bride.

Now most of these barbarous customs were familiar enough in all feudal countries; but in Spain, where, with the exception of Catalonia, feudalism had never been thoroughly and firmly established, they were distinctly unusual and provoked much complaint. In the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, moreover, a number of different forces were at work which paved the way for emancipation. The steady improvement in the lot of the Castilian *solariego* doubtless had its effect in Catalonia, especially after the house of Trastamara supplanted the old royal line of the counts of Barcelona in 1412. The decline of the political power of the nobles and the growth of that of the king and cities operated in the same direction; and the humanitarian precepts of the church doubtless counted for something. Under James the Conqueror there began a process of granting to certain localities exemptions, more or less complete, from the *malos usos* and other kindred exactions, and it was continued and increased in the succeeding reigns. When a territory was thus exempted the serfs on the adjacent lands naturally strove with might and main to migrate thither; and by the end of the fourteenth century the great majority of the Catalan peasants had managed in one way or another wholly or partially to emancipate themselves. In 1395 there were probably not more than fifteen to twenty thousand families subject to the *malos usos*; and these were, for the most part, localized in the neighborhood of Gerona, Vallés, and Vich, and were situated, curiously enough, chiefly on ecclesiastical lands. In the next half century Maria de Luna, the wife of King Martin I, and the illustrious jurist Tomas Mieres of Gerona labored actively to promote the cause of freedom. Finally, on July 1, 1448, King Alfonso the Magnanimous, in Naples, put forth a 'constitution' granting to the serfs the right to meet and discuss the abolition of the *malos usos*; and later, in 1455, he actually proclaimed their temporary suspension. There was a brief reaction under John II, when the question of the liberation of the serfs became for a time fused with other issues of foreign and internal policy, but the process of emancipation had already reached a point from which it was impossible permanently to turn back. The glory of promulgating the instrument which completed the liberation of the Catalan peasant

was reserved, as we shall later see, to Ferdinand the Catholic, in 1486; but it is only fair to his predecessors to point out that the famous 'Sentencia Arbitral de Guadalupe' did little more than crown and consummate a work of which the greater part had already been accomplished.

Before passing on to the remarkable political and economic development of Barcelona, which is undeniably the salient feature of the domestic history of Catalonia in the later Middle Ages, a few social and constitutional peculiarities remain to be mentioned. There were probably more slaves in Catalonia in proportion to the population than anywhere else in Spain, because of the activity of its foreign and commercial relations. They were acquired either by purchase or as prisoners of war, and during the period of the Catalan Grand Company there were a number of Greek slaves in Barcelona. The story of the gradual superseding of the *Usatges* by the Roman law does not differ widely from that of the corresponding process in the other Iberian realms. In 1409 King Martin, with the consent of the Catalan Cortes, established a 'hierarchy of Codes' similar to that set up by the *Ordenamiento de Alcalá* of 1348 in Castile; in this the 'common' (i.e., the Roman) law was formally recognized as 'supplementary' to the *Usatges*, constitutions, and acts of the king and Cortes, and to the customs and privileges of the realm. There were a large number of different kinds of taxes and tributes, some of which came to the crown of its own right, while others could be imposed only with the consent of the Cortes; of the latter one of the most important was the *bovage*, or tax on each yoke of oxen, first granted in 1217. The crown's facilities for collecting these imposts, however, were lamentably deficient, and a large share of the financial work of the county consequently devolved upon the *Diputaci3n General de Catalu1a*, or standing committee of the Cortes, which maintained a special treasury and set of revenues of its own, deposited the funds received in the great bank or *Taula* of Barcelona, and subsequently superintended their distribution and employment.

Consideration of Catalan finances naturally leads on to that of the Catalan Cortes, to which representatives from the Balearics also came; for the Majorcan realm never enjoyed the privilege of having a national assembly of its own, even during the period when it was ruled by a separate line of kings. There were but three *brazos* in the Catalonian Cortes; several attempts were indeed made in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries to create a *braç dels cavalliers generosos homens de paratge*, on the model of the *brazo de Caballeros* of the Cortes of Aragon, but they never met with any permanent success. About a dozen towns and cities were usually represented in the third estate; most of them sent one *procurador* or *sindico*, several sent two, but Barcelona sent five and sometimes more. Apparently each town had but one vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives, but Barcelona's predominance was perfectly obvious and deeply resented. The method of selection of the municipal representatives varied in this period according to local custom—not until the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella did *insaculaci3n* become the regular practice. Full and definite instructions were given to the *síndicos* by the concejo of the municipality they represented. In Barcelona this function was performed by the *Vintiquatrena de Cort*—a most interesting body—a sort of permanent commission of the Concejo, consisting of twenty-four persons selected for the special purpose of supervising and counselling the *síndicos*, even down to the minutest details of their private life. Neglect of these instructions might subject the delinquents to the censures of the church or even to a revocation of their powers. The process of *habilitaci3n* was formal, rigid, and very complicated. No less than thirty-six rules were laid down concerning the qualifications of members. Unanimity of votes, theoretically obligatory in all four estates in Aragon, was here restricted to the nobles. There was, of course, no Justicia. At the concluding session or *solio*, which resembled that of Aragon, the sovereign was obliged to swear to the measures which the Cortes had passed, before he was granted the *donativo*. But the surest guarantee against any infringement of the rights and privileges of the Catalonian Cortes was the above-mentioned *Diputaci3n General*. It originated in the end of the fourteenth century, and was composed of six persons, one from each estate and three *oidores de cuentas*; it



held office for a term of three years, and its members had special privileges, special titles, and a special costume. In addition to its financial powers already described, it had the duties (1) of publishing and explaining the acts of the *Cortes* as well as the *Usatges* and other codes and of seeing to their observance; (2) of furnishing arms and munitions to the military forces of the county if they were called upon to resist an invasion or to deal with an infraction of the *fueros*; (3) of sitting in judgment in cases of dispute between the inhabitants and authorities of the land, and of arresting criminals denounced by the public prosecutor; and (4) of providing adequate naval defense for the Catalonian coasts, harbors, and shipping. It performed, in fact, all the functions of the *Diputaci3n del Reyno of Aragon*, and many of these of the Aragonese *Justicia* besides, and insured to the Catalonian *Cortes*, whose servant it was, a measure of efficiency which probably exceeded that of any other similar body in the peninsula.

Besides the separate national assemblies of the three different realms of the Crown of Aragon, there were also the so-called General *Cortes* of the eastern kingdoms. These were composed of representatives of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, and also of the Balearics, and met ordinarily at Monz3n or Lerida, which lay in debatable ground between Aragon and Catalonia. They were summoned only to deal with matters of general concern to all the Spanish dominions of the Aragonese kings, and were in effect little more than a juxtaposition of the separate assemblies already described. By an arrangement made in the year 1383, the king made his opening address, stating the purpose of the meeting, in Catalan, and the Infante answered him in the name of the *Cortes* in Aragonese.

The organization of the army and navy of Catalonia deserves some notice, since it was largely by Catalan soldiers and sailors that the Italian and Mediterranean conquests of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were made. Feudal methods of recruitment continued throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, though most of the work of the Italian and Mediterranean campaigns was done by mercenaries—especially by the light-armed ‘Almogavares’ or skirmishers, who formed the greater part of the Catalan Grand Company. But the real nucleus of the military forces of Catalonia was the armed contingents of the municipalities, who were called out by the process commonly known as the *somatent*. This could be used in case either of national peril or of merely local disturbance, to punish a murderer, put down a revolt, or prevent the infliction of unjust penalties by rebel barons in contravention of the law of the land. The *veguer*, or chief royal official of the town, mounted the balcony of the Casa Consistorial, called out the words “*Via fora, Somatent*” ordered the bells to be rung, and then raised a banner in the public square, around which the gathering inhabitants could rally. Competent leaders were on hand to marshal and direct the troops thus raised; if the cause of their summons was merely local, they dealt with it alone; in or national danger, they joined forces with the *somatents* of the adjacent cities, and, with them, formed the backbone of the country’s defense. There was also a less formal and authorized type of *somatent* known as a *sacramental*, composed of a voluntary association of the inhabitants of a certain neighborhood, to expel criminals and malefactors; but these *sacramentals* proved highly dangerous to the public peace, on account of the bitterness of feeling which reigned between the upper and lower rural classes, and Ferdinand of Antequera was obliged to adopt strenuous measures to regulate and control them.<sup>1</sup> There are many obvious parallels between these *sacramentals* and the *hermandades* of Castile previous to the reforms of Ferdinand and Isabella; but the regular *somatents* differed sharply from both in the fact that they were not spontaneous growths, but were regularly authorized and controlled by the crown. Indeed, it is not improbable that the reform of the Castilian *hermandad* accomplished by the Catholic Kings was suggested by their knowledge of the Catalan *somatent*. These municipal levies served rarely, if ever, beyond the borders of the county. They were primarily intended to preserve order at home and prevent invasion from abroad. That of Barcelona was naturally by far the most important. It was composed of thirty-four companies, organized by the different commercial corporations and



gilds, commanded by captains selected therein, all under the leadership of the *canceller en cap* of the municipality.

The history of the development of the Catalanian navy is also intimately bound up with that of Barcelona, and the commercial side of it will be briefly treated in that connection. But the maritime trend and tradition of the county extended far beyond the limits of its capital, and antedated the period of the latter's preeminence; they reached back to the ninth century and the early days of the Spanish Mark, when Armengol, count of Ampurias, won a notable victory over a Saracen fleet in the neighborhood of the Balearics. Subsequent rulers did much to increase the national interest in naval affairs, and the Catalans themselves proved the aptest of pupils in all matters pertaining to the sea; so that when James the Conqueror and Pedro III launched their realms on a career of expansion in the Mediterranean, there was no lack of ships to enable them to carry out their program. On the other hand, there was crying need of centralization and system in the entire naval organization. Many of the great lay and ecclesiastical lords of the country possessed small fleets; which they not only often refused to allow to be employed in the royal service but sometimes actually utilized for piratical purposes of their own; even the ships of the capital were by no means always available for the purposes of the crown. By a series of royal privileges and ordinances of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, however, the naval forces of the country were organized in more permanent fashion. Ships of war were thenceforth furnished in four different ways. There were, first, the royal galleys, either constructed, equipped, and maintained at the king's expense, or else hired, often with their crews, from other lands; these formed the nucleus of most of the conquering expeditions sent forth into the Mediterranean. Next came the ships of the *Lonja de Contratacion*, or Board of Trade, which were also usually hired, and were dedicated especially to the task of protecting the Catalanian commercial fleets. Thirdly, there were the naval forces maintained and paid by the *Diputaci6n General*, which were principally employed in defending the coast against the attacks of pirates. Lastly, there were the special ships which Barcelona was permitted to arm and maintain as guardians of the port. The admiral, appointed by the crown as the head of this imposing armament, was, generally speaking, the most important man in Catalonia after the monarch. Sometimes, indeed, his power was so great as occasionally to threaten that of his sovereign, as, for example, was the case with Roger de Lauria, and, a century later, with the second Bernaldo de Cabrera. There were an enormous number of different kinds of ships, of which the most common were the galleys (*galeras*) both heavy (*gruesas*) and light (*sutiles*), and also a special type called *uxers*, which were distinguished by heavy castellated structures or turrets on the bow and the stern. There were also smaller auxiliary ships called *galeotes* and *corces*, besides transports and little boats of various sorts (*taridas*, *cocas*, and *fatucas*). The principal method of propulsion was by oars; sails were distinctly secondary and supplementary. The famous *Ordenanzas Navales* of 1354, drawn up at the behest of Pedro IV by his admiral, the first Bernaldo de Cabrera, grandfather of the one above mentioned, contains a number of interesting details concerning naval preparations and tactics, sailors' pay, and sailing directions for the various fleets. Particularly noteworthy were the means employed to guard the coasts against the raids of pirates. An elaborate system of watch towers and lighthouses, with bells, horns, and messengers on foot and on horseback, revealed the peril before it was too late, and notified the adjacent inhabitants to stand to their arms.

All the internal history of Catalonia in this period, political, constitutional, military, and economic, really converges and is focused at Barcelona, whose astonishing growth and prosperity in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries overshadow all other features of the evolution of the Catalanian state, and afford the best possible explanation of its change from a predominantly feudal and aristocratic, to an essentially urban and commercial existence. The foundations of this remarkable development were laid in the famous charter which was granted

to the city by James the Conqueror in the year 1257, and which superseded the primitive constitution inherited from the days of the Spanish Mark. Under this new charter, the *veguer* and *bayle*, royal appointees and representatives, were henceforth to be aided in governing the city by a small council of eight burgesses, who met every week and really dominated the entire municipal administration; and also by a larger one of two hundred persons which was occasionally called into consultation. The main features of this charter were preserved throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, though the size and method of recruitment of both the bodies it had created underwent a number of important variations. The membership of the smaller (the *Concell*) was reduced to six and later to four, and finally, in 1265, fixed at five. That of the larger sank to one hundred, where it remained during the fourteenth century, thus causing it to acquire the name of the *Concell de Cent*; in 1387 it was raised to 120, in 1455 to 128, and finally, in 1493, to 144, where it remained till its extinction in 1714. The original members of the smaller *Concell* were appointed by the crown and elected their own successors; but after 1274 they were chosen by a body of twelve electors selected by the *Concell de Cent*, whose members were in turn elected by the smaller *Concell*.<sup>1</sup> The members of both bodies held office for terms of one year only, and their gradual democratization is very noteworthy. At first they were almost exclusively recruited from the ranks of the richer and privileged citizens, but by the middle of the fifteenth century we find only two of the smaller *Concell* chosen from the municipal aristocracy; the others had to be taken, one from the merchants, another from the artisans, and the last from the laboring men. In the larger body, also, the popular classes apparently began to predominate at an even earlier date. As time went on the functions of the two councils gradually became defined. The smaller was essentially an executive and administrative body. It saw to the maintenance of public order, to the distribution and spending of the municipal revenues, and the preservation from infringement of all the fueros and privileges of Barcelona. It was perfectly ready, if the circumstances demanded it, to assert its rights against nobles, ecclesiastics, royal officers, or even against the crown itself. It appointed the minor officials of the municipality to carry out its decrees. It had the privilege of petitioning the monarch at any time. Its members bore the proud title of 'magnificos'. They could sit covered in the royal presence; they were preceded by mace bearers on their journeys; and their representatives at the royal court were afforded all the privileges of foreign ambassadors. The functions of the larger *Concell de Cent* were, on the other hand, rather legislative and advisory; its approval was necessary for the passing of new ordinances and for the imposition of municipal taxation. Jointly with the *veguer* and *bogle* the two bodies possessed many of the prerogatives of absolute sovereignty, particularly in economic matters, as will hereafter more fully appear. They had the right to make independent commercial treaties with foreign powers, and to exercise an extensive mercantile jurisdiction, which they intrusted to two *consols de mar*. Whether or not, as has been suggested, the development of this interesting system of municipal government was largely directed or influenced by that of the Italian cities of the same period, with which the Catalans became familiar in their commercial and military enterprises to the eastward, it is impossible definitely to say; but it is certain that the resemblances were numerous and very close.

The power of Barcelona did not stop with the city walls. In common with the other chief Catalan municipalities, she managed to extend her jurisdiction over the adjacent villages and territories by granting them what were called *derechos de vecindad* or *carreratge*. The places to which this right of *carreratge* had been given were thenceforth regarded by a legal fiction as streets of the capital itself, endowed with all its privileges and immunities, in fact virtually annexed, so that Barcelona became to all intents and purposes a little *regnum in regno*. This process of municipal aggregation was generally favored by the Catalan rulers, first as a means of curbing the power of the baronage, and second because it served to replenish the treasury; for almost every extension of the municipal boundary by the method just indicated was purchased by a substantial contribution to the royal coffers. The nobles naturally opposed it, and in the cases of the smaller towns not seldom succeeded in forcing the king to revoke the donations made (though

never to return the funds received for them). But the preeminence of Barcelona, fortified by its advantageous maritime location and immense political and commercial reputation abroad, made the right of association with it so valuable that nothing could permanently arrest its extension and development. The name of Catalonia was often quite unfamiliar in foreign lands at the close of the fifteenth century; but everyone spoke of the glories of its capital. Barcelona *was* the whole county, in the eyes of most of Western Europe, and even in the Catalan legal and judicial treatises of that period one constantly finds the name of the city loosely applied to the entire principality.

The mounting prestige of the capital and the pride and prosperity of its citizens revealed themselves in various quarrels with the Catalan nobles on the subjects of rival jurisdictions and precedence, and in numerous conflicts of authority with the *Diputaci6n General*. Some of these were serious, and affected the whole political life of the county; others were absurdly trifling, as when in 1444 the Concellers objected to the placing of a standard on the grave of one of the most noted statesmen and jurists of the day, on the ground that such an honor would show a dangerous favoritism to a counsellor of the king. But the best of all proofs of the high position which Barcelona had won for herself was the dignities and privileges attached to membership in the ranks of her 'honored citizens' (*ciudadanos honrados*). These were the richer and more powerful burgesses, who had raised themselves, principally by their success in business, above the regular level of the mass of the urban population, and were socially regarded as being on the same plane with the lower nobles—the so-called *generosos* or *hombres de paratge*. Their numbers were limited, but on the other hand any man who possessed the necessary qualifications might gain admission to their ranks by vote of the representatives of the municipal government, who met annually on the first of May to consider possible candidates. The political privileges of the *ciudadanos honrados* were equivalent to those of the knights of the military orders; they were entitled to the *desafio* and *riepto*; they were exempt from all imposts save the municipal taxes of Barcelona. Altogether the *ciudadania honrada* was unquestionably the highest privilege of urban life which the Iberian Peninsula afforded; and men of today, had they lived at that time, would doubtless have valued it even above admission to any of the ranks of the aristocracy. Yet Barcelona was fully alive to the danger of permitting these privileged persons to monopolize the city government and guarded against it, as is indicated by the changes already described in the composition of the two *Concells* during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

But, after all, the fundamental cause of Barcelona's greatness was her commerce. It made her richer than all the realms of the Crown of Aragon put together; "it paved her streets with gold"; it was the ultimate source of her political preeminence. The notion, which one continually encounters in the history of Castile, that trade and manual labor were dishonorable and degrading, never obtained in Catalonia; in fact, commercial success, as we have already seen, was the high road to social recognition. The history of the various guilds and industrial organizations in Barcelona is vastly interesting and important, but as the emphasis in this book is necessarily laid rather on external than on domestic affairs, it seems wiser to forego any attempt to describe them, in order to have more space for the history of Barcelona's foreign trade. From ancient times the city had been an important commercial centre, and though its prosperity was interrupted during the period of the Goths and Moors, it revived in the early days of the Reconquest. In the second half of the eleventh century Ramon Berenguer II granted his special encouragement and protection to its shipping. Documents of the next two hundred years reveal active trade relations between Barcelona and Genoa and Pisa, whose merchants thronged the Levant; before the accession of James I the way had been prepared for the expansion of Catalonian commerce to all parts of the Mediterranean. We have already seen that great emphasis was laid in the succeeding period on the maintenance of trade with the more westerly states of North Africa, complicated though the situation there was by ambitions for political control. Farther eastward this latter difficulty did not obtain, and we find, throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, constant

evidences of the efforts of Catalan merchants to establish themselves in Tripoli and in Egypt. The occasional embassies dispatched by the Aragonese sovereigns to the 'Soldans of Babylonia' were primarily due to commercial considerations; and in 1437 Barcelona showed that she realized the value of the Egyptian trade by petitioning Alfonso the Magnanimous to make peace with the Soldan in order that it might be reestablished in its pristine vigor. But the commercial ambitions of Catalonia were by no means limited to the Mediterranean. In the fourteenth century her ships began to make their appearance in the ports of England and Flanders; in 1389 a Catalan 'factory' was set up at Bruges, and Catalan goods thence distributed to the merchants of Germany and the Baltic lands.

The commodities exported included salt, wine, iron, steel, arms, coral, honey, saffron, and fruit; but unquestionably the most important products which Barcelona sent abroad were raw wool and manufactured cloths. So deafening, in fact, was the noise coming from the cloth factories in Barcelona, that in 1255, on petition of the citizens, they were segregated in especially secluded quarters. Among the principal imports may be mentioned silk, oil, dyestuffs, paper, drugs, and glassware. In the reign of James the Conqueror a number of edicts were put forth to protect Catalonia from the competition of foreign Italian merchants; in 1273 a citizen of Barcelona was authorized to seize the goods of some Genoese who had robbed him, while eight years earlier an order was issued for the wholesale expulsion of all Lombards, Florentines, Sienese, and Luccans trading there. But with the accession of Pedro III a more reasonable spirit began to prevail, and in the next two centuries Catalonia settled down to a policy of permitting the importation at merely nominal duties (usually less than one per cent) of commodities not produced in the principality; at the same time, however, she generally prohibited completely the entrance of such goods as were manufactured at home, and thus protected her own industries. It is also worth noting that, in view of her lack of agricultural advantages, and of the possibilities of famine, she often flatly forbade, or else imposed heavy duties upon, the exportation of grains. The maintenance of her merchant marine and the retention of her carrying trade were objects of most anxious solicitude. In 1227 a royal order was issued to the effect that all traffic with the ports of Egypt and North Africa must be borne by ships of Barcelona alone, to the exclusion of foreign vessels. The application of this edict was extended in the succeeding reigns, until finally in 1454 Alfonso the Magnanimous ordained that no foreign ship whatever could be loaded in the ports of his dominions. The Catalan merchant marine responded bravely to the efforts that were made in its behalf. The *ataranzas* or dockyards of Barcelona, which had to be frequently rebuilt and enlarged in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were the most famous in the Mediterranean, and far surpassed those of Seville. Foreign visitors repeatedly asserted that the Barcelonese equaled the Venetians, and excelled all others, in the number and variety of their ships.

The organization of the thriving foreign trade of the Catalan capital was both liberal and efficient. In 1279 Pedro III issued an important charter of privileges to the town of Barcelona, in which he authorized its merchants to elect two special officers to sit in judgment on commercial cases. In the beginning of the fourteenth century they took the name of *consols de mar*; in 1347 their power and jurisdiction were more strictly defined, and the right to elect them was transferred to the city magistrates. They presided over the *Lonja de Contratación* or Board of Trade, composed of the leading merchants of Barcelona, membership in which was highly prized but very difficult to obtain. The protection of Catalan merchants in foreign lands received the attention of the government at an even earlier date. A privilege of the reign of James the Conqueror authorized the *Concell de Cent* of Barcelona to appoint consuls to reside in all the foreign lands with which Barcelona traded, and these consuls were given full authority and jurisdiction to govern, punish, and judge not only all the Catalonians, but also all other subjects of the Crown of Aragon, resident in the place to which they were sent. But what unquestionably served to extend the naval and commercial power and prestige of Barcelona more than anything

else was the famous *Llibre del Consolat*, one of the earliest codes of maritime and commercial law, compiled by a group of celebrated sailors and merchants of the Catalonian capital, probably in the reign of James the Conqueror. In the fourteenth century it was enforced throughout the Levant, translated into almost all the different languages spoken there, and universally recognized as the basis for the regulation of the intercourse of the Mediterranean peoples in the matters with which it dealt. It is thoroughly international in form and substance; no mention is made in it of the place of its compilation or of the king of Aragon who sanctioned it; the sums of money set down in it are reckoned in byzants and not in sob of Barcelona. It was a notable contribution to world civilization, unfettered by any national limitations or restrictions; and its speedy and wellnigh universal adoption bears eloquent testimony to the high prestige of the country of its birth.

Cosmopolitanism, enterprise, and greed of gain abroad, restless energy, patriotism, and love of liberty at home were the qualities which these different developments fostered in the Catalonians. They were also naturally led on to celebrate their glorious deeds in stately prose and joyous verse in their native Catalan tongue. The chronicles of the kings of the house of Barcelona rank among the best historical narratives of the later Middle Ages. Troubadours from Provence found the warmest of welcomes in the Catalonian cities, especially at Barcelona and Tortosa; and for a long time the author of the finest poem of the year was rewarded with a magnificent prize, "thus manifesting to the world the superiority which God and nature have assigned to genius over dulness." And the versatility, progressiveness, and daring of the Catalonians are the more remarkable when contrasted with the sombre conservatism and stiff-necked obstinacy of the Aragonese. Seldom has history furnished a more striking contrast than that afforded by the union of these two realms under a single line of rulers. They had literally nothing in common save their passion for freedom; and even that they evinced in totally different ways. In language, in outlook, in interests, and in ideals they remained absolutely divergent—another of the innumerable examples of the ineradicability of Spanish separatism. The effect of this characteristic upon the development of the empire which had begun to be built up beyond the seas was already very marked; and the union with Castile, through the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, was destined to extend that effect to wider fields. When the discovery of America furnished a western outlet to imperial energies hitherto almost exclusively occupied to the eastward, the hardest of all the problems which confronted the Catholic Kings and their successors was that of endowing the gigantic agglomeration with the unity which was essential to its permanence.

#### THE BALEARICS

We now pass to a brief examination of the constitution and internal conditions of the Aragonese dependencies in the Mediterranean and in Italy, and begin with a few words concerning the kingdom of Majorca. As first constituted under the separate line of sovereigns which began with the death of James the Conqueror, the realm included the islands of Majorca, Minorca, and Ivisa, the counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon and the adjacent lands, and those parts of Montpellier which recognized the sovereignty of the king of Aragon. But with the extinction of the separate line of kings in 1349, the county of Montpellier, as we have already seen, fell out of the combination and was sold to the king of France, so that the history of its internal development, though both interesting and important, particularly on the urban and economic side, ceases to affect Spanish affairs, and consequently need not be considered here.

The counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon, on the other hand, never enjoyed quite the same measure of autonomy as the Balearics. They had insisted, for instance, at the time of the separate constitution of the Majorcan realm, that the *Usatges* of Catalonia should continue to be in force



within their boundaries,<sup>1</sup> while the islands refused to observe them; moreover the fact that Cerdagne and Roussillon were actually adjacent to Catalonia made it inevitable that the measure of their independence should be somewhat diminished in consequence. Theoretically, of course, they remained part of the Majorcan realm even after the termination of the separate line of kings; practically, however, their autonomy counted for so little that we are justified in restricting our attention to the islands.

Under the arrangement by which the distinct Majorcan monarchy was finally constituted in the reign of Pedro III, the Balearics were granted a distinct code of laws and independent judicial and financial systems. Moreover, as we shall later see, the municipal assemblies of the towns of Palma and Ciudadela were permitted gradually to extend their authority over the islands of Majorca and Minorca respectively in such a way as to make them virtually national in their scope. All this certainly savored of complete autonomy. But at the same time the kings of Aragon insisted that the Majorcan sovereigns should render them feudal homage in token of their vassalage, that they should be summoned to the Catalan Cortes with the other great feudatories, that they should never be permitted to hold Cortes of their own, and that they should promise to aid the kings of Aragon against all their foes. Even with these limitations, however, the sovereigns of the separate line labored strenuously and continuously to consolidate and increase their own monarchical power; and though they were unable to shake off the galling suzerainty of the kings of Aragon above, they certainly contrived to assert their authority over their subjects below, more completely perhaps than any of the contemporary kings of the different Iberian realms. The absence of baronial traditions was of course a distinct advantage for them; and they followed with considerable success the policy of impressing their subjects by a show of outward magnificence and ostentation. Naturally the annexation of Majorca to the other realms of the Crown of Aragon in 1349 militated somewhat against these developments, since the executive power was thenceforth represented by a viceroy sent out by the Aragonese sovereign; on the other hand it is important to observe that the termination of the separate line of Majorcan kings did not affect the constitutional autonomy of the Balearics, which, in accordance with the immemorial principles of Spanish particularism, was left entirely untouched. We have therefore to sketch the main features of the independent internal organization and local government of the islands, which survived long after the extinction of the separate dynasty of Majorcan kings.

In Majorca itself the whole story revolves around the efforts of the capital, Palma, to extend its jurisdiction over the entire island, and there is a parallel development of the town of Ciudadela in Minorca. As the Balearics were conquered from Catalonia, the bulk of the expeditionary force and also of the colonists who followed it were of an essentially urban type. The wealth and energy of the Balearics thus became early concentrated in the cities, and the rapid development of Majorcan commerce strengthened the tendency of the more valuable portions of the community to desert the countryside. The numbers and activity of the Majorcan Jews also, to whom the kings extended their special protection, were an added source of prosperity and attractiveness for the municipalities, particularly the capital, so that during most of the fourteenth century the town of Palma monopolized the life of Majorca more completely even than did Barcelona that of Catalonia; all the wealth and talent of the island were concentrated there. The history of its government and administration during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries furnishes a significant commentary on this development, and on the fruitless efforts of the rural communities to arrest it.

At first Palma was ruled by a royal *bayle* and *veguer* and a general assembly of the citizens; but about the middle of the thirteenth century this general assembly began to be gradually elbowed aside by a small, self-perpetuating body of six annually elected *jurados*, who managed to concentrate in their own hands the chief power, not only over the municipality, but also over the rural districts which it had already begun to dominate and control. In the course of the

fourteenth century, however, the situation changed again. The annexation to Aragon, as we shall subsequently see, ruined Majorcan commerce, and caused the inhabitants of the capital to turn back to the country districts with the idea of exploiting them; and this naturally caused the *forenses* or rural population, who had never had any voice in the government of the island, to clamor more loudly than ever for representation. The most obvious way of meeting this demand, and at the same time of keeping all real authority in the hands of the municipal government, was to revamp the larger and more general assembly (usually called the *Consell*) of the citizens, and to give the *forenses* seats in it. By a number of successive reforms, of which the most important were made in 1398 and 1448, this end was gradually accomplished. The *Consell* recovered its earlier predominance and the *jurados* were subjected to it; the rural population was given representation there, though its delegates never formed more than a minority. The *foremen*, however, were not satisfied with this. As long as the *Consell* of Palma dominated the entire island, their hands were really tied. They therefore now strove to secure some measure of autonomy for themselves, particularly in financial affairs, and were so far successful as to obtain an arrangement by which a portion of the taxes should be set apart to be used by them for their own special purposes. But even these reforms did not go to the root of the matter. The differences between the *forenses* and the *ciudadanos* lay far too deep to be remedied by regulations and institutions. The inhabitants of Palma looked on the rural population with disdain and contempt. The ruin of their commerce by the annexation had led them to gamble and speculate on their country domains, and to overtax and oppress those who labored on them, but they had no real sympathy or interest in agricultural development; indeed, like some of the early conquistadores in America, they regarded their association with it as a disagreeable and degrading necessity. The quarrels and corruption which disgraced the government of Palma were not calculated, on the other hand, to increase the respect of the *forense* for the *ciudadanos*; and the final result was that in the year 1450 a peasant insurrection burst forth in the island of Majorca which literally deluged it with blood. A royal amnesty caused a temporary cessation of the strife without any definite decision in the year 1454; but under John II it broke out again and ultimately became involved with the contemporaneous revolt which was in progress against that monarch in Catalonia. At the close of the reign a statement of grievances by both sides was presented to the sovereign, but the latter died before he was able to provide any real remedies. Meantime the insurrection had so reduced the population that the economic life of the island had virtually come to a standstill; in addition to the number who had perished in the risings, there was a considerable exodus of *forenses* to Corsica.

But the indubitably miserable and disrupted state of the Majorcan realm at the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella must not blind us to its immense prosperity and wealth in the earlier and happier stages of its development. The soil was rich and fertile, and the Moors had done much to improve it; despite its tragic neglect, due to the urban trend already described, the agricultural output of Majorca was very large, and formed a considerable portion of the wealth of the community. The truest source of Majorca's greatness, however, was its commerce. Palma was an almost obligately stopping place for ships plying between Spain and the Levant and North Africa. Its inhabitants were inevitably caught up and carried along on the commercial currents which flowed past them. It was a microcosm of Barcelona in this respect, with consuls and factories established for the benefit of its merchants in most of the lands with which it dealt, with a commercial fleet of at least three hundred and sixty larger vessels, and with more than thirty thousand foreign sailors and traders dwelling within its walls. It was especially noted as a center for the exchange and barter of slaves. The extinction of the separate line of Majorcan kings was of course a severe blow to Palma's commercial prestige. Barcelona did not propose to be hampered any longer by its competition, and soon succeeded in restricting it. Moreover the capture of Constantinople by the Turks a century later further limited the eastern trade of the Majorcan capital, though even at the time of the Catholic Kings it had not fallen so low that it

would have been impossible to resuscitate it. But during the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries it is not too much to say that Palma was a sort of Mecca for millionaires. All contemporaries bear witness to the luxury and elegance of its houses and of the villas of the neighboring countryside. The children of the greater commercial families were described by a writer of fifty years afterwards as “richer than the merchants of his own day.” And this great efflorescence of Majorcan commerce was accompanied by notable progress in letters and in science. The sailors of the Balearics knew and used the magnetic needle as early as 1272? The Majorcan school of cartography was famous throughout Western Europe, where its maps were almost universally employed for purposes of navigation. Ramon Lull, “knight errant of philosophy, ascetic and troubadour, novelist and missionary,” who travelled through Europe and Palestine and was finally stoned to death outside the walls of Bugia by the Mohammedans whom he was striving to convert, was born in Palma in the year 1235.

### **SARDINIA**

Though Sardinia had been granted by the Pope to the kings of Aragon in 1297, it will be remembered that no serious attempt had been made to take actual possession of it till 1323; and that for more than a century after that date the island was in confusion and turmoil, owing to the interminable conflicts of the Pisans, Genoese, and Judges of Arborea with the Aragonese invaders. Even after the judgeship was suppressed in 1409 and the feudal marquisate of Oristano substituted for it, there were constant revolts and insurrections; so that the constitutional machinery of the new Aragonese government never fairly got into working order during the period with which we are now dealing. We cannot, therefore, at present do more than indicate the foundations upon which the Spanish administration of Sardinia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was ultimately to be built up.

The chief administrative problem with which the Aragonese were confronted in Sardinia was that of centralizing and unifying the government of the island and of effacing the lines of its ancient division into four separate and independent judgeships. As an obvious method of accomplishing this purpose, the kings of Aragon began in 1323 to appoint viceroys to represent their sovereign authority there. Down to the middle of the fifteenth century, or as long as the rebellions and internal wars continued, these viceroys were chiefly occupied with military affairs, and were therefore able to accomplish relatively little in the line of constitutional reform. Moreover, they were not always implicitly trusted by the monarchs who sent them out. The kings of Aragon were alive to the danger that ambitious viceroys might strive to make themselves too independent in their remote domain and strike out a line of policy inimical to their own; and they attempted to guard against this peril by appointing them for very short terms. All the Sardinian historians speak of a stringent regulation which limited the viceregal tenure of office to three years. The records show that this was by no means invariably observed; but it is fair to add that the terms which fell below the statutory limit were more numerous than those which exceeded it. Save, however, for this restriction of the period of their rule, the Sardinian viceroys during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were virtually absolute under the crown. Down to the time of Ferdinand and Isabella there was practically no council or advisory body to aid or control them in the discharge of their duties. Nearly all the minor officials of the island were appointed by them, or on their recommendation, and obediently carried out their instructions. To this general rule, however, there was one noteworthy exception. The Aragonese sovereigns were determined that the administration of the royal revenues in Sardinia should be kept out of the hands of the viceroys, who might otherwise be tempted to use their authority to enrich themselves at the expense of the crown.

In 1341 a *procurador real* was nominated to take charge of the king's finances in the island, and the viceroy was strictly enjoined not to meddle with his affairs. This separation of the management of the *patrimonio real* from that of the other branches of the government of the overseas dependencies grew to be one of the characteristic features of Spanish imperial administration, as will hereinafter more fully appear.

The appointment of viceroys, however, was not the only way of breaking up the old quadripartite division of the island, and of making its inhabitants conscious of the unity of the new administration. Another equally effective means to the same end, and one fully in keeping with the best traditions of the government of all the Spanish kingdoms, was the inauguration of a national assembly. In the reign of King Martin, the Sardinian cities of Cagliari and Alghero were granted the right of representation in the Cortes of Catalonia, but the records do not show that this privilege was ever exercised; the prevailing policy from the outset was to treat Sardinia like Sicily and Naples, as a *reino de allá mar*—a separate kingdom with a system of administration entirely distinct from that of the realms of Aragon—and therefore to endow it with a parliament of its own. Zurita tells us that in the year 1355 Pedro the Ceremonious summoned the three estates of the Sardinian Cortes to meet at Cagliari, and that they were composed of Aragonese and Catalonians as well as of the inhabitants of the island; but he is exceedingly indefinite as to what was accomplished there, and the Sardinian historian, Dexart, emphatically denies that this body should be given the name of a parliament, “quia nullas leges tulit nec capitula.” No such doubt, however, can exist about the assembly held by Alfonso V in 1421; it marks the real beginning of the Sardinian representative system, and entitles the Magnanimous King to the credit of its foundation. It was modelled in general on the Cortes of Catalonia, in three estates, and had similar regulations for elections, summonses, and meetings. There were six *habilitadores* to determine the qualifications of members to sit; sixteen *tratadores* to carry on negotiations between the different *brazos* and particularly to settle the difficult question of the proportional incidence of taxation; and also eighteen *provisores* whose duty it was to listen to complaints of the arbitrary conduct of royal officials. It was also customary for the different estates to meet separately as *estamentos* without special summons and to deliberate, each one upon its special affairs. Efforts were made to introduce the Catalonian custom of holding triennial parliaments, but they never attained permanent success; the intervals between sessions were subsequently limited to ten years, but even this rule was not invariably observed. The principal function of the parliament of Sardinia, at least from the royal point of view, was the granting of subsidies or *donativos*; and the obvious correlative of this was the right to petition the crown for the redress of grievances, and to present requests, which, if accepted by the monarch or his representatives, acquired the force of laws. The generosity of the Sardinian estates in voting funds for the prosecution of Alfonso V's Italian campaigns was such as to elicit from that monarch, in a burst of gratitude, a favorable response to a request for the election of a special tribunal (over and above the *provisores*) to sit in judgment on the viceroy and other royal officials, in case of alleged violation of the laws of the land. This institution never came into actual existence, for, as Manno shrewdly observes, “those things that are born of an excessive effervescence of enthusiasm cannot survive”; nevertheless the fact that it was even contemplated indicates that the king and the Sardinians were by no means out of sympathy with one another, and that the island parliament faithfully discharged its function of informing its sovereign of his subjects' desires.

There is little more that needs to be said concerning the Aragonese administration of Sardinia previous to the accession of the Catholic Kings. Some effort was made to settle the interminable conflicts of lay and ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the island—a heritage of the papal claims to sovereignty there by the election of a special tribunal of appeals in the reign of John II; and in 1460, at the General Cortes of Fraga and Lerida, that monarch solemnly reconfirmed “the perpetual union and incorporation” of both Sardinia and Sicily “in the kingdom of Aragon and

the royal Crown thereof.” The institutional autonomy of the island, however, was not disturbed, and we hear little or nothing of the problems of its administration in the works of contemporary historians. On the whole, one gains the impression that the Sardinians, though constantly complaining of the corruption, greed, and arbitrary conduct of the officials of the island, were by no means dissatisfied with the fate that had united them with the realms of the Crown of Aragon. The very fact that they grumbled about the conduct of the local administration indicates that they believed that their new sovereigns intended to treat them well. And it is noteworthy that almost all the Sardinian historians speak enthusiastically of the numerous benefits conferred on their native land by the rule of the kings of Aragon, particularly of their measures to eliminate the abuses of antiquated feudal jurisdiction, of their gradual abolition of slavery, of their solicitude for the military defense of the island, and most of all of the favor they showed to the Sardinian municipalities, to which they granted privileges and immunities comparable to those of the cities of Catalonia. Agriculture received far more attention from the government here than in most of the other lands over which the Spanish monarchs held sway; the commerce of the island, though it was of course not comparable to that of Majorca or Catalonia, unquestionably improved after the Aragonese occupation; while the diminution of the population in this period, of which all contemporaries complained, is probably in great measure to be ascribed to the number of deaths on the field of battle. Most of the benefits of the Aragonese rule in Sardinia were not fully realized till the time of Ferdinand the Catholic, who consolidated and enhanced them, but there can be no question that the first two centuries of Spanish administration in the island, though far from ideal when judged by modern standards, showed a considerable improvement over the form of government which it supplanted.

## SICILY

The Aragonese administration of the island of Sicily was powerfully affected from the beginning by two special considerations. The first of these was the undying love of independence and liberty, which was the dominant characteristic of the Sicilians, and which revealed itself in their repeated demands for a separate line of kings. The second was the high tradition of free institutions and self-government which the island had inherited from the times of the Norman and Hohenstaufen, and which the Aragonese, as heirs of these dynasties, felt themselves in some measure bound to maintain.

We have already encountered numerous evidences of the Sicilian passion for autonomy, and of the readiness of the earlier Aragonese kings to respect it. It is natural to ascribe the establishment of a separate Sicilian dynasty by the will of Pedro the Great to the irresistible influence of Spanish separatism, and to attribute James II's abandonment of his original resolve to rule in Sicily as well as in Aragon to that monarch's reluctance to fight with the papacy; but it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Sicily's unwillingness to recognize any sovereign whose attention was distracted by the government of other realms was a most important element in causing both these decisions. And it will be remembered that for over one hundred years—from the treaty of Anagni in 1295 to the death of the younger Martin in 1409—the Sicilians were successful in maintaining a separate dynasty, and therefore in preventing themselves from being brought under the sceptre of the kings of Aragon. Of the independent Sicilian sovereigns of this period, Frederic, the son of Pedro III and the brother of James II of Aragon, whose reign lasted from 1296 to 1337, was unquestionably the greatest. He had come to the island so young that he felt himself almost a native. As he had defended his realm, not only against the Pope and the Angevins, but also against his brother the king of Aragon, who had deserted him at the treaty of Anagni, he won for himself and for his dynasty the affection and good will of the Sicilians. Instead of serving to make Sicily Aragonese, his reign committed his successors to the cause of Sicilian



independence. And in addition to defending his new kingdom against foreign foes, the reign of Frederic did much to improve its internal administration, which had suffered grievously from the cruelties and oppressions of the Angevins. All the free institutions inherited from Norman and Hohenstaufen times were strengthened and renewed. Particularly important was Frederic's revival of the powers of the Sicilian Parliament, which had been virtually in abeyance under the house of Anjou. In all the greatest affairs of the realm, in peace, in war, in treaties, and in finance, the Sicilian national assembly attained in this period an authority so extensive that the history of its manifold activities is virtually the history of the island. It is true that Frederic's three rather unworthy successors, Pedro II, Louis, and Frederic IV, were for the most part puppets in the hands of the rebellious baronage, and lost much of the ground that Frederic had gained. The national assembly was rarely convoked under them, and when it did meet was little more than a battleground of factions. Nevertheless the parliamentary tradition was not suffered to die out, and under the younger Martin, who saw the necessity of courting popularity in order to gain recognition, it was once more revived in full force. At a Parliament held in Syracuse a number of 'good laws' and regulations were passed to bring back the ancient liberties of the realm; and as a means of diminishing the excesses of baronial power, a royal council of twelve members was created, of which one half was elected by the commons and one half appointed by the crown. Order and free government were on the high road to restoration, when the death of young Martin in 1409 and of his father in the succeeding year threw everything again into confusion, and left Sicily as well as Aragon without a king.

During the interregnum and the first three years of the reign of Ferdinand of Antequera, Blanche of Navarre, the widow of the younger Martin, managed to maintain herself in Sicily as the representative of the Crown of Aragon against the local factions which were attempting, in one way or another, to set up a new line of independent sovereigns. In 1415 Ferdinand sent his younger son, John, to replace Blanche as viceroy; but the Sicilians, foreseeing that the rest of the Aragonese dominions would ultimately fall to John's elder brother, Alfonso, straightway attempted to revive their autonomy by securing for John the title of independent, king of the island. This naturally resulted in the recall of John to Aragon at the moment of Alfonso's accession; for the latter did not propose to tolerate any division of the Aragonese inheritance. On the other hand, the Sicilians had no wish to accept Alfonso as their sovereign; in fact, the Magnanimous King, not daring to run the risk of a point blank refusal by the Sicilian Parliament, secured recognition from separate assemblies of barons and the representatives of the third estate, summoned successively to the Castello Ursino in Catania. Moreover, as Alfonso rarely paid his Sicilian subjects the honor of visiting them, they continued their efforts, down to the very close of the reign, to establish a dynasty of their own. When, in 1458, Alfonso died, and John succeeded him as king in Aragon and in Sicily, the islanders attempted to induce the latter to fix his residence among them; failing in this, they sought to persuade him to set up his son, Charles of Viana, as his representative there, with the thinly disguised intention of making him an independent sovereign. Naturally John II did not accede to these desires; but the fact that he found it advisable solemnly to confirm the annexation and incorporation of Sicily with the realms of the Crown of Aragon in the Cortes of Fraga and Lerida in 1460<sup>1</sup> may be taken to indicate that the ambitions of his Sicilian subjects for autonomy caused him a good deal of anxiety. Even as late as 1477, when the heiress of the richest fief in the island announced her intention of wedding a prince of the Neapolitan royal house, the king of Aragon was so much worried lest the match result in the setting up of a separate line of Sicilian kings, that he actually attempted, though unsuccessfully, to prevent it, by offering himself, despite his eighty years and his blindness, as a rival candidate for the lady's hand.

But though the Sicilians failed in their efforts to maintain a dynasty of their own, they strove the harder for that very reason to preserve all the other emblems and organs of their national and

institutional freedom. The intensely separatist character of the Spanish methods of government doubtless facilitated their efforts in this direction, but it is impossible to withhold a tribute of admiration to the Sicilians themselves for their heroic though not always judicious determination to maintain their liberties. A brief examination of the chief component parts of the Sicilian constitution in the middle of the fifteenth century will serve to make clear the measure of success which these efforts attained.

The representative of the Aragonese king in the island was a viceroy, but the office, in the fifteenth century, was not seldom in commission—conferred, that is, on two or even three persons at the same time. Its duration was exceedingly variable. At a later date the normal term came to be regarded as three years, but it was often less and not seldom more. The viceroys, through the powers delegated to them, could summon, prorogue, and dissolve the Parliament; exercise all the rights of a legate of the Holy See (claimed by the Sicilian sovereigns since the days of Pope Urban II); appoint all subordinate officers, save a few who were nominated directly by the crown; pardon criminals; grant feudal fiefs; put forth proclamations which did not infringe the laws and liberties of the realm; deal directly with the see of Rome in matters ecclesiastical; oversee the publication and execution of papal bulls in Sicily; and represent the island in its dealings with foreign states. They were selected, during the fifteenth century, quite as often from among the prominent families of the island as from those of Aragon. They were paid a large salary; they dwelt in the royal palace at Palermo; and they were invested with all the pomp and prerogatives of kings. Of the great officers of the crown, who had been so prominent in Angevin times, when Sicily and Naples were under a single rule, only the chief Justiciar of the royal court, the Constable, and the Admiral remained in the island; and their functions were rather advisory than authoritative. Over and above the *donativo*, which, as we shall subsequently see, could be granted only by the Parliament, there was a long category of revenues which came to the viceroy as a matter of course; among these customs duties, profits of jurisdiction, feudal dues, revenues of vacant benefices, and the sale of bulls of crusade were the most important. Taxation was not, however, anywhere nearly so oppressive in this period as it subsequently became; and though it was not absolutely impossible even at this early date for small sums occasionally to find their way across the sea to Spain, the revenues were largely used for Sicilian purposes. The administration of justice was also completely dominated by the viceroy: he had a seat and a vote in both the chief courts of the realm, the *Magna Curia* for civil and criminal affairs, and the *Real Patrimonio* for financial ones; they followed him about wherever he went, and were guided by his wishes in rendering their decisions. There was also a so-called *Sacro Consiglio*, composed of the members of both these courts, and of as many other officials as the viceroy was pleased to summon, by whose advice he was supposed to be guided in judicial questions of supreme importance and other 'grave affairs'. In spite of vigorous protests from the Sicilians, the practice of sending certain cases across to Spain for final settlement gradually began to establish itself in this period.

The authority of the viceroy, though in general strongly supported by that of the subordinate officers and of the courts, was also seriously limited, throughout the fifteenth century, by the powers of the island Parliament. This body had behind it a strong local tradition; on its maintenance and development the Sicilians concentrated their strongest efforts; and the unquestioned importance of the Cortes of the realms of the Crown of Aragon doubtless operated indirectly in its favor. It was composed of three estates or *bracci*—barons, clergy, and representatives of the cities; and there were numerous and elaborate regulations concerning parliamentary procedure and privilege. The place and time of convocation were determined by the viceroy. The ancient Hohenstaufen maxim of annual Parliaments had now fallen into desuetude, so that during most of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the assembly was summoned whenever convenient; but in 1488 it became triennial, owing to the establishment of a rule that the sums which it was invariably requested to grant should be paid up within three

years. Its chief functions were to receive the oath of each new sovereign to preserve the laws and privileges of the realm, and to watch over the subsequent performance of it; to propose *capitoli*, which if accepted by the kings acquired the force of laws; and to vote taxes, to which, as in Aragon, the significant title of *donativos* was always given. The fact that the royal treasurer, in his capacity of custodian of the revenues of vacant sees and confiscated fiefs, was given access to both the upper houses, and was generally recognized as the principal representative of the viceroy in the Parliament, indicates that the financial functions of that body were regarded by the government as of primary importance. Various documents in this period bear witness to a constant attempt to make the grant of funds by the Parliament dependent on the acceptance of the *capitoli* by the viceroy; but it may well be doubted whether this principle was ever rigorously observed in practice.

In one respect the advent of the Spanish domination in Sicily actually strengthened the local Parliament, and that was in the establishment of a *Diputazione del Regno*, on the model with which we have become familiar in the realms of the Crown of Aragon. This originated during the reign of Alfonso the Magnanimous, in a demand that representatives of the realm should oversee the raising, collection, and spending of the *donativo* in the manner and for the purpose voted. In 1475, under John II, its functions were extended to include the right to defend the nation against all infractions of its privileges and laws. It would seem that the only way it had of actually exercising this right was to complain to the viceroy or to the king himself; but the records show that this prerogative was frequently and effectively used. The members of the *Diputazione* were at first nine, then fifteen, and finally twelve in number; each *braccio* elected one third of them; and they were paid moderate salaries.

Other indications of the determination of the Sicilians to preserve the largest possible measure of independence might be multiplied without number. They invariably held that they had been united to the realms of the Crown of Aragon by their own free will and not by conquest; and that therefore they were entitled to resist any encroachment on their liberties and privileges, in a way that Naples and Sardinia were not. In spite of their annexation to Aragon, they maintained their own system of currency, their own flag, their own consuls abroad, and their own representatives at the church councils of Constance and Basel. When envoys from the Sicilian Parliament came to Barcelona they were received with all the pomp and circumstance of ambassadors of a foreign state. Indeed, in a list of precedence of European lands, published by Julius II in 1504, Sicily was placed fifth in the order, after the Empire, France, Spain, and England; and before Scotland, Hungary, Bohemia, Portugal, and Venice. Theoretically without doubt it was well that the preservation of all these ancient liberties and franchises should compensate for the evils of an absent sovereign; but practically this resulted in the maintenance of feudal anarchy, confusion, and lawlessness—the more pitiful because brought into strong relief by contrast with the orderly if absolute monarchies that were consolidating themselves in other European states. Unquestionably the island lacked governance. Economically it was in a wretched condition. The population was probably little more than half a million souls; the fields were cultivated only when in close proximity to the towns; there were vast waste spaces with few paths and no roads. Commerce was in abeyance owing to the Turkish raids; and the discovery of America and of the new trade routes was soon to bring it almost to a standstill. Nearly all the wealth in the island was in the hands of the Jews, who enjoyed under Alfonso V and John II a very unusual number of privileges, and a large measure of local autonomy under their own elected officers or *proiti*. They were generally well liked, and constituted, in fact, a veritable *regnum in regno* until the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic, who expelled them. Intellectually the state of Sicily was chaotic. Though printing was introduced at Palermo before 1473, the vast mass of the people was densely ignorant. On the other hand, the founding of the University of Catania by Alfonso the Magnanimous in 1445 relieved law students from the necessity of going to Bologna,

while names like those of Antonio Beccadelli (Panormita) and Lucio Marineo Siculo show that the island produced notable scholars, though they unquestionably found more congenial fields for their activities in other countries. In all walks of life we encounter “the same singular contrast of civilization and barbarism, of light and darkness, of apparently heterogeneous and discordant facts, which is the chief characteristic of Sicily in this period.”

#### NAPLES

“When the Kingdom of Naples was transferred from the Family of Anjou to Alphonsus King of Aragon, although it came under the Dominion of a most powerful King, possessed of so many hereditary Kingdoms, such as Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, Majorca, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, Roussilion, and many other flourishing Dominions; and new Families, new Customs, and Fashions were brought to it from Spain, yet it luckily happened that this magnanimous King did not treat it as a foreign Kingdom; nor did he look upon it as a Province of the Kingdom of Aragon, but had as great a Regard for it as if it had been his antient and native Kingdom.... Whether it was upon account of the Sweetness of its Climate, or its Grandeur, and the vast Number of its illustrious Barons and Nobility; or whether it was his Love for his dear Lucretia Alagna, it is evident that he preferred this Kingdom to all his other Dominions, and it never was in so flourishing a Condition, as in his Reign. He fixed his Royal Residence in Naples, where he resolved to pass the Remainder of his Life; and, as if he had forgot his paternal Dominions, all his Care, and all his Thoughts were employed about this Kingdom.”

In these striking words, a famous eighteenth-century historian sums up the essential features of Alfonso’s rule in Naples: he treated it not as a dependency of the realms of the Crown of Aragon, but rather as the head and center of all his dominions. It was of course inevitable that Alfonso should import many “new Families, new Customs and Fashions” into Naples, not only from the realms of the Crown of Aragon but also from Castile, his native land, where he had passed his early years. His edict that all poor and indigent people should have a public audience every Friday and that an advocate should be appointed for them—with a yearly salary from the royal treasury—has a distinctly Castilian flavor. Moreover, he spoke Spanish to the day of his death, in contrast to his illegitimate son and successor, Ferrante, the first ‘Re di Napoli’, who was Italian in speech, in character, and in education. But there can be no doubt that Neapolitan interests generally prevailed over those of the Spanish realms during the reign of the Magnanimous King. It was not till the early years of the sixteenth century, when, under the lead of Ferdinand the Catholic, the last French attempt to recapture Naples was defeated, that the realm became thoroughly Hispanicized and the inherited local and Angevin traditions and institutions completely superseded by those of its new masters.

The type of administration which Alfonso inherited from his Angevin predecessors in Naples was much more feudal than national; and as it was his aim rather to make himself popular in his new realm than to assimilate it to his other possessions, he continued and maintained the system which he found there. He upheld and increased all the ancient rights and privileges of the Neapolitan baronage and doubled their numbers. He endowed the petty lords as well as the more efficient basis by the fusion into a single body— henceforth known as *Camera della Sommaria*—of the ancient tribunals of the Mint and of the Royal Chamber. It was supereminent above all the other councils of the realm, with but one exception, of which anon; and a new division of the kingdom into twelve provinces facilitated its proceedings. It was given charge of everything that concerned the royal revenues and patrimony, in order that the king’s ministers “might be more careful and diligent in providing him with Money.”

Despite the recklessness of his grants to the Neapolitan baronage, Alfonso made one heroic effort to centralise the administration of justice by the erection of the *Sacro Regio Consiglio di*

*Santa Chiara*, so called from the great monastery in which, down to the middle of the sixteenth century, it held the majority of its sittings. It was modelled partly on the type of royal council whose acquaintance we have made in the Spanish realms, and partly on the Roman Rota, with whose forms and procedure Alfonso had become familiar through his friend Alfonso Borgia, bishop of Valencia and afterwards Pope Calixtus III. It was composed, under the king, of a president, who was usually the king's eldest son or else one of the greatest prelates of the realm, two 'military' assistant counsellors to represent the baronage, a vice-prothonotary, and a number of learned doctors of the law—at first nine, later six and seven, and afterwards ten and twelve. It was a general court of appeal from all the minor tribunals of the realm and also from the *Camera della Sommaria*; and Giannone goes further and maintains that cases were brought up to it from the courts of Sicily, and even from those of the other Aragonese lands as well, "whence we are convinced," he further adds, "of the Vanity of the Opinion, that [Naples] from the beginning of Alphonsus's Reign became dependent upon the Crown of Aragon." The list of authorities cited by Giannone in support of these assertions is certainly impressive; their statements, however, are not always specific, and a large allowance must necessarily be made for the patriotic bias of Giannone himself. It was natural that much of the business of his other realms should be referred to Alfonso, and it is highly probable that he frequently discussed it with the members of the *Santa Chiara*; but it would certainly be difficult to prove that that tribunal possessed any constitutional authority of its own outside the kingdom of Naples. It was unquestionably the most important body in the realm in which Alfonso fixed his residence, and could therefore scarcely fail to be informally consulted in regard to the affairs of the rest of his dominions; but there is no reason to ascribe anything more to it than this.

As the Aragonese had originally come into Sicily and Naples as heirs of the imperial house of Hohenstaufen, they inherited friction with the papacy, which had claimed suzerainty over Naples as well as Sicily since 1059 and had in general supported the Angevins there. This friction was considerably more serious in the kingdom of Naples than in the island, partly because the Aragonese authority there had been so much more recently established, and partly because of greater geographical proximity. Even after his recognition and investiture by Eugenius IV in 1443, there were interminable quarrels over boundaries, and countless conflicts of jurisdiction between Alfonso and his successors and the contemporary Popes, particularly about the question of the revenues of vacant benefices. Even the Borgia Calixtus III refused to recognize Alfonso's illegitimate son, Ferrante, as king of Naples, on the former's death in 1458; and a similar attitude on the part of subsequent pontiffs encouraged John, the son of René of Anjou, to make another effort to expel the Aragonese in 1462-64. Giannone complains that Alfonso and the kings that came after him failed to apply against the papal encroachments "those strong and effectual Remedies which were begun to be made use of in France", but rather attempted "to cure the wounds with Ointments and Plasters." In political and institutional ways the accusation is perhaps well merited, but on the other hand we must not forget that it was under the patronage of the Magnanimous King that Lorenzo Valla shattered the foundations of the papal claims to temporal sovereignty by his investigations into the historical validity of the so-called Donation of Constantine. The mention of the name of Valla tempts one to go further and study the development of the Renaissance at Alfonso's luxurious court, but this fascinating topic lies so far from the field to which this volume is devoted that it must of necessity be left aside.


Nor can we dwell on the internal side of the reigns of Alfonso's illegitimate son and successor in Naples, Ferrante I (1458-94), nor on the briefer rule of his different descendants during the next ten years. Naples ceases to form a part of the Aragonese Empire in this period, and though an intimate political alliance was maintained between Ferrante and his uncle John, the history of the kingdom has little to do with that of Spain until the opening of the Italian wars. Certainly Ferrante had absorbed all his father's passion for the Italy of the Renaissance. There was little or nothing




Spanish about him; he possessed the characteristic virtues and vices of the typical fifteenth-century Maecenas and petty despot, and belongs wholly to the annals of the peninsula, where his life was lived. The Neapolitans themselves regarded him with enthusiasm; “they preferred a native bastard to a foreign pretender”, whatever his lineage and descent. In other words, Naples was as yet in no sense truly Aragonese; indeed the fifteen years (1443-58) during which the two realms had been united under a single scepter had served rather to make the Aragonese king Neapolitan.

Yet in spite of all its weaknesses and limitations, we can-not contemplate the position of the great Mediterranean empire which James the Conqueror and his successors had built up without being profoundly impressed by its grandeur. It had been won from infidel and Christian alike, often against heavy odds and by means and for ideate of which there was much reason to be proud and little to be ashamed. It had secured for the East Spanish realms a position of unquestioned predominance in the western basin of the Mediterranean Sea. It went far to counterbalance the isolation from the affairs of Western Europe which characterized fifteenth-century Castile, and to preserve for the Iberian kingdoms as a whole their place in the family of European states. When united with the other dominions which the events of the next century were to bring to Spain, it was destined to contribute its share towards giving her preeminence among the nations of the earth.

**VOLUME II**  
**THE CATHOLIC KINGS**



## BOOK III THE UNION



### CHAPTER XII THE MARRIAGE OF FERDINAND AND ISABELLA

“EVER since the wars began in Castile between King Henry and the nobles of his realm, and before the marriage of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, a song used to be sung there by the newcomers within the kingdom; and the words of this song, which was set to very pleasant music, were

‘Flowers of Aragon  
Blossom in Castile.’

