| CRISTO RAUL.ORG ' | 
|  | THE UNIVERSAL HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY |  | 
| FROM JUSTINIAN TO LUTHER. AD 518-1517CHAPTER XIII.SOME SCHOOLMEN
         THE philosophic and theological systems of the Middle
        Ages have received the name of Scholasticism from the cathedral and monastic
        schools in which they originated. With the exception of John Scotus Erigena,
        the first writers and teachers of the Carolingian age were of a practical turn
        of mind. But in the eleventh century practical interests gave way to a pure
        love of science, and scholars strove to give a perfectly logical form to the
        doctrines of the Church. Soon after 1100 we already find a sharp distinction
        between two different schools of thought, the Nominalists and the Realists,
        though some germs of their different theories can be found in the ninth
        century. The Nominalists maintained that 'general notions' or 'universals' are
        mere abstractions of the understanding, to which we give names in order to
        describe the qualities of particular things. The Realists held that these
        'universals' have a substantial reality, they are objective ideal existences
        before and apart from human thinking, and are more real than individual things.
        The universals were believed to inhere in the individuals and to constitute
        their 'form' or essence. Thus, according to the Realists, humanity is real;
        according to the Nominalists men are real, each man is real, but humanity is
        not real. The difference was one of serious importance, for Realism was linked
        with a spiritual view of the universe, and Nominalism with an unspiritual view,
        and might fairly be described as skeptical and rationalistic in tendency, if
        not in intention.
         Roscellinus (d.c. 1125) represented this rationalistic
        school of thought and his tritheistic doctrine
        concerning the Trinity was opposed by St. Anselm, whose guiding principle in
        the philosophy of religion was 'Believe in order that you may understand'.
        Condemned at Reims, Roscellinus was received at Rome
        and then returned to teach in France. Nearly contemporary with him we find
        several notable Schoolmen. Among the most important of them were John of
        Salisbury and Peter Abelard, a pupil of Roscellinus.
   John of Salisbury, an Englishman who became Bishop of
        Chartres, may be called a forerunner of the Renaissance of the next century. He
        is an Academician and reproduces the style and thought of Cicero. He is a
        Christian humanist, believing that the love of God is the true philosophy. But
        he hesitates to make affirmations where he sees no absolute certainty: he is
        cautious and knows that we must often be content with probabilities.
         The celebrated Abelard (1079-1142) was a thinker of a
        different type. He was a born fighter. The basis of his doctrine was
        Nominalist, and he had assimilated the Aristotelian theory of knowledge more
        completely than any of his contemporaries. He compelled his Parisian teacher,
        William of Champeaux, to change his views, and he then proceeded to attack
        another distinguished teacher, Anselm of Laon. He left Laon for Paris, where
        his lectures on theology and philosophy enjoyed an extraordinary vogue. At this
        time he seduced and was secretly married to the beautiful and talented Heloise.
        For his sake she unselfishly denied the marriage, while he was cruelly
        mutilated in a way which disqualified him for ecclesiastical preferment. He
        fled to the monastery of St. Denis, but had to leave it when he maliciously
        announced the historical fact that St. Denis of Paris was not Dionysius the
        Areopagite. He next lived for a short time at an oratory named the Paraclete,
        leaving it to become abbot of a monastery in Brittany; he again lectured in
        Paris, and was excommunicated by Pope Innocent II. He found a refuge with the
        Abbot, Peter the Venerable, of Cluny, who not only effected a reconciliation of
        Abelard with Bernard, but obtained permission from the Pope for him to pass his
        last days in peace at Cluny. He died in 1142 near Chalon-sur-Saône whither he had gone in quest of health. His remains
        were carried off in secrecy to the Paraclete, where Heloise was laid to rest in
        1164. Their bones still lie united in the cemetery of Père-la-Chaise.
   Abelard's influence, both during his life and in later
        days, has been the result rather of his force of character than of any
        originality of ideas. The notion that he was an apostle of free thought who
        deliberately intended to wreck the principle of authority must be seriously
        questioned. It cannot be denied that in opposing the tritheism of Roscellinus he taught a Sabellian doctrine of the Trinity,
        and his doctrine of the Atonement fails to do justice to the propitiatory
        character of Christ's death. But he wished to understand in order that he might
        believe. And his famous Sic et Non, in which he put together the conflicting
        opinions of the Fathers, was written to promote the solution of religious
        problems, and not the dissolution of faith. He says, “I do not want to be a
        philosopher by contradicting St. Paul, nor to be an Aristotle so as to separate
        from Christ”. The extent of his learning was not vast, but what he studied he
        studied deeply; his mind was penetrating and his dialectic was formidable.
