

GREECE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

*A RECORD OF HELLENIC EMANCIPATION
AND PROGRESS: 1821—1897*

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WITH MAP AND 24 ILLUSTRATIONS



LONDON
T. FISHER UNWIN
PATERNOSTER SQUARE
1897

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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

THE EUROPEAN CRISIS IN 1897

THE story of the kingdom of Greece, and of its relations with the Great Powers of Europe, is one which not only claims repetition by its interest but absolutely demands to be pressed on the attention, and constantly brought up to date. For it is a story of crises, a succession of stages in the gradual solution of a problem; and the problem is so complicated in its character that it would be foolish, if not useless, to enter upon any new stage in its solution without keeping clearly before us the results already ascertained.

There are two points at which it is interesting to study the position and prospects of a nation, and especially of a nation which is in process of development towards a higher ideal of unity and stability. One may observe it in a moment of peace and quietude, visit its towns and villages, obtain such impressions as may be conveyed to the mind after some weeks or months of residence in the country, and bring home a few transient pictures of the life and manners of the people. Or, apart from all opportunities of ocular inspection, one may be attracted by the aspect of a nation in its periods of political storm and stress, and so be drawn into a train of ideas

which are perhaps less picturesque than the records of a traveller, yet certainly not less engrossing to the reader who concerns himself with the making of history.

Greece has reached a new crisis in the closing years of the nineteenth century, at the end of the third generation after her establishment as a kingdom. She is at a turning-point of her history as a nation ; and it would have been in no way surprising if, at the depth of her misfortunes in May, 1897, with the Turk in Thessaly and confusion reigning supreme at Athens, it had appeared to some of her feeble-hearted friends, as well as to her sternest censors, that her ruin was complete and final. And in spite of this, if not entirely by reason of this, the story of New Greece has suddenly become as interesting and important to Europe as it has been at any epoch since the War of Independence.

If there is a single Englishman who is not convinced of the real importance of Greece to Europe—which of necessity implies the duty of Europe to take every opportunity of strengthening the Greek kingdom, and extending its borders amongst the surrounding Greek population—he would do well to sit down before a map of Europe, to blot out the name of Greece, and to substitute for it “ Turkey,” or “ Slavonia,” or one of the letters of the “ Russian Empire.” If he is not prepared for such a transformation, and wishes the name of Greece to remain, he ought to be ready for the natural corollary, which is to give the Greeks power and authority to hold their country against all comers, and to strengthen them, as occasion serves, by the addition of territory which is indisputably Greek.

With such as profess themselves indifferent to the maintenance of Greece as an independent State, whether because they have no sympathy with the people on the ground of their name and ancestry, or because they attach no importance to the principle of nationality, or because they do not see the value of a bulwark against the encroachments of Slavonians or Russians, or for all these reasons combined, it would be useless to argue. They have their own opinions, and would probably adhere to them even if the *Ægean* were to become a Russian or a Turkish sea. But the vast majority of Englishmen would be shocked by any such relapse of civilisation as is here implied, or by any permanent retrogression of the kingdom of Greece from the position which she has held under the sovereignty of King George. And in their case it is by no means superfluous to urge that if Greece is not made stronger by the good offices of the European Powers she must inevitably become weaker, and lose all hope of fulfilling the mission which Europe has intrusted to her.

This conclusion follows so clearly from the facts and circumstances of the case that it has been drawn over and over again during the past seventy years, not merely by Greeks and the open champions of Greece, but also by the coldest and most impartial observers, and by the Governments of the European States. More than that; it has been carried into effect, intermittently no doubt, but with remarkable energy, on several distinct occasions. When the Powers exacted from Turkey the complete independence of Greece, and substituted for her provisional Government a Bavarian king, council, and army, they did not, perhaps, take the very wisest

course in the interests of Greece, but at all events they established her as a free kingdom under the protection of Europe, and with a strong claim to future extension. On the expulsion of Otho the Powers more than renewed their pledges, or at any rate their good offices of such a nature and in such a form as to possess the essential virtue of pledges ; and on this occasion, by the equity and goodwill of Britain, Greece received a large accession of territory in the cession of the Ionian Islands, after more than half a century of British occupation. Again in 1881, as a sequel to the Congress of Berlin, and by the operation of a menace from the friendly Powers, most of Thessaly and a small part of Epirus were added to the narrow confines of the kingdom. The records of the Congress, and the various diplomatic incidents of the three following years, show beyond dispute that the policy of Europe, and of the three Western Powers in particular, had at least as much effect in bringing about the cession of Thessaly as any mere claim of Greece on her own behalf. There is a constantly recurring phrase in all the discussions of the time, put forward especially by the representatives of Great Britain, that Greece should receive equal and parallel treatment with that accorded to any other nationality.

For Panslavonianism had been set up in sharp rivalry with Panhellenism. In 1878 the new claim prevailed over the old one. The Slav, powerfully backed by Russia, had all but ousted the Greek from Macedonia ; and though the other Powers at Berlin unmade the Treaty of San Stefano, in the supposed interest of Europe against Russia, they did not as definitely insist on the enlargement of Greece,

in the interest of Hellenism as against Slavonianism. The persistence of the Western peoples of Europe, aided by a timely change of Government in Great Britain, and by the fact that a rectification of frontier was due to Montenegro as well as to Greece, obtained from Turkey at any rate the greater part of the forfeit virtually imposed upon her at Berlin.

Twenty years have passed since Russia went to war with Turkey on behalf of the Slav populations between the Danube and the Balkans. For some time previously she had espoused the Panslavonian cause, and it is impossible to separate the Russian Government from the earlier movements of the Panslavonian Committee, or from the disturbances in Servia, Bulgaria and Montenegro which gave rise to the Russo-Turkish war. It is only now, at the end of the century, that we can appreciate the full effect of the crusade which was preached in the last generation by M. Katkoff at Moscow. It has gone far to change the whole current of events in South-eastern Europe ; for whereas the Russia of Alexander I. and Nicholas I. had directly patronised Greece, and had certainly treated the Slavs and the Greeks with equal favour as enemies and partial heirs of Turkey, the second and third Alexander and the second Nicholas have practically committed themselves to the cause of the Slavs, adopted them as the clients of Russia, and put aside the older claims of the Greeks as incompatible and embarrassing. The change of policy was sufficiently manifest in 1878 ; in 1897 it has become glaring and palpable. And if this change or modification of policy on the part of Russia is patent to and admitted by everybody, let us see what change or modification, if any, is to be

discerned in the policy of the rest of Europe towards Greece.

Change or modification on the part of Greece there is none. Her policy is the one constant term in the problem, however much the rest may vary. It is the policy of her natural and necessary feelings as a restored Hellenic nation, the mother State of millions of scattered Hellenes. She is set by Europe as a tower of refuge on the border of the Turk-lands, essentially because she, first amongst European victims of the Turk, demanded and dared to be free. She is established by Europe as a nation and nucleus of Hellenism, guaranteed to exist, encouraged to grow, inspired by pledge and promise to hold up the standard of complete national reunion. And her policy—displayed by her own methods and in her own temperament—is to be worthy of her mandate and mission.

In what respect, then, and to what extent have the Great Powers changed their attitude towards Greece, and towards the general position of affairs in South-eastern Europe? The events of 1896-7 enable us to answer this question with some approach to confidence.

1. The massacres in Armenia are admitted on every hand to have been the most outrageous exhibition of Turkish barbarism since the Turk established his dominion in Asia Minor. Europe did nothing to prevent or to avenge them, and Russia, who is the neighbour of the Turk in Asia, and consequently the most responsible of all the Powers (outside of the stricter limits of humanity, wherein the responsibility of all is equal) distinctly refused, in common with Austria, to menace the Turk with

coercion. The complicity of the Sultan and his ministers, and of Turkish officers and officials, was clearly proved. All that was ever held to justify the controlling authority of Europe over Turkey existed here in its very worst form, and not one hand was lifted to arrest or avenge one of the blackest crimes recorded in history.

2. Voices were raised against this crime, but they were absolutely futile; and the six Governments knew that they were futile without a threat of force to sustain them. The Powers resorted to the old farce of asking Turkey to reform herself, which we know to be impossible, and which Turkey has never yet accomplished of her own free will, or on the demand of her own people, or from any other motive than fear of force or greed of gain. And whilst the Powers were thus idly parleying with the Porte, the fiat of the Sultan went forth again, and thousands of Christians were massacred in Constantinople, under the very eyes of the Ambassadors.

3. Crete, in the meanwhile, exasperated by the violation of the Pact of Halepa (agreed to by Turkey as part of the general settlement in 1878), and held down by strict martial rule since the rising of 1889, was in a state of continual ferment. There was a massacre of Christians at Canea in 1896; every local representative of the Powers sent home warnings of further massacre, and testified to the moderation of the Greek Government in face of a strong popular excitement in Greece. No attention was paid to these warnings; and in February, 1897, when the slowly incubated scheme of general reforms was on the point of being presented

to the Sultan for his acceptance, another and a worse massacre at Canea, ordered from Constantinople in full assurance that it would be followed by an acute crisis in Greece, checkmated the Powers at the moment when the game appeared to be in their hands.

4. Though it has been brought as a reproach against the Government of King George that the dispatch of a Greek army to Crete was dictated by a spirit of aggression, and a desire to fish in troubled waters without regard to the wishes or convenience of the Powers, it is, on the contrary, indisputable that all the six Governments were perfectly well aware of the extreme tension of popular opinion in Greece, of the extreme difficulty of the situation at Athens, which for nine months had harboured the surviving victims of the previous massacre, and of the practical certainty that the next outrage in Crete would be followed by a Greek invasion. The event was precisely what they had expected; and, whoever may have accused or suspected the Greeks of a mere attempt at self-aggrandisement, the Governments themselves could not have done so. It would be nothing less than ridiculous to doubt that the Powers recognised in the massacre of February—which they could have prevented if they had known their own minds—a clever move in the game of the wily barbarian, a countermove to the scheme of reforms, a stroke of Moslem genius by which the Caliph of Roum snatched his victory in the very hour of his defeat. It was too much to expect that the Chancellors and Foreign Ministers, the Premiers and Ambassadors, should admit that they had been completely outplayed by the inmate of the Yildiz Kiosk. It suited them better, whilst

the crisis lasted and inconvenient questions had to be answered in Parliament, to lay all the blame on the contumelious Greek, and to pretend that whilst the puny State was protecting its race-fellows from massacre, in a single island of the Turkish Empire, the six great Powers of Christendom could not continue to vindicate humanity upon its arch-enemy and disturber.

5. Then followed in quick succession the practical conquest of Crete by the insurgents and Greek regulars, the protest of Turkey, the strengthening of the naval forces of the Powers, the pledge of autonomy for Crete, the co-operation of Christian Powers with the Turks, the shelling of the insurgents, the blockade of the island, the gathering of the Greek and Turkish armies on the frontiers of Thessaly and Epirus, the warning of the Powers that in case of war the actual aggressor should not be permitted "to reap the slightest advantage from his aggression," the crossing of the frontier by the Hetairists, the declaration of Turkey that she would not regard this inroad as a *casus belli*, the advance of Edhem Pasha into Thessaly without any actual aggression by the regular army of Greece, the victory of the Turks, the intervention of the Powers, and the long-drawn negotiations at Constantinople.

Throughout this series of critical and culminating facts, affording from day to day an extraordinary and amazing course of instruction in the foreign politics of the six great Powers of Europe, one thing stood out above all the rest with never-failing and tyrannous prominence, like an overwhelming shadow before the eyes of every man who had thought that light was breaking in the eastern skies,

and that the sun of liberty was about to shine on the Ægean coasts. It was the so-called Concert of Europe.

No word could be more auspicious for the preservation of peace, and for the safeguarding of the interests of humanity in Christian Europe. The three Liberal nations of the West do not always find their interests in external questions identical, and it is rarely that these three nations and the three imperial Powers of the East are able to act in concert for any length of time. The fact that all the six Powers remained in association for many months, so far as their attitude towards Turkey was concerned, from a period anterior to the formation of Lord Salisbury's last Cabinet down to the present time, is one of very great significance, and should have been one of the happiest augury. At any rate, it prompts us to make a close scrutiny as to the principles on which so firm a fellowship is based, and as to the objects which it is calculated to attain. The complete concert and harmony of Europe ought to be a blessing to mankind, and its full-grown and ripened fruit should be an honourable peace, the application of combined strength to the promotion of just causes and to the advancement of liberty, and before all, as indispensable conditions of peace and liberty, the control and constraint of any nation which maliciously disturbs the public peace, or acts as an oppressor of liberty.

Of such a character was the Concert of Europe which was led by Great Britain in the year 1880, for the purpose of achieving the unfinished work of the Congress of Berlin. The claims of Montenegro and Greece, sanctioned by the Powers and tacitly

conceded by Turkey in 1878, were still unsatisfied, and Great Britain invited her allies to a Conference for the purpose of bringing the pressure of the Concert to bear upon the Porte. This action was eventually successful; and it is therefore pertinent to recall one of the preliminary agreements of the Powers amongst themselves on entering into concert:—

The Governments of the six countries, “in order to prove the entire disinterestedness with which they pursue the execution of all the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin, undertake not to seek, in any arrangements which may be come to in consequence of their concerted action for the execution of the said Treaty in regard to the Montenegrin question, and eventually the Greek question, any augmentation of territory, any exclusive influence, or any commercial advantage for their subjects which those of every other nation may not equally claim.”

How does the so-called Concert of 1897 compare with the Concert of 1880? And in what respects are the policies and motives of the several Powers in harmony or in opposition with their policies and motives seventeen years ago? It is all the more necessary to ask this question because a charge of inconsistency has been freely brought against those who had nothing but praise for the earlier Concert, and who condemned, or regarded with suspicion, the later confederation of the same six Powers.

NO TRUE CONCERT.

The self-denying clause which is quoted above is the natural and regular preliminary to concerted action. Even without formal enunciation, the same principle would be binding in honour upon any Powers or individuals who entered into a combina-

tion for common purposes. Separate aims for selfish objects are incompatible with a common aim for a common object: the two things are mutually exclusive. Therefore, the first reasonable ground for questioning the justice of the Concert of 1897 would be the existence of separate and selfish aims on the part of any one of the Powers. Now it is a fact universally admitted, illustrated a hundred times over, and openly affirmed by responsible statesmen, so that no one would think of demanding a reference to chapter and verse when it is repeated, that the real cause which prevented any effectual restraint of Turkey during the Armenian and Cretan massacres was the mutual suspicions of the Powers. Neither Russia nor Great Britain, nor any other Power which would have undertaken to vindicate humanity against the Turk, was able to come to the rescue of the butchered races, because the motives of each were suspected by all the rest.

It was precisely upon this basis of suspicion that the last compact of Europe was established; and manifestly the word concert is not strictly applicable to the understanding which grew out of this mutual jealousy and mistrust. The understanding was that no Power should take a single independent step or measure in regard to Turkey, on pain of incurring the hostility of the other five. In 1880 there was an agreement to do a particular thing. In 1897, and for some time previously, the main anxiety was that no one should do anything. The result in 1880 was to coerce Turkey in the interest of Montenegro and Greece. The result in 1897 was to secure Turkey against coercion, at a cost of wholesale outrage and assassination in Armenia and Crete.

In place of concerted action we had the somewhat novel spectacle of concerted inaction. And when the Cretans, on their own account and by their next friends the Greeks, with all the right (amongst other rights) that nature gives to such as are attacked and injured, presented a bold front to their enemy, the concerted inaction of the Powers was developed little by little into concerted war against the Christian in the interest of the Turk, and against the victim on behalf of the oppressor.

The story will be told more in detail in a future chapter. One of my objects in these introductory pages is to consider in what sense and how far the combination of the Powers in 1896-7 presented the true features of a Concert. I believe the following propositions to be an accurate statement of facts.

(a) Whereas the essence of a true Concert of Europe is the combining of all the Powers for a beneficent object, the effect of this particular combination has been to leave some of the worst massacres known to history unpunished and unchecked, to strengthen the most detestable tyranny in the world, to coerce the victims of Turkey by bombardments from the European fleets, and to bring ruin to a free, progressive, and civilising State of our own creation.

(b) The combined Powers declared that their object was to maintain peace amongst themselves. Thus they were themselves the menacers of the public peace; they combined against and even coerced themselves. That was no true Concert, but at best a form of self-denying ordinance. So far as the ordinance could be regarded as an instrument of a Concert to restrain Turkey from massacre,

and Crete and Greece from war, it lamentably failed. So far as it was an instrument for any other purpose than peace (as for the eventual partition of Turkey in Europe) that purpose was at the best selfish.

(c) It is essential to a Concert that the combining Powers shall renounce any separate aims incompatible with the common object, any exclusive influence, or any commercial advantage beyond that which may be enjoyed in common. Yet it is notorious that several of the six Powers did exert an exclusive influence with the Porte, and pursued separate aims outside the common interest. If the name of Concert could be given to a conventional abstinence from a just coercion of Turkey, solely because the Powers could not trust each other to administer justice without plundering and fighting all round, then even this Concert was vitiated by separate aims and activities on the part of more than one of the combining Powers.

Thus, in plain terms, the European Powers were in Concert not essentially for the maintenance of peace, but essentially on behalf of their conflicting designs in Turkey, and for peace as a mode of economy in the pursuit of these designs. So far as mutual peace was actually their object, the object was humane and excellent; for nothing could be more in accord with the best interests of humanity than that Europe should strive and wait for a peaceful opportunity of planting their several flags of civilisation upon the realm of European barbarism. But when we find that the observance of their policy implied virtual acquiescence in the Armenian massacres, practical

impotence in view of the massacres in Constantinople, half-hearted action as a result of the massacres in Canea, the limitation of Cretan liberty when circumstances were most favourable to the entire emancipation of the island, the forcible repression of Greece when she came to the aid of her race-fellows in direct pursuit of her European mandate, and an anti-Hellenic course of action which involved the Turkish invasion of Thessaly, with a studious deference to the bloodthirsty Sultan, which has rehabilitated him on the morrow of his almost incredible outrages on two Christian nations, we have the strongest possible reasons for impugning the judgment, not to say the motives of the Powers, and for maintaining that they have paid for a supposed advantage a price utterly out of proportion to the value of what they obtained.

So soon as we admit that peace was not the sole object of the Powers, and that there were ulterior and conflicting objects which had threatened their peace, and suggested a combination as a temporary device, it is inevitable that we should regard these less open and disinterested motives as of the very essence of the question. The citizens of a civilised State, for the sake of public order and security, will submit to be policed and restricted and regulated, even at the cost of much comfort and freedom of action. The proudest and most intelligent nations, knowing the inestimable blessing of peace, will leave the control of their national interests to Governments and individuals who are liable to err with the rest of their kind, and will even endure, if need be, the yoke of a dictatorship or a tyranny. But, in proportion as

men are civilised and intelligent, they will require that their police shall be not merely arbitrary, but reasonable and discriminating, and that their dictators shall be the creation of an absolute need, and actuated by sincerity and equity.

Now the combination of the six Governments in 1897 was a dictation of the most stringent and oppressive character, and the demand which it made upon the nations of Europe was immense ; but there is considerable doubt as to the absolute need for its existence, whilst its equity was certainly not beyond question. If it guaranteed the peace of Europe, its guarantee was only against the menace of the combining Powers, whose threatened wars would have been rooted and grounded in iniquity. Russia, we were told, could not rescue the Armenians because Great Britain in 1878 had undertaken (as the price of Cyprus) to exclude Russia from Asia Minor ; or, if that were waived, because the movement of a Russian army would have excited jealousy and alarm ; or because she had been overborne in 1878, and would not run the same risk again. Great Britain could not send her fleet to Constantinople, because Russia would have seen in this course of action a blow at her prestige or a raid on her own preserves. The Powers which had created and encouraged the Greek kingdom could not allow the Cretans to be annexed to Greece, because one or more of them aimed at appropriating Crete ; and they could not support Greece against Turkey because Macedonia would have taken the opportunity to rise, and the principles on which Macedonia is to be divided had not yet been formulated. And so forth.

There is more or less of truth in these arguments ;

but it is manifest that some of them are the arguments of a cynical selfishness, whilst others merely allege the possibility of war, which was by no means a certain result of the coercion of Turkey. It was the coercion of Turkey which was the main duty of the Powers throughout; it was she who had defied and tricked them, outraged humanity, butchered myriads of Christians, forced on the insurrection of Crete, and justified the intervention of Greece. At any point of the long-continued series of grievous injuries inflicted upon civilisation by the Sultan and the Porte, from the massacres of Sassoun downwards, the Powers were bound by every kind of solemn obligation to coerce the common enemy. That was their duty to the civilisation which they represent; it was the duty of each of the six Governments to its own people; and, above all, it was the duty of Europe to the populations harried by the Turk. Arraigned before the court of the united Powers, the Sultan would not have found a word to say in arrest of judgment; he would have submitted at once. With the Powers perfectly united, there would have been no war though Armenia and Crete had been absolutely severed from Turkish dominion. That would have been a true and honoured Concert, worthy to lead the world and to hold its respect.

“But,” the Powers said, “we cannot do that, because we should fight amongst ourselves. We have our own policies for dealing with the corrupt empire of Turkey, and restoring it to civilisation by a process of gradual appropriation and assimilation. The destiny of Russia is to approach Constantinople from the south, the east, and the north, and to make it the capital of Panslavonia. The destiny of Austria

is to extend her sway from Bosnia to Macedonia, and to broach the sea at Thessalonika, whilst in that case the Kaiser would be welcome to round off his empire with the German-speaking provinces of Austria. Great Britain has always recognised the immense value of Crete as a naval station, whilst eventually she might accept the confirmation of her position in Egypt as a set-off against the designs of Russia and Austria. France has certain pleasant associations with Syria, and may in good time be invited by the Powers to return thither. But all these grand ideas need time to grow. The world is scarcely ready to adopt them; and, though the Chancellors and Foreign Ministers might arrange the business over a cup of coffee and a cigar, they are firmly determined not to risk so fair an edifice by doing anything which might contribute to the premature collapse of Turkey, or which might bring two or more of themselves into conflict in South-eastern Europe. Such being our interests and our several ambitions, we have ranged ourselves under the sacred wings of Peace, and renewed the Holy Alliance for the regulation of the smaller States. Whilst our milk is forming its cream, we can allow no dancing in the dairy."

Apart from all consideration of details, this is a sufficiently accurate representation of the attitude of the Powers in 1896-7. Their treatment of the questions of Armenia, Crete, and Greece was precisely what one might have expected from such a combination. The bombardment and blockade of Crete were no more (and perhaps no less) barbarous than the dragooning of Italy and Spain by the Holy Alliance. In the inception of the idea by Russia, in the adhesion of the Central Powers of Europe, in the

zealous conformity of France, in the triumph of despotism and the despair of struggling nations, there is a fairly close parallel between the circumstances of 1822 and those of 1897. It is not too late to draw the parallel still more close by the withdrawal of Great Britain from a combination in which she has no fit and natural place, and in respect of which she has but made from the beginning

“a barren quest
Of honour where no honour can be gained.”

For what honour has been gained? “Peace” is the prompt reply, the only and oft-repeated cry. In Armenia? No doubt the peace of death after outrage broods over the bones of a hundred thousand human beings. In Constantinople? Let the Ambassadors answer who saw with their eyes the bludgeoning of unarmed and unoffending citizens, and knew it for the Sultan’s work. In Crete? If the Powers had held the Sultan to his word, or if they had intervened on the first or the second massacre at Canea, or if they had allowed the annexation to Greece, which the history of the island proves to be absolutely just and necessary, then indeed they might have claimed to be acting, though late in the day, on behalf of a peaceful settlement. And in Greece? Surely there was every motive of interest and humanity in preventing the war between Turkey and Greece. There were a dozen ways of arresting it; but the one most certain way of bringing it on was the way of the angry schoolmaster, who will not listen to reason, but demands instant, humiliating, abject submission.

In none of these cases was Europe able or willing

to secure peace ; but the Powers took credit to themselves for not fighting each other. We may admit the credit as far as it goes. It is a negative sort of virtue ; and it does not preclude us from thinking that united coercion of Turkey would have left the Powers equally at peace amongst themselves, if they had entered upon the performance of their manifest duty with a single mind and without *arrière-pensée*. It is either this—benevolent Powers who failed to be beneficent—or else it is a case of self-seeking Powers, pursuing tortuous paths to a selfish end, and wrecking the peace of two races in order to postpone their own war of aggrandisement.

BRITISH INTERESTS.

As to Great Britain herself : what has been her position in this Junta of the European Powers ? Every nation has her own responsibilities and interests, her own past and future, her own peculiar relations to every international question which may arise. Has Great Britain occupied within the past few years, in regard to the Powers of Europe and in relation to Greece, the position so clearly marked out by her generally consistent policy in the past, and by her evident and admitted interests in the future ?

In the past she has kept herself more or less free and independent of foreign Powers, never blindly adhering to the policy of other Governments, justly suspicious of Bunds and Alliances by which at any moment she might have to subordinate her judgment and sacrifice her convictions and interests to those of the great military Powers. There is in this policy a spice of selfishness which commends it to such as think that a great progressive nation should always

regard her own interests as the highest political consideration; but there is also a motive which cannot in any fair sense be described as selfishness—the desire to keep a free hand in the pursuit of an honest commercial and civilising mission, and to be able at all times to do what is right or necessary in her own eyes (which is the best that any of us can do) without restraint or veto from any despotic or rival combination. That is a proud position for a nation to occupy; and that is a policy which has made us what we are to-day, which has enabled us to civilise and organise immense nations, to sympathise with and befriend many a small constitutional State. It has not prevented us from entering into alliance for particular purposes with nations of our own kind and order—with France to wit, our sister and yoke-fellow in the harness of civilising influence, one with us in strongest sympathies and aspirations, and never so near to close co-operation as after a transitory pique or misconception.

As inheritors of this policy of independence and aloofness, how have we borne ourselves towards the Junta of 1897? We have been hand and glove with it, not by a merely passive association, but adding substance and strength to the five members of the continental league, and acting, wherever it acted, with greatest promptitude and efficiency. The strongest and most vigorous man in any combination leads, whether he wishes it or not—leads, at any rate, in strength and vigour, if not in direction and secret intrigue. We were, perhaps, reluctant to enter the compact; we were certainly anxious to curb the Sultan and befriend his victims. Yet when we proposed to rescue the Armenians by a display of force, our

proposals were categorically set aside by Austria, Germany, and Russia; and when the Powers resolved to prevent the complete liberation of Crete by the Greeks, it was we who fired at the insurgents the heaviest and most deadly shells. . Our might, if not our will, made us the chief instrument of the designs of our allies. The Eastern Empires were acting in the natural sequence of their policy: we, having departed from our policy of independence, found ourselves within a brief period ministering arms to despotism, and bombarding a Christian race for the crime of daring to strike its own blow for freedom.

That this race was a race of Greeks, one in blood with the Greeks of the kingdom which we had set up, endowed, enlarged by our own free gift and by the coercion of Turkey, makes our late treatment of Crete and Greece neither more nor less flagitious, but far more unwise, unfortunate, and improvident. We have assisted at the undoing of our own work. Every reason which induced us to liberate Greece, to strengthen her as a new factor in South-eastern Europe, to encourage her growth and extend her influence, was a forcible argument against active participation with the Powers in coercing her. When she sent an army to Crete, she was simply following in the lines that we had traced for her, and obeying the dictates of a feeling which is imperative on every freeman. All that was necessary for our own Government, in order to observe the traditional policy of Englishmen, to maintain our rights and defend our handiwork, was to say that we would under no circumstances bombard or blockade the scene of a recent Turkish massacre. For the law of


the Junta was that no action could be taken by it if one of the six Powers objected; and indeed we did object to more than one proposal injurious to Greece, as the Eastern Powers objected to more than one of our proposals to bring pressure to bear on Turkey. That is distinctly to the credit of Lord Salisbury's Government; but unfortunately the stand was made on details, and not on the most serious new departures. It availed little to refuse the blockade of Greece, which would have prevented the war in Thessaly, when we had already blockaded Crete and bombarded its wretched inhabitants.

The nature and effect of our attitude towards the Greeks may be conveyed to the mind of one who has not independently appreciated them if we draw an imaginary but not unreasonable parallel. Let us suppose for a moment the case of Montenegro, with a spur of the Black Mountain subject to Turkish rule, and the people on its slopes repeatedly harassed and massacred, and appealing to their fellow-countrymen at Cettigne. Imagine an insurrection, a force of Montenegrins coming to the aid of the rebels, an immediate remonstrance from the Powers, a Christian force advancing through the Turkish ranks, training its guns upon the rebels, and shelling them for presuming to help in a work which the Powers had undertaken; and then, to make the parallel complete, imagine Russia, the old friend and protector of Montenegro, making herself a prominent and officious executioner of the will of a Junta controlled by Great Britain, which was known to entertain the design of advancing the Greeks at the cost of the Slavs, and curtailing the influence of Russia wherever possible. What should we think of Russia under such circum-

stances? What would the Montenegrins think of her? And what would the people of Russia think of their own Government?

The idiosyncrasies of nations cause them to act very differently under almost identical conditions; and the inconsistencies of national character, aggravated by the mutual reactions of confirmed partisanship, cause the same nation to adopt the most strongly contrasted policies in different generations. It is scarcely comprehensible that a country which has done so much and given so much to build up the Greek kingdom should have been one of the foremost to wreck it in 1897, or that the people and the party which haughtily withdrew from the Holy Alliance should be so ready to execute the will of Russia, who backs Slavs against Greeks, whose eyes are fixed on Constantinople and the Levant, and who has old scores to wipe off; the will of Germany, who is undoubtedly our keen and not too chivalrous commercial rival in the East; the will of Austria, who has territorial ambitions in direct rivalry with the claims of Greece; and of France, whose persistent antagonism in Egypt and elsewhere has been so recently and unmistakably declared.

It is urged in defence of this coercion of Greece that it could not be permitted to a small State, on her own initiative, to attempt the solution of a problem on which the Great Powers were already engaged, and to substitute her methods for theirs. Nothing at first sight could appear more reasonable than this dictum; but its force is modified by the facts of the case in almost every particular. The real Cretan problem, apart from any ulterior designs of the Powers, was simply and solely the liberation of



[To face p. 24.]

REMAINS OF THE PARTHENON.

Crete from the Turkish yoke. The solution of the problem, the only solution historically right and practically efficacious, was the union of Crete to its mother-country. The Powers had been engaged, it is true, on some problem not very clearly defined, but they were pursuing the same delusive and compromising methods which had failed so many times before, at Constantinople, in Armenia, and in Crete. Greece, again, was acting not so much on her own initiative as on the compulsion of facts which were of the gravest possible moment to her. No doubt her action in invading Crete, and in holding her ground in Thessaly until the Turk crossed the frontier, was in one sense mad and reckless. Yet the really significant question is not as to madness and recklessness, but as to uncontrollable impulse, and as to the motive-power of that impulse. It is very little to the purpose to say that Greece was not prepared for a war against Turkey, or that the King, or the Government, or the people, or foreign encouragement, was responsible for the war and its disasters. It is far more to the purpose to say that the *idea* of defending Greeks and defying Turkey was the creative idea of the Greek State—that if Greece is not to act on that idea she had better cease to exist—and that if the Powers effect her ruin after effecting her regeneration, then she and they must abide the consequences, and the appeal must lie from them to their history.

If we admit that the Powers could not, and could not be expected to, make way for Greece, recognising her success of a day after their own failure for years, it must also be admitted, on the other hand, that the intervention of Greece on behalf of the Cretans was,

from her own point of view, absolutely just and laudable. If in the political sphere the action of the Powers was defensible and legitimate, in the moral sphere the championship of Greece was a heroic impulse, the noble instinct of an emancipated people hastening to the rescue of their enslaved brethren, a strong human deed in an age of cynical indifference to humanity. The looker-on who is bound by convention, anxious above all to be correct according to the rules of the political game, setting the interests of a nominal Concert and a nominal peace before every other consideration, may not hesitate for a moment in declaring that the Powers were right, and that Greece, being wrong, fully deserved her punishment. But it is one of the consolations of independent minds, whose judgments are their own and whose responsibility does not extend beyond the calm comparison of right and wrong, that they can hail the heroic impulse and the strong human deed whenever and wherever they reveal themselves. The apparent success or failure of the deed is by no means a test of its rightness. Greece has failed in her attempt to advance the cause of Hellenism, and the Junta has triumphed through the operation of a Turkish force in Europe. But in the moment of failure, at Domokos as at Utica, there is always the appeal from fickle fortune to that faith in a cause which is stronger than fortune:—

“*Victrix causa diis placuit, sed victa Catoni.*”

The ground for continued confidence in the cause of Greece is that nothing has happened (as I attempt to show in this volume) which could justify us in altering our convictions of twenty or of seventy years

ago. The race is the same as it was when we created a kingdom of New Greece ; the kingdom is still the outpost of civilisation in the Mediterranean ; and our interest in supporting a free and constitutional State on the Ægean does not decrease, but steadily increases with the lapse of time. Nor is there any cause for dismay—still less for the abandonment of hope in the future of Greece—arising out of her grievous disasters in 1897. These disasters, for which the Powers must hold themselves so largely accountable, establish a new claim upon the justice and magnanimity of Europe ; and, sooner or later, the claim will be allowed. On Great Britain, in particular, the new claim is urgent from every point of view. If it becomes generally admitted, as it surely will be, that our Government, from early in the year 1895, surrendered our independence in European affairs to a too close association with the military despotisms, it will follow in the mind of every candid Englishman that we owe to Greece a certain moral restitution and practical revindication. And if ever it should come to be in the power of those who have most warmly espoused the cause of Greece, even against the so-called Concert, and at the risk of positively encouraging her in defiance of the Concert, and in a desperate war against Turkey, to wield the influence or might of this country for the emancipation of South-eastern Europe, then I make bold to say that a Liberal Government would be especially committed, by every consideration of constraining honour and responsibility, to obtain for Greece the amplest and most favourable consideration of her historical claims.

Meanwhile the service which Greece has rendered to Europe—and it must never be allowed by her friends

to sink into oblivion—is that, at the lowest ebb of European zeal for freedom and humanity, when the futility of the old methods of dealing with Turkey were patent to all the world, and when the Chancellors and Foreign Ministers persisted for their own purposes in treating “the integrity of the Ottoman Empire” as an immutable maxim, in obedience to which they had suffered the massacre of a race to go unavenged, she, Greece, translated into action the thought that was uppermost in every independent mind. At a moment when the world was fettered by cruel facts, and ideas were scouted as a menace to the peace of Europe, she formed an idea, sharp in conception and strong in operation, which instantly drew upon Crete the rapt attention and sympathy of Europe. Whereas the Powers had feared to avenge Armenia lest in avenging her they should go to war with each other, Greece struck a sudden blow for humanity, and left the thought of danger behind her. Ideas like this work themselves out from their own inextinguishable germ of life; and we may have perfect confidence that the idea of right and necessary championship in Crete will involve for Greece, in the long run, decidedly more of advantage than disaster.

To a sceptical and unimaginative mind this will appear to be in no way probable. On the morrow of the great calamity in Thessaly, amidst the dissolution of order consequent upon a grievous reverse in war, it is easy to dwell on the “recklessness” and “madness” of Greece, and to forget that she has lived up to a standard which is partly of our own creation. But the provident man, remembering that in the fifteen or twenty years before 1897 the Greeks had

grown more notably in good sense, sobriety of character, and the moral stamina which is the basis of genuine civilisation, than in any previous period of their history, and carrying his mind forward to the time when their present wounds shall have healed, will not merely retain his confidence in their destiny, but will also hope and expect from them an increased measure of steady national development.

CHAPTER I

EUROPEAN INTERVENTIONS

The Right of Intervention—Recent Interventions, by Concert and by Single Nations—The Congresses of Laybach and Verona—National Enthusiasms—Intervention in Turkey—The Reconstruction of Turkey.

WHEN we speak of the right or claim of Europe to make new dispositions of any part of the territory which composes this particular quarter of the globe, little else can be intended than that the Powers, acting in concert, may deal with facts and situations as they arise, in such a manner as may seem most for the benefit of the people affected by their decisions, or for the common benefit of the nations. These two objects are generally, but not always, coincident. In the very rare cases in which it might seem right to overbear the will of a nation in determining its future lot, we must at least expect to find a practical unanimity amongst all the remaining nations: and even then the ultimate advantage of the people thus constrained must be manifestly implied and assured in the advantage of the majority. The constraint of an individual nation for the common weal of an economy of nations rests upon the same sanction as the constraint of the liberty of an individual for the common weal of a human

society. No words can be needed to show that, without this practical unanimity, and without this sanction, any interference with the freedom of a people, uninvited or unprovoked, is a crime.

It cannot be maintained that one or two Powers, or even a coalition, would be justified in assuming the control of a nation's destinies for no better reason than that the nation in question was weak, whilst its possessions were coveted by its neighbours. But if, up to a certain point, the complete independence of a people within its own territories must be acknowledged, and if every people may justly claim to be "master in its own house," this cannot preclude the right of a community of nations to intervene in the affairs of any one member of the community, when either this member is disturbing the general peace, or its Government has become clearly and indisputably impotent. It is no doubt fairly open to question how far the collective authority of a community like Europe ought to be systematised, or whether we should be doing wisely to set up an international court, extending its jurisdiction over nations, and an international police in order to carry out its decisions. But the rights of the majority must necessarily be paramount, however they ought to be exercised. There is probably very little difference of opinion as to the right which the Powers possessed in 1876, for instance, to intervene in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, so long as they intervened in concert, and for the benefit of the several nations which constituted the subjects of the Porte.

It is, perhaps, possible, in the absence of any distinct international agreement, or in times when

the mutual understanding of the Powers has been weakened by the independent action of one or two of them, to justify the conduct of a single Power, or of a coalition, which intervenes in the affairs of a notoriously ill-governed State, in so far as its intervention is directed to the benefit of the oppressed nationality, and not to its own exclusive interests. Such justification, however, is only possible on the ground that the intervention is beneficial to the nationality relieved, and, through it, to the community of nations whereof it is a member. The principle of the mutual dependence of the associated nations is not necessarily violated by an intervention of this kind, even though the intervening State has acted nominally outside the general concert.

Of the interventions in Europe during the past century, the present generation would probably be agreed that the majority were unjustifiable; whilst there are instances in which it would hardly now be denied that the intervention of the European concert, though refused, was extremely desirable. The history of the suppression of Poland furnishes examples of intervention and non-intervention which seem to be almost equally destitute of justification. The partition of the State by Russia, Austria, and Prussia, in 1772, rendered more effectual in 1795, was the source of many of the subsequent crimes and misfortunes of Europe; whilst the later history of that ill-fated nationality furnished opportunities for the restraining influence of the majority of the Powers, which were either neglected or used in a fashion too mild to be effectual. The settlement of 1815, which had left Cracow a

free republic, and Central Poland a kingdom under the protection of Russia, was set aside in 1846 by the three parties to the treaty of 1772; and on this occasion it is true that the conscience of Britain, France, and Sweden revolted. These three Powers, with Turkey, protested; and perhaps they would have done more to vindicate the right of nations if the swords of the aggressors had been less heavy in the scale. Intervention might have been renewed in 1863 with more apparent hope of success, for Russia was then comparatively isolated. But Britain, for reasons which seemed to her sufficient at the time, stopped short of an effectual assertion of the authority of Europe; and the Poles were once more left to their fate.

The intervention of Europe in the affairs of revolutionary France was certainly unjustifiable in the first instance, and brought with it its own expiation. It was justified from the moment when the Republic became wantonly aggressive; but in its origin it had no better excuse than the scandalous intervention of the Allies in Naples (1821) and Spain (1822). After the final defeat of Napoleon the victorious Powers conceived a scheme, admirable from the point of view of the monarchs and statesmen of the time, by which the well-being of Europe was to be assured through their united action. It was, in fact, just such a scheme of European concert and international police as theorists in every age have recommended for our adoption; and its results may be accepted as a sufficient proof of the extreme danger of systematic intervention, or of any intervention not absolutely demanded by exceptional circumstances. The Allies agreed to meet in Con-

gress, from time to time, in order to take concerted action wherever it might seem advisable in the common interest. At Laybach, accordingly, in the year 1821, the representatives of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France determined to suppress the Liberal Government of Naples, and to assist the worthless Ferdinand in violating the Constitution which he had sworn to maintain. Britain had already grown sick of the compact into which she had entered. Her representative attended the Congress, but he was instructed to disagree with the decision of his colleagues, and to demand that no idea of self-aggrandisement should enter into the plans of the Powers.

A year later the Congress of Verona pronounced the fate of Spain. The Spanish Ferdinand had shared the fate of his Neapolitan namesake—his subjects had dared to proclaim a Constitution, and the crowned heads of Europe saw in this fact a rebellion against the first principles of government, and a menace to civilisation. Such was the language of European statesmen little more than seventy years ago; and the representatives of the Powers at Verona decided on another intervention. This time Britain spoke more boldly. Canning had succeeded Castlereagh at the Foreign Office, and, so far, the honour of the country was safe. The Duke of Wellington—himself a conscientious opponent of popular reforms—declared that Britain would have nothing to do with an intervention in the internal affairs of other nations which would be more likely to prejudice than to promote the interests of those whom it professed to benefit. But the Congress proceeded without the concurrence of Britain, and France was made the

instrument of this new oppression, as Austria had been of the first. The Duke d'Angoulême, with an army of 100,000, over-rode Spain, set the king on his throne again, and left 50,000 troops to keep him there. The results of this intervention were lamentable in the extreme. In the wake of the army, which contained thousands of Liberal Frenchmen, the Spanish royalists turned upon the champions of popular freedom, and slaughtered them without mercy. The outbreak of murderous passions was incomparably more fierce and sanguinary than the White Terror had been in France; and, worse still, the unhappy country was doomed to half a century of impotent struggles for liberty, which, but for the Congress of Verona, it might have been to a great extent spared.

It may be contended that the acts of these two Congresses prove nothing absolutely against the wisdom and value of a European concert, systematised into a kind of international court of arbitration. The concerted action agreed upon in 1815 was made an instrument of oppression in 1821 and 1822; but it had succeeded in 1818, when the Allies met the representatives of France at Aix-la-Chapelle, and anticipated the evacuation of that country by several years. Moreover, it was not strictly the action of the European concert which was at fault at Laybach and Verona. The concert had ceased to exist. Such a concert, indeed, could not be held to be broken by the wanton and inequitable abstention of a single Power, any more than the judgment of a court in *banco* could be vitiated by the withdrawal of one of the judges. But a European concert in 1822 without the concurrence of Britain was an absurdity.

The decisions taken at Laybach and Verona in the years 1821 and 1822 were, therefore, anything but the decisions of a true concert. They amounted, virtually, to mere pacts between the representatives of four crowned heads, who resolved to trample on the liberties of nations in the interests of impotent monarchs.

And, again, if it is attempted to argue from these examples that a serviceable European concert, established for anything more than a single specific object, is impracticable, and doomed to failure beforehand, it is sufficient to reply that the compact of 1815 was one in which absolute monarchs had the predominance, in obedience to whom the veterans of a quarter of a century of constant war stood ready to dragoon any part of Europe at a day's notice. It might be very different with a concert of free nations, of enlightened republics like France and Switzerland, and of constitutional monarchies like Britain and Italy, in which the royal prerogative, when opposed to the will of the people in Parliament, is comparatively slight authority. A true concert of nations would rarely be deserted except by a Power anxious to engage in war; and the worst motives and incentives to war are unknown in a land which has set its mind upon self-government. The self-government of an economy of nations demands much the same qualities as the self-government of a single nation, or of an individual. As these qualities are developed in individuals and in single nations they will become more and more applicable to economies; and the main tendency of our time, however counteracted by reactionary lusts of war, is to develop these qualities in the fullest and widest sense.

Of interventions by one State, or a coalition of States, in the internal affairs of another, it would be far more difficult to define the justifications; but no doubt the strongest one of all would be that the step should be taken in each case for the benefit, and at the request, of an oppressed nation struggling against an oppressor. Moreover, it must be taken only with the sanction of the community of nations, or at least after such sanction has been frankly and unreservedly asked. Indeed, we are compelled to fall back once more upon the broader question of the international concert; for though a single State may under certain circumstances be justified in intervening, it cannot claim to be so justified until it has at least solicited a sanction of this kind. The solidity of European interests, for instance, plainly forbids the idea of an intervention against the will of the community of nations, if for no other reason than because such an intervention must necessarily affect the trade, the property, and the legitimate influence of each particular Power. The practical wisdom of stipulating for the sanction of the community of Powers is manifest. The responsibility of deciding between a nation and its Government is occasionally very great. It is better that this responsibility should rest on the concert of nations than on a single State, or even on a powerful coalition.

It is barely possible to conceive a case of justifiable intervention on behalf, and at the request, of a dynasty or Government against its people. A people cannot oppress its rulers; in the event of hostility it is the privilege of monarchs and Governments to put themselves out of the way. The most familiar recent instances of such intervention by a single

Power are those of Russia in Hungary (1849) and of France in Rome (1848), neither of which, we may suppose, would find many palliators in the present day. As the world progresses tyrants have fewer opportunities of crushing their subjects, whether by their own strength or with the aid of a neighbour. In place of these interventions of royal cousinship we now more frequently meet with a somewhat novel phenomenon in history—the intervention of one crowned head on behalf of the revolted subjects of another. It is a little remarkable that the same tyrannies which butchered the Hungarians and suppressed the Roman Republic were amongst the first to turn their hands to work of a directly opposite character. Louis Napoleon cast off the Austrian yoke from Italy, and the son of Nicholas severed the chains of the Turkish rayahs in the Danubian States. There is, indeed, nothing new in the fact of one monarch espousing the cause of another monarch's subjects. When wars were mainly dynastic or religious, the pretext of national deliverance was very commonly put forward, and with more or less of apparent justice. But the spirit of the past century has been peculiarly favourable to the assertion of popular liberties, whether by internal revolution alone, as in France, or by the combination of internal revolution and external aid, as in Italy, or mainly by foreign intervention, as amongst the subject races of Turkey.


The distinguishing feature, as well as the justification, of most modern interventions on behalf of oppressed nationalities consists in the generous enthusiasm of one people for another less free than itself; and the intrigues of a Government can

scarcely be justifiable when they are not based upon, and do not spring directly from, such a national enthusiasm. A nation has much the same right to deliver a nation as an individual has to protect an individual ; and, when the nation speaks, its Government is entitled—nay, bound—to act. But without this popular warrant it is very difficult to conceive a justification for the interference of a Government ; for under such circumstances the Government cannot be that of a free country, but must be actuated by dynastic and selfish motives. The world very rightly distrusts constitutions, and liberties, and deliverances, which are the gift of autocrats. Autocrats and tyrants exist under a virtual compact with each other ; they logically stand or fall together ; there is an honour amongst them, so that, when one departs from the recognised precedents and traditions, he is guilty of a certain treachery towards all the rest. As no monarch can give his subjects a full measure of personal freedom without making himself the actual or virtual president of a republic, so no autocrat can take forcible measures to give liberty to the subjects of another autocrat without becoming a traitor to his order, and practically forfeiting his title to his own crown.

The attitude of Russia towards Turkey in 1876 was a peculiar one in this sense—that, if the Czar was still an autocrat, he began his reign by giving a considerable increase of liberty to his own subjects, before he turned his attention to the subjects of the Sultan. The case fell between the two indicated above ; for though no one could call Russia a free country, yet the Russian people had displayed a generous enthusiasm for the Turkish rayahs, which

at least testified to their own capacity for freedom. And here we perceive a further complication in the problem; for it is fairly open to doubt whether the Slavophil tendencies of Russia are not in great measure the creation of previous intrigues on the part of the Government. It is doubtful whether the former wars between Russia and Turkey—at all events prior to 1828—were incited or endorsed by any pronounced sympathy of Russian subjects with the victims of Turkish misrule. However this may be, the war of 1877 had a better justification than those which went before it, on the precise ground that it was a popular war, based, at least in part, upon a generous popular enthusiasm.

Passing to the reasons which, in 1878, warranted Europe in endowing Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro with a share of the possessions of Turkey, it must be observed that the sanction for such interference rested, in the first place, as already indicated, on the existence of certain facts, and of a certain situation which could not by any conceivable method be replaced by the facts and the situation of a previous period. We could not, even if we would, have reconstructed the Turkey of 1875, obliterated the crimes and repaired the misfortunes of the Turkey of 1876, undone the victories of Russia over the Turkey of 1877. Assuming that the voice of Russia in regard to the future fate of the Ottoman Empire could have been silenced, and supposing that the Power which had silenced Russia's voice had invited Europe to revert, as far as possible, to the state of affairs established in 1856, what could Europe have done? What the public opinion of Europe would not have suffered to be done, what



TOWER OF THE WINDS, ATHENS.

[To face p. 40.]

the mind revolts from as an impossible crime, is that she should have restored the direct rule of the Porte over the nationalities which it had failed to govern justly. It would be superfluous to enlarge upon the crimes of the Turkish Government, which it has either committed through its own volition or allowed to be committed through its impotence. As well might the United States have attempted to restore the institution of slavery as Europe to rehabilitate the sway of the Porte over a province once emancipated.

The thing was physically, as well as morally, impossible. The Turkish system was destroyed throughout the provinces affected by the wars of 1876-8. The valis, the mutessarifs, the caimakans, the mudirs, had fled, or had been driven away; the whole civil administration of the vilayets, the whole military organisation and the police of the country, so far as Turkish authority is concerned, were at an end. Not a pasha, not a bey, not a zaptieh, could return to his post and resume the power which he was wont to exercise.

What Europe at large demands in the south-east is, above all, finality. It recognises the impossibility of such finality under the integral and independent sway of the Porte, it despairs of reconstructing Turkish credit, it has lost all confidence in Turkish government. The Powers of Europe, therefore, had to face these facts and this situation. They were called upon to devise, in concert, a new equilibrium in place of the old instability. It was a task not for one Power but for all. Unless this task had been undertaken by the European concert, and unless the Powers had agreed in looking upon intervention as a

duty, rather than as a matter of option, there could have been no reasonable prospect of finality in their deliberations.

If any further justification had been needed for the constraint and control of Turkey by the Great Powers, beyond that which sprang from the actual condition of the empire, and the impossibility of restoring its former government, it was found in the appeal made to Europe by all the subject nationalities, which demanded their liberation from the Turkish yoke, basing their demand on the plea of oppressive and unprogressive government, which morality and history approve as a sanction of revolution. An impotent government, revolted subjects of half a dozen nationalities, the absolute need of pacification from without, more than justified the statesmen of Europe in their acts of intervention.

How, then, were we bound to intervene? Who was to rule where Turkey had failed to rule? What ought to be the limits of our interference? And, having regard to the desired finality, to what eventual disposition of South-eastern Europe ought we most to incline? Evidently the guiding principle must be the restoration of liberty to the individual and to the nation. Nothing could be just, nothing in the nature of things could be permanent, except a Servia for the Servians, a Bulgaria for the Bulgars, a Greece for the Greeks. Europe did right in setting up the Principality of Bulgaria, perhaps more than right in assenting to the union of Eastern Roumelia to Bulgaria, certainly less than right in refusing to Greece a part of Thessaly, most of Epirus, and the island of Crete. But apart from the question of nationality, there are other and more general con-

siderations which lead us irresistibly to prefer the aggrandisement of one particular Power on the shores of the Mediterranean, whenever and wherever it may be enlarged without doing violence to the principle of nationality. It seems most natural to conclude, on a careful review of the whole situation, that the best guarantee for the future peace and stability of South-eastern Europe is to be found in giving the fullest possible effect to the claims of the Greeks—not in the sense of extending their dominion over other distinct races, but with the policy, deliberately adopted and steadily carried out, of adding to the existing kingdom of Greece, as occasion may serve, every province, every city, every coast and island, to which the Hellenic race can establish so much as the semblance of an historical title.

CHAPTER II

PANSLAVISM AND PANHELLENISM

Panslavism, its Origin and History—The Slavs in Europe—Russia's Claims to the Hegemony—The Panslavonian Committee—An Exposition of Types—Panhellenism—A Greco-Slavonian State—Enumeration of the Greeks—Greek Preponderance on the *Ægean*.

IT would be puerile for Europe, and above all for Englishmen, to sit down as mere spectators in the great drama which is still to be played out before them, and expect that the right would triumph as a matter of course. That great principle of energy and motive-power which, under the name of Panslavism, is alleged to have instigated the Russian attack upon Turkey in 1877—an allegation which is, indeed, a proved fact—is of necessity antagonistic to the cause of Greece. The antagonism may not even now be openly declared, but it exists, without the shadow of a doubt; and its existence was revealed in the abortive treaty of San Stefano, wherein the Russians, in the first glow of their military triumph, carried the boundary of Bulgaria to the very shores of the *Ægean*. That extravagant demand seemed to give the keynote of Panslavism, and opened the eyes of every friend of the Hellenic cause to the full extent of its danger.

Panslavism and Panhellenism have found their point of collision, and it is one of the problems of the present generation to trace out their common boundary. It may be well to contrast the two with some attention to details.

It is barely half a century since Panslavism had its birth as a new element in European politics; and its origin constitutes one of those striking facts which—often trivial enough in themselves—illustrate the philosophy of history; which seem to exhibit history as a distinct and sentient organism, self-conscious and avenging, exacting the expiation of every crime, and visiting the sins of fathers upon their children.

So far as can be ascertained, the word Panslavism, or Panslavonianism, was first used by the Polish insurgents after the revolt of 1846, in the hope of converting it into a weapon of revenge against Austria. A French historian* narrates the circumstances in which this fatal instrument of a nation's vengeance was forged. "The Marquis Wielopolski," says M. Martin, "had started in life as a patriot. In 1831, dispatched to London by the Polish Revolution,† he presented several remarkable diplomatic notes to Lord Palmerston. His efforts failed against the fixed policy of abstention adopted by the British Government. He returned to Poland much hurt by the desertion of his country by the whole of the West. When the revolution was at an end he did not emigrate, and for fifteen years he remained silent. In 1846 the massacres of

* Henri Martin, *Pologne et Moscovie*, p. 11, *et seq.*

† The Duchy of Warsaw became a kingdom of Poland, under the protection of the Czar, in the settlement of 1815. The ten months' insurrection of 1830-31 ended in the conversion of the kingdom into a Russian province.

Gallicia occurred. A document of sinister eloquence won the attention of Europe—‘A Letter from a Polish Gentleman to Prince Metternich.’ It was by him. The opening was an outburst of indignation and vengeance against Austria. The conclusion was this: that Poland, abandoned by the West, cannot deliver herself from her three oppressors; let her give herself to the one who is Slavonian like herself; let her abdicate, disappear in a vengeful suicide, and punish Europe by creating Panslavonianism.”

Wielopolski was faithful to his idea, and discountenanced the rising of his fellow-countrymen against Russia in 1861. For two years he presided over the Administrative Council under the Grand Duke Constantine, and contributed to the failure of an attempt which would have destroyed his subtle edifice of revenge. No man can say how deeply his weapon was destined to wound. The Pole himself could scarcely have foreseen the use to which Russia would apply it.

The Panslavonian movement, of which Russia has undertaken the direction and guidance, affects one of the largest families of the human race. The Asiatic tribes from whom the modern Slavs are descended took possession of the bulk of Eastern Europe; and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that they formed the great vanguard of the immigration, settling down on the first plains which they discovered on the hither side of the Caucasus, and gradually spreading over the countries now known as Russia, Eastern Germany, Poland, Northern Hungary, Northern Turkey, Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, and Transylvania.

The Slavonian peoples are capable of subdivision into six principal classes:—(1) Great Russians, or Muscovites; (2) Little Russians, Rusniacs, or Ruthens; (3) Poles or Lekhs; (4) Slovacs, including the Bohemian Czechs, the Moravians, and other Carpathian families; (5) Sorabians and Obotrites of Lusatia and Brandenburg; (6) Illyrians, including the Wends, or Venets; the Bulgarians, Servians, and Croatians.

The highest (Russian) estimate of the number of Slavs was (in 1875) as follows:—

Russian Slavs	...	...	...	...	47,700,000
Austrian	...	...	...	...	17,000,000
Prussian	...	...	...	...	2,400,000
Saxon	...	...	...	...	200,000
Turkish	...	...	...	...	7,700,000
Total					75,000,000

The name of "Slav" is a comparatively new appellation for the Sporæ, or Serbs, and the Venets, or Wends, under which latter name, according to Professor Max Müller, the older historians usually refer to the Slavonian tribes. The Slavs probably owe their modern name to the grammarians, if not to their successful warriors; the word "slava," or "slavitza," in their own language, signifying "glory." *

Such are the peoples over whose destinies Russia has assumed the right to preside; and it is worth while, in days when so much force is rightly held to

* See, amongst the best authorities on this subject, Schafarik, *Slavische Alterthümer*; Cyprian Robert, *Le Monde Slave, son Passé, son État présent, et son Avenir*; Louis Léger, *Le Monde Slave*; and *Études Slaves*.

reside in the principle of nationalities, to inquire how far this right may be fairly based on the Slavonic origin of the Russian people. M. Henri Martin's conclusion from the known facts of the case will probably commend itself to the reader's acceptance:— *

“The people whom we call Finns, or, under another name, Uralians, appear first on both sides of the Ural. . . . On the south and east, towards the Volga and the Don, appeared under various names another Turanian branch, that of the Turks, or Western Tartars. . . . About the time of transition from antiquity to the middle ages, a new and great European race, that of the Slavs, makes its appearance in opposition to the Finns and the Tartars. . . . From their first place of concentration on the Vistula, in the region where Poland was to be, they diverge in every direction, absorb the groups of analogous origin spread over Eastern Europe, overflow on the west as far as the Elbe, on the north as far as Lake Ladoga, on the east as far as the Don, on the south-east as far as the Dnieper, on the south as far as the Danube; they then cross the latter river, and flow like a torrent in the direction of Greece.

“The name of Russians was unknown in this first age of Slavonic history—namely from the sixth to the ninth century; it was introduced from without, in the second half of the ninth century, by foreign conquerors. After their wide expansion, the Slavs had in their turn submitted to a reaction from the peoples which surrounded them, whereto their loose and shifting federation of tribes was unable to oppose a sufficient

* Henri Martin, *La Russie et l'Europe*, p. 21.

resistance. In the south they lost their Greek possessions; in the west the German peoples recovered large territories from them; in the south-east, on the Lower Danube, on the Black Sea, on the Don, the Turanian races robbed them of their supremacy. . . . In the extreme north a Slavonic tribe, which the old chroniclers call the Slovenes, and which had founded Novgorod, on Lake Ilmen, found itself locked in between the Scandinavians, by this time masters of all the seas and rivers, and the Finn populations. The most eastern of the cis-Uralian Finns, the Permians, or Biarmians, who possessed a kind of civilisation and a trade with Central Asia, seem to have disputed the supremacy with the Scandinavians, and, like them, to have harassed with their incursions the other Finns and the Slovenes of Novgorod. The Finn tribes nearest to the Slavs . . . as well as their neighbour Slavs of Novgorod and Isborsk, had been, about 859, conquered by the Vareg Russians." In the following year they had expelled the invaders; but finally, "having fallen into an anarchical state, and being probably again attacked by the Permians, they recalled the Vareg Russians across the sea, and invited the latter to assist and govern them.*

"These Vareg Russians were nothing else than Scandinavians—this is a fact now beyond question. The name of Russian, under the form of Ros, Rhos, Russ, was in the ninth century synonymous with that of Scandinavian or Norseman. It was in sufficiently general use to be known at the same time by the Byzantines, the Franks, and the Arabians; and a

* M. Martin quotes as his authority the celebrated chronicle of Nestor, combined with other historical monuments.

passage in the Gallo-Frank annals of St. Bertin for the year 839 testifies that the Scandinavians themselves assumed that name, although its origin was probably Finn. It is believed that the Scandinavians thus summoned across the sea by the Finn and Slavonian tribes came from the Swedish district called Ross Lagen, in the vicinity of Upsal. Another hypothesis, less probable, fixes their point of departure on the Russian coast, on the shores of the Kurische Haff and the Niemen, which were held for a time by the Vareg Russians, and retain a trace of their name. . . .

“The language underwent a change with the lapse of time, but not the mind, a phenomenon which has more than once been observed in history. . . . The Russo-Finns (the Muscovites) speak Slavonian, but they do not think Slavonian. Slavonian and Scandinavian freedom could never be established in Suzdalia, which presently assumed the name of Moscovia. Never was municipal bell sounded, or popular assembly periodically convened in the cities of Suzdal, Rostov, Vladimir, Tver, and Moscow.”

After insisting on the fact that the founders of the Muscovite dynasty had transferred their seat of government from Kiev, in disgust at “the turbulence of their Slavonian provinces,” preferring, in the words of Karamsine, “the docility of a people always ready to obey,” M. Martin concludes that the Muscovite empire was equivocal from the first, “with a prince of Scandinavian origin, speaking Slavonian, and taking his base of operations amongst the Finns. . . . The basis of the Russian empire is consequently Finn, or, to use a more general term, Turanian. . . . Some

Scandinavians and more Slavs had evidently followed the Rurevitches into the region outside the woods (*zavolotchié*). Others came after. The Novgorodians, on their side, sent a colony to Viatka, in the north-east. Need we weigh the drops of Slavonian or Scandinavian blood in the veins of the great Russian people, follow the series of the crossings, inquire into the varieties of the physical type? By no means; that is not the question. The question is this: In that combination of a Turanian base with an adventitious European element which has formed the Muscovite or great Russian people, what spirit has always dominated, and is still predominant? The Turanian or the Aryan spirit? The Asiatic or the European? The answer cannot be doubtful."

M. Martin's conclusions—and they are those of the majority of students—are of considerable importance. They would at all events dispose of the principal historical and national arguments by which the Russians of to-day, and the Muscovites in particular, seek to establish their claim to direct the political destinies of the Slavs. They strike at the root of Panславism, as it has been preached and held up for admiration within the last thirty years. They prove that if the Russian idea of Panславism could be carried out, the result would be a so-called Panslavonian empire, of which by far the greater part—the whole of Asiatic Russia, the northern, eastern, and southern provinces of European Russia—would be inhabited by races which are not Slavs.* And, beyond all question, if there is in the centre and

* These arguments are fully borne out by the researches of M. Duchinski of Kiev, on the anthropological types of the Russian people.

west of European Russia a fair admixture of the Slavonic element, the Finn element predominates in the north, and the Mongol in the south.*

Notwithstanding its weaknesses and absurdities, the theory of Panslavism has set on foot a movement of considerable force, which has already produced great results, and which it would be a fatal mistake to treat as though it must necessarily prove abortive. It may fail in the end. Wielopolski's weapon of revenge may pierce the hands of those who would use it for their own selfish purposes, but at the same time it may easily be fatal to victims who have had no part or lot in the oppressions of Poland. The later history of Panslavism, which has all but destroyed the Ottoman Empire, and which still menaces the interests of Greece, is well worthy of a brief review.

The movement, at first promoted chiefly in Austria, by the Bohemian Czechs—amongst them, especially, MM. Pulazki and Reiger—found one of its earliest Russian organs in the *Moscow Gazette*, edited by M. Katkoff. This gentleman argued the cause which he had adopted with a patriotic persistence; and it may be observed that the fact of this persistence, which had its reflection and its support amongst vast

* The Empress Catherine II. had her own notions as to the origin of the Russians. According to her, the Russians were descended from the Roxolans. It was her own historiographer, Müller, who first demonstrated the fact that the word "Russian" is of Scandinavian origin. The discovery cost him dear, for he was imprisoned, and compelled to acknowledge that his mistress was right. Trediakowski, secretary of the St. Petersburg Academy, fared still worse. Having ventured to agree in the opinion of Müller, he received a hundred blows with the knout, which gained one more convert to the Empress's views. When the German historian, Stritter, declared that the Russians were of Finnish origin Catherine rose to the occasion by issuing a special ukase, wherein the descent of her subjects was supposed to be placed beyond further doubt.

numbers of the population of Russia before official Russia would have anything to do with the theory, strengthens the contention that the espousal of the Bulgarian cause in 1877 was due in great measure to a popular enthusiasm, and was not a mere pretext of dynastic ambition.

In 1864, shortly after the suppression of the insurrection in Warsaw, the Moscow "Society of the Lovers of Natural Science" proposed to form an exposition of "Russian types," in order to celebrate the unity and integrity of the empire. The idea had virtually collapsed, when, in 1866, the battle of Sadowa gave the deathblow to Austrian predominance in the German Confederation; and the Panslavonians drew fresh courage from the humiliation of the house of Hapsburg. The intended Russian exposition now assumed the form of a Slavonian exposition, and the Czar for the first time gave open countenance to the movement. He, the Empress, the whole court and official world of Russia, favoured the scheme of the Moscow Society; the Grand Duke Vladimir accepted the presidency of the Exposition; and Panslavonian Committees were formed in every country of Slavonian origin. The importance of these facts was manifest to everybody who heard of them, and who was in a position to see the end to which they pointed. M. Katkoff enjoyed a legitimate triumph in the columns of the *Moscow Gazette*. "The new era dawns at length" (he wrote on February 17, 1867), "and for us Russians it is of momentous import. That era is ours; it calls to life a new world, kept to this moment in the dark, and in expectation of its destiny—the world of Slavonians. After centuries spent in sorrow and servitude, that

world at last approaches the hour of its renovation. That which has long been forgotten and suppressed once more comes to the light, and prepares for action."

The Ethnological Exposition was opened by the Czar in person on May 5, 1867. There, dressed in their national costume, and surrounded by their characteristic weapons and domestic implements, were lay figures of Great and Little Russians, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovacs, Czechs, Moravians, Croats, Dalmatians, Servians, Montenegrins, Bulgarians; and the visitors were able to admire their numerous cousins gathered from over half the continent of Europe, and to nourish their enthusiasm by noting the remarkable similarity of feature which the modellers in wax had succeeded in imparting to the effigies.

