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THE SELEUCID EMPIRE. 358-251 BC. HOUSE OF SELEUCUS

CHAPTER 15.

THE FIRST YEARS OF ANTIOCHUS III (223-216)

WE return from our survey of the East to that point in our narrative when we saw the Seleucid King struck down in Asia Minor whilst engaged in recovering his inheritance from Attalus of Pergamum. By the assassination of Seleucus III the royal army was suddenly deprived of its head in the enemy's country; but a successful retirement across the Taurus was effected by the skill of the general Epigenes.

For a while the succession to the vacant throne appeared doubtful. Antiochus, the younger son of Seleucus II Kallinikos, then a youth of about eighteen, was far away in Babylonia, and some time must expire before he could appear in the West. Meanwhile the direction of affairs had been at once assumed upon the King’s death by his cousin Achaeus. He had acted vigorously against the party responsible for the murder, and had put Meaner and Apaturius to death. He was strong, able and popular, and public feeling ran in favor of his assuming the diadem. But Achaeus remained true to his absent cousin, proclaimed him king, and himself undertook a new campaign in Asia Minor to restore the authority of the Seleucid house.

The popular voice of the Macedonians in Syria now called for the presence of the young King, and Antiochus moved west. The first dispositions of the new reign were the delivery to Achaeus of full powers in the trans-Tauric country and a similar delegation of the royal authority beyond the Tigris to Molon, the satrap of Media, and his brother Alexander, the satrap of Persis. Antiochus III, however, was not yet his own master. The real director of the affairs of the kingdom was the prime minister, Hermias. He had shown himself a minister of the type familiar at despotic courts, greedy of power, intolerant of rivals, and murderous in his rancors. His influence was a menace to all prominent persons in the kingdom. Epigenes, the beloved general, was the especial object of his jealousy. Such a régime naturally brought its nemesis in the disaffection of the King’s high officers. It was generally expected that Achaeus would renounce his allegiance. Molon and Alexander made haste to secure themselves, as they imagined, by rebellion (221). Their neighbors on the east, Arsaces in Parthia, Diodotus in Bactria, showed an example of successful defiance. Molon also now declared himself a king and essayed to turn away from the house of Seleucus the hearts of the Greek colonists and native tribes in Nearer Iran.

The weaknesses in the frame of the Empire, which ultimately proved fatal, were already indicated in this crisis—its relinquishment of Asia Minor and Iran foreshown. But as yet it did not seem past hope that a strong hand might renew the broken bonds. Achaeus might still with skillful management be retained. In the East one element in the situation made powerfully for the house of Seleucus—its popularity with the Greek cities. Encompassed by alien peoples, the Greeks in the East looked to Antioch for the protection of Hellenism. It was the great advantage the house of Seleucus possessed, and again and again in the course of these times barbarian conquerors and rebel captains found it a permanent force to be reckoned with. The line of policy by which the crisis at this moment could be met was plainly marked out—to avoid all further entanglements, to conciliate Achaeus, and to turn the disposition of the eastern Greeks to account. It only required a firm will to carry it through.

Unfortunately the throne was occupied by a youth and swayed by a corrupt minister. At the council held to consider the rebellion in the East, Epigenes advised an immediate advance on the satraps, and urged the passion of loyalty which the appearance of the King in those regions would arouse. Hermias replied with a fury due in part to his hatred of Epigenes, in part to terror of the war. He roundly accused the general of wishing to deliver the King’s person into his enemies’ hands. The Council were frightened by this outbreak into acquiescence, and only a force under Xenon and Theodotus (nicknamed “One-and-a-half”) was sent against Molon. Hermias, however, was still uneasy lest the King might be induced to go to the eastern provinces, and to prevent it he conceived the plan of reopening the controversy with Egypt as to Coele-Syria, which would keep the King’s hands full, and at the same time would not, in view of the character of the reigning Ptolemy, entail much danger. For about this time (winter 222-221) the Egyptian throne, which had been occupied by three great rulers, passed to the contemptible Ptolemy Philopator. It became the interest of Hermias to present before the King’s eyes the danger in the west of the Empire in the liveliest colors. The success which Achaeus had met with in Asia Minor gave him an opportunity. Already the Pergamene power had been broken, and Attalus was being driven within ever narrower limits; already Achaeus was to all intents and purposes master of the trans-Tauric country. It was easy to work upon the King’s fears and make him see a great conspiracy threatening the Empire on all sides—a league which embraced the king of Egypt in the West as well as the revolting satraps in the East. Hermias removed all doubts by producing a letter (which he had forged) from Ptolemy to Achaeus, urging him to assume the diadem.