   St. Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153) was Abelard's most
        persistent antagonist. He was genuinely disturbed by the effects of Abelard's
        teaching. The discussions which had begun in the schools were now taken up in
        the universities, where famous teachers were able to gather together large and
        enthusiastic bands of followers. And his letters are full of lament over the
        loss of faith arising from attempts to apply the canons of our limited reason
        to truths which in a great measure belong to a sphere beyond our grasp.
        Abelard, he maintains, is suspicious of God's word, and his disciples debate in
        the streets about the Virgin birth of Christ and the Sacrament of the altar.
        The arguments on such questions were not very different then from what they are
        now; and the uniformity of nature was invoked with equal assurance by the
        skeptics, though impressed upon the student's imagination with less wealth of
        detail than in modern times.
         Bernard was a man of fervent faith and the most
        eminent mystical writer of this period. He inaugurated a spiritual movement
        which can be traced through the Middle Ages to the Reformation and beyond it.
        Without excluding philosophy from religion, he expresses his own conviction
        when he says, “My philosophy is to know Jesus and Jesus crucified”. The way to
        truth is Christ, and the principal thing in the teaching of Christ is humility.
        It is the virtue by which a man knows what he is himself and feels compassion
        for his neighbor, and so rises through sorrow for his sins to the contemplation
        of God. The Bible was his favorite reading, and his theology was a theology of
        the heart.
         Hugo of St. Victor (d. 141) and his pupil Richard of
        St. Victor (d. 1173) tried from the side of mysticism to bridge the gulf
        between those who subordinated faith to reason and those who believed that
        faith is the surest path to truth. The former writer was very highly esteemed
        as a ripe scholar and deep thinker, and is placed by Dante among the great
        teachers of the Church. Side by side with a mystical reaction from the
        philosophy and somewhat perverted logic of the time, we find the production of
        learned summaries of the content of the Christian faith. Such books were
        written by Hugo of St. Victor himself, Robert Pullen of Oxford, who was admired
        by Bernard, and Peter Lombard, whose work remained for centuries a popular
        text-book of the schools and won for its author the title of Magister Sententiarum. But the speculative impulse was nearly
        exhausted by the middle of the twelfth century, and the mystics were devoting
        themselves to preaching and edification. A momentous change was at hand. After
        an interval of about half a century there came a new development of
        Scholasticism. It was the result of a knowledge of the complete works of
        Aristotle, transmitted by the Muslims and the Jews of Spain.
   Alexander of Hales (d. 1245), an English archdeacon
        who studied and lectured in Paris and entered the order of St. Francis, was the
        first Schoolman who knew all the Aristotelian writings and applied the forms of
        Peripatetic philosophy to the elaboration of the doctrinal system of the
        Church. His ponderous Summa Theologiae, which Roger
        Bacon declared to be equal in weight to one horse, was recommended highly by
        Pope Alexander IV and a Roman Conclave, and it caused the Franciscans to give
        him the name of Doctor Irrefragabilis. It is not a
        book of great intrinsic value, but it is of real historical importance as
        marking a new stage in human knowledge. And Alexander of Hales had the honor of
        teaching St. Bonaventura, whom he described as 'an Israelite indeed, in whom
        Adam appears not to have sinned'.
