THE
PLANNED
BY the late LORD ACTON LL.D.
REGIUS
PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY
EDITED
BY
A. W. WARD Litt.D.
G. W. PROTHERO Litt.D. STANLEY LEATHES M.A.
PREFACE.
THE main
focus of activity for European forces shifts from age to age. Thus in preceding
volumes, under the changing play of national collisions, and the stimulus of
new ideas, we have seen its position move from Italy to the Rhineland and to
Switzerland. Its limits are sometimes narrow, sometimes they embrace a wider
field. But in no epoch is the centre of material and spiritual energy for
Europe more definitely located, in none is the action proceeding from that
centre more novel in its kind, more destructive of the old, more ambitious of
the new, than in the period of the French Revolution. For this whole decade the
main attention of the student of European history must centre in Paris.
The present
Volume traces the intellectual genesis of the revolutionary movement among the
audacious thinkers and the philanthropic listeners of the eighteenth century.
It shows how the institutions and the administration of France were unfitted to
resist a violent shock, while her vacillating rulers hesitated to use such resources
as the constitution placed in their hands. Benevolent enthusiasm, peaceful
agitation, irresolute control, are succeeded by anarchy and terrorism; society
seems to be resolved into its elements, and the fortunes of the nation to
depend on the caprice and idiosyncrasies of a few chance-selected men. The
impulse spreads beyond the frontiers. Europe gathers her forces to resist the
destructive flood. France reacts to hostile pressure; institutions are
extemporised in the midst of foreign and civil war; the organic unity of the
French nation reasserts itself; order succeeds to anarchy, fixed aims to vague
aspirations; and wars of conquest follow wars of self-preservation. Separately
is described the attempt of legislators to break loose from the bonds of
custom, convention, and tradition, and to build up a new scheme of human
relations from a purely rational basis. Finally, the effect of these
destructive and reconstructive ideas is traced in action and reaction through
the chief countries of Europe;
and the
foundations of our modem political and social scheme become visible. The new
phase of European history, which opens with the Consulate, is left to be
treated in another volume.
But while
this main drama absorbs our main attention, and dominates one-half of the
European continent, a secondary plot unfolds itself in the east. The
preoccupation of the central Powers leaves room for the ambition and intrigue
of Russia; and the fate of Poland is decided in accordance with Catharine’s
wishes. Meanwhile the jealousy of Austria and Prussia and their disputes over
the Polish spoils leave to France a breathing-space; the revolutionary
government has leisure to establish itself; and before Poland is finally
dismembered the gravest crisis has passed. Here and there moreover we see
indications of a new and imperious problem, the Eastern question, which will
occupy the energies and attract the ambitions of statesmen and diplomatists for
more than a century to come.
The
regeneration of France, the extinction of Poland—these themes with their
accessories claim all our space. From the European point of view, the domestic
politics of England become of secondary interest, even to Englishmen. The
European significance of British activity is in the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean. British internal struggles and party fortunes influence the main
plot only in so far as they hamper or assist the efforts of William Pitt and
Nelson. But the due consideration of British politics is only deferred; the
period before 1793 will find its place in Volume VI, the period after 1793 in
Volume IX; while Volume VI, which will naturally include the story of Grattan’s
Parliament, must also follow that movement to its close in the Act of Union.
The thanks of
the Editors are due to all the contributors to this Volume for time and labour
unsparingly devoted to the common task • and also to Mr C. It. L. Fletcher, of
Magdalen College, Oxford, for advice and assistance freely given, and to
Professor Maitland for his careful revision of the translation of the Chapter
on “ French Law in the Age of the Revolution.”
A. W. W.
G. W. P.
S. L.
Cambridge,
April,
1904.
CHAPTER I.
PHILOSOPHY
AND THE REVOLUTION.
By P. F. Willert,
CHAPTER II.
THE
GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE.
By F. C. Montague, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of
Oriel College, Oxford, Professor of History in University College, London.
FINANCE.
By Henry Higgs
CHAPTER IV.
LOUIS XVI.
By Professor
F. C. Montague, M.A.
CHAPTER V.
THE ELECTIONS
TO THE STATES GENERAL.
By Professor
F. C. Montague, M.A.
CHAPTER VI.
THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY, AND THE SPREAD OF ANARCHY. By Professor F. C. Montague, M.A.
THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1791.
By Professor F. C. Montague, M.A.
CHAPTER
VIII.
THE LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY.
By
J. R. Moreton Macdonald, M.A.,
Magdalen College, Oxford.
CHAPTER IX.
THE NATIONAL
CONVENTION TO THE FALL OF THE GIRONDE.
By J. R. Moreton Macdonald
CHAPTER
X.
THE FOREIGN
POLICY OF PITT TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH FRANCE.
By
Oscar Browning
CHAPTER XI.
THE EUROPEAN
POWERS AND THE EASTERN QUESTION.
By Richaed Lodge
CHAPTER
XII.
THE TERROR.
By
J. R. MOBeton Macdonald
CHAPTER
XIII.
THE
THERM1D0RIAN REACTION AND THE END OF THE CONVENTION.
By
J. R Mobeton Macdonald, M.A.
CHAPTER
XIV.
THE GENERAL
WAR.
By
R. P. Dunn-Pattison
CHAPTER XV.
THE NAVAL
WAR.
By H. W. Wilson, B.A., Trinity College,
Oxford.'
CHAPTER XVI.
THE
DIRECTORY.
By G. K. Fortescue, Keeper of the Printed Books
at the British Museum.
CHAPTER
XVII.
THE
EXTINCTION OF POLAND, 1788-97.
By
Professor Richard Lodge, M.A.
CHAPTER
XVIII.
BONAPARTE AND
THE CONQUEST OF ITALY.
By
J. Holland Rose, Litt.D., Christ’s
College.
CHAPTER
XIX.
THE EGYPTIAN
EXPEDITION.
By
J. Holland Rose
CHAPTER XX.
THE STRUGGLE
FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN.
By H. W. Wilson, B.A.
CHAPTER
XXI.
THE SECOND
COALITION.
By
T. Holland Rose, Litt.D.
BRUMAIRE.
By H. A. L. Fisher,
M.A., Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford.
CHAPTER
XXIII.
REVOLUTIONARY
FINANCE.
By
Henry Higgs, M.A.
CHAPTER XXIV.
FRENCH LAW IN
THE AGE OF THE REVOLUTION.
By Paul Viollet, Member of the Institute,
Professor of the History of Civil and Canon Law in the Nicole des Chartes,
Paris.
EUROPE AND
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.
By G. P. Gooch,
M.A., Trinity College.
PHILOSOPHY
AND THE REVOLUTION.
Philosophy, wrote Mallet du Pan in his Mercwre
Britannique, may boast her reign over the country she has
devastated. Her votaries, he said, hastened the degeneration and corruption of
the French by weakening the bulwarks of morality, by sophisticating conscience,
and by substituting the uncertain dictates of man’s fallible reason, the
equivocations of passion and of selfishness, for rules of duly imposed by
tradition, confirmed by education, and secured by habit. They threw doubt on
all truths, and shook the foundations of whatever had been established and
consecrated by time, by experience, and by a wisdom saner than their own.
Intellectual anarchy prepared the way for social anarchy. Rousseau, the
favourite author of the middle classes, who was read and commented upon in the
streets, misled virtue’s self. He taught the nation to receive the dogmas of
popular sovereignty and of natural equality as axioms, and deduced from them
their most extreme consequences. He was the prophet of the Revolution, and his
works were its Gospel.
Mounier, on
the other hand, an observer not less acute and one who had himself played so
important a part in the opening scenes of the Revolution, considers that the “
philosophers ” contributed but little to the overthrow of the old political and
social order. It is true that they had attacked abuses and advocated reforms,
that by their hostility to religion and by their generally materialistic
doctrine they might indirectly have undermined morality and encouraged a
selfish luxury and corruption; but he maintains that their wilder rhapsodies
were little read or not seriously taken. Such works as Rousseau’s Discourse on
Inequality, or that of Mably, Doubts on the Natural Order of Societies, were,
he assures us, looked upon as brilliant pieces of declamation, and had as
little practical influence as More’s Utopia. Desire of civil and political
liberty existed before the Encyclopedie was published (1751-72) or Montesquieu
had written; and, if during the latter part of the century that desire became
more vehement, this was far more due to an envious appreciation of English
freedom and of American independence, than to the influence and teaching of the
philosophers. They were not the cause
2
The principles of 1789 and 1793.
of ruined
finances, of fiscal oppression, of the vacillation, the weakness, and the
incompetence of the government. The Americans had adopted and proclaimed the
same principles as the French revolutionists, yet none of the evil results
attributed to those principles had followed. Nor were the crimes and follies
which dishonoured the Revolution so much due to the false and mischievous
doctrines of theorists as to the unscrupulous ambition of rival demagogues;
nay, they were perpetrated in cynical contempt of those principles which these
men had constantly in their mouths. If Rousseau had never written, the doctrine
of popular sovereignty would have been asserted, as it had been by the French
in the sixteenth and the English in the seventeenth century. Christianity had
taught as emphatically as any philosopher that men were equal; nor was that
hateful maxim, by which the worst crimes have been justified, that all means
are legitimate which conduce to the safety of the State, of so recent
invention. Before we can decide which of these statements comes nearest to the
truth, and to appreciate the part played by the French writers and philosophers
of the eighteenth century in preparing the way for the Revolution and in
determining the objects aimed at by the reformers, it may be well to summarise
roughly the principles which influenced the men of 1789 and 1793, guided their
policy, and inspired their constructive efforts. In the thousands of pamphlets
which poured from the press during the year which preceded the meeting of the
States General, in the Declarations of Rights, in the preambles and resolutions
voted by the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies and by the Convention, in
the speeches of the liberal statesmen and demagogues, we find certain general
principles accepted as axiomatic, and the assumption that all conclusions which
can be logically deduced from these indisputable premises require no further
justification. Let us enumerate the most fundamental of these axioms.
All men are
by nature equal; all have the same natural rights to strive after happiness, to
self-preservation, to the free control and disposal of their persons and
property, to resist oppression, to hold and to express whatever opinions they
please. The people is sovereign; it cannot alienate its sovereignty; and every
government not established by the free consent of the community is a
usurpation. The title-deeds of man’s rights, as Sieyes said, are not lost. They
are preserved in his reason. Reason is infallible and omnipotent. It can discover
truth and compel conviction. Rightly consulted, it will reveal to us that code
of nature which should be recognised and enforced by the civil law. No civil
enactment which violates natural law is valid. Nature meant man to be virtuous
and happy. He is vicious and miserable, because he transgresses her laws and
despises her teaching.
The essence
of these doctrines is that man should reject every institution and creed which
cannot approve itself to pure reason, the reason of the individual. It is true
that if reason is to be thus trusted it
The conception of natural law.