In the marriage of the young King, which now took place, we may see the Seleucid court actuated by the motive of securing its more than ever precarious hold on Asia Minor. The policy initiated by Antiochus II was still followed. The bride chosen for Antiochus III was Laodice, the daughter of Mithridates I of Pontic Cappadocia. She was, no doubt, his first cousin, her mother being that aunt of his whom Mithridates had espoused. She was escorted from Cappadocia by the admiral Dioguetus, and the nuptials were celebrated at Seleucia on the Euphrates Bridge, where the
court was at the time residing. As soon as the marriage was over, the court moved to Antioch, and preparations for an attack on Egypt were pushed forward.

The position of Molon meanwhile in the East grew increasingly formidable. In his own satrapy of Media he had a defensible country, guarded by mountain and desert, and, as we saw in the case of Pithon, well adapted for the formation of a great military power. He had taken measures to bind the neighboring satraps to his cause. The native princes, outside the sphere of Macedonian authority, of whom the greatest was Artabazanes of Lesser Media (Adharbaijan), were ready to support an antagonist of the Seleucid power. The inherent loyalty of the Greek and Macedonian settlers to the royal house Molon fought by largesses, severity, promises and forged dispatches, tending to show the King in an evil light. The generals sent by the court, Xenon and Theodotus, did not dare to offer battle and sat down behind fortifications. Molon became master of Apolloniatis. Then he even marched on Seleucia. The city being on the western bank of the Tigris, he could not reach it without crossing the river, and this Zeuxis, the satrap of Babylonia, prevented by seizing all the boats. Molon had to be content to take up his winter-quarters (of 221) in Ctesiphon, the military station opposite the city on the other bank, and there wait his opportunity.

These movements of Molon caused a fresh tension at the court. But Hermias still carried his point. Only a general should be sent against a rebel. Kings should go to war with none but kings. Accordingly, late in the summer of 221, whilst the invasion of Coele-Syria was set on foot under the leadership of the King in person, Xenoetas, an Achaean adventurer, led a new force eastwards. He was given supreme authority over the provincial commanders to conduct operations at his discretion.

Xenoetas marched to Seleucia, where he found Zeuxis. The governors of Susiana and the “Red Sea” province, Diogenes and Pythiades, who were still loyal, joined him by command. He pitched beside the river on the western bank over against the rebels. The information brought him by deserters, who swam the river, showed how strong the royal cause still was in the East. The rank and file of Molon’s regular forces, drawn, no doubt, from the Greek or Macedonian colonies, were, they reported, at heart far more attached to the King than to their leader. Xenoetas had only to cross the river and the mass of Molon’s army would come over to his side.

The subsequent events do not allow us to think much of the diligence or watchfulness of either of the opposed commanders. Molon was first so slovenly in his patrolling that Xenoetas was able by night to throw across a body of troops nine miles downstream and take up a strong position among the marshes without opposition. The main camp on the west bank was left in charge of Zeuxis and Pythiades. An attempt of Molon to dislodge Xenoetas failed, owing to his defective topographical information, and his detachments floundered helplessly in the morass. When Xenoetas advanced to give the rebel army an opportunity to desert, Molon abandoned his camp and took the road to Media. The advantage which Xenoetas had won by his enemy's negligence it was now his turn to throw away by his own. Considering all danger over, he occupied Molon’s camp at Ctesiphon, brought over his cavalry for the pursuit, and suffered his troops to give themselves up to riotous indulgence. Then Molon turned swiftly and took the division of Xenoetas by complete surprise. A great part were massacred in drunken slumbers, others, mad with panic, tried to regain the camp of Zeuxis by swimming the Tigris, and in most cases perished. An impressive and fantastic spectacle was offered by the scene on the river, not only men swimming, but horses, pack-beasts, shields, dead bodies, stuff of all kinds, carried on the surface. The panic spread to the opposite shore, Zeuxis and the other division incontinently fled, and Molon crossed the river, without meeting any resistance, to occupy the original camp of the royal army.

The retirement of the satrap of Babylonia left Seleucia exposed. Even Diomedon, the governor of the city, had accompanied his flight. The eastern capital of the Empire fell forthwith into the rebel's hands. Babylonia was Molon’s, and, passing down the river, he took possession of the "Red Sea" province, whose governor, Pythiades, had probably, like Diomedon, fled with Zeuxis. Diogenes, on the other hand, had hurried back to defend his province, and contrived to throw himself into the citadel of Susa, although Molon was already investing it when he arrived. Molon could not afford to stay long in Susiana; leaving therefore a detachment to prosecute the siege, he returned to complete the conquest of the riverlands north of Babylonia, the provinces of Mesopotamia and Parapotamia.

