


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THE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION
OF THE DUTCH IN JAVA

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THE POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

OF

THE DUTCH IN JAVA

BY

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To
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PREFACE

WHEN I was first drawn into a study of some of the features of Dutch policy in Java, I was surprised by the wide divergence between the descriptions of this policy current in English and the facts as they appear in the writings of Dutch historians and in the original documents. It seemed worth the while to carry the study farther than I had first proposed, and the results are presented here with the hope that they may be useful to students of colonial affairs. My aim has been to give in a volume of brief compass the significant results of the experiences of the Dutch in their most important dependency. For lack of books in Dutch constructed on the lines which I wished to follow, it has been necessary in many places to renounce the guidance of previous writers, and I can hardly have avoided errors in fact or in conclusion. The material at hand, however, seems full enough to justify this course, as it includes most of the important printed sources up to the period covered by the last three chapters; these last chapters have been compiled to connect the past of Java with its present, for the sake of students of modern conditions. I have attempted especially to make the most of the valuable information scattered through Dutch periodical literature, scanning the contents of the individual volumes of all the important periodicals, without reliance on the index except in the case of De Gids. Brief

bibliographical notes are prefixed to some of the chapters, and the references in the text are designed in part for the benefit of students who are not conversant with Dutch literature and who may desire to extend their study; the "Repertorium" of Hooykaas and Hartmann should be mentioned here as likely to be of aid to such students in further work in the periodicals.

For permission to use parts of two articles on the culture system, which I published originally in the Yale Review in 1900, I am indebted to colleagues on the editorial board of that journal.

CLIVE DAY.

267 LAWRENCE HALL,
NEW HAVEN, CONN.,
October, 1903.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE NATIVE ORGANIZATION

	PAGE
Area and position of Java. Its importance due to its remarkable fertility	1
The Malay population. Importance of the native institutions in the development of Dutch colonial policy	3
Obstacles to an accurate knowledge of the native organization	4
History of Java before the arrival of the Dutch. Evidence of developed forms of government	7
Description of the organization of the state of Mataram	10
Powers of the provincial governors, or regents	13
Criticism of the native political organization	16
Bad effects of personal absolutism	16
Recurrent wars of succession	18
Weakness and corruption of the administration	20
Inability of the native political organization to maintain peace	21
Slight positive benefits granted by the government to the people	24
Burden of the native government	25
Economic organization of the people	26
Preponderance of the agricultural class	27
In some parts of Java villages formed of individual landholders	28
Political organization and independence of these villages	30
In central Java villages formed of dependent tenants	31
Burden of the dues demanded from the tenants	31
Their political dependence on their landlords	33
Unfavorable condition of the mass of the people	34
Likeness of the native organization to that of mediæval Europe	35
Opportunities afforded for the exercise of European influence,	36

CHAPTER II

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: POLICY

1. Early commerce of the Dutch in the East. Conditions leading to the establishment of the East India Company	39
3. Necessity of establishing a government in the East for the Company's affairs	42

	PAGE
Choice of a site in Java for the capital	43
Inducements to territorial expansion, political and economic	44
The Company led to this expansion against the desires of the Directors	46
Superiority of the Dutch in diplomacy and war	48
The commercial policy of the Company; this policy based on monopoly	51
Monopoly maintained by wars with European competitors	52
Attempts at breaches in the monopoly designed to attract colonists	55
Proposals of Governor General Coen; their failure	56
Failure of other attempts to secure commercial privileges for individuals, and of the colonizing schemes connected with them	58
Application of mercantilist notions	60
Organization and character of the Company's commerce	61
The bulk of the Company's cargoes received in the form of tribute	62
Contingents and forced deliveries	63
Description of the contingent system by a Dutch official	65
Regulation of production in Java. The coffee culture	66
Regulation of sugar manufacture	68
The Company's finances; difficulty of arriving at a knowledge of them	70
The Company sustained through much of its history by its credit	71
Causes of the Company's decline	72
The Company prosperous only in one part of the seventeenth century	74
Decline of its trade	74
This decline due mainly to the competition of foreigners	75
Weakness of the Company's commercial management	77
Growth of the Company's revenue from political sources	79
Fall of the Company occasioned by European wars	80

CHAPTER III

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: GOVERNMENT

The Company not a single unified corporation. Powers of the separate Chambers	82
The Committee of Seventeen, designed to direct the general policy	84
Secrecy and corruption of the Directors	85
Freedom of the Company's directorate from any control	86
Influence of the directorate on the course of policy; maintenance of monopoly, character of the colonial administration	88
Independence of the Indian government in most points	89

	PAGE
Organization of the Indian government. Power of the Governor	
General	91
Criticism of the organization of the Indian government	93
Salaries granted Indian officials	95
Character of the Indian officials	96
Mode of appointment and promotion. Examples	97
Corruption among the Company's officials	100
Gains of the officials from illicit trade	102
Peculation by officials	103
Gains by officials from abuse of their political position	104
Inefficiency of the Company's fiscal administration	106
Abuses in the army	107
The Company as a government over the natives ; variety in its relations with them	108
Government through protected kings or regents	109
Position of the regents	110
The Dutch residents ; difficulties and abuses of the position	112
Evils of the system of government seen in the workings of the contingent system	115
Economic faults of the contingent system	117
Attempts to reform the contingent system	119
Difficulty of any reform in government	119
Small contributions to civilization of the natives in the period of the Company's rule	121
Opposition of the Company's interests as trader and as ruler	122
Benefit to the natives of the peace maintained by the Company	123
Growth of the native population in the eighteenth century	125

CHAPTER IV

JAVA AFTER THE FALL OF THE COMPANY

Abrupt changes in the colonial history of Java after the fall of the Company	127
Principles accepted in reorganizing Java under the Dutch state	129
Questions of reorganization before the Dutch government	130
Contrast between commercial and political systems	131
The political, or tax, system advocated by Dirk van Hogendorp in 1799	133
Van Hogendorp's criticism and proposals	135
Argument from conditions in districts leased to Chinese	136
Van Hogendorp's proposal of restricted freedom of commerce	137
Criticism of Van Hogendorp's proposals by Indian officials	138

	PAGE
Difficulty of administration the decisive objection	139
Appointment of a commission to frame a system	140
The commission opposed to Van Hogendorp's proposals	141
Adherence to the Company's system of contingents and govern- ment through native rulers	143
Report in favor of greater freedom of trade	143
Beginning of a new period in government under the charter of 1803	144
Application of changes delayed by political changes in Europe	147
Independence of the Indian government from home control	148
Conditions in Java at the arrival of Governor General Daendels	150
Reforms in the administration	151
Abuses and reforms in the judicial organization	153
The former system of native government maintained	154
The contingent system retained and extended	157
Abuse by Daendels of the forced labor of the natives	159
Fiscal difficulties of Daendels	160
His arbitrary rule	162

CHAPTER V

THE PERIOD OF BRITISH RULE

The British conquest of Java; weakness of the Dutch	164
Status of Java under British rule	166
Organization of the British colonial government; Raffles made Lieutenant Governor	167
Career and abilities of Raffles	168
Change of system attempted by Raffles	170
Motives for the change	172
Far-reaching character of the proposed reforms	173
The land-tax the central feature	174
Scheme of the land-tax	175
Question of the form of tax settlement	176
Provisional adoption of the village settlement	177
Change to individual settlement; reasons	178
Novelty of Raffles's plan the attempt to introduce administration entirely under European control	181
Reasons for the failure of Raffles's land-tax. Imperfections in the scheme	181
Practical difficulties in the way of executing such a plan	183
Collapse of the scheme of the land-tax in application	186
Maintenance of some of the forced cultures	188

	PAGE
Raffles's commercial policy	190
Failure of Raffles's government on the fiscal side	191
Reform attempted in the administration	192
The residents	194
Reform in the judicial organization	195
Contrast of the attempts at reform in the European and in the native organization	196
Failure of attempt to restrict the power of native rulers	196
Persistence of old abuses	199

CHAPTER VI

THE PERIOD OF THE DUTCH RESTORATION

Inclination of the Dutch to liberal principles on the reëstablishment of their government	203
Difficulties of the Dutch commissioners	205
Question of retaining the land-tax. Faults in its operation	206
Investigation of its workings and decision to maintain it	207
Changes in the land-tax. (a) Village settlement	209
(b) Amount set by bargaining with the village governments	211
Forced cultures retained in part	212
Question of the regulations to be adopted for the cultures formerly forced	214
The European administration strengthened in numbers	215
Attempt to raise the quality of officials	216
The native administration	218
Attempts to reform abuses in the native organization; cash salaries, native officials forbidden to trade, regulation of contracts with natives	220
Ultimate failure of these attempts	221
Transfer of the government from the commissioners to Baron van der Capellen	223
Continued irregularities in the workings of the land-tax	224
Reform of the land-tax prevented by the introduction of the culture system	226
Failure to secure freedom in the coffee culture	227
Necessity of active internal trade for the success of the free coffee culture; need of European settlers to this end	230
Liberal policy of the Commissioners to European settlers	232
Reactionary policy of Van der Capellen	233
Law of 1821 against foreign traders	234
Law of 1823 against land leases to foreigners	235

	PAGE
Responsibility of Van der Capellen for the introduction of the culture system	237
Foreign trade and commercial policy. Conditions in 1816	237
Attempt to protect Dutch commerce by differential duties	238
Establishment of the Dutch Trading Company	240

CHAPTER VII

THE CULTURE SYSTEM: POLICY

Unsettled state of Dutch policy in Java about 1830	243
Reversion to the policy of the Company; fiscal reasons	244
Fiscal demands of the Netherlands	245
Van den Bosch the chief agent in the change of policy	246
His criticism of the existing system	247
Plan proposed by Van den Bosch; the culture system	249
Undeserved reputation of the culture system in later literature	250
Money's book on Java; character and criticism	251
Influence of Money	253
The culture system purely a revenue measure	256
Changes in the original plan due to the desire for revenue	257
Extent to which the culture system was applied	258
Economic criticism of the plan of the culture system; inability of a government to organize production	259
Failures in the attempts to introduce new cultures	262
Failures in established cultures	263
Inequality in the burden of the cultures	265
Impropriety of judging the system by averages	267
Difficulty of securing averages	268
Hardships imposed on the natives in the transportation of products	271
Effect of forced labor and monopoly on the quantity and quality of product	273
Influence of the culture system on the exclusion of European planters	274
Reestablishment of commercial monopoly	277

CHAPTER VIII

THE CULTURE SYSTEM: GOVERNMENT

The land-tax during the period of the culture system	280
In the case of natives subject to the culture system the tax maintained as a standard	280

	PAGE
In the case of natives free from the culture system old abuses of the tax continued	281
Growth in forced services besides those demanded for cultures	283
Hardships and waste of the system of forced services	285
Effect of the culture system on the character of the government; difficulty of the question	286
Did the culture system cause an actual decline in government?	287
Was the culture system itself responsible for the evils of the period?	287
Influence of the home government in preventing any but the most necessary expenditures	288
Slight attention paid to the welfare of the natives	289
Restriction of expenditures on the political administration	290
Effect on the spirit of the European officials	292
Percentages to officials on the returns of cultures	293
Ignorance of the European officials	294
Partiality in appointments and promotions	295
Abuse of the natives by officials	296
Increase in power of native officials	296
Grants to regents of public revenues from land; bad results	297
Small salaries of native officials and resulting abuses	299
Tolerance of abuses by the government	301
The village government; its importance	302
Growth of communal land tenure in the villages	303
Growth in power and decline in character of village heads	304
Abuses of the village governments	307

CHAPTER IX

THE CULTURE SYSTEM: REFORM

Government revenues from the culture system	309
Criticism of the attempt to defend the culture system by the assertion that Java became more prosperous under its operation	310
Significance of the continued growth of population	312
Migrations and famines due to the culture system	314
Supreme power of the king in determining colonial policy	316
The Dutch ignorant of the state of affairs in Java	317
Strictness of press regulations	319
Small power of the Dutch Chambers in colonial affairs before 1848	320
Slight practical results in the colonial field of the constitutional revision of 1848	323
Beginnings of the reform movement after 1848. Van Hoëvell	326

	PAGE
Establishment of the colonial constitution, 1854	327
Ambiguity of the colonial constitution regarding the culture system	328
Influence of Dekker's "Max Havelaar" in stimulating reform	330
History of the reform movement in the Chambers	333
Victory of liberal principles under the colonial minister, Van der Putte	334
Final victory of the reformers about 1870	335
Practical reforms in Java during this period	335
Parallels to the culture system in the Philippines and in British India	336
Criticism of attempt to defend the culture system	338

CHAPTER X

RECENT ECONOMIC POLICY

Economic difficulty in tropical colonization the smallness of the wants of the natives	345
Underestimate of the future by the natives	348
Credit bondage: exchange of future labor for present goods	348
Credit bondage a native institution in Java, and used by the Dutch to solve the labor problem	350
Effect of the culture system on native labor	352
Continuance of the practice of securing laborers by political pressure	354
Difficulties encountered with free labor	355
Difficulty in engaging laborers; necessity of advances	356
Regulation of labor contracts by the government	357
Difficulty in holding laborers to their engagements	358
Punishment of breach of contract	358
Small amount of exports produced entirely by natives	360
Importance of the Chinese in the industrial organization	360
Their functions as middlemen	362
Necessary unpopularity of the Chinese	364
The land problem	366
Danger of allowing the right of sale without restriction; example, the "particular" lands	367
Principle that the state is sole proprietor of the land	369
Prohibition of sales to foreigners	372
Lease of cultivated lands permitted under restriction	374
Exceptional arrangements in the Principalities	376
More liberal regulations on the lease of uncultivated land	378
Economic progress of Java under the modern system	379

CHAPTER XI

RECENT FISCAL POLICY

	PAGE
Relation of the finances of Java and of the Netherlands	382
Continuance of the "net-profit" system	383
Decline of the question in practical importance	384
Development of Dutch policy as shown in expenditures in Java	386
Comparison of the budgets of 1870 and 1900	386
Expenditures on education	389
Abolition of the government sugar culture	392
Restriction of the government coffee culture	394
Place of labor services, in lieu of taxes, in the native organization	397
Attempts to reform the abuses of these services	400
Progress in reform since 1890	401
Development of taxes in the recent period	402
The land-tax	404
System of higgling, or "admodatie stelsel"	405
Failure of the reform measure of 1872	406
Practical reform in the administration of the tax	408
Beginning of systematic regulation	408

CHAPTER XII

THE MODERN GOVERNMENT AND PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

The government at The Hague	409
The minister of the colonies	410
Proposal of a colonial council	411
Powers of the Dutch legislature in colonial affairs	411
Criticism of the part played by the legislature	412
The government in India; its centralization	414
Dependence of the Governor General on authorities at home	414
Power of the Governor General in India; the Council of India, the departments of administration, the General Secretariat	415
The provincial administration; peculiarity of its position	417
Scheme of the provincial administration	418
The resident and his assistants	418
The controleur	419
Native officials; the regents and district heads	420
Centralization and its bad effects	421

	PAGE
Proposals for the reorganization of the central government . . .	422
Proposals for the establishment of representative provincial govern- ments	423
Faults of European officials in the provincial administration . . .	424
Character of the native officials	425
Relations between European and native officials	426
Salaries of European officials in the provincial administration . . .	428
Slowness of promotion in the provincial administration	430
INDEX	433

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POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE DUTCH IN JAVA

CHAPTER I

THE NATIVE ORGANIZATION

[NOTE.—I have embodied in the text of this chapter the necessary comment on the sources of information, and refer to the footnotes for detailed indication of the available material. The standard history of native Java is by Veth, forming the first two volumes of his work on Java now appearing in a revised form. Earlier histories lack critical discrimination; the works of Raffles and Crawfurd, however, are still of value for the description of institutions at their time. Scheuer, "Het Grondbezit in de Germaansche Mark en de Javaansche Dessa, Rotterdam, 1885," is largely historical, but suffers from its bias toward the old theory of the Aryan village community; it is based on material which I have used independently.]

JAVA is the second in the chain of large islands that stretch out from the Malay peninsula toward Australia. In its greatest extent its length is over one thousand kilometres, a distance nearly equal to that from New York to Louisville or Charleston, or, in the Old World, from Paris to Vienna. The breadth of the island, however, is in no place over one-fifth of the length, so that the total area (including some small neighboring islands) is only about fifty thousand square miles, almost exactly the same as that of England, or a little more than that of the State of New York. Java is much smaller than some others of the Dutch East India islands, and makes but one-

fourteenth of their total area, but it is now, and has been throughout most of the period of European colonial enterprise, the first of them in economic and political importance.] At the present time it has a population about threefold that of all the other islands, and provides about five-sixths of the total revenues received by the colonial government.

The superiority in wealth and population that Java possesses over the other territories of the Dutch in the East Indies can be ascribed in large part to the remarkable fertility of the island, due to its geological constitution. It is said to contain more volcanoes, active and extinct, than any other known district of equal extent; the substances thrown out from these volcanoes are spread over the whole island, obscuring in most places the original rocks, and forming a soil of exceptional productiveness. The climate is favorable. There is scarcely any variation in the mean temperature from month to month, and the rainfall is heavy and sure. Records of recent years show occasional droughts in different parts of the island, and more frequent inundations, but Java fares better in this respect than most other parts of the tropical world, certainly far better than British India. The combination of soil and climate has gained for the island the title of "the garden of the East," and has made its vegetation the type of tropical luxuriance. Much of the surface is covered by mountains, and even now only about four-tenths of it is under cultivation, but that area maintains on a low grade of the agricultural stage a population little less than the population of modern industrial England.

In this introductory sketch of the scene of Dutch colonial enterprise, more importance attaches to the people

whom the Dutch found there than to the place itself. The natives belong to the Malay stock, which has spread from southeastern Asia over a great part of the islands in the Pacific Ocean. Physically they are of low stature and of delicate build, no match for the average European. Their intellectual and moral characteristics will appear in the following description of their organization, as it existed at the time when the Dutch came in contact with them.

The writer is convinced that the native organization is the most important topic to be treated in describing the course of the Dutch in Java. It is the key of their history. The Dutch have been at all times few in proportion to the mass of natives. Java has been to them not a "colony," but a "possession" or "dependency." They have kept their place in the island not by driving the natives out, but by learning to work with them and to rule over them.—Up to the most recent times they have not entered into relations with the mass of the common people. One man cannot know or govern tens or hundreds of thousands. They have had to work and rule through native chiefs, and through the customs of government which those chiefs represent. The Dutch have succeeded in their colonial policy only by learning to understand and to use the native institutions; ignorance or misuse of the opportunities for control which the native organization affords has been one of the chief causes of their failures.

The course of Dutch policy is a history of the gradual recognition of this fact. In the earliest period the East India Company attached itself as a parasite to Javanese society, with little knowledge of its organization and little

regard to the effects. The failure of the company brought the Indian possessions under the direct control of the state. A beginning was made in the study of the native institutions, but the knowledge of them was still only superficial, and in the period of the culture system they were so misused as to threaten the prosperity of the people and the integrity of the government. Finally, in the modern period of reform, beginning about fifty years ago, the selfish pressure on native institutions was relaxed. The Dutch perceived at last that native customs are a more important factor in the economic and political organization than any of their own laws and regulations. Their history in recent years has been marked by careful study of native institutions, and by the constant effort to shape their policy to them.

In view of the importance of this topic of the native institutions in Java, it is proper here to make the admission that the subject offers unusual difficulties to the student, and that any treatment of it must be general in terms and hazy in details. We should like to know what the organization was before the Dutch appeared, and what the successive changes have been since then under Dutch influence. Unfortunately it was not till about the beginning of the nineteenth century that the subject attracted the serious attention of European administrators, and in some important points the subject was not thoroughly studied by them until after the middle of the century. Thus, in regard to land tenure, one of the most important topics of all, the student is obliged to rely in large part on the results of a government investigation which was not begun till 1867. The testimony embodied in the report of the investigation shows that at that time

the Dutch had not only completely changed the superstruction of native government, but had profoundly modified its substructure as well, and that the village organization of to-day cannot be taken as evidence of what existed one hundred or even fifty years ago. Even at the end of the eighteenth century some of the native institutions had become seriously distorted by the pressure which they suffered under the East India Company. The evidence from a late period must evidently be used with caution.

On the other hand we get from native traditions a great amount of material, but literary rather than critical in character, and more dangerous than useful in the hands of any one not specially trained to its interpretation. It would be ungrateful not to recognize the service that Dutch scholars have done in the last hundred years in their work on this material, and yet one cannot repress the regret that no scholar (so far as I know the literature) has approached it from the special standpoint of comparative politics, and has reconstructed from it and from the evidence of early Dutch observers, a complete picture of the primitive political constitution. One finds plenty of dynastic narratives of the native states, with an account of their various wars and intrigues, but generalizations on the real significance of it all occur only as *obiter dicta*. The importance of native institutions in shaping the colonial policy of the Dutch has been fully recognized by one of the foremost Dutch authorities,¹ but, in spite of the work that he and others have accomplished on the line that he suggested, an immense amount is still left to be done. The narrative history of the native states has been

¹ P. J. Veth, "Gedachten over de behandeling der geschiedenis van Ned. Ind.," TNI., 1867, 1:2:323.

put in shape for use, but scholars have scarcely more than begun to study the native constitutional history or to explain the native institutions in the modern terms of social and political science.¹

In view of the difficulties of the subject, it is fortunate that the purpose of this book requires no more than a sketch of the main features of the organization with which the Dutch had to do. Such a sketch, tentative in many points, disregarding many differences in time and place, is presented in the following pages, with the conviction that the general impression will strike not far from the truth, whatever liberties may seem to have been taken in the treatment of material. One further bit of preface may be proper, to disarm the suspicions of readers who may find the picture of Malay politics unexpectedly black. This study is meant to be critical, but the writer is conscious of no animus to influence his judgment in this or other parts of the work, and seeks only to convey to the reader as accurately and soberly as may be the results of his studies. If the native political organization is described as being so very bad, it is because it cannot be made to appear better without departing from the truth as shown in historical documents. The faults of government, it is true, are more likely to go on record than its merits; the reader may make what allowance he chooses for this fact, and may assume that a fuller record would lead to a more favorable judgment. The writer thinks this might be the case as regards the sparsely populated

¹ The change of tendencies in the Netherlands is shown by the publication in *Bijdr. TLV.*, 1901, of a valuable study on the native village organization by Professor L. W. C. van den Berg. I shall have occasion to refer to this later.

parts of Java; as regards the government of the mass of the people he doubts it.

As an introduction to this sketch of the native political institutions in the period of the Dutch East India Company a very brief summary of the early history will suffice. Linguistic evidence shows that before the beginning of the Christian era the Malay inhabitants of Java cultivated rice on terraced and irrigated fields, worked iron and other metals, and had a considerable knowledge of navigation. In the first century A.D. occurred the invasion from continental India that forms the commencement of the Hindu period in Javanese history. This period lasts until about the beginning of the fifteenth century. Authorities differ in their estimates of the influence that the invading Hindus exercised over the Malays, and it may be, as some suggest, that the Hindus continued and developed the Malay organization rather than that they changed it in its essentials.¹ Whatever the judgment on this point may be, and however few original contributions may be ascribed to the Hindus, it is certain that the eastern and central parts of Java, in which the Hindu monuments are mainly found, have nowadays a population differing radically in character, customs, and language from the inhabitants of the western end of the island.²

¹ Brandes, "Een jayapattrā," *Tijd. TLV.*, 1889, 32:122. He thinks that the Malays pursued their development independent of Hindu influence till the eighth century, and that they had then achieved important advances along a number of different lines, including a system of coinage and a well-established government. Van Eck asserts that Hinduism was only a cloak over the Malay, obscuring but not eradicating his original traits; the Javanese was only "a disguised Polynesian" in respect to Hindu influence. "Schetsen," XII, *Ind. Gids*, 1882, 1:624. Professor L. W. C. van den Berg is a believer in Aryan influence.

² The character and causes of the difference are discussed by Van

The main point of contrast that interests us here is that of political character and institutions. The Soendaneese of western Java show far more personal independence than the Javanese proper to the east of them, whose meekness under political control amounts to servility, and whose rights in such an important matter as land tenure are so small as to put their possessions entirely at the mercy of their rulers. The character and institutions of the Javanese proper can be explained only by the assumption that the people had been subjected for many centuries to a government developed far beyond the stage of the old tribal system.

The indication here given that a settled and advanced form of government existed in the Hindu period is confirmed by all the contemporary historical evidence. Marco Polo and Friar Odoric speak of the government of Java as a monarchy, and reaching far back beyond their time Chinese accounts give the same impression. One of these of the period of the T'ang dynasty (618-906) speaks of a king of Java, whose supremacy was recognized by twenty-eight small countries lying about his capital; an account from the period of the Sung dynasty (960-1279) describes a state which maintained an army of thirty thousand men and had a highly organized administration, with more than a thousand officials employed in the different departments. Testimony from native sources

Hoëvell, "Onderzoek naar de oorzaken van het onderscheid . . . tusschen de Soendaneezen en eigenlijke Javanen," *TNI.*, 1841, 4:2:132 ff. He thinks that the difference originated in Hindu times and has developed since. The boundary line between the Javanese proper and the Soendaneese is found in the residencies of Tagal and Banjoemas. Dekker, "Max Havelaar," 190, said that the two peoples are no more alike than modern Englishmen and Dutchmen; the comparison may serve as some measure of the difference, though it obscures the peculiar quality of it.

is all to the same effect. If all other evidence were lacking, it would be possible to conclude from the great temples of the Hindu period, like Boro-Boedoer, that the mass of the people had already learned to submit to the control coming from some single source of authority. Native inscriptions do exist, however, generally in the form of a grant by the prince to some individual of land, office, or special privileges; these documents show that in the Hindu period in Java the central government had at least as much power as it had in mediæval Europe.¹

In the latter part of the fourteenth century the Hindu empire of Madjapahit extended not only over Java proper but over Soenda as well, and exercised some kind of overlordship over parts of Malakka, Sumatra, Borneo, and other islands in the archipelago.² Under internal dissension and with the extension of Mohammedanism in the fifteenth century this empire crumbled. Islam vanquished the Indian religions and became in time practically the exclusive faith of the inhabitants of the island. In its progress through Java it broke up the old states into new ones, but there is no evidence that it changed the character of the political organization, or added anything essential

¹ Of especial interest to any student of institutions is a Javanese grant of immunity of 860 A.D., much like contemporary grants in Europe. This is translated and discussed by Kern, "Over eene oudjavaansche oorkonde," *Verslagen en Mededeelingen der Koninkl. Akad. v. Wetenschappen. Afd. Letterkunde*, Amsterdam, 1881, 2. Reeks, 10:77 ff. For a discussion of this and other inscriptions see Veth, *Java*, 1:40, 43, 54, 68. For the special points cited in the text see Yule's "Marco Polo," *Lond.*, 1875, 2:254, and his "Cathay," *Lond.*, 1866, 1:87; Groeneveldt, "Notes on the Malay Archipelago . . . from Chinese Sources," *Verhandelingen Bat. Gen.*, 1877, 39:1:13, 16.

² Rouffaer, "Het tijdperk van godsdienstovergang in den Maleischen Archipel," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1899, 6:6:113. This study is based on sources but recently rendered available.

to it. At the time when the Dutch East India Company began its operations in Java, it found the whole island subject to monarchical and absolute governments. These governments were undoubtedly of later origin in the west than in the east of the island; they had not been in operation long enough in the west to destroy all the rights of the people, and had not extended into thinly populated districts where small tribal groups like the Badoeis could still maintain themselves. It may be that remnants of tribal institutions are still to be found in the native organization,¹ but the people had for the most part passed far beyond the tribal stage when the Dutch appeared in the East. The territorial state under an absolute monarch was the typical form of political organization, and over a great part of Java such states had been in existence probably over a thousand years. The people had been disciplined as few of the other Malays have been. They had been governed till they had lost all power to govern themselves, and they had been repressed so that they had no longer the ability to throw off a bad government. It is a fact of prime importance in the history of the Dutch in Java that they found the native institutions in this condition, not fresh and in a course of vigorous development, but old and worn, going through their cycles of change only to return to the starting-point. Nothing else would explain the ease with which the Dutch conquered and ruled the island.

An idea of the native political organization can be

¹ This is asserted by Van Baak, "Nota over het eigendomsrecht op den woesten grond op Java," Eindresumé, 3, Bijlage N.; C. F. van Delden Laërne, "Jets over den oorsprong van het communaal landbezit op Java," *Tijd. TLV.*, 1875, 22: 260, 268.

given by selecting for description Mataram, the most powerful of the states with which the East India Company had to do.¹ In the first half of the seventeenth century this state ruled over the greater part of the island. Like all of the large native states it had been built up in a comparatively short time by conquest, and there was no organic union between its different parts. That it was no natural growth but the artificial construction of a successful warrior is clearly shown by the organization of the government. The monarch had under his direct control only a small part of the state; the rest was held in his name by subordinate princes who maintained just as much independence as they dared. A distant province, left under the rule of a representative of the conquered dynasty, would be only nominally subject to the monarch, while provinces near the capital and ruled by members of the monarch's family would be really dependent on him. In a large part of the state, the northeastern provinces, the scheme of administration was as follows: Each province had its subordinate king, *pangeran*, and beside him a governor representing the central authority; throughout the districts and towns of the province each of these officials was represented by distinct subordinates. Besides these two groups of officials there was a third, devoted to the provincial administration; each place had two tax-gatherers, who reported directly to superiors in their own department, and were independent of other officers. Then over the whole group of provinces were two

¹ The following description is based on Ryckloff van Goens, "Reijsbeschrijving van den weg uit Samarangh nae de konincklijke hoofdplaets Mataram, . . . 1656," Bijd. TLV., 1856, 1:4:307-350. Van Goens was sent as an envoy to the native court and remained there for some time.

special commissioners, who had *their* special agents everywhere to watch the conduct of affairs and report daily at the capital. Finally there was a body of several thousand inquisitors, who ranged the country in bands "like hunting dogs" to see and hear whatever was going on. They had the right of entry everywhere, even in the assemblies of the greatest nobles; they were "the king's executioners," set to catch his enemies, and they were much feared and hated. The whole system was evidently framed with but one object, not of doing something, but of preventing anything from being done; it was based on suspicion and fear.

The army was divided up among the various higher officials; a certain number of soldiers was ascribed to each, to be raised from the territory subject to him, and that number could not be exceeded. The king alone was free to keep as many soldiers as he pleased; practically, of course, the size of his guard was limited by the amount of money and men that he could secure from his own and his vassal territories.

One side of the workings of this system has been described for us by the Dutch envoy who was present at court. The monarch appeared in public ordinarily three times a week to attend a tournament to administer justice or to hold a council. On nearly every day, however, the nobles of the state, from *pangerans* down to minor officials, were required to attend court and to wait through the morning on the chance that the monarch might appear. They imperilled their fortunes and even their lives if they stayed away; the monarch could assure himself of their fidelity only by requiring their constant presence. Ordinarily several thousand, great and small, attended an

audience. Everything at court depended on the monarch's personal favor. The nobles were fearfully anxious lest they should offend a man who could ruin them by a word, and studied day and night the art of pleasing him. One day the monarch ordered that Van Goens's bodyguard should be called in, but gave the command to no one by name; instantly two or three hundred nobles started off, treading each other under foot in their wild desire to call six common soldiers. On another occasion the monarch summoned one of Van Goens's followers and the whole court, great and small, with the exception of the *pangerans*, rushed after him and introduced him, breathless with the confusion. The monarch laughed, and indeed the situation has its amusing side; it seems like a scene from a comic opera. A comic opera becomes a serious thing, however, when it assumes the place of a real government, and not all the incidents of Javanese court life were as innocent as those just described.

At the time when this description was written the empire of Mataram was still young, and the central government exercised more efficient control over the under-kings or regents than was often the case. The hold of the sovereign on his subordinates seems generally to have consisted only in the above-mentioned obligation on their part to appear at court at certain periods.¹ The regents were often nearly sovereign in their authority and can be regarded in the discussion of their administration as independent kings, ruling over districts roughly compar-

¹ Jonge, *Opk.*, 5: 36, *Journael of Haan*, 1623; *ib.*, 6: 110, Governor General Maetsuyker to Directors, 1668 (Palembang). In Banjoemas the nobles were required to spend six months of the year at court. S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2: 648.

able in size to counties in the Eastern States of America.¹ The form of government presents about the same characteristics in all the different regencies. Every regent had one or more viziers or ministers (*pateh*), who attended to the actual business of administration, and a dozen or so high court officials, generally appointed from his relatives. The surrounding country was subject to a descending series of subordinates, some assigned to the government of definite areas, and some given special functions. Raffles says² that the executive, judicial, and fiscal authority, united in the person of the sovereign, descended undivided to each subordinate, but the separation of the fiscal functions observed in Mataram is found later in the political organization, and may well have been common, arising from the jealousy of the central government at the concentration of power in the hands of subordinates.³ In general the statement of Raffles is correct: "Every officer has unlimited power over those below him, and is himself subject to the capricious will of the sovereign or his minister."⁴ Subordination rather than association marked the system. In practice, of course, the authority of any official was limited by his ability to make it effective at a distance. Each official, beginning at the

¹ In de Jonge, *Opk.*, 10 : 237, 260 (Aanmerkingen, Mossels, 1751, 1754), there is a list of the seventeen regencies in Jacatra, with the area and population. The mean area would seem to be about twenty-five square miles, English, but some are so small that they cannot have been independent in government. Some exceeded 100,000 morgen Dutch, or were over 300 square miles. The figures of population are of little value, as some districts had been depopulated (*ib.* p. 248). A regency in modern Java averages between 500 and 600 square miles. ² *Hist.*, 1 : 299.

³ Kollman, "Bagelen onder het bestuur van Soerakarta en Djokjokarta," *Tijd. TLV.*, 1864, 14 : 355. Differentiation in the functions of subordinate officials appears also in the reports of Rothenbuhler and C. de Groot. ⁴ *Hist.* 1 : 160.

bottom, kept all that he could of the powers and profits of government, and so the process went on through the various stages to the sovereign at the head of the series.

The public revenue consisted mainly of payments in kind and of labor services by the cultivators of the soil. The money receipts were so small that they can be neglected. Consequently officials could not be paid money salaries, and they were supported by the assignment to them of certain fractions of the sovereign's rights to produce and labor. This system is normal on a certain stage of economic organization, and has sometimes created in its development a special public class among the people, with hereditary rights to land and to office as well. Tendencies in this direction are observable in the history of native Java, which had to be considered by European administrators later in their bearings on the tenure of land. In general it may be said here that officials failed to obtain public recognition of such a privileged position. The son of an official never had the right to succeed to his father's position, though he was very commonly appointed to it, and appointments from outside the families of the higher classes were rare. The office-holding nobles formed a class distinct from the rest of the population, with a character and traditions of their own, but according to the native theory nobility was official, not hereditary. Descendants of officials clung to the titles which had marked their ancestors' position, and in some districts it was hard to find a man, even among the common people, who did not claim a title; none had a privileged position, however, unless he himself held office.¹

¹ C. de Groot, Report, 1823, TNI., 1853, 15:1:86. Crawford said that the fluctuations in fortune of members of the office-holding class were very great. Raffles, Sub., 92.

Enough has been said about the higher political organization in Java to form a basis for the criticism of its workings as they appear in the period of the East India Company, and to enable the reader to appreciate the extent to which the natives might gain in passing under European rule. The most evident fault of the system was the tendency to unrestrained absolutism that appears in all parts of it, but especially in the persons of the under and upper kings. "The princes ruled over the people with absolutely unlimited authority, without other laws than those that they themselves imposed. The idea of property, even that in wife and children, was entirely unknown to the native, whenever the will of his rulers came into play."¹ Everything depended on the accidents of character of a single individual. At best the people were subject to caprices such as those of the monarch Ageng, referred to in Van Goens's description, who allowed no man to spend the night in court, but slept himself, the only man, in the midst of ten thousand women. In many cases the Javanese rulers were real monsters, crazed to an "imperial frenzy" by the power of their position. Ageng's successor, Amangkoe Rat, signalized his succession to the throne by the murder of twenty thousand individuals, and throughout his reign put out of the way, sometimes with his own hand, any one against whom he had the slightest ground of suspicion. When one of his wives died, he

¹ "Regten en verpligtingen, . . . in Cheribon," TNI, 1863, 1:1:146, from a census report of the residency describing conditions in the time of native rule. The same account appears in different times and places. Coen wrote of Java in general, 1619, "The law of these countries is the will of the king," de Jonge, Opk., 4:183. Mossel wrote of Bantam, 1747, "The king rules this kingdom sovereign in the highest degree," *ib.* 10:119.

starved a hundred women to give expression to his grief, then searched among the wives and daughters of his subjects for a beauty to become her successor.¹ We are told by a modern writer that Amangkoe Rat is not a fair type of the native ruler, and that the Dutch were really responsible for his excesses, as the people would have turned him out if they had not been menaced by a foreign power.² This writer, depressed with the faults that he finds in the modern Dutch government, is inclined sometimes to doubt whether the natives have benefited by their change of rulers. It is true, as he says, that a bad foreign government is not better than a good native one. That may be granted, and it may be granted too that Amangkoe Rat was the extreme specimen of his kind. Still, the impression remains after reading the annals of the native states that good rulers were few, that the temptations to abuse were strong for any man, far too strong generally for princes brought up in the harem. There were some good rulers, but they were ineffective through faults in the system of administration; there was really no good native government.³ Over against the opinion of Van Kesteren, the author cited above, may be put that of St. John, who

¹ Another ruler had a house at court in which he enjoyed the spectacle of naked women fighting with tigers. These examples, which might be much extended, are taken from Veth and from volumes 6 and 7 of de Jonge, Opk.

² Van Kesteren, "Een ideaal voor den Indischen staatsdienaar," *Ind. Gids*, 1885, 2 : 1534.

³ This assertion, it should be understood, is meant to be confined to Java. The tribal governments of Sumatra and Bali may be better than poor European government, as is asserted in *TNI.*, 1873, 2 : 1 : 141. Instances of rulers with good intentions who could not secure good government, through the weakness of the administration or the vices of royal relations, can be found in de Jonge, *Opk.*, 11 : 375 (Bantam); 12 : 110 (Soerabaya).

thought that the Malay governments were fit only for evil, could not do good, that *any* foreign government was better. "Their imbecility is as incurable as their despotism is ferocious. They deserve only ruin. They are at once proud and corrupt, despotic and feeble."¹ Between these extremes I should incline to St. John's view.

Far more serious, though less striking, than the tyranny over individuals, were the effects of personal rule on the course of public policy. Veth says that the native policy was marked by a course so tortuous as to put to shame the most extravagant Machiavellian. It expressed not the unconscious tendencies of growth of a society, but the ambitions or whims of an individual. It dissipated the force of the people in lines that led nowhere or in lines that had to be retraced. The ruler of Mataram conquered one of the eastern points of Java, only to find that it was impossible to establish his sway there permanently; he depopulated the district and left it. The state of Mataram began to crumble immediately after the death of its founder; to the wars in which it originated succeeded wars in which it dissolved, and the only result to the people was misery and want.

The state was often prevented from exercising its destructive powers against its neighbors only by internal dissensions that exhausted its resources in wars of no public interest. The record of family quarrels within the different dynasties seems interminable; these family quarrels are called the chronic evil of the state of Mataram. Many originated in greed for power, many in purely personal incidents, such as love-affairs in which some member of the royal harem or candidate for it was implicated.

¹ Horace St. John, "The Indian Archipelago," Lond., 1853, 1 : viii.

The institution of hereditary monarchy is ordinarily justified on the ground that the state gains so much from having the succession to the government simply regulated and generally recognized that it can afford to bear with rulers who are often weak and sometimes wicked. Bad government is better than the anarchy of a war of succession. In Java the one great apology for hereditary monarchy seems lacking. By native custom the rule descended to a son of the monarch born of one of his regular wives; the heir, not necessarily the eldest son, was designated as crown-prince during the life of his father, who acted sometimes with a council of nobles in making the nomination. The system led to countless intrigues among the wives and even the concubines of the monarch, and gave no assurance that the person who managed to win the royal nomination could make good his claims after his father's death. It seems no exaggeration to say that half or more of the serious wars in which the native states engaged rose out of the futile question as to which of two men equally bad should govern a certain territory. I have seen no evidence that princes or dynasties won the affection or loyalty of their people in the period of native rule. The Dutch Governor General wrote in 1677, at the time of a revolt in Mataram by a pretender to the crown, that it was surprising that a people used for centuries to obey this ruler's ancestors should, as they did, give their allegiance to the rebel with entire indifference.¹

The most important figure in the central government beside the sovereign was the *pateh*, or chief minister, who appears even in the smaller kingdoms as the chief executive of the king's commands. He was supposed to do the

¹ Maetsuyker to Directors, 1677, de Jonge, Opk., 6: 169.

work of ruling while the sovereign enjoyed the pleasures. This influential official appears sometimes as a man of vulgar origin, made great by the royal favor; sometimes as a relative of the king, retaining his position when he had become old and useless.¹ When an able man filled the place he was prevented often from accomplishing any good by the sovereign, who preferred to listen to the advice of his favorites, and thwarted his *pateh* in every possible way, through jealousy of his influence.²

The administration was fitted neither by its organization nor by its personnel to remedy the faults of the central government. In describing above the administrative organization in Mataram in the seventeenth century, attention was directed to the way in which the various officials were set to watch and check each other; the spirit of this arrangement seems characteristic of the whole native political system, though it appears nowhere else so clearly expressed in the frame of organization. We find nowhere among officials a feeling of mutual trust such as must underlie all effective coöperation. Every official was jealous and suspicious of those above him, beside him, and beneath him. Each one made all the profit he could and did as little as he dared in return for it. Offices were gained from a superior by favoritism, and by promises of greater returns from the people than had been squeezed from them before. The Soenan (emperor of Mataram) put over Japara two of the worst tyrants in Mataram, of

¹ Mem. of Siberg, 1787, de Jonge, Opk., 12 : 89.

² Reis of Engelhardt, 1803, de Jonge, Opk., 13 : 156. The power behind the throne was sometimes exercised by a European renegade, or by a woman of the lowest character. Cf. M. L. van Deventer, Gesch., 1 : 129, 294 ; 2 : 155 ; de Jonge, Opk., 7 : 215.

whom one, the father of one of his favorite concubines, had already been deposed for misgovernment, because they promised to secure for him a present from the East India Company.¹ The ruler of one of the districts of Kra-wang, to maintain his personal power, appointed as subordinate officials inexperienced men and boys of twelve or thirteen years, over whom he could be completely master. I quote from the report of a Dutch official. "These boys have no idea of orders; much less do they know how to carry them out. They are proud of their relationship to the head-regent, and shrink from nothing to satisfy their desires. The common people must contribute to everything, to their hunting and fishing parties, etc., so that it is no wonder that they are listless, depressed, and not up to their duties. The wretched inhabitants pay little or no attention to their plantations, which they let run waste, and seek for nothing more than bare subsistence, which they find in the cultivation of their rice-fields."²

The higher officials spent their time at court, drawing revenue from their lands through agents, but visiting them rarely, and sometimes, it is said, ignorant even of their geographical location.³ The nobles of Bantam, toward the end of the eighteenth century, are described as spending their time in eating and drinking, chewing betel, and horse racing; they lived off the revenues of their lands and left business to lesser persons.⁴

Such a government as this described was incompetent to

¹ de Jonge, *Opk.*, 6 : 181 (1669).

² *Verslag of Guitard*, 1790, de Jonge, *Opk.*, 12 : 197. Conditions were about as bad in another regency; *ib.* p. 206.

³ *Raffles, Sub.*, 80, 91, 125.

⁴ Breugel, "Beschrijving van het koningrijk Bantam" (1787), *Bijd. TLV.*, 1856, 2 : 1 : 332.

fulfil properly any of the duties that belonged to it. It could not perform the first function of government to defend the people against foreign enemies and maintain peace and security at home. The shores of Java are lined with old watch-towers, designed to guard against the inroads of pirates, but the pirates nevertheless penetrated to the very centre of the island, plundering villages and carrying the inhabitants off into slavery.¹

The central government was unable even to maintain peace between subordinate rulers. The Governor General wrote in 1620 that every governor in Mataram was ruling as he pleased; one governor was robbing the subjects of another to win the favor of the emperor by the presents which successful pillage afforded.² An account of the same time gives an idea of the anarchy that prevailed in Mataram at this period of its greatest power. A noble, "king of a city" wanted the daughter of another to wife, and sent an embassy with presents to ask for her hand. He was told with expressions of polite regret that she was promised to another. He sent a body of two or three thousand men, who took the daughter by force, razing the palace of her father; then two other nobles, friends of

¹ Horsfield, "Essay on the Geography . . . of Java," n. d., 24-25; Eindresumé, 2: 95. It should be stated that both these references are from the nineteenth century, embodying only memories of an earlier time. Piracy increased considerably after the middle of the eighteenth century, in connection with a Mohammedan religious revival. M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 2: 289. The Company showed little more ability than the native states in repressing piracy, but I see no reason to suppose that the Company was responsible for the evil. Under the conditions of Malay government piracy was a regular institution; Raffles says that it was "regarded as an honorable occupation, worthy of being followed by young princes and nobles." Raffles's *Memoir*, 1: 93.

² Coen to Directors, de Jonge, *Opk.*, 4: 202.

the outraged father, raised armies in his behalf, and at the time of writing a war was impending.¹

Within the petty districts in which the regents governed there was no security. The country was overrun with robber bands. "Whoever went outside his village without protection ran the chance of being murdered," was the native testimony as to conditions in Bantam under native rule. The Company did not dare to send its official messengers without an escort in the North East provinces.² The many penalties against different sorts of robbery and theft that are found in the Javanese laws are proof of the evils against which they were directed, but there is no proof that these laws were effectively enforced. One is reminded of conditions that existed in England before the Norman conquest in reading of the prevalence of cattle stealing, and the difficulty that the Dutch experienced in stopping it in the districts under their protectorate. All judicial remedies were found ineffective, and it was necessary to revert to the old native custom that no buffalo could be bought or sold except in open market.³ A single illustration will show how sadly justice was administered. Van Hoëvell, on a journey in central Java, came to a deep rocky cleft in the ground.

¹ *Journal of Haan, 1623, de Jonge, Opk., 5 : 39.* From a later period may be cited a case in which the Dutch were compelled to interfere in Cheribon, to stop the "despotic reprisals" of a regent, who was kidnapping the subjects of another because they had stolen from his people. *Zwaardekroon to Directors, 1719, de Jonge, Opk., 9 : 32.*

² *Eindres., 3 : 3 ; ib., 3 : 42.* In central Java there was no security in the period of native rule, and criminals escaped with impunity. [Valk] "De toestand van Bagelen in 1830," *TNI., 1858, 20 : 2 : 76 ; Kollman, "Bagelen," Tijds. TLV., 1864, 14 : 354.* For a description of the lack of security in Bantam see *M. L. van Deventer, Gesch., 1 : 28.*

³ *Aanmerkingen, Mossels, Preangers, 1754, Jonge, Opk., 10 : 270.*

He was informed on good authority that under native rule the regents and lesser officials took criminals or any men who were in their way, bound and left them there to die without a trial; they thereby saved the expense of sending them to court for trial!¹

In the way of positive contributions to the welfare of the people the government did practically nothing. In some parts of Java there is said to have been a comparatively active internal trade, but this was carried on not only in the face of political insecurity and such taxes as the ingenuity of rulers could suggest, but also in spite of an almost total absence of roads. The Dutch government conducted an investigation of the labor demanded from the people under native rule in the maintenance of roads and bridges. They found it amounted to little or nothing, and the reason appears in one of the answers, "because there were no roads or bridges."² Even in the nineteenth century Raffles found that goods conveyed by water were generally transported on pack-animals or on the shoulders of men and women.³ The result was to keep the people down on a low stage of agricultural organization, and to deny them all the comforts that could have been obtained from a system of exchange and of organized labor. Native annals

¹ "Wreede strafeningen . . .," TNI, 1840, 3:1:169. The article describes many of the cruel punishments current in the native period, mutilations, setting men to fight tigers, and the like. It appears, in a report from Japara, 1674, that a man who wished to appeal a case to the *soenan* in person could do so only on paying five hundred dollars (an immense sum for a native), and by giving over all his wives to the keeping of the *soenan*. Jonge, Opk., 6:191.

² Eindres., 3:13. There was one short road in Bantam, and there are scattered examples of roads in the other parts of Java, but the real beginning in road-building dates from the efforts of the Company and of Daendels.

³ Hist., 1:219.

are full of the records of famine and pestilence; they arose from a local failure of the crops or from one of the many wars, and they were so serious because it was impossible to supply a deficit in one part of the country by drawing on the surplus which might exist in another. Alternate waste and want characterized the organization of Java, as they did that of mediæval Europe.¹

Every movement of wares incident to exchange was seized upon by the rulers as an opportunity to levy toll. Duties were levied at all the ports, and in the interior the circulation of goods was hemmed by frequent toll-gates. Markets existed not only as a convenience for consumers and a protection to the validity of sales,—they were as much or more a device of the governing class to raise taxes. No trade could be carried on outside the market, the monopoly of which extended sometimes for a distance of twenty miles or more. Government claims to monopoly were exercised sometimes in the particularly hateful form of an engrossing of the food supply.²

To this description of the upper political organization in Java I have to add only one more point in this place. The machinery of government was not only cumbrous and ineffective; it was immensely heavy. A Dutch official

¹ Figures of rice prices in different parts of the archipelago, given by de Jonge, *Opk.*, 4 : 15, show clearly the influence of the lack of transportation. Dutch governors in the seventeenth century were directed to keep in stock a supply of rice for two years, to avoid the famine that might appear at any time. Instructions of 1650, *Mijer, Verz.*, 114.

² This last feature of native government was not unknown in the nineteenth century. Raffles (*Memoir*, 81) thought that the idea of trade monopoly was copied from the Dutch, but van Goens found it already existing and applied to the trade in rice, when he visited Mataram. *Reisbeschr.*, 350. For the abuses of the market see especially Wiese, in Jonge, *Opk.*, 13 : 60 ; other descriptions, *ib.*, 13 : 36, and Raffles, *Hist.* 1 : 220.

estimated in 1802 that the members of the privileged class amounted to one-eighth of the whole population.¹ The proportion can scarcely have been as large as this in all parts of the island; strike off a large part of it, and there still remains a great burden, which must have been felt the more as it must have seemed such utterly dead weight.

Passing from the upper to the lower classes of native society, the investigator finds a description of their economic organization comparatively easy. It was the simple and uniform organization of a people living from the soil, with but unimportant trade relations. The typical Javanese cultivator was the owner or tenant of an acre or so of irrigated rice land, from which, with a few crude agricultural implements and the services of a buffalo, he secured the greater part of the food supply of his family.² His dwelling was a hut or cottage, which he could construct in a few days, and there was little in or about it which was not the handiwork of himself or of some member of his family. "The family of a Javan peasant is almost independent of any labor but that of its own members," wrote Raffles.

¹ Wiese, on Hogendorp's Bericht, Jonge, Opk., 13:47. M. L. van Deventer, Gesch., 2:297, accepts this as trustworthy. D. van Hogendorp, Nad. Uitl., 10, said that of 3693 jonks rice land in Pekalongan 3134 were occupied by natives doing services for the official class, but I do not feel sure of the interpretation of this passage.

² I purposely avoid most of the difficulties and details of the lower organization, as their discussion in this place would be of little profit. I must notice, however, the assertion of Gelpke, "De rijstkultuur op Java," Bijd. TLV., 3:9:180, that rice was to the natives an article of luxury before the nineteenth century, and that they lived on herbs, etc. This is not borne out by the report of 1804, which he cites, and cannot be reconciled with the constant reference to rice cultivation in the descriptions of early native Java. Wiese said in 1802 that rice was "het voornaamste, ja bijna eenige voedsel der Javanen," Jonge, Opk., 13:65; Jaussaud in his Memoire, 1810, called it the "principale nourriture du peuple," *ib.*, 13:514.

In every cottage there were a spinning-wheel and loom, and in the yard about it were raised the fruit and vegetables that the family consumed. Any small surplus that could be spared was taken to market to be exchanged for salt fish, dried meat, or what petty luxuries the family could afford.¹

The class of professional traders and artisans seems to have been very small in the interior, and of no great importance even at the seaports. We are told of large cities in different parts of the island, but the figures of their population were grossly exaggerated, and in many cases these so-called cities were nothing but groups of villages.² It is proper to recognize the existence in Java of a class of people earning its livelihood by other means than agriculture, but it would be wrong to linger over the description of this class, for its importance in the economic organization was small, and in the political organization, so far as my studies have extended, absolutely inconsiderable.

I pass then to the topic that will end this survey of the native organization, and take up the political organization of the agricultural class, the bulk of the common people. My object must be to describe the local political institutions peculiar to this class, and the bonds uniting it with the higher government. There is not, I believe, a task in

¹ Raffles, *Hist.*, 1 : 95, 121, 182.

² A comparison of the figures given for the population of any place at different times shows that they are entirely untrustworthy. Without going into details I may say that the largest places could have had at most a population of a few tens of thousands. Cf. M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 1 : 46 ; 2 : 39. Raffles's estimate, *Hist.*, 1 : 118, that a tenth to a quarter of the people were engaged in manufactures or trade is misleading, I am sure.

Javanese history more difficult to accomplish with perfect thoroughness, so great is the variety with which the student has to deal, and so obscure are the causes for many of the differences. Luckily it is not necessary for present purposes to attack the most difficult part of the problem—that dealing with the origins; and in this sketch it is permissible to single out the main features and treat them broadly, to the exclusion of conflicting details.¹

In some parts of the island, especially the eastern and western extremities, the natives were grouped in villages closely similar to the severalty village of British India. The similarity is most probably due to the idea, widespread in the tropics,² that a man who undertakes the arduous task of reclaiming land from the jungle is entitled to enjoy and to hand down to posterity the results of his labor. One or more men would clear a piece of the waste and construct little by little the irrigation canals necessary for efficient rice culture; other men

¹ The following sketch of village organization is based mainly on the material in the Eindresumé, "Het onderzoek naar de rechten van den inlander op den grond in de residentie Bantam," TNI., 1872, 1:1 and 2, and Raffles, Substance. The article by L. W. C. van den Berg on the organization of the native village, "Het inlandsche gemeentewezen op Java en Madoera," Bijdr. TLV., 1901, 6:8:1-140, is a very valuable contribution to the subject, but I cannot feel that it has settled the doubtful questions of the origins. It is written almost entirely from the legal standpoint, and disregards tribal and economic influences. Van den Berg is still a firm believer in the "primitive Aryan"; he quotes Baden Powell, but he holds fast to Maine. A number of questions connected with the origin of the different forms of land tenure and village organization, and the question of the development of communal land tenure I have omitted, as being of special interest only to the student of early institutions, and likely to be valuable to him only when they can be treated in greater detail than the plan of this book would allow.

² B. H. Baden Powell, "The Indian Village Community," Lond., 1896, 151, 207.

would join, and in the course of time a new village would have arisen.¹ Land tenure was individual and hereditary. The leader in the settlement would be the first head-man in the village; his name was long remembered in village tradition, and commonly, though not always, his descendants enjoyed the dignity of his office. Even when the office of head-man was held for life, and regularly by a member of the founder's family, the form of election seems to have been kept up; and in some districts the elections were held at frequent intervals and led to constant rotation in office. Rothenbuhler describes conditions as they were in Soerabaya, where the head-man was called *petinggi*. "This *Patingie* is always chosen by the inhabitants themselves, without the intervention of any one else and from their own number; but his rule lasts no longer than two or three years, when there is a new election and the old *Patingie* returns to the class of the common people, without any advantage over the others. This custom has existed in Soerabaya from time immemorial, and no regent or chief would venture to break it, for fear that this might cause an emigration of people. For the inhabitants are extremely attached to this custom, and not unreasonably so, because by it each one of them in turn becomes *Patingie*, and no one needs to fear that an unfair distribution of burdens and privileges will take place."² It was the duty of the *petinggi* to represent his village in dealings with the upper government, especially in the matter of taxation; he was supposed to prevent the levying of unduly large taxes, and secure for the village the benefits

¹ Cf. Eindres., 2 : 69, 81, describing this process in Tegal and Pekalongan; Raffles, Sub., 100, etc.

² Rothenbuhler, "Rapport van den staat en gesteldheid van het Landschap Soerabaija" [1812], Verhand. Bat. Gen., 1881, 41 : 3 : 16.

of a fair apportionment among individuals. In return for the duties he rendered, he received a number of personal privileges, and enjoyed gratuitously land and labor, the equivalent of a salary. Besides the head-man, who had many different titles in different parts of the island, the village had sometimes a council of elders, and commonly an assistant or deputy head, a priest, and sometimes a writer or secretary.

It is unnecessary for the present purpose to describe in greater detail this form of village government. The important feature of it is its local independence. As long as the villagers paid their taxes, they were free to conduct their own affairs as they chose; officers elected by them attended to all the business of local government, including taxation, the judicial settlement of minor disputes, and the maintenance of local police. There was no equality of possessions among the members of the village. Some were well-to-do, with more land and stock than they needed for their own subsistence, and some were landless and had to work for others to gain their living. There were, however, no important social or political class divisions corresponding to these differences in economic position; the form of village which I have just described can be called democratic.¹

¹ The classes described by the resident of Japara, 1830, S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 289, as existing in the native villages at the beginning of the century, are clearly economic. The same can be said of the classes described in Cheribon, 1830, *ib.*, 2: 270, the description followed by Van Hoëvell and Pierson, and of those in Bantam, Onderzoek, TNL, 1872, 1: 1: 243. Figures of the distribution of the land in the severalty villages in the nineteenth century show that the "peasant-holding" was the rule. Cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 144, 147; A. W. Kinder de Camarecq, "Bijdrage tot de kennis der volksinstellingen in de oostelijke Soendalanden," Tijd. TLV., 1861, 10: 273.

I do not wish to be understood to mean that this village government, which seems so intelligible in its form to western minds, was a good government according to western standards. It was no better than the shiftless and ignorant men that composed it. So far from answering to our ideals of the perfect "village community," it was both weak and cruel, as will appear in its later history. It was, however, the best of the forms of local government that native Java could offer, and it has furnished the type on which the Dutch in the nineteenth century have modelled the other forms. It was far better than the only other form that I shall describe, which might be called the dependent or tenant village.

In the territories of central Java included in the old state of Mataram the people lived in village groups as elsewhere, but with scarcely any of the property rights and political privileges that are found in the other parts of the island. Imagine a free village ground down by taxation until the inhabitants are in constant danger of eviction for failure to meet the demands, and have become practically tenants at will; imagine an agent appointed by the landlord to be put in place of the head-man elected by the villagers; those are the changes that must be supposed to account for the conditions that appear in central Java.¹

In the free village, at least until the latest period of the East India Company, there was some limit to the taxes which the people bore, even though it was as high as that reported by an English official,—three-fifths of

¹ L. W. C. van den Berg, *Inl. Gem., Bijd. TLV.*, 1901, p. 17, quotes evidence to show that the dependent village was a degeneration from the free form, and Raffles assumed that to be the case, *Sub.*, 184. Many natives have testified that tenure once hereditary had been made precarious by the government. Cf. *Eindres.*, 2: 97, 123, etc.

the crop. In the dependent villages the only check on the demands from above was the fear of driving the people off the land. A native official has testified that in the time of native rule the payments of the people were fixed, not in proportion to the extent of land held or to the production, but in accordance with the need for money of the higher officials.¹ Officials in Java were paid, as has been said above, by grants from the sovereign of that part of his revenues that came from a certain district ; but in central Java the officials received, not the right to a certain revenue, but the right to the land itself, with power to get from it all that they could. Each official was served by a series of agents, who bid among themselves for the right to collect dues, and made their profits by the excess of what they could squeeze from their subordinates over the amount that they had to pay to their superiors. Last in the series came the *bekel*, himself a man from the class of cultivators, who sometimes worked a little land, but whose main support was the amount he could make from the rents paid by the tenants under him. Each *bekel* had the administration of a very small area, cultivated by not more than half a dozen families, to judge from conditions in the nineteenth century. "The status of the slave is always deplorable ; the status of the predial slave is often worse than that of the personal or household slave ; but the lowest depth of miserable subjection is reached when the person enthralled to the land is at the mercy of peasants, whether they exercise their power singly or in communities."² The natives of Java were not bound to the soil ; but the right of emigration was about the only

¹ Eindres., 2 : 99, note (c), Banjoemas.

² Maine, "Village Communities," Lond., 1871, 166.

right left to them. The demands of the upper classes were great enough, but these were raised indefinitely as they passed through the hands of middlemen, and reached their height when they were imposed by the *bekel*. He was one of the common people; he knew all their weaknesses and the possibilities of gain from them, and he used his power mercilessly. Some *bekels* raised twenty-fold what they paid to their superiors.¹ Their devices for extortion were innumerable. It was notorious that the office of *bekel* was for sale to the highest bidder, and the competition brought the worst characters into the position of immediate superiors of the people.²

The real evil of the organization is apparent only when it is realized that the successful bidder, who took practically the position of lessee of the land, was also its ruler. With the right to raise taxes he bought at the same time the sovereign's rights of police and jurisdiction, and became lord and master of his small domain.³ This condition was further complicated by the fact that a village was very often divided among a number of different officials, so that each would be represented in it by an agent independent of the others. A village had sometimes as many as five different lords, and each one ruled as he

¹ Eindres., 2: 122, note 2, Bagelen; *ib.*, 3, Bijl. A., 3. A native *pateh* testified that the cultivator had to pay fl. 50 or 60 a year, *ib.*, 2: 200, Madioen. The figures seem impossibly large, but give some conception of the reality.

² Raffles said that a *bekelship* brought \$20 to \$30 in central Java. Van Overstraten reported that *bekels* were changed sometimes two or three times a year, to make room for better extortioners. Jonge, *Opk.*, 12: 292.

³ Raffles, *Sub.*, 90; Eindres., 2: 121; Valk, Bagelen, TNI., 1858, 20: 2: 80; Gelpke, "Het dessabestuur op Java," *Ind. Gids*, 1879, 2: 137. In Soerakarta, it is said, the *bekel* had public functions only in exceptional cases. Eindres., 3: Bijl. B., 51.

pleased.¹ There was no real village government in the case of these groups.

It would require much laborious research to determine with any approach to accuracy the proportion of people living in free villages to those who had the position of dependent tenants. In parts of the west, where strong states had never grown up, and in the east, where the country had been absolutely depopulated and resettled by immigrants from the island of Madoera, the tendency was toward freedom ; in the remainder of the island, the most thickly populated section, dependence was the rule. Even in the villages where there were individual peasant proprietors there was commonly a number of cultivators who worked land that had been cleared, not by themselves or their ancestors, but by men in the service of members of the official class. The occupants of such land were tenants, paying dues more like rent than taxes, and in political subjection to the lord of the land on which they lived.² On the whole, the mass of the people must be regarded as existing in a decidedly unfavorable condition. Their characteristics as individuals can be explained more readily by assuming them to result from the evils of their economic and political organization than by reference to any other cause. The Dutch are practically unanimous

¹ Gelpke, "Het landbezit op Java en de geschiedenis," De Gids, 1874, 1: 54; Valk, Bagelen, 82.

² Space will not permit more than a mention of the process of clearing "op last," with the resulting distinction of two kinds of land, *sawah jasa*, due to individual initiative, *sawah negara*, land cleared by official direction. In studying the history of the native land tenures one is impressed with the importance of economic factors in determining political subjection, as in this case. Mossels, in his Aanmerkingen, 1751, speaks of the regents as though they owed their political power mainly to economic superiority.

in characterizing the natives as shiftless and indolent. What motive had they to be anything else, when all the fruits of labor beyond the means of bare subsistence were taken by political superiors? They are servile toward the strong, cruel to the weak, cowardly in the face of enemies. All these qualities seem like natural products of their government. Climate and natural environment have undoubtedly played their part in moulding character, but to my mind the greatest encouragement in looking forward to an ultimate civilization of the natives is the belief that their faults are due, not so much to natural and irremediable causes, as to institutions which the Dutch can do something to destroy or at least to reform.

European observers have, from early times, been struck with the likeness of the native organization in Java to that of mediæval Europe.¹ In general features, depending on likeness in the underlying economic organization, there is considerable similarity; in details the contrasts are as striking as the resemblances. The comparison is improper if it leads to the two organizations being classed together as on the same plane of development. In the structural skeleton they seem alike; in the way in which the living parts worked together, still more in the possibilities of growth, they are vastly different. Mediæval Europe, in its darkest age, was far in advance of native Java, and it inherited from the Roman Empire and from Christianity germs of improvement which were wholly lacking in the East.

¹ See the interesting parallel drawn in Chap. VIII of Pierson, *Kol. Pol.*, in which, however, many points would need revision to be brought into accord with the views of modern institutional historians. The Dutch use many words from the feudal vocabulary (over-lord, vassal, appanage, etc.) to describe the native institutions, and the student has constantly to guard against being misled by them.

To a people advanced in civilization, as were the Dutch at the time of their first contact with the natives, Java offered wonderful opportunities. To men in search of riches it was a ready prey; it was weak in its ability to defend itself against a people with good arms and organization, and in its whole framework of government it lent itself to an exploitation for the benefit of the conqueror. It is not surprising that the Dutch merchants of the seventeenth century turned into warriors and statesmen, or that the trading company they served became a great engine of political extortion. To men seeking to spread the benefits of civilization, it offered a field in which a little influence used with intelligence and honesty could accomplish results so great as to seem disproportionate to the effort expended. Government in Java was so bad because it had no motive to be better; there was not the contact with other peoples and other civilizations that would force improvement in the mere struggle for existence. It was far worse than it needed to be, if but a small amount of European intelligence were infused into the conduct of affairs. The greatest curse of the island, wars that exhausted the inhabitants without any useful aim in view, could be stopped by the judicious use of a tithe of the resources that the wars consumed. The overgrown political organization, in which the privileges and profits of government appear so prominently that one can scarcely find in it the idea of duties owed in return, accomplished less for the people than could be accomplished at a fraction of the expense by a small group of European administrators.

Yet, as later history has proved that there is a limit beyond which a foreign power cannot safely go in exploit-

ing the riches of the island, so the Dutch are finding now a limit to their power for good. As they penetrate further into the structure of the native organization, each official costs as much as others in the class to which he is added, but he works on smaller things and does less good. As the Dutch approach the natives, they find it harder and harder to reach them, and they are still separated from the people by a tissue of native institutions. In the passive resistance that the people make to impulses from outside, the Dutch will always find a stay to their ambitions, and in a sense Java will always be governed, as it has been in the past, by the Javanese.

CHAPTER II

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: POLICY

[NOTE. — The most important source of material for this and the following chapter is De Jonge's collection of documents from the colonial archives; it covers the period down to the fall of the Company, in twelve volumes. Mijer's *Verzameling* gives the instructions of the home government, except those of 1613, which are to be found in *Tijd. TLV.*, 1853. The instructions are printed also in Van der Chijs's collection of the Indian statutes. This series, and its companion collections of the *Dagh Register* and *Realia*, all published by the Batavian Society of Arts and Sciences, offer a great deal of material on the details of life in India, but little that I could use in this general sketch of policy and government.

The best general history of the Dutch in Java in this period is M. L. van Deventer's *Geschiedenis*, which is based in part on unpublished sources. Meinsma's *Geschiedenis* is a faithful compilation, with a full chronological table of contents, which makes it convenient for occasional use. On special topics of policy and administration Saalfeld has been superseded by Van Rees and Klerk de Reus.]

THIS chapter will be devoted mainly to the policy of the Dutch in Java in the period of the East India Company. There would be no object in describing chronologically the series of events, in their innumerable details, arising from the contact of Dutch and natives. The narrative history has been admirably done in Dutch, and readers who are sufficiently interested to desire to pursue the subject further are referred to the writings in that language. There is, on the other hand, no book to which they can be referred, describing in compact form the institutions rather than the events of the period. The subject has been neglected, and yet it is just the one

likely to be of profit to the readers of the outside world, as presenting a summary of the narrative in general terms, making possible a comparison with the history of other colonial powers. At the same time the subject of the Dutch policy before 1800 is one that lends itself especially well to a topical rather than a chronological treatment. We have the word of a Dutch author, who is an authority on the subject,¹ that the Company has no "history," that it shows no development in its organization or policy. There are marked changes, from one period to another, in the extent of its operations, and in the financial results, but the underlying principles of its action remain almost the same.

Only in the period of the beginnings does it seem advisable to describe briefly the different events in their relations to each other, as an introduction to a more general discussion of the policy later. The outburst of energy in the Netherlands which led to the war of liberation had been in large part stimulated by economic causes, and it expressed itself in the economic field. In the latter part of the sixteenth century there was a great expansion of Dutch commerce. With a boldness arising from the freedom of individuals to seek profit where they would, unhampered by the government restrictions that were maintained in many other countries, the Dutch sent their ships to all parts of the world, even to parts unknown. It was natural that they should seek beyond all else to reach the East, which they believed to be the source of untold wealth, and from which they had hitherto been kept by the jealousy of Spain. An agent was sent to Lisbon to get such useful information as could be obtained.

¹ Klerk de Reus, NOC., vii.

and as the result of reports from him and others, a fleet was equipped and despatched from the Netherlands for Java in 1595. The losses of this first venture, in ships, men, and money did not deter the Dutch from following it up. A successful voyage meant a profit of hundreds per cent, and atoned for a number of disasters.¹ In 1598 twenty-two ships, owned by different individuals or associations, left for East India, and before 1602 sixty-five ships had made the return voyage.

The circumstances of this growing trade were, however, unsatisfactory to the participants and to the government. The ships or fleets of different owners lost from view everything except the chance for immediate profit; they committed faults hurting those who came after them, or let slip opportunities, because they felt no permanent interest in the general welfare of the trade. Cut-throat competition between rival dealers raised prices in the East and lowered them at home. The States General formed a committee from representatives of the participants in the trade, and urged them to work together harmoniously for their common interests.² The traders turned a deaf ear to advice which seemed to threaten the chance for individual profit, and it was clear that more positive action was necessary if the causes of complaint were to be removed. In 1601 the States of Holland urged a definite regulation of the eastern trade, and in 1602 the States General passed the law by which the traders were formed into a single corporation. This law was destined

¹ A voyage of 1598 brought a profit of 400%, M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 1: 41. For fl. 120 the Dutch could buy in the East an amount of cloves worth in Europe fl. 1200. Craen's "Dagboek," 1605, De Jonge, *Opk.*, 3: 195.

² De Jonge, *Opk.*, 1: 245.

to form the basis of trade and government in the Dutch East Indies for nearly two hundred years.¹

The importance of the charter of 1602 comes from the fact that it not only incorporated the merchants who were then trading to the East Indies; it gave to them and to their successors by various renewals a monopoly of the trade, and powers of government which were practically sovereign. The peculiar features in the organization of the Company, and in its relations to the state, which made it one of the most remarkable corporations of all times, will be discussed later in their bearing on its efficiency as an organ of government. I must proceed here with the narrative of its activity in the East until a point is reached (1619) when it can be regarded as firmly established in Java, and shall then treat the different sides of its policy there.

In the early years of the Company's existence little change can be observed in the character of commerce in the eastern archipelago. The Spice Islands in the Molucca group were the great goal of the trade, but other points were not entirely neglected, and the area of commercial dealings was of great extent. Within this area the Dutch ships and trading posts were scattered about without any centre. The faults of the preceding period were still apparent. Ship captains still kept in their hands most

¹ The charter of 1602 is printed in a number of different places; see for references to them Chijs, NIP., 1:2. I have used the text of Cau, "Groot Placaet-Boeck," 's Gravenhage, 1658, 1: col. 530-538. I omit here as unnecessary a discussion of the general question of the justification of the Company, such as may be found in Leroy-Beaulieu, Roscher and Jan-nasch, Laspeyres, etc. The motives for the charter of 1602 can be found concisely stated in Oldenbarnevelt, "Verklaring d. beweegredenen," Gedenkstukken, ed. M. L. van Deventer, 's Gravenhage, 1862 f., 2: 311.

of the conduct of affairs, and they were apt to forget the permanent and general good of the corporation which they served in their desire for personal and immediate gains.¹ The evil of this lack of organization was felt especially after the conclusion of the twelve years' truce with Spain, which set free the forces of that country for use in the East. In the year of the truce, 1609, the first great step toward reform was taken, in the appointment of a Governor General, to restore and preserve order, and to direct, according to the instructions given him, the forces of the Company.

The appointment of this official made necessary the choice of a political capital. For economic reasons, also, the establishment of a centre of operations was desired. Experience showed that ships and provisions decayed and men sickened on the long voyages about the islands; the establishment of a staple would enable the Dutch to collect cargoes there, and despatch ships promptly on their return voyage to the Netherlands. The Dutch needed a good harbor, secure against attack and well situated as a base of military operations against their enemies, near to good water and supplies for shipping, and to be reached conveniently without the need of waiting for a change of the monsoon. The instructions of 1609 suggested Bantam, at the western end of Java, and Djohor, near the modern Singapore, as possibilities; it was important to have the main position near one of the

¹ See the Remonstrantie of Le Maire, 1609, complaining that the Company had done nothing but import spices and a few poor silks, and had in its desire for gain altogether neglected the explorations which were so necessary for its future. De Jonge, *Opk.*, 3:367. Losses and disasters in the East were caused "principalyk by faulte van goede conducteurs," *Corte Rem.*, J. L'Hermite, 1612, *ib.*, 3:393.

straits that gave access to the archipelago from the west. The Malay peninsula, however, was already commanded by the Portuguese, and the Dutch had not fared well in Bantam, where different factories had been established already. So the first Governor General was directed to enter into relations with the king of Jacatra, east of Bantam, and to ask him for a place for a "rendezvous of the whole Indian navigation." In some respects a post there was more desirable than one at Bantam.¹ Before the arrival of the first Governor General, Both, such a position had been secured by a contract with the native prince. The English attempted, in 1618-1619, in alliance with the ruler of Bantam, to drive the Dutch from Jacatra, but the attack failed. The territory of Jacatra was conquered for the Company by Governor General Coen, the fort which was destined to become the capital of the Dutch East Indies was named Batavia, and the territorial rule of the Dutch in Java may be said to have begun.²

From this starting-point the Dutch extended their territorial rule until, in 1750, it embraced about one-sixth of the island, and in 1800 three-fifths.³ Mill, in his "His-

¹ An English report to the Court of Committees, 1617, said that "Bantam was the greatest place of trade in the Indian Seas," but that Jacatra offered advantages in the supply of provisions, Bruce, AEIC., 1: 188. For a summary of the history of the establishment of the staple see Van Rees, KP., 253, and for most of the facts cited by me the early instructions to the Governor General in Mijer or Chijs, and in Tijd. TLV., 1853, 1.

² Coen wrote home, in August, 1619, "The foundation of the rendezvous so long desired is now laid," Jonge, Opk., 4: 179.

³ The estimates of Professor van den Broek, in Encyc. Ned. Ind., 2: 135. A useful table of the successive additions to the Dutch territory is given there; the list embraces sixteen additions between 1620 and 1800, and six since that time. Parallel to the course of political expansion, but not identical with it, is the expansion of the Company's commercial advantages. In the annals of that expansion the following points may be noted as

tory of British India,"¹ criticised the establishment even of trading posts, by a commercial company, as burdening the company with unnecessary expense. He would have had trade conducted without any permanent European settlements. Some trade could undoubtedly have been carried on this way, but under disadvantages to which Europeans were little likely to submit. Both for political and economic reasons the Dutch wanted a permanent territorial establishment to serve as their capital and staple. When this had been founded at Batavia, the Dutch discovered that they had but made a beginning in territorial rule, when they thought that they had reached the end.

In contact with weak and shifty native states it was impossible for them to refrain from pushing forward their frontier when opportunity offered, and opportunity was never lacking. At the time of the settlement of the Dutch, Java was in a condition of political unrest that was probably chronic. The most important native states were Bantam, to the west of Batavia, and Mataram to the east, this latter state holding in subjection most of the centre and east of the island.² Neither state formed an organic unity. Both states were engaged in extending their power over rebellious vassals or neighboring territories; both invited interference by the constant internal dissension. The Dutch frontier was harassed by kidnapping and pillaging among the most important: 1645, destruction of native competing commerce in Bantam; 1677, monopoly of trade in Mataram; 1681, monopoly in Cheribon; 1682, monopoly in Bantam; 1743, direct control of ports and customs duties on the north coast.

¹ 1: 105.

² In 1625 Mataram included all Java but Bantam, Batavia, and a part of the eastern end of the island that still maintained independence. M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 1: 140.

incursions of the smaller nobles, and by quarrels with the native governors, who were seeking to be bribed by the Dutch to quiet.

Economic considerations made that seem necessary which was natural and easy from the political point of view. In the independent native states the Dutch had to submit to trade side by side with European competitors, or to be excluded entirely in favor of their rivals. A favorite device of the native sovereigns to punish the Dutch for any offence, and to bring them to terms, was an embargo that closed their dominions to all trade. At best the Dutch had to pay high prices for the most valued products, the sale of which was monopolized by the native governments, and had again to pay high duties at the frontiers. Every extension of the political influence of the Dutch was accompanied by the grant of commercial privileges: the exclusion of competing traders, the settlement of low custom and transit duties, and the promise of native princes that commercial products should be sold to the Dutch at the market price or even below it.

The Dutch began their career in the East with no idea other than that of buying cheap and selling dear; their ideas and aims were purely commercial.¹ The experience of a few years taught them that in a country like Java they could not deal satisfactorily with individual traders and that they must deal with governments. They were forced, before they knew it, to become politicians, seeking their commercial ends through diplomatic channels, and warriors, upholding the gains that had been given them

¹ Cf. the *Memorie* of Admiral Heemskerck, about 1600, on the proper conduct of trade, *Jonge, Opk.*, 2 : 448. I have found nothing on the other side showing political aspirations.

by treaty. Every indication goes to prove that the territorial expansion of the Dutch in Java was involuntary, at least so far as concerns the attitude of the directors in the Netherlands. The East India Company never became dependent on war, as did the West India Company, whose interests led it to oppose a truce on the ground "that the aforesaid company could not exist except by war."¹ The series of instructions to the Governors General, down to those of 1650, which remained the guide to policy through the whole succeeding period of the Company, bade the chief executive in India never to make war unless forced, and especially to spare no pains to keep peace with the princes of Mataram and Bantam.² It seems to have been morally impossible for the Dutch officials to obey these directions in the face of all the temptations to break them. Men of vigor, like Governor General Coen, who did much to shape the Company's military policy in its early period, came to the conclusion that trade and war were inseparable; war might seem costly, but to their minds it was the cheapest way to attain peace. Coen wrote to the directors, when he was Director General in 1614, "that trade in India must be conducted and maintained under protection and favor of your own weapons, and that the weapons must be supplied from the profits enjoyed by the trade, so that trade cannot be maintained without war or war without trade."³ Another Dutch official gave it as his opinion in 1655, that

¹ So the directors of the West India Company told the Committee of States, 1633, New York Colonial Documents, 1:61.