On the same occasion, also under official patronage, there was held a Panslavonian Congress. Representatives of the various groups above named, with the exception of the Poles, were invited to Russia, and entertained in most of the principal cities. The banquet given to them at Moscow, with Prince Tcherkasky in the chair, was naturally more enthusiastic than any of the rest, and betrayed the force already acquired by a movement which, within ten years from its sanction by the Court of Russia, was to carry the armies of the Czar to the gates of Constantinople.*

The earlier propaganda of Panslavism was conducted in the name of the Greco-Slavs; but from the year 1866 we rarely meet with this conjunction of

* Constantinople itself, in the theory of the more adventurous spirits, is a Slavonian city.



A MODERN GREEK TYPE.

[To face p. 54.]

nationalities. Was it one of the stipulations of the Russian Government that the claim of Greek kinship should be dropped, and that no Hellenic delegates should be invited to the Congress? Was it jealousy or a wise caution which prompted this modification in the original programme? Some light may be thrown upon the subject by the successful negotiations which General Ignatieff presently undertook, with the object of transferring the Bulgarian Christians from the bosom of the Greek Church, and the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople, to the so-called "orthodox" national Church of Russia.

Let us see, then, what cause for jealousy the Russians might reasonably find in Greece. What is it that Hellas can hopefully oppose to the theory of Pan Slavism? What, in short, are the character and force of that Panhellenism, as we may call it (for want of a better name), which may be brought forward as the rival and opponent of Pan Slavism?

Stated in broad and general terms, and with an assumption at all events no greater than that of the Russian theorists in the assertion of their Pan Slavonian claims, we may say that the Hellenes of to-day are spread over the whole coast of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia Minor—that they hold the seaboard of the *Ægean*, from the kingdom of Greece, from Epirus and Thessaly, to Macedonia, Thrace, Constantinople, and, with a few exceptions, the shores of the Levant and the islands of the Archipelago. The entire group of the ancient Greek colonies, the entire Byzantine Empire, is the inheritance of the kingdom of Greece, in a sense quite as real and as forcible as that in which the Russians can be held to have established the claim

of the Slavs to the reversion of Turkey. It is on no mere tradition, no laborious assemblage of texts and obscure references, that we have to build up the history of the Greek expansion. Hardly a link is wanting in the records of that progress, and all the records combine to show the thorough and genuine character of the hold which the Greeks had secured upon their colonies, before the paralysing irruption of Turanian barbarism. When Paul made his journey from Syria to metropolitan Greece, he travelled by far the greater part of the way through Greek-speaking lands, which had been Hellenised (and therefore civilised) for centuries. In Cilicia, Cyprus, Lycaonia, Galatia, Pamphylia, Lycia, Phrygia, Troas, Samothracia, he was constantly amongst Greeks. Up to the period of the Roman conquests there was scarcely any authority which could contest that of the Greeks in Asia Minor and South-eastern Europe; whilst the barbarians, who from time to time had broken in amongst the Ionians and other Greek colonists, had become Hellenised almost immediately after their incursion. No schoolboy needs to be reminded of these facts; but it does seem necessary to bring them to the knowledge of the Panslavonians, and of too enthusiastic Slavonian advocates amongst ourselves, who are adventurous enough to claim a foothold on the Ægean for the heirs of the Finns and Scandinavians.

It may be objected that the progress of the ancient Greeks was one of colonisation only, not of conquest—an advance of trade, confining itself to seaports, to a few large inland towns, and to the trade routes connecting these, rather than an advance of arms, which held entire realms in awe.

This is not a very accurate distinction ; but, even if it were, it would be sufficient to answer that such a peaceful and civilising progress is a more real and stable conquest than any which can be reaped by the sword. The fact is that the Greeks, like the modern English, carried war in one hand and industry in the other. What the conquerors won by force of arms the colonists and merchants knew how to retain by the arts of peace.

Nor were the legitimate conquests of the Greeks limited, even in Europe, by the mere seaboard. The geographical names of the Balkan peninsula prove how widespread the Greek influence must at one time have been, and how the Hellenic civilisation must have permeated the whole land, as far as and even beyond the Danube. Sophia and Nikopolis are by no means the only important towns north of the Balkans which attest their Greek origin by their names. The testimony of M. Elisée Reclus, an impartial authority, who is certainly actuated by no political bias in stating the result of his researches, will assist us in appreciating the position of the Hellenic race in European Turkey. "Setting aside the Turkish element," says this writer,* "the one which has the greatest importance in the Bulgarian regions is the Hellenic. On the northern slopes of the Balkans the Greeks are not numerous, and their influence hardly exceeds that of the Germans and Armenians established in the cities. But south of the Hæmus, although relatively few, they are more widely spread. In every village there are a few living by trade, and practising every handicraft. They are the indispensable men of the locality ; they

* Elisée Reclus, *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle* vol. i., p. 223.

know how to do everything, are ready for any emergency, have a hand in everything, and stir up the whole population with their energy. Always bound close together, forming a sort of freemasonry in the country, always eager for knowledge, they obtain, almost invariably, an influence infinitely superior to their numerical importance. No sooner are they two or three in number than they act as a petty council. On the other hand they constitute, here and there, some considerable groups amongst the Bulgarians. They are numerous at Philippopolis and Bazardjik. In one of the valleys of the Rhodope they have a large city to themselves, Stenimacho; neither Turk nor Bulgarian has been able to thrive there."

Again, the same authority bears testimony to the Hellenic character of the Turkish seaboard.* "By a curious effect, which shows how the sea has been the principal element in the distribution of the Mediterranean peoples, and in the course of their history, the whole Ægean littoral of Turkey belongs ethnologically to the Hellenic race. As Greece proper extends, under the sea, towards Egypt, through the island of Crete, so it extends northwards to the Danubian regions, by a long line of territory bordering the Ægean. Thessaly, Macedonia, the ancient Chalkidike, Thrace, are Greek countries. Constantinople itself" (founded by Megarians in 667 B.C.) "is in the ethnological Hellad. Hence a complete breach of concord between the geography of races, by far the most important, and that of mountains, rivers, and climates. Hellenic Turkey, formed by so many different natural basins, has no geographical unity, except in connection with

* Elisée Reclus, *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle*, vol. i., p. 145.

the waters of the Archipelago which bathe all its shores."

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this testimony, confirmed as it is by every impartial authority on the subject. It serves to emphasise the fact that the Greek race is the only one whose right to the shores of the Ægean is, on the ground of nationality, incontestable, and that, of all the subject races of the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks alone could claim the hegemony, by virtue of former predominance as well as of actual moral force.

The superiority of the Greek genius has led some to argue in favour of a Greco-Slav Confederation, which should be independent at the same time of Turkish misrule and Russian influence. The Slavs, it is urged, whose blood is nowhere pure, are of specially mixed descent in Bulgaria and Albania; and these would amalgamate with the Greeks more readily than with the Russians. The religion of the great mass of Turkish Christians is that of the Greek Church, and it is doubtful if Ignatieff's intrigue has definitively weaned the Bulgarians from the Greek form of that Church. Again, it would be better for Europe that the Bulgarians should not be brought wholly and finally into the hands of Russia, as they will be if the Panславian theory is established, and the chance of creating a Greco-Slavonian State be thrown away. The prevalence of the Russian idea of Panславism would be injurious, not only in a political sense, but also morally, for it would substitute a Turanian and even Mongol cast of thought for the Aryan genius, which has, under the happiest auspices, become identified with the civilisation of Europe.

The argument is strong, but I do not think that we ought to be convinced by it. It is doubtless a great temptation—always supposing that a legitimate and equitable reason had been found for excluding Ottoman claims—to carve a strong kingdom out of European Turkey, extending from the Morea to the Danube, fronting the Adriatic, the Ægean, the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea, and strong enough to hold the Dardanelles and the Danube mouths as the *mandataire* of Europe. Equally great is the inducement to check, whenever we have the power to check it, the growth of an immense empire which, already holding some two-thirds of the continent, and numbering 72,000,000 inhabitants in Europe alone, threatens to absorb another 28,000,000 Slavs, and thus bring up the total of her population to 113,000,000;* an empire which, by its law of compulsory service, passed in the beginning of 1874, places nearly three millions of soldiers at the disposal of one man, which is almost the last refuge of autocratic power in the civilised world, and which is credited, by men of considerable discernment, with the desire of yet more sinister aggressions in Europe and Asia than any yet accomplished.†

One can hardly avoid saying that, if the dangers

* *St. Petersburg Kalendar*, 1876. The total has since been increased.

† Thiers, in his *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, seems almost to have lost the balance of his judgment in writing of the future of Russia. "When the Russian Colossus," he says, "shall have one foot on the Dardanelles and the other on the Sound, the Old World will have been reduced to servitude, and freedom will have fled to America. A chimera still for short-sighted politicians, these sad previsions will one day be painfully justified; for Europe, stupidly divided, as the Greek cities were in presence of the king of Macedonia, is certain some day to suffer the same fate" (vol. viii., p. 448).

of Europe from Russian aggression were really so great, no Greco-Slavonian kingdom could do much to protect Europe against them. But that which Europe may reasonably expect from a solidly-constructed State on the Ægean would in all probability be secured from a strong Greece with more ease and prospect of finality than it could be from a combination of Greeks and Slavs. Russian statesmen and diplomatists have always been conspicuous for their skill in intrigue; and it is easy to understand what would be the prospects of a Greco-Slavonian State in the presence of an ever-active Panslavonian propaganda. The difficulty, if there is any momentous difficulty, arising from the vast extent of the Russian Empire, and from its alleged desire to absorb all the Slavonian race, must be met and dealt with by Europe as seems best when the emergency arises; but it would be increased rather than diminished by involving Greece in the same toils which enfold and fetter Austria. The added force of New Greece must come from the same quarters which gave her her force in the earlier ages—from the seaboard of the Eastern Mediterranean, beginning with Epirus and Thessaly, and proceeding, as just occasion offers itself, perhaps with the Shkipetars of Albania, but certainly with Macedonia and Thrace.

When we come to inquire what is the actual numerical strength of the Greek element under Ottoman rule, and of the Greek race in general, we are met by difficulties which it is impossible wholly to surmount. The population of the Greek kingdom, according to the last census taken was 2,187,208. When we turn to Greater Greece, and

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attempt to reckon up the scattered Hellenic family in Europe and Asia, we find ourselves baffled. No trustworthy census of the Ottoman dominions has ever been taken; and the estimates made by Turkish officials and by foreign statisticians differ remarkably in respect of every portion of the empire. In 1867 the Turkish Government estimated the number of the Sultan's subjects in Europe, Asia, and Africa, at 40,000,000. An impartial estimate of the population, not including the tributary States, puts it at 28,900,000, which is considerably lower than the official reckoning. Of these twenty-eight millions there are some 3,500,000 Greco-Latins, including the Greeks proper, the Albanians, and the Zingarians.

In European Turkey alone M. Elisée Reclus * estimates the Greco-Latins at 2,800,000, and the pure Greeks alone at 1,200,000. It may be interesting to quote his ethnological classification of the races of European Turkey, in which he rests upon the authority of Lejean, Kranitz, and Crörnig:—

Slav: Serbs, Bulgarians, Russians. *Pelasgian*: Shkipetars (Albanians), Hellenes. *Latin*: Roumanians, Zingarians, Italians. *Turanian*: Turks, Tartars, Turkomans, Magyars. And, mingled amongst the other races, Armenians, Germans, Jews, Arabians, Tsiganes.

The same authority gives us the following distribution of races and religions in European Turkey, including the tributary States, in the year 1875.†

		Population.		Mahomedan.	Greek Cath.	Latin Cath.
Slavs	{	Serbs . . .	1,775,000	650,000	945,000	180,000
		Bulgarians . . .	4,500,000	60,000	4,400,000	40,000
		Russians, Ruthens,)				
		Cossacks)	10,000			
		Poles . . .	5,000			5,000

* *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle* (1875).

† *Ibid.*, vol. i., p. 238.

		Population.	Mahomedan.	Greek Cath.	Latin Cath.
Latins	(Roumanians . . .	75,000		75,000	
	(Zingarians . . .	200,000		200,000	
Greeks		1,200,000		1,200,000	
Albanians	(Guegans	600,000	400,000	50,000	150,000
	(Toscans	800,000	600,000	200,000	
Turks	(Osmanlis	1,500,000	1,500,000		
	(Tartars	35,000	35,000		
Semites	(Arabs	5,000	5,000		
	(Israelites . . .	95,000			
Armenians		400,000		20,000	
Tcherkesses		90,000	90,000		
Tsiganes		140,000	140,000		
Franks		50,000		45,000	
		11,480,000	3,480,000	7,070,000	440,000

Leaving 380,000 Armenians, 15,000 "Orthodox Christians," and 95,000 Jews.

The vast preponderance of Greek Catholics (previous to the political conversion of the Bulgarians) is a fact well worthy of our attention, for it speaks eloquently of the enduring influence of the Greek spirit amongst all the European subject races of Turkey.

The conclusion at which we might arrive, judging from these statistics alone, would be that the recognisable Greeks, in Greece and Turkey together, amounted to something under four millions—excluding the Albanians ("Pelasgians"). More liberal estimates have been made by other authorities; but the simple fact is that the precise enumeration of the Hellenic race is, in the circumstances of the case, impossible. The Greek descent is overlaid and obscured by the lapse of time, and by the blighting effect of Turkish oppression; but it is absurd to suppose that the descendants of the ancient Greeks, and of the colonists who settled on the Ægean and Levantine shores, and over the whole region of Asia

Minor, are included in the handful of men represented by the foregoing figures. Under one name or another the Greeks must be far more numerous; and let it not be forgotten that the supple genius of the race has prompted a certain proportion of the Sultan's Greek subjects to adopt the turban, for their own greater freedom and security, as men have accommodated their religious professions to their circumstances in every age and clime.

One more enumeration may be added; and it is drawn up with greater circumstantiality than any of those above quoted. This is taken from a collection of statistics recently made by M. Synvet,* a Greek resident in Constantinople, who discharged honourable functions as an Ottoman subject, and whose testimony must be looked upon as the result of a careful and unprejudiced investigation.

M. Synvet reckoned the Greeks under direct Turkish rule in the beginning of 1878 at a total of 4,324,369, the summary of his census being as follows:—

Turkey in Europe.	Thrace	728,747
	Macedonia	587,860
	Epirus	617,892
	Thessaly	247,776
	Dobrudska (formerly Preslava) and the towns on the right bank of the Danube	30,000
	Moesia, Raxia, Metochia	40,000
The Islands		724,000
Turkey in Asia Minor		1,188,094
Asia { Northern Syria, Cœlesyria, Palestine, and Phœnicia		125,000
Other Catholic Greeks, scattered		35,000
Total		4,324,369

The Turkish towns with a Greek population of 6,000 or upwards are the following:—

* *Les Grecs de l'Empire Ottoman.* Constantinople, 1878.

Constantinople *	230,000	Korytza . . .	8,400
Adrianople . .	24,450	Kastoria . . .	6,000
Philippopolis . .	10,000	Klissoura . . .	7,000
Stenimacho . .	10,182	Janina . . .	14,362
Thessalonika . .	15,000	Bitolia (Monastir) .	23,400
Rodosto . . .	6,000	Arta . . .	9,600
Khora . . .	9,000	Prevesa . . .	7,200
Kavakly . . .	6,250	Metzovo . . .	14,000
Kirk-kilissa . .	6,750	Berat . . .	8,400
Demotika . . .	6,860	Larissa . . .	7,600
Souffi . . .	7,875	Turnavo . . .	8,750
Varna . . .	8,000	Trikhala . . .	7,000
Kozani . . .	10,800	Volo . . .	6,500
Shatista . . .	7,800	Vromyri . . .	6,800

In the island of Crete there are computed to be a quarter of a million Greeks; in Cos, 120,000; in Cyprus, 90,000, and in Mitylene, 90,000; in Chios, 70,000; in Rhodes, 50,000; and in Samos, 40,000.

Now if the total population of European Turkey be compared with the several particular elements in that population, it is evident, even on the most unfavourable estimate, that the Greeks form a larger factor than any other single race. According to the statistics of the Syllogues in Constantinople, already quoted, the Greeks in Thrace are far more numerous than the Mussulmans, more than double the number of the Slavs, and about two-fifths of the total census. In Macedonia they are more than double the Mussulmans, more than five times the number of the Slavs, and more than one-half of the total population.

All these, and all of any race who are baptized into the Greek communion, we must claim for the

* The Turkish estimate of population (I avoid the use of the word "census") for Constantinople at the present moment gives about 153,000 Greeks and 385,000 Mussulmans (who include conforming Greeks) out of a total of 870,000.

sake of our argument, if we would be apt scholars of the Panslavonian theorists. The friends of Greece must not strain at a gnat whilst her rivals are swallowing a camel. Their Panhellenism must be vigorous and adventurous, if it would earn provinces and merit an empire.

Amidst the unavoidable uncertainty by which the problem is surrounded, we seem to be in possession of facts which fully justify the Greeks in their claim (on this ground alone) to the whole littoral of the Ægean.

CHAPTER III

GREEK NATIONALITY

The Principle of Nationality ; its Moral Limitations—Rights of Nationality—Distrust of the Principle—Its Application in the Case of Greece—Descent of the Modern Greeks—The Theory of Fallmerayer—Testimonies to the contrary.

ONE principle is at the basis of both Panslavism and Panhellenism, as it has been at the basis of almost every recent modification of frontiers in Europe—the principle of Nationalities. It is a keen weapon in the hands of the oppressed, cleaving through the strong arms of tyrants, and severing the bonds of mighty empires ; but it is liable to great abuse, and may serve the purposes of aggression as easily as the aspirations of a struggling people. Before we avail ourselves of it, even when our judgment assures us that the cause is just, it becomes us to inquire what are the warrants, the sanctions, the limits of a principle which has been made responsible for so many sanguinary wars.

The limits may be defined first of all, and without much difficulty, since they arise in the nature of things, and consist of recognised moral laws. The sense of justice and duty, which admits of no rival in its authority over the human mind, would have forbidden, if it had not been suppressed, some of the

most effectual operations of the principle of Nationalities during the past half-century. The conversion of the kingdom of Poland into a Russian province, the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, the appropriation of Alsace-Lorraine, were abuses, not to say negations, of the principle on which they have been nominally justified. The publicists and theorists who have applauded these acts have cited the name of nationality as though this were an all-sufficient excuse for aggression; but they have not cared to illustrate the various sanctions of the principle by applying them to the cases in point. They did not, because they could not, show, in any one of the instances referred to, that the peoples appropriated and annexed had themselves initiated movements by which the aggressors profited. They did not venture to assert that the free and spontaneous suffrage of those peoples had justified their transfer from one government to another.

The necessity of initiation on the part of the people themselves, and of a free suffrage for the expression of the popular will, is the most important limit to the just operation of this principle of Nationalities. It includes all others, and is the direct outcome of the abstract principle of justice. This is in accordance with what has already been said in regard to the justification of interventions of every kind—that they must be based on a state of things arising independently of the intervening Power, and must be undertaken for the benefit of the people interfered with. The universal suffrage of a people, *and of a people capable of exercising universal suffrage*, seems to be in general indispensable for the sanction of an act of annexation. It may indeed be admitted that

the annexation of a cognate nationality, notoriously oppressed, and having initiated a struggle for freedom, might be justifiable, even if the nationality were unable to express its will by a free and unfettered suffrage. The initiation of the struggle might then be accepted as a virtual suffrage; but in any such case as this the sanction of the concert of nations would undoubtedly be necessary, in order to cover the responsibility of the annexing Power. The question of simple intervention is different. In that case no universal suffrage seems to be necessary, even in theory. The people receives an accession of freedom, but is not asked to dispose of its liberties, or to give them in pledge to a new monarch. Whether it accepts a new government, the same in kind as it had before, but with additional guarantees, or whether it is left to form its own government, under the protection of a friendly Power, and guaranteed by treaty obligations, the intervention has been entirely beneficial to it, and the necessity for asking its sanction is excluded. But when the liberties of a people are vindicated against one monarch and immediately placed under the direct tutelage of another, then the popular vote is indispensable.

The case in which it might be proposed to erect a new State out of several provinces detached from the dominion of a common ruler—such, for instance, as a Greco-Slav State, or a Slav State including territories in which the Greek element predominated—seems to fall, for the purposes of the present argument, into the same category as an ordinary case of annexation. There would be forcible subjection of one race to another, a violation of the genuine principle of

nationality, and consequently a necessity for popular sanction. Now, universal suffrage, freely expressed, is the only just and adequate means of ascertaining the will of the nation. But the process of universal suffrage can only be honestly applied in proportion as a nation is free and enlightened. Therefore it is evident, as between Slavs and Greeks, that the will of the former could not be justly permitted to override the will of the latter.

The idea of nationality itself is limited by certain well-recognised principles, in the absence of which it is impossible to build up a coherent and stable political edifice. Publicists have formulated these principles for us over and over again. Thus Eötvös wrote: "If it be asked where is the characteristic of a national individuality, we will answer, solely in the consciousness of personal existence, and in the need of realising it." Buchez declares that "Nations are constituted by the tendency of a population towards a common end." The same thing was shrewdly expressed by Prince Jerome Napoleon, in a notable speech to his constituents at Ajaccio, in the year 1866. "What is a nationality? It is an aggregate of conditions of origin, race, customs, geography, history, language, religion, interests. It is necessary that this nationality should exist in the will of those who desire it; it is necessary, in order that a people should be worthy of acquiring a nationality, that it should know how to cement it by sacrifices."

The world was, perhaps, first familiarised with the word and the idea of "nationality" in the literary manifestation of that great national movement which raised the Germans, at the beginning

of the present century, against the Napoleonic incubus. Little by little it became a potentiality, being introduced into the diplomatic vocabulary by the people against whom it was first employed.

When Napoleon III. went to war "for an idea"—as it used to be said—in 1859, the Austrian Government formally put it to Britain whether she was prepared to admit the novel claim, and to see it applied to India, Canada, and Ireland? Lord John Russell, then Foreign Secretary, if he did not give a categorical reply to the Cabinet of Vienna, at least acknowledged, in all his utterances and dispatches, the full right of political communities to combine and govern themselves (saving the rights of others) according to their will.

Does the Europe of to-day believe that the Europe of 1859 was in the wrong? And, if not, why is she unwilling to accord to Greece the moral and physical aid which she gave to Italy? Or is she merely waiting until the Greeks have sufficiently justified their claims by insurrections and bloodshed? She has not been asked, be it once more repeated, to commit an injustice against Turkey on behalf of Greece, but only to help Greece to the utmost of her ability whenever a just occasion arises. She has not been asked to accept the principle of Nationalities in the sense in which it has been abused by more than one Continental Power, but only to give it a generous interpretation when it can be made the legitimate instrument of a righteous and beneficial act.

The principle has fallen into something like disrepute amongst us, and especially amongst democratic thinkers. Apart from its having been used as the cloak of great national crimes, it is alleged that

its operation tends to divert the peoples from more important social reforms, that it checks the development of personal liberty by excessive centralisations of power, that it renders the fusion of races more difficult, and the like. It may, however, be observed, in respect of the general question, that the need of national unity is often greater than, and antecedent to, all other needs, as was the case with Italy; and that the genuine desire of approximation in cognate races is too strong to admit of any other kind of advance until it has first been satisfied. With regard to Greece in particular, it will not be contended that her complete regeneration will retard the acquisition of individual freedom by the race. Everything combines to show that the unification of Greece would instantly and notably develop all the best qualities of the Greeks. We are justified in this belief by the actual development of the Greek Kingdom since its establishment. We are justified again by more general considerations, which affirm it as a necessary and invariable fact that the political emancipation of any race whatever implies its immediate advance in the capacity of self-government, and its speedy promotion in the scale of national power and dignity. No more striking illustration of this fact could be found than in the example of Italy, which, twenty years after the time when she was a mere "geographical expression," destitute of liberty and almost hopeless of reunion, sat as one of the Great Powers at the Congress of Europe, and raised an influential voice on behalf of the struggling nationalities of the Ottoman Empire.

Perhaps the most forcible vindication of the principle of Nationalities in its highest sense is contained

in the work of M. Maximin Deloche, published on the morrow of Italian liberation.* M. Deloche sets out by the observation that almost every war and insurrection in Europe for the past forty years has had for its cause the oppression or dismemberment of a nationality. Greece, Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Roumania, Italy, Schleswig Holstein, the Ionian Islands, had all exhibited, like the German and Pan-slavonian movements, the irrepressible force of this instinct of concentration. "The conception of the right possessed by every nation of remodelling itself in order to live according to its natural instincts or historical traditions, proclaimed by all the utterances of the publicists, has already achieved rapid progress, and impressed itself deeply on the most inattentive minds. True it is that the German is still isolated in his Germanism, the Slavonian in his Slavonianism, the Italian in his Italianism. . . . But, none the less, these several ideas, flowing from the same source, expanding in the same historical phase, almost in the same hour, and tending to the same goal, are applications of one and the same law. This law, which is passing in our day from the speculative to the positive category, which asserts itself so powerfully amongst peoples and governments—this law may be called 'affinity of race' when it assumes an ethnological instinct, and advances from the origin onward, and 'nationality' in the historical domain. Affinity of race is the brotherhood realised amongst the descendants of one and the same race of men, between tribes which have the same physical and moral type. Nationality

* Maximin Deloche, *Du Principe des Nationalités*.

is the link between groups of men which have proceeded together in the paths of civilisation, have developed their instincts in the same direction, cultivated the same aptitudes and contracted the same habits, which possess a common tradition, a common history, and in many cases a common language. In consequence of the division of these races or nations—which has taken place, now in a far-removed past, now in comparatively recent times, by brute force and by the ratification of diplomatic instruments—their fragments have persistently laboured, first underground, then in open light, to assemble themselves together again, to renew the relations which were suspended by violence, and to reconstruct their old union. This spontaneous labour, directed and accomplished by what is essentially intangible and irresistible—the conscience and the will of human agglomerations—is eminently worthy of respect and sympathy.” *

Nationality, then, according to M. Deloche's explanation of the word, is manifestly the operative energy which has incited and promoted the Hellenic regeneration. Not simply the prevalence of a “physical and moral type,” though this is significant enough, but also the common instincts, tendencies, traditions, religion, and even language, have re-converged (as yet with only partial success) to build up once more the old Hellenic influence. The same region of the earth's surface which was Hellenised two thousand years ago strives now to reassert its old Hellenic character, and appeals, in the widest and yet the most legitimate sense, to the great principle of Nationalities.

The right of the modern Greeks to claim the inheritance of the Hellenes by direct descent has been contested by more than one theorist; especially, and first, by Dr. Philip Fallmerayer, in a work, published in 1847, on the history of the Morea.* Fallmerayer's notion, which has been eagerly caught at and maintained by Russian writers, was to the effect that the Slavonic immigration, between the sixth and the fourteenth centuries, had practically extirpated the Greek stock, and that the present inhabitants were consequently a race of Slavs. It is true that the Slavonian tribes had penetrated at one time into the very heart of Greece. Even in the fourteenth century, when the Turks first entered Europe, they found a kingdom (not to call it by Stephen Dushan's grander name, an empire) of Servia, extending from Belgrade to the Gulf of Corinth. The Byzantine Empire was at this time hard pressed by its enemies. The Turks had robbed the Greeks of the whole of Asia Minor except the dominion of Trebizond, lying along the Black Sea, between the mouths of the modern Tchouruk-su and Irmak rivers. The Servian conquests fronted the Ægean between the Struma and the island of Thasos. The kingdom of Bulgaria had pushed its frontiers to the neighbourhood of Adrianople. Venice had possession of Argos, of the south-western promontory of the Morea, of Corfu, Crete, and Eubœa. The Duchies of Cephalonia, Achaia, Athens, Naxos, were in the hands of various other Powers. The Greeks at this moment retained in Europe only Byzantium, a narrow Thrace and Macedonia, a

* *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea.*

contracted Morea, and the promontory commanded by Thessalonika.*

The result of all this compression must have been to weaken the Greek element, at all events in the towns, and to produce a temporary eclipse of the Hellenic influence. But even at the worst, when the Slavonic incursions were at their strongest, the extirpation of the Greek stock was not simply improbable, it was impossible. The geographical character of the Peloponnese forbids the acceptance of Fallmerayer's theory, even if it were not discredited by other all-sufficient considerations. The German theorist seems to have been the victim of a reaction against the Philhellenic movement of his time; and, as a matter of fact, his paradox has been scouted by most writers of authority, until it is now defended, if at all, from purely political motives.

Not only do the Greeks of to-day retain all the features of their ancient nationality, but they exhibit remarkably faint traces of the Slavonic occupation.† If their ancestors were decimated, oppressed, driven into the mountains by the invaders of the sixth and following centuries, the most reasonable conclusion from existing phenomena is that they rapidly recovered from the check, absorbed and leavened the Slavs, and redescended from the mountains in order

* Mr. E. A. Freeman, in his *Ottoman Power in Europe*, gives an outline map of South-western Europe at the time of the entrance of the Ottomans.

† Fallmerayer mentions the existence of certain Slavonic names of places in Greece. Probably enough the Slavs changed a name here and there, or gave their own names to new places. But even if this argument were worth anything at all for Fallmerayer's purpose, it would be destroyed by the fact that, in almost every instance where a Slavonic name survived in Greece to a recent date, the true Greek name had survived also, preserved on the spot by Greeks themselves.

to govern their conquerors. The modern Greeks, in fact, offer a very notable instance of the persistence of type in the midst of manifold influences which might have been expected to destroy or modify it. Surrounded by Slavonians, and Slavonised Albanians, they remain a distinct and original race, and bear witness to their comparative purity by their physique, their customs, their language, their habits of life and thought. They do not "think Slavonian" any more than they look or "speak Slavonian." The Bulgarians, on the other hand, furnish us with the true character of a Slavonised race. Probably of Ugrian origin, like the Huns, having entered Europe from the East, and being undoubtedly Turanians, they have become merged in the Slavonian type. They are at this day as much Slavs, in customs and in language, as the Western Russians or the Serbs themselves. But all recent travellers in Greece have been struck by the distinctness of the Hellenic character. From Byron and Leake to About and the great majority of our contemporaries, all have recognised in modern Hellas the true descendants of the Greeks of old.

Far more important than the authority of Fallmerayer, whose theory was based on little else than a hypothesis, is the consensus of modern ethnologists and anatomists, which decides clearly in favour of the identity of the ancient and modern race of Greeks. Thus Dr. Friedrich Müller,* to take but one example, includes in his classification of the Indo-European family the following distinct branches: the Thraco-Illyrian (Albanian); the "Greek—ancient and modern;" the Slavonian, including the old Slavs,

* *Allgemeine Ethnographie*, Vienna.

Bulgarian Serbs, Slovans, Russians, Polaks, Czechs, Poles, Old Prussians, Lithuanians, and Lettonians.

It would be possible, if it were necessary, to multiply authorities on this point almost without end. Probably, however, there are very few persons in the present day who seriously contest the descent of the Greeks; and we may be content to let Edmond About conclude the argument for us in his lighter vein. About spent a couple of years in Greece more than forty years ago. He had been one of the most distinguished Greek scholars at the Paris University; he spoke Greek in its modern colloquial form, and was eminently fitted to arrive at a just and impartial view of the Hellenic question. He erred, if at all, in severity against the modern Greeks; and certainly he lost no opportunity of ridiculing the foibles of the national character.

"The Hellenic race," About wrote in 1854,* "constitutes the great majority of the population. This truth has been questioned. According to a certain paradoxical school, there are no longer any Greeks in Greece; the whole population is Albanian, that is to say, Slavonian" (for which we may read Shkipetarian). "It is easy to perceive the aim of such a doctrine, which makes of the sons of Aristides so many compatriots of the Czar Nicholas. But it is sufficient to have eyes in order to distinguish the Greeks, a refined and delicate people, from the rude Albanians. The Greek race, indeed, has degenerated very little; and these tall youths of supple gait, oval face, bright eye, lively spirit, with whom the streets of Athens swarm, are undoubtedly of the same family

* *La Grèce Contemporaine*, p. 40.

from which Phidias took his models. It is true that the War of Independence destroyed a large portion of the population ; but since her deliverance Greece has repopled herself by the accession of families of Greeks. Some of them came from Constantinople, from that famous Phanar* which has so long conducted the affairs of Turkey. It is well known that a part of the Byzantine nobility remained at Constantinople after the conquest. More learned and more clever than the Turks, these Greeks, some of whom descended from imperial blood, set about reconquering by craft what the fortune of war had robbed them of. They became the interpreters, the secretaries, the counsellors, of the Sultans ; keeping modestly in the background, in unambitious posts, they knew how to govern their masters. More than one of them rose to the rank of hospodar, that is, governor of a province ; and those who did not attain such eminence busied themselves simply in making their fortunes. There are at the Phanar more than fifty thousand Greeks who confidently await the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire, and who became rich men whilst waiting. After the War of Independence, when the Greek fatherland was born, several Phanariot families gathered round the King. They were attracted by freedom, no doubt ; but perhaps also by the creation of a court, and the hope of occupying the principal posts. The first Athenian families, the Musuris, the Soutzos, the

* “ During the seventeenth century the increased importance of the diplomatic relations of the Porte with the Christian Powers opened a new political career to the Greeks, and gave rise to the formation of a class of officials in the Ottoman service called Phanariots, from their making the quarter of Constantinople around the Patriarchate, called the Phanar, their place of residence.”—Finlay, v., 241.

Maurocordatos, the Argyropulos, &c., are Phanariot families."

The Greeks of to-day, then, are practically descendants of the Greeks of antiquity. The permanence of type is established, and, with it, the right of inheritance.

CHAPTER IV

CAUSES OF THE INSURRECTION OF 1821

The Eve of the Outbreak—The Preservation of Greek Learning—Powerful effect of this Circumstance upon the National Regeneration—Earlier Efforts—The Revolutionary Spirit—Contributory Causes—The Hetairias—Russian Philhellenes—Greece before the War—British Philhellenes—The Cession of Parga—Greek Commerce—Turkish Tyranny—Primates and Tax Farmers—Klephts and Armatoles.

THE existing Greek question in Europe arose more than a hundred years ago. It is a usual thing to say that it was created mainly by Russian intrigue. There can be no doubt that Russian agents were busy with the Greeks even as early as the time of Peter the Great; and incitements to rebellion amongst the subjects of the Porte were continued under the Empresses Anne, Elizabeth, and Catherine II., and, speaking generally, by all their successors. But Russia could not have created the discontent of the Greeks, and could not have initiated their desire for independence. It is needless to seek in foreign intrigue an explanation of what is more than adequately accounted for by Turkish misrule. The main cause of the struggles for freedom which, after generations of failure, were destined to be successful at last, is to be found in the vitality and

energy of the Hellenic race, in its superiority to the race of its oppressors, and in the constant intellectual activity which had its natural issue in revolt. Russia took advantage of a weapon which she found ready to her hand ; but that weapon was forged by humanity, not by intrigue.

The Turks themselves contributed not a little to the triumph of the subject race, by employing large numbers of Greeks in the public service, by according increased privileges to the Greek Church in Turkey, and by raising the more able Phanariots, and others of their countrymen, to the highest offices in the State. Under the Kuprilis, grand viziers in the seventeenth century, honourable and responsible posts were conferred on the Phanariots, and on several natives of the island of Chios—one of the most enlightened, because one of the least actively oppressed, portions of the old Byzantine Empire.*

The opening up of these new political duties and dignities would necessarily stimulate the ambitions

* The creation of two posts in particular, those of Dragoman of the Porte and Dragoman of the Fleet, is a remarkable instance of the discernment of the Grand Viziers ; though there can be little doubt that it was an unwise act from the point of view of a tyrant who could only govern by the sword, and who ought, therefore, to have crushed, instead of using, his most enlightened subjects. These two Dragomans were a sort of Secretaries of State for the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire, as the Voivodes of Wallachia and Moldavia were a sort of Viceroy. All these offices were filled by Phanariots, whose influence, founded especially by the Maurocordatos, Kallimakis, Hypsilantes, and Karadjas, rose to a great height at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Is it possible that the Turks of that age recognised at least one aspect of the Greek Question as it reveals itself to us in the present day ? Perceiving the intellectual superiority of their Greek subjects, both to themselves and to the aggressive races of the north, did they seek to plant them in the Transdanubian provinces as a moral barrier against the Russians and Austrians ? Such statesmanlike instincts are not rare amongst the Ottoman Turks.

of the Greeks, and make them more impatient of the Turkish yoke. As Finlay observes, "Some degree of literary instruction was necessary to enable the dependants of a great Phanariot official to attain many offices in his gift. The desire of learning was consequently extended among the people, but, unfortunately, the very object for which it was sought prevented its producing any moral improvement on the national character. Fortunately for the Greeks, other contemporary causes tended also to disseminate education from a purer source, and by revealing to the people some idea of the vicious nature of the society by which they were governed, whether Christian or Mahomedan, awakened a conviction that, until the national independence was established, no permanent improvement could be effected in the moral condition of the people."*

The influence of which Finlay speaks was hardly needed to encourage education amongst the Ottoman Greeks. It is, in fact, one of the greatest boasts of the race, and one of the strongest arguments which can be urged in their behalf, that they had maintained, in an almost unbroken line, the reality as well as the traditions of Greek learning, throughout the centuries of Turkish rule. The literary productions of their most learned men, written within this period, and published in various European towns, were both numerous and valuable.† The loss of their political and social freedom seems to have inspired the Greeks with an ardent love of letters, which they cherished all the more jealously because

* *History of Greece*, v., 245.

† Cf. A. P. Vreto, *Neohellenike Philologia*; also the chapter on Education and Literature in the present volume.

of the ignorance of their oppressors. We have abundant evidence of the existence of libraries and schools, of literary and scientific research, of vigour and continuity of thought amongst the continental and insular communities in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The first care of a wealthy Greek, anxious to contribute towards the regeneration of his fellow-countrymen, appears to have been to found a school, or to enrich a library, or to increase the sphere of influence of the clergy.* It is natural that the chief depositaries of learning should have been the ecclesiastical authorities, or the teachers of schools under ecclesiastical guidance; and it is equally natural that the bulk of the instruction given in the schools should have been based upon the style and matter of the Greek Christian fathers. This was, indeed, the only condition on which education could have been imparted to the children of the subjected race; and the clergy performed their work so well that, as Finlay says,† in spite of the political degradation of the Greeks, probably “a larger proportion of them could read and write than among any other Christian race in Europe.”‡ One

* M. Schuyler, in a letter from Constantinople in the *Athenæum*, May 18, 1878, mentions the case of the Evangelical School of Smyrna, founded by Pantoleon Sevastopoulos, in 1743, “who left it his library and small estate.”

† *History of Greece*, vi., 16.

‡ The evidence of others is less favourable; at least, in one respect. Thus Gervinus (v., 80) writes:—“As early as the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries the (ancient) Greek language had been taught in various schools at Constantinople, Chios, Janina, &c.; but only for ecclesiastical purposes; and even amongst the clergy the knowledge of ancient Greek was limited to such a narrow circle that Tournefort could tell us (in his *Voyage dans le Levant*, Letter 3, 1717) that not a dozen persons in the country possessed it.” I think that established facts warrant a presumption more favourable to Greek learning than the evidence of Tournefort.

more proof of the permanence of the type; one more justification of the neo-Hellenic claims.

It would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of this salient fact. It is the gist of the whole matter, and there would be no difficulty in showing that Greek independence has sprung virtually from Greek education. If the race had not preserved the traditions and the characteristics of its best days, and placed the same value on learning in the eighteenth century as it had done when in the zenith of its power, it would inevitably have sunk to the level of the most degraded subjects of the Porte, and would never have recovered its liberty, except, perhaps, as the vassal of another Power. The Greeks have entered upon the path of liberty because they have steadfastly clung to the dignity of education. They have found that education means power, in the best and widest sense, for they can trace their regeneration, step by step, from the school to the kingdom. A nation which, under the oppression of a grinding tyranny, could prove itself more enlightened than many of the mightiest States in Europe has deserved more than a partial emancipation; it has earned the full reversion of its ancient patrimony.

The earlier Greek struggles, previous to the War of Independence which finally shook off the Turkish yoke, were immature and abortive attempts, instigated by Russia, and having for their result to delay rather than to hasten the effectual movement.* Great

* There had indeed been other desultory attempts to raise the Greeks incited by agents from Western Europe. Thus Philippe de Comines records an abortive insurrection in the north of Greece, fostered by the emissaries of Charles VIII. of France. The Sultan

national upheavals have their natural periods of evolution, and cannot be precipitated by spurious and artificial enthusiasms. So long as the Greeks themselves were not thoroughly ripe for revolt, so long as the genuine fire burnt only in the hearts of a few pioneers and martyrs of liberty, the intrigues of Russia were hopelessly impotent. The futile war of 1770-4, undertaken by Catherine II., on the advice of her favourite, Gregory Orloff, and in direct violation of existing treaties between Russia and the Porte, was little better than a filibustering adventure, in which the Greeks bore but an insignificant part. Something more was necessary before Hellas could arise as one man, with an irresistible resolution, and with such a moral force that the European concert of nations (or what was equivalent to it) was compelled to intervene in its favour. The intellectual battle had to be fought out before the battle of material force could be attempted; and the crisis of that intellectual battle was to be brought on by the French Revolution.

Of all the enduring benefits conferred upon Europe by the Revolution of 1789, none was more auspicious than its development of the cause of Greece. Not only were the Greek patriots stimulated to renewed hope and vigour by the grand spectacle of a nation shaking off its chains—I speak especially of the first three years of the Revolution, and of the period immediately antecedent to the meeting of the Assembly—but simultaneously, and throughout Europe, the

was warned of the mischief from Venice, and nipped it in the bud. After that Charles de Gonzague and Cleves, Duke de Nevers, and seventh in descent from Andronicus the Old, Emperor of the East, made an equally unsuccessful attempt. See Vreto, *Life of Kolokotronis*, p. 11.

ideas of the Philhellenes assumed the conviction and the force of maturity. From the French initiative we may trace most of the conquests of liberty which signalised the earlier decades of the present century ; and if the fruits of that glorious new growth were not to be reaped in Greece for thirty years after the seed had been sown, this was only because the Greeks had to wait and suffer, in common with the rest of Europe, until the terrible recoil from that great shock had passed away.

It was barely six years from the signature of the Treaty of Paris when the Greeks threw down the gauntlet. Naples and Spain, as we have seen, claimed their liberties about the same time, and were reduced to silence by Austria and France. But with Greece and Turkey the case was different. The self-constituted vicegerents of fate, who met at Laybach and Verona to protect their own tyrannies by perpetuating those of others, were no longer of one accord in dealing with this question. Russia had an interest in the weakening of Turkey, and, without Russia, Austria and Prussia were not likely to interfere. Great Britain, who had protested mildly at Laybach, and firmly at Verona, against the suppression of a nation's liberty, was not hard to persuade when the question was one of popular emancipation. Never for many years together has Britain contrived to assure herself and the world that she is anything but the most liberal and democratic of nations. She has allied herself with despots, and truckled to tyrants, but only in unworthy moments of reaction and self-forgetfulness. Herself indissolubly wedded to the supremacy of the popular will, having always rejected, without hysterical passion or undue violence, the

undue presumptions of monarchical prerogative, her generosity has rarely been appealed to in vain by a nation struggling against its oppressor. Appealed to now by Greece, she listened soberly * to her claim—not by virtue of, but in spite of, Russia's advocacy.

The question presented to Europe was one between the tyranny of Turkey, hated by all freemen, which had never cared to make itself friends amongst its fellow-tyrannies, and Greece, the land of the Hellenes, of a race which had renewed its youth with the rejuvenescence of Europe itself, and which demanded to be free amongst the first of the liberated peoples. It was impossible not to recognise the justice of this demand. There was a solidarity between Greece and Europe which every enlightened man, every man whose mind had been emancipated by the ideas of the epoch, felt and acknowledged as a matter of course. Europe, in fact, was passing through a new Renaissance; and in this Renaissance Greece and Italy had a special right to participate. The sixteenth century had witnessed a Renaissance of letters; in the nineteenth century political action reinforced learning, and the new birth was to regenerate nations as well as literatures. It had been so in France; it had been so, after a different fashion, in Germany and Britain; and it had been so in Greece. The political revolution had been preceded by a literary revolution; and this last was practically a fresh literary Renaissance. Evolved in England, where men revolted against a spurious dogmatism

* Very soberly, it is true. The epoch was one of reaction, so far as our Government was concerned; but the people heard the voice of the Greeks. It was the age of Castlereagh; but it was also the age of Canning.

and a feeble Teutonic classicalism, the new ideas were destined to come to maturity in France, and there to be translated into the language of action.* In Greece, the schools, the printing press, the ecclesiastical teaching, the Hetairias, displayed a literary rather than a philosophical activity; but their activity in the eighteenth century was unquestionably cognate with the activity of English and French ideas.

Gervinus, centering his attention on the revival of letters amongst the Greeks, and perhaps making too little of the southward revolutionary current, maintains that "neither the efforts of Latin Christianity during two hundred years, nor the dreams of the Greek Church for more than a century, nor the French Republicans, nor the French Imperialists, nor the Italian Carbonari, were to give back their freedom to the Greeks. . . . We shall see at work the savage and anarchical resistance of the Albanians and the Suliots, the strength of the klephts amongst the Greeks themselves, the audacious ambition of the Phanariots, the power of Ali Pasha and Mehemet Ali,

* "Although born in England, the philosophy of the eighteenth century could not develop itself in England; the fever for demolition and reconstruction remained superficial there, and momentary. Deism, atheism, materialism, scepticism, ideology, the theory of the return to nature, the proclamation of the rights of man, all the temerities of Bolingbroke, Collins, Toland, Tindal, and Mandeville, the bold ideas of Hume, Hartley, James Mill, and Bentham, all the revolutionary doctrines, were so many conservatory plants, produced here and there in the isolated studies of a few thinkers; in the open air they proved abortive, after blooming for a little time under the too vigorous competition with the old vegetation. . . . On the contrary, in France, the seed imported from England takes root and spreads with extraordinary vigour. . . . This is owing to the seed having fallen on suitable ground, that is to say, on the patrimony of the classic spirit. In this land of the *raison raisonnée* it no longer encounters the rivals that impeded its growth on the other side of the channel."—Taine, *L'Ancien Régime*, bk. iv., ch. 1.

which operated sometimes in favour of, and sometimes against, the Greeks. But all these causes would not have had a decisive bearing on the success of the insurrection; everything depended on the recovery to an intellectual and moral life of that nation which, after its political ruin, had already made the European world young again, and which now compelled Europe to take an interest in its political resurrection. In their essential parts, that recovery and that rejuvenescence were potentially present in the inner and remarkable development of the Greeks which had displayed itself for the first time during the reforms of Mustapha Kœprili, but which became a splendid tree only when the weather favourable to the growth of the revolution supplied its offspring with a more abundant nourishment." * A little further on Gervinus strikes the true note. "Since the French Revolution the common aim and centre of action had been found which had been lacking before, and towards which every movement in the moral and material progress of the nation was to be directed. It was the idea of the political recovery of the fatherland which, like an electric spark, touched all the isolated elements, with their divergent forces, suddenly fused them, and made of them a homogeneous whole."

In 1770 the Greeks had failed, because they were fighting (or were not fighting) for Russia. In 1821 they succeeded, because then, for the first time, they fought for each other.

Throughout the last decade of the last century, and the two earlier decades of the present century, the friends of Greece were impatiently looking forward to

* *Geschichte des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, v., 79.

her deliverance. Young Greeks at the universities of Europe, or travelling in almost every foreign country, were cheered by the generous fire of sympathy, and returned to their homes with renewed confidence. At Jena, Schiller challenged his Greek hearers to strike a blow for national freedom. Men hoped that the wide conflagration of the revolutionary wars would reach Greece also, where "the landing of a single French regiment would have roused the whole land to revolt." * The conflagration died out at last, and the Treaty of Vienna had nothing to say to Greece except by placing the Ionian Islands—bandied about from Venice to France, from France to Russia, and back again—under a British protectorate. Even this the Greeks were fain to accept as a happy augury; for they began to look to England for their complete deliverance.

It was during this period of thirty years that Philhellenism became a mighty moral power, more especially in England. Greece was one of the few places on the Continent which English travellers could safely visit, and they resorted in considerable numbers to the Morea, the Ionian Islands, and the Archipelago, as well as to Albania. "Athens," says Gervinus, "became a rendezvous for foreigners, and a colony of scientific men. By the side of the archont Logothetis, called the modern Pericles, on account of his

* I am here following Gervinus.—During the Napoleonic wars the influence of Russia was rather sinister than favourable to the Greeks. The Czar Alexander had quarrelled with Turkey in 1805, thus driving the Sultan Selim into the arms of the French. Napoleon had already seized Illyria; it would have been easy for him to overrun the Ottoman dominions; and, indeed, he had at one time entertained the idea. But in the long run the enemy of Russia was his friend; and this may have seemed to him a sufficient reason for letting Turkey alone. The Greek armatoles did attempt an insurrection; but it was ill-supported and easily suppressed.

charming and witty conversation, Lord Guildford* was for some time the centre of society. Later on, he used his large fortune, and all the resources of his mind, for the purpose of stimulating the national spirit amongst the Ionians; and he won amongst the Greeks themselves the title of 'greatest and thrice greatest of Philhellenes.'"

Greek writers were not idle in this preparatory movement. Amongst them was the savant Koraes, who, in 1803, read before the Society of the Observers of Man, at Paris, a memoir "on the present state of civilisation in Greece," which contained one of the earliest direct assertions of the necessity for national emancipation. But it was in the Hetairias especially that the intellectual activity of the Greek patriots and the Philhellenes found its full and free expression. The first of these societies, the "Hetairia of Philomuses," was perhaps founded with a genuine, though not with an exclusively literary, aim. It was inaugurated at Vienna by Count Capo d'Istria,† and its object was described as being the creation of schools in Greece, and the cultivation of a taste for classical art by the opening of museums and libraries. The headquarters were removed to Athens in the year 1814, under the patronage of many of the distinguished persons of every nationality who had assembled with the Congress at Vienna. Another similar association, under the name of the "Literary Society," had been founded in 1810 by the metropolitan Ignatius, at Bucharest, and was specially promoted and assisted

* Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands.

† Capo d'Istria was a native of Corfu. He is a prominent figure in the history of Greek regeneration.—See on the Hetairias, Gervinus, v., 123; Finlay, vi., 97; Bougeault, iii., 525; Philemon and Xanthos amongst Greek historians.

by Russians. Bucharest was already the home of Greek learning, thanks to the Phanariot Voivodes, who, whatever their faults may have been, had left this amongst other proofs of the superiority of their race. Here also, in 1811, Anthimos Gazis had started the *Learned Mercury*,* a magazine of modern Greek literature, in which the neo-Hellenic spirit was vividly displayed.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the opinions of Europe on the true character of the relations between Russia and Turkey were very much the same as they are to-day. The suspicion of Russian motives was perhaps not quite so pronounced; but then, as now, it was steadfastly believed that the Government of St. Petersburg was aiming at the dismemberment of Turkey, at the possession of Constantinople, at a Mediterranean boundary; and then, as now, the majority of statesmen perceived in the constant interventions and intrigues of Russia few better motives than the advancement of a selfish ambition. It was not surprising that the less enthusiastic minds, starting with this idea, saw the hand of the Russian Government in the new literary associations of the Greeks. The hand of the Russian Philhellenes was undoubtedly there; and in respect of another society, the "Philike Hetairia" of Odessa, it is placed beyond question that official Russia gave it countenance and support. That the active propaganda carried on by the Hetairists contributed not a little to the outbreak of the insurrection of the Greeks, in 1821, can hardly be contested.† Strange to say, the British consuls in

* Λόγιος Ἑρμῆς.

† The semi-political, semi-literary clubs of revolutionary Paris very probably, as Finlay observes, suggested these societies, secret or open,

the Levant were the only foreign agents who, having had the opportunity of watching this propaganda, shut their eyes, as late as 1820, to the approach of an inevitable Russo-Greek attack upon the Porte.

There was a large and prosperous colony of Greeks at Odessa in the year 1814, when the Philike Hetairia was founded.* Finlay tells us that the first members were "bankrupt merchants and intriguing adventurers, possessed of some cunning and great enthusiasm"; and few historians have found anything better to say of the wilder and more restless spirits who made themselves conspicuous in the earlier conduct of the association. Russian and even Greek writers have naturally said all that it was possible to say on behalf of these men; but the wiser patriots of the time knew that little was to be gained from the assistance of hare-brained fanatics who talked of burning Constantinople, assassinating the Sultan and his ministers, and exterminating the Mahomedan population. Desperate remedies of that kind come of overheated passions, and in the emergencies of revolutions. They are not calmly plotted beforehand, except by the enemies of human society.

Gervinus† shows how much reason there is to conclude that the Russian Government was at an early period cognisant of the existence and objects of the Odessa Hetairia. In 1816 its headquarters were removed to Moscow, whilst its very existence was

of the Philhellenes. The name of the Odessa Hetairia, Φιλική 'Εταιρία (*subaudi* τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἐπανάστασεως), carries us back to the *Société des Amis du Peuple*, and the like.

* The origination of the scheme is credited to Nicholas Skuphas, a native of Arta.


† *Geschichte*. v., 123.

unknown to all save a few of the Greeks resident in Turkey. The members were recruited from the Hellenic communities in Odessa and Moscow, and from travellers passing through these cities, who were initiated by the leaders of the association, and taught its watchword—"the armed union of all the Christians of the Turkish Empire, for the purpose of making the Cross triumph over the Crescent." A Thessalian, named Perrhaibos,* was thus initiated as he was on his way to St. Petersburg. In 1817 he presented to the Czar Alexander, through the good offices of the diplomatist Stourdza, "a new scheme for a rising of the Greeks." One of the companions of his voyage, also initiated in the secrets of the Hetairia, was Nicholas Galatis, of Ithaca; "a vain swindler who gave himself out for a count, and a delegate of the Greeks, who opened his negotiations with so much imprudence that he was arrested by the police and conducted to Moldavia. On the same night Perrhaibos was likewise arrested. But—a significant fact—not only was the latter immediately set at liberty, after receiving a compensation in money, but the Consul-General at Jassy, Pini, was directed to give his protection and pecuniary help to the swindler Galatis, so that, 'as a member of an association which aimed at shaking the Ottoman yoke,' he might not suffer at the hands of the Turks." This looks as though the Hetairists already had powerful friends at the Russian court; and, at all events, from that moment the propaganda received a wide extension in Southern Russia and the Danubian provinces. The sham Count Galatis

* He had incited the Suliots to revolt in 1814; and in the following year he published a history of that brave and unfortunate race.


was worth appeasing. The first thing he did at Jassy was to win over the consul's interpreter, George Leventis, a Peloponnesian. Leventis was not content with adopting the idea of an insurrection; he wanted to make it forthwith a reality. By way of a beginning he set himself to promote a rising in Servia, and for that purpose invited Kara George, the expelled prince of that country, to Jassy, where he managed to supply him with means. The attempt was made, in connection with a more serious movement in Moldavia, and proved abortive. This "tragical prelude of the Greek Revolution," says Gervinus, "a prelude put upon the stage and enacted by the Phanariot Hypsilantes, who had submitted himself to Russian inspirations," ended in "the atrocities inseparable from every Turkish occupation or triumph." From this moment all eyes were turned upon the Greeks; for it was understood that the next act in the drama of emancipation was to be played in Greece.

Before proceeding to pass under review the events of the War of Independence, and of the establishment of the Greek kingdom, it may be well to glance at the actual condition of the subjected Hellenic race immediately before the insurrection. It may be at once admitted that the Greeks in Turkey were by no means specially or universally oppressed at the beginning of the present century. We have already seen that their intellectual superiority and industry had gained for them many exemptions and privileges which were not enjoyed by any other subject race. They had honourable careers thrown open to them; they had the opportunities of making and enjoying large fortunes; their religion was treated with some



VALE OF TEMPE (THESSALIAN FRONTIER).

[To face p. 96.]



toleration by their Mahomedan rulers; their right of self-education, and in some cases of self-government, was generally respected. In certain parts of the empire the Greeks were in a better material condition than their Mahomedan fellow-subjects. No doubt this fact was due principally to the Greeks themselves, and in part even to the loose and ill-organised system of Turkish government; but it was something that, amidst the characteristically blighting despotism of Ottoman rule, there could exist here and there a practically independent district or community. One cause more than any other contributed to produce this result, and it was that the collection of the taxes was chiefly managed for the Porte by Greek officials. From the Phanariots in the capital to the humblest clerks and farmers of taxes, the administration of the empire was largely carried on by the shrewd, methodical, business-like and fairly trustworthy Greeks. Not only in this respect, but also on account of the ecclesiastical authority wielded by the Patriarch of Constantinople over a large number of the Sultan's subjects, the Government found it advisable to leave considerable power in their hands; and thus the Greeks throughout the empire enjoyed a general immunity which they would certainly not have retained if the administration had been confided wholly to Mahomedans.

Again, the Porte saw in the Greek population something more than a recruiting-ground for administrators and clerks. Commerce, agriculture, the navy, were crowded by skilful and successful Greeks. The Greek merchants and farmers of Southern Turkey and the Archipelago paid a considerable share of the



revenues of the empire. The pashaliks of the Morea, of Thessalonika, of Crete, and of the Coast were amongst the most valuable districts of the whole of Turkey, and it was not worth the Porte's while to interfere (except by occasionally increasing the imposts) with such lucrative sources of its annual income.

Another fact helps to account for this comparative prosperity and immunity of the Greeks. Russia had imposed upon Turkey, in the famous treaty of Kainardji (1774), her right of protecting the Christian subjects of the Porte. By the seventh article of that treaty the Sultan undertook to permit the free exercise of the Christian religion, and to listen to the special representations of the Russian Government on behalf of the co-religionists of Russia. The constant interference of the Russian embassy between the Mahomedan rulers and their Christian subjects—an interference which was soon emulated by most of the other European Powers—has done more than anything else to hasten the decline of the Ottoman Government.

If, however, the Greeks in Turkey had some reason to congratulate themselves on the fact that they were not often, or as a race, subjected to the brutality of their semi-barbarous masters, they were never able to forget for a long time together that they were at the mercy of the cruel caprices of a tyrant. The very uncertainty and inequality of their condition prevented the most prosperous amongst them from being content with their lot. "At Constantinople," Finlay observes,* "the Greek was a crouching slave; at Bucharest and Yassi, a despotic

* *History*, vi., 7.

tyrant; at Chios, a happy subject; and at Psara, and in the villages of Mount Pelion, a free citizen." The fact is instructive, especially when read in the light of subsequent history, which shows us that it was precisely in the most well-to-do portions of the empire—in the Morea, in Crete and other islands of the *Ægean*—that the most desperate struggles have taken place to cast off the Turkish yoke. It is another proof of the statement that the education and elevation of the Hellenic race have been the principal causes of its recovery of freedom. It is not when the victims of oppression are most abject, and most bitterly crushed, that they are ripest for insurrection and deliverance, but when the dignity of humanity exerts the strongest dominion over them. Not the crouching slave, but the man who has found it impossible to remain a slave, deserves and is able to be free.

Finlay reproaches many of the wealthy Greeks with supineness at the moment of the national struggle for liberty. "Great as the ecclesiastical, literary, and commercial influence of the Greek race really was in European Turkey," he says, * "the events of the Greek Revolution showed that the influence of Greek nationality had been greatly overrated by the Greeks themselves. . . . A large part of the Greek nation made but feeble efforts to aid their countrymen when struggling for independence. The literary powers of the learned created a loud echo of patriotism; but thousands of wealthy Greeks continued to pursue their own schemes of interest and profit, under the protection of the Sultan's Government, during the whole period of the Greek Revolu-

* *History*, p. 8.

tion." Finlay's depreciation of the national sentiment was probably based upon his own observation ; * but we are fairly entitled to question the accuracy of his deduction from the particular cases of indifference which may have come under his notice. After a war of several years' duration, maintained against every effort which the Ottoman generals could put forth, it may be questioned whether any foreign observer can be justified in reproaching " a large part of the Greek nation " with lukewarmness, or in stigmatising the circumspection of prominent Greek subjects in other portions of Turkey, whose situation would necessarily be precarious, as the grossest selfishness.

We have every reason for concluding, from indisputable facts, that the Greek nation as a whole deserved the warm sympathy which it commanded throughout Europe, as soon as it had committed itself to its desperate struggle with the Turks. And if we consider the inequality of this struggle, the vast sacrifices which it imposed upon the entire population of Greece proper, the paralysing brutality of the Ottoman troops whenever chance brought them a temporary victory, and the danger incurred by all Greeks outside the limits of the actual insurrection, it is impossible not to admire the gallantry of the movement, and an ungrateful task to fix our eyes upon isolated instances of abstention.

Europe unquestionably hailed the promise of Greek regeneration with enthusiasm ; and Britain, though perhaps the slowest of the Great Powers to give the struggling nationality her countenance and hearty

* Unless, as Mr. Tozer says in a note to Finlay's autobiography, it was the result of his disappointment with the progress made by the Kingdom of Greece after 1830.

support, was eventually the most efficient instrument in assuring its success. As it was in the past, so it may be—almost inevitably will be—in the future. There are, indeed, several reasons which explain the first reluctance of the British Government to take part in the liberation of Greece. Distrust of Russia, a doubt whether Greece would ever be strong enough to use her power in an independent manner, and an unwillingness to weaken Turkey in the important position which she occupied in the East, were motives already influential with British statesmen, though far from being as potent as they have since become. The Philhellenes of the earlier phase were mostly liberal-minded scholars, poets, and travellers, whose ideas asserted themselves in literature, but were slow to exercise an influence over politics. Up to the death of Lord Castlereagh, in 1822, it was useless for the Greeks to expect any assistance, direct or indirect, from the British Foreign Office; and even the influence of Canning was exerted for little else than the patching up of a peace between Turkey and her rebellious subjects. Public opinion, which had begun to express itself very forcibly in favour of popular liberties in England, was not yet instructed and trained to the point of enthusiasm for Greek liberties. Our grandfathers knew next to nothing of Greece. For the mass of the nation there was no such thing as an Eastern Question, whilst their knowledge of the relations existing between Turkey and Greece might have been summed up in a sentence. Even those who made some effort to discover the truth, and who for that purpose consulted the records of travellers, must have been puzzled to know whether their sympathies ought to be with the

Turks or with the Greeks, so sorry a picture was drawn by many writers of the patriots in their own country. The battle of Navarino itself was not generally approved in England; and it contributed largely to the fall of the Canning-Goderich Administration, and to the return to office of the Duke of Wellington, with his blank negation of popular claims.

How little the British Government, in the time of Castlereagh's greatest influence, was disposed to assist the cause of the Greeks may be seen from the history of Parga, the surrender of which town to the Turks, in 1819, reflects anything but credit on the perversely scrupulous foreign policy which was responsible for it. The Ionian Islands had been ceded by Venice to France in 1797. Three years later they were seized by a combined force of Russians and Turks, and a special convention nominally gave back to the Ottoman dominion all the former Venetian possessions on the coast, including Prevesa and Parga. Ali Pasha, of Janina, alternately a servant and a rebel to the Sultan, had already occupied the places in question, with the exception of Parga. The Porte's jealousy of Ali Pasha induced it to wink at the resistance offered to him by this town, and to leave it in the enjoyment of its liberal institutions; so that, in effect, Parga was undisturbed up to the peace of 1815. At that time the French garrison in Corfu, being called upon to surrender the island to the English, secretly invited Ali Pasha to enter Parga, on the opposite coast. An English force from Zante, however, lost no time in occupying the town; and the British Government, being called upon by the Porte to carry out the terms of the Russo-Turkish

convention of 1800, raised objections, and protracted the negotiations for four years.

The inhabitants of Parga themselves protested vigorously against being handed over to the Turks, and especially to Ali Pasha, whose cruelties had rendered him an object of aversion. They declared that they would leave their homes rather than exchange their independence for the tyranny of Turkish rule; and when the cession was actually resolved upon, the bulk of them fulfilled their threat, and emigrated to the islands, under circumstances "of the most tragical character." * Britain was able to secure for them a compensation from the Porte of £150,000; but this did not prevent bitter complaints and reproaches being levelled against her. In regard to Parga, there was evidently no reason why the convention of 1800, between Russia and Turkey, which dealt with territory belonging to neither the one nor the other of them, which was set aside by the Treaty of Tilsit, in 1807, which had never been acted upon by the Porte, and which was in any case superseded by the cession of the Ionian Islands to England in 1815, should have been considered binding upon Great Britain. Parga seems to have passed to and fro with Corfu—and it certainly passed so in the year 1800. We find the French claiming to dispose of it on the occasion of the surrender of Corfu to the British. It was probably the jealousy of the Continental Powers, who were unwilling to leave Britain in possession of a fortress on the mainland, which prompted the Porte to insist upon the surrender of Parga. It might have been infinitely better for Europe, and for Britain in

* Finlay, v., 227; Perrhaibos.

particular, if Castlereagh had steadfastly declined to abandon a position commanding Epirus and the whole of the Greek peninsula. Such a course was dictated by reasons of policy, and was certainly no more forbidden by international probity than the cession of the islands. If it had been followed, there would have been something to hand over to Greece, in 1864, more valuable to her than the Ionian Islands.

One result of this lamentable retrocession was that the refugees of Parga, settling chiefly in the Ionian Islands, there formed a nucleus of discontent, or at all events added largely to the discontent already created by the rule of the British Government and their Lord High Commissioners.* The soreness never wore off, from that moment until the plebiscite of 1864 declared enthusiastically for re-union with the mother country.

Finlay says, † in reference to the cession of Parga, and to the general indignation provoked by it:—“Perhaps public opinion is not unjust when it blames the acts of a free Government for violations of the principles of abstract justice, which it would praise as wise and politic measures if they were adopted by a despotic prince. Men habitually arraign the free before the tribunal of equity; slaves and despots they judge by the exigencies of expediency and policy. Truth and justice ought always to penetrate to the hearts of free men, but they are not expected to find an echo in the breasts of princes

* The first of these, Sir Thomas Maitland, nicknamed “King Tom,” was extremely unpopular. Lord Guildford was a genuine Philhellene, and did much to reconcile the inhabitants to their new masters.