And the children took little bannerets, and, riding on canes and prancing about, cried, ‘Standard of Aragon, standard of Aragon!’ And I repeated it and repeat it now five times over; for we can now say after our experience of what followed after: ‘Lord, out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast thou perfected praise because of thine adversaries, that thou mightest still the enemy and the avenger’. And to this text we may now reverently attribute a fresh significance over and above the gloss which Holy Mother Church appends to it. And this is to the effect that our Lord observed that His people of Castile were suffering from all manner of pride and heresy, blasphemy, avarice and rapine, wars, tumults and quarrels, thieves and robbers, whoremongers, assassins, gamblers and keepers of gaming tables; from whence it followed that the names of our Lord God and of bur Lady, the glorious Virgin Mary, were frequently taken in vain and denied by these evil gamblers, and that the Moors were enabled to murder, plunder, and gain ransoms from Christian folk; and further as a remedy for these evils that our Lord of His infinite mercy and goodness placed it in the mouths of innocent children to proclaim, in the guise of warriors with their standards, and joyously to sing the praises of those who had recently come within

the realm, before He put an end to the woes with which the kingdom was afflicted. So that from the flowers and the standard which entered Castile from Aragon for the celebration of the holy marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, by which the two sceptres of these kingdoms were finally united, there have proceeded so many and such marvellous benefits in the thirty years of their joint reign, that we, who have been witnesses of what our Lord has accomplished in our day and generation, may well take to ourselves the words of our Lord and Redeemer, ‘Blessed are the eyes which see the things that ye see. And thus with the union of the royal crowns, our Lord Jesus Christ visited His wrath upon His foes, and destroyed the murderer and the avenger.’”

Such are the words in which Andres Bernáldez, the noted chronicler of the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, describes what he believed to have been an augury of the reign of the Catholic Kings.

It certainly seemed that all the miseries which had afflicted the kingdom of Castile in the later Middle Ages had reached their culmination during the first three-quarters of the fifteenth century, in the reigns of John II and Henry IV. The former had not completed his second year when he ascended the throne; and the regency for him, which was initiated under the wise guidance of his uncle, Ferdinand of Antequera, was virtually continued, though under far less skilful and devoted hands, until the day of his death. For the king had no aptitude whatsoever for business, nor ability to rule; he was absorbed in the patronage and pursuit of letters, music, and art; when his uncle, the ‘good regent’, was called away to the throne of Aragon in 1412, the only question was who should replace him. For a time a council of ministers attempted to continue his work, but its members were for the most part tools in the hands of powerful magnates, or pensionaries of the king’s relatives in Aragon and Navarre. Before long, however, a more masterful personality arose, whose proficiency in jousting, dancing, and song insured his favor with his sovereign, while his boundless cupidity and ambition made him aspire to supremacy in the state. From 1420 till 1453, Alvaro de Luna was the undisputed lord of Castile. His audacity impressed; his magnificence dazzled. He was given the office of Constable, and his credit with the puppet monarch mounted so high that all the other counsellors of the realm were soon elbowed aside or overshadowed. The mere fact that the favorite, as well as his master, was the subject of a contemporary chronicle—an honor hitherto almost exclusively reserved for kings—is a significant indication of his preeminence. Nor was it enough that John should hand over the conduct of the government to his all-powerful minister; in the most private actions of his daily life Alvaro’s word was law for him; the Constable was even permitted to exercise some measure of superintendence over his marital relations. Needless to say, such prestige as Castile had won during the comparatively vigorous rule of Henry III was soon thrown away under a regime like this; the waste and corruption at home were only equalled by the weakness and vacillation abroad. The plots to overthrow the favorite were innumerable and kept the realm in an uproar, but one by one they failed; and the state of public confidence and morality is shown by the fact that when the rebels desired to parley with the king and his minister, it was often necessary to find some neutral person of known integrity to preside over the conference, and to furnish him with a large military force as a safeguard against foul play by any of the parties concerned.

In 1418, just at the time that Alvaro was rising into prominence, the king had been married to his cousin Maria, daughter of his uncle and former regent, Ferdinand of Antequera; and three years previously his sister (also named Maria) had wedded Alfonso the Magnanimous; the two branches of the house of Trastámara which occupied the thrones of Aragon and Castile were thus closely connected by a double tie. In 1425 a son, Henry, was born to the king of Castile and his Aragonese wife; but no other children followed, and in 1445 the queen died. It is not necessary to believe the assertions of his enemies that Alvaro was responsible for her demise, but

he evidently felt that it was quite within his province to select her successor. Without consulting the king, who apparently desired to wed a French princess, he calmly arranged a marriage for him with Isabella, a cousin of Affonso the African, king of Portugal, and forced his master to conclude it in August, 1447. The motives that inspired the Constable to seek this alliance were probably almost entirely personal; but the match shows that, despite all the struggles and wars of the previous century, Castile still saw the advantages of keeping close to her neighbor on the west. The Portuguese marriage, however, proved the ruin of its originator. Alvaro's arrogance had at last reached a pitch which even John found it impossible to endure. The new queen could not stomach his influence with her husband, which so completely eclipsed her own, and began plotting for his downfall. Finally, after the Constable had refused to listen to a plain hint to retire, he was arrested at his palace at Burgos, and executed two months later in the public square at Valladolid (June 2, 1453). On July 21, 1454, King John followed his favorite to the grave. In addition to his successor Henry, the son of Maria of Aragon, he left two children by his Portuguese wife: Isabella, born April 22, 1451, at Madrigal, who was destined to be the first queen of a united Spain, and Alfonso, born November 15, 1453.

Great expectations were entertained of the new king, who, as Prince of Asturias, had shown commendable energy and vigor; if he had occasionally risen in revolt against his father, he had also valiantly defended the honor of Castile in the battle of Olmedo, in May, 1445, against a hostile combination of factious nobles supported from Aragon and Navarre. He was accessible to his subjects and extremely liberal in giving. A proclamation of war against the Moors of Granada, issued soon after his succession, induced the belief that the infidel was speedily to be driven from the peninsula. But the Granadan war was so slackly conducted that the soldiers mutinied for lack of leadership, and the Emir openly expressed his contempt for his Christian foes; while in internal affairs the young monarch developed an apathy so shameless that he not seldom affixed his signature to public documents without taking the trouble to read them through. The coinage was debased in shocking proportions in order to furnish material for the royal munificence. Crime and rebellion stalked unpunished throughout the length and breadth of the land, and the moral degradation of all ranks of society exceeded even the measure common to that licentious age.

The personal aspect and private life of the new monarch were calculated, moreover, to enhance the dissatisfaction created by his career. "All his Face was disagreeable ... his Manners and course of Life were wholly addicted to Debauchery and Lewdness." In 1440, at the age of fifteen, he had been wedded to his cousin, Blanche of Navarre, daughter by a first wife of the future John II of Aragon; but he had been divorced from her thirteen years later on the ground that he had been unable to consummate the marriage. Examination of the unedifying details of the case leads, however, to grave doubts as to the truth of the pretext alleged; and the fact that negotiations for a second marriage of the Infante with a Portuguese princess were initiated before the first was dissolved is further evidence in the same direction.

It seems highly probable, in fact, that political reasons were at the back of the whole affair. Castile, as has been already pointed out, had quite as many grounds for wishing to unite with Portugal as with Aragon. The constant interference of the Aragonese Infantes in the internal affairs of the realm, where as descendants of the house of Trastamara they possessed extensive estates, had been a fertile source of trouble for many years. Moreover, the second queen of John II, whose influence with her husband had been unbounded, was a cousin of the lady who was under consideration as a bride for her stepson, and doubtless exerted all her efforts to perpetuate Portuguese influence in Castile. In any case the arrangements for the Portuguese match were pushed rapidly forward during the last months of the reign of John II, and the wedding was finally celebrated, on May 20, 1455, at Cordova, ten months after Henry had ascended his father's throne.



The mass of the nation, however, whose disgust at the fickleness of the new king as a ruler led them the more easily to give credence to uncomplimentary stories concerning his private life, were convinced that the assigned cause of his divorce was the true one; and the fact that the new queen bore no children during the first six years of her married life still further strengthened their belief. The cognomen of *El Liberal*, which had been previously assigned to the king because of his extreme generosity, was now exchanged for the far less flattering one of *El Impotente*. But Joanna of Portugal was sprightly and gay; she had many devoted admirers, prominent among whom was a certain Beltran de la Cueva, a brilliant and handsome young nobleman who had gained complete ascendancy over the mind of the king, and, like Alvaro de Luna, had risen with extraordinary rapidity to the foremost position in the Royal Council. At a feast held in honor of the ambassador of the duke of Brittany, Beltran had held the lists against all comers in defence of the supremacy of the charms of his lady love, whose name he refused to reveal, but whom common report identified as the queen; and when, in February, 1462, Joanna was delivered of a daughter, we are told by the contemporary chronicler Palencia that men generally refused to recognize her as the child of the king, but assigned her paternity to the favorite. Whether the popular belief in regard to this matter was correct or not has been the subject of much unprofitable discussion, which from the nature of the case cannot possibly lead to any definite result; yet it is pertinent to observe that it was plainly to the interest of Ferdinand and Isabella, whose rival for the throne of Castile the unfortunate Infanta was subsequently to become, that the tradition of her illegitimacy should be perpetuated, and that the courtly chronicles which were produced in their reign are consequently unsafe guides. Far more important, however, than the actual facts in regard to the paternity of the Infanta, who is usually known as *La Beltraneja*, was the effect which the doubts about it exercised on the state of the realm. This was to deliver over Castile to an orgy of rebellion and lawlessness, which surpassed even the anarchy of the preceding age.

Three months after the birth of the princess, in May, 1462, the king summoned the Castilian Cortes to Madrid, and received their oath of recognition to her as lawful heiress of the realm. Unfortunately we possess no document to tell us what persons signed this oath. It is certain that the king made every effort to secure the names of all the magnates of his realm, but there is strong reason to believe that a number of malcontents were already preparing to take advantage of the doubts which had been cast on the Infanta's origin, as a pretext for a revolt against the crown. Chief among these were Juan Pacheco, Marquis of Villena, and his uncle, Alfonso Carrillo, archbishop of Toledo. The former, who was of Portuguese extraction, and had been introduced into the Castilian royal household through the good offices of Alvaro de Luna, was a restless, intriguing spirit, who delighted to fish in troubled waters. Honor and loyalty were strangers to him. His own advancement was his sole aim, and he cared not what means he employed to attain his ends. The archbishop, who could claim few clerical attributes save his title, was another characteristic product of the age—ferocious in his hatreds, formidable on the battlefield, and exceedingly valuable to any cause which he should elect to espouse, on account of the vast resources which he commanded as primate of Castile. Both these men, who had expected to rule in the counsels of the young king, had fiercely resented the sudden rise of Beltran de la Cueva and the consequent eclipse of their own fortunes. They had been deeply dissatisfied with the way in which the new favorite had carried on the government; now, with the birth of La Beltraneja and the questions that had been raised concerning it, they saw their opportunity for revenge.

How much they could have accomplished by their own resources is exceedingly doubtful, but it so happened that powerful outside support was close at hand. The restless King John of Aragon, who had never ceased to covet the throne of Castile for his own family, had dreamed ever since 1457 of a marriage of his son Ferdinand, the offspring of his second wife, to Isabella, the half-sister of King Henry, as a means to secure that end. The recognition of La Beltraneja as

the lawful heiress of the Castilian throne would spell ruin for his plans; and the prospect of it threw the Aragonese king into the arms of the Pachecos. The growing cordiality of the courts of Castile and Portugal, which had been a marked feature of recent years, was also most unwelcome to John, with his aspirations for an ultimate union of Castile and Aragon; and his apprehensions were redoubled when he learned in 1464 that negotiations were on foot for a marriage of the Princess Isabella to Alfonso the African—a union which would naturally cut the ground from beneath his feet in another way. Finally, Henry the Impotent had contrived to give offence to the king of Aragon by sending aid to the latter's rebel subjects in Catalonia in the winter of 1462-63; while a year later he had filled the cup of the wrath of the Pachecos by raising the detested Beltran de la Cueva to the coveted dignity of grand master of Santiago. All these things combined to unite the Castilian rebels and the king of Aragon. They had numerous objects in common, and the advantages of cooperation were obvious.

On May 16, 1464, Carrillo and Pacheco, together with the latter's brother, the grand master of Calatrava, solemnly bound themselves together to provide for the security of the Infanta Isabella and of her brother Alfonso, whom they represented as in danger from some frightful conspiracy. A little later (the exact date is not possible to ascertain) the king of Aragon joined with them and with other lords and prelates of the realm to propound to King Henry certain measures which would redound to his good service and to the weal of his kingdom. A public pronouncement of their intentions, which the confederates issued at Burgos in the following September, reveals what these measures were: the recognition of Alfonso in place of La Beltraneja as lawful heir to the throne, and the appointment of a committee of five to consider the state of the realm. At a conference with King Henry, moreover, the rebels secured the person of the prince, and they furthermore extorted from the king a promise to acknowledge him as his heir, on condition that he should marry La Beltraneja. Subsequent events, however, persuaded them that Henry had no intention of abiding by any concessions which he might temporarily be induced to make, especially as they had entirely failed to persuade him permanently to dismiss Beltran de la Cueva. The revolt had, in fact, gone too far to be settled by negotiation, and as the king showed no disposition to fight, the conspirators soon became convinced that their only hope of effecting their ends was by violently and publicly humiliating him. At Avila accordingly they "resolved upon a most Barbarous Action, to the Eternal Infamy of Spain; Without the Walls of that City they Erected a Scaffold, and placed on it the Statue of King Henry in his Royal Robes on a Throne with his Scepter and Crown. Thither the Villanous Nobles, and a Multitude of People, resorted. Then a Cryer proclaimed Sentence against the King, laying to his Charge many horrid Crimes. Whilst the Sentence was reading, they leasurly stripped the Statue of all its Robes, and at last, with Reproachful Language, threw it down from the Scaffold. This Villany was acted upon Wednesday the 5th of June. Immediately Prince *Alonso*, who had been all the while present, was brought upon the Scaffold, there lifted upon the Shoulders of the Nobles, and proclaimed King, the Royal Standard being Displayed in his Name, as was the Custom at the Inauguration of Kings. The Multitude presently cried, *God Save King Alonso*, which was ingaging themselves in the Quarrel".

The opinions of Spanish jurists and historians differ widely as to the rights and wrongs of this dramatic act, but the majority condemn it as an unwarrantable revolt against the constituted authority of the crown. Terrible disruption in the realm was certainly its immediate result. For neither the king's partisans nor those of the revolutionists were strongly preponderant. A list of the *grandees* which followed the rival standards indicates that the two sides were evenly balanced; a prolonged struggle seemed therefore inevitable, to the ruin of the peace of the realm. The king was supported by Beltran de la Cueva, whom he promptly raised to the new dignity of Duke de Albuquerque; he also sought the support of the papacy, which he urged to fulminate against the rebels the censures of the church; he even sent the queen to Portugal to continue the

negotiations of the previous year for the marriage of Isabella to Affonso the African, and to demand aid and support from the latter in his distress. A treaty was actually signed between the queen and the Portuguese monarch to that effect; but at the last moment King Henry drew back and refused to ratify it, on the ground that Affonso had put too high a price upon his alliance. The fact really was that the Castilian sovereign still fervently hoped to find a way out of his difficulties without an appeal to arms. The rebels had certainly given him every pretext for attacking them, not only by the deposition at Avila, but also by the violent and abusive proclamations which they subsequently caused the young Alfonso to issue in justification of his assumption of the kingship. The forces at their disposal were no greater than Henry's; there had recently been some desertions from their ranks to those of the crown, and John of Aragon was at the moment too fully occupied in Catalonia to give them any aid. A vigorous thrust by the royal party at this stage would in all probability have compassed their defeat; but King Henry preferred negotiation, and in the spring of 1466 he entertained a proposal to detach the Pachecos from the insurgents by the marriage of the Princess Isabella, whose union with the king of Portugal was now regarded as impossible, to the grand master of the order of Calatrava, the brother of the Marquis of Villena. Despite the entreaties of the princess, who was apparently resolved to die rather than submit to the match, the preparations for it were hurried through. Applications were made to Rome for the grand master's dispensation from his vows of celibacy; magnificent presents were purchased for the bride; but the wedding was prevented at the last moment by the sudden death of the bridegroom, while on his way to Madrid for the ceremony, on May 2, 1466. The nature of the illness that carried him off was impossible to ascertain, and at least one authority attributes his demise to poison; but if poison it was, there is no reason to lay the responsibility at the door of the still youthful Isabella?

The death of the grand master, however, did not break off the negotiations, which continued till the year 1467, though without success. A number of betrayals and desertions characterize this state of the proceedings, but before long it became obvious that a trial of strength on the field of battle was sooner or later inevitable. It occurred at last, on August 20, 1467, on the plain of Olmedo, close to the spot where John II of Castile, twenty-two years before, had triumphed over his subjects. Many deeds of reckless valor were performed on both sides—the most dramatic being perhaps the action of Beltran de la Cueva, who, on learning that forty knights in the opposing ranks had sworn to slay him if he ventured to show his face in the fight, promptly notified his foes of the garb he intended to wear, in order that they might not be at a loss to find him. The king's forces, which were the more numerous, retained possession of the field at the end of the day; but Henry had not the energy to follow up his victory, and less than a month later he permitted Segovia, his favorite town, to fall into the hands of his foes, without striking a blow in its defence. Again the hope of detaching the Marquis of Villena from the confederates led to a renewal of fruitless negotiations, with the usual series of betrayals and counter betrayals as their inevitable accompaniment. This time a new element was introduced by the fact that the young Prince Alfonso, who had hitherto surrendered himself to the dictates of the grandees, had begun to give signs of independence and vigor, which promised to leave small room for the continuation of baronial tutelage. "This youth", exclaimed one of the magnates, "although in the hands of others and under our guardianship, is gaining far too much arrogance for such tender years! If we are to avoid ruin, we shall have to seek means to control him, either by dissipation or some other yoke".

On July 5, 1468, the prince died, after an illness of four days' duration. When we consider the state of the realm and the prevalence of foul play, we cannot wonder that the majority of the contemporary historians incline to attribute his death to the characteristic fifteenth-century cause: Pulgar alone states categorically that he was carried off by the pestilence. In view of the nature of the evidence, we shall probably do well to follow the example of the chronicler Castillo and not

attempt to give too definite a verdict; but the words in which that prudent writer comments on the event make it perfectly plain what he believed. "It was assuredly", he avers, "a most marvellous fact that three days before he died, the prince's death was divulged throughout the whole realm".

With Alfonso gone, everything depended on the Princess Isabella, who had been in the camp of the insurgents ever since the fall of Segovia in the previous year, and had recognized the late prince as the lawful occupant of the Castilian throne. If she insisted on being acknowledged as queen, and could prevail upon a sufficient number of the insurgents to support her, a continuation of civil war and anarchy would be inevitable; on the other hand, a compromise would infallibly be welcomed by Henry and would probably go far to preserve the peace of the realm. At a meeting held on August 17 to deliberate about the situation, a rift appeared in the ranks of the confederates; the archbishop of Toledo being clearly in favor of immediately recognizing Isabella as queen, while the Marquis of Villena counselled a reconciliation with the king. Isabella, quite as much from policy as from unselfishness, soon decided that if possible she would pursue the latter course. She had no intention of renouncing what she regarded as her just title as queen of Castile, but she plainly perceived that her reign would be far happier, and the kingdom more united, if she could obtain Henry's approval. She therefore consented to hold an interview with her half-brother, not indeed as the titular head of a rebel faction suing for peace, but as lawful queen of the realm, willing for the sake of internal quiet to permit him during his life to retain the dignity of king, provided her own right to succeed him was unequivocally recognized. The interview took place on September 19, 1468, at Toros de Guisando, southwest of Avila, in the presence of the archbishop of Toledo, the Marquis of Villena, and other grandees. It ended in an agreement substantially in accord with the Infanta's contentions, Henry being allowed to live out the remainder of his days on the throne of Castile, while Isabella was recognized and sworn to as princess and heiress of the realm to the prejudice of the claims of La Beltraneja.

At this point we must leave the narrative of Castilian events, in order to bring the affairs of the eastern kingdoms up to date.

John II of Aragon, the younger brother of Alfonso the Magnanimous, and the father by his second wife of Ferdinand the Catholic, was unquestionably one of the most remarkable sovereigns of the fifteenth century. Compact and vigorous in body, and inured to toil, he was filled to the brim with nervous energy and power; even the painful cataract which afflicted him in the latter part of his life, and, until it was removed by an operation in 1468, rendered him at times almost totally blind, was unable to diminish his extraordinary vitality. His physical qualities were fully matched by those of his mind and character. Unceasingly ambitious, a past master of diplomacy and intrigue, he was held back by no moral scruple from the relentless pursuit of his own ends. Had he lived in Italy, half a century later, Machiavelli might well have utilized him instead of Caesar Borgia as a model and pattern for *The Prince*.

During the last years of the reign of his father, the good King Ferdinand, John had hopes, as we have already seen, of securing for himself the succession in Sicily; but his elder brother, Alfonso the Magnanimous, had no wish to see him established there, and in 1419 succeeded in diverting his attention in another direction by arranging a marriage for him with Blanche, widow of Martin the Younger of Aragon, and daughter of the king of Navarre. We have not had occasion to deal with this little saddlebag realm since the early days of the Reconquest, when it was alternately involved in the affairs of Aragon and Castile. Suffice it to say that after remaining for a long time in the hands of a separate Spanish dynasty, which, however, was closely related to the royal lines in the other Iberian kingdoms, it had passed in the year 1234 to the French family of the counts of Champagne, thence in 1284 to the French crown, and finally, in the early part of the fourteenth century, to the French feudal house of the counts of Evreux; the wife of John of Aragon

was the daughter of the third of the Evreux kings of Navarre. During this long period of subjection to French influence, the Navarrese had maintained their pristine independence, and sturdily insisted on the rigorous observance of all their ancient privileges. It is true that some new institutions, notably a *Chambre des Comptes*, were introduced by the sovereigns of the Evreux line, but the inhabitants were more than ever averse to having their destinies shaped by their more powerful neighbors; and they had thus far succeeded in imbuing the foreign sovereigns whom dynastic changes had brought them with their own zeal for the preservation of their autonomy.

The marriage treaty of John of Aragon and Blanche of Navarre was apparently inspired by the idea of a sort of federation of the little Pyrenean realm with the kingdoms of Spain, and was welcomed by the Navarrese as a guarantee of their independence against the French influences which had been preponderant there for the past two centuries. John of Aragon, however, regarded the matter in a somewhat different light. Elbowed out of Sicily, he was keenly desirous to possess a crown of his own; since it was improbable, at that period, that he would ever be the heir of his brother Alfonso in Aragon, he welcomed the opportunity to satisfy his ambitions in Navarre. But that was not all. Though his accession in Aragon was improbable, it was, to say the least, possible; he was, moreover, exceedingly influential in Castile, and was constantly meddling in its affairs. If fortune favored him, there was certainly a chance that from Navarre as a centre he might ultimately unite all the different kingdoms of Spain under his own or his children's rule, as they had once been united four centuries before under the sceptre of Sancho the Great. Just when an idea of the possibility of an Iberian unity first took shape in the mind of John of Aragon, it is impossible to say. It was clearly the guiding motive of his declining years, and may well have been dimly conceived of even at this early stage. But the indispensable preliminary was that he should make good his hold on the little mountain kingdom whose heiress had become his wife; and his prospects of accomplishing this were not at first encouraging. In his marriage treaty with Blanche of Navarre, he had been unable to prevent the insertion of numerous provisions which seriously limited his political authority in that realm. The Navarrese had no intention of making him really king; they expressly stipulated that he should have no sovereign rights apart from his wife, and that, if she predeceased him, her eldest child, whether male or female, should inherit the throne to the prejudice of her husband. The treaty, however, failed specifically to state at what age under these circumstances the royal power and authority should be fully surrendered to the heir; and, as things worked out, this omission ultimately afforded John an opportunity, of which he was not slow to avail himself, to get the government into his own hands.

A son, Charles, was born to John on May 29, 1421; and two daughters, Blanche and Eleanor, followed in the succeeding years. In 1425 Charles the Noble, the old Evreux king of Navarre, died, so that John, as husband of the late monarch's daughter, became titular king of the realm; but the Navarrese were so violently opposed to granting him any real political power that he soon desisted from any effort to make his authority felt, and left the conduct of the government in the hands of his wife. During the next fifteen years he was almost exclusively occupied in Aragon and Castile; in the former, as lieutenant and representative of his absent brother, Alfonso the Magnanimous; in the latter, as an ambitious intriguer, head and centre of all the various baronial coalitions which aimed to curb the omnipotence of Alvaro de Luna. Finally, in May, 1441, Blanche of Navarre died, leaving the throne of the realm, in conformity with her marriage treaty, to her son Charles, Prince of Viana, but begging him not to assume the title of king "without the consent and blessing of his father". If the queen hoped in this way to reconcile her son and her husband, she was grievously in error; what she had really done was to render a conflict between them inevitable. Had she left the delicate matter entirely alone, John would probably never have dared to assert any claims at all; as it was, he reappeared in Navarre soon after the death of his wife, and demanded that Charles recognize him as king. After a



long struggle, in which he was far more vigorously opposed by the Navarrese Cortes than by his gentle and modest son, he gained his ends; though Charles drew up a secret protestation against the validity of his father's title to the crown. Ostensibly, however, the victory lay with John, who soon returned to his intrigues in Castile, leaving Charles to govern Navarre as his lieutenant and representative in his absence.

In September, 1444, John of Aragon was betrothed to Joanna Enriquez, the brilliant and charming daughter of the Admiral of Castile, and great-great-granddaughter of King Alfonso XI; their marriage was celebrated in the summer of 1447. This union was a significant evidence that, despite his recent defeat at Olmedo in 1445, John of Aragon had by no means renounced his ambition to make capital for himself out of the domestic discord in Castile. The Admiral Enriquez was the most powerful of the opponents of Alvaro de Luna, and his alliance would mean everything to John in case the latter decided to renew the contest in the western kingdom. Meantime in Navarre the news of John's second marriage was received with universal apprehension and disapproval. According to the fueros, he was thereby deprived of the last remnant of legal right to the Navarrese throne; but the inhabitants knew him too well to think for one moment that he would acknowledge this, and their worst fears were confirmed, in the autumn of 1449, when he reappeared in the realm, bringing with him a host of Castilian and Aragonese followers, whom he promptly installed in posts of profit and authority, to the prejudice of the Navarrese. Despite the pliant nature of Charles, it was clear that the differences between father and son could only be settled by war. The mass of the Navarrese supported the prince; so did the dominant party of Alvaro de Lima in Castile; in law-respecting Aragon also warm sympathy was manifested for his side. But Navarre itself was so disrupted that John was not entirely without adherents there; that the powerful family of the Beaumonts had decided to throw in their lot with Charles was sufficient reason why their traditional rivals, the Agramonts, should range themselves on the side of his father. In late October, 1451, the rivals met at Aybar, south of Sanguesa. After they had almost succeeded in reaching a satisfactory compromise by parleying, the impatience of their rival partisans reached the breaking point; battle was joined before the opposing chiefs could prevent it, with the result that the young prince was defeated and made prisoner. The Cortes of Aragon showed a disposition to offer mediation between father and son, but John would have none of it. Later a plan was broached for placing the settlement of the affair in the hands of Alfonso the Magnanimous, and pending the latter's decision the prince was permitted, under harsh conditions, to return to Navarre, in June, 1453; but as the terms on which he had been liberated were not fulfilled, the hope of a peaceful solution of the difficulty vanished, and war blazed forth again between the rival parties. Meantime, in the midst of all these broils and battles, John's new wife had borne him a son, the future Ferdinand the Catholic, on March 10, 1452, in the little town of Sos. When the baby was christened in the cathedral of Saragossa on February 11, 1453, it was observed that the utmost pomp and magnificence were displayed, "just as if he had been the heir of all these kingdoms".

It will be readily understood that the birth of Ferdinand was not calculated to diminish the animosity between John and Charles. The chance, which had been slight in 1420, that John might some day succeed his brother Alfonso in Aragon, was now far greater. The disruption in Castile promised well for the ultimate success of his intrigues in that direction, especially in view of his marriage with Joanna Enriquez. If he could but establish his own authority in Navarre, and hand it on unchallenged to Ferdinand, the latter might some day actually realize his father's dreams of a union of all the Spanish realms under a single sceptre. And so the struggle between John of Aragon (who most of the time was represented in Navarre by his indomitable wife) and the unfortunate Prince of Viana continued from 1453 to 1456, with occasional interruptions for diplomatic purposes; but the tide turned steadily against the prince, so that he finally abandoned the unequal fight, and, travelling by way of France and northern Italy, sought refuge at the court

of his uncle, Alfonso the Magnanimous, in Naples. The latter had little relish for the ways of his brother; on the other hand he had deep sympathy and a high regard for his unfortunate nephew, whose literary and artistic tendencies must have strongly appealed to him; and he was busily engaged in an attempt to reconcile father and son on a basis satisfactory to the latter, when he died, on June 27, 1458. The Neapolitans offered their crown to Charles, in prejudice of the rights of Alfonso's illegitimate son, Ferrante, to whom the Magnanimous King had left it; but the prince had too much respect for the memory of his uncle to accept, and soon passed over to Sicily, where he hoped to find peace and quiet, if not active support and sympathy in his misfortunes.

The ultimate result of the death of Alfonso the Magnanimous was to widen the scope of the quarrel between Charles and his father, and also to bring it to a head. John succeeded his brother in Sicily, Sardinia, and in his Spanish realms, so that his dreams of Iberian unity were brought measurably nearer realization than ever before; yet, on the other hand, Charles became the legal heir-apparent in all these kingdoms at the same time. If the new king of Aragon desired to pass on all his dominions to his beloved Ferdinand, the Prince of Viana must somehow be set aside. The latter's presence in Sicily, moreover, was profoundly disquieting to John; for the natives, who retained the happiest memories of the prince's mother, Blanche of Navarre, and had not ceased to aspire to the possession of an independent sovereign, were obviously desirous to make Charles their king. The upshot of the matter was that in the spring of 1459 John sent over a special messenger to Sicily to order his son to repair to Majorca, where the latter finally arrived on August 20. Meantime negotiations had been in progress between the prince and his father. The former was, as usual, willing to go to any lengths to obtain peace; but his cause had of late been vigorously espoused by the liberty loving Catalonians, who rivalled the Navarrese in their respect for the law, and, detesting the way in which John had dared to override it, urged the prince to make a strong stand for his rights. On the other side, the king and his wife conducted the negotiations with the greatest skill and duplicity; and, pressing their advantage to the utmost, finally extorted from Charles in January, 1460, an agreement by which the latter delivered to his father the principal fortresses of Navarre, allowed his rights as heir in that realm and in Aragon to be passed over in silence, and received in return merely his father's pardon for faults which he had never committed, and the permission to reside wherever he wished, save in Sicily and in his native land. Two months after the conclusion of this agreement, the prince arrived at Barcelona, where the population, who had followed his fortunes with increasing affection and solicitude, joyously welcomed him as *Primogenit*, or heir to the throne. Clearly they thought that the fact that his title had been passed over in the recent treaty meant that John had intended to concede it to him; but they were enlightened on this point a few days later in most unsatisfactory fashion by a letter from the king to his chancellor, the bishop of Gerona, in which they were strictly forbidden to treat or address the prince as the heir or successor of his father.

This mandate was taken by the Barcelonese as a violation of their constitution. They resolved to defend the rights of the prince; and from that moment the scene of interest in this singular drama shifts from Navarre to Catalonia. The events of the summer of 1460 served further to widen the breach between father and son. In order to strengthen himself for the struggle which he now foresaw was inevitable, Charles made overtures for the hand of the Infanta Isabella of Castile—a plan doubly distasteful to his father, because the accomplishment of it would necessarily render impossible what was already the darling project of the latter's heart, namely the marriage of Isabella to his son Ferdinand. In order to prevent it, the king suddenly appeared in Catalonia, where he was received with a coldness which contrasted strongly with the popularity of the prince; and on December 2, at Lerida, where John was holding the Catalanian Cortes, Charles was suddenly arrested and ordered into confinement. But the liberty-loving Catalonians rushed to the rescue of the captive. The Diputación General took his case under its protection, and after the failure of a number of embassies despatched to the king to demand his release,

proclaimed the Somatent on February 8, 1461, “against the evil counsellors of the crown”. Taken entirely by surprise, John was forced to yield. After a vain attempt to extricate himself from his difficulties by diplomacy, he liberated Charles, who in March returned to Barcelona amid the cheers of the enthusiastic populace; and in the following June he signed a treaty which was virtually an admission of defeat. But the prince did not live long to enjoy the victory which the valorous Catalonians had won for him; on September 23, 1461, he fell ill and died at Barcelona.

The death of Charles, however, was by no means the end of the difficulties of the king of Aragon. In Navarre, the prince’s two younger sisters, Blanche and Eleanor, still remained—a bar to the succession of the Infante Ferdinand, if not to John’s own possession of the throne during his lifetime; while in Catalonia the prince’s demise, which was universally believed to have been caused by foul play, insured the continuance and increase of the rebellion. But before we examine the way in which John handled these two problems, we must pause to introduce upon the stage another actor, whose character bears striking resemblance to that of the king of Aragon, though their aims were diametrically opposed—the redoubtable Louis XI of France, who had succeeded his father on the throne of that kingdom on July 22, 1461. The fundamental idea of the policy of this monarch was to increase the domains of the crown of France at home at the expense of his feudal vassals, and abroad at the expense of the neighboring realms; in Spain he specially coveted the county of Catalonia. Memories of the days of the Spanish Mark furnished some historical justification for this ambition; the acquisitions of St. Louis at the expense of James the Conqueror were even fresher in men’s minds; a French reconquest of Cerdagne and Roussillon, and if possible of further territories to the south of them, would be a fitting sequel to the treaty of Corbeil. The outbreak of the Catalonian revolt also, which so nearly coincided with Louis’s accession, apparently afforded a particularly favorable opportunity for the prosecution of his plans. The question was, how would he take advantage of it? Would he support the revolutionists and ultimately attempt to make himself their sovereign? Or would he support King John against them and make the king of Aragon pay liberally for his aid?

A brief testing of the first of these alternatives convinced Louis of its futility from his point of view. The Catalans were bent on the assertion of their rights, but they were not willing to renounce their allegiance to the king of Aragon, and still less to accept the sovereignty or tutelage of the king of France. The latter was consequently thrown back on the policy of supporting John, and on April 12, 1462, signed with him a treaty at Olite, on the basis of mutual guarantees in the possession of their respective states. But in addition to being a general agreement of friendship and alliance between France and Aragon, the treaty of Olite contained special provisions relative to the kingdom of Navarre, where Louis was quite ready to cooperate with John provided he could thereby facilitate his own aims in Catalonia. John’s problem in Navarre was how to deal with the two surviving sisters of the late prince: of whom the elder, Blanche, the divorced wife of Henry the Impotent of Castile, had been pronounced heiress of the realm in her brother’s will, while the younger, Eleanor, had strengthened herself by a marriage with her powerful French neighbor, the brilliant Gaston de Foix. Realizing that he could not possibly hope to dispose of both these princesses at once and thus clear the way for Ferdinand’s succession in Navarre, John had made a virtue of necessity, and adopted the policy of allying himself with the younger, for whose vigorous husband he had a wholesome respect, against her elder sister. Since 1455 he had drawn close to Gaston and Eleanor de Foix, by an agreement which assured to them the Navarrese succession, and to himself the tenure of the throne during his lifetime. Now by the treaty of Olite John obtained Louis’s support in this arrangement, and received the French king’s promise to aid him in the conquest of such places in Navarre as held out against him; it was further stipulated that the unfortunate Blanche should be placed in the hands of her sister Eleanor, as a guarantee against her asserting her own rights to the Navarrese throne. The very day after the signature of this compact, the unhappy lady was

informed that she must go to France, in order, so she was told, that she might be wedded to the Duke of Berry. The pretext did not deceive her, and she protested violently, but in vain; her father was obdurate. Two months later she was virtually a prisoner in her sister's hands at the castle of Orthez, whence she was subsequently removed to Lescar; and there, on December 2, 1464, she died, not improbably a victim of poison. On April 30, 1462, during her journey northward, and with a full realization of the fate that was in store for her, she had bequeathed all her rights to Navarre under her brother's will and the law of the land to her quondam husband, King Henry of Castile, and his successors, to the prejudice of the claims of Eleanor and her heirs; and Ferdinand the Catholic subsequently adduced this bequest in support of his own pretensions to Navarre by right of his wife Isabella. At this point the Navarrese question falls into the background; and we may leave it in order to return to Catalonia, merely remarking, as we pass on, that the memory of John of Aragon's desperate struggles to gain for himself full control of the little mountain kingdom furnishes the key to the otherwise inexplicable lengths to which Ferdinand the Catholic subsequently went to regain it. That monarch had been brought up with the idea that Navarre was one day to be his, and it never ceased to haunt him until he had taken measures to realize it.

Less than a month after the signature of the treaty of Olite, which dealt with the affairs of Navarre, the kings of Aragon and France made another and more important pact (May 9) at Bayonne, relative to the revolt in Catalonia. It provided that Louis should furnish John military aid against his rebel subjects, carefully defining its nature and the amount of the money compensation to be paid for it, and further stipulated that as soon as the revolt should have been suppressed, the two border counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon—the only Aragonese lands remaining north of the Pyrenees—should be handed over to the king of France until the payments due from the king of Aragon should have been completed. An entering wedge had thus been driven for the French occupation of Catalonia—the ultimate goal of the ambition of Louis XI. On the other hand, the news of the alienation of the counties naturally completed the measure of the wrath of the Catalonians against their king. Hitherto the revolt had been conducted for the defence of the fueros, but without any thought of the deposition of the monarch; now John and his wife were solemnly declared public enemies and deprived of their royal rights, and the Diputación General arrogated to itself supreme power in Catalonia, on the plea that it must act as regent for the ten-year-old Ferdinand. It was, in fact, only a thinly veiled move for independence, and by the following August even the farce of recognizing the rights of the Infante was abandoned; the ancient traditions of the county, together with its extraordinary economic prosperity, combined to give it the strength and prestige to venture thus early on a struggle for complete freedom. And the deeds of the revolutionists were fully worthy of their declarations. The Diputación General pushed forward its preparations for military defence with energy and success. At the opening of hostilities the queen and her son were besieged in Gerona, and it was only with great difficulty that the rescuing armies of Louis XI and Gaston de Foix effected their deliverance on July 23. A siege of Barcelona in the following autumn by a Franco-Aragonese army under King John was a complete failure. The most important result of the campaign had been to put Louis's army in practical possession of Cerdagne and Roussillon, and in the early months of 1463 the king of France took advantage of it. On March 2 he replied to a delegation of the inhabitants, who came to inquire what his intentions were in regard to the counties, with a series of casuistic arguments justifying his annexation of them. He had already gone much further than any interpretation of the treaty of Bayonne could possibly have warranted; he was treating Cerdagne and Roussillon as if they were to be permanently an integral part of the kingdom of France.

The occupation of the two border counties by the forces of Louis XI, culminating in this declaration of their annexation, was most displeasing both to John and to the Catalan revolutionists. It enlightened the former as to the true character of his treacherous ally,



while it gave the latter their first inkling that their independence was quite as much in danger from France as from Aragon. Revenge was for the moment quite out of the question for John, but the insurgents' reply to the French invasion was to throw themselves into the arms of King Henry of Castile. The latter had many causes of quarrel with the king of Aragon. The fact that Blanche of Navarre had declared him her heir in that realm created another bone of contention between the two sovereigns, and also between the Castilian monarch and Louis XI; and the latter's failure promptly to ratify and continue at his accession the traditional Franco-Castilian alliance was another factor which tended to embroil them. Indeed, as far back as August, 1462, when the French armies had been in Cerdagne and Roussillon only one short month, an ambassador was despatched by the Diputación General of Barcelona to the court of Castile formally to offer the sovereignty of Catalonia to Henry the Impotent. In September the latter accepted it, and promised to send an army to the aid of his new vassals; in December Castilian troops arrived on the confines of Aragon. For the French king this development was most unwelcome. If the Castilian army should succeed, as there was good reason to think it might, in completely dispossessing the king of Aragon, Louis would have had all his trouble for nothing, and would stand little chance of retaining Cerdagne and Roussillon. At all costs he must eliminate the king of Castile, and with this end in view he put himself forward as arbitrator in the quarrel between John and Henry; he hoped that a peaceful solution of their difficulties would induce the latter to retire to his own realm. To Louis's proposal both sovereigns agreed—John as a means of gaining time, Henry out of natural indolence and desire to avoid war; and in the end of April, 1463, Louis gave sentence at Bayonne to the effect that Henry should abandon the Catalans, and John give up to Henry the revenues of his Castilian estates and certain disputed territories in Navarre. The French king had thus got rid of the Castilians, though at the cost of incurring their increased enmity; for they were deeply dissatisfied with his award, and were subsequently to show it to his discomfiture. He had also diminished the difficulties of John of Aragon, ostensibly still his ally but really his enemy, in Catalonia; and yet, on the other hand, he had added to his irritation by the concessions which he had obliged him to make in Castile and Navarre. In other words, he had substantially increased the causes that would naturally lead John to seek ultimately to take revenge on himself; he had also paved the way for that revenge.

John had to bide his time, however, for many years to come; his path was still blocked in a number of different directions. In June, 1463, the Catalans, deserted by Castile, applied to Louis XI, to see if he could be induced to abandon his alliance with the king of Aragon and aid them to win their independence. At first the French king held out the highest hopes to the ambassadors, but his deeds belied his words; and it was not long before the emissaries became firmly convinced that he cared nothing whatsoever for their liberties, and that the real object of his policy was to unite Catalonia to his own domains. The farce of continuing the negotiations was kept up through the remainder of the year, owing to the reluctance of both parties to come to any definite decision; but all real hope of an accommodation had vanished long before. Meantime another power had become involved in the struggle, through the action of the Catalans in offering their sovereignty to Dom Pedro, the Constable of Portugal, whose maternal grandfather had been one of the unsuccessful candidates for the Aragonese throne after the death of King Martin in 1410. This prince arrived in Barcelona on January 22, 1464; but he was feeble and ineffective to the last degree, and under his unhappy tutelage the cause of the revolutionists went from bad to worse till his death on June 29, 1466. With the story of the Constable's misfortunes we are not particularly concerned, but the episode of his intervention had an important bearing on the relations of Aragon and Castile. The resentment which the sovereigns of these two states had cherished against one another for many years past had visibly cooled since Louis XI's attempt to arbitrate between them in 1463. Many of their mutual grudges had been forgotten in the heat of their common anger against the arbitrator, and now the process of rapprochement between the two Spanish courts, which the French king had unwittingly initiated, was still further advanced by this affair



of Dom Pedro. It was of the utmost importance to John that Henry should bear no aid to the new sovereign of the rebel Catalans; if on the other hand the king of Aragon could induce the king of Castile definitely to abandon the Constable, it would be a long step towards ruining the entente between the Castilian and Portuguese courts, whose recent progress had so greatly worried John. On June 9, 1464, the king of Aragon gained his end by the signature at Pamplona of a treaty with the king of Castile, in which the two monarchs promised one another mutual aid against their respective enemies. Castilian support of the Constable, which had been more than possible a few months before, was henceforth out of the question. To be sure, the king of Aragon was not yet certain enough of the loyalty or power of Henry the Impotent to trust his fortunes exclusively to him; and he had by no means abandoned his own intrigues with the malcontents in Castile. Indeed, at the very moment that he was negotiating for the treaty of Pamplona, he was in active relations with the Pachecos; the double game was ever dear to the heart of John II. But, for all that, the signature of the treaty of Pamplona was an interesting evidence of the real tendency of the times, though contemporaries do not seem to have comprehended its meaning. It was a milestone on the road to the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella.

Fresh complications ensued on the death of the Constable of Portugal in 1466, when the Catalans offered their sovereignty to a new protector—René the Good of Anjou and Provence—of whom they expected better things. Though too old himself to embark upon such a perilous venture, this ‘titular sovereign of half a dozen empires’ had a son, the gallant John of Calabria, whom he could send to the Catalans as his representative. Though he did not actually possess a rood of the land that he claimed in Sicily, Italy, and Jerusalem, he was solidly established in his French dominions, and his tenure of Provence, which had so many historical and commercial connections with Catalonia, rendered him a particularly valuable ally for the revolutionists. He was also descended, through his mother, Violante, from the old line of the counts of Barcelona, and was therefore not without hereditary claims; while, on the other hand, he was the head of a family that had been the consistent opponent of the house of Aragon in Sicily and the Mediterranean since the time of the Sicilian Vespers, and had himself fought with Alfonso the Magnanimous over the succession in Naples. Finally the new candidate received after some little delay a promise of support and cooperation from his nephew, King Louis of France, who had begun to realize that he could never hope to attain his ends in Catalonia through alliance with John, and therefore quite characteristically had determined to reverse his policy; the Italian ambitions of the French king also combined at this juncture to induce him to favor the new pretender. Indeed, René’s acceptance of the sovereignty of Catalonia and its results may be regarded as a link in the chain that binds the Angevin-Aragonese struggle of the two preceding centuries to the Franco-Spanish wars of the succeeding age. It fills the gap between the triumph of Alfonso the Magnanimous and the raid of Charles VIII.

The Catalan question, in fact, was rapidly becoming a European one, in which all the various powers were to take sides either for or against the king of Aragon. The Angevin military occupation of the county, which began in the spring of 1467, was checked, though not wholly prevented, through the skill and intrepidity of Joanna Enriquez and of the Infante Ferdinand, who received in this campaign his baptism of fire; but the military events are of far less consequence for our purposes than the diplomatic ones. Here, as may be imagined, it was the old king of Aragon who took the lead; and though he was terribly hampered by his blindness, and weakened in the winter of 1468 by the death of his valorous wife, his efforts were extraordinarily successful. At the crisis of his political fortunes, he was found at his very best. His object was to draw near to any and every power which could possibly be made an enemy of France and Anjou, and his agents all over Europe were busy in effecting this end. In Italy he managed to win the support of the duke of Milan—the more important because Louis had counted the Sforza as an ally of his own. He also approached Charles the Bold of Burgundy and Edward IV of England. But

unquestionably his most brilliant victory was won in the kingdom of Castile. He had keenly observed the course of events in that realm since the signature of the treaty of Pamplona in June, 1464: the triumph of the rebels and the humiliation of the king of Avila in 1465, the subsequent waverings of the policy of the crown and the project of the marriage of the Infanta Isabella to the grand master of Calatrava, the second battle of Olmedo, the sudden death of the Infante Alfonso, and finally the reconciliation of Toros de Guisando; so rapidly did fortune change between the conflicting factions that the king of Aragon must have been exceedingly thankful that he had kept in touch with both sides. Still it would obviously be preferable for him if possible to gain his ends in alliance with the *de jure* power in Castile, rather than in opposition to it; and whatever the internal state of the western kingdom, the course of its foreign policy in the last two years had been such as to give John of Aragon good reason to hope much from the attitude of Henry the Impotent. Two features of the situation were especially encouraging. The first was the Castilian king's refusal to ratify the treaty with Portugal which his queen had drawn up in 1465 and which provided for the marriage of the Princess Isabella to Alfonso the African. The second was his conclusion, in the summer of 1467, of an alliance with Edward IV of England, which marked the definite breach of the traditional entente between Castile and France. Indeed, it is by no means fantastic to suppose that the king of Aragon may have contributed to both these results, though we have no positive evidence of it. And now, with the death of Alfonso and the subsequent recognition of the Princess Isabella as the lawful successor to her brother's throne, the time had come for vigorous and decisive action. The acknowledged heiress of Castile could not in the nature of things remain unwedded long. If her marriage to the Infante Ferdinand—the cornerstone of the whole policy of John II—was ever to be realized, there was not a moment to be lost.

The king of Aragon and his son did not even wait for the news of the interview at Toros de Guisando to make overtures for Isabella's hand; an ambassador was despatched to Castile carrying the formal proposals for it in July, 1468, as soon as the death of Prince Alfonso was known. Isabella, who was fully alive to the political advantages of the match, and had received most favorable reports of Ferdinand's personal charms, accepted at once, and the marriage treaty was drawn up and duly signed in January, 1469. But serious opposition both abroad and at home remained to be encountered and overcome before the union of the royal pair could be actually accomplished. Louis XI of France, aroused too late to a realization of the results of his neglect of Castilian affairs, made haste in the spring of 1469 to despatch to Henry's court a special ambassador, Jean Jouffroi, bishop of Albi, charged with the double duty of revamping the old Franco-Castilian alliance at the expense of the more recent Anglo-Castilian one, and of offering Louis's brother, the Duke of Guienne, as an alternative candidate for Isabella's hand. In the first of these errands the bishop was successful, owing to the vacillations of Henry IV; but in the second and more important one he utterly failed, despite several interviews with the Infanta herself. The marriage which was to unite the Spanish realms was thus accomplished in the teeth of the displeasure and opposition of the king of France; but it had also been greatly facilitated by the mistakes of Louis's whole Spanish policy in earlier years; so that the Catholic Kings came to the throne with a tradition of hostility to France behind them, which was to bear terrible fruit in the succeeding age.

But John and Ferdinand had other things that worried them far more, for the time being, than the abortive opposition of the king of France. Chief of these was the hostility which the prospect of Isabella's marriage aroused in Castile. No sooner were the intentions of the princess known, than the majority of the grandees, foreseeing the end of their independence if the monarchy was suffered to become too strong, forgot the reconciliation of Toros de Guisando, and prepared to espouse the cause of La Beltraneja. Nay more, with the aid of the treacherous Marquis of Villena, they won over the fickle king to support them, and still further strengthened their hands by reviving the project of earlier years, that the Princess Isabella should be wedded to Alfonso of

Portugal. This last plan was wrecked on the firm refusal of the Infanta to entertain it; moreover a considerable number of the grandees, among whom the most prominent was the archbishop of Toledo, rallied to her side, while the popular sympathy for her cause was manifested on every hand in no uncertain tone. Still, her situation in the spring of 1469 was critical in the extreme. She held her court, virtually unprotected and alone, at first at Ocaña, near Toledo, and afterwards at Madrigal, south of Valladolid. She was being constantly spied upon by her numerous foes, and was subject at a moment's notice to capture and imprisonment. In the end of August, while her brother and the Marquis of Villena were on a progress in Andalusia, they directed the archbishop of Seville to march with sufficient forces to her residence and seize her; but the plan was frustrated by the energy of her friend the primate, who was never found wanting if a battle of any kind was to be fought, and succeeded in carrying her off in triumph to the friendly shelter of Valladolid.

Nothing, however, could permanently secure the Infanta's safety so effectively as the speedy completion of her marriage. Envoys were therefore despatched to Aragon to urge Ferdinand to come and claim his bride. As John, in the throes of his struggle with the rebels in Catalonia, was utterly unable to furnish his son with a military force sufficient to cope with his foes, the Infante was obliged to undertake the perilous journey with only a few attendants, disguised as merchants, and at night; not until he reached Burgo de Osma did he receive the protection of the partisans of his betrothed, and it was later still before he was able to throw off all concealment. In the evening of the fifteenth of October he reached Valladolid and held his first interview with the princess; and on the nineteenth, at the private residence of Juan de Vivero, they were married. So great was the poverty of bride and groom that they were apparently obliged to borrow money to pay the expenses of their wedding and of the simple ceremonies which followed it; and the contemporary chroniclers, who usually wax eloquent in their descriptions of such events, are almost silent about the whole affair. But no outward pomp or circumstance could possibly have added lustre to the union which created the mightiest nation of the sixteenth century and laid the foundation for one of the two greatest empires of modern times. The real celebration of the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella was the glorious epoch in Spanish annals which it introduced.

The characters of the monarchs whose wedding had been solemnized under such unusual circumstances have been so often and so fully described that it is difficult to add anything more; but as the period of their reign was that in which above all others the personalities of kings determined the policy and prestige of kingdoms, it is impossible to pass over the subject in silence. The contemporary chroniclers are absurdly loud in their praises of both sovereigns, particularly of Isabella; and even some of the modern historians have not entirely avoided exaggeration. Piety, dignity, inflexible determination and high courage, both moral and physical, were the outstanding virtues of the queen; intolerance and excessive fondness for pomp and display her most obvious faults. Her main aim in life was to reduce her kingdom to internal peace, order, and union, and to level all barriers and distinctions under the throne; and for the accomplishment of that mighty task her character and abilities preeminently fitted her. No less heroic a figure could possibly have humbled the rebel baronage, or invested the administration of justice with the majesty which should be inseparable from the law. Her husband, on the other hand, was essentially cosmopolitan in his talents and qualities—as distinctively the product of the land whose main attention had been directly to foreign affairs, as was Isabella of a country which had been chiefly occupied at home. Cautious, calculating, and persistent; parsimonious, though to good purpose, like his contemporary Henry VII of England; he never acted impulsively, never struck unless he was well able to follow up the blow. Deficient in frankness, generosity, and other qualities which win men's affections, he was on the whole less highly esteemed than was the queen, and was not unnaturally detested by the victims of his political triumphs; but the real man,

as revealed by his correspondence, steadily improves on closer acquaintance. Diplomacy was unquestionably his forte; and as the diplomacy of the time consisted chiefly in lying, we need not wonder that Machiavelli held him up as a model for princes in his skill at “playing the fox”. Ferdinand himself was quite aware of his abilities in this regard and gloried in them. It is said that on learning that Louis XII of France had complained that he had deceived him for the second time, he promptly replied, “He lies, it’s the tenth”. Other subsidiary merits and defects of the royal pair will be indicated in the succeeding pages; for the present we need only remark that the above mentioned qualities in each formed the most complete and perfect counterpart of those of the other. Ferdinand and Isabella supplemented one another at every point; where the one was weak, the other was strong, and vice versa. Between them they possessed talents which would make it possible for their united realms to follow up each and all of the multifarious paths of activity that opened before them on every side. At the most critical stage of her development, Spain was thus enabled to pursue all the national objects which had previously animated her component parts, and to assume many fresh burdens besides.

CHAPTER XIII

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONES AND THE CONQUEST OF GRANADA

THE union of the Spanish kingdoms, which was the ultimate object of the policy of John of Aragon, was far from being fully accomplished by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella. The best possible start had already been made; but there was still much more to be done before the future sovereigns could call their thrones their own. Castile had to be pacified and united, the power of the factions abased, and that of the monarchy exalted. Hostile France and Portugal had to be dealt with, and their recognition won. The Catalan insurrection had to be put down, and the kingdom of Granada conquered from the Moors. The narrative side of the story of these events will occupy us in the present chapter; the social and constitutional aspects will be treated in the two succeeding ones.

The news of the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella was most displeasing to Henry IV; while Louis XI of France, who had awakened too late to the true state of affairs in Spain, could not at first believe that his tardy efforts to prevent it had been unsuccessful. The two kings were naturally drawn close together by their common enmity to the newly wedded pair, and speedily prepared to join forces against them. Within a year of the marriage of his sister, the Castilian sovereign, in flagrant defiance of the pact of Toros de Guisando, made oath to the legitimacy of la Beltraneja, once more acknowledged her as lawful heiress of his throne, and finally caused her to be married by proxy to Louis's brother, the Duke of Guienne, who shortly before had been suing for the hand of the Princess Isabella. This combination, supported as it was by a large number of the Castilian grandees, boded ill for the cause of Ferdinand and his bride; but there were two serious weaknesses in it which ultimately effected its ruin. In the first place, it was largely the work of Louis XI, a foreign monarch, and if it attained its ends, it was bound to carry the sovereignty of Castile across the Pyrenees. This fact naturally elicited vigorous opposition among those whose patriotism was not entirely subordinated to their desires for personal aggrandizement; and it is highly significant that as soon as the news of it was made public, the inhabitants of the northwestern provinces—the traditional cradle of Spanish independence—went over to support the cause of Ferdinand and Isabella. Secondly, and even more important, the *entente cordiale* between Louis and his brother, which underlay the entire scheme, was only temporary. In less than a year after his proxy marriage, the Duke of Guienne had applied to the Pope for dispensation alike from the oath of fidelity which he had made to the king of France and from his union with his Spanish bride. He was already negotiating with Charles the Bold of Burgundy, in whom he discerned a far more powerful ally than the Impotent King of Castile. In the autumn of 1471, he had even gone so far as to apply for the hand of Charles's daughter, Mary. But before he could make much progress with this new plan he died, on May 25, 1472. His removal served to relieve Louis XI from serious embarrassments at home, but it also terminated the project of French interference in Castile, of which his marriage with La Beltraneja had been the corner stone. If the French king continued to desire to breed trouble for Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain, he would have to find other methods.

Meantime in Castile everything was in turmoil and confusion. Ferdinand and Isabella held their little court at Dueñas, but were so destitute of resources that they were unable to take arms against their foes. In fact, down to the death of Henry the Impotent, they did everything, short of renouncing their rights to the succession, in order to maintain friendly relations with him. But the king would not abandon La Beltraneja, nor desist from his efforts to find a husband for her.



After the summer of 1471, when the match with Guienne had become practically out of the question, he dallied with schemes for wedding her to Frederic, the son of Ferrante of Naples; to Henry of Aragon, a nephew of John II; and finally to Affonso the African of Portugal. None of these projects was realized—at least not in Henry’s day—but the negotiations for them, and the fact that there was no prospect of a permanent reconciliation between Henry and his sister, served to keep the realm in an uproar during the last three years of the Impotent King. Andalusia was devastated by the bloody feuds of the Ponce de Leons and the Guzmans. All the highways in the realm were infested with robbers and thieves; even the *hermandades* seemed temporarily powerless. Late in the year 1473, Henry and Isabella held an interview at Segovia, during which they manifested every evidence of outward friendship and cordiality. At Epiphany, 1474, Ferdinand was also received by the king of Castile, and in the succeeding months there were other meetings. Still, no understanding was apparently reached on the crucial question of the succession to the throne, and “since many things which it were perilous to set down were alleged concerning each party, it was impossible to make peace between them”. Finally, on December 11, 1474, King Henry died in his palace at Madrid. A careful comparison of the statements of contemporary chroniclers and of the documents bearing on the case points to the probability that he left no formal or written will; but it seems clear that he declared verbally on his deathbed that he recognized La Beltraneja as his daughter and as lawful heiress of his throne. There can be little doubt that she was the legal successor. She was unquestionably the daughter of the queen of Castile, born in the royal palace; and the allegations of her foes in regard to her paternity were never definitely proved. Finally, she had been formally acknowledged and sworn to by the Castilian Cortes as the heiress of the realm, and had been recognized as such by King Henry.

But if the strict letter of the law was on the side of La Beltraneja, expediency and the political interests of the kingdoms of Spain dictated the recognition of Isabella, who was solemnly crowned queen of Castile in Segovia two days after her brother’s death. She already represented, in fact, the nascent idea of Iberian unity, and the principle of freedom from foreign intervention. It was for these reasons, rather than because of any legal argument which she advanced in support of her claims, that the majority of patriotic Castilians rallied loyally to her standard. Many of the nobles, also, began to waver in their allegiance to La Beltraneja, and sought reconciliation with Isabella. The prospect of her strong rule was probably no more palatable to them than before, but they had begun to discern that the ultimate victory would probably rest with her, and they did not care to be found in the ranks of her foes. Among them were the Duke of Albuquerque, reputed father of La Beltraneja, and the powerful house of Mendoza; even the treacherous Marquis of Villena apparently made secret overtures to the queen at this period, though the parties were unable to come to any definite agreement. On the other hand, the archbishop of Toledo, angered at a slight at the hands of Ferdinand, deserted the cause of his spouse, declaring that ‘as he had released her from spinsterhood, so he would send her back to the distaff again’. As long as this sort of sentiment was rife in the realm, Isabella could not be said to hold the throne of Castile. And the forces of the opposition were the more to be reckoned with, because they were to receive ardent support at the critical moment from King Affonso the African of Portugal.

