


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Cambridge Historical Series

EDITED BY G. W. PROTHERO, LITT.D.

HONORARY FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

ITALY

FROM 1494 TO 1790

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ITALY

FROM 1494 TO 1790

BY

MRS H. M. VERNON

(K. DOROTHEA EWART)

Author of *Cosimo de' Medici* in the
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GENERAL PREFACE

The aim of this series is to sketch the history of Modern Europe, with that of its chief colonies and conquests, from about the end of the fifteenth century down to the present time. In one or two cases the story commences at an earlier date: in the case of the colonies it generally begins later. The histories of the different countries are described, as a rule, separately; for it is believed that, except in epochs like that of the French Revolution and Napoleon I, the connection of events will thus be better understood and the continuity of historical development more clearly displayed.

The series is intended for the use of all persons anxious to understand the nature of existing political conditions. "The roots of the present lie deep in the past"; and the real significance of contemporary events cannot be grasped unless the historical causes which have led to them are known. The plan adopted makes it possible to treat the history of the last four centuries in considerable detail, and to embody the most important results of modern research. It is hoped therefore that the series will be useful not only to beginners but to students who have already acquired some general knowledge of European History. For those who wish to carry their studies further, the bibliography appended to each volume will act as a guide to original sources of information and works more detailed and authoritative.

Considerable attention is paid to political geography, and each volume is furnished with such maps and plans as may be requisite for the illustration of the text.

G. W. PROTHERO.

PREFACE

THE history of Italy in the period here treated divides itself naturally into two parts, 1494-1559 and 1559-1790. In the former, Italy for a brief space became the focussing point of European History; whereas in the latter she sank into obscurity, and her affairs were so much in the background, except for a few short intervals between 1690-1748, that in general histories they receive little notice. Therefore, since the events of the earlier years are fully described in numerous accessible works, I have thought it better to deal with them briefly, in spite of their importance, treating them rather as an introduction to the neglected period, about which it is difficult for the ordinary reader to obtain information.

I wish to express my most grateful thanks to Dr G. W. Prothero, the Editor of the Series, for valuable advice concerning the scope and arrangement of this book, and to Mr E. Armstrong, of Queen's College, Oxford, for his great care and kindness in revising the proofs.

K. DOROTHEA VERNON.

December 1908.

EDITORIAL NOTE

WHEN this volume was ready for printing, circumstances rendered it impossible for me to follow the practice which I have adopted in regard to all other volumes of the series, and, in conjunction with the author, to revise the proofs as they passed through the press. I count myself very fortunate in having been able, in this emergency, to obtain the assistance of Mr Edward Armstrong, whose mastery of Italian, as well as of other branches of history, is well known. For his kindness in discharging my editorial duties in this connexion I tender him my hearty thanks.

G. W. PROTHERO.

December 1908.

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CORRIGENDA.

For Emmanuele throughout read Emanuele.

Page 316, line 20. *For Vittorio Amedeo I read Carlo Emanuele I.*

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION—THE ITALIAN STATES IN 1494.

THE extraordinary change which revolutionised the character of Italian life and history in the course of the sixteenth century is not a phenomenon which can easily be referred to the ordinary course of national evolution, but requires a much wider and more elaborate explanation. Italy had once been the centre of European affairs; all that was most striking and vital in history was a part of her history; and though, since the thirteenth century, the gradual growth of independent nations had removed the centre of interest from Italy, which did not follow the general tendency, yet the remarkable activity and intensity of her social and political life seemed to increase rather than diminish, to reach indeed a culminating point towards the end of the fifteenth century. How was it then that a people so intellectual, vivacious, individual, so instinct with character and with genius, immediately collapsed before the attack of foreigners at a far lower stage of civilisation, and fell into a degradation, a "death in life," so complete as that which enveloped it when the following century had but half run its course? The fact was that the extreme complexity of Italian life, its exuberant florescence, its almost extravagant energy, gave an appearance of strength which was absolutely illusory. There was a weakness

hidden at the root, a want of moral and physical stamina in the nation, which was in reality due to exhaustion. It had lived too hard, using up all its resources, and had no reserve of force to fall back upon when the strain came. Degeneration set in with a rapidity which has no parallel in national history. Men who had seen Florence at the height of her prosperity in Lorenzo de' Medici's lifetime, and had shared in the tolerant philosophical speculation and the free and brilliant life of his circle, lived to see the city starved out by a non-descript rabble which called itself an Imperial army, and knew what it was to fear the Inquisition and the spies of the Grand Duke Cosimo.

Most fatal of all her shortcomings was the national tendency to disintegration, which rendered Italy helpless before the new nations of the sixteenth century. France, England and Spain had severed themselves from the cosmopolitanism of the Middle Ages, and at the same time were uniting the scattered elements of feudal life into a national system under a national head. Even in Germany, where the divergences were still profound, the precedence of the Austrian House gave a semblance of unity which was not wholly delusive. But in Italy such cohesion seemed impossible. In the fourteenth century there had been prospects of it, as for example under the Houses of Neapolitan Angevins and Milanese Visconti, but in the fifteenth a balance was established between the States, which rendered it impossible for any one of them to become master of the others. The practical disappearance of the feudal system, which gave at least a nominal coherence to society, the vague acknowledgment of an Imperial overlordship which helped to preclude any other, the violent local jealousies which to this day prevent the real unity of Italy, the extraordinarily divergent types of character, to a great extent due to divergence of origin, all tended to keep Italy a group of independent States; yet these difficulties would not have been insuperable had it not been for the existence in the midst of

Italy of the Papacy, which could not absorb and would not be absorbed. Indeed Machiavelli went to the root of the matter when he declared that it was the Papacy which had always kept Italy divided and still continued to do so.

The Papacy acted amongst the Italian States as one of themselves, taking part in their petty politics, and striving by intrigue or small conquests to add to its share of territory. It had neither the material resources nor the continuity of policy necessary for the subjugation of the rest, yet against it the wave of conquest beat in vain. Even if the conqueror were so devoid of the religious scruples of his day as seriously to intend to destroy the Temporal Power in his own favour, it would have been impossible for him in the long run to act against the public opinion of Europe, which was certain to take the form of armed intervention for the rescue of the Holy See. The Papacy had always found a friend in need, a Charlemagne against the Lombards, a Charles of Anjou against the Hohenstaufen. What neither Lombard nor Hohenstaufen could do, what Charles V with his vast power shrank from doing, and what no later potentate until Napoleon dared to do, could hardly be accomplished by one amongst a mutually jealous group of little princes and republics. Nor indeed, though greedy States might scheme to swallow their neighbours, was there any general idea amongst the higher class of minds, from the time of Dante to that of Machiavelli, that any such union was necessary, or even desirable. To them the idea of liberty was curiously perverted; it meant, to be the citizen of a town which, either corporately or in the person of its prince, ruled others; and not to be citizen of such a town meant slavery. It mattered little if the prince were a tyrant and ruled atrociously; it was far better, if one were a Milanese, to be governed by the worst of the native Visconti, than to fall under the beneficent, but "foreign" rule of Venice.

Nor were the Italians disunited only at home; they were equally so in the face of transalpine interference. There

seemed to be no corporate sense uniting Italian to Italian against Frenchman or German, but rather a tendency, for which the Papacy had set the example, to call in extraneous aid in local wars. Throughout the fifteenth century, France was almost a sixth power in the Italian system, especially when for two several periods Genoa was actually a French Protectorate. The position of France on the Italian frontier, and the diplomatic genius of Louis XI, who in this respect was more Italian than the Italians, partly accounted for this; but it was still more due to the French dynastic claims upon two Italian States. The House of Anjou had by will devolved to the Royal House of France its old claim to the Kingdom of Naples; and the House of Orleans considered itself the legitimate successor of the Visconti in the Duchy of Milan. Hence the other Italian States could hold these claims as threats over the heads of the *de facto* rulers, the House of Aragon in Naples, the Sforza in Milan. Each State in turn, except Naples, had deliberately invited French intervention, and on one occasion a French army had actually taken part in an Italian war. Florence, which had an old and sincere attachment to France, cemented by their close commercial relations, could always count upon her as an ally; but the great Medici learned the danger of the invasion of Italy by a powerful military State, and were clever enough to keep France at arm's length while not forfeiting her friendship. But when in 1492 Lorenzo de' Medici died, there was no wise head left to take his place as leader in Italian politics, and mutual jealousies were certain soon to lead to an appeal to France. At the same time the French King, Charles VIII, was young, restless, full of dreams of chivalric enterprise, of distant conquests, even of Crusades. With this spirit the French nobles were completely in sympathy; their pugnacity, repressed at home under the monarchy, had to find vent abroad; a young, lusty and united nation was ready to pounce upon the rich spoils of Italy, and in Italy there was neither strength nor unity to resist it.

In order to understand the subsequent history it is necessary to form an idea of the different States which composed Italy, and of their characters and politics. This idea can only be obtained with the aid of a careful study of the map. It will be observed how much the possibilities of foreign invasion depended on the attitude of the States which held the Italian side of the mountain passes, through which access could be obtained to the country. And again it should be noticed how the mountain system of Italy itself divides the country, and how that to advance from north to south it is necessary to pass through a long tract of hilly and broken country, with torrential rivers, stretching along the east coast through Romagna, the March and the Abruzzi, or to cross the Apennines into Genoa, Tuscany or Umbria. And, since Umbria is also hilly and difficult, Tuscany in fact commands the best routes southwards. It might also be noted that the rivers, being, especially in winter, rapid and turbulent, act rather as barriers than as water-ways, with the sole exception of the Po.

The map dated 1494 shows Italy divided into five principal States, Venice, Milan, Florence, the Papacy, and the Kingdom of Naples. Venice was decidedly the most powerful; her extensive Eastern possessions gave her prestige, and her great wealth, gained in foreign commerce, provided her with the sinews of war. Her subjects in her mainland possessions, which she called "Terra Ferma" in contradistinction to her over-sea dominions, were contented under her just and liberal government and, not having for centuries known independence, greatly preferred her rule to any other. The lower classes within the city were satisfied with prosperity and good government, and enjoyed their share of the splendid, brilliant life of the city, with its constant succession of fêtes and spectacular displays.

The character of the Venetians was more stable and self-controlled than that of most Italians, and the government

reflected the people ; it was persistent, reserved, self-confident, dignified. The great passion of the citizens was loyalty to the State, which they served with whole-hearted devotion ; and she was able to draw on the most able and intelligent for her statesmen, diplomats and naval commanders. Amongst the shifting Italian governments her constitution was remarkably stable, and it was one of the few institutions which survived the upheavals of the early sixteenth century. It was strictly aristocratic, the nobles alone having any share in the government ; yet their number was large, and the higher posts in the State were not limited to a clique but circulated freely amongst the most able, so that few of the disadvantages of an oligarchy were experienced. The whole body of nobles formed the Grand Council, whose business it was to elect to nearly all the State offices. The Senate, with a hundred and sixty members, was the chief legislative body, and had also the direction of foreign policy. The College, which acted as a kind of Cabinet, contained committees for all executive functions, prepared business for the larger Councils and executed their decisions. At the head were the Doge and the six Ducal Councillors, who took part *ex officio* in all the Councils ; but the Doge himself had become, by successive limitations of his power, a very constitutional sovereign, hardly indeed more than a dignified impersonation of the Majesty of Venice. Outside the regular hierarchy of the constitution was the Council of Ten, a body appointed with a view to the swift and secret despatch of such public business as suffered from the publicity and slowness of the ordinary Councils. Accordingly, urgent questions of foreign policy and serious criminal cases, especially those involving treason, fell into its hands ; and, though in reality neither illegal nor oppressive in its methods, its summary and silent action caused it to be regarded with a kind of superstitious terror. It kept good order within the city, and enabled the State to obtain in foreign policy the advantages of a single ruler, decision, vigour and promptness.

Yet Venice was not without weaknesses of her own, and the general degradation of Italian character had not failed to reach her. Her nobles were beginning to live more for luxury and less for duty, and preferred spending the wealth of their merchant fathers to acquiring new riches by commercial enterprise. At the same time her commerce was losing ground under the pressure of competition with other trading States. Florence, Marseilles, and Antwerp vied with her for the trade of the near East, and, when in 1486 the Portuguese discovered the route to India by the Cape of Good Hope, the main line of traffic with the further East was diverted from the Mediterranean, with its dangers of the overland route and the pirates; before long Dutch shippers encroached on the carrying trade of Venice. The advance of the Turks along the Mediterranean coasts threatened more and more to swamp her colonial Empire, and she had to face them without any aid from Europe. The Porte had already seized the Morea and Negropont, and was rapidly improving its fleet, building it up out of the swarm of pirate ships which began to infest the Mediterranean, with a view to becoming a first-rate sea-power. At the same time the success of Venice in augmenting her mainland territory exposed her to the bitter jealousy of her neighbours. All her possessions west of Lake Garda had once formed part of the Duchy of Milan; the strip of land, with the fortress of Peschiera, which formed the connection between her possessions west and east of Garda, had belonged to Mantua. The Polesina of Rovigo she had conquered only a short time since from Ferrara; Ravenna and Cervia were properly Papal fiefs; in Friuli the Empire and the Austrian House had claims. Venice might have self-interested allies, but she had no friends; she was rather proud of her splendid isolation, but it led to her future ruin. It was the jealousy with which she was regarded that made an Italian Crusade against the Turks so impossible. In such a Crusade Venice must lead, but no Italian power would loyally serve under her; indeed

the other States looked on not displeased to see her lose her Eastern outposts, seemingly oblivious of the fact that her losses brought the Eastern peril nearer and nearer to their own shores.

The Duchy of Milan was a State of an entirely different character: the government was frankly a tyranny, though the general prosperity following the long years of peace and the fairly moderate rule of the Sforza Dukes caused the people to acquiesce with tolerable contentment. Francesco Sforza (1450) was a soldier of adventure, a "Condottiere," who conquered the Dukedom in spite of the keen opposition of Venice and of Milan itself; and, although it was properly an Imperial fief, held it regardless of the refusal of the Emperor to recognize him. Galeazzo (1466) was assassinated by nobles on account of a private grievance; and the third Duke, Gian Galeazzo (1476), succeeded to the Duchy as a child. The real government was in the hands of his uncle, Lodovico, "il Moro" as he was called, a man of entire unscrupulousness and of great abilities, but who, to his own ultimate ruin, had an exaggerated belief in his cleverness. He fancied that he could make tools of everybody, including the King of France and the Emperor, and planned schemes of ambition, the first step towards which must be to wrest the Duchy from his feeble nephew. He was aided by a clever and ambitious wife, Beatrice d'Este. Her cousin, Isabella of Naples, was the wife of the young Duke, and Beatrice would never rest while Isabella took precedence of herself. The cause of Isabella and her husband was naturally that of Isabella's family, the royal House of Naples, and it was this question, which was to a certain extent a woman's quarrel, that finally brought on the crisis in Italian history. Meanwhile, Lodovico could command the resources of the Duchy, which was rich in prosperous commercial towns and in fertile plain-lands, and commanded the southern outlets of the Swiss passes, the Simplon, S. Gothard and Splügen. It was however ill-defended from France, since the western passes

were held by the Dukes of Savoy as lords of Piedmont, and they could admit the French whether Milan liked it or not. Hitherto these Dukes, who were purely feudal lords, with but limited control over their own States, had taken little part in Italian politics. Their ambition lay towards the west, and they appeared rather French than Italian. Piedmont also had long been insignificant, as the appanage of a younger branch of the House of Savoy; but it was now re-united to the Duchy, and, under a strong ruler, might easily become important. But in 1494 the Duke was a minor, and his mother and guardian was wholly under French influence.

Florence was a State of a wholly different type, and much more complex. Republican in form, with all the machinery of a democratic government, it was in reality wholly dominated by the Medici, a wealthy burgher family, whose rule was none the less absolute for being indirect. They held no official position, but disposed of all the offices, and directed the policy of the State. They had the support of a powerful clique, whose fortune was bound up in their own, and their position, as leaders in the financial world, not only in Italy, but in all Europe, brought all the trading interests in the town into line with theirs, while greatly increasing its importance and prosperity. The lower classes were attached to them on account of their generosity, lavish expenditure on fêtes, and employment of labour. Their popularity was increased by their unostentatious manners and their liberal patronage of Arts and Literature. They were real connoisseurs, and Lorenzo had considerable literary ability, so that they took a representative place among the Florentines, whose chief interests were wealth and culture. Their skill in foreign policy had given both Cosimo (1434) and Lorenzo (1469) great influence in Italy, and had raised Florence to the position of arbiter in Italian affairs. Towards the end of his life Lorenzo held all the complicated threads of foreign policy in his own hands.

The strength of Florence lay in the wit and versatility of

her citizens, in her commercial position as the city of great bankers, above all in the cleverness of the Medici. Yet the Florentine character had been weakened since Dante's day by ease and luxury; the very charm of her cultivated society, with its high aesthetic and literary development, showed her lack of strenuous qualities, and the old spirit of freedom had been replaced by sycophancy. A great danger lay in the distaste with which the dominance of Florence was regarded by her subject towns, most of which had been free republics before she deprived them of their liberties. Another source of weakness was the dislike borne to the Medici by a section of the citizens, especially those whose families had belonged to the oligarchy which they replaced. This had long been crushed into submission, but was roused to activity when, on Lorenzo's death in 1492, his place was taken by his totally incompetent son, Piero. Piero offended everyone's susceptibilities by trying to play the tyrant, while the most faithful adherents of the Medici were disgusted by his idleness and vanity. He was little fitted to take the helm of Italian affairs from his father's hand and steer Italy through the coming dangers.

We might have expected to find the Papacy, if not ruling, yet leading Italy, and indeed in earlier periods it had done so. But the gradual degeneration of the Roman Church is a subject which hardly comes within our present scope, except in its most obvious effects, viz. the degradation of the character of the Popes and their consequent loss of influence. The Popes of the fifteenth century, having deliberately crushed the earlier efforts of Christendom towards reform, set themselves, with curious short-sightedness, to the purely secular aim of building up a temporal State. Sixtus IV (1471), who made his family—the Della Rovere—Italian Princes, might indeed have intended that they should be dependent on, and subserve the glory of, the Roman Church; his successors' aims were purely personal, and devoted to the aggrandisement of their relations. Innocent VIII (1484) frankly acknowledged his son, but had

not time to do much for him. Alexander VI (1492) was wholly bound up in the interests of his children, to whom he was devoted, and for whom he would go to any lengths of political or private crime. The Papacy as a moral force was totally discredited; except for a certain conventional respect of language, its Italian neighbours treated it as one of themselves, and the uncertainty of Papal elections added zest to the political game. The Popes were not less moral than their neighbours, excepting the Medici, who stood above the contemporary standard. Their sin was that they were in no respect more moral; while the very fact of their high ecclesiastical position, combined with the known scandals of their lives and rule, discredited religion itself amongst all those who could observe them closely.

The irregular organisation of the Papal States and their constant disorder were in themselves sufficient to suggest to the Popes the necessity for a more effective rule. Rome itself was turbulent and permanently discontented. The presence of the Papacy was oppressive, while its absence led to financial disaster, since the citizens had little means of subsistence apart from the Court and its visitors. The country districts round Rome were mainly composed of the feudal estates of the old Baronial Houses, which, in spite of constant efforts on the part of the Papacy to suppress them, were almost as pugnacious and turbulent as they had been in the Middle Ages. Chief amongst these were the great families of Orsini and Colonna, which still to a certain extent represented Guelf and Ghibelline factions. From them were largely drawn the armies of Italy; and, when they were not employed in legitimate warfare, they were usually pulling down each others' castles in the country, or stabbing each other in the streets of Rome. Of similar character and tastes, though of more modern origin, were the lords of the Romagnol districts, most of whom had acquired two or three towns by force or fraud, and held them under the nominal suzerainty of Rome. The most notable of them were

the lords of Urbino; their dominion soon fell by marriage to the Della Rovere, the family of Sixtus IV, who retained it as a practically independent State, with a very moderate government, for generations after the Malatesta, Manfredi and the rest, had fallen victims to the great shock of the sixteenth century wars. There were also in the Papal States certain so-called Republics, the most important of which were Bologna and Perugia, each dominated by a powerful family. The chief vassal of Rome was however the Duke of Ferrara, who was practically independent, though he owed fealty to the Popes, while at the same time he was an Imperial feudatory for the Lombard States of Modena and Reggio, of which he was also Duke. The Este family was one of the oldest in Italy, and had ruled Ferrara for centuries; the Dukes were as a rule enlightened, able, often brilliant men, and the Court of Ferrara was one of the chief centres of Italian culture. They hated Venice, which had lately taken Rovigo from them, and were ready to join any party against her, while they were closely related to the ruling Houses of Naples and Milan.

Near neighbours to the Este, and of a somewhat similar type, were the Gonzaga, Marquesses of Mantua. They had held that city as an Imperial fief for many generations, were Imperialistic in interest, and often married German wives. They were perhaps the most respectable of Italian princely Houses, the only ones, it was said, who "were not afraid to show their dead." Mantua was a buffer State between Milan and Venice, and was protected and robbed by both in turn. The possession of the almost impregnable fortress of Mantua itself gave it an importance out of proportion to its size.

The extraordinary diversity in the character of the Italian States can hardly be better illustrated than by the contrast between most of them and a purely feudal and typically mediaeval kingdom such as was that of Naples. Great Barons and Princes, amongst whom we find branches of the Orsini and Colonna, held vast estates, and had been until lately

almost independent of the crown. Their character for fickleness was notorious, and they set up and pulled down dynasties until they found their masters in the House of Aragon. Alfonso, King of Aragon and also of Sicily, conquered the Kingdom of Naples (1442), moulded it into a semblance of order, and left it to his illegitimate son, Ferrante (1458), when his hereditary dominions had to pass to his brother, the legitimate heir. Ferrante was therefore first cousin to Ferdinand the Catholic, and was equally clever and unscrupulous. He crushed a rebellion of the Barons with treacherous brutality, and it seemed as if their independence were at an end. But their feudal power was too deeply rooted to be so easily destroyed; any opportunity for rebellion was sure to be eagerly seized, and there were exiled Neapolitans at the French court, urging the King to assert the old Angevin claims.

The city of Naples itself was a powerful factor in politics, bearing somewhat the same relation to the kingdom as Paris did to France; its possession was the most important object to both parties in time of war. The nobles took an important share in its municipal government. The general condition of the people was in culture and civilisation far behind that of the rest of Italy; and feudal oppression in the rural districts prevented all prospect of progress. Whatever hope there was lay in the centralising policy of the House of Aragon, and this the nobles did their best to thwart.

Before ending this review of the Italian States, it is necessary to mention the republics of Genoa and Siena. Both had been reduced to political decrepitude by the extravagant vehemence of party struggles within them. Siena was still too large a mouthful for Florence to swallow, but Florence was none the less waiting her opportunity, and Lorenzo de' Medici had great influence in Siennese politics. Genoa, still commercially important, seemed politically incapable of rational self-government. At present she was under

the protection of Milan, but her position as the gate of Italy towards the west made her an object of desire to France, and, later on, to Spain.

In this account of the Italian States, stress has intentionally been laid upon their divergences, but at the same time their essential points of likeness must not be forgotten; for in diplomacy and military affairs, and in their attitude towards religion, political and social morals and culture, they were sufficiently alike for it to be possible to speak of these things generically as Italian, with merely local varieties. Each Italian ruler had perfected the art of diplomacy to one of the most subtle finesse, and his political success was proportionate to his diplomatic skill. Political morality, whether in external or internal government, was simply a matter of expediency; a government was just and moderate, like that of the Medici, merely because justice and moderation paid best in that particular case; or it was tyrannical for the same reason. It was this system which was embodied by Machiavelli in his political theory, which is not so much immoral as non-moral, based on the principle that what is most successful is best. Diplomatic chicanery, treachery and cruelty are all laudable if they attain their ends; not more or less so than religion, mercy and justice if these are equally successful. Machiavelli had indeed a great end in view, for which he judged all means to be sanctified, the union of Italy under one ruler, his great ideal of success, whom he embodied under the name of the "Prince"; but Machiavelli's contemporaries used no less dubious means for totally narrow and selfish ends.

Most of the Italian Princes among their immediate ancestors had secured their States by a mixture of cunning and violence, and held them by precarious titles, or, as in the case of the Medici, with no title at all. The rulers had no prescriptive rights, no ancient loyalty, no military organisation on which to rely; they could count only upon their own skill in working on the self-interest or the fears of their people. So the Neapolitans

submitted to Ferrante because they had tried rebellion and failed; and so the Florentines obeyed Lorenzo because he embodied their best interests and maintained their prosperity. Equal skill was needed by each ruler to keep up his position in rivalry with the neighbouring States, and the elaborate diplomatic system of Italy in the fifteenth century was the cradle of that theory of balance of power, which shaped European politics for many generations. The States formed and broke alliances with rapid and confusing permutations and combinations, the object of which was always to prevent any one Power or group of Powers from becoming strong enough to be really dangerous to the others. It was a method of politics which usually enabled governments to avoid actual war, which they hated, so that, as it was acutely said by a contemporary, "War is waged chiefly by reputation,"—one coalition mentally measured its strength against the other, and refrained from attack. Their interests in commerce and culture had made the urban populations of Italy essentially un-military; and, as the Greeks employed slaves to do the necessary labour, leaving themselves free for nobler pursuits, so in the same way the Italians of the cities employed mercenary troops to do their necessary fighting. These troops were composed either of brigand-like bands of adventurers, or were the subjects of the smaller States with their Prince, who let himself out on hire with his army. Any of them would take service with the highest bidder, and would usually without scruple go over to the enemy if he made a better offer. Their object was to prolong war, and with it their pay, while involving themselves in as little danger and discomfort as possible. Campaigns were as leisurely and complicated as a game of chess, and indeed but little more bloody. Nobody suffered but the unfortunate tillers of the soil upon whom the armies quartered themselves, although the taxpayers had to pay high for the luxury of a war. It was with this kind of army, which absence of competition had

caused to neglect all modern developments in the methods of warfare, that Italy had to defend herself against the military nations which attacked her.

The social organisation of the Italian States differed less than might be gathered from the study of their political systems. Omitting Piedmont, Naples and the Patrimony of S. Peter as merely feudal districts with the usual feudal characteristics, the whole strength of society lay in the cities, which completely dominated the surrounding country districts. Whether the country were owned by nobles or by wealthy citizens, the owners nearly all lived for the greater part of their lives in the towns, where their interests centred, either as politicians or as merchants. Wealth was in the main commercial; and the older type of landed gentry had been to a great extent replaced by a new court nobility, whose importance was derived rather from the favour of the Prince than from the possession of great territorial estates. In the States which were republican in form, this court nobility was of course wanting; but the importance of the burgher class, in which was the mainspring of Italian energy, was very great in those States which were actually ruled by Princes and their courtiers. While the rest of Europe, with the exception of a few trading cities, was still very poor, the wealth of Italy was almost incredible. Her natural fertility had been multiplied during the recent period of comparative peace; her merchants had prosperous manufactures and extensive foreign trade; her bankers were the financiers of the world. Italian silk and cloth were exported to all parts of Europe, and Italian traders travelled to the most inaccessible of the Eastern lands in search of gain. Venice still retained the greater part of the carrying trade of the world: the Medici had influenced the politics of England and France by their loans to Edward IV and Charles the Bold. But all this wealth was no protection against, but rather a temptation to, the needy northern adventurer. It had long ago tempted medieval Emperors; and, now that

Europe was developing powerful centralised States, while Italy daily grew feebler, the desire to taste her delights and to despoil her treasures was stronger than ever.

Moral, as well as military, degeneration had in Italy followed upon prosperity. The forms of religion were observed, its rites added to the splendour and interest of life, but its spirit was almost lost. Life was in itself too satisfying, there was too much of luxury and pleasure; the claims of secular literature and of art, the fascination of the study of antiquity, the business of the pursuit of wealth, all filled men's thoughts to the exclusion of religious preoccupations. The clergy were as worldly as their flocks; the court of Rome set an example of indifference to spiritual things, of absorption in human ambition, pleasure, culture. Intellectual interest turned to philosophical speculation, irrespective of dogmatic orthodoxy; the best minds of the age were Platonic idealists, but most were frank materialists. From the Pope downwards the universal motive of conduct was individual self-interest or enjoyment; the moral structure of society was hopelessly weakened. Outbursts of savage barbarity amongst the tyrants, with massacres of whole families of their rivals, were looked upon philosophically as perhaps regrettable, but inevitable, incidents. Poison and the dagger were the recognized weapons of political and social enmities, but such gruesome chances rather added to the zest of life and the excitement of the struggle of the individual for fame and power. The general level of existence was easy, and life was debonnaire, even for the poorest. Italy whirled on, joyous, beautiful, enamoured of herself, of life and all its pleasures; her politicians schemed their petty victories; her soldiers fought their mimic wars; her scholars crowned her with the glories of her marvellous Renaissance; and no voice warned her of approaching ruin until the despoilers were actually within her gates.

(The condition of Italy at this period will be found further described in the chapters on Religion, and the Renaissance.)

CHAPTER II.

THE INVASION OF ITALY.

IT was in 1494 that Lodovico il Moro, longing to supplant his nephew, yet not daring to do so for fear of Naples, invited Charles VIII to invade Italy, holding before him the bait of the Kingdom of Naples, to serve as a starting point for a Crusade. Charles was more than ready to accept the invitation; he patched up hasty, disadvantageous treaties of peace with Ferdinand of Spain and Maximilian, and marched into Italy with an army as carelessly equipped as if it were starting on a holiday tour. And it was in fact little more than a holiday tour that lay before it. In five months it had passed through Italy,—“with wooden spurs and a piece of chalk” (to mark the soldiers’ billets), as it was said,—and Charles was King of Naples (Feb. 1495). Lodovico received the French graciously, and took advantage of his nephew’s somewhat suspicious death to make himself Duke. Piero de’ Medici and the Pope were allied with Alfonso of Naples (for Ferrante died before the French came), and Piero might have defended the Tuscan passes. But Florence sulked because she would have preferred a French alliance; Piero lost his head, surrendered all the principal Florentine fortresses to Charles, and was in consequence turned out of Florence by a popular rising. The Pope was powerless to resist; Alfonso, as cowardly as he was brutal, fled to Sicily; his gallant young son, Ferrantino,

endeavoured to defend the Kingdom, but in vain. The Neapolitans were delighted to exchange their sombre Aragonese rulers for the lively French. The rest of Italy looked on at Charles' progress with a kind of cynical indifference, as at a matter which little concerned it.

But Charles, who had apparently forgotten all about his Crusade in the pleasures of Naples, had not long been established there when Italy took fright, realizing at last the probable consequences of his conquest. Lodovico guessed that the next step would be to install the Duke of Orleans at Milan. He hastily patched up a league with Venice, Ferdinand and Maximilian, and Charles awoke from his enjoyment of south Italian luxury to find himself nearly caught in a trap. The Neapolitans were already disgusted with the prodigality and debauchery of the French, and would give them no help. Charles retreated northwards at full speed; he was met after crossing the Apennines at Fornovo by the Venetian and Milanese army. There was a sharp battle, but the French were able to continue their march, and soon quitted Italy altogether (Oct. 1495). The Neapolitans were glad to get back Ferrantino, but he died at the moment of victory, and was succeeded by his uncle, Federico.

The French invasion had come and gone like a storm in summer; but it was a storm which had rooted up the old political system of Italy. At the first glance the actual changes which it wrought might not seem very great; the sixty years' domination of the Medici in Florence was indeed at an end, but a Sforza still ruled at Milan, and a prince of the House of Aragon at Naples. Yet the way into Italy had been opened, and Charles had shown the world how easy it was to travel upon it. Had a little prudence been added to his audacity, the conquest of Naples might have been consolidated, and it might have become, at least for a time, part of the French monarchy. Again, the weakness of the Italian military system had been exposed at Fornovo, where the French, though

disorganised by retreat, defeated a considerable native army. And the delicate balance of power amongst the Italian States themselves had been rudely shaken, never to be restored.

For the moment, however, the fright which they had experienced made them endeavour to protect themselves by the artificial unity of a general League. This League, however, was not purely Italian, but only anti-French, for it included Ferdinand of Spain and Maximilian, and, indeed, one result of it was the marriage of Maximilian's son, Philip of Burgundy, to Ferdinand's daughter. The child of this marriage, Charles V, future ruler of Germany and Spain, was destined to bring the liberty of Italy to its ultimate extinction. Nor had the French invasion taught the Italian Powers the danger of foreign intervention, for in 1496 they called upon Maximilian to conduct an expedition against Florence, with the object of forcing her to join the League. The expedition proved an ignominious failure, but it created in Maximilian also a taste for meddling with Italian politics.

Florence, meanwhile, had been restoring her constitution to its earlier character, that of an aristocratic Republic, but on a base rather more popular than that on which it had stood before the time of the Medici. She was completely under the influence of an eloquent Dominican friar, Savonarola, whose preaching wrought a moral reformation in the city. The people thronged to hear his sermons, gave up their sports and gambling, and made a public bonfire of their licentious books and pictures, their dice, cosmetics and fineries. Savonarola preached that the wrath of God was about to descend upon Italy for her sins, and that France was the chosen instrument of His judgment. He believed that Charles would return to Italy to carry on the work, and, under his influence, Florence clung to the French alliance, in which indeed she thought lay her only hope of avoiding the restoration of the Medici. All the efforts of the League States, which suspected her of recalling the French, were powerless to move her as long as Savonarola

remained supreme. But his attitude, as head of the democratic and anti-League parties in Florence, transformed him from the religious leader into the political partisan, and brought upon him the enmity of the oligarchical and the Medicean parties at home and of the League abroad. The Pope ordered him to stop preaching, upon which Savonarola urged more strongly than before the need for Church reformation, and recommended a General Council. This exasperated Alexander into excommunicating him, thus greatly weakening his influence in Florence. The Franciscans, always jealous of the Dominicans, challenged him to an "Ordeal of fire," which he dared not refuse. The Ordeal was a failure owing to quarrels between the two parties as to how it was to be conducted, and the popular faith in Savonarola's mission disappeared. He was tried as a heretic, and condemned to be hung, and his body burned (May, 1498). Savonarola's fall was due to political rather than to religious causes; but the movement which he had conducted showed that there was uneasiness in the popular conscience, and a recognition that reformation was sorely needed.

Florence was no longer dangerous to the League, but the League was already breaking up, for the mutual jealousies of the Italian States proved stronger than their fear of invasion. Undeterred by their recent lesson, Venice and the Pope did not hesitate to accept the chance of aggrandising themselves at the expense of Lodovico, which presented itself when the accession of Louis XII to the throne of France united in his person the French royal claim to Naples, and the claim of the House of Orleans to Milan. Venice agreed to help Louis in the conquest of Milan in return for a slice of the Duchy; the Pope hoped to cover under French protection his efforts to create a principality for his own son.

Once again the success of the French seemed almost miraculous. The very glamour of their name caused castles and cities to surrender at their approach. Lodovico's ally,

Maximilian, was too busy with German affairs to aid him ; and, though Lodovico, once driven from his Duchy, was able to hire Swiss mercenaries and to reconquer most of it, the French retaliated by hiring other Swiss. Those in Lodovico's service would not fight against their countrymen ; Lodovico was captured, and ended his days in a French fortress. The King of France became Duke of Milan, and Venice added Cremona to her territory. The fall of the Sforza was little regretted ; Lodovico was greedy, selfish and cunning ; he had outwitted himself, and his ruin was mainly due to his confidence in his own cleverness. It was he in fact who had taught his rivals how to bring the French into Italy. In the hour of his fall, he employed yet another destructive force, the Swiss. They were now the most noted soldiers of their day ; all parties schemed and bribed to obtain their services, and the ruinous nature of the succeeding Italian wars was largely due to their ferocity.

Once established in Milan, Louis XII naturally looked towards Naples, whither Charles VIII had shown him the way. But he had now to reckon, not only with the ruling House, but with Ferdinand of Spain, whose position, now that he was allied with Maximilian, was strong enough to enable him to oppose the French advance. Ferdinand, though he had helped to restore his cousin to Naples, had not forgotten that he himself had a claim to that crown, as the legitimate representative of the House of Aragon. It was easy to maintain that Alfonso had had no right to leave even a conquered kingdom to his illegitimate son¹.

Ultimately the two powerful claimants made an iniquitous bargain to divide Naples between them, France taking the northern and Spain the southern provinces. They easily conquered it from the rightful owner (1501), but the royal marauders soon quarrelled over their spoil. The French were far from their military base, while the Spaniards had theirs in

¹ See p. 33.

Sicily; the famous Spanish captain, Gonzalo de Cordoba, was finally successful in driving out the French and conquering the whole kingdom (1504).

Meanwhile, as the two extremities of Italy fell under foreign domination, its central province was the scene of a remarkable attempt to create a new consolidated State. The aim of the policy of Alexander VI was to found a principality for his son, Cesare Borgia, to whom he was devoted. Indifferent to the interests of the Church, Alexander intended to place the whole of the Papal States in Cesare's hands. He cleverly made use of his spiritual position to obtain an influential place in international politics; he negotiated on almost equal terms with France and Spain, and used the French alliance as a shield to cover his aggressions. Cesare was as able as, and even more unscrupulous than, his father; he had real military and administrative talents, determination, secrecy and promptitude. Neither father nor son was restrained by any scruple of morality or humanity, neither hesitated at treachery or murder to accomplish his ends. Cesare's sister, Lucrezia, was three times married as it suited their policy; her first husband was divorced, the second murdered. The lords and princes of the Papal States were rapidly dispossessed; then Cesare, looking further afield, aimed at Tuscany. But Florence was protected by her French alliance, and he had unwillingly to hold his hand.

This check, and the reverses of France in Naples, led Alexander to contemplate a change to a Spanish alliance, when his plans were ended by his sudden death (August, 1503). Though certainly the worst of the Renaissance Popes, he was hardly inferior to the moral standard of his contemporaries. But even their blunted sense was shocked by his disregard of the conventional propriety which was still expected of a Pope, while the seemingly supernatural success of his plans frightened them. A mythus grew up about his name, and he came to be regarded as a hardly human monster of iniquity, stained with unmentionable crimes, in which his children were implicated.

Cesare had not yet had time to consolidate his States on any firmer basis than the support of his father. Himself ill at the time of Alexander's death, he was unable to take decisive measures to secure his position. Soon afterwards, the nephew of Sixtus IV, Cardinal Della Rovere, was elected Pope as Julius II. Julius was far too energetic and ambitious to tolerate the existence of Cesare's dominion in the States of the Church. Cesare quickly sank into insignificance, and was killed shortly afterwards in a skirmish in Navarre.

The Borgia had failed, and it is impossible now to tell how far they had intended to extend their scheme; whether a lingering regard for public opinion would have checked Alexander from emancipating his son's principality from the Papacy, or whether, undeterred by such scruples, they would have aimed at a still larger dominion. If this were indeed the aim, their success, in spite of their personal character, could hardly have been a misfortune for Italy. Cesare, violent and unscrupulous as he was in conquering, ruled well and repressed disorder where he had conquered. Italy could never have suffered from him what she had to endure from the tyranny of foreign rulers and the ravages of foreign armies, which her lack of unity brought upon her. Machiavelli, who, almost alone among his contemporaries, had the real welfare of Italy at heart, expressed a sincere admiration for Cesare, who was not far from fulfilling the author's ideal of a successful prince. But the union of Italy was to remain Machiavelli's dream alone.

Cesare's place as the central figure of interest was quickly filled by the new Pope, Julius II. Resolute, high-spirited, ambitious, rather a soldier than a priest, as passionate and obstinate as he was courageous, he set before himself as the object of vigorous pursuit the glorification of the Papacy as a Temporal Monarchy, and the consolidation of its States under its own direct rule. His ideals were not noble; he had no feeling for the spiritual character of his office; yet since it was for the Church, as he conceived it, and not for himself that he

laboured, he commanded the respect of his contemporaries. But he affords an exact illustration of Machiavelli's dictum that the Papacy divided Italy for its own interests. Passionately eager though he was to drive out the foreigners who held both Milan and Naples, yet their expulsion would be no satisfaction to him unless he could be sure that the Papacy would remain the chief Power in Italy after they were gone. But he knew that, though Florence was now feeble, Venice would be a powerful rival to the Papacy for predominance in the peninsula. Venice had already, on the fall of the Borgia, stretched out her hand and taken a share of the spoils, and it was more tolerable to Julius that France and Spain should rule half Italy than that Venice should hold the Papal fiefs of Rimini and Faenza.

Julius' aim was not to crush Venice altogether, but so to weaken her that, though he might ultimately use her as an ally against the foreigners, she would never again be able to rival the precedence of the Papacy. It was impossible for him to attack her single-handed, so that he had to make use of the very foreign powers whose presence in Italy he deplored, forgetting that in so doing he strengthened their position in the country. He had to wait awhile for his opportunity, the great powers being too busy to heed Italy, and he occupied himself with the work of bringing the Papal States under his rule; but in 1508 the European monarchs were again at leisure, and Maximilian was actually involved in a war with Venice, which had taken Trieste and Görz from him.

In 1508 was formed the League of Cambray, whose object was to recover from Venice all that she had at any time taken from her neighbours, that is to say the whole of her mainland territory. France put forward the claims of the Duchy of Milan; the Papacy wanted her Romagnol possessions, Rimini and Faenza, Ravenna and Cervia. Spain claimed some Apulian ports which the dispossessed House of Aragon had pledged to Venice in return for help towards its restoration. Verona, Padua and the neighbouring towns of East Lombardy, whose

former rulers had left no representatives, were claimed by Maximilian as Imperial fiefs, for which no investiture had ever been granted. Venice had no allies, but everyone was interested in her spoliation. Even her enemies, however, were surprised at the suddenness of her collapse before the League of Cambray. A French invasion alone was sufficient to reveal the latent weakness which her self-confident attitude had hitherto concealed. The Venetian army was defeated in the Battle of Agnadello (May 14, 1509), and the French immediately found themselves masters of the whole country. Rather than allow her subject population to suffer needlessly, Venice absolved it from its allegiance, and withdrew her garrisons from the towns. An Imperial envoy took possession of the places claimed by the Empire; Spain occupied the Apulian Ports, and the Papacy the Romagnol fiefs unopposed. Venice herself was threatened with a siege. Her only hope lay in dividing her enemies; Julius, now sure of her humiliation, made peace on very high terms. Spain, having taken all it wanted, ceased hostilities, and Venice was able to concentrate her energies, first upon driving Maximilian out of Eastern Lombardy, and then upon recovering what the French had taken. The war continued until 1516, when, as the price of help given to France, she regained her old territories, Cremona excepted, as far as the river Adda. But Venice was never again the formidable power that she had been before the League of Cambray. Besides the material damage caused by the war, it had cost her her prestige; the bubble of her reputation was broken; she soon began to shrink from taking an active part in politics, usually endeavouring to preserve her neutrality. The fidelity of her subjects was an advantage; they were grateful for her generosity in the war; and, after a taste of French and Imperial rule, were glad to help in restoring themselves to her protection. Her energies were henceforth employed in saving a portion of her Eastern Empire from the advancing Turks.

No longer afraid of the rivalry of Venice, Julius II turned

his attention to clearing Italy of her foreign occupants. His first attack was upon France, and he hoped to use Spain against it, as he had used both Spain and France against Venice. He therefore combined with Spain, England and Venice in the so-called "Holy League," about which there was nothing "holy" but its name. It was hardly surprising that, as Julius used temporal weapons against him, Louis should retaliate by attempting to use a spiritual weapon against the worldly Pope, and to summon a schismatic Council. Julius recognized that the attack threatened the weakest point in the Papal position, the crying need for reform, and met it by summoning a Council of his own at the Lateran, but he trusted more to war than to theological argument.

The French first defeated the army of the League in the Battle of Ravenna (April 11, 1512), but their gallant young general, Gaston de Foix, was killed, the victory was not followed up, the League reorganised its army and obtained the adherence of Maximilian. France had also quarrelled with her old friends, the Swiss, and the Pope was able to hire a large body of them; they invaded Lombardy, and in a short time the French were driven beyond the Alps (June, 1512). Lodovico Sforza was avenged twelve years after his fall, for the Duchy was given to his son, Massimiliano, a harmless young man. Julius took his share of the spoils by annexing Parma and Piacenza.

The Pope was triumphant; it seemed to him that Italy had only to arouse herself from her inertia in order to shake off the foreign domination. Yet the Spaniards still remained, strongly rooted in Naples, and the Swiss were virtually in occupation of Lombardy. And, in spite of his energy, Julius was not statesman enough to make the best use of the advantages that he had obtained. Unlike Cesare Borgia, he did not know how to organise his conquests. He contrived to upset all Italy, but to resettle nothing. His plans were magnificent, but he did not pay sufficient attention to details; he allowed his feelings to run away with him, and to lead him into dangerous extremes.

Just as his jealousy of Venice had led him to strengthen the foreigners at her expense, so now his hatred of France led him to assist in making Florence virtually dependent upon Spain. Florence had always clung to her French alliance; but, while her powerful protector was beyond the Alps, she was powerless. But the Spaniards wished to extend their influence by re-establishing the government of the Medici (Lorenzo's sons, Giuliano and Cardinal Giovanni)¹, who had sought their protection. The Pope agreed because of his hatred of France. There was a powerful Medicean party within the city; Florence had nowhere to look for external help, and with Spanish aid the Medici were reinstated (Sept. 1512). They nominally restored the government to its condition under Lorenzo, and directed its policy in the interests of their patron, Spain.

Julius II died in February, 1513, leaving Spain the dominant power in the peninsula. Venice and Milan were very weak, and, though the Papacy had been considerably strengthened by the organisation of its own States, yet it was by no means a match for the power of Spain. Julius' more ambitious political schemes are well typified in his architectural plans. The old Basilica of S. Peter's he ruthlessly tore down in order to make way for a new building which he had scarcely time to begin. The mighty tomb for himself which Michael Angelo was commissioned to construct was left unfinished. So was it with his designs to drive the foreigner from Italy, and to reconstruct its political system with the Papacy as its dominating power. But one substantial achievement remained; the development of Cesare Borgia's work; a great part of the Papal States had been occupied, and the only important feudatories who now remained independent were the Estensi of Ferrara and Julius' own relatives, the Della Rovere of Urbino. But the States now subjugated were not again to form a principality for a Pope's son or nephew; Julius brought them under the direct rule of

¹ See p. 34.

the Papacy, and thus consolidated that Temporal Power which had become so important a factor in Papal policy.

Weary of the agitations of Julius' reign, the Cardinals determined upon a successor of more peaceable temperament, Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, who took the name of Leo X. Leo, like his father Lorenzo, was inclined to peace and the pursuit of pleasure, a true child of the Renaissance. His ambition was to strengthen the hold of his family on Florence, and to extend its influence in Italy, using the resources of the Papacy to subserve this object. He had dreams of obtaining Naples or Milan for his nephew; Lorenzo, the son of Piero, who nominally ruled Florence, while Leo in reality directed its policy, administering it together with the Papacy as if they were one State. Leo did not pursue his aims with the violent methods of Julius II, but with the subtleties of refined Medicean statecraft. His idea of policy was to negotiate with both parties at once, profiting by the advantages of the winners, while dissociating himself from the defeated. The consequences of his duplicity were that he earned universal distrust, and lost the commanding position which Julius II had obtained for the Papacy in international politics, a position which was for a time occupied by Cardinal Wolsey. In Leo's hands the Papacy sank to the rank of a second-rate Italian State. The Popes had deliberately neglected their spiritual precedence for the sake of their temporal ambitions; it was hardly surprising if their contemporaries took them at their own estimation, and reckoned their power according to their small temporal resources.

Leo never dreamed of following up Julius' great plan of ousting the foreigners from Italy, and supported the Spanish side when, in 1513, Louis XII tried to recover Milan. The Swiss frustrated his attack, beating his army in the Battle of Novara (June 6, 1513), but the death of Louis XII, and the accession of Francis I, young, adventurous and ambitious, changed the aspect of affairs. In a very short time he had swooped upon North Italy, defeated the Swiss in the two days'

Battle of Marignano (Sept. 14, 1515), and taken Milan from its helpless Duke. Marignano was the first great battle in which the Swiss had been beaten, and their prestige suffered considerably in consequence. Some of them joined with Maximilian in a renewed attempt to drive out the French, but were unsuccessful.

France seemed more powerful than ever. Ferdinand of Spain died in 1516 and his young grandson, Charles, was glad of a French alliance to secure his own position. The principal work of Julius II was undone. Lombardy was once more shared between France and Venice, for Venice had recovered nearly all her old States in return for helping France to recover Milan. So Julius' two former enemies had united to restore the State of Italy to what it had been at the time of his accession. Leo had lost the prestige which Julius gained for the Papacy; and Urbino, which he took from the Della Rovere, he did not add to the Papal States, but bestowed on his nephew, Lorenzo.

In 1519, the death of Maximilian ushered in a new phase in European politics, the era of the ascendancy of the Austro-Spanish House of Habsburg; but the years between 1494 and 1519 had wrought more change in Europe than had the whole century preceding them. The great States sprang suddenly into the consciousness of their individual force, and each of them, under strong and ambitious rulers, flung itself into conflict for the pre-eminence. They found in Italy a free field in which to fight out their rivalry. Thus the years of new life for Europe were for Italy the years of death and dissolution. In the midst of the bloom of her intellectual Renaissance, the spirit of the people which inspired it was being slowly crushed to death beneath the tyranny of foreign rulers and the ravages of barbarous soldiery.

The fertile plains of Lombardy were laid bare by the trampling armies of French and Swiss, subsidised by Venice and the Pope to the ruin of their own country. Cities were sacked, and their helpless inhabitants robbed and

massacred, crops destroyed and the peasants starved in the woods whither they had fled for refuge. The French, though fierce in battle, were the least brutal of the invaders to non-combatants; their rule was much preferred in Milan to that of the Swiss. It was by their debauchery and licentiousness that the French did most harm, introducing into Italy new and horrible forms of disease. Most hated of the foreigners were the Spaniards, who ruled Naples and hung threateningly like a black cloud over the rest of Italy. The sack of Prato (1512), by which they had terrorised Florence into submission to the Medici, sent a shudder even through minds accustomed to the worst horrors of war. The Neapolitans, who had lightly parted with their old rulers, found themselves under a government far more harsh, avaricious and inquisitorial than any they had hitherto experienced. Nearly every article of food was taxed, their commerce throttled by vexatious regulations, their money sent to Spain to pay the wages of the very soldiers who were quartered on themselves.


Of the Italian States which remained independent, none was strong enough to have any hope of throwing off the foreigners. The Papacy, though it had increased its material strength by consolidating the Temporal Power, was morally discredited by its own crimes and by the shifty policy of Leo X, and it was on the verge of a spiritual revolution which was to end its world-wide influence for ever. The Temporal Power could do nothing to save it in this crisis,—was perhaps rather a source of weakness than of strength.

Venice, though her territories had suffered less from war, was impoverished and enfeebled, her commerce leaving her, her prestige vanished, her Eastern Empire hourly threatened, her Italian States inserted like a wedge between Austria and France, and constantly menaced by both Powers. But saddest of all to contemplate was the degradation of Florence. Under the younger Lorenzo, her condition was much more humiliating than it had been under his grandfather. The tool of the


Papacy, dominated by Spain, the spirit of her citizens seemed for a time to be crushed. The empty form of republican institutions survived, but the free burgher was ousted by the Medicean sycophant, and the government was debased by a systematic espionage. We find even Machiavelli begging Lorenzo for office such as he had held under the Republic.

It is after all to Machiavelli that we have to look for elucidation and illustration of the system of politics which these years were inaugurating. His politics were a real science, based upon the facts of history, and practically applied to the needs and circumstances of the age, especially in Italy. Machiavelli came to the conclusion that, though a Republican form of government was usually preferable, it was quite incapable of solving the problems of the age. Italy's need was a despot who could give her autonomy, law, unity, and a strong, absolute executive. Such a despot might possibly have been found in Cesare Borgia, must certainly not be unlike him in administrative ability, in unswerving tenacity of purpose, and must be as ruthless, unscrupulous, and, if needs were, as treacherous in the pursuit of the great aim before him. He must organise and train an effective native soldiery, as indeed Machiavelli himself attempted to do on a small scale for Florence, by which alone the foreign armies could successfully be resisted. This despot, whom perhaps Machiavelli hoped to find in Lorenzo de' Medici, was never to exist for Italy, but his qualities and methods were adopted by Italy's neighbours, and were for centuries embodied in the State system of Europe, while generations of political theorists debated furiously upon the one point in the argument which most impressed their imaginations, the severance of politics from morality.

GENEALOGY OF THE HOUSE OF ARAGON



GENEALOGY OF THE EARLY MEDICI



CHAPTER III.

THE GROWTH OF SPANISH POWER IN ITALY.

IN 1519 the death of Maximilian united Austria and Spain under his grandson, Charles, who was shortly afterwards also elected Emperor. Thus the already powerful influence of Spain in Italy was strengthened by the addition to it of the Imperial claims to a general overlordship, claims weak and vague enough in the hands of Charles' predecessors, but effective when backed by Spanish force. And it is important to notice that Charles, while extending his rule in Italy, did so rather in the interests of the Spanish Monarchy than of the Holy Roman Empire, though he used the Imperial rights when convenient, especially for the purpose of extracting pecuniary contributions. No doubt his reason was that Austria was to descend to his brother's family, and Spain with its dependencies to his own, but at the same time he must have felt the want of definiteness in the Imperial claims, and have had a latent sense that they, with other medieval things, were passing into the realms of unreality, while the Spanish Monarchy and its conquests had all the reality of military and administrative force.

Yet Charles, with all the cares of his vast dominions upon his shoulders, might not have troubled much about Italian politics, had it not been that the history of his reign was one of a long, fierce rivalry with France, and that most of the struggle was, as usual, fought out in unfortunate Italy. Thus

his first object had to be the attainment of such a grip upon Italy that France should never again attempt to gain a hold there. Naples and Sicily were the base of his power; Milan, in the hands of France, must be wrested away, and ultimately transferred as an Imperial fief by the Emperor to the King of Spain; central Italy must be dominated through the medium of a dependent Papacy.

It was strange that so late in history a repetition of the position of the Hohenstaufen in Italy should arise, and the Emperor be once more King of the Sicilies, but in the sixteenth century there were no thirteenth century Popes, and Charles was perhaps destined to avenge Frederick II upon the Papacy. Their mutual relations were very complex; the old papal-imperial rivalry might arise between them at any moment, yet in the future they must stand together, if they meant to preserve their ancient rights from the rising tide of Protestantism, which threatened them almost equally. Still Charles was able to use toleration of the German Protestants as a threat against the Papacy. On the other hand the Pope had still his old claim to the overlordship of Naples, and could withhold investiture from its king, while the Inquisition, on which the Spanish Monarchy greatly relied as an instrument of civil government in their States, might be crippled by Papal opposition. Again, Charles' Eastern dominions were threatened by the Turks, and the Pope alone could obtain the co-operation of other States and permit him the use of ecclesiastical tenths against them. Hence, a determined and patriotic Pope might not impossibly, by a firm, self-confident attitude, have maintained neutrality for Italy, so that the great duel might have been fought out elsewhere. But there was no such rare spirit now to fill the Papal throne. The two Medici, Leo X and Clement VII (1523), were subtle and cunning, not strong, and cared more for the dominion of Florence than for the peace of Italy.

Amongst the other Italian States, Venice, only anxious to

preserve her territorial integrity, naturally leaned towards France, for the Habsburg dominion over Milan meant that she was shut in between Habsburg States, and that she could no longer play off one neighbour against the other. Alfonso of Ferrara had won a position for himself on account of his excellent artillery, which had helped to win the Battle of Ravenna; he was engaged in a continual struggle with the Popes over Modena and Reggio, which they declared to be part of the ancient domain of the Countess Matilda, left by her to the Papacy, as well as over Ferrara, which was an undoubted Papal fief. Milan found her government much worse conducted under Francis I than under Louis XII, though when she fell into Imperial hands she regretted the French. Florence was a mere pawn in the game between the Papacy, Charles and Francis. The Medici Popes rightly believed that Francis would seize the first opportunity to restore a republican government, so advantageous to French interests, and this fear, more than any other cause, inclined them to the Spanish party.

It is impossible to describe in detail the long duel between Charles and Francis, and we must confine ourselves to its effects upon Italy. From the first moment Leo X lost all chance of a dignified neutrality by his feeble intrigues over the Imperial election. Charles thus learned with whom he had to deal, and offered bribes for Leo's help against France, one of which was the suppression of Luther. Accordingly the Edict of Worms was signed on the same day as a secret Treaty between the Pope and Emperor. In a few months the French were expelled from Milan (November, 1521), the Milanese joining the Imperialist army against them, and Francesco Sforza, Massimiliano's brother, was installed as Duke.

Then Leo's sudden death ended his schemes. He left the Papacy discredited, its treasury loaded with debts due to his extravagance. He had tried to increase the Temporal Power, but his hold on the Papal States was not strong enough to prevent many of the lords whom he had dispossessed from

returning after his death, while Della Rovere recovered Urbino. Charles wished that Leo's successor should be Cardinal de' Medici, whose policy would probably continue that of Leo's, but French influence and fear of the hereditary principle prevented his election, and a sudden impulse towards religious reform amongst the Cardinals resulted in the choice of the pious Adrian of Utrecht, who had been Charles' tutor. Charles expected from Adrian humble complicity with his commands, and was far from pleased when Adrian, who was free from the clogging ties of Italian politics, declared for a general peace, in order that the attention of Europe might be concentrated on a Crusade and a reform of morals and discipline. But Adrian found no supporters, and was incapable of resisting single-handed the wiles of diplomacy; he was drawn against his will into renewing the Papal alliance with Charles. He had to realize that, without the Emperor's support, he was powerless to contend against Luther and disloyal Cardinals.

Adrian's attempts for an internal reform of the Church were as futile as his struggles for peace, and he died in September, 1523, a disappointed man. The Curia and Romans were delighted when the Cardinals, by the election of Giulio de' Medici (Clement VII), seemed to promise a return to the days of luxurious prodigality which they had enjoyed under Leo X. Clement held all the threads of Leo's policy, and was generally supposed to have inspired and directed it. Charles therefore welcomed his election, and expected him to keep the Papacy and Florence faithful to the Imperial party. Clement had also a better reputation than Leo. "A just man, and a man of God; he does not sell benefices, nor countenance simony," said a Venetian ambassador. He refused to sell Cardinals' hats, tried to economise the Papal revenues, intended to rule Florence with justice and liberality, to raise the character of the Papacy and to act as an Italian patriot against the foreigners. He had perhaps hopes of establishing a balance of power between Francis and Charles, with the Papacy at the head of an Italian

League as the balancing force. But for all this he had not sufficient strength of character; his very cleverness only involved him in intrigue; all his good resolutions gave way before outside pressure, and a fatal irresolution spoiled his diplomacy.

The Florentine Berni skilfully described his rule as:—

“A Papacy composed of compliment,
 Debate, complaisance and consideration;
 Of furthermore, then, but, yes, well, perchance;

 Of thought, conjecture, counsel, argument¹.”

Really, Clement, with the best intentions, could not satisfactorily act at one and the same time as head of the Church, Italian patriot, maintainer of the Temporal Power, and chief of the Medici family. The interests of these different characters clashed, and had to be sacrificed successively one to the other. As Pope, he ought to be the ally of the Emperor against the Lutherans; as Italian patriot, he should be independent of both Emperor and France and head of an Italian League; while the interests of the Temporal Power made him the rival of Venice and Ferrara, and the ambitions of the House of Medici could only be attained under Charles' protection.

In spite of Charles' hopes that he would prove amenable, the Pope, together with Venice and Alfonso d'Este, was really alarmed at the Spanish predominance in the peninsula, for Francesco Sforza was only nominally independent of Charles. The Pope and Alfonso therefore joined in Francis' effort to recover Lombardy, since it seemed to them as if only by the support of one foreign power could they weaken the other. But the crushing defeat and capture of Francis himself at Pavia (Feb. 23, 1525) left Italy at the mercy of the Emperor.

Francis had no hesitation in sacrificing his Italian claims and allies in order to obtain his personal freedom, but Charles' own want of money prevented him from at once following up

¹ Translation from Symonds' *Italian Literature*, p. 368.

his advantage in Italy, and the Italian Powers had a short breathing space in which they formed hasty plans for deliverance from the prospect of an intolerable Spanish tyranny.

Their only chance was to create a genuine Italian League, to which the fright from which they were suffering might prove an effective cement. The opportunity was seized by Francesco Sforza's clever Chancellor, Morone, who had already made his master's government at Milan popular by the establishment of an irremovable Senate with considerable powers. Morone was a subtle schemer, unreliable and faithless, but he had talent; to emancipate Sforza from Spain, and create an Italian League, of which he should himself be the inspiring force, opened a prospect which exactly suited his ambition. Venice could be relied upon; Clement, after much vacillation, joined; but a military leader and an army were needed. Morone offered the prospect of the crown of Naples to one of Charles' generals, the Marquis of Pescara, if he would join the League, bring his troops over with him, and help to expel the Spaniards from Italy. Morone hoped that Pescara, virtually an Italian, though of Spanish origin, would be prompted by patriotic feeling to accept the offer. Pescara, pretending acquiescence, listened to the plot, and then revealed it to the Emperor.

Charles dealt with the situation by deposing Sforza, and bringing Milan directly under Spanish rule. The Milanese fought bravely for their Duke, but they were no match for the Imperial army, which soon occupied the whole Duchy, and subjected it to every conceivable oppression. The Imperial troops rarely got any pay, and were thus constrained to live on plunder.

In spite of Sforza's fall the Italian League was merged in the European League of Cognac, which Francis, repudiating the Treaty of Madrid, joined. But, since the League arranged that Milan was to be restored to Sforza, Francis had no inducement to interfere personally, and left the Italians to defend themselves as best as they might. Clement, risking a *rapprochement*

between the Emperor and the Lutherans, headed the League, but even at this crisis he could not act simply as the leader of Italy, he must have the promise of Naples for one of his family; and he shut Alfonso d'Este out of the League by insisting on the surrender of Reggio to the Papacy. Consequently Alfonso's excellent artillery was placed at the disposal of the Imperialists, who had very little of their own.

In November, 1526, Bourbon, the Imperial commander at Milan, was joined by an army of German Lanzknechts. Their captain, Frundsberg, had no money, and they were attracted by prospects of Italian plunder; many were Lutherans, and longed for a chance to attack Rome and the Pope himself. No one misunderstood their purpose, and the Emperor's instructions were hardly ambiguous. "Tell them," he wrote, "that they are to go against the Turks; they will know what Turks are meant."

Lombardy was already stripped bare by marauding armies; Rome was rich; German and Spanish troops alike were famished. Their own generals, if they had wished to do so, could not have prevented them from marching upon Rome.

Della Rovere, the old enemy of the Medici, was commander of the League forces; his slowness had already caused the loss of Milan, his unwillingness was to cause that of Rome. The only real soldier was the Pope's young cousin Giovanni "delle Bande Nere," who had made a successful attempt to revive the old Italian military company, and had played a notable part in recent wars. But he was killed by one of Alfonso d'Este's cannon in trying to prevent the junction of Bourbon and Frundsberg; Della Rovere made no attempt to stop them, and simply followed their march southwards.

Clement's position was very precarious, but he hardly seemed to realize his danger, and his parsimony made him unwilling to spend money on defence. It would indeed have required a strong barrier to check the savage horde of starving fanatics and professional plunderers, whose own commanders

had no control over them, and who swept down through Italy, and on May 6, 1527, reached Rome. They soon forced an entrance into the Borgo, and beat down such resistance as the Swiss guards and a few more troops could offer. The Pope and all the rest of the ecclesiastics who were fortunate enough to be in time took refuge in S. Angelo. Confused by the loss of Bourbon in the first assault, the invaders paused before crossing the Tiber; but, meeting no further resistance, they seized the bridges, and found Rome defenceless in their grasp. Then began a scene of horror which can hardly be described. The citizens were brutally tortured and murdered, houses and palaces stripped of every valuable, women violated, churches and convents desecrated with awful profanities by the fanatic Lutherans. The savage barbarities of the Germans were supplemented by the more ingenious cruelties of the Spaniards. Nobles and Cardinals were captured and put to ransom, sometimes two or three times over, nor did they escape insult and torture. Many persons lost their lives during the sack, many more during the famine and plague which inevitably followed. The splendid, wealthy Rome of Leo X was wrecked and ruined, never to recover its former magnificence. For four days the tragedy continued, and Clement, watching from S. Angelo's the desolation of his capital and the agonies of his subjects, hoped in vain that the army of the League would appear to rescue him. At last the Prince of Orange, who succeeded Bourbon in command, was able to restore a semblance of order amongst the troops. S. Angelo was then closely blockaded, and, after much hesitation, due to the difficulty of raising the enormous sums demanded as ransom, Clement capitulated (June 5). But it was not until November that he succeeded in escaping from his captors.

Though the Popes had lately neither deserved nor obtained much respect from Europe, there was a universal shudder of horror when the news was told of the degradation which the chief Pastor of Christendom had suffered. Even the Emperor,

whose army had committed the outrage, was constrained by public opinion to express himself shocked, and to order that his court should go into mourning. For the moment, indeed, Italy, the Papacy itself, seemed at his disposal; it would not have been very surprising if he had deposed the Pope and reduced his office to a dependency of the Empire.

But Charles, even if he had possessed the necessary courage and indifference to opinion, had neither money nor troops to complete the work. The army in Rome was ruined by its own debauchery, and almost disappeared in the ravages of the resultant plague.

Charles might almost feel that vengeance was descending upon him when Henry VIII and Francis I signed the Treaty of Amiens, and declared themselves ready to defend the Pope. A French army under Lautrec occupied most of Lombardy and marched upon Naples; Andrea Doria, a first-rate naval commander and the most capable Italian of the age, seized Genoa for France. The city of Naples was besieged by Lautrec, and blockaded by Venetian and Genoese ships. The fortunes of the Spaniards seemed, in spite of the recent conquest of Rome, to have reached their lowest ebb.

But Francis threw away all his advantages, alienated Andrea Doria and drove him over to the Imperial side, thus losing Genoa, and allowed Lautrec's army to be ruined for want of support, so that it had to surrender to the Imperialists. Francis was indeed a broken reed; the Italian League which leaned upon him was lost, and it had no force or cohesion of its own. Charles wisely decided to exchange compulsion for cajolery; he wanted the Pope's support in the English divorce case, and against the Lutherans, who were almost as dangerous to the Empire as to the Papacy.

As for Clement, he was growing tired of being an Italian patriot. Venice had taken back Ravenna and Cervia while he was a prisoner; the States of the Church were in the utmost confusion; worst of all, Florence had once more thrown off

the Medici yoke, re-established the Republic, and invoked French protection. "I had rather be the Emperor's chaplain, than let myself be set at nought by my own subjects," exclaimed the Pope. By the Treaty of Barcelona (June, 1529) Charles and Clement agreed to sink their differences, and to unite for the repression of heretics and for the "settlement" of Italy upon the lines that best suited them both. Charles was to receive the Imperial crown from the Pope, and to marry his illegitimate daughter to Alessandro de' Medici.

After all the struggles of the last thirty years, the settlement was a perfectly simple matter now that Emperor and Pope thoroughly understood one another and agreed to divide the spoils. Francis did not interfere; indeed, in order to recover his sons' liberty, he abandoned all his Italian allies with complete indifference (Peace of Cambray, 1529), leaving them to make the best terms that they could for themselves.

Accordingly when, in the autumn of 1529, Pope and Emperor met at Bologna, princes and ambassadors from all the other States appeared before them, and Charles gave forth his awards, acting more like a real emperor than had any of his predecessors since the thirteenth century. He settled their disputes, often about precedence only, and they submitted as if to their rightful monarch. Italy seemed at last to have recognized the futility of her struggles, and to accept with meekness the Dictator who was to restore peace on his own terms, while her princes gratefully accepted titles and distinctions at his hands.

Venice made her peace by relinquishing Ravenna and Cervia to the Pope, but Charles would not let Clement have things all his own way, and Modena and Reggio were not only awarded to Alfonso d'Este, but were as formerly to be held as fiefs of the Empire, in spite of Papal claims to suzerainty. Milan was to be restored to Francesco Sforza; Charles knew that he could not live long, and, since the Turks were threatening Vienna, felt that some moderation must be dis-

played towards Italy. To the Marquis of Mantua was given the title of Duke, and to Savoy the County of Asti, once the dower of the House of Orleans. The independence of Genoa had been secured by Andrea Doria as the price of his services. She was to be protected, but not interfered with, by Spain. Doria reformed the constitution of Genoa, and set it upon a basis so stable that, surviving the shock of several internal revolts, it endured with little alteration until the time of the French Revolution, and, from one of the most unstable, Genoa became one of the most conservative of States. Doria himself refused to be Doge, but during his lifetime Genoa remained wholly under his influence.

The question of Florence remained to be settled. She had sent envoys to Bologna, hoping against hope that Charles might consent to treat her like Genoa; but, even if his word had not been pledged to Clement, the Emperor knew that the Republic would always keep one corner of Italy open to France. Had Florence made terms with him before his reconciliation with the Pope, she might perhaps have escaped, but the glamour of France was still, in spite of the advice of some of the wiser citizens, too attractive for the popular party.

Clement, neither as Cardinal nor as Pope, could be accused of having ruled Florence oppressively. He had not extorted money, and he had taken the advice of the principal citizens. But he had sent thither two bastard youths of the Medici House, Ippolito, son of the younger Giuliano, and Alessandro, son of the younger Lorenzo by a Moorish slave, whose lineaments he inherited. They were under the care of a tutor, the Cardinal of Cortona, who was also governor of the city, but it was obvious that Florence was some day to be a principality for one of the lads. There was still too much independence of feeling in the city to submit calmly to such a prospect, and the embarrassment of the Pope during the Imperial invasion had been the opportunity for a rebellion, and for the restoration of the Republic upon Savonarola's model.

Nor indeed did Clement really wish to let loose upon Florence the unruly Imperial troops, of whose behaviour he had already seen too much. He hoped that fear would induce her to submit to the Medici without force, and he continually urged her to surrender of her own accord. But Florence was obstinate, and prepared to resist the Papal and Imperial army, which, accompanied by cannon from her old private enemy, Siena, was sent to besiege her. The rich citizens acquiesced in the destruction of their suburban villas; all joined in improving the fortifications; Michael Angelo was appointed commissioner general for this work, and himself directed it.

The Emperor was only half-hearted, and inclined to persuade Clement to give way; while the Imperial commander, the Prince of Orange, who had watched the sack of Rome and was not sure that he could control his own troops, declared that for Florence to suffer a similar fate would be "an irreparable misfortune." But the Emperor was dependent upon the Pope to grant him ecclesiastical tenths for his own war against the Turks, and Clement was as obstinate as Florence. The rule of the Medici there was to him the dearest object in life, and of far higher importance than the interests of Italy or of the Papacy itself. Though entirely alone, Florence resisted with devoted gallantry for a whole year; the Prince of Orange was killed in a skirmish, and it was only the treachery of her own general, Malatesta Baglioni, which at last forced her to surrender. Fortunately the Imperial captains contrived to avoid a sack (August, 1530).

Alessandro de' Medici was sent to govern Florence with the title of Duke; and, though indemnity and the preservation of republican offices and forms of government were promised, these pledges were violated, and the State turned into an absolute principality for the young Duke.

Meanwhile, on February 24, 1530, Charles had been crowned by the Pope at Bologna. The crowns of both Lombardy and Rome were brought there for the occasion, for neither Milan

nor Rome, devastated by his own armies, was in a fit state for the ceremony. Surrounded by Italian princes and Spanish generals, with few Germans present, he seemed rather to be crowned King of Italy than Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, though it was as Emperor that he extorted submission, especially in the case of Florence.

Even if Charles had wished to convert this hegemony in Italy into a more definite rule, he must have known that the task would be impossible. The existence of the Papacy would once again have made an Italian kingdom out of the question; and, even if Spain had been strong enough to govern such a subject kingdom, the other European powers would not have tolerated such an increase in the Habsburg dominions. Charles, without money, and threatened by Turks and pirates, discontent in Spain, disorder and Protestantism in Germany, dared not add to his own difficulties. His plan was to keep a hold upon Italy by a system of alliances, cemented by the bonds of marriage, self-interest or enmity to France. In Milan he was supreme, and the Duke was kept loyal by his wife, Christina of Denmark, Charles' niece. His sister-in-law, Beatrice of Portugal, managed her husband, Charles III of Savoy. The necessity of his support to maintain the Medici rule in Florence gave the Emperor his hold upon Alessandro and the Pope. The smaller republics were all in the alliance; Genoa especially benefited by the trade which passed through it between Spain and the Empire. The Duke of Ferrara, in spite of his French leanings, held Modena and Reggio from the Emperor as pledges of loyalty. The Duke of Mantua was grateful for his new title; Venice had French preferences, but dared not show them, and she was alienated as Francis' policy of alliance with the Turks developed itself.

Charles might well hope that Italy would henceforth be a sealed book for France. Indeed, except in Piedmont, France did not again acquire a foothold there until the time of the French Revolution.

This was the most notable result of the events of the last ten years; but not much less important was the degradation in the position of the Papacy. The process begun in Leo's time was completed in that of Clement; the Papal States were indeed more under central control, but the Papacy had no longer any real weight in Europe. In secular politics it was a weak Italian State, generally dependent upon Spain; in ecclesiastical, it was obliged to fight for its life against the increasing forces of Protestantism, and here again had to look for its salvation to the orthodox support of the Emperor and the Spanish King. Clement and succeeding Popes might indeed intrigue with France, but, until the following century, their Habsburg masters had seldom to do more than jerk the leash in order to bring them to submission.

After his coronation, Charles had to hasten off to Germany to contend with Turks and Protestants, but he returned in 1532 to finish the settlement of Italian affairs, and to press upon the Pope the necessity of holding a General Council. He had another interview with Clement at Bologna, when the Treaty of 1529 was extended, but Clement was already restive under Imperial control and was intriguing with France. His hatred of the idea of a Council drove him further; he had an interview with Francis at Marseilles, when was arranged the famous match between the King's second son, Henry, and Caterina de' Medici, half-sister of the Duke of Florence. But Clement died (1534) before anything came of the new alliance. He had disappointed the bright hopes that had been based on his talents and amiability; he had done nothing to solve the German question; and he left Italy under foreign domination. His reign will always be remembered by the sack of Rome and the final extinction of the Florentine Republic.

The new Pope, Cardinal Farnese, Paul III, was committed to no political party, and showed at first leanings towards a moderate reform. If he was able to co-operate loyally with the Emperor, the German question might yet be settled. In

1535 Charles returned to Italy immediately after his successful expedition against Barbarossa and his conquest of Tunis. He was acclaimed in Sicily and Naples as the saviour of the oppressed people from the pirates who harried their coasts. In Naples he was met by a deputation of Florentine exiles, some of whom had been banished by the new government, and some who had voluntarily left the city rather than submit to Alessandro's tyranny. Many of the old Medicean group had hoped for a restoration of the former party rule, and were much disgusted at the establishment of an absolute government and the abolition of the ancient chief magistracy. Their leader was the handsome and brilliant young Cardinal, Ippolito de' Medici, Alessandro's cousin, who seems to have possessed all those delightful family traits which Alessandro lacked, and who was disgusted at being passed over for the bastard son of a slave woman. But Alessandro succeeded in poisoning Ippolito on his way to Naples, and, presenting himself there, gained Charles' ear, and made the protests of the exiles vain. Charles knew that any measure of independence to Florence meant danger to the Imperial hegemony, and Alessandro's marriage with the Emperor's natural daughter, Margaret, was celebrated in great state.

It seemed at length as if Italian affairs were settled, and it was indeed time that the country should enjoy an interval of peace, though it was peace bought at the price of servitude. She had to recover from the ravages of more than forty years of constant warfare. Great tracts of country had passed out of cultivation, almost depopulated but for the bands of brigands,—desperate peasants, outlaws and disbanded soldiers,—which infested them. The flourishing towns were stripped of their wealth and deprived of their commercial resources, the population decimated by plague, massacre, and famine. Country and town alike were depressed by heavy taxation, and by the extortions of the soldiery quartered upon them. Two Englishmen travelling in Lombardy wrote, "Between Vercelli

and Pavia in fifty miles of country, the most fruitful for vines and corn in the world, all was desert. Not a man nor a woman did we meet working in the field; Vigevano, formerly a good town with a fortress, to-day is deserted and ruined. Pavia is a pitiful sight; in the streets the children cry for food and die of hunger." A French general had advised the king, in forming his army, to bring a number of "Guastatori" from France with him; "for it is difficult to find any in Italy, since the greater part of the peasants are dead of famine, pestilence and otherwise."

But unfortunately, in October, 1535, the Duke of Milan died without an heir, and the disposal of his Duchy opened up a fresh question which altered the aspect of politics in Italy, and again disturbed its peace.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SPANISH POWER IN ITALY.

THE Emperor had no desire to incorporate Milan into his hereditary dominions at the expense of the undying enmity of France; he preferred a buffer State, which could be included amongst the Italian powers dependent on himself, and was willing that this State should be held by a French prince with an Austrian wife. But the conditions on which Francis was willing to accept the offer and withdraw his own claims were so exorbitant that Charles could not agree to them. Moreover they were backed by a wholly unprovoked assault upon Savoy. Charles III, the amiable but not very competent Duke, had long remained faithful to the French alliance, and allowed his States to be used as a road by trampling French armies of invasion; but, now that Charles had become an Imperialist, Francis suddenly discovered that he himself had all kinds of excellent claims to both Savoy and Piedmont, and proceeded to put them into force. He had as his allies the Bernese, who had just freed Geneva from the rule of Savoy. Savoy and the greater part of Piedmont were overrun and captured in a very short time, the Duke hardly making any resistance (1536).

Much against his will, the Emperor again found himself involved in war with France. An invasion of Provence by the

Imperial army was as barren of results as such raids usually were, but nearly all the remaining Piedmontese towns were garrisoned by Imperial troops, who treated the people like conquered enemies instead of allies; so that, by the end of 1537, the unfortunate Duke found his dominions in the possession of two armed forces, which were almost equally regardless of his rights.

The Emperor still wished for peace and so did the Pope. Both wanted to concentrate their energies on heretics and Turks, while Francis had made use of his alliance with the latter to bring the pirate leader, Barbarossa, on a raid even more destructive than usual upon the Italian coasts. The Pope urged Charles and Francis to meet him at Nice, where a truce was agreed to; later on they had a personal meeting on the Imperial flag-ship, and it seemed as if the Milanese question was at last to be peaceably settled. But no agreement was made about Savoy, which remained in the hands of the foreign garrisons. The French provided for a settled government, setting up a provincial parliament in their portion. The towns held by the Imperialists were ruled by the Governor of Milan; only the Val d'Aosta, Nice and a few smaller places were still held by the unhappy Duke.

Yet once again the negotiations about Milan broke down, and, in 1540, the Emperor invested his own son, Philip, with the Duchy. This was in reality a momentous event, since it showed that Italy in the future was to be under Spanish, not Imperial, guardianship. The ancient Imperial rights in Italy were not to lead to the establishment of an Austrian overlordship, but were to be passed over to Spain, and a Spanish hegemony to be created. Later on, Charles bestowed on Philip and his heirs the perpetual Imperial Vicariate in Italy. The act was in itself unconstitutional, but the idea which it embodied was established in fact. The decision was of the utmost importance for Italy, as, in the present weak state of the Empire, its authority, unbacked by Spanish force, would

soon have sunk again into desuetude. Spanish control was a far more pressing reality.

Naturally the first result of the investiture was renewed war between Francis and the Emperor, and new sufferings for Piedmont. The citizens of the little town of Cuneo distinguished themselves by beating off, almost unaided, the attack of a whole French army; but as a rule the people were too much crushed to dare to stand up for their rightful Duke. In 1543 an allied French and Turkish fleet descended upon Nice, captured and burned the town, but could not overcome the gallant defenders of the fortress. As the Imperial-Genoese fleet advanced, it retreated; but the Turks carried off thousands of prisoners, and sold them as slaves at Toulon, where their fleet was allowed to winter. In the following year, the French snatched a victory at Ceresole in Piedmont, but it was fruitless, for soon afterwards the Emperor, with the co-operation of Henry of England, was able to force Francis to make the Peace of Crépy (1544). Francis promised provisionally to give up all Savoy and Piedmont except two fortresses, and once more it seemed as if Italy might settle down to peace, and the Emperor be allowed to turn his undivided attention to Protestants and Turks.

One of the obstacles to Italian peace, Alessandro, Duke of Florence, had disappeared in 1537, murdered from motives of personal hatred by a cousin. There was no near relation to succeed him, but only another distant cousin, not even descended from Cosimo "Pater Patriae," Cosimo, a son of Giovanni delle Bande Nere, a youth of seventeen. Now, if ever, was the opportunity for the older Mediceans to restore the government of the party, and Lorenzo's two grandsons, Cardinals Salviati and Ridolfi, hastened to Florence. If Cosimo were Duke, they thought that at least his power might be strictly limited. But the boy was too clever for them; he secured the Emperor's approval of his election, brushed aside the constitutional safeguards, and literally frightened the two old Cardinals out of

Florence. He had yet more determined enemies to meet, the Strozzi family and other exiles, who marched upon the town with an army. But the Imperial troops at Cosimo's disposal defeated them and took many prisoners, amongst them Filippo Strozzi himself. Most were publicly executed; Strozzi died mysteriously in prison.

Cosimo was soon settled in his Duchy. His government was absolute, severe and inquisitorial; enemies at home and in exile were pursued with relentless hate; no shred of liberty remained to the Florentines; yet Cosimo had the good sense and self-control which Alessandro lacked. He kept order, administered strict justice, and avoided the personal tyrannies which had made Alessandro so odious. The Emperor could rely on him to keep Florence in subjection and loyal to himself, from whom alone he could hope for protection against the exiles. The latter, headed by Filippo Strozzi's son, Piero, all looked to France for help.

Cosimo married Eleanora, daughter of the strict, but just, Viceroy of Naples, Pedro de Toledo. Naples had never been better ruled, and was unusually quiet under his government. The nobles complained bitterly to Charles of his severity, but the people delighted in their security from the violence and oppression of the nobles, and Charles rightly reposed great confidence in him.

The Milanese gave no trouble, and most of the independent governments were quiet enough; but the Emperor's difficulties arose in part from the opposition party, which continually intrigued with France, and in part from the Pope. Francis, the faithless and ruthless, who abandoned his allies without a pang, and who brought hordes of semi-savages to plunder the Italian coasts, posed as the protector of Italian exiles and minorities. Discontented Florentines, Neapolitans and Milanese haunted the French court; French agents were everywhere in Italy, plotting especially in Ferrara, Venice and Rome. The little Lombard town of Mirandola was a French

protectorate, and a centre for all these intrigues. Besides this, the Peace of Crépy had proved a failure, and Francis kept Savoy and Piedmont in his own hands, maintaining there an army of occupation which would always be ready for interference in Italy, should opportunity offer.

Paul III also was quite willing to take a hand in French intrigues if by such means he could attain his dearest wish, the establishment of a State for the most worthless and scandalous of all Papal bastards, Pier Luigi Farnese. At first the Pope hoped to get his desire from the Emperor, and in fact secured Novara as a fief for Pier Luigi, and Charles' daughter, the widow of Duke Alessandro, as a wife for Pier Luigi's son, Ottavio. But when Charles refused to follow up the marriage by investing Ottavio with Milan, Paul went over to the French side, and openly encouraged the ally of Turks and Protestants against the only sovereign who attempted to defend Europe from the former and Catholicism from the latter. Paul was in fact too deeply impregnated with the ancient Papal jealousy of Imperialism to be able to co-operate loyally with the Emperor, even against heretics. He was indeed obliged to summon a General Council at Trent in 1544, but his attitude towards it showed that he had no intention of allowing it to become Charles' instrument for a reconciliation with Protestants. Nor would he act loyally as Charles' ally in the Smalkalde war against the Protestants, and finally he moved the Council to Bologna, where it was useless to the Emperor.

In the meantime he had invested Pier Luigi with Parma and Piacenza (1545). The Papal rights in these States were more than doubtful, being based only upon the supposed testament of the Countess Matilda; and, though Charles permitted the Pope to hold them himself, to grant them to Pier Luigi was sheer provocation, and the Imperial Chamber declared them to be an integral part of the Duchy of Milan. At the moment Charles was too busy in Germany to interfere, but Pier Luigi filled up the cup of his offences by encouraging,

together with France and the Pope, the Fieschi revolt in Genoa. This was a rebellion of a section of the Genoese nobility against the ascendancy of Doria and the protection of Spain. At the same time there was a dangerous outbreak in Naples, only checked by Toledo's skill, on account of the Pope's attempt to introduce the Inquisition. The Pope was known also to be intriguing with Florentine exiles against Cosimo de' Medici, and there was a rising in Siena,—hitherto so Imperialist,—in which the Spanish garrison was only saved from massacre by the intervention of Cosimo.

Thus all Italy was in quite a dangerous condition, and unfortunately the new Governor of Milan, Ferrante Gonzaga (1546), was not suited to deal with the crisis. Devoted though he was to the Emperor's interests, he pushed them with rough and inconsiderate methods which spoiled the effect of the carefully moderate attitude which Charles had for so many years maintained. Against the Emperor's better judgment, he was persuaded to countenance a conspiracy planned by the subjects of Pier Luigi,—justly incensed against him,—which Gonzaga was to supplement by marching Imperial troops to seize Piacenza. Charles stipulated that Farnese should not be personally injured, but the prohibition was naturally disregarded by the angry nobles, who gladly took the opportunity of murdering their hated oppressor (1547). Gonzaga annexed Piacenza to the Duchy of Milan, and there was war in all but name between Emperor and Pope. There was a general scramble for Parma; while the Pope wished to recover it for the Papacy, Ottavio Farnese seized it for himself. Both sides intrigued with France, which was preparing to interfere when Paul III died, actually at war with his own grandson (1549). His Papacy had been singularly inglorious; his policy full of feeble shiftings and turnings, sometimes leaning towards reform, but at close quarters shrinking back from it; he was so much afraid of the one great Catholic force, the Emperor, as to seem at league with Protestants and Turks against him; in earnest

only in one matter, the aggrandisement of his family, and in this seeming at last to have so lamentably failed. Paul could not have guessed on his deathbed that his descendants were actually to rule an Italian State for nearly two centuries.

His successor, Cardinal del Monte, Julius III, a mild-mannered, literary man, wished for peace, and hoped to content all parties by granting Parma to Ottavio Farnese. But, though young Farnese was the Emperor's son-in-law, Gonzaga, more Imperial than the Emperor himself, would have none of him. The war continued until Farnese was driven to throw himself upon French protection. The Pope retaliated by declaring his fief forfeited; the French sent troops to defend Parma, which Gonzaga was besieging. The war in central Italy soon spread to Piedmont, and that unhappy country again suffered from the rapacity of both parties. Gonzaga was not strong enough there to do more than hold the French in check, so that they might not be able to join in the Parma war. Italy was full of disturbance; there was another revolt at Genoa; the long-smouldering discontent of Siena was stirred by the French into open flame; Neapolitan exiles were very active. The Emperor sent Alva, with a good army, to reinforce the Imperial party in Italy.

But the Pope was tired of a war which brought him no profit, and had already cost the life of a good nephew, Gianbattista del Monte. He made a truce (1552), which permitted Farnese to hold Parma for two years; later on permanent investiture was granted to him. The Emperor, attacked and almost captured by the Protestants, could not interfere, and had to see the General Council, which Julius had re-opened (1551), speedily vote its own suspension. The war in Piedmont had merged into a new struggle between the Emperor and France, now ruled by Henry II, and Charles had little strength to spare for Italy. Gonzaga could not do more than stand on the defensive in Piedmont, while its natural defender, Prince Emanuele Filiberto, a youth who already

gave signs of an extraordinary military talent, was fighting for the Emperor in Flanders.

In 1553 died poor old Charles III of Savoy, worn out with sorrow and ill-usage. His sufferings had increased since Gonzaga, who was the enemy of his house, became Governor of Milan, and, in many underhand and cruel ways, robbed him of his remaining revenues and scanty comforts. Soon after his death Gonzaga was withdrawn, the Emperor recognizing that he had already done more than enough harm in Italy. Emanuele Filiberto begged to be allowed to take his place, but Charles kept him in Flanders, and sent Alva to Lombardy. Alva had no more success in Piedmont than Gonzaga, and the French held nearly all the country. In 1557 they made another attempt upon Cuneo, which again repulsed them after a memorable defence. It was to repeat this feat on three subsequent occasions. In the same year the great victory of the young Duke, Emanuele Filiberto, over the French at St Quentin gave him a claim upon the honour and gratitude of Spain which could not be set aside, and, as the time of the ultimate settlement of Italy drew near, it became plain that at least part of the States of Savoy must be restored to their rightful owner.

The rebellion of Siena has already been mentioned; it was the most interesting event of a rather barren period. Siena, Ghibelline from time immemorial, was pleased to welcome the Emperor and submit to his protection, so long as he preserved her autonomy and defended her from the ambitions of the Medici. But in Siena, as in Lombardy, the Emperor's interests were too zealously served by an Imperial agent. Mendoza was always troubling Siena, changing the balance of her government amongst her innumerable parties, forcing her to repatriate exiles, disarming the people while not properly guarding them from the license of the Spanish garrison, finally building a fortress, which the Sienese naturally looked upon as the stronghold of a future tyranny. French agents were busily working

to destroy her loyalty; there was one outbreak in 1546; in 1552 a French and Italian force dashed upon the city, and, aided by the citizens, attacked and captured the garrison. The people enjoyed themselves in pulling down the fortress, and holding celebrations of liberty with processions and merry-makings. The Emperor ordered Toledo to interfere, but there was a third party to reckon with, Cosimo de' Medici. Cosimo meant to have Siena himself some day and be Duke of Tuscany, but he knew how to bide his time. First he tried to get the Emperor's revenge postponed, and Toledo's death early in 1553 aided this design. Later in the year Charles entrusted Cosimo himself instead of Toledo with the task of reducing Siena, sending him money and troops for the purpose. Their commander was Gian Giacomo Medici,—no relation of the Florentine family,—who began his career as a brigand chief in Lombardy, and so terrorised the neighbourhood of Como that he imposed terms upon Sforza, and ultimately obtained from the Emperor the Marquisate of Marignano and a command in the Imperial army. His brother afterwards became Pope Pius IV. He was a capable and ruthless soldier, but in Piero Strozzi, who conducted the defence of Siena, he nearly met his match. At last, after the Sienese *Contado* was so ruined that it has never to this day recovered its prosperity, Strozzi was defeated and his army broken up (August, 1554), and Siena itself was besieged. Though Strozzi had returned to France, the defence was obstinate and gallant; for the citizens would not yield till they were starving; and when at last surrender was inevitable (April, 1555), many of the inhabitants left the city, and for a considerable time a devoted band of them fortified themselves in the strong town of Montalcino, calling it the Republic of Siena. They only submitted when the general peace deprived them of any further hope of French aid. A fresh detachment of Tuscan exiles then retired to France, to keep up there the agitation against the Medici.

Yet Cosimo did not obtain his reward at once; the

Emperor granted Siena to his own son, and Philip only bestowed it upon Cosimo when he wanted his help in the war. Cosimo was to hold it as a Spanish fief, on condition of helping Spain when she was attacked in Italy. He had also to leave in Spanish hands five coast places, known as the "Presidi." They were pledges for his loyalty, and formed an entrance for Spain into Italy in case Genoa should ever be shut against her. With Spain as overlord of Siena, the process of converting Italy into a Spanish fief advanced one more step. When Charles V retired into his monastery the hegemony of Italy passed unquestioned to Philip, and very little more was heard there of Imperial rights until the time of the War of the Spanish Succession.

One more difficulty was however to be overcome in Italy before the final settlement of 1559, namely, the hostility of the new Pope, Cardinal Caraffa, Paul IV (1555), who, as a Neapolitan patriot, hated the Spanish conquerors with a deadly hatred. The fierce, self-willed old man began his reign by sacrificing his really genuine passion for reform, which could only be effective with Spanish co-operation, to his wild desire to free Italy from Spanish domination. The language which he used against Charles and Philip could not be sufficiently abusive; he ousted the Ghibelline Colonna from their castles to bestow them on his own worthless nephews, entered into alliance with France, hired German Protestant soldiers and negotiated with the Turks. The Duke of Guise was sent with a French army to help him by invading Naples. Alva marched to expel Guise, but news of the Battle of St Quentin recalled him to France, and Alva advanced upon defenceless Rome. It seemed as if the tragedy of 1527 might be repeated. But Alva's army was under his own control, and Alva was under Philip's, while Philip was far too wise as well as too devout to permit another sack of Rome. He ordered Alva to make peace on terms very favourable to the Pope. Much against his will, Alva entered Rome rather as a penitent than as a

victorious general, and Paul gloried most ungenerously in his cheaply-bought triumph. But Philip knew what he was about; France lost its most valuable ally in the peninsula, and the Pope, satisfied with success, turned his attention from politics to religion. He discovered the evil deeds of his nephews, drove them from Rome, and busied himself in forcing the Babylon of the Renaissance to assume at least the appearance of Puritan austerity, in organising the Inquisition, persecuting the heretics of Italy, and initiating the Counter-Reformation movement which owed so much to him.