† *History*, v., 277. Finlay’s work was last revised by the author in 1863.

and statesmen. The severe criticism of English policy is the eulogy of English liberty. The conduct of the English Government in the Ionian Islands has, however, neither been wise nor liberal: though it has administered justice with equity, and protected industry and commerce, it long opposed the liberty of the press. The chief ground of its unpopularity nevertheless is, that it has checked the movements of those who desired to cause an insurrection of the Greeks in Turkey. . . . But the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands have no good reason to complain, for if the English Government has not performed its duty, the nobles and the people of the Ionian Islands have completely neglected theirs. They have not availed themselves of the liberty they have so long enjoyed for improving their moral condition, and for attaining a moral and intellectual superiority over the other Greeks who were subject to the Sultan. All foreign domination appears to have exerted a baneful influence on Greek morality." Finlay is, at least by implication, bitter against both the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands and those of the Greek mainland—against the first because they disliked British rule, and against the last because they plotted to cast off the oppression of the Turks; and yet in both cases he admits the domination to have been baneful. He condemns the Greeks for being corrupt under foreign tyranny, but he is unable to sympathise with them when they insist on demanding their freedom. Greece is entitled to appeal to a more generous tribunal.

Britain owes to Greece a reparation for the wrong done to her children at Parga. In 1819 she subjected a prosperous community to the worst of all

tyrannies, with the sole alternative of exile.* The time is approaching, if it has not fully arrived, when she may assist in drawing together the Greeks from the Ægean to the Balkans, from Parga to Macedonia and Thrace. Autonomy may serve the ends of compromise; but the nineteenth century can hardly pass away without extending the sceptre of the Greek kingdom over all the Greeks in Europe.†

Amongst the clearest symptoms of the fitness of the Greeks for independence was the condition of their commerce during the half-century preceding the establishment of the new dominion. It was not only by intellectual, but also by moral and physical superiority to their oppressors that the rejuvenescent race were to earn their freedom. The commercial industry of the Greeks, at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, was phenomenal; it has been admitted and described by many writers, by no means partial to the nation as a whole.‡ Their manufactures, their agriculture, their shipping, responded to a common stimulus, due partly to the Russian protection after the Treaty of Kainardji, and partly to the natural genius and power of recovery in the race. By the terms of the commercial treaties entered into between Russia and the Porte, in the years 1779 and 1783, the right of Russian interference on behalf of the Greek Christians was supplemented by the immunity of Greek property under the Russian flag; and thus

* The £150,000 went to the owners of property—not to the mass of the people who had no title-deeds, but only patriotism, and independence, and other unmarketable possessions.

† I let the paragraph stand as it was written in 1878. Time may confute us—it cannot make us unsay our aspirations.

‡ Finlay, v., 281; and (as quoted by him) Beaujour, Clarke, Leake.

the Greek merchants were enabled to carry on a large trade in the Mediterranean, in the Black Sea, and even as far as British ports, under both Russian and Turkish protection. During the long European wars, vast profits were in this way secured by Greek exporters, and by the mercantile navy plying between the mainland, the islands, and foreign ports. This industrial development was woefully interfered with by the long War of Independence; but it contained a promise which has since been fulfilled in the commercial records of New Greece.

It is not to Englishmen that one need insist upon the large influence which this extended commerce must have had upon the aspirations of the Greeks for an independent national existence, nor upon the manner in which the machinery of trade would avail the cause of regeneration and freedom.

It would be superfluous, as already pointed out, to look for the causes of the Greek insurrection with the expectation of finding evidences of desperate cruelty on the part of the Turks, or desperate suffering on the part of the Greeks. Both these things we should undoubtedly meet with in the Greece of 1800 to 1820, but they were not the immediate causes of the outbreak. These causes were, first, the regeneration of the race, the influence of modern ideas, the elevation and enrichment of thousands of Greeks; and next, the fomentation of all such causes by Philhellenism and Hetairism, by a propagandism exerted both from within and from without—most actively from Russia, who, in so far as her motives were selfish, saw her own advantage in any limitation of the Ottoman power, even if it resulted in the aggrandisement

of a nation whereof she had every reason to be prospectively jealous. But it cannot be too often repeated that much more is necessary, in order to stir up a national insurrection, than the intrigues and money of foreign agencies. No influence and no bribes would suffice to create the animosity of a race, much less to plunge a country into civil war, if there were not, to begin with, the two conflicting and irreconcilable elements of oppressors and oppressed, and if the wrongs of the oppressed were not already deep enough to have forced them to the brink of desperation. That this was so with the Greeks, as it has been so with all the Christian races subjected to Ottoman rule, it is useless to deny.

One form alone of the tyranny exerted by the Turks over their victims—although it had disappeared more than a century before the outbreak of the Greek War—would explain any insurrection, however ruthless, and after however long an interval of time. The tribute of children, exacted by the Ottoman conquerors when they could not extort a tribute in money or in chattels, surpassed in subtle cruelty almost every diabolical device which it has entered into the mind of a tyrant to conceive. Whatever the purpose to which the ravished Christian children were put—and it was not only the Janissaries who were recruited from this source—the life-blood of the subject races was drained from them by Sultan Orkhan's obscene institution. Thus to the barbarous cruelty itself were added the enervation and emasculation of the race. The Greeks, in common with the Bulgarians and the Slavs, were held in bondage by their own children and brethren. For generation after generation there was scarcely a house in which there

was not one dead—dead, at least, to the ties of home and kindred. Were injuries like this capable of being forgotten?

There was in Greece, under the Turkish rule, an aristocracy of wealth, and partly of talent, which went by the name of the *kodja-bashis*, or primates, corresponding somewhat to the *publicani* of the Roman tributary provinces. They farmed the taxes under the Turkish beys, generally subletting them to petty authorities in the several communities within their districts. The taxes fell, as a rule, nominally upon the whole population; but the Mahomedans were usually strong enough to throw the burden upon their Christian fellow-subjects, who were thus made to support, by their unremitting labours, the entire edifice of plunder and extortion, from the lazy Mussulman farmer to the cadis, the *kodja-bashis*, the beys, the metropolitan officials, and the Sultan himself. The two great divisions of tax-payers were the rural and the urban populations—including the shepherds, the mountaineers, the muleteers (who, in a country destitute of canals, navigable rivers, and almost of roads, were a numerous and important class), the tradesmen of the municipalities, and the merchants of the seaports.

The taxes consisted principally of the levy of tenths in kind on the gross produce, which of course became far more than tenths when the stipulated tax of a given district had to be supplied by a limited number of Christian tax-payers; an additional levy of grain for the provision of the capital; and the *haratch*, or poll-tax, which, as a matter of course, frequently gave rise to the most galling tyranny.

There were two other classes of the Greek popu-

lation which played a prominent part in the history of the country—the klephts and armatoles. The klephts, or brigands, who had established themselves in the mountainous districts, were not simply robbers, urged by greed and ferocity to turn their hands against their fellow-men. They included most of those who had fled from the cruelties of the Turks or the brutality of the tax-gatherers; and it is not to be wondered at that they gradually came to be regarded with a feeling of romantic interest and admiration, as patriots and popular champions rather than as the scourges of society. The national songs of the War of Independence, and of the generations preceding it, give ample evidence of the existence of such a feeling. Guarded as their language usually is, and concealing quite as much as it reveals the patriotic sentiment of the writers, there can be no doubt that they were sung by thousands of Greek men and maids with a full appreciation of the spirit which dictated them.

The *armatoloi*, or men-at-arms, were instituted in various localities in the old Byzantine Empire, in order to insure that protection against anarchy or invasion which the later emperors were powerless to provide for their subjects. After the Ottoman incursions many of the mountain districts submitted to the Sultans only on condition of being allowed to retain their local privileges,* which, it would seem, were not unlike the *fueros* of the Basque provinces in Spain. It was in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, especially, that the armatoles were tolerated by the Turks, long after they had been suppressed, or had died out, in other districts; but towards the end of

* Finlav. vi., 20.

the eighteenth century a determined effort was made to destroy the system. The pashas of Janina were appointed from amongst the Albanian Mussulmans with a special view to this end. Ali of Tepelen, who became dervendji pasha * in 1787, was cruelly efficient in the work ; and amongst his devices was the secret encouragement of the klephts, in order to provide a pretext for introducing Albanian mercenaries amongst the armatoles, nominally to strengthen, but virtually to assimilate them. At the same time he appointed the bravest klephts to commands amongst his Christian guards ; whilst, on the other hand, his policy drove many armatoles to fall back into the ranks of the klephts. Thus it happened that klephts and armatoles came to be confounded by the Greek population, who began to look on both alike as representing the spirit of opposition to Turkish rule. These two classes of Greeks were subsequently famous for the part which they took in the War of Independence.

* One of his principal duties being to guard the dervends, or mountain passes, from the ravages of the klephts.

CHAPTER V

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Weakness of Turkey—Ali of Janina—The Danubian Revolt—The Massacre in the Morea—Character of the Struggle—Turkish Reprisals—Sultan Mahmoud—The Murder of the Greek Patriarch—Intervention of the Powers—1821 and 1876—British Interests—Rupture between Russia and Turkey—Progress of the Greeks—Declaration of Independence—The Greeks disavow the Foreign Intriguers.

TURKEY has been falling to pieces any time during the past century ; and, since the Treaty of Vienna, there have been few statesmen who believed it possible that the empire of the Sultans in Europe could endure. Not only had the Porte failed to obtain a place amongst the European community of nations ; not only had the Great Powers at Vienna and Paris left Turkey outside the scheme of reconstructed Europe ; not only had the Mahomedans shown themselves incapable of assimilating, or being assimilated by, their Christian fellow-subjects, but the oppressed races had learned a lesson from France which the more capable of them were quick to put to the proof. Self-respect and self-reliance were all that was needed to give liberty to the Servians, the Roumanians, the Greeks. The sacred right of rebellion had come almost as a revelation to the victims of Turkish misrule ; and no

sooner had they recognised that to cast off a cruel yoke was a solemn duty, justifying insurrection, than they became, from that very moment, practically free. It was no longer a question of underhand intrigue, nourished by foreigners, but rather a noble struggle and a holy war.


With the Turks it was altogether different. They had been steadily declining, even before they were forced to admit the right of foreign interference. They had lost in moral strength as their Christian subjects had gained. It was by sheer force of arms that they had been able to carry on their mockery of government, to extort their imposts, and to hold their enemies at bay. They would have fallen or been broken to pieces if they had not retained some of the spirit of Orkhan, Amurath, and Mahomet II. But now, even their physical force was deserting them. Their obstinate exclusion of Christians from their armies had the natural effect of diminishing the Mahomedan preponderance after every war; and the Asiatics occasionally introduced in order to redress the balance were necessarily inferior, in many important respects, to those whom they replaced. If the Turks had foreseen what was to happen, and resolved to hold their conquests at any cost, they would probably have thought twice before they abandoned the plan of recruiting their ranks from tribute children.

In such circumstances, and with such a race as we know the Greeks to have been, we cannot wonder that the year 1820 found them on the verge of rebellion. Pretext and opportunity were found in the commotion created in the west by Ali Pasha of Janina, whose overweening ambition had at last compelled

Sultan Mahmoud to make war upon his too powerful subject. There can be no doubt that Ali's rebellion assisted, if it did not hasten, the insurrection of the Greeks. One of his first acts, as soon as he knew that his old enemy Ismael had been sent against him from Constantinople, was to summon the armatoles to his assistance; and after that he made a direct appeal to the Greeks. By the advice of his Greek secretaries he assembled a divan of Albanian agas and Greek bishops, whom he addressed in the Greek language, assuring them that he had made an enemy of the Government by espousing the cause of the Christians. He promised them a constitution in the event of success, and exhorted them to rouse their countrymen to action. The bait was not taken so greedily as Ali had hoped, but the opportunity was not thrown away by the Greek patriots. One of these, Odysseus, who had been brought up in Ali's household, commanded a body of Christian troops in the interests of his master; but, on the other hand, a considerable number of the armatoles adhered to the cause of Sultan Mahmoud, having an old grudge to settle with the Pasha of Janina.

The Greeks of Thessaly secured arms in a like manner, but from the other side. Sulieman Pasha, appointed to the pashalik of Larissa in place of Ali's son Veli,* invited all the Sultan's faithful subjects to take up arms against the rebel. At the same time he addressed a circular to the armatoles and privileged Christian communities, urging them to unite in the general movement. It has been said that

* Veli had previously been pasha of the Morea, where he had emulated his father's vices and cruelty, and had done much to exhaust the patience of the Greeks in the Peloponnese.



ΔΙΑΚΟΣ.

[*To face p. 114.*]

Suliman's Greek secretary, Anagnostes, who translated this circular into Greek, made it read as if it were a simple authorisation for the Christians to take up arms "for their own protection." * It may have been so; and the patriots at all events availed themselves freely of the permission.

In one other respect Ali's difficulty profited the Greeks. Nineteen years before, the bloodthirsty pasha had driven the brave Suliotes from their homes; and the refugees, hospitably received by the Russians in Corfu, had remained on the island, under its successive masters, up to the present time. Remembering the indomitable courage of these old foes of Ali's, Ismael now invited them to return to their homes. Perhaps they came all the more readily because their confidence in and gratitude to their English protectors had been rudely shaken by the cession of Parga in the preceding year. Their fighting-men, to the number of about two hundred, joined Ismael's camp; but they soon found that there was very little to be expected from the incapable commander. He not only failed to put them in possession of their old homes, but left them almost without the necessaries of life; and as Ali himself intrigued with them at the same moment, and offered to restore to them the strong fortress of Kiapha, they made terms with his agent, and thus recovered their heritage. Probably the Suliotes were already pledged to assist the Greeks in their projected movement. The Hetairists had been busy in the Ionian Islands, in spite of the repressive measures of the Lord High Commissioners; and it is only reasonable to conclude

* Finlay—whose narrative of the War of Independence I am now following, side by side with that of Gervinus.

that the refugees were amongst their most willing converts.*

One of the successors of Veli, son of Ali, in the pashalik of the Morea, was Khurshid Pasha, a stern, licentious, remorseless Turk. He had already held other important commands, and had acquired a high reputation for energy and ability. In Egypt he had originated the policy of enrolling negroes in the ranks. At Nish it was told of him that he had built a tower of the heads of the Servians. In the month of March, 1821, this man was removed from Tripolitza to the army before Janina, Ismael having made nothing of his opportunity. The Moreotes, relieved of the terror inspired by Khurshid, and emboldened by the weakness of his successors, were now ripe for an outbreak; and it required but a trifle to light the conflagration. The new Seraskier had scarcely settled to his work in Epirus when he heard that the Morea, the Islands, and a large part of the mainland of Hellas itself, were in open revolt. Nevertheless, he did not abandon the siege of Janina, which continued up to February, 1822, and then ended with the familiar Turkish drop-scene of treachery and cold-blooded murder.

The leaders of the Greek movement may be broadly distinguished as Hetairists and non-

* Mendelssohn Bartholdy, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, as quoted in Mr. Tozer's note to Finlay, vi., 83. Finlay expressly says that the Sultan authorised Ismael to restore the Suliotes, and that Ismael thereupon sent an agent to treat with them in Corfu. This statement is not inconsistent with Bartholdy's assurance that the return of the Suliotes was connected with the Greek insurrection, and due to the action of the Hetairists. The fact may be that they had volunteered their services to the Turks in the first instance.

Hetairists. There were Greeks and foreigners amongst both, but the most worthy of the two classes of patriots were undoubtedly to be found amongst those who shunned the intrigues of the secret societies, and who felt that Hellenism was strong enough at last to work out its own deliverance. It would be difficult to say in which of these categories we ought to place Count John Capo d'Istria. When the Hetairists came to offer him the leadership of the insurrectionist movement (so far as they had it to offer), he ostentatiously declined to listen to them; and it was subsequently maintained on his behalf that he knew nothing of the political intrigues of the Philike Hetairia. But he referred them to Prince Alexander Hypsilantes, son of the deposed Hospodar of Wallachia, a major-general in the Russian army,* and Hypsilantes closed with them at once.

Meanwhile an insurrection had taken place in the Danubian provinces, almost simultaneously with the outbreak in Greece; and, in order to assume the direction of this movement, Hypsilantes abandoned his career in the Russian service, and crossed the frontier, with his court of Phanariots and his company of comedians, to proceed to Bucharest. The times were not ripe in Moldavia as they were in Greece, and the insurrection failed. Hypsilantes, too, though a genuine patriot, was not a born leader of men; and, moreover, the stars fought against him. The Holy Alliance happened at the moment to be in session at Laybach, and

* According to Gervinus, Capo d'Istria advised Hypsilantes to accept the offer made to him, and assured him that Russia would lend the movement her open support.

the Czar could not well desert the cause of tyranny in Turkey whilst he was supporting it in Naples. He therefore acquiesced in the crossing of the Danube by a Turkish force, dismissed Hypsilantes from his service, and bade Nesselrode and Capo d'Istria to warn him against proceeding with his project. At the same time the Greek patriarch in Constantinople anathematised the rebels, at the imperious command of the Sultan.*

Laybach diplomacy and patriarchal anathemas would have been as straws against a thunderstorm if the movement had been inspired by a genuine, ripe, and resolute patriotism. Patriots there were in abundance, but they were fettered by the company of self-seekers and mercenaries; nor was Hypsilantes the man to guide a patriotic movement. He continued the struggle for some time, and egregiously failed; then, abandoning his followers, he took refuge across the Austrian frontier. A pistol-shot would have been a happier and more dignified ending to his career; for Austria, having first offered to deliver him up as a deserter from the Russian army—an offer which the Czar politely declined—kept him a close prisoner for six years, and only released him when he was at the point of death.

There remained the humbler patriots of this unfortunate movement. These, to the number of a few hundred—and a few hundred beside had already died in battle—refused to surrender. Under Georgiaki and Pharmaki they took their stand where the Turks hemmed them in, and sold their lives with the greatest heroism. A handful

* See Tricoupis, i., 106.

escaped across the Russian frontier. Another handful were persuaded to capitulate to the Ottoman commanders, under a promise that their lives should be spared; and these were accordingly beheaded.* The remainder, Georgiaki amongst them, fell where they fought. Their story is well worth telling; but there are many such honourable episodes in the history of the next few years.

“In the month of April, 1821,” says Mr. Finlay, “a Mussulman population, generally of the Greek race, amounting to upwards of 20,000 souls, was living dispersed in Greece, employed in agriculture. Before two months had elapsed the greater part were slain—men, women, and children were murdered on their own hearths, without mercy or remorse. Old men still point to heaps of stones, and tell the traveller, ‘There stood the pyrgos (tower) of Ali Aga, and there we slew him, his harem, and his slaves;’ and the old man walks calmly on to plough the fields which once belonged to Ali Aga, without a thought that any vengeful fury can attend his path. The crime was a nation’s crime, and whatever perturbations it may produce must be in a nation’s conscience, as the deed by which it can be expiated must be the acts of a nation.” †

The judgment is not an unfair one, though it may be questioned whether the whole responsibility for this slaughter, the whole perturbation of conscience, does not properly belong to the nation of the oppressors rather than to the nation of the

* Pharmaki, after undergoing torture at Constantinople.

† *History*, vi., 139.

oppressed. Revolutions, it has been said, are not made with rose-water; they are made, as a rule, with the same machinery as that of the tyrannies which call them forth. In England we sign a monster petition, which requires two honourable members to carry it up the floor of the House; in France, a poet makes a speech, and the students raise a barricade. In the Greece of 1821 there was a terrible accumulation of wrongs to be revenged—from the kidnapping of the tribute children to the cruelties of Veli and Khurshid, and the extortions of the gypsy-haratcher. The revenge springs from the injury, the responsibility rests with the oppressor. We need not justify the extermination of the Turks in Greece, but we may fairly turn to the Ottoman Government for its expiation.

It would be useless to discuss the question where the Greek revolution first broke out. The general uprising had been appointed for the 25th of March (6th of April), but many massacres and revolts took place during the preceding days. The initial chapter in the history of New Greece was written simultaneously throughout the country. In the mountains of Achaia, especially at Bersova and in the Krathis valley, at Kalavryta, at Patras and Vostitza (Aigion), in the Maina, and other parts of Messene, in short, throughout the peninsula, this vindictive passion burst all bounds. The Greeks went about singing a song of slaughter, which has been imitated on more than one occasion since—

Τοῦρκος μὴ μείνη 'ς τὸν Μωρεά
Μηδὲ 'ς τὸν κόσμον ὅλον·

“No more Turks—either in the Morea or in the



KOLOKOTRONES.

[To face p. 121.]

whole world." It was a sudden energy of instinct, a concentration of the passion of centuries. Over and over again a militant Christianity has exhibited such a paroxysm of bloodthirsty rage, matching the murderous fury of the followers of the Prophet.*

The Greek war, as was inevitable, was a war of *guerrilleros* and klephts, of raids and reprisals. The Hetairists had no great military leader at their service, and those who began by shunning the Hetairists were in no better position. One of the most prominent chiefs was Theodore Kolokotrones,† who, up to the time of the outbreak, had resided in one of the Ionian Islands, where he had attained the rank of major in the British army. It was told of his father, who died at Kastanitza in 1780, that he had killed with his own hands no fewer than seven hundred Turks. Major Kolokotrones had done his best to persuade the British authorities that the cause of his countrymen deserved their active support; but, failing in this endeavour, he had no hesitation about throwing in his lot with the Hetairists. He had been in constant communication with both Capo d'Istria and Hypsilantes, and, when the latter embarked on his ill-fated expedition in the Danubian provinces, Major Kolokotrones set out for the Maina, in company with another notable Hetairist, Anagnostaras, formerly a klephtic hero in the band of Zacharias.‡ Petros Mavromichaelis, bey of the Mainotes — the bold and independent

* At the same time it is right to say that numberless instances occurred throughout the country in which the lives of Mussulmans were saved from the popular fury by influential Greeks.

† He has left an account of his life in his *Διήγησις Συμβάντων τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Φελλῆς, ἀπὸ 1770 ἕως 1836*.

‡ Gervinus.

inhabitants of the central promontory of the Morea—was generally expected to take the lead of his countrymen in their struggle for freedom. Another prominent patriot at the outset of the insurrection was Germanos, archbishop of Patras, who had been initiated in the Philike Hetairia, and who has left a narrative of many of the events which came under his observation.* The initial act of the revolution is held to have been the raising of the cross by Archbishop Germanos at the monastery of Laura, whither he had fled on being summoned to Tripolitza, March 25th (April 6th). This day is still celebrated by the Greeks as the anniversary of their restoration to independence.

The history of the War of Independence has been written often enough, and, if it needed re-writing, it would not be in these pages that its details could be satisfactorily discussed. It will be sufficient for our purpose if we glance at the general character of the struggle, the circumstances under which it attained its end, and the attitude of Europe in respect to it. And, as regards this last point, it may be observed that Greece had to wage with Europe a struggle more difficult and more protracted than its struggle with the Turks. It had to persuade the Great Powers—the Great Powers of the days of Laybach and Verona, of Metternich and Castlereagh—that it deserved its independence. Not only so, but it had to overcome the indifference, the selfishness, in some instances the direct hostility, of these Powers, and to enlist them actively on its side. It was not enough to gain the ear of Britain, the favour of Russia, the consent of France. Turkey must be

* Ὑπομνήματα περὶ τῆς ἐπανάστασεως τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

smitten by Europe, as well as by her Greek subjects, before she would be willing to resign herself to the loss of the peninsula. Who could be sanguine, in 1821, that all this would ever be accomplished? With Naples and Spain dragooned into submission, with the Wallachian patriots frowned down by Russia and snubbed by their own patriarch, who could have foreseen Navarino? The Greek outbreak was, in its first stages, a war of despair, and its most enthusiastic champions could scarcely tell how the sacrifice of their lives was likely to avail their cause. Men of discernment perceived that the freedom of Greece, though it depended in the first instance upon Greek patriotism, could never be definitely established without European aid; and it was for this aid that the best friends of Greece abroad were continually working and waiting.

The Greeks had almost done their part by the summer of 1821. On the 30th of June they defeated the second attempt of Khurshid Pasha to force an entrance into Acarnania through the Pass of Makronoros. At this moment they had liberated the whole country, from Cape Matapan to the Gulf of Arta and the Eubœan Sea. The few remaining Turks were blockaded in Athens, Lepanto, Tripolitza, Patras, Corinth, Navarino, and half a dozen other fortresses; but the bulk of Hellas, the Morea, Eubœa, Hydra, Spetzas, and other islands, were in their possession. They paid no more taxes, suffered no more oppressions from the Turks. They were in an incalculably better position than that which they occupied six years later, when the victories of Ibrahim Pasha and his Egyptians had reduced them to the verge of submission. If Europe had been as ready

to assist them at the beginning of their struggle as at the end, it would have been better for all concerned. It would have prevented a vast amount of bloodshed, perhaps including that of the sanguinary war between Russia and Turkey; and it is very difficult indeed to admit that true statesmanship was exhibited in delaying the settlement of such a question.

No man could doubt the existence amongst the Porte's Greek subjects of qualities out of which a free nation might be made. But statesmen do not suddenly become heroic, and Europe preferred to wash its hands of the struggle rather than connive at the success of an insurrection. It was necessary for the Greeks to prove their title to freedom with arms in their hands, and to bear, unsupported, the whole brunt of Sultan Mahmoud's power, for a period of six terrible years.

Every reader of history, be it only the contemporary annals of newspaper history, knows something of the Turkish method of fighting, and can conceive how they set about the work of "stamping out" the rebellion. The cruel business of reprisals soon began. One of the first Turks to enjoy the luxury of revenge was Issub Pasha, who, hearing at Missolonghi of the outbreak at Patras, fell upon the Greeks as they were laying siege to the fortress, and dispersed them, afterwards treating the town with great severity. At Levadia, in Western Bœotia, the Christians had besieged a body of Mussulman Albanians in the castle, and, after a blockade of three weeks, had taken the place, and slaughtered the garrison. At their head was Diakos, formerly a lieutenant of armatoles under Odysseus. Within a

fortnight after this, as Diakos was engaged in forming a company of Levadians, he was captured by the Turks and impaled. These are but two isolated instances amongst a thousand. It was *œ victis* from that time forward, as between Greek and Mussulman, both in Greece and in other parts of the Ottoman Empire.

In Constantinople itself the Sultan's repressive measures began before the massacres in Greece. The existence of the Philike Hetairia had long been concealed from the knowledge of the Porte, and even when its designs were made known to the Sultan and his ministers they were treated with contempt. The outbreak of the Danubian insurrection, however, suddenly awoke the Ottoman Government to a sense of its danger, and roused Mahmoud to fury. The Mussulmans were immediately summoned to arm; and as many Greeks as were able to do so now fled from the capital, foreseeing the storm which was about to burst. On the 3rd of April a number of Hetairists, or alleged Hetairists, were executed; and about ten days later, the Sultan having received news of the massacres in the Morea, many prominent Greeks were put to death—amongst them being Murusi, dragoman to the Porte. On Easter Sunday, the Patriarch himself, being accused of complicity with the Hetairists, was deposed and hung. His body, after swinging three days from the gate of the patriarchate, was dragged through the streets of Constantinople by the Jews, and thrown into the sea.

Thus encouraged, the rage of the Mussulmans throughout Turkey began to assuage itself in the most terrible cruelties. Seven bishops, a large

number of priests, and crowds of Christians of all ranks, were put to death in Constantinople. At Adrianople and in many other parts of Thrace, at Thessalonika, at Smyrna, in Crete, Cyprus, Rhodes, and a hundred other towns and islands, wherever the Mussulmans were more numerous than the Greeks, the latter were plundered, outraged, and murdered. A sanguinary revenge was taken for the slaughter of the Turks in Greece. As Finlay writes, "For several months during the year 1821 Greece and Turkey presented a succession of scenes so atrocious that no pen could venture to narrate their horrors. The Turks have always been a bloodthirsty race, indifferent to human suffering, and they had now terrible wrongs to avenge. The Greeks had, by long oppression, been degraded into a kind of Christian Turks. It is impossible to form a correct estimate of the number of Greeks who were massacred by the Turks; some have considered it as great as the number of Mussulmans murdered in Greece."

Sultan Mahmoud was drastic in his methods, and whatever he undertook was done, or at least attempted, thoroughly. Hardly a single prominent Greek was left undisturbed in the capital. In addition to Gregorios and the seven bishops, the Phanariots Rhizas, Photinos, Manos, and others, were arrested and beheaded; and from that time the aristocracy of the Greeks in Constantinople was almost entirely merged in the race as a whole. Some of the old notables, then or a few years later, espoused the fortunes of New Greece, and became the leaders of a royal court and the founders of a new nobility.

In the Divan it was proposed to massacre the

Greek population throughout the empire, and the Sultan himself appears to have entertained the project. Saïd Effendi induced Mahmoud and his colleagues to consult the mufti, who declared that the Koran forbade the slaughter of the innocent with the guilty. This struck the Divan as a new reading of old texts, and the mufti was banished. Several of Mahmoud's ministers met the same fate. The grand viziers, Ali Rhiza Pasha and Ali Benderli Pasha, were in turn disgraced. The Sultan could trust no one save himself; but his consciousness of strength seems to have fairly justified the preference.

Mahmoud had nursed schemes of reform for several years past, without confiding them to any of his counsellors. To curtail the power of the pashas, to centralise the authority of his empire, to gather into his own hands the reins of government, to have a strong army at his disposal, and for this purpose to humble the pride of the janissaries—these were amongst the principal objects of his solicitude; and the Greek rising offered him a chance of carrying his purpose into effect. He issued a firman and a hatti-cherif, on two successive days, in which he pointed out that the Osmanlis had too long indulged in the sloth, luxury, and inactivity of town life. He urged them to throw aside their effeminacy, to adopt the life of camps, to become once more a militant race, as their ancestors had been. The appeal was evidently intended to pave the way for the suppression of the privileges accorded to the janissaries, who had grown to be a source of embarrassment and danger to the Sultan.*

* The slaughter of the janissaries took place in June, 1826.

In the meantime the decrees produced an immediate effect, serious enough, as it proved, to involve the Porte in new and still graver perils. The Mussulmans took arms with alacrity in every part of the empire. At the same time every Christian was compelled, even through the medium of the patriarch and the priests, to give up his means of self-defence. Then it was that the massacres were redoubled, and that all Europe was alarmed by the frenzy with which the Turks began to slake their thirst for blood. The Giaours were hunted down in the streets of the capital like veritable "dogs"; the janissaries exercised no restraint whatever, either on themselves or on the armed populace; every Mussulman had his gun or his yataghan, and brought down his quarry when and wheresoever he chanced to fall in with him. Not even foreigners were safe. The Russian and Spanish embassies were threatened by lawless mobs; and when the representative of the Emperor of Austria was on the point of proceeding to an interview with the reis-effendi, which had been arranged by the dragoman Murusi, he learned that the latter had been beheaded on a charge of intriguing with the enemies of the Sultan.*

As might have been expected, these massacres of Christians awakened a strong sympathy with the Greeks amongst the Christian nations of Europe, who were not disposed to consider the Greek initiative as affording a justification for acts of the Turks. The hanging of the Patriarch, in particular, aroused the deepest indignation, and gave more and more of the character of a crusade to the War of Independence. The Russian Government, the pre-

* Gervinus.

scriptive patron of the Sultan's Greek subjects, whose right of interference had been admitted in recent treaties, addressed the strongest remonstrances to the Porte. Russia had a better title than any other Power to take the lead on this occasion, by virtue of her partial community of religion with the Greeks ; and the murder of some of her sailors during the massacre added another motive for independent action on her part. But the representatives of the Christian Powers could hardly avoid being unanimous in exercising a strong pressure upon the Porte, and compelling it, if not to punish, at least to put an end to the butcheries which it had instigated and encouraged. A meeting of the diplomatists was held for the purpose of taking into consideration the desperate condition of Constantinople, the extremity of the Greeks, the common danger of all the Christian residents. Various measures were proposed, and unanimity was almost, but not quite, secured. One Power saw fit to withhold its concurrence, and to render ineffectual the protest addressed to the Porte.

That Power was Great Britain.

The student of history, suddenly confronted by a fact of this kind in the annals of his own country, finds himself startled and annoyed, like a sensitive man who has had a mirror thrust before his face. He is chilled back from the cosmopolitan to the insular aspects of history, and falls from the higher philosophic regions to the lowest levels of fact. An Englishman scarcely knows what to say or think of such a breach of concert, such an interruption of diplomatic unanimity in a good cause, as that which occurred in 1821. It is true that he remembers the character of Lord Liverpool's long Administration,

especially in its middle phase, when Castlereagh was at the Foreign Office. He knows too well how Britain was dragged for a time at the tail of the Holy Alliance, and how the better and nobler aspirations of the people were misrepresented by its rulers. But, at the same time, he knows that Lord Strangford, a just and honourable man, represented the country at Constantinople. Unable to approve, unwilling to condemn, he is disposed to take refuge in the easy compromise of believing that the circumstances of the time justified a step which, taken by itself and apart from its surroundings, would appear to be without justification.

Lord Strangford's refusal to bring efficient pressure to bear upon the Porte, in conjunction with the other ambassadors, encouraged Turkey to turn a deaf ear to all remonstrances. The embassies, of course, had already protested, and the excesses of the Mussulmans were actually being restrained. The Grand Vizier at the moment was Ali Benderli Pasha, and he had taken stern measures to bring the massacres to an end. Some attention had been paid to the representations of Baron Strogonoff, the Russian ambassador, as well as those of Lord Strangford himself; and, perhaps, our ambassador conceived that enough had been done in the way of intervention. No sooner had the Porte learned that the representatives of the Powers could not agree on strong measures to protect the Christians, than it sent a flippant answer to the note of the Russian ambassador (April 27th), excusing "the impulsiveness and zeal, perhaps excessive, of the soldiers." At the same time, Ali Benderli was dismissed, and his successor, Hadji Salik Pasha, was enjoined, on

the day of his installation, not to follow the example of his predecessor, "who had, in his folly, prevented the punishment of the wretched Greek nation, and thus cooled the zeal of the Mussulmans." * Thereupon the massacres broke out with fresh fury, and the arrests and executions were renewed.

It must be allowed that Baron Strogonoff was far from conciliatory in his attitude, whether towards the Porte or towards his colleagues; and though he had all but Lord Strangford with him in proposing a combined expostulation with Turkey, he was otherwise less influential in the diplomatic college than the ambassador of King George. This fact increases Lord Strangford's responsibility on the special occasion referred to, but it certainly strengthens the contention of those who hold that he was justified by Russian intrigue.

The rupture between Russia and Turkey to which the Greek revolution ultimately led was delayed for a few years by the conduct of the Czar Alexander, who, as a member of the Holy Alliance, could not bring himself to assist rebels, even when they were Greeks, or to contribute to the defeat of the tyrant, even when that tyrant was the "butcher Mahmoud." But it was by no fault of Strogonoff's, or of his fellow diplomatists, Capo d'Istria and Pozzo di Borgo, † that the war did not immediately break out. The masterful Ministers of Russia played fast and loose with their country in that generation, and the insufficient restraint exercised over them by their Government

* Gervinus, v., 215, *et seq.*

† Pozzo di Borgo was a Corsican, who entered the Russian service in 1803. He subsequently (1837—9) represented his Government at the Court of St. James's.—The counsel of Nesselrode was strongly on the other side.

led to many wrong conclusions, and caused the Czar to be blamed for much over which he had had no control. No doubt individual Russians had promised an army to Hypsilantes, to Kolokotrones, and to other Greek patriots, and it was not surprising that the latter should have considered the Government pledged to assist them. But the probability is that the Czar himself never seriously contemplated a war on behalf of the Greeks.

The Russian Government contented itself by despatching a note to the Porte, wherein it dissolved the question in a stream of generalities. It condemned alike the zeal of the Mussulmans and the zeal of the Christians; dwelt upon the principles of humanity and the duties of civilisation; appealed to the growth of public opinion; and declared that the settlement of the quarrel was a question for Europe at large. The Porte replied haughtily, asserting that all the Greeks who had suffered at the hands of the Government had been punished for crimes committed, and according to the rights exercised by the authorities of every State; that the Greek churches had been desecrated only by the dregs of the population; that the arming of the Mussulmans and the formation of camps were measures calculated simply to maintain order within the Sultan's dominions; and that as soon as tranquillity should have been restored, and the refugees in Russian and Austrian territory should be delivered up to justice, the Porte would engage to re-appoint the Hospodars in the Danubian provinces, and to observe the treaties and conventions into which it had entered. Shortly after the receipt of this note Strogonoff removed himself and his staff from Constantinople;

but the declaration of war which might have been expected to follow was not made. Lord Strangford employed all his influence with the Porte to prevent a rupture; and it was Great Britain herself, under the guidance of Canning, who eventually asked Nicholas to do what Alexander would not.

Meanwhile the rising of the Greeks had already produced important results. Within three months, as we have seen, a large part of the Peloponnese was liberated; the islands of Hydra, Spetzai, and Psara, had proclaimed their union with the mainland; all the Cyclades and many of the Sporades were following suit; in Eubœa, in Crete, in Samos, in parts of Macedonia, the example of the Morea was bearing fruit. A large fleet of small vessels was at once devoted to the purposes of what was looked upon as a holy war, and the Greek sailors took a noble part in the struggle.* Tricoupi† gives an interesting account of the tactics pursued by the combined fleet of the Hydriotes, Spetziotes, and Psarians. It was under the command of Jakomiki Tombazis, who, having fallen in with a Turkish man-of-war (the *Moving Mountain*, 74 guns) off the north of Chios, pursued it

* "The following appears to be an accurate account of the naval force of Greece in 1821:—

Hydra	contained	4,000 families,	with	115 ships	exceeding	100 tons.
Spetzai	"	1,600	"	60	"	"
Psara	"	1,200	"	40	"	"
Kasos	"	1,500	"	15	"	"
Trikeri	"	400	"	30 vessels	of various sizes.	
Galaxidhi	"	600	"	60	"	"

The number of vessels between 60 and 100 tons in all Greece was supposed to amount to 290, and there were many decked boats in every island and port."—Finlay, *History*, vi., 167.

† *History*, i., 275.

to the roads of Erissos, and fired upon it without effect. He then determined to have recourse to a device which his countrymen had formerly found serviceable—the use of fire-ships. The plan was to take an old hulk, and fix upon its fore-deck and along one side three or four large cases of pitch and other combustible materials. A train of gunpowder connected these cases, and in addition the sails and rigging of the ship were soaked with turpentine. When the time came for action the prepared vessel was driven upon the enemy, and fixed to her side by means of grappling-irons. The hardy crew would then fire the train, and escape by the port-holes into a small boat, taking their chance of surviving. In the case mentioned, one Pargios of Psara had the honour of making the first fire-ship in the War of Independence; but his effort was unsuccessful. On the following day (June 18th) he constructed two more; one of which burned itself out without injuring the Turk, whilst the other set her on fire and utterly destroyed her, very few of her crew contriving to escape.

The remainder of the year 1821 brought both good and bad fortunes to the Greeks. A Turkish fleet under Kara Ali penetrated to the bottom of the Gulf of Corinth, and laid Galaxidhi in ashes; whilst the patriots, on their part, under Kolokotrones, Anagnostaras, Giatrakos, and Petrobey, captured Tripolitza after a long siege, and butchered the inhabitants with almost incredible ferocity.* But perhaps the most significant events of the first year of the revo-

* Kolokotrones himself, who has the full courage of his convictions, boasts that the number slain, after capitulation, was 32,000! One-third of that number seems to be a more reasonable estimate.

lution were the assembling of the Greek notables at the Convent of Valtetzi, on the 7th of June, and the Declaration of Independence on the 27th of the following January. From Valtetzi, this first Greek Senate removed to Stemnitza, near Karitena; and it busied itself, in the summer and autumn months, chiefly in levying taxes and supplies for the army. Committees were appointed to be chosen in the towns and villages, which were to manage the affairs of each locality, to undertake the collection of the imposts, to provide recruits for a national guard, to institute a force of police, and to charge themselves with the support of the widows and children of those who fell on the field.

Thus the instincts of the Greeks recurred at once to the old autonomous institutions of the country; but, before there had been time to act upon the plan of this senate, a new element was introduced into the government by the arrival at Astros of Demetrios Hypsilantes, the younger brother of Prince Alexander, who had come to assume the direction of affairs. The Greeks, most of whom believed him to have been sent by the Czar, received Prince Demetrios with acclamations, hailing him as their deliverer. The leaders, who were too ambitious and jealous to welcome the new-comer with complete satisfaction, concealed their sentiments for a time. Hypsilantes had an excellent opportunity of establishing his authority over the country. He possessed, as Gervinus says of him, qualities more valuable than those of his brother. He was an ardent patriot, unselfish, and ready to sacrifice his own desires. "He was a gallant soldier, . . . an honest, upright, and humane man. . . . But, physically,

he could scarcely have been less favoured by Nature. Short, bald, speaking through his nose, timid and awkward in his manners, looking forty years old at twenty-five, requiring much sleep, he had, in addition, neither eloquence nor the art of dealing with men." The last failing was worse than all the rest. Demetrios gradually lost his popularity; and when the news arrived of his brother's defeat and flight, his chance of ruling the Greeks was practically gone.

The Senate of Stemnitza had been constituted only for the duration of the siege of Tripolitza; and after the success of that operation Hypsilantes issued a high-flown document, convoking a National Assembly in the captured town. He described himself as "the father of the people, whose complaints he had heard in the heart of Russia." He declared that he had come to fight for the Greeks, to give them laws and institutions, and to protect them both against the Turks and against the "would-be oppressors of the people." An instrument of this kind was not ill calculated to give offence to the more prominent patriots, who had already found cause of annoyance in the assumptions of the four or five dozen Greeks whom the Prince had brought with him, and who had imbibed lofty ideas of what a new Greek Government should be during the course of a European education. Nevertheless, the Assembly was elected, and met, under the mandate of Hypsilantes; but not without revealing symptoms of that unfortunate lack of harmony which was to militate so greatly against the definitive triumph of Greece. At Missolonghi an Assembly had met under the direction of Mavrocordatos (Nov. 11, 1821),

which constituted a senate to exercise authority until the creation of a central Government. Another Assembly met at Salona, under the presidency of Negris; whilst the Archonts of the Peloponnese summoned a third.

The Assembly of Tripolitza—moved thence to Argos, and from Argos to Piada, near Epidaurus—met on the 1st of January, 1822; and, in spite of much irregularity in the mode of its election, it received the general recognition of the country. Mavrocordatos, notwithstanding his independent action at Missolonghi, was appointed president; and he had the satisfaction of formally proposing the disuse of the Hetairist emblems—the black flag and the phoenix. The Chamber voted the substitution for these of the figure of Minerva as the national device, with a flag of blue and white stripes. Hypsilantes protested in vain, and raised his black banner amidst the calm contempt of the delegates. The Hetairists, in fact, had done their part. The nation had always been coldly disposed towards them, and the Assembly of Epidaurus virtually discarded them.

After proclaiming the independence of Greece, discussing a constitution, and nominating a government of five members for one year, the Assembly selected Corinth as the temporary capital, and adjourned. The government was composed of Mavrocordatos, Logothetis, Orlandos, Khanakaris, and Anagnostis Papayannopoulos (Delyannis).*

The Declaration of Independence, signed at Epidaurus on the 27th of January, bears the signatures of sixty-seven members of the Assembly. In this

* They were to be re-elected, like the Assembly, every twelve months.

instrument the Greeks justified their revolt on the highest grounds, and took special pains to convince Europe of the worthiness of their cause.

“The Greek nation,” so runs the text, “calls heaven and earth to witness that, in spite of the terrible yoke of the Ottomans, which threatened it with extinction, it still exists. Burdened by acts as unjust as they were ruinous, which these ferocious tyrants, after violating their capitulations, together with every principle (*esprit*) of equity, were rendering continually more oppressive, and which aimed at nothing short of the complete annihilation of the subjected people, it found itself under the absolute necessity of taking up arms for its self-preservation. After having repelled violence by the unassisted courage of its children, it declares this day, before God and men, by its legitimate representatives, united in this national congress convoked by the people, its political independence.

“Far from being based on principles of demagoguery and rebellion, far from having for its motives the special interests of a few individuals, this war is a national and sacred war; it has for its sole object the restoration of the nation, and its re-endowment with the rights of property, humanity, and existence—rights which are the possession of neighbouring states, but which were torn from the Greeks by a despoiling Power.”

The first words of the second paragraph of this Declaration were doubtless intended to disarm those who had already reproached the Greeks for their revolutionary violence, and condemned the insurrection as being founded upon foreign intrigue rather than upon a genuine patriotism. The cause of the

new State would clearly have been vitiated from the beginning if it had been raised on no stronger basis than the plots of a few Russian diplomatists, or the wild schemes of the Hetairists. The Greeks had shown, on several distinct occasions, that this was far from being the case. The jealousy entertained by many of the popular leaders against the Philike Hetairia and its busy emissaries was displayed in an unmistakable manner before Hypsilantes had proved his incapacity. The unfitness of Prince Demetrios had become more and more manifest as the time went by. It was to his weakness that the terrible scenes in the sack of Tripolitza must be attributed; and his want of tact and authority was in a large measure accountable for the formation of the provincial senates in Eastern and Western Hellas, and for the reappearance of the senate of the Peloponnese. True, it was he who had convoked this general Senate of the entire nation, and he had done so in response to a general demand of the people. But the result was to show for how little the Hetairists, and the supposed nominee of the Russian Government, counted amongst the Greeks. Both in the election itself, and during the windy debates of the delegates, it became apparent that foreign influence, when it pretended to exercise an authority over the political aspirations of the Greeks, was practically a dead letter.

The Declaration was not all that Mavrocordatos and his colleagues effected. The Constitution of 1822, drawn up no doubt by theorists who had imbibed the ideas of Western Europe,* was yet

* Finlay says that it was the work of the Phanariots Mavrocordatos and Negris, assisted by an Italian refugee named Gallina.

fully discussed and voted by the Senate ; and it laid down several practical principles of political action which figure to this day amongst the guarantees of Greek freedom. The Declaration of Independence, calculated to appease the Governments of the Great Powers, spurns at the unpopular "principles of demagoguery and rebellion" ; but the Constitution is evidently founded upon the democratic ideas of the French Revolution. It was modelled on that of the French Directory, affirming civil and religious liberty, security to person and property, equal eligibility to office, and the independence of the judicial body. The legislative power was vested in a Senate elected by the people, conjointly with an executive council appointed by the Senate. The Council consisted of five members ; it declared peace and war, and was invested with the supreme direction of affairs.

CHAPTER VI

THE APPEAL TO EUROPE

Greek Dissensions—Want of capable Leaders—European Diplomacy—Indecision of the Czar Alexander—The Massacre of Chios—Its Effects—The Congress of Verona—The Appeal of the Greeks—Its Failure—The Responsibility of Europe—Greek Heroism—Byron in Greece—His Good Influence—The First Greek Loan—English Encouragement.

MAVROCORDATOS was a stronger man than Demetrios Hypsilantes; but even he was not able to control the undisciplined spirits of his fellow-countrymen, or to combine their divergent forces into a single resultant. His own assembly at Missolonghi, and that of Negris at Salona, were duly subordinated by their presidents to the central authority at Corinth. But the Peloponnesian Senate, unjustifiably restored, went far to stultify the constitution of Epidaurus, and perpetuated the anarchy by which the country was distracted for several years to come. Archbishop Germanos himself employed his influence in endeavouring to form at Patras a congress of leading men in the Morea, for the separate government of the Peloponnese. The notion of some of these men seems to have been that the ancient Greek system of local self-rule might be at once revived; and thus each ardent theorist was

anxious to see his own views carried out, at a time when every Greek ought to have contributed his heartiest endeavours towards the expulsion of the Turks. These assemblies, instead of promoting the success of the insurrection, rather helped to retard it. They claimed the right to maintain bodies of armed men, in order to enforce obedience to their decrees ; and the evil effect which this must have produced upon the armies in the field may be judged from the fact that the Peloponnesian Senate alone kept one thousand soldiers in its pay.

This discordance amongst the civil officials was matched by the disagreements of the military commanders. Not only were Hypsilantes and Mavrocordatos in open rivalry for the supreme command, but the minor chiefs were perpetually at variance with each other. Odysseus, for instance, aimed at a separate government in Eastern Hellas ; and his example was followed in other provinces, and at various periods during the war. To such an extent was the ambition or the greed of individuals carried that the country was continually torn by intestine quarrels. Greek met Greek on more than one shameful battlefield, whilst the Turks were regaining the ground which they had lost, and threatening even the recovery of the Morea. The faction-fights stirred up by Kolokotrones (November, 1823, to June, 1824), and after that by the primates of the Morea, distracted the nation up to the year 1825. The second of these movements, being successfully opposed by the Roumeliot military party, established the government of Kondouriotes and Kolettes—Mavrocordatos still remaining the nominal dictator of Greece. Kolokotrones, Delyannis, and others,

were taken prisoners, whilst Zaimes, Niketas, and Londos, three of the leading primates, escaped into Acarnania, where they contrived to hold themselves safe. The Roumeliots suppressed this attempt to overturn the legislative assembly and the executive with almost as much cruelty as the Turks were wont to employ against their rebellious subjects. And it was over the very ground ravaged and devastated by Kondouriotes and Kolettes that Ibrahim Pasha, a few months later, made his victorious march.

The history of the Greek War of Independence is a painful one, and we may congratulate ourselves on not having to follow it closely. If the historian had merely to recount the patriotism of the masses and the enthusiasm with which the Hellenic cause was defended, both by a large proportion of the industrial classes in Hellas and the Morea, in Southern Albania and the islands, and by the foreign volunteers who flocked to the assistance of this national regeneration, his task would be light and pleasant. But it is impossible to make oneself a spectator of the struggle without being continually reminded of the selfishness, the cruelty, the vanity, and, to crown all, the incompetence of men who might have led Greece to an earlier and happy victory. The nation had been so long under the yoke that, when at last it burst its fetters, it had no statesman, no general, no skilful organiser, able to command the confidence of his fellow-countrymen. The primates and Phanariots, amongst whom we might have expected to find a capable leader, had been trained only in the arts of tyranny and intrigue. The able men were frequently dishonest; the honest men almost invariably weak. Italy, happier in her time,

found her Cavour and her Garibaldi; but Greece had no Piedmont to build her a bridge between oppression and liberty. It would be idle to draw a parallel between the emancipation of Greece and that of Italy, except for the purpose of showing under what widely different auspices the two great nations of classical antiquity were destined to recover their independence. Greece became a European State in spite of a thousand adverse circumstances. Italy, nobly as her children struggled, renewed her youth amidst a conspiracy of favouring chances.

With more skilful leaders and more competent and honourable administrators, the successful campaign of 1822 ought to have sealed the triumph of the Greeks. The splendid revenge reaped by Miaulis and Kanares * for the diabolical massacres of Chios,

* Kanares, a Psarian, who survived to the year 1877, destroyed more than 3,000 Turks during the first year of the war. One of his most brilliant exploits was performed on the 9th of November, in the Bay of Tenedos, where the Turkish fleet was lying at anchor. Two bargues, flying Ottoman colours, suddenly hove in sight, followed by two Greek brigs. "The chased vessels," says Alison, "were fire-ships, one of which was commanded by the intrepid Kanares, and the other by a Hydriot hero, manned by seventeen of the seamen who had burned the admiral's vessel at Chios, dressed as Turkish sailors. Not suspecting the *ruse*, the Turks, with great interest, watched the chase, and opened their line, with loud cheers, to admit their supposed countrymen into safety. In an instant Kanares was upon them. The Hydriots ran aboard of the admiral, and the Psariots fastened their bark to another ship of the line containing the treasure, while Kanares called out, 'Turks, you are burned, as at Chios!' The Capitan Pacha, by cutting his cables, narrowly escaped destruction; but the other two-decker was so strongly grappled by Kanares that it caught the flames, and, with 1,600 persons on board, blew up soon after with a terrific explosion. In utter consternation, the whole of the Turkish vessels cut their cables, and made for the Dardanelles; two frigates ran ashore and were wrecked in the flight, and the entire command of the sea was abandoned to the Greeks. . . . So daring did they become, that not only did they entirely intercept and ruin the Turkish commerce, but they made prizes of thirteen vessels, including



THE PASS OF THERMOPYLÆ.

[To face p. 145.]

the capture of all but a few fortresses in the Morea, and of Napoli di Romania (Nauplia) in particular, had sufficed to prove that the modern Hellenes were true descendants of the heroes of Thermopylæ. What might not a Garibaldi have made out of the heroes who were capable of such deeds! Here were all the materials of a gallant war of liberation—a war of half a million against thirty millions—in which the few would have prevailed, without Navarino, if only the leaders had had the necessary genius.

From that day to the present, through three generations, the weakness of Greece has been in her lack of strong and efficient leaders. Those who have been provided for her by her friends abroad have been scarcely, if at all, more serviceable to her than her own eminent men. Rarely in the world's history has a State so sorely needed a great military leader.

It was not, however, from lack of leaders that Greece suffered most during her revolutionary war. The discord and anarchy in which she was plunged for several years, and which very nearly caused her struggle to be abortive, were due in large measure to her want of the moral support of Europe. Perhaps it was too much to expect that the Great Powers should, as early as 1822, have exacted Greek independence from Turkey at the point of the sword; but if they had had the grace to show the Porte a united front, and to regard the quarrel with the one with a million piastres on board, in the harbour of Damietta. This glorious result is mainly to be ascribed to the cool daring and personal prowess of Kanares, who, after he had left the fire-ship and descended into his bark, seeing that it was not properly inflamed, went on board again alone, and set it on fire."—*History of Europe*, ii., 392.

natural sympathy of Christians for Christians, or even with the strictest impartiality, the hands of the Greeks would have been incalculably strengthened. Instead of this, Christendom frowned at the efforts of this Christian race, and practically backed the Mussulman in his attempt at suppression.

The coquetry of the great Powers over the Eastern Question of 1821-7 is both entertaining and instructive, especially when taken in connection with subsequent phases of the same political problem. Let us turn, then, to the diplomatic history of these six years, in order to see what Europe did for Greece in the days of her direst need.

As early as June, 1821, Russia had addressed the other Powers in a diplomatic note, wherein the Czar propounded to his allies the two following questions:—(1) What would be the attitude of the Powers in the case of a war between Russia and Turkey? (2) What system would the Powers suggest in lieu of the Turkish rule, supposing that rule to be determined by such a war? This note was accompanied by three exegetical documents; one from the pen of Baron Strogonoff, giving his version of the complications which had arisen between the Porte and the Russian embassy; another pointing out at considerable length that the Powers had committed themselves to the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte; and the third recapitulating the transactions between Russia and Turkey, since the treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, and dating from that treaty the claim of Russia in particular to take an interest in the fate of Greece.*

* I am following Gervinus's account of this diplomatic episode. Book v., 377 *et seq.*

The Czar, to quote the words of a dispatch addressed to Count Alopeus, the Russian ambassador at Berlin, did not desire to advance any private ends, or to act without coming to an understanding with his allies. "On the other hand, the Russian army was prepared and ready to execute the decisions of the Powers. Now, as of old, and as in the future, it would not march for the purpose of extending the limits of Russia, but in order to maintain peace, and to strengthen the equilibrium of Europe."

Russian diplomacy, it may be observed, is very scrupulously built upon tradition and precedent. Almost identical words have been employed, on more than one subsequent occasion, for an almost identical purpose.

The Court of Berlin alone responded to the evident wishes of the Czar. The Prussian Chancellor, Prince Hardenberg, replied to Count Alopeus, after a month's delay, that he hailed with satisfaction the disposition of Russia to treat the Greek Question as a European concern. He concurred in invoking the concert of the Powers, and suggested a Conference—a Conference, he added, which would not secure the desired end unless France and England openly and unreservedly participated in it. But France and England were by no means enthusiastic at the prospect opened up by Russia; whilst the Austrian Government could not conceal its alarm at the notion of a member of the Holy Alliance contributing to the emancipation of an oppressed race.

The parties to this Holy Alliance were not wanting in cynicism—sufficient, at all events, to absolve them from the reproach of being mere religious visionaries. The Czar wrote an autograph letter to

his imperial cousin at Vienna, in which he hinted that the gratification of Francis in Naples had merited a return in kind. That was just where Austria's difficulty lay. She might have understood a Russian expedition to subject the Greeks to Turkey, but her construction of the Holy Alliance had not made allowance for the encouragement of revolutions.

Castlereagh—a marquis by this time, but still best known by the name under which he had become so unpopular with the majority of Englishmen—did for a subsequent generation precisely what the Russian diplomatists had done—he established precedents both by action and by language. He saw in the question which had now arisen a problem in which Britain had a very special concern. British interests in the East revealed themselves to his mind with all the distinctness of sudden conviction, and he perceived that the designs of Russia were incompatible with those interests. He was right in his conclusion, if not in the inductions which led him to form the conclusion. The issue which had been raised involved the rehabilitation of Greece; and it would have been an incalculable misfortune for Europe if Russia had gained a permanent footing in Hellas and the Morea. Canning saw the matter in its true light, when he maintained that Britain had a direct interest in restoring Greece, and giving it the reversion of South-eastern Europe. As for Castlereagh, he, in common with Wellington, saw little more than the necessity of thwarting Russia. He instantly made advances to the Austrian Government, he bade Lord Strangford unite with the inter-nuncio in nominally supporting the Russian demands

at Constantinople—on the principle of avoiding a rupture by backing the stronger against the weaker party—and, above all, he enjoined him not to allow himself to be drawn into any collective action.

Austria now made a proposition of her own for a Conference at Vienna, for the express purpose of preventing a rupture between Russia and Turkey. Britain, as in 1876, adhered to the Vienna “note,” in preference to the Berlin “memorandum.” But now it was Russia’s turn to hold back, and the suggestion of Metternich came to nothing. There was an amusing by-play of diplomacy over this invitation. After the dispatch had been sent to St. Petersburg, and when the court of Vienna was expecting a reply to its note, a bag of documents duly arrived in the Austrian capital. By a separate communication Metternich was informed that the bag had already been sealed when the invitation was received, and that it was sent off “without a minute having been found for the purpose of reading the new dispatch.” The excuse was clumsy, but sufficient; and it extorted a rejoinder to the effect that the contents of the bag were left unread.*

Notes and memoranda failing, Castlereagh, who had the warm personal support of his sovereign, invited Metternich to meet him in Hanover; and there the two statesmen arrived at an understanding, by which the shadow of an Anglo-Austrian alliance, with the qualified concurrence of France, was made to supersede the European concert proposed by Russia and Prussia. The object of the British and Austrian statesmen being to do nothing and to bring about nothing, their new policy entirely succeeded. They

* Gervinus, p. 394.

wrote a joint note to St. Petersburg, requesting that Russia would unfold her plans in the East. This was of course impossible; or, so far as it was possible, the question had been anticipated and answered in the Russian note of June 21. On the present occasion a few generalities, strung together by Capo d'Istria, explained that the Czar did not desire, and had not desired, to act without the sanction of Europe.

Meanwhile, at Constantinople, the ambassadors, who had been unable to agree together in bringing pressure to bear upon the Porte, were discussing the advisability of urging the Greeks to fight in a more humane manner. There was room for such advice, but the suggestion, as we have seen, fell through, partly from a fear lest the intervention should be interpreted as a sanction of revolution. It was then proposed that the Greeks should be recommended to accept an amnesty from the Porte, but this suggestion also came to nothing. As Russia observed, if the Greeks declined to listen to the appeal, she would be deprived of her right to uphold their cause with the Porte; whilst the Greeks had good reason to distrust any amnesty not accompanied by guarantees.

Towards the end of 1821, however, a change came over the spirit of European diplomacy. The instincts of Austria had been right. The Czar Alexander could never have been persuaded to make war upon a tyrant on behalf of a rebellious race, and the Powers were soon convinced that Russia did not mean to fight. Lord Strangford and Count Lützow received instructions from Hanover to use the firmest language with the Sultan's

ministers; and the latter did not fail, whilst making light of the representations, to twit the Powers with their "abject submission to the will of Russia."

On the 8th of March, 1822, the same two ambassadors presented a joint note to the Porte, strongly urging compliance with the Russian demands. The negotiation was interrupted by the news of the Greek movement in Chios, which, as the Porte alleged, apparently with reason, had been openly assisted by the Russian agents at Psara. The effect of the news was favourable to Turkey, but the scale was once more turned decidedly against her by the inhuman butcheries with which she took her revenge on the devoted island. These butcheries, in fact, caused a profound sensation in Europe, and especially amongst the English people.* The public con-

* Cobden's observations on the massacre of Chios, or Scio, are well known, but they are worth quoting once more. They were printed in 1841, from a letter written by Cobden to a friend:—"Having a few years ago, partly at your suggestion, embarked in a controversy upon the Eastern Question, I became so far interested in the subject as to be induced to pay a brief visit to Turkey, Egypt, and Greece, in the spring of 1837, for the purpose of making inquiries on the spot as to the actual state of things in those countries, the result of which effectually opened my eyes to the amount of misrepresentation that had been for years industriously spread respecting the alleged reforms and improvements going on in the Ottoman Empire. Scio is an island about double the size of the Isle of Wight, like it presenting to the side of the open sea a wall of precipitous rocks, and offering to the spectator, who sails along the narrow strait which separates it from the mainland, a series of sloping hills and picturesque valleys. This island, with a population of 100,000 Greeks, was a kind of appanage of the sultana mother; and although ruled nominally by a governor and a garrison of two or three hundred Turks, the latter were, in fact, treated rather as their guests than their masters, and the inhabitants governed themselves by their own laws. Scio became the garden of the Archipelago; the wealthy Greeks retired there after a life of successful commerce. Thither the aged and timid flocked for security; and the widow and orphan, that they might enjoy that protection and means of instruction which no other part of their

science was fairly aroused, and the Opposition forced upon the Cabinet, and upon the "self-elected" majority of the House of Commons,* a sense of their responsibility. Lord Strangford, who had been pursuing a course which rendered his country more or

enslaved country afforded. There, too, was congregated all that was refined, intelligent, and captivating, of Greek society—the very name of *Sciote*, when applied to females, implied fascination and beauty. To complete the picture, schools, colleges, and libraries, were established in this happy island. Such were the fruits of exemption from Turkish visitation. The dismal reverse of this picture remains to be told. Upon the breaking out of the Greek revolution the Sciotes, conscious of their defenceless situation, renounced all participation in the plans of the insurgents, and the heads of their Church, and a number of the principal inhabitants, voluntarily became hostages for the good conduct of their fellow-citizens. The struggle between the Mussulman and the Christian—the tyrant and the slave—became a religious war; and the hapless inhabitants of Scio were at length given over, by a mandate from Constantinople, to the fanaticism of the faithful. There was immediately a rush from the capital, and from the large towns on the coast of Asia Minor towards Tchesmé, the nearest point of embarkation to Scio. One cannot better picture the horrors that followed than by imagining that the Isle of Wight, with its happy and cultivated population, were suddenly given over to the lawless violence of fifty thousand of the most desperate characters of London, Portsmouth, Southampton, and the other large towns of the south, armed with knives, pistols, and guns. Imagine the worst that could arise from the unbridled cruelty and lust of such a mass; imagine fields covered with wounded fugitives, streets filled with mangled corpses, the churches heaped with slain, and the rooms of every mansion and villa, from the nursery to the kitchen, reeking with the blood of men, women, and children. Not one house, excepting those belonging to the Consuls, escaped destruction. Fire, sword, and the still more deadly passions of fanaticism and lust, ravaged the island for three months, during with such horrors were enacted—related to me by eye-witnesses—as quite mock all human credulity. Of 100,000 inhabitants not 5,000 were left alive upon the island. Forty thousand of both sexes were sold into slavery; and the harems of Turkey, of Asia, and Africa are still filled with the female victims. Such was the massacre of Scio, unparalleled in modern history (a tragedy compared by the British Consul, an eye-witness, to the destruction of Jerusalem), which thrilled the public mind of Europe and America with horror."

* The phrase was Lord John Russell's.

less answerable for all the acts of Turkey—alternately scolding and flattering the ministers of the Sultan, and maintaining confidential relations with them when all his colleagues had orders to avoid unnecessary intercourse with the Porte—received fresh instructions from London. Greece, both by what she had done and by what she had suffered, began to make an impression upon Europe; and the ambassadors now proposed that the mediation of the Powers should be employed not only to put an end to the insurrection of the Greeks but also to decide upon their future fate.

Lord Strangford exhibited the adroitness of a genuine diplomatist in effecting his sudden change of front. Djanib, the reis-Effendi, protested against the extravagant demand that the Porte should guarantee the safety of the Greeks, and thus admit itself to be in the wrong. "Am I not entitled," he exclaimed, "in my own house, to rule with a light or with a heavy hand?" "True," replied our ambassador; "but if the cries of your wife and children, ill-treated by you, disturb the public peace, I may first in a friendly way desire that you will abstain from your practices, and then, if you refuse, I may apply to the *cadi*. Such things happen every day in your capital." One of the Turkish Ministers laughed heartily at this; but the Porte was not convinced.

It was in the month of August, 1822, that the Congress of Verona met. The plenipotentiaries had assembled in the first instance at Vienna, but on the death of Castlereagh they adjourned to Verona;* and there, on the 9th of

* Canning was on the eve of departure from England to assume the post of Governor-General of India; but public opinion at once fixed upon him as the successor of Castlereagh at the Foreign Office.

November, Nesselrode opened the Eastern Question. The Czar, he declared, was ready to renew his diplomatic relations with the Porte, provided that the latter would either discuss the guarantees suitable to be given to the Greeks as an inducement to accept an amnesty, or prove, by a "series of facts," that it was "disposed to respect the Christian religion, placed under the protection of Russia," and establish peace in the Greek peninsula. The Austrian, Prussian, and French representatives concurred in this suggestion; but Wellington hesitated. It was necessary for him to consult his colleagues at home; and, after a fortnight had elapsed, he was prepared with his reply. Acknowledging the "magnanimous moderation" of the Czar, he declared that, in the opinion of his Government, the Porte had already displayed, by its partial concessions, a "series of facts" which would warrant Russia in re-opening diplomatic relations. At the same time he undertook that the pressure of Britain should still be brought to bear upon the Porte, in order to confirm it in its good dispositions.