² Chijs, NIP., 2:156; Mijer, Verz., 115. Cf. the complaint on the expenses of war, 1635, Chijs, 1:272. I treat this topic at greater length in the next chapter.

³ Jonge, Opk., 4:25. Again, in 1619, "without war you will never in the world attain to good peace," *ib.*, 4:132.

nothing but war could put the Company on the proper footing with the natives, who could be kept from doing harm only by being inspired with fear. He thought that the natives misunderstood the motives of the directors in urging that trade be carried on peacefully; they had been known to say to an official of the Company, "Your orders are to live with us in friendship and to put up with everything."¹ Under weak officials war became a habit, and was kept up for years simply because they did not know how to make peace.² It may be, as was suggested by a Dutch governor in the eighteenth century, that officials found greater profit for themselves in war than in peace.³ This governor thought that the Company had been ruined by its wars, and lamented bitterly its departure from the ordinary lines of commerce.⁴ I have found in the reports from officials in the seventeenth century only one similar criticism of the course that the Company pursued,⁵ and in general officials seem to have been hearty supporters of the war policy. In 1689 the Court of the London East India Company instructed officials in the presidencies of Bombay

¹ Van Goens, "Vertooch wegens den presenten staet van de [O. I. Co.]," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1856, 1:4:177.

² M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 1:185.

³ Mem. of Hartingh, 1761, *Jonge, Opk.*, 10:331. "Het is zeker dat de vrede tot prejuditie van eens Gouverneurs beurs strekt."

⁴ *Ib.*, 10:371, "alle oorlogen of wat er naer zweemt of gelykt, is voor de Comp. land en volk ten totale ruine. . . . Ach, had de Compagnie koopman gebleven, en nooyt het lyntje zoo hard getrokken!" The opinion expressed here received practical application only a few years afterward, when the government refused to interfere in behalf of a fugitive prince in spite of the privileges he offered it, on the ground that the Company's territories had reached a sufficient extent, and that new establishments were not to its interest. Mem. of van Ossenberch, 1765, *Jonge, Opk.*, 11:24.

⁵ Report of Major Poolman, 1676, *Jonge, Opk.*, 6:205.

and Madras not to neglect political advantages in the pursuit of trade, and referred to "the wise Dutch," who in their general advices "write ten paragraphs concerning their government, their civil and military policy, warfare and the increase of their revenue, for one paragraph they write concerning trade."¹

In other places I shall describe the political arrangements by which the Company ruled the lands it conquered, and shall attempt to estimate the gains and losses that resulted from its territorial expansion. I can do no more here than indicate the motives through which the policy became established, and discuss briefly the means by which it was carried into effect. Raffles said that it was a national boast of the Dutch that they conquered Java, not so much by force of arms as by intrigue and stratagem. "It was by corrupting and bribing the chiefs, and sowing dissension among them, that the Dutch succeeded."² This view is substantially correct. In form the Dutch were never carrying on a war of conquest against the natives; they were always fighting *for* the natives, and their territorial gains came to them from the interested party as compensation for services rendered. It was the ceaseless quarrelling among the native states that enabled the Dutch always to find a party or a person to champion. They chose, when it was possible, to sup-

¹ Bruce, AEIC., 3:78. What is meant by "general advices" is not clear. The description suits the reports from colonial officials, but these were supposed to be secret. The description certainly would give a false impression of the instructions of the directors, which urged that trade should be carried on peacefully, as said above.

² Hist., 1:332. About the same view is presented in Raffles, Mem., 92. The Javanese said that the Dutch had good heads but cold hearts, and that it was the reverse with them; this reason for their defeat is too flattering.

port the legitimate ruler in his claim to the throne or in his attempt to put down rebellious vassals; with their help and with his own resources their candidate was generally successful, and he was not allowed to forget to whom his success was due.¹ "Divide et impera" was the natural motto to follow when in contact with the native political organization, and was the principle which accounts for the greater part of the Dutch success.² In attempting to pick their way in the tortuous paths of native politics the Dutch made mistakes which were sometimes followed by disastrous results, and the course that they pursued in some cases is decidedly questionable from the standpoint of modern ethical standards. There is much to criticise, but there is something of boldness and sagacity that commands admiration in this side of Dutch policy.³

While recognizing the great importance of diplomacy

¹ "Hoe is de Compagnie in 't bezit harer landen op Java gekomen?" TNI., 1856, 18:2:40, 45.

² Hartingh wrote in 1761, "That which has so long been fought for, and the foundation on which the Company must exist, and has had to base itself upon from the beginning, and that too which has made her great — is division." De Jonge, Opk., 10:372. I must apologize for the translation, but it is impossible to turn bad Dutch into good English even by taking minor liberties with the arrangement of words. The idea expressed by Hartingh can be found in a number of other places.

³ Any one desirous of a full idea of the difficulties which confronted the Dutch in dealing with the native states can be referred to an extract of the secret deliberations of the Council (Jonge, Opk., 10:281), where the attitude to be assumed toward the *Soenan* is debated. The question was as complex as any in our modern international politics. Louw, "De derde Javaansche Successie-oorlog," Batavia, 1889, 1, 3, believes that the deposing of the *Soenan* in 1704 was responsible for much of the anarchy of the following period. As an example of the courage and guile of Dutch diplomacy I would refer to the narrative of two envoys sent to one of the native states in 1744. J. A. van der Chijs, "Hoe de Compagnie soms met Javaansche regenten handelde," Tijd. TLV., 1879, 25:222 ff.

in explaining the expansion of Dutch influence in Java, it seems to me mistaken to minimise, as some would do,¹ the part played by actual force. No amount of diplomacy would have availed without the army which the Dutch maintained and which was in pretty constant service. Diplomacy did not make it possible for the Dutch to dispense with an army, but enabled them to get along with a surprisingly small one. In 1619 the total land forces of the Dutch in the East were only about fifteen hundred men, and of these less than four hundred were in Java. Governor General Coen wrote that the English were ashamed to find that they had been beaten by a pack of boys.² About fifty years later the army in Java had been increased to a little over one thousand, of which half were Europeans.³ The numbers grew with the extension of Dutch territory, but even in the eighteenth century, when the Company's army reached its greatest size, it counted only about ten thousand men, scattered among the different possessions of the East.⁴ The native element, of which the army was largely composed, counted for little when the recruits were taken from Java proper, as was the custom until the latter part of the period.⁵

¹ Hoe is de Komp., 39.

² Jonge, Opk., 4 : 184, 201.

³ Instr. of Speelman, 1678, Jonge, Opk., 7 : 196. In 1679 only 382 Europeans were reported, *ib.*, 7 : 36.

⁴ See the figures and discussion in Klerk de Reus, NOC., 112.

⁵ Van Hogendorp wrote in 1799 that the armed men were useless which the native regents furnished the government according to contract. Schets, Eindres., 2 : Bijl. LL., 154. The Javanese were such cowards that on one occasion four hundred of them in the Company's army fled when they saw in the distance thirty men whom they took for Madoerese. Jonge, Opk., 7 : 122. The Madoerese are much braver and are said to be capable of development into good soldiers.

The European soldiers were the scum of all nations. They were poorly paid, ill treated, and half disciplined; they fought in a strange country, under a debilitating climate, constantly subject to sickness. Nothing shows in a more striking way the weakness of the natives and of their organization than the almost uniform success that attended these few companies of Europeans, in their conflicts with native armies many times their size and provided, in part at least, with the same arms.¹

The foregoing sketch of the territorial expansion of the Dutch in Java seems necessary for a proper understanding of other features of the Dutch policy, but it may be proper again to warn the reader that this expansion came about gradually and almost unconsciously. It certainly formed no part of the original plan. The Company was according to its charter and its real design a commercial corporation, granted only such military and political functions as were thought necessary to enable it to keep its place in the eastern trade. Throughout the Company's history commerce remained, in appearance at least, the main object of its existence.

The principle on which this commerce was conducted, from the beginning to the end of the Company's existence, was the principle of monopoly; that one word gives the essence of the Company's commercial policy. Exclusive privileges of trade were granted in the charter, and were emphasized in the earliest instructions.² Monopoly was

¹ It is impossible to get accurate figures of the native armies; Dutch and Javanese vied in exaggerating them. Cf. M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 1: 231 note. From seven different figures given in the first seven volumes of *De Jonge I* get the impression that the army of Mataram in the seventeenth century counted ten to twenty thousand men in the field.

² "Instr. voor de kooplieden," 1603, *Jonge, Opk.*, 3: 207.

the central feature in Coen's bold plan of expansion in the archipelago, which, within a little more than a generation, led to the subjection of a field of commerce greater than that of the whole Mediterranean Sea.¹ The directors wrote in 1647 to the Governor General to warn him against illicit trade, saying that the Company must not depart from "the principle that has been her only object from the beginning, that the profits of trade may be enjoyed by the shareholders alone."² The principle of monopoly was proclaimed in the instructions of 1650, remaining in force for one hundred and fifty years, and it was expressly recognized in all official reports down to that of the committee of 1795 which immediately preceded the fall of the Company.³

Protests against this policy, in the Netherlands and in Java, and abortive plans to modify it will be noted later, as will also its injurious effect on commerce. In this place attention will be directed to only one of the effects of the monopoly policy, its influence in forcing the Dutch to war with their European commercial competitors.

The Dutch fought for trade with the representatives of

¹ Van Rees, KP., 229. As will appear immediately, Coen proposed a breach in the monopoly, but his proposal was rejected.

² Jonge, Opk., 6:2.

³ The instructions of 1650 stated that "the whole welfare of the East India Company of this country consists in this, that she may enjoy solely, to the exclusion of all others, the fruits of the trade granted alone to her." Chijs, NIP., 2; 136; Mijer, Verz., 74. The official report of 1761 said that the Company's aims, from the time of the first voyage to the Spice Islands, "have been directed to only one object. to have exclusive possession of these, and so become sole master of their fruits and spices, that such a market may be made for them as her existence may demand." "Rapport over 's Compagnies Regt op de Grootte Oost, door R. de Klerk, J. E. van Mijlendonk en W. E. Alting," *Verhandelingen Bat. Gen.*, 1868, 33:22, 48. Cf. *Rapport v. Com. Gen.*, 1795, De Jonge, Opk., 12:348.

half a dozen European nations. With the Portuguese and the English the conflict was especially severe. The first Dutch fleet that arrived in Bantam, in 1596, found the Portuguese established there, and had a quarrel with them; it was the beginning of a conflict that ended only in 1641, when the Dutch captured the important post of Malakka, and broke the power of the Portuguese in the archipelago.

With the English the struggle was longer. The English sought at first the Indian islands, rather than that part of the mainland which has become associated with their name, and the first factories of the London East India Company were those established in Sumatra and Java, on the voyage of 1601-1603.¹ In spite of the fact that Dutch and English were theoretically friends, the relations between them in the archipelago differed little from those of Dutch and Portuguese. The desire of each to exclude the other from the trade led to constant conflict that grew sometimes into formal war. An Indian councillor wrote to the directors in 1618 that a plot just discovered, between the king of Bantam, the English, and the French, to destroy the Dutch settlement at Jacatra (Batavia), was the fourth of the kind that had been made.² The siege of Batavia by the English in 1618 has already been noted. In 1619 a Dutch fleet of six sail attacked four ships of the London East India Company, and there was a severe action in which one English ship was sunk and three others were captured. The home governments, realizing the danger of conflicts in the East,

¹ Mill, HBI., 1:26; Bruce, AEIC., 1:151. The following narrative is based largely on the material in Bruce.

² Jonge, Opk., 4:87.

and desiring to prevent them, formed by treaty in 1619 a "Council of Defence," consisting of an equal number of members of each company. The trade was to be divided between the two companies, and this council was to maintain their common interests. The council was established at Batavia, and some general articles of the treaty were carried into effect. In 1621-1622 the council employed a combined English and Dutch fleet in an attack on Manila. This expedition, however, led to a quarrel and separation, and the treaty proved to be a source of evil rather than of good. Its provisions were vague, and their execution was impossible in the face of the policy of monopoly which guided the course of both nations. On the expiration of the Twelve Years' Truce, 1621, the Dutch fitted out expeditions which nominally were to act against the Portuguese and Spanish, but which, under various pretexts, were employed to oust the English from their trade strongholds. The "massacre" at Amboyna embittered feeling for generations. In answer to an admonition from the directors to keep on good terms with the English, Governor General Coen wrote in 1622 that this could not be done unless the Dutch should leave not only India but the whole earth; friendship with the English meant the total ruin of the Company.¹ The political troubles at home weakened the support of the English, and emboldened the Dutch attack.² In 1628 the English president

¹ Jonge, *Opk.*, 4: 265. In his "Advys," 1623, *Stukken*, 90, he wrote in regard to the English "that the least concession gives the greatest quiet and peace."

² In 1649 an English pepper ship was taken, and its cargo confiscated by the Dutch; the Governor General at Batavia replied to a complaint by saying "that the English were traitors and had no king, and he would do them all the injury in his power." Bruce, *AEIC.*, 1: 446.

and council removed from Batavia, where they had been suffered to stay for a time by the Dutch, to a position in the independent state of Bantam, which they made their political capital and commercial staple in the East. Their presence there was one of the motives to the Dutch conquest of Bantam, which occurred in 1682, and forced them to withdraw. The English never regained their position in Java, but in the eighteenth century they established posts in other parts of the archipelago ; throughout the century they carried on an illicit trade with the Dutch possessions, which the Dutch felt as a serious infraction of their monopoly, but which they were never able to stop.¹

In regard to private merchants of the Netherlands the Company maintained a monopoly which was absolute ; the Dutch Company was never troubled by interlopers or by rival corporations, as was the London Company.² After a comparatively short period in which their monopoly was opposed at home, it was accepted by all the Dutch as a permanent institution and regarded as a part of their national greatness. The only serious and long-continued pressure aiming at a breach of the monopoly came from within the Company, and applied not to the trade in general but only to that part of it carried on within the eastern possessions. The demand for the opening of the

¹ As late as 1769 the directors thought it worth their while to devote part of an official communication to censuring the Governor General for furnishing supplies to an English ship ; ships in distress might be helped repair their disasters, nothing more could be allowed. Jonge, Opk., 11 : 95.

² The way in which it treated a ship of the West India Company that stopped at Java in 1722 was calculated to discourage similar visits ; see the account in Van Rees, KP., 70-71.

internal trade in the East was destined to be constantly repeated, and never fully satisfied. It arose in connection with plans of colonization, and the two topics, free trade and colonization, can best be discussed together.

Nothing in the charter of the East India Company shows that the founders looked beyond ordinary commerce to the establishment of permanent Dutch settlements in the East. Soon after the beginning of territorial rule, however, the idea was advanced that colonization with Dutch settlers was the only way in which to insure the possession of land that had been conquered.¹ This idea was taken up and pressed by Governor General Coen after the establishment of Batavia, and formed one part of a great scheme of his that would have changed the whole character of the Company's policy if it had been carried out.

Coen saw before him a rich country, capable of supporting in comfort multitudes of people who could earn only a bare subsistence at home. He believed that the settlement of these people in India would save the pay of garrisons and fleets, would increase the territorial revenues of the Company, and would set free its resources for use against foreign enemies. The financial condition was already so bad that he urged his plan as the only way to avert disaster to the Company.² To effect the immigration Coen proposed that thereafter officials should bring their families with them, that other persons should be encouraged to come in the ships of the Company or even of private individuals, and finally, the most important

¹ Corte Rem. of J. L'Hermite, 1612, Opk., 3 : 390.

² Coen advocated this plan in different reports and writings extending over a number of years. I have summarized it, without regard to its chronological development, from De Jonge, Opk., 5 : 115, and Coen, Stukken, 137, 119.

part of the plan, that the internal trade should be thrown open to the colonists. They were to pay duties to the Company, and sell to it all their wares, so that it would be relieved of the burden of collecting cargoes, but would still have a monopoly of the commerce with the mother country.¹

Before leaving India, in 1623, Coen gave practical effect to his theory by opening the trade with the Coromandel coast to the citizens of Batavia. His proposals were presented to the Committee of Seventeen at home, were discussed from time to time by them, and finally tabled in 1626; in 1627 the Governor General was strictly forbidden to allow any freedom of trade to private individuals.² In 1630 the right of internal trade was restricted to those who had special permission for the voyage from the Governor General, and many of the colonists returned home. Without the chance to engage in commercial ventures, there was very little to keep them in Java. For some time little was done to further colonization; the Indian officials either agreed with the views of the home government, or were cautious and half hearted in urging a change.³ In the instructions of 1650 it was stated to be the intention of the Company to favor the citizens of Batavia so far as it could without injuring

¹ Jonge, *Opk.*, 5:2. His proposals went so far even as to admit men of all nationalities, except public enemies, to trade at Batavia. *Stukken*, 124.

² Jonge, *Opk.*, 5:3 ff. Coen had some colonists, but of a very poor class; they were mostly discharged soldiers and sailors and abandoned women, a godless lot that gave more trouble than they were worth. See Schiff, "Kolonisatie op Java," *Tijd. TLV.*, 1869, 17:111.

³ Governor General Brouwer to Directors, 1635, *Opk.*, 5:219; Governor General van Diemen to Directors, 1610-1641, *ib.*, 5:242, 252. The Committee of Seventeen replied to Van Diemen that the main reason for the formation of the Company had been to make gain by abolishing com-

itself, but as the whole welfare of the Company was said in another part of the instructions to depend on its absolute monopoly of trade, the citizens had very little to which to look forward.¹

It would be unprofitable to narrate in detail the proposals for a more liberal system in the Company's commercial system in the East. The evils of this system were apparent in India, in deterring colonization, in throwing into the hands of natives or foreigners the trade that might have been carried on by Dutch citizens, and in stimulating smuggling by these foreigners, by the Dutch citizens, and by the officials of the Company themselves. Representations were frequently made to the home government, to be met only with the old reply, that the Company had exclusive monopoly for its policy and could not tolerate competition from any source.²

Interest in the question of colonization did not revive

petition, and hence they were opposed to commercial colonies. N. P. van den Berg, "Een smeekscrift van de Bataviaasche Burgerij," *Tijd. TLV.*, 1875, 22 : 536. Berg prints petitions of the Batavian citizens for better treatment, that were considered for a time but led to nothing.

¹ *Mijer, Verz.*, 74, 114. The directors asked for the opinion of the Indian officials, and in this case they supported the monopoly. Schiff, *Kol. Tijd. TLV.*, 1869, 135 note.

² For the free-trade schemes after 1650 see Van Rees, *KP.*, 261 ff. ; De Reus, *NOC.*, 255 ff. and Beilage ; Schiff, *Kol. Tijd. TLV.*, 1869, 117 ff. Schiff interprets a resolution of the Committee of Seventeen, 1662, as bidding the Indian government to show moderation in executing the laws concerning trade monopoly, but in 1676 the directors wrote to the Governor General that the trade of private individuals had proved to be "harmful, yes, ruinous . . . a pest and sore in the Company's body," and that it would ruin the Company unless vigorously opposed. *Jonge, Opk.*, 6 : 159. It appears from the contracts or treaties made with native princes that the principle of excepting individuals from the Company's monopoly by granting them passes to trade in the interior was maintained. *Jonge, Opk.*, 7 : 372 (Cheribon, 1681) ; *ib.*, 8 : 215 (Bantam, 1682) ; *ib.*, 8 : 264 (Mataram, 1705).

until near the middle of the eighteenth century, when Baron van Imhoff presented to the directors a scheme for a reform of the traditional policy, which won great favor at the time, and led to his appointment as Governor General.¹ A novelty in the plan that Imhoff attempted to carry out was the establishment of an agricultural colony. A few Dutch peasants were led to emigrate, and were given land, but the attempt, the only serious one of its kind in the history of the Company, proved an entire failure. The directors imposed impracticable conditions as to the settlement of the colonists, and surrounded them with all sorts of restrictions. The colonists wasted their time on crops unsuited to the place, were discouraged by the competition of the natives and by violence suffered from them, and dwindled away.² On the point of commercial freedom Imhoff secured some concessions, but nothing approaching to real freedom of trade in the archipelago; trade was conducted as before by foreigners and by the Company's servants rather than by the Dutch citizens in whose favor the privileges were supposed to be granted.

The attitude of the government in the eighteenth century can be read in a memorial of Governor General Mossel, written in 1752.³ He realized the evils of the monopoly, and proposed that it should be limited to trade

¹ Medals were struck with Imhoff's bust on one side, "*Spes meliorum temporum*" on the reverse; he was sent out to India in a ship specially built and named *De Hersteller* (reformer). Kalf, "Een koloniaal hervormer," *Ind. Gids*, 1894, 1:950.

² The total number of these colonists was not more than a score or two. See the account of them in J. Hagemann, "Over de Europesche boeren, 1742-1760," *Tijd. TLV.*, 1869, 17:60 ff. Schiff, *Kol.*, 148-153, prints a document describing their later condition.

³ Jonge, *Opk.*, 10:199-223, especially 215 ff.

in certain articles and with certain countries. The sovereign, he said, must not ply a universal trade, "for not everything can be run profitably"; it should confine itself to "distinguished and privileged" articles, suited to its high estate, and let the common people live from the refuse (*afval*), from which they could make small profits when no one else could. The fault of Mossel's scheme was the same that rendered fruitless all the others; the "refuse" from the Company's trade did not satisfy private entrepreneurs, and they traded either not at all or illicitly in competition with the Company. Every few years down to the end of the century there was a so-called "regulation of the free trade," which was really a revision of the previous restrictions. The Company maintained its monopoly unbroken almost to the last.¹

The main part of the Company's commercial policy was embodied in the one idea of monopoly; other features were less important. Current mercantilist ideas were expressed in a reluctance to pay specie for wares purchased, and reiterated instructions to make purchases only with goods.² So far as any trade was permitted in the East aside from that carried on by the Company, it was confined in narrow limits, to minimise its danger to

¹ Jonge, *Opk.*, vol. 11-12, contains a great number of these regulations; more details could be found by searching the *Plakaatboek*. Reus, *NOC.*, 261, dates the beginning of a more liberal régime from Governor General van der Parra, 1771; from then on the monopoly was crumbling. What may be regarded as an infraction of the monopoly principle before that time was the establishment, in 1751, under charter from the Indian government, of a company to trade with the west coast of Sumatra; it was abolished in 1757, and so-called "free-trade" reintroduced. Jonge, *Opk.*, 10:319 note.

² Cf. Coen, *Stukken*, 81, 85; Jonge, *Opk.*, 4:278; the same ideas constantly reappear.

the Company, and was regulated for the benefit of manufactures in the Netherlands.¹

The carrying trade of the Company was organized on an elaborate system, established in time of war and remaining unmodified throughout the later period. The ships sailed always in fleets, of which three commonly left the Netherlands in a year. Most of the ships returned in one great body, the "return-fleet," which was required by the directors to avoid the English Channel, and sailed home by the north of Scotland to lessen the danger of attack. It is said that the voyage occupied ordinarily six or seven months.² The mean number of ships leaving the Netherlands annually was less than twenty-five, taking the figures for the whole period, 1603-1781.³

¹ Private trade at most of the ports except Batavia was either prohibited or was burdened with extra duties. As an example of the way in which trade was moulded to suit the views of the government may be cited a regulation of 1761. To favor direct trade with the port of Malakka a double duty was levied on all goods brought to Java from other parts of the straits of Malakka. Jonge, *Opk.*, 10:380. I have found evidence of a desire to protect the home manufacturers only in the latter part of the eighteenth century. It was ordered in 1753 (Jonge, *Opk.*, 10:226), "to support the factories of our native country," that no woollens other than those made in the Netherlands should be imported or sold, and in 1802 Wiese referred to the restrictions on trade as necessary to protect home manufactures. I have seen nothing like the provision imposed on the London East India Company in the charter of 1693, which required it to export English manufactures to the value of £150,000 in a season. Bruce, *AEIC.*, 3:133.

² Reus, *NOC.*, 121. In the voyage described by Leupe ("Vrouwen aan boord van Compagnieschepen," *Ind. Gids*, 1881, 2:682) the ship consumed more than a year in reaching Batavia. For further details the reader is referred to Goens, "Lotgevallen van een Hollandsch retourschip in 1665," *De Gids*, 1896, 2:295 ff.; and the anonymous article in *Bijd. TLV.*, 1862, 2:6:202 ff., entitled "De bevelhebber eener retourvloot."

³ Reus, *NOC.*, 119. He compares the figures of 1847, when 282 ships arrived at Batavia from abroad. In 1897 over six hundred steam and

The character of the commerce of the Dutch East India Company can be learned from the figures given for the cargo of a return-fleet of eleven ships in 1739.¹ In thousands of gulden the figures were as follows: The total was 2316; of this amount a little over 1000 were credited to the mainland, and the remainder came from the islands. Some of the wares came from other sources than Java, tea from China, and spices from the Molucca group; premising that I give the values of the main wares in the order of their importance: tea, 460, coffee, 304, pepper, 212, sugar, 67, mace, 59, nutmegs, 33, camphor, 33, indigo, 29, cloves, 25, gambier (cutch), 22. Variations would appear of course from year to year, but so far as regards Java the general character of the trade remained the same throughout the eighteenth century. It was based on a few great staples that could be grown to advantage in the island and that were eagerly desired in Europe. It was the object of the Company to control the source of supply of these articles, and by regulating the amount thrown on the market in Europe to fix prices as it pleased. An early historian of the Company² says that if a surplus of any product accumulated, it was buried or burned rather than that it should be sold on a declining market.

In payment for these wares the Company exported to

sailing ships traded with Dutch India from America and the chief countries of Europe. Jaarcijfers, Kolonien, 1897, 81.

¹ Governor General Valckenier to Directors, 1739, Jonge, Opk., 9: 285-287. With this list may be compared another statement in Governor General Hoorn to Directors, 1707, Opk., 8: 135-142, which gives about the same impression. In the eighteenth century spices formed a much less important part of the trade than in the seventeenth.

² Valentijn, quoted in Van Rees, KP., 285.

India specie and manufactures, mainly textiles, so far as it made payment at all in a commercial sense. It is a remarkable feature of the East India Company that a very large proportion of its wares came to it in a political rather than an economic way, as tribute and not by exchange. This was true especially in the later period of the Company's history in Java, when its real trade dwindled away until it became inconsiderable. In the beginning the Company traded like any other merchant, establishing factories where its agents collected the wares of the country and held them for shipment. These factories were maintained later,¹ but declined constantly in the amount of products they supplied, in proportion to the amount received in the way of "contingents" and "forced deliveries."

Both contingents and forced deliveries were supplies of products exacted annually from the native governments of Java as a recognition of the supremacy of the Company. In theory the contingents were fixed amounts of products due annually from the native rulers for a small return or for nothing, while the forced deliveries varied in amount, and were sold to the Company for a price agreed upon. In their origin contingents were purely political tribute, while the deliveries had the appearance of economic contracts. In fact, however, both were political in

¹ An idea of one of them is given in a report by Mossel, 1747 (Jonge, *Opk.*, 10 : 222) ; trade in Bantam was carried on in a fortress in the city, by a commander and some subordinate agents, with a garrison of three companies. I have seen little to show just the character of the relations between the Dutch agents and the native or Chinese merchants. A clause in a contract with Bantam, 1686 (*Opk.*, 8 : 210), leads one to suspect that even these relations were not purely economic ; by this clause none of the Company's people, buying wares, was to take them away by force before the seller had agreed to the price and received it.

character and no distinction can be observed between them.¹

In the early treaties made by the Dutch with the native governments the provisions were mainly political, bearing on questions of alliance, of extradition, and the like ; other provisions gave the Dutch trading privileges in the interior, but nothing more.² First in the treaty with Mataram, 1677, the *Soenan* promised to supply four thousand measures of rice annually to the Company at the market price. Soon afterwards (1786) the Sultan of Bantam was forced to agree that all the pepper of his dominions should be sold to the Company at a certain price per pound.³ About the same time the contingent system was introduced into the Preanger regencies (formerly dependent on Mataram, in western Java), and each of the native rulers there had set for him a certain amount of pepper, indigo, cotton yarn, or the like, that he must get from his people and give to the Company. The system spread rapidly after its establishment. With every increase of their political power the Dutch worked deeper into the native organization, and

¹ Deliveries were sometimes gratuitous (cf. *e.g.* *Opk.*, 11:258), and contingents were often paid. Contingents were, so far as I know, always fixed in amount. Daendels, *Staat*, 9, says that deliveries included the whole crop of a district. This was sometimes true, as in the Bantam treaty of 1686, but more commonly a certain amount was stipulated for delivery. The Dutch did not secure in this way a perfectly regular supply ; great fluctuations appear in the amounts of coffee delivered 1744-1766 (*Opk.*, 11:68), and the regents often fell far behind their engagements (*ib.*, 11:488, giving a list of products which the regents had paid, and which they still owed in 1780).

² Cf. De Jonge, *Opk.*, 3:313 (not executed) ; 3:352 ; 5:79 ; 5:286 ; 6:83.

³ De Jonge, *Opk.*, 7:81, 165 ; 8:213. The order regulating the contingent system in the Preangers (printed in *Tijd. TLV.*, 1869, 17:355 ff.) was issued in 1698, not 1689 as given in M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 2:20.

reached more rulers on whom they could impose their tasks. The list of wares taken grew until it covered most of the native products of any commercial value, and the Dutch used their opportunity to introduce through the means of contingents some new wares which they thought might be produced to advantage.¹

The way in which the system was founded on the native political organization is described by a Dutch official who was in northeast Java at the close of the eighteenth century.

“According to a principle of the feudal system of government the country or the land is the property of the prince or the landlord; and since the coast provinces have been ceded by the native princes to the Company, it has the property right in the land there. This land, divided up into great districts, it makes over to regents, under the name of Adipattijs, Toemongongs, etc., on conditions commonly called contracts, whereby these regents pledge themselves to furnish products, some for nothing and some for a fixed payment, as well as to do services and in case of war to support the Company with armed men. On the other hand, these regents turn over the land again to the common Javanese, to cultivate it, and to pay over to themselves a part of the fruits and produce, that they may be able to supply their contingents to the Company and support themselves. . . . In this way the regents can be regarded as great farmers (*Pagters*), who have leased land from the Company and lease it out again in small divisions to the common people.”²

The advantages of this system to the Dutch are obvious.

¹ Cf. lists in *Opk.*, 8 : 356 ff.; 11 : 250, 258, 464, etc.

² Dirk van Hogendorp, “Schets of Proeve” (1799); from an extract in *Eindresumé*, 2, Bijlage LL., p. 152.

Taking the native organization as they found it, they used its taxing power to secure the wares they wanted, and were so relieved from the necessity of building up an extensive commercial organization of their own. The sums that they paid the regents for their forced deliveries were far below the market prices of the goods, and they saved all the expense of administration by making native officials do their work. The evils of the system will appear in discussing the condition of the natives in the period of the Company. From the very fact that the Dutch refused all the responsibility of administration, while they increased the burdens on the native organization, the faults of the native political system were magnified many fold, and every gain of the Dutch implied a disproportionate increase in the labor and hardships of the common people.

In previous sections I have described the general features of the Company's commercial system; there remain to be considered in this connection only the details of the Company's policy in regulating production and prices in Java. For illustration I shall take the coffee and sugar cultures, two of the most important cultures in Java in the eighteenth century.

Coffee had been introduced from Arabia in the latter part of the seventeenth century.¹ The demand for the product grew rapidly in the Netherlands, and the Company's directors wrote constantly to the Indian govern-

¹ The date of the introduction of the coffee tree varies as given in different authors (1661, 1696, 1723); it has not seemed worth while to sift the evidence on this point. P. A. Leupe, "Invoering der koffijkultuur of Java," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1858, 22 : 56, says that the coffee was brought to Java as a curiosity in 1696, and that the first Java coffee came to market in 1712.

ment urging an increase in the amount supplied for the return-fleet. The government met this demand in the characteristic way, stimulating production not through the offer of higher prices, but through commands laid on the native regents to furnish the amounts required as contingents or forced deliveries. As it takes the coffee tree some years to reach maturity, there was almost always a discrepancy between the amount produced in Java and that which the directors thought they could sell to good advantage in the Netherlands; this led to violent fluctuations in the government's policy, and to most arbitrary orders in the amounts demanded and the prices paid. To make up a decline in the Company's revenue the price paid for the coffee supplied was reduced in 1725, and this price was again cut in 1726.¹ The motives and pretexts on which the Company acted may be seen in an order of the executive committee in The Hague confirming this action. It recited the fall of the Company's profits, complained that the natives were growing rich at its expense (!), and charged them with using their money to buy firearms; it ordered that the price should be reduced one-half, and that one-half of this lower price should be retained by the Company because of the low state of its treasury, but that interest on this should be paid to the regents, and presents made to them, to secure their influence in effecting the change.² The amount of coffee delivered to the Company had declined to one-half in 1730; natives neglected or destroyed their plantations in spite of the threats of the government. In less than five years,

¹ Rapport, 1731, Opk., 9 : 159.

² Verbaal d. Haagsche Besoigne, 1727, Opk., 9 : 93. Part of the pay sometimes took the form of truck.

however, the government was commanding what it had just before prohibited; it saw no other way to protect itself against the great supply of coffee which it had, stimulated them to uproot the excessive coffee trees, and it forbade the planting of more. It followed this policy from 1733 on, in various parts of Java, but changed before 1740, and began again to order the establishment of new plantations.¹

Up to a certain point it received the product of these plantations at fixed low prices; beyond that the producers must be content to let their crop spoil unless they could market it, in spite of severe penalties, through smugglers. In 1744 native rulers complained that the Company would take from them only a quarter of the crop that they could deliver.² The conditions of the coffee culture were more settled in the latter part of the eighteenth century, but the vices of the Company's policy continued as long as itself existed. In 1788 the directors wrote to the Governor General that, to stimulate the coffee culture, he might assure the natives that there would be no more extirpation, or prohibitions, but in May, 1796, an order was given that the cultivation of coffee in northeast Java should stop. In September of the same year another order was issued that the culture should be stimulated in every possible way.³

Sugar differed from coffee in that it was a manufactured

¹ Klerk de Reus, NOC., 229 ff.

² Imhoff, "Reis van den Gouv. Gen. . . . in de Jakatrasche Bovenlanden," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1863, 2:7:237.

³ Jonge, *Opk.*, 12:160; Veth, *Java*, 2:237, quoting Hogendorp's Bericht. In 1782 the price paid the natives for their coffee was little over one-tenth that which had been paid in the early part of the century. The Governor General excused the policy on the ground of a scarcity of money and a surplus of coffee. *Opk.*, 12:33.

product, requiring to be put through machine processes before it was fit for market. It was manifestly impossible for the government to impose deliveries of sugar on the native regents; Chinese were the only Orientals competent to direct the production, and the Chinese were outside of the native political organization. The way in which this difficulty was met appears from a sugar contract of 1707.¹ There were three parties to this contract — the Dutch government, the Chinaman, who promised to sell his product to none but the government, and a native official, who ceded to the Chinaman for a certain time the land for the culture, and agreed to use his influence to secure the necessary labor. The government controlled the culture by making advances to the Chinamen for their outfit, and by using its political power to get for them the land, labor, and supplies that they needed.²

During the early part of the eighteenth century there was a great fall in the price of sugar in Europe, and the directors of the Company thought it necessary, as in the case of the coffee culture, to restrict production and to lower the price paid for the product. The Company had money invested in many of the mills, and therefore could not, as in the coffee culture, proceed by the simple method of extirpation. It did, however, in many regulations extending through the eighteenth century, forbid the establishment of new mills, and even their transfer from one part to another of the island.³ On the other hand,

¹ De Jonge, *Opk.*, 8 : 324 ff.

² See for these points and other details N. P. van den Berg, "De Suikerindustrie op Java onder het bestuur van de Oost Indische Compagnie," *De Economist*, 1892, 2 : 495-519, 612-635.

³ These regulations went into minute details about the local distribution of the mills, as seen in Mossel's proposal, 1750. In 1711 the Indian

it maintained a monopoly of the sugar trade that enabled it any time to break the prices it paid to the producer.

The investigator on whose work any one must now rely who attempts to describe the course of the Company's finances, prefaces his history with the statement that it is impossible to give a clear summary of the Company's financial development.¹ No one, not even the most favored of its contemporaries, knew just how the Company stood at any given time. A double set of books was kept, in which the business done in India and in Europe was accounted for separately, and a real balance was never drawn. The books were kept jealously guarded from the public, and seem sometimes to have been kept secret from the directors themselves. Accounts were published occasionally to satisfy the terms of the charter, but they gave no idea of the Company's actual condition. The only way in which the general public could estimate that was through the dividends declared, and the dividends themselves formed no criterion by which to judge of the Company's prosperity. The accounts which have been preserved show that from an early period in the Company's history its dividends stood in no relation whatever to its profits. Sometimes no dividends were declared in years when the Company had made money; more frequently dividends were declared in the years when the

government established a tax to protect the mills around Batavia from the competition of the rest of Java; the directors abolished this. Even in 1798 the government was opposed to allowing sugar mills to be erected freely. Governor General Overstraten to Directors, *Opk.*, 12 : 453.

¹ K. de Reus, *NOC.*, 181. I must refer to this work for all details. Not the least interesting part of the book is its appendices, giving in tabular form certain aspects of the Company's fiscal development.

Company lost money. The tendency was to declare a dividend every year, and most of the two hundred years of the Company's existence were marked by the division among the stockholders of sums ranging from 12½ per cent to 20, 30, 40, or 50 per cent of the capital stock.¹

When there were no profits, dividends were disbursed with money borrowed for the purpose; this came to be the regular course of action in the later period of the Company, until the declaration of the last dividend in 1782. The Indian accounts show constant losses from 1693 on, and the home accounts were always unfavorable after 1736. The Company lived through most of the eighteenth century on credit, and one of the most astonishing features of its history is the fact that its credit remained good almost to the last. Verelst, successor of Clive as Chairman of the Select Committee, wrote home from India in 1768, when the Company had long been hopelessly insolvent, that the extent of the credit of the Dutch exceeded all conception; their bills drawn to an enormous amount in Europe on Bengal and Madras were solicited as favors.² Even in 1781 shares of the Company sold for over two hundred. It must be that not only the affairs of the Company were kept secret, but that the public was systematically deceived. Klerk de Reus shows that the directors falsified accounts sent them from India, and some of the Indian

¹ See the list in De Reus, Beilage VI. The claim of Hooft in the States General, 1825-1826 (De Waal, NISG., 1: 215), that the East India Company divided annually 19%, taking the mean of the years 1602-1796, is not far from the truth; Reus computes total dividends of over 3600% or over 18% a year (NOC., 181). Van Alphen's estimate in the same session, that the Company divided total profits of 2,000,000,000 gulden, is an evident exaggeration. Waal, NISG., 1: 223.

² Mill, HBI., 3: 448 note.

accounts of the later period appear pretty clearly to be fabrications themselves.¹

Before taking up the causes of the Company's decline, it seems advisable to warn the reader that this book is a study only of the history of the Dutch in Java, and that the author has made no attempt to follow the ventures of the Dutch East India Company in other islands or on the continent of Asia. The Company drew its revenue from many sources, and the decline of the Company evidently cannot be explained satisfactorily by describing merely the course of its fortunes in Java. Still, if this be confessed, and the reader be thereby put on his guard, some discussion of the causes of the Company's decline will be of use, even if it rests on but part of the evidence and can pretend to lead to no certain conclusions.

So far as regards the position of the Company in Java, it will be remembered that its revenues were of two distinct kinds, answering to its double functions of trader and ruler. Some of the wares that it sold in Europe it had bought with other goods; the profits in this sort of transaction depended on its buying cheap and selling dear. It made money if the proceeds of its sales exceeded the cost of the goods exchanged and the necessary expense of maintaining a commercial establishment. On the other hand, it received other wares in the way of tribute to its political supremacy; the amount that it had to give in direct exchange for these wares was small, and it made money if by their sale it got an excess over that small amount and over the costs of maintaining the political and military establishment that assured its supremacy.

The fiscal history of the Company can be roughly sum-

¹ Cf. De Jonge, *Opk.*, 11 : 390, 502 ; 12 : 451.

marized by saying that in its early period, when it was more trader than ruler, it made money on the whole; that in its later period, when it was more ruler than trader, it lost.

There is a temptation to argue from this that the Company was ruined by a change of policy,¹ or, if not that, that it grew weaker internally and owed its fall to a corruption of its administration. I believe that neither of these hypotheses is true, but that the Company was inefficient both in respect to trade and government from its very beginning. It enjoyed, however, exceptionally good luck when it began its career; it found its rivals in the East so weak that it was able by crude measures to secure a monopoly of the trade, and it sold its products for very high prices in the European market. Prices fell as time went on and rivals grew stronger; then first the weaknesses grew apparent, and it was forced by competition from the field of trade to the field of government where it could protect itself for a time. There can be no doubt that the extension by the Dutch of their political influence in Java was due to the fact that they were unable longer to make money by buying goods in the open market, and were forced to get them in a way which for a time proved cheaper. The whole subject will be made clearer by a review of some features of the Company's fiscal development.

The seventeenth century was by no means a period of

¹ This is the view taken by Muntinghe, Report, 1817, S. van Deventer, LS., 1: 295. The first deficit of the Indian finances appeared, he says, in 1693, just when the Company had completed its conquests (?). "From the moment that the merchant becomes prince and king, the losses of the merchant must be dated;" these losses were so regular that they must be ascribed to a permanent cause (expenses of government), not to the chances of commerce.

unmixed prosperity. The accounts for the early part of it are lacking, and the criticisms of the Company made at that time in the Netherlands were biassed and are perhaps untrustworthy.¹ We have, however, at the end of the first quarter century of the Company's existence, an exposure of its condition by Coen, which shows that for a number of years it had been running behind.² The causes were the same which constantly reappear afterward, the failure to make enough out of trade to cover the expense of the commercial and military establishment.³ The figures given by Klerk de Reus, beginning in 1639, show profits in India, but apparently this favorable change had occurred only a little while before.⁴

From then until 1693 the years in which losses are recorded are exceptional; this is the only really prosperous period in the history of the Company.⁵ Before the

¹ As an example of one of these see Le Maire's "Remonstrance," 1609, Opk., 3:369.

² See Coen's report in De Jonge, Opk., 4:276 ff., and his "Advys, Vertoogh, and Poincten v. Reg." (Stukken, 67, 116, 131).

³ Coen wrote in 1623 (Stukken, 120) that the ships, factories, and people employed by the Company in the cloth trade cost more than the profits on the cloth. A large part of the Company's means had been used to secure possession of the Spice Islands (*ib.*, 112). As early as 1614 Sir Thomas Roe, Ambassador to the Mogul court, advised the English to avoid a territorial establishment which would consume their profits; he instanced the Dutch, "their dead pay consumes all the gain." Mill, HBI., 1:33.

⁴ See Governor General Brouwer to Directors, 1636; Opk., 5:221. He said that in the period 1613 to 1632 the excess of gains over losses had been only 300,000 gulden; in the three years following 1633 the net gains averaged over 1,000,000 gulden a year. De Reus's figures, to be found in Beilage V, were taken from the statement compiled by P. van Dam, but never published.

⁵ In the middle of the century there was a period of depression. Van Goens, in his report of 1655 ("Vertoogh wegens den presenten Staet,"

end of the seventeenth century the Company's trade had begun to decline, and by the middle of the eighteenth century it had practically ceased to exist in Java, except in so far as it rested on a political basis.

In 1747 we read that the sales of the Company in Bantam scarcely deserved the name, and that the trade from the Netherlands to India returned no profit.¹ When the Governor of the northeast coast arrived at his post in 1754, he found his warehouses full of manufactures, cloth and other goods, which had long been lying unsalable; the Company did practically no business there.²

It is true that the Dutch limited the market for sales in Java by getting so large a part of their products on the contingent system, but during the time when their trade in the island was declining; their commercial rivals were still able to find a ready market for the wares that they smuggled in. Commercial competition must be

. . . Bijd. TLV., 1856, 1 : 4 : 141 ff.), said that the condition of the Company had declined for some years; "All the Indian factories are burdened with one or another difficulty," war, losses without gains, business without profit, decline of trade, lack of capital, losses at sea.

¹ Rapport of Mossel, 1747, Opk., 10 : 122. "Extract uit een Secretet Besoigne," *ib.*, p. 131.

Mossel, in his Memoir, 1753 (Opk., 10 : 216 ff.), shows that the Company had been unable, with all its expedients, to make anywhere near enough commercial profit at Batavia during the last fifty years to meet the expenses of the establishment.

² Memorie of Hartinghe, Opk., 10 : 359. A later governor of the same district asserted (Van der Burgh, Memorie, 1780, Opk., 11 : 479) that he made the Company's trade profitable, but his report seems not to deserve credence; a successor said that the Company's trade there had never been important and then amounted to nothing (Memorie of Niepoort, 1784, Opk., 12 : 62). The same account is given from other parts of Java, as Cheribon; no business was done there. Memorie of Hassalaer, 1765, Opk., 11 : 42.

given as the chief cause of the decline of the Company's trade in the eighteenth century.¹

The monopoly for which the Company fought so bitterly was never perfect. It was sufficient to stifle any great enterprise on the part of the Dutch citizens in Java, and prevent the growth of a really free trade, but it still allowed enough competition to menace the Company's trade in the seventeenth century and to destroy it in the eighteenth. The Governor General wrote, in 1660, that there was scarcely hope for recovery from the depression ruling then in the trade in piece-goods if the English and Arabs continued to compete; they glutted the market with piece-goods everywhere, and sold so low that there was no profit in the trade.² Foreign merchants who were excluded from entrance to the Dutch harbors in Java got a footing in an independent state like Bantam, and from there distributed their wares throughout the island. Even in the public market in Batavia more foreign cloth than Company's cloth was seen and sold daily.³

The English were driven out of Bantam, and out of other posts that they occupied in the archipelago, but

¹ M. L. van Deventer, who is inclined to a more favorable estimate of the Company's trade than I can take, thinks that the decline of its cloth trade was due in part to the fact that the natives tended to make more cloth for themselves. This is the reason given by Maetsuyker, 1659 (Opk., 6 : 83), but does not explain why the English extended their trade in cloth at this very period. It may be that the Dutch forced the natives into the cloth manufacture by selling so dear.

² Maetsuyker to Directors, 1660, Opk., 6 : 88.

³ Directors to Governor General, 1676, Opk. 6 : 157. Maetsuyker asked (1675, Opk., 6 : 129), in view of the way in which the Company was being undersold through smuggling, whether it would not be better to admit the foreign merchants at Batavia, get the duties on their trade, and build up a great commercial city there. The directors returned a vigorous negative; the monopoly was to be strictly upheld.

the attractions of the trade, the weakness of the Dutch commercial competition, and the corruption of the Dutch administration, made their return inevitable. English, French, and Danes shared in the trade that the Dutch claimed as their exclusive possession, and the competition of the first two nations named was the more formidable as their trade was conducted in part by individual entrepreneurs.¹ In the middle of the eighteenth century the Dutch were being undersold in their own market,² and as the English increased their power on the continent of India they extended their commercial intrusion in the islands.³ Before the end of the century the Dutch were forced to admit that their attempt at monopoly was a failure.⁴

All of the commercial and industrial undertakings in which the Dutch East India Company embarked showed the debilitating effect of corporate management. They were moulded into a complicated routine in which the action of individual foresight and energy disappeared.⁵

¹ Mill (HBL., 1 : 88) says that the Dutch were dismayed in 1655 at the rumor that Cromwell was about to dissolve the London East India Company and allow free trade ; they expected the keener competition to ruin them.

² Opk., 10 : 359.

³ H. T. Colenbrander, "Frankrijk en de Oost Indische Compagnie in de Patriottenjaren," *De Gids*, 1899, 1 : 454, 456. In 1775 the Dutch complained that they could scarcely get a cargo in India, the source of supply of much of the piece-goods, because of the English influence. Opk., 11 : 275 ff.

⁴ Cf. Report of Commissioners General, Opk., 12 : 349.

⁵ Van Rees, KP., 288 ff., has an interesting discussion of the weakness of the Company in competing with individuals ; he cites the staple regulations as especially oppressive. An example of the way in which the Company lost money by failing to suit its action to the needs of the market can be found in Leupe, "Invoering d. koffij," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1858, 2 : 2 : 60 ; the directors estimated that they lost a third of a million gulden because the Indian government could not (it said) find ship room for coffee which they had ordered.

The Company, however, was unable to compete not only with individuals but also with other companies of the same general character; it must have been an unusually bad specimen even of its kind. Some light will be thrown on its inefficiency in discussing the abuses of its administration in the next chapter.

The Company failed in the carrying trade as well as in merchandizing. In the first part of the eighteenth century over 4 per cent of the ships sailing were lost on the voyage home, many of them, presumably, because they were overladen with goods representing the private ventures of the Company's officials.¹ Toward the close of the century ships were often despatched from India out of season; it led often to the loss of ship and cargo, or to an untimely auction due to the late arrival. The committee which investigated the affairs of the Company before its dissolution reported that if the Company were to be maintained, it had no choice but to give up its navigation and trade only in chartered ships. The expenses for repairs were ruinous, and this reform was regarded as absolutely essential.²

The same ill success attended the Company in the field of industry. The sugar culture, in which it invested large amounts in the form of advances, was seldom profitable to the manufacturers and was a source of loss to the Company.³

¹ Reus, NOC., 119. The ship in the voyage described by Van Goens was shaky, "swak van timmeragie."

² Rapport of Commissioners General, 1795, Opk., 12:337. This change had been made by the London East India Company some time before. Mill, HBI., 3:11.

³ Wiese, Opk., 13:73. In a report of 1810 the culture was called "an intolerable burden" to the government. Report of Director General Chassé, Opk., 13:484.

It is not likely that the Company was equally unfortunate in all branches of trade. The accounts for its different factories in the East, so far as they can be trusted to give a true picture of affairs, show that it was gaining in some countries, losing in others.¹ In general it seems to have remained about stationary in trading efficiency, so that more progressive rivals were constantly encroaching on one part or another of its field. We have here the reason for Mossel's proposal, made in the middle of the eighteenth century, that the Company, being a "distinguished" merchant, ought to confine its trade to distinguished wares, *i.e.* those that through some political advantage or bit of luck it could trade in profitably.

The decline of the purely commercial income of the Company in Java in the eighteenth century was accompanied by a rapid growth in its income as a ruler. The money taxes which it raised in the form of custom duties, tolls on markets and internal trade, poll taxes, etc., increased as it extended its territorial influence, and the disguised taxes of the contingent system grew until they formed the mainstay of its revenue in India.² References

¹ Reus, Beilage IX. In the period 1680-1757 the most favorable showing was made in Japan, Coromandel, Surat, and Persia trade. The Bengal trade was uncertain, and the Malabar trade almost uniformly unfavorable. Different factories in Java showed constant losses. We know too little, however, about the way in which the figures in this table were compiled to be able to draw any sure inferences from them. The same can be said of the figures given by De Reus, pp. 192-193, and taken by him to show that the profit of the Indian trade was 50% in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Such a result can be reached only by disregarding expenses that could properly be charged to the trade account.

² It is impossible to give the exact proportion which the Company's revenues as trader and as ruler bore to each other; the two sources of revenue are confused in the accounts kept by the Company.

will be made later to the indications that the political revenues of the Company would have sufficed to enable it to maintain its position in Java if they had been husbanded with decent care. In the first half of the eighteenth century they were offset by the expenses of the wars which the Company waged to extend its political power.¹ The Company had established itself so firmly by 1755 that it secured comparative freedom from troubles with the natives thereafter, and might have enjoyed a period of recuperation. The resources of the Company were, however, being squandered in improper dividends and in unprofitable trade, its administration was unnecessarily costly, and the European wars beginning in 1780 and 1795 gave it the death blow.²

The Company's military and naval power declined so that it became impossible to protect the island from pirates.³ In 1778 the Governor General appealed directly to William V of the Netherlands for soldiers and sailors, saying that appeals to the directors had proved vain.⁴ To secure the money for running expenses the Governor Gen-

¹ An estimate is printed in De Jonge, *Opk.*, 10 : 277-278, of the financial result of the wars against Mataram up to 1750 ; expenses on military account were put at 8,000,000 gulden and the gains through forced deliveries, etc., at less than 7,000,000. From 1746 to 1758 the Company is said to have spent over 4,000,000. De Reus, xxxviii, note.

² For the effect of European wars and maladministration in ruining the Company see Colenbrander, *Frankrijk, De Gids*, 1899, 1 : 458 ; Muntinghe's *Minute in Raffles, Sub.*, 281 ; the discussion of Van der Parra's proposal to reform the administration, 1763, *Jonge, Opk.*, 10 : 397 ff. ; and Siberg's statement of the accounts, 1799, *ib.*, 13 : 8.

³ Governor General Alting to Directors, 1791, *Opk.*, 12 : 239. The Resident of Tagal had fitted out a vessel against these pirates at his own expense.

⁴ *Johge, Opk.*, 11 : 315. In 1801 the Company's navy in Java counted only six ships. *Ib.*, 13 : 31.

eral had to give up the old monopoly policy and sell goods directly to foreign merchants.¹ State commissions were established to effect a reform, if possible, in the Company's condition, but they found their task a hopeless one. The directors were forced in 1793 to admit that they had no cash, and their governing powers were taken away by the law of 1795, which put a State commission in their place. Finally, in 1798, the Company was entirely abolished ; its debts, amounting to more than 134,000,000 gulden, and its sources of income, were assumed by the State. Its territories were henceforth to be ruled for the State by a Council of the Asiatic Possessions.

¹ Governor General Alting to Directors, 1785, *ib.*, 12 : 74.

CHAPTER III

THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: GOVERNMENT

IN the preceding chapter I have attempted to give some idea of the policy pursued by the Dutch East India Company in Java, and the effect of this policy on the Company. Most of the reasons for the course which the Company followed are to be found in the conditions that existed in the native organization in Java. The policy of the Company, however, to some extent, and the success of the policy to a very large extent, were dependent on its peculiar organization and the character of its administration. It will be the purpose of this chapter, therefore, to discuss the organization and administration of the Company and to show their influence on its history. Another topic not yet considered will be the effect of the Company's rule on the natives.

The essential features of the Company's government in the Netherlands were fixed by the charter of 1602, and remained substantially the same for nearly two hundred years. In form the Company was neither purely "joint-stock" nor "regulated," but between the two, with features resembling modern forms of industrial combination. It was organized from a union of a number of smaller companies, and the partial independence of the companies was recognized in the division into provincial "Chambers," of which there were six. In the earliest period, at least,

these Chambers maintained a large degree of independence in the conduct of their trade. To each Chamber was assigned a certain quota in the trading operations of the Company; Amsterdam, for instance, supplied half of the ships and cargoes going to the making of a fleet, while the two small Chambers of North Holland together supplied one-eighth. The control and administration over ships and wares were vested in the Chamber which supplied them, even though the ships returned to another port in the Netherlands. A provision of the charter required that a Chamber with a surplus of some ware, like spice, of which the other Chambers stood in need, should share with them, and each Chamber was required to report regularly to the others the results of the trading operations, but these provisions merely indicate how far removed from the modern type of trading corporation the Company was. In certain matters of policy the Chambers were subject to a higher authority, the Committee of Seventeen, whose powers will be described immediately. In the course of time this committee extended its authority, and brought the Chambers into much closer dependence, but it never reached the position of the governing board of one great corporation. The powers of the Chambers went so far, for instance, that each not only maintained a separate administration in the Netherlands, but had also the right to appoint officials for the Indian service, a right which the Committee of Seventeen tried to control by various regulations, but which led to many abuses and to an excessive growth of the Indian personnel. Each Chamber was governed by a board of directors, appointed at first by the States General, with provisions for the filling of vacancies which soon put the control of

the boards in the hands of the municipal governments of the Dutch towns. Attempts of the stockholders to secure representation in the boards proved fruitless.

Above the boards of the separate Chambers was the Committee of Seventeen, established to control the general policy of the Company. According to the charter it was to decide how many ships were to be sent out at any time, where they were to go, and "other things" touching trade; its decisions were to be made known to the Chambers, and to be carried out through their executive action. The Committee of Seventeen formed the real centre of government of the East India Company. It received and answered the reports of the Indian administration until the amount of correspondence rendered necessary the establishment of a special commission for this purpose, and then it still retained control of the general direction of the Indian policy. It determined the amount and character of the products to be sent to India, and fixed the prices at which the wares sent in return were to be sold. It was the common clearing house in which the claims of the different Chambers on each other were settled. This Committee of Seventeen was not a permanent body, but was formed afresh at every session by the election of delegates from the boards of the different Chambers. The Chamber of Amsterdam was entitled to eight of the seventeen delegates, a right which amounted to a control of the committee, and did much to preserve its power from the harmful effect of the mutual distrust and jealousy of the local boards.

The directors' positions soon fell into the control of the ruling city magistrates' families, and the directors formed an inner ring in the Company with a power which their po-

litical influence made practically absolute. They refused to render an account of the Company's fiscal status at the end of the first ten years, as they were bound to do by the terms of the charter, and again refused, on various pretexts, at the end of the second ten years. Protests on the part of the stockholders were met with the threat that no dividend would be declared for seven years unless they kept still. The approaching expiration of the Company's first charter led, in 1622, to a vigorous attack from the discontented elements, who demanded an accounting and a voice in the affairs of the Company. In form concessions were made to the opposition; in fact the directors, in alliance with the States General and the municipal governments, surrendered nothing. The right of the stockholders to a share in the election of directors proved illusory, and the account books which they were to examine mysteriously disappeared.

If we believe a small part of the charges brought against the directors of this period and never disproved, these officials must have been thoroughly corrupt. They were accused of manipulating the price of the stock by declaring improper dividends and by giving out false information to help them in their speculations. They had proposed to invest a million of the Company's money in the West India Company to further their personal interests. As private individuals they sold goods to themselves as representatives of the Company, and made improper profits out of their emolument of a percentage on the costs of equipping the fleets. In this last detail reforms were effected, first by limiting the percentage to one on the profits of the return cargoes, and later by substituting for it fixed salaries. In the general position of

the directors no change was made.¹ The large dividends which they declared made the public quiet if not contented. The directors disregarded all attempts to force them to render an account of the condition of the Company and took scrupulous precautions, not only to keep secret their own deliberations, but also to prevent knowledge of the course of affairs in India from reaching the public. Officials were forbidden to keep private journals or to make maps or sketches; they could not write letters or give information to any individual, even though he were a director of the Company. All letters must be opened, read, and censored by the Company.

The Company soon attained, in its relations with the State, the same independence and freedom from wholesome control that characterized its relations with the stockholders. The first charter reserved nominally to the States General the right of interference, and imposed on the Company the duty of frequent reports. During the early years the Company and the government maintained a pretty close connection, but one which was marked by an entire disregard of the public interests in behalf of the claims the directors put forward to a privileged position. The pretext for the support which the States General rendered the directors in their war with the stockholders was the public character of the Company, its services to the State of a commercial, military, and political kind; the fact seems to be rather that this support was obtained through the political and

¹ The payment of salaries to directors is not the important turning-point in the history of the Company that Roscher and Jannasch, *Kolonien*, Leipzig, 1885, p. 272, represented it as being. Saalfeld's *Geschichte*, on which Roscher largely relied, is corrected and amplified in many important points by Klerk de Reus, and has lost its value as an authority.

personal influence of the directors. The government passed a law taking the directors under its "special safeguard and protection," and forbade the courts to entertain suits against them; the directors had only to make a request for help against the stockholders, and the government granted it, as in the law prohibiting the public from speculating in the Company's stock.

Before the middle of the seventeenth century the Company had outgrown the need of further dependence on the government, and maintained from then until its fall a position that was practically sovereign. The addition of the Prince of Orange to the directorate in the eighteenth century, with the right of representation on the Committee of Seventeen, was of no practical importance. In recognition of the privileges granted it the Company paid large lump sums to the State at the periodical renewal of its charter, it shared prizes with the State, and was subject to certain general taxes and special contributions; these financial obligations comprise the sum of its dependence. Ustariz, writing in the first half of the eighteenth century, ascribed the success of the Dutch East India Company, which he thought to be the richest and most powerful trading corporation of the time, to the absolute sovereignty which it exercised in the management of its affairs at home and abroad.¹

Into the hands of directors, acting as described through their Committee of Seventeen, freed from every particle of control on the part of stockholders and government, were intrusted the immense powers of the East India Company. The great commercial privilege of monopoly

¹ "Theorie et pratique du commerce," translation from the second Spanish ed., Paris, 1753, p. 115.

has already been described. Within the field it covered, extending from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan, the Company was given the right to make treaties and alliances in the name of the States General, to build forts, and to maintain the necessary civil, judicial, and military establishments. It could take such measures as it thought best to meet force or fraud on the part of the natives. All the great powers of a sovereign State were made over to it, to be exercised at its discretion.

In certain important points the directors exercised a controlling influence on the Company's policy in India. This is most striking in regard to the maintenance of the policy of strict monopoly. The bad effects of this policy and the impossibility of executing it thoroughly were so evident in India that the Governors General protested again and again against it, as has been noted above. There can be no question that the Indian government would have legalized much of the illicit trade and would have stimulated the settlement of private merchants, if their proposals and attempts at reform had not been met by constant opposition and criticism on the part of the directors. The directors lived in a period of European history when natural trade monopolies and special commercial privileges were the rule. They saw these monopolies maintained with comparative success by the public administration of the day, and could not understand why similar success should not attend their policy in India. They did not realize the evils of their restrictions, and were too short-sighted to perceive the possible benefits of change; they set their faces obstinately against any real reform, and prevented any, down to the time of the Company's fall.

Besides this effect on economic policy must be put, as of nearly equal importance, the influence of the home government on the character of the Indian administration. The personal interests of the directors were too closely concerned in the appointment of Indian officials to allow them ever to establish a system of appointment and promotion that would build up a corps of trained officials. Too many men were sent out, and often these men were entirely unfit for the posts they were to occupy. Through a parsimony that seemed to them economy, they paid their officials salaries entirely unsuited to the conditions in which the officials lived and the temptations to illicit gain by which they were surrounded. Here again the directors did not lack representations from India of the true state of affairs, but these fell unheeded. No help in reforming the administration was granted from home through the period of the Company's history.¹

Finally, an influence appearing in the points of policy already noted but extending beyond them and pervading all parts of the Indian policy and government, the directors held up in their own persons the ideal of a selfish and momentary gain, at the expense of whatever outcome to the society which they represented. They were in their own persons enough to prevent the growth of a wholesome *esprit de corps* among their servants, and to discourage far-sighted plans of policy which could be carried out only through temporary sacrifices and through united and persistent efforts.

The directors were almost absolutely ignorant of the geography, the commercial possibilities, and the native institutions of their Eastern possessions when they began

¹ Cf. Wiese, Jonge, Opk., 13 : 52.

their rule. The early instructions to the Governor General¹ recognized the fact that the directors must depend on Indian officials to determine in detail the course of commercial and political policy. Even well into the nineteenth century this ignorance of conditions in the East characterized those at home who were supposed to control the Eastern policy, and led to the same result, the decision by the Indian officials of most of the questions that they had to face. The colonial history of the Dutch was made in Java, not at home. The most important feature in the development of Dutch policy, that by which the Company was diverted from commerce to war and government, was effected, as has been stated above, not only without directions from home but against the active protests of the directors. The language used by the Governor General to the directors in the early and formative period of the Company's policy is remarkable for the outspoken way in which the directors were criticised for what was regarded as mischievous interference on their part. Coen wrote to them in 1619,² "I swear to you by the Almighty that the Company has no enemies who do so much to hurt and hinder it, as the ignorance and thoughtlessness (do not take it ill of me) which obtains among Your Honors, and silences the voice of the reasonable." A score of years later Governor General van Diemen answered a criticism of his policy by the following: "We have said, and we repeat, that affairs in India must be left to us, and that we cannot await orders about them if we are to do the Company's service. Your

¹ Cf. Mijer, *Verzam.*, Instr. voor Both, art. 8, p. 7, art. 21, p. 13; "Instruktie voor Geraerdts Reijnst," *Tijd. TLV.*, 1853, vol. I, art. 8 ff., p. 132, art. 20, p. 141.

² *Opk.*, 4: 133. I translate freely.

Honors know the reason, namely that the times will not suffer it.”¹ The Governors General of the later period were generally of less force than those two whom I have cited, and on that account would be less apt to assume a similar attitude of independence in their official communications, but they had, too, no occasion to claim what had been tacitly granted to them. The reports made to the directors by the Governor General in the eighteenth century are very full as a rule, but they tell what the government has already done and do not ask what it may do. The replies from the Netherlands review the subject of the reports and give in reference to them the opinion of the directors, more or less grounded, but they seldom disallow or positively direct any action, unless it be in connection with the monopoly or the expenditure of money. The whole burden of their letters is: make more money for us, in whatever way you can.

In India, therefore, is to be sought that part of the government of the East India Company that was most influential in directing policy, and India was the seat of the administration, on whose efficiency the final success of any policy must depend. At the head of the Indian government was the Governor General. I have already referred to the conditions which made necessary the appointment of such an official. It is sufficient here to

¹ 1641. Jonge, *Opk.*, 5: 249. Schiff, *Kol. op Java, Tijd. TLV.*, 1869, p. 124, notes that the directors made Coen, Van Diemen, and Maetsuyker Governors General, in spite of the fact that they all were known to be opposed to the monopoly features of the Company's policy. He thinks it was due to the fact that the directors always regarded the Company's system of monopoly as abnormal, and that they were feeling for a change. It is hard to believe this in view of the attitude which the directors took toward attempts to reform the monopoly; they would suffer anything from a Governor General but an attack on that.

notice that according to the original theory he was simply to be the president of a council which was to be the real governing body, but that the whole tendency of the situation of the Dutch in Java was to bring about a monarchical form of government, and the Governor General soon obtained a position above his councillors. Valentijn could write of him early in the eighteenth century, "the power of this lord comes very close to that of a king or the monarch of an empire." It would be easy to make out a list of his functions from the last Instructions, those of 1650, but to do this would obscure the fact that the Governor General was practically limited in his powers only by the difficulty of executing them at any distance, and the danger of being recalled. The directors attempted sometimes to control the Governor General by special commissioners whom they sent out, but in general he could manage to do as he pleased.

The council varied considerably in its composition and its members from time to time. For a considerable period it retained some important powers, among them the right of electing a successor to the Governor General in the event of his death, and until the directors should signify their pleasure. The practical influence of the Council declined, however, very rapidly. It can be measured by the fact that a Governor General, who owed his election to it (Camphuijs, 1684-1691), on the occasion of a conflict as to the right to appoint a subordinate official, simply bade the councillors good day, and ruled for two years entirely without them.¹ The councillors were in

¹ Kalf, "Van Ambachtsman tot Gouverneur-Generaal," *Ind. Gids*, 1894, 1: 334. It is said that Camphuijs got his position because he was the most unpopular member of the Council, and the least likely candidate.

general creatures of the Governor General, employed in executive business at Batavia, or sometimes sent out as governors of outlying islands. Under Governor and Council were naturally a great number of subordinate officials for the different branches of the service, many of them with functions that were at first purely commercial, as is indicated by the titles, upper-merchant, merchant, under-merchant, book-keeper, clerk.

It is hard to disassociate the office from the man who holds it, and to criticise the scheme of administration without touching on the character of officials. So far as practicable, however, I shall reserve the criticism of the personnel of the Indian administration for discussion later, and speak here of evils arising partly at least from faults in the scheme of organization itself. The great powers vested in the Governor General were probably necessary for the efficient conduct of government, but they made the office more important than the Dutch could afford to have it. The Governor General held office, in the period of the Company, for a term that would average less than six years ; the frequent changes led to vacillations in the policy pursued, and there was always the danger that a weak man would get the place and undo the work of his predecessors.¹ On the other hand the powers of the Governor General were in one way not great enough. The government of the northeast coast, including in the eighteenth century all central and eastern Java, and

The other councillors were suspicious of each other's ambitions, and enough voted for him to give him the place. He had been confirmed by the Seventeen before the incident referred to in the text. Cf. Meinsma, 1 : 105.

¹ Cf. M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 1 : 197.

comprising thirty-six regencies, was intrusted to a governor who was a more important official in the eyes of most of the natives than the Governor General himself. Subject in theory to the Governor General, and reporting to him, he took on occasion the position of an independent ruler, and it was difficult for either Governor General or directors to hold him to account.¹

The conflicts which mark the history of the Indian administration were not peculiar to Dutch India; still they must be ascribed in part at least to imperfections in the distribution of authority there. Early instructions refer to the "harmful jealousies and dangerous contentions" which the home government never could prevent. The arrangement by which the Council filled a vacancy in the governor-generalship seems to have tended naturally to intrigues and quarrels.² There was frequent strife between the Governor General and the Director General, who was in especial charge of commercial operations, and the line

¹ M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 2: 229, 281; *Jonge, Opk.*, 12: xvi; 13: cix (introductions by Deventer); Veth, *Java*, 2: 330; P. J. Mijer, "Mr. Pieter Gerardus van Overstraten," *TNI.*, 1840, 3: 1: 208.

² After the death of Governor General van Diemen, in 1645, the jealousies in the Council brought a series of charges and counter-charges to the attention of the directors, and incited the Director General van der Lijn to flog the Councillor of India Sweers and his mistress in Sweers's house. See *Jonge, Opk.*, 5: 267 ff.; Leupe, "S. Sweers," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1873, 3: 8: 40. Both Van der Lijn and Sweers were thieves, it is said. In the eighteenth century Valckenier, the worst of the whole line of Governors General, arrested and packed off to the Netherlands three of his councillors whom he suspected of plotting against him. One of the three was appointed Governor General by the directors before they had heard of the trouble. See Leupe, in *Bijd. TLV.*, 1858, 2: 2: 361-370. A letter of Valckenier defending himself (in *Opk.*, 9: 341 ff.) is a most remarkable literary specimen; it is divided, without rhyme or reason, into 1120 sections.

between the executive and judicial authority was so vague that conflict was inevitable.¹

A danger still greater than conflicts between officials was that of too close alliance between them. Two cases in which the families of the Governor General and the Director General were united by marriage relations led to such results that the directors voted that no relationship of first or second degree might exist between these important officials. In the period just before the fall of the Company Java was governed for nearly twenty years by a ring of officials, united by self-interest and family alliances.²

It would be unreasonable to expect in the time and place of the East India Company's rule such a good administration as is found in a modern state, but the weakness and corruption natural to an early Indian administration were aggravated many fold, unnecessarily, by the refusal of the directors to allow proper salaries. From the beginning of the Dutch rule in India the directors showed a nervous anxiety to prevent their commercial profits from being eaten up by the expenses of administration, and thought to reach their end by setting low salaries and resisting all requests to raise them.³ The Governor General, who ruled with an authority unknown to a Dutch prince over an empire that made the Netherlands seem insignificant in comparison, was given, to support his state, a salary

¹ De Reus, NOC., 97. N. P. van den Berg, "Een Conflict tusschen de regeering en den Raad van Justitie, 1795," *Tijd. TLV.*, 1884, 29 : 229 f., esp. 332.

² De Reus, xli ; Kalf, "Van weesjongen tot Raad van Indie," *Ind. Gids*, 1894, 2 : 1791.

³ Cf. Instructions of 1617 ; three pages are taken up in Van der Chijs's edition of the *Plakaatboek* by restrictions on the raising of salaries.

of 1200 florins a month, and this sum was never increased from the time that it was set in 1624. Other officials were paid in proportion. I will select some examples from the list printed by De Reus,¹ giving the monthly salaries in gulden paid in 1720 : councillors, 350 ; receiver general, 130 ; upper-merchants, 130 ; merchants, 60 ; under-merchants, 40 ; book-keepers, 30 ; assistants, 10 to 24. To these salaries, however, should be added allowances for the higher officials, which amounted to about one-fourth of the salary at the end of the seventeenth century, and rations of various kinds. Pensions were not established until after the middle of the eighteenth century.² On the other hand only one-half of the salaries was paid to officials during their service in India ; the remainder was due only on the expiration of the term for which the official had engaged to serve. As a result the commissioners sent out to examine conditions in India before the fall of the Company reported that there were very few offices in India whose occupants could exist on the legal income,³ and this state of affairs had existed through the whole period of the Company.

It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the Company's service offered few attractions to men of ability and integrity, who saw before them the chance of a successful career

¹ NOC., 234 ff.

² De Reus, NOC., 95. In 1632 it was the practice, apparently, to give to the widows of the Company's servants in Batavia half the monthly ration of their dead husbands, but this allowance was probably only temporary, and amounted to very little in the aggregate. Instructions, 1632, Art. 21 ; Mijer, 54.

³ Rapport, 1795, Jonge, Opk., 12 : 353. Coen (Stukken, 70, Advys 1623) urged that as little cash as possible should be paid in salaries, but that the Company should pay its servants in truck ; I cannot say to what extent this proposal was carried out.

at home. The Company showed few scruples in recruiting its officials. It took boys who ought to have been at school, men from the poorer callings who welcomed a change because they could not lose by it, and outcasts from the middle and upper classes of society. Reviewing the list of Governors General, it appears that these officials, the highest in the Indian government, were generally of humble origin. Three rose from the rank of common soldiers, and three others from that of "adelborst," little above it. One was originally a gunner's mate, one a sergeant, one a sailor, and another a ship's boy. Representatives of the noble and patrician classes were rare. In the highest places below the rank of Governor General we find an orphan, a foundling, a runaway student, and a charlatan, and we are assured that these examples, picked from the mass, are by no means uncommon.¹

These officials were sent out to India on the recommendations of the directors of the separate Chambers, over which the Committee of Seventeen had very little control. From the time of the first Governor General, who complained that a man given him as one of his councillors was entirely unfitted for the position, was lax in administration and given to drink;² from the time of Coen, who called Batavia "the respectable reformatory,"³ down to the end of the Company's rule, the men furnished for the Indian government offered hopelessly bad material from which to create a good administration. "Bad in Holland, good in East India" was a proverb in the eighteenth

¹ Kalff, "Van Soldaat tot Landvoogd," *Ind. Gids*, 1897, 2:1130;
"Van weesjongen," *Ind. Gids*, 1894, 2:1582.

² Governor General Both to Directors, 1614, *Opk.*, 4:8.

³ Heeres, "H. Janssen," *Ind. Gids*, 1896, 1:110.

century.¹ It is no wonder that the officials abused the powers given them, that they neglected the interests of the Company to make money for themselves in improper ways, and that they led lives as vicious in regard to private as to public morals.

In regard to the promotion of officials, so far as I have been able to learn, the directors showed more intelligence than they usually did in matters of administration. They sometimes, but rarely, sent out from the Netherlands, men who were put immediately into positions of responsibility; as a rule the men whom they appointed started as assistants, and had to make their way up through the different ranks.² Promotion seems to have depended mainly on the favor of the Indian government; appointments made by the Governor General were confirmed at home. Incidental passages in the Indian reports show that favoritism and family influence played their part in promotion, and that bitter jealousy existed between officials sometimes, but it is surprising that conditions were no worse. It is probably true that able men rose more rapidly (though not more surely) in the days of the Company than later. I will instance the careers of a few men as illustrations.

¹ Kalf, *Ind. Gids*, 1894, 2:1596. "Hollandsch slecht, Oostindisch goed." Wiese expressed in 1802 the wish that the directors would exercise more care in the choice of soldiers, especially officers, "And not, as before, count everything good enough for East India." Jonge, *Opk.* 13:55.

² From *Mijer, Verzam.*, 117 note, 240, it appears that the civil service was classified in grades at the time of the Company, but I do not know what were the practical workings of the system. To judge from a provision in the Instructions of 1650 (*ib.*, 111), forbidding arbitrary changes in the officials attached to the judicial department, the Indian government could not have been held strictly to any scheme of a classified civil service.

Coen, one of the greatest of the Dutch Governors General, lived in the early period of the Company, and had the advantage, unusual later, of beginning his career at the grade of under-merchant, in 1607. From that grade he rose to the positions of upper-merchant in 1612, president of the factories at Bantam and Jacatra in 1613, Director General in 1614, and Governor General in 1617.¹ Van Diemen was a merchant who had become bankrupt in Amsterdam, and who enlisted as a common soldier of the Company, reaching India under an assumed name. The Committee of Seventeen warned the Indian government against him in 1618, but in 1619 we find him employed as a book-keeper, 1623 upper-merchant and councillor, 1629 Director General, and 1636 Governor General.² Camphuis, referred to above as the Governor General who abolished the Council that had created him, was originally a Haarlem boy who had been sent to work for a silversmith in Amsterdam. At eighteen he got a place in the Company, probably through the personal influence of some director. His superior, Maetsuyker, who is said to have arranged a telescope so that he could observe how business was being carried on in the counting room, favored Camphuis because he would work, in contrast with the mass of the young employees, the nephews and favorites of the directors. Camphuis was advanced until he became Governor General in the peculiar way described above.³ Even in the latter part of the eighteenth century an official of industry and ability could win rapid advancement by his merit, as

¹ Lauts, Coen, *Bijd. TLV.*, 1858, 2 : 2 : 283.

² Van der Chijs, "Hoe men in de 17. Eeuw Gouverneur Generaal werd." *Tijd. TLV.*, 1885, 30 : 598 ff.

³ Kalff, "Van Ambachtsman," *Ind. Gids*, 1894, 1 : 167 ff.

is shown in the career of Governor General van der Parra.¹ Instances such as these are offset, it is true, by many others of worthless men promoted through improper influences and of good men whose careers were hurt by the personal opposition of those above them,² but this flexibility of the Indian administration in regard to the promotion of officials had still some manifest advantages over the bureaucratic organization of later times, and must be regarded as one of the more favorable features of the Company's system.