In 1559 the years of struggle for the domination of Italy came at last to an end in the Peace of Câteau-Cambrésis, which guaranteed the continuance of the Spanish hegemony. France, in renouncing its claims to Milan and Naples, restoring Piedmont and Savoy to their Duke and recalling its aid from Italian malcontents, was virtually pledged not to interfere in Italy any more. And the domestic circumstances of France forced it for quite a considerable time to keep the pledge unbroken. Yet Henry II would not wholly shut himself out of Italy, for, while restoring Savoy and Piedmont, he retained,—until, it was stated, the French claims should be finally adjudicated upon,—five of the best Piedmontese fortresses,—Turin, the capital, Pinerolo, which secured the passage of the Alps, Villanova d’Asti, Chieri and Chivasso. As a counterpoise, Spain garrisoned Asti and Vercelli until France should have given up the others. Even without these fortresses, France had a road into Italy through the Marquisate of Saluzzo, which she had, with little excuse, taken from its owner in 1548. Thus she commanded a route over the Alps direct from Dauphiné. Again, Philip had obliged Emanuele Filiberto, as a condition of Spanish support in the peace negotiations, to allow him joint sovereignty over the ports of Nice and Villafranca, the garrisons to be provided and paid by Spain, and to take an oath of fealty to both Spain and Savoy. Thus the Duke could by no means feel himself secure in the possession of his own dominions.

Moreover, he was obliged to marry Henry's sister, Margaret of France, who was no longer young. Henry no doubt hoped that there would be no heir, so that France, when she should have recovered from her exhaustion, would have another opportunity for asserting her claims to Savoy.

By preserving the protectorate of Mirandola, France was also still able to keep a garrison in the middle of North Italy, which might serve as a nucleus for new efforts.

It will be well to pause for a moment, and make a tour of the Italian States as they appeared after the 1559 settlement. In Lombardy, besides mutilated Piedmont and Spanish Milan, were the States of the Gonzaga, whose head was now Duke Guglielmo, cousin of the Imperial general, Ferrante Gonzaga. Besides Mantua, he held Montferrat, which, on the extinction of the ancient Paleologhi line, had been disputed between Mantua and Savoy, and had been awarded to Mantua by the Imperial Chamber in 1536. Mantua was however weakened by the subdivision of its States into appanages for the numerous younger branches of the family.

Venice had remained neutral throughout the late wars; she naturally inclined towards France, but was alienated by the French alliance with the Porte. Between 1538 and 1540, she was involved in a Turkish war, and had been obliged to make peace on unfavourable terms.

Ferrara, Modena and Reggio passed in 1559 from Ercole to Alfonso II d'Este, who, with a French mother, Renée of France, and French education, had a natural bias towards France. Ercole had unwisely allowed himself to be drawn into the war of Paul IV against Spain, and was not included in the peace made by Alva at Rome. Ottavio Farnese was entrusted with the prosecution of the war against him, and, deserted by France, he had at last to accept humiliating terms.

Ottavio Farnese, who had been wise enough to recover Imperial favour as soon as possible, was in possession of Parma, though Piacenza was for the present withheld. His son,

Alessandro, entered Spanish service, in which he was to distinguish himself extraordinarily.

Genoa and Andrea Doria were still faithful to the Habsburg alliance; the port was extremely useful as forming the only route for Spain into its Milanese dominions. The Republic had had much trouble lately from its subject island, Corsica, where misgovernment had caused revolt. In 1553 a Franco-Turkish fleet landed there an exiled patriot, Sampiero Corso, who led the Corsicans against the Genoese and offered the sovereignty of the island to France. However, Genoa received help from Imperial troops, and the rebellion was checked in 1559 by the withdrawal of French aid in accordance with the conditions of the peace.

Tuscany now belonged to Cosimo de' Medici, excepting Lucca, the Spanish Presidi and the little independent State of Piombino, which, with the greater part of Elba, was held by a prince of the Appiani family. But Porto Ferraio, the best harbour of Elba, belonged to Cosimo, and was fortified by him as a defence against Turkish raids. Lucca was allowed to retain her independence, which Charles and Philip looked upon as a useful check to Cosimo. Lucca had lately been the scene of a curious incident, the plot of the bold Gonfalonier, Burlamacchi, who, carried away by his classical studies, dreamed of a great plan for ridding Italy at once of foreign and ecclesiastical domination, and uniting it into a confederation of free States with political and religious liberty. The plot was betrayed to Cosimo, and immediately reported to the Emperor. Burlamacchi was executed, protesting that he had never meant disloyalty to the Empire, by which he must have referred to its abstract rights, not to the present Emperor's interpretation of them.

The last seventy years had witnessed a great change in the Papal States. The large towns and independent fiefs had all, with the exception of Urbino and Ferrara, become subject to the central government; even Ancona had been deprived of

its republican independence. Urbino was ruled by Guidobaldo della Rovere, a descendant of the family of Sixtus IV.

Naples and Sicily were Spanish dependencies, each ruled by a Viceroy, but not under the same kind of military government as was Milan. The Neapolitan disturbances ceased when the threatened Inquisition was withdrawn; the invasion of the Duke of Guise caused temporary trouble, but the party disloyal to Spain was comparatively small and weak. Naples and Sicily, though heavily taxed, would really have been well off at this period, had it not been for the ceaseless depredations of the pirates upon their coasts. Numbers of the inhabitants were captured and sold as slaves, villages and even towns were burned, and all portable property carried off. The Emperor endeavoured in vain to stop the evil by attacking it at its source, the coast-towns of North Africa, where Barbarossa and his fellow-pirates dwelt, and whence they issued forth on their harrying expeditions. All the renegades and vagabonds of Europe joined them, and they were encouraged and sometimes assisted by France. In 1535 the Emperor himself led an expedition to conquer Tunis, and all Italy rejoiced at his success; but his constant wars in Germany and against France distracted Charles' attention, and his expedition in 1541 against Algiers was a disastrous failure. Barbarossa kept the Italian coasts terrorised till his death in 1546, and there were others to take his place. Toledo, however, in part protected Naples by fortifying the coast-towns, and building a series of watch-towers along the shore, from which warning was given of the pirates' approach, and soldiers summoned to resist them. The really sensible plan would have been to create a large and efficient navy to keep the seas free, but the Emperor never had either the time or the money to do more than subsidise Doria's fleet, which was mainly Genoese.

CHAPTER V.

SOCIAL, INTELLECTUAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY FROM 1492 TO 1559.

THE momentous changes wrought in Italian life, social, moral and intellectual, during the period which we have had under review, correspond with those which took place in her political condition. The thirty years between 1490 and 1520 saw the culmination of the Renaissance; the thirty years after 1520 saw its decadence, together with the development of a new social order and the beginning of a revolution in the character of the national religion.

Of Italian society as it existed about the turn of the century it is impossible to give a satisfactory picture in a short space, and it has been excellently described in many accessible books. Never in the world's history has there been a period of greater magnificence and brilliancy than when Venice, the five larger courts of central and northern Italy and the smaller courts of Romagna vied with one another as centres of intellectual, artistic and splendid life. Their rulers competed in attracting to themselves the finest intellects, the most skilful craftsmen, and were each surrounded by a band of courtiers, and, even in Rome, of beautiful women, all alike highly educated, and able to appreciate, often to emulate, the work of the professionals. On the days that the court was not hunting, groups of eager listeners would gather round the *improvisatore* or the story-

teller; others would visit the artist's workshop; others would discuss new books, or argue of Platonic philosophy, love and chivalry. Elaborate dramatic entertainments, balls, receptions, religious ceremonies, gave opportunity for pageants of beauty and of gorgeous dress, nor were the poor shut out from participation. Most of the governments rested so entirely upon popular support that it was a matter of policy as well as of pleasure to keep the lower classes contented, and the Italian lower classes were easily contented with a little food and a great many fine shows. Long years of almost unbroken peace had left the country prosperous, commerce and agriculture alike flourishing, so that food was easily obtainable. The court lived, hunted and danced in public, shared in the popular Carnivals, Festas and races, and held its "Trionfi" and other spectacular displays in the streets and squares, the people taking their part as by right. Nor were the courtiers the mere titled dependents of their lords; they were semi-independent landowners, rich city merchants, adventurers of all kinds, military, artistic and literary. There was little social distinction; wealth and intellect were universal passports, and in Italy a peasant might rise to be Pope or Duke. It was the age of the development of the individual, of the influence of cultivated women, of the passionate search for beauty and culture, the worship of nature as revealed in humanity, as well as the age of the classical revival, and the culmination of the second great art period in the world's history.

It is extraordinary how little difference the earlier years of the wars made in Italian life as a whole. The fall of the Medici took the leadership from Florence; later on, the extinction of the Duchy of Milan made another court the less, and the conquests of Cesare Borgia crushed out of existence the smaller Romagnol courts, which had each in its way aimed at perfecting a little picture of culture, each with its individual features. Parts of the country, especially the Milanese, suffered terribly from the inroads of foreign soldiery, but the majority of

the States had not yet felt the worst pressure of war, and their indifference to the fortune of their fellows was quite astonishing. The ruin of neighbours and relatives was looked upon as a regrettable, but quite unavoidable, incident, somewhat as had been regarded the sudden sanguinary outbursts within the courts themselves, with their tale of wholesale murders and secret assassinations. When, for example, the Montefeltri of Urbino fall victims to Cesare Borgia, Isabella d'Este, Duchess of Mantua, the dear friend of the dispossessed Duchess, thinks first of how she can coax the conqueror to give her some of the art-treasures from his spoils. At Mantua and at Ferrara the gay life of the Renaissance continued unchecked until it was gradually modified by the influence of Spain and the Counter-Reformation.

We cannot but notice how authors and artists seem to have lived in a kind of intellectual dreamland, hardly touched by the troubles of their country, quite ignoring the political situation. Ariosto does not care whether he serves an Italian or a French tyrant, so long as the tyrant gives him the means and the leisure for his work.

That which above everything else produced the extraordinary complexity and variety of the Italian Renaissance was the existence of so many independent centres of culture, alike in their aims and ideals, but producing types all differing in details. Before 1494 Florence had held the primacy; here the type produced might be called specially domestic and commercial. The Medici and the group of families surrounding them, all rich merchants, formed the centre of Florentine life. Art built and decorated their houses, and pictured themselves, often engaged in homely tasks, in the Churches. In spite of the influence of the Humanists and of the Platonic Academy, Tuscan culture was also very Italian. It was the Tuscans who developed the vernacular into a literary language; Lorenzo encouraged them, and the result of his influence was seen after his death, when the Florentine historians developed a simple

and powerful prose style, clear and terse, without Latinisms, circumlocutions or conceits. The fall of the Medici and the influence of Savonarola revolutionised Florence; the Republic was too serious, too hard-pressed from without, to cultivate the graces; Savonarola preached against the non-moral, pagan tendencies of the age. On his bonfires of Vanities, secular pictures, as well as dice and false hair, were burned; Botticelli laid aside his palette and became for a time a disciple; Fra Bartolommeo was a Piagnone whose piety coloured all his work. Only the shallow mind of Andrea del Sarto, as he painted his exquisite, soulless Madonnas, was untouched by the great convulsions which shook Florence. When the Medici rule was for a short time restored, Michael Angelo built the Sacristy of S. Lorenzo and the tombs of Giuliano and Lorenzo de' Medici contained in it, but Michael Angelo was at heart a Republican, and afterwards found more congenial employment in helping to fortify the city against the Imperial besieging army.

The literary products of Florence at this period were the historians already referred to. They represented her new seriousness of spirit, her search for the ideal constitution, and the sense which she alone in all Italy possessed of the perilous condition of contemporary politics. They all, Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Varchi, Pitti and the rest, show the modern critical spirit, the real historical sense of proportion and of evidence, but, in the two former especially, we find that history is the handmaid of political theory, and the facts of history are to be used as illustrations of the theories they wish to prove.

Machiavelli, in spite of his curiously uninteresting personality, had dimly burning within him the soul of an Italian patriot; he cherished the dream of a united Italy under a strong prince; he understood that such an end could only be reached by much craft and through immense suffering of the individual, and his admiration for the craft and disregard of the suffering were merely typical of his age. But it is

remarkable that, just when the system which had governed Italian politics for some generations was breaking up, just when the craft which he glorifies was failing before the *force majeure* of the "Barbarians," this theory of politics should by Machiavelli be for the first time edited and its methods described, so that it made an easy conquest of the conquerors themselves, was adopted by them and became the State system of Europe for three centuries.

Machiavelli's influence on political theory and on practical politics is almost incalculable. Guicciardini, who tried to build up the ideal constitution for a city-state, is mainly interesting for the light he throws on Florentine history and politics.

The type of Venetian culture was essentially that of the rich and powerful corporation, and to the determination of its character her independence, her self-glorification, her toleration in religion and freedom of morals, the oriental tendency towards gorgeousness and luxury due to the Eastern influences on her history, and her extraordinary physical beauty all contributed. The natural brilliance of her colouring and translucent atmosphere are reflected in the works of her great artists, Giorgione, Titian, Tintoretto and Paul Veronese. In them we see portrayed her splendid, sensuous life, dignified, yet full of movement, wholly self-satisfied, without a trace of the spiritual striving which troubled Florence. Life in Venice seemed untouched by the agonies of Italy; the blows inflicted by the League of Cambray were received in silence, and seemed at first to have no effect on her social organisation. Art and Literature, spectacular displays and religious ceremonies centred themselves as formerly in the glorification of the State; there seemed complete unconsciousness that its death-knell had begun to ring. To the period between 1509 and 1559 belong some of her most magnificent buildings, including the Library of S. Mark, in which Sansovino dedicated his brilliant talent to the glory of his city.

Indeed, as the rest of Italy became more and more troubled, the custom grew up for the rich and idle to resort to Venice at festival times for the unrestrained enjoyment they could no longer find at home. The fêtes were as splendid as ever, the moral license unchecked so long as no political intrigues were attempted by the stranger. In Venice also congregated the freethinkers and the satirists, who, as the century advanced, found life increasingly difficult in other parts of Italy. Here dwelt in safety the king of satirists, Pietro Aretino, the basest figure of the Renaissance, who made a fortune by blackmailing the powerful and spent it in debauchery.

But it is not fair to judge Venice by alien scamps; her literary life can better be appraised by the splendid activity of the Aldine Press, which continued to pour forth editions of the Classics, beautifully printed and bound, and edited by the first scholars of the day, some of them Greek immigrants.

The Renaissance at Milan had a short career, but nowhere was it more brilliant. Here it took its most monarchical form, being wholly under the direction of Lodovico il Moro and his talented, captivating wife, Beatrice d'Este. During the short period of their rule, the Milanese court was thronged with poets and romancers, with painters and craftsmen, gay gallants and beautiful women. High above them all towered Leonardo da Vinci, whose mysterious personality seems to embody the elusive spirit of the Renaissance, and makes an impression on us independent of the fragments of his art and his multifarious scientific, artistic and mechanical writings, with their almost inspired intuition into regions of knowledge hitherto unexplored. It was for Lodovico that the work of Leonardo's prime was done, whether artistic, hydraulic, or of any other kind; together they made wonderful schemes which Leonardo's tardiness or Lodovico's early fall brought to nothing. On his prison walls at Loches, Lodovico amused himself with making

sketches of the mighty equestrian bronze which Leonardo was to have cast for him.

At Mantua in its palmiest days ruled Isabella d'Este, Beatrice's equally gifted sister. Less wealthy than Lodovico, the lords of Mantua could not attain so great a splendour, yet they were so far happier that they escaped his tragic fate, and perpetuated with their race their special type of culture until it died with the dying Renaissance. There were plenty of artists at Mantua, but the greatest was Mantegna, who decorated the Gonzaga's castle with his classical paintings¹, and celebrated Francesco Gonzaga's very doubtful success at Fornovo with his beautiful "Madonna della Vittoria." For a later Gonzaga, Giulio Romano built the Palazzo del Tè, in whose gorgeous halls and *loggie*, covered with exuberant decoration, we can well imagine the Mantuan princes living their splendid, showy life.

In Milan and Mantua, where there were many idle people wanting amusement, the "Novelle" especially flourished. These were not novels as we understand them, but collections of short stories, witty, farcical or sensational, sometimes merely anecdotes, sometimes elaborate narratives. They were, after the model of the "Decameron," supposed to be related by a company of ladies and gentlemen to one another, and the ladies, like those of the model, were not squeamish in their tastes. Bandello, one of the cleverest and coarsest of these Novelle-writers, was tutor to Lucrezia Gonzaga at Mantua. But hundreds of clever people in Italy, including the women, wrote Novelle. Indeed, the general diffusion of education had an effect similar to that with which we are now acquainted, and there was an extraordinary fertility in the secondary forms of literature.

The special note of the Ferrarese Renaissance was the cult of Chivalry and of the Italian language. The first was owing

¹ One of these, "The Triumph of Julius Caesar," is in the collection at Hampton Court.

to the survival of the ancient dynasty and its feudal traditions. This spirit manifested itself in the fifteenth century by the revival of the romantic epic by Bojardo. His idea of adapting the Carolingian legend was seized upon by Ariosto, who saw its possibilities, and, by his genius, transformed it (in the "Orlando Furioso") into a marvel of perfect style and aesthetic beauty. In Ariosto, the special favourite of the Ferrarese court, the Italian language reached its zenith as an instrument of poetry; another protégé of the Este family was the master of Italian prose, Bembo, who paid homage to Lucrezia Borgia, wife of Alfonso I. Bembo's style was more elaborate and elegant than that of the Florentine historians; it was in fact a work of art rather than a simple vehicle for the expression of thought, and it became the model for later Italian prose-writers.

There was no great drama of the Italian Renaissance, for in the earlier period classical imitation throttled it, and later the inspiration, from which alone great drama can spring, was lost. The jaded taste of the courts could not tolerate simplicity; it required novelty, piquancy and smartness to stimulate it. These objects could be obtained either, as in the comedies of Machiavelli, by the cynical presentment of extreme vice mingled with personal satire, or by enlivening classical and pseudo-classical dramas with interludes of singing, ballet-dancing and buffoonery. The court of Ferrara was particularly famous for such performances; as for example, on the occasion of the marriage of Alfonso d'Este and Lucrezia Borgia, five comedies of Plautus, enlivened in this way, were presented on five successive nights, with the most elaborate and magnificent staging. Yet it was in this hybrid form of drama that the Opera was later on to originate.

The dynasty of Ferrara was one of those few which the wars did not seriously trouble, but it was far otherwise with those most delightful children of the Renaissance, the Montefeltri of Urbino. Yet Guidobaldo, last of the race, with his gifted wife, Elizabetta Gonzaga, held a court which was

above all famous for its polished manners, and his nephew and successor, Francesco della Rovere, kept up its reputation. It was at the court of Urbino that Castiglione wrote his "Cortigiano," the manual of polite behaviour for a courtier and a gentleman.

Yet, manifold and splendid as was the Italian Renaissance in these courts, its culminating point within the thirty years preceding 1527 was undoubtedly reached in Rome. Rome was free from military molestation; in Rome was wealth, leisure, a trained school of Latin style, the Chancery; above all, to the ambitious, Rome held the best chances of success. Never indeed, since the fall of the Empire, has Rome been more truly the capital of Italy than at this date when her political sway was in no way recognized in the peninsula. And to Rome in the prime of her grandeur were granted the Medici Popes, with all their family gifts of literary and artistic appreciation and criticism, and the family talent for patronage. If Julius II wished to glorify Rome as the visible sign of a glorified Papacy, Leo X followed in his steps simply to gratify his private passion for the beautiful.

To the court of Leo flocked artists and savants alike. The Cardinals and Papal officials, many of them promoted on account of their learning, held smaller courts in their palaces, and the wealthy residents followed their example. Agostino Chigi, the rich banker, who astonished the world by his expenditure, had a private Greek printing-press in his house. For him Peruzzi built the Villa Farnesina, and Raphael decorated it and built the Capella Chigi in Sta Maria del Popolo. Everyone had a library, a collection of ancient art and of inscriptions. The literary men gathered in the Academy to polish their wits against each other's; their leader was Bembo, no less a Latin than an Italian stylist, and a real scholar. A crowd of writers poured forth Pindaric odes, Ciceronian letters, Plautine comedies, didactic poems in the style of the *Georgics*.

The Papacy of Adrian VI broke up this brilliant assemblage for a time, but it returned with joy to welcome Clement VII. The sack of Rome however brought the golden age to a speedy end. The more fortunate of the Humanists fled; many were killed, or died of plague, famine or torture; the Papal court never recovered its glory.

But the period had also left indelible marks on material Rome. Julius II, thrilled with his passion to glorify the Papacy, and with it Rome and himself, was able to obtain the services of the two giants of Renaissance art, Michael Angelo and Raphael. To Raphael he gave the task of decorating the "Stanze," or rooms in which he lived, and here the painter has displayed in perfection the full height of his tranquil genius. The scheme of decoration is the apotheosis of the Papacy as a religious and intellectual force, and no less as a temporal power. Julius himself watches the expulsion of Heliodorus from the Temple, an allegory of the expulsion of the French from Italy. Raphael's portraits of Julius II and Leo X give us our best idea of the two Popes, the one consumed as by an inward burning of the fiery spirit, the other self-satisfied, genial, alight only with sensuality.

Julius II and Michael Angelo were not unlike in the grandeur of their ideas; they quarrelled, but understood one another. It was for Julius that Michael Angelo designed his titanic work on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. For Julius he was to erect a mighty tomb, a monument of allegorical statuary; but the tomb was never finished, and the "Moses" can but give us an idea of the whole design.

But Julius proposed for himself a still greater monument, a new Cathedral of S. Peter, and for this he ruthlessly pulled down most of the ancient and beautiful Basilica. His architect was Bramante, whose mark is, more than that of any other builder, set upon modern Rome. Bramante abandoned the hybrid, half-Gothic, half-Romance style in favour of a severe and stately Classicalism. Little of Bramante's own work

remains, but architecture continued for a long time on the lines which he had laid down ; and, though even his plan, that of a Greek Cross for S. Peter's, was abandoned, yet without doubt the conception of that stupendous creation proceeded from Bramante's brain. After Bramante's death, various architects continued his work, and altered his designs ; but the process was very slow, and in 1527 only bare walls and columns were as yet raised.

Leo X was not a less enthusiastic patron of art than was Julius II. Raphael's later work in the Vatican was done under his patronage. Raphael had now formed a "Bottega" in Rome, where pupils and craftsmen, under his direction, produced a great deal of the work which is known by his name. His influence, exerted through this school, largely determined the trend of Roman art, which adopted the classical manner of his later years, but could not inspire it with his genius.

The Medici Popes sent Michael Angelo to work in Florence, where he built the Sacristy of S. Lorenzo and carved its statues. A sense of gratitude to the Medici kept him as a rule, though unwillingly, in their service, until released by the death of Clement VII, but these are the least fruitful years of his life.

It is very obvious how the Renaissance followed more closely the classical type in Rome than in any other part of Italy. Since Latin was the language of Churchmen, the cultivation of a beautiful Latinity was only a natural ideal. Again, Rome, more than all Italy, was full of models of classical art. Hence the trend of the Roman Renaissance was in every way towards the revival of antiquity and towards the consequent departure from Christian tradition. S. Peter's is a great classical temple substituted for a medieval church ; Raphael, after residence in Rome, abandoned the pietistic Umbrian style of his earlier altar-pieces for the frank Paganism of the Villa Farnesina.

The propagation of a Pagan ideal of life and method of

thought, so active throughout Italy, was in Rome most sharply in conflict with the ideal which should animate the Christian Church. The nominally Christian character of the Papacy made the contrast still more glaring, and the general disintegration of morality seemed in Rome to take a form so shocking to the Christian sense that it was little wonder that the Protestants looked upon her as the Harlot, the Babylon of nations.

The principal question of the immediate future for Italy was whether her conscience would also be stirred by the strivings of the northern nations after religious revival. Of all European peoples the Italians were the least credulous, the least superstitious, the readiest to hear new things. They were embarrassed by little natural attachment to ancient traditions, customs and ways of thought; they had wholly shaken off Medievalism and its theology; it was replaced by the classical learning of the Humanist, who considered the Immortality of the Soul a legitimate subject for dispassionate speculation. The Papacy they knew too well to have any shred of reverence for it, rather there was resentment at its use of spiritual weapons to gratify temporal ambition at the expense of other States. Religious observances were not indeed disregarded, but were made the excuse for a social festival or spectacular display. And beneath the general indifference there was an undercurrent of dislike and contempt for the clergy, the incompatibility of their character and wealth with their spiritual claims. In the lower classes there was still in existence the leaven of Waldensianism, of Franciscan Mysticism, of that secret Communism which had of old attracted them so strongly.

Italy at peace would have been far too well satisfied with itself to be touched by moral upheavals; but the catastrophes of the early years of the sixteenth century might well have sobered the frivolous and led to a religious revival. This was in fact for a time their effect in Florence; Savonarola preached that her

troubles were the punishment of her sins and that she must repent, and Florence flung aside her gay amenities and aesthetic delights, and prayed fervently in the sackcloth of the penitent to be delivered from the wrath to come. But Florence soon grew tired of her latest excitement; she gave up burning Vanities and burned the Prophet instead. Afterwards she gave to the world the Medici Pope who was of all the Renaissance Popes the most characteristic, socially delightful, cultivated, enthusiastic for art and learning, yet so incapable of understanding the deeper needs of the age that he laughed at the first threatenings of the coming storm. Leo was a Pope in whom the Romans delighted, but the conscientious Adrian VI found his endeavours to reform the Curia highly unpopular. First amused, then bored, then loudly complaining, the Roman court, helpless to resist directly its tyrant's will, managed in the long run to render all his efforts vain, and openly rejoiced at the relief brought by his death. Another Medici Pope was welcomed with delight; the ecclesiastics whom Adrian had sent home came flocking back, and with them artists and humanists, courtiers and courtesans, and Rome was gay once more until the sack ended its Renaissance life for ever.

Meanwhile the outbreak of the German Revolt was bound to affect Italy, and the Papacy was driven to take action either to crush or to pacify it. In 1530, in fact, the Emperor forced Clement to summon a General Council, which he hoped would be the panacea to heal the wounds of Christendom. Intrigue with France enabled Clement to ward off the Council for the present, but its ultimate coming was inevitable, and the attitude of the Papacy towards it necessarily depended to a great extent on the attitude of Italy. If Italy were to join with Germany the Papacy could not resist the pressure for reform, but, on the contrary, the Popes found that they could look to Italy for support against the pressure. The Curia was opposed to the slightest change, for it was quite certain that the reformers would begin by reforming it, and the mere

mention of a Council brought down the prices of the Funds. Behind the Curia stood the self-interest of Rome and of half Italy. Rome without the Papal court would be ruined, and Italy would share the financial depression. Again, it was to the Papal court that all the younger sons and the clever youths of the lower classes looked for a career. Each one hoped that, in the kaleidoscope of politics, he himself might achieve greatness, might even become Pope. And now that the glory of Italy was departing, it was the possession of the Papal court alone which preserved for her something of her ancient prestige.

Throughout the long struggle the opinion of the mass of Italians remained unchanged; it was to the ranks of the Italian Bishops in the Council that the Popes could always look to support the Curia, without whose lucrative offices they might have starved in their petty dioceses. The weight of this solid force of resistance and the skilful manipulation of political intrigue enabled the Popes, Paul III and Julius III, to thwart the original purpose for which the Council was called, and to convert it instead into an orthodox body, whose chief work was to fix in definite form parts of the dogmatic system of the Church which had hitherto been hazy and undefined. There was no attempt at conciliation; the Roman Church simply put forth its formulæ, and those who differed must either submit or be branded as heretics. Italy as a whole was either already orthodox or was ready to submit, yet there were during this period in Italy three movements towards reform, distinct in origin, character and history.

When Paul III felt obliged to attempt a compromise, he found amongst the more thoughtful Italian clergy a moderate party able to advise him. A movement towards reform had originated amongst the secular clergy in the "Oratory of Divine Love," whose members set before themselves a high ideal of life. One of these, the vigorous, fiery Neapolitan, Caraffa, joined with the pious founder of the Oratory, Thiene, in forming an Order for the reform of the clergy. The Theatines,

as its members were called, gained great power, and, under their influence, the character of the Italian clergy began to improve.

This moral movement co-operated with certain mild tendencies towards doctrinal reform. These had reached Italy mainly through German visitors to Venice, where the atmosphere of religious toleration had allowed their ideas to circulate. Four members of the Oratory, Contarini, Sadoletto, Ghiberti and Reginald Pole, were affected; they were all men of the highest character and learning. Paul III created them Cardinals, and looked to them to help him through his difficulties. But he never acted upon the suggestions put forward by the commission of reform which they headed; and, though he sent Contarini to treat with the German Protestants at the Conference of Ratisbon (1541), it is most unlikely that he would have ratified the concessions which Contarini was willing to make, even if the Germans had not themselves broken off the Conference. Contarini was the most liberal of this group of reforming Cardinals, but the failure at Ratisbon ruined his influence. Pole was indeed one of the earlier Presidents of the Council of Trent (1545), but he found that the real power was in the hands of his coadjutors, and after a time he quitted Trent, hopeless of achieving reform.

In fact the rapid advance of the German Reformation frightened the more moderate Italian reformers. To Pole and Contarini it was far less heinous to keep silence about their doctrinal views than to countenance open rebellion against the Church. And the disciplinary reforms which they most desired were actually accomplished in a few years, in part by the decrees of the Council of Trent itself.

But there were other reforming elements, not so easily contented. As the Renaissance died away, and their troubles deprived the Italians of the sensual self-gratification which had hitherto satisfied them, new ideas from the north joined with Italian tendencies to originate reforming movements, not

unconnected with Humanism, and inspired by a moral and intellectual unrest, which under happier circumstances might have led to a definite school of doctrinal reform. In Italy these movements never became other than inchoate, uncertain of their own conclusions; yet they had a considerable importance, were probably more widespread than has generally been supposed, and gave origin to repressive measures which undoubtedly achieved their immediate object of suppressing heresy, but which also led to results not contemplated by their authors, namely to the complete extinction of freedom of thought and the consequent intellectual emasculation of the nation.

Humanism had encouraged independent speculation, and, when certain Humanists began to speculate in Theology, they reached conclusions at variance with the strict teaching of the Church. The group of refined, literary people, who gathered round their Spanish leader, Valdes, at Naples, had no intention of revolt against the Church, but their cravings after a more spiritual religion led them to embrace a modified form of the doctrine of "Justification by Faith." Valdes' ideas were embodied in an anonymous book, the "Merits of Christ"; his own book, called the "Hundred and Ten Considerations," was commended by George Herbert to Nicholas Ferrar. Valdes himself, Vittoria Colonna, the poetess, and most of their friends, died at peace with the Church; but others went beyond Valdes' teaching, and afterwards came into conflict with authority.

In Ferrara and Modena there were similar Humanistic movements towards doctrinal reform. The Modenese leader was its wise and tolerant Bishop, Morone; Sadoletto was also a Modenese. The Duchess of Ferrara, Renée of France, was almost openly a Protestant; and, in spite of her husband's prohibition, sheltered Swiss and French Protestant refugees, amongst them Calvin himself.

In Lucca, there was a more definite Protestant movement, led by one of Valdes' most advanced followers, Vermiglio,

which affected the whole city. Most of the children were sent to Vermiglio's school; the magistrates ceased to attend ecclesiastical functions and forbade the observance of Holy Days.

Far more popular and dangerous was the mystical type of heresy, whose adherents adopted many of the tenets of Swiss Protestantism, and which was specially suited to the character of the Italian lower classes. These were much influenced by the reformed Franciscans, or Capuchins, who, though themselves generally orthodox, set before the people the Franciscan ideal of poverty and asceticism, which must have contrasted strongly with what they knew of the wealthy hierarchy of the Church. This ideal found a quick reception amongst people who were still influenced by medieval Franciscan teaching and even by Waldensianism. The Vicar-General of the Capuchins himself, Bernardino Ochino, another disciple of Valdes, employed his splendid eloquence in preaching, particularly in Siena, a really advanced type of Protestantism, including the doctrines of Justification by Faith and Predestination. There were many varieties of teaching, tending towards Unitarianism, Manicheism or Pantheism. The most cultivated and logical of the extremists was Giordano Bruno, who maintained a frank Pantheism, tinged with the Neo-Platonism of the Humanists. The Unitarians were of different shades of opinion. They founded no definite school in Italy, but, when the persecutions began, some of them fled to Poland, where they hoped that political anarchy would allow them freedom of opinion, and there they called themselves Socinians, from their leaders, the Sienese Lelio and Fausto Socino. Their ideals were freedom of thought, and a religion as free as possible from the supernatural, and hence they were almost as far removed from Protestantism as from Catholicism.

But in the more simple and popular type of heresy the old tenets of the Waldensians were revived, the sufficiency of the Scriptures, repudiation of the Babylonish Church of Rome,

adult baptism, refusal of civil office, disapproval of war. The natural result was Communism. The movement was strongest in the north-eastern provinces, where it came under the influence of Swiss Protestants. It was completely organised, with ministers and bishops of its own, seventy of whom held synod in Vicenza in 1549. A system of messengers kept the scattered congregations in touch, and warned them of danger from the government.

To sum up, there were three reforming groups in Italy: the pious secular clergy, who wished for a moral revival; the humanistic group, whose theological speculations had led them to wish for dogmatic reforms; and the really Protestant group, composed mainly of the lower classes, usually mystic, Communistic, almost Anabaptist. Both Lutheranism and Calvinism had influence, but neither was found in its entirety. The bulk of the population was unaffected, but there was quite enough heresy to awaken the alarm of the orthodox Church. She was not prepared to go one step to meet those who did not accept her complete dogmatic system. She was determined to bring back the errant before it was too late, and for this she used two methods, both with complete success.

It was to Cardinal Caraffa, the founder of the Theatines, that residence in Spain suggested a revival of the Inquisition for the purposes of repression. The Inquisition had become almost impotent since the days when the Dominicans used it against the Waldensians; the same weapon might now be used against their revived heresies. Some of the moderate Cardinals urged conciliation, but Caraffa's strong will prevailed; in 1542 Paul III reconstituted the Inquisition, with powers superior to those of the Diocesan authorities. Caraffa was its first President; bold, energetic, merciless, impartial, he determined to root out every trace of heresy, attacking first the leaders and the powerful in order to intimidate the lesser folk. He was completely successful; the leaders were executed if they did not succeed in escaping from the

country, or were too plucky to run away. But they mostly showed in this respect more common sense than desire for martyrdom, and lived to take part in foreign reformations. Their followers naturally hastened to secure themselves by recantation and submission. Caraffa had not at first a free hand, and had sometimes to refrain from the most extreme measures; but when, in 1555, the Cardinals, still nervous about heresy, elected its president as Pope, the Inquisition was unfettered. It never became, as in Spain, an independent force, with quasi-civil authority, but the native Italian Office was effective enough for all ecclesiastical purposes. The failure of the attempt to introduce the real Spanish Inquisition into Naples has already been described (p. 56).

Most of the Italian States submitted meekly enough, even when the Inquisition overrode their own authority. Only Venice resisted, refusing at first to allow its reconstitution in her territories, and finally subjecting it to a lay commission. Few heretics were punished unless they added lay to ecclesiastical offences; German Protestant merchants and German students at Padua were unmolested. However the Republic was persuaded to give up a few Italian leaders to Paul IV, who promptly burned them.

Siena and Lucca, as the hotbeds of heresy, were the first to be attacked. Ochino was summoned to Rome, but, with the aid of the Duchess of Ferrara, managed to escape from Italy. Later in life, he visited England at the invitation of Edward VI; and afterwards, finding Calvinism too narrow for him, was banished from Switzerland on a charge of atheism. The whole Capuchin Order was implicated in the charge of heresy, and was for a time threatened with dissolution. Vermiglio also was summoned to Rome and escaped to Switzerland, and many others who had taught heretical doctrines followed his example.

Lucca however remained very Protestant, and refused to receive the Inquisition, while its Gonfalonier, Burlamacchi,

dreamed of overthrowing the Temporal Power. But the failure of the Burlamacchi plot gave Paul IV his opportunity, and the Lucchese government was forced, if it wished to preserve its independence, to institute measures against heresy on its own account.

Paul's energies were also directed against Modena; he even went so far as to imprison in S. Angelo the saintly bishop Morone, in spite of his being a Cardinal. Nothing however was proved against him; Pius IV reinstated him, and he took a leading part in the later Council of Trent. Morone was not the only Cardinal attacked by Paul IV; Reginald Pole was summoned from England and examined, but his complete submission disarmed the Pope's suspicions. His recall however spoiled the work which he had been doing for Rome in England.

As the Pope grew fiercer and more bitter in old age, the Inquisition grew more savage. Its chief, Michele Ghislieri, was chosen for his ruthlessness. Prosecutions and punishments increased, private witnesses and secret depositions were encouraged, until no one felt safe. In Rome there was almost a reign of terror until Paul's death, when the populace rose, burned the Holy Office and liberated its prisoners. But Paul's work was already done; heresy no longer dared to preach or to write. Some of the heretics had retracted, some were dead, some in exile; the rest had quietly abandoned their opinions or kept them carefully concealed.

In 1557 was published the first Index of prohibited books, by means of which Paul hoped to strike at the very roots of heretical opinion.

In Paul IV's reign, also, the other method of restoring Italy to orthodoxy, namely by reconversion, was in working order. The Theatines, Capuchins, and similar religious Orders helped in this process, but far stronger than they was the new "Order of Jesus," established by a Bull of Paul III in 1540. In a few years Italy was full of Jesuits, and their teaching did much to

restore wavering loyalty and to confirm doubtful faith. The culture, urbanity and intellectuality of the Jesuits particularly appealed to the Italian upper classes, just as the mysticism of the Capuchins had appealed to the poor. The chief weapon of the Jesuits was education, and in their numerous schools they were busily training up a new generation of devout Catholics. Thus the result of their work was felt most strongly at a rather later date.

In 1559 we find Protestantism in Italy broken, but not wholly exterminated; though only a few bolder spirits in provinces less amenable to Papal authority still resisted. All chance of a general reforming movement was over; the Papacy had successfully asserted its dominion, the future lay with the Jesuits and the Counter-Reformation.

It has been to a certain extent assumed that the decadence of the Italian Renaissance was due in part to the crushing effects of the Index, the degrading influences of Jesuitism and of the hypocrisy which the Counter-Reformation introduced into Italian life, but the facts of chronology make this theory impossible. Though these causes were responsible for the absence of later intellectual movements, the decadence of the Renaissance itself was far advanced when the Counter-Reformation was as yet embryonic. It would be safer to say that the two were in great part the outcome of the same set of conditions and causes.

First among these were the wars and foreign invasions which undermined national prosperity and rendered personal security uncertain. Men who walk daily in distress and danger cannot give themselves freely to art. The centres of Renaissance life were impoverished and broken up; first Florence, then Milan, last, and heaviest loss of all, Rome, fell victims to invasion or revolution. After 1527 there was no centre for common literary or artistic activity; the individual workers were scattered and discouraged, often plunged in poverty.

Even when there was respite from actual war, there was no

restoration of public tranquillity and prosperity. The Spanish governments set the example, only too readily followed by the native princes, of extorting from their subjects the maximum of financial contribution, while granting in return the minimum of personal security and orderly government. The rule of Toledo at Naples was in the latter respect an honourable exception, but the financial difficulties of the Imperial government rendered exceptions to the former impossible. Heavy taxes were ground out of a people whose agricultural wealth and commercial prosperity were already destroyed by the ravages and the insecurity of war, and who, at the same time, were forced to support an alien and ruthless soldiery, which could not even maintain decent order in the country it was holding in subjection. While the Turks took their toll of life, liberty and property from the coasts, the brigands dominated the country districts. A brigand chief like Gian Giacomo Medici (the Marquis of Marignano) was more powerful in the lake country than was the legitimate Duke, and could even treat for terms with the Emperor. In spite of proclamations, threats and savage punishments, brigandage was on the increase, largely on account of the constant sentences of outlawry and exile passed especially on recalcitrant criminals. For example, the proscribed Florentine was often either a brigand in Lombardy or a hired ruffian in the service of some Roman noble. The evil was not diminished by the custom of pardoning one outlaw who succeeded in betraying or assassinating another.

Nor were the effects of bad government displayed only in the open enemies of society. Besides the crowd of ill-conditioned dependents whom the greater nobles took into their service, and made the instruments of their tyrannous and immoral desires, every man of courage and spirit liked to behave as if he were a law unto himself, in defiance of all social restraints. In the autobiography of the artist-jeweller, Benvenuto Cellini, we read of frequent street-brawls, of family feuds and private revenges, of duels and secret murders,

of rapes, and illicit amours, and of all these not as offences against society, but as the defensible and often laudable occupations of the gentleman of culture and religion.

The Individualism and the passion for personal fame, acquired at whatever cost, which had distinguished the Italian Renaissance, combined disastrously with the natural cruelty and the tendency towards intrigue which always marked the Italian character. For this was a time when every tie of national loyalty was relaxed, when the restraints of religion were lost, and the moral ideal dissolved under the influence of Paganism and of that scum of all nations, which flocked into Italy under the banners of the invading armies.

The moral standard of Italy in the fifteenth century was not high; by 1530 it had become infinitely degraded. It was not without reason that a loathsome disease was called the "French Evil," since it was first known when Charles VIII held Naples. The Rome of Alexander VI has become an historical example; Paul III sacrificed Italy and the Church to the fortunes of his bastard family. The religious Houses were often hotbeds of immoral life; indeed it was difficult for a woman who entered a convent to preserve her good character in the face of the temptations which there beset her.

Domestic morality was equally debased. Without taking the comedies of Machiavelli and the *Novelle* of Bandello as literal pictures of daily life, we cannot but judge of its character by considering that they reflected, with whatever exaggeration, contemporary manners, and delighted contemporary taste. Leo X could enjoy the performance of Machiavelli's works without a blush. Domestic crime was common enough in the fifteenth century; in the sixteenth it seemed to take the special direction of wife-murder for infidelity, often with the consent and even the assistance of the wife's own family. One cannot suppose that the self-constituted judge and avenger made any pretence to conjugal fidelity on his own account.

No national characteristic is so surely reflected in a nation's literature as is its morality, and in Italy there was no exception to the rule that the deterioration of the one is followed by the decadence of the other.

Thus war, want of safety, the lowering of the moral standard, were all external causes of decadence, to which must be added the internal cause, the exhaustion which, sooner or later, always follows a period of great intellectual fertility. Original inspiration seems at last to come to an end, and later work is a reproduction of the old, but without its inherent genius. In Italy yet another cause operated in the same direction, namely the influence of Spain.

This influence was shown most strongly in the Counter-Reformation, but had before that time been exerted in Italy with unfortunate effects. Society in Spain was a narrow oligarchy; the noble families were haughty and exclusive; they despised commerce, and their only profession was the army. Nothing could be more unlike the society of fifteenth century Italy, yet Italy in the sixteenth century gradually came to conform to the pattern set by her new masters. The sole reward which the Emperor could give to his Italian partisans was the bestowal of patents of nobility, and these were showered abroad freely, and sold to anyone who would pay for them, so that soon the Italian courts swarmed with petty nobles, who jostled with the old aristocratic country families, and spent their substance in maintaining the show in servants and carriages which they imagined to be suitable to their position. Soon the nobles monopolised the courts, and the old custom of welcome and comparative equality to all who had wit, talents or wealth, gave way to a rigid exclusion of those who had not landed estates or titles, and especially of those connected with trade. Consequently, all the burghers who were fairly rich abandoned commerce, bought titles and estates, and flourished their pretentious, ridiculous nobility as their passport to society. The principal subject of interest in

the courts soon became the struggles for precedence between the new and older nobility. In this the example was set by the princes themselves; their energies and time were frittered away, and co-operation against the enemies of Italy was made impossible by these contests. The most important part of an ambassador's instructions was that which told him to whom he was to bow, with whom he was to shake hands, whom he should advance to meet, whom he should accompany to the door, and what kind of seat he might offer his visitors.

Imitation of Spain went still further; the gay colours of Italian dress were abandoned for Spanish black, and the easy, charming manners of the Italian courts for stiff Spanish etiquette. The pleasant intercourse,—“domesticanza,” as it was called,—between prince and subjects was over, and the prince lived in frigid seclusion, with as many airs of dignity as if he had been the Emperor himself. There could be no more of that familiarity between artists and Humanists and their patrons which had been so valuable for the success of the Renaissance. The literary man could no longer look upon his patron as his friend, but had to serve him humbly as a dependent, and the ill-effects of this system we shall find later on painfully exemplified in Tasso's history.

Another evil was the exaltation of militarism at the expense of the civic virtues; the bravo and the soldier ruffled it before the world as its most important personages, and the old ideal of burgher life was wholly lost, and was replaced by a conception of society so changed that, for example, a man who visited Florence in 1492 and again in 1540 might have been excused for believing that he was in the same town, inhabited by a different race and ruled over by an alien family.

The result of the abandonment of commerce was doubly disastrous; it created a large idle class, to whom all professions but the Church and the army were closed, and idleness was of course the fertile parent of disorder, folly, extravagance and immorality; and it brought to a speedy end the material

prosperity of the Italian cities, already damaged by the insecurity of war-times. Italy could never be again the financial centre of Europe; and to the folly of her own citizens in abandoning commerce were added other causes which completed her financial ruin, the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the consequent diversion of Oriental trade routes, and the heavy taxation of the new governments, which seemed, with a perverse ingenuity, to fix the incidence in such a way as to do the greatest possible harm to trade at the least profit to their finances. For the first time for a very long period the upper classes in Italy found themselves poor, while at the same time the change in the general ideal of society led them to spend what money they had on titles, estates and a showy style of living.

Hence we find political, moral and social changes all combining to hasten the natural process of artistic and literary decadence.

Of course no exact date can be given for the beginning of this process, but we may notice, for example, that, except in Venice, no artists of the first rank began their careers later than 1520, which was also the date of Raphael's death. Venice had been late in beginning her artistic Renaissance, and in Venice also it reached its zenith later than elsewhere; so that in 1559 Titian, Tintoretto, Paul Veronese and Sansovino were all still in the full activity of their work, and so also was the great portrait painter, Moroni, who may be included in the Venetian group. Elsewhere we find marks of decadence upon the productions of all but one of the artists who were at work between 1520 and 1559, and more than marks upon the productions of all those who were not in the first class.

Correggio, in spite of the exquisite grace and charm of his pictures, showed a softness and mannerism which sometimes degenerated into mere prettiness, and he set an example, which was followed by painters throughout Italy, of decorating ceilings with fat, sprawling angels and lumpy clouds. Sodoma's

work had a beauty and tenderness, and a dignified piety worthy of a fifteenth century artist, but he lacked the force and grasp of the great masters. In Milan, Ferrari, Luini, and other followers of Leonardo carried on many of the master's best traditions, and since Leonardo had few mannerisms which could be copied and exaggerated, the Milanese school long remained saner and simpler than its contemporaries in Florence and Rome.

Michael Angelo lived on till 1564; for Paul III he painted the Last Judgment in the Sistine Chapel; he was then made architect in charge of the building of S. Peter's and designed its magnificent dome, thus setting a worthy crown upon his life-work. The cathedral was, however, far from completed when he died.

Michael Angelo was in himself so great that he stands above ordinary criticism; yet we can see in the vehemence and restlessness of his later work, with those contorted bodies and over-developed muscles, the tendency to sacrifice beauty and dignity to exaggerated strenuousness and unrestrained energy. Michael Angelo's greatness covers his faults, but not those of his imitators, who copied his mannerisms but could not share his genius.

The same may be said of Raphael and his school. So long as the master lived and the pupils worked under his direction all was well; but after his death they fancied that they could carry on his great undertakings, and cover huge canvasses and wall-spaces with his ease and skill. Yet none of them, except to a slight extent Giulio Romano, were depositaries of his skill. Their work was hasty, showy and insincere. To these faults they speedily added an unenlightened imitation of Michael Angelo; sculptors and painters alike tried to be strenuous and "terrible," and only succeeding in being clumsy and vulgar. Nude anatomical monstrosities, supposed to be in the master's style, shared the fashion with the fat cherubs of Correggio's imitators. The influence of classical art, which

had impressed Raphael and Michael Angelo so strongly, went on working on their followers long after its genuine inspiration was exhausted. Classical themes and characters were reproduced *ad nauseam*, but wholly without the classical feeling for dignity and simplicity. Nymphs and Satyrs were especially popular; and the moral degeneration of the age is nowhere more plainly shown than in the suggestiveness which such a choice of subject appeared to justify, while the example of Michael Angelo seemed to excuse the coarseness of the models, the exaggerated realism of treatment and the awkward restlessness of style.

Architecture was the last of the arts to fall below the best standard of the Renaissance, since the dome of S. Peter's, the Palazzo del Tè at Mantua (Giulio Romano) and the Library of S. Mark at Venice (Sansovino) were all built after 1530. This was probably because architecture was more guided by rule than the other arts, and so retained its strength and dignity when they had become weak and vulgar. Michael Angelo might, in his genius, set aside laws, and produce such marvellous works of caprice as his Chapel and Library at S. Lorenzo; but the tendency of the age is embodied in Palladio, who has given his name to the type of cold, severely classical architecture which spread from Italy far into the North and became in the seventeenth century the ideal of English building. Palladio and his school based their work upon a strict study of Vitruvius, adhered closely to classical models in proportion and the rules of architectural orders, and employed very little adornment.

The changed conditions of life as well as the process of exhaustion told rapidly upon literature. Most of the authors were now dependent upon noble patrons, and had to please them rather than to express spontaneous ideas. Their dedications are often mere begging letters, and their works are often disgraced by fulsome flattery of their patrons, or by no less disagreeable attacks on their patrons' enemies. The "Amadigi" of Bernardo Tasso, the great poet's father, was dedicated first

to Henry II, then to Philip II; it is disfigured by adulatory passages, and was so pruned and changed to suit the ideas of Bernardo's patrons and friends that it lost nearly all spontaneity.

The classical impetus had in reality spent itself, yet Latin writers continued to abound, and their frigid, vapid productions rapidly succeeded one another. One worthy bishop wrote a "Cristiade" in which Christ seems like a classical demi-god; other writers turned out hundreds of classical letters in the style of Bembo and of the Curia. Italian literature was nearly all possessed by stilted classicism, or degraded to serve the basest comedy and the coarsest satire. As a rule it was prolix, insincere, bombastic, artificial. It was only when such writers as Benvenuto Cellini or Vasari escaped from the hackneyed themes and wrote naturally, that glimpses of the simpler, more vigorous Italian prose appeared. Bernardo Tasso almost contrived to conceal his really poetic imagination and powers of expression under a stiff, unnatural and painfully correct veneer of style. A great deal of both verse and prose was written merely for the sake of writing something, however vapid. Every town in Italy possessed its literary academy,—sometimes several rival academies,—which took its rise from the inordinate love of admiration of the authors, or, as in the case of Cosimo I's *Accademia Fiorentina*, from a subtle desire for advertisement on the part of the ruler. The academies met to read and criticise their members' productions, with the consequence that reams of rubbish were written in which an elegant style strove to hide the poverty of ideas. The nadir was reached when a clever rhymers composed some musically sounding verses absolutely devoid of meaning. The real interest for contemporary critics was the question of language; whether Italian was only to be Tuscan and to be modelled strictly on Petrarch, or whether it was to be modified by Lombard, Venetian and other dialects was a matter endlessly debated. So passed out in verbose platitudes the great age of the Renaissance. But though poor in authors, the period was

still rich in students. Greek and Oriental languages were much studied, the latter with a view to work on the Old Testament. Philology awoke much interest. New printing-presses were set up; the great Libraries, especially that of the Vatican, were increased. Cosimo I reopened the University of Pisa, and filled its chairs with the best teachers he could obtain. Collections of antiques were very popular, and descriptive catalogues were compiled. Roman History, Law, Archaeology and Inscriptions had many students, and even Medieval History and Diplomatic began to attract attention. Though one impulse of creative fervour had passed away, the active brains of the Italians only needed a new interest to stimulate them to fresh efforts. The question was whether their new conditions of life would permit of the fruition of such efforts.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

THE SPANISH HEGEMONY: 1559-1601.

THE territorial condition of Italy, as fixed by the Peace of Câteau-Cambrésis, endured without considerable change until the War of Spanish Succession. Two important reasons combined to render it a more lasting settlement than the Treaties which had preceded it. First, France, to whom the Peace was unfavourable, was unable for many years to make any effort to modify it, on account of the internal troubles which distracted her attention from Italian affairs. Secondly, Spain was satisfied with the Treaty, which, now that France could not interfere, gave her a control over Italy so secure that she was almost as powerful in the nominally independent States as in her own dominions.

Philip II had no wish to make himself formally master of these independent principalities; the mere lust of possession had little temptation for him; the aim of his policy was rather to extend his influence and that of the spiritual and temporal system in which he believed. Italy was ruled by Spanish methods, by Inquisition and espionage, by the extinction of liberty both of thought and action. In this respect there was nothing to choose between the Duke of Tuscany and the Governor of Milan. In Philip's fruitless efforts to extend these benefits to the liberty-loving peoples of the North he spent the whole forces of his monarchy, and left it after forty years ruined beyond hope of recovery. That he might concentrate his

energies upon this policy, he needed little from Italy but that she should remain at peace, and for this object he would make some sacrifices, giving way on minor points and overlooking minor annoyances. At the same time he was careful to ensure safety should war break out in spite of his precautions. There were about seven thousand Spanish soldiers in Naples and five thousand in Lombardy. Toledo had built a ring of fortresses about the Neapolitan coasts; Lombardy bristled with fortifications, mostly the work of Ferrante Gonzaga. Yet the army was ill-disciplined and the fortresses short of artillery. The younger sons of ruling princes often took service and held commands in the Spanish army and fleet; Gian Andrea Doria was for some time commander-in-chief of the latter; while the independent princes were *condotti* by Spain, that is, received subsidies in return for a promise of military assistance in case of war.

Philip II used two principal means of preserving Italian subservience, the prevention of external influence and the suppression of all manifestations of local independence. It was therefore of first importance to check any *rapprochement* between France and the Papacy, lest the Papacy should resort to its traditional device of calling in French help against its oppressors, and should endeavour to form an anti-Spanish Italian league favourable to France. Hence the fear of French Protestant tendencies must be kept alive in the Popes, and they must be taught to look to Spain alone for the defence of Catholicism, and to be in consequence the humble dependents of Spain in politics.

Again, Spain must carefully foster the resentment of Savoy towards France in consequence of its late sufferings from her aggressions. So long as France was weak Spain did not wholly object to her retention of Saluzzo, since it was a thorn in the side of Savoy and kept alive the ill-feeling.

In a less degree Spain had to guard against possible Austrian interference. The Austrian branch of the House was not

strong enough at this time to assert the ancient Imperial rights in Italy against Spain, but they were not forgotten. There was no love lost between the Habsburg cousins, and occasional unpleasantness arose when Spain annexed vacant Imperial fiefs in Italy as though they were rightfully hers. Spain fostered the friction between Austria and Venice, at the same time trying to prevent Venice from making friends with France and the Swiss, and to keep her in perpetual terror of the Turks.

In the not very difficult task of checking local independence the Italian princes materially assisted Spain by their insane mutual jealousies. The principal object of each one's policy seemed to be the assertion of his ceremonial precedence over the others. As an old author remarked, "They never contended for dominion, for liberty, for life, as they now contended for this dignity with all the skill, industry and diplomatic arts they could employ."

The older feudal families of Savoy and Ferrara were especially jealous of the upstart, bourgeois Medici, and they grudged Cosimo's lead in Italian politics, due to his influence with Spain and the Pope. They were accordingly furious when the grant of the title of "Grand Duke" by Pius V to Cosimo seemed to give the latter the natural precedence due to superior rank. There were two principal fields of battle between Ferrara and Tuscany. First, there was the court of Rome, where a perpetual struggle for predominating influence went on, particularly in the Conclaves. Mantua and Parma often joined in the opposition to Tuscany, yet could not shake the Tuscan ascendancy. Secondly, there was the Imperial Court, where an interminable lawsuit for precedence between Ferrara and Tuscany dragged on its weary length. Cosimo's assumption of the Grand Ducal title set the Emperor against him, and the question of whether or no Tuscany was a fief of the Empire complicated the matter. When the Emperor at last recognized the Grand Ducal title and precedence (1576), the other Italian States were only more dissatisfied than ever; Savoy appealed

direct to the Diet against the Emperor's decision; the others intrigued in France against Tuscany. The contest became ridiculous when it centred in a wrangle as to who should be called "Altezza," "Serenissimo," or "Illustrissimo." It was at last appeased by the wise Grand Duke Ferdinando, who allowed the rest all the titles they wanted, and arranged marriage alliances to heal old sores and put an end to the general bitterness against the Medici.

Still each of the princes would have frankly preferred subservience to Spain to an acknowledgment of the leadership of one amongst themselves in a national movement against foreign domination. When early in the seventeenth century it seemed as if Savoy might lead such a movement, its failure was due quite as much to Italian obstruction as to Spanish repression.

But the main reason for the Italian acquiescence in Spanish domination was because it secured that period of peace which the country so badly needed after the sufferings of the last half-century. In contemporary writings we find few allusions to the disadvantages of the Spanish domination and many to the advantages of a continuation of peace. For example, a Venetian wrote of Philip II, "May he live long, because he always loves peace and quiet and the princes who love these, placing his own interests behind this object.....It is indeed wonderful how, with such fortune and greatness, so many States and such great armies, he is of so moderate and composed a mind, and so far removed from passions and ambitions." To most of the States the first object of policy was peace at any price, so that its idolisation degenerated into pusillanimity.

Italy had her time for recuperation; and, though step-motherly governments did all they could to hinder her prosperity by ruinous taxation and interference with commercial enterprise, yet the natural fertility of her soil, the industry of her cultivators and the business abilities of her citizens restored a fair measure of general comfort. "The Garden of Lombardy,"

which had been made a desert, became fruitful once more, and the cities, whose population had been decimated by war, were again inhabited, and grew prosperous and almost wealthy. Italian princes were able to lend money to needy French and Austrian monarchs, and to make a fine show of a kind of rococo splendour in their little courts.

Peace was desirable also in order that the Italian rulers might reorganise their States and place their finances and means of defence upon stable bases. Hence the Italian States supported Spain in her policy of maintaining peace in Italy, and of suppressing any turbulent force which seemed likely to disturb the general amity.

Again, co-operation with Spain was necessary against the common enemy who harried all Mediterranean coasts and commerce alike, the Turkish and corsair fleets. Unfortunately, mutual jealousies, especially between Spain and Venice (see Chapter II), hindered the execution of any well-organised plan of general defence. Crippled by his other wars, Philip could never build a really efficient fleet for Mediterranean service, and such ships as he had were naturally devoted to the defence of the Spanish rather than of the Italian coasts. Genoa, Naples and Sicily had all small fleets; the Pope, Tuscany and Savoy could all arm ships; but there was no real co-operation, partly because they all disliked one another, partly because they all joined in disliking Gian Andrea Doria, the commander of the Spanish Mediterranean fleet.

Tuscany had a quasi-military-religious order, founded to fight against the Turks, but the Knights, though fond of fighting, cared almost as much for booty, and soon degenerated into a set of Christian corsairs, whose unlawful piracies kept up a bitter feeling between Venice and Tuscany. Savoy tried to organise a similar order, that of SS. Maurizio and Lazzaro, but it was a failure. Along the coasts were watch-towers, from which warning was given of approaching pirates, so that troops could be summoned and the people fly to shelter, but this was

usually a case of shutting the stable door after the horse was stolen.

The most formidable of these corsairs were Dragut and Ucciali. The first had been made a galley-slave by the Genoese, and revenged himself on the Christians by seizing ships and prisoners, taking some from the very Chiaja at Naples, defying all Doria's attempts to capture him. Ucciali was a Calabrian, who, taken young by the pirates, became a leader amongst them, and, as a renegade, did more harm to the Christians than did the born Mahomedans. He attacked Villafranca when Emanuele Filiberto was in the town, and almost carried off the Duke himself, and he was the best naval commander of the Turks at Lepanto.

Occasionally Spain sent out expeditions to the African coasts, intending to capture or destroy the corsair haunts, but these usually failed because of tardy or inadequate preparations, and such conquests as were made were not properly protected from attempts at recapture. In 1565, however, the Christians scored a great success against Dragut, who attacked Malta with an enormous force, intending to capture this outpost of Christendom, and crush the Knights who were his boldest enemies. The Knights, however, made a brilliant defence, until the Spaniards, late as usual, succeeded in coming to their assistance, and together they drove off the Turks.

The prestige of the Papacy had been so diminished since the beginning of the century that Philip II expected to be able to dominate it entirely, and make it an instrument of his policy, employing it to keep France in difficulties and Italy subservient. But he discovered that the Papacy had still sources of strength which enabled it to retain a part of its independence. The power of the purse was on the Pope's side, since Philip relied for a great part of his revenues on what was known as the *Crociata*, an Indulgence purchased by all good Spaniards, the proceeds of which were granted to the King, nominally to pay for war against the Turks. Should the Pope refuse this grant,

Philip would either have to lose the money or to embark on an anti-Papal war. But Charles V and Alva had found how barren were the most sweeping military triumphs over the Papacy. As a clever Venetian wrote: "The Spaniards know that to take up arms against the Papacy is always considered impious, and such wars invariably end in the restitution of conquests made from it. Nor is there any other prince in Italy so able as the Pope to excite the others to resistance. So they establish their dominion in Italy upon peace with the Pope, fearing, in the case of war, both the interference of other Powers and the discontent of their own subjects." For example, the Papacy might stir up trouble in Naples, and reassert its own rights of suzerainty there.

It was moreover the plan of Philip's general policy to pose as the champion of orthodox Catholicism, so that a close union with the Papacy was part of his political stock-in-trade. Again, as the Counter-Reformation progressed, under Popes of austere and lofty character, the Papacy gained a moral prestige amongst Catholic nations which it had not enjoyed for generations, and was therefore able to assert a certain independence in politics, and even at times to oppose Spain on moral grounds.

So sure had Philip been of the subservience of the Papacy that he had not even troubled to keep up the strength of the Spanish party in the College of Cardinals and its influence in the Conclave. Accordingly, the first four Popes of this period were practically nominees of Tuscany, whose Dukes took a great deal of trouble to secure the election of a friendly neighbour. From Pius IV (1559), whose brother, the Marquis of Marignano, had fought so long in Imperial service, Spain might have expected complete submission. But Pius refused, in spite of threats, to grant precedence to the Spanish over the French ambassador. Spanish bishops were sent to the second Council of Trent for the purpose of transferring part of the authority of the Papacy to the National Churches.

But Pius and the Curia cleverly secured the support of the Emperor and France, and, backed by the solid majority of Italian bishops, they successfully resisted Philip's demands and finally closed the Council in spite of him. Philip allowed part of the Decrees of the Council to be published in his dominions rather than forfeit the *Crociata*, but it was withdrawn nevertheless by the austere Pius V on the ground of the immorality of purchased Indulgences. Pius V even dared to reissue, with additions, the Bull *In Coena Domini*, an assertion of the old Papal claims to interfere in temporal affairs. Naturally the Powers would not publish it, but that the Papacy should even try to revive it showed the improvement in its position. In the anti-Turkish League of 1571, it was Pius V who led and Philip who followed; and when Pius created Cosimo de' Medici Grand Duke of Tuscany, Philip protested, but did nothing. Gregory XIII (1572) was milder and less *exigeant* than Pius V; he was moreover enthusiastic about Philip's plans against England. He restored the *Crociata* to Philip, but would not agree to all Spanish demands, and forbade his son to accept compromising Spanish favours. He refused to join a League against France, declaring that the Papacy ought rather to strive for peace. The Bull *In Coena Domini* had revived the ancient disputes about ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Sicily and Naples; the bishops encouraged the people to resist new taxes, and the Viceroy's retorted by sequestering the bishops' temporalities. The struggle was at its fiercest in Gregory's time; but the Viceroy's, steadily supported by the Spanish government, allowed the Church to gain no advantages. Gregory's successor wisely allowed the question to drop, and confirmed the Sicilian *Monarchia*, the ancient agreement by which the island settled its own ecclesiastical affairs.

With Sixtus V (1585) Philip was at first on good terms. He respected the Pope's energetic and vigorous character, realized that the vast sums of money which Sixtus contrived

to accumulate rendered him independent, and was afraid to bully him. Sixtus did not indeed think Philip enthusiastic enough about the Crusade on which his heart was set, and Philip found Sixtus too languid about his pet project, the Armada. But it was not till the question of France divided them that real difficulties arose.

Gregory XIII had chidden the French government for laxity against the Huguenots until the Massacre of S. Bartholomew gained his fervent congratulations. Sixtus always despised and disapproved of Henry III; but orthodoxy bound him, rather unwillingly, to support the League, though he disliked its Spanish policy. He feared the overweening power of Spain, and believed that Philip wished to break up England and France into small States, dependent, like the Italians, upon Spain. After the death of Henry III, orthodoxy forced the Pope to oppose Henry of Navarre, yet he felt that he was helping Philip to conquer France. Philip "politely insisted" that the Pope should join in the war of the League, but Sixtus hesitated, perhaps hoping for Navarre's conversion. The Spanish ambassador in Rome began to use threats; in Paris and Madrid priests denounced the Pope as the friend of heretics. Sixtus, whom intimidation always infuriated, called the ambassador bad names, and swore that he would rather throw his money into the Tiber than send it to the League. The agitation caused by the struggle hastened his death (1590), but his delay gave Navarre the much needed time for preparations.

It was all important to Philip to secure the next Pope's support and, with it, access to Sixtus' stored-up wealth, and he no longer disdained to exert Spanish influence in the Conclave. The next three short-lived Popes were all Spanish nominees; one of them, Gregory XIV, lived long enough to send part of Sixtus' treasure to the Catholic League. Clement VIII (1592), though not the Spanish choice, seemed so timorous and irresolute that Philip thought he could easily be frightened into submission. But Clement shared Sixtus' unwillingness to

deliver France tied and bound into the hands of Spain, and the conversion and request for absolution of Henry of Navarre gave the Pope an opportunity of restoring the European balance of power without endangering Catholicism. Spain and most of the Cardinals urged him against Henry; Florence and Venice persuaded him in Henry's favour. Into the story of the Pope's vacillations we cannot enter; the long delay nearly lost France to the Catholic Church, but Henry's military triumphs at last overcame Clement's fears, and, when the absolution was granted (1595), Clement found that the Papacy was almost emancipated from its bondage to Spain. Philip was even compelled to hide his anger, lest Italy, led by the Pope, should join France against him. The Papacy could once more play off France against Spain, and so recover much of its lost independence.

Besides the Papacy, Venice was the only Italian Power from which Spain had anything to fear. Venice remained alone in Italy quite independent of Spanish influence; she still had wealth, courage, patriotism and natural abilities; she might stir up the ill-governed Lombards to rebellion, close the roads between Austria and Lombardy, ally with the Papacy against Spain, or call France once more into Italy. Venice herself much disliked the sense of being shut in between Habsburg possessions, especially while France was too weak to use as a counterpoise; she feared lest Spain should revive Milanese claims to part of her terra-firma; she knew that Spain was constantly intriguing in Rome to make the Popes distrust her orthodoxy; her trading interests at Naples suffered under Spanish rule, and her commerce was injured in the constant predatory warfare between Turkish and Spanish ships. Against Austria she still had border grievances; and Austria, strongly resenting the exclusive dominion of Venice in the Adriatic, protected the *Uscocchi*, a horde of cosmopolitan pirates who found shelter in the Dalmatian islands and Istrian coasts, and preyed upon Venetian shipping.

On the other hand, there was always, in spite of conflicting commercial interests in the Levant, a real affinity between Venice and France. Venice lent money to Henry III, who, on his return journey from Poland, visited the Republic, and was entertained right royally. In spite of the anger of the orthodox, Venice recognized Henry of Navarre as King of France immediately upon the death of Henry III, and she was mainly instrumental in obtaining the Papal absolution for him. In fact, she earnestly desired to see the European balance of power restored by the reconstitution of the French monarchy. Meanwhile she wished that France should retain Saluzzo, and still have an open door into Italy.

In one point of policy, Venice during this period showed less than her usual prescience. Both for political and commercial reasons, and in order that she might be able to obtain mercenary troops from the Swiss and elsewhere, it was most important for her to keep open a passage over the Alps, free from Habsburg domination. Such a route was held by the League of the Grisons, to whom the Valtelline belonged. But Spain was the first to see the importance of this route, as connecting Milan with Austria, and the Governors of Lombardy worked hard and spent much money in obtaining influence over the Grisons League. Some members of the League, however, feared to be crushed between two Habsburg Powers, and made advances to Venice, offering her the right to use the Grisons passes in return for a military subsidy; but Venice, very unwisely, hung back on the ground of expense, and allowed Spain to extend her influence unhindered.

The animosity between Venice and the Habsburgs was well kept in check, since both desired peace above all other objects in Italy, and neither would willingly do anything to endanger it. Venice knew that she had neither strength nor money to spend on useless wars, since all her energies must be reserved for Eastern affairs. But it was with regard to these Eastern affairs that the relations between Venice and Spain

were most critical (see Chapter II). In spite of their common fear of the Turks their interests did not lie together. Venice wished if possible to avoid quarrels with the Porte, but the constant struggle between Spain and the Turks frequently threatened to involve her in war. Spain, on the other hand, wished to drag Venice into war in order to transfer the brunt of the Mahomedan attack from the western to the eastern Mediterranean; yet, when a direct assault of the Turks upon Cyprus led to the Spanish-Venetian League of 1571 and the Battle of Lepanto, Spain would not give Venice enough help to enable her really to destroy the Turkish maritime power and make herself mistress of the Levant. The diverging interests of the allies led to a rapid break-up of the League, and its only lasting result was an angry feeling between Spain and Venice which helped to embitter their Italian relations.

From Tuscany, nearly shut in between Genoa, Lombardy and the five Spanish seaports known as the "Presidi," Spain had little to fear. Moreover, the Duke held Siena as a Spanish fief, and had a Spanish wife, Eleonora de Toledo, whose relations espoused Tuscan interests at the court of Madrid. But as the ally of his other neighbour, the Pope, Cosimo might prove troublesome, since each might encourage and protect the other against Spain. Cosimo was quick to see the value of the Papal alliance for himself, and to do his best to secure it by exerting that influence over the Papal Conclaves which Philip was inclined to neglect. With Pius IV he was on very friendly terms, and Pius even proposed to create him "King of Tuscany," but desisted on account of Spain's opposition. To Pius V Cosimo gave up the heretic Carnesecchi as a bribe, and the Pope, pleased to assert independence of the Emperor, conferred on Cosimo the title of "Grand Duke of Tuscany," and crowned him in great state at Rome (1570).

Philip had suspected Cosimo and Pius IV of planning an anti-Spanish League, but now he was still more angry, and so

also was the Emperor at this contempt for his prerogatives and of his claim to suzerainty in Tuscany. Cosimo had at one time tried to gain favour in Spain by sending his son Francesco there to seek a Spanish bride, but in this quest he was unsuccessful, as the lady would have nothing to say to "the son of a merchant." An Austrian Archduchess had then been provided for Francesco, but the young man behaved so shamefully to her that the Emperor's anger was doubled. Savoy, Ferrara and Parma were also incensed that Cosimo should have tried to win the struggle for precedence by right of a superior title, and Philip felt the Grand Duke to be so generally unpopular that it was not worth while to offend the Pope by punishing him; still, he must be carefully watched, and all indications of acquisitiveness promptly suppressed.

Philip therefore firmly refused when Cosimo asked for leave to hold Corsica as a fief of Spain. The Corsicans had rebelled against Genoese misgovernment, and their leader, Sampiero Corso, appealed to Cosimo for help, offering him the dominion of the island. As this would probably have implied a kingly title, Cosimo would have much liked to accept, but Philip would not hear of such an injury to his friends the Genoese, and certainly did not wish Cosimo to be a king.

But Cosimo kept his influence with the Papacy, and, after Gregory XIII's Conclave, it was said that he must have employed magic to secure an election so favourable. He also tried, rather hesitatingly, to find friends in France. Catherine de' Medici hated him, as coming from a rival branch of her own family, and she protected Tuscan exiles in France when Cosimo tried to get them assassinated. Ferrarese influence in France was also directed against the Medici. But Cosimo lent money and troops to the Government, and in 1571 bought French recognition of his Grand Ducal title with a loan of a hundred thousand ducats. The Grand Duke was also certainly

involved in the obscure intrigues which preceded the Massacre of S. Bartholomew; and, though it seems impossible to unravel the purposes and plans of the actors in these confused months, yet it is certain that the Tuscan ambassador shared in the scheme of Charles IX and Coligny for an attack on the Spanish power in the Netherlands, that Coligny and the other Huguenots appear to have been regarded as "friends of the Grand Duke," and that Cosimo urged the Pope to permit the Navarre marriage. The outcome of the whole affair was to make Spain more suspicious of Tuscany than ever, while Cosimo could gain nothing substantial from the temporary favour of shifting French parties. Cosimo had to trim, as his ambassador wrote, "with perpetual fear in your actions, which are suspected by everyone, since you try to hold the balance of power in order to secure the safety of your own State."

Francesco I (1572) had neither his father's ability nor courage, and, wrapt in slothful self-indulgence, was content to remain subservient to Spain, emptying his treasury to supply Spanish loans, and sending his troops and his brothers, Don Pietro and Don Giovanni (illegitimate), to enter Spanish service. A loan of a hundred thousand ducats to the Emperor, and help in securing the Polish crown for a Habsburg brought him his reward, the longed-for recognition of the Grand Ducal title (1576), and with it the no less desired precedence over Savoy and Ferrara.

Only once did Francesco risk offending Spain. When Don John of Austria tried to subjugate Genoa (1571), the "Nuovi" party there sent to ask him for help, even offering him the dominion of Genoa. This he dared not accept, but he so disliked the idea of having Don John as a neighbour that he sent the Nuovi secret aid, and took an active part in effecting that reconciliation of Genoese factions which led to the failure of Don John's plans. Don John was very angry, but by obsequious behaviour and pecuniary accommodation Francesco managed to escape Philip's wrath.

Dependence on Spain however led to a quarrel with France, which Spain did its best to foment. Francesco would not lend money to Catherine, and even asked for repayment of his father's loans. Besides this, Francesco's agents murdered some Tuscan exiles whom she was protecting. Savoy and Ferrara were busily intriguing at Paris against their hated rival, and ultimately the precedence of their ambassadors over the Tuscan was formally acknowledged. Francesco therefore withdrew his ambassador, and for some years left Tuscan affairs at Paris in the hands of a private agent.

On the death of Gregory XIII, France, Ferrara and Parma united in a vigorous effort to wrest from the Medici that influence with the Papacy which they had so long exercised. But Francesco's brother, Cardinal Ferdinando de' Medici, was too clever for them, and Sixtus V was really his nominee. This was not the first sign given by Ferdinando of his political talents; and when he succeeded his brother (1587), Tuscany again became a force to be reckoned with in politics.

Ferdinando was determined not to be the slave of Spain; he refused an Austrian marriage for himself, and obtained instead the hand of Christine of Lorraine, the favourite grand-daughter of Catherine de' Medici. Philip was annoyed at this manifestation of independence, and proceeded to make things unpleasant for the Grand Duke; the garrisons of the Presidi were menacingly increased; Ferdinando's younger brother, Don Pietro, was supported in factious opposition, and encouraged to claim Siena as his share of the family inheritance. Ferdinando at once threw himself warmly into the cause of Henry of Navarre, persuaded him to join the Catholic Church, and vied with Venice in efforts to secure his reconciliation with the Papacy. The first Papal Legate sent to France after the absolution had been granted was Cardinal Alessandro de' Medici, afterwards Leo XI. Ferdinando's reward was soon to follow; in 1600, Henry IV married Maria de' Medici,

niece of Ferdinando and daughter of Francesco. Thus a member of the later House of Medici renewed the family connection of the older branch with France, and the ancient friendship of the Lilies was for a time revived.

Philip of Spain had interfered to prevent a match between the same young lady and the Duke of Parma; the substitution of this royal bridegroom could hardly fail to annoy him. Spanish diplomacy had been for a long time exerted to embarrass Ferdinando; at Rome there was a constant struggle between Spanish and Tuscan parties, and Philip tried to make mischief between Tuscany and other Italian courts. But Ferdinando was too clever for him; he obtained the friendship of Ferrara and Mantua and formed marriage relations with them; and he made up an old quarrel with Venice on the subject of the Tuscan corsairs. Spain had even threatened him with war on the question of Château d'If, the castle which commands the harbour of Marseilles, and which had been garrisoned by Tuscan troops. Ferdinando declared that he was holding it for a future "Catholic King of France," and his garrison helped to prevent the League from taking it in 1595. Later on, Château d'If nearly led to a quarrel between France and Tuscany, since Ferdinando continued to hold it in pledge for the large sums of money owed him by Henry. But this difficulty was accommodated by the marriage of Maria and her dowry of 600,000 crowns. Nor was Spain really inclined for a war with Tuscany; polite relations were always maintained, and the Grand Duke was mentioned in the Peace of Vervins as an adherent of Spain.

Thus Ferdinando had succeeded in raising Tuscany to quite an important position in European politics; he was independent of Spain, and had considerable influence in France, while the French marriage connection added much to his dignity.

Ferrara was the only one of the smaller Italian States which attempted a policy independent of Spain. Alfonso II,

whose mother was French, resembled a French nobleman in character, education and chivalrous tastes. His uncles and brother, Cardinal d'Este, resided long in France; his sister married the Duke of Guise, and Guise influence was exerted in his interest. However, annoyed at Tuscan influence in France, and anxious to obtain Imperial recognition of precedence over Tuscany, Alfonso married an Austrian Archduchess and led a fine body of cavalry to take Imperial service in Hungary. But when, on the succession of Henry III to France, Alfonso foolishly aspired to obtain the crown of Poland for himself, he alienated the Emperor, who wished to secure it for one of his own family. Accordingly the Emperor confirmed the title of Grand Duke to Tuscany, and gave with it the precedence over Ferrara. Alfonso turned again to France, and the ill-feeling between Henry III and Francesco of Tuscany led to the declaration in 1580 that Ferrara took precedence of Tuscany in France.

Spanish influence over the other Italian princes was maintained through the system of *Condotta* (see p. 96). Not that their military services would have been very valuable, except in the case of Mantua, whose possession of two important strategic posts, Mantua itself and Casale in Montferrat, gave it an importance disproportionate to its strength. But the *Condotta* kept the princes in subjection, and acted as a check on their more independent neighbours. The Papacy was surrounded by a ring of these dependents of Spain; even the greater Barons of the States of the Church itself were taken into Spanish pay.

Guidobaldo della Rovere, Duke of Urbino, was flattered and caressed; his son, Francesco Maria, was educated in Spain, and acquired Spanish manners and tastes. Guglielmo Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua, had some natural inclinations towards France; his brother, as Duke of Nevers, held large estates in France and was practically a Frenchman. But Guglielmo would never have ventured to do anything which

might offend Spain; he knew well enough that he only held his Duchy of Montferrat against the rival claimant, the Duke of Savoy, by favour of the Habsburgs. His wife was a Habsburg, and his son and successor, Vincenzo (1587), became a close adherent of Spain.

Alessandro Farnese, the son of Ottavio, Duke of Parma, was brought up at the Spanish court, married Maria of Portugal, and served Philip faithfully for many years in the Netherlands. He was rewarded by the grant of Piacenza as a Spanish fief. Piacenza had been lost to the Duchy after the murder of Pier Luigi, and had not been restored by the Peace of Câteau-Cambrésis. When Alessandro himself was Duke, and also during the reign of his son, Ranuccio, Parma remained devoted to Spain.

Of the smaller republics, Lucca was allowed to remain independent, in order that it might curb the pride of the Grand Duke, while Genoa had very intimate and peculiar relations with Spain. Genoa preserved her independent government under Andrea Doria's constitution, yet Spain was able to command the use of her port and ships, and of the wealth of her rich merchants. Through the port of Genoa, Spanish communications with Lombardy were maintained, and without it Spanish rule in Italy would have been seriously endangered. The Spanish Mediterranean fleet was under the command of Gian Andrea Doria, and Genoese ships formed the most efficient part of it. Genoese merchants settled and traded in Spain, Naples and Lombardy; they were encouraged to buy Spanish estates in order that their interests might be made permanent. They lent to Philip and to the Spanish Governors in Italy vast sums of ready money, receiving in return control of a great part of the revenues, farming the taxes and acting as finance and customs officials, to the great disadvantage of the unfortunate taxpayers, whom they ruthlessly oppressed. Only by their pecuniary aid could the government be carried on, and yet they made enormous profits.

Yet Philip could never feel quite safe about Genoa while France remembered that she had once controlled the Republic whose port was the gate of Italy, and while the Genoese lower classes always retained French sympathies. In 1571 and 1575 the French Government was planning to recover Genoa; French help was sent to Sampiero Corso to aid him in his attempt to free Corsica from Genoese rule. A great danger threatened Spanish influence when (1571) civil war broke out in Genoa, and, while the older families, the *Portico Vecchio*, called for Spanish interference to restore their authority, the younger group, the *Portico Nuovo*, asked help from France and Tuscany. Don John of Austria and Gian Andrea Doria brought the Spanish fleet to support the *Portico Vecchio*, and Don John conceived the idea of seizing this opportunity of conquering Genoa for himself. But Doria and the *Portico Vecchio*, as well as the Pope and the Emperor, opposed him strongly, and he had to renounce his ambition and return home in a huff. Nevertheless, when peace was ultimately restored, Spanish influence in the Republic was left practically unimpaired.

In the fifteenth century, the Duchy of Savoy had hardly been looked upon as an Italian State, and was not included in the Italian balance of power. Emanuele Filiberto, however, saw that the real source of his strength would lie rather in fertile Piedmont, defended from France and the Swiss by the Alps, than in barren Savoy, which lay exposed to invasion from either, and that therefore his true policy was to act as an Italian Prince and to associate himself with the interests of Italy. But the position of his States made them a natural buffer between France and Spanish Lombardy, so that the Duke was always forced to have political aims and interests outside those merely Italian, and to consider his States, not only as an Italian principality, but as a European Power, which, small though it was, must have its own policy and its own position among the nations.

The geographical position of Savoy had a double importance; it divided France and Italy, and, at the same time, it lay between the Italian and the northern possessions of Spain; hence it was a vital necessity to Spain to be able to use it both as a wall against France, and as a military road between Lombardy and Franche-Comté. France, on the other hand, when she should again be strong enough, would require to pass through Piedmont into Italy, and hence her present object was to retain her hold on Saluzzo and the fortresses which the Peace of Câteau-Cambrésis had allotted to her. But Emanuele Filiberto would never rest until both these and the fortresses held by Spain were restored, since without them he could not call his States his own. It was also important to him to secure peace for the reorganisation of the administration and finances of his State; yet, situated as he was, he must always be ready for war, and must hold the balance between France and Spain in such a manner that, in case of war, he could set a good price upon his alliance.

Education, association, the ties of friendship and gratitude inclined him towards Spain. He looked to Spain to procure for him the restitution of his fortresses, to protect him from the complicated claims of France upon Piedmont, and to send troops if necessary from Lombardy for his defence. Though trying to treat all parties in his State with fairness, he knew that most of his chief subjects were receiving bribes and pensions from either the French or Spanish courts; but it was the French faction from which he had most to fear, because it was the stronger, and included most of the nobles who had enjoyed their independence under the French Government.

From France he had more to fear than to expect, since it had shown that it could invade and conquer both Piedmont and Savoy with ease and rapidity. Yet, if he were the ally of France, the seat of a campaign might be transferred from his own States to Lombardy. His French wife, Margaret, exerted her influence in favour of a French alliance.

Finding that Spain acted, as a Venetian ambassador said, "more than tepidly" in the matter of recovering his fortresses, Emanuele Filiberto negotiated direct with France, and so skilfully that by means of loans of money and troops, he obtained his end without committing himself to a definite alliance with France, and without alienating Spain. It was actually more difficult to make Spain keep her part of the bargain, and give up her fortresses when the French ones had been restored. But all the Duke's efforts to obtain Saluzzo failed, for Spain would not really help him. Intrigues at the French court and with the governors of Saluzzan fortresses were all in vain, even though he offered to cede Bresse to France in exchange for Saluzzo.

In the same way his desires for Montferrat, which the Imperial Court had awarded to the Gonzaga, were thwarted by Spain, which feared to see him grow any stronger. But he was influential enough to prevent France from selling Saluzzo to the Swiss, and to check a scheme by which Spain proposed to take Montferrat from the Gonzaga, and give them in exchange a piece of Lombard territory adjoining Mantua.

The force and steadfastness of Emanuele Filiberto's character could not but inspire respect and obtain for him the position of independence which he sought. Venetian ambassadors believed that, in case of war, he could long have preserved his neutrality, and have gained a high price for his alliance. Besides setting the internal administration of his country on a sound basis, he created a good army, and built fortresses, particularly Montmélian to protect Savoy from the French, and Vercelli to protect Piedmont on the Milanese border. "Determined to make himself respected by everyone," wrote a Venetian, "he does not wish to be looked upon as a subject prince of Spain, but as a free though affectionate relation of his majesty." His nickname "Testa di Ferro," Ironhead, is sufficiently suggestive.

Emanuele Filiberto's aims to strengthen his country, to give

it the power of resistance and a weight in European politics, were completely attained. The prestige of Savoy was greatly increased, and so was the respect with which it was regarded, especially by Spain. In another direction the Duke's policy met with entire success, namely in his desire to establish better relations with the Swiss. The Swiss were valuable allies, on account of their near neighbourhood, their military powers, and the interests they shared with Savoy, since both were wedged in between great monarchies of whom they desired to remain independent. Emanuele Filiberto made an arrangement with the Catholic Cantons for mutual defence in time of war, and, with great difficulty, concluded a peace with his father's enemies, the Bernese (1564), each ceding some contested territory. Emanuele Filiberto did not renounce his claims to Geneva, but promised not to enforce them. This peace ripened into a League for mutual defence; a similar League was made with Valais, whose control of the Great S. Bernard was very important, and a peace was made with Geneva, though neither side abandoned its rights.

Emanuele Filiberto's son, Carlo Emanuele I (1580), was not content with his father's cautious policy. He was young, vigorous, energetic, thrilling with youthful hope and ambition, and dreaming of great conquests. A born soldier, he longed to wear the laurels which his father had gained in youth. Far from trusting to slow negotiation to round off and even extend the borders of his States, he was ready to plunge into war at once on the chance of driving his unwelcome neighbours from Saluzzo or Montferrat, or of recovering Geneva, whose loss seems to have weighed as a perpetual disgrace on the minds of all the family.

Montferrat was barred for the present, since Carlo Emanuele dared not defy Spain. Henry III held out hopes of helping him to attack Geneva, but he not only withdrew his offer, but also warned the Duke that France would not allow Geneva to be molested.

Unwilling to remain neutral and passive, Carlo Emanuele upon this threw himself entirely into the arms of Spain, hoping that Spanish interference in French politics would soon afford him an opportunity for seizing Saluzzo. He married Caterina, Philip's second daughter, through whom he hoped, on account of the delicate health of her brother and elder sister, one day to procure the crown of Spain itself for his own family. Then he joined eagerly in the Spanish policy of intrigue with the League against the French Government. He had close relations with Guise and Mayenne, and at the same time was negotiating with the Huguenots of the Dauphiné. How far Philip of Spain approved of his activity it is difficult to judge. Philip did not wish to have war with France forced upon him while he was still busy with the Armada, and seems to have tried to turn Carlo Emanuele's attention in other directions by offering him the governorship of the Netherlands or the command of the Armada, even the kingdom of England itself, to be held as a Spanish fief.

But Philip had probably given consent, even if he had not promised help, when Carlo Emanuele suddenly occupied Saluzzo by force (1588), declaring that he did so to save his own States from the infection of Protestantism, which was widespread in that Marquisate. At first he protested that he only meant to hold Saluzzo as a French fief, in trust for France until she should have restored her internal order, but this was obviously a pretence. Carlo Emanuele found that his action nearly resulted in uniting all the French parties against him, since his friends of the League declared themselves as angry as was Henry III himself at this insult to France. A real union of the French parties was however impossible; Carlo Emanuele was able to consolidate his rule in Saluzzo undisturbed and to turn his attention again to Switzerland. Certain burghers of Lausanne, discontented with the rule of Berne, plotted to admit a Savoyard army into the town, and the plot was only frustrated by a violent storm on the lake

which the Savoyards had to cross. The Bernese retaliated by invading Savoy; they trusted in French promises, but Henry III could give them little help, and the Savoyards repulsed them. It was Carlo Emanuele's turn to advance, and he threatened Geneva, building a new fortress, *Sta Caterina*, only two miles from the city. If Spain had co-operated, Geneva must have fallen, but Spain distrusted the young Duke's ambition; very little help was given, and that grudgingly, while Philip showed obvious reluctance to be involved in a Swiss war. The death of Henry III made the Bernese ready for peace, while Carlo Emanuele wished to turn his attention towards France, so the Treaty of Nyon was concluded in 1589.

The disputed succession in France raised fresh hopes for Carlo Emanuele. He thought that he might be elected as the Catholic party's candidate for the crown. The selfish designs of Philip II and his distrust of Carlo Emanuele made this really impossible, but the Duke had nevertheless considerable influence with the League. A number of leaders in Provence, where the League was very strong, invited him to invade that district, and Spain, hoping to be able to use his successes for its own purposes, encouraged the attempt. At first it was most successful; at Aix the Duke was splendidly received as Governor of Provence; in 1591 he entered Marseilles in triumph. But Lesdiguières, the great Huguenot commander of Protestant Dauphiné, checked Carlo Emanuele's progress in that direction, and Berne seized the opportunity to repudiate the Treaty of Nyon and attack Savoy on the north.

Hard pressed by Lesdiguières, Carlo Emanuele turned to Philip for help, even visiting Spain himself to rouse its lethargic government. But though he was promised troops from Milan, few were sent and those were useless. The Provençals soon lost their enthusiasm for him; Lesdiguières completely out-generalled him, and in 1592 that ubiquitous commander

invaded Piedmont and took several fortresses. The Spanish commander would not attack him, lest the defeat of his army should leave Lombardy unprotected, but the Duke struggled gallantly on, and recovered everything but the fortress of Exilles, which gave Lesdiguières the command of a pass into Italy.

Meanwhile Philip and Carlo Emanuele grew more and more distrustful of one another; as a Venetian ambassador wrote, "Philip only helps the Duke as a doctor gives food to a sick man, enough to keep him alive, but not enough to make him lusty." Piedmont was suffering from the long war, and resultant plague, and could not pay its taxes, so that the Duke, for want of money, was obliged to negotiate with France, and a Treaty was actually drawn up (1595) by which Carlo Emanuele was to hold Saluzzo as a French fief. But Henry IV was rapidly growing stronger, and refused to ratify the Treaty; war began again, and Lesdiguières successfully invaded Savoy. Peace only came at last in the unwelcome form of the Treaty of Vervins (1598), which obliged Carlo Emanuele to surrender what he still held in Provence, and left the question of Saluzzo to the doubtful result of Papal arbitration. An ambassador wrote to the Duke, "Spain, which does little to defend herself, does still less in the interests of your Highness."

Though neither Montferrat nor Geneva were mentioned in the Peace, the Duke was soon told that they were respectively under the protection of Spain and France and must not be annoyed. Thus Carlo Emanuele found himself thwarted on all sides, for he could not hope that the Pope would dare to offend France by awarding him Saluzzo; but Clement VIII, fearing to offend Spain by restoring to France her foothold in Italy, rid himself of the responsibility as soon as he could. Henry IV might have recovered Saluzzo by force, but he wished if possible to avoid another war, in which Spain might be tempted to join. So he continued negotiations and finally permitted Carlo Emanuele to come to France and pay him a personal visit. Carlo

Emanuele trusted to winning over the French ministers by presents, and their King by a fine scheme for a joint attack on Milan, but Henry was too cautious to indulge in such dreams at present, and refused to renounce Saluzzo unless in return for other Alpine valleys, which would give him an equally good road into Italy. Sully was opposed to Carlo Emanuele from the first. The Duke allowed himself to be involved in the Biron conspiracy, and so, trusting that this would give Henry plenty of occupation at home, he signed a treaty surrendering either Saluzzo or the stipulated valleys, and returned to Savoy to repudiate it immediately, and appeal to Spain to help him in defending Saluzzo.