The news of the disaster reached the King at a moment when he was on other grounds disposed to suspend operations against Ptolemy. He had about the same time that Xencetas left for the East moved out from Apamea, the military headquarters of the Empire, to accomplish the invasion of Coele-Syria. The gate of that province towards the north was the narrow and swampy valley, called Marsyas, between the Lebanon and Antilibanus mountains. It was commanded on each side by the fortresses of Gerrha and Brochi, and these were held for Ptolemy by Theodotus the Aetolian. In vain the royal army attempted to break through; the lieutenant of Ptolemy brought the Seleucid King to a foolish stand at the very threshold of that province it was proposed to claim by arms. Under these circumstances the news arrived that the army of Xenoetas had been annihilated.

The quarrel, of course, between Hermias and Epigenes now flamed up afresh. Events were confounding the policy of the prime minister. In spite of his raving denunciations, Epigenes had too strong a case not to carry the Council with him. It was resolved that the King should advance against Molon in person. Hermias had the sense to embrace the inevitable; if, however, he could not hinder the expedition, he was determined his rival should win no laurels in it. But to remove him was doubly difficult, since on the one hand his reputation made the King his friend, and on the other he was an idol of the army. When the forces for the East were mustered at Apamea, an occasion to overcome both these obstacles at one stroke offered. The troublous times under the last kings, combined with the loss of the eastern provinces, had acquainted the Seleucid court with what in later times was to become its standing embarrassment—want of money. The pay of the troops fell into arrear, and they began to use the urgency of the present crisis to press their claims. Hermias now came forward and proposed to the King a bargain with which he had no choice but to close; he undertook to satisfy all the demands of the soldiery on condition that Epigenes did not accompany the expedition. This action represented him at the same time to the army as its champion, and attached it to his interests. Epigenes retired into private life. Only the troops drawn from Cyrrhestice (6000 in number) stood by the fallen hero, and their disaffection was not disposed of till after a pitched battle the following year (220), in which the majority of them perished. Even in his retirement Epigenes was an object of fear to the guilty minister. He compassed his death on the charge of corresponding with Molon, a charge which he supported by causing a forged letter from the rebel to be slipped among Epigenes' papers. The hush of terror prevailed in the entourage of the King.

The royal array crossed the Euphrates at the end of 221, and traversed Mesopotamia by the route which led close under the northern hills to Antioch (Nisibis) in Mygdonia. In this city a halt of six weeks was made during the most severe portion of the winter, and with the first approach of spring (220) the advance was continued to the Tigris. From this point two alternative routes presented themselves. Hermias wished to march directly upon Molon in Babylonia, following the course of the river on the western bank. The satrap of Babylonia, who was now with the King, was able, from his special knowledge of the country, to show the inconveniences of this plan. Amongst other things, the southern part of Mesopotamia was desolate steppe, where only the wandering Arabs spread their tents, and it would be impossible for the army to find fresh supplies. Having passed through this, a march of six days, they would come upon the elaborate canal system by which Babylonia was at once irrigated and defended, and if this were held by the enemy it would effectually bar their way; the only alternative would be retreat through the steppe in the face of the enemy, and probably without provisions.

Zeuxis therefore urged that they should cross to the eastern side. There, as soon as they reached Apolloniatis, the country was under regular cultivation, and they would be in the midst of plenty. The hold which the house of Seleucus had upon the hearts of the settlers, who were intimidated only into supporting Molon, would be turned to account. Above all, by threatening to cut off Molon from his base in Media they would compel him either to offer battle or run the great danger which a delay, in view of the doubtful temper of his troops, would bring. Before the reason and authority of these arguments Hermias was constrained to give way. The army crossed the Tigris in three bands and advanced southwards.

At Dura they reached the northern limit of Melon's conquests in Parapotamia, and found his troops still besieging the town. These they drove off and proceeded for eight days more, when, crossing the ridge of Oricus, they saw at their feet the rich district of Apolloniatis.