Let me review the conditions of the Indian administration. The men were gathered largely from the outcasts of European society. These men were underpaid and exposed to every temptation that was offered by the combination of a weak native organization, extraordinary opportunities in trade, and an almost complete absence of checks from home or in Java. Under these circumstances corruption was inevitable. Ambition and greed, it is said, were the ruling traits of the official class. Accounts of the life of the Company's Indian servants unite in describing it as luxurious and costly in the extreme. The Company tried in vain by sumptuary regulations that forbade the wearing of precious stones, the use of covered carriages, etc.,³ to

¹ Kalf, "Van Soldaat," *Ind. Gids*, 1897, 2 : 1131.

² As examples of this last class could be cited Van Lawick van Pabst (*Jonge, Opk.*, 13 : 269) and Dirk van Hogendorp (Kalf, "Dirk van Hogendorp," *Ind. Gids*, 1896, 1 : 434 ff.).

³ Cf. *Instructions*, 1632, art. 7, *Chijs, NIP.*, 1 : 265 ; *Reglement of 1676, Opk.*, 6 : 165. Governor General Brouwer wrote in 1633 to the directors (*Opk.*, 5 : 213) that the marriages of officials to Dutch women resulted in such an increase of wants that the officials were sure to make up in some way for their low salaries. Similar complaints, not uncommon at first, led to a general observation of the rule that officials should lead a single life in Java. The results can be imagined.

prevent the expenditure of money which it knew could not have been gained in its service. Such regulations were fruitless. Extravagance increased with the course of time, and an utterly despicable form of society grew up, in which display and sensuous enjoyment were taken to represent the European civilization they parodied.

It would take too long to describe all the means that the Company's servants employed to gain the wealth which the Company's policy in trade and administration forbade them. An idea of conditions in the seventeenth century can be gained from a letter written by an Indian councillor, who had been deposed for participation in illicit trade, and who attempted to defend himself by accusing his associates. Such evidence is not always trustworthy, but there is abundant confirmation of the truth of the general picture given. Officials were holding a plurality of offices or were drawing the Company's pay and using their time to build up their private fortunes; they were selling goods to the Company at advanced prices; they were leading a luxurious life and conniving at all kinds of corruption; silk was stolen from the Company's warehouse and naval stores were given away from the Company's storehouse.¹ Daendels, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, could give a list of ten different ways in which officials regularly made their income.² It seems possible, however, to classify the

¹ Leupe, S. Sweers, *Bijd. TLV.*, 1873, 3:8:35 ff., especially 44 ff.

² These were "morshandel," trade in the products of the country; "overwigten," for the excess of products received by government; "minwigten," excess of products, kept from producer (officials received contingents, etc., by one measure, and delivered by another); "spillagie," excessive warehouse allowance; "stille winsten," from trade in monopolized articles like rice and opium; "contributien" and "hommages," tribute levied on the people; "heerendiensten," services exacted from the people. *Staat*, p. 6.

most important of these abuses under three heads ; gains from an infraction of the Company's commercial monopoly; peculations; and gains from the abuse of political authority.

In the instructions to the first Governor General, before the Company had been in existence ten years, it was said that it had suffered severely from the action of every person in its service, in buying up the most desirable wares on his own account, and sending them home as a private venture in the Company's ships, contrary to the terms of his engagement. The Governor General was instructed most emphatically to put a stop to this "particular" trade, and must swear to carry out the Company's directions. This is only one of a series of regulations, beginning before that time and extending through all the instructions and later communications of the directors, aiming to protect the Company from the competition of its own servants. These regulations never accomplished anything; the Company was asking too much and giving too little. The directors might go to any extreme in the penalties they imposed for particular trade; they could not get their orders executed. The Committee of Seventeen passed a regulation in 1676,¹ forbidding ship captains voyaging from the Netherlands to allow any vessels to come alongside before they reached Batavia, on penalty of death or at least of public flogging and banishment. Three years later the Governor General could write that the Company's trade was being ruined by private trade, and that this was plied in the Company's ships more than in any other way.² The abuse was so natural that it became regularly established in Java, and did not

¹ Opk., 6 : 165.

² Governor General van Goens to Directors, 1679. Opk., 7 : 2, 11.

disappear until the monopoly which invited it was gone. Even preachers engaged in trade, and conditions were such, not long before the fall of the Company, that the Governor General himself advised a young official as to how he should take advantage of his opportunities in this direction.¹

The second way in which officials became rich was by stealing from the Company. Some forms of theft came in time to deserve a less harsh name, as they were so current and open that they could be regarded as legal. Such were the allowances got from the Company for the delivery and warehousing of goods collected from the natives. It is probable that officials continued, during the existence of the Company, to take advantage of the absence of checks by selling to it and buying for it goods at unnecessarily high prices.² The whole system of accounting was so weak and so loosely administered that every opportunity for peculation was given the Company's servants. In 1785, after the death of the chief cashier, a shortage of a million gulden was discovered in the Company's treasury at Batavia. There had been examinations of the accounts and cash, but these had been intrusted to the cashier's brother; nothing was done to punish any officials or to

¹ The official, Dirk van Hogendorp, reached an understanding with the captain of a ship of the Company going to Bengal, to carry some cargo for him; the captain misled Van Hogendorp, who lost on a venture in French wines, while the captain himself gained on a venture in pepper. Kalf, Dirk van Hogendorp. Ind. Gids, 1896, 1: 300.

² Maetsuyker wrote that he could not buy sugar at the prices set by the directors, and gave excuses for paying more. "Qui s'excuse, s'accuse," says Van den Berg, De Econ., 1892, 2: 507. Down to the time of Daendel there was no efficient control of the purchasing department of the Indian government, and there is no reason to suppose that officials were unnecessarily honest.

recover the losses, which were simply written off the books. Other examples of official dishonesty could be given for this last period of the Company, and it is hard to believe that they represent a condition peculiar to that time.¹

Finally, officials used the tremendous power that their position in the Company gave them to extort money from the few Europeans who were settled in Java and from the many natives. There is an anecdote of a man who inquired the meaning of the initials G. D. H. carved over a gate in the Castle at Batavia. He was told that they stood for the name of one of the Governors General. "Then I've been misinformed," replied the stranger, "for I understood that they meant 'Give up half'" (*Geeft de helft*).² Dirk van Hogendorp, who served the Company in its last years, said that officials used the Company's peculiar policy in the sugar trade to fill their own pockets. They secured, whenever they pleased, a prohibition on the export of sugar, and so depressed prices and were enabled to buy for themselves what quantities they wanted; when they had enough, they removed the prohibition, unloaded their stock, and were ready to repeat the process. "Is it then a wonder," wrote Van Hogendorp, "that some have won millions, while the Company has gone to ruin, the people have become poor, and the country is exhausted and waste?"³

The natives were naturally the chosen victims of the Dutch officials, who could squeeze from them anything in

¹ Cf. M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 2 : 322 ff.

² Kalf, "Een koloniaal hervormer," *Ind. Gids*, 1894, 1 : 960. Of a Governor General and his upper-merchant it was said, "One holds the sack and the other fills it."

³ Berg, *Suikerind.*, *De Econ.*, 1892, 2 : 620.

the guise of taxes without fear of their resistance, and without the necessity of accounting with the government. About 1730 the Commissioner for Native Affairs is said to have made an annual income of twenty thousand dollars (Dutch) by the sale of licenses to the Chinese. The governor of Soerabaya could make twenty-five thousand dollars (Dutch), more than ten times his salary, by farming out the right to conduct the trade in rice to the exclusion of competitors. The resident of Cheribon, whose salary amounted to less than a thousand gulden a year, had a net income of over a hundred thousand gulden gained from exploitation of the natives.¹

As has been said above, no serious step to improve these conditions was ever taken by the directors; and the evils continued substantially the same until the rule of Daendels, in the early part of the nineteenth century. The directors interfered in particularly flagrant cases of maladministration,² and allowed the Governor General, when he was so disposed, to effect what reforms he could without making demands on their time or money. They would never face the question of a complete reorganization of the administration. The hopelessness of looking to them for the necessary changes is evident in their sanction of the "amptgeld," a tax on officials established in the later period of the Company. This tax, laid on the officials holding the more lucrative positions, was designed to enable the Company to share in their profits, and was, of course, a complete recognition of all the abuses of the

¹ De Reus, NOC., 168 note; Kalf, Ind. Gids, 1896, 1 : 306; Veth, Java, 2 : 226-227.

² So in the dismissal of Governor General Durven and others, 1731. Opk., 9 : 168.

time and of the Company's incapacity to do away with them. In many cases the sum paid in "amptgeld" exceeded the legal salary of the officials.¹

In every branch the Company's administration was costly and inefficient. In the fiscal administration, vitally important to the welfare of the Company, methods of book-keeping were kept unchanged from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, and these methods were so poor that it was impossible to learn from the books in what points the Company was gaining and losing.² The books were kept in different ways, and with different standards of money, in the various factories, and they were not kept up to date.³ Every attempt to maintain an efficient control and audit was a failure. The books were examined not at all, or only as a matter of form; bribery of the examiner was probably common. Van Dam, who was commissioned by the directors at the end of the seventeenth century to write a history of the Company (which was afterwards locked up and kept secret), said: "Everything is in vain if the officials will not do right, nor hold themselves bound

¹ Wiese on Hogendorp's Bericht, Jonge, *Opk.*, 13:89; Governor General Daendels to Min., 1808, *ib.*, 13:321. A statement of the revenue from the Eastern districts, 1805-1806, shows that the "money paid by civil officers yearly for holding their situations" amounted to over one-fifth of the total, but of course conditions were abnormal then; the amount received for contingents seems exceptionally low. See the figures in Raffles, *Sub.*, 177.

² The Commissioners General of 1795 acknowledged that they could not tell from the Company's books what the Indian navigation, one of the greatest expenses of the Company, really cost. *Opk.*, 12:337; S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 1:4.

³ When Hartinghe became Governor of northeast Java, 1754, he found the trade books three years behind, and the army pay rolls still worse. *Mem.*, 1761; *Opk.*, 10:331. There were always many more names on the pay rolls ("mortepayen") than soldiers in the service.

by the oath which they have taken, and, especially, will not show the fidelity which they have promised. Everything must yield to the passion to fill the purse and to become rich quickly. From the beginning to now men have been working on the means to prevent this, but they have never been able to discover the necessary corrections, and nothing that they have done has had the anticipated success."¹ This might have been written with as much truth in 1800 as in 1700.

To match this example of commercial maladministration we may take as an illustration of the Company's weakness as a political body the organization and management of its army. This was reputed to be the weakest spot in the Company's organization; I have referred above to the light that is thrown on the native organization by the fact that it was conquered through such means. The pay was small, and half of it was reserved by the Company until the term of service had expired; of the remainder the soldier received only one-half in cash, and that in depreciated currency, while the rest was truck on which the Company made 75% profit. It is not surprising that men were got to serve only by impressing, or by recruiting among the most degraded class of Europeans. Discipline was so lax that common soldiers were permitted to keep mistresses and slaves, while, at the same time, they were constantly exposed to the danger of floggings and more brutal punishments. The officers received poor pay, and got promotion, not by

¹ Reus, NOC., 197; I translate somewhat freely from the German version of the Dutch original. For details in the text and further details see De Reus, Sections B. II, 2 b. and D. III, b., and Van der Kemp, "Proeve eener geschiedkundige schets over het Staatsrekeningswezen van Nederlandsch Indië," TNI., 1876, 2 : 22 ff.

seniority, but by favor. The higher organization was dangerously loose; the authority of the commander-in-chief reached but a little way from Batavia, and the troops scattered about the different provinces were under the command of governors who were sometimes merely civilians.¹

In the preceding description of the Company's administration I have taken up mainly those parts of it that had to do with the European directors and with the general organization and direction of commerce. To the European world the Company was merely a money-making corporation. To the native, however, it was a government, the most powerful of all the political forces with which he came in contact; and to complete the picture of the Company's organization it is necessary to describe those parts of it that controlled, for better or for worse, the native population.

It must be premised that the Company's government had, even at the end of its history, reached no uniformity in its application in the different parts of the island. The Company had begun as a mercantile corporation, ruling only its own servants, and had been led or forced to extend its authority through a long period. In the course of time it broke the power of the native rulers, but the amount of control that it imposed on each varied with the difficulties that he could make against complete subjugation, and with the attractions that his country offered to

¹ De Reus, 108 ff.; Louw, "Derde Jav. Successie-oorlog," 9 ff. For details of the military life see J. A. Duurkoop, "De Soldaat onder de O.I.K.," TNI, 1864, 2 : 7 ff. The army was not so bad in the seventeenth century as later, but I have thought it allowable to combine facts from different periods in this brief sketch.

commercial and political exploitation. The Company's authority, therefore, even at the end of the eighteenth century, shaded off from the centre to the periphery of its establishment. A very small proportion of the land of Java, that composing the large ports, was not only ruled but also administered by the Company's European officials. Even in the cities there were exceptions to this direct administration; the Chinese were under head-men of their own, who represented the Company's government to them. Outside the cities the Dutch gave up at once any claim to direct contact with the individual natives. Even the country directly surrounding the capital, Batavia, which was naturally the part of the island most thoroughly subjected, was ruled for the Company by native chiefs, who paid the Company for the privilege, or by private individuals who bought the land outright and received with it most of the rights of government.

The greatest part of Java was ruled for the Company under different forms of protectorate. A native ruler against whom the Company had warred lost some of his independence when he was conquered, but either he or some member of his family was ordinarily allowed still to exercise the most important functions of government which the Company was unprepared to undertake. Changes were sometimes made in the upper part of the native political organization, as those for instance by which the districts of Madoera and Soerabaya were divided into a number of parts instead of being kept as units, but there were only a few districts, around Batavia and east of it in Cheribon, where the upper organization was abolished altogether, and where the Company ruled through minor native officials. Ordinarily the

high officials of the old organization were retained, ruling as "regents" of the Company instead of as independent or vassal native kings. Their position was ordinarily hereditary. Even in the northeastern part of the island, where the Company's authority was greatest outside of Batavia, a departure was rarely made from the direct line of succession, and then only as a result of bribery of the European officials.

The powers left to the regents varied greatly, as I have said, in different parts of Java. In the northeastern, the richest part of the island, the Company kept them under a pretty close oversight; they reported regularly to European officials, and before the end of the Company had begun to give proof of the influence of European civilization on their ways of life.¹ In some of the poorer districts of the west the supervision was much less close, while Bantam and the fragments of the old state of Mataram still retained a nominal independence and are excluded from the scope of this sketch.

An idea of the position of the regents can perhaps best be given by summarizing one of the contracts or commissions that defined their powers and duties; I choose one from the northeast coast, dated 1773, and said to be an example of many similar ones.² The regent promised fealty and obedience to the Company; he was to come and give personal homage as often as was required of him, and was to hold no correspondence with any other chiefs

¹ Hartinghe, 1761, *Opk.*, 10:353; Van der Burgh, 1780, *ib.*, 11:461. Van Overstraten could speak of native officials in 1793 as being "tools" of the Europeans. *ib.*, 12:313.

² This can be found in Jonge, 11:253 ff. or Eindres., 3; Bijl. F. A list of conditions on which a regent was to rule in Madoera, 1745 (*Opk.*, 10:57 ff.) shows some variations but none of great moment.

without permission. He was to keep the peace among his own people and with his neighbors, was to rule fairly, not to levy new taxes, and not to dismiss his officials without the Company's consent. He was to do nothing of moment without the Company's permission, and was to have jurisdiction only over petty criminal cases, sending the important ones to be tried by the Company's officials. He promised to encourage agriculture, to lease no villages to Chinamen, to obey the Company's commercial regulations, and to help stop their infraction. In return for the Company's favor, finally, he promised annually to deliver at fixed prices certain quantities of rice, indigo, timber, and cotton yarn, to pay a sum of money, and to furnish horses and laborers for the Company's service.

These conditions suggest the powers that were left to the regent, but they do not tell the investigator how those powers were exercised and how successful the Company was in enforcing the conditions that it set. The remark that Governor General Mossels made¹ of conditions in the west is equally applicable to all parts of Java where the Company attempted to rule; the regents exercised as much authority as they could. The question, then, of the character of the Company's rule over the natives in Java is a question not of principle but of practice. On such a question it is impossible to generalize. One author² says that the Dutch kept their position in Java by leaving the regents alone, and sacrificing the people to them. Another,³ to refute this statement, points to the restrictions imposed on the regents and contends that

¹ Aanmerkingen, 1751, Opk., 10 : 239.

² Veth, Java, 2 : 203.

³ M. L. van Deventer, Gesch., 2 : 299 ff.

these were carried into effect sufficiently to assure the welfare of the mass of the population. He can cite a number of cases in which the Dutch interfered to protect the people from the native rulers or to improve some weak points in the native organization.¹ There were districts, if we can trust official reports, in which no interference was necessary.² It is unquestionable, however, that there were many cases in which interference was sadly needed and came late or not at all.³ The Company was disinclined to meet the political complications that were almost sure to follow when a regent was deposed, and always followed a temporizing policy. And, as will appear immediately, the Dutch could do little to remedy abuses in the native organization without interfering to remedy faults in its personnel. Everything that I have seen supports Raffles's statement, that the personal character of the regent afforded "almost the only security for the good treatment and prosperity of the cultivators."⁴

A great deal depended on the official of the Company who was intrusted with the supervision of the native governments. This official has in modern times grown into the "resident," the most important member of the territorial administration, and I shall use that title in speaking of conditions in the time of the Company, though

¹ *Gesch.*, 2: 197; four cases of a regent being deposed for extortion. *Ib.* 295, improvement of the judicial organization.

² Hartinghe, *Kort Verslag*, 1756, says that because of the good government of the regent Samarang was populous and flourishing; according to the proverb a man could carry a sack of money to Soerakarta without danger. *Opk.*, 10: 305.

³ Cf. Jonge, *Opk.*, 12: 529, with its description of a regent who was well disposed to the Company, but extravagant and an extortioner. *Ib.*, 13: 154, 155, pitiful conditions in Madoera. The list could easily be extended.

⁴ *Minute*, 1813, Sub., 260.

other titles were given to men fulfilling similar functions. The residents were by no means as numerous as the regents; one was assigned to each of the courts of the semi-independent princes, and others had each a group of regencies in the districts where the Company had established a more effective suzerainty. The resident was the political agent who kept watch of the workings of the native government, and used his influence, as representing the power of the Company, to check abuses and urge reforms.

The position was a difficult one, requiring tact and patience, and yet a certain amount of determination and insistence in dealing with the native rulers; all the possible benefits of Dutch influence could be lost by the display of too much or too little zeal. In view of the general character of the Company's servants, it will not surprise the reader to learn that good residents were the exception rather than the rule during the period of the Company's administration.¹ The resident was ordinarily a man of low origin, with all the faults and vices of his fellows, entirely incompetent to understand the native organization through which he must work, and to improve properly the opportunities it offered him. If the Governor General could bring on a useless war by lack of politeness to a noble,² it was all the more natural that the residents should lower the Dutch influence in the eyes of the natives by their disregard of native etiquette and by their personal vices.³ In spite of all regulations the residents

¹ Cf. Mem. Van Vos, 1771, Opk., 11: 171.

² K. de Reus, NOC., xxxvii.

³ The Dutch resident at Bantam, in the earliest period of the Company, was a drunkard, beat the natives, and had to be removed. Governor General Both to Directors, 1614, Opk., 4: 10, 13. Speelman wrote in

bore themselves like petty princes, parading about in four-horse chariots with drums and guns, despising the helpless natives and growing rich off them.¹ The combination of powers in the person of the resident, by which he was not only a political but a fiscal agent of the Company, intrusted with the collection of contingents and deliveries, gave him a chance for extortion which he could seldom resist. On the other hand the lack of efficient control made the powers of the resident a danger to the Dutch as well as to the natives, and there were cases in which he was more than suspected of hurting rather than aiding the interests of the government.²

The resident had to do ordinarily only with the highest native officials, and had to trust the regent to attend to the execution of the measures that he had approved. Such control of government as is implied in the direction of subordinate officials was lacking to the Company in most parts of Java. Exceptions appear in some districts,³ but not enough to require a modification of the

1677 that it was notorious that the deceased resident of Soerabaya had hurt the Company's standing with the natives by his abuses. *Opk.*, 7: 143. At the close of the Company's rule the resident of Soerakarta abused his power to oppress the people and roused the native rulers against the Dutch. *Opk.*, 12: 161.

¹ *Mem. of Hartingh*, 1761, *Opk.*, 10: 358.

² *Veth*, *Java*, 2: 210; *Opk.*, 13: 128.

³ In Krawang and in the northeast the Dutch interfered on occasion to depose subordinate officials who had misbehaved; *Opk.*, 12: 197, 313. Special native agents were sometimes maintained by the Company to watch and check the workings of the native organization, but the device did not work successfully in the period of the Company. These officials are described as men of the worst character, who took advantage of their position and were a scourge to the natives. *Mem. of Hartingh*, N. E. Coast, 1761, *Opk.*, 10: 357. Another device, that of setting one regent to watch others, was also unsatisfactory. *Mem. of Siberg*, N. E. Coast, 1787, *Opk.*, 12: 120.

general statement. In a semi-independent state like Bantam the Dutch resident had intercourse with no other people than the royal family and a half dozen of the most prominent court officials.¹

The weakness and evils of the Company's government in Java can best be discussed in relation to the system of contingents, by which it gained an important part of its revenue. It is useless to argue, as does M. L. van Deventer,² from the official statements of payments required by the Company, that the burden of these payments on the natives was light. To do that is to assume that the double administration of Dutch and natives in Java was honest, and that the people paid out no more than the Company received. The reverse was the case. At every step in the progress of forced deliveries from the producer to the Company's treasury the officials, through whose hands they passed, took toll, so that a small amount received by the Company represented an initial payment on the part of the cultivator that was often oppressive and sometimes crushing.

Dutch and native officials offended in almost equal degree. The princely income which some residents enjoyed came to them only by their exactions from the natives in defiance of the conditions which the Company had imposed. The regents were forced to give overweight and to receive under-pay; they had to give besides what was due to the Company as much again or more for the residents' private purse.³ The abuses which the regents suffered at the hands of the residents they made

¹ Mem. of Reijnouts, 1779, Opk., 11 : 378.

² Gesch., 2 : 303.

³ See the details collected in Van Soest, KS., 1 : 68, Veth, Java, 2 : 249.

up with interest on their own subordinates. It appeared on investigation in the time of Raffles that it was impossible to demand a greater contingent of rice from the common people, who had reached the limit of their ability to pay, but that the regent had a great surplus which he had exacted from them and which he retained for himself.¹ On the other hand the small pay which the government offered for the forced deliveries, and which came from the residents' hands still smaller, was diminished again or disappeared completely after it reached the regent. A large proportion of the natives received no compensation whatever for the products that they furnished; the others could consider themselves fortunate if they got half of what the government offered, and got this in cash instead of overvalued truck.² Governor General van Imhoff, who made a journey in the interior of Java in 1744, found many districts from which the people had emigrated, and he attributed their flight to the exactions of the native rulers intrusted with the collection of the products that the country was bound to deliver. The native rulers kept the government pay, and levied all kinds of contributions besides those that reached the government treasury.³

I would not be understood as saying that the forced deliveries were felt everywhere as a great burden. Nederburgh said that there were cases in which the natives paid money to the regent instead of products, and the regent

¹ Eind., 2 : Bijl. NN., 174. Cf. the figures of expenses in cultures given by Nederburgh, "Consideratien over de . . . regentschappen," Tijd. TLV., 1855, 3 : 198, 208 ; they show that the regents gained heavily.

² Cf. Opk. 11 : 19, 334, 466 ; 12 : 198.

³ "Reis van den Gouverneur Generaal in den Jakatrasche Bovenlanden," Bijl. TLV., 1863, 2 : 7 : 244.

then bought up the products which he was bound to deliver.¹ Such an arrangement appears to be so much like modern methods of business and taxation that we can assume it to have been free from very serious abuses, but we must consider it to have been exceptional in view of the reports that reach us. I shall speak later of the value to the natives of Java of the Company's rule; I believe it to have been a blessing to them. One may believe that and still emphasize the facts that the Company tended constantly to increase the demands on the native organization, that every demand was magnified many fold in passing down the ranks of officials, and that in some places the pressure came to be greater than the natives could bear.²

As the Company's system was the natural basis for the culture system of later times it is proper here to emphasize a fact that will be discussed more fully later,—the fact that any system of this kind by which a government attempts to control production is likely to be attended by loss to the people far more than offsetting the gain to the government. No special criticism can be passed on the demands the Company made for rice; it was a product that all the people raised, and in which they could pay their dues more

¹ "Consideratien," Tijds. TLV., p. 139.

² Even in a semi-independent state like Bantam the influence of the Company was felt in a quadrupling of the rice tax, and misery and ruin were ascribed to the Company's policy. J. de R. van Breugel, "Bedenkingen oven den Staat van Bantam" (1786), Bijds. TLV., 1856, 2 : 1 : 116, 145 ff.; *id.*, "Beschrijving van het koninkrijk Bantam" (1787), *ib.*, p. 319. The decline in Bantam was attributed in part to a decrease in the number of slaves who had done the work on the forced cultures. Governor General Alting to Directors, 1787, Opk., 12 : 127. For many details about the working of the contingent system I would refer to "De rijstkultuur of Java vijftig jaren geleden," Bijds. TLV., 1854, 1 : 2 : 1-117.

readily even than in money. When, however, the Company demanded the delivery of other products, in the cultivation of which the people had no experience, it imposed on them hardships entirely incommensurate with the gain it made. The cultivation and preparation of indigo were "a real torment" for the natives, and the Company made small profits from the proceeds; there was a question whether it did not lose by diverting labor from other crops.¹ The Company demanded cotton yarn of a certain grade, among other forced deliveries; the spinning caused the people an incredible amount of labor and trouble, and people who knew thought there was an actual disadvantage in having the thread of the fineness that caused this difficulty.²

The regular source of supply for pepper was Bantam and Sumatra, but the Company determined to extend its cultivation in the eastern part of Java; most of the pepper was planted on unsuitable land, some where it did not grow at all, some where only a few sickly vines grew, and some that grew high but bore no fruit.³ To get more coffee the Company spasmodically ordered an increase in the planting of the trees, but the natives took no interest in the cultivation of a crop which they did not understand, and the returns from which were deferred for a number of years if they came at all. The young trees planted were so badly cultivated that more than three-quarters of them died. The ground was only scraped, not ploughed and thoroughly cleansed from weeds, and the trees were stuck in without proper arrangement of the earth around

¹ Wiese on Hogendorp's Bericht, Opk., 13 : 75.

² Reis van Engelhardt, Opk., 13 : 209.

³ Verslag van IJsseldijk, Opk., 12 : 489.

their roots. Weeds grew up, buffalo and wild pigs broke in, and in a few months nothing was to be seen of the "plantation."¹

In the eighteenth century the Company attempted some reforms in the administration of the contingents, especially to make sure that the small pay it gave should reach the cultivator. So in 1734 the Governor General wrote to the directors² that he had decided to have the Company pay the cultivator directly for pepper in the Lampong districts (Sumatra), as the poor people were cheated by the native agents in both measure and price, and some got nothing at all for what they delivered. The regulation did some good, but the servants of the company cheated the people just as the natives had done, and brought the Company into bad repute. Van Imhoff, as the result of his journey in Central Java, ordered that Dutch officials instead of the regents should receive and pay for the rice delivered,³ and the same measure was taken in the conquered lands of the eastern extremity of the island,⁴ but the old system was adhered to in other parts of the island,⁵ and the new system was never satisfactorily carried out.

Between the Dutch legislators and the common people the native political organization stood as a bar to any

¹ Verslag Van Guitard, Opk., 12 : 198, 205. For the difficulties of the coffee culture, and the poor quality of the product see also Opk., 13 : 67 and 205. Crawford, Hist. Ind. Arch., 1 : 491 says that under forced culture a coffee tree returned one and one-quarter pounds a year, while the product of a tree even ill cared for by a private cultivator was two pounds. Forced deliveries had the same deplorable effect on the condition of the forests. Opk., 13 : 219.

² Jonge, Opk., 9 : 233.

³ Governor General to Directors, 1747, Opk., 10 : 106.

⁴ Jonge, Opk., 11 : lxii.

⁵ Cf. Memorie of Mom, Resident of Cheribon, 1778, Opk., 11 : 330.

effectual improvement. In so far as the Company was willing to extend its own administration, it could hope for at least a partial fulfilment of its commands, but the charges of the administration increased in geometrical progression as the Company sent its officials deeper into the ranks of the natives, and the trading company grudged the money that was taken from its profits. It left the Javanese, therefore, to their native rulers, on the pretence of favoring them by allowing them to keep to their own laws and customs, but with the real motive of self-interest. The most enlightened among the Dutch officials saw the evils of this course, and realized that no lasting reform in the Company's political system was possible without a reform in the conditions of native government.¹ One of the officials who made himself prominent by his proposals of reform in the last days of the Company conducted an investigation into the workings of the native government with the idea of repressing its abuses. He found, however, that his work was one of almost inconceivable difficulty, "since there is not a district here in Java, not even a village, which is ruled like the others, as everything with the Javanese is based on *adats* or customs, which are often as uncertain as they are oppressive."² Without the support from those above him, the best of the Company's officials might well hesitate to begin a task to which there seemed no end,— which, indeed, the Dutch have not yet completed. Furthermore, in the only period when plans

¹ Cf. Kort Begrip of Van Imhoff, 1746, *Jonge, Opk.*, 10:96; Van Overstraten to Governor General, 1792, *Opk.*, 12:291. Dirk van Hogendorp called the system "very faulty, unhappy in its effect on land and people, and harmful to the sovereign himself"; he demanded a break from "feudalism." Schets, *Eindres.*, 2, *Bijl. LL.*, 152.

² Van Overstraten to Governor General, 1796, *Opk.*, 12:408.

of a general reform were seriously considered by the Company's officials, the Company itself was already tottering, and Java was threatened by foreign enemies, while for the successful execution of such plans as were proposed a period of peace and prosperity seemed essential.¹ The period of the Company closes therefore with its system still unchanged.²

In the way of positive contributions to the welfare of its subjects in Java the East India Company did practically nothing. There was no lack of directions from home to treat the natives well, but there was no support in the carrying out of these directions, which were really irreconcilable with the Company's system. Beside the directions which the directors sent their officials, it is instructive to place the prayer to their God which they made at every assembly, asking him to bless the financial affairs of the Company, but saying not a word about the natives.³ There can be no doubt as to which interest they really had at heart. So in the matter of religion and instruction, they bade every councillor to make an annual report on trade and war and especially (!) on the extension of Christianity and schools,⁴ but they were forced only by popular pressure in the Netherlands to take some positive action.⁵ They sent out a few ministers and teachers under strict control, but the amount these

¹ Verslag of Van IJsseldijk, 1799, Opk., 12 : 549.

² Reforms had been attempted in matters of detail in the eighteenth century, but they were not lasting. Such were Van Imhoff's abolition of the interior transit duties in Mataram (Veth, Java, 2 : 164 : M. L. van Deventer, Gesch., 2 : 131) and R. de Klerk's proclamation abolishing forced services (Opk., 11 : 337 ff., Eind., 3 : Bijl. E, 123).

³ Klerk de Reus, NOC., 167.

⁴ Chijs, NIP., 1 : 38, Instr. 1617, Art. 32 ; Mijer, Verz., 33.

⁵ Van Rees, KP., 241 ff.

accomplished was inconsiderable.¹ So small was the amount of culture received by Java from the Netherlands that the Dutch themselves degenerated; they and their children spoke Malay and Portuguese to the exclusion of their own tongue.² Where the Dutch got little, the natives got practically nothing; a commission which reported in 1803 said that the natives, after two hundred years' intercourse with Europeans, had made "a few steps forward,"³ but the reader wonders what basis there is even for this mild assertion.

It is impossible to study the history of the Dutch East India Company without being impressed with the truth of what Adam Smith has said of the inconsistency of the functions of merchant and sovereign united in the same corporation. I have suggested already the evils that arose from the twofold nature of the Company, and shall return later to the discussion of this general topic; it is sufficient here to note that from the earliest days of the Company and throughout its history, the true cause of its poor government was recognized.⁴ Van Mossel in his memorial of 1753⁵ clearly saw the opposition between the

¹ In 1810 Daendels found but six ministers in all of the Dutch East Indies. Opk., 13:448. For the small number of Christian natives see M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 2:265.

² M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 2:259 ff.; Kalf, "Van Soldaat tot Landvoogd," *Ind. Gids*, 1897, 2:1134. The corruptions in spelling and grammar that appear in the reports of Dutch officials testify to their scanty education.

³ *Mijer, Verzam.*, 131.

⁴ Cf. Van Rees, 114, 161, with extracts from Usselincx and from a pamphlet of 1622. Pieter van Hoorn, in his "Praeparatoire Consideration," 1675, attempted to prove to the Indian and home governments that colonies were better ruled by "distinguished and generous powers" than by merchants seeking always a momentary gain. *Jonge, Opk.*, 6:133.

⁵ *Jonge, Opk.*, 10:213, 216.

Company's interests as merchant and as sovereign, and saw also that this division in the very being of the Company was a constant threat to its prosperity. The relief which he suggested was, however, only a palliative for the evil, and neither this nor any other improvement was acceptable to the directors. The statement of Raffles¹ that the Dutch "always have contemplated the prosperity of the Eastern tribes with the invidious regret of a rival shopkeeper, and regarded their progress in civilization with the jealousy of a timorous despot," was written in 1811, before he landed in Java, but it testifies to the knowledge that he already had of the policy pursued by the Dutch, and is confirmed by abundant evidence from the Dutch themselves.² It is true, as Veth³ says, that the Company was greedy rather than cruel; it did not oppress the natives by design. Oppression was, however, the necessary result of a system which made present gain its only goal, and prohibited the expenditure of money on any object from which direct and immediate returns could not be foreseen.

To the citizen of a modern state the Company's system, by which it used the native officials as taskmasters to supply its constantly increasing demands and left the mass of the population almost helpless under the abuses of these officials, must seem entirely reprehensible. Was not the Company simply a bloodsucker, a worthless parasite on the native organization? This is the view

¹ Mem., 76.

² The fear expressed by the directors, in the extract in De Reus, NOC., 228, that the Javanese might become rich, is found not once but many times in their instructions. It is a parallel to the opinion of a Javanese prince that if the natives had more than the necessaries of life, they would use the surplus to do some harm to their rulers. IJsseldijk, *Bedenkingen*, 1800, Eindr. 2, Bijl. MM., p. 162.

³ Java, 2 : 250.

taken by some students, who find not a single ground to extenuate the Company's existence in Java.¹ This view is imperfect; it does not see past the swarm of abuses which made up the Company's rule to one great benefit which was in itself enough to compensate for everything. This benefit was peace.² The Company would tolerate pretty nearly everything in the way of direct oppression, but the instinct of self-preservation forbade it to tolerate useless wars. These wars had been the greatest curse of the native organization, and the end of them was not in sight when the Dutch arrived. A great empire which had been built up by the wars was falling by more wars, because it represented no real advance in the native civilization and ruled only through the sword. The Dutch did little, truly, to diminish war as they extended the lines of their political influence, but within those lines they maintained a peace that had not been dreamed of before.

I would not lay great stress on such statements as that made by a Dutch governor in 1792,³ that the natives preferred to live in the districts more immediately subject to the Dutch rather than under the more independent native governments. This was doubtless true under certain conditions, but it is offset by the fact that the natives were constantly emigrating from the Dutch districts to escape the oppressions which they suffered there.⁴ As

¹ So Pierson, KP., 5.

² Cf. Veth, Java, 2:239; M. L. van Deventer, Gesch., 2:193. Van Deventer, however, seems to me to confuse the prosperity of the people and the prosperity of the Company, two very different things.

³ Van Overstraten to Governor General, Jonge, Opk., 12:295.

⁴ I have referred above to the emigrations caused by the demands for contingents; they were not at all uncommon. The Company's policy of

has been shown above, the Dutch did little to remedy some of the worst abuses of the native government and even intensified them sometimes.

In spite of all, taking Dutch and native Java together, there was an improvement in the condition of the natives in the latter part of the eighteenth century. This improvement, which can be attributed to no other influence than that of the Dutch, is proved by the great increase in population. Raffles had no love for his predecessors, and he knew that they had in some districts kept down population by their exactions, but he was forced to admit that under them the population as a whole had grown greatly before his arrival.¹ In the period before 1755 wars, with their disastrous effects on population and production, had been almost constant. The Dutch were partly responsible for these wars but not wholly; the natives would have fought about as bitterly without them. In the period of peace that followed the population increased in nearly all the great sections of the island and in some parts of it doubled.² A change of this kind does not imply necessarily the highest kind of progress or an absence of all abuses. It does not absolve the Company

recruiting soldiers led to a general emigration from Madoera. Cf. Reis van Engelhardt, 1803, *Opk.*, 13: 153. The eastern part of Java, which on the whole owed all its prosperity to the Company, was hurt toward the close of the century by the frequent demands for military service and showed a decline in population, *Opk.*, 13: 194. All the evidence which I have seen supports Van der Lith, *De Gids*, 1888, 3: 369, in his contention that M. L. van Deventer goes too far in his estimate of the positive benefits conferred by the Company.

¹ *Hist.*, 1: 70 ff.

² For figures and details see M. L. van Deventer, *Gesch.*, 2: 232, 307; De Jonge, *Opk.*, 12: 296, 532; 13: 95, 99, 181. Crawford thought that the population tripled from 1740 to 1810; *Hist. Ind. Arch.*, 2: 430.

for all it did and all it left undone. If, however, we judge the Dutch East India Company, not by the European standard, but by the low standard of primitive political organization, this one fact, the growth of the native population, seems to me to justify its existence as a government.

CHAPTER IV

JAVA AFTER THE FALL OF THE COMPANY

[NOTE. — The collection of De Jonge has been continued, covering the history down to 1820, by M. L. van Deventer ; elaborate introductions by the editor furnish valuable summary and criticism. For the reorganization by the Dutch State after the fall of the Company, the writings of Dirk van Hogendorp, and the report and charter of 1803, in Mijer's "Verzameling," are important.

The chief sources for the period of British rule, beside those contained in the continuation of De Jonge, are the "Memoirs" of Raffles, consisting largely of extracts from his letters, of which the edition of 1830, in one volume, is preferable, and the documents collected in Raffles's "Substance of a Minute." S. van Deventer's "Bijdragen tot de Kennis van het Landelijk Stelsel" contains some material on the period of British rule, and is one of the chief sources for the period of the Dutch restoration. Elout's "Bijdragen" supplements this in some points.

The best secondary authority on the British period is Norman. H. E. Egerton, "Sir Stamford Raffles," London, 1900, is less full and less accurate. Three chapters of Pierson's "Koloniale Politiek," are given to the history of Java, from Raffles to the introduction of the culture system ; this book can be heartily recommended as an introduction to the study of Dutch policy.]

IT is hard to imagine a sharper contrast than that shown by the history of Java during the two centuries of the Company's rule and during the century which has succeeded. The peculiar powers given to the Company were exercised with an exclusiveness and a secrecy that protected it from the forces making toward progress in the world about it, and kept it encysted, as it were, in the developing life of the times. The Company's rule was marked by an obstinate adherence to old forms of policy

and administration which did not preclude all change, but which made change when it did come so gradual as to be barely noticeable. The decline of the Company was slow, and its fall was itself not a sharp break, but a succession of changes in which the Company's powers passed piecemeal to the State.

Java was brought thus first into contact with the public life of Europe at the very period when the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon were causing there the most violent changes. The Dutch government which assumed control of the East Indies was no longer that of the Princes of Orange but that of the Batavian Republic, and the Governor General who first brought to Java the new spirit of the times addressed his despatches to the minister of King Louis Napoleon or to the great Emperor himself. United with France by the fortunes of war and politics in Europe, the Dutch colonies were exposed defenceless to Great Britain, and among the last of the British conquests was that of Java. For five years the island was ruled as a dependency of British India by an Englishman, Raffles, who attempted in that brief interval to effect changes in the governing system that amounted to a revolution. His work was scarcely more than begun, when the island was transferred again to the Dutch; but enough had been accomplished to serve as an incitement to further change, and to prevent a complete reversion to the old system. During the first period of the Dutch restoration Java was managed on a mixed system in which the traditional methods of the East India Company were employed to exploit it for the benefit of the crown. Then followed the culture system. The revolutionary movement of 1848 in Europe brought Java for the first time under the con-

trol of the representatives of the Dutch people, and the result has been to stimulate changes so extensive that the sum of them in the last fifty years counts for more than the total development of the preceding time.

While it seemed proper, in the brief compass of this book, to treat the period of the East India Company as a unit, and to discuss the different features of the Company's policy and administration under a topical arrangement, a similar method is clearly inapplicable to the history of Java in the nineteenth century, and a division into periods is necessary. I shall discuss first the principles adopted by the Dutch State after the abolition of the Company, and the application of these principles in Java down to the time of the British conquest.

On one point there was general agreement among the Dutch. The object of every policy suggested was the welfare of the Netherlands. Individuals advocated changes in one point or another of the system that the Company had pursued, and demanded reforms of the various abuses which the Javanese had suffered under the old system, but they based all claims for change on the interests of the Dutch themselves. Amelioration of the condition of the natives, wrote one of the representatives of the reform party, "though undoubtedly a consideration of the highest moment in the eyes of humanity, seems to me to become only a secondary object in a political point of view; and, with the exception of every measure contrary to the principles of justice and equity, it appears to me that the safest principle which can be adopted, to judge of the propriety of any colonial regulations, or of any changes and alterations to be introduced therein, is, that every colony does or ought to exist for the benefit of the

mother-country."¹ There appears, however, in the discussions of the times a broader and clearer judgment of what the Dutch interests were, and an appreciation of the fact that they could never really diverge from the interests of the subject people. A new element, that of permanence, had been introduced into the relations between Dutch and natives by the substitution of the Dutch State for the Company. No corporation, not even one so powerful and long-lived as the Dutch East India Company, can look ahead as does a government which expects to endure as long as the people that made it. The Company had sinned constantly by its devotion to momentary gains, at the expense of the welfare of the people and the permanence of its own prosperity. The principle of solidarity of interests was now explicitly recognized, and what we should call departures from its application were all excused on one pretext or another.²

It was one thing, however, to unite on certain general principles of action, and another to decide how they should be carried out in concrete form. The government was faced by the peculiar union of commercial and political functions

¹ Raffles, Sub., 280, Minute of Muntinghe, 1813; he expressed the same idea in his report of 1817; S. van Deventer, LS., 1:284. I find substantially the same idea expressed in the Report of the Commission of 1803, which fixed the Dutch policy, and even in the proposals of the two Hogendorps, who represent the extreme reform element before 1800.

² Cf. Consideration of Wiese, 1802, Opk., 13:52, urging the government to establish a political system that could be permanent by making the interests and duties of officials coincide. Muntinghe, Report, 1817, S. van Deventer, LS., 1:334, emphasized the necessity of adopting a system that would be suited to Java when the population had increased two or three fold. Recognition of the union of interests of Dutch and natives appears often in the important report and charter of 1803, though the report advocated a policy which was destined in the long run to cause the natives to be exploited by their rulers.

in the Company, and found its great difficulty in deciding what attitude it should take toward this combination. During the time of the Company's decline, from 1780 on, the general feeling was that it must be maintained at any cost, certainly that the trade monopoly which it enjoyed must be continued; there was no thought of throwing the trade open to individuals.¹ Should the government now itself exercise this trade monopoly as the Company had done, or should it maintain the monopoly in favor of another Company erected on the ruins of the old one? Should it continue the Company's political system, based on government through the native organization and on contingents, or should it, freed entirely from commercial considerations, cease to demand the delivery of specified articles, break away from its dependence on native rulers, and assume the direct government of the mass of the people? The conflict between the different functions of the Company had long been realized by enlightened officials, and was recognized at this time even by those who proposed that the state should continue the Company's system; I find the best expression of it, however, in the report of a Dutch official, Muntinghe, a few years later, and use that as a basis for a general discussion of the question.²

Muntinghe distinguished two systems, one of trade (*stelsel van handel*), one of taxation (*stelsel van belasting*). The system of trade was essentially that of the East India Company, in which the sovereign was also a merchant, and the government was ruled by a spirit of commer-

¹ Colenbrander, Frankrijk, De Gids, 1899, 1:459. He says that in all the literature of the period there was scarcely an opinion to the contrary. Cf. Frank, Ind. Gids, 1888, 2:1856.

² Rapport van Mr. H. W. Muntinghe, 1817, S. van Deventer, LS., 1:282-283.

cialism, the only object of the Company being to secure certain wares for the European market. It required the delivery of products at less than the market price and could get these only by forced labor ; to secure the requisite amount of labor it had to work through the native organization, maintaining the regents in their authority, and permitting them to abuse the people at will. Under such an arrangement a regular government and a regular system of taxation, assuring the liberty of persons and the security of property, were impossible.

A system of taxation, on the other hand, was to Muntinghe one in which the government considered the welfare of the people as the prime condition of its existence, sought to further their welfare by giving them the greatest freedom in the use of their time for cultivation and in the disposal of their products, and protected them from every abuse of person and property by their native rulers. The government then would share in the prosperity of the natives by the imposition of just taxes which they would easily be able to pay.

In the choice between these two systems as they are thus presented, there seems little reason for hesitation. The system of taxation harmonizes so thoroughly with modern ideas, and with the lessons that can be read from the history of our political progress that it seems the only course for the Dutch government to follow. The English East India Company had, moreover, during the last half of the eighteenth century, made very rapid approaches to this system. Though it is clear that the English Company had a system something like that of the Dutch contingents,¹

¹ Compare the description by Hunter, "Annals of Rural Bengal," second ed., N.Y., 1868, 352, of the weaving villages ; it appears from other passages that the labor in these villages was forced.

revenue from this source seems never to have been a very important item in their receipts. They made most of their income, after the grant of the dewanee, from the native taxes, which they collected at first through native officials, but which they had begun to reform and to administer themselves before the end of the century. The Dutch knew of these changes and had an idea of the profit that the British had made by them.¹

The man who did most to rouse public discussion on the question of reorganization and to direct attention to the advantages of the tax system was a former servant of the Company, Dirk van Hogendorp. A younger brother, G. K. van Hogendorp, had as early as 1795 published a memorial urging reform in the colonial systems in both East and West Indies, and remarkable for the bold proposal that the State should maintain only the exclusive right to trade, and should give up most of its governing functions. The argument was that the main benefit from a colony was its trade, and that trade would be greatest when the colony was most free from interference; a free man works more than a slave, he produces more and consumes more, and therefore freedom would stimulate commerce. Consequently G. K. van Hogendorp maintained that the government would do best to give up its extensive territorial possessions in the East Indies, with its restrictive political system, and maintain there only staple ports with forts and warehouses.² We may ascribe these proposals

¹ Muntinghe says that after the impossibility of reforming the Dutch Company on the old plan of monopoly was apparent (1796), "the institutions of British India . . . were generally held out as a model for the future regulations of Java." *Minute*, 1813, *Raffles*, Sub., 282.

² Kalf, "G. K. van Hogendorp," *Ind. Gids*, 1886, 2: 1779 ff. "Java for the Javanese," says Kalf, who draws attention to the fact that Raffles had the same revolutionary ideas before he had the responsibility of ruling Java.

of G. K. van Hogendorp, who had no practical knowledge of the colonial question, to the influence of the political ideas of the French Revolution ; they received no serious consideration.

With the older brother, Dirk van Hogendorp, the case was different. He had gone out to Java in 1784 and had been in the military and civil service of the Company for nearly fifteen years, holding the office of resident both on the continent and in Java. He had risen to the position of Governor of the eastern extremity of Java, when his vigorous ideas on the abuses of the Company's system and the need of reforming it involved him in trouble with the government ; he was arrested, escaped to British India, and returned to the Netherlands. On the return voyage he wrote a "Report on the Present Condition of the Bata-vian Possessions," which was published at the end of 1799, and which caused, it is said, more excitement at home than was roused by the appearance of "Max Havelaar" in the period of the culture system.¹ There is a question as to the influence that Van Hogendorp had in fixing the policy adopted by the government in the charter of 1803, but there can be no question as to his importance in stimulating the discussion that led up to the charter.² He presented facts, hitherto concealed, about the workings of the Company's system in Java, and proposed in substi-

¹ Frank, "Dirk van Hogendorp," *Ind. Gids*, 1888, 2 : 1688. For the facts cited see this article and Sillem, "Dirk van Hogendorp."

² Frank, *l.c.*, pp. 1689, 1864, and Sillem, 347 ff., 361, are inclined to magnify the influence of Dirk van Hogendorp. Grashuis, "Het Charter van Nederburgh," *Ind. Gids*, 1897, 2 : 1253 ff., gives most of the credit for the charter to Nederburgh, though he admits that some of Van Hogendorp's ideas are embodied in it. His view, that Van Hogendorp was rather an agitator than a legislator, seems a fair one.

tution for it a new system which he could defend by arguments drawn from his own experience in Java and in continental India.¹

Van Hogendorp found the great weakness of the Company's system to be the way in which the Company exercised its governing functions. In a previous chapter I have quoted his description of the "feudal" system by which contingents were raised. The result of this system was such oppression of the mass of the people that they could be said to have no rights of person or property and no interest in improving their position. Neither Company nor State could hope to make a success of the possession of Java until it had remedied this condition of affairs. "Self-interest is the only motive which can stimulate a man to activity, and since the Javanese has and can have no interest in working and cultivating the land more than he has to for the necessities of his existence, Java will never attain to the prosperity which its fertility would otherwise admit, unless some means be found to interest the Javanese in agriculture."

"In my opinion the best means to this end would be to transfer the lands to the common people, in property or on hereditary lease, as the English have tried to do in Bengal with great success, and to abolish all forced ser-

¹ The original text of the "Berigt" came into my hands too late to allow me to use it for citation. The same ideas, however, are found in the "Schets of Proeve oven den tegenwoordigen staat van Java, en ontwerp tot verbetering van dies bestier," written presumably in 1799 and published in Eind., 2: Bijl. LL., pp. 152 ff., and in the "Nadere Uitlegging," published in 1802, in answer to an attack by Nederburgh on the report. I cannot enter into all the details of Hogendorp's proposals; they can be found summarized in Wiese's report, 1802, Jonge, Opk., 13:45, 110. The summary which I give in the text is taken from the "Schets."

vices. The regents, with their families and followers, would lose most by this, but *Salus Populi Suprema Lex*; the general welfare must be preferred to the interest of a few. We can, however, provide a fair compensation for the regents by setting aside for them annually from the general taxes a fixed money salary and some measures of rice for their maintenance.”

“ We should then be able to introduce a general tax in kind on the land and a poll-tax on persons. On the other hand the people would be permanently freed from all forced services, personal and official.”

To support his plan Hogendorp could point in Java to the districts that had been farmed out to the Chinese.¹ When these people had acted as tax-farmers on a small scale for the native rulers, they had been guilty of the worst extortions, and had caused the ruin of the villages which had been put in their hands. When, however, as was the case in some parts of East Java, they had been given considerable districts, which they held for a long time and in which they were practically regents, they found their interests to coincide with a reform of the native institutions rather than an abuse of them. They acted like sensible capitalists on business principles; they freed the people from arbitrary demands on their time, paying them for whatever services were asked, and required from them only a certain proportion of their crops. The proportion might seem high, but it was fixed, and as long as the people paid it they were secure in the enjoyment of the surplus, and were granted even the right to hereditary transmission of the land. The result had been to attract people from all the surrounding coun-

¹ Nad. Uitl., 57-58; Schets, 153.

try, so that these districts were the most thickly populated and the best cultivated in Java.¹ Van Hogendorp thought that by extending a similar policy to all Java, it would be possible to get by a tax perhaps one-tenth of the crop, more than the Company was then securing by means vastly more burdensome to the people.²

To enable the natives to meet their taxes they were to be granted greater freedom of cultivation and trade, though the commercial system which Van Hogendorp advocated was, in regard to external commerce, far from deserving the title of "free trade" that he gave it. The State was not to conduct the trade between Java and the Netherlands as formerly, but was to allow this to be carried on by Dutch merchants, and, under special restrictions, even by the citizens of other nations. Trade with China and Japan was not, however, to be thrown open, the spice trade was still to be kept a strict government monopoly, and, a provision curiously inconsistent with the general tendency of the reform, the forced deliveries were to be maintained.³

This plan of Dirk van Hogendorp, if we exclude some of its inconsistencies and restrictive provisions, represents pretty exactly the platform of the liberal political element

¹ Van Overstraten to Governor General, 1793, *Opk.*, 12 : 315 ; *Verslag van IJsseldijk*, 1799, *ib.*, 12 : 548 ; *Reis van Engelhardt* (with fullest details), 1803, *ib.*, 13 : 182 ff. ; Hopkins's Report (permanence of tenure), 1814, *Raffles*, Sub., 103. A general discussion of the Chinese districts can be found in *M. L. van Deventer*, 2 : 297 ff. ; *Veth, Java*, 2 : 239 ff. The history of the Chinese districts seems to me an extremely suggestive example of the benefit that the application of intelligent self-interest, apart from any humanitarian motives, can sometimes confer on a corrupt political organization.

² *Nad. Uitl.*, 50.

³ *ib.*, 33 ff. ; scheme of government, paragraphs 3, 6, 7, 20, 21.

in the Netherlands in the latter part of the nineteenth century. It has not yet been realized in its completeness, and it was so far in advance of the times when it was proposed, that its adoption and practical application were out of the question. The reasons will appear on reviewing some of the objections that it called forth in India and the Netherlands; I shall cite first from the reports of three prominent officials in India to whom the report had been submitted by the home government with a request for their opinions.¹

While these officials recognized the existence of abuses in Java and the need of reforms, they were unanimous in opposing the adoption of Hogendorp's plan. Some of the objections were of little weight, as one, for instance, commonly brought forward at this time, that a greater freedom of trade would by competition lead to a rise in prices by which the native would benefit but not the government. Of more importance was the objection that the change which Van Hogendorp advocated was so radical that it amounted to a revolution, attempting to accomplish in a day what would require generations for its fulfilment. Van Hogendorp, said the officials, described the common Javanese as a slave, and then proposed to bestow on him all at once full freedom of person and property. What guarantee was there that the native would appreciate and use properly the rights conferred upon him? He was notoriously lazy and shiftless; if he were released from the pressure exerted on him through the rulers of his own race, would he not stop working alto-

¹ Opk., vol. 13, "Adviezen omtrent het Bericht van D. van Hogendorp;" Governor General Siberg, p. 39 ff.; Director General van Wiese, 43 ff.; Councillor van IJsseldijk, 109 ff.

gether, perhaps sell the land that had been given him and finally sink into a worse condition of dependence even than that which he had occupied before? Men must be ripe for a change to make it effective.¹

It might seem that Van Hogendorp could have made a valid answer to their objection by referring to the taxes which he proposed to introduce. Would not the native be forced by them to work, as he had formerly been made to work to supply the regent's contingents? The native would still be responsible for certain payments, though he would make them directly to the government and not to the native rulers. Here comes in the decisive objection, the difficulty which made Hogendorp's proposal fruitless and which was destined to wreck schemes of a similar kind long afterwards. The government could not do without the native rulers, and with them it could accomplish no reform that implied a complete change in all the native customs of government. The government could call the forced deliveries a tax, and it did that; Wiese wrote that the contingent "can and must be considered a land-tax."² So long, however, as the contingent was administered exactly as before, subject to the same abuses, there was no gain in a change of name. Van Hogendorp seems to have realized that it was this question of administration which formed the flaw in his scheme, and did what he could to obviate the difficulty. He proposed that the European government should interfere with native institutions as little as possible, that it should retain not

¹ L.c., 40, 45. It should be noted that Van Wiese, in the very report in which he ridicules the idea of free labor existing in Java, gives an example of it; cf. p. 95. Labor on the Chinese lands also was free. Muntinghe gives other examples afterwards. S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 289.

² L.c., p. 60.

only institutions but native officials, so far as was rendered advisable by the customs, the feelings, even the prejudices of the people.¹ The "only" changes were to be the introduction of assured individual property rights and an equitable system of taxation. These modest changes went to the very root of government. Even for the beginning of his system, which he meant should be introduced carefully, he wanted a census of population and a cadastral survey of the land.² The Director General asked³ who was going to attend to the allotment of four hundred thousand pieces of land, scattered over an area far exceeding that of the Netherlands; and to that question there was no answer.

To the Indian officials the question of reform was not one to be settled by abstract reasoning, but by a consideration of the actual conditions in Java, especially the character of the people and their customs of government. They asked that the specific abuses of native rule should be stopped, but they thought that the attempt to abolish the "feudal system" was impracticable; assuming that it was retained, they thought that the contingent system was the simplest and most desirable way of raising the revenue, and regarded a monopoly in the export trade as thereby rendered necessary.⁴

Whether the reports of these Indian officials had any influence in determining the line of policy followed by the Dutch does not appear. By a decree of November 11, 1803, the government of the Batavian Republic had established a commission of six persons, to report how "in the country's possessions in East India, trade should be

¹ Nad. Utitl., 34, 49, 56.

² *Ib.*, 59.

³ *Opk.*, 13: 50.

⁴ *Ib.*, 13: 58, 97.

pursued and the possessions governed, that there may be assured to them the highest possible degree of welfare, to the trade of the Republic the greatest advantage, and to the country's finances the greatest benefit."¹ This commission is said to have represented fairly the different views on colonial policy.² It included Dirk van Hogendorp, and another former colonial official who had been prominent in opposing Hogendorp's plan; this latter man, Nederburgh, is responsible for the wording of the report and charter which were presented in August, 1803, and is credited with the greatest influence in fixing the form they took.³

The commission began its report with the question of trade, not of government, regarding the question of government as one to be settled in conformity with the commercial policy adopted. We have in this fact an index of the emphasis that the commission laid on the various parts of the government's instructions. After reviewing the system of the Company, the commission took up the proposals of Van Hogendorp and rejected them on much the same ground as that taken by the Indian officials whose reports are cited above. It believed that it was impossible to allow the natives freedom in cultivation and in the disposal of their products without a change in the native institutions which would be fol-

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 1: 5; Mijer, 119, 225.

² Sillem, "Dirk van Hogendorp," 112.

³ The summary following in the text is based on the report and charter in Mijer, Verzameling, 117-261.

It is worth noting that Java had by this time gained an importance far exceeding that of all the other possessions. Director General Wiese gave in his report forty-five pages to Java, and ten to the other islands; Nederburgh had Java in mind especially in framing the charter, and gave up almost his whole report to that island. Cf. Grashuis, Ind. Gids, 1897, 2: 1266.

lowed by consequences most dangerous politically as well as economically. The commission recognized that a condition of free trade and money taxes was better for a state than the system of forced deliveries, provided it could be maintained, but if the change were attempted in Java, it foresaw only a decline in cultivation, an enormous increase in the expense of salaries, and the impossibility of covering the expense by taxation. Instead of the Dutch people getting any benefit from their Indian possessions, they would have to make up a deficit there. The commission regarded Van Hogendorp's argument based on British India as of no weight ; it asserted that Java was too poor and the Javanese too backward to enable such reforms as those of Cornwallis to be carried to a successful conclusion in the island.¹ Our task, said the commission, is to investigate what ought to be done under the conditions as they actually exist, not to speculate on a possible future. It quoted "the excellent author of the well-known work," "The Wealth of Nations," to show that the principle of freedom of trade should be applied cautiously under certain circumstances, and recommended accordingly that the contingents of the most important articles (coffee and pepper) should be maintained under such regulation as would free them from abuses. It raised the question whether an excess of coffee and pepper over the amount demanded by government could be left to be disposed of freely, and decided that the dangers from smugglers and engrossers were too serious ; the whole amount of these products must be delivered to the government. The sugar trade, on the other hand, was to be made free.

¹ The commission denied, moreover, that the British had made profit by their change to a tax system. Mijer, 138.

In retaining the system of contingents and forced deliveries, the commission took a step that decided the political relations in which the Dutch government was to stand to the natives. The State was freed from many of the commercial responsibilities of the Company, as will be shown immediately, and the commission proposed that it should devote its energy to the establishment of a regular government. The contingent system was retained, however, simply to secure coöperation of native rulers and to make it unnecessary for the State to penetrate far into the native organization. The commission believed that the Dutch must exercise "rather a system of oversight (*Bestuur van Toezicht*) than a direct government, — so that the natives will be left to the authority of their own rulers, with their own manners and customs, under their own laws and legal system." The government was to devote itself only to the repression of abuses. An article of the charter ordered that the most appropriate measures be taken "to assure and to improve the condition of the common people, to abolish all irregular and arbitrary taxes, and to stimulate and extend cultivation so far as possible," while "the native laws, manners, and customs shall be maintained." In the light of later experience these two principles, that the condition of the common people be improved and yet that native laws and customs be upheld, seem inconsistent; but no serious attempt had up to this time been made to reconcile two things that proved irreconcilable, and this provision may have been perfectly sincere.

In regard to external trade the charter framed by the commission abrogated in one article all the old regulations. "With a few exceptions," said the report,

“prescribed by the general interests of the country’s inhabitants themselves, all European and Indian wares are left to a free trade.” The exceptions were based on fiscal and social reasons, applying to government products (coffee, pepper, spices), firearms, opium, rice, and wood. Barring commerce in these prohibited articles, all Dutch citizens were allowed to trade throughout the East Indies, subject only to certain staple regulations; and ships of friendly powers were admitted in Batavia and other westerly ports.¹ The commission discussed several different systems for the State to pursue in disposing of the products that came to it as contingents, and decided that they should be brought to Netherland in chartered ships, and sold there by public auction. These changes in the relation of the State to external commerce were the most important amendments on the former policy of the Company.

If the report of the commission of 1803 deserves to be described by a Dutch author,² as “the most important official document on our colonial policy that, taking the times and circumstances into account, has ever appeared,” this is not alone because of the significance of its contents so far as I have already outlined it. In many points, as I have shown, the State was to assume the same position that the Company had held; this is true especially of the important question of the relations of Dutch and natives. The surrender by the State of the commercial functions of the Company, though forced by the conviction that the

¹ Trade with China and Japan was subject to special restrictions; I have not attempted to cover all the details of these commercial regulations.

² M. L. van Deventer, in Jonge, *Opk.*, 13: lix. Cf. *Mijer*, xvii.

government could not conduct with profit a trade in which a corporation had failed, was still only partial. If we measure the importance of the charter, not by what it retained of the old system but by the changes that it made, the greatest innovations were not in policy but in the field of the Dutch government and administration.

The Asiatic Council, established in 1798 to rule the Eastern possessions, succeeded not only to the place but the powers of the directors of the East India Company, and governed practically as it pleased. Now, for the first time, a basis for government was set for the Council to which it must conform. Councillors could no longer, as the directors had done, send out what instructions they pleased to the Governor General; they were to act strictly within the lines laid down for them and were responsible to the State for any transgression.¹ The State not only assumed in this point an authority which was new; it proposed that its authority should be maintained in the East as that of the Company's directors had never been. It fixed the administrative regulation on the lines which have always since been followed. It made in law the Governor General independent of his Council as he had long been in fact, and regulated anew the positions and

¹ Grashuis, Ind. Gids, 2:1264; Consideration, 1803, Bijl. B., "Instructie voor den Raad," Art. 1, 14, Mijer, p. 262 ff. Tendencies in this direction are shown by the Dutch constitution of 1801. De Louter, Handl., 67. I must say here that I shall not attempt to trace through the early part of the nineteenth century the changes in the organ of the home government (the Council or single minister) intrusted with the general direction of colonial affairs. Changes are not infrequent, but I have not been able to find any significance in them. Up to the time of the culture system the home government exercised a comparatively insignificant influence on the course of colonial affairs.

powers of his subordinates. Provision was made for the improvement of fiscal administration and control. The civil service was closed to all who had not passed an examination in the Netherlands and served for three years as clerk in India; it was to be divided into four classes, and service of three years in one class was a prerequisite to promotion to the next. Finally, the first condition of any honest and efficient administration was fulfilled in promising that the State would pay such salaries to its officials that they could live according to their rank without dependence on outside gains. In the later colonial constitutions (*Regeerings Reglementen*) amendments were made in the details of the Indian organization, and there were great changes in the spirit of the administration at different periods, but the framework of the government has remained substantially as it was fixed by the charter of 1803.¹

The importance of the charter of 1803 comes from the fact that it outlines with substantial correctness the Dutch policy and the ideals of the Dutch government in the following period, while its accompanying report gives an insight into the reasons that determined the decisions. Considered as positive law, the charter had but a short and unimportant life. It was adopted by the executive government of the Republic in 1804. Muntinghe, who was an ardent advocate of the tax system, wrote some years later² that public opinion was very much divided on the question of the preservation of the "feudal system," and that the opinion of the government differed so far from that

¹ On this point and for further details see especially Grashuis, "Het Charter van Nederburgh," *Ind. Gids*, 1891, 2.

² Minute, 1813, Raffles, Sub., 283.

of the commission "that in the resolution passed on their report, the articles of coffee and pepper were left, with every other kind of produce, to a free trade and cultivation." Whether these changes were made or not at the time of the adoption of the charter,¹ they were embodied in the colonial constitution of 1806, adopted under the rule of Grand Pensionary Schimmelpenninck. This constitution showed a more liberal tendency also in the emphasis it laid on the need of reforming the abuses of forced services.² The conditions of the time, however, were such that the government of the Netherlands had no chance to put the charter into practical effect in Java, where the remnants of the Company's administration were struggling to maintain themselves as best they could. Commissioners were sent out to Java to introduce the new government, but they were delayed so long before they reached the island that they were recalled by Louis Bonaparte, who assumed the government of Holland in June, 1806. King Louis dissolved the Council established to govern the Asiatic possessions, substituting for it a minister of his own, and sent out a Governor General in the beginning of 1807 to represent his authority in the East. He instructed the new Governor General, Daendels, to investigate the question of the contingent system,

¹ De Louter, 68, speaks of "some changes" in the charter of 1803, but refers to the abolition of the coffee and pepper monopoly as though it first occurred in 1806. Mijer, p. xvii, quotes Muntinghe without giving help from other sources. D. W. Schiff, "De koloniale politiek onder den Raadpensionaris Rutger van Schimmelpenninck," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1864, 2:8:377 ff., gives a full summary of the legislative history of the charter, without referring to any changes made in it at the time of its adoption; the text that he gives on page 286 does not show the change in question, and I think that the change was not made until 1806.

² Schiff, *KP.*, *Bijd. TLV.*, 1864, 2:8:385-386.

and to report on it in connection with the recommendations of the commission of 1803; meanwhile he was to maintain the status quo.¹

With the arrival of Daendels in Java the centre of interest in Dutch colonial policy shifts from the Netherlands to the East. Only during the few years after the fall of the Company was the colonial question very much discussed in the Netherlands, and was action taken there that was of moment to Java. For a generation following, the governments of the island, Dutch or foreign, were left to follow instructions or to disregard them, with little influence from home. The report of 1803² had recognized that it was neither desirable nor possible to put the Governor General under close restrictions. While he was to be held strictly subject and responsible to the Council in the Netherlands, he was given all power necessary to carry on government under the difficulties of distance and his peculiar environment. The character of the times forced even greater latitude in the powers of the colonial government than was designed.

Daendels had gained his appointment, not from any experience in colonial affairs, but as the reward for military and political service under the French in the Netherlands. Not bound by any traditions of the Company's system, he showed himself equally free from any deference to the views of the liberal party; he was a man of energy, who saw many things going wrong, and set about in a rough-and-ready fashion to right them. The difficulties of communication were such in this period of the Napoleonic wars that he did not receive a despatch from home

¹ Daendels, Staat, Bijl., 1: Org. Stukken, Prep. Mis., No. 1., Art. 27-28.

² Mijer, 160.

for nearly two years after his arrival in Java,¹ and shortly before his resignation he wrote to the Emperor Napoleon complaining of “l’abandon criminel, dans lequel le ministère de Hollande a eu la perfidie de laisser cette Colonie depuis mon arrivée.”²

It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that he paid little regard to instructions; he followed his own ideas ruthlessly, as will appear immediately. After a short interval followed the five years of British occupation, even more free, of course, from any guidance on the part of the Dutch government. Another colonial constitution was framed in the Netherlands before the restoration of the Dutch, but it had no practical influence. The independence of the island can be measured by the fact that the commissioners, who were sent out to govern it after the evacuation of the British, framed a constitution for the government of India in 1818, which never received the royal sanction, but which all the Indian officials swore to observe, and which was regarded as fundamental until 1827. It was replaced in 1827 again by a constitution framed by a royal commissioner in Java and lacking the royal sanction; the new constitution was designed to check the independence of the colonial government, which had shown a flagrant disregard of restraints imposed by the previous fundamental law and by orders from the

¹ He arrived in Java Jan. 1, 1808; on Nov. 30, 1809, he acknowledged the receipt of the first despatches, which had come a few days before. Jonge, *Opk.*, 13: 433. In April, 1810, he acknowledged despatches sent June, 1809. *Ib.*, p. 458. In January, 1802, the Governor General had not received a letter sent in March, 1800, referred to in a letter August, 1800, which had arrived. *Ib.*, p. 32. This was in a period in which good ships, especially American ships, made the trip from North America or Europe to Java in four months. *Ib.*, p. 98.

² December, 1810, Jonge, *Opk.*, 13: 520.

Minister of the Colonies. At this time the home government was tending to draw tighter the bond which held the colonies, because of its fiscal needs, and because of them it established the culture system in 1830. It will be necessary, on reaching that date in the narrative, to return to the Netherlands to explain the development of the Dutch colonial policy; in the intervening period the main influences on the development of policy and administration are to be found in the island of Java itself.

An idea of the conditions that existed in Java when Daendels arrived can be given by quoting from one of his reports¹ the results of an investigation made on the northeast coast, the most important section of the island under Dutch rule. During the eight years' rule of Governor Engelhardt the expenses of the government had increased, and public interests and revenues had been neglected; dishonesty was the rule in the administration of the public warehouses, and there had been flagrant fraud in the leasing of public lands. Restrictions on trade and on the import of opium had been publicly disregarded. The Governor himself, or others with his connivance, had secured monopolies which they exploited. Natives had received no pay for the products that they delivered or had been cheated on the weight. They had suffered from a great abuse of the forced services to which they were subject, and were held in credit bondage for debts that were insignificant or had been increased by fraud. Neither the Governor nor any of the subordinate officials had thought it necessary to repress these abuses

¹ 12 Nov., 1808, Opk., 13 : 318. There is no reason to doubt the substantial correctness of this description; it merely adds details to the general idea given by Van Hogendorp.

so long as they did not exceed a traditional limit. The peculiar political position of the government of the north-east coast, which was so independent of the Governor General during the eighteenth century that he could exercise little supervision there, would make it possible for abuses such as Daendels described to be confined to that part of the island. Other evidence, however, shows that they were pretty general throughout Java.¹

The first evil that Daendels had to meet, the one that he attacked with the greatest intelligence and force, was the inefficiency and corruption of the Dutch administration. Apart from the personal character of the officials, he found that the scheme of organization was bad. Government and administration were confused, and the highest officials were so burdened with the care of petty details that they had not the power, if they had the will, to oversee and check the actions of their subordinates. The councillors were men taken from the posts of government in the outlying factories; their successors were afraid to complain of the dishonest practices which they left behind them, and they in turn tolerated the continuance of the abuses. The Director General decided important questions without the knowledge of the Governor

¹ See "Europeesche zeden op Java in Daendels' tijd," *Ind. Gids*, 1896, 1: 285-286, based on the Indian statute book of the period. We find a resident who stole the crown jewels of a native prince, a sheriff who levied blackmail on innocent prisoners, a captain in the army who struck his under-officers and men in the face during drill, used them for domestic servants, and sold their rations for his own profit, other officers who abused the natives and took their property without paying for it.

In Braem's report of 1808, "Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis en de kennis van Nederlandsch Indië in het jaar 1807," *TNI.*, 1863, 1: 2: 23, we find evidence of a general lack of officials competent to fill either high or low positions.

General and Council.¹ The Governor of the northeast coast acted like a separate and independent sovereign, and his position threatened to nullify any attempt at a general reform.²

Daendels recalled the Governor of the northeast coast, without appointing a successor, and centralized and simplified the government at Batavia. He greatly extended the real power of the Governor General by relieving him of minor duties. To insure stricter accounting in the civil and military services, he established a general board of audit and introduced a simpler method of book-keeping.³ New offices were established for the conduct of special business, as that concerning the coffee plantations and forests. In place of the previous officials, with their various titles and widely different spheres of authority, the provincial government was intrusted to nine "prefects," who were directly subject to the Governor General and represented his authority in the different parts of the island. The prefect could be termed, as was the intendant of the old régime in France, the work-horse of the provincial administration; all kinds of power, political, administrative, financial, military, and judicial, were united in his hands, and were exercised by him under the orders of the Governor General.⁴

Daendels not only reformed the scheme of administration, but also the mode of paying and promoting officials, so that a career in the colonial service could be pursued with honesty and still with success. The first

¹ Daendels, *Staat*, 4 ff.

² Daendels to Min., 20 Mar., 1808, *Jonge, Opk.*, 13: 313.

³ Further details will be found in *Opk.*, 13: 306 ff, 349 ff.; *Staat*, 74-80.

⁴ Details in Kleyn, "Het gewestelijk bestuur," 32 ff.

steps toward the realization of the ideal of Nederburgh and his fellow-commissioners of 1803, that young men of high principles might be attracted to the colonial administration, were taken when Daendels abolished the tax which the Company had used to mulct officials of their extra gains at the same time that he prohibited these gains and established fixed and adequate salaries.¹

In no branch of its government did the Company need reform more than in its judicial organization. The conditions as far as regarded the Dutch themselves were tolerable. A code of laws based on those at home had been formed in the seventeenth century, which is said to have been satisfactory in itself, but which suffered in its application by the dependence of the judicial on the executive branch of the government, and by the poor quality of the men who sat as judges.² It was the natives who suffered most in this as in other ways from the utter neglect of the Company where its direct pecuniary interests were not concerned. The Company maintained but

¹ The salaries of the prefects ranged from ten to twenty thousand dollars (Dutch) a year. *Opk.*, 13:322. Daendels describes, *ib.*, p. 393, his reform in the salaries of the warehouse officials, who had before depended on various fees and gains that opened the way to abuses.

² Polanen, who was himself Vice-President of the Council of Justice, wrote in 1806 that the authorities at home during the last twenty-five years had shown the most complete indifference as to whether justice in Java was administered well, badly, or not at all. *Opk.*, 13:270. That the judicial authority should be to a certain extent dependent was regarded as necessary (cf. Wiese, *ib.*, 13:53), and Daendels aimed to prevent the courts from being "disobedient" to the government. Daendels to Min., October, 1809, Jonge, *Opk.*, 13:428; M. L. van Deventer in *Opk.*, 13:lxxxix. Wiese wrote (1802, *Opk.*, 13:53) that it was impossible to keep good men in the judicial position, because of the inadequate salaries, and Daendels found the members of the high court at Batavia morally and intellectually unfit for their duties (*ib.*, 13:354).

two courts for cases in which natives were concerned. The court at Samarang had jurisdiction of the whole eastern half of the island, so far as it was subject to the Company, and criminals and witnesses were brought hundreds of miles to wait in prison for the annual session. This court was composed of native regents, who judged according to the native law but were in all important cases subject to the will of the Dutch Governor.¹ The court of schepens at Batavia seems to have met more frequently, and did not have such an extensive jurisdiction, but the parties and witnesses to a suit were kept waiting for weeks and sometimes until they had fallen victims to the unwholesome climate.² As might be expected the natives showed little inclination to seek Dutch justice; on the contrary they tried to conceal crimes serious enough to be brought before the Dutch courts, and never appeared as witnesses unless brought in chains.³ Daendels took the only step adapted to remedy this state of affairs, by increasing the number of courts, making each prefect the president of a native tribunal in which all civil and criminal cases, unless they were of unusual moment, were tried.⁴

Under the head of Daendels's influence on the administration in Java there remains to be considered only one topic, that of the native organization. The Governor

¹ De Reus, NOC., 172.

² Mijer, Verz., 185 ; Daendels, Staat, 15.

³ Daendels ascribed to this condition a large part of the native crimes in the country around Batavia. He made special arrangements in that district. Opk., 13 : 308 ff.

⁴ Opk., 13 : 330. S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 27. Daendels also increased the number of high courts and ordered that native courts should meet twice a week in each regency.

General had been instructed, in the spirit of the charter and the later colonial constitution, to improve the lot of the common people. There was only one way in which he could do this effectually, by reforming the native governments, which made up nine-tenths of all the government that the people had. Daendels knew the evils that existed. He studied at first hand the conditions under which the people lived, in a hasty trip through the island. He got all the information that he could from the European governors, and from the native rulers as well, arranging a congress in which he met thirty-eight regents for a conference on the problems before him.¹ He had, too, the right idea, of attempting no radical departure from the framework of the native organization as it existed, but of adapting his reforms to it. Even his energy could accomplish little, however, in the face of a great social organization, that had led its independent life for centuries, that had been changed only in its upper strata by the contact with the Dutch, and was destined to defy their attempts to mould it for many years to come.

At the points of direct contact between Dutch and natives, changes were possible and were effected. Regents were henceforth to hold the position, not of protected rulers, but of government officials, bearing the honorable title of "the King's Servants"; they were to stand no longer in the relations of contract with the government but subject to it.² At the courts of Soerakarta and Djokjokarta, the most independent of the native states in Java, the Dutch ministers were to appear with the golden parasol, the attribute of high royalty, and were to remain cov-

¹ Staat, 40.

² Opk., 13 : 329.

ered in the presence of the princes.¹ Changes of this formal character were easily effected, but were of little more than nominal importance. Changes reaching much further were designed. The regents' incomes were carefully defined to prevent the abuse of their right to demand taxes and services of the people, and they were forbidden to give or receive presents on the occasion of official appointments. Subordinate native officials, down even to the rank of village head-man, were to be appointed by the Dutch.² The duties and power of each official were scrupulously described.³ The only thing lacking is the proof that these wholesome regulations were actually carried out. In the absence of this proof, and with certain indications that the old abuses continued throughout the following period, there seems little reason to discuss further the plans of Daendels for the reform of the native organization. They were only a platform of principles.⁴

Further light is thrown on the weakness of Daendels's

¹ See M. L. van Deventer in *Opk.*, 13 : cxi, for a criticism of the wisdom of this regulation and an examination of Daendels's claim to accuracy in his description of humiliations imposed on former residents.