It is hardly surprising that Henry's patience was exhausted; "My predecessors stripped the Duke of Savoy to his doublet, I will strip him to his shirt," he exclaimed; and, refusing to listen to further negotiations, he marched an army rapidly into Savoy, and soon occupied nearly the whole Duchy. Now Carlo Emanuele looked to Biron to save him, but Biron, far from declaring against the King, himself took part in the invasion of Savoy.

It was to Spain only that Carlo Emanuele could look for help, but the death of Philip II had not made Spanish policy either more energetic or less selfish. Philip III and Lerma did not really wish France to recover Saluzzo, but they distrusted Carlo Emanuele and suspected him, not without reason, of designs on Milan. They accordingly adopted a skilful, if dishonorable, course of action. Fuentes, Governor of Milan, was ordered to send troops which, on pretence of protecting Piedmont and Saluzzo, occupied the principal fortresses. At the same time Carlo Emanuele was exhorted to resist France to the uttermost; illusory hopes were held out to him that, since the Infant was in weak health, his son should be heir to Spain. "This dream," wrote a Venetian, "nearly cost him all his States, so anxious was he to oblige Spain at all costs." "Like a convalescent who retards his

own recovery by trying to take too much food at once," Carlo Emanuele, in reaching after the shadow of a kingdom, nearly lost the substance of his own States. Exhaustion at last forced him to allow the Pope's nephew, Cardinal Aldobrandini, who was in France, to treat for him, but he was still determined to cling to Saluzzo, and was so angry when the French took Sta Caterina and allowed the Genevese to destroy it that he nearly broke off the negotiations. Henry for his part was anxious for peace, but seemed equally determined not to give way about Saluzzo.

The Cardinal threatened to leave France; Sully threatened to carry the war into Italy. "I am going," he said, "to kiss the feet of the Pope, but I shall go well accompanied." Meanwhile Carlo Emanuele was rendered more reasonable on hearing that the Queen of Spain was pregnant, so that, as a Venetian said, "Deprived of the hope of getting what was not his own, he turned his attention to preserving what was."

It is difficult to understand why Henry suddenly gave way on the question of Saluzzo, and consented to conditions so different from those on which he had hitherto insisted; yet, by the Treaty of Lyons, signed at last in January, 1601, Saluzzo was surrendered to Carlo Emanuele in exchange for Bresse, Bugey, and some other districts of Savoy.

The advantages of the Treaty of Lyons to Carlo Emanuele were obvious; though Bresse and Bugey far exceeded Saluzzo in fertility and pecuniary value, he was amply compensated for such material loss by the increased security of his own States, and the immense gain in political importance which the complete command of the eastern slopes of the Alps gave to him. Henceforth the alliance of Savoy would be the more essential to both Spain and France; to France, since Savoy now held the gate of Italy against her; to Spain, since the defence of Milan depended more than ever upon Savoy. Amongst the Italian States also the importance of Savoy increased, and to most of them, especially to Venice, the Treaty was exceedingly

unwelcome. They felt themselves deserted by France, given over to Spain. But in the long run the independence of Savoy acted for the advantage of the whole country, since Savoy became the pioneer of the effort to shake off Spanish domination.

The motives which prompted Henry IV are harder to understand. True, Bresse and Bugéy were desirable acquisitions; they seemed to be an integral part of French territory, extending its borders to their natural boundary, the Rhône; they protected Provence from invasion by Savoy, and from Franche-Comté; they brought France nearer to the Swiss and to the German Princes. Nor could the loss of Saluzzo be said to exclude France entirely from Italy, since it was impossible for a weak power like Savoy to protect the many passes which led over the Alps into Piedmont; but it deprived her of a foothold in Italy, and a military depôt on which invasion could be based, and it alienated from her the other Italian States which had rejoiced in Henry's successes. "The King has made the Peace of a Duke, and the Duke the Peace of a King," they said, meaning that while Henry had made territorial, Carlo Emanuele had made political, gains.

Again, it was through the surrendered district that Spain had been accustomed to march her troops from Italy to Franche-Comté on their way to Flanders, so that its complete cession might in this respect have been a great advantage to France; but Carlo Emanuele dared not vitally offend Spain by closing this route, and, as its possession was a valuable pawn in the game of politics, it was equally to his advantage to retain it. By the Treaty, therefore, the Pont de Grésin, which secured the passage of the Rhône, and a strip of territory leading from thence to Franche-Comté was left to Savoy. However, Henry may have thought the concession of little worth, since in war-time it would be easy to block up so narrow a passage.

Yet it is not unlikely that Henry, in signing the Treaty of

Lyons, acted with deliberate and wise intent in the future interests of his country. Italian expeditions had hitherto brought her little but evil; it would be better to attend first to the internal consolidation of France and to the acquisition of allies on the border, the German Princes, the Swiss and even Savoy itself, now that the constant irritation of the Saluzzo question was removed. When France should be strong enough to attempt another struggle with the Habsburgs, Savoy would be a most valuable ally. Undoubtedly the Treaty of Lyons was the prelude to the future Treaty of Brossolo, and to whatever parts of the "Grand Dessein" Henry ever really contemplated.

CHAPTER II.

VENICE AND THE TURKS.

THE politics of Venice had always a two-fold character. Since her very existence depended upon commerce, for which she had long formed the link between East and West, she was always obliged to maintain at once her connection with the Powers of West and North Europe and with those of the Eastern Mediterranean; she had to preserve both her "terra-firma" possessions and those of the Archipelago. But from the moment that the Turks took Constantinople, it was obvious that they must come into conflict with Venice. They soon attacked her territories in the Balkan Peninsula, and, by the sixteenth century, they were casting covetous eyes on Cyprus, Crete and her other Eastern islands. War with the Turks was, however, doubly ruinous to Venice, who not only lost her territories, but also her commerce with the East, especially with Constantinople. Hence it was necessary for her prosperity, even for her existence, to keep as much as possible at peace with the Turks, though at the cost of much diplomatic humiliation. But when Venice made commercial treaties with the Porte to save her trade, the rest of Europe shrieked that she was betraying Christianity by dealings with the infidel enemy, and she was placed on a moral level with France, which had an alliance with the Porte directed against other Christian Powers. Had there been any possibility of

uniting Christendom in a Crusade against the advancing Turks, Venice was more than willing to be in the forefront of the battle; but, from the first, when Pius II made his crusading plans, Venice was the only Power which showed any enthusiasm for the cause. So great was the disunion of Christendom that every common effort was doomed to failure, and the jealousy with which Venice was usually regarded, and which came to light in the Cambray war, was not the least cause of these failures. The Fourth Crusade was not yet forgotten, and the rest of Europe had no desire to make conquests in the East for the benefit of Venice. In the sixteenth century, the difficulty of union was increased by the conflicting interests of Venice and the Habsburgs in Italy, for theirs were the only European States directly involved in the Eastern question. Hungary, even Austria, were overrun by the Turks; the coasts of Spain, Sicily and Naples were harried by the Mahomedan corsairs of North Africa. But instead of joining in a common plan of action, the menaced Powers allowed the enemy to deal with them in turns, each thankful when the misfortunes of the other procured an interval of repose for itself.

Hence, when in 1565 the Turks attacked Malta, the stronghold of the Knights of S. John, Spain sent them help, but Venice refused to break her peace with the Turks. It was natural therefore that Venice should be accused of selfish devotion to her own interests in the East, and indifference when her neighbours were attacked. Yet it is hardly fair to blame her without reserve. The existence and prosperity of the dominions of Spain did not, as did those of Venice, depend upon the forbearance of the Porte. True, the pirates did much damage to their coasts and shipping, but the Porte did not really control the pirates, and Venetian property, though protected by treaty, also suffered much. On the other hand, the ruler of Spain must always feel that, if he did not assist Venice when she was threatened, he would be deliberately sacrificing the bulwarks in the East which still stood between his own

States and the great enemy, and allowing him to draw nearer to the Moors of Granada and of North Africa.

So we find Spanish help given to Venice, but given grudgingly ;—“ enough to keep the sick man alive, but not to keep him in health,”—enough to preserve the Empire of Venice from destruction, but not enough to prevent the Turks from swallowing its outposts one by one. Unfortunately for Venice, her fear of the Turks in the sixteenth century was so great, that she fancied herself incapable of facing them alone, spent her energies on frantically negotiating impossible Leagues, and, delaying defensive measures until she received help, lost the advantage which bold and rapid action might have given her.

In 1537, indeed, she defended Corfu singlehanded, but she spoilt the effects of her success by waiting all the summer of 1538 for the arrival of a Spanish contingent under Doria, who finally ruined the campaign by his unwillingness to fight, no doubt under instructions from home not to risk his fleet. There was nothing left for her to do but to conclude a ruinous peace, which cost her a large slice of her eastern Empire, and gained for her the increased dislike and distrust of Spain, which now accused her of making peace without considering the interests of her ally.

By the middle of the sixteenth century, the Turks had conquered all the possessions of Venice in the Balkan Peninsula, except a few towns on the Dalmatian coasts ; but Crete, Cyprus, Corfu and many smaller islands still belonged to Venice. Venice was no match for the Turks as a military Power, but she had the advantage of a long and successful naval career. The Turks could not at once adapt themselves to nautical conditions ; the war of 1538-40 was fought out mainly by their ally Barbarossa and his pirate fleet. But as early as 1499 the Sultan sent a message to the Doge ; “ You can stop wedding the sea now ; we are going to have our turn ” ; and by 1570, the Porte had deliberately made itself

into a sea-power, more formidable than any then in existence. The great point in its favour was that it had practically an unlimited command of men and money. The Turks might be bad sailors, but when ships and crews were lost they were rapidly replaced, and Greek and African mercenaries could be hired. The ships were built by renegade Greeks and Italians,—for great numbers of whom the reckless use in Italy of the penalty of exile was responsible. In 1533 the Turks could send out, with some difficulty, a hundred ships; in 1570 there were three hundred ready equipped.

To face this immense power Venice had to rely upon her experience, her courage and her wits. She could barely in war-time muster a hundred ships, garrison her Eastern fortresses, and hire a contingent of German and Italian mercenaries. But her sailors had the instinct of generations and the practice of a lifetime in their favour; they fought with splendid courage and dogged persistence. Many of the subject populations were attached to Venice by religion; the Corfiots, Mainots, Dalmatians and Albanians fought gallantly for her. Unfortunately, the Venetian commanders, though brave enough, were, with few exceptions, wanting in decision, judgment and tactical skill, and were often bitterly jealous of one another. This points to a serious deterioration in the stock of Venetian patricians. And when it came to land fighting, Venice had to rely upon natives who were always ill-disciplined and upon mercenaries who were generally rebellious. Thus, while it sometimes happened that her victorious navy swept the seas, annihilated Turkish fleets and blockaded the Dardanelles, a Turkish army, firmly planted in one of her possessions, could remain there undisturbed, subjugating the fortresses at leisure, and waiting till a moment of fatigue or bad weather should give an opportunity for reinforcements to slip by the blockaders.

From 1540 till 1570 there was peace, and Venice would gladly have prolonged it. But there was constant friction on

account of the Mediterranean pirates, since the Porte held Venice responsible for the peace of the Adriatic, and blamed her for the depredations committed there on shipping by the Knights of Malta and the Uscocchi, although the Venetians suffered equally from them. So anxious was Venice to preserve peace that the Turks, as a Venetian ambassador to Constantinople wrote, "believed that we should grant them every demand they made. This belief was confirmed by our cautious diplomacy, estimating their strength too highly and underrating our own, so that their natural pride made them believe that they could get Cyprus for the asking."

A new Sultan, Selim, wanted to celebrate his accession by a showy conquest; he coveted Cyprus for its fertility and fine wines, and as an important naval station, and he thought that its distance from Venice would make it an easy prey. Exaggerated reports of the damage done by a recent explosion in the Venetian arsenal further emboldened him, and he sent to demand the immediate cession of Cyprus. "You must give it me freely or by force," he said, "and beware of provoking my terrible sword, for it will wage fierce war against you everywhere; nor trust to your treasure, for it shall run from you like a torrent." Venice had not fallen so low as to submit to this browbeating; she returned a defiant answer and hastened to prepare for war. Unfortunately her hold upon Cyprus was weak. She had kept up the feudal system there, so that the nobles, though loyal, were disorderly, while the peasants were oppressed and disaffected.

The defenders were insufficient to prevent a Turkish landing, or to hold the open country, and soon shut themselves up in the two fortresses of Nicosia and Famagosta, hoping to hold out until a Venetian fleet came to their aid. However, Nicosia, whose commander was nervous and muddleheaded, was soon taken by assault and cruelly sacked. But Famagosta, in which, there were good troops and a brave and capable Governor, Bragadin,

held out firmly, and might have been saved if succour had arrived in reasonable time.

Unfortunately, though her ambassador at the Porte had assured her that the Turkish navy was not really formidable, Venice was afraid to send her own to face it alone, and waited to find allies. Pius V was really enthusiastic; this was the opportunity for which he had longed to organise a great Crusade for the final extermination of the infidels; he sent out a contingent of ships under a good commander, Marcantonio Colonna, and set to work to negotiate a League. But the Emperor had just concluded peace with the Turks and refused to break it. Philip II was much embarrassed by Flemish affairs and by the attitude of France, where Coligny's influence was growing dangerous. It was not very wise for him to send his fleet into the East and risk its destruction there, yet it was an opportunity to draw off the pirates from his own coasts. He feared too that, if he did not help Venice, she would make a peace with the Turks who could then turn their attention to Italy or to Spain itself. Finally he compromised by sending fifty ships, but so late in the year that the Venetian fleet was already demoralised by idleness and disease. Nicosia had fallen before the combined fleets could reach Cyprus, and Gian Andrea Doria, Philip's admiral, who had orders not to risk a pitched battle, insisted on retiring without an attempt to relieve Famagosta. The Venetians were afraid to advance without him, and Famagosta, after holding out with splendid gallantry for more than a year, surrendered in August, 1571. The terms were honourable, but the victorious Pashà broke his oath, sacked the town and murdered the commanders in cold blood. Bragadin was brutally flayed alive on the public square of the town which he had so heroically defended.

Thus Cyprus passed into the hands of the Turks, just as if Venice had possessed no fleet which could have made an effort to save it. Venice had again waited all the spring, until, in July, Philip, in order to get grants of money for a "Crusade"

from the Pope, signed the League, and a Spanish fleet under Don John of Austria with Marcantonio Colonna and the Papal ships sailed to the East. No doubt Don John had been warned against rashness, but the Prince was young and adventurous and eager to fight, and when the allies met the Turks in the Gulf of Lepanto, he attacked them vigorously (October 7th, 1571). Doria indeed tried to keep out of the battle, but Don John, Colonna and the Venetians won an overwhelming victory, in which the Turkish fleet was almost destroyed. Had the allies followed up their success, and sailed direct upon Constantinople, where the terror and confusion were extreme, it is not impossible that they might have driven the Turks for ever out of Europe. But so grand an enterprise was far beyond their courage. Probably Don John was allowed to feel Philip's displeasure for having already risked so much. The Spanish fleet was ordered home for the winter; the Turks, recovering from their fright, had another navy on the sea in six months.

In spite of her experience, Venice, next year, again ordered her commanders to wait for Don John and the Spanish fleet. They sailed to the East in July, blockaded the Turks in Modon, but allowed them to escape, and Don John went home in the autumn after a campaign of masterly inactivity. Venice realized that Philip was successfully keeping the Turks at a distance from his own shores at great expense to her and at a distinct profit to himself. In fact he was receiving a Papal grant to keep up a large fleet, but had not materially increased it from what he was always obliged to maintain in times of peace. Venice had nothing to gain by prolonging the war; indeed the Turks were already threatening Crete; she therefore made peace in 1573 as she had done in 1540, independently of her Spanish ally. Philip was really annoyed; for the Massacre of S. Bartholomew had relieved him of his fear of the French Protestants, and he could have taken a more active interest in Eastern affairs. Venice abandoned

Cyprus; elsewhere the peace was on the *Status quo* basis. She was more than ever confirmed in her wish to keep at peace with the Porte, while the Turks were more than ever certain that, though the Christians might beat them on the seas, they would never co-operate long enough to secure the fruits of their triumphs. "Lepanto," it was said, "might as well have been a Turkish victory." Yet Venice had at least learned that Turkish fleets were not invincible, and her attitude in naval warfare was henceforward more bold and self-reliant.

There followed seventy years of peace, with a commercial treaty renewed by each Sultan. Venice felt her energy and wealth ebbing away, and all her strength was involved in the task of maintaining a dignified attitude in European affairs. She sought, on account of "her inability for warlike undertakings," wrote a Venetian, "to maintain her empire rather by civil prudence than by military valour, and to avoid war as she would destruction." So she yielded again and again to the Porte when trouble arose about the pirates, even to the extent of paying an indemnity for having exterminated some of them. But while following Sarpi's advice, "to profess friendliness to the Porte," she neglected its conclusion, "to remain always prepared for war, so that her weakness should not encourage its rapacity." She had not in fact material resources sufficient for effective support of her navy and her Levantine garrisons and fortresses; "they are no better kept than those of Spain," it was said. Her colonial administration deteriorated as did that of her home-government, owing to the decadence of the ruling families.

In Crete, as in Cyprus, the products of the feudal system were an unruly nobility and a discontented peasantry. Taxation was heavy, commerce hampered by the mistaken protective policy of the sovereign State against her colonies. Many discontented Cretans intrigued with Constantinople, others had taken refuge there. Crete, the last important Venetian possession, with its splendid harbours and its central position,

was very tempting ; in 1644, a warlike sovereign, Ibrahim, determined on its conquest, and he easily found a pretext for war. Venice and the Turks alike were much troubled by the piratical raids of the Knights of S. John and of S. Stephen (the Florentine Order) ;—"if it were not for these," wrote a Venetian ambassador, "there would be no arsenal at Constantinople." But, since they were Christians also, the Porte chose to blame Venice for their performances, and now declared, in spite of her assurances, that some Maltese pirates had taken into a Cretan harbour a Turkish ship which they had captured.

Ibrahim would not attack Malta itself, which was strongly defended ; it was Crete that he wanted, and in 1645 a powerful fleet left Constantinople. "It is to be," wrote the Sultan, "the terror of the whole world ; the multitude of its ships shall marvellously change the Sun, Moon and Stars ; at the roaring of its guns the fishes shall hide themselves in the depths of the sea, and the trees shall be uprooted from the earth."

Venice, afraid to offend the Sultan, had done little to prepare Crete for defence, and the native levies fled to the hills at sight of the Turks, who easily effected a landing and besieged Canea. It was bravely defended, and did not surrender until the walls were breached in four places. Thus the Turks made good their footing in the island, and their ships, safe in the shelter of Canea harbour, refused to go out and fight the Venetian fleet. The Venetian captains in the early part of the war were singularly unfortunate or incapable, and so constantly allowed Turkish vessels to slip past them that the Turks at last believed them ready to surrender Crete rather than risk further offending the Sultan by destroying his ships. All the island was quickly subjugated except the principal town, Candia, which was strongly fortified and garrisoned.

But Venice was now rousing herself from the lethargy of the long peace, and she determined to make a great effort to

preserve this last of her important Eastern possessions. The navy was increased, mercenaries engaged, stores rapidly sent to Candia. A vigorous offensive war was begun in Dalmatia, where the Morlacs, a border Christian tribe, placed themselves under Venetian protection and proved excellent irregular troops. The important fortresses of Dervis, Klissa and Knin were captured, and the Venetian border considerably extended. Meanwhile Venice did all she could to obtain help from Europe, but the Powers were indifferent or hostile. All that she got in return for negotiating the Peace of Münster was that Spain offered help in return for aid against Portugal, and France on the opposite condition. Venice would accept no such terms, but Mazarin's conscience prompted him to send her a little pecuniary aid. The Emperor would not break his own peace with the Porte for the sake of Venice, which had certainly never done so much for him. Little could be expected from Italy, unless from the Popes. With an uneasy feeling that something was expected of them as heads of Christendom, they, with Malta and Tuscany, contributed a few ships. Donna Olympia was more careful of Papal reputation than was Innocent X, and sent a contribution from her own hoard. Alexander VII allowed Venice to suppress some of her own Religious Houses, and to take their money, but only at the price of restoring the Jesuits; he even ventured to suggest a relaxation of her mortmain law.

England and Holland gladly watched the ruin of Venetian commerce, and their merchants hastened to take the place of hers at Constantinople. Their captains hired out their ships to convey provisions to the Turkish army in Crete, and sold munitions of war at a good profit. Once, however, the depredations of pirates nearly forced Cromwell into a war with the Porte, and an English squadron entered the Mediterranean. But England's commercial stake in the East was too high to be lightly imperilled, and Cromwell considered a Spanish war less risky and more popular.

But, though left quite alone, Venice was making a gallant fight for Crete. In 1648 Luigi Leonardo Mocenigo became Governor of Candia, and for three successive summers beat off Turkish assaults. "The house of Mocenigo never surrenders fortresses," he exclaimed to one who counselled surrender, "rather let us all die, and let me fall first!" His spirit so emboldened the defence that, in 1650, the Turks had to convert the siege into a blockade which lasted for seventeen years. Year after year Venice made heroic efforts to reinforce the garrison and to relieve it from the sea. Her fleet became mistress of the seas, sailing unopposed through the Archipelago and even blockading the Dardanelles. Again and again, as Turkish ships tried to slip through the blockade, great naval battles were fought at the opening of the straits and whole Turkish fleets were sometimes destroyed; yet the resources of the Porte were inexhaustible; it could always provide a new fleet, and Venice never entirely succeeded in cutting off communications with the camp at Canea, and so starving it out.

In the annals of these sea-fights there were deeds of heroism which shed the glamour of romance upon the prosaic seventeenth century. Giuseppe Delfino, surrounded by Turkish ships within the Dardanelles, fought his way free, hastily repaired his broken rudder, and attacked them once more. He captured one, but, being assaulted by fourteen others, had again to withdraw. His sails were torn up, but he replaced them by flags and cloths, and sailed out of the straits to rejoin the Venetian fleet, which had expected never to see him again. The fight of Tommaso Morosini's ship, alone against forty-five Turks, recalls the tale of the *Revenge*. The captain was killed, but the crew went on fighting, though the Turks had climbed into their rigging, hauled down the Lion of S. Mark and hoisted the Crescent. Finally, after inflicting almost incredible damage on the enemy, the ship was saved by the arrival of a Venetian fleet. In 1655 and 1656 Lazzaro Mocenigo won two great battles, in the latter of which he lost an eye; in 1657 he

intended to force a passage through the Dardanelles, and attack Constantinople. His ships were separated by a storm, and the Turks were able to slip past them and take refuge under the forts of Natolia. Three times Mocenigo advanced under their guns to attack the fleet, but at last his own ship caught fire, and a falling spar struck and killed the gallant commander.

From 1658 to 1664 the Turks were hampered by their war in Hungary, which culminated in Montecuccoli's great victory on the Raab; but the Emperor Leopold only utilised this success to obtain peace, and Venice gained little by the diversion. The Peace of the Pyrenees, however, enabled Mazarin to pacify his conscience with regard to Venice, and at the same time to get rid of Condé's troops by sending four thousand of them to Crete. But they were headstrong and reckless, and were nearly all killed in a futile attack on the vast Turkish camp. The rest soon fell victims to the climate. But the chivalrous spirit of the young French nobles had been roused, and another little army under the Duc de Noailles went out on this latter-day Crusade. The sympathies of Europe seem to have been in a manner awakened, and the Emperor and German and Italian Princes sent supplies of men and money. But they were too late; Candia was already doomed. The Turkish army had once more closed in upon it (1667), attempting by sheer force of numbers and artillery to overwhelm its weary defenders. From May to November there were thirty-two assaults, seventeen sorties, six hundred and eighteen mines exploded. The same struggle continued in 1668 and 1669. Citizens and garrison fought gallantly together, and not a stone was abandoned without a desperate struggle. The captain was now Francesco Morosini, the greatest Venetian of his century, as excellent an organiser and disciplinarian as he was brave a soldier. Against Morosini's advice, de Noailles led the whole French force to a daring, but reckless sortie (1669). For a moment its dash was successful, but it was soon repulsed with

great loss, and de Noailles in disgust insisted on returning at once to France. Candia was left with a garrison of barely four thousand men, wholly insufficient for the defence, while another four thousand were in hospital. The outworks destroyed, the outer circle of walls abandoned, the inner circle already tottering, it was obvious to all that the end had come. Yet none would counsel Morosini to surrender; some indeed would have blown up the town and died fighting. But Morosini could not thus sacrifice the faithful inhabitants; instead he obtained for them the best terms possible. Indeed, when the entering Turks saw the condition of the defences, they regretted having conceded so much. Wisely venturing to exceed his powers, Morosini treated for a general peace. Crete indeed must pass to the victors; but Venice retained the three fine harbours of Suda, Grabusa and Spinalonga. In Dalmatia she was to keep the strip of territory which she had conquered. Many faithful Cretans left the island and made homes in Istria, where traces of their language and customs are still found.

So ended the siege of Candia, "Troy's rival," as Byron long afterwards called it. It had continued twenty-two years; in the last three alone thirty thousand Christian and over a hundred thousand Turkish lives were lost. Over four million ducats, not including stores and ammunition, had been sent to Crete by Venice during the war. She had shown that she still possessed something of her old spirit, that she could still produce fine sailors and a few good captains, and, in Istria and Dalmatia, loyal and brave subjects.

In spite of diminishing trade, her private wealth was still considerable; large voluntary contributions were made, and plebeian families were allowed to buy the patriciate at high prices. On the whole her self-esteem and self-reliance had increased during the war, and she was ready to take her revenge by joining the "Holy League" in 1683.

There had been no real reconciliation with the Porte since

the late peace ; there were continual troubles about the pirates, and difficulties about the Dalmatian borders, where the Morlacs made raids on their former tyrants. The chances of 1683 seemed excellent. Sobieski had just repulsed the Turks from Vienna, their best troops were employed in Hungary, and their maritime States were therefore ill-defended. Relying too much on the divisions of Christendom, and believing that Venice would never join Austria, the Turks had weakened their navy to strengthen their army, so that it was now the turn of Venice to attack. Crete was too strong to attempt ; but the people of the Morea, especially the Mainots, were ready to welcome Christian invaders.

Between 1683 and 1688 the series of Morosini's victories was unbroken. He was so well trusted that, unlike most Venetian commanders, he was left unhampered by tiresome instructions and criticising civilian officials from the home-government. His popularity grew to such a height that he received the unprecedented honour of a statue in the hall of the Council of Ten, holding a Turkish banner, and inscribed,

Francisco Mauroceno
Peloponnesiaco adhuc viventi
Senatus.

In spite of her late heavy losses, Venice again proved her resources by the vast sums voluntarily contributed to a popular and successful war. By 1687 the Morea was subjugated ; each mosque had again become a Christian church, and was dedicated to the saint under whose auspices the town was taken. In Prevesa, captured on September 29th, was found a mutilated painting of S. Michael ; was it not plain that the saint, resenting his mutilation, had restored the town to the Christians ? The Turks retired across the Isthmus, and Morosini laid siege to Athens. Unfortunately a bomb fell on the Parthenon where the Turkish ammunition was stored, and wrecked what centuries of weather and neglect had spared.

“O Athens! O nurse of the Arts! to what art thou reduced?” cried Morosini in genuine regret. Unable to maintain himself at Athens, he tried to ship a number of art treasures to Venice, but they were spoilt in the transit. However, the two Lions of S. Mark, which had been left at Athens when the Turks first conquered it, were sent home to adorn the doorway of the Arsenal.

In 1688 Morosini was elected Doge, though the constitutional safeguards of the Dogeship had to be violated in order to enable him to retain his command. But an unsuccessful attempt upon Negropont injured his health, and he had to return home. Girolamo Corner, who was doing well in Dalmatia, went out and took the last resisting Morean fortress, Napoli di Malvasia, but he soon died, and his successor was not equal to the work. Then Morosini, in spite of his age and infirmities, responded to the popular appeal and resumed the command. He captured a few islands, and reorganised the defences of the Morea before death took him from the scene of his triumphs.

Venice buried the last of her heroes with all the honours due to his grand deeds and character. He had given her the Morea in exchange for Crete, but the heroic defence of Candia was, in spite of its failure, the crown of his career. He was the last man to have taken advantage of his double office, but another Captain-Doge might not be so scrupulous, and it was enacted that no future Doge should act in this capacity.

There was no one able to succeed Morosini; Antonio Zeno, who took command, was timid, undecided and a poor disciplinarian. He seized Scio; but the Turks could not submit to the loss of a harbour of such importance and so near the Dardanelles. By his dilatoriness or indecision, Zeno lost an opportunity for destroying their fleet and allowed it to retire safely into Smyrna. Angry and discontented at the failure, the Venetian fleet grew rebellious during the winter at Scio. In the spring, Zeno sailed out to attack the Turks

again; the Venetians fought boldly, but they were ill-commanded and disorderly; for once the Turks out-generalled them, and they were driven back into Scio. Then Zeno lost his head, and, fearing to lose both Scio and the fleet, determined, in spite of the protests of the subordinate officers, to abandon the former in order to save the latter. Later on, indeed, the Venetian fleet recovered its command of the sea, and blockaded the Dardanelles; but Venice now seems to have thought it wiser to confine her land conquests to the Adriatic coast. Corner had made considerable progress there, and destroyed Castel Nuovo, a nest of pirates. He was helped by Albanians and Morlacs; but Venice was not strong enough to extend her protection to the Montenegrins who asked for it, and could only offer an asylum in Dalmatia to refugee Croats, of which many took advantage. Later, the Venetians pushed on to the R. Narenta, reduced the pirate stronghold of Dulcigno, and forced the troublesome Ragusans, who alone amongst the coast peoples resisted her, to relinquish their communications with the Turks.

Meanwhile, Prince Eugene of Savoy had been gaining splendid successes in Hungary against the Turks. In 1689 they asked for peace, but would not submit to the exorbitant demands of the League, then at the height of its triumphs. But when the Emperor, involved in war with France, was anxious to be able to concentrate his attention on the coming question of the Spanish succession, he took the opportunity afforded by Eugene's great victory at Zenta (1697), to initiate negotiations. Poland and Venice, both exhausted by the long war, were eager for peace, but they soon found that Austria meant to make the best terms she could for herself, and was not over-anxious about their interests. The Turks quite understood the situation, and yielded to Austria's demands, while resisting those of her allies. Venice protested, and allowed peace to be concluded without her (Peace of Carlowitz, 1699). She had afterwards to subscribe to what

she considered unfavourable terms, but in reality she was not badly used, since she kept the Morea, Aegina and part of her Dalmatian conquests.

Her acquisitions were more than she was likely to be able to retain. The Turkish Empire was indeed already decadent, the Sultans were degenerate, Constantinople continually in revolution, money and energy wanting. But Venice was still weaker than the Porte, and her new possession increased her vulnerability. Turkish misgovernment had reduced the people to the utmost degradation, so terrorised that "they would fly from the sight of a turban"; yet, under the influence of the Greek priests, they hated their new Latin masters. The country, uncultivated and depopulated, was overrun with brigands; the Mainots were particularly troublesome. Venice tried to improve the country by building roads, forming agricultural colonies and starting manufactures, but she ruined what trade there was by driving off the English and French merchants on account of her heavy tariffs. She gave the towns a measure of local self-government which resulted in utter corruption and disorder. The taxes barely paid the expenses of administration; Venice had little money to spend on fortifications and garrisons; she was financially embarrassed by the late war, and was occupied in trying to keep her Italian possessions free from the encroaching armies of the Powers engaged in the War of the Spanish Succession.

While a great European League existed, which would have helped Venice in the East in return for help against France, the Porte dared not attack her; but, after the Peace of Utrecht, it judged Austria too much exhausted to interfere, and too much annoyed at the persistent neutrality of Venice even to wish to do so. It therefore accused Venice of destroying a treasure-ship, and of granting protection to the refugee Vladica of Montenegro, and thereupon declared war (1714). Venice was poor and ill-prepared; she had no allies, though the Pope and Malta lent her a few ships. The Greeks of the Morea were tired of

civilisation, and seemed to prefer Turkish anarchy. Venice had now no Morosini; her captains were quarrelsome and incompetent, her fleet too weak to dare to meet the Turks. Tinos and Aegina at once surrendered; many Morean towns did the same on hearing that Corinth and Napoli di Romania, which resisted, had been horribly sacked. The Turks also took Suda and Spinalonga in Crete, and attacked Corfù, almost the last Eastern possession of Venice (1716).

Austria was not however so much exhausted that she could not seize the opportunity to attack the Turks while they were employed elsewhere. Eugene invaded Hungary, and won the great battle of Peterwardein. This diversion probably saved Corfù, which was defending itself with the utmost gallantry, but could hardly have escaped if the Turks had been able to reinforce its besiegers. The Venetian fleet recovered its supremacy, winning two battles in 1717, and the people of Dalmatia were once more in arms against the Turks. Venice hoped to recover the Morea, but in 1718 the Emperor, having gained all he wanted, insisted on concluding peace (Peace of Passarowitz). Venice was too weak to be able to make her interests respected; she was allowed to keep her acquisitions in Dalmatia and Albania, but she had to relinquish the Morea and her Cretan harbours. A few islands, including Corfù, were now all that was left of her Eastern Empire.

The long duel was over, for neither combatant retained strength for a fresh attack. The warlike spirit of Venice was dead; her citizens required nothing but peace and a comfortable life. "Trade had followed the flag," and they had sunk together; commercial supremacy disappeared with Empire.

It is a chapter of history which seems rather like an anachronism, bringing the spirit of Crusade, with a touch of medieval romance and religious enthusiasm, into an atmosphere of latter-day materialism. The deeds of Morosini and the feats of some Venetian sea-captains read like a page of thirteenth century history. But it was the survival of these

qualities in Venice, the courage, resource and self-sacrifice which she exercised in these wars, which prevented her from falling a prey to the general decadence of Italy, and caused the European Powers to respect her, and to refrain from attempts to subjugate her. When, exhausted at length, she suspended her activity in the East, there set in those last processes of decay which ended in the forfeiture of her independence.

CHAPTER III.

INTERNAL POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION :

1559—1700.

THE effect of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation upon the Papacy was to convert it once more into a mainly ecclesiastical institution, taking very little part in, and having very little influence on, European politics; yet the process of conversion could not be complete so long as the Papacy possessed the temporal States, and without these it was convinced that it could not exist. The States were of course far too insignificant for the basis of a world-power, but they gave the Papacy a part in Italian politics, and their interests, or their supposed interests, and their extension frequently determined the Papal policy. Hence the Papacy still retained many of the characteristics of a temporal monarchy, though it differed from its neighbours because it was elective, and because all its officials were ecclesiastics. The character of the Popes themselves conformed to the ideals of the Counter-Reformation. No one without a high reputation for piety and morality could hope to sit in Peter's chair; the only vice not excluded was hypocrisy. The Cardinals liked a lawyer, enthusiastic for the claims of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, a capable administrator, who could manage the Papal States and finance satisfactorily, and a man of diplomatic experience, able to steer a safe course in foreign politics. It is worthy of notice that many of the Popes were of Tuscan origin. Too ardent a politician, who might embroil the Papacy in quarrels, was to be avoided, and the great Powers also objected to a vigorous politician, and would unite to veto

an Italian prince, such as Cardinal Farnese or Cardinal d'Este, whose policy would be dictated by family interests. Moved by the same reasons, the Cardinals never favoured a candidate from a family already powerful in Rome, especially from that of the late Pope. Hence several Popes were drawn from the lowest ranks of society. A man of learning, with peaceable disposition and high character, was preferred; an elderly man, so that others might hope for a turn, and a man without too many relations.

The Cardinals were divided into parties, called by the name of the Pope who created them, and generally led by his nephews. There were endless intrigues and combinations between them and the representatives of such foreign Powers as tried to influence the elections. The Conclaves were long and hotly contested, for it was only while they lasted that the Cardinals found themselves important. Most elections were reactions from the last, a severe Pope would follow a mild, a peaceable Pope would replace a pugnacious one. Each election was also generally a victory for the parties which had been out of power during the last reign. Foreign influence in the Conclaves was intermittent; the Grand Dukes of Tuscany sometimes compassed the election of their candidate; Spain specially exerted itself at one time to secure anti-French Popes; and Louis XIV felt himself bound to interfere in Papal elections as in everything else (see Chapters I and V).

But from the middle of the seventeenth century, the more independent Cardinals formed a party called the "Squadrone Volante" (the flying squadron), which was free from the influence of foreign States and of Papal nephews. The Squadrone frequently decided disputed elections, adopting from amongst the party candidates the man whom it considered best fitted for the Papacy.

Except at the time of the Conclaves, the Cardinals had, up to about the middle of the seventeenth century, little substantial power. They spent the intervals principally in intriguing to

influence the next election, or to prepare the way for their own candidature. The foreign Cardinals and the Italian princes had behind them the influence of their own governments, whose nominees they generally were. Some of the Cardinals were chosen for their learning, such as Bellarmine and Baronio; some, like Filippo Neri, for remarkable piety, many for useful service in the Curia, the Inquisition, or in diplomacy, the rest merely as interested friends of the ruling house. They were organised into "Congregations," each of which nominally controlled some branch of religious or administrative work, but, with the exception of the Inquisition, the Pope over-ruled them at his will. If he asked their advice they usually hastened to say what they thought would please him, and he often merely announced his intentions in Consistory without consulting them at all. Abroad the Cardinals might seem great princes, in Rome "they only served to form a splendid crown for the Pope."

As the Papacy shrunk in importance, the Curia became less cosmopolitan and less intellectually conspicuous. By degrees nearly all the offices were made purchasable, and in order to raise money a vast number of sinecure offices were created, some to be held for life, some hereditary. The offices were called "Monti," the holders "Montisti." To purchase Monti became practically the same as buying Papal Stock on which good interest was paid, and, in those times of financial uncertainty, Papal Monti were considered a safe investment, and attracted many rich Genoese and Tuscans, as well as members of the old Roman families and of newer families founded by the Popes. Roman society thus came to consist mainly of wealthy Montisti, some holding actual, some nominal office in the Curia.

At the same time that this oligarchical movement progressed, the Papacy was undergoing a modification towards a less absolute and more aristocratic form of government. This was in the first place due to what may be called "Administrative

Nepotism," which flourished between 1560 and 1660. The Counter-Reformation made a return to the older abuses of nepotism impossible, and Paul III was the last Pope to create a principality for his family. Yet almost every Pope, finding himself isolated amongst officials whose loyalty was doubtful, naturally relied upon relatives whose interests must be bound up with his own. The Popes were generally old and rather past work; they were surrounded by exaggerated etiquette, cut off from close intercourse with diplomats and officials. The Venetian ambassadors frankly declared that they preferred a Pope who ruled through his nephew, and the Jesuits impressed upon Alexander VII that he would never gain reliable information while he kept his nephew away from court. Administrative nepotism tempered Papal absolutism, since the nephew had always to remember his position after his uncle's death. Few were seriously called to account, but Pius IV punished the Caraffa, and Innocent X arraigned the Barberini for misappropriating the revenue.

As Rome became full of powerful families, ennobled and enriched by each succeeding Pope, it became more and more difficult to resist their influence and retain the old Papal autocracy. It was a sign of the times when there was no longer a clean sweep of the offices at each election, and the new Pope confirmed many of his predecessor's appointments. As the seventeenth century progressed administrative nepotism, always liable to abuses, became discredited, and the Popes sometimes replaced the "Cardinal nephew" by a "Cardinal secretary" who became very powerful. About the same period the influence of the *Squadron Volante* made itself felt at other times than in the Conclaves, and thus we find, by the eighteenth century, that the Papacy is no longer an autocracy, but a limited, though not constitutional, monarchy. We must trace the steps of these changes in rather more detail.

Pius IV (1559) was in part elected because the Cardinals hoped to find in his easy, affable temper a pleasant change from

the ferocity of Paul IV. Yet Pius was a true Pope of the Counter-Reformation; he punished the crimes of the Caraffa, and continued the work of reform. Naturally prone to amusement and the pleasures of the table, he was kept up to the mark by his nephew, Cardinal Carlo Borromeo, Archbishop of Milan. Borromeo was a man of stern and lofty character, the Apostle of the Counter-Reformation at its best, though unfortunately marred by its bigotry and its cruelties. But as the first great Cardinal nephew, he set an excellent example; he performed the administrative work thoroughly, but never abused his influence, spent his revenues well and did not even try to make a party dependent on himself. His influence was no doubt felt at the next Conclave, when Pius V, the strictest of the Counter-Reformation Popes, the "Pope of the Inquisition," was elected (1565). Pius was devout, upright and fearless, but obstinate, suspicious, merciless, and roused to fury by opposition. Vehemently eager for war against heretics and infidels, to him were due the worst of the crimes of the Roman Inquisition and the anti-Turkish League which fought at Lepanto. Relying wholly upon himself, and unmoved by personal interests, Pius, though making his nephew a Cardinal, ruled without a minister.

Gregory XIII (1572) was an entire contrast, a man of the world, and a good lawyer, cool and self-contained. His intentions were good and he wished for reform,—indeed he deserved well of posterity for his new Calendar,—but he liked ease and wanted energy, so that his reign has become famous for its administrative disorders. "His laws were good," it was said, "but no one had to keep them¹"; and the Papal States, always disturbed, relapsed into a condition of positive anarchy. His cold manner and reluctance to grant favours rendered him unpopular; if he meant to be gracious, "the words seem to be torn out of him by force." His son by an early marriage was well provided for, but had no part in the government; and in

¹ Hübnér, *Sixtus V.*

Gregory's reign there appears the first Cardinal Minister, Tolomeo Galli, who acted as foreign secretary, and acquired considerable power.

Sixtus V (1585) owed his election to his lofty and austere character, and the Cardinals rightly judged that he would restore order to the Papal States. The severity, almost savagery, of his rule, touched as it was by a certain grim humour, so impressed his contemporaries that a kind of myth has grown up about him, and one of the best of the Popes has been popularly represented as an ogre of cynical ferocity. In spite of his natural vehemence and obstinacy, he really wished to act justly and uprightly, and it was the strain of the mental struggle to judge between Henry of Navarre and the League which killed him (p. 103). His desire to strengthen the Papacy led him to raise vast sums of money for storage in the castle of S. Angelo, a measure which was financially ruinous, since interest had to be paid on this unproductive capital, but politically advantageous, as a belief in its great wealth increased the importance of the Papacy. Yet Sixtus spent largely on the many buildings in Rome which still bear his name. Sixtus was too self-reliant to need a nephew's help in governing, but he ennobled his family and endowed it with great wealth.

After the next three short-lived Popes followed Clement VIII (1592), who was almost wholly absorbed in foreign affairs. Personally he was slow and diffident, yet his diplomacy was successful, since it was conducted by a much stronger and more able person, his nephew, Cardinal Aldobrandini. For a brief time the Papacy resumed a powerful influence in European politics; and it was Aldobrandini's skill which added Ferrara to the Papal States.

Aldobrandini's rule represented nepotism in one of its best forms; that which it took under Paul V (1605) was far less creditable. Paul was personally a serious, learned and upright man, an earnest reformer, averse from intrigue, dignified and gracious; his election was expected to bring honour and peace, but unfortunately his narrowness of mind and his

passion for Canon Law involved the Papacy in a most serious quarrel with Venice, from which it emerged considerably weakened (p. 179). Paul seemed afterwards to have no energy but to pile up a colossal fortune for his Borghese nephews, whose Palace and Villa are imposing features in modern Rome. Cardinal Borghese's political influence, however, was not very great, but the reign of Gregory XV (1621) marks the complete ascendancy of the Cardinal nephew. Gregory was a quiet old man in feeble health, and was absolutely ruled by Cardinal Ludovisi, a skilful and ambitious politician, whose first object was to amass a fortune and to create a party in his uncle's brief lifetime.

The period of the Counter-Reformation was now really over, and the next Pope, Urban VIII (1623), was not saturated with its traditions. A handsome, genial, witty gentleman, a poet and lover of letters, and a good lawyer, his first object was self-glorification, and his next the restoration of the Papacy's political influence. His ambitions upset the peace of central Italy;—"Orbem bellis, urbem gabellis implevit," said Pasquin. A Venetian ambassador wrote, "he glories infinitely" even in his own Latin hymns, "and wishes to be raised high in the opinion of men." He was so talkative that ambassadors grumbled because they had to give audience to the Pope, not he to them.

Urban reverted to the old idea of the Papacy as a leading Italian power; his politics were directed rather to the interests of the Papal States than to those of Catholicism; hence the lukewarmness of his support of the Emperor in the Thirty Years' War (see Chapter IV). To strengthen the Papal States he spent much thought and intrigue in securing the reversion of the Duchy of Urbino (p. 158), and he seized Castro from the Duke of Parma by force (p. 159). Urbino and Castro were both integral parts of the Papal States, and their incorporation meant the reduction of the whole to direct Papal rule; but the Pope's aggressions frightened the Italians, and Urban had to relinquish his last prey. The disappointment no doubt

hastened his death. Urban was in fact bolder than he was skilful; his very cleverness sometimes made him irresolute; in later life his impatient vehemence developed into a form of madness.

Under Urban nepotism flourished; his family, the Barberini, became enormously wealthy, and their heraldic "Bees" can be seen everywhere in Rome to-day. There were two Cardinal nephews, Francesco, who had little aptitude for politics and preferred literature, but who clung to his position out of jealousy of his younger brother, and Antonio, who had all the Pope's ambition, love of glory and lively manners, with great strength of will besides. The Castro War was his work, and it made him most unpopular, especially in Rome, where it increased the taxation. Even the Pope had conscientious scruples about the wealth of his family, and the Romans were delighted when his successor charged the Barberini with maladministration and they fled to France. Afterwards, however, they made a compact with Innocent's relations, and were allowed to return. Their influence was more enduring than that of any other Papal family.

Under Innocent X (1644) the worst abuses of family influence were experienced, for the Pope was ruled, not by his nephew, but by his sister-in-law, Donna Olympia Maldalchini. Under her malign influence, intrigue and corruption were rampant in the court; no one could hope to prosper without purchasing her favour. The days of Paul III seemed to have returned when it was rumoured that the lady was more than sister to the Pope. Innocent's nephew, Cardinal Pamfili, was so incapable that he renounced the Cardinalate and married, but Papal politics were skilfully conducted by the first of the famous Cardinal Secretaries, Pancirolo. Pancirolo and Olympia struggled for mastery over the Pope, and the Secretary brought into favour the Pope's young cousin, Astalli, whom he hoped to make his own ally. Innocent's life was embittered with the quarrels of these four and their efforts to ruin

one another. When he found that Olympia made him the jest of Europe, he banished her, only to find that he could not get on without her.

Innocent was a just and economical ruler of the Papal States, but he was too timid and dull for general politics, from which he abstained as much as possible. He would not even try to make a peace, or to obtain help for Venice against the Turks. His neutrality consisted in refusing everything to everybody. Intensely avaricious, he accumulated great wealth for the Pamfili, and his one extravagance was to build for the glorification of his family.

Alexander VII (1655) determined to keep clear of all family entanglements. "A Pope ought," he said, "like Melchisedek, to have no relations." The Squadrone Volante had selected him simply on his merits, and great things were expected of him. "Intent only on God's service...he admitted no worldly motives, but seemed as if he were preparing to render account of his government even before it was begun." But "goodness, learning, religion, without strength of character, prudence and judgment, only lead to weakness of government¹."

The Pope's life was absorbed in a struggle between his conscience, which bade him keep his relations away, and his inclination to call them to Rome, which was encouraged by all the court, the Jesuits and the diplomats, some from a desire to flatter, some because the absence of a Cardinal nephew was really inconvenient. Alexander finally gave way, and "an inundation of Chigi¹" and other Sieneſe arrived, and monopolised all the best offices. Alexander would not grant them Papal revenue, nor allow them to lead the government, but "they were hated because they might be powerful, and despised because they were not." Meanwhile, Alexander himself tried to lead a life of learned leisure apart from politics. His conceit, narrowness of mind and petty jealousy exasperated his contemporaries; he allowed himself to

¹ Venetian Ambassadors' Reports in Berchet e Barozzi, *Relazioni Venete*.

be involved in an undignified squabble with France which ended in his bitter humiliation (Chapter V), and he dismissed his able secretary, Rospigliosi, and the famous historian, Pallavicini, because he was jealous of their chance of succeeding him.

The Papacy, now excluded from European politics, had become little more than a dignified and rather pleasant office,—a kind of Deanery,—for worthy Cardinals. Rospigliosi (Clement IX), who did succeed Innocent X (1667), and Clement X (Altieri, 1670), excellent and harmless old gentlemen, lived in retirement, delegating their official duties to capable nephews. The late reaction against nepotism and the embarrassed state of the Papal finance made it impossible to create any more princely families, though both Rospigliosi and Altieri were well endowed. The quiet virtues of the two Clements and of their nephews really raised the Papacy in public estimation. But Cardinal Altieri was not without ambitions after a policy and party of his own, to attain which he kept his uncle entirely in the background, while the old man principally occupied himself in prayer.

The influence of the Squadrone had considerably disturbed the old system of Papal elections, with its balance between the Powers and the parties of preceding nephews. The Squadrone was the principal factor in the last two elections; now it had begun to exercise its power between the Conclaves, and had brought Cardinal Altieri, who was less clever than he thought himself, under its influence, so that he created Cardinals who were really chosen by the Squadrone. Innocent XI (1676), the candidate of the Squadrone, was quite independent of foreign influence; and for a brief time, under a Pope of powerful character, integrity, austerity, zeal and economy, the Papacy regained a considerable measure of European importance. Formerly a soldier, Innocent had the military instinct of discipline and great courage; but he was narrow-minded, wanting in prudence and moderation and in

political skill. Hence he was not clever enough to avoid the open quarrel with France which the over-bearing conduct of Louis XIV provoked (Chapter V). But the steady courage with which Innocent faced his formidable foe gained a moral triumph for the Papacy, even before the exigencies of politics forced Louis to accord it a substantial victory. Yet the ultimate result of the quarrel was an unfortunate estrangement of the French nation from the Papacy. Alexander VIII (1689) and Innocent XII (1691), though not naturally bold, followed the policy of Innocent XI towards France, but were not otherwise distinguished. Innocent XII had, indeed, an enthusiasm for reform, but the Papal court set itself to check such a dangerous tendency, and persuaded the Pope to limit his energies to the care of the poor. The two Innocents were honourably distinguished by their freedom from nepotism.

The sack of Rome had left the city very poor and depopulated, and it was not until the formation of a new Roman society from the Papal families and the Montisti that it recovered its prosperity. The population, which had fallen to forty thousand, rose again to a hundred and twenty thousand in the seventeenth century. The government was, of course, wholly in the hands of ecclesiastics; but though Papal relations made profit out of the gabelles, they never risked rebellion by allowing the citizens to feel starvation. The Romans freely criticised the government through "Pasquin," the battered statue to which, in spite of police vigilance, they always managed to affix their libels. When the sister of Sixtus V, a woman of humble origin, had been ennobled, Pasquin complained that his linen was unwashed, because his laundress had become a princess. It was Pasquin who compared the Barberini to the "Barbari" who had devastated Rome.

It was unfortunate that the Papal States were not so well cared for as the city; but the Popes, having lost much foreign revenue, were chiefly bent upon getting as much money as

possible from them, nor could they understand that good government and material prosperity would increase the revenue. "It must be God's will," said a Venetian, "that the Papacy should keep its States; no other Power that governed so badly could do it." The territory was naturally fertile; the people hardy and warlike; Bologna and Ancona had a prosperous trade. Ferrara and Urbino, the most flourishing parts of the States, were at first under other rulers, but were in time subjected to the Papacy. Though the Barons were turbulent, their quarrels and extravagance prevented them from acquiring political power.

But the Communes and the peasantry were impoverished by over-taxation and industrial interference. Agriculture was hampered by the fixing of a maximum price for corn, and by many other vexatious restrictions. Land went out of cultivation, the people emigrated, and their numbers were further diminished by plague and privation. The once flourishing campagna became a marshy, malarial waste. Trade was hampered and burdened in every conceivable way; and while taxation steadily increased, its burden was doubled by the decrease in population. Ferrara and Urbino suffered the same fate; and after fifty years of Papal rule, the population of the former was said to have diminished by two-thirds.

The money thus exacted was spent on founding Papal families and in paying the interest on the loans of the Montisti. Except by Urban VIII there was little attempt at military expenditure. The Popes knew that no one would attack them without great provocation, and they were generally careful not to give any provocation at all. The administration of justice was as bad and corrupt as the rest of the government, and the only outlet for the oppressed people was brigandage. Ruined peasants, criminals, and victims of injustice formed bands of robbers, who were often shielded by the unruly Barons and engaged to fight in their private quarrels. Unfriendly neighbours sometimes provided them with a refuge over

the borders. They were helped by their relations amongst the peasants, with whom they shared their spoils, and they defied the authority of the Pope and his untrustworthy troops. Sixtus V, by executing five thousand in six years, checked the evil, but only for a time, and it continued to be the curse of the country up to the last century.

At the bottom of Papal misgovernment was of course the mismanagement of Papal finance. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation had seriously limited the sources of income; for the former extortions of the Curia could no longer be permitted. The revenue received from purely ecclesiastical sources by the office of the "Dataria" was generally enough for the Pope's personal expenditure; but the Papacy must have money to aid in the struggle against heretics and Turks, and each Pope needed large sums for his Roman buildings and for the endowment of his family. The Papacy unfortunately found it very easy to raise money, since its Monti were always at a premium, and successive diminutions of interest did not appreciably lower their market value. One Pope after another raised a new loan, which was called by his name, and the shareholders received their interest from some banking-house which farmed the tax on which the interest was secured. Though new taxes and gabelles were constantly imposed, the debt became so enormous that the whole annual revenue was absorbed in paying interest, and could not cover the ordinary expenses of administration, which had accordingly to be met by new loans. Sixtus V made matters worse by his unproductive hoard in S. Angelo. Urban VIII made an enormous increase in taxation, and nearly doubled the debt. Later Popes lowered the rate of interest, and managed, by strict economy and avoidance of foreign politics, to keep the Papacy solvent; but the debt had increased from three million crowns in 1560 to about fifty million in 1660. The ultimate result of the system was not to discredit the Papacy, which could rely on the wealth of the whole Church as its

ultimate security; indeed, the Monti were always looked upon as the safest of investments; but it was to impoverish the States which, with diminishing population and decreasing fertility, had to keep pace with the continually increasing demands of their rulers.

It was extraordinary under the circumstances that the Popes were able to enlarge the territory subject to their rule. The Italians, though jealous, would not usually take the trouble to interfere, and, so long as the balance of power between the Habsburgs and France was not affected, the acquisitions of the Papacy made little difference to foreign Powers. France might have been expected to espouse the cause of its old friend, Ferrara, but the favour of Clement VIII was more important to Henry IV.

The extinction of the Duchy of Ferrara was an important and melancholy event for Italy. The State was old, with an interesting history and character of its own; its Dukes were intelligent, able and brilliant, and they had played a notable part in the Renascence. Alfonso II, with his clever French mother, the Protestant Renée, and a French education, was half a French cavalier of the period of Francis I, half a splendid prince of the Italian Renascence. His brilliant court, crowded with clever men, was adorned by his two sisters, the learned Lucrezia and Leonora, the patronesses of Tasso; and here the Renascence spirit was kept alive after it had died out everywhere else in Italy. The Dukes of Ferrara were just, if severe, rulers, and were respected by their peoples. Their States were prosperous, well fortified and supplied with artillery and good troops, some of whom had served in Hungary with Alfonso. But Alfonso died in 1597, and his nearest heir was a cousin, Cesare, of illegitimate descent. Clement VIII declared that Ferrara, an acknowledged Papal fief, must hereupon revert to the Papacy; meeting with no opposition, either from the Ferrarese themselves or from their neighbours, he hastily improvised a small army and appropriated the State.

Ferrara soon became poor and insignificant, and so disappeared the last relic of the Renaissance.

Cesare remained Duke of Modena and Reggio, as these were Imperial, not Papal, fiefs. For a long time his heirs disputed with the Papacy the possession of Comacchio, which Clement had appropriated with Ferrara, but which the Estensi declared was their allodial property. The dispute obtained political importance in 1642 (Chapter V).

Urbino, under its della Rovere Dukes, had been contented and prosperous. The country was fertile and lightly taxed, for the Dukes made money by foreign *Condotta*. The court and reigning family were highly cultivated, sober and moral. Guidobaldo II (1538) unwisely imposed heavy taxes, which the people resisted, but without disorder. Francesco Maria (1574) removed the obnoxious taxes, and governed justly and mildly. He had ideas in advance of his age, and made unsuccessful experiments in representative government. Unfortunately he was married to Lucrezia d'Este, who was many years his senior, so that they had no children. The Urbinese feared greatly the extinction of the line, and were delighted when the Duke made a second marriage and had a son, Federigo. Federigo was married to a Tuscan princess, and the government was placed in his hands; but he had been unfortunately spoilt; he gave himself up to folly and debauchery, and died suddenly, leaving only an infant daughter. At once the grasp of the Barberini fell upon Urbino. Francesco hastily married the child to the Grand Duke Ferdinando II, hoping to find protection from Tuscany, but Tuscany dared not resist the Pope, even to obtain the inheritance of Urbino. Francesco reluctantly admitted that his fiefs were held from the Papacy, and must revert to it. Yet the Barberini could not leave him alone, and Francesco's later years were darkened by priestly interference in his government, as well as by the forebodings, which were only too correct, that his beloved State would soon be ruined under

Papal rule. He did not even have the minor consolation of surviving the Pope who had so tormented him, and the Barberini enjoyed the triumph of securing Urbino (1631).

Castro was not the fief of a feudal dynasty, but a tract of territory near Rome, which had been granted to the Farnesi by Paul III; and in the hands of a hostile Duke of Parma it might really become dangerous to the Papacy. Odoardo Farnese had a personal quarrel with the Barberini on a question of precedence, and the latter determined on revenge. Farnese had raised money upon Castro in the form of a Monte; the Barberini, by a change in the fiscal regulations of the Papal States so injured the gabelles of Castro, that it could not pay their interest to the shareholders. They complained to the Pope, who declared Castro forfeit to pay the debt, and the Barberini occupied it by force. So far the Italian Powers made no objections; but when the Barberini, pleased with their success, proceeded to attack Parma (1642), then Venice, Tuscany and Modena, alarmed at their aggressions, and fearing lest the Italian balance of power should be upset, formed a league to repress them and protect Parma. The Duke was emboldened to make a raid on the Papal States; in this the allies did not support him, but in the following year Tuscany invaded the States of the Church with some success, and Venice defeated and nearly captured Antonio Barberini. The raw Papal levies were useless against the mercenaries of the league and the excellent Tuscan militia. Most of the store of Sixtus V was exhausted, and the Pope was hard put to for money. France consented to mediate, and a peace was made at Venice (1644), by which Castro was restored to the Duke. Thus the first purely Italian war for nearly a century had no result save financial injury to all parties. But henceforth no Pope would rest satisfied without Castro.

In 1649 the shareholders were still unpaid, and Innocent X made the murder of the Bishop an excuse for occupying Castro once more. The town was destroyed, the Bishopric

transferred, and the revenue paid to the shareholders. Since no one feared Innocent, the Duke, Ranuccio II, could not get active assistance; he was however told that he could redeem Castro within eight years for an impossibly large sum of money. The affair assumed a new phase when France took upon itself the protection of Parma's interest (Chapter V); but by quiet persistency the Popes ultimately gained their own way, and Castro, "incarcerated" by Alexander VII, remained an integral part of the Papal dominion. Thus the whole of the States were at last under direct Papal administration.

The administration of the Spanish dominions in Italy is one of the scandals of history. Its main objects were to provide free quarters for Spanish troops and profitable careers for the favourites of the King's favourite. "They all come in order to pay their debts," it was said, and when they returned home, enriched by the spoils of Italy, they were absolved by court influence from having to make any statement of accounts. "It appears as if the King of Spain enjoys to be robbed," said a Venetian. The "Council of Italy," a mixed body of Spaniards and Italians sitting at Madrid, was supposed to be the supreme authority; but the officials in Italy either dictated to it or ignored it as best suited them. "The King rules in Madrid, I in Milan," remarked one Governor. Hence the independent policy of Fuentes and Osuna (Chapter IV). The latter, elated with success, even planned to become independent in name as in fact, and to make himself King of Naples. He hoped to raise the native population against the nobles and to find allies amongst the European enemies of Spain. But his plot was discovered; the people failed to rise in his favour; and, losing his courage at the critical moment, he obeyed the summons of the home-government to return to Spain. Indeed, the Neapolitans never wished to exchange the King of Spain for his viceroys, whom they believed to be responsible for their troubles. They thought that if only "they could build a bridge to communicate with his

Majesty" they would obtain relief. When goaded to revolt they shouted, "Long live the King! Death to the bad Government!" They liked to feel themselves part of a great Empire, and were faithful to the far-off King,—too far off to be himself a tyrant,—who sometimes removed a more than usually tyrannous viceroy.

There were actually forms of constitutional government in Naples. The Viceroy was supposed to consult the "Collateral Council," mostly composed of Italians; the ancient Neapolitan "Parliament" with its three estates was still called to vote money. In the city the municipal administration was conducted by the district councils called "Piazze," five for the nobles, one for the people, each of which chose an "Eletto" to transact business with the Viceroy. But the Viceroy disregarded the Council, domineered over the Parliament, and used the municipal organisation as a means to create quarrels between the nobles and the people. The Spaniards, though without any conception of the higher arts of government, had yet a perverse talent for ruling slaves; and the secret of their success was so to divide all sections of the people that no united opposition to the government was possible. The nobles were kept asunder by old feuds, family quarrels, the strife of Guelf and Ghibelline, of Aragon and Anjou. Ill-feeling against the clergy was fostered by the government's campaign against ecclesiastical encroachments. The people were jealous of the feudal rights and the immunity from taxation enjoyed by the nobles, while in the city the nobles were subjected to a severe administration which favoured the people against them. Yet, if the Viceroys were severe, the lesser officials were generally venal, and there was little to choose between the malpractices of the central courts of justice and the tyrannies of the local feudal jurisdictions.

Again, the Viceroys skilfully contrived to delude the nobles with high-sounding titles and petty offices in the city, so that they abandoned their independence in the country,

and often sold their estates in order to take part in the frivolities of the town, and to squander their money in ostentatious rivalry. Their natural bent for military pursuits was discouraged, and the large army kept up at the expense of the province was almost wholly foreign. Yet it could not free the country from the ravages of brigands, who flourished unchecked by the government and encouraged by the nobles. At the same time the army absorbed the money which ought to have been spent on a fleet to guard commerce from the Turks and pirates who ruled the sea, and rendered even coasting trade unsafe.

Much money was spent on coast fortresses, on roads and bridges and on fine buildings in Naples, which the Viceroys liked to call after their own names. But roads and bridges were of little use when commerce was almost extinguished by the fatal fiscal policy of the government. Customs regulations, minute even to absurdity, and foolish though well-meant interference in the course of trade did much harm, but it was taxation that nearly ruined the country, in spite of its extraordinary natural fertility and the economical habits of the people. The direct taxes, called "Donativi" (gifts), which had to be voted by Parliament, were demanded on every pretext, for example, to provide a baby Prince's layette. But much more disastrous were the gabelles, especially those on food, which were made to fall on the producer, so that by far the greater burden of the taxation fell upon agriculture, that is to say upon the peasants, at whose expense the more dangerous city population was favoured. The impecunious government farmed the gabelles, in return for ready money, to Genoese merchants who oppressed the payers. Some of the Communes, ruined by debt, sold their own liberty; others bought a license "to rebel in the name of the King," and so escaped taxes. Peasants flocked to the more favoured city, and begged or starved in the streets. The country was depopulated, land fell out of cultivation, and the result was of

course perennial famine for country and city alike. In 1600 the Calabrian peasants rose in a revolt; it had been preached and organised by friars, led by a mystic philosopher, Campanella, and was half-religious, half-political. This was stamped out in blood, but disaffection grew more dangerous when it reached the town.

In 1621 there were bread riots in Naples, since a series of bad seasons made it impossible to keep down prices. The Viceroy's carriage was mobbed; a piece of bad bread was thrown into it with the cry, "See, Illustrissimo, what we have to eat!" The riots were put down with brutal severity; but wars in North Italy caused increase of taxation; and in 1646 the Viceroy, Arcos, unwisely imposed a gabelle on fruit, the staple article of the Neapolitan's diet. Starvation at last drove the apathetic populace to revolt. The leader was a fish-monger of the lowest class, named Masaniello, brutal, but vehemently eloquent. He held a sham court of justice; its first victims were Neapolitan nobles, whose heads were fixed on stakes round the market-place. Yet the people declared themselves loyal to the King of Spain; and, when the Viceroy in terror promised to grant all their demands, there was a lull in the storm, and Masaniello, who, maddened by power and pride, had fallen into the wildest extravagances, was murdered. But the government's promises were broken, the people rose again, gave Masaniello a stately funeral, and besieged the Viceroy in his castle. The peasants rose also and murdered their oppressors; the country was in anarchy, and Mazarin was waiting his opportunity to interfere. Don John, son of Philip IV, arrived with a fleet; but bombardment only drove the Neapolitans to abandon the last pretence of loyalty and proclaim a Republic. Totally incapable of self-government, they sought a foreign leader, and unwisely chose that agreeable, but unstable, adventurer, the Duke of Guise, who posed as heir to the Angevins. Guise could get no serious support from Mazarin, and though at first the populace were enthusiastic,

their enthusiasm soon cooled off. They wanted him to be a kind of Stadtholder, while he expected to be King. The upper and middle classes, who hated mob rule, supported the Spanish government; and a new Viceroy, Oñate, offered tempting terms to the populace.

Finally the rebellion collapsed, and the Spanish government returned without conditions. Guise was sent a prisoner to Spain, and narrowly escaped execution. Oñate lessened the gabelles, and the Neapolitans, so long as they had enough to eat, did not mind his executing their leaders. When Guise returned with a fleet in 1654, Naples did not stir. (See also Chapter IV.)

In 1656 there was an awful visitation of the plague, aggravated by the criminal folly of the government, which refused at the beginning to acknowledge its epidemic character. It seemed as though the whole population was doomed to extinction. But the usual economic effects of plague and the reforms of one or two superior Viceroys, who restored the coinage, suppressed brigands and slightly equalised taxation, brought a return of something like prosperity towards the end of the seventeenth century.

Sicily, although it suffered also from over-taxation, bad fiscal and judicial systems, brigandage and insufficient protection from pirates, was yet much more fortunately situated than was Naples. It had belonged to Aragon for centuries before the union of Spain, and it retained its medieval constitution and a consequent independence of political and local life, strong enough to resist the bureaucratic tendencies of Spain. Parliament voted taxes and made laws; the nobles retained their feudal authority; the people were warlike and had never been broken to slavery. Every class and district had its jealously guarded rights; the towns were especially active and independent, and rich with their large export trade in corn. The Spaniards knew that the result of direct oppression would be a re-enactment of the Sicilian Vespers at their expense. And Sicily was specially

valuable to them as an outpost against the Turks. The Sicilian fleet took part in the relief of Malta and in the Lepanto war, and it was greatly strengthened and very successful under the Viceroyalty of Osuna (1611-1616), though it fell into decay as the Spanish Monarchy decayed in the seventeenth century.

Yet the Spaniards did all they could to diminish the independence of the Sicilians, especially by cunningly dividing class from class and town from town. They took advantage of the exaggerated local patriotisms, and especially of the jealousy between the two principal cities, Palermo and Messina. Palermo was the seat of the government, but Messina was almost independent of the central administration, with a Spanish governor, called the "Stadico," and a self-elected Senate. Spain fostered their rivalry, and allowed it to go so far that it led to the most dangerous Italian revolt which she had to face in the seventeenth century.

There had been various lesser revolts caused by over-taxation and scarcity, but this rebellion of 1674 was far more serious. Messina had unwisely been allowed a monopoly of silk-exporting, and the withdrawal of this monopoly caused much disaffection. The Stadico tried to divide classes by allowing the merchants to raise the price of bread. There were riots, and the Spanish government foolishly determined to crush Messina once and for all, and sent a new Viceroy, Bayonna, and a Stadico for the purpose. Bayonna declared rioting to be revolution, and the Messinese fortified the town and organised defence, in which all classes enthusiastically took part. Wiser than the Neapolitans, they at once asked help from France. If Louvois had been Mazarin, Sicily would probably have soon become French, for there were here none of the circumstances which caused Mazarin to distrust the Neapolitan rebellion. The Messinese no sooner received French ships with troops and provisions, under Vivonne, than they enthusiastically declared themselves French subjects (April, 1675). But Louvois did not intend to make any sacrifices for Messina, and only

looked upon Vivonne's expedition as a diversion to embarrass Spain. After a time the Messinese discovered this, when all their appeals for more help were disregarded, and they consequently would no longer obey Vivonne. The struggle dragged on till 1678, and then Louvois and Louis determined to abandon the enterprise, but dared not publish their intention lest the Messinese should forestall them by a "Sicilian Vespers." A new commander, La Feuillade, was sent; he got all the French guns and troops on board the ships on pretence of a naval enterprise, and then suddenly informed the Messinese of his orders to withdraw. A few nobles and rich bourgeois retired with him to France. Those who remained were not severely treated by the Spanish government, but all the city's independence and privileges were taken from her. (See also Chapter V.)

The revolt of Messina was far more dangerous than the revolt of Naples had been. This was no affair of a noisy mob led by a fishmonger, clamouring for cheap fruit and careless from whom it was obtained, but it was the carefully organised effort of a united city claiming its liberties, and willing to change masters rather than surrender them. Vivonne's progress against the Spaniards, in spite of the little help he got from home, had been great enough at first to show what might have been accomplished if Louvois had been in earnest. But the Sicilians had learned their lesson, and gave no more serious trouble to the Spanish government; indeed, in the early part of the next century, they showed great unwillingness to be separated from the Spanish Monarchy.

The Spaniards, according to a popular saying, "nibbled in Sicily, ate in Naples, and devoured in Milan." Already ruined by half a century of terrible wars, Lombardy had little chance to recover under Spanish rule. "Milan, which used to be called the pet lamb of Italy, is to-day starved and tortured," the Lombards cried to Henry IV, begging for his intervention.

They were an easy people to rule, patient, obedient, indus-

trious, not accustomed to liberty, quite satisfied if they might pursue their trade or agriculture in peace. But peace was exactly what they could not get, and their very patience only made their tyrants impose more upon them. They had no Parliament to fight for them, only a "Senate," composed of nobles, with few powers, and those principally judicial.

Lombardy was to the Spaniards simply a *place d'armes*. Its strategical position was of great importance to the Habsburgs, since it linked Spain with Austria, and, through Franche-Comté, with Flanders, and was also the barrier between France and Italy. The towns were all fortified; the borders bristled with defence works. There was a garrison of about five thousand veteran Spaniards, besides Italian troops, including a native militia, for which each Commune had to provide and equip its quota of men. Lombardy was under a kind of martial law, with, instead of a Viceroy, a military governor, who was one of the best commanders in the Spanish service. These governors were only too ready to involve the country in war, heedless of the sufferings of the people, who were used as badly by friends as by foes. Readers of "I Promessi Sposi" will remember how the German army passed through Lombardy in 1629. The peasants fled before the soldiers, who rifled their houses, dug up their gardens for hidden property, and destroyed their crops. On their return, the troops spread abroad the plague, which they had contracted at Mantua, though the Milanese had begged the government to take precautions.

Times of peace were not much better. At first the soldiers were quartered upon the people, so many in each Commune, and their disorderly behaviour gave much trouble. In the seventeenth century barracks were built, but the heavy expense had still to be borne by the Communes. Spain in fact expected Lombardy to pay, not only for its own administration, but also for its garrison and fortifications. The revenue, though, as a Venetian said, "it was more than many princes get from great and powerful Kingdoms," yet was insufficient for such a

purpose, and the taxes were pledged to Genoese money-lenders, who cruelly oppressed the taxpayers. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the surplus Neapolitan revenue was sent to Milan, but not to save the pockets of the Lombards. As in Naples, the city was favoured at the expense of the country, and it had not to quarter soldiers. From the *Censo del sale* (salt-tax) the Milanese were exempt, but the rural Communes had to continue paying their fixed quota, however their population diminished. The *Perticato*, or land-tax, was less heavy on land belonging to the citizens than on that belonging to the country people. The *Mercimonio*, or tax paid by the townspeople on business profits, was comparatively moderate. Ecclesiastical owners, who held about half the land, were entirely exempt. The usual results of diminishing population and neglected fields followed; houses were even pulled down to escape taxation. A bad season produced famine, which was felt most severely by the country, since a great part of the harvest was requisitioned by law for the towns. In the terrible famine of 1628 the peasants flocked into the towns to beg, and numbers died in the streets. The good Archbishop, Federigo Borromeo, whose character stands out brightly against the dark background of his times, tried in vain to feed them. The government, frightened by popular clamour, had kept down the price of bread until nearly the whole available store of corn was exhausted, and sheer famine was inevitable. Then it gathered the starving peasants by thousands into the huge Lazzaretto, where crowding and famine prepared the way for the awful outbreak of plague in 1630. At first the government refused to believe in it, and so neglected all precautions to check it. The country was almost depopulated; many villages were wholly deserted; many towns lost over two-thirds of their inhabitants. The ignorant people believed that the plague was deliberately propagated by evil-minded persons, called "Untori" (anointers), who spread about poison. The government, either from fear or from stupidity, acquiesced in this

belief; many unfortunate creatures were arrested, tortured and executed on the flimsiest evidence.

As in Naples, the government encouraged the nobles in profligacy and vanity; they gave up commerce and squandered their fortunes in extravagance. They were kept subservient by the titles and precedence which the government could bestow, and which they coveted. Hence, though a great part of the municipal government was in their hands and though they composed the Senate, they seldom showed the least independence. In order to separate them from the people, they were exempted from taxation and were allowed to tyrannise over the peasantry, and they kept bands of hired ruffians, called "Bravi," to enforce their rule and to carry on feuds with their neighbours. Frequently these were discharged soldiers or criminals, who found safety in the livery of a powerful patron; and their brawls, rapes and assassinations were constant, in spite of the numerous proclamations issued against them by the government. "Lontano il Monarco e debole la plebe" (the King far off and the people weak) was the motto of their masters. Besides these, bands of brigands, mostly desperate peasants, ravaged the country; the government could neither keep order nor enforce justice.

The bourgeois had two good characteristics, an enthusiasm for his business and a love for his city, which showed him to be, in spite of generations of slavery, the descendant of the twelfth century Lombard. The Spaniards permitted a considerable measure of municipal self-government which provided an outlet for his energies, and allowed him to oppress his country neighbours. The Communes, in groups called "Pievi," vigorously resisted, and the best spirit of the people was wasted in local strife. Lombard trade had survived many vicissitudes, but the Spaniards "killed the goose that laid the golden eggs," not only by burdening industry, but by the ridiculous fiscal policy which was intended to protect and defend it. Trade with France, its most profitable customer, was forbidden, really for

political reasons, nominally "because the French are bad Christians." Every trade was hampered by petty regulations; for example, poultry and fish might not be preserved in ice, "because their apparent freshness cannot be genuine." Yet bakers might buy a license to sell loaves below the legal weight. The export of raw silk which had given Milan its wealth was forbidden, in order to encourage a native manufacture. Manufacturers were forced to provide work for the artisans, but the artisans had no freedom of contract. Accordingly both manufacturers and artisans frequently emigrated to France or Venice.

It is hardly surprising that the civilisation of Lombardy deteriorated, that the people, so cheerful, gentle and polite, grew barbarous and servile, while their very language was debased by exaggerated expressions of respect and absurd titles. They were brutalised by the public infliction of torture and cruel punishments. Commerce, literature and art were all neglected, and frivolous amusements which weakened the national character were alone encouraged. Even the influence of the famous Cardinal Archbishop, Carlo Borromeo (Federigo's uncle), well-intentioned though he was, only did harm, since he increased the power of the Jesuits and of the Inquisition, and so furthered the demoralisation. The Milanese never rebelled, at first because they dared not, but afterwards because long years of abject slavery had taken from them all wish for independence.

Genoa was in the seventeenth century the richest State in Italy. Its merchants had great commercial talents; "if you wish to sharpen your wits, deal with the Genoese," was a popular saying. But they were courteous, trustworthy and punctual in business, sober in dress and home-life, though fond of public display. Protected by Spain for political and financial reasons, they made a great part of their wealth through her; the revenues and trade of her dominions in Europe and America were in their hands. They provided the government with ready money, farmed the revenues, managed the banks and

bought up the estates of the nobles who borrowed from them. Though the Spanish government might repudiate its debts, the Genoese continued to prosper. Other Genoese business houses enriched themselves in Rome, where they held most of the Monti and administered the finances. Their over-sea trade flourished and was protected by their fleet. For many purposes Genoa was represented by the Bank of St George, a corporation within, but independent of, the State. It was a union of the public fund-holders, managed by their own officials. Its interest was secured on portions of the revenue and territory, which were administered by itself. Undisturbed by political agitations, it was always well-managed and prosperous. Formerly it had ruled Corsica for Genoa, but had shown in the administration such selfishness and avarice that the Corsicans were indignant when the Peace of Câteau-Cambrésis transferred them back from France to Genoa. In 1564 there was a new rebellion led by the brave, but ferocious leader, Sampiero Corso, who was subsidised by Caterina de' Medici. He offered the island to Cosimo, who would gladly have accepted it, had Philip II permitted him to do so (p. 107). Spain sent troops to help the Genoese, but the Corsicans resisted fiercely, and a bitter struggle continued until after Sampiero's death (1567). Then the Genoese offered several concessions and the Corsicans submitted. Henceforth the Genoese government itself administered Corsican affairs.

The worst troubles of Genoa came from within; the ancient factions still existed, and the lower classes hated the nobles who excluded them from the government, and cherished affectionate feelings towards France. The Genoese could not sacrifice self or party for the sake of the State; the government was poor while the citizens were rich, and was continually disturbed by plots and rebellions. Doria's constitution (p. 45) had broadened the government by admitting new families to take part in it. But there was great jealousy between the older and newer families, which resulted in the Fieschi plot of 1547. It was

decided that offices should be shared equally, but thus the division was perpetuated, and the two groups of families organised themselves into the "Portico Vecchio" and the "Portico Nuovo." In 1571 civil war broke out, in which Spain assisted the Portico Vecchio and France and Tuscany the Portico Nuovo. Don John and his fleet arrived, and Genoa narrowly escaped losing her independence altogether (p. 113). Meanwhile the lower, unenfranchised classes joined in the struggle. Finally negotiations between the chief powers and the Genoese parties resulted in an agreement to effect various reforms, and the Porticos were declared abolished. But there was as yet no real settlement; the factions continued, and the government could not enforce order. The disaffected talked treason so openly that Carlo Emanuele I, Genoa's deadly enemy, was easily led to believe that a revolution could be effected with his assistance. Hence his promise of help to the plebeian conspirator, Vacchero (1628) (p. 219). The plot was discovered, but only just in time; and since it was obvious that the weakness of the government had encouraged the conspirators, a new magistracy, that of the "Inquisitors of State," was founded, rather on the Venetian model. Wars against the Dukes of Savoy and the French attack of 1684 (p. 264) did much to inspire the Genoese with real patriotism, and they met these dangers with remarkable unity and firmness. At the end of the century Genoa had attained internal stability, and, though her trade was decreasing, she was still rich.

The Republic of Lucca remained independent because Spain did not wish it to be sacrificed to swell the dominions of the Grand Duke. The Lucchese were much afraid of Tuscany,—“like a quail under a sparrowhawk,”—and were always prepared to resist a surprise attack from their neighbours. But the Grand Dukes knew that the wealthy Lucchese would have migrated abroad in a body rather than submit to their rule.

The government was wholly aristocratic; the nobles were

rich merchants, chiefly of silk ; but by degrees they abandoned commerce and lived upon their estates, while many of the artisans emigrated to Florence. Early in the seventeenth century Lucca and Modena revived an ancient contest for the possession of the mountainous district called the Garfagnana. The war, though petty, was very destructive, but Spain at last forced Modena to make peace.

After the loss of Ferrara, the Dukes of Modena were of little importance ; but one of them, Francesco I, was "a prince of great sense, with high talents and no small ambition¹." He took an adventurous part in contemporary politics, hoping to be revenged upon the Papacy. His son, Alfonso, married Laura Martinozzi, and so entered Mazarin's family circle, while Princess Mary of Modena was the wife of James II of England. The Dukes of Modena, and those of Parma also, kept up little courts full of intrigue, and toy armies in gorgeous uniforms ; but an observer remarked in 1668 that the petty Italian princes had neither money, troops, captains, well-affected subjects, populous towns nor prudent counsellors. They were further weakened by their love of luxury and their libertinage. None was worse than the cruel and greedy Ranuccio I of Parma (1592). The Piacentine great families plotted to dethrone him in favour of the more genial Duke of Mantua ; the plot was avenged with such savagery that many Italians believed that Ranuccio invented it himself as an excuse for getting rid of his enemies. Odoardo (1622) resembled his military grandfather, Alessandro, and was "a prince of warlike spirit who first took counsel of his courage"; but the result of his military enterprises was that his States were over-run by Spanish troops (p. 233). His son, Ranuccio II (1646), burdened his subjects with heavy taxation in his vain attempt to buy back Castro.

One of the better kind of princely families was the Gonzaga, but the seventeenth century saw their ruin. One cause of their misfortunes was the possession of Montferrat and

¹ *Memoirs of Plessis-Besançon.*

its much coveted stronghold, Casale. The contest to control it involved the Gonzaga in serious wars. The town had preserved some of its ancient liberties, but these the Dukes ruthlessly destroyed. Another source of weakness was the family custom of splitting off fragments of the Duchy, Guastalla, Sabbionetta, etc., as appanages for younger sons. Each had a fine title, a little fortified capital, a palace and an art-collection, and all of them quarrelled with one another and with the head of the family.

But the real cause of failure was the moral degeneration which set in with Vincenzo I (1587). His father, Guglielmo, was upright, thrifty and religious, a typical Gonzaga; but he was severe, and quarrelled with his lively, self-indulgent son, Vincenzo. Scandal always hung about the prince's name; he was supposed to have assassinated the "Admirable Crichton" in a fit of jealousy; he burdened the Duchy with debt, and his kindness to Tasso cannot redeem his many faults. His sons were morally and physically degenerate; two of them were Cardinals, and both these made irregular marriages, and then repudiated their wives. They all ruled in turn and died in early manhood, leaving only one legitimate child between them, Maria. The subsequent contest for the possession of the Duchies (Chapter IV) brought terrible trouble on the people, the horrors of the German invasion, the sack of Mantua and the plague.

The successful candidate, Charles, Duke of Nevers, was popular with the people of the Duchies; he was brave, wise and magnanimous; but his death in 1637 left Mantua to an infant grandson, Carlo II, under the guardianship of his mother, Maria Gonzaga. Carlo, reverting to the Austrian alliance of the line, renewed its custom of German marriages. His wife was an Archduchess, Isabella Clara; his sister, Eleonora, was the second of her name to marry an Emperor; his daughter was the wife of the Duke of Lorraine, and the mother-in-law of Maria Theresa.

The extraordinarily deteriorating effects of Italy upon the French character soon showed themselves in Carlo II. "Handsome and clever if he would but apply himself to serious matters," it was said of him; but he gave himself up altogether to folly and debauchery. His foreign politics were a miserable, cowardly shuffle, which only brought more trouble on his unhappy people; he was ruled by a greedy, incapable minister; and he died young, leaving his son, Ferdinando Carlo (1665), under the guardianship of his worthless mother. Isabella Clara was ruled by her paramour, Bulgarini, and so great was the scandal that the Emperor interfered, and forced both to retire into convents. But Isabella soon returned to court, and resumed her control of her son and his State. Ferdinando Carlo generally lived abroad, seeking diversion at Venice and elsewhere amongst actresses, singers and buffoons. When he had exhausted the Mantuan finances, he sold Casale for a French pension. No country suffered more than Mantua in the great wars after 1690. The Duke went off to Venice, ordering that two courtesans should be sent to him before the city was besieged. His brave and noble wife, Anna Isabella Gonzaga, tried in vain to defend his unhappy country. After the Duchy was lost, Ferdinando Carlo died (1707), saying to those about him, "Learn from me how to die, but not how to live,"—for he was not unconscious of his own folly. He left no legitimate children.

Of all the Italian States Venice was certainly the best governed, for the government understood that its real strength lay in the loyalty of the people. Though protective laws favoured the city against the provinces, the trade and agriculture of the latter were considerable; the provincial towns were comparatively free and prosperous. Verona had a large silk trade with Germany; Brescia was famous for its iron and wool manufactures. The country nobles gave much trouble with their *Bravi* and their feuds; and the government, in spite of "Inquisitors" and "Syndics" in the provinces, could

not really repress the evil. There was often suffering from plague and famine, but the evils of war and over-taxation were avoided. The people recognized the good intentions of the government and were contented. Many of the best artisans from other Italian States emigrated to Venice.

In the city itself the lower classes had small taxes, good government, hygiene and education, assistance in times of scarcity, with constant amusement for all. The Dieci kept strict order, prevented the dissolute nobles from disturbing the peace, and suppressed mendicancy. The Inquisition had little terror. There was much wealth in Venice and a general high level of prosperity.

But the character of the citizens was only too certainly deteriorating. The stress of war could still produce heroism and patriotism (see Chapter II), but over-cautiousness of policy and abstention from mainland war gave a false sense of security, and the city appeared prosperous only because its citizens were now profusely squandering the vast wealth accumulated in the past. Many nobles abandoned trade, and, investing their money in land, devoted themselves to lives of unbridled license, to gambling, duelling and debauchery, to theatres, balls and every kind of entertainment. The Dieci never interfered unless public disturbance or serious scandal threatened. While Paris and Vienna were unsafe, all the frivolous folk of Europe flocked to Venice for amusement. The Carnival, crowded with foreigners, was a dissolute orgie. Fête followed fête; after Easter came the regattas, culminating in the festival of the Bucentaur at Ascensiontide. Then came more regattas and fireworks in the summer evenings; in autumn the nobles retired for fresh amusement to their gorgeous country villas, many of which had theatres attached. In winter there were theatres and concerts, and the Ridotti (gambling-houses) were opened. Dramatic performances were sumptuous, frivolous and very coarse. Visits of distinguished foreigners were the excuse for the most elaborate open-air

shows. Intelligent minds enjoyed the general culture and the atmosphere of intellectual freedom. In the Venetian dominions Galileo found liberty to work and speak, and enthusiastic disciples. The Aldine Press still issued its splendid books; many palaces and churches and the Rialto Bridge itself date from this period.

It was the loss of trade which primarily caused the degeneration of Venice. The main route of commerce was now along the Atlantic coast and round the Cape; the Mediterranean was infested with pirates and separated from the Far East by the dangerous desert of Suez. Venice actually contemplated cutting a canal through the isthmus, but abandoned the project as impossible. During the Turkish wars France and England seized much of her trade with the nearer East. The loss of her colonies cut off both her markets and her sources of supply. Austria, jealous of her monopoly of the Adriatic, encouraged the Usocchi to shelter amongst its islands. Besides these, Turkish and African pirates attacked Venetian shipping; Genoa and Marseilles struggled for her precedence in the Mediterranean, Ancona, protected by the Popes, and the new Tuscan free port of Livorno threatened her supremacy. Her over-land trade with Germany was still large; her ships went to the East and North; but the carrying trade of Europe had passed to the Dutch and English.

Venice could not accommodate herself to changing conditions, but clung to protection until there was nothing left to protect. No Venetian subject might ship goods in foreign bottoms, or take foreign service. All ships trading amongst Venetian ports, and, so far as she could enforce it, all ships entering the gulf, had to touch at Venice and pay duty there. The dues of the Venetian port were so enormous that all who could landed their goods elsewhere, especially at Livorno. Venice tried several plans of reform; in 1610 it was proposed to make her a free port and to attract foreign merchants by enabling them to buy Levantine goods safely and cheaply.

But Venice could never make up her mind to genuine free trade; import duties were lessened, but not export; in 1684 it was plain that the attempt at freedom had come too late, for trade was already settled in other channels, and it was then abandoned.

The navy deteriorated with trade; the crews no longer gained maritime experience; in spite of bounties ship-building languished. In Venice there was diminution of employment and of population. If it had not been for the financial genius of the government, the terrible wars must have produced national bankruptcy. After the Lepanto and Candian wars the revenue was nearly all pledged to pay interest on the debt. Sound finance was restored by strict economy and diminution of interest; but there was still much private wealth in Venice, and voluntary contributions came readily in times of stress.

The poorer nobles however suffered from the effects of extravagance; some obtained assistance from the government; some undoubtedly sold intelligence to foreign princes. The government was conscious of leakage, and, if ever a traitor was discovered, he was made an example. Sometimes even the acute Dieci were deceived by false denunciations; the most famous case was that of Antonio Foscarini, who was strangled as a traitor (1622), and, four months later, declared to have been innocent. His accuser was executed.

The poorer nobles formed a kind of opposition to the richer and more powerful, who secured most of the offices, and especially to the Dieci, which was gradually absorbing all State affairs into its jurisdiction. This opposition was exercised in the Grand Council of which all the nobles were members; in 1582 they abolished the "Giunta" or committee of fifteen important officials which had re-inforced the Dieci, but without result. In 1624 this opposition was led by a lively, pugnacious and eloquent noble, Renier Zeno. He was banished, but returned more popular than ever. There was an attempt on his life, probably inspired by the Doge, and in

1628 he was again banished, but the Grand Council annulled the sentence.

But the Dieci itself was gradually giving place to a smaller and more compact body. It had long appointed temporary committees of its own members for special purposes; from 1539 it appointed annually a committee of three to examine difficult cases; treason and the divulgence of State secrets were gradually referred to them. By the end of the century they were called the "Inquisitors of State"; more and more cases came to them for examination, till they became practically responsible for public order and internal security. Though their proceedings were in reality always strictly legal, the awe which they inspired was very great, and the nobles whom they kept in order hated them even more than they hated the Dieci.

One advantage which the Venetians enjoyed was practical immunity from ecclesiastical tyranny. The Press Censorship and the Inquisition were under lay control; foreign Protestants were allowed freedom of speech and worship. The mortmain law prevented the escape of too much land from its share of taxation; indeed the clergy often had to pay tenths for the Turkish wars. Above all, ecclesiastical jurisdiction was kept within strict limits, and the clergy were under the control of civil law. Foreign intervention was carefully excluded, and the Curia was not permitted to acquire any influence in the Councils. The Papacy always suspected Venice of secret Protestantism, and conflict was almost inevitable. The Papacy continually tried to press its claims, and Venice resisted, supported by most of her own clergy, who were generally better patriots than Churchmen. There were also squabbles about the Ferrarese border and the management of the Po waters.

Most of the Popes were careful to avoid an open quarrel, but Paul V was more zealous than wise; he ordered the Venetian government to surrender two criminous clerks, and was promptly, if politely, refused. "I am Pope, and demand nothing but obedience," cried Paul, threatening excommunica-

tion. The Venetian ambassador was recalled, and the government issued a solemn protest. An Interdict was proclaimed (1606), but the clergy obeyed the government, and no one but the Jesuits observed it. They were driven from Venice amid the curses of the people who knew that they had influenced the Pope. Indeed Paul had not consulted the Cardinals, most of whom disapproved. The quarrel became political when Spain and France intervened; but both wished to avoid war, and rivalled each other in eagerness to arbitrate. The Pope was very obstinate; but when he found that Spain would not go to war on his account, he submitted to French arbitration. He knew that Venice had only to ask and all the Protestants of Europe would come to her aid; England had already congratulated her on "shaking off the Papal yoke." Paul withdrew his censures and imposed no public penance, on condition that Venice withdrew her protest and gave up the clerks to the French ambassador, who passed them on to the ecclesiastical authority. The theoretical question was ignored, and Venice had certainly made good her position. The Jesuits remained excluded from her States for more than fifty years.

The leader of the resistance was a Servite monk, Paolo Sarpi, to whom the government gave an official position as theological adviser. He was a man of enormous learning, theological and scientific, of high character, courage, originality and intellectual activity. He held that the functions of Church and State should be entirely separate, and that the rights of the State to autonomy were inherent, not dependent upon ecclesiastical permission. He was orthodox in dogma, but wrote works against the Inquisition, sanctuary and patronage, and also a famous history of the Council of Trent, very learned and able, but naturally rather biassed. Attempts, originated in Rome, were made to assassinate him. The Venetians would have made him a popular saint, had not a later Pope successfully intervened. Sarpi's life and work were

inspired by a passionate patriotism, and his dying words were of Venice; "Esto perpetua."

The agreement of 1607 settled no fundamental questions, and disputes frequently arose again. But the Popes had learned that they were not likely to obtain anything from open conflict with Venice, and no others imitated Paul's rashness.