3
must be
unclouded by prejudice and superstition. These are at once the cause and the
effect of the defective and mischievous social, political, and religious
institutions, which have perverted man’s nature, inflamed his passions, and
distorted his judgment. Therefore to overthrow prejudice and superstition
should be' the first effort of those who would restore to man his natural
rights.
Natural
equality, nature and her law, which is prior and superior to all civil
enactments, the Social Contract and the indefeasible sovereignty of the
people—all these were conceptions familiar to jurists and' publicists and even
to politicians before the eighteenth century. That which is characteristic of
the French authors of that period is their faith in reason, and a conviction
that, since all that is amiss is due to imperfect institutions, all would
speedily come right were thbse imperfections remedied. This delusion was
encouraged by the influence of the classics, with their exaggerated faith in
the power of1 the legislator. If Lycurgus, by imposing a few rules
of life, could turn men into Spartans, it must be comparatively easy to turn
Frenchmen into men. It was not yet a commonplace that we ourselves, our
characters, prejudices, and habits, as well as the laws and institutions under
which we live, are the result of a long process of evolution. When this truth
is half recognised, as it is by Rousseau himself, who holds that the work done
by Calvin in Geneva is impossible in a larger State, the conclusion drawn is
that things must go on as they are, and that only partial palliatives are
possible. The idea of progress, of gradual amelioration, is never suggested,
except by Turgot in a prize essay; and, although Utopias are not wanting, no
writer before the Revolution made any systematic attempt to forecast the probable
future of society, the direction in which it would advance.
We should far
exceed our limits were we to attempt to trace the history of the idea of
nature, her rights, and her law, from the Sophistic antithesis of nature and
convention, from the doctrine of the Stoics, popularised by Cicero and applied
by the Roman lawyers, through the writings of the theologians and jurists of
the Middle Ages down to the days of Grotius and Selden. But it must not be
forgotten that many of what are called the principles of 1789 were recognised
and used as convenient weapons against the authority of the Crown during the
sixteenth century both by Catholics and Huguenots; by none more emphatically
than by the priest Boucher and the Jesuit Mariana.
Men, said
Boucher, are by nature free. The people choose their prince and confer upon him
their sovereignty; but they who delegate their authority remain the superiors
of their representative. Civil law gives the ward a remedy against an unjust
guardian; the King is the guardian and patron of his people and may be deposed
if he oppresses them. It is the duty of subjects to resist a prince who
violates God’s law, the theological equivalent for the philosopher’s law of
Nature.
Mariana, in
his celebrated apology for tyrannicide, also asserts that the derived authority
of the prince is subordinated to the popular sovereignty; for we cannot suppose
that all the members of the State would voluntarily have stripped themselves of
their rights and have handed themselves over unconditionally to the good-will
of an individual.
Such
doctrines, advanced by the apologists pf intolerance and persecution, the
partisans of Spain, and the enemies of national independence, were not
attractive to the majority of Frenchmen. Weary of civil strife and anarchy, of
political and theological controversy, disgusted by the selfish and unpatriotic
intrigues of princes and nobles, the people were led by a sound instinct to
rally round the monarchy, the centre and the iymbol of national life. This
conservatism is conspicuous in the writings of that genius who more perhaps
than any other undermined in France the foundations of belief. Montaigne
(1533-93) drew from his conviction, that human reason cannot attain to, truth,
and that every argument may be met by another equally cogent, the practical
conclusion that to make reason arbiter in social and political questions must
lead to anarchy, and that therefore a wise man will not by. innovations weaken
the force of custom and tradition, the foundation and the strength of all lavs
and institutions. It is better, he says, to endure a bad law than by altering
it to impair • the authority of habit. The evils of change, the miseries of
revolution, are indisputable; the advantages of this or that form of government
are debateable, Why encounter a most certain evil for the sake of, a most
doubtful good ?
But, while
Montaigne’s belief that truth is unattainable led him also to deprecate any
attack on the doctrines of the Church, of which he believed the effects to be
wholesome, he again and again suggested a destructive criticism of those
doctrines and placed the most deadly arms in the hands of others, who like
Voltaire, believed their effects to be evil. The “Libertines,” as they were
called, Epicurean free-thinkers and sceptics, avowed followers of Montaigne,
one of the best known and last of whom was Saintjfivremond (1613 C.-1703), the
friend of Ninon de l’Enclos, continued the tradition of incredulity during the
seventeenth century. They held faith to be the negation of reason and that we
should follow our natural impulses and instincts. Rightly consulted and
understood our nature is a law to, itself. But it was from Bayle (1646-1706),
and not from them, that Voltaire and the other assailants of orthodoxy and
tradition borrowed their most effective weapons.
There may, at
first sight, appear to be but little of the spirit of the eighteenth century in
Bayle’s writings. Like Montaigne he rejects the authority of reason, in which
alone the “philosophers” believed; and unlike Montaigne, who holds that if
little better than animals we are little worse, and as prone to virtue as to
vice, he maintains with Pascal that man’s nature is essentially evil. Virtue is
a perpetual struggle of will against natural instincts; and the history of civilisation
is, according
5
to him, the
history of man’s successful efforts to overcome and rise above his nature. As
for a golden age, that, he asserts, must be sought, not prior to civil society,
but prior to creation; for then, and then only,pain and sorrow, moral and
physical evil, were unknown.
In politics,
moreover, Bayle was a timid conservative, wholly averse from revolutionary
principles. Yet his Dictionary was the storehouse from which the philosophers
of the following generation derived their method and no small part of their
ideas and their facts. The irreverent banter or ironical reverence with which
the most solemn subjects are treated, the skill with which the reader is
insensibly led to the conviction that he is far less certain about things than
he imagined, the insidious suggestion that, although all reason is against such
a creed, it is perhaps as well to believe in God, in Providence, and in immortality—if
you are fool enough—all this in Bayle breathes the very spirit of “
philosophism.” The method of the Ehcycbpedie as described by Diderot is the
method of Bayle’s Dictionary. “Articles dealing with respectable prejudices
must expound them deferentially; the edifice of clay must be shattered by
referring the reader to other articles in which the opposite truths are
established on sound principles. This method of enlightening the reader has an
immediate influence on those who are quick of apprehension, an indirect and
latent influence on all.” It was from Bayle that writers, anxious not to give
too sudden a shock to prejudice or to avoid consequences unpleasant to
themselves, learnt the art of suggesting the most extreme conclusions from
seemingly innocent premises. Yet one liberal principle was openly advocated by
the cautious and conservative Bayle—that of toleration. His Commentavre
philosophique sur le CompeUe Intrare was published in 1686, three years before
Locke’s Letters on Toleration. Free thought is, he argues, a natural right,
since neither religious creeds nor philosophic theory admit. of demonstration,
but are matters of conjecture. Nor is it dangerous to allow menTd exercise this
right, for even an atheist is not necessarily a bad citizen. Society could
exist without religion.
This brief
sketch will suffice to show that one part of the philosophic doctrine of the
eighteenth century, the negative and destructive part, was already in existence
before the seventeenth century had ended; and we have also noticed that the
positive conceptions of popular sovereignty and natural rights were familiar to
the publicists of the sixteenth century. The great writers of the age of Louis
XIV either concerned themselves but little with political theory, or gave their
support to that ideal of government which it was the ambition of the “great
monarch” to realise. Descartes in theory held that the State should resemble a
town symmetrically planned on a level site; but in practice he was a
conservative. Who, he asked, would wish to pull down the buildings of an
ancient city in order that it might be rebuilt by square and line? Slow reforms
are best; it is far easier to destroy than to construct. Pascal—a pessimist in
6
politics as
in all else—maintains^ like Spinoza and Hobbes, that might is right; for, he adds,
plight is might and right is not. As justice could npt be made strong, force
was justified; and so peace at aU, events was secured. It is dangerous to let
the’people know that the laws are not just. “This dog is mine,” said those poor
children. “This.is my place in the sunshine.” “Such,” he exclaims, “was the
origin of injustice and usurpation among men.” But while the sun of Louis XIV
stood in the zenith these; were but unheeded mutterings; and Bossuet set out
with great pomp:of words the theory of the absolute monarchy. The
authority of Kings is sacred, absolute, indefeasible. “Ye are gods” the
Scriptures declare. The sovereignty of Kings is prior to all law, which owes
its validity to their enactment or assent.
The French
civil wars of the sixteenth century, though the immediate issue had been
religious rather than political, had led men to investigate the basis of
political authority; in a still greater measure this was the result of the
struggle between the Crown and the Parliament in England, where the questions d
sputed were mainly constitutional. The leaders of the Long Parliament, many of
whom had been educated at the Inns of Court, had for the most part the distaste
for appeals to first principles characteristic of ;Ejiglish lawyers; so that, although
there was a disposition among the more extreme fanatics tq refer to natural,1
rights and to the indefeasible sovereignty of the people, the opposition to the
Crown was mainly based on constitutional and legal precedents. It is therefore
not surprising that the first attempt to settle the controversy between
King,and people by logical deductions from abstract assumptions should have
been; made by a champion of absolutism. It was a dangerous innovation to
appeal to reason for- the justification of despotism. To do so was to
acknowledge the authority of a tribunal whose verdict was likely to be adverse.
Moreover, Hobbes (1588-1679) gave to the compact on which he based his State a
singularly unreasonable form. The social pact according to him, was a covenant
made by every man with every man to give up their natural freedom, their
natural right to everything, to the man (or body of men) whom they chose to
represent them, to submit their wills to the sovereign’s will, their judgment
to his judgment. While the subjects were bound by this covenant the sovereign
was left perfectly fee, both because his people had covenanted with each other
not to resist his will, and because he still retained his natural right to all
things, his natural liberty to do all things. It was reasonable for men to seek
to escape from Hobbes’ state of nature, a state indeed of natural liberty ajid
equality but also of war of all against all, in which they were “solitary,
brutish, vile, and miserable”; but was it reasonable that they should
unconditionally surrender up themselves, their lives, and properties to the
goodwill of the sovereign ?
But the
political speculations of Hobbies, as well as his crude sensualist and
utilitarian doctrine, influenced French thought not so much directly
Locke
and his influence.