This impetuous monarch, as we have already seen, had previously entertained high hopes of winning the Castilian succession by marrying either Isabella or her niece, La Beltraneja. As soon as the news of Henry IV’s death reached him, he prepared to return to the charge. In early January, 1475, he had resolved to gather his forces, invade Castile, and, after wedding La Beltraneja, to incorporate it in his own dominions. On the eighth of that month he wrote to solicit the aid of Louis XI of France, who, after considerable delay and tentative negotiations with the other side, agreed in September to support him. Meantime, during the early days of May, Affonso entered Castile with a small but efficient army, joined forces with the Marquis of Villena, was solemnly affianced to La Beltraneja, and was recognized with her by their adherents as lawful

sovereign of the realm. But the Portuguese monarch was as unaccountably dilatory in substantiating his claims to the Castilian throne as he had previously been precipitate in advancing them. At the moment of his invasion, Ferdinand and Isabella were totally unprepared to resist him. Had he struck at once, before they had had an opportunity to collect their forces, he might possibly have compassed their defeat. But instead he waited idly for reinforcements from his Castilian confederates, and thus afforded his rivals a precious respite, which they well knew how to utilize. Proposals for a settlement of their differences by personal combat between Affonso and Ferdinand, and also for peace on the basis of the cession to the former of Galicia, Toro, Zamora, and a large money indemnity were exchanged, but ended in nothing; and in the meantime, by superhuman exertions, Ferdinand and Isabella recruited every available soldier from those portions of the realm which remained loyal to them. Finally Ferdinand made a move to capture the town of Zamora on the Douro, so as to cut his enemy's communications, and thus brought Affonso to bay; the Portuguese monarch, who had recently received considerable reinforcements under his son, was obliged to accept battle on March 1, 1476, on a wide plain to the east of the city of Toro. It was "a noble combat of the ancient sort", as one of the Portuguese historians remarks with satisfaction, "for in spite of the presence of artillery and gunpowder, destined to revolutionize the art of war", it was decided for the most part by hand-to-hand conflicts with swords, "making the whole a contest rather of physical strength than of skill". Night and a deluge of rain put an end to the fighting, and the Portuguese writers are fond of pointing out that as Affonso's son remained in possession of the battleground till the following morning the conflict can scarcely be regarded as a defeat for his side. But if the forces of Ferdinand and Isabella were denied the glory of a complete victory in the field, they certainly succeeded in gathering all the fruits of it. The military and political prestige of their rival was shattered beyond repair. Zamora surrendered on March 19; in June Affonso retired with La Beltraneja to Portugal, and the remnants of his army were soon dispersed. On the other hand, Ferdinand and Isabella did everything in their power to make all men believe that they had won an overwhelming victory. Processions and thanksgiving services were ordered in the chief towns of the realm. The captured standard of Affonso V was solemnly laid on the tomb of John I of Castile, in reparation for the great defeat of Aljubarrota ninety-one years before. The convent church of San Juan de los Reyes at Toledo was founded to commemorate their triumph.

But the fiery king of Portugal was unwilling to desist from his Castilian project without one more attempt to retrieve his fortunes. French aid, as he now clearly realized, was more than ever indispensable to success; and with the object of securing it, he repaired in the summer of 1476 by way of Ceuta and the Mediterranean Sea to the court of Louis XI. But in the meantime that crafty monarch had taken the measure of Affonso's incompetence. His own troops, sent to the succor of his Portuguese ally, had failed to make any impression in the north of Castile. He had begun to realize that he stood little chance of successfully opposing Ferdinand and Isabella, and that he had better make haste to treat with them. He therefore put off the requests of Affonso with various excuses, and soon after permitted him to visit the court of his rival, Charles the Bold, ostensibly for the purpose of mediating between Burgundy and France. Charles, who was Affonso's cousin, did not take long to convince him of the faithlessness of Louis; and on January 21, 1477, the Portuguese monarch was back again at Paris, where he received news of the Burgundian duke's defeat and death in the battle of Nancy sixteen days before. For some months more he hung about the French court, wasting his time in fruitless negotiations for a papal bull of dispensation for his marriage to La Beltraneja; when at last he was roused to a sense of the ridiculous and humiliating situation in which he had placed himself, he suddenly resolved to resign the throne of Portugal in favor of his son, and end his days in a monastery in Jerusalem. But the protests of his friends and of the king of France prevented the execution of this project; in the autumn of 1477 the unhappy monarch returned to his own dominions, where his son, who had already assumed the crown, made haste to relinquish it in his favor. Once more Affonso

prepared to try his fortunes by the sword. He collected his forces, notified the king of France of his intentions, and in the early months of 1479 again invaded Castile. But his chances of success, slight three years before, had by this time dwindled to nothing. Ferdinand and Isabella had already begun to reorganize their kingdom. They had received the submission of the majority of the rebel nobles. A treaty with Louis XI, though not yet actually signed, was inevitable in the near future. The only battle of the ensuing campaign was fought near Albuera, February 28, 1479; before hostilities could proceed any further, negotiations for a settlement had begun between Isabella and Affonso's sister-in-law, the Infanta Beatrice of Portugal. In the following September, two treaties, reiterating and confirming the ancient peaces, were concluded by the accredited representatives of both kingdoms. One of them further provided for a mutual restoration of conquests along the Castilian-Portuguese border; since, however, its main interest for us lies in its stipulations with regard to the Canaries and the west coast of Africa, it may be most conveniently reserved for consideration in another place. The other, which more immediately concerns us, dealt directly with the dynastic question. It decreed that Affonso should abandon the title of king of Castile, and Ferdinand and Isabella that of sovereigns of Portugal; that the king and queen of Castile should pardon and restore to their estates such of their subjects as had supported the Portuguese in the recent war; that their daughter Isabella should wed Affonso, the little grandson of the king of Portugal, to cement the union and concord between the two realms; and, finally, that La Beltraneja should either be married to John, the infant son of Ferdinand and Isabella, or else take the veil.

That unfortunate lady was not long in choosing between the alternatives which had been set before her. Thoroughly tired of being the sport of factions, she entered the convent of Santa Clara de Coimbra, with the full approval, if not at the positive exhortation, of Ferdinand and Isabella; and the wretched king of Portugal, equally weary of the cares of state, was only prevented from retiring to a monastery by his death at Cintra, August 28, 1481. Seldom, if ever, has a royal career so gloriously begun had a more utterly farcical termination.

Thus was the union of Aragon and Castile consummated, as it were, in the teeth of the opposition of Portugal. Accident rather than design was responsible for the way things had worked out. Geographically and historically, as we have already seen, Portugal possessed many more ties with Castile than did the eastern kingdoms, at least down to the accession of the house of Trastamara to the thrones of the realms of Aragon; and linguistically, when we remember that Catalan, Valencian, and Italian, rather than Spanish, were spoken in the bulk of the Aragonese dominions, she was scarcely further apart from Castile than were they. Throughout the later Middle Ages Castile had sought alliances with the royal house of Portugal quite as often as with that of Aragon, and it was largely by alternative plans of union with Portugal that the enemies of Ferdinand and Isabella attempted to subvert the ends for which their marriage stood. That Castile turned eastward rather than westward when the decisive moment came, was a fact of the gravest import for her future career. Had she united with Portugal rather than Aragon, she would probably have avoided entanglement in all the weary European wars and diplomacy which issued out of the struggle over the Neapolitan inheritance. She might well have been able to devote herself exclusively to the upbuilding of a great imperial domain on the Atlantic. She might have avoided that multiplicity of conflicting interests, powers, and responsibilities, which, though it doubtless served to enhance her prestige for a time, proved ultimately to be a potent cause of her decline. To speculate on what might have been is proverbially idle; but in the light of our present knowledge it certainly seems that the union of Castile and Aragon, though attended for the time being by most brilliant results, was ultimately productive of effects far less beneficent than would have followed a union of Castile and Portugal. There can be no question that it diverted both parties to the bargain from their normal and traditional lines of development. It forced Castile into Mediterranean politics and Aragon into expansion in the New World; and the

final result of it was to create an organism so vast, so complicated, and so cumbersome, that it was literally impossible that it should endure.

We have purposely forbore to carry to a conclusion the story of the relations of Ferdinand and Isabella with Louis XI of France, because it can be more conveniently finished in connection with the affairs of Aragon and Catalonia, to which we now turn.

We left the old king of Aragon in 1469, at the time of Ferdinand's marriage, in the midst of a military and diplomatic duel with the Angevin suzerains of the rebels in Catalonia. Encouraged by the brilliant success of his Castilian policy, John continued throughout the year 1470 to spin his anti-French intrigues with the Italian states, and to wage desultory warfare with his foes in his own dominions and in Navarre. Finally, on December 16, he had a stroke of good fortune in the sudden death of John of Calabria, the idolized leader of the revolutionists. A triple alliance which John managed to conclude on November 1, 1471, with Ferrante of Naples and Charles the Bold of Burgundy against Louis XI of France, served as an excellent guarantee against the latter's ability to lend aid to the Angevins for a further prosecution of their designs on Catalonia. It also enabled the king of Aragon, who had hitherto been obliged to stand upon the defensive, to take vigorous measures to crush the revolutionists. Throughout the first part of the year 1472 the Catalans continued to hope; but the promises of old René of Anjou availed nothing without the support of the French king, who was by this time convinced that an Angevin occupation of Catalonia would bring him no nearer the realization of his own ends there, and consequently sought rather to oppose it. The refusal of Galeazzo Maria Sforza to permit the Genoese fleet to revictual Barcelona in September, 1472, when the city was besieged by the forces of the king of Aragon, bore witness to the efficiency of the latter's Italian diplomacy, and sealed the fate of the revolutionists. On October 17 John entered his capital in triumph. With a moderation, rare in those days, which does high honor to his political sagacity, the victorious monarch forbore to take vengeance on his rebel subjects; he confirmed all their privileges and assured them of his good will. He thereby obliterated many of the bitter memories of earlier days, and laid the foundations for the restoration of cordial relations between the inhabitants of the county and the throne.

There remained the difficult problem of the border counties of Cerdagne and Roussillon, which the armies of Louis XI had occupied in 1462, and which the French king had declared, in defiance of the treaty of Bayonne, to be permanently incorporated in his dominions. John was all on fire to reconquer them. The French maladministration of the counties made their inhabitants long for a return to the obedience of the king of Aragon, and constant plots were hatched, with his connivance, for the overthrow of the existing régime. In February, 1473, John was able to enter the town of Perpignan and inspire the inhabitants with his own indomitable courage; and when, two months later, a French army arrived to besiege it, the vigor of its resistance and the fear of the effects of the obviously cordial relations between Charles the Bold and the king of Aragon convinced Louis of the advisability of coming to terms. On September 17, by the peace of Perpignan, John II had the extreme satisfaction of forcing his ancient rival to agree to an arrangement which practically reiterated the provisions of the treaty of Bayonne. One slight modification was this time introduced by the king of Aragon, in the vain hope that it would insure the observance of the pact which Louis had violated ten years before. Pending the payment of his debt—now estimated at 300,000 *écus*—to the king of France. John insisted that the counties should be administered, not as before by Louis, but by a governor general selected by the latter from a list of ten proposed by himself. It was as notable a triumph for the diplomacy of the king of Aragon as it was a signal humiliation for the sovereign of France, but it was not destined to be permanent. Notwithstanding all his efforts, John was unable to raise money for the deliverance of

the counties; and meantime a temporary cessation of Louis's difficulties at home enabled the French king to send another army of invasion into the disputed territories, with instructions to "lay waste the land until not a fruit tree remained standing". The inhabitants made a desperate resistance, and Roussillon got the name of the 'graveyard of the French', but it was all in vain. Perpignan fell on March 10, 1475, and Louis promptly installed his representatives in both counties, with instructions to pillage and plunder indiscriminately, which they were sensible enough to disobey. Had the king of Aragon not been so old and feeble, or had Ferdinand not been so exclusively occupied with the vindication of his rights in Castile, the French king would probably have been expelled at once. As things fell out, the liberation of Cerdagne and Roussillon was bequeathed by King John to his son as a sacred duty, and when at last the opportunity came, we shall see that the latter did not fail to take advantage of it.

Thenceforth the scene of the diplomatic struggle between John and Louis shifts from Aragon to Castile, and Ferdinand begins to replace his father as the protagonist on the Spanish side. Louis's certainty that neither the king of Aragon nor his son would ever permanently acquiesce in the loss of Cerdagne and Roussillon was doubtless an important element in causing him to ally himself with Affonso of Portugal, when that monarch attempted to secure the Castilian succession; and thus the Franco-Aragonese quarrel of the past began to be transformed into the Franco-Spanish struggle of the future. But there was to be one more lull before the final bursting of the storm. The Burgundian troubles, experience of the inefficiency of the Portuguese king, and the traditional friendship of France and Castile, all combined to persuade Louis XI that, for the time being at least, a policy of peace with the Spanish sovereigns promised better things than a continuation of war. Ferdinand and Isabella, whose hands were more than full with the regulation of affairs in the peninsula, were quite ready to go halfway to meet him. On October 9, 1478, accordingly, a treaty between the representatives of the two nations was signed at Saint Jean de Luz, in which four previous pacts between France and Castile were formally renewed, and each monarch definitely renounced his alliances with the enemies of the other. Among the leagues abandoned by Ferdinand and Isabella in this treaty were specially mentioned "all confederations, compacts, and fraternities begun and completed in whatsoever way and with whatsoever signatures, promises, expectations, oaths, and forms of words, either generally or specifically expressed, with Maximilian, duke of Austria, and his wife, or their eldest son." The "confederations begun and completed" between the Catholic Kings and Maximilian and his wife, to which these words refer, were doubtless the outcome of a series of negotiations which had been in progress between the two courts in 1477 and 1478. Since Maximilian's wife was Mary, the daughter of Charles the Bold of Burgundy, it was but natural that Ferdinand should seek his alliance, as the obvious way to keep alive the ancient friendship which had previously united his father with that most inveterate of the foes of Louis XI. The king of England, the duke of Brittany, and the Swiss were also involved in these negotiations, and though we lack precise information in regard to their scope, we may be sure that the shrewd Zurita was not mistaken in thinking that they were based on the fact that "all these powers were destined of necessity to be perpetual enemies of the house of France". What was meant by the reference to a possible understanding with Maximilian's "eldest son" is much more difficult to conjecture. As the Archduke Philip was only born on July 22, 1478, it seems scarcely possible that any alliance for him in the family of the Spanish sovereigns could have been contemplated as early as this, though the hand of their eldest daughter Isabella (born October, 1470) was, at this juncture, still free. Still it is certainly worth noting that the union of the Spanish realms not only was accomplished in the face of the enmity of the king of France, but also was apparently in a measure supported in its earliest years by some sort of an understanding with the house of Austria. The whole framework of the diplomatic combinations of the succeeding age was foreshadowed with startling accuracy at this early date.



The treaty of Saint Jean de Luz wisely left the thorny question of Cerdagne and Roussillon untouched, and John of Aragon was included in the general peace. On January 20, 1479, the old king died at Barcelona, in the eighty-third year of his age; and was succeeded by his son Ferdinand in all his dominions save Navarre, which by the terms of the treaty of Olite passed to his daughter Eleanor, the wife of Gaston de Foix. In some of his most cherished projects he had met defeat; Navarre had escaped him at the last; at the moment of his death Cerdagne and Roussillon were in the hands of Louis of France; but the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, for which he was primarily responsible, was a triumph beside which his failures shrink into insignificance. The unification of Spain, with all its tremendous consequences, is the contribution of John of Aragon to the history of Europe.

No more fitting celebration of the union of the Spanish kingdoms could have been imagined than that they should jointly proceed to the completion of the great work of the Reconquest, and round out their dominions by the final expulsion of the Moors from the peninsula.

Since the battle on the Salado in the reign of Alfonso XI, the Christians had scored but three important victories against the forces of the kings of Granada. A great battle had been won by the armies of John II at Sierra Elvira, close to Granada, in 1431; in 1410 and in 1462 the town of Antequera and the Rock of Gibraltar had been captured. During the latter part of the reign of Henry IV and the first five years of that of Ferdinand and Isabella the internal troubles of the realm effectually prevented any renewal of attacks against the Moorish strongholds. When in 1476 the queen sent to demand payment of the annual tribute due from the king of Granada, the latter evinced his contempt of his Christian overlords by the famous answer, that the mints of his realm “coined no longer gold, but steel”. Their Catholic Majesties were still too busy with other cares to heed this insolent reply, and their failure promptly to chastise their haughty vassal encouraged him in 1481 to surprise the Christian fortress of Zahara on the confines of the province of Cadiz. But by this time the Christians were in better condition to retaliate. The War of Succession with Portugal had been triumphantly terminated. John of Aragon was dead, and Ferdinand was in full possession of his hereditary domains. A report that the important fortress of Alhama, on a rocky peak in the vega just southwest of Granada, was inadequately garrisoned and negligently guarded, led to the despatch of Rodrigo Ponce de Leon, the fiery Marquis of Cadiz, in February, 1482, on a desperate attempt to seize it unawares. The expedition, which demanded quite as much proficiency in rock climbing as in fighting, was extremely hazardous but completely successful; and the subsequent efforts of the Moors to retake the place were beaten off. From that moment the campaign against Granada ceased to be a mere series of forays, and assumed the character of a regular, methodically conducted war. The sovereigns took it up vigorously, with the idea of ending once and for all the Moorish hold on the peninsula. The Emir, reading the signs of the times, solicited aid from the Merinites across the Strait, but Isabella checkmated this move by sending a Castilian fleet to cruise in the adjacent waters, and to cut off all communication with the African coast.

And now, just at the moment when the Moors of Granada needed all their forces to withstand the Christian attack, they were seriously weakened at home by dynastic quarrels of the typical Mohammedan sort. Jealousies in the harem of the Emir, Abul Hassan, were the source of it; the famous massacre of the Cordovan family of the Abencerrages in the Alhambra and the imprisonment of the queen and her son, Boabdil, were its first results. But the captives contrived to escape from their confinement and to enlist the sympathies of the Granadinos; after a series of bloody feuds the old Emir was expelled, and forced to seek refuge at the court of his brother in Malaga. The latter's energy and bravery had won him the title of *El Zagal* or ‘the Valiant’, and his prestige reached its climax in the spring of 1483 by his brilliant victory over an expedition

which the indefatigable Marquis of Cadiz had led into the neighboring territories. But the ultimate result of the triumph of El Zagal was distinctly unfavorable to the Moorish cause. It inspired his nephew, Boabdil, to attempt to emulate his exploits; but *El Rey Chico*, as the Spaniards called him, was proverbially unlucky in everything that he undertook, and instead of eclipsing his uncle's victory, as he had hoped, he was speedily defeated and captured by the Castilian Count of Cabra. A vigorous debate ensued among the Christian leaders as to the most profitable way to make use of the prize which fortune had placed in their hands; but the final verdict was that Boabdil should be released and sent back to his own dominions, on terms which bound him hand and foot to the cause of Ferdinand and Isabella, and which consequently insured the vigorous continuance of the internal quarrels in Granada. Boabdil did not refuse these degrading conditions. He sneaked back into his capital, where El Zagal had meantime succeeded in establishing himself; though he failed to gain admittance to the Alhambra and the upper town, he soon gathered his adherents on the banks of the Darro and the Jenil, and waged a murderous war upon his rivals. In the midst of the confusion, the old king, Abul Hassan, disappeared, not improbably a victim of foul play.

While revolt and sedition were thus rife in the Moorish camp, the Christian army presented a spectacle of enthusiastic unity and devotion such as Spain had seldom, if ever, witnessed before. A number of different causes contributed to this happy result. In the first place every effort was used to make men feel that it was a national Spanish enterprise—the first of its kind—made possible by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, and not an affair of merely local import. As the kingdom of Granada nowhere touched the realms of the Crown of Aragon, Castile alone could hope to benefit territorially by its reconquest; nevertheless Ferdinand was fully as active in the prosecution of the war as was the queen, whose services, though undoubtedly extraordinary, have probably been somewhat exaggerated in the gallant phrases of the contemporary chroniclers. And as the best possible method of stimulating the spirit of unity so essential to success, the sovereigns did their utmost to instil into their troops the conviction that the war was rather religious than political in its aims. They strove their hardest to awaken the old crusading ardor, which had been dormant for long periods in the past, but which, when thoroughly roused, had shown itself capable of working wonders, as in the campaigns of Las Navas and the Salado. During the year 1486, in the very midst of the struggle, the king and queen made a solemn pilgrimage to the shrine of Santiago de Compostela. A huge silver cross, the gift of Pope Sixtus IV, was carried in Ferdinand's tent throughout the campaign; it was invariably raised by the royal standard bearer on the topmost pinnacle of each conquered town and adored with impressive ceremonies by the assembled hosts. Finally, the constant presence of Ferdinand and Isabella in the midst of their advancing armies was a tremendous asset for the cause. It was the surest possible way of keeping the factious nobles from deserting, of maintaining order and discipline in the ranks, of convincing the soldiers that there was no duty they were called upon to perform in which their sovereigns were too proud to bear a part. And the enthusiasm which the enterprise kindled in Spain extended before long to other lands as well. Volunteers and adventurers, many of them of noble birth, flocked to the Christian standards from Germany, France, and England, longing to have a share in the glorious triumph which all felt certain was soon to be won. Prominent among them was a brother-in-law of the Yorkist king Edward IV, by name Sir Edward Woodville, who was apparently not ashamed, as a means of impressing the Spaniards with a sense of his dignity and importance, temporarily to appropriate the title of Lord Scales. These foreigners brought back to their native lands glowing tales of the power of Ferdinand and Isabella; indeed, the reputation which the sovereigns won in Europe through the Granadan war was no small element in accounting for the extraordinarily rapid rise of Spanish prestige in the immediately succeeding years. On the other hand, the Spaniards learned much from their visitors, at the same time that they contrived to impress them. Particularly was this true of a body of Swiss mercenaries who joined the royal standard, and doubtless furnished Gonsalvo de Cordova and Gonzalo de

Ayora with many of the ideas which subsequently enabled them to produce the terrible Spanish infantry of the Italian wars.

Two or three outstanding features of the military side of the campaign deserve passing notice; for the Granadan war really forms the introduction to the period of the most brilliant development of the Spanish arms. The forces assembled were apparently very large—according to one doubtless exaggerated contemporary estimate, the grand total reached 80,000—but the method of their recruitment remained predominantly feudal. The sovereigns saw the difficulty and set themselves to remedy it. Some progress was made toward the formation of a national force by utilizing the troops of the *hermandad*, which had recently been recreated as a royal institution. The above mentioned Swiss mercenaries were also valuable as a nucleus for an army of the modern sort. The mediaeval methods, however, were much too firmly planted to be eradicated at once, and the sovereigns were obliged to wait until after the conclusion of the war for the full completion of their plans of army reorganization. On the other hand, a number of important changes in the methods of fighting were effected before Granada fell. The exceedingly rocky and mountainous character of the greater part of the territory in which the Moorish capital lay rendered it most unfavorable for cavalry. The struggle was bound to be primarily a war of sieges, in which infantry and still more artillery would have to play the principal part. Consequently we find the Christians making strenuous efforts to increase the number and efficiency of their cannon. Engineers and mechanics were summoned from within and without the realm. Numerous pieces of extraordinary weight and still more extraordinary clumsiness were constructed. It was apparently impossible to alter the direction of their aim, either vertically or horizontally, without moving the gun carriages to which they were firmly attached; and infinite labor was necessary to prepare roads for them through the mountain passes. They fired huge balls of stone and iron; the latter were sometimes heated almost to the molten stage, thus producing the effect of a sort of liquid fire. Yet despite their extreme unwieldiness, these rudimentary cannon accomplished their ends. Fortress after fortress which would have defied assault, was battered down by their projectiles. Systematic forays meantime devastated the adjacent vegas, while the Castilian fleet continued to patrol the Mediterranean; and the success of these methods of starvation may be judged by the fact that the Moors soon began to offer to liberate Christian prisoners in return for supplies, until such exchanges were sternly forbidden by Ferdinand and Isabella. Generous terms were usually granted to the inhabitants of conquered towns, but any subsequent infraction of them by either party was sure to be speedily punished—in case of the Christians by vigorous penalties, in case of the Moors by sanguinary executions and destruction. The solicitude of the queen for the physical welfare of her troops forms one of the pleasantest chapters of the whole story. She was busily engaged in forwarding provisions from the great base at Cordova. She did her utmost to find surgeons and medical supplies. She even established and equipped at her own expense a large number of special tents for the care of the wounded. It is the earliest recorded case of anything resembling a modern field hospital.

The year 1484 was marked by no important event, but in 1485-86 the Christian lines were drawn considerably tighter around the Moorish capital. The western outpost of Ronda, perched on the summit of a precipitous cliff, succumbed to the artillery of the Marquis of Cadiz. Wedges were driven into the heart of the infidel realm by the capture of Loja and Illora, and the fall of Marbella on the Mediterranean coast afforded an invaluable base of operations for the blockading Castilian fleet. In 1487 everything was concentrated on the siege of Malaga, the largest of the outward defences of the kingdom of Granada, and, with the exception of Almeria, its only remaining seaport of importance. An indispensable preliminary was the capture of Velez, situated on the road from Malaga to Granada; and in April Ferdinand crossed the Sierras with a large army and finally sat down before its walls. El Zagal sallied forth from Granada in a desperate effort to relieve it, but was unsuccessful; moreover his treacherous nephew seized

the opportunity to make himself supreme within the capital, which shut its gates on El Zagal when he attempted to return thither after his failure, and finally obliged him to seek refuge in the eastern cities of Guadix, Baza, and Almeria, the only portions of the realm which remained loyal to him. Meantime Velez surrendered, and the blockade of Malaga began. It was a long and arduous undertaking. The garrison was largely composed of African troops, who had more stomach for fighting than the Spanish Moors; the fortifications were very strong, and high hopes were entertained of relief from the Barbary coast. But the vigilance of the Castilian fleet prevented that, while the wretched Boabdil attacked and cut to pieces a rescuing party despatched by his uncle, El Zagal; on the other hand the arrival of Queen Isabella in the camp of the besiegers redoubled their enthusiasm, and imbued them with a chivalrous resolve to do or die for the cause. Sudden assaults by the Christians and sorties by their foes varied the monotony of the blockade; but the crucial event of the entire siege was the effort of a Moorish fanatic, who had gained access to the royal tent on the plea that he was inspired with the gift of prophecy, to assassinate the king and queen. Happily the attempt failed, but the news that the lives of their sovereigns had been imperilled served to rouse the loyalty and ardor of the Christians to the highest pitch. Everything was got ready for a grand assault, which, however, was delayed for a brief period owing to Isabella's desire to save bloodshed; meantime the spectacle of the besiegers' preparations, coupled with the terrible dearth of provisions within the town, convinced the defenders that there was no alternative to an acknowledgment of defeat. After a fruitless effort to extort lenient conditions from Ferdinand by a threat of massacring the five or six hundred Christian captives in the dungeons of Malaga, the inhabitants surrendered at discretion. Whether owing to the fact that the garrison was largely composed of African troops, or to some other cause, does not appear; but it is certain that the terms which Ferdinand imposed on the conquered town form a most disagreeable contrast to those granted to the places which he had captured before. The whole population was virtually condemned to slavery. One third was transported to North Africa to be exchanged for Christian captives there detained; another was appropriated by the state as payment for the expenses of the campaign; the rest were distributed among the nobles, the Pope, and the sovereigns of friendly lands. One hundred warriors were incorporated into the papal guard and converted, before the year was out, into "very good Christians"; fifty beautiful damsels were presented to the queen of Naples, and thirty to the queen of Portugal. Such was the perhaps not entirely unmerited revenge for the hosts of Christian maidens, seized in Spain during the previous seven centuries and despatched across the dreary wastes of Northern Africa to supply the harems of the Orient.

The fall of Malaga rendered that of Granada ultimately inevitable. But Ferdinand and Isabella were resolved to take no chances, and in order to make assurance doubly sure, directed all their energies during the years 1488 and 1489 to the reduction of that eastern extremity of the Moorish territories which acknowledged the sway of El Zagal. In 1488 Ferdinand advanced along the coast to attack Almeria, only to be beaten off with heavy loss by his crafty opponent. In 1489 the Christians centred their efforts on the siege of Baza with better success. The town finally surrendered, after prolonged resistance, at the very end of the year. As Boabdil did nothing to help his uncle, the latter recognized the necessity of admitting defeat.

Negotiations and a personal interview with Ferdinand followed, and finally ended in an arrangement by which the Moorish king surrendered to the Christians all the principal fortresses of the realm, including Guadix and Almeria, and received in return the sovereignty of the small district southwest of Malaga, to be held by him as a vassal of the king of Castile. But El Zagal was much too proud to be permanently satisfied with so shadowy a vestige of royalty. He soon disposed of his new dominions to the king and queen of Castile in return for a money indemnity, and passed over to Africa, where, stripped of everything by the savage Berbers, he ended his days

in misery and solitude.<sup>1</sup> He was by far the ablest figure on the Moorish side of this last great contest of Cross and Crescent in the peninsula, and assuredly deserved a better fate.

Meantime the unhappy Boabdil, whose treachery was only equaled by his ineptitude, seized the moment of his uncle's defeat to renounce the obligations to the king and queen of Castile which he had contracted at the time of his capture, and hurled defiance at Ferdinand and Isabella. In the spring of 1490 the Christian armies camped on the broad vega beneath Granada. The troops were in splendid condition; everything combined to make them certain of victory, and yet they did not underestimate the difficulties of the crowning task. With a full realization that time was indispensable to success, and a permanent fortified base on the vega the best guarantee for the maintenance of a rigid blockade, they constructed, during the winter of 1490-91, a new town in the wide plain, six miles to the west of Granada, and significantly named it Santa Fe. It was laid out in the form of a Roman camp, with regular streets crossing each other at right angles—"the only city in Spain that has never been contaminated by the Moslem heresy"; it was destined to be the scene of the capitulation of Granada, and of the signing of the contract with Columbus which led to the discovery of a New World. The sight of such a formidable establishment was profoundly discouraging to the beleaguered Moors. It proved to them that their foes would never cease from their efforts until their object had been triumphantly accomplished; and in October, 1491, negotiations for the surrender of Granada were begun, Hernando de Zafra, the royal secretary, and Gonsalvo de Cordova being entrusted with the conduct of them on the Christian side. After long conferences the terms were finally settled on the twenty-fifth of the following November; they were exceedingly liberal—the sharpest possible contrast to the vengeance that had been visited upon Malaga. The city was to be surrendered within sixty days, and the artillery and fortifications given up. The Moors, however, were to be permitted to retain unmolested their customs, dress, property, laws, and religion; they were to continue to be ruled by their own local magistrates, under the supervision of a governor appointed by the Castilian crown. They were carefully guarded against extortionate taxes, and they were to be furnished transportation to North Africa in case they desired to emigrate. The conditions, indeed, were in general such as did high honor to the magnanimity and generosity of the victors, and rendered the subsequent violation of them the more shameful. The actual surrender took place with impressive ceremonies on January 2, 1492. Pradilla's great painting accurately depicts the scene as the contemporary chroniclers have described it—the stately courtesy of Ferdinand and Isabella, the timorous hesitancy of the vanquished Boabdil.

“Here passed away the Koran; there in the Crow was home;

And here was heard the Christian bell; and there the Moorish horn”.

It was indeed a glorious victory, won at a critical moment, and stained by few acts of treachery and cruelty. It had evoked all that was best in the character of the Spaniard. It showed that under the inspiration of a Holy War, hallowed by nearly eight centuries of national tradition, he could rise superior to petty local aims and ambitions, and was capable of really great things. It served, as perhaps nothing else could have done, to win enthusiastic support for the throne of Ferdinand and Isabella, by identifying their rule at the very outset with the advancement of the Faith, and with the successful completion of the national task. But there is grave danger in regarding the conquest of Granada merely as marking the end of an epoch. In many ways it was not so much an end as a beginning. We have already observed that no sharp dividing line can be drawn between reconquest and conquest; the two merge into one another and form a continuous whole. Attempts had been made to secure a footing in North Africa for centuries before Granada fell; and a year after its surrender Ferdinand and Isabella despatched a certain Lorenzo de Padilla, governor of Alcalá, in disguise to the Barbary coast, to gather information which should be valuable to them in the event of their carrying their arms across the Strait. Clearly the Catholic



Kings had already made up their minds to pursue the Crescent beyond the borders of Spain. Moreover, it so happened that in the midst of all these exciting events a very persistent Italian mariner, whom many men thought to be half mad, but whom the sovereigns believed in and supported, came back from a long voyage of discovery into the West, with marvellous tales of new lands to conquer beyond the seas. Everything combined to beckon the new monarchs forward and onward at this crucial stage in their career. Certainly it was no time for them to rest on their laurels.

But internal reforms of the most drastic and far reaching sort were the indispensable preliminary to foreign conquest. They had indeed been largely accomplished during the period of the Granadan war, and we must study them carefully before turning to the story of Spain's new career of expansion beyond the seas.

CHAPTER XIV

ABSOLUTISM VERSUS SEPARATISM. UNITY OF FAITH AND RAGE

STRIKING similarities have often been noted in the internal development of the three great states of Western Europe during the fifteenth century. In each a period of unparalleled anarchy and confusion was followed by the erection of a strong central monarchical government, capable alike of defying the factions at home and of taking the lead in campaigns of aggression and conquest abroad. To the terrible strife of the Armagnacs and Burgundians in France, correspond the Wars of the Roses in England, and the wretched disorders which characterized the reigns of John II and Henry the Impotent of Castile. The efficient royal despotism which emerged in France under Charles VII and Louis XI has its English counterpart in the reign of the first king of the house of Tudor, and its Spanish in the rule of Ferdinand and Isabella. Of the three states, France was on the whole the first in point of time to achieve national consolidation; the Spanish realms came second, and England third. How far the last two profited from the experience of the first; how much actual institutional borrowing occurred between them, is a vastly interesting subject, about which much has been surmised, though little definitely proven; but we cannot enter into it here. All that it is important for us to remember in the present connection is that the great work of national unification which the Catholic Kings performed was thoroughly in harmony with the highest aims and aspirations of the most enlightened statesmen of their day and generation in other European lands. Royal despotism was the form of government best suited to the stage of development which had been attained in the fifteenth century. It offered the sole sure means of escape from the intolerable evils of baronial anarchy. Order had to be reestablished before constitutional liberties could be observed.

The foregoing paragraph will have made clear that many of the problems with which Ferdinand and Isabella were confronted, when at last they were able to call their thrones their own, were almost precisely identical with those which had already been dealt with by the kings of France, and were subsequently to be attacked by the kings of England. Such, for example, were the domination of the rebel baronage, the reestablishment of the royal finances, and the reorganization of the administration of justice; and in the solution of each of these problems we shall encounter many resemblances between the methods of the Catholic Kings and those of their French and English contemporaries. But there were at least two special questions with which Ferdinand and Isabella were obliged to deal, which were emphatically *cosas de España*—peculiar to the Iberian Peninsula and absolutely without parallel north of the Pyrenees; in answering these two special questions the Spanish kings had no foreign precedents to guide them. Both were of such fundamental importance for the future of the Iberian realms and of the Spanish Empire that no apology is needed for a thorough consideration of them at the outset. The first arose out of the fact that Christian Spain contained at least four separate states—Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia—each with an independent set of institutions, which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to weld into a single homogeneous whole, even though the dynasties that ruled over them had been united by a fortunate marriage. The second was the direct result of the large measure of racial and religious toleration which had pervaded the Iberian realms during the greater part of the Middle Ages, and which had revealed itself again in the very liberal terms of the capitulation of Granada in 1491—namely, the existence of numerous and important Jewish and Moorish communities within the realm, whose presence was a most emphatic negation of the fundamental principle of unity on which the rule of the Catholic Kings was to be built up.

One of the surest proofs of real statesmanship is the ability to distinguish what is possible to accomplish from what is not. A completely united Spain, ruled under a single set of institutions and a single crown, would doubtless have been more in consonance with the ideas of political centralization prevalent at the time, than the maintenance of the system of separate and autonomous kingdoms which had been inherited from the Middle Ages. But with all their enthusiasm for strong central government, it is by no means certain that Ferdinand and Isabella really desired to see the process of unification proceed as far as this. They themselves inherited the separatistic traditions of their race, and despite the fact that the current was flowing strongly in the opposite direction, they were not improbably anxious, in some degree at least, to maintain them. In any case, whatever their personal desires and predilections may have been, they must have realized from the very first that any complete fusion of Castile and the realms of the Crown of Aragon was, for the time being, outside the sphere of practical politics. The largely fortuitous union of the thrones through their marriage was no indication that the institutions of their respective realms could be made to follow suit. Dualism, in fact, was inevitable from the very first. The only question was how to work out the details.

The principal source of information in regard to these is the marriage treaty, which was drawn up and signed by the high contracting parties in January, 1469, nine months before the celebration of their wedding. It is principally made up of a series of limitations imposed upon the authority of Ferdinand in Castile; there was no need under the circumstances to emphasize the corresponding restrictions of the rights of Isabella in the realms of the Crown of Aragon. Ferdinand promised to respect all the laws and customs of the western kingdom, both local and national; all the separate institutions of the different realms whose crowns were to be united were thus maintained in their pristine vigor. All appointments in Castile, whether political, ecclesiastical, or military, were to be made in accordance with the queen's desires, and her consent was necessary for the preferment of any foreigner within the realm. No portion of the domain of the Crown of Castile was to be alienated unless Isabella gave her permission; no grant or favor was to be bestowed there save by her. In deference to the greater size and importance of the western kingdom, Ferdinand promised to fix his residence there, and not to depart thence without the queen's consent. He also pledged himself to the prosecution of the national Castilian task, the reconquest of the entire peninsula from the Moors. As a final evidence of his acquiescence in these arrangements, and also, perhaps, of the completeness of the understanding between the royal pair in other matters as well, it was stipulated that all laws, ordinances, treaties, and other documents of a public character should bear the signatures of both.

Whether Ferdinand had ever intended loyally to abide by these arrangements may well be doubted. There is strong reason to believe that from the very beginning he had cherished hopes of quietly setting aside the terms of the marriage treaty, and of demanding independent authority for himself in the western kingdom. Certainly the words in which the herald proclaimed the accession of the new sovereigns in Segovia after the death of Henry IV in 1474 were highly displeasing to him: "Castile, Castile", sounded the cry, "for King Don Ferdinand and his consort, Doña Isabella, Queen Proprietress of these realms". With the idea of making one last effort to assert himself, Ferdinand now came forward with the claim that as great-grandson of John I of Castile he was in his own right lawful sovereign of that kingdom, and that females were excluded from the succession; but the law of the land was clearly against him here, and his attempt to override the provisions of the marriage treaty simply led to a reconfirmation of them.

All the terms of the previous instrument were reiterated, though perhaps in some instances less specifically than before; there were also added several new stipulations tending to emphasize the concurrence of both parties in the arrangements that had been made. Of these the most important were that justice should be administered jointly by both monarchs when they were residing in the same place, and by each one separately when they were apart; that the heads of

both were to appear upon all coins; and that the united arms of Castile and Aragon (the former being given precedence) were to be borne on a common seal and carried on a common standard. The famous *Tanto Monta* ("One is as good as the other") which the monarchs adopted as their motto, is another evidence to the same effect. But despite all these efforts to accentuate the indivisibility of the interests of the two sovereigns, the fundamental principle of the agreement of 1474-75, as in that of 1469, was the complete independence and autonomy of the realms whose crowns had been united. Save for the foreign policy, in which henceforth all the Spanish kingdoms would naturally move as one; save for the Inquisition, which was to be established in 1481 with a single organization for Castile and the realms of the Crown of Aragon; and save for the abolition in 1480 of the prohibition of the exportation and importation of certain commodities from one kingdom to another (the customs duties, however, being maintained), the union of the crowns made no difference in principle in the government of the states of Christian Spain. Though the fundamental object of the administration of the Catholic Kings had been to secure internal unity, the particularistic traditions of their native land forced them to restrict their efforts to the attainment of that end *within* each of the separate realms which composed their dominions; fusion or amalgamation into a single state was at present out of the question. The absolutism which their government produced was therefore an absolutism of an essentially decentralized nature; and the special problems and difficulties with which the builders of the Spanish Empire were subsequently confronted can never be adequately appreciated unless this fundamental characteristic is constantly borne in mind.

On the other hand, it is important to remember that the measure of decentralization and separatism which was insured by the regime above described was in practice considerably less than might at first sight appear. The principal reason for this was, of course, the fact that Castile comprised by far the larger part of the Iberian Peninsula; that she was greatly preponderant, from almost every point of view, over the three realms of the Crown of Aragon put together. It was not as if the crowns of four kingdoms of approximately the same size had been united, with the separate laws and institutions of each maintained in full force; it was rather a most unequal partnership, in which the western realm by the natural course of events was inevitably bound to assume by far the most important role. We have already seen that during the Middle Ages the kings of Castile were sometimes loosely spoken of as kings of Spain, thus indicating how completely the western realm overshadowed the eastern ones in the eyes of the world at large; and during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella its preponderance became more marked than before. Castile alone had reaped the fruits of the conquest of Granada. The discovery of America, of which it was practically the sole beneficiary, still further increased its power and resources, and transferred the centre of the Spanish Empire from Barcelona to Seville. The court resided in Castile the greater part of the time, and before long it became necessary to appoint viceroys to represent the authority of the crown in each of the Aragonese kingdoms. Naturally this increased preponderance of the western realm was bound to have its effect upon the constitutional arrangements of the time. From the very first the Catholic Kings centred their reforming energies on Castile. This was partly, no doubt, because it was in much worse case than the eastern kingdoms, and because the royal absolutism which it was the sovereigns' chief aim to set up would there be opposed by selfish barons with whom no true patriot could sympathize, rather than, as in Aragon, by a set of democratic institutions firmly grounded in national tradition and good will. But a much more important reason why Ferdinand and Isabella devoted their chief attention to the western kingdom was because they realized that if they gained their ends in Castile, their victory would be far more significant than if they won it in the realms of the Crown of Aragon. With Castile pacified and under control, they could well afford to ignore the probably more difficult and certainly less profitable task afforded by Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. They could make the former the real centre of their dominions, and permit the various institutions by which the latter attempted to limit the royal prerogative, and of which Spanish separatism

refused to permit the abolition, gradually to wither and decay for lack of material to work upon. Queen Isabella is said to have once remarked to her husband, "Aragon is not ours, we must go and conquer it anew"; but the words, if they were ever actually spoken, cannot be taken to indicate any settled intention on the part of the Catholic Kings to make over the institutions of the eastern realms with anything like the same thoroughness with which they reformed the institutions of Castile. In our examination of the various constitutional changes which added lustre to their reign, we shall therefore be occupied almost exclusively with the western kingdom; occasionally the eastern realms are the scene of some reform of sufficient importance to deserve special mention, but for the most part they fall into the background. From the time of the union of the crowns, Castile overshadowed the other Spanish kingdoms; and though the latter's separate constitutions were not wholly abrogated until the advent of the Bourbons in the eighteenth century, they were so completely permeated by Castilian principles and methods that their practical importance was very slight.

We pass to the topic of racial and religious divergence. Save for the latter part of the Visigothic period and the great wave of clerically stimulated fanaticism which swept through the Iberian realms in the second part of the fourteenth century, the Spanish tradition, as we have already seen, favored a large measure of liberality to differing creeds and foreign peoples. Intolerance was emphatically not an indigenous national trait. Yet the spectacle presented by the large number of Moors and Jews, converted and unconverted, who resided in their dominions, must have been gall and wormwood to Ferdinand and Isabella, with their ideas of absolute unity and the levelling of all distinctions under the throne. Particularly obnoxious were the *Conversos*, or nominally Christianized Jews, who were justly believed to be secretly loyal to the faith of their fathers. Differences in race alone no one as yet would have dreamed of attempting to obliterate, and frankly avowed and acknowledged differences in religion were not held at the time of the accession of the Catholic Kings to call for drastic action; but that there should be concealed disloyalty within the pale of Holy Church was a thought that the pious Isabella, at least, could not endure. Unity and purity of the Faith were the cornerstone of her policy, and, in her eyes, the first essentials to unity of the state. Open and traditional disbelievers could perhaps be regarded as beyond the scope of Christian inquiry, but those who had been once converted, even against their wills, must not under any circumstance be suffered to relapse. It was to deal with the *Conversos*, or false Christians as they were sometimes called, that Ferdinand and Isabella resolved to apply to Pope Sixtus IV for permission to introduce the Inquisition into the kingdom of Castile, where it had never been known before.

The desired permission was promptly granted in a bull bearing the date November 1, 1478, but it was not till more than two years later that the institution it created really got to work; the long interval simply shows how difficult it was for the sovereigns to overcome the various forces which were hostile to their new departure\* But when at last the new tribunal began to sit, its unique and original constitution, differing so sharply from that of the ancient mediaeval ecclesiastical Inquisition, gave it a "peculiar and terrible efficiency". The essence of this was "its combination of the mysterious authority of the Church with the secular power of the crown. The old Inquisition was purely an ecclesiastical institution. In Spain, however, the Inquisition represented not only the pope but the king; it practically wielded the two swords—the spiritual and the temporal—and the combination produced a tyranny, similar in character, but far more minute and all-pervading, to that which England suffered during the closing years of Henry VIII as Supreme Head of the Church."

The foundation for this invasion by the state of a realm hitherto exclusively reserved to the church was the initial demand of Ferdinand and Isabella, which Sixtus IV granted without



realizing its true significance, that the appointment and dismissal of all the officials of the new institution, from the Inquisitor General down, should be made, or at least controlled, by the monarchs themselves. In common with the other kings of their day and generation, Ferdinand and Isabella were resolved to reduce to the lowest possible terms all papal interference in the management of ecclesiastical affairs within their realms. They had no intention of setting up within their own dominions any institution whose officers should be nominated from Rome. But the right of appointment and dismissal was by no means all. The crown supervised the 'instructions' issued by the inquisitors. It insisted that the Inquisition's confiscations should be paid into the royal treasury. It controlled and regulated salaries. From interference with the spiritual side of the Inquisition's activities, Ferdinand and Isabella for the most part abstained, but in matters temporal their authority was complete and unchallenged. What doubtless combined to fortify and establish the measure of their royal control was the fact that the first crucial years of the existence of the Inquisition in Castile coincided with the period when the most important political and constitutional reforms of the reign were carried into effect. Everything was being directed towards the centralization of authority in the hands of the crown at the very moment that the new institution first saw the light; small wonder that it yielded to the current of the times. A single example will suffice. One of the principal methods by which Ferdinand and Isabella established their royal power in political affairs was by the increase and development of the powers of the Consejo Real, and the creation of responsible offshoots of it to control the different branches of the government service. The major part of this work was accomplished by the famous Cortes of Toledo of 1480, of which anon; by 1483 the success of the experiment had been proved beyond the possibility of a doubt; and in that year a new council—*Consejo de la Suprema y General Inquisición*, popularly designated as the *Suprema*—was brought into being to secure and maintain the royal authority over the tribunal which had recently been called into existence.

Any detailed examination of the growth, powers, and procedure of the new institution lies entirely beyond the scope of the present work; moreover, it would be supererogatory, if not positively impertinent, to attempt to traverse again so soon the ground that was so thoroughly covered by one of America's most distinguished historians only a decade ago. The Inquisition's privileges and prerogatives gave it 'supereminence' over every other institution in the state from the time of its establishment; and this high position was on the whole maintained and strengthened, despite occasional setbacks, during the two succeeding centuries. Its permanent courts under the Crown of Castile (including the Canaries) reached the total of twelve, while those in the realms of the Crown of Aragon numbered four. It was extended, as we shall later see, to Sardinia, Sicily, and the American possessions; and numerous temporary tribunals were set up in the course of its development. We have already remarked that, save for the sovereigns themselves, the new institution was the only one common to the eastern and western kingdoms; except for the period 1507-18, when, owing to the death of Isabella and Ferdinand's second marriage to Germaine de Foix, a new separation of Aragon and Castile seemed likely to occur, there was but a single Inquisitor General for all Spain and all the Spanish possessions, and a single organization which embraced them. In more ways than one, then, the Inquisition fostered and advanced all the projects of union and centralization on which the internal policy of the Catholic Kings was founded; and in so far as it accomplished this, it was certainly possible to defend it according to the political theories of that day.

Yet the price which Spain had to pay for this advantage—if advantage it may be called—in the fastening upon herself, beyond all hope of escape, of a detestable spirit of racial and religious intolerance to which she had hitherto been for the most part a stranger, was out of all proportion to what she had gained. At the period of its establishment, we find countless evidences, particularly in the eastern kingdoms, of the dread with which the Inquisition was regarded. Its erection was the worst kind of a blow to the aspirations for liberty which have always

animated the Spaniards, and thinking men had already perceived that intolerance was ultimately certain to beget economic ruin. But as time wore on, the signs of the Inquisition's unpopularity gradually diminished, and the Spaniards were converted "from the most tolerant to the most intolerant nation in Europe". Their passion for racial and religious unity had been fired at precisely the moment that they had at last attained the national consolidation for which patriots hitherto had so ardently but fruitlessly longed. It was thus natural that the two things should become inseparably connected in their minds, just as it was natural that the history of Prussia during the last two centuries should serve to imbue the normally peaceable German with the idea that militarism is the inseparable adjunct of imperial greatness and power. And the growth and development of the Inquisition was by no means the sole evidence of this alarming increase of the spirit of racial and religious intolerance.

The Holy Office, as we have already pointed out, had no jurisdiction over the avowed and professed Jews, who were generally held to be beyond the pale of Christian inquiry. The number of these had, of course, greatly diminished owing to the persecutions of the fourteenth century; in 1474 there were only about twelve thousand families of them left in Castile. Down to the foundation of the Inquisition, the wealth and prosperity of the *Conversos* had caused large numbers of orthodox Hebrews to follow their example, and come, nominally at least, within the bosom of the church; but when the Holy Office was finally established and got to work on the 'false Christians' the lot of the latter ceased to be enviable and became distinctly the reverse; everything now combined to cause the professed Jew to cling more steadfastly than ever to the faith of his fathers. There was no longer any hope of his conversion; if complete unity of the faith was to be attained in Spain, expulsion was the only possible method of securing it.

But the policy of expulsion was so utterly at variance with the traditions of mediaeval Spain, and the economic consequences of it were so obviously destined to be disastrous, that it was some years before Ferdinand and Isabella, with all their zeal and energy, were able to put it into practice. It appears that the queen made a move towards getting rid of the Andalusian Hebrews in 1480, at the time of the foundation of the Inquisition, but nothing came of it; twelve long years more of deliberate inculcation of racial intolerance and stimulation of anti-Semitic prejudice were necessary before the fatal step could be finally taken. The conquest of Granada furnished the desired opportunity. Some sort of recognition of God's goodness and mercy in delivering over the last stronghold of the infidel in the peninsula was clearly due; and the fact that with the conclusion of the campaign there was no longer the same need of the Jewish contributions which had gone far towards supporting it was a practical consideration which may well have settled the matter. Despite the efforts of prominent Hebrews to bribe their Catholic Majesties to postpone or abandon it, the edict of expulsion was signed at Granada on March 30, 1492; it granted the professed Jews of all the Spanish realms four months—until July 31—either to accept baptism or else to leave the land. They were given no fair or adequate means of disposing of their property or of collecting the debts justly due them; the time was all too short, and the government took no effective measures to protect them from robbery and fraud; moreover, the laws forbidding the export of gold and silver made it difficult, if not impossible, for them to carry away the equivalent of such possessions as they were obliged to sell. The total number of the exiles, of the dead, and of those who submitted to baptism to escape expulsion was probably rather less than more than 200,000; but even if we accept Colmeiro's doubtless exaggerated estimate of the population of Spain in that period as 10,000,000, we shall unquestionably conclude that the loss was far greater than she could afford. And "the sum of human misery" inflicted, as Lea has rightly said, "was incomputable." Most of the exiles passed over to the Italian lands or to the Moorish states of North Africa, where tribulations of various kinds and degrees awaited them. Some of them fled to Portugal, where they were permitted to remain for a time on payment of a heavy impost to the crown. In 1497, however, as we shall see more fully in another

connection, Ferdinand and Isabella insisted, as part of the price of the marriage of their daughter Isabella to Emmanuel the Portuguese king, that the latter should follow their example and expel the Jews from his dominions, which he accordingly did. Their most satisfactory place of refuge was unquestionably the domain of the Sultan of Turkey, who properly estimated their economic value and scoffed at the praises which the bulk of Western Christendom lavished on the mistaken policy of the Catholic Kings. And the horror and loathing of their native land, which the unfortunate Israelites carried with them wherever they went, was not the least ominous feature of the situation. The Jews were perhaps too small a portion of the population to have their enmity count for much; but when in years to come the Moors and the Protestants were added to the victims of Spanish intolerance and exclusiveness, the nation drew down upon itself the bitter hatred of some of its most powerful neighbors, so that the fabric of its empire was shaken to the very foundations.

Racial and religious animosity had certainly made great strides between 1480 and 1492, but the next decade saw it increase more rapidly still; and this time, as the Jews were gone, it was the Moors who bore the brunt of the attack. The terms of the capitulation of Granada, as already remarked, had granted the most generous possible conditions to the vanquished infidels. They were to remain undisturbed in the enjoyment of their own property and customs, laws, and religion. All attempts forcibly to convert them were strictly forbidden, and they were guaranteed the favor and protection of the Castilian crown. For at least five years after the fall of Granada, the main provisions of the capitulation were loyally observed; indeed, in April, 1497, when the king of Portugal expelled all the Moors from his dominions, Ferdinand and Isabella specifically invited the exiles either to come and settle in Spain, or else to pass through it on their way to their final place of refuge. But in the immediately succeeding period there came a change. In 1492 Isabella determined to revive the high episcopal traditions which Granada had enjoyed in Roman and Visigothic times, to erect it into an archbishopric, and to confer it upon her confessor, the saintly Hernando de Talavera. Under his gentle influence numerous Moorish converts to Christianity were made; but the process did not advance with sufficient rapidity to suit their Catholic Majesties, who in November, 1499, took the decisive step of associating with Talavera a man of a very different stamp—the redoubtable Francisco Ximenes de Cisneros, archbishop of Toledo. Inflexible determination and fanatic zeal for the propagation of the Christian faith were the principal traits of this extraordinary prelate; from the moment of his arrival in Granada he dominated everything; the gentle Talavera was simply elbowed aside. Conversion by compulsion and terrorism supplanted conversion by persuasion and instruction; baptism *en masse*—3000 at a time on one occasion—by the use of the *aspergillum* or baptismal sprinkler, replaced the individual rite. When rebellions ensued as a result of these proceedings, Ximenes insisted that the Moors had thereby forfeited their lives and their property, and that they ought not to be pardoned unless they promised either to accept Christianity or else to leave the realm. The sovereigns lent a willing ear to these representations; and the Holy Office, which had been extended to Granada in the same year that Ximenes had been sent there, urged them still further along the path of persecution. Ferdinand was unquestionably less amenable to clerical argument than was Isabella. He recognized the high value of the Moorish portions of the population from the economic point of view, and often strove to check the ardor of his more fanatic spouse. But the queen was determined to rid Castile at all costs of the last remnant of its non-Christian population, and on the plea that it was impossible to prevent the avowed and confessed Moors from entering Granada, where they would infallibly contaminate those whom Ximenes had baptized, she finally issued, on February 12, 1502, an edict for their expulsion. This provided that all unconverted adult Moors, except a few slaves with whom it was impossible to interfere, should leave the realms of Leon and Castile before the end of the following April. As a matter of fact, however, the edict

really amounted to a sentence of conversion or death, for the conditions under which it provided that the expatriation should be carried out were quite impossible of fulfilment. The prescribed places of embarkation were too remote to be reached within the allotted time, and resort to the adjacent Iberian and North African realms was prohibited. The edict was virtually an order for the forcible conversion of all the non-Christian inhabitants of Leon and Castile and the consequent bringing of them within the jurisdiction of the Holy Office.

The edict against the Moors in 1502, in contrast to that against the Jews of ten years before, did not for the present apply to the realms of the Crown of Aragon. Not until the reign of the Emperor Charles V was it extended to the eastern kingdoms. Isabella, as we have seen, was primarily responsible for it; indeed, after her death in 1504 her husband did what he could to mitigate the severity of its enforcement. Ferdinand's whole career shows him to have been much less intolerant than the queen; in this respect at least his point of view was far more modern. But even his efforts to stem the tide of persecution were in the end totally fruitless; the movement begun by Isabella and her clerical allies and advisers was to continue practically unchecked until its force was broken by the scepticism of the eighteenth century. How far the effects of this baleful arousing of the demon of persecution and exclusiveness was responsible for the fall of Spain and her empire, it is profitable to inquire, provided we do not expect a definite answer. Certainly it was a cause, and, in all probability, a principal one; but to hold it solely or even almost solely responsible for the disasters that followed, is too much. The Spanish Empire of the sixteenth century was such a vast, unwieldy, and heterogeneous organization that it is idle to attempt to account for its rise or fall on the theory of any single explanation. Many exceedingly complex, and in large measure accidental, elements combined to effect its sudden growth and decay; and if the present work lays less than the usual emphasis on the errors of Spain's racial and religious policy, it is because the writer feels that they were but one of a number of reasons that went to produce the final result.

CHAPTER XVI  
INTERNAL REORGANIZATION

HAVING disposed of the two distinctively Spanish problems with which Ferdinand and Isabella were confronted, we can take up the story of their principal administrative reforms, which were inspired, one and all, by the idea of giving the nation peace, order, and union under the absolute authority of the crown. Before any positive work towards the upbuilding of a strong central government could be attempted, it was essential to clear the way for it by two negative measures of fundamental importance. An end must be put to the long course of unpunished crime and contempt for authority which made the name of Castile synonymous with anarchy even in that lawless age; and the rebel aristocracy, the principal foe to the omnipotence of the king, must be permanently reduced to subjection.

The quotation from Andrés Bernáldez, with which this volume opens, may well be supplemented by a description from the pen of another contemporary, in order to portray the full horrors of the period in which Ferdinand and Isabella began to reign. “So corrupt and abominable were the customs of these realms, that everyone was left free to follow his own devices without fear of reprehension or punishment; and so loosely were the conventions of civilized society observed, that men practically relapsed into savagely, in such fashion that the wise and prudent deemed it next to impossible to bring order out of such chaos, or regulation out of such confusion; for no justice was left in the land. The common people were exterminated, the crown property alienated, the royal revenues reduced to such slight value that it causes me shame to speak of it; whence it resulted that men were robbed not only in the open fields but in the cities and towns, that the regular clergy could not live in safety, and that the seculars were treated with no respect, that sanctuaries were violated, women raped, and all men had full liberty to sin as they pleased”.

In times of such agony the Hermandad had proved itself the sole effective remedy in the past, and in the reign of Henry the Impotent “the extension of the malady made the cure more urgent still”. A new Hermandad, far larger and more powerful than any that Castile had seen before, had therefore been inaugurated in 1465 and definitely constituted two years later. A set of laws and ordinances, which were drawn up for it at a general assembly of its representatives at Castronuño near Valladolid, exhibit the institution at the height of its independent development, and show that the municipalities, disrupted and shaken though they were by the anarchy of the times, were still centres of patriotism and national pride. These ordinances declare that a Hermandad, comprising the important towns of Leon, Castile, Asturias, and Galicia, is established for the execution of justice, and for the preservation of the wellbeing of the realm and its royal crown. They prescribe the forms of its organization, from the alcaldes in the towns, on whom fell the important duty of intervening to prevent crime and disturbance, through the eight deputies who headed each provincial subdivision of the institution, to the supreme general assembly or *Junta General*. They lay down the methods of recruiting and utilizing the military forces of the institution, the contribution due from each municipality for their support, the means of forcibly collecting it in case of a refusal, and also the difficult question of conflicts of jurisdiction with the ordinary authorities. They are, in fact, the constitution of a powerful “administrative, judicial, legislative, and military machine”, “a state within a state, or, more



exactly, the sole state then existent in Castile". The excessive praises of contemporary chroniclers must not lead us into thinking that it succeeded in fully accomplishing its purposes, or "that there was once more safety on the roads in such manner that men could travel anywhere without fear". The evils of the day were far too deep seated for that; but had it not been for this Hermandad of 1465-67 they would probably have been much worse. In any case, the institution had demonstrated its value so signally and so recently, that, in casting about for some means of restoring order at their accession, it was impossible that Ferdinand and Isabella should ignore it.

One of the most striking features of the administration of the Catholic Kings, and also one of the most convincing proofs of their statesmanship, was their careful avoidance of gratuitous innovations. If their purpose could be as well served by the remodelling of an ancient institution as by the creation of a new one, they unhesitatingly chose the former alternative, knowing full well that the permanence of their work would thus be more completely assured. The application of this principle to the Hermandad was obvious and important. The institution was highly esteemed and enjoyed noble traditions. It had stood in the past for objects of which no true patriot could fail to approve. With crown support it would be able to accomplish its purpose far more effectively than ever before, while the monarchy itself would gain prestige from association with it. Finally, under royal control, it could never lend itself to enterprises hostile to the throne. Accordingly, after consultation with the principal personages in the most important cities of the realm, the sovereigns promulgated a plan for the reorganization of the ancient Hermandad under the auspices of the central government, at the Cortes of Madrigal, April 27, 1476. On the basis of this proclamation, a new constitution was drawn up by the representatives of the different municipalities in solemn conclave at Dueñas on July 25, and sanctioned by the sovereigns on August 13 following. Three features of this new constitution deserve special emphasis. First, in order to preserve the authority of the crown over the institution as a whole, a representative of the monarchy, the bishop of Cartagena, was installed as president of the *Junta* or council of the Hermandad, which was composed as formerly of provincial delegates. Before this body all questions of importance were ultimately certain to come, and the sovereigns were thus enabled to keep in touch with every phase of the institution's activities. Second, in addition to preventing crime and maintaining order, the new Hermandad was given complete jurisdiction over certain classes of crimes, and full power to punish them. Among these may be mentioned robbery and arson in the open country, rape, and all acts of rebellion against the central government; and elaborate rules prevented the ordinary judicial authorities from interfering in such cases. Finally, the amounts of the contributions due from each town for the support of the new institution, the sources and means of collecting them, and the penalties for default were regulated more carefully than ever before, as were also the size and distribution of its military contingents throughout the realm. No rank or class of men, whether nobles or clergy, was exempt from the tribute which the maintenance of the Hermandad required; "for as it was equally useful to all, so it was but fair that all men should pay their share." The new institution may thus be regarded as "the first attempt to establish a system of taxation to which everyone should contribute irrespective of his estate and condition, and therefore as the initial step towards the abolition of the ancient privileges" and the levelling of all distinctions under the throne.