   It was, however, the Dominican order, and not the
        Franciscan, which succeeded in effecting the great revolution of which
        Alexander of Hales was the forerunner. The men who did this work were Albertus
        Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas. They presented to the world a synthesis which
        combined all that revelation called men to believe and all that the reason
        allowed them to comprehend. Before this synthesis was made, the philosophers
        were dialecticians who had derived from Aristotle instruments for argument, but
        had little matter concerning which to argue. The theologians employed the same
        methods of discussion, although their theology remained in its essence the
        Christian Platonism of St. Augustine. But when the Physics, Metaphysics, and
        Ethics of Aristotle were assimilated, there came a change. A clearer
        distinction became drawn between philosophy and theology, between what can be
        demonstrated and what cannot, and a new importance became attached to the
        experience of the senses. It became necessary to observe nature as it is.
         It is in this realm of nature that Albertus Magnus (d.
        128o) recognized the authority of Aristotle, and in his appeal to Aristotle and
        the Greeks he liberated human reason by simultaneously restricting and
        enlarging its domain. It was his deliberate purpose 'to make intelligible to
        the Latins' the treasures of knowledge accumulated by the Greeks and by their
        Arab and Jewish disciples. It has been well said that in his works they can be
        discovered like unpolished precious stones, stones which were to gain from the
        Latin genius of St. Thomas a brilliance and a setting which were not given to
        them by the German intellect of Albertus. His knowledge of physical science is
        considerable. And in spite of inconsistencies, his immense industry and his
        protracted study of Aristotle gave him a real power in digesting and expounding
        the philosophy of the great master and remodeling it for Christian use. He
        studied at Padua and Bologna, and lectured with great success at Cologne,
        Strasbourg, and Paris. In 1254 he became Provincial of the Dominicans and in
        126o the Pope made him Bishop of Regensburg. He was an efficient provincial and
        an active preacher. Among his voluminous writings is a commentary on St. John
        and a criticism of the Muslim Averroes. His principal theological works are a
        commentary on the Book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and his own Summa Theologiae, which shows the influence of both Peter Lombard
        and Alexander of Hales.
   St. Thomas Aquinas (1227-1274) entered into the labors
        of his teacher Albertus, and may be regarded as the incarnation of medieval
        Christian philosophy. Born of a noble family at Rocca Secca, he was taught as a
        child in the monastery of Monte Cassino, and as a lad at the university of
        Naples. There, against the wishes of his family, he assumed the habit of St.
        Dominic in his seventeenth year. He then studied under Albertus at Cologne and
        at Paris, and became under Albertus second lecturer at Cologne. He then
        returned to Paris in 1252 to win his doctor's degree, and lived in intimate
        friendship with St. Bonaventura. He threw himself into the controversy raging
        between the Dominicans and the University of Paris with regard to the liberty
        of teaching; and it was not until 1257, when the opposition of the university
        to the mendicant orders had been overcome, that the two friends obtained the
        degree of doctor. Urban IV recalled him to Italy in 1261, and he taught
        successively in Rome, Bologna, Pisa, and Naples. He died on March the 7th,
        1274, on his way to the second general Council of Lyons.
         His works cover an enormous ground and illustrate the
        gradual travail of his mind. The Commentary on the Sentences manifests his
        thought in process of formation, influenced by Augustinian views which he
        afterwards abandoned. The Commentaries on Aristotle and Pseudo-Dionysius show
        two great sources on which he drew for his philosophy and his theology. The
        Summa Theologiae shows us his own philosophy in a
        form adapted to beginners. And the Summa contra Gentiles contains the same
        doctrine, but with an exhaustive discussion of the problems briefly solved in
        the Summa Theologiae.