1
as through
the teaching of his follower and opponent Locke (1632-1704). Locke’s Essay
concerning Human Understanding is the chief source of the French philosophy of
the eighteenth century, of the philosophy of common sense, which though
condemned as shallow gave at least an intelligible answer to the most momentous
questions. It may be that it dealt but superficially with problems, the
solution of which it is probably the fate of humanity to be ever seeking and
never to find; yet it satisfied the irany, and this doctrine more profound, but
neither so intelligible nor so logical, could not have done. In the works of
Locke may be found nearly all the most essential principles which influenced
the political and social theories of the French writers. According to him, men,
born virtuous, free, and equal, originally lived in a state of nature, which
was gradually corrupted by the growth of property and luxury, until, to check
greater evils, civil government—an evil itself, so far as it limits natural
freedom—was instituted. Man has natural rights, discoverable by right reason,
which existed in the state of nature; but law, a measure by which controversies
may be decided, a judge to apply that law, and force to support his decisions,
were then wanting. It was to supply these and for lie protection of life and
property that government *ras instituted; the members of the State by the
Social Compact surrendering their rights so far as was necessary to secure
these ends, but retaining others which are to be maintained even against the
sovereign. As civil government in itself is an evil, its functions should be
strictly limited. Man’s reason is the highest law. Before civil society is
instituted, reason is the one law, the law of nature; in civil society it still
is the test of the validity of all law. No law can be binding which is opposed
to right reason, the foundation on which all law rests. As the Contrat Social
of Rousseau is the outcome of Locke’s Treatises on Government, so is the Girdle
of his Thoughts concerning Education; while the Englishman’s Letters on
Toleration gave a great impulse to the crusade led by Voltaire against
intolerance, although he lays less stress than Voltaire and his followers on
the sceptieal argument against persecution: the absurdity and error, or at all
events the uncertainty, of the doctrines assent to which is to be enforced.
Enough has
been said to show that at the end of the seventeenth century “ principles ”
were not wanting to which the French people might appeal should a time come
when they were no longer satisfied with the existing social and political
arrangements. Already there were many signs that this time was near. The ruin
of the finances was complete. The condition of the rural population was wretched.
The peasants indeed, as Sir William Temple had noticed in the earlier and more
prosperous years of the reign of Louis XIV, were so dispirited by labour and
want that their misery was no danger to the government; but Frenchmen with any
jatriotism or feeling could not but
8
Political stimulus to destructive thought.
conclude with
Vauban and La Bruyere, with Fenelon and Saint-Simon, that there was something
amiss in institutions, under which a large part of the industrious population
of the most fertile country in Europe was condemned to a life of abject
suffering.
Moreover the
undoubted stimulus, which had been given to manufactures and trade by the
policy of Colbert, had, by increasing the wealth and importance of the middle
classes, prepared them to welcome doctrines subversive of social distinctions
and privileges. De Tocqueville remarks that the policy of the French monarchy
had encouraged the jealousy and hostility of classes to prevent their common
action. It certainly had aggravated that rancorous envy of the privileges of
birth and station which is one of the less amiable features of the French
character. “ My motto,” said Camille Desmoulins, “ is that of every honourable
man—no superior.” This is the spirit which many of the most acute contemporary
observers, men so different as Montlosier, Rivarol, and Roederer, held to be
one of the chief causes of the Revolution.
Although
Louis XIV played out his part on the public stage not without dignity amid
calamities which would have overwhelmed a weaker character, the eyes of his
subjects during his later years were no longer blinded to the shortcomings of
the government by his glory and by the splendour of his Court. The pharisaical
decency imposed upon the courtiers did not excuse in the eyes of the majority
of the devout— Jansenists or sympathisers with the Jansenists—subservience to
Jesuit intolerance; while the cruel persecution of the Protestants disgusted
believers whose humanity was stronger than their religious passions, and still
more so the free-thinkers, a growing class among the educated. “Every young
man,” wrote the Duchess of Orleans in 1679, “either is or affects to be an
atheist.” There was a general sense of oppression, a vague desire for reforms
and for greater freedom, and a growing impatience of a savagely intolerant,
narrow, and, as it seemed, hypocritical orthodoxy.
Almost
eveiything that was done or left undone by the government of the Regent Orleans
tended to strengthen these feelings. The Parliament had under Louis XIV been
strictly confined to its judicial functions. The first public act of the Regent
was to invite the magistrates, tacitly assumed to be the representatives of the
sovereign people, to determine how the country should be governed during the
King’s minority. Henceforth up to the very end of the monarchy the lawyers set
themselves to oppose administrative reforms as the champions of the people,
and, no longer refusing “to unveil the august secrets and mystery of
sovereignty,’1 claimed to be “ as it were a compendium of the Three
Estates,” thus keeping alive the idea of popular sovereignty. Reverence for the
Crown was impaired by the cynical profligacy of the Regent and by the elevation
to the highest place in Church and State of his favourite
Law's scheme.—Religious conflicts.
9
Dubois, the
most unscrupulous knave ever raised from mean estate by brilliant talents and
the basest arts.
The failure
of Law’s scheme still further degraded and discredited the government. The
King, as a French historian remarks, or at least the King’s representatives,
had turned bankers, and had proved unsuccessful and fraudulent bankers.
Moreover the Mississippi Bubble had brought the nobil’ty and the moneyed
classes into closer contact. Many of the greater nobles had used their prudently
realised profits to satisfy their creditors; others who had not speculated in
the Rue Quincampoix took advantage of the depreciated paper currency to pay off
their mortgages. But such material advantages were purchased by the aristocracy
at the price of diminished self-respect and public consideration. Sordid care
for gain had not hitherto been one of the vices of the French nobles. Honest
trade was still scorned; but henceforth men of the highest rank did not
hesitate to stain their scutcheons by marrying the daughters of financiers,
and to repair their waste by sharing in the questionable but lucrative
speculations of their fathers-in-law, whom they flattered and humiliated.
Throwing away their pride, these nobles, perhaps for that very reason, wrapped
themselves more closely in their vanity. The uneasy familiarity, to which the
rich financier and his children were admitted by “people of quality,” made the
impassable barrier by which they were separated more palpable and more
invidious. The rich parvenu knew that he was richer, and close intercourse
convinced him that he was not less cultivated, intelligent, and refined, than
these descendants of the Crusaders. It is significant that the wealthy
publicans and stockjobbers were the most eager patrons of the philosophers, the
most ready to welcome, or, like Helvetius, to disseminate, their most
subversive doctrines. The idea of equality, to which, says Senac de Meilhan,
the people were at first indifferent, was cherished by the rich.
Meantime the
Jansenist controversy, and the fierce and indecent conflict between the
Molinist hierarchy and the Gallican Parlement over the Bull Unigenitus, dealt a
deadly blow to religion. Nothing, except perhaps the extravagances of the
Jansenist enthusiasts, was more likely to encourage incredulity than the
arguments by which the Molinists sought to discredit the well-attested miracles
of the deacon Paris. The diarist Barbier, a typical bourgeois of education,
remarks that what was now seen taught men what to think of the miracles and
marvels of former times; and so, no doubt, many reasoned. The Bull Unigenitus,
wrote the Marquis d’Argenson, and not the philosophy imported from England, is
the cause of the present hatred of the priesthood.
Many
Frenchmen had visited England during the reign of Charles II when the
intercourse between the two Courts had been close. French reviews began to
notice English works about 1717; not a few English books had been translated;
and almost all the subjects touched upon by Voltaire in his Letters on the
English had been dealt with before his
10
Vottcure's Letters on the English.
return to
France in 1729, but without attracting attention. Locke’s Essay had been
translated in 1700, hut few copies were sold till 1725. Circumstances had not
as yet suggested that any practical lesson could be learnt by France from her
northern neighbours; and “ the immediate force of speculative literature
depends on practical opportuneness.” Nor was it till much later that the
thought of transplanting any part of the English Constitution was seriously
entertained. Just as it was the experimental and rationalistic method of the
English writers, rather than their actual doctrines, which so greatly
influenced French thought in the eighteenth century, so it was the comparison
of the general spirit which inspired the administration in the two countries,
and of the results of government in them, which encouraged the discontent of
the French with their own institutions, rather than any wish directly to
imitate a nation very generally regarded as “ seditious and violent, brutal in
temperament, and always in extremes.”
The
publication of Voltaire’s Letters on the English (1734) may be taken as marking
the point when the active campaign of the “philosophers ” against the existing
order of State, Church, and society began in France. The assault on the Church
from the first was direct and uncompromising; that on the State was indirect,
and often scarcely intentional on the part even of those by whom it was most
advanced, It is significant that Voltaire’s book should begin with a
description of the Quakers, which enables the writer to attack indirectly every
observance of sacerdotalism, every tenet of dogjnatic Christianity. When he
passes on to the.other sects,he loses no opportunity of sneering at the
orthodox faith and commending toleration. He lays stress on the absence of a
privileged nobility and on the respect shown to trade, but he deals shortly
with the Constitution and government. Not less characteristic is it that he does
not mention the political speculations of Locke, only noticing his refutation
of innate ideas and of Cartesian spiritualism.
The:
polemical activity of Voltaire (1694-1778) continued for nearly half a century;
but the whole plan of his campaign and the objects to which it was directed are
indicated in this book of some 150 short pages. His life henceforth was a
constant warfare against superstition, identified with Christianity, which he
believed to be the source of all intolerance and misery, and against those “
unreasonable ” scientific and metaphysical theories, which were capable of
being pressed into the services of orthodoxy, or which were obstacles to the
supremacy of common sense.
We are not
concerned with Voltaire as a critic of literature or historian or
metaphysician; but we may notice that in every department of human
knowledge—and there was hardly any into which he did not enter—he showed
himself ';he same philistine of transcendent cleverness. He expresses the views
and arguments of the average educated man in the most felicitous language, with
the most marvellous lucidity, and with the most brilliant wit. But while the
average man has been
taught to
distrust his own judgment, Voltaire is fully persuaded, and with good reason,
of his own .cleverness and sterling common sense. What he cannot understand
must therefore he concludes be nonsense; and what does not please him must be
bad. He therefore loudly proclaims opinions which the ordinary man holds, but
hesitates to acknowledge even to himself* Socrates was either madman or knave;
Aristotle is unintelligible; Plato a dotard. All systems of philosophy are
perfectly futile; and metaphysicians do not understand their own foolish
busier® When in his Dictionary he sums up under Philosophie the grains of
common sense he has been able to gather .from the writings of philosophers, a
reader with no taste for metaphysics is likely to recognise an admirable
summary of his own conclusions.
His
canon of historical criticism is that what appears absurd to him is incredible.