Molon was now finding out how precarious his defences were against the magic of the King’s person. He could not trust the populations of the provinces he had lately conquered. He could not trust his own army, not at any rate the Greeks and Macedonians, who constituted the bulk no doubt of his regular troops. He saw himself in danger of having his communications with Media cut. Hastily recrossing the Tigris, he purposed to arrest the progress of the royal army in the rugged defiles of Apolloniatis, and placed his chief reliance on the Kurdish irregulars who served with his army as slingers. In this region, accordingly, the two armies met, and some indecisive skirmishes took place between the scouting parties on either side. But the neighborhood of the King made it enormously harder for the rebel to prevent his army breaking up in his hands. How to use this instrument without losing it became the problem; Molon did not know what wave of feeling might not rush through his troops if the youthful king of the old and glorious house were seen claiming their allegiance. He determined to strike by night, but when, riding out with a picked body, he saw ten young soldiers make away in a body towards the royal camp, his nerve was shaken, and he returned at dawn, a doomed man. The decisive battle was fought on that day.

The royal left, where Hermias and Zeuxis commanded, was driven back by Molon, but on the right Molon’s brother Neolaus found himself opposed to the King, and all that Molon feared took place. As soon as the King was seen, the troops went over. Molon saw that the game was up, and, together with the other ringleaders in the rebellion, committed suicide. Neolaus hastened to the province of Persis, where his brother Alexander was waiting the event with the remainder of the family of Molon, his mother and his children, and made haste to consummate the self-destruction of his house. The body of Molon was crucified in the Callonitis on the road over the Zagrus, the most conspicuous spot in Media. It was understood that in the punishment of rebel leaders the house of Seleucus followed the practice of the old Achaemenian kings.

The rebellion had been shipwrecked on the respect which the royal name commanded in the popular heart throughout the Greek east. It now remained to settle the affairs of the reconquered districts. To the soldiery who had followed Molon the King had first addressed a severe reprimand; they then shook hands in honest Macedonian fashion and made up the quarrel, and the troops were led back to Media by officers specially appointed to reorganize the province. Antiochus himself moved to Seleucia, to hold his court in the eastern capital. And now his individual personality began to emerge in distinction from that of his minister. Hermias was for turning the punishment of those who had taken part in the rebellion into a debauch of cruelty. Upon Seleucia, which had after all only yielded to superior force in joining Molon, the prime minister was forward to gratify his frightful appetite. The “Adeiganes” were banished. Others of the principal citizens were put to death, or mutilated, or racked. A fine of 1000 talents was laid upon the city. The bent of the young King was all the other way. Prudence and generosity together urged him in the direction of mildness, and he was able to some extent to restrain the minister's enormities. The fine was reduced to 150 talents. Diogenes, who had distinguished himself by his defence of Susa, was rewarded by being transferred to the governorship of Media, and was succeeded in Susiana by Apollodorus. Pythiades was superseded in the “Red Sea” province by Tychon, the archigrammateus of the royal army.

Antiochus considered that the moment of prestige should be used to assert the authority of the house of Seleucus in the neighboring country, or the work would be left half done. He designed in the first place to attack Artabazanes of Lesser Media, who was now in extreme old age. Again Hermias took fright at eastern expeditions and played the old card of Coele-Syria. But on news arriving that the Queen had been delivered in Syria of a son, a new prospect of power opened before him in case of the King's decease, and he now advocated the eastern expedition as making that contingency more probable.

The King accordingly left Seleucia, and led the army across the Zagrus into the Urumiya basin, where the Iranian dynasty had reigned, since the time of Alexander, undisturbed. On the novel appearance of a royal army in these regions Artabazanes bowed to the occasion, and accepted the terms which Antiochus imposed.

For a complete reconquest of the eastern provinces the time was not yet ripe. It would be hazardous in the extreme for the Seleucid King to plunge into distant lands while the hearth of the Empire was threatened by Achaeus and Ptolemy. But before the King set out homewards an event of importance took place in his immediate circle. The dark hopes which Hermias was nursing were penetrated by the royal physician, Apollophanes, between whom and Antiochus a real affection existed. To broach his suspicions to the King was, however, still dangerous, since it was not known how far the influence of the minister over the young man's mind extended. Apollophanes nevertheless ran the risk, and pointedly adjured the King to remember his brother’s fate. To his relief, Antiochus confessed that he himself secretly regarded Hermias with aversion and dread, and prayed Apollophanes to make for him a way of escape. There was no lack of persons in that society ready to bear a hand in the destruction of the hated minister. But even with the King’s countenance Apollophanes had to work by stealth. On the pretext that Antiochus was suffering from certain disorders, the physician was able to regulate the admissions to the royal apartments, and the King's chamber became itself the rendezvous of the conspirators. Then it was given out that Antiochus had been ordered to walk abroad at dawn, to take the cool air of morning, and Hermias seized the occasion to come at the King’s person. It was a trap; the only others present at that unusual hour were those who were in the plot. The King chose for his early walk a path which led them to a lonely spot outside the camp, where he made an excuse to retire. Immediately the conspirators dispatched Hermias with their swords. The news of the prime minister's fall was received with a transport of joy throughout the kingdom. Wherever the royal army came on its homeward march, the King was met with expressions of satisfaction. At Apamea in Syria, where the family of Hermias was residing, his wife was stoned to death by the women of the place, and his children by the children.