Next day (November 27th) Tatitscheff read to the Congress a document in which the Czar declared that the "friendship of his allies inspired him with such a sense of security, that he entirely confided to their wisdom the direction of all future negotiations." It was evident that Turkey had nothing to fear from the Powers.

It was at this fatal moment that Metaxa and Jourdain, the delegates of the Greek provisional government, arrived in Italy with the first formal appeal for recognition. The Declaration of Independence had not been without its effect on the

public opinion of Europe, which became more and more favourable to the Greek cause with every new success over the Turks, and with every month which saw the Peloponnese practically free. Opinion was doing its work ; but it was still far from being strong enough effectually to demand the liberation of Greece. The Senate, which included many men of considerable ability, must have foreboded the uselessness of its application to the Great Powers ; but the Greeks, proud of what they had already accomplished, and sanguine of ultimate victory, addressed the sovereigns with a lofty humility, and perhaps also with a certain degree of pardonable guile.

In an age when constitutions were smothered by the paternal severity of a Holy Alliance, it became a young aspirant for freedom, born of rebellion and popular self-assertion, to employ the approved formulas, and to mingle statecraft with religion. The Senate therefore addressed the Allied Sovereigns in a document which bristles with the phrases of an ecstatic piety, and which must have deeply stirred, for a double reason, the emotional heart of the Czar Alexander.* In this document Greece demanded her

* “ Les sentimens de piété, d'humanité, et de justice, dont la réunion des Souverains est animée, font espérer au gouvernement de la Grèce que sa juste demande sera convenablement accueillie. Si, contre toute attente, l'offre du gouvernement venait à être rejetée, la présente déclaration équivaldra à une Protestation formelle que la Grèce entière dépose en ce jour au pied du trône de la Justice Divine—Protestation qu'un peuple Chrétien adresse avec confiance à l'Europe et à la grande famille de la Chrétienté. Affaiblis et délaissés, les Grecs n'espéreront alors que dans le Dieu fort. Soutenus par sa main toute-puissante, ils ne fléchiront pas devant la tyrannie. Chrétiens persécutés depuis quatre siècles pour être restés fidèles à notre Sauveur et à Dieu notre Souverain Maître, nous défendrons, jusqu'au dernier, son église, nos foyers, et nos tombeaux ; heureux d'y descendre libres et Chrétiens, ou de vaincre, comme nous

re-admission into Christendom, together with the protection of Europe against the vengeance of the Porte. Neither the justice nor the fervour of the suppliants prevailed. The fate of Chios must have branded the true character of militant Islam upon the heart of every European monarch and statesman; but the practical effect of that unparalleled atrocity was, apparently, no greater than if the impression had been stamped on running water. The heart of Europe was dead, or callous from a quarter of a century of war. Even England, who would not have the blood of Spain upon her head, found not a word to say for Greece. Canning had not yet felt his power; the influence of Castlereagh overshadowed his country from the tomb.

The reply of the Congress to the appeal of the Greeks contains nothing which need surprise us; and, indeed, it affords an adequate explanation of the change which appeared to have come over the policy of the Czar. The decision of the European concert of tyranny was made known in a Circular issued at Verona on the 14th of December, which declared that "the coincidence of the Greek rising with the revolution at Naples and in Piedmont left no doubt as to the identical origin of those various movements"; that the leaders of the Greek revolt had erred in thinking it possible to sow discord in the councils of the Powers; and that the Sovereigns had determined to repel the principle of revolution,

avons vaincu jusqu'ici, par la seule force de notre Seigneur Jésus-Christ, et par sa divine puissance."—*Annuaire Historique*, v., 405.

Mavrocordatos had already, in the summer of 1822, made overtures to Britain, or at least to Lord Guildford, Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, suggesting that Greece might be established under the protectorate of one of the Great Powers.—Gervinus, v., 374.

without inquiring in what shape or in what country it made its appearance.*

One scarcely knows whether to praise most the political shrewdness of this solemn assembly of statesmen, who discovered the complicity of the Greek rebels and the Italian secret societies, or the religious fervour of the old Czar, who sacrificed a noble ambition to the more sacred duty of maintaining tyrants on their thrones, or the consistency which made Wellington, on behalf of the Liverpool Ministry, concur in abandoning the Greeks to the brutality of Turkey, whilst he protested at the same Congress against the dragooning of Spain.

Such was the diplomacy of Europe in 1822. In the remarkable parallel which the reader will not have failed to draw between the events of that epoch and the events of 1876–8, there are discernible a few points of distinction in principle and action, by no means always favourable to the later age. The art and practice of diplomacy seem to be chiefly learned by the careful study of such parallels; and I suppose that, if existing traditions of statesmanship are maintained, some new phase of the Eastern Question, arising towards the end of the present century, will be laboriously conducted and determined after the models of 1822 and 1878.†

The blindness of Europe in 1822—hardly greater, it may be thought, than her blindness in 1878—caused her to throw away an opportunity which she seized, on no better pretext, five years later. Surely it would have been wiser, even from the tyrant's

* Gervinus.

† The sentence was written in 1878. I let it stand; the reader himself will transpose the future tense into the present.

point of view, to establish Greece in 1822, when the massacres in Chios, and throughout the length and breadth of the Ottoman dominions in Europe, had made such an intervention in Turkey both just and politic, than to wait for another lustrum, until oceans of blood had been shed, millions of money spent on both sides, humanity sickened and wearied by these rank harvests of tyranny, and until, moreover, the actual intervention (albeit partly the result of an accident) became a reward of obstinate and successful revolt.

We may dwell upon this phase with the more advantage because Europe's treatment of the Greeks in 1822 was the fountain-head of all her responsibility towards New Greece, and deposited the capital of a debt which has been increasing ever since at compound interest. Our conduct towards Greece, for more than three-quarters of a century, has been marked by an injustice amounting almost to positive cruelty. We have made her a State, it is true; but a State in fetters, and saddled by conditions under which no race of men, however intrinsically capable of self-government, could be expected to prosper. The injustice began from the moment when we refused to liberate her, though she had shaken off her bonds, and stood at bay before the tyrant who would have re-imposed them. We condemned her to a bitter struggle, after her first battle had been successfully waged—a struggle in which not only thousands of patriots fell year by year, not only her land was desolated and her fleets and towns were destroyed, not only the worst elements of a long-oppressed people rose to the surface, and dragged her through countless humiliations, not only her young

life was burdened by usurious loans (and indemnities—to Turkey!), but her whole subsequent existence was embittered by the remembrance that the help of her friends had cost her more than the deadly ferocity of her enemies.

The Congress of Verona poisoned the very founts of Europe's generosity to Greece. We have been generous with one hand and unjust with the other. The debt of 1822 still remains unpaid, and the shame of Verona unexpunged.

Well might Kolokotrones, hearing the result of this appeal to the Powers, warn his men that they must trust entirely to their guns and their swords. He, in common with many other leaders, civil and military, had already taken the measure of European diplomacy; and they saw only too plainly that, if Greece would be free, she must enfranchise herself.* They were doing it, in spite of every obstacle and every relapse. The number of self-sacrificing Greeks—like Miaoulis and Kondouriotes, two merchants of Hydra, who spent more than a hundred thousand pounds to equip a flotilla—was very great; and, considering the slender population of the peninsula, the magnitude of the forces which faced the Turks, both on sea and on land, was especially striking. Comparatively few of the inhabitants of Hellas or the Morea can have shirked the call of patriotism; and their ranks were continually recruited from that Greater Greece, spread over all the shores of the Ægean, which looked to Athens as its mother-city.

* “Hereditary bondsmen! know ye not

Who would be free themselves must strike the blow?”

So Byron had written, apostrophising the Greeks, in 1811.—*Childe Harold*, ii., 76.

Finlay, writing of this period, almost does justice to the race who freed themselves without a leader, and broke their bonds by the universal instinct of a regenerate people. From some circumstance, he says,* “which hardly admits of explanation”—though it has seemed to later writers that the explanation was simple enough—“and which we must therefore refer reverentially to the will of God, the Greek revolution produced no man of real greatness, no statesman of unblemished honour, no general of commanding talent. Fortunately, the people derived from the framework of their existing usages”—the surviving communal system—“the means of continuing their desperate struggle for independence, in spite of the incapacity and dishonesty of the civil and military leaders who directed the central government. The true glory of the Greek revolution lies in the indomitable energy and unwearied perseverance of the mass of the people. But perseverance, unfortunately, like most popular virtues, supplies historians only with commonplace details, while readers expect the annals of revolutions to be filled with pathetic incidents, surprising events, and heroic exploits.”

The heroic exploit of Botzaris and his defence of Missolonghi in the autumn of 1823, which is only one out of a hundred similar instances, might satisfy the most exacting reader. Greatly reduced in strength by a sanguinary campaign, having barely three thousand men wherewith to hold his ground in Southern Epirus, Botzaris found himself threatened, towards the end of August, by more than eight times his number, under the Pasha of Scodra. Unable to

* *History*, vi., 231.



MARKOS BOTZARIS.
(From "*Kolokotrones*.")

[To face p. 160.]

attack the enemy after any of the ordinary fashions of war, he resolved upon a desperate stratagem. Not the first Greek who had been known to take a similar resolution, Botzaris selected a hundred and fifty Suliotes, all as brave as himself, and fell by night upon the Turkish advance guard of five thousand men, encamped in a valley near Karpenitza. The sudden incursion of these heroes produced the desired effect. The Albanians were surprised, and scarcely knew where to strike. It is asserted that they recognised the voice of Botzaris, as he called upon his companions to smite home; their fire was concentrated upon him, and he was wounded in the abdomen. That made no change in the behaviour of the gallant Greek, who fought and exhorted still. Meanwhile the remainder of his three thousand, as arranged beforehand, had attacked at other points; and the Turks, thoroughly beaten, were dispersed in all directions. Eight hundred men were slain; a thousand prisoners, eighteen standards, seven guns, and immense military stores were taken by the Suliotes. But Botzaris was shot through the head as day began to dawn. He was interred with military honours at Missolonghi, and the Government published a decree in his honour.*

The heroism of the Greeks cannot be seriously contested. With or without efficient leaders, they fought as though the whole struggle depended on each individual; and their valour was well seconded by the volunteers who began to flock into the country from various parts of Europe. The sorry business at Verona stimulated the Philhellenism of all who had

* The decree was signed by Mavromichaelis, and began, "Beloved Greeks! lo, another Leonidas figures in your history."

“dreamed that Greece might still be free.” In England, France, Germany, Russia, public opinion began more and more distinctly to favour the Greek insurrection; public meetings were held, appeals were made; money, arms, and men were sent to the Peloponnese. The Greek Committee in London * was particularly active, and its labours were shared by men eminent in every rank of life. Amongst the more notable Philhellenes who personally offered their services to the Greek Government, in addition to the Russian subjects already named, were Colonel Stanhope (son of the Earl of Harrington), Colonel Napier, † Gordon, Abney Hastings, Raybaud, Blaquière, and Lord Byron.

It was on the 5th of January, 1824, that Lord Byron landed at Missolonghi; and on the following 19th of April he died in that town, having accom-

* The list of the Greek Committee in March, 1823, included the Hon. H. G. Bennett, M.P., Jeremy Bentham, Sir F. Burdett, M.P., Robert Campbell, Colonel Davies, M.P., Edward Ellice, M.P., William Evans, M.P., Lord Erskine, Lord Ebrington, M.P., C. A. Elton, J. B. Gilchrist, T. Gordon, J. Henry, John Cam Hobhouse, M.P., Joseph Hume, M.P. (Chairman), the Hon. C. H. Hutchinson, M.P., Lord Archibald Hamilton, M.P., the Hon. D. Kinnaird, J. G. Lambton, M.P., T. B. Lennard, M.P., General Long, J. Maxwell, M.P., Zachariah Macaulay, Thomas Moore, Sir J. Mackintosh, M.P., George Phillips, M.P., David Ricardo, M.P., T. Spring Rice, M.P., Lord John Russell, M.P., J. Smith, M.P., James Scarlett, M.P., Richard Taylor, J. Williams, M.P., Sir R. Wilson, M.P., John Wilks, and William Smith, M.P.—a total of thirty-six, of whom twenty-three were Members of Parliament. Dr. (afterwards Sir John) Bowring was Secretary to the Committee.

† Byron wrote to Dr. Bowring (Oct. 10, 1823), introducing Colonel Sir Charles Napier: “A better or a braver man is not easily to be found. He is our man to lead a regular force, or to organise a national one for the Greeks. . . . He is, besides, a personal friend of both Prince Mavrocordato, Colonel Stanhope, and myself, and in such concord with all three, that we should all pull together—an indispensable, as well as a rare point, especially in Greece at present.”

plished his mission, and happy in the consciousness that he had done so. By fits and starts the poet may have conceived himself to be a possible great administrator, and he even coquetted with the idea that he might be called upon to occupy a very exalted position in Greece. At times he thought himself a soldier. On his thirty-sixth birthday (January 22nd) he wrote one of his last poems, which illustrates this more martial mood:—

“The sword, the banner, and the field,
Glory and Greece around me see!
The Spartan, borne upon his shield,
Was not more free.

“Awake! (not Greece—she *is* awake!)
Awake, my spirit! Think through whom
Thy life-blood tracks its parent lake,*
And then strike home! . . .

“If thou regret'st thy youth, why live?
The land of honourable death
Is here: Up to the field, and give
Away thy breath!

“Seek out—less often sought than found—
A soldier's grave, for thee the best;
And look around, and choose thy ground,
And take thy rest.”

But Byron's real mission did not depend on his success as an administrator or a soldier, nor was it abortive because he died in his bed so soon after his arrival in the land to which he sacrificed himself. It was this sacrifice by which he performed all that he could expect to perform; and one cannot doubt, reading the letters and journals written by him at the time,

* The first Lord Byron was distinguished at Roundway Down, and in other Royalist victories during the Civil War.

that he had an intuitive sense of the true value of his work. "He but looked upon himself," says Moore,* "—to use a favourite illustration of his own—as one of the many waves that must break and die upon the shore, before the tide they help to advance can reach its full mark. 'What signifies self,' was his generous thought, 'if a single spark of that which would be worthy of the past can be bequeathed unquenchably to the future?' Such was the devoted feeling with which he embarked in the cause of Italy; and these words which, had they remained only words, the unjust would have pronounced but an idle boast, have now received from his whole course in Greece a practical comment."

The name of Byron was a greater power in his own day than it is at present, and it would probably be impossible for us to realise the effect produced by his example and his fate, not merely upon the Greeks themselves, but upon all the friends of Greece throughout the civilised world. He shed a lustre on the idea of Philhellenism, and at the same time he did much in a very practical way to advance the cause of the insurgents. From the moment of his embarkation at Leghorn with Trelawny, Hamilton Browne, and Count Gamba,† through the months of his sojourn in Cephalonia, and up to the day of his death, he worked incessantly to provide the combatants with the sinews of war. Not satisfied with urging the British Philhellenes to persevere with the schemes which had been set on foot to raise a Greek loan, he spent much of his own fortune in anticipation of the money from England. He had entered upon his new

* *Letters and Journals of Lord Byron* (Murray, 1832), vi., 80.

† Brother of the Countess Guiccioli.

undertaking with a decided prejudice against the Greek character, and a distrust in the Greek leaders ; but his enthusiasm to a great extent overcame at least the first of these feelings. And he had common sense as well as enthusiasm. He saw that nothing but hard fighting would secure the independence of the Greeks, and that this fighting must be done by the Greeks themselves, and in their own fashion. His constant effort was to promote the armament of ships and the equipment of soldiers ; and he laughed at the philanthropic designs of Stanhope, who now represented the Greek Committee in Greece, and who wanted to model a new State on the basis of the American constitution, even while the Turks were threatening to regain all they had lost.

Trelawny and Browne had gone straight to the Morea, in order to ascertain the views of the leaders, and at Tripolitza they met Kolokotrones, who, knowing the friendly relations between Byron and Mavrocordatos, plainly assured the Englishmen that if the latter persisted in his intrigues, he would set him on a donkey, and have him whipped out of the country. Odysseus assumed another tone. He studied the character of his visitors, and contrived to please them all in turn. He was a democrat with Stanhope, a sportsman with Humphreys, an athlete with Trelawny,* and eventually, it must be added, in evil odour with his countrymen. The influence of Kolokotrones and Odysseus upon Stanhope and Trelawny was that they set to work “ to detach Lord Byron from Mavrocordatos ” ; † but Byron was too

* Gervinus, vol. vi., p. 24, *et seq.* Mr. Trelawny married the sister of Odysseus.

† Moore's *Letters*, &c., vi., 191.

wise to suffer himself to be moved by the petty jealousies of the chiefs. Before his arrival in Greece he had written from Cephalonia to the "General Government," urging on them the supreme importance of union; and this letter may be quoted to show what the nature of his influence actually was.

"The affair of the loan," he wrote,* "the expectations so long and vainly indulged of the arrival of the Greek fleet, and the danger to which Missolonghi is still exposed, have detained me here, and will still detain me till some of them are removed. But when the money shall be advanced for the fleet, I will start for the Morea; not knowing, however, of what use my presence can be in the present state of things. We have heard some rumours of new dissensions, nay, of the existence of a civil war. With all my heart I pray that these reports may be false or exaggerated, for I can imagine no calamity more serious than this; and I must frankly confess that, unless union and order are established, all hopes of a loan will be vain; and all the assistance which the Greeks could expect from abroad—an assistance neither trifling nor worthless—will be suspended or destroyed; and, what is worse, the Great Powers of Europe, of whom no one was an enemy to Greece, but seemed to favour her establishment as an independent Power, will be persuaded that the Greeks are unable to govern themselves, and will, perhaps, themselves undertake to settle your disorders in such a way as to blast the brightest hopes of yourselves and of your friends.

"Allow me to add, once for all, I desire the well-being of Greece and nothing else; I will do all I can to secure it; but I cannot consent, I never will consent, that the English public, or English individuals, should be deceived as to the real state of Greek affairs. The rest, gentlemen, depends on you. You have fought gloriously—act honourably towards your fellow-citizens and the world, and it will then be no more said, as has been repeated for two thousand years with the Roman historians, that Philopœmen was the last of the Grecians. Let not calumny itself (and it is difficult, I own, to guard against it in so arduous a struggle) compare the patriot Greek, when resting from his

* Moore's *Letters*, &c., vi., 95.

labours, to the Turkish pacha whom his victories have exterminated.

"I pray you to accept these my sentiments as a sincere proof of my attachment to your real interests."

The first Greek loan was contracted in London on behalf of the Provisional Government, during the spring of 1824. The nominal amount was £800,000 ; it was issued at 59, and was secured on the revenue accruing, or expected to accrue, from the customs, fisheries, and salt works. The Greeks received about £300,000 net, for which they engaged to pay a nominal five per cent., which meant an actual thirteen and one-third per cent. It would be difficult to say which side in this bargain displayed the greatest shrewdness or the greatest ingenuousness.*

* No part of Finlay's *History* is more courageously or pungently written than that in which he lashes the conduct of the pseudo-Philhellenes, who transmitted to the present generation so heavy a burden of responsibility. "It was by those who called themselves Philhellenes," he says (vi., 433), "in England and America, that Greece was most injured. Several of the steamships, for which the Greek Government paid large sums in London, *were never sent to Greece*. Some of the field-artillery purchased by the Greek deputies was so ill-constructed that the carriages broke down the first time the guns were brought into action. Two frigates were contracted for at New York ; and the business of the contractors was so managed that Greece *received only one frigate after paying the cost of two*. . . . It will be seen that waste and peculation were not monopolies in the hands of Greek statesmen, Albanian shipowners, and captains of armatoles and klephts. *English politicians* and American merchants *had also their share*. The persons principally responsible for this waste of money, and these delays, were Mr. Hobhouse, now Lord Broughton ; Mr. Edward Ellice ; Sir Francis Burdett ; Mr. Hume ; Sir John Bowring, the Secretary of the Greek Committee ; and Messrs. Ricardo, the contractors of the second Greek loan. Sir Francis Burdett was floating on the cream of Radicalism, and Lord Broughton was supporting himself above the thin milk of Whiggery by holding on vigorously at the baronet's coat-tail. Both these gentlemen, however, though they were guilty of negligence and folly, kept their hands pure from all money transactions in Greek bonds.

The British Philhellenes were by no means the only foreign friends who rendered notable assistance to the Greek cause. In Germany there were committees which worked in accord with that of London. In America, a President's Message expressed the desire of the nation to see Greece obtain her independence; whilst material aid was sent both from that country and from parts of the world as distant as India and Australia.

In France, as soon as the Egyptian fleet had set sail for the Morea, an association was formed for the succour of the Greeks, and numbered amongst its members such men as Larochevoucauld, Lafitte, the Duke de Fitzjames, St. Aulaire, and Dalberg. Chateaubriand wrote a "Note on Greece," which, as coming from an ex-minister of Louis XVIII., scandalised many of his friends. The good effect of Chateaubriand's advocacy was soon experienced,

The Right Honourable Edward Ellice was a contractor for the first Greek loan, but was not a bear, at least of Greek stock. In a letter to the *Times* he made a plain statement of his position, and owned candidly that he had been guilty of 'extreme indiscretion in mixing himself up with the Greek deputies and their affairs.' What he said was no doubt perfectly true; but we must not overlook that it was not said until Greek affairs had ceased to discount the political drafts of the Whigs; and a less friendly witness might perhaps have used a stronger phrase than 'extreme indiscretion.' The conduct of Mr. Hume and Sir John Bowring was more reprehensible, and their names were deeply imbedded in the financial pastry which Cobbett called the 'Greek pie,' and which was served with the rich sauce of his savoury tongue in the celebrated *Weekly Register*. Where there was both just blame and much calumny, it is difficult and not very important to apportion the exact amount of censure which the conduct of each individual merited."

It is painful to reprint this passage, which I cannot but regard as exaggerated. Yet it is essential to a just estimate of the position which New Greece has occupied in relation to Europe that all the circumstances of her establishment as a kingdom should be clearly kept in mind.

and the Greeks received from France several valuable cargoes of arms, ammunition, and money. Switzerland, too, and the Italian States, furnished ardent sympathisers; and there was, perhaps, not a single civilised country which did not hold out to the struggling nation an earnest though unofficial support.

The significance of this constant encouragement and assistance is chiefly this—that the Greeks were backed and fostered in their revolt, from the very beginning, by the public opinion of Christendom; and this consensus of enlightened and energetic sentiment in Europe, cosmopolitan and continuous, virtually created a responsibility which could only be discharged by the constant moral support of Greece in her subsequent difficulties. There are circumstances in which the man who gives incurs the duty of giving again; and this undoubtedly was the case with the Philhellenes of 1820–30. It may have been the fault of the Greeks themselves that so many of them interpreted the British loans and the British volunteers as the first instalments of assistance from the British Government. But it was not their fault that the succour of their friends was so unwisely bestowed, that the loans were made to them under unjust conditions impossible to be fulfilled, and that they were fooled by the hope that money sufficient for all their needs would be constantly forthcoming. The Greek leaders were undoubtedly misled by the too great zeal of some of their foreign counsellors; and it was most unfair to abandon their cause, as a few Philhellenes did, because they failed to repay these loans in the course of a year or two, or to display the characteristics of a great nation imme-

diately after their escape from a ruinous seven years' war.*

Yet more impressive in the eyes of the insurgents

* Mr. Finlay was one of the friends who thus abandoned Greece. Within four pages, in which he speaks of the employment of the English money, he describes Kondouriotes and Kolettes as "two ignorant and incapable persons"; he says of Mavrocordatos that his conduct "was neither honourable to himself nor advantageous to his country"; of John Soutzos that he was "stigmatised as the most corrupt and rapacious Phanariot in Greece"; of Zaimes that he was the author of an "iniquitous movement," "neither energetic nor courageous"; of Londos that he was "addicted to riotous debauchery." It would have been well if Finlay could have acted on the principle of Byron, who, in a letter written shortly before his death, says, "I have heard a good deal of Sisseni, but not a deal of good; however, I never judge from report, particularly in a revolution."

With regard to the character of the two English loans, and the light in which they were looked upon during the earlier years of the reign of Otho, I may quote a passage from a statement made by the Greek Minister of Finance in 1836 (cited in Mr. Strong's *Greece as a Kingdom*:—"The financial affairs of Greece may be divided into three principal epochs. The first commences from the day when the trumpet of liberty was first sounded, and comes down to the year 1828. . . . If we turn our attention to the first epoch, we shall endeavour in vain to find any order or regular system in the finances of the nation. That was the period of universal movement, uncertainty, and war. Government rapidly succeeded government, and their short duration was not calculated to build up solidly the great national edifice—the finances of the country. It is true there existed at that time a finance-ministry, by whom registers and accounts were kept; but the confusion which existed in the financial operations of that period were so vast, through the pressure of circumstances, that even now, after a lapse of so many years, it is scarcely possible to check them. On the one hand, immense sums are charged for extraordinary expenses of the state, purchase of warlike stores, preparations for military expeditions, arming and manning the infant navy, and the payment of the troops; on the other, we find revenues arising from the tithes raised on the produce of the land, from the sale of national property, from foreign and domestic loans, subscriptions, presents, and other pecuniary assistance. But to determine the precise amount of these receipts and expenses, even supposing that the former were duly paid into the treasury of the provisional government, and properly accounted for, is a work of time, and must be left till the laborious investigations on the subject are completed."

was the recognition by the British Government of the effective blockade by the Greek fleet of various Turkish ports—a recognition which, if not actually premature, was at least a significant illustration of the inconsistency of our conduct towards the Greeks. The reverses of the latter between the summer of 1824 and the end of 1825—the destruction of Kasos and Psara, the sanguinary ravages of Ibrahim Pasha, at the head of the Egyptian contingent in the Morea,* the capture of Navarino, Missolonghi, and other towns, the defeat of Kolokotronis by land and of Miaoulis by sea, decidedly overshadowed the victories of the Greeks; but they clung throughout to the conviction that Great Britain, if not Europe in concert, would step in to relieve them. And it must be confessed that they had reason for their belief.

* Sultan Mahmoud was so near the end of his resources that he was driven to call upon his most powerful and dangerous vassal, already meditating a rebellion on his own account, to suppress the insurrection in Greece. Mohammed Ali responded with alacrity, and embarked 8,000 men and 1,000 horses at Alexandria on the 19th of July, 1824.

CHAPTER VII

EUROPEAN INTERVENTION

Plans for Greece—Canning's Views—Successes of the Egyptians in the Morea—British Intrigues in Greece—Britain and the Holy Alliance—Canning and Metternich—Extremity of the Greeks—Death of the Czar—The Protocol of April, 1826—The Treaty of London (July, 1827)—The Secret Article—The Battle of Navarino: a Happy Blunder—Destitution of the Greeks—Responsibility of the Philhellenes.

THAT the Greeks had been taught to look to Britain for their ultimate emancipation is rendered sufficiently manifest by their renewed appeal for an English protectorate in 1824, and by the circumstances under which this appeal was made. That the British Government, or rather the British nation, made itself specially and permanently responsible for the due establishment of the Greek State will be found to follow directly from the second series of negotiations, which occupied the twelve months preceding the death of the Czar Alexander (December 1, 1825).

During the year 1823, which was distinguished by many important successes on the part of Greece, a dozen different suggestions had been made as to the future government of the country. The Legislative Assembly—which occupied itself in constant

deliberations on constitutional and legal topics, whilst the Executive struggled with the enemies of the country abroad and at home—at one time conceived the idea of offering the crown to Dom Miguel of Portugal. Negris suggested the ex-king of Holland, Jerome Bonaparte, whilst others turned their eyes to the Duke of Leuchtenberg; but sufficiently strong objections were found to all these ideas. A Russian scheme, attributed to Capo d'Istria, was published in Paris, in the course of the following year, and was much canvassed throughout Europe. This plan* proposed to deal with the Greek mainland, including Thessaly and Epirus, with the Morea, Crete, and the islands. Leaving to the latter their ancient democratic institutions, it would have created three distinct principalities, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with Turkish garrisons in certain fortified towns, and with a guarantee of this new constitution by the Great Powers.

It is probable that the Czar himself had agreed to this proposal, which at all events went as far as he could have been expected to go in the direction of Greek liberation. British diplomacy in that age, under the influence of Canning, was more robust. Canning had no notion of allowing Russia to settle the question in her own fashion. He seems to have resolved not only to assist the Greeks in their struggle, but also to maintain the superiority of British over Russian influence in the East. He knew that the Hetairists, though they had been regarded with suspicion by others of the patriots, had still their representatives and propagandists in

* Printed by Tricoupis, iii., 385.

Greece. He must have heard, for instance, of the mission of Varvakis, a rich Greek merchant from Odessa, who combined with a princely benevolence towards his fellow-countrymen an ardent desire to create a strong Russophile party. Up to his death, in the beginning of 1825, Varvakis constantly advocated the selection of Capo d'Istria for the presidency of the State; and his efforts may have had some effect upon the eventual choice of the Russian diplomatist for that post.

Stimulated by the knowledge of these Russian intrigues, Canning began to move the wires which were destined to set himself in motion. The Greek leaders, understanding that Britain was willing to assume the charge, resolved to place themselves under her protection.*

They prepared a declaration to this effect, and invited the signatures of the leading men in the country. At the same time they sent an agent, Spaniolakis, to lay their views before Canning, assuring him that a monarchy was necessary for the good government of the country, and declaring their readiness to accept any one who should be nominated by Great Britain. It was thus early understood that the choice had fallen upon Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg. A protest against the Russian scheme of simple autonomy accompanied this direct appeal to Britain; and Canning is said to have been

* About the same time there had been a French project, for conferring the crown upon the second son of the Duke d'Orleans. The intrigues in Russia were carried on independently, and even in defiance, of the Czar and his ministers; for Alexander clung to his *non possumus*. But so strong was the public opinion of the Empire in favour of the coercion of Turkey that a hostile demonstration was made in the Czar's presence, in September, 1824, at a grand review of the Guards.

“better pleased by this act than by anything which the Greeks had done since the time of Epaminondas.” This protest was received on the 4th of November, 1824; and on the first of the following month Canning wrote directly to the Greek Government at Nauplia, giving them to understand that if the Greeks, at a subsequent period, wished to have recourse to the good offices of Britain, and if they should formally express such a desire, they would find her ready to accept the duty.

Observe how the responsibility of Britain towards Greece accumulates with every new phase of these negotiations. Canning’s letter was little short of a recognition of Greek independence, and it was undoubtedly construed in that sense by the Greeks. The responsibility was doubled and trebled by the open assistance rendered to the Government of Nauplia by English subjects, and even by English vessels in the *Ægean*; and still more by the conduct of Sir Frederick Adam, the new Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands,* and of Commodore Hamilton, commanding a British squadron in the *Levant*. It was at Zante, and under his auspices, that the committee had been formed which drew up the request for a British protectorate, the Government of Greece remaining in the background.

Meanwhile the Czar, perplexed between his desire to pursue the traditional policy of Russia as against Turkey, on the one hand, and his resolution not to encourage the rebellion of the Greeks against a crowned head on the other hand, had conceived the idea of opening a new chapter in the history of the Holy Alliance. He had proposed in 1823 a Confer-

* He had married a Greek lady of Corfu, and was a hearty Philhellene.

ence of the Powers at St. Petersburg; and Canning was obliged to weigh the chance of rendering Greece an immediate assistance against the disadvantage of appearing to move in the matter at the instance of Russia. It was hardly possible for him to hesitate. He wrote to the Russian Government to the effect that, in face of protestations both from the Porte and from the Greek leaders, Britain considered it useless for her to attempt a mediation. Nothing more was needed to excite the wrath of the Continental Powers against the British Foreign Minister. The members of the Holy Alliance haughtily denied the value of representations proceeding from the leaders of a rebellion,* and they made no effort to conceal the disgust with which Canning's policy inspired them. Metternich went so far as to write to Nesselrode that Britain ought no longer, even if she should desire it, to be admitted to the Conference; and he began to suggest hostile measures on the part of "the true alliance" against the friend and protector of rebels.†

In the year 1825, in view of the successes of Ibrahim Pasha, the Russian Government renewed its proposal for a Conference, and this time Canning had nothing to say against it. He saw that no result could come of deliberations in which the Powers principally concerned had diametrically

* About this time Canning enraged many of his fellow-countrymen, as well as the great majority of Continental statesmen, by recognising the South American Republics. He has himself told us that he "called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old." His instincts were now leading him to call a New Greece into existence, in order to redress the balance of Eastern Europe.

† Gervinus, vi., 120-126.

opposite interests. Russia wanted to be the *man-dataire* of Europe, or at least of the Holy Alliance, for the forcible coercion of Turkey; but she was (officially) inimical to Greek independence. Austria, on the other hand, did not desire to see Turkey attacked or weakened, being far more inclined to help her to crush her rebellious subjects;* and it was thus by no means likely that Metternich would go out of his way to promote the objects of Nesselrode. The Conference was held, but it was little better than a conclave of the Holy Alliance (February 24, 1825). Russia, assuming the necessity for intervention, proposed that the Powers should at once demand a cessation of hostilities, under the threat of recalling the Ambassadors. Whereupon the Austrian plenipotentiary, demurring at a step which seemed to lead up directly to the employment

* Austria, it may be mentioned, was at this very moment enlisted in the cause of the Turks. "On the 24th May, the Capitan Pasha put to sea from the Dardanelles with the Turkish squadron, consisting of a ship of the line of sixty-six guns, two frigates, six corvettes, and fifty brigs and transports, many of which bore the Austrian colours. As they had on board a vast quantity of ammunition, shells, projectiles, scaling-ladders, and platforms, it was supposed their destination was Hydra or Samos. In reality, however, they were intended for the siege of Missolonghi, on the vigorous prosecution of which the Divan were now intent. Sakhtouri no sooner heard of the approach of the Ottoman fleet than he set sail for Hydra, and came up with them as they were beating through the straits between Andros and Eubœa; and, instantly breaking their line, sent the dreaded fire-ships among them. Two of them grappled the sixty-six gun ship, and blew her up, with eight hundred men on board, the whole treasure of the fleet, and the Capitan Pasha's flag. He himself narrowly escaped by getting into a smaller vessel a few minutes before the explosion took place. Another frigate of thirty-four guns was at the same time burnt by the fire-ships on the left. Upon this the Turkish fleet fled in all directions; twenty found refuge in Carysto and Suda, but five Austrian transports were taken, with thirteen hundred barrels of gunpowder and great military stores."—Alison, ii., 413.

of force, suggested, inconsistently enough, that the same end might be gained by a threat to acknowledge the independence of Greece. The fact is, Metternich knew that the Russian Government would never assent to such a plan; and thus it came about that the Conference fully answered Canning's expectations. It drew up a "remonstrance" with the Ottoman Government, and the Porte, seeing that the Powers were hopelessly divided, naturally replied in a cool and contemptuous tone (June 3, 1825).

In the meantime, the wholesome measures of Britain in Greece were bearing good fruit. The declaration asking for British protection had been signed by nearly all the leading men of the country, including every part of the Morea, Hydra, and other islands. The signatures numbered about two thousand, the only notable refusals having come from Hypsilantes, Kolettes, and Kondouriotès. Armed with this general sanction of the nation, the promoters of the scheme brought their declaration before the representative body in Nauplia, and the Assembly formally ratified it. The instrument was short, simple, and conclusive:—

(1) "In virtue of the present act, the Greek nation places the sacred deposit of its liberty, independence, and political existence under the *absolute protection* of Great Britain. (2) The President of the Council shall immediately execute the present law.—Napoli, July 21 (August 1), 1825."

Demetrios Miaoulis, son of the famous Greek captain, brought this act to London, and presented it to the Foreign Secretary; but Canning did not jump at the offer. Much had happened since he set the intrigue on foot, and since Sir Frederick Adam began his work in the Ionian Islands. Metternich and his

friends had not been able to undermine the influence of the British Minister, as they had constantly laboured to do, but they had found access to the ears of the English Tories, as well as of King George and the Duke of Wellington; and Canning had apparently become more cautious. Besides, it is to be observed that he had practically obtained his object in the mere formulation and presentation of the appeal to Britain. Metternich had thought himself happy in having administered a check to Russia and a snub to Britain; but Canning saw further than Metternich, and knew that the confidence of the Greeks was not misplaced. For the present, however, he was obliged to bid them wait. He openly told the Greek delegates that their offer could not be accepted; that its acceptance would involve Britain in a war with Turkey, and would give cause of complaint to the Powers. He recommended them to look not for a single protectorate, but for the common mediation of the Powers.

“There might be a point in the contest,” said Canning, “in which Great Britain might exert her influence to promote a compromise between the Greeks and the Porte; not for the entire independence of Greece, for that would be asking everything, and could not be the subject of a compromise (if they could conquer it, it was well, and that was their affair), but for anything short of independence which might form the basis of an arrangement with the Porte.”

This was diplomatic language; but the Greeks were not deceived. Nor was Europe deceived. It saw that Britain was gradually gaining her ends, whilst the Holy Alliance was gradually breaking up. Then, as many times before and since, in a good or an evil cause, the triumphs of diplomacy went to the

wielder of the greatest material power, and to the most resolute and self-reliant Minister. It was not long before Russia frankly accepted the situation, and showed a desire to effect an understanding with Britain. Prussia, not greatly concerned in the future of Turkey and Greece, had no intention of moving without the co-operation of both Russia and Austria. France, of whom Metternich had boasted that he held her in his pocket, being liberally inclined to Greece, in spite of her reactionary king, preferred the alliance of Britain and Russia to the continued concentration of power in Eastern Europe. Austria was baffled everywhere, and to almost everybody's satisfaction.* Henceforth London, instead of St. Petersburg, was the point to which the friends of Greek liberty turned their eyes.

It was better for Greece to be served by Britain than to be served by Russia; and it was better for Europe that the new State should not owe its emancipation to a Power whose influence on the Ægean would have been a danger to the community of

* The annoyance of Metternich, when he found Canning master of the situation, was so great that he drew up a dispatch, to be sent to the Austrian representative at the Court of St. James's, directing the latter to put the following questions to the British Government:—1. What were the intentions of Canning in the business which, with the co-operation of the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, had been entered upon between Hamilton and the rebels? 2. Had Hamilton acted with the consent of his Government? and, if not, was he to be punished with death? 3. In the opposite case, the Imperial Cabinet would decline to have any further dealings with the British Cabinet, which did not know how to keep its subordinates within the limits of obedience (*Gervinus*, vi., 142). The terms were toned down before the dispatch was sent; but something of the kind was communicated by Esterhazy to Canning. The latter made a conciliatory reply, and Metternich did not insist on an explanation.

nations. No country ought to have seen this more clearly than Austria; and yet no country showed a more absurd jealousy of Canning's increasing power. One would have thought that the humiliation of the Russian intriguers was sufficient to make the Government of Vienna offer its co-operation to Britain; but, instead of this, Metternich held aloof, and preferred to have no part whatever in the establishment of New Greece. There were, indeed, other questions at issue between the courts, in addition to the question of Greece; and Canning never succeeded, up to the day of his death, in persuading the statesmen of the old *régime* of the soundness or safeness of his views.

The policy of Canning in the autumn of 1825 was natural enough; and it was the only policy which he could have taken, under the circumstances, with any hope of success. He doubted the sincerity of Russia's advances. He was determined to settle the Eastern Question in his own way, and not in Russia's. Of one thing he was quite convinced, namely, that the exclusive intervention of Russia in the affairs of Turkey must tend, sooner or later, to the disadvantage of Britain. On this point (though on few others) he was in harmony with the Duke of Wellington; and his recent reconciliation to the King and the Court party would incline him to pursue an anti-Russian course with all the greater willingness. His idea was that an understanding between Britain, France, and Austria was necessary, in order to strip Russia of her last pretension to act independently against the Porte—a line of action which the Russian Government, in a circular note of the 18th of August, had shown an evident

inclination to take. Therefore, when Count Lieven, the Russian Ambassador in this country, communicated a fresh memorandum (October 24th), requesting Britain to take the matter in hand, as being "the only Power able to bring it to a satisfactory issue," Canning was not thrown off his guard. Writing to Lord Liverpool on the following day, he expressed an opinion that the time for action would not have arrived until both Austria and France should have given Britain their mandate to deal, first with Russia, and then with the belligerents in Turkey.

This was the view of the British Cabinet in 1825; and the development of their policy was only interrupted by the death of the Czar, which occurred on the 1st of December. The event was of the utmost importance. The new Czar, Nicholas, at once undertook to settle the Eastern Question; and his zeal precipitated the action of Canning.

Whilst the fortunes of Greece were thus canvassed by the diplomatists, the insurgents themselves had been hard pressed by their enemies. Ibrahim Pasha, having occupied Koron, Modon, and Navarino, made the western promontory of Messene a strong base of operations, from which, drawing on Alexandria by sea, he gradually overran the Morea. Kolokotrones, Hypsilantes, and other chiefs made a bold stand against the Egyptians, whenever a favourable opportunity offered; but the disciplined forces of Mohammed Ali—though they numbered, at the time of their greatest successes, barely eight thousand men—were more than a match for the Greek levies in the open field. After the autumn of 1825 the

chiefs were never able to face the invader in the plains. They carried on the contest from the mountains, where they could not easily be pursued, and from whence they occasionally descended upon detached bodies of the Egyptians. During the occupation of the country by Ibrahim Pasha, the Greeks experienced the full bitterness of their struggle for liberty. They had had their day of success, when the whole Peloponnese appeared to have shaken off the incubus of Ottoman rule; and on more than one occasion their day of defeat had been equally glorious—as when the last defenders of Psara destroyed more in their death than they had destroyed during a long siege, whilst the Psariote women cast themselves into the sea, rather than fall into the hands of the bloodthirsty foe. But Ibrahim Pasha fought with other weapons besides the sword and gun. “A market was opened at Modon,” says Alison, “for the sale of captives of both sexes, who were crowded in dungeons, loaded with irons, unmercifully beaten by their guards, and often murdered in pure wanton cruelty during the night. Such, indeed, was the severity with which they were treated that, in comparison with it, the old Turkish system of beheading or blowing from the mouth of a gun every male prisoner above sixteen years of age might be considered as merciful.”

It is the *ultima ratio* of Mussulman warfare, with which subsequent generations have made us still more painfully familiar. The details may have changed; but the spirit of the Ottoman armies, and the brutality with which the Ottoman Government is wont to suppress its insurrections, remain what they have always been. The Asiatic hordes

have been wise in their generation. The effect of their mode of fighting has been to paralyse all who were not strong enough to beat them back in the first instance. It had paralysed the Greeks of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and it has all but paralysed the Greeks of the nineteenth century. Yet it did not prevent the Greeks from being, apparently, the only Europeans who in 1897 scorned to shrink before the Turks.

By sea the insurgents reaped many glorious victories, especially by the constant use of fire-ships, whereby they destroyed thousands of their enemies; but, even on the element on which they are almost as much at home as Englishmen, they could not permanently maintain the supremacy. At Missolonghi a protracted siege was endured with incredible bravery, under circumstances which entitle it to be considered as one of the most famous sieges of modern times — a siege which did as much as anything else to give irresistible force to the growing enthusiasm of Europe. In 1826 the fortunes of the Greeks were at their lowest ebb, in spite of European sympathy and their own heroism. The Turks invested Athens, and defeated every attempt to relieve it. Fabvier, Sir Richard Church, General Gordon, Burbaki, Heideck, Hastings, Cochrane, and other foreign volunteers, came to the assistance of the besieged; but they all signally failed. The battle of Phalerum, fought on May 6, 1827, when Sir Richard Church cast his army of three thousand Greeks against the position of Reschid Pasha, had for its issue one of the most signal disasters which the insurgents had suffered during the whole war; and the English generalissimo “was so much dis-



SIR RICHARD CHURCH.

[To face p. 184.]

couraged by the aspect of affairs that he ordered the garrison of the Acropolis to capitulate." * The garrison refused to follow this counsel; but on the 5th of June, taking advantage of the presence of an Austrian and a French vessel at the Piræus, which assured them an honourable capitulation, Fabvier and his companions evacuated the fortress.

Meanwhile, the known opinions of the new Czar rendered it certain that he would have less hesitation or compunction in dealing with either Turkey or Greece. More than ten years had passed since the Russians and English had met as allies in the streets of Paris, and there were symptoms that the two Governments would not long be able to maintain even the semblance of amity which had latterly been restored between them. These and other reasons convinced Canning, and those with whom he acted, that new efforts were necessary in order to secure and maintain the ascendancy of English influence in the East.

In the autumn of 1825 Mr. Stratford Canning (cousin of the Foreign Secretary), afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, had been despatched on an embassy to the Porte, with instructions to persuade the Sultan to bring the war in Greece to a close, and at the same time to prevent the war between Turkey and Russia, on which the latter was known to be bent. But he had another mission. On the 9th of January, 1826, off the island of Hydra, he had an interview with Mavrocordatos and Zographos, the former of whom Englishmen had persisted in regarding as the most responsible leader in Greece. An arrangement was come to at this meeting whereby

* Finlay, vi., 432.

Britain was authorised (so far as Mavrocordatos could authorise her) to suggest to Turkey a basis for the inglorious pacification and future government of Greece. On the strength of this understanding the British Cabinet sent the Duke of Wellington to St. Petersburg, in order to bring about the co-operation of the two Governments. Nicholas, unable to contest the right of Britain thus to take the first step in the renewed negotiations, agreed without difficulty; and the more readily because at the same time he refused the mediation of Britain between his own Government and that of the Sultan.

There was a little confusion and hesitation, not to say double-dealing, in the policy of more than one of the Great Powers during the negotiations of 1826. Mr. Stratford Canning,* who had left for Constantinople in the beginning of October, did not reach his destination until the 27th of February, and it was only then that he heard of the accession of the Czar Nicholas, of the Duke of Wellington's mission to St. Petersburg, of "Lord Strangford's unauthorised suggestion to Count Nesselrode of England's readiness to join the other allies in conference for the pacification of Greece, and the positive disavowal of that notion by the British Government." There seem to have been no new instructions for the English representative. "The

* See an article in the *Nineteenth Century*, August, 1878.—The incident of Mr. Canning's interview with Mavrocordatos in Hydra appears to require elucidation. Lord Stratford declares that this interview had "cast a deep shade on my diplomatic prospects." If this means that Mavrocordatos and Zographos were too ready to come to an understanding with Turkey, and thus actually threatened to make Britain's offer of mediation effective, everything is clear. It is quite intelligible that Wellington and Strangford should have been pulling one way, and the Cannings another.

instructions," Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has himself told us, "which I took with me from London still held good. England was forced to act alone on the subject of Greece, and resolved, in virtue of her unfettered position, to make a single-handed effort in order to obtain the desired pacification."

A protocol was signed on the 4th of April, 1826, by Wellington on the part of Britain, and by Nesselrode and Lieven on the part of Russia, according to which the two Powers in concert were to make the following propositions to the Porte:— That Greece should be a dependency of Turkey, paying her an annual tribute, the amount of which was to be "permanently fixed by common consent"; that the Greeks "should be exclusively governed by authorities to be chosen and named by themselves, but in the nomination of which authorities the Porte should have a certain influence"; that they "should enjoy a complete liberty of conscience, entire freedom of commerce, and should exclusively conduct their own internal government"; that, "in order to effect a complete separation between individuals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions which must be the necessary consequences of a contest of such duration, the Greeks should purchase the property of Turks, whether situated on the continent of Greece or in the islands"; that, in case of present failure, the two Governments (or, as the protocol has it, "His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty") would still consider the above terms as "the basis of any reconciliation to be effected by their intervention, whether in concert or separately, between the Porte and the Greeks"; "that, moreover, His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial

Majesty will not seek, in this arrangement, any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantage in commerce for their subjects, which shall not be equally attainable by all other nations"; and "that His Britannic Majesty and His Imperial Majesty, being desirous that their allies should become parties to the definitive arrangements of which this protocol contains the outline, will communicate this instrument, confidentially, to the Courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, and will propose to them that they should, in concert with the Emperor of Russia, guarantee the treaty by which the reconciliation of Turks and Greeks shall be effected, as His Britannic Majesty cannot guarantee such a treaty." *

This was the first approximation towards the establishment of a Greek State; and it is to be observed that the Governments were already sufficiently sanguine to think of saddling the Greeks with an absolute impossibility — the "exclusive" conduct of their self-government by authorities in whose nomination the Porte was to have a "certain influence." And it may be further observed that the British Government was not at this time at liberty to guarantee the observance of a treaty between Turks and Greeks.

But nothing, in the first instance, came of this protocol, although the Greek Assembly ratified the engagement entered into between Mr. Stratford Canning and Mavrocordatos. Both Russia and Britain had had their separate interests to pursue

* I quote from "Papers relating to the Establishment of the Kingdom of Greece," presented to the House of Commons in 1878. The French version only was presented in 1828.

elsewhere; and neither Government had much confidence in the other. In October, Russia obtained from Turkey the convention of Akerman, whereby her influence at the Porte was restored; and in the following December Britain sent her expedition to Lisbon, at the request of the Princess Regent, and without asking for the sanction of Europe. Therefore, when the two Governments at last offered their mediation to Turkey, the Porte had no hesitation in rejecting it (June 10, 1827).

In the meantime another Great Power had duly qualified itself for intervention between Turkey and her rebellious subjects. France had fallen out with the Dey of Algiers, which was a dependency of the Porte; and thus it was that the Government which had suppressed liberty in Spain allowed itself to assist in the emancipation of Greece.

Capo d'Istria was elected President of Greece by a National Assembly at Troezene on the 14th of April, 1827. He was selected, for a period of seven years, because (in the words of the decree) "he possessed a measure of political experience which the Ottoman domination had prevented any native Greek from acquiring."

On the 6th of July, 1827, a formal treaty was signed at London, between the Governments of Britain, France, and Russia (represented by Lord Dudley,* the Prince de Polignac, and Lieven). The recitation declares that "His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,

* Canning became Premier (April 30, 1827), on the resignation of Lord Liverpool, and Dudley succeeded him at the Foreign Office. The Duke of Wellington refused to take office under the popular commoner; and, indeed, he had conscientiously objected to much of Canning's policy.

His Majesty the King of France and Navarre, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary struggle which, while it abandons the Greek provinces and the Islands of the Archipelago to all the disorders of anarchy, daily causes fresh impediments to the commerce of the States of Europe, and gives opportunity for acts of piracy, which not only expose the subjects of the High Contracting Parties to grievous losses, but also render necessary measures which are burthensome for their observation and suppression; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of France and Navarre, having moreover received from the Greeks an earnest invitation to interpose their mediation with the Ottoman Porte; and, together with His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, being animated with the desire of putting a stop to the effusion of blood, and of preventing the evils of every kind which the continuance of such a state of affairs may produce; they have resolved to combine their efforts, and to regulate the operation thereof by a formal Treaty, for the object of re-establishing peace between the contending parties, by means of an arrangement called for no less by sentiments of humanity than by a concern for the tranquillity of Europe."

The formal initiation of the treaty, it will be perceived, came from Britain and France, so far, at least, as the solicitation of Greece was concerned; and the Russian Government was careful to have it understood that it acted in this manner on the invitation of Britain. It was cultivating good relations with

the Porte, and was not unwilling that its old rival at Constantinople should take the lead in what was certain to be an unwelcome and (for the time) futile step. As for the interruption of commerce in the Mediterranean and Levant, this had been felt chiefly, and very seriously, by Britain and France; especially in consequence of the great increase of piracy during the Greek war (in which Greeks, amongst others, had naturally played their part).

The first article of the treaty pledged the Contracting Powers to renew their offer of mediation to the Porte, by means of a joint declaration from the ambassadors at Constantinople; "and," continues the article, "at the same time, a demand for an immediate armistice shall be made to the two contending parties, as a preliminary and indispensable condition to the opening of any negotiation."*

The next five articles comprised the substance, and almost the exact words, of the Protocol of 1826; but, in place of Britain declaring her inability to guarantee the observance of the treaty, the sixth article provides that "the arrangements for reconciliation and peace which shall be definitely agreed upon between the contending parties shall be guaranteed by those of the Signing Powers who may judge it expedient or possible to contract that obligation." The point was left open; and there is no difficulty in understanding that the objection of the British Cabinet to enter into a guarantee, prospectively operative against Turkey, in conjunction with

* This demand was duly made, and acceded to by the Greeks alone. The Turks subsequently contended that the insurgents had been guilty of a breach of faith by attacking them (in the naval battle of Salona) after agreeing to suspend hostilities.

Russia, was partly removed by the introduction of France into the compact.

There was, in this same Treaty of London, an "additional" and secret article, providing for the actual recognition of Greece as an autonomous State, and for the attainment of peace by (at the least) a menace of coercion. It is important to note the precise terms of this secret article—the tinder to which the blow struck at Navarino presently set fire. It was by this Treaty of 1827, confirming and extending the Protocol of 1826, that Greek liberty was secured; and from the secret article the complete independence of Greece followed by a natural sequence of events.

"(1) It shall be declared to the Porte . . . that the inconveniences and evils described in the patent Treaty as inseparable from the state of things which has for six years existed in the East, and the termination of which, by the means at the command of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, appears to be still distant, impose upon the High Contracting Parties the necessity of taking immediate measures for forming a connection with the Greeks.

"It is understood that this shall be effected by establishing commercial relations with the Greeks, and by sending to and receiving from them, for this purpose, Consular Agents, provided there shall exist in Greece authorities capable of supporting such relations.

"(2) If, within the said term of one month, the Porte does not accept the armistice proposed in the 1st Article of the patent Treaty, or if the Greeks refuse to carry it into execution, the High Contracting Powers shall declare to either of the contending parties which may be disposed to continue hostilities, or to both of them if necessary, that the said High Powers intend to exert all the means which circumstances may suggest to their prudence for the purpose of obtaining the immediate effects of the armistice of which they desire the execution, by preventing, as far as

possible, all collision between the contending parties; and, in consequence, immediately after the above-mentioned declaration, the High Powers will, jointly, exert all their efforts to accomplish the object of such armistice, without, however, taking any part in the hostilities between the two contending parties.

“Immediately after the signature of the present Additional Article, the High Contracting Powers will, consequently, transmit to the Admirals commanding their respective squadrons in the Levant conditional instructions in conformity to the arrangements above declared.

“(3) Finally, if, contrary to all expectation, these measures do not prove sufficient to procure the adoption of the propositions of the High Contracting Parties by the Ottoman Porte; or if, on the other hand, the Greeks decline the conditions stipulated in their favour by the Treaty of this date, the High Contracting Powers will, nevertheless, continue to pursue the work of pacification, on the bases upon which they have agreed; and, in consequence, they authorise, from the present moment, their Representatives at London to discuss and determine the future measures which it may become necessary to employ.”

It is probable that the Contracting Powers did not yet contemplate the entire independence of Greece, even as a contingency of the next few years. Nothing in their conduct at this time accuses them of so much robustness of mind as would be implied in that supposition. The Greece with which they desired to “form a connection” was perhaps a simple autonomous State, somewhat on the model of Servia, which, though practically self-governing, should remain a portion of the Turkish Empire. The “integrity and independence of Turkey” were thought as important in the eyes of most English statesmen in 1827 as they were in the eyes of one or two of their successors in 1877 and 1897. The Porte rejected the offer of July as it had rejected the offer of February, and on the same plea, that the inter-

ference of foreign Powers in the internal government of its empire was unjustifiable.

The words had been written down, and the sequence of events followed more quickly than the most sanguine could have hoped ; though it must be admitted that one of the means which "circumstances suggested to the prudence" of the Powers for enforcing an armistice tended very happily to produce a rupture. The allied fleets of Britain France, and Russia (twenty-six sail, 1,270 guns), unwilling to give the Turkish and Egyptian fleets (eighty-two sail, 2,000 guns) the chance of escaping from the Bay of Navarino during the winter months, and unable to find shelter at the mouth of the bay on the outside, coolly entered the harbour (October 20, 1827). The Turks naturally thought themselves on the point of being attacked, or at all events they declared this to be their impression. They therefore opened fire upon the Allies from their own vessels, and from the batteries on Sphacteria, before the Russian fleet, which was in the rear, had filed through the entrance of the bay. The Allies needed no second invitation. They returned the fire of the Turks and Egyptians, and with such effect that, by the following morning, of the eighty-two vessels which had ridden safely in the Bay of Navarino on the eve of the battle, only twenty-nine remained afloat.

The battle of Navarino may be fairly described as a happy blunder. It was not contemplated in the instructions given to the allied fleets. Sir Edward Codrington, the British admiral, was blamed at home for exceeding his orders, and taking a step which necessarily resulted in an engagement. But

there can be no question as to the wholesome character of the punishment inflicted upon the butchers and slave-dealers of the Porte, or as to the advancement of the cause of freedom, and the actual decrease of bloodshed, which was the consequence of the blow.

The ambassadors of the Allied Powers at Constantinople made a last offer of mediation to the Porte, but it was refused; and they withdrew from the capital in the month of December.* There was, however, no immediate declaration of war. Turks and Greeks still carried on their unequal contest; and, even after the victory of the Allies, an Egyptian fleet sailed from the Morea to Alexandria, with Greek slaves on board, unmolested and unchallenged.†

Thus slowly grew the idea of extorting Greek independence from the Porte by force of arms. Towards the end of 1827, after Britain, Russia, and France had apparently determined that the insurgent race should be added to the family of the European States, Reschid Pasha was assuring the Sultan, not without reason, that he had re-subjected the continent of Greece, from Missolonghi to Athens. Meanwhile the destitution of the Greeks who had not fallen into

* "In concert with my colleagues," says Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in the article above quoted, "I employed the month of November in occasional efforts to obtain a more favourable hearing at the Porte. Explanations were given, arguments were urged, warnings were repeated to no purpose. The lamented decease of Mr. Canning in August had been followed at home by those rather hesitating counsels which are apt to accompany an uncertain tenure of office. Nothing in the shape of instruction had reached me since the astounding incident of Navarino."

† It was ostensibly for this neglect that Sir Edward Codrington was recalled.

the hands of the Turks or Egyptians was of the most desperate character. The Asiatic and African invaders (including many who were brought into the country for the sole purpose of devastation) had laid waste all the fertile districts over which the blight of their presence had passed. A wholesale famine had settled down on the devoted land. The starvation of Greece was not figurative, but actual; thousands died of absolute want of food. Private charity alone preserved the life of a vast number of Greeks, amongst whom were many persons of culture and position. If it had not been for the tardy interference of the civilised world, Sultan Mahmoud would have most effectually vindicated his authority over his subjects, by creating a wilderness which he might have called a peace.

At the end of 1826 the Executive Government, which had fled from Nauplia to Ægina, had some sixteen piastres left in the public treasury. The revenue had sunk from five-and-a-half million piastres in 1825 to little more than a quarter of the sum in 1826. The armies, such as they were, were supported only by voluntary efforts. After the surrender of Athens, Lord Cochrane wished to hold a review of the Greek fleet at Poros; but, as he was unable to pay the wages of his sailors, the vessels, which ought to have been ready for action, set sail and dispersed.*

Demoralisation had increased in every department, and in connection with every authority which professed to speak and act in the name of Greece. The wretched Greeks had been the football of fortune,

* Finlay was with Lord Cochrane at the time, and relates the circumstance.

and, before relief came to them, they had sunk to the very depths of misery and humiliation.

Let us, in the present day, ascertain and realise the degree in which our grandfathers and great-grandfathers contributed to the misfortunes of the struggling race, in order that we may appreciate the responsibility which undoubtedly rests upon us. Let Englishmen in particular face the items of the long outstanding account between this country and Greece, which unquestionably leaves the balance of debt on our side. Be it observed that, if it was Britain more than any other country which helped Greece to obtain her independence, it was right that Britain, before all, should have prevented that independence from becoming a mockery. We encouraged the Greeks from the very outset. We—that is to say, public opinion in England, rather than the English Government—bade the insurgents persevere against the most hideous forms of suppression, and look to us for the moral force and aid which their cause demanded. We even helped them with money and arms. When their own resources were insufficient for their needs, we raised loans for them; and when their chiefs were found to be incompetent, we sent them leaders.

This is the bright aspect of the picture; but it is not the only aspect. This was how Englishmen encouraged Greece; but what did Britain actually do for her? After seven years, our moral aid—assisted by the splendid blunder of Navarino—had converted the rebels into a State; but with that one fact our positive beneficence towards this ill-starred people may almost be said to have ended. Not a third of the money subscribed in England for the

Greeks ever reached them. Not a tithe of it assisted their struggle for independence. Some of the officers whom we sent to command their armies and their fleets—one of them made his paltry bargain for fifty-seven thousand pounds—were as incompetent as the Greek leaders whom they thrust aside. The circumstances of the siege of Athens were such as might well make every Englishman blush for shame. It was but a poor service, after all, that England rendered to the heroic little nation—a nation which, under the black night of tyranny, held out the torch of liberty, and was the first to justify the assertion of popular rights. We have, perhaps, overestimated the value of what England did for Greece in the third decade of the nineteenth century. We called upon the Greeks for tremendous sacrifices; we stimulated them to resistance until their land had been devastated and their race decimated; we pressed upon them usurious loans, delusory aid, injudicious counsels; we set up an emaciated and penniless State; we mocked it with a President who became an oppressor, and a King who became a selfish tyrant; and then we exacted unlimited gratitude, and loaded it with ungenerous reproaches.

Who that reads and considers the history of the time can doubt that we are still in debt to the Greeks? They have never had the chance of growing into a great and powerful nation, or of developing the genius for trade and the civilising energy which are their natural inheritance. They were exhorted to be free with their chains half severed, to run in the race with shackles on their feet, to be a model for the very Europe which had demoralised them.

Europe demanded an impossibility of Greece; and to that injustice she has added the greater one of condemning and neglecting the half-emancipated race for what has been, not its crime, but its chief misfortune.

CHAPTER VIII

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KINGDOM

The Death of Canning—Britain's New Policy—The Views of Wellington—Britain Responsible for the Limitation of the Boundaries of New Greece—The French Occupation—Adhesion of Turkey to the Treaty of London—The Protocol of 1832—Removing the Landmarks—The Burdens of the New State—The Hopeless Condition of the Kingdom.

CANNING had died on the 8th of August, 1827;* and in him the Greeks lost their most powerful friend. If he had lived, it is probable that the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece might have been effected under happier auspices, and with greater chances of securing immediate good government. Canning was an indifferent Tory, but he was a bold and capable statesman, who had shown that he understood the true mission of the Hellenic race in South-eastern Europe. He was held cheap by Wellington, by the King, by sticklers for the old and unprogressive traditions of diplomacy; but he had known how to make his views prevail over those of Metternich and Nesselrode. He might have done

* He was succeeded in the premiership by Lord Goderich, whose tenure of office ended on the 10th of January, 1828. From this time until the 16th of November, 1830, the Duke of Wellington presided over the Cabinet, his Foreign Secretary being Lord Aberdeen. From 1830 Earl Grey was Premier, with Lord Palmerston at the Foreign Office.

incalculably more for Greece than Wellington or Aberdeen was able or willing to do. He could hardly have done less or worse.

When Canning died, all Europe felt that it had lost a master-mind. Within twelve months the understanding between Britain, France, and Russia was virtually at an end. Russia had declared war against Turkey on her own account, the European concert was more dubious than ever, Greece had almost abandoned the hope of assistance from Britain (or from any one else, unless it were Russia), and the influence of the Czar was once more predominant in the Mediterranean. "In the protocol of the 15th of June, 1828," says Finlay,* "Lord Aberdeen, with the diplomatic inaptitude which characterises the proceedings of Great Britain at this period, allowed the clauses to be inverted, and by this inversion the claim of Russia to an exceptional position with regard to Turkey was in some measure ratified. England, as protector of a Greek population in the Ionian Islands, ought to have insisted on equal rights. Russia was not driven from the claim she set up to an exceptional position until Sebastopol fell."

This is what Europe lost by the substitution of the Wellington-Aberdeen policy for the policy of Canning. Canning felt no admiration for the conduct of Russia; he did not accept Russia's views; but on the other hand he formed an alliance with her, and by this very means took the lead and gained his end. Wellington, as soon as he found himself at the head of affairs in Britain, was careful on every occasion to dwell upon the ambition and duplicity of Russia;

* *History*, vii., 25.

he almost drove the Czar to pursue an independent course; and the consequence was that he lost the lead, and suffered Russia to gain her end.

Our policy in the Eastern Question in 1828 was the same as our policy just fifty years later; and, indeed, the one was professedly based upon the other. It started off with the conviction that Russia is antagonistic to us, is plotting for supremacy in the East, and employs incessant duplicity in labouring for this end. This conviction being firmly entertained (and it may be thoroughly warranted by facts *) a weak school of diplomacy proceeds—how? To diplomatised? By no means. It proceeds to hold aloof, to interfere at the wrong moment, to emphasise its suspicion, to boast what it will do if Russia does so and so; and thus, in the end, either to give the virtual triumph to Russia or to fight her that we may prove our physical superiority. These are the bad traditions of British policy in the East. They are not traditions arising out of the policy which Canning had begun to pursue. Canning would never have allowed Russia to go to war with Turkey without at least establishing on the spot an independent Greek kingdom, on the widest possible basis, capable of balancing the scale of influence into which Russia had cast her sword. He would never have allowed a French force alone to sweep the Turks out of the Morea, and to occupy the country during five years. In short, he would have led Russia and Europe, not have been led or pushed aside by them.

A grand opportunity presented itself at this moment to substitute Greece for Turkey (prospect-

* Canning, at all events, entertained it.

tively) as the warden of South-eastern Europe, and as a counterpoise against the undue influence of Russia in the Mediterranean. We cannot be surprised if the attainment of this object appeared impossible in 1828; but we have reason to regret that more was not done towards an end which every British statesman must have perceived to be advantageous in the highest degree. The Duke of Wellington was a great soldier, but he was not a statesman. Almost all his political acts were inspired by an ambition to defend his fellow-creatures against the insidious dangers of reform. His instincts in European affairs were identical with his interests in English domestic questions. He had no enthusiasm for Greece; and it is a question whether he so much as appreciated the possible value of that country in the political economy of Europe. His correspondence during the years 1828 and 1829 is penetrated by suspicions of, and reproaches against Russia; but it hardly occurred to him to counteract Russia in Greece.