He has all the prejudices of the average man who relies on his common sense,
and of an unimaginative student of natural science who believes only in
generalisations derived from observation and in logical deductions from such
premises. Hence he was entirely wanting in originality; and it has been truly
said that there were, Voltairians before Voltaire wrote. His influence was so
great because he forcibly enunciated ideas which were held half unconsciously
or timidly by his readers. : All the crowd, in the well-known story, saw that
the Emperor was naked; but it was only after the child put into words what all
had seen that the general conviction had any practical result. Clearly to
formulate and to assert prevalent opinions was in itself to threaten the
existence of institutions which were out of harmony with them. The force of
habit, dislike of change, self-interest, induce men to admit a strange
inconsistency between their real beliefs and their social arrangements. Nor is
it easy to startle them out of their sluggish acquiescence. To have done this
was Voltaire’s great achievement. ,
Like many
others of the middle class who have gained wealth and consideration, Voltaire
was conservative from fear of the future, not from reverence for the past. He
was far from believing that his persistent attacks on the Church would shake
the monarchy. But the strangest of his delusions was the conviction that all
dogma could be swept away, yet a residuum of belief retained sufficient to
supply a necessary sanction for the morality of the uneducated. Since he held
the lower classes to be barbarians, incapable of culture and inaccessible to
reason, it would have been logical to refrain from any interference with their
faith. And at times he writes as if this had been his wish. He remarks, for
instance, that when an old superstition is well established a wise statesman
will use it as a bit, which the people have voluntarily taken into their
mouths. But it does not seem that he would have extended this forbearance to
Roman Catholicism, which he believed to be the most mischievous of creeds. It
was chiefly the intolerance of the Roman Church, an intolerance which appears
to be the logical consequence of
her doctrine,
that made him her irreconcilable enemy. To celibacy and monasticism moreover he
had a rooted aversion. They were unnatural and unreasonable, and founded on
that ascetic contempt of the body with which he and his contemporaries had so
little sympathy. He attributed the prosperity of England to the riddance that
had been effected of priests, eremites, and friars “ with all their trumpery,”
and believed that “ the voice of reason now supreme ” would applaud such a
reform in France. He thought that it could be carried out, not only without
producing any civil discord, but even without serious disturbance of the
popular faith. In this he anticipated, even if he was not responsible for, the
delusion of the Constituent Assembly.
Writing in
1750, he says that the privileges of the Church will crumble away like an old
ruin whenever it may please the Prince to touch them. The King had only to say
a word and the Pope would have no more authority in France than in Prussia.
Herein he was only expressing opinions very generally held. D’Argenson said
that the Revolution would begin with an attack upon the priests, who would be
tom to pieces in the streets. Barbier notes that all Paris is filled with
passionate hatred of the Molinist hierarchy, and that this anti-Roman party is
swelled by all honest folk who detest persecution and injustice. Voltaire’s
diatribes against Catholicism and Christianity continued to be virulent, even
after his fear of the consequences of the atheistic teaching of his more
advanced friends, and perhaps an honest conviction, had led him to undertake
the defence of natural religion. Men at all times and places had believed in
the existence of a Supreme Being; and the belief, he declared, was reasonable.
Nor did his
common sense allow him to believe that a time was at hand when mankind would be
the docile subjects of logic and reason. The human race generally was not in
his opinion two degrees nearer to civilisation than the savages of Kamtschatka.
In most countries he thought the multitude of brute beasts called “ men ”
outnumbered those who think by at least 100 to 1. Yet a popular government is,
he says, less iniquitous than despotism; unfortunately it is only possible in a
small and favourably situated country. It will no doubt commit errors of policy
and be divided by factions; but we shall not see in it Sicilian Vespers, St
Bartholomews, Irish massacres, men burnt by the Inquisition, or sent to the
galleys for drawing a pail of water from the sea. In another place he maintains
that a Republican constitution is the best,
because
under it the nearest approach is made to natural equality_ by
which he
means an equal right to personal liberty, to property, and to the protection of
the laws. The English cry for liberty and property is according to him, the cry
of nature.
He comes
nearest to radical doctrine in the Idies Republicaines published in 1765. He
there defines the ideal function of civil government as “ the execution by one
or more of the General Will in accord-
His
practical proposals.
13
ance with
laws voted by all.” The English, he says, are to be envied, because among them
every citizen has recovered those natural rights, which the subjects of other
monarchies have lost. These are the right of each individual to the unimpeded
control of his actions and property, the right of addressing his
fellow-citizens through the press, of being tried on all criminal charges in
accordance with strict law before a jury of independent men, and of professing
without molestation whatever religion he pleases. He considers that there is no
reason why the French should not enjoy these rights under the existing
monarchy. Voltaire had no political and hardly any social reforms greatly at
heart. But he was impatient of what was unreasonable; he was humane and good-
natured ; and therefore wished the people, “ vile canaille ” though they were,
to be happy and contented. He was rich and therefore anxious to secure order
and stability. The reforms he desired were those which would naturally suggest
themselves to such a man. Even as regards religion, all that he $sked for the
present was: that all creeds should be tolerated and civil rights extended to
the Protestants, and even to the Jews—a miserable and contemptible race; that
no ecclesiastical law should have any force unless sanctioned by the State;
that the government should fix what feasts should be observed, and regulate
the marriage laws; that there should be no privilege of clergy; and that
excommunication, annates, and other payments to Rome should be forbidden.
He attacked
torture with indignant common sense. Was the man who might be innocent to
endure suffering much more terrible than the punishment which he would incur if
guilty ? He eagerly advocated a reform of the criminal laws, such as was
demanded by Beccaria. The innocent children of a felon ought not to be punished
by the confiscation of his property, nor a servant girl put to death for
stealing half-a-dozen napkins. Criminal procedure ought not to be secret and a
pitfall for the innocent. There ought not to be twenty different systems of law
in the same kingdom. All laws ought to be clear and intelligible. All citizens
should be equal in the eyes of the law, and all fiscal privileges ought to be
abolished; a vexatious system of internal taxes and tolls should not prevent
commodities from being sent to the place where they were needed. Such are the
most important reforms asked for by Voltaire. They are all demanded again and
again in the cahiers of 1789, and were effected by the Constituent Assembly.
Voltaire
hated theorists and “ ideologuesand appealed throughout to common sense and
utility rather than to general principles and a priori conceptions. Living when
he did, it was impossible that he should not sometimes speak of “nature” and
“natural laws”; yet even then he never loses touch with reality. He denies that
the savage is the “natural man.” Primitive man was the dirtiest and most
miserable of brutes, wholly absorbed in the struggle for existence. To live
freely among equals is true life. Our lives are more in accordance with nature
than that of the
14
savage, who
transgresses her law from morning to night, being useless to himself and to
others. For we are naturally social beings; consequently the law of our nature
is to do what is conducive to social happiness. Like almost every writer of the
eighteenth century Voltaire believed the people to be what institutions and
rulers make them; but he did not share the prevailing delusion that the removal
of all mischievous institutions and restrictions -would restore them to a state
of primitive virtue and happiness. He could not indeed allow that man is
naturally evil—for that was the Christian doctrine. But as things are, he
believes the populace to be everywhere the same, stupid and cruel, and that at
bottom none are more cruel than his own countrymen,' the mildness and docility
of whose disposition it was then the fashion to extol.
There is
little that can be called original in the many volumes of Voltaire; but he
rarely says anything that is not eminently rational, lucid, and convincing; and
he says the same thing over and over again, never fearing to repeat himself,
never striving after originality, but determined to be heard, and charming his
reader by his brilliant lucidity, by his wit, and by sparing him every intellectual
effort, even the strain of careful attention. He was the leader of the attack
on the Church, on superstition, intolerance, and injustice, the most brilliant
and persuasive assertor of the authority of reason; but he did nothing that
others also were not attempting, that left undone by him they might not have
accomplished. His work was negative. He cleared away the obstacles which dammed
back the rapidly rising flood, but his hand was only the most active and
unerring of many engaged in the same task; and even unassisted the impatient
stream would have overflowed and borne away the impediments to its course.
The suffei
ings of the last years of Louis XIV’s reign had called the attention of many to
the faults of his rule, and had led them to desire a change in the spirit and
method of government. Sofaie of these reformers had been among the friends of
the Duke of Burgundy, and had trusted that the accession of the pupil of
Fenelon would enable them to realise their hopes. They were for the most part
nobles who regretted an idealised feudalism. Their views therefore had little
influence on the future, yet one author who belonged to this party must be
mentioned. This is the Comte de Boulainvilliers (1658-1722), who, in two works
posthumously published, a History of the Ancient Government of France and
Letters on the Parlenient, maintained the Feudal System to be the masterpiece
of the human intellect. Everything gained by the authority of the Crown, every
franchise obtained by the commons, was according to him a usurpation, an
infraction of the rights based on conquest of the nobility, the heirs of the
conquering Franks. This theory was accepted in part by Montesquieu, and by the
Parlement when defending in 1776 the privileges of the nobles against Turgot,
and was turned against
15
the
feudal classes with fatal effect by their revolutionary enemies. If the people
were the conquered Gauls, why should they, when might was on their side, endure
the oppression of men who boasted themselves to be their alien conquerors P ■ .
But even
under Louis XIV there were reformers who looked to the future rather than to
the past. Among them may perhaps be counted the illustrious name of Vauban. In
his Dime Roy ale he insists on the misery of the people. One-tenth of the
industrious population, the real strength of the State, were, he says,
destitute, and this shortly after the Peace .of Ryswick, before the most
disastrous years of the reign. A complete reform of the fiscal system was, he
said, as just as it was necessary; for there was a “ natural ” obligation on
all citizens to contribute to the support of the government-in proportion to
their ability; and every privilege exempting from this obligation was alike
unjust and contrary to the common interest. ( During the Regency and under the
administration of Fleury political questions were discussed with a freedom that
had been impossible in the previous reign. A spirit of reform was abroad. In
1724 some men who shared the growing interest in social and political questions
agreed to meet every week for the purpose of reading essays and holding
discussions in the rooms of a certain Abbe Alary. They called themselves the
Club de VEntresol from the place of their meeting. We may suppose the English
name of “Club,” now first used in France, to have been suggested by
Bolingbroke, who was one of the score or so of diplomatists, officials, and men
of letters, who were members of this society. The leading spirit of the
Entresol, at all events the most prolific contributor of essays and harangues,
was the Abbe de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743). The Club was suppressed by Fleury in
1731; but the members must have had a remarkable incapacity for being bored, a
most vigorous interest in the subjects discussed, or it would not so long have
survived the lucubrations of so pitiless a pedant, so indefatigable a reformer
as the excellent Abbe. He had projects for everything, from securing a
perpetual peace by the establishment of a European diet to the “utilisation of
dukes and peers.” There were among his ideas some which were sound, and some
which afterwards made their way in the world. In two points more especially the
Abbe de Saint-Pierre foreshadowed or contributed to the beliefs of the next
generation. He had faith in the perfectibility of mankind. The race is as yet,
he said, in its childhood. Like La Bruyere he considers our experience of some
7000 or 8000 years superficial and incomplete. “How old do you call yourself?”
asked Fontenelle. “About 10” was the answer. And secondly his religion was a
deism, more like that of Rousseau than that of Voltaire; for, although he would
wish a priest to be something between a policeman and a relieving officer, he
seems to have been by no means devoid of real, albeit sentimental, religious
feeling; and his description of Agaton, a very
wise and
saintly Archbishop, is a curious analogue to that of the Savoyard vicar.