The first Grand Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo de' Medici, inherited most of the stronger traits of his fore-runners' characters; he had secrecy, swiftness, decision, diligence, self-restraint, great ability for business and administration, a distaste for war and preference for diplomacy, in which he excelled, the art of choosing his instruments well. He lived with economy, but lavished money on public entertainments; he was kind to the poor, and he patronised literature and art as much from genuine interest as from policy. Like his predecessors, he was cunning and unscrupulous, never ceasing in his implacable pursuit of an enemy. More powerful than they, he could persecute and even assassinate his enemies abroad. He adopted some of the methods of the former Medici government; old forms were preserved, old magistracies existed with nominal powers, but their authority was a shadow; Cosimo nominated their members and ruled them through his secretaries. Again, he adopted the old plan of equalisation of classes, but he carried it much further; he did not maintain the old Caucus or reigning clique; the Palleschi who had made him Duke soon found themselves on a level with the rest. His ministers were able men, but he seldom asked their advice; he allowed no party names, no feuds, no class exemptions and privileges. The provinces and subject towns were ruled as on an equality with Florence, and found their circumstances much improved. Even Siena became fairly loyal, since it was not subjected to the rule of Florence, but had an independent administration.

But Cosimo had also the blood of the Sforza, Renaissance tyrants, in his veins. He showed none of the familiar homeliness which had made former Medici beloved. He

lived apart, in a stiff, semi-Spanish court, and told a citizen relative that "My cousins are Emperors and Kings." He had outbreaks of cruelty which led to the circulation of horrible stories about him; that a daughter who had compromised herself was murdered; that he killed in cold blood one of his sons, a mere boy, who had murdered his brother in a fit of passion. Tyrant-like, he ruled by espionage and by fear; he knew the opinions and private affairs of all those whose opinions mattered, and even a hasty speech might be punished by unexplained imprisonment. The strictest order was maintained by an efficient police; there were no tyrannous nobles, no corrupt magistrates, few *bravi* or brigands. The ecclesiastical courts could not give immunity from crime. There was strict justice for all and protection for the weak.

But there was no protection against the government itself. Cosimo's financial maxim was that "the wealth of private citizens is that of the prince divided amongst many purses." From the heavy taxation he piled up a vast reserve fund, but in times of emergency he extracted loans from rich persons, and he knew the details of everybody's income; their interest came from the taxes which they themselves paid. It is hardly surprising that commercial enterprise flagged.

Like the earlier Medici, Cosimo's strength rested largely on his private wealth derived from business undertakings on a large scale. But he knew that he could not rule Florence absolutely while she was full of great merchants and prosperous artisans. So he tempted the rich away from commerce by creating a court nobility whose members could not be traders, and a semi-religious "Order of Sto. Stefano," which was pledged to fight against the Turks. The Order, besides providing a vent for the dangerous energies of the younger nobles, actually gained considerable booty by attacks on Turkish ships; but thus it not only closed Oriental trade against Tuscans, but itself deteriorated into a body of Christian pirates. The best citizens now became second-rate nobles; they bought landed estates,

and were encouraged by the government to turn their attention to agriculture, in which, indeed, considerable progress was made.

The condition of the peasantry was improved by the military system. A devout follower of Machiavelli, Cosimo believed that a native army could be made loyal and efficient, and he tried the experiment with great success. But he confined his militia to the peasant-class; it would not have been safe to arm the citizens. Much attention was given to the fleet, which was fairly efficient, and protected the coasts well. It was a great disadvantage not to possess the Presidi; but Porto Ferrajo on Elba was made a fine fortified port, and a harbour was begun at Livorno.

The people were not discontented; the Liberals were all in exile, and the rest found peace and order an agreeable change. There was one scheme, the Pucci plot (1559), to murder Cosimo; but it seems to have originated amongst his powerful enemies. Benvenuto Cellini had said, at the time of Cosimo's election, "You Florentines have placed a youth on a wonderful horse; you have given him spurs, and put the bridle in his hands....Then you have told him that he must not pass certain limits. But who will hold him now when he wishes to pass them?" Cosimo swept away the confining bands with ease; he began as "Head of the Republic"; he died absolute Grand Duke of Tuscany. But the historical charge against him that he had destroyed the remnants of Florentine liberty was little felt at the time.

In old age Cosimo gave way to a dissolute and vicious life, and took as his second wife a vulgar woman, one of his mistresses. His elder son, Francesco (1574), seems to have inherited only his father's bad qualities, a cruel, suspicious nature and a tendency towards immorality. But he was weak and idle, had small administrative talents, and what powers he possessed were ruined by self-indulgence. His only good points were the encouragement of art, literature, science and agriculture,

and the improvement of the Livorno port. He became the absolute slave of a handsome Venetian woman, Bianca Capello, the wife of a Florentine, who foisted off a peasant's child on him as her son, and treated with intolerable insult the plain but estimable Grand Duchess, an Austrian Archduchess. After this lady's death Francesco married Bianca, and lived idly in the country with her, leaving the government to bad ministers, who nearly ruined all the careful fabric of Cosimo's administration. His brother, Cardinal Ferdinando, strove against Bianca's influence, and sometimes effected a temporary improvement. This Cardinal was the best of the later Medici; he had great influence in Rome, where he made Sixtus V Pope, and afterwards dared to defy him openly.

Sometimes Ferdinando and Bianca seemed reconciled, and it was on one such occasion that Francesco and his wife died suddenly and mysteriously within a few hours of one another. There seems no real doubt that their deaths were due to natural causes, but poison was of course suggested, and, since Ferdinando's high character was above suspicion, it was believed that the Grand Duke and Duchess had succumbed to poison which the latter had prepared for her brother-in-law. Such suspicions are hardly surprising against the Medici family, since Francesco's other brother, Pietro, had murdered his wife, and his sister, Isabella, was murdered, with the approval of the Grand Duke, by her husband, Piero Orsini.

Cardinal Ferdinando (1587) was a genuine Medici of the old type, strong and resolute, pious and affectionate, with great commercial and diplomatic talents, a love for a domestic life, and a real desire for the welfare of his people. To this he added uprightness and personal morality. He renounced the Cardinalate, married Christine of Lorraine, and brought up an affectionate and well-behaved family in a well-ordered court, with less etiquette but more morality than that of his father. Contemporary writers give us pleasant glimpses of Florentine life at this time. There are many balls to which Princess

Maria (Francesco's daughter, the future Queen of France) comes "with all freedom." There are festivals also; the subject provinces still bring their tributary banners on S. Giovanni's day. The "Palio" is run and there are tournaments. Noble youths are trained to ride in the Duke's stables. Nobles and people resort to the Piazza del Duomo; a band plays and poets improvise. "The Florentines are sober in life and dress; they exercise minds and bodies well; they are courteous to foreigners and always well-mannered. The gentry dress in French fashion; the ladies are modest and well-behaved; gentleness and politeness are the rule for all."

Ferdinando employed good ministers, but attended to the details of government himself, and the administration rapidly improved. A determined attack was made on the brigands, and the worst of them, Piccolomini, was captured and hung; but they could not be wholly suppressed, because they could so easily take refuge over the borders. The taxes, if heavy, were well-spent. The loyalty of the citizens was gained by giving them a larger share in municipal government, but the provinces suffered by Ferdinando's protection of the city industries against themselves. Ferdinando's weakest point was his submission to the encroachments of ecclesiastical authority, which Cosimo had kept firmly at bay. Ferdinando could never forget that he had been a priest, and was too much under the influence of the Papacy and the Jesuits.

Ferdinando's chief aim in home policy was to bring back to Tuscany some of her lost commercial prosperity. Livorno, the harbour which had been built and fortified by his predecessors, was made a free port, and was soon thronged by foreign traders, many of whom settled there. It became a busy, cosmopolitan town; a lively trade sprang up with Holland and England, and, through them, a contraband trade with America. Christian pirates brought their booty there unquestioned, and English buccaneers sold the spoils of Spain. Provençal traders, who hated the Genoese, flocked there, and

the good understanding with Henry IV furthered French trade. Through commerce, Ferdinando established friendly relations with Queen Elizabeth; the Protestant Queen and ex-Cardinal greatly admired one another; and Tuscany got corn from England in times of scarcity. Ferdinando's own business operations were large and prosperous, and he was always ready to help Tuscan merchants in difficulty. He continued Cosimo's agricultural work; and, though his attempt to drain the Maremma failed, the Val di Chiana and Pistoian swamps were in great part reclaimed.

Ferdinando was deservedly loved, and his successor shared the excellencies of his character. Cosimo II (1609) was also affectionate, well-intentioned and high-principled. Though only nineteen years old, he had to struggle against constant ill-health, and occupied himself much with books and the conversation of learned men. He wanted his father's strength of will, but tried to carry on his administration unchanged. Ferdinando's strict economy was not however adhered to, and much money was spent on keeping up a court gay enough for Cosimo's young wife, brothers and sisters. Unluckily, also, the death of a trustworthy minister led to the appointment of a favourite of the dowager Grand Duchess, Cioli by name, who had nothing but courtly manners to recommend him, and Cioli irretrievably lowered the international reputation of Tuscany.

Cosimo's frail health soon gave way, and in 1621 he died, leaving Ferdinando II, his son, a child under the guardianship of his mother, Margherita of Austria, and his grandmother, Christine. Cosimo had appointed a Council of State, without whose advice they were not to act, and had limited their control of the finances. But the Regents could not be forced to obey these regulations unless they chose. They were personally popular, generous and kind-hearted; but they were too much ruled by two influences, that of Cioli and that of their own exaggerated piety. Accustomed to feudal governments in their own homes, they encouraged the nobles and allowed them to

tyrannise over the people ; Cosimo's "equality before the law" was forgotten. The citizens more and more aped the court and abandoned trade. As this caused distress, an attempt was made to fix the price of bread, with disastrous effects on agriculture. Brigandage and mendicancy increased ; land, lately brought into cultivation, was again neglected.

Ferdinando I had allowed too much ecclesiastical influence in the country ; under the Regents and Cioli it became predominant. It was Cioli who surrendered Galileo to the Inquisition. Friars were allowed to hold government offices ; clerical favourites abounded. Money was spent extravagantly on ecclesiastical purposes and also on the semi-feudal court which the Regents liked.

Degeneration was slowly working within Tuscany, and the law was fulfilling itself that a State is doomed which is founded upon the strong qualities of the ruler and the demoralisation of the citizens. Citizenship was in fact disappearing ; the rulers were aristocratic, even semi-feudal in their tastes, and the people followed their example. Ferdinando had many good qualities ; he was industrious, affable, conscientious, sincerely anxious for his people's good. He was so popular that his subjects would freely ask his advice in their private affairs. He worked hard to save the country from the worst effects of the plague and famine of 1629-30 ; the people co-operated loyally, and the outbreak was checked early. He was much loved by his family, and his brothers willingly served under him. He lived economically, reducing the court expenses ; he took pleasure in study and in the company of learned men. Many came from abroad to visit him, and the pupils of Galileo directed his studies. His fondness for science led to suspicions of his orthodoxy. His brother, Prince Leopoldo, founded a scientific academy, whose work formed an epoch in scientific discovery. Ferdinando not only gave facilities for, but himself assisted in, the work ; the laboratory was in his palace.

But, though he tried to rule well, Ferdinando had not the

strength of will to effect great reforms. He was "slow in mind, much afraid of new things." He let Tuscany slip still further back among the nations, with diminished prestige and resources, until it had no more influence than Mantua.

The constant demand of Spain for subsidies and the war of Castro heavily burdened the finances. But the war brought out the loyalty and improved the *morale* of the people, and the victories of the Tuscan army showed that Cosimo's experiment had succeeded. The brief prosperity resulting from the opening of Livorno to free trade had passed, for the Tuscans had not enterprise enough to seize its advantages for themselves, but let them pass into the hands of English and Dutch settlers. At the same time both the native cloth and silk industries were declining, and agriculture was falling into an unsatisfactory state. The government's well-meant attempts to improve matters generally failed because of ignorance and incompetence.

Ferdinando's wife, the Princess of Urbino, was so bigoted that, hating his scientific pursuits, she lived apart from him for many years after the birth of their son, Cosimo. Unluckily she was allowed to educate the boy, who grew up as proud and bigoted as herself and her clerical friends; besides this he was naturally stupid, selfish and sulky. Taught that all amusement was wicked, and imbued with an exaggerated sense of his own dignity, he was married to the beautiful and spirited Margu rite of Orleans, daughter of Duke Gaston and sister of the "Grande Mademoiselle."

Margu rite hated her ugly, narrow-minded husband and his dull, prim court; he hated her frivolities and was furious when she mocked him. After years of quarrelling she extracted permission to retire to France, where she was supposed to live strictly in a convent, but in reality gave herself up to frivolity and intrigue. Cosimo's naturally sullen temper was embittered, and he became almost the worst, and certainly the most unpopular, of the Medici Grand Dukes (1670). His mother

and her following of friars ruled the State; court and administration were filled with the meanest hypocrisy and intrigue. The friars carried on a system of moral espionage, and numerous regulations were issued to make the people pious by force. Yet disorder and misgovernment of every kind increased. Money was lavished on ecclesiastical purposes, on missions to Protestant countries and the support of foreign "converts" at the court. More was wasted on an absurd show of outward pomp. The finances were exhausted; taxation increased, until the world laughed to hear that the Grand Duke derived revenue from wigs and donkeys. When the great wars began, and Tuscany was called upon for heavy subsidies, the misery of the country increased. Docile though the people generally were, an angry mob clamoured round the Pitti Palace, demanding bread.

A regular opposition now gathered round Cosimo's eldest son, Prince Ferdinando, who inherited his mother's qualities, and hated his father. He kept up a small, but very extravagant court, with young and lively friends, musicians and actors. Cosimo's younger brother, Cardinal Francesco Maria, born after Cosimo's marriage, was Ferdinando's ally. Thus family quarrels broke up the old advantageous solidarity of the Medici, and their matrimonial troubles, which the people looked upon as a judgment, continued in the younger generation. Ferdinando's wife had no children; his brother, the weak and amiable Gian Gastone, was married to a German termagant, who would not even live with him. The succession was very doubtful, and thus the century ended in great anxiety both for the Tuscans and their rulers.

The Duchies of Savoy and Piedmont, restored to Emmanuele Filiberto in 1559, were of a heterogeneous and rather unpromising character. Most of Savoy was barren; the people lived in extreme poverty with their flocks. The feudal nobles were powerful and independent; there were so many castles that it was said "one cannot move without seeing three or four." French in language and race, the Savoyards had of

late come to consider themselves as French subjects and objected to the transfer. In Piedmont there were not quite so many feudatories, but still plenty. Here the fertile country easily produced enough for the people's necessities; the standard of living was low; the people were idle and frivolous and disinclined to work. Trade and manufacture hardly existed.

“Piedmontese and Montferrine,
Bread and wine and tambourine,”

was the local saying.

The towns were few and small, except Turin, which was of a good size and well built. There was also the province of Nice, with its maritime population, which suffered from Turkish raids. There were the rough, but loyal, mountaineers of the Val d'Aosta, and those of the Vaudois valleys, whose loyalty was distinctly tempered by heresy. And there were the counties on the Swiss borders, with Protestant and Swiss leanings.

Under the French government the feudatories had enjoyed much liberty and the people little taxation. The former Dukes had lived on their demesne, now nearly all alienated. They were easy-going and kind-hearted, and were largely governed by the assembly of clergy and nobles called the “States General.”

Emmanuele Filiberto was welcomed “as if he were a God,” but the people soon found that they had a master to deal with very unlike the old Dukes. Great strength and wonderful powers of endurance lay in his small, wiry body—“all nerve, no flesh”—rapid in gesture, and yet dignified. The family fierce moustache had already appeared. He was too reserved to be popular, and preferred respect to affection. He kept up Spanish etiquette at the court, very different from the popular friendliness of his ancestors. Prompt in action, self-controlled, a man of few words, and hating talkers and flatterers, religious and abstemious, a strict observer of his word, caring for no amusement but hunting and military exercises, he was yet

a man of good intelligence, and read and conversed well on such subjects as mathematics, chemistry and military engineering. He was faithful to, and fond of, his handsome, clever wife, Marguérite of France, though she was much his senior, and really listened to her advice. "Testa di ferro" (Iron-head), he was called; he was the strong man needed to build up his States into a nation; and his foundations, though often shaken, were never overthrown.

His first work was to weaken the dangerous feudatories by destroying privileges and forbidding the fortification of castles; while, by allowing the nobles to commute their military service for money, he ended their military predominance. The States General, which had called itself the "guardian" of the Dukes, was no longer summoned, and indeed, at that critical time, its action would have been very dangerous. The two Senates, one for Savoy and one for Piedmont, the supreme courts of justice, were retained; there was a fiscal *camera* and a Council of State, but all were completely under the Duke's control. He consulted his ministers only as much as he pleased, and indeed had good reason to think that most of them were pensioners of Spain or France. In foreign politics entirely, and in home affairs mainly, he kept the reins in his own hands. He showed equal favour to both parties, and the administration was on the whole satisfactory. The last remnants of villeinage disappeared; the Communes were reorganised. Economic improvements were made; small manufactures were started, mulberry trees planted for silk culture. The country's superabundant natural products were exported to Genoa and Switzerland, and trade with France began.

The fiscal burden was necessarily heavy, because the Duchy, and especially its vulnerable borders, had to be prepared for defence against its many possible enemies by fortifications, artillery and a well-trained army. A few ships were equipped to keep the Turks in check; their control was

entrusted to the quasi-religious Order of SS. Lazzaro and Maurizio, similar to the Tuscan Order of Sto. Stefano. At first the Duke tried to maintain a large court, but soon began to economise in this respect. He was also able to avoid war, and so to leave a large surplus to his son. The country proved well able to bear the increased taxation; though the large salt-tax which was imposed at first pressed too heavily on the peasants, and was in part superseded by a land-tax. But the greatest triumph of Emmanuele Filiberto was the creation of an effective and, for the most part, native army. A militia was formed, whose members received privileges and were drilled in time of peace, but were only to be paid when on active service. There was also a regular force for garrisoning fortresses. The officers were trained by competent foreign instructors. The army thus raised was to prove itself ultimately an excellent fighting machine, and the militia service was so popular and so greatly improved the character of the people, that we no longer hear of their idleness and feebleness but of their spirit and patriotism.

It was Carlo Emmanuele I (1580) who used his father's money and military preparations for the ceaseless wars in which nearly his whole reign of fifty years was consumed. His fragile body was imbued with an indomitable spirit; his ambition and his military ardour were unquenchable. In spite of all the hardships which his policy entailed, the people were devoted to their Duke, whose frank, agreeable manners, courage and daring gave him immense popularity. The secret of his power was his ability to inspire the people with his own spirit, and to turn the peaceful, pleasure-loving Piedmontese into a nation of soldiers. When the Duke was asked how many soldiers he had, he replied, "As many as I have subjects." In his earlier years they were inexperienced and showed cowardice; but in 1618 we read, "the people are fitted for fighting and fond of it; they have all been brought up as it were for war." Here is the explanation of the

remarkable achievements of this little State, its bold resistance to whole armies of French and Spaniards, and its future powers of expansion.

Like his father, Carlo Emmanuele ruled almost independently of advisers. His own policy changed so rapidly that his ministers could not keep pace with it. One of them, Albigny, who had married the Duke's half-sister, was accused of treachery when he intrigued for the Spanish party after the Duke had gone over to the French, and was actually executed. But Carlo Emmanuele had not his father's administrative gifts, and though he meant to rule well, he did not keep a strict hand over the officials and magistrates, and the government considerably deteriorated. The Duke's main object in internal affairs was to obtain enough money for his wars. He nearly trebled the taxes, and, even then, most of them were pledged as interest for ready money borrowed on extravagant terms. The Spanish garrisons and foreign armies did much damage, trade was stopped and crops ruined; famine and plague naturally followed. Peasants in Savoy, whose cattle had been driven off, were dying of starvation. The cession of Bresse and Bugey in place of the less fertile Saluzzo was a serious economic loss.

Yet the recuperative powers of the land and people must have been great; for, soon after sheer exhaustion had forced Carlo Emmanuele to accept the Treaty of Lyons, a Venetian wrote that the country was prosperous and the population large. Silk culture was increasing and a road was being built from Nice to Turin across the mountains to facilitate trade.

Vittorio Amedeo I (1630) was as bold a soldier as his father and more prudent. From his mother, the Infanta Caterina, he inherited a better physique and a more steady temperament. Richelieu said of him, "a just man, deaf to abuse and flattery, more cautious and self-contained than his father...he did not keep up showy state by heavy taxation...he was a good master, husband and father, and a good ruler,

caring as much for the welfare of his subjects as his father had disregarded it." In fact, he won general respect for courage in adversity, for faithfulness, gravity and love of justice. He reformed the administration and finances and encouraged industry. In three years of peace he succeeded in paying off much of his father's debts.

Yet he had not sufficient force of character to triumph over the difficult circumstances which surrounded him. The country was distressed by war and taxation, France would give him no peace, and his wife, the masterful Duchess Christine, a true daughter of Henry IV, incessantly exerted her influence in favour of France, and worried him with her vanities and jealousies. She quarrelled with the Duke's brothers, Tommaso and Cardinal Maurizio, and with Tommaso's wife, the Princess of Carignano, who was as strong-willed as Christine and more ill-tempered. When, in 1637, the Duke's death left his sons mere infants, the quarrels over the Regency between Christine and her brothers-in-law added to the horrors of foreign war those of a particularly bitter civil strife, in which France and Spain, supporting the rival claimants, were really contending for the control, perhaps for the actual possession, of the State itself.

The history of the civil war is so bound up with general politics that it must be described later (Chapter IV). Its result was to divide the recently united people into factions, which of course embodied all the remnants of local feuds and jealousies, to make the country a prey to their savage contests, as well as to the depredations of the foreign armies which overran it. There was no recognized government; no industry or agriculture could exist; and the result was of course extreme exhaustion and destitution. Even when the civil war was nominally over, the Duchess and princes formally reconciled, and Christine recognized as Regent, the bitter feelings thus roused lingered on, to break out now and again in local feuds and plots against the government. There had been an

element of genuine patriotism in the princes' party, since it was they who had resisted the French domination, and were looked upon as embodying the idea of national independence, but even this was worn out. The continuance of Christine's rule under French domination was endured, because no one had further energy to resist it.

Christine absolutely controlled her weak-willed son Carlo Emmanuele II and his State until her death (1663). Her extravagant expenditure on her court and favourites, and, in old age, on works of piety, prevented the recovery of the finances, and the only redeeming feature of her rule was the influence which she allowed to an upright and able minister, son of the unfortunate Albigny, who did what he could to protect the State from ruin and the French. She kept up a gay court, quite French in character,—“magnificent, the home of fêtes and gallantry,” wrote the “Grande Mademoiselle,” in order to amuse her son, who was brought up wholly ignorant of history and politics.

Yet Carlo Emmanuele had a kindly disposition, was “tactful, agreeable and well-bred,” said Mademoiselle; and, in spite of the personal immorality of which he was not in the least ashamed, was well-intentioned also; but, when he became master of his own States, he found himself in a very difficult position. The people were still loyal and military, but the administration was in great disorder; the nobles were out of control, the country impoverished. Treasury and Communes alike were burdened with debt. Carlo Emmanuele did the best he could to reform matters, but his industry was greater than his abilities, and most of his ministers were not satisfactory. Fortunately however the finances fell into the hands of a self-made and most competent man, named Trucchi, who rescued them from the terrible condition in which Christine had left them. Peculation was checked; the nobles and clergy were forced to pay taxes; but there could be no real reform while the government revenues proceeded largely from

the sale of offices and of pardons for crime. Carlo Emmanuele insisted on keeping up a court ridiculously disproportionate to his position, and modelled upon that of Versailles, and he expended a great deal of money in trying to secure the "Trattamento Reale," that is, the treatment by foreign Powers of himself and his ambassadors as if he were a king. Fortunately however a long period of peace gave the country time for natural recuperation, and Carlo Emmanuele helped in restoring its industries. Good roads were built, including a useful route between Chambéry and Lyons. A separate Senate was established for the province of Nice, and efforts were made to stir up the lazy people of that district to use their opportunities, and to make Villafranca a real commercial port. Foreign merchants were persuaded to settle; new industries were introduced; commercial relations with England, Holland and Portugal improved; a diligence service into France established. Carlo Emmanuele also patronised art and literature, in which former Dukes had not as a rule been greatly interested. The army was reorganised, new fortifications and artillery provided. On the whole there were solid improvements, and Carlo Emmanuele was decidedly popular. Though he liked to make a great parade of absolutism and personal importance, yet he was friendly to everyone and disregarded etiquette. A characteristic story is told of him that, when dying, he ordered the people to be admitted "for them to see how a prince dies."

Carlo Emmanuele's heir was another minor, Vittorio Amedeo II (1675), left under the Regency of his mother, Giovanna Battista of Nemours, a passionate, proud, selfish woman, who, absorbed only in her own ambitions and amours, allowed the government, foreign relations and army to sink almost into the condition in which the last woman Regent had left them. Like Christine, she wished to go on ruling after her son came of age; but she relied on her own cleverness and French support to effect this, and did not attempt to conciliate either the people or the young Duke himself. She

kept him under an irksome tutelage, and did not manage him, as Christine ruled Carlo Emmanuele, by affection and indulgence, but by fear and harshness. Surrounded by spies, he learned to think and plan in secret ; the French ambassador said of him at the age of thirteen that it was hard to discover his thoughts. Two years later his mother planned to marry him to the heiress of Portugal, to send him to that country, and remain to rule Savoy alone. Vittorio Amedeo shammed illness when a Portuguese fleet came to fetch him ; and the Admiral, soon discovering the cause of his disorder, went home in a huff. The sympathies of the people were with him, and the rumour of his going nearly caused a rebellion ; but neither people nor Duke could resist the Regent while the whole power of France was on her side.

But the boy's cleverness was almost supernatural ; he got rid of his mother's objectionable minister, Pianezza, by revealing to her the offers which Pianezza had actually made him against her. Then he gained the favour of Louis XIV by accepting a marriage with Princess Anne of Orleans, to which the Regent dared not object. Thus sure of French support, he told the officials that he had taken the government upon himself, and so, by a most peaceful *coup d'état*, ended the Regency. He was still not twenty years old.

Vittorio Amedeo showed equal cleverness and powers of dissimulation in preparing to free his country from the yoke of France (Chapter V). " His heart, like his country, is covered with mountains," said a French ambassador. He quietly restored the finances, pacified the rebellious parts of the country with generous treatment, and prepared the army for its future tasks. The loyalty and enthusiasm of the people when they learned that he would lead them against their French oppressors knew no bounds ; they took up arms in thousands, while the ferocity of the peasants kept the French army in terror.

A new era of success was dawning for the House of Savoy ;

but we must pause for a moment to review a special point in its past history which has been both fiercely condemned and eagerly defended, that is, the Dukes' treatment of their Vaudois subjects.

Amongst the Vaudois lingered the medieval Protestantism of Provence and North Italy. These wild people, living in their high Alpine valleys, were little known until the Reformation caused them to enter into an alliance with the new Protestants, and to come out of their valleys and preach to their neighbours. The Dukes of Savoy, alarmed by the religious condition of France, believed that the Vaudois and Provençal Huguenots thought of seizing Saluzzo and making it into an Italian Geneva. Emmanuele Filiberto preferred moderation, but the Papacy urged strong measures. There was much fighting, and the Vaudois, in their mountain fastnesses, were usually able to repel the Duke's troops. An agreement was made, and they were promised liberty of religion within certain narrow limits. But they were irritated by Catholic missionaries, and were unable to resist the desire to proselytise outside their own borders. Constant friction led to occasional acts of violence, attacks on Catholics and churches, and, in retaliation, severe Ducal edicts.

Finally, Christine's minister Pianezza took an army into the mountains. The Vaudois, convinced that the government meant to exterminate them, refused to submit, and a cruel contest followed. The soldiers were not actually ordered to commit barbarities, but their fanaticism was not in any way controlled, and many Vaudois who escaped the soldiers were driven from their homes and died of cold and starvation. Milton's sonnet, "Avenge, O Lord," has made this persecution famous in history.

England and the Swiss at last intervened, and a new agreement was made. But the Vaudois, urged by their fanatic leader, Jean Léger, twice revolted against this settlement, and were twice repressed by force. Many of them left the

country. The succeeding period of uneasy peace was broken after the Edict of Nantes was revoked, when Louis XIV insisted that Vittorio Amedeo II should, much against his will, join in the persecution of Protestantism by helping to suppress the Vaudois. Thousands were massacred, or died in prison; many others went abroad, and the valleys were nearly depopulated. But directly Vittorio Amedeo had emancipated himself from French control, he encouraged the exiles to return; they fought eagerly with him against France, and the Dukes never again experienced trouble from them.

CHAPTER IV.

THE REVIVAL OF FRENCH INFLUENCE IN ITALY: 1601—1642.

THE cession of Saluzzo may have been part of Henry IV's scheme with regard to Italy, in which he showed self-restraint, acuteness and foresight. Its object was to enable Italy to form an independent League, under French protection, which should join in the general movement against the Habsburgs and should drive them from the Peninsula. Whatever further plans Henry may have contemplated, he certainly intended to give Lombardy to Carlo Emmanuele in exchange for Savoy, which he wished to annex to France.

But the immediate result of the Treaty of Lyons was to alienate most of the Italian States from France and cause a reaction in favour of Spain. Ferdinando of Tuscany felt that all his courage in defying Spain and all his trouble about Henry's Absolution were thrown away, and Maria de' Medici's dowry wasted; besides, Henry and Maria quarrelled, and Sully refused to pay off the French debts to Tuscany. Ferdinando accordingly humbled himself before Spain, and begged the Emperor to intercede. Philip III and Lerma would willingly have restored Spanish influence by peaceable means; but Fuentes, an ambitious, pugnacious soldier, whom Lerma had made Governor of Lombardy to get him out of his own way, wanted a war in which he might gain personal distinction, and so was determined to embroil Italy by fair means or foul. He seldom asked permission of the home government for his actions, and frequently disobeyed its orders. Fuentes would have liked

best to attack Venice, whose independence was most annoying to him; but Venice, sure that he would receive little support from Spain, made such vigorous preparations to resist him that he thought it best to leave her alone, and employed himself in annoying and frightening Tuscany. Ferdinando's protective influence over the Malaspina lords of the Lunigiana was disputed. Piombino and Elba, which Ferdinando hoped to obtain from the Emperor, were occupied by Spanish garrisons, and a new fortress, Porto Longone, was built on Elba. But, when Ferdinando was thoroughly frightened, Lerma took the opportunity offered by the death of the troublesome Don Pietro de' Medici (1604) to accept the Grand Duke's submission, and Tuscany was once again humbly dependent upon Spain.

In North Italy the timorous princes hastened to revive their *Condotta*, and to place themselves anew under Spanish protection. Montferrat was filled with Spanish troops on the pretext of defending it from France. To keep Genoa in check Spain annexed, with the Emperor's consent, the Imperial fief of Finale, a most useful possession, since it secured a port for Lombardy independent of Genoa. Indeed, Spain never lost an opportunity of getting hold of small fiefs in Lombardy or the Lunigiana.

With Carlo Emmanuele, now very bitter against France, Fuentes had much influence. The Duke still hoped for the succession to Spain, since Philip III had no male heir, and allowed his three elder sons to be sent for their education to Madrid, where the lads found that they were treated as hostages for their father's good behaviour.

Henry IV, discovering Carlo Emmanuele's share in the Biron conspiracy, massed troops about the Pont de Grésin, and the Duke, frightened at the menace, allowed Fuentes to fill Savoy with Spanish troops, though he was wise enough to refuse to have any in Piedmont. Then Albigny, the Duke's chief minister, who was wholly in Spanish interests, suggested the moment as opportune for a new attack upon Geneva. Albigny

himself planned and led a night assault upon the city; the alarm was not given until some of his troops were actually within the walls, but these were surrounded and cut down by the citizens, and the rest of the assailants were beaten off.

Still Fuentes had not succeeded in stirring up a war, but another opportunity was soon to come. In 1602 Henry IV renewed the former valuable French leagues with the Swiss, who provided him with soldiers, and could open their Passes from France into Italy. The most important of these Passes were held by the Grisons, to control whom the Governors of Lombardy had long been striving. The Grisons being Protestant, and afraid of their Habsburg neighbours, preferred a Venetian alliance, but it was not until the Treaty of Lyons that Venice awoke to the importance of securing their good-will. In 1603, however, she offered them large subsidies, and received, by the Treaty of Davos, their military service, the right to use their Passes, and to make a new road direct from Brescia to the Valtelline, which would lead to the north without passing through Lombardy. These treaties of France and Venice with the Grisons alarmed the Spanish government, and Fuentes was at last given a free hand to upset them by any means he chose. First he tried to starve out the mountaineers by forbidding trade between them and Lombardy; then he built a fortress at the foot of the Valtelline, calling it after himself, and made a league with the Catholics of the Forest Cantons. Thus Venice was cut off from the north, and the Grisons intimidated. There was a Catholic party amongst the Grisons themselves, so that they were soon on the verge of civil war. If Fuentes had been a little more conciliatory, the Grisons would probably have given way, but his bullying only exasperated them to resist him. They appealed to their allies, but France and Venice hung back from war.

At this moment the quarrel between Paul V and Venice came to a crisis (1606), and it seemed as if Fuentes would be gratified, and all Italy, France and Spain plunged into war. Philip and Lerma tried hard to avoid the danger, but Fuentes

stirred up the Cardinals against Venice, and prepared for hostilities. Venice turned to France for aid, and Henry saw here both a risk and an opportunity. A war against the Pope, in which all the Protestants of Europe would join, and which would take the form of a religious contest, was most undesirable for him. Yet, if war broke out he would be obliged to take part in it, since he could not look on while Spain crushed Venice and annexed the Grisons. But successful mediation, especially since Spanish arbitration had failed, would give him a new and powerful influence in Italy. His diplomacy was brilliantly successful; the war was averted and the parties reconciled; Henry assumed the position of arbiter in Italy which was just what he wished, and which opened to him once more the field of Italian politics.

Meanwhile Fuentes' threatening attitude united all the Grisons against him; they renewed their alliances with France and Venice; and Lerma, more determined than ever to avoid Italian war, ordered Fuentes to send a great part of the troops in Lombardy into the Netherlands, so that Italy had a respite from the anxiety in which his turbulence had kept it.

But there was another turbulent spirit in Italy which could not rest in peace. Carlo Emmanuele was weary of the Spanish alliance, which brought him money but no glory. Spain found it economical to keep garrisons in Savoy, and they were well placed to guard Italy and the road to Flanders from the French; but Spain was far too proud and stupid to conciliate her useful ally by courtesy and small concessions. Fuentes and the Spanish envoy at Turin treated him like a Spanish subject; the princes were unkindly used in Spain; the eldest died there, and the Duke suspected poison. His projects for his children were thwarted; and, though he was allowed to marry his daughter, Margherita, to Prince Francesco of Mantua, Spain prevented the sensible arrangement by which Savoy's claim on Montferrat was to be compromised for some border territory. To keep Carlo Emmanuele occupied, Spain suggested chimerical plans,

such as a Crusade to enforce the ancient claims of his House on Cyprus, and he spent large sums in preparing for expeditions until their impracticability became self-evident.

In 1605 the birth of an heir to the Spanish throne ended the Duke's hope of succession, and loosened the tie which bound him to Spain. From this time we find him drawing towards France, though slowly and cautiously. "Remember," he wrote to his son in 1605, "that of all slaveries there is none so bitter and unbearable as that of Spain, from which there is never any hope of escape." But France must be shown that she is not feared, "whatever big words she may use, because, if she thinks you are afraid, she will bully you."

In 1606 the other princes came home; in 1607 Albigny was executed for traitorous correspondence with Spain. Various projects of alliance with France were drawn up and abandoned. Henry was willing to strike a blow at the Habsburgs and to allow Carlo Emmanuele to have Milan, but he wanted Savoy to round off the borders of France, and Carlo Emmanuele did not wish to give it up. Henry and Carlo Emmanuele also cherished projects for a general Italian League against Spain; hence the marriages of the Duke's daughters to the Princes of Modena and Mantua, and the project of a marriage alliance with Tuscany also. Venice and Mantua, Modena and Parma, were all offered portions of Spanish territory; all but Venice had certainly some secret understanding with France on the subject. Their Spanish subsidies were in arrears, and they all thought that they might, as a Venetian ambassador said, "enjoy to show themselves Italians, and not slaves of Spain." The Duke of Mantua, whose wife was the French Queen's sister, had in particular suffered from Spanish bullying.

Venice would not allow herself to be involved in the scheme; she refused a French alliance, saying that it would only provoke Fuentes to invade the Grisons; she hated war, and did not trust Carlo Emmanuele; but, if a victorious French army had actually been in Lombardy, she would scarcely have remained

neutral. Tuscany was still under Spanish influence; the new Duke, Cosimo II, was married to an Austrian Arch-Duchess, and his cousin, Maria de' Medici, was urging him to negotiate a Franco-Spanish marriage, in spite of Henry's obviously hostile intentions towards Spain. Whether or no Henry actually offered Naples to Paul V, that Pope remained persistently deaf to his charming; he wanted a Crusade, hated the very idea of an Italian war, and believed that Fuentes heckled the Grisons from purely religious motives.

Spain, blinded perhaps by the Grand Duke's negotiations and Carlo Emmanuele's intrigues, was extraordinarily stupid in realizing her danger; but Fuentes was fully alive to it, and was so active in his preparations that Carlo Emmanuele feared in 1609 that he would invade Piedmont. But it was not till April, 1610, that the Treaty of Brossolo was actually signed between France and Savoy. The terms were very favourable to Carlo Emmanuele, who, in return for the assistance of Lesdiguières to conquer Milan, was merely to destroy Montmélian, the strongest fortress in Savoy, and to admit French garrisons into two Piedmontese towns. His eldest son was to marry Henry's eldest daughter. War was to begin on May 19th, but on May 14th Henry was assassinated.

The news was received with consternation amongst the allies. Everyone knew that, whatever she might promise, Maria would be quite unable to prosecute the war against Spain, and, in fact, in a very few months, the Grand Duke Cosimo had successfully negotiated a double Franco-Spanish matrimonial arrangement. Spain insisted on the eldest French Princess for the Infant, and Carlo Emmanuele was not pleased to put up with the second instead for his son. Meanwhile Spain learned all about the Treaty of Brossolo, and Fuentes prepared to take revenge upon Savoy. Fuentes' death indeed gave a momentary respite, but Lerma was quite as determined to punish Carlo Emmanuele's temerity. The Duke's protest and apologies were disregarded, and he was obliged at length to

send his second son to Spain to make a humble act of contrition before the King. Thus Carlo Emmanuele escaped punishment, but he never forgot the bitter humiliation.

Yet, irrepressible as ever, in the very next year he was attacking Geneva again, thus angering many of his French friends, and, soon afterwards, we find him looking for new allies amongst the Protestant Powers, and hoping to increase his dignity and independence by a marriage alliance with England. Both Tuscany and France entered into the competition for Prince Henry's hand; Spain interfered to prevent Carlo Emmanuele from securing it, and the Pope objected on religious grounds. However the death of Prince Henry put an end to the struggle, the chief result of which was to leave Carlo Emmanuele less satisfied than ever with both France and Spain.

In 1613 the death of Francesco I of Mantua opened the first chapter in the question of the Mantuan succession, which was to agitate Italy for many years. Mantua was a male fief, and passed to Francesco's brother, Cardinal Ferdinando Gonzaga, but Montferrat had come to the Gonzaga through a female, and its heir should be Francesco's little daughter, Maria, whose mother, Margherita, was Carlo Emmanuele's daughter¹. Carlo Emmanuele, already claiming Montferrat as his own, seized upon this opportunity to make good his claim. He suggested to Inoyosa, the Governor of Milan, that Spain and he should share Montferrat, and Inoyosa at first entered into the plan. Carlo Emmanuele tried, but failed, to seize Casale by treachery; then he demanded the custody of the princesses, his daughter and grand-daughter, but Ferdinando refused to give them up, and appealed to France for help. Neither France nor Spain wished for war at present, and certainly not to gratify the Duke of Savoy, and Lerma decided to prohibit Inoyosa from assisting Carlo Emmanuele.

In the meantime, the Duke had invaded Montferrat, and conquered all but the fortress of Casale, which, defended by

¹ See p. 220 for family tree.

Ferdinando's French cousin, the Duke of Nevers, was altogether too strong for his small forces. The people of Montferrat, who disliked the Gonzaga, welcomed him, and all seemed to be going well when he received Lerma's commands to leave Montferrat alone, and learned that Inoyosa was ordered to defend it from him. He dared not resist, but withdrew his troops, and a truce was made. But the peace of Italy had thus been broken, and this little war was to inaugurate a period of incessant fighting and much suffering in Piedmont and Lombardy. The Italians looked upon the event with feelings akin to panic; the Pope, Tuscany and Venice all remonstrated with Carlo Emmanuele; and, indeed, the Venetian ambassador spoke so strongly that Carlo Emmanuele angrily sent him home.

Once again Spain had checked Carlo Emmanuele's ambitions and asserted her authority successfully in Italy. But Carlo Emmanuele was by no means beaten yet; he appealed on all sides for help, and neither he nor Ferdinando heeded the terms of the truce which prescribed general disarmament. Then Lerma went a step too far, sent "orders" to the Duke to submit, "as if he were a subject," and bade Inoyosa invade Piedmont if the "orders" were not immediately obeyed. Carlo Emmanuele was furious; he formally returned to Spain his Order of the Golden Fleece, and war began again in September, 1614. Two Spanish armies, from Lombardy and from Genoa, invaded Piedmont, but with little success. Carlo Emmanuele showed great courage and military talent; his army was excellent. "The greatest trouble I have," he wrote, "is to keep back my troops, which are too anxious to advance." He fully believed that he was about to prick the bubble of the Spanish power. Urging Venice to join him, he wrote, "Now is the moment to throw off the Spanish yoke. We shall find that this power, which from a distance appears so terrible, will diminish and disappear like a shadow as we approach it. Let us rush upon the Milanese.... It has no good fortresses nor soldiers to defend it. I call the Republic to share spoils, not dangers."

Carlo Emmanuele's pluck and spirit, in thus defying alone a great Monarchy, impressed men's minds. We find signs of this in contemporary writings. "If the Turk," wrote Alessandro Tassoni, "were to invade Italy many would follow him, instead of uniting against him. We are so cowardly and weak that we are more anxious to enslave ourselves than are our enemies to enslave us." But the hour of Italy's freedom was not yet come. The smaller States sent troops to serve Spain, and, though James I of England gave money to Savoy, Carlo Emmanuele received no other help. Fighting continued until June, 1615, and then the Powers mediated; a Convention was drawn up at Asti by which both sides were to disarm, and the Montferrat question to be settled by the Imperial Court. Philip agreed unwillingly, so that the Franco-Spanish marriages might be celebrated in peace, but he did not mean to forego the punishment of the impudent Duke of Savoy, and Inoyosa was replaced by a famous soldier, ambitious and cunning as Fuentes, Pietro de Toledo.

Shortly afterwards, a man of the same type, the Duke of Osuna, was sent to Naples. Spain intended to use the weakness of France during Louis XIII's minority as her opportunity for bringing Italy once more into complete submission. She could count on the hatred of Paul V for Venice, on the subservience of Tuscany and the obedience of Mantua, which could only retain Montferrat with Spanish help.

To make herself supreme, Spain knew that Venice must be crushed as well as Savoy, and for this purpose she could use the enmity of Austria towards the Republic. Austria always looked upon Venice as the usurper of Imperial territory, and bitterly resented her claim to monopoly of the Adriatic. There were frequent border quarrels, and their relations were exasperated by the Uscocchi (p. 177), whom the Austrians, in spite of Venetian protests, deliberately protected and encouraged. Venice tried to suppress them by force, and there ensued a frontier war which was being waged in 1615. Venice

had no desire to add to her burdens by a Spanish war, yet she was bound to sympathise with Carlo Emmanuele in his struggle against the Habsburgs.

Both Venice and France had pledged themselves in the Convention of Asti to protect Carlo Emmanuele if Spain attacked him. On this account he was anxious to make Spain the first to break the Convention. The Spanish governors played into his hands; Osuna was preparing a fleet, Toledo kept up his army, and intrigued with disaffected Piedmontese, while Ferdinando Gonzaga also failed to keep his part of the Convention. Toledo even demanded that Carlo Emmanuele should write to ask pardon of the King of Spain and submit himself to his judgment. Carlo Emmanuele, acting with unusual caution, managed to pose as the victim of Spanish machinations, so that Venice promised him subsidies, and Maria de' Medici was obliged to allow Lesdiguières to visit Turin, where that gallant old enemy of Spain assured Carlo Emmanuele that he would come to his aid whether the Queen sent him or no.

War began again in September, 1616, by Toledo invading Piedmont. The Queen did forbid Lesdiguières' expedition, but he answered, "My respect for your Majesty's reputation obliges me to cross the mountains, in order to exalt your name, which is despised by those who ought to honour it." When he reached Piedmont, Carlo Emmanuele had already driven out Toledo, and together they invaded Montferrat and the Milanese. Lesdiguières however returned to France on hearing of the Court revolution which had emancipated Louis from his mother's control, and the new French government, most anxious to avoid a breach with Spain, hindered his return to Italy. Carlo Emmanuele found himself in considerable difficulties, for next spring Toledo again invaded Piedmont, and besieged the most important of its eastern fortresses, Vercelli. Carlo Emmanuele looked everywhere for help; indeed, ever since the beginning of the war he had been incessantly negotiating with English,

Swiss, Dutch and German Protestants. At last, pocketing his pride, he allowed the English ambassador to renew Emmanuele Filiberto's Treaty of 1564 with Berne, and in return received Swiss reinforcements. Soon afterwards Lesdiguières returned, but Vercelli had already fallen, though not without a gallant defence. Lesdiguières however saved Asti, and joined Carlo Emmanuele in an invasion of the Milanese. Meanwhile, though supplying him with large sums of money, Venice steadily refused to join him in a definite league, and to break her nominal peace with Spain. Yet she gained little by her refusal, since, while struggling with Austria for the fortress of Gradiska, which she needed to defend her borders from Uscocchi and Turks, she was hampered by the menacing attitude of Toledo, who kept his troops upon her western frontier, and still more by the open hostility of Osuna. Defying the orders of the Spanish government to keep the peace, he armed a fleet which co-operated in the Adriatic with the Uscocchi in attacking Venetian ships, whose spoils were sold in the Neapolitan markets, raided the Istrian coasts, and, had it not been for the prudence of the Venetian commanders, would have come into open collision with the Venetian fleet. Yet all the time negotiations for peace were going on at Paris and Madrid, the Venetian envoys at Paris acting for Savoy also. Venice wished for peace, but insisted on the inclusion of Savoy; Austria was also ready now to make terms. Lerma hoped to reconcile them, yet could not bring himself to treat direct with Carlo Emmanuele, whom he looked upon rather as a rebel than as an independent Prince. Spain might restore Vercelli as a favour after the peace, but would not be compelled to relinquish it as a condition.

But Louis, exceedingly anxious for peace, frightened the Venetian ambassadors into giving way on this point, and signing a peace without any express stipulation about Vercelli. Both the Venetian government and Carlo Emmanuele were very indignant, but Lesdiguières was recalled, and there was

nothing for it but to submit. Peace between Spain and Savoy was signed at Madrid (Sept. 1617), and at Neustadt between Venice and Austria. Venice was to restore her conquests by land, and a verbal promise was made that Osuna should give back the ships he had taken. The question of the navigation of the Gulf was left unsettled. Carlo Emmanuele and Toledo were to disarm, and restore prisoners and conquests. Lerma might make peace, but he could not force Toledo and Osuna to carry it out, and Lerma was soon replaced by Uzeda, who was their ardent supporter. Toledo neither disarmed, nor restored Vercelli, but continued to threaten both Savoy and Venice. Osuna refused to give up his Venetian prizes, increased his fleet and publicly declared that to crush Venice was "the only way to obtain an honourable peace." They could rely on the help of Bedmar, the Spanish ambassador in Venice, whom the Venetian Inquisitors of State had long suspected of encouraging conspirators against the Republic, and of sending information to Austria, though they had not proof sufficient to secure his recall. Carlo Emmanuele was alive to the danger; he did not disarm, and he continued to urge Venice to league herself openly with him against the Spaniards. "In bearing so much from them we are playing their game," he declared; "our safety lies in defending ourselves by attacking them....We must strike before they become stronger." In March, 1618, Venice agreed to a defensive league.

Venice was just at this time the scene of that maze of plot and counter-plot between Bedmar, Osuna and Toledo on the one hand, and the Inquisitors of State on the other, which is known as the "Bedmar Conspiracy." So contradictory is the evidence with regard to it that even now we cannot with certainty give an authoritative account of it. According to Venetian historians, in the autumn of 1617 a plot for giving up Chioggia to the Usocchi, concocted by a certain Spinosa, together with other schemes against Venice in which Osuna was concerned, was revealed to the Venetian government by a

French mercenary, Pierre. Pierre's reports were confirmed by the Venetian envoy at Naples. Pierre was in reality Osuna's confidential agent; he had taken service with Venice and revealed Spinosa's plot in order to gain the confidence of the Venetian government and a post of authority, from which he could assist Osuna's plan. This was that Toledo should seize Crema, Osuna and the Uscocchi attack Venice from the sea, while some other conspirators, French soldiers in Venetian service, were to blow up the Arsenal and contrive a general mutiny of mercenaries, who were to be rewarded by permission to sack the city. By the simultaneous execution of these movements, early in 1618, Osuna hoped to conquer Venice herself for Spain.

But the plot was delayed because Osuna was not ready, and meanwhile two of the French mercenaries revealed it to the Dieci. The Dieci contrived that a spy should be present at one of the meetings of the conspirators, and seized a letter which implicated Bedmar. Arrests were made, and Pierre and others were executed. Bedmar, as ambassador, was respected; but, though he angrily declared himself innocent, he thought it best to obtain leave to visit Milan, and Venice secured his recall from the Spanish government. Toledo was also recalled to Spain. As Venice did not publish any account of the plot, Bedmar declared it to be a complete fiction, invented by the Inquisitors of State in order to get rid of Toledo and himself. Osuna asserted that the object of Venice was to destroy Pierre in the interests of the Turks, because he was planning a French Crusade. Many others believed the plot to be a fabrication, and accused Venice of cruelly murdering in secret more than a hundred falsely accused persons.

It is possible that Venice, rendered nervous by the intrigues which encompassed her, exaggerated the dimensions of the plot, either unintentionally, or deliberately in order to impress the Spanish government with the enormity of its agents' behaviour. But that there was no ground for believing in a conspiracy

cannot be maintained, when we consider Osuna's open hostility in the Gulf, his unguarded language about Venice, and the hardly more veiled enmity of Toledo. Bedmar's responsibility cannot be definitely fixed. Yet Philip III agreed to recall him, and Bedmar's own subsequent accounts to his home government are certainly suspicious.

The plot cleared the air in Italy for a time. The removal of Toledo and Bedmar did much to smooth over difficulties, and when Louis XIII remonstrated at the non-fulfilment of the Treaty of 1617, which he had himself guaranteed, Vercelli was at last restored to Carlo Emmanuele. The Duke's eldest son, Vittorio Amedeo, was married to Louis' second sister, Christine.

Always sanguine, Carlo Emmanuele was soon making great plans for an alliance of France, Savoy and Venice against Spain. He wanted to take part in Osuna's revolt from Spain (p. 160), but Venice refused to have anything to do with such doubtful schemes, though Osuna offered her three ports in Apulia. "If the Republic lets this opportunity slip, by Heaven, I will turn Friar!" cried the impetuous Duke of Savoy; but he also soon lost confidence in Osuna, and it is said to have been he who revealed the plot to the Spanish government. Carlo Emmanuele's next grand idea was to get himself elected King of the Romans, or King of Bohemia, or both. Mansfeld visited Turin, and there were negotiations with German Princes, and even an agreement signed at Rivoli (1619). But the whole scheme ended in smoke; Carlo Emmanuele could not have left Piedmont even if the Germans had really wanted him, and, now that Europe was on the verge of the Thirty Years' War, such fanciful plans were outside practical politics.

Yet the position of Spain in Italy was much altered since 1600, and this, as Henry IV died before carrying out his plans, was wholly due to Carlo Emmanuele. This volatile, unreliable dreamer, impelled by territorial ambitions and a passion for

military glory, had shown a courage and a power of concentrated effort, which, if they could not make him successful in an offensive war against Spain, yet enabled him to give her a great deal of trouble. The bubble of Spanish world power was pricked when this insignificant princeling defied her with impunity. Italy, stirred from her lethargic sleep, looked on with a surprise which a little more encouragement might have turned into national enthusiasm. If France had not been involved in the difficulties of the minority; if Venice had added a spice of daring to her prudence and courage, and had trusted Carlo Emmanuele a little more; if Ferdinando I had been Grand Duke instead of Cosimo II; if Sixtus V had been Pope,—then the downfall of the Spanish power must have taken place. The opportunity passed; and the Spanish power, though weakened, lasted on in Italy till the end of the century.

The first effect of the Thirty Years' War upon Italy was a rising, called the "Sacro Macello" (1620), of the Valtelline Catholics against their Grisons masters, of whom they massacred a great number. They then appealed for protection to Feria, the new Governor of Milan. Here was the old Grisons question revived in a more dangerous form. The struggle between Catholic and Protestant parties in the district had never really ceased; it was the repressive measures of the Protestants which had led to the massacre. Now that Austria was involved in war it was more important to her than ever to keep open the route to Spanish Italy; but the unexpected energy which Austria was displaying and her successes against the German Protestants made the enemies of the Habsburgs all the more anxious to divide them.

Feria was delighted with the excuse for an aggressive policy, and Lerma's successors, Uzeda and Olivarez, would not be likely to check him. He drove the Grisons out of the Valtelline, and established an independent government there under Spanish protection. Then he made an alliance with the

Catholic against the Protestant Grisons, which led to civil war in the Leagues. The Protestant Grisons, Venice and Savoy asked France to interfere, but France was distracted by her own religious war and the quarrels of the court factions. The present minister, Luynes, could neither venture to make war with Spain nor to make peace with the Huguenots; at last he sent an envoy, Bassompierre, to Madrid, to protest against the annexation of the Valtelline.

Olivarez seemed anxious to be accommodating; in 1621 the Treaty of Madrid was signed, by which the Valtelline was to be restored to the Grisons. Orders were sent to Feria to evacuate it, but he simply disregarded them. He acted on his own responsibility, so that the Spanish government could disavow his actions if convenient, but he knew very well that Olivarez would not be angry with him, and he hoped that France would still be too busy at home to be able to enforce the execution of the treaty. Meanwhile the death of Paul V and the election of Gregory XV (1621) introduced a new factor into politics, the Pope's clever nephew, Cardinal Ludovisi. Ludovisi wished that Spain and France should remain on good terms, since a war between them would damage the cause of Catholicism in Germany; he therefore urged Spain to execute the Treaty of Madrid, while securing to the people of the Valtelline the free exercise of their religion. Ludovisi did not wish to remain, like Paul V, a mere dependent upon Spain, and began to make advances towards Venice, hoping to gain by persuasion those concessions in ecclesiastical affairs which Paul could not obtain by force. Both the Papacy and Venice would have much to gain by a friendly understanding. But Olivarez and Feria were cleverer than Ludovisi. Feria represented himself as the champion of Catholicism, protecting the Valtelline from Protestant oppression. Then Olivarez suggested that the Valtelline should be formed into a principality for the Ludovisi, of course under Spanish protection. Gregory was at first charmed by the plan, but his

complacency was rather shaken when the Habsburgs took another step in advance, and the Arch-Duke Leopold, claiming part of the Grisons territory as rightfully belonging to his family, invaded the country from the north, co-operating with Feria from the south, and annexed as much as pleased him. The Grisons were forced to sign a treaty (1622), recognizing the independence of the Valtelline, and guaranteeing free passage to Austrian and Spanish troops. Venice plainly pointed out to the Pope how the Habsburgs were closing in upon Italy, and making religion a cloak for their ambition. Gregory appealed to France again to enforce the execution of the Treaty of Madrid, but it was not till after the Peace of Montpellier with the Huguenots (Oct. 1622) that Louis could attend to the matter. Then he had a personal meeting with Carlo Emanuele, Lesdiguières and a Venetian ambassador at Avignon, which resulted in the signing of a Treaty of Paris (Feb. 1623), by which France, Venice and Savoy agreed to take Mansfeld into their pay and force Spain to relinquish the Valtelline. The Pope rightly protested against letting loose the savage troops of Germany upon Italy; but, as far as France was concerned, the whole affair was a piece of bluff to frighten Spain into giving way, and Spain soon afterwards promised to deposit the Valtelline fortresses with the Pope. They were accordingly occupied by Papal troops.

Spain was merely trying to gain time, and she turned her attention to persuading the next Pope (Urban VIII, 1623) to throw his influence in the Valtelline question into her side of the scale. But the whole aspect, not only of the Valtelline affair, but of all European politics, was completely changed by the accession to power in France of Richelieu, a steersman at last come to the helm who would not continue the French policy of drift. His object was to break down the domination of the Habsburgs; he did not intend for the present to involve France in open war, but to advance his schemes partly by diplomacy, and partly through his allies, German and Italian.

Failing to gain anything by remonstrating with Spain and with the Pope, who hoped that he would be allowed to keep the Valtelline for his family, Richelieu assured Venice and Savoy that he meant to fulfil the late Treaty of Paris. Carlo Emmanuele at once broached a plan for dividing the Spanish possessions in Italy between France, Venice and himself, but Richelieu did not intend to fight Spain, only to frighten her out of the Valtelline. Meanwhile, to keep Carlo Emmanuele in a good humour, the wily Cardinal suggested an attack upon Genoa. Genoa was an old enemy of Savoy; she had helped Spain in the late war, and there were various border quarrels. A successful attack upon Genoa would be a serious blow to Spain, yet this can hardly be held to justify Carlo Emmanuele in planning to overthrow an independent Italian State, and divide its territories with France, thus allowing her once more to gain a foothold in Italy. Venice remonstrated, though she had no personal love for Genoa; but Richelieu, while he made Carlo Emmanuele believe that the conquest of Genoa was his first object, assured Venice that the Valtelline campaign was by far the more important.

Late in 1624, a French and Swiss army under Cœuvres entered the Valtelline, and, co-operating with the Grisons, expelled the Papal garrisons by force. Then, joined by Venetian troops, Cœuvres took Chiavenna from its Spanish garrison, but their united efforts failed to capture Riva. Venice built boats on Lake Garda, but Ferial also had a fleet there, and Cœuvres had to retire. France and Venice blamed one another for the failure, and the war dragged on in a desultory manner.

Urban VIII was naturally indignant at the treatment of his garrisons in the Valtelline. He complained that Spain had not supported them properly, and complained still more that France had used such violent measures. He sent his nephew, Francesco Barberini, to France to remonstrate, declaring that his conscience would not let him suffer the restoration of the

Valtelline to the Grisons, but Barberini got very little satisfaction out of Richelieu and soon returned to Rome.


In March, 1625, Carlo Emmanuele and Lesdiguières invaded Genoese territory, but the French and Dutch fleet which was to help them never appeared. A new Huguenot war, fomented by Spain, distracted Richelieu's attention. Genoa was at first panic-stricken, and Carlo Emmanuele wished to attack it boldly, but Lesdiguières was too cautious and only allowed a few conquests to be made in the Riviera. Spain sent men and money to Genoa, and then a fleet, which included Papal and Tuscan ships. Genoa recovered her courage, and made energetic preparations for self-defence. Lesdiguières and Carlo Emmanuele began to squabble, when Feria, emboldened by the advance of an Austrian force against Cœuvres, made a sudden raid into Piedmont and seized Acqui. Lesdiguières and Carlo Emmanuele were obliged to return to Piedmont, and Genoa recovered all that they had taken. However, Feria wasted three months in besieging Verrua, which boldly defended itself, while Carlo Emmanuele harried his outposts; and at last the Spaniards had to abandon their camp and retire in ignominious haste, so that the result of the campaign was unfavourable to Spain and restored Carlo Emmanuele's self-confidence. He tried to persuade Louis that this was a good opportunity for the French to invade Lombardy. This was just what Richelieu did not want, but he held out hopes that next year France would join in a vigorous attack on Spain. Prince Vittorio Amedeo went to Paris to make the necessary plans; everything seemed settled, and in March, 1626, the French government made with the Huguenots that peace which was to leave it free for action in Italy. England promised ships to Carlo Emmanuele, and he wrote to Charles I, "Seeing Your Majesty sword in hand against Spain, my courage and the desire I have to serve you are redoubled."

But in the spring news that a treaty between Spain and France, called the Treaty of Monçon, had secretly been

negotiated at Madrid burst like a thunder-clap upon Carlo Emmanuele. Neither he, Venice nor the Pope had known anything about it. A Venetian ambassador described it thus: "Broken faith, false promises, secret intrigues, plain trickeries, 'Yea' in the mouth, and 'Nay' in the heart, have between them ended in a treaty...full of prejudice and injury to Venice, Savoy, and the Grisons, with the sole end of satisfying Spain, since all the advantages are on her side."

It was the manner, rather than the matter of the treaty, which caused so much anger, since it stipulated that the Valtelline should, with certain restrictions, be restored to the Grisons. The question of the use of the Passes was however left open. The war against Genoa was to cease, and each Power was to require its allies to make peace. But Carlo Emmanuele never forgave Richelieu, and henceforward there was constant enmity between them. He threw himself into every scheme against France, especially into the Soissons plot against Richelieu. He encouraged the Huguenots, and tried to unite England and Spain in an anti-French league. It was long before he would submit to peace with Genoa, and before it was finally arranged, he took part in the Vacchero plot (1628, p. 172). Though he had already signed a truce with Genoa, he made the preposterous claim that the conspirators should be treated as prisoners of war, and threatened to kill his Genoese prisoners if they were executed. Genoa acted with firmness and dignity, disregarded his threats, and punished the conspirators as they deserved. Spain interposed to make peace at last, but the incident is certainly very discreditable to the Duke.

The Treaty of Monçon brought only a short interval of peace, for in Dec., 1627, the death of Vincenzo II Gonzaga opened again the question of the Mantuan succession. While Maria, Carlo Emmanuele's grand-daughter, had the best claim to Montferrat, which was a feminine fief, the nearest heir in the male line to Mantua was Charles, Duke of Nevers, head of a branch of the family which had settled, and held large estates,



in France. Nevers unluckily convinced himself that the Emperor and Spain would never permit his succession, and determined to secure it by force or intrigue. His son, Charles, Duke of Rethel, went incognito to Mantua, and was married, at Vincenzo's bed-side, to Princess Maria, thus uniting her rights with his. On Vincenzo's death, Nevers hastened to Italy to take possession of Mantua and Montferrat. Nevers had hoped to settle Carlo Emmanuele's claims to Montferrat by peaceable negotiations which had already begun, but Carlo Emmanuele had by this time decided to throw over the French alliance, which had brought him nothing but vain hopes and bitter disappointments, and to see whether, impressed by the proofs he had given of independence and military capacity, Spain would not now treat him better.

Neither the Emperor nor Spain had intended to dispute Nevers' claim, but his behaviour naturally made them angry. The Emperor placed the succession question before the Imperial Courts; Spain decided to conquer Mantua for another Gonzaga, Ferrante, Duke of Guastalla, and made a temporary arrangement with Carlo Emmanuele for dividing Montferrat. Carlo Emmanuele, sure that Richelieu would soon interfere, wisely allowed the fortress of Casale to fall to the Spanish share, and he easily occupied his own share, Alba, Trino, etc. in the spring of 1628, while Cordova, Governor of Milan, had to sit down to a lengthy siege of Casale.

As the Duke expected, Richelieu soon interfered to secure for France, through Nevers, a strong influence in North Italy and the command of the two powerful fortresses, Casale and Mantua. Richelieu was encouraged by the attitude of the Pope, for Urban, always French in his inclinations, had forgiven the Valtelline affair and was on the side of Nevers. But the Catholic party in France opposed war with Spain, and Richelieu was involved anew in a Huguenot war, which he could not neglect for Italy. Richelieu himself still wanted to avoid open war with Spain, for which he did not believe France to be

strong enough. Spain was equally anxious to avoid a direct struggle with France, and so the quarrel was carried on in North Italy, with the North Italian Powers ranged against one another, supported by French, German and Spanish armies, which never met in battle as principals, but contented themselves with ruining the States of their Italian allies and foes alike. At the same time Carlo Emmanuele's change from the French to the Spanish party killed the germ of an Italian League which had existed in his alliance with Venice. Venice had not in the least got over her aversion to Spain, and she was bitterly disappointed when Carlo Emmanuele went over to the side of the enemy against whom they had striven together.

While Richelieu was delayed at La Rochelle, Carlo Emmanuele commanded the situation, and all parties paid court to him. Cordova, eager to take Casale, took his part against Genoa. Venice and the Pope begged him to separate himself from Spain, and to join a real Italian League. Richelieu offered him half Montferrat, if he would intervene to save Casale. But Carlo Emmanuele's ambitions outran his common-sense. He wanted France to make him a King, and to give him Geneva or Genoa or both. Richelieu preferred to send an army to Italy, but Carlo Emmanuele defeated it at the Battle of Sampeyre (August, 1628). "I hope that these people will not be so ready to invade my States again," he said, and continued to scorn Richelieu's offers. His hatred for Richelieu grew, and he longed to see the Cardinal succumb to his French enemies. But in October La Rochelle fell, and Venice negotiated peace between England and France. Richelieu was free at last to save Casale, and to punish Carlo Emmanuele. He explained to a Venetian ambassador that, on account of the Princess Christine, France would not permanently deprive the Duke of his dominions, but would "merely keep one Pass as an opening into Italy." Richelieu had in fact decided that the cession of Saluzzo had been a mistake, and that France could not maintain her influence in Italy by diplomacy alone.

The Italians were cowardly and cunning; so long as Spain held dominions in Italy they would truckle to her, but so long as France was shut out by the mountains, they believed that they could treat her as they pleased. In order to carry on an anti-Habsburg policy, Richelieu must be able to influence both Italy and Germany. Casale was valuable in itself, but was useless when Savoy was hostile. Hence the Pass "as an entrance into Italy" became the turning-point of Franco-Italian politics until the end of the century.

But first Casale, already in great difficulties, must be relieved, and for this Richelieu would still negotiate with Carlo Emmanuele. Carlo Emmanuele's terms were too high, and the advance of Richelieu's army towards the Alps did not intimidate him. He believed in his own military prowess, and trusted for help to the Spaniards. But Cordova could do no more than continue the siege of Casale, and protect the Milanese from Nevers; and Carlo Emmanuele's little army had small chance against the strong French force which crossed the Alps in the dead of winter and met it in the Pass of Susa, while another French army invaded Nice. The Piedmontese were driven back, but Richelieu still hoped to save Casale peaceably, and, by the Capitulations of Susa (March, 1629), promised Carlo Emmanuele his share of Montferrat, if the Duke would give passage to the French army. But Richelieu kept Susa. Cordova could not think of facing the French army; he hastily raised the siege, and accepted the Capitulations of Susa. In order to get rid of the French, Carlo Emmanuele signed a treaty (Bussolino, May), promising to defend Nevers from Spain, and to ask the Emperor to grant him Imperial investiture. Richelieu was glad to be able to return to the struggle with his home enemies.

The Treaty of Bussolino, though Richelieu wished to maintain it, was little more than an armistice. Carlo Emmanuele wrote to the English Minister, Carlisle, "All the great forces of France have not swallowed us up, nor made us afraid." He

had thrown himself entirely into the Habsburg League, and Spain, or rather Olivarez, who was responsible for the war, was determined to get Casale and revenge himself on Richelieu and Venice, while the Emperor, at this moment triumphant in Germany, was despatching an army under Collalto to revindicate long-lapsed Imperial authority in North Italy. Cordova was replaced at Milan by Spinola, a soldier of high reputation.

Of the other Italian Powers, Mantua and Venice were, by a treaty signed early in 1629, allies of France. Venice had constantly urged Richelieu to invade Italy, but would not herself send troops to assist Mantua till the French were actually in Piedmont. She was very much afraid of Austria, and believed that the Emperor had said of her, "*Carthago delenda est.*" Urban VIII, though pressed to join this League, was professedly neutral; but Urban was, like the Popes of the Renaissance age, rather an Italian Prince than a champion of Catholicism, and was more afraid of strengthening the Habsburgs in Italy than of weakening them in Germany. The Emperor declared him to be morally the ally of Protestantism; hence, as the Imperial army advanced into Italy, men reminded themselves of Charles V and Clement VII, and it was reported that Wallenstein had said that Rome had not been sacked for a hundred years, and must now be richer than ever.

Tuscany remained uneasily neutral. Neither the Regents for Ferdinando II, nor he himself when he came of age, had the courage or enterprise to free themselves from dependence on Spain. Ferdinando tried to mediate between Nevers and the Emperor, hoped to avoid the obligation to send troops for the defence of Milan, and, when obliged to do so, apologised to Richelieu. Once, when Spain high-handedly seized and granted to Prince Ludovisi the Principality of Piombino, for which the Medici had always longed, Ferdinando's allegiance was seriously shaken, but weakness and fear of the Pope, who hated him for his claims to Urbino, kept him faithful to Spain.

In the summer of 1629, Collalto advanced unchecked through the Valtelline, and laid siege to Mantua, which Venice was helping Nevers to defend. At the same time, Spinola besieged Casale. Richelieu was busy at home, and would have preferred peace, but his negotiations with the Emperor were unsuccessful. He called upon Carlo Emmanuele to fulfil the Treaty of Bussolino, but Carlo Emmanuele was, instead, urging Spinola to help him defend the Alps against France. Spinola, as a Genoese, hated the Duke, and delayed until the French were actually on the border (Feb., 1630). Then he promised Carlo Emmanuele most of Montferrat and agreed to send troops to his assistance.

Richelieu did not wish to quarrel with Carlo Emmanuele, whose hostility would render it very hard for the French to relieve Casale and Mantua, and kept negotiating with him, until news came of the Duke's agreement with Spinola. Richelieu then crossed the Alps near Susa, dashed past the Piedmontese camp at Avigliana, nearly captured Carlo Emmanuele himself at Rivoli, and then laid siege to Pinerolo, which commanded the eastern slope of one of the most important passes. If Pinerolo had resisted, his position would have been precarious, but it surrendered in a few days, and Richelieu rapidly occupied the passes between it and France, thus rendering his position secure. Then, leaving his army, he joined the King, who had invaded and taken all Savoy but Montmélian, and was ready in May to cross the Mont Cenis.

Meanwhile all the help which Carlo Emmanuele had had from Spinola was five thousand Spanish troops and constant exhortations to delay the French by negotiations, and not to risk a battle which might open the way for them to Casale. Spinola was also trying, but in vain, to delay Richelieu by negotiations through the Papal Nuncio and his clever agent, Mazarin, who thus makes his first appearance in history. But Carlo Emmanuele was still prepared to resist:—"Abandoned by

every aid, and exposed to the accidents of fortune," he wrote, "between the ill-will of Spinola and the pressure of France, we have yet justice on our side."

In May, Louis crossed the Mont Cenis; Prince Vittorio Amedeo was defeated at Avigliana, and the new French army, joined by that at Pinerolo, captured Saluzzo. It was forty-five years since Carlo Emmanuele had first taken Saluzzo from the French, and the blow was heavy; but a few days later came news of the fall of Mantua, and he once more hoped for Spanish aid.

The siege of Mantua had lasted nine months, and the defenders had suffered terribly from plague and famine; plague too devastated the besieger's camp. A chronicler says that a hundred thousand persons died at Mantua. All the efforts of Venice to relieve it were in vain; it was taken in July, and the sack, which lasted three days, is famous in history for its barbaric and long-sustained horrors. Afterwards the Imperial troops quartered in the city, and, demanding contributions from Modena and Parma also, kept the country for months in terrible misery, while they recklessly spread the plague over Lombardy. When the Duke of Modena ventured to plead that his people were driven to despair, the new Imperial commander, Aldringen, retorted, "How much the desperate can produce out of their despair the Mantuans can show." Aldringen feasted while the Mantuans starved; and he took home the Ducal Library as his share of the spoils, which the Imperial army carried off in cart-loads. Nevers and his family lived in exile and poverty.

Meanwhile Collalto hastened westwards to co-operate at last with Carlo Emmanuele; when the Duke, who was collecting his forces for a fresh struggle, died suddenly at Savigliano (July 26th, 1630). The last days of his life were sad; his States were already exhausted by war; France was holding a great part of them, including Saluzzo, for which he had striven so hard, while Spain, though nominally his ally, was in no

sense his friend, and would run no risks on his account. Venice was alienated; he himself was no longer lauded as the champion of Italy, but was denounced as selling her to Spain and to the still more dreaded Germans for the sake of personal gain. No one trusted him, for his rapid changes had alienated all parties, and, now that he was beaten, no one respected him. At the best he was regarded as the victim of his own ambitions. Yet his people loved him, and he had created a real patriotism for them, if not for all Italy. After all, he was only, in fighting for Montferrat, trying to get what he considered to be rightfully his. There were many fine points in his character; he was undaunted in courage, unwearied in expedients. His fault was that he aimed too high, and, when he might have secured most of Montferrat, exasperated Richelieu by demanding Milan, Geneva or Genoa.

Vittorio Amedeo I was not so clever as Carlo Emmanuele, but he was also a good soldier, and was more trustworthy and stable. He was generally considered prudent, moderate, upright and well-intentioned. Hence he was more likely to obtain a good peace. But he succeeded to a position of great danger and difficulty, from which he owed his escape probably to the fact that his wife was the sister of Louis XIII. Richelieu would have to spare his States, but not without taking that "Pass for entrance into Italy" which he deemed so important. Yet Vittorio Amedeo, with more of his father's determination, might have played his cards better. He was too much swayed by the influence of his wife, Christine, a strong-willed, vain and ambitious woman, who continually urged him to yield to the pressure of France. Ten thousand Spanish soldiers were coming to aid Savoy, Casale was at its last gasp, and Richelieu was still far from reaching it, but he was anxious for peace in order that he might attend to German affairs. He declared himself quite friendly towards Vittorio Amedeo, and allowed Mazarin to continue negotiations. A truce was made in September, in spite of the protests of Spinola.

Meanwhile the victories in Germany of Gustavus Adolphus, subsidised, it was said, by Venice as well as by France, forced the Emperor to recall his army from Italy, and to make a peace with France, which included their Italian affairs (Treaty of Ratisbon, 1630). Nevers was to recover Mantua, and to receive investiture for it; the forts made by the Imperial army in the Grisons and Valtelline were to be destroyed. Spinola died of grief because after all he was not allowed to take Casale. In return, France was to give back Pinerolo to Savoy, which was to have a strip of Montferrat, including the town of Trino. Venice was included in the peace, but her vanity was offended because she was mentioned as the adherent of France.

But Richelieu did not mean to accept the whole peace as it stood. He hastily despatched a French force towards Casale, which the Spaniards were still besieging. A battle nearly took place before the walls, but Mazarin rode backwards and forwards between the Generals, and persuaded both to retire and leave Casale to the Mantuans. It was a dramatic moment when the Papal messenger rode out between the threatening armies, crying aloud, "Peace! Peace!"

This settled the Casale question, but Richelieu was determined not to give up Pinerolo. He was afraid to act openly, since the Imperial and Spanish armies were both in Italy; but he traded upon the weakness of Vittorio Amedeo and the readiness of his wife to grant anything to France. Vittorio Amedeo feared that the Spaniards would not support him, especially as his father's enemy, Feria, was again Governor of Milan, and so he allowed Richelieu to persuade him into a secret treaty (Cherasco, March, 1631). France promised him Alba, as well as Trino, in Montferrat, for which she would compensate Nevers in money, and she held out hopes of helping him to conquer Genoa. In return Pinerolo was to be ceded to France. The Treaty of Ratisbon was, however, publicly ratified; the Imperial army went home, spreading desolation in its path, harrying even the Spanish territories of

Milan; the French army appeared to leave Pinerolo, but remained concealed in and near the town. When the Imperialists were gone, France pretended to demand the surrender of Pinerolo as a pledge for the Duke's good behaviour, while Vittorio Amedeo pretended to protest angrily, but to be powerless to resist the French demand. Sham conventions were signed, ceding Pinerolo, first for six months, then permanently, on condition that France bought Alba from Mantua for Savoy. "The King," said Richelieu, "has obtained Pinerolo, by circumspect, but irreproachable, methods." The Emperor and Spain knew themselves to be duped, but could not just then interfere; Venice and the Pope were delighted that France had recovered her foothold in Italy.

Thus Vittorio Amedeo reversed his father's policy, and sold his independence of France for a territorial acquisition. It was perhaps an unavoidable, but certainly a fatal step, and one which caused constant trouble to Savoy for nearly a century.

Though, terrified by the Imperial army in Lombardy, the Pope had not dared to listen to the suggestions of Venice and take part in the war, his attitude had throughout been of considerable importance. His influence was all on the side of France, and he hardly disguised the hope that the success of Gustavus Adolphus would force the Emperor to withdraw his army from Italy. Good Catholics were amazed. "Amidst conflagrations of churches and monasteries, the Pope remained stiff and cold as ice," they said. "In Spain they already consider me a heretic," said Urban; and indeed there was some talk of a Council; but no one could really attack him while France defended him, nor would Ferdinando II of Tuscany venture to dispute for Urbino in arms against him.

Thus the Pope and Mantua were protected by France, and Venice, after the object-lesson given her by the Imperial invasion through the Valtelline, was delighted that the French could now easily reach Italy. So there begins with the Treaty of Cherasco a new period in Italian history, the period when

French influence gradually supplanted Spanish, though Spain did not lose her territorial possessions. The object of Richelieu's policy had always been to induce the Italian Powers to form an Italian League under French protection and aimed against the Habsburgs, similar to that of the German Protestants. So far he had failed; but he now hoped that the pressure of France south of the Alps would give the Italians courage to oppose Spain, while a carefully disinterested attitude would convince them that France did not wish for territorial acquisitions, but only for alliances in Italy.

Spain and France were both now bidding for Italian allies, their agents went the round of the Courts, and the Spaniards tried to frighten the Italians by rumours that Gustavus Adolphus had designs upon Italy. With Spain the Italians could never again voluntarily ally themselves; Richelieu had the advantage of being already on friendly terms with many of them, yet they would not wholly trust him. They did not feel moved to serve France without the prospect of tangible advantages for themselves, and they thought the *aegis* of French protection bought at a high price if it involved incessant war, and exhaustion to their States. Vittorio Amedeo wanted to form an Italian League which should secure the neutrality of the Peninsula, but Richelieu's diplomacy thwarted his efforts, and rendered impossible any league not under French protection.

Richelieu won over Odoardo of Parma, a young, warlike and ambitious Prince, but Francesco of Modena, after some hesitation, decided that it was more prudent to keep on good terms with Spain. The Grand Duke continued to send troops to Lombardy whenever Spain was particularly insistent. Venice, though quite friendly to France, would not commit herself to any leagues. She still kept troops in Mantua, partly as a check on the Duke, partly as an outpost for herself. Spain had been more civil to her of late; "Not from any real wish of friendship, but hoping to gain some advantage..." but Venice "must

never let herself be inveigled by those Sirens," unless France should ever become more dangerous than Spain.

Mantua was divided between the Duke's, or French, faction and the Spanish party, led by his daughter-in-law, Princess Maria, now a widow, who was instigated by her mother, Margherita of Savoy. The Court was full of squabbles and intrigues, until the Duke sent Margherita home to Turin, and Mantua was again for a time completely under French influence.

The Pope remained friendly to France; he created Richelieu's brother a Cardinal against the rules of the Curia; he was intimate with the Elector of Bavaria, to whom he looked to check the Habsburgs in secular, and the Protestants in religious, politics. His steady opposition to the Emperor was in part responsible for the ultimate success of Protestantism in Germany, yet no one was more indignant when the Emperor had to give way to the Protestants in matters of principle. Hence the Papacy had very little influence in the Westphalian negotiations. But in Italy itself Urban was determined to maintain peace, and he sent Mazarin (1634) on a special mission to secure it.

It was the alliance of Savoy that was of the most importance to France, for it was only with the aid of Savoy that France could easily and directly strike at the Milanese. Richelieu wished never to have to fight his way through Piedmont again. Vittorio Amedeo distrusted Richelieu, and longed for settled peace; but he knew that Spain was no protection, and his wife urged him to trust her brother. The Court of Turin was torn by dissensions, the Duke's brothers and sisters ranging themselves against his wife, and inciting him to break free from France.

The younger brother, Prince Tommaso of Carignano, warlike, active and clever, was the leader; Cardinal Maurizio, vain, amiable and intriguing, followed Tommaso, though he was the "Protector" of France at Rome. The women of the family

added personal dissensions to the strife ; they said that Christine was vain and overbearing, while she complained that she was not respected as a "Princess of France."

Christine's vanity involved her husband in an unnecessary difficulty ; she urged him to assume the title of "King of Cyprus." A book was written by the Duke's favourite, the Jesuit Monod, asserting Savoy's right, and Venice, furious that Savoy should claim what had long ago been hers, broke off official communication with Turin. This was a loss of friendship which Savoy could ill afford. Nor did Richelieu acknowledge the title, though he held it out as an additional bait to gain Vittorio Amedeo's alliance.

In 1634 Prince Tommaso secretly left Savoy, and took service in the Spanish army, hoping thus to pave the way for his brother to change his politics and embrace the Spanish alliance. Richelieu upbraided Vittorio Amedeo, who, though he was not privy to the flight, showed no great disapproval of it. Then Cardinal Maurizio renounced the Protectorate of France at Rome, and assumed that of the Empire and Spain.

In 1635 Richelieu determined to force Vittorio Amedeo to conclude an alliance with France, and accordingly marched a French force to the border. Richelieu did not mean to make Italy the seat of the coming war, and only intended that Vittorio Amedeo should keep the Spaniards in check in Lombardy. He did not therefore wish to carry out the Treaty of Cherasco and help Vittorio Amedeo to conquer Genoa, yet he actually ventured to ask the Duke to acknowledge French suzerainty in Savoy. This the Duke refused, but weakly promised several more Alpine valleys if France would secure for him the rest of Montferrat, Lombardy as far as the Ticino and the title of King. In July, 1635, the League of Rivoli was concluded between France, Savoy, Mantua and Parma. The allies were to share conquests, Mantua to receive Cremona in compensation for Montferrat ; France was to invade the Valtelline and Lombardy. Richelieu's conception of a League

was at last fulfilled, and Italy found that Pinerolo had indeed opened wide her doors to France.

Rohan, with one French army, successfully invaded the Valtelline, cutting off all communication between Austria and Lombardy; Créqui with another passed through Piedmont, intending to co-operate with Rohan in Lombardy. But, against Vittorio Amedeo's advice, Créqui and Odoardo Farnese stopped to besiege Valenza; much against his will, the Duke joined them, but the besiegers were driven off by a Spanish relieving force, which afterwards raided and harried Piedmont. The French blamed Vittorio Amedeo, who, they said, did not wish to conquer Lombardy, in order that he might not have to surrender the passes; Vittorio Amedeo blamed Créqui's vanity and incapacity. However the Duke was able to fortify the important strategical post of Breme, at the junction of the Sesia and the Po.

Next year the allies again advanced into Lombardy; they defeated Leganés, Governor of Milan, at Tornavento; but either because they were too weak to go further into a hostile country, or because, as the French said, Vittorio Amedeo refused to follow up the victory, they retired behind the Ticino, leaving Parma at the mercy of the Spaniards. Odoardo was besieged in Piacenza; and though, supported by loyal subjects, and encouraged by his secretary, a Frenchman, he held out a long time, hoping for French aid, he had at last to accept the mediation of Ferdinando of Tuscany and make peace with Spain.

In 1637 the Grisons, tired of the French, who did not pay their subsidies regularly, listened to the promises of Spain that they should keep the Valtelline and have free trade with Milan; they rose against Rohan, and drove him out of the country. This finally settled the Valtelline question; Spain had, by steady persistence, gained the control which she sought, and her restoration of the Valtelline to the Grisons showed how insincere had been the religious pretexts which she had put forward throughout the struggle.

Vittorio Amedeo and France had planned an attack on Finale, whose loss would be a serious blow to Spain, cutting off her communications with Lombardy. But, though the Duke besieged the town, he had to abandon it because the promised French fleet never appeared. Richelieu's real interests were not in Italy at all; he would not supersede Créqui, nor increase his troops. The death of the Duke of Mantua, leaving as his heir an infant grandson, weakened the French party, since Mantua could take no further part in the war; and the little Duke's mother and guardian, Princess Maria, had leanings towards Spain.

In September, Vittorio Amedeo and Créqui met at Vercelli; they took part in a banquet, immediately after which the Duke and his two chief generals fell ill. Poison was of course suggested, but apparently without much reason. One of the generals recovered; the other and the Duke himself died within a fortnight.

Vittorio Amedeo would have been a good ruler in more peaceful times; but he had neither the skill nor the firmness to resist Richelieu, nor was he free from the overmastering desire for territorial aggression which so often led the House of Savoy to the verge of ruin. It was he who said that Italy was like an artichoke which he would devour leaf by leaf. But the result of his reign was to leave France firmly settled on the Alps, and his own States at the mercy of Richelieu.

Vittorio Amedeo left two infant sons, Francesco Giacinto and Carlo Emmanuele. Their mother claimed to be their guardian, and was at first acknowledged as such by all the authorities. But her brothers-in-law disputed the claim, and, as there was no law which could settle the question, it became a political struggle between the French and Spanish parties in the State. Piedmont was already occupied by a French army, while Spain was in arms upon the frontier.

Richelieu felt that his opportunity had come to obtain complete control of Savoy. A policy of alternate bullying and

petting would subdue a vain and impulsive woman to his will, and he had excellent instruments for the work in the astute and unscrupulous French envoy, Eméry, and in Christine's own favourite, Count Filippo Aglié. Aglié was clever and agreeable; he had great influence with Christine and was entirely devoted to French interests. Her other minister, Monod the Jesuit, was ambitious and intriguing, but really patriotic, and Eméry was instructed to procure his dismissal. Eméry proceeded cautiously at first, winning Christine's trust, spending French money freely, and getting all offices filled with French partisans.

Meanwhile Cardinal Maurizio, anxious to share in the Regency, wrote to Christine to offer his services, even himself in marriage, and set out for Piedmont. The Duchess could have easily managed him if he had come, and his popularity in the country would have helped her; but Eméry interfered to forbid it, even threatening that the French troops should arrest him, and Christine, who wished to be sole Regent, acquiesced.

As time went on, Eméry threw off the mask of gentleness, and became daily more domineering and dictatorial. Christine was bullied into renewing the Treaty of Rivoli, against her better judgment and Monod's advice, for the continuation of war was ruinous to her States, and merely enabled France to fight against Spain at their expense. Still Richelieu was not satisfied; he wanted an excuse to occupy the Piedmontese fortresses, and thought that Christine must be still further humbled before she would submit wholly to his will. So he sent as commander to Piedmont La Vaillette, of whom his own father said, "France cannot have any generals left if she employs my son," and La Vaillette's incompetence allowed Leganés to capture Vercelli, the strongest and most important of Piedmontese fortresses. Eméry remarked that if Spain were allowed to keep Vercelli, she might acquiesce in the retention of Pinerolo by France.

In October, Francesco Giacinto died; his brother, Carlo

Emmanuele II, was a delicate child, and, as his sisters might not succeed, Cardinal Maurizio was the next heir. Richelieu was determined to exclude him, and ordered Eméry, in case of the Duke's death, to proclaim his eldest sister, who should then be married to the Dauphin. But now the Princes were determined to interfere. They knew that they would be welcomed by the people, who hated subservience to France, and were tired of Christine, her reckless extravagance and ignorance of government, her improper relations with Aglié, and the vanity which made her sign herself "Sister of the Most Christian King *and* Duchess of Savoy." Maurizio, believing that the people would rise to welcome him, refused Leganés' proffered aid and entered Piedmont alone. But those who plotted in his favour had been arrested, and there was no general rising. Christine did not want him as a prisoner, so her troops politely escorted him out of the country. The result was that Tommaso and Maurizio signed a treaty with Leganés for a joint attack upon Piedmont. Tommaso believed that with a little Spanish help he would be able to rally the people against Christine, but Leganés' intentions were quite different, and he meant to treat Tommaso, not as an independent allied Prince, but merely as a general in Spanish service. Tommaso gave way too far to Leganés' conditions, and so compromised his own position from the first. His attack on Christine, begun as a national movement against French influence, became only a part of the contest between Spain and France carried on by political parties in Piedmont; and patriotic motives, the only excuse for civil war, were obscured by the passions of faction. Even in those parts where war did not reach, Piedmont was torn by rival parties, with party brawls and quarrels, pamphlets, badges, and nicknames of "*Principisti*" and "*Madamisti*."

The Piedmontese towns eagerly welcomed Tommaso. Christine could only look to France for assistance, which Richelieu refused to grant until she had dismissed and imprisoned Monod. Then he demanded that French garrisons should be admitted

into several important Piedmontese fortresses, and that the young Duke and his sisters should be brought up in France. The Duchess protested and implored; Eméry threatened and insulted her, saying that "tears would not save the State." But Tommaso was advancing on Turin, and the citizens would not make preparations to resist him. Christine, in despair, gave up the fortresses, but she sent her children for safety to Savoy. Then Richelieu despatched Longueville with a new army to protect her.

The French commander in Turin persuaded Christine to leave it, and retired with his troops into the citadel, while the citizens eagerly welcomed Tommaso into the town. The Senate recognized the Princes as Regents, and the people helped in the attack on the citadel. But Leganés did not wish to let Tommaso have Turin, and so make him complete master of Piedmont; also he wished to return to Montferrat and besiege Casale; he accordingly opened negotiations with Longueville for a truce. Tommaso, frightened lest Spain and France should agree to divide Piedmont between them, offered terms to Christine; but she, still acting under French influence, refused them, and Tommaso had unwillingly to agree to the truce. Still Richelieu was not satisfied with the extent of his power over Savoy. He wanted the little Duke in France, and his States wholly under French protection. In order to extort Christine's consent, Louis XIII ordered her to meet him at Grenoble. The Duchess left her son at Montmélian, the strongest fort in Savoy, with orders to the Governor not to surrender him, even on written instructions from herself, and went to Grenoble, determined to resist Richelieu to the last. For once the Cardinal found that he had miscalculated. Christine defied Louis' blandishments and Richelieu's threats and outbursts of fury, and left Grenoble, having promised no more than to give up a few additional fortresses. Richelieu was bitterly disappointed; "He counted these days amongst the darkest in his splendid career," said a Piedmontese ambassador. He revenged himself

by encompassing, as soon as possible, the ruin of Aglié, whose loyalty to France he suspected, and whom he had angrily blamed at Grenoble for encouraging Christine to resist him. Aglié's maladministration and relations with the Duchess furnished excellent pretexts against him. Richelieu no longer even pretended to regard Christine's feelings; Aglié was arrested and imprisoned in the citadel of Turin, and the Duchess was informed that the King, in order to guard her reputation, considered his removal desirable.

Yet, more determined than ever to keep his hold upon Piedmont, Richelieu began negotiating with Tommaso, who knew well enough that Spain was only using him as a cat's-paw. Tommaso's position in Piedmont was at this moment very strong, and was further strengthened when Nice gladly opened its gates to Maurizio; but the advent of a new French commander, the young and brave Harcourt, changed matters. He defeated Tommaso at Ponte della Rotta, dashed across Piedmont to relieve Casale, which Leganés was besieging, and then returned to shut Tommaso into Turin, where the Prince was still besieging the French garrison in the citadel. Harcourt tried to starve out Tommaso, and Leganés in turn tried to blockade Harcourt, so that three sieges were going on at once. But Leganés refused Tommaso's entreaties to join him in an attack in force on Harcourt, and in September, 1640, Tommaso had to capitulate and sign the Convention of Ivrea (Dec. 1640). The Princes placed themselves under French protection, and promised to help drive the Spaniards from Piedmont if they would not withdraw. Probably, however, Tommaso only signed in order to frighten Spain into treating him better. In any case, his action had precisely this effect. Leganés, who obviously would never agree with Tommaso, was replaced by the courteous and specious Count of Siruela, who induced him to break the Convention by tempting offers of a good subsidy and sole command of the joint armies. Still Spain only intended to make Tommaso fight her battles for her, and

to keep the war in Piedmont; hardly any help was given him, and, since Harcourt was far more than a match for him in military matters, by the end of 1641 the Princes only retained the extreme north and south of the country. And Tommaso knew that what the French now conquered they conquered, not for Christine, but for themselves.

But Richelieu and Louis really were by this time wishing for peace. They were growing old, and did not want to leave France involved in war. Hence Richelieu desired to win over the Princes, influence Piedmont through them, and meanwhile allow them, just as Spain had done hitherto, to fight out the Italian war on behalf of their patrons. Besides, the Piedmontese were suffering bitterly from war, and blamed the French. Richelieu was warned to beware of a Piedmontese "Sicilian Vespers."