Thus, writing to the Comte de la Ferronnays (February 26, 1828) he refers to the policy of the Allies in respect of Greece as a "a course of measures commenced with the view of pacifying" that country, "and of preventing the warfare which has existed there for seven years from spreading to the rest of Europe." And again, "We are all interested in the continued existence, in a state of independence, of the power of the Porte in Europe. We are not prepared for its destruction. . . . We ought to direct our efforts steadily to attain *our original object, the pacification of Greece*, without injury, or at least with as little injury as possible, to the power of the

Porte.”* That was written before Russia’s declaration of war. On the 28th of August, 1829, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen:—“We mean to maintain the power of the Porte; and although we are ready to agree to the adoption of a mode of executing our purpose in Greece, consistent with the respect due to that Power, our concurrence in that mode was *founded upon the necessity of coming to some settlement in Greece for the sake of the Porte itself.*”

The “we” includes Canning; but nothing is more certain than that Canning himself would have repudiated such a construction, or such a limitation of his motives.

In a conversation between the Duke of Wellington, Lord Aberdeen, Prince Lieven, and the Count de Matuscewitz, held at the Foreign Office on the 4th of September, 1829, the Duke “entreated” the Russian representatives “to warn the Emperor of the danger of establishing in Greece a focus of revolution. Such an establishment,” he said, “may give this country a little more or less of trouble. But revolutionists in Greece will not limit their efforts to the Ionian Islands. They will turn their attention to other countries, and will lay the foundation of fresh wars, and of misery for mankind.”

Here was a spectre almost as chimerical as those of Verona, which the Duke himself, at the instance of Canning, refused to combat. And, in dread of such a spectre, the Wellington Cabinet threw away an excellent chance of precluding “fresh wars,” and

* *Correspondence of the late Duke of Wellington* (Murray), under the dates given.

averting much "misery for mankind." The same chance returned in 1878, and was again thrown away. To say nothing of the chance of 1854, the Congress of 1878 committed itself to another patchwork "settlement" of the Eastern Question, which left the main difficulty unsolved, and condemned the next generation to fresh wars and misery. And precisely the same chance occurred, and was thrown away, in 1897. The circumstances vary, but not the essential character of the situation. The right and wise course in each case was to do at once what was then, and is to-day, inevitable—to grasp the nettle tightly, instead of loosely fingering it.

The memorandum of the conversation in question was written by the Duke himself, and enclosed to Lord Aberdeen in a letter dated "Strathfieldsaye, 5th September, 1829." It is right to say that the fears of the Duke may be held to have been partly justified by the conduct of Capo d'Istria; but at all events they appear to have been greatly exaggerated. At this same interview a question arose as to the boundaries of the new State, on which considerable difference existed between the Governments of Britain and Russia. The Duke declared that "the opinion of this Government was not altered upon that subject." Whereupon Count Matuscewitz retorted, "That is to say, as far as possible from the boundaries proposed by us." The Duke replied "that we had stated our reasons, and were more than ever convinced that the limits proposed by us were those best calculated to secure peace."

Here we have another proof that the Wellington Ministry acted throughout rather as the advocate of Turkey than as a friend of Greece. Its aim was to

take from Turkey, and to give to Greece, as little as possible. The chief responsibility of endowing the new State with a lamentably insufficient territory rests, therefore, upon ourselves. It was we who would have clipped out a Greece limited by the mouth of the Aspropotamos, in order that the Ionian Islands might be faced by a Turkish mainland. There was, be it observed, a better and more generous way of relieving ourselves from the fear of insurrection in these islands—a fear which actually led the Duke of Wellington to talk of “sustaining a revolutionary war against a Russian subject placed in Greece as President under the protection of the Powers.” This way was to hand over the islands to their natural possessors, and thus to give Greece a little better chance of paying her debts. But it took us five-and-thirty years to perceive our duty in that respect, though a revolution was menacing us during the whole time.

On the 30th of August, 1828, a French army of fourteen thousand men, under General Maison, landed at Petalidi, in the Gulf of Koron. They expelled Ibrahim Pasha, drove the last armed Turk and Egyptian out of the Morea, and occupied the country until the year 1834. As early as the 10th of August, 1829, the Duke of Wellington wrote to Lord Aberdeen, “We must call upon the King of France distinctly to perform his promise to withdraw his troops from the Morea.” The influence which Canning had carefully nourished, and which had led the Greeks in 1825 to throw themselves upon the “absolute protection” of Britain, had been wantonly squandered. Greece had passed out of our hands. We had not merely lost an opportunity ;

we had inflicted an injury and incurred a responsibility.

The invasion of Turkey by Russia (April, 1828–September, 1829) completed the liberation of Greece. By the tenth article of the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14th) Turkey gave its adhesion to the protocol of the Conference of London, which had been signed by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, and Russia, on the 22nd of March. Another Conference became necessary, in view of the Russo-Turkish treaty, and, in anticipation of this, the Porte had entered into a separate agreement with the representatives of Britain and France at Constantinople, in these terms: “The Sublime Porte declares that, having already adhered to the Treaty of London, it now further promises and pledges itself to the Representatives of the Powers who signed the said Treaty to subscribe entirely to all the decisions which the Conference of London shall adopt with respect to its execution.”

The triumph of the Russian arms had thus brought the Ottoman Government to a mood of complete submission to the will of the three Powers. Let us see what it had effected for the Greek nation.

The Conference of 1829 based its decisions upon a series of conclusions, arrived at by a previous Conference, held at Poros on the 12th of December, 1828, which latter Conference acted upon “information supplied by the Greek Government,” and “after frequent communications with Count Capo d’Istria.” The Conference of Poros had fully discussed the questions relating to the “continental and insular boundary” of the proposed new Greece, to the

“tribute” and “indemnity” which the liberated State was to pay to Turkey and Turkish subjects, and to the “suzerainty” which it was intended to reserve to the Sultan in place of his forfeited sovereignty. Upon the conclusions which had been arrived at in the course of these discussions, the plenipotentiaries at the London Conference in 1829 (Aberdeen, de Polignac, and Lieven) determined to “propose to the Ottoman Porte” that Greece should pay it a million and a half of Turkish piastres as an annual tribute, and an indemnity on behalf of Mussulman proprietors and other sufferers in Greece; that the new State, under the suzerainty of the Sultan, should enjoy the rights of self-government; that the Porte should “participate in the choice” of an hereditary “chief of Greece,” who should receive his investiture at Constantinople; that the arrangements to be entered into should be placed “under the guarantee of such of the signing Powers as shall think it advantageous or possible to contract that obligation;” that “the guarantee in question shall assure the Ottoman Porte against every hostile enterprise or act on the part of the Greeks,” and *vice versa*. With regard to the boundaries of the new State, it was “proposed to the Porte that the point of departure for the continental boundary shall be near the entrance of the Gulf of Volo; from whence the line, ascending to the crown of the Othrys, shall follow its whole range as far as the summit, situated to the east of Agrapha, which forms its point of junction with the chain of Pindus. From this summit it will descend into the valley of the Aspropotamos, by the south of Leontitos, which it will leave to Turkey; crossing

afterwards the chain of the Macronoros, it will include in the Greek territory the defile of that name, which leads from the plain of Arta, and will terminate in the sea at the Ambrakiot Gulf. All the provinces situated to the south of that line shall be comprised in the new Greek State. The islands adjoining the Morea, the island of Eubœa, or Negropont, and the islands commonly called Cyclades, shall form part of that State."

Such was the proposal of March, 1829. Eleven months later, on the 3rd of February, 1830, after a declaration from Russia that her Treaty of Adrianople did not "invalidate the rights of the Emperor's allies, nor clog the deliberations of the Ministers assembled in Conference," the plenipotentiaries came to the following decisions, which form the basis upon which the Kingdom of Greece was built up.

"Greece shall form an independent State, and shall enjoy all the rights, political, administrative, and commercial, attached to complete independence.

"In consideration of these advantages granted to the new State, and in deference to the desire expressed by the Porte to obtain the reduction of the frontiers fixed by the protocol of the 22nd March, the line of demarcation of the limits of Greece shall take its departure from the mouth of the river Aspropotamos, ascend that river as far as the latitude of Lake Angelo Castro, and traversing that lake, as well as those of Vrachori and Saurovitza, it shall strike Mount Artolina, from whence it shall follow the ridge of Mount Oxas, the valley of Calouri, and the ridge of Mount Ceta, as far as the Gulf of Zeitoun, which it shall reach at the mouth of the Sperchius.

"There shall likewise belong to Greece the whole of the Island of Negropont, with the Devil's Islands and the Island of Skyros, and the islands anciently known by the name of Cyclades, including the Island of Amorgo.

“The Greek Government shall be monarchical, and hereditary according to the order of primogeniture. It shall be confided to a prince, who shall not be capable of being chosen from among those of the families reigning in the States that signed the Treaty of the 6th of July, 1827, and who shall bear the title of Sovereign Prince of Greece. The choice of that Prince shall form the object of subsequent communications and stipulations.”

After which, and after further arrangements for the pacification and immediate settlement of Greece, “the three Courts sincerely congratulate themselves on having come to a perfect agreement, in the midst of the most serious and delicate circumstances. The maintenance of their union during such a period offers the best pledge of its permanency; and the three Courts flatter themselves that this union, as firm as it is beneficial, will not cease to contribute to the confirmation of the peace of the world.”

The infant kingdom was made to pay a somewhat heavy price for its independence. A glance at the map will show how large a slice of Continental Greece was cut out of the new-made State “in deference to the desire expressed by the Porte.” The Powers had created a cripple, and then, at the desire of a tyrant who had “subscribed entirely to all their decisions beforehand,” they mutilated their creation.

It is true that on a subsequent occasion, in the arrangement signed at Constantinople, on July 21, 1832, between Great Britain, France, Russia, and Turkey, the limits of Greece were again advanced, so as to approximate to the frontier assigned by the Conference of March, 1829; but only on condition of the payment to Turkey, by the unfortunate country which the Turkish mercenaries had rendered

a desert, of as much as forty million piastres.* The mutilated cripple was partially healed, and then made to pay more than it possessed for the operation.

The final arrangement of the boundary, as settled in 1832, was as follows :—

“ On the eastern side, the extreme point of separation of the two States shall be fixed at the mouth of the little river which flows near the village of Gradiza. The frontier line shall ascend this river to its source, shall thence reach the chain of Mount Othrys, leaving to Greece the passage of the Klomo, provided the crest of that chain be not passed ; thence it shall follow in a westerly direction the crest of the same chain along the whole extent thereof, and especially the Peak of Varibovo, until it reaches the height which, under the denomination of Veluchi, forms the point of connection of the three great mountain ranges of the country. From this height the line shall continue, adapting itself as much as possible to the salient features of the country, across the Valley of the Aspropotamos to the Gulf of Arta, terminating at that gulf between Koprina and Menidi. . . . Nevertheless, as the representatives, *full of deference for the wish which has been expressed in the name of his Highness* relative to the portion of the district of Zeitoun, situate to the left of the Sperchius, have agreed that reference should be made on the subject to the Conference of London, upon the express condition that the decision and execution of the measures consequent thereupon should not be retarded thereby, it has become necessary to provide for the contingency of that portion of the territory of Zeitoun remaining to the Ottoman Empire. The boundary-line to the east will in that case commence at the mouth of the River Sperchius, and will run up its left bank to the point of contact of the districts of Zeitoun and of Patradjik ; thence it will reach the summit of the chain of the Othrys, following the common boundary of those two districts, and the most direct line, in the event of that common boundary not attaining the summit of the chain of the Othrys. It will continue in the manner before mentioned, and terminate at the Gulf of Arta.”

* The piastre was worth about 2½d. The forty millions may be reckoned at £458,000.

This arranged, the plenipotentiaries of 1832 wound up with fresh self-congratulations. They "declared" that, "considering the arrangements recorded by common agreement in the present instrument, the object of the Treaty of London of the 6th of July, 1827, and of the Protocols under different dates which relate thereto, is completely attained; that the prolonged negotiations to which those stipulations have given rise are terminated in such a manner as never to be renewed; in fact, that the Greek Question is irrevocably settled."

"Irrevocably settled!" The whole history of Greece, from that moment to the present, bears witness to the fatuity of the assertion.

It can hardly be necessary to say that the Greek nation was not consulted in the striking of these bargains, or that it was not particularly grateful for the mode in which Europe had secured its independence of the Porte. It may be pleaded that there was no very practicable method of consulting the nation, which remained more or less turbulent during the whole term of Capo d'Istria's presidency, and which, in the year 1832, was in a condition of general anarchy. But, at all events, the attempt was not made. Greece was in tutelage to Europe, and Europe knew no other way of treating her ward than by taking its government entirely out of its hands, and settling its destiny without consulting it.

As for the payment of the forty million piastres, it was known to everybody concerned that Greece had, practically speaking, no resources from which to meet the obligation imposed upon her. Europe therefore provided the money by raising a loan, in the name



A MODERN GREEK TYPE.
(From the Cyclades.)

[To face p. 212.]

of a country which was virtually a stranger to the whole transaction, and which was bound down to the liquidation of capital and interest before it was even ascertained what its revenues were likely to be.

A king was sent with the money—a young lad of seventeen, absolutely ignorant of kingcraft, utterly incompetent to govern, capable of nothing but the indefinite increase of the national debt, and escorted by an army of hungry Bavarians (November 1, 1832).

The young kingdom was stifled in its birth. No nation whatsoever could have flourished under such conditions. The very founts of national life were dried up. The establishment of New Greece was delusive from the first.

These words ought not to be used lightly; but they are justified by the facts of the case. The Powers borrowed on behalf of Greece three series of a loan of sixty million francs*—raised, under their guarantee, at 94 for the 100, bearing interest at 5 per cent. The disposal of the first two series, of the nominal amount of 44,672,000 drachmas, was as follows :—

	Drs.
Six per cent. on the price, commission, &c. ...	5,298,000
Indemnity to Turkey, for extension of frontier, forty million piastres, equivalent to ...	13,750,000
Interest and sinking fund for first year, kept back by Rothschilds	4,842,000
Paid into the Greek treasury †	19,612,000
	43,502,000

* About 67,000,000 drachmas, or £2,400,000.

† It may be incidentally remarked that the sum spent on the (Bavarian) army alone during the years 1833-5 was stated by the Minister of War, Schmaltz, in 1836, to have been 20,087,978 drachmas.—Strong, p. 287.

And the greater part of the third series of the loan was employed, as soon as received, to liquidate the interest and sinking fund of the first two series, already in arrear!

This was surely a crushing weight to lay on the shoulders of the new-made kingdom. No one can be surprised that, by the year 1846, this debt alone had reached the amount of seventy-two million francs; whilst new loans have since been contracted, all virtually necessitated by the original endowment of responsibility and debt.*

Nothing more can be needed to complete the condemnation of those who undertook in such a niggardly spirit to found the new Hellenic State. Forced to action by the indomitable resolution of the Greeks, and anxious at the same time to establish a kingdom on the Ægean which should be independent of foreign influence, they had set up a practically bankrupt State, restricting its boundaries with a cynical indifference to the claims of nationality, compelling it to pay a heavy price for a few extra miles of territory, excluding from its government the patriots whom a brief period of genuine freedom would have converted into statesmen, saddling it with an army of foreigners, and forcing upon it a monarch whom it eventually became necessary to drive out by a new revolution. Few greater cruelties, if such a word can be applied to political blindness, are recorded in the pages of history.

There were many better things which Europe

* Of course the country had other heavy expenses to meet; as, for instance, in connection with the indemnification of its own population ruined by ten years of war.

might have done with Greece; short of the most drastic remedy of all—the liberation of the entire Greek coast in Europe, from Albania to the Straits. That would have been a great and a bold deed, possibly requiring other Navarinos, and sundry campaigns in Thrace; but it could have been done, there was a just pretext, and it ought to have been done. It might have involved the dissolution of Turkey in Europe, but this would have been accomplished amidst the applause of all far-seeing men. It would have advanced civilisation in a notable degree. There would have been a price to pay, in life and money; but the cost would not have been a tithe of that which Europe has had to expend in maintaining the barbarous rule of the Porte. There would then have been no Crimean War to look forward to; no Bulgarian insurrections and massacres; no Servian and Montenegrin wars; no Russo-Turkish wars; no dangerous conflicts of rival diplomacies, such as those which have since cast their shadow over Europe; no shameful readmission of Turkish arms into Thessaly. Russia might not have been absolutely excluded from interference across the Danube; but the troubles of Bulgaria would have been trifling by comparison with what they actually have been. A strong Greece, a Greece such as she has yet to be made, a Greece in Epirus, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, would have been a guarantee against aggression far stronger than that broken reed of Ottoman corruption on which British statesmen have chosen to lean.

As it is, the partial establishment of New Greece was a crisis of liberty in modern Europe; but what

would not her complete establishment have been! For Great Britain and for Russia it would have been the harbinger of a happier future, and the pledge of a more enduring peace. For Italy it might have implied regeneration in 1848, instead of in 1860. For France and Austria, it might have signified at least one war the fewer. But for Greece herself, it is impossible to exaggerate the benefit which it would have conferred upon her.

All this was too heroic for times still in thralldom to the ideas of the Holy Alliance. From then until now Europe has been learning, by national humiliations, by vast armaments, by the slaughter of her bravest men, and by the arrest of popular progress, a lesson which is not even yet impressed upon us, that heroic deeds, boldly conceived and sternly executed, mean less blood, less money, less slaughter in peace and war, than the policy of making many nations wait on the convenience of the common enemy of all, and of patching up by compromise what ought to be determined by timely and resolute action.

This was too much for the Europe of 1829, as it proved to be too much for the Europe of 1878 and 1897. But what can be said of the policy which refused Thessaly and Epirus to the Greeks, and which made a penniless State buy its oppressors out of the valley of the Aspropotamos?

The following is a list of the principal diplomatic instruments in the establishment of the Greek kingdom :—

Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain and Russia.
April 4, 1826. (Protocol of St. Petersburg.)

- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. July 6, 1827. (Treaty of London.)
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. July 7, 1827. (Secret Article.)
- French Occupation of the Morea. Great Britain, France, and Russia. July 19, 1828.
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. December 12, 1828. (Conference at Poros.)
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. March 22, 1829. (Conference at London.)
- Religion of the King of Greece. March 22, 1829; April 30, 1833.
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. February 3, 1830. (Conference at London.)
- Independence Guaranteed. The same three Powers. February 3, 1830; May 7, 1832.
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain, France, and Russia. May 7, 1832.
- Agreement between Turkey, Great Britain, France, and Russia. July 21, 1832.
- Otho recognised by the Germanic Confederation, at the request of the Powers. October 4, 1832.
- Mediation between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain and Russia. February 21, 1833.

CHAPTER IX

GREECE UNDER THE BAVARIANS

The Crown offered to Prince Leopold—His wise Stipulations—Tyranny and Death of Capo d'Istria—Another Civil War—Otho of Bavaria—Bavarian Rule—The Council of Regency—European Responsibility—Britain and her Representatives—The Revolution of 1843—The new Constitution—The Creditors of Greece—Relation between Greece and Turkey—The Revolution of 1862.

THE Greek crown had originally been offered to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who at once wrote to Lord Aberdeen that he could imagine no effectual mode of pacifying Greece without including Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete in its territories :—

“I am afraid that the hidden interest which caused this separation to be determined will augur no good to the new State. The exclusion of Candia will cripple the Greek State both morally and physically, will make it weak and poor, expose it to constant danger from the Turks, and create from the beginning innumerable difficulties for him who is to be at the head of that Government, because Greece will never be made to understand and appreciate the exclusion of Candia, and out of this circumstance alone a perpetual source of irritation will flow. Other efforts not less dangerous to the tranquillity of the new State must arise from the same cause. For is it likely that the Greeks,

henceforth in an improved position, should slacken in their sympathy for their countrymen and fellow Christians? Or is it more likely that the Candiotes, with the accomplishment of the Greek cause before their eyes, should forget that they are Greeks themselves? For what am I to infer from these propositions for the entire pacification of Candia, a point of the greatest moment to the Greek Government? Certainly not grounds of confidence that its inhabitants will peaceably return under the Turkish dominion. And what mode of pacification will then remain? In my opinion, nothing but the force of arms."

That was very wise to begin with; and yet he yielded to the temptation of ruling over a State which he could not imagine it possible to pacify. For three months he trifled with the duties he had so lightly undertaken, and then resigned his short dream of ambition. It is at least conceivable that if he had gone straight to Greece, and formed a council of the ablest and most honest men in the country, he might have established at once a powerful State and an enduring dynasty.

The offer of the crown to Prince Leopold had been made in a joint note from Lord Aberdeen and the French and Russian Ambassadors in London. The Prince made certain stipulations in accepting "the useful and honourable career opened to him by the High Powers"; and the plenipotentiaries, in a protocol dated February 20, 1830, undertook as follows:—To guarantee Greece against foreign aggression; to guarantee a loan "to be applied exclusively to the maintenance of the troops of the Sovereign Prince"; and to leave at the Prince's disposal, for one year, the division of the French army still remaining in Greece. At the same time they declined to interfere with Turkey, except by diplomatic representations, in respect of its treat-

ment of the Greeks in Samos and Crete; and they spoke of "insurmountable difficulties" in regard to the extension of the Greek frontier on the mainland, which Prince Leopold had suggested.* After full deliberation the Prince withdrew his acceptance of the crown, and there was an interval of many months before the Powers were able to come to an agreement in favour of the Bavarian candidate.

Finlay draws a dark picture of the condition of the country under the rule of Capo d'Istria. The President, he tells us, had contrived to secure an Assembly entirely subservient to himself. "Most

* There is a short summary of these negotiations in the *Examiner* of May 15, 1830. It is interesting to note the tone of public opinion in those days on the subject of this appointment. The *Examiner* of April 18, 1830, has some remarks which are far more pungent than we should dare, or care, to employ in the present generation. Only two or three sentences are capable of quotation:—"How inexplicable is the silence which has prevailed in the press and in Parliament, respecting the appointment of Prince Leopold to the Sovereignty of Greece, one of the most impudent and impolitic measures that have ever disgraced the councils of the country. . . . The occasion which made the name of the Prince of Saxe-Coburg known to the world was the favour which his person found in the sight of a young Princess. . . . England would seem to have seized the first opportunity of making a King of him, at no other risk than that of plunging herself into wars for the maintenance of his throne, and with no other violation of justice than giving away a people without their consent, or a care about their opinions. . . . The injustice and impolicy, however, of the appointment in question pass without remark, while writers and orators are never weary of inveighing against the usurpation of Miguel; so true it is, that what least concerns the country most interests our public men." On the other hand, the *Standard* of that day, writing after the resignation of Prince Leopold, declared that it had "never expressed the slightest interest in this question of the Sovereignty of Greece. We believe firmly in the burden of our national song, that we should 'rule the waves,' and as long as we can do that, the Morea, no matter by whom governed, is in our power to use as we please." This was, apparently, the spirit in which many Englishmen then regarded their responsibilities towards Greece.

of the ablest and most influential men had been driven from the public service, and excluded from the Assembly of Argos. The Senate was composed of the President's creatures. The Government had not received a permanent organisation. No administration of justice gave a sure guarantee for life and property to private individuals."* A law was passed to limit the freedom of the press; and Capo d'Istria was even able to obtain, through the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, an order from the Ottoman Government to the editor of a Smyrna paper "to abstain from criticising the conduct of the President of Greece."†

The consequence was that the whole country soon became overspread with a network of revolutions. Capo d'Istria engaged in a civil war, in which he was assisted by the Russian fleet; and that was the outcome of the first government which Europe had bestowed upon Greece.

The assassination of Capo d'Istria, at Nauplia, occurred on the 9th of October, 1831. The Senate immediately appointed a commission to carry on the government of the country, which consisted of Agostino Capo d'Istria, brother of the late President, Kolokotrones, and Kolettes. This body had the greatest difficulty in preserving the public peace. The Capodistrians, who commanded a sufficient force of troops through the influence of Kolokotrones, and who were backed up by the Russian ships, intimidated the new National Assembly which met in the autumn of 1831, and forcibly excluded the deputies from Hydra, the Maina, and other constituencies, in order to weaken the Opposition.

* Finlay, vii., 56.

† *Ibid.*, p. 61.

The Commission quarrelled with the French officers, whom they compelled to retire from their posts; and there is evidence to show that the influence of the Russian Government was directly employed in shaping the course of the Capodistrians. The Opposition, to which Kolettes soon made up his mind to adhere, repudiated the conduct of the majority in the National Assembly; and, as both sides were supported by an armed force, a new civil war broke out.

It was just at this time that Sir Stratford Canning landed at Nauplia for the purpose of informing the Greek authorities that Otho of Bavaria had been selected by the Powers as King of Greece. He made strong representations to Agostino Capo d'Istria and his supporters respecting the dangers of the policy which they had adopted. He pointed out to them that the eyes of Europe were fixed upon Greece, and that he was now on his way to Constantinople in order to secure the assent of the Sultan to the definite establishment of the royal dynasty. He urged them to put an end to the civil war, and to convoke a National Assembly from the entire country. But, in the meanwhile, the plenipotentiaries of the Powers, imagining that the Assembly of Argos was legitimately constituted, sent directions to the residents in Nauplia, authorising them to recognise the Provisional Government; and their protocol appears to have crossed the report sent home by Sir Stratford Canning. Thus all was in confusion, and the more moderate Greeks may be excused for hesitating as to where their allegiance was due. The majority of the moderate party

probably adhered to Kolettes, who, driven back with his Roumeliot troops upon Megara, was now preparing to return to Argos, in order to recover his authority, if possible, before the arrival of the Bavarians. He was strong enough to effect his purpose. He entered Argos, accompanied by Kondouriotes, Mavrocordatos, Mavromichaelis, and Miaoulis; and on the 9th of April, 1832, Agostino quitted the country in a Russian vessel.

But the civil war was by no means at an end. The Capodistrians rallied themselves, and unhappy Greece was once again plunged into anarchy. The Great Powers had given her two rulers at least. They had signed treaties, arrangements, protocols without end. They had "settled" Greece over and over again; and yet they proved themselves absolutely incapable of restoring peace to the distracted nation. Almost as long a period had passed since Navarino as that which intervened between the outbreak of the War of Independence and the destruction of the Turkish fleet. In the meantime France had exchanged Charles X. for Louis Philippe, Britain had been busy over the new kingdom of Belgium, and Russia had a Polish insurrection on her hands. The diplomatists of the three Powers did, indeed, find time for Conferences and diplomatic notes; but they were impotent in everything beyond this. They left the Greeks frying in their own fat; and they complained that the discords of the country (for which they were themselves largely responsible) prevented Europe from carrying out her benevolent intentions. The existence of an evil prevented the Powers from discovering a remedy.

The last National Assembly elected before the arrival of Otho was dispersed by a riotous mob of unpaid soldiers (August 26, 1832);* and this act of violence, apparently prompted by the British representative in Greece, though probably without anticipating the effects of his conduct, proved to be the crisis of the anarchy by which the country had so long been afflicted. Eleven years were to elapse before another Greek Assembly met. Of course the suppression of free institutions was not due to the riot of Pronia, which was only an isolated phenomenon. It was the Bavarian king, as the instrument of Europe, who took this masterful method of dealing with the internal discords of Greece.

* In connection with this riot, Papadopoulos Vretos relates an anecdote which he professes to have heard from the mouth of Mr. Dawkins, the English Resident in Greece—and which, if correctly repeated, may be added to the long list of English responsibilities. He tells us that he dined with the Russian Resident on the day after the dispersion of the deputies, and that Mr. Dawkins called after dinner, and told the following story:—"As I was riding out yesterday with Griffith, we were surrounded by a crowd of filthy palikaria, shouting and gesticulating like demons. All spoke at the same time, and all appeared to be delivering set speeches, so that the road was an oratorical pandemonium. When I could find an opportunity to make myself heard, I asked Griffith what was the play they were acting for our private edification. After many vain efforts he obtained a partial hearing. The soldiers declared they had no bread, no clothes, and no money. It would have been superfluous for them to have told any one who looked at them that they were without credit. I saw that instantly. They wished my Excellency to take their case into consideration, and provide for their wants. I stated to them that my functions did not allow me to become their commissary; but, pointing with my whip to the hall of the National Assembly, I said that I believed there were many persons in that building who possessed great experience as commissaries and paymasters. They seized my hint with wonderful alacrity, and set off running and whooping like wild Indians. Griffith and I took a long ride, and when we returned in the evening we heard of the great event of the day."—See Finlay, vii., 95.

This Otho of Bavaria was the second son of King Louis. He was sixteen years old when the Greek crown was offered to him by the three Powers (February 13, 1832). The election was ratified by the Assembly at Pronia (August 8th), which at the same time abolished the Senate. On the 4th of October the new King was recognised by the Sovereigns of the Germanic Confederation. On the 1st of the following month King Louis concluded a treaty of alliance with his son, by which he agreed to provide three thousand five hundred Bavarian troops; but the elder monarch cautiously declined to take any part in guaranteeing the Greek loan, out of which the troops were to receive the first instalments of their pay. It was not until the 1st of February, 1833, nearly one year after his acceptance of the crown, that Otho arrived at Nauplia; and his arrival had been preceded, a fortnight before, by a battle in the streets of Argos, between the French troops and the Capodistrians under Kolokotrones.

With a boy of seventeen, one can never predict very confidently what he is likely to do or to become. It was natural that the advent of Otho in Greece should be hailed with enthusiasm by the more sanguine of his subjects, as well as by all, in every country, who anticipated that Greece would now be happy and united, prosperous in herself and serviceable to Europe. But these happy forecasts left one thing out of consideration which ought not to have been forgotten. However Otho might hereafter develop himself, it was certain that he was not yet able to rule; and Greece required above everything a strong and experienced ruler. This was a fatal blot in the arrangements of the Great Powers.

The King being at best a cypher, it was necessary to look to his Ministers for a pledge and promise of national liberty. A Council of Regency was appointed by King Louis, in accordance with the terms of the Convention signed between the three Powers and the Court of Bavaria (February 13, 1832).^{*} Not a single member of this Council was a Greek. The incoherent elements of the new-made State, forced asunder by a dozen years of discord, and yet needing only a strong and just Government to weld them into a compact nation, were delivered into the hands of a boy-king who could not rule, and of a foreign triumvirate who had no conception of their character or requirements. Count Armandsparg was a Bavarian nobleman who contented himself with setting up a mimic Greek court; and he offended even his colleagues by his haughty assumption of

^{*} The following articles of this convention (which was signed for England by Lord Palmerston) define the authority of King Louis during his son's minority:—

“Article 9.—The majority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, is fixed at the period when he shall have completed his twentieth year; that is to say, on the 1st of June, 1835. Article 10.—During the minority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, his rights of Sovereignty shall be exercised in their full extent by a regency composed of three councillors, who shall be appointed by his Majesty the King of Bavaria. Article 11.—The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall retain the full possession of his appanages in Bavaria. His Majesty the King of Bavaria moreover engages to assist, as far as may be in his power, the Prince Otho in his position in Greece, until a revenue shall have been set apart for the crown in that State . . . Article 16.—As soon as possible after the signature of the present Convention, the three councillors who are to be associated with his Royal Highness the Prince Otho, by his Majesty the King of Bavaria, in order to compose the regency of Greece, shall enter upon the exercise of the functions of the said regency, and shall prepare all the measures necessary for the reception of the sovereign, who on his part will repair to Greece with as little delay as possible.

superiority. Maurer was a professor of law, whose sympathies hardly extended beyond the technical labours which devolved upon him. General Heideck was the only one of the three who had been in Greece before, and he knew next to nothing of the people whom he had to govern. The Council never worked harmoniously; and their individual acts showed so little wisdom that it might possibly have been worse for the unfortunate Greeks if they had been of one mind about their duties.

The history of the first ten years of Otho's reign is a history of broken pledges, violated rights, and abused privileges. The King of Bavaria had engaged, amongst other things, that a National Assembly should be summoned by the regency to assist in drawing up a Constitution. The promise was never kept. The Greeks were practically excluded from participation in the government of their country; the regency was invested with unlimited power; and it was only by a revolution, at the end of ten years of tyranny, that the nation was able to recover the fundamental rights of freemen. Considerable attention was naturally paid by the Bavarian administrators to the organisation of the army; and a great service was rendered to the country by the partial suppression of the irregular bands who had begun to make civil war a trade by which they earned their living. Beyond this, and one or two salutary acts of Maurer, it would be difficult to mention any special or enduring advantage which the people received from their new rulers.

We need not stay to examine the system, such as it was, by which the Council of Regency

attempted to govern Greece. The impotence of the attempt was manifest long before the popular impatience displayed itself in action. One evidence of original and independent talent on the part of the Bavarian triumvirate was afforded in their rejection of the very forms of administration which were most characteristic of the political genius of the Greeks. They dispensed with the valuable assistance which they might have derived from the municipal institutions of the race, and set up a framework of centralisation which the humblest of Greek secretaries could have shown them to be impracticable. They issued their fiats, and expected nature itself to bow to them. They were as rational in establishing their system of government as they were when they talked of rendering the Greek rivers navigable. If they could have Haussmanised the country in the first instance, they might have made their brand-new machinery work. As it was, their failure was worse than ridiculous.

Nature mapped out Greece for the home of a democracy. Its thousand valleys, cut asunder by trackless mountains, watered by precipitous rivers, and almost destitute of roads, must be self-governed or not governed at all. Even under the Turks the Greek race had been characteristically democratic; its municipal institutions had survived because they were a physical necessity. The Bavarians retained the Turkish system of taxation, even to imposts in kind, and to exactions by brutality; but they attempted what the Turks had never done, to destroy the indestructible fabric of local self-government. They divided the kingdom into ten nomarchies, which were subdivided into eparchies; but even this

arrangement was so arbitrary that it was modified twice within the first five years. Eparchs and nomarchs, moreover, were strictly subjected to the caprices of the central Government.

It would be a long task to enumerate the evidences and symptoms of misrule by the Council of Regency. The press was gagged; brigandage increased; the development of the country languished; unjust or oppressive taxation ruined whole districts, and converted peaceful shepherds into marauding klephts. The natural consequence was that plots and conspiracies began to multiply, and these were encouraged by the quarrels of the regents themselves. The ablest member of the Bavarian Council was undoubtedly Maurer, whose legal institutions were especially creditable and beneficial to the State. The jealousy which had sprung up between him and Count Armansperg, or rather between Count Armansperg and the majority of the Bavarian officials in Greece, came to a head in 1834, when the King of Bavaria, taking the part of the Count, suddenly recalled Maurer, together with the experienced Secretary to the Council. From July in this year until the beginning of 1837 the whole government of Greece was practically in the hands of this vain, presumptuous, incompetent, but amiable aristocrat. One act of the Count's during this period of tyrannic rule may serve as an indication of his general disposition. The *Soter* newspaper having offended him by the freedom of its criticism, he determined to punish it. In order to secure a verdict, "two judges were removed from the bench in the tribunal before which the cause was brought, immediately before the trial." The editor was fined

2,000 drachmas (about £72), and sentenced to one year's imprisonment. But now Maurer had his revenge on his rival, by virtue of the fair legal system which he had set up and caused to be respected. On an appeal being made to the Areopagus, the sentence of the inferior court was annulled, and "the attacks of the press became more violent and more personal."*

Let us mark the responsibilities underlying this series of facts. Europe had lightly set up a Government in Greece which the Greeks were morally certain to dislike, and eventually to destroy. It had required an emancipated race, intensely proud of its nationality, and of its recent exploits, to submit to the rule of aliens, foreign to them in blood, in religion, in habits, and in tendencies. It had made Munich the source of authority for Attica and Arcadia. The power which Britain, France, and Russia delegated to the King of Bavaria, the latter delegated to feeble and presumptuous individuals, who had no qualifications for their work, who boasted that their authority was above the law, and who refused to the Greek nation all voice in its own government. There was no blunder committed by the Bavarians for which Europe itself may not be called upon to answer.

More than this, the Residents of the three Powers in Greece intensified the original wrong. The affairs of the unhappy kingdom seem to have

* Finlay, vii., 144. According to the same authority, Armansperg "took care that all the Ministers should never be able to speak the same language; and he deprived the Cabinet of its control over the finance department, by keeping the place of Minister of Finance vacant for a whole year. His lavish expenditure at last filled all Greece with complaints."

been regarded as by no means a monopoly for one set of foreign officials. The Bavarians were constantly reminded of the presence of the Residents, and especially of the English representative. We have seen how Mr. Dawkins interpreted the duties of his position in 1832. A year later we find Maurer vainly asking for his recall, on the ground that he persistently thwarted the acts of the Regency. Mr. Dawkins may or may not have been justified in the course which he took; but it is difficult to perceive what justification he and his colleagues can have had for their active espousal of Armansperg's quarrel against Maurer and Abel. It is still more difficult to justify the British and Russian Governments for urging King Louis to recall the most efficient member of the Council, and to leave a virtual autocracy in the hands of this arrogant German Count. Britain went even further than this. When the viciousness of Armansperg's financial measures was realised by France and Russia, and when the two Governments hesitated to guarantee the third series of the loan, on the ground of the Count's unsatisfactory explanations, the British Cabinet saw fit to defend the Bavarian. Lord Palmerston was so enthusiastic in the matter that he applied to Parliament for power to guarantee the British portion of the third series, independently of the action of France and Russia. Whether this was done to curry favour in Greece, or whether Lord Palmerston had been convinced by Admiral (afterwards Lord) Lyons, who had succeeded Mr. Dawkins, and who warmly supported Count Armansperg, there can be no question as to the impolicy of the act, or as to the responsibility of the British Cabinet. Almost

at the very time when Lord Palmerston was recommending his fellow-countrymen to accept this new burden, and to hand over another large sum of money to a man so utterly incompetent, the King of Bavaria and his son found it necessary to recall the Count, whose failure could no longer be concealed.*

Armansperg was recalled in February, 1837, and was succeeded in the presidency of the King's council by Rudhart, another Bavarian. Rudhart was driven to resign at the close of the year, and Zographos, the Greek representative at Constantinople, was appointed Premier. The foreigners had failed one after another; and at length, after ten years of Russian and Bavarian failure, a Greek was allowed to try his hand at the government of Greeks.

Admiral Lyons was an energetic asserter of British dignity abroad. There could have been no better exponent of the spirit implied in Lord Palmerston's famous boast—"Civis Britannicus sum." He made the Greek Government, or rather the King himself, humbly apologise to him, for permitting him to stand outside the royal circle at a theatrical representation. He was not liked at Athens; and yet for years together he contrived to make Court and Ministers follow up each act of annoyance with a fresh apology. This may have been spirited; but it was surely impolitic in the highest degree. At all events it sufficed to cause and maintain a breach

* The vast responsibility incurred by British interference in Greek affairs is impressed upon us at every turn, and can scarcely be exaggerated by any words which we may see fit to employ. When King Otho attained his majority he seems to have been on the point of making Kolettis his chief Minister. The hopes of the Greek statesman, as Finlay candidly asserts, "were frustrated by the influence of Great Britain at the Court of Bavaria."

between Britain and Greece. But there were other reasons, at the same time, which contributed to alienate the two countries from each other.

Greece was now overrun with brigands; and pirates by sea were almost as active as the brigands on shore. Our continued retention of the Ionian Islands brought it to pass that a number of British subjects suffered injury from these marauders; and Admiral Lyons was instructed to demand redress. We had insisted on investing our money in Greece, and we now insisted—no doubt rightly—upon the indemnification of injured “British citizens.” But the manner of our insistence made the very name of Englishmen to stink in the nostrils of the Greeks. With his “spirited foreign policy,” Lord Palmerston would not be satisfied until he had humiliated King Otho, exasperated Greek merchants by seizing private property for the debts of the Government, and finally, after a dozen years of recrimination, compelled the Greek Cabinet to make a second restitution.*

Thus the British influence in Greece, wisely fostered by Canning, had been wasted and frittered away by the clumsy diplomacy of a too spirited age. The country which might have done so much for the Greeks, which might have helped them to develop their great resources, and to become strong and solvent in a single generation, was really contributing to the paralysis by which their national life was stunted. The conduct of Britain towards Greece is only partially explained by the fact that our statesmen and diplomatists were supremely ignorant of the condition of the country. Admiral Lyons was continually assuring Lord Palmerston of the

* Then only by the intervention of France, in 1850.

freedom and tranquillity which had been established by the King's Government, though, as Finlay points out, "not one of his assertions was true."* The whole land was infested with brigands, whom the Bavarian Executive was unable to hold in check. The authorities were openly defied, life and property were unsafe, the press was gagged, the law was strained in order to secure convictions, agriculture and commerce were almost at a standstill. The worst of all the injuries inflicted upon Greece by her subjection to the feeble rule of the Bavarians was that the bulk of the wealthy and energetic Greeks abroad, who had contemplated a return to the land of their forefathers, stayed away. Twenty years after the first blow had been struck for independence, Greece was still no home for the merchant, the farmer, or the man of private fortune.

It must be admitted, in common fairness to the Bavarians, that they had little encouragement from Europe to develop such capacity for government as they actually possessed. We have seen how Maurer and Abel were dismissed, whilst Armansperg was retained, and how the specious promises of the Count secured him for a time the countenance of the Great Powers. When Armansperg was dismissed, Rudhart attempted a vigorous and stern administration; but he contrived to quarrel with the British represen-

* "On the 24th of February, 1836, Lyons wrote to Lord Palmerston that 'the communes in Greece have the entire direction of their own affairs; the press is unshackled; the tribunals are completely independent; private property is scrupulously respected; the personal and religious liberty of the subject is inviolable.' Yet not one of these assertions was true."—Finlay, vii., 164. Admiral Lyons seems to have taken his facts from Count Armansperg. He cannot have taken them from the newspapers of the day, nor from the critics of the Government.

tative, and in ten months he was obliged to resign. By this time King Otho had attained his majority, and he took it into his head to govern virtually without a council. This at least displayed some vigour of mind in the young monarch, and men waited to see if the new promise would be fulfilled. Otho's personal rule was a thorough failure. He had never made himself loved, but now he made himself hated. His despotism had already been pushed to extremities when the three Powers began to press him for payment of the interest on the guaranteed loan. Otho was driven to exact more grievous taxes than ever from his unfortunate subjects; but within six months it was found necessary to relax the severity of an impost which was found to be absolutely intolerable.

By this time (1843) Greece was more than ripe for another revolution; and Europe took no pains to conceal its opinion that a revolution under the existing circumstances would be quite justifiable. King Otho was not only urged to provide for the payment of his debts, he was reminded that his father had accepted the kingdom on his behalf with a distinct pledge that Greece should be constitutionally governed; and it was plainly intimated to him that his subjects had a right to exercise a voice in their own government. The Greeks knew that Europe had remonstrated with their king; they knew that they were expected to revolt; and in all probability they had their revolution managed for them from without. At any rate, they had good reason for their rebellion against a despotism which was fast ruining, if it had not already ruined, the country.

On the 15th of September, 1843, a bloodless revo-

lution got rid of Bavarian absolutism, and compelled Otho to assume the *rôle* of a constitutional monarch. Without much trouble the young king was induced to dismiss his Bavarian Ministers, to appoint a new Ministry composed of Greeks, to summon a National Assembly, and to engage beforehand to abide by its decisions. The Assembly met in November, and, about four months later, on the 30th of March, 1844, Otho took an oath to the Constitution. It is needless to examine this imperfect instrument, which was replaced, twenty years afterwards, by another and a better charter of popular liberties. It seems to have been drawn up on fairly good models, if without much premeditation; but before the middle of the century Europe had not much to offer in the shape of written constitutions.

The interference of the Powers in the affairs of Greece can hardly be said to have grown less frequent or less imperious under the constitutional *régime*; and, indeed, the exercise of supreme political authority by men like Mavrocordatos, Kolettas, Tricoupi, and Djavellas, young in the art of government, and often rash from a novel sense of power, was calculated to afford grounds for more or less reasonable intervention on the part of Britain, France, or Russia. Corresponding with the distinct policies of London, Paris, and St. Petersburg, there were political parties in the Greek Assembly which went by the name of English, French, and Russian, and which were undoubtedly encouraged by the action of the three Governments. This rivalry for diplomatic supremacy at Athens had the effect of checking the growth of independent statesmanship.

In 1846 Lord Palmerston roundly accused Kolettas

of winking at the existence of brigandage, and of granting impunity to certain individuals or bands from interested motives. The accusation was made on other occasions, before and since, in connection with other equally prominent men. It appears, however, to have been made too lightly, on an inadequate basis of facts, and with an insufficient knowledge of the special character and history of brigandage in Greece. Kolettes indignantly denied the justice of Lord Palmerston's complaints, and declared that life and property were safe in the provinces, especially amongst the labouring classes, as indicated by the progress of agriculture and commerce. There was apparently more truth in the assurance of Kolettes than there had been in the similar assurance of Admiral Lyons to Lord Palmerston a few years before; and the statistics of the country proved that its commerce made great strides at the period of which Kolettes spoke.

In 1847 the British Government renewed its demand for the payment of interest on the guaranteed loan. The Greeks complained, not very reasonably, that this was an unfriendly act on our part, especially since France and Russia declined at that moment to concur in the demand. The debt was unquestionably due from Greece; and it was not necessarily an unfriendly act to urge her to pay her liabilities. If she could have made the effort, and paid off the loans of 1824-5 and 1832-6, Greece would have occupied a stronger position before Europe, and would have received a warmer support from her friends abroad. But it is to be considered that the kingdom was actually bankrupt when Europe gave it birth, and that it had ever since been labouring in vain to

make its revenue exceed its expenditure. Kolettis did not repudiate the debt, but he pointed out that the Chamber of Deputies was devoting all its energies to the reduction of taxation, which had been most oppressive, both in character and in amount, for many years. He suggested a plan by which the Government might hope to begin by paying one-third of the interest in 1848, and gradually increase until the full amount was paid off in 1860. The three Powers had apparently no confidence in the Greek Cabinet, for they do not seem to have accepted this offer. But, unfortunately for Greece, Kolettis died just a week after the dispatch of the note, and without having had the opportunity of proving the sincerity of his intentions.

The immediate difficulty was got over by the princely generosity of M. Eynard, of Geneva, who supplied the Greek Government with half a million francs wherewith to satisfy the British demands. But it was not long before new difficulties arose. In 1850 Lord Palmerston set about maintaining, or restoring, the British influence in Greece by blockading the Piræus, and seizing Greek vessels, in order to enforce the settlement of claims by Mr. Finlay, by the notorious Don Pacifico, and others. The spirited action of Lord Palmerston on this occasion nearly upset his Ministry, and quite destroyed his influence in Greece. The unjustifiable blockade of the Piræus, suddenly renewed after negotiations had been entered into, naturally gave offence to France and Russia. The latter country protested against our breach of international law; and it must be admitted that the protest was warranted by facts. The conduct of Britain on this occasion is the more to be regretted


because our demands included a claim for the two islands of Cervi and Sapienza, as belonging to the Ionian group—a claim which could not be enforced, and which it would scarcely, under any circumstances, have been creditable for us to put forward.

The most intelligible and beneficent interventions in Greece after her establishment as a kingdom were undertaken for the purpose of preventing a rupture of diplomatic relations between Athens and Constantinople. Twice at least before the Crimean War the Powers had reminded Greece that their guarantee of the State against foreign invasion made it incumbent upon them to demand that she also should abstain from provocations. In 1854 the case was different. Then the Greeks found one of the guaranteeing Powers engaged in hostilities against their old oppressor, and it was only natural that the country should have been tempted to cast in its lot with Russia, in the hope of securing a further instalment of its legitimate patrimony. But Britain and France, having the command of the sea, were able to awe Greece into an unwilling neutrality. The combined fleets occupied the Piræus, after an abortive Greek invasion of Thessaly and Epirus; troops were landed on Greek soil in May, 1854, and remained until February, 1857.

This was a terrible blow to the hopes of the Greeks, as well as to their pride. Their invasion of Turkey had been almost ridiculous by its rashness and want of success. The King and his Ministers could scarcely have expected that the Western Powers would permit them to take up arms against the Porte; and it was only by sheer miscalculation that they could imagine the time to

be suitable for the forcible extension of their borders. The result of their ill-advised movement was to humiliate the country by a foreign occupation, to discredit several prominent politicians past recovery, to increase the burdens of the State, to bring the idea of Greek aggrandisement into disfavour with those who were best able to promote it, and, generally, to check the advance of Greece towards her fuller emancipation.

The fortunes of the Greeks were at their lowest ebb during the latter years of King Otho's reign. That they were bankrupt was not their own fault; but they did little or nothing to extricate themselves from the quagmire of debt into which Europe had plunged them. That the land was infested with brigands must be regarded rather as the misfortune than as the crime of the Greeks as a nation; and yet we find under the Bavarian rule that the curse of brigandage increased instead of diminishing, and that the Government became less and less able or willing to suppress it. These were but two of the causes which fanned the discontent of the nation into a flame. The revolution of 1862, which drove Otho from his throne after a failure protracted over nearly thirty years, was the natural outcome of the popular despair of good government. From the very beginning of the national regeneration, it had been popular Greece—Greece without leaders, and submitting by compulsion alone to the yoke of the foreigner—which had kept alive the flame of genuine patriotism. It was the people which had believed in itself, and which had retained the confidence of others through a hundred phases of public disgrace or misfortune. And it was a



METEOR-MONASTERIES IN THESSALY (S. NIKOLAS).

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spontaneous upheaval of the people in 1862 which shook off the incompetent monarch imposed upon it by the Powers.

The Greeks held themselves justified in taking their affairs into their own hands; and the right was hardly contested by any Government in Europe. There was at that time presiding over the British Foreign Office a statesman with all the matured love of popular liberty, and all the courage in giving expression to his ideas, which had distinguished Canning himself. Earl Russell had spoken boldly and imperiously to Austria on behalf of the Italian patriots, and he now spoke boldly in defence of the Greeks.

"During a long course of years," he wrote to Mr. Scarlett, the British representative at Athens (November 6, 1862), "the British Government endeavoured to impress on King Otho the mistaken nature of the system of government which he pursued, and the necessity of adopting a system better calculated to conciliate the affection and confidence of his subjects, and to promote the prosperity of Greece. The Kingdom of Greece having, by the transactions of 1832, been acknowledged as an independent State, the people of Greece are entitled to exercise the rights of national independence; and one of the rights which belong to an independent nation is that of changing its governing dynasty upon good and sufficient cause.

"Her Majesty's Government cannot deny that the Greeks have had good and sufficient cause for the steps they have taken."

Words like these on the part of an English Minister did much to wipe off the reproach of Verona.

CHAPTER X

REVOLUTION AND CONSTITUTION

The Expulsion of Otho—Elevation of the National Sentiment in Greece—Offer of the Greek Crown to Prince Alfred—King George—The Cession of the Ionian Islands—Mr. Gladstone's Mission—Terms of Cession—The New Constitution—Carpet Bag Politics.

THE expulsion of Otho from Greece was one step in a process of purification and refinement, instinctively determined upon by the people, independently of, and even in spite of, their rulers. The regeneration which had produced the patriots of 1821, and which had enabled them to throw off the Turkish yoke, now inspired new patriots with an energy of a somewhat different kind. The obstacle to freedom was no longer in the tyranny of foreign oppressors, but in the corruption of the Greeks themselves, deepened and encouraged by the selfishness of the monarch. The one obstacle was as fatal to genuine liberty as the other, and there was the same necessity to remove it out of the path of the rejuvenescent race.

The Greeks of the nineteenth century were fast becoming re-Hellenised; and the maturing of the true Hellenic sentiment was attested in many different ways. A comparison of the Constitutions

of 1844 and 1864 reveals this new development of the ancient spirit in a very noteworthy manner; and the same fact was illustrated by the leaven of political integrity, dignity, and order which brought about the honourable revolution of 1862. The Greek people, which had dared to be free, now determined (so far as they were able) that their Government should be above the suspicion of dishonour. It has been said that the movements which cost Otho his throne were guided by indistinct aspirations, and led up almost fortuitously to their actual results. The truth seems to be that the action of the people throughout Greece was determined by the energy of the reawakened national feeling, which was undergoing a natural process of evolution.

Europe had some vague idea of this. It had been admitted from the first outbreak of the War of Independence, as it is admitted to the present day, that the modern Hellenes have an indefeasible claim to liberty—apart from the claim inherent in humanity—as the lineal descendants of the Hellenes of old, and in proportion as they display the qualities of their forefathers. But the Greek kingdom has not been treated leniently, or with partiality. It has been put to a severe test in being made to establish its legitimacy under the most arduous conditions, and has been allowed to take its place amongst the nations only step by step, as its difficulties have been painfully surmounted. In 1862–4 Europe was unwontedly complaisant to the people which was dethroning its king. We have seen what Earl Russell thought on the subject. Not one of the Powers protested against the conduct of the Greeks.

Public opinion had anticipated the fall of Otho, and it welcomed the inauguration of a new *régime*.

Of course Europe took it for granted that Greece would obey another king; and it may be doubted whether the Powers would have sanctioned an experiment on the part of the Greeks to govern themselves on any other than a monarchical system. Nor do the Greeks appear to have had any inclination for a Republic. Their aim was twofold; first, to increase the area of national emancipation, and secondly, to reform and purify the Government. They conceived that the first of these two objects might be gained by selecting Prince Alfred of England as the successor of Otho, whereby they hoped to obtain the Ionian Islands without delay, and probably other territories in the course of time. Prince Alfred, however, was excluded by the understandings of 1827 and 1830, which laid it down that no member of the reigning families of the three Powers should ascend the throne of Greece.* Earl Russell renounced the crown for the Queen's second son; but at the same time the Cabinet entered into a new and vast responsibility towards Greece, which has influenced the relations of the two countries from that time forward, and

* Universal suffrage was appealed to by the Provisional Government to decide upon the future occupant of the throne. Before the voting had been completed it was announced that the Powers adhered to their undertakings on the first establishment of the kingdom. Notwithstanding this fact, the votes recorded, in Greece and at the foreign consulates, were as follows:—For Prince Alfred, 230,016; for the Duke of Leuchtenberg (a Romanoff) 2,400; for an orthodox King, 1,917; for the Czar, 1,841; for “a King” simply, 1,763; for Prince Napoleon, 345; for the Prince Imperial of France, 246; for a Republic, 93; for Prince Amadeo of Italy, 15; for the Count of Flanders, 7; for Prince William of Denmark (King George), 6; and for Prince Hysilantes, 6. In accordance with this vote, Prince Alfred was actually proclaimed as King of Greece.

which has made Britain in a very exceptional and particular manner answerable for the welfare of the Greek nation.

The Cabinet of Lord Palmerston undertook to find a new king for Greece. Earl Russell wrote to Mr. Scarlett that it appeared to Her Majesty's Government that the first interest of Greece was "to elect a prince to rule over her who should be generally accepted," and "that he ought not to be a prince under twenty years of age, but rather a prince of mature years, and of some experience in the world."

The opinion was a reasonable one; but the task of finding such a prince amongst the reigning families of Europe (even in the days when many families reigned in Germany) proved to be beyond the power of the British Government. Two selections were made, in King Ferdinand of Portugal and the Duke of Saxe-Coburg; and Mr. Henry Elliot, who had been sent on a special mission to Athens, had the rashness in both instances to announce the choice to the Greeks before a reply had been received from the kings elect. The two Coburgs, however, declined the offer; and, after another delay of about a month, the choice fell upon Prince William George, second son of Prince Christian of Holstein-Glucksburg, subsequently King of Denmark. The Prince's sister had recently been married to the Prince of Wales, which will partially account for his selection; but any possible jealousy which the Russian Government may have been inclined to feel was obviated by finding for the Prince a consort in the daughter of the Grand Duke Constantine, the niece of the Czar.

In spite of some trouble amongst the rival ministers and leaders of factions, which would have occurred whatever the decision of the British Government had been, the Greek Assembly and nation acquiesced in the selection ; and they were the more disposed to resign their right into the hands of Britain because Mr. Elliot had already announced the resolution of this country to cede the Ionian Islands to their natural owners.

Ever since Lord Lytton had sent Mr. Gladstone on his mission to Corfu in 1858, as High Commissioner Extraordinary (though subsequently, for a few weeks, he exercised the functions of Lord High Commissioner), it had been generally recognised amongst British statesmen that the Ionian Islands could no longer be retained by Britain without gross injustice. The fact had been recognised for a long time by a few more discerning and courageous politicians ; but Mr. Gladstone's mission, and the perspicacity of Sir H. Storks, who succeeded him, left no doubt in the minds of those who had any pretension to statesmanship. Mr. Gladstone, especially, was soon weary of attempting to reconcile to British rule a population which had for thirty years persistently demanded its union with the mother country, and which met his first approaches by declaring its unalterable desire* to become a part of New Greece. He was not the man to contravene the will of a people. He even suggested that the Ionians should petition the Queen for the independence which they coveted ; and he forwarded to Her Majesty a vote of the Ionian

* The word was *θέλημα*, and was probably intended to signify determination, rather than desire. Was the will of the Corfuotes any stronger or more natural than that of the Candiotes to-day ?

Parliament, declaring that "the single and unanimous will of the Ionian people had been and is for their union with the Kingdom of Greece."

The Revolution of 1862 occurred at a happy moment for the Greeks. There was a Liberal Administration in England. Earl Russell was at the Foreign Office. Cavour and Garibaldi had made Italy; and the British Foreign Minister had given Austria to understand that this country recognised the right of a people to choose how and by whom it should be governed. Earl Russell and his colleagues not only said this, but they meant it.

A new era in international politics was being inaugurated, an era in which policy is to be squared more precisely with principle; in which moral constraint is not to be acknowledged in theory and neglected in practice; in which a duty, once perceived and acknowledged, is to be performed by Governments as by individuals, even to the actual sacrifice of a nation's apparent interests. These maxims, applied to the case of the Greeks, pointed steadily to one conclusion; and, though they were so applied in 1862 rather by undefined instinct than by argument and profession, they were still formulated in the writings of contemporary publicists and politicians. It is true that the Cabinet in which Lord Palmerston was Premier, Earl Russell Foreign Secretary, and Mr. Gladstone Chancellor of the Exchequer, resisted the cession up to the eve of the Revolution; but it assented in the last month of 1862.

The conditions of annexation are worthy of note. On the 27th of May, 1863, the three Powers had recorded in a protocol that they held themselves

bound to maintain the monarchical principle in Greece, as well as to watch over the peace and tranquillity of the kingdom. On the 5th of the following June they recognised Prince George as the elected King of the Hellenes, and further entered into the following, amongst other, engagements:— To induce the Ionian Parliament, before voting the annexation, to appropriate an annual sum of £10,000 as an increase to the civil list of the King; and to endow King George, out of the revenues of their respective peoples with an annual sum of £12,000—the said sum to be deducted from the interest due from Greece on the loan of 1832.* On the 14th of November a treaty was concluded between the same three Powers, with Austria and Prussia, by which it was agreed that the Ionian Islands should be ceded on condition of their future neutrality in time of war, of the dismantling of their fortresses, and of the retention of existing commercial privileges by foreigners.

The Greek Government stoutly protested against these latter conditions, and succeeded in limiting the neutrality to Corfu and Paxos. The deed was eventually signed; and on the 2nd of June, 1864, the cession of the Ionian Islands was completed.

The act was distinctly good and beneficial; and the selection of Prince George as the constitutional monarch of a self-governing kingdom has turned out to be successful. From this time most unquestionably, if not before, Great Britain assumed to herself the chief responsibility for the good behaviour and the welfare of Greece. That which had been the joint concern of Europe, or at least of three leading

* The young king, to his credit be it said, resigned one-third of his civil list in 1865.

Powers in Europe, our statesmen had now made the special and prominent concern of this country.

The Constitution, as ratified by King George on the 21st of November, 1864, was an achievement of the Revolutionary Assembly.* That it is not a perfect instrument need hardly be said; but it was a very notable advance upon the Constitution of 1844. The latter virtually abolished the municipal self-government which had subsisted even under the Turks. Under it the demarchies were simply subordinate governments taking their initiation and authority from the central administration. Their officers were nominated by the king, or by his ministers, and they held their appointments at the good pleasure of the Court, or of a party. Even the rates levied by the local councils were liable to appropriation by the central government. The Constitution of 1864 swept away the whole system—including even the institution of a Senate—under which these abuses had been possible; and, by enacting that “the election of the municipal authorities shall be made by direct, universal, and secret suffrage, by ballot,” it conferred upon the communes and town councils an adequate power of controlling their own affairs and securing their privileges.

The following articles of the Constitution are those whereon the modern liberties of Greece principally rest, and upon which the actual edifice of government has been built.

* This Assembly met on the 22nd of December, 1862, and was dissolved on the 28th of November, 1864. The Provisional Government was composed of Bulgaris, Kanares, and Roupfos. The ministry included Zaimes, Koumoundouros, Kalliphronas, Deligeorges, Manghinas, D. Mavromichaelis, Nikolopoulos, and Diamantopoulos.

After declaring the establishment of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and granting toleration to "every other recognised religion," the text proceeds to define the public rights of the Greeks:—

3. Greeks are equal in the eye of the law, and contribute without distinction to the public burdens in proportion to their fortunes. Only Greek citizens are admissible to public employments. Citizens are those who have acquired or may acquire the qualifications required to constitute citizenship by the laws of the state. Titles of nobility or distinction cannot be conferred on Greek citizens, nor recognised. 4. Personal liberty is inviolable. No man can be prosecuted, arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise restrained, except when and how the law provides. 5. Except when taken in the act, no man can be arrested or imprisoned without a judicial warrant specifying the ground of arrest or imprisonment. He who is seized in the act or arrested by warrant must be carried without delay before the competent examining judge, who is bound, within a delay not exceeding three days from his compareance, either to release him, or to deliver a warrant for his imprisonment. Should three days elapse without the examining judge granting a warrant of imprisonment, every jailor or other person, civil or military, who may be charged with the detention of the person arrested, is bound to release him instantly. Any violation of these provisions is punishable as illegal imprisonment. 10. Greeks have the right to assemble tranquilly and unarmed. The police may be present at all public meetings. Meetings in the open air may be prohibited if they offer danger to public security. 11. Greeks have the right to form societies in conformity with the laws, and in no case can the law require a previous permission on the part of Government for the exercise of this right. 12. The dwelling is inviolable. Domiciliary visits can only be made when and as the law authorises. 13. In Greece men cannot be sold or bought. A purchased slave, or a serf, of any race and religion, is free as soon as he enters Greece.

It is already evident from whence the Constitution of Greece was derived. The basis is English, with a



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TOMB IN THE KERAMIKOS, ATHENS.

French extension ; and it was urged by the first critics of the Greek constitution-makers that they had taken the armour of a giant to clothe the body of a dwarf. All the best and most successful experiments which have followed political revolutions have shown that the rapid education of a people by the exercise of free institutions is attended by results almost, if not quite, as satisfactory as the slow conquest of such institutions in the teeth of opposition from privileged classes and individuals. This process of education may be signalised by displays of awkwardness on the part of the learners ; but there is a distinct advantage in the absence of the venerable abuses and evil traditions associated with the slower methods.

The thirteenth article of the Constitution established a notable contrast between the social condition of Greece and that of Turkey. To this day the human traffic is carried on, however surreptitiously, in the Greek provinces of the Sultan's dominions ; and this fact has been one of the most fertile causes of hostility between the neighbouring authorities.*

* "One of the most illusory reforms ever carried out in any country was the closing of the slave-markets of Constantinople. The public sale of human beings naturally shocked Western ideas of decency, but it is manifest that to the slave himself it mattered little whether he was sold in an open market or by private treaty, while the cause of humanity on the whole suffered rather than gained by the privacy with which henceforth the traffic was veiled in the coffee-houses of Tophaneh and the khans of Stamboul. All visitors to Constantinople who have made inquiries into this subject will confirm me when I say that although the external signs of human servitude are only too apparent, it is extremely difficult to discover how or where the contraband trade is carried on." And that the kidnappers even to this day pursue their labours amongst the Hellenic populations, up to the very frontiers of Greece, appears to rest on evidence which cannot be gainsaid.—F. W. Chesson, *Turkey and the Slave Trade*, 1877.

14. Every one may publish his opinions by speech, by writing, or by printing, conformably to the laws. The press is free. The censorship, with every other preventive measure, is prohibited. The seizure of newspapers and other printed communications, whether before or after publication, is prohibited. Exceptionally, the seizure after publication is permitted in case of insult to the Christian religion, or the person of the king. But in this case the public prosecutor is bound within twenty-four hours after the seizure to submit the case to the judicial council, and the judicial council is bound to decide whether the seizure is to be maintained or withdrawn; otherwise the seizure ceases to be valid. Appeal is allowed only to the publisher of the article seized, and not to the public prosecutor. Only Greek citizens are allowed to publish newspapers. 15. No oath can be imposed except in the form provided by law. 16. Higher instruction is provided at the expense of the state. The state contributes to the schools in the municipalities according to the exigencies of the case. Every one has the right of establishing private schools in conformity with the laws of the state. 17. No one can be deprived of his property except for some public necessity duly certified in the manner provided by law, and always preceded by indemnification. 18. Torture and general confiscation are prohibited. Civil death is abolished. The punishment of death for political crimes, except in the case of complicated crimes, is abolished. 19. No previous permission of the Government authorities is required to prosecute a public or municipal official for illegalities committed in the exercise of his functions, except for acts specially ordered by ministers. 20. The secrecy of letters is inviolable.

The freedom of the press, once asserted and guaranteed, has rarely been interfered with. In no country has this liberty been so conspicuously respected after so short a probation. The chief cause of the remarkable immunity of public opinion in Greece is to be found in the enlightened attachment to education and literature. The supreme importance attributed to national education in Greece is attested by the insertion of such a clause as the sixteenth in

a formal Constitution. Clause 17 appears to have anticipated the necessity of appropriating the conventual estates.