   To the contemporaries of St. Thomas the influx of new
        knowledge seemed to certify the truth of doctrines incompatible with the faith
        of the Church, and it was therefore necessary to distinguish reason and faith
        more carefully and to render to each its real due. St. Thomas knew what a proof
        is when it is solely rational, and, because he knew, he denied the possibility
        of demonstrating the doctrine of the Trinity or the creation of the world in
        time as opposed to its creation in eternity. The universe is distinct from God
        and has a perfect and intelligent cause, but reason does not, like revelation,
        tell us that it had a beginning in time. The demonstration of the existence of
        God is necessary and possible; and in the things of sense, that is, things
        whose nature is proportionate to our own, we can find a point from which our
        minds can rise upward to God. He is the summit of a series of causes of which
        the base is the reality of things perceived by the senses. The forms of things
        created, the ideas of things, exist in the thought of God, they are the
        knowledge which He has of a possible participation in His perfection on the
        part of things created. Our knowledge is not capable of reaching directly to
        the supreme good; but by a constant effort of the intellect and by choosing the
        things that are in necessary connection with that good, we can reach a real
        beatitude here, and divine that which we may reach hereafter. Now, this
        reduction of our knowledge of God to a knowledge which begins with the senses
        appeared to be directly opposed to the mystical belief that man can have direct
        evidence and clear intuitions of God's existence and God's presence. It might
        seem a dry theory to men who were conscious of an abiding “unction from the
        Holy One”. But it was the teaching of a man who was not only a great thinker
        but also a fervent saint and poet. If St. Thomas had not that passion for
        conformity with the Crucified that we find in St. Francis, he devoted his life
        to the contemplation of God, and his Eucharistic hymns are among the most
        precious jewels of medieval devotion.
         It is to be regretted that he was ignorant of Greek,
        and he defended the authority of the Pope against the Greeks by quotations from
        the usual forgeries then current in Western Christendom.
         Roger Bacon (1214-1294) was not only one of the most
        distinguished members of the Franciscan order, but also a great man in an age
        of great men. Popular English tradition came to regard him as a combination of
        the magician and the mechanician. And it is true that, like a child of his age,
        he believed in astrology and the philosopher's stone: and it is also true that
        he describes the method of constructing a telescope. But he was first of all a
        wise and learned man who perceived the folly of deserting the Scriptures for
        the works of Peter Lombard and of cultivating physical science by arguments
        which ignored research. His Oxford teachers gave him a bent in the direction of
        positive science and the knowledge of languages; he took the degree of Doctor
        of Theology at Paris, and returned to England about 125o. He then spent most of
        his time in Oxford, but his lectures roused the suspicion of his Franciscan
        superiors, and about 1257 he was sent back to Paris, where he was kept under
        strict supervision and endured great hardships. Help came to him from an
        unexpected quarter. In 1265 Guy de Foulques, who had
        acted as papal legate in England, became Pope with the name of Clement IV. He
        wrote to Bacon ordering him, notwithstanding any injunctions of his superiors,
        to send him a treatise on the sciences concerning which he had inquired when
        legate.
   In spite of the want of money and other materials,
        Bacon in two years' time sent to the Pope two works, the Opus Majus and the
        Opus Minus, and began an Opus Tertium. These large works were regarded by him
        as introductions leading to a greater work embracing the principles of all the
        sciences. But these with his other writings reveal to us a keen thinker
        exposing the sources of error, outlining the relation between philosophy and
        theology, insisting on the necessity of acquiring foreign languages, and the importance
        of mathematics and of experimental knowledge. For a time Bacon enjoyed a
        breathing space in Oxford, but in 1278 his books were condemned by Jerome of
        Ascoli, the general of the Franciscan order, and he was again imprisoned. He
        was free once more in 1292 and probably died in Oxford in 1294.
         Duns Scotus, probably a native of Scotland, became a
        member of the Franciscan order about 129o, studied in Oxford and Paris, and
        died in Cologne in 1308. He was one of the most original thinkers that Oxford
        has produced. An Aristotelian who had learned much from St. Thomas, he was also
        deeply influenced by the Augustinianism of the Franciscans and the scientific
        methods which had been taught by Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon. With him
        philosophy and theology have fewer points of contact than with St. Thomas, and
        he makes a sharper distinction between reason and revelation. He lays the
        utmost stress upon the primacy of the will in both God and man, though he
        regards Infinity as the most essential attribute of God. To him the fact that
        will controls the acts of the intelligence, and is the first cause of the act,
        is proof of the supremacy of the will. Even when the choice of an act seems to
        be the irresistible result of the knowledge that we have of an object, the will
        is wholly responsible for the choice that is made. He repeatedly criticizes St.
        Thomas. And though his work is less magnificently harmonious than that of the
        great Dominican, he surpasses him in force and originality. The manner in which
        he balances together the doctrine of God's transcendence and the doctrine of
        His creative will, and his elucidation of certain aspects of Christ's Person,
        helped to safeguard some essentially Christian ideas against a mischievous
        logic. He was fitly named Doctor Subtilis.