The efficiency of this reorganized or Holy (*Santa*) Hermandad is the best possible justification of the wisdom of the sovereigns' treatment of it. The pursuit of criminals was carried relentlessly forward, lap on lap, by the squadrons of archers which were maintained in each locality. When the limits of the territory of one company were reached, it relinquished the chase to a fresh one, which was always oh hand to take it up. Death or mutilation were the regular punishments. Whenever possible the malefactor was brought back to the place where he had committed his crime to undergo them; and the death penalty was invariably inflicted by a discharge of arrows at the body of the victim, bound upright to a wooden post, which, as

the ancient law significantly specified, “should never be permitted to have the form of a cross”. Yet despite the ruthlessness of its procedure, the new institution met with little resistance or complaint. The nobles alone, who realized that it was certain ultimately to curtail their excessive powers, were bitterly hostile, but since they were themselves the fundamental cause of the prevailing anarchy, we may well believe that Ferdinand and Isabella paid no attention to their remonstrances. The Hermandad was vigorously supported by the crown in all its proceedings and rendered splendid service in return. We have seen that, in addition to their regular duties, some of its contingents formed a useful nucleus for the Christian army in the Granadan war. A similar institution was established in Aragon in 1488 and endured until 1510. Long before the latter date, however, the more important Castilian Hermandad had accomplished the work which it had been reorganized to do. Crime and rebellion had been suppressed, peace and order established. That this happy consummation was largely due to other contemporary measures of the Catholic Kings, which we shall examine in their proper place, it would be idle to deny; and it is certain that the character and prestige of the monarchs themselves counted for much. Still the Hermandad must always be remembered as the entering wedge of the administration of the Catholic Kings. By the year 1498 there was no longer any need for its continued existence—at least not in the form in which it had been reconstituted in 1476. The taxes for its maintenance were already very high and steadily increasing, and Ferdinand and Isabella resolved radically to modify and restrict it. By an ordinance of July 29 of that year they suppressed the supreme council or Junta of the Hermandad, its salaried officers, and the imposts which its upkeep demanded. Appeals from its sentences to the ordinary courts of the realm were thenceforth specifically permitted, and the severity of its ancient punishments was moderated by the order that criminals should be hung before being shot. Its archers indeed were to be maintained -in the different localities to watch over the security of the roads; but this last was probably little more than a concession to popular conservatism. To all intents and purposes the Hermandad had finished its work and been discontinued.

At the same time that Ferdinand and Isabella were bringing the active agents of crime and rebellion to book, they took measures of repression against the Castilian aristocracy, in whom they rightly recognized the ultimate authors and fomenters of the manifold evils of the times. That many of these measures were ostensibly gentle and pacific must not blind us to their real effectiveness, or lead us to imagine that the sovereigns did not realize the deadly peril to their throne that lurked in the excessive powers of the baronage. It simply shows that they shrank from open collisions, whenever it was possible to avoid them and to attain their ends without provoking civil war. Moreover, it is important to notice that most of the steps they took to curb the rebel nobles were specifically sanctioned by the Cortes of Castile, and therefore, nominally at least, bore the stamp of the approval of the representatives of the entire realm. The national assembly furnished valuable aid to the Catholic Kings in the establishment of their absolutism against internal anarchy and baronial rebellion. After it had successfully accomplished that purpose and had itself begun in turn to constitute a menace to the omnipotence of the crown, it was destined, as we shall subsequently see, to be rather cavalierly cast aside.

Systematic destruction of a large number of baronial castles—strongholds of unlicensed tyranny and rebellion—was a distinguishing feature of the early years of the reign, and effectively supplemented the activities of the Hermandad. The nobles were also formally commanded to keep the peace among themselves, and heavy punishment was unsparingly meted out to those barons whose misdeeds rendered them subject to it; for rank and lineage were no longer to be permitted to shield any malefactor from the consequences of his crime. The Cortes of Madrigal in 1476 carried the good work considerably further. In addition to taking the first steps toward the reform of the royal councils and courts, which we shall examine in another place, they initiated a thorough reorganization of the royal household; by this the duties and powers of Chancellor,

Mayor domo, Adelantado Mayor, and the other ancient dignitaries of the crown were so strictly limited and defined that the great lords and clerics who held these offices were virtually deprived of all influence in the government. But the hardest blows were dealt through the Cortes of Toledo in 1480, which a contemporary chronicler admiringly characterizes as “a God-given means of remedy and reformation for the past disorders”. Two petitions, ostensibly emanating from the procuradores, but in all probability inspired by the sovereigns to whom they were addressed, set the ball rolling in the right direction. The first demanded that the royal revenues be restored to their proper proportions, ‘since failure to do so would inevitably mean increased taxes’; the second required that the various alienations, whether of lands, cities, or funds, which had been made without sufficient cause during the preceding reign, should be promptly revoked. In pursuance of these requests a great Act of Resumption was passed, by which the nobles lost and the crown gained an annual revenue of 30,000,000 maravedis. The details were worked out by the queen’s confessor, Hernando de Talavera, whose high character insured him the confidence of all men, in consultation with the very nobles against whom the measure was aimed. The amount that each one should give up was settled according to the merits of his particular case; if he could prove that he had rendered services commensurate with the grant that he had received, he was permitted to retain it, but most of the beneficiaries lost the whole or a large part of what they had been given. There was some grumbling, of course; but the measure was almost a *sine qua non* of national financial salvation, and the fact that the queen in her final will and testament revoked some of the grants which had been allowed to stand in 1480, as well as certain others which she herself had made, shows that Talavera’s verdicts had not been unduly severe. That the nobles themselves had been invited to participate in every stage of the process by which they had been deprived, was the best possible answer to any complaints.

The annexation of the grand masterships of the three great orders of military knighthood really forms a part of the story of the sovereigns’ measures against the Castilian baronage; intrenched as these institutions were, behind privileges both aristocratic and clerical, it was doubly essential that they be made to bow before the majesty of the throne. The first move came in 1476 on the death of the grand master of Santiago. When the news reached Isabella at Valladolid she promptly took horse, and after three days’ hard riding, the last part of it in a pouring rain and at night, she appeared at the convent at Uclés, where the thirteen dignitaries of the order were discussing the selection of a successor. The magnates were amazed at her vigorous insistence that they suspend their proceedings; they were dumfounded by her announcement that she desired that the coveted office be conferred on her husband, and that she had written to Rome to ask for a bull of investiture from the Pope; but the charm and power of her personality overcame all resistance. The royal ambassador at the Vatican wrote that “the Pope and cardinals held it to be a most monstrous thing and contrary to all precedent that a woman should have any rights over the administration of orders”; but his urgency finally triumphed, and the desired provision of Ferdinand to the grand mastership of Santiago at the request of the queen was duly granted. It is true that Ferdinand, whose whole handling of this problem of the grand masterships was marked with even more than his usual caution, did not at once avail himself of the permission that he had received. The candidate whom the dignitaries had intended to elect was permitted to assume the office and to hold it until his death in 1499. But in 1487 the Catholic King utilized the opportunity afforded by the death of the grand master of Calatrava to give effect to the papal bull and possess himself of that office; in 1494 he took over that of Alcántara in similar fashion; and when five years later the grand mastership of Santiago once more fell vacant, he repeated the process there. As these offices had only been conferred upon Ferdinand for his lifetime, the process of annexation was not complete until in 1523 a bull of Pope Adrian VI definitely incorporated all three military orders into the crown of Castile; but their ultimate fate was inevitable from the moment of Isabella’s first dramatic interference in 1476. What had been one

of the principal sources of political anarchy and disruption during the two preceding centuries had now been converted into a source of added wealth and power to the monarchy.

A number of other measures, all of which aimed directly or indirectly at the depression of the Castilian baronage, may be briefly mentioned. The Cortes of Toledo of 1480, in addition to passing the great Act of Resumption already described, further indicated their compliance with the royal desires by numerous petitions for the restraint of aristocratic abuses and usurpations. These were for the most part accepted, and converted into laws prohibiting the use of phrases, dignities, or methods of address which were anciently prerogatives of royalty. The *grandees*, for example, were henceforth forbidden to place crowns above their coats of arms, or to have maces carried before them on state occasions. The erection of new castles—one of the most harmful of baronial privileges—and the practice of duelling were also explicitly prohibited. At the same time the nobles were one by one deprived of important political offices, save in those rare cases where their loyalty was certain and their ability unquestioned. The advancement to the most important posts in the realm of low-born, subservient, self-made men—preferably legists or clerics—is as notable a feature of the policy of Ferdinand and Isabella as of that of their contemporaries in France and England, and left scant room for the baronage. Yet the sovereigns were keenly alive to the danger that the aristocracy, if removed from the government service, where the monarchy could in a measure superintend them, might retire to their great landed estates and hatch plots against the throne. To guard against this peril they made every possible effort to induce the nobles to dance attendance upon themselves. This process of converting their proud *hidalgos* into servile courtiers was exceedingly difficult to accomplish. The independent traditions of the Castilian baronage made it almost impossible to change them over at short notice into king's minions, and Ferdinand and Isabella scarcely did more than make a beginning. But their methods of operation were skilful and exceedingly interesting. They flattered the aristocracy by permitting them to retain most of the empty rights and honors to which they were traditionally entitled; even a few of the significant and important ones, which it might have been dangerous to attempt to abolish, were permitted to remain. Thus the highly prized privilege of keeping their hats on in the royal presence continued to be the distinguishing badge of the Castilian nobility; so much so, in fact, that a common form of announcing the grant of a title was a command from the king to the recipient, in the presence of the full court, to 'be covered'. It was also judged wise not to meddle with the ancient aristocratic exemptions from torture, imprisonment for debt, or even from the payment of regular taxes—much as the sovereigns must have disliked them. A considerable increase in the number of titles and of titled persons, moreover, was apparently held to be good policy by the Catholic Kings: they doubtless hoped in that way to diminish the importance of the distinction. There were, for example, but seven dukes in Castile at the time of their accession; during their reign the number was raised to fifteen. Flattery and cajolery were thus judiciously mixed with vigorous measures of suppression, in the sovereigns' treatment of their unruly magnates.

Such were the principal means by which Ferdinand and Isabella succeeded in vindicating the authority of the monarchy against the class which more than any other had contrived during the past two centuries to hold it in tutelage. By them the preponderance of actual power in the body politic, which hitherto had been unquestionably possessed by the aristocracy, was made to pass to the crown, where it equally unquestionably remained until the days of the French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte. That such a shifting of the centre of authority at home was the indispensable preliminary to the efficient upbuilding of an empire abroad must be evident to the most casual observer. And in order to understand the relentless persistency with which the Spanish kings attempted to safeguard and conserve every minutest particle of their royal authority in the New World, it is essential to keep in mind the tremendous exertions which they had been

obliged to put forth to establish it, at the very moment when they entered into possession of their new dominions.

At the same time that Ferdinand and Isabella contrived to curb and dominate the enemies of strong central government throughout their dominions, they took effective positive measures to upbuild their own power. The first and by far the most important of these—indeed the source and mainspring of the entire administration of Spain and the Spanish Empire down to the very end of the old regime—was their reform and development of the Royal Council.

We have already examined the origin and growth during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries of this interesting institution, the various changes in its composition and powers, and finally its subjection in the reign of John II and Henry IV, along with most of the other organs of the central government, to the factious control of the baronage. Obviously, if it were ever again to perform the function for which it had been originally created—namely, to advise and aid the king in the management of the realm—its personnel would have to be completely altered, and it would have to be once more brought back into close and intimate contact with the monarchy. A good beginning was made toward the attainment of these two ends in the Cortes of Madrigal in 1476. In spite of the fact that the original summons to this assembly makes mention of a long list of prelates, nobles, and legists as members of the Royal Council, the third of its enactments specifically provides that that body should in future be composed of but one bishop, two barons, and six *letrados*, with six secretaries; and at another place the monarchs distinctly promise that no new person shall be added to the Council unless there is a vacancy, or without the consent of the existing members. The aristocracy and ecclesiastics were thus in large measure hunted out, and the preponderance was definitely handed over to the legists. Moreover, throughout the portion of the *cuaderno* of these Cortes which deals with the *Consejo*, there occur various phrases which indicate that the sovereigns and procuradores had made up their minds that all the members of that body ought to be in constant residence at the court, but that the facts did not correspond to their desires. No specific rule was laid down on this matter for the time being; but it is clear that Ferdinand and Isabella had discerned the dangers inherent in the chronic absenteeism of many of the members of the Council in the past, and had determined to put an end to it.

All the progress made at the Cortes of Madrigal in 1476 was consolidated and increased at those of Toledo in 1480. The first thirty-three sections of their *cuaderno* are almost exclusively occupied with the reform of the Royal Council: the first two and the thirty-second of these sections deal with its membership and place of meeting; the rest with its procedure and powers. Its composition was now definitely fixed at one prelate, three nobles, and eight or nine legists, all but the first of whom were named in the *cuaderno*. A sop was thrown to the humbled aristocracy by the permission to those magnates, both lay and clerical, whose dignities anciently entitled them to the position of crown counsellors, to attend the meetings of the *Consejo* whenever they chose; but as the right to vote and transact business was specifically restricted to the regular members, the privilege was largely illusory. All meetings of the Council were to be held in the royal dwelling, wherever the monarchs happened to be, “and if there was not room, then as near to it as possible”; no separation of the crown from its advisers was to be tolerated in future. It was clearly the intention of the sovereigns that the reorganized institution should work, and work hard, to earn the large salaries which were paid to its members. It was to sit every day except Sundays and holidays—from six to ten in the morning between Easter and mid-October, and from nine to twelve during the rest of the year: if the business on hand could not be finished within the appointed time, the sessions were prolonged. Every member was sworn to inviolable secrecy. Four councillors, of whom two must be legists, constituted a quorum. Elaborate regulations



prescribed the methods by which business should be conducted. Speed, order, and efficiency were the watchwords at every turn. It is clear that written records were kept of all the most important proceedings. In that way the sovereigns could inform themselves concerning the doings of their Council much more accurately than through oral reports; and moreover an enormous body of valuable experience and administrative and judicial precedents was thus accumulated and preserved for the guidance of those to come after. Huge stacks of documents and copies of documents of every sort and description became in fact a distinguishing characteristic of Spanish administration from the days of the Catholic Kings.

The competence and powers of the reorganized Council were exceedingly extensive; in theory every phase of the government of Castile fell within its purview. It acted as an advisory body to the crown in appointments, grants, and the bestowal of the royal patronage, as well as in certain matters of policy; and in such cases the sovereigns alone signed the document announcing the decision, though some of the councillors might indorse it. But the Council also dealt independently with a number of administrative affairs on its own authority. It doubtless often consulted the sovereigns in such cases, if doubts arose as to the proper course to pursue, but the royal signature did not appear on the paper which announced the verdict; those of the councillors were held to suffice. It even went so far as to exercise one of the most distinctive prerogatives of royalty after the death of Queen Isabella, and summon on its own authority the Cortes which all men demanded. It was also the supreme court of justice of the realm, to which appeal lay from the lower tribunals, to which all men without distinction of rank or lineage were unquestionably subject, and whose decision was absolutely final; it was thus the principal means of centralizing the administration of justice in the hands of the crown. "When the liberties of the nation had perished, it preserved the laws". Fridays were set apart for the exercise of its judicial functions, and during the earlier part of the reign the sovereigns lent all the majesty of their presence to these occasions by presiding whenever possible in person. We shall revert to this phase of the Council's activities in another place; for the present we need only remark that contemporaries were so deeply impressed with it that the old name of *Consejo Real* began to give way to that of *Consejo de Justicia*. *Consejo de Castilla*, however, ultimately became the regular designation of it, though all three titles continued to be used indiscriminately for the same body for many years to come. Finally, in conjunction with the monarch the Council possessed the right to issue orders and proclamations which had the force of laws; but its legislative powers through the so-called *autos acordados* were not fully developed until the days of the Hapsburgs. The ancient notion that valid laws could only be made in and by the consent of the Cortes had not been entirely abandoned in the reign of the Catholic Kings.

It will be readily understood that all the vast powers above enumerated could not possibly be exercised in full by a single body with a personnel so limited as that which we have just described. A large amount of work would have to be delegated to minor tribunals, and a passage in Pulgar in reference to the Cortes of 1480 has led many authors to conclude that four other councils, each with a separate function of its own, were already in existence and full working order at that date. "At the time of these Cortes", says the chronicler, "there were five councils in five separate apartments in the royal palace where the king and queen were staying;" and he then goes on to a brief description of their duties and personnel. But to assume that all these bodies were permanently established in their final form at this early period, is to antedate by over forty years the constitutional arrangements of the time of Charles V, and to ignore indisputable proofs of their subsequent organization. Of the four, outside the *Consejo Real*, only one, that of the Hermandad, can be regarded as having attained anything like its final form in this period; and it only lasted, as we have already seen, until 1498. The other three bodies which Pulgar describes were merely groups of the chiefs of certain special branches of the administration, nuclei out of which full-fledged councils were afterwards evolved. What the words of the chronicler do show

is that there was already a certain set of men—and it was the only one in which the grandees were permitted to play a prominent role—in which Ferdinand confided with reference to foreign affairs; this was the origin of the Council of State, which emerged in its final form in 1526. “In another part of the palace”, continues the story, “were the *Contadores Mayores* and the officials who kept the accounts of the royal treasury and the crown domain”; from these was ultimately evolved the *Consejo de la Hacienda*, but it did not take definite shape till 1568. Finally, a number of nobles and legists resident at the court, but natives of the realms of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Sicily, and well versed in the laws and customs of those lands, were intrusted, according to Pulgar, with the administration of the affairs of those kingdoms; yet it was not till November 19, 1494, that the *Consejo de Aragon*, of which this body was the origin, was definitely constituted for that purpose. In its final form it was composed of five legists; and it is worth noting that two of them were also members at one time or another of the *Consejo de Castilla*, an arrangement which the continuous presence of both bodies at the royal court rendered possible. This cannot, however, be taken to indicate any effort towards the fusion of the two bodies or of the different realms over which they had jurisdiction. It is explained by the very high ability of the two men in question, Alfonso de Caballeria and Felipe Pons, which made them indispensable. The Councils of Castile and of Aragon continued to deal exclusively with the affairs of the realms to which they respectively belonged; neither one trespassed upon the territory of the other.

In addition to these different committees, there were two regular councils which took definite shape before the close of the reign. These were the *Consejo de la Suprema*, which we have already examined in connection with the Inquisition, and the *Consejo de las Ordenes*, which was certainly in existence in 1515. The *Consejo de Indios*, whose origin and early development may most conveniently be considered in another place, was apparently spoken of as such as early as 1509, though it was not finally established until 1524.

The measure of independent authority possessed by these different bodies, both before and after they emerged from the stage of amorphous committees to that of full-fledged councils, varied widely, as was natural, in every case; but the immense preponderance of the Council of Castile is in general the all-important fact to be borne in mind. It was spoken of by the sovereigns as *Nuestro Consejo* in the *Ordenanzas Reales* as if no other council existed; if others took their places beside it in the succeeding years, it certainly maintained its preeminence. The *Contadores de Hacienda* did little more than carry out in detail the main lines of the financial policy, which were laid down by the superior body. The Councils of the Hermandad, the Suprema, and the Indies doubtless enjoyed a somewhat larger measure of autonomy, but it was impossible for them to initiate a course of action repugnant to the Council of Castile. In the Council of Aragon we have, in theory at least, rather a coordinate than a subordinate jurisdiction during this period; but the fact, already noticed, that two of its members had seats in the Council of Castile, was an excellent safeguard against the two bodies falling to loggerheads with one another; and in case of difference of opinion on any isolated point, there could be no question which would prevail. The Council of State, on the other hand, was a purely advisory body with no real authority at all. Though it was usually placed at the head of the list of all the *consejos* in official descriptions of the government of Spain, the precedence accorded it was merely a sop to the grandees who had seats there, and for practical purposes amounted to nothing. The *Consejo de Castilla* continued to vindicate its position at the head of the great conciliar system whose ramification is the salient feature of Spanish constitutional development during the next three centuries; under the king it was the supreme power in the Spanish Empire, of which, as time went by, Castile became more and more unquestionably the centre.

It is not easy to state what measure of authority was possessed by each of these different bodies apart from the sovereign. In this matter, as in the relation of the different councils to one another, the facts doubtless varied in every case. With the *Hacienda*, the Suprema, and the

*Hermandad*, the sovereigns had probably little to do, save through the Council of Castile. With the *Consejo de Indias* they were doubtless somewhat closer in touch, and still more so with the Council of Aragon. The Council of State, on the other hand, was almost wholly dependent upon the presence of the crown, since foreign affairs, with which it dealt, were always directly guided from the throne. The powers of the all-important Council of Castile, as we have already seen, were partly exercised independently of the sovereigns, and partly in conjunction with them; but the tendency, as time wore on, was towards a marked increase of its own authority apart from the crown. During the early part of their reign, the monarchs were in constant attendance. They feared that in their absence it might get out of hand; and we have already seen that they made a special point of presiding in person on Fridays, when it dealt with judicial affairs. After the forces of anarchy and rebellion had been definitely overthrown, however, they felt safe in leaving it more and more to its own devices. This is doubtless the significance of the first definite emergence in 1489 of an office of which there had previously been only vague hints—that of the President of the Council of Castile, or, as he soon came to be called, the President of Castile. It was conferred in that year on Don Alvaro de Portugal—“a very upright and most prudent man”—and again ten years later on Juan Daza, bishop of Oviedo and later of Cartagena. Its occupant soon came to be by far the most important person in the realm after the monarch; but the days of its greatest independent power and prestige did not come until the seventeenth century, when lazy, pleasure-loving ‘picture kings’ succeeded to the throne of the indefatigable Ferdinand and Isabella. Their Catholic Majesties were far too active and omniscient to permit any subordinate person to usurp their functions.

Such were the foundations of that great system of councils which formed the framework of the administration of the Spanish Empire, and which we shall encounter again and again in our examination of the different branches of the service of the crown. Through them the sovereigns carried their absolutism into every department and subdivision of the conduct of the government. Every single member of each of these different councils was appointed by the monarchy and could be dismissed at its pleasure. We have already pointed out that the overwhelming majority of these appointees, save in the Council of State, were *letrados*, whose origin and training rendered them fit instruments for the erection of a system of royal despotism; yet it is important to observe that Ferdinand and Isabella, in sharp contrast to many of their Hapsburg successors, were glad to advance men of originality and independent power to these important posts. The kind of councillor that Charles V, and still more Philip II, preferred, was the man who would obediently, nay almost slavishly, follow orders and precedents and never strike out into a line of policy of his own; and this characteristic was not the least important of a number of elements that combined to paralyze the efficiency of Spanish administration in the end of the sixteenth century and give it that reputation for extreme slowness, heaviness, and inadaptability which has clung to it ever since. But these defects did not appear, or at least they are not at all prominent—save perhaps in connection with the government of remote colonies and dependencies—under the Catholic Kings. Partly no doubt because the Spanish Empire had not yet attained its ultimate unwieldy proportions, but also because the sovereigns were not afraid to trust the management of it to men of ability, provided their loyalty was beyond question, the government of Ferdinand and Isabella forms an agreeable contrast to that of their successors in the comparative speed and efficiency of its operations.

Next in importance after Ferdinand and Isabella’s reorganization of the Royal Council and its satellites come unquestionably their reforms in the administration of justice. To these the establishment of the *Hermandad* was an indispensable preliminary; for so terrible was the situation at the time of their accession that emergency measures were imperatively necessary before the ordinary courts of the realm could be expected to discharge their functions. At the same

time, however, the sovereigns did their best to restore the badly shaken prestige of the regular tribunals; and they began, as we have already seen, at the top of the ladder by regularly lending the majesty of their presence to the Council of Castile on the days which it devoted to judicial affairs. The penalties meted out by that body in the early years of the reign were extremely severe. Villalobos, the medical adviser of Ferdinand and also of Charles V, characterizes the mutilations and beheadings that it inflicted as “terrifying and horrible vivisections”; but it is doubtful if any less drastic methods would have served the purpose. Certainly they enjoyed the warm approval of contemporaries, and Isabella in particular received, as was probably her due, the lion’s share of the credit for the restoration of respect for the law. Fernández de Oviedo, writing in 1556, describes the early years of the reign as “an age of gold and of justice, when he who was in the right obtained his due. Since God has taken away the saintly queen, it is far harder to get an audience of a secretary’s valet than it used to be of her and her Council, and a great deal more expensive.”

The reorganization of the Council of Castile and the emphasis laid upon its judicial functions effected all the reform that was necessary at the fountain head; the next problem was how to deal with the royal *Audiencia* or *Cancillería* below it. During the troublous times of the preceding reign the functions of this tribunal had been continually interrupted, and its place of abode constantly changed, despite the pragmatics of 1405 which had established it at Valladolid; in 1480 the sovereigns definitely ordered it back to that city, where it henceforth remained. This, however, was only a beginning. It soon became evident that there was far too much work on hand for a single royal court to perform—especially as Ferdinand and Isabella, with the growing security of their thrones and the increased complexity of their administration, tended more and more to hand over to it many of the cases hitherto reserved to the Council of Castile, in order to leave the latter body more time for the discharge of its governmental functions. They therefore set up a second tribunal, first at Ciudad Real in 1494, and subsequently at Granada in 1505, for the southern part of the realm; this body and that at Valladolid were always known after 1494 as Chancillerías, a name which emphasized their proximity to the throne. The Tagus marked the boundary between their jurisdictions. A subsidiary tribunal also made its appearance in Galicia in 1486, and others were created in subsequent reigns with the gradual extension of the dominions of the crown; these lesser bodies were all called Audiencias, and we shall later encounter that term, though with a somewhat different and extended significance, in the Spanish possessions in the New World. But the two original courts enjoyed for a long time by far the greatest measure of prestige. Especially was this true of that of Valladolid. The number of its judges steadily rose as the reign progressed, owing to the enormous accumulation of suits that were brought before it. The four *oidores*, mentioned in the Cortes of Toledo of 1480, were increased to eight and later to sixteen; so that at the end of the reign there were four *salas de lo civil* in place of one. The *sala de lo criminal*, composed of three *alcaldes*, remained unchanged, as did also the *sala de los hijosdalgo*, but there was also added a special *sala* and *juez* for natives of the province of Vizcaya. One-year terms were prescribed for most of the judges. Apparently the sovereigns dreaded lest with a longer tenure they might be in danger of getting out of hand; and their fear of aristocratic intrusion is once more revealed by their stem prohibition of all such claims to “the enjoyment of any judicial or governmental office by virtue of any hereditary right or title” as had been made in the two previous reigns. The increase and development of the duties laid upon the *procurador fiscal*, or prosecutor on behalf of the crown, form one of the most striking features of Ferdinand and Isabella’s judicial reforms. He was constantly urged to display the greatest energy and activity in order that the prerogatives and revenues of the monarchs should in no wise be diminished or impaired. The sovereigns also zealously guarded the judicial rights and privileges of the poor. In the larger tribunals they maintained special counsel for those who could not afford to pay for it at their own expense; and in the minor ones they commanded that all the lawyers in attendance should give freely of their services to the destitute “without payment and for the love of God.”

The audiencias, the cancellerías, and the Council of Castile were protected against petty and vexatious suits by the provision that no case of less than 3000 maravedis' value could be brought before them; but various interesting precautions were taken to prevent the miscarriage of justice in the lower courts. One of these provided that cases which could not be appealed might be tried over again at the request of either of the parties, before the same judge with two or three other persons of known integrity associated with him. A number of other elaborate regulations prescribed the methods of procedure of the Castilian audiencias and the nature of the cases that could come before them? Such details in regard to the minor and municipal tribunals as are relevant will be described under the head of local administration.

In Aragon, Ferdinand evinced his enthusiasm for *letrados*, and also his distrust for such measure of independent authority as had been preserved to the Justicia, by insisting, in 1493, that when dealing with certain cases that magistrate should be obliged to take counsel with five legists appointed by the crown. It was a long step towards getting rid of the older associates of the Justicia, over whom the Cortes had managed to retain a considerable measure of control; and the process was completed in the succeeding reigns.

A necessary supplement to the reform of the tribunals was the codification and standardizing of the laws they administered. We have already seen that some progress had been made towards this end from the reign of Alfonso the Learned onward, and that the Roman elements in Spanish law had gained steadily at the expense of the native ones. The process, however, had not gone nearly far enough to satisfy the sovereigns; diversification and contradiction were still far less frequently the exception than the rule. The first step taken to remedy the existing state of affairs was to intrust a certain jurist named Diaz de Montalvo with the task of collecting all the ordinances and *pragmáticas* put forth subsequently to the *Fuero Real*, the *Partidas*, and the *Ordenamiento de Alcalá*; he began his work in 1480, and finished it on November 11, 1484. Despite the doubts of certain earlier writers, there can be no question of the legal validity of this collection, which is popularly known as the *Ordenanzas Reales*, and of which no less than five editions were printed before 1500. On the other hand, it did nothing towards diminishing the discrepancies of the already existing codes; nay more, it even failed to reconcile its own provisions with those of the earlier collections; so that, if possible, it rendered confusion worse confounded. Petitions were presented by the procuradores of the Cortes of Toledo in 1502 that measures be taken to cure this crying evil, and to explain the many ambiguities in the existing laws; for this purpose eighty-three enactments were put forth by the Cortes of Toro in 1505, which are usually known as the *Leyes de Toro*. The remedy was good as far as it went, but it was totally inadequate. Nothing short of a complete fusion of all of the valid laws of the realm into a single code would do the work, and that was not accomplished until the *Nueva Recopilación* in the reign of Philip II. A striking passage in Isabella's will reveals her dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs in this particular, and her deep solicitude for improvement; but events moved so fast, and there was so much new legislation during her reign, that it was perhaps just as well that the task of codification was postponed to a more static period. The collection known as Ramirez's *Pragmáticas* (1503), to which reference has been several times made in the preceding pages, was a supplementary compilation of a less official character; those of its provisions which attained recognized validity were subsequently embodied in the *Nueva Recopilación*.

The absolutist theories of Ferdinand and Isabella made them chafe under the restrictions of their royal authority which were imposed by the powers of the Castilian Cortes. At first, while their attention was centred on breaking the power of the baronage, they concealed their dread of the national assembly, and skilfully utilized it as an ally against the nobles. It will be remembered that the Cortes of Madrigal in 1476 and of Toledo in 1480 lent them valuable aid in this particular.



But with the aristocracy reduced to impotence, the sovereigns' fears of democratic opposition not unnaturally revived. They saw that the indispensable ally of the past might easily develop into the menacing rival of the future, unless it was carefully restrained; they therefore took pains to summon the national assembly as infrequently as possible, and, whenever they were obliged to have recourse to it for financial purposes, to make the most of those germs of decadence which had already begun to appear in its constitution and procedure. The result was that the history of the Castilian Cortes under the Catholic Kings shows a decline quite as marked as the development of the powers of the Council. The salutary victory of the monarchy over the aristocracy—an indispensable condition of continued national existence—was dearly bought by the stifling of those aspirations for liberty which formed the brightest feature of mediaeval Castilian life. At the most critical stage of its existence the realm was transformed from a turbulent oligarchy, whose lawlessness was partially redeemed by a somewhat undisciplined passion for freedom, into a monarchy so omnipotent that nothing, save the national tendency towards separatism, could hold out against it.

The chronology of the Castilian Cortes under the Catholic Kings forms a significant commentary on these developments. According to the official reckoning they were summoned sixteen times between the death of Henry IV (1474) and that of Ferdinand (1516): of these meetings four took place before 1483 and the other twelve after 1497. The explanation of this curious distribution is not far to seek. The first four sessions represent the period when the monarchs needed the alliance of the Cortes against the aristocracy. The gap between 1482 and 1498 indicates that the sovereigns had won their battle and dismissed their ally; and the hiatus would inevitably have been prolonged, had it not been for the necessity of obtaining national recognition of new heirs to the throne, and still more of gaining extra funds for the prosecution of the Italian wars. Careful comparison of the dates of most of the last twelve meetings with the ebbs and flows of the foreign conflict will reveal close interrelation between them.

Besides their refusal to call the national assembly together, except when absolutely necessary, the sovereigns utilized every quiet and inconspicuous means to accelerate the deterioration of its powers. Most important was their omission to summon the two privileged orders. Both nobles and clergy came in 1476 and in 1480, but afterwards we hear little or nothing of them; and by the end of the reign the Castilian Cortes had become to all intents and purposes a meeting of thirty-six procuradores from eighteen cities—"a number" which, as has been well said, "was too large for a council, but not enough for a national assembly". In strict legality there can be little doubt that the sovereigns were fully justified in leaving the privileged orders out, since their presence was entirely dependent on the will of the crown. On the other hand the tradition of their attendance was so strong that it is almost inconceivable that Ferdinand and Isabella could have succeeded in breaking it, if the persons concerned had made a stand for their rights. It is at their own door that the blame for the gradual elimination of the nobles and clergy from the national assembly is chiefly to be laid; but it is not difficult to see how they came to lose interest in the meetings of a body, whose functions, as time went on, came to be more and more exclusively restricted to the voting of taxes from which they were exempt.

At the same time that the two privileged orders ceased to attend, the independence and ability of the procuradores of the cities declined. The humble, indeed almost abject tone of their petitions to Ferdinand and Isabella forms a striking contrast to the haughty claims which their predecessors had addressed to previous sovereigns. The remodelling of the municipal constitutions and fueros, which we shall subsequently describe, placed their selection more than ever in the hands of the crown and of its representatives; and the degradation of the Cortes was still further accelerated by the initiation, in 1501, of the practice of voting salaries to their own members. Most of their various rights and powers, save the control over the *servicio*, rested rather on custom than on written law, and were exercised only in consonance with the wishes of the

crown; all this made it the easier for Ferdinand and Isabella to override them. In legislation, for instance, the increased activity of the sovereigns and of the *Consejo* left the *Cortes* little to do. They continued, of course, to frame petitions on a wide variety of topics, but as they possessed no real hold over the crown, the monarchs could afford coolly to disregard such requests as were not to their liking. Even in financial affairs the powers of the *Cortes* were really very slight. The list of revenues which came to the crown independent of their vote was so long that in times of peace the government managed to subsist without their aid, as is shown by the long period from 1482 to 1498, in which the national assembly was not summoned once. Isabella, it is true, had grave misgivings as to whether the *alcabala* could be lawfully levied without the *Cortes*' consent; but her dying request that the matter be carefully investigated was disregarded. Over the *servicio* the *Cortes* did retain undisputed control; but their extraordinarily ineffective procedure, and their failure to make the most of their authority in other respects, enabled the sovereigns in the long run almost invariably to extort what they wished from them. The baleful effect of this state of affairs on the financial development of a nation which possessed unusually little comprehension of economic principles, and the external demands of whose government increased by leaps and bounds in the succeeding period, requires no additional emphasis.

The *Cortes* of the realms of the Crown of Aragon were of course in far better condition to resist the invasion of their ancient prerogatives by the monarchy. Realizing the difficulties of the situation there, Ferdinand followed his usual policy of leaving them as far as possible alone. The Aragonese *Cortes*, the most obstinate of all, met but seven times during his reign, those of Valencia once, and those of Catalonia six times, while the General *Cortes* of the three realms were convoked only thrice. Money came far harder from the assemblies of the eastern kingdoms when they did meet than from those of Castile, with the natural result that a totally unfair proportion of the financial burden of the Spanish Empire was thrown upon the western kingdom.

All in all, the Catholic Kings had managed to drive the *Cortes* of their various realms a long way on the road to destruction; but with all their efforts they were unable entirely to exterminate the ancient Spanish love of freedom and democracy, as the revolt of the *comuneros* in the succeeding reign was to prove in dramatic fashion. The Emperor, who was considerably less hostile to popular assemblies than his predecessors, gave the Castilian *Cortes* one last and very advantageous opportunity to vindicate their ancient position; but that body, when the chance came, showed itself lamentably unable to take advantage of it.

Consideration of the national assembly naturally leads on to that of the national finances, whose reestablishment was rendered doubly essential by Spain's active foreign policy and brilliant imperial prospects. To this the great acts of retrenchment and resumption in the *Cortes* of Madrigal and Toledo were the indispensable preliminaries; and at the same time a solemn prohibition forbade the further levying of any extra or special imposts by individuals or corporations, in virtue of any grants or favors of the preceding reign. Vigorous efforts were also made to reduce to the smallest possible dimensions the measure of exemption from taxation enjoyed by the two privileged orders. Especially noteworthy is a law providing that when any church, university, or notable person enjoyed the right of extending such exemption to anyone else, it should be exercised only in favor of poorer men, and not in the case of the rich.

These early measures really give the keynote to the whole financial policy of the Catholic Kings, who with their usual conservatism strove rather to correct the defects and abuses of the system they had inherited, than to augment their income by inventing new sources of revenue. According to the figures usually given, the total annual yield of the Castilian imposts amounted to only 885,000 reals in 1474, while thirty years later it had increased to 26,283,334; but during this long period only two new types of revenue were added. The first of these was the product of

the mines of the Indies, which we shall take up in another place; for the present we need only observe that the amount of it, during the early years of discovery and exploration, was not large. The second was the so-called *Bula de la Cruzada*, or system of indulgences conceded by the Pope, through which those who contributed to the Moorish wars could purchase immunity from the penalties of Purgatory. As actually administered, it was an intolerable exaction. It was continued after the expulsion of the infidel from Granada, and the revenues derived from it were used for all sorts of purposes which had never been intended; what had been originally granted temporarily and for a specific end, became in fact a regular and permanent crown revenue. Subsequently it was even collected in the American possessions. The Cortes of 1512 complained vigorously against these abuses. “The preachers of the Bull”, they protested, “keep men two and three days in the churches from morning to evening to listen to their sermons, and thus prevent them from earning their daily bread; and when they find that they cannot thus induce them to take the said Bull, they parade through the streets, asking every one they meet if they know their *Pater Noster* and *Ave Maria*; and if perchance they find anyone who does not, they force him to take the said Bull as a penance; and if any one does not take it they drag him around with them in shackles to hear their preachments, and thus force him at last by compulsion and intimidation to do their will”. Yet the sums derived from the Bull of Crusade formed, after all, an insignificant portion of the grand total; the bulk of the income of the Catholic Kings was obtained from the older sources. Of these, as we have already seen, there were a very large variety, in theory at least, over and above the *servicio*, but the disrupted state of the realm and the inefficiency and corruption of the royal tax gatherers prevented all but a very small portion of the sums that should have been collected from ever reaching the royal treasury. The first aim of the financial policy of the Catholic Kings was to secure some sort of an approximation between the amounts due to the crown and those which were actually received.

The group of men, or Council, as Pulgar somewhat prematurely describes it, which constantly resided at the court and busied itself with the royal revenues, was of course the head and center of the new system. It was composed, so the chronicler tells us, of “the *contadores mayores* and the officials of the books of the treasury and royal domain, who managed the king’s taxes and the salaries and grants that were paid by the crown, and settled everything that concerned the royal property and patrimony”. This body was divided, early in the reign, into two separate offices or *Contadurías*—one for the treasury itself (*Contaduría de hacienda*), and one for the royal accounts (*Contaduría de cuentas*): each was directed by two *contadores mayores*, who had at their disposal a large secretarial force. And the increased efficiency of the central financial council which resulted from this reorganization was equaled, if not surpassed, by that of the subordinate officials whom it sent out to do its bidding throughout the length and breadth of the realm. The royal tax gatherers seemed to be everywhere. The *corregidores*, whose activity, as we shall later see, was one of the most striking features of the administration of Ferdinand and Isabella, were always on hand to protect and support them in exacting the uttermost farthing. Backed up by the authority of the powerful monarchy, they could no longer be intimidated by local magnates into shirking their duty.

Under such a system as this the ancient revenues of the crown took on a new lease of life. The *diezmos de aduanas* mounted fast and high, partly no doubt because of the permission to deal with Aragon in certain commodities hitherto forbidden, which paid the ordinary duties in crossing the line; more because of the general increase of the commerce of the whole realm which accompanied the restoration of order, and because the customs officials were able to perform their functions. A new and elaborate schedule of rates for the *derechos de sello* or *cancillería* in the *cuaderno* of the Cortes of Madrigal shows that the sovereigns were determined to make men pay liberally for any grant or favor from the crown. Most notable of all was the reform in the collection of the *alcabala*. In 1491, before Granada, the sovereigns put forth a long series of regulations

concerning its incidence and collection, and the prevention of the frauds that had hitherto occurred in connection with it. A great increase in the yield resulted from this measure, despite the queen's insistence that the clergy, who had hitherto like the nobles been subjected to the *alcabala*, should henceforth be exempted from it. Its collection was at first let out to farmers for a certain fixed sum; but this method aroused such bitter protests that at a suggestion from Ximenes it was finally turned over to the municipalities themselves, which were allowed to use their own methods in gathering it in, but were expected in return to hand over annually to the royal treasury sums proportionate to their size and importance. Even this reform did not entirely silence complaint, and the matter was a constant source of worry to Isabella down to the day of her death. The rate remained at ten per cent throughout the reign; and despite the clerical exemption it was the most important of all the revenues of the crown.

A thorough reform and standardization of the value of the coinage accompanied these measures. Most of the work was carried through in 1497; and though the debased or 'vellon' currency was permitted to remain in circulation, its relation to the gold and silver money was more strictly defined than before, so that the confusion in values, though still extreme, was by no means so bad as in previous reigns.

None of these financial reforms, however, could have effected their ends had they not been accompanied by a general revival of the economic life of the realm as a whole. Had the wealth of the nation remained where it was in the reign of Henry IV, the government could have done nothing but 'borrow from beggars'. The solicitude of Ferdinand and Isabella for the prosperity and wellbeing of their people in this respect is highly creditable. The economic progress of Castile under their administration is not one of their most conspicuous triumphs, and it is idle to deny that they made a number of serious mistakes. But when we consider that they inherited a people with little or no talent for affairs, and a traditional aversion to agricultural labor, and when we remember that their religious policy committed them to the expulsion of the portions of the population most valuable from an economic point of view, we shall certainly admit that their successes outweighed their failures. Their Hapsburg heirs did not do nearly so well in this respect, though it is fair to say that the problems with which they were confronted were harder. Indeed, if the Spanish empire in the New World had not been launched on the crest of a temporary wave of prosperity at home, it is doubtful whether it could have survived its earliest trials.

The inevitable clash of the agricultural and pastoral interests was one of the foremost subjects to engage the monarchs' attention. At first sight their policy appears to indicate a willingness consistently to sacrifice the former to the latter. Certainly their favor and protection gave the Mesta at the end of their reign a far stronger position than it had occupied at the beginning. Yet on the other hand it is only fair to point out that they also strove to do their best by the proverbially thorny problem of Castilian agriculture. Though the *labrador*—or laborer in the fields—still remained a social outcast and a political nonentity, his estate and condition were ameliorated in a number of different ways. A pragmatics of 1480 granted the *solariego* the right to remove from one place of abode and settle in another, and permitted him to take with him such possessions as he desired, and to sell the rest, irrespective of distinctions of *tierras de señorío*, *de abadengo*, or *de realengo*, or *behetria*. This law was by no means rigidly observed, even by the monarchs themselves, but it marked a considerable advance over the conditions that had obtained before. It may in fact be justly regarded as dealing the death blow to serfdom in Castile. Earlier legislation forbidding the seizure for debt of cattle for the plough and of agricultural implements, and exempting one pair of oxen on each farm from taxation, was revived at the Cortes of Madrigal; and a new regulation was passed in 1496 commending laborers and their property to the special protection of the Hermandad. An important pragmática was also issued in the latter year at Burgos, insisting on the preservation of the forests, gardens, and vineyards of the cities. The sovereigns' encouragement of great fairs at the chief centres of the

realm naturally helped the circulation of agricultural products. On the other hand, the sale of grain was subject to heavy taxation down at least to the year 1504, when a series of bad harvests caused the impost to be suppressed. One gains the impression that in good years, such as came with gratifying frequency in the last decade of the fifteenth century, Castilian agriculture could just manage to hold its own; but that it was in no condition to resist bad ones, of which there was a long succession after 1503. Of course there was the greatest difference in the situation in the different parts of the realm. Portions of Murcia and Andalusia were so fertile that they could take care of themselves in any season, while some of the barren stretches of the meseta defied the most favorable possible conjunction of climatic conditions and human effort.

In the realms of the crown of Aragon Ferdinand also strove to better the lot of the peasants and serfs, largely no doubt as a blow to the nobles and on broad humanitarian grounds, but partly in order to serve economic ends. In Aragon, indeed, where the condition of the rural poor was far worse than in Castile, he had to admit defeat, and permit the continuation of certain ancient abuses which he had hoped to eradicate. In Catalonia, however, where the *payeses de remensa* had risen in revolt under the turbulent rule of John II and continued their rebellion during the first years of his own reign, he finished the noble work which had been begun by his predecessors by definitely abolishing the six *malos usos* in the so-called *Sentencia arbitral de Guadalupe* in 1486. Various measures of precaution were naturally maintained to guard against any fresh outbreak, and some of the ancient financial exactions were suffered to continue, in order to satisfy the claims of the baronage; but the process of liberation had by this time advanced too far to be ever permanently checked; and an important rôle in the history of his native land was assured to the Catalan peasant in the succeeding generations.

Meantime the Castilian Mesta made rapid and consistent progress. It had a long start on its agricultural rivals in the western kingdom when the reign began, and a combination of court favor, and of the general prosperity which accompanied the restoration of internal order, placed it in an almost impregnable position before Ferdinand's death. Hitherto the crown's control over this great sheep owners' guild—the dominant force in the principal national occupation—had been preserved by the king's appointment of the *alcalde entregador*, or principal judicial protector of the Mesta, who kept open the *cañadas* and regulated the interminable quarrels arising out of the encroachments of the pastoral on the agricultural lands and vice versa. In 1454 this important office had been conferred on Pedro de Acuña, a member of the Royal Council, in order that the monarchy might be kept the closer in touch with the Mesta's affairs. This, however, was not enough to suit the Catholic Kings, who were determined still further to strengthen their hold over the Castilian sheep owners, and to derive the largest possible revenue from their profits. In the year 1500, accordingly, they created a new position, the Presidency of the Mesta, to be held *in perpetuo* by the senior member of the Council of Castile, with the duty of supervising all the inferior officers of the institution, and of directing its internal organization and external relations. The President naturally superseded the *alcalde entregador* as the principal link between the Mesta and the crown; in 1568 the *alcalde's* office was finally taken over by the Mesta itself for the sum of 750,000 maravedis. In 1492 and 1511, moreover, the Catholic Kings caused a new set of ordinances to be drawn up for the regulation of the Mesta's internal constitution: the bulk of the work was done by Doctor Palacios Rubios, one of the famous *letrados* of the day, who was also prominent in the early history of the administration of the Indies.

But if the creation of the office of President of the Mesta and the promulgation of new laws for its observance brought the institution more closely than ever under crown control, they also insured to it a great increase of crown protection and support. The first part of the sixteenth century unquestionably witnessed the climax of its development. Its extraordinary power and prosperity in this period are the outward emblems of the victory of the pastoral over the agricultural interests in Castile, in a conflict which presents many interesting analogies to the



contemporaneous English struggle over enclosures. The Mesta was now not only a highly organized and specially privileged corporation, securely entrenched behind the favor and protection of the crown and amply capable of defending itself against the hostility of municipal officers and local magnates. It was rapidly becoming a considerable political force, which could lend valuable aid to the monarchy in its struggle to dominate the Cortes, the municipalities, and the courts. It is needless to add that the crown took good care to secure to itself a liberal recompense for its patronage of the Mesta in money as well as in reciprocal political support. The revenues it derived from *servicio y montazgo* were multiplied many times over in the reign of the Catholic Kings; moreover the latter appointed special judges of their own—*jueces pesquisidores*— to hear suits between the Mesta and the local tax collectors, so that a good many of the imposts which had previously been levied by the municipal authorities gradually found their way into the royal hacienda. It was also in this reign that the Mesta began the practice of occasionally voting special contributions to the crown, over and above the taxes it ordinarily paid; under Charles V the sums yielded by this custom were substantially increased.

The industrial and commercial policy of the Catholic Kings was dictated, like that of their contemporaries in other European lands, by the strictest principles of state regulation and protection. Standardization of weights and measures, minute regulations concerning the manufacture and production of different commodities, sumptuary laws of infinite variety and scope, and stern prohibition of the export of certain commodities and of the import of others occupied a large share of the attention of Ferdinand and Isabella. Much pains was spent on the revival of manufacturing, for which the sovereigns discerned the country's exceptional advantages. Hitherto Castile had exported chiefly raw material and bought most of its manufactured commodities abroad. Now, with the idea of righting the balance in one of the most important staples of Castilian trade, the sovereigns ordained that no more than two thirds of the raw wool produced in the realm should be sent out of it, and forbade the importation of manufactured cloths. For the time being the result was highly gratifying. The woollen industries of Toledo and Seville became famous throughout Western Europe, while in the south the manufacture of silk, which had flourished so notably under the Moors, was maintained at such a point that in 1504 the factories of eight cities in Andalusia paid about 9,000,000 maravedis a year in taxes to the royal treasury. All the internal tolls and economic barriers which had been established within Castile with the connivance of Henry IV since 1464, and from which the nobles drew the greatest profit, were abolished; the sovereigns also showed the most persistent energy in improving the public roads and highways. Though the high tariffs at the custom houses on the frontiers of the realm were maintained, its foreign commerce flourished as never before. The list of consuls maintained in other countries to look after the interests of Castilian trade in this period reminds one of the palmier days of Barcelona. As in other lands, the export of gold and silver was strictly prohibited. A law was passed in the Cortes of Toledo to that effect, and elaborate precautions were adopted to give effect to it. When any Spaniard left the realm, he was to inform the *corregidor* of the place where he resided what sum of money he carried with him. At the frontier the same formality had to be gone through before an *alcalde de las sacas* and three other witnesses. The destination and the probable length of the traveller's stay had also to be revealed, and all the details were written down, so as to be available as testimony against him in case it was found that he had lied. Foreigners were forbidden, by a pragmatics of 1491, to take any money out of the realm; if they came as merchants they were obliged to exchange their goods for the products of the land. Of all the features of the monarchs' commercial policy, that which bore most directly on the fortunes of the Spanish Empire was their zeal for the increase of shipping. The ramifications of the subject are very wide. Even the course of foreign affairs was at times affected by it; for rival navigation acts were one of the chief causes of the bickerings of Ferdinand and Henry VII of England, which formed such an unedifying feature of both monarchs' declining years. But, whatever its results, the origin of the policy was primarily economic. The

discovery. of America furnished the needed impetus, and in 1495 the sovereigns offered a large premium for the construction of ships of six hundred tons and upwards. In 1500 they forbade the loading of any foreign vessels in their harbors if a Castilian one was available. In 1501 a fresh pragmatics forbade the sale of any Spanish vessel in a foreign land without the express authorization of the crown. Such measures as these produced the desired results. In 1481 their Majesties were able to despatch but seventy ships to aid Ferrante of Naples in putting the Turks out of Otranto in 1496, before the full effects of their policy could have been felt, we are told that they sent 130 vessels, carrying 20,000 men, to convey their daughter to Flanders, at the same time that another squadron was blockading the coasts of Cerdagne and Roussillon. All in all, it is clear that the Catholic Kings succeeded in arousing the economic energies of Castile in a variety of directions, and to an extent previously unknown.

In Catalonia and in Majorca, on the other hand, the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella witnessed a marked economic decline. A number of causes contributed to this result. In the first place, the devastating civil wars and internal uprisings which occurred under the rule of John II dislocated the commercial activities of Barcelona and of Palma. In the second, the constitution of the former city was thoroughly remodelled by Ferdinand for the benefit of the monarchy in such a way as to sap the vitality of its ancient democratic institutions, and also seriously to injure its trade. The ancient practice of electing the members of the *Concell* and of the *Concell de Cent* was exchanged for a system of *insaculación*, and the representatives of the mercantile and artisan classes were gradually elbowed aside. Thirdly, it seems perfectly clear that the economic effect of the Inquisition and of the expulsion of the Jews was felt much more quickly and acutely in the eastern kingdoms than in Castile.

A larger proportion of their trade was managed by Hebrews, and the complaints of the citizens of both capitals to Ferdinand plainly show that, in their estimation at least, the evil results of religious intolerance were chiefly responsible for their misfortunes. The advance of the Turks in the eastern Mediterranean deprived both Catalonia and Majorca of some of their most valuable markets in the Levant, and at the same time the discovery of America diverted the economic energies of Spain as a whole in a new direction. Castile suddenly became the centre of interest, and the eastern kingdoms were eclipsed. Barcelona lost a fifth of its population during the last third of the fifteenth century; in the early part of the sixteenth it revived somewhat, owing probably to the Italian wars, which necessarily focussed men's attention on the Mediterranean shores; but it never regained its former prestige. In 1491 the *consules* of the *Lonja* memorialized Ferdinand in a truly pitiful strain. "The commerce of this your city", they declared, "is entirely prostrated and abandoned ... and the workmen and the artisans, who can no longer gain a livelihood or ply their trades, depart and transfer themselves to other kingdoms".

The principles of centralization and monarchical supremacy on which the internal policy of Ferdinand and Isabella was founded left scant room for the maintenance of the high traditions of municipal self-government which had been inherited from the days of the Reconquest. The decline of the Castilian cities had begun more than a century before the accession of the Catholic Kings. Many of the ancient *fueros* had been shamefully transgressed, and royal appointees had begun to supersede the locally elected officials under the earliest sovereigns of the house of Trastamara; but hitherto the effect of these changes had been rather to convert the municipalities into centres of corruption and violence, than to render them amenable to the control of the crown. The monarchy had not yet attained a position sufficiently strong to enable it to reap the benefit of the abrogation of the local liberties; it had not succeeded in acquiring for itself the powers of which the *concejos* had been deprived. Dissipation of authority, rather than its concentration in royal hands, had thus far resulted from the crown's premature attempts at municipal regulation.

The town of Caceres in Estremadura was a case in point. In the reign of Henry IV it was apparently divided into two hostile factions, which fought so bitterly over the possession of the city offices that “deaths and other improprieties,” as Pulgar significantly expresses it, were the usual result. But Ferdinand and Isabella did not propose to tolerate the continuance of such conditions as this. The queen visited Caceres in person, in the year 1477, and ordained that the municipal magistrates, who had hitherto been elected annually, should now be chosen by lot and hold office for the rest of their lives; but that when, through deaths, future vacancies should occur, she and her successors would appoint to the same in such manner as would best conduce to the service of the crown. “And this she established as the regular law and custom of this place, and all the inhabitants thereof rejoiced in it, because it put a stop to their quarrels and the evils that followed in their train, which had resulted from the elections of earlier days”. Apparently the cities were perfectly ready to renounce their ancient liberties, now that at last they had got a monarch sufficiently powerful to give them peace and order in return.

The prevalence of such sentiments as these afforded the Catholic Kings an admirable opportunity to subvert the foundations of local autonomy in Castile without the sacrifice of popularity which such a measure would naturally be supposed to entail; and Ferdinand and Isabella took full advantage of the situation to carry their absolutism into every comer of the land. A number of ordinances were put forth in the Cortes of Toledo of 1480 to strengthen their control over the municipal magistrates. Hereditary grants of offices were revoked, and deathbed resignations in favor of kinsmen or friends forbidden. If a *regidor* was found to have leased his position to some other person he was to forfeit it as penalty for his offence; though, on the other hand, the crown not seldom put up the local magistracies for sale. All cities which did not possess a *casa de ayuntamiento* or town hall were directed to build one within two years, in order that municipal affairs might be conducted with dignity and decorum; they were also commanded to keep written records of all their special laws and privileges. Certain local institutions were judged to be so dangerous that, instead of attempting to modify them, the Catholic Kings determined to abrogate them entirely.

Such was the case with the *Hermanidad de las Marismas*, which, by a pragmatics of 1490, was forbidden to hold further meetings, save under the supervision of the *corregidor* of Vizcaya—a mortal blow to its independent existence. Still, for the most part, Ferdinand and Isabella proceeded cautiously in this as well as in the other phases of their internal policy. Indeed, many of the municipal reforms which they initiated seemed to be quite as much inspired with the idea of improving conditions in the cities as with that of augmenting their own power at the expense of the *concejo* or *ayuntamiento*.

Yet it was not on the remodelling of the city governments themselves. that Ferdinand and Isabella chiefly relied to effect their ends; but rather on a great increase of the authority of the representatives of the central government whom they sent out to inspect and override them. It was in this reign that the *pesquisidores*, *veedores*, and *corregidores* for the first time really came into their own. The first named continued as before to play a primarily judicial role; they were usually dispatched to settle cases which the municipal *alcaldes* could not manage by themselves, and to see that other royal officials did their duty. The second, as their name implies, were supposed to exercise general oversight of the public affairs of the locality to which they were assigned, and report to the crown. The *corregidores* were by far the most important of all. Beginning in the year 1480, they were sent, for the first time, to all the Castilian cities without exception, so that the institution was henceforth definitely extended over the entire realm. At the same time, the sovereigns were careful to keep these important offices out of the hands of the aristocracy, and especially of the knights of the three military orders. In 1500 the *corregidores* had attained to such importance that an elaborate pragmática was put forth on June 9 at Seville, describing their functions and responsibilities. This pragmática remained valid throughout the sixteenth century,

and gives the best existing description of the institution at the height of its power. As soon as he had been appointed, the *corregidor*, if present at the court, was obliged to take his oath of office before the Council of Castile, which delivered to him his special instructions. Arrived in his *corregimiento*, he must refrain from imposing any illegal taxes, from mingling in local factions, from the purchase of real property, or from building himself a house without the royal license, from selecting his subordinates from the inhabitants of the region over which he had been set, and from farming out any of the privileges or offices in his control. He was specially recommended to guard against any encroachments of ecclesiastical and seigniorial jurisdiction, to prevent the construction of castles or fortified houses in the cities, and to see to it that no new impost of any kind was established on any pretext whatsoever. He must learn the special laws and customs of his *corregimiento*, in order, if he deemed it expedient, that he might reform them in collaboration with the local *regidor*; he was to keep a close watch on the local finances, and inform himself in regard to the wealth and extent of the public lands of the municipality and the best methods of increasing their yield. Inspection and regulation of the relations of Moors and Christians, oversight of gambling houses and prevention of forbidden games, superintendence of local customs dues, general police and executive authority, and above all the securing of the impartial administration of justice to all men, both in civil and criminal affairs—these and many other things besides were included in his official functions. The *corregidores* were, in fact, omniscient servants of an absolute king. Nothing less than this would suffice if they were to make head against the tremendous current of Spanish separatism which had rolled on unchecked for centuries. Even as it was they were unable completely to arrest it or to make it possible for the sovereigns to effect a national unity in any way comparable to that of France. Decentralization, as we have already observed, continued to be the salient feature of the life of the peninsula, even after the advent of despotism had crushed the nobles and sapped the vitality of the *concejos*. The ancient forms remained, though the animating spirit had fled. But without the *corregidores* it is certain that Ferdinand and Isabella would have been able to accomplish far less than they did. By them every man in the realm, no matter how obscure or remote, was brought into direct and immediate contact with the central power. They were as indispensable to the crown in local affairs as was the Council of Castile in national ones.