21. All power has its source in the nation, and is exercised in the manner appointed by the Constitution. 22. The legislative power is exercised by the king and the House of Representatives of the people (*Boule*). 23. The right of proposing laws belongs to the representatives of the people, and to the king, who exercises it by his ministers. 24. No proposal relative to an increase of the public expenditure by salary or pension, or in general for any personal interest, can originate from the House of Representatives. 25. If a project of law be rejected by one of the two legislative powers, it cannot be introduced again in the same legislative session. 26. The authentic interpretation of the laws belongs to the legislative power. 27. The executive power belongs to the king; but it is exercised by responsible ministers appointed by him. 28. The judicial power is exercised by courts of law. Judicial sentences are executed in the king's name.

These articles strictly define the royal prerogative; and they were dictated by the experience acquired during the reign of King Otho, who constantly violated the authority of the judges, and overrode the rulings of the courts. The theory of royal prerogative under a constitutional *régime* could scarcely be enunciated in a more satisfactory and judicious form; although it is evident that, as national self-command increases, it will be found desirable to contract still more closely the limits of the king's privileges. The twenty-fourth article is a self-denying ordinance, specially honourable to the framers of the Constitution.

The substantial observance of these articles, both by King George and by the popular representatives, is one of the best possible proofs of the fitness of Greece for advanced liberal institutions. An exception to this rule occurred in the year 1866, when the

Chamber, which had assembled on the 23rd of January, voted the payment of its members ten days later. It was immediately dissolved by the king.

59. No tax can be imposed or collected, if it has not been previously voted by the House of Representatives and sanctioned by the king. 60. The House of Representatives votes annually the limitation of the military and naval forces, the conscription for the army and navy, and the budget, and it revises the expenditure of the preceding year. The budget must be brought before the House during the first two months of each session. The examination is made by a special committee, and it is voted as a whole. 61. No pension or recompense can be issued from the Treasury without a law. 62. A representative cannot be prosecuted or questioned on account of any opinion or vote given in the exercise of his duty as a representative. 63. A representative cannot be prosecuted, arrested, nor imprisoned during the session of the House, except in case of seizure in the criminal act. Personal detention cannot be exercised against a representative during the session, four weeks previous to its commencement, nor three weeks after its termination. If a representative be in prison, he must be released four weeks before the commencement of the session.

The following articles, on the composition of the Chamber, when compared with our English system of representation, do not in every respect leave the balance in our favour.

66. The House of Representatives is composed of deputies chosen by the citizens having the right to elect, by direct, universal, and secret suffrage, the votes being given by ballot, according to the provisions of the law of election passed by the Assembly, which can only be altered in its other provisions. 67. The deputies represent the nation, and not the eparchy by which they are chosen. 68. The number of deputies from each eparchy is determined in proportion to the population. In no case can the whole number of representatives be less than 150. 69. The representatives are elected for four years. 70. To be elected a

representative, it is necessary to be a Greek citizen of the eparchy, or to have been domiciled and possessed of political and civil rights for two years in the eparchy where the election is made; to have completed thirty years of age; and also to possess the qualifications required by the law of election. 71. The duties of representatives are incompatible with those of paid officials and demarchs, but not with those of officers of the army or navy not in active service. Officers may be elected, but when elected they are placed on half-pay during the whole representative period, and remain so until recalled into active service. Leave of absence must be granted on demand five months and a half before the commencement of the elections.

The number of deputies is now 207; the number of electors, about 450,000. Deputies receive 2,000 drs. for the session, and 1,500 drs. for each extra session.

Parliamentary government has answered, on the whole, fairly well in Greece. The Chamber of Representatives has served as a safety-valve to an excitable people, peculiarly fond of discussion, hot in contention even when not factious in conduct. No doubt there have been scenes of violence and illegality, unconstitutional enterprises, and even acts tending to subvert the liberties of the nation, within the Greek Chamber; but it is right to add that those incidents have not been more discreditable than similar scenes and acts in other legislatures. The Greeks have shown that they were fitted for representative self-government; just as the present king of the Greeks has shown that he is fitted to be a constitutional monarch of a free people.

The statesmen of 1863 had much to do to establish the administration of justice on a firm basis, and to remove the stigma which had been cast on the entire judicial system by its frequent violation under King Otho. A dozen articles of the Constitution regulate

the appointment, the general immovability, the powers and the privileges of the judges. Thus:—

86. Public prosecutors, their substitutes, and justices of the peace have not the right of appointment for life. 87. Judicial commissions and extraordinary courts of judicature cannot be established under any pretext. 88. The sittings of courts of law are public, except when publicity would be injurious to good morals or public order, but in such cases the courts are bound to publish a decision to that effect. 89. Every sentence must be founded on reasons assigned, and announced at a public sitting. 90. Trial by jury is maintained. 91. Political crimes are judged by juries, as well as those relating to the press, as often as they do not relate to private life. 92. Judges can accept no salaried employment except that of Professor of the University.

Greece is divided, for administrative purposes, into sixteen nomarchies (under officers whose duties correspond to those of French *préfets*); into seventy eparchies (under eparchs, or *sous-préfets*); and into 440 demarchies (under demarchs, or mayors). The nomarchs and eparchs are appointed by the Government of the day; whilst the demarchs are elected by the people. The nomarchies are governed by municipal councillors, elected on the spot by universal suffrage, in whom resides the power of levying the local rates. The nomarchs have no control over this latter function; but the accounts require to be audited by Government officials, as in the case of local expenditures in England. The constitution of the eparchies is of a similar kind; and the popular representatives meet annually, like the French municipal councils, in local parliament.

The sixteen nomarchies, or departments, of Greece are as follows:—On the Continent, Attica-Bœotia, Eubœa, Phthiotis-Phocis, Acarnania-Ætolia; Larissa,

Trikhala, Arta ; in the Morea (Peloponnese), Achaia-Elis, Arcadia, Laconia, Messenia, Argolis-Corinth ; in the Archipelago, the Cyclades ; in the Ionian Islands, Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante.

The Ministry of Greece comprises the departments of the Interior (Public Works, Post and Telegraphs, Roads, Police, &c.), Instruction and Religion, Justice, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Army, and Navy. The holder of any one of the several portfolios may occupy the position of President of the Cabinet.

The profession of politics, like every other, is an open career ; and not only are the Greeks naturally inclined to the methods of parliamentary government, and disposed by their training and traditions to throw themselves with fervour into the business of debate and intrigue, but the circumstances of the country render the competition for every political office exceedingly keen. The ministers in power are constantly besieged by a host of qualified candidates ; and it is needless to add that some of the worst evils of competition are experienced as the result of this plethora of politicians. The crowds of able men, all anxious to serve their country and themselves, are like a swarm of bees crowding round a hive which is too small for them. If the hive could be enlarged, every bee would find its cell, and apply itself to a profitable work. Failing that, they will crowd upon each other, impede each other's industry, and prevent the achievement of any valuable result.

It is useless, in the existing state of things, to expect that this severe rivalry, with all its injurious consequences, can be brought to an end. There is an honourable understanding in Greece that the rights of citizenship extend, practically if not

legally, wherever the Hellenic race exists. Epirotes, Macedonians, Cretans, are all good subjects of King George when they come to Athens, and the right of all is admitted to take their share in the service of their country. Attempts have been made to overcome, or at least to check, the disadvantages of excessive competition, but hitherto with little success. The ministerial crisis of 1875, which created an intense excitement throughout the country, and which at one time even threatened to develop into a revolution, turned specially on this point. The Constitution was menaced by the conflicts of leaders who, more or less unblushingly, admitted that they derived their strength from place-holders and place-seekers, and who, having risen to power by corruption, endeavoured to fortify themselves by illegality. Public opinion expressed itself boldly and sternly. The eyes of the nation had been opened to the worst abuses of a system which was sapping the morality of the State; and, after a short but severe struggle, the honour of the country was vindicated, and the Constitution was solemnly ratified.

Unfortunately, the evils in question have recurred more than once. The swarms of place-hunters still exist; Greece is no better able than before to find work for the vast overflow of talent which clamours for employment. There is only one way in which she can be delivered from this, as from most of her other troubles. Until the Greeks are in possession of a field ample enough to occupy the capacities and energies of the whole race, it is impossible that they should rise to the highest level of national life.

CHAPTER XI

GREECE UNDER KING GEORGE

Progress towards Self-government—Universal Suffrage—Abolition of the Senate—The development of Commerce in Greece—The Cretan Insurrection, 1866-9—The Russo-Turkish War—Assertion of the Greek Claims—British Constraint of Greece, 1877-8.

AFTER the accession of King George, the Greeks made more satisfactory progress in the direction of self-government, and in the quality on which all worthy self-government of necessity rests—popular self-control. They had already shown themselves to be, at the least, a superior race, with high traditions and ambitious hopes, not merely intelligent but also zealous for education and apt for culture and polish. To such a people a written constitution was surely most appropriate; they were familiar with the ideas of a reasoned liberty; they were a “nomarchic” race, entirely ready to set themselves a rule of public life, and, on the whole, to obey it.

Two facts, no doubt, were ominous of trouble in the future. It remained to be seen how this young plant of Hellenic nationality, saturated by the sap of social freedom, would thrive in a soil inadequate for its widely spreading roots. And it was patent to

everybody (or should have been patent) that the national duty inherent in the reconstitution of Greece, stimulated by the constant appeal of unredeemed Hellas, precluded the normal calm and the financial regularity of an ordered State.

The abolition of the Senate by the Provisional Government of 1862, coupled with universal suffrage, has been held accountable for many of the troubles of Greece. These troubles are sufficiently accounted for by the facts which have just been mentioned; yet it is quite conceivable that a second Chamber, under a written constitution, might have endowed the country with a greater measure of deliberation and prudence.

The suppression of the Senate and the Council of State left the Government of Greece to the Representative Chamber and to the king. The powers of the monarch are very considerable, although his authority is strictly limited (as was proved in the political crisis terminated in 1875) by the authority of the Boule, emanating directly from the people. According to the charter of 1864, the king is personally irresponsible, though his ministers are responsible; he appoints and dismisses these ministers, as well as officers of the army and navy, and all public officials; he sanctions and proclaims the laws; he can prorogue or "suspend the continuance of" a legislative session; he has the right of pardon and amnesty, of conferring decorations and coining money. His civil list is fixed at 1,125,000 drachmas (£40,179), including the sum appropriated from the revenues of the Ionian Islands; in addition to which the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia contribute a sum

of £4,000 each for the endowment of the dynasty which they created.

We may defer to a future chapter any consideration of the finances of Greece; but this is perhaps a convenient point at which to estimate the development of industry and commerce during the first four decades of her existence as a kingdom. It is all-important to know how far this new kingdom, set up by the Powers as a pioneer of emancipation in the south-east, as the first-fruits of the principle of nationalities, and as (in some measure) a concession to poets and scholars, had justified its creation by practical and positive results. For it is only by such results that our New Greece of the nineteenth century can hope to live and thrive.

The great hope of Greece, whether cramped within her existing boundaries or extended so as to include Crete, Janina, and Thessalonika, will always rest in the enterprise and energy of her people. The Greeks are remarkable for both these qualities, and the resources of the country itself are practically inexhaustible. What Greece needs is the capital wherewith to develop and circulate more widely the natural products of a wealthy land. The ancient Greeks distinguished themselves, even before the Christian era, by their agricultural industry and by their commerce. In almost every age we find traces of the activity of Greek merchants, of their thrift and perseverance, of their skill and prosperity, wherever the great markets of the world were open to them. Their commercial aptitude has continued to be one of the characteristic features of the race; and the success which has crowned their efforts is attested in all the important centres of industry.

The Turks, from their first raid on the Morea in 1346, gradually destroyed the indigenous traffic of the country; and the subsequent occupation drove the people into the mountains, ravaged the coasts, and paralysed the maritime trade. But, whether at home or abroad, the commercial aptitude survived. It secured wealth and consideration for the Greeks under the sway of their conquerors, and it even preserved a comparative independence in certain districts and prosperous islands, which were able to pay for their immunity with a tribute of food or gold.

The configuration of Greece is marked by numerous mountain chains, which break up the surface into a thousand valleys. Thus a large area is not susceptible of cultivation; but, fortunately, the country is excellently watered, and the basins of the streams are fertile in a high degree. The diversity of hill and plain, plateau and luxuriant slope, whilst it contributes largely to the picturesque character of the scenery, accounts for the remarkable variety of the agricultural products. The plains of Greece feed a great number of cattle, sheep, and goats, whilst the bees are probably as productive to-day as they were at any previous time. The corn and olives of Attica, Phthiotis, Acarnania, the gardens and vineyards of the Eurotas and of Laconia, the plantations of Corinth, Achaia, Elis, the cornfields of Thessaly, the vines and fruit-trees of the Southern Morea, the citrons and olives of Methana, the dense forests of Acarnania, of Ceta, of Taygetus, of Eubœa, the inexhaustible products of the soil both on and beneath the surface, bear witness to the

fertility of a land whose capabilities have never yet been fairly gauged.

With so lavish a provision of Nature, and with such an unstinted supply of raw materials, an industrious people may do much, by commerce and manufacture, to establish their national prosperity on a firm basis. And accordingly we shall find that the Greeks, in addition to the mere exportation of natural products, such as olive oil, currants, citrons, and the like, have already created a number of manufacturing industries, which will doubtless receive a notable development in proportion as the available capital of the country increases. The making of wine and other liquors, oil, silk and cotton goods, glass and pottery, is carried on in various parts of the mainland and the islands, and employs machinery to a considerable extent, many of the machines being themselves constructed in Greece. The mineral resources of the country are by no means slight, and it is certain that a rich reward awaits the explorer who, with capital and enterprise, will seek the hidden wealth where it is likely to be found. With such natural advantages, aided by the commercial and maritime aptitudes of the nation, we may certainly expect to find in Greece a normal increase of trade and prosperity; and the expectation will not be disappointed. Let us test the results by a series of comparisons.

The industrial condition of Greece in 1833, previous to the arrival of King Otho, may be appreciated from the remarks of Thiersch, who had been the Prince's tutor, and who preceded him to Greece in order to form an estimate of

the actual state of the country. Thus he declared that, even as regarded the necessary enterprise (though there were plenty of Greek capitalists anxious to spend their money on the advancement of their fatherland) and labour (though there were thousands of men accustomed to labour, and willing to return to it) everything was unprepared —“almost everything remains to be accomplished.” “The trades of the weaver, the cloth manufacturer, the fuller, are barely exercised in this country; and so with the trades of the tanner and the leather-dresser. Skins, finding no workmen to dress them, are nearly without exception exported, and that at a low price. . . . The country draws everything from abroad; its linen, its leather, its iron, including locks, nails, knives, and boilers, its arms, its furniture, and its glass.”

The list might easily be extended; and the condition of affairs was not much improved after six years of Bavarian rule. In 1839 the value of the imports of manufactured goods, including glass, silk, wool, cotton, straw, wood, linen, leather, bone, iron, and other miscellaneous articles, amounted to over 7,000,000 drs., whilst the exports of similar articles during the same period may be estimated at less than 250,000 drs.

The total value of Greek exports and imports for the eight years 1833 to 1840 inclusive, in drachmas, was as follows:—

IMPORTS. drs.				EXPORTS. drs.
1833—12,267,773	...	...	...	5,534,219
1834—16,438,363	...	...	...	6,772,110
1835—16,179,145	...	...	...	9,779,900
1836—15,905,389	...	...	...	12,803,222

IMPORTS.				EXPORTS.			
drs.				drs.			
1837—18,374,617	...	...	...	7,522,307			
1838—21,751,283	...	...	...	6,739,770			
1839—18,599,167	...	...	...	7,330,438			
1840—20,270,004	...	...	...	8,748,477			

The advance, it will be observed, was by no means continuous in either respect; and whilst the values of the imports point to increasing means at the command of the Greeks, the figures relating to the exports certainly do not attest much increase of industrial effort. Later, in 1845, a French observer, M. Lecomte, found it worth while to remark on the fact that there were a few ship-building yards, a few small manufactories of gauze, hats, leather, soap, rope, and silk, all relying upon hand labour; whilst one or two other factories had failed for want of prolonged enterprise.

A quarter of a century later, in 1869, M. Burnouf wrote that Greece was still selling her raw materials, and buying them back in a manufactured form.

Now let us take the contrast to this dreary picture—a contrast of ten years against five-and-thirty—which affords one of the most significant proofs of the remarkable progress made by Greece after securing a settled government.

“In the Piræus alone,” says M. Moraïtinis,* “a town of 18,000 inhabitants, which fifty years ago was a mere deserted plain, rendered ugly by three wretched cottages, and which, ten years ago”—that is to say, in 1868—“did not possess a single manufactory, contains at the present time (1877) more than thirty steam factories: six cotton mills, one silk-weaving

* *La Grèce Telle qu'Elle est*, p. 296.

establishment, three forges, two good factories for machines and agricultural implements, one for pottery, one for glass, one for nails, eight steam mills, two manufactories of tissues, and several of furniture. . . . Moreover, industrial progress is manifest also in the provinces, so that the aggregate industry of the country shows us at the present day 112 important steam factories, most of them established within the space of ten years; more than 300 factories similar in their character to steam factories, and more than 400 other establishments; wherein there work about 24,300 artisans, and which turn out annual products of the value of about 166,000,000 drachmas" (say £5,925,000).

Few countries could show a more remarkable increase in the rate of progress during an equally brief period. The causes of this encouraging movement were, no doubt, many and various, and it might be impossible to enumerate them all. Amongst them were the same causes which operated generally throughout Europe in stimulating trade, during the first few years of the period in question; the stimulus felt by Greece after the close of the Cretan war, and the great increase of her shipping trade in the Mediterranean during the temporary paralysis of the French trade—perhaps we might also say, of the Austrian and Italian trades; the fillip given to Greek industry by Mr. Gladstone's enlightened commercial policy, which caused the trade in Greek wines to spring into sudden importance; and the more energetic encouragement of trade by the Government, which acted, after the suppression of brigandage, as though an oppressive weight had suddenly been lifted from its shoulders.

The reports of Mr. Wyndham, who was Secretary of the British Legation at Athens in 1876, supply us with particulars as to the volume and direction of Greek trade with foreign countries in 1872 and 1873; and these figures are especially satisfactory to Englishmen, since they indicate the extent of the trade carried on at that time between Greece and our own country. The total value of the import and export trade with England in 1872 was 57,289,120 drs. (£2,046,040), or 37 per cent. of the whole trade of Greece. The value in 1873 was 65,709,716 drs., an increase of more than £300,000, amounting to 41 per cent. of the whole trade. The corresponding values for the under-mentioned countries were as follows:—

				drs.	£
1872.	Turkey	...	...	21,893,501	= 781,911
	„ Austria	...	...	21,627,502	= 772,411
	„ France	...	...	18,211,872	= 650,424
	„ Russia	...	...	17,455,765	= 623,420
	„ Italy	...	...	8,588,211	= 306,722
1873.	Austria	...	...	21,390,928	= 763,962
	„ Turkey	...	...	20,622,132	= 736,505
	„ France	...	...	15,755,257	= 562,688
	„ Russia	...	...	13,749,576	= 491,056
	„ Italy	...	...	9,572,135	= 341,862

The six countries absorbed 93 per cent. of the foreign trade of Greece.

“During 1872 and 1873 the largest quantity of imports were from England. They represented in 1872 the value of 25,664,068 drs. (£916,574), constituting 26 per cent. of all imports, and in 1873, 28,468,875 drs. (£1,016,746), or 31 per cent. of the total. The principal imports from England were, in 1872:—Tissues—cotton, £290,245; woollen, £53,036;

cotton and woollen, £37,529 ; linen, £21,459 ; other, £19,360 ; coal, £93,220 ; raw hides, £91,269 ; cotton yarn, £56,046 ; sugar, £41,764 ; salt provisions, £25,462 ; liquors, £20,859 ; coffee, £20,215 ; unwrought iron, £13,928 ; wrought iron, £11,045. In 1873 :—Tissues—cotton, £305,602 ; woollen, £37,286 ; cotton and woollen, £30,644 ; linen, £16,341 ; other, £33,992 ; coal, £124,911 ; raw hides, £113,904 ; cotton yarn, £51,067 ; sugar, £41,962 ; salt provisions, £24,512 ; liquors, £19,989 ; coffee, £22,038 ; unwrought iron, £20,478 ; wrought iron, £10,989." *

In regard to the exports of Greece for the same years, Great Britain took no less than 57 per cent. of the total in 1872, and a greater proportion in 1873—the values being respectively £1,129,466 and £1,330,030. The principal items were as follows :—

				1872. £	1873. £
Currants	...	...	...	830,204	1,065,890
Lead	...	...	...	183,429	179,636
Emery Powder	...	...	...	23,598	13,809
Valonea	...	...	...	20,050	6,294
Olive Oil	...	...	...	13,801	33,846
Tobacco	...	...	...	41,376	8,812

A comparison of the exports and imports in 1873 with those of thirty years before shows that the total value had become six times as great. Again, whilst in 1845 the imports were twice as valuable as the exports, in 1873 they were in a proportion of less than three to two. The gradual increase in each respect may be estimated from the following figures :—

* *Parliamentary Papers.* Report January 19, 1876.

				IMPORTS. drs.	EXPORTS. drs.
1845	...	...	...	22,000,000	11,000,000
1862	...	...	...	49,109,666	32,323,426
1865	...	...	...	90,251,389	51,671,719
1870	...	...	...	97,021,085	52,908,429
1871	...	...	...	108,536,576	76,382,701
1872	...	...	...	128,131,725	67,378,524
1873	...	...	...	117,642,163	76,858,333

These figures refer to the general commerce of Greece. The special commerce, comprising the exported produce of the country and the imports consumed within it, may be reckoned approximately at 80 per cent. of the general. Thus in 1873 the special imports were valued at 92,187,500 drs., and the special exports at 64,482,756 drs.

Satisfactory as this commercial development must be considered, it would no doubt have attained greater proportions if the country had not been constantly preoccupied by its sympathy with the Greek subjects of the Porte. Within a dozen years of the accession of King George, Greece found herself on two notable occasions involved in serious difficulty and heavy expenditure by a championship which she had been taught to regard as almost a condition of her national existence. The first of these occasions was the Cretan insurrection of 1866-9.* The aid rendered

* For a comprehensive statement of the Cretan aspect of the Greek question, see *Papers of the Greek Committee*, New Series, No. 1 (1897). The insurrection of 1896, which led up to the war between Greece and Turkey in the following year, was the ninth distinct rising of the Cretans since 1821, and of the previous eight that of 1866-9 was in many respects the most important. In all of them, as is shown by the pamphlet above mentioned, the Cretans have demanded their union with Greece, and have looked to her for aid and protection. "Not only are the Greeks of the mainland their own flesh and blood, inseparable from them in nationality, religion, and aspirations; not only have their struggles and

by Greece to her struggling children in this heroic and long-suffering island was so efficient, and it added so largely to the difficulties of the Porte, that Britain and France thought it their duty to intervene. Pressure was brought to bear upon the Government of King George, and Greece was compelled to play a humble part before Turkey. The Conference of the Western Powers at Paris, in January, 1869, renewed that over-cautious restraint of Greece which has been a characteristic feature of European—and especially of British—policy for nearly fifty years.

But before the Conference at Paris, before the crisis of the insurrection, Great Britain had done enough to show that she had already resigned her claim to be considered the special champion of Greece. No pen can be impartial which does not condemn the encouragement given to Turkish tyranny by the Administration of 1866-8, and especially by the notorious dispatch of its Foreign Secretary, which forbade the captains of British vessels to remove the Cretan women and children from the fury of the Turks.*

sufferings been endured in common; but the supine, and indeed hurtful, intervention of the Powers in Cretan affairs has tended all the more effectually to throw the Cretans into the arms of Greece. Moreover, in each successive insurrection, Greece has borne the burden of the consequent disquietude and expense. Tens of thousands of women, children, and helpless old men who on each outbreak fled before the indescribable barbarities of the Turks found refuge and relief in Greece. During the great insurrection of 1866-9 no fewer than 50,000 such refugees were maintained at the public cost and by private contributions in Greece. On all these grounds it is inevitable, as it is rational, that the Cretans should in critical contingencies seek advice and guidance at Athens."

* See the Blue Book, *Correspondence respecting the Disturbances in Crete*, 1866, 1867, No. 158. In the following passage the italics merely indicate the amazement which must be felt by every reader of

Russia, be it observed, refused to take part in this new subordination of Greek to Turkish interests. She had not come to love Greece more, but she loved Turkey less than ever. She did not want to make Greece a strong Power, but she had apparently sickened of the farce of sacrificing the new kingdom to the empire which she wished to destroy. Every enemy of Turkey was, at least to that extent, a friend of Russia; and the diplomacy of St. Petersburg aimed more and more at competing with Britain for the supremacy at Athens. If the Western Powers had given Greece a king, Russia had given her a queen.* If Britain had ceded the Ionian Islands, Russia held out hopes that she would go beyond her rival in generosity, and obtain for the Greeks a more extended northern frontier. Against the liberality


this inexplicable document; and they are the only comment which is needed. "Lord Stanley has received despatches from Greece which clearly show that the proceedings of H.M.S. *Assurance*, in taking off from Crete a certain number of refugees, has been regarded in Greece, not in the light of a simple act of humanity, irrespective of political considerations, but as an indication on the part of Her Majesty's Government that they sympathise with the cause of the insurgents, and Lord Stanley cannot doubt but that the same construction would be put on any similar proceedings on the part of Her Majesty's ships of war, especially if taking place in consequence of express orders to that effect sent out from this country. Lord Stanley fears that the effect of any such step would be to hold out false hopes of assistance to the insurgents, and thereby in the end to create far more suffering by the protracting of the war than that which might be averted at the moment by the removal of these destitute persons. Her Majesty's Government deeply lament the further ruin and misery in which a prolongation of the struggle cannot fail to involve the Christians in Crete; but *it is their duty not to expose themselves to misconstruction, and not, by an appearance of intervention, the moral effect of which might be very great, to depart from the position of strict neutrality which they have thought it their duty to assume.*"

* It was in October, 1867, that King George married the Grand Duchess Olga, at St. Petersburg.

and freedom of Britain, which in general enlisted the admiration of Greece, Russia was able to set the ties of a common religion. But the rivalry was one in which superiority of force was more persuasive than mere promises. Russia had promised in 1853 what she had not been able to perform; and, as a matter of fact, the prestige gained by Britain in the Crimean War was proof against all the approaches and blandishments of Russia—at all events up to the year 1878. An influence which could survive Lord Stanley's despatch could survive anything; and thus it happened that the British Government was able, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, to restrain Greece from action, and, once again, to retard her natural development.

A special significance attaches to the behaviour of Greece during the Russian invasion of Turkey, and to the action of the British Foreign Office in intervening between the Porte and the Government of Athens. The relations of the three countries at this juncture may be looked upon as an epitome of their relations from the first establishment of New Greece.

In June, 1877, before the Russian army had crossed the Danube, the Porte saw reason to fear that Greece would cast in her lot with Russia. A change of Ministry had occurred at Athens, and the new Cabinet was virtually pledged to war. Every one supposed that the Greeks would attack Turkey; but, as time passed by, and as the King's army did not move across the frontier, it became evident that the influence of Britain was being used on behalf of the Porte. On the 9th of June our representative at



KASTAKI (THESSALIAN FRONTIER).

[*To face p. 272.*]

Athens had an interview with the Greek Foreign Minister, M. Tricoupis, in which, at the instance of Mr. Layard, he invited an explanation of the intentions of Greece. M. Tricoupis at once expressed himself in frank and intelligible terms. He stated that Greece was prepared to observe a strict neutrality, "provided no unforeseen incident should force her to assume a different attitude";* but, at the same time,

"He did not consider that the Hellenic Government was bound to go out of its way to prevent the outbreak of insurrectionary movements amongst the Hellenic subjects of Turkey, should it believe that such movements would conduce to the ultimate or to the general interests of Hellenism. The Hellenic Government would, nevertheless, be prepared to exert all its influence with that object, and to be entirely guided by the advice of Her Majesty's Government in that and in all other matters of its foreign policy, if it could obtain authority from Her Majesty's Government to assure the Hellenic populations that their interests would not suffer, at the conclusion of peace, in consequence of their having now abstained from resorting to insurrection. To put the case in a few words, M. Tricoupi undertakes to go beyond the international duties which can strictly be required of Greece, and to endeavour to prevent outbreaks in the neighbouring provinces, upon condition of obtaining a promise from Great Britain that when the time comes for entering upon negotiations for peace, over which Her Majesty's Government may be expected to exercise considerable control, it will be considered *that there is an Hellenic question before Europe*, no less than if such an Hellenic question had been raised by the actual insurrection of all the Hellenic provinces."

This was perfectly explicit. The Greek Government proposed a bargain to the British Government

* Mr. Stuart to the Earl of Derby, June 9, 1877. *Correspondence respecting the Relations between Turkey and Greece* (Turkey, No. 19, 1878).

—neutrality for the moment in return for British advocacy of the Hellenic claims when the war was concluded. M. Tricoupis was as precise as it was possible for him to be in defining the advocacy which was desired. He asked for an undertaking that Britain would “secure for the Hellenic race a position of equality with their Slavonic neighbours”; and he went on to declare that, without such a pledge, the position of Greece would be, perhaps, more difficult than that of any other nation affected by the war.

“Independently of the aspirations of her people for an accession of provinces which they deem to be their rightful inheritance, she could not submit inactively to the increased degradation and suffering to which the population of those provinces would be subjected, if they should be abandoned to their fate, whilst the Slav provinces obtained special privileges, or were placed under the special protection of the European Powers. An Hellenic question will then certainly arise, unless Her Majesty’s Government will admit *that it already exists*, and that, in the settlement of other collateral questions, it will not be ignored.”

What was the answer of the British Government to this appeal? It could hardly be other than favourable. Greece offered to leave Turkey alone, when she might have caused her most serious embarrassment, on the sole condition that Britain would not permit the Slavs to profit at the expense of, or to the exclusion of, the Greeks. In other words, Britain should secure what she desired, on condition that she would thereafter do what it was her special interest to do. That is how the matter stood, in point of fact. But it was contended that Britain could not undertake beforehand to advocate “an Hellenic question” without admitting that Turkey must be weakened in order to strengthen

Greece—which she was not prepared to admit. And, in effect, Lord Derby replied to M. Tricoupis' proposals in this sense.

“ Her Majesty's Government,” he wrote,* “ are not prepared to give any assurances in relation to events which might occur in case of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire in Europe. It would, in their opinion, be both improper and premature to contemplate such a contingency as the partition of the country now under Turkish rule. They are, however, ready to assure the Greek Government that, so far as may lie in their power, they will, when the time comes for the consideration of the settlement of the questions arising out of the war, be ready to use their best influence to secure for the Greek population in the Turkish provinces any administrative reforms or advantages which may be conferred upon the Christian population of any other race.” And at the same time the Greek Government were “ counselled ” not to “ raise insurrectionary movements ” in the Turkish provinces, which could “ only serve to increase the misery and devastation of the war, and injure the population whose interests the Greek Government desired to secure.”

So much for the pledge and the prophecy of July. In August the Russians had occupied the Shipka Pass ; and Greece once more showed signs of an intention to strike a blow at Turkey. The Porte did not hesitate to appeal to Britain for the assistance which it had good reason to expect. On the 21st of August Server Pasha telegraphed to Musurus Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador in London, in the following terms :—

“ You are aware that the military preparations in Greece are being carried on with ever-increasing activity. Although the Cabinet of Athens does not cease to endeavour to reassure us on this point, yet the action of the revolutionary committees and the language of the Greek newspapers become daily more pronounced.

* Lord Derby to Mr. Stuart, July 2, 1877.

The Government is urged on to war by the Press ; the nation is being called to arms ; and to say nothing of the volunteers who, contrary to the Greek laws, are recruited from among our populations, paid emissaries are circulating through our frontier provinces in order to organise a rising there. It is also the aim of Greece to excite the feelings of Europe ; witness the representation she has made to the Powers on the pretext of the insignificant incident which occurred at Kavarna. This state of affairs causes deep and unceasing anxiety to the Imperial Government, and obliges me to call to it the serious attention of the Guaranteeing Powers of Greece. I have to request you, therefore, to speak on this subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, *who will not fail, I am sure, to exercise a salutary influence over the Cabinet of Athens.*"

After some little hesitation, Lord Derby did as he was requested. On the 3rd of September he wrote to Mr. Wyndham, at Athens, instructing him "to ask the Greek Government if they will authorise Her Majesty's Government to give assurances in their name to the Porte that they will not attack Turkey, or connive at attempts to stir up insurrection in the Greek provinces." The Greek Government gave a qualified pledge in this sense, whilst carefully limiting their engagements to the "present" time, and flatly declining to "discourage" the insurrections in Thessaly and Epirus. The Porte was obliged to be content with this assurance. It expressed its "most sincere thanks" to Lord Derby ; but the Greek Cabinet very naturally considered the intervention "as an unfriendly act on the part of Her Majesty's Government."

Most Englishmen, in all probability, consider that the act was something more than unfriendly. It is very difficult to admit the justice of this step on the part of the British Cabinet ; but at any rate it cannot be denied that Lord Derby and his colleagues, by acting as they had done, had contracted a most grave

and pressing responsibility, which could only be discharged by a warm and persistent advocacy of the Hellenic claims on the conclusion of the war.

M. Tricoupis seems to have taken up, throughout this remarkable correspondence, a judicious and unassailable position. It is humiliating for Englishmen to find a Greek Minister placing this country so thoroughly in the wrong as M. Tricoupis does, for instance, in a dispatch addressed, on the 11th of September, to Mr. Gennadius, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in London.

"The Porte," he says, "should herself endeavour to find the means to avert the dangers that her position towards Hellenism in Turkey creates for her, and should not appeal to Greece. A conscientious study of the causes of the present state of affairs will convince the Porte that it depends upon itself effectually to remedy the evil, the responsibility for which it unjustly tries to throw on another. As regards Greece, in her relations with her fellow-countrymen in Turkey, she is very careful to respect her international obligations towards the Porte, but beyond this she takes as guide the interests of Hellenism only. It was for the sake of these interests that she was created an independent State. She appreciates too highly the mission which the Great Powers of Europe have entrusted to her in the East to give up the exercise of the rights and the fulfilment of the obligations which that mission imposes on her. That crises like the present were possible in the East was not unforeseen by the diplomatists and statesmen who, assembled in a Conference, were called upon in the year 1832 to answer the demands by which the Porte tried to fetter Greece, even then; and now that these predictions have been fulfilled, Greece will not deviate from the path of duty traced for her by the London Conference."

As the Russian invasion of Turkey progressed, the anxiety of the Greek Government naturally increased. M. Tricoupis expressed, with complete frankness, the fear of himself and his colleagues lest

the abstention of the country from hostilities should leave it with a weaker claim on the Great Powers than the States which had made common cause with Russia. The Greek nation continually urged its Ministers to declare war, and to send an army across the frontier; but the Cabinet listened a dozen times to the insistence of Great Britain. Thus, on the 9th of November, Mr. Wyndham reminded M. Tricoupis of "the advice Her Majesty's Government had repeatedly given, that Greece should maintain a strictly neutral and pacific attitude," and told him that "the Greek Government could hardly turn to England for protection if they involved their country in a war with Turkey in spite of the advice of Her Majesty's Government." * Both the counsel and the threats were reiterated on many distinct occasions, especially at the instance of the Porte, through Musurus Pasha or Mr. Layard. M. Tricoupis and his colleagues showed every disposition to conform themselves to the advice of the British Government, "as being the Government of a Power to whom Greece turned more than to any other for protection and advice." †

On the receipt of a rumour at Athens, towards the middle of December, to the effect that Russia was offering terms of peace to Turkey which conflicted with Greek interests in the southern provinces of the Empire, M. Tricoupis complained to Mr. Wyndham "that it appeared as if Hellenic interests were to be completely neglected"; and he declared his opinion "that even if a Greek force invaded Thessaly

* Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby, November 10, 1877. The language was "approved" by Lord Derby in the usual manner.

† The same to the same, December 2nd.

and Epirus, and was beaten, Greece would be better off than if she continued to maintain a pacific attitude." And further, he "spoke with much bitterness of the policy of England, and of the advice which she had given to Greece to maintain a pacific attitude." *

The Greek army did, in effect, cross the Turkish frontier in the first week in February, 1878; but the Government recalled it immediately, at the urgent request of the Powers. M. Delyannis (M. Tricoupis' successor) accompanied this act by a Circular Note, dated February 7th, which merits attention.

"The Government," wrote M. Delyannis, "has just given orders to the Commander-in-Chief of its troops to recross the frontier, as it counts with perfect confidence on the promise of the Great Powers . . . to take care that the national aspirations and interests of 'the Greek populations in Turkey' shall become the object of the deliberations of the approaching Congress, and is firmly convinced that the Powers, in their sense of equity and impartiality, will regard as a just complement and natural fulfilment of their promise concerning the national aspirations of the Greeks of Turkey, the special representation of these aspirations in the Congress itself. . . . This step, which is an evident proof of the readiness of the Government to follow the counsels of the Great Powers, gives us also the right to hope that our demand for the representation of Greek aspirations in the approaching Congress will be kindly acceded to by the Great Powers."

If the Hellenic Government at any time "entirely mistook the views of Europe," as Lord Beaconsfield afterwards declared, surely they did so at this moment; and it was now that they ought to have been solemnly warned of the fact. It was perfectly well understood what was meant by "the national aspirations and interests" of the Porte's Greek

* Mr. Wyndham to the Earl of Derby, December 13, 1877.

subjects; and the Ministers of King George ought not to have been allowed, in so vital a matter, to labour under such a fatal mistake.

On the day preceding that on which the Circular Note was despatched, Mr. Wyndham had communicated to M. Delyannis an intimation, received by him from Lord Derby, on which we are justified in assuming that the Note of the Greek Government was intended to rest:—

“ While instructing me to join in the representations made by his Excellency the Minister of France,” said Mr. Wyndham, “ Her Majesty’s Government charges me to renew the assurances contained in the despatch addressed to Mr. Stuart, dated the 2nd July last, in which Her Majesty’s Government gives the assurance that *it will do all it can*, when the time comes to consider the settlement of the questions resulting from the war, *to secure for the Greek population of the Ottoman provinces any administrative reforms or advantages which may be conceded to the Christian population of other races.*”

In these words is comprised the essence of the pledge to which the Government of Lord Beaconsfield committed itself. The language of diplomacy is naturally and necessarily vague; and the promise thus made and ratified to Greece is not remarkable for its definite character. But it is clear enough up to a certain point; and, such as it was, it insured the submission of Greece to the counsels of the British Government. It was as sacred a promise as has ever been made by one nation to another; and it ought to have been regarded as all the more binding because of the vastly superior strength of the nation which made it.

How was this pledge redeemed by the British Government? We must turn for an answer to the protocols and the secret history of the Congress of Berlin.

CHAPTER XII

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

Revision of the Treaty of San Stefano—Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury—The Claim of Greece—A good Beginning and a bad End—The Cyprus Convention—Greece Empty-handed—The Case of Crete—The Conferences of Prevesa, Constantinople, and Berlin—Partial Cession of Thessaly and Epirus.

FOR some years after the close of the Russo-Turkish War, the fortunes of Greece hung in the balance. It was not for Greece that Russia had fought and conquered, but for a race whose interests in the Balkan Peninsula were in conflict with those of the Greeks—or, if not in real and necessary conflict, at any rate in actual rivalry as a result of the Panslavonian movement. For the Slavs Russia had now exacted from Turkey a fantastic territory stretching south of the Balkans as far as Kavala on the Ægean, and westward to Albania. All Europe was startled by this new map of Bulgaria as conceived by General Ignatieff and the Grand Duke Nicholas.

Greece had reasons entirely her own for dreading to see this map sanctioned by the Powers. Much of the country over which the invader was closing his hand, in order to stamp it for ever with the imprint

of Slavonianism, was Greek by tradition, by language, and by preponderance of race. From the time when it had first been Hellenised, many centuries ago, it had been bound up with the religion and interests of Greater Greece. The population was nowhere unmixed. In the north and north-east there were desultory settlements of Slavonians; in the west the Albanians had encroached on particular districts, such as the middle reaches of the Vorousa (Aoös). But from the Gulf of Arta northwards, beyond Konitsa and Grevena, the Greek language very largely predominates;* whilst in Southern Macedonia both the language and the religion of the people proclaim their distinctly Hellenic character. In 1878 the Greeks were disposed to make a somewhat larger ethnological claim than they would perhaps make at the present moment;† and it is easy to understand the alarm with which they viewed the extravagant assertion by Russia of the Bulgarian claims.

The British Government did not forget, at any rate in the earlier stages of the Berlin Congress, the promises which they had made to Greece. At the first sitting of the plenipotentiaries in the Radzivil Palace (June, 1878), the Marquis of Salisbury gave

* See Kiepert's map of Epirus, based principally on Aravandinos.

† Passing over what may be argued from the wide dispersion of the Greek language and religion in Thrace, Asia Minor, and the islands of the Levant, with the historical argument from the condition of the Byzantine Empire at the time of the earliest Moslem invasion of Europe, and fixing our eyes on what is more clearly and immediately practical, it is certainly a most moderate and defensible statement of the Greek claim, in the event of any subdivision of Macedonia in the near future, to say that Greece is entitled to a frontier starting from Kavala, opposite to the island of Thasos, and passing through Drama, Seres, Demir-Hissar, Doiran, Gievgyeli—on the railway line from Mitrovitz to Thessalonika—Ostrovo, Monastir, Phlorina, Kastoria, Grevena, Argyrokastro, and Avlona.

notice that he should raise the question of the admission of Greek representatives. At the second meeting he proposed that delegates of the Hellenic kingdom should "at least be present at all sittings in which questions in connection with the interests of the Greek race were to be discussed"; and he made this proposal on wide and comprehensive grounds. He pointed out the general and common interests of the Porte's Christian subjects; the distinctions between the Slavs and the Hellenes, which had been intensified by the events of recent years; the natural fears of the Greeks lest their Church should be subjected, their language suppressed, and their race gradually absorbed and overwhelmed, if their rivals should gain a preponderating influence in certain provinces. "The two races," he continued, "are not on an equal footing before the Congress. The Slavs have as their defender in this room a powerful military nation, related to them by blood and by faith, strong in the prestige of its recent victories. The Greeks, on the contrary, have as their representative here no nation of the same race. Her Majesty's Government is of opinion that the decisions taken under such circumstances would not content the Greek race, and, consequently, would not promote either the tranquillity of the Ottoman Empire or the peace of Europe."*

This was an excellent beginning. The Greek Question was raised by the Marquis of Salisbury in its best and strongest form. The sincerity of Russia was directly appealed to, and an answer was given (and especially given, by anticipation, to Lord Beaconsfield himself) to all who maintained that the claims of Greece could not come fairly and fully

* Protocol 2.

before the Congress of Berlin. But this was not all that the English plenipotentiaries did for Greece, in form and in theory, and in advance of the real and practical issues. When France proposed that a representative of his Hellenic Majesty should be "admitted to give expression to the observations of Greece when the question of determining the fate of the provinces bordering on the kingdom shall be brought forward," Lord Salisbury suggested that the phrase "provinces Grecques" should be substituted for "provinces limitrophes du royaume." In other words, he wished that the Congress should turn its attention to "Greek provinces which do not border on the kingdom," and that the Greek representative should be present whenever there was question of "the provinces of Macedonia and Thrace, and of Crete."*

So far, the pledge of Britain was remembered; and, if there had been as much anxiety at the inter-Congressional meetings to promote the cause of Greece as there was apparent sincerity in the Congress itself, we cannot doubt that Greece would have been fully satisfied, whilst her further territorial ambition might have slumbered for another century. Britain went beyond any of the Powers in asserting the rights of Greece, and in defining the true position of the Hellenic race in the Eastern problem. Lord Salisbury carried Italy and Austria with him, and even Russia was willing to extend the French proposal so as to include the island of Crete. If it had not been for France, the Greek representatives would have been admitted to the meetings dealing with Eastern Roumelia. But Germany and Russia ad-

* Protocol 3.

hered substantially to the French formula, and Lord Salisbury's amendment was not carried.

After the third sitting of the Congress, the cause of the Greeks owed little more to its English advocates. A change came over the policy, or at least over the attitude, of our two representatives before the claims of Greece were actually taken into consideration. Are we to conclude that, between the 19th of June and the 5th of July, Lord Beaconsfield had signed away so much of the Sultan's territory, and had paid so dearly for Russian concessions and Austrian support, that he began to fear lest history should associate his name, as well as those of his Russian friends, with the destruction of Ottoman independence and integrity? A misgiving of this kind would account for the modification of plans, for the sudden abandonment of the Greeks, and for the apparent resolution to make Greece pay for Slavonian triumphs.

In the meantime, as Greece had been invited to give expression to its claims before the Congress, it became necessary for its representatives to formulate the desires of the nation. This was done by M. Delyannis and M. Rhangabé at the ninth sitting, held on June 29. It is impossible to read their arguments without admitting the moderation of the Greek demands. After Lord Salisbury's magniloquent address on first proposing the admission of the Hellenic delegates, the latter might have been excused if they had gone into the whole question of population, religion, and race-characteristics in Macedonia and Thrace, and proved, as they could easily have proved, that practically the whole littoral of the Ægean was the lawful inheritance of Greece. But they did

nothing of this kind. They had probably heard that M. Waddington "shrank from expanding too greatly the sphere of the Hellenic Government's observations"*; and they had still more probably been prepared for the lukewarmness of England. They had had that "dark hour unseen"; and they now came before Congress with nothing more than a demand for Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete. It is true that they were nominally limited to this demand by the terms of their admission, as settled by the French formula;† but it would not have been difficult for them to extend their argument over the whole field of their national ambitions.

M. Delyannis, after observing that Greece forms only a small portion of the Hellenic nation, and recognising that the views of Europe are not at present favourable to the realisation of the entire problem, maintained that the satisfaction of the desires of the Hellenic Government in respect of Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete "would be the fulfilment of the firm and

* Protocol 3.

† The French formula, indeed, limited the question to the two border provinces. It was the 15th Article of the San Stefano Treaty (now under discussion) which brought Crete before the plenipotentiaries. Russia alone seemed to be solicitous about the unfortunate island. The article in question stood as follows:—"The Sublime Porte undertakes scrupulously to apply in the Island of Crete the regulation put in force in 1868, paying regard to the wishes expressed by the indigenous population. An analogous ordinance adapted to the needs of the localities will be also introduced in Epirus, Thessaly, and other portions of Turkey in Europe, for which there will be a special organisation not within the purview of the present document. Special commissions, in which the indigenous element shall largely participate, shall be formed in each province to elaborate the details of the new ordinance. The result of these labours shall be submitted to the examination of the Sublime Porte, which will consult the Russian Government before putting them in execution."

persistent will * of the populations of these provinces, and would give peace and a practicable existence to the kingdom." He pointed out that the transfer of the border provinces would remove a constant source of trouble from Turkey, at the same time that it would be a natural complement of what has already been done for Greece by the Great Powers ; and he continued :—

“ As for the supreme interest which these provinces themselves possess in their annexation, it is known on all hands that, for half a century past, they have been demanding their union with Greece. . . . Only a few months ago, one of them could be pacified solely by the formal assurance of a Great Power that ‘the Hellenic cause should not be injured,’ and that this Power itself would state explicitly to the Congress that this pacification was owing to its intervention. Another province, the Island of Crete, is still in full insurrection, and, according to the latest news, much blood is being shed there. Would it not be a work of justice and humanity to satisfy the national aspirations of these countries, to fulfil their wishes so often expressed, and for the future to spare them the destruction and catastrophes to which they expose themselves in order to gain a national existence? As regards the Hellenic Kingdom, all the expressions of the national wishes of the Hellenic population of Turkey can naturally only produce profound emotion in the Hellenic Kingdom. . . . This excitement is rapidly communicated to all the inhabitants of the country, although not natives of the fighting provinces, and the whole population of the kingdom, which cannot forget what it owes to the former struggles of these disinherited brethren, nor remain impassive in view of their struggle for deliverance, rushes to join their ranks in order to assist them in re-conquering their liberty. Such a state of affairs gives rise each time to serious crises in the Hellenic Kingdom, which render the position of its Government very difficult. Unable to refuse its sympathies to the Greeks of the provinces in question, united by the bonds of history, race, and common misfortunes to free Greece ; unable to proclaim an in-

* “*Volonté ferme et tenace.*” It reminds us of the *θέλησις* of the Ionian Islands.

difference which would deprive it of the confidence of Hellenism, and would smother the just hopes which the Greeks of Turkey have always founded on free Greece, every Greek Government would be powerless to struggle against the stream."

In conclusion, M. Delyannis referred to the great pecuniary burdens imposed upon Greece by the troubles on her frontier. "It is very natural," he declared, "that the poor Hellenic Kingdom, which has more than once been saddled with the like obligations, which even now is supporting thirty thousand refugees on its soil, and is compelled to undertake preparations beyond its strength, should not only be weighed down by the burden of such expenditure, but should be crushed by it."

To this temperate and logical argument M. Rhan-gabé added some further considerations on the advance effected by the Kingdom of Greece since the proclamation of its independence, and on the difficulties experienced from its contracted area, from its ill-defined boundaries, and from the never-ceasing agitation of the frontier provinces. And he went so far as to say that an increase of territory was necessary to the very existence of the State.

Such, then, were the net demands of Greece at the Congress of Berlin. To these points the Government had reduced the Hellenic Question referred to in the diplomatic correspondence of the previous July and February. It was in connection with these claims that Great Britain stood pledged to see that "the Hellenic cause should not suffer" from the cessation of the insurrection at the urgent request of the British consuls. How did our representatives interpret the generous disposition of the British people in regard to the promises made in its name?

How did they observe, I will not say the letter, but the spirit of the pledges given by Lord Derby in 1877 and 1878 ?

At the sitting of July 5th (Protocol 13), M. Waddington developed his plan for the rectification of the Greek frontier. During the six days which had elapsed since M. Delyannis read his memorandum to the Congress, the first French plenipotentiary had been studying the question, at the desire of his colleagues ; and, in accordance with the system of intermediate deliberation which contributed so much to the attainment of a general understanding, and to the success of the general traffic whereby the fate of Turkey was decided, he had held sundry confabulations with the plenipotentiaries of the other States.*

* In the course of the debate held by the House of Commons between July 29th and August 2nd, Sir Charles Dilke recorded a chapter of the secret history of the Berlin Congress, which is as significant as anything contained in the Protocols. I should not repeat the passage here if it did not tally with information which I had myself received from a distinct and trustworthy source. "What," asked Sir Charles Dilke, "had happened between the ninth and thirteenth sitting of the Congress ? After the ninth sitting M. Waddington had been charged by his colleagues with the duty of studying the Greek proposals and formulating a resolution to be submitted to the Congress. His first resolution had been for the annexation of the whole of Thessaly and Epirus to Greece. This proposal was supported privately by Italy, and even by Austria herself. It was not opposed by Germany and Russia, yet it had to be abandoned on account of the resistance which it met with somewhere. M. Waddington then fell back on the territorial limits which are mentioned in the Protocol, but proposed a definite and settled annexation. This met with decided opposition from the English delegates ; and on the very morning of the sitting which was to decide the case of Greece M. Waddington had an anxious but fruitless interview with Lord Beaconsfield, and pointed out in how hard a position he was placed by those who had asked him to formulate a resolution on the subject of the Greek demands, and who then opposed his minimised proposal, which was in fact their own. The result of the opposition of the English delegates was the proposal of the resolution in such a form that it found no place as a resolution in the Treaty. The outcome of the transactions was the loss by England of the sympathy of the only

The result of these confabulations was that M. Waddington now formulated a meagre proposal, the offspring of his own timidity at the third meeting, and of the virtual abandonment of Greece by the British representatives. The French Minister prefaced his resolution by a clumsy attempt to draw a line of conciliation between two absolutely irreconcilable interests.

It was not the object of the Congress, M. Waddington declared, "to satisfy the extravagant aspirations of certain organs of Hellenic opinion"; but at the same time it might be a just and politic act to annex to Greece provinces which would be a source of strength for her, whilst they are now a cause of weakness to Turkey. Prince Leopold thought that "Greece could not prosper under the territorial conditions imposed upon her—above all, without the Gulfs of Arta and Volo, with the territories adjacent to them; and experience has proved the justice of that view." Greece cannot prosper within her present limits; she cannot maintain a peaceful frontier; she cannot meet the engagements incumbent on all civilised States. Therefore M. Waddington desires to point out, in a general way, and "without derogating from the sovereignty of the Porte," the final arrangement which he considers desirable.

"The authority of the High European Assembly would impart to the two Governments—Ottoman and Greek—the moral

rising Power in the East that was not Slavonian." (See also, on the same subject, the letters of "An Epirote," in the *Times*, Aug. 12, 1878.) It is sufficiently manifest that a history of the Congress of Berlin which did not include such chapters as the one here cited would be worse than useless to the historical student.

strength necessary, for the former to consent to opportune concessions, and for the latter to abstain from exaggerated pretensions (*revendications*). But, to accomplish this object, his Excellency considers it necessary, on the one hand, not to demand from the Porte impossible sacrifices ; on the other, to appeal to the moderation of Greece. The first French plenipotentiary has therefore thought it of use to trace, as a basis for negotiations, a general line, indicating, at one and the same time, to Turkey, the measure of the intentions of Europe, and to Greece, the limits beyond which she cannot be allowed to go. Such is the object of the following resolution which he had the honour to submit, in common with the first plenipotentiary of Italy, to the deliberations of the Congress :—

“‘The Congress invites the Sublime Porte to come to an understanding with Greece for a rectification of frontiers in Thessaly and Epirus, and is of opinion that this rectification might follow the Valley of the Salamvria (the ancient Peneios) on the side of the Ægean Sea, and that of the Kalamas on the side of the Ionian Sea.

“‘The Congress is confident that the interested parties will succeed in coming to an agreement. At the same time, the Powers are prepared to offer their direct mediation to the two parties.’”

Was there ever a proposal less in keeping with the arguments by which it was introduced ? The only explanation of the inconsistency between M. Waddington's reference to the difficulties of Greece and his utterly inadequate suggestion of means for their removal is this—that he had prepared his arguments to serve as the introduction for a much more liberal resolution.

These arguments certainly appear to show that the original design of the Congress, as interpreted by the French plenipotentiary after his round of confabulations, was to enforce the rectification of frontiers upon the Porte. But, if so, that idea was distinctly rejected by Lord Beaconsfield. After

Austria had adhered to the proposal, the first British plenipotentiary, with the full knowledge that Germany and Russia coincided in the scheme, gave utterance to his reservations and protests in a speech which is already famous, and which is not likely to be forgotten either in England or in Greece.

“Lord Beaconsfield wishes”—to quote the Protocol—“before the Congress decides the important question submitted to it, to offer some remarks intended to prevent a misunderstanding which might be caused by the declaration of the Greek delegates. His Excellency states that England has always used her influence (*‘insisté’*) with Greece and Turkey, with a view to the maintenance of a good understanding indispensable in her eyes to counterbalance the influence of a third race—that which by disturbing peace has led to the assembling of the Congress. At first these efforts of Great Britain were seconded on both sides. But the two countries found themselves in presence of a great difficulty, the insufficient and imperfect frontier traced in 1831. In the eyes of every competent statesman, this frontier is a danger and a disaster as well for Turkey as for Greece: its conformation is an encouragement to brigandage, and brigandage necessarily produces agitations in the adjoining provinces. When the last war commenced, and the inhabitants of the district bordering on the frontier became excited by it, England caused representations to be made to the Porte which that Power listened to favourably; but his Excellency regrets to have to add that this time it was not the same as regards Greece; the good advice of England could not prevail against the contrary opinion, and serious difficulties arose. Lord Beaconsfield, however, believes it to be his duty to add that the insurrection in Epirus and Thessaly was not fomented by the Greek Government, which, on the contrary, in conformity with the advice of Great Britain, applied itself to its repression. England, moreover, caused to be conveyed to Athens the advice not to count upon territorial aggrandisement.”

It is difficult to reconcile the statement that Greece did not listen to England in 1877 with the other statement, that the Greek Government, “in

conformity with the advice of Great Britain," did what it could to repress the insurrection. The fact is, as we have seen, that Greece, however unwillingly, yielded to British restraint, greatly to her own detriment. Was it not as part of the bargain that the British Premier was now "using his best influence," and "doing all he could," to secure liberty for the Greek provinces of Turkey?

Then followed the very curious protest of Lord Beaconsfield against the notion that Turkey was an "Etat vieilli," and was undergoing a process of partition. The word partition could not apply to the "arrangements and retrocessions" which Europe was sanctioning, and "the Greek Government was entirely mistaken as to the views of Europe." Entirely mistaken in asking for the retrocession of Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete? The terms of Greece's admission to the Congress only forbade her to trouble herself about more than these three provinces. Lord Salisbury's amendment suggested that she should plead the cause of all "the Greek provinces"—Macedonia and Thrace included. But it is not easy to believe that M. Delyannis had received no encouragement to prefer his demand; and indeed we know for a fact that M. Waddington's first suggestion had been for the simple annexation of the frontier provinces. Lord Beaconsfield continued:—

"No one could doubt as to the future of this country; States, like individuals, which have a future are in a position to be *able to wait*. But at the same time his Excellency is convinced that Greece and Turkey will proceed to a rectification of their frontiers; that a cause of disorder and trouble will thus be got rid of, and a *lasting peace* secured." Nevertheless he "would not recommend, for the attainment of this end, any measures of coercion;

in his eyes the Sultan, tried by such great misfortunes, deserved great respect and sympathy. His Excellency believes, however, that the opportunity should not be allowed to pass of expressing, in a very decided manner, the opinion that a rectification of frontier would be an act of high policy favourable to the welfare of the two countries. Lord Beaconsfield looks upon the boundary proposed by the first plenipotentiary of France as open to discussion; but, unanimity being above all things desirable, his Excellency would withdraw all objection in presence of an unanimous vote of the other Powers. The first plenipotentiary of Great Britain ended by expressing the hope, and even the conviction, that an equitable solution of the question of frontiers will be accepted by the Sultan."

So that Lord Beaconsfield regarded even the Kalamas and Salamvria line as open to discussion. He thought the very nearest natural frontier too wide for the country which he desired to protect from border troubles. Surely this moderating influence had gone far enough! Was Greece, unable to assure herself from disturbance in the passes of the Othrys, to set up a line of stones somewhere down the mountain sides, and there beat the boundaries at stipulated periods? Was this the plan for getting rid of "disorder and trouble," and securing "a lasting peace"? Lord Beaconsfield had just reminded Greece that she had a future, and he must have known what Greece herself understood her future to be. What "lasting peace" did he expect from a country which, having a future, was put off with an appetising morsel of her legitimate inheritance, and told to wait for the rest?

The objection applies to the frontier traced by M. Waddington's proposal scarcely less than to the yet narrower limits which Lord Beaconsfield would apparently have assigned. How are we to reconcile

the zeal of the Congress for a definite settlement with their conduct in throwing down a bone of contention between the Greeks and the Turks? Did they imagine that Thessaly and Epirus, which by tradition, education, prevailing language, and customs, should be treated as living and sentient organisms, might be wantonly cut in halves without a desperate and protracted struggle? Could they for a moment contemplate a lasting peace, so long as Crete should not be united with the mother country?

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that statesmanship was at fault in regard to the Hellenic difficulty; first, by sending Greece from the Congress dissatisfied, and by assigning to her narrow and inadequate frontiers, thus ensuring the renewal of the border-struggles on an early occasion, when their very aim in rectifying the frontier was to prevent these disorders; secondly, by refusing to decide between Turkey and Greece, by sending Greece cap in hand to Turkey, and by declaring at the same time (as Lord Beaconsfield declared) that the Powers would not "recommend coercive measures" against Turkey; and thirdly, by dividing Epirotes from Epirotes, and Thessalians from Thessalians.

In brief, the plenipotentiaries posed as the restorers of Turkey,* as the advocates of the Hellenic claims in their widest sense,† as the friends of humanity, as the champions of international agreements, as sticklers for the authority of the European concert. And when the time came for deeds instead of words, they left a powerful and

* "Fortifier un ancien Empire:" Lord Beaconsfield, Protocol 9.

† Lord Salisbury, Protocol 2.

determined enemy on Turkey's western frontier, absolutely certain to harass her perpetually; they snubbed Greece for "mistaking the intentions of Europe"; they took no note of Turkish atrocities in Thessaly and Epirus, as shocking in their character as those in Bulgaria; and they made light of an agreement into which they had themselves entered with Greece.

The story of the Berlin Congress, even if we confine our attention to the proceedings directly relating to Greece, would not be complete without mention of the secret agreement between Great Britain and Turkey, negotiated and concluded whilst the Congress was sitting, whereby the island of Cyprus was handed over to this country as a set-off against the Russian conquests in Asia Minor. In this instrument it was provided that,

"If Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them, shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any territories of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, England engages to associate herself with his Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return, his Imperial Majesty the Sultan promises to England to introduce necessary reform, to be agreed upon later between the two Powers, into the government, and for the protection of the Christian and other subjects of the Porte in those territories."

Now the circumstances under which our ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Layard, was securing this advantage for England, at the precise moment when Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury were discussing the general settlement at Berlin, seem, at any rate, to have a distinct bearing upon the treatment of the Greek claim by

the Congress. We have seen that on June 29th the Greek representatives unfolded their claim; on July 1st the Anglo-Turkish Convention in regard to Cyprus was signed by the Grand Vizier; on July 4th it was ratified by the Sultan, whilst on the same day, at Berlin, the Greek question was postponed for twenty-four hours; and on July 5th this question was disposed of by the limitation of the frontier previously suggested, and the reference of the whole matter to the goodwill of the Sultan.

Thus the Greeks left the Congress empty-handed, or at best with a suggestion from the Powers to the Porte that her frontier should be extended to Janina and Trikhala. There were few indeed who imagined that Turkey would of her own motion cede a single yard of territory to Greece, after ceding so much to Russians, Slavs, and Austrians; and for more than two years the suggestion remained without effect. M. Waddington's "moral strength" had not been assimilated.

So much for Thessaly and Epirus. As for Crete, the Sublime Porte engaged "scrupulously to apply the organic law of 1868, with such modifications as shall be judged equitable." A great deal depended upon the authority which was to decide what was equitable and what was not; but it was evident that many modifications would be necessary before the constitution of Crete could satisfy the Greeks in that island. In the course of the year 1878 the General Assembly in Crete forwarded a "Decree and Memorandum" to the Governments of the Christian Powers, detailing the objects of the Cretans in their last insurrection. The Assembly demanded the concession of complete autonomy,

the right of electing their own ruler, and a guarantee from the Powers; and they offered to pay a tribute of half a million piastres to the Porte. But at the same time they indicated what they considered the most just solution of the difficulty, and what was evidently the ultimate aim of their policy—the union of the country with the Kingdom of Greece. As a matter of fact hostilities continued in Crete until, by the intervention of the British consul, the Pact of Halepa was signed on October 15th.*

The effect produced upon the Porte by the expression of Europe's opinions and desires at Berlin was soon made manifest. The thirteenth sitting of the Congress was held on the 5th of July. On the 13th orders were given at Constantinople to increase the army in Thessaly by

* "In spite of its many and manifest drawbacks, the Pact of Halepa was accepted by the Cretans as a compromise, the more reliable as its preamble recorded that it was negotiated through the mediation of the British Consul, Mr. T. B. Sandwith; and this was held to be a guarantee of its faithful application. At the outset, it had certain beneficial results. Political parties were formed, in which the Mahomedan Cretans blended, irrespective of religious differences, with their Christian countrymen; and the unprecedented phenomenon of a Christian Vali (Governor-General) completing his four years' tenure of office was witnessed in the person of Photiades Pasha. But this tendency to conciliation of the conflicting elements in the island was by no means to the liking of the Porte. The presence of a Mussulman military Governor was, therefore, discovered to be necessary; and, as his grade was usually superior to that of the Vali, and the Mussulman Sub-Governor was the one official whose recommendations carried weight with the Porte, nothing was easier than to create insuperable difficulties for the Christian Vali. Thus successive Valis were compelled—often by private wire from Constantinople—to tender their resignation; while, at the same time, the Porte took care not to fulfil the financial engagements prescribed by the Pact. By these means an acute crisis was brought about under the governorship of Sartinski Pasha (a Pole), in 1889, when a preconceived plan of deception and treachery was carried out by the Porte with consummate skill."—*Papers of the Greek Committee* (New Series), No. 1: *Crete and Greece*.

ten thousand men, whilst a squadron under Manthorpe Bey was dispatched to Volo. On the 17th the Greek Government invited the Turkish Government to appoint Commissioners for the regulation of the new frontier; but on the 20th, after the subject had been discussed on several occasions by the Ministers of the Sultan, it was decided not to give up any territory to Greece, and not to comply with the wishes of Europe. Safvet Pasha declared to Sir H. Layard that this decision was final, and authorised him to communicate the fact to the British Government. No one can be surprised at this resolution on the part of Turkey. If she could not resist the Russians in Roumelia, and if she could not hope to exclude the Austrians from Bosnia, she was at least able to baulk the expectations of Greece; and it was natural that she should at once resolve to do so.

On the 8th of August Safvet Pasha sent to the Powers an elaborate Circular Note, showing cause why their advice should not be followed by the Porte. In September, Greece renewed her request for mediation, without effect; but at last, on the 21st of October, M. Waddington addressed a dispatch to the Governments of the Great Powers, suggesting that the time had now arrived for acting on the 24th Article of the Treaty. His proposal was that the six Powers should ask the Porte to give its explicit adhesion to the principle of a rectification, and should consent to name Commissioners.

Five of the Powers at once frankly accepted this proposal; but Lord Salisbury at first demurred to its

form, regarded it as a menace to Turkey, considered the time "inopportune" for such a step, and regretted that the Powers had not "thought fit to delay" it. A month after the date of M. Waddington's dispatch Lord Salisbury formally replied, in a long plea for Turkish interests,* assenting to the mediation on condition that Greece should be "invited in return to give the Porte security in the future against the claims which have often threatened the peaceable relations of the two Powers in the past." The plenipotentiary who had startled the Congress five months before by his bold assertion of Hellenic rights, even in Macedonia and Thrace, now required that the possessor of these rights should give security against their assertion.