Another
member of the Entresol was the better known Marquis d’Argenson (1694-1757),
Intendant of Hainault, and for a short time (1744-7) Minister of Foreign
Affairs. D’Argenson was fully convinced that the time was out of joint, and not
less that he was bom to set it right. His constantly disappointed hope to be
invited to do so made him a, bitter critic of the government. His memoirs
afford abundant citations to historians who wish to paint the maladministration
of the old monarchy and the rr'serj of its subjects in the darkest colours;
but, positive as he is in assertion, his views vary from day to day with his
spirits, and these greatly depend on a chance word from the King. The grumbles
of a pessimist, who is also a disappointed office-seeker, are not always very
trustworthy evidence. D’Argenson’s political views and programme are contained
in his Considerations on the Government of France, a work published in 1764
after his death, but written many years earlier to refute the reactionary and
feudal Boulainvilliers. He is strongly in favour of decentralisation. To govern
well it is necessary to govern less. An order of the Council should not be
required to repair a bad road, or a hole in a church wall. The government
should be content to leave something undone; a physician does not undertake to
digest for his patients. He would have the country divided into districts,
boroughs, and municipalities, the administration of which should be entrusted
to officials appointed by the Intendants from lists of candidates elected by
the communes. The Provincial Estates should be composed of representatives of
the districts and a few great landowners, sitting in one Chamber. He would
abolish all internal tolls and duties, and inclines to permit free trade with
foreign countries. Those who cultivate the 'and should be relieved from all
feudal dues and obligations. If people would lay aside their prejudices they
must allow that it is most conducive to the good of the State that all men
should be equal. Nobles are but drones in the hive. He thinks it no objection
to his principles that, they are favourable to democracy and tend to the
destruction of the nobi. ity. But he has no wish to limit the authority of the
Crown. The powers of the Roman tribunes, of the English Parliament, of the
States General, the right of remonstrance claimed by the French law Courts are
mischievous; for the sovereign power whether in a monarchy or a republic should
be one and unquestioned, like that of the Almighty. “The whole art of
government consists in nothing else than the perfect imitation of God no doubt
an easy art, at all events one in which d’Argenson imagined himself to be well
versed. At the same time he would, have the Prince remember that he exists for
the people, and that they are not his chattels. D’Argenson thought Morelly’s
Code de la Nature, which we shall have to notice hereafter as one of the
earliest sources of modem Socialism, “ the book of books,” and far superior to.
Montesquieu.—The
Lettres Persanes.
17
Montesquieu’s
great work. He has himself been justly called a socialistic rather than a
liberal royalist; but the Due de Richelieu’s description of him as “ the
Secretary of State of Plato’s Republic ” is scarcely just, for it is clear
that, had he obtained the coveted place of Prime Minister, he would have
attempted reforms not very unlike those afterwards undertaken by Turgot, and in
a spirit even more uncompromising. His ideal for France was a reforming
despotism based on local selfgovernment, with equal laws and equal
opportunities for all. To a certain extent he anticipated the doctrines of the
Economists. So early as 1739 he thought a treaty admitting English manufactures
would be good for France, since it would divert French capital and labour from
manufactures to agriculture—a more truly productive employment. Some years
later he hears that the English have taken off import duties. He wonders whether
they have fully recognised the profit they may derive from making their island
the world’s market. It is a mistake for a government to try to direct
production. Liberty, Liberty, he exclaims, this is what is wanted for
individuals and communities.
Montesquieu
(1689-1755) printed his Persian Letters in 1721. The popularity of this book,
one of the most remarkable of the century, was great and immediate. It breathes
the spirit of the reaction, then at its height, against the monarchy of Louis
XIV; and, written thirteen years before Voltaire’s Letters on the English, it
anticipates his attack on intolerance and orthodoxy. As a satire of society it
is weak, for the characters described are lifeless types; and a modem reader is
disgusted by a frigid and elaborate indecency, very characteristic of that
period and far more repulsive than the spontaneous obscenity of Aristophanes or
Rabelais. But when the writer turns to religious and political matters there is
no want of outspoken vigour. The Pope is an old idol, worshipped from habit,
yet still a potent magician, since he can make men believe that three are one,
and that the bread they eat, the wine they drink, are neither bread nor wine.
Nor had the state of affairs so completely changed in France that her rulers
could read with complacency such an attack as that contained in the Persian
Letters on the memory of the late King. It is true that the Regent could not be
reproached with a minister of eighteen and a mistress of eighty years, nor with
banishing his most useful and industrious subjects. But it was not Louis XIV
alone who rewarded the man who handed him a napkin more liberally than the
captain who had won a battle, and gave a small pension to an officer who had
run away for two leagues, but a rich government to him who had run four. Nor
was the preceding reign the only one in which pensions had been so lavishly
granted as to make it appear that Princes, in consideration of the merits of
their courtiers, had decided to enact that every labourer should henceforth
diminish his children’s daily bread by one-fifth.
Few readers
in these days probably lay down The Spirit of the Laws, the great work with
which the name of Montesquieu is generally associated, without a feeling of
disappointment, and of wonder that a book which is less a book than the
materials for one should have obtained so vast a reputation not in France
alone, but throughout Europe and especially in England. It was natural indeed
that Burke should have exerted his unequalled command of hyperbole to extol the
foreigner who had so well appreciated the merits of the British Constitution;
but Horace Walpole and Gibbon are scarcely less emphatic in their commendation.
Walpole probably was very ready to appreciate the merits of the wit and man of quality,
who, like himself, affected to regret a vulgar impulse to join the scribbling
herd; while the historian of the Decline and Fall was likely to be a kindly
critic of a writer who at least had pointed out the way to the field in which
he was himself to win renown. But we must remember that it is in part because
the success of Montesquieu has been so great that it is now difficult to do him
full justice. Much that he said for the first time has become trite. The ideas
that he suggested have been developed and elaborated, so that as presented by
him they appear crude and incomplete. It is not the .least of his merits that
he attempts to apply a historical and indnctive method to political and social
questions; but to this we are now accustomed, and we are most struck by the
faults in the application of that method. Much in short that was then original
now seems commonplace, and errors then scarcely to be avoided are in our eyes
inexcusable.
But we may
not stop to attempt a criticism or analysis of The Spirit of the Laws. It is
■ sufficient for our purpose to set forth the leading ideas which
Montesquieu wished to impress on his readers. He begins by asserting a general
proposition, that the constitution most in conformity with nature—nature as
understood by jurists and Stoics-^-is that which is best suited to the
character of the nation for which it is intended. There is no absolutely best
form of government. If law generally is the reason of mankind, the civil and
political laws of each nation should be the application of that reason to
particular cases. The laws should correspond to the character and principles of
the established government, and like it must depend upon and suit the climate
and physical conditions of the country. But it is not the illustration and
practical application of this general principle that Montesquieu has most at
heart. He believes that the salvation of France depends upon the possibility of
undoing the evil work of Richelieu and Louis XIV, and of a return to the old
monarchy, as he conceives it to have existed under Henry IV or Louis XII. The
danger which threatens France is despotism, leading to anarchy. He would warn
his countrymen, renew and invigorate their love of liberty. He is a liberal
conservative, who would temper monarchy by aristocratic
Montesquieu's political ideals.
19
institutions,
the antithesis of d’Argenson, one of the first advocates of democratic and
socialistic despotism. Monarchies perish when obedience becomes servile, when
honour—the sense of personal dignity and love of privilege—is no more, when the
nobles are the despised instruments of the Prince, when the dishonourable and
the base are honoured; when the monarch, abolishing all institutions and bodies
intermediate between himself and his people, seeks to centralise all government
in himself; when, in short, a kingdom is in the condition of France under Louis
XV. Montesquieu is convinced that all undivided sovereignty is bad—whether in
the hands of the one or of the many; it leads to despotism, and despotism to
anarchy.
The best form
of government accordingly is a carefully balanced constitution such as that of
England; but this, he allows, can only be brought into being and continue to
exist by some most fortunate combination of circumstances. The next best polity
is a monarchy in which the power of the Prince is limited by love of privilege
among the nobles and by the existence of intermediate bodies which will be an
obstacle to arbitrary action and will guide the obedience of the subjects. He
is disposed to approve of everything which creates friction and so impedes the
direct action of the Sovereign; even the law’s delays are in so far salutary.
The first aim of tyrants is, he says, to simplify the laws, because they
recognise in their forms an obstacle to despotism. This desire to limit the
power of the Sovereign distinguishes Montesquieu from almost all the political
theorists of his age. The philosophers generally had no objection to
enlightened despotism, still less had the Economists ,• whilst it was the aim
of the followers of Rousseau to free the sovereign people from all checks and
trammels.
Montesquieu
thought that the supreme merit of the British Constitution, the security that
undivided sovereignty should not become despotism, lay in the performance of
the executive, legislative, and judicial functions by special bodies—the King’s
ministers, the legislature, and the law Courts: a misconception sufficiently
plausible to be accepted by Blackstone and other English authorities as well as
by the able men who framed the Constitution of the United States. He suggested
that the evils under which France was suffering might be remedied by doing that
which Burke reproached the Constituent Assembly for having left undone. He
would have had “privileges which, though discontinued, were not lost to memory
” restored, and those opposed and conflicting interests which “ interpose a
salutary check on all precipitate resolutions ” so organised as to limit the
arbitrary power of the government. In short, he wished the constitution of the
old monarchy “ which had suffered waste and dilapidation ” to be rebuilt and
enlarged on the Same plan. That this or something'like this should be attempted
was the wish of some of the more enlightened nobles, and, as would appear from
the pamphlets and cahiers of 1788 and 1789, of some of the more
conservative
commoners at the time of the meeting of the Estates. But there were few even
among the moderate reformers who would have been content to stop just at this
point. Encouraged probably by the successful constitution-building of the
United States, the liberal royalists, a majority at one time in the Constituent
Assembly, hoped to realise in France the constitution described by Montesquieu
as ideally best—that of England, freed from some of its anomalies and
imperfections. They were disappointed; yet, had we sufficient space, it would
be easy to show that, although Si eyes prevailed, traces of Montesquieu’s
influence are not wanting in the Constitution of 1791.