By the time that Antiochus returned to Syria (end of 220) the danger from the West had declared itself in a sufficiently palpable form. Even the comparatively short expedition to Adharbaijan had emboldened Achaeus to throw off the mask. He designed to recross the Taurus, and counted on the support of Cyrrhestice when he appeared in Syria. Leaving Sardis, the seat of his government in Asia Minor, he took the road to Syria. At Laodicea (in Phrygia) he publicly assumed the diadem and the royal name. But immediately he had to meet the same difficulty which had thwarted Molon, the feeling among the Greco-Macedonian soldiery which forbade them to lift their spears against a Seleucid king. Achaeus was obliged to dissimulate the objective of his march. But as the troops moved ever forward towards the Cilician Gates the suspicion of the truth broke upon them, and in Lycaonia they were on the verge of mutiny. Like Cyrus the Younger in somewhat similar circumstances, Achaeus had to cover his real purpose by pointing against the Pisidians—the untamed mountaineers who were at chronic war with all civilized government in Asia Minor. His foray, which yielded a considerable amount of loot to the troops, had the further advantage of regaining their good-will. But he was forced to abandon the idea of an invasion of Syria at the present moment, and retraced his steps to Lydia.

This was the situation which confronted Antiochus on his return from the East. He saw that Achaeus had committed a blunder in uncovering his hostile designs whilst restrained from carrying them out. Syria need fear no attack from Asia Minor for some time to come. In regard, therefore, to Achaeus, Antiochus confined himself for the present to protests and menaces; he turned to deal with the other party to the league, Ptolemy. Once more Apamea hummed with the preparations for an attack on the Ptolemaic power in Palestine.

Polybius tells us that at the council held to discuss the plan of campaign Apollophanes, the physician, first pointed out that, before embarking on an invasion of Coele-Syria, it was of prime importance to recapture the harbor-city of Seleucia, which since the wars of Seleucus II had been in Egyptian possession. The surprising thing is that the urgency of this step was not immediately plain. One would have thought that a hostile garrison established some 12 miles from Antioch, commanding its communication with the sea, to say nothing of the loss of the strongest city in the kingdom, the place where the founder of the royal line reposed, would have been felt as an intolerable burden. It is almost inexplicable that while this remained, enterprises in other directions should have been contemplated. Apollophanes was himself a citizen of Seleucia, exiled probably under the Ptolemaic régime, and this lent warmth to his arguments. The Council was brought to see the obvious. Whilst Theodotus One-and-a-half was sent to occupy the passes towards Coele-Syria and prepare for the invasion, the King himself moved from Apamea to Seleucia and took up a position in the suburbs of the city. Diognetus, the admiral, was at the same time to operate against the city by sea.

The attempts of Antiochus to buy over the governor Leontius, who controlled the city in the Ptolemaic interest, failed, but he succeeded in corrupting some of his subordinates. It was agreed that if the Seleucid army could gain possession of the outer city which adjoined the harbor, the gates should be opened. On this side alone was it possible to scale the walls. Accordingly, whilst the other generals, Zeuxis and Hermogenes, attacked the gates on the landward side (the Antioch Gate and the Dioscurium Gate), Ardys forced his way into the outer city, supported by Diognetus, who simultaneously brought his squadron to bear on the docks. The officers within the city, who were bought by Antiochus, now prevailed on Leontius to ask for terms. Antiochus agreed to the condition that the free population (6000 in number) should be spared, and the city was surrendered. Those citizens who had been exiled, no doubt the warmer partisans of the house of Seleucus, were restored to their homes and property; otherwise the citizen-body was left undisturbed. A strong garrison was, of course, installed to hold the harbor and citadel. On the side of Egypt no attempt seems to have been made to avert a blow by which their position was so seriously impaired.