² *Opk.*, 13 : 328. S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 1 : 32 ff.

³ See *Kleyn*, 44 ff.

⁴ In Daendels's reports, it is true, we are always given the impression that the reforms he proposed were being carried to a successful conclusion, and that the Javanese had benefited greatly from them. From other sources we get the contrary impression, and these are the only sources that corroborate each other. An idea of Daendels's honesty of statement can be got from the fact that he (*Staat*, 115) has the audacity to hold up as a source of great benefit to Java the post-road, which the people were forbidden to use, and which cost them in its construction an amount of suffering almost incredible. *Kleyn* says that by the measure making regents government officials "an end was put to the independence of the regents in Java," but cites no proof. *Kleyn* gives a useful summary of the laws that were passed, but does not follow them up and show to what extent they were enforced.

attempt to reform the native organization by a consideration of the fiscal policy which he adopted. In a document dated some six months after his arrival in Java,¹ he seems to have proposed to try the experiment of introducing a government tax of one-fifth of the rice crop in the province of Cheribon, which had been recently annexed. The experiment was never carried into effect. Daendels showed, from the very beginning of his government, a marked leaning toward the old contingent system, and before the end of his first year of rule² he had reached the conclusion that this system was inevitable under the conditions. He cited as reasons for the impossibility of introducing a tax system the low state of the common people, the small amount of their production and consumption, the petty sums of money which they handled, — a number of reasons which rather shadow forth than express the truth, that no system could be adopted which was not put absolutely into the hands of the native governments for administration.

It is impossible to say whether he realized that this question of administration was the vital one in determining the Dutch fiscal policy, and kept the fact to himself because he saw the inconsistency of advocating the reform of the native government at the same time that he declared his dependence on it. Whatever the secret opinions of Daendels may have been, there is no question about his acts. With the same vigor and resolution that he showed in reforming the abuses of the Dutch administration, he main-

¹ Instruktie enz., June 19, 1808, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 38-42. The document is a set of instructions to native commissioners who were to assess and collect the tax. In the regulations for the government of the northeast coast, September, 1808, a tax was imposed on the land of natives not subject to forced cultures ; this was given up May, 1809. LS., 1 : 34.

² Governor General to Minister, 12 Nov., 1808, Opk., 13 : 325.

tained and extended the Company's fiscal system, and sacrificed the natives and the native governments to the demands imposed upon them. He made some reforms in the cultures; he gave up, for instance, the requirement of indigo and cotton yarn, which bore heavily on the people and gave little return to the Dutch. He exceeded his instructions, however, in requiring the cultivation of a new product, cotton, in place of these,¹ and when that culture proved a failure, he concentrated his attention on the extension of the coffee culture. He believed that the poor condition in which he found the coffee culture was due to the neglect of the government,² but he did little to remedy the evils existing, and rather magnified them by spreading them over a wider area. He forced the Javanese to plant coffee in their gardens, and even on the graves of their ancestors, and caused the flight of thousands of natives and the depopulation of some districts by the severity of his measures.³ In theory the planters were to receive pay for the coffee they delivered, but the old abuses were maintained in measuring the weight of the product, except that the government was now to profit by them instead of the officials, and there is nothing to show that the natives were luckier in getting their pay than formerly.⁴ The result, at any rate, was the same, — neglect of the plantations and their consequent decline.

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 33.

² Opk., 13 : 319 ff.

³ Raffles, Sub., 66 ; S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 192, quoting Engelhardt.

⁴ Regulations like those of Daendels had been passed in the time of the Company without remedying the evil, and improvement must at best have been slow. Former abuses persisted in the pepper and rice deliveries (M. L. van Deventer, in Opk., 13 : lxix), and though Daendels gave up the government sugar business he created a rice monopoly that was far more oppressive. *Ib.*, 13 : lxxxii, 332.

Daendels took some salutary measures to restrict the demands that officials could make on the services of the natives for their personal use. Dutch officials had been accustomed by exercise of their authority to maintain great troops of domestic servants, and to use the natives as beasts of burden in transporting merchandise, giving little or no pay in return. Daendels forbade these practices, and defined the services that could legitimately be required of the natives: work in maintaining roads and canals, in transporting goods on government service, and in loading and discharging ships. He attempted also to interfere in the native organization to free the people from the necessity of doing carrying service for their rulers. To conclude, however, from these regulations, that Daendels earnestly meant to improve the condition of the common people would be wide of the mark; he freed the natives from these demands only to lay still heavier ones upon them in the name of the government. He upholds, in one place,¹ "the general principle, that an increase in taxes, so long as it does not exceed the ability of the natives, serves to stimulate all branches of industry and to increase not only the public revenues, but the welfare of individuals." Whatever truth there may be in this, viewed as an abstraction, applied as it had to be through the native officials, the principle could be saved from disastrous results only by the exercise of moderation, patience, and sympathy that were entirely foreign to Daendels's character. He laid upon the regents a whole series of onerous burdens, which they in turn imposed on their subjects.² His system has been described by one of

¹ Daendels to Min., August, 1809, Opk., 13 : 390.

² See the summary by Van Deventer in Opk., 13 : lxxvii.

his subordinates¹ as "the most vigorous attempt ever made, at least in Dutch India, to get from a people by force and by forced labor all that can be demanded not alone for commerce but for public works, for a strong defence, for ample payment of officials, and for the unhampered establishment of all departments and branches of administration." The most notorious case in which he abused the power to demand services was the building of the great military road, which extended nearly the whole length of the island, and which he had made in two years by merciless compulsion of the natives.² Daendels's successor as Governor General wrote to the colonial minister soon after his arrival, in regard to the condition of the natives under Daendels, that they were so burdened with forced services that they were certainly more wretched than they had ever been.³

Some excuse for the entire disregard that Daendels showed of the spirit and letter of the instructions defining the attitude he should assume toward the natives can be found in the peculiar political and commercial circumstances of the period of his rule. Before his arrival the Dutch in Java had been forced to allow free trade to ships of foreign nations; it was the period of the Napoleonic wars, and there was no way to market the products which

¹ Muntinghe, Rep., 1817, S. van Deventer, LS., 1:302.

² Daendels gives account to the government (Opk., 13:315, 335) of the progress of the road, but says nothing of the terrible sufferings it caused. They are described frequently by later writers. Money characteristically describes the roads made "by forced labor at a great sacrifice of life," and later remarks that they "bring down daily blessings on Daendels's name." Java, 1:161. The extent to which the fear of Daendels still lives in the native mind can be measured by an anecdote in Leclerq, "Java," Rev. Deux Mondes, November, 1897, 144:175.

³ Governor General Janssens to Min., 21 June, 1811, Opk., 13:541.

formed the government revenue, but by accepting the services of neutral carriers. The fiscal results of this period between the fall of the Company and the arrival of Daendels were fairly good, and are taken by some to show that the Company owed its decline rather to the losses in its commerce than to its territorial rule.¹ About the time of Daendels's arrival, however, the effect of the American embargo began to be felt; a great stock of products accumulated in the warehouses, for which there was no market.² Daendels was in straits, therefore, from the beginning of his administration, while he had to regard an attack on the island by the British as reasonably certain. He had recourse to all kinds of expedients, loans and confiscations, the issue of depreciated currency, and the sale to individuals of the government's rights in land.³ Under the circumstances he was not likely to be very scrupulous in limiting the demands that he made upon the natives.

He shows throughout the brief period of his rule the methods of a politician rather than of a statesman, making his decisions suit the needs of the moment with little

¹ Speech of Van Alphen, 1825-1826, De Waal, NISG., 1: 231; Veth, Java, 2: 257. Braem's report of 1808, "Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis en de kennis van Nederlandsch Indie in het jaar 1807," TNI, 1863, 1: 2: 29, gives a pretty satisfactory fiscal showing except for the circulation of depreciated paper money.

² Daendels to Minister, Opk., 13: 455, 468; Jaussaud, Memoire, *ib.*, p. 515. Wiese wrote in 1802 that it would have been impossible to maintain the government during the past war without the specie brought by American ships. *Ib.*, p. 91.

³ Jaussaud, "Memoire sur la commerce," 1810, Opk., 13: 513 ff.; Governor General Janssens to Minister, 1811, *ib.*, 539. It was nothing less than impudence for Daendels to write to the king as he did in 1810 that the finances were in such good condition that instead of his drawing on the king as authorized, he could let the king draw on him for 1,000,000 gulden. *Ib.*, 493.

regard for the future. This is true especially of his fiscal policy; he could not afford to wait for returns, and so reverted to the old means of getting them. Even in the most permanent and valuable of his contributions to the colony, his reorganization of the Dutch government and administration, he set in his own career an example of arbitrariness and contempt for law which was wholly at variance with the system that he desired to impose upon his subordinates. He used his official position to force merchants to sell to the government at any price he chose; other buyers were frightened away.¹ On one occasion he commanded five persons, on trial before the High Court, to be hanged within three days, and had the sentence executed in spite of the opposition of the court. At another time he arrested and kept in close confinement seven men, former officials, without judicial warrant and without apparent reason.² He refused to honor a contract made by a government agent with American commercial houses and killed the American trade.³ "The ardent hope of seeing the end of an administration which oppressed every one made the Europeans as well as the natives desire to see the colony pass into the hands of the enemy," wrote Daendels's successor, Janssens.⁴

¹ Jaussaud, "Memoire," *Opk.*, 13: 518.

² "Zeven Bannelingen," *TNI.*, 1860, 22: 2: 146, 148. An official who disobeyed him and showed disrespect was flogged by Daendels's orders.

³ M. L. van Deventer in *Opk.*, 13: lxxxv ff. The Americans were afterwards granted compensation by the government. M. L. van Deventer, *Ned. Gezag*, 179.

⁴ Quoted in *Opk.*, 13: cxxix. Compare Governor General Janssens to Minister, June, 1811, *ib.*, 541. "L'île de Java est très malheureuse . . . le mécontentement, pour ne pas dire le désespoir, était à son comble . . . La terreur était si grande, que son impression durait même après mon arrivée: la crainte fermait encore la bouche aux premiers fonctionnaires."

The estimate placed on Daendels and on his work by different authors has varied immensely. By some he has been pictured as one of the great reformers.¹ The tendency of recent times, if we can take as an expression of it the writings of Mr. M. L. van Deventer, one of the most distinguished of modern Dutch workers in colonial history, is in the reverse direction.² Some features of Daendels's activity, especially his political relations with the individual native princes, lie outside the range of this study. So far as concerns his other work, he seems to me to be entitled to high credit for having "cleaned out the Augean stable of the Company" in the reorganization of the Dutch administration.³ In his attitude toward the great question of the government of the natives and their fiscal relations with the Dutch, he shows a consciousness of abuses and an idea of how they could be remedied, which might, under more favorable circumstances, have led to real reforms, but which did not prevent him in fact from continuing the system of the East India Company and exaggerating some of its worst features.

¹ Cf. Kleyn, *Gewest. Best.*, 51 ff.; S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 1: 54, "Daendels cleared the way for Raffles." Pierson, *KP.*, 10, says that Daendels's object was to maintain the old system but to free it from abuses; he judges Daendels by his professions rather than by his practice, and his judgment is too favorable.

² Cf. *Opk.*, 13: lix, xciv, cxli.

³ The phrase of Meinsma, *NOL.*, 2: 1: 63.

CHAPTER V

PERIOD OF BRITISH RULE

TOWARD the close of the eighteenth century the English had intruded more and more in the commerce of the Dutch islands; their smuggling increased, and they obtained concessions to trade from the Dutch government. Dutch officials felt that the English would attempt to make up for the loss of the American possessions by extension in the East,¹ and opportunities to effect this extension in legal form were offered by the political changes of the Napoleonic period in Europe. When William V fled from the Netherlands in 1795, he commissioned the English to occupy the Dutch colonies for him, and most of the Dutch possessions in the East came under the British flag soon afterward. Batavia was blockaded by an English squadron in 1800, and Java was saved from conquest at that time probably only by the diversion of the Egyptian expedition.² Twice in the period 1803–1811 an English fleet appeared off the island and made hostile demonstrations, and in October, 1811, the conquest which had so long impended actually occurred. Java was in no condition to offer serious opposition to the English arms. Daendels had made some

¹ Secret Resolution, Governor General and Council, 1785, De Jonge, *Opk.*, 12: 68.

² M. L. van Deventer in *Opk.*, 13: v. Van Deventer shows in this work and in the introduction to his *Ned. Gezag* that the conquest of Java had been contemplated by the British long before it was actually carried out.

improvements of military value in the construction of roads, forts, and harbors, but he had roused such opposition by his arbitrary measures that the government was seriously disorganized, and he left it with both treasury and army pitifully weak.¹ His successor, Janssens, had only a "soi-disant armée," as he said, in which there were scarcely more than a hundred European troops. Most of his officers were half-breeds, and the body of the troops was composed of natives serving under compulsion, who were totally unreliable. A short campaign was enough to rout this mob. The Governor General wrote that if he had won the last battle he should not have known what to do, as all his resources were exhausted and he could not have continued to rule.²

Java was conquered by the joint action of the British government and the English East India Company, under an agreement by which the English relations with it were to cease after the destruction of the Dutch-French ascendancy, and it was to be turned over to the natives.³ The

¹ Summary of Daendels's military reforms in article "Zeven bannelingen," *TNI*, 1860, 22 : 2, p. 147. M. L. van Deventer, *Opk.*, 13, *Inleiding, passim*, thinks that Daendels was largely responsible for the British conquest.

² Governor General Janssens to Minister, October, 1811, *Jonge, Opk.*, 13 : 546 ff.

³ The Governor General of British India received from the Secret Committee of the East India Company instructions, dated Aug. 31, 1810, to expel the enemy from Java and their other settlements in the East. "It is by no means our wish, or that of his Majesty's government, that they should be permanently occupied as British colonies; and that observation applies not only to the unhealthiness of Batavia, but to the general inexpediency of extending our military establishments. We merely wish to expel the enemy from all their settlements in those seas, to destroy all the forts, batteries, and works of defence, . . . wishing to leave the possession of these settlements to the occupation of the natives." M. L. van Deventer. *Ned. Gezag*, 4.

resources and possibilities of Java were still unknown in Europe; the British seem to have judged the island from the unfavorable outcome of the Dutch East India Company, and to have decided that it was dangerous to their Eastern interests while it continued under French rule, but that it offered no hope of gain to themselves.¹ To the leader of the British expedition, Lord Minto, the evacuation which the government had decided upon appeared in a very different light; the abandonment of Java, "unarmed to the vengeance and cupidity of the Native Tribes," seemed "absolutely, because morally, impossible."²

No opposition developed in England against the temporary occupation of Java, but throughout the five years of British rule the status of the government remained in an uncertainty which was a source of irritation to both Dutch and British. While the British government took the ground that it was merely holding the island until it could safely be restored to the Netherlands at the conclusion of a general peace in Europe, there were indications that it meant to keep it permanently as it did keep other of the Dutch possessions. Meanwhile the British rulers in Java were forced to carry out their plans with the feeling that at any time they might be dispossessed, and that whatever reforms they introduced might be swept away.

¹ M. L. van Deventer, NG., ii ff. The island was ceded by England later "in total ignorance of its value to the Dutch." Raffles, Mem., 286. Hume maintained, in the debate on the treaty of 1824, that the cession of Java "took place in utter ignorance of the interests of England." Hansard, New Ser., vol. 11, Lond., 1825, col. 1447.

² Lord Minto to the Secret Committee of the East India Company, Dec. 6, 1811, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 5. The last words are italicized in the printed document, but I believe this to be the work of the editor.

In August, 1814, Great Britain formally contracted with the Netherlands to return Java, and other possessions which the Dutch had held in 1803, and which had since been occupied by the British. The execution of this agreement was delayed for a time by the return of Napoleon, which encouraged the British governor of Java to hope that it might yet be made a British dependency, but at the end of 1815 Dutch commissioners left Europe to take possession of the island, and the formal transfer of it to them was made in August, 1816.

During the period of the British occupation Java was ruled as a part of British India, dependent on the government at Calcutta. The Governor General of British India, Lord Minto, stayed six weeks in the island after the conquest, to form the new government and establish the general principles that it was to follow. In a proclamation issued during the campaign¹ he promised that the natives should enjoy the same position as was held by the inhabitants of British India, that the Dutch should be eligible to office under the new government, and that the Dutch laws should remain in force with certain modifications. In regard to the government's fiscal policy the proclamation promised that "the vexatious system of monopoly will be revised, and a more beneficial and politic principle of administration will be taken into consideration," without making any specific pledges. In instructions given to his subordinate on the establishment of the government, Lord Minto referred to the Dutch policy of contingents as "a vicious system, to be abandoned as soon as possible," and recommended a radical reform in the land system to stimulate the industry of

¹ 11th Sept., 1811. Raffles, Mem., 103 ff.

the natives.¹ He regarded his duties completed, however, in outlining in this general way the policy which the new government was to follow; there is no evidence that he determined it in its details.² The responsibility for the settlement of all the most important questions of government and policy was laid upon the new Lieutenant Governor, who was given a legislative power that made him practically absolute in Java, and only nominally dependent on the Governor General at Calcutta. This power was exercised from 1811 to a date shortly previous to the Dutch restoration in 1816 by Thomas Stamford Raffles, who made the short period of his rule one of the most important in the whole history of Java, by the originality and vigor with which he met the problems before him.

Raffles was the son of a ship captain in the merchant service, was born at sea, and had few advantages in his early years. When only fourteen years old he became a clerk in the East India House, and distinguished himself by such industry and ability that after ten years' service he was sent out to Pinang (Straits Settlements) as under-secretary in the newly organized government.³ Raffles was remarkable among his contemporaries, not only for his power to work, which was prodigious,⁴ but for his

¹ Raffles, Mem., 212.

² This can be inferred from his letter of December, 1811, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 9. Norman, BH., 43, knows of no instructions more specific left by Minto.

³ According to one version, Raffles got his preferment by a discreditable marriage. M. L. van Deventer, NG., vii. Egerton, p. 8, says that Boulger ("Life of Raffles," Lond., 1897) has disproved this. I have not seen Boulger's book. It is severely criticised by one of the best Dutch historians. See Van der Kemp, "De Singapoorsche Papieroorlog," Bijd. TLV., 1898, 6:5:389 ff.

⁴ He could write a letter himself and dictate to two assistants at the same time; he wrote the important minute of 1814 at a rate that kept

scientific interests. He acquired a knowledge of some of the Eastern languages, and was soon recognized as an authority in knowledge of the conditions and institutions of the Malay States. Transferred to Malacca in 1809, he used his opportunities to gather information about the islands of the archipelago, was taken on the Java expedition of 1811 as secretary to Lord Minto, and was chosen by him as the person best fitted to organize and carry on the government of the new conquest.

The character of Raffles has been severely criticised by Dutch historians, who can point to more than one instance in which his deeds do not accord with his professions and are not consistent with each other.¹ There has never been any question of the man's ability or of the importance of the work that he did. There were many flaws in the conception and execution of his plans, and few of these plans were brought to fruition until long after he had left the island. His efforts should be judged, however, by direction as well as distance. Raffles was great, not in the results that he achieved, but in the ideals that he established, which have been a power in all later reforms. He tried to do alone, in a few years, and with the uncertainty of his position constantly before him, what generations of later workers have accomplished.

three clerks busy copying. Mem., p. 210. He worked more hours a day in the enervating climate of Java than most men can work under the most favorable conditions, and wore out his subordinates by the trips, sometimes sixty or seventy miles a day, that he made when he was superintending the introduction of his tax system, *ib.*, 260, 209.

¹ Cf. M. L. van Deventer, NG., x ff., xxxiii, xl, 1; Veth, Java, 2: 295 ff. Veth says that the judgment of the man has grown constantly less favorable, of his work constantly more favorable, as time has brought to light new sources of information. Norman, 46 ff., 315, forms a more favorable estimate of his character than later writers among the Dutch.

“I have been forced to act, in every measure of importance, on my own responsibility,” he wrote to a friend in 1814. His superiors in British India were afraid to involve themselves in the execution of far-reaching plans which might at any time be interrupted by the restoration of the Dutch to power.¹ He secured from his associates, both English and Dutch, a support which he recognizes in generous terms, but he was still the only source in Java from which all reforms came; he found in others more criticism than encouragement, and only a fraction of the restless energy which he himself displayed. His letters and reports are full of references to the provisional character of his government.² Viewed in the light of the difficulties under which he worked, the faults of Raffles’s career as Lieutenant Governor grow smaller, and his failure appears only as a deferred success.

Of the changes made by Raffles in the system of colonial policy by far the most important was the reform that he attempted in the fiscal relations of natives and Europeans. For the first time a vigorous effort was made to carry into effect the system that Dirk van Hogendorp had advocated, that had been rejected by the Dutch commission of 1803, and had been thrust far into the background by the reactionary policy of Daendels. It is probable that Hogendorp’s ideas were known to Raffles, as he had in his council two Dutch officials who could not have been ignorant of them.³ There is a world-wide difference,

¹ Letter to English, Mem., 227.

² Mem., 205, 226; Sub., 16, 276; Van Deventer, NG., 51.

³ In Hist., 1: xxxviii and 301, Raffles quotes from Hogendorp’s report “recommending a policy similar to that which we subsequently pursued.” I do not remember to have seen Hogendorp’s name mentioned in the minutes of Raffles’s administration, and Muntinghe, in his minute of 1813,

however, between the formulation of a plan in the abstract and the serious attempt to realize it; and the execution of the plan was all Raffles's own. While Lord Minto had urged a departure from the old contingent system, he had left no specific suggestions for any substitute policy and had discouraged rather than urged very active measures. "On this branch," he wrote, "nothing must be done that is not mature, because the exchange is too extensive to be suddenly or ignorantly attempted."¹ Raffles said that the system which he adopted had been in contemplation since the fall of the native state of Djokjokarta (June, 1812),² about nine months after his arrival. At that time he had a commission of officials at work investigating the practicability of the change; they reported favorably on it, and in October, 1813, Raffles issued a proclamation publishing the reforms that he proposed to introduce. He had asked the opinion of the government at Calcutta in 1812, and as no reply had come from there, he proceeded on his own responsibility.³

seems to have purposely avoided describing Hogendorp's work, though it is hard to believe that he did not know it. It may be that Muntinghe did not want to detract from the credit of Raffles's work. Sillem, "Dirk van Hogendorp," 361 ff., thinks that Muntinghe and afterward Elout refrained from referring to Hogendorp by name from motives of policy; Hogendorp's ideas were conceived to have a revolutionary flavor. Raffles says, Sub., 78, "It was Mr. Muntinghe who first pointed out to me the gross errors, and the still grosser corruptions of the former government; and it was from a confidence in his opinion, and a reliance on his unerring judgment, that I first conceived it practicable to work the change which has been wrought."

¹ Raffles, Memoir, 212; same in Substance, 4.

² Sub., 276.

³ Memoir, 221, letter to Lord Minto, January, 1814. This must have crossed a letter from the Secretary of the Governor General, Jan. 15, 1814, reproving Raffles for the suddenness of his changes, and asserting that they had not been referred to the Calcutta government.

The considerations leading Raffles to a change of system are stated so fully and concisely in the minute of 1813 that they can best be given in his own words.¹ "The loss derived to the public by a delivery of produce, the sale of which may be uncertain, and the waste and expense of which is unavoidable, is not a more urgent reason for an alteration than its oppression upon the inhabitants and its discouragement to agriculture. While the regent is bound to deliver a certain quantity of money and produce, and the feudal services of the people can be called for, to an unlimited extent, by former usage, and the influence of ancient habits, there can be no security against oppression, nor any excitement to industry; and the revenue of the State must equally suffer by the number of intermediate hands through whom it is collected, by the expense of subordinate officers in charge of the produce, by wastage of the produce itself, and by the irregularities and temptations to which the system gives rise." Raffles believed that a change of system was demanded not only in justice to the natives, who were reduced to the lowest condition and were driven from one part to another of the island by the oppressions which they suffered, but also by the fiscal interests of the government. Judging the matter even in the light of Muntinghe's dictum "that every colony does, or ought to exist, for the benefit of the mother-country," he thought that "it was as necessary, in a financial point of view, to introduce an amendment in the revenue system, as it was consistent with justice and sound policy, and congenial to the principles of a British administration, to release the numerous inhabitants of this island from feudal sla-

¹ Raffles, Sub., 253 ff.

very and bondage.”¹ As I shall proceed immediately to a description of the practical workings of Raffles’s system, it will not be necessary to stop here to analyze in detail the arguments by which he advocated its adoption. There was evidently in his mind a rather vague picture of the contrast that existed between conditions as he found them in Java and had left them in civilized Europe, and so strong an idea of the advantages of the advanced stage of civilization, with its just government and free enterprise, that the difficulties of bringing the people of Java to this stage were lost to his sight.

The system which suggested itself as offering the greatest possibilities of improvement was “that which has been adopted in British India, the benefits and advantages of which have stood the test of experience.” This system, as he proposed to introduce it, was summarized in the following terms:²—

“1st. The entire abolition of all forced delivery of produce at inadequate rates, and of all feudal services, with the establishment of a perfect freedom in cultivation and trade.

“2d. The assumption, on the part of the government, of the immediate superintendence of the lands, with the revenues and rents thereof, without the intervention of the regents, whose office should in future be confined to public duties.

“3d. The renting out of the lands so assumed in large or small estates, according to local circumstances, on leases for a moderate term.”

It would be hard to imagine a more sweeping change

¹ Min. of 1813, Sub., 254; Min. of 1814, Sub., 10-15.

² Min., 1813, Sub., 261.

in the whole system of government than that implied in these few sentences. The native officers who had heretofore ruled the people under the Dutch were henceforth to have their powers restricted to a narrow field; instead of paying themselves by what they could get from their unhappy subjects, they were to receive such grants from the superior government as would make it "both their duty and their interest to encourage industry and to protect the inhabitants." Their place as actual rulers was to be taken by European officials, who were to introduce and administer an entirely new fiscal system; the people were to pay the government dues on the European basis of the rental value of their lands, instead of on the native basis, a network of personal and secret considerations which baffled the scrutiny of any European government. Finally, to touch only on the most important modifications, the government was to reform the whole system of indirect taxation in the interest of free industry and trade, by abolishing the internal tolls and transport duties, and taking under its own administration the customs duties and salt tax, which had heretofore been farmed out.¹

The central part of Raffles's system was the land-tax, which was to absorb all the multiform dues and services paid by the people under native rule, and was to be, as it has been in British India, the mainstay of the government treasury. Raffles admitted the great variations in the amount of these dues in different districts of the island, but believed that they might be generally commuted, one

¹ In this sketch of Raffles's original proposals I have supplemented the statement in the minute of June, 1813, by the summary of changes announced in the proclamation of October, 1813, Substance, 173 ff.

district with another, for a payment in money, equivalent to about two-fifths of the annual gross rice produce of the soil.¹ This furnished the basis for assessing the new tax. The lands of the island were divided into two sorts, irrigated (*sawah*) and dry (*tagal*); each sort was divided again into three classes according to its average yield. Each class of land was to pay as tax a certain proportion of its crop. Thus *sawah* lands of the first class paid one-half of the estimated product of rice, of the second class two-fifths, and of the third class one-third, while the dry lands, planted largely with maize, paid smaller proportions ranging down to one-fourth.² Raffles desired to leave to the cultivators of lands of varying productiveness about the same amount for each, taking the surplus for the government. While this scale was set to guide the officials in introducing the tax, Raffles did not expect at first to raise the full amounts as they were set forth, and ordered that these proportions should be regarded simply as maxima. Raffles desired that the tax should be collected in money so far as it proved practicable, and believed that the introduction of a money tax would bring into circulation great amounts of hoarded coin, but he saw that it was inadvisable to make an absolute requirement of money payment. When circumstances made it necessary, the tax could be paid in kind, but only

¹ Sub., 29, Instructions to Commissioners in Eastern Districts, September, 1812; Minute of September, 1813, Van Deventer, NG., 18 ff., practically identical language. I have referred above, in the chapter on the native organization, to the great variation in the dues of the natives, which made a fair average impossible.

² Rev. Instructions, 1814, Sub., 198. The figures of annual yields according to which the lands are classified are given, for Soerabaya, in the minute of 1814, *ib.*, 137.

in rice, and not in the various products which the Dutch had formerly taken as contingents.

The most difficult point to be decided by Raffles in the introduction of the land-tax was the question of the class of natives with whom he should deal in the levying and collection of the tax. To use the phraseology of British India, he had to choose between the *ryotwari*, the *zamin-dari*, and other possible modes of settlement. So far as concerned existing conditions in the native organization, he was convinced, from his own observations and those of most of his officials, that there was between the sovereign and the cultivator no class whose rights he was bound to regard. As has been stated above, in the description of the native organization, the nobles held their lands as a rule only during tenure of office or at the will of the sovereign; the tendency to heredity of tenure had not proceeded far enough to force the European government to respect it.¹ Raffles formulated, therefore, the general statement that the sovereign was the only lord of the soil, and that the European government, taking the place of the sovereign, had the sole right of property in the land of the island.²

¹ This would apply properly to the *poesaka* or official lands, but not to the lands cleared *op last*, which represented the investment of private capital and covered large areas. Raffles did not recognize the existence of this latter class of lands.

² From this legal fiction, for in view of the variety of conditions existing in the land tenures of different parts of Java it was nothing more, arose the term land-rent (Dutch, *landrente*), which has remained the customary name for the land-tax in Java to the present day. It is not the place here to discuss the justice of the view that the sovereign of Java was the actual proprietor of all the land. This was formally pronounced to be the law by the Dutch government not many years ago, and has furnished a subject for extended discussion by Dutch legal historians. In its practical application the theory seems to have worked no harm.

The only motives to guide Raffles in the choice of the natives with whom he was to deal being those of convenience and policy, he decided at first not to attempt a direct contact with the cultivators, but to lease the lands to the lowest official class, represented by the *bekels* and village heads. He realized that the greater the number of native officials between the government and the cultivator the more loss and oppression there would be, but he was afraid to offend the classes with political influence by excluding them from administration entirely, and demanded only that the commissioners who introduced the tax should grant the leases to persons as near the actual cultivator as possible. The country would then be divided up into larger or smaller estates, according to local circumstances. The large estates, however, were to be considered only as due to a necessary compromise, and as temporary. Leases were to be granted only for a short period, three years at most, that the government might keep in its hands the power to revise the settlement as its understanding of the conditions and of its interests increased. Raffles spoke, in the early history of his land-tax plans, of arranging a settlement for a longer period, for seven or ten years, or even in perpetuity,¹ but the instructions from Calcutta, where the permanent settlement was known, were adverse to his plan, and advised him that the home government would certainly disapprove it.²

A beginning was made with the introduction of the land revenue on the basis of Raffles's minute and instructions of 1813. The settlement was made ordinarily for one year and with the heads of villages. Within four months,

¹ Letter to Hammond, October, 1813, Mem., 194.

² *Ibid.*, 197.

however, of the formal beginning of the land settlement, Raffles's ideas had changed on the question of administration, and in his minute and instructions of 1814 he expressed a decided preference for the *ryotwari* or individual settlement. It is possible, as Norman suggests, that in the interval Raffles had heard of the experiment with *ryotwari* settlement made by the British government in the districts under Madras, and modified his plans by reason of this new information.¹ The reasons which Raffles gives for the change are in themselves sufficient to explain it. The village settlement, he says,² "was simply a step arising from the necessity of the occasion, the impracticability of at once entering upon a more detailed plan, and which, at the moment of its adoption, was meant to be considered as temporary, to be no longer adhered to if, on the acquisition of further knowledge, a more particular system of management should be advisable."

"In the period that has elapsed since the first settlement a sufficient knowledge has been obtained, by the most serious investigation into the whole minutiae of the revenue affairs of the country, to render government more fully competent to carry into execution that more detailed plan, which it was always in their contemplation to introduce, as early as might be practicable.

"The agency of intermediate renters is considered as quite unnecessary to be adopted in future. It is deemed

¹ BH., 215 n. Raffles's letter to Minto, Feb. 13, 1814, Mem., 224, says that he adopted the *ryotwari* settlement without knowledge of its introduction elsewhere, but in his minute of Feb. 11, 1814 (Sub., 194), he refers to the *ryotwari* settlement "as it is termed in western India, where it is understood to have been advantageously introduced." It is hard to explain this inconsistency to the advantage of Raffles's candor.

² Rev. Instructions, 1814, Sub., 193.

that such a plan of settlement will leave the bulk of the people entirely at the mercy of a numerous set of chiefs, who, however well they may have hitherto conducted themselves, would certainly, in such case, possess an ability of injury and oppression, against which the ruling power would have left itself no adequate means of prevention or redress, and which cannot therefore be permitted consistently with the principles of good government.

“It has therefore been resolved, that this intermediate system be entirely done away, the government determining to act, in future, through its intermediate officers, directly with each individual cultivator, and to stand forward, in short, the sole collector and enjoyer of its own revenues.”

The great fault of the Dutch system Raffles found to be that “no direct control or communication was held with the people”;¹ the introduction to the minute of 1814, giving the reasons for adopting the individual settlement, described in detail the abuses which have been made known already to the reader. “It appeared, therefore, absolutely necessary to proceed at once to the root; and by establishing a connection with the peasantry, by removing, as much as practicable, all restrictions on their trade and industry, by satisfying the vanity of their chiefs and those claims which the actual possession of authority entitled them to entertain, and by combining the acknowledged principles of European legislature with the peculiar usages and customs of the country,—to introduce a uniform and general system throughout, calculated to draw forth the extensive resources of this colony and to

¹ Min., 1814, Sub., 8.

advance the wealth and happiness of its numerous population.”¹

The advantages of the village settlement were urged by one of the British officials engaged in the introduction of the land-tax ; it was the system to which the people were accustomed,² it was the easiest to introduce and administer, and it made proper provision for natives of the official class, who might if set aside become pensioned drones, vagabonds, or dangerous characters.³ The proposal was rejected by Raffles, in spite of the manifest advantages it promised, because it conflicted with the principle he had adopted of direct government of the individual natives. “The collection of the revenue, under such a system, is no doubt rendered much easier, and it was still more so when collected through the regents. But the revenue is still farmed to an intermediate class : the cultivators do not fall immediately under the protecting influence of government ; a large proportion of the revenue of the country is absorbed before it reaches the government treasury ; the real resources of the country are not known ; and, in short, though the public revenue may have been partially improved by setting aside the regent, and the people may

¹ Sub., 21-22.

² See above, the chapter on the native organization.

³ Report of Colonel Adams on the settlement of Soerabaya, Min., 1814, Sub., 118. Crawford, report on Kadoe, urged that the *bekels* should be considered as the permanent landholders, and that the settlement should be made with them. As the *bekels* were the agents appointed by superior officials to collect the dues of the native organization, this proposal looked to the introduction of the *zamindari* system. The proposal was rejected by Raffles on the ground that the *bekel* system was exceptional and marked a degeneration of the normal organization. Other objections applied as well to this system as to the system of village settlement. Sub., 109, 113, 115.

have been relieved from some of the most intolerable burdens, the main object in view, in relieving the cultivators from the oppression of their chiefs, and drawing forth the actual revenue of the country, is far from accomplished under such a system.”¹

It was the adoption by Raffles of this principle of direct contact with the individuals among the people, without the intervention of more or less independent native officials, which stamped his policy as original and marked him out as the leader in the new school of colonial governors. I cannot agree with Pierson's statement,² that the great novelty in Raffles's system was the introduction of taxation to take the place of commercial transactions as a source of revenue. Some of the contingents required of the natives under the old system represented thoroughgoing commercialism on the part of the government, an effort to direct the productive power of the natives in certain channels to secure certain wares for the European market. There were true taxes, however, under the old system, both direct and indirect. The Company's rice contingent was as much deserving of the name of tax as Raffles's land-rent, which could be paid in the same staple of consumption. The great and only contrast between these revenue measures of the old system and the ones proposed by Raffles was the difference in administration, by which the whole process of assessment and collection was to be brought under the control of European ideas of honesty, economy, and justice.

The reasons for the failure of Raffles's land-tax can be

¹ Sub., 120-121.

² KP., 27 ; Pierson follows Muntinghe here without a sufficient analysis of his reasoning and the facts he cites.

classed under two heads: first, certain faults in the scheme and in the way in which Raffles began its introduction, for which he stands directly responsible; second, the impossibility under the conditions of the native organization of introducing any, even a faultless, scheme of the kind, with the resources that Raffles had at his disposal.

The times were little suited for such a serious reform as Raffles undertook, and the uncertainty of them is reflected in a haste and rapidity of change on his part that could be attended only by bad results. Within a year he changed from leases in large parcels to village and then to individual settlements, prescribing one system before the other had been introduced.¹ The scheme of assessment was very far from attaining the object for which it was made, of taxing equitably the holders of different grades of land, and imposed an undue burden on the poorer grades.² Raffles seems moreover to have done little to establish a scheme of assessment that could be generally applied throughout the island; the one that he gave for the eastern districts was unsuited by reason of local variations for use elsewhere, and he had to leave the matter of assessment largely to the judgment of the individual collectors.³ The plan of requiring not a fixed amount but a proportion of the average crop, while it seemed to

¹ M. L. van Deventer, NG., xcii. Bruijn, in his report on Bantam, 1817, says that lands in the upper districts there were leased to native chiefs in 1813, to village head-men in 1814, and to the common people in 1815; *ib.*, 149.

² Report of De Salis on Pekalongan and Kedoe, 1816, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 93.

³ S. van Deventer, LS., 1:380, report of 1818 with figures; *ib.*, 2:4. This led to great differences in the burden of the land-tax in different localities.

promise to the government the maximum that it could fairly demand, led to difficulties and frauds.¹

Theoretical flaws in Raffles's scheme of land-tax are of little importance, however, in view of the way in which the scheme was mangled and distorted when it came to be practically applied to the native organization. When Raffles wrote his minute of 1814, in which he adopted the system of individual settlement as the normal,² he had had actual experience with this form of settlement only in its application in districts formerly subject to Chinese farmers. These districts were peculiarly suited to such a settlement, and he seems to have been encouraged to make it general because of the success it had in them.³ Just as soon as Raffles attempted to extend the individual settlement to other parts of Java, he entered a field entirely unprepared for the change, and the administrative apparatus at his command broke down completely. In the minute of 1813⁴ Raffles said that he desired only to establish "the justice, practicability, and advantage of the new system; and when this object is attained," he said, "I shall have the honor to suggest the plan which it appears to me advisable to pursue, in effecting its gradual and ad-

¹ Report of Hopkins, 1814, Probolingo and Bezoeki, Sub., 148.

² He allowed exceptions to the practice of individual settlement then, but village settlements were to be made only for short times, and were to be changed as soon as possible to the individual form.

³ It was said that the new system, when introduced into a district of Pekalongan formerly under Chinese, gave a net revenue nearly fourfold that formerly received, which was collected with perfect ease. Raffles, Sub., 35, 137. On the other hand, De Salis, in his report on Pekalongan and Kedoe, 1816, said that one district that had formerly been leased to a Chinaman, and was then under individual land settlement, had always been in arrears. M. L. van Deventer, NG., 92.

⁴ Sub., 277.

vantageous introduction." The minute and instructions of 1814 are in appearance more explicit as to the details of the mode of settlement, but in the face of the variety of conditions found in the native organization Raffles had in fact to leave all the most important questions to be settled by his subordinates. These men, who, he says,¹ "in the short space of six months enabled me to effect a revolution, which two centuries of the Dutch administration could scarcely dream of," numbered all together less than a dozen. The force was ridiculously inadequate to carry out the plans which involved the assessment and collection of a tax on some four or five million individuals.

A prerequisite to the success of Raffles's scheme was some sort of cadastration. Two years after Raffles's departure from Java a report² stated that the survey of the fields "had not been begun everywhere, had been completed nowhere, and no reliance could be put on the exactness of the surveys in the places where they had been made." Some of the districts in Bantam could not be surveyed because of the prevailing insecurity,³ and when something was made that passed for a survey, it rested not on actual measurements by Europeans but on the statements of native officials, absolutely untrustworthy because of the prejudiced source from which they came, and useless because they were expressed in native land measures varying in every locality of the island. Raffles had made elaborate plans for the collection of the necessary data. The residents were to be assisted by survey officials and collectors, (few of whom were ever appointed,) in the preparation of a map on the scale of an inch to a mile,

¹ Sub., 74.

² Report of 1818, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 380.

³ M. L. van Deventer, NG., 148.

which was to show the amount of land for which each village was responsible. Within the village blank forms were to be used to secure information about the population, the varieties and yields of land, the way in which it was held, etc.¹ When the collector had thoroughly acquainted himself with the conditions and resources of each village, he was to proceed to the assessment of the tax, not on the village as a whole, but on each individual cultivator. Even Raffles's sanguine mind realized the necessity of putting a limit somewhere on the activities of the European helpers he hoped to secure, and the village head-man was made a government official for the settlement of the tax on individuals, responsible for its collection and possessed of the powers necessary to that end.² The collector was to make out a statement based on information furnished by the head-man, giving not only the total tax due from the village, but also the details of its assessment; then the head-man was to collect the tax and return to each cultivator a receipt which showed in full the ground, character, and amount of his payment.³ All this was to be done in a country in which scarcely a single village head could read and write!⁴

¹ See the schedules, lettered A to G, in Sub., 202 ff.

² Apparently, the futile attempt was made at first to intrust the detailed settlement to European officials. In Soerabaya, 1815, the collector began to divide the land among the individual inhabitants and make a separate settlement with each; he had done this in scarcely fifty of the twenty-seven hundred villages subject to him when he realized the hopelessness of the task, and continued the settlement villagewise. S. van Deventer, LS., 1:374, report of Van Lawick van Pabst.

³ Rev. Instructions, 1814, Sub., 197, 212-215.

⁴ Report of De Bruijn, Bantam, 1817, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 151. De Bruijn said that one native writer sufficed for a district including many villages far distant from each other.

It is easy to imagine the result. The individual settlement existed only in name. The head-man, when called upon, furnished the list that was required of him, but manufactured it for the occasion, and did not attempt to make it an accurate picture of the village or to revise it to accord with changes in landholding. A considerable amount of paper was put in circulation, but it might just as well have been left blank as to be covered with ink marks which few could read and to which none attended.¹

Never was system further removed from the plans of its projector than Raffles's land-tax as it was actually carried out. Free play was given to the arbitrary and unjust action, not only of the village head-men but of the European officials as well, who with the best intentions made the most serious mistakes. Bewildered by the rapidity of the changes thrust upon them, and entirely ignorant of the conditions of the organization to which these changes were to be applied, they threw all of Raffles's instructions to the winds, and followed the policy of getting what they could from the natives in a wild and haphazard way. Raffles complained in 1814 that one of his residents had deviated from instructions in important particulars, had given out no tax receipts or statements, had retained the system of forced deliveries and services; "thus, by connecting together two systems radically hostile to each other, the whole became a mass of confusion, productive of little advantage to government or benefit to the country."² A Dutch official who investigated the workings of the tax system in two residencies, reported in

¹ Report of De Salis, Kedoe, 1816, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 94. Report of Servatius, Cheribon, S. van Deventer, LS., 1:369; Report of 1818, *ib.*, 1:381.

² *Sub.*, 38.

1816¹ that it was impossible to discover any principles which the British official had followed in the introduction of the tax ; he had acted "by way of guessing." In one province² the land-tax was established on such a basis that it would yield a net return of 156,000 rupees ; a new official appointed to administer it in 1814 raised it to 399,000 ; the next year another official adopted a new standard and made the figure 212,000. The amount actually paid, 1815-1816, was 89,000. The officials did not know what area of land was taxable, what the yield of the land was, or what the crop was worth in money. In Soerabaya the land-tax was raised 80% ; the natives did not want to "lease" land on those terms, but were forced to do so by the government.³ Because of the sufferings in this province the government instituted a commission toward the end of 1815 to investigate the workings of the tax. Such confusion existed in the whole revenue department that it was impossible to determine what had been and what fairly could be paid by villages, still less in respect to individuals. The land-tax was cut down an even 20% and should have been still further reduced. When reductions were made, however, as in Cheribon and Soerabaya, they benefited mainly the native officials and usurers ; Raffles's scheme for remission in the case of over-taxed natives could not be practically administered, and the poor and weak continued to pay the highest taxes as under the old native organization.⁴

¹ Report of De Salis, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 91.

² Cheribon, Report by Servatius, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 366 ff.

³ Report of Van Lawick van Pabst, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 374.

⁴ Elout to Director General of Colonies, May 30, 1816, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 68 ; Report of Van Lawick van Pabst, *supra* ; Report of 1881, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 381.

Before proceeding to recount the fiscal results of the land-tax established by Raffles, it will be advisable to consider his policy in regard to the old system of forced cultures. While he agreed with Minto in condemning the system, his practice did not accord exactly with his principles. He made a number of changes looking to the abolition of contingents; in the contracts with the native princes of Djokjokarta and Soerakarta, made in 1811, he freed them from the obligation of furnishing wares to the government as they had been used to do, and engaged to pay all laborers that they supplied.¹ He wrote in the proclamation of 1813,² "The system of vassalage and forced deliveries has been abolished generally throughout the island," but in the same paragraph he admitted that some parts of the old system had been retained provisionally, and in fact he passed these on to the Dutch practically unchanged. The reason for his course, so much at variance with his published ideas and with the heedless energy with which he pressed the introduction of the land-tax, was undoubtedly the very practical consideration that he needed money. Until the land-tax began to return the larger revenues which he expected from it, he could not safely cut loose from the fiscal devices of his predecessors.

The moment was peculiarly propitious, however, for the abolition of the forced cultures, and Raffles himself gained little from retaining them. The most important culture,

¹ Contracts in M. L. van Deventer, NG., 315, 319. Compare a letter from the resident of Buitenzorg, 1812 (misdated 1882), *ib.*, 332, proposing an increase in the pay of laborers required to come from a distance to work.

² Sub., 174.

that of coffee, was a source of actual loss to the government in the early period of his administration ; he found the government storehouses heaped with a product for which he could find no market, while he was obliged to pay the natives something for whatever additional supplies they furnished. He proposed to stop these payments and to allow the free cultivation and export of coffee and other products in the eastern districts of the island.¹ The lands formerly devoted to the culture of export articles like coffee and pepper were subjected with others to the land-tax, and the cultures rapidly declined.² In the Preanger regencies of western Java, however, where the production of coffee had been most successful in the past, the culture was retained, and these districts were excepted from the operation of the land-tax.³ Raffles says ⁴ that at the time when the island was restored to the Dutch he was making arrangements to free the coffee cultures also in the Preanger districts, but if he had plans of that kind they were never executed. Another exception to the system of taxation was made in the so-called *blandong* districts, where the people were required to cut and haul teak-wood for the government. There was considerable vacillation in the policy followed in these districts, and different methods of exploiting the forests were tried, but in general the

¹ Minute of 1813, Sub., 274 ; 1814, *ib.*, 66. Minute of September, 1813, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 22.

² For the variety of ways in which the transition to the tax system was effected in the case of the coffee lands, see De Salis in M. L. van Deventer, NG., 89. The idea of Raffles that the coffee production in the East would maintain itself without compulsion proved an illusion ; there was no profit in the culture at the time.

³ Norman, BH., 242, says that the natives in these districts suffered more under Raffles's rule than they ever suffered before or since.

⁴ Hist., 1 : 144.

system of forced labor was retained.¹ Raffles's government seems as time went on to have tended constantly to take up again with the traditions of former policy; it became in time so commercial that it was called "warehouse keeper" by Crawford,² and it made the reversion to the Company's policy much more easy and natural in the time of the culture system by preserving the most important cultures to that time.

Until near the close of Raffles's administration small revenue was received from the coffee culture, because commerce was still interrupted by the wars in Europe and America. Raffles wrote in 1814 that he had not been able to dispose of a single cargo during the year.³ Conditions improved after this date, and if the figures given by Raffles can be trusted, there was a pretty active commerce between Java and the outside world before the end of his administration.⁴ Before Raffles had landed in Java he had expressed the intention of restricting the enterprise of Americans and other "commercial interlopers" and "unprincipled adventurers,"⁵ who enjoyed most of the trade, and used it to sell firearms to the natives. He did not revert to the exclusive policy of the Company, but he established a system which was not "free trade," even as that phrase was understood at the time. Ships that did not have British registry, and British ships coming from

¹ M. L. van Deventer, NG., 90; Norman, BH., 161 ff. Elout said that the forestry measures of the British oppressed the people, wasted the wood, and hurt the treasury, *ib.*, 164.

² Deventer, NG., cxvii. See this for further illustration.

³ Raffles to Governor General, British India, Oct. 6, 1814, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 47.

⁴ The figures given by Raffles, Hist., 1:215, are of ships and tonnage and do not show the amount of actual trade, as is pointed out in Norman, BH., 282 ff.

⁵ Mem., 74.

west of the Cape, could trade only at Batavia; the customs duties were comparatively low, ranging from about 6 to 10 %, but in some cases a preferential duty was imposed to favor British shipping.¹ Raffles's most efficient work in respect to commerce was done in the way of equalizing duties at the smaller ports and in reforming the method of collection, by abolishing the system of farming out the duties to private individuals.

Raffles had very sanguine expectations of an increase in the revenues of Java by the introduction of the land-tax; he thought that in some districts it would furnish tenfold the previous receipts.² The land-tax did in fact show a steady gain in the first few years after its introduction, rising to over 1,000,000 Java rupees in 1814 and to nearly 2,500,000 in 1815. It formed only one item, however, though the most important one, in the government receipts, which were got from a great variety of sources.³ Other revenues declined, or at least did not advance with it, and though the total receipts of the government were larger than under Daendels or his predecessors, they continued less than the expenditures, and there was an annual deficit of several million rupees.

¹ Details of Raffles's tariffs, of which there were four, are given in Norman, BH., 266 ff., in tabulated form. By the tariff of 1814 foreign ships paid 15 % *ad valorem*, while British paid 10 %; and there was a tendency afterward to increase the preferential in various ways. M. L. van Deventer, NG., cvii. Just before the island was restored to the Dutch the British lowered the duties with the hope of gaining by it afterward. Norman, 272.

² Min., 1813, Sub., 276. He asserted that this increase had been attained in his minute of 1814 (*ib.*, 49), but the figures he gives there do not accord with the figures of actual receipts and must represent only estimates.

³ See the table in Raffles, Hist., 1 : opp. 342, and for a detailed description of the different sources of revenue M. L. van Deventer, NG., xcix ff., 119 ff., 164 ff.

Raffles ascribed his recall, which took place shortly before the evacuation of Java by the British, to the opposition in British India and in England caused by his demands on the Bengal treasury.¹ In his straits for funds he did not resist always the temptation to issue paper money. His issues, however, were in the form of bank-notes and treasury bills, which were redeemed for the most part before the middle of 1816, and he drew out of the circulation over \$8,000,000 (Dutch), in nominal value, of the depreciated paper money left in Java by his predecessors. The device by which he accomplished this result is one of the features of his administration that has been most severely criticised ; instead of taxing the money out of circulation, he sold land, as Daendels had done before him, and received the paper in payment. A land sale by the government is not so innocent in Java as in countries of the New World, for it implies a sale of labor too ; the State parted with a share of its rights over the people settled on the lands, and gave to the purchaser a power over them that has proved a hindrance to good government up to the present time.²

Leaving now the topic of policy for that of administration, there are to be considered the changes attempted and effected by Raffles in the European organization in Java and in the government of the natives. "It would be endless to notice the difficulties and obstacles which occurred

¹ Raffles, Mem., 284.

² I mean only to suggest some of the striking features of Raffles's fiscal policy ; for the details the reader is referred to Norman, to M. L. van Deventer, NG., Introduction, and to C. E. van Kesteren, "Een legaat uit den Engelschen tijd," Ind. Gids, 1884, 2 : 403 ff. ; 1886, 1 : 449 ff., where he will find an extended discussion. Raffles recovered for the government some of the lauds previously alienated, but was charged with making an improper personal gain out of the sales which he instituted.

in the establishment of a pure and upright administration. Not only was the whole system previously pursued by the Dutch to be subverted, but an entire new one substituted, as pure and liberal as the old one was vicious and contracted; and this was to be accomplished and carried into effect by the very persons who had so long fattened on the vice of the former policy.”¹ These words may awaken surprise in view of the reforms that have been described as taking place under Daendels, and they may be taken, written as they were by Mrs. Raffles, as exaggerating considerably the evils that Raffles had to meet. There was some truth in them, however; it is a characteristic difficulty of the historian of the colonial administration in Java at this period that he reads of reforms as being proposed or even effected under one Governor, only to learn from the Governor’s successor that the work is all to be done over again. This is as true of the period of Raffles as of other periods; a totally different impression is given by reading his own accounts of the improvements he made and then reading the account of conditions as his successors found them. Where so many good intentions were lost on the way to fulfilment, it would be fruitless for the purpose of this book to notice the changes in detail, and I shall attempt no more than a review of the main tendencies of Raffles’s administrative work. It should be noted beforehand that in spite of the attempt of the preceding Dutch Governor General to prevent his officials from serving under the English,² they formed a considerable part of Raffles’s administration, and seem to have been

¹ Mem., 100.

² He made them swear not to take office. Minto to East India Company, Dec. 6, 1811, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 3.

at least as faithful and efficient as the officials of British origin.¹

In regard to the provincial administration, Raffles's main object was to effect a better government of the mass of the people by strengthening the position of the European officials. He nearly doubled the number of residents, to whom now first the name becomes permanently attached; he revised the territorial divisions to suit the change in numbers, and provided for a uniform subdivision of each residency into districts under native regents, that was not completed in his time but that served as a basis for organization afterwards. The instructions that he formulated for the residents expressed so well the proper character of their powers and duties that they were retained entire by the Dutch after their restoration. An attempt was made to bring the resident into closer touch with the natives by requiring him to make periodical journeys and reports, and by giving the people the right to make petitions and complaints to him. The somewhat elaborate plans of Raffles for an extension of the European administration below the residents failed for lack of funds; some few collectors were appointed, but in general the resident continued to be burdened by a great variety of functions, civil, military, judicial, and financial, and it is not surprising that he failed to execute all of his duties satisfactorily. The fiscal administration was modified by the British without being improved; the Dutch commissioners found it to be loose and ill regulated when they arrived.²

¹ M. L. van Deventer, NG., xciii, names six Dutch officials who served under Raffles. I have referred above to the fact that two of the three members of his original council were Dutch; to one of them, Muntinghe, he acknowledges a very great obligation.

² Letter of Elout, June 21, 1816, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 78.

The judicial reorganization by Raffles is estimated by a competent critic¹ to have been one of the best and most permanent results of the period of British rule. Raffles made a clean sweep of the previous arrangements for the administration of justice and reestablished them with an eye both to the general principles underlying judicial efficiency, and to the local needs of Europeans and natives in various districts. He found that no distinction was made in the exercise of police and properly judicial functions, that abuses which he termed scandalous still existed in the conduct of justice, and that the system of courts was badly arranged. The measures which he took were far from remedying all evils, and he made some serious blunders, as in the attempt to introduce the British jury system into native Java.² There seems no question, however, that he rendered the administration of justice for Europeans more efficient, and that he established the principles on which the judicial relations with the natives were afterward developed. He showed an industry in collecting information about native customs that was entirely praiseworthy, and he made an earnest effort to enable and encourage the natives to submit their cases to courts under European influence.

The reforms which Raffles effected in the organization of the European officials in Java were in kind not different from those which Daendels had attempted before him; they were such changes as would suggest themselves naturally to a businesslike man, and presented no particular difficulty in their execution. With the plans of Raffles for

¹ M. L. van Deventer, NG., cxxx.

² See Veth, Java, 2 : 321, for a summarized criticism of Raffles's judicial changes.

the reorganization of native government the case was different. They were so entirely opposed to the policy followed by Europeans in the preceding centuries and to the conditions of the native organization that they amounted to a revolution. They were resisted by the ignorance or the interests not of a few scores of officials, but of a whole people. In the few years of the British rule and amid all the distractions peculiar to the period they had no chance of fulfilment. No greater contrast can be imagined than that between the ideals that Raffles published of the proper government of the natives and the facts. Raffles's name lives now because of the vigorous attempt that he made to realize his ideals, but it was left to others to accomplish what he proposed, and the beneficent influence of his plans has been felt more in later times than it was in his own.

Raffles reduced the position of the princes who ruled the fragments of the former state of Mataram, leaving to them only a shadow of the independence that they had formerly enjoyed.¹ Difficulties increased, however, in geometrical progression as he attempted to extend his influence in the native organization, and the test of his power came when he attempted to define and check by it the authority of the provincial governors or regents and of their subordinates. The Lieutenant Governor had to determine first how far he dared to go, second how far he was able to go, in limiting their powers. In the reports of Raffles, and of his superiors in British India and inferiors in Java, there is apparent a certain timidity in interfering with the officials who were

¹ By the contracts of 1811 the Sultan agreed that the British resident should act as his prime minister, and the *Soenan* engaged not to appoint or remove his minister without the consent of the British. M. L. van Deventer, NG., 316, 317.

the actual rulers of the natives, and who might organize silent opposition or provoke open war against the European government if they were too harshly treated.¹ His idea was to win their favor by promising them a position that was, so far as regarded its material advantages, superior to that which they had previously enjoyed, while he meant that they should renounce the powers and privileges that had been abused to oppress the natives. They were to be government officials, subject to instructions in which their powers and duties were carefully defined.² They were to be paid regular salaries, instead of helping themselves as they chose from the resources of the people.

Their good conduct might have been secured in this way, if it had not been necessary from fiscal considerations to limit the money salary to the proportions of a *douceur*, and to retain in large part the old system by which the native officials were paid in land. "Generally speaking," said Raffles, in his minute of 1813, native officials were to be paid from the government treasury; "as far as practicable" the system of payment in land was to be abolished.³ The introduction of the land-tax did cause for a moment a disturbance in the relations previously existing between the official class and the people;

¹ Cf. Raffles, Sub., 263 ff., 289; M. L. van Deventer, NG., 29.

² See for an example of these instructions "Een instructie voor een inlandsch hoofd uit den Engelschen tijd," Bijd., TLV., 1861, 2: 4: 134 ff. This set of instructions, given by the resident of Rembang to the *pateh* or minister of a district in which there was no regular regent, is a document of about four pages. It describes the proper relations of the minister to the government, in the collection of taxes, etc., and to the people, in furthering their physical and moral welfare. The minister could not levy extra taxes, was limited in the amount of service he could exact, etc.

³ Sub., 264. The salaries proposed ranged from two to seven thousand Spanish dollars a year. Min. of Sept. 17, 1813, NG., 22.

lands which had been held as "appanages" by officials, to use the Dutch-Indian term, were treated like any other lands and leased to the occupants, without the reservation of any rights to the officials who had lived off their returns.¹ It was but a short while, however, before the native officials renewed their former relations with the cultivators, and Raffles was forced to sanction this arrangement because his resources were not sufficient to provide adequate salaries.² As long as the former relations between the native officials and the people existed, it was idle to hope for a change in the character of the native government. Raffles issued an order abolishing forced services, but he had no means of putting it in execution, and if he carried out his design of imposing a house-tax to take the place of forced deliveries and services, the natives were burdened probably more heavily than before. The report of 1818 recognized that so far as a regent was supported by grants of land the natives on the land regarded the regent as their lord, whom they were bound to serve according to the ancient customs of the country. The regent made a masterful use of his power, and old exactions continued as before.³

¹ Examples of this appear in the "Eindresumé," 2: 152, 155. The report of Vos on Pasoeroean, 1816 (M. L. van Deventer, NG., 108), if it can be accepted as accurate, proves that for a time the land-tax accomplished what was expected of it; he said that the common people were contented, while the nobles who had been used to live by the sweat of others were the ones who made the loudest complaints.

² In his letter of January, 1814, Mem., 223, he says that he gave the regent the choice of money or land, or both. It is probable that the regents kept most of their previous sources of income, and enjoyed a cash salary in addition.

³ S. van Deventer, LS., 1: 383. The evidence that Egerton cites to show that forced services were abolished according to Raffles's order is

Muntinghe had asked in his minute of 1813, discussing the police powers left to the native chiefs, "who is to control this power of police, with regard to feudal services, and other exactions, customary and usual under the former system? Who will prevent the lower class of Javanese from showing to their regents the same veneration, the same subjection, and from bestowing on them the same services and contributions, which they think it next to a religious duty to offer and perform?" When land was leased in large blocks, it was inevitable that the government should settle it on the native officials; so at the first settlement of Soerabaya the lessees were head-men of the native government, who had formerly held villages as their means of support; they were greedy to lease of the government, and gained by the transaction, while the natives remained in their old condition.¹ It was useless to insert in the contracts of settlement such provisions as one that appears in the settlement of Bantam, "No taxes or services of any kind are to be exacted from the inhabitants."²

Muntinghe foretold the breakdown of Raffles's system of taxation and government, though he believed in its principles and was a strong supporter of them in the following period. He foresaw, too, that the individual settlement could not be realized, and that the land would fall again into the control of the native officials, who would have at their command the labor and produce "as under a feudal system." The land-tax system not only left the insufficient, and his statement that the land-tax system abolished all the regents' profits, "licit and illicit," is incorrect. Egerton, "Raffles," 91-92. Cf. M. L. van Deventer, NG., xvi ff., xcix.

¹ Verslag, Van Lawick van Pabst, S. van Deventer, LS., 1: 373.

² M. L. van Deventer, NG., 17.

regents with their power practically unimpaired ; it also continued the authority of the village heads, who had been elected or appointed in the previous period, and tended to strengthen this authority. The land-tax seems to have been the chief cause of the introduction of the communal land tenure in the villages, with all its opportunities for abuse and oppression. A report written a few years after the introduction of the land-tax describes the head-men as taking every advantage of the ignorance of the villagers in collecting the tax ; they forced some people to pay the tax in advance that they might have the use of the money, others to pay the tax twice over, and the people were helpless under them.¹ According to one official the obligation to pay the tax in money put the people in the power of the well-to-do among them, who assumed the rôle of capitalists and plied usury without mercy.²

Raffles had as little success in attacking one particular

¹ Report of 1818, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 382.

² Report of Van Lawick van Pabst, Soerabaya, *ib.*, 373, "the common Javanese simply changed his master. Formerly he did service for the government and for his regent ; now he was under obligation to do service for the lessee of the village or the man who advanced his money. So that most of the Chinese and principal native inhabitants of the city of Soerabaya can be said to have leased the land, like the regent and the few native heads who were employed, whose income consisted partially of lands instead of a cash salary, and who did as they pleased with the lands and the people attached to them." While Raffles had not absolutely required payment in cash, he had strongly urged it (cf. Min., 1814, Sub., 154, Rev. Instructions, *ib.*, p. 200), and his officials tended to force part payment at least in cash. One resident stipulated that from one-fourth to one-half of the tax should be invariably paid in money. Jourdan, Pasoeroean, Sub., 140. See also Rept. of 1818, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 382. One resident reported that though he had not foreseen any source from which money could be obtained, payments were for the most part made in it, and not in kind. M. L. van Deventer, NG., 87.

abuse of the native organization, the internal transit duties, as in attempting its general reform. The larger native states in Java had not in their territorial growth wiped out the taxes which marked the frontiers of the smaller units from which they were formed; internal transit duties hindered commerce and production as they did in Europe to recent times. "The taxes on the internal trade extended to every article of produce, manufacture, or consumption passing through the country; they were levied by corrupt and extortionate agents, and in most cases were farmed out to Chinese. A different mode of taxation existed in every district, and to have attempted to reduce them to one uniform system would have been as impracticable as to have enforced their subsequent collection with any degree of regularity or correctness."¹ The amount of the internal duties on the transport of wares was estimated at nearly 50% of their value by one English official and was probably much more. To them were added the market dues, which were levied on the wares exposed for sale in every petty village; there was no limit to them except that set by ill-defined custom and the ability of the trader to pay. Raffles proclaimed the abolition of internal duties, and ordered that the market tolls should be administered directly by the government instead of being farmed out to Chinese, but his regulations had little practical effect. Even in his own time, it is said, new toll-gates were established where none had existed before,² and the old ones persisted with all of their abuses.³

¹ Raffles, Sub., 135.

² Elout, "Bijdragen," 1851, p. 51.

³ Cf. M. L. van Deventer, NG., 95, for the existence of toll-gates in Kadoe, 1816; Ind. Gids, 1892, 1: 988 ff., an original document describing

The statement of Merkus¹ that the government by Europeans, not only of Java but of the Javanese as well, really dates from Raffles is inaccurate, as any such general statement must be. No single man can make over a great political system when that system is a true expression of the society on which it rests. Least of all could Raffles accomplish this under the many difficulties of his short rule. It is praise enough for him that he attempted the task that generations had to do, and that he worked so manfully to accomplish it. Neither his own failure nor that of his Dutch successors to realize the ideals that he proposed condemns his plans. Those plans were sound and practicable, and if more men like Raffles had followed him, and had been allowed to carry on the work unhampered by selfish demands from Europe, Java would now be the gainer by many years of progress.

the abuses, 1817-1824; and P. H. van der Kemp, "De economische oorzaken van den Java-oorlog," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1897, 6:3:42-48. Among other measures taken by Raffles for the good of the people ought to be mentioned his acts limiting the slave trade and looking to the abolition of slavery. The institution of slavery was not sufficiently important in Java to warrant a detailed discussion of these acts and their results; for them see Norman, *BH.*, 157 ff., M. L. van Deventer, *NG.*, cxxxiv ff.

¹ S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2:286.

CHAPTER VI

THE PERIOD OF THE DUTCH RESTORATION

THE British rule forms a great dividing line in the history of the Dutch in Java. Before the time of Raffles there was but slight departure from the system of the East India Company. This system was not entirely abolished by him, and enough of it was preserved to furnish a basis in later times for the extension of the culture system, which marked a reversion to its principles. The new principles, however, which had been formulated by Dirk van Hogendorp and which Raffles had attempted to apply, were never entirely out of mind; they revived with the growth of political liberalism in Europe, and formed the ideals toward which the Dutch have worked in the most recent period of their rule. At the time of the Dutch restoration in 1816 they were accepted by the officials who were sent from the Netherlands to take possession of the island, and inspired the measures which these officials took in reëstablishing Dutch rule.

The colonial constitution of 1815, framed when Java was still occupied by the British, determined that inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies should be allowed the free cultivation of all products except spices and opium, and saving the forced deliveries which had been maintained by the British, and which were to be subject to future regulation. The constitution implied that the

main obligation of the natives to the government was to be a land-tax, and that when they had paid this tax, in money or in kind, they were to have free disposal of the produce of their lands.¹

The persons to whom the general execution of these principles was confided, and who were granted great authority in determining the details, were three commissioners, who had been appointed in 1814 to receive Java from the British, and who arrived in the island and began their work in 1816. A fourth person, who nominally did not share in the authority of the commissioners, but who had actually great influence in determining their policy, was one whose name has been mentioned in previous chapters, H. W. Muntinghe. His services had been mentioned with grateful appreciation by Daendels² and by Raffles.³ He was without question the Dutch official who was most competent to direct the restored government, and he had at first been named as one of the commissioners, but later was set aside to make place for a nominee from the Netherlands.⁴ As president of the Council of Finance Muntinghe occupied a subordinate position, but his practical experience made him indispensable to the commissioners, and the remarkable report which he submitted to them in 1817, and in which he maintained the policy that Raffles

¹ Reg., 1815, art. 78-79, *Mijer, Verz.*, 392. Proclamation of Director General of Colonies, 1815, *M. L. van Deventer, NG.*, 54.

² Daendels to Minister, October, 1809, *Jonge, Opk.*, 13 : 430.

³ Raffles said that he owed to Muntinghe the most valuable assistance in framing his government ; that Muntinghe first pointed out to him the abuses in the former system, and encouraged him to reform it. *Sub.*, 78.

⁴ *Meinsma, Gesch.*, 2 : 133. Meinsma thinks that this change was made that Muntinghe's abilities might be more effectively utilized, and that there were objections, too, to promoting an official already in Java to be commissioner.

had followed, was accepted by them with some reservations as expressing the principles they were to follow.¹

No rulers of Java before or since have been faced by the peculiar difficulties which confronted the Dutch commissioners of 1816. They fell heirs to the projects of their predecessor for a complete change in the system of government, but found these projects only half carried out and confused by the greatest differences in their practical execution. Raffles had written to a friend, in the early period of his rule, "unless I felt satisfied that I could *fully* establish the new system before I attempted its adoption, I might by a *partial* interference hamper and annoy the government which is permanently to rule over the island."² The danger of a mixture of systems, old and new, had been foreseen by Muntinghe, who wrote in his minute of 1813,³ "the partial grant of a free trade and free cultivation, under a continuation of the feudal system in general, is a mock privilege, which can be of no effect whatever on the emancipation of the people at large, nor of any benefit to government, beyond what a system of monopoly will afford. It must, in fact, prove a continuation of the ancient system; it can forbode nothing else but a repetition of the same losses and disappointments which it had produced before, and the partial liberation announced by it to the inhabitants of Java will always remain nominal."

The mixture of systems which both Raffles and Mun-

¹ This report, which is printed in extenso in S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 281-355, and from which I have made already a number of quotations, is held by Pierson, KP., 45, to express with sufficient accuracy the considerations moulding the policy of the commissioners.

² Raffles to Marsden, January, 1813, Mem., 206.

³ Raffles, Sub., 287.

tinghe had deprecated had come to pass; it was indeed inevitable that the transition from one system to another should be marked by the existence together of both old and new. It was the business now of the commissioners to untangle the existing confusion, to choose the better among measures that might all seem bad, to decide upon the practicable, and to exercise the energy at their disposal with all the economy that the conditions made necessary. They found their administration to consist largely of Englishmen, who were helpful and obliging, but who could not be permanently kept in service; they found the Dutch officials who had been maintained in office by the British to be prejudiced against changes which had thrust them into the background, and the new officials whom they appointed were raw and ignorant, unable to give them accurate information of conditions or to help them in reforms.¹ Worst of all, they found an empty treasury and a constant deficit. They had to begin their rule by drawing on the Netherlands to make the payments to the British which the transfer of the island involved; they had to borrow at 9% and were not then in a condition to pay in full the salaries of the military and civil service.²

The most important point of policy to be settled by the commissioners, "the great and delicate question," as Muntinghe put it, was the attitude that they should assume to the land-tax; the decision on this point involved the choice between free labor or forced as the

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 259 ff. The praise of the officials expressed by Elout in his farewell address, "Bijdragen," 1851, must be taken with allowances proper to the occasion.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 268.

base of their system. Enough has been said about the practical workings of Raffles's tax to make plain to the reader that the commissioners were little likely to accept it without hesitation or reservation. It was not only incomplete in its principles but absolutely wild in its workings. Owing to the insufficiency of the European administration, it had in no case retained the character which Raffles had designed for it; it had become degraded by being moulded to fit the native organization, and showed in its workings all of the abuses of the former native system.¹ The tax was not only unjust; it was also inefficient. It failed to meet one of the first requisites of a good tax, namely that the government should be able to estimate its yield and collect the estimated sum; commissioners found that the returns from the tax dribbled into the treasury far in arrears, and considerably below the amounts that had been expected.²

The commissioners confined their action at the start to the endeavor to get information as to the actual workings of the tax from the officials in the field. The reports showed, as they came in, the greatest diversity of opinion among the residents, to be explained in part by their personal prejudices, but in greater measure by the fact that the tax worked in the same way in no two districts. The resident of one district thought that the people were not ripe for a tax system; he asserted that the hurried introduction of the land-tax had resulted in a decline in

¹ For evidence of the clumsy workings of the land-tax, in addition to that already quoted, see the reports of 1816 and 1817, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 86, 150 ff.; S. van Deventer, LS., 1:376.

² See the figures of conditions in 1816 from the report of 1818, S. van Deventer, LS., 1:378. Pierson, KP., 42, says that the arrears, 1815-1817, amounted to 2,000,000 gulden.

production and even in population.¹ The resident of Tagal thought that the tax was harmful, even ruinous, to the natives, and would be destructive in its influence on the government.² On the other hand one resident spoke of the "astonishing speed with which the country has advanced in cultivation and population in the last five years," as a result of a new system.³ Conservative officials recognized the faults in the workings of the tax system, but thought that these could be remedied in the course of time by reforms in the administration, and recommended that the tax be continued in the hope of its future development.⁴

The commissioners inclined to this last view, that the land-tax was good in principle but subject to great irregularity in its workings; they decided in the latter part of 1816 to retain it without change for the time, but to attempt to improve its administration.⁵ Muntinghe's report of 1817, to which they gave in general their endorsement, presented a thorough-going platform of liberal principles as the basis of their policy. The government was to depend primarily on taxes, especially on the land-tax, which was to be maintained and improved; and all commercial considerations were to be regarded as of secondary importance. The natives were not to work except voluntarily and for full pay, and that they might

¹ Report of De Salis, Pekalongan and Kedoe, September, 1816, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 84.

² Report of January, 1817, S. van Deventer, LS., 1: 370.

³ Report of Vos on Pasoeroean, Sept., 1816, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 105.

⁴ Report of Servatius, Cheribon, March, 1817, S. van Deventer, LS., 1: 369; Report of De Bruijn, Bantam, 1817, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 161.

⁵ Van der Capellen to Director General of Colonies, Oct. 15, 1817, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 204; S. van Deventer, LS., 1: 271.

have the means to meet their taxes they were to be secured against interference with their persons, property, and the fruits of their labor.¹

The commissioners made zealous use of all the time they spent in Java to put the land-tax on a practical and permanent basis. They recognized the difficulty of their task and approached it with a becoming modesty. They collected information by personal investigations and by the agency of their subordinates, they deliberated on it carefully, and set forth their results in laws which though admittedly tentative suited so well the conditions that they endured for generations. Hearty endorsement can be given to the appreciation by a modern financier, Mr. N. G. Pierson.² "I believe that no one can do more than cast a superficial glance at the legislative work of the Commissioners General, without conceiving a great admiration for the men who accomplished this work. It gives evidence of knowledge of the facts, of careful deliberation, — above all of sagacity. A matured plan formed the basis of the whole regulation, and where means were lacking to execute this plan in the way desired, they attempted no impossibilities, but contented themselves with provisional measures, while they gave the necessary instructions to make sure that proper definitive measures could be taken later."

The laws of 1818 and 1819, which expressed the results of the commissioners' deliberation and which continued to regulate the land-tax system down to 1872 and even after that date in fact, introduced the following important changes into the system as it had been left by Raffles.³

¹ S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 1:335; I have rearranged and condensed the six articles in which Muntinghe sets forth his principles. ² *KP.*, 30.

³ The texts of these laws are printed in S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 356-360,

First, the attempt to impose the tax on individual natives was to be abandoned, and thereafter the tax was to be imposed on village groups. In a sense this marks a decline from the ideals of Raffles, who had been led to the individual settlement because of his conviction that so long as any native officials, even the lowest, the village heads, controlled imposition and collection of taxes, the people were bound to suffer injury. There was some truth in Raffles's notion, as can be shown by abundant instances of injustice and oppression in the Javanese villages in very recent times. The idea, however, that this flaw in the tax system would be sufficient to wreck the workings of the tax and force the government to adopt a detailed settlement, though it was clearly presented by a subordinate official at the time, has not proved true.¹ On the other hand, the commissioners were moved by a consideration that in their position was of the greatest practical importance, the fact that the village system lightened immensely the labors of administration for the Europeans by throwing some of them on the shoulders of natives. It was simply impossible for the commissioners to provide the number of officials who would have been

400-407, and summarized by Pierson, KP., 43 ff. ; considerations leading the commissioners to these changes are given in Elout, "Bijdragen," 1851, 31 ff.

¹ De Bruijn in his report from Bantam, 1817, urged the detailed settlement because of the chances for abuse in any other. "It would be possible, perhaps, in case land is leased to desa heads, to collect considerable sums, with little trouble and expense, for a time ; but this advantage cannot possibly be permanent, for it would be opposed to the common interest, and would dry up the springs from which lasting benefit to the country must flow, while at the same time this system would conflict with the expressed sentiments of the government, that the immediate advantage of the public treasury does not give the only criterion for the suitability (*doelmatigheid*) of a tax." M. L. van Deventer, NG., 160.

necessary to realize the individual assessment and collection of the tax ; substitute, however, a village group for the separate individuals as the tax-paying subject, and the difficulties were lightened many fold. It might seem a pity to sacrifice the natives to the tyranny of village misgovernment, but conditions would at least be better than in the old times when regents and their subordinates had too their share in all extortion, and the commissioners clearly regarded the system of village imposition as but temporary and destined to give place to the taxation of individuals in time.¹

A second important change in the land-tax, closely connected with this first, was the abandonment of any fixed principle of assessing the tax, and the regulation that the amount to be paid by each village should be reached by agreement with the village government, — that is, by higgling. Raffles's attempt to base his tax on the general principle that land of a certain quality should pay a certain proportion of its yield to the government had proved entirely impracticable, and like all such laws, that make a show of justice without hope of securing its substance, had stimulated rather than checked abuses. The amendment prescribed certain considerations which officials should take into account in making the bargain with the village government for the taxes of the year : the amount paid in former years, the condition of the crops at the time of the bargain, and circumstances peculiar to any village that would affect its tax-paying power. The commissioners gave up all attempts at precision by this method which

¹ Paragraph 1 of the law said that the village system should continue "just as long as the fields shall fail to be properly surveyed, classified, and valued." S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 401.

they adopted for the raising of the land-tax, but they created a system so pliant that it preserved the natives from extinction if not from injustice, while its practicability from the government standpoint can be measured by the steady increase in the returns. Finally, the commissioners gave permission to the natives to pay the tax either in money or in kind as they preferred, and so guarded against any danger that may have existed of sacrificing the people to native usurers by requiring cash payments.¹

The commissioners had received no instructions to do away with the forced cultures, which had been maintained by Raffles, and showed a natural reluctance, while the system of the land-tax was still in the experimental stage, to give up a source of revenue that had become of importance with the opening of trade.² In their report of 1818 they opposed the idea that all of Java ought properly to be subjected to the same system, and withheld their opinion on the advisability of retaining the forced coffee culture in the Preanger regencies until they should have more full information on the working of the land-tax.³ Pierson charges the commissioners with inconsistency, and exposes the fallacy of the arguments by which they sought to justify their action, but his criticism seems too unsparing in view of the difficulties under which the commissioners labored. It is not fair to say, as he does, that the system of cultures was either good or bad, entirely to be accepted or condemned. Everything was more or less bad, from a European standpoint, in Java at this

¹ After 1827 part of the tax had to be paid in money.