But the more extreme
reformers might ask: was it clear that Montesquieu believed constitutional
monarchy to be the ideally best form of government? Had he not said that the
establishment of a democratic republic in England had been prevented by want of
virtue ? And was not that constitution obviously the best of which the
principle was virtue, and which could only continue to' exist so long as
education and law maintained virtue, public spirit, and disinterested
patriotism, checked luxury and promoted equality among its citizens? But if a
republic was the best constitution, why should it not be established in France
? They had learnt from other teachers that, so soon as corrupting institutions
were destroyed, the native virtue of man would assert itself. All that was needed
therefore was to destroy everything that existed, to pass the laws which,
according to Montesquieu, are of the essence of a republic and thus secure its
existence. Unfortunately Montesquieu, who had derived his ideas of democracy
from classical antiquity, had written that a republic can hardly be established
without magistrates invested with an awful authority, and laws which will
forcibly lead back the State to freedom that the law of public safety must
prevail over every other consideration—the most execrable maxim of tyranny as
Rousseau called it: and even that, “ as in old days the statues of the gods
were sometimes hidden, it may at times be necessary to throw a veil over
liberty.” The whole spirit of the Jacobin Revolution, it has been said, is contained
in a sentence spoken by Robespierre: “ If the strength of a Republican
government in time of peace is virtue, in the time of Revolution it is both
virtue and fear—for fear without virtue is deadly, virtue powerless without
fear.” When Robespierre said this he inay have seemed to himself and others to
have been closely following the precepts of Montesquieu.
Montesquieu,
like every other reformer, wishes for a complete reform of the fiscal system;
but, unlike the “ Economists,” he would lighten the direct and increase the
indirect taxation. He would have direct taxation progressive. The absolute
necessaries of life should be exempt from all burdens. The comforts of life
should be lightly taxed, mere luxuries heavily. The State should teach its
members to work, and supply the opportunity of working. Its duty is to see that
no citizen is without
“ an assured
subsistence, daily bread, decent clothes, and a kind of life not destructive of
health ”—a most momentous admission.
The
Spirit of the Laws appeared in 1748; in 1753 Chesterfield, visiting Prance,
recognised “ all the symptoms which he had ever met with in history previous to
great changes and revolutions in government—" a celebrated prophecy, which
would be a more convincing proof of the writer’s sagacity, had he not three
years later foretold even more positively the imminent ruin of his own country.
But no doubt in the middle of the eighteenth century the French had begun to
reason more freely than ever before upon matters of religion and government. Contempt
and hatred of the clergy, discontent with the government, were more and more
openly proclaimed. Incredulity was no longer confined to the upper classes.
D’Argenson, especially after he had lost office in 1747, predicted more and
more persistently some great convulsion, which might even end in the
establishment of a Republic. Observers less pessimistic than this political
Cassandra were alarmed at the prevalent spirit of restlessness and discontent.
This feverish disquiet preceded and was the cause, not the effect, of the
numerous books on economical and political theory and practice, criticising
existing institutions and suggesting more perfect social arrangements, which
were produced during the next twenty years by writers differing in their views,
but unanimous in ascribing the misery of the people to the organisation of
society. Whatever they see amiss, the exclamation that arises to their lips is
that ingeminated by Arthur Young, “ Government, all is Government.” The
Economists, in their own eyes the most conservative of reformers, are wanting,
as Tocqueville says, in all respect for anything that exists or that is likely
to be an obstacle to the realisation of their ideal. Their books, he maintains,
are instinct with the spirit of democratic revolution. It is not only that they
hate certain privileges; variety itself is odious to them, and they would
welcome uniformity and equality even in servitude.
According to
Rabaut Saint-^ltienne the Economists first taught the French to reflect on the
science of government; but Dupont of Nemours, himself one of them, with more
justice considers that Montesquieu gave the impulse to the political and
economical speculation of which the physio- cratic school itself was a result.
Not a little also of the public interest in such matters must be ascribed to
the influence of a book, L'Ami des Hommes, published in 1756 by the Marquis de
Mirabeau (1715-89), afterwards the most enthusiastic follower of Quesnay
(1694-1774), but at that time, as he says, “no more an Economist than his cat.”
Such economic principles as his work contains he had taken from a manuscript in
his possession written by Cantillon, an Anglo-French banker, part of which, On
the Nature of Trade, was published in 1755. Yet there is much in Mirabeau’s book
that is in harmony with the teaching of the
Physiocrats';
and its great popularity prepared the way for the diffusion of their doctrines.
A contemporary critic said that the author “ thought like Montesquieu and wrote
like Montaigne.” Like Quesnay the Marquis was a utopian optimist, firmly
persuaded that he possessed the secret of so organising society as to secure to
men the happiness for which nature intended them. He was convinced that
agriculture was the source of all wealth; he was opposed to,all restrictions on
trade and industry, and so thorough-going a free trader that he held a war of
tariffs to be not less destructive than a war of cannon. Both as a partisan of
agriculture and as a noble he was opposed to the “ moneyed interest.” “ Great
fortunes in a State are like pike in a pond.” The man who lives on an income
derived from funded- property is a self-indulgent drone, and the cause of most
of the evils in society. The lower classes are, he says, the most truly
productive, and should therefore be honoured. He tells us that he would always
make way for:a water-carrier with a feeling of respect; yet his hatred of ;the
bureaucratic government is almost as much due to his indignation that men of no
birth should lord it over the country gentlemen as to a dislike of
centralisation, which had led him six years before to write a tract in favour
of local self-government.
Struck no
doubt by the similarity of their views and anxious to gain a proselyte whose
reputation with the public would be useful to the cause, Quesnay asked Mirabeau
to visit him, told him that Cantillon was an ass, initiated him into the true
economic doctrine, and gained a devoted disciple. Quesnay, the “ Confucius of
Europe,” as his followers called him, was the physician of Madame de Pompadour;
and it was in his lodgings under her apartments that his meeting with the
Marquis took place, from which the existence of the Physiocrats, as an
organised and actively proselytising sect, may be dated (July, 1757). No doubt
Quesnay had already thought out his system; and many of his opinions were
shared by his friend Goumay (1712-59), a member of the Bureau du Commerce and a
student and translator of the English economists, who had induced his official
superior Trudaine to accept the maxim, “ Laisser faire et laisser passer,”
which he is said to have been the first to formulate as the true principle of
practical political economy.
Before his
alliance with Mirabeau, Quesnay had only written articles in the Encyclopedie;
one (Fermkr), in which he ascribed the poverty of the cultivators and the decay
of industry to the misery and oppression which drove the peasants into the
towns, to the sirbitrary and unjust taxation, and to the restrictions on the
com trade ; and another (Grains), in which he pointed out that the natural
advantages of France ought to be turned to account by concentrating labour and
capital on the land, the produce of which should be exchanged for foreign
luxuries, a reversal of Colbert’s policy. In 1758 his Tableau dtconomique was printed
at Versailles at the royal press, and it is said under the King’s personal
supervision, for Louis XV had as warm a regard as his selfish insensibility
The
doctrine of Quemay.
23
allowed for
the vivacious monkey-like little man with the face, according to his admirers,
of Socrates. It is not likely that the King suspected any danger to his
government from that enigmatical table, or took the trouble to listen to the
explanations of his “ thinker,” as he called the author. Two years later the
Economic Table was reprinted, with elucidations scarcely less obscure, by the
Marquis de Mirabeau, together with essays by the same hand, one of which
pointed out the evils of the corvee. Henceforth the restless Marquis became the
leader of a band of disciples who preached with eager conviction the doctrine
of the net product and of the impot unique. Next to the “ Friend of Humanity,”
the most able and popular of the “Economists” as they called themselves—the
name of Physiocrats was given long after by T. B. Say— were Mercier de la
Riviere (1720-94), an official and at one time governor of Martinique, whose
book, The Natural and Essential Order of Political Societies, published in
1767, contains the clearest and most connected account of the doctrine of the
school; and Dupont of Nemours (1739-1817), who wrote a book in 1763 entitled
Reflexions on the Riches of the Nation, and served the cause with an
indefatigable pen in the Journal de VAgriculture et du Commerce (1763-66) and
in the &phemerides des Citoyens (1766-72).
The Marquis
de Mirabeau was of opinion that the three great inventions “ which have given
stability to political society ” are writing, money, and the Tableau
jtconormque. Fortunately it is possible to give a sketch sufficient for our
purpose of the doctrine of Quesnay, without attempting to explain this most
crabbed document, the main object of which is to show that the national capital
can only be increased by returning a greater share of the “net produce” of the
country to “productive expenditure,” i.e., to the support of agriculture, and
that one tax upon the net returns of the land ought to be substituted for the
jxisting complicated, unjust, and extravagant fiscal system. Rulers and
subjects alike must obey the self-evident laws of nature. These “ natural
laws,” which mankind ought to observe, are the expression of the conditions
under which man, in the social state “natural” to him, will secure the maximum
of well-being. The system might equally well have been christened “
theocratic,” since it is represented as a recognition of and obedience to the
laws of nature, which are also those of God—the Physiocrats were convinced
deists. These laws are an infallible guide. We can deduce from them the whole
science of human life. God intends the good of man, whose universal motive is
desire of happiness; and these are the rules on the observance of which it is
“evident” that his happiness depends. Once understood they must command the
assent of all men as infallibly as mathematical truth; so that all restriction
of individual freedom is both unnecessary and injurious, and the function of
government is reduced to a minimum. Indeed government would appear unnecessary,
were it not that some education is needed to enable men to recognise the
cogency of
nature’s laws, and were it not that in every society there are some brutes not
under the control of reason. The province of government should therefore be
confined to that of policeman to coerce these brutes, and of schoolmaster to
render their number as small as possible. The establishment of a uniform,
national, and compulsory system of education was one of the practical reforms
most insisted upon by the Economists.
We are not
concerned with Quesnay’s erroneous idea, that labour and capital can only
produce new wealth, or value, when employed on the land, nor with his curious
theory that all taxation ultimately falls upon the owners of the soil; but
there can be little doubt that the notion of substituting one single direct
tax, levied on all landowners alike, for the existing cumbrous and unjust
system of taxation, was singularly attractive, and led many to profess
themselves the admirers of doctrines they only half understood. The criticism
by the economists of existing institutions fostered the prevailing discontent;
and change was made to appear easy by their optimistic confidence that reform
was not difficult, that little more was needed than to destroy mischievous
restrictions on natural liberty, and to formulate clearly the natural and
necessary laws of society.
“ The more I
ponder over the abuses of society,” wrote the Marquis de Mirabeau, “and the
remedies suggested, the more convinced I am, that it needs only that twelve
principles expressed in twelve lines should be firmly fixed in the head of the
Prince or of his minister and carried out in detail, to set everything right,
and to renew the age of Solomon.” The Economists did no service to their
country in thus encouraging the belief that it was as easy to build as to pull
down, and that men in general were reasonable. In some ways like Rousseau, they
represent the reaction against the logical development of the “ philosophism ”
of their century. The Friend of Humanity boasts that that “ odious
philosophism” was never allowed to penetrate into their periodicals. Mercier de
la Riviere insists that the study of the natural order of society leads man
back to God, and enables him to recognise more and more His wisdom and
beneficence exemplified in the laws He has given to mankind. “Helvetius,” said
Turgot, “seems to be constantly labouring to prove that it is not to our
interest to be honourable men.” The Physiocrats maintained that enlightened
self-interest teaches us that not honesty only but “ virtue ” is the best
policy. Not a few men either in the service of the government or closely
connected with it more or less accepted the creed of the sect, among others
Goumay, Trudaine de Montigny, Malesherbes, Bertin, the Cardinal de Boisgelin,
and Turgot. Quesnay himself had the ear of the King and the support of Mariams de
Pompadour. The teaching of the Economists had therefore a direct influence on
the measures of the central government and carried still further the reaction
against Colbertism, which had led Machault, the
25
one able
Finance minister under Louis XV, to reply, when he was told that trade and
manufactures were perishing, “ so much the better, there will be the more
labour to employ on the land.” Yet more did it influence the spirit of the
provincial administration; for Turgot, although his reforms in the Limousin
were the most systematic, the most successful, and the best known, was not the
only reforming Intendant.