Tommaso was finally disgusted with Spanish treatment, and ready for an accommodation with France. By the Peace of Paris (June, 1642) Christine was to remain the Duke's guardian, but the Princes were to take part in the Council of State. Maurizio was to be Governor of Nice, Tommaso of Ivrea and Biella. Maurizio renounced the Cardinalate, and married his child-niece, the Duke's sister, Luisa. France was to oblige Spain to evacuate Piedmont and restore Vercelli; then she was to restore all that she held except Pinerolo. Tommaso was to command the joint forces in Italy. He succeeded in carrying the war into Lombardy, capturing Acqui and Tortona, so that Piedmont had a brief respite.

Yet the general result of the struggle was only too clearly shown in the control which France now exercised over Savoy. She garrisoned the best fortresses, including Turin, and the government could do nothing without Richelieu's approval. Savoy was little more than a province of France; and, firmly established there, Richelieu could easily extend his influence over the rest of the Peninsula. Spain had enough to do to protect her own provinces, and her influence in Italian politics

was greatly diminished. Richelieu posed as the liberator of oppressed States from Habsburg tyranny; as the Treaty of Rivoli stated it, "The Spaniards have never ceased to attack the common liberty, to molest the Princes their neighbours, and to disturb them in their legitimate possessions"; but, by 1642, the control of France was heavier and more exacting than that of Spain. For example, the Duchess Regent of Mantua always had leanings towards Spain, and longed to emancipate herself from the control of France, as exercised by the French garrison at Casale and the Venetian at Mantua. She had plotted with Olivarez to expel the French from Casale; the plot failed, but Leganés, knowing her wishes, besieged the town in 1640. Harcourt drove off Leganés, and found in his abandoned camp all the secret correspondence between Spain and the Duchess of Mantua. Venice, still clinging to French protection against the Habsburgs, immediately increased her garrison at Mantua.

In central Italy, the Pope was considered the ally of France, but the Barberini were really independent, preferring their private interest to that of any party:—"This blessed Pope has most extravagant ideas," said Richelieu angrily. The Barberini upset Italian politics altogether by their attack on Castro (p. 159). Though the other Powers at first suspected it, they were not relying upon French support; it was in fact Farnese who was the ally of France, and who resisted boldly because he expected French help. Venice and Tuscany, fearing that he might place his States wholly under French protection, resolved rather to help him themselves, and hence their anti-Papal League. But Richelieu "showed more inclination to aid" Farnese "by counsel than by force," though he encouraged Venice to threaten the Pope, since "nothing would have so much effect upon him as the stimulus of fear." The French ambassador at Rome tried to procure peace, and Urban accused him of favouring Farnese. Both France and Spain attempted, but unsuccessfully, to use the new Italian League for

their own purposes. Indeed, both the Dukes of Tuscany and of Modena found the new sense of independence as members of this League quite stimulating. Ferdinando became less obsequious to Spain, held back aid from the Lombard war, and even admitted French war-ships into Livorno.

The death of Richelieu in 1642 makes a direct break in Italian history. Mazarin meant to carry on his policy, but he continued it under different circumstances and with different results. Richelieu had certainly gained what he most desired, a strong influence and a firm footing in Italy, and that with very little expenditure in blood or money. But he had not completed the Italian anti-Spanish League of which he dreamed, nor taken any steps towards driving the Spaniards from Italy. This was, in part, because his attention had been too much occupied elsewhere, in part, because the Italians would neither trust him nor one another. Nor had his recent treatment of Piedmont been such as to win their trust; it was rather an object-lesson in the fear of France. As the gradual weakening of Spain lessened the pressure of her hand upon Italy, so by degrees the Italians came to believe that they were better off as they were, neutral in the great European struggle, than that they should sacrifice peace and ease to crush the old Tyrant who could no longer hurt them, and in so doing perhaps place a new and heavier yoke upon their own necks.

CHAPTER V.

ITALY, MAZARIN AND LOUIS XIV: 1642—1690.

WHEN Mazarin had to take up the threads of Richelieu's policy, he found two separate wars proceeding in Italy. One was the Castro War (p. 159), and, like Richelieu, Mazarin hoped to convert the Italian league against the Pope into an Italian league under French protection; but, also like Richelieu, he was disappointed. The League was not unfriendly, but would not be drawn into enmity with Spain, and indeed was defending Farnese in order that he might not throw himself upon French protection. Therefore to prevent the Pope from turning to Spain, France acted as mediator. Peace was made in 1644, and Italian feeling towards France was rather improved in consequence.

The other war, part of the general European struggle, was carried on in rather a dilatory fashion by the Spaniards of Lombardy and the French and Piedmontese under Tommaso of Savoy. Tommaso was not a first-rate general; the French forces were scanty, but yet did infinite harm in Piedmont, where they were sometimes attacked by the exasperated peasants. Piedmont was exhausted, and still torn by faction quarrels and the struggle for power between Christine and the Princes. Mazarin favoured Tommaso, hoping to make use of him, and for long would not restore the Piedmontese fortresses to the Duchess. However, in 1645, by the Treaty of Valentino, he gave up all but six, including Turin, the exceptions to be retained until a general peace.

In 1646 Mazarin hoped to frighten Spain into accepting peace by a sudden attack upon her dominion at Naples:—"Truly the best Indies that the King of Spain possesses." Chronic discontent at Naples might easily be encouraged to become open revolt. "Naples only wants a leader," a Cardinal wrote to Mazarin, and Mazarin hoped to provide a leader in Prince Tommaso of Savoy. Naples could not be trusted to rule itself as a republic; as a French dependency it would give trouble and cause European jealousies; but under a friendly Italian prince it might be a valuable ally.

Mazarin's plan was to encourage Naples to revolt by sending Tommaso to conquer the Presidi, those Tuscan sea-ports which Spain still held. This would provide a half-way station towards Naples, and at the same time deprive Spain of a shelter for her fleet, of a link with Genoa, and of the control of Tuscany. From the Presidi, Mazarin might also over-awe the new Pope, Innocent X (1644). Mazarin had, knowing him to be devoted to Spain, opposed his election, but in vain. Innocent retaliated for this opposition by refusing, according indeed to Papal rule, the Cardinal's hat which Mazarin asked for his brother Michele. When Innocent prosecuted the Barberini, they fled to France, where they received ample protection and support. The policy of the Pope was supposed to be dictated by his ally, the Grand Duke, and he also might be controlled from the Presidi, and forced to abandon his obsequious attitude towards Spain, and to give up sending military help to Lombardy. In fact, as soon as a French fleet threatened Livorno, Ferdinando hastened to make terms, and, though he could not be drawn into a definite alliance with France, he promised to allow passage, provisions and the use of his ports to the French army and fleet.

In May, 1646, a French navy, under the Duc de Brézé, conveyed Tommaso's army to the Presidi. Orbitello was besieged, but it was too strong for Tommaso. A Spanish fleet arrived, and there was a naval battle, in which the French were defeated

and de Brézé killed. His successor took the fleet home to France, and a combined Spanish and Papal army forced Tommaso to raise the siege of Orbitello and retire to Piedmont. Later in the year, however, another French fleet took Porto Longone and Piombino. The latter belonged to the Pope's relative, Prince Ludovisi, so that its capture was a personal attack on the Papacy.

Innocent now had to make peace, giving the Cardinalate to Michele Mazarin and reinstating the Barberini, though "he drank that cup with great bitterness." It was generally rumoured that Mazarin intended to retain Piombino as a refuge for himself should he ever be expelled from France.

Meanwhile in Naples, Mazarin's first plan, for an insurrection of the nobles, had failed; but in 1647 broke out Masaniello's rebellion (p. 163). Yet Mazarin hesitated before deciding what attitude to adopt towards it. He did not wish to exasperate Spain, and so hinder the course of the peace negotiations then being conducted in Westphalia; nor did he know whom to send to Naples. Tommaso was proved incapable, Condé refused to go; indeed there were few men able at once to fight Spain and conciliate the Neapolitans. The bourgeois and gentry preferred the stable Spanish government, and no leader could find security in the fickle, disorderly mob which just now ruled Naples. It had in fact proclaimed a republic, and showed no signs of welcoming French intervention. So Mazarin merely strengthened the fleet at Porto Longone, and awaited his opportunity. At length Neapolitans came to Rome to ask French help; but, before the ambassador responded, the Duke of Guise had, on his own responsibility, closed with the Neapolitan offers, and he was settled in Naples before the French fleet arrived there. So vague and contradictory were its orders, and so deep the mutual distrust between the Admiral, Guise and the Neapolitans, that the fleet before long returned to France without striking a blow. Immediately afterwards the conclusion of a separate peace between Spain

and the Dutch left the former a free hand against France, and Mazarin, feeling that he had been too cautious, sent the fleet back to Naples, under the command of Prince Tommaso. But he was too late; Spain had already subdued the Neapolitan rising and Guise was in captivity. Tommaso had to go home disappointed.

Mazarin had thus lost a good opportunity through over-caution. Though he believed that the Neapolitan revolt would prove ephemeral, yet a bold move in favour of Guise would have seriously embarrassed Spain and weakened her in other parts of Europe.

In North Italy, France was seeking allies; Piedmont was still bound, though unwillingly, to her; but Venice, far from wishing to enter upon an Italian war, was negotiating in Westphalia for a peace which would enable the European Powers to help her in her deadly struggle with the Turks in Crete (Chapter II). However, Francesco I, Duke of Modena, gallant and adventurous, signed in 1647 a treaty with France for combined attacks upon Lombardy. The Duke imagined that France would make conquests for him and remain indifferent to her own advantage. He soon found out that he was mistaken, and that France was too far off even to protect him effectually. His alliance at first enabled France to attack Lombardy from the side of Cremona, but French, Piedmontese and Modenese combined were not powerful enough to take that great city, and the attempt had to be abandoned (1648). Next year the Governor of Lombardy forced Modena to make a humiliating peace.

In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia was concluded. Since it did not end the war between France and Spain, it brought no decisive settlement to Italy, yet several Italian matters had come before the Congress and were affected by the peace. An ambassador from Savoy attended the negotiations, but Mazarin would not allow him to act independently of France, and yet did not himself espouse Savoy's interests. No one else was

likely to do so, and the Emperor indeed made no objection to surrendering Imperial rights over Pinerolo to France in return for concessions of more value to himself. He promised Savoy investiture for that part of Montferrat which it now possessed, provided that France would fulfil her old promise to compensate Mantua for it. But, as Mantua refused to surrender her rights and receive compensation, Savoy did not get the promised investiture. Since there was no peace between France and Spain, France retained the six Piedmontese fortresses and Spain Vercelli.

Venice took a leading part in the Congress, but, as France and Spain were not reconciled, little additional help was sent to her for her eastern war. Tuscany, as a neutral, was not mentioned, but it had suffered much from loss of Spanish favour and commerce since its treaty with France, and the Grand Duke was glad to make peace with Spain when, in 1650, the Spaniards recovered Piombino and Porto Longone. Spain even consented to sell him Pontremoli. Innocent X, wholly absorbed in personal and local affairs, and refusing to be contaminated by dealings with Protestant Princes, had taken little part in the negotiations, and was accordingly ignored in the final treaty. The Papacy was accustomed from time immemorial to take a leading part in such great peaces, and its exclusion from this one was felt by contemporaries to be a great blow to its prestige. They blamed Innocent for his indifference to European affairs, even to the interests of Christianity. Though he fulminated against peace with the Protestants, he had not helped the Emperor make war against them; his assistance to Venice in the Turkish war was small and grudging; he even seemed indifferent as to whether Naples was to remain Spanish or to become French.

An energetic Pope might have procured peace for Italy in the dreary years between the Treaty of Westphalia and 1655. Spain would gladly have consented; Italian war was always embarrassing and unprofitable to her, and her attention was

much occupied elsewhere. Mazarin wished to keep up the Italian war, precisely because Spain did not wish it; but, during this period, his activity was limited by the difficulties of the Fronde, and a little resolution in Italy would have forced him to consent to peace. But the Pope was indifferent, Venice was busy, Savoy was still under the selfish, feeble government of Christine, who was always weakly subservient to France. Prince Tommaso was in French service, and was at one time minister to Anne of Austria, but he had no longer any influence in Savoy.

So the war dragged on year after year, and the Governor of Milan, Caracena, having forced Modena to submit, easily invaded Piedmont again and again. Little help came from France, and the unfortunate Piedmontese could not repel him alone. In 1652 he won the alliance of Carlo II of Mantua, who had lately come of age. Married to an Arch-Duchess and with one sister the wife of the Emperor, the Duke's weak and fluctuating will was turned for the moment towards Spain, by whose help he hoped to regain all Montferrat. Caracena willingly assisted him in driving the French from Casale, but Gonzaga obtained no benefit from the change, since Casale was now under Spanish protection and was garrisoned by Germans.

Caracena tried also to win over Savoy, promising to restore Vercelli and conquer Pinerolo. Christine hesitated and negotiated, but as Spain grew stronger and Mazarin weaker, Caracena raised his terms. Mazarin restored all the fortresses except Pinerolo and Turin, and Christine finally wavered back to her old allegiance.

In spite of his misfortunes, Mazarin tried to retain his influence in Italian affairs, and to keep up diplomatic relations. French envoys continued to urge the Italian Princes to unite and free themselves from Spanish tyranny, and made the old assurances that France was wholly disinterested, only desirous of Italy's prosperity, but that she must keep Pinerolo, for "the Italians themselves know how

important this is, in order that they may receive succour from France against the oppression of Spain." However, Mazarin's envoys had small success until he was himself again in power in 1655.

His first move was to send Guise with a fleet to Naples to see whether the insurrection could be revived. But there was no response from the Neapolitans, so Mazarin had to turn elsewhere. On the death of Innocent X he hoped to regain influence in Rome. Innocent had been entirely ruled by the Spanish and Medici parties, and they were still very strong in the Conclave, but the French party was allied with the independent "Squadrone Volante." However the Squadrone persuaded Mazarin to assent to the election of Cardinal Chigi, though Mazarin personally hated him. As most of the Cardinals feared French influence exceedingly, Chigi's election was secured. The new Pope, Alexander VII, soon showed himself unfriendly to France; and, by refusing to recognize the independence of Portugal, ranged himself on the Spanish side in politics.

In North Italy Mazarin was more successful. Francesco of Modena had only been waiting till France was settled to revive the old alliance, which was cemented by the marriage of his son to Mazarin's niece, Laura Martinozzi. But Modena's alliance was of little use as long as Spain held Casale, so that Mazarin next set himself to win over the vain, fickle Carlo II of Mantua. Carlo was invited to visit Paris; the King admitted him to share his dissipations; Mazarin played cards with him; his aunt, Anna Gonzaga, surrounded him with feminine attractions. His Austrian wife protested that "Casale" was "besieged by female flattery"; but Carlo yielded and signed a treaty with France, promising to accept a share of the Milanese in compensation for Savoy's part of Montferrat. Prince Tommaso and Duke Francesco then invaded Lombardy, besieging Pavia and threatening Milan, so that the citizens prepared to defend their own walls. But the distance of Milan from the French

base, the incompetence and irresolution of the Italians, the impatience of the French themselves at the slowness of their progress, and the distractions of France in other parts of Europe made a general success impossible. The siege of Pavia was raised, and the retreat from it was very disastrous.

In 1656 Tommaso died, but the allies did as well without him, taking Valenza in the Milanese. But Carlo of Mantua was wavering again, though French envoys pointed out to him that Spain only wanted his alliance in order that the campaign might be fought in Montferrat instead of in the Milanese. Frightened by the "Ban of the Empire," by the complaints of his wife and of "those in his own court who were in Spanish pay," he made another alliance with Spain in 1657. But Spain cared for nothing but the control of Casale, and gave him no help when Francesco of Modena invaded and laid waste the Mantuan, while the Piedmontese invaded Montferrat. No one cared for him, and he was only despised for joining Spain at the wrong moment, and then, after his States had been ruined, obtaining a treaty of neutrality from France (1658).

The death of Francesco of Modena checked French success in Italy, and relieved the Pope of the fear that their armies would turn next against the Papal States.

France continued to dominate Savoy, though in 1657 she gave up Turin to the Duke "as a mark of confidence." Next year, Mazarin proposed a marriage between Carlo Emmanuele's sister, Margherita, and Louis XIV. The two courts had a most friendly meeting at Lyons; the youthful king and duke fraternised, and complained together that the excessive tenderness of their respective mothers had so far kept them from active participation in war.

But Mazarin had a secret object in this meeting, namely, to provoke the jealousy of Spain, and obtain an offer of peace together with the hand of the Infanta for the King of France. And in fact, while the French court was at Lyons, a Spanish

envoy arrived with the desired offer. Anne of Austria herself explained to Christine why the proposed engagement must be abandoned, and the Savoyard court returned home, angry, but not daring to express its indignation.

Savoy, Mantua and Modena all sent envoys to take part in the negotiations for the Peace of the Pyrenees; but they might have saved themselves the trouble, since Mazarin and Haro, the Spanish minister, privately settled their affairs without consulting them. The treaty was so worded as to emphasise the fact that the Pope had no part in making it, while France and Spain agreed to secure justice from the Papacy for Modena and Parma in the disputes about Comacchio and Castro. The Treaty of Cherasco was confirmed, and Spain promised to secure Imperial investiture for Savoy of its part of Montferrat. Vercelli was restored to Savoy, Valenza to Spain. The Venetian garrison in Mantua was not mentioned, but it was withdrawn in 1662 at the Emperor's request. A Congress was to settle the remaining questions between Mantua and Savoy, and this Congress met, but came to no conclusions, since Mantua refused to acquiesce in the loss of any part of Montferrat. Haro suggested to Mazarin that, if the fortifications of Casale were to be destroyed, a bone of contention would be removed; but Mazarin, pretending to safeguard Mantua's rights, refused. No doubt he hoped soon to see again a French garrison in Casale.

No one in Italy could feel enthusiastic about the Treaty of the Pyrenees, and it was galling to know that Italian affairs had been entirely settled by foreign Powers. But an interval of peace was gladly welcomed, for, though all had suffered by the burden of war, no one had gained by the long and exhausting struggle. They had all danced to the tune which France had piped, and did not love her any the better for the useless sufferings which her policy had entailed upon them.

Carlo Emmanuele II felt the hand of France heavy upon him. He had the sense to reject Mazarin's suggestion that

France should conquer Genoa for him, and herself receive Nice in return. "France has one foot in my States, I do not wish her to place the other there," he remarked. He refused to degrade himself and his mother's royal blood by marrying Mazarin's niece, Hortense Mancini, as Mazarin very much wished; but the minister, Pianezza, who had to refuse the match, thought it best to retire until after Mazarin's death. However, Carlo Emmanuele did not object to a French wife, and married in 1663 Françoise of Orleans, one of Duke Gaston's daughters, and, on her death, Jeanne Battiste (Giovanna Battista) of Savoy-Nemours, an heiress who brought him large estates (1665). So French did the Court of Turin remain that it was said that the Piedmontese would, in the world to come, gladly share whatever fate should befall the French there. Yet Savoy gained little by the French alliance; the Emperor did not grant the Montferrat investiture, and neither France nor Spain gave the longed-for "Trattamento Reale" (p. 196), though Carlo Emmanuele lavished money and diplomatic promises in both courts to obtain it.

In 1662 were restored diplomatic relations between Venice and Savoy, which had been broken off on the question of the title to Cyprus. The breach had been most unfortunate, since Venice and Savoy, acting together, might have saved, or at least mitigated, the troubles of recent years. Savoy profited in politics and commerce by the restored intercourse, and four Savoyard regiments fought for Venice in Crete; but the agreement was not yet complete, since Venice would not grant the "Trattamento," which would have been tantamount to acknowledging Savoy's claim to royalty.

Venice had of recent years taken little part in Italian politics; she was in fact too much occupied by the Cretan war. She pursued her usual cautious policy:—"Careful to remain friendly with France, yet to keep her out of Italy as far as possible." She was now on better terms with Spain, which she did not fear so much as France, yet she could not

afford to quarrel with France, which, alone of European Powers, seemed inclined to assist her in the East. After the Peace of the Pyrenees both Louis XIV and Mazarin showed enthusiasm for crusading ideas. French volunteers and soldiers, for whom Mazarin wished to find employment abroad, went to Crete (p. 135), but Mazarin's death put an end to his scheme for uniting Christendom in a Crusade. He left a large legacy, which he intended to be used for Venice; but unfortunately gave it in trust to the Pope, and Alexander sent it to the Emperor, who also was at war with the Turks.

The Grand Duke still clung to his neutrality, but was pliant to pressure; "It is better to bend than to be broken," he said. Mazarin wanted Tuscan influence in the Conclave, and made friendly advances, which ended in a marriage (1661) between Prince Cosimo and Margu rite of Orleans, another of Gaston's daughters. Spain was annoyed, but could not interfere.

Duke Alfonso of Modena did not long survive his father, and his boy-heir, Francesco II, was in the guardianship of his mother, Mazarin's niece, and of his uncle, Cardinal d'Este, who was also French in sympathy. Both he and Ranuccio II of Parma were closely linked to France by their interests, which France alone would maintain against the Pope. By the Treaty of the Pyrenees, both France and Spain were pledged to protect them, but Alexander VII disregarded the joint protest of their ambassadors, when, in 1660, he finally incarcerated Castro into the Papal States (p. 160).

Spain would not risk a quarrel with the Papacy on Parma's account, but Louis XIV warmly took up the matter, sending a special envoy to Rome to assure the Pope that he would carry on Mazarin's policy unchanged. The immediate result of this embassy was a quarrel between its members and the Papal police (*sbirri*) about the right of asylum in the ambassador's house, a much abused privilege which the Pope was determined to abrogate.

The removal of Mazarin's guiding hand from France was

soon felt in Italy. Louis XIV, determined to show that "France was the premier Power of Christendom," abandoned Mazarin's cautious methods in dealing with a refractory person like the Pope; and, as a French historian points out, his arbitrary and provocative policy sowed the seeds of that hatred and fear of France abroad, whose harvest was to be so disastrous to her. A new envoy was sent to Rome, not a skilful diplomat, but Créqui, a haughty soldier, and Créqui was instructed how to act, not only in case of a rupture, but as if on purpose to provoke one. Less firm than Mazarin would have been in important matters, Créqui was to show himself unbending in points of precedence and etiquette, about which the petty-minded Roman court was particularly sensitive. The quarrel soon broke out on the question of ambassadorial immunities. No doubt the Pope and his relatives behaved very badly, allowing the Corsican Guard to attack the French embassy and endanger the life of the ambassador himself. Afterwards, the Pope offered reparation; but Créqui, interpreting his master's intentions rightly, soon left Rome.

Louis seized Avignon, and said he should hold it till Modena and Parma were satisfied, and till reparation had been made for the treatment of the French ambassador. The Pope, narrow and obstinate, thought that Louis would give way if only he resisted long enough. "Let the King come," he exclaimed, "let him take Castro, yea, Rome itself, if he can, but it shall never be recorded that Alexander was so cowardly as to abandon his rights." But he got scant sympathy from the Italians, who were terrified at the bare prospect of a French invasion, and called the Pope's courage obstinacy. A Venetian said that the Chigi imagined Rome to be the world, "but the King of France has taught them that they have not studied geography well"; and again, "Louis XIV would be more of a saint than Louis IX if he does not use this opportunity for making conquests in Italy."

But, when French troops actually began to appear in the

Duchies, Alexander's courage failed, and by the Treaty of Pisa (1664) France obtained all that she demanded. Modena was to receive money compensation for Comacchio, Parma to be allowed eight more years in which to redeem Castro. Cardinal Chigi was to go to France and ask the King's pardon; the Corsican Guard was to be disbanded, and a pyramid raised at Rome to commemorate the event. Louis could not be generous in his triumph, and, though the clauses about Castro and Comacchio were never enforced, the useless pyramid kept alive the Papacy's memory of its humiliation and fear of France.

Still, Louis did recognize that he had not gone the right way to obtain the influence that he wished for in Rome, and the next ambassador, Chaulnes, was instructed to avoid quarrels and "to try if there are any means by which his Majesty, as is his great desire, can establish a good and sincere union with the Papacy." The shadow of the Spanish Succession problem, already casting itself over European politics, is seen in one suggestion that Chaulnes was empowered to make. The Infanta, Louis' wife, had renounced her claim to the succession; but, as the Pope had not given his consent to the Treaty of the Pyrenees, the renunciation might be held not to apply to Naples, which was a Papal fief. If, in case of the young King of Spain's death, the Pope would support Louis' claim to Naples, Louis would concede much to the Pope in return.

Louis was beginning to find that the Castro question was the chief difficulty, as the Cardinals believed Rome to be insecure while the Farnesi were at Castro, and would never elect a Pope who was not firm on the subject. And it was above all Louis' object to capture the Conclave, and to ensure that the next Pope elected should be a French rather than a Spanish nominee. Chaulnes worked to win over the Cardinals, and actually secured the election of Cardinal Rospigliosi (Clement IX, 1667), who was the candidate favoured by France. There followed a period of good relations between France and the Papacy; the Pope was allowed to take a formal part in the negotiations for

the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle; the Castro question was quietly dropped, though the Treaty of Pisa was not formally abrogated. Louis had in fact felt less interest in the Duke of Parma, since it had been discovered that he was revealing French secrets to the Pope, in order to curry favour for himself. Except for the quarrel with Alexander VII, affairs between France and Italy were conducted with moderation and good sense up till the year 1670, by the ministers Lionne and Pomponne. France and Venice remained on good terms, though Venice feared the substitution of French for Spanish influence at Rome, and thought that the Cardinals were selling themselves to France, "to strengthen that yoke which Italy is making for herself." His marriage had rendered Cosimo III curiously dependent upon Louis, without the help of whose authority the Grand Duke was totally unable to control his troublesome wife. Louis really exerted himself, though with little effect, to diminish the scandal wrought by her behaviour. But the constant correspondence involved brought the two courts into very close relations.

France had much influence in the smaller States, though Louis condescended to allow his ambassadors to squabble with the petty Princes on questions of etiquette and precedence. It was lowering the prestige of France to let it rest upon such considerations. Carlo II of Mantua died in 1665; his heir, Ferdinando Carlo, a minor, was under the guardianship of his Austrian mother, the Arch-Duchess Isabella Clara. France feared an increase of Habsburg influence, and told the Arch-Duchess how Haro had proposed to dismantle Casale, as a warning that she should not allow Spain to obtain complete control of that fortress. France and Spain competed to provide a wife for the young Duke, but Isabella wisely selected his Italian cousin (see p. 310). It was important to France that he should have a child, since otherwise the heir to Montferrat was his aunt, the Empress Eleonora.

In Savoy, French control was steadily but not unpleasantly maintained by the amiable ambassador, Servient. The weak-

ness of Spain, rendered it impossible for Savoy to assert independence of France, but Carlo Emmanuele cherished private designs on Geneva and on Vaud, which he hoped that France would allow him to gratify. He recalled the Piedmontese regiments from Crete and made considerable preparations; indeed he said that he had spent two million francs "for the Faith." Bern and Geneva contended with him for the support of the Catholic Cantons, and war seemed imminent, but France intervened to forbid it, much to the Duke's disappointment. France, however, did not choose that the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle should be disturbed for the sake of Savoy's ambitions.

But, as Louvois gained influence, a further change was wrought in French relations with Italy. Louvois despised the cautious reticence of the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin; he hardly cared to preserve even the pretence of disinterestedness. It was not in fact the desire of the King himself that the smaller States should remain pleasantly unconscious of their dependence on France; rather he wished them to feel and to acknowledge it.

The first sign of change sent a little shudder of nervousness through Italy. In 1670 Louvois and Vauban the engineer visited Pinerolo, and Louvois spent a few hours with the Duke of Savoy at Saluzzo. No doubt he came to study the military capacities of both Duchy and Duke. He flattered the latter so skilfully that the Duke, as a compliment, offered his youthful son for a French command. He was startled to find that the offer was taken literally, and that he was called upon to send nearly five thousand Piedmontese troops to France, where they served until the Peace of Nimuegen.

In the smaller Duchies French recruiting officers behaved as though they were at home, and the Dukes were too much afraid of France to stop them. Genoa was bullied into contributing a regiment of Corsicans, but Venice, angry at the abandonment of Crete, was less complaisant.

Towards the Papacy, French policy was a little more cautious. Chaulnes was not, however, any longer to conceal French influence in the Conclave, but to publish and emphasise it, and to threaten if necessary to enforce the Treaty of Pisa. In the Conclave of 1670 the candidate of France was not elected, and Clement X was understood to be a compromise. But Cardinal Altieri was much afraid of France, and the more he gave way the more Louvois demanded. The French government encroached upon Papal rights in France, especially in patronage. It confiscated Church property, suppressed monasteries, encouraged the independence of the Sorbonne, checked the export of money to Rome. Yet Altieri dared not object lest the Castro question should be revived.

Disappointed of his schemes on Geneva, Carlo Emanuele II turned his attention to the old enemy, Genoa, and persuaded himself that in aiding the plot of Raffaele della Torre he would be freeing the Genoese from domestic tyranny (1671). Della Torre was provided with money, and a Piedmontese army was to co-operate with him, and attack Savona, where it might expect to be welcomed, since Savona had always been ill-treated by the Genoese. As an excuse for interference, Carlo Emanuele could plead the perpetual disputes over the boundary line, where a heterogeneous medley of fiefs, Imperial, Ecclesiastical, Spanish, Piedmontese and Genoese, lay together in great confusion. The moment seemed propitious; Spain and France were on the verge of a new war; Spain would therefore be too busy to interfere, France might welcome the diversion.

The Genoese had no desire for the kind of liberty that Carlo Emanuele would have conferred on them. The Della Torre plot was discovered and suppressed (1672), and vigorous preparations, in which nobles and people showed equal enthusiasm, were made against the Piedmontese attack. Carlo Emanuele had been afraid to assemble a large force, lest it should betray his intentions; his army was small, ill-disciplined,

and ill-commanded. Both its divisions were beaten by the Genoese, who captured papers showing the Duke's complicity in the Della Torre plot, and published them. He began to prepare a new army, when France intervened. It did not suit Louis' plans to have war in Italy just then. Spain had not yet declared war against France, but the danger to Genoa would probably bring her into the arena.

The French envoy, Gaumont, found Carlo Emmanuele and his people eager to avenge their disgrace, and most unwilling for peace. "The King may be master of all I possess," said Carlo Emmanuele, "but he shall never deprive me of my honour." However, when his army had obtained a few retaliatory successes, he gave way to the French orders. By the Treaty of Saint-Germain (1673), conquests were to be restored. The University of Ferrara was to arbitrate about the borderline, but the arbitration was never effected, and the old sores remained unhealed.

There were two disagreeable results of the war; firstly, Louis said that, as the Duke had so many troops, he must spare more to assist France against the Dutch. Secondly, one of the Piedmontese generals, Alfieri, was, most unjustly, accused of treason because of his ill-success, and was executed as a scape-goat for popular disappointment. The other general, Livorno, son of the Piedmontese minister, Pianezza, thought it better to retire to France, where he gained the favour of Louvois, and for a long time made himself exceedingly troublesome to the Savoyard government.

In 1675 Carlo Emmanuele II died, leaving his youthful son, Vittorio Amedeo II, virtually in the guardianship of France. The little Duke was instructed to say to the French ambassador's wife that he "should beg his Majesty to be now his Papa, since he had lost his own." But Louvois was now bent on a forward policy, and was determined to adopt a sterner attitude towards Savoy. Servien, the kindly, easy Ambassador who was looked upon as a friend by the Court of Turin, was

replaced by a diplomat of sterner mould, Villars. Villars frightened the Duchess Regent by his continual demands and threats, worried her about etiquette and the Ambassador's immunity, and allowed his quarrelsome wife to become a perfect nuisance in Turin. Louvois did not wish an Italian war as yet, but he wanted to frighten Spaniards and Italians by the prospect of one, so he sent to Turin an important diplomat, d'Estrées, who demanded from the Duchess passage for a French army and an offensive alliance, and frightened her into all sorts of promises. A general also came to Pinerolo as if making military preparations. The result was that Spain, much alarmed, agreed to the Peace of Nimuegen, and Louis and Louvois could cherish the comfortable conviction that the name of France was becoming a terror in Italy.

After the Peace, Louvois could afford to be genial, and Villars was replaced at Turin by the more pacific Abbé d'Estrades, who had, above all, no wife. Louvois was pleased with the idea of sending the young Duke to Portugal (p. 197). It would embarrass Spain to have him there, and leave the borders of Italy defenceless before France. The unpopularity of the Duchess Regent might even lead the Savoyards to place themselves directly under French rule. Louis' approval therefore was formally signified to the Regent, and troops were offered her in case of disturbances in Piedmont.

The selfishness, greed and meanness of Louvois' policy was plainly revealed to Italy in the part taken by France in the rebellion of Messina (p. 165). This was quite a different matter from the rebellion of Naples in 1647, in which Mazarin had feared to take a decisive part. The revolt of Messina was well-organised and complete; it involved all classes, its leaders were reliable, and they made a genuine offer of themselves and their country to France. While France seemed to be really trying to help them, they were full of energy; but starvation and long waiting for aid which never came chilled their enthusiasm. Discontent and disobedience grew apace, and

Vivonne's struggle against the Spaniards became at last hopeless. Louvois, though he would have liked Sicily and the position it gave in the Mediterranean, knew that France was not strong enough to undertake its conquest in real earnest. The French fleet, though it defeated the Dutch fleet alone, was not equal to the combined Spanish and Dutch, and the rest of the island supported Spain out of enmity to Messina. France was fully occupied elsewhere, and could not honourably fulfil her pledges to the Messinese.

When in 1677 Louvois was stronger, he made a new effort, but he was then too late. Messina was exhausted, the French fleet and garrison quite disorganised. Next year, Louvois needed the fleet nearer home, and recalled it with a ruthless disregard for the deserted Messinese, which was an object-lesson for any small State hitherto disposed to trust in France. Louvois did not even make any stipulations for them in the Treaty of Nimuegen.

The Peace only gave Italy a momentary respite from anxiety. Louvois' schemes never ceased; his diplomatic webs were woven everywhere. He was now busy in Mantua. The dissipated Duke, Ferdinando Carlo, and his no less vicious mother, who actually governed, were tired of the Habsburg alliance, because the Emperor had asserted his authority too openly over them, and had tried to check Isabella's immoralities. Spain too stopped the Duke's pension and the payment of the garrison of Casale, and tried to get control over a strong Mantuan fortress, Guastalla, on the Po. In this condition of mind, the Duke met d'Estrades at Venice (1677), where he spent most of his time in amusing himself, and d'Estrades offered him a French pension for the control of Casale. The Duke's secretary, Mattioli, "who has gained the Duke's confidence by sharing his dissipations," visited France and arranged to sell Casale for a hundred thousand crowns, with an extra ten thousand for himself. Pomponne was surprised at such easy terms; "It seems," he said, "either to prove the

small capacity of the master, who could make so little use of his advantage, or else to make one suspect the bad faith of the minister." However Mattioli was not seriously doubted, and Catinat went to Pinerolo to make preparations for taking over Casale, but with such secrecy that he pretended to be a prisoner and lived in a dungeon. But months passed, and no more about the Treaty was heard from Mantua. Early in 1679, the Duchess of Savoy told Louvois that Mattioli had betrayed him, that he had acted without commission from the Duke of Mantua, and had since revealed the secret Treaty to Venice and the Emperor.

The Duchess hoped to gain Louvois' favour, but instead found herself accused of having been the first to reveal the secret Treaty. Eager to clear herself, she offered Louvois to betray Mattioli, who was at Turin, into his hands. Unaware that his intrigues were known, Mattioli was persuaded to meet Catinat in order to receive the stipulated reward. He was arrested and taken to Pinerolo, and from that hour disappeared from the world. He has frequently, and not without cause, been identified with the famous "Iron Mask." His fate struck terror into the Italians, and warned them of the danger of playing fast and loose with France. Meanwhile the Duke of Mantua declared that he had never authorised Mattioli's mission, and had made no treaty with France; Louvois had to withdraw Catinat, and the scheme seemed to have failed. The Duchess found herself treated as the scape-goat; her minister, San Maurizio, was blamed for the discovery of the plot; she had to dismiss him, and take as her minister that Livorno, now Marquis of Pianezza, whom Carlo Emmanuele had banished, and whom France had forced her to recall. Livorno's policy was wholly in the interests of France, and the question of a definite French alliance was re-opened; the Duchess drew back, but unwillingly consented to allow the passage of French troops through Piedmont. She was quite helpless, "imprisoned between Pinerolo and Casale," while "the French ambassador

rather besieges than courts her." For Louvois still hoped to get Casale, and thought that the Duke of Mantua might be persuaded to yield it for better terms. After some negotiation (1680), Ferdinand Carlo signed a Treaty by which the citadel of Casale was to be given to France in return for a ready-money payment, a pension and the protection of France in case of war. He promised that, if he died without children, the succession of Montferrat should pass to France, and not to the Duke of Lorraine, who was the direct heir. In September Boufflers occupied Casale without any opposition.

There was no movement in Italy, yet the Italians, sure that Spain would not submit without a struggle, felt bitterly resentful against France. "I assure your Majesty," wrote d'Estrades, "that there are few countries where the French are less loved than in this one, or where your Majesty's power causes more apprehension and distrust, since you have taken possession of Casale." In reality, the act was one of Louvois' worst mistakes, for France could not pretend any kind of right to Casale, as to Strassburg, and it brought her much future trouble. But for the moment the ease of the acquisition caused Louvois to despise Italy still more, and to determine on a future war in order to magnify the power of France here as elsewhere.

The possession of Casale was however useless unless France could be sure of maintaining her control over Savoy. The young Duke had to be reckoned with; he was growing into premature manhood, and his secretiveness and tenacity of purpose had been noted from childhood. His clever escape from being sent to Portugal showed to almost everyone but his mother that he was of a very different stamp from his father, and that he would some day assert himself and shake off her authority. Louvois hoped to have bound Savoy irrevocably before this should happen, and pressed the Duchess to make a formal Treaty with France, frightening her with reports that Spain meant to attack Piedmont. Louvois and Pianezza at

the same time planned to secure the young Duke by a French marriage. Alarmed at her son's increasing independence, the Regent signed the required Treaty. Three thousand French soldiers were quartered in Piedmont, but were not to enter the fortresses; the Regent was to keep up an army which France would help pay. But, as France did not guarantee to keep the Regent in power, she had thus bartered the independence of Savoy for nothing. However, Louvois meant to support her as long as it suited himself, and told the Duke that France would resent any act of insubordination against her. Louvois in fact hoped to obtain from her weakness permission to garrison some Piedmontese fortresses. But the Regent had learned at least one lesson from Christine's example, and she positively refused the demand. She was even ready to sacrifice her authority rather than to save it at so ruinous a cost.

Vittorio Amedeo, knowing that he could not depose his mother without Louis' permission, was making advances towards the French King, promising to serve him loyally and to marry as Louis pleased. Abandoning as hopeless his designs upon the fortresses, Louvois at last changed the demand for them into an order that the Regent should ask for the hand of Anne of Orleans for her son. She knew that this was the death-knell of her rule, yet she dared not refuse. Vittorio Amedeo accepted the wife provided, and the implied permission to set aside his mother's authority.

Louvois had been very cunning, but not quite clever enough, for he had not got the fortresses; but he had taught Vittorio Amedeo to be as cunning as himself, and had inspired him with a detestation of France no less bitter because it had to be kept secret.

But Louvois had still more egregiously blundered in his policy towards Genoa, which had hitherto been wavering, but which he contrived to alienate completely. The bad faith and national bankruptcy of Spain had long ago caused Genoa to free herself from financial dependence, and Genoese capital now

sought other markets. The Spaniards, regarding the Genoese as spendthrifts always do regard usurers, had made little effort to retain their friendship, in spite of the obvious advantages of commanding Genoa's resources and her strategical position. In old days the stability of the Republic's internal government had depended upon the Spanish alliance, but this was no longer the case, and a little diplomacy on the part of France might have won her a valuable ally. But this did not suit the methods of Louis and Louvois. The sea-power of Genoa competed with that of France; in the Mediterranean it was the sole effective remnant of the once mighty Spanish power; in the Levant France and Genoa struggled over the succession to Venetian trade. And the ambitions of Louis XIV, prompted by Colbert, were turning towards expansion of sea-power. Colbert hated the Genoese; "Sometimes," it was said, "he can hardly contain his anger when he hears of the arrival of a rich fleet at the port of Genoa." So Genoa was to be crushed, and, though a neutral during the recent wars, she had found that her shipping was attacked by the French as if she had been a belligerent. Marseilles gloried when Genoese ships were brought in, and their cargoes sold as contraband.

At last, goaded to despair, Genoa turned upon the tormentor. When the war of 1683 began, she armed galleys for herself and for Spain, received Spanish ships into her port and repaired them. France ordered her to desist, and she refused with dignity. The French ambassador was withdrawn, and a fleet appeared off Genoa. After a brief conference, the commander, Seignelay, ordered a bombardment. When considerable damage had been done, he again offered terms, but a message was returned; "Whatever harm the city may receive, it could by no means equal the steadfastness with which the citizens resolve to defend their liberty." For twelve days the bombardment continued; about eight thousand balls were said to have fallen into the city and a thousand buildings were destroyed. Then the French ammunition was exhausted,

and the fleet retired. The material splendour of the "City of Palaces" suffered, yet many Italians agreed with Queen Cristina of Sweden, when she said that she would gladly have been a Genoese woman to share such glory.

Yet Spain, with quite an astounding selfishness and short-sightedness, allowed her gallant little champion to be excepted from the Treaty of Ratisbon. France might "require every satisfaction of the Republic," short of taking away her territory, since this would inconvenience Spain. Thus abandoned, Genoa was obliged to accept Innocent XI's mediation, yet she preserved her self-respect. The Doge and four Senators had to go to France to beg the King's pardon; but the dignity of their behaviour won general admiration. Louis' triumph was hollow; for even Genoa's old enemy, Savoy, regretted her humiliation. France was steadily inspiring all the Italian states with hatred to herself.

The marriage of Princess Maria of Modena and the Duke of York was intended as a new tie between the Duke of Modena and France, but France would not provide a wife for the Duke himself, nor give ecclesiastical or military preferments to his relations. The younger Farnesi, finding no prospects in France, were entering Spanish service again. Cosimo III of Tuscany was bound to France in intimate, if uncomfortable, relations, as long as his troublesome wife lived in France and could only be controlled by the King. He was kept in awe by the French fleet in the Mediterranean and the bombardment of Genoa. He hoped to make his daughter, Anna, the third Tuscan Queen of France, but was disappointed, possibly because France had no pleasant memories of her Medici Queens. However, Tuscany was also on friendly terms with the Habsburgs, and Cardinal de' Medici was "Protector" of the Empire at Rome. Cosimo had dreams of being acknowledged heir to the Duchy of Lorraine, to which he certainly had rights. The Emperor seemed to favour him, but the idea never bore fruit.

Spain had by this time lost most of her influence in Italy. The pettiest princes spoke disrespectfully to her, and treated her plan of an Italian league against France as a chimera. She had forgotten to provide them with Habsburg marriages, and was inclined to regard them all as suspected allies of France. She no longer dominated the Mediterranean, where all ships had now to salute the French flag. France might have conquered Genoa, or even Naples or Sicily, if she had concentrated herself upon them.

Venice was determined on neutrality, and showed friendliness to both parties. But, just as the Dutch preferred Spain in Flanders, so Venice wished to keep Spain at Milan, thus protecting herself from the too close neighbourhood of France. The alliance of Venice and Austria in the Turkish war of 1683 drew her nearer to the Habsburgs and made France jealous, while her rather unexpected triumphs in the Morea gained her a general increase of respect.

Only in Rome, because of her personal ties with the Cardinals, was Spain still powerful. The private dislike of Louis XIV to Clement XI's nephew, Cardinal Altieri, so blinded his judgment that—"tout pour me venger d'Altieri"—he permitted the election of the Spanish candidate, Odescalchi, in the conclave of 1676, rather than that of Altieri's nominee. Innocent XI, indeed, took no interest in secular politics, but soon a serious quarrel arose about ecclesiastical questions, especially patronage and jurisdiction. The Archbishop of Paris, Harlay, encouraged Louis to resist the Pope; possibly he hoped to be himself made Patriarch of an independent Gallican Church. The French nation and Church generally supported the King; it is said that they would have turned Protestant to please him. But Louis was all the time parading his Catholic orthodoxy by exterminating the Huguenots. Innocent XI considered this display of zeal quite supererogatory, and even declared that forcible conversion was opposed to the spirit of Christianity. The French clergy, in their general

assembly of 1682, subscribed four propositions aimed directly at the Papal power, and maintaining the independent usages of the Gallican Church; and these tenets were, at the King's order, generally accepted in France. The Pope, though he had no material weapons, used all the spiritual means at his command. The clergy preferred by the King might receive their revenues, but he would not grant them investiture, so that by 1687 thirty-five French Sees were without duly authorised Bishops. The King might appeal to a Council, imprison the Legate and occupy Avignon, but Innocent remained firm. The Italians, remembering the Créqui affair, and dreading the appearance of a French army in Italy, called him "obstinate." "It was, so to speak, like resisting Heaven itself," wrote a Piedmontese ambassador. The other Powers had relinquished the ambassadorial rights of asylum, which had caused so much disorder in Rome, but Louis refused, saying, "God made me to set an example, not to follow one." In 1687, a French ambassador, Lavardin, came to Rome, escorted by three squadrons of cavalry. Though the Pope excommunicated them all, they swaggered about Rome, trying to provoke quarrels, and insulting the Pope and his officials in every possible way. At first Lavardin frightened the Roman court into showing him subservience, but, as the Pope took no notice whatever of him, and as nothing terrible happened after all, Rome gradually returned to its allegiance; Lavardin found himself isolated, and in a rather ridiculous position.

Innocent was counting on the inevitable European reaction against the pretensions and tyranny of France. He steadily subsidised Austria through her Turkish war, promised money to William of Orange for a French war, and he has been accused of complicity in William's plot against England. Certainly he disapproved of the policy of James II, but it is hard to believe that he could have preferred a militant Protestant like William. As the Grand Alliance gradually formed, Innocent knew that he was safe. France was too busy

to trouble him further. He lived long enough to see the Papacy's victory assured, since, just before his death, Lavardin was recalled (1689).

By 1687, France, though hardly holding any Italian territory, had virtually replaced Spain as tyrant of the Peninsula. But she was never to have so good a chance of converting this domination into actual possession. Long intervals of peace had restored partial prosperity to the Italians, and taught them that a kind of passive resistance was the best protection from foreign aggression, and that French armies, however terrifying, had little perseverance and were quickly demoralised in Italian warfare. Nor could France expect freedom from outside interference in her dealings with Italy, for she had infuriated at once England, Holland and the Emperor by her grasping, bombastic policy.

A considerable change in the future prospects of Italy was occasioned by the fact that it was not now the King of Spain, but the Emperor, who led the Habsburg family group. The Italians, still often considered as Imperial feudatories, found that they had to reckon with a very practical revival of Imperial claims to feudal authority. These claims acquired special significance now that the question of the Spanish Succession was becoming urgent, since one claimant to the Spanish states in Italy was an Austrian. Spain had as a rule discouraged Imperial pretensions; an Austrian would regard the matter quite differently, and an Austrian ruler of Naples and Milan would have power to enforce the Imperial ideas. Yet if they became the property of a French prince, there would be an end to Italian independence. Hence the Spanish Succession was to Italy a matter of extreme importance, involving more than a mere change in the Balance of Power, and the war of the Grand Alliance was fought in view of the Succession question here as elsewhere.

When in 1686, the League of Augsburg (later the Grand Alliance) was formed, the attitude of Italy towards it was very

uncertain. The smaller Powers feared France; the Duke of Mantua lived on a French pension; Venice was busy in the Morea. The League could count on the Pope's favour, but there were now no military Popes. Savoy might possibly be won by the League, and its alliance would be very valuable. It would interpose the Alpine barrier between Italy and France, divide France from Casale and give the other Italian States time and spirit to withstand her. All depended on the character and courage of the Duke, on the stability of the tie which bound him to France, and on the advantages which the League could offer him.

Vittorio Amedeo II was fitted for an adventurous policy. The courage, secretiveness and determination which had enabled him, as a mere boy, to make himself master at home, were to be exercised on a larger field. Under a disguise of debauchery and stupidity, he hid first-rate military and political capabilities. Louis did not realize with whom he had to deal, but he did recognize the importance of retaining the Duke's alliance. And France had all the advantages; there were the traditional friendship, the French wife, the fine bribes that France could offer in the Milanese and Liguria, even Geneva. The League could make no such offers, it could not give him Bresse, it would not give him Geneva; it could only proffer some Imperial fiefs called the Langhe on the Genoese borders, investiture of Montferrat, the "Trattamento Reale" (p. 251). But the League could make him independent of France, a real Duke in his own Duchy instead of a kind of French feudatory; above all, it might drive the French from Pinerolo.

Louis threw away all his advantages. He tried to treat Vittorio Amedeo just as France had treated his father and grandfather; he would not even pretend to make the French alliance less galling to the young Duke. Vittorio Amedeo was not permitted to receive a Spanish ambassador, and a visit of pleasure which he had planned to Venice was peremptorily forbidden.

A question of great future importance was opened in 1683. Vittorio's presumptive heir was his cousin Filiberto, a deaf-mute, eldest son of Prince Tommaso. Filiberto's younger brother, now dead, had married Olympia Mancini and settled in France. Of the sons of this marriage, the eldest, Tommaso, was next in the succession of Savoy. Tommaso married beneath him, and his grandmother, the old Princess of Carignano, in her anger persuaded the afflicted Filiberto to marry a Princess of Modena, in the hope of excluding Tommaso from the succession. Louis XIV, who would not suffer any one of importance in Italy to marry without consulting him, forbade the match, but it took place nevertheless¹. Louis flew into a towering rage, and insulted the Houses of Savoy and Modena almost beyond endurance. Vittorio Amedeo had to humble himself; but next year there visited him a younger brother of Tommaso, Prince Eugenio of Carignano, who was in the service of the Emperor, and he was received with marked friendliness at Turin. He was the afterwards famous Prince Eugene. He had been brought up at the French court, and as a delicate, studious youth, had been destined for the Church; but he set his heart upon a military career. Louis XIV refused him a French commission, and he escaped from France, and entered the Imperial army (1683), where he soon distinguished himself in the Turkish war. Louis XIV chose to consider the Duke's welcome to his cousin as a personal insult to himself, and withdrew the military subsidy, which, by the Treaty of 1682, he was paying to Savoy. Vittorio Amedeo said nothing, but his intentions became more settled. He was steadily organising the financial and military resources of his States, but his elaborate preparations were so carefully hidden that a new French envoy, d'Arcy (1685), believed him to be entirely given over to dissipation.

In 1685 Louis attacked the Vaudois in the Alpine valleys and ordered Vittorio Amedeo to co-operate on his side of the

¹ From this marriage sprang the present Royal Family of Italy.

Alps, threatening, in answer to the Duke's objections, to send French troops to do the work for him. Catinat was sent to assist him, and found the Duke so slow, dubious and apparently incompetent that he described him to Louis as a mere child, irresolute and muddle-headed. All this irresolution was in fact a ruse for delay that the Vaudois might have time to escape, and four years later Catinat had to change his opinion of Vittorio Amedeo. Louvois seems at times to have doubted Vittorio Amedeo's fidelity, yet took no steps to conciliate him. The Minister was as rude as Richelieu used to be to Christine, and seemed to fancy that the Duke was no more than a puppet in the hands of France. "All this *canaille*," he said of Piedmontese troops, "could not for a moment face the French army."

In 1687 Vittorio Amedeo announced his intention of visiting Venice for the Carnival, and Louis thought it best not to interfere, though French spies accompanied him and watched his every action. But, by pretending to pass all his time there in amusements, he outwitted them, and contrived to have much private conversation with Prince Eugene and Maximilian of Bavaria, who were also at Venice, ostensibly bent upon pleasure. No League was signed, but many plans were discussed. The French government suspected, but could not discover anything definite. The Duke seemed to be accumulating money and exercising his little army; there was a report that he was about to buy from the Emperor his rights over the Langhe fiefs, whose disorderly independence had long caused border troubles. D'Arcy no longer called the Duke a fool, but said, "His heart is as much covered by mountains as is his country."

To disarm suspicion, the Duke suggested a joint attack upon Geneva, but the arch-enemy of Protestants snubbed the suggestion. Late in 1688 the general war began, and, partly to test, partly to cripple, Savoy, Louis demanded the loan of three Piedmontese regiments. Vittorio Amedeo made every

excuse he could think of till Louis angrily withdrew the request; then, afraid that he had gone too far, Vittorio Amedeo actually sent them. To check him from raising others, Louis ordered him not to keep more than two thousand troops on foot at once. Vittorio Amedeo obeyed by keeping a fresh two thousand every four months, so that six thousand were exercised in a year. The Duke put on an air of offended innocence, complained of the King's distrust, and asked for the return of his regiments because of a raid of the Vaudois from Switzerland. The request was haughtily refused, Louvois urging the King not to conciliate, but to frighten the Duke into submission.

Meanwhile, Vittorio and Prince Eugene continued to correspond, and, before the end of 1689, a Venetian, Grimani, in Imperial service, visited Turin, and then returned to meet Eugene at Venice. A definite league was planned, to be signed as soon as the Duke was ready for war. The Langhe fiefs, the price of the alliance, were transferred to Savoy. Louis' eyes were opened at last, but he still relied on bullying, and Catinat was ordered to invade Piedmont. Vittorio Amedeo needed time, and played for it with nerve and skill. To Catinat's successive demands, that a large number of Piedmontese troops should be sent to France, that passage through Piedmont should be granted him, that he should garrison Turin and Verrua, Vittorio Amedeo promised ready agreement, only deprecating the King's wrath. Catinat no doubt expected refusal, and was puzzled at this ready acquiescence, for he forwarded the Duke's reply to Louvois, and waited for further instructions. Meanwhile, Turin was rapidly preparing for a siege, and the Piedmontese, with willing enthusiasm, joined the Duke's army.

Louvois saw that Catinat was being duped, and ordered an immediate advance upon Turin. Still the Duke contrived to keep Catinat negotiating for two days longer. On June 2nd Catinat sent in his ultimatum; Vittorio Amedeo immediately signed his Treaty with Spain and the Emperor, who were to

furnish him with troops, and sent envoys to sign treaties with England and Holland, which both promised him subsidies. In Turin he summoned the people and appealed to their patriotism. "For a long time," he said, "the French have treated me as a vassal, now they treat me as a valet; the time has come to show myself a free Prince." He met with a ready response, and, during the three weeks gained by negotiation, Turin had been made so strong that Catinat dared not attack it.

At last Louvois offered concessions, but it was now too late. Vittorio Amedeo refused them proudly, and the war had fairly begun. Louvois did not yet realize his mistake, for he thought that Piedmont could be conquered in a few weeks. He had still a lesson to learn.

Thus was Italy launched upon a new war, a war which must be anticipated seriously, so deep were the interests, so vast the forces involved. As yet it barely touched their borders, but the Italians knew that they could not escape before the great future question of the Spanish Succession should be solved.

CHAPTER VI.

SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY: 1559—1700.

THE conclusion of the Peace of Câteau-Cambrésis and the election of a conciliatory Pope, Pius IV, were intended to facilitate the re-assembling of the Council of Trent. The Council, which finished its labours in 1563, became, through the skilful diplomacy of the Curia and of its agents abroad, and through the persistence and argumentative skill of the Jesuits, a complete success for the Papacy. The doctrinal position of the Church was now so distinctly defined that the Inquisition could henceforth prove the least independence of thought heretical. The spiritual power of the Papacy was so much strengthened that no Italian State could hope to escape its interference; while the disciplinary reforms ordered by the Council furnished the Curia with a new pretext for setting aside the authority of the Bishops, and for thrusting itself, by means of Apostolic Visitations, into the affairs of all the weaker States. These Visitors were exceedingly troublesome; they quarrelled with all the lay authorities, and, by insisting on the strict closure of the Convents, reduced to starvation thousands of Religious, who had taken the vows for family reasons, but had continued to earn or beg their living outside the Cloister. Nor, to judge by the frequent clerical scandals, were the Visitors successful in enforcing a higher moral standard. Long afterwards, as long indeed as superfluous daughters were forced to take the veil without any vocation, many of the Convents were homes of vice. Nor was the conduct of the Friars at all satisfactory.

With renewed vigour, the Papacy pressed, and even increased, the old claims of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Pius V and his successors republished with additions the Bull "In Coena Domini," which asserted the extremist Ultramontaniam, and the struggle with Italian States on these subjects culminated in the great quarrel between Paul V and Venice (Chapter III).

The Council of Trent stimulated that process which was already going on in Italy, and is known as the Counter-Reformation. Heresy was scotched, but not quite killed; in Lombardy the Waldensian sects were so active that Philip II wished to establish the Spanish Inquisition, a design only frustrated by the furious opposition of the people, roused for once out of their customary lethargy. But the disciplinary Visitations of Pius IV's severe and strenuous nephew, Carlo Borromeo, purged by fire and terror the Alpine valleys of all taint of Protestantism. In a retired part of Calabria there had been for two centuries a settlement of Vaudois. Now the government of Naples sent troops which destroyed their villages. Ten thousand persons were massacred with the utmost brutality, and sixteen hundred imprisoned for life. Pius IV was not personally enthusiastic for the Inquisition, but his successor, Pius V, was the former Inquisitor, Michele Ghislieri (p. 84); he stimulated the Holy Office to fresh efforts, and freed it from all control, even from the Pope's. The terrors of Paul IV's reign were renewed in Rome; no one could feel safe while secret depositions were encouraged, and the accused were not even told the names of their denunciators. There were now few prominent heretics left alive in Italy; but Valdes' disciple, Carnesecchi, was living under Cosimo I's protection at Florence; and a friend of Ochino, Palerario, who had already been driven from Siena by the Inquisition, was actually Professor of Rhetoric at Milan. One of the conditions on which Cosimo received the Grand Ducal title was the surrender of Carnesecchi to the Inquisition. Palerario, when summoned to Rome, obeyed, believing that he could justify

himself. Carnesecchi was burned in 1567, Paleario in 1570. After this date, there were few executions for heresy, not because the Inquisition had relaxed its vigilance, but because there were few heretics left to burn. They were all dead, in prison, in exile, or re-converted by the Jesuits. The Inquisition had to busy itself in scenting out the taint of heresy in philosophy and science; occasionally it found a distinguished victim, such as Bruno the philosopher, burned in 1600.

The work of the Inquisition was assisted by the clerical censorship of the Press. Books which did not pass this censorship could only be published abroad; even then they might be added to the list of prohibited works on the Index. The Council of Trent issued a new Index, and there was a Congregation of Cardinals appointed to keep it up to date.

On the constructive side the Counter-Reformation was equally active. The standard of the upper clergy had already been raised by the Theatines and other Orders (p. 78), and this improvement in character and education spread to the lower clergy by means of the Council's clerical seminaries. The Oratory of S. Filippo Neri (founded 1575), who has been called the Apostle of Rome, had immense influence. It rendered fashionable a perfervid, emotional type of devotion, immortalised in pictures of fainting nuns and sentimental angels, and it performed those Cantatas with ecstatic Libretti, set to music by Palestrina himself, in which we find the origin of modern Oratorio. Meanwhile the Jesuits had taken possession of the greater part of lay education. The boys trained in their schools were well disciplined and had plenty of classical drill; they were also devout Churchmen, taught to surrender their consciences, and to find their spiritual life in the sentimental devotions of the Oratory.

The moral leaven of the Counter-Reformation worked slowly in Italy. It was some time before the rough and ready methods of assassination were carefully organised into the duel, and domestic murders of the most atrocious kinds were still

perpetrated. The great crimes which distinguish the years between 1560 and 1610, especially the real and imagined Medici tragedies and the *cause célèbre* of the Cenci, have become famous in the history of criminology. Pius V had to renounce his attempt to clear Rome of courtesans, lest Roman society should be completely broken up. Excepting where such strict rulers as Cosimo I kept stern order, murder, rape, brigandage, the prepotency of the rich over the poor, the tyranny of foreign mercenaries, the injustice of corrupt magistrates prevailed. Yet the very fact that great crimes attracted so much attention proves that there was already a change in the moral attitude of Italy. Gradually the Counter-Reformation permeated every class in society, until an outward respectability of conduct and a great profession of religious devotion became the general rule. This air of propriety was enhanced by the stiffness of manners inculcated by Spanish etiquette, which came into fashion together with the black costume of the Spanish gentleman. The old gay, variegated life and irresponsible immoralities of Renaissance Italy had disappeared, together with free intercourse of classes, social independence of artists, liberty of individual development and of self-expression. The essential character of the Italians still remained sensuous and self-indulgent, cruel and crafty, but the real passion for freedom and for beauty, which partly redeemed these vices, was exchanged for a worship of conventionality and an hypocrisy, which only appeared to smother them. Under a thin veneer of decency and religion, lust and luxury, jealousy, slander and intrigue, vanity and greed kept their hold upon society. Reform was only skin-deep; and though to profess the frank Paganism of the Renaissance would now have brought a man to the stake, yet to practise its vices only involved a mild penance from a complaisant Jesuit Confessor.

Reform had not killed medieval superstitions, which seem more horrible in contrast with comparatively modern customs.

The nephew of a Cardinal tried to kill a Pope by sticking pins into his wax effigy. Carlo Borromeo conducted a campaign against witchcraft no less terrible than his campaign against heresy, and hundreds of wretched women were burned for transactions with the Devil, in which many of the victims themselves seriously believed. The horrors of the Plague were doubled by the persecution of the "Untori" (p. 168), who were supposed to spread it. Voluminous books on Magic were written, and Astrology was as popular as ever. A good surgeon would not attempt an operation until he had ascertained the "lucky day" for it. Large sums of money were entrusted by the credulous to alchemists who promised to multiply them. As late as the eighteenth century a Grand Duke of Tuscany hoped to fill his empty Treasury by this means. Here, however, good came out of evil, for many alchemists became genuine chemists.

The condition of the lower classes was one of complete ignorance and extreme poverty; indeed, the fatal protectionist and agricultural policies of the Italian States, already described (Chapter III), together with epidemics and famines, combined to ruin the peasantry and to keep the population very low. In the towns the abandonment of trade led to much want of employment; and, since the governments' only methods of meeting the difficulty were by fixing artificially low prices and by encouraging indiscriminate charity, idleness and thriftlessness grew apace. "Pious foundations," as the Charities were called, did incalculable harm. In Rome, for example, a young man, who wished for two or three years of enjoyment, had only to marry in order to secure the substantial dowry provided for Roman girls. Crowds of beggars were maintained by daily doles from the Convents, just as hordes of disreputable ruffians were maintained by the nobles whose livery they wore.

The middle classes, once the strength of Italy, had much diminished under pressure of the universal desire to abandon trade for foolish Court honours. The richest people were the

money-lenders, mostly Genoese, who made large profits out of the financial embarrassments of Governments and Communes, and invested their gains in comfortable Roman *Monti*. The lawyers, who, as constituting the only intellectual class, rapidly grew in power, were mostly recruited from among the younger sons of the nobles. Artists and literary men no longer formed a powerful class able to dictate their own terms to their patrons, not infrequently to bully them too, as Aretino did. There was now no public to applaud them; and they must choose between obscure poverty and the service of some capricious patron. So Tasso submitted his genius to the caprices of the Court of Ferrara; and, learning the bitterness of the bread of servitude, broke his heart and ruined his intellect, yet either could not, or would not, free himself. So Tassoni must disown his Philippics against Spain when it suited his master of Savoy to change politics. Even the Professors at the Universities, unless it were at liberal Padua, must be careful lest their teaching should offend ecclesiastical or lay authority. There were still plenty of authors and artists, but they were generally the hangers-on of courts and cardinals, and the *virtuosi* of the Opera were beginning to take precedence over them.

The upper classes, shut out from political and military avocations, and taught by Spanish example that commerce was degrading, became hopelessly idle, while the increasing narrowness of education stifled all worthy literary aspiration. Cosimo I founded his Order of Santo Stefano to provide occupation for lively young nobles; but such a vent was not usually forthcoming, and few had any thoughts beyond amusement and intrigue. Their ambition was to out-do one another in outward show, especially in the number and grandeur of their servants and equipages. On these a great deal of money was wasted, while very little was spent on hospitality or domestic comforts. Each noble strove to be first in titles and decorations, valuing most those which proceeded from foreign rulers; above all, questions of precedence continually agitated society, and not

infrequently enlivened it by undignified scuffles in Court or Church between the rivals and their retainers. These quarrels often ended in duels; for, now that there was hardly any real fighting to be done, military instincts were directed towards the elaboration of a scheme of sham chivalry, an artificial code of honour, with most complicated rules for every possible and impossible contingency. Since easy social intercourse with women of good rank, such as had distinguished the Renaissance age, was now debarred by Spanish custom, its place was taken by intrigue. Women were secluded and guarded jealously, and we hear no more of a Vittoria Colonna or an Isabella d'Este; but such precautions did not raise the standard of morals.

There were few entertainments in private houses, except for weddings or funerals. The nobles were parsimonious in everything but outward display, and kept their daughters strictly at home. Cosimo III actually made a law forbidding young men to go into a house in which unmarried girls were living. It was not a new custom for the guests at weddings to sit at different tables according to sex. Hence the importance to each Italian city of having a court of its own, and a prince who entertained freely. There was generally a place of public resort for the men, such as the Piazza del Duomo at Florence, where a band played in the evenings; but more and more the Theatre came to include the life of society, while its affairs were the first topic of conversation.

Yet, since it is an ill-wind that blows no good, this devotion to the Theatre led to remarkable progress in music, the one art which the Counter-Reformation did not hinder. Each court had its Opera House; and, during the season, society assembled there daily, partly to gossip and take refreshments, but partly also to criticise and applaud. The constant demand for new music stimulated rapid production. The singers were petted and highly paid; it was said that the last Duke of Mantua spent on a Prima Donna what he received for the sale of Casale.

It was of course on Roman Society that the Counter-Reformation made the greatest impression. In 1600 it would have been impossible to call Rome any longer "Babylon, the harlot of nations," for Rome was decorous and serious, in spite of not infrequent street fights between the servants of ambassadors and nobles and the populace and Papal guards. But decorum and religious observance could be easily combined with a great deal of public display, with slander and with greed. Cardinals, ambassadors and rich Papal families rivalled one another in the number and splendour of their servants and carriages, and in the fêtes which they provided. Rome had more entertainments than any Italian city except Venice, because the ambassadors celebrated in this way any fortunate event in their own countries. On the birth of a son to James II of England, an ox was roasted whole in the streets and fountains of wine provided. Rome was still the resort of clever youths, who found patrons amongst the Cardinals, and those with literary gifts were sure to prosper. There was plenty of culture of a certain type, much interest in literary matters and patronage for architects and artists. In the seventeenth century were built the façade and colonnade of S. Peter's, most of the Vatican Palace and many of the churches, palaces and fountains which fill modern Rome, and all were decorated with rows of statues and acres of painting. Intrigue was the very life of the place; it was centred on the Papal elections, but was by no means quiescent in the intervals. Some question of precedence, etiquette or immunity was always arising, and required all Rome to scheme and argue, sometimes even to fight, for its settlement.

An interesting episode in Roman life was the residence of Cristina, ex-queen of Sweden, who abandoned her throne in order to become a Roman Catholic. Alexander VII, delighted with this Papal victory, gave her a magnificent reception, and called her Alessandra after himself. At first her intrigues, social and political, and her claim to behave as if she were still

a sovereign, caused trouble, but after a time she settled down, took an active part in the literary and social life of Rome, and interested herself politically in the party of the *Squadrone*. Foreign visitors were at this time becoming a recognized feature in Italian life. John Evelyn and Bishop Burnet recorded their experiences, as Montaigne, who seems to have been most impressed by the badness of the inns, had also done. Milton's writings are full of the influence of Italy. The "Admirable Crichton" came to air his accomplishments, and was assassinated by a jealous prince (p. 174). It was still the fashion for rich Italians, as well as for foreigners, to go to Venice, especially for the Carnival; for, though Venice had lost her political precedence, she still retained the social hegemony of Italy, and nearly all that remained of the freedom, variety and splendour of Italian life and thought.

Amongst the princely and vice-regal courts there was little variety; though that of Ferrara, so long as it existed, retained more of the Renaissance type of life and culture than the others. At Mantua actors and singers found the most hearty welcome. In Florence there was, except during the reign of Francesco I, a high level of outward propriety. Here the comedy-ballet first developed into real Opera, and here Ferdinando II turned the Palace into a scientific laboratory.

As the seventeenth century wore on, the influence of Spain was in part replaced by that of France. Society became somewhat more genial, and manners less stilted; dress was gayer, etiquette less rigid, intercourse between the sexes more easy. The Court of Turin was a little model of that of Versailles; but the French fashions gained ground slowly in the more distant courts. In spite of all her efforts, Margu rite of Orleans altogether failed to Frenchify the Florence of Cosimo III. In fact the costume and perruque of Louis XIV travelled more rapidly than his manners.

The latter part of the sixteenth century was a critical period for Italian culture. The Renaissance was quite over; its

inspiration, except only in Tasso, was dead. Yet in Italy there was much intellectual activity, and many minds able enough to study the problems of the age. It was still an open question whether Italy would retain her intellectual position in Europe, and lead the way in metaphysics and natural science as she had led in poetry and art. She had only to follow up her Renaissance study of "Nature and Man" on more exact and critical lines. The tyranny of the worship of language and style was strong; but it might yet be shaken off by original and enthusiastic thinkers.

The older theology and philosophy, the rule of Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle, had long ceased to satisfy enquiring minds; the coming of Descartes and modern metaphysics was inevitable. If Italy had been free she might have anticipated it. In the latter half of the sixteenth century she produced two philosophical thinkers, eccentric, undisciplined, unable to keep their own riotous imaginations in check, yet each with ideas, vague, but pregnant of future thought. Giordano Bruno, a Calabrian (1550-1600), strenuously claimed freedom of thought, and reliance upon human reason; he broke the fetters of authority, and refused to believe what Aristotle and the Schoolmen said simply because they said it. Accepting the Copernican system, he pushed its application to its logical conclusions, and planned a system of the Universe with a plurality of worlds, and the animation of all organic and inorganic creation by one omnipresent Intelligence, a kind of Pantheistic God. In spite of obscure style, confused arrangement, and much wild speculation, his writings contain many germs of later thought. His theory of "Causation" is in effect our "Evolution." In the course of a wandering and adventurous life, he spread his teaching far and wide, and even tried to convince the obscurantist Dons of Oxford. He had no inclination towards Protestantism, and unwisely trusted that, as in the last generation, pure speculation would not offend the ecclesiastical authorities so long as the philosopher was

outwardly submissive. But the days when the Immortality of the Soul might be discussed with impunity were over. Bruno fell into the clutches of the Inquisition, which had no difficulty in proving his writings most unorthodox. He was ready to make a formal submission, but he would not renounce what he held to be his natural right to freedom of thought. After years of imprisonment, he was burned in Rome (1600), quietly defying his judges;—"You," he said, "have perhaps more fear in pronouncing this sentence than I have in receiving it"; and at the stake he put aside the crucifix which was offered him; he had lived without, and would die without it.

Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) was also a Calabrian, and bitterly opposed to the Spanish rule. His share in the rebellion of 1600 (p. 163) brought upon him twenty-seven years of imprisonment. He was finally released by the efforts of Urban VIII, who knew him to be a devout Catholic. Campanella was in fact too much of a theologian to be a genuine metaphysician; he tried to study too many subjects, to reconcile too many opposing theories, and to combine the teachings of Revelation and of experiment. His most interesting production was his Utopia, the "*Città del Sole*" (city of the sun), which was as communistic and cosmopolitan as any modern Utopia, and included a four hours' working day and State regulation of marriage.

The tragedies of Bruno and Campanella illustrate plainly enough the result of the Jesuit and Spanish domination in Italy, and show what any other philosophers might have to expect from their tender mercies. The Inquisition was so ably supported by the Congregation of the Index that the centre of the publishing trade had shifted to Switzerland and Germany; while MSS. submitted to the Censors of the Press often emerged in such a condition that their authors could hardly recognize them. Booksellers had to submit a list of their stock to Pius V. It was with difficulty that Cosimo I obtained permission to publish a bowdlerised Boccaccio.

The tendencies of the age are illustrated in another way by the life of Torquato Tasso (1544-95). Tasso was by nature and genius a child of the Renaissance, possessed by its feeling for beauty, for rhythm, for the music of words, for the colours of imagination. He had moreover a strong sense of the Romantic, an extraordinary skill in versification, and, what was not so characteristic of the Renaissance, a real purity of soul and love of goodness. But he was educated in extravagant devotions and excessive deference to authority, while his natural morbid weakness and self-distrust were developed. Early in life he entered the Court of Ferrara, under Alfonso II, a position very different from what it was in the times of Ariosto. The court poet was no longer flattered and feared, he was expected to be entertaining, complaisant, and prolific of light verse at everyone's bidding. At Ferrara there were rivals who envied Tasso's genius and were angered by his own belief in it and by the unusual favours bestowed on him by the Duke and his sisters, Lucrezia and Leonora.

The sisters were very kind, and Tasso was sincerely devoted to them, but the ancient scandal that the relations between him and Leonora were too intimate can hardly be credited. Alfonso was an autocrat who would have dealt with such presumption in summary fashion. At Ferrara Tasso wrote his graceful, but not profound, pastoral play, "Aminta." It gained him an immense success, for its form was novel and its style melodious; it idealised court life and flattered the Ducal family. Then he embarked on his life-work, the "Gerusalemme Liberata," which was intended to be the great epic of the age, at once romantic and religious, and free from the cynicism of Ariosto. It has indeed a singular grace and beauty, and has won a place unrivalled in the hearts of Tasso's countrymen; but it reveals Tasso's peculiar weaknesses, his want of concentration, his vague, unreal sentimentalism, and, at times, the dominion of words over ideas which had become so painfully characteristic of contemporary literature. Morbidly nervous

about its reception, Tasso submitted it before publication to a great variety of critics, whose mutually destructive criticism nearly distracted him while he strove to embody its results. Fears of heterodoxy haunted him, and drove him into a tormenting anxiety about his own beliefs and a craven terror of the Inquisition. These troubles, in addition to the quarrels and mortifications of his life at Ferrara, served to unhinge a mind never very firmly balanced. Sometimes he tore himself from Ferrara, but an irresistible impulse always brought him back. The Duke was really very tolerant of his vagaries and complaints; but it became painfully evident that Tasso was not mentally competent, and at last Alfonso had him confined in a lunatic asylum. He was not cruelly treated, but the confinement increased the melancholia from which he suffered. After seven years he was released, and wandered about Italy, meeting with much kindness and respect. He died peacefully in the Convent of S. Onofrio at Rome, just as the Romans were preparing to crown him Poet Laureate. His life is a melancholy record of genius ruined, in part indeed by temperament, but also largely by environment. Tasso was born a generation too late, and the talents which would have had full scope in the free air of the Renaissance were thwarted and enfeebled in this narrower atmosphere. He had to please a petty court, in bondage to French and Spanish fashions, and a Press Censorship with Jesuit standards; and also he felt obliged to follow the contemporary fashion of imitating classical style and Petrarchian language.

Another sufferer from court life was the poet Guarini (1537-1612), who was also in the service of Alfonso II, and hoped to fill Tasso's place as court poet. His disillusionment is embodied in his most famous work, the pastoral, musical drama, "Pastor Fido," an uncompromising attack on courts. Its flaccid sentimentality, sensuousness and musical rhythm, combined with a kind of novelty, made it extraordinarily popular.

All real originality was rigorously discouraged. Latin and Latinised verse, classical tragedies, Ciceronian epistles, succeeded one another with monotonous regularity. Style and language were cultivated as if they were the be-all and end-all of literature. The numerous Academies assembled to listen to reams of highly polished, melodious emptiness; for everybody wanted to write something, and it did not much matter what. Criticism of language led to the study of Italian philology, and the famous Florentine *Accademia della Crusca* undertook the task of drawing up a complete Tuscan vocabulary, not of words in use, but of words which had been used by literary models, especially by Petrarch. The "*Crusca*" began its career by condemning the "Gerusalemme." The Tuscans had a cult of Petrarch; they held him to be above criticism, and worthy of unquestioning imitation, but the dictation of Tuscany was not tamely submitted to by the other provinces, and many and fierce were the battles waged over the question of dialect. Such purely academical conflicts provided an outlet for repressed political and theological controversies.

There was in fact no lack of intellectual activity. The Universities of Padua, Pisa and Bologna and the Sapienza of Rome were busy and crowded, though the teaching was generally limited to the tenets of Aristotle and Galen. The great Libraries flourished; Cosimo I founded the *Bibliotheca Laurentiana*, and bought whole libraries for it; he sent to the East for MSS., as well as for antiques for the Medici Collections. Federigo Borromeo founded the Ambrosian Library at Milan, enriched it with maps and charters, and provided a College of Doctors to assist its students. Paul V and Urban VIII increased the Vatican Library. Urban was himself a poet and a literary enthusiast, and, as Cardinal, numbered Galileo amongst his protégés. There was still much interest in Greek and Oriental literature. Cardinal Ferdinando de' Medici had an Oriental printing-press at Rome. Archaeology, Inscriptions, the History of Jurisprudence, were studied; even medieval

history was no longer wholly despised. Cardinal Baronius, the famous Vatican librarian, wrote a learned and unprejudiced ecclesiastical history of the early centuries, based on Vatican documents. But it was Baronius who bade Galileo cease to teach the Copernican system, since "men should learn how to go to Heaven, not how Heaven goes." A great deal of history was written; sometimes this was to glorify patrons, for which purpose documents were occasionally forged. But Cosimo I recalled the anti-Medicean Varchi from exile, in order that he might write his history of Florence. The best contemporary history appears in the "Relazioni" or Reports of the Venetian ambassadors; these are very detailed and accurate, full of insight and of political acumen, and often picturesque. Sarpi's history of the Council of Trent has been mentioned (p. 180); Cardinal Pallavicini wrote a rival history from the Curial point of view, as elegant and flowery in style as Sarpi's is simple and direct.

Political science mainly consisted of a theoretic reaction against Machiavellianism; indeed, the Jesuits burned Machiavelli in effigy. This reaction is particularly illustrated in the best contemporary writer in political science and economics, the Piedmontese Botero (*d.* 1617), who had himself witnessed the experiments of Emmanuele Filiberto I and of Carlo Borromeo. Botero conceived of the State as the prince's personal property, and considered economic prosperity merely as increasing the value of the estate. His descriptions of contemporary States and his ideas on economic questions show insight and boldness, but they are vitiated in part by his contempt for history, and in part by his preoccupation with the principles and progress of the Counter-Reformation.

Some of the writers already mentioned, especially Guarini and Pallavicini, show the influence of a new development in Italian culture, which is called the "Baroque." After so much monotony the Italians longed for novelty, and found it in exaggeration. A craving for the fantastic and astonishing, for

far-fetched metaphors, sickly sentiment, artificial elegance, seemed at this time to possess all Europe. In France there were the *Précieux*, in England the Euphuists, in Italy the Marinists, called after the leading exponent of the style. To avoid simplicity at all costs was their design; nothing must be called by its ordinary name. Metaphors and antitheses, "Conceits" as the Euphuists called them, were no longer merely ornaments, they were the object of poetry:—"È del poeta il fin la meraviglia," said Marini (the poet's end is to astonish). The tendency was not new; it had affected Petrarch and Ariosto; but now that contemporary life was so artificial, it became universal, penetrating even into the most serious prose. A scientific treatise is called "The celestial Anatomy of the Comets"; in a sermon S. Ignatius is spoken of as the "Hercules of Biscay, who bears in the fire of his name the Armoury of the Seraphim." A preacher excuses his defects by saying "I need the Algebra of the Infinite." This style exactly suited the devotional fashion set by the Jesuits; their manuals were full of strained metaphors; in their sermons they competed for notoriety by surprising their audience, till we even hear of a preacher who "preached his usual jests."

Gianbattista Marino (1569-1625) of Naples was considered by his contemporaries as amongst the greatest of poets, to be ranked with the classics. In France he was received with much honour by the Queen and her Italianised court, and triumphantly proved himself more "precious" than the *Précieux*. On his return home he had a grand public reception, the nobles formed his guard of honour, the people shouted his praises. To keep up his reputation, he felt it necessary to write an epic; it was on Adonis, and Shakespeare's poem on the same subject is simple and prudish beside Marino's. Melodious words and flowing rhythm, tortured metaphors, repetition, exaggerated effects, in vain shelter Marino's emptiness and pettiness of ideas; vice and prurient sensuality are only rendered more suggestive by the veil of hypocritical morality and the pretence that the

poem was an allegory of the soul possessed of evil. The "Adone" was placed on the Index; but it was only too characteristic of the moral attitude of the age, when evil and the love of evil peep constantly through the disguise of decent behaviour and devout religion.

Marinism invaded and captured all the literary academies. A new one was founded by Cristina of Sweden, and called the "Arcadia." Its members adopted pastoral names; its years were counted by Olympiads. It and its contemporaries were specially addicted to figured poems and acrostics. But the literary efforts of the age were not confined to Marinism; there were still plenty of serious students; Cristina patronised real learning and had the Baths of Diocletian excavated at her own expense. Even under the uninspiring rule of Cosimo III, Florence boasted that remarkable Librarian, Magliabecchi, whose name one of its libraries still bears. Ugly, dirty and deformed, he was a marvel of learning, and performed astonishing feats of memory for the benefit of those who consulted him. Italian literary influence was extensive; it pervades the work of Milton and Dryden, of Racine, Boileau and Lopez de Vega. And, to judge by the constant and violent quarrels of literary men, their intellectual activity should have been immense. No one was more involved in these than Alessandro Tassoni, the one noted contemporary poet who escaped the influence of Marinism (1565-1635). Tassoni was out of harmony with his age; he had good sense, critical acumen and humour; he loved independence and hated hypocrisy. He was bold enough to criticise Petrarch, and so brought a perfect hurricane about his head. Then he parodied the fashionable heroic epic in a comic poem called the "Secchia Rapita," purporting to tell in sham heroics the fortunes of a bucket robbed by one town from another in a petty medieval war; in reality, a clever, bitter satire on contemporary society and politics. Tassoni suffered particularly from the evils of court patronage. He tried in vain to win fortune from Carlo Emanuele II, and wrote to please him those Philippics against Spain which he had afterwards to disown.

The Philippics show a political independence remarkable for that age. Tassoni urged union against Spain; "But the wise and the pusillanimous say it is impossible; the nobles and knights desire honours and medals, prizes of their servitude." "And truly," he burst out, "those unhappy creatures with souls so servile that they enjoy being ruled by a foreign power, are unworthy of the name of Italian." Few of his contemporaries, indeed, could come up to Tassoni's standard.

Until the Baroque period set in, Italian art continued merely imitative of Renaissance types. Frigid Palladian palaces and churches, vast Raphaellesque frescoes, the apparent object of which was to cover as much wall-space as possible, statuary which imitated Michael Angelo's least desirable attributes, all were produced. Classical themes, correctness of technique without individuality or inspiration, prevailed. In Venice, indeed, the Renaissance in art lived on till the end of the sixteenth century, but the death of Michael Angelo in 1564 ended it for the remainder of Italy. Yet there was no lack of artists, and they found plenty of patrons amongst Popes, Cardinals and Princes. Cosimo I was the most munificent of the latter, and his sons followed in his footsteps. The scattered Medici collections were gathered together again, and arranged with devout care; it was Francesco I who first used the long gallery between the Pitti and the Uffizi for their reception. Treasures of art and archaeology were constantly added. The Florentine Academy of Design was founded by Cosimo I to form a sort of Tribunal of fine arts. Cosimo built the Loggia in the Mercato Nuovo and acquired the Pitti Palace, which was considerably enlarged and decorated by himself and his sons, while the Boboli gardens were laid out behind it. The making of gardens was a speciality in this period, and the designers successfully combined semi-natural landscape with artificial effects of terraces, fountains and sculpture in a manner peculiarly suited to Italian environment. Villas were a fashionable form of building; Francesco himself assisted in the architecture of

his favourite residence. Ammanato (*d.* 1592) was the architect and sculptor chiefly employed; the beauty of his Ponte Santa Trinità almost redeems the feeble vulgarity of his statuary, which is only too conspicuous in Florence. The Medici were more fortunate in their patronage of a foreign sculptor of real genius, John of Boulogne, who imbibed the sense of beauty if not the strength of the great Italians. His Rape of the Sabines is well known in the Loggia de' Lanzi; he made the equestrian statues of Cosimo I and Ferdinando I, and his Mercury in the Bargello ranks with the best Renaissance work.

In Florence the lesser forms of art still flourished. Arras makers were brought from Flanders to teach, and Florentine tapestry soon became famous. Cosimo set up glass and coral works; Francesco had a private laboratory and experimented in the making of porcelain; it was he who introduced the popular Florentine mosaic work. The Farnesi endeavoured to make the Collections of Parma rival those of Florence.

In Rome the building of S. Peter's continued steadily, if slowly. Under Sixtus V the Cupola was completed; under Clement VIII Fontana raised the Lantern. Paul V entrusted the direction to Maderno, who unwisely abandoned Michael Angelo's design for a Greek Cross, lengthened the nave, and built the ugly façade, so that, for the sake of mere size, the Dome was hidden from the Piazza and the general proportions spoiled.

Rome is full of the visible signs of the activity of these Popes, for they all marked their erections with their names. Sixtus V placed the obelisk before S. Peter's; Paul V, besides the Borghese Palace and Villa, made so many fountains that he was called in jest "Fontifex Maximus." Maderno's work is spread all over Rome; he suggested indeed an audacious plan for the complete reconstruction of the Borgo; but Fontana's is most evident in Naples, where the Viceroys were actively engaged in building new streets and palaces. Both were strongly affected by the growing tendency towards the

Baroque style, which reached its full development by the middle of the seventeenth century. As in Literature, it signified a revolt of individualism against classical rules, a craving after novelty, an avoidance of simplicity at whatever cost, too often merely culminating in the bizarre. Art was roused out of stagnation to exuberant energy, to vigorous movement, to bold experiment. In Venice the Baroque style of architecture is seen under the most favourable circumstances; its vehemence and its extravagant decoration seem to harmonise with the dramatic quality of their surroundings. Elsewhere its falsities and its absurdities appear more prominent and less excusable. Classical fronts are put to old churches, the architraves often without any building behind them; the orders of architecture are hopelessly mixed; columns of fantastic shapes are painted or decorated with bronze; sometimes they are broken, sometimes appear to fall, but are supported by a muscular angel. In one case at least they stand upside down. There are crooked lines, uneven angles, ornaments used as supports, the heavy parts made to appear light. Painted imitations of marble vaunt themselves shamelessly. The colossal is admired simply on account of its size. And it is all over-loaded with decoration; statues stand at every corner, sit on cornices, peep under arches. Fat, simpering angels sprawl and wave fluttering inscriptions. Polychromic decoration is immensely popular; its apotheosis is reached in the Chapel in S. Lorenzo built as their family mausoleum by the Medici Dukes, and covered all over with patterns in coloured marble and precious stones. Sculpture and painting show the same tendency to frenzied agitation, strained attitudes, flying garments, over-loaded detail. Some artists incline towards false sentimentality, others towards a disagreeable realism (notably Caravaggio, 1569-1609), loving to depict the horrors of martyrdom, and ministering to the most depraved tastes under the pretence of aiding devotion.

Rome is full of the Baroque style, for never were builders more active than in the seventeenth century. The city was

extended over the Quirinal, Viminal and Esquiline hills. The Popes and their families erected churches and palaces, fountains and obelisks; Princes and Cardinals followed their example. The great Jesuit Church, the Gesù, is as complete an example of Baroque as can be found. In Rome the style can be judged at its worst and at its best; at its worst perhaps in the tombs of the Popes, clumsy monuments of vanity, inscribed with pompous adulatory paeans, in letters a foot long; at its best in the work of Bernini, the one real genius of the Baroque school. Bernini (1598-1680), who was architect to nine Popes, had all the courage, the irresponsible, tireless energy of his school, with more self-control, and a certain originality and grandeur of conception which renders his most famous work, the Colonnade of S. Peter's, splendid as well as vast. The High Altar, the statues beneath the Dome and those on the roof, are all very Baroque, but not unsuited to their surroundings. Bernini's fountains show much appreciation of the effects of running water; his sculptures are skilful, but exaggerated in movement and detail. Louis XIV sent for Bernini to finish the Louvre, but his design was never carried out.

Later in origin than the Baroque, and continuing side by side with, though in opposition to it, was the eclectic school of painting. It was founded by the three Caracci, Luigi, Annibale and Agostino of Bologna, and continued by their pupils, with Bologna always as their head-quarters. The object of the Caracci was to return to the model of the great masters, selecting from each what was most admirable for imitation, and so creating a kind of composite style. They showed much care in technique, and at times no little grace and dignity; they were free from the faults of the Baroque, but they also avoided its one merit, vigour. There was no spontaneity; they painted from types, not from real life; they were bound by conventionalities and rules. A contrast between Raphael's and Caracci's work in the Farnesina at Rome exactly illustrates the difference between inspiration and imitation.

The two most eminent members of the eclectic group were Domenichino, whose well-known Communion of S. Jerome at the Vatican would be more impressive if it were not for the proximity of Raphael's Transfiguration, and Guido Reni (1575-1642), who added to the better qualities of his masters original power, a true sense of colour and an ideal of the beautiful. His *Aurora* in the Rospigliosi Palace at Rome is a painting of inspired loveliness, but his work degenerated into effeminacy (as in the S. Michael of the Capuccini), and weak sentiment (as in his representations of "Ecce Homo").

In the seventeenth century a school of landscape painting appeared in Italy. Salvator Rosa (1615-73) painted darkness and desolation, forests, ruins and wastes with much force and energy. The two great Frenchmen, Poussin and Claude, lived almost entirely in Italy, where much of their best work is still to be seen.

Neither literature nor art were in this period natural products; both were artificial, hampered by authority, by conventions and by criticism. The natural genius of the Italians broke forth in new directions; and in one of these, Music, the authorities rather helped than hindered. There was plenty of popular music in Italy; there were folk-songs, carnival songs, madrigals, dance-music, and there were many talented performers, who were often also skilled improvisors. But there was no organised art of music; the laws of counterpoint and harmony were in disorder; it was not even certain how many tones existed. Church music followed the Flemish style, but had become very decadent. The bass gave forth the theme while the other voices and the instruments embroidered on it, sometimes as the composer directed, but not infrequently at their own sweet will; sometimes in elaborate variations, all runs, trills and shakes, sometimes by the introduction of popular, and often very profane, airs, so that, while the bass chanted a solemn Sanctus, the treble might be warbling a tavern catch. The effect was of course an inde-

scribable confusion, a hideous medley of noises, quite unfitted for devotional purposes. The Council of Trent interfered to stop this abuse, and had it not been that the Borromei were themselves musical, Church music might have been confined henceforth to plain-song. Carlo Borromeo and a Commission of Cardinals, appointed to consider the subject, asked the Roman Choir-master, Palestrina (1524-94), whether it would be possible to write a simpler style of music, in which the words would be reverently treated and distinctly heard. Palestrina wrote three Masses, one of which, named in honour of the late Pope, Marcellus, fulfilled the conditions exactly. The Cardinals were delighted; it was ordered that Church music should henceforward conform to Palestrina's model. Palestrina was made composer to the Papal Chapel; he continued to produce great quantities of Church music, including the Cantatas for the Oratory, which were the germ of modern Oratorio. His tomb is rightly inscribed "*Princeps Musicae.*"

Palestrina and his successors in Church music were still bound by many old conventions and ideals, but secular music emancipated itself from the more burdensome of these soon after Palestrina's death. The regular drama had become so dull and monotonous that it had to be enlivened by songs and dances to make it palatable. The play grew less and less important in comparison to its musical interludes, until, like Guarini's "*Pastor Fido*," it was largely composed of sung lyrics, and then it developed into Opera. It was difficult to break the bonds of convention and introduce simple Melody, learned from popular song, into music intended for performance to a cultured audience. It was still more difficult to acquire the art of fitting music to the words and making it suit the character of the drama. At the end of the seventeenth century, an association of Florentine gentlemen, led by Vincenzo Galilei (Galileo's father), invented recitative, which they called "*Musica parlante*," that idealisation of speech into

song on which modern Opera is founded. The first complete Opera in this style performed in public was the "Euridice" of Giulio Caccini and Jacopo Peri, given to celebrate the marriage of Maria de' Medici in 1600 in Florence. In the same year at Rome was performed the first dramatic Oratorio, with regular characters and plot, and employing recitative, composed by Emilio Cavaleri.

The more famous Monteverde (1568-1643) endeavoured in his Operas to illustrate the action and the characters in the music, even anticipating the Wagnerian principle of associating special harmonies and instruments with each character.