This vast accumulation of power in the hands of the *corregidor* explains why the Catholic Kings took such unlimited pains to get the best men in the realm for the office. Bovadilla describes, with interminable prolixity, the qualifications and characteristics of the ideal *corregidor*, and the way in which he should make use of the authority confided to him. Though his book was not published till 1597, it seems certain that the author was thinking, when he wrote, rather of the appointments of the Catholic Kings than of those of their successors, for the average was distinctly lower under the Hapsburgs. And it was not merely by exercising great care in their selection that Ferdinand and Isabella maintained the highest standard for their *corregidores*. At the close of their term of office these magistrates were subjected to a most searching test through the development in this reign of the institution of the *residencia*. We have already seen that it had come to be the practice in Castile, at least as early as the reign of John II, that the *corregidores* should remain at their posts for a period of fifty days after the expiration of their appointment, in order that any complaints against them might be heard and justice done accordingly; and we may remark in passing that this seems to dispose of the well-known statement of Herrera, that King Ferdinand imported the *residencia* from Aragon. On the other hand, it is quite possible that some of the fresh developments and improvements of the institution which marked this reign may have been suggested by the Catholic monarch. Of these the following are the most important. The length of the period of the *residencia* was shortened from fifty to thirty days; but evasion of it, which had not seldom occurred in the past, was henceforth prevented by an elaborate system of oaths and forfeits. Many new precautions, moreover, were taken to render the *residencia* fair and effective. Hitherto the hearing of the complaints against the

outgoing official had apparently been a somewhat haphazard affair. Usually it had been intrusted to *pesquisidores*, who not seldom made dishonest use of their authority, in order to win for themselves the place of the man on whom they were sitting in judgment. To remedy these evils, the conduct of the affair was now turned over to a *juez de residencia* with elaborate instructions in regard to the performance of his duties. He was to be held during the period of the inquiry to the observance of all the rules which had been framed for the *corregidor*; he was to take care that the *residencia* be duly published and proclaimed, in order that the remotest portions of the *corregimiento* might be heard from; he was not, however, to be satisfied with general accusations, but was to get specific facts and spare no pains to learn the truth. He was to inform himself concerning the conduct of the local officials and the general state of the *corregimiento*, and to report to the central government. There were, furthermore, numerous regulations defining the limits of his independent authority, and the matters to be referred to the Council of Castile, to which, when the *residencia* was completed, a full report of it in writing must always be rendered? All this shows that the institution was now regularly and permanently established as an integral part of the administrative system of Castile; moreover, it was utilized henceforth in connection with other officials than the *corregidores*. “Asistentes, Corregidores, Gobernadores, Alcades mayores y Tenientes, Alguaciles y Merinos y sus Tenientes” are described in laws of the first part of the next reign as magistrates whose *residencias* must be reported to the Royal Council; and besides, as we shall later see, the institution made its appearance in the Indies during the period of Ferdinand and Isabella. Whether it was primarily intended, as seemed to be the case, to secure the highest possible standard of honor and efficiency among the government appointees, or whether the crown was merely attempting, under the guise of preventing abuses, to gain for itself a further hold over the officials who represented it at a distance from the seat of the royal power, it is difficult to say; but it is probable that the first of these alternatives came nearer realization, in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, than it did under their successors. With all their enthusiasm for centralization, the Catholic Kings never forgot their zeal for the impartial administration of justice.

The ecclesiastical policy of the Catholic Kings, in so far as it is not concerned with the Inquisition and the expulsion of the Jews and the Moors, may be summed up in a single sentence. The sovereigns would gladly promise unswerving loyalty to Rome, and enthusiastic devotion to the advancement of the interests of the church in all their dominions; but in return they demanded from the Pope wellnigh complete control of the clergy of Spain and all her dependencies. The idea of national churches, independent of papal control, which had already manifested itself in England, France, and the Empire in a variety of different ways, was firmly upheld by the Catholic Kings. It tallied closely with their schemes of political centralization; and they put it in practice, as we have already seen, in connection with the foundation of the Inquisition, whose officials they insisted on nominating themselves. But the measure of the authority which they exercised over the regular ecclesiastical appointments of the realm at the time of their accession did not correspond at all to their desires. During the confusion of the preceding reigns papal provisions to the Spanish sees had increased apace, in defiance of more ancient precedents to the contrary; and they were the more obnoxious in that the nominees in such cases were almost invariably foreigners. A vacancy in the see of Cuenca in 1482 gave the sovereigns a chance to make a stand for their own prerogatives in this respect. After a vigorous dispute they elicited from Sixtus IV an acknowledgment of their right to ‘supplicate’ in favor of the worthiest candidate for any of the more important ecclesiastical offices of the realm; it was of course understood that in such cases their supplication would not be refused. Practical control of the smaller benefices, which the Pope had reserved for himself in the agreement of 1482, was also subsequently acquired by the sovereigns, through various indirect methods. Moreover, in the conquered realm of Granada, and



in the Indies, they were given outright the privilege of appointment to all ecclesiastical posts, as a reward for the services which they had rendered to Christendom in these land. In 1501 they were also granted all the tithes in the American possessions, to be used for the building and support of the churches there, so that their ecclesiastical authority in the New World was even more securely established and fortified than at home.

Doubtless the Popes were chiefly inspired by ulterior motives in making these concessions. They recognized the sovereigns' power and prestige; they needed their alliance for political purposes; and they wisely determined to grant with a good grace what they were not strong enough to refuse. Indeed, they gave more than was demanded. At the close of the year 1494, Alexander VI formally conferred on the Spanish monarchs their proudest title, 'the Catholic Kings', ostensibly as a reward for their great services to the faith—really because he needed their help in expelling the forces of Charles VIII from Italy. And Ferdinand, in turn, took pleasure in exalting the authority of the papacy on a subsequent occasion, when he thought that its assertion might prove politically useful to him. The ancient claim of the Holy See to dispose of the temporal kingdoms of the earth was dramatically upheld by the Spanish monarch in 1515, when he justified his claim to the realm of Navarre before the Cortes of Burgos on the ground that it had been granted to him by Pope Julius II.

But though external political considerations were unquestionably the principal reason for the cordial relations of the papacy with the Spanish sovereigns, it would be grossly unjust to the latter to depreciate the immense services that they rendered to the church within their own domains. The monasteries were reformed and the vices of regulars and] seculars punished. The scandalous immorality of the clerics was checked. Their usurpations were restrained and absenteeism was sternly prohibited. Activity and zeal replaced idleness and corruption, for the time being at least, as the distinguishing marks of the Spanish priest. In all this beneficent work the monarchs' right-hand man was Cardinal Ximenes, whose admirable devotion and fervor went far to palliate his unbending intolerance. And no better comment on the position which he desired the church to occupy on earth could possibly be imagined than the memorable words in which he justified the arrangement of the text in the famous Complutensian Polyglot Bible—the fruit of his energy and enthusiasm, and perhaps the most notable triumph of scholarship in the Spain in which he lived. The Old Testament is printed in three parallel columns—the Septuagint on the left, the original Hebrew on the right, and the Vulgate in the centre. "Midway between the Greek of the Church of the East and the Hebrew of the synagogue", runs the Cardinal's sonorous preface, "we have placed Saint Jerome's Latin translation of the Church of Rome, even as Christ was crucified between two thieves."

The needs of the Spanish Empire demanded powerful military resources. One of the most important reforms of the Catholic Kings was their transformation of the scattered and undisciplined feudal levies which had effected the Reconquest, into a modern, organized, efficient, well equipped army, unquestionably superior to any other in Europe down to the time of Gustavus Adolphus.

We have already seen that the recruiting of the troops for the Granadan war was for the most part of the old-fashioned sort. The contingents of the Hermandad afforded a nucleus, it is true, but the bulk of the levies were furnished and commanded by the great nobles, who marshalled them under their own special standards. But at the same time traces of a different type of military organization began to appear. Pulgar speaks of a body of regular troops, paid by the crown, which was maintained in Galicia in the early part of the reign for the repression of disturbance there. In another place the chronicler tells us of a royal bodyguard of one thousand men (its numbers were soon to be trebled), all servants of the king and queen. He also waxes

enthusiastic about the body of Swiss mercenaries which had been sent to the peninsula for the Granada campaign—“warlike men, who fight on foot and never turn their backs on their foes, and therefore wear all their defensive armor in front. They go to earn their livelihood in foreign lands and aid in wars which they consider just. They are good and devout Christians and hold it a great sin to take anything by force.” This very rosy description shows that Spain was keenly observant and appreciative of the military progress that was being made in other lands. The sovereigns had begun to hire foreign soldiers in order to learn from them new methods of waging war; they had thus shown that they realized the necessity of taking the control of military affairs out of the hands of the baronage. The results of their experience were evident in a pragmatics, dated February 22, 1496, at Valladolid, which announced that thenceforth the state would take one man out of every twelve between the ages of twenty and forty-five to serve in the royal armies. It was not intended that the soldiers thus recruited should be permanently under arms. They were mobilized only when there was an immediate prospect of war, but they were paid by the crown from the day on which they entered active service, and their employment may be justly regarded as a long step towards the formation of a standing army. The Italian wars showed that the measure was inadequate to the needs of Spain’s expanding power, and Cardinal Ximenes and Charles V were obliged to develop and augment it; but the days of the old feudal levies were gone forever. The new army was wholly controlled by the central government, and, as long as its pay was forthcoming, generally firm in its allegiance. If funds ran short its behavior was indeed unutterable, as countless episodes in the wars of the sixteenth century were abundantly to prove; the case could scarcely have been otherwise, in view of the fact that rascals and cutthroats as well as patriots and gentlemen found places in its ranks; but it was no worse than the other mercenary armies of the time, and was a vast improvement on the military system which it supplanted.

At the same time that the sovereigns altered the methods of recruitment, a brilliant young officer named Gonsalvo de Cordova, who had fought through the Granadan campaign and reflected on what he had learned there, began to introduce equally radical changes in armament and tactics. He was ably seconded in this important task by Gonzalo de Ayora, who had studied the art of war in Italy. The mediaeval Spanish infantryman, equipped for guerilla warfare in a mountainous country, was far too lightly armed to withstand the shock of contact with the powerful squadrons that had been developed north of the Pyrenees during the preceding hundred years; nor was he adequately protected against firearms or discharges of arrows. On the other hand, the speed and suppleness of the Spanish formation were precious assets which could not be lightly cast aside; the problem was to preserve them and gain needed stability at the same time. The ultimate solution was reached in two different ways. In the first place, the defensive arms of all the Spanish infantrymen were augmented by the addition of a light helmet with a brim, a cuirass, gorget, and brassarts. For offensive weapons, one half of them received long pikes, while one third retained the short sword and javelin of earlier days, with a small round shield for additional protection, and the remaining sixth were given arquebuses of the best and most portable type. Almost any sixteenth-century battle scene will give a good idea of this formidable equipment. Then, in the second place, the organization, grouping, and subdivisions of the forces were completely made over. The ancient unit was the company (*capitanía*) of five hundred men, far too small to be effective in modern warfare. After much experiment a regiment (*coronelia* or *escuadrón*), under the command of a colonel and composed of twelve companies, was gradually evolved, numbering thus, in theory at least, six thousand men. The proportions of the different sorts of armament above described were retained by dividing ten of the twelve companies into two hundred pikemen, two hundred short-sword-and-javelin men, and one hundred arquebusiers apiece, and by filling the two remaining ones with pikemen alone. Six hundred cavalymen, half light, half heavy, accompanied each regiment of infantry; their comparatively insignificant numbers are the best possible evidence of the great change that had been effected in the art of waging war. But if the cavalry counted for little, the artillery was vastly more considerable than

ever before. The Granadan war had taught the sovereigns its value and importance, and their secretary and counselor, Francisco Ramirez, spent an infinity of time and pains in developing it. The guns were of all sorts, of different sizes and calibers, but the greatest difficulty was that of transportation; for hitherto cannon had been utilized almost entirely as stationary pieces for siege work, and the idea of carrying them about as an inseparable adjunct of an army in the field was relatively new. Before the end of the reign, however, this had all been changed, though it seems that Gonsalvo de Cordova set no great store by his artillery. The normal contingent accompanying each brigade (that is, two *coronelias*) was now sixty-four pieces of different types. In 1505 the entire Spanish army was divided into twenty *coronelias* under the command of a colonel-general. The ancient mediaeval hierarchy of military officers had in the meantime practically disappeared. The office of *condestable* was henceforth merely an honorary distinction, and after the Granadan war we hear no more of his lieutenants or *mariscales*.

The battle tactics of this renovated army made it the terror of Europe for a century to come. The pikemen and short-sword-and-javelin men were usually formed in squares, the latter in the center, and the pikemen, several rows deep, with their spears advanced, outside. The arquebusiers and artillery were separately disposed, where they could shoot to good advantage, and the cavalry was chiefly utilized for scouting and for the pursuit of fleeing foes. Few charges of hostile horsemen could make any impression on the phalanx of pikes, especially as their ranks were invariably thinned by the Spanish artillerymen and arquebusiers before they reached the point of contact. On those rare occasions when the outer lines of the square were broken, the light-armed troops in the centre were on hand to finish off such riders as had got through. When a phalanx of Landsknechts was encountered, the Spanish formation had two important advantages, besides its above-mentioned superiority in firearms. In the first place, the light-armed troops in the centre gave it greater flexibility, so that it was not broken by bad ground to the same extent as were its opponents. Second, when the front ranks closed in combat, and the opposing pikemen began thrusting at one another a spear's length apart, the short-sword-and-javelin men would creep underneath and slash and stab indiscriminately at their opponents, who were too fully occupied in front to defend themselves. Time after time was this manoeuvre repeated with deadly effect, but no one was able to devise means of stopping it until the time of the Thirty Years' War. When we consider the stupendous progress in military implements and science which has been accomplished during the last half century, we cannot help wondering that methods so rudimentary as these should have remained virtually unchallenged for so long.

The efforts of the Catholic Kings to increase the Castilian merchant marine, which have been already described in another place, served also to strengthen the Castilian navy. The line between ships of commerce and ships of war was not yet so clearly drawn but that practically all were available for both purposes, though Ferdinand made some effort to distinguish between them. The development of artillery furnished a splendid opportunity for improvement in efficiency, but was not utilized to the full; the ancient tactics of ramming and boarding were retained for a long time to come, and were one of the main causes of the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. The *almirante*, like the *condestable*, lost most of his ancient authority; in 1479 a *capitán mayor* was given effective control of the national fleets.

The naval resources of Catalonia diminished, on the whole, in this period, as those of Castile increased. In this matter, as in so many others, the western kingdom asserted its preponderance.

The intellectual life of the Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella gives evidence of the increased cosmopolitanism and contact with the outside world which form one of the principal features of the reign. The Italian influence in art and letters, of which we observed the beginnings in the

previous century, is now far more predominant than before; the rule of Alfonso the Magnanimous had made the eastern kingdoms more Italianate than ever, and their union with Castile transplanted the new tendencies to the west. The education of the royal Infantes was entrusted to Italians. Peter Martyr de Anghiera, humanist and historian of the New World, set up a school at the court, in which he taught Latin and history to the children of the greatest families in the land; in fact, if one encountered a learned man in Spain during the early part of the reign of the Catholic Kings, it was usually safe to assume either that he was a foreigner, or else that, if Spanish, he had received a prolonged Italian training. In later years there was a change. Spain saw that she could not afford to remain aloof from the great movement of the Renaissance and send abroad for all her knowledge; and the foundation of the University of Alcalá, through the efforts of Cardinal Ximenes, at once gave her a standing in the world of scholars which she had not enjoyed since the days of the caliphate of Cordova. But for many years more, inspiration continued to come from without. Antonio del Rincon, the sovereigns' favorite painter, was a pupil of Domenico Ghirlandaio. In architecture and sculpture we encounter a strange jumble of ancient Moorish and modern Renaissance styles; profusion of elaborate detail was the not entirely satisfactory result. Ferdinand de Rojas's *Celestina*, a Rabelaisian novel in dramatic form, and perhaps the literary masterpiece of the reign, cuts loose from all the ancient traditions of Castilian prose, and in its accurate delineation of human life under the widest possible variety of circumstances closely resembles the models of Italy and of France. It heralded the approach of the day of Cervantes and of Lope de Vega. New fashions in the writing of history, likewise of foreign origin, begin to make their appearance. The old annalistic forms survive, but men like Hernando del Pulgar and Andrés Bernaldez no longer limit themselves to the narration of battles, uprisings, and royal ceremonies; they give precious details concerning the development of national institutions and customs, and show that they have reflected upon underlying causes and results.

A few last words remain to be added concerning the administration of the Mediterranean territories under the Catholic Kings; but as we shall have a more convenient opportunity to deal with Naples in connection with its reconquest by Ferdinand in 1503-04, we may restrict ourselves for the present to the affairs of Sardinia and of Sicily. In brief, the aim of the sovereigns' policy in these islands was cautiously and gradually to Castilianize them, to abrogate little by little the independent rights and privileges which they had inherited from the past, or received at the hands of the sovereigns of Aragon, and to reduce them to a condition of subservience to the monarch comparable to that which had been created in the western kingdom. Yet so anxious were Ferdinand and Isabella to avoid collisions, whenever possible, with the inhabitants of these *tierras de allá mar*, that most of the changes which they introduced were effected quietly, and indeed almost stealthily. It was not until the end of the sixteenth century that the full effects of the policy they had initiated were evident, and that the Sardinians and Sicilians realized how completely their ancient liberties had been undermined.

The only matter in which the sovereigns ventured to fly squarely in the face of popular opinion was in the establishment of racial and religious unity. When the interests of the Faith as they conceived them were at stake, they were restrained by no considerations of political expediency. The Spanish Inquisition was extended to Sicily in 1487 and to Sardinia in 1492; in spite of popular disaffection and complaint, and even bloody revolts, it was maintained without interruption to the close of the reign. In Sardinia, it is true, the tribunal was in a somewhat decadent condition at the time of the death of Ferdinand, owing chiefly to the exhaustion of the confiscable property of its victims, and strenuous efforts were necessary to revive it under Charles V; but in Sicily we have ample evidence that the institution was exceedingly active. The edict for the expulsion of the Jews was also extended to both islands in 1492. In Sardinia there was apparently no great outcry against it; in Sicily, however, where the Hebrews had perhaps enjoyed

greater privileges than anywhere else in Europe, there was considerable resentment, which was greatly increased by the cruel and unjust manner of its enforcement by the viceroy, Ferdinand de Acuña. As elsewhere, its economic effects were disastrous, while politically it formed an admirable basis, as did the Inquisition, for a further introduction of the principles and practices of monarchical centralization at the expense of the national liberties.

In constitutional affairs one of the most important innovations introduced by the Catholic Kings was the practice of conferring the office of viceroy on Castilians in place of Catalans and Aragonese. This evoked numerous complaints, and demands on the part of the local parliaments that only subjects of the realms of the Crown of Aragon be recognized as eligible for this dignity, but Ferdinand quietly ignored them, as an inspection of the lists of the successive representatives of the crown in both islands will plainly show. The powers of the viceroy were so great that the whole complexion of the administration varied with the character of the appointee. With men at the helm who had been trained in the now thoroughly monarchical atmosphere of Castile, Ferdinand could rest fairly confident that his Mediterranean domains would be kept well in hand; Castilians, moreover, were also appointed to some of the subordinate posts. In Sardinia the practice of placing legists, instead of soldiers, in the viceregal office was also occasionally adopted in the period; this, again, smacks strongly of the methods of the western kingdom. In 1496, we hear of the appointment there of the first *abogado del fisco*, to conduct financial suits on behalf of the crown, and lend aid in the management of the royal treasury.

The attitude of the sovereigns towards the parliaments of Sardinia and Sicily reflects the conditions which obtained in those islands. Certainly Ferdinand and Isabella rather favored than opposed their meetings. In Sardinia the national assembly was summoned in 1483 and in 1511, after an interruption which had lasted the entire length of the reign of John II. Whether the cause of its convocation was that Ferdinand saw in it the best means of breaking down the old barriers that had divided the island in ancient times, or that he needed the funds which it alone could grant, it is impossible to say; but we know that when it did meet, it used the opportunity to present numerous petitions to the crown. In general one gains the impression that Sardinia enjoyed, under the Catholic Kings, a measure of internal peace and tranquility to which she had hitherto been a stranger; and that such was her delight in the establishment of order that she raised little objection to such invasion of her autonomous privileges as accompanied it. In Sicily, there was much more vigorous opposition to monarchical encroachments. Nowhere else in the widely scattered dominions of the Spanish sovereigns was the passion for freedom more deeply implanted, and the national assembly was regarded as the emblem and personification of national liberty. Yet Ferdinand made no effort to prevent or curtail its sessions. This was chiefly, no doubt, because he recognized that he was not strong enough openly to defy it, and partly because of financial necessity. On the other hand, he consistently strove to sap its vitality in a number of indirect ways. He played off the two upper orders against the third estate, and refused to accede to a request that the barons and clergy be forbidden to send deputies to represent them in their absence—an abuse which had seriously weakened the efficiency of the Parliament as a whole. He strenuously defended the right of the viceroy to summon the assembly to whatever place he wished, and thus made it possible to hold its sessions in remote or unhealthy spots, where opponents would find it difficult to attend, and if present might easily be bullied into submission. By slight changes of phraseology he managed to extinguish the ancient contractual theory that the granting of the *donativo* was dependent on the royal assent to the petitions of the Parliament and the observance of the national privileges; he also invariably tried to get the financial business of each session concluded first, and to his own satisfaction, before the desires of the representatives were heard. The Sicilian Parliament was undoubtedly far weaker at the end of the reign than at the beginning.



Such were the main features of the great work of monarchical unification and consolidation accomplished by the Catholic Kings. When we consider that the chief aim of their policy ran counter to the most dominant of Spanish characteristics—separatism—and when we remember how widely scattered and differentiated were their various domains, we cannot fail to be deeply impressed with the importance of the results they achieved, even though we may not always sympathize with the ends they had in view. Perhaps the most remarkable feature of their work was the skill with which they adapted their methods to the widely varying problems with which they were confronted; it was their great versatility that enabled them to handle all sorts of different questions at one and the same time. Wisely recognizing the impossibility of welding all their dominions into a single state, they had concentrated their efforts on the principal one of them—Castile—with the aim of subjecting it completely to their control and making it the pivot of their empire. They had endeavored to imbue the lesser portions of their possessions with some of the principles of Castilian polity, but they did not deprive them of their native laws or institutions, or attempt to absorb them in the greater kingdom; and as new territories were successively acquired in later years, they were treated in similar fashion. The result was a congeries of separate states, differing from one another in race, in traditions, in language, and in government, and bound together solely by the fact that they possessed a common kingship— a loose-jointed, heterogeneous empire, the fundamental principle of whose administration was that of decentralized despotism.

**BOOK IV**  
**EXPANSION**

CHAPTER XVI  
THE CANARIES

WE have already emphasized the continuity of the reconquest of Spain from the Moors, and her conquest of an imperial domain beyond the seas. We have seen that Castile had gained her first outpost in the Atlantic, and that Aragon had won an empire in the western Mediterranean, before Granada fell. The reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, during which the infidel was finally expelled from the peninsula, witnessed the completion of the winning of the Canaries, the discovery and earliest explorations of America, and the acquisition of several important cities on the North African coast; it also saw Spain gain new lands for herself in Europe, and take her place in the front rank among the nations of the earth. For the sake of clearness we shall take up the different phases of this mighty process of expansion one by one, beginning with the conquest of new lands across the water and closing with the relations of Spain to her European neighbors; but we must constantly bear in mind that they were all, roughly speaking, contemporaneous, and that at certain critical moments they exercised an important influence upon one another.

In the course of the war of succession between the Catholic Kings and Affonso the African, the difficult question of the respective rights of Castile and of Portugal in the Canary Islands and the adjacent coasts had kept constantly coming up. In November, 1476, eight months after the battle of Toro, Ferdinand and Isabella ordered an inquiry to be opened in regard to the possession of the island of Lanzarote and to the right of conquest of the rest of the Canaries; in 1477 a verdict was rendered favorable to the claims of Diego de Herrera and his wife Inez (Peraza), whose previous history has been related in another place. It will also be remembered that in October of that year the Herreras were confirmed in their tenure of the conquered islands of Lanzarote, Fuerteventura, Ferro, and Gomera, but yielded to Ferdinand and Isabella all claims to the three remaining and larger ones in return for an indemnity of 5,000,000 maravedis. The Catholic Kings lost no time in attempting to substantiate their rights. An expedition of six hundred infantry and thirty horse set sail from Seville in the spring of 1478, under the leadership of an intrepid soldier named Juan Rejón, with instructions to avoid interference with the Herreras in the four islands that acknowledged their sway, but to effect a landing in the Grand Canary and to make preparations for its conquest. But the Portuguese had no idea of permitting Ferdinand and Isabella thus to establish unopposed their sovereignty over the archipelago. By way of serving notice that their own claims to the Canaries were not to be regarded as extinct, they dispatched seven caravels to attack Rejón and his men. This episode naturally led to a reopening of the old discussion between the two realms as to priority of occupation and conflicting rights in the islands and the opposite coasts, with the result that in one of the treaties signed in 1479, at the termination of the War of Succession, the Portuguese renounced all title to the Canaries, but received in return exclusive privileges of conquest and possession on the adjacent African shore, including the kingdom of Fez and the lands of Guinea, and also in the Azores, Madeira, and the Cape Verde Islands. Moreover the Castilian sovereigns promised that they would not permit their subjects to

trade in the territories assigned to Portugal without the express permission of the Portuguese king. Probably the treaty was not regarded at that time as being any too favorable to the king of Castile. Possession of the Canaries was then held to be important chiefly as facilitating acquisitions in Africa, on which the eyes of both nations were at that time directed; and in the neighboring African territories the Portuguese were recognized as supreme. No one then realized that the greatest value of the archipelago was ultimately to be found in the fact that it furnished a most convenient stopping place and harbor of refuge on the way to the Spanish possessions in the New World.

Meantime Rejón and his followers had landed, on June 24, 1478, at the Grand Canary, and were received in friendly fashion by the natives. Serious difficulties, however, were soon to come. The Canarians were split into two factions, of which the first, under an upstart military chieftain called Doramas, was attempting to oust from power Thenesor Semidan, the brother of the late king, who had been appointed regent during the minority of his nephew. Doramas wished to fight the Spaniards, while Thenesor was for a policy of peace; but the mass of the islanders supported the former, and before the end of the summer two encounters occurred at Guinguada, in which the Spaniards, despite their vastly inferior numbers, were brilliantly victorious. After these battles the Canarians retired inland, hoping that the invaders would remain content with the shores; but spasmodic Portuguese interference served to keep up the fighting spirit of the natives, and led in turn to constant raids and devastations by the troops of Rejón. Meantime the effectiveness of the Spanish operations was greatly lessened by a dissension of the characteristic sort between Rejón and Juan Bermudez, dean of Rubicon, who had been associated with him for the purpose of converting the natives, but who was chiefly interested in prosecuting his own schemes. News of their quarrels finally reached the Spanish court, and in the summer of 1479 Ferdinand and Isabella sent out a *juez pesquisidor* named Pedro Fernández de Algaba, and a certain Alfonso Fernandez de Lugo, a soldier of the Granadan war, to find the facts and render a verdict. Rejón was falsely accused, seized, and shipped off to Spain. There, however, he soon succeeded in rehabilitating himself, and was promptly sent back with fresh troops to continue the conquest. Meanwhile Algaba had mismanaged everything in the Grand Canary. His attempt to win military prestige by a victory over the natives resulted in a disgraceful defeat; and the final upshot of the matter was that he was accused of treacherous dealings with the king of Portugal and executed, at Whitsuntide, 1480, by the order of the very man he had previously been sent out to report upon. Bermudez had meanwhile been banished to the Herreras in Lanzarote, where he soon died of chagrin, and Rejón for the time being was left supreme. The whole story gives a startlingly accurate forecast of the adventures of many of the American conquistadores at a later date.

All these quarrels in the Canaries naturally retarded the progress of the conquest of the archipelago, and convinced Ferdinand and Isabella that other means must speedily be employed. The person whom they selected for the difficult task was Pedro de Vera, of ancient Castilian lineage, a renowned fighter in the Moorish wars, whose energy, ambition, and revengefulness made him an uncomfortable neighbor in Spain, but promised well for his success in the role of conquistador. His extensive possessions, which enabled him to fit out an expedition largely at his own expense, were of course an added recommendation. Vera was warmly received by Rejón on his arrival in the Canaries in August, 1480, and carefully made the most of the latter's friendship until overwhelming reinforcements arrived to support him; then he lured Rejón on board ship, clapped him into irons, and sent him off a prisoner to the Spanish court to answer to the charge of unjustly executing Algaba, whose widow was clamoring for vengeance. But Rejón had powerful relatives in high places, soon after his arrival in Spain he not only procured his release, but obtained command of new ships and forces; in June, 1481, he reappeared in the Canaries with two caravels and three hundred and twenty men. Meantime Vera had been guilty

of dastardly treachery in his dealings with the natives. In order to entice a number of them on board ship, so that they might be sent off and sold as slaves in Spain, he swore to them before a Host, whose consecration by the priest he had secretly forestalled, that they were to be employed to conquer Teneriffe. Most of the islanders jumped off the boat when it touched at Lanzarote, and the complete execution of Vera's plans was thereby prevented; but the impression made by the attempt was of the very worst, and it led to a number of conflicts with the natives, in one of which their gallant leader Doramas met his death. When Rejón finally arrived in the midst of all these exciting events he was not permitted to land. He accordingly weighed anchor, with the intention of passing over to Palma, but stress of weather forced him ashore at Gomera, which was one of the islands still controlled by the Herreras. Diego de Herrera's son Ferdinand, who was usually called Peraza after his mother's family, was in command there at the time; bearing no special good will to the representatives of the monarchs whom he regarded as usurpers of his family domains, he sent a force to capture Rejón on his arrival. In his attempt to resist it, Rejón was killed. His noble widow, Elvira de Sotomayor, departed for Spain in search of revenge, and finally succeeded in having Peraza sent home and tried for his offence. Peraza, however, escaped the penalty which the wife of his foe demanded by a marriage which won him the favor of the queen. King Ferdinand's attentions to a fair maid of honor, by name Eleanor de Bobadilla, had recently aroused the jealousy of Isabella; as the easiest way out of the difficulty, a match was arranged between the lady and Peraza, which served to remove the former from the court, and secured pardon for the latter on his promise to return to the Canaries and bear aid to the king's soldiers in conquering the Grand Canary, Palma, and Teneriffe. The personal note is distinctly dominant during this phase of Spanish progress toward the attainment of imperial domain.

Meantime in the Canaries the conquest was gradually progressing. With the death of Doramas, the natives' spirit of resistance was temporarily broken, and in the early months of 1482 an expedition under Algaba's companion, Alfonso de Lugo, resulted in the capture of the *Guanarteme* or regent, Thenesor Semidan. The latter was by this time thoroughly reconciled to the prospect of Spanish domination, and his captors accordingly made haste to utilize him for that end. He was sent over to Spain, presented to the king and queen, and was apparently so immensely impressed by their majesty and power that he at once consented to receive baptism and return to his native land in order to bear aid in the completion of its conquest. So anxious were Ferdinand and Isabella to make the most of the favorable opportunity afforded by the submission of the Canarian chief, that they sent five shiploads of fresh soldiers among them some of the contingents of the *Hermandad* to accompany him on his homeward journey. But even with all these reinforcements (the Spanish soldiers in the islands cannot at this juncture have numbered much less than two thousand) the final subjugation of the Grand Canary was not destined to be accomplished without one more desperate struggle. A large portion of the natives still favored resistance, and elected the youthful Bentejuf, nephew of the converted *Guanarteme*, to lead them in a final war against the intruder. Vera at first attempted to utilize the *Guanarteme* to persuade them to surrender without fighting. Failing in this, he prepared in the spring of 1483 for a vigorous campaign in the mountains. Guerilla warfare was waged for some weeks with varying success. Finally a detachment of Spaniards was lured into a difficult rocky country, honeycombed with caverns and secret hiding places known only to their enemies, and there defeated with severe slaughter, chiefly owing to the great stones which were rolled down on them from above. This reverse at Ajddar (for so the place was then called) was by far the heaviest that the Spaniards had ever suffered in the Canaries, and it would have been worse still had not the *Guanarteme* been on hand to persuade the victors to spare the lives of many of their vanquished foes. But the invaders were by no means daunted. Vera reorganized and increased his forces and in April was again in the field. Moreover, profiting by his defeats, he avoided his previous mistakes. Instead of sending small detachments recklessly forward into places where they could be captured one by one, he cautiously drove the natives from one stronghold to another, until he had them virtually

surrounded in their final place of refuge at Ansite. A brief parley with the Guanarteme, who accompanied Vera wherever he went, convinced the bulk of the natives of the futility of further resistance, and induced them to surrender on promise of good treatment; but the heroic Bentejuf and his most intimate friend refused to endure the humiliation of admitting themselves vanquished, and, after embracing each other on the brow of a high precipice, committed suicide by jumping over the brink. The formal capitulation took place on April 29, 1483, with appropriate ceremonies, which were afterwards repeated at the Spanish headquarters on the seashore, already known as Las Palmas. Acceptance of Christianity and of the sovereignty of the king of Castile were, for the time being, the only conditions imposed by the victors, and Vera made haste to report the successful termination of the conquest to the king and queen in Spain.

We must pass on rapidly now to the story of the conquest of Palma and Tenerife. For six years after effecting the subjugation of the Grand Canary, Vera was chiefly occupied in setting up the framework of the Spanish administration of the island. He was also called upon during this period, however, to bear aid in subjugating a revolt of the natives of Gomera, in which Ferdinand Peraza was killed (1487). In this affair, Vera showed such dastardly treachery and unmitigated cruelty towards the islanders that he drew down on himself the condemnation of the bishop of the Canaries, whose ancient see at Rubicon had been transferred on November 20, 1485, to Las Palmas. Finally, after a series of futile protests against Vera's atrocities, the bishop went home to complain of him, with the result that Ferdinand and Isabella sent out Francisco Maldonado as *juez pesquisidar* to investigate. The charges were impossible to deny, and in December, 1489, Vera was sent back to Spain in irons. Thenceforth he disappears from the history of the Canaries. Maldonado, who succeeded him, inaugurated his term of office with a wretchedly unsuccessful attempt to take Tenerife; but his failure brought forward the man who was destined to carry the conquest of the archipelago to a triumphant conclusion. Alfonso de Lugo, Vera's old companion in arms, had by this time enjoyed a wide experience of Canarian campaigns. That Palma and Tenerife remained unsubdued had long been a thorn in his side; and soon after Maldonado's repulse, he returned to Spain to get aid from Ferdinand and Isabella for a final expedition against them. His reputation at the court stood high on account of his previous military successes; he had a large private fortune, which he had substantially increased by his careful management of his estates on the Grand Canary, and consequently was able to offer to fit out the expedition at his own expense. All he demanded was supreme military command for the time, and a promise of the office of *adelantado* and the political authority that went with it in the future; and these Ferdinand and Isabella were glad to grant him. They also apparently invested him with some measure of authority over the adjacent West African coast, despite the fact that by the treaty of 1479 that region had been handed over exclusively to the Portuguese. Armed with these offices and powers, Lugo recruited his forces, and returned to the Canaries in the spring of 1491. On September 29 of that year he landed on the island of Palma. By gentle and conciliatory means, and by skillful utilization of tribal divisions, he managed to win the allegiance of the majority of the natives before the following spring. One clan only, under the chieftain Tanausu, defied him; the latter's headquarters, established in a sort of mountain crater, were so strong that Lugo was unable to storm them. When force did not avail, however, the Spaniard was quite ready to use fraud. Tanausu and his followers were invited to a parley on May 3, 1492, and there treacherously set upon and most of them slaughtered; the chief himself was captured alive, but subsequently starved himself to death on board the vessel by which he was being sent to Spain. This barbarous affair marked the end of the natives' resistance. In the summer of 1492, when Lugo sailed back to the Grand Canary, Palma had been virtually incorporated in the domains of the realm of Castile, though there were sporadic revolts by the islanders for many years to come.

Tenerife alone remained, but Tenerife was destined to give more trouble than all the rest. Lugo did not underestimate the difficulties of the task. When, in April, 1493, he finally set forth



to conquer the island, he took with him no fewer than a thousand foot and one hundred and twenty horse—all picked men, whom his own fame and the cessation of the Granadan war had enabled him to collect. It was by far the largest single force that had yet appeared in the Canaries, and only slightly smaller than that which accompanied Columbus on his second American voyage. Lugo's landing was unopposed, and he made haste to construct a fortified camp, the nucleus of the future city of Santa Cruz. Meanwhile an embassy, accompanied by the invaluable Guanarteme of the Grand Canary as interpreter, was dispatched into the interior to parley with the natives. The latter were, as usual, divided among themselves. Benchomo, the ablest and most powerful of the chieftains, aspired to lord it over the rest; but his ambitions roused the enmity of various rivals, who were inclined from the first to seek the alliance of the Spaniards against him, while Benchomo himself naturally became the representative of the principle of resistance to foreign encroachment. For a whole year after their arrival the Spaniards strove to utilize these discords of the Tenerifians for their own advantage, and with considerable success, for several of the most powerful of the local chieftains accepted baptism and the suzerainty of the king of Spain; but the mighty Benchomo, with five minor princes who had promised from the first to stand by him, determined to resist until the end. His first blow for the preservation of his country's freedom was certainly highly successful. He drew a large detachment of Spaniards who had ventured to invade his territories into a deep mountain defile at Acentejo, and there suddenly fell upon them unawares. So terrific was the discharge of stones from above that both sides of the gorge seemed to roll down together upon the unfortunate invaders. The horrors of the ensuing rout were vastly increased by the panic among the great herds of cattle which the Spaniards had attempted to bring away with them. Six hundred of their number were slain, and three hundred more of their island auxiliaries. Even Lugo himself was wounded and beaten from his horse; and only a few escaped unhurt. Had Benchomo desired, he could easily have taken the life of every Spaniard in the island, but he was moderate and merciful in victory, and on receiving a promise from a number of the invaders who had fallen into his hands that they would not repeat the attempt, he caused them all to be escorted to the coast. Nevertheless the reverse was so serious that speedy recuperation was obviously impossible, and on June 8, 1494, Lugo left Tenerife with all his remaining men and returned to the Grand Canary to collect fresh forces.

The ensuing summer was filled with preparations for a fresh campaign. New detachments were brought from Spain and Lanzarote, and loyal Canarians were mustered into service. In November, 1494, Lugo was able to land another large force at Santa Cruz. Wisely refusing again to venture into the mountain regions, he finally enticed Benchomo down to a pitched battle in the plain at La Laguna in early December, and there defeated him with great slaughter. There seems to be some doubt as to whether Benchomo or his brother Tinguaro was slain in this fight, for the face of the corpse was so badly disfigured by sword cuts as to be virtually unrecognizable; the probabilities, however, point to Benchomo, though most of the authorities take the other view. In any case the battle of La Laguna was decisive. Though guerilla warfare continued until September, 1496, ultimate surrender to the invaders was inevitable. Famine and the ravages of the local fever, called the *modorra*, hastened the end. Numerous picturesque episodes and adventures occurred during the final stages of the conflict; of these the most notable was perhaps the love match between the captive Spanish officer, Fernando Garcia del Castillo, and Dazila, the fair daughter of one of the Tenerifian chiefs. But the final result of the struggle was never in doubt. On September 29, 1496, the last of the native rulers recognized the authority of Ferdinand and Isabella, and when Lugo finally returned to Spain in 1497, he carried a number of them with him; one, whom Zurita asserts to have been Benchomo, was subsequently exhibited in Venice. Lugo was of course the hero of the hour. Not only was the governorship of Palma and Tenerife conferred upon him, but the title of adelantado of all the Canaries was made hereditary in his family, and his authority over the four smaller Herrera islands was further augmented, at least temporarily, by his marriage with Eleanor de Bobadilla,

the fiery widow of Ferdinand Peraza. He even attempted to realize some measure of the rights over the adjacent West African coast, which Ferdinand and Isabella had conferred on him when he first embarked on the conquest of Palma, by the erection of a fort there which should dispute the exclusive claims of the Portuguese; but his efforts in this direction were not particularly successful, and they cost him the life of his favorite son. The rest of his days were chiefly spent in Tenerife, where he died and was buried early in the year 1525 —one of the most interesting of the Spanish conquistadores, and one of the least known.

Thus by the opening of the sixteenth century the entire Canarian archipelago acknowledged the sovereignty of the crown of Castile. Of the seven islands that composed it, however, the four smaller ones which had been conquered first continued to be administered as family holdings by the descendants of the Herreras down to the end of the eighteenth century; only Grand Canary, Palma, and Tenerife were completely incorporated in the Castilian realm. The systems of government set up in the two portions of the archipelago naturally differed accordingly. In the lesser Herrera islands the different descendants of the original grantees maintained, each one in the district that fell to his share, a considerable measure of political power; but every possible opportunity was utilized to effect a gradual diminution of their authority, and to subject them more and more, as time went on, to the control of officers sent out by the crown. The transference of the episcopal see from Rubicon to Las Palmas deprived Lanzarote of many privileges, and Lugo's office of adelantado gave him numerous opportunities to interfere, as the crown's representative, in the lesser islands, particularly in Gomera and Ferro, where he acted for some time as regent for his wife's children by her first husband, Ferdinand Peraza. Nevertheless, the political rights of the Herreras were by no means extinguished; and the *útil dominio* conferred on them by the arrangement of 1477 continued to be recognized, in theory at least, down to the period of the Napoleonic wars. In Grand Canary, Palma, and Tenerife, on the other hand, the regular machinery of Castilian government was gradually set up. The office of adelantado remained hereditary, as the original grant had provided, in the family of Lugo and the collateral lines, though it was stripped of all political authority as the result of a residencia in the year 1536-37, so that the administration of the three principal islands was thenceforth directly in the hands of representatives of the crown. But since it was during the earlier period, while the adelantados were still supreme, that the foundations of the permanent system of government were securely laid, the change effected by the above mentioned residencia was only a change in the source of authority; the crown of Castile had merely substituted itself for the local magnate who had previously represented it. Each island was organized as a municipality, the limits of the capital town being held in each case to extend to the shores. A fuero of the most liberal and democratic sort was granted by Ferdinand and Isabella on December 20, 1494, to Las Palmas in the Grand Canary, which soon became the recognized center of the archipelago; an *ayuntamiento*, whose membership was variously constituted, makes its appearance, together with *alguaciles*, *alcaldes*, *almotacenes*, and all the other familiar concomitants of Castilian municipal life. A number of special privileges, including notable exemptions from taxation and the coveted distinction of a coat of arms, were also conferred upon it. The islands of Palma and Tenerife were administered on similar lines. To give unity and cohesion to these three different organizations a supreme tribunal of appeal, or audiencia, was set up in the Grand Canary in 1526-27; it was largely owing to the reports which it sent home that the Emperor ten years later took away the political powers of the adelantado.

The treatment of the native Canarians by the Spaniards has been represented in various lights by different authors, and it is by no means easy to determine the facts. The propagation of the faith was of course a primary object of the conquest, and acceptance of Christianity consequently obligatory on the islanders from the very first. Dominicans and Franciscans established themselves in the archipelago with the first conquistadores and followed the

Castilian banners wherever they went. Two of them, indeed, were hurled from a precipice by those whom they were attempting to convert; but the proselytizing energy of the government was not to be denied, and before long all the Canarians adopted the religion of their conquerors. Doubts naturally soon arose as to the genuineness of some of the conversions and furnished an excuse for the extension of the Inquisition to the archipelago in 1504; but officially the Canarians are to be regarded as Christians from the time of the completion of the Spanish conquest. There can be little doubt that it was the intention of the home government that the natives should be humanely and generously dealt with in other respects, and that they should not be deprived of their right to hold land; but it also seems equally clear that these intentions were not fully carried out in practice. An enormous number of those who had served in the conquering armies, or contributed to their support, had to be rewarded by extensive grants of land; the distribution of *repartimientos*, or allotments of territory among their followers, was one of the most difficult duties of the early adelantados, and one in which much jealousy and ill will were unavoidably stirred up. Under a system such as this it was inevitable that the natives should suffer. Some few of them—especially those who had aided the Spaniards in the conquest—were permitted to retain small and generally undesirable portions of land. Others remained as tenants on the territories that had been handed over to the invaders. Marriages between the natives and their conquerors were also of frequent occurrence. But in general we may be certain that the lot of the indigenous Canarians grew steadily worse during the first two centuries of Spanish rule. More and more were they elbowed aside to make room for the newcomers. There were ample facilities for emigration, owing to the large number of ships that touched at the islands, and the population rapidly declined; it is, however, but fair to add that Canarians figure very prominently at certain stages of the conquest and colonization of the Americas, and also in Flanders and in Italy.

The question of slavery and the slave trade in the archipelago is perhaps the most difficult of all. During the first three-quarters of the fifteenth century there was certainly a great deal of both, attributable probably rather to the Portuguese than to the Spaniards; but after the completion of the conquest in the period of Ferdinand and Isabella efforts were unquestionably made to restrict them. The enslaving of the native Canarians, the Catholic Kings did their best to terminate entirely. It continued to be employed as the regular penalty for an insurrection, and occasionally Portuguese raiders succeeded in carrying off small groups of the islanders into captivity; but if Canarian slaves were brought over to Spain to be sold the crown usually gave orders that they be granted their liberty. On the other hand, the practice of organizing elaborate slave hunts among the natives of the adjacent Barbary coast, across the so-called Mar Pequeña, had been popular in the Canaries for so many years that Ferdinand and Isabella wisely recognized the impossibility of putting an end to it. They therefore strove instead to regulate it in a way favorable to themselves, and to ameliorate the conditions under which it was carried on. Apparently the sovereigns were at first scrupulously careful to observe the arrangements, made in the treaty of 1479, giving the Portuguese exclusive rights on the African coast opposite the archipelago. In 1495 they forbade any expedition by any of their subjects into that region, unless the formal consent of the Portuguese monarch had been previously obtained. A few years later, however, they altered their policy in this respect, and became much more aggressive, probably as a result of the demands of their subjects in the Canaries, to whom the congenial occupation of slave hunting on the opposite coasts had become a principal means of livelihood. A prolonged dispute with the Portuguese authorities ensued, and finally ended, on September 18, 1509, with an agreement by which the latter acknowledged Castile as the lawful possessor of the Torre de Santa Cruz on the West African coast, and recognized the authority over it of the adelantado of the Canaries.

“A veritable halfway house between Europe, Africa, and America”—such are the words in which a recent historian of the Canaries significantly describes them. The Catholic Kings

doubtless regarded their conquest as a logical sequel to the War of Succession with Portugal, an assertion that they did not propose to permit that state to monopolize the fascinating occupation of discovery and colonization in unknown lands. The importance of the archipelago was primarily evident in connection with Africa, where the Portuguese had already established themselves. It formed a Spanish outpost on the confines of the Dark Continent, occupying in relation to it a position closely analogous to that of Cyprus to the Holy Land in the days of the Crusades. But in the end the relation of the Canaries to the Spanish conquests in the Western Hemisphere was to prove more intimate and significant still. They became a regular stopping place for outgoing and returning ships. Columbus put in there on each of his four voyages; the *Pinta* was provisioned and repaired in the harbor of Las Palmas in the Grand Canary in the last three weeks of August, 1492; and the island of Gomera was the last bit of land in the Eastern Hemisphere which the great explorer trod before he first set foot in the West Indies. Still more striking were the effects of the conquering, colonizing, and proselytizing experiences of the Spaniards in the Canaries upon their conduct and policy in the New World. The archipelago furnished them with the material for their first colonial experiment, and their methods there were reproduced with remarkably few variations in the Indies. The Canaries in the sixteenth century may, in fact, be justly described as a microcosm of the Spanish dominions across the Atlantic. In some ways the Spanish policy in the archipelago was more liberal than in America. There were not, for instance, the same restrictions on immigration; some foreigners, especially Italians, were allowed to come, and until the establishment of the Inquisition in the archipelago in 1504 a number of Jews sought refuge there. Moreover, owing doubtless to the fact that they held all the islands, and consequently had no reason to fear, as in America, the acquisition of land by hostile powers in disagreeable proximity to themselves, the Spaniards welcomed traders and merchants from other countries, and did their best to establish relations with them. The mineral and agricultural products of the archipelago were both numerous and valuable, and furnished plenty of commodities for commerce; and the government, which rigorously exacted its fifth (*quinta*) on every cargo shipped in Canarian ports, did its utmost, though not always in the wisest ways, to promote their material prosperity. Altogether, the archipelago may be said to have occupied a pivotal position in the Spanish Empire from the end of the fifteenth century.

CHAPTER XVII

THE INDIES

THE story of the discovery of America, like that of the conquest of the Canaries, is intimately bound up with the relations of Castile to Portugal. The latter had been active in foreign exploration and conquest long before the accession of the Catholic Kings. The efforts of Prince Henry the Navigator had made her a Mecca of fifteenth century mariners. Traditionally she had a far better right to the honor of finding the Western Hemisphere than had her eastern neighbor, and it was largely the result of accident, and possibly of the issue of the War of Succession, that Castile stepped in at the last moment to deprive her of it.

It was probably in the latter part of the year 1476 that Christopher Columbus first appeared in Portugal, and seven years later, towards the end of 1483, that he laid certain propositions for a voyage of discovery into the western ocean before King John II, the son and successor of Affonso the African. Whether these propositions contemplated merely the finding of a shorter and easier way to the eastern shores of Asia, or the discovery of new lands which the explorer had reason to believe lay hidden in the western ocean, or both, we are fortunately not called upon to decide; a group of scientists gave its verdict against the feasibility of his schemes, and in 1484 he left Portugal for Spain. After dispatching his brother Bartholomew to press his suit at the courts of England and of France, he took his own measures for furthering his projects in Castile. The Duke of Medina Sidonia, to whom he first applied, did nothing for him. The Count of Medina Celi, whom he visited next, was more encouraging, but powerless to help him alone; at the end of 1485 he sent Columbus on to the court of Ferdinand and Isabella at Cordova. In April and May of the following year their Catholic Majesties gave audience to the explorer, and charged Hernando de Talavera with the formation of a committee to examine the validity of his claims. This committee held its sittings at Salamanca, where Columbus in all probability appeared before it. With characteristic Spanish deliberation it failed to render its decision before 1490; and during the long interval the explorer, despite the protection of Ferdinand and Isabella, was often hard put to it to get a living. When the sentence of the commission was finally rendered, it was adverse, and the Catholic Kings bade Columbus a courteously worded adieu. Though profoundly discouraged, he soon determined to go and seek better fortune in France. On the way thither, after a visit to his former friend and patron, the Count of Medina Celi, he passed by the monastery of La Rabida, near Palos, where he greatly interested Fray Juan Perez, a former confessor of the queen, in his schemes of discovery and exploration. It also seems highly probable that he succeeded in obtaining at this critical juncture the effective support of the famous pilot Martin Pinzon, who was to be his right-hand man in his momentous voyage. In any case it is certain that Perez was able to make representations to Isabella concerning Columbus's plans and prospects, which resulted in the explorer's recall to the Castilian court before Granada in the summer of 1491, in order that he might be given another hearing. Conferences ensued, but the conditions which Columbus demanded, in respect both to the funds for his expedition and to the rights and dignities to be conferred upon himself, were such that all who were consulted regarded them as unacceptable, and in January, 1492, the explorer was again dismissed. He had no sooner departed, however, than a number of persons intervened to demand that he be brought back once more. Prominent among these was a wealthy member of the Royal Council, of Aragonese Jewish extraction, by name Luis de Santangel, and also Beatrice de Bobadilla, Marchioness de Moya,



Isabella's most intimate friend, and elder sister to the lady who figured so prominently in the history of the Canaries. The final result was that before Columbus, on his sorrowful journey northward, had reached the Puerta de Pinos, two leagues from Granada, he was overtaken by a royal *alguacil* with orders to return at once.

Three months more elapsed, however, before terms of agreement could be reached. The final arrangements were concluded on the seventeenth of April at Santa Fé. Columbus was granted the rank of Admiral, with all the dignities and privileges thereto pertaining, in such territories as he should discover, and the title was to pass on his death to his heirs. As admiral he was given the right to be sole judge of all cases arising in connection with the trade and commerce of the territories in question. He was to be viceroy and governor general in the lands he expected to find, and was to have the right of presenting three candidates for any post of profit and emolument under him, from whom their Majesties should select one. He was to have one tenth of all the products drawn from the said lands, and the right, if he contributed one eighth to the cost of the expedition, to receive one eighth of the profits resulting from it. It used to be the fashion to represent Ferdinand as indifferent, or even positively hostile, to the whole enterprise, and to give all the credit of the affair to Isabella; but more recently strong reasons have been advanced for thinking that the king of Aragon bore an important part in the whole negotiation. That his signature is affixed to all the documents and capitulations relative to the expedition may not count for much, and the story that he employed the first gold brought to Spain from the Indies to gild his royal palace at Saragossa is not particularly significant, but the fact that his own officials found most of the necessary money for the voyage is an evidence of interest too substantial to controvert. The whole matter is of great importance as leading up to the question of how far the realms of the Crown of Aragon were subsequently permitted to take part in the conquest and colonization of the New World—a problem which goes down to the very foundation of the Spanish Empire. We shall return to this matter in another place. For the present we need only observe that though the privilege of emigration and settlement was with rare exceptions restricted to the inhabitants of the western kingdom from the time of the announcement of the discovery to the death of Queen Isabella in 1504, it was gradually thrown open to the inhabitants of the other Spanish kingdoms in the succeeding years, until, by the end of the sixteenth century, they enjoyed absolute equality in this respect.

The story of the preparations for the voyage and the equipment of the three caravels has been often told. So great was the prevalent distrust of the issue of the expedition, that it is more than doubtful whether, even with the backing of the crown, Columbus could have successfully organized it, without the precious aid of the pilot Martin Pinzon. The Catholic Kings were scrupulously careful not to permit the explorer to trespass on the Portuguese territories in Africa; he was specifically forbidden to go to the Guinea coast. The contemporary accounts vary widely as to the number of persons who went with him. Probably the total was rather less than more than one hundred and twenty, of whom ninety were sailors of one sort or another. The majority came from the towns of southwestern Andalusia, but there were apparently a Genoese and a Portuguese among their number, and possibly an Englishman and an Irishman. Strangely enough, no priest accompanied the expedition. The little fleet sailed at dawn on August 3, 1492, from Palos, put in six days later at the Canaries for repairs, and finally departed thence on September 6 for the unknown seas. Doubts, discouragements, and proposals to turn back, grumblings and mutinous threats from the crews were the daily accompaniments of the next five weeks, but the sublime faith of the Admiral triumphed, and at last, on the evening of October 11, a flickering light was perceived in the darkness ahead. The following morning revealed the low-lying shores of one of the Bahamas, which the majority of modern scholars have agreed in identifying as Watling's Island, and which Columbus significantly named San Salvador. Whether we accept the older notion that the object of the Admiral's expedition was to reach the east by way

of the west, or follow M. Vignaud's more recent argument that he had started out with the idea of finding new lands which he had reason to believe existed some seven hundred and fifty leagues west of the Canaries, it seems clear that Columbus, having already progressed some two hundred leagues farther than he had ever expected to go, was persuaded that he had reached the confines of the eastern world. At any rate he dubbed the natives he encountered 'Indians', a name which had hitherto had an exclusively Oriental connotation, though Ferdinand Columbus tells us that his father adopted it because it was suggestive of great riches; and as 'Indians' the aboriginal inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere have continued to be known until this day.

Of course the adventurers soon discovered that the land they had found was merely an outlying islet. They therefore continued their voyage westward to look for the larger territories which lay beyond. On October 28 they struck the northern shore of Cuba and explored it; and so sure was Columbus that he had reached the mainland, and that the realms of the Great Khan could not be far away, that he sent off two of his followers to seek for the court of that potentate and carry him the compliments of the sovereigns of Spain. From Cuba he sailed southeast to Haiti, in which he fancied he recognized both the island which he had expected to discover and the Cipango which Martin Pinzon believed had been reached; on account of its similarity, at first appearance, to Spain, he named it Española. Off the coast of this island his largest ship, the *Santa Maria*, ran aground on Christmas Day and was wrecked. Ready aid from the friendly Indians, however, made possible the saving of the cargo and provisions, and the Admiral finally became convinced "that God had permitted the disaster in order that the place might be chosen for a settlement". Some forty of his followers agreed to remain and await his return; the construction of a stronghold to give them shelter was begun; every effort was made to urge upon them the importance of preserving the friendliest possible relations with the natives; finally, on January 4, 1493, after duly impressing the cacique with a sense of his power by a salvo from his cannon, Columbus set sail for home. He took with him specimens of gold which his followers had collected, and also a few Indians; the number of these was increased during the first week of the homeward voyage when he touched at several other points on the northern shore of Española, and came for the first time into hostile collision with the natives. The return voyage was beset by gales. Columbus was obliged to stop at the Azores on the way, where the Portuguese governor apparently had some thought of apprehending him; moreover, when he finally landed at Lisbon and told his story to the Portuguese sovereign, there was talk of King John's laying claim to the lands he had discovered, and even of provoking the explorer into a quarrel and compassing his death. Clearly the Portuguese were jealous of Columbus's good fortune, and of the fact that Spaniards rather than themselves were to profit by it; and the remembrance that the explorer had originally applied to them for aid in his great enterprise, long before he had visited the Castilian court, must have added to the bitterness of their reflections. But Ferdinand and Isabella were now far stronger than they had been during the War of Succession. King John could not afford to quarrel with them, and he knew it; he therefore wisely determined to bide his time, and leave the substantiation of any claims he might have to a more favorable opportunity in the future. Columbus was accordingly permitted to depart with a splendid escort of knights; two days later he again embarked, and finally, on March 15, 1493, dropped anchor in the harbor of Palos, whence he had set sail over seven months before. The people received him with enthusiasm and thanksgivings, and he was speedily summoned to report to their Catholic Majesties at Barcelona.

Before pursuing further the fortunes of the explorer, we must examine the measures taken by the Catholic Kings to guarantee their possession of the lands he had discovered; for they did not wait to see Columbus before applying for papal confirmation of their right to the new territories. Dread of Portuguese competition was, of course, the explanation of their haste. The news of the Admiral's adventures at Lisbon on his homeward voyage had brought the dangers of it forcibly to their minds, and there were also other memories of earlier days which strengthened

their determination to guard themselves against it. Bulls of Martin V, Eugenius IV, Nicholas V, and Calixtus III had granted the Portuguese such lands as they might discover from Capes Nun and Bojador southward towards Guinea and beyond, and there was a general impression that their claims under these bulls extended as far as the Indies. In 1479-80 the Catholic Kings had specifically recognized by treaty the exclusive rights of Portugal to all lands she should discover in Guinea and off the coast of it, except the Canaries; and on June 21, 1481, Pope Sixtus IV had confirmed this treaty, and also the grants under his predecessors' bulls. Since that time the Portuguese had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and followed up the east coast of Africa to a point beyond Algoa Bay; clearly, in view of the prevailing ignorance of geography and the doubts as to the exact location of the lands Columbus had found, it was essential that Rome be immediately notified of the Spanish pretensions. Ferdinand and Isabella had every reason to believe that their claims would not fare ill at the hands of the recently elected pontiff, Alexander VI, who, in addition to being of Valencian birth, was beholden to them in a variety of different ways. Their foresight was justified by the event; in all the ensuing negotiations the pontiff was less an arbiter, than an instrument in the hands of the Catholic Kings. In April, 1493, he put forth the first of the two famous bulls *Inter caetera*, granting to the Spanish sovereigns exclusive right and possession in all the lands and islands discovered in the West, towards the Indies, in the Ocean Sea, as well as in all others yet to be discovered in that region. On May 17 the bull was dispatched to the papal nuncio in Spain. It was doubtless Alexander's hope that the very vague phraseology which had been employed would safeguard the rights already granted by his predecessors to Portugal "from Cape Bojador towards Guinea and beyond", and at the same time satisfy the demands of Ferdinand and Isabella; but he was destined to be disappointed. By the time that the bull arrived in Spain, the sovereigns had had time to discuss the whole affair with Columbus, and to learn the full extent of his achievements and of his hopes. They had also opened negotiations with John II of Portugal, and had been informed of the counter-claims which that monarch had to urge. The wording of the first bull was clearly inadequate: it did not settle the question of the dominion of the Atlantic, particularly to the southward, which Spain was most desirous to secure. Columbus urged the advisability of a demarcation line; and the sovereigns, acting on his suggestion, again applied to Rome for an amplification and extension of the rights already conferred upon them. The result was the second bull *Inter caetera*, which was issued in June and reached Spain in the middle of July. It granted to their Catholic Majesties all lands found or to be found both to the west and to the south towards India and all other regions, provided they had not been occupied by any other Christian prince previously to Christmas, 1492; and it established a line to be drawn, north and south, a hundred leagues to the westward of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, beyond which no foreigner was to venture without a license from the Spanish sovereign. Furthermore, a supplementary bull *Eximiae*, issued in July, reiterated and emphasized the rights and privileges to be enjoyed by Ferdinand and Isabella in the territories in question; while a final one, dated September 26, provided—in flat contradiction to the earlier instrument—that previous occupation by other Christian potentates should not constitute a title, and annulled all grants "to kings, princes, infantes, or religious or military orders" in the regions assigned to the king and queen of Spain.