The
restrictions on the com trade were abrogated in 1764. Unfortunately bad
harvests in three successive years brought free trade and economic theory into
disrepute; for dear food was a more effective argument than the ridicule of
Voltaire, or Galiani’s most lively and acute criticisms in his Dialogues on the
Com Trade (1769). The com taxes were accordingly reimposed by Terray in 1770,
to be again removed by Turgot on his accession to power in 1774. Once more the
seasons took the side of protection; and the unavoidable rise in the price of
food was utilised to the utmost by the enemies of the minister to decry his
policy—by no one with more reckless appeals to popular passion and prejudice
than by Necker, in his book on The Corn Laws and the Com Trade, a production
hailed by Diderot as a work of genius. When Turgot was driven from office
(1776), free trade in com was abandoned, together with those other reforms
which were in strict accordance with the principles of the Economists: the
abolition of the corvie, and of the close companies and trading corporations,
the organisation of local selfgovernment by representative councils of
landowners, and the attempt to mitigate the iniquities of the oppressive fiscal
system; reforms which Turgot had assured the King would, if completed by a
national system of education, make the French in a few years a new people and
the first in Europe. Talents, virtue and disinterestedness, honour and zeal,
would take the place of corruption, timidity, intrigue, and greed. Such words
in the mouth of a man like Turgot are a remarkable instance of the prevalence
of that blind confidence in the perfectibility of the people, provided a few
reforms are carried out, which proved so dangerous a delusion.
The more
advanced philosophers had no sympathy with the Physiocrats. But Voltaire,
whose dislike of everything pedantic and obscure led him to ridicule Quesnay’s
abstruse dogmatism, had eagerly welcomed the ministry of the greatest and the
most practical of the school. There may have been some affectation in the
emotion he showed when he met Turgot during his triumphal visit to Paris in
1778; but the words he wrote on hearing of the great, minister’s fall ring
true: “ I have nothing but death to look forward to, since M. Turgot is out of
office. The thunderbolt has blasted my brain and my heart.”
It ceased to
be fashionable among those who would be thought enlightened to profess the
principles of the Economists; yet the impulse given by them continued to some
extent to influence the administration. More favour was shown to agriculture.
Enclosures were encouraged, to
26
the detriment
of the poorer cultivators; and the English negotiators.of Pitt’s commercial
treaty were surprised by the wish of the French Foreign Office to promote free
trade between the two countries. “The most liberal system was what they desired.”
Even in 1789 not a few of the cahiers ask for the “impot unique" the
single tax on landed revenue.
It has been
often remarked that before the middle of the eighteenth century the attack of
the philosophers was directed against the Church, while from that time down to
the outbreak of the Revolution political and social arrangements were chiefly
criticised. This is not to be accepted without some explanation. We have seen
that from the beginning of the century onward there was among the enlightened a
very real interest in political questions and a desire for practical reforms,
and that those who say that the Church alone was assailed are thinking too
exclusively of Voltaire. But while the earlier generation, men like d’Argenson
and Montesquieu, would have been content to build on the old foundations,
Rousseau and his followers, as well as the Socialists, such as Morelly and
Mably, aspired to construct the State of the future on a wholly ideal basis,
and more or less believed themselves to be sketching a Utopia. The philosophers
in the narrow sense—the men of the Encyclopedic as they are sometimes
called—men such as Diderot, d’Alembert, Helvetius, or Holbach, had hardly any
positive political creed. Their teaching was destructive and negative. What
they did was to substitute reason for the seemingly intuitive dictates of
conscience; reason, which at the critical moment is likely to become the
advocate of passion and selfishness, if the premisses of these men are
accepted, that the end of all our actions is our own private happiness, and
that they are good or bad only so far as they do or do not conduce to that end.
To “ return to nature” meant with them to throw off all moral restraint; as if,
Rousseau pointed out, our conscience was not as much a part of our nature as
our senses.
The practical
outcome of their doctrines can nowhere be more clearly traced than in the
purple patches with which Diderot embellished and enlivened the Abbe Raynal’s
otherwise meritorious and tedious Philosophical and Political History of the
Indies (published 1774). We are told in these diatribes that the unhappiness of
civilised man is caused by the absurd laws which constantly violate those of
nature; that the groans of the oppressed are stifled in a prison or on the
scaffold; and that if anyone should attempt to vindicate the Rights of Man he
would perish in infamy. The sole employment of Princes, when not engaged in
unjust wars, is to forge heavier chains for their wretched subjects and to make
their slavery more grievous. Everywhere • the peaceful citizen is the prey of
the lawyer, the publican, and the brutal soldier. In the country the labourer
is the victim of a pitiless landlord, who robs him of the hay on which his
weary limbs seek a few hours’
Rousseau.—-The
Sentimental School.
27
respite. If
he owns a few acres the lord of the manor is there waiting to reap where he has
not sown; if he has oxen or horses they are taken for the corvie; when nothing
but his person remains, he is torn from his family to serve in the militia. In
the towns the workpeople are exploited by idle and avaricious employers. As for
religion, it is the invention of hypocritical and infidel priests, who have
made the idea of a supreme being destructive of all morality. How much wiser
are the Japanese Shintos ! They teach the people that “the innocent pleasures
of man are pleasing to the Deity”; and girls are attached to the temples to be
a source of honest profit by “ piously yielding to the most sacred impulse of
nature.” Such is the kind of writing that Raynal thought might be indulged in
with a light heart. It is well known how bitterly he repented when he
discovered that this was not quite the case.
Voltaire had
too much sense to be the slave of logic. He refused to accept the extreme
consequences of his own principles. He lamented and refuted the atheistic
doctrines of his friends. But, for all that, he and they were of the same sect,
a sect of which the doctrine was negative, and the practical aim of which was
destruction. Some wished to destroy a little more, others a little less, but
all rather for the convenience of freer movement in more liberal space, than
from any wish to find room for a new construction. Not so the men of whom we
have next to speak.
Man cannot
live on reason alone; and no tyranny is more certain to provoke revolt than
that of logic. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) in asserting the claims of
sentiment did but give expression to a widely felt feeling. D’Argenson, in the
previous generation, lamented that that fine quality sensibility would soon be
lost. Love and the need of loving were disappearing from earth. But afterwards
he recognises in himself Pamela as well as Cato; a mixture of Richardson and
Plutarch, the very formula of Rousseauism. Painters and poets, exclaimed Diderot,
all who have either taste or feeling, read Richardson day and night. The
Marquis de Mirabeau would like to make Grandison his model, and says that we
should carefully cultivate feeling. When Diderot, meeting Grimm after a
fortnight’s separation, wept on his waistcoat and sobbed out at intervals
during dinner, “ My friend! my dear friend!,” or when the Due de Nivemais on
his way to London visited the tomb of the Black Prince, and remembering his
virtues burst into tears, they were but following a fashion already prevalent
before the gospel of emotion, the Nouvelle itloise, was printed. Rousseau
insisted, almost in the spirit of Montaigne or Pascal, on the fallibility of
our intellect, the deceitfulness of our senses. But, he concludes, if reason
crushes and abases man, an inner sentiment exalts him; we hear a voice which
forbids us to despise ourselves. Writing in 1766 Horace Walpole says, “You must
not conclude the people of quality atheists, at least not the men.
28
Rousseau’s sympathy with the people.
Happily for
them, poor souls, they are not capable of going so far into thinking. They
assent to a great deal because it is the fashion, and because they don’t know
how to contradict.” If it is an explanation of the popularity of Voltaire that
he said what most were thinking, then we may say that Rousseau was popular
because he gave the most perfect expression to what others were feel’-
g.
Another cause
of his influence was his real sympathy with the people. One of the first
questions a political theorist must decide is whether he would have society
framed so as to secure the highest culture, the noblest activity for the few,
disregarding the many, or whether, sacrificing the ideal life of the few, he
should try to raise the many to a decent standard of culture and physical
well-being. The former was the choice of Voltaire, the guest and correspondent
of princes, the moneyed man fond of luxurious leisure, the devotee of art, as
he understood it, and of literature. It could not be the choice of Rousseau. He
belonged himself to the people, he had mixed with them during his happier and
earlier years, and had sympathised with their joys and sufferings. He had met
among them with that kindness which he was perversely determined not to
recognise when shown to him by the cultured and wealthy. Purity, justice,
humanity, are according to him only to be found in cottages. His political
ideal was a government for the people by the people. The iZmile has been called
a paedagogical romance; it shows how a boy of the upper classes may be so
trained as to share in popular virtue, but for that reason the education is
essentially popular and capable of wide application. Joseph Chenier was not
altogether wrong when he said that public education should conform to it, nor
the Committee of Public Instruction when they attempted to carry it into
practice, l^mile is to be taught reading, writing, and arithmetic, singing and
drawing, national history orally by narrative, the principles of natural
(undenominational) religion. Practical information is to be imparted by object
lessons; and careful attention is to be given to physical and technical
training. Might not this be a modem programme of primary instruction ? It is a
system which would tend to produce useful citizens rather than to train a few
superior intellects to accomplish, or even fully to appreciate, great
achievements in literature, science, and art.
The admirers
and opponents of Rousseau have often done him injustice by confounding with his
later doctrines the views crudely put forth in the Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality (1753), and by trying to crush into one homogeneous and logical
system statements and views really irreconcilable. His very inconsistencies
show that he took a more comprehensive view of the problems with which he
dealt, than his deductive method, and the abstract and arbitrary assumptions
which form his premisses, would lead us to expect. But to his followers in the
next generation one text of the master was as authoritative as another; and
they naturally cited those which flattered the passions or justified
the policy of
the moment; so that in the Jacobin Club and the Convention a paradoxical and
unsuccessful prize essay was more heard of and had more influence than the
philosophical Social Contract (1760), the moderate Letters from the Mountain
(1764), or the generally sensible Considerations on the Government of Poland
(1772).