These innovations were attacked with vigour and venom, but gradually won their way to general acceptance, and the seventeenth century is rich in operatic music of a high quality. The passion of the Italians for the Theatre encouraged prolific production; variety and originality were applauded; one composer, Alessandro Scarlatti (1659-1725), wrote over three hundred Operatic works, showing extraordinary fertility of ideas. Scarlatti was also a versatile performer and a great teacher. He was head of the Naples Conservatoire, which produced famous composers and many singers, who, well instructed in the art of "bel canto," diffused his teaching all over Europe. Encouraged by popular applause and princely favour, the technique of the performers rose to a high level, and at the same time the improvement of instruments was studied. Scarlatti paid special attention to the clavicembalo.

In the seventeenth century the earlier forms of the Sonata in pieces for the organ and clavicembalo are found; in these Girolamo Frescobaldi had the greatest reputation. Concerted instrumental music was also written; Scarlatti encouraged it in the form of Operatic overtures which he originated. Archangelo Corelli (1653-1713), the violinist, wrote concerted music; but ideas on this subject were yet so limited that his compositions for the violin never extend above D on the first string, and he was very angry when Handel not only wrote music for the higher A, but also showed him how to play it.

Bound by rules and conventions, and slavishly imitating classical models, contemporary drama was too little like real life to satisfy the dramatic instincts of the people, which found vent in another popular creation of the sixteenth century, the "Commedia dell' Arte," or improvised comedy. There were certain stock characters, drawn from contemporary society; Pantaleone, an absurd old Venetian noble, and his Bergamesque servant, Arlecchino; a Bolognese pedant, Doctor Graziano, and a Neapolitan *contadino*, Pulcinello, with a number of lesser, varying characters. A résumé of the plot was written, and the clever actors improvised the amusing dialogue, all speaking in dialect and mimicking local peculiarities of dress and manner. Much wit and skill were required from the performers; and the touring companies of the Commedia dell' Arte became very popular with all classes. Italian princes were god-parents to their children. Caterina and Maria de' Medici invited them to France; Henry III, who had seen them at Venice, did the same, and had to rescue them from the clutches of the Huguenots. They visited Spain and Vienna, and performed in London eight years before Shakespeare came there. The influence of the Commedia dell' Arte was widely extended. From it Molière drew many of his types and incidents. Lopez de Vega and the Spanish theatre show traces of its influence, and not less the Elizabethans. Many of Shakespeare's comic characters, especially Parolles and Holofernes, might be drawn from it; Hamlet's advice to the players is a warning against over-doing the Italian style. Milton, when in Italy, saw the performance of a play, "Adam," which, although comic, seems to have suggested Paradise as a subject.

It was inevitable that such a type of drama must ultimately deteriorate; the human actors were often replaced by marionettes. In our pantomime Harliquenade and Punch and Judy show we have the remnants of the Italian Commedia dell' Arte.

The more intellectual Italians, debarred from philosophy

and literature, turned towards the newest avenue of progress, Science. The Italian mind was naturally practical and inclined to concrete studies, more adapted to physical science than to metaphysics. Under conditions of free development it would probably have taken the same direction. Nor did it seem at first as though the scientists would meet with more serious opposition than that which proceeded from the natural conservatism of the Universities. The beginning was brilliant; in the first half of the seventeenth century Italy led in science as in the fifteenth century she had led the Renaissance. But, after a time the progress was checked, and by degrees the enthusiasm faded away; no new recruits followed the pioneers, and Italy relinquished her lead to other nations.

The Italian Universities had long studied pure Mathematics; the Professors challenged one another to Mathematical Tournaments, in which they showed off their learning by propounding new problems which only the challenger could solve. Algebra, for example, though regularly taught, was in a very elementary stage until a remarkable Brescian, Tartaglia, showed in one of these duels that he had discovered a method for solving cubic equations. Tartaglia (1500-57) was an eccentric person, who in boyhood had been so brutally mutilated at the capture of Brescia that he could hardly speak. He translated Euclid into Italian, was a great authority on fortifications and artillery, and wrote several books, one of which he dedicated to Henry VIII. But Tartaglia insisted on keeping his algebraic discovery to himself, only at last revealing it under an oath of secrecy to a still more eccentric Mathematician, Cardano. Cardano enlarged and perfected Tartaglia's method, and then perfidiously published it. The controversy which followed was exceedingly bitter, but the benefit to Algebra was considerable, and soon afterwards a method for solving equations to the fourth degree was discovered by a pupil of Cardano. But it was not till about 1600 that Algebraic symbols were used.

By 1600 there had been some progress in applied Mathematics. For example, Battista Porta of Naples, in studying Optics, had discovered the principle of the Camera Obscura. Both Porta and Cardano mingled their researches in legitimate science with occult. Porta, who founded the first of all scientific societies, the *Accademia de' Secreti* at Naples (1560), was tried for magic by the Inquisition, and his academy was dissolved. Cardano was an astrologer and really believed himself to be a magician, with a familiar spirit. He was an adventurer, and imposed successfully on all kinds of people, visiting England and Scotland, and drawing up a horoscope for Edward VI. Carlo Borromeo made him Professor at Bologna, but he was attacked by the Inquisition, probably for heresy, and deprived of his Chair. His books, though full of magic, portents, etc., show scientific notions in advance of his age about evolution and the universality of natural law, whose import he did not himself comprehend. His autobiography, written in the frank style of Benvenuto Cellini, gives a good idea of a scientific student's life; its wild guesses, its empirical methods, its curiosity and effort after experiment, its baffling external hindrances.

Yet it was astrology that led the way to the astronomy of the future, while alchemy led to real progress in chemistry and other sciences. Francesco I, in his private laboratory, not only compounded poisons and drugs, but made researches in mineralogy and metallurgy. Francesco's chief merit is his interest in science; he began to make a natural history collection, and sent botanists far and wide for specimens for the Botanical garden at Pisa. Rome, Padua and other cities had Botanical gardens, originally founded to provide medical simples. Finely illustrated books of Botany were already in existence.

Medicine was still in a very empirical condition. Remedies compounded of horrible ingredients were given; it was believed possible to heal bruises by drugs. Early in the

sixteenth century knowledge of the human body was confined to the teaching of Galen, which was given as infallible in the Universities. The difficulty of obtaining bodies for dissection was almost insurmountable, but the Belgian Vesalius found liberty to conduct human dissections and to teach what he had discovered at Padua, under the protection of the liberal Venetian government. He was the first to question Galen's authority, and to study anatomy by experiment (1540 *c.*). The furious opposition which he encountered from the Galenist Professors caused him to throw up his work in disgust, and he ultimately died on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. But Vesalius' pupil, Fallopio, Professor at Pisa and Padua (1550 *c.*), and Fallopio's pupil, Fabrizio (1537-1619), Professor at Padua, both made valuable discoveries in anatomy. Fallopio has given his name to the canals or tubes which he observed; Fabrizio's most notable discovery was of the valves of the veins, whose function he did not however guess. He also originated the idea of comparing the anatomy of different animals. Fabrizio was a famous teacher, and hundreds of students from all over Europe flocked to Padua to hear him. At the same time Cesalpino (1519-1603) lectured successively at Pisa and Rome, and attacked much of Galen's teaching. His principal work was, however, the classification of plants, in which he was the pioneer. Many of the groups which he indicated are now recognized as natural families. Fabrizio and Cesalpino both had ideas about the circulation of the blood, in part anticipating its complete discovery by Harvey, who himself studied under Fabrizio at Padua about 1600.

In 1564, three days before Michael Angelo died, was born the man who opened a new era in science, Galileo Galilei, son of the Florentine musician. At Pisa he obtained a small Professorship in Mathematics (1587), but he had already incurred the hatred of the staff because he refused to accept Aristotle's word as binding, and insisted on thinking for himself. Moreover he unwisely criticised an instrument

invented by Don Giovanni de' Medici, and, finding Pisa too hot to hold him, obtained a post at Padua (1592), where he spent the eighteen happiest and most fruitful years of his life. Here he found perfect liberty and congenial friends, amongst them Sarpi. He studied and taught all kinds of pure and applied Mathematics. Even before his greatest discoveries were made, he was effecting the reforms in scientific method which are perhaps his highest title to fame. Firstly, he insisted on the abandonment of empirical methods and *a priori* reasoning, and refused to admit any arguments or premises which had not been proved by experiment. Secondly, he widely extended the application of mathematical methods to science, without which great advance would have been impossible. In 1609 Galileo procured from Flanders the newly invented telescope, which he immensely improved and then began to use for the study of the stars. The fame of the Copernican system had already reached Italy; Bruno had based his system of the Universe upon it. Galileo had not at first been disposed to accept it, but his observations through the telescope left him without further doubts. He discovered the comparative nearness of the planets, the moons of Jupiter—which he called the Medici stars in honour of Cosimo II—the rough surface of the moon, the phases of Venus, the rotation of the sun. The publication of his discoveries caused an immense sensation; Venetians crowded to look through the telescope; Kepler, Campanella and many others sent congratulations. The French court ordered some more new stars which were to be named after the Bourbons. But the peripatetic Professors were furious; they would not come near the telescope; they maintained that there could not be more than seven planets because seven was the mystic number; that if the earth moved so fast no bird could find its way back to its nest, and used many equally cogent arguments. Still worse, they began to quote Scripture. Galileo's temper was not mild, and angry controversies began. He unwisely admitted that there were

scriptural passages not literally true, but adapted to the ignorance of their readers.

The Church had not yet pronounced on the Copernican system, but it was dangerous to provoke her. While Galileo stayed at Padua he would be safe, but love of home and hope to find more leisure for research led him to accept the Grand Duke's invitation to return to Pisa (1610), where he worked steadily for more than twenty years. Anxious about the attitude of the Church, he at once visited Rome to explain his position, and was received with respect. In Rome there was a new scientific society, the Accademia de' Lincei, founded in 1603; some of Galileo's work appeared amongst its publications. In 1616, hearing that the Inquisition had condemned the Copernican system, Galileo hastened to Rome again. Here he found favour with Paul V himself and with Cardinal Barberini, but he was warned that he must teach the Copernican system as an hypothesis only.

In 1632 he published his "Dialogue on the Ptolemaic and Copernican Systems," in which he certainly did not treat the latter as an hypothesis. Jesuits persuaded Barberini (now Urban VIII) that a foolish and ignorant personage in the Dialogue was intended for himself, and the Inquisition was allowed to summon Galileo to Rome and to try him for heresy. Ferdinando II protested, but did not venture to protect him.

Even the Inquisition dared not treat him with actual hardship, but long months of questioning, insinuations, threats and persuasions formed a moral torture before which the old man's resolution weakened, and he at last signed the retraction which was demanded of him. His punishment was forced residence, with certain restrictions, first at Rome, then at his own villa of Arcetri near Florence. His friends and disciples were allowed to visit him; the Grand Duke and his brothers were assiduous in their attentions; Milton was amongst his foreign visitors. He was able to continue writing, and completed his last book, a great treatise on the laws of Motion. In it he announced

and elaborated his discovery that "every body continues in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, except in so far as it may be compelled by impressed forces to change that state." But the Inquisition worried and spied upon him; the shame of his retraction weighed heavily on his mind; and loss of sight and domestic bereavement made the end of his life unhappy. He died in 1642, the year of Newton's birth.

Science was now in a very different condition from that in which Galileo had found it. Immense strides had been made in Astronomy, Mathematics and Physics; the telescope was in full use, the thermometer was invented, the microscope was soon to follow. The experimental method had displaced the old trust in authority, so that future advance seemed certain. Nor did the fate of Galileo at once act as a deterrent.

Soon after Galileo's death his former assistant, Castelli, a Friar (*d.* 1644), was teaching his master's doctrines in Rome itself. For it was not so much the Copernican system as Galileo's uncompromising attitude to which the Church objected. Indeed, he was told by Jesuits that if he had obtained their friendship he might have taught anything he liked. Castelli was an early authority on Hydraulics; he superintended drainage works for Urban VIII and Ferdinando II, and published a book on the "Measure of Running Water." Hydraulics were an important practical matter in a country which needed so much artificial drainage, and they obtained the attention of another pupil of Galileo, Torricelli. Torricelli (*d.* 1666) had stayed with Galileo at Arcetri on terms of affectionate intimacy. He became physician to the Grand Duke, but continued his researches in pure and applied Mathematics. It was Torricelli who invented the barometer, but Viviani, also a pupil of Galileo, actually constructed the first from Torricelli's description. Both pure and applied Mathematics were steadily pushed forward in many directions. Viviani (1622-1703) gave special attention to Conic Sections. He endeavoured to supply the lost book of Apollonius, and,

when the real one was discovered, his version was found to be nearly correct. Viviani had been Galileo's favourite pupil, and was treated by him like a son. He wrote Galileo's life, and is buried with him at Santa Croce. He was a Fellow of the Royal Society of London, and a member of the Paris Academy.

Cavalieri (1598-1647), a Milanese Jesuit, who was Professor at Bologna, laid the basis of Infinitesimal Calculus. In Optics one of the most important discoveries was made by a Bolognese, Grimaldi (1618-63), who anticipated the undulatory theory of light. Newton did not agree with this theory, but it was afterwards proved to be correct, and indeed to form one of the fundamental Laws of Physics.

In Astronomy the principal worker was Domenico Cassini (1625-1712), who was Professor at Bologna in 1650. He wrote a treatise on the Comets, and calculated the rotation of certain planets. Though he was on friendly terms with the Popes, it was probably dread of interference from the Inquisition which made him accept Colbert's offer of the post of Royal Astronomer of France (1669). Here he continued his discoveries, and four of his relations succeeded him in the office. After Cassini's departure Astronomy languished in Italy; no doubt it was thought too dangerous a form of study to be profitable. The founder of Geology and Crystallography was Stensen, a Danish immigrant, physician to Ferdinand II and tutor to the sons of Cosimo III. He discovered the nature of fossils, observed stratification, and asserted that Tuscany had once been under the sea. Rather unluckily he was converted to Catholicism, and, failing to reconcile his geological discoveries with the teaching of the Church, he gave up Science, and became a missionary to the Danes.

It was in Florence that the chief advances both in Physics and Biology were made, under the patronage of the enlightened Grand Duke, Ferdinando II, and his brother, Prince Leopoldo, himself a pupil of Galileo. Learned men were attracted from

all parts and given facilities for research. A laboratory was provided in the Duke's Palace, and Leopoldo entrusted with its direction. In 1657 the group of scientists were organised into a society, called the *Accademia del Cimento* (Experimental Society), of which Leopoldo was President. Many foreign scientists corresponded as honorary members with the Academy. Its joint work was clearly described by the secretary, Magalotti, in a beautifully illustrated book¹. In this Galileo's thermometer and Viviani's barometer are described; also the pendulum, whose use Galileo had first divined, and the hygrometer, invented by the Academy. There is a series of meteorological observations made by order of the Grand Duke in various places, including Warsaw and Innsbruck. There are descriptions of experiments in the velocity of sound and light, in the resistance of air and water, in magnetism, electricity, phosphorescence, projectiles and astronomy.

Besides Viviani, the most noted members of the Academy were its founders, Borelli (1608-79), a Neapolitan, and Malpighi (1628-94), a Bolognese. Malpighi was by far the most distinguished biologist of the age, and was the first to use the microscope for the study of minute structure. With its help he laid the foundations of embryology and histology, and of vegetable and animal morphology. He first grasped the fact that both vegetable and animal life, including man, have a common structure and similar laws of growth. At Pisa Malpighi and Borelli worked together, but after a time they unfortunately quarrelled. Malpighi returned to Bologna, and henceforth most of his work was published by the Royal Society of London. Borelli went to Sicily, where he investigated an eruption of Etna. Suspected of a share in the rebellion, he fled to Rome, where he might have starved had it not been for Queen Cristina, who maintained him and published his great work on animal motion. Under the

¹ *Saggi di Naturali Esperienze fatti nell' Accademia del Cimento.*

influence of Galileo's training he studied motion from the physicist's standpoint, and his work is full of mechanical problems. He was also something of an astronomer, and had an elementary notion of gravitation.

The quarrels of Borelli with Malpighi and Viviani weakened the Accademia del Cimento; in 1666 it was moreover deprived of its President, for Prince Leopoldo was made a Cardinal. The Academy did not survive his loss, for the age of scientific enthusiasm in Italy was drawing to a close. Gradually the increasing mental debility of the people, the control of education by the Jesuits, and the steady discouragement of the authorities did their work. The mantle of science fell upon northern nations, and Italy was left to intellectual darkness.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

THE WARS OF 1690—1714.

BETWEEN 1690 and 1748 Italy was, as she had been just two centuries previously, the theatre of a succession of important European wars. From the peace of 1559 until 1690 the state of the peninsula had not greatly changed, though the influence of Spain had, outside her own possessions, gradually given place to that of France. Though France possessed no more Italian territory than in 1559,—merely having exchanged Saluzzo for Pinerolo,—Louis XIV had been able to exercise almost a tyranny in Italy.

The territorial changes which had taken place during this period were the addition of Ferrara, Urbino and Castro to the direct dominions of the Church, and the division of Montferrat between Mantua and Savoy. But the Italian balance of power had entirely changed. Venice, her face turned steadfastly eastward, had lost her predominance; the Papacy, excluded from European politics, had become provincial; Tuscany was hardly more important than Parma. But Savoy, on account of its situation and the political activity of its rulers, took the lead in, and held the key to, the peninsula. Although since 1642 it seemed to have slipped back, its new young Duke was

to recover all, and more than all, that had been lost. In 1690 it was very dependent on France; it emerged from the War of the Grand Alliance a European Power, small indeed, yet strong by reason of the energy, courage and skill of its ruler, the patriotic endurance of its people, and its situation of extraordinary strategic importance.

Its military organisation was well suited to its position and capabilities. The small, but highly trained, standing army could quickly be supplemented by a good militia, while every able-bodied man received some military training and was ready to defend his own locality. The country was full of forts, and local levies were always ready to co-operate with the regular garrisons. Catinat's army was surrounded by bands of fierce irregulars, which hindered its operations at every turn. The war in Piedmont was particularly ferocious, partly on this account, partly because of Louis' hatred of the Duke, and desire to hasten his ruin: "Burn! Burn!" was the burden of Catinat's instructions, and Catinat had to order that every man found in arms should be instantly executed. Piedmont was, however, very different from the Palatinate, and was defended with much vigour and skill. On August 17th, 1690, Catinat succeeded in luring Vittorio Amedeo into a pitched battle at Staffarda, in which the French general's skill gained him a decisive victory; but Vittorio Amedeo only called out the rest of his militia and made fresh preparations for defence. Catinat was able to conquer all Savoy, except Montmélian; but Piedmont was far from subdued, and Louis' sanguine expectations of crushing Vittorio Amedeo at a blow were disappointed.

In 1691 Catinat captured Nice and besieged Cuneo. But Cuneo was true to its traditions of successful defiance of France, and held out till Prince Eugene was able to relieve it. Meanwhile Vittorio Amedeo had been pressing for more assistance from the Allies, who were inclined to regard the Italian war as of little importance. William III, however,

held that Dauphiné and Provence were France's most vulnerable points ;—"From Piedmont only," he said, "may we hope to bring the French to reason." An Imperial army, under Maximilian of Bavaria, reinforced by Huguenot refugees under Schomberg, was accordingly sent to Italy, but unfortunately the instructions given to the Imperial commissioner, Caraffa, were not at all such as William III intended. He was to hold the French in check, but not to risk his army seriously, and his principal object was to be the re-establishment of the Imperial authority and prestige in Italy. France being for the moment excluded from Italy, most of the States received the Imperial pretensions meekly. Large contributions on feudal grounds were demanded and paid, with much complaint, but with little resistance. The Grand Duke, however, whose daughter was married to the Elector Palatine, brother of the Empress, managed to pay only on his strictly Imperial fiefs, and also secured the "Trattamento Reale" at the Imperial Court, which had been so lately granted to Savoy. The Duke of Mantua could not escape by a mere money payment the punishment due to his late French alliance and the sale of Casale to France. Louis could not protect him, nor even secure neutrality for him now. No preparations for defence had been made when, in 1689, he was attacked by the Governor of Milan ; the ministers had fled, the Duke was amusing himself at Venice. The Duchess did all she could to protect the people, though she dared not resist in arms. In 1691, promising to preserve neutrality and to destroy the fortifications of Guastalla, which had been built at the instigation of France, she obtained a nominal peace ; but it gave no security to the people, upon whom much of the Imperial army was now quartered, and no immunity from the huge feudal contributions demanded by the Emperor.

Thus employed, the Imperial commissioner had no intention of risking his army amongst the mountains to save Savoy, and Montmélian surrendered after a year's gallant

resistance. Vittorio Amedeo had to learn that the possession of Savoy was rather a burden than a defence against France. The Duke clamoured to the Allies about Caraffa's obstinacy and slowness, and William III persuaded the Emperor to substitute Caprera. But Caprera brought no change of system. Though Catinat's army was much weakened in 1692, and might have been driven out of Italy, the Spaniards insisted on besieging Casale. Vittorio Amedeo wanted Pinerolo, which the Allies had indeed promised him, but he could not attack Catinat alone, and the year was wasted in raids over the French borders, which Catinat could well afford to neglect.

In 1693 the Imperialists joined Vittorio Amedeo in an attack on Pinerolo, but it was now too late. Catinat had received considerable reinforcements, and his superior generalship enabled him to win a signal victory at Marsaglia (Oct. 4th), in which the Allies lost more than a third of their forces. It was the turning-point of the war, and led Vittorio Amedeo, who had long been hesitating, to accept the best terms of peace from France that he could get.

Louis had never wished for war in Italy; he had quite enough to do in other directions, and, had it not been for his greed for Casale and foolish contempt for Vittorio Amedeo, this extra embarrassment might well have been avoided. Now he was doing all he could, consistent with his exaggerated sense of dignity, to put a stop to it. He assured the other Princes that he only wished to obtain neutrality for Italy, and to protect her from Imperial pretensions; he asked the Pope and Venice to mediate between him and Savoy. Nor did Spain wish for Italian war, nor for the presence of a large Imperial army in Lombardy. But the Emperor was pleased with this chance for reviving Imperial claims in Italy, and for making preparations to secure the Spanish dominions there for himself. Milan had been granted by Charles V to the male descendants of Philip II only, so that the Emperor had a more definite claim to it than to any other part of the Spanish dominions. Hence his objections to the neutrality of Italy.

A French envoy, Rébenac, had been for some time travelling in Italy (1691-1692), endeavouring to create an anti-Imperial League. The Duke of Mantua, still longing for a renewal of the French alliance, received him warmly. When, in 1694, the Emperor ordered him to dismiss another French agent, the Duke said, "You depart, and I must stay here like a body without a soul; but assure His Majesty that I only remain to see if I can be of service to him." Elsewhere Rébenac found that, though the Emperor was feared, France was not loved. Genoa had not yet re-built the Palaces which the French had destroyed. Rébenac warned the Dukes of Parma, Tuscany and Modena that the Emperor's present claims were only the thin end of the wedge; that he meant to incorporate Parma and Modena into the Duchy of Milan, and that Tuscany would not escape with independence. Parma and Modena actually promised to co-operate with a French army, should it appear in Lombardy. They probably felt tolerably safe from any such contingency.

Tuscany was conciliated by a treaty recognizing the neutrality of the port of Livorno, but the Grand Duke would only promise to join an anti-Imperial League if the Pope would do so. But Innocent XII hated both politics and war. Both Alexander VIII (1689) and Innocent XII (1691) were friendly towards France, but insisted on the suppression of the Articles promulgated by the French assembly in 1682, and these were finally withdrawn. Reconciliation did not however entail alliance, and Innocent, "timoré au delà de tout ce qu'on peut imaginer," refused to commit himself to anything which might lead to war, even though Rébenac tried to frighten him with tales of the Lutherans and Huguenots in the Imperial army, and of the Emperor's intentions to revive old Imperial claims against the Papacy. Innocent simply replied that all his energy was absorbed in aiding the Holy League against the Turks.

For the same reason Venice also refused to engage in Italian affairs. She was bound to the Emperor by the Holy

League, and knew that France rejoiced in the loss of her Eastern commerce. She was however outwardly friendly to Louis, and he believed that she would not in the long run submit to the re-establishment of the Imperial power in Italy.

Vittorio Amedeo profited by the difficulties of France, and determined to make out of them a good bargain for himself. He could not feel bound by any exaggerated sense of loyalty towards the Allies, who, with the exception of William III, had done very little for him. It was not to be expected that they would exert themselves greatly to secure good terms for him in future peace negotiations, and he thought he might forestall them. The death of Louvois (1691), hastened, it was said, by Catinat's repulse from Cuneo, removed his bitterest enemy, and made Louis still more ready for peace. However, his earlier offers to Vittorio Amedeo, in the winters of 1691-1693, made no mention of Pinerolo, without which the Duke would never come to terms. Casale was offered him instead, but Vittorio Amedeo refused it, as the "skin of the bear which has not yet been trapped." After the battle of Marsaglia, however, Vittorio Amedeo was determined on peace, and, as he knew that the Allies were daily becoming less anxious for a continuance of war, he wished to get his affairs settled before general negotiations began. But, willing to give the Allies another chance, he asked the Emperor to agree to the neutrality of Italy. Leopold flatly refused, and William III urged the Duke to go on fighting, or at least to negotiate for the whole Alliance at once.

In the winter of 1694, England and Holland put forward peace propositions in which Pinerolo was not mentioned, although the Grand Alliance had promised it to Savoy; William III openly said that, considering French successes in Italy, it could not be demanded. At the same time, Vittorio Amedeo's request to be made Governor of Milan, in order that he might prosecute the war with vigour, was refused. On the other hand, the Duke's negotiations with France were pro-

gressing, and a good understanding had already been reached, whose effects were to be shown in the coming campaign.

Casale was still blockaded, but it could not resist much longer. And Vittorio Amedeo was not going to permit the establishment of such an Imperial fortress at his very doors. He arranged with Louis that the French should offer to surrender on condition that the fortifications were demolished, and the town restored to Gonzaga. The Allies naturally objected to such terms, but Vittorio Amedeo persuaded them to give way, and the famous fortifications were razed. Then the Allies proposed to attack Pinerolo, and the Duke wrote to France that he could not refuse the proposal, but would instead make peace with France immediately, if Pinerolo were promised to him. It was a hard thing to ask of the proud Louis, who had never yet ceded anything to an enemy, but Vittorio Amedeo would accept no other terms. Yet it was of great importance to Louis to break up the Grand Alliance by making peace with one of its members separately, and of still greater importance to have Savoy as his ally in the coming struggle over the Spanish inheritance; otherwise, he could never reach Milan. At last Louis yielded, and the treaty was signed at Pinerolo in June, 1696. Pinerolo, its fortifications demolished, was to be ceded as soon as a general peace was concluded. Before publishing this treaty, the Emperor was again to be asked to agree to Italian neutrality; if he refused, Savoy would join France in attacking Milan. Milan was spoken of as Savoy's share in the Spanish inheritance. Again the Emperor refused the suggested neutrality, which would of course involve the withdrawal of his army from Milan, where it was so comfortably established, waiting for the death of the King of Spain.

In August, a new treaty, amplifying the last, was signed at Turin between France and Savoy. Savoy was to receive the "Trattamento Reale," and Vittorio Amedeo's daughter, Adelaide, was to be married to the Duke of Burgundy, the

Dauphin's eldest son. Then Vittorio Amedeo, with a rapidity which took away the Allies' breath, joined forces with Catinat, and marched to invade the Milanese.

The Imperial army, though it might bully helpless Italians, could not face the united forces of France and Piedmont, and the Allies sulkily agreed to a conference at Vigevano, where Vittorio Amedeo mediated between them and France. The King of Spain, trembling for Milan, and by no means pleased with the Emperor's post-obit arrangements about his property, wished for a general as well as an Italian peace, but only the latter was negotiated at Vigevano. The Italian Princes had to pay the expenses of withdrawing the Austrian army; but, though thankful to be rid of it, they could not believe it would be long absent.

The Venetian ambassador in Paris asserts that Pomponne proposed Venice as the mediator of a general peace. This was probably only intended as flattery, for Venice was now too weak to influence Europe; but Pomponne frequently pointed out to her that Austria would only favour her as long as she was useful in the Turkish war. This in fact Venice learned to her cost in the Peace of Carlowitz (p. 139).

The anti-Habsburg, Italian confederation which France still continued to urge was now quite impossible. Austria had used her ascendancy in Italy to draw the Princes into the net of Habsburg marriage alliances, from which Spain had allowed them to escape. A sister of the Empress and of the Elector Palatine was to marry the Duke of Parma. The daughter of Cosimo III was already married to the Elector Palatine, and his younger son, Gian Gastone, was now betrothed to the Elector's widowed sister-in-law. A German wife was also found for the Duke of Modena. For the present, Imperial influence decidedly outweighed that of France.

In the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) the public clauses of the Treaty of Turin were confirmed. The Grand Alliance had certainly succeeded in checking the advance of Louis XIV,

and in overthrowing his domination in Italy. He had lost Pinerolo and Casale, and the Princes no longer feared him. No one had gained so much as Savoy. The fatal Treaty of Cherasco was at last reversed; the constant menace of Casale was removed. As Vittorio Amedeo stood in Pinerolo he must have felt himself indeed master in his own States. Yet more, Savoy had taken its place amongst the chief European Powers; she had forced France to treat her as an equal, had held the balance of power and was undoubtedly leader of Italy.

The Peace of Ryswick was intended to allow of a peaceable solution of the Spanish Succession question, and negotiations for a partition at once began. By the Partition Treaty of 1698, Milan was to be given to Austria, Naples, the Presidi and Finale to France. The treaty was a monument of political cynicism, since the signatories did not consult the rulers and much less the inhabitants of the countries portioned out. But Vittorio Amedeo considered that he ought to have a voice in the matter. The future of Milan was of great importance to him, and he even laid claim to a share in the whole inheritance. This claim, derived from the wife of Vittorio Amedeo I, who was Philip II's daughter, was certainly very remote; but the Duke had the indomitable hopefulness of Carlo Emanuele I, and believed that one party or the other would give him a piece of Lombardy to gain his alliance. At present the Allies were angry with him; and Louis, though he instructed his ambassador to mention Vittorio Amedeo's claims, was not sorry when William III refused to recognize them. "Your Majesty will see with pleasure," wrote the French ambassador, "that the negotiations incline to the Electoral Prince. The Duke of Savoy is ambitious, thrifty, clever, capable of restoring the finances of Spain and of building fortresses there.....while, under the Elector, Spain will remain as it is."

Yet Louis took care not to alienate Vittorio Amedeo. He no longer under-estimated his skill, cunning and energy, and

French ambassadors were instructed to act with great caution, careful to assure the Duke of the King's friendliness, yet to discourage any ambitious schemes which might disturb the present peace. He was to be watched carefully, though secretly, lest he should re-open negotiations with Austria.

The attitude of the Duke was very reserved; he hoped that France would make him a good offer for the continuation of his alliance; but, in his caution, he let slip the opportunity of participating in the Partition Treaty of 1700. This treaty would have made France the leading Power in Italy, for Milan, though not actually to become a French possession, was to belong to the Duke of Lorraine, whom France could easily control. Italy would have again been obliged to submit to foreign domination, and Savoy would have been shut in between States practically French. Accordingly, Vittorio Amedeo began again to negotiate with Austria; but he had so poor an opinion of the Emperor that he would not sign any definite agreement, hoping that he might still get better terms from France.

The birth of his eldest son, after many years of marriage, gave him a new enthusiasm for the future of his House, and he vigorously pressed his claim to a share in the Spanish inheritance on France, England and Holland. His rights were not positively denied, and various plans were put forward on his behalf, none of which pleased everyone. Vittorio Amedeo would not, unless for very favourable terms, commit himself, until the death of Charles II should show whether the last Partition Treaty would ever be carried out. Louis only pretended to favour Vittorio Amedeo's claims in order to prevent him from coming to an understanding with the Emperor; and, when, on the King of Spain's death, Louis accepted the whole of his inheritance for the Duke of Anjou, Vittorio Amedeo was informed that, as the Spanish property was not to be divided, France understood the late propositions to lapse. Yet Louis knew that he would find it hard to secure Milan for his grandson without the Duke's consent, and hence

offered him alliance, subsidies, the command of the Franco-Spanish army in Lombardy, and a marriage for his younger daughter with the new King of Spain, but no territorial advantages. Vittorio Amedeo found it hard to refuse, though territorial expansion was the chief thing for which he cared; but there was at present no Grand Alliance which could protect him from the French army now at the foot of the Alps, and demanding passage through his States. The treaty was signed in April, 1701, and Vittorio Amedeo and his army joined the French in invading Lombardy. "After five months of manœuvring I have been obliged to sign the treaty," he wrote. Neutrality, which would have left his States at the mercy of France, was impossible; but he was secretly determined to sell his services for more favourable terms at the first convenient opportunity.

Though the whole of Italy was certainly affected by the course of affairs, it was the Papacy alone which had in any way influenced them. The attitude of the Papacy requires some explanation. It was only in 1692 that it was reconciled to France after a peculiarly bitter quarrel, yet in 1700 Innocent XII advised Charles II to bequeath his whole monarchy to the grandson of Louis XIV.

The Popes no longer possessed any international importance, nor could the petty Papal States, much though the Popes had sacrificed for them, secure them any influence in European politics. The real importance of the Papacy lay in its position in the Italian State system, and its part in the Italian balance of power. Hence its first object was to prevent Milan and Naples from falling into the hands of a first-rate Power. If the Partition Treaty were carried out, they would become French, which was certainly to be avoided; if Charles II left them by will to Austria, the danger to the Papacy would be still greater. France was a really Catholic Power, while Austria was the ally of northern Protestants, and the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire itself was no longer essentially Catholic. Above all, Austria once established in

Italy would assert Imperial claims, which would be exceedingly inconvenient to the Papacy. But Louis XIV could not live for ever, and, if the Duke of Anjou received the whole inheritance, Milan and Naples would once more be ultimately controlled by a weak King of Spain. These were the reasons for Innocent's advice to Charles II, and in the next Conclave the Cardinals elected a Pope of decided French leanings, Clement XI. Clement had assisted in the reconciliation of France to the Papacy in 1692, and, as Minister to Innocent XII, had determined that Pope's favourable policy towards France. But, now that he was Pope, Clement showed a rather unexpected caution. The Grand Alliance would certainly be renewed, and an Austrian army was preparing for Italy; to commit the Papacy unreservedly to France was a greater risk than he cared to take.

Of the Italian States most directly affected, Milan was determined, if possible, to escape an Austrian domination. The French were unknown, the Spaniards known and despised, but the Germans were known and sincerely detested. The Imperial army had not spread its terrors in vain, and Milan willingly accepted Philip V (the Duke of Anjou), and prepared to resist Austria.

The Neapolitans, on the other hand, had no experience of Germans, but had a lively dislike for Frenchmen. Helped by Imperial agents, Neapolitan nobles prepared a plot against Philip V, but it was a total failure. The people, who hated their own nobles more than any foreigners, refused to rise; the insurgents were easily mastered, and Philip V was somewhat grudgingly accepted as King by Naples and Sicily.

Meanwhile, Louis XIV was making the best of his opportunities before the Grand Alliance should be formed anew. A skilful diplomat, Cardinal d'Estrées, was busy preparing the way for the French in Italy. He suggested an Italian league, with the Pope at its head, not to act on the offensive, but merely to keep out the Imperial army. But Louis' experience

might have taught him that, though an Imperial army was dreaded, Italy had no centripetal force which could unite it to resist any sort of cataclysm. The Pope could not lead, nor would the other States follow him. Neither had they any enthusiasm for the French. Why, indeed, should Italians exert themselves for either France or Spain? War must in any case bring suffering upon them. Why augment it by needlessly infuriating the Germans? The Pope and Venice declared themselves neutral, and the Pope refused the investiture of the Sicilies to both claimants. The attitude of Venice was of much importance, since she could, by closing her passes, make access into Italy very difficult to the Germans. It was evidently dangerous to Venice that Austria should hold Milan and so nearly surround her territories, while Austrian claims on Lombardy must logically lead to an assault on her *terra-firma*. Yet the late Eastern war had left her utterly exhausted, and a breach with the Emperor would embolden the Turks to attack her newly won Morea. A quarrel with France would be ruinous to her commerce. But she made some preparations to defend her territories from the raids of either party.

At Venice d'Estrées found the Duke of Mantua amusing himself as usual. Ferdinando Carlo was terribly afraid, and with good reason, of Austria, and he had no intention of fighting to defend his States; so he sold Mantua itself to France for a sum down and a new pension. French troops surrounded the town; and, after a feigned resistance, arranged to impose upon the Emperor, it surrendered (April, 1701). Louis XIV wrote to d'Estrées, "It is necessary to save the feebler Princes of Italy without consulting them, even sometimes in spite of themselves." But the Duke of Mantua had been "saved" with his own consent.

Renato of Modena promised to resist the Imperial army, but privately made a compact with the Emperor, thus hoping to escape the worst consequences of war. Francesco III of

Parma hoped to shelter himself by declaring that he was a vassal of the Church. Genoa and Lucca took refuge in neutrality. The Grand Duke actually recognized Philip V as King of Spain, in order that he might receive investiture of Siena from him; yet, "fearing war all the more because he has never seen it," he really meant to be neutral. France would not conciliate him by granting the "Trattamento Reale," and family ties drew him towards Germany. The Emperor asked him quite politely for a subsidy, and Cosimo had only himself and his showy style of living to blame if people wrongly believed him to be rich.

Early in 1701 an Austrian army entered Italy. It was small, but it was strong in its commander. Prince Eugene was devoted to the Austrian service; he was young, daring, and emboldened by his recent successes against the Turks. He passed the Alps with masterly rapidity, and encamped with the permission of Venice along the Adige. The French general, Catinat, experienced but rather old-fashioned, was hampered by instructions from Paris, and by the rivalry of Vaudemont, Governor of Milan. Only after Catinat had beaten Eugene at Carpi (July 12th), and driven him back to the Mincio, did Vittorio Amedeo join the French army. He had been busy marrying his daughter to Philip V. But when he arrived, the quarrels of the commanders increased, and the replacement of Catinat by Villeroi only made matters worse. Villeroi offended Vittorio Amedeo by familiarly calling him "Monsieur de Savoie." Against the opinion of his colleagues he attacked Eugene, and was defeated at Chiari (in Brescian territory, Aug. 29th). He then retired into winter quarters behind the Oglio, and Vittorio Amedeo made this an excuse for going home. But Eugene took the opportunity to seize several fortresses south of the Po, to blockade Mantua, and to invade Ferrara and Parma, declaring Parma to be an Imperial fief. In January, 1702, he nearly took Cremona by a night attack, and made Villeroi himself prisoner. Thus the

Imperialists were active all through the winter, keeping the French in a state of nervous suspense. The French commanders were indolent and extravagant; the soldiers were ill-disciplined, and numbers deserted; they gained the people's hatred by their treatment of churches and women. The Venetians, nominally neutral, were ill-treated by both armies alike, and the *terra-firma*, so long at peace, found itself a prey to the worst evils of war. French ships sailed up the sacred Adriatic, and burned an Austrian boat within the port of Venice. A contemporary versifier wrote of Venice:

“Tell me the truth, is it peace or war?
It is not war, since I am yet at peace.
It is not peace, since I am full of war.”

The Italians would not fight for their opinions, but often expressed them in satirical or allegorical verses. In one of these, the Duke of Mantua is called “the prodigal son, asking pardon of his father” (the Emperor); the Neapolitans waiting for Philip V are “the souls in Purgatory waiting for Christ.”

But in 1702 Vendôme, with eighty thousand troops, drove Eugene, who had only twenty-eight thousand, from Mantua. The Duke and his Court resumed their dissipations as if nothing had happened: “One would hardly believe that war is at the gates.” The Duke even thought that he would like to play at being a general, though most of his officers resigned at the prospect of fighting; “His fancy to be a captain and a knight-errant made him forget his natural cowardice.” But he gave so much trouble that he was soon made to retire to Casale, taking with him “his carriage, confidantes and part of his musical staff, male and female, with his poet, to prepare an Opera.”

In 1702 Philip V visited Italy. He was well received in Naples, and made himself so popular that a statue of him was erected; but there was a good deal of discontent, especially amongst the clergy. The Pope sent a Nuncio to meet him, but would not grant the investiture. In fact the Pope's delay

in this matter had caused both claimants to act as though it were not required. At Livorno Philip was met by the Grand Duke, and everyone said that a Franco-Tuscan alliance would soon be announced. Cosimo was indeed balancing himself on his insecure seat of neutrality, and he did not please France by maintaining the freedom of the port of Livorno, and thus giving Austria a naval refuge in the western Mediterranean.

Next Philip met Vittorio Amedeo at Acqui. But as he had promised Cosimo to accord to the Duke no higher honours than to himself, they quarrelled about etiquette. Vittorio Amedeo said he would not dine with Philip unless he might occupy a chair of equal dimensions, and went off the next day, angrily declaring that he would not join the French army that year nor submit to a French general. Matters were not going smoothly between France and Savoy. When England, Holland and Austria completed their alliance in 1701, Vittorio Amedeo asked Louis for Montferrat. Louis evaded the request, and did not listen when his ambassador in Savoy urged the necessity of bribing the Duke. Vittorio Amedeo intercepted the King's correspondence with his ambassador, and learned that Louis was glad that he did not mean to join the army, and spoke of him with bitterness and suspicion. He considered his own army insulted when the King required only half the number of Piedmontese troops that year, and hoarded the money thus saved for a future revenge. In spite of the ambassador's vigilance, he was negotiating with the Allies, and Queen Anne herself was trying to reconcile his demands with the Emperor's offers.

The war was everywhere going badly for the Emperor. In Italy Philip V had joined Vendôme, and participated in his triumphant advance. Modena was occupied, the Duke driven into exile; Eugene had to retreat to the Mincio. In the winter he went to Vienna, and said that he would not return to Italy without reinforcements. A very inferior general, Stahremberg, took his place. Had it not been for the courage

of the Tyrolese in repulsing him, the Elector of Bavaria would, early in 1703, have joined Vendôme in Italy.

The Emperor grew more amenable, and made better offers to Vittorio Amedeo. Yet Louis would not believe his ambassador when he wrote that a treaty was nearly concluded, and that the Duke must "either be contented or crushed." At last he offered Montferrat. Vittorio Amedeo tried to lengthen out negotiations until he could get his army home, but for once Louis was too quick for him. Vendôme disarmed all the Piedmontese troops that were with him, imprisoned the officers, and marched upon Piedmont. Vittorio Amedeo made hasty preparations to defend Turin and called out the militia, but his position was precarious; Vendôme was at hand, the Imperial army far off and weak. Even then he made capital out of his own difficulties, and told the Imperial envoy that he would submit to France unless the Emperor added Vigevano to the other cessions which were promised him by the treaty. The envoy protested, but gave way, and the treaty was signed (Nov. 8th). England and Holland promised subsidies, the Emperor an army to join the Piedmontese. The Duke was to be commander-in-chief in Italy, and he was to receive all Montferrat, Alessandria, Valenza, the Valsesia and the Lomellina, with their dependencies; the Emperor would confirm the investiture of the Langhe fiefs. But Casale was not to be refortified. The ultimate claims of the Duke on the Spanish succession were recognized. By secret clauses the Duke was also to receive Vigevano and part of the Novarese; France was to be invaded, and conquests made at her expense to be shared between Savoy and Austria. The Emperor refused to ratify the clause relating to Vigevano, but promised compensation elsewhere.

The treaty signed, Vittorio Amedeo prepared to resist France; saying he "would rather die in arms than bear the shame of further oppression." One French army under Tessé occupied Savoy, and besieged Montmélian. Vendôme had to hold Stahremberg in check and threaten Vercelli, but in the

winter Stahremberg managed to circumvent him and bring some troops into Piedmont. Vittorio Amedeo tried hard to get the Swiss to take Savoy itself under their protection, even offering it as a member of the Confederation of the Republic, but the Swiss were too much afraid of Louis XIV to accept the offer.

The year 1704 was a disastrous one for Vittorio Amedeo. Eugene was fighting in the Battle of Blenheim, but the effects of this victory did not yet reach Italy. The Austrians could barely hold the Tyrolese borders, while two French armies under Vendôme and La Feuillade concentrated upon Piedmont. Vercelli, Susa, the Val d'Aosta were taken. Montmélian fell after a year's gallant defence. La Feuillade subjugated the province of Nice and then took the town (April, 1705). Vendôme attacked Verrua (Oct. 1704); but its brave resistance under its gallant captain, Baron d'Allery, really saved Piedmont. Vittorio Amedeo co-operated from without in harassing the besiegers, and it was not till Vendôme succeeded in isolating Verrua by destroying the Po bridge that the town surrendered (April, 1705). Turin was now the only important fortress left to Vittorio Amedeo.

In Germany and Spain the Allies prospered meanwhile; it was only in Italy that France was triumphant. England and Holland urged the Emperor to send speedy help, and themselves subsidised Prussian regiments for Italy. Eugene prepared to come to the rescue of his hard-pressed cousin. The death of the Emperor Leopold (May, 1705) and the succession of Joseph I gave greater cohesion and energy to the Imperial policy.

During the winter the French prepared defensive works along the Adda and Oglio to resist Eugene. They occupied the Polesina and took Mirandola to prevent him from marching round their southern flank. Eugene reached Italy in April; Vendôme opposed him, while La Feuillade prepared to besiege Turin. During a brief absence of Vendôme, Eugene slipped

across the Oglio; in August Vendôme defeated him as he tried to cross the Adda (Battle of Cassano). The battle was disastrous to both armies; in Lodi the boys sang, "At Cassano twelve thousand Germans were slain; but when we turn them over to look, we find that after all they are Monsièes (Messieurs)." Vendôme could not co-operate in the siege of Turin, and it had to be abandoned for the year.

Vittorio Amedeo made good use of the respite; and, when La Feuillade appeared in the spring of 1706 with a vast siege train, including 128 guns, Turin bristled with fortifications, and was full of provisions and munitions of war. The citizens were loyal and determined on resistance. D'Allery, the hero of Verrua, and a capable German, Count Daun, commanded the defence. Vittorio Amedeo left the city just before the siege began, and harassed the enemy from without; but the French army was overwhelming. Vittorio Amedeo knew that Turin could only resist a few months, and constantly begged Eugene to hasten. "As long as Turin holds out," he wrote, "you may conquer the French; if you let it fall, they will drive you from Italy; you must even venture a battle to avoid such a calamity." But across Lombardy stretched a barrier of French fortifications and troops which Eugene, for all his efforts, could not pass.

However, in May was fought the Battle of Ramillies, and then Vendôme, the one unbeaten French general, was recalled from Italy to oppose Marlborough. Eugene quickly outwitted his successor, the Duke of Orleans, and forced a way amidst masses of enemies, through Ferrara, Modena and Parma, towards Piedmont. Orleans hurried to Turin, hoping to take it before Eugene could arrive. The fighting round the city was very fierce; on August 29th the French were actually entering a defence work, called the "Mezzaluna" of Porta Susa, when a mine exploded beneath them. It was a mine whose train had not been laid, but it was fired from within by a soldier who was blown up with the French above. His name,

Pietro Micca, is held sacred in Piedmontese history. Two days later, the citizens saw, on the Colle di Superga, the signal which announced the approach of their deliverers. On the same hill Vittorio Amedeo vowed to build a church to the Blessed Virgin should victory be granted him. The French had fifty thousand, the Allies thirty-five thousand troops; but the latter had one commander of genius, and one of splendid courage, doubly animated by despair. The battle took place on September 7th, and ended in the complete rout of the French, with a loss of twenty thousand men. Their whole equipment and camp furniture were taken. The handsome church of the Madonna on the Colle di Superga commemorates the battle to this day. In a short time Piedmont was clear of the French, and Vittorio Amedeo and Eugene turned back to conquer Lombardy.

Weary of the bad discipline, loose morals and domineering manners of the French, the Milanese now accepted the new régime, which, after all, could hardly be much worse than that of the Spanish. "Milan smiles," wrote a citizen, "and cannot sufficiently express her gladness. Eugene was met with cries of 'Long live the Emperor.' He must have been deafened by the cheering...handkerchiefs and laurel boughs were waved." This vociferous greeting contrasted strongly with the ominous silence which had greeted Philip's reception. Eugene governed well; his troops behaved like "Religious of the strictest observance," a pleasant change after French debauchery. Even the Hussars were kept in good order, though their appearance seems to have been alarming. "They are black, with shaved heads and great moustaches, like bridges turned upside down, and with caps of sheep and cow-skin, frightful and terrible; they fly so fast over the ground that their horses seem to be enchanted."

The castle of Milan, which held out with a French garrison, was besieged by Count Daun (Feb. 1707). Fortunately the gunners of the garrison were Milanese, and in firing on the city did as little harm as they dared. On March 12th, the

castle surrendered, the garrison retiring unmolested, while the Milanese prophesied that "they would return on the day of Judgment." Some other Lombard fortresses which still resisted were evacuated at the same time.

Thus ended the Spanish rule in Lombardy, unlamented, unregretted. It had lasted a century and a half, and, though of late not actively vicious, was passively as unsatisfactory as any government could well be, incapable of improvement, thoroughly decadent. Would revived Austria communicate its vitality to its new dependency?

The effects of the collapse of French power in Lombardy were felt throughout the Peninsula, particularly in Mantua. The Duke, having become a widower in 1703, had gone to France to seek a wife, first sending an agent to prospect as if for a new *Prima Donna*. In Paris the Duke's intrigues amongst the ladies delighted the rather dull Court. Finally he returned to Italy with a youthful bride, *Mademoiselle d'Elbœuf*. The expulsion of the French frightened him again to Venice, where "he found himself so delighted to be no longer in Mantua, that he enjoyed in great tranquillity the pleasures of the Carnival." France made no terms for him, but offered him a pension, which he, with unusual dignity, refused. The Emperor took possession of Mantua as an Imperial fief, and the Duke died in 1708. So ended the main line of the Gonzaga, a survival of Italy's free and prosperous days, once dignified and honourable, but long since decadent, ruined by idleness, luxury and debauchery. The French branch of the House had begun well, but quickly followed its predecessor on the downward path. Again it was shown that French heads could not withstand the intoxication of Italy. There were younger branches in petty principalities; one, the Duke of Guastalla, hoped for Mantua, but the Emperor realized its value, and kept it for himself. Even when the Emperor Joseph invested his brother with Milan, he retained Mantua in his own hands.

Venice felt her situation to be very precarious. The war

had been fought in great part within her borders, her territories had suffered severely, and she had not even been able to keep foreign troops out of her fortified towns. She had resisted all temptation to abandon her neutrality, but, now that Imperial troops had drawn a cordon all round her States, she felt herself wholly isolated, and was much alarmed by the Emperor's increasing insistence on his feudal rights in Italy.

The Grand Duke, having unwisely compromised himself by recognizing Philip as King of Spain, had thought it best not to complicate matters by acceding to the Emperor's demand that he should recognize another King, the Arch-Duke Charles. Fortunately for Cosimo, he had powerful friends in Germany, especially his son-in-law, the Elector Palatine. But after the Battle of Turin, an Imperial envoy came to Florence to demand a huge contribution from Cosimo's Imperial fiefs and winter quarters for a number of troops. He was ordered to recognize the Arch-Duke Charles as King of Spain, and to ask for investiture of Siena from him. The vengeance of the English fleet was threatened should he prove contumacious. Cosimo managed to wriggle out of most of the conditions, and did not recognize Charles. In fact, both Charles and Philip offered him the Presidi for his support, but he preferred to remain neutral.

On the other hand the Duke of Modena profited by the Austrian success. He returned from the exile into which the French had driven him. His wife was sister to the Empress, and he made the best of his opportunities for demanding the reward of fidelity. On the principle that the more one asks the more one is likely to get, he suggested that the Pope should be made to give back Ferrara and Comacchio. Finally, Mirandola was sold to him; its own little Duke had been expelled by the Austrians.

Genoa had to pay large Imperial contributions, but one of the worst sufferers was the Duke of Parma. "He had," said a French envoy, "shown much firmness and a desire to imitate

his predecessors in their attachment to France." The firmness was however chiefly manifested in his attempt to escape inconvenience by hoisting the Papal flag, and declaring himself a vassal of the Holy See. This did not deter either party from marching and camping in his Duchy, and occupying his towns. The Emperor thought he must be punished for equivocating, and in 1707 a large body of Imperial troops wintered in Parma, and committed lawless depredations.

Clement XI, who had hoped to offend nobody by pleasing nobody, now found himself friendless. "Austria considers herself bitterly offended," exclaimed his Minister, Paolucci, "and from France we do not receive the least comfort or gratitude." The Imperial and French armies fought over Ferrara; the Emperor insisted that Clement had favoured the French there, and had thus violated his neutrality; and this, added to the Pope's refusal to recognize the Arch-Duke, made him so angry that he broke off diplomatic relations with the Papacy. Louis XIV did not think he owed any gratitude to the Pope, and Philip V was angry at the ecclesiastical quarrels in Naples.

The Neapolitans had not found the new government an improvement on the last. The country was full of discontent; the clergy were actively anti-French. Imperial agents subsidised the brigands. No attempt had been made to prepare for defence; and, when in the early summer of 1707 an Imperial army under Daun moved southwards, there opposed him only a few troops on the borders, who immediately ran away, and the Spanish garrison of Naples, under the Viceroy, Medinaceli. Daun crossed the frontier on June 24th; Naples surrendered on July 7th, and the populace were delighted to pull down Philip's statue. Daun showered promises upon them, and declared that the vague, but much loved "Privilege of Charles V" should be revived. Shortly afterwards the whole country was in Austrian possession.

Daun had formally asked the Pope's permission to pass

through his States, but did not wait for it to be granted. Regardless of etiquette, his envoy appeared before the Pope in sword and spurs, and Daun himself visited Rome with a large armed escort. Clement just succeeded in inducing him to keep his army outside Rome, and to allow it to cross the Tiber ten miles away. Daun went on his way, but worse was to follow. The Duke of Parma, to get rid of the Imperial troops, had paid a large contribution and taken an oath of fealty to the Emperor. Clement angrily protested, and excommunicated the Imperial officials at Parma (July, 1707). The Emperor then confiscated ecclesiastical revenues in Naples and Milan; his troops occupied Comacchio and threatened Ferrara. The Duke of Modena began to hope that he might recover the ancient domains of the Estensi.

The Pope, drawing on the reserve money in S. Angelo, assembled an army of fifteen thousand men, but, undisciplined and untrained, they fled at the enemy's approach, and their commander returned alone to Rome. Daun occupied Romagna and advanced upon Rome; the Pope retired into S. Angelo. His flight was premature, for the Emperor did not contemplate inflicting on him the fate of Clement VII. Though no one took arms in the Pope's defence, the Emperor knew that public opinion in Europe blamed his own hasty and provocative policy. A crowd of pamphlets disputed learnedly of the rights to Comacchio. The Papalists said it was part of the Donation of Constantine. The historian Muratori championed with immense erudition the claims of the Duke of Modena. Envoys from the Catholic Powers appeared in Rome; France revived the project of an anti-Austrian Italian League. The Emperor, probably a little nervous at his own daring, was easily brought to negotiate; and Clement, with exhausted finances, and no serious prospects from France, could not refuse. When the Pope held out against the Emperor's terms, Daun advanced a little nearer to Rome and Clement gave way. Yet the treaty signed in January, 1709,

was far from unfavourable to the Papacy, and showed that it still possessed a considerable moral force and the power of skilful diplomacy. The Imperial army was to leave the States of the Church; the Comacchio question was to be settled by a Congress. Charles III was not formally acknowledged by the Pope as King of Spain, but he was to be treated as such; a Nuncio was to be sent to him, and the former recognition of Philip V was not to prejudice his rights. Thus Clement practically acknowledged two contemporary Kings of Spain. This arrangement could not be final, and a Committee of Cardinals sat to consider the matter. Perhaps it was the Battle of Malplaquet which led to Clement's formal recognition of Charles in October, 1709. Next year the Congress on Comacchio gave judgment in favour of the Pope, but before the Imperial troops evacuated it, the Emperor's death further delayed the settlement. Neither the Pope nor the Emperor had gained in reputation. The Pope had been made to change sides against his will; the Emperor was only disliked the more for his bullying, and Papal recognition did Charles no service. The Austrians were losing ground in Spain, but their hold on Italy was still strong. An attempt upon Sicily failed, but most of the Presidi were captured.

In 1707 the Allies carried out a joint invasion of France. England and Holland wished to attack French sea-power in the Mediterranean, and Sir Cloudesley Shovel's fleet carried Austrian troops to Toulon; Eugene and Vittorio Amedeo co-operated with them in an attack upon this important naval base. But Toulon, defended by Tessé, was too strong for them, and they had to beat a disastrous retreat, much harassed by the French peasantry. Vittorio Amedeo thus learned how futile were invasions of French territory. He already knew that Savoy was indefensible, for he made no attempt to recover it. In 1708, however, he occupied the Fenestrelle valley, the last Alpine Pass which belonged to France, and so finally drove the French behind the mountain barrier. The Emperor,

like the Mayor of Hamelin, wanted to avoid paying the stipulated price for clearing his property of enemies, and flatly refused to hand over Vigevano or give investiture for the Langhe fiefs. The Maritime Powers urged him to yield, for they appreciated Vittorio Amedeo's services, and remembered how he had once made peace for himself alone. Marlborough pleaded for him, won over, says a Venetian, by the Duke's judicious liberality, for "he knows how to sow in order to reap." After 1708, the Duke refused to fight in person until his claims were satisfied. The Emperor shifted to and fro, making promises and breaking them again, and these quarrels were the beginning of that ill-feeling between Savoy and Austria which lasted for most of two centuries.

The Duke knew that his position was not secure; the Italian States were jealous of him; the Emperor hinted that cessions of Imperial territory were void without the consent of the Empire. When peace negotiations should begin, England and Holland might sacrifice his interests in order to obtain better terms for themselves. Meanwhile Vittorio Amedeo's daughters were constantly praying him to fight no more against their husbands, and Louis thought that the moment had come to tempt him to desert the Allies, and offered him Milan without any unpleasant conditions. But Milan was the "skin of the bear which was not yet trapped," nor was France in a position just now to go hunting for Savoy.

Vittorio Amedeo did not wish to expose his new possessions to an attack from Eugene, for whose generalship he had the greatest respect. But he took no further part in the campaigns, and secret negotiations continued all through 1709-1711. Then, however, they were merged in the general peace negotiations. Savoy's relations with the Emperor were still unsatisfactory, though Queen Anne sent Peterborough to mediate. The new Emperor, Charles VI (1711), at first promised to satisfy Vittorio Amedeo, but no agreement was ever reached.

Louis XIV had long been soliciting terms from the Allies,

and offering conditions most humiliating to France ; conferences were held, but with no result until after the death of Joseph I. Meanwhile a new and thorny question had been put forward, namely, the future succession to Tuscany. It seemed hopeless that the Medici should produce any male heirs, and the Grand Duke, his brother and his sons, were all in a precarious state of health.

The Duchy of Florence had been settled by Charles V upon Alessandro de' Medici. When he was assassinated the Senate of Florence elected Cosimo I as Duke, and Charles V confirmed the election (1537). But in spite of Charles' interference on these occasions, Florence had always claimed independence of the Empire, and the Medici had constantly insisted that it was not an Imperial fief. Thus, it seemed as though, on the extinction of the line of Cosimo I, sovereign rights should return to the city which had itself conferred them on the Medici. But Siena and the Medici possessions in the Lunigiana were undoubtedly fiefs of the Empire, although the Emperor had invested Spain with the overlordship of Siena. If it could be proved that the nearest male relative should succeed to Tuscany, this would be the Duke of Parma (through the daughter of Cosimo II); but his only heir was his daughter Elizabeth. Next to him came the King of France (through Maria de' Medici), but certainly no one would let him have Tuscany. Yet Louis hoped to get Cosimo to make an arrangement in favour of the Duke of Berri. The Grand Duke naturally preferred his own daughter, wife of the Elector Palatine ; but as she had no sons, her succession would only postpone the final settlement. Cosimo hoped that Tuscany would not become the prey of contending claimants after his death, but that the succession question might be amicably settled at the pending peace negotiations. His own conscience, roused rather tardily perhaps, and the advice of his Council led him to adopt the view that the sovereignty of Florence ought to return to the citizens themselves. To suggest this idea to

the Powers, he sent to the peace conference at Gertruydenberg (1710) an envoy who bore a name, Rinuccini, famous in its associations with Florentine Republicanism. The Dutch were delighted, and England was favourable. Without actually vetoing the reconstruction of the Republic, the Emperor obstinately maintained his rights to Siena, and, without Siena, it was hardly worth while to secure the independence of Florence.

The death of Joseph I (April, 1711) changed the whole situation of affairs, and the Tuscan question was put aside while more important matters were rearranged to suit new conditions. As England and Holland inclined towards permitting Philip V to retain the Kingdom of Spain, it became certain that the new Emperor, Charles VI, must be compensated for its loss by the Spanish possessions in Italy. Peace was now certain, but the settlement was very difficult and slow. The Emperor's determination, in spite of the opposition of his own allies, to recover the wide domains of Charles V, resulted in his exclusion from the negotiations, in which England became both the dominating and the mediating Power. England was greatly influenced by her desire to prevent any one State from obtaining sole command of the Mediterranean; hence she could not permit Spain to be united to either Austria or France; and hence she was much interested in the destiny of Naples and Sicily. She was well-disposed towards Savoy, which she looked upon as an Italian counterpoise to Austria. Queen Anne had a personal interest in the Duke, as a relation; and she perhaps felt that he should be compensated for his exclusion from the English succession in favour of the House of Hanover. The Tory ministry was also favourable; since, when the ambassadors of the Allies had requested the Queen to restore the Whigs to power, the Savoyard Maffei had held aloof. Hence in the peace negotiations, England espoused the interests of Savoy, and Peterborough even proposed Vittorio Amedeo as a possible King of Spain. This the Duke himself did not wish; but he did hope that England and

France would procure Milan for him, in order that he might hold Austria in check. It soon became evident, however, that the Emperor would never be induced to accept peace, unless Milan, which he valued more than any other part of Italy, were given to him. When in 1712, the formal peace conference opened at Utrecht, the ambassadors of Savoy, including Maffei, were allowed, for the first time in history, to take rank with those of the great Powers. The representatives of Venice alone among the other Italian States were admitted. The Pope had to watch the Powers arranging their own affairs and those of Italy without consulting him, and wholly ignoring his feudal claims on the Sicilies.

From the Congress, Vittorio Amedeo demanded that his ultimate right of succession to Spain should be recognized, that France should restore all captures, and cede the valley of Fenestrelle, east of the Alps; also a strip of territory west of the Alps to act as a barrier for Piedmont, and another between Savoy and the Rhone. He wished that France should direct her trade with Italy through his States instead of by Valais and the Simplon. Also he required that the Emperor should guarantee the Treaty of 1703, and cede either Vigevano or an equivalent. Venice only asked an indemnity for all that she had suffered, but the real object of her policy was to secure independence for Mantua, in order that it might act as a buffer State between her and the Austrian Power at Milan. For this she would even acquiesce in the Emperor's possession of Sicily and Naples, though they would render him exceedingly dangerous in the Adriatic. Mantua had but a shadow of its former glory; its population was decimated, its climate had become very unhealthy; yet its strategic position was still of great importance. The Duke of Guastalla, who had fought for the Emperor, had a good hereditary claim to it (p. 220). The Maritime Powers naturally cared nothing for Mantua, but very much for Sicily. Venice hoped to gain support from a union of the lesser Italian States, which might be induced to follow

her. They would never follow Vittorio Amedeo, whom they distrusted and envied, although it was he who had driven the French from Italy, and so practically given them peace since 1707, long before it was obtained by the rest of Europe. But the scheme for the Italian union broke down, because the lesser States were afraid of offending the Emperor; it was even proposed that he should be invited to join it. The other Powers would not do for Italy what she would not try to do for herself, and her ultimate interests were left to chance or sacrificed to expediency. Each of the smaller Dukes put forward his own demands, of which the most important was the claim of the Duke of Parma to be recognized as heir to the Medici. The Grand Duke's preoccupation was to get this very succession question settled. The Imperial Diet, both during the vacancy of the Empire and at the coronation of Charles VI, had not come to any decision on the subject, though the claims of the Elector Palatine were favourably considered.

When the task of the Congress of Utrecht was complicated by the deaths of the Dauphin and of the Duke of Burgundy, so that now only the life of one frail child lay between Philip V and the throne of France, it was again suggested that Vittorio Amedeo should be King of Spain, and it was proposed to compensate Philip by Savoy, Piedmont, Naples and Sicily, which he might retain even if he were King of France. But Philip preferred to renounce his right to France and remain in Spain, and Vittorio Amedeo refused to relinquish Piedmont for any bribe.

In the summer of 1712, England, very anxious that Sicily should not be annexed to either Austria or France, suggested that it should be given to Savoy. Being without a fleet of his own, Vittorio Amedeo would have to place himself under English protection, and would give her commerce favourable treatment. The Powers generally objected; but England was so determined on the subject that in August articles were signed securing Sicily for him, with the title of King. Other questions

concerning him were reserved for settlement till the general peace. The Emperor was very angry; he said that he should consider the Treaty of 1703 annulled and his friendship with Savoy ended for ever. This of course meant that he would recover if possible the acquisitions recently made by Savoy in Lombardy. The Maritime Powers and France accordingly declared that they guaranteed the Treaty of 1703, and insisted on the Emperor's promising neutrality to Italy and withdrawing from it all but twenty thousand of his troops. Charles VI had to acquiesce, but much against his will.

The value of Sicily to Vittorio Amedeo was rather problematical; he had no fleet, and yet would have to rule from a distance a fierce and proud people, who had hitherto found gratification in forming part of a great Monarchy with a government by no means exacting, but who would hardly welcome a petty Prince who was accustomed to absolutism and ready obedience. Yet Vittorio Amedeo was hopeful that, as an ambassador wrote to him, "Holding Piedmont and Sicily, Savoy might also acquire Milan and Naples, which would gladly substitute its mild rule for Imperial oppression." Thus it might "aspire to rule the greater part of Italy, and prevent Germans and French from ever entering it again."

The obstinacy of the Emperor, and his refusal to treat at Utrecht on any reasonable basis, resulted in the disadvantageousness of the terms offered him when (April, 1713) the other Powers were on the point of signing their respective treaties. Naples, the Presidi and the greater part of the Milanese were to be his share of the inheritance; the Elector of Bavaria was to receive Sardinia, the Duke of Guastalla Mantua. The Emperor was to surrender Vigevano to Savoy, Comacchio to the Pope. He angrily refused these terms, and the war continued.

In the summer of 1713 the other treaties were signed. France ceded to Savoy Fenestrelle and some other small places east of the Alps. Savoy ceded Barcelлонette on the

western slope, so that the watershed became the exact boundary. Vittorio Amedeo might fortify any place that he pleased except Pinerolo. France guaranteed Vittorio Amedeo's possession of Sicily, and acknowledged him as heir to Spain after the family of Philip V and before the Habsburgs. Spain made difficulties about the cession of Sicily, and exacted from Vittorio Amedeo a pledge to respect the rights and privileges of the people, and to allow Spain to dispose of land confiscated for felony there. By this means Spain hoped to keep a hold on the island, and stir up discontent against the Savoyard government.

The Emperor, furiously angry, declared that Savoy, by making peace without him, had annulled the Treaty of 1703, and refused to make any arrangement about Vigevano and the Langhe fiefs. He even allowed Genoa to buy Finale, which Vittorio Amedeo would have accepted as an equivalent to Vigevano. Diplomatic relations were broken off, and the Emperor, hearing in 1714 that Vittorio Amedeo had gone to Sicily, even thought of violating the neutrality of Italy and attacking Piedmont in his absence. But Eugene declared that no Imperial troops could be spared from the Rhine.

However in 1714 Austria and France made peace at Rastatt, the Emperor receiving Mantua and Sardinia besides the parts of Italy already promised him. Louis XIV, having secured Spain for his grandson, abandoned Italy to Austrian domination. The long and weary war was ended at last, and, as the Emperor promised to respect the neutrality of Italy, the danger of his revenging himself upon Savoy was warded off for the present.

The war, as it had affected Italy, had amply demonstrated the utter helplessness of all its States, with the sole exception of Savoy. Venice, surrounded on land by Austrian dominions, and with Austria at either end of the Adriatic, could never again be really independent. The Papacy had not even been called to take part in the deliberations at Utrecht, and its claim to the suzerainty of the Sicilies had been quietly ignored.

Its neutrality was known to be the result of weakness, not of disinterestedness. The Duchy of Mantua had disappeared; those of Parma and Modena remained insignificant. Genoa had attained the coveted Finale, but it was only to bring future trouble upon herself. As to the succession to Tuscany, the Congress of Utrecht decided to let it remain unsettled. But as the Emperor dominated Italy and held the Presidi, the decision must lie chiefly in his hands.

The results of the change upon Milan and Naples were as yet uncertain. Austria might be more tyrannous than Spain, but on the other hand might choose to effect financial and administrative reforms. But for their neighbours there could be but one opinion about the possibilities of the future; Italy was still indeed to be dominated by Habsburgs, but by the active, instead of the effete, branch of the House. Spain had long ceased to bully; Austria showed every sign of disagreeable activity. Everyone was threatened by the revival of Imperial claims; Modena, Siena and the new acquisitions of Savoy in Lombardy were undoubtedly Imperial fiefs; the Emperor also claimed rights over Parma, Piacenza, Comacchio, even Florence. He might go on to include Piedmont, and the Venetian *terra-firma*.

And Austria would not perhaps be content, as Spain had been, with the dictatorship of Italy; she might wish to be its territorial owner. Savoy only would have the power or the courage to resist, for Savoy was no longer merely a petty Italian principality; its Duke was now King of Sicily, possessing the royal title so long aspired after, and was a power in European politics. England had at Utrecht made his interests her own; France had been forced to cede French territory to him. If Italy were only a geographical expression, Savoy, with a ruler of powerful vitality and individuality, was a living force, a small, but effective, nationality.

CHAPTER II.

DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN ITALY: 1714—1769

THE chief result of the Treaty of Utrecht upon Italy appeared to be the transference of political predominance there from Spain to Austria. This was the Emperor's one compensation for thwarted ambitions, and he dreamed of a return to the days of the Hohenstaufen, without even the interference of a powerful political Papacy. His attitude is well illustrated in his efforts to revive feudal dominion over Tuscany, which had been practically dormant since the days of Barbarossa. Imperial contributions had been extorted, though the Grand Duke never gave them without protesting Tuscany's feudal independence; but now the Emperor expected to be treated as suzerain in the question of settling the succession.

But the rôle of Barbarossa was not an easy one. To begin with, the Germans were much more unpopular than were the Spaniards in Italy, where the sacks of Rome and of Mantua and the recent depredations of the Hussars were not forgotten. Germans were tipsy, uncivilised "barbarians"; but the Spaniards were civilised, and could even act the tyrant gracefully. Their dominion no longer even seemed tyrannical; it was part of the natural order of things, it was an easy, if degrading, yoke; while the Austrian domination started with every popular prejudice against it.

Its Italian interests were actually a national misfortune to Austria, dividing its energies, checking its natural expansion

eastward, draining its military resources, and not even bringing in much pecuniary profit. Milan, as a link between the Habsburg States, had been invaluable; as an outlying province it was a burden, and rendered Austria vulnerable to France, which could now attack her without disturbing the German Princes. The Emperor's dreams of maritime power in the Mediterranean led only to financial disaster. His position in Italy created a dangerous enemy in the Duke of Savoy, who had recently acquired Sicily and part of Lombardy at his expense. The Emperor declared that he had never ceded the latter; and there was no formal peace between them, though the neutrality of Italy generally was guaranteed by the Treaty of Rastatt. The Emperor knew that the Duke would advance eastwards if he could. "No pledge," wrote a French Minister, "can withhold him from following his interests. If his reputation has suffered, his States are considerably augmented." But for the present, Vittorio Amedeo would be busy consolidating his rule in Sicily, and he had lost a powerful protector in Queen Anne. George I, afraid lest France should attack England, or Austria Hanover, would never quarrel with either on behalf of Savoy.

The Austrian dominion in Italy was first threatened from another quarter. Spain could not forget the loss of Milan and Naples, but Spain would have been powerless to attack Austria without help from Italian sources. The Parmesan Minister of Spain, Alberoni, whose intrigues and audacity kept Europe alive for some years, had a really patriotic feeling for Italy, and hoped to obtain its liberation through Spain. He worked upon the ambition of Philip's second wife, Elizabeth Farnese, niece of the new Duke of Parma, who swayed her weak husband, and who entered joyfully into Alberoni's scheme, since it involved the creation of Italian principalities for her sons. Alberoni did not wish to revive the direct rule of Spain over Italy, which had been a weakness to Spain and a misfortune to Italy, but to create States, ruled by independent

Princes, but under Bourbon patronage. Elizabeth was herself the next heir to Parma, after the fat, elderly Duke and his brother; and the Farnese claim to Tuscany was undoubtedly strong.

Alberoni was clever, but not quite clever enough. Since the recovery of Sicily was part of his plan, he would not ask the alliance of the Emperor's bitterest enemy, the Duke of Savoy. Nor was he able to prevent the formation of the Triple Alliance (1717), the express objects of which were to preserve the peace of Europe, and to repress the dangerous activity of Alberoni himself. Though the Emperor was not a member of the Triple Alliance, its efforts for peace protected him while he was involved in the Turkish war of 1716-1718.

This war was due to a revival of the Papal-Crusading idea. The late war had left Clement XI disillusioned and humiliated. At Utrecht the Papacy and its feudal claims in South Italy, Parma and Piacenza, had been simply disregarded. It was treated as a petty principality which need not be consulted. So far Clement's policy had completely failed; but he was clever enough to see that the threatening attitude of the Turks offered an opportunity for recovering the moral prestige of the Papacy. Venice would fight to protect the Morea; and if, like Pius V, Clement could organise a Holy League, the Papacy might enjoy the glory of another Lepanto.

Clement was successful in obtaining promises of peace for the Emperor from France and Spain, for Alberoni was not yet ready for war; the Holy League was renewed, Clement provided subsidies and armed ships. Even Alberoni secured for himself the Cardinal's hat by despatching ships, ostensibly to join the Crusade. All seemed to be going well, Austria was victorious in the east; and, though the mutual distrust of the Allies prevented naval success, Clement hoped much for the future.

But Alberoni's forces, instead of going to the Levant, landed in Sardinia, a recent acquisition of Austria, and rapidly com-

pleted its conquest (July, 1717), for the Sardinians hated the Austrians and were delighted at the return of their old masters. The Turkish war was accordingly soon ended (Peace of Passarowitz, see p. 141), and Clement's plan was a failure. He did not forget that his disappointment was due to Alberoni.

Alberoni had for the moment outwitted the Triple Alliance; and he hoped to make Sardinia a stepping-stone to further advance in Italy. But George I and the Regent of France were determined to secure European peace, and thought that the best means was to obtain the adhesion of the Emperor to the Triple Alliance. To gain this Alberoni's ambitions must be crushed, and even the alliance of England with Savoy must be sacrificed. England abandoned the policy of Anne in limiting Austrian influence in the Mediterranean for the sake of the German interests of the House of Hanover. Vittorio Amedeo was simply told that he must give up Sicily to the Emperor, and that he should receive Sardinia instead.

Equally threatened by the Triple Alliance, it seemed as if Spain and Savoy would draw together, but Alberoni still believed that he could by audacity take and keep both Sardinia and Sicily, and in July, 1718, the Spanish fleet sailed for Sicily. The people, with whom Vittorio Amedeo's rule had never been popular, received the Spaniards with enthusiasm; the Piedmontese Viceroy had to retreat through country which was openly hostile, and could garrison only Messina and a few smaller towns. A rumour that Vittorio Amedeo meant to cede the island to the hated Germans made the people still more angry.

But all Alberoni's daring schemes failed, and his fleet was destroyed off Sicily by Admiral Byng (August). In the same month the Quadruple Alliance was concluded, and Spain and Savoy were offered three months in which to adhere to it. The Emperor was to have Sicily, and Savoy to receive Sardinia instead; the succession to Parma and Tuscany might be settled on Elizabeth Farnese's son. The tables were at last

turned upon Vittorio Amedeo, and the Powers with whom he had long played fast and loose were taking their revenge, and settling his affairs without consulting him. The Regent called him "a fox taken in its own snare." He tried hard to escape, but in vain. In November he adhered to the Quadruple Alliance; his troops in Sicily joined the Germans, and together they checked the Spanish advance. Messina had already willingly surrendered, but the Allies recovered it in spite of the Spanish victory at Francavilla (June, 1719). Palermo however resisted until the end of the war.

The Quadruple Alliance had more difficulty in reducing Spain to submission, and it was in fact obliged to procure the dismissal of Alberoni (December, 1719), before it could induce Philip V to adhere (Feb. 1720). The Spanish army left Sicily, accompanied by about five hundred devoted Sicilians who would not remain under German rule. A few years later Sicily gladly welcomed the Spaniards back again. The succession to Parma and Tuscany, with other thorny questions, it was proposed to leave to a European Congress.

Alberoni, excluded from the Papal States by the still resentful Clement XI, disappeared for a time, but after Clement's death he entered Papal service, was Legate to Ravenna, and died at a great age. His career had been personally a failure, but was a political success. Spain, lately the sport of partition treaties, was again one of the great Powers, and had stood alone against all Europe. Elizabeth Farnese carried on Alberoni's foreign policy; and her constant agitations, backed by the passive resistance of the Italians to German domination, were to fulfil Alberoni's dreams, to confine Austria to Lombardy, and to replace a great part of the Peninsula under Spanish influence.

Tuscany and Parma, almost unknown to history since the sixteenth century, were now for some years amongst the main preoccupations of European politics. The Quadruple Alliance had calmly assumed that Tuscany was an Imperial fief, and

had suggested that Elizabeth's son should succeed to it and to Parma under Imperial suzerainty. But both the Grand Duke and Elizabeth herself strongly objected to acknowledging such suzerainty, while the Emperor was not reconciled to the idea of establishing a Spanish Bourbon in Italy even as his own vassal. It was the thin end of a very dangerous wedge.

Meanwhile the link of kinship between the Bourbon Houses reasserted itself, and took the shape of a "Family Compact" (1721). Elizabeth grew bolder on the strength of it, and proposed that the Tuscan fortresses should immediately be garrisoned by Spanish troops. The Emperor firmly refused, and war seemed almost certain. The death of Cosimo III in 1723 only rendered settlement more pressing; Gian Gastone adopted his father's attitude.

The European Congress, which was to decide all outstanding questions, only met in 1724, and resulted in little but talk. However, an unexpected turn of affairs put an end to it, and wholly changed for a time the condition of European politics. Elizabeth, always impatient, realized that the "Family Compact" was not procuring any great advantages for her, and that her husband's precarious health did not admit of her wasting time. She therefore consented to the plan of a clever adventurer, Ripperda, to make advances to Austria for a direct settlement. In this there were advantages for both parties; since it was humiliating that the Maritime Powers should control the policy of Spain and Austria and direct it in their own interests. The Emperor felt that if only Elizabeth could be satisfied, his dominion in Italy would be safe. Besides, he was already striving for European recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, and wanted the consent of Spain to it. At this moment, Louis XV repudiated his engagement (under the "Family Compact") to a little Infanta, and, in order to obtain an heir, was married immediately to a Polish Princess. Elizabeth declared herself bitterly offended, and in April, 1725, the

first Treaty of Vienna was concluded between Spain and Austria. It guaranteed the succession of Parma and Tuscany to Elizabeth's eldest son, Charles.

The Maritime Powers, which had for years striven to reconcile the Emperor and Spain, were by no means pleased when they settled matters for themselves, suspecting in the treaty dangerous secret clauses, which actually existed. Its first result was the Treaty of Hanover between France, England and Holland (Sept. 1725). This in turn led to a new secret agreement between Austria and Spain, by which a war with England and a marriage between two of Elizabeth's sons and two Archduchesses were planned. Ripperda was now chief Minister in Spain, and was determined to keep Elizabeth faithful to her strange ally.

Both Leagues prepared for war and sought for new allies, so that Vittorio Amedeo (now known as the King of Sardinia) once more found his friendship solicited by both parties. There were still questions unsettled between him and the Emperor; and the latter, not wishing to make any more concessions to Vittorio Amedeo, proposed the old expedient of an Italian League. France was more pressing, and sent ambassadors to Turin to flatter the King and persuade him that she was willing to make conquests in Italy on his behalf. Vittorio Amedeo, however, did not believe that war was imminent, but believed that both sides were reserving themselves until the Austrian Succession question should require settlement. The French ambassador could only get "*une infinité de raisonnements*" from the wily old politician, who refused to commit himself and waited for more definite offers. He corresponded on friendly terms with Fleury, probably gaining much valuable information from the Cardinal's letters, but was not to be won by Fleury's suggestions of family affection between France and Sardinia, or by vague talk of Milanese conquests.

Vittorio Amedeo's prediction was right for the present.

The Emperor did not wish to endanger the Pragmatic Sanction by war, and Fleury was equally attached to a pacific policy. Spain attacked Gibraltar, but there was no formal declaration of war. Nor did the alliance between Spain and Austria continue long. The Emperor hung back from the actual establishment of a Spanish Bourbon in Italy, and would not carry out the proposed marriage arrangements, nor join in the war against England. Always thinking of the Pragmatic Sanction, he wanted a more influential husband than Elizabeth's son for his eldest daughter; but Elizabeth knew that unless the marriage took place the Emperor would not like to have Charles in Italy. In fact the Emperor tried to settle the succession to Parma by arranging a marriage for Elizabeth's younger uncle, Antonio, who was now Duke. If only Antonio were to have a son, he might be proclaimed heir to Tuscany as well as to Parma. The fall of Ripperda dissolved the last tie which bound Elizabeth to Austria, and Fleury now found it easier to restore French influence in Spain. He promised Elizabeth that Spanish garrisons should be introduced into Parma and Tuscany, and that Charles should hold these States free from Imperial suzerainty. Accordingly, when England negotiated the Treaty of Seville (November, 1729), which included France, Holland and Spain, it guaranteed all Fleury's promises to Elizabeth, and the Allies promised to go to war if the Emperor refused to acquiesce. Vittorio Amedeo commented scoffingly: "I admire the dexterity with which these diplomats induced a Princess to destroy her own work and to content herself with such dry grass as is this Treaty of Seville."

Once more war seemed imminent. The Emperor was really angry, and told Gian Gastone that he would send Imperial troops into Tuscany, but this the Grand Duke managed to avoid. It was in fact the object of his life to prevent Tuscany from becoming the scene of a European war; and for this he intrigued and promised, twisted and turned, negotiating with all parties at once. He persuaded the Allies

to propose the neutrality of Tuscany, but to this the Emperor demurred, and filled the Lunigiana with Imperial troops.

It was only Elizabeth who really wished to force on hostilities; Vittorio Amedeo wrote to his ambassador in France, "Do not believe in a war; everything will end in words. This has been the system of England and France for years. When they pull my garments I answer that I shall be ready when the time comes, but I know how to distinguish substance from shadow....Both England and France gain by the maintenance of Italian peace. Cardinal Fleury awaits a more serious occasion, the death of the Emperor. He wishes to gain time, but not to fight." So Vittorio Amedeo continued to refuse offers of alliance, and remained neutral.

Just as he predicted, the Treaty of Seville "vanished into smoke." The Allies reflected that it would be wiser to make a good bargain with the Emperor by guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction than to go to war with him for the sake of Elizabeth. The death of the Duke of Parma (Jan. 1731) made immediate settlement imperative, for the Emperor's troops at once occupied his duchies, though the Emperor said he was only holding them for the Infant. At this crisis England offered her mediation, and in July the second Treaty of Vienna was concluded. In return for the Powers' guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, the Emperor would allow the Infant to come to Italy at once, take possession of Parma and Piacenza, and garrison the Tuscan fortresses with Spanish troops.

The treaty was made without consulting the Grand Duke, but the latter was more concerned to end his days in peace than interested in any particular heir. The Infant was not unacceptable; he had been brought up largely by Italians, and had many Italian characteristics; the Spaniards were tolerably popular, and the Infant's succession at least made it certain that the Emperor's suzerainty would not be more than nominal. It would give Tuscany the support of the Bourbon Powers, while union with Parma would greatly increase its importance.

Accordingly, Gian Gastone made a private arrangement, quite satisfactory to himself, with Spain, in which all mention of the Imperial suzerainty was carefully avoided. Charles, still a minor, was to remain under the guardianship of the Grand Duke and of the Dowager Duchess of Parma. He brought with him a Spanish establishment and the troops for the fortresses. But the Spaniards had been furnished with money to lavish and orders to be conciliatory; the Italians were ready to be conciliated, and Charles made an easy conquest of all hearts. On the feast of S. John, according to ancient custom, the Tuscan provinces did homage to their Florentine rulers; Gian Gastone, without consulting the Emperor, allowed Charles to receive this homage. The Emperor was angry, and an open quarrel threatened, for Imperial troops still occupied Parma. But England again mediated, and Charles was allowed to take possession of Parma (Oct. 1732). The Pope protested in vain against this violation of his claims to feudal suzerainty.

Italian questions seemed to be really settled at length, and Vittorio Amedeo's prediction that there would be no war until the death of the Emperor would probably have been fulfilled, had there not arisen in 1733 the question of the Polish succession. This might seem to have little connection with Italian politics; but, in fact, though the Powers would not break the peace for the sake of Italy, yet so inflammable were Italian affairs, that a far distant conflagration was certain to spread to Italy at once. The Emperor was by no means reconciled to the Infant's establishment there, and on the other hand Elizabeth's ambition was not yet satisfied. She wanted to recover South Italy, to establish another son there, and to break up the Austrian domination altogether. The southern Italians were still discontented with Austrian rule, and preferred their former easy-going masters, who if they misgoverned did not overgovern them. The Lombards were less discontented, but few would risk personal inconvenience for the sake of the Austrians.

And France, once she had decided to fight the Emperor, was certain to want to attack him in Italy, which she considered the most vulnerable point in his defences. France and Spain were therefore natural allies, but Fleury knew that, without the assistance of Sardinia, France could not attack Lombardy. Vittorio Amedeo had now abdicated; Carlo Emmanuele III was a fresh actor on the political stage, and his character and intentions were unknown, but of great importance. In his old age, Vittorio Amedeo had cautiously remained neutral; but he had left his son in an excellent position, with prosperous States, a full Treasury, and a splendidly trained army. "He must be regarded as a Power to be sought and judiciously managed," wrote Chauvelin to the French ambassador at Turin. He was supported by excellent Ministers, Del Borgo, the foreign secretary, and Ormea, whose diplomatic abilities were soon to make Sardinia of even greater importance than before.

Chauvelin, the French foreign secretary, was one of those enlightened politicians who, following Richelieu, wished to secure the autonomy of Italy, and to see it governed by native and naturalised princes, free from Habsburg domination. The Queen of Spain's sons would serve this purpose well enough; the ambitions of the House of Savoy could be satisfied, and France might even secure the Duchy of Savoy for herself in exchange for Milan. But the difficulty was to get Spain and Sardinia to act together. Elizabeth's plans included the recovery of Lombardy for Spain; and, though Fleury assured Carlo Emmanuele that "there was cloth enough in Italy to cut for both Spain and himself," yet Carlo Emmanuele would never tolerate the establishment of a strong Bourbon-Farnese State, backed by Spanish influence, to rival his own leading position in Italy.

Carlo Emmanuele followed the family tradition of balancing between France and Austria until he discovered which offered the best terms. Through England negotiations were opened with Austria, but there were many difficulties. The Emperor

still withheld investiture for some of the Piedmontese fiefs, and owed money unpaid since the last war. Carlo Emmanuele would not guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, since he would himself have a claim upon Milan if the male Habsburg line failed. The Emperor thought Carlo Emmanuele's demands excessive, and Prince Eugene wrote, warning him solemnly against "the trap laid by France, the most dangerous enemy of our House." The Emperor did not realize the critical nature of the situation, nor the importance of winning Sardinia. The defences of Lombardy were neglected, and the country denuded of troops for the German war.

Since there seemed no chance of profitable terms from Austria, Carlo Emmanuele turned rather reluctantly towards France. He was deeply distrustful of Spain, and disliked Fleury's suggestions about Savoy. He positively refused to allow the Infant to have a slice of Lombardy, and proposed instead that, if he joined in the war, he should be permitted to conquer the Sicilies. By the Treaty of Turin between France and Sardinia (Sept. 1733), France was to help conquer Milan for Carlo Emmanuele, who was to be commander-in-chief of their joint forces. There was a private understanding, not formally embodied in the treaty, that, if Mantua were conquered and added to Milan, Savoy should be ceded to France. Probably Carlo Emmanuele never intended to conquer Mantua; he preferred to leave Austria a foothold in Italy, in order that he might balance it against the Bourbons. In October France and Sardinia declared war against Austria, Carlo Emmanuele announcing that "besides my own ruin," Austria "threatens the liberty of Italy, of which my House has always been the most firm defence."

It was easy enough to draw up a programme for Elizabeth Farnese, but very difficult to make her follow it. She had not sufficient imagination to grasp the essentiality of Sardinia at all, and she wanted for her sons all that Spain had ever held in Italy, as well as the Farnese and Medici inheritance.

Besides, she wanted war with England, which was forbidden by the Treaty of Turin, and which Sardinia would never sanction. Thus, when the French and Sardinian armies were safely launched into Lombardy, so that Carlo Emmanuele could not easily draw back, Fleury signed with Spain the Treaty of the Escorial (Nov.), so wholly inconsistent with the Treaty of Turin that Fleury could not possibly execute both. Indeed, he said that the Treaty of Turin was a scrap of paper which could easily be torn up. By this new "Family Compact, eternal and irrevocable," Spain and France guaranteed to one another "all the rights which they had or ought to have," and to Elizabeth, "all the rights which could be attributed to her, whether possessed at present by others or no." This might easily mean nearly the whole of Italy, including the Lombard provinces actually possessed by Sardinia. France would help Spain to attack Gibraltar. Sardinia was not even mentioned, far less the French pledges to Carlo Emmanuele. Meanwhile Carlo Emmanuele was fighting successfully in Lombardy. The French contingent was commanded by Villars, who had however long passed his prime, and had become querulous and self-indulgent, preferring the amusements of Lombardy to the war. Carlo Emmanuele immediately displayed the military talents of his race, rapidity, decision and personal courage, tempered by more prudence than was shown by some of his ancestors. In his first campaign he had, however, not many difficulties to master. Daun, the Austrian Governor, had only a few troops, with which he garrisoned the castle of Milan and some other fortresses, and himself withdrew to the almost impregnable Mantua. He left a committee of government in Milan, which declared itself loyal to Austria, but had no intention of facing any danger for its sake. Carlo Emmanuele entered the city unopposed on December 11th, though many noble families withdrew to Vienna. The castle resisted for three weeks, but by February, 1734, all the Milanese was occupied by the invaders. The great ambition of the House

of Savoy seemed fulfilled, and the Kingdom of Lombardy within its grasp; but in reality its conquest had only just begun.

As usual, the discipline of the French troops went to pieces after only a few months in Italy; Villars, who thought of little but amusement, had no control over them; and, as they had themselves nothing to gain by conciliating the Lombards, they pillaged and insulted them recklessly. The Piedmontese troops were always praised, but the French were called "new barbarians and vandals from Africa." The French government was as bad; Carlo Emmanuele had promised it a share in the Lombard taxes as long as the war lasted, and, instead of agreeing to his suggestion that the burdens on the people should be lightened, it wished to increase them. When Carlo Emmanuele renounced part of his share, the French doubled theirs, so that the people escaped nothing. Fleury refused to see Lombard delegates upon the subject. The winter was severe, and was followed by a long drought, so that the distress caused by the war was heavily felt.

Nor did the Milanese welcome the Sardinian rule, for they much preferred to be the subjects of a great monarchy, to enjoy its honours and titles and the local independence due to the distance of the central government, in spite of mal-administration and over-taxation. They hated the Piedmontese in true neighbourly fashion, and shared the general Italian dread of the House of Savoy. On Carlo Emmanuele's entry into Milan, "he was not acclaimed by the populace," which "rather applauded the conquered than the conquerors." Carlo Emmanuele did all he could to win Milan, giving entertainments to demonstrate the advantages of a resident court, and leaving the offices in the hands of Lombards. The administration of justice was improved, better order enforced, and native troops enlisted. "The government," wrote a Milanese, "is full of gentleness, and endeavours to gain the heart of the country." It was in fact too good for the disorderly nobles, who mostly

corresponded with their relatives in Vienna. No one had any conception of an Italian, anti-Austrian ideal, and, in 1736, the people "gloried in their return to the paternal government of Austria." Thus, when difficulties arose elsewhere, Sardinia could place no reliance on Lombard support.