         Henceforth the Dominicans and the Franciscans were
        opposed as respectively the followers of Thomas and the followers of Scotus.
        The Franciscans tended to be critical and progressive, whereas the Dominicans,
        after the revolution effected by Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas, became
        conservative and the friends of tradition.
         The differences between the Thomists and the Scotists extended to almost every branch of theology and
        intimately touched the questions of grace and sin, predestination and free
        will. St. Thomas, in dealing with these great questions, remained in line with
        the teaching of St. Augustine. The Scotists were
        nearer to Pelagianism. St. Thomas, like St. Augustine, St. Bernard, and many
        others, held that although the Blessed Virgin committed no sin, she was not
        conceived immaculate. Duns Scotus held that she was even in her conception free
        from the taint of original sin, and this theory became a darling doctrine of
        the Franciscans. It was erected into a dogma in 1854 by Pope Pius IX after
        considerable discussion and a good many misgivings. In the sixteenth century
        the Council of Trent strove to keep the balance between Thomists and Scotists, but inclined on the whole towards the former. The
        influence of the two schools can be clearly traced in the intellectual
        movements of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, and the late medieval
        revival of Nominalism left its mark on Socinianism, the left wing of the
        theological revolt against Rome.
   In spite of the differences by which they were
        divided, the Thomists and the Scotists were alike
        Realists, and for a time checked the advance of Nominalism. But the last stage
        of medieval philosophy was marked by a revival of Nominalism in a militant
        form. This revival was mainly the work of the English Franciscan William of
        Occam (d. c. 1349). It became widely influential, and the last of the medieval
        Schoolmen, Gabriel Biel (d. 1495), a professor of Tubingen, was a Nominalist.
        The Realists of this later period called themselves Antiqui,
        while the Nominalists, who prided themselves on being Moderni,
        showed remarkable points of contact with some modern modes of religious
        thought.
   Occam's method proceeded on the supposition that logic
        deals not with things nor with thoughts, but with terms arbitrarily imposed by
        ourselves. Words are signs of thoughts which are signs of something else, but
        the relations between words and thoughts, thoughts and things, are all
        imperfect; and when we use certain terms we neither assert nor prove anything
        as to the relations aforesaid. Occam believed the Realists to be quite wrong in
        thinking that there is a real universal or common element in all the individuals
        of one class, for the individual thing is the only reality, whether it be in
        the outward world or in the world of mind. He distrusted abstractions and laid
        stress upon the objects of immediate perception. Further, Occam made a complete
        severance between philosophy and theology. He denied that any doctrines are
        rationally demonstrable. Reason can only bring forward probabilities in their
        favor. Thus the unity and the infinity of God are more probable than a
        plurality of gods, but they cannot be demonstrated. Nevertheless he accepted
        theological truths because they are revealed: they are certain from the point
        of view of faith, and reason does not contradict them. Like Scotus, he held
        that morality is founded on the arbitrary will of God.
         In all this theory of a twofold truth we can see a
        reaction against the great work of Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas, which was
        the reconciliation of reason and faith as 'two bells of one accord'. Occam, and
        others like him, were believers. But their belief was built upon the very
        skepticism from which it was intended to be a refuge. The result was that this
        theory of a twofold truth was accepted by philosophers who had no love for any
        religion, and on the other hand by mystics who cared little for any systematic
        theology. We must now consider the splendid effort to reconstruct the relation
        between faith and reason that was made by a great ecclesiastic, Nicholas of
        Cusa.