On December 15th the Turkish Government agreed to name Commissioners, and a fortnight later they appointed a place of meeting which could not be discovered on the map. When on January 20, 1879, the Greek Commissioners sailed for the Gulf of Arta, intending to search for their destination, they were stopped by a shot from one of ports at Prevesa, and the Porte protested in a Note to Athens against their "inconvenient promptitude." On the 25th of the same month the place of meeting was changed to Prevesa, and on the 26th the Greeks accepted it, and sent up their Commissioners. They were again fired upon and stopped, and the Turks again protested.

The Conference at Prevesa came to nothing, because the Turks refused to take the Congress line as a basis of negotiations. On the 20th of

* *Parliamentary Papers; Greece*, No. 1, 1879.

March, 1879, the Greek Commissioners were recalled, and on the following day M. Delyannis repeated the appeal for European mediation. Again M. Waddington was the first to respond. On the 21st of April he addressed a Note to the Powers, in which he suggested that direct mediation should be employed by means of a Conference of the Ambassadors at Constantinople. To this proposal the German Government gave an immediate and specially cordial assent; but the Governments of Austria and Italy reflected the views of Great Britain on the subject, which were to the effect that the Ambassadors should act independently, and not in concert. This, of course, practically disposed of the idea that the Ambassadors, as representing the European Concert, might have exercised a salutary influence over the new Commissioners whom Turkey and Greece were invited to appoint. The Commissioners were named; but, as the European Concert did not now exist in any effective sense, the influence of the Ambassadors was hardly more than nominal.

On the 12th of June Lord Salisbury wrote to Sir Henry Layard a long dispatch, setting forth in a fair and candid style* the reasons which should induce Turkey to come to terms with Greece. In this dispatch the action of the Ambassadors was spoken of as though it was to be the principal instrument in securing the compliance of the Porte, and Sir

* This document was written immediately after the Willis's Rooms meeting, convened by the Greek Committee. The success of that meeting had been very great. It was a gathering of influential persons, it was unanimous and enthusiastic, and bore witness to the existence of a strong public opinion in favour of the claims of Greece.

H. Layard received instructions in that sense. The Conference of Constantinople was no more effectual than that of Prevesa. Greece entered upon it without hope, because the Porte refused beforehand to accept the recommendations of the Congress as binding. There was no real effort to arrive at an understanding, and the delays of the Turks were as truculent, if not quite so frivolous, as those adopted six months before. The consent of the Powers in June remained fruitless until the following November, and the meetings of the Commissioners between the 17th of November and the 29th of December were only a series of make-believes and equivocations on the part of the Sultan's Government.

As soon as the collapse of the second Conference was seen to be inevitable, M. Waddington, anxious before quitting office to put the Greek question in the way of solution, submitted to the Governments of the Great Powers a proposal that Turkey and Greece should be asked to agree upon a line which would pass to the south of the district of Janina, and which, by the way of compensation to Greece, would divide Thessaly according to a more liberal interpretation of the 13th Protocol. This proposal was made without previously ascertaining the mind of the Greek Government on the subject; and it may not be amiss to observe that the French Premier, though undoubtedly a sincere friend to the Hellenic cause, had shown himself to be more anxious for the speedy settlement of the difficulty than for the full satisfaction of claims which he believed to be just and reasonable. Some months before, he had suggested a compromise which would have given

to Greece barely a fourth of the increase to which she considered herself entitled. Certainly his new compromise was not calculated to be acceptable either to the Greek nation as a whole or to those who had advocated the extension of the Greek power in South-eastern Europe. The possession of Janina was of the essence of the boon which it was proposed to confer upon Greece, and to cut out the entire vilayet of that name was to shear the gift of half its value. No doubt this suggestion of France was intended to facilitate the settlement of the question, so far as that settlement depended upon the assent of Turkey. But it was a suggestion at once cruel and unjust to Greece, and humiliating and impolitic for Europe.

In the spring of 1880 the Government of Lord Beaconsfield was replaced by the second administration of Mr. Gladstone. The concert of the Powers was at once renewed, and Lord Granville lost no time in proposing that a third Conference should meet at Berlin, in accordance with the 24th Article of the Treaty of 1878. On the 9th of June our Foreign Minister wrote a dispatch to Lord Odo Russell, in the course of which he said :—

“The views of Her Majesty’s Government are indicated in the instructions addressed to Mr. Goschen on his proceeding to Constantinople. Her Majesty’s Government wish it to be distinctly understood that, while urging the completion of this rectification of frontier upon the Porte in the interests both of Turkey and Greece, they desire to adhere generally to the geographical indications given in the 13th Protocol of the Congress of Berlin. They do not wish that there should be any forcible annexation to the latter country of an unwilling Mussulman population in such numbers as to be a source of danger and insecurity. On the other hand, they consider that the line should be so drawn

as to relieve the Greek-speaking inhabitants, so far as they are collected in a sufficiently defined district, from a Government which does not satisfy their traditional sympathies and national aspirations." *

The last sentence expresses, very aptly and succinctly, the true principle of all rectifications of the Greek frontier. It was the formally adopted policy of Great Britain in 1880; and it was equally applicable in 1897 to the case of Crete, the unredeemed portion of Epirus, the north of Thessaly, and the districts lying south of the Kavala-Avloni line—all of which demand to be relieved from "a Government which does not satisfy their traditional sympathies and national aspirations."

The Conference of Berlin was long protracted, and it was without practical effect, owing to the virtual breakdown of the concert of Europe. The Powers began by demanding that their recommendations at Berlin (the Kalamas - Salamvria line, including Janina) should be taken as definitive. The Porte had objected to the Conference itself, and it objected to its conclusions. No doubt Europe could have inspired the Sultan with sufficient "moral strength" to enable him to yield to its advice; but, unfortunately, the change of Government in Great Britain was counterbalanced by another change of Government in France. The Republic had hitherto taken the lead in the Conference, but on the 3rd of October M. de St. Hilaire, who succeeded M. de Freycinet at the Foreign Office, told Lord Lyons that his Government could do so no longer.

"They were decidedly of opinion," he said, "that the Monte-

* *Parliamentary Papers: Greece* No. 3, 1880.

negrin, Greek and Armenian questions should now be treated as one whole ; and in the interest of peace and harmony they were extremely anxious that all three should be finally settled with the greatest possible promptitude by the six Powers in concert. The French Government would carefully consider any suggestions for settling them which might be proposed to them, and would be very desirous of adopting any plan which was agreed upon by the other Powers. They must, however, state at once distinctly that they would not incur any risk of being drawn into a war." *

The Porte took advantage of this altered disposition of France to decline the advice of the Powers in a more categorical manner ; but the Sultan offered to enter into fresh negotiations on the understanding that the decisions of the Conference of Berlin (based on those of the Congress) should be allowed to fall to the ground.

Though France had desired that the Greek, Montenegrin, and Armenian questions should be treated as a whole, the joint Naval Demonstration had no sooner obtained satisfaction for Montenegro than the fleet was allowed to separate ; and M. de St. Hilaire immediately suggested an arbitration between Turkey and Greece (Dec. 22, 1880), on condition that the two countries should bind themselves to accept the award. The offer was refused both at Constantinople and at Athens. The cause of Greece appeared to be making no advance whatever, and the Government of King George, naturally beginning to despair of any positive satisfaction of claims which had been declared legitimate on such excellent authority, pushed on their preparations for war.


A new danger thus confronted Europe—the

* *Parliamentary Papers : Greece* No. 1, 1881.

danger of a violation of peace which would leave the Powers no alternative except to take the field against Turkey, or to abandon Greece to all the consequences of defeat. It was very much the same kind of crisis as that which arose sixteen years later; but in 1881 there were conditions which did not exist in 1897. There was, in the first place, a more genuine concert of the Powers, which, though it had exhausted much of its force, was still animated by a desire to complete the programme drawn up at Berlin. And, in the second place, there was one Power, that of Great Britain, strong from the impulse of a memorable appeal to the constituencies, which regarded the liberation of Thessaly and Epirus as a point of honour and an imperative obligation, and which took care to impress upon its allies a sense of the compulsion under which it laboured.

The result was a compromise at the best. The Powers virtually accepted the last offer of the Porte. They reopened negotiations through their Ambassadors at Constantinople, suffered the decisions of the third Conference to drop out of sight, and accepted on behalf of Greece a mere composition on her claim, which they had made their own. On the side of Epirus the frontier was set back from the Kalamas to the Arta, whilst in Thessaly a strip, not in any way equivalent, was ceded by Turkey on the north bank of the Salamvria, leaving the Turk within easy striking distance of Larissa.

With this composition Greece was compelled, much against her will, to rest content. Europe, after all, and in spite of the wavering of France in October, 1880, had done much, if not precisely her best, to remedy the injustice of 1878; but it cannot



BYZANTINE CHURCH AT AINTA.

[To face p. 306.]

be denied that the outstanding claim of Greece to Epirus and Crete was as strong an obligation on the part of a community of great Powers towards a small dependent State as it is possible to imagine, or as the records of history can show.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SETTLEMENT DISTURBED

A Struggle for Economy—Heroic Taxation—Gold and Paper Money—MM. Tricoupis and Delyannis—The Bulgarian Revolution—The Expansion of Bulgaria—A Parallel Movement in Greece—Mobilisation—Conflict with the Powers—Well Meant, Ill Timed.

THE settlement of 1881 was not destined to bring to the Greeks a long period of unbroken peace and commercial development. There were some who hoped that the annexation of Thessaly, added to the insecurity of the national finances, would have given ample occupation to the ministers of King George for many years to come, and that a series of well-considered budgets would disarm those who, reasonably or unreasonably, regard the financial embarrassments of the country as diminishing her claim to sympathy. The desire to rehabilitate Greece in the eyes of her creditors was nowhere stronger than amongst the statesmen of Athens, and the story of Greece from 1881 to 1885 is an honourable story of effort in this direction. But fate ruled otherwise, and the logical sequence of the crisis which conferred on Greece the three new nomarchies was to demonstrate how futile is the expectation of

regular development in the south-east so long as the expulsion of the Turk from Europe is delayed.

On the 9th of October, 1881, M. Delyannis, who had been Prime Minister since 1879, gave place to M. Tricoupis, who had won the elections of that year on a promise to reorganise the finances and to restore the gold currency. He remained in office until February 11, 1885, and so long as his administration lasted he amply redeemed his pledges. His proposals were to levy new duties on spirits and beer, wine, cigarette paper, tobacco, petroleum, playing cards and matches; to take strong measures so as to expedite and ensure the payment of taxes; to increase the Customs' tariff; and to raise a loan of 170,000,000 drachmas on the security of the Customs for the abolition of the paper currency (which amounted to 109,500,000 drs. in 1884). The laws necessary to give effect to the fiscal charges were passed in 1883 and 1884. But in the meantime a commercial depression, due to independent and general causes, had set in, and the loan was not well taken up. About one-third of it was subscribed; and M. Tricoupis, determined to get rid of the paper money, borrowed from the banks of Constantinople and Athens, and resumed cash payments.

These drastic but perfectly sound measures had the effect of making the Prime Minister unpopular. Greece lost her faith; she was not heroic enough for an effort of this particular kind—or, it may be, the call which M. Tricoupis had made upon her, and the simultaneous decline of prosperity, strained the loyalty of the taxpayer to the breaking-point. In the spring of 1885 the electors transferred their allegiance

to M. Delyannis, who came into office pledged to undo the greater part of the work of his predecessor. He was to cut down the taxes on wine, spirits, and tobacco, to abolish the monopolies on petroleum, cards and matches, to decrease the expenditure by twelve million drachmas, and to repeal or modify the legislation which was intended to secure the prompt payment of taxes.

M. Tricoupis had presented his budget for 1885 before the dissolution, and had proposed an expenditure of 85,642,000 drs. M. Delyannis gave immediate satisfaction to his supporters by reducing the amount to 74,007,000 drs. With that the bolt of economy was shot; for the budget of 1886 proposed an expenditure of 89,075,000 drs., and in the budget of 1887 the figure had risen to 94,657,000. Not only so, but the deficit of eleven millions anticipated by M. Delyannis for 1885 grew by the end of the year to twenty-six millions; and in 1886 there was a deficit of twenty-five millions. In the same two years there was a loss on exchange amounting to eight or nine millions, and an extraordinary expenditure of nearly seventy-one millions. So that, as M. Tricoupis had come into office in 1881 with a programme of sound finance and gold currency, and had lost power because the nation could not respond to his efforts, so M. Delyannis, taking office in 1885 with a programme of economy, was compelled in less than two years to restore the paper currency and to spend a hundred and thirty million drachmas, over and above his budget estimates.

Add to this that a considerable part of M. Tricoupis' large loan in 1884, applied to the abolition of paper money, was practically thrown away, and

we have a disaster and a calamity for Greece which it would be difficult to exaggerate. It remains to inquire how the misfortune was created, and how far the statesmen of Greece could or ought to have prevented it.

The fiats of the Berlin Congress, as we have seen, had not given universal satisfaction; and, in particular, the Roumelians to the south of the Balkan Range, whom Russia had coupled with the Bulgarians in the treaty of San Stefano, complained that the Powers had robbed them of a liberty won for them by force of arms. There can be no doubt that Russian agents, and Committees backed by Russian money, encouraged this discontent for a few years; but when Prince Alexander of Bulgaria showed himself too independent to become a simple satrap of the Czar, the feeling at St. Petersburg underwent a decided change. Russia no longer desired to see the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria; the Czar frowned on the ambitions of Prince Alexander, and ordered the Russian officers to leave the country.

Meanwhile affairs in Roumelia came to a crisis. On September 13, 1885, Gavril Pasha and his Turkish officials were expelled from the province; a deputation from Philippopolis waited on the Prince at Sofia, and the union was virtually accomplished.

Now if this sudden and startling achievement could have been looked upon as an isolated fact, and kept separate from the general considerations which affect the Balkan Peninsula, there need have been no complication of sympathies in Europe. The domain of liberty had been widened, and by a peaceful

revolution, in which even the Sultan acquiesced, one step more had been taken in that gradual "consolidation" of European Turkey which Lord Beaconsfield had recommended at Berlin. Though the Powers formally withheld their approval of the union, as a disturbance of the settlement of 1878, they made no attempt to prevent it; and Lord Salisbury, who had recently formed his first administration, took occasion to say at Newport, less than three weeks after the entry of Prince Alexander into Philippopolis, that, although he had approved of the separation of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia when their union was effected by Russia, yet—

"It was the policy of Europe, it was the inevitable result of the progress of events, that when there was a homogeneous Christian population subject to the rule of the Porte, that homogeneous Christian population would, by its own tendencies, by its own innate character, necessarily before long free itself from that subjection; and it was an operation of that kind which the Berlin Treaty sanctioned."

These words suggest to us aptly enough the light in which the Bulgarian movement would present itself to the people of Greece. It was "an operation of that kind" which the Berlin Treaty, so far as the Greeks were concerned, sanctioned by nothing stronger than a recommendation to Turkey, which would probably have had no definite result if the British Government of 1880, strongly urged by public opinion, had not insisted on a moiety of the claim. It was an operation of that kind, seven times repeated in Crete within seventy years, which had succeeded in every particular except the necessary sanction of the Powers. It was the tendencies and

innate character of the strictly homogeneous Greeks which had seemed to render it inevitable that the inhabitants of Crete, Epirus, and the Macedonian and Thracian shores would free themselves from subjection to the Porte. But if this was in agreement with the "policy of Europe," it had already become manifest that the emancipation of Greeks was by no means so inevitable as the emancipation of Bulgarians.

And now the easy acquisition of Eastern Roumelia by Bulgaria—an acquisition by which large numbers of Greeks were subjected to Slavonic rule, whilst the balance roughly established in 1878, and disturbed by the compromise of 1881, was in great measure destroyed—produced in Greece a strong sense of disappointment and defeat. The injustice of her treatment, the harsh refusal of Europe to secure the liberation of Crete and Epirus on more than one favourable opportunity, the cruelty of their own subjection to impossible conditions of national life, their apparent desertion by the Powers which had established the kingdom, struck them at this moment with overwhelming force, which was scarcely realised at the time, even by their friends in the western capitals of Europe. Englishmen and Frenchmen sympathised, as was natural, with the freedom of the Eastern Roumeliots. The Greeks of Athens needed no time to enable them to appreciate the significance of the contrast between the words in which Lord Salisbury presented their claims at Berlin and the words in which the same statesman, at Newport, hailed the aggrandisement of a Slavonian Principality.

In any case the excitement at Athens was so

great that M. Delyannis, though he tried to curb it, found the task beyond his power. When the Chamber met on October 23rd, a large majority of the deputies demanded a mobilisation of the army.

On November 5th the Ambassadors at Constantinople met in conference, and it was only through the strong representations of Great Britain and France that they abstained from advising the Sultan to restore his authority in Roumelia by force of arms. Sir William White recommended that Prince Alexander should be appointed by the Sultan as Governor-General of the province, either for five years or for life. Russia was strongly opposed to this course, and the Czar, in order to remove all doubt as to his attitude, deprived the Prince of his honorary colonelcy in the Russian army. The immediate result of this step was to induce the Servians—who, with less cause than the Greeks, seeing that they were themselves a Slavonian race, were bitterly opposed to Bulgarian aggrandisement—to cross the frontier without a declaration of war. The dramatic manner in which Prince Alexander, after an initial reverse, defeated and put to flight the army of the invader, and the still more dramatic manner in which he, personally, fell a victim to Russian animosity, belong to the history of Bulgaria. But before the end of 1885 peace was concluded, the Sultan had abstained from appointing a Turkish Governor of Roumelia on the urgent insistence of Lord Salisbury, and the Porte had assented to the “personal” union of the two provinces under Prince Alexander.

The opposition of Greece remained ; and by this

time M. Delyannis was engaged in massing his troops on the northern frontier. In the early spring of 1886, the general position of affairs in Europe undoubtedly appeared to be critical. The attitude assumed by Greece, which was not anti-Bulgarian, but simply an assertion of the claims of the western Roumelioti to parallel treatment with Eastern Roumelia, was no doubt justified in principle. But the enthusiasm of the deputies, and of the Athenian populace, prevented them from taking a cool survey of facts and possibilities. Their bellicose demonstration inspired Serbia with a hope of fresh disturbances, for which she prepared by increasing her armaments. Bulgaria was compelled to make corresponding sacrifices, and Turkey was naturally preparing for war. Early in January the Powers had called upon the four countries to disarm; and shortly afterwards, as the Greek fleet was about to put to sea, a second Note from the Powers warned the Government against making an attack upon Turkey. M. Delyannis replied, on February 2nd, that Greece could not, as an independent State, submit to any veto upon the free disposal of her naval forces.

It was an answer worthy of a stronger Power. M. Delyannis might have withdrawn at this moment with perfect dignity. Greece has her cause against Turkey and her claims upon Europe, which she can urge with best effect when the Turk is outrageous and Greeks are suffering. The worst possible time for urging them is when the Greeks are free from direct violence and when Turkey is committing no overt or conspicuous outrage. No doubt King George and his Minister personally recognised this

fact, but they seem to have been overborne by popular clamour.

On February 6th there was again a change of Ministry in Great Britain. The Foreign Secretary in Mr. Gladstone's third Administration was the Earl of Rosebery, who had previously associated himself, when not in office, with that strong English advocacy of the claims of Greece which was certainly one of the procuring causes of the cession of Thessaly. And Lord Rosebery at once resolved to follow up the restraining policy of Lord Salisbury. M. Delyannis, who had a majority of about three to two in the Boule, persisted in calling out reserves and massing troops on the frontier, though by this time Servia had signed peace, and Prince Alexander had made a defensive alliance with Turkey. The only encouragement received by Greece outside her own borders (beyond the knowledge of Russia's attitude towards Bulgaria) came from France, which had no ships with the combined fleet in Suda Bay. France nevertheless advised Greece to accede to the wishes of the Powers, though at the same time she declared that she would, on a fitting occasion, press the claims of King George to Epirus and Western Roumelia.

After further Notes of the Powers had produced no effect at Athens, their representatives proclaimed a "pacific blockade" of the Greek coast, and left the capital on May 10th. M. Delyannis now resigned office, and some time was consumed before M. Tricoupis was commissioned to form a new Ministry and prepare a decree of disarmament. In the meantime the troops on the frontier actually came into collision with the Turks near Turnavo. But even-

tually the decree was issued and communicated to the Powers; and on the 7th of June the blockade was raised.

We shall see in the following chapter how dearly Greece has had to pay for this patriotic but ill-timed effort to advance the interests of the nation.

CHAPTER XIV

MATERIAL PROGRESS

Finance—The Public Debt—Commerce—Greek Trade with Great Britain—Agriculture in Greece—Natural Products—Staples of Commerce—The Forests—Public Works—Lake Kopais—The Corinth Canal—Obstacles to Progress.

THE acquisition of Thessaly had brought to Greece more of credit and satisfaction than of actual profit or financial relief; and that was in the natural and expected course of events. It must be remembered that, whenever the Greeks recover from Turkey a new instalment of their ancient patrimony, they acquire a land which has been suffered to fall into decay. The tax-farmers have exhausted it year by year for many generations, public works have been almost unknown, and the Mussulman population, even if naturally industrious, have been helpless under a greedy and incompetent rule. So it was in 1832, and so it was again when Thessaly became a part of the kingdom. Harbours, lighthouses, roads, bridges, canals, all required attention. The new subjects of King George stood in need of something more than the mere change of government; they paid their taxes more freely, but they had the satisfaction of seeing them spent in their own country.

It was vain to suppose that Thessaly would at once yield a balance of public revenue over expenditure, such as might be applied to relieve the burdens of other parts of the kingdom. On the contrary, Thessaly cost the mother country an enormous sacrifice of money, which is only in part represented by the military expenditure of the five years from 1877 to 1881, amounting to, or causing an aggregate deficit of, no less than 140,000,000 drachmas.* This expenditure was incurred mainly in order to assert the claim of Greece to Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete, to procure for her a hearing at Berlin, and to put her in a position to insist on parallel treatment when, two years after the Congress, every nationality except her own had received attention and vindication.

The financial records of these years have not, so far as I know, been published in detail, but it has been calculated that the deficits of the years 1880 and 1881 accounted for more than ninety million drachmas out of the total just mentioned for 1877-81.† “The years before 1882,” says M. Beckmann, “belong to a period whereof the books are closed for ever.” All that one can say is that the Greek Government, in the difficult crisis described in the last chapter, acted according to their lights for the advancement of the national cause, and that the

* The rate of exchange gives us varying values for the drachma as compared with the English pound sterling. When there is no forced paper currency (as between 1882 and 1885) the drachma may be regarded as equivalent to the franc. With paper currency, but no extreme commercial or political depression, we may reckon twenty-eight drachmas as nearly equal to one pound. When there is great depression, the rate of exchange may rise as high as forty.

† *Les Finances de la Grèce: Étude composée sur la base de documents authentiques.* By Joseph D. Beckmann (1892).

annexation of Thessaly was the practical outcome of the situation. The deficits were met by loans, including one of sixty million drachmas in 1879, and one of a hundred and twenty millions in 1880.


From 1883 onwards, the annual public revenue and expenditure are given below, to the nearest thousand drachmas.

	ORDINARY REVENUE (Actual).	EXTRAORDINARY REVENUE (Loans, &c.).	EXPENDITURE.
1883	58,538,000	—	67,780,000
1884	60,745,000	46,675,000	91,347,000
1885	59,375,000	2,052,000	122,798,000
1886	62,151,000	33,417,000	129,718,000
1887	82,850,000	93,360,000	107,228,000
1888	89,551,000	4,120,000	108,051,000
1889	83,372,000	99,300,000	168,739,000
1890	79,824,000	43,224,000	141,361,000
1891	88,013,000	12,900,000	110,164,000 *

The last column includes the special expenditure on the service of the loans, conversions of public debt, and so forth.

It is to be observed that these figures by themselves convey no clear indication of the regular, or what may be called the natural expenditure of the country, though the first column gives the actual amounts raised by taxation for the necessities of each year. We may summarise from M. Beckmann's useful pamphlet an account of certain special causes of expenditure in each of the nine years to which his figures refer.

* The expenditure in 1892 was stated at 107,679,000 drs., and in the following year at 101,563,000 drs. The estimates of ordinary revenue for 1895 were 93,035,000 drs. ; for 1896, 90,222,000 ; for 1897, 93,752,000 drs., with a small surplus in each case.



PIREUS HARBOUR.

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In 1883 there were no extraordinary receipts or expenditure, and the deficit of nine and a quarter millions was one of ordinary administration.

In 1884, about eight millions are accounted for by extraordinary military and naval expenditure, and the ordinary deficit was about twenty-two and a half millions.

In 1885 there was a new mobilisation, accounting for an extraordinary expenditure of 35,700,000 drs. on the army and navy, and there was an ordinary deficit of twenty-eight millions.

In 1886, mobilisation accounts for 35,167,000 drs., in addition to which there was a further extraordinary expenditure of about four millions; the ordinary deficit exceeding twenty-eight millions.

In 1887 we have 15,891,138 drs. applied to the conversion of three former loans of thirty-five millions; close upon six millions for naval expenditure, including the three ironclads, *Hydra*, *Psara*, and *Spetzai*; more than three-quarters of a million for military expenditure; and 2,417,000 drs. for railways. Deducting 24,998,000 drs. as extraordinary expenditure, there would in this year be an ordinary surplus of 719,000 drs.

In 1888, Greece spent 1,571,000 drs. on railways, and nearly ten millions on shipbuilding; and there was an ordinary deficit of 6,861,000 drs.

In 1889, the amortisation of four previous loans absorbed 66,348,000 drs.; the dowry of Princess Alexandra, 400,000 drs.; a subvention to Cretan refugees, 400,000 drs.; railways, 8,000,000 drs.; public works and buildings, 2,577,000 drs.; on account of the three ironclads, 3,136,000 drs.; debt to the National Bank, 1,700,000 drs.; the Paris Exhibition,

250,000 drs. ; a total of 82,811,000 drs., with an ordinary deficit of 2,197,000 drs.

In 1890, the extraordinary expenditure included no less than 23,693,528 drs. on the very necessary Piræus-Larissa railway, and on the Myloi-Kalamai and other railways ; 4,814,000 drs. for the three ironclads ; a further subvention of 1,320,000 drs. for the Cretan refugees ; 15,539,314 drs. for the final redemption of the original loan of 1824-5 ; and 149,700 drs. for the palace of the Crown Prince. M. Beckmann adds other items of extraordinary expenditure for this year, making up a total of 51,299,610 drs., and he arrives at an ordinary deficit of 10,237,000 drs.

In 1891—the accounts of which year were not made up when M. Beckmann wrote—railways took 18,851,653 drs., and other extraordinary expenditure 551,863 drs., leaving a provisional deficit of 2,746,717 drs.

The ordinary deficits, as here exhibited, show a general tendency to decrease—the years 1885 and 1886 being treated as exceptional. From this it may be argued that if there were no extraordinary expenditure there would be very little difficulty in securing an equilibrium in the Greek budgets, and that there would be no further need for the contracting of loans. When that is said, we have not said much. If Greece laid no railways and carried out no public works ; if she made no effort to improve the lighting of her coast, which is nearly half as long again as the coast of England ; if she would forbear to spend money on Greek refugees from Turkey ; if she would resign her ambitions and dispense with an army and navy, then no doubt she

might balance her income and expenditure. Those who think that she ought to take this course should at least encourage her to do so by convincing her that she has no necessity for an army and navy, and that the oppressed Greeks of Turkey will be liberated by Europe without any active interference on the part of their mother country. As a matter of fact, no Greek province of Turkey has ever been directly released from the tyranny of the Sultan, however favourable the opportunity, unless the Greeks themselves took up arms to enforce it. Greece maintains an army and navy, and makes sacrifices on behalf of her countrymen in Turkey, because she considers it as a necessary condition of her existence. And it is Great Britain more than any other country which has taught her to think so.

But unquestionably it behoves the Greeks to remember that they live in an age when financial considerations are perhaps more potent than any other, and that their future depends upon the assistance of two countries—Great Britain and France—which see a special and peculiar sanction in financial equilibrium. Nothing has of late gone so much against Greece, in the public opinion of these two countries and of Germany, as her rapid accumulation of debt, and her failure to keep up the regular payment of interest. She may look upon the judgment as harsh, but it is not unnatural or unintelligible—however much more intelligible we might think it if the Powers which are her principal creditors were to seize every occasion, such as that which arose in 1897, to enlarge her frontiers and remove the main cause of her difficulties.

M. Delyannis returned to power after the elections

of 1890, and was Prime Minister for sixteen months. The financial situation had by this time become extremely difficult, though a gleam of hope had been created by the repayment of the Loans of 1824-5, arranged during the time when Mr. John Gennadius was Greek Minister in this country. The revenues appropriated to the liquidation of this Debt were regularly paid into the Ionian Bank, and the last bonds were redeemed in 1890. By this auspicious effort the credit of Greece in the European money markets was notably strengthened. In 1892 the *Boule* was dissolved by King George, and M. Delyannis was dismissed for failing to provide for the immediate needs of the country, and postponing the Budget. M. Tricoupis returned to office; but in November, 1893, being unable to obtain a further loan from the bondholders, who asked for a closer supervision of the sources of revenue pledged to them, he declared a national bankruptcy. Negotiations were continued with the bondholders, but to no good purpose; and M. Tricoupis unfortunately resented the sound and sensible advice tendered to him in 1894—to admit a representation of the bondholders, short of actual control, upon a financial Council for the administration of the Debt. The history of the country might have been very different if this rational course had been taken.

Up to the beginning of 1896, the total outstanding National Debt of Greece was 655,128,897 gold drachmas, and 167,981,781 paper drachmas.

In a previous chapter we have glanced at the condition of Greek commerce during a series of years antecedent to the national disturbance of 1876-81. Let us now take a later series of figures, from the

period succeeding the annexation of Thessaly and the mobilisation of 1885-6, with no very exceptional disturbance of the country on political grounds.

				IMPORTS.	EXPORTS.
				drs.	drs.
1889	...	...	...	132,653,248	107,077,708
1890	...	...	...	120,785,604	95,791,684
1891	...	...	...	140,359,675	107,489,700
—				—	—
1894	...	...	...	131,950,590	89,149,080
1895	...	...	...	128,186,490	85,387,500

To a large extent this stagnation, and even decrease, in the trade of Greece with foreign countries is accounted for by the generally unfavourable conditions of the commerce of the world, by which nearly all nations have been affected. But in so far as the case of Greece can be separated from that of other nations, and regarded on its own merits, the moral is the same as that which has been drawn elsewhere. The energy which should go to domestic and material development goes to external politics and intrigue: it could not be otherwise; and until the whole of Greece is emancipated from the Turk it would be useless to wish it otherwise.

After the suppression of brigandage, which was practically effected in 1870,* it was natural that the

* In April of that year a party of travellers, five of them English and one French, were seized by a band of brigands at Oropos, near the historic Marathon. For more than ten days England was kept in suspense about the fate of the prisoners. On the 11th of April two of these, Lord and Lady Muncaster, were released, after being informed that their companions would be liberated on the payment of a ransom of £25,000, coupled with a free pardon. It was determined that this sum should not be paid; and the Greek Government, strongly urged thereto by the foreign representatives in Athens, resolved to secure the robbers at all hazards. Troops surrounded the gang, and cut off all hope of escape. The prisoners—Mr. Vyner, Mr. Herbert, Mr. Lloyd, and the Count de

pursuit of agriculture should be stimulated at the same time that public order was rendered more secure. Yet the progress made in the cultivation of the soil has not been very remarkable. M. Rhangabé, speaking of his country as he saw it some five-and-thirty years after its worst, drew the contrast with pardonable pride. "A few years of liberty," he says,* "have completely changed the aspect of the land. They who visit it to-day, after having known it when the Turks were in possession, behold a spectacle which, like an effect in a panorama, suddenly transforms arid deserts into luxuriant landscapes. Nature seems to be regenerated together with the people. Fields once barren are covered with a rich growth. The earth, scarcely furrowed by the plough of the slave, who knows not if he will be permitted to reap the fruit of his toil, is to-day a source of increasing revenue."

In 1864, the number of stremmas † under cultivation, in crops and fallow, was 6,076,000, out of a

Boyl—were dragged from place to place by the retreating brigands, who frequently threatened to murder them; and in the end, on the 21st of April, the miscreants carried out their threats. The band was broken up immediately afterwards; some of the men being killed in fight, whilst seven were captured. But this was far from being sufficient to appease the very serious feeling of anger and indignation excited in Greece, in England, and throughout Europe, by so lamentable a proof of the insecurity of life in the country. The charges of connivance were freely repeated—in some cases, it would seem, with great injustice. Once more there were frequent Ministerial crises; but the king and his advisers had determined that brigandage should be definitely suppressed. A decree was issued in October, six months after the Marathon outrage, giving additional power to the authorities; and the provisions of this measure were carried out in a thoroughly effectual manner.

* *Greece: her Progress and Present Position*, 1867.

† A stremma is a little less than a quarter of an acre. The old stremma, however, was equivalent to $\cdot 314$ of an acre.

total area of 45,699,248. The plantations (yielding fruit of various kinds) occupied 1,359,900 stremmas. The ground not susceptible of culture, including rocks, forests, marshes, towns, and roads, amounted to about 26,405,348 stremmas. Thus the land still open to culture, or uncultivated arable land, was as much as 11,748,000 stremmas.* In other words, barely one-sixth of the entire area of Greece was under cultivation in 1864—including plantations, but not forests.

Only one European country was in a worse plight, and that country was Russia, with its immense and almost irreclaimable steppes. But it must be remembered that more than one-third of Greece consists of sterile rocks, whilst the rivers, lakes, and marshes occupy one-tenth of the remainder. The marsh of Kopais alone has a superficial extent of nearly 300,000 stremmas.

“Nearly one-fourth of the population of Greece,” says M. Rhangabé, “subsists by agricultural pursuits. This is something in a country where maritime pursuits are more profitable, and employ upwards of thirty thousand families. They who pass through Greece to-day gaze with pleasure upon vineyards

* A more detailed statement was given by Mr. Strong in 1842. Neither he nor M. Rhangabé takes account of the Ionian Islands.

	Morea.	Continent.	Islands.	Total.
Mountains and rocks ...	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,967,226	15,967,226
Rivers and lakes ...	1,500,000	2,000,000	—	3,500,000
Forests ...	3,000,000	4,000,000	—	7,000,000
Arable land ...	11,436,409	8,171,949	300,000	19,008,358
Gardens ...	35,000	69,000	115,000	219,000
Vineyards ...	240,000	186,000	324,000	750,000
Currant plantations ...	14,440	2,120	—	16,560
Olive groves ...	12,551	21,455	7,604	41,610
Lemon and mulberry groves	260	116	110	486
Towns and villages ...	157,340	47,360	7,060	211,760
Total stremmas	21,396,000	19,498,000	6,721,000	47,615,000

extending as far as the eye can reach, upon rich plantations, where the olive, the fig, and the orange mingle their verdant shade, and give to Messenia, Laconia, and Argolis the appearance of vast gardens. The number of foreign trees, intended for new plantations, which pass the custom-house of the port of Athens alone, amounts to many millions."

Though the agricultural products of Greece have increased in bulk since 1864, it does not appear that the cultivation of the land has made such notable progress within the past thirty years. Statistics prove that special industries have been stimulated, and that the trade in particular articles of consumption has rapidly grown ; but, on the other hand, the science of farming has not yet taken root in the soil. No doubt a considerable amount of capital has been invested in the plantations of currants, olives, citrons, mulberries, and the like ; but the arable land is not farmed after the systematic manner of English and French farms, with a liberal expenditure in draining, tilling, and planting, and with the aid of the best machinery.

Capo d'Istria founded a school of agricultural science and endowed it with land and a State grant ; but in 1865 the Chamber found it necessary to close the establishment, on account of its want of success. It was replaced by a more technical school, which had little better fortune than its predecessor. Whatever the reason may be, it would seem that farming as a practical art is not much understood or encouraged in Greece. The State itself is too poor to bring its lands under the highest kind of culture. The peasant proprietors, owning from the smallest patches to a few score stremmas, have neither capital nor know-

ledge sufficient to do justice to their farms. The *métayers*, tilling the estates of the larger proprietors, and living on one-half of the produce—in Thessaly it is often two-thirds, whilst in other parts of the country, as in the Ionian Islands, the proprietor takes two-thirds, providing the tenant with his seeds, manures, and implements—are still less likely to adopt scientific methods.

In 1860 it was computed that there were 12,855,560 stremmas of land under cultivation (including 5,419,660 of forests), out of a total area of 45,699,248. In 1875 the number had increased to 16,721,200, part of the increment being due to the annexation of the Ionian Isles, which have a total of about 2,750,000 stremmas. In 1887 the cultivated area reached 19,290,841, out of a total (now including Thessaly) of 63,606,000 stremmas. Bearing this increase of territory in mind, a comparison may be drawn, in respect of a few particular products, between the number of stremmas under cultivation in 1860 and 1875, and between these numbers and the estimated totals in 1887.*


		1860.	1875.	1887.
Wheat		944,093	1,601,480	2,484,031
Barley		362,871	679,111	902,502
Meslin		361,825	577,500	501,263
Oats		41,486	—	90,249
Sesame, &c.		4,504	9,170	79,595
Cotton		21,105	109,860	61,916
Tobacco		25,000	42,204	38,987
Vine		492,502	—	1,266,204
Currant		153,058	---	468,775
Olive		370,000	---	1,742,154
Fig		18,000	---	104,809

* The complete list is quoted by Mr. Bickford-Smith in his volume on *Greece under King George*.

The largest increase is due, of course, to the fertility of the Thessalian plains.

Grain is not produced in sufficient quantity to allow of its exportation. The most valuable exports are currants, wine, and olives. In 1820 the currant plantations on the southern shore of the Gulf of Corinth exported about ten million pounds of the fruit. The War of Independence reduced the production to something like half the amount in 1831. Twenty years later it had reached 57,000,000 lbs.; but in the following year it was reduced by disease to 10,000,000 lbs. The disease was overcome by the use of sulphur, and in 1858 the yield was 62,000,000 lbs. From this time it has steadily increased. In 1865, after the annexation of the Ionian Islands, 111,000,000 lbs. were exported from Greece. Eleven years later, in 1876, the export amounted to 195,000,000 lbs., representing a value of about £1,400,000 per annum. In 1891 the export was about 375,000,000 lbs., valued at £2,750,000.

The quantity of land under cultivation for currants could not be greatly increased. The currant vine is fastidious in its growth, and appears to flourish nowhere except in some of the Ionian Islands, on the northern and western shores of the Morea, and around Missolonghi. When the fruit is produced, it is liable to destruction or deterioration by rough weather or excessive moisture; and yet the culture cannot be extended far inland. The crops are gathered in August; and it happens that the Gulf of Corinth is at this time frequently exposed to storms, which may in a day convert a heavy crop into a light one. The vine bears in its sixth year, and does not reach perfection for a dozen or fifteen



THE BATHS AT KYLLENE.

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years, so that it is necessary to manage the plantations very systematically, and to sink capital long before a return is expected. The planters, however, are not so restricted in these respects as the farmers. A prosperous trade, in which there is a ready market for all that can be produced, enables those who are engaged in it to provide efficiently for its extension; and the currant trade of Greece is, in fact, one of the most healthy branches of the national industry.

The wine trade has existed in Greece from time immemorial. Some centuries ago there was a considerable export of the well-favoured malmsey and malvoisie (apparently several brands under each name) from the neighbourhood of Napoli di Malvoisia, Monemvasia, the ancient Epidaurus Limera, on the eastern coast of the Morea. The vines were destroyed, though a few of the best varieties are alleged to have been transplanted to Tenos. For a long time, however, the Greek wines were in very little request. Much depends upon the proper cultivation of the vine, and much upon the process of making; but both of these arts had been neglected under the Ottoman rule. The Greeks and Albanians settled on the shores of the Ægean still crushed a few grapes, ripe and unripe together, suffered them to ferment, drained the juice into skin bottles, and threw in a lump of resin from the pine-trees. The product was a coarse, strong raki, good to make a slave forget his servitude, or to awaken the poetic fervour of a klepht, but useless as an article of commerce. There is a difference even in resinosities; but one has to acquire a taste for the best of them.

In 1830 there were only 24,000 stremmas (6,000

acres) of vineyards in Greece. In 1865 the area of vine culture had risen to half a million stremmas ; and the increase has continued up to the present day. In 1867 the production was reckoned at 1,850,679 barrels,* coming from Achaia, Elis, the Cyclades (especially Santorin), Arcadia, Attica, Boeotia, Argolis, &c., in this order. The exportation of wine from Greece has now resumed its commercial importance. The export in 1891 was valued at 6,241,648 drs.

Ibrahim Pasha's victories extended also to the olives, whereof it was computed that he destroyed as many as two-thirds. In 1834 there were 2,300,000 olive-trees, producing about a million okas of oil. In 1860 the trees numbered about 7,500,000, and the oil, 5,812,315 okas, from 370,000 stremmas of land. In 1876 the trees were estimated at twelve millions, and the okas of oil at nineteen millions, yielding an income to the State of 1,600,000 drs., on a total value of 23,000,000 drs., contributed by every province of the kingdom. In 1891 the value of exported olives was over a million drachmas, and of oil 8,711,000 drs. The exportation of figs had attained, in 1891, a value of 1,761,000 drs., more than half of which was earned by Messenia.

Greece yields large quantities of other sub-tropical fruits. M. Mansolas, in a volume of statistical information relating to the country, states that "all the varieties of the *Hesperidæa*, oranges, lemons, bergamots, citrons, &c., about a hundred sorts, have been introduced. These trees are spread over the

* The French fût ; about $16\frac{1}{2}$ imperial gallons. The figures are those of M. Moraitinis, who does not include the Ionian Islands, "desiring to record the progress achieved by regenerate Greece, adorned and enriched by the men of Greece, under Greek laws."

gardens of the islands and coasts, as well as on the slopes and valleys of Southern Greece. In many parts, and especially at Paros, Andros, Karysto, Naxos, Messenia, Sparta, Argolis, Lenidi, these fruits have become an important article of commerce. At one time Genoa largely exported these trees to Greece and the East; to-day Karysto, Paros, Andros, and Naxos have taken the place of Genoa. Finally, Greece also cultivates rice, particularly in Levadia, madder, opium, and flax."

Tobacco and cotton are comparatively new branches of culture in Greece. The annual export of the former now yields about four million drs. The cotton industry was practically created by the American Civil War. The plants were tried in the marshy lands of Levadia and Phthiotis; and they thrived so well, there and elsewhere, that the production of raw cotton rose from 28,537 quintals * in 1862 to 193,615 quintals in 1864. Since then, however, the production of cotton has diminished.

The forests of Greece had deteriorated greatly during the Turkish occupation, and they continued to deteriorate so long as they were left without proper superintendence, at the mercy of the klephts, the wandering shepherds, and the villagers.† The present extent of the forests is about five and a half million stremmas, which would be ample for the regulation of the climate and the attraction of rain, if they had been systematically preserved by the constant planting of young trees to fill the place of those which were cut down, or which had fallen into

* The quintal is about 100 kilogrammes, or 210 lbs.

† Lykabettus is now almost naked. Pentelikon, Parnassus, and even Hymettus, have been stripped.

decay. This necessary work was long neglected, and the climate probably suffered in consequence. In many parts of Greece the rains are insufficient; but there has been considerable improvement in this respect during recent years. The sale of timber, again, which yields to the State only a small revenue, might be made to produce a sensible effect upon the national balance-sheet; and there is here a fine opening for greater enterprise, and for the employment of a more abundant capital. The mountains of Acarnania, the Pholoë mountains, many of the ranges of the Morea, of Attica, of Eubœa and Thessaly, are covered with forests of oak, fir, and other serviceable trees.

Greece has indeed her forest laws, which, if strictly enforced, would soon bring about a more satisfactory state of things. As early as 1836 the Bavarian Government promulgated three decrees, all directed towards the prevention of the evil. Severe penalties were pronounced against those who injured the growing trees, and it was specially forbidden to drive the flocks into the underwood. An ephor was appointed to overlook the forests, having under him inspectors, guards, and foresters. But it would seem that the revenues of the State are benefited by less than a million drachmas—a sum insignificant by comparison with what it might be made.

The produce of bees, in honey and wax, is very considerable. The honey of Hymettus is still distinguished by its flavour, contracted from the many aromatic flowers of the plains and slopes of Attica; but yet more appreciated is the honey of Karysto, which, “transparent and golden, of a delicious flavour, fills the mouth with an aroma of roses, exquisitely delicate.”

On the whole, the agriculture of Greece is in a hopeful condition, languishing chiefly for want of capital, but not for want of soil, excellent varieties of plants, or the industry of agriculturists. The Government, moreover, has generally done its best to encourage cultivation, by subsidies, by remission of taxes, by founding institutions calculated to promote the scientific development of the natural wealth of Greece, and by providing facilities for technical education. The University of Athens has its Botanic Garden and Museum. Chambers of Commerce and Agricultural Councils exist in the principal towns of the nomarchies, part of whose business it is to keep the Government instructed as to the progress and requirements of their several districts. Many laws have been passed, in the past and present reigns, having for their object to protect and foster the agriculturists.

The absolute necessity for capital for the proper development of the national resources has stimulated Greek statesmen to attempt the foundation of an Agricultural Bank, not only to supply the needs which may hereafter arise, but also to assist the State in a work which seems to be imperatively demanded—the relief of the land from the heavy imposts now weighing upon it. More than once a vigorous effort has been made to establish such a bank, but hitherto the labour has been in vain.* One such proposition was due to M. Koumoundouros, and its boldness gave rise to not a little excitement throughout the country. He proposed that the State should take possession of the property of the convents, and, setting apart one-half of the value to

* There is, however, an Industrial Credit Bank, established in 1875.

provide pensions for the dispossessed monks, appropriate the other half to the foundation of the Agricultural Bank. The total estimated value of the conventual property in Greece is ten million drs.—only £357,000; and as the half of this would be insufficient for the purpose in view, it was suggested that additional capital should be raised, either by special bonds, or by loans from the National and Ionian Banks, at 4 per cent., in return for a twenty-five years' extension of their privileges. And furthermore, the new bank was to have the privilege of issuing to the extent of five times its actual capital—which would give it a nominal capital of a hundred million drachmas.

Conventual property has been secularised in various countries, and after various methods; but in this case Greek met Greek, and the scheme fell to the ground as soon as it was made public. The Holy Synod opposed four arguments to the proposition of M. Koumoundouros, which the Government considered too forcible to be neglected.

It urged, first, that there were plenty of lands in Greece, not yet under cultivation, which might serve the turn of the State as well as the conventual lands. This, of course, was far from being the case, inasmuch as the property of the monks is readily saleable, whilst the property of the State is not so. The second contention—that the confiscation was opposed to the canon law—might have had no greater force than the first; but the remaining two were more formidable. If the Government were to alienate the property of its own convents, urged the Synod, it would justify the confiscation of Greek convents in Roumania, against which it had strongly protested;

and, finally, it would give the Porte an excuse for stripping the Greek religious institutions in Turkey.

The Government of Athens admitted the cogency of these arguments, and abandoned its scheme. But secularisation of religious estates, with proper compensation for the religious communities, rests on very good precedents, and is certainly within the competence of every State.

The energy of the Greeks in respect of public works, for more than half a century past, deserves the fullest recognition. The country which the Turks left behind them on their expulsion bore no more significant evidences of their impotence and neglect than the marshy plains of the Morea and eastern Hellas. The heart of the Peloponnese, once the granary and storehouse of dense populations—the fertile tracts surrounding the cities of Megalepolis, Mantinea, Orchomenos, the plains of Stymphalos, and of the twelve cities round Lake Kopais (Topolias), the broad banks of a dozen life-giving streams, had all been reclaimed by the element from which the engineers of younger Greece had redeemed them. Part of this work of devastation, it is only right to say, was the consequence of the ten years' war, and of the abandonment of precautions which were observed even in the time of the Turks. Mr. Strong, writing in 1842, said that he had been told by the villagers living near the ruins of Stymphalos how, a quarter of a century before, they had been able after a dry winter to cultivate certain tracts of the marshy plain, and reap fifty times as much as they had sown.*

* Here is a fact to the credit of the Turks in Greece, worth recording on that account: "The old men of the valley of Stymphalos," says Mr. Strong, "still remember the considerable works which were under-

The extent of the mischief wrought by the neglect of public works, and of works of drainage in particular, may be judged from the circumstance that, out of twenty subterranean passages by which Lake Kopaïs was formerly drained, only one now exists in a serviceable condition. These artificial outlets were amongst the most creditable works of the old engineers; and we can readily understand that the opening of one of them (at Pheneus) was ascribed, as Pausanias relates, to Hercules. In the time of Alexander the Great, Crates pierced the mountain which separated Lake Kopaïs from the Eubœan channel. Forty vertical shafts, sunk into this tunnel for the purpose of cleansing it when necessary, remain to the present day. An English company has made considerable progress in draining this enormous lake, its intention being to carry off the water, by way

taken by the Turkish Government sixty-five years ago, in order to clear the subterraneous channel, which had become stopped up. During the six summer months of the year 1776, 500 men were employed on the undertaking. After having cleared away the mud and soil which choked up the modern channel, to the depth of fifteen feet, and above a hundred feet in length, they discovered regular steps cut in the red marble rock of which the mountain is composed. On clearing out the mud which covered the twenty steps, the lowest of which was about thirty-five feet below the level of the valley, which had risen by the accumulated deposit of alluvial soil, they came to the entrance of the ancient channel, consisting of two large gates, or openings cut in the rock. The operations were then directed to clearing these passages of the mud which obstructed them, in the hope of reaching the point where the ancient channel joined that through which the waters are at present disgorged, and which traverses the mountain at a less depth than the two ancient gates, but in the same direction. Scarcely, however, had they proceeded twenty yards with the operation, when a part of the roof of the cavern fell in suddenly with a tremendous crash, burying half a dozen workmen under it. The rest, who were mostly Greeks, were so frightened that they fairly ran away, and could not be persuaded to return, in consequence of which the works were unfortunately abandoned."—*Greece as a Kingdom*.

of Lakes Likeri and Paralimne, to the Channel of Talanta.

The completion of the Corinth Canal, on which a French company had spent £1,750,000 without success, has been effected by Greek capital and labour. This channel of three miles and a half, cut at a width of a hundred feet through the solid rock, and saving between two and three days in the voyage between Italy and the capitals of Greece and Turkey, is now in working order—a fitting monument to the enterprise of a free people.

The railways and carriage roads, the steamboat services and general marine of Greece, the restored harbours and constantly improved lighting of the coast, with many other details of material progress, which space forbids me to enumerate in the present volume, should suffice, in addition to what has already been said, to prove that the Greeks are a practical and competent race, full of commercial and maritime genius, ready to play a leading part in the re-civilisation of South-eastern Europe, and limited not by their own sloth, but by lack of resources and opportunities on which they had every reason to count. For, much as they have actually done to develop their small inheritance, it is impossible not to recognise that every forward movement of the Greek race, political or commercial, is barred in advance by the mutual jealousies of the Powers, who have given them a mandate without permission to obey it.

CHAPTER XV

GREECE AND CRETE

The Ninth Cretan Outbreak—The Broken Pact of Halepa—Turkish Intrigues against Turkish Governors—An “Irresistible Popular Current”—The Massacres in Crete—Greek Abstention Impossible—Greece occupies the Island—The demands of the Powers—Their Pedantry—Their Responsibility.

WE saw in the last chapter how in the years 1889 and 1890 M. Tricoupis was obliged to find 1,720,000 drachmas to supplement private benevolence for the relief of Cretan refugees. This last expenditure arose out of a new insurrection in the devoted island, which was, in fact, the opening of the latest and decidedly the most interesting and critical volume of modern Greek history.

Every fresh insurrection in Crete, every outrage on Cretans under the eyes of the Turkish soldiery, every flight of new victims to the Athenian sanctuary, had bound the island more inseparably to the mother country. A century such as this has been would have created a bond where none existed; but as it was seen in 1830, and as it has been seen by every man of discernment from that time to this, that Greece without Thessaly and Crete was like a

man crippled at his birth, so it is manifest to-day that each new vein of sympathy and freedom which carries the blood of a common body across the Cretan Channel threatens the very life of the kingdom in the event of its severance.

The Pact of Halepa had never been fairly observed. The Christian Valis had been capriciously changed, or thwarted by Mahomedan subordinates, or overawed by military governors. Crete, therefore, had never been at rest, and the approximation of the two creeds had been prevented by the Porte as often as it seemed to be possible. In 1889, after eleven years of fallacious operation, the Pact was repudiated by Turkey; the malcontents, or, when they could not be reached, the women and children, were butchered, and the insurrection was stifled in blood. Nine thousand houses, a hundred and fifty schools, and sixty-two churches were sacked and burned, wholesale ruin was brought upon the inhabitants, and Greece was flooded with refugees.


Not until 1895, after much further tyranny and perversion of justice, did the Powers induce the Porte to appoint another Christian Vali. Karatheodori Pasha, a Greek subject of the Sultan and a Turkish official of high standing and cha-

* Let me add one more testimony as it happens to occur to me:—
“ Je crains que les frontières artificielles de l'État nouveau, et les conditions qui lui sont imposées, n'aient pour effet de l'empêcher de se développer. De là, une situation fautive pour les Grecs et une éternelle tentation d'en sortir. S'ils tendent la main à leurs frères restés sous le joug, ils excitent la colère de leurs protecteurs; s'ils se résignent à rester ce qu'ils sont, ils se trouvent réduits à une certaine impossibilité de vivre, sans débouchés, sans commerce, sans relations; et leurs frères les accusent de les avoir livrés.”—Edgar Quinet, 1857.

racter, made a brief attempt to govern the island under the old conditions—that is to say, with a Mahomedan civil subordinate and a military governor. His authority was undermined, his police were not paid, his recommendations were ignored at Constantinople; and in March, 1896, he abandoned a position which was utterly untenable for a man of honour and self-respect.* As though the Turks had only waited until the Vali should be driven out, his departure was succeeded by a massacre of Christians at Canea.

There is no need to say with what feelings these events had been followed in Greece, whither the tide of Cretan refugees began once more to flow with its old strength and volume. After their bitter lesson in 1886, the Greeks of the kingdom had been quietly brooding—not forgetful or despairing, for they had built their fleet, and cherished their faith in the future. For more than six years they had harboured the exiles of Crete, who had varied in number but never wholly ceased. In 1889, misled for a moment by the fair promises of the Turk, they had counselled moderation whilst the Sultan was flooding the island with his troops. Even now, after the massacre of March, they listened to the European Governments and obeyed their injunctions, until our Ambassador at Vienna wrote in May to warn Lord Salisbury of the inevitable sequel:—

* Karatheodori himself had stated to the British Consul at Canea “that nothing more deplorable than the state of the finances could be imagined, that the gendarmerie was not in a condition to maintain public security, and that generally the officials act as if the only object of their holding office was to secure salaries for themselves.” The Mussulmans “made up their mind to wreck the Administration so as to show the impossibility of Crete being governed by Christian Valis.”



PLACE DE LA CONCORDE, ATHENS.

[To face p. 342.]

“ Moderation has been counselled by Count Goluchowski through the Austro-Hungarian representatives both at Athens and at Constantinople. His Excellency, however, fears that events have gone to such lengths that an irresistible popular current may carry away the King of Greece and his Government. In his opinion, the blame for the present situation lies entirely with the Turks themselves, and it will be impossible for Greece to stand aloof if acts of savagery take place in the island ; under such circumstances, she would probably have much European sympathy on her side.” *

And indeed the time was close at hand when Count Goluchowski's prediction was to be fulfilled. Abdullah Pasha was sent with reinforcements, red with the blood of Armenia, to the Turkish garrison in Crete ; and the islanders, who had occupied their familiar strong positions, managed to hold their own. The Sultan, following his usual course of feigned submission to the inevitable, and studiously watching for an opportunity of invasion, offered not merely the restoration of the Pact but a still larger measure of freedom. The promise was a form of autonomy, and at that stage the Cretans were willing to accept it—solely, of course, on the strength of its reaching them under the sanction of the Powers. They practically laid down their arms, waiting for the fulfilment of the pledge.

Meanwhile the Government of King George had remained quiescent.. Their attitude had been perfectly correct ; the Powers had acknowledged their moderation and patience, though it was known to all that the maltreatment of Crete, and the long-continued refusal of the Sultan to keep his word, had produced in Greece, amidst the race-fellows and blood-relations of the victims, an irrepressible

* *Parliamentary Papers : Turkey* No. 7, 1896, p. 86.

sympathy and desire to avenge. So late as February 4th, M. Delyannis * told the Boule that his Government intended to maintain its policy of abstention, in reliance on the promise of the Powers to safeguard the interests of the Cretans.

It is necessary to dwell upon this phase of the question, because the effort of Greece to conform to the wishes of the Powers was remarkably loyal and persistent. She had everything against her—the running fire of outrages by Mahomedans on Christians, especially throughout the years 1895 and 1896, the gauntlet of sharp criticism from the Greek constituencies, the spur of her own responsibility and indignation. It was as though she wished to make the contrast between 1886 and 1896 as sharp and vivid as possible. In the former year she had not been allowed to take the initiative as the champion of Greater Greece: now the Powers admitted that Crete needed a champion. Who was it to be? The same contrast had been marked by the action of Great Britain in declining to agree to the blockade of Crete when proposed by Austria in July, ten years after the raising of the blockade of Greece, proposed by Lord Rosebery in 1886. In fact, Lord Salisbury emphasised the contrast by the language which he employed to the representatives of the three emperors. The German ambassador

* M. Delyannis had returned to power after the elections of 1895. On January 22nd in that year M. Tricoupis, unable to arrive at an understanding with the bondholders, who were exasperated by his refusal of anything like supervision of the revenues assigned for the service of the Debt, resigned office. The elections which followed in April left him outside the Boule. Less than three months after his resignation he died at Cannes, in his sixty-third year (April 11, 1895).

expressly mentioned the blockade of 1886 as a precedent. Lord Salisbury replied that the distinction appeared to him to be very clear. "If Greece were to assume a hostile attitude to the Turkish Government, and make any aggression upon the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, the collective guarantee into which the Powers entered at the Treaty of Paris would become a matter for serious consideration." But the proposal of Austria was to "take part against the Cretan insurgents."

Lord Salisbury's attitude was so far logical. He might (and afterwards did) defend Turkey against Greece; but he would not defend the Turkish Government against its own subjects. In view of what was now to follow, this seems to have been a somewhat fine distinction.

On the very day when M. Delyannis was assuring Europe, through the Boule, that Greece would abstain from intervention — though by this time Turkish outrages on the Christians were being reported from day to day, and the Consuls had offered an asylum on the men-of-war to the Christian inhabitants of the coast towns—a frightful massacre took place in Canea. This is how a *Times* correspondent at Athens reported the news which reached the capital from Crete on the 5th of February, and the effect which was produced by such stories as that of the nine Christians roasted to death in a baker's oven:—

"The trouble in Crete seems to have reached a climax. Since yesterday at noon indiscriminate firing, begun by the Turkish soldiers from the battlement, has been going on in the streets of Canea. Fires have broken out at various points of the town, and are said to have already destroyed a large number of houses.

Such of the Christian inhabitants as were not able to take refuge on board the foreign warships have barricaded themselves in their dwellings. The Consuls made their way to the town to-day by water from Halepa, where the Christians are equally panic-stricken, and are flying to the foreign ships. British and French marines are guarding the Suda telegraph station. The situation is described by the Consuls in their telegrams as hopelessly compromised, and grave fears are entertained for the lives of the Christian population of the three towns. The above news has caused tremendous excitement here, and great enthusiasm has been aroused by the announcement made in the Chamber this evening by M. Delyannis, that the Government had decided to abandon the policy of abstention which he outlined yesterday, and had ordered two Greek warships to leave for Canea immediately. The ships selected are the ironclad *Hydra*, 500 men, and the cruiser *Mykale*, 300 men."

Now the inference from these facts is absolutely inevitable, and it is this—that the Greeks could not possibly have taken any other course. Further abstention would have been against nature. Not one of their censors, in this country or elsewhere, would have done differently in their place. Not one of the Powers, if it were possible to imagine them in similar circumstances, could have restrained its populace or its own impulse. To say that King George or his people were actuated by a mere desire for territorial aggrandisement is to talk manifest nonsense. That which was done by Greece was incontrovertibly right—or, a still stronger statement, was a dictate of humanity which could not have been disobeyed. We have become so familiar with the existence of the Turkish oppression in Europe that it costs us an enormous effort to look straight and squarely at what would otherwise seem an elementary problem of our common humanity—the martyrdom of Greeks and the championship of Greece.



AN EVZONE (GREEK REGULAR).

[To face p. 346.]

The whole island was at once plunged into war. From Kisamo and Selino in the west to Sitia in the east, fighting was renewed between the two races, which are irreconcilable under Turkish misrule, but which would speedily live together in amity, as they live in Thessaly, under the rule of Greece. The first impulse of the Christians, before the arrival of the Greek vessels, was to hoist the Greek flag and declare their union with the mother country (Feb. 6th). On the 10th, Prince George was sent with a flotilla of torpedo-boats to prevent the landing of Turkish troops. On the 13th, Colonel Vassos was despatched with a force of 1,500 men to occupy the island in the name of King George. On the 15th, Berovitch Pasha, the Christian Governor appointed by the Porte, who had taken refuge after the massacre at Canea with the Christian chiefs at Halepa, fled to Corfu. In the course of a few days the whole of Crete, except a few of the coast towns which could easily have been reduced, was in the hands of the Christians, and Greece, having the command of the sea, could no doubt have held the island against the Turks.

But this would have been an attack upon "the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire," which the six Powers had undertaken to maintain, until such time as they should be ready to destroy that integrity for their own purposes. They had entered into such a compact, taken up such a position, exchanged amongst themselves such pledges and guarantees, that it was certainly impossible from their own point of view to allow the dismemberment of Crete from Turkey. Therefore they called upon Greece to withdraw her troops, summoned the

insurgents to lay down their arms, and warned the Greek fleet that they would prevent by force "any act of aggression against the Turks."

At the same time they promised that Crete should receive a form of autonomy, and that she should not again pass under the direct rule of the Sultan, although his suzerainty must be maintained. It might have been wiser if Greece had accepted this conclusion. It would assuredly have been wiser if the Powers had built for her an easier bridge of retreat. Considering the circumstances under which she came to Crete, the compelling cause and the irresistible impulse, the most inept course imaginable was to demand, with threats of compulsion, that the Greek ships and troops should be withdrawn within six days, whilst the Turkish troops were to be retained "for reasons of police." This was no bridge of retreat, but a formidable barrier; the more so because at that very moment the statesmen of Europe were talking of their renewed hope in the stability of the Ottoman Empire—a hope renewed, if one comes to examine the matter closely, by the proved ability of the Sultan to massacre his Christian subjects by tens of thousands without let or hindrance from the Christian Powers. If it had been the set purpose of the Powers, or of some of the Powers, to make the withdrawal of Greece well-nigh impossible, a better plan for effecting that purpose could not have been devised. And so it was throughout the disastrous events which followed from these beginnings. The blood of Greece was hot, and the Powers gave her no alternative but abject submission. In return for a promise of autonomy which Europe might not have been able to fulfil—and the

failure would not have been without precedent—the Greeks and Cretans were to submit to conditions which were always galling, and frequently dishonouring.

This overbearing pedantry of the Powers, which only hardened the defiant mood of Greece, and the everlasting shame of their bombardments in Crete, made them largely responsible for the development of the situation, and for the final catastrophe of the Thessalian campaign. It is perhaps futile to speak of generosity in connection with the very matter-of-fact policy which has recently guided the counsels of Europe; but we had a right to expect that Britain, at any rate, would have dealt less illiberally, less ungenerously, with a nation whose defiance, after all, has been merely relative, like the defiance of a race-horse which has been bred and trained to win, and which is pulled by its jockey in the straight run home.

My Introductory Chapter deals in general terms with the crisis which has been created for us by the six Great Powers, and there is the less need on that account to review in detail the events of the past few months. But as the object of this volume is to combine a retrospective view of the progress of modern Greece with an estimate of her actual condition in regard to Europe, I shall conclude with a rapid survey of her literary development and achievement.

CHAPTER XVI

EDUCATION AND LITERATURE

Is Greece over-educated?—The National System of Education—The University of Athens—The Hellenic Genius—The Nature and Scope of Hellenisation—The Modern Greek Language—Klephtic Songs—Learning and Letters in the Nineteenth Century—Literature of To-day—Graver and Lighter Prose—The Drama—Poetry—Literature in Unredeemed Greece—The Syllogues—The Press—Folk-Lore and Fairy Tales.

EDUCATION is highly developed in modern Greece. There has never been a century, out of the past twenty or five-and-twenty centuries, in which the Greeks have not been the most intelligent and best instructed race of South-eastern Europe. This particular form of continuity is clearly one of the strongest proofs of legitimacy which can be urged on behalf of the Greeks of the kingdom.

It has often been urged that there is a plethora of educated people in Greece, and that the two millions of inhabitants do not require, and cannot find employment for, all the clerks, doctors, and lawyers turned out by the Gymnasia and the University of Athens. No doubt the poverty of the country, still more than its paucity of inhabitants, precludes the full utilisation

tion of this professional training. Some critics have been led to talk of the widespread education of Greece as an "impediment in the way of progress." Yet the very plethora of scholars and professional men indicates the fitness of the Greeks to undertake a civilising rôle in the East, and establishes on their behalf a strong claim for the extension of their influence and authority.


The physicians, lawyers, administrators, and clerks of the Ottoman Empire have been principally Greeks for centuries past. Education amongst the Mussulmans has never been more than rudimentary, and the State has had no system whereby public instruction was practically enforced upon the young. To the present day, the best, if not the only schools in populous Turkish towns are those in which Greek and Mahomedan pupils are taught side by side; and the masters or mistresses of such schools are nearly always Greek. There is no comparison of any sort between the national education of the Turks and that of the Greeks; and the superiority of the latter race, in point of instruction, to every other now or recently subjected to Turkey is very distinctly marked.