Antiochus now received tidings which put a very new complexion upon affairs in the south. It will be remembered that the Ptolemaic governor in Coele-Syria was Theodotus the Aetolian. His singular success in repelling the attack of Antiochus in 221 had, in the altered conditions at the Egyptian court under the miserable government of Ptolemy Philopator, only made him the mark of petty jealousies. He was summoned to Alexandria, and he knew well what that meant. In this strait he turned to the Seleucid King. Antiochus received an intimation that Theodotus was ready to deliver the town of Ptolemais (Old Testament Accho; modern Acre), the official residence of the governor of Coele-Syria, into his hands. Panaetolus, a subordinate of Theodotus, would likewise surrender Tyre. This decided Antiochus to defer dealing with Achaeus still longer and to act in the matter of Egypt at once. He once more threaded the Marsyas valley and sat down before Gerrha and Brochi. But here the intelligence reached him that Egypt was taking measures swiftly to crush Theodotus before he could arrive. Nicolaus, himself too an Aetolian, and a soldier who had seen many wars, had been appointed by the Alexandrian court to secure the province, and Theodotus was now closely besieged in Ptolemais. There was no time to be lost. Antiochus left his heavy troops to continue the siege of Brochi, and, taking with him only the light-armed, set out to reach Ptolemais by the more rugged road which runs down the Phoenician coast. On the news of his approach Nicolaus retired, but ordered his lieutenants, Lagoras, a Cretan, and Dorymenes, an Aetolian, to occupy the pass by Berytus. The King, however, succeeded in dislodging them, and, once master of the pass, could afford to wait in position for the rest of the army. Then he advanced and was soon joined by the partisans of Theodotus. The gates of Tyre and then those of Ptolemais were opened to him according to the undertaking, and with the cities he got possession of their naval arsenals and considerable stores. He was able to make over to Diognetus, the admiral, no less than forty vessels, half of which were decked ships of war, of three banks of oars and upwards.

In the flush of these first successes Antiochus contemplated an immediate invasion of Egypt itself. But the accounts he received of the Egyptian muster at Pelusium to secure the frontier made him defer an enterprise which had baffled the companions of Alexander, Perdiccas and Antigonus. It seemed more prudent for the present to complete the conquest of Coele-Syria, a process which consisted in the reduction of the cities one by one.

It was, however, in reality a false move. Egypt was in a state of utter unpreparedness, and an immediate attack would probably have succeeded. The slow conquest of Coele-Syria gave the Ptolemaic court just that respite which it needed. It used it well, hiring the ablest captains of Greece to reorganize its forces, and pressing forward its preparations with feverish activity, whilst by invariably receiving foreign embassies at Memphis and making a show of laissez-faire it contrived to hoodwink the world completely as to what was on foot. It engaged the good offices of the Greek states, Rhodes, Cyzicus, Byzantium, and the Aetolian League, to mediate in the quarrel, and the diplomatic running to and fro which ensued all served to gain time.

Winter (219-218) found Antiochus still occupied with the siege of Dora, the chief fortified harbor between Carmel and the Philistines. The city, supported from without by Nicolaus, defied his efforts. During the cold season the hardships of the besiegers would be doubled. An aggressive move on the part of Achaeus was again dreaded. Under these circumstances Antiochus agreed to an armistice of four months and hastened back to Seleucia. Garrisons were left in the various strongholds south of the Lebanon, which he had acquired, and the charge of Seleucid interests in that region committed to the old governor Theodotus.

The winter was used by the Egyptian court to continue its preparations, and the drill sergeant was busy at Alexandria. The Seleucid court, on the other hand, reposed upon the contemptuous estimate generally formed of the reigning Ptolemy. As soon as Antiochus had reached Seleucia the troops had been dismissed for months of idleness in their winter-quarters. The time of truce was wasted in futile negotiations. All the old controversy as to the treaties which preceded and succeeded the battle of Ipsus was gone over again. Then no agreement could be arrived at as to Achaeus; the Egyptian court required that the peace should extend to him also, whilst Antiochus stood out that it was monstrous for Ptolemy to interfere between himself and a rebel subject. Warlike operations were accordingly resumed on either side in the spring (218). Antiochus reassembled his forces to complete the subjugation of Coele-Syria, whilst a Ptolemaic army mustered at Gaza under Nicolaus. Ample reinforcements and material of war were sent from Egypt, as well as a fleet under the admiral Perigenes, to co-operate with the land-forces.

It seems curious that on his retirement at the end of the previous year's campaign, Antiochus had not secured the passes between Lebanon and the sea, especially since communication with the numerous garrisons in Palestine could only be maintained by way of the coast. Nicolaus was able to occupy in advance the passage at its narrowest point. At Platanus a precipitous ridge bars almost the whole strip of land, already narrow enough, between the mountain and the sea. This naturally strong position for a defender, Nicolaus strengthened further by artificial works and guarded by a large body of troops. He himself remained in support by the town of Porphyreon. The Ptolemaic fleet was stationed in the neighbourhood under Perigenes, who assisted zealously in the plans of the general.