Clearly all these stipulations were aimed directly at the Portuguese; Alexander, who, on account of the political situation in Italy, was like wax in the hands of Ferdinand and Isabella, was being steadily led on to more and more open infringement of the rights of their rival. Naturally, under the circumstances, King John regarded the course of the negotiations between Spain and the Vatican with steadily increasing dissatisfaction. In addition to all their other advantages, the fact that the Catholic Kings were holding their court at Barcelona, whence they could reach Rome twice as quickly as could the Portuguese monarch, doubtless convinced the latter that little was to be gained by an attempt to outbid them there; his best hope was to deal directly with Ferdinand and Isabella themselves. He therefore instructed Ruy de Sande, his

representative at the Spanish court, to lay his case before them; moreover he assembled a powerful fleet, probably with the idea of threatening a descent on Columbus's discoveries if his protests should not be heard. The negotiations dragged slowly along far beyond the date of Columbus's departure on his second voyage, but both parties were desirous to avoid a quarrel, and Ferdinand and Isabella saw no harm in yielding to the argument of King John that the original line—one hundred leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands—limited too closely Portugal's opportunities for expansion in the Atlantic. On June 7, 1494, a treaty between the monarchs was accordingly signed at Tordesillas, by which the line of demarcation of their respective claims was drawn north and south at a point three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands—that is, about half way between them and the islands that Columbus had discovered; everything beyond that line was to fall to the Catholic Kings, everything to the east of it was to belong to the Portuguese. The line hits the north coast of South America just east of the mouth of the Amazon, and of course ultimately served to secure the Portuguese title to Brazil. On the other side of the globe it passes just west of New Guinea, but it was a long time before the facts were accurately determined, and in the meantime Spain made good her hold on the Philippines, which lie on the Portuguese side of it.

We now return to the career of Columbus, who was most graciously received by their Catholic Majesties at Barcelona; indeed, the months immediately succeeding his triumphal return from his first voyage were unquestionably the happiest in his life. But the sovereigns were even more concerned with the vigorous prosecution of the advantages already won than with rewarding the Admiral for his energy and faithfulness. On May 23, 1493, it was announced that a new and much larger expedition to the Indies would be sent out, and no less than sixteen royal orders were issued on that same day in regard to the preparations for it. Other *cartas* and *cedulas* on the same subject followed in large numbers during the next three months, and bear witness to the immense enthusiasm which the whole affair had roused. The principal object of them all seems to have been to secure over every phase of the enterprise the largest possible measure of royal control and supervision compatible with the privileges granted to Columbus in 1492. The name of Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca, archdeacon of Seville, appears in the majority of these documents as a sort of superintendent of Indian affairs resident in Spain, and links this earliest period of discovery with the beginnings of the regular political and commercial organization of Spanish America in the next century. From 1493 until after the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, Fonseca was, in fact, the crown's chief minister for colonial affairs. The duty of converting the Indians to Christianity was emphasized again and again, and a Catalan monk of the Benedictine order, named *Boyl*, was especially entrusted with it. The expedition numbered seventeen ships and some fifteen hundred men, among them soldiers, artisans, and laborers, and it carried all sorts of building and agricultural implements, seeds, and livestock. Clearly it was intended that a permanent colony should be founded. On the other hand the enterprise was regarded as so hazardous that it was deemed unwise that any women should accompany it; the lack of them goes far to account for the miserable broils of the colonists with the natives in the succeeding years.

The adventurers set sail from Cadiz on September 25, 1493. On November 3 they sighted one of the Lesser Antilles, which, as it was on a Sunday, they named *Dominica*; the inhabitants, however, were so hostile that they did not remain there long, but passed over in the latter part of the month to *Española*, where Columbus had left a portion of his company on his previous expedition. Much to his horror, not a trace of them was to be found. Throwing off all discipline after his departure, they had assaulted and maltreated the natives; a few of them had been massacred in return, and the rest had been driven off and perished in the wilderness. It was both an earnest of far worse difficulties of the same sort that were to come in the near future, and the beginning of immediate troubles for Columbus, which were to make his second expedition a very different affair from the first. In December the Spaniards passed along the north coast of *Española*

to a more favorable site, and set about the construction of a permanent town, which they named Isabella. But the heavy labor in the strange climate played havoc with their health. Columbus himself was prostrated for prolonged periods. Discipline broke down, and the punishments the Admiral inflicted kindled the resentment of his followers. Explorations into the interior brought back encouraging reports of gold, but not enough specimens to satisfy the sceptics. Worst of all were the relations of the Spaniards with the Indians. The disappearance of the first colony had raised dark suspicions and deep resentment in the hearts of the newcomers: even Fray Boyl had counselled measures of vengeance and terrorization. A few of the natives, who were believed to be cannibals, were taken prisoners and sent back to Spain in January, 1494, with a recommendation from the Admiral that they be Christianized and taught Spanish, in order to make them available as interpreters; and Columbus further advised that more of them be captured and sold as slaves to pay for the supplies of various kinds that the colonists so sorely needed. All this was glozed over by much discussion of the spiritual welfare of the Indians, but it marked a wide departure from the line of policy advocated by the sovereigns less than six months before, and the clash of conflicting views on this most difficult subject was to constitute one of the hardest problems of Spanish colonial administration. During the summer of 1494 the Admiral made a voyage of discovery to Jamaica and along the Cuban coast. After his return he was once more overtaken by a long and painful illness; and before his recovery was complete some of his followers, among them Fray Boyl, deserted and went back to Spain, where they roundly declared that the Indies were not worth retaining. The remaining colonists were in a sorry plight. Provisions ran short. Relations with the natives went steadily from bad to worse. It became necessary to raid the interior, and to terrorize the Indians into submission by the exaction of heavy tributes. In the spring of 1496 things were in such evil case that Columbus determined that he must go back to Spain to seek help and advice. Leaving his brother Bartholomew, who had come out in 1494, in command at Isabella in his absence, he set sail with two caravels, bearing about thirty Indians and upwards of two hundred homesick and discontented colonists, and reached Cadiz on June 11.

His detractors had not been idle in his absence. Instead of the triumphant welcome accorded him in 1493, he now had hard work to regain the badly shaken confidence of the Catholic Kings, and to secure the maintenance of his original rights and privileges. More serious still, the fascination of the Indies for the mass of the Spaniards seemed temporarily dead; the Admiral was reduced to the most desperate extremities to find colonists to accompany him on a third voyage; most of those who finally went were paid by the crown, and the rest were criminals and jailbirds, who were sentenced to transportation in lieu of prison or execution. An advance guard of two ships was despatched in January, 1498, Columbus himself following with six more in May; but half of these were sent straight to Española from the Canaries, while the Admiral with the rest took a more southerly course across the Atlantic. The first land he sighted was the island of Trinidad (July 31), and a little later he descried the continent of South America beyond it. At first he took it for another island, and named it Isla Santa, but a little later the enormous volume of fresh water pouring out of the mouths of the Orinoco convinced him that he had reached the mainland. Passing on up the coast to the northward and westward, he discovered the islands of Tobago, Granada, Margarita, and Cubagua, and finally arrived at the newly founded town of Santo Domingo on the southern shore of Española in the end of August, after an absence of nearly two years and a half, to find conditions even worse than he had feared. Difficulties with the natives were more threatening than ever: and far graver still, dissension and insubordination had broken out among the Spaniards themselves; some ninety of their number, led by a certain Francisco Roldan, had become so enraged at the strict discipline of Bartholomew Columbus that they had gone off into the interior of the country and abandoned themselves to a life of violence and debauchery. After long negotiations, the Admiral determined that it would be expedient to pardon these rebels and restore them to favor, and he finally did so; but long before this had



occurred, he realized his powerlessness to set affairs permanently to rights in the colony without aid from home, and consequently sent back to Spain in the autumn of 1498 a full account of the insurrection, with vigorous demands for reinforcements, and for a *letrado* of experience, who should be capable of fulfilling the duties of a judge. But Columbus had enemies as well as friends on the returning ships, and also at court, who made the most of his absence to traduce him. He had also sent back a large cargo of Indians, with an assurance that the continuance of the practice of enslaving them was the best possible means to preserve the existence of the colony; and these arrived, most unfortunately for him, at a juncture when the proverbially sensitive conscience of the queen had been vigorously aroused on the ethical questions involved. The net result of this welter of conflicting circumstances, reports, and arguments was that the sovereigns in May, 1499, intrusted the government of the Indies to Francisco de Bobadilla, a knight of Calatrava and ancient servant of the crown, and sent him out there in January, 1500, armed with several alternative commissions, to be used according to his discretion. This was a gross infringement of Columbus's rights and monopolies in the Indies, as defined in the grant of 1492, and can scarcely be justified on the ground of the request in his letter to the sovereigns for a *letrado*; but the Catholic Kings had already made up their minds that, whatever his services to them as an explorer, the Admiral had no talent for ruling men. The appointment of Bobadilla marks, indeed, the beginning of the taking over of the administration of the Indies by the crown. It seems clear that the new governor was prejudiced against Columbus before he started, and his impressions were strengthened by what he found on his arrival. The Admiral was speedily clapped in irons and sent back to Spain; and though liberated and granted an interview by the sovereigns soon after he landed, he never regained anything approaching the position he had previously held. No more political authority of any kind was ever vouchsafed to him. His original rights and privileges were more and more shamefully invaded. From henceforth he was merely one (and by no means the most conspicuous) of a number of explorers of the Western Hemisphere. He made one last voyage to the Indies in 1502, on which, after being refused permission to land at Española, he followed down the east coast of Central America from Honduras to Panama; but so many others had reached other portions of the mainland before him that this final venture attracted but little attention. The very month of his return (November, 1504) saw the death of his best friend and patron Isabella; Ferdinand for the moment was far too much absorbed in his efforts to retain possession of the Castilian throne to pay any attention to him; and on Ascension Day, 1506, the great discoverer passed away at Valladolid, in an obscurity which, under all the circumstances, may well have been more grateful than the reverse.

We must now briefly run through the achievements of the other explorers in the New World down to the death of King Ferdinand in 1516. The first of these was a certain Alonso de Ojeda, who had distinguished himself by his bravery and resourcefulness on Columbus's second voyage. He was in Spain at the time that the report arrived of the Admiral's discovery of the mainland of South America in 1498, and being himself a favorite of Fonseca, boldly asked leave, in defiance of the exclusive rights of Columbus, to undertake a voyage into the west for his own profit and advantage. With an injunction to avoid all Portuguese possessions, and any lands discovered by Columbus previous to 1495, the desired permission was accorded him, and on May 20, 1499, Ojeda set sail. He struck the north shore of South America well to the east of the point reached by Columbus in the previous year—probably somewhere in the Guianas—and coasted along to the northward and westward as far as Cap de la Vela—thus covering wide strips on both sides of the coast previously traversed by the Admiral. In the Gulf of Maracaibo he found a native village built on piles, which so reminded him of Venice that he bestowed upon the region the name Venezuela, which it bears today. A visit to Española not unnaturally involved him in a vigorous dispute with Columbus, after which he returned to Spain, where he was warmly received and granted new privileges of exploration and conquest. But long before Ojeda could profit by this fresh patent, other explorers were in the field. Indeed, it seems probable that he was

actually anticipated on the Venezuelan pearl coast by the pilot Alonso Niño, who left Cadiz with a single caravel in the early summer of 1499; though unimportant from the point of view of exploration, the expedition apparently brought back much treasure, and thus raised the badly shaken prestige of the Indies in Spain. In the late autumn of 1499 Vicente Yañez Pinzon, a brother of Columbus's associate Martin, and, like him, a companion on his first voyage, sailed in a more southerly direction than any of his predecessors, struck the coast of Brazil, probably near its easternmost point, and followed the coast some two thousand miles north and west, discovering the Amazon (which he took to be the Ganges) by the way, and returning via Española to Spain. He was followed a few weeks later by a certain Diego de Lepe, who made the Brazilian shores still farther to the south, and got back to report before Pinzon. Finally, a Sevillian notary, by name Rodrigo Bastidas, sailed in October, 1500, explored the coast from Cap de la Vela to the Isthmus of Panama, and returned to Spain in 1502. The last voyage of Christopher Columbus along the Central American shore fell in the same year, so that the entire coast of the Western Hemisphere, from Honduras to beyond the eastern point of Brazil, had now been visited by the Spaniards.

Meantime, while all these Castilian adventurers had been flocking to the New World, the Portuguese, who had relapsed into temporary inactivity during the ten years following Bartholomew Diaz's famous expedition of 1486, gave signs of reawakening interest in the acquisition of new and unknown lands. In 1495 King John had died and was succeeded by his energetic and enthusiastic cousin Emmanuel the Fortunate; in 1497 Vasco da Gama was dispatched on the memorable voyage which carried him to the Malabar coast of India. In 1500 another expedition was sent out by the king of Portugal under Pedro Alvares Cabral to follow up the advantage that da Gama had already gained. Probably on the advice of his predecessor, Cabral steered well out westward into the Atlantic after leaving the Cape Verde Islands, in order to avoid the calms of the Gulf of Guinea, and on April 21 sighted the east coast of Brazil, near Porto Seguro, some five hundred miles to the south of the point reached by Diego de Lepe a few weeks before. Of course no one knew at that time that the line of demarcation established by the treaty of Tordesillas fell far to the west of the landings of Lepe and Pinzon, but it was probably altogether fortunate for the later substantiation of the Portuguese rights to Brazil that Cabral chanced thus accidentally to light on its coast as early as 1500. Had the Portuguese claims under the treaty of Tordesillas not been backed up by actual discovery at this critical moment, they might well have been subsequently forgotten.

For six years after Columbus's departure on his last voyage in 1502 there is a curious lull in Spain's exploring activities. Only one or two scattering expeditions were undertaken, and with practically no results. Ferdinand's preoccupation with domestic troubles and European politics was doubtless the chief explanation, and the Archduke Philip died before he could carry out any of his American projects. In 1508, however, the work of discovery was actively taken up again, a large portion of the voyages for the next decade and more being directed toward the finding of a passage through the continent which would give the Spaniards access to still richer lands beyond. Cuba was circumnavigated in 1508 by Sebastian de Ocampo, and conquered and settled in the succeeding years by Diego Velasquez, Pánfilo de Narvaez, and others. In 1508-09 Vicente Yañez Pinzon and Juan Diaz de Solis followed the American coast from Honduras down probably somewhat beyond the extreme eastern point of Brazil: those who maintain that they attained the fortieth parallel are confronted with the difficult problem of showing why they failed to discover the Rio de la Plata. In 1509 comes the first permanent effort of the Spaniards to settle on the mainland. The energetic and popular Ojeda, who seemed to bear a charmed life, and had never once been wounded in his many encounters with the Indians, was granted a strip of the coastline from Cap de la Vela to the Gulf of Darien, with the name of New Andalusia, while a rich planter of Española, called Diego de Nicuesa, received the stretch northward from the Isthmus to the eastern point of Honduras, with the title of Castilla del Oro. An attempt of Ojeda to make a

settlement near the modern town of Cartagena was frustrated by the hostility of the Indians, who with their poisoned arrows slew some seventy of his followers; he therefore moved west to the extreme limit of the territory assigned to him and built there a fort, which he called San Sebastian, on the eastern side of the Gulf of Urabi. But the marvelous good luck which had hitherto accompanied him seemed to have turned at last. The Indian attacks continued, and Ojeda himself was struck by an arrow; only by cauterizing the wound with plates of white hot iron was he able to preserve his life. He had lost most of his followers, and the survivors had become restless and discouraged. Finally he determined to leave the settlement in charge of his friend and supporter, an attorney named Enciso, and himself to repair to Española for aid; but he failed to obtain the help he sought, and died some years later in poverty and wretchedness. Nicuesa had meantime striven valiantly to develop his section to the northward, and founded the town of Nombre de Dios just east of the present city of Colón; moreover he subsequently attempted to extend his authority over the remnant of Ojeda's colony, which had by this time moved from San Sebastian across the Gulf of Darien into territory which fell within Nicuesa's jurisdiction. But Ojeda's men would have nothing to do with him; his own followers were decimated by disease; and finally the unhappy adventurer was forced to sail for Spain in an unseaworthy ship, and was never heard of again.

The dominant personality in the remnant of Ojeda's little colony at Darien was a certain Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, who had escaped from his creditors in Española to the mainland, concealed in a cask, on a ship that bore Ojeda's lawyer lieutenant Enciso to his destination. It was at his suggestion that the settlement had been removed from San Sebastian to Darien; having earned the gratitude of the company by proposing this wise change of abode, he refused obedience to Enciso, and finally shipped him off to Spain, with a letter to Ferdinand ringing with the scorn of the man of action for the legist 'who tries to do everything from his bed'. With the reins of authority securely in his own hands, Balboa made a vigorous attempt to secure provisions. This naturally brought him into conflict with some of the Indians, but he strengthened himself for any struggle that might ensue by a close alliance with one of the native chieftains, who even went so far as to give him his daughter. The intimate knowledge of the aborigines which resulted from these events brought to the Spaniards constant rumors of 'regions flowing with gold', and another great sea to the westward; and on September 1, 1513, Balboa, with a picked company of one hundred and ninety of his followers and a number of Indian servants, started off through the tropical forests to substantiate them. So dense was the undergrowth that the explorers made on the average less than two miles a day; but on September 25 they were rewarded by coming out on a summit whence they could gaze upon "the other sea so long looked for and never seen before of any man coming out of our world". Four days later Balboa waded into the waters of the Mar del Sur, or Southern Ocean, as he had already named it, holding aloft a banner and a sword, and solemnly took possession of the portentous Pacific and the adjacent lands in the name of his royal master, the king of Spain.

But it seemed to be for the most distinguished of the Spanish explorers that the cruellest of fates were reserved. Columbus had been cheated out of his rights and suffered to die in oblivion; Balboa, who next to the Admiral had perhaps rendered the most notable service, was to be rewarded for his achievements with death. In April, 1515, before the news of the discovery of the Pacific had been reported in Spain, King Ferdinand, whose most recent information concerning the state of affairs at the Isthmus had been received through the report of the rancorous lawyer Enciso, sent out a stern and truculent official, Pedrarias Davila, as governor of the colony with full powers and a large military force, and special instructions to take the residencia of Balboa. On his arrival a trial was instituted, but the prestige which Balboa had won by his discoveries and his obvious popularity with his followers discouraged Pedrarias from pushing it to its conclusion; and his perplexities were increased in 1515 when news came from Spain that

Ferdinand had at last received word of Balboa's achievement, and had rewarded him with the title of *adelantado de la Mar del Sur*. But Pedrarias was profoundly jealous of the man he had been sent out to supplant and vowed his ruin. There was indeed an official reconciliation between them, and Balboa was sent off on a fresh exploring expedition; but a report from a treacherous subordinate that he entertained plans of regaining independent authority for himself gave his enemy an excuse for arresting him again. After a humiliating trial, he was beheaded, with four of his companions, sometime in the year 1517. Had his discovery of the Pacific been reported a little earlier in Spain, Pedrarias would in all probability never have been sent out, and Balboa might well have anticipated the work of Pizarro. It was a sad earnest of the tragic results which were bound to ensue from the extreme slowness and difficulty of communication between the now widely scattered portions of the Spanish Empire.

Two more expeditions, one to the north and one to the south, complete the tale of the exploring activities of Spain in the New World during the period at present under review. Rumors of an island called Bimini to the north of Española, which contained a spring or fount of eternal youth, so fascinated a certain Juan Ponce de Leon, who had come out in 1493 and since risen by his own energy and valor to the headship of the island of Porto Rico, that he applied for a patent to discover and colonize it; and this was granted him by the king at Burgos on February 23, 1512. The voyage he undertook in pursuance of this license brought him in April of the following year to the northern part of the eastern shore of the present state of Florida. He took the land he had found to be an island, and christened it with the name it bears today, probably because he had discovered it on Easter Sunday—the Spanish Pascua de Flores—or possibly on account of the luxuriance of its vegetation. During the next two and one-half months he coasted down along the eastern shore, rounded the point, and followed the western side up possibly as far as Appalachee Bay. Thence he returned, still obsessed with the idea of discovering Bimini, for further exploration among the Bahamas, and finally got back to Porto Rico in September. He still cherished the delusion that Florida was an island, as is proved by the terms of the patent for its settlement which he secured in Spain in the following year (1514)<sup>1</sup>; but as he did not actually return thither until 1521, the remainder of his career must be reserved for another volume.

Meantime to the southward the news of Balboa's discovery of the Pacific gave fresh impetus to the old quest for a strait; and on November 12, 1514, King Ferdinand commissioned Juan Diaz de Solis, the companion of Vicente Yañez Pinzon's famous voyage of 1508, and now chief pilot of Spain, to explore the coasts of South America, to a distance of seventeen hundred leagues or more beyond the Isthmus of Panama, if possible, taking great care not to trespass on the territories of the king of Portugal. With three small ships and seventy followers, Solis left San Lucar on October 8, 1515, struck the Brazilian coast just north of Rio de Janeiro—well to the south, indeed, of the point reached by Cabral fifteen years before, but still east of the line of demarcation—and coasted along until in February, 1516, he reached the estuary of the Rio de la Plata. Surprised at the great volume of fresh water, but not suspecting at first that it could be the mouth of a river, he called it the Mar Dulce. On landing, the adventurers were suddenly assaulted by a great host of cannibal Indians, and Solis and some of his men were slain; the rest of the company, fearful that a similar fate would overtake them if they attempted to avenge the death of their comrades, sorrowfully departed, and after loading their vessels with Brazil wood, made the best of their way back to Spain.

Thus far did the exploration and settlement of the New World progress under the Catholic Kings; the first years of their imperial successor were to witness fresh strides in advance. To complete the picture of Spanish America at the death of King Ferdinand, we must now briefly sketch the growth of a system of administration of the new territories after the abolition of the monopolistic privileges of Columbus.

It is scarcely possible to overemphasize the obvious truth that the Spanish colonial system was an exceedingly gradual development. No one could have had any notion at the time of Ferdinand and Isabella of the immense importance of the place the Indies were ultimately destined to occupy in the Spanish Empire. The policies and institutions under which they were administered grew up little by little, *pari passu* with the extension of the domains of the Crown of Castile in the Western Hemisphere. The methods adopted by Ferdinand and Isabella were no more than the earliest beginnings. They bear little resemblance to the full-fledged colonial system as it appears in the end of the sixteenth century.

Yet, on the other hand, there were certain dominant principles of colonial policy initiated by the Catholic Kings which lasted right down to the days of the Bourbons, though the methods of applying them changed greatly as the years went by. Some of them, indeed, go back to the heyday of the fortunes of Columbus. The motto subsequently added to the coat of arms granted to the Admiral in 1493 hints at one of the most essential of them:

A Castilla y a León

Nuevo mundo dió Colón;

and the same idea appears again and again in the Laws of the Indies and in the writings of contemporary historians and legists. The American possessions were not, strictly speaking, Spanish; in a sense they were Castilian, though even that statement can only be accepted with reservations; but with the realms of the Crown of Aragon they had nothing whatever to do. Down to the death of Queen Isabella, indeed, even the privilege of emigration was not granted to the inhabitants of the eastern kingdoms. There may be some ambiguity in the phraseology of the famous ordinance granting to 'cualesquier personas' liberty to go and settle in the Indies and to 'cualesquier personas nuestros subditos e naturales' the right to go and make discoveries there; but Herrera and Oviedo are perfectly definite in their statements that only Castilians were permitted to pass over to the Indies in these early years. After 1504, when Ferdinand obtained control of the western kingdom, it seems clear that the restrictions were considerably relaxed, at least in practice, by frequent utilization, for the benefit of the inhabitants of the realms of the Crown of Aragon, of the royal right to grant special exemptions from the operation of existing laws; but it was not till the year 1596 that all the inhabitants of Spain were legally given the same privileges of emigration to the New World. And in matters of government and administration the realms of the Crown of Aragon were much more completely and permanently shut off from participation in American affairs; the laws and institutions of the Indies continued throughout to be modelled on those of Castile. It is not difficult to see the reason. Geographical considerations doubtless counted for something; but a far more fundamental explanation of the unwillingness of the sovereigns to permit any of the political methods of the eastern kingdoms to percolate to the Indies was their dread lest the new territories should be contaminated by coming in contact with the 'Aragonese liberties' which they had not been able wholly to subvert. It was their ultimate object to maintain absolute control of their American possessions for themselves: therefore the government of those possessions was to be modelled on that of Castile, which had been reduced to a satisfactory condition. The system which these statements imply was not fully set up until Hapsburg days; but the idea of keeping the administration of the realms of the Crown of Aragon and their dependencies in Italy and the Mediterranean rigidly apart from that of the territories fact begun to make itself felt in the initial stages of the development of the Indies: the new empire that was opening up to the westward was not to be permitted to learn anything from that portion of Spain which had hitherto enjoyed by far the largest measure of imperial experience.

It must not, however, be inferred from the foregoing that the Indies in any sense belonged to Castile as a whole, or that any Castilian institution except the crown had the smallest vestige



of authority there. Spanish colonial laws and institutions were to be brought into the closest alignment with those of Castile, in sharp contrast to their many divergences from those of Aragon, but save for the sovereign at the head of them all, they did not possess a single authority in common. The Castilian Cortes, councils, and audiencias were not to have an atom of power in America (save, possibly, in the very early days through an occasional appeal from the Casa de Contratación to the royal justices in Seville): the crown proposed to maintain exclusive control of the new possessions—to manage them as another hereditary domain, through a totally new set of institutions, without doubt closely similar to, and in fact modelled on, those of Castile, but entirely separate from them.

This determination of the crown to supervise every phase of the development of the American possessions manifests itself first of all in economic affairs, a fact which has been adduced by some authors to prove that the primary object of the sovereigns in the new territories was to derive revenue from them. The political authority conferred on the Admiral in the capitulations of 1492 was quite adequate to the needs of the first settlement in Española, and he had not yet demonstrated his failings as a ruler of men; but the monarchs were much concerned that the revenues of the little colony should be developed to the full, and that only the right sort of men for that purpose should be permitted to emigrate. They therefore appointed Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca in 1493 to supervise the preparations for Columbus's second voyage, as we have already seen, and to issue licenses to those who were to accompany him; furthermore, acting on a suggestion from the Admiral, they gave orders that all ships returning from the Indies should enter and unload at Cadiz alone. From the very beginning the entire trade of Spanish America was concentrated at a single port—for when Cadiz was abandoned in 1503, its place was immediately taken by Seville—in order to facilitate the rigid supervision which the crown was resolved to maintain. This system was, of course, most detrimental in its economic effects, both on the mother country and on the colonies—the more so because of the immense difficulties of communication in separatistic Spain—and there were petitions that other seaports might be permitted to share in the American trade. No attention, however, was paid to these requests. The government was definitely launched on its policy of strict supervision and monopolistic control, and all other considerations were to be sacrificed to the maintenance of it.

All this, however, was the merest preliminary. The early years of the sixteenth century were to witness a much further development of the machinery of royal control of American affairs. In the first place, Columbus's rights and privileges had by this time been entirely abrogated, so that the crown had matters completely in its own hands. In the second, other explorers had been sent out, and new lands had been discovered, so that Fonseca, energetic man-of-all-work though he was, had become absolutely overwhelmed with the multifarious tasks that were imposed upon him. In 1503, accordingly, it was determined to relieve him of a large share of his economic responsibilities by the erection of a *Casa de Contratación*, or Board of Trade. This body, which was at first composed of a treasurer, a comptroller (*contador*), and a business manager (*factor*), was established in June, 1503, in the Alcazar Real at Seville, where it remained until the days of the Bourbons. Besides the three officials above named, a chief pilot made his appearance in 1508 (the office was first bestowed on Amerigo Vespucci) and the beginnings of a sort of a school of navigation took shape before the close of the reign; a postmaster-general (*correo mayor*) was also appointed in May, 1514; and as the business of the Casa increased, a number of secretaries and legal counsellors naturally had to be added. But the original division of the functions of the Casa into three main parts remained virtually undisturbed for over a hundred years. The *tesorero*, *contador*, and *factor* became each the head of a department in which subordinate officials found their places.

From the composition of the Casa de Contratación we pass to the more difficult and important subject of its functions. Our chief source of information concerning these is the

ordinances of January 20, 1503, and of June 15, 1510, which have been preserved to us in full; and also that of 1504, of which we have an abridgment. At the outset the crown probably had some idea of retaining the American trade entirely within its own hands. Experience, however, soon proved that this was impracticable, so that the Casa fell heir to the exceedingly onerous task of supervising all the ships and merchants that carried goods and passengers to and from the Indies and seeing to it that all the laws and ordinances relative to navigation, emigration, and commerce with the new territories were fully and exactly carried out. It has been well described as "at once a Board of Trade, a commercial court, and a clearing house for the American traffic." The chief duty of the treasurer was to receive and care for all the gold, silver, and precious stones which were due to the royal treasury from the American mines. These were regarded, in this period, as belonging to the crown, though the latter rarely exploited them on its own resources. The regular practice was to turn them over to private persons to operate, but to demand that a large share of the product (two thirds at first, though the proportion was gradually reduced until, in 1504, it reached one fifth) be paid over to the Hacienda Real for the privilege. To the *factor* fell the function of outfitting and provisioning ships, of purchasing supplies and armament of all kinds, and the care of all merchandise, except gold, silver, and precious stones, that was remitted from the Indies to the Crown. The *contador*, meantime, discharged the very difficult duty of registering all persons and commodities carried by outgoing or incoming ships. Every person wishing to emigrate, was obliged to obtain a license from the crown, which had to be duly authenticated. No infidels or heretics, or their descendants down to the fourth generation, were permitted to go, and it was the *Contador's* business to see that they were kept out. The meticulous paternalism which characterized every phase of the Indian administration of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was indeed not fully developed in the period of the Catholic Kings; but an excellent foundation for it had unquestionably been already laid. The precision and detail with which it was expected that the different officials of the Casa should discharge the functions assigned to them can be best appreciated by careful perusal of the ordinance of 1510; that their task was no sinecure may be judged from the fact that they were expected to come together for consultation and joint action twice a day, morning and afternoon, every day in the year except holidays. In this connection it may also be observed that the Casa as a body attempted from the very beginning to exercise some measure of judicial authority over Indian affairs, and as a result soon found itself involved in quarrels with the municipal authorities of Seville. In September, 1511, a royal proclamation attempted to define the Casa's jurisdiction as a court of law, and the nature of the cases that should come before it; but interference by the local judiciary continued until the Casa's powers were amplified and the Council of the Indies was definitely established in the reign of the Emperor Charles V. The collection of the *averia*, or toll for the convoy of the fleets, and of the *almojarifazgo*, or duty on commodities imported from the Indies, was also to form an important branch of the Casa's activities; but as these imposts were not established till the succeeding reign, we do not need to consider them here.

From matters economic we pass to the political administration of the Indies. The original concessions to Columbus in 1492 gave him supreme authority over such territories as he should discover; then on his return in the following year Fonseca was appointed, as we have already seen, as the royal representative in Indian affairs resident in Spain; and the terms of the various commissions issued to him show that he was clothed with wide powers of government as well as of economic supervision. The gradual withdrawal of the privileges of the Admiral in the succeeding years, as well as the rapid progress of American exploration, naturally increased the burden of Fonseca's responsibilities, and a number of subordinate persons were associated with him; a certain Gaspard de Gricio appears in 1501 as secretary for the affairs of the Indies, and was succeeded, on his death in 1507, by the Comendador Lope de Conchillos. At the same time the officials of the Casa de Contratación, which had been formally established four years before, were ordered to keep close in touch with these men, as was also Governor Ovando in

Española; and in 1514 we learn that in affairs of great importance Doctors Zapata and Palacios Rubios, and the *licenciados* Santiago and Sosa, all of them members of the Council of Castile, were called in by Fonseca and the secretary to give their advice. This group of men formed the germ of the future Council of the Indies, or supreme authority in the management of the Spanish possessions in the New World down to the end of the old regime; but since that body was not permanently organized until 1524, we may postpone further consideration of it until the succeeding reign. A number of orders and injunctions from Ferdinand relative to the Indies, some of them of an extremely minute and detailed character, plainly show that the king kept close watch over the administration of the American possessions; certainly this first amorphous committee on the Indies, from which the full-fledged *Consejo de Indias* was subsequently evolved, enjoyed little independent authority apart from the crown. The king's concession in 1507 of coats of arms to fourteen different 'cities' of Española is an interesting indication of the way in which the Spaniard carried his ancient love of emblems and dignities with him across the sea.

So much for the organs of Spanish American government which remained resident in Spain. We now turn to the representatives of the crown in the Indies themselves. In later days, after the Spanish American administration had got into full working order, these consisted of viceroys, captains-general, audiencias, and their subordinates, but this was not until the time of Charles V and Philip II; for the present we are concerned merely with the methods in vogue during the period intermediate between the withdrawal of the privileges of Columbus and the end of the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. Our chief source of information concerning these is the instructions issued to Francisco de Bobadilla, who was sent out to supersede Columbus in 1500, and subsequently to Nicolas de Ovando and Diego Columbus, who followed him in turn in 1501 and in 1509; the orders borne by Pedrarias Davila in 1514 to the colony at Darien also contain items of interest. Aside from their precepts for the treatment of the Indians, which is a matter of such importance as to demand separate consideration, the following features of these instructions are particularly worthy of attention. In the first place, the powers granted to the new governor in each case were practically all-inclusive: all subordinate officials were to take their orders from him, but he was beholden to no one, and was not compelled to take any one's advice. A plan of controlling Pedrarias at Darien by forbidding him to act without the consent of certain important lay and ecclesiastical officials who were sent out with him was tried, indeed, but was soon abandoned as useless; and for a long time afterwards the governor was left to manage affairs alone. Only in the nascent municipal constitutions did any vestige of ancient Castilian democracy or self-government permanently survive; it is interesting to observe that the inhabitants of the settlement at Darien elected Balboa as their alcalde in 1510, and that we hear of procuradores chosen to inform the crown of the desires of the inhabitants of the cities of Española as early as 1508. All the royal orders laid great stress on the necessity of strict and impartial administration of justice; and the practice of taking the residencia of outgoing officiate became firmly planted in the Indies from the very beginning, with all its attendant benefits and disadvantages. It must be confessed, however, that the latter were considerably greater than the former under the system as it operated in the American territories; for so great was the dread in those distant regions of complaint by some malicious foe that the majority of the magistrates feared to deviate in the slightest degree from instructions composed, often quite ignorantly, in Spain; with the result that healthy initiative was checked, evils of which the home government knew little or nothing were perpetuated, and a sort of creeping paralysis ultimately came to pervade the entire structure of the Spanish Empire in the New World. Finally, the instructions to the successive governors reveal plain traces of the crown's burning desire to extract revenue from the American lands at any and every possible opportunity. In 1501, Ovando was ordered to try to levy a *servicio voluntario* on the inhabitants of Española to defray the expenses of the 'wars against the Turks'; in 1509, we hear of the same thing again under the name of an *empréstito*, or loan. On the other hand, it is fair to say that one of the commonest privileges offered to induce men to

go and settle in the New World was exemption for a more or less prolonged period from the *alcabala*.

Lastly we come to the difficult question of the treatment of the Indians, and the various attempts to reconcile the sovereigns' firm determination to deal kindly with them, and ultimately to convert them to Christianity, with their desire to see the colonies self-supporting and, if possible, a source of profit. No one who has read the documents can doubt the sincerity of the good intentions of the Catholic Kings in their policy toward the natives, who were regarded from the outset as subjects of the crown of Castile, and not, as by the English colonists farther north, as independent tribes, hostile or friendly as the case might be. The major part of the instructions to practically every explorer and governor sent out from Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella is occupied with exhortations and commands to be kind and just to the Indians, and to bring them as soon as possible to the Christian faith. But the church itself was the means on which the sovereigns chiefly relied to accomplish their purposes in this respect. Their control over the ecclesiastical revenues and appointments in the Indies was even more complete, as we have already seen, than that which they exercised in Spain, and they utilized it with an eye to the welfare of the natives, as well as to that of the emigrant Spaniards. At least two bishoprics were set up in the islands in the course of the years 1512-13, and their occupants were chiefly concerned with the superintendence of the work of conversion; but an earlier and more active agency in this, and also in the protection of the Indians from maltreatment by the newcomers, was the contingent of monks which came out with almost every fresh party of settlers. Some of these, indeed, like the Benedictine Fray Boyl who accompanied Columbus's second expedition, were quite unworthy of the high task that had been laid upon them; but the majority were of better stuff, and certainly, meant to do their duty, though their achievements did not always correspond to their intentions. The foremost champions of the rights, and also of the conversion of the Indians, were the Dominicans, whose zeal for the welfare of the natives ultimately obtained "such root in that brotherhood as almost to become one of the tenets of their faith"; unfortunately, however, the jealousies of the other orders, particularly of the Franciscans, were so aroused by their activities in this direction that the cause for which they labored not seldom suffered from having been permitted to become the subject of bitter monkish quarrels.

Nevertheless the actual facts of existence in the Indies were strangely at variance with the indubitably benevolent intentions of the home government. Columbus himself, who in 1492 was apparently imbued with the sovereigns' humanitarian views, had become as early as 1494 at least temporarily a convert, as we have already seen, to the necessity of enslaving the Indians. The perilous condition and scanty resources of the colony at Española were of course the cause of the change. Gold had not been found in anything like the quantities that had been expected. If the settlement was to be maintained at all, means must speedily be devised to make life there profitable and attractive, and the method finally adopted was to parcel out the land and the enforced labor of the Indians resident upon it in so-called *encomiendas*, or *repartimientos*, among the Spaniards who went out to the New World. This system, which did not reach its full development until the time of Ovando, is said to have been suggested by a tribute which had been imposed on certain Indians in 1495 as penalty for a revolt, and which had been rendered by them in the form of manual labor; but certainly the idea of dividing up conquered territory into *repartimientos* between those who had won it goes back to a much earlier period of Spanish history, and was employed by James the Conqueror when he captured the Balearics and Valencia. Obviously, the character of this practice as ultimately developed in the Indies would depend primarily on whether the emphasis was laid on the allotment of the land, or on that of the compulsory services that went with it; and as time went on it was the latter that became the increasingly predominant factor. It is true that Ferdinand and Isabella strove to make the *encomienda* system actively promote their plans for the conversion of the natives to Christianity,



for in all the patents the grant of their services was made conditional on the grantees' teaching them "the matters of our holy Catholic Faith". Indeed, one of the reasons for the establishment of the *encomiendas* was that the Indians had withdrawn into the interior to avoid, all contact with the Spaniards, and consequently were inaccessible to missionaries. The sovereigns were also careful to insist that the Indians on the *encomiendas* should be paid for their work at a reasonable rate, for in addition to their desire to Christianize them the monarchs were determined that the natives should not be enslaved. In 1501 they had even gone so far as to authorize the importation of negro slaves into the New World in order to spare the Indians, and though the license was temporarily revoked in the last years of the life of the queen, it was renewed in 1505, and the practice it sanctioned gradually established itself in the succeeding years. Yet despite all these precautions to safeguard the welfare of the natives, the tendency of the settlers to exploit them for their own advantage, to the prejudice of their health and their instruction, proved too strong to be effectively resisted. The royal arm could not reach across the sea and bring the offenders quickly to justice. The period of labor in the fields, and still worse in the remote mines in the interior, was gradually lengthened; wages were not regularly paid; and the precepts of kind treatment and instruction were neglected. So cruelly were they abused, in fact, that the Indian inhabitants of the islands began to dwindle away; according to an admittedly partisan witness the existence of similar conditions throughout the world would soon cause the human race to die out.

A violent sermon delivered by the Dominican monk Fray Antonio de Montesinos to the inhabitants of Santo Domingo on the fourth Sunday of Advent, 1511, served to bring clearly into relief this wide discrepancy between the home government's program for the Indians and the facts as they actually were. The preacher fiercely rebuked his auditors for their oppression and neglect of the natives, and when the colonists demanded that he retract what he had said, he repeated his discourse on the succeeding Sunday with redoubled emphasis and ended by announcing that the sacraments of the church would thenceforth be refused to those who did not amend their ways. The colonists replied by sending a Franciscan monk to Spain to complain of the Dominicans; and the latter naturally retorted by dispatching Montesinos to defend them. The Franciscan had every advantage over his adversary at the court, but the vivid horror of Montesinos's recital led Ferdinand to appoint a commission of inquiry, whose labors finally resulted in the publication, on December 27, 1512, of a brief code—generally known as the Laws of Burgos, from the place in which it was put forth—which has justly been described as "the first public recognition of the rights of the Indians, and an attempt at least to amend their wrongs". Limitation of the periods of the labor of the natives, regulations concerning their food and shelter, and a provision for the nomination of inspectors to see that the orders of the crown were actually carried out, are the principal feature of this theoretically admirable ordinance; but as the inspectors were themselves *encomenderos*, they had every inducement to neglect the discharge of their functions. We have here again, in fact, the selfsame difficulty which crops up in every phase of the Spanish administration of the New World to the very end. The regulations made by the home government were usually excellent, but distance and defective means of communication rendered it wellnigh impossible to carry them out. The best evidence of the nonobservance of the Laws of Burgos is the fact that less than three years after their passage a certain settler of Cuba, by name Bartholomew de las Casas, whose conscience had been aroused by the exhortations of the Dominicans, surrendered his *encomienda* and made his way back to Spain to plead for the Indians before the king. Powerful interests in the Casa were opposed to him, and Ferdinand died before this future apostle of the Indians could be fully heard, but the work which he had so nobly begun was to be carried much further in the succeeding reign. — All the fundamental difficulties of the Indian question had, in fact, been clearly recognized under the Catholic Kings, but practically no progress whatsoever had been made towards its solution. The circumstances of the reign of the Emperor Charles V were destined greatly to increase the complexity of the issues involved in the problem which his grandparents had bequeathed to him.



This is not the place to attempt any extended estimate of the position and significance of the Indies in the fabric of the Spanish Empire. Only the surface had as yet been scratched. The real wealth and extent of the new possessions remained hid for many years to come, and the system under which they were to be administered was still in its infancy. Yet one brief comment may be added here, if only to emphasize the tremendous importance of the achievement of Christopher Columbus. More than sixty years ago a shrewd and observant writer advanced the theory that the possession of the Indies was the determining cause of the ruin of Spain in the succeeding centuries, that it diverted her from her normal and traditional lines of development, caused her to neglect excellent chances nearer home, and forced her to bleed herself white in the effort to maintain her remote acquisitions in the New World. There is much to be said for this argument. The number, variety, and coincidence of Spain's opportunities, as we have often remarked, was one of the most potent causes of her decline, and it was the American possessions which caused her to deviate the furthest from the paths she had trodden before. Had she kept out of the New World she would doubtless have led a more comfortable existence in the Old. She would not have been so easily induced to attempt impossible tasks. She would not have drawn down on herself the jealousy and hatred of neighboring states. She would probably have avoided the fatal trial of strength with England. She might well have been more powerful today. Yet when all is said and done, it was the Indies that account for her greatness during the brief period that it lasted. If they were a principal cause of her subsequent decay, they were also the primary source of her temporary preeminence. Without them she would never have been able to retain the hegemony of Europe so long as she did; without them the Spanish Empire would scarcely have been worthy of the name. What seemed to contemporaries but a fortunate incident was really the great turning point in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. The day that Christopher Columbus set sail from Palos was the most fateful in the history of United Spain.

CHAPTER XVIII

NORTH AFRICA

THE Spanish possessions in the New World did not so monopolize the attention of Ferdinand and Isabella as to prevent them from laying plans for the conquest of another region, whose destinies, from time immemorial, had been intimately connected with those of the Iberian Peninsula. The task of carrying the Christian arms across the Mediterranean into North Africa was the obvious and logical sequel to the capture of Granada; it was dictated by every consideration of sentiment and of expediency; in 1493, as we have already seen, the Catholic Kings had sent out a trusty official, Lorenzo de Padilla, in disguise to reconnoiter. The kingdom of Fez, directly across the Strait, was closed to him by virtue of the provision in the treaty of 1479 which had assigned it to Portugal. He therefore set his course farther eastward and finally penetrated to Tlemcen, whence he returned with much useful information. In the following year (1494), the Spanish ambassador at Rome reminded the Pope of the many historical ties that united Spain to Mauretania and demanded that his Holiness should concede to their Catholic Majesties the exclusive right of conquest of the North African coast. Portuguese representatives were, of course, on hand to insist on the priority of their rights in the western part of the territory in question, and on the Atlantic seaboard; they were finally brought to agree, however, that everything east of and including the town of Melilla should be assigned to Spain, though they took a mild revenge by challenging the Spanish claims to the possession of lands on the west coast opposite the Canaries. The Pope also handed over to the Spanish sovereigns and their heirs the *tercias* of Castile, Leon, and Granada *in perpetuo*, to aid them in the prosecution of the Holy War, and in 1496-97 the town of Melilla was seized by a representative of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who subsequently turned it over to the Catholic Kings. Yet despite all these early activities, it was almost ten years later before the Spanish conquest of North Africa can be said to have really begun. The chief cause of the delay was unquestionably the Italian wars, which absorbed all the available resources of the Catholic Kings during the decade following the memorable raid of Charles VIII on Naples. Not until the year after the final conquest of that kingdom by the troops of Gon-salvo de Cordova was it possible to launch the first regular expedition against the Barbary coast.

The real hero of the story of Spanish expansion in North Africa during the first ten years of the sixteenth century is neither King Ferdinand nor Queen Isabella, but Cardinal Francisco Ximenes de Cisneros. His fame as a churchman and as regent of Castile during the twenty months that elapsed between the death of Ferdinand and the arrival of his grandson Charles from the Netherlands will doubtless long outlive his reputation as a builder of the Spanish Empire; but it is in the latter capacity that we have to consider him here, and it is no reason to depreciate its significance that the cardinal accomplished still greater things in other directions. A well-established tradition, accepted by a contemporary biographer, pictures him on the southern slope of the Sierra Vermeja, in the year of the conquest of Granada, pointing out to an attendant monk the distant promontories of the opposite shore beyond the blue waves of the Mediterranean, and solemnly urging upon him the glorious duty of carrying the Christian faith into the country of its infidel foes. It was doubtless his enthusiasm that inspired the monarchs to take the first steps towards the realization of this project in the years that followed the conquest of Granada; and more important still, it was his insistence that prevented the whole matter from being quite

forgotten in the whirl of European diplomacy which occupied the next decade. Isabella was certainly a far more ardent supporter of the cardinal's plans than was her husband. Her attention was not centered, as was his, on the prosecution of the Italian campaigns; and it is one of the ironies of history that she died before the first expedition against Mers-el-Kebir was actually sent forth. "I beg my daughter and her husband", so runs a memorable passage in her will, "that they will devote themselves unremittingly to the conquest of Africa and to the war for the faith against the Moors"; and her words may well have been an inspiration to Ximenes in the hard struggle to enlist the sympathies of the cautious Ferdinand in his crusading schemes, which he was henceforth left to carry on alone. It is perfectly clear that the North African enterprise did not commend itself to the king of Aragon on religious grounds alone, and also that he failed at first to perceive its political and economic advantages. The cardinal won his consent to it at last by pointing out that an attack on the Barbary coast was the best means of defending the Spanish ports from the ravages of Moorish pirates, which had increased in frequency since the fall of Granada; and still more by promising to advance to the royal treasury the sums necessary to pay for the requisite number of troops during the first two months. But though Ximenes was quite capable of utilizing political and financial arguments in order to secure the consent of his sovereign, his own enthusiasm for the North African campaign was primarily of a religious character. It was as a crusade, and as a final and glorious consummation of the great work of the Reconquest, that he regarded it, and he succeeded in imbuing the soldiers who were collected for the purpose with the feeling that they were sent forth to fight for a sacred cause. There can be no question that the militant religious fervor which inspired these last crusades of the West went far deeper than that of the period of the Reconquest as a whole, and the influence of Cardinal Ximenes was one of the principal causes of the change.

On the advice of a Venetian merchant named Geronimo Vianelli, who had traded all along the North African coast, and also served under Gonsalvo de Cordova in the Italian wars, the cardinal selected the fort of Mers-el-Kebir as the point that it would be most profitable to attack. It lay just west of the far more important town of Oran, which was the key to all the country round about, and which was so strongly fortified that a direct assault from the sea was foredoomed to failure. Only by land could Oran be attacked with any reasonable prospect of success, and a land attack necessitated a base at Mers-el-Kebir. Some 10,000 troops were accordingly collected at Malaga in August, 1505, under the lead of Diego Fernandez de Cordova, a distant kinsman of the great captain, and embarked on a fleet of 140 ships commanded by Ram6n de Cardona. Passing up the coast to Cartagena to take on their pilots, they finally set sail on September 3, and after being driven about in the Mediterranean by bad weather, arrived eight days later off Cape Falcone, at the entrance to the Bay of Mers-el-Kebir. The disembarkation was effected through the heroism of 180 Spaniards, who made their way to shore in small boats and by swimming, and fell upon a vastly superior body of Moors with such fury that they soon cleared a space for others to follow them. The next step was the occupation and fortification of a hill dominating the city, and the repulse of a violent counterattack. A vigorous bombardment of the fortress itself was soon after begun, and preparations to storm it hurried forward. But a Moorish soldier who had fallen (perhaps not unintentionally) from the battlements of Mers-el-Kebir into the sea and swum out to the Spanish fleet, brought news of the wretched state of the garrison. They had been overwhelmed and discouraged by the suddenness of the Spanish assault; they were divided among themselves; their leaders had been killed; and they were ready to treat. Desirous to avoid unnecessary slaughter, and fearing the arrival of Moorish reinforcements from the interior if he delayed too long, the Spanish general sent his informant back to the fortress to offer the defenders generous conditions in return for immediate surrender. The details were soon arranged. The Moors were accorded free leave to evacuate the place with their wives and children, and all the belongings that they could carry away with them. They gave up the keys of Mers-el-Kebir to their conquerors and liberated thirty-five Christian captives who had been taken from the Portuguese

on the occasion of an unsuccessful attack by them in 1501. A solemn entry of the triumphant troops followed and was accompanied by a great profusion of religious ceremonies and thanksgivings. The news of the victory, when reported in Spain, evoked fervent rejoicing. Even the unemotional Ferdinand yielded temporarily to the popular enthusiasm.

Mers-el-Kebir was not, however, an end in itself. For Ximenes and his most ardent supporters it was merely a steppingstone, as we have already seen, to the capture of Oran. Indeed, there is strong reason to believe that the plans of the cardinal had already begun to go much further than the mere control of the coast. "Africa, Africa for the king of Spain, our sovereign lord!" echoed the shouts of his troops as they entered the conquered fortress; and there are plenty of other indications in the contemporary historians that Ximenes was already contemplating the foundation of a Hispano-Mauretanian empire stretching southward to the confines of the Sahara. Moreover, it soon became evident that Mers-el-Kebir itself could not long be retained, unless the Christian territories round about it were enlarged. The Moors of Oran were constantly on the watch to cut off any foraging expeditions into the interior; and more important still, the king of Tlemcen, whose access to the coast was menaced by the hold the Christians had already won, was moving heaven and earth to expel them. Most serious of all was the question of supplies. Cooped up in Mers-el-Kebir, it was impossible for the Spaniards to maintain themselves on what they had already won; before June, 1506, it had been found necessary to send over to them no less than 12,000 bushels of grain from Barcelona. If the captured *presidio* was to be made self-supporting, as it was clearly desirable that it should be, further conquests were indispensable; advance was essential as the sole way to prevent retreat. For a long time, however, it was impossible to bring King Ferdinand to see this. He was glad that Mers-el-Kebir had been taken, for its capture had cost him practically nothing; but the North African enterprise had never fired his imagination as it had the cardinal's, and in the months that followed its initial success he was deeply absorbed in his quarrels with his son-in-law, Philip, over the Castilian regency, and afterwards with his journey to Naples. Even Ximenes himself was obliged to neglect the Barbary conquests in this period, owing to the multitude of problems that claimed his attention in Spain. Throughout the year 1506 and the early part of 1507 the garrison of Mers-el-Kebir was shamefully neglected, despite urgent messages dispatched by the gallant Diego Fernandez de Cordova to beg for reinforcements. Finally, the news of a Moorish victory over a Christian detachment which had been sent out to seize provisions, coupled with a personal visit of the Spanish general to the Castilian court during the absence of Ferdinand in Italy, elicited from the cardinal a substantial body of troops; but the *razzia* in which they were utilized soon after their arrival resulted in a terrible disaster. The Moors let them plunder at will, and then, as they were retiring to their base, led them into an ambush in the ravine of Fistel, where they slew or captured nearly all of them; Diego Fernandez de Cordova managed almost alone to escape by night to Mers-el-Kebir. Encouraged by this success, the Moors of Oran attacked the Spaniards in the fortress itself; though they were repulsed, the episode served to clinch the argument of the Spanish leader that unless more troops and munitions were speedily sent out from home, the loss of all that had been already gained was inevitable. Ferdinand had by this time returned from Italy. The European situation was temporarily quiet, and he was free to devote more of his attention to North African affairs. The last months of the year 1507 saw vigorous preparations for a renewal of the Barbary campaign on a much larger scale.

But when it came to settling the details of the arrangements for the new attack, all the old difficulties and divisions broke forth afresh. First, there was the inevitable question of funds. The royal treasury had been emptied by the Italian campaigns; and Ximenes, as previously, had to come forward with an independent offer. After long negotiations, it was finally agreed that he should pay the entire cost out of the revenues of his archiepiscopal see, and should receive in return supreme command, under the crown, of the forthcoming expedition, together with the royal

promise that all conquests made should specially appertain to the diocese of Toledo. Then came the problem of finding a competent military leader. Diego Fernández de Cordova would have been the best possible choice on account of his previous experience, but the failure of his last raid had discredited him, and both king and cardinal were resolved to make a change. Ximenes wanted the Great Captain, but Ferdinand, suspicious of the latter's schemes for personal aggrandizement, would have nothing to do with him, and insisted instead on nominating Pedro Navarro, renowned indeed as a soldier and engineer in the Italian wars, but altogether too untrustworthy and rapacious for leadership in an enterprise like this. Nay more, Navarro, from the moment of his appointment, lent himself obediently to the private schemes of Ferdinand, who, though ostensibly an enthusiastic convert to the plan of the cardinal, was still much of the time secretly working against him. Ximenes had powerful enemies about the Castilian court; and the king, who lived in perpetual terror of having his authority overshadowed by that of some subordinate, was easily led to believe that Ximenes was aiming at the conquest of an independent empire. Indeed, it is not impossible that it was chiefly with the idea of putting a spoke in the cardinal's wheel, and of delaying the departure of the main enterprise against Oran, that Ferdinand sent off Navarro, in July 1508, on the pretext of a punitive raid against the Moorish pirates, to attack the island and town of Velez de la Gomera, far to the westward, in the regions which had been assigned to the Portuguese. The expedition was brilliantly successful. The island was captured, and the town on the opposite shore bombarded and destroyed. But the Portuguese at once complained of this invasion of their sphere of influence, as they had done in 1494 when the Spaniards laid claim to Melilla; and they were apparently further irritated, rather than grateful, when Navarro relieved the Portuguese garrison of the fortress of Arzila on the Atlantic coast, which was being besieged by the Emir of Fez. Long negotiations naturally ensued before the two nations could come to an agreement; and, as before, the Portuguese attempted to bring the Spanish rights on the mainland opposite the Canaries into the discussion, in the hope that if they lost at one point they would gain at another. Eventually they were defeated at both; for the boundary between the territories claimed by the two states in the Mediterranean was ultimately moved west to Velez, which remained in Spanish hands till recaptured by the Moors in 1522, while the Spanish possession of the Atlantic coast opposite the Canaries was confirmed, as we have already seen, in 1509. The chief immediate result of the whole episode, however, was a long postponement of the main enterprise against Oran. It was a striking instance of the way in which the whole North African policy of Spain in this and in the succeeding reigns was made to suffer as a result of jealousies and divided councils at home; certainly nothing short of the heroic determination of Ximenes could have set the expedition in motion at all. Not until May 16, 1509, were the last pretexts and excuses of his enemies exhausted, so that the great army, 14,000 to 20,000 strong, was enabled to embark for the Barbary coast, in a huge fleet of ninety great ships and several hundred transports.

The crossing this time was so speedily accomplished as to leave the Moors but little time for preparation. On the second night after its departure from Spain, the bulk of the army was landed on the shores of Mers-el-Kebir. The activities of certain Christian captives within the walls of Oran had apparently won over some of the Moors inside the fortress from their allegiance, so that the Spaniards were measurably aided in their enterprise by treachery in the ranks of their foes; but all accounts agree that the really crucial factor in the conflict was the enthusiasm evoked by the dauntless bearing of Cardinal Ximenes. Despite his seventy-three years, his bodily infirmities, and the dubious loyalty of some of his subordinates, the cardinal insisted in sharing all the hardships of the expedition. Mounted on a mule, and preceded by the great silver cross of Toledo, he rode along the ranks exhorting the soldiers to do or die for the faith. Only the assurance that solicitude for his personal safety would divert his followers' attention from the battle could dissuade him from taking active part in the attack, and it was his urgency that saved the less zealous Navarro from the fatal error of postponing it. The plan of the operation comprised two distinct parts. The first and most important was the assault and capture of the high ridge that



separates Mers-el-Kebir from Oran and completely dominates the latter; the second was a bombardment of Oran itself from the ships in the bay, to be followed, if successful, by a landing of troops and a storming of the walls. The attack on the ridge, delivered late in the afternoon and with great desperation, finally attained its objective, owing largely to the cover which a thick mist afforded to the advancing troops, and to a battery of heavy guns which Navarro turned loose at a critical moment on the Moorish flank. The Spaniards reached the summit in time to gaze down upon the minarets of Oran flashing in the level rays of the dying sun. But in order to make the most of the advantage already gained it was essential to press on, and capture the town before its defenders could recover from their surprise. The fleet had meantime done its part, by drawing the fire of the cannon on the walls, and landing a large detachment on the shore at the foot of the ridge; it was by joining with this force in a sudden desperate attack that the troops on the summit could best hope to carry the city then and there. Down the eastern slopes, therefore, they rushed, and, uniting with the detachment at the base, went forward against the fortifications of Oran. The lack of storming ladders did not stop them. Thrusting their long pikes into the crevices of the rocks, they surged over the walls with an impetuosity that nothing could resist, and, led by the captain of the cardinal's bodyguard, planted the cross and the arms of the primate on the ramparts. Leaping down on the inside, the soldiers soon overwhelmed the Moors at the gates, and a few moments later the entire Christian army poured through into the streets. The massacre and pillage which ensued form one of the darkest blots on the Spanish arms in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. Neither age nor sex exempted any one from the outrages of the brutal soldiery; the streets were filled with corpses, and thousands of Moors were captured to be sold as slaves; Navarro was totally unable to maintain discipline. A pleasanter feature of the conquest was the liberation of the three hundred Christian prisoners confined in the Casbah, or citadel of the town; for Ximenes, who made a solemn entry into Oran two days after its capture, this ceremony was the culmination of the whole expedition. The booty taken was considerable. A large portion of it was devoted by the cardinal to the maintenance of his army, and the rest he turned over to the royal treasury. An army sent by the king of Tlemcen for the relief of Oran retreated in hot haste when it learned that the town had already been taken; the episode furnished the best possible vindication of the wisdom of Ximenes's refusal to permit Navarro to postpone the attack.

The completion of the conquest of Oran brought once more to the fore all the old differences between the two leaders. In the eyes of the Cardinal, it was merely an entering wedge, like Mers-el-Kebir, for the foundation of a Spanish empire in North Africa. He wished to import colonists to settle it as a permanent Spanish outpost; and he desired to penetrate at once to Tlemcen. But Navarro, like Ferdinand, was very skeptical about the possibilities of a North African empire. Like most professional soldiers of his day, his immediate interest in the campaign he had undertaken was the prospect it offered of booty and reward. Having captured Oran, he wanted to move on and attack and plunder other rich ports to the eastward; and he showed no enthusiasm for the more difficult and permanent projects which fascinated Ximenes. These antagonisms came to a head in a violent scene between the two leaders, a day or two after the capture of Oran, over the limits of their respective jurisdictions. A proclamation of Navarro, in defiance of the conventions signed by Ximenes and Ferdinand, that the conquered city belonged to the crown, and was in no wise attached to the see of Toledo, carried the quarrel somewhat further, and the climax was reached when one of Ximenes's servants laid before him an intercepted letter from the king to Navarro, in which the latter was urged to amuse the cardinal with various projects and detain him as long as possible in Africa, thus preventing his return to Spain, where his presence was not desired. Naturally the suspicions of Ximenes were at once aroused. He had always been rather the counsellor of Isabella than of her husband: what black treachery was Ferdinand meditating against him now? The only way to meet such treatment was to return at once and ascertain the facts, and this with characteristic promptitude the cardinal resolved to do. At a council of the officers he designated Navarro as commander-in-chief, and

urged him, with all the eloquence he could command, to continue the campaign; then, with many promises to watch over and provide for the needs of the expedition at home, he set sail on Wednesday, May 23, after a sojourn in North Africa of less than one week. Disdaining an invitation to visit the king, he dispatched one of his subordinates to Ferdinand to report; and then, after occupying himself for a couple of weeks with the collection of supplies and equipment for the army that he had left behind, he retired on June 12 to his beloved university at Alcalá. A bitter quarrel, arising out of an odious attempt to deprive him of the rights over Oran which had been guaranteed to the see of Toledo in the original convention with Ferdinand, pursued him to his quiet retreat. The king made no pretense of keeping either to the letter or the spirit of his agreement in the matter; and the feud lasted without definite settlement beyond the limits of the cardinal's life. It was another example, perhaps even more striking than those contemporaneously afforded in the Indies and in Italy, of the suspicion and distrust with which Ferdinand in his later years regarded any evidence of independence or initiative in the representatives of his authority in distant lands. Unfortunately these traits were inherited and magnified by his successors until they became a distinctive and ultimately ruinous feature of Spanish colonial and imperial policy.