In November 1733 a Spanish army had landed in Tuscany, the terms of the Treaty of the Escurial were revealed, and Carlo Emmanuele realized his position. To accommodate differences, Fleury suggested that Mantua should be offered to the Infant. But, while Spain still openly claimed Milan, Carlo Emmanuele dared not allow Spanish States to surround it; nor permit himself to be shut in amongst Bourbons while he was at enmity with the Emperor.

Villars wanted to attack Mantua early in 1734, but Carlo Emmanuele did not at all wish it to be conquered, and declared that the risk was too great. Villars angrily demanded to be recalled, and the French government acceded, but he died on his way home. While the French and Piedmontese remained inactive on the Oglio, the centre of interest shifted to South Italy. The Infant and the Spanish army, commanded by Montemar, crossed the Papal States, the Pope showing them much friendliness, and reached the Neapolitan border. Naples was as little prepared for resistance as Lombardy; there were German troops under Traun, but no native army and no border defences, and Traun was soon driven back by the invaders. The people were less contented than the Lombards; augmented taxation to meet the invasion embittered them, and there were local risings to greet the Spaniards. Nobles joined the Spanish army, and peasants assisted it. The obvious disaffection of the Neapolitans frightened the Viceroy, Visconti, into flight, and Naples sent a letter of invitation to the Infant Charles, who was now making a kind of triumphal progress through the Kingdom. On May 10th he made his state entrance into the city, proclaimed as "a visible instrument of Providence," to whom the Neapolitans

restored "that obedience which, in spite of changes of fortune, they had never forgotten." The populace was enthusiastic, and S. Gennaro, expressing august approval, "was so obliging as to liquefy in a few minutes."

This conquest of Naples by a Bourbon Charles recalls in ease and rapidity its conquest by a more famous Charles in 1494. In both cases it was the weakness of the defence which rendered the conquest so easy. The Austrian army was finally routed at Bitonto on May 25th; Pescara, Gaeta and Capua held out for a time; Capua was the last to surrender (November). In August Montemar was received with delight by the Sicilians, and by the end of the year the Germans were driven from the island, and the new King was able to make a tour throughout his dominions. For Philip V had formally ceded the Sicilies in sovereignty to his son, and Spain thus made some reparation for all the evil that she had done them in the past. South Italy was once more to be an independent Kingdom, and herein lay the germs of hope for the future, and a solid reason for the superficial rejoicing of the populace.

The northern campaign had been much less decisive. In May the Austrian general, Mercy, with sixty thousand troops, entered Italy. The Sardinians held the northern course of the Oglio, the French its southern course and the Po. Mercy out-manceuvred the French, crossed the Po, took Guastalla, and almost beat the French at Colorno, for Carlo Emmanuele delayed and only arrived at the end of the battle. In June there was a fierce, indecisive battle between the French and Austrians at Parma; but Mercy was killed, and, when Carlo Emmanuele joined the French afterwards, the allies were able to advance, recover Guastalla, and occupy Modena and Reggio.

The strategical position of Modena at the south-eastern corner of Lombardy was important. The Duke inclined towards Austria, but would have remained neutral. However, the allies now occupied his towns, whether he would or no,

and he retired to the Papal States. The allies promised to preserve his jurisdiction and revenues for him, but broke their promises.

Carlo Emmanuele now remained inactive ; his heart had gone out of the war, he scarcely hoped to retain Milan, and saw no reason to exasperate the Emperor further against himself. But in September the Austrians under Königsegg surprised the careless French camp, and the French general had to escape in his nightshirt. Carlo Emmanuele came up and covered a retreat to Guastalla, where was fought the next day (Sept. 19th) the most notable battle of this war. Carlo Emmanuele showed able generalship and personal courage, and his victory gained him a great reputation. The Austrians retired behind the Oglio, but Carlo Emmanuele would not attack Mantua, and the campaign accordingly ended.

Carlo Emmanuele in fact knew that he had little to hope from the Bourbons. Fleury was urging him to conquer Mantua in order to please Elizabeth, who was showing an inclination to desert her ally. Carlo Emmanuele caustically remarked that the more Elizabeth was promised, the more she demanded, and sought to improve his own position by renewing the old close relations of Sardinia with England. Walpole offered to get terms for him from the Emperor. The project of a peace which the English Minister suggested foreshadowed the final settlement of 1748 ; the Infant was to have the Sicilies, Carlo Emmanuele part of Lombardy, the Emperor to be compensated by Parma and Tuscany. But the plan at present pleased nobody ; and the hectoring manner with which Walpole demanded its adoption rather tended to bind the allies together again. Their armies co-operated in driving Königsegg back from the Po, though, when the Spaniards proceeded to blockade Mantua, Carlo Emmanuele would not join them. Nor did the French government intend to press the siege, for secret negotiations between it and the Emperor were in progress. Knowing that the allies could not be kept together

much longer, and that Elizabeth was privately trying to make terms, Fleury had determined to steal a march upon them, and secure a peace satisfactory to France. The Emperor expected to get better terms from France alone than from her allies, and he was not disappointed. In October, peace preliminaries between Austria and France were signed; the siege of Mantua was abandoned, and the Spanish army had to retire into Tuscany.

France had used her opportunity with great skill, since it was arranged that the Duchy of Lorraine, which she had long coveted, was soon to be made over to her, while its Duke was to be compensated by being made heir to Tuscany. As the Duke was the affianced husband of Maria Theresa, this arrangement pleased the Emperor, because Tuscany would in the future belong to his family; Parma and Piacenza were to be his immediately, in exchange for the Sicilies which Charles, the Infant, was to keep. The Emperor was also to recover the Milanese; but Carlo Emmanuele was to choose for himself two amongst its three western provinces, Novara, Tortona or Vigevano. Considering how the Emperor had been beaten in the Italian war, the terms were very favourable to him.

Elizabeth Farnese had only herself and her greediness to blame for her disappointment. She had been beaten at her own game, but she was exceedingly angry, and threatened to fight for the possession of the duchies. However, in February, 1736, Spain sulkily acceded to the peace preliminaries. Carlo Emmanuele thought himself equally ill-used, and made even more difficulty about acceding. Still he was secretly glad to see the Spaniards well out of North Italy. It might seem a little dangerous to have Austrian States on two sides, yet he knew that he could now continue the traditional policy of balancing between Habsburgs and Bourbons.

Modern French writers have blamed Carlo Emmanuele for thwarting Chauvelin's ideal of an autonomous Italy, wholly free from Austria. Had he joined ardently in the war, this

ideal might have prevailed, and most of Italy would have belonged to two Bourbon-Farnese princes. But, though nominally independent, these princes must have been guided by Spain and France, and Carlo Emmanuele, well knowing the characters and ambitions of Fleury and Elizabeth Farnese, could hardly be sure that Italy would profit by the change. He can scarcely be blamed for considering the safety of his own States before the rather problematical benefit to Italy. He could not rely on the French government to keep any promises it might make, nor to act with the disinterestedness which it professed. In fact, France ultimately sacrificed Tuscany to the Emperor in order to get Lorraine for herself. England also would have interfered to prevent Italy from becoming the preserve of the Bourbons.

The final peace was not signed till November, 1738, and it seemed several times as if the negotiations would be broken off. The Emperor was rendered rather more amenable by the embarrassments of his Turkish war, but Spain made endless difficulties, especially about withdrawing her army from Tuscany. The Tuscan succession was a hard matter to settle. The Duke of Lorraine did not like giving up his ancient home for the future possession of a foreign principality, where he was a complete stranger. The Tuscans and the Grand Duke were, without being consulted, deprived of Charles, whom they had learned to like, and provided with an heir of whom they knew nothing, but that he would probably be the next Emperor, and would look upon Tuscany as a mere dependency, and send hated Germans to rule it. However, Gian Gastone obtained one compensating clause that, if Francis became Emperor, Tuscany should be settled on a younger member of his family, in order that it might have a Duke of its own. There was a lively quarrel between all the parties over the large allodial estates and private property of the Medici.

Charles (now Carlo III of Naples) had already taken from

Parma to Naples all the movable property of the Farnesi, including their art collections; it was feared that the Medici collections might share the same fate. The Duke of Lorraine said that he must have the Medici property to help him meet the Medici state debt. Gian Gastone died in the middle of the quarrel (July, 1737); the Duke of Lorraine's representative took possession of the duchy, but the Electress Palatine, Gian Gastone's sister, retained the private property. However, she ultimately settled it on the new Duke, on condition that the collections were never removed. But Charles did not renounce his claim, and the Peace allowed him to retain the Presidi, which were a constant menace to Tuscany.

Carlo Emmanuele made difficulties of his own, but was finally satisfied with Novara, Tortona and the long-delayed investiture of the Langhe fiefs. But neither he nor Spain would prejudice their future claims by guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction. No one but France was pleased with the Peace, but no one regarded it as more than a truce, to last till the Emperor's death should open the question of the Austrian succession. Austria and France seemed to be on good terms for a time, but there was no love lost between Austria, Spain and Sardinia.

Beyond the general inconvenience and loss occasioned by hostilities, the late war and peace had no great effect upon other Italian States. Modena had suffered most, but the Duke returned to his duchy after the war, and Mirandola, which Spain claimed, was restored to him. He remained attached to the Imperial party. Venice had preserved her neutrality throughout, though her territories suffered much from the hostilities on the Oglio. She had no belief in French plans for the autonomy of Italy; still less was she likely to fight for the Emperor, though she allowed his troops passage through her States. She was however pleased that the Sicilies should be transferred from Austria to the Infant, since the Austrian

power at both ends of the Adriatic was dangerous to her trade and supremacy there¹. The Papacy had as usual found its feudal claims on Parma and Piacenza entirely ignored. For some time the Pope was in doubt about granting to Charles the investiture of the Sicilies, but it was finally given in order to divert the young King from an anti-ecclesiastical policy.

In October, 1740, died the Emperor Charles VI, and war began in Germany at once. It was at first uncertain how far this war would spread; Fleury, always pacific, wished at least to keep Italy at peace. If he could have counted on both Spain and Sardinia as allies, they might have succeeded in persuading Maria Theresa to cede them Italian provinces in order that she might be able to concentrate herself upon the German war; but the incompatible claims of Spain and Sardinia made Fleury's scheme impracticable. Elizabeth was determined to recover the central Italian duchies, and had obtained from the newly elected Emperor, Charles Albert of Bavaria, a promise of Milan also. At the same time Carlo Emmanuele claimed Milan, basing his demand on the Diploma of investiture given by Charles V to Philip II, which settled the succession, in the event of the failure of the male line, upon Philip's daughters, and Philip's daughter was the wife of Carlo Emmanuele I. This claim was not put forward at the time of the war of Spanish Succession, because Vittorio Amedeo was not aware of the existence of the Diploma. Neither Spain nor France admitted this claim, and Elizabeth urged the omission of Sardinia from their alliance, but Fleury insisted that war should not begin until he had done all he could to win Carlo Emmanuele.

But Carlo Emmanuele reposed no trust in France, and his confidence was further shaken when Fleury proposed that he should share Lombardy with Don Philip, Elizabeth's second

¹ In 1740 Venice and Carlo Emmanuele made up the old quarrel about Cyprus; since the Duke was now a King in his own right there was nothing left to quarrel about.

son. Philip was son-in-law to Louis XV, so that his interests were important to France; but Carlo Emmanuele would never endure to have him settled in Lombardy. And the English government, in which he confided implicitly, urged him to eschew the Bourbons, and promised to obtain good terms for him from Maria Theresa.

Both Carlo Emmanuele and Ormea, who was now his guiding spirit, really inclined towards an Austrian alliance. Austria was too weak to be dangerous, and England would give money, if not military help. They "preferred the Habsburgs represented by a Queen in distress, to the Bourbons personified by the insatiable Queen of Spain." But Maria Theresa, bent on preserving her father's monarchy intact, was most unwilling, in spite of England's persuasions, to gain Sardinia's alliance by territorial cessions. Her slowness and obstinacy led Ormea to keep open negotiations with France, into whose arms he might yet find himself driven. All through 1741 he continued negotiating, really to gain time.

At last Fleury could hold back Elizabeth no longer; in December Montemar, with one Spanish army, landed at Orbetello, and was joined by a considerable force from Naples. Ormea declared that if the Spaniards advanced towards Lombardy, negotiations should be broken off at once. Still Fleury hoped to gain Sardinia, and invited Carlo Emmanuele to propose his own terms. Those which he sent were purposely high; they were not in fact meant to be accepted, for Sardinia's understanding with Austria seemed to be near. But, in spite of reverses, Maria Theresa was still recalcitrant, and no regular league had been made when the advance of the Spaniards precipitated Sardinia into war. A curious, probably unique, arrangement, called a "Military Convention," was hurriedly made (March, 1742). Austria and Sardinia were to co-operate in defending Lombardy from the Bourbons, England providing Sardinia with money for the purpose. But both parties reserved their rights to Milan for future settlement, and Carlo

Emmanuele remained free to make other alliances, merely promising to give Austria a month's notice and to evacuate her States.

It was a clever plan, since it gave Carlo Emmanuele time to see how the war would go before definitely committing himself to either party, and, in the meantime, power to check the Infant's advance. It would also enable him to avoid the charge of bad faith so often made against his father; a French writer called it an ingenious expedient "to ally interest with good faith, and truth with all that seems most contrary to it." Carlo Emmanuele and Ormea acting loyally together, and served by their excellent ambassadors in England and France, Solaro and Ossorio, were perhaps better informed and more skilful in diplomacy than any other European Foreign Office.

But the position was at first critical; Montemar was coming from the south, Don Philip from Provence, where he expected to find French co-operation. Austria had called off nearly all her troops to Germany; Milan was almost drained of soldiers and quite unprepared for defence. In spite of English money and fleet, Carlo Emmanuele must depend upon himself. But "it pleased him to defend Italy alone, a thing never dared by his ancestors, who always had more powerful allies behind them¹." It is noteworthy how the House of Savoy always found that their own enemies were the "enemies of Italy." Carlo Emmanuele "prides himself on being the defender of his country, and is obviously pleased if praised for employing his forces and his person for preserving the tranquillity of Italy¹."

Both parties urged Venice to take part in the war; Carlo Emmanuele pointed out to her the danger of establishing the Spaniards at Mantua and offered her Cremona. Venice clung to her neutrality, but allowed the Austrians passage through her territories. The opinions of the Papacy were little con-

¹ Foscarini, the Venetian ambassador.

sidered; a great part of the campaign was fought in Papal territory, both armies marching about there as if it were a sort of No Man's land. But the strategical position of Modena gave it importance. Duke Francesco III had a fair army, and fortresses which both parties coveted. He knew that neutrality was useless, since no one would respect it, and after some hesitation made a secret league with the Bourbons, who guaranteed his possession of Mirandola, and promised to add Guastalla to it. Tuscany was nominally neutral, but Spanish armies marched across it, and English ships harboured at Livorno.

The people of Italy were generally indifferent to the Foreign Powers which quarrelled over them, unless they were personally inconvenienced by the fighting. A Neapolitan versifier wrote :

“If France should win, what matters it to me?
If Austria loses, does it better thee?
They do not fight for either thee or me;
Rather indeed they scoff at me and thee;
Yet will they bring a thousand woes on thee.”

Only the Piedmontese were genuinely interested, because they longed to fight their old foes the French. The Vaudois peasants offered to serve without pay. Carlo Emmanuele's army was in perfect order; he occupied Parma and Reggio, and gave the Duke of Modena ten days in which to decide. The Duke fled to join the Spanish army. Montemar found a task before him very different from his easy campaigns in South Italy. He seemed paralysed by Carlo Emmanuele's activity; allowed him to take Modena and Mirandola, and finally retired into Romagna. Directly afterwards he was deprived of his Neapolitan contingent; for sea-power had unexpectedly asserted itself in what seemed a purely land war. Spain, while drawing upon Naples for help, expected the other Powers to treat it as neutral. The city was quite unprepared for defence when (August 19th) an English squadron under Commodore

Martin appeared, and ordered the King to withdraw his army from North Italy immediately on pain of a bombardment. According to tradition, Martin gave two hours for the answer, and awaited it, watch in hand. The King, "not wishing to be known as a coward," urged refusal; but his Council finally persuaded him to make complete submission, and the Neapolitan army was called home. The English government afterwards disowned Martin's action, but wisely refused to acknowledge the neutrality of Naples.

Even Elizabeth Farnese now agreed with Fleury that it would be worth some sacrifice to win over Carlo Emmanuele. She suggested that he should disregard his pledge to give Austria a month's notice of a change of alliance, and should, after quietly weakening the defences of Lombardy, suddenly admit the Spanish army and join forces with it. Carlo Emmanuele was not over-squeamish, but he declined this proposal rather abruptly. Elizabeth then called him "that Italian brute," and urged her son Philip to hasten his invasion. Philip occupied Savoy, and Carlo Emmanuele was obliged to return to Piedmont, but Montemar was too weak to take advantage of this retreat. Carlo Emmanuele easily drove Philip back into France, but Philip was able again in the following winter to occupy Savoy, once more demonstrating the fact of its military indefensibility.

The death of Fleury removed the last check from Elizabeth's unrestrained ambitions. In the winter she urged the Flemish commander, Gages, who had replaced Montemar, to attack the Austrians while Carlo Emmanuele was still absent in Savoy. There was a fierce though undecided battle at Camposanto (Feb. 8th, 1743), but Gages afterwards retired to winter quarters.

Much to Elizabeth's annoyance she found that the French government still wanted Sardinia's alliance before joining in the Italian war. Negotiations were going on, but the terms offered by Sardinia were so high as to make it almost evident

that they were little more than a ruse to gain time until Austria should be induced to make Carlo Emmanuele a really satisfactory offer. The progress of these negotiations with France was confided to the English government, in order to stimulate it to put pressure upon Maria Theresa.

But Maria Theresa, who felt her situation improving, was very loth to make concessions. The loss of Silesia was so bitter to her that she hated the thought of surrendering a yard of Lombardy. It was not until Carlo Emmanuele assured England that he was on the point of making terms with France that she yielded, and, much against her will, signed the Treaty of Worms (September, 1743). By this Carlo Emmanuele renounced his claim upon Milan in return for the cession of its western provinces, so that his borders would now reach Lake Maggiore and the river Ticino, and include the Pavian territory south of the Po, and Piacenza, with the western half of its duchy. He also received the Austrian rights upon Finale, which meant that he might get it from the Genoese if he could. The morality and wisdom of this clause were both doubtful. Genoa had been neutral so far, and it was rash to incur her enmity gratuitously. England in fact made objections, but withdrew them when Carlo Emmanuele suggested that Finale should be a free port. Carlo Emmanuele guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction. He was to be commander-in-chief of the Austrian and Sardinian forces in Italy, and was to receive a yearly subsidy from England. There was a secret clause, planning the conquest of South Italy, Naples for Austria, Sicily for Sardinia. The terms were not so speciously attractive as those offered by France, but Carlo Emmanuele felt more certain of their fulfilment, especially as they were guaranteed by England. It would be decidedly an advantage to him to command the Simplon and the S. Gotthard, and Finale might make a sea-power of Piedmont.

The result of the Treaty of Worms was to draw Spain and

France closer together ; a new " Family Compact " was signed, and France joined in the Italian war. Milan, Parma and Piacenza were to be conquered for Don Philip, England to be forced to disgorge Gibraltar and Minorca, and Sardinia to restore to France the territory ceded to it by the Treaty of Utrecht. An autumn attack was made upon Piedmont by the valley of the Varaita ; but Carlo Emmanuele checked the invaders at Casteldelfino, and they, fearing to be entangled in frozen passes, retired into France (October).

Early in 1744 Don Philip and the French, under the Prince de Conti, prepared to invade Nice. They counted on the help of their fleets, which had just succeeded in breaking out of the blockade in which the English had long held them at Toulon. Carlo Emmanuele had to meet them alone, for the Austrian army under Lobkowitz had gone off to invade Naples. Maria Theresa believed that the Neapolitans, some of whom were certainly disloyal to the present government, would rise in force to help the Austrians, and she did not realize that the whole strength of her army was really hardly sufficient to protect Lombardy. She was deaf to the remonstrances of England and Sardinia, attributing them to jealousy ; indeed it was true that neither of these Powers was really willing to see the Austrians re-established in South Italy.

The Bourbon invasion of Nice was at first successful ; for the Piedmontese troops despatched by Carlo Emmanuele to meet it were defeated, and would have been destroyed, had not the English fleet taken them on board and conveyed them to Oneglia. Don Philip took Villafranca and Oneglia ; he wished to invade Parma by way of the Riviera, but Conti saw the danger of the long coast road, with the English fleet on one flank and the Piedmontese army on the other. So the French and Spanish withdrew in order to make another attack by way of Dauphiné.

Carlo Emmanuele had spent the winter in strengthening

the defence of the passes, but when the Bourbon armies crossed the Col d'Argentière to follow the Stura route, the troops stationed to hold it gave way, and in August the French were besieging their old enemy, Cuneo. But Cuneo meant to keep up its former reputation, and it had an excellent commander, Leutrum. Carlo Emmanuele called out the national militia, and the people responded eagerly, while the mountaineers about Cuneo worried the French army incessantly. Determined to save Cuneo at any price, Carlo Emmanuele attacked the French camp (Battle of Madonna dell' Olmo). He was repulsed with serious loss; but some militia destroyed the trenches of the besieging armies during their absence, and after this their heavy losses forced them to abandon the siege and retire into Dauphiné (October).

One dangerous year was over; but Carlo Emmanuele meant to face the next without Ormea, who had hitherto shaped his policy. Doubtful of the wisdom of the Treaty of Worms, and poisoned against Ormea by jealous rivals, Carlo Emmanuele gradually withdrew his confidence, till Ormea found himself excluded from the King's counsels. In 1745 he died. A few years earlier his loss would have been severely felt, for there was no other Minister like him; but now the King himself was able to do his work, so that there was no change in the character and ability of the Sardinian government.

Meanwhile the Austrians had advanced on Naples, encouraged by the undoubted fact that nearly all invasions of Naples were at least temporarily successful. Contemporaries asserted with righteous indignation that the people were incurably fickle, but it would have been equally true to say that they were only hoping in vain for good government from a succession of alien and oppressive masters. There was an active party amongst the nobles which intrigued with Austria, and would have joined its army if successful. But the fright given by the English raid had woke up the lethargic administration to a sense of its danger. A special magistracy was

keeping a tight hand on the disaffected; defence works had been built, the army reorganised, and native regiments with noble commanders raised. The populace was not disloyal, for it had no pleasant recollections of the Austrians. But its loyalty was never seriously put to the test.

England, disapproving of the expedition, gave no help, while Charles was supported by the Spanish army under Gages, a commander of real ability. The Austrians were inferior in numbers and artillery, and had to act far from their base. Some of them actually entered the Abruzzi, but were driven out by a detachment of Neapolitans. Gages and Charles met in the Papal States, and faced Lobkowitz at Velletri. Here they remained for six weeks, bombarding one another across the valley. On August 10th the Austrians made a night attack, and Charles had to escape out of the window of his lodgings to avoid capture. But while the Austrians stopped to sack Velletri, Gages restored order to his forces, and, advancing again, drove the Austrians back to their camp. There was no further movement till October, when Lobkowitz slowly retired to Lombardy, Charles following, but not attacking, him. Finally Charles returned to Naples with all the airs of a "conquering hero." No doubt the failure of the invasion strengthened his hold on that kingdom. Rome had treated both intruding forces with perfect courtesy.

The year 1745 opened darkly for Sardinia. England and Austria, both in difficulties at home, could give it little help. Gages occupied central Italy, and was supported by the Neapolitans, who no longer feared an English attack. Don Philip was ready to invade Piedmont. The danger was increased by the League of Aranjuez between Genoa and the Bourbons (1745), which Carlo Emmanuele had brought upon himself by the clause about Finale in the Treaty of Worms, and by the help and open encouragement which he was giving to Corsican refugees. England and Austria also sympathised with the Corsicans, but France helped the Genoese against them. As

long as the English fleet was off her coast, Genoa was quiet ; but in 1745 this menace was removed. By the League of Aranjuez Finale and Corsica, together with all the territory which Savoy had taken from her since 1479, was guaranteed to Genoa, in return for a contingent of troops and free passage through her dominions. Thus the forces of the Bourbons in Provence and central Italy were brought into communication, while they found the use of the Genoese ports very advantageous.

In May, Don Philip, together with the French under Maillebois, invaded Nice, while Gages, evading the Austrians with great skill, moved northwards, passing through Genoese territory, and meeting his allies near Alessandria. The latter, joined by the Genoese army, had passed through the Riviera into Piedmont. Carlo Emmanuele, with much inferior forces, could not single-handed check their advance ; but Schulenburg, the Austrian commander who now succeeded Lobkowitz, contrived to join him. Maillebois had wished to attack the Piedmontese before this junction ; but the Genoese, who feared for their own frontier, and Philip, whose objective was Parma, insisted on first besieging Tortona. The resistance of Tortona delayed their advance until September. Part of Maillebois' army then took Parma and Piacenza, the people welcoming the return of the Spaniards, and seized Pavia by surprise (Sept. 22nd). This movement pleased Don Philip, and was a successful ruse for frightening Schulenburg. He insisted on retiring to defend Lombardy, and left Carlo Emmanuele alone to face the bulk of the Bourbon armies, immensely superior to his in numbers. They defeated him at Bassignano on the Tanaro (Sept. 27th), took Valenza and Casale, and besieged Alessandria, one of the principal fortresses in Piedmont.

Elizabeth Farnese thought that the moment to satisfy her ambition was now come. She insisted that Philip should be allowed to advance upon Milan. There was no resistance, and Milan itself received the Infant cheerfully (Sept. 19th). Philip

was proclaimed King of Lombardy, and besieged the castle. He gave balls, attended the opera, and made himself thoroughly agreeable, but seemed to have forgotten that there was still an Austrian army in Lombardy.

Carlo Emmanuele was in a very difficult situation. The victorious Bourbon army held a great part of Piedmont. After Alessandria, it would turn upon Turin, and there was no Prince Eugene now to come to the rescue, and indeed little hope of foreign help. England was occupied with her rebels, Austria with the attacks of Frederick of Prussia. Carlo Emmanuele was accordingly ready to listen to fresh offers from France.

The new French Foreign Minister, d'Argenson, was a brilliant if rather unpractical political theorist. He espoused Richelieu's ideal of an autonomous Italy, but considered that Bourbons had no more right than Austrians to intrude upon the Peninsula. He hated the new Family Compact and its obligations towards Spain, and suspected that, once Don Philip was settled in Italy, Elizabeth would want to establish her third son, Louis, there also. Elizabeth he compared to a greedy, disagreeable child, grudging all that did not profit herself, and never satisfied. France had gained and could gain nothing by the Spanish alliance, for Elizabeth disliked to see France successful, and had no conception of gratitude. "If," wrote the French ambassador in Madrid, "all she asks is done for her, she still thinks that more might have been done.... One must not only wish what she wishes, but when and as she wishes it." Accordingly d'Argenson believed that the true policy for France was an alliance to rid Italy of all foreigners, for he wished France to occupy the position of arbitrator and peace-maker in Europe.

D'Argenson, with the approval of his King, immediately opened negotiations with Carlo Emmanuele; he thought that he could leave Spain altogether out of his calculations, and that it would be forced to agree if he made terms with Sardinia. He had not reckoned sufficiently on the obstinacy of Elizabeth, and on

the hopelessness of pleasing both her and Carlo Emmanuele. Elizabeth had the superstitious dread of every petty Italian prince for the House of Savoy; she would rather give Austria half the Peninsula than cede a yard of it to Sardinia. Carlo Emmanuele reciprocated her hatred; indeed it is probable that his negotiations with France at this period were once more merely an expedient to gain time. Nor was it likely that d'Argenson's ideas would gain sympathy elsewhere in Italy; he complained that "the Italians seem possessed with the chimerical fear of seeing the King of Sardinia made too strong."

Late in 1745 a project was sent to Gorzegno, now foreign secretary for Sardinia. It suggested the expulsion of all Austrians from Italy, and the division of their States between Sardinia and Don Philip. But a strip of South Piedmont was actually to be in Philip's share, and Genoa was to receive Oneglia and Nice. It also suggested a confederation of Italian States, to protect themselves against the authority which Austria "claims on imaginary titles to exercise over them." They were to declare that the Italians had never authorised the German princes to elect a ruler for them, that the Imperial authority was acquired by violence, and that for the future they intended to be independent of the Emperor, and to establish a Diet and a joint military force of their own.

Gorzegno replied that thus to provoke the anger of the German princes would lead rather to war than to peace. Solemnly to repudiate Imperial rights, which did no one any harm so long as Austria was not powerful enough to enforce them, must have seemed to the level-headed Piedmontese a gratuitous provocation of the Empire, while the "Confederation" scheme was visionary and outside the range of practical politics. Much of the Sardinian State was actually held as a fief of the Empire. Besides, d'Argenson's project would leave Sardinia at the mercy of the Bourbons and cut off from its English ally on the sea. Carlo Emmanuele suspected that beneath the altruistic protests of France lay the determination to make herself supreme

in Italy; since only under her "protection" could this Confederation defy Austria. Indeed, distrust of France was nearly as deeply rooted in Carlo Emmanuele as hatred of Spain.

But for the present Carlo Emmanuele wished to continue negotiations, so he encouraged d'Argenson to believe that he would accept a modified scheme. A French agent, Champeaux, was sent to Turin disguised as an *abbé* (Dec.), bearing fresh proposals, from which the repudiation of Imperial authority was omitted. Champeaux was to show Carlo Emmanuele "the impropriety of disputing with a great and victorious King, who is ready to restore and even to augment the States of a dispossessed prince." But he was "to temper this haughtiness by demonstrations of kindness and friendliness." Secret preliminaries were actually signed at Turin (Dec. 26th); the terms were indefinite and were to be decided after more negotiation.

France guaranteed the adhesion of Spain, but here d'Argenson reckoned without his host. Meaning to enforce submission by fear, he told the French ambassador at Madrid that Philip must adhere to the preliminaries within two days. "Do not hide that it is too late to make objections." In case of a refusal "Maillebois' army will be recalled, and France will wholly abandon the Italian war." Elizabeth was naturally furious at such cavalier treatment. She said, "We are treated like children, and threatened with a whipping if we disobey." This was in fact exactly d'Argenson's attitude. Even the lethargic Philip was roused to indignation, and wrote angrily protesting to his nephew, Louis XV.

D'Argenson was much embarrassed, for Louis would not quarrel with his uncle and ruin his son-in-law, Don Philip, for the sake of Sardinia. However, he still hoped to frighten Spain into acquiescence, and in January, 1746, Champeaux came to Turin as plenipotentiary to continue negotiations. The draft of a treaty which he brought differed from that signed in December, but he had orders to insist on immediate signature. This peremptory attitude was a mistake; for Sardinia, bound

by the Treaty of Worms, was in a difficult position, and should have been allowed time to extricate itself. Moreover, d'Argenson angered Carlo Emmanuele by allowing Austria to hear that preliminaries had been signed. Nor was Champeaux a good agent; he was clumsy and tactless, while Gorzegno was consummately skilful, gaining time by arguments about the precise terms of the treaty and the recalcitrance of Spain, assuring France of Sardinia's good-will, allowing the Sardinian agent in Paris to draw up an armistice which was actually completed (Feb.), though not ratified by Sardinia nor published. Everything was to gain time; for Maillebois had instructions not to press the siege of Alessandria while the negotiations lasted, and Carlo Emmanuele hoped that if the town could hold out for a few more weeks, Austria, now free from her Prussian war, would send him effective help. He arranged with the Austrian commander, Lichtenstein, who was now in Lombardy, a plan for the relief of Alessandria, and operations were to begin on March 4th.

Accordingly Gorzegno urged (February 28th) that France should make certain promises which Carlo Emmanuele demanded, declaring that if this were not done and the armistice published immediately, Sardinia could no longer avoid the pressure of Austria to begin a campaign at once. At last the Comte de Maillebois, son of the Marshal, came from Paris with instructions to publish the armistice. Carlo Emmanuele had by this time no intention of concluding the treaty, but he sent his Minister, Bogino, to the frontier to meet the count. They met at Rivoli on March 4th. Bogino first protested that the terms of the armistice differed from those of the preliminaries; the count then reproached Sardinia with bad faith. Bogino urged that the armistice should be published in Sardinia's terms, but the count continued to insist on those of France. Bogino left Rivoli; the advance of the Austrians and Piedmontese towards Alessandria began. The count wrote that he would sign Sardinia's terms; but it was now too late, and, by March 10th, Alessandria was free.

On March 8th, Elizabeth Farnese had actually promised to agree to the treaty; but her concession came too late to be of any use. D'Argenson had made great mistakes in trying to bully Spain and to better Sardinia in the game of diplomacy, and he had failed in both. Carlo Emmanuele had indeed played the game with more acuteness than ingenuousness, for he knew that he was the weak playing against the strong; yet he had avoided actual bad faith. It was d'Argenson's blunders which gave him the winning hand; but the whole affair did not of course improve Sardinia's indifferent reputation for diplomatic honesty. Spain had beaten d'Argenson by meeting his bluff with obstinacy. Louis XV was not pleased when he found that the sole result of d'Argenson's policy was to bring France to the verge of an ugly quarrel with Spain, and the fall of the too clever Minister followed soon afterwards.

The defence of Alessandria was a fine incident in military history; its relief was a brilliant one. Three joint movements had been planned; Lichtenstein and Leutrum, the Austrian and Piedmontese commanders, were to attack the French at Moncalvo and Asti, and while they were thus occupied, a detachment of Piedmontese was to reinforce and revictual Alessandria. Leutrum's attack was startlingly successful; in two days he had taken Asti with a garrison of six thousand French. Maillebois vainly attempted to relieve it, for the Spaniards with him believed that he had himself instructed it to surrender, and refused to help. With Asti fallen, Maillebois could not hold his position at Alessandria; he raised the blockade and retired. The other Piedmontese towns were quickly recovered; by May the country was free from invaders.

After the relief of Alessandria, Lichtenstein turned back on Milan, where little preparation had been made to resist him. Don Philip was almost captured, for he left the town only two hours before the Austrians entered it (March 19th). Lichtenstein followed him southwards, recovered Parma, and attacked him and Maillebois, who had come to his aid, at Piacenza

(June 16th), completely defeating them. Unfortunately Maria Theresa was still so jealous of Carlo Emmanuele that she recalled Lichtenstein, who was on excellent terms with him, and sent instead Botta Adorno, an exile from Genoa, but quite Genoese enough to hate Carlo Emmanuele. Their disagreements and the skill of Maillebois saved the Bourbon army from a very critical situation, and enabled it to retreat in safety.

The death of Philip V was followed by orders from Spain that its army was to be immediately recalled from Italy, and the French were obliged to follow. In spite of the protests of Genoa, the country was completely evacuated by the autumn. Genoa was abandoned to the hatred of Carlo Emmanuele and the revenge of Adorno. The Genoese government surrendered the city to the latter without any attempt at resistance. Adorno insisted that Genoa should ask pardon of Austria, pay a huge ransom, and provide for the Austrian soldiers, lodged in and round the city, who extorted all they could from their unwilling hosts. The Piedmontese occupied Finale; but Carlo Emmanuele was persuaded by England, against his better judgment, to undertake a futile invasion of Provence. Soon, however, he was recalled by the news that Genoa had expelled the Austrians. Their insolence and intolerable demands exasperated the people, who rose tumultuously and demanded arms; but the government, fearing a sack if the Austrians were offended, refused the request. The people seized arms from shops and private houses, barricaded the streets, organised themselves and elected popular leaders, for they received no help from their nobles or government. At first Adorno despised the rising, but his troops, almost surrounded by the infuriated populace and the peasants who flocked down from the hills, lost courage and fled in great confusion (December 10th). Adorno had to retire, and the people, with great self-control, laid down arms and restored the keys of the city to the Signory, with the significant words, "Here are the keys which your Honours so freely presented to our enemies. Try to keep

them safe in the future, since we have recovered them with our blood."

The death of Philip V brought a great change to Italy, since it put an end to the influence of Elizabeth Farnese. The new King, Ferdinand VI, would not take much trouble for his half-brothers; and, though he and Louis XV both wished to see Don Philip settled in Italy, they were contented with a moderate establishment for him. A peace conference was opened in September, for nearly all the Powers were tired of the war and had little to gain by continuing it. Maria Theresa alone was discontented unless she could recover the Sicilies and Silesia.

The revolt of Genoa prolonged the war for a time. Austria must vindicate her dignity, Carlo Emmanuele wanted to secure his Riviera conquests, while France and Spain felt obliged to protect their ally. Maria Theresa and Carlo Emmanuele did not indeed agree in their views about the future of Genoa, and it required English mediation to arrange between them a "Treaty of Genoese Partition." But Genoa had to be conquered before it could be partitioned, and, ever since its outbreak of patriotic enthusiasm, it had been making strenuous efforts to prepare for self-defence. Austrians and Piedmontese besieged the town, the English fleet held the sea, but French ships managed to keep open communications, and the Genoese resisted gallantly.

France succeeded in persuading Ferdinand that honour required him to help in the relief of Genoa, and a joint French and Spanish army reached Nice; the Piedmontese upon this left Genoa, and Adorno had to raise the siege. Having accomplished this object, the French commander, Belleisle, sent his brother to make a surprise attack upon Piedmont by way of the Monginevra. There was no time for regular preparations to resist the attack; but a small Piedmontese force under the Count of Bricherasio occupied two little passes on the way to Exilles, and defended them with such energy that the whole French

army failed to dislodge it, and in the attempt lost six thousand men, including their commander. This fight has been called the "Thermopylae of Piedmont," and with it ended the Italian war.

Peace negotiations were in progress at Aix-la-Chapelle, but there were many difficulties. England and Austria were ready to grant Parma and Piacenza to Don Philip; but Maria Theresa maintained that, as this would be a violation of the Treaty of Worms, she could not be expected to fulfil her obligations under that treaty and to cede part of Lombardy to Carlo Emmanuele. And Carlo Emmanuele declared that, if he was not to have Piacenza, as promised by the Treaty of Worms, he must receive compensation elsewhere, preferably on the Riviera. Then it was suggested that Charles of Naples would almost certainly be King of Spain in a few years, and that, when that happened, his brother Philip might have Naples, so that Parma and Piacenza might be shared between Sardinia and Austria. But Charles protested against this plan, for, though he knew that he could not have both Spain and Naples, he intended the latter for his own younger son.

In April, 1748, England, Holland and France signed Preliminaries which guaranteed part of Lombardy to Carlo Emmanuele, and Parma and Piacenza to Don Philip, with reversion to Austria and Sardinia should Charles become King of Spain. All the other Powers protested. Carlo Emmanuele was aggrieved because no mention was made of Finale. France made another proposal that he should have Parma and Piacenza, and give up Savoy and Nice to form a State for Don Philip; but this he refused, partly because he would not be cut off from the sea, partly because he would not surrender Savoy, the ancient home of his House—"Though I cannot protect it in time of war, it yet serves to protect Piedmont from France," he wrote. Austria at last agreed not to demand the reversion of Parma unless Don Philip actually succeeded to Naples, but Carlo Emmanuele was so obstinate that the fate of the two

little duchies was separately arranged for, and Piacenza was to become Sardinia's property if Charles became King of Spain, whether Philip succeeded to Naples or no. Genoa's independence was guaranteed, but no settlement was made about Corsica. The Duke of Modena recovered his States; the little Duchy of Guastalla, whose Gonzaga line had become extinct, was added to Parma. Sardinia received the Lombard territory promised by the Treaty of Worms (p. 366), but nothing in the Riviera. The final treaty was signed in October, 1748, but Charles of Naples refused to ratify it. He was disgusted with his brother Ferdinand for taking so little interest in Italian affairs, and still more so when shortly afterwards his sister, Maria Antonia, was betrothed to Carlo Emmanuele's son.

It was unfortunate that the still unsettled question of the future of Piacenza should have prevented a complete understanding between the Italian princes, which might have protected them from further interference from abroad. A league between Naples and Sardinia would have rendered Italy practically independent, for foreign domination in the Peninsula was at a lower point than it had been for more than two centuries. The Austrian possessions were now small, and Austria was not strong enough to assert Imperial claims in other parts of Italy. The Bourbons were at present too discontented with one another to act as one family, so that neither France nor Spain had just now much influence in Italy.

Meanwhile, as the Treaty of Aix did not sufficiently guarantee the new settlement of Italy, negotiations were carried on for another. Maria Theresa wanted to exclude the King of Sardinia, since she disliked having to guarantee his latest Lombard acquisitions; but she had to give way, and, in 1752, Austria, Spain and Sardinia signed the Treaty of Italy, which guaranteed one another's States there, and those of the two Infants, all in the terms of the Treaty of Aix.

Carlo Emmanuele was in a very satisfactory position. He was on terms of close friendship with England, and contemplated linking himself with her sea-power in the Mediterranean by converting Nice into a free port. France was sending ambassadors to court him, but Carlo Emmanuele would not commit himself. One of the instructions to these ambassadors runs:—"It is this King's custom not to make any engagements in advance, and he will only bind himself at the moment that he sees war about to begin." With Austria and Spain he was actually in league by the Treaty of Italy; Austria seemed to have acquiesced in the loss of western Lombardy, and Carlo Emmanuele's son was married to a Spanish Infanta.

In 1753 there was a danger of trouble for Italy in a Modenese marriage question. Duke Francesco's son, Ercole, was the last male of the House of Este, and his one little daughter, Beatrice, was betrothed by the Duke to Maria Theresa's son, Leopold, on the understanding that the Duchy of Modena should always remain independent of Austria. But France and Spain, dreading the consequent increase of Austrian influence in Italy, supported Ercole, who wished his daughter to marry the heir of Parma, so that the duchies might form a single central Italian State.

Between 1748 and 1756 took place the great change in European politics which resulted in the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. It affected Italian affairs considerably, and at one time Italy was nearly dragged into hostilities.

The position of Sardinia was completely changed by the new alliance between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons, so that it could no longer carefully balance itself between these two. Cut off geographically from the opposing league of England and Prussia, Sardinia was practically crushed into political insignificance between her two powerful neighbours, and, if they should agree to unite against her, she would be helpless. And, in the Treaty of Versailles between them, there was a not obscure hint that Austria might wish to recover her cessions in

Lombardy. Accordingly a self-effacing neutrality was the only wise policy for Carlo Emmanuele, though it was most distasteful to so active a diplomatist and soldier. He had in vain warned England against subverting "the ancient system to which Europe up till now owes her liberty." The French ambassador at Turin wrote, "Sardinia expects to be courted, and to indulge freely its partiality for England. Now it is reduced to inaction, and sees in the future a new political system which will endanger its aims and ambitions." Neither France nor Austria courted Sardinia any longer, and England, already far away, was cut off still more by her loss of Minorca.

Pitt made a daring proposal to bring Carlo Emmanuele once more into politics. This was to form an Italian league which should drive the Austrians from Italy, and share their possessions between Sardinia and Parma. But Carlo Emmanuele thought the scheme unpractical and dangerous, and Charles of Naples not only saw no personal benefit in it, but also so dreaded Sardinia that he would not co-operate with that State under any circumstances. Pitt however continued to make polite advances to Charles, whom he considered important as future King of Spain, so that Charles began to hope, and Carlo Emmanuele to fear, that England would favour the former when the Piacenza question should come up for settlement. Various plans were suggested to meet this future difficulty, and in the Fourth Treaty of Versailles (1758) Austria renounced all its claim on Parma and Guastalla, but this settled nothing about Piacenza. There was no question but that, by the Treaties of Aix and of Italy, Carlo Emmanuele was entitled to Piacenza when Charles should ascend the Spanish throne, whatever might then become of Philip; but, hemmed in as he was amongst unfriendly Powers, Carlo Emmanuele would find it hard to enforce his claims. Charles did not intend to let his brother succeed to Naples; Louis XV would hardly allow his son-in-law, Philip, to lose half his State. Austria preferred to see Piacenza held by a weak prince like Philip than by

Carlo Emmanuele, for Piacenza was well fortified and situated just between Lombardy and Tuscany. Even England, though she recognized Carlo Emmanuele's rights, assured Charles that she would not allow him to suffer. When Ferdinand's death seemed imminent, both Charles and Carlo Emmanuele made preparations for a fight about Piacenza; but Louis XV and Choiseul were very averse to allow the war to be extended to Italy, and the Sardinian rights, which France had guaranteed, seem really to have weighed on their consciences. Choiseul informed Carlo Emmanuele that, while recognizing the justice of his claim, Louis wished him to leave Piacenza to Philip, and to accept compensation elsewhere. To agree was to place himself dangerously in the power of France, which would naturally fix the compensation to be given, and England warned him to refuse. But Carlo Emmanuele accepted the French offer, for this was the only way in which he could ensure that his claims would be considered at all. Compensation on the Riviera would have pleased him, but he must have known that it would be very difficult to procure.

In August, 1759, Ferdinand of Spain died, and Charles peacefully succeeded him. Before he left Naples he settled its succession on his third son, Ferdinando. The eldest was a hopeless idiot, and he therefore desired to take the second with him to Spain. Ferdinando, a child of nine years, was put in the charge of the able Minister, Tanucci (see Chapter III). Much afraid of Sardinia and suspicious of France, Charles felt that the boy-king required the protection of some other great Power besides his own. For this he turned to Austria, and, to win her alliance, surrendered to Tuscany the Presidi and his old claim to the Medici allodials (p. 359). In return, Austria guaranteed the Sicilies to Ferdinando and Parma to Philip.

Here was a strange revolution in politics. A few years since Bourbon and Habsburg had been struggling for Naples; now the Bourbon King of Spain was looking to the Habsburgs to protect a Bourbon King of Naples. There was altogether a

new order of things in Italy; for Lombardy and Tuscany, Naples, Modena and Parma were bound in an informal union, which for the present guaranteed Italian peace, since it received the support of both Austria and the Bourbons, and could keep in check the ambitions of Sardinia. The union was drawn closer by Maria Theresa's plan for reviving Austrian influence in the Peninsula through the medium of Habsburg marriages with the Italian princes. As the Archduke Leopold became Grand Duke of Tuscany, his younger brother Ferdinand was married to the heiress of Modena. Two Arch-Duchesses, Maria Carolina and Maria Amalia, were married in Italy, one to the King of Naples, the other to the son of the Duke of Parma. Indeed, in the end, the intrigues of the Queen of Naples were to substitute Austrian for Spanish influence there, and the Austro-Neapolitan alliance was to last on into the nineteenth century.

The Piacenza question was settled peaceably in spite of all fear to the contrary. As he had promised France, Carlo Emmanuele stayed quiet on the death of Ferdinand of Spain, and Philip remained in undisturbed possession of Piacenza. But France had still to fulfil her promise of compensating Sardinia for its loss. At the same time, France wished to arrange a new Family Compact with Spain, and could not therefore offer any compensation of which the new King, Charles III, did not approve. Charles was still under the influence of his mother, Elizabeth Farnese, and of Tanucci, the Neapolitan Minister, both of whom were bitterly hostile to Sardinia. Charles therefore maintained that he failed to recognize the necessity for compensating Sardinia at all, but was willing to agree to a pecuniary compensation. Carlo Emmanuele declared that no pecuniary indemnity would satisfy him, but that he would be content with a strip of coast and some Imperial fiefs. In the private treaty between France and Spain, signed at the same time as the Family Compact (1761), compensation to Sardinia was guaranteed, "the King of France wishing to keep his word, and the King of Spain

being disposed to fulfil the pledge of the King of France," but nothing definite was suggested.

This Family Compact formally included Naples and Parma, and the four Bourbon States were to guarantee one another's possessions and security in all parts of the world; but Tanucci, who dreaded lest it should involve Naples in the European war, managed to defer Ferdinando's signature under various pretexts, with the result that the young King never signed at all. Nor did Naples obtain any benefit from the commercial clauses of the Compact, since France still jealously excluded it from Mediterranean trade.

Meanwhile, Carlo Emmanuele's hopes of obtaining a fair compensation were raised by the request of George III that the Piedmontese ambassadors in London and Paris should negotiate a peace between England and France (Dec. 1761). The declaration of war between Spain and England checked these negotiations for a time, but, since France and England both really wished for peace, they were not altogether dropped, and so skilful were the Sardinian diplomats that an understanding was presently reached. At a ball given at the French Court in August, 1762, there was a ballet in which performers, representing England, France, Spain and Portugal, were symbolically reconciled by one representing Sardinia. Tanucci, who had himself refused the post of mediator, was much disgusted. He had protested to Charles against the intervention of the Sardinians. "They will only sow discord," he wrote; "dealings with vipers and tigers are never profitable. I know that all Sardinian diplomats poison everything they touch." In spite of his prognostications peace preliminaries were signed through Sardinia's mediation in November.

Still the Piacenza question was not settled, and Carlo Emmanuele was seriously reflecting whether he might not risk a resort to war to enforce his claims. Austria would not care; Spain and France were busy elsewhere. But he was not quite bold enough for such a venture, and only continued to protest

against the proposed pecuniary compensation, urging England to postpone her signature to the general peace until his demands were satisfied. At last, however, he gave way (June, 1763), and agreed to accept a large sum of money (over nine million *lire*), retaining his claim to succeed to Piacenza should Philip's line fail, or Philip succeed to Naples.

In only two other affairs before the French Revolution did Italy become involved in European politics; namely, in the suppression of the Jesuits (see Chapter III), and in the question of the Corsican rebellion. As a possession of Genoa, Corsica enters into Italian history.

There had long been nominal peace in Corsica (see p. 171), but its internal condition did not improve. While Genoa tried by severity to repress the natural ferocity of the people, she raised revenue from the indiscriminate sale of gun-licenses. It was said that a twentieth of the population was assassinated every year. The Government confessed that it was powerless to keep order. Over-taxation, injustice and famine led to new revolts, which broke out in 1729. The Corsicans elected native generals, and held a national assembly, and the Genoese, quite helpless alone, asked the Emperor for aid. Charles, delighted to push Imperial claims in Italy, sent troops, who with much difficulty forced the Corsicans to accept terms (1732). Genoa then exiled the Corsican leaders, and the rebellion broke out afresh. However, since Genoa held the sea, the islanders found it nearly impossible to obtain weapons and munitions. This led to a curious incident, the election as King of Corsica of a German adventurer, Theodore of Neuhof, who promised to procure foreign help. A Constitution was drawn up, creating a limited monarchy and a representative assembly; it was of a remarkably modern type to be the work of a half-civilised people. Theodore had soon himself to go in quest of the aid that he promised; two or three times he brought Dutch ships and supplies, but the Genoese meanwhile called in the assistance of France (1737).

France was alive to the commercial advantages of the possession of Corsica, and resolved that they should ultimately be her own. She cleverly managed to secure a party in the island attached to herself, and to retain a kind of informal control there. The League of Aranjuez (1745) brought new developments, the interference of Carlo Emmanuele and his allies. An English fleet appeared and landed a Corsican exile, Rivarola, who renewed the rebellion. The Treaty of Aix was concluded in such haste that it did not contain any settlement of the Corsican question.

The revolt continued, and in 1755 the Corsicans elected as their general Pasquale Paoli, the youthful son of an exiled leader. Paoli had great abilities, and a singularly noble character; he stands out amongst the few heroes of the eighteenth century. For fourteen years he ruled the Corsicans well; order was restored, and feuds ended. There was a Constitutional Government with Paoli as President; his power was controlled by a general assembly and an executive council. At the same time he carried on a continual struggle with Genoese and French, organising the irregular Corsican troops, and leading them in a guerilla war, the success of which was wonderful, considering the poverty of his resources. Little by little the French ousted the Genoese from their rule over the island, and, by the Treaty of Versailles (1768), Corsica was actually sold to France. It was now worth while for France to send a large army there to reduce it to submission, for the possession of Corsica secured her communications with Italy, and increased her influence in the Mediterranean. England, hampered by the American war, could not interfere; and, after a short but gallant struggle, Paoli, completely defeated, left the island rather than expose it to hopeless suffering (1769). Thus the semi-Italian island became French, and repaid France by giving her Napoleon. For many years Paoli lived in England, the friend of Doctor Johnson, greatly honoured, pensioned by the government, admired by all Liberals. Hoping that the

French Revolution would restore freedom to his country he returned there, hailed by French enthusiasts as a famous champion of Liberty. But disillusion soon followed; he found that "Liberty" did not mean freedom for Corsica, and he ultimately returned to England. His history is not perhaps strictly Italian; yet it is refreshing to dwell briefly on a great man and an heroic episode in an age of mediocrities and selfish, narrow politics.

CHAPTER III.

INTERNAL POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION : 1700—1792.

THE first half of the eighteenth century in Italy was filled with wars, but in the succeeding years of peace new ideas on philosophy, economics and politics began slowly to penetrate thither from France. Only a few of the more thoughtful Italians responded to them ; the lower classes were too dull, the upper classes too frivolous, to understand. Certain reforms were pressed upon the apathetic people by foreign-bred rulers, Joseph II and his brother, Leopoldo, who, themselves full of eighteenth century notions, delighted to make experiments upon the docile Italians. The Piedmontese Dukes also effected many changes ; but these resembled the improvements of a landlord upon his own property ; there was nothing spontaneous or popular about them.

The States of the Church remained unaffected by contemporary movements ; the Government was scandalously inefficient, the people debased, the country in great disorder. All the disastrous economic conditions of the seventeenth century remained unchanged, and brigandage alone flourished. The roads, which were few and bad, were sometimes blocked by a few peasants holding a chain across them and demanding toll. Readers of *Monte Cristo* will remember the description of the power of influential brigand chiefs, from whom the streets of Rome were not safe. The law was savage and brutal, executions were frequent ; but there was no improvement.

Indeed, for a man who was not an ecclesiastic, brigandage was almost the only possible way of making a fortune.

Within Rome, thanks to fixed low prices and indiscriminate charity, life was easy enough, and the people were contented; but in the country, though the taxation was moderate compared with that of some neighbouring States, there was great suffering from war, famine, agricultural depression and official oppression. Discontinuity of government made matters worse; the Governor of Rome, for example, only held office for a short time as a step towards the Cardinalate, and the short reigns of the Popes caused a rapid change of officials, each of whom had no object except to get rich quickly. While the Papal Treasury was empty, the Papal officials were enriched with monopolies. For example, the officers of the *Annona* who had to provision Rome made huge profits for themselves in the process.

Meanwhile the state of the finances was as bad as ever. Current expenses were largely derived from lotteries, since the revenue barely covered the interest on the debt. Yet, though the rate of interest was low, *Monti* remained at a premium, for nobody doubted the solvency of the Papacy. Pius VI, the most extravagant of the eighteenth century Popes, increased the debt by twenty million crowns, so that in 1789 it amounted to eighty-seven million. Trade was seriously embarrassed from want of specie, since Roman paper was of little value abroad, and there was a consequent drain on the coinage. The lotteries brought plenty into the country, but this the Apostolic Chamber re-exported, buying with it cheap Roman paper, for which it obtained full value at home.

Yet there was enough money to provide fortunes for officials and for Papal families. The worst evils of nepotism did not appear again; but the Corsini nephews of Clement XII and the Braschi relations of Pius VI amassed great wealth. The Braschi had a monopoly of oil and of the exportation of corn, and a large part of the reclaimed Pontine marshes was granted to them.

Clement XII permitted a more dangerous form of nepotism, for his nephews ruled him entirely, especially in his old age. "Let them do as they wish, since they are masters," he said. Most of the Popes of this period were, however, tolerably well served by Cardinal Secretaries, useful, but not too powerful, with the exception of Benedict XIII's scandalous minister, Coscia. The Cardinals thought that they had elected a nonentity, whom they could govern as they pleased; "but," said one of them, "who will govern this Coscia?" Benedict was absorbed in his devotions, and was so pious that on his death-bed he ordered Raphael's frescoes in the Vatican to be white-washed, and died believing that it had been done. Meanwhile Coscia sold patronage and spiritual privileges, and when complaints were made to the Pope, he said, "Ah! ch  questo   niente!" Benedict's death was announced at the Opera; and the people rose and left, crying, "Good! let us go and burn Coscia!" Coscia escaped with his life, but not without severe punishment.

The Cardinals who were not ministers generally lived luxurious and lazy lives, rivalling one another in social display. Some, as, for example, Lambertini (Benedict XIV), were men of literature and learning; but most were rather stupid, and "very much on their dignity." At the Conclave they all became very important, and Rome was the centre of general political interest. The Catholic Powers had their parties, which formed shifting combinations with those of the Cardinals, so that months of intrigue generally accompanied each election. The views of the Cardinals were in great part determined by personal animosity and interests, but one distinct party was formed early in the century, that of the "Zelanti" (Zealous), which wished for a Pope who would not abandon any of the ancient Papal claims, or make Concordats with the temporal rulers. In opposition to the Zelanti was a more moderate group, which compassed the election of Benedict XIII. Benedict's Concordat with Sardinia (p. 393) infuriated the Zelanti, and they

procured the election of Clement XII, who annulled the Concordat. But the election of Clement's successor, Benedict XIV, was a reaction towards moderation. Over these Conclaves lowers the sinister figure of Cardinal Albani, almost the only really able Roman of the period. Himself debarred, as nephew of Clement XI, from the Papacy, he yet by force of character, skill in intrigue, and utter want of scruple, ruled his fellow-Cardinals and directed the Conclaves. "A masterful and terrible man...the cleverest in the College, the worst in Rome... Satan is not more feared in Hell than he is here." The spectacle of these old men, the good ones generally stupid, the clever ones mostly wicked, intriguing, slandering, lying, haughtily dictatorial or hypocritically weak, is not pleasant, especially when the object of the Conclave is considered. One old Cardinal, who barely missed election, returned to his cell and died in three days, and the Romans laughingly called his complaint "Rabbia Papale." When the French Cardinal Tencin was influential, they said, "Tencin has the Holy Ghost in his pocket."

The later elections of the century turned principally on the question of the Jesuits; Clement XIV (1740) was really chosen by the Bourbon States for the express purpose of carrying out the suppression of the Order. On this occasion Joseph II was visiting Rome; he advised the Cardinals to choose a Pope like Benedict XIV. An exception was made in his favour to the strict rules of the Conclave; the seals were broken, and he was allowed to visit the Cardinals.

As a temporal State the Papacy was quite insignificant; its interests, its feudal claims and the inviolability of its territory were completely disregarded by the Powers. Nor, since the early Middle Ages, had its spiritual authority ever sunk so low. It had now to contend against the hatred of the new philosophers, of Free-Masons and Encyclopaedists, whose influence even affected professing Christians like Maria Theresa and her sons, and such Catholic countries as Spain and Portugal. Their

antagonism was strengthened by the Jansenist movement against Jesuitism, and by the growing spirit of nationality which resisted the Papacy's extra-national claims. We cannot here follow these movements in detail, but their effect upon the Papacy forms the subject of its history in the eighteenth century.

In France the Jansenist attack was contemporary with the Parliament's assertion of the rights of the Gallican Church against the Pope; but Louis XIV now sided with the Papacy, so that Clement XI ventured to publish a Bull, "Unigenitus" (1713), which uncompromisingly asserted Jesuit theology, thus unwisely alienating the learned Catholics who followed Augustine and Aquinas. In former days it was the Papacy which looked for support to the Jesuits; now the position was reversed, and the Jesuits, weak and unpopular, had to fall back upon the Papacy. Their blunders and the Bull "Unigenitus" caused, after the death of Louis, a violent movement in France against Jesuitry and Ultramontanism, and Spain and Portugal, which had suffered most from them, joined in. The aged and feeble Pope, Innocent XIII (1721), was powerless to cope with the situation, and Benedict XIII (1724), though he had good intentions, was without statesmanlike qualities, and was ruled by Coscia. He held a council at the Lateran, mostly composed of Italians, which confirmed the Bull "Unigenitus." Though Louis XV endeavoured to make peace, the quarrel raged throughout the reign of Benedict's successor, Clement XII (1730). Meanwhile, in Spain and Portugal there was a movement for the taxation of the clergy and the restriction of Papal rights; and even Italy, the stronghold of the Papacy, was no longer quiescent.

In Piedmont, the opposition came from the King and his Ministers, especially Ormea. Early in his reign, Vittorio Amedeo II had begun to study the works of Sarpi and to resist the exorbitant claims of the Papacy, especially in patronage and jurisdiction. He made mortmain laws and claimed the revenue of vacant benefices, so that Clement XI threatened

him with an interdict (1702). Vittorio Amedeo retorted by declaring that, if Emmanuele Filiberto had been called "Iron Head," he would be called "Steel Head." The difficulty was increased when Vittorio Amedeo became King of Sicily and refused to ask the Papacy for feudal investiture of that island. In Sicily a struggle was already in progress between the Bishops and the secular court which exercised the royal *Monarchia* (p. 102). Vittorio Amedeo supported the court, and when he left Sicily created a *Giunta* (committee) for ecclesiastical affairs, composed of better-class Sicilians, who were very hostile to the Papacy. But the Friars and Jesuits taught the lower classes that the government was impious; and, as their rulers became gradually unpopular, public opinion veered over to the side of the Papacy. The Spanish government had never come to an open breach with Rome, so that it was in part religious feeling which led the people to welcome back the Spaniards. Clement knew that he could not defy Spain with impunity, and the ecclesiastical difficulty in Sicily was soon arranged.

But the ecclesiastical trouble in Savoy grew worse, and a fresh difficulty arose over the question whether Papal investiture was needed for Sardinia. The Popes refused to appoint Bishops, and the people grew discontented at being left without any. But, when the more conciliatory Benedict XIII became Pope (1724), Vittorio sent his clever minister, Ormea, to Rome to negotiate a Concordat. At Rome Ormea gained his reputation as one of the most skilful diplomats of the time. In spite of the opposition of Cardinals and Curia, he secured the support of Coscia and other influential servants of the Pope, and gained over Benedict himself by protestations of Vittorio Amedeo's personal piety, and detestation of philosophers and Jansenists. But Benedict was dreadfully frightened of his Cardinals, and Ormea had to work hard for three years before he could obtain a satisfactory Concordat (1727). The Cardinals angrily declared that the Pope would die some day, but there

would always be Cardinals ; and this proved only too true, for Clement XII was elected on purpose to denounce the Concordat. Clement hoped that he would get his own way with the new young King ; but Carlo Emmanuele III, supported by Ormea, was as firmly opposed to Roman claims as his father had been. The Sardinian envoy was recalled, and matters were at a deadlock.

In Naples, where the contest between Church and State had continued all through Spanish rule, the anti-Papal movement had become popular ; for the influential class of lawyers, who naturally hated the encroachments of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, had begun to study the subject historically, and to express the results of their study in writing. The most able of these was Giannone, who wrote an account of the *Monarchia* and other anti-Papal works. The publication of his famous *History of Naples* in 1723 caused a great disturbance ; Giannone had to leave the country, but the city voted him a pension, and his work became the standard of the anti-Papal party, which was growing strong amongst the educated classes. Reform was urged upon the Austrian government, but in vain, and Charles III soon found himself bombarded with petitions that he would free the State from clerical tyranny. Charles' anxiety to obtain Papal investiture made him at first deaf to these petitions ; but the Pope hesitated to grant it, and a chance quarrel nearly led to an open breach. Neapolitan recruiting in the Papal States roused great indignation and even armed resistance amongst the people ; and Charles, quite indefensibly, sent troops which raided Velletri, carried off prisoners, and imposed a fine on the town. The anti-Papal party at Naples seized this opportunity to urge the King to confiscate ecclesiastical property. But Charles still needed the investiture, and in 1738 obtained it by dropping for a time the question of ecclesiastical reform.

The election of Benedict XIV (1740) seemed to be the beginning of a new epoch in Papal history. Benedict was

really learned in Law and the Humanities, and was something of a philosopher. Voltaire, Montesquieu, Hume and Muratori were amongst his friends; Frederick the Great praised him; Horace Walpole called him "A Priest without interest or insolence, a Prince without favourites, a Pope without nepotism, an author without vanity...he restored the lustre of the tiara with those arts only by which he obtained it, that is with his virtues." With the rather coarse humour, easy tolerance and political common-sense of a Renaissance Pope, he combined uprightness, hatred of intrigue and real statesmanship. He avoided nepotism, and practised such economy that he could build, excavate and patronise literature without burdening the revenue. Aided by two able Secretaries, Cardinals Valenti and Archinto, he effected reforms in the Papal States, and steered safely in foreign politics between Austria and France.

Benedict understood that the Papacy had been trying to maintain an impossible position, and that only by concession in temporal matters could it hope to retain its spiritual primacy, only by yielding something to the spirit of nationality could the spirit of infidelity be kept in check. "I prefer to let the thunders of the Vatican rest," he wrote; "Christ never called down fire from Heaven." Arrangements were accordingly made with Spain and Portugal, and a Concordat with Naples which allowed the taxation of some ecclesiastical property, and limited ecclesiastical jurisdiction, clerical immunities, etc. The Concordat did not however put an end to controversy, for there were constant disputes over it; the clergy tried to avoid carrying it out; the government continued to make ecclesiastical reforms without Papal permission; ecclesiastical censures were frequently disregarded. There was a popular explosion of wrath when it was discovered that the Archbishop was secretly trying to re-introduce the Inquisition. A new Concordat was proposed, but not made.

Sardinian affairs were more satisfactorily arranged. Ormea had already won the good-will of Clement XII by a particularly

mean act. He invited Giannone, who was at Geneva, to visit Savoy, and then arrested him. Ormea would not quite go to the length of giving up his deluded guest to the Roman Inquisition, but he kept him in prison until his death ten years later. The Pope wrote to thank the King, and expressed a wish for reconciliation. Negotiations proceeded apace under Benedict, and in 1742 a Concordat was signed, securing valuable ecclesiastical reforms, especially in matters of patronage and clerical immunities.

French difficulties could not be settled by a Concordat, for it was the people, not the government, which defied the Papacy. Benedict showed good sense in defending the Church rather against Atheism than Jansenism. "Since infidelity makes daily progress," he wrote, "it is rather necessary to ask men whether they believe in God than if they accept the Bull" (*Unigenitus*). While urging the French clergy to moderation in their struggle with the Parliament, he issued a Bull against the Free-Masons, who, though less dangerous than was popularly supposed, were no doubt addicted to infidelity.

The result of Benedict's policy was to divert the general attack from the Papacy, and it fell with full force on the Jesuits instead. Jansenists, philosophers, and the upholders of national independence made common cause against them. They had few friends; their ambition and intrigue made them universally unpopular; and they were hated by the secular clergy, who resented their undue influence at Rome. The movement began in France, but was taken up more vigorously in Portugal by the powerful minister Pombal. He persuaded Benedict, who himself had no love for Jesuits, to appoint a commission to enquire into their conduct (1758).

But Clement XIII (1758) was the Pope of the Zelanti, and was practically pledged to make no more concessions. He and his minister, Torrigiani, were brave and honest, convinced of the righteousness of their cause, sure that present troubles were only passing trials, and that the Church must triumph in

the end if they only stood firm, and yet avoided giving offence. Clement would not permit any attacks on the Jesuits, yet he could do very little to protect them. Pombal accused the Portuguese Jesuits of a plot to assassinate the King, and deported them wholesale to the States of the Church, where they were landed and left in a destitute condition. Charles III of Spain had at first held back from the movement, but his minister, Roda, persuaded him that the Jesuits were plotting against him also, and he followed the example of Portugal, closed their establishments, and escorted them all to the Papal States. However, the Spanish Jesuits were granted pensions. In France also the King for a time protected the Jesuits, but at last joined in the general movement against them. The Order was declared abolished, but Jesuits who wished to live privately in France were permitted to do so. Clement published a Bull, "Apostolicum Pascendi," proclaiming the innocence and merits of the Jesuits, but it did more harm than good to their cause.

Austria and Sardinia did not join in the expulsion of the Jesuits, but the Bourbon Princes of Italy followed the example of their foreign relations. Tanucci, who now ruled Naples for the young King, Ferdinando II, shot the Jesuits across the frontier with scant ceremony. Ferdinando of Parma, directed by his minister, du Tillot, had already tried his hand at ecclesiastical reform. Clement, unwisely thinking that he could at least coerce a petty Prince, threatened excommunication, and renewed the unforgotten Papal claim to suzerainty over his Duchies. In a moment all the Bourbons were up in arms to protect Parma. France occupied Avignon, Naples seized Pontecorvo and Benevento, marched troops into the Papal States, and threatened to restore Castro to the Duke of Parma. Clement was alarmed and offered to negotiate, but he found that the Bourbons insisted on the complete suppression of the Jesuit Order, and intended to hold the Pope's property until he complied with this demand. At this crisis Clement XIII died (1769).

The Bourbon party was very strong in the Conclave, and demanded the election of a Pope who would pledge himself to abolish the Jesuit Order. This the Zelanti refused to permit, but they so far gave way as to agree to the election of Clement XIV, whose views on ecclesiastical questions were known to be moderate. Clement was a man of great learning, unspotted character and a meek spirit. He hated the temporal ambitions of the Papacy, and wished to show himself a humble disciple of his Meek Master. Moreover, as a Franciscan, he disliked Jesuit theology. Conciliatory from the first, he confirmed the Sardinian Concordat, dropped the threat of excommunication against Parma, and appointed a commission on the Jesuit question.

The Bourbon courts urged immediate action, but Clement, determined to do justice, refused to be hurried. He must have time to study the question, to allow Roman opinion to change,—as in part it did,—time, perhaps, to allow the Jesuits to work out their own ruin by the extravagance of their denunciations, their obstinacy and intrigues. Even Cardinal Albani, “the old wolf,” most zealous of the Zelanti, deserted their cause. Altogether, Clement took four years to reach his final decision, and meanwhile he worked hard to rectify the relations of the Papacy itself with the different States.

The really Catholic King and people of Portugal longed for reconciliation; Pombal was won over, and thoroughly cordial relations were restored. With Joseph Clement was on friendly terms, and the able and honest French ambassador, Bernis, mediated between him and the French court. The Parma difficulty was temporarily settled by the abandonment of Clement XIII's Monitorium. Only Naples remained actively hostile. Tanucci continued the attack on ecclesiastical privileges; he tried to separate the Religious Orders from their Roman superiors, placing their property under government control, and republished the works of Sarpi and Giannone. He paid no heed to the Concordat of 1741, but the King of Spain rebuked him and ordered him to hold his hand.

In 1773 Clement went to his country house and refused to

see anyone who would talk about the Jesuit question; in August the Bull for the suppression of the Order was published. The angry Jesuits invented terrible stories of how the Pope went mad when he signed the Bull, and, never recovering his senses, died raving of eternal punishment. The tales were quite untrue, though they gained credence, but no doubt the old man was much agitated in carrying through what must have seemed so tremendous a revolution. The fortunes of the Papacy had so long been bound up with those of the Jesuits that it seemed doubtful whether one could survive the other. The Jesuits refused to accept their sentence; they clung together, refused the pensions offered them, and remained a secret society, intriguing, slandering, stirring up disaffection against the Pope. So fierce were their threats that Clement feared assassination. When he died (1775), not without suspicion of poison, the French ambassador placed guards round his catafalque to protect it from desecration.

Immediately after the suppression of the Jesuits Avignon and Benevento were restored to the Papacy, but with much circumlocution, to make it appear as if the arrangement were not a bargain.

The dissolution of the Jesuit Order is almost the only striking and picturesque event of eighteenth century Italian history. It was of more importance for Italy than for the rest of Europe, because of the number and power of the Jesuits there. Yet it is noticeable that the Italians were not bitter against the Jesuits, and only welcomed the suppression because of the financial advantages to be derived therefrom. The rulers of Naples and Parma acted rather as Bourbons than as Italian Princes. Church reform of the kind which Sardinia had already obtained was what Italy really required. Austria was in the same position. This Clement's successor, Pius VI (1775), was to find to his cost.

The election of Pius was a compromise between the Powers and the Zelanti, who thought him a prudent, just and moderate

man. But this was exactly what Pius was not. He was vain and timid, constantly fluctuating between extremes of obstinacy and extremes of concession, as he was led by alternate fits of vanity and timidity. Diplomats soon gauged his character, and played upon his vanity. Conscious of his saintly countenance, his stately figure and beautiful manners, he thoroughly enjoyed a great ceremony in which they might all be displayed. He could be made to believe that he had gained a substantial advantage if he were provided with a crowd which shouted his praises, and knelt for his benediction. His vanity led him to lavish money on buildings called by his name, such as the Museo Pio-Clementino in the Vatican and its collections, on ceremonies and entertaining, and on the work which was to immortalise him, the draining of the Pontine marshes. It was a great ambition, but the Pope's resources and ability were unequal to it. Much money was wasted, and only very partial results achieved. Meanwhile the Papal States were ill-governed, and the debt increased with startling rapidity.

Pius was in a difficult position, urged by the Zelanti party to maintain the rights of the Church, and bullied by the Powers, who dictated his choice of Ministers, and took without permission such rights as he refused to surrender. The Jesuits intrigued incessantly, but Pius dared show them no countenance, though he secretly sympathised with them. It added to his embarrassment that they were protected by two non-Catholic Princes, Frederick of Prussia and Catharine of Russia. France, Spain and Portugal were now fairly satisfied, and the French ambassador, Bernis, smoothed over difficulties and looked after Pius, who, he said, was "like a child of good natural gifts, but too lively." The chief trouble came from Joseph II, since ecclesiastical reform figured largely on the Emperor's programme. He suppressed some monasteries, transferred the control of the rest from their Roman superiors to the Bishops, and demanded the patronage of all Lombard Bishoprics and benefices. Pius conceived the foolish idea of a personal visit

to the Emperor to plead the cause of the Church. He only made himself and the Papacy ridiculous, while Joseph unconcernedly pursued his course, calling himself "Supreme guardian of the Church, and administrator of its temporalities." Once, on the verge of an open quarrel, Joseph decided on a sudden visit to Rome, but concluded when there that he had best gain his ends by flattery. The Romans cried, "Long live our Emperor!" and perhaps Joseph, remembering how lately Pius had visited Vienna as a suppliant, thought that Canossa was avenged.

Certain Italian princes, infected with modern ideas of reform, found it easier to attack ecclesiastical than lay abuses, and joined with enthusiasm in the new sport of Pope-baiting. Only the King of Sardinia, who already had all that he needed, and the Duke of Parma, who was very religiously inclined, refrained. Venice, so anti-Papal that she had even contrived to quarrel with Benedict XIV, was annexing ecclesiastical rights one after another without scruple. Her zeal in suppressing convents, or subjecting them to the control of the Bishops, nearly led to an open breach with Pius. The Pope's vanity once led him to visit Venice; he was received with politeness, but with such coolness that he left again rather suddenly.

The anti-Papal policy of the Neapolitan government, though slightly held in check by Spain and France, was not modified by the fall of Tanucci, but grew more violent as Naples emancipated itself from Spanish control. Unfortunately this policy was not prompted by a genuine desire for reform; the worst abuses were left untouched lest the superstitious populace should be offended; it was really the manifestation of a savage hatred of the Papacy; hence its progress was often self-contradictory and illogical. In Sicily there was a more single-minded reformer, the Viceroy Caraccioli, who abolished the Inquisition amid popular applause. Caraccioli had been heard to say, "If ever I am Minister at Naples, I will make the King independent of that Grand Mufti at Rome"; but

when he actually became Minister, responsibility modified his views, and he attempted reconciliation. This failed, however, and in 1788 the Neapolitan government refused to pay the customary annual act of homage to the Pope. Ferdinando declared that he held the Kingdom by right of conquest, and not as a Papal fief, but was willing to pay the tribute as a "devout offering" instead of a "customary due." This offer was no compensation to Pius, whose vanity delighted in the picturesque ceremony of the presentation of a palfrey which always accompanied the homage. The struggle lasted till the French Revolution frightened all the Italian sovereigns, and then a *modus vivendi* was found; but the Papal claim to homage was not abandoned till 1855.

Ecclesiastical reform was seriously needed in Tuscany, where the later Medici had been disastrously subservient to the Papacy. The Regency government had begun the work by passing a Mortmain law and reforming the Inquisition, which was particularly officious in Tuscany, on the Venetian model, with lay assessors. The clergy were not permitted to ask Papal permission to contribute towards an Imperial *Donativo*, and one Bishop, who refused to pay, was exiled. Leopoldo continued the work by abolishing rights of asylum, suppressing convents and making ecclesiastical lands pay taxes. In 1775 a Concordat was made with the Pope about patronage, but shortly afterwards Pius warned Leopoldo to cease his reforms. Leopoldo replied politely, but continued his course unmoved. He obtained the dioceses of Pistoja and Prato for a man after his own heart, Scipione Ricci. Ricci wished the Church to co-operate with the State in reforming measures, but his first efforts involved him in difficulties with the powerful Dominicans, and there were always Jesuits at hand to make mischief. Their policy was to stir up opposition amongst the ignorantly orthodox populace, who were easily made to believe that Ricci was no better than a Protestant, and that the famines and earthquakes which troubled Tuscany were God's rebuke of the Grand Duke's presumption. Some of

Ricci's reforms, such as the equalisation of endowments, were wise, if premature, but some were petty and irritating, and others plainly impracticable. Leopoldo and Ricci vainly tried to educate public opinion by pamphlets. The people would not prefer cemeteries to churches for burial; and, when all the popular Religious Confraternities were abolished at once, they indignantly refused to join the new parochial "Charitable Guilds" which the Grand Duke proposed as a substitute. Leopoldo meanwhile exasperated the Curia by sweeping changes; the Inquisition was abolished; Rome was no longer to appoint to Tuscan benefices, nor to take their income during vacancies; the direction of charities was placed in lay hands. Leopoldo's next plan was to have a National Church Council, although the Bishops discouraged the idea. First, however, he allowed Ricci to attempt a revival of the Synodical system of Church government, and a Synod of the Diocese of Pistoja was actually held, which even expressed its approval of the French "Four Articles" of 1682 (see p. 267), and of various Jansenist opinions. Then Leopoldo called a private assembly of the Bishops (1787), which debated reform for a long time, but without result, till Leopoldo dismissed it as hopeless. The plan of the National Council was allowed to drop, and Ricci was ordered to draw up a general scheme of reform, which Leopoldo began to carry out. While the Bishops' assembly was sitting, there arose a report in Prato that Ricci had ordered the destruction of its precious relic, the girdle of the Virgin, as spurious; the people rose in riot, ransacked the Bishop's Palace, and burned his portrait, crying, "Thus must heretics be treated!"

For a long time Pius avoided a quarrel with Leopoldo, though he tried to prevent his election as King of the Romans; but in 1788 an open breach occurred, and relations between the Papacy and Tuscany ceased until Leopoldo's removal to Germany in 1790.

The Tuscan movement was really more dangerous than the

Neapolitan because of its Jansenist character. Ricci was virtually a Jansenist, and Leopoldo followed him. But the movement was superficial, coming from the rulers and not from the people. The changes made were not dogmatic, but disciplinary, and this is a fair test that a religious movement has not a popular origin. Even in Naples, where educated public opinion was mainly anti-Papal, there was no movement to compare with that of Jansenist France and its Parliament. There was no idea of dogmatic reform, and the superstitions of the populace were unchanged. The religious measures of Joseph II in Lombardy were, as we shall see, equally unpopular.

It is vain to speculate on what might have been the course of ecclesiastical history had not the French Revolution broken across it, shattered the reform movement, and resulted in extreme reaction. We cannot tell whether the Papacy and populace, by the sheer weight of inertia, would have resisted successfully the efforts of princes and lawyers, or whether the latter would have succeeded in establishing National Churches. As it is, a National Italian Church in the free Italian State is still a dream of the future.

The Austrian rule at Naples had reproduced all the defects of the Spanish, its ruinous financial system and non-national army, and added a new abuse, the direction of the government through Spanish refugees in Vienna. It was, however, popular with the nobles, whose feudal independence it preserved, and was long regretted by them. A tendency appeared towards limiting the Viceroy's power. Direct appeal to Vienna was encouraged, and the local authorities, including the Collateral Council, recovered some of their decayed powers, with the result that there was a recrudescence of disorder, corruption and injustice. The government did make some attempts towards reform; it wished to recover the alienated taxes, codify the laws and reorganise the Communes, but local opposition thwarted all its schemes.

It was not so much unpopularity which caused Austria to

lose Naples, as her complete neglect of all preparations for defence. The latent military capabilities of the natives were ignored as they had been under Spanish rule, and, when the Infant Charles marched over the country, there were only a few Austrian troops to oppose him. The old friends of the Spaniards welcomed him, and the people were always pleased with a change, whatever it might be.

The Infant, now become Charles III of Naples, was a young man of fairly good abilities and character and amiable disposition, of whom there were hopeful expectations; but he had one defect which he allowed to gain the mastery over him to the ruin of all his good points, an exaggerated passion for sport. His first royal tour was a kind of itinerant hunting-party, and closer enquiry was made into the condition of the game than into that of the people. The energies of his earlier years were occupied in acquiring and stocking large estates, and in building lodges on them which were really palaces. From this beginning the passion for building grew upon him until it became only second to his love for hunting, and his expenditure upon it was out of all proportion to the revenue of his kingdom. The remainder of his time during his earlier years was occupied in theatre-going and religious exercises, and he took little active part in the government.

Charles allowed the Ministers successively nominated by his energetic mother to have complete control of him and his kingdom, so that Naples was nearly as dependent upon Spain as it had been in the seventeenth century. The death of Philip V and retirement of Elizabeth (1746) left the reigning Minister without support, and Charles then began to take an active share in the government, regularly attending the meetings of the Council of Ministers, talking of royal responsibility and economic reform. There was, however, another female aspirant to the control of Charles' not very vigorous will in the person of his wife, Maria Amalia of Saxony. She came to Naples as a mere child (1738), but she was pretty and agreeable, and

shared Charles' love of hunting, so that he was sincerely attached to her. After the birth of her eldest son (1747) she began to take part in politics, and soon formed a Queen's party. Charles did not let her rule him entirely, and an ambassador reports that he said to her on one occasion, "Madam, cease meddling in these affairs!" But he was not strong enough to stop her meddling, and his heart was really still in the chase, so that the court was full of intrigue between King's favourites and Queen's favourites, the hunters and the non-hunters. Ministers had to exert all their energies to keep their offices, and between them all many schemes of reform fell to the ground.

The only Minister of striking individuality was Tanucci, who in 1734 obtained the subordinate office of Secretary of Justice. He was not a Spaniard like so many of the officials, but a Pisan lawyer who had entered Charles' service in Tuscany, and whose undoubted talents soon gained him a reputation. He had not the qualities of a great statesman, but was clever in a superficial way, eloquent, ingratiating, specious, but extraordinarily vindictive. It has been supposed that his influence became all powerful with Charles III and inspired that King's policy; but in fact he was not even a member of the Council of State during Charles' reign, and the extent of his influence is very uncertain. In 1755 he was made Foreign Secretary, and so well did he satisfy the King that Charles left him as chief Minister to his son Ferdinando in 1759.

The chief danger to Charles' rule came from the nobles of the Austrian party, who still corresponded with that government, and with their friends in voluntary exile in Vienna. The war of Austrian Succession caused a recrudescence of disaffection; Austrian propaganda was spread abroad amongst the people, and Maria Theresa was told that an Austrian invasion would meet with much internal support. The Seven Years' War again led to some unsettlement, and the danger was only at an end with the marriage of Ferdinando to Maria Theresa's daughter, Maria Carolina. To meet these dangers, there was

appointed on four occasions a Committee with the sinister name of *Giunta d'Inconfidenza* (Committee of Distrust). It employed spies, received accusations of treason, arrested and arbitrarily punished many persons with imprisonment. It ignored clerical immunity, forbade anyone to leave the country, or to send letters abroad without leave. In 1743 the Committee of which Tanucci was president arrested eight hundred persons, but liberated them afterwards. The *Giunte* certainly accomplished their aim in spreading terror amongst the disaffected.

This disaffected party was almost wholly composed of nobles and ecclesiastics, and it was the main object of Charles' policy to decrease their power and independence. The nobles maintained tribes of unruly followers, were often in league with the brigands, defied royal jurisdiction and exercised their own unjustly, oppressed their vassals and quarrelled with their neighbours. Four-fifths of the people were subject to their jurisdiction. The government, fearing lest they should rebel, or should try to withhold the *Donativi* (the taxes voted by the Parliament), dared not use strong measures, though Tanucci, as Secretary of Justice, tried to regulate feudal jurisdiction. But the government followed the Spanish policy of weakening the nobles by enticing them with titles and offices to Naples, where they rivalled one another in ruinous extravagance and display. Their importance was further diminished by the ennobling of vast numbers of new families by the Austrians and Charles III, so that the distinctions of rank became blurred. It was proverbial to say of the Austrian creations, "He is indeed a Duke, but not a gentleman." Charles found a considerable source of revenue in the sale of titles, and of the membership of his new noble Order, that of S. Gennaro.

The ecclesiastics held more than a third of the land; they numbered more than a hundred thousand, and they bore very little taxation. In spite of the efforts of the Spanish Viceroys, ecclesiastical jurisdiction was still very extensive, and involved

endless disputes. Charles' ecclesiastical policy has already been described; the struggle lasted throughout his reign without bringing him much advantage. But it gave prominence to the already powerful class of lawyers, whose dearest object was the destruction of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The law was the only career open to talent; it often led to office and nobility. The lawyers presented a united front in opposing any legal reform, badly though it was needed in the conflict of jurisdictions and codes. An abortive attempt at codification only added to the confusion. The King made matters worse by personal interference and the issue of new Pragmatics. Tanucci's well-meant efforts against delay and corruption were generally thwarted.

Naples had hardly any commercial middle-class; native industries were almost non-existent; in fact neither industry nor commerce could contend with the fiscal system, which permitted the revenue officials to vary the tariffs at will. Agriculture languished, since exportation of natural products was almost wholly forbidden, altogether indeed when the appearance of a comet led the prophets to foretell scarcity. The government did make some attempts at fiscal reform, but these were thwarted by the prejudiced and unpractical conservatism of the people. A Magistracy for Commerce, with large powers, was appointed; many of its regulations were good; but it speedily came into conflict with privileges and prejudices, and the Neapolitan *Piazze* (see p. 161) petitioned for its abolition. It was dangerous to alienate the *Piazze*, with their power of granting supplies, and the new Magistracy was accordingly deprived of nearly all authority. Again, the government had permitted Jews to reside in Naples, but they were sent off because the Friars told the King that he would not have an heir while they remained. Commercial treaties, foreign consuls, maritime regulations were all wasted on a State that had no foreign commerce and no marine.

The Neapolitan city population was aptly described by de Brosses as "la plus abominable canaille, la plus dégoûtante

vermine" ever known; Naples was like Paris because of "le mouvement infernal qui y règne." The dregs of the population camped in the streets, and lived on the food provided by the convents. The government, afraid of another Masaniello, pandered to the city; the price of food and the taxes were kept low; frequent fêtes were provided for public entertainment. The city was strictly protected against the provinces, and the peasants were crushed between the tax-gatherers and the noble and ecclesiastical oppressors. Some joined the crowd of city mendicants, many became bandits. Filthy, nearly naked and half-starved, they lived on maize and herbs, without salt or oil. "So savage are they, that they can hardly be considered Christians but that they are baptized." In that fertile country there were districts where wheat was unknown. The burden of taxation fell mainly on the peasantry; there was now a royal court to maintain, and the King's sport and building were very expensive. There was a certain measure of financial reform; the clergy had to pay more, and some of the alienated taxes were redeemed. A new assessment was made, but it was nearly as unfair as the old towards the poor, and the burdensome poll-tax was retained.

Ferdinando (1759) was the third of Charles' sons; the eldest was weak in intellect, the second was heir to Spain. He was only nine years old, and Tanucci was absolute ruler throughout his long minority. Tanucci was bent on reform; he tried to encourage agriculture and commerce, to improve means of communication, to limit feudal powers; but his only idea of economic reform was to pile on customs duties. "He carries into public administration the subtleties, detours and chicane of the law...is rather a lawyer than a statesman." But his chief energies were devoted to the anti-clerical crusade which delighted his legal mind. Meanwhile he allowed the young King to grow up ignorant and self-indulgent. Ferdinando wrote so badly that he banished ink-pots from the Council table. He played ball in public, ate macaroni at the theatre, and mixed with vagabonds on easy terms. He would join in

a rowdy fête, or visit a convent and challenge the monks to a macaroni-eating race. But he was popular because of his honesty and friendly manners. He loved the people; "Are they not my children?" he cried; and when terrible earthquakes devastated the land, "I would rather have lost all my family than see the ruin of these provinces." He was a curious contrast to his learned, serious, fussy brothers-in-law, Joseph II and Leopoldo of Tuscany. They preached philosophy to him, and exhorted him to reform his State. Yet Ferdinando could say truthfully to Joseph, "When I go travelling I can hardly tear myself from my people, your subjects are pleased when you are far off. Yet I eat, drink, sleep, and don't bother myself at all. Do take a little rest and let others do the same." Joseph's subjects, harassed with all his reforms, would no doubt have been pleased with the advice. Noticing the discontented air of the Tuscans, Ferdinando remarked to Leopoldo, "Here is a puzzle! you know so much and read so much, and your subjects do the same; yet see what melancholy! I know nothing, and can argue about nothing, yet my subjects are always *en fête*. I know too that Florence was gay in the time of the Medici. Believe me, and govern them a little less; all your learning makes them dull."

The Queen, Maria Carolina, was a different kind of person; she was clever and agreeable, won her husband's love and respect and managed to educate him a little; she soon became the confidante of his State concerns. They squabbled sometimes, but he kept no secrets from her. At first she made herself agreeable to Tanucci; but, once she had succeeded in winning a place in the royal Council, she set herself to undermine his influence, and procured his retirement in 1771. He was no great loss, for his only solid achievement for Naples was a measure of ecclesiastical independence. But Maria Carolina, though clever and obstinate, had no statesmanlike qualities, her mother had long since warned her against her imprudence, conceit and frivolity, and she allowed herself to follow the

promptings of impulse and prejudice. Her first minister, Sambuca, was a prudent person, and effected some reforms; but Maria Carolina wanted to make Naples a military power, and to free it from dependence on Ferdinando's father, the King of Spain.

Charles III had tried to set about creating an army at the time of his accession, and again during the war of Austrian Succession; but his activity was short-lived, neglect soon spoiled what had been accomplished, and Tanucci was completely indifferent to military affairs. An Irishman named Acton, who had served in the French and Tuscan navies, was entrusted by Sambuca with the task of military and naval reorganisation. He worked hard, and with good results; a native army was formed and ships were built; but Acton was a clever adventurer, and determined to make his fortune; he was brilliant and amusing, and soon captivated the Queen, whose anti-Spanish prejudices he encouraged. He intrigued against Sambuca, and managed to gain the confidence of the King. Charles of Spain ordered his son to dismiss Acton; the Queen encouraged Ferdinando to defy his father. It was a struggle between the Spanish family influence and the Queen's domineering will. Charles invited Ferdinando to visit Spain alone; Maria Carolina would not let him go. The Spanish ambassador demanded the exclusion of the Queen from the Neapolitan Council, and on this being refused left Naples. Sambuca was dismissed (1786); Caraccioli, the famous old Viceroy of Sicily (see p. 401), nominally took his place, but Caraccioli was very old, and Acton really ruled. All public correspondence with Spain ceased, and Naples fell under the influence of Austria and England. Yet Joseph II complained of his sister that "she never does what I suggest, and what pleases her in the morning displeases her in the evening."

The alienation was very bitter to the old King of Spain, who looked upon the Kingdom of Naples as his creation and special glory, and was unpopular with the Neapolitans, who considered Acton and the Queen to be foreigners, and disliked

their well-meant attempts at financial and military reform. It was rather Caraccioli than Acton who carried on the anti-Papal policy of Tanucci, and refused the customary homage.

Caraccioli is one of the most remarkable figures of the century. In spite of his extreme ugliness he had charmed society in Paris by his cynical wit, brilliant conversation and agreeable manners. As a friend of the Encyclopaedists he imbibed the ideas which he tried to put in force in Sicily when he became its Viceroy. Sicily was still the home of feudalism and all its abuses. Yet its ancient Parliamentary constitution still existed, and was valued as the symbol of independence, for the Sicilians hated to consider themselves fused with the mainland State. Caraccioli really effected many badly needed reforms. He abolished the Inquisition, limited the power of the Barons, and tried to ensure public safety. But he trusted too much in his own cleverness; he did not show sufficient respect for the adored constitution, scoffed at the popular devotions and boasted of his anti-Papal designs. So the Sicilians were rather pleased when he went to Naples to lend the *aegis* of his name to Acton's government.

On the whole the Bourbon rule had undoubtedly been advantageous to Naples. The money collected in the Kingdom was at least spent within it; and the Kings, though not clever enough to do much good, were well-intentioned and fairly popular. They contrived to effect some reforms, and would have accomplished more if they had had the strength of will to combat the array of ancient abuses, of privileges and obscurantism, which opposed their efforts.