² Coffee had never brought such high prices as it brought in the time of the commissioners. A picol sold at the end of the British period for \$7.50, in 1818 for \$17 to \$20. M. L. van Deventer, NG., clxii.

³ S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 393.

⁴ KP., 40 ff.

time. The system of forced cultures had certain features that rendered it particularly liable to abuse ; it is hard in judging the action of the commissioners at this time to keep from mind the great evils of the culture system as it was extended in later times, and to forget the influence that the maintenance of the coffee culture had on this extension. In the time of the commissioners, however, another great part of the government's revenue system, the land-tax, had been singled out for reform ; they could not do everything at once, and are scarcely to be blamed for devoting their energies pretty exclusively to this object and deferring other reforms until this had been accomplished. The commissioners stood squarely on the ground that the home country had full right to all returns that could be got from the natives without infringing their claims to liberty and protection. "Even magnanimity has its limits."¹ At the time, moreover, the coffee culture, confined to the parts of Java most suited to its application, seems to have exercised comparatively little oppression.² The commissioners retained the forced coffee culture in the Preangers, therefore, though they freed the people from some of the burden of taxation imposed by Raffles.³

¹ Commissioner General to Director General, Dec. 23, 1817, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 228.

² Piccardt, CS., 55, says that there is a world-wide difference of opinion as to the influence of the forced coffee culture on the Preangers. Some think that it exercised little pressure ; others describe the population as impoverished ; he finds it impossible to form an opinion in the matter. There were native demonstrations against oppression, 1817-1819, but they seem to have been caused by the failure of the British to reform certain general abuses in forced services to which the native government lent itself, and show no connection with the coffee culture. Cf. M. L. van Deventer, NG., clxvi ff., 180, 183.

³ They even introduced the coffee culture into a district at the eastern end of the island where it had not been established before, but Deventer

They retained also the system of forced services in the forests, with some new regulations designed to prevent abuses.¹

The commissioners had not only to come to a decision on the status of the forced coffee culture where it had been retained by the British, but also to review and revise the regulations that the British had adopted for the coffee culture in other parts of the island. Four possible plans of action were suggested to them in the report on the subject from the Council of Finance.² First, the government might force the natives to cultivate the coffee and deliver the product for very low prices, as had been done under the East India Company and as was to be done later under the culture system; second, the government might require forced culture and delivery but pay the natives by wages instead of measuring their reward by the amount of the product; third, it might give up the attempt to force or pay the labor on the coffee plantations, but offer a fair price for the product and require that it should be sold to no one else; finally, it might put the lands in the hands of the natives subject only to certain special regulations about the planting of trees that would insure the maintenance of the culture, and grant the natives free disposal of the product of their lands when they had paid a fair tax on them. The last of these plans, and the most liberal

thinks this may have been done on political considerations; NG., cliv. Veth suggests other reasons; Java, 2 : 340.

¹ The failure to remove oppressions is shown by the fact that in 1821 half a thousand inhabitants of the villages subject to the *blandong* system came to Samarang, asking for relief; the government found it impossible to disperse them by punishment of the ringleaders, and had to concede what they asked. Baud, Pro Mem., 1829, S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 191.

² M. L. van Deventer, NG., 189 ff., cli ff.

of all of them, was the one adopted by the commissioners. By a law of 1817 the government leased the coffee plantations to the village governments for a term of six years, on condition that each year new plantations equal in extent to one-fifth of the old were to be laid out. The natives were to pay a tax or rent, varying from one-third to one-half of the product, according to the goodness of the plantation; they could then dispose of the surplus if they pleased; the government stood ready to take it at a certain price if they chose to sell. Any one who chose to lay out a new plantation could pursue the coffee culture on payment of a tax of two-fifths of the crop. If the natives refused to take the coffee plantations on these terms, the government proposed to cultivate them on its own account by wage labor.¹

In the organization of the European administration the commissioners adhered in most points to the arrangements that they found existing after Raffles's reforms. Some of his changes were revoked,² but the commissioners applied their energies in general to extending the administration and to realizing the designs that Raffles had held by an increase in the number of officials. In contrast to the rigid economy that had been practised under the British rule, officials were multiplied, not always apparently with a corresponding increase in efficiency.³ The attention of

¹ I follow the summary of the law in Pierson, KP., 39; S. van Deventer, LS., 1:274 ff., prints only extracts.

² So, for instance, the attempt to introduce the jury and several other changes of a judicial character; Veth, Java, 2:338; Elout, Bijdragen (1851), 21 ff.

³ Cf. the description and criticism of the administrative changes in M. L. van Deventer, NG., cxi ff. A few years afterward it was declared that 3,000,000 gulden a year could be saved on the expenditures on war and public works, and that the same applied to the civil service, *ib.*, cxliii.

the commissioners was naturally directed to the strengthening of the administration of the land-tax, which had been much undermanned in the British period; they appointed new officials and redistributed their duties.¹

They began too the agitation for an improvement in the quality of the officials sent out from the Netherlands for Indian service, whom they declared to be in many cases entirely unfit for their work.² The need not only of good character and abilities, but also of special training, in the case of members of the Indian civil service, became more and more apparent as the government extended its work of reform, and gained a better appreciation of the difficulties and the way in which they must be met. "Knowledge of native languages, knowledge of native customs and institutions, and the appreciation of the character and valuable qualities of the native population," wrote Muntinghe, "we think we may submit to your Excellencies as indispensable requisites in all officials who are in the future to be charged with the collection of the land-tax. And

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 391, 396 ff.

² The Director General of the colonies wrote in 1816 that there was a great desire to go out to India, and there was pressure to secure places; M. L. van Deventer, NG., 130; at the same time the commissioners were complaining of the quality of the men sent them for the civil service and asking that at least these might be fit to learn, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 262. One of the commissioners wrote to the Director of Colonies in the summer of 1817 that improvement was impossible as long as India was regarded as a dumping ground for men of whom the Netherlands wanted to be rid, drunkards and the like, as was then the case; M. L. van Deventer, NG., cxliv, 185. Van Alphen thinks there is evidence of corruption among the Dutch officials in the time of the commissioners, by which they grew rich at the expense of the natives. "Onze kennis van Indie," De Gids, 1867, 1 : 517. Elout, in his report of 1819, Bijdragen (1851), 71, mentions abuses by officials which Daendels had tried to extirpate but which still lingered on.

we are of the opinion that on the fitness of these officials the good and regular working of a system of taxation must in large part depend.”¹ A beginning was made in this period with the establishment of institutions designed to help officials to gain the knowledge desired of them. A military school was established at Samarang in 1818, at which young men were to be trained for service in the army, navy, and engineering corps, and provision was made by which the school should receive six pupils from outside for instruction in the Javanese tongue.² Arrangements were made the next year to place young men with the residents in different parts of the East Indies to learn languages and institutions by intercourse with members of the native nobility, and at the same time subordinate members of the Dutch provincial administration were notified that they must acquire such a knowledge of the language of the district as to be able to use it readily, on penalty of a diminution in their pay.³

The provincial administrative organization was maintained as established by Raffles, but with the changes that experience proved necessary to remedy some of its weaker spots. The resident of Soerabaya reported⁴ that murder, robbery, and arson increased constantly in the island of Madoera, which nominally was included in the territory subject to him, but which really was abandoned to its native government; the commissioners made of the island a separate residency. Conditions were as bad in Bantam, at the other extremity of Java, and the country was rescued from anarchy in 1819 by a reorganization attended

¹ Report of 1817, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 338, 273.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 41. This school was given up in 1826.

³ *Ibid.*, 42. ⁴ November, 1817, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 208.

by a considerable increase in the number of European and native officials.¹ Complaints from other parts of the island were met by the increase of officials and the dismissal of the untrustworthy.²

A noteworthy feature of the period under discussion is the change in attitude of the government toward the native officials. One of the residents wrote in 1823³ that many European officials after the introduction of the land-tax thought that it was for the common good that the native officials should decrease in number, and finally be done away with altogether; experience, however, had brought the conviction that they were indispensable, that the Europeans could not reach the native communities without them. Some of the residents obstinately attempted to do without the services of the regents, but the government had come to appreciate their necessity, and did what it could to secure their good services. To define accurately their position, without giving them too much or too little power, was a delicate matter, but they must at least be protected against humiliation by the resident and be assured some sphere of action.⁴ By a law of 1820, passed after the departure of the commissioners but apparently in the spirit of their instructions, the rights and duties of the native regents were established. Any attempt to sum-

¹ Report of Tobias, 1819, S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 30. As an example of the condition of Bantam about the time of British rule the resident cited the case of an Oriental adventurer who raised his flag, levied taxes, and acted the part of ruler not four miles away from the Sultan's residence, *ib.*, 26, note.

² Report, 1818, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 391; two regents and one district head had been dismissed. For the increase in numbers see *ib.*, 2 : 72 ff., *passim*.

³ S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 73.

⁴ Letter of Van der Capellen, 1820, S. van Deventer, 2 : 55 ff.

marize the forty-six articles of the law would lead to too great detail, but the spirit of the measure can be rendered by quoting one paragraph: "In matters concerning the government of the natives the regents are the confidential advisers of the resident, and he shall treat them as his younger brothers."¹

The tendency in this as in most of the other regulations of the commissioners was to depart from the somewhat abstract ideas of Raffles in favor of practical efficiency. By renouncing the fiction that Europeans were ready to assume entire charge of affairs, they could use and check the power of native officials as else they would have been unable to do. There was frequently occasion afterward to remind the residents of this regulation;² in spite, however, of many infractions, it was observed sufficiently to bring a new spirit of coöperation into the administration and to increase the power of the government.³

It is impossible to blink the danger that came from the official recognition of the regents' powers; the abuses of the culture system follow so closely, and are so clearly related to this partial abdication by European officials that it is hard to judge the action of the commissioners fairly. I am inclined to think, however, that the abuses resulted in the change in spirit of the government after 1830, and were no necessary result of the commissioners' action. The previous tendency of residents to snub the regents and attempt to set them on one side may have had better

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 61.

² *Ibid.*, LS., 2: 67 ff., 78.

³ Chailley-Bert, JH., 236, quotes Baud for the opinion that this measure secured the support of the regents during the Java war. The new ambitions inspired in native officials by the government's policy can be seen in the competition for titles and honorary distinctions that increased from this time on. Cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 70.

motives than jealousy or ignorance, but I hold it to have been unfortunate because impracticable.

Below the rank of regent came the head-men of the districts into which the regency was divided, who received orders both from the regent and the resident, and were intrusted mainly with police duties, the settling of petty disputes, and the gathering of information for their superiors.¹ Last in the hierarchy of officials were the village heads, who formed the link uniting the common people with the government above; they reported on the condition of the villages, were responsible for the maintenance of order among the common people, and carried into final execution the commands of the superior officials.² While the commissioners and their successors increased the number of intermediate officials, there was no occasion for them to attempt an increase in the number of village heads, who were found in one form or another in nearly every village group. A law of 1819 attempted to assure that they should be elected freely by the villagers, subject to the approval of the Dutch resident.³

Equal in interest if not in practical importance to the extension and regulation of the native officials were certain measures aimed at particular abuses in the existing organization.⁴ The most important of these concerned the way in which the native officials were paid for their services. The attempt of Raffles to introduce money salaries and its failure have been noted already. The

¹ For the position of the *demang*, or *wedono*, and his assistants, *mantri*'s, see Kleyn, *Gew. Best.*, 89 ff., which gives a summary of the law of 1819.

² Kleyn, 93 ff.

³ S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 1: 414.

⁴ I should, however, note that the two protected principalities and the Preanger regencies were excepted from all these changes.

evils of the native system of payment by land grants were called to the attention of the commissioners and were recognized by them.¹ By a law of 1818 they attempted to restrict the dues that an official could take from his land to an amount equal to the government land-tax, and in 1819 they altogether abolished payment by the grant of land.² Another part of this same law prohibited the native officials of higher rank from engaging in commercial transactions, on penalty of losing their positions; this would remedy the evils of official usury, so far as positive law could accomplish anything without the economic influence of European merchants. Finally, another law of 1819 provided against the abuse of the common people through the connivance or intimidation of their village governments, by taking away from the villages the right to contract as corporations, and by requiring every contract to be made with individuals and to be registered with the residents if it were to be binding.³

I spoke above of these three reform measures as being interesting rather than important. They show that the commissioners had an understanding of some of the worst abuses to which the people under their charge were sub-

¹ The resident of Rembang proposed, 1817, that the pay of the native officials should be entirely in money and should be increased. S. van Deventer, LS., 1:277. The commissioners, in their report of 1818, admitted that the people of eastern Java suffered as much as ever under the burden of forced services. "The grant of land necessarily implies the grant of people, according to the ideas of the Javanese, always of services, to be rendered by the people who inhabit the land to the usufructuary of it;" *ib.*, 1:383.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 1:412-413. The cash salaries of regents as established in 1820 varied in different parts of the island; most were between 10,000 and 20,000 gulden a year; *ib.*, 2:60, note.

³ S. van Deventer, LS., 1:408. Daendels also had forbidden this practice.

ject, and testify to their desire to remedy the evils. They were, however, measures extremely difficult to carry out. They required that European ideas of business and justice should penetrate to the very recesses of the native organization if they were to be established. Evidence in the period immediately after their adoption shows that they were violated and that the government was unable to punish the offenders.¹ If the policy and spirit of the commissioners had descended intact to their successors in the government, these salutary regulations would in time have been efficiently upheld. They lost in force when the culture system was introduced, and were all of them repealed later to enable the culture system to be carried on.

The period of the commissioners' rule lasted less than three years. It was marked, as I have shown in the preceding paragraphs, by a sincere attempt to realize the best ideals that had been proposed for the government of the natives, so far as they were practicable. Certain features of the commissioners' policy, not yet referred to, will be described in connection with their later development. The general principles on which the commissioners acted,

¹ The resident of Rembang wrote in 1823 that native officials drew their salaries and kept their lands too; European officials and private individuals held villages to service by contracting to pay the land-tax for them. S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 75. The government stopped this last abuse in one case in 1824 (*ib.*, 2: 85), but no one knows how many cases there were that passed unnoticed, when, as in this case, the resident himself was the offender and brought the matter voluntarily to the attention of the government. The resident of Japara reported in 1823 that he could not, with all his other duties, undertake the investigation of the frequent abuses of native officials; the duty of investigation was passed from one to another official; *ib.*, 2: 81 ff. S. van Deventer says that he gives only a few examples of the many abuses of native government in this period. A number of these have been collected by Van Soest, KS., 1: 142 ff.

and which they left to guide the future government, can be given in summary in a quotation from a speech of Commissioner Elout, made to his successors when he left India in 1819. "The mother-country has a claim to a full enjoyment of the advantages which its foreign possessions offer ; you must work with that in mind. But the mother-country has no desire that the people of these possessions should serve exclusively to procure those advantages ; it desires and wills that the people themselves should have their part of them ; this principle too you must never lose from mind. The mother-country wills yet more ; it grants to strangers that they pluck fruits in our garden, so long as they do not dig up our soil nor sow it with weeds ; you are to care for this and watch against its abuses."¹ As the Governor General, to whom the chief direction of affairs was now intrusted, Baron van der Capellen, had been himself one of the commissioners, there seemed every likelihood that the spirit of their policy would be upheld, and the reforms developed on the lines that they had laid down.

The new government retained the regulations for the assessment and collection of the land-tax, which had been established as provisional by the commissioners, and extended their application to new territory as opportunity offered.² Up to the time of the introduction of the culture

¹ Elout, *Bijd.* (1851), 5. I have translated somewhat freely.

² The land-tax was introduced into new territory, gained by lease from native princes, and into parts of the government domain where other systems had before been allowed to continue. S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2 : 89 ff. Even in the heart of the government territory there had been exemptions from the tax on various considerations. So in Cheribon, a village was freed from the tax on condition that it supplied four men daily to watch a prison. In 1826 the government relieved the village of this duty and subjected it to the regular tax ; as a result the government was enabled to

system the yield of the land-tax increased steadily, as will be seen from the following figures giving actual net returns, in gulden: ¹—

1818	3,259,933	1824	5,436,348
1819	3,876,221	1825	5,293,792
1820	4,012,228	1826	6,128,668
1821	4,418,814	1827	5,803,449
1822	4,997,771	1828	5,493,416
1823	5,413,530	1829	5,972,706

The administration of the tax was, however, still very irregular. The commissioners had been forced by need of funds to hurry the officials in the collection of 1818, to the harm of the principles which they had laid down,² and evidence extending all through the period now under consideration shows that principles were generally disregarded by the residents and collectors. In some districts officials attempted, apparently, to carry on an individual settlement,³ which had been abandoned by the commissioners in favor of the village system, while in others the tax was imposed, not on villages separately but on a group of villages, five or more, under one native official. It is apparent that this last departure tended to defeat the plan of the commissioners to minimize the influence of native officials; if one man contracted for the taxes of a whole dis-

hire police officials to do what the villagers had done before, and still had a considerable surplus from the tax yield of the village; *ib.*, 2: 103. In extending the land-tax to new territory the government did not always follow the general principles of assessment laid down by the commissioners (cf. *LS.*, 2: 90, 92), but the departures seem to have been of no great practical importance.

¹ *S. van Deventer*, *LS.*, 2: 129. Other tables show comparatively slight losses by remissions, etc. The effects of the Java war appear after 1825.

² *Ibid.*, 1: 396.

³ So in *Kadoe*, 1819, *S. van Deventer*, *LS.*, 2: 11.

trict, he would have inevitably great political power in the district and could hardly be stopped from abusing it.¹ The independence and arbitrary character of the residents' actions are illustrated by the case of the resident of Soerabaya, who changed the method of assessment in his residency without consultation with the government and caused a great decrease in the yield of the tax.² A report of 1823³ said that the establishment and administration of the tax in the residency Rembang were incomplete, that the assistant did not follow the principles of the tax laws, and that the collection was often carried on with force.

Enough has been said to show that the land-tax, in its practical application, was still full of faults. They were faults, however, that were to be expected when an untrained European administration attempted to introduce a new system of dealing with the native organization; they did not vitiate the principles on which the system was based, or preclude the hope of improvement as the

¹ *Ib.*, 2 : 580, shown in Kadoe by a report of 1833. An attempt made in 1837 to reform this condition was apparently a failure, for a report of the Director of Cultures in 1844 shows it still existing; *ib.*, 3 : 79, 198. The arrangement seems to have resulted from preëxisting institutions in the native organization.

² The decrease amounted in one year to over 400,000 gulden, about one-thirteenth of the total yield of the tax in all Java. The resident asserted that the larger part of this decrease was due to a failure of the crops, and that the rest, about 150,000 gulden, represented an alleviation of the burdens of the population necessary to prevent their emigration. The government refused, however, to accept these excuses, and charged the resident with an unwarranted disregard of instructions. S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 123 ff. Van Deventer, *ib.*, 2 : 14, shows that some of the reports from the tax collectors, purporting to show the principles according to which the tax was administered, cannot be taken as a picture of the actual conditions; they were office documents, worth only the paper on which they were printed.

³ S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 75.

Dutch officials increased their knowledge by experience. Judged by the most practical consideration, the payments to the treasury, the tax was a success, and it needed only time to have remedies found to stop the abuses in its workings. In the years just before 1830, when the land-tax gave way to the culture system as the main source of revenue, the Indian government was busied with investigations and preparations that would enable it to overcome the faults of the tax. It had begun the organization of a force to carry on a cadastral survey and had appointed a commission to undertake the reform of the tax when the outbreak of the Java war of 1825 and interference from the Netherlands prevented the execution of its plans.¹ Through pressure from the home government the culture system was introduced, and with it began a long period of reversion to the principles of the East India Company that thrust into the background all plans for reform.

In the period after the departure of the commissioners in 1819 there is observable a tendency in India to gravitate back to the Company's policy, though it was never strong enough to lead to the open sacrifice of the tax system to that policy, and would not have led to the culture system except for the influence of the home government. Such a tendency to reversion was natural, considering that many Indian officials had been trained under the old system, that parts of that system had been retained by the commissioners, and that the extension of it was easy and seemed profitable.

According to Merkus, who had an excellent opportunity to observe the workings of the government from an official position, there never was any earnest attempt to

¹ S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2 : 113 ff.

carry into practice the rules that the commissioners laid down in the law of 1817 for the regulation of the "free" coffee culture. The coffee lands were not leased to the villages in return for the payment of a tax or rent, but forced upon them; the proposal of the government to undertake the cultivation by wage labor of land which the natives did not care to work on the terms offered them remained a dead letter, because the natives were not given the privilege of a choice. Provisions for the valuation of the lands were not carried out; they were arbitrarily assessed in various ways, and a cash return was required from them without the option of paying in kind. "In a word, the chief principles of the system adopted by the Commissioners General was never put in practice; the main object that they had in view, voluntary labor and free disposal of the product, was lost entirely."¹ The officials did in form allow the natives free disposal of the crop remaining after paying the government dues, but with such restrictions as made it of little value. Officials refused to pay the prices which the law prescribed for them in the purchase of the product, and natives were forced to sell their crop to private dealers at five cents a measure when the government was supposed to offer twenty-three cents.²

It is said that the nullification of the liberal coffee regulations of the commissioners was the work of the provin-

¹ Merkus, "Koncept-voorstel," 1832, S. van Deventer, LS., 2:504.

² Woordenboek van Nl., 2:173. Meanwhile, as the price of coffee in the world market rose, the government demanded larger and larger money payments as commutation for the coffee delivery. S. van Deventer, LS., 1:276 n. The government accepted payment in kind in some districts, but required money in many residencies even as late as Merkus's report of 1832. LS., 2:506.

cial officials ; there appear to be no laws of the Indian government by which it was authorized, however freely it may have been condoned or even incited by the central administration. The attack of the government, on the system of free cultures that the commissioners had designed to establish, was indirect ; the government did not officially abolish the free cultivation of coffee, but did make it practically impossible by refusing one of the conditions necessary for its existence. The whole theory of the tax system, as it had been formulated by Dirk van Hogendorp and others, implied a certain freedom of internal trade by which the natives would be enabled to get the greatest returns for their labor and would thereby be in a position to pay higher dues and at the same time enjoy greater comfort than before. In regard to a tax levied in kind on one of the staple products of the natives, like rice, this consideration was not of a very great weight. If, however, the natives were to be encouraged or compelled to engage in the production of an article like coffee, the value of which depended almost entirely on the demand of the export trade, it was of the greatest importance that they should be brought into close relations with the export merchants and be enabled to market their crops to the best advantage. The organization of trade among the natives of Java was so undeveloped that it offered few facilities for the accomplishment of this end, and when the cultivators were left to rely upon it in disposing of their coffee, they lost all the opportunity for gain which a great demand in Europe for their coffee seemed to assure them. They fell into the hands of their officials, and of the country usurers, Chinese, Moors, and half-breed Europeans, who exploited them without mercy and

pocketed all the profits of the culture. The translation of a report from the resident of Pasoeroean, quoted by Merkus,¹ will show what conditions resulted. "The trade in the coffee of Malang (the richest district in this product in all Java, not excepting the Preanger regencies) is now in the hands of two, at most three, merchants of Pasoeroean, who go to Malang in the so-called coffee season to see that the contracts into which they have entered are carried out. Months previously these merchants make contracts with natives, Arabians, and also Chinese to deliver them certain quantities of coffee within a fixed time, generally the months July, August, September, and October, for prices of 7 to 10 gulden. When the contracts are made, such considerable advances are given that they often amount to as much as the stipulated prices, and this under condition that if the amount contracted for is not delivered at the time fixed, the contractor or furnisher must pay 20 gulden for every pikol short. These so-called *djoeragans* . . . are not themselves the purchasers of the coffee but make oral contracts in turn with smaller dealers, even with the head-men of the villages, by which it often happens that five, six, up to eight or more persons are engaged in such transactions. Only in rare cases do they make advances to the common villager, but buy the coffee of him for delivery in a certain number of months. The native, who lives in the present and is not used to looking ahead, sells them his coffee indifferently at 4 to 5 gulden copper per pikol, with little thought of the higher price which it will be worth in a few months." Conditions varied, but in many parts of Java were even worse than those pic-

¹ "Koncept-voorstel," S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 505-506.

tured in Malang ; Merkus gives as a fair picture of them the following example. A village whose product is estimated at 30 pikols of coffee is assessed for two-fifths of it, or 12 pikols, making a total of 20½ gulden at the price fixed in the year (1831, in the example) by the government, at 17 gulden a pikol. Supposing that the head-man sells at 8 gulden and disposes of the money honestly among the villagers, they get 240 gulden, 36 gulden more than the amount of the tax, or pay for their coffee at the rate of 1.20 gulden a pikol. On the other hand, if the head-man, by reason of dishonesty or of other circumstances, accounts only for 6 gulden a pikol or 180 gulden, the village will have to pay 24 gulden more than it gets for its whole coffee crop, and will have to make up this difference from some other source.¹

To any one who has studied at all extensively the workings of undeveloped industrial organizations, it will be apparent that the evils pictured in these accounts were due largely to the ignorance of the people themselves, and that a complete eradication of them could come about only when the mass of the people had been educated to a certain level of intelligence and foresight. It will be apparent also, however, that the one sure means a government could adopt to minimize the evils was a stimulation of competition among the merchants which would protect the cultivators at least to some extent against the abuse of their ignorance. It was impossible to dispense altogether with native or Oriental traders, and as long as they continued to be middlemen, it was idle to expect a complete reform, but the government could at least encourage the settlement in the island of European capital-

¹ "Koncept-voorstel," 1. c., 507.

ists and merchants and could hope for improvement so far as their influence extended. Laws against abuses were as powerless as humanitarian preaching would be; the government must choose for its agents business men sufficiently well educated in the European code to realize that they consulted their own interests when they took some care for the cultivators and assured them, so far as they could, a fair reward for their labor. The question of colonization, which had always been neglected before, when there had been little for settlers to do, assumed a new importance when the change was made from a system of forced labor under native administration to a system of taxation administered by the government. It was impossible to introduce a European fiscal system without basing it on a European business system, and it was impossible to get the European business system without the Europeans.

It would unnecessarily complicate the discussion to take up at this point the arguments for and against the admission of Europeans to the island as planters, with a permanent right to the land; the question of land sales to the Europeans can be considered to better advantage in connection with the government's land policy in later times. It was not essential to the prosperity of Java that Europeans should have indefeasible rights to the land and extensive power over the native cultivators. It was essential, however, that they should have free access to the different parts of the island, and every opportunity to reach the products, if not the persons, of the natives.

Before the period of the commissioners, 1816-1819, there had been but slight opportunity for Europeans to settle in Java. Raffles, in adopting and applying the liberal principles that Dirk van Hogendorp had formu-

lated, failed to carry them out in their entirety; he not only forbade the leasing of land to Europeans, but also hindered their settlement in the interior as merchants by vexatious restrictions.¹ Muntinghe favored a more generous policy, at least in the concessions he was inclined to make to European planters, though he urged that no land grants should be made to them except under careful restrictions to safeguard the rights of the natives.² The regulations that were finally adopted by the commissioners were thoroughly liberal. The privilege of settlement could be obtained from the Governor General under no more onerous condition than the taking of an oath to observe the laws; this privilege comprised the right to choose freely the place where the petitioner would settle and the occupation that he would carry on. The commissioners made it the duty of the Indian government to extend agriculture by the grant of lands and the encouragement of the European population, and gave liberty to persons desirous of establishing industries to make the necessary arrangements for land and labor with the natives.³ The beginnings of an organized industry are to be found in the earliest part of the commissioners' rule, when one resident reported, as an example of what could be accomplished by free cultivation and free trade,

¹ M. L. van Deventer, NG., cxlv; Min., 1813, Sub., 270. He regarded the permission to Europeans to lease lands as "altogether inadvisable on every account."

² Report of 1817, S. van Deventer, LS., 1: 282-283, 345 ff. Many of his restrictions on land grants were adopted in the liberal period after the culture system. Elout, Bijdragen, 1851, report of 1819, discusses at considerable length the conditions under which European planters might be admitted.

³ Reg. Reg., 1818, Art. 92 ff., 106, 111, Mijer, Verz., 420 ff.; M. L. van Deventer, NG., cxlvi ff.

that a single energetic manufacturer in Pekalongan had made in the year a greater amount of indigo than had ever before been made in all Java in the same length of time.¹ Many petitions were addressed to the government for the grant of waste lands, and the prospects of industrial progress on the new lines seemed bright.

Baron van der Capellen, however, the new Governor General, seems to have been overcome by a reactionary spirit after the departure of his fellow-commissioners. "One is amazed," writes Pierson of the period after 1819, "at the lack of intelligence, the narrowness, which the Indian government then showed." Van der Capellen in the seven years of his rule entirely ignored the principles that had been established for his guidance and reverted step by step to the old system. On the pretext of protecting the native population against exploitation the government discouraged the settlement of European planters, "regarding them as parasitic plants, consuming the nourishing sap of the tree without rendering fruit themselves. From 1819 to 1826 the European planters or entrepreneurs received no encouragement whatever. The regulations of the colonial constitution, to which reference has been made, remained a dead letter, and the culture of sugar, of indigo, and of everything that requires the application of capital for its manufacture, was ruined. The culture of coffee decreased also in so far as Europeans engaged in it, while on the other hand the coffee plantations which, as an exception to the general rule, were planted by the Javanese under command from the government, were extended."² A law

¹ Report of De Salis, September, 1816, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 88.

² Secret report, Minister to King, Mar. 17, 1831, S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 182. Report of Minister to King, May 15, 1828, Elout, Bijdragen

of 1821 forbade all Europeans to trade or settle in the Preanger regencies (a coffee district) without the written permission of the resident, and prohibited except under the same possibility of dispensation the maintenance by Europeans or other foreigners of warehouses or trading posts at any distance from the centres of provincial government.¹ The law was on its face designed to protect the natives against the extortions of merchants, but it was one of those remedies that can cure a disease only by killing the patient; granting that foreign merchants had been guilty of oppression, the people were certainly better off under them than when left helpless in the hands of the native usurers. A stronger motive behind the law was the jealousy that the government already felt against the participation of European individuals in the coffee trade, even at a time when the cultivation and commerce of coffee were nominally free, and when the government still forced the natives to dispose of their product to dealers.

The spirit in which the government acted in this period can be learned from the case of a Dutchman, De Wilde, who administered with striking success a large coffee (1851), 130 ff. The figures for sugar production given in *Woordenboek van Nl.*, 3 : 464, show a great decline in the period of the Dutch restoration, but a rapid increase in sugar exports after 1826.

¹ Veth, *Java*, 2 : 346-347. The law was made still more strict in 1823, *ib.*, 2 : 354. The way in which the law was executed can be learned from the case of a Chinaman, Tan Hogoan, who had established a warehouse in Japara for the purchase of coffee from the people. Soon after the law was passed government officials broke into the warehouse, distributed the coffee among the people, and took away the books. The Chinaman sought vainly for restitution of the coffee; he was told that he had settled in a nearly deserted country, far removed from government surveillance, and that he was one of the speculators the government wanted to get rid of. S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2 : 132 ff.

plantation on land in the Preanger regencies that the government had sold outright in the time of Raffles, and on which it had no right to impose its trade restrictions. It demanded, nevertheless, that all the coffee raised on the estate should be sold to the government at a low fixed price, and when De Wilde returned from a visit to the Netherlands in 1821, with a royal decree commanding that at least the price paid for his coffee be raised, the Indian government simply refused to recognize the decree, saying that he must have misled the king by false representations. Indian officials left nothing undone to harass De Wilde for his presumption, and he and his fellow-proprietors were forced finally to end the unequal contest by selling out to the government.¹

One of the most serious blows to the organization of native industry under Europeans was a law of 1823 that prohibited leases to Europeans in the principalities of Soerakarta and Djokjokarta. Those states, the fragments of the empire of Mataram, maintained still the old native institution by which officials were paid entirely by the proceeds of land which they held in usufruct. The officials, as has been stated in an earlier chapter, did not themselves manage their estates, but sublet them, and at this period they had in many cases European planters as lessees. Europeans could afford to offer a much higher rental than natives because they did not rest content with old crops and customs of cultivation, but stimulated the growth of export staples from which they secured a large return. The system worked greatly to the advantage of the native officials and of the planters, and while there

¹ Veth, 2 : 352 ff. An appeal to the home government secured no redress. Cf. Elout, *Bijdragen* (1851), 169-170.

was undoubtedly the possibility of an abuse of the common people, there seems to be no question that they were better off under European lessees than under natives.¹ The government had no sound arguments that it could advance for the prohibition of the leases; the reason for the prohibition was not one that could be publicly defended, though it sometimes showed itself, as in a report denouncing the European planters because they "threaten" to increase greatly the production of coffee. The government had returned to the jealous attitude of the East India Company, and could tolerate no industry, however much it might conduce to the welfare of the people, so long as it seemed likely to affect the immediate interests of the treasury.²

The prohibition imposed serious losses on the lessees, who had in many cases entered into engagements for long terms of years, and had invested considerable amounts of capital, and it created such a disturbance in the internal organization of the principalities that it counts as one of the main causes of the Java war of 1825-1830.

During the continuance of this war an attempt was made by a new commissioner, Du Bus de Ghisignies, to undo some of the mischief wrought by Capellen. Du Bus was a hearty supporter of the liberal principles, and favored the encouragement of European immigration, but he was prevented by the state of war in Java and by the opposition of the king from accomplishing any results of lasting importance. Both what he did and what he proposed to do vanished without effect under the culture

¹ Cf. Veth, 2 : 343 ff. ; Deinse, "De Toestand in de Vorstenlanden," Leiden, 1887, p. 70 ; Pierson, KP., 63 ; Van Soest, KS., 1 : 113.

² Veth, 2 : 349 ; Pierson, KP., 66.

system. This system, as will be shown in the next chapter, was due mainly to the peculiar conditions at home, partly to the effect of the Java war on the Indian treasury. Van der Capellen made the introduction of the system easy if not inevitable by the reactionary policy that he had pursued, and he bears more responsibility than any other of the Dutch rulers of Java up to this time for the evils of the following period.

In tracing the history of the Dutch policy in the East, it is impossible at times to avoid sharp transitions from one topic to another. The natural continuation of the description I have given of the measures of the government in the third decade of the century would be the narrative of the introduction and spread of the culture system. Before taking that up, however, it will be necessary to treat a topic which has but slight connection with the internal conditions of Java and the domestic problems that have been under discussion. This is the topic of foreign trade and commercial policy.

At the restoration of Dutch rule under the commissioners in 1816 the scale of customs duties left by the British was maintained for a time without change. This scale of duties had, however, been altered in 1815 and 1816 to secure to the British after the change in government which they saw impending the favor of low duties and equal privileges with the Dutch, and was a legacy to the new government for which it owed few thanks.¹ Dutch commerce revived but slowly after the restoration of peace in

¹ According to the figures in Norman, BH., 267, the general duty on goods imported from abroad was lowered from 10 to 6%; apparently the differential established in 1815 was still maintained against all other ships than Dutch and British.

Europe in 1815, while British and American merchants maintained and extended the trade which they had begun in Java during the previous interval. These foreign merchants deserved their prosperity, for they studied as the Dutch had never done the needs of the natives, and by importing staples for their use they could afford to underbid other traders for the exports of the island.¹ The Dutch saw themselves, to all appearances, robbed of the benefits which they had hoped to secure from the public control of their Eastern possessions and soon protested. The king, who had been "very unpleasantly impressed" by the arrival of an American ship at Amsterdam bringing a cargo of coffee directly to the Netherlands, was assured that measures would be taken to protect trade against the encroachments of Americans; these measures were demanded also by the Chambers of Commerce of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which urged a differential of 20 to 25% or even more to help Dutch shipping.² The colonial constitution of 1815 had laid down the principle to guide the commissioners that Dutch ships and cargoes should pay less than foreign,³ and this principle was carried out in 1818 by a tariff which imposed on

¹ M. L. van Deventer, NG., cxliv. Jaussaud wrote in his "Memoire sur la commerce," 1810, Jonge, Opk., 13:517, "la consommation des denrées d'Europe est assez borné. Cinq ou six cargaisons suffisent pour en approvisionner le pays et faire tomber considérablement le prix." While the foreign merchants were extending commerce by their sales to the native population the Director General of the colonies could encourage the Dutch king only by referring to the increase in Dutch trade likely to ensue from the demand for supplies on the part of the government. M. L. van Deventer, NG., 201.

² Director General of Colonies to Commissioner General, Sept. 25, 1817, M. L. van Deventer, NG., 200.

³ Art. 87, Mijer Verz., 394.

foreigners double the duties paid by the Dutch, 12% against 6%. Still more effective protection was granted the next year by a royal decree which exempted from all duty whatever products of Dutch origin when imported into Java in Dutch ships.¹ In spite of all these favors to Dutch commerce, less than one-third in value of the imports into Java in 1819 were carried by the Dutch, who entered only 43 ships out of a total of 171,² and Crawford, whose book was published in 1820, could speak of the Americans as being "in fair possession of by far the most valuable part" of the Indian trade.³ Dutch manufacturers and merchants showed themselves especially weak in the trade in piece-goods, which alone formed the bulk of the imports for native consumption, and in which the English had had almost a monopoly. By a law of 1824 passed "to encourage and support so far as possible the enterprises of manufacturers in the mother-country" all cotton and woollen goods manufactured in foreign countries west of the Cape of Good Hope were subjected to a duty of 25% *ad valorem*, with an additional 10%, making 35% in all, if they were imported through some country east of the Cape.⁴ These regulations, aimed especially against the English trade in piece-goods, were

¹ N. P. van den Berg, art. Rechten, Encyc. NI., 3 : 379.

² Speech of Van Alphen, Session 1825-1826, De Waal, NISG., 1 : 228. Of the imports to a total value of fl. 5,885,083, the Dutch entered but 1,843,144 while the English entered 3,378,406. Of the ships 62 were English and 50 American. Van Alphen's summary of the tariff history of this period does not agree in all respects with that of Van den Berg, but the two accounts seem to supplement rather than contradict each other.

³ Hist., 3 : 289. He presents an interesting discussion of the relative advantages of the English and Americans.

⁴ Van den Berg, l. c. The attack on the foreign piece-goods by means of special differentials was begun in 1823. Van Alphen, op. cit., 233.

opposed to the terms of the treaty made immediately afterwards with England, by which each power promised that merchants of the other power should pay in the Eastern possessions not more than double the duties exacted from citizens of the mother-country, or not more than 6% if the goods were free for citizens of the mother-country. Not till years afterward, however, and only as the result of constant protests from England, was the tariff brought into conformity with the treaty.¹

Mention has been made in a previous chapter of the nearly universal belief held in the time of the East India Company that the trade with the Indies was better put in the hands of a great corporation than left to private individuals. When the old East India Company was abolished, the question of calling into existence some substitute for it had for a time no practical importance, as conditions had stopped all trade between the Netherlands and Java; and when the Dutch recovered the island in 1816, trade was left for a time in the hands of private merchants. The feeling, however, that a great corporation was better fitted than any individuals could be to make trade prosper, and to secure its profits for the mother-country, was not dead. It was expressed by a man so liberal in many respects as Muntinghe, who favored the establishment of a great trading company so long as it was denied the monopoly and the sovereign power that had proved so

Figures given by Van Alphen, p. 236, show that in 1824 the imports of Dutch origin were only half those coming from England, and less than the total coming from the rest of Europe.

¹ Text of the treaty of 1824 in De Waal, NISG., 2: 79. It applied both to wares and to ships, *ib.*, 150. With the exception of a short period it was not executed in Java till 1836, when domestic piece-goods were taxed 12½% and foreign 25%. Van den Berg, p. 380.

disastrous to the East India Company ; and it led to the incorporation in 1824 of the Dutch Trading Company (*Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij*).¹

The preamble of the royal decree gives the following reasons for the incorporation of the Company : trade with Dutch India had not answered the expectations of the merchants engaged in it, who were kept in business only by the assistance of the government, and who demanded still more help ; both India and the Netherlands suffered for the lack of this trade ; means must be found to remedy this, and to assure the Netherlands the advantages “to which her rank among peoples, the position of her territory, and the importance of her colonies give her claim” ; this means must be sought, not “from the example of some other nations” in systems of exclusion, but “in a powerful and well-regulated union of sufficient capital and associated labor, with the maintenance of free navigation for all sailing under the flag of the Netherlands or of a friendly power.” The Company was founded, accordingly, to further “the national trade, navigation, ship-building, fisheries, agriculture, manufactures and business.”²

It is not unlikely, in view of the superstitious reverence with which the East India Company had long been regarded, that the Dutch really believed that the Company could accomplish all that was hoped for it and all that ordinary merchants had failed to do. Whatever may be thought of the sincerity of the arguments for the public benefits to be conferred by the corporation, it was certainly regarded as a good private investment. The king, who created it by his mere decree, took a block of one-

¹ Report of 1817, S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 303, 286.

² De Waal, NISG., 1 : 104 ; Articles of Agreement, No. 65, *ib.*, 114.

third of the stock originally proposed and guaranteed to the other stockholders a return of $4\frac{1}{2}\%$; the public oversubscribed to the remainder of the stock nearly ninefold on the first day that it was offered to them, and the capital was greatly increased to meet their demand.¹

The Company was to have no peculiar public privileges such as the East India Company had enjoyed. It was especially enjoined against attempts to secure monopoly or to impose forced cultures on the natives of India; it was to make its profits as an ordinary trader and was to charter, not own, the ships that it employed. The main advantage that the articles of agreement promised it was the chance to contract for government business, and until the culture system built up this business the Company's books showed an unfavorable balance.

¹ The capital was set originally at fl. 12,000,000, with the right of increase to fl. 24,000,000; the king took fl. 4,000,000. Public subscriptions amounted to over fl. 69,000,000, and the capital was raised to fl. 37,000,000. See Van den Berg, art. "Handelmaatschappij," *Encyc. NI.*, 2:10 for these and further details.

CHAPTER VII

CULTURE SYSTEM : POLICY

[NOTE.—For the period of the culture system S. van Deventer's *Bijdragen* is the great source. The documents contained in it were printed first in *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië*, and afterward collected and published separately ; an alphabetical index to both editions, by proper names and by subjects, was prepared by J. Boudewijnse and published in *Bijd. TLV.*, 1867, 3:2:411-534. E. de Waal prints speeches and other parliamentary documents relating to colonial affairs from 1814 to 1848. The *Woordenboek* is valuable for its statistical information. Of secondary authorities, Pierson's book is perhaps the most concise and suggestive. Van Soest's *Geschiedenis* gives full details, some from sources not accessible to me. Piccardt's *Geschiedenis* is a convenient compilation. Other writings on the culture system are criticised in the text.]

IN the previous chapter I have described a condition of affairs in Java that was in unstable equilibrium, a mixture of principle and practices that were inconsistent with each other, and would have in the course of time to give place to a regular and consistent system. The impulse of the commissioners toward liberalism had spent itself under Van der Capellen, and had been followed by a reactionary movement toward the policy of the East India Company ; this movement had apparently not gone so far but that it could be checked and reversed by Capellen's successor, Du Bus de Ghisignies, who was an outspoken advocate of the liberal principles of Raffles and the commissioners. The reform projects of Du Bus were, however, never carried to fulfilment. At this critical point in the development of Dutch policy events in Java

and in the Netherlands occasioned a return to the policy of the Company, which was now retained almost unchallenged for a generation.

Both in Java and in the Netherlands the reasons for the return to the old system were of a fiscal character. The fault in Java did not lie in the land-tax, which had nearly doubled its returns in the period 1818-1829. Other measures of the Indian government were, however, not so satisfactory in their results, and as the expenditures were allowed to increase without proper care for the means of meeting them, the favorable balance which the government could show up to 1820 was changed in that and the succeeding years to a deficit.¹ This need not have been in itself so serious as to call for any far-reaching change in policy; it could have been remedied by the exercise of a little prudence in the Indian government. A new and very heavy demand on the treasury, however, began to make itself felt in 1825, caused by the outbreak of war with Dipa Negara, the Sultan of the protected principality of Djokjokarta, in the centre of the island.² The policy of borrowing to cover the deficit, which had been resorted to before the outbreak of the war by some loans made on very unfavorable conditions, had now to be continued, and by 1830 the Indian gov-

¹ The government made a failure of the salt manufacture, and committed the error of an over-issue of paper money; other causes, including a decline in the price of coffee, combined to bring about an annual deficit of 1,000,000 gulden or so, in a budget showing total receipts of about 20,000,000. De Waal, NISG: 165-166.

² The causes of this war were economic as well as political and religious, but I must content myself here merely with a reference to its results, and refer the reader to the articles by P. H. van der Kemp in *Bijd. TLV.*, 1896 and 1897, and to the reports of Elout in *TNI.*, 1864, 2: parts 1-2, for full information.

ernment was burdened by a debt of over 30,000,000 gulden and an interest charge of over 2,000,000. Both capital and interest were secured by the home government.¹

Meanwhile the government of the Netherlands had come to concern itself more and more with the fiscal conditions of its Eastern possessions. The southern provinces (Belgium) showed from the start a disinclination to contribute to the support of the Dutch colonies,² and the king, who could regard these colonies almost as his private property from the power that the constitution gave him over them, seemed anxious only that they should not be a burden on his purse. Raffles dined with the king in 1817, and gave as his impression "that, notwithstanding the king himself and his leading minister seem to mean well, they have too great a hankering after profit, and *immediate* profit, for any liberal system to thrive under them. . . . The king complained of the coffee culture having been neglected, and expressed anxiety that he should soon have consignments; and while he admitted all the advantages likely to arise from cultivation, and assured me that the system introduced under my administration should be continued, maintained that it was essential to confine the trade, and to make such regulations as would secure it and its profits exclusively to the mother-country."² There is no evidence that the

¹ Piccardt, CS., 70; Pierson, KP., 69.

² The Director General of Colonies wrote to the commissioners, Oct., 1816, that the people of the southern provinces criticised colonial expenditures in the council and legislature, and that the king was economical; he had asked for an appropriation of 22,000,000 gulden for 1817, and got 12,000,000 with difficulty. M. L. van Deventer, NG., 132.

¹ Raffles to Marsden, July 27, 1817, Mem., 289-290.

Dutch government went farther in the first part of the period after the recovery of Java than to urge economy on the Indian government, without attempting to direct the policy in details.¹ After the establishment of the trading company in 1824, however, the king took a more direct interest in Java; as chief stockholder in the Company, and guarantor of its dividends, he felt severely the losses imposed on him by the ill success of its operations in its early years, which cost him several million gulden. In the Dutch parliament an opposition had grown up to a colonial policy which seemed to threaten the government with the support of a weak dependency, and it was feared that the budget of 1829 would be rejected by the Chambers unless assurance could be given that the Dutch Indies would be put in a condition to meet their obligations. The times were ripe for a decisive interference from home in the fiscal policy of the Indies.

The man who realized the necessities of the situation, and the opportunities that it presented, was Lieutenant General van den Bosch, who had won the king's confidence by service in military and administrative positions in the East and West Indies, and who promised now to solve the colonial problem. He was made Governor General of India in 1828, took up the active duties of government in Java in the beginning of 1830, and from that date to 1839, when he was forced to resign from the office of minister of the colonies, determined Dutch policy in the

¹ The Director General of Colonies wrote the commissioners in August, 1817, that it was necessary to remind them from time to time that the king expected the Indian possessions not only to support themselves but to repay advances made to them. M. L. van Deventer, NG., 187. A royal decree of 1825 contained twenty-three articles imposing economy on the Indian government. S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 97.

East with practically absolute power. His successor as minister of the colonies, Baud (1840-1848), had been trained in his school and simply maintained the system which Van den Bosch had established.

The plan of Van den Bosch was confessedly a return to the practices of the old East India Company. He reopened the question, which had been so long debated, of the relative advantages of forced and free cultures in Java. The character of the question had changed as a result of the fiscal obligations into which the East Indies had entered. The home government could no longer, as formerly, afford to let the opposing parties fight it out at their leisure, but must interfere to establish in the shortest possible time the system which promised the best fiscal results. While the government recognized that under the scheme of the liberals, as represented by Du Bus de Ghisignies, the productive power of Java would increase, yet this could be but slowly and the government demanded immediate returns.¹ Van den Bosch had just returned from service in the West Indies when he was consulted in the matter; he had had there the opportunity to observe production by slave labor, and was convinced that production in Java could never compete with it so long as the Javanese were left free to cultivate as they chose.² When he was asked for his opinion in

¹ Secret Report of Minister to King, Mar. 17, 1831, S. van Deventer, L.S., 2: 181 ff. To the minister who presented these considerations to the king another point seemed of importance also; he saw no way to remit money to the Netherlands, and urged the necessity of securing the payment of the dues from Java in the form of products suited to export.

² Van der Hoek, the author of a book published at Leiden, in 1829, compared the production of Java (for export) with that of slave-holding colonies, found that the slaves were only one-eighteenth in number, but produced five to six times the amount of exports that came from the people

December, 1828, he criticised the system of free cultures, and thought that "the institutions of the former East India Company, of which forced cultures and deliveries were the chief pillars, deserved the preference."¹

Van den Bosch picked out all the weak points in the practical working of the land-tax; he showed that it lent itself to abuse by the native officials, and imposed on individual natives burdens that were beyond their ability to bear. He asserted that under the system of the land-tax forced services, instead of being alleviated, were heavier than ever. He maintained that in the half century ending in 1805, under the Company's system, there had not been a serious political disturbance, while in the period from 1805 to 1830 there had been nine revolts or wars. Besides this comparison, which was not exact in the matter of fact, and which in any event did not justify the inference he suggested, he put another which made it seem that the natives preferred the districts of forced culture to those of the tax system. In reply to the advocates of free culture and colonization, he emphasized the amount of land held by the natives on a communal tenure and exaggerated the difficulties of securing export products from such

of Java, and reached the conclusion that under the existing system the labor of one slave was worth that of one hundred Javanese. S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 105.

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 184. This is quoted in the ministerial report of 1831, cited above. I regret that I have not had a chance to use the early reports of Bosch, printed in Steijn Parvé's collection. For Bosch's criticism of the existing institutions I have drawn from his note written March, 1831, and printed in S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 227-278. For the form of the plan as originally proposed I must depend on Van Soest, KS., 2: 43 ff., based on Bosch's report of March, 1829. The features of the plan are repeated, apparently, without change in Bosch's report of 1834, Bijd. TLV., 1863, 2: 7: 426 ff.

land.¹ It would be fruitless to review here all the arguments that he brought forward to justify a change of policy; they amounted to a general indictment of the tax system, which indeed offered material enough for criticism.

The plan of the culture system, as proposed by Van den Bosch in 1829, was in brief as follows: Instead of paying to the government a certain proportion of their crops, the natives were to put at its disposal a certain proportion of their land and labor-time. The revenue would then consist not in rice, which was almost universally cultivated and which was of comparatively little value to the government, but in export products grown under the direction of government contractors on the land set free by the remission of the former tax. According to the estimate, the natives would give up only one-fifth of their time in place of two-fifths of their main crop. The government proposed to bear the loss from failure of crops if this was not directly due to the fault of the cultivators, and moreover promised to pay the natives a certain small price for such amounts as they furnished. The government proposed in this way to secure products suited for export to the European market, on which it expected to realize profits largely in excess of the prices paid to natives and contractors, and of the costs of administration. To the natives it promised increased prosperity and a lighter burden of taxation, as a result of the fuller utilization of their chances under the far-sighted management of Europeans. The labor that before through carelessness and ignorance would have been wasted in idleness or in the cultivation of some cheap and superfluous crop was to supply a product of great value in the world market, and

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 255, 241, 229, 245, 244.

the natives were to share in the resulting profits. Van den Bosch justified his proposal not only by the benefits it would heap upon all parties, but by reference to previous history and the character of native institutions which made it seem not only impolitic but unjust to cling longer to the land-tax as the basis of government revenue.¹

To a person unacquainted with the practical effects of the culture system in the period after its adoption, and ignorant that the system was but the continuation of an abuse that had existed since the early period of the East India Company, the plan contained in Van den Bosch's proposal has many attractive features. The system has in fact been judged so often by the professions of its founder rather than by its actual workings, that it has been the object of pretty general and sometimes very extravagant praise. The chances are, if any one picks up an English book with a reference in it to the culture system, that he will find the reference eulogistic; he will get the impression that the system was a very good one, and

¹ Cf. Van Soest, KS., 2 : 44 ; Pierson, KP., 88. For a sharp criticism of Bosch's knowledge of the conditions in Java, especially of the native institutions about which he wrote with easy assurance, see Veth, Java, 2 : 409-411. This high authority on native Java holds that all of Bosch's arguments, based on reference to native institutions, bear the mark of having been thought of "pour le besoin de la cause," without regard to the actual facts. Bosch had spent about ten years in Java at the beginning of the century as an officer in the army, and had published a book on the Dutch colonial possessions on his return to the Netherlands, but his knowledge of the native organization was never more than superficial.

Muntinghe, in his report of 1817, had expressed his resentment at the way in which the Company's contingent system was made to figure as "an immemorial institution" of the natives, and disguised as "the mild yoke." See S. van Deventer, LS., 1 : 315. Both the contingent system and the culture system were based on native institutions, but were imposed upon them from above, and were more European than native in their character.

will be puzzled to explain how it was ever given up in our enlightened age. In a German book on colonial policy he will almost surely find the culture system treated with tender reverence, and with evident regret that it has ceased to exist. Only in Dutch books, written by those who have the most intimate acquaintance with the system in its actual operation, will he find it thoroughly condemned; in recent years, since the question of forced culture has been removed from politics, there has been, so far as I know, not a single voice raised in its defence.

It will be the purpose of the present chapter to show that the culture system does not deserve the good repute it has so long enjoyed. It will not be amiss, however, at this place to explain how it has happened to receive a consideration so generally favorable. Almost all of the eulogies of the culture system can be traced back to one source, a book by an English barrister, J. W. B. Money, which was published at London in 1861 under the title "Java; or How to manage a Colony." After four years' residence in Calcutta Money found that his wife's health required some change, and selected Java for a summer's trip in 1858, "more from hearing that it was a beautiful island, with a fine climate, easy travelling, and an opera, than with any idea of acquiring useful information from an examination of the Dutch colonial system." He did not speak Dutch or any of the native languages, and got much of the information that he embodied in his book on shooting parties and similar excursions, where he associated with officials, planters, and the Javanese nobility. It will appear later that men of this class had the best reasons for concealing the truth of affairs in Java, and systematically put forward only the favorable features of

the governing system that they followed. Money had left British India in the throes of the Sepoy mutiny, when the English seemed to be losing hold and were faced by a most threatening future. He found in Java what he thought was a solution of the Indian question, and devoted his book to praising the Dutch system to the disadvantage of everything British.

A measure of his eulogy can best be given by quoting a few sentences from his introduction. The culture system, he says, in twenty-five years after its introduction, "quadrupled the revenue, paid off the debt, changed the yearly deficit to a large yearly surplus, trebled the trade, improved the administration, diminished crime and litigation, gave peace, security, and affluence to the people, combined the interests of European and native, and more wonderful still, nearly doubled an Oriental population, and gave contentment with the rule of their foreign conquerors to ten millions of a conquered Mussulman race. The only English aim it did not attain was, what the Dutch had no wish to secure, the religious and intellectual elevation of the native. But these benefits were all obtained by means not only compatible with that object, but which have involuntarily operated in that direction, and have so far produced a firmer and more natural basis for future improvement than is shown by any of the results of our educated and missionary efforts in India."

At the time when Money's book was published, the culture system was already losing ground, but its political supporters in the Netherlands were fighting against all change, and used the book for a party document. In this way it gained such importance as to call forth an authoritative refutation of its errors in a ministerial

communication to the Second Chamber. Though Money asserted that he had got his statistics from authoritative sources, investigation showed that in some tables quoted by him not a single figure agreed with the official records, and the colonial department searched in vain for the source of his statistics.¹ His book is totally unreliable.

Money's book had a success that accorded with the extravagance of his statements and the importance of his subject. Some one in Jamaica, where the labor problem was pressing as it always is in the tropics, reprinted a part of it, "as containing at least some suggestions tending to enlarged views of a policy that may be applicable to our condition, but has not yet been recognized."² The

¹ T. J. Hovell Thurlow, Report on Java and Dependencies in Rep. of H. M. Sec. of Embassy, 1868, v, vi, Lond., 1869, pp. 337, 392. Compare the criticism of the book in *Woordenboek van Nederlandsch Indie*, 2 : 269, where it is called a "touched-up picture"; the writer says that Money got his favorable impressions of Java at races and stag hunts, and would have judged differently if he had stayed longer and seen more. In a Belgian review quoted by Hoëvell ("Eene stem uit den freemde . . .," *TNI.*, 1861, 23 : 2 : 349) Money's figures are assumed to be accurate, but his conclusions were "almost always wrong." A Dutchman who spent many years in Java, both in an official capacity and as a private individual, said that he could not read Money's book through, it was so full of perversion and misstatement. *TNI.*, 1873, 2 : 1, 125. No one at all conversant with the actual conditions in Java, as they are known to us on unimpeachable evidence, can retain the slightest respect for Money's authority after reading his book. I began to keep a catalogue of its errors, but found the list extending so far that I gave up the task as useless.

The name of W. J. Money appears in a petition to the government of Java in 1828; he was a member of the British Parliament and part owner of estates in Java that had been bought in 1812, but I know of no connection between him or his successor, William Taylor Money, and the author of the book. See the "Advice of the Council," Dec. 22, 1828, in Elout, *Bijdragen*, 1874, pp. 134, 140.

² "Cultivation in Java, being an account of the culture system at present pursued in that island and its beneficial results; extracted from Money's 'Java, or How to manage a Colony,' with an introductory preface by

United States Consul at Batavia commended to our government, then engaged in the war of secession, the book describing a system that had "blessed the island and benefited the world"; he said (incorrectly) that slavery had been abolished in Java through the culture system, and suggested that the system might be applied to the emancipated slaves of the United States.¹ I am not aware that any attempt was made to introduce the culture system in other parts of the world, but the good name that Money gave the system lived on even after the system was abolished, and has often reappeared in later books.²

It is not worth while to linger over the details of the original plan of Van den Bosch, and for this reason, that elaborations in a plan of this kind did not count, they would not be applied. A man who spent many years in an official position in Java says that he never saw a *principle* carried out there; all was variety, — there was no

W. W. A., shewing the suitability of the system for this island." Kingston, Jamaica, preface dated Jan. 1, 1862. A copy of the book is in the Boston Public Library.

¹ U. S. Commercial Relations, 1862, report of Diehl, p. 279 ff.

² English writers on the culture system either follow Money implicitly, as Ireland in "Tropical Colonization," or show his influence, as Miss Scidmore in her book on "Java" and Miss Kingsley in "West African Studies." Wallace concurred in the conclusions of Money's "excellent and interesting work," "Malay Archipelago," 105. Boys, "Some Notes on Java and its Administration by the Dutch," Allahabad, 1892, is an independent study and is of value, but neglects the work of Dutch historians and critics.

Reference to the works of Roscher, Hasse, and Geffcken will show that all those writers have an unduly favorable estimate of the culture system; French writers are more independent. The little book by Hough, "Dutch Life in Town and Country," N. Y., 1901, p. 271, says that the culture system "produced very good results, especially in Java and Madura," and that the condition of laborers is not so good under individual planters as it was under government cultures.

uniformity.¹ The customs and institutions of the East are too old to be changed in mass by the whims of western legislators; they mould the laws, the laws do not mould them. One point at a time can be carried, but not much more than that. So in a system of this kind it was certain that the plan would not be uniformly carried out, that it would be modified in its details, and would take a different shape in different places.

More important than the scheme was the spirit in which it was applied, for it was that which would tend to determine the actual working system, whatever the logical paper system might be. Van den Bosch had been a leader in charitable enterprises in the Netherlands, and he brought forward the culture system as a great measure of philanthropy, designed to elevate and educate the native population. His reports are full of smooth phrases in which he urges the necessity of protecting the natives against abuses, and of furthering their welfare. "So long," he wrote in his report of 1834,² "as we do not regard and treat the Javanese as our children, and do not honestly fulfil to them all the duties which rest upon us as their leaders and protectors, our arrangements will constantly be subject to shocks, and the aim that we propose will not be attained but will lead constantly to disappointments." The history of the system that Bosch established was destined to confirm in a striking way the truth of statements such as this, but whether he put any faith in them at the time can well be doubted. We find

¹ Van Vleuten, "Belasting in arbeid en belasting in geld op Java," *De Gids*, 1872, 3: 213.

² "Memorie van den Commissaris-Generaal," printed in *Bijd. TLV.*, 1863, 2: 7: 391. For statements of similar tone in earlier reports see in the documents in *S. van Deventer, LS.*, 2: 191, 249, 264, 268, etc.

along with them in Bosch's reports too many calculations for the increase of the government revenue, too many references to Java as a conquered province, too many comparisons with the products of the slave islands of the West Indies, to let us believe that he had the welfare of the natives very seriously at heart.

He was put in charge of Java for one definite purpose, to make money for the Dutch government, and even if he had been inclined to spare the natives in reaching this end, he would have been prevented from doing so by the pressure from the Netherlands. In the first year of the culture system he increased the production of export products in Java by 3,000,000 gulden, at the expense of personal exertions that seriously impaired his health; but he thereby only whetted, did not stay, the Dutch appetite for revenue. When the minister in the Netherlands lowered his demands from 8,000,000 to 5,000,000 gulden in 1832, in response to the Governor's representations, Bosch on the other hand had raised his promises to 12,000,000, and though he would have been glad to come down to the lower figure he was not allowed to do so.¹ When his successor as Governor General declared in 1834 that it would require every exertion to remit 10,000,000 gulden, Bosch himself, then minister of the colonies, sent back word that 18,000,000 should be sent from the crop of 1836, and as much more as could possibly be obtained.² Bosch wrote that the Governor in India was in no position to know what the interests

¹ S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2 : 350, 529. Nothing is more striking in the early laws and reports of the culture system than the emphasis laid on the "pressing necessity" of raising money; between the lines or explicitly stated one reads everywhere that money must be had at any cost. Cf. *LS.*, 2 : 148, 152, 186, 267, 274, etc.

² *LS.*, 2 : 776.

of the Netherlands required! In the three years 1836 to 1838 the Dutch government contracted debts of 236,000,000 florins on the security of the Indian revenues;¹ and the need of meeting interest payments prevented thought of any abatement in the demands on Java. Only one strong motive underlay the foundation and the maintenance of the culture system, the desire to obtain revenue for the Dutch treasury. Pious hopes of benefiting the natives which may have been at first sincere could be only hypocritical after a few years' experience with the workings of the system, and at any rate never interfered materially with its development. This fact must never be lost from mind in judging the culture system; the spirit of the government pervaded the system and made it much worse than such a system needed to be.

To understand the culture system it is necessary to remove the mask which it wore from the beginning and to see it in its nakedness. All of the features in the original plan which interfered with the yield of revenue were given up almost from the start. Bosch at times attempted to give his system the air of being based on freedom instead of force, and indeed, if it promised the natives such advantages as he asserted, there seems little reason for compelling them to accept it. The indigo and sugar cultures were, in form, carried on at first by contracts with free laborers, but even the appearance of freedom was soon renounced.² Bosch had at first proposed to take only one-

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 42.

² As early as August, 1831, Bosch speaks of natives cultivating indigo and sugar "by agreement or by appointment (*designatie*)"; with insignificant exceptions all the cultures were forced from the start. Merkus, Nota, February, 1831, showed that the people did not know the difference between contract and command, and that "agreements" between the

fifth of the land for cultures, according to what he said was a "native custom." In July, 1830, he stated that to be a proper proportion; in August of the same year he said he was convinced that there would be no difficulty in taking one-third,¹ and in fact he took whatever amount he pleased, even to one-half or the whole. While according to the original theory the people were to give the government only about one-fifth of their working time, it will appear from evidence that I shall quote later that there was no limit to demands upon them. Bosch proposed that the government should bear the losses from bad harvests; this was not carried into effect. By giving up land and services to the government cultures the people were supposed to be freed from the land-tax; in many cases they had to bear the cultures and pay the land-tax in addition.²

During the period of its operation the culture system was applied to the cultivation of a long list of products. The government experimented with coffee, sugar, indigo, tea, tobacco, cinnamon, cochineal, pepper, silk, cotton, etc., and dropped from the list the products which after an extended trial gave no promise of returning a profit to itself.

government and the natives existed only in name. S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 221. Baud, in 1834, recognized the existence of abuses and oppression when there had been a departure from the "fixed principles," *ib.*, 2 : 611. There was no "fixed" principle but government profit.

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 157.

² For these and other differences between the theory and the practice of the culture system see Vitalis, "Misbruiken in de administratie op Java," TNI., 1851, 13 : 2 : 248 ff.; Van Soest, KS., 3 : 165 ff., Veth, 2 : 411; Pierson, 88 ff. Van Soest says (2 : 192) that at the very time when the cultures were introduced, existing taxes on articles of consumption were raised and new taxes established. There were, it is true, a number of attempts to correct abuses; cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 410, 646, 701, 704. These touched, however, only minor details in the operations of the system and did not reach the real sources of evils.

From the fiscal standpoint, coffee, sugar, and indigo were the only products that ever attained importance. The system was put in force in different islands of the archipelago, in northern Celebes, on the west coast of Sumatra, and in Java, but Java was always the chief field of its operation. Even in Java, however, the system was applied only partially. The "particular" lands, which had been sold by the government in full property to individuals, and the two protected principalities, were free from its operations. The districts where the forced delivery of products had never been abolished, even under the liberal rule of Raffles and his successors, were naturally included in the field of the new system, and it was extended over other places where conditions seemed to favor the growth of export products. The government experimented with places as it did with crops. It should be noted, however, that the system never affected all the population even of the districts where it was introduced; in the period from 1840 to 1850, when it reached its greatest extension, it occupied still but a small proportion of the total area.¹

Before proceeding to a discussion and criticism in detail of the workings of the culture system, it will be proper to notice here the chief economic flaw in the theory of its advocates. Money, if we may take him as their spokesman, says:² "Where, as in India, the capital and the land are in the possession of the conquered native, and the intelligence alone belongs to the conquering European, the ordinary

¹ In 1839 about eight hundred thousand families were subject to it, more than half of the population of the districts in which the system had been introduced. In 1845 the cultures occupied about 5.5% of the total cleared land (Van Soest, 3: 167), in 1854-57 about 3.2% of the total agricultural land of the native population. *Woordenboek*, 1: 647.

² Java, 1: 313.

motives of men prevent the combination of intelligence and capital to the improvement of the soil. On the other hand, when native labor is directed by European intelligence and assisted by the capital which in Eastern countries only European governments have both sufficient credit to command and sufficient knowledge to apply, the result is equally beneficial to all the parties to its production." If any government has a sufficient knowledge and intelligence to know an individual's business better than he himself knows it, the conclusion of Money's statement holds true. We must, however, substitute the word ignorance for the words knowledge and intelligence in Money's theorem, and the conclusion becomes quite a different one.

In putting the culture system in operation the government had necessarily to proceed on a general, more or less abstract, plan. In assuming the responsibility of production, it centralized the management of it and treated the country almost as though it were a gigantic checker-board to be laid out in squares of tea, coffee, sugar, indigo, and pepper. Van den Bosch himself realized that the experience to be gathered from the history of the crops which were already grown in Java was insufficient to guide the government in extending their cultivation ; and in directing the planting of new and untried crops the government was thrown entirely on its own resources. For the individual planter was substituted a government clerk, an office farmer, whose real business had to do with red-tape and not with agriculture. Everything was to be stretched to fit a Procrustean plan. In 1832 each residency was required to furnish a quota of products in direct proportion to the estimated population.¹ This demand was never

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 680.

repeated, but the method that it illustrates remained the same. The natives were made to plant crops where the conditions of soil, climate, or altitude made their success impossible; they were given a task incapable of accomplishment, and were kept at it long after its hopelessness should have been apparent. And of the many slips of government calculations, resulting in failure of the crops, the natives bore the loss; it needed but a few years of experience to prove that the government could secure no profit if it were made responsible for its own mistakes.

A quotation from a report made by the Governor General in 1834, after a journey of inspection, will suggest the evils that were a necessary corollary of the culture system.¹ "The sugar culture was accompanied by a succession of disappointments, caused chiefly by lack of knowledge, a poor organization of labor, and an injudicious selection of the location for the main sugar factory. This factory had at hand neither a sufficient extent of good land nor woods for the supply of fuel; no roads were laid out through the sugar-fields, and the cane had to be carried to the mill by the laborers themselves. The results were losses for the manufacturer and pressing hardships for the cultivators."

This quotation really sums up the history of the culture system, but the subject is so important and the material for its illustration is so abundant that I shall proceed to discuss it in some detail. I shall take up first the different crops that were tried and show how generally the attempt to cultivate them failed, and how heavily the failures bore on the natives. In the cases

¹ Rapport, Aug. 23, 1834, S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 634. This extract describes conditions in the residency of Tagal.

where cultures survived the period of experiment, it will be necessary to note at what sacrifices to the natives this result was achieved. Another topic, and the last in the purely economic criticism of the culture system, will be the effect of the system on the quality of the product furnished.

The experiments in the introduction of new crops were sometimes made on such a small scale or under such conditions that the natives were not seriously affected by them.¹ Ordinarily, however, the government would require the natives of a certain district to give up part of their land and labor to the cultivation of some new crop, and make them dependent on the success of the venture for any remuneration. In 1834 a report stated that experiments were being made in a number of different places on the cultivation of tea, but that up to that time they had given but slight results; in 1841 the culture was still being carried on, but with loss to the natives and no important returns to the government.² Silk culture appeared to have no prospect of success from experiments so far as they had been carried in 1834, but the government decided in that year to make the natives assume the cultivation of the mulberry groves, and to pay them only in proportion to the silk product they returned.³ The cinnamon culture was established by forcing the natives

¹ Experiments on cotton culture were made usually in the yards of government or native officials, and some crops were tested in the Botanic Garden at Buitenzorg. S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 744, 745.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 626 ; 3 : 124. In 1841 it was stated that the one hundred thousand tea bushes in Japara yielded bad results constantly ; that the families engaged in the culture worked hard and got little, and that ten out of fifty of them had fled. Evidently a government order of 1834 (*ib.*, 2 : 737) that tea experiments should be conducted by free hired labor was not carried out.

³ *Ibid.*, 2 : 627, 738.

to work for pitifully small wages; it was maintained for over twenty years, though Money was told that it paid so badly that no private planter thought of going into it.¹ The case was the same with other cultures that disappear finally from the scene with only a long record of failures behind them. The government itself lost money on the experiments; the natives were always victims.²

Even the crops that formed the main stay of the culture system in the later period secured their position only at the cost of a great number of failures. In the case of coffee these failures, though very numerous, were not so serious, as this crop was grown ordinarily on land that had not been used before by the natives. Sugar and indigo, on the other hand, displaced native food crops, and therefore imperilled even the existence of the people when the ventures in them turned out ill. In a number of districts the attempts to introduce sugar culture failed completely.³ Sugar was planted and manufactured by the natives in some parts of Java, without any govern-

¹ S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2: 741; Money, 1: 44, 172. Money says that the government maintained it for the pleasure of paying the natives high wages at a loss to itself; even if he told the truth in other points, it would be hard to believe him on this one.

² Further details on the minor cultures (tobacco, pepper, etc.) could be gleaned from Van Soest and the documents in S. van Deventer, *LS.*

³ See S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2: 696 ff., and the report of Baud's inspection of 1834. Baud found that the natives were heavy losers by the government sugar ventures, and urged a reform in the system of payment, but I have seen no evidence that it was carried out. *Ib.*, 2: 680, 654, 670. "If the crop does not come to maturity, or is burned or washed away before the canes are ripe, and therefore before the estimation of the yield, the peasants get nothing for their labor. Self-interest thus teaches them to use care and caution to provide against accidents." Money, *Java*, 1: 116. Self-interest would teach the native to run away from a government which forced him to plant sugar under such conditions that it was likely to fail from the start.

ment intervention and with entire success,¹ but the government failed when natives succeeded, for reasons suggested in a quotation above. Indigo was a crop in which the proportion of failures to successes was even more marked. When Baud made his journey of inspection in 1834, he found that the requisite conditions of success in the indigo culture had been so generally disregarded that it was necessary to reorganize the whole industry.² The failure was due often to injudicious selection of land, sometimes to mere administrative carelessness. In 1831 thousands of men were called out in a certain district to prepare the land for the cultivation of indigo. When the work was done the plants were lacking, and it was not until two months later, when the ground was rank with weeds, that indigo seed was received from Batavia, and the people had then to do the work over again.³

Outright failures in the attempt to force the cultivation of crops on the natives might be expected at the introduction of the system, and of course were most marked in its early stages. At no period in its history were they entirely lacking; they attended every extension of a culture, and appeared in old-established cultures when the land had been exhausted from the drain on its resources of crops like indigo and tobacco. Failure, however, is a limit; many may approach it when few are actually pressed to it.

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 653.

² In one residency he advised the abandonment of every indigo factory; in another, eight out of seventeen large factories had already been abandoned, and four more would soon follow; similar conditions existed in the other residencies. Cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 624, 629, 636, 640.

³ Van Soest, KS., 2: 129.

A striking feature of the culture system as it was administered in Java was its injustice as a means of raising government revenue; it distributed burdens so unequally that it pressed many of the inhabitants to the verge of failure, while it bore lightly on others and left some entirely untouched. It is not necessary to defend here "equality of sacrifice" as a proper principle of taxation; whatever position one may take toward that principle, one will not defend such inequality of sacrifice as marked the application of the culture system.

In the first place, there was the distinction between the people subject to ordinary taxes and those subject to the culture system. It is estimated that the sugar culture demanded more than twice the labor required by rice-fields subject to the old land-tax.¹ Then there was no uniformity inside the spheres of the culture system; local officials imposed demands as they pleased, without regard to general principles.² Some natives had only one culture to provide for; others had two or even more.³ Different cultures bore on the people with very unequal weight. The indigo culture was especially oppressive, requiring an immense amount of care and labor; and natives in the indigo districts migrated to other sections where only coffee and sugar were cultivated.⁴

Moreover, within each culture there were such differ-

¹ Piccardt, CS., 83.

² See for proofs of this S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 578, 636. It is intelligible enough in view of the history of the land-tax.

³ Van Soest, KS., 3 : 171.

⁴ S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 83, Report of 1839. Baud found in 1834 that the coffee culture had indirectly been stimulated by that of indigo; the village head-men cultivated coffee "with remarkable energy" for fear that else they would have to cultivate indigo; *ib.*, 2 : 625.

ences in the equation of government demands and native ability to meet them that some natives could be comparatively well off while others, occupied in the same culture, were almost destitute. To take a statistical example the amount received by a family planting indigo was as follows, in the residencies and years named: ¹—

	CHERIBON	PEKALONGAN	BEZOEKI
1854	f. 8.40	f. 4.35	f. 13.80
1855	4.83	2.30	7.39
1856	7.40	5.05	8.98
1857	6.96	2.94	8.81
Average	6.90	3.66	9.74

The yield of sugar per unit of area was as follows, in 1833, in different residencies: 6, 36, 28, 14, 7, 24, 8, 36, 64, 48.² The differences were as great in the coffee culture.³ The government took small account of the variation in the fertility of land and its fitness for different crops. If coffee would not yield well where the government ordered it planted, so much the worse for the

¹ Woordenboek NI., 1 : 525. I have omitted fractions. The proportion of families to the area planted varied about as widely and with no apparent justification; cf. *ib.*, p. 524.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 2.

³ While a family in Japara was required to maintain 282 coffee trees, a family in Cheribon had to maintain 1184. Woordenboek NI., 2 : 177. Statistics from the same source (*ib.*, 1 : 666) show that in 1854-1857 more than half the residencies did not reach the per capita average in the coffee crop of 2.11 pikols, and of these five were under 1 pikol. See Pierson, KP., 138, for a table of the amount received by a family for coffee in different residencies, in the best year, the worst, and the average in the period 1853-1864.

native planter. The government at first paid different prices for a product, according to the place, but, as Bosch's successor said,¹ it seemed "questionable, from a financial standpoint," to pay 7.50 florins for what was being bought in another place for 3 florins, and the tendency was toward a uniform price, approaching the minimum. The government, like the old East India Company, lowered the return it gave for products when prices fell in the Netherlands, without regard to the needs of the cultivator.²

When differences such as those described existed in the returns the natives received from the government, it is apparent that general averages are not fitted to picture the actual condition of affairs. Averages would mask the considerable number of people who received very little, and in some cases almost nothing, for the use of their land and labor. A class of this kind is far more important than its mere numbers would indicate. The State can afford to have all its subjects poor, but it can afford to have very few ruined; no amount of prosperity among some classes will make up for absolute destitution among others. Now the existence of a class of this kind can be proved for every period of the culture system down to its reform, and indeed seems a necessary characteristic of the system.³

While the government gained during a certain period by the culture system, it gained only by appropriating practi-

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 625.

² Piccardt, KS., 114; S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 188 ff. Absolute uniformity in the payment for crops seems never to have been reached.

³ To substantiate the point I would refer to the many instances collected in the different volumes of Van Soest, KS.

cally all the profits, and by making the natives bear practically all the losses. It could never have obtained its surplus if it had paid the natives a "living wage." The system of piece-wage identified the native with the success or failure of the crop that he cultivated, and all depended with him whether the seed fell on good ground or bad. Some fell on good ground and prospered. In Pasoeroean the yields were so large that the cultivator could use the government pay to hire laborers, and after paying them fair wages he had a profit left for himself. That, however, is no vindication of the system. The system required that the cultures should be extended over land of average fertility, and on such land the yields could never in the long run pay government expenses and government profit and leave enough over to maintain all the laborers in a proper condition of efficiency.

Besides the danger of taking a general average to indicate the condition of the Javanese under the culture system, there is further a difficulty, amounting almost to impossibility, of securing an average accurate enough to be acceptable. We should want to know what the average native received from the government, what he gave in the form of his land and labor, and what exemptions from other taxes his subjection to the culture system secured him. The elements in this problem are too many and too difficult of ascertainment for a satisfactory solution. If a recent writer¹ says that under the culture system the native was assured a wage about equal to that which he could get in any employment where European competition had not raised it, I am forced to

¹ Anton, "Neuere Agrarpolitik der Holländer auf Java," in Schmol-ler's Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, 1899, 23 : 1341.

believe that he relies for his authority upon the statement of some panegyrist of the culture system, and is not conversant with the facts of its operation. It is difficult to ascertain even the amount that the government paid out to the natives.