The Greeks have been penetrated in every age by the conviction that knowledge was the most available and the highest kind of power. This conviction was the saving clause of their servitude, and it may be said to have been the chief agent in their recovery of national independence. As soon as the Morea and the southern continent of Hellas were freed from the Turks, and the remaining nucleus of Greeks were able to turn aside from their internecine quarrels to consider the basis of their future institutions, the

first lawgivers of New Greece resolved that education should be the primary aim and effort of the State.

It is true, as M. Burnouf observed (although, perhaps, in too sweeping terms), that the instruction of the Greeks in 1830 was almost non-existent; that the country was in some sense "a solitude overrun by triumphant and ignorant klephts," and that everything needed to be done. Much, no doubt, required to be done over again; for the barbarous rage of Sultan Mahmoud and his mercenary, Ibrahim Pasha, had destroyed the schools of Greece with special zest. The education of children and adults was at a standstill; and for ten years the land had been overshadowed by intellectual darkness. But still a system of education had been at work even under the rule of the Pashas; and the Greeks fell back, without difficulty or long preparation, into a familiar groove.

They began, first of all, with the elementary education of both sexes. Even Capo d'Istria turned his attention to the matter as to one of the highest importance; but it was not until the Bavarians made a certain approximation to orderly government that anything durable was achieved. In 1834 a training school, or "seminary for schoolmasters," was established, and supplied the elementary schools with their teachers. In the year 1840 there were registered in Greece as many as 252 of these elementary schools, which were attended by 22,000 scholars. These were under Government control, and dependent upon Government support; but in addition there were voluntary schools, supported by the priests and others, which brought up the total number of children receiving some kind of



THE APSAKEION AT ATHENS.

[To face p. 352.]

education to 32,000. The proportion to the entire population was little more than 4 per cent., or forty in the thousand. Poor as this result unquestionably was, the rate was already half as high as it was in England a generation later.

In 1872 there were under instruction in Greece—at public establishments, 73,219; at private establishments, 7,978 pupils; total, 81,197—or something over 56 in the thousand. The corresponding figures for 1877 were as follows:—In the Communal Schools, 74,561; in private schools, 10,650 pupils; total, 85,211—or, on a population of one million and a half, about the same proportion as in 1872.*

Ten years after the annexation of Thessaly there were in the whole of Greece about 2,350 public elementary schools, educating over 80,000 boys and 21,000 girls; whilst the private schools brought up the number of children under twelve, subject to formal instruction, to about 6·5 per cent. of the population. The comparatively small number of girls in the public schools is worthy of notice.

Elementary education in Greece, in addition to being gratuitous, is compulsory—at least in theory. Children are compelled by law to attend the primary schools between the ages of seven and twelve years.

The comparison between Greece and other civilised countries in the matter of education is more favourable to the former when we pass on to the Secondary Schools. Between the ages of ten and twenty, one out of every fourteen male inhabitants (in 1877) was under instruction. The different classes of the

* The population of the kingdom in 1870, according to a census taken in that year, was 1,457,894.

secondary schools, including those supported by the State and those dependent upon private effort, were as follows : " Hellenic " Grammar Schools, attended by 6,055 pupils ; Gymnasia, 1,942 ; Foreign Societies' Schools, 1,414 ; Naval Schools (six), 83 ; Ecclesiastical Seminaries (four), 115 ; Roman Catholic Girls' School, 240 ; Polytechnic School, 300 ; other establishments, 5,826.

In 1893 the number of Hellenic schools was 281, and of scholars, 18,240 ; the number of Gymnasia, 41, and of scholars, about 6,000.

The regular gradation for male scholars in Greece is from the Primary Schools to the Grammar Schools, and thence to the Gymnasia and University, the instruction being gratuitous throughout.

The University of Athens, opened in the year 1837, numbered, four years later, 292 students—167 in Law, 53 in the Arts, 52 in Medicine, and 20 in Theology. Of these, no fewer than sixty-nine came from abroad ; that is to say, from the Ionian Islands, Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, Thessaly, Wallachia, and Asia Minor. Thus, from its first institution, the University served to bring together the most prominent and promising of the rising generation of Greeks, and it became, as its founders expected that it would, a rallying-point for the scattered and half-emancipated race.* It was with this anticipation that the wealthy Greeks in all parts of the

* George Gennadius was amongst the founders and first professors of the University. He was connected with education before he played his memorable part in the War of Independence ; and when the war was ended he established the " Central School " at Ægina, which flourished in spite of the illiberal discouragements of Capo d'Istria and his Corfuote sycophants. On the death of Gennadius, Professor Thiersch wrote an appreciative notice of him in the *Ausland* (1854), in which he says : " Gennadius

world made a strenuous effort to establish it on a firm basis, and to erect a worthy edifice as the chief home of learning in Greece. Up to the year 1841, about a quarter of a million drachmas were subscribed for the building, whereof 32,000 came from Alexandria, 9,500 from the Ionian Islands, 7,600 from Constantinople, and other considerable sums from Smyrna, Ibraila, Jassy, and Galatz, and wherever the Greeks formed a numerous colony. The University buildings are situated in a fine square in Athens, where their white marble walls, columns, and statues present what is considered to be one of the finest features in the restored capital.

The progress of the various faculties has been as marked as that of every other form of education in Greece. Thus the number of students had risen to 550 in 1855; it had more than doubled in the first

may be considered as the founder of the Greek Gynmnasia, and to him is due the first Philological faculty in the University of Athens, wherein most of the professors are his disciples. He has left many original works and translations; but he (notwithstanding his great patriotic work during the War of Independence) wished to be, and remained to the last, the true master and guide of the youth of Greece, a position which no inducement could prevail upon him to abandon, and through which he influenced in many ways and with much effect the intellectual and scientific regeneration of Greece. His death leaves an irreparable gap in Greece and throughout the Hellenic world, in which his many disciples cherish his memory. But in Germany also, where Gennadius sojourned in 1822 and 1823, on his way from Southern Russia to Greece, those who had the good fortune to make the acquaintance of this talented man of letters and eminent patriot will hold his name in abiding and affectionate remembrance."

The career of this illustrious Greek is aptly summarised by the French historian, J. J. Ampère:—"Un seul savant, M. Gennadius, tout en réclamant dans la lutte armée une part glorieuse, resta fidèle à ses fonctions académiques. Nul n'exhorta plus énergiquement que lui les combattants aux sacrifices et à l'union; en même temps, autant que les circonstances le permirent, il ne cessa jamais d'instruire la jeunesse."

year of King George's reign ; and it now reaches an aggregate of about 3,400 ; the number of professors being fifty-three. Connected with the University there are excellent museums, laboratories, a library of over 170,000 volumes ; clinical, obstetrical, and other hospitals ; an observatory, a botanical garden, and almost every adjunct which an English or French scholar would find at Oxford, Cambridge, or Paris.

The State expended, in 1876, the following sums in providing gratuitous education at the University :—

On the four Faculties	...	...	333,240 drachmas.
„ Library	...	...	33,900 „
„ Observatory...	...	...	14,220 „
„ Botanic Garden	...	...	7,760 „
On Archæology	...	...	123,690 „

Approximately the same amount is provided to-day.

Respect for knowledge is only one feature, though it is perhaps the most conspicuous feature, of the Hellenic genius, which has of late afforded unmistakable proofs of its vitality and rejuvenescence. The character of Hellenism reveals itself wherever the Greeks have enjoyed a few generations of independent social life. It has accommodated itself to the Christian ethics and to international conventions, as well as to the nineteenth-century environment of positive facts, but in all essentials it is (as, being based largely on surviving literature and art, we should naturally expect it to be) the same as it ever was. Predominance of the *idea* ; acceptance of the whole logical sequence between the idea and its execution ; the love of justice, order, and virtual

equality, creating and directing the municipal community as it governs and directs the family; the fervour of patriotism, giving birth to phenomenal heroism whenever the country is in danger; the idealisation of natural beauty, offspring of a cultivated eye and an intellectual sense of harmony and subordination; the idealisation of moral beauty—all these characteristics we find in the Greeks of antiquity; and we meet them again, some already prominent, others as yet less distinctly indicated, in the Greeks of to-day.

It is one of the most interesting studies of the age to watch the progress of this new Hellenisation, gradually recovering its force after a suppression of centuries, and after what was so nearly an absolute effacement. The terrible incubus of Turkish misrule is not yet expelled from South-eastern Europe, and we can realise the full extent of the mischief which it has effected during the past five hundred years. The crime of the Turk is summed up in the fact that he had almost destroyed Hellenic civilisation; and the merit of his victorious enemies begins with the fact that, sometimes in spite of themselves, they have rescued and restored this civilisation. It is true that history has preserved for us a record of the continuity of Greek civilisation—not only in the persistent encouragement by the Eastern Church of secular learning, but also in the high refinement of comparatively free Greek colonies, and of comparatively neglected portions of the Ottoman Empire—such as the island of Chios up to the beginning of the present century. But, in spite of this, the nucleus of effective Hellenism whereby the modern kingdom of Greece was endowed at its birth was feeble, and its

work for the past seventy years, performed under the most adverse conditions, has been laborious and slow. The spirit of the Turk has been a negation of intellect, industry, and art. Now that Europe has abolished Turkish rule over so large a portion of the Ottoman Empire, we begin to recognise the renewed vigour of Hellenism.


It is sometimes argued that little is to be expected of the Greeks because of the paucity of their numbers; that Bulgarians, or Albanians, or Mahomedans, have a prior claim upon such and such a territory because a census of the population shows the Greeks to be in a minority. Many hasty conclusions have been accepted with regard to the populations of the Ottoman Empire, from which deductions have been drawn unfavourable to the cause of Greek regeneration; but, even if these were all correct, the plea of numbers is by no means the strongest of those which are put forward on behalf of the cause in question. It may be that the Greeks in Europe and Turkey are hardly more in number than the inhabitants of London, and that the entire nation in Europe, Asia Minor, and the islands does not exceed ten millions. How many, then, were the Greeks who broke the power of Xerxes? How many were the Greeks of the mother country which colonised Thrace, Asia Minor, the islands of the Levant, Egypt, Sicily, the coast of Gaul? What, judging from the narratives of the historians, would have been the census of the Spartan and Athenian Republics? There could be no greater mistake than that of judging the force of the Hellenic race, as compared with the surrounding populations by the single criterion of numbers.

François Lenormant puts this view cogently, whilst describing the predominant influence of Hellenism in the liberation of the South-east.* “The Hellenic race represents the motive power in the Ottoman Empire, as, twenty-two centuries ago, it represented it in Persian Asia. It represents the same motive power even in the immense Russian Empire, to which it has given its faith, its civilisation, and its arts, so that, in a moral sense, there has been rather a kind of transformation of Slavs into Greeks than the alleged transformation of the Greeks into Slavs, which Fallmerayer took upon himself to assert as a positive fact. Wherever trade, industry, and civilisation have attained a certain degree of development in Eastern countries, the honour of the fact belongs to the Greeks. Clergymen, physicians, moneychangers, merchants, pashas, secretaries, financial clerks, interpreters, all over Turkey, the Greeks have cast over the country a sort of immense net, which allows them to secure all the business, to take in hand the direction of every Governmental intrigue or popular movement. Their mission has been even to revive the national sentiment in the other Christian races. In Servia, the germs of emancipation and recovery were planted by Rhigas, and by the hospodar Constantine Hypsilantes, long before the movement which has now manifested itself amongst the Slavonian populations. The Roumanians of Moldavia and Wallachia, who show to-day so much animosity and rage against the Greeks, and confiscate, in spite of right and treaties, the property of their convents, only began to feel themselves a nation when they were released from

* *La Grèce et les Iles Ioniennes*, p. 5.

their ignorance and debasement by the Phanariot princes, when they had had for a century an exclusively Greek education, and when Bucharest was the first reconstructed centre of Hellenic life. . . . In the parts of Bulgaria where Hellenism has diffused its influence, the Bulgarians also have risen in their own estimation. In the condition of decadence to which servitude had reduced them, they had scarcely preserved any love of country, and their only patriots had passed through Greek schools. It would be easy to show the Hellenic movement, as powerful as it is beneficent, penetrating, by a sort of infiltration, through Asia Minor and Syria, amongst the Maronites of the Lebanon, and even, occasionally, amongst Mussulman chieftains, like Ali Bey and the Emir Daher, who attempted to raise the flag of Arabic nationality against the Ottoman Porte."

Not even here is the limit of the Hellenic influence to be found. According to some thinkers, for whose theories a great deal may be said, there is a Hellenism in the history of individual minds, as in the history of the human race. The phase is reached when a man has attained the full conception of his individual dignity. It is the highest product of the Indo-Caucasian spirit, and, once imbibed, is hereditary through endless generations. It informed and inspired the noblest productions of art, speech, and thought; gave us a Phidias, a Sophocles, a Demosthenes, a Socrates; dominated and perfected the minds of men in every succeeding generation. The history of Hellenism is the history of humanity in its sublimest flights; and it has been said, with scarcely perceptible exaggeration, that it would be easier to enumerate the refinements which mankind does not



THE ACADEMY AT ATHENS.

[To face p. 360.]

owe to the Greeks than it would be to reckon up our debts. The subtle influence has transformed and appropriated all that went before it, as it has been foremost to generate or impregnate all that has come after it. It brooded on the rude conceptions of Arabia and Egypt, and gave us the natural and metaphysical sciences. It brooded over the abstractions and absorptions of Judaism, and nursed the infant Christianity into a giant before whom the world was fain to bow. It found on the Nile an essence of reason and scepticism, which it refined seven times in the fire of its own penetrating genius, and endowed with its own immortal spirit. It conquered its conquerors in every age, being most beneficent when most oppressed, and saved civilisation alive when the world was relapsing into savagery.

Is it possible for us to suppose that the true Hellenic race—the descendants of a race to which the world owes all that it holds most sacred—is to be permanently subjected to Turk, or Slav, or Russian? There is not room in human nature for such an anti-climax.

The fact which governs and controls the literature of modern Greece is that the language has, for a considerable time past, been undergoing a peculiar process of change. The speech of the Hellenic race has been regenerated with the race itself; and this important modification, which began in some sort before the outbreak of the insurrection in 1821, is not yet complete.

The history of language offers, perhaps, no more striking instance of a race of men setting itself

deliberately to reconstruct its own ancestral grammar and vocabulary, and discarding, in the course of a generation or two, the corruptions of centuries. Yet that is what the Greeks have attempted, and with no small measure of success. As the revival of national life involved, for Greece, the revival of learning, so, with equal necessity, the revival of learning implied the return of the race towards the classical epoch of its language. From 1820 forwards, the Greeks began to make it almost a point of honour to employ the more archaic forms, and especially to strip from the speech of Pericles and Æschylus the ungainly Turanianisms of their oppressors. To take a single instance: the Turkish name for a gun, *toufek*, had been the word most frequently used in Greece for that invention of modern times. In this case the ancient Greek did not supply a name for the complex idea; but it instantly resumed its vital energy in obedience to the instinctive demand, and thenceforth the gun of the Greek patriot was his *televodon*, that which carried his missile far, when he aimed it at the heart of his enemy.* The change effected is already a radical one; and the consequence is that there are now in Greece two distinct forms of speech. More precisely, we may say that there are a score of different forms, from the classicalism of the University to the rudest *patois* of Bœotia or of the Maina. We have, therefore, two distinct kinds of modern Greek literature, the Romaic (as the corrupt Greek has commonly been called), and the neo-classical.

The Greek language was undergoing a rapid


* Prosper Mérimée, Introduction to *Contes et Poèmes de la Grèce Moderne*.

process of decay long before the break up of the Byzantine Empire. It shared to some extent the fate of Latin in Western Europe, although its decomposition was not destined to proceed so far. Latin has been practically dead for centuries; but Greek has never been a dead language. It has been spoken by purists in every age. It has been retained (like the Latin) by men of science, and in the Universities; but it has also had the advantage of being preserved, comparatively pure, by the patriarchs and priests of the Eastern Church. And, finally, it has been taught, from the best text-books, in the schools which have been constantly associated with the ecclesiastical organisation of the Orthodox communion. In these schools, at the patriarchates, in the houses of the wealthy Greeks, in the libraries and syllogues which escaped the long arm of Turkish oppression, the sacred flames of learning and of patriotism supported each other with a mutual heat; and towards the end of the eighteenth century the ardour of these flames had made itself felt over the whole extended surface of what may not inaptly be described as Greater Greece—amongst the primates and the commercial men of Hellas and the Morea, amongst the great shipowners of Hydra, Spetzai, and Psara, in learned and refined societies, such as that of Chios, in the thousand mercantile communities of Thrace and Macedonia, and throughout the numerous Greek populations of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. Wider even than this the fervour had extended itself. It had been nursed by the great hospodars of the Danubian principalities; it was fanned into greater brightness in the capitals of Europe; it supplied work for the printing-presses of

Vienna, Venice, Trieste, and Paris; it generated a new flame of Philhellenism in Russia, Germany, and the West.* Europe hailed with enthusiasm this regeneration of the Greek language and the Hellenic spirit. For more than two centuries the scholars and the schoolboys of Christendom had been indoctrinated with the ideas of the classical age. They were destined now to repay a long accumulating debt to the two great Aryan races of the South; and it is not entirely fanciful to say that "the great dead of Greece," the tragedians, the historians, old Homer himself, contributed to the redemption of their race in the nineteenth century.

There had been a lighter literature in Greece

* "From the farthest limits of Thrace and from Macedonia to Tenarus, in all the islands and in the western parts of Asia Minor, Greek was the language of the Church, of literature, and of politics. For many years the population under Turkish rule were deprived of all means of education, for most of the scholars who rendered Greece illustrious during the fifteenth century—Gemistos, Bessarion, George of Trebizond, Argyropoulos, Lascaris, Chalcocondylas, and numberless others—passed with their learning either into Western Europe, or to those Greek Islands still occupied by the Venetians, and were thus the cause of the revival of Greek civilisation in Italy and France, whilst in its birthplace it was obscured from the middle of the fifteenth down to the end of the sixteenth century. Public instruction began to revive about the beginning of the seventeenth century, owing to the initiative of that Greek community which was formed at Venice by fugitives from all parts of Greece. They left their country, but they did not forget her, and sought to prepare for her a brighter future. They advanced funds, and chose able teachers. Many schools were founded at Athens and Yanina. Yanina, especially, became quite a college for teachers, who in their turn became the heads of schools in the Peloponnesus and Continental Greece, in Thessaly, Macedonia, Scio, Cydonia, Constantinople, Yassy, and Bucharest. The words of such celebrated masters as Eugenius, Boulgaris, Nicephoros, Theotokis, John Demitriades, Constantine Koumas, Stephen Doungas, Constantine Economos, Neophytos Bambas, George Gennadios, and others as illustrious, resounded from one end of the Hellenic East to the other."—*Modern Hellenism*, p. 10 (published by the London Hellenic Committee.)



[To face p. 364.]

THE OBSERVATORY, ATHENS.

during the Middle Ages (in addition to works on theology and history), which divided itself into two main streams—the one chivalric, chiefly imitated from the romantic narratives of the French *trouvères* and the Italian chroniclers, and owing its existence in part to the ceaseless eastern flow of Latinised Europe towards the Holy Land—the other, more distinctly popular and national, reflecting the national life in its simplest and most familiar forms. The characteristics of this latter species of song—for song it was, almost invariably—are much the same as those of the ballad and *chanson* literatures of France, Italy, and Spain, at corresponding periods of their history. Always accompanied by rude music of some kind or another, of the voice when the lyre or *saza* was absent, often improvised by the wandering minstrels, or drawn from the repertory of an imperfect memory, or accommodated with more or less skill to new and special occasions, these rude ballads sprang direct from the daily experience and sensations of the peasants, shepherds, and muleteers of Greece, and reflected the superstitions and the wild passions of a subjected race.

Two trains of ideas more frequently than any other may be distinguished amongst these songs of modern Greece—those which were inspired by religious observances, and those which clustered round the romantic life of the mountaineers, the refugees from oppression, and the bandits, all of whom have been somewhat roughly classed as *klephts*. The Eastern Church has invariably exercised a powerful and paternal influence over the humbler ranks of Greeks—as it does to this day over the millions of Slavs and Greeks whom it has

gathered into its fold. We cannot, therefore, be surprised to find that many of the songs and "recitatives" of the Greeks—a sort of secular hymns—are associated with the rites and ceremonies of their religion. The feast of St. Basil (Jan. 1st), the Carnival, the feast of St. Constantine, and other days and seasons more or less specially sanctified by the Church, are celebrated with great fervour by the majority of the population; and most of them have their appropriate songs. The observance of days extends beyond the ecclesiastical calendar. Thus the children have a feast of their own on the 1st of March, when they sing from door to door, carrying the figure of a swallow in their hands, and repeating a simple refrain:—

"She is here, she is here!
The swallow that brings us the beautiful year;
Wide open the door!
We are children again, we are old no more." *

The songs of the klephts, or, more properly, of the mountaineers—for there are many so-called klephtic songs which are the purest outpourings of unalloyed patriotism—are very popular throughout the provinces of Greece, and were still more popular previous to and during the struggle with Turkey. There is, it must be confessed, a great monotony in this anthology of a wild and oppressed race; yet it is interesting not only as a historical phenomenon but also as the efflorescence of a tender sentiment. It is impossible to compare it with the poetic anthology of France or Italy; but there can

* Bougeault, *Histoire des Littératures Étrangères*, t. iii. p. 534.—The modern Greek songs have been collected by Fauriel, the Count de Marcellus, Pappadopoulos Vretos, Sathas, Passow, Wagner, and others.

be no question as to the vitality and strength of the feeling to which it bears witness. I venture to paraphrase one of these klephts' songs, taking it almost at hazard; it is a fair specimen of the mingled baldness and significance of the majority:—

Bathed in the mountain-spring Pliaskas lies
Immersed, and yet his pulses throb and burn.
Then to the sparrows round him twittering cries,
“Birds, is there any hope? Will strength return?”

“Pliaskas, wouldst thou live? Dost healing crave?
To fair Olympus wend thy weary way!
There brave are never sick, sick ever brave,
There dwell the klephts, and wield unfettered sway.

“Riches and glory wait on courage there;
Tolios at Caterina rules alone,
Nikos and Christos wide dominion share,
Lazopoulos is lord at Platamon.”

Forth fares the sad Pliaskas, evil-starred;
To Tournavos his eager steps are bound:
By treacherous enemies the path is barred,
And soon his head is rolling on the ground.*

* C. Fauriel, *Chants Populaires de la Grèce Moderne*, t. i. p. 29

Κοίτῃ ὁ Πλιάσκας, κοίτῃται 'σ τὴν ἐρήμην τὴν βρόσιν :
Μετὰ ποδάρια 'σ τὸ νερὸν, πάλε νερὸν γυρεύει
Μετὰ πιονλιὰ συντύχαινε καὶ μετὰ χελιδόνια
“Τάχα, πιονλιὰ, θὰ ἰατρευθῶ ; τάχα, πιονλιὰ, θὰ ἰάνω ,”

“Πλιάσκα, μὲν θύλῃς ἰατρικὴν, νὰ ἰάνωνν ἢ πληγαὶ σου,
'Εβγα ψηλά 'σ τὸν Ὀλυμπόν, 'σ τὸν εὐμορφὸν τὸν τόπον.
'Ανέριτοι 'κεῖ εἰν ἄρρωστοὶν, κ' ἄρρωστοὶ ἀνιρεῖόνων.
'Εκ' εἰν οἱ κλέφτες οἱ πολλοὶ, τὰ τέσσαρα πρωτάτα.

“Ἐκεῖ μοιράζωνν τὰ φλωριά, καὶ τὰ καπετανάτα.
Τοῦ Νίκου πέφτ' ἢ ποταμιὰ, τοῦ Χρήστ' ἢ Ἀλασῶνα,
'Ο Τόλιος καπετάνεψε φέτος 'σ τὴν Κατερίνην,
Καὶ τὸ μικρὸν Λαζόπουλον πῦρε τὴν Πλαταμῶναν.”

Who will doubt that the vivid Greek imagination

Κ'ὁ Πλιάσκαρς ὁ κακόμοιρος, ὁ κακομοιριασμένος,
'Σ τὸν Τοῦρναβον κατέβαινε, ἵκεϊ νὰ σεριανίσῃ,
Καὶ οἱ ἔχθροί κατόπι τοῦ τοῦ πῦρ'αν τὸ κεφάλι.

The son of Lazos and his fellow klephts lived early in the present century, on the mountains of Thessaly. Several of them were surprised and slain at Kapsaris, about the middle of the second decade.

A rendering in English verse of the songs collected by Fauriel was published in the year 1825, by Mr. Charles Brinsley Sheridan, from whom I quote a few stanzas of the inspired "Hymn to Liberty" of Dionysius Salomos, a Greek poet who had previously written both in Greek and in Italian. The date of this poem is 1823.

"Yes! I know thee by the lightning
Of thy tyrant-slaying glaive,
By thine awful glances bright'ning
As thou gazest on the brave.

"Kindle from our country's ashes,
Liberty! thy sacred fire.
Many a Spartan sabre clashes:
Breathe on one Tyrtæan lyre.

"Thou wert grovelling in the dust,
Humbled by thy bitter doom;
Heaven was still thine only trust—
Heaven has uttered, 'Quit the tomb!'

"Brooding o'er our hills and plains,
Silence watch'd the thunder near.
Every arm was cramp'd by chains,
Every heart was chill'd by fear.

". . . Now thy sons, defying danger,
Strike beneath their native sky,
And distrusting every stranger,
Swear to free themselves, or die.

". . . Seven young sisters from the main
Raised on high applauding hands,
Though protection's treacherous chains
Bound them still in flowery bands.

". . . Woe to those who meet the glaive
Grasp'd by Freedom's fearless hand,
And infatuated brave
Græcia's roused and patriot band."

saw more than meets the eye in these simple lines? —saw wounds of the soul, rather than of the body, which no cunning of nature or art could cure, and which drove the sufferer from house and home, to appease his restless heart in the wild freedom of the mountains? The melancholy close is a common feature in these poems; and that, too, is a reflection of the circumstances amidst which they were composed and sung.

There are other songs expressing still more forcibly the patriotic sentiments of the mountaineers; and the most remarkable of them all are those which show that the *armatoles* were themselves frequently as patriotic as those who had never accepted service under the tyrants. The following bold allegory may serve as an instance:—

“Olympos and Kissavos, the mountains, chide each other.
 Olympos says to Kissavos, ‘Why with me do you quarrel,
 You who have ever been trampled by the Moslem?
 I am ancient Olympos, and in the world am famous.
 Of summits I have forty-two, and brooklets two and sixty.
 Each brooklet has its banner, and every tree its Klept.
 And on my highest peak is perched an eagle.
 He holds within his talons’ grasp a warrior’s head.
 Oh, wretched head of mine, why are you thus maltreated?
 Eat, bird, my youth, and, if you can, my courage.
 Your wing will grow a yard in height, your claw will stretch a palm.
 Twelve years was I an *Armatole* at Xerómero and Louro.
 At Khassia and on Olympos twelve years was I a Klept.
 Sixty Agas have I killed and left in flames their hamlets.
 Many are the Turks, my bird, and many the Albanians,
 That I have left upon the turf; they never can be numbered.
 But my turn came at last to fall in midst of battle.’ ” *

The contemporary literature of Greece, whether cast in the popular form or purged more or less

* *Modern Hellenism*, as quoted above.

fastidiously from the most ungainly corruptions of the language, is still a continuation of the literary activity of the past century and a half. From the time of the illustrious Phanariots who first won the confidence of the Porte, from the patriarch Samuel, from Bulgaris,* Doukas,† and Rhigas,‡ from the scholarly Koraes, from Theotokes, George Gennadius,§ Rhizos Neroulos, Minas, and Schinas, to

* A Corfuot, who taught at Mount Athos, was made Bishop of Kherson by the Empress Catherine, and translated the *Æneid*, and the *Confessions* of St. Augustine (1716—1806).

† A pupil of Lambros Photiades, at Bucharest. He was himself a schoolmaster at Janina, who translated Virgil, and modernised Thucydides.

‡ The Tyrtæus of New Greece—a Thessalian in the service of Michael Soutzo, hospodar of Wallachia, whose patriotic songs did much to rouse his countrymen to rebellion. He ventured across the Austrian frontier, and was promptly handed over to the Turks.

§ George Gennadius, who died at the age of sixty-four, had also been a pupil of Photiades. In the funeral oration which A. Rhangabé was deputed by the University to deliver in 1854, there occurs a graphic account of the spirited action by which Gennadius was able to avert one of the greatest dangers which menaced the country in the War of Independence. Nauplia was crowded by refugees from Missolonghi, who were growing desperate and dangerous. "But no one had the courage to act; no one had a plan to propose. Then Gennadius, emerging from the crowd, sprang upon the roots of the plane-tree which grew in the middle of the square, and thence, turning his flashing eyes upon the multitude, with a loud voice, and an eloquence which carried all before it, because it came from the heart, cried:—'The fatherland is being destroyed; the struggle is failing; freedom is at her last gasp. There is need of immediate help. These brave men, who have lived on powder and breathed flames, who swarm about us in their idleness and starvation, must be hurried off to new scenes of danger. We need money for this, and money there is none. But if we mean to have a fatherland, if we are worthy to be free, the money will be found. Let each man give what he has and what he can. Here is my poor mite. Let him copy me who will!' And amidst the cheering of the crowd he turned out upon the earth the slender purse of a scholar. . . . 'But no!' he continued, after a pause, 'this is a worthless contribution. Not another obolos have I to give; but I have myself, and I offer myself to the highest bidder. Who wants a teacher for his children for four years?



GEORGE GENNADIUS (d. 1854).

[To face p. 370.]

the present generation, the succession has been uninterrupted. Of historians and prose writers in the last generation, we may take note of Paparrigopulos, author of a *History of Greece from its Origin*, of S. Tricoupi and Soutzo amongst the historians of the Revolution, and of Constantine Sathas, who, amongst his numerous historical and biographical labours, has given to the world the most complete account of Greek learning from the year 1453,

Let him throw the price down there!’ These noble words kindled a flame of irrepressible enthusiasm. All hastened forward with tears in their eyes, and some brought money, and others, not excepting the very soldiers who were suffering from poverty and hunger, brought arms or ornaments, or whatever they had which would fetch a price. Thus in a short time enough was collected to provide for the first and most pressing needs.”

The women were called upon to assemble next day in the church, and add their contributions; but many stayed away. Then, hot with indignation, he turned to the children of the public schools who stood beside him, and cried aloud:—“‘ Unhappy children, your mothers have deserted you! They have heard that the Ottoman butchers and enslaves the Greek, that to-morrow he will come and drag you into captivity; but little they reck if they can save their paltry gold. No other protector remains to you on earth, but only the common protector of all, who is yonder in heaven. Fall upon your knees and pray to Him!’ And all the children, afraid to disobey that imperious voice, knelt down. And he bared his head, and raised his eyes to heaven, and cried: ‘O God, most high, Thou that art the protector of the wretched, and of them that have no refuge, do not Thou also abandon these children that bow before Thee. Save them from the chains of slavery. They who begat them have turned aside from them; do Thou look down upon them. Look down upon Greece, against whom all men have risen, whom her own offspring desert and betray. . . . Or if Thou, the all-wise, knowest that it is destined that they should be trained to ignoble feelings, and brought up to selfishness and love of power, so that they should hereafter bring evil upon their country, give them rather to the edge of the sword, and me with them, that I may not again behold a day of slavery and humiliation for Greece!’ And when he had ended his prayer, he hurried out of the church, leaving the people awestruck and in tears.”

After that the women subscribed more than the men; and from Nauplia were despatched the expedition of Karaiskakis and Hadji Michaelis's troop of horse, which did much to turn the tide of war.

enumerating within the four centuries no fewer than twelve hundred writers in his own language.

“Year by year,” said a writer in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, nearly forty years ago, “the Academy at Athens conducts a competition in poetry, and gives a prize, founded by the wealthy patriot, Ambrose Ralli, to the poet whose production is considered the most noteworthy for originality, and best calculated to restore the language to its pristine purity. The day fixed for the formal winding up of the competition is the 25th of March, the anniversary of the proclamation of Greek independence. On that day the whole of Athens is excited; every class of society displays the like eagerness; the cafés and bazaars are deserted; the open places are filled by the crowd, which gesticulates, shouts, and argues with the warmth natural to the race. After reading a report on the several productions in the competition, the president announces the winner, congratulates him on behalf of the nation, reads his verses aloud, and sets a laurel crown on his brow. The crowned poet, when he quits the meeting, is received by the acclamations of the multitude, and is borne off to his home almost as it were in a triumph.”

The Greeks are disposed to look upon the cultivators of the national language and literature as patriots of a very genuine kind; and they are wont to pay special honour to their poets. It is not unnatural that they should consider poetry and patriotism as indissolubly associated, seeing how many of the first soldiers of independence were poets, and how many of their poets supplied the music of war which led their countrymen to victory.

Rhigas and his contemporaries have already been mentioned. George Zalokostas, author of *Armatoles and Klephts*, was one of the soldier-singers who survived the struggle long enough to see his country rid of a foreign yoke; at all events rid of the yoke of the Turks. He was an instance of the so-called klephts who were driven to the mountains in pure self-defence, and whose only enemies were the enemies of their country. A poet of stronger stamp was Alexander Soutzo,* member of a famous Phanariot family, a scathing satirist, who holds a high rank even in the literature of Europe, and who lashed the follies of his country with a wholesome severity. He spent much of his life in exile, at various European capitals; but on his death the National Assembly voted him a statue. One quality had never been denied in him—that of an ardent lover of his country. The last years of his life were occupied, not in satirising his friends, but in a dreary and unfinished epic of the Crimean War, *The War in the East*.

Other Greek poets of yesterday, whose writings are still fresh in the memory of to-day, were Orphanides, author of *Chios in Chains*; Panagiotes Soutzo, brother of Alexander, who wrote *The Traveller*; and Valaoritis, who glorified the Epirote heroes in their own rough dialect.

Rhizos Rhangabé, born in 1810, had style and taste, both varying in a notable degree. In addition to his miscellaneous poems, he wrote two dramas,† a series of romantic stories, an heroic ode to Lord Byron, ballads which are highly praised for their

* Born at Constantinople, 1803; died at Smyrna, 1863.

† *Phrosyne* and *The Old Woman*.

combined spirit and finish, and a number of archaeological treatises in Greek and French. M. Rhangabé was a distinguished statesman, for some time Greek Minister at Washington; and he was one of the unfortunate embassy which represented Hellenic interests at the Congress of Berlin. He was by no means the only dramatist of modern Greece, even in the last generation. Rhizos Neroulos, who at Geneva, early in the century, did much to inspire his pupils and friends with an interest in modern Greek literature, wrote two elegant tragedies, *Polyxenes* and *Aspasia*. Chrestopoulos wrote his *Achilles* about the same time; and he was followed by Evanthia, the female author of *Nikirate*; by Alexander Soutzo with *Botzaris*; by Zambelios with *Karaiskakis*; and by others, who took their subjects frequently from the War of Independence. These dramas were put on the stage at Jassy, at Odessa, at Bucharest, and in Corfu.

To the same generation belong Bernardakis, the dramatist-professor, author of *Merope*, *Euphrosyne*, *Maria Dezapatri*, &c.; Spyridon Vasiliades (*Loukas Notaras*, *The Kallergis*, &c.); Athanasios Mavromichaelis (*Coriolanus*, *The Capture of Tripolitza*, &c.); the poet and comedian Vlachos (*The Grocer's Daughter*, and other pieces, illustrating national habits and character); Skylizzes, Karasoutzas, Tertzetis, the literary coadjutor of Kolokotrones, Bikelas, Paraschos, and others.

Greek literature in the present generation displays what must be considered, in view of all the circumstances, a really remarkable advance in strength and style. The continued historical labours of Constantine Sathas, largely devoted to the collection of



K. PAPARRIGOPOULOS. [To face p. 375.

mediaeval documents from the Venetian and other libraries, are of great actual and prospective value to the student. The history of Paparrigopulos has been carried forward; the *Historical Studies* of Mr. Mark Renieris have earned for their writer a repute which adds force and authority to his ardent patriotism; Paspatis and others have pursued the same lines of study with considerable success. In law and jurisprudence we have Potlis, Moschovakis, Rhallys, &c.: in theology, Bryennios (honoured with an Oxford degree), Kyriakos, Baphides, Kalogeras, &c.; in geography and topography, Miliarakis, Gedeon, Dimitzas, &c.; in education, Bambas and many others. Eminent for more reasons than one is Mr. S. P. Lambros, familiar to Englishmen by his annual survey of Greek literature in the *Athenæum*.

A biography of Koraes by Dionysios Therianos deserves mention as an exceptionally learned and comprehensive work, useful particularly for its introduction on the Greek scholars of the Renaissance, and on Hellenic culture under the yoke of Turkey. The death of Therianos a few months ago deprived Greece of one of her most learned and accomplished men of letters. The *Kleio*, which he edited for many years, remains a treasury of literary as well as of political information, written in as admirable a style as any modern Greek has yet attained—with the exception, perhaps, of his friend and coadjutor, Dr. Theagenes Livadas. Dr. Livadas is not merely a learned Hellenist, but he is also distinguished as a student and interpreter of Dante, Goethe, and Shakespeare. Another Athenian editor distinguished as a man of letters is Mr. A. Byzantios, of the *Hemera*.

Theodore Demetrakopulos is the author of a criti-

cism of what is known as the Erasmian theory of Greek pronunciation. The subject has been treated in a still more exhaustive and conclusive manner within the past year or two by the zealous labour and clear exposition of Mr. J. Gennadius.* In "The Patmian Library," Mr. J. Sakellion, keeper of the Manuscripts in the National Library (recently deceased) catalogued the 735 manuscripts of the monastery of Patmos. Dr. Jannaris, who is now a lecturer on Modern Greek in the University of St. Andrews, has a well-established repute as a learned man of letters. A. P. Kerameus and G. Kostomiris are amongst the modern Hellenes who devote themselves to the preservation and enumeration of ancient manuscripts, the former having catalogued 645 codices in the library of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, out of 2,400 Jerusalem manuscripts.

G. Hatzidakis (*The Question of Language*) and

* *Nineteenth Century*, Oct., 1895, Jan., 1896; *Contemporary Review*, Mar., 1897.—Orphanides, in his amusing satire of *Tiri Liri* (Τίρι Λίρι) has a jest at the expense of the British Erasmians. One Zolotas, a sportsman of Syros, has shot a wonderful cuckoo, and a boatful of tourists land at Hermoupolis to investigate the business. "Some of them had books in their hands; some had straps across their breasts, and others white handkerchiefs twisted round their hats. But one of these handsome strangers, a gay youth of arch expression and satanic eyes, on whose mouth flickered a smile of pitiless irony, with sharp tilted nose, fit subject for a caricature, turned to a boatman and said, in ultra-Erasmian Keye-cree Heteye-cree style (με τὴν προφορὰν τὴν ἐρασμιωτάτην τῶν χάρε ἐτάρε): 'O pie, lexon moy pow an ayien antros Zolota oykoy?' 'Pardon me, sir,' the wag of a boatman replied, 'I am ignorant of the Chinese tongue.' The stranger opens his notebook and writes, 'Few of the Greeks to-day speak Greek; they being for the most part sprung from Illyrians, Triballians, Slavs and Vandals. Nowhere in Syros, the most commercial city of the new kingdom, could I find any one to understand me.'"

J. Polylas (*Our Literary Language*) are two amongst many writers who have entered into an interminable controversy over the respective merits of the popular form and the revived classical form ("kathareuoussa") as a literary medium. The English reader will find some interesting passages on this question in the introduction to Mrs. Edmonds's rendering of the *Memoirs of Kolokotronis*,* by Mr. J. Gennadius, who mentions the notable fact that the return to a purer Greek was part of the revival of Hellenic culture which preceded the emancipation of Greece.

The Greeks of to-day are making ample and worthy contributions to the elucidation of their ancient monuments. Great as is the work which has been accomplished in the domain of Hellenic archæology by the learned section of the civilised world, it is not left to foreigners to recover and re-interpret the ruins of the earlier civilisations. Greece is richly stored with museums, public and private. In Athens the Central Museum, the Akropolis Museum, the Institute, the Schliemann collection, the private collections of Messrs. Lambros, Karapanos, Philemon, and others, are full of antiquities. Of course literature reflects this activity of the Greeks in rendering honour to the art and culture of their ancestors. One of the most noteworthy of recent works on archæology is that of Christos Tsuntas on *Mycenæ and Mycænæan Culture*. It is especially valuable for its attempt to reconstruct the art, religion, and racial origin of the inhabitants of Mycenæ.

* In the *Adventure Series* (Fisher Unwin).—I may also refer the reader to *Neohellenika*, by Prof. Michael Constantinides, a very interesting companion to the study of modern Greek (Macmillan).

The biography of modern Greek worthies has of late received much attention, and in addition to the works already mentioned the last few years have furnished memoirs of Alexander Rhizos Rhangabé, by his son, of Loukas Rhalles, of Spyridon Pilikas, of the Metaxas family, of "Gennadios Scholarios," by Tryphon Evangelides, and others.

Of contemporary writers on the classical Greek language and literature, who have published during the past few years, we have Prof. Semitelos (*Greek Metres*, with a continuation to Byzantine and recent times); Prof. Kontos, Prof. Mistriotis (a *History of Greek Literature*); Constantine Papazis (*Demetrios Phalereus and Athens*); M. Pantazis, and J. Argyriades.

As these lists are of necessity incomplete, I must refer the reader who desires to have a satisfactory outline of modern Greek works before the last decade to a handbook of the *History of Greek Literature*, by S. Sakellaropoulos, published in 1886. For later dates the *Bibliographical Bulletin*, published in connection with the *Hestia* of Athens, will be found very serviceable.

N. Polites, besides being an archæologist and the editor of a Greek *Konversations Lexikon*, is attractive as a social chronicler of close and accurate observation, combined with a supple and pleasant style. His myths and folk-stories have been deservedly popular in the last generation, and his edition of the *Memoirs of Kolokotrones* must not go unmentioned. D. Bikelas, whose literary activity began with a volume of poems in 1862, has made a considerable reputation as an essayist, a translator, and a novelist. His infinitely pathetic story of

Loukis Laras appeared in the *Hestia* during the year 1879; it is known to Englishmen through the excellent translation of Mr. J. Gennadius, and is still perhaps the most characteristic work of its author. A. Vlachos (also known as a translator of Heine); A. Curtides (a writer of excellent books for children); G. Drosines ("Letters" from Northern Eubœa, and sundry excellent novelettes); G. Bizyinos (now deceased); C. Anninos; D. Koronilas (a dramatist and novelist); Spyridon Paganelis (*Attic Nights* and *On the Other Side of the Isthmus*); Gregorios Xenopoulos (*Nikolas Sigalos, &c.*); J. Psycharis, Professor of Modern Greek at Paris; Papadiamantes; Moraitides; Karkavitzas (*Diegemata, &c.*); E. Rhoidis (a critic and satirist—*Eidola, &c.*); Nikolas Vlachogiannis (who uses the pseudonym of Jannis Epachtitis); Constantine Pappagiannis (*First Fairy Tales*—Mainote); Demetrios Hatzopoulos (*Wild Flowers*); Nikolas Spandonis (*Our Athens*); Argyris Ephtaliotis (*Island Stories*—a collection of romantic tales from the isles of Greece, admirably translated into English by Mr. Rouse, of Rugby); E. Lykudis; Alexandra Pappadopulo, and Eugénie Zographu, may be added to the list of novelists, dramatists, and writers of lighter prose.

Achilles Paraschos published his collected poems in 1881. They are unequal in merit, but the best of them are patriotic and romantic lyrics, full of genuine sentiment. In common with his contemporaries, Paraschos was comparatively uninspired by the acquisition of Thessaly. The denial of Epirus and Crete impressed them more than what they had gained. So long as Olympus and Ida continue to be Turkish mountains there is a fatal bar to poetic

enthusiasm. Amongst the Greek men of letters who prefer the poetic form of expression may be mentioned Demetrios Kokkos, recently deceased, the author of *Gelotes, Macedonia, &c.*; Georgios Drosines (*Idyls, &c.*), who, like more than one young Greek poet of the decadence, began with an echo of Heine and Coppée; A. Valaorites; S. Balbes (*The Cranes of Ibycus*); A. Antoniadès (*Scanderbeg, Kretiis, &c.*); Kleon Rhangabé (*Poems of Sorrow*; also a dramatist—*Julian the Apostate, The Duchess of Athens, &c.*); G. Martinellis (*National Portraits*); G. Suris (a satirist); K. Palamas—a reactionary in language (*The Eyes of My Soul, &c.*); S. Stephanou; M. Martzokis (*Ballades, &c.*); A. Palles (*Songs for Children*)—a reactionary who has occupied himself by rendering part of the Iliad in the popular form of modern Greek; Constantine Krustalles (*Idyls, &c.*); Constantine Manos (*Words of the Heart*); Georgios Markora; Miltiades Malakasses (a “realist” of much sweetness, even when the sweetness cloyes); Nikolas Damiano (*Thalassa*); Georgios Stratigis, and A. Provelengios. Mr. Provelengios is a native of Siphnos, and his poems are highly valued by his countrymen.

There is naturally in Greece a distinct strain of romantic, erotic and anacreontic verse. I add a specimen from a popular lyrical poet of the last generation, Athanasios Chrestopoulos.

Gods ensphered in starry light,
Jocund watchers of the night,
Baulk the hours' impetuous throng,
Slowly move and linger long.

Would that now your course were stay'd,
Here your watch eternal made;

Hail, ye sentinels divine,
Placid be your souls, and mine.

Chiefly thou, the twilight star,
Phosphor, hide thy beams afar ;
Bid the sun depart and find
Other worlds to scorch and blind.

Fairest night the world has known,
Spread thy veil from zone to zone ;
Let no glimmer pierce the screen,
Lest the prying day be seen.

So may I at peace for ever
Float as on a boundless river,
Lit by love's undying light
Through the calm of endless night.*

The next example is taken from the younger school of Hellenic song-writers. It is a romantic lyric of Stephanou, reminiscent of Heine, and, if not

* Θεοὶ ἀστέρες φωτεροί,
Τῆς νύχτας ἔφορ' ἱλαροί,
Ταῖς ὥραις ἐμποῦῖστε,
Κ' ἀργά, ἀργά κινῆστε.

Κ' ἀνίσως εἶναι ὄντατόν,
'Απὸ τὸν τόπον σας αὐτόν,
Παρακαλῶ νὰ ζήτε :
Ποτὲ μὴ ταραχθῆτε.

Κ' ἐσὺ ἄστρον τῆς αὐγῆς,
Κρυβήσου, πλεον μὴν ἐβγῆς,
Κ' εἰπὲ κ' ἥλιος πέραν
Νὰ φύγ' εἰς ἄλλην σφαῖραν.

Ἡ νύχτα τούτη ἄς γενῇ
Στὸν οὐρανὸν παντοτεινῇ,
Κ' ἡμέρα ἄς μὴ σιμώσῃ
Ποτὲ νὰ ξημερώσῃ.

Γιὰ νὰ χαρῶ παντοτεινὰ
Τὸν ἔρωτα μου σιγανὰ
'Σ αὐτὴν τὴν αἰωνίαν
Τῆς νύχτας ἡτυχίαν.

so clear-cut as the gems of our Western lapidaries are expected to be, still bright with facets of genuine poetry.

This have I seen—the cloudless dome
From sapphire turn to leaden gray ;
I've seen the fairest garden-bloom
Lie shattered in the clay.

The spring that welled with silvery light
I've seen to marshy levels fall—
The star that decked the brow of night
Drop from her coronal—

An eagle captive on the ground—
A nightingale in songless woe—
Thee, the inconstant, faithful found,
And me, a heart of snow.

The Cypriot language and literature are peculiarly attractive for the reason that Cyprus, thanks to its geographical position, presents a curious blend of the Greek and Oriental types, which are associated not only in its vocabulary and grammatical forms, but also in its poetry and folk-lore. Even in history and ecclesiastical writing the two characteristics are apparent side by side, and the early modern authors of Cyprus afford a conspicuous illustration of the fact that there is no break of continuity between the Greeks of to-day and the Greeks of the later Byzantine Empire, as there was no definite break—nothing more than deterioration or modernisation—between them and the Greeks of the golden age. The materials for a proper study of this literary fact are meagre—the hoof of the Turk has crushed out nearly all but the deeper roots of the Byzantine florescence. But no century

is without its link of survival, even though in some centuries the link is not much stronger than that of exiled Greek scholars in Italy, Spain, France, and England. One of these, Neophytos Rhodinos, who died at Rome in 1659, left behind him a notable work on *Heroes, Strategists, Philosophers, Saints, and other famous Personages belonging to the Island of Cyprus*, which is a monument not only of the learning and eloquence of its author, but also of the learning of those who preceded him. Amongst others, he mentions his father, Solomon Rhodinos, as the writer of a chronicle, partly in prose and partly in verse, of the critical period of 1570–85.

Within the present century, and especially in the latter half of the century, Greek writers have paid much attention to the antiquities and history of Cyprus, as of many other colonies and plantations of their ancestors. The *Kypriaka* of Athanasios Sakellarios is a scholarly treatise on the topography, language, legends, and folk-songs of the island—the legends being full of reminiscences from the oldest Greek history, the songs preserving many a mediæval episode of love and adventure, some essentially Cypriot, like the story of Arodaphnusa, a concubine of Peter II., others more or less common to the Greek race, like the cycle of the demigod Akritas. Other recent works on or from Cyprus are those of G. Loukas, Hieronymos Myriantheus, Sathas, Paul Lambros, and G. Frangoudis.*

The history of Corfu was ably written by the late J. Romanos, and since his death a *History of the Despots of Epirus* has been printed from his papers. F. Albana is another Corfuot writer, and A.

* Cf. S. P. Lambros in the *Athenæum*, September 6 and 13, 1879.

Hidromenos has published a comprehensive story of the chief Ionian Isle.

The *Chronography of Epirus*, by Aravantinos, and the *Story of Ali Pasha*, by his son, Spyridon Aravantinos, are contributions to the history of the unredeemed province. Macedonia has received the attention of Hatzidakis and others; J. Lambrinides has written of *The Greek Colonies*; A. Vallindas of the island of Kythnos; indeed, there are few of the redeemed or unredeemed provinces and islands to which contemporary Greek writers have not devoted special study.

Amongst other characteristic manifestations of intellectual activity are the Syllogues—associations or clubs which combine literary intercourse with the exercise of practical benevolence, and no doubt, also, with an occasional dash of politics. A syllogue is, presumably, a simple club, and the ostensible object of its formation may be literary, charitable, political, or otherwise; but most frequently the members, including representatives of both sexes, allow themselves to travel beyond the range of interests comprised within their special denomination. It is certain that the custom of forming and taking part in these syllogues originated in a state of society in which a subject race, superior to its masters in knowledge, manners, and modes of thought, felt the necessity of frequent and intimate communion amongst themselves, both for the satisfaction of their loftier tastes and aspirations and for the purpose of mutual protection. All the objects named above are accounted for by the circumstances under which the earliest of the syllogues were established.

The cohesiveness of the Greek race, in its modern regeneration, is illustrated by the fact that political or semi-political coteries of this kind exist in almost every Hellenic community throughout the world. "In all towns where there are but a hundred Greeks," says M. Moraïtinis, "in Turkey, in Asia Minor, in Egypt, in Russia, in the towns of the West, in America, in the Indies, in Australia—in brief, wherever there are Greeks, such associations are set on foot."

In the kingdom of Greece itself there are many syllogues of considerable importance and influence, especially devoted to literature and benevolence. Thus there are in Athens two philanthropical societies, founded by the Princess Maria Hypsilantes and by Madame Helen Paparrigopulos, which carry on a serviceable work amongst the poor of the capital. There is the "Syllogue for the Propagation of Greek Literature," the object of which is "to found schools for children of both sexes, to extend elementary instruction by the best methods, and to publish works necessary for this purpose." There is the Byron Philological Syllogue, for "the intellectual development and moral training of its members, and other citizens, by study and literary work," and the Parnassos Literary Syllogue. There is the "Hetairia of the Friends of Education," under the patronage of the Queen, which supports schools, principally for girls. The capital of this association is over a million and a quarter of drachmas, and the pupils for whom it provides instruction number more than 1,500.

Amongst other associations of a similar character may be mentioned the Musical and Dramatic Syllogue,

maintaining an institution after the manner of the Paris Conservatoire ; a Syllogue of Sacred Byzantine Music ; various societies for the support of orphanages, for the instruction of the labouring classes, &c., &c. In fact, it may be said that Greece, taking her late start into account, is able to bear comparison with many far wealthier states in the matter of her public beneficent institutions.

The Greek press has sustained an honourable part in the drama of Hellenic regeneration. Under Capo d'Istria, under the Bavarian Otho, it fought the battle of popular liberty, and earned a title to gratitude by its outspoken courage and its defiance of persecution. Since 1864, Greek journalists have been free from oppressive censure. In 1867 nearly a hundred periodicals figured amongst the evidences of Greek progress at the Paris Exhibition. At the present day the number has risen to 131, whereof fifty-one are published at Athens, eight at Hermoupolis, six at Larissa, five at Patras, Zakynthos, and Volo. Other Greek journals are published at Constantinople, at Smyrna, at Alexandria, and in other populous Greek centres.

Republicanism seems to have comparatively few serious advocates in Greece, at all events as a practical object of the immediate future. The *Aion*, as M. Moraïtinis informs us, "one of the most important and oldest papers, recently unfurled the standard of Republican ideas, and discussed them with perfect freedom. Its articles were in the best manner, and bore witness to the erudition of their author. Why did this journal cease to exist? Because, in spite of the worthiness of its political management, the public read it with an interest

which had no effect upon the heart—with that negative interest wherewith we read any essay which, though well written, deals with facts far removed from ourselves, incapable of disturbing the sphere in which we move.” *

The attitude of Greece in this respect is, apparently, the same as that of England and Italy, and of the two or three other truly constitutional monarchies. With the substance of liberty and self-government a people cares less for the form. Virtual Republics can afford to be indifferent as to the names by which their institutions are known. The probability is that a vicious, or even an unwise monarch would destroy monarchy in any country where popular self-government is an established fact. King Otho was on the point of making a Greek Republic possible in 1862; and, indeed, it is to be remembered that Otho's successor was found for Greece, not by herself, but by the Powers in accordance with the understanding of 1832. But King George has ruled well and wisely; and the Greeks have no temptation to demand a change.

The output of books, as well as of newspapers and magazines, is considerable, especially when we remember that few of them secure a very numerous audience. But if Greek writers do not grow rich by their literary activity, they have the satisfaction of finding their readers in many climes, from the furthest pyramid to the coasts of Ultima Thule. The tendency of contemporary Greek letters of the lighter sort, so far as they depart from the national and racial types, is to base themselves on French models, and

* *La Grèce Telle qu'Elle est*, p. 205

to take the tone of the Boulevards and the Quartier Latin. Within these limits there is room for the accommodation of a great variety of tastes. A foreign reader of Greek, who wishes to have some idea of the advance recently made at Athens in mere graphic and descriptive workmanship, may be referred for an example to the well-printed and copiously illustrated folio *Hellas*, edited by M. Gabrielides, and published at the office of the *Akropolis*—a worthy album of modern Greece, essentially national, yet bearing distinct traces of French influence.

Before leaving the subject of literature in Greece, a word may be said of the Greek folk-lore, which is rich in legend and homely mythology, and which has of late been more systematically collected and discussed. The relics of ancient faith and superstitions, of the pantheism and heroölogy of two thousand years ago, survive in the traditions of the Greeks of to-day. Long narratives, as well as short fables and ballads, are faithfully handed down from memory to memory. The fact is one more proof, if more were needed, of the legitimacy of the modern Greeks. The stamp of their ancestors is unmistakable in those legends of the fates and furies, the nereids and hamadryads, which subsist amongst the mountaineers and villagers of Greece. A few pages may be devoted, without apology, to the outline of one or two of these Hellenic fairy tales.

The following story of "The Three Sisters" (which the reader will recognise as an old friend in a new dress) is abbreviated from the pages of the Baron d'Estournelles de Constant.*

* *La Vie de Province en Grèce.*

THE THREE SISTERS.

Once upon a time there were three sisters, who slept together.

One night the Fates came to tell their fortunes, and sate above their heads; for each sister had her Fate.

When the first two had spoken, it was the turn of the Fate who belonged to the youngest sister.

"Mine," she said, "being the prettiest, shall have the best fortune. She shall marry Vasilopoulo, the king's son."

But the eldest sister had awoke, and was listening. When the morning had come she took the second sister on one side, and told her all that the Fates had said; and they began to tyrannise over the youngest.

One day they resolved to go and cut some wood. They therefore made a cake, and set out. When they had gathered their fagots they sat down on the edge of the precipice, so deep that no one could climb down it on any side. Then the eldest sister said to the youngest—

"Now, little one, come and let me do your hair."

The little one went, and the eldest began to arrange her hair. But as she was doing it she let the cake roll from her knees on the ground.

"There," she said, "now go and look for it!"

And she gave her a great push, and the little one fell over the precipice.

The poor child fell to the bottom, and, being unable to climb up again, began to weep. But then, behold, a Nereid came to her, and said—

"Why are you weeping, child? Have you fallen from the rock, and cannot get up again? Come with me, and I will take you for my daughter."

And she took her to her house.

So the little girl was very happy with the Nereid. But when Sunday came the Nereid wanted to go to her church; and, as she would be a long time away, she told her that she was to open the copper in which the serpents were, and give them something to eat.

"You must not be afraid," she added. "When you want them to go in again you have only to rap with a stick on the pot, and the serpents will go in of themselves."

Meanwhile the two sisters, when they got home again, said to the Sun—

“Sun, dear Sun, which is now the fairest one? Is it either of us, or she whom we have thrown over the precipice?”

“It is your sister,” he replied, “who is in the Nereid’s home.”

Then the two sisters returned to the precipice, and the younger of the two pushed the elder so that she fell in the same place where the youngest had fallen. When she was at the bottom she came to the home of the Nereid, went in, and found her sister; and the little one kissed her when she saw her.

Then the eldest one began to dress her sister’s hair again, and by and by she stuck a poisoned pin in her head. The poor little one fell down dead on the spot, and the eldest one ran away.

When the Nereid returned she found the little one, and took her in her arms, and wept over her. Then she saw the pin, and pulled it out; and the little one came to life again.

Meanwhile the eldest sister had gone home; but when she repeated her question to the Sun, and received the same answer, she returned to the Nereid’s house. The Nereid was out again, but she had forbidden the little one to open the door; so the eldest sister took a slate off the roof, and threw in a poisoned grape. The little one ate it, and fell down dead again.

This time the Nereid could not find the cause of her death, so she put her in a box, and threw her into the sea. But her Fate did not desert her. The waves shook the grape from her mouth, and she revived; and the box floated until it came to the king’s palace. Vasilopoulo saw it, and told his servants to bring it to land; but when he found that it was only a box he sent it down to the kitchen.

In the night the little one was hungry; so she opened the lid, got out, ate some food, and lay down in the box again. This she did every night, until the servants found how the food disappeared, and went and told the king’s son.

“I see,” said Vasilopoulo. “Very well, I will go and catch the thief.”

So he went into the kitchen at midnight, and saw the little one come out, and caught her in his arms. And the king’s son, seeing her so pretty and so sweet, loved her, and took her for his wife.

Then the two sisters said to the Sun—

"Sun, dear Sun, which is now the fairest one? Is it either of us, or she whom we poisoned?"

And the Sun replied, "It is your sister, who has the king's son for her husband."

Meanwhile Vasilopoulo had been obliged to go to war; and in his absence the queen had a son. One day a poor woman came to her, and asked to be allowed to live in the palace and nurse her child. The queen did not recognise her sister, and consented. Presently the sister, whilst dressing the queen's hair, stuck an enchanted pin into her head, and the queen was changed into a little bird. Then the other took her garments, and put herself in her place.

When Vasilopoulo returned he found his wife greatly changed, and took a strong dislike to her. So he spent the whole day in a room apart, with his child. One day a little bird flew in to them, and fondled them both with its wings; and then it began to sing—

"Sweet be the slumbers of the king,
Night bear his child on downy wing!
But let the gipsy woman lie
Full many an hour with sleepless eye."

One day the false queen heard the words, and she said to Vasilopoulo—

"Are you not going to tell some one to kill this bird, which deafens us day after day?"

"I shall never give you that pleasure," replied the king; "for I while away my time with that bird."

But the queen pressed him every day to kill it, and in the end wearied out, he let her have her way. She instantly ordered her servants to seize the bird and kill it; but they were to take care not to let a single drop of its blood fall to the ground.

The servants did not attend to her, and a drop of blood fell down, and from this drop a tree of great beauty grew up.

One day the king went into his garden, and, seeing this wonderful tree, sat down under the shade of its leaves. Then the tree drooped down its long branches, closing them about the king; and the king was so much delighted that he did not move from it, and returned every day to sit there with his son.

The queen also took it into her head to sit in the same place;

but the tree, drooping its branches, parted its leaves, and pricked her with its thorns.

Then she turned to the king, and asked him to cut it down.

At first the king refused, but at last he ended by consenting. So she ordered her servants to cut it down by the roots, and not to give the smallest piece to any one.

An old woman, who was passing, asked them to give her a branch to light her fire, but in vain. Then the old woman snatched a branch, and ran away.

When she got home she forgot to put it on the fire, and left it in a corner.

Every morning the old woman went out marketing. One day, when she came back, she found the house put straight, the fire lighted, and the floors swept. She asked her neighbours if they had seen any one enter the house, but no one had done so. On the following day, and every day afterwards, the same thing took place.

Once she pretended to go out, and hid herself in the house, in order to keep watch. Then she saw a woman, as beautiful as a Nereid, coming out of the branch; and she immediately clasped her in her arms.

After that these two women remained together, and the elder one felt a great love for her companion, who was so beautiful and so good.

The news spread about that the old woman had in her house a lady as beautiful as a Nereid. The king himself heard of it, and sent for the old woman to question her. Then the old woman told him all that she knew.

Vasilopoulo at once guessed that it was his wife; and he sent for her.

So she told him from the beginning all that had happened to her; and he immediately ordered that her sister should be tied to two strong horses, and that the horses should be whipped until they had torn her to pieces, for having pretended to be the queen.

And they lived very happily.

It is pleasant to find our old friends of the nursery reappearing in a Greek dress, and in the heart of a country where they have evidently been long acclimatised. Without attempting to fix the period

when such stories as that of "The Three Sisters" first entered Greece, it may safely be asserted that the introduction is by no means recent. There is more local colour in the narrative just quoted than is indicated by the presence of the Parcæ and the Nereids. The story of Vasilopoulo and his enchanted wife is steeped in the spirit of Greek mythology and pantheism;* and more than one or two centuries have been needed to make it a familiar legend in every province of Greece. It might, indeed, be argued, with not a little force, that the shores of the Mediterranean are likely to have become the home of many a familiar fairy-tale, now common to the whole of Europe, before the shores of the Baltic and the North Sea.

The same authority to whom we have been indebted for the Greek version of "The Three Sisters"† extracts another short fairy-tale from the *Neohellenika Mythologia* of Polites, wherein a more prominent part is played by the Nereids, who have enjoyed a greater vitality in Greece than any other personages of the ancient mythology. This story is more distinctly Greek in its complexion, and belongs more characteristically to the soil. The locality is in Crete.

THE NEREID WIFE.

A shepherd of Sgourokephali had been carried off by the Nereids to their grotto, because he played the lyre well, and that amused them.

* Thus the author of *La Vie de Province en Grèce* observes: "Helios and Apollo, who were afterwards confounded together, were entirely distinct in Homer; and Helios (the sun) then discharged exactly the same functions as in our story. It is he who knows all, he who is consulted, he who reveals to Vulcan the infidelity of Venus, and to Ceres the rape of her daughter by Pluto."

† The Grimms have a similar story under the same title.

The man fell in love with one of them, and, finding no remedy for his love, went to ask the advice of an old woman in his village, to whom he related his sufferings.

And the old woman advised him after this fashion :—

“ At the hour when the birds are about to sing, take her whom you love by the hair ; hold her fast ; and, as she has the power of changing herself into different shapes, do not be afraid. Take care to hold her until the birds sing.”

Having obtained this advice, the young man returned to the grotto, and began to play on his lyre as usual ; and the Nereids began to dance.

When the hour drew nigh at which the birds were about to sing, he threw down his lyre, sprang forward, and caught his well-beloved by the hair.

The Nereid instantly began to change her shape ; now into a dog, now into a serpent, and a camel, and a fire. But the man, who was not frightened by all this, at length heard the birds sing, and saw the other Nereids become invisible.

Then his well-beloved went back into her first lovely shape, and followed the young man into his village, and lived with him for a year, and bore him a son. But she never spoke a single word.

This marvellous and unbearable silence made the young man go once more to the old woman, to tell her of his disappointment.

The old woman advised him to light his furnace, and, holding her child in his hands, say to the Nereid, “ Will you not speak to me ? Then I will burn your child ”—and, so saying, pretend to throw him into the fire.

And he did as the old woman advised him.

But he had scarcely spoken those words when she cried out, “ Stop, dog ! my child ! ”

And she snatched her son, and became invisible to his eyes. And as the other Nereids did not care for her in their company, because she had become a mother, she settled herself on the margin of a spring called Loutra, near the grotto. And twice or three times in the year she is to be seen, watching over her child.

Here, unmistakably, we have the Nereid Thetis, wife of Peleus, King of the Myrmidons. The story is an inversion of one of the later traditions of Achilles,

according to which his mother placed him on the fire in order to render him immortal, and fled on being discovered by her husband.

It is in reading such stories as this that we recognise the descendants of the fabulists and the race-fellows of Homer.

THE END.