After the withdrawal of Ximenes the whole aspect of the North African campaign changed. No one else had taken the possibilities of a Spanish empire in North Africa as seriously as he. Few but himself had cherished any thought of penetrating inland. Had he remained in command, an expedition against Tlemcen would almost infallibly have followed the capture of Oran, and there is every reason to think that it would have been successful, so thoroughly were the Moors demoralized by the losses they had already sustained. But with the cardinal in retirement the opposition had its innings. Ferdinand, and under him Navarro, were now the guiding minds. With the king the principal motive of the North African campaign had doubtless been the suppression of piracy; for Navarro, as we have already seen, the capture of booty was the main consideration; and both these ends could be far better attained by attacking other seaports than by advancing inland. In the autumn of 1509, therefore, it was decided that Navarro should attempt the capture of Bugia, just east of Algiers, leaving Oran in charge of Diego Fernández de Cordova, who was recommended for the purpose by the cardinal before his retirement, and invested with the imposing title of 'Captain General of the town of Oran, the fortress of Mers-el-Kebir, and the kingdom of Tlemcen.' In 1510 the ruler of the latter place recognized the sovereignty of Spain, and gave a solemn promise, which he shortly afterwards broke, to furnish aid to the Christians against their foes. Some of the neighboring tribes also made political and commercial treaties with the invaders in the succeeding years, but this and the emigration to Oran of six hundred Spanish families were all that the cardinal was able to accomplish towards the permanent foundation of the empire of which he had dreamed. For all practical purposes the control had passed into the hands of men who had much less ambitious ends in view.

The rest of the story of Spanish expansion in North Africa during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella may be briefly told. On January 1, 1510, Navarro set sail for Bugia with a large force, and a few days later dropped anchor in the bay before it. There is much discrepancy among the different accounts of the capture of the place. According to some authors the entire population fled at the sight of the Spanish fleet, and Navarro was able to take possession without striking a blow; it seems more probable, however, that the fugitives were merely the women and children, for there is good evidence that a vigorous resistance was made, under the lead of a Hafside prince named Abd-el-Aziz, before the invaders finally entered the place. Curiously enough, it was soon after, and as a direct result of their capture of Bugia, that the Spaniards first came in contact with the power which was ultimately to be their most effective foe in North Africa—the famous Barbarossa brothers. These two, whose names were Arudj and Khairaddin, were sons of a potter of the island of Mytilene, and after a stormy career as pirates in the Levant had transferred the

scene of their operations to the western Mediterranean. It was soon after their arrival off the North African coast that the dispossessed ruler of Bugia applied for their aid in the recovery of his dominions. The elder lost no time in seizing the opportunity that chance had thrown in his way. With a thousand Turks he joined forces with Abd-el-Aziz, and, probably in 1512—the date is somewhat uncertain—assaulted the Spaniards in Bugia. The assailants were repulsed with great slaughter; Arudj had his arm shattered by an arquebus shot, and his younger brother had to remove him to Tunis to recuperate. But he was anxious to repeat the experiment, and in the following year (1513) was again in the field. This time he resolved to proceed more methodically. He began by establishing himself on the island of Gerba, where the Moors had remained in unchallenged possession since the expedition of Alfonso the Magnanimous in 1432, and where Barbarossa could effectively organize an expedition at his leisure. Next he assaulted and captured Jijeli, just east of Bugia, from the Genoese (1514), who in a fit of jealousy at the recent Spanish conquests on the Barbary coast had possessed themselves of it the year before. Having obtained this solid base on the mainland, he returned in 1515 to the attack of Bugia, with the aid of a host of plundering Berbers who rallied to his standard. The town was heroically defended by a small garrison under Don Ramón Carroz for three months, at the expiration of which time Christian reinforcements arrived in such numbers that Barbarossa deemed it prudent to retire; but the Spaniards had by no means seen the last of him, as they were to learn to their cost in the succeeding reign.

Meantime the great majority of the adjacent Berber tribes were far too much terrified by Navarro's victories to contemplate further resistance. They deemed it more prudent to acknowledge Spanish overlordship, at least for the present, than to fight for their independence under the aegis of a Turkish corsair. Algiers was convinced that submission was the sole way to avoid the fate of Bugia. On January 31, 1510, a capitulation was signed by envoys whom the town had dispatched to Navarro to sue for peace, promising the recognition of the sovereignty of Spain, friendship with her friends, enmity to her foes, payment of tribute, and liberation of all Christian captives. Furthermore, the Algerians made haste to confirm their surrender to Navarro by dispatching an embassy to Ferdinand in Spain to ratify what they had done, and to offer costly presents to their new master. But Navarro believed in making assurance doubly sure. He realized that as the submission of Algiers had been rather compulsory than voluntary it was more likely to be temporary than permanent; he therefore took measures which he hoped would serve to hold his new vassals permanently to their allegiance. He seized and fortified an islet—the famous Peñón d'Algel—in the harbor directly opposite the town, and left a strong garrison there, in the belief that it would keep the inhabitants in perpetual terror of the Spanish arms; but it was only six years afterwards that Arudj Barbarossa entered Algiers in the face of the Spanish guns, while in 1529 his brother captured the Peñón itself, and built the mole which connects it with the mainland today. Certainly the Barbary coast was not to be permanently held by any such devices as these. Systematic conquest and colonization of the interior were the only way; but the sole advocate of such a policy as this was now in retirement at Alcalá, and for the time being Navarro's methods seemed amply sufficient. Tenes and Dellys made haste to follow the example of Algiers and send in their submission; and before the year 1510 was over Navarro was able to follow the injunctions of Ferdinand, and, discreetly avoiding the powerful fortifications of Tunis, to pass on to the conquest of Tripoli farther east. After a desperate resistance the town was captured. In deference to traditions inherited from Norman days, it was placed in the succeeding year under the jurisdiction of the viceroy of Sicily and accounted thenceforth an integral part of that kingdom until its cession to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem in 1528. It was the last conquest of the reign on the Barbary coast; moreover, it was almost immediately followed by a very serious reverse. Together with Garcia de Toledo, the father of the famous Duke of Alva, who had been sent over from Spain with seven thousand men for the purpose, Navarro attempted to capture the island of Gerba; but the expedition was most rashly launched,

without adequate preparations or knowledge of the country, and was finally beaten off by inferior forces with a loss of several thousand men. The disaster was not retrieved in Ferdinand's day. Navarro was called off to Italy by the war of the Holy League in the following year, and North African affairs were neglected during the rest of the reign.

The verdict which the student of history will pass on the whole North African enterprise under the Catholic Kings will depend primarily on the standpoint from which he regards it. Looked at as an isolated affair, or even as a phase of the development of the regions in question, it seems certain that the Spaniards would have done better to have followed the more ambitious program of Cardinal Ximenes and striven to establish a real Mauretanian Empire. The enterprise was hallowed by the most ancient of the national traditions: if the thing were worth doing at all, it certainly seems, when regarded as a separate problem, as if it would have been worth doing far better. But when we come to fit these North African campaigns into their proper setting in the general development of the Spanish Empire, we shall not be at a loss to find plenty of reasons, if not ample justification, for the somewhat halting method in which they were conducted. They formed, after all, only one, and perhaps on the whole the least important, of a vast number of problems that simultaneously claimed the attention of the Catholic Kings. Without even going into the question of internal affairs, it was inevitable that the responsibilities of maintaining and strengthening their political, territorial, and dynastic position in Europe, as well as the development of their newly discovered domains in the Western Hemisphere, should occupy a far larger share of the attention of the Spanish monarchs than the possibilities of further expansion on the Barbary coast. Had Oran or Mers-el-Kebir been captured before Columbus reached the Indies, or even before the beginning of the Italian wars, they might possibly have taken precedence; but as it was, these North African campaigns were started last of the long list of memorable enterprises which distinguish the reign of the Catholic Kings: under all the circumstances they were bound to be subordinated to the others. Indeed, the mere effort of retaining the few strongholds which had been won diverted energy and resources which were badly needed elsewhere. Superadded to the multitude of other cares and responsibilities which had so recently and so suddenly been saddled upon Spain, they constituted a burden which was ultimately to prove too heavy for her to bear. It was really a case of the last pound that breaks the camel's back.

CHAPTER XIX

MARRIAGE ALLIANCES AND THE CONQUEST OF NAPLES

No plainer evidence of the rapid rise of Spain's power and prestige in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella could be desired than the immense increase in the activity of her foreign policy. It has, perhaps, been the fashion somewhat to exaggerate the measure of the isolation of the mediaeval Spanish realms—to forget the conquests of Aragon in the Mediterranean and in Italy and to remember only the Moorish wars and the domestic troubles of Castile; but it is undeniable that the part played by the Iberian kingdoms in the general history of Europe down to the end of the fifteenth century was insignificant in comparison to that of England, France, or the Empire. Before the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, however, all this was radically changed. From comparative obscurity Spain leaped forward to a position of acknowledged prominence in the family of European states, and in the succeeding reigns she was, for a brief space, to attain primacy. On her relations with her neighbors the whole course of European history in the sixteenth century turned, and it was in the effort to prevent her from becoming omnipotent that the principle of the balance of power was gradually evolved. Her chief rival for the hegemony of Europe was France. England, at first her friend and ally, gradually became her foe, and finally dealt her the stroke which rendered ultimately inevitable the ruin of her dominion overseas. With the Empire she was accidentally brought into intimate dynastic relations which proved disastrous to both. Italy was the principal theatre of her continental wars. With Portugal, the most obvious menace to the even tenor of her imperial way, she consistently pursued a policy of friendship, and later of annexation by marriage, which was finally rewarded by temporary success in 1580-81. Against the Turk, after considerable hesitation, she declared the Holy War and announced herself the champion of Christendom. All, or nearly all, the issues involved in these momentous developments had proclaimed themselves before the end of the reign of the Catholic Kings; in fact most of the chief international problems of modern times were stated in the course of the first two decades of the sixteenth century, though the solution of them was reserved for later generations. And the man who set the stage for the great drama that was to unfold itself in Europe in the period when his country reached the highest pinnacle of her glory was King Ferdinand the Catholic. By him Spain was dragged forth from obscurity, and irrevocably committed to that immensely active foreign policy, which, under less sympathetic and skillful guidance, she followed unflinching for the next one hundred years. He took the lead in external affairs even more markedly than Isabella had done in domestic ones. The fortunes of the nation abroad could not, in the nature of things, be vigorously pressed until the great internal problems of the time had been solved. Then, when these necessary preliminaries had been cleared away, the queen became so absorbed in the affairs of the Indies and of North Africa that she left her husband a free hand to deal with his fellow potentates of Europe according to his own desires. Finally, after her death in 1504, that is, during the twelve last and most difficult years of the reign, Ferdinand had exclusive control of every phase of the policy of his native land. Thus the story which forms the subject of this and of the succeeding chapter begins inconspicuously, and for a long time is overshadowed by that of Spain's activities at home and in the Western Hemisphere; but it gradually emerges from obscurity into prominence, until at the end it takes precedence of everything else; and it is dominated throughout by the figure of the Catholic King

It will be convenient to clear away the account of Spain's relations with Portugal at the outset; for these constitute an episode by themselves, apart from the general current of European affairs, and almost unaffected by the history of Spain's dealings with the larger states. Since



Portugal had declared her independence in the twelfth century, Castile had often longed to win her back, and had several times taken steps, both peaceful and warlike, to attain that end. Castile's weakness and ill fortune, however, had invariably caused these efforts to fail, and when, in the latter part of the fifteenth century, she suddenly turned her face to the eastward and united her destinies to those of Aragon, the opposition of Portugal had nearly succeeded in subverting the thrones of Ferdinand and Isabella. But after the final defeat of the projects of Affonso the African, it was natural that the more ancient traditions of intimate alliance, if not of unity, should be revived. The expansion of Portugal down the West African coast made her friendship more desirable than ever for Castile; while the triumphant union of the Spanish kingdoms rendered it hopeless for Portugal to oppose them in war. It may indeed seem strange that Ferdinand and Isabella did not anticipate by a century the work of their great-grandson, Philip II, and deliberately invade and overwhelm their western neighbor by irresistible military force; and their failure to do so is the more difficult to explain when we remember the rapidity with which the value of the reward increased before their eyes, through the immense expansion of the Portuguese empire overseas. Excess of responsibilities and opportunities in other directions, rather than any hesitancy on grounds of international morality, was doubtless the principal cause; but one cannot help wondering whether it would not have been sounder policy for Spain to have sacrificed the Italian program of the latter part of the reign to a more vigorous prosecution of her ends in Portugal; and whether indeed she would not have done so, had King Ferdinand happened to be a Castilian. Be that as it may, the sovereigns were certainly too busy at home, at the time of the repulse of Affonso the African's last raid into Castile in 1479, to think of retaliating by a counter-invasion of Portugal. An honorable and secure peace was, for the time being, all that they cared to demand; and this, as we have already seen, they shortly afterwards obtained. At the same time it was arranged that their eldest child, Isabella, born October 1, 1470, should be married, when she had reached a suitable age, to Affonso, the grandson of Affonso the African, and the son of the future King John the Perfect. An intimate dynastic alliance, such as had frequently been made in early days, once more united the two realms; but whereas hitherto it had usually been the Castilian Infante who had wedded the Portuguese princess, now, for the first time since the middle of the fourteenth century, a Portuguese Infante had found a wife in Castile. The primary cause of the change was unquestionably the fact that there was not at that time available any Portuguese princess of a suitable age for Ferdinand and Isabella's only son John, who was born June 30, 1478; had a favorable opportunity offered they would doubtless have been glad to continue the policy of their predecessors. Yet in their readiness to marry Isabella to the Portuguese Infante, as well as in the fact that they subsequently arranged for their son John an alliance in a very different quarter of Europe, we have evidence that their chief object for the moment was rather to conciliate Portugal, and to win her friendship, than to prepare the way for reannexing her. It is also clear that in view of the great increase of strength which had resulted from the union of Aragon and Castile, they felt that they could face with equanimity the very slight risk that their daughter's marriage might someday threaten the independence of Spain by giving her a Portuguese sovereign.

The wedding of Isabella and Affonso was finally celebrated in the autumn of 1490; but the bridegroom died a few months afterwards, and the Infanta returned to her native land, to forget her grief in works of charity and devotion. Her father-in-law, King John the Perfect, continued to reign in Portugal until his death on October 25, 1495, when he was succeeded by his cousin, Emmanuel the Fortunate, hitherto Duke of Bejar, and at that time twenty-six years of age. Emmanuel, it would appear, had become enamored of Isabella during her previous residence in Lisbon. Immediately after his accession he sent an embassy to the Castilian Court to ask for her hand and to offer a renewal of the ancient alliance. His overtures were finally rewarded by success, but not until the autumn of 1497; and the contemporary chroniclers assure us that the cause of the long delay was the reluctance of the Infanta to marry again, which was only overcome

at the last by the earnest entreaties of her parents. It seems highly probable, however, that political considerations had much to do with the whole affair. The Portugal of 1495 was far stronger than that of 1479. In 1484 Diogo Cam had discovered the Congo; in 1486 Bartholomew Diaz had doubled the Cape of Good Hope. The new king was known to cherish most ambitious projects, and to be haunted by the idea that he might some day unite all the Iberian realms under his own scepter. In Spain, on the other hand, the dynastic situation was critical in the extreme. No other sons, except John, had been born to the royal pair, and as their youngest daughter, Catharine of Aragon, was by this time ten years old, they had little hope of further issue. If by any chance John should die childless, such offspring as Isabella might have by Emmanuel would inherit the Spanish thrones, and Portugal would become, theoretically at least, the head of a united Iberia. Such a prospect would of course be most unwelcome to the Catholic Kings, and it seems probable that they deliberately postponed the union of Isabella and Emmanuel until they should be sure of the marriage of John with Margaret, the daughter of the Hapsburg Emperor, Maximilian. This match, as we shall subsequently see, had been under consideration for several years past. It had been practically settled in the early part of 1495, but the vacillations of the Emperor had postponed the final ratification until the fifth of the following November; and the anxieties of the Catholic kings concerning it were not absolutely set at rest until the actual celebration of the marriage on April 3, 1497. Margaret's pregnancy was announced in the course of the summer, so that Ferdinand and Isabella felt reasonably safe in going ahead with the Portuguese match; in September Isabella was finally wedded to Emmanuel at Val de Alcántara near the frontier. But the sovereigns were keenly alive to the possible dangers inherent in the alliance to which they had consented and were resolved to extort an important concession in return. Apparently on the plea that the marriage of Emmanuel and Isabella might some day result in the union of all the Iberian realms under a single scepter, and that conformity of action in racial and religious matters was therefore imperative, they demanded, and Emmanuel agreed, that all the Jews in Portugal should promptly be expelled, as they had already been, five years before, from Aragon and Castile.

Then, like a bolt from the blue, came that truly terrible series of deaths which ruined all the carefully laid plans of Ferdinand and Isabella, and ultimately brought to pass a catastrophe far more serious than that which they had feared. The wedding ceremonies of Emmanuel and Isabella were clouded by the news of the dangerous illness of the Infante John: on October 4, 1497, he died. Shortly afterwards his widow, Margaret, was delivered of a stillborn child; and all the direct descendants of the Catholic Kings in the male line were thus wiped out. Isabella, the wife of Emmanuel, now became the legal heiress of her parents, and she and her husband were promptly summoned over from Portugal and solemnly recognized as the lawful successors to the Castilian throne by the Cortes, assembled at Toledo. An attempt to extort a similar acknowledgment from the more obstinate representatives of Aragon elicited vigorous opposition, owing to the doubts cast upon female rights of inheritance; but the discussion was closed in tragic fashion on August 23, 1498, by the death of Isabella in childbirth. Her baby, a boy, who was named Miguel, received the recognition that was denied to his mother, so that the crowns of Aragon, Castile, and Portugal were now, as Prescott says, "suspended over one head"; but the situation was not destined to endure, for on July 20, 1500, before he had completed his second year, the Infante followed his mother to the grave. This event terminated, of course, all danger of a Portuguese monarch's falling heir to the Spanish throne, but it also, unfortunately, confronted the nation with a far more grievous peril—the succession of the foreign Hapsburg offspring of the marriage of the sovereign's third, and oldest remaining child, Joanna, to the Archduke Philip the Handsome. In view, therefore, of the distressing prospect that the sovereignty of Spain might one day be carried across the Pyrenees, there was every reason why Ferdinand and Isabella should wish to draw near to Portugal, in order to make a united stand for the cause of Iberian freedom from the matrimonial entanglements of the house of Hapsburg. The fresh strides of Portugal's territorial

advance in distant lands since the marriage of Emmanuel to Isabella were an added argument for the renewal of the ancient bonds. Vasco da Gama had reached India in 1497; Pedro Alvares Cabral discovered Brazil, and Gaspar Cortereal, Labrador, in the spring and summer of 1500; for one brief moment it almost seemed as if the imperial prospects of the little western kingdom were destined to eclipse those of Spain itself. Consequently, when Emmanuel, still fascinated with the dream of possibly placing his descendants on the thrones of Castile and Aragon, approached their Catholic Majesties with a proposal to marry their fourth child, Maria, they did not hesitate to accept; and the wedding was celebrated in October, 1500.

From that time onward, until the end of the reign, the relations of Spain and Portugal call for no special remark. It was to the interest of both states to keep on the friendliest possible terms with one another. Both were exceedingly busy in extending their possessions in distant lands; neither had any time to spare for bickerings with its next-door neighbor. Even in their new dominions overseas they scrupulously avoided collisions in this period. There was a notable cessation of Portuguese raids on the Canaries, and the boundary between the Portuguese and Spanish spheres of influence in North Africa was amicably settled, as we have already seen, in 1509. Emmanuel continued to the last to cherish the hope of ultimately winning the Spanish thrones for his descendants, and when his second wife, Maria, died in 1517, he immediately took steps to renew the tie that had been broken by marrying for the third time into the royal family of Spain. The bride that was selected for him on this last occasion was Eleanor, the niece of his first two wives, and elder sister of the Emperor Charles V, who was struggling for recognition as king by the Cortes of the different Spanish realms at the time that the marriage took place; but Emmanuel died in 1521, and was succeeded by John III, the offspring of his union with Maria. In the following reigns, as we shall later see, the policy of intermarriage between the two royal families was carried further still—so far indeed as ultimately to transgress the laws of nature; moreover, in the next generation the Spanish monarchs turned the tables on Emmanuel, and themselves reverted to the ideas of reannexation by dynastic unions that had animated the mediaeval Castilian kings. Charles V married the sister of John III; the first wife of his son Philip II was the Empress's niece and the Portuguese king's daughter; finally, when the 'curse of the Jews' had carried off all the other direct descendants of Emmanuel the Fortunate, the Spanish sovereign was able to realize the hopes and ambitions of a multitude of his predecessors, and seat himself at last upon the Portuguese throne.

When we contrast the Portuguese policy of the Catholic kings with that of their predecessors and successors, we note, in the first place, that they were obliged to abandon their aims of annexation by marriage for lack of opportunities to carry them out; but that on the other hand they saw that it was essential to terminate the ancient quarrels that had divided the two states in previous generations and to cultivate friendly relations. To attain this end they even risked the danger of Spain's being united to Portugal, but they accomplished their object, and broke, for the time being, the miserable tradition of hostility that stretched back for so many years. When we recall the fact that the crucial lap in the race for imperial domain was being run by the two nations at the very moment that this happy change was being effected in their relations at home, we shall appreciate more fully the wisdom and importance of the policy of Ferdinand and Isabella in this regard. The treaty of Tordesillas would, in all probability, have been a scrap of paper before the reign was finished, if it had not been strengthened and supported by the consistent maintenance of cordial friendship between the high contracting parties in the Iberian Peninsula. That peace with Portugal was also absolutely essential to the effective handling of Spain's different problems in other parts of Europe is too obvious to need further emphasis here.

The dealings of Spain with the various non-Iberian nations are so closely interrelated that it is useless to attempt to follow the course of the Catholic Kings' policy toward any one state without keeping in touch with their contemporary dealings with all the rest. From first to last, however, the story revolves around their rivalry with France. There lay the gist of the whole matter, and Spain's attitude towards the other countries was primarily governed by it.

We have already seen that Castile, the larger and dominant portion of Spain, had enjoyed an unusually long and uninterrupted tradition of amity with France during the later Middle Ages, but that in the third quarter of the fifteenth century the friendship between the two countries had been severely strained. The immediate reason for this was the various efforts of Louis XI, already described, directly or indirectly to prevent the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, and to frustrate the ends for which it stood. Another cause of a more general nature, yet certain to be exceedingly effective in the long run, was the fact that with the close of the Hundred Years' War and the expulsion of the English from Gascony the two kingdoms became for the first time contiguous to one another at the western end of the Pyrenees. By the realms of the Crown of Aragon, on the other hand, France had been regarded for more than two centuries past almost in the light of an hereditary foe.

The princes of the house of Anjou had been the chief rivals of Aragon in Italy, and there was an even more ancient tradition of hostility with the French crown over the lands north of the Pyrenees which had been claimed at one time or another by the Aragonese kings. Furthermore, these enmities had all been accentuated and brought to a head by events of the latter part of the reign of John II and of the early years of that of Ferdinand. There was, in the first place, the bitter memory of the way in which Louis XI had tried to make capital for himself out of the Catalonian revolt in the reign of John II. Despite all the latter's energy and skill, he had been obliged to endure the humiliation of leaving Cerdagne and Roussillon in French hands at the time of his death, and to hand on the task of reconquering them to his son; certainly the French king's cooperation in John's Navarrese policy had not been hearty enough to efface the remembrance of his treachery farther eastward. Then, in 1480-81, with the deaths of old King René and of his nephew Charles, the ancient line of the counts of Anjou had become extinct, and Louis XI fell heir to the Angevin lands in Provence and also to the Angevin pretensions to Naples. The Neapolitan question did not directly influence the course of Franco-Spanish relations for many years to come, but the effect of the acquisition of Provence was felt at once. It gave the French monarchs a long and valuable stretch of seacoast on the western basin of the Mediterranean—a coign of vantage from which they could deal deadly blows to the progress of the Aragonese Empire. Never before, in fact, had there been anywhere nearly so many opportunities for dissension between France and Spain as at the accession of the Catholic Kings; never had the interests of the two nations threatened to conflict at so many different points. It is true that the large majority of these causes of quarrel pertained only to the realms of the Crown of Aragon; but with Ferdinand in control of the foreign policy of united Spain it was inevitable that they should become the dominating factors in the situation. Under the circumstances, the ancient traditions of Franco-Castilian friendship and alliance were bound to be forgotten, and France and Spain to engage in a desperate struggle for supremacy.

It was a long time, however, before that struggle declared itself in open war. From 1480 to 1495 it was essentially a battle of secret diplomacy and intrigue, such as was dear to the heart of the crafty king of Aragon. On the Spanish side the cause of the long delay in appealing to arms is obvious at a glance—the imperative need of restoring order and strong government at home, and of expelling the Moors from Granada, before launching the united kingdoms on the perils of a foreign war. In France, also, the desire to attain internal unity accounted for much. The last three years of the life of Louis XI were chiefly occupied in reaping the rewards of his earlier efforts to ruin his feudal vassals; and his son Charles VIII, who succeeded him in August, 1483, devoted

the first part of his reign to the termination of the independent existence of the duchy of Brittany. Indeed, the struggle over Brittany (1485-91) became for a time the storm centre of European politics during the period immediately previous to the opening of the Italian wars. Spain, England, and the Hapsburgs were all intimately concerned in it, each striving to utilize the embarrassments of the king of France in such a way as to extort concessions valuable to themselves. It thus forms an admirable starting point for our examination of the foreign policy of Ferdinand and Isabella, and a glance at it will enable us to get a clear idea of the aims and relative positions of the different European powers on the eve of the famous raid of Charles VIII on Naples.

The first object of the Catholic Kings was to get back Cerdagne and Roussillon, whose recovery was regarded by Spain as almost equally important with the conquest of Granada. There had apparently been some talk of Charles VIII's voluntarily restoring them at the beginning of the reign; but as nothing ever came of it, the episode merely had the effect of whetting the appetites of Ferdinand and Isabella. Then arose the struggle in Brittany, which offered the sovereigns a splendid opportunity to fish in troubled waters, to increase the difficulties of their rival the young king of France, and perhaps indirectly to accomplish the end which was nearest their hearts. They themselves were far too busy actively to interfere in such a remote region; but there were two other powers already involved in the contest, either one of which might conceivably be induced by a suitable reward to do for the Catholic Kings the work which they were at present unable to perform. The first of these two powers was Maximilian, the Hapsburg King of the Romans, the son of the Emperor Frederick III, and, through his marriage in 1477 with Mary the daughter of Charles the Bold, the heir to all the ancient Burgundian quarrels with the crown of France. His wife had died in 1482, leaving him as regent in the Netherlands for their son Philip; moreover, he had been in close relations with the duke of Brittany since 1486, and had even gone so far as to promise to marry the latter's daughter Anne in order to cement their alliance against their common enemy Charles VIII. The other was Henry Tudor, king of England since 1485, who, though he was greatly indebted to the French monarch for timely aid in his final and successful attempt to win the English throne, had also spent no less than twelve of the earlier years of his exile in Brittany, where he had been most hospitably treated by the duke. Of the two sovereigns, Maximilian seemed at first to have more causes of quarrel with the French king than did Henry VII, and, consequently, to promise better for the purposes of Ferdinand and Isabella. In the spring of 1488, however, an unexpected event occurred which determined them to try to make use of the king of England instead.

This event was the arrival of proposals from the English court for a close political and commercial alliance between the two kingdoms and the marriage of Arthur, the eldest son of the English monarch, to Catharine, the youngest daughter of the Catholic Kings. No one realized more thoroughly than Ferdinand and Isabella that Henry came to them with these friendly overtures as a suppliant. The new Tudor dynasty was not yet firmly seated on the English throne. It was threatened by pretenders, and by the hostility of neighboring states. Moreover the realm had fallen so low during the anarchy of the Wars of the Roses that it had forfeited the respect of continental Europe, and desperate efforts were necessary to enable it to regain its badly shaken prestige. In an intimate alliance with the Spanish sovereigns, whose fame had already begun to spread beyond the boundaries of their realm, the English king saw the chance for which he had been waiting; in no other way could he so significantly assert his right to be treated as an equal by the other monarchs of the time. But upstarts have to pay heavily for recognition, and Ferdinand and Isabella did not propose to permit the case of Henry Tudor to prove an exception to the rule. They determined, as the price of the union for which the English king was so desirous, to demand that he break with Charles VIII, by whose help he had won his throne, enter the Breton war against him in alliance with the King of the Romans, against whom he bore a grudge—in fact that he so



embarrass the king of France in the northwest of his dominions, that Ferdinand and Isabella should be able to gain with a minimum of effort the southern counties on which their hearts were set. Henry VII, in other words, was to win Cerdagne and Roussillon, for Spain, from France, in Brittany. Such was the real significance of the famous treaty signed at Medina del Campo, March 27, 1489, between the Catholic Kings and the English ambassadors, in which the latter finally agreed to the conditions imposed by the former in return for their alliance and the hand of their daughter.

The war in Brittany which ensued on the conclusion of this treaty was slackly conducted by all the participants, save possibly the king of France. Maximilian, blow hot, blow cold, at one moment deserted the allies, and at the next returned to the attack, thus convincing every one with whom he dealt of his absolute untrustworthiness. The Spaniards sent a bare thousand men into the duchy to besiege Redon, and also to keep watch on the conduct of their English allies, whom they expected to do most of the work. But Henry Tudor was no novice at the game of diplomacy. He was exceedingly loath to break with Charles VIII at all and made the most of every opportunity to delay the opening of the war which he had bound himself to wage. Not until 1492 did he seriously take the field. The fate of Brittany had already been decided by that time. On December 6, 1491, the Duchess Anne had been married to Charles VIII, and the way had thus been paved for the union of the province to the domain of the Crown of France. But the international issues which had become involved in the struggle still remained unsettled, and there is no knowing when the solution would have been reached had not the young French king, in defiance of sound precedent and the advice of his wisest counsellors, abandoned the work of internal consolidation, which had been bequeathed to him by his father, and begun to prepare for his memorable raid on Naples. Peace with his neighbors was of course the obvious prerequisite to an expedition into distant lands, and as Charles was all on fire to depart, he naturally paid the price demanded by those with whom he dealt. To Henry of England, by the peace of Etaples (November 3, 1492), he promised 745,000 crowns of gold as reimbursement for the expenses of his campaign. To Ferdinand and Isabella, by the treaty of Barcelona (January 19, 1493), he restored Cerdagne and Roussillon without even demanding payment of the 300,000 crowns for which John of Aragon had pawned them to Louis XI. The sole compensation which Charles received for his surrender of the counties was a promise, soon to be broken, that the Catholic Kings would make no marriage alliances with the King of the Romans without his consent, and would consider themselves the enemies of all those, save the Pope, who should be at war with France. The definitive handing over to the Catholic Kings of the lands for which the Tudor sovereign, in order to get his marriage treaty, had entered the war, was thus postponed until two and a half months after the English monarch had withdrawn from it; but as the cession had been discussed between the representatives of France and Spain since the year 1491, Henry VII must have known, when he signed the treaty of Etaples, that with Charles's attention riveted on Naples, the Catholic Kings would obtain what they desired. The result of the Italian projects of the young king of France was really a windfall for the sovereigns of both England and Spain. The latter got back the lands on which they had set their hearts far more easily and swiftly than they had any right to expect; the former obtained his marriage treaty without the serious military effort which, at one time, had seemed inevitable—indeed, without permanently imperiling his friendly relations with France. Finally, the treaty of Senlis (May 23, 1493), by which Charles VIII purchased peace with Maximilian before his departure for Italy, had an important bearing on the subsequent fortunes of Spain. By it Margaret, the daughter of Maximilian, who had been destined for Charles VIII, and had resided in Paris since 1483, was handed back to her father; and with her went the lands which were to have constituted her dowry. The way was thus opened for her subsequent marriage to the Infante John in 1497, and the continuation of the territorial jealousies of France and the Hapsburgs was insured for the future.

The Breton war had served in fact to place the pieces for the great game of international politics which was to be played during the critical period of the Italian wars. It gave renewed proof of the irreconcilability of the ambitions of Spain and France. The treaties with which it ended had no element of permanence. It had merely served to reveal to Ferdinand and Isabella the gross incompetence of the French king and was the prelude to a fresh outburst of hostilities in another place. Moreover the course of the struggle in Brittany had also shown the Catholic Kings where to look for allies in their forthcoming duel with the kings of France. They had been able to bring the English monarch into the war on their side and hoped to do so again. This hope was not invariably realized in the succeeding years; in fact, some of the most serious mistakes of Spanish diplomacy in the sixteenth century arose from deficient comprehension of the fact that the Tudors, save for a few temporary aberrations, had thrown over the mediaeval English tradition of enmity to France. Still, for the time being, it is no wonder that Spain thought she could gain many advantages by keeping the ancient animosities alive. From Maximilian also something might reasonably be expected. There was no question of his hostility to France; the danger was lest his versatility and ubiquitousness might destroy the value of his alliance for Spain. In any case, the plan of a marriage between the Archduke Philip, son and heir of the King of the Romans, and one of the daughters of Ferdinand and Isabella was under discussion at least as early as the autumn of 1491, and even spoken of as a settled matter in the following February. The origins of the most fateful dynastic union of the sixteenth century are thus to be traced back to the period of this Breton war. Finally, the years of this singular conflict saw Ferdinand and Isabella reach a satisfactory solution of their internal problems, and consequently set them free to devote a far larger share of their energies to foreign affairs. Hitherto they had been obliged to do most of their work through others. Henceforth they were able to enter the lists themselves, with all the power and prestige which their domestic triumphs had insured them. The preliminary period was in fact over, the main events were about to begin, and with the change the scene of interest shifts from northwestern France to southern Italy.

We left Italian affairs in 1458, at the death of Alfonso the Magnanimous, who had bequeathed Naples to his illegitimate son, Ferrante, while the rest of his domains were inherited by his brother John. For the next thirty years the two Aragonese courts in Spain and in Naples were united in most intimate friendship and alliance; they maintained a regular family compact. John was too busy at home to interfere actively with Italy, though he had numerous interests there; it was consequently essential for him to keep on the best of terms with his nephew, who could represent him on the spot. Ferrante needed the aid of his uncle against hostile Angevins and Turkish corsairs, and welcomed his advances. In all the 'leagues for the preservation of Italian peace' which succeeded one another in such bewildering confusion at this time, the name of John of Aragon is invariably found together with that of his nephew. In 1476 Ferrante married, as his second wife, Joanna, the daughter of his uncle, and a sister of Ferdinand the Catholic. The objects of this intimate alliance were defensive rather than offensive. Maintenance of the status quo was at that period all that either partner could reasonably expect. The alliance was founded, moreover, essentially on practical considerations, rather than on any real affection. John doubtless coveted Naples for himself, and would have been only too glad to expel Ferrante if he could. Ferrante, on his part, bore no love to his uncle and would willingly have thrown him over had he dared. But as a matter of fact neither sovereign was strong enough to do without the other; and on John's death, in 1479, his son inherited the Neapolitan alliance.

Though Ferdinand the Catholic was no less busy in Spain during the early part of his reign than his father had been before him, he was obliged from the very beginning to take a somewhat more active part in Italian affairs. Every time he interfered there, however, in this first period, he did so on behalf of his Neapolitan kinsman; in fact the sole object of his Italian policy seemed to be to defend Ferrante against his various foes. When the Turks took Otranto in 1480, Ferdinand

was the chief agent in forming the league of princes that expelled them in the following year; moreover he dispatched no fewer than seventy ships from Castile to aid the Christian forces. Still more significant was the action of the Spanish monarch in a small conflict of the characteristic Italian sort which broke out in the northern part of the peninsula in 1482. On May 2 of that year, Venice, land-hungry and insolent, and supported by Pope Sixtus IV, declared war on Ercole d'Este, duke of Ferrara; the Pope moreover solicited the aid of Louis XI, offering in return to help him to assert the French claims in Naples against the house of Aragon. Wide ramifications of the impending struggle were obviously possible; and Ferrante of Naples, who, besides being threatened in his own domains, was father-in-law to the duke of Ferrara, applied for the support of the Catholic Kings. The latter, totally unprepared at that juncture for any considerable military effort beyond the boundaries of their realm, were yet most unwilling to see their Neapolitan kinsman deprived of his dominions. Accordingly they strove at first to prevent the conflict by conciliatory means, and by reminding the Pope of his duty to maintain peace among Christian princes. Meantime they became convinced that Louis XI was so old and feeble that there was no danger of the French interference which they dreaded most of all. Consequently when the Venetians, scorning arbitration, invaded Ferrara in the course of the summer, the Spanish sovereigns adopted a more vigorous attitude, threatened commercial war with the republic, and spoke of armed intervention to the Pope. The latter was so impressed by these menaces that he promptly ratted to the side of Naples and Ferrara. By the end of the year 1482, Venice had not a single ally left among the Italian states, save Genoa; but she was still too proud to lay down her arms, and attempted to strengthen herself by begging for the intervention of France. The war, then, was by no means over, though the ultimate issue could not long remain in doubt. During the whole of the year 1483, the sovereigns, busy with the Granadan campaign, strove their hardest to put on others the work of bringing the republic to its senses. They even advised Ferrante of Naples to consider a league with the Turk against Venice, and gave him full power, in case it should be concluded, to enroll the realms of the Crown of Aragon among its members. But more vigorous measures than these were necessary on the part of the Spanish monarchs to bring the Ferrara war to a close. Early in 1484 they fulfilled their threat of a commercial campaign against the republic, and expelled all Venetians from their territories. In the following June they sent a fleet into Italian waters to cooperate with that of Naples. Finally, on August 7, they had the extreme satisfaction of compelling Venice to sign a treaty which granted all their demands and reestablished the status quo. The whole episode had demonstrated the vigor of the Spanish-Neapolitan alliance and greatly enhanced the prestige of Ferdinand and Isabella. They had asserted in dramatic fashion their right to be consulted in future settlements of Italian affairs.

Just ten years later the two ends of Spain's foreign policy were most unexpectedly drawn together by the French king's crossing the Alps at the head of a large army, intent on possessing himself of Naples as heir of the house of Anjou: fascinated, as Comines says, "with the smoke and glories of Italy." The strength of the Spanish-Neapolitan alliance was now to be tested again. To all the old causes of Franco-Spanish hostility which had come to the surface in the struggle for the throne of Castile and in the Breton war, another was now to be added—and in view of the memories it awakened, it was perhaps the most potent of them all. And now for the first time the Catholic Kings were able to give their chief attention to the direction of foreign affairs. The Granadan war was over. Their thrones were secure. Neither the Indies nor North Africa had yet begun to occupy a large share of their attention. They had a well-trained and efficient army and could back up their diplomacy by military force. Opportunity came in a way that no one could have anticipated, simultaneously with the ability to utilize it. The intensity of the struggle with France increased with the enlargement of its scope.

But though Spain was now far stronger than ever before, and though Ferdinand fully realized the rashness and incompetence of Charles VIII, his conduct at this crisis was marked with

even more than his usual caution. He was the last man in the world to play carelessly when the game was in his own hands; and besides, might there not be a double stake to be won from the French king's descent into Italy. Hitherto, as we have seen, the Neapolitan alliance had been almost a necessity for Spain; but now, with her internal problems solved, it might safely be thrown over—the more so, since the able though vicious Ferrante had been succeeded, in January 1494, by his much less valorous son Alfonso. Neither Ferdinand nor his father before him had given up hope of ultimately reuniting Naples to their own dominions; at the bottom of their hearts they had always regarded the illegitimate Neapolitan dynasty as usurpers; but they had both realized that to quarrel with it before they had set their own house in order would be madness. Now at last the chance had come. Coincident with the termination of the domestic difficulties of the Catholic Kings, their arch enemy, the king of France, was voluntarily setting out on an expedition directed against their ally of the past, whom they now were quite ready to cast aside. On the face of it, the situation gave the Spanish sovereigns every pretext for declaring war on Charles VIII, whom it was essential sooner or later to expel from Italy; but on the other hand, there was obviously much to be gained by delaying the opening of hostilities until the Valois monarch should have attacked and weakened for them the Neapolitan dynasty which they were now most desirous to displace. And the supreme cleverness of the Italian diplomacy of Ferdinand the Catholic during the next ten years consists in the fact that he timed the ebbs and flows of his policy in just such a way as most effectively to compass both these ends.

At first the Catholic Kings seemed anxious above all things to prevent the French king's expedition. In the winter of 1493-94 they dispatched their ambassador Diego López de Haro to the Vatican to counterwork the envoys of Charles VIII, and to keep the new Pope, Alexander VI, on the side of the Neapolitan king. Six months later they sent a special envoy, Alfonso de Silva, to the French monarch at Vienne, to warn him to desist from his enterprise and to recommend that he devote all his forces to a war against the Turk. When Charles replied that by the peace of Barcelona Ferdinand had bound himself to treat the enemies of France as his own, Silva reminded him that since Naples was a fief of the Holy See, it was not affected by the provisions of that instrument. Yet, on the other hand, the Spanish sovereigns carefully avoided giving effect to their threat for many months to come. They had formally taken their stand against the French invasion; but they suffered Charles to cross the Alps unopposed in August, 1494, and to proceed as far as Rome before he heard from them again. Then at last, in January—February, 1495, just as the young monarch was about to enter the kingdom of Naples, the ultimatum came. Ferdinand's envoys, Juan Albion and Antonio de Fonseca, gained access to the French king, roundly accused him of insulting their master and maltreating the Pope, warned him again to abandon the Neapolitan enterprise, and finally threatened, in case he persisted with it, to throw over the treaty of Barcelona: the older historians tell us that on receiving an angry reply from Charles, the ambassadors dramatically produced the original copy of that agreement and tore it in pieces before his eyes. Whatever the precise manner in which the interview ended, its purport could not possibly be misunderstood; it was nothing more nor less than a frank declaration of war. Yet it is important to notice that the climax had been postponed until the other aim of the Spanish monarch's Italian policy had been at least partially accomplished. On January 23, while Charles was still at Rome, Alfonso of Naples had voluntarily abdicated the throne of that kingdom in favor of his son, Ferrante II, and retired to Sicily. Not until the Neapolitan dynasty had begun to totter was the challenge of Spain hurled at the king of France. Of course the extreme slowness of communication between Spain and Italy renders it impossible that Ferdinand should have planned the timing of the ultimate defiance of Charles to accord so exactly with his own desires. It was owing to good luck, rather than to foresight, that it occurred precisely when it did. Nevertheless, the fact that he had delayed it so long may reasonably be taken to indicate that he was not unwilling to see Charles temporarily attain the goal of his ambition. The ulterior objects of Ferdinand the Catholic in Naples, quite as much as the difficulties and delays of military

preparation, were unquestionably responsible for the fact that the king of France had been allowed to get so far.

Ferdinand of Aragon was not the man to issue a challenge without being ready to fight. As in the Breton war, however, he determined, as far as possible, to put the work on others. Since the autumn of 1494 he had been planning the formation of a league against Charles VIII, in order to make sure of victory when the time for action should come. The question was where to look for allies; and among the Italian states he quickly decided that Venice, his enemy in the Ferrara war, was the most suitable for his purpose. The republic was probably the most powerful of all the states in the peninsula at the time, and political combinations shifted far too rapidly in the Italy of those days for her to cherish any lasting resentment against Spain for the quarrel of ten years before. She was out of the line of march of the French king, and consequently could make her preparations undisturbed. She was also, for the moment, on excellent terms with Lodovico il Moro, duke of Milan, whose sister, Hippolita, had married Alfonso of Naples. In the autumn of 1494, accordingly, Ferdinand despatched an ambassador, Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa, to Venice to propose to that power a league with the Pope against Charles VIII, and to promise the cooperation of a Spanish fleet and troops under Gonsalvo de Cordova. On January 5, 1495, Figueroa reached his destination and immediately set to work. In order fairly to estimate the situation with which he was confronted, we must leave him for a moment at Venice, and examine the ramifications of the policy of his wily master in other parts of Europe.

In the Breton war, it will be remembered, Ferdinand had been greatly aided in his efforts to embarrass the French monarch by Henry VII of England, and also by Maximilian, King of the Romans, who now, since the death of his father on August 19, 1493, was Holy Roman Emperor in all but name. It was therefore natural that in the present crisis he should turn to them again. From the former he was able to gain nothing of substantial value. The Tudor king was by this time far too firmly set upon his throne to be induced, as before, to break with France. He did, indeed, finally adhere to the league against Charles VIII which Ferdinand was striving to create, but not until September 1496, long after it had accomplished its purpose. With the versatile Maximilian, Ferdinand was much more successful. Even before Charles VIII had begun to think of his descent on Naples, there had been talk of a marriage between Maximilian's son, the Archduke Philip, and one of the daughters of the Catholic Kings; and in 1492 embassies had been exchanged between the two powers for the purpose of settling the terms. No very rapid progress was made in these early stages, chiefly for the reason that Charles VIII had refused to give up Cerdagne and Roussillon until assured that Ferdinand would make no marriage alliances with the Hapsburgs without his consent: such, it will be remembered, was the stipulation in the treaty of Barcelona of January 19, 1493. But now, with the coveted territory safe within their grasp, the Spanish sovereigns were perfectly ready, in case any advantage could be gained by so doing, to tear up the agreement they had made. They consequently despatched another envoy, Francisco de Rojas, to the court of Maximilian in November, 1493, to bring the matrimonial negotiations to a conclusion.

The task was not an easy one. The plan of marrying the Infante John to the Archduchess Margaret had by this time taken shape and had to be considered in conjunction with that of the union of Joanna and Philip. Maximilian, as usual, changed his mind almost every day. Philip's Francophile leanings made matters doubly complicated and led to constant bickerings with his father. Furthermore, Rojas was greatly embarrassed by the fact that down to the final denunciation of the treaty of Barcelona, in February, 1495, the Catholic Kings insisted on continuing the pretense of demanding the consent of Charles VIII. By the spring of 1494, however, the Spanish ambassador had successfully concluded his business, at least with the Hapsburgs. A letter of the Catholic Kings to their envoy, dated July 1, from Arevalo, indicates that the only thing lacking was the approbation of the king of France. Failure to obtain this was



doubtless responsible for the postponement of the final ratifications until the time that Ferdinand was ready openly to break with Charles VIII; and the exciting events that followed further delayed matters until November 5, 1495, when the treaties were finally confirmed at Malines. But though the last formalities were not complete until after the French king had been driven out of Italy, the alliances were practically certain before he entered it, so that King Ferdinand had every reason to hope for the active support of Maximilian in his Italian schemes. Furthermore his new intimacy with the Emperor had a most important effect on his negotiations with Venice. We have already seen that the republic was in many respects admirably fitted to be the instrument of Ferdinand's plans for opposing Charles VIII; but there had been one serious difficulty in the way. For years Venice had lived in terror of invasion by Maximilian, who had repeatedly announced his intention of conquering her; not until she was relieved of that menace could the republic devote her energies to making war on the king of France. Now, in November, 1494, she was most agreeably surprised to receive friendly overtures from the Emperor, which were gladly accepted by the Doge, and ripened in the following January into proposals for a regular alliance. Though we have no document to prove it, there seems every reason to believe that this change in the attitude of Maximilian, so convenient for the realization of Ferdinand's Italian aims, was effected through the skillful ambassador of the Catholic Kings in the Netherlands.

It was almost three months later, however, before the confederates could be brought together in a formal treaty to attain their ends. Suarez de Figueroa labored for it with might and main, but there were still many difficulties to be overcome. Philippe de Comines had been posted in Venice by the king of France to watch developments and report, and it was by no means easy to hoodwink him into believing that all was well. Moreover both the Venetians and the duke of Milan, though they had been brought to good terms with Maximilian, showed a decided repugnance to having the armies of the Emperor cross the Alps. "If the Germans descend upon Italy", said Lodovico il Moro, "they will be in no wise preferable to the French; instead of one fever we shall have two". All this, coupled with Maximilian's other responsibilities, prevented the arrival of the vanguard of the imperial army in Italy until the late summer of 1495, after Charles had got back into the north of the peninsula; it was not until 1496 that Maximilian himself was able to lead an expedition across the mountains, and when it did finally arrive, it turned out to be a miserable failure. Ferdinand in Spain was doubtless accurately informed of the Emperor's numerous embarrassments, and realized from the first that little military assistance could be expected from him. All the more reason why he should hasten his own preparations. By December, 1494, he had got ready a large fleet and 3500 soldiers, to be dispatched, under Admiral Galceran de Requesens, to Sicily, to cooperate with the forces that were being mustered there. Meantime, on March 31, 1495, the League was formally signed at Venice between the Pope, the Emperor, Spain, the Venetians, and the duke of Milan, "for the peace and tranquility of Italy, the welfare of all Christendom, the defense of the honor and authority of the Holy See, and the rights of the Holy Roman Empire, ... and the protection of its members against the aggressions of other potentates at that time possessed of states in Italy, even if those potentates should lose those states in the duration of the League." The news of it reached Ferdinand in Spain either late in April or early in May; it caused him at once to send off to Sicily another detachment of 2100 men under Gonsalvo de Cordova, to support the troops of Requesens, who was already on the spot, and to bear aid to young Ferrante II in the recovery of the kingdom of Naples. The force was so small as to justify the verdict of Prescott that it was Ferdinand's intention "to assist his kinsman rather with his name, than with any great accession of numbers"; but when we remember what the ulterior objects of the Catholic King were, as well as the fact that he was holding another army in readiness for a diversion in Cerdagne and Roussillon, we cannot wonder that it was not larger. It reached Messina on May 24, and two days later was transferred to Calabria, where Ferrante had already begun operations.

The military events that followed can be recounted in short space. On May 20, four days before Gonsalvo reached Sicily, Charles VIII had quitted Naples, leaving the Count of Montpensier with some 10,000 men to defend the kingdom as best he could. His retreat to France occupied three months less than his descent into Italy. The two important events of it were the battle of Fornovo, on the Taro, where his army succeeded in cutting its way through the forces of his Italian foes assembled to oppose him, and the treaty of Vercelli on the ninth of the following October, by which he succeeded in detaching Lodovico il Moro from the League of Venice. Meantime, in the kingdom of Naples, Gonsalvo and Ferrante had come to blows with the French forces that had been left to defend it. The first encounter took place at Seminara, some twenty-five miles northeast of Reggio; owing to the impetuosity of the young Neapolitan monarch, who insisted on fighting against the advice of his more experienced ally, it resulted in a victory for the French. The latter, however, were unable to follow up their advantage. Gonsalvo managed to retreat in safety to Reggio, while Ferrante boldly transferred himself to the city of Naples by the ship of Admiral Requesens; and on July 11 he was able to effect an entrance into his capital. The rest of the year was occupied in ousting the French from the neighboring fortresses and in a fresh advance of Gonsalvo from southern Calabria. The Spanish commander was now seen at his very best. His army was still small, despite the arrival of reinforcements from Spain, but it was in perfect fighting trim; and the extraordinary rapidity of its movements rendered it impossible for the French to withstand him. One victory followed another in rapid succession; so that when at last, in the summer of 1496, Gonsalvo was called across to join Ferrante in besieging the town of Atelia, he was saluted on all sides as 'the Great Captain', the title by which he was thereafter best known. The capitulation of Atelia, on July 20, virtually marked the end of the resistance of the French. Gaeta surrendered on November 19, and Taranto on the eighteenth of the following January. A little later Gonsalvo, at the invitation of the Pope, passed over to the Patrimonium Petri, expelled a French garrison which Charles had left in Ostia, and was subsequently accorded a most magnificent reception in Rome; in August, 1498, he was back in Spain. A series of raids and forays into French territory north of the Pyrenees had meantime been carried out by another army, under command of Enrique Enriquez de Guzman. Much damage was done and booty taken; and though the French retaliated by a counter-raid on Salsas, the enterprise demanded so many troops that were desperately needed elsewhere, that a truce soon terminated the struggle in that region.

The League of Venice, in fact, had thoroughly accomplished the work that it had been organized to do, and the interests of its members had begun once more to diverge. Milan, as we have seen, had deserted at the treaty of Vercelli. The ridiculous failure of Maximilian's military demonstration in 1496 showed that nothing more was to be expected from him. Venice had forced Ferrante of Naples to deliver up to her some of the ports of Apulia in return for her aid against the French—an event which must have been most unwelcome to the king of Spain. Finally, on October 7, 1496, the brave and vigorous, though cruel, Ferrante II of Naples, the ally of Gonsalvo, died most unexpectedly at the very moment of the recovery of his realm, and was succeeded by his weak and yielding uncle, Frederic. The latter was the fifth monarch to occupy the fatal throne of Naples within three years, and obviously far less competent to defend it than any one of his predecessors. The significance of these events was not lost on Ferdinand the Catholic; they indicated that the time was ripe for a reversal of his policy. He had got rid of the French. He had no more use for his allies—indeed one of them, Venice, was actually in possession of a portion of the territory which he coveted for himself. The throne of Naples was at present occupied by a prince whom it promised to be easy to despoil. Now, if ever, was his chance to win the crown which Alfonso the Magnanimous had withheld from his father.

The first essential to the achievement of this purpose was to gain peace on the side of his quondam enemy, the king of France, and Ferdinand soon found that the latter was quite ready to

meet him halfway. Despite the resentment which he must have cherished against the Spanish monarch for his expulsion from Italy, Charles realized that he was in no condition to seek vengeance. Moreover, his fears of the hostility of the Catholic Kings were considerably increased in the winter of 1496-97 by the conclusion of the two Spanish-Hapsburg marriages, whose dangers to his own realm he had thoroughly realized, and which he had hitherto moved heaven and earth to prevent. On October 20, 1496, the Infanta Joanna became the wife of the Archduke Philip at Lille; on April 3, 1497, the Archduchess Margaret wedded the Infante John at Burgos: so that the two most powerful neighbors and rivals of France were now united by a double tie. These same months also witnessed a revival of the negotiations for the marriage of the Infanta Catharine to Arthur, Prince of Wales, which had been almost abandoned after the conclusion of the Breton war. Encirclement, in fact, seemed to threaten the king of France, so that some sort of an understanding with his neighbors became almost a condition of existence. From Henry VII, as he well knew, he had little to fear. With Maximilian, as usual, negotiations dragged on for an interminable space without reaching any definite conclusion. But Charles's dealings with Ferdinand the Catholic determined the whole course of international relations during the next five years and revealed for the first time to the world at large the schemes that had long lain hidden in the brain of the Spanish king.

Peace between the two sovereigns was simply and quickly attained. A suspension of hostilities was agreed to on February 25, 1497; on April 25, it was transformed into a seven months' truce, which was again extended and considerably amplified, on November 24, at Alcalá de Henares. But an inquiry into the course of the negotiations that underlay these treaties shows that much more than a mere peace between the two kingdoms was under consideration. All through the year 1497 the ambassadors of Charles VIII, led by Guillaume de Poitiers, Seigneur de Clerieux, kept journeying back and forth between the courts of France and Spain; and in the course of their interviews with Ferdinand and Isabella a proposition for the joint conquest and partition of the kingdom of Naples came up for discussion. Whether this proposal emanated ostensibly from the French or from the Spanish side, it is impossible to state. Comines tells us that it "was made by Ferdinand out of mere dissimulation to win time," notwithstanding, he thought, that the Spaniards "wished with all their hearts the said *reale* of Naples to be their own, and sure [sic] they had better title to it than they that possessed it". Zurita, on the other hand, maintains that the idea of a division of Naples was first broached by the French. They began, so he tells us, by asserting that the whole of that kingdom unquestionably belonged to their master, and that he was resolved to have it, though he might consent to give up the realm of Navarre in exchange. Subsequently, however, they modified their demands, and were finally brought to suggest a partition, based on the cession of Calabria to the Catholic kings. In view of what we know of the aims and ambitions of Ferdinand the Catholic, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that he was the real originator of the plan; but we may well believe that he also succeeded in gaining the very considerable diplomatic advantage of making the other side propose it first. At any rate, it seems clear that the agreement at Alcalá de Henares, signed November 24, 1497, was accompanied by an understanding of the sovereigns of France and Spain to the effect that they should jointly invade Naples when the opportunity should arise, and divide it between themselves—Calabria going to Spain, and the rest of the kingdom to France. It also appears that the French ambassadors on this occasion had various other proposals to make, all of them indicating that Charles VIII was still so infatuated with the idea of conquering Italy that he was willing to sacrifice everything else to the accomplishment of that end; these, however, Ferdinand declined, on the ground that they constituted an infringement of the rights of his allies in the League of Venice. As usual, the Catholic King distrusted everybody, and wisely refused to commit himself wholly to any one side as long as it was possible also to maintain a foothold in the camp of the other. Nevertheless, he had gone far enough to give a plain hint of the main aim of his Italian policy in the immediately succeeding years, though the incompetent monarch with

whom he was negotiating was totally unable to fathom its meaning. All the preparations for the game that Ferdinand was to play in Naples between 1500 and 1504, at first with the aid, and then at the expense, of Louis XII of France, were made before the death of Charles VIII, which occurred, as the result of an accident, on April 7, 1498. Indeed, had it not been for the various delays which the change of rulers inevitably caused, the climax of the Neapolitan drama would not, in all probability, have been postponed nearly so long as it was.

The new king of France was quite as anxious to conquer Italy as his predecessor had been before him; but his first objective was the north rather than the south of the peninsula. From his grandmother, Valentina Visconti, Louis inherited a claim to the Milanese, which he was all on fire to vindicate against the Sforzas. At his accession to the French throne, he assumed the title of duke of Milan, and at once prepared to expel the usurper and set himself up in his place. For this enterprise, peace with his neighbors was, of course, indispensable; and he immediately took steps to assure himself of it in much the same way as Charles VIII had done on the eve of the raid of 1494, though not at so great a cost. In July he renewed the peace of Etaples with England. With Maximilian, who also had pretensions to Milan, he was unable to come to terms; but as the Emperor was deeply engaged at the moment in a war with the Swiss, his opposition did not promise to be serious, while his son, the Archduke Philip, was so amicably disposed that he actually did homage to the Chancellor of France for Flanders, Artois, and Charolais. Ferdinand the Catholic also finally accepted Louis's friendly overtures, despite the fact that the Italian states, plainly foreseeing the intentions of the French king, urged the Spanish monarch to mediate between him and themselves. On July 31, 1498, the two sovereigns made a treaty of peace and of mutual aid in case of attack. The business was transacted near Paris by Louis and certain Spanish ambassadors whom Ferdinand had dispatched for the purpose, and a secret interview was apparently held at the same time, in which it seems probable that the partition of Naples was again discussed, though it is impossible to be certain. At any rate, Frederic of Naples was so disturbed over the out-look, that he shortly afterwards sent an embassy to the Spanish court to ask for the hand of one of the Infantas for his son, the Duke of Calabria; the support and protection of the Catholic Kings were doubly indispensable to him now, because the Pope, together with the Venetians, was believed to be in league with the king of France. Failing in this, Frederic was constrained to draw close to Lodovico Sforza, who was already in alliance with the Emperor; but the trio were palpably inadequate to resist the mighty combination—including most of the rest of western Christendom—which had pledged itself to the support of Louis XII. The second act of the Italian drama was thus opening with a change of scene and a considerable redistribution of the powers concerned; but Ferdinand the Catholic, though he shifted his methods according to the needs of the moment, held steadily to the same ultimate object which had animated him from the first. As before, he planned to use the French king to weaken the king of Naples, then to pick a quarrel with the invader and expel him, and finally to seize the throne of Alfonso the Magnanimous for himself.