The government asserted that it paid large sums, but on critical examination these have to be cut down considerably.¹ During much of the period the government paid the natives in debased copper currency.² The native was not sure of getting even what the government meant him to have.³ If we accept, however, the figures given by one of the best historians of the culture system,⁴ as indicating the average reward of a family engaged in cultures, ranging from ten to twenty gulden for the most important crops, we have made no great practical progress. The amount of land taken differed widely in different times and places, and was often unknown to the European officials. The amount of labor given was no more definite. It would be fatally misleading to rely upon the statements of Van den Bosch as to what proportion of land and labor he meant to take; every bit of later evidence shows that his plans were dis-

¹ Cf. Van Soest, KS., 3 : 78. Baud's figures of fl. 20,000,000 paid to natives are reduced to about 12,000,000.

² Cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 729 ; Money, 1 : 127.

³ Cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 85, Report of 1837. The natives subject to a sugar factory were fl. 59,000 in arrears. Investigation showed that they had been dishonestly treated from the beginning, and that if they had been properly paid their arrears would have been only fl. 22,000. Natives engaged in the sugar culture had to wait eighteen months before receiving remuneration for their labor ; meanwhile they lived on money borrowed at the rate of 240% a year. "Jets over de misbruiken van inlandsche hoofden op Java," TNI., 1854, 16 : 1 : 36. Other abuses in payment are described there.

⁴ Van Soest, KS., 3 : 167.

regarded from the beginning. If we accept as fair an estimate by a later authority that the coffee culture must have required on the average at least ninety days of labor from the native,¹ we can be sure that the other cultures required in general more than that. It would not be difficult to find numerous examples of this amount of time being exceeded even in the coffee culture; I cite only one case from a report of 1835, in which it appears that the natives gave up in coffee culture and other services 225 days in the year, for a remuneration of less than five cents (Dutch copper) a day.²

Assuming that it were possible to ascertain the amount of pay received and the amount of land and labor given by the average family, there is still the question of how the culture system affected the native in other ways, especially how far it secured him exemption from other taxes. That question is one whose difficulty will be apparent when I take it up a little later. It would not be going far wrong, I believe, to set off against the benefit of possible exemptions the increase in other burdens (*e.g. heerendiensten*) attending the operation of the system; if that be done, my impression is that the natives, even taking the average, were very far from getting "fair wages" under the culture system.³

¹ Woordenboek, 1 : 661.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 726.

³ This impression is confirmed by what figures I have seen, giving the sums (copper) which the government paid forced labor by the day. Cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : p. 432, 1831, 10 cents for transport; p. 605, 1834, 8 cents for transportation of timber; p. 766 (1835), 15 cents for work on Samarang fortifications. For comparison with these figures it may be stated that the proper average pay for free labor in Java at this period is estimated at about 25 cents a day (Dutch). (Woordenboek, 1 : 661; Report of H. M. Sec. of Embassy, Lond., 1863, vi. 143.) Gelpke estimated the income of the average family in Java at fl. 150 a year. (Kock,

Another factor in the condition of natives under the culture system which eludes statistical inquiry is the hardship imposed on them of bringing their labor or the products of their land to the place appointed by the government. In attempting to establish a new system of production at a stroke, instead of waiting for it to develop naturally, the government found factors of production which were not so easily coerced by orders and regulations as the native labor supply. Under the simple organization of society in Java there had been but little trade or intercommunication, the roads had remained of a very primitive kind, and the population lived dispersed in small groups. The government experienced great difficulty in getting products from one part of the country to another, but the loss that fell upon it in this way was trifling in comparison with the sacrifices imposed upon the natives by the fiction of treating them as suited to a higher organization of industry than the one which they had attained. Considerations of economy led the government to establish as few warehouses and factories as possible, and consequently a large district was tributary to each one. Bosch proposed in 1830 that the supply of sugar cane should be drawn only from a "moderate" distance of about seven miles.¹ Even when the estimated distance was not exceeded, the compensation that the government offered for the transport of products was far from adequate.

Twee Stelsels, De Gids, 1888, 2: 469.) The Javanese, speaking of the government reward for cultures used to say, "It is so light that the wind blows it away." For examples of low pay in a comparatively late period of the culture system, see TNI., 1873, 2: 1: 133.

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 161. The ordinary measure of distance in the Dutch reports of this period is the *paal*, which was twenty minutes' walk or about one marine mile. Cf. Encyc. NI., 2: 472, Article Maten.

Baud was forced to recognize on his journey of inspection that while the sum of fifty cents, which the government had set as proper pay for the carriage of cane sufficient to make a pikol (133 pounds) of sugar, might be considered just if applied to organized transportation on a large scale, it was a very small return for the five or six trips of an individual native, who might have no proper means of carriage.¹ When exhausted fields went out of cultivation, in the sugar and indigo cultures, the original distances were greatly exceeded. In the case of two indigo factories half of the natives had to bring their products a distance of thirty miles or more; in the case of another, some natives came from a distance of eighty miles.² To remedy the scattering of the sugar-fields, at one time, all land near the sugar factory was taken for cane, and rice-fields were assigned in the outlying cane-fields. Cane did not have to be carried so far, but of the natives attached to the factory some had to walk to their work and back again at night, a distance of many leagues, while in many cases they were forced to a like journey to reach their new rice-fields. As late as 1866 it was found that an order that all coffee plantations at a greater distance than eighty minutes' walk from the dwellings of the natives should be forbidden, could not be carried out

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 628. In 1835 investigation showed that in the Preanger regencies natives in the coffee culture, who were forced to keep carts and buffaloes to transport their coffee to the government warehouses, were forced in some cases to make a trip of about sixty miles each way, consuming three weeks and bringing a reward of only fl. 10 copper. For the low pay of natives in transporting sugar cane at a considerably later period, see TNI., 1854, 16 : 1 : 37.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 624, 710. In the original the distances are given as thirty *palen* and seventy-seven *palen*; possibly twenty minutes' walk did not mean as much then as now.

without seriously impairing the production of coffee, and it was repealed in less than a year.¹

Enough has been said to show that in spite of any promises of the founder of the culture system it was a system of forced labor. It could not be maintained without compulsion because the government insisted on keeping up the culture of crops that could not return both profit to itself and fair wages to the laborers. The expectation that export articles would pay well for their cultivation, wherever grown, proved false, and if the planter had been an individual instead of a government, the cultivation would have stopped in many, perhaps in most, districts.

With pay so small, and with all the chances on which it depended so far removed from their control, the natives lost all stimulus to work. They gave their labor grudgingly and made no attempts to acquire skill or to prevent waste in the operations that were required of them. The yield of the government cultures was markedly less than that of free industry.² And besides the loss in quantity

¹ Van Soest, KS., 2 : 228 ; Pierson, KP., 156. Men had sometimes to leave their families for three or four months to work on distant sugar-fields, and would return to find wife and children dead or gone. "Jets over de misbruiken," TNL, 1854, 16 : 1 : 36.

² Figures simply confirm the impression made by the early history of the contingent system that the quantity was less and the quality worse than in free cultures. Baud found that the government sugar culture, under the most favorable conditions, gave a product less than half that attained by free native planters. S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 654. A man who lived as an indigo planter in Java for some years said that the government indigo culture gave 5½ lb. where private culture gave 20 ; he discusses the reasons. Q. v. Ufford, "De indigo-teelt in de vorstenlanden van Java," De Econ., 1860, 184 ff., 188. The production of pepper, under free labor, was two to three times that of the government culture. "Over de Gouvernements peper kultuur op Java," TNL, 1862, 21 : 340-341.

and quality due to the employment of forced labor, the product suffered further deterioration in the factories under the system of government monopoly. Whether the government carried on the processes of manufacture itself or intrusted the manufacture to contractors, the stimulus of competition was lacking in both cases and the result was the same, a product of poor quality.¹

In taking over the system of the old East India Company, the Dutch government was drawn inevitably into the old policy of monopoly and exclusion. Itself a producer, it was bound to view competitors with jealousy, and was forced into an attitude of hostility toward all, either natives or Dutch, who engaged in the production of export articles on their own account. Bosch said, before the introduction of the culture system, that he proposed not to do away with the principles of free trade and free disposition of labor, but only to modify them indirectly, to stimulate the production of Europeans and natives and make Java a good market for Dutch manufactures.² This

The government coffee culture gave not only a smaller product (three-fourths according to one estimate), but one of inferior quality, and the life of a coffee tree in Java was scarcely more than half of what it was in Ceylon, where the tree was properly cared for. Pierson, KP., 155 ff.

¹ See in general Van Soest, KS., 2:139, 215; Woordenboek NI., 3:627. Many of the contractors were unreliable and ignorant, especially at first; the "sugar" which the government was forced to take from them was more like mud, and considerable quantities of it were condemned every year as unfit to be transported to Europe. S. van Deventer, LS., 2:701. The government industry turned out such poor indigo that the price fell in Europe; according to the Woordenboek (1:522), a reform was effected later. In 1842 the government allowed contractors to sell a part of their product in the open market on condition that they furnished a better quality to the government at the low fixed price; this grant of partial freedom was successful in stimulating manufacturers to better methods. Pierson, KP., 112.

² Bosch to Elout, June 15, 1829, S. van Deventer, LS., 2:615.

statement, like most of the others made by Bosch, was good reading for the upholders of liberal principles, but of no practical effect. In respect to the natives the government tried so far as it was able to make them "ascripti glebae," by maintaining previous regulations that hindered the free movement of labor. The natives were subject to an elaborate and oppressive system of passports, designed to hold them to their work under the culture system, but constantly evaded in practice.¹ Independent native producers lacked the right to dispose freely of products competing with the government cultures.²

In respect to European planters the government policy was at first determined, so far as regards legal form, by the principles inherited from the preceding liberal period. The colonial constitution of 1827 made it the duty of the government to encourage and extend the grant of lands to

¹ See "Afschaffing van het passenstelsel," TNI., 1863, 1:2:236 ff. The system grew out of police regulations designed to facilitate the capture of criminals. It was very inefficient. Van der Wijck showed that it led to the imprisonment of twenty innocent men for an average of ten days for every criminal that was taken. Under the culture system it was used to prevent migration and to keep independent planters from getting laborers. According to a regulation of 1833 vagabonds, against whom no criminal charge could be brought, were to be set to work in "agricultural establishments"; natives who did not render all the services demanded were improperly punished under this regulation. S. van Deventer, LS., 3:177.

² By a law of 1833 natives were not allowed to sell coffee even for consumption within the district where it was produced. Later the residents were allowed some discretion in regulating such sales, but as they were inclined to strictness by their personal interests (culture percentages) they were hardly likely to make concessions. S. van Deventer, LS., 2:564. The measures taken by an official in 1844 against natives planting sugar cane on their own account shows that the government attacked not only the sale but the production of articles competing with its monopoly; *ib.*, 3:133.

Europeans, and the constitution of 1830 retained this liberal feature. It was, however, entirely inconsistent with the spirit of the culture system, and was disregarded by the government from the start. Independent planters had a bad name with the government as "particulars," "fortune-seekers," and were practically excluded from the island. There were a few leases of waste land to Europeans under Baud, the successor of Van den Bosch as Governor General, but the law of 1838, the first general regulation, was distinctly opposed to them, and the government decided in 1840 that the leasing of land to private persons for the cultivation of coffee, sugar, and indigo should cease entirely, and that for other cultures no lease should be granted without the express permission of the minister of the colonies.¹ European planters could cultivate crops in competition with the public cultures only in the "particular" lands that had passed out of government control, and there only in the face of an irregular official opposition. As a result the number of Dutch who supported themselves in entire independence of the government service was very small, only six hundred and eight in 1856 in all Java and Madura, out of a total population that amounted to about twenty thousand, exclusive of soldiers. Of foreign Europeans there were

¹ Van Soest, 3 : 72 ff. ; Pierson, KP., 102 ; De Louter, 605. Money, 1 : 136 ff., is all wrong. According to Ward, in his report on the progress of Netherlands EI. (Rep. of H. M. Sec. of Embassy, Lond., 1863, 6 : 145), the number of leases held of the government varied in 1858-1860 from 38 to 41. Attempts to open Java to European colonization were failures ; S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 190 ; "Kolonisatie in Neerlands Oost Indie," De Econ., 1858, Bijblad, 309 ff. The chapter in Money on the treatment of Europeans (2 : 169 ff.) gives many details showing the jealousy with which the government protected its preserves.

in the same year less than one hundred engaged in gainful occupations. The British representative wrote to his government in 1868 that under the existing system all private enterprises depended on the person of the Governor General, on his power to grant and revoke government contracts, permission to settle, etc. "Nine million florins sent out to Java for investment were remitted back to Holland during the past year, on account of the feeling of uncertainty as to the future, and consequent want of good security that prevailed."¹ It will be unnecessary to repeat here the bad results proceeding from this exclusion of European entrepreneurs; the subject has already been discussed in a previous chapter.

The tendency of the Dutch in the period of the culture system to revert to the methods of the old East India Company showed itself also in the matter of foreign commerce. Reference has been made in a previous chapter to the establishment of the *Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij*. This trading company, in which the king was a large stockholder, was designed originally to control commerce with the East rather by its great capital and assumed economic superiority than by any special public privileges. In its early years it disappointed the expectations of its founders. With the establishment of the culture system, however, it began a new lease of life; almost as though it were succeeding to a just inheritance it secured for itself a large share of the commercial monopoly of its predecessor. It had been the practice in the liberal period of the restored Dutch rule to sell the government products in Java in so

¹ Thurlow's report of 1868, p. 418. The statistics are from the *Woor-denboek*, 1: 599. See there, 1: 680, for example of the way in which private planters were hampered by political influence.

far as was practicable, and an active commerce had sprung up in the products of government and private cultures, in which foreigners, especially English and Americans, had taken a prominent part. Under the culture system the government controlled the production of the largest part of the exports. It was perfectly natural that the government should attempt to confine the trade in these exports to its own subjects, and in view of the semi-official character of the trading company, it is not surprising that it was granted a monopoly. Under the so-called consignment system it was given the sole right to transport the products of the government cultures to the Netherlands, where it sold them on government account. It acted also as a finance company to support the government in its industrial enterprises, advancing money on the products when they were first received, though it could not realize on them for over a year afterwards. The trading company profited by the experience of its predecessor and carried on its operations by chartered ships; it secured very advantageous contracts from the government, and by its interest and commission charges it made large profits. These gains, it is hardly necessary to say, were made at the expense of the public interests. The United States commercial agent at Batavia wrote in 1855 that "trade here, both Dutch and foreign, is crushed by the giant monopoly known under the name of the 'Trading Society,' which, from its large capital, and its privileges granted by charter, kills all private enterprise."¹

¹ U. S. Commercial Relations, quarto, 1857, 3 : 186. For details on this topic see the articles by N. P. van den Berg in *Enc. NI.*; *consignatiestelsel*, 1 : 379 ff.; *Handelmaatschappij*, 2 : 9 ff.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CULTURE SYSTEM: GOVERNMENT

THE preceding chapter was devoted mainly to a study of the policy of the Dutch government during the period of the culture system. The word "policy" implies of course politics, but in this case the aims of the government were so purely fiscal that the description and criticism in the chapter were mainly economic in character; attention was directed especially to the economic flaws of the system and to its material results. It is necessary for completeness to study now the history of the Dutch in Java at this period from another standpoint, from that of the ruler rather than of the money-maker. It will be necessary to note the characteristics of the spirit, the methods and the results of government in the period of the system, and to suggest the connection between these characteristics and the system itself. No sharp line can be drawn between policy and government; many topics could be treated equally well under either head; but even a rough classification seems better than none at all.

First in order will be a description of the effects that the system had on previously existing institutions for supplying revenue. In discussing the tax system of the Dutch government during the operation of the culture system, it is important that the reader should bear in mind the fact already noticed, that the government cultures

were imposed on only a part, and the smaller part, of the native population. To secure revenue from the people who were free from forced cultures the government had to look to the ordinary forms of taxation as they had been developed by previous administration.

In regard, then, to the most important tax, the land-tax, there is a double question ; first, to what extent were the natives who were subject to forced cultures relieved from it ; second, how was it applied and developed in the case of the natives from whom it was exacted. The original scheme provided that the natives should give their land and labor to cultures in lieu of paying the land-tax, and colonial legislation confirmed this feature of the plan.¹ We find, however, in fact, that the land-tax was still retained for natives under the culture system, at least in being taken as the standard for their payments. They were not quits with the government if they gave their land and labor ; they must produce enough at the tasks the government set them to equal at any rate what they had given before in taxes on their rice lands. The government was attempting to play with them the game of "heads I win, tails you lose." So we find results such as those set forth in the report of Baud's journey of inspection.² He found that in fifteen districts of Cheribon the natives were able in general to pay only 53% of their land-tax with the products of their indigo culture. Taking the districts in detail, they secured from the indigo

¹ Van der Poel, "Nota," 1850, S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 279, quotes Staatsblad, 1834, No. 22, as securing remission of the land-tax to all engaged in cultures.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 630. This was after the passage of Statute No. 22, which he quotes.

crops the following amounts, in percentages of the land-tax owed by them : —

5 districts	less than	30 % of land-tax
3 districts	less than	50 % of land-tax
2 districts	less than	80 % of land-tax
4 districts	more than	100 % of land-tax
1 district	more than	200 % of land-tax

Very often the whole land-tax, or the difference between the amounts which were due from the natives on the standard of the old land-tax and the actual product of the cultures at the government rates, was remitted.¹ It is apparent, however, that the whole tendency of the government was to force the natives to pay all that they had paid before and as much more as it was possible to get from them. It is impossible to fix statistically the number of natives engaged in cultures who enjoyed remission of taxes; the privilege of remission rested with the minor administrative officials, and was used by them at discretion. It is certain that many, probably most, of the natives bore the double burden of culture services and taxes too.²

Of more interest in the present connection is the land-tax imposed on natives who remained free from the government cultures. The culture system influenced the development of this tax mainly in a negative way, by diverting from it to the forced cultures the attention of government

¹ Cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 634, 639, 750.

² Woordenboek NI., 3 : 486-487, gives statistics of land-tax in sugar-fields in relation to production and government remuneration, but I am not sure of their interpretation. See Van Soest, 3 : 189 ff., for examples of arbitrary action of officials in imposing land-tax on fields occupied with cultures. Bleeker, "Het partikulier landbezit op Java," De Gids, 1863, 1 : 23, quotes examples from Krajenbrink of the double imposition of cultures and land-tax.

officials, and letting the former tax continue with all its old imperfections. One would expect, from the spirit of the government in the period of the culture system, that attempts would be made to force greater revenue from this source also. There were, indeed, spasmodic attempts on the part of officials to increase the returns of the tax, often with a suddenness that would have been brutal if the attempt could have been realized. The passive resistance of the native organization prevented any rapid changes, and the amount returned by the tax grew at about the same rate as in the previous period.¹

The administration and collection of the tax were to such an extent in the hands of the natives themselves that the government could not regulate its amount or control its action. Least of all could it do this when it was putting all energy into the extension of cultures. The European personnel in the tax department remained entirely inadequate to its duties.² Occasional investigations showed that the tax was raised in a haphazard, entirely unsystematic way. Different systems of imposing the tax were followed in different places. Some lands estimated for taxation at 319 *bouws* really measured 460; others estimated at 492 measured 719. The proportion of the product received by the government was estimated to be 12% in one residency, 28% in another, 33% in a third. This does not mean, of course, that

¹ According to the figures in the "Memorial of the Director of Cultures" (S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 191) the yield of the tax, in millions of gulden, was as follows for the years 1833 to 1841; 7.3, 7.4, 7.6, 8.0, 8.0, 8.2, 8.6, 9.3, 9.9. Comparison with the yield 1818-1829 (*ib.* 2 : 129) shows no important change in the rate of growth.

² See on this point and for the facts following in the text the report of Assistant Resident Clignett, 1836, S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 45 ff.

the common people actually paid no more than that. The *penatoes* of Kadoe, native officials who were at the head of groups of five or more villages, took not uncommonly half the product, and kept the surplus after paying the tax to the government.¹ All the abuses of former times maintained themselves, in short. Some attempts were made to revise the system in details,² and in 1844 the Governor General, Merkus, proposed a general reform, but not enough interest was taken in the matter in this period to lead to any important results, and the whole question of the land-tax was handed down for solution in a later time.

While the culture system did not lead to any great increase in the money taxes of the natives, it was attended by a great increase in the demand for labor services, outside the culture services proper. This demand came from a number of sources, from officials both European and native, acting both in a public and a private capacity. The government grudged the expenditure of any ready money, and accomplished the execution of any public works that seemed necessary, such as fortifications, roads and bridges, and the like, by the forced labor of the natives, for which it returned insignificant pay. Officials found it to their personal advantage to get the attention of their superiors by forcing the natives to make roads, build stone inns, and embellish towns; and merely to make

¹ "Memorial of Director of Cultures," S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 198 (ca. 1844).

² A royal decree of 1842 ordered that the land-tax in some parts of Java should be collected in money, but it was not until 1859 that the attempt was made to carry this into effect. S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 85, 186, 188. Some reforms were actually effected in other and less important taxes, as in the abolition of the oppressive tax on markets and shops, 1851.

this show of zeal wasted an immense amount of labor, as will appear immediately. Furthermore they expected to live off the country, whether they were at home or traveling, by levying contributions on the natives' produce and services.¹ In some sections of country the work alone on roads and bridges amounted to more than all the services that had been demanded formerly by the native government, and the total effect of the culture system with its attendant demands was estimated to be an increase of burdens from ten to one hundred fold.² While the natives in the chief city of Cheribon were allowed to purchase exemption from all services except the communal for three gulden a year, cultivators in one of the country districts paid as much as three gulden a month for exemption, and there are said to have been cases where the price of remission was sixty gulden a year.³ Men were so burdened with forced services that in some cases they had to themselves little more than one day in the week. A Dutch official estimated that at least one-fourth of the working time of the natives was taken up with services.⁴ Much of

¹ See a summary of the effect of the culture system in increasing the burden of various kinds of forced services in Van der Poel's "Nota," 1849, S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 259 ff. He said that the system led to practical slavery. A list of the services required by government, giving an idea of their great variety, will be found in "Opgave van alle diensten die van rijkswege verrigt werden in het Regentschap Bangil van 1825 tot 1843," Bijd. TLV., 1862, 2 : 6 : 116-120.

² Report of Inspector of Cultures, 1855, Eindresumé 3: Bijlage K.I, p. 147. An idea of the difficulty of the work on roads is given in Van Sevenhoven's "Nota," 1834, S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 724.

³ S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 480, 763 ; Van Soest, KS., 3 : 180. It should be remembered that 150 gulden is a liberal estimate of the average annual earnings of a family.

⁴ Een Pessimist, "Indische toestanden," TNI., 1873, 2 : 1 : 131. He suggested the following revision of the fourth commandment, to be put in

the labor, especially that in the government fortifications, had to be carried on far from home and under extremely unwholesome conditions. There is a story, not credible, but one which would not have lived except for the grain of truth in it, that when the fortifications were being built at Gombong, in the period of the culture system, the natives bound to service were ordered to take the necessary burial shrouds with them.¹

A feature which must strike the student of the history of Java at this period is the pitiful inefficiency of the natives doing public work under the direction of the government, and the uselessness of much of the work that they did. Take, for a concrete example, the description of the building of a dam. A force of twelve hundred men labored, one-third with spades, one-third with mattocks, and the remainder employed in dragging timber; they were superintended by a force of about one hundred native chiefs attended by their servants, musicians, dancing girls, and trumpeters. The men worked without proper implements, excavating but one-fifth of a cubic yard a day apiece, and carrying the earth from place to place in baskets holding about half a cubic foot. The native officials who supervised the work were utterly incompetent; they did not care which way their men were going so long as they appeared to be in motion; earth was carried to one place in the morning and back again at night. There was no organization; bridges

the mouth of the Dutch government: "Six days shall ye labor for yourselves or for me; and of the work ye do for yourselves I shall take one-fourth, and of the work ye do for me I shall take two-fifths, but the seventh day ye shall serve your master; this day shall belong to me altogether."

¹ Korevaar, *Ind. Gids*, 1891, 2 : 2176.

were so narrow that one hundred men were always waiting at them; men were grouped so thickly that only one out of ten could do any work. These men worked over three months and received no remuneration.¹ I do not know the later history of this dam, but similar public works of greater magnitude were utter failures, from lack of competent engineers and proper supervision. An attempt to get water connection with the Bay of Tjilatjap failed because an impossible route had been selected; another route was chosen, but the difficulties experienced from the caving in of the banks caused this second canal to be abandoned, and connection was finally made by a third. The work on another canal was all lost for similar reasons.² The work done by command of government officials was often perfectly useless. One resident had the fancy to have the roads lined with hedges; his successor had them torn up and replaced by stone walls. A third resident required the roads of his residency to be bordered by finished wood fences, which had always to be kept neatly whitewashed. Meanwhile the government would not allow the natives to use the regular post-roads for the carriage of their products, but required them to maintain parallel ways that were of course vastly inferior.³

Turning now to a broader topic, the general character of the Dutch government in Java at this period, it must

¹ Thurlow's Report, 1868, p. 366 ff. According to the report of 1849 the government, even when it paid some wage to forced labor, found it so inefficient that it could save money by paying a higher wage to free labor. TNI., 1860, 22 : 2 : 167.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 647, 652, 733.

³ Van Soest, KS., 3 : 178, 187. If we can believe "Max Havelaar," p. 38, the "highways" built by forced labor were often only broad paths, unserviceable in wet weather because of the mud.

be said that it is very difficult to reach an estimate of the influence of the culture system that will be satisfactory in all respects. It is not hard to ascertain the faults of the government in this period. Van Deventer's collection of documents furnishes ample material of a perfectly trustworthy character; the official reports contained in it were written by men who not only had a thorough personal knowledge of the facts that they described, but who also were in most cases adherents of the system, and who in all cases served best their personal interests by describing conditions in the most favorable light. The difficulty lies not in ascertaining the facts but in drawing just conclusions from them. One danger lies in the temptation to compare the conditions of government under the culture system with conditions in previous periods, and to infer from the evils known to have existed after 1830 that government became much worse in the period of the system. I am inclined to believe, however, that this contrast in the conditions before and after 1830 has been exaggerated by some authors. In reading the history before 1830, one is often fretted by the feeling that the writers did not know or did not choose to describe all the evils that existed; possibly if we had on the early periods information so extensive and presented with such an avowedly critical purpose as in Van Deventer's collection, we should not find the evils of government under the culture system so entirely novel. It seems safest not to attempt to show that the government suffered a great decline after 1830; it will be enough to show that it was bad, and has been vastly improved in recent times.

Another danger, perhaps more insidious, is the tendency to ascribe to the culture system, a peculiar means of rais-

ing government revenue, all the faults of government that appeared during the period of its operation. The system has enough to answer for in the economic evils that inevitably attended it. Many of the political evils could just as well have existed under any other revenue system; they resulted not from the culture system itself but from the spirit that prompted and maintained it, the spirit of more revenue for the Dutch at any cost to the Javanese.

The spirit of greed ruled the Dutch government as it had ruled the East India Company. The policy was not in all respects so short-sighted as it had been; the authorities in the Netherlands were willing to sanction expenditures when the Dutch rulers in Java could show good prospects of an immediate money return. Liberal appropriations were allowed for the extension of the culture system, though the colonial government could not always get what it wanted even for this purpose, and was restricted in ways that must have hampered its efficiency.¹ For other purposes, however, for the reform of the government administration and its revenue system, nothing could be obtained; the home authorities enjoined an economy that amounted to short-sighted stinginess. Baud ordered in 1836, just before he retired from Java, an investigation looking to the reform of the land-tax, but at the same time the colonial minister was urging "strict economy," and nothing could be effected.² In 1841 the Governor General wrote home, describing abuses existing in the government of the natives, and of

¹ A law of 1840, quoted by Van Soest, 3:96, seems characteristic; officials were warned to spare the use of printed forms when these could be written just as well. Van Soest has collected a number of examples of government parsimony.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 2:754; 3:25.

his powerlessness to reform them without the expenditure of money. Baud, now become minister of the colonies, had changed his point of view with his office. He replied to the Governor General in a confidential letter: "The bow is constantly tight drawn in this country. I cannot and may not advise you to give up a system designed to assure ample contributions from the colonial revenues, and to keep the bow from breaking." He forbade any increase in expenditures that was not most strictly necessary. He could not, he said, just to save the peace of mind of a few officials, sanction the abrogation of "the only system by means of which Java can continue to be the life preserver of the Netherlands."¹ Again, in 1846, when the Governor General urged the reform of the land-tax on the basis of Merkus's proposal, the minister replied that it was desirable but impracticable; it would need too many officials, too much money.²

The welfare of the natives played no part in government calculations, and practically nothing was done for them. An examination of the first public budget of Dutch India, that of 1840, shows that of the public expenditures all but an inconsiderable sum went to maintain Dutch military and political influence and means of fiscal exaction. The department of finance, commerce, and cultures cost over 30,000,000 gulden and the department of war nearly 7,000,000; internal administration and police cost 3,500,000; on the other hand a sum of about 500,000 was allotted to the department of justice, and less than that sum to the objects grouped

¹ "de kurk waarop Nederland drijft"; S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 122.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 222.

together as "agriculture, religion, arts, and sciences."¹ Money found European schools and missionaries in Java, but all under government control and carefully restricted. "They are chiefly occupied with the half-breeds, and with the other intermediate races at the seaports; but in the interior the natives are practically denied European education and are secured against missionary efforts for their conversion."² The reason for this, as for almost all the features of Dutch policy at this period, was the greed of gain; the political reasons that Money suggests were subsidiary.

Money criticises the English for having introduced into Java during the period of their rule a system of administration too expensive to be maintained by the undeveloped industrial organization to which it was applied, and justifies on this ground the introduction of the culture system.³ This point has been discussed in an earlier chapter, where I attempted to show that the needs of the Netherlands rather than of Java occasioned the change to the culture system; I refer to it now only for the sake of the contrast in which it puts the attitude of the government to the Dutch administration in Java before and after 1830. After 1830 the government secured its increase in revenue not only by forcing production, but also by checking expenditure even in the most necessary departments

¹ See the figures in De Waal, NISG., 3: 10-11. Comparison with the figures of 1834 shows little change in the appropriations for civilization. Education does not appear in the budget at all. The request of an official, in 1835, for thirty gulden, copper, a month, for the education of natives in his residency, was refused. S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 776, note.

² Money, 1: 45. This is one of the few points in Dutch policy that Money criticised. He thought that the English got their strongest hold on India by the spread of education. Cf. *ib.*, 2: 159.

³ Java, 1: 99.

of administration. As a result, administrative officials during the period of the culture system were in number too few for their work, in quality often incompetent or corrupt. The government was willing to increase the number of officials engaged in the revenue service, while it refused to make any extension in the political department.¹ The European officials, who were supposed to look after the general interests of the people, had each an immense area to supervise, and if they had had the best of intentions, they could not have exercised a very efficient control over affairs.² When abuses finally came to light and were charged against the leaders of the government, they could all say, as did one of the Governors General, "I did not know it. My orders were not carried out."³

¹ In 1833 Bosch was willing to appoint two controleurs to assist in the administration of cultures, while he refused the resident an assistant. This was typical of the period. Cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 589.

² For example, one administrative division, Demak, had an area of 1000 square *palen* (over 800 square miles), with a population of 230,000. One European controleur was charged with all the duties of governing the natives, and was expected to perform other services besides. The government refused to give him an assistant. The sufferings of the natives in this division in 1849-1850 have become notorious. See [Van Hoëvell] "Een voorbeeld van de bescherming der inlandsche bevolking op Java," TNI., 1855, 17 : 2 : 82. When the culture system was introduced into the residency of Kediri, a district with nine thousand population was governed by a single native official, on a salary of thirty gulden a month, helped only by a policeman or two. Nota of Hasselman, 1846, S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 226. A former official says that thefts were constant among the natives. It was assumed as a matter of course that a well-dressed native owed his prosperity to some unlawful livelihood ; eight men lived near his official residence who were known by all to live only by thieving. The evil could not be stopped because the administration of justice was so weak ; in a division extending eighty miles or so from one limit to the other there would be but one court, and criminals were seldom brought to justice. TNI., 1873, 2 : 1 : 136.

³ TNI., 1855, 17 : 2 : 76.

The spirit of the home government penetrated the colonial administration, as must always be the case, and with a few honorable exceptions the officials came to think that nothing mattered so long as the revenues were large. Most of them accepted the culture system without questioning; what slight resistance they showed was crushed by the great power that Bosch enjoyed, and soon all opposition was eliminated.¹ Men who were at heart liberals, like Bosch's successor, Baud, found themselves bound by strict instructions and justified their course by the "press of circumstances" in the home country.² Officials soon learned that their careers depended on the fiscal showing their districts could make;³ they attended to

¹ Cf. S. van Deventer, LS., 2:182, 197; 3:1, 4. One councillor, Merkus, presented a memorial of remonstrance (see his Nota of 1831, *ib.*, 2:219 ff.), but found it convenient soon after to ask for a leave of absence, and did not secure again his position in Java.

² *Ib.*, 2:615, 617. In Elout, Bijdragen, 1861, Inleiding, a letter from Baud is printed, written in 1851, and meant to justify his change of attitude; he had belonged originally to the supporters of the land-tax, but had experienced a change of heart because of the need of "export products."

³ The resident of Pekalongan was discharged and put on half pay, in 1833, because the indigo culture had turned out so badly. Bosch wrote: "The office of resident can be filled only by such officials as have the will and the ability to introduce the culture system that has been adopted, and make it further the interests both of the Javanese and the government." S. van Deventer, LS., 2:574. There was another case in the early period of the culture system (1832-1833) in which the population appeared as suffering from over-extension of cultures and other abuses due to incompetence of officials; the resident was threatened with dismissal and a subordinate was degraded. S. van Deventer, LS., 2:410 ff. In later times, when the impossibility of reconciling the interests of natives and government was more clearly recognized, officials did not suffer in this way. Experience taught them that they need not worry about the condition of the natives so long as the demands of the government were satisfied. Van Soest gives examples of officials who were promoted when they were brought to the attention of the government as having overworked the natives. KS., 3:171.

the business of raising revenue, and did not worry the government overmuch with accounts of the sacrifices of the natives.¹

An efficient means to interest the officials in the success of the government cultures and stimulate them to increase the return was the percentage system introduced by Bosch. The government granted a certain premium or commission on the product, to be divided among the officials who had directed the culture.² During the later period of the system over 1,000,000 gulden a year were paid out in this form of percentages on three cultures alone; residents had their salaries doubled or more than doubled by this means.³

A tremendous pressure was thus brought to bear on the whole political administration to enlist the interest of officials in the yield of government cultures. Nothing could have been more efficient in accomplishing the end desired, but at the same time no plan could have been devised more certain to blind the eyes of officials to duties

¹ In view of the example set by their superiors, it is not surprising that administrative officials should falsify their reports and gloss over unpleasant occurrences. Dekker (MH., 165-166) says that this was done constantly. He cites as characteristic a report beginning "During the past year the peace remained peaceful (is de rust rustig gebleven)."

² For example, in the sugar culture, the government gave the resident 10% on the product, and gave in addition a sum of 44 cents per pikol, divided as follows: 16 to the subordinate European officials; 8 to the clerks; 10 to the inspectors; 10 to native officials. Van Soest, 2: 77. The amount and mode of payment varied at different times.

³ Piccardt, CS., 137; Van Soest, 3: 169. Money said that some residents got fl. 1200 to fl. 1500 in addition to their salary. 1: 126. (The resident's salary was 12,000 to 15,000 gulden.) It is said that when the government lowered the emoluments in the indigo culture and established a fixed salary, the officials became careless, and some of them perfectly indifferent. Vitalis, Misbruiken, TNI., 250.

proper to their position. They were taken from the sphere of public servants and turned into managers and overseers of plantations. So long as they showed a good surplus of products every year, the home government put no check upon their action.

Neither in the training of officials nor in the regulation of their careers by promotion did the government take any measures sufficient to counteract the bad influence of its fiscal policy upon them. In character and abilities they were below standard. Various laws designed to insure a proper education of the officials in the higher posts were not carried out in practice, and a real reform of the civil service was deferred to the reform period after 1860.¹ In 1846, when a reform of the land-tax was under discussion, an official on leave in the Netherlands reported to the home government that a reform such as was proposed could not be carried out by officials of the kind that then ruled Java. Subordinate officials, by whom the reform would have to be executed, counted in their number some zealous and experienced men, but also a considerable proportion of very poor stuff ("zeer onbedreven sujetten"), who did not even appreciate the importance of the matter, and were entirely unfit to collect information on which to base a fair system of taxation.² The minister wrote to Java that the reform must be put off, not only on account of the expense it would entail, but also because of the ignorance of the officials. Java must wait, he said, for a time which he hoped was not far off, when every official

¹ See Lowell, "Colonial Civil Service," N.Y., 1900, 114 ff. A description of the theory on which appointments to the civil service were based will be found in Money, 1: 190 ff., but it is uncritical and neglects the facts entirely.

² Note of Hasselman, 1846, S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 231.

would be master of a native language, and could study the native institutions intelligently.¹ From another source it would appear that a considerable number of the subordinate officials had more or less command of Javanese, and had been appointed for that reason, but they were, as suggested above, morally and intellectually incompetent.²

Favoritism still played an important part in determining appointments and promotions. Officials were constantly transferred to make room for others who had no ability, and no other title to favor than the relationship or patronage of high officials or of aristocratic Batavian families. Good men were kept in subordinate positions at the centres of government, because their superiors found them useful, while poor men were promoted to a place in the provincial administration to get rid of them; they were said to be "good enough for the interior."³ The results likely to follow from such practices are pictured in the career of a man who had proved his unfitness for the civil service in the position of secretary of a residency, but who enjoyed protection in high quarters and was made assistant resident. To make a place for him a competent man was transferred to a less desirable post. The assistant

¹ Minister to Governor General, October, 1846. S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 221.

² Nota, 1852. S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 322. The report says that the controleurs were young, almost all born in Java, and not uncommonly half-breeds. I shall refer again to them in discussing abuses in the native government.

³ Vitalis, "Misbruiken in de administratie op Java," TNI., 1851. 13: 2: 250, 265. The author was himself an official, and perhaps a disappointed one; I know of no other reason for discrediting his testimony. He says that the residents were ignorant and careless, and that there had not been a director of cultures since 1836 who had a competent and practical knowledge of the workings of the system.

resident had the duty of readjusting the taxes in 1851, after some had been abolished. He raised the tax on occupations sixfold in one year, and interfered in the native land tenure to effect an arbitrary equalization of holdings; next year he was given another place, and an attempt was made to undo all the mischief that he had caused.¹

European officials enjoyed not only the culture percentages in addition to their salaries, but also many illicit sources of income. Unchecked by any strict control, they disregarded government injunctions and lived off the land and labor of the people they were set to govern. They followed the example set them in the culture system and demanded labor services and products from the people for nothing, or for a slight return. They travelled about the country with the pomp and retinue of petty Oriental despots, spending sometimes days or weeks in sybaritic life at the inns—all at the expense of the natives.²

The native officials of Java have always displayed more aptitude for acquiring the vices than the virtues of their European rulers, and they showed, as was to be expected, the bad effects of the examples set them during the time

¹ "Wat de Javaansche maatschappij al niet verdragen kan," *TNI*, 1861, 23 : 2 : 287-298. I presume this article to have been written by Van Hoëvell, who generally did not sign his articles in the *Tijdschrift*.

² See especially the details in Van Soest, *KS.*, 3 : 177 ff. The dissolute life of some of the residents is described by Vitalis, *Misbruiken*, p. 249, and he gives instances of the abuse of the natives for the selfish ends of officials. Van Hoëvell, "Batig Slot," *TNI.*, 1850, 12 : 1 : 139, quotes an experienced official as saying that a European official, when building a house, paid money only for his European materials; he would require of the people labor, stone, wood, tiles, lime, etc., without remuneration. I do not touch on such bits of scandal as can be found, *e.g.*, in Max Haveelaar, p. 132.

when the culture system was in operation. The result was the more harmful, as one consequence of the system was a very material increase in their power. The Dutch had never touched more than the fringe of the social organization in Java. They had governed from the outside through the agency of Javanese officials, and only these had the knowledge necessary to control the natives under the varying local conditions. The Dutch knew what they wanted when they established the culture system, but they had to go to the native officials to find out how to get it; the administration broke down when it was a question of direct contact with the individual natives, or with the village head-men, a question of the distribution of tasks or the like. Even the minor European officials, the *controleurs*, had to depend on the statements of native officials for their information, and had to leave the execution of orders to these same natives.¹

Money² speaks of the "different lines marked out for each race, according to their peculiar requirements—gain for the European, power for the native"—and he describes in this case correctly the result to which the culture system led. Van den Bosch proposed to secure the adherence of the ruling class of natives, the regents, by giving back to them the position and part of the power that they had enjoyed before the Dutch and English had reduced them to the place of officials. To increase their prestige they were turned again into semi-independent

¹ Nota, 1852, S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 327; Alphen, "Kennis van Indie," De Gids, 1867, 1: 493. Alphen says that the manager of a sugar factory learned more about the people than a *controleur*, in one-third of the time. Natives were always suspicious of officials, and if they told them anything, were likely to conceal or pervert the truth.

² Java, 1: 47.

rulers, with grants of land to furnish them with dues in labor and kind as under the old régime, and with a native militia for a bodyguard, strong enough to impose upon the people, but so weak that it need never be a menace to the government. In return they were to lend to the government their knowledge and their influence in getting what was wanted from the native population.¹ The policy of the government was at first to restrict these land grants to the highest class of native rulers, the regents, but many of the subordinate natives secured similar privileges in time.² The grant of land implied the right also to tax the natives on the land; the Dutch government abdicated its duties and turned the people over to the native chiefs. The results can be imagined. The controleur of Demak described them as they showed themselves in his territory. The year after the grant was made the people of the village affected went to him and

¹ For a summary of this policy, see Van Soest, *KS.*, 2 : 82 ff.; for details, S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2 : 141, 201, 249. Merkus, *Nota*, 1831 (*ib.*, 2 : 211), favored the policy of payment in land, though he recognized the objections. A good excuse was the fact that the system of money salaries had never been carried out completely; it was notorious that the regents still enjoyed the revenues of much land.

² According to the original proposal all native officials could have enjoyed land revenues instead of money; S. van Deventer (*LS.*, 2 : 499) thinks that the government applied the system only to the regents because it had not so much need of the support of other classes. For evidence that all the native officials shared in the land grants, see *ib.*, 3 : 183, a grant to a subordinate native official, 1843, of "one or more *desas*," to secure his good-will; *ib.*, 3 : 162 a statement of the "appanage" fields in Probolinggo, 1857, showing that minor officials held a large amount. The old abuse of farming out the revenues of villages reappeared; in one case a Dutchman farmed the land-tax of a village, and made it, of course, much heavier. *Eindresumé*, 2 : 228, note *c*. Other cases of this evil practice, in which Chinese, Europeans, even government officials, appear as tax farmers, are given by S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2 : 644.

begged to be freed from the impositions that the regent was laying upon them; the next year they reappeared with the same petition. He could do nothing, and in spite of many similar representations the Dutch government in Java would do nothing.¹ Down to the time of its abolition, in 1867, the system of land grants in lieu of salaries remained a great source of oppression; the best European officials protested against it, and there was one case even in which a native Javanese regent denounced it for its abuses, and refused to be a party to it.²

At the same time it is possible to exaggerate the direct effect of these land grants; until within a short time before Bosch came to the head of the government they had been permitted, and even when they had been abolished in theory it was known that the practice they represented continued to exist. I should say that the open recognition of them now by the government was important chiefly as an index of its general spirit, its willingness to free itself from all responsibility for the welfare of the natives so long as its treasury was filled. This spirit corrupted the essence of government; it permeated in the most subtle way all parts of the European and native administration. One most important manifestation of it was the parsimony shown in the scale of salaries paid to the native officials. These salaries were not only insufficient to guarantee good service on the part of the subordinate native officials; they were not sufficient even to support life on the standard to which natives of the

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 458 ff.

² See the description of this case by Van Hoëvell, "Het bezoldigen van inlandsche hoofden in sawahs der bevolking," TNI., 1857, 19 : 1 : 287, with a general criticism of the system.

official class were used. The officials as a matter of course made up the deficit by exactions imposed on the natives, and the government, forced to recognize the necessity of such exactions, had no ability to hold them within bounds.¹ After the description that has been given of the abuses of native rule, and after the examples that have been given to show what liberties even the European officials allowed themselves in the period of the culture system, it will be necessary only to suggest the oppressions of the native officials. Every demand of the European government increased as it passed through their hands. They multiplied tenfold and more the demands which the government in theory allowed them to make on the labor services of the population.² A Dutch official describes how they not only taxed the people for rice, but traded as well in this chief food staple, growing fat off the necessities of the people in time of want, and imposing useless labors on them at the height of famine.³ Another official, who was instrumental in bringing on the final reform, asserted

¹ When Baud made his journey of inspection, 1834, he found that all the district head-men of Cheribon (getting a salary of fl. 25 a month) used improper means for increasing their incomes; the government winked at it. S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 632. When Van Deventer published his collection (1865), the salary of these officials was still in many cases fl. 25. The spirit of the government in this period may be illustrated by the fact that, in one case at least, to stimulate sugar culture, it discharged the regular native officials and replaced them by Chinese—men who in such a position would be perfect bloodsuckers. LS., 2: 635. See in general, on the inadequacy of the salaries, the report of the resident of Samarang, 1852, printed in TNI., 1865, 3: 1: 131-138 ("De belasting in heerediensten en landrenten op Java"). In the same volume is an extract from a Batavian newspaper, which said that a district head needed three times his salary (fl. 50) for his support; *ib.*, p. 252.

² Alphen, Kennis, Gids, 1867, 1: 494.

³ See the description in TNI., 1855, 17: 2: 79 ff.; S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 185. The assistant resident was ignorant and unable to control abuses.

that he had personal knowledge of twenty-three cases in one month in which natives had been robbed of their buffaloes by the regent.¹ The land-tax, even the culture services, might be reasonable in any district, and yet the natives might be brought to absolute destitution by the extortions of men of their own race.

Dutch officials took a special oath to protect the natives against their own chiefs, but even when they were zealous and intelligent, they could accomplish little in face of the selfish apathy of the government. According to an official report dating from the later period of the culture system,² the subordinate European (or half-breed) officials vied with each other at first in hunting out abuses on the part of native heads, partly from a sense of duty, partly from arrogance and a dislike of the native officials. The government had so many complaints to investigate that it instructed its officials to show less zeal; they went to the other extreme, and let complainants sit at their doors unheard until their resources were gone, or sent them away with threats. It became proverbial that the government would rather dismiss ten residents than one regent, and every excuse was sought to cover up unpleasant occurrences that might lead to trouble. The career of the author of Max Havelaar, who, with all his faults, was an honest official, shows how discouraging were attempts to redress the wrongs of the common people.³ The apathy of the Dutch government was the more

¹ Dekker, MH., 189. See other instances of oppression in S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 643.

² Nota, 1852, S. van Deventer, L.S., 3 : 323.

³ Dekker's story, told in MH., 227-228, 241 ff., may be misleading in detail, but the fact remains that he was forced out of the service for insisting on the punishment of the illegal acts of a native regent.

serious, as a just charge against a native official could be proved only with great difficulty. The common people were terror-stricken when it came to the point of testifying against their superiors, and the native officials were themselves all banded together to support abuses.¹

In tracing the effect of Dutch policy in the period of the culture system we have reached the last link in the chain of institutions, the village government. This institution, the lowest of all and the least known to the Europeans, was at the same time the most important. It was the medium through which all orders of European and native officials reached the common laborers. "We can exert influence on the Javanese in no other way than through it," wrote a Dutch official.² Given the slight development of the upper administration, which made subject to each official, even of the lower native orders, a large area and a numerous population, the village government became the most important organ of administration; on it depended directly millions of people who scarcely ever saw an official of any considerable rank.

Of one effect of the culture system upon the internal organization of the village, it is possible to speak with certainty, because its traces are still apparent. The government could carry out its purpose of changing the

¹ See the account in "Een voorbeeld . . ." TNI., 1855, 17 : 2 : 87, of the way in which the native officials secured positions for their relatives, and built up "rings." An instance is given of a regent who secured the change of a district head four times in six years, until he finally got his brother-in-law into the place. It was absurd for Money (1 : 228) to talk of the native officials being kept honest by "public opinion."

² Mem. of Van Sevenhoven, 1840, S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 105. The proposal of the resident of Cheribon, 1838 (*ib.*, 3 : 92), to diminish the power of village governments and if possible to abolish them, was a wild idea.

direction and amount of production in Java only as it reached the landed population, and to reach that class it had to work through the village organization; it could not deal with individual peasants. There was a pressure from above to maintain the communal system of land tenure and to extend it at the cost of villagers whose land had become individual and hereditary property. The village strove to bring under its control all land that it could get to satisfy the government demands. Claims to individual rights disappeared with the decrease in the individual interests and voluntary labor of the natives. In spite of an abundance of free land the population heaped itself up in the villages, to divide the burdens among more families, and the land share of each family grew smaller and smaller. An investigation into the land tenures of the residency of Cheribon showed that the system of clearing right was once nearly universal there, and that remnants of individual and hereditary property rights were to be found nearly everywhere, but that the system had been in large part destroyed by the introduction of the sugar and indigo cultures, and had given way to the communal system. In a number of villages natives testified that their forefathers had owned the rice-fields as private property, but they had been converted into communal property by command of the government. A later investigation (1878) in the same district showed that communal land tenure was retained most generally in the districts of the sugar culture.¹

¹ Communal land tenure in Java is not an aboriginal institution as supposed by Laveye and others; it represents a modification of individual tenure by government influence, and hence resembles the Russian mir (cf. Simkhowitsch, "Die Feldgemeinschaft in Russland," Jena, 1898). While this, I think, can be held to be absolutely certain since the

Dutch fiscal policy affected not only the native land tenure, the natural basis of village institutions, but the village government as well, that Baud had called¹ "the palladium of peace in Java." The head-men of the village governments got a great increase in power with the growth of fiscal demands; their knowledge of local conditions made them indispensable both to European and native officials, and made them final arbiters in apportioning taxes and tasks. They shared also in the percentages and premiums set by the government to stimulate zeal in the collection of revenue.² On the whole, however, the district head seems to have been the last in the hierarchy of officials who represented the interests of the Dutch treasury and gained by his con-

publication of the ample evidence in the Eindresumé, some points in the rise of communal tenure are still obscure. The land-tax worked with the culture system to bring about the change; the fiscal demands of the government, expressed either in tax or cultures, were the motive force. This place is unsuited to the discussion in detail of a question which belongs in the general history of institutions. For the statements in the text see Van Soest, 1: 145; Gelpke, "Desabestuur," Ind. Gids, 1879, 2: 140; Veth, "Het cultuurwet," Gids, 1866, 1: 287-290; Van Gorkom, "Regeling der landrente," Gids, 1879, 3: 50. Further details and references in Pierson, 144 ff. The government showed no respect whatever for property rights of the natives, when they stood in the way of a reorganization that would be suited to a supply of export products. The inhabitants of one village were made to plant indigo on the lands of another, lest the home population should spare its land. Nearly every village in Cheribon had land *enclavé* in the land of another village, when Van Gorkom wrote; old inhabitants testified that this was the result of the indigo culture. When a village had no land fit for indigo, pieces were assigned to it elsewhere, and these were kept later. See examples in Eindre-sumé, 2: 65, 72, 186, 200, Bijl. 55. The persistence of communal land tenure and the scattering of the lands of a village are great hindrances to production and administration at the present day.

¹ Baud to Governor General, 1840, S. van Deventer, LS., 3: 94.

² Cf. S. van Deventer, 2: 721 (coffee); 750 (land-tax).

nection with the administration. The village head-men were on the other side of the cleft between Dutch and native interests, and the increased power and emoluments that the system gave them did not recompense them for the precarious position in which they were put by being identified with the producing class. If the village did not supply all that was demanded of it, the head-man was punished for its failure.¹

In the liberal period that preceded the introduction of the culture system the principle was accepted that the villages should have perfect freedom in the choice of their heads, and that elections could be nullified by the resident only for specific reasons, and with the approval of the Governor General. After about 1840 deposition became the common punishment for head-men who were not successful in extorting what the government desired. The right to a free election became nothing but a form, and men became village heads because they seemed fit tools to their Dutch superiors, or because they were willing to

¹ In S. van Deventer, 1 : 419, a statistical account is given of the number of head-men punished in one residency in the period 1836-1840 ; the figures for the different years show a constant increase, 68, 154, 222, 281, 275. Van Soest, 3 : 197, says that the culture system was maintained by a systematic "terreur," by all kinds of punishments. They ranged from simple arrest and confinement in the stocks as long as a fortnight to beatings and barbarous Eastern tortures. Men were bound for a day to the cross with the face turned toward the sun, were dragged at the tails of horses, were kept all night in water, and so forth. Pierson finds a subject for grim humor in the report of a resident who, after speaking of the binding of men to bamboos in the sun, says that "in spite of these expedients" the opposition to the system grew no less. Baud forbade the use of the rod for the punishment of village chiefs without judicial sanction, but the prohibition, though repeated later, was never observed. The use of beatings to increase production was abolished by Van der Putte in 1865.

pay for the place and the promise of profit it held out to an unscrupulous taskmaster. A "trade in village officers" arose. I quote from the report of the Inspector of Cultures, Van der Poel, 1850.¹ "In this way are chosen to be village heads all kinds of men, who, for the most part supported by the authority of the State, are in a position, it is true, to have orders executed, but who on the least occasion become unserviceable, since, not belonging to the class of men who are born on purpose, as it were, to enter the village government in Java, they have no moral influence. A great deal is overlooked so long as a village head simply pays good attention to the European cultures, and as it happens not infrequently that a village's share in the cultures far exceeds the strength of the inhabitants, but nevertheless the work turns out well and satisfies the European officials, it may easily be conceived that the heads of such villages get power beyond the others. Now this favor denotes, not money rewards, presents, or honors, but simply a reprehensible overlooking of irregularities, for it has often happened that the village heads, having embezzled half or two-thirds of the land-tax (300 or 400 gulden), are simply relieved of their functions, only to be reinstated under another name after two or three years."

Another report,¹ based on this of Van der Poel's, said that three-fourths of the traditional class of village heads had disappeared, and that the office was held by

¹ S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 283 ff.

² S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : Bijlage D., p. 327. Compare with these accounts that given by an ex-official in TNI., 1873, 2 : 1 : 134. He thought that the lower classes fared better under the new heads, but lost in that the members of the old "patriarchal" families were set against them and would not help them in time of need.

people of the lowest class, who had suffered every punishment but death. The people had given up the attempt to secure good heads, finding it better to yield and get a share of the money used for buying votes.

It is impossible to describe the exact effects of the culture system upon the relations of head-men to villagers, and of villagers to each other; they will never be known, for they were not known to the Dutch at the time. The government in the Netherlands wanted money, and sent word to Java to furnish products, to furnish more products. The impulse was transmitted through the different officials until at last it reached the native who produced the products, but beyond a certain point the Dutch could not follow or control it. They could repeat the shock, and more violently, if they were kept waiting for the desired reaction, but they could not determine its impact upon the individual natives. It is probable, from what is known of the nature of village governments, that the cases of injustice and oppression in the workings of the culture system that were brought to the notice of the Dutch and put on record were as nothing compared with tyrannies and extortions by petty officials, by the comparatively well-to-do, by village cliques, wrought inside the villages and never known to the outside world. "The little man never makes open complaint," said a native witness at an investigation in 1850, when asked why the gross abuses discovered had not sooner been brought to the attention of the government. The native bore his sufferings in silence, and it was mainly by unconscious manifestations of his distress, by famine and pestilence, by flight from the land, that the government came in time to realize the faults of the system.

The veil that overhung the workings of the village government was lifted from time to time by some zealous official, and the picture presented seems always to have been the same — corruption and selfish oppression. The head-man used his power so far as he dared for his own interests; he shared it when he had to, but only with the rich. The burden of taxes and services fell mainly on the poorer classes; the rewards for products furnished went mainly to those with political influence, who had done no work. The villager who did not meet the demands of his petty government was sold out; even his wife and children could be taken from him to work in the house of the village tyrant and leave him tortured with jealousy and driven to crime.¹

¹ It seems unnecessary to describe in detail the abuses suffered under the village governments. Material for a description will be found especially in the third volume of S. van Deventer, *LS.* (78, 105, 258 ff., 266 ff., 283, etc.). See also Vitalis, "Misbruiken in de administratie op Java," *TNI.*, 1851, 13 : 2 : 246 ff.; and "Een voorbeeld van de bescherming . . ." *TNI.*, 1855, 17 : 2 : 80.

CHAPTER IX

THE CULTURE SYSTEM: REFORM

THE main object in view in the institution of the culture system was attained by it, and a net profit was sent each year to the home government that soon exceeded the anticipations even of the founder. The exact amount of the surplus will never be known, for some of the statistics were falsified and some are lacking, but there is an estimate by the best authority on finance in the Netherlands, N. G. Pierson, covering the most important part of the period of operation of the system, that can be accepted as a close approximation to the truth. The estimate makes the net profit of the system 22,333,000 gulden a year from 1840 to 1874, a total profit of about 781,000,000 gulden.¹ Over four-fifths of the total came from one crop, coffee,

¹ Pierson, KP., 148. For criticism of the figures published by the government as representing the profits of the culture system, see Piccardt, CS., 93; "De financiële resultaten van 's Gouvernements landbouw en handel," TNI., 1853, 15 : 2 : 1-7; "Over de Gouvernements peper cultuur op Java," TNI., 1862, 24 : 2 : 335 ff.; Rees, Hervorming, Ind. Gids, 1885, 1 : 740. The figures given by different authors vary widely, according to the period chosen and the way in which government statistics are interpreted. C. Th. Deventer, "Een eereschuld," Gids, 1899, 3 : 253, bases on the previous studies of De Waal and N. P. van den Berg an estimate that the actual surplus of government revenue for the period 1831-1866 was fl. 498,000,000. The Indian surplus enabled the Dutch to diminish the interest charge on their debt by two-fifths and to spend hundreds of millions on railroads. Piccardt, CS., 151. Piccardt shows that the Dutch were encouraged to run into debt by the profits from the Eastern dependencies. *Ib.*, 105.

and of the remaining cultures, bringing in fl. 142,000,000, sugar alone gave fl. 115,000,000. It is apparent that the system failed as a system even in respect to the one point of net surplus. It could introduce cultures, but could not maintain them unless they were so well suited to the natural conditions of the country and the needs of the market that the advantages of land and climate overcame the disadvantages of forced labor and government management. The government actually lost on many crops for a number of years.¹ And its greatest success, the coffee culture, was so profitable, not because of good management on its own part or good cultivation on the part of the native, but because of the change of the price of coffee in Europe, for which it was in no way responsible.²

It has been asserted that this large surplus revenue was really a burden on the European consumer of the imported products, rather than on the natives of the Indies.³ The assertion does not deserve serious consideration. I have shown already that the government revenues were obtained

¹ I have already spoken of the losses of the natives. The government made them bear the brunt of failures, but lost itself in the advances made for seed and labor, in the investment of capital in factories, etc. Most of the minor cultures were sources of loss to the government as well as to the natives.

² In 1848 the government sold coffee for fl. 13.30 a pikol (133 lb.), in 1856 for fl. 32.04; deducting its expenses, profit was fl. 3.71 as against fl. 27.75. *Woordenboek*, 1: 422. With the amount of coffee sold annually a difference of one cent a pound made a difference of over fl. 1,000,000 in revenue. (Thurlow's Report, p. 371.) Veth shows that the coffee crop declined both in quantity and in quality while it was making such large additions to the revenue. "Phases der bestrijding van het koloniale stelsel," *De Gids*, 1869, 1: 113.

³ The (English) *Economist*, Oct. 12, 1861, p. 1127; *Money, Java*, 1: 45-50. In denying this I do not, of course, pretend that differential and protective duties did not hurt the Dutch consumer.

at the expense of incalculable exertions and hardships on the part of the subject people. It would not be necessary to touch on this point again if supporters of the culture system had not so persistently urged in its behalf the statement that Java really increased in prosperity during the operation of the system, and if there were not in this statement a kernel of truth likely to lead the student astray.

The question to be resolved is a double one; first, whether Java became more prosperous in the period 1830-1860; second, whether the prosperity can be traced to the action of the culture system. Taking the second question first, it should be admitted that the government cultures did not work hardship in the case of every individual who was subject to them. When some of the oppressive features of the system had been reformed, and when it was applied to parts of Java especially suited to the cultivation of the products that the government demanded, natives might gain rather than lose by it.¹ Pierson has shown that in some parts of Java the culture system worked like an ordinary money tax, as the cultivators hired laborers to perform the services for them, and in some cases received more from the government than they paid in wages.² While it would be idle to deny that the culture system worked occasional benefits, I have already shown that it

¹ This seems to have been the case in some of the eastern residencies under the reformed sugar culture. See Vitalis, *Misbruiken*, p. 252. This evidence is the more valuable because Vitalis was a bitter opponent of the system in general, and it is confirmed from a native source (*Eindr.*, 2: 266, *Bezoeki*; culture services were not oppressive there). The evidence of Hasselman (*Nota*, 1846, *S. van Deventer*, *LS.*, 3: 226) is not so conclusive as to conditions in Kediri.

² *KP.*, 139.

was oppressive in its general application; and even in the cases in which natives gained by a culture, there was always the danger that some chance would reverse its fortunes and make the culture a serious responsibility rather than a resource for the government.¹ Making every allowance for cases in which natives gained by the culture system, leaving out of account every objection that can be urged against the theory of the system, the action of the Dutch government in abolishing it seems amply justified by the known evils that it worked in the economical and political organization.

Granting, however, that the culture system was bad, Java may still have grown more prosperous in the period during which it was maintained. As has been shown in an earlier chapter, the proportion of arable land occupied by government cultures was not more than about one-twentieth of the whole. The burdens of the cultures may have been shifted to some extent on natives who were not directly subject to them, and these natives may yet have maintained or improved their economic position. If we accept the growth of population as a rough criterion of welfare, the culture system seems to have had little influence, one way or the other, on the increase in numbers. The population continued to grow, as every Oriental population will grow when peace is assured by a European government, and when new land lies ready for occupation. A Dutch official wrote about 1800, "In nearly every part of this beautiful island whole stretches of fertile land lie

¹ Wallace, *Malay Arch.*, 251, cites the inhabitants of Menado as great gainers from the culture system. They were brought up in the debate on the Dutch budget in 1893 as suffering severely from the decline of the coffee culture, and the government was forced to appropriate money for their relief. (*De Louter, Handleiding*, 388.)

waste and fallow for lack of population." Raffles said that in seven-eighths of Java the soil was entirely neglected or only half cultivated, while the people lived off the remaining eighth.¹ The land lay waste through the fault of the native political organization. Under such conditions a traveller's statement in reference to one of the East India islands held true in regard to Java also; children were regarded as a source of income rather than of expense, and the necessity of supporting a family was no obstacle to early marriage.² The population therefore continued to grow during the period of the culture system as it had grown before under the government of the Dutch, and at about the same rate.³

¹ Wiese on Bericht, Jonge, Opk., 13 : 87 ; Raffles, Hist., 1 : 119 ; Dirk van Hogendorp, Schets, 1799, Eindr., 2 Bijl., LL., 154.

² A. S. Bickmore, "Travels in the East Indian Archipelago," N.Y., 1869, p. 278. It is manifestly unfair to compare the growth of population in Java and Ceylon, as has been done to show the benefit of the culture system. The soil of Ceylon is poor in comparison with that of Java. See Sir Samuel W. Baker, "Eight Years' Wanderings in Ceylon," Phila., 1869. Boys recognizes the extraordinary fertility of Java as the main reason why the Javanese could bear up under the culture system. Java, 68.

³ Bleeker found that the population increased in the period 1795-1830 from three and a half million to seven million, while in a period of equal length under the culture system, 1830-1865, it increased from seven million to fourteen million. "Nieuwe bijdragen tot de kennis der bevolkingsstatistiek van Java," Bijd. TLV., 1869, 3 : 4 : 453. Other tables by the same author show that the culture system had little effect on the movement of the population as a whole. Exceptions to the normal growth can be found both before and during the culture system. In the period of the great Java war, 1824-1830, the increase was only 1.82% a year; 1845-1850, in a period of epidemics (partly due to the action of the system), the annual increase was but .021%; *id.*, "Over de bevolkings toename op Java," TNI., 1863, 1 : 1 : 193. Leclercq, "Java et le système colonial des Hollandais," Revue des Deux Mondes, November, 1897, 144 : 185, says that there are "numerous proofs" of the connection of the system with the growth of population, but gives nothing to substantiate his asser-

If we seek to know more than the mere number of the people in Java at different times, and ask what was the economic status of individuals, whether the standard of living rose or fell, we find statisticians ready to answer our questions. Statistical material is, however, notoriously misleading even in a modern state, and it is still less satisfactory as a basis of argument when it applies to a half mediæval society such as that of Java. So far as it can be trusted it shows a decline in the condition of the individual native about the middle of the nineteenth century, but it tells us absolutely nothing about the share of the culture system in influencing this decline.¹

Leaving aside the question of the general condition of Java, it is not necessary to rely upon statistics to trace the effects of the culture system. The forced services proved to be an intolerable burden in many parts of the

tion. Pierson, KP., 75, believes that the communal land tenure, induced in part by the government cultures, gave an unwholesome stimulus to the multiplication of numbers. I have seen no other reasonable suggestion as to how the system could have furthered the increase of people subject to it. Van Soest, KS., 2 : 129, gives striking examples of its influence in the other direction, and Wallace, Malay Arch., 264, unconsciously suggests that the forced cultures caused the slow increase in Menado. Material for a detailed study of the growth of population in different localities can be found in Bleeker's articles in TNI. for 1863 and Bijl. TLV., 1867 and 1869, but the interpretation of this material in connection with the statistics of cultures would require an extended monograph.

¹ See especially the statistical articles by W. Bosch, TNI., 1857, 19 : 1 : 365 ff. ; 19 : 2 : 348 ff. ; De Economist, 1860, 343 ff. ; TNI., 1865, 3 : 1 : 257 ff. ; 1868, 2 : 1 : 21 ff. This last was written in reply to an article by Pierson, De Econ., 1867, 315, who asserted that prosperity increased under the culture system, though not necessarily because of it. Bosch attempts to prove impoverishment of the natives by the per capita statistics of taxes and of the consumption of rice, salt, piece-goods, etc. Bosch gives at least enough facts to disprove absolutely Money's statements, Java, 1 : 308 ff.

island. Despite all government restrictions, a movement of population began from the districts in which the system had been introduced to government lands not subject to it and to the lands held by private individuals. Populous regions lost as much as one-half or two-thirds of their inhabitants through emigration. The residency of Japara lost in the first half of the year 1841 alone over two thousand people, who were escaping from the burden of forced services. Some villages came to have no other inhabitants than the head-men.¹ Those who remained at home suffered from recurrent famines and pestilences, due to the diminished food supply. The natives were not left time or land enough to raise their food, and were not given wages enough to buy it. That the government might have the fields earlier for sugar cane, the cultivators were forced to plant the kinds of rice that matured earlier, but gave a smaller crop of poorer quality. Many were forced to subsist on wild roots and herbs, — and to remedy matters the government proposed to make rice too a forced culture. In the famine of 1849–1850 over a third of a million people died in central Java, in one of the richest parts of the earth, which now maintains a population that has doubled in numbers.²

¹ Summary in Van Soest, KS., 3: 204 ff.

² I refer again to Van Soest, KS., 3: 206–222, for a summary account of the famines. One would hardly expect a government official to know the difference between kinds of rice; *oryza sativa* returns a crop of 25-fold, but needs eight or nine months to ripen, while *oryza praecox* ripens in five or six months, and returns only 18-fold. Scheuer, “Mark en dessa,” 159. “Pessimist” describes, in TNI., 1873, 2: 1: 130, the famines of 1858 and 1862, of which he was an eye-witness. People lived for months on the roots of *gadoeng*, a plant of the yam family, which is poisonous if not properly prepared; hunger drove many to eat the root before it was fit for food.

It is remarkable that no armed revolts against the system ever occurred. From time to time the natives in one place or another protested against the exactions of the government, but they had no ability to organize an opposition, and simply fared the worse for their show of resistance. As the Governor General cheerfully remarked in 1834,¹ "The habit of subjection and obedience, so especially peculiar to the Javanese, makes many things possible in their country which elsewhere would have to contend with great difficulties."

Of all these events practically nothing was known at the time in the Netherlands. No government industry was ever so free from the supervision of the general public, or so unchecked by the public criticism that keeps governments in the right track, as was the culture system. The minister of the colonies was the only man in the Netherlands who could know the real state of affairs in the East, and he was responsible to the king alone, determining the colonial policy without thought of popular or parliamentary opposition. When Raffles was looking forward to the transfer of Java to Dutch rule, he wrote a friend that he hoped the Javanese would be as happy under the Dutch as under the English, if not happier. "I say happier because Java will, in importance, be more to Holland

¹ Baud's Report, S. van Deventer, LS., 2 : 677. He referred to a rising of sugar cultivators in Soerabaya, and said also, "I am compelled to doubt whether the artisans of the city like to be forced to work almost continuously in the government establishments for less than they can earn from private persons," but thought an increase in pay was questionable policy "from a financial standpoint." There was a rising also in Pasoeroean at this time; *ib.*, 2 : 583. For description of later risings, see *ib.*, 3 : 131, and Pierson, KP., 122-127 (Cheribon, 1839); "Hoe de resident van Tagal het kultuurstelsel op de been houdt," TNL., 1861, 23 : 2 : 164-170 (Tagal sugar culture, 1860 or 1861).

than she could ever be to England.”¹ His idea that Java would receive more efficient attention from the small country proved a delusion. The Dutch fundamental law of 1815 did not recognize the principle of the responsibility of ministers to the legislative body; the States General itself was chosen under the restrictions of a narrow suffrage and had very limited powers. The Dutch had no chance to interest themselves in their colonies because the constitution expressly conferred upon the king the exclusive right of control in the State’s transmarine dependencies.² The members of the Dutch Chambers acquiesced in this arrangement apparently without thought of resistance; more than once after 1815 they emphasized the fact that it was not their business to meddle in colonial affairs. The royal speeches made at the opening of the States General, and to be found in De Waal’s collection, contain often absolutely no reference to colonial affairs; in the period after 1830, when the great changes of the culture system were in progress, the dry statement “complete quiet prevailed” was the usual amount of information given the legislators. It was not until 1819 that the constitutional provisions regarding the Dutch budget itself were carried into effect, and then the “ordinary” parts of the budget were discussed and revised only at ten year intervals.³ A member of the

¹ Memoir, letter to Minto, July 2, 1814, p. 228. The letter is misdated in Egerton’s “Raffles.”

² Art. 60 read as follows, “De Koning heeft bij uitsluiting het opperbestuur over de volkplantingen en bezittingen van het Rijk in andere werelddeelen;” a member of the constitutional convention asked whether this included legislative power, the presiding officer said yes, and there was no further discussion. De Waal, NISG., 1: 23, 27.

³ De Waal, 1: 62. Budgets were made biennial in 1841; *ib.*, 3: 162.

States General complained, in 1828, that when he and his fellows asked about the colonial budget, they were told that the government itself did not know its details, and left its revision largely to the Indian administration; they got only general statements and vague promises that gave them absolutely no idea of the true state of affairs.¹ This very member became minister of the colonies soon afterward but made no change of importance; the colonial finances came to the attention of the Dutch legislature only as the resulting surplus or deficit appeared in the Dutch budget.² Hogendorp might well exclaim that the Dutch, unlike the English, had neither the desire to make known the facts about their Eastern possessions, nor even the desire to know them themselves.³

The lack of knowledge and interest on the part of Chambers and people was the more natural as the home government was itself in the dark. Van den Bosch made secrecy a part of his policy; he justified it on the ground that he wished to preserve the system from knowledge and application by other nations, but he kept even the king ignorant or misinformed.⁴ As Van Soest says, one man (Bosch) ruled the system up to 1840; after that the system ruled the men. Even the minister of the colonies had only a vague and often perverted idea of conditions in Java.⁵

¹ Speech of Clifford, 1828, De Waal, 1 : 336; his speech of 1826 (*ib.*, 1 : 204) makes much the same complaint.

² See the budgets 1832-1834; De Waal, 2 : 21-26.

³ Bijdragen, 1825, quoted in De Waal, 1 : 158.

⁴ S. van Deventer, *LS.*, 2 : 612; 3 : 34, 38. Van Soest (*KS.*, 2 : 209) says that Bosch "wound himself around" King William I and gave him a false idea of the workings of the system. Men who favored it were given royal audiences; others were kept away.

⁵ In view of what I said in an earlier chapter as to the character of official reports at this time, it is not surprising to learn that individuals

Practically no one outside the colonial office had any knowledge or interest concerning colonial affairs. The few pamphlets attacking the government's policy, published in the Netherlands, were of no account against the glowing financial statements that the government could publish. The minister of the colonies received the reports of all officials and edited them before they were laid before the king or made known to the public; all unpleasant details were cut out that the ministerial policy might appear in the best light. Java was jealously closed to the individual traveller; it contained few Europeans who were not directly connected with public administration and subject to its discipline, and strict press regulations prevented the agitation of any questions that could embarrass the government. The reading public in the Netherlands saw little that was not meant for them; news "pour l'Europe" was a stock phrase in the East for touched-up pictures that concealed the real condition of affairs.¹

Restraint of the press by law was superfluous, as the administrative authority of the colonial government was enough to prevent the publication of anything unpleasant. No printing establishment could be started without special

were much better informed by private letters than the minister by his despatches. "Waar zijn waarachtige berigten omtrent den toestand van Ned. Ind. te zoeken?" *TNI*, 1852, 14 : 1 : 140. From a complaint of the Governor General in 1839 (*S. van Deventer, LS.*, 3 : 75) it would seem that the minister often treated colonial despatches as did the English ministers in Walpole's time, and did not read them at all. A Dutch provincial official showed that his superiors had utterly erroneous notions in regard to conditions in Java; *Nota of Van der Poel, 1850, S. van Deventer, LS.*, 3 : 279.

¹ De Stuers, "De vestiging en uitbreiding der Nederlanders ter Westkust van Sumatra," *Amsterdam, 1850, 1 : xxv, c ; 2 : 77-78.*

permission, and as a rule nothing could be printed without being submitted to a censor who struck out everything on which a criticism of the government could possibly be based. The "Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië" was sanctioned in 1838 only on condition that it refrained from touching on political questions, and the reader who scans its early volumes in search of information on Java will find only articles on such subjects as primitive Christianity and polar expeditions. An official who contributed to this journal the part or whole of any official document, without express permission, was threatened with the penalties for embezzlement and breach of confidence; collaborators of the journal who had been sending it innocent articles on native customs were afraid thereafter to be connected with it.¹

The beginning of a parliamentary opposition in colonial affairs appears a little before 1840, but it had much more to do with Dutch than with colonial politics, and was in no sense an attack upon the culture system. The home government, in financial straits because of the recent separation of Belgium, proposed to raise a loan on the strength of the colonial revenues, and got the assent of the Chambers in 1836 to a loan of 140,000,000 florins, secured by the transmarine possessions. The amount was supposed to represent the repayment to the home government of a part of its colonial expenditures in former years. Some curiosity was expressed as to the basis of the government's claim against its colonies, and figures were given to justify it; members were easily satisfied, and in some cases at least actually opposed the publication of facts on the

¹ Veth, "De openbaarheid in koloniale aangelegenheden," *De Gids*, 1848, 2: 86, 91, 95.

colonies, as likely to lead to bad results.¹ When the government, however, came again to the Chambers in 1839 for a loan on colonial account, it did not find them so complaisant. The government was unpopular because of the unsuccessful issue of the long struggle with Belgium, and the finances were in a very bad condition. Van den Bosch, then minister of colonies, tried to influence legislators by a secret and confidential letter that he circulated, but the States General at least revolted at such political methods, and the second Chamber rejected his proposal by a vote of 39 to 12.²

The growing independence of the legislature was recognized in an amendment to the colonial article in the constitution granted by the government the next year. According to its terms the States General was to receive regular information on the income and expenditures of the colonial possessions, and was to determine by law the disposal of surplus revenue coming from the colonies.³ This may be regarded as marking some progress of the States General in its fight for power, but it had practically no effect on the course of colonial policy. To determine how the net surplus should be spent in the Netherlands was something absolutely distinct from determining how

¹ See the report of the fifth section of the Chamber, 1836, De Waal, 2 : 144. Original text of the law, *ib.*, 2 : 101; final text, 2 : 159. I do not attempt to give all the fiscal details. The government did not actually borrow the capital sum, but required the annual interest payments from the Indies.

² De Waal, 2 : 304. Bosch resigned, was made a Count and a Minister of State.

³ De Waal, 2 : 321, 362. There were objections even to this amount of parliamentary power over the colonies; it was said that parliamentary interference had cost England the United States, and France San Domingo. See the speeches of Beelaerts van Blokland, De Waal, 2 : 353; of Van Alphen, *ib.*, 348.

the revenues should be raised in India, and how much of them should be spent there. No better proof could be given of the backward political development of the Netherlands, as a Dutch author has pointed out, than the fact that this new power was regarded as a real concession.¹ It was still impossible for members of the Chamber to obtain any full and accurate information from the government as to the policy pursued and the results in India; the minister of the colonies deprecated any interference on the part of the States General, and refused to make it a party to his deliberations.²

It is natural, therefore, though it seems astonishing to one who knows what was taking place at the time in Java, that in running through the long speeches made in the States General, one scarcely ever finds an intelligent reference to the culture system or criticism of its workings. The name appears in the debates, coupled sometimes with the terms "forced culture" and "monopoly"; there is an occasional reference to complaints of European contractors and planters in Java; but practically all of the discussions referred to the conduct of the home government and belonged rather to Dutch than to colonial politics. It was generally assumed that the increased revenues from the East were due to the prosperity of the natives, and that the culture system was conferring on them all the benefits that its founder had promised.³

The one great fact known to the Dutch people and to their representatives in the States General was the net surplus that was turned into the treasury every year.