Antiochus advanced, and on the way renewed the alliance of his house with the Phoenician republic of Aradus. Then he passed Theuprosopon, Botrys, which he took, Berytus, Trieres and Calamus. The two latter towns were fired. From Calamus he sent an advanced party ahead under Nicarchus and Theodotus (the Aetolian or One-and-a-half?) to occupy the passage of the Lycus, and moved himself with the heavy troops more leisurely to the river Damuras (mod. Nahr-ad-Damur), where he awaited the return of Nicarchus. The admiral Diognetus at the same time brought his fleet to anchor beside the army. After their return the King went in person to reconnoiter the position of the enemy at Platanus, and on the following day, leaving the heavy troops behind under Nicarchus, himself led the light-armed to the assault of the ridge. The opposed fleets simultaneously engaged close to shore, so that the land and sea fight presented, Polybius says, a single line. In both, the Ptolemaic forces had at first the better, but Theodotus succeeded in gaining the top of the ridge inland, where it joined the lower slopes of the Lebanon, and then attacked the enemy from above. This turned the day; the force of Nicolaus, evacuating the pass in confusion, fell back upon Sidon. The Egyptian fleet, although still victorious, drew off and accompanied the retirement of the land-forces. Antiochus had succeeded in breaking open the door of Palestine.

The Seleucid army pursued its march along the Phoenician sea-board. From the walls of Sidon the defeated army saw the invaders' tents spread close by. Antiochus did not stop to besiege Sidon—that would have been an immense undertaking—but passed on southwards. It was probably when Ptolemais was reached that he ordered Diognetus, who had hitherto waited on the land-forces, to take the fleet back to Tyre, in order to hold the Ptolemaic fleet, which still kept the harbor of Sidon, in check. The King himself struck up inland to Philoteria on the Sea of Galilee. It was his plan before going farther to establish a belt of Seleucid power across central Palestine. There was direct communication between the coast at Ptolemais and the Greco-Macedonian colonies beyond Jordan. Some of the roads traversed the skirt of the Galilean hills, and were commanded on this side of Jordan by Philoteria and the fortress Atabyrium on the isolated conical hill of Tabor; another road went by way of the rich plain which divides the hills of Galilee from those of southern Palestine, and this was barred on the edge of the Jordan depression by the strong city of Scythopolis (Old Testament, Beth-shan; modern, Baisan).

Philoteria and Scythopolis submitted on conditions to the Seleucid King and received his garrisons. Atabyrium had to be reduced. A successful stratagem delivered the town into Antiochus’ hands. The fall of Tabor following on the surrender of Philoteria and Scythopolis produced a profound impression in the country. The officers in the Egyptian service began to go over, Ceraeas and Hippolochus among the more notable. The latter was a Thessalian condottiere, who brought 400 horse along with him.

Antiochus now crossed the Jordan into a region dominated by a galaxy of Greco-Macedonian cities. Pella, proclaiming its Macedonian origin by its name, Camus and Gephrus received the invader, and the prestige which accrued thereby to the arms of Antiochus attached the Arab tribes of the neighboring country to his cause. Their adherence was a distinct gain, especially in view of the provisioning of the expedition. The partisans of Ptolemy threw themselves into Abila under Nicias, a kinsman of Menneas, but this city too was compelled to open its gates. The most illustrious of all these cities, Gadara, surrendered on the threat of a siege. To complete the work of the campaign it was necessary for Antiochus to strike out about fifty miles to the south. There in the city of Rabbath-Ammon or Philadelphia the defenders of the Egyptian cause had congregated, and were harassing the friendly Arabs by raiding their grounds. So strong was the city that although Antiochus subjected it to a regular siege and battered down the walls in two places, he was unable to take it till one of the prisoners showed the underground conduit which supplied the garrison with water. The reduction of Rabbath-Ammon brought the campaign of 218 to a close. Nicarchus was left with an adequate force beyond Jordan; Ceraeas and Hippolochus were detached to protect the adherents of the house of Seleucus from molestation in the country about Samaria; the King himself returned to winter in Ptolemais.