The war in northern Italy, during the years 1499-1500, saw fortune alternate rapidly between the combatants. Milan was taken, lost, and retaken by the French king and the Venetians within the space of seven months, but Ferdinand the Catholic kept out of the struggle there. For the time being his sole object seemed to be to lend aid to the Venetians against the Turks. He made ready a large army and a fleet for this purpose and appointed the Great Captain commander of it; and in the winter of 1500-01 the allies attacked and captured from the infidel, in a most gallant action, the fortress of St. George in Cephalonia. Gonsalvo, at the time of his departure on this expedition, was specially warned not to take sides in any of the struggles between Christian potentates which were at that time devastating Italy; but in view of what subsequently occurred, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Ferdinand entered the Turkish war largely as a means of

getting his forces into convenient proximity to Naples, in order that they might be quite ready for action in that kingdom when the decisive moment should arrive. Meantime he vigorously pressed forward his secret negotiations with the king of France concerning the partition of the realm they both coveted. Frederic of Naples, foreseeing more plainly than ever the fate that was in store for him, again attempted without success to engage the Spanish monarch to protect him against his foes; then, when his overtures were refused, he rashly applied for aid to the Sultan, thus giving his prospective enemies another excuse, which they did not fail to utilize, for attacking him and seizing his dominions. Finally, on November 11, 1500, by the famous treaty of Granada, Ferdinand and Louis settled the details of the project for the partition of Naples which they had cherished for so long. On the ground that they both had better right to it than King Frederic, who had also imperiled the safety of Christendom by alliance with the Turk, the kings of Spain and France, in the interests of general peace and safety, agreed jointly to invade the kingdom and to divide it between themselves. Not only Calabria, but also Apulia, was now to go to Spain, which had obviously increased its claims since the beginning of the negotiations; the profits of the crown pastures in Apulia were equally divided; the rest of the realm was assigned to France; and any inequalities of income in their respective portions were to be so adjusted that the amount of revenue which the monarchs of both countries should derive from their new dominions should be the same? The treaty was not to be made public until the high contracting parties had completed their military preparations, though the papal nuncio in France apparently wormed the secret out of King Louis before the close of the year. On the other hand, it seems that Lorenzo Suarez de Figueroa, who was now Spanish ambassador at Rome, "the very center of all politics" in those days, was kept totally in the dark about it by his master, and therefore, when questioned, stoutly denied that any such pact existed. It was a characteristic example of the methods of Ferdinand the Catholic.

The disparity of the forces of the allies and those of the king of Naples was such that an easy conquest was practically certain. The French troops, some 12,000 to 15,000 strong, under the lead of the Sieur d'Aubigny, left Milan June 1, 1501, and reached the Neapolitan frontier July 8. The French and Spanish ambassadors at Rome seized the moment when the invading armies were crossing the States of the Church to notify the Pope of the intentions of their masters, and to extort from him confirmation of their rights, and investiture in the territories to which they respectively laid claim. No serious resistance was experienced from the forces of King Frederic, save at Capua. The city of Naples was surrendered without a blow, and the unfortunate sovereign sent off to an honorable captivity in France, where he died in 1504. All the contemporary accounts of the conduct of the French soldiers, during these first months of the occupation of the kingdom, agree that it was atrocious. Murders and ravishings of the defenseless were the order of the day, and a legacy of hatred was laid up for the invaders of which the Spaniards were subsequently to reap the advantage. In the meantime, Ferdinand, having finally refused to King Frederic the protection which the latter had not ceased to hope for, ordered the Great Captain to land his forces in the southern part of the peninsula; thence they advanced northward and occupied within the space of a month the bulk of the regions assigned to the Spaniards. Taranto, commanded by Frederic's son the Duke of Calabria, was the only place which defied them. It was apparently too strong to be taken by assault, so that Gonsalvo had to sit down to a siege. Only by transporting a number of Spanish ships on rollers across a tongue of land to the inner harbor directly under the walls of the town, was he finally able to capture it, on March 1, 1502. An ugly incident of the capitulation was the fate of the young Duke of Calabria. He had been solemnly promised his liberty by Gonsalvo before he surrendered, but as a result of a missive from Ferdinand, which arrived at the last moment, the agreement was violated, and he was sent a prisoner to Spain.

The joint conquest concluded, the inevitable disputes and quarrels between the allies were not long in breaking out. Blood had been spilled in Rome months before, in a fight between some



of the soldiers of the French army as it passed through, and certain Spaniards who were resident there, over the question as to whether the French or the Spanish king had the better right to the Neapolitan realm. Now that the rivals were actually on the ground and in possession of the spoils, more serious trouble was bound to come. Ferdinand was of course amply prepared for it, though he urged Gonsalvo to postpone it as long as possible; and the accounts of the interviews of the Great Captain and the young French regent, the Duke of Nemours, concerning the limits of the possessions of their respective masters, read as though they also had become convinced that a breach was ultimately inevitable. The precise cause of the quarrel—the question of the Basilicate and the Capitanate, which had perhaps purposely been left untouched in the treaty of Granada—is less interesting for us than the diplomacy by which the Catholic King sought to insure to himself the victory in the impending struggle. To Maximilian his ambassador represented that the conduct of the French, both in the north and south of Italy, indicated that they would be satisfied with nothing short of the control of the entire peninsula; and he urged the Emperor as lawful suzerain of Milan immediately to declare war upon them. Though Maximilian did not accede to his desires, he was at least kept practically neutral during the next few years; the treaty of friendship and alliance which it seemed probable that he would make with France in 1501 was postponed until 1504. With the Pope and the Venetians also Ferdinand labored hard and with good results. Alexander VI was not perfectly certain whether Spain or France was the safest repository of his political fortunes. He appeared at first to incline toward the latter, and his redoubtable son Caesar Borgia was hand in glove with Louis XII; but Spain had attractive proposals to offer in other directions, and at midsummer, 1502, it was believed in Venice that a rupture had been brought about between the Pope and the French. This was certainly an exaggeration; yet on the other hand the Borgias had been effectively prevented from breaking with Spain; and, lastly, the Venetians, who were becoming more and more alarmed every day by the preponderance of France in the north of the peninsula, maintained a neutrality which tended to be favorable to Ferdinand. If the Catholic King had not succeeded in winning allies for himself, he had at least made certain that they would not be secured by his foes.

Meantime in the kingdom of Naples the rivals had at last abandoned all attempts at conciliation and begun to fight. The war was at first of the old-fashioned sort—a war of sieges, raids, and deeds of individual valor, rather than of decisive pitched battles in the open. Most characteristic and dramatic of all was the famous combat of eleven French against eleven Spanish knights outside the walls of Trani, in the winter of 1502-03—the result of a formal challenge issued by the Sieur d'Urfé. It was witnessed, so we are told, by over 10,000 persons, and is described in glowing colors by all the contemporary historians. The foremost champion on the French side was the Chevalier Bayard, the knight 'sans peur et sans reproche'; the most famous of the Spaniards—at least if his subsequent exploits be taken into account—was Diego Garcia de Paredes, "who never had his equal in strength and courage," and lived on to the year 1533. The Spaniards gained the initial advantage by aiming their lances at the horses rather than at the persons of their foes; but when they attempted to ride down the dismounted Frenchmen and give them their *coup de grâce*, the most skillful of their adversaries leaped aside, and, catching the shafts of their spears as they rushed by, managed to disarm them. Night put an end to the fighting without conclusive results; the judges, who were Venetians, refused to give any verdict; before leaving the lists the combatants embraced one another, and all present agreed that it was a fair and equal feat of arms.

More conclusive, if less heroic than these proofs of valor by renowned champions, were the first real battles of the war, in which the French at the outset obtained a decided advantage. In December, 1502, d'Aubigny won a considerable victory at Terranova in Calabria against an army which had recently been sent over from Spain to reinforce Gonsalvo; and the latter was obliged to rest on the defensive. In the beginning of 1503 there seemed a prospect of peace through

the instrumentality of the Archduke Philip, who proposed the eventual cession of Naples to his son, the future Emperor Charles V, and the marriage of the latter to Claude, the daughter of Louis XII; the negotiations, however, proved abortive, owing to the refusal of King Ferdinand to ratify the terms which had been made for him in France. Indeed, the whole affair served chiefly to gain for the Spaniards much valuable time, and to enable Gonsalvo to be heavily reinforced; while on the other hand it lulled the French, who really believed that peace would be concluded, into a false sense of security, and rendered them unprepared for a continuance of the war. When in the end of April, 1503, Gonsalvo issued from his retreat at Barletta, intent on regaining the laurels which he had temporarily lost, his foes were in no condition to withstand him. He defeated Nemours at Cerignola. One of his lieutenants routed d'Aubigny at Seminara. On May 14, 1503, the Great Captain entered Naples in triumph; Gaeta alone in the whole kingdom held out for the French. Then indeed King Louis roused himself to desperate efforts to retrieve his fortunes. An army was sent into Cerdagne and Roussillon, and kept Ferdinand and Isabella busily occupied there. The French fleet revictualled Gaeta, and obliged Gonsalvo to raise the siege. Finally, a large force under La Trémouille was sent to retake Naples. As Alexander VI died (August 12, 1503) at exactly the moment the French general reached Rome, the latter wasted three months there in a fruitless effort to influence the cardinals in favor of the election of George d'Amboise; and when, in October, he finally reached his destination, Gonsalvo was fully prepared to receive him. A series of desperate combats along the river Garigliano ensued in the next three months, and were marked by a number of deeds of extraordinary valor and courtesy by the heroes of both armies. At first the French succeeded in throwing some troops across the stream, but they totally failed to dislodge the Spaniards from their main position; then, in a night attack, December 28, 1503, Gonsalvo suddenly assumed the offensive, seized the bridge by which the French army had crossed, and drove it back in headlong flight on Gaeta. This action practically marked the end of the war. Gaeta surrendered on January 1, 1504, and two months later a formal treaty was concluded between Louis and the Catholic Kings, in which the French sovereign definitely recognized the Spaniards as lawful possessors of Naples.

Thus, after ten years of tortuous diplomacy and bloody war, the primary aim of the Italian policy of the Catholic King was at last triumphantly attained, and another rich territory added to the domains of the Spanish Empire. The Neapolitan contest in its different phases had exhibited Ferdinand at the very height of his powers. It was through it that Machiavelli became acquainted with his methods, which he described for the guidance of contemporary statesmen in *The Prince*. Into the question of the morality of those methods it is happily unnecessary for us to enter here; of their effectiveness there cannot be a shadow of doubt. It would be idle to deny that Ferdinand possessed many advantages in the struggle on which he had launched himself both against his own cousins and against the French. Tradition, on the whole, was distinctly favorable to him; for the memories of the union of Naples and Sicily under the Normans and Hohenstaufen counted heavily against the claims of the French as heirs of the house of Anjou, and of Ferrante and his successors as descendants of Alfonso the Magnanimous. Sicily, moreover, was of immense practical value to him throughout the contest as a base and source of supplies. The French had nothing to correspond to it, and their admiral, Prégent de Bidoulx, was unable, despite the most strenuous efforts, to wrest from his Spanish adversary the all-important control of the sea. Lastly, in Gonsalvo de Cordova the Spanish monarch possessed a general whom his enemies could not possibly hope to match. Prudent, yet immensely aggressive when the moment for action arrived; never over-elated by success or despondent in failure; liberal to his soldiers, courteous to his foes: he seemed to endow the cause he fought for with a certain moral elevation which made men forget the treachery of his master and contributed no small element towards its ultimate success. His diplomatic triumphs moreover must not be forgotten; his victories on the field of battle were scarcely more valuable to the Spanish cause than his manipulation of the leading Neapolitan families, who were wavering between the rival factions. Yet after all, the conquest of

Naples was primarily the work of Ferdinand the Catholic. It had been made possible chiefly because it had been planned for long before; it was largely the fruit of the Spanish monarch's ability to look ahead and work quietly and effectively towards the attainment of a distant goal. Moreover, it meant far more than the mere winning of a kingdom. It was Ferdinand's way of serving notice on his fellow sovereigns that united Spain intended to maintain and increase the Mediterranean empire which had been founded by Aragon, as well as to assume all the responsibilities that she had inherited from Castile. In addition to setting her own house in order and developing and enlarging her possessions overseas, she proposed henceforth to play a leading part in the international politics of Western Europe.

The new master of the conquered kingdom made some changes in the system of government which he inherited from his predecessors. In the days of Alfonso the Magnanimous, there had been no attempt to subordinate Naples to the realms of the Crown of Aragon; if anything, the reverse had been the case, for the first conqueror of the Italian kingdom preferred it to his native land, fixed his residence there, and made it the center of his dominions. Now, however, under Ferdinand the Catholic, Naples became a regular dependency of the Spanish monarchy, like Sicily and Sardinia before it; so that "a new Polity, new Magistrates and Laws agreeable to the Spanish Customs and Principles", were "introduced into the Kingdom". The occasion of the initiation of these reforms was a visit which Ferdinand made to Naples during the winter of 1506-07 in a fit of jealousy and distrust of the Great Captain, who had continued to reside there as the royal representative after the completion of the conquest three years before. The beginnings of the new regime were thus established under the supervision of the king himself.

The first evidence of the new order of things was that Naples "lost the Honor of being the Royal Seat", and was thenceforth governed, like the other Mediterranean dependencies, by viceroys sent out from Spain. These were, as elsewhere, appointees of the crown, and their average term seems to have been about three years. Many of them, however, held office for shorter periods, while a few extended their tenure to more than four times that length; the case of Ramón de Cardona, whose term began under King Ferdinand in 1509, and continued until his death in 1522, is a case in point. The powers of these Neapolitan viceroys were considerably greater than those of the corresponding officers in the other Mediterranean dependencies. They were, from the first, the representatives of an absolute king; they did not reach back, as did the viceroys of Sicily and Sardinia, to the days of the more limited monarchy of the realms of the Crown of Aragon. Their authority, moreover, was not restricted to the same extent as in the other Mediterranean dependencies by the rights of the local assembly; for the meetings of the ancient Neapolitan parliament had by this time degenerated into a mere formality, while the more important *Seggi* of the city of Naples found themselves more and more completely in the control of the central power as the years went by. So conveniently were these constituted, indeed, for the purpose of enabling the viceroy to divide and weaken the forces of his opponents, that Tommaso Campanella, writing in the early seventeenth century, hints broadly that the king of Spain might do far worse than to establish a similar institution at home, as a means of protecting himself against baronial encroachments. The great crown officers of Angevin days, the High Steward, Grand Chamberlain, and the rest, who had been maintained by Alfonso the Magnanimous, were now either dismissed or shorn of all their important functions; certain others after the Spanish fashion were introduced to replace them, but Ferdinand took good care, as he had already done in Castile, that the central authority should not be overshadowed. And finally, at the same time that he strove to weaken and divide all the forces from which opposition might be anticipated, Ferdinand took positive steps to fortify and Hispanicize the office of his representative in Naples. A special privy council, or *consulta*, of the viceroy, which soon came to be known as the

*Consiglio Collaterals*, was instituted in 1507 at the time of the visit of the Catholic King, and at once took precedence of the Santa Chiara, the Sommaria, and all the other tribunals of the realm. Down to the end of the reign it was composed of two legists, a Sicilian and a Catalan, with a secretary or clerk, under the presidency of the viceroy. In later years a Neapolitan member was added, but the two senior councilors invariably came from outside the kingdom, and usually from Spain. The significance of these arrangements was perfectly obvious. Besides being Spanish himself, the viceroy was to be advised and guided at every turn by a body dominated by Spanish influence. The Neapolitans were to be practically excluded from any real participation in the government of their own country.

One result of this system of administration was that Naples was overburdened with taxation to a far greater extent than any of the other Mediterranean dependencies of Spain. The home government expected its overseas possessions to pay for themselves and yield revenue besides; and as the power of the Neapolitan viceroy was virtually absolute, there was practically no limit to the number of tributes which he could impose. There was, besides, a special reason why the inhabitants of Naples should be made to pay more heavily than the Sicilians or Sardinians; and that was the provision in the treaty of 1504, stipulating that the Angevin proprietors of the kingdom should be reestablished in the possession of the estates from which they had been evicted in the course of the war. This difficult task was performed by Ferdinand himself, during his visit in the winter of 1506-07; and though every advantage was taken of such flaws as the ingenuity of the lawyers could discover to impugn the validity of the Angevin titles and evade the terms of the peace, a large number of the territories had either to be bought up or given back, and those who were deprived of them compensated by a grant of funds. All this was naturally very expensive, and necessitated fresh levies on the people: for a time it was not a question of making the new kingdom an asset but rather of preventing it from becoming a liability. Moreover, when the work of restoration and transfer was completed, the new imposts which it had called into existence were suffered to remain. What had been adopted as a temporary expedient was converted into a permanency, and Naples was given a long start on the road to financial ruin which she travelled to the bitter end. Other and most burdensome levies were invented and set in operation in the succeeding years, without the slightest reference to correct economic principles, or to the convenience or prosperity of the people. The pills were sometimes gilded, indeed, and their true nature disguised by the use of an attractive label; for men would often grant *donativos* which differed in no essential respect from the *tributes* at which they boggled; but of any serious or effective attempt to ease the burden we hear nothing at all. Needless to say the material prosperity of the kingdom suffered terribly under such a system as this. The sums which the government annually wrung from its subjects were multiplied seven or eight-fold during the first hundred years of the Spanish administration, while agriculture, industry, and commerce dwindled away. It is, however, but fair to add that the blame for these unfortunate developments is to be laid less at the door of Ferdinand than at those of his Hapsburg successors. The Catholic King could plead the exigencies of the situation in Naples itself at the time of the conquest in partial justification for what he had done; but the sums derived from the far heavier exactions of the days of Charles V and the Philips were not utilized for the benefit of the Neapolitans, but were spent for the most part outside the realm, on the maintenance of other more remote and less subservient portions of the Spanish Empire.

The ecclesiastical situation in Naples was peculiar and difficult, because of the kingdom's proximity to the States of the Church, the claims of the Pope to its feudal overlordship, and the papal tradition of alliance with the hostile Angevin elements in the realm. Roman ambitions and encroachments had made trouble there before for the illegitimate Aragonese dynasty; they were to do so again and in even more serious fashion in later years, particularly under Pope Paul IV. The strongest bulwark against these encroachments was the provision that no papal bull

or other instrument could be promulgated in the realm without the special license or exequatur of the king or his representative; and no better proof could be desired of the firm resolution of the Spanish monarchs to eliminate Roman interference in the internal affairs of their dominions than the vigor of their resistance to any attempt to evade this regulation. In 1508 King Ferdinand gave orders to hang a papal messenger who carried a brief lacking the required indorsement of the king.

The most interesting phase of the ecclesiastical history of Naples in this period, however, is the attempt and failure of King Ferdinand to introduce the Spanish Inquisition there. In 1503, Gonsalvo de Cordova, who desired to conciliate the Neapolitans, had made a solemn engagement that it should never be established in the kingdom; but in the following year the influx of *conversos* from the other Spanish possessions became so great that Ferdinand determined to ignore his general's promise and to try to set up the Holy Office in his new dominions. Jealousy of the papal Inquisition, which had meantime been introduced into Naples by Julius II, further strengthened the king's resolve; but the opposition of the Neapolitans was so outspoken that, fearing a revolution if he persisted, he postponed the fulfilment of his purpose until 1509. When at last, at the very end of that year, all the preparations had been made, and the Inquisitors who had been appointed arrived, there was a terrible uproar in the capital. The populace rushed to arms and surged in fury through the streets. The Catholic King had unquestionably been prepared for some resistance, but the political situation in northern Italy, where the Pope needed Gonsalvo's veterans to fight his different foes, and was evidently prepared to make things extremely disagreeable for Ferdinand if he withdrew them to overawe the Neapolitans, convinced the Spanish monarch that, bitter as it was for him, he must yield again. To cover his retreat he put forth two *pragmáticas* ordering the expulsion from the realm of all professed Jews and *conversos* before March 1, 1511, and thus gave himself a plausible excuse for revoking the Inquisition on the ground that there would be no more work left for it to do. These *pragmáticas*, however, were not obeyed, as is proved by the records of the papal Inquisition, which in the meantime had continued its activities in Naples, and to which, it seems, the inhabitants did not seriously object.<sup>1</sup> The whole situation must have been gall and wormwood to the Catholic King. The most recently acquired of his dominions was honeycombed with unbelief; yet he was prevented from using that means of arresting it which had proved so terribly effective in Spain. His dissatisfaction, moreover, must have been considerably enhanced by his jealousy of the rival papal institution, subordinated though it was to the authority of his viceroys. The whole affair showed that the Neapolitans still retained some measure of their pristine independence; and in this one matter at least, they made good their contention to the very end of the story, for the full-fledged Spanish Inquisition was never permanently established within the kingdom.



CHAPTER XX

THE HAPSBURG PERIL AND THE ANNEXATION OF NAVARRE

THE foreign policy of the last twelve years of the reign of Ferdinand the Catholic was largely shaped by that long series of family bereavements, which, beginning with the death of his son-in-law, Affonso of Portugal, in 1491, continued almost without interruption till near the end. Every single one of his dynastic ventures was attended with the most persistent ill fortune.

The marriage of Catharine of Aragon to Arthur, Prince of Wales, which had been arranged by the treaty of Medina del Campo in 1489, was not actually celebrated until 1501. The tender years of the children were the obvious reason for the long delay. In the course of it the original agreement of 1489 was abandoned, and another was substituted for it in 1496. Constant bickerings and maneuverings for diplomatic advantage characterized the relations of Spain and England during this period and in the succeeding years. Ferdinand and Isabella angered the Tudor king by coolly throwing over the treaty of Medina del Campo after they had got back Cerdagne and Roussillon. They declared, on the shallowest of pretexts, that the marriage which it had provided for could not take place. They held out the prospect of a renewal of the negotiations for it, however, in order to induce Henry to join the League of Venice against France in 1495; and though the English king did not promptly accede to their desires, his position was so much stronger than it had previously been that the Catholic Kings felt it unwise to flout him again. A fresh marriage treaty, accordingly, was signed in October, 1496. The haggling over details continued up to the proxy wedding, which was celebrated in May, 1499, and even beyond it, until the arrival of the princess in England in the autumn of 1501. The negotiations were at one time involved with the career of the pretender Perkin Warbeck, and also with the commercial and shipping rivalries between the two realms; and their outcome was powerfully affected by the conduct of the Spanish representative at London, Rodrigo de Puebla, who, in revenge for the nonpayment of his salary by the Catholic Kings, labored rather in the interests of England than of Spain. Finally, however, the last difficulty was cleared away. On August 25, 1501, the princess sailed from Corunna, and, after having been driven back to Laredo by a storm, finally reached Plymouth, October 2. The wedding was celebrated at St. Paul's on November 14, and one half the large dowry of 200,000 scudi which had been agreed upon was paid over at the same time.

Meanwhile the Catholic Kings had been cruelly stricken at home, as we have already seen, by the death of Prince John without heirs, October 4, 1497, six months after his union with Margaret of Austria, and again by the losses on August 23, 1498, and July 20, 1500, respectively, of the Princess Isabella and of her surviving child Prince Miguel. The heiress to the thrones of Spain and the Spanish Empire was now the Princess Joanna, third child and second daughter of the Catholic Kings, who had wedded the Archduke Philip the Handsome on October 20, 1496, at Lille, and had already given him two children, Eleanor, born November 16, 1498, and Charles, born February 24, 1500. The latter on his father's side would inherit the Hapsburg domains in the Netherlands, Burgundy, Austria, and the Empire, and would probably ultimately be elected Emperor. If from his mother he received the Spanish thrones as well, the sovereignty of all the realms of Ferdinand and Isabella would be carried out of the peninsula to a foreign dynasty, which was already heavily loaded down with responsibilities in other parts of Europe and cared far less for Spanish aims and aspirations than for the increase of its family dominions. Such was the really

terrible catastrophe—threatening to undermine the foundations of all their splendid work—which now stared the Catholic Kings in the face. They had taken every reasonable precaution to prevent it, by the alliances which they had arranged for their two eldest children, but the hand of death had defied them. The double Hapsburg marriage, from which they had hoped to gain so much, promised now to spell the end of Spain for the Spaniards. And the worst part of the situation was that it seemed impossible to find any remedy. The rights of Joanna and her children, under the law of the land, were clear. The sovereigns had no hope of further offspring themselves, and no issue of any other marriage or of any collateral line could have a valid title to the thrones of both Aragon and Castile. Moreover, even if Ferdinand and Isabella were prepared to override all law and hereditary right in the interests of national independence, they could not well afford to insult and defy the house of Hapsburg, especially when they themselves were on such bad terms with France. It was a wonderful stroke of good luck for the future Charles V, as a contemporary historian sagely observed, that Prince Miguel, the sole remaining obstacle to his inheritance of the Spanish throne, should have died when the son of Philip and Joanna was but four months old; and his very dynastically minded grandfather, Maximilian, did not propose that the infant should be robbed of even the tiniest portion of the fruits of his good fortune. The Spanish monarchs must have felt unutterable things at the way that their marriage policy had worked out, but for the moment there was little for them to do but to sit still and trust that something would turn up.

Common prudence, however, pointed to the wisdom of maintaining all existing ties with other friendly states, in order to be perfectly ready for whatever the future might hold; and this consideration was doubtless uppermost in the minds of Ferdinand and Isabella when, in April, 1502, their attention was once more focused on England by the sudden and unexpected death of Arthur, Prince of Wales. The close bond that had united the two nations since his marriage with Catharine in the previous November was snapped; and it was essential for Spain that it should be promptly mended—the more so as she was obviously about to come to blows with France over the partition of Naples. The situation that had obtained at the time of the treaty of Medina del Campo was, in fact, almost precisely reversed: Spain, not England, was now in the position of suppliant, and Ferdinand and Isabella lost no time in dispatching to London a special ambassador, the Duke of Estrada, to ask for a renewal of the previous treaty and a second marriage for Catharine with Arthur's younger brother, the future Henry VIII. The Tudor monarch was ready to negotiate, though he fully understood the strength of his own position, and gladly availed himself of it in later years to pay Ferdinand back for the humiliations which that monarch had previously inflicted on him. For the time being, however, all went smoothly. The new marriage treaty was drawn up, and ratified on June 23, 1503, providing for the celebration of the wedding in 1506, when young Henry should have completed his fifteenth year, and for the payment of the rest of Catharine's dowry at the same time. Neither of these events, however, actually took place until after Henry VIII's accession in 1509. Though it was generally understood that Catharine's first marriage had never been more than a union in form, Ferdinand asked the Pope to grant the necessary bull of dispensation for her second, so phrased as to cover the case even if the previous one had been fully consummated, and the Pope acceded to his request. The final instrument, which arrived in England in the summer of 1505, did indeed introduce a faint element of uncertainty in the situation by speaking of Catharine's first marriage as *forsan consummatum*, but since the brief or preliminary summary of it which was sent to Spain in the previous year to comfort the dying Isabella omitted the word *forsan*, there could be no reasonable doubt of the papal intentions. Both these documents were to play an important part twenty-five years later in the history of Henry VIII's divorce; and it seems to indicate an almost prophetic insight that the Spanish monarch should have taken such pains at this early date to safeguard the validity of his daughter's second marriage. Certainly the great energy and persistence displayed by Ferdinand in regard to the English match shows that he was greatly disturbed over the state of his relations with

the continental powers. He was at war with France. The Hapsburg alliances, from which he had hoped so much, actually menaced the independence of Spain; and the Portuguese marriages, by which he had sought to forestall this last danger, had turned out fruitless. No wonder, in view of all the circumstances, that he clutched at England.

Meantime the sovereigns had been reminded of the imminence of the Hapsburg peril through a visit from Philip and Joanna, who, after having been sumptuously entertained by King Louis of France, arrived in Castile from the Netherlands, in January, 1502. The purpose of their coming was to receive the recognition of the Cortes as lawful heirs of the throne, and to enable the Archduke to become familiar with his future subjects. Ever since the death of Prince Miguel, Ferdinand and Isabella had begged them to come to Spain; they doubtless hoped that by approaching Philip while he was still young they might make him see things through their eyes, forget his Burgundian affiliations, become a true Spaniard and work primarily in Spanish interests. But it was to be a long half century more before any real Hispanicization of the Hapsburgs was possible; certainly Philip was never susceptible to the process, and Charles V did not succumb to it until the end of his life. In the latter case it was dynastic ambition that stood in the way; with the Archduke it was mere shallowness and want of character. It had never been possible, in fact, to make him take a serious interest in anything, or pursue any plan to its logical conclusion. He had already got into difficulties with his mercurial father Maximilian in the Netherlands; the sober energy and grandiose projects of the Spanish monarchs did not appeal to him at all. It is only too easy to see how utterly he disappointed the hopes of the Catholic Kings. The contemporary chroniclers give several instances to prove it, and one can read much more between the lines. The conduct of the Archduke's Flemish attendants also elicited the most unfavorable comment. They had nothing in common with the Spaniards, and seemed solely intent on the acquisition of fat pensions for themselves. Moreover, Philip was most anxious to return as soon as possible to his native land. After his recognition, with his wife, by the Castilian Cortes at Toledo, and by those of Aragon at Saragossa, he made his preparations to depart, despite the fact that his wife, on account of an approaching confinement, was unable to accompany him. As on his journey to Spain, the Archduke determined to travel by way of France, toward whose monarch he had manifested a disposition far too friendly to suit either his father or his father-in-law; however, in view of the course of the war in Naples and the uncertainties of the situation in other parts of Europe, Ferdinand decided that it would do no harm to take advantage of Philip's offer to open negotiations for a peace. The result was the treaty of Lyons of April 5, 1503, which we have already noticed in connection with the Neapolitan war. Philip had so grossly exceeded his instructions in arranging it that Ferdinand was not without justification for his refusal to ratify; and the only practical result of it, as we have previously observed, was to afford the Great Captain a precious respite in southern Italy, which he knew how to utilize far more effectively than did his foe. But the whole episode showed what the diplomacy of the years 1504-11 was to demonstrate more clearly still, that in view of the possibility of trouble with the house of Austria Ferdinand was prepared, at least temporarily, to seek an adjustment of his difficulties with France.

The next and perhaps the most stunning blow of all—not only in itself but also in the tremendous consequences with which it was fraught—was the death of Queen Isabella at Medina del Campo on November 26, 1504. By it the tie that had united the Spanish kingdoms was once more broken; for Isabella's will expressly provided that the thrones of Leon and Castile should descend to her daughter Joanna, as 'queen proprietress', and to her husband Philip as king consort. Only in case Joanna should be absent from the realm, or "being present should prove unwilling or unable to govern", was her father to act as regent in Castile until the future Charles V should come of age; otherwise Ferdinand was henceforth to be nothing more than the king of the realms of the Crown of Aragon. It was a bathos almost inconceivable for a man who had been so powerful, and Ferdinand's was not the sort of disposition that would submit to it without a struggle. Moreover,

he was not in all respects unfavorably situated for a contest against his daughter and son-in-law for the retention of the throne of Castile. The law of the land was indeed clearly against him; but on the other hand the national detestation of subjection to foreign authority would tell heavily in his favor. His war with France was over. Furthermore the Princess Joanna, who had given birth to her second son, the future Emperor Ferdinand, at Alcalá de Henares on March 10, 1502, had returned to the Netherlands in the spring of 1504, eight months before her mother's death. It is quite possible that her departure was hastened by ill-treatment at the hands of Ferdinand. Certainly her absence from Spain at the time of Isabella's demise afforded her father a legal opportunity to act as regent in Castile until her return, without transgressing the provisions of her mother's will; it thus gave the Catholic King an enormous initial advantage over his children in the struggle for the throne of that realm. Finally, there were the very grave doubts raised by the phrase in Queen Isabella's will about Joanna's being "unwilling or unable to govern". We know that the possibility indicated by these words had been contemplated at least two years before Isabella's death and communicated to the Cortes; and the natural inference is that Joanna had already begun to show signs of the mental derangement which first became unquestioned and notorious after the death of her husband. There is, however, no documentary evidence to show that she was insane at this early date, though she was certainly neurotic and hysterical. What seems most probable is that at the time of Philip's visit to Spain in 1502, Ferdinand and Isabella had made up their minds, if possible, to prevent her succession on account of the foreign rule which it would inevitably entail, and to utilize any signs of abnormality which the princess may have given as an excuse for setting her aside. At any rate the words in the queen's will gave Ferdinand a powerful weapon for a struggle against the harsh fate which the tragic consequences of the Hapsburg marriages had brought upon him, and against the carrying of the sovereignty of Castile beyond the borders of Spain. If his conduct in the succeeding years seems deficient in parental solicitude, we must not forget that he was fighting for the cause of national independence as well as for his own hand.

There could be no question that Philip and Joanna intended to make all possible efforts to substantiate their claims to the Castilian throne. The Archduke assumed the title of king of Castile as soon as he had learned of his mother-in-law's death. He did everything in his power through his agent, Juan Manuel, to stir up disaffection against Ferdinand, particularly among the Castilian grandees. He wrote to his father-in-law to demand that he resign the Castilian regency and retire to his own domains. He even put forward claims to Naples on the ground that it had been conquered by the armies of Castile and was therefore a dependency of that realm and strove to win away the Great Captain from his allegiance. And at first King Ferdinand seemed to acquiesce in what he was powerless to prevent. He caused Philip and Joanna to be formally proclaimed as lawful sovereigns of Castile; he also summoned the Castilian Cortes to Toro on January 11, 1505, in order that the recognition might be confirmed. But Ferdinand, like his father before him, was never so dangerous as when apparently at the end of his resources. He took good care that these same Cortes at Toro should ratify his title to the regency during the absence of his daughter; moreover he permitted the assembly openly to allude to Joanna's mental infirmities, and to the steps to be taken in view of them. Still more important were his measures to strengthen his position abroad—his primary object being, of course, to gain for himself at the expense of his son-in-law the friendship and alliance of France. To accomplish this some sacrifice, immediate or prospective, of the Spanish conquests in Naples would inevitably be necessary, for Louis XII was still very sore over the defeats that he had sustained there; but Ferdinand was accustomed to rapid changes of front in that quarter, and was prepared to bid high for the prize he had set himself to win. The net result was a treaty, signed by the French king and Ferdinand's representatives at Blois, on October 12, 1505, providing for the marriage of the Spanish monarch to Germaine de Foix, niece of Louis XII, and granddaughter of Ferdinand's own half-sister Eleanor; this arrangement also incidentally strengthened the claims of the Catholic King to Navarre, which had been held by the senior branch of Germaine's family until it passed by marriage to the Albrets in

1484. Louis XII at the same time resigned all his rights to Naples to Germaine, to descend after her death to her children; he carefully stipulated, however, that if she died without issue the French crown was to get back those portions of the realm which had been assigned to him by the treaty of Granada in 1500.

Prescott, who is very severe on the “disgraceful and most impolitic terms of this compact”, points out that if Germaine had had a son, he would have inherited all the realms of the Crown of Aragon, and thus nullified the best results of the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella by once more severing the destinies of the Iberian kingdoms; if, on the other hand, she died childless, it was provided that a large share of Spain’s recent Neapolitan conquests should be surrendered. But if we fix our eyes on the immediate effects of the treaty, rather than on the distant contingencies that were contemplated in it, we shall probably conclude that this verdict is much too harsh. The all-important thing for Ferdinand, at the moment, was to secure French support and the prospect of an heir—both of them indispensable weapons in the impending contest for the Castilian throne and the cause of Spanish independence of foreign sovereignty; and with these the treaty provided him. The stipulation about the partition of Naples in case Germaine should die childless was far too remote to cause him serious hesitation. He had cheated Louis XII in that kingdom before, and openly boasted that he would do so again; and as a matter of fact, neither the French king nor his successors ever got back the coveted lands. If, on the other hand, his new queen had borne him a male child who had survived, there is every probability that he would have labored with might and main to set him on the Castilian throne to the prejudice of the Hapsburgs, and at least a fair chance that he would have succeeded. The treaty of Blois was not made merely “in order to secure the brief possession of a barren authority” or “to gratify some unworthy feelings of revenge”. It was a shrewd political move, virtually dictated by the needs of the moment, but also calculated better than any other to preserve the safety and independence of Spain at a serious crisis in her career.

The marriage of Ferdinand and Germaine took place on March 18, 1506, at Dueñas near Valladolid; and six weeks later Philip and Joanna, who had this time been refused permission to cross France, arrived by sea at Corunna. There had been much correspondence between the different parties during the previous year; in the course of it an arrangement had been evolved for the administration of Castile under the joint names of Ferdinand, Philip, and Joanna, and the handing over of one half the public revenues to the Catholic King. This was obviously, however, merely a temporary makeshift, designed to tide things over until Philip and Joanna should reach Castile; a new settlement was inevitable as soon as the persons concerned could meet and talk things over. The interview finally took place, in the month of June, in the little village of Villafafila in the Galician mountains. Ferdinand arrived at the appointed place with a few faithful attendants mounted on mules, “with love in his heart and peace in his hands”; while his gorgeous son-in-law appeared at the head of a powerful army, and obviously enjoyed, for the moment, the support of the Castilian grandees. And at first it seemed as if the cause of Philip and Joanna was to triumph all along the line; for Ferdinand signed an agreement in which he promised to retire to Aragon, and to surrender the government of Castile to his “most beloved children”. An additional treaty, however, robbed Joanna of her share in the spoils on account of “her infirmities and sufferings, which for the sake of her honor are not specified”; Ferdinand and Philip bound themselves to use their united forces to prevent her from meddling in the government; the father betrayed his daughter and the husband his wife. Thus Philip thought to obtain the goal of his ambitions and to secure for himself undisputed control in Castile; but he little knew the man with whom he was dealing. On the afternoon of June 27, the very same day that the two treaties were signed, Ferdinand made a solemn protestation that he refused to recognize their validity, on the ground that they had been extorted from him under compulsion; and that he would never consent ‘that his daughter should be deprived of her liberty or of her



rights as hereditary proprietress of this kingdom'. Prescott is at a loss "to reconcile this monstrous tissue of incongruity and dissimulation with any motives of necessity or expediency"; but it is still more difficult to conceive of Ferdinand the Catholic as intriguing and deceiving without a definite purpose in view. The protestation was primarily valuable as a step toward disposing of his arch-enemy Philip; yet despite all its assertions that Joanna was lawful queen of Castile, it nowhere denied that she was mentally incapable of reigning, and consequently created no impediment to getting rid of her in case it should prove ultimately desirable to do so. Clearly Ferdinand wished to leave himself a free hand in Castile, in order that he might be able to act there in whatever way should seem most advantageous when the opportunity should arise; and the determining factor in the situation was the possibility of male issue by Queen Germaine. Prescott cannot seem to get rid of the idea that Ferdinand cared little or nothing for the cause of Spanish unity. He implies that the king's desire for male issue by his new wife is explained by his wish to deprive the Hapsburgs of the Aragonese realms and their dependencies, and that in order to attain that end he was willing to set up the old lines of cleavage within the Iberian Peninsula. But it seems far more consistent with the character of Ferdinand as we know it, to conclude that if the son whom Queen Germaine finally bore him, May 3, 1509, had survived, the Catholic King would have strained every nerve to win for him the throne of Castile in defiance of the law of the land, and to hand down the united crowns to a Spaniard. The memory of his father's treatment of Charles of Viana was still fresh in his mind; he had himself already been a party to one usurpation of the throne of the western kingdom in the interests of political expediency; why should he not have attempted it again? The question is not susceptible of proof either one way or the other; but Ferdinand's conduct can be as adequately explained on the hypothesis of a somewhat unscrupulous patriotism as by assuming that his every move was inspired merely by personal jealousy and hate.

In any case, the Catholic King was powerless to give vent to his real feelings in the summer of 1506. He had another affecting interview with Philip on July 5, during which the most perfect apparent harmony prevailed between them; and he wrote him a letter from Saragossa on the twenty-ninth, urging him to treat Joanna lovingly, and that they should live together as a good husband and wife ought to do. He not only fulfilled his promise to retire to Aragon; on September 4, 1506, he embarked at Barcelona for Genoa on the way to settle the affairs of his kingdom of Naples. But he had been only a few weeks on Italian soil when he was overtaken by the news of the sudden death of his son-in-law Philip at Burgos, on September 25. The event was so convenient for his purposes that the accusation of poison was inevitable, as was the case with so many of the enemies of his redoubtable father. The physicians, however, were unanimous in declaring that the Archduke's death was due to natural causes, and they apparently convinced the contemporary historians, though some modern writers incline to take the other view. But whether or not King Ferdinand had any reason to expect that Philip would not long survive his departure for Italy, he certainly showed no impatience to return. Not until the late summer of 1507 was he back again in Castile. In the meantime he had settled the affairs of Naples, relieved the Great Captain, of whose popularity and independence he had become profoundly jealous, from his duties as viceroy there, and held his famous interview with Louis XII of France at Savona, to which we shall return in another place. Did the king deliberately stay away in order that suspicion and hostility might have a chance to cool down, and that the rebel barons might once more be brought into subjection for him by the iron hand of Cardinal Ximenes? Or was his absence prolonged in the belief that his daughter's mental infirmities would increase the faster if she were left to bear her grief alone? There can be no doubt that Joanna became hopelessly insane immediately after her husband's death, though it was not till February 14, 1509, that she finally withdrew to the gloomy fortress of Tordesillas, to live out in dreary solitude the remaining forty-six years of her existence. In the interim between her father's return and her final retirement, she remained under the close supervision of Ferdinand. The latter had *every* reason to keep a strict

watch upon her, for her hand was sought by various princes at the time, as a means of gaining title to the throne of Castile. But all these proposals were firmly refused, on the plea of Joanna's insanity; and meantime her father left nothing undone which should serve to confirm his title to the administration of her kingdom. Some of the unruly barons, who had not forgotten how their ancestors had lorded it over the land during the periods of monarchical abasement, were inclined to raise their heads in revolt. Most of them, however, had been so thoroughly disciplined in the previous thirty years that they soon tired of anarchy and gave in their submission; and Ferdinand's final triumph over the factions was confirmed by the Cortes at Madrid, in October, 1510, when he solemnly took the oath as administrator of the realm in his daughter's name. For the rest of his life, at least, the Hapsburgs were to be kept out, and Spain preserved to the Spaniards.

From this time onward the dynastic question falls into the background. Ferdinand's animosity to Philip transferred itself on the latter's death to his eldest son and heir, the future Emperor Charles V, who remained in the Netherlands until 1517, and certainly gave few signs in his early years of the abilities which developed so rapidly when he became possessed of his great inheritance. But the failure of male issue by Queen Germaine rendered it impossible for the Catholic King to turn his feelings to any practical account, and though the thought of the fate that awaited his kingdoms after his death must have embittered his declining years, he was absolutely powerless to avert it. In only one way did he give any outward evidence of the feelings that burned within his breast, and that was by lavishing every sort of care and affection on Charles's younger brother, the future Emperor Ferdinand, who had been named for his maternal grandfather, and continued to reside in Spain until after the latter's death. The old king took an intense interest in his education and made every effort to inculcate in him the Spanish point of view. He would doubtless have been delighted to put him in his brother's place and may possibly have laid schemes to that effect. Some historians have even thought that the real key to the old king's tortuous Italian diplomacy from 1509 to 1514 was his desire to create a new realm for his beloved youngest grandson out of Sicily, Naples, and any other states he might manage to acquire in the peninsula—the whole to be protected by the German, Austrian, and Spanish territories which would inevitably go to Charles. Of all this there is no proof, for the Catholic King was a past master of the art of covering his tracks, and our only means of estimating the policy of the last part of the reign is the one definite achievement that resulted from it, namely, the acquisition of Navarre. To the story of this final conquest we now turn, but our picture of the latter years of the old king will be the more accurate if we bear in mind the gloomy prospect with which he was perpetually confronted at home: the assurance, growing stronger and stronger as time went on, that the empire which he had been at such pains to build up was destined to be inherited by a foreign prince.

From 1506 to 1511 the external policy of Ferdinand the Catholic continued to be based on friendship with France; the Hapsburg danger remained far too pressing for several years after Philip's death to admit of any other possibility. The Catholic King was constantly reminded of Maximilian's jealousy and hatred during this period by the visits to Spain of secret agents from the Netherlands, who did their utmost to fan the smoldering flames of discontent among the Castilian grandees and to persuade them to rise in revolt against his regency. One of these envoys had to be imprisoned; another was shown out of the realm directly after his arrival at Laredo. Moreover, it was not merely a question of Ferdinand's maintaining his position as administrator in Castile. There is reason to believe, as we have already seen, that until the disappointment of his hopes of male issue by Queen Germaine he contemplated assuming the aggressive and ousting the Hapsburgs entirely. Clearly it would be impossible to fight both Hapsburgs and Valois at once. He had already scored heavily against the latter in the Neapolitan war, and prudence now dictated the maintenance of cordial relations with them, in order to be

perfectly certain of their neutrality, and if possible of their alliance, in case Spain should come to blows with the former. Consequently, we find the rapprochement which began at the treaty of Blois, in October, 1505, continued and solidified in the succeeding years. In June, 1507, after his departure from Naples, Ferdinand met Louis at Savona near Genoa, where the latter had gone to suppress a revolt. The interview there lasted four days. Beneath the attendant festivities and the notable honors accorded to the Great Captain, it is difficult to determine what serious business was transacted on this occasion. Probably those who have seen evidences in it of a Franco-Spanish alliance against the Hapsburgs, or even of negotiations preliminary to the league which was formed so shortly afterwards against the Venetians, have considerably exaggerated the importance of the whole affair. The only thing that the documents prove to have been definitely settled at Savona was the maintenance of the existing peace on the basis of the status quo for at least six months to come. This, however, was quite enough to show that Ferdinand and Louis both realized that for the present neither was strong enough to be able to dispense with the support of the other.

In the following year, when France made peace with the Emperor, and joined with him and with Pope Julius II in the famous League of Cambray against Venice, the Spanish monarch seized the first opportunity to get himself included in the alliance. To let Louis and Maximilian throw their united forces into Italy, while he stood completely aside, would mean danger to his new dominions in Naples; besides, if the king of France and the Emperor got a chance to lay their heads together while he was excluded from their deliberations, might it not result in the immediate sending of the Archduke Charles into Spain to claim the Castilian inheritance, the challenging of his regency there, and the upsetting of many other plans. There was also one positive advantage to be derived by Spain from entering the league against Venice, namely, the recovery of the Adriatic seaports of the kingdom of Naples, which had been intermittently in Venetian hands since 1495. All these considerations combined to make Ferdinand throw in his lot with the allies; but he did so with little enthusiasm, and with a firm resolve, doubtless strengthened by the fact that the Great Captain was in retirement, to shirk the military duties assigned to him. The only part of the campaign that really interested him, the recovery of the Neapolitan ports, he accomplished with almost no effort at all; for Venice, comprehending the necessity of concentrating against France, virtually surrendered them without attempting a defense. But the rest of the war the Spanish monarch left to his confederates, content merely to keep close enough in touch with them to make sure that they meditated no treachery. He knew the nature of Italian politics well enough to realize how rapidly the combinations changed, and doubtless foresaw that if Louis were permitted to gather in most of the spoils of the campaign, he would infallibly be made to pay for it in the near future. As usual his judgment was correct. Even before the Venetians had been brought to their knees, the allies had become so jealous of the preponderance of the French in northern Italy that everything was ripe for a complete diplomatic revolution.

By this time, moreover—that is, in the winter of 1510-11—Ferdinand's own attitude towards the foreign situation had undergone a change. His hopes of male issue by Queen Germaine were practically gone. The ultimate succession of the Hapsburgs to the Spanish throne was consequently inevitable. On the other hand, there was no immediate prospect that the Archduke Charles would be sent to Castile. It seemed likely that his own regency in the western kingdom, which Maximilian had formally recognized on December 12, 1509, would be permitted to continue unchallenged for many years to come. French aid, in other words, was no longer so indispensable for him in the dynastic problem, either for offensive or defensive purposes, as it had been before. And, finally, there was one more territorial conquest which he had ardently desired since his boyhood, and was determined, if possible, to carry through before he died—a necessity for the attainment of Spain's natural boundaries on the north, yet scarcely to be

accomplished without incurring the displeasure of France—the conquest of the little mountain kingdom of Navarre. When, therefore, the European powers, under the lead of Julius II, prepared to turn on Louis XII for the purpose of expelling him from Italy, Ferdinand was secretly rejoiced and promptly joined the confederates. He had no more use for the Valois now; and if they were completely isolated, he might well derive territorial advantage from the fact in a region on which he had long had his eye. Into the well-known story of the Italian campaigns of the Holy League we need not enter here, for though Gonsalvo's veterans formed the backbone of its armies, and Ramón de Cardona, viceroy of Naples, was on the whole its most successful general, Spain reaped no direct reward from its victories in that quarter. We must rather concentrate our attention on what is usually regarded as a side issue of the war, and see how Ferdinand utilized for his own purposes in the Pyrenees the fact that most of the French forces were engaged beyond the Alps.

Since the failure of John II of Aragon to get it away from the children of his first marriage, we have had no occasion to follow the fortunes of Navarre. Eleanor, the sister of the unfortunate Prince of Viana, and heiress, after his death, of the little Pyrenean kingdom, had carried it, as a result of a marriage which had been arranged for her in 1434, into the possession of the powerful French house of Foix, whose principal domains, in Béarn and Bigorre, lay contiguous to Navarre on the northeast. Had she not had the good fortune to survive her treacherous father—though only for the short period of twenty-one days—her descendants would in all probability have been despoiled of their inheritance; but as it was, the kingdom passed, on her death in 1479, to her youthful grandson, Francis Phoebus, the eldest child of her eldest son Gaston, who had predeceased her. Francis Phoebus, however, also died in 1483, leaving no children, so that Navarre was inherited on his death by his younger sister, Catharine, and was by her in turn transferred, through her marriage in the following year, to Jean d'Albret, son and heir of Alain le Grand, the most eminent of the feudal nobles of the south of France. Navarre had thus been strengthened by dynastic unions with a number of adjacent states; but it had also been sadly shaken and disrupted by the frequent changes of its rulers; and, finally, it was seriously menaced by the jealousy of the neighboring powers. Ferdinand and Isabella had at one time planned to marry their son John to Catharine of Foix,<sup>1</sup> and never really forgave the Albrets who had forestalled them; moreover, the younger line of the house of Foix, represented at first by John, second son of Eleanor of Aragon, and, after his death in 1500, by his children, Germaine, the second wife of King Ferdinand, and Gaston, the hero of the battle of Ravenna, insisted on treating the Albret claims as a usurpation, and strove for a long time to win the succession for themselves.

Most important of all, however, was the effect on Navarre of the newborn hostility between France and Spain. These two states had now definitely entered upon a contest for the supremacy in Western Europe. Navarre held the keys to the passes of the western Pyrenees. Spain could not afford to let the destinies of the Albrets' realm be exclusively guided by France, nor could France tolerate its permanent subjection to the influence of Spain. The little mountain kingdom, heretofore secluded and remote, became all at once the battleground of opposing policies. In this long struggle for the control of the Navarrese government, the Catholic Kings, despite the fact that the local dynasty was rather French than Spanish in its affiliations, were on the whole victorious. By a series of eight treaties, between 1476 and 1500, they succeeded in reducing the Navarrese sovereigns to the position of protégés of Spain. Their ultimate object was doubtless annexation, but for this the time was not yet ripe, and Ferdinand never did anything in a hurry. Besides, in the early years of the sixteenth century, a fresh complication arose, when the Hapsburgs, in anticipation of trouble with the Spanish monarchs, offered their alliance to the sovereigns of Navarre in return for their support in the successional quarrel in Castile. An understanding was reached between the houses of Austria and Albret, which continued to be a thorn in the side of Ferdinand the Catholic long after the death of Archduke Philip; it was also most displeasing to Louis XII. During the period immediately preceding the war of the Holy

League, the Navarrese managed to play off the ambitions of these different foreign potentates against one another in such a way as to preserve their independence. Finally, at the opening of the conflict, they announced their intention of remaining strictly neutral, in the belief that the hostile powers would so exhaust themselves during the course of it, that their own position would ultimately become impregnable.

These hopes were destined to be disappointed. Navarre's position between the two great rivals of the first half of the sixteenth century, coupled with the military value of the territory she possessed, rendered it inevitable that sooner or later she should fall a prey either to France or to Spain. It was during the spring of 1512 that her fate was decided. The crucial event in the story was the death in the battle of Ravenna, on April 11, of Gaston de Foix, the representative of the claims of the younger branch of his family against the Albrets, and the consequent passing of his title to his sister Germaine, the wife of Ferdinand the Catholic. Hitherto the French kings had tended to support the Foix line, as a means of bringing pressure on the existing dynasty; now it would be suicidal for them to continue to do so, since the representative of the Foix claims was the queen of Spain. The only thing for Louis XII to do was to draw near to the Albrets. On July 18, at Blois, he concluded with them a secret treaty of alliance; this treaty, however, he purposely caused to be worded in such ambiguous fashion as to deceive the Navarrese sovereigns themselves in regard to its true meaning. While they thought that they were only committing themselves to a defensive agreement—so loose as to be even consistent with the maintenance of their policy of neutrality—they really bound themselves to aid the king of France against attacks which he expected from the Spaniards and the English in the Pyrenees and in Guienne. Ferdinand, in the meantime, sat still and watched events. He realized that the death of Gaston de Foix was ultimately bound to throw France into the arms of the Albrets, and that therefore the time had come for him to stop negotiations and make ready to attack; but, as usual, he wanted to make success as nearly certain as possible before he took the field. Consequently, while secretly preparing an army of invasion, he continued to negotiate with the Navarrese. He also brought every conceivable argument to bear upon that very magnificent young gentleman, his son-in-law, King Henry VIII, to induce him to send an English force into Guienne. Ostensibly the English were to go to war for the recovery of their ancient continental possessions; in reality, as Ferdinand plainly saw, the sole practical result of their expedition would be to help him to win his own game? It must have given the old king great satisfaction to pull the wool over the eyes of the son of the one sovereign who had ever come near getting the better of him in the past; at one time he even had the effrontery to suggest that the only way for the English army to make certain of Guienne was to begin by attacking Navarre. And Ferdinand's final act to justify the invasion which had been determined months before, was certainly one of the most extraordinary pieces of duplicity that history records. He knew nothing whatever of the terms of the treaty which the Albrets made with the Valois on July 18, at Blois, but he realized that their rapprochement boded no good to him. To accomplish his own ends it was essential for him to forestall the confederates, but at the same time he well knew that the most telling possible vindication of the assault which he was now fully prepared to deliver, would be to spread it abroad that the Navarrese and the French had made an agreement to attack him. He accordingly concocted an abstract of a treaty, which he falsely represented as having been signed by Louis XII and Jean d'Albret, and published it as such on July 17; it purported to provide for a joint attack by the French and Navarrese on Gipuzcoa and the adjacent Castilian lands, and the settlement of all the details of an intimate offensive alliance between them, primarily directed against Spain. However odious the deception, there can be no question of its effectiveness. The Spanish army of invasion, 17,000 strong, under the Duke of Alva, which crossed the Navarrese frontier from the westward on July 21, was persuaded that it was being employed for the purpose of national defense to anticipate a foreign attack, and not for aggression or spoliation; outsiders, too, were generally convinced of the justice of Ferdinand's cause.



The Navarrese, it is almost unnecessary to add, were in no condition to resist. The fact that the Catholic King had continued to negotiate with them up to the very last moment, had lulled them into a false sense of security, so that no military preparations had been made; moreover, the English army, under the Marquis of Dorset, though it did not lend itself quite so obediently to Ferdinand's purposes as that monarch had hoped, created a most valuable diversion by threatening Guienne, and thus prevented the dispatch of French troops to the aid of the Navarrese. The Spanish invasion was, in fact, a triumphal procession. Jean d'Albret fled before it in early August into Béarn. Ten days later a subsidiary Aragonese army entered the southern part of the realm and besieged Tudela, which surrendered on September 9. Meantime (August 28) the Duke of Alva summoned the inhabitants of Pamplona to recognize Ferdinand as their lawful sovereign. And the way in which the Catholic King defended his assumption of the crown of Navarre was certainly a fitting counterpart to the methods by which he had previously justified his invasion. Taking advantage of the fact that he was a member of the Holy League, he determined to make use of Pope Julius II to establish him in lawful possession of the territories he had won, just as he had previously utilized Alexander VI at the time of the discovery of America. On the plea that the Navarrese were heretics and schismatics, because they had adhered to the council which had been summoned to Pisa in the previous year at the instance of Louis XII, the Pope was induced to launch against them a bull of excommunication, dated July 21, 1512, which was solemnly published by Ferdinand exactly one month later in the cathedral church of Calahorra. By it the Albrets were declared to be deprived of their sovereign rights and their subjects absolved from their allegiance; on it, over and above all the claims which he could put forward on other grounds, Ferdinand based his seizure of the crown of Navarre, "which he had won with the full authority of the church ... in a war for a just cause, as his Holiness had declared."

Contemporary historians tell us that the usually unemotional Ferdinand actually wept for joy when he learned of the winning of Navarre. We need not wonder at the depth of the old king's satisfaction. The conquest was not only the fulfillment of a duty bequeathed to him by his father, the realization of a dream that had haunted him from his youth; it rounded out his dominions on the north, just as the capture of Granada had done on the south, and was the *sine qua non* of national safety, whenever France and Spain should be at war. The military defense of his new frontiers was the problem which occupied Ferdinand's chief attention in Navarre during the remaining years of his reign. The French and the Albrets made a series of desperate efforts to recover it, down to the year 1521, but none attained permanent success; for the Catholic King left no stone unturned to secure for himself undisputed control of the passes of the western Pyrenees. In the year 1514 he carried his conquests across the range and obtained the complete submission of the small region of French Navarre, or 'Ultrapuertos', as the Spaniards called it. Moreover he entirely refused to listen to the advice of the counsellors who urged him to abandon it on the ground that it was not worth keeping; the Catholic King had been more than fourteen years in his grave before it was voluntarily relinquished by Castile, and the boundary between the two realms established where it is today. Constitutionally Ferdinand followed the traditional Spanish practice of suffering the conquered realm to retain complete autonomy. The national laws and liberties were scrupulously respected. The different organs of the local government—Cortes, Council, Exchequer, and the rest—were left virtually undisturbed. Every possible concession was made to win the loyalty of the Navarrese: so much so, in fact, that it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the only change brought about by the conquest was the incoming of a new dynasty, which was represented on the spot by a Castilian viceroy. On the other hand, the Catholic King did not propose to leave the realm which he had been at so much pains to conquer in any such state of independent isolation as would make it possible to tear it away from his successors. With the idea of committing the larger and more important portion of Spain to its protection and retention, he solemnly declared before the Cortes of Burgos, on July 7, 1515, that Navarre was united and incorporated with the kingdom of Castile. It may well have cost him a pang not to turn

it over to Aragon, with which it had certainly more intimate historical ties. Zurita tells us that he hesitated a long time before settling the difficult question; but there can be little doubt that his final decision was the wisest. Certainly Castile would have been threatened far more seriously than Aragon by the presence of the enemy in Navarre. It was but fair that she should reap the benefits of its annexation and undertake the onerous duty of its defense.

While the conquest of Navarre was being completed, the war against the French continued to rage with unabated violence in Italy. At one moment, just after the battle of Ravenna, there was a unanimous demand that the Great Captain be called forth from the retirement to which Ferdinand, after his return from Naples, had ungenerously consigned him. By him alone, insisted the allies, could the fortunes of the Holy League be restored. The Catholic King finally gave his consent, the less reluctantly because he plainly saw that a further advance by the French would endanger his Neapolitan dominions; and so great was the enthusiasm for service under the banner of Gonsalvo that it seemed, for a short space, wrote Peter Martyr, that Spain was to be drained of all her noble and generous blood. But more favorable news was received from Italy before all the necessary preparations could be made. The Great Captain was ordered back into seclusion on his estates at Loja, and died at Granada on December 2, 1515, without having been able to render the last service which his country demanded. Other generals carried the work of the League to its triumphant conclusion. The French were soon expelled from Milan; peace was made before the end of 1514, and Louis XII died on the last night of the year. His brilliant young successor, Francis I, immediately returned into Italy, won 'a battle of the giants' at Marignano, reoccupied the Milanese, and before he had been a year on the throne regained all, and more than, the prestige which his predecessor had lost; but Ferdinand, save for making a fresh alliance with Henry VIII of England, seems to have remained quite indifferent to the conquests of the French. The old king's days were numbered, and he knew it; of his principal contemporaries, whom he had fought and outwitted, only one, the Emperor Maximilian, was still alive; a new generation had arisen; he had done his work and was probably not sorry to go. Death came to him at last, on January 23, 1516, in the little village of Madrigalejo in Estremadura; and Adrian of Utrecht, the envoy of the Hapsburg Charles, hovered about like a bird of evil omen all through his final illness, as if to remind him in his last moments of the detested Fleming, who was to reap the reward of his labors and to inherit his hard-won domains. Certainly it was the bitterest irony of fate that at the very moment when Spain's national unity had been attained, her national independence should have been lost. Ferdinand and Isabella had earned the everlasting gratitude of their country by giving her the one, and by increasing, beyond the most ambitious dreams of their contemporaries, the wealth and extent of her dominions overseas. Yet their reign had also resulted in depriving her of the other, and in bequeathing her the almost insoluble problem of reconciling the national interests with the dynastic ambitions of a race of alien kings.

**ENDD OF PARTT ONE**

**THE RISE OF  
THE SPANISH EMPIRE  
IN THE  
OLD WORLD AND IN THE NEW**

**PART ONE**

**THE MIDDLE AGES**

**&**

**THE CATOHLIC KINGS**



**PART TWO**

**CHARLES, THE EMPEROR**

**&**

**PHILIP THE PRUDENT**