         One of the most attractive and interesting figures of
        the fifteenth century is Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). He was a man
        endowed with rare sagacity and a passionate love of truth. He detected as
        frauds the Donation of Constantine and the forged Decretals, and he anticipated
        Copernicus by maintaining the theory of the rotation of the earth. He was
        conspicuous at the Council of Basel, where he proposed a scheme for concord
        based on a recognition of the rights of both Pope and Council. He afterwards joined
        the papal party; but his honesty is beyond question, and as papal legate he
        carried out numerous reforms in Germany. He was a many-sided philosopher, and
        his writings prove him to be one of the finest representatives of later
        medieval thought. The word Unity may be called the motto of his aspirations. He
        was deeply dissatisfied with the scholastic Nominalism which separated faith
        and knowledge, for he believed that faith must be sustained by knowledge both
        new and old. And he desired to heal the divisions of Christendom by a
        reconciliation between the Greek and the Latin Church, hoping that Western
        thought might be renovated by contact with Greek culture.
         His theology is influenced by Pythagorean and Platonic
        metaphysics. From these metaphysics he borrowed formulas to express his
        speculations on Christian doctrine. He gave to his principal treatise the title
        of Docta Ignorantia,
        holding that, like Socrates, we must start from the knowledge that we know
        nothing. The man who begins with this knowledge may find in the truths which
        his intellect first regards as contradictory a path towards the highest and
        most perfect unity. The One for which he seeks must be that in which all things
        find their meeting point, accident and substance, body and spirit, movement and
        repose. It must include the greatest and the least, the highest and the lowest.
        It harmonizes all. Yet are we right when we say It? Should we not rather speak
        of Him? Nicholas of Cusa seeks a positive constructive theology in which God
        will appear as uniting in himself that which is scattered in all creatures, and
        he seeks a negative transcendent theology which distinguishes God from His
        creatures. He has been accused of Pantheism, but it is very doubtful whether
        this charge can be substantiated, in spite of phrases that suggest it. A
        mystical element appears in his doctrine that among those who profess religion
        the highest class find their delight not in sensuous things like the lowest
        class, nor in the understanding like the intermediate class, but in a manner
        which transcends everything that sense and understanding can grasp.
   The highest stage can be reached by the true believer
        in Christ. In his third book Nicholas shows how the absolute Being of God is
        presented to man in the Person of our Lord. In Him God and the world find their
        reciprocal mediation. In the universe, which is a limited image of God, there
        are not infinitely many degrees of concrete being; and the universe therefore
        does not exhaust the absolutely greatest power of God. If we were to think of
        the greatest as existing concretely in a determinate species, it would in
        reality be all that lies within the whole possibility of that species: it would
        be its highest possible perfection. It would be both creature and God, the
        perfection of a determinate species and the absolute maximum. Now Man has the
        most relationship with the totality of being, and therefore is the best fitted
        of all things for union with God. For this union it was necessary that the
        likeness in God, that is the Son, should unite with Man. Through this Son, and
        for Him, all things exist, and nothing can attain to higher perfection without
        this union of the human and the divine. It has appeared in the Person of
        Christ. In His Person and in His death He has made up and completed what is
        defective in all men. His perfect humanity remained throughout hypostatically
        united with His Deity. He rose again with a glorified immortal body that human
        nature might also rise to eternal life, and the mortal body become spiritual
        and indestructible. So He is both the centre and the
        completion of all creation.
   A deep and devout religion is allied with these more
        metaphysical doctrines. The activity of faith consists in the inward union of
        the believer with Christ. The possibility of this union lies in the fact that
        in Christ is the most perfect humanity, and all men are in Him. Faith, which is
        developed by knowledge, is vitalized by love. As everything that lives loves
        life and every thinker loves thought, so we cannot have faith in Jesus as
        immortal life and perfect truth without loving Him. The Church is the mystical
        body of Christ, and through the Word and the sacraments is the medium of union
        with Him; and as diverse finite things, notwithstanding their plurality, are
        comprehended in the concrete unity of the universe, so Christians have their
        concrete unity in the Church.
         Nicholas believed that man had been created for unity
        and redeemed for unity. He held that the eternal Word had taught all nations to
        feel after Him and one nation to be His special messenger, that his own
        inquiries and the inquiries of the philosophers were directed towards the same
        goal, and that one Book gives to all the assurance that those who seek will
        find.
         With Nicholas of Cusa the age of medieval
        scholasticism and of medieval reform ends, and ends with dignity.
             
         
 CHAPTER XIV.BONIFACE VIII AND THE BABYLONISH CAPTIVITY
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