¹ Buijs, "Het koloniaal debat," Gids, 1870, 2 : 347.

² Compare the speeches by Golstein and Baud, 1845, De Waal, 3 : 475, 591.

³ Cf. De Waal, 2 : 129, 176, 284.

Arguments against the system would have needed to be strongly urged and widely spread to meet this argument for it, and in fact there was practically no opposition to the culture system in the Netherlands before the revision of the Dutch constitution in 1848.¹ The members of the liberal party did not before that time oppose the government's colonial policy; they opposed the political system that allowed the government to have a policy of any kind free from their knowledge and control. It was not until the fundamental question of government by the king or government by the people had been settled that the details of government could form the subject of parliamentary discussion.

The colonial question was of minor importance in the agitation that resulted in the constitutional changes of 1848,² and the chief results of the new constitution appeared in the field of Dutch politics. The Chambers of the States General were given more of a popular complexion, ministers were declared responsible to them, and the Second Chamber in especial received a great extension in the rights of initiative and amendment. As regards colonial affairs the Chambers were not united in their desires. The great majority of the members desired to limit the almost absolute power that the king had had in colonial legislation, but many feared at the same time that

¹ Cf. Money, 1 : 300. "Every Dutchman at home knows that the surplus revenue from Java saves him from some personal contribution to the State, and the prosperity of the colony is thus guarded from the unsuitable application of philanthropical crotchets, and of nineteenth century ideas . . ." This was not so true of the period when he wrote as of the earlier period.

² I have seen nothing to confirm the statement of Van Soest (KS., 3 : 108) that nothing did so much to awaken and keep alive the movement for constitutional revision as the desire for an honest colonial government.

the Chambers might be tempted to undue interference with the existing arrangements that had proved so profitable. The legislature demanded the right to associate itself with the king in colonial government, but it wanted little more than this formal concession; it had but the vaguest idea of how it should use its right, and in all probability the conservative element would have rejected part of the royal concessions if it could have foreseen the use that was to be made of them in the coming years.¹

The point on which most agreed was settled, that a colonial constitution, defining the objects and methods of government, should be established "by law," that is, by the concurrent action of king and Chambers, instead of by the king alone as previously. Further than this, the Chambers were given specific rights of legislation over colonial currency and finance, and a vague right to legislate on other matters "as the necessity might appear."

It is apparent that the important constitutional change of 1848 found the Dutch altogether unprepared for a reform in colonial policy and administration. The debates of the time showed a general ignorance of the most important facts concerning the condition and needs of the Eastern dependencies. Few speakers touched on the colonial affairs, these only in a desultory way, and with a vagueness of utterance that showed them to be groping in the dark. It was characteristic that the debate on the colonial provisions of the new constitution centred in the question whether the Council of State should be continued or abolished, — a matter of the very slightest importance from the standpoint of the following

¹ Buijs, "Kol. debat," *De Gids*, 1870, 2 : 348 ; Waal, *NISG.*, 3 : 2 ; *De Louter*, 87 ff.

period.¹ Though the new constitution provided that the king should make annually a circumstantial report on colonial affairs to the States General the reports appeared long after the events to which they referred, they were ill informed and dry.² Many members of the Second Chamber still nourished the fear that the States General would busy itself too much with colonial affairs, and were grateful to a government that would pay money into the treasury and not tell how it got it.³ A liberal ministry came into power after the constitutional revision of 1848, but it found enough at home to occupy all its energies, in the reform of electoral laws, of provincial and communal organization, of poor relief and taxation. The colonial question remained in the background, and no one thought whether the colonial minister and his associates represented the colonial ideals of the liberal party. The liberal party really as yet had no colonial policy. If any one spoke of liberal colonial policy, as rarely happened, he had in mind some specific question, like the abolition of slavery, or had a vague idea of some sort of enlightened despotism. There was an indistinct feeling, perhaps, that something should be done for the colonies, but there were no clear plans as yet. The reform of the colonial system did not follow 1848 as a direct and immediate result of

¹ Buijs, "Kol. debat," *Gids*, 1870, 2 : 349. He says that only one man among all (Sloet tot Oldhuis) sketched the real lines of the great colonial question. Veth, *Openbaarheid*, *Gids*, 1848, 2 : 80.

² "Waar zijn waarachtige berigten omtrent den toestand van Ned. Ind. te zoeken?" *TNI*, 1852, 14 : 1 : 129. The report on the year 1849 was sent in toward the end of 1851.

³ Thorbecke, in his speech of December, 1852, said that most members of the Second Chamber still had this fear. Goltstein, "Koloniale politiek," *Gids*, 1879, 2 : 251.

the constitutional revision; the difference from the former period was at first scarcely perceptible.¹

The year 1848 forms, nevertheless, a turning-point; it marked at least the beginning of opportunity to reform the colonial policy through parliamentary channels if not the beginning of actual reform. A new class of men entered the Second Chamber, liberals schooled in the doctrines of the classical political economy and opposed to monopoly and compulsion, in closer touch with the people and with broader sympathies than had been the case before. They could make their influence felt through the powers that the publicity of debates and the rights of initiative and amendment conferred upon them. Early in 1848, uninfluenced by the revolutionary movement in Europe, the Governor General granted the "Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië" more freedom in the publication of official documents, and that journal gave the public more information about the Eastern dependencies in the four years following this date than it had been able to give in all the decade preceding.¹ The editor of the "Tijdschrift," who had spent the past ten years as a preacher at Batavia, was involved in a political demonstration there and found it advisable to return to the Netherlands. He was elected to the Second Chamber, and disclosed to his fellow-members a state of affairs in Java of which they had not dreamed before. While he was not at this time, as he be-

¹ Buijs, "Kol. debat," *Gids*, 1870, 2: 349 ff.; Beaufort, "Dertig jaren uit onze geschiedenis," *Gids*, 1895, 3: 510. Convenient summaries of the parliamentary history of the period are to be found in "Histoire Générale" of Lavissee and Rambaud, 11: Chap. 11, by Métin; in Ritter, "Eene Halve Eeuw," 1: Chap. III, by Geertsema.

² Veth, *Openbaarheid*, *Gids*, 1848, 2: 105, 111; *TNI*, 1852, 14: 2: 438.

came later, an opponent of the culture system through and through, he was well informed on the evils of its operation. His knowledge, boldness, and eloquence secured him a hearing if they did not secure him votes; he performed, as no other man could have done, the work of preparing the Chambers for a reform, though his standpoint was too advanced for great influence in practical politics.¹

Another influence that led to a crystallization of opinion on the colonial policy was the framing of the *Regeerings Reglement* in 1854, according to the constitution of 1848. The liberal tendencies in the Netherlands were strong enough to assure for themselves a decided influence in constructing the principles on which the colonial government was to be carried on. The *Regeerings Reglement* established, among other objects of Dutch rule, greater freedom of the press, the abolition of slavery, the furthering of the education of the natives, the lease of waste lands to European planters, and a proper regulation of the native services and land-tax.² As regards the culture system, the colonial constitution gave a true expression of the state of feeling at the time, a mixture of ideas in which the desire to further the fiscal interests of the home government struggled with the desire to extend the chances of European planters in Java and to protect the natives against oppression.³

¹ See the obituary of Van Hoëvell in *De Econ.*, 1879, 1 : 275 ff. ; Buijs, "Kol. debat," *De Gids*, 1870, 2 : 350 ff. ; Goltstein, *KP.*, *Gids*, 1879, 2 : 258.

² I quote the most important provisions from the summary in Veth, *Java*, 2 : 425 ff. The colonial constitution is a document covering twenty-five octavo pages as printed in the "Regeeringsalmanak."

³ Buijs, *Gids*, 1870, 2 : 352, calls it a fitting expression of the half-liberalism, "faithful as far as the purse" (*getrouw tot aan de beurs*), that inspired legislators at the time.

The importance of the paragraph on the culture system in the colonial constitution, as forming the basis for all later reforms, and its value in indicating abuses that had to be done away, justify a verbal translation of it in this place.¹

“The Governor General keeps so far as practicable in operation cultures introduced by the government, and in agreement with the royal commands takes care : —

1. “that the cultures do not interfere with the production of sufficient means of subsistence ;

2. “that so far as the cultures occupy land cleared by the native population for its own use, this land be disposed of with justice and with respect for existing rights and customs ;

3. “that in the assignment of labor the same rules be observed ;

4. “that the pay of the natives concerned, avoiding injurious enhancement, be such that the government cultures return them with the same labor at least the same advantages as free cultivation ;

5. “that so far as practicable the oppressions which, after a careful investigation, may be found to exist in regard to the cultures, be removed ; and

6. “that then a regulation be prepared, based on voluntary agreements with the communities and individuals concerned, as a transition to a condition in which it will be possible to dispense with the intervention of the government.”

While this article of the colonial constitution recognized in the culture system something not immutable and eter-

¹ Reg. Reg., Art. 56 ; “Regeeringsalmanak voor Ned. Ind.,” 1899, 1 : 15*.

[* There are two sets of pages in this book, and one is marked by the addition of an asterisk.]

nal, as the strict conservatives would have desired, it deferred to a distant future any change in the principle of forced labor. It might seem to have established the system more firmly in enjoining that it should be maintained for the time, and in basing it upon common principles of justice and policy. In fact, however, the recognition of these principles led fatally to the abolition of the system. They were really nothing but a restatement of the promises that Bosch had made, and that the government had continued to assert, but they were irreconcilable with the workings of the system. It was a pleasant ideal, that of getting great revenue and of conferring at the same time great benefit on the people who paid the revenue, but it was visionary. The Dutch must choose between making money by the sacrifice of the natives, and protecting natives at the sacrifice of fiscal interests. The colonial constitution could not be applied without leading to one or the other of these alternatives. Little by little Dutch legislators perceived this, and began to range themselves in parties sharply defined on the question of the maintenance or abolition of the culture system.

Before the issue was joined, some of the worst features in the application of the culture system had been reformed. The feeling in the Netherlands was changing, the condition of the Dutch finances was improving, and the rise in the selling price of coffee enabled the government to relax its demands without a loss in revenue. Beginning with the rule of Rochussen, who was Governor General from 1845 to 1851, the more flagrant abuses were corrected; the minor cultures, unprofitable and oppressive, were restricted, and the government returned to the principle of limiting its crops to one-fifth of the natives' land. A

change in the spirit of the government was shown by the partial reform in 1852 of the *pasar* tax, which had been farmed out to the Chinese, and had been a fruitful source of oppression. The introduction of the colonial constitution of 1854 set a new standard for the government in India, and forced a more liberal policy there, though its practical results fell below the anticipations of the reformers.¹

The credit for bringing home to the mass of the people the need of a reform, and of making it, as it was, the political question of prime importance during a great part of the sixties, belongs in considerable measure to an interesting figure in the history of Dutch literature, Edouard Douwes Dekker. His book, "Max Havelaar, or The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company,"² published under the pseudonym of Multatuli, has often been compared to "Uncle Tom's Cabin" in the influence that it exercised. Dekker had served the government in the East Indies for a number of years in various capacities; in 1856 he was made assistant resident of Lebak in Java. He found that native officials oppressed the people, practically with the connivance of their Dutch superiors, and his complaints and demands for justice were met with an apathy that caused him to revolt. He had the temper of a man of letters rather than of a politician; in a few weeks he had made his official position untenable, and returned to the Nether-

¹ The regulations for the lease of waste land to Europeans, 1856 ff., were so hedged with restrictions that they had little practical importance.

² The original was published in Amsterdam in 1860 under the title, "Max Havelaar, of de Koffijveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij, door Multatuli." An English translation by Baron Alphonse Nahuijs was published at Edinburgh in 1868, and characteristic selections are printed in Warner's Library, 8: 4513-4520.

lands to appeal to the people against the government. In the form of a story of which Max Havelaar, an official in Java, is the hero, he described his own experiences, exposing the faults of the colonial policy and the vices of the administration. The book is not free from errors of fact, for Dekker idealized the Javanese and condemned the Dutch without discrimination; it is fantastic in its composition and style, and partly merits Wallace's description, "a tedious and long-winded story." It certainly lacks the directness and force of "Uncle Tom's Cabin."¹

The author himself was not impeccable. When he had completed arrangements for the publication of the book, he considered negotiations with the government for its suppression; the terms that he proposed were that he should be given the office of resident in Java to get money to pay his debts, that a handsome advance should be made to him, that the years lost from service should be counted for his pension, and that he should be decorated with the order of the Dutch Lion!² Spite of all faults of style and author, however, there were a force and earnestness in the book that commanded attention and justified the

¹ I quote a criticism of the book from a literary standpoint by Keymeulen, "Un écrivain hollandais," *Rev. des deux Mondes*, 1892, 110 : 802. "Si nous avions à juger Max Havelaar comme un roman ordinaire, nous en parlerions avec sévérité et peut-être n'en parlerions nous pas du tout. L'action presque nulle, mal conduite et médiocrement intéressant, se traîne de chapitre en chapitre entre des conversations sans vivacité et des descriptions en style d'ingénieur." . . . The praise of the editor of a later edition of Max Havelaar, Vosmaer, is certainly extravagant. Not every one, however, will agree with Keymeulen, and no one who reads the book will deny that the author had very rare ability in some lines.

² Keymeulen, p. 796. I have verified this very strange transaction from Dekker's letters, though it does not appear from them that he actually attempted to carry it into effect. See Mevr. Douwes Dekker, "Brieven van Multatuli," Amsterdam, 1890; letters for 1859, pp. 126, 146.

author's introductory statement, "I shall be read." From digressions and extravagances of which the writer was himself conscious, he returned always to the main point. "The book is motley — there is no regularity in it — straining after effect — the style is bad — the author is inexperienced — no talent — no method — Good, good, all good ! But — the Javanese is maltreated !" ¹

It may be an exaggeration to call Multatuli the Indian Luther, posting his theses, and to say of his book that it struck the whole country with horror, that it was like a thunder clap in a clear sky.² It was only one among a number of factors tending to strengthen the demand for colonial reform at home. It came in a critical moment, however, and intensified forces that might have worked surely but would have worked more slowly without it. A Dutch reviewer deprecated the tone and manner of the book while recognizing its claim to attention.³ He thought that the romantic color of the story would hurt its influence with the serious-minded ; instead of proving anything it would only raise questions, and people would not believe that the state of affairs could be so bad as pictured. The very merit of the book was that it did raise questions ; it interested people, however ill it informed them, and it forced the colonial question before the Chambers. It brought a new note, too, into the colonial strife ; it disregarded abstract questions of policy and based itself on broad grounds of

¹ Max Havelaar, p. 255. The broken sentences are in the original.

² Keymeulen, 805 ; Max Havelaar, Dutch ed., p. 6 (Vosmaer) ; English ed., p. vii (Nahuys, quoting a member of the Dutch Chamber). In the *TNI*, 1887, 16 : 1 : 197-200, there is a review of Dekker's life from the "*Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*," with a criticism aimed to show that his influence has been exaggerated.

³ *De Economist*, 1860, *Bijblad*, 234 ff.

humanity. Dekker took sides neither with the conservatives for forced labor, nor with the liberals for free labor; he had but one refrain—the Javanese is given over to the oppression of his chiefs and they abuse him in the name of the king.¹

The colonial question came to the front in the Dutch Chambers about 1860, and held a leading place in their deliberations during the decade. It gave rise to bitter personal and party feeling, caused a number of ministerial crises, and occasioned the settlement of some important principles in Dutch constitutional practice. It was the misfortune, indeed, of the Dutch dependencies at this period that the questions of the greatest practical importance to them were judged at home largely by their bearings on party and constitutional politics.² By 1870 the liberals had won the victory, and the culture system had been condemned to make a place for the modern system of free labor. The narrative of the steps by which this result was accomplished is in brief as follows: ³—

The decade opened with a ministry in power representing the moderate conservatives and upholding the principles of the culture system. The budget of the minister of

¹ Pierson, KP., 332.

² The United States consul at Batavia ascribed the lack of confidence and stagnation of trade in 1868 to “the lengthy discussions in the Dutch Parliament by members who know nothing of India, and by others who . . . still consider their Indian possessions a sort of mining speculation, etc.; the nearly equal division of political parties in Holland on colonial affairs; the frequent changes of cabinet and consequent vacillating policy as regards Netherlands India.” U. S. Commercial Relations, 1868, p. 425.

³ This sketch of the parliamentary history of the period is based mainly on the following authorities: Geertsema, in Ritter, “Eene Halve Eeuw,” 1, Chap. III; Beaufort, “Dertig jaren uit onze geschiedenis,” De Gids, 1895, 3: 504 ff.; [Brouwer] “Koloniale kamerkout,” *ib.*, 1863, 1: 249 ff.; Buijs, “Het koloniaal debat,” *ib.*, 1870, 2: 338 ff.

the colonies was rejected by the Second Chamber, but without decisive indication that a break in the former policy was demanded; and the ministry as it was reorganized soon afterward took for its watchword "liberal in Netherland, conservative in India." The fall of this ministry led to the recall to power of Thorbecke, who had been the soul of the liberal opposition. That this marked a victory of liberal principles in colonial as well as domestic affairs was clearly shown by the rejection of Thorbecke's first nominee to the portfolio of the colonies, and the substitution for him of Van der Putte, who had been picked out by public opinion as the man to carry through the colonial reforms, and who kept his place even when such difference of opinion arose between him and Thorbecke as forced the latter to resign. For three years Van der Putte maintained his power in the face of an opposition that was united only in its resistance to change; it included all cautious spirits who prized the millions coming to the Dutch treasury from Java and feared that any interference with the culture system would imperil the surplus. The conservatives had no measures of their own to propose in place of the reforms that Van der Putte urged; when they defeated a law of his for the opening of Java to the enterprise of individual Europeans and forced him to retire, they kept the power for themselves only by refraining from a positive policy of any kind. In some features the government of the conservatives was marked by reactionary measures in India; in general it was a period of stagnation. All the influence of the king was thrown in favor of this ministry, and it endeavored to maintain itself, in spite of some tactical mistakes, by appealing to the dynastic feeling in the country. With

the campaign cry of, "No faction, hurrah for Orange!" it won a slight majority in an appeal to the people. The conservative majority was, however, not harmonious and disappeared in 1868; the return of the liberals to power in that year settled finally not only the great constitutional question whether ministers were to be royal or parliamentary,—it settled also the question of colonial policy. The so-called agrarian law, passed in 1870, may be taken as the end of the struggle. In contrast with the spirit of previous legislation this law had for its direct aims the safeguarding of native rights and the encouragement of the enterprise of individual Europeans; government cultures might still exist, but in the face of this practical application of the principles enunciated in 1854 their position was henceforth exceptional and insecure. It is significant that in the long debate over this law no one among the conservatives dared meet the question of principle squarely, and oppose the law solely on the old ground that it was a departure from the culture system. The culture system lasted long after this time, some remnants of it indeed are in existence yet, but from this date it was doomed to extinction.

The growth and final victory of the movement in the Netherlands for a reform of the colonial system was reflected in Java in a series of measures that did away with a number of abuses handed down from the preceding period. The less important government cultures, those of tea, tobacco, indigo, pepper, and cinnamon, were given up between 1860 and 1865. Some of these had been the source of actual loss to the government, none had been the source of any considerable profit, and even the conservatives were ready to agree that these cultures were not

worth the keeping. As coffee was grown on waste land, the sugar culture was henceforth the only one occupying arable land of the natives. The natives were to some extent prepared for a system of free labor contracts by the abolition of the vexatious passport regulations restricting the free movement of laborers, and by a serious attempt to protect them against excessive demands on their services by the government or by native officials. The right of contract for labor with a whole village was taken away. The premiums or percentages on government cultures, formerly paid to officials, were abolished, the payment of native officials in land was restricted, and the village heads were freed from the fear of degrading punishments. As abuses disappeared, the necessity for concealing them vanished also, and the important facts concerning conditions in Java were no longer jealously guarded as official secrets.¹

Later chapters will show that much remained in Java to be reformed in the generation following the fall of the culture system. Before treating this recent period it will be well to return again to the culture system, to notice any other system like that applied by the Dutch, and to review briefly the general faults that are inherent in every system of the kind.

The closest parallel to the culture system known to the writer is the system of forced cultures established by the

¹ Van der Putte opened the colonial archives in 1866; one reason that Thurlow gave for making his report in 1868 was the opportunity that he first had then of securing accurate information. Report, p. 338. S. van Deventer's *Bijdragen*, the most important source of information about Java during the period of the culture system, was made by command of Van der Putte, and was compiled very hurriedly through fear that a conservative ministry might get power and forbid its publication. Gids, 1868, 4: 417. I have summarized the reforms in Java, 1860-1870, from the list in *Regeeringsalmanak*, *Kroniek*, p. 598* ff., and from the article by "Een Oud-Resident," *TNI.*, 1879, 8: 2: 420 ff.

Spanish government in the Philippines in 1780. It was applied at first to the production of tobacco, indigo, and silk, but was later restricted to tobacco alone. On land fit for the cultivation of tobacco the natives were forced, on penalty of severe corporal punishment, to grow that crop and to deliver the product to the government at an arbitrary and nominal price. The government sold the product in Europe, and got from this source a considerable part of its revenue—fiscal reasons determined the introduction and maintenance of the system in the Philippines as in Java. The system resulted in the abuse of the natives, corruption of the officials, the discouragement of private enterprise, and such a deterioration in the quality of the product that much of it was unsalable at any price. A report to the home government in 1871 from the director of the culture showed that the net gain from it was much less than had been supposed (\$1,360,000), and would vanish entirely if the government made the necessary expenditures on machinery, factories, and warehouses, paid the arrears due to native cultivators (\$1,600,000 for the crops of 1869 and 1870), and paid cash in the future. It showed that the people of the richest districts of the islands had been reduced to utter misery by the culture; they were worse off than the slaves in Cuba, for these were fed by their masters, while the government would not allow the natives in the Philippines the time necessary to gain their food supply. The forced culture was finally abolished in 1882.¹

The Dutch have sometimes claimed that they were no worse than their English neighbors, and that only "British

¹ Jagor, "Reisen in den Philippinem," Berlin, 1873, pp. 257-270. Foreman, "The Philippine Islands," London, 1892, p. 349.

cant" could deny the existence of forced cultures in British India. The claim is justified by the facts to a certain extent. In the indigo and opium cultures in India there have been cases of compulsion of the natives by the planters attended with as grave abuses as any that marked the application of the culture system in Java.¹ There is this essential difference, however, that the British government has never made itself responsible for the evils by encouraging the system that gave rise to them, and if it sinned it was by omission. Dilke drew the proper contrast between the policies of the two governments when he said, "With our system there is some chance of right being done, so small is our self-interest in the wrong." The British government faced the right way, whatever were its weaknesses; the Dutch government was in itself a wrong.

The author of a recently published article on the policy of the Dutch in Java² expresses a doubt whether the

¹ See Money, *Java*, 1: 143; the review of Wiselius, by Van der Lith, *Gids*, 1888, 4: 164, and Stobie, "An Incident of Real Life in Bengal," *Fortnightly Review*, 1887, 48: 329-341—an astonishing story of what can happen even in modern India. Boys, p. 66, says that the government of India "is not inexperienced in the culture system," but admits the "all-important point," the difference between competition and compulsion. The [English] *Economist*, in a review of Money's book, Oct. 12, 1861, p. 1127, suggested that the government might apply the culture system to the cultivation of cotton in India so far as to advance capital to contractors, and allow the civil servants to help them in making arrangements with the natives for labor; it rejected the idea that the government would compel the natives to grow cotton. Dilke, "Greater Britain," *Phila.*, 1869, 2: 156, opposed the scheme of government advances to the coffee planters of Ceylon, through fear of jobbery and fear that the government would connive at the oppression of native laborers. I suspect that instances of methods very much like those of the culture system could be proved in British India, but I am not aware that a government system of the kind ever existed under British rule.

² G. K. Anton, "Neuere Agrarpolitik der Holländer auf Java," *Schmoller's Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung*, 1899, 23: 1337-1361.

oppression of the native population was a necessary result of the system, and is not rather to be ascribed to abuses in the application of a principle than to the principle itself. To his mind all depends on the character of the State that assumes the office of planter. Under the present Dutch government, of which he holds a high opinion, he believes that the native population would fare better under "the paternal despotism of a culture system freed of its abuses," than under the exploitation of capitalists. How far can a system of this kind be freed from evil characteristics? The present writer believes that the abuses followed in the main as a result of the principles of the system, the principles of forced labor under government management for government profit. Not that the examples cited to illustrate the faults of the system would occur again in just the same form, for many of them are extreme. They were not things that happened every day in every part of the island. But things of the same kind would happen again, wherever the system was tried, and whatever state administered it. They would happen because they result not from vices peculiar to a race of men or a period of time, or even to a particular organization of society, but from the universal failings of human nature and human organization. Neither mankind nor government has become so much better in the last fifty years that it can trust itself to undertake problems that have hitherto always proved insoluble. If the Dutch government deserves so much confidence to-day, it is because it has given up the kind of functions that the culture system thrust upon it, and has confined itself to what a government can properly do. It might reintroduce the old system, and administer it for a time with some success,

certainly with less abuse than was characteristic of the former administration, but in the end the world would lose a good government and get only a poor planter by the change. It is impossible to draw the line between evils inherent in the system itself and abuses in its administration, because the two are vitally connected.

This criticism does not apply to a system introduced and maintained with really benevolent motives. I am perfectly ready to admit that the culture system could have been carried out according to the original plans of Van den Bosch so as to be a blessing and not a curse to the people subject to it. There were flaws in the economic theory of the system, but flaws that need have led to no evils if the system had been applied in a spirit of humanity according with the high professions of its founder. The sufferings of the Javanese seem in large part to have had no direct connection with the culture system; they were results of a faulty political organization. It would be bad faith to deny these facts. It is, however, of little importance to admit them. A culture system inspired with benevolence could accomplish good results, but it would be the most expensive means of accomplishing them that can possibly be conceived. It would wreck any government that could not draw on unlimited funds from some source outside the field of the system's operations. Even the most superficial acquaintance with the history of the Dutch will teach the fact that they made most of their money from cultures by a disproportion between burdens imposed and benefits rendered such as no good government can approve. What revenue they got without a disproportionate sacrifice of the natives could have been got as well by modern methods

of taxation, as their later history shows. There is no more likelihood that modern governments will introduce "benevolent" culture systems in their dependencies than that they will organize production on the methods that Swift described as existing in Laputa. They could not afford the expense.

It is out of fashion nowadays to draw moral lessons from history. We are told to regard the facts and to let the motives go. Yet to the present writer the biggest fact in the history of the culture system is the motive to its establishment. Selfishness colored the whole period. It explains the sufferings of the natives under cultures, and it explains their sufferings under the faulty political administration. So nowadays, when the culture system is held up for imitation in other tropical countries, and we are told that it will both bless the people and benefit the treasury, the vital question is, Which comes first in the mind of the European power — people or treasury? One must be sacrificed, — which will it be? Egoism and altruism lead to divergent results. If a moral lesson can be drawn from the history of the culture system, it is this: that selfishness, even of an international kind, does not pay. Seeley was right not only when he said that it is "essentially barbaric that one community should be treated as the property of another, and the fruits of its industry confiscated not in return for benefits conferred, but by some absolute right, whether of conquest or otherwise"; he was right too when he said that such a relation is "too immoral to last."¹ The Dutch made money for a time, but they sacrificed their permanent interests in the process. They prevented the education of native laborers,

¹ "Expansion of England," Lond., 1891, 66.

they prevented organization by European planters, and the revenue that they got was no compensation for the check on Java's productive power. They could get now a greater net surplus from Java than they ever got in the time of the culture system if they chose to raise their demands and lower their returns as they used to do.

CHAPTER X

RECENT ECONOMIC POLICY

[NOTE. — For the period from 1870 to the present I have made no attempt to cover the sources, comprised largely in the series of government documents; I have used a recent colonial report and budget, for an index of present conditions, and have relied for statistical information mainly on a copy of the colonial Jaarcijfers. The Regeeringsalmanak gives a description of the organization of government, contains important laws in full or in abstract, and has some valuable statistics. Documentary material on land and labor policy is furnished also in the publications of the Institut Colonial International. Standard reference books are De Louter's Handleiding and the "Encyclopædie van Nederlandsch-Indië." A. Lawrence Lowell, "Colonial Civil Service," N.Y., 1900, gives a detailed account of the way in which Dutch colonial officials are educated and selected. Chailley-Bert's Java is an interesting and suggestive criticism, written by one who is conversant with the colonial problem in other countries, and who has studied conditions in Java on the spot. Except the little volumes by Boys and Jenks, writings by other travellers are of slight importance as regards topics covered here. Periodical literature in this period is voluminous, and I have based my work in large part on that. For treatment of some topics in the present fiscal system, more extended than suited the purpose of this book, I refer to an essay by me in the Publications of the American Economic Association, August, 1900, third series, Vol. I, no. 3, pp. 461-492.]

THE reluctance of the government to give up the system of forced cultures in Java can be explained in part by the natural inertia of all political organizations, by the tendency of every government to continue in the line to which it has become accustomed. A better reason for the maintenance of the system is to be found in the revenue that it has yielded, so long as the conditions of the world market have favored one or another of the many crops to

which the system has been applied. But apart from these considerations there has been another argument constantly urged in favor of maintaining forced cultures which has had immense weight in delaying the passage to a system of free cultivation. The argument was this, that under freedom there would be no cultivation of export articles at all ; that the native, left to himself, would give up producing coffee and sugar and would raise nothing more than the food necessary for his own subsistence, and that the people of Europe would lose all the benefits which the natural resources of Java, if properly exploited, could confer upon them.

The strength of this argument will be apparent from a brief review of some of the features of the great problem that has formed the stumbling-block in so many schemes of tropical colonization, the problem of labor.

The German economist, Roscher, began his volume on the principles of political economy by calling attention to the wants of man as his specially human characteristic. Every man, even of the lowest races, is separated from brutes by wants of a purely material character — the need of clothing and of fire, the need of organization imposed by a long period of infancy, that has done so much to create the institution of marriage. Roscher justly criticised the saying of Seneca, that if you desired any one to be rich, you should not increase his riches but decrease his wants, as a principle that would subvert all civilization.

Civilized peoples owe their advancement to the fact that they have *wanted* so many things and have been willing to work to get them. The need of things, it has been said, is the spring that keeps the clock-work of society going. The wants of a civilized man are so

great that he can satisfy them only by constant labor and by subordination to the strictest discipline. Society has developed its present complex and delicate organization simply because no other organization was efficient enough to provide men with the objects of their desires. Wants have come first, and means have then been devised to meet them.

Now the characteristic of the native of the tropics, that is of prime importance when he is regarded in his relations to the outside civilized and commercial world, is the smallness of his wants. If we can believe the traditional descriptions of tropical life, he may pick breakfast, dinner, and supper from a tree that grows wild in his back yard, he may clothe himself with leaves stripped from another tree, and build his house by a day's labor on another. Humboldt was assured, in his American travels, that the natives would never amount to anything as long as the banana tree existed, and it is said that in some of the West India islands the natives could not be got to work until the banana tree had been cut down. Nature is so bountiful that he relies almost entirely upon her, and the educating influence of labor is lost to him. The characteristic proverb of hot countries is to the effect that it is better to sleep than to wake, that it is better to lie down than to sit up, that it is better to be seated than to stand, that it is better to rest than to work, and that death is better than all.¹

¹ Quoted by Jean Barré Saint-Venant, "Des colonies modernes sous la zone torride," Paris, 1802, 122. It is proverbial in Java that the native never runs when he can stand, never stands when he can sit, and never sits when he can lie. Nederburgh, "De onmondigheid van den Javaan ten aanzien van het grondbezit," TNI., 1878, 7:1:21. Barré Saint-Venant quotes from the reports of the French intendants a striking

The native of the tropics finds in the "bounty of nature" so full a satisfaction of his wants that the trader or the employer has little hold upon him. If he can, by working for himself, satisfy all his needs, there is no reason why he should bind himself to work for others. Trader or employer must prove to him that he wants something before he can be argued into working to get it. The first steps in economic education are the hardest; while the wants of a civilized man seem unlimited, it is most difficult to instil a single new one in a savage. Traders are often forced to make gifts to create a desire for more. Newcomb gives in his political economy an instance that shows how cautious we must be in applying some of the principles of modern economic theory to uncivilized people. Traders on the coast of South America, desiring to call out an increased supply of a native product, doubled the amount of goods that they offered for it, and found that they got, instead of more, just half of what they had got before. A precise parallel, in the case of labor, not of goods, is furnished by the experience of employers of native laborers in Chihuahua, who were led by competition among themselves to raise wages from fifty cents to one dollar a day. "For generations these people had fashioned their life on a three-dollar-a-week basis; finding themselves with the three dollars in their pockets on Wednesday night, nothing could induce them to work Thursday, Friday, or Saturday." The only use that they could imagine for the sur-

example of the demoralizing influence of the tropics on uncivilized peoples when they are suddenly released from the pressure to work: the annual exports from San Domingo, comparing 1789 with 1794-1796, fell from 226,000,000 to 4,000,000 livres, *ib.*, 51. The exports of the two negro republics are now less than \$20,000,000 a year.

plus was gambling, and it became necessary to put wages back to the old figure to get the men to work six days in the week.¹ In all the West African colonies, says Miss Kingsley, there is not a single thing Europeans can sell to the natives that is of the nature of a true necessity.²

It is to a large extent the difficulty of finding a basis of exchange with uncivilized people, of finding something that they want to trade for their products or labor, and which they cannot produce themselves, that has led to the establishment and maintenance of slavery in the tropical regions of the world. It leads nowadays to the introduction of coolies, natives of countries where the pressure of population is so great that it is a strain to provide even the bare necessities of life, and from which the natives are absolutely forced into the higher organization. The importance of coolie labor at the present time can be measured by the fact, shown in Ireland's statistics, that in 1896 over four-fifths of the total trade between the United Kingdom and the British tropical colonies were with colonies employing imported contract labor.³

¹ Logan, "Peonage in Mexico," Gunton's Social Economist, N.Y., 1893, 5 : 102.

² "West African Studies," Lond., 1899, p. 339. Tobacco is most important, then the group of trade articles, gunpowder, guns, and spirits, next salt, and below these four staples come Manchester goods and miscellanies. Compare the list of imports into the Congo State, in Wauters, "L'État indépendant du Congo," Bruxelles, 1899, p. 409; the total amount of imports for native consumption is not 8,000,000 francs, of which five-eighths are cloth. The few Europeans in the territory imported a nearly equal amount.

³ Popular Science Monthly, 54 : 483. Lagos and Bermuda, in which a very dense population affords a domestic labor supply, are included in the above with colonies employing coolie labor, but do not greatly affect the total.

Untrained in the providence that is made necessary in some parts of the world by the very alternations of seasons, partly civilized peoples set a value much lower on goods to be received or consumed in the future than on the means of present enjoyment. Jagor says that in the Philippines the natives would help harvest the rice crop at first for a tenth share in it, but that when they had satisfied their more pressing necessities, they had little thought of securing a store for the future, and the price of labor rose to a fifth, a third, or even a half of the crop. A savage may see in a trader's stock something that he covets, but if the labor required to procure the means of purchase must be spread over any extended period of time, he will not have the heart for it; the trader may come again and again and find him each time wanting the ware but always without the means of paying for it. The trouble with the monkeys, says Kipling, is that they forget. Half-civilized man is like the monkeys,—he forgets, and he must be taught to remember.

The problem of establishing economic relations with partly civilized peoples would be a more difficult one if it were not for this fact, that they set as low a store on future labor as they do on future goods, and that for present enjoyment they are willing to make large promises of future return of labor. They enter into debt to their employer, and then first are they bound and made serviceable to the modern organization. It is by means of credit bondage that industrial undertakings have been established and are now maintained through a great part of the tropical and semi-tropical world.

Without proper regulation the institution is liable to serious abuse; it is the curse of some half-civilized peo-

ples and is always attended with dangers when applied to these peoples in contact with their industrial superiors. But Wallace goes too far when he says¹ of this debtor and creditor relation between natives and Europeans that, while it extends trade for a time, "it demoralizes the native, checks true civilization, and does not lead to any permanent increase in the wealth of the country, so that the European government of such a country must be carried on at a loss." The statement is not borne out by experience. On the other hand — I quote again from Wallace² — "there are certain stages through which society must pass, in its onward march from barbarism to civilization. Now one of these stages has always been some form or other of despotism, such as feudalism, or servitude, or a despotic paternal government; and we have every reason to believe that it is not possible for humanity to leap over this transition epoch, and pass at once from pure savagery to pure civilization." Wallace thought that the culture system was the longed-for agent that would lead the natives to a higher civilization; but in fact even at the time when he wrote that system was on the point of being given up, and the "despotism" that has taken its place is one based on economic rather than political subjection. With all its possible dangers credit bondage has this inestimable merit, that it requires of the State only the *regulation* that is the State's proper function; action is left to individuals, and the power of

¹ "Malay Archipelago," 106.

² *Ib.*, 264. Compare Wakefield, "View of the Art of Colonization," Lond., 1849, 174: "Every colony that has prospered, from the time of Columbus down to this day . . . has enjoyed in some measure what I have termed combination and constancy of labor. They enjoyed it by means of some kind of slavery."

the State being thereby conserved suffices for such regulation and repression as may be necessary.¹

This bondage for debt exists in many different countries of the world at the present time, as a means of holding half-civilized peoples to labor. It may be familiar to American readers as an important part of the labor organization of Mexico. After the abolition of the *encomienda* system, by which the Spanish had previously tried to solve the labor problem, the Spanish employer "managed to get the workmen into his debt, and to procure the enactment of laws giving him the right to retain them in his service until the debt was discharged; then he furnished bad supplies at the highest prices, so that the debt was never paid and the Indian remained a slave."²

The institution of credit bondage was a common one in the Malay Archipelago before the Dutch arrived, as is shown by its persistence in the native organization. I have referred in the chapter on the native organization to the fact that one of the Dutch Governors General

¹ An interesting recognition of this truism of political science, as I think it may be called, can be found in a report dating from almost the beginning of the culture system, Merkus, *Nota*, February, 1831, S. van Deventer, LS., 2: 222. A very vigorous statement of the need of some sort of pressure to force natives of the tropics to work will be found in Pfeil, "Studien und Beobachtungen aus der Südsee," Braunschweig, 1899, 244.

² Logan, "Peonage in Mexico," *Gunton's Social Economist*, N.Y., 1893. The system is described also by Prince A. de Iturbide, "Mexican haciendas — the peon system," *North American Review*, 1899, 168: 427 ff.; the debt which is one of the essential features of the system is usually \$10 to \$30 at the start, but may be inherited through generations. The fundamental law of Mexico prohibits the practice, but the custom is stronger than the constitution. Jagor describes as existing in the Philippines a credit bondage similar in all important respects to that found in Java and the other Malay Islands; for a similar institution in British India see Hunter, "Rural Bengal," 233.

explained the subjection of the common people to their rulers on the ground that the latter had loaned them money which they were never able to repay, though always working to do so. If the economic relation of debtor and creditor did not play such a part in determining the political organization as might appear from this account, it is certain that members of the ruling class were very often usurers, and that they loaned frequently on the security not of the property but of the person of the borrower. Of the importance of credit bondage in the native social organization there is no question. The native laws of debt were much more severe than either Hindu or Mohamadan law, giving to the creditor full power over the person of a debtor who was unable to meet his engagements, and even over the persons of the debtor's family. The debtor's status was not exactly that of a slave, for his freedom was merely suspended, not destroyed, and if he could secure the means to pay the debt, he could become free, or at least change his master for a new one. But he was bound to the service of the creditor, and in practice there was great danger that the status would become perpetual. It has been known to last for generations, and whole classes of so-called slaves in the Malay Archipelago have been traced back to an origin in bondage for debt.¹

¹ Even at the beginning of the nineteenth century Daendels found thousands of the so-called "pandelings" or credit bondmen in one of the residencies of Java. Staat, 10. For a general discussion of the institution of credit bondage see Wilken, "Het pandrecht bij de volken van den Indischen archipel," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1888, 5 : 3 : 574. For other statements in the text see that article, Van den Berg, "De afwijkingen van het Mohammadaansche vermogensrecht op Java en Madoera," *ib.*, 1897, 6 : 3 : 124 ff., and Verwey, "Jets over het contractueel pandelingschap en de bestrijding dezer instelling in de Nederlandsch-Indische wetgeving," *ib.*, 1893, 5 : 8 : 234 ff. The interference of the Dutch with this insti-

The institution of credit bondage, as it existed in the native organization, was not one that could be recognized and maintained by the Dutch. The relation of master and servant originated commonly in a loan for consumption and led to no useful economic results, so by a succession of enactments continuing far into the nineteenth century bondage for debt was prohibited and has finally been abolished in Java. At the same time this institution suggests the means by which the Dutch have solved the problem of "free" labor in Java; they found no better way to secure the necessary supply of labor than a system of credit advances by which the improvident and irresponsible native is bound fast for a certain limited time. In touching on this institution of credit bondage I have anticipated the final settlement that the Dutch have found for their difficulties. The transition to this economic solution of the problem, from the political organization of labor as it existed during the period of the culture system, was not immediate. Long after the culture system was in name abolished its effects were felt as elements in the labor situation, and they must be noticed in this place.

Supporters of the culture system asserted that, aside from effecting an increase in the production of certain articles, it was valuable for its educational influence. It was supposed to discipline the natives by constraining them to labor. Some authorities, who deprecated its bad influence in many directions, expressed themselves in favor of it as a temporary but necessary stage in the development

tution was one of the causes of the present war in Atjeh. Van der Lith, "Rechtsverhältnisse in Nied. Ind.," *Jahrbuch f. vergl. Rechtswissenschaft*, 1898, 4 : 15.

of free contract relations between European employers and native laborers. It is probable that in fact the system was of some benefit in impressing on the minds of the natives the obligation of steady work under certain circumstances. But the culture system formed the worst possible introduction to a system of free labor in so far as regards the impression that it left on the natives as to the real reason for labor. They worked because they had to, not because they wanted to, in fear of punishment and not for hope of reward. The culture system educated them as producers, not as consumers;¹ it gave them the capacity for labor without the motive for applying it, for it created in them no wants that they had not had before. The ships that took tropical products to the Netherlands returned to Java in ballast during the operation of the culture system; the coffee and sugar were a tribute for which Europe made no return. It was perfectly natural that the natives who saw the ships come empty should be willing to let them go away in the same condition. After each step, therefore, in the abolition of the culture system, the natives tended, for a time at least, to revert to their former hand-to-mouth system of production, that brought them in as much as they had been accustomed to receive and cost them much less labor.²

¹ "It is not money that the Javanese need, but the faculty of using it," said a man who had a good acquaintance with the free laborers about the time when the culture system was declining. According to his experience the only thing that would tempt laborers to work was the desire for opium or the want of money for gambling. *De Economist*, 1862, *Bijblad*, 333.

² When the forced services in the clove culture were abolished in 1859, "in spite of the advantages offered to them, the majority of the freedmen declined to engage themselves as free laborers." Ward, *Report on the Progress of Neth. E. I.*, in *Rep. of H. M. Sec. of Embassy, Lond.*, 1863,

European employers found it impossible to get the necessary supply of labor without maintaining the practice, current under the culture system, of relying upon official pressure rather than on the native's sense of his own advantage, to lead him to work. An author who had been in the Dutch official service, but who was at the time of writing a tobacco planter, exposed the fallacy of the idea that freedom of contract in labor relations was established at a stroke. The native overseers on the plantations secured the good-will of the district chief, the native official next above the village head-men in rank, and through his influence got any number of laborers desired. Another observer, writing at the same time, describes political influence as the determining factor in the chance of starting any undertaking. All depended on the attitude taken by the Dutch and native officials; if they were favorable to the undertaking, the people obediently made the desired contracts. As a natural result of the way in which the laborers were engaged, they proved slippery and unreliable, seeking every opportunity to evade their obligations.¹ The system by which contracts could be made with a whole village at once tended to increase the chance for an abuse of political power. After 1863 the contracts had in form to be with individuals, but the influence of the chiefs still remained an important or decisive element in the labor

6 : 145. Cf. Bickmore, "Travels in the E. I. Arch.," N.Y., 1869, for a description of affairs in Amboyna. D'Almeida, "Life in Java," 1 : 269, says that the natives in Boedoeran were emancipated from forced services in cutting and carrying cane a few days before his arrival there; he found the industry in straits for lack of laborers, and the cane often left till over-ripe.

¹ De Economist, 1862, Bijblad, 347, 334.

question, especially in districts where communal property prevailed. In 1882 a writer gave as the impression left by a journey through Java his belief that the problem of securing labor without the connivance of the head-men had been solved, but even then all authorities did not agree with him.¹

In their relations with the really free laborers of Java, those who are not subject to the influence of some political chief, European employers have experienced two great difficulties, which will now be considered separately.

At the start the difficulty is encountered of getting men to bind themselves to work for wages who see any chance to continue their independent existence. Travellers in Java are all struck with the productiveness of the island, with the ease with which the natives can manage to live. In spite of the dense population, reaching in 1891 a proportion equivalent to over two persons to the cultivated acre, there is scarcely yet a serious pressure of population on subsistence; in the middle of the nineteenth century the population was only half what it is now and there was much more free land available. The class of natives who had neither land nor a trade to support them and who served others for hire was not large in numbers and was absorbed to a considerable extent in the internal organization of the village. The scale of living of the average cultivator would appear hopelessly low if measured by western standards; the total personal property of a family, including house, furniture, clothing, and imple-

¹ De Economist, 1882, 2: 1122. Van Rees, "Hervormingsplannen, in 1863 aan den Gouverneur-Generaal Sloet aanbevolen," Ind. Gids, 1885, 1: 745, speaks of the political influence exercised in the making of contracts as a point then needing reform.

ments, might be worth only a few dollars, say five or ten, in our currency.¹ Where wants are small, however, a low scale of life may satisfy, and in fact among the Javanese the lower the scale of life the more likely they are to rest content with it so long as they are not absolutely starving. In practice it has been found impossible to secure the services of the native population by any appeal to an ambition to better themselves and raise their standard. Nothing less than immediate material enjoyment will stir them from their indolent routine. As a result, it is the universal practice among employers to offer a large part of the wages for any period in advance; if the native takes the bait, he can be held to labor (in theory, at least) until he has worked out the debt that he has incurred. The system of advances to secure the services of laborers is described as universal down to the present time. Employers and officials deplore it, but recognize its necessity; even the government makes advances when it requires the services of wage laborers.² As an example of the process

¹ For a description of the standard of life of the Javanese, and estimates of the value of their property see Raffles, *Hist.*, 1 : 88; TNI., 1873, 2 : 1 : 127; and some excellent articles by Poensen in *Mededeelingen Ned. Zend.*, "Jets over het Javaansche gezin," 1887, Vol. 31, esp. p. 221; "Jets over de Javaansche desa," 1893-1894, Vols. 37-38. A good idea of the penury of the life of the common people is given by the description in S. Coolsma, "West Java," Rotterdam, 1879, p. 120 ff.

² See especially "Vorschotten bij de tabaks kultuur," TNI., 1861, 23 : 2 : 157 ff.; Pol, "Indische adviezen in de Staten Generaal," *De Gids*, 1877, 2 : 257 ff. A number of reports from Dutch officials are quoted there (p. 281), in which the system is described as a "necessary evil," "demoralizing but unavoidable," etc. Peelen, *De Gids*, 1893, 1 : 392, speaks of the system as "een ware kanker," but says that it is practically impossible to get laborers without advances. The sugar contract cited is from Van den Berg, "De afwijkingen van het Mohanmedaansche vermogensrecht op Java en Madoera," *Bijdragen TLV.*, 1897, 6 : 3 : 127.

the following contract can be cited, long in use by sugar planters to effect the transport of the cane. The advance figures as the price of the cart and draught animals, which the native declares to have sold to the employer with the right reserved to himself to buy them back at the end of the season, and under condition that he shall have the use of them in the meantime. The transport charges are paid for only one day out of five or seven, and the rest goes to the repurchase of the outfit; if it is not enough at the end of the season to repay the original advance, the debt will run over to the next year. This contract is peculiar in that the employer has some security for the advance that he makes. In the case of ordinary labor contracts he has only the person of the native, and these contracts are the most common of all.

It is evident that this system could readily lead to a permanent subjection of the native to the European employer, like the credit bondage that was formerly common in the native organization. In securing laborers for the Spice Islands, who were to receive wages of 6 gulden a month, it was customary to pay 50 to 100 gulden in advance,¹ and a case is given in which a cook, whose wages were to be 1 gulden a month, was given an advance of 30 gulden at the time when he was engaged — nearly three years' pay. The government intervenes to protect the laborers by a regulation prescribing that contracts cannot be made for a term exceeding five years, and that they must contain full specifications of the services to be rendered and the pay to be given. Every contract must be recorded with the government, and its terms are investi-

¹ Lans, "Rosengain," Rotterdam, 1872, p. 16; Van der Linden, "Banda en zijne bewoners," Dordrecht, 1873, p. 45.

gated, and their proper fulfilment assured by government officials.¹

In fact, however, the natives seem competent to protect themselves against European employers. The second great difficulty experienced by planters in their relations with the laborers is the tendency of the natives to break their contracts and leave their work, whether for good reasons or for no apparent reason at all. Under the culture system, which identified the economic and political organization, and applied all the police power of the state to hold laborers to their work, it was possible to check the untrustworthiness and fitfulness of the natives. Whatever influence the discipline of the system may have had, it certainly did not effect any radical reform in their character. After its abolition laborers would take advances on their wages and then desert; some laborers hired themselves to two or three undertakings at once to get the advances. When they did not leave an undertaking entirely, they worked only as the fancy seized them; in one residency an official report stated that a man who would work fifteen or twenty days in a month was considered a good hand. The loss caused to planters by the lack of the workmen on whom they had counted, and often at the very time when their labor was most needed, led in 1872 to the publication of an ordinance punishing the breach of a labor contract with a fine of 16 to 25 florins, or forced labor on public works for seven to twelve days. The justification of the ordinance is apparent in the fact that during three years of the period in which it was in force almost nine thousand cases of breach of contract were punished under its provisions. Opinion in Java was

¹ De Louter, "Handleiding," p. 618.

practically unanimous in upholding the ordinance ; members both of the commercial and of the official classes agreed in regarding it as a necessary corrective of the faults of native labor. To theorists in the Netherlands, however, the regulation seemed to disguise a new form of credit bondage, by which the freedom of natives was sacrificed to the employer ; fault too was found with the fact that cases involving the breach of a labor contract could be tried by petty judges and by administrative officials. In 1877 the Second Chamber of the States General passed a resolution against the ordinance that led to its repeal ; since 1879 cases of the breach of labor contracts have had to be brought before regular tribunals, and though the penalty has been made more severe, it has been necessary for conviction to prove that the native intended to desert at the time when he made the contract, a point very hard to establish. The bad results on the economic organization were not slow in showing themselves, and down to the present time complaints and agitation for a reform in the legislation have been increasing.

This action of the States General is an excellent example of the mischief that doctrinaires can work when they interfere in the management of affairs which they do not understand. Pfeil describes properly this question of punishment for breach of a labor contract as one that from a distance looks simple, but in practice is extraordinarily difficult of solution. It is of the greatest importance in the economic development of a tropical dependency. The motives of the legislators were undoubtedly good ; they were the same that led to a reform of the culture system. The legislators did not, however, realize, as perhaps they never will, that people

cannot pass at one step from a low to a high organization. To abolish the culture system was a good thing; to hope to establish in its place a completely modern system was folly. The new system could be better than the culture system, but it must not be too good to be true.¹

Individual natives, not bound by contract to a planter, have shown little desire or ability to produce for the European market. Java presents in this respect a contrast to British India, and the cause is apparently the same as that of so many other contrasts between the two countries, the greater productiveness of the land in Java, and the lack of pressure on the population. Chinese traders scour the country for export products, but the total amount thus brought into the channels of the world's trade is small in comparison with the amount that is produced under the direction of planters.²

The Chinese deserve special consideration in this study

¹ For the text of the legislation see "Lam ain d'œuvre aux colonies," Pub. de l'Inst. Col. Internat., Paris, 1895, 1 : 510 ff.; "Het koninklijk besluit van den 17 Mei, 1879," TNI., 1880, 9 : 2 : 405 ff. The latter article has abundant material on which to base a criticism of the policy. For other points in the text see Pol, "Ind. adviezen," De Gids, 1877, 3 : 258, 261, 273; De Economist, 1878, 1 : 392 ff.; 1891, 1 : 386; Pfeil, Südsee, 252. Peelen, De Economist, 1893, 1 : 394, hoped for a reimposition of the penalty, as the government had announced that it was not averse to such action, but nothing has been done, to judge from the article *Overeenkomsten* in the Encyc. NI., published a year or so ago.

² It is estimated that except for rice, kapok ("silk-cotton"), hides, and the pepper and forest products of the Outer Possessions, amounting to little over 5,000,000 gulden in a total of over 200,000,000 gulden, Java has not a single export that is not produced under the management of Europeans. Van den Berg, "Java's bevolking en Java's bebouwing," De Economist, 1894, 1 : 29. It is possible that this estimate does not include the native-grown coffee. It is found now that when natives are freed from the obligation of growing coffee, they let the crop decline in quantity and quality. "Begrooting van Ned. Ind.," 1900, Bijlage, 35, p. 7.

of the organization of production in Java. They form only about one per cent of the population, but they have an importance disproportionate to the place that they take in the census enumeration. With qualities differing from those of both natives and Europeans, they form a link between the two races, that alone would be separated by an almost hopeless distance; they are the natural middlemen of the East. Of all the Chinese in Java very few are coolies or field-laborers; they live by their brains, not by their hands. They are a permanent element of the population, with a settled residence and a family life that has been established for generations. Whatever their general moral character may be, — no two authors agree in describing it, — there can be no question as to their economic virtues. In contrast to the natives the Chinese have tastes which, if not refined, are at least expensive. Those who can afford it love to live in style, impressing the rest of the world with their houses and their equipages, and even the poorer ones seek what luxury they can afford. All love enjoyment, and — this is the important point — all are willing to work for it. Their steadiness and intelligence put them on a plane above the natives, who have never shown the ability to compete with them on equal terms in trade or industry. They seem to lack the breadth and boldness of conception that would enable them to enter large enterprises as rivals of the Europeans, but between the two races they have an assured position.

In the early history of the Dutch in Java the Chinese appear most prominently as political agents of the government, especially as tax farmers. Their oppressions were in some cases horrible, but the fault was no more

theirs than that of the government they served; they were efficient, at any rate, and under proper regulation they were of great service in developing the organization. Even in the eighteenth century they were recognized as indispensable in their capacity of manufacturers, traders, and money-lenders; they alone showed the ability to stimulate production, not by political pressure, but by economic means such as characterize the modern system of labor.¹

In modern times the Chinese have lost much of their importance as tax farmers, but their place in the commercial organization is secure. Business houses in Java find them indispensable in marketing the goods imported for native consumption; it is only they who have the patience and cunning fitting them to bargain with the petty agents who enter into direct relations with the native consumers. The Europeans have been loud and constant in their complaints of the business methods of the Chinese, whose frequent bankruptcies are notorious and are charged with being often fraudulent. But, in spite of everything, European merchants cannot do without the Chinese; they have before them the dilemma of doing business with the Chinese or of doing no business at all.²

¹ Mossel, "Aanmerkingen," 1751, *De Jonge, Opk.*, 10 : 254; Wiese on Hogendorp's Bericht, *ib.*, 13 : 62 ("De onentbeerlijkheid van dit Volk hier te land is algemeen erkend"); report from Demak, 1805, in "Rijstkultuur op Java," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1854, 1 : 2 : 43. Raffles found all internal trade in their hands and said that they were the life and soul of commerce. *Hist.*, 1 : 82, 222 ff.

² "De Kali Bezaar te Batavia," *De Economist*, 1862, *Bijblad*; Mees, "De Indische groothandel en de Chineesche lijnwaadhandel," *De Economist*, 1884, i. The president of the Java Bank, in his annual report on the state of the market (*Kol. Verslag*, 1898, *Bijlage*, MM.), complained of the depression in the import trade as largely a result of the untrustworthiness of the middlemen; failures of the Chinese had not been so numerous in

The prominence that has been given to the Chinese in their relations with European merchants should not distract attention from the other side of their functions, really more important, their dealings with the natives. The position that they have held under the government in the past has assured them the establishment of relations with the people in all parts of the island ; every pawnshop and every opium agency is the nucleus of a little commercial organization. Chinese peddlers vend their wares throughout the country, and Chinese traders pervade the markets where most of the native trading is done. They sell everything that can tempt the native to buy, manufactured wares and ready-made clothing, drugs and chemicals for dyeing, and all sorts of "notions." Some come to the market with bags of copper coins to buy the native produce, and some do not appear at all, but wait from the early dawn at convenient cross-roads to forestall the market by buying up the articles that are being carried there for sale. The petty trade is not confined to Chinese, but is carried on most successfully by them ; the natives seem unable to compete with them on equal terms, and are driven into less remunerative branches of the trade, or become dependent agents.¹

1897 as in preceding years, but still caused many losses. An idea of the economic importance of the Chinese in Java can be given by some figures from a recent colonial report ; of seventy-eight stock companies sanctioned by the government in 1897 fifteen included Chinese, and the number of Chinese depositors in the principal savings banks is about equal to that of natives, in spite of the small proportion that they form of the population. Cachet, "Een jaar op reis," Amsterdam, 1896, 630, says that the traveller finds a better stock in the Chinese shops than in any others, is served more quickly and can buy more cheaply in them.

¹ The best references for the place taken by the Chinese in the native organization are Poensen, "Naar en op de pasar," Mededeelingen van wege het Nederlandsche Zendelingenootschap, Rotterdam, 1882, 26 : 1-30 ;

The Chinese are always represented as great sinners in their relations with the natives, overreaching them in every way; they cheat in trade, advance money at usurious interest, and exploit their victims sometimes mercilessly. These facts cannot be denied, and yet it is very easy to base a false inference on them. The natives and the native organization are to blame rather than the Chinaman. The Chinese take much the same position in modern Java that the Jews took in mediæval Europe; they are giving the natives some primary economic education, and they are hated for it just as the Jews were hated.

The modern world looks with too little sympathy on the distrust and dislike of the middleman that are characteristic of primitive communities. In our environment of competition and market prices we are apt to forget how necessary is friction in the beginnings of trade, and how surely ill feeling grows out of it. Every bargain is a personal contest; the merchant takes all that his own strength or the weakness of the seller permits him, without fear of a future loss of custom to counterbalance the present gain. Without a market a one-price system is impossible; without a one-price system ill feeling is

Beijerman, "Jets over de Chineezzen in Ned. Ind.," *ib.*, 1885, 29 : 1-25. Jenks, Report, 55, 157, in describing the restrictions to which the Chinese are subjected for the protection of the natives, implies that a large part of the native population is preserved from contact with Chinese traders. This was certainly not so in the past, as can be learned from the articles cited, on which I have based my description. De Louter says, it is true, that the tendency of late has been toward a stricter enforcement of the regulations limiting the free movement of the Chinese ("Handleiding," 119, note 3); but there are a great many towns in which the Chinese can reside (see list, in "Regeeringsalmanak," 1899, Bijlage X), and I should suppose it to be very difficult for the government to carry out any prohibitions of peddling to the letter.

inevitable. Our ancestors found it so in early New England, and no amount of legislation could prevent the "extortion" practised on weaker members of the community by traders who were of the same blood and religion. The Chinese have been disliked in Java not because they were Chinese, but because they were tax-gatherers, money-lenders, and traders, and men of other races in their position would have been no better off. Their competitors in the petty trade in Java, the Indo-Arabs, of the same religion as the natives, are even more disliked. The Javanese have a saying by which they contrast the two races, "They both bleed us, but the Moor hurts."

The Chinese have always been unpopular in the East, and will always be, so long as they fill their present position of middlemen. The idea of excluding them is an old one in the history of Java, and attempts have sometimes been made to put it into practice. They all lead, however, to the same result, the conviction that the Chinaman is no worse than another man would be in his position, and that the position is a necessary one in the development of society. The Chinese trader is to the native consumer the missionary of the modern economic organization. He brings to the native and presents to him in concrete form the advantages to be gained by entering the organization in producing for exchange. Every imported ware sold by peddler or merchant is a pledge that a native product of equal value is gained for export. The petty trader should have the credit for the total amount produced for export by the individual natives, and for a large proportion of that which is produced by natives under European direction. The writer has no information as to the form in which wages are paid on the plantations; it is possible

that the truck system prevails to some extent, and that the laborers are forced to take their pay in the shape of commodities at the proprietor's store. So far as they are paid in money and are allowed to spend it without restriction, they find the real incentive to labor in the wares that are offered them by the trader. On the skill and energy with which he fulfils his functions production for the European market depends.

A modern writer¹ finds two great questions in the relations between European rulers and the people of tropical dependencies. The first is that of labor, discussed above. The second, hardly distinguishable often from the first and always running parallel, is that of land. The separation of land and labor comes at a comparatively late period in economic development, and has scarcely more than begun in modern Java. It implies a "market" both for land and for labor, freedom of movement on the part of labor and capital, ample and accurate information on the side of both parties to the exchange, and such intelligent foresight that they can be trusted to consult their permanent interests in any transactions in which they engage. These conditions are lacking in Java. A government which supposed them to exist and introduced the principle that the natives could do as they pleased with property rights to the land they occupied, would find itself involved in difficulties as great as if it upheld the right of the natives to sell their persons into credit bondage. Transfers of land would not be simple economic transactions. With the land would go the person of the former proprietor, not merely as a laborer, but as a political dependent of the new

¹ Stengel, "Die Arbeiterfrage in den Kolonien," *Jahrbuch der internat. Ver. f. vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft*, 1898, 4 : 245.

owner, and the state would find its sovereignty impaired by the rise of innumerable landlords who would exercise many of the privileges of government without the possibility of being held to account for any duties. Tendencies in this direction can be plainly seen in the native organization in the period when it was free from Dutch influence, and they still exist. The Dutch government cannot hope to check their operation inside the village, where the natives must be left to themselves; it must seek merely to prevent them from gaining such force as to invade the higher political organization.

The Dutch government is not without experience of the evils that can result from the transfer of rights to land. In its person as sovereign it has in the past stimulated from the top of the organization the very process which it seeks now to prevent from working up from the bottom. The so-called "particular" lands exist nowadays as the result of land sales by the government, which have taken place at various times from the period of the East India Company down to about 1830, but which were especially common during the hard times at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The conditions on which the government made its sales varied in different cases and were often far from clear. In some cases apparently the natives on the land were put wholly at the mercy of their lords, who could demand unlimited dues and services and could dispose of the native holdings as they pleased. The government reserved to itself the right to interfere for the protection of the cultivators, but it was not strong enough to prevent serious abuses of their position by the landlords. With the improvement in the Dutch administration in the nineteenth century the government has become able to

exercise a more efficient control over the proprietors of particular lands ; it upholds certain rights of the cultivators, and exercises its sovereignty in the judicial administration and in the imposition of certain taxes.

The proprietor still keeps, however, a semi-public position ; he exacts dues in labor and in kind from the natives, and, subject to the approval of the State, he appoints and pays the head-men who exercise the most important functions of communal government. The " particular " lands comprise a population of more than one half million natives, some of them grouped in vast estates of 75,000 or even 175,000 people. They are owned in large part by stock companies, by absentee landlords, or by Chinese.¹ Abuses are inevitable under such conditions, and there have been a number of complaints directed especially against the Chinese but involving European administrators as well.²

¹ The following statistics are given in the Kol. Verslag for 1898, Bijl. AAA., as regards the possessors of " particular " lands : —

	Number.	Bouws.	Inhabitants.
Stock Companies	62	622,971	592,631
Europeans	101	557,636	513,092
Chinese	197	368,810	469,937
Other Orientals and natives	74	18,907	43,870
	434	1,568,324	1,619,530

For confirmation of the statement about the political position of the landlords see Elout, *Bijdragen*, 1851, 160, 178.

² The " Tjiomas affair " of 1886 was a conflict on one of these estates between natives, European agent, and government, which brought the anomalies of the position of the particular lands clearly before the public. The affair led to a good deal of polemic writing from which it is hard to disengage the truth ; apparently in this case the proprietor was not guilty of the abuses charged against him, the natives were inspired in large part by religious fanaticism, and the government allowed itself unwarrantable liberties. See the articles in the *Indische Gids*, 1886-1887, by Faes, Van K[esteren], and Sol, and the " *Koloniale Kroniek* " in *De Economist*, 1886. One conclusion is certain, that the particular lands are a practical hindrance to good government.

There have been various propositions for the repurchase of these lands by the State; but there seems at present little likelihood that the government will seek to remedy the evil in this way.

The alienation of the particular lands is an extreme case, of historical interest rather than of present practical importance. The government will never again abdicate its powers as apparent necessity forced it to do when these lands were sold. Yet some concession it must make to employers of native labor if it is to give them any control over land held by natives, and stimulate an efficient organization of production. The history of the measures that it has taken to solve the problem would be a long one if told in all the detail of its chronological development. Some facts of that history have been touched on in earlier chapters when the position of private planters before and during the culture system was under discussion. The question, however, became of great importance only when the government withdrew from its position as the one great European planter in Java, and the object of the following pages will be to describe merely the main results of the development in the period since the decline of the culture.

Logically, the first question which the government has had to face has been the question of land laws according to the native ideas. Who were real owners of land in the native organization? In whom should the government recognize the right of property, the right to "all those undefined uses which remain over after all the definite and specific uses of others have been deducted"? To these questions the native customs returned a somewhat ambiguous answer. The cultivators of the soil had at least in some parts of the island a tenure so insecure that they appeared to be

laborers rather than proprietors ; the lords who were over them held their lands only with their office as a rule ; the sovereign alone appeared to exercise such rights as are associated with private property in the western world. The Dutch in the period of the Company were little troubled by questions of abstract principle in their relations with the native organization, and had, as has been shown, few intimate dealings with it, but when Raffles came to introduce the land-tax, he had to face the problem of native tenures. He sought a solution that might conveniently be applied to the whole island, and found it in his statement that the native sovereigns were sole proprietors of the land, and that the European government succeeded to their rights. This solution has been confirmed by the Dutch government which has made official announcement that in general it is the sole proprietor of the land and recognizes property rights in others only in the particular lands and in the towns.

Enough was said in the chapter on the native organization to show that the principle adopted did not accord exactly with the facts of the native organization. Raffles recognized departures from it in some districts. It was a legal fiction, much like that which prevailed in England in the feudal period.¹ The principle is to be justified, not by

¹ L. W. C. van den Berg, "Het eigendomsrecht van den staat op den grond op Java en Madoera," *Bijd. TLV.*, 1891, 5 : 6 : 1-26, seeks to justify historically the principle that the sovereign is proprietor of all the land in Java and Madoera. The argument does not convince me ; it seems irreconcilable with the facts of land tenure as they are related in Raffles's Substance, and it does not accord with the theories of the natives, as they appear in the *Eindresumé*. In Bantam the people regarded themselves as proprietors — but were afraid to say so ! The judicial adviser of the Governor General, Mr. G. D. Willinck, published in 1891 a pamphlet ("De Grondrechten bij de volken van den Oost-Indischen Archipel," 's Grav., 1891) to show that historically the sovereign could not be regarded as sole proprietor of the land, especially in the Outer Possessions. He

reference to the earlier history of the Javanese, but by the later history of the Dutch, who have accepted the trust imposed upon them in assuming the position of proprietors, and administered it faithfully in the interests of the natives.

Passing from this question, which is largely one of theory, the practical problem has been the use that the government should make of its rights, and especially the conditions on which it should permit foreigners access to the land. This problem can be divided into two parts, according as the land is or is not already cleared and cultivated by native laborers. Arable and waste appeal to different classes of planters, and lead to very different relations between planters and natives.

The land already cleared and settled presents the more serious problem. This land, most of which is irrigated and devoted to rice culture by the natives, is suited to crops like sugar, tobacco, and indigo. The government must guard it with especial jealousy because it is the source of the greater part of the food supply, and because it lends itself with singular readiness to the exploitation of shrewd capitalists, whether they be Orientals or Europeans. Land and labor go together, and both are so tied up in the native political organization that the man who captures that can abuse its resources much as he pleases. This applies with especial force to the villages in the richest parts of the island, where the land is held on a communal tenure.¹

thought, however, that the government had exercised proprietary rights so long in Java that there was no use in returning now to old customs. It would be possible to extend greatly the discussion and references on this point, which has been long debated in the Netherlands, but for present purposes it seems unnecessary.

¹ According to the statistics in "Jaarcijfers, Kolonien," 1897 (pub.

Though the government has taken to itself the property right in land, it has left the natives in hereditary possession, and it has interfered but slightly with the customs of native tenure. These customs, to judge from the native evidence collected in the report of a government investigation, are the product of local growth, but slightly modified by external influences like Islam. The Dutch government has exercised an important influence only in stimulating the extension of communal tenure, and effected that unconsciously by its fiscal demands in the past. The restrictions that it imposes on the clearing of fresh land by natives are generally disregarded; the conversion from communal to individual tenure which it has invited proceeds very slowly; and the opportunity that it offers the natives of an approach to Western principles in acquiring so-called "agrarian property" has evoked little interest.¹

The one restriction which the government has upheld with severity and with success has touched the periphery of the native organization, as it were, rather than its centre. This restriction applies to the relations between natives and non-natives, whether Europeans or foreign Orientals. According to a formula which has been framed to describe the policy of the Dutch, the native is major in

1899), p. 34, the total number of villages in Java and Madoera (including some of peculiar constitution), was 29,968; 6573 had only individual tenure, 10,213 had only communal, 12,949 had a mixture of the two. It is with reluctance that I refrain from describing in detail the communal institutions, and discussing their origin and present significance, but it seems wiser not to attempt in this book a subject which should form a study by itself.

¹ For a brief description and criticism of agrarian property, see Anton, NAHJ., Schmollers Jahrbuch, 1899, 23: 1349. The institution has not been of sufficient importance to warrant an extended treatment of it here.

his relations to other natives; he is a minor in his relations to the rest of the world.¹

With respect to the permanent transfer of rights from natives to non-natives the prohibition is absolute; there can be no valid sale to a foreign Oriental or to a European. Foreigners can own building lots in the towns, and can acquire such parts of the "particular" lands as the present proprietors may desire to sell to them, but they cannot hope for more. It is impossible to say how serious the evils would be if this prohibition were removed. It is a measure of security based on past experience with native weakness, and on the conviction that the native is not yet ready to hold his own in bargaining with Chinese or Europeans.² The planters of these foreign nationalities are, of course, eager that the prohibition should be removed, but so far as is known to the writer there is no likelihood that this step will be taken. No better endorsement of the present policy could be had than that given by conditions in British India, and by the statement of a traveller from there, who thought that the Javanese owe their prosperity as much to the wise pro-

¹ Chailley-Bert, "Les Hollandais à Java," *Cosmopolis*, May, 1898, 10 : 421. I do not find in the book, "Java et ses habitants," this sentence or the accompanying appreciation of the land system as a "chef-d'œuvre où l'on trouve dosées à souhait la liberté et l'intervention."

² When the investigation of 1868 was made, there was great difference of opinion among officials as to the probable results if natives were allowed to sell their lands to foreigners. Many officials thought that after a few years, perhaps a generation, the natives could be trusted to look after their own interests. See Eindr., 2, the last paragraphs of the separate residency reports. These views would now, I think, be called too optimistic. For evidence to show that the Javanese would fall a prey if allowed free sale of land, see Neberburgh, "De onmondigheid van den Javaan ten aanzien van het grondbezit," *TNI*, 1878, 7 : 1 : 26 ff.; Gelpke, "Landbezit," *De Gids*, 1877, 1 : 76.

tection of the government as to the fertility of the island. "It is not too much to say that the loss of all the many benefits which undoubtedly would have been conferred on Java by the substitution of English for Dutch rule is not too high a price to have paid for escape from the many evils of unrestrained power to alienate landed property."¹

The only hold that foreigners can get on land cultivated by natives is a lease, fixed at a short term and hedged around with restrictions. Legislation supplementing the agrarian law of 1870 allowed the lease of native arable to persons or corporations of Dutch citizenship, or resident in the Netherlands or in Dutch India, for a term of five years, or, in the case of land held on the tenure of "agrarian property," for twenty years. Every contract must be made with individuals, even when the land was held on a communal tenure, and the insertion of clauses in the contract providing for a renewal of the lease at the end of the period was prohibited. Advances on the rental could be made only to an amount covering one year, and every contract must be registered by officials of the provincial government to become valid.

Restrictions such as these would seem to assure the native against abuses, but experience proved that the law had gone too far, and really furthered the evils that it was designed to prevent. Planters who desired for the sugar

¹ Boys, Java, 56. Colquhoun, "Russia against India," 1900, p. 133, says that from 10% to 25% of the land of the Punjab has been taken by usurers since the Mutiny. An item in the New York Post, Nov. 6, 1900, stated that a Punjab Land Alienation Bill had recently been enacted, providing that permanent alienation of the land should take place only among the members of the agricultural tribes, while temporary alienations and leases were limited to a period of twenty years. This legislation followed substantially the line of the Dutch.

culture the rich land of the villages with communal tenure could not be held to innumerable contracts with individuals holding each an acre or less, and exercised all kinds of improper devices to secure the land they wanted from the village governments. Subleases and other irregular arrangements nullified the intent of parts of the law, and the provision for the public registration of contracts became almost a dead letter. The government was forced to recognize that it had exceeded its power of practical control, and amended its legislation to the advantage of the foreign planters. Lands held on an individual tenure can now be leased for a term extended to twelve years, and communal lands can be leased in block by a vote of two-thirds of the village community under strict public supervision, though still only for the former period of five years. Not more than one-third of the irrigated fields of a village can be leased at any time. So far as shown by official reports and statistics, the government has secured its object of a more efficient protection of the natives by these measures; undertakings which formerly concealed their operation from public authority have been induced to register and so subject themselves to control.¹ The government has extended its paternal care even beyond this general legislation in the case of certain crops; the establishment of undertakings for the

¹ The number of contracts offered for registration increased very largely, and the government found no objection to most of them. Contracts were refused registration for various reasons; some concealed a loan on growing crops under the form of a lease contract; some exceeded the one-third limit. The judgment of officials was "on the whole favorable"; difficulties were experienced only in a few districts, and a local investigation was ordered to determine how these should be met. Kol. Verslag, 1898, pp. 65-66.

manufacture of sugar and indigo requires the special permission of the Governor General, which can be refused altogether or granted under such restrictions as appear to safeguard the interests of the natives.¹

An exception to the regular system in the leasing of native land appears in the two principalities of Soerakarta and Djokjokarta, where the Dutch government rules not directly but through a protectorate.² In those districts the old native institution still persists of maintaining the administration not by money salaries, but by grants of the public income from land. From early times the grantees have found it to their advantage to farm out their rights to European planters, who use the control thus given them over native land and labor to cultivate export products. By a native custom that has become pretty general in the principalities the old theory of Van den Bosch is roughly realized ; two-fifths of the land are set apart for the use of the holder of the "appanage" or his representative, the European farmer. Two-fifths are reserved for the personal needs of the natives, and the remaining one-fifth is devoted to the service of the *bekel*, the village head. The farmer disposes of such labor dues

¹ So in 1898 petitions for the establishment of sugar factories were granted only on conditions affecting the use of water or the location of the lands leased ; one petition was denied altogether because the food supply was not sufficient in the district in question ; the petitioner might neither lease land nor buy cane of the natives. Kol. Verslag, 1898, Bijl. WW., p. 10.

² This system is briefly described in Jenks, Report, pp. 63-64. No statement about the system can be at the same time general and accurate, for practices differ widely even in the two principalities. I have sought to suggest only the characteristic features ; for details the reader is referred to Eindr., 3, Bijl. B and C., and to articles by Van Alphen, Ind. Gids, 1882, 2 : 279 ff. ; 1893, 2 : 1881 ff.

as are fixed by local custom, and provides for what further needs he may have by the hiring of wage labor.

Though in form the farmer is denied all political power over the subject cultivators, this arrangement is evidently subject to abuses that the Dutch have long had to fight in the land over which they have exercised direct control. It is allowed now to continue only because of the peculiar political situation of the principalities, and it is carefully restricted in its operations. Foreign Orientals are denied the privilege of farming, and Europeans are granted it only on the written permission of the Governor General, revocable at any time. Contracts can be made for a term of thirty years; every contract is carefully investigated by a government official, and must apply to land at least three hundred and fifty acres in extent, this last provision being designed apparently to enable the government to exercise more efficient supervision. Opinions differ as to the effect of this system on the cultivators subject to it. There seems no question that the people are in general worse off in the principalities than in the government lands of Java, but this may well be a result of the difference in general historical development and have nothing to do with the question of European leases. Testimony is not lacking, on the other hand, that the natives fare better under European farmers than under any of the native systems to which they are subject.¹

It was remarked, near the beginning of this description of the modern land system, that the government has found it advisable to modify its policy according as the

¹ Report of Spaan, 1875, Eindr., 3, Bijl B., p. 36; A[lphen], "De exploitatie van gronden en bevolking in de kedjawen-desas der Vorstenlanden," Ind. Gids, 1893, 2: 1889.

land is or is not already occupied by native cultivators. There remains now to be described the policy adopted with regard to uncleared land, the waste as it may conveniently be termed.

This land, which is utilized especially for the production of coffee, tea, and cocoa, may be acquired on much more liberal terms than the native arable. The planter who does the work of bringing it under cultivation may fairly ask for a term of use long enough to repay him for his original outlay. He must build up an organization by bringing laborers to the land, instead of relying upon a union of the two factors of production effected by the natives themselves, and there is not the same opportunity for an abuse of the native resources.