It would seem that during the winter the Seleucid conquest of Palestine went forward, as the frontier cities of Gaza and Raphia are found to be in the hands of Antiochus at the opening of the campaign of 217. By the spring of that year the Egyptian court considered its preparations complete. It soon became evident that the decisive encounter was at hand. Ptolemy himself took the field, accompanied by his sister-wife, Arsinoe. The Egyptian army halted for its final marshalling in Pelusium, and then advanced across the desert. Antiochus on his part was equally soon on the move. His final dispositions for the march across the desert were made at Gaza. Ptolemy on the fifth evening after leaving Pelusium encamped about five miles short of Raphia, the first town in Palestine. When morning dawned, the Seleucid army was seen in position only a little more than a mile away, with Raphia in its rear. For some days the hosts remained stationary, face to face. Then Antiochus moved still nearer, so that only about five stadia separated the stockades of the two camps. Five more days went by without a movement. It was during these that Ptolemy narrowly escaped assassination at the hand of Theodotus the Aetolian, who stole into the Egyptian camp in the dark, and even broke into the state tent—to discover that Ptolemy slept elsewhere!

The Ptolemaic army began to be pinched by the inconveniences of its position; it had the desert behind it, while Antiochus had cultivated land to draw upon. On the sixth day it deployed in battle formation. A picture is drawn for us in a Jewish writing of the queen Arsinoe proceeding along the Egyptian lines, “with lamentation and tears and her hair loosed”, to fire the troops in her cause; that she addressed them is stated by Polybius, but it was probably rather in the bold spirit of a Macedonian princess.

Antiochus accepted the challenge, and the armies closed. The first phase of the battle was an engagement of the cavalry and light-armed troops on both wings, either phalanx waiting its turn in the centre without movement. The issue of this part of the fight was evenly balanced. On the Seleucid right and Ptolemaic left, where the two kings commanded in person, the lines of Ptolemy were disordered by the recoil of the African elephants from the Indian ones of Antiochus. Taking advantage of this, the household cavalry and light-armed Greek mercenaries of Antiochus broke the Ptolemaic left. In the excitement of victory the young King pressed the pursuit to a dangerous distance from his phalanx. On the other wing the fortunes had been reversed; there the Seleucid horse and the light-armed contingents of Asiatics—Lydians, Arabs and Medes—had been routed by the squadrons of the Thessalian Echecrates and the infantry composed of Greek mercenaries, Thracians and Gauls.

It was now time for the phalanxes to decide the day. Lowering their sarissas, the great masses rolled forward and closed. The fruits of the long preparation of the Egyptian court were now reaped. At the first shock the main part of the Seleucid phalanx broke and fled; only the select corps of 10,000, the flower and choice of all the provinces, endured the tussle for a while, and was then forced to follow the flight of the rest. At the moment when Antiochus on the right was already tasting the joy of victory, more experienced eyes observed that the clouds of dust in the centre of the field were moving towards the Seleucid camp. Antiochus wheeled in desperate haste, but it was too late. The whole army was making in full retreat for Raphia. It was a bitter mortification for the young king. He was persuaded “that as far as his part in the battle went, it had been a victory, but that through the base spirit and cowardice of others the enterprise as a whole had foundered”.

The defeated army took refuge for the following night at Raphia. But Antiochus was anxious to put a greater distance between himself and Ptolemy, and next day continued his retreat to Gaza. It was from this town that he sent the request which, with the Greeks, was the formal acknowledgment of defeat—the request for permission to bury his dead. Then he set his face homewards, abandoning the conquests of two campaigns. Ptolemy for his part was not disposed to press the pursuit, and rested completely satisfied with the restoration of the status quo, the withdrawal of the Seleucid power behind the Lebanon. He simply made a progress through Palestine, where the communities vied with each other in the effusion with which they returned to allegiance. “Perhaps”, the historian comments, “it is the usual way of men to adapt their conduct to the occasion; but in an especial degree the people of those parts are born timeservers”.

Antiochus had other reasons besides the fear of his retreat being harassed to quicken his steps. He did not know what alarming effects the defeat might have on the popular temper. What if Achaeus, to whom the diadem had once been proffered, should now appear in Syria, with all the credit of his successes in Asia Minor, and call upon the populace, Macedonian and native, to desert a prince who was discredited and lamed? Antiochus was concerned, as soon as he reached Antioch, to agree with his southern adversary quickly. He dispatched an embassy, headed by his nephew Antipater. Fortunately, the Ptolemy who now ruled Egypt cared for little except bestiality and belles lettres, and Antiochus found him unexpectedly accommodating. He agreed to a year's truce, and Sosibius, the vizier of Egypt, was sent to the Syrian court to conclude it. The truce seems to have led almost at once to a definite treaty of peace. Seleucia at any rate Antiochus had won back from Egypt. But in Coele-Syria, after all his efforts, he was obliged to see the old state of things restored. All his energies were now devoted to the crushing of Achaeus. The winter of 217-216 he spent in renewing his military organization, and preparing on a grand scale for the advance across the Taurus with the coming of spring.