When the Austrians took possession of the Duchy of Lombardy, now composed of Milan and Mantua, they found flourishing all the abuses of a Spanish administration and of the most degraded of Italian dynasties. Charles VI had neither leisure nor means to pay much attention to internal reform, and nothing could be expected from the crowd of greedy and needy Spanish exiles at Vienna to whom he entrusted the

administration. There was much chivalry in Charles' attitude towards these exiles who had suffered for his cause ; but, since he dared not support them at the expense of Austria, he gave over his Italian States into their hands, treating Italy as if it had been an integral part of the Spanish monarchy, and administering it through the "Council of Spain," which had managed Spanish affairs during the time that he was himself King of Spain. Numbers of Spaniards lived in comfort on Italian offices and pensions ; Lombardy had more Spanish officials than under the Spanish rule itself. Their leader was the unscrupulous Perlas, Marquis of Realp, who managed to gain the confidence of the Emperor and was all powerful with him. Perlas spent his time in inventing "outrageous schemes" to get money out of Italy.

The Austrian administration tended towards centralisation. The first Governor, Prince Eugene, was recalled because he was too independent, and his successors were mere officials. The central government constantly interfered, and appeals to Vienna against the local authorities were encouraged. Italians flocked there to get ridiculous titles and waste their money, while the working classes suffered from want of employment. Even the clothes of the soldiers were imported from Austria.

One considerable financial reform was achieved by Eugene, the fusion of a number of intricate dues into a single tax called the *Diario*. It was intended only for the support of whatever army was kept up ; but it was soon fixed at a high figure, while the troops were so diminished that they were quite insufficient for defence. It was an improvement to fix the amount of taxation, but its apportionment was as unfair as ever. Most of the burden fell on the peasantry, and the *Censimento* (the system of apportionment of direct taxation) was quite out of date. Most of the taxes were alienated, or farmed out, and their private owners collected them with much tyranny. The administration was completely venal, and of all the vast sums collected very little ever reached

the central government, and most was appropriated by the Austro-Spanish officials.

Yet the Austrian rule was not unpopular; the people were already used to Spaniards and their misgovernment; the limitation in the Governor's authority was liked; the people were pleased to form part of a great Empire, and the nobles enjoyed their purchased honours. Still the Milanese were quite as pleased with Don Philip in 1745, and their loyalty to Austria was largely composed of hatred to the Piedmontese, towards whom they felt as lazy and inert people often do feel towards energetic and aggressive neighbours. They resented it bitterly as Savoy slowly but surely devoured the Lombard "artichoke, leaf by leaf."

Maria Theresa did not like Italians, but she was conscientious; she abolished the scandalous "Council of Spain," and left the management of Italian affairs almost entirely to her minister, Kaunitz. Kaunitz meant to do well for Lombardy, and he was encouraged by the more enlightened Lombards themselves to believe that the local magistracies, and particularly the Senate of Milan, were merely engines of petty tyranny. Their powers were accordingly gradually diminished; the Senate was confined to its judicial functions only, and power was concentrated into the hands of governors, who were under the control of the home government. But popularity was obtained by the creation of a Milanese court. Firstly, Francesco III, Duke of Modena, was made "Administrator," with nominal powers and a semi-royal state; in 1771 he was replaced by his daughter, Beatrice, and her husband, the Arch-Duke Ferdinando, who were gay young people, and made Milanese society very lively.

Kaunitz was anxious for reform, and encouraged the governors to make experiments. In 1761 a new *Censimento* was issued, which provided for the equal taxation of all property, irrespective of the status of its owner. Its collection was so simplified as to effect an immense economy, and to make it

possible to lower the sum required from eleven to eight million *lire*. Yet it included exemptions for the clergy, and a poll-tax which pressed hardly on the peasants. At the same time the ancient distinction between the City and the Duchy (the provinces) was destroyed, to the great benefit of the latter, which had been taxed at a much higher rate than the city.

In 1763 a Lombard, named Pietro Verri, published an enquiry into the economic condition of Lombardy, with special reference to its industrial decadence. This book attracted much notice at Vienna, and led to the appointment of a Council of Public Economy at Milan, of which Verri was a member, to prepare a scheme of reform. It specially attacked the *Appalto*, or lease of customs, which was most ruinous to commerce. Most of the customs were held by a private company whose members made immense fortunes at the expense of the tax-payers. An attempt was first made to share the customs between the company and the government, but it was unsuccessful, and Verri determined to get it abandoned. He succeeded in winning over the young Emperor Joseph, who visited Milan in 1769. "In the time of the Gospel as well as to-day," said the Emperor, "the farmers of taxes have always been odious to the people." He persuaded his mother that they sucked the blood of the Milanese, and the whole system was abolished. A deputation, including Verri, went to Vienna to discuss the new financial organisation. Most of its members preferred the old system, and, though Joseph supported Verri, the majority so far succeeded that Verri was not made president of the new *Camera de' Conti* (Chamber of Finance) which was established. But Verri's personality gave him an influence much greater than that of his official position. His excellent scheme of tariff reform was accepted; it established fixed and moderate import and export duties, and abolished all internal customs. A new coinage, issued in 1777, was a complete success, and much economy was effected in the expenses of the administration. These reforms, coupled with

a long period of peace, secured for Lombardy an era of prosperity unknown since the fifteenth century. Money became plentiful, commercial security increased, public and communal debts diminished. More land was brought into cultivation, and the culture of silk increased. In 1776 a *Società Patriotica* was formed, of which Verri was the head; it tried to promote agriculture and industry by offering prizes, issuing pamphlets, and otherwise propagating useful knowledge. The process of emancipation from the medieval trade system was slow; it was the guilds which paid the mercantile tax, *Estimo del Mercimonio*, and hence they actively opposed independent trading. But the government encouraged foreign settlers, who introduced new processes, machinery and manufactures. Industry was progressing towards a peaceful change to modern conditions before the French Revolution.

But even Verri's appetite for reform was surfeited when, on his mother's death, Joseph II proceeded to put into practice the ideas which he had picked up from the Encyclopaedists, and to ride rough-shod over the prejudices and privileges, the superstitions and vested interests which were thickly strewn throughout his States. Joseph had travelled and read, talked with specialists and imbibed Liberal opinions. He rightly held that all classes should be equally considered, that the Prince should not look upon his State as his property, but as a divine trust, and should limit the taxation to his actual necessities. But he wanted to reform everything at once, and thought himself too clever to need even the best advice. "He did good with a cudgel," said the Lombards, meaning that he tried to regenerate the world by force. Since the local authorities opposed him, he tried to subjugate them absolutely to the central government, and at the same time to force his widely differing States into one Procrustean bed of administration, lopping off all local customs and national divergences, and declaring that what was good for the German must also suit the Belgian, Lombard and Croat. His opposition to the

Papacy was due to his intolerance of a rival authority within his States. Within three years of his accession, three hundred and seventy-six ordinances had been issued for Lombardy alone; every institution and authority was upset, the whole system of law and government revolutionised, the minutest points of conduct and dress were prescribed, and the resulting confusion grew worse by the constant issue of modifications and explanations. The Senate and other local authorities were swept away as obscurantist. True, they had exercised petty tyrannies, but the people looked upon them as the only barriers against absolutism. Feudal jurisdiction was abolished; a new, military, Austrian police kept order with guns. The government was in the hands of aliens, Germans, as well as Venetians and Tuscans who were even more hated than Germans. Far from sympathising with the government's anti-Papal policy, the people were shocked at the Emperor's sacrileges, and believed him, like his brother Leopoldo, to be at heart a Jansenist. They bitterly resented the dissolution of their Confraternities, and also the orders against processions, pilgrimages and votive offerings and the popular devotion of the Sacred Heart.

The Milanese were too supine to protest otherwise than by grumblings and pasquinades, and Joseph could experiment upon them without fear of the rebellion which he met with from others of his subjects; but directly he was dead (1790), the Milanese petitioned his successor, Leopoldo, to return to the old ways. Verri and the other reformers who had expected much from Joseph were deeply disappointed. The magistracy of which Verri was president was suppressed like the others, and he retired into private life. Of Joseph he wrote, "he understood that the government was bad, but not that the general destruction of laws and customs is a remedy worse than the evil. He disregarded public opinion, and exhibited to men the despot who knows no other rule than his own will."

Yet Joseph effected little improvement in public order; the tyranny of the great lords, the bravi and the brigands, continued;

so also did mendicancy and smuggling. Ferocious proclamations and savage punishments were useless. But a real revolution in criminal law began with the publication by a young Milanese noble, Beccaria, of a book on crime and punishment ("Dei Delitti e delle Pene"). The savage code of criminal law which then existed, its unjust procedure, its horrible punishments, were sharply denounced; its uselessness exposed. Beccaria held that the function of justice was not vengeance, but the repression of crime. The lawyers of course replied furiously, but the more liberally inclined governments, England, France and Switzerland, began to adopt his suggestions. Joseph tried to put many of them into practice, and created a Chair of Political Economy for Beccaria at Milan.

In Milan the modern ideas which were revolutionising France made more impression than elsewhere in Italy. Verri and his friends studied the Encyclopaedists, and in some points expressed theories even more startling than theirs. Verri as a political economist sometimes anticipated Adam Smith, and he clearly saw the errors of the Physiocrats. Verri, Beccaria and a few others founded in 1764 a journal called "Caffé," attacking all prejudices and pedantries, whether literary, social or economic. The government, which was remarkably tolerant of free speech, did not interfere; but the paper finally collapsed before the determined opposition of the Milanese, who hated to have their preconceived notions upset. Yet it contained the germ of the later *Società Patriotica*, of which some of its contributors were members. The weakness of all the reformers, including the Emperor, was a belief that reform could be imposed by force, from a benevolent absolute authority, independently of any corresponding movement amongst the people. "Liberty" did not mean a share in the government, but personal security and equality before the law. It was the result of Joseph's experiments which disillusioned Verri, but the passive resistance of the Lombards themselves would have prevented the success of all attempts to regenerate them by

force. Centuries of civil and ecclesiastical slavery had made them torpid, servile, frivolous and idle in all but commercial pursuits. The Spaniards had so long excluded them from military service that Maria Theresa tried in vain to raise a native army; they would rather pay anything than enlist. There was no more decadent and effeminate race in Italy. The few active spirits like Verri and Beccaria could not rouse them from their lassitude and indifference. The nobles, except those who lived in unruly independence in the country, were generally absorbed in the petty details of life, in food, dress and gossip, in striving for empty titles, and in the sham chivalry and sham love-making of an intensely artificial existence. Of their younger sons the more energetic joined the lawyers, a powerful and solid body; the rest were *Abati*, society priests without Cure, or merely *Cicisbei*, the recognized lovers of married women. The commercial classes cared for nothing outside their business, the peasantry were little better than slaves. There was no political or military life, hardly any intellectual life worthy the name amongst these pupils of the Jesuits and dependents of Spain.

The causes of the decadence of Venice have been already enumerated (Part II, Chapter III). The loss of trade and colonies, the Turkish wars, the strict adherence to continental neutrality, had all impoverished and weakened her. The aristocracy, living for the most part in idleness and folly, were diminishing also in numbers. This was due to immorality, the limitation of families and entails. About 1700 there were fourteen hundred members of the Grand Council, in 1790 only seven hundred. A few provincial families were ennobled, but the patricians would not admit rich city families, who might have infused new life into their decadent stock.

Meanwhile Venice was recognized as the pleasure haunt of Europe; it was said that there were sometimes thirty thousand visitors in the town. Nowhere else could men go masked four months in the year. Social life was frankly corrupt. The

nobles selected *Cavalieri* for their wives with a view to political advantage: they thought it a merit not to visit their mistresses on Fridays and Saturdays, reserving these days for their devotions and government business.

Venice had struggled nobly against her own decadence, and the Morean war brought to the front once more her best qualities of patriotism and self-denial, and the heroes who still remained amongst her sons. But the conquest of the Morea was her last effort, and the Peace of Passarowitz (p. 141) closed the final chapter in her book of greatness. There was an epilogue in the career of Angelo Emo, who waged gallant war with the Bey of Tunis (1784-92), but died leaving his work unfinished.

Public policy was no longer bold and rapid, it had grown timid and hesitating. But the strict rule of the Inquisitors of State still preserved internal order, and nowhere else in Italy were life and property so secure, and the people so equitably governed. There was still an opposition to the Inquisitors, led by a group of nobles who had imbibed some modern liberal notions. They wished the Ten to recover its powers from the Inquisitors, and at the same time to be itself controlled by the Grand Council. A bold noble, Angelo Querini, proposed to appeal from the Ten to the Grand Council; he was arrested and imprisoned by order of the Inquisitors (1761). This caused great excitement; the Grand Council would not elect a Ten, and it was necessary to appoint a State commission of five *Correttori* to enquire into the situation. The opposition complained to them of the arbitrariness of the Inquisitors, who brought all other courts and magistracies into contempt. They thought that Venice should, like other modern States, be ruled by public law and open courts. The *Correttori* suggested two plans, one to modify slightly, the other to change radically, the power of the Inquisitors. There was a fierce debate in the Grand Council, but the first proposal was adopted, to the joy of the populace, who trusted to the Inquisitors to keep the

nobles in order. The opposition party was still discontented; it was mainly composed of the impoverished nobles who had to subsist principally on government allowances. In 1774 their allowances were increased, but a proposal to close the gambling-houses which had ruined them was abandoned. The seditious talk amongst these nobles led to a government order to close all the coffee-houses at an early hour, but the order had to be rescinded.

In 1779 there was another agitation for reform, and another commission of five *Correttori* was appointed. One of them was a leader of the reforming party, Giorgio Pisani, who wished to play the demagogue. There were public demonstrations in his honour, and a *Pisanesca* society was formed which followed his teaching. But the claws of the Inquisitors were not yet cut, and they suddenly imprisoned Pisani at Verona. The nobles, who hated any idea of popular influence in the government far more than they hated the Inquisitors, acquiesced in his fate, and they allowed the arrest and imprisonment of other persons for sedition. The other four *Correttori* drew up a moderate scheme of reform; the open expression of discontent was smothered; but in 1785 the Inquisitors thought it wise to suppress a branch of the Free-Masons established in Venice. When the final blow came, the outward form of government was unchanged; Venice seemed as safe, as stable as ever; but the outward shell of order covered a chaotic mass of corruption and discontent, and, having no inward support, collapsed like a bubble at the outward shock.

The eighteenth century saw fresh attempts to recover the commercial and financial stability of Venice. In 1733 the *Savii alla Mercanzia* presented a lamentable report of the condition of commerce. Ancona and Trieste, Livorno and Genoa had absorbed Venetian trade; the western towns of the Venetian dominion procured goods more cheaply through Lombardy than through Venice. The *Savii* recommended no export and moderate import dues; the Senate would not go

so far, and tried the establishment of a moderate uniform tariff, both for import and export (1736); but, as no improvement appeared, the experiment was abandoned.

Industry was not much better off than trade; it was hampered by heavy duties on raw materials and on food-stuffs; the trade-guilds remained close corporations, though there was some talk of ending their monopoly. It was suggested that the various taxes and services due from the provincial population should be merged into a single tax; that a chamber of commerce should be established, and that a road to the Grisons should be made, with a tunnel through the mountains. Conservatism thwarted the former proposals, the Arch-Duke of Austria the latter. One new departure was the concession of treaties with North African States, in order to protect Venetian shipping from the pirates. It was a deed painful to Venetian sentiment, but absolutely necessary. The navy and arsenal were in a bad condition, though the last of the *Murazzi*, the artificial embankments on the *Lidi*, was built at this period.

In ecclesiastical affairs Venice maintained her ancient independent attitude, but was less actively hostile to the Papacy than were many of her neighbours.

Now that the Duke of Savoy was King of Sardinia there was no further need to quarrel about the absurd Cyprus title. An agreement was negotiated in 1740 through Cardinal Albani and Marco Foscarini, one of the few noted Venetians of the century. Foscarini proved that Venice could still produce an ambassador whose diplomatic and literary gifts were of the highest order.

In spite of its manifold imperfections the end of the line of Medici was sincerely regretted by the Tuscans. They were a native family; they represented the characteristics and idiosyncracies of their own people, their love of a pleasant life, of art and literature, their hatred of war. Nearly all of them had shown skill and insight in understanding and ruling their subjects. Many of them had been personally liked. The

Tuscans had not suffered from an alien tyranny, exercised by foreign officials and soldiers; their money had not been sent out of the country to support an alien court. Their lands had not been overrun by marauding armies. Ancient forms and customs were preserved; the sentiment of national life remained alive. Until the last few years Tuscany had preserved a fairly high level of prosperity and good government.

The end of Cosimo III's reign was, however, a period of unbroken gloom. The unhappy, monk-ridden Duke was surrounded by hypocrites and impostors, and hated by his people, who suffered as much from his system of moral espionage as from over-taxation. The one hope of the people, Prince Ferdinando, died in 1713. Gian Gastone was childless, in bad health, and living apart from his wife. Cardinal Francesco Maria had renounced the Cardinalate and married a young wife, in the hope that, corpulent and diseased though he was, he might yet provide an heir to the family. But the Princess, disgusted with his appearance, refused to live with him. The sacrifice was in vain, and the Cardinal soon afterwards died. Cosimo's daughter, the Electress Palatine, really ruled her father, and he schemed to get the succession settled on her. It was for this purpose that he tried to revive the ancient constitutional right of the Senate to fix the succession, maintaining that, since the Senate had bestowed the Duchy on Cosimo I, the right should revert to it on the extinction of his line (see p. 334). But the Powers had other, and to them more important, interests to consider, and Cosimo's belated constitutional conscientiousness was wasted.

In 1723 Cosimo died, and Gian Gastone immediately revolutionised the character of the government. He was like one of the older Medici in his humanity and friendliness of spirit, and to these he joined an inordinate love of entertainment, and of the society of gay young people. He loved to live "domestically" amongst his subjects. All the inquisitorial methods of the late government were abandoned, and the friars

sent about their business. Princess Violante, the amiable widow of Prince Ferdinando, acted the part of Grand Duchess with great popularity. The court was blithe with gaiety, French manners and social freedom; and the French habit of easy intercourse between the sexes replaced the stiff etiquette and pomposity of Cosimo's court. The Florentines delighted in the revival of shows and merry-makings, threw off the vaneer of strict propriety and followed the lead of the court. Yet, in spite of the occasional outbursts of foolish youths, public order improved under an easier rule; the taxes were diminished, national prosperity increased, and even trade revived a little.

But in Gian Gastone's later years, when his efforts to keep the detested foreign heir at a distance had failed, he lost interest in life, and dwelt in idle retirement, amongst a few rather low-class favourites, trying to drown melancholy forebodings in vulgar amusements. His health and character deteriorated, and so of course did the government. The new liberty of manners passed into a kind of anarchy, and the better class of people began to regret the stricter rule of his predecessors, when his death in 1737 gave them over to the House of Lorraine.

The fate of Tuscany was not so bad as had been anticipated. The Grand Duke, Francis of Lorraine, husband of Maria Theresa and himself future Emperor, could not spare time for more than one visit to Florence, but he sent an amiable, if not very clever, Regent, the Prince of Craon, who tried to keep up a court and was personally liked. The Electress Palatine was on friendly terms with the government until her death in 1743. She left the allodial and personal property of the Medici to Francis, on condition that the Grand Ducal collections should not leave Florence, but the allodials barely balanced the debts.

The Regency however could not make up to the Florentines for the loss of the Grand Duke's court. They hated the Lorrainer officials and soldiers, and soon regretted the Medici. "The

Tuscans," wrote the traveller, de Brosses, in 1739, "would give two-thirds of their property to have the Medici back, and the other third to get rid of the Lorrainers. They hate them as the Milanese hate the Piedmontese. The Lorrainers ill-use, and what is worse, despise them." Many would have preferred Don Carlos, who had made himself popular, but a wiser citizen said, "I prefer the Lorrainers to the Spaniards, because, though the former would take my clothes (property), the latter would deprive me of my skin (liberty of thought) also."

In 1747 a Lorrainer, de Richécourt, ousted Craon, and took his place at the head of the Council of Regency. De Richécourt was rough, overbearing and unpopular, but he had great abilities, and seriously undertook the work of reform. His ideas were good, but they were often thwarted by the home government, by the obstinate ignorance of the people, and by his fellow-ministers, Neri and Ginori. All three wished for reform, but personal jealousy prevented them from agreeing on the best methods. De Richécourt had Neri removed to Lombardy, where he did valuable work, and afterwards (1757) Ginori got de Richécourt recalled. Something however had already been accomplished.

De Richécourt hoped to retrieve the finances by buying up the alienated taxes, but the Grand Duke insisted on selling them all to a foreign company, which gave him a share in its profits. Two-fifths of the whole revenue was sent to Vienna, and wholly spent abroad. De Richécourt struggled for administrative economy and consolidation of the debt, but the finances were still hopelessly over-burdened. There could be no escape without an improvement in the national prosperity. The Maremma remained uncultivated because people and government both believed that export of corn meant famine. The Grand Duke tried to colonise it with Lorrainers, but their unhealthy surroundings killed them. De Richécourt got permission to export two-thirds of the Maremma corn; more was soon grown, and the district improved. Internal and

external duties and the survival of the medieval guild-system throttled other industries, but the Florentines clung tenaciously to their ancient *Arti*. Tuscany got little advantage from the prosperity of Livorno, where the foreign settlers took all the profits from the lazy natives. It was astonishing to travellers who had seen Florence, absorbed in stupid frivolities and petty trades, the half-cultivated country, and the general poverty and apathy which prevailed, to find themselves in busy, bustling, prosperous, cosmopolitan Livorno, with its crowded quays and harbour and the palaces of its foreign magnates. However, equalisation between the tariffs of Tuscany, Lombardy and Austria rather improved native Tuscan industries.

Neri's work was the reform of law, especially of feudal law, which Tuscany badly needed. There were in the country many feudatories holding direct from the Emperor, but now that the Emperor was Grand Duke, he was able to subject them to the Tuscan government. All feudal jurisdiction was for the future to be exercised by Vicars, to be appointed by the lords, but approved by the government. Neri also hoped to weaken the feudal system by forbidding new entails, and ordering that those in existence were only to last for four more generations. Yet the condition of the country remained very disorderly, and was made worse by the frequent use of outlawry as a punishment. Neri's effort to codify the law failed, because of de Richecourt's opposition; but he and the minister for ecclesiastical affairs, Rucellai, were allowed to effect certain ecclesiastical reforms. The new mortmain law was, rather curiously, a revival of an ancient Statute of Ghibelline Siena.

Unfortunately for Tuscany, Ginori succeeded in supplanting de Richecourt by complaints of his severity (1757), but did not live long to enjoy his triumph. The new Regent was Botta Adorno, who had already shown his overbearing manners and tyrannical temper to the Genoese (Chapter I) and Flemish. He gave some satisfaction to the Florentines by keeping a finer court than that of de Richecourt; but the eight years of

his Regency were barren of reform. Besides, he sent four thousand Tuscan peasants to serve in the German wars, of whom only three hundred ever returned. Many more peasants emigrated to avoid the dreaded service.

In 1765 the Florentines welcomed with delight a Grand Duke and Duchess who were to reign amongst them. These were Peter Leopold, younger son of Francis and Maria Theresa, and Maria Luisa, Infanta of Spain. A court was formed for them, modelled on the Spanish fashion, but the young people dispensed with stiff etiquette, and preferred to live simply, sharing the life of the people. Leopoldo, as he was called in Tuscany, was still a minor, and his brother Joseph and his mother had no intention of allowing him to become independent. It was with difficulty that he got rid of the unpopular Botta Adorno, and then a German minister was sent to manage affairs until 1770. Leopoldo and Joseph were really affectionate brothers, but Leopoldo could not help resenting Joseph's airs of superiority and authoritative letters. Joseph considered that the Tuscan revenues belonged primarily to himself; and, in spite of Leopoldo's remonstrances, he took all that he needed for the German wars, maintaining that the needs of the Empire were those of the provinces. Even after 1770 Joseph liked to interfere in Leopoldo's affairs. Sometimes he visited Tuscany, and gave advice about the education of Leopoldo's eldest son, whom he looked upon as his own heir. Or he wrote letters of good advice, exhorting Leopoldo to throw off the discontent and suspiciousness which clouded his character. "Let yourself be a little deceived," he wrote, "rather than torment yourself continually...do not shut yourself up, and make yourself melancholy, and take walks alone with your stick." But Leopoldo was so suspicious that he believed that Joseph set spies on him; and he even wrote letters to his sister in lemon juice, to prevent their being read. Leopoldo was slow and cautious, not frank and imperious like Joseph; but, like Joseph, he was interested in philosophy and science, and sincerely anxious for

the welfare of his people. Educated for Holy Orders, he was even more of a "Sacristan" than his brother. His abilities were moderate, but he chose good ministers, and sensibly followed their advice. The Lorrainers were gradually replaced by Tuscans; Neri was practically prime minister, Rucellai continued to manage ecclesiastical affairs. Neri was prudent almost to excess; but he was unassuming, faithful and deservedly popular. He knew much law, and had learned more in Lombardy from Beccaria. Feudal jurisdiction was further limited; there were reforms in procedure and in the appointment of magistrates. In Lombardy Neri had done much for municipal reform, and he worked on the same lines in Tuscany. The provincial Communes, which had never quite lost their independence, received municipal self-government, and the ancient inter-communal leagues were recognized. Self-government did much to improve and educate the people. The new system was extended to Siena, and helped to revive the *contado* from its long depression. The city of Florence had however to wait till 1782 for the grant of independence to its local authorities. Neri's death did not end the reforms. Many magistracies were suppressed, transferring their functions to the *Otto*, or supreme court of Criminal Justice. Police superintendence was vested in an official called the *Presidente del Buono Governo*, whose power shortly became very great. Following Beccaria's prescriptions, great reforms were introduced in criminal justice, even the death penalty was abolished. The gallows and instruments of torture were publicly burned. The result was a distinct improvement in public order and a diminution of crime. The Florentines in gratitude wished to erect a statue to Leopoldo, but he would not permit it.

Economic reform was terribly needed, for the finances were exhausted, and the country actually suffering from famine. In this work Neri was able to secure the services of a clever specialist, Tavanti, and a census was made. Free-trade in corn was Neri's object, and he got all restrictions on internal trade

removed, and permission to export it when cheap. The custom of fixing artificial prices for food was abandoned. The Maremma was still unhealthy, and an expensive attempt to drain it was a failure; colonists could not be attracted, for there was no excess of population anxious to take advantage of the privileges offered.

By degrees the government was able to lessen the evils of mortmain and to abolish the complicated rural rights, such as forced labour, rights of wood-gathering, etc., which reduced the peasants almost to serfdom, and heavily burdened agriculture. Unluckily, Leopoldo was persuaded to allow the owners of the forests surrounding Florence to cut them down for timber. The results were landslides, floods, dislocation of the lowland irrigation system, and loss of the shelter which they had afforded to the city from the bitter Apennine winds.

On the whole there was much improvement in agriculture. Early in the reign wages were often paid in kind, famine was endemic, the land-owners barely solvent. Later in the reign we find the latter investing capital in the city, the condition of the peasantry much improved, and a great deal of waste land brought into cultivation.

Neri and Tavanti carried through a complete industrial revolution. The *Arti* and the old mercantile magistracy, the *Sei di Mercanzia*, were swept away; a new chamber of commerce was established in the place of the latter, and this chamber was also to collect information and to advise the government. Trades were made free to all, many tiresome taxes were abolished, and so was the protection of the city against the country. Trade thrived and unemployment decreased, but mendicancy flourished so long as "pious foundations" were permitted to support the idle. The number of begging friars and hermits was a scandal; the hospitals were looked upon as asylums for anyone in difficulties. Rucellai tried to regulate and suppress these abuses, but ecclesiastical and popular opposition made the task difficult.

Commerce suffered much from pirate raids. Acton, the Irish sailor, fought well against them in Tuscan service; but Leopoldo grew suspicious of him, and he transferred his services to Naples. Leopoldo tried to economise by suppressing the fleet, with the result that the pirate ravages increased, and even Livorno trade was injured. However, Livorno continued to flourish, and remained the rival of Marseilles and Genoa.

Finance was in a terrible condition; the State debt was heavy; Joseph had taken all the ready money; the customs were pledged, the country could not bear more taxation. But the crisis was successfully met. National prosperity and economical administration, with the abolition of many sinecures, increased the revenue. The customs were bought up, the taxes simplified, and, accordingly, more economically collected. The revenue from salt increased as its price was lowered, and its purchase made no longer compulsory. The national debt was reduced to a single fund, and much of it was paid off by setting it against remissions of the land-tax. The debt was decreased from eighty-seven to twenty-four million *lire*, yet Leopoldo spent thirty million *lire* on public works, and left a reserve fund of five million. He continued to defray the expenses of court and administration out of indirect taxation, though this was diminished, and from the proceeds of the crown lands. Industrial reform steadily raised the revenue, while lowered taxation was benefiting industry.

In his youth Leopoldo had dreamed of granting a constitution to Tuscany, and becoming a constitutional monarch. He abolished the *Consulta*, the Medici tribunal, which, rather like the Venetian Dieci, had obtained a share in all the functions of government. Yet another committee soon took its place. Leopoldo's ministers persuaded him that it was better to be a benevolent despot than a constitutional monarch, and, until the Tuscans could be educated, they were probably right. Unfortunately, after the death of Neri (1776) and of Rucellai and

Tavanti (1778), Leopoldo found no ministers really competent to fill their places. There was no diplomatic service to train civil servants, and Leopoldo was not competent to train them himself. Leopoldo's own weakness grew upon him; he set spies to watch his ministers and his people, and spies to watch those spies. He indulged a morbid curiosity about the private affairs and opinions of the people, and this curiosity was fostered by Chelotti, the head of the secret service, who had a dangerous influence over him. The police officials were given a secret and inquisitorial authority which rendered them a terror to the people, and there was actually a rising of the soldiers against them. Leopoldo's popularity accordingly decreased, nor were his reforms altogether pleasing to the Tuscans, who were remarkably conservative, and thought many of them unnecessary and mischievous. Public opinion could not keep pace with the variety and rapidity of the changes; there was in fact, as Ferdinando of Naples had said, "too much government." The numerous pamphlets of useful information which Leopoldo issued for the instruction of the people remained unread, but the vehement opposition of the clergy to the government had much more effect. The people were not fond of friars, and rather enjoyed their discomfiture; but they were devout Catholics; they suspected Leopoldo and Bishop Ricci of Jansenism, and were bitterly incensed when the government turned its attention to popular devotions, and interfered with processions, funerals, religious Confraternities and relic-worship. The people laughed aloud in church when Ricci celebrated Mass in the Italian language. Those who had found it very convenient to put their superfluous relatives into convents were aggrieved at their suppression. The people rioted when they thought that a relic was to be destroyed as spurious. Accordingly Leopoldo's removal to Austria in 1790 was not greeted with very much lamentation.

The primacy of the Kingdom of Sardinia in Italy was not limited to military and foreign affairs. Sardinia had the

organisation and homogeneity that the other States lacked; it was a European Power, and had reached a stage of evolution equal to that of the other great Powers. Its statesmen rivalled Walpole and Fleury, its diplomats were of the first rank. Had not the Revolution thrown back all gradual and natural developments the future destiny of Sardinia would almost certainly have fulfilled itself much earlier. Though the energy of the State proceeded from its Kings, yet they could rely upon a real national sentiment and force, and upon a supply of faithful and capable ministers.

Vittorio Amedeo II was one of the most brilliant of his brilliant race. His talents in diplomacy and war and his extraordinary success placed him amongst the most remarkable personages of the age. He was hard-working, taciturn, parsimonious, hot-tempered, keeping his family in awe, and so tormenting his mistress with his jealousies that she escaped in disguise to France. His little figure, with its fierce moustache, its enormous, top-heavy wig and shabby coat, could inspire terror. Yet his people knew his worth and served him with loyal devotion. His greatness was not only in external affairs, for he was the first eighteenth century reformer in Italy, and did great things for his States long before Joseph and Leopoldo filled Italy with their big talk.

His one great blunder was his abdication in favour of his son, Carlo Emmanuele III (1731). He wanted to marry a lady of lower rank and thought that he was tired of ruling. Hitherto he had not allowed his son any share in the government, and he now left his trusted minister, Ormea, in charge. But Ormea knew that two Kings could not rule at once, and attached himself to the rising sun. Of course Vittorio Amedeo soon wished to interfere and criticise, but Carlo Emmanuele and Ormea disregarded him. He insisted on returning to Turin, and declared that the act of abdication was invalid. "I will throw Ormea back into the mud from which I took him," he thundered. Ormea feared lest filial

piety should lead Carlo Emmanuele to submit, and persuaded him to imprison his father at Rivoli. Some control was no doubt necessary, but the cruelty of the imprisonment was inexcusable. The old King was treated like a dangerous lunatic, till ill-usage in reality almost deprived him of his senses, and his stupid, but harmless, wife was confined in a house of correction. Carlo Emmanuele's conscience sometimes troubled him, but Ormea persuaded him that the helpless old man was still a dangerous schemer, and he allowed his father to die unheeded after a year's captivity. Except for this blot on his character Carlo Emmanuele was worthy of the highest praise. He hid under an elaborate dress an insignificant and ugly body, but he had all his father's best qualities without his violent temper. "After Frederick II," said Gibbon, "he had the second place amongst the sovereigns of Europe." Foscarini called him "courteous, affable, yet circumspect in speech," wishing to show frankness, and thus "cancel from the mind the sinister impressions caused by his father's dissimulation." His self-respect and dignity, his domestic and religious virtues set a fine example. He kept his court wonderfully pure. His ideal of duty was high; "Kings are not created to amuse themselves," he said. Vittorio Amedeo thought him slow and stupid, but he was only cautious. He was as great, if not so showy, a general as his father; the passion for military glory gave colour to an otherwise sober nature. But he liked to be recognized as a true patriot, and as one who had unselfishly done much for Italy. A French ambassador was instructed to recommend himself to the King of Sardinia by admiring his administration in every part.

Carlo Emmanuele's hobby was his army, and he never tired of making schemes for its improvement. His son, however, Vittorio Amedeo III (1773), had all his father's industry without his talents, and neglected more important duties to immerse himself in the petty details of militarism. Playing at soldiers from childhood, he continued to play at soldiers all

his life. He amused himself in designing expensive uniforms, far too grand to be useful. He was well-intentioned; "the happiness of his people is his incessant study...indeed, he is too condescending, and allows his kindness to be abused. If he has not all the gifts of a great King, he supplies them with all the virtues of a good man." But he could not understand, nor cope with, the tendencies of the new age. His want of vigour led him to submit to the influence of his wife, an Infanta of Spain, who subjected the court to Spanish etiquette and clerical domination. His eldest son was brought up by priests, and married to a French Princess who was as pious as her mother-in-law. The court became like a convent, there were no entertainments and no conversation except about saints and charities. All this was very unpopular, but the Duke was too fond of his wife to object. All the spirit and energy of the race shrivelled up into Vittorio Amedeo's dry formalism, as he strutted about amongst soldiers who had never fought and pompous ecclesiastics.

Vittorio Amedeo II had controlled every branch of his government, but he had the gift of choosing good ministers, often unknown men whom he trained for the purpose. He would not tolerate bad service, and had one finance minister punished by imprisonment for life. His earliest minister, San Tommaso, had a great, though hidden, influence over him; Vittorio Amedeo called him the "strongest, cleverest and most prudent of all his servants." But much more famous was the later minister, Ormea, who, as a clever young lawyer, attracted the King's attention, and rapidly rose to power. Under an agreeable, frank manner he hid powers of profound calculation and dissimulation, which enabled him to defeat the cleverest diplomats of Paris and Rome. It was at Rome that he made his reputation in negotiating the Concordat of 1727 (see p. 393). For many years he conducted Sardinia's foreign policy with constant success, and so skilful was his choice of subordinates that there was not a chancery in Europe so

well-informed and so well-served. An office of Grand-Chancellor was created for him in 1742, and the world came to believe that Ormea ruled Sardinia and its King also. But soon afterwards Carlo Emmanuele began to withdraw his confidence, though he never actually dismissed Ormea. Probably he thought that the powerful minister was becoming too powerful. Ormea died soon after. He was called "the Richelieu of Piedmont"; Carlo Emmanuele thought him too much of a Richelieu, especially when he asked the King to procure a Cardinal's hat for him.

Carlo Emmanuele had other excellent ministers; Ossorio, who succeeded Ormea in foreign affairs, was "devoted to his master's interests, upright and honest," but in consequence more difficult to negotiate with. Caisotti, an excellent lawyer, became Grand-Chancellor. Bogino reorganised the government of Sardinia and faithfully served his master for forty years. But the petty-minded Vittorio Amedeo III disliked their sincerity and firmness; he dismissed Bogino and did not consult Caisotti. He ruled by his own favourites, who were, like himself, rather incompetent than ill-intentioned, but the result of incompetence was plainly seen in the deterioration of the administration.

The Kings of Sardinia were not reformers after the type of Joseph II. They were untouched by philosophical ideas, and had no dreams of Constitutions. Yet most of them were set upon the improvement of their States, and turned active and sensible minds so effectively to this business, that, by the end of the reign of Carlo Emmanuele III, the Kingdom was much in advance of other parts of Italy in the matter of practical reform. In the reign of Vittorio Amedeo III, however, there was a slight falling back.

As soon as the Peace of Utrecht gave him leisure, Vittorio Amedeo II began to make sweeping reforms in ecclesiastical affairs, in the administration, finance and the legal system of his States. The ministers were formed into a regular Council

of State, containing eight members; the King however rarely asked advice of the whole council, but consulted the ministers separately. Three of these ministers, the Secretaries for foreign affairs, internal affairs and war, became more important than the others, and had advisory committees attached to their departments.

In 1717 Vittorio Amedeo created an elaborate new form of executive, consisting of four departments called *Aziende*; three supervised taxation, artillery and the royal household, the fourth was the pay-office. Their estimates and balance-sheets had to be approved by a general council of finance before they were submitted to the King. No European State had a system so complete, or so economically and strictly administered.

Reform in taxation was urgently needed, and in 1698 the making of a new assessment was ordered. It was delayed by the wars, but was in use by 1740. By taxing much land, ecclesiastical and feudal, which had been exempt, it decreased the burden upon small proprietors, and yet increased the revenue, which, owing to these reforms and to a general prosperity, doubled itself in the course of the reign, though all the extra war-taxes were remitted, and Carlo Emmanuele, in spite of his long war, had hardly to reimpose any of them. "The people," said Foscarini, "support the weight of taxation with tranquil minds." Yet the system was not by any means ideal. The salt-tax pressed heavily on the poor, who had to buy a fixed quantity of salt for themselves and for their cattle, a rule which prevented many people from keeping cattle at all. The rough peasants of the Mondovi district rose in dangerous riots against this tax. Vittorio Amedeo II put down the rebellion severely, but relaxed his severity after the Mondovi people had fought loyally for him in the wars.

Vittorio Amedeo III had not, unfortunately, the gift of economy. Between 1680 and 1780 the revenue had nearly trebled itself, and yet he was always in debt. This was caused

by peculation, general maladministration, the large incomes paid to his numerous sons, and the increased cost of court and army. The latter more than doubled during his reign; there was great waste and far too many officers, twenty-eight generals alone for an army of under fifty thousand. In the court there were over six hundred servants, generally idle and extravagant, and there were endless pensioners and sinecure-holders.

One of the main objects of Vittorio Amedeo II's policy was to destroy the remains of feudalism. Besides imposing the land-tax on the nobles, he revoked at a blow all the grants of demesne land made by his predecessors for some generations. Eight hundred feudatories were affected, and they fought for their property in the law courts. But Vittorio Amedeo packed the courts with his own dependents, and so secured verdicts against the nobles. The forfeited lands were freely sold, and their sale brought in a large revenue. A title of nobility accompanied each purchase, so that in about seventy years eight hundred new families had been ennobled, besides those who had obtained titles for military, political or judicial service. The older families at first treated them as upstarts, but by degrees they assimilated and inter-married, to the great benefit of the older aristocracy and of society generally.

Criminal law and the methods of legal procedure had come down almost unchanged from the Middle Ages. Numerous courts with conflicting jurisdictions administered various types of law and innumerable edicts, with conflicting rules, so that justice was slow, costly and most uncertain. Vittorio Amedeo II was the first Italian Prince to order a complete codification of the law; it was published in 1723. Law was now certain, but had not infrequently to give way to the arbitrary interference of the Kings in the courts of Justice. Once Vittorio Amedeo dismissed the whole Senate of Turin, because it would not submit to his reversal of its judgments. Feudal jurisdiction was limited by permitting appeals from the feudal courts, and

by submitting the appointment of feudal magistrates to the approval of the government.

But Vittorio Amedeo's code was full of medieval laws, savage punishments and class differentiation. Nor did his successors attempt to modify it by embodying Beccaria's suggestions, so that it was said of the code, "One would think it dated from the fifteenth instead of the eighteenth century." Nor was there any idea of personal liberty, freedom of speech or writing. People who offended the King sometimes disappeared suddenly for ever. The police system was inquisitorial, and issued numerous petty regulations. For instance, police permission was needed to give a private ball; only persons of the upper classes might apply, and they might employ "only three musical instruments, not noisy."

Vittorio Amedeo III reformed the Communes, with government officials to protect them from the feudatories, on a plan excellent in theory, but found defective in practice.

Savoy, Nice and Sardinia each had its governor under the Crown. Savoy had grown more prosperous, but the absence of the King in Piedmont was unpopular. The nobles, demoralised by long periods of foreign occupation, resented control. The younger nobles lived in disorderly fashion at Chambéry. The administration of the province became less and less satisfactory; in 1781 and 1784 a general chase of vagabonds was ordered by the government. The numerous Piedmontese officials were much disliked, and the influence of events in France began early to permeate the lower and middle classes.

When Sardinia came into the possession of Vittorio Amedeo II it was in a very backward state of civilisation. The scanty inhabitants, busy with their feuds, scarcely cultivated the land, which served as pasturage to numerous, but indifferent, cattle. The expenses of the administration largely exceeded the revenue, but the government did not care to call the Parliament, the "Tre Stamenti," to make extra grants.

Vittorio Amedeo II and Carlo Emmanuele III, however, effected certain reforms, especially during the rule of the latter's excellent minister, Bogino. Disorder was repressed, justice improved, colonisation attempted. Mining and coral fishing were encouraged, new forms of cultivation introduced, and assisted by agricultural Banks. A Sardinian regiment was raised, schools founded, the Italian language taught. The population increased, and so did general prosperity, but feudalism was still strong, and when Vittorio Amedeo III removed Bogino, there was a reaction. Piedmontese were jobbed into the offices without regard to their qualifications. In 1780 there was a popular rising against a Piedmontese official who held back bread in time of scarcity and maltreated the starving people. A good governor was afterwards appointed, and matters improved a little.

Piedmont was prosperous and contented. Nowhere in Italy did the people suffer less from the petty tyrannies of the nobles, for these were kept down with a firm hand, and their authority weakened by the elevation of new families. In fact an official was substituted for a feudal nobility. Some hundreds resided at court, taking part in its many formal ceremonies, attired in the elaborate costume of the period, with wigs so large that hats had to be carried. Nor were the nobles so idle in Piedmont as elsewhere, for nearly all served in the army, where they had to work hard in the lower ranks before obtaining commands. Military discipline and exercises and frequent hunting increased their efficiency. Though the army was over-staffed and over-dressed, it was not in reality a toy, but an effective force under its soldier Kings, though there was deterioration under Vittorio Amedeo III. In the wars the nobles served with enthusiasm and without pay. "When the King goes to war," wrote Foscarini, "there do not remain in Turin a dozen Knights able to serve, and these seem much ashamed of themselves." Military training had kept up the physical efficiency of the people also, but so much indulgence

in soldiering had tended to the neglect of agriculture and commerce, for neither of which they had much natural talent. The old methods of agriculture were followed; the government tried to introduce improvements, but on the other hand it checked progress by its laws regulating prices and preventing free traffic in food-stuffs. Much wool was imported, because, though the country was well adapted for pasturage, sheep breeding was hindered by tiresome government regulations.

The town industries were organised into *Università* (Guilds); they prevented competition, excluded new comers and were burdened with minute rules. So rigid was the demarcation between trades that cutlers might not make the handles of their knives. The processes of manufacture were subject to regulations which prevented the trial of new methods. Certain industries, especially the woollen, were fairly successful, but none entirely so, in spite of strict protection. For example, to protect cloth, ladies were forbidden to wear cotton dresses out of doors. The export of raw silk was forbidden in order to protect silk manufactures, with the result of checking silk culture.

The educational system of the State was very characteristic. The University was itself a government department, and it was the director of the public schools, which all boys must attend. All school curriculums were as definitely fixed as if they were laws of the country; no elasticity, no initiative were allowed. While religious education was enforced, no clerical influence within the schools was permitted.

The Kings were in fact imbued with the idea that the more they governed, the better off the people would be. The State was developed like a private estate, for its own good and that of its master. Nothing could be done by, but everything for, the people. They were not discontented, for modern thought had not reached them. Only the bourgeois class, which was growing in prosperity and intelligence, began to resent the privileges of the nobles. Towards the end of the century, the

near neighbourhood of France began to show itself, and there were agitation and riots, particularly in Savoy, against taxation and dear food. But it must be owned that, of all the Italian States, none had less to complain of in the matter of material prosperity.

The internal condition of Genoa remained unaltered from the seventeenth century. After the crisis of 1746 (p. 376) it seemed for the moment as if the people would themselves assume control of the government, but the nobles soon recovered their position and the old state of affairs was restored.

Francesco III, Duke of Modena, in spite of unpleasant experiences in the wars of 1733 and 1740, settled down again afterwards to enjoy a long and quiet rule. The marriage treaty for his grand-daughter Beatrice (p. 383) brought him favour from Austria and the governorship of Milan. The Duchy was exceedingly feudal, even municipal government was in the hands of the nobles. Francesco made ecclesiastical reforms, and began to codify the law; but he was, neither at home nor in Milan, really interested in the business of government, and preferred to play the elderly gallant, looking as juvenile as he could, and spending a great deal more than he could afford. Indeed, both the Duke and his Duchy and toy army have a distinctly Gilbertian flavour. The army had very grand uniforms, but we read that "the dragoons were peaceable men, and not desirous of injuring anyone." On one occasion the people of Reggio, being disappointed because an *Opera bouffe* was presented at the theatre instead of a serious play, rose in rebellion and imprisoned all the garrison until the government apologised for its mistake.

Ercole III (1780) was a more serious politician; he had some capable ministers, contrived to effect considerable economies, partly by keeping down court expenses, and was able to undertake public works and to lower the taxation. He was the last of his name, and his daughter Beatrice, now wife of the Arch-Duke Ferdinand, was heiress of Modena and Reggio, Mirandola, Carpi, Correggio and Massa.

Parma, after many vicissitudes, in the course of which it was robbed by Charles III of Naples of the whole of the Farnesi's splendid collection of books and art-treasures, became a Bourbon State in 1748 under Philip of Spain. The Duchy included Piacenza and Guastalla. Philip was fortunate in having an enlightened minister, a Frenchman, du Tillot, who, after the Duke's early death (1765), continued to rule Parma for his young son, Ferdinando. Du Tillot's reforms were mainly ecclesiastical, and included the abolition of the Inquisition, a mortmain law and various other excellent provisions (see p. 397); but he also improved the condition of law, justice and finance, and more than doubled the revenue without overburdening the people. He encouraged learning, and, during Philip's reign, Parma became quite a paradise of literature. The Librarian Paciaudi was commissioned to reorganise the University, and the court was full of learned men.

Unluckily, Ferdinando, though carefully educated, turned out rather like a Jesuit than a Duke. His pleasure was to ring Church bells and sing in the choir. He was stupid, and quickly fell under the influence of his pretty, clever, strong-willed wife, Maria Amalia, a true daughter of Maria Theresa. The Duchess hated du Tillot, and Ferdinando of course already disliked his ecclesiastical policy. In spite of the support of France and Spain, the minister was dismissed in 1771. Ferdinando joyfully restored the Inquisition, destroyed du Tillot's new law court and recalled the Jesuits. Maria Amalia and her favourites ruled; the court was full of intrigue between them and the Bourbon party, but the headstrong Duchess managed to quarrel even with her own relations. The finances were soon in disorder, the government in debt, the country overrun with brigands. The fruit of du Tillot's labours was all lost.

CHAPTER IV.

SOCIETY, LITERATURE AND ART IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

THE general characteristics of the eighteenth century need no description here; its most unfortunate tendencies were perhaps at their worst in Italy; its best were too often either absent or attenuated. Here the vigorous movements which had filled the seventeenth century in other countries had been unknown, so that the eighteenth was but the end of a long period of decadence. The change from Spanish to French influence in life and manners which had been going on in the seventeenth century was now accomplished. Piedmont had long been very French; Milan was also affected by its proximity. Naples and Parma had Bourbon rulers; Gian Gastone de' Medici transformed his father's Spanish court into a French one; the Lorrainers had French traditions. Italy was now become a poor copy of France; such intellectual life as it possessed was for the most part merely imitative of the French. Its precedence in music was, except for the art of *Bel Canto*, passing over to Germany. Its scientific supremacy had departed, though it could still boast of a few great names. Though the better part of French literature was so little known in Italy that Italian authors could copy literally from French books without fear of detection, yet French novels, fashions and cookery were slavishly followed; conversation was either in that language, or else interlarded with French phrases; "ladies neglect the Tuscan speech to gabble French," it was said.

The long régime of Jesuit education and ecclesiastical censorship, the want of the forces of political activity and national independence had done their work. There was no moral nor mental stimulus to lead to high ideals, or to rescue the Italians from the general fatuity and bad taste. Their intellectual faculties were now reduced to the lowest level. They were strictly ruled by conventions in religion, manners and taste; so that Italy had now neither great vices, nor tragic crimes and passions, just as it had no heroic deeds, sacrifices nor aspirations. We hear no longer of the fierce marauding Barons of the "Promessi Sposi"; there is no civil war to tear Piedmont into fratricidal factions, no Masaniello to thrill Naples with horrors. While the lower classes were sunk in apathy and languor, enlivened only by the feats of the brigands and the excitements of smuggling, society lived in a round of vacuous frivolity. Sentiments were languid but effusive, love itself was light to come and light to go, voluble and ceremonious, manners were affected, religion of the superficial, unintelligent kind impressed by the Jesuits on their pupils. Social life is characterised by the words which describe eighteenth century art and literature, "Rococo" and "Arcadian." The "Baroque" with its strivings after the original and bizarre, its desire to astonish and to excite, has passed away; conventionality and artificiality reign supreme.

It can hardly be said that the life of society is reflected in the Theatre, but undoubtedly the Theatre permeates and dominates society, and social life is just as artificial, as scenic, as full of conventions as is the stage. The wigs and hoops of contemporary costume illustrate the strivings after unnatural effects; the gardens are made to look as much like drawing-rooms as possible. The artists represent nature theatrically and artificially; their peasants are Arcadian shepherds in fancy costume. Even Olympus and all its inhabitants are transferred to Arcadia; they sport in groves, sail through the air, and enact Ovidian love-scenes. They decorate the Salons,

and appear at the Theatre in transformation scenes sitting upon property clouds.

An Italian writer¹ has pointed out how contemporary society was reflected in its dwellings; the elaborate beds are suggestive of late rising, the profusion of mirrors typifies vanity and levity, and points out the undue attention to toilet. The large reception rooms suggest the habitual occupation of society, their decorations its elaboration and conventionality. But, in spite of the want of sincerity and of force, we must admit that there is no little charm in the dainty Dresden china and the pretty marble statuettes, the gilded, splendid clocks and candelabra, the lacquered and painted furniture, the intarsia work in tortoise-shell and metal. With them we find the frieze of stucco, the frescoed ceiling, the gilt-framed mirrors. All these call up images of ladies in hoops, weird head-dresses, powder, patches and high heels, waving exquisite fans, and of gentlemen in wigs, embroidered suits and gilded swords, who bow low, hat in hand, as the violins begin the languid music of the Minuet.

Social life could not be healthy, for there was rooted upon it a morbid, unnatural institution, that of the *Cicisbeo*. This was a gentleman chosen by each married woman as a kind of *Cavaliere servente*, to be in constant attendance upon her, to act as her protector, companion and friend. This closeness of intercourse did not lead to as much immorality as might have been expected, in fact the *Cicisbeo* was supposed to guard his lady from improper attentions. He was not infrequently chosen by the husband, or by the lady's relations in her marriage contract. The arrangement sometimes lasted for years, but was also often terminated by an amicable agreement, and a new *Cicisbeo* selected. But such a delegation to a stranger of the husband's natural rights and position was bound to give an unwholesome character to society, and the claims of the lady upon the *Cicisbeo's* time and attention increased the general tendency to idleness. To modern ideas the slavery of the

¹ Fradeletto, "L'arte nel 1700," in *La Vita Italiana nel Settecento*.

Cicisbeo seems quite intolerable. After attending to his own elaborate toilet, he waited upon his lady while hers was performed, and accompanied her to promenade and Mass, lifting the *portière* of the church for her, and giving her the holy water upon his finger-tips. Then he dined with her, and attended her to the reception, where it was his business to dance with her, or to the theatre, where all society had its *loges* for the season, and where it gossiped and sipped chocolate, flirted, and fluttered fans and scented handkerchiefs, paying but little attention to the piece. Such was the life of most young Italian gentlemen. The poorer younger sons, if they were not clever enough to be lawyers, generally took minor orders, and lived as "Abati" in rich families. The Abate acted as chaplain, major-domo, private tutor, domestic entertainer and family confidant. At meals he must amuse the company with anecdotes, and he must be prolific with epigrams and verses upon all occasions, demanding the sympathy of even the heathen deities when my lady's lap-dog dies, or her baby is christened.

Masculine society convened in the newly established coffee-houses; but these did not become, as in other countries, the centre of political and literary movements. They were mere places of resort where more idle hours could be wiled away over innocuous drinks and much less innocent conversation. The interests of society rarely went beyond the latest scandal, the fashionable Opera, the squabbles of rival *virtuosi*, the newest monstrosity in hair-dressing. Amusement was the one aim of social existence. The Milanese and Florentine nobility were satisfied under Austrian domination when their alien master established in each capital a petty court to give big parties. A local court was by far the most popular advantage brought to Naples by the Bourbons. On the other hand, the Piedmontese nobles were inclined to be discontented, because the court of Vittorio Amedeo III was so intolerably prim.

In such a society the events of real importance passed

unheeded. Except in Rome the suppression of the Jesuits caused little excitement. The new teaching of the Encyclopaedists was unheard; the classical revival of the latter half of the century, though it began in Rome and Naples, only became fashionable as it filtered back into Italy through France. Verri and Beccaria, Joseph II and Leopold of Tuscany were regarded as irrelevant and tiresome bores. The threatening of future upheaval fell upon deaf ears, and the society, which was to break up like a painted ball of glass at the first sharp blow, believed itself to be perfectly stable and secure. One egregious historian maintained in 1787 that the present political systems were nearly perfect, few reforms were required, and those peaceful ones; as for a revolution "Europe no longer fears it." To Venice, hovering upon the brink of destruction, the Gozzi-Goldoni theatrical controversy was the event of chief interest.

Of those spirits which revolted against the conventional narrowness of life, a few, like Verri and Beccaria, found legitimate scope for their energies; generally they became wanderers, adventurers, outlaws from regular society. Alfieri passed restlessly from place to place, vexing his fierce spirit with girding at tyrants who were not worthy of his invective. Others, less single-minded, turned to the Black Arts as a vent for their restlessness, and made a living by trading upon the superstitions in which society was still steeped. A Venetian, Casanova, made his dupes believe that he corresponded with spirits, and knew the secrets of immortality and rejuvenation. Cagliostro formed his credulous followers into a Lodge of mystic Free-Masons, calling themselves prophets and sibyls. They believed that he would conduct them to perfection; meanwhile, he pretended to perform miraculous cures, and to turn mercury into gold. He had a long and prosperous career, living in great luxury; but he fell at last into the grasp of the Inquisition, and was imprisoned for life rather because he was a magician than because he was an impostor. Of middle

and lower class life we hear very little, for few thought it worth the chronicling, and Goldoni's attempt to draw his characters from thence was stigmatised as unworthy of the dignity of literature. We do not believe in the dancing, singing peasants, in picturesque costume and with impossible sheep, who figure in contemporary art; but we gather that the poor, though degraded and ignorant, were not on the whole discontented. If taxation was heavy, charity was lavish; and, except in times of war, there seems to have been tolerable prosperity in the towns and in certain of the country districts. Plagues and famines were less constant and severe than in the seventeenth century. In the less accessible and civilised parts of the country, however, there was often extreme poverty and misery, and brigandage was by no means decreasing. But on the whole the population was too servile to resent misgovernment, and too apathetic to hope or care for reform.

Literature for the most part faithfully reflected society, and the Arcadian Academy, which had grown up in Rome out of the literary proclivities of Queen Cristina (p. 290), so nearly embodied the tendencies of contemporary literature that the latter has generally been called "Arcadian" after it. Conventionality and artificiality were its chief characteristics. The first principles of the Arcadians had been a return from Marinism to nature, but it was a purely imaginary nature to which they returned, as theatrical and unnatural as were the gardens which to them represented landscape. The Arcadians busied themselves in writing the largest number of elegant effusions on the smallest of possible subjects, effusions full of gods and goddesses, of limpid streams and hoary groves, of pretty sentiments and vapid protestations, of shepherds and of nymphs with golden tresses and cerulean eyes. Innumerable academies multiplied these productions indefinitely, and formed mutual admiration societies whose members politely compared one another with Plutarch and Vergil. Another fashion was to write interminable didactic poems on the most unpoetical subjects, such as

physics, medicine, agriculture and philosophy. A rhymed cookery book was in favour for reading aloud during the nobleman's toilet. Ladies and gentlemen of fashion produced much verse suitable for drawing-room albums, and complete anthologies were compiled and printed for a smart wedding or funeral. Improvisation was highly popular, and persons with a knack for reeling off quantities of this kind of verse "out of their heads" were much admired.

An enormous number of plays and *libretti* for operas were written by these mediocre poets. Their plays were as a rule neglected, while the people flocked to the "Commedia dell'Arte," and it cannot be said that the dramatists deserved any better fate. An attempt to improve Italian drama was made by two eminent literary men, Scipione Maffei (1675-1755) and Apostolo Zeno. The latter was court poet at Vienna, and endeavoured to free the stage from its melodramatic, spectacular character, and to give it regularity of action and seriousness of purpose. Maffei's "Merope" showed a real knowledge of Greek tragedy, which had hitherto been ignored by Italian dramatists.

The characteristic playwright of the age was the Roman Pietro Trapassi, better known by his Arcadian name of Metastasio (1698-1782). As a clever boy-improviser he attracted the notice of the eminent lawyer Gravina, and was adopted and educated by him. While still a youth he found his *métier* and the road to fame in writing verses to be set to music, his first great success being "Gli Orti Esperidi," written for the Empress' birthday, and set to music by Porpora. Metastasio's charm, beauty and talents always made him beloved, and he was now adopted by a Roman Prima Donna, generally called "*La Romanina*," in whose house he met with constant admiration and with every opportunity for exercising his talents. In a short time he had written *libretti* for all the great Italian composers, and his words were sung by all the famous singers of the day. He then succeeded Zeno as court

poet at Vienna, where he met with equal success, social and literary, turning out a number of very popular plays with great regularity, finding many kind friends, innumerable admirers, and a lady whom he could love with just the mild, cold sentiment which was suited to his amiable and selfish nature.

Metastasio's success, though complete at the time, was fleeting, and did not survive the Opera of Porpora's composing and Farinelli's interpretation, for his work had little intrinsic literary merit, and owed its charm to its delightful adaptability to the music and the style of singing for which it was composed. The old dramatic devices, the stock characters and situations, the monotonous "love-interest," the melancholy lovers and professional villains, with their conventional sentiments and behaviour, appear again and again. There is entire want of dramatic unity or probability, of historical propriety, of local colour. There is no insight into nor development of character, no power nor passion in the tragedy nor natural humour in the comedy. Indeed, Metastasio openly expressed his contempt for Greek drama. But the verse is graceful and really poetic as well as facile; the declamation sometimes rises almost to heroic heights, the dialogue is lively, the lyrics charming.

Just as Metastasio embodied the passing time, Goldoni and Alfieri pointed forward to the coming age, Goldoni to the true comedy of manners, Alfieri to the tragedy of the age of revolution. Goldoni (1707-93), finding the comedy of Italy hide-bound with convention, hopelessly trivial, artificial and monotonous, endeavoured to create for his own country a comedy of character such as Molière had created for France. He had not Molière's transcendent gifts, his deep insight into character, his force and power of expression. He could, for example, never create a really villainous character. But he had a genuine sense of humour, a rich fund of good spirits, immense vitality, sympathy with every class and type of human nature. He was always spontaneous, always entertaining, full of natural jokes, really comic situations, without farcical

extravagance or disagreeable suggestiveness. Though he wrote a hundred and fifty plays they show extraordinary variety of plot and character. He drew his personages from every rank of society in Venice, and, allowing us to escape for once from the Salon and the "pastoral glade," he gives us a glimpse of real everyday existence, of fishermen, shopkeepers, innkeepers and their wives, of domestic interiors and of life in the streets. In tragedy he failed; and, with a defective technical equipment, he never reached a high literary level, and perhaps wrote better plays in Venetian dialect than in pure Italian.

Goldoni's defiance of contemporary conventions could not pass unchallenged, and he soon found a dangerous adversary in Carlo Gozzi (1722-1806), who believed that drama was degraded by association with everyday incidents and vulgar, middle-class personages. Gozzi was also a Venetian aristocrat, and he and his class had good reason to look upon Goldoni's work, from the political as well as the literary point of view, as revolutionary in effect if not in intention. Without direct satire, it exposed only too clearly the pretences and frivolity of society, the vices and misgovernment of the aristocracy. Yet it was impossible to oppose Goldoni merely by reviving the type of drama which he was replacing, so Gozzi had to invent a drama which should be novel and yet contain older characteristics of proved popularity. He hit upon the fairy-tale,—the fairy-tale of the Arabian Nights and of old Italian nursery lore,—the extreme antithesis of reality, and mingled this with scenes and characters revived from the *Commedia dell'Arte*. It was rather degrading for a dramatist thus to deliver himself up to the vagaries of these improvisers, but the plan gave Gozzi the popular success which he wanted, and enabled him to use his fairy-story device as a vehicle of satire against all his enemies and particularly against Goldoni. The contest between the two dramatists' companies and their supporters was long and fierce; it became mixed up with political and social feuds; but Gozzi, with the aristocracy to back him,

finally triumphed. Goldoni left Venice, but met with a warm reception in Paris, where he produced many successful plays until the time of the Revolution.

Alfieri (1749-1803) was a Piedmontese noble, who from his boyhood had enjoyed complete independence and the command of great wealth. Of a proud, passionate, restless, undisciplined nature, he travelled from place to place, falling violently in love and as violently out again, spending extravagantly, quarrelling and duelling, indulging his passion for horses. At last he found happiness in the love of the Countess of Albany, whom he rescued from her degraded husband, the Young Pretender; and he spent the last years of his agitated life in comparative peace at Florence.

The perusal of Plutarch's "Lives" had inspired him with that passion for abstract Liberty of which the French theorists talked so much, but which never had, nor could have, concrete existence. When the Revolution actually came, Alfieri's aristocratic soul revolted at its outrages, and he denounced the revolutionaries no less fiercely than he had declaimed against the tyrants. Though he could not bring himself to live under the rule of his own King, he yet confessed, "the race of our princes is excellent on the whole, especially when compared with others. And in my inmost heart I feel affection for them rather than aversion." Alfieri was in fact modern in the conflict between his emotions and intellect; "La mente e il cor meco in perpetua lite," he said. His memoirs, in spite of their frigid style, reveal his mental struggles, the ungovernable passions striving with the real nobility and generosity of his nature.

Tragic drama in Italy was an interest for the dilettante; it was bound by conventions, and modelled upon Seneca; it had no ideals, no mission. Alfieri believed that he could, through tragedy, not only break the traditions of the Arcadian school and begin an intellectual renaissance, but also renovate the heart and conscience of the people, that, in his own fine words, "men should learn, through the stage, to be free, strong,

generous, transported by true virtue, hating violence, loving their country, conscious of their rights, and be in all their passions ardent, upright, magnanimous." His effort produced no immediate result, but his words have inspired many an Italian patriot of later generations to heroism and self-sacrifice. For an intellectual renaissance Alfieri could do little; he was himself too scantily equipped by education, too closely bound to classical models, and too much obsessed by his one dominant idea, the glorification of "Liberty."

Lacking critical sense, Alfieri could not discriminate between the classics, and admired Tacitus as much as Homer. He was ignorant of, or despised, the great drama of England, Spain and Germany. He copied the severe form of French tragedy, but avoided its imagination and romance. He strictly observed the Greek Unities, banished the love-interest, the lyrics, even the Chorus, repressed in an extraordinary fashion the exuberance of his own nature, forced his drama into the narrowest of moulds, denuded his style of all grace of expression until it became absolutely harsh, condensed his dialogue until it became obscure. Yet he utterly failed to reach the sublime simplicity of the Greek, its philosophy, its development and grandeur of movement, its insight into character. His personages are mere types; he must always have a tyrant and a classical, or pseudo-classical, hero, to declaim against the tyrant. His disregard for history makes him cast Saul, Philip II, Cosimo I, Creon, all for one part, with David, Don Carlos, etc., for the other. There is little action; the characters talk, but do nothing.

Yet Alfieri had a severe grandeur and dignity, a sincerity and moral force, and a depth of genuine emotion, which raised him, far above the petty conventionalities of his contemporaries, into the domain of real poetry, and placed him in the same category as, though not on an equality with, Schiller.

The critical spirit of the eighteenth century was not largely represented in Italy; its best exponent was the Abate Giuseppe Parini (1729-99), a poor Lombard, who gained considerable

experience of fashionable life as domestic chaplain and tutor in great establishments. He had keen insight and common sense, and, if not exactly genius, enough literary taste and talent to break sharply away from the traditions of the Arcadians and write in a simple, spirited and dignified style, which at its best almost approaches its Vergilian model. He saw through all the folly and vanity which surrounded him, and determined to use his poetic gifts to expose and satirise contemporary life, and endeavour to improve it. His best known poem is "Il Giorno," in which he gives a detailed and life-like account of the way in which a young Italian noble spends his day, pointing out with firm, yet light hand, its utter emptiness and foolishness, so that many contemporary readers must have felt shame, and, it is to be hoped, attempted amendment.

A similar attack in prose was made by Verri and his collaborators in the journal "Caffé" (p. 418); it was aimed, said the editor, against "the pedantry of talkers, the scurrility of the lower forms of literature, and the fidgety insistence on detail which have so much influence on Italian character, literature and politics." Hence it contained both social satire and literary criticism.

The uses of journalism for these purposes was now beginning to be realized, and other literary journals besides "Caffé" made their appearance. In Venice, Carlo Gozzi's brother, Gaspare, brought out a series of papers, called the "Osservatori," a kind of "Spectator," with light, vivacious articles of smooth and easy satire, not very profound, but lively enough. As Carlo Gozzi used the fairy-tale as an instrument of satire, so Gaspare adopted the fable for the same purpose. A more serious literary critic was the Piedmontese, Giuseppe Baretti, who travelled much, was Secretary to the English Royal Academy and a friend of Garrick and Johnson, and who found abroad just such national institutions, characteristics and literature as the Italians lacked. In the Journal

which he founded on his return to Italy, "Frusta Letteraria," he attacked Arcadian literature, the narrow education and the effeminate life of the day. He urged the importance of national life, speech and art, pointed out that thought is of more value than style, that Italy could not live on her Past alone. His literary judgments were frequently mistaken, and he showed against Dante, Goldoni, Verri and Beccaria the same animus as against the Arcadians. His style was savage and full of scurrilous invective; but he was the first serious literary critic in Italy, and had the very rare merit of honesty and independence of mind. "Frusta Letteraria" had, however, only a very short career.

With the exception of these, and a few other literary papers, journalism was as yet almost non-existent in Italy. Some few brief and quite jejune weekly leaflets were issued, giving notice of theatre performances and so forth, but politics and all other serious subjects were wholly excluded.

Metaphysics had no chance to flourish in the eighteenth century in Italy, and the more strictly intellectual minds turned towards law, history and the philosophy arising from their study. Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1743), a Neapolitan lawyer, lived for years in a retired country place, pondering over the laws of human development, and in his "Scienza Nuova" (1725) made the first serious contribution to the philosophy of history. The study of Roman Law taught him that Law has an historic evolution, and this theory he extended to the whole history of mankind, making wide generalisations from facts so far as he understood them. He traced the growth from myth to religion, from custom to law through civilisation, and the development of reason. He was the first thinker to see the allegorical foundation of mythology, and to discover in it the key to primitive history and poetry, to realize the value of popular traditions and sayings, to attack the belief that civilisation was initiated by philosophers, and to show that Draco, Solon, etc., were personifications. Where Vico failed

was in his ignorance of the facts of primitive and medieval history, which led him into the erroneous theory of "cycles of development." Europe, he believed, had returned to savagery in the Middle Ages, and was about to do so again in his own time.

But if some of Vico's conclusions were wrong, his methods were right; and, though his teaching was disregarded by the contemporary school of French philosophy, much of it was revived by Kant and the German philosophers.

The Neapolitan lawyers produced other writers, Gravina, the patron of Metastasio, and one of the Arcadian Academy in its better days, who wrote a history of Roman Law, and Giannone, whose career has already been described (pp. 394, 396). The sensation which followed the publication of Giannone's "History of Naples," and the subsequent events of his life have conferred rather a fictitious value on that work. By the anti-clericals he has been hailed as a martyr to their cause; by the clericals he has been confounded as their bitterest enemy. Giannone's own intentions do not seem to have justified the results which the publication of his book entailed, and the book itself was not worth the controversy which has raged about it. It has really little literary or historic value, and is mainly a *réchauffé* of earlier histories, a little coloured by the legal point of view.

Less famous, but more truly great than Giannone, was another Neapolitan lawyer, Filangieri, whose great work, "La Scienza della Legislazione," was a comprehensive treatise on law, political science, education and public morality. He denounced the abuses of the age with eloquent passion and patriotism, yet with such skill that the Neapolitan government was not offended, but constantly required his official services. Of Beccaria's work on law mention has already been made (p. 418).

An historian of far more importance and originality than Giannone was the Modenese, Ludovico Muratori (1672-1750),

whose interest in the unpublished sources of history was first aroused when he was one of the Doctors in the Ambrosian Library at Milan. He selected and published some of its manuscripts in his work called "Anecdota." More famous is his vast collection, "Rerum Italicarum Scriptores," which contains most of the hitherto unpublished sources of Italian history from 500 to 1500. His "Annali d' Italia" is a correct, if uninspiring, chronicle of facts. At Milan, and afterwards at Modena, where he was Librarian and Keeper of the Archives, he worked incessantly, constantly publishing lesser tracts and treatises on history, archaeology, philosophy, theology, law. He wrote to defend the Modenese claims against the Papacy, and was attacked on this account, not only by ecclesiastical lawyers, but also by the Jesuits and by many literary rivals. Neither Piedmont nor the Republics would allow him to publish their historical materials. "How is it to be expected," he sadly wrote, "that the Italians should make progress in letters, if, instead of encouraging one another, they are full of envy, and only care to attack each other?" But Benedict XIV, who was one of his literary friends, protected him from clerical vehemence, and declared that he might freely publish all his opinions "on matters neither dogmatic nor disciplinary."

A good deal of history was written in the eighteenth century; little beyond that already mentioned had much merit, but an exception must be made in favour of that extraordinarily acute monograph, "Storia Arcana di Carlo VI," in which the Venetian ambassador and Doge, Foscarini (p. 422), unravelled the causes of the unexpected weakness shown by Austria in 1733, with a masterly completeness and psychological insight equal to those of the best modern historians. Huge histories of Italian literature were also compiled, but the authors were more concerned in chronicling facts about literary men than in attempting any reasoned criticism of their works. Latin was still often written, and the interest in Oriental study which had long been one of the glories of Rome, had not died away.

Stefano Borgia, secretary to the Propaganda, pawned his table silver to procure rare manuscripts through the missionaries. Kircher the archaeologist made a brave, though unsuccessful, effort to interpret hieroglyphics. Little philological work was done; the "Crusca" was nearly inactive. The pedants still continued to bar all that was not in Boccaccio; the old fight of dialects continued. The Universities were fairly active, and attracted foreign as well as Italian students. That of Pavia was completely reorganised by Maria Theresa.

In political economy the work of the Italians was more valuable. There was quite a large number of workers in this field, whose interest had been directed thither by the French economists, and was stimulated by the efforts after practical reform which took place in the latter half of the eighteenth century. The Italians made little contribution towards economic theory, being rather concerned with practical problems, and they were generally followers of the Physiocrats. They believed that reform could only come from the supreme authority; and, while contending for the abolition of all privileges and monopolies, for internal free trade and freedom of contract, most of them were still convinced of that theory of the "Balance of Trade," which asserted that one country's gain was another's loss, and hence they maintained the necessity of protection against foreigners. Few were as advanced as Filangieri (p. 456), who, though ignorant of Adam Smith's work, demanded complete freedom of trade and the abolition of all restrictions on industry. Verri and Beccaria, the most enlightened reformers in economics and law, were both protectionists as far as external trade was concerned, though both urged internal freedom. Beccaria believed the physiocratic doctrine that land is the only source of wealth; but Verri showed the fallacy of this belief, and was perhaps the first writer to insist that labour is the true producer of wealth. His work is full of excellent practical precepts, most valuable in the contemporary condition of Italy.

Of the other Italian economists the most distinguished

were two Neapolitans, Genovesi and Galiani. The former was a protectionist and physiocrat, but was sufficiently advanced to hold up England as the model to be followed in economic matters. Genovesi was involved in some trouble on account of his heterodox philosophical and ecclesiastical opinions, until, in order to give him practical protection against his clerical adversaries, an admirer founded on purpose for him a Chair of Political Economy in Naples University, which was the earliest of its kind in Europe (1755).

Galiani (1728-82) was a man of splendid talents and extraordinary social gifts. He was Secretary of Legation to France, and, although he was really a dwarf, he captivated French society by the charm of his conversation, his wit and personal fascination. Everyone in Paris quoted his *bons mots*; he was the pet of its most brilliant Salons. Marmontel said that he was "Harlequin with the head of Machiavelli." Grimm called him "Plato with the vivacity of a Harlequin." A diplomatic *faux pas* led to his recall from Paris; and, though he was still high in government favour and held important offices, he could never be contented with the provinciality of Naples, the dulness of its society, the bald inanity of its literature, and was always yearning after the brilliance and intelligence of Paris. At twenty years of age, Galiani had published a treatise on Money which made him famous; it became quite a classic of economics. In Paris he wrote a book on Wheat Commerce, opposing the teaching of the physiocrats, and combating the free exportation of corn. It was written in so lively a style that Voltaire said it was "as diverting as one of our best romances, and as instructive as our best serious works." Many of Galiani's ideas were true and penetrating, but he was too much inclined to show off his cleverness by paradox and cynicism.

In Science there were still some anatomists to carry on the traditions of the great Italian school. Morgagni (1682-1771) studied under Valsalva, became his assistant, and,

many years afterwards, published a valuable edition of his works with additions. His anatomical works early brought him fame; for some time he was Professor at Padua, where his house became the centre of learned society, and was much frequented by distinguished foreigners. His chief work was published when he was already eighty years of age; it was the first treatise on Morbid Anatomy, and was based on a great number of post-mortem examinations, and illustrated with immense anatomical and medical knowledge. He was thus in some respects the founder of modern Pathology. Other beautifully illustrated, complete and elaborate anatomical works were published by the Sieneſe Mascagni (on the lymphatic system), and by two of Morgagni's pupils, Scarpa (on the nervous system), and Caldani (on Pathology). The Modeneſe Spallanzani (1729-99) was an important and picturesque personage. His best work was done in Physiology; he experimentally diſproved the exiſtence of ſpontaneous generation, and was the firſt diſcoverer of the proceſſes of diſtention through ſolvent action of the gaſtric juice. But he wrote numerous works on other branches of Science, and his obſervations made at the mouth of the crater of Stromboli have earned him the title of founder of modern Vulcanology. Spallanzani firſt ſtudied ſcience under his couſin, Laura Baſſi, the famous Profeſſor at Bologna. He held various University poſts, but was able to indulge in his paſſion for travelling and collecting. He explored the ſhores of the Mediterranean, viſited Turkey, the Lipari iſlands and Sicily, all on his ſcientific queſts.

There were a few Italian mathematicians and phyſicists. Friſi (1728-84), a Barnabite Friar, found that his views brought him into trouble with his eccleſiaſtical ſuperiors, but was released from his vows by the Pope and allowed to become a ſecular prieſt. By far the greateſt of contemporary Italian mathematicians was La Grange (1736-1813), who was born and lived for many years at Turin, though his family was of French

extraction. La Grange began to study mathematics for pleasure, and, by the age of twenty-six, his brilliant papers, criticising and improving on the works of Newton and Euler, had made him famous. From Pure Mathematics he went on to Astronomy, and was occupied with perfecting his famous discoveries about lunar and planetary perturbations when (1766), as "the greatest King in Europe" wished to have "the greatest mathematician" at his court, he was offered the post of Director to the Mathematical Department of the Berlin Academy. From this time his connection with Italy ceased.

It was in Electricity that Italy during this period produced the most valuable discoveries. Galvani (1737-98), a Professor at Bologna, found that contact with dissimilar metals produced muscular contraction in the limbs of a frog, and Volta (1745-1827), a Professor at Pavia, made use of this discovery to invent the electric battery. This led to the recognition of a new kind of electricity, called Galvanic or Voltaic. The "Galvanometer" and the electric "Volt" are of course named after them. Volta's work was taken up and carried on by great mathematicians like Sir Humphry Davy, and Volta, modestly recognizing that he was not himself a mathematician, published nothing on Electricity for the last twenty-five years of his life.

In the eighteenth century Italian Music maintained a high level, though it was left behind by the progress of the Germans. The standard both of the making of instruments and of musical performance was rising. Amati was making his violins at Cremona; Stradivarius was his pupil. The keeper of Prince Ferdinando de' Medici's collection of musical instruments, Bartolommeo Cristofori, invented the first pianoforte about 1711. From Vivaldi, a Venetian violinist, Bach learned a great deal. But the eighteenth century was above all the golden age of vocalists, and, though we cannot be sure that the praises of their contemporaries were not exaggerated, yet it is quite certain that Farinelli's voice had a compass of three and a half octaves, that Lucrezia Ajugari could sing an octave

and a half above the treble clef, and that Baldassare Ferri could sing unaccompanied up and down two octaves with a continuous trill. The great singers were vain, troublesome and quarrelsome; they demanded huge salaries, and occasionally refused to sing altogether, though Dukes and Viceroys might threaten them. At Florence, Ferri's carriage was drawn through the streets by his admirers; Cafarelli bought a Dukedom with his gains. He was specially favoured by Louis XIV, but told the King's messenger that "all the ambassadors in the world do not make one Cafarelli." Castrati were still largely employed and much admired. The greatest of these was Farinelli (1705-82), an exponent of the florid, bravura style of singing. After visiting Vienna, London and Paris, he went to Spain, where he remained for twenty-five years. His singing cured Philip V of his melancholy madness, and the singer became indispensable to the King, performing the same airs to him night after night. Farinelli was later a favourite with Ferdinand VI's Queen, and acquired great influence in the court, which, however, he did not abuse.

There were two principal schools of music, at Venice and at Naples, both of which had regular conservatoires and produced numerous performers. The most famous teacher of singing was Porpora (1686-1767), the master of Farinelli and Cafarelli. Haydn was for a long time in his service and learned much from him. Porpora was highly thought of in Italy; but when the enemies of Handel invited him to bring an opera company to England to set up in opposition to the great German, the venture was a failure, even though Farinelli was one of the company.

Another rival of Handel was Buononcini (1672-1750), a composer of operas. All London took sides for one or the other; Handel was the King's favourite, so Buononcini was supported by the Prince of Wales' party. Handel triumphed, and Buononcini left London; but, since as yet Handel had only written his operas, the difference between their merits was not much greater than the verses of Byrom would indicate:

“Some say, compared to Buononcini,
That Mynheer Handel’s but a ninny;
Others aver that he to Handel
Is scarcely fit to hold a candle.
Strange all this difference should be
’Twixt Tweedledum and Tweedledee.”

Much in the same way the Italian Piccini (1718–1800) was invited to Paris to rival Gluck. The Dauphiness patronised Gluck; Piccini was favoured by Madame du Barry’s faction. Gluck had enunciated the revolutionary doctrine that the music should follow the sense of the words; Piccini maintained the traditional idea that the musician should be superior to his *libretto*. For the moment Piccini triumphed.

The general character of Italian Opera had thus been little changed. The drama was subordinated altogether to the vocalists’ display. Each singer must have a fixed number of airs in different styles. The whole action of the play was in “plain recitative,” not, as in France, varied by melody and accompaniment. The airs came in as episodes or reflections. But the eighteenth century saw certain modifications. Jommelli (1714–74) was the first to break through the tyranny of the *Da Capo*. He was Chapel Master to the Duke of Württemberg, and, when he returned to Italy, his music had become so German that two of his operas were hissed off the stage. Jommelli also wrote a good deal of Church music of a learned and serious character.

A new departure in Opera was made by Il Pergolesi (Giovanni Battista Jesi, 1710–36), who, in spite of his very early death, was undoubtedly the greatest Italian composer of the century. In his exquisite little opera, “*La Serva Padrona*,” which was at first performed as an Intermezzo between the acts of a serious opera, he applied music to a simple, domestic subject, and produced a result most sparkling and charming, full of real inspiration, in orchestral effects and in purity of style much in advance of the age. Pergolesi also wrote some fine Church music; had he lived to maturity Italy might have had her Mozart.

The Neapolitan Logroscino (1700-63), following Pergolesi's example, initiated the *Opera bouffe*. This was a kind of lyrical drama in which the characters sang songs in turn or together. Paisiello used this device for serious drama; Mozart adapted it from Paisiello and brought it to perfection. Piccini had regular sung concertos at the end of each act. Paisiello was an immensely prolific and very popular writer, who commanded high prices for his works. He visited, and was honoured by, Catherine II of Russia, Ferdinand VI of Spain and Napoleon. In Russia he wrote "Il Barbiere di Siviglia," which was afterwards eclipsed by Rossini's famous opera on the same *libretto*. Paisiello also improved Opera-writing by increasing the use of instruments, and giving new forms to instrumentation.

In 1769 the fourteen-year-old Mozart visited Italy, and created a great sensation by his performances. The Milanese musical authorities could not believe that a German boy could write an opera or manage the orchestra of the Scala Theatre, but Mozart contrived to do both, and his "Mitridate" was performed there with great success. On a rather later visit to Italy, he produced, besides two operas, a Serenade for the Arch-Duke Ferdinand's marriage. This was the work which called forth Hasse's often quoted remark, "This boy will cause us all to be forgotten."

The best writer of Church music, besides Pergolese and Jommelli, was Marcello (1686-1739), a Venetian. His principal works are settings for fifty psalms in Italian. He also wrote musical criticism; but the best musical theorists were Tartini and Martini. Martini (1706-84), a Bolognese Franciscan, published many old musical works, and wrote a history of ancient music. He opened a school of composition in which many writers were trained, and he urged them to uphold the dignity of Church music, and to keep out the encroaching theatre airs. He discovered the genius of Mozart, and befriended him in Italy. Martini was interested in the mathematical side of music, and Tartini (1692-1770) also

wrote on this and on its mechanical problems. It was he who discovered the resultant tones which are often called by his name.

The form of the Sonata as Corelli left it was taken up and developed by Domenico Scarlatti (1683-1757), son of Alessandro, in his numerous works, which are difficult and complex, and much in advance of his age. Scarlatti employed the two subjects in the tonic and dominant, with a section leading back into the tonic, and a repetition of the second subject in the tonic key. He was a famous performer both on the harpsichord and organ, and, in a competition with Handel, it was decided that, though the German was the better organist, Scarlatti equalled him on the harpsichord.

In Art, the gloom, the braggadocio and the exaggerations of the Baroque period gave way to the delicate amenities of the Rococo style, dainty, mannered, unreal, with all its dancing Arcadians and affected deities. The feminine ideal was now elegance; the artist was never more pleased than in depicting the lady at her toilette. The nude was feeble or gross; it was not simply nudity, it was nakedness. There was nothing spiritual in Art, not even the Madonna, who tried to be like the Pompadour. The Churches were over-loaded with frivolous decoration, the very tombs were monuments of vanity, with their statues of fine gentlefolk in eighteenth century costume, their pretentious allegorical figures and inflated epitaphs. Landscape was an artificial invention; a Doric temple stood beside a rustic bridge, shepherdesses dressed in the height of fashion danced in the foreground about a conventional Pan. The cult of the Chinese was popular; its figures and accessories constantly appear in eighteenth century Art, and its influence, exercised through fashions of porcelain painting, was evident.

The theatre also showed its influence upon Art; good artists were often scene-painters, and the characters from the Masquerade, Pulcinello and the rest, appear in their easel-pictures.

Art was really at its best in decorative work, where the

artificiality and conventions of the Rococo were not out of place. Immense care and talent were lavished upon wood-carving, intarsia, porcelain and ceramica. The glass of Venice was still famous, as were the tapestries of Florence and Turin. Clocks, fans, snuff-boxes, musical instruments were all exquisite of their kind. Rosalba Carriera, one of the most popular portrait-painters, who painted Louis XIV, Metastasio, the Cardinal of York, Watteau, and many other celebrities, was famous for her fans.

Miniature painting was at its best, and here again Carriera excelled, poetically idealising the actual features of her subject, and endowing them with that soft, delicate prettiness which so exactly suits miniature. When the miniature is enlarged on canvas, and the characteristics of the fan and porcelain painting appear in the more serious forms of Art, we have exactly what is meant by Rococo.

Art did not suffer for want of patronage; Italian artists were warmly greeted at foreign courts, particularly at St Petersburg. Zuccarelli and Bartolozzi were amongst the earliest Royal Academicians. Italian princes and nobles bought their works for their own collections, of which that of Marco Borghese was the most famous. Benedict XIV added a picture gallery to the Capitoline Museum. Italy was invaded by foreign purchasers, German and English, who carried off some of her grandest works to their own lands. The Dukes of Saxony bought for the Dresden Gallery the Sistine Madonna, the collections of the Chigi and of the Dukes of Modena, and the first three statues found in Herculaneum.

The most considerable architectural work of the century was done for Charles III of Naples, whose passion for building has already been noticed (p. 405). The Palace of Capodimonte, the theatre of San Carlo, the largest in the world, and the royal villas at Portici and Caserta were all being executed about the same time, and vast sums were spent on them. It cannot be said that any of them were architectural masterpieces, though

for Caserta was engaged Vanvitelli, the best known architect of the time. Next in importance to the Neapolitan buildings were those of Turin. The city was mainly rebuilt on a formal modern plan, and the elaborately decorated Superga Church was erected (p. 327). Juvana, a fertile, but affected, architect, was principally employed.

The most distinguished of the Italian Rococo painters was Giovan Battista Tiepolo (1696-1770), who rose considerably above his contemporaries in originality and vigour. He had real powers over effects of lighting, a directness of expression, a sense of colour, splendid and dramatic movement which link him to an earlier age of Venetian Art. He might pass for an enfeebled and affected grandson of Paul Veronese. But the seeming energy of his pictures is in fact unreal and forced; his ceilings, for example, are thronged with allegorical figures in confused groups, extremely foreshortened, apparently blown about by violent winds; they give the impression that they will fall out of the ceiling upon the spectator. There is no real physical beauty, the limbs are padded rather than muscular, the flesh soft and pale.

Tiepolo achieved a great quantity of work, and covered with figures many large canvasses as well as ceiling frescos.

Fortunately not all the painters of the age followed the Rococo style. There was a small, but fairly meritorious group of *genre* painters; the best was perhaps Longhi, who painted daily life in Venice with precision. Allied to the *genre* type was the little group of what may be called town painters, of whom the best were Venetians. Canaletto, if rather cold and stiff, had a style of his own in which he has never been rivalled, and painted Venetian buildings and canals with a clear, fine touch, mastery of architectural detail and great power of representing water effects. The Venetian landscapes of Francesco Guardi are sometimes mistaken for those of Canaletto, but there is a real difference between them. Guardi was less serious and exact than Canaletto, his colouring was

brighter, and he was fond of depicting his streets and canals full of gay, spirited crowds of people, carnival scenes and pageants. Both were very prolific, and hardly any English collection is without their work.

About the middle of the century archaeological discoveries turned Art into a new channel. In 1738 Charles III ordered regular excavations at Pompei and Herculaneum, and though much harm was done at first by clumsy methods and ignorant antiquarians, yet enough antiques were discovered and preserved to excite a new interest in ancient Art. The paintings in the baths of Titus at Rome were uncovered, the ruins of Hadrian's villa excavated, and in 1752 the discovery of the ruins of Paestum in a forest revealed Greek architecture to western Europe. Not only did a cult of the antique soon become the fashion, so that Pompeian wallpapers and Paestan peristyles abounded, but the study of archaeology was seriously undertaken, and this not merely in the fashion of the Neapolitan savant who, appointed to examine and describe the discoveries at Herculaneum, shut himself up in his study, and proceeded to indite five enormous volumes on the Labours of Hercules.

The German Winckelmann (1717-68), who worked for many years amongst Italian antiquities, was the founder of historical and scientific archaeology. Winckelmann had the rare gift of combining Latin sympathies with German industry, the analytical and the romantic soul in one. Not contented with mere aesthetic admiration for ancient Art, he determined to understand it. He realized that Art had its historical development, that the different styles depended upon their periods, and these he traced out and scientifically arranged so far as his knowledge permitted. As he had seen little of earlier Art, many of his conclusions have since been proved erroneous; but his theory and system were right, and his work, coming as it did just when archaeological interest had been awakened by discoveries, opened a new period of classical revival, a period of serious archaeological study and of imitation of classical forms of

art. A fresh interest was taken in the collection of antiques ; the new Vatican Gallery, the Museo Pio-Clementino, was filled with them, and an excellent descriptive catalogue was compiled by its director, the learned Visconti, who continued Winckelmann's work on the historical aspects of Art.

Finely illustrated books on Roman remains were published, and the improvement in copper engraving spread the knowledge of ancient monuments all over the world. Not only did the best artists work in this way, but some devoted themselves entirely to engraving. Of these the best known were Piranesi, who published sixteen volumes of views of Rome, and Bartolozzi, who lived in London for forty years, and whose numerous works are therefore plentiful in England. Bartolozzi was inclined to put too much of his own fancy into engravings from the antique, but his reproductions of pictures are beautiful, and occasionally more artistic than the originals.

The classical movement in Art began in Italy with Raphael Mengs (1728-79), who was Winckelmann's intimate friend. He was a man of great mental ability, learned in history and archaeology, and had some conception of the ideals of dignity and repose characteristic of ancient Art. But he was an eclectic also, and believed that Art could be compiled from a selection of the best characteristics of the past, Greek design, the expression of Raphael, the chiaroscuro of Correggio, the colouring of Titian. But he had no real artistic genius of his own, his painting was laborious and mannered. He was perhaps rather a teacher than an artist, and, as he was director of the Vatican school of painting, the cosmopolitan society of artists which flocked to study in Rome imbibed from him, and from the study of the antique which he and Winckelmann advocated, a classical spirit which they carried home and spread about the world. It was the exact contrast of the Rococo, for it was disciplined, reasoned, reflective ; it abhorred the affectations, the foreshortenings, the sham effects of the Rococo, and its ridiculous pseudo-mythology. The classical aspirations

of the early Revolutionaries found sympathy in it ; David was its first complete exponent.

Angelica Kauffmann (1740-1807), who came to Rome from the Grisons, was a disciple of Mengs, but rather as an eclectic than as a classical student. Her manner resembles that of Mengs, but is softer, weaker, and yet more agreeable. Her portraits were immensely popular, especially in England, where she lived for many years, and was one of the first Royal Academicians. Battoni, a Lucchese, was also an eclectic ; he helped to free Art from Rococo mannerisms ; though without originality, he copied the Renaissance painters with such success that his works have sometimes been attributed to Correggio.

The classical movement culminated in Italy with the work of Canova, the earlier part of which belongs to the eighteenth century. Canova (1757-1822), who had already attained fame by his youthful sculptures at Venice, came to Rome in 1780. He had learned to study nature in anatomy, expression and attitude, and he now added a careful study of the antique. In Rome he made the celebrated tombs of Clement XIII and Clement XIV at St Peter's ; but these, in spite of a certain dignity and grandeur of conception, are not amongst his best works. The Christian ideal was not that which suited his talents, which were at their best when the subject was classical. Then he at times attained to something of the stateliness and purity of ancient Art. He reformed Italian sculpture, and brought it back from its eighteenth century affectations and mannerisms, but sometimes fell into the opposite fault, and made his figures lifeless, without expression or individuality.

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