These considerations were recognized in the legislation from 1856 on, by which a lease of waste land could be obtained for a term of twenty years, and for the payment of a rental fixed by competition, but in practice much less than that paid for cleared land. By 1870 forty thousand *bouws* (about seventy thousand acres) had been leased on these terms, at the rate of about six gulden a *bouw*. Further concessions were made in the agrarian law of that year, and leases on the old terms have practically disappeared. By the present regulations waste land can be secured by planters on an emphyteutic tenure (*erfpacht*), for a term of seventy-five years, and for the payment of a quit-rent ranging from a maximum of five gulden per *bouw* to one gulden or even less.¹ The planter has no assurance that

¹ In exceptional cases the state gets more than the normal maximum of five gulden. Jenks quotes reasons for establishing a uniform low rate; Report, 112. I omit a great amount of administrative detail, for which, see the sources cited at the head of the chapter. The maximum area of

his lease will be renewed at the end of its term, or that he will receive compensation for permanent improvements that he has made. This last consideration is not, however, of great importance in a tropical country like Java, and the advantages of the tenure so far outweigh its disadvantages that the area of land held on emphyteusis has increased constantly and now forms no inconsiderable portion of the total cultivated area of the island.¹

Planters have not ceased to complain of the strictness with which the government regulates their relations with the native laborers and landholders. This proves nothing; if they did not complain, we could be sure that they were having things too much their own way. It is impossible for the government to protect the natives as is necessary from the political point of view without subjecting itself to criticism from the economic standpoint. Government officials hold planters in a position of extreme dependence, and may sometimes abuse their authority.² Yet this course seems justified by the fact that on one side the native has been well protected, and on the

the concession is about five hundred *bouws*, and the privileges are restricted to the same persons as enjoy the right to lease land of natives.

¹ In 1897 the area held on lease from the government was 502,931 *bouws*; on lease from natives, 132,297 *bouws*. The total amount of land cleared for cultivation by the natives was 3,819,513 *bouws*. *Jaarcijfers*, 1897, 53, 50. Land leased from the government was used as follows: Coffee, 443 undertakings; cinchona, 83; tea, 68; cocoa, 59; sugar, 24; tobacco, 7; other, 66; 363 undertakings were held by companies, 366 by individual Europeans, 45 by Chinese, 6 by natives. *Kol. Verslag*, 1898, Bijl. ZZ.

² Cf. Worsfold, "A Visit to Java," Lond., 1893, 172, 180; Chailley-Bert, *JH.*, 166, 212. In *Ind. Gids*, 1899, 2: 845 ff., a circular is printed which was issued by a resident in Borneo, reproving his subordinates for checking the freedom of individual undertakers. The conditions which it suggests must still exist in Java. Cf. Van Kesteren in *Ind. Gids*, 1885, 1: 583 ff.

other production has steadily and rapidly increased. The following table presents a summary of the advance, measured by the growth of imports and exports :¹—

[FIGURES IN GULDEN, 000 OMITTED.]

	IMPORTS	EXPORTS	TOTAL
1825 . . .	14,317	17,889	32,206
1835 . . .	21,962	34,997	56,959
1845 . . .	37,221	68,083	105,304
1855 . . .	47,981	84,127	132,108
1865 . . .	61,644	115,017	176,661
1875 . . .	125,672	177,076	302,748
1876-1880 . .	148,746	192,878	341,624
1881-1885 . .	154,066	190,867	344,933
1886-1890 . .	145,241	186,338	331,579
1891-1895 . .	172,484	211,345	383,829
1900 . . .	195,924	259,034	454,958

Statistics of this kind present of course no absolute proof of a growth of welfare. Welfare in the European sense hardly exists in Java now. The people prefer to increase in number rather than to raise their standard of life as individuals. They seem, however, in spite of a great growth of population, to have at least maintained the customary standard.² Articles describing the private economy of

¹ This is made up from the figures given by N. P. van den Berg in *Enc. NI.*, 3: 544-545. The figures for 1825 to 1865 inclusive, taken from G. F. de Bruyn Kops, include only the trade of Java and Madoera; later figures apply to all of Dutch India. Figures in the *Jaarcijfers*, p. 65, show that in recent years the trade of the Outer Possessions has been rather less than half that of Java and Madoera. Expressed in quantities instead of in values, the growth of trade would be considerably greater.

² The article by C. E. van Kesteren, "Een en ander over de welvaart der inlandsche bevolking en de toekomst der Europeesche landbouwnijverheid in Ned. Ind.," *Ind. Gids*, 1885, 1: 551-619, does not convince me; he seeks to prove statistically a decline in welfare since 1880. I have seen no later articles seeking to maintain the same point.

the Javanese show that they have a pitifully small margin above the mere necessities of life.¹ Oriental and European standards are vastly different, however ; measured by the Oriental standard, or measured by their own past history, the Javanese are now comparatively well-to-do.²

¹ Cf. J. H. F. Sollewijn Gelpke, "Het budget van een Javaansche boer," *Ind. Gids*, 1880, 2 : 563 ff. ; *id.*, "De middelen welke de inlander heeft om de landrente te voldoen," *ib.*, 1886, 1 : 420 ff., 575 ff. ; "Arminius," "Het budget van een Javaanschen landbouwer," *ib.*, 1889, 2 : 1685 ff., 1885 ff., 2149 ff. ; and the articles cited above under labor.

² See Leclercq, "Java," *Rev. des deux Mondes*, Nov. 1897, 144 : 186, for the impression made on a European traveller ; he found the people well fed, properly clad, and much better off than the people of Ceylon.

CHAPTER XI

RECENT FISCAL POLICY

THE transition to the modern system of production in Java has involved necessarily the revision of the government's fiscal system, and has been accompanied by many fiscal reforms. The culture system was, however, too powerful an institution to disappear completely and at once from the field either of production or of finance; the strongest parts of it were maintained for some time for the revenue that they produced, and the spirit of it modified in important points the form of succeeding legislation. The most significant principle in the Dutch Indian fiscal system, the relation established between the finances of the home country and the dependency, still remains substantially as it was established in the period of the culture system, though robbed now of its practical importance.

The liberal party of the reform period, however radical it seemed to its opponents at the time, shrank from a complete breach with the past colonial policy, and had no thought of surrendering all the advantage which the Netherlands had enjoyed from the profits of rule in the East. Multatuli said, with characteristic sarcasm, that there were in the Netherlands two parties "with very different principles": the conservatives, who wanted to

get from the Indies all the profit possible, and the liberals, who wanted to get all the profit possible from the Indies.¹

The reform party stood for a just government, free from abuse of the natives and from the exclusion of Europeans, but it believed in making as large a surplus for the home treasury as was consistent with "the essential and permanent interest of the colonies," and held an exaggerated idea of the profit that might be gained by a purer system of taxation.²

The so-called *Comptabiliteitswet* of 1864 provided that thereafter the budget of Dutch India should be fixed by a law of the home government; it had important political consequences in restricting the power of the Governor General, and in stimulating interference on the part of the Dutch parliament, but it led to no change in the "net-profit system," by which the Dutch received the annual surplus from their dependencies. The Indies continued to contribute sums ranging between 10,000,000 and 40,000,000 gulden a year.³

The system by which the balance of the Dutch budget was made dependent on a contribution which came from a distant dependency and which varied immensely from year to year seemed to some not only unjust to India but injurious also to the Netherlands. De Waal, minister of the colonies in 1869, proposed that in the budget for the next year a sum of 10,000,000 gulden should be set

¹ Quoted by Keymeulen, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1892, 2 : 805.

² See the summary of the liberal position by Brouwer, "Kol. kamerkout," *De Gids*, 1863, 1 : 262, and for a view of the profit to be made by a change, Bosch, *TNI.*, 1862, 24 : 2 : 277.

³ See the table of Dutch revenues, 1849 to 1890, by Boissevain, "Die neueste Stenerreform in den Niederlanden," *Schanz's Finanz-Archiv*, 1894, 11 : 692.

as the contribution from the Indies ; he planned to revise this amount in later years to make it a fair equivalent for the expenditures on colonial account of the home government, and proposed to appropriate all surplus above this fixed contribution to the benefit of the dependency. His project was rejected by the Second Chamber. The outbreak of the war with Atjeh in 1873 changed the practical bearings of the question, by causing such an increase in the expenditures in the Indies that the surplus dwindled, and in 1878 vanished entirely. Since that date there have been occasional years in which the Indian finances showed a surplus, but the tendency in general has been in the opposite direction, and even in the exceptional years the home government has taken no tribute from its dependency. On the other hand it has been forced to assist the Indian treasury by advances and by the negotiation of loans, always, however, at the charge of the dependency.

Though the question of policy involved in the "net-profit system" has lost its practical importance since the Indian dependencies have ceased to return a surplus, it has continued to be a subject of discussion in the Netherlands, and a number of attempts have been made to revise the relations between the Indian and the Dutch treasuries. All schemes have had in common the idea that the Indies should be held to contribute each year a fixed sum which should recompense the home government for its expenditures on colonial account, while any surplus above that should be appropriated by the States General to objects of direct interest to the people in the East. The amount of the annual contribution has varied in the different projects from 2,000,000 to 6,000,000 gulden. It has been proved impossible to reach an agreement on

the amount which might properly be imposed, for the Indies bear now all expenses which can be directly charged to them, and this further contribution represents the payment for institutions which the Dutch would have to support in any event, but which are supposed to be of interest also to the dependencies, — such as the army and navy at home, the diplomatic and consular services, the system of higher education in the Netherlands, and the Dutch States General.¹ As the question has been purely one of theory, it has been easy to find objections to every plan proposed, and none has gained enough support to enable it to become law. In recent years the problem has been complicated by the growth of a sentiment in complete reaction against the old colonial policy, charging the Dutch government with having robbed the Indies of their millions in the past, and demanding a restitution of the surplus that has been taken since the *Comptabiliteitswet* went into operation in 1867.² As a result of this conflict of opinions the matter still remains unsettled, and the budget of the Netherlands still shows each year among the revenues an item “Contribution of Dutch India to the revenues for the payment of the kingdom’s expenditures,” against which no sum is set.³

Allusion was made above to the Atjeh war which began

¹ Van Soest, “De kwestie der Indische bijdrage,” *TNI.*, 1879, 8 : 1 : 234. For further details, see this article, “De vaste bijdrage,” *TNI.*, 1880, 9 : 2 : 455 ff., and H. J. Bool, “De financiële verhouding tusschen Nederland en Indie,” *Ind. Gids*, 1892, 2 : 1815 ff., 1893, 1 : 213 ff.

² This view, which was first brought up in the States General in 1888, by Nieuwenhuis, the Socialist leader, is defended by C. T. Deventer, “Een eereschuld,” *De Gids*, 1899, 3 : 205 ff.

³ *Staatsbegrooting*, 1900, “Wet op de middelen, Raming voor 1900,” letter O.

in 1873 and has continued to the present time. This war has caused an expenditure of hundreds of million of gulden, taken from the general treasury of the Dutch East Indies, and hence paid mainly from the revenues of Java.¹ As the field of operations, however, lies in Sumatra, a narrative of the war or discussion of the points of policy involved in it lies outside the scope of this book, and this mere mention of it must suffice in taking up the next topic, the development of Dutch policy as shown in the expenditures in the East during the last generation. Considerations of space and of available material impose a summary treatment of this topic, which can best be illustrated for present purposes by comparing the budgets of 1870 and 1900.²

EXPENDITURES OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIES, IN THE INDIES

[FIGURES IN GULDEN, 000 OMITTED.]

	1870	1900
I. Superior government	749	1,108
II. Justice	3,121	5,330
III. Finance	4,345	12,824
IV. Internal administration . .	40,445	29,558
V. Education, religion, and industry	6,919	16,625
VI. Public works	7,318	21,889
VII. War	18,320	25,254
VIII. Navy	5,199	4,574
Total	86,420	117,162

¹ An estimate in Ind. Gids, 1893, 2 : 1897, puts the Atjeh expenditures at 200,000,000 gulden. Recent press despatches announce that the war is now practically over.

² No pretensions to exactness can be made, of course, in comparing individual budgets, but this is of small importance in view of another

In some of the departments of expenditure the increase in the items represents a normal development of government activity, keeping pace with the increase of the population and the growth of subject territory. Other items, however, show differences so striking as to call for special explanation. The great fall in expenditures in Department IV, internal administration, seems to denote a saving in the most important branch of government, the provincial civil service, which would be a complete departure from the ideals of the reformers who secured the abolition of the culture system. In fact, however, the truth is the reverse of this. In this department are included the expenses of the forced cultures, which included both coffee and sugar in 1870, and which cost at that time about 25,000,000 gulden, five-eighths of the total expenditure of the department. The government coffee culture in 1900 still demanded over 5,000,000 gulden, but this sum formed in the budget of that year little over one-fifth of the expenditures on internal administration, and left for purposes really directed to the welfare of the natives a greatly increased amount. The natives have gained in the same way, though to a less degree, by the growth of the expenditures in Department III, finance, which represents the extension of the tax system in place of the cultures of the earlier period.

element of uncertainty, the fact that expenditures in Java and in the other islands are not separated in the budget statements. As I seek to give only a general view of the development I have not complicated the table by adding to it colonial expenditures in the Netherlands, amounting in each period to about one-fifth of the totals here given. The statement for 1870 is taken from *De Economist*, 1870, 1:232; that for 1900 from the official "Begrooting van Nederlandsch Indie," No. 22. See "Jaarcijfers, Kolonien," for further details.

The most significant changes are those which appear in Departments V and VI ; they are striking enough if the figures for 1870 and 1900 are compared, but if the figures of 1840 are taken for a starting-point the changes amount to nothing less than a revolution. The Dutch Indian government had in 1870 broken with the policy that made revenue and power the only objects of the State, and had made some steps in furthering the civilization of its subjects, but in a decade since that time it has moved faster and accomplished more than in generations together before.

The items which appear under the head of public works comprise the cost of the construction and maintenance of the state railways (making up nearly half of the total), and expenditures on irrigation works, bridges, roads, harbors, and buildings for schools, hospitals, prisons, and offices. Many of these expenditures are of the nature of public investments, bringing in money returns to the treasury ; and the government has been criticised for its reluctance to enter on railroad or irrigation undertakings when there seemed no likelihood of a business rate of profit. There may be truth in these criticisms, but they should not obscure the fact that past the middle of the nineteenth century the Dutch government in Java was not even businesslike. Natives with a past such as that which has formed the history of the Javanese can afford for a time to do without liberality or charity from their government, if they can be assured that it will manage their public affairs with reasonable economic foresight. Critics are not lacking, moreover, who accuse the government of undue extravagance.¹

¹ Cf. Nunen, "Jets over de beteekenis van Indie voor Nederland," *Ind. Gids*, 1896, 2 : 1337-1340.

The last of the departments of expenditure requiring elucidation to show the development of Dutch policy since 1870 is that in which are grouped the items education, religion, and industry. The last item is almost purely of fiscal interest, embracing only small outlays for the advancement of the arts and sciences, while the expenditures on government undertakings in tin, coal, and salt form more than half of the total of the department and represent properly expenses in the collection of revenue. The other items are of sufficient importance to justify a comparison in detail between the figures of the two budgets.

[FIGURES IN GULDEN, 000 OMITTED.]

	1870	1900
Education of Europeans	690	2700
Education of natives	300	1409
Religion	504	713
Medical service	502	2028

When the Dutch took possession of Java in 1816, there was absolutely no public school in the island for the instruction of European residents. A school was established in that year, and from this beginning there was a growth, gradual at first, much more rapid in recent years, of institutions for the instruction of European children.¹ There had been projects for the secondary education of Europeans, and some vain attempts to accomplish it in the early period, but the first institution destined to permanence was the Gymnasium Willem III, founded at Batavia

¹ The number of primary schools for Europeans, in Dutch India, was as follows, according to the summary in *Encyc. Nl.*, 3 : 76 ; 1820, 7 ; 1833, 19 ; 1845, 24 ; 1868, 68 ; 1883, 129 ; 1888, 141 ; 1891, 147 ; 1894, 156 ; 1898, 164.

in 1890 and entirely reorganized in 1867. Two other institutions of the same kind have since then been established, and provision is also made now for the higher education of girls and for trade schools. In view of the comparatively small European population in Dutch East India, little over sixty thousand, of whom a relatively small proportion is of school age, the appropriations for the education of Europeans must be regarded now as decidedly liberal.

The same cannot be said of the expenditures on the education of natives, notwithstanding the advances that have been made. Opinions have differed, it is true, as to the advisability of educating the natives of a dependency like Java, but in spite of any theoretical objections to the course, the practical advantages of it are so apparent that it is bound to come. The Dutch must educate the higher class of natives, whom they use in government, for political reasons, and they must educate the mass of the people for political reasons and for economic reasons too.¹

Some attempts were made to educate the upper class of Javanese in the first half of the nineteenth century, but these attempts fell far behind the grandiloquent statements of colonial constitutions and colonial governors, and bore little fruit. Even in 1848 the grant of 25,000 florins a year, to be used for the education of native officials, was regarded as a great concession, though its purposes were perverted and it led to little practical result. It was not until 1866, when a special department was established for

¹ Cf. Maine, in Ward, "Reign of Queen Victoria," Lond., 1887, 1: 506, for the necessity of popular primary education in India, where the mass of the people show the same helplessness in the simplest money transaction that modern English or Americans show in technical questions of law.

education, religion, and industry, that the government began seriously to grapple with the problem before it, and the advances made since that time are many-fold the sum of the progress attained before. The scheme of instruction includes now not only natives of the official class, but the common people as well, and while it has thus extended its scope it has at the same time become more effective, by being gradually simplified in the subjects taught and in the methods of teaching. The proportion of natives undergoing primary instruction in Java is still very small, roughly one in five hundred of the total population, and progress in the task of native education is hampered by the small funds which even now are allotted to it, but every movement must have a beginning, and this movement for the education of the Javanese is still so young that its prospects appear most hopeful.¹

¹ I purposely omit most of the details on this subject, for which the reader is referred to Chailley-Bert, *Java*, Chap. V; Ritter, "Eene halve Eeuw," 1:127; De Louter, *Division 3*, Chap. V; or the article "Onderwijs" in *Encyc. Nl.*, 3:73 ff. The statement of the proportion of the Javanese undergoing instruction is made up from figures in the *Jaarcijfers*, 1897; statistics on this subject are, however, very untrustworthy, as is pointed out by F. S. A. de Clerq, *Ind. Gids*, 1883, 1:346; 1895, 1:640. Clerq was inspector of native education for twelve years (*De Econ.*, 1883, 1:543), and his two articles in the *Indische Gids* are very valuable for the proofs of progress that they give. When the normal schools were started after 1872, the teachers were taken largely from the European primary schools, most of them knew no native language and had to teach in Dutch; the government was forced to take native teachers for the primary schools of very poor stuff, for fear of discouraging others who were in the normal school; instruction in the primary schools was mechanical and ineffective; and the natives showed little interest and gave no help in keeping the children at school. The later article by Clerq, "De resultaten van het inlandsch onderwijs in de jaren 1888-1892," *Ind. Gids*, 1895, 1:630 ff., shows decided improvement in many directions. In the interval the Dutch language had been removed from the course of the normal schools; it had wholly missed the object for which it was instituted, to enable the natives to read Dutch books and

There remains to be considered in this sketch of recent Dutch policy the subject of government revenues, to which the remainder of this chapter will be devoted. It will be necessary to trace the decline of the old methods of raising revenue, exemplified in the culture system, and then to sketch the development along new lines of the taxes which form the main resource of the Indian treasury at the present day.

After the abolition of the less important forced cultures in the sixth decade of the century two only were left, those of sugar and of coffee. The sugar culture was peculiar in that it had always given employment to a considerable number of Europeans, who carried on the processes of manufacture as contractors under the government. The organization of the industry under these Europeans promised to make the change from compulsory services to wage labor much easier, and to facilitate also the taxation on which the government must depend for its revenue when the industry was transferred to private enterprise. The contractors favored a change that would give them greater freedom and the chance of larger profits, and the interests of private capitalists were enlisted to influence the government in favor of freedom of industry. A law of 1870 provided for a gradual transition from forced to free culture; beginning in 1878, the amount of land and labor owed by the natives was diminished annually, and in 1890 the transition had been completely effected.

newspapers. The best natives could understand only children's books in Dutch, and many failed in the language who would have made good teachers. See J. H. J. Laats, "Over het nut der veranderingen die . . . in de reorganisatie van het inlandsche onderwijs zijn gebracht," *Ind. Gids*, 1892, 1:2. Chailley-Bert, *Java*, 310, pictures the natives now as eager for school instruction.

Meanwhile the planters were bound to pay the natives wages considerably higher than those customary under the culture system, and to pay them for their land as well, and in addition to pay to the government a tax on the sugar produced, varying from two to three gulden per pikol (133 lb.). The government lost slightly by the change, receiving according to Pierson's estimates 4,000,000 gulden annually in place of over 5,000,000 that it had been making by the sale of sugar in the previous period. But the natives gained very decidedly, and the profits to the planters were sufficient to lead to a rapid extension of the culture outside the bounds that the government had formerly set for it. Between 1871 and 1884 fifty new sugar factories were built, and the production rose from 2,725,000 pikols to 6,495,000 pikols.¹

This period of progress in the sugar industry has been followed by one of depression that has developed into a real crisis in recent years. It was said recently that of the one hundred and ninety sugar factories in Java, fifty often worked at a loss, and of the others only twenty were really profitable.² The United States consul reported that the sugar industry was "in a hopeless condition," that only one-tenth of the plantations were paying.³ But there is no evidence to connect this decline with the change from government to private management. It is due to the ravages of the *sereh*, and to the fall in price caused by the increase of production throughout the world and by the European bounty system. On the other hand,

¹ Boissevain, "Ned. Ind.," De Gids, 1887, 2: 341.

² Peelen, "Java's suikerindustrie," De Economist, 1893, 1: 399.

³ U. S. Commercial Relations, 1896-1897, 1: 1040. In 1898 (p. 1065), the consul reported that sugar was doing better, as a result of the Spanish-American War and of the repeal of the export duty.

it may be said that the free industry is bearing up against difficulties that would have absolutely crushed the government culture if it had been maintained, — that would have crushed the natives engaged in the culture, for it was they who bore all losses. Under the culture system, without the spur of competition, machinery and processes were extremely crude. The American consul at Batavia wrote in 1862 that it was impossible to introduce improved agricultural implements in Java, because of the prejudices and lack of energy of the people there.¹ The free planters inherited traditional methods from their predecessors, but when the crisis came, they were fit to meet it by the flexibility of a free organization. They introduced improvements in all branches of the industry, in machinery, in processes, and in cultivation. The government has been obliged to give up the tax on sugar production or export, which, after being suspended for a number of years, was finally abolished in 1898. The wages of native cultivators have fallen to some extent. But the brunt of the blow has been borne by the individual planters, who have succeeded by energy and economy in reducing very considerably the costs of production.²

But one government culture remains to be considered, the most important of all in the past and the only one that is still maintained, the coffee culture. Under the old system coffee alone returned more than four-fifths of the total revenue that was obtained from the sale of products by the government; the large profits were an index of

¹ U. S. Commercial Relations, 1862, 287.

² De Vries, *De Gids*, 1895, 1:283; *De Economist*, 1889, 187. The mean product, in pikols per bouw, has risen from 52.88 in 1881 to 91.86 in 1897. "Jaarcijfers, Kolonien," 1897, 54.

the strength of the culture, and led to its being retained for fiscal reasons long after the other cultures had been abolished. In 1898 the government coffee culture was still imposed on 250,157 families, scattered through fourteen of the twenty residencies into which Java is divided. In the budget of 1900 the receipts of the government from the sale of coffee are estimated at 10,185,815 gulden, out of total receipts estimated at 141,931,008 gulden, and the specific expenditures on account of the coffee culture are put at 5,713,561 gulden.

The cultivation of coffee differed from that of sugar in organization, in that no elaborate processes were necessary to prepare the crop for market, and the whole industry was carried on by natives. The lack of a class of Europeans, standing in established relations with the native cultivators, was an argument against abolishing the forced culture, for it was asserted that the natives would be left to themselves and would cease to produce for export at all. Individual planters were no longer, as formerly, discouraged from settling in the island; they were given opportunity to lease land and make contracts for labor with the natives, and the production of coffee on private account has increased until it amounts to more than that carried on under the government. But the government has resolutely upheld its own interest in the coffee culture, seeking by changes in detail to remedy the abuses of the old system and to increase its efficiency. The payment of percentages on production was abolished in 1865, in the case of European officials, because of its bad effect on both officials and natives, and the pay of the cultivators has been raised. Percentages are still retained for the native officials, who are the superintendents of cultivation.

Under their direction work is carried on in a careless and half-hearted way. Attempts to introduce a more intensive cultivation and better treatment of the crop have failed because the interests of the natives are not enlisted, and it is said that the quality of the product is declining.¹

With the fall in the price of coffee, due to increased supply in the world's market, and the consequent decline in profits, the motive for maintaining the government culture has grown weaker. The government has had, moreover, to contend with the ravages of the coffee blight, which reached Java in 1879 and which has ruined many plantations. Before the date named, in 1875, a committee of the Second Chamber, after studying a report of the chief inspector of cultures, advised that the government culture should be discontinued, but the Chamber rejected the report. Again, in 1888, a royal commission was appointed to report on the government culture, and after a thorough investigation advised that this last remnant of the culture system should be given up. No decisive action was taken, but the Chamber recommended that the government should give up the monopoly rights that it had exercised over the production of individual natives, and should either pay natives bound to the culture full wages or lease the plantations. A subsidy was granted to go in part toward raising the price paid the cultivators, who were reported as suffering severely in some districts.

The judgment passed against the forced coffee culture

¹ U. S. Commercial Relations, 1898, 1066 ; Van Soest, "De koffijkultuur op Java," *De Economist*, 1872, 1:128. For the shiftlessness and low returns on government plantations see *Tijd. TLV.*, 1884, 29:513 ; Jenks, Report, 59. An anonymous article, "De zegen der Gouvernements koffiekultuur," *Ind. Gids*, 1898, 1:159 ff., shows that all the old abuses of the forced culture persist to the present day.

by the Second Chamber has not yet been carried into execution. The government is reluctant to abandon the revenue that comes from this source, and the treasury finds enough supporters in the Dutch parliament to enable it to resist successfully the abolition of the culture.¹ Little by little, however, the last of the forced cultures is passing away. Of the natives engaged in the culture nearly half are now freed from the obligation of planting more trees to replace those that die out, and since 1894 forced culture and delivery of coffee have been entirely abolished in four of the residencies where they formerly prevailed. The change to complete freedom is sure to come and will probably be not long delayed.

The government has had a simple problem to settle in its policy with respect to the forced cultures; it has been able at any time, when it chose to forego the revenue coming from them, to decree the abolition of the cultures, with the certainty that all the sacrifices which they imposed upon the natives would cease. It could end the forced services on which the cultures rested because it had created them. Its power, however, over the forced services owed inside the native organization is far less complete, and its effort to regulate these services and free them of their abuses has led to a long struggle, making in its results no great showing in the treasury statements, but of hardly less import to native welfare than the abolition of the forced cultures themselves.

In an undeveloped economic and political organization, such as was that of the Javanese in the period before

¹ See the articles by Wessels in *Ind. Gids*, 1894 and 1895, for the mixture of fiscal and humanitarian considerations appearing in the debates in the Second Chamber on the abolition of the culture.

Dutch rule, labor services took the place in large part of money taxes.¹ In the period of primitive simplicity these services had, in general, imposed no very serious burden on the common people, and were rendered only by those who possessed land and were competent to bear them. Under Dutch influence, however, the services became vastly more onerous, and were exacted from a constantly increasing proportion of the people, including even those who had no land of their own.²

Besides the demands made on the people for the government cultures the forced services comprised the following. First, there were the "general" services, devoted to objects of common welfare, especially the preservation of public order and the maintenance of roads.³ Secondly, there were the "special" services, so called, comprising work on a great variety of objects; the most important item in this class was the *pantjen* services, by which native officials, without charge to themselves, secured for their personal use a part of the working time of the people.⁴ Finally there were the communal services, cor-

¹ Even now in Europe and America taxes are sometimes "worked out," and of course in an earlier period the payment of dues in labor was universal. For a comparison of the practices in Java and in Europe see A. F. de Rooy, "Heerendiensten, een vergelijkende studie," *Ind. Gids*, 1893, 1: 357 ff.

² See *Eindresumé*, 3: Bijlage K., ii, p. 149 ff., "Extracten uit de antwoorden van de Residenten, . . . 1861;" reports given there show that the process had proceeded much farther in some residencies than in others.

³ According to the statement for the residency Soerabaya, given by Rees, "Hervorming" (1863), *Ind. Gids*, 1885, 1: 729, the services of this class amounted to nearly four million working days a year, of which over half were given to the guard-houses, and over quarter to work on the roads. The only other item of importance was the maintenance of irrigation canals.

⁴ See the details given by Rees, *ib.*, p. 731. A comparison of the labor services exacted with the figures of population in Soerabaya might seem

responding to the local taxes in a modern state; they consumed a vast but indeterminate amount of labor, in the building and maintenance of roads, bridges, and enclosures in and about the villages, in watch and patrol duty, and in personal service for the village officials.

There were local differences in the system on which these forced services were levied that need not be described here; more important were the differences in the amount of the services in the various localities, which had increased until in some districts the people were almost crushed by the weight of the services, while in others the oppression caused by them was comparatively small.¹ A common characteristic of the system in all localities was its wastefulness; the labor was given grudgingly, and was ineffective, both for that reason and for lack of proper direction.²

Proposals for the reform of the system of forced services had been made even as far back as the time of the

to promise instruction, but would be more likely to mislead; the official statistics of forced services were notoriously inaccurate, representing in most cases only the minimum of labor required.

¹ I speak here of services distinct from those demanded for government cultures. Even in 1888 a local investigation showed that the government had no notion of the real amount of forced services exacted in Soerabaya; in some cases forced services and taxes amounted to more than the yield of the land after the proper costs of cultivation had been deducted. See Dedem, "De agrarische kwestie op Java," *Ind. Gids*, 1890, 2: 2134.

² I have referred before to this point, the uselessness of much of the work required of the natives; an example, dating from the period after the culture system, is given by S. L. W. van der Elst, "Arbeidsverspilling op Java," *TNI.*, 1875, 4: 1: 348-350. During a time of scarcity thousands of natives in Malang (Pasoeroean) were employed, without compensation, in constructing a gutter along the roads. The gutter was badly made, was useless in many places, and a public nuisance in others. The result was that after a time the government ordered that the gutter should be in some places partly, in others wholly, filled up.

Company, and had sometimes found expression in the form of laws. It was not, however, until the change of spirit shown in the abolition of the culture system that laws on this subject could be carried out with any efficiency. The colonial constitution of 1854 ordained that the Governor General should determine the conditions of service in the various localities, and should revise these conditions every five years with a view to diminishing the burden of the services as far as practicable. It was impossible at the time to satisfy the requirements of this constitution; the Dutch government was still too much in the dark concerning the facts of the native organization to be able to establish the local regulations which the variety of customs demanded. In 1864, however, some general regulations were issued, defining the services that might be exacted, and establishing one day per week as the maximum labor due from the landholders on whom the services were held to rest; local officials were to make the facts conform to these regulations as well as they could. At five-year intervals down to 1890 these regulations were revised, tending always to further restriction of the services.¹ Outside the line of these revisions an important reform was carried, in the restriction and final abolition of the *pantjen* services due to native officials, which had been a source of great abuse. The government proposed to recompense the officials for the loss of these services from the proceeds of a poll-tax of a gulden imposed on natives subject to services. The yield of the tax

¹ Pfeil, Südsee, 251, asserts that one important reason why the forced services were given up was the decline of the authority of the whites over the natives, due to the conflict between political parties. This is, so far as I know, a pure figment of the imagination; no facts are cited to support the statement, and I know none that could be cited.

proved to be much more than sufficient for this purpose, and in recent years the excess has been applied to the commuting of other forced services.¹

However valuable were the general regulations of forced services, as showing the spirit and aims of the government, they did not satisfy the need for the specific local regulations which the colonial constitution of 1854 had projected. The variety of local custom made it impossible to follow general rules, and threw on the shoulders of the administrative officials a great responsibility in settling doubtful points.² The decade since 1890 has marked a new period; the legislative branch of the government has finally taken up the problem of *local* regulation, and has established, in a long series of laws, the conditions of forced service in the various residencies of Java.³ Based on local investigation of the facts, these laws represent the aim of the legislator for the first time in thoroughly practicable form; they have led to the reform of many abuses and promise steady improvement in the future. Of especial importance has been the control exercised over the communal services, which the government had previously been unable to reach and which greatly needed reform.

¹ The tax was first applied in 1882, and the government pocketed the surplus until 1887 in defiance of criticism. Even before the law was passed it had been attacked, because it would exact an unnecessarily large sum from the natives and because of other weaknesses; see G. F. C. Rose, "De afschaffing van de pantjen-diensten," *Ind. Gids*, 1881, 2: 737-741.

² The article by De Wolff van Westeroode, "Proeve eener regeling van de controle op de heerdiensten," *Ind. Gids*, 1893, 2: 1121 ff., shows how much could be done by an administrative official, on his own initiative, to organize the system of forced services and to remedy its abuses.

³ A good idea of the extent and complexity of this legislation can be gained from L. W. C. van den Berg, "Het inlandsche gemeentewezen,"

Naturally enough some are dissatisfied even now with the progress that the government has made and urge a more rapid advance; they argue, from the experience of Europe, that a system of money taxes is far better than a system of forced services, and urge the complete substitution of one for the other.¹ On the other hand it must be remembered that the passage from payment in kind to payment in money occupied a long period in European history, that Java has only just emerged from an economic state that may be styled mediæval, and that it has required all available energy to bring the system of money taxes to its present development. Indian officials, writing from a full knowledge of the conditions, are inclined to justify the old system of forced services, and to emphasize the difficulty of an entire change to money taxes, while the natives are still so backward and the corps of European officials so small in proportion to them.²

By freeing the natives from forced labor the Dutch have attained at last the "system of taxation" which had been the ideal of Dirk van Hogendorp and other colonial reformers at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Several aspects of this change have already been considered, and its importance has been emphasized. There seems no occasion, however, to describe here in detail the means by which the government has raised its revenues since it has adopted its new course. Technical measures

Bijd. TLV., 1901, 6:8:39, 81-88, or the table in Encyc. NI., 3:28-29. An example of a law on the regulation of services is printed in Eindresumé, 3: Bijlage M.

¹ Cf. P. C. Huijser, "Het verband tusschen heeren-en cultuurdiensten en de indische tekorten," Ind. Gids, 1899, 2:1362 ff.

² For a presentation of this view see Ernst, "Afschaffing of apkoopbaarstelling der heerenendiensten op Java?" Ind. Gids, 1890, 2:1434 ff.

of taxation hardly lend themselves to generalization, and readers who are curious in this matter are referred to another place, where it has been treated with some fulness.¹ I can attempt here only a bare summary, reserving for detailed treatment only one tax, the land-tax, the most important of all at the present time, and the most significant in its historical development.

One process to which the Dutch have applied themselves in their fiscal reforms in the course of the century has been that of simplification. An immense number of devices for raising revenue had grown up in various parts of Java, some springing from the native organization, some from Dutch governors. From the number the Dutch have had to select those that offered the greatest revenue and the least disadvantages. They have retained some that are open to criticism, such as the opium and salt monopolies, but they have abolished others that were still more injurious to native welfare, and they have made those which they retained into a reasonably consistent system.

They have introduced new taxes, on European models, and they have supplied in part the loss of the revenues that used to come from the forced cultures by the extension of government undertakings depending on free labor. Finally, they have improved the working of the whole tax system by bringing under public administration taxes that were formerly farmed out to independent contractors, and by stimulating new energy and a new spirit of humanity in the whole corps of revenue officials.

A measure of the difficulties encountered and of the

¹ See the essay on the Dutch Colonial Fiscal System cited at the head of the chapter.

success attained can be secured from a study of the history of the land-tax. In earlier chapters the process has been described by which this tax, that began its existence as a thoroughly European measure in the brain of Raffles, escaped from the control of its founder and his successors, and changed its character completely in contact with the native organization. It will be necessary now to describe the actual working of the tax in the modern period and the attempts that have been made to raise its character.

Reports dating from the middle of the century furnish full descriptions of the operations of the tax at that time. The principles on which it had been established had been abandoned so completely that it preserved the same form in no two localities.¹ European officials attempted to secure from the natives figures of the rice yield on which they could base the assessment of the tax, but they were unable to check or verify these figures, which reached them falsified or purely fictitious. The European officials were utterly unable to tell what the natives could or should pay; they knew only what the natives had paid in the past. They juggled with the figures that they had then, until they got a result differing little from that of previous years, and set this as the tax for the year.²

They inclined to raise the tax a little every year, and the critical point in the process of assessment came when

¹ "It works differently in almost every residency," *Memorie*, 1844, S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 192 ; there were differences even inside a residency, *ib.*, 264.

² In some cases they actually reversed the theoretical process ; starting from the sum which they desired to raise they deduced from that statistics of the crop of the year ! See the *Nota* of Van der Poel, 1850, S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 264-266.

they made known their demands to the village governments on whom the tax was levied. The European officials would then assert that the natives had paid too little in the past in proportion to the yield of the land and in comparison with other villages; they would charge the natives with concealing the facts of their prosperity; and they would threaten to take away the land of the villagers. The village heads, on the other hand, would protest that they had paid too much in the past, and that the natives would be ruined if the government did not lower its demands.¹ The amount of the tax was finally settled, not on general principles and by reference to ascertained facts, but by the issue of this personal contest between a European official and the representatives of the village government. Shrewdness and bluster were the determining factors, when neither side had an accurate knowledge of the other's position.

The faults of this system of higgling, known as the *admodatie stelsel*, are apparent. It led to great injustices in the distribution of burdens among the villages, and these injustices were multiplied in the assessing of individuals inside a village, a process with which the European government did not concern itself at all. The tax, being unjust, was also inefficient, for individuals and villages used the strength that should have borne taxes to shift the burden on the weaker members of the society; these might be overtaxed and still give the government but slight returns. The only justification of such a system was its practicability. The European officials were few; by this system they made the natives do much of

¹ See the description by a resident, quoted in a letter of Merkus, 1844, S. van Deventer, LS., 3 : 205.

their work. They were ignorant of actual conditions, and they found in this system something that would work in the dark.

The faults of the land-tax became more prominent as the culture system disappeared, and they called forth an elaborate reform measure which became law in 1872. The new law did not attempt to introduce individual instead of village settlement, but it did aim to establish certain general principles on which the tax should be assessed. Lands were to be classified and taxed according to the yield, and the normal tax was to be one-fifth of the gross product. The law has been severely criticised for making the gross instead of the net product the basis of assessment,¹ but there is little need to discuss this or other of its details. Like so many other reform measures, this law was passed before the government had the knowledge and resources necessary to insure its execution, and has remained in most points a dead letter. It proved impossible to classify the fields satisfactorily even once, and utterly out of the question to renew the classification every five years, as the law intended; and the old assessment, settled by higgling, continued still to be the basis of taxation.

To this day the character of the land-tax has not changed materially in its operations over the greater part of Java. The government sent an agent to study the methods of taxation in British India in 1878 and ordered an investigation in Java the following year; following these investigations came a project of law which would have retained the *admodatie stelsel* to a certain extent, but

¹ See K. W. van Gorkom, "De landrente op Java en Madoera," *De Gids*, 1879, 2: 402; Wessels, "De landrente op Java," *De Econ.*, 1889, 84.

would have modified it by imposing a small fixed tax on the land of the natives in addition to the variable payment.¹ The government would not accept even this modification. Taught by experience, it has clung to the old tax, tending in recent years to fix with some permanence even the amount of the assessment.²

A recent writer makes the land-tax the chief blot on the government of Java,³ and of course it is open to serious criticism from the European standpoint. In principle it is bad. In practice, however, it has undergone great changes in the last twenty years. While the population has grown with astonishing rapidity in that period, the government has allowed the sum of the tax to remain almost unchanged. It has strengthened the personnel of the administration in quantity and in quality, and has corrected many faults in the local operation of the tax.⁴ Such abuses as are inherent in the principles of the tax have been minimized, and can be borne until the government can carry out the general reform which is now in process of preparation.

¹ See a criticism of this project of J. H. F. Sollewijn Gelpke by L. Wessels, in *Ind. Gids*, 1887, 2 : 1839-1868 ; 1888, 1 : 11-24. Other projects are set forth in detail, *ib.*, 1889, 1 : 153 ff.; 1891, 1 : 979 ff. Some slight experiments were made on other lines, following the proposals of P. H. van der Kemp.

² See for details of this tendency to permanence of settlement Kol. Verslag, 1898, i. 2, 63 ; *Encyc. NI.*, 2 : 357.

³ L. Wessels, "De landrente in verband met het kadaster op Java," *Ind. Gids*, 1890, 1 : 91. One feels in reading this and other articles by Wessels (cf. *De Econ.*, 1889, 82-99), that the author is too theoretical, and is giving counsel of perfection, not for practice.

⁴ An example of the change in spirit in the administration of the tax is given in a table by J. E. Meyboom, "Bezuinigen," *Ind. Gids*, 1899, 2 : 1202 ; this table gives the exemptions from taxation for failure of crops in the period 1878-1897, and shows a great increase in the second decade.

The great condition for a general reform is an accurate knowledge of the economic status of the individual natives; especially necessary is a record of the tenure and productivity of land such as is given by cadastral surveys. The Dutch government, after a long series of attempts and failures, has realized that it is incompetent to undertake the work of making a cadaster for all of Java at once. It has begun one, however, in one of the local divisions, and has founded on it a reform of the land-tax which embodies the ideals of the most progressive officials. In a considerable part of the residency Preanger regencies the land-tax is now imposed on individuals, not on village groups, and is calculated not on the gross produce but on an approximation to the net produce of the land.¹ An extra number of officials has been set at work in this district to carry out the necessary investigations and surveys, and the results have been so satisfactory that the change can now be regarded as assured, and will undoubtedly be extended in time to other parts of the island.

¹ See the text of the law of 1896, and an appreciation and criticism of it by Wessels, in *De Economist*, April, 1897, 291-316. A summary of it and of earlier legislation will be found in *Encyc. Nl.*, 2: 358 ff.

CHAPTER XII

THE MODERN GOVERNMENT AND PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION

PRECEDING chapters have been occupied with a description of Dutch policy in the recent period; the aim of these chapters has been to show the objects and results of legislation and administration. The aim of this concluding chapter will be the description of the mechanism of government, by which the policy has been made effective. It will be necessary to show how the powers of legislation are distributed, and what arrangements are made for applying the general rules of the legislators by administrative officials.

The organization of the Dutch Indian government is determined by a great number of laws, which seek to regulate its workings down to the small details with legal nicety. Even a summary of these laws, in the form of a handbook for students, occupies more space than this whole book. It will be necessary, therefore, if the ground is to be covered in one chapter, to omit all but the most essential facts, and to sacrifice exactness to the purposes of a general sketch.

The government of Dutch India may be divided into three parts, each part with peculiar functions corresponding to its distinct geographical position. The home government at The Hague is concerned especially with

legislation. The central colonial government at Batavia combines the functions of legislation and administration; it receives the general rules which have been formulated in the Netherlands, elaborates them, and transmits them to the places where they are to be carried into practical effect. The officials of the provincial and local administration, finally, scattered throughout the Malay Archipelago, make realities of the rules by applying them to the concrete questions with which they are confronted.

The power of legislation was, in the early part of the nineteenth century, conceded almost without restriction to the Governor General. Some part of that power is still retained by him, but most of it has passed to the government at home, where it is exercised by two distinct authorities, the Dutch legislature (the two Chambers and the king) and the king alone, acting through his minister. At one time the king was the only source of colonial legislation in the Netherlands, and in spite of the great gain in power by the States General in the latter half of the century, the king's minister is still the most influential organ of colonial government. The minister owes, of course, a parliamentary responsibility to the Chambers for anything that is done or left undone in the colonies. In ordinary times, however, the Chambers seem to make but slight use of this opportunity to control the course of colonial policy. The Chambers exercise a more direct influence in certain matters of legislation expressly reserved for their consideration. Most of the important laws, however, are established by the mere fiat of the minister of the colonies, and with every allowance for checks upon his action he must be regarded as the most important source of colonial policy. Aside from

his power of legislation he appoints the colonial officials and has other executive functions.

Some obvious objections to this system of colonial legislation, by which laws are framed in a country so far distant from that in which they are to be applied, will be touched on later, in describing the position of the Governor General. Reference need here be made only to the evil of vesting the legislative power in a single man, who may lose his position at any time by the changes in political conditions at home, and who, in fact, holds office ordinarily but a few years or even months.¹ The frequent changes of the individual who serves as minister of the colonies are thought to detract from the consistency of colonial policy, and proposals have been made to surround the minister by an advisory council, which would still leave him the right of decision, but which would by its influence over him secure more stability and continuity of development.²

Account was given in a previous chapter of the way in which the States General secured a share in colonial legislation. The constitution of 1848, which gave to the

¹ The list of ministers of the colonies, in *Regeeringsalmanak*, 1899, 1: 574*, gives thirty-six names (counting repetitions in different times) for the period of fifty-six years, 1842-1897, and fourteen names for the twenty-one years, 1877-1897. In exceptional cases a minister has kept his place for three or four years in recent times.

² The project, as defended by a distinguished authority on colonial affairs, would make the councillors honorary officials, with small salaries, chosen not only for their special knowledge of Dutch India, but also for their general attainments. See P. A. van der Lith, "Decentralisatie in Nederlandsch Indie," *TNI.*, 1889, 18: 1: 129. See also Heldring, *De Gids*, 1872, 2: 256, and "Een woord over koloniaal beheer," *De Economist*, 1872, 2: 1158. I do not know that the project has ever been presented in the form of a law.

Dutch legislature the power to establish the *Regeerings-Reglement*, or colonial constitution, reserved to it the settlement of a few specific questions, and gave it further a vague right to pass laws for the colonies as the need might appear. The right last named has been of slight importance.¹ In pursuance of a clause of the colonial constitution the Dutch legislature has fixed the import and export tariffs of the colonies, and it has amended that constitution by several laws, of which two had considerable significance.² Only in one way, however, has the Dutch legislature exerted a constant and serious influence in the course of colonial affairs; the constitution of 1848 reserved to it the regulation of the colonial finances, and since 1867 it has passed upon the colonial budget annually.

While there can be no question that the interest shown by the Dutch legislature in colonial affairs in the decade from 1860 to 1870 was of benefit to Java, there is serious doubt whether Java and the other colonies gain by having their fiscal affairs brought before the Dutch parliament every year, to be discussed and settled in detail. As early as 1872 it was asserted that the liberal programme, renaissance of India through the Dutch parliament, had failed because the parliament was unfit for the task in its lack of knowledge and interest and in the inefficiency of its control.³ Against one author who maintains that the intermixture of the home legislature in colonial affairs is

¹ See the list of laws passed under it, De Louter, 160. Counting as one law a series of agreements with commercial and transportation companies the number is but six, and none of the laws has any great significance, except possibly the one abolishing slavery.

² The agrarian law and the law regulating the government sugar culture, both passed in 1870.

³ Heldring, "Ons Bestuur," De Gids, 1872, 2: 244.

a benefit to Java,¹ may be put many who regard the present dependence of Java on the legislature as an evil. Members of the Dutch Chambers are elected for their views on domestic questions, — religion, education, fiscal and social policy, — without regard to their knowledge of colonial affairs. The number of colonial specialists in parliament has decreased, and most of the present members show little interest in colonial affairs; the annual debate on the budget leads only to speech-making, which is useless when it is not harmful, and invites interference from ignorant men which is likely to be mischievous.² The necessity of presenting the budget to the States General forces the Indian officials to prepare their estimates long before they are to go into effect, without knowledge of the changes that will be made in the intervening period by the government in the Netherlands. The strict centralization of the Dutch Indian government brings into the budget items of purely local interest, and matters of urgent local importance are made dependent on the whims or prejudices of Dutch legislators.³

¹ Kock, "Twee stelsels," *De Gids*, 1888, 2: 471, asserts that Dutch India is better off than British India because the Dutch parliament plays a more direct part in colonial affairs than the British.

² Cf. J. P. Th. van Nunen, "Jets over den toestand der Indische financiën," *Ind. Gids*, 1897, 1: 338; "De Indische begrooting voor 1897 in de Eerste Kamer," *TNI.*, 1897, 2d new series, 1: 157 ff.; S[andick] in *Ind. Gids*, 1899, 1: 385. Van Kesteren, "De tegenwoordige verhouding tusschen Gouverneur-Generaal en opperbestuur," *Ind. Gids*, 1879, 2: 38, quotes an Indian official who, when asked what he thought of the freedom of the press, said he thought it was not dangerous as long as the press did not print what was said about India in the Dutch Chambers.

³ Cf. Kesteren, *Ind. Gids*, 1879, 2: 46; Huijser, "Decentralisatie," *Ind. Gids*, 1888, 2: 1842; Van der Lith, "Decentralisatie," *TNI.*, 1889, 18: 1: 134 ff. For a more detailed description of the method of making the budget, see *Pub. Am. Ec. Ass.*, August, 1900, 483.

The most reasonable plan for doing away with the present evils is one, to be described later, for the establishment of local governments in Dutch India, with budgets of their own. Proposals have been made, also, to remedy the difficulty by giving more of a colonial character to the Dutch parliament. These proposals have taken several different shapes: the establishment of a special "imperial" parliament, or the introduction of representatives from the colonies into the present Dutch Chambers for participation in all or in purely colonial questions. In no shape, however, have the proposals been free from serious objections, both theoretical and practical, and there seems little chance that any of them will ever be realized.¹

Passing to the Dutch government in India, and taking up first the centre of that government at Batavia, the most striking characteristic is the immense concentration of power in the Governor General, who in his sole person represents the royal authority, and who is responsible for the conduct of all affairs. Both in legislation and in administration he is without rival and with few checks in India; the only serious limitation on his power is that imposed by the government in the Netherlands.

The restriction on his freedom of action comes not from the colonial constitution of 1854, which vests in him all surplus of authority not exercised by the organs of the home government, but from the growing tendency of the home government to eat up this surplus and assume new functions to itself. The establishment of regular com-

¹ See for a criticism of these projects Heldring, *De Gids*, 1872, 2: 244 ff.; J. G. Schot, "Eenige Nederlandsch-Indische belangen," *Ind. Gids*, 1890, 2: 1629; Lith, *TNI.*, 1889, 18: 1: 118 ff.

munication, by steam navigation and by the telegraphic cable, has bound the Indian government to the Dutch more closely than any written instructions or special officials such as the old Commissioners General could do, while the restless inquisitiveness of the States General has led to the bond being drawn constantly tighter. Outside the sphere assumed by the Dutch legislature and the minister of the colonies the Governor General may still make general laws; in cases of exceptional urgency he may even suspend the laws of his superiors for a time. These rights have, however, but little meaning now that the home government can send despatches and receive answers in a few hours. The Governor General has still a most important position in India, and his advice is certain to be of influence in determining Dutch policy, but he has lost, apparently forever, the right to choose his own course in the serious questions of government.¹

Beside the Governor General stands a council composed of five members; to insure its independence the members are appointed by the home government, and may hold no other salaried office. This council is designed to assist the Governor General in the function of legislation, and he is bound to lay before it all projects of laws. In case the

¹ As far back as 1879 a Dutch writer complained that if the Governor General wanted the police to carry sidearms, he had first to ask permission from The Hague! See Van Kesteren, "Tegenwoordige verhouding," *Ind. Gids*, 1879, 2: 56. The same writer asserted that the serious war with Atjeh was brought on by the minister of the colonies; the Governor General simply followed the instructions sent him, *ib.*, p. 65. De Louter notes this growing dependence of the Indian government, and quotes the advice given by a former Governor General to the minister of the colonies, in a speech in the First Chamber in 1894: "Do not write too many letters to the Governor General, and do not let those from the Governor General lie waiting too long on your desk," *Handleiding*, 165.

majority of the council is opposed to a project he may still, however, enforce it as law until a decision has been received from the government in the Netherlands.¹

In a few exceptional cases the Governor General is obliged in administrative matters to gain the consent of the Council for his action; in other cases he is obliged to seek its advice. In general, however, he is perfectly independent in administration, and is the only responsible official in that branch of government, as he is in legislation. The administration is divided, for the more efficient conduct of business, into five departments,² but the heads of these departments lack the independence and the peculiar responsibility of the ministers in a parliamentary government. They are ordinary officials, who are appointed by the Governor General and are directly subordinate to him. Though they necessarily have many dealings with the heads of the provincial government, the latter are responsible, not to them, but to the Governor General, in whom everything centres.

Without going further into the details of organization it will be apparent that the Governor General has imposed upon him a mass of duties which one man can scarcely oversee. Peculiar importance attaches, therefore, to the General Secretariat, the clerical force which has grown up about the person of the chief ruler to assist him in fulfilling his many obligations. The Secretariat conducts the

¹ Since the institution of the Council, in 1854, there have been only three cases in which it failed to reach an agreement with the Governor General. In two of these cases the Governor General carried the law into execution, and had his action confirmed by the minister. The Council has the right of initiative, but makes little or no use of it. See De Louter, 178 ff.

² Adding the central government, the army, and the navy, we have the eight divisions of the budget of expenditures.

correspondence and edits the orders of the central government in India. This institution occupies in form a humble place, but in fact plays an important part in government; its members are not mere mechanical links between the Governor General and his various officials, but are independent agents, giving not only form but substance to the expressions of the government's will.

In this summary sketch of the Dutch Indian government I have reached finally the last of the parts into which, for convenience of description, I divided it — the provincial administration. As it is idle to argue about the relative importance of the head and the members in the human body, so it is impossible to say that one part of a government is more necessary than another. This, however, may at least be said with confidence, that the provincial administration in Java is that part of the government which in its development has imposed the greatest difficulties and demanded the greatest pains. The Dutch employed in the central government, whether at The Hague or in Batavia, do work that is typically European. The arithmetic of their politics does not differ greatly from that which they would employ in the Netherlands.

Only in the provinces do the Dutch face fully the problem of their government in the East: the control of a great social and political organization, instinct with a vitality of its own, and working in ways which have passed out of the memory of Europe for centuries. The provincial officials bind together different ages of the world's history. If they would succeed in their task, they must remain European and yet become native. Only they can interpret the two peoples, Dutch and Javanese, to each other; transform the petty native problems into

terms intelligible to European legislators; and, again, transform European laws for practical application to native conditions.

The system of provincial administration appears in the following table, which gives the various titles (those of native officials in italics), and which marks by the number and salary the relative importance and place in the hierarchy: ¹—

TITLE	NUMBER	SALARY
Resident	22	fl. 15,000
Assistant Resident	78	7,200
Controleur	165	
First class 47		4,800
Second class 68		3,600
Aspirant 50		2,700
<i>Regent</i>	72	12,000
<i>District Heads</i>	434	2,500
<i>Under District Heads</i>	1,033	
First class 357		1,200
Second class 676		780

The resident represents the authority of the Governor General in the province of his activities, an area roughly comparable to that of a county in one of the northeastern

¹ I have compiled these figures for the administration in Java from the estimates of expenditures, "Begrooting van Nederlandsch-Indie voor het dienstjaar 1900," Afdeling IV. As salaries vary sometimes for officials of the same title, the figures for salaries must be regarded merely as illustrations, not far from the average. Some residents, for instance, get fl. 12,000 and some fl. 18,000; district heads get fl. 2400 or fl. 2700.

I have found two articles especially useful for the following description of the provincial administration: "Over het binnenlandsch bestuur op Java en Madoera," *Ind. Gids*, 1897, 1: 743-791; and C. J. Hasselman, "Lotsverbetering voor de ambtenaren bij het binneulandsch bestuur in Nederlandsch-Indie," *ib.*, 1898, 2: 1158-1200.

States of America. A French author finds only one official, the French prefect, comparable to him in the multiplicity of his duties.¹ He combines administrative, minor legislative, judicial, and fiscal functions, and has still in some cases political or diplomatic responsibilities. He is under certain specific obligations: to protect the natives from all oppression, to maintain peace, to further agriculture and education, to guard religion, and to extend the amount known of his residency; but a complete catalogue of his activities would run to an indefinite length.

Though the number of residents has greatly increased in the course of the nineteenth century, each has still, on the average, about a million people subject to him, and it would evidently be impossible for him to fulfil his duties to them in any detail. He has helpers, therefore, the assistant residents, who exercise all his functions except that of legislation, and who relieve him of the administrative work in the subdivisions of the residency. These subdivisions correspond generally with the regencies, and the assistant residents have come to be the regular agents for dealing with the highest native officials, the regents. Assistants are in theory subordinate to the resident, but in practice are forced by the amount of business to act in most cases independently of him.

The last in the series of European officials, the *controleurs*, have been called the "nerves and sinews" of the administration; they are supposed to collect information and to execute commands for their superiors without independent authority. The theory, however, which would make them mere instruments, through whom the residents and their assistants would govern, has not been realized.

¹ Chailley-Bert, *Java*, 178.

Under the conditions of government in the East, authority tends to run down the series of European officials to those who are closest to the natives. The controleurs are in daily touch with the native officials, and this position gives them an authority which no law can take away; they are the most competent to settle the petty local questions which form so important a part of the business of government, and exercise a most important influence on the conduct of affairs.

It is a principle of government, expressly recognized in the colonial constitution, that the natives shall be left, so far as circumstances permit, under the immediate rule of their own heads. Each residency in Java and Madoera consists, as a rule, of one or more regencies, under natives of noble or princely rank, who are made responsible for the conduct of their subjects. The Governor General, who appoints the regents, is bound, so far as possible, to maintain their hereditary succession, and the government seeks to gain from this class of officials the prestige and the experience of the old lines of native rulers.

At one time the regents were all-powerful in the native hierarchy, and they are still of influence as political advisers; they retain the dignity of their former position but they have had to cede much of its practical power to native subordinates, the district heads, in whom lies the "centre of gravity of the administration."¹ These officials, who far outnumber all others in the provincial administration, are appointed with the advice of the regent, and are supposed to receive their orders through him, but the extension of the Dutch organization has brought the

¹ "Zijn er op Java te veel Europeesche ambtenaren van het binnenslandsch bestuur?" by a controleur, *Ind. Gids*, 1895, 2 : 1113.

lower Dutch officials into close contact with the district heads, and made of them agents closely subject to the Dutch administration. With them the series of government officials stops. Below them lie the village groups, which the government seeks to regulate and through which it approaches the individual natives in many cases; village officials, however, receive no salaries from the Dutch, and must still be regarded as belonging to the native organization.

The village officials have still the important function of apportioning the land-tax. Aside from that they exercise but a slight influence on government; they are too weak and ignorant to be much more than tools of the lower native officials. Yet the village governments form the only institution in Java really representing the natives and hence in a position to control the arbitrary course of the Dutch government. Except for them there is no regular channel through which the people can express themselves in politics. The administrative hierarchy pervades every part of the island and covers every function of government, and from top to bottom it runs unbroken. Officials have ear alone for the orders that reach them from their superiors; all face toward one point, the centre of government at Batavia or Buitenzorg or wherever the Governor General may be.

The system of autocratic centralization is a natural product of the history of the Dutch in Java, but it entails obvious disadvantages. It throws on the central government an overwhelming amount of business and encourages the regulation of details by officials in Batavia which might better be left to officials in the country districts.

The evil of centralization appears particularly in the apportionment of expenditures in various localities. All taxes flow to the central treasury, and all payments are distributed thence. The local officials send in their demands, in competition with each other, each asking for more than is really necessary, as the burden of the extra payment will scarcely be felt in the locality in which he is especially interested. The central government cannot weigh the justice of the demands, and cannot place the resources of the country where they are most needed.¹ Many duties of government, of great local importance, are left unfulfilled, because their necessity is not appreciated at Batavia, and the result is dissatisfaction that may grow to an open breach between the government and its subjects.

Something might be done to remedy the overburdening of the central government by a reorganization of the departments of administration.² A more promising plan of reform would attack the bureaucracy more nearly at its centre. A project which was introduced in the States General in 1893, but which was dropped after the fall of the minister who supported it, sought to give vigor to the Council of India by adding to it a number of extraordinary councillors, to be chosen at least in part from individuals in private life.³ Any thoroughgoing reform of the central government would have also to restrict the

¹ See the examples in O. M. de Munninck, "Decentralisatie in Ned.-Indie," *De Gids*, 1897, 4: 135, 138. A useless iron bridge is built in one place while the city of Soerabaya is kept waiting for a quarter of a century for the water supply that is urgently needed.

² See *Ind. Gids*, 1894, 1: 689 ff.; and *ib.*, 1897, 1: 459 ff., regarding a separate department of administration for the Outer Possessions.

³ See text and comment in *TNI.*, 1893, 22: 2: 391 ff.; *ib.* 1894, 23: 1: 30 ff. The idea of a more efficient legislative council is an old one; see *De Gids*, 1872, 2: 253; *De Economist*, 1872, 2: 1160.

sphere of the Secretariat, and to provide for more efficient coöperation between the Governor General and the heads of departments of administration, who are now too closely subject to him.

To reach the root of the evil, however, changes in the local as well as in the central government will be necessary. In recent years there has been a growing demand for some means by which the inhabitants of the various localities of Java, especially those living in large cities, might influence the conduct of affairs. There is no thought of granting suffrage and representation to the mass of the natives, who are, by general agreement, entirely unfit to exercise political rights outside their villages. The demands for a more liberal system have come not from them but from European settlers, and in their favor there is likely to be some departure from the present autocratic centralization. To show the tendency of the movement I describe the changes proposed by one of the Dutch authorities on colonial government.

Provincial councils should be established, to be at first merely advisory, leaving the authority still with the resident; they should be composed of European officials, of native officials of the highest rank, and of private individuals, both European and native, designated by the Governor General. The proposed local governments should occupy themselves especially with matters concerning public works, agriculture, and industry, and should be granted about one-third of the present public revenues for their local budgets.¹ Modest as these pro-

¹ De Louter, "Decentr.," *Ind. Gids*, 1888, 2 : 1596 ff. Even in the middle of the century the question of independent municipal institutions

posals seem, it was not until 1893 that attempt was made to prepare the way for their realization, and the necessary amendment to the colonial constitution was not carried at that time.

Not only the theory of autocratic centralization, on which the provincial administration rests, has been criticised; officials of the administration have been charged, even in recent times, with neglect of their duties or perversion of their powers. It is an immensely difficult task to build up an administration of this peculiar kind, that shall work properly even in the absence of a controlling public opinion, and it is a task which the Dutch have not yet fulfilled. Administrative officials are charged not only with indolence and apathy, but also with a direct disregard of instructions, with occasional dishonesty, and with many misdeeds which could not be brought before a criminal court, but which still are harmful and are forbidden. In spite of precautions there have been a number of cases of shortage in the accounts, and officials make improper gains in many ways, receiving presents from their subjects, and misusing their influence in auctions and notarial affairs.² One of the old faults of

was mooted, as can be learned from the article in *TNI.*, 1862, 24: 1: 341 ff. A commission gave an adverse report on it in 1878, printed *Ind. Gids*, 1899, 2: 1309 ff., and since then the subject has been discussed in numerous articles. See for further references *Encyc. NI.*, 1: 429.

² These facts appear in a book, "Macht tegen recht," by M. C. Piepers, formerly advocate general, published at Batavia in 1884. I have not seen the original, but there are full summaries of it in *Ind. Gids*, 1884, 2: 701 ff.; *TNI.*, 1884, 13: 2: 401 ff.; and *De Gids*, 1885, 3: 113 ff. See also Vellema, "Pandjeshuizen," *Ind. Gids*, 1893, 2: 1590, and Hasselman, "Lotsverbetering," *Ind. Gids*, 1898, 2: 1169 ff., with further references.

Piepers wrote his book as a protest against the misuse of judicial functions by the residents. The conflict between the provincial administration and the judiciary has been a serious question in India, and has roused

the provincial officials, the misuse of natives for personal and domestic service, has persisted, and called forth an admonitory circular from the central government in 1895.¹ The keeping of native concubines by unmarried officials is general, and in spite of resulting abuses is openly permitted by the government. The institution is, in fact, so thoroughly established that a man of rank and consideration in the world of Indian officials could publish recently an article in which he discussed the relative advantage to a young official of marrying a European or keeping a native mistress, and reached the conclusion that either course had its good and bad sides, and the choice was about equal between them.²

Faults in the personnel of the European administration appear more serious when one considers how certain they are to be intensified in the native officials, who form so important a part of the government. In spite of the good work that has been done by the schools for native officials, they are still unable to meet the calls upon them, and many natives are appointed, even to the highest positions, without having been through these schools. At best the faults of native character would disappear but slowly, as new intellectual and moral standards grew up in native society, and under present conditions there must be many officials in the government's service who are as

much discussion, but it seems unnecessary to pursue the subject further here.

¹ "Eene nieuwe schrede op den goeden weg?" Ind. Gids, 1895, 2: 1101 ff. Natives under judicial sentence were used for bath and kitchen attendants, gardeners, and stable boys.

² See Adelante, "Concubinaat bij de ambtenaren van het binnenlandsch bestuur in Nederlandsch-Indië," TNI., 2d new series, 1898, 2: 304 ff. See further, Schot, "Ned. Ind. belangen," Ind. Gids, 1890, 2: 1632-1636; "Huwelijken in Indië," Ind. Gids, 1893, 1: 385-390.

ready to take advantage of opportunities for abuse as were their predecessors in the time of the East India Company. The old evils of native government still crop up, as that, for instance, of family rings, which still control the administration of many districts in Java.¹ Native officials show characteristic weaknesses not only as administrators, but also in their functions as advisers to the responsible European officials; they lack independence and seek to comply with the preferences or the prejudices of their Dutch superiors instead of advocating the course which at heart they believe to be the wisest.

Coöperation between Dutch and native officials is the keystone of the government of Java, and when one party to the work is as weak as are necessarily the natives, very rare qualities are needed in the Dutch officials who share with them the government. These officials need to be not alone men of intellectual power, trained in the difficult subjects of social and political organization in the East; they must have the capacity for influencing and elevating men of an inferior civilization, for which sound moral standards are indispensably necessary. A certain school of writers on tropical dependencies emphasize the value of imposing authority and reserve, in the attitude of Europeans to natives; they tend to base government on terrorism.² Granting a certain amount of truth in this, so far as concerns the relations between government and

¹ See "De ontwikkeling van de inlandsche hoofden op Java," *Ind. Gids*, 1892, 1 : 684.

² Cf. Pfeil, "Sudsee," 256. He advocates strictness rather than leniency, reserve rather than any confidential and familiar relation. "Strenge bewirkt Furcht, Gerechtigkeit erzwingt Achtung, oder, soweit dies bei den Farbigen möglich ist, Liebe. Furcht und Liebe sind aber noch stets die besten Erziehungsmittel gewesen und werden es bleiben, aber die Furcht steht voran."

governed, it has certainly less application to relations between the two races when both share the responsibility of government. The Dutch have had sufficient experience with this question to give decided value to their conclusions, and they have tended constantly in their recent history to further close and confidential relations between the European and native officials. To this tendency a recent observer ascribes a large share of their success in government.¹

In this, however, as in other points, the administration is still far from having reached the ideal of perfection. While in some cases extremely happy relations exist between the Dutch officials and their native associates, there is complaint that in all ranks of officials there are examples of a mistaken treatment of the natives by the Dutch. Regents are offended by a disregard of etiquette, and lower officials are ordered about like servants, with scoldings and curses.² It is asserted, apparently with justice, that Europeans overestimate their own knowledge, that they are too vain to acknowledge a dependence on natives, and that they secure much less help from the natives than they could get by approaching them in a different spirit.³

Conservation of energy in the government and administration is of the utmost importance if the Dutch are to accomplish all the tasks which they have taken up in Java, and no means looking to that end appears to promise more than an improvement in the quality of the European officials in the provincial administration. Such an improvement would be reflected in the tone of the native

¹ Chailley-Bert, *Java*, 183.

² "Nota betreffende de verhouding tusschen het Europeesch en het inlandsch bestuur op Java en Madoera, door een regent," *Ind. Gids*, 1889, 2 : 1521 ff.

³ Cf. "Zijn er, enz.," *Ind. Gids*, 1895, 2 : 1114.

officials, and would facilitate that collaboration of the two branches of the administrative service on which so much depends.

To secure the proper training and character in their provincial administration the Dutch have a system of education and selection which has been in trial for many years, and which is still undergoing revision to suit it to its purposes.¹ Another means to the desired end is an improvement in the conditions of pay and promotion which will make the career of the provincial official attractive to first-class men.

The career of an official in the provincial administration was sketched as follows by a recent writer.² He goes to India soon after reaching his majority and is set at work provisionally for two years on a salary of fl. 150 a month. He is then made aspirant-controleur at fl. 225, is advanced after three or four years to the position of controleur of the second class at fl. 300, and after six years more of service reaches the first class with a salary of fl. 400. Six years later he becomes assistant resident at a salary of fl. 600, which may be raised, by periodic increases, again after six years, to fl. 600. The majority of officials

¹ On this topic see Lowell, and for examples of recent criticism by Dutch authorities, A. J. Immink, "De opleiding der Oost-Indische administratieve ambtenaren," *De Gids*, 1899, 2: 157-190; C. J. Hasselman, "De opleiding der Europeesche ambtenaren bij het Binnenlandsche Bestuur in Nederlandsch-Indië," *Ind. Gids*, 1899, 1: 300-328. There seems to be general agreement in India that the present system is not up to the demands or the possibilities, and there is frequent comparison with the English system to the advantage of the latter.

² Hasselman, "Lotsverbetering," *Ind. Gids*, 1898, 2: 1178 ff. The figures of salaries do not include the allowances for travelling expenses, etc., which are said to be about sufficient for the actual needs. It should be noted that a residence is provided gratuitously for officials of the rank of controleur and above.

in the provincial administration reach no higher rank than this ; about one-third of the officials become full residents, after nearly thirty years of service, and enjoy a salary of fl.1250 a month. Regulations provide that an official who has served twenty years, and has reached the age of forty-five, may retire on a pension which amounts to one-quarter of the highest salary which he has received.¹

While the salaries of officials in the highest positions in Dutch India are very generous, these sums cited are certainly not commensurate with the importance of the work that is done by members of the provincial administration or with the demands upon their qualities as individuals. The government may plead the fact that it is compelled by the exigencies of tropical service often to maintain several dependents for the same office — perhaps one aspirant learning the duties, one in active service, one on leave and one pensioned. The fact remains that the average official in the provincial administration cannot meet the demands of his life in India and live up to his position afterwards in the Netherlands on the pay which the government gives him. The position of officials has grown steadily worse in the last twenty years, measuring the needs by the means given to meet them, and is much worse in Dutch India than in British India.²

¹ For details of the regulations concerning salary, leave, and pensions the reader is referred to De Louter, 240 ff., or to Encyc. NL., 1 : 27 ff., article "Ambtenaar."

² See for points cited in the text and for further details Van K[esteren ?], "Moet de positie der Indische ambtenaren verbeterd worden?" Ind. Gids, 1884, 2 : 219 ff. ; "Engelsch-Indische bestuursambtenaren en Nederlandsch-Indische Collega's," *ib.*, 1893, 2 : 1905 ff. ; Van S[andick ?], "Grieven en wenschen van ambtenaren bij het binnenlandsch bestuur," *ib.*, 1898, 1 : 401 ff. ; J. P. Th. van Nunen, "Jets over de bezoldigingen en pensioenen der burgerlijke ambtenaren in Indie," *ib.*, 1896, 2 : 1675 ff.

The discontent among officials in the provincial administration rises not only from the small salaries attached to all positions except the highest, but also from the slowness of promotion. The *controleur* is described as leading a dog's life. He is overburdened with duties, is made responsible for everything that goes wrong, and is attacked from all sides. Dutch planters charge him with lack of zeal in furthering their enterprises, while the regent and native heads assert that he is unduly harsh to the people, and the resident complains of his weakness in not reconciling the different parties. The position of the assistant resident is little better: he does the work of his superior without having his pay or his position. Yet most members of the provincial administration spend their lives in these lower positions. They find themselves at every stage worse off than their associates in the judicial department, or in the technical branches of administration—public works, forestry, and education. They see themselves passed by all. While they are plodding along in the hope of securing ultimately a competence, they see contemporaries, who began their career at Batavia in one of the departments or in the General Secretariat, and who thus became known to the members of the central government, given the great prizes of office.

It is asserted, moreover, that nepotism and favoritism still play a part in the promotion of officials.¹ Men who are proverbially indolent and incompetent are retained in the service and are advanced in rank, whether it be through personal influence or from a dislike to break their careers. The tolerance of poor officials must be

¹ "Eng. Ind. bestuur," *Ind. Gids*, 1893, 2: 1917 ff.

far from exceptional, for it has gained for itself a name, "sympathy-system" (*Kassian-stelsel*).

The conditions of service in the provincial administration have formed a grievance so long that they have been forced on the attention of the central government and of the Dutch legislature; minor reforms have been effected and changes reaching further are likely to follow. It seems generally admitted that the position of the controleur should be improved to accord with the importance of his functions, and that the office of assistant resident should be modified so that it can fairly be made the goal in the career of most of the provincial officials. One project would abolish the residencies entirely, and raise to their place the smaller administrative divisions among which the serious work of government has been divided.¹

After this description of the organization and workings of the Dutch government in Java, the reader might expect a summary appreciation of its efficiency. I have offered material for such an appreciation in the chapters describing the recent policy in various lines, but hesitate to generalize for lack of personal observation and of the comparative studies on which a general judgment should be founded. It is possible to learn from Dutch Indian literature what the Dutch have tried to do, in what measure they have succeeded, and, to some extent, what have been the causes of their failures. It is difficult to say what would have been the result if they had followed a different course from that which they have pursued, and it is impossible for me to say how much better or worse another people (the English, for example) would have

¹ "Over het binnenlandsch bestuur," *Ind. Gids*, 1897, 1 : 753, 764 ff.

done in their place. With all the points of likeness that invite comparison between Dutch and British India there are differences so great that the comparison should be attempted only by those who are thoroughly at home in both fields of government, and who are willing to undertake elaborate investigations on which to base their conclusions.

INDEX

- Adat*, native custom, 120.
Admodatie-stelsel, higgling in land-tax, 405.
 Ageng, native monarch, 16.
 Amangkoe-Rat, native monarch, 16.
 Amboyna massacre, 54.
 American commercial competition, 190, 238.
Amptgeld, tax on salaries, 103.
 Atjeh, 384.

 Bantam, 44 ff.
 Batavia founded, 43.
 Baud, J. C., 247, 276, 288, 292.
Bekel, village official, 32.
Blandong districts, 189.
 Bosch, J. van den, 246 ff., 318, 321.
Bouw, 1.7 acres, 282.
 British India, 2, 338, 373, 431.
 Bus de Ghisignies, Du, 236.

 Camphuis, J., 99.
 Capellen, Baron van den, 223 ff., 233 ff.
 Chinese, 183, 201, 360.
 Coen, J. P., 46, 56, 90, 99.
 Coffee, 66, 118, 158, 214, 227 ff., 263 ff., 387, 394 ff.
 Colonization, 56.
 Commerce, 39, 61, 160, 190, 237, 278, 353, 380.
Comptabiliteitswet, 383.
 Consignment system, 278.
 Contingent, 63, 115, 143.
 Controleur, 419, 430.
 Council, 92, 145, 415.
 Credit bondage, 348.

 Daendels, H. W., 148 ff.
 Dam, P. van, 106.
 Dekker, E. D., 301, 330, 382.
 Diemen, Anthony van, 90, 99.
 Dipa Negara, 244.
 Director General, 94, 151.

 District heads, 220, 304, 420.
 Djokjokarta, 155, 171, 188, 196, 235, 244, 376.

 Education, 121, 289, 389.
 Elout, C. P. J., 223.
 English competition, 53, 76, 237 ff.

 Famine, 25, 315.
 Fl., florin, *see* Gulden.
 Forced delivery, 63, 248.

 Governor General, 42, 91, 145, 414.
 Gulden, about \$.40, 62.

Heerendiensten, 270.
 Hindu period, 7.
 Hoëvell, W. R. van, 326.
 Hogendorp, Dirk van, 104, 134, 170.
 Hogendorp, G. K. van, 133.

 Imhoff, Baron van, 59.
 Indigo, 64, 264 ff., 335.

 Janssens, J. W., 162, 165.
 Judicial organization, 153, 195.

Kassian-stelsel, 431.

 Labor, forced, 15, 31, 159, 198, 284, 398 ff.
 Land, leases, 231 ff., 274, 371 ff.
 Land, sales, 192, 367, 372.
 Land-tax, 173, 191, 206, 224, 248, 280, 404.
 Land tenure, native, 28, 303, 366 ff.

 Madjapahit, 9.
 Mataram, 11, 196.
 Merkus, Pieter, 202, 226, 283.
 Mexico, labor system, 350.
 Military organization, Dutch, 50, 80, 107, 165.

- Military organization, native, 12, 50.
 Minto, Lord, 167.
 Mohammedan conquest, 9.
 Money, J. W. B., 251.
 Mossel, Jacob, 59.
 Muntinghe, H. W., 129 ff., 199, 204 ff.
- Nederburgh, S. C., 141.
 Net-profit system, 383.
- Officials, *see also* Resident, Controleur,
 Regent, District heads.
 Officials, character, 96, 150, 216, 294,
 424.
 Officials, salaries, 95, 146, 152, 293, 428.
 Officials, training and appointment,
 97, 146, 216, 294, 428.
- Paal*, twenty minutes' walk, 271.
 Pangeran, under-king, 11.
Pantjen services, 398, 400.
 Particular lands, 259, 367.
 Particular trade, 102.
Pateh, native minister, 14.
Penatoes, native officials, 283.
Petinggi, village head, 29.
 Philippines, 337.
Pikol, 133 pounds, 230.
 Piracy, 22.
- Poel, Van der, 306.
 Population, 2, 125, 312, 380.
 Portuguese competition, 53.
 Preanger Regencies, 189, 212, 234, 408.
 Putte, F. van de, 334.
- Raffles, T. S., 168, 231, 245.
Regeerings Reglement, 327.
 Regent, 110, 155, 196, 218, 297, 420.
 Resident, 112, 194, 218, 418.
 Roads, 24, 160, 271, 284.
 Rochussen, J. J., 329.
- Sawah*, irrigated rice land, 34, 175.
Soenan, emperor of Mataram, 20.
 Soerakarta, 155, 188, 196, 235, 376.
 Staple, 42, 44, 60.
 Sugar, 69, 78, 261 ff., 392 ff.
- Tagal*, dry rice land, 175.
 Taxes, 79, 402. *See* Land-tax.
 Thorbecke, 334.
 Trading Company, 241, 277.
- Ustariz, 87.
- Village government, 29, 220, 304, 421.
- Wilde, De, 234.

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
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