It is only in
the Discourse on Inequality that the state of nature is exalted as a golden
age, from which civil society based on a compact obtained by fraud to
perpetuate injustice has degenerated. In the Social Contract we are told that
the civil is preferable to the natural condition, since in it duty takes the
place of physical impulse, right of appetite, property of possession; that we
ought to bless the moment of the contract which changed a stupid animal of
limited capacity into a rational being and a man. Rousseau tells us that his
object is to enquire whether there is or can be in politics any sure and
legitimate rule of administration, taking men as they exist and laws such as
are possible. But this purpose is soon forgotten; what is really discussed is
the abstract and universal basis of political right; and men are taken not as
they are, but as abstract beings out of all conditions of time, place, and
circumstance. He begins by asking a question, Why is it that man who is bom
free is everywhere enslaved? And his answer implies that all existing
governments are illegitimate; that there is but one government by natural
(divine) right, the rule of the popular majority. For nature, he says, gives to
no man authority over his equals. Force cannot* as Hobbes and Spinoza suppose,
be the origin of right. For if so a stronger might would be a better right, and
therefore all right fluid and uncertain.
When men
reached a point at which cooperation was necessary for their welfare, the
problem which they were called upon to solve was to find a form of association
capable of protecting the person and the goods of each with the whole strength
of the community, while each individual should remain as free as when in a
state of nature. If the body politic which results from the social pact does
not protect person or property, or unnecessarily interferes with personal
freedom, the contract is violated and annulled. This would seem a strict
limitation of the power of society, a bold assertion of the rights of the
individual. Helvetius had written that everything is well done which is done
for the public safety. The public safety, answered Rousseau, is nothing unless
all individuals, enjoy security. He denies the assertion of Grotius that a
people could alienate their liberty; so one-sided a contract would be void ab
initio. What consideration would compensate a man for the surrender of all the
attributes of humanity ? Such a bargain would be contrary to law and reason.
The right of society to claim obedience from the individual depends upon that
obedience being indispensable, in order to enable society to perform the
functions for which it was instituted. But no criterion is given by which we
can judge whether the obedience is.
30
or is not
necessary. To supply some rule determining at what point resistance to the
authority of the sovereign begins to be legitimate, was no doubt one of the
motives which actuated the framers of the Declaration of Rights. Rousseau
himself says that the sovereign must judge what sacrifices the State may demand
as necessary. But if so what remains of the rights of the individual ?
Moreover, he gave to his Social Contract a form which implies popular
absolutism, the complete surrender by each member of himself and of all his
rights to the community, that alienation of all individual liberty against
which he elsewhere protests.
He excuses
the inconsistency by pointing out that in the only legitimate State every
individual is a member of the sovereign body. Everyone is at once subject and
sovereign; and, if he is oppressed by the sovereign, it is by himself. He has
moral liberty, for the law which he obeys is self-imposed. Besides, it is
irrational to suppose that the sovereign—the aggregate body of citizens, which
can have no interests other than those of the individuals of whom it is
composed—will be tempted to act oppressively like a magistrate who is swayed by
antisocial impulses and private interests. Rousseau makes two erroneous
assumptions that the interests of the part are always identical with those of
the whole, and that the popular majority is always able to discern and willing
to pursue the general interest. In his article itconomie in the Encyclopedie he
asserts axiomatically that the State is a moral being capable of volition; that
the golden rule of every legitimate,
i.e.
popular, government is to carry out the general will, which always tends to the
well-being of the whole and of each part and is always just— for the voice of
the people is in truth the voice of God. It is unnecessary to point out the
vast influence and the abuse of these principles in subsequent years; nor is
it easy to read without a shudder, when remembering the crimes perpetrated in
the name of popular justice, the commendation of a custom, attributed to the
Chinese, of throwing into prison any official accused by popular clamour,
“which is never raised without good reason.”
That the only
legitimate constitution is that in which the will of the sovereign people, or
rather of the sovereign majority of free and equal citizens, prevails; that
this will is always just, and that therefore a citizen is only virtuous so long
as his will conforms to it; that the masses are always wiser and better than
the few—these were principles easy to understand and likely to win popular
acceptance. Little rhetoric is required to convince men that they are as good
and as wise as their neighbours, and that authority not exercised by themselves
is an abuse. The limitations and corrections suggested by Rousseau were
forgotten or rejected. Although the people cannot delegate their sovereignty to
the executive, he lays down the rule that the more numerous a people is the
more powerful and vigorous ought the government to be, the larger the powers
entrusted to it. If the State is small the executive
may be
numerous and weak; if large, the government should be entrusted to a few, and
they ought to have a wide discretion—a truth ignored by the authors of the
Constitution of 1791, though perhaps not forgotten by those who placed power in
the hands of the Committee of Public Safety. Rousseau moreover expressly says
that to be fit for political <ociety men must already possess the social
virtues; that the social disposition, which it is the object of the State to
create, must already be there in order that the State may be formed. “ Before
the laws exist men must already be what the laws are to make them.’’ To escape
from this vicious circle he relies on the lawgiver, Lycurgus or Calvin, and on
the sanctions of religion, an admission fatal to the historical reality of his
Social Contract. Still less are all nations fit for liberty. If a people is to
be free it must be mature—nor can it if once enslaved be made free. It is
possible to acquire liberty; but once lost it cannot be recovered.
His ideal
State was Sparta or republican Rome, as he conceived them to have existed, or
rather a more perfect Geneva. “ After full consideration,” he says, “ I have
given the preference to the constitution of my own country”; but he did not
believe that it could be copied except by a community with a small territory
and limited population, least of all by France. “ How great would be the danger
of disturbing the vast masses which compose the French monarchy ! Who could
arrest the impulse once given or guard against the possible consequences ? Even
if the advantages of the new arrangement were indisputable, what man of sense
would venture suddenly to abolish old customs, to change old maxims, and to
alter that shape which an existence of thirteen hundred years has gradually
given to the State ? ” Rousseau, therefore, would have been far more cautious,
than the Physiocrats in the practical application of his abstract doctrine. It
would indeed be easy to cite many passages of sound practical sense, many
luminous suggestions which would surprise those who only know Rousseau as “the
great professor and founder of the philosophy of vanity,” whose writings were
the Jacobin “ Canon of holy writ.”
No attention
was paid to him when he spoke words of soberness and wisdom, based on
experience and common sense. Such remarks might be admirable; but there was
little in them that was original, nothing that expressed the feelings and
flattered the passions of the moment; and it must be confessed that they were
out of harmony with the logical consequences of his abstract and universal
principles. They were brushed aside by his revolutionary followers; and they
have had no such effect on European politics as the clear and precise dogmas of
natural equality and freedom, of inalienable popular sovereignty, and their
corollaries: that every government not based on popular consent is a
usurpation: that the people can at any moment dismiss their rulers: that—-the
nation being an aggregate of equal and independent units,
whose will
can only be discovered by counting heads—if owing to the size of a country a
representative body is necessary, this assembly must represent not classes or
interests but individuals. Whence it follows that manhood suffrage, equal
electoral districts, a chamber of delegates, who may not pass measures which
have not been submitted to the electorate, and the other characteristics of the
modem democratic State, are institutions based on natural right; while that
which was at one time- the ideal of English Liberals, a polity based on the
representation of organised bodies, classes, and interests by deputies
entrusted with a wide discretion and constituting a real legislature, is not
more legitimate than monarchy itself.
It has been
said with some plausibility that the Constituent Assembly was Voltairian, while
Robespierre and his followers in the Convention attempted to carry out in
letter as well as in spirit the precepts of Rousseau not less in their
religious than in their secular policy. The decree of 18 Floreal, affirming the
belief of the French nation in the existence of the Supreme Being and in the
Immortality of the Soul, accepted “ the profession of faith of the Savoyard
Vicar ” as the established religion, and as a minimum of faith to be imposed
on all citizens. For scepticism—by which he meant the agnosticism of Montaigne,
of Bayle, and of Voltaire—said Robespierre, is aristocratic, while the
materialistic and systematised atheism of the Encyclopaedists is selfish and
anti-social; and neither must be tolerated. Voltaire had attempted to assert
the existence of a Supreme Being, and the possible immortality of that
mysterious particle we call our soul, against Diderot and Helvetius. But his
common sense and sceptical arguments, his appeals to the evidence of design in
the universe, and to the absurdity of dogmatising negatively when we know
nothing, do not touch those complicated emotions on which religion depends. Not
so the impassioned unction of Rousseau’s rhetoric. It may be sentimental,
vague, not quite untainted by a strain of insincerity; but it affects and
stimulates the feelings through the imagination, and was the source of that
romantic religious revival which prepared the way for clerical reaction under
the restored monarchy. This result would have probably surprised Rousseau, who
derived the religion as well as the constitution of his ideal State from his
native town, not foreseeing that the emotions excited by his eloquence would,
like his Savoyard priest, find greater satisfaction in the splendour and the
far-reaching associations of Roman faith and ritual, than in the colourless
Socinianism of Geneva.
There are
passages in Rousseau which imply that much is amiss in the existing
distribution of wealth ; but nowhere does he suggest that it would be either
possible or desirable to introduce Communism. Yet five years earlier than the
Contrat Social a book was published, the Code de la Nature, in which communism
is said to be the only organisation of
33
society which
can secure man’s happiness, and therefore the only one in accordance with the
will of his beneficent Creator. So little was Morelly, the writer, known that
La Harpe, who refuted the Code de la Nature, attributed the authorship of the
book to Diderot. But Morelly had already advanced the same views in a prose
poem called The Basiliade, or the Moating Islands (1753), which described a
communistic Utopia, and professed to be a translation “from the Indian.” The
Code de la Nature was the most systematic exposition of Communistic Socialism
which had as yet appeared, giving a logical coherence to ideas derived from
Plato, More, Campanella, and even Montesquieu. Self-interest is the universal
motive, and when misdirected the source of all evil. Nature intended all things
to be held in common, so that the interests of all should be identical. Each
man pursuing his own interest would further that of the community, were it not
that private ownership leads men to pursue discordant aims, injurious to each
other and to society. Besides it is unnatural for men to seek to injure each
other. There is in man “a certain native probity” which has been destroyed by
avarice, “the desire of possessing,” the root of all vice. Morelly sketches the
social order which would enable men to be as happy and as virtuous as is
possible in this life, although as things now are he has no hope that it can be
established. Although his book was not unread and had the usual advertisement
of being burnt by the hangman, Morelly acquired so little fame that even the
dates of his birth and death are unknown.
The
voluminous writings of Mably (1709-85), the brother of Condillac, who shared
some of Morelly’s communistic opinions, are more celebrated, and had an
authority with the legislators of the Revolution second only to that of
Rousseau and Montesquieu. The most important; of Mably’s books were the
Conversations of Phocion on the Relation of Ethics and Polities (1763),
Observations on the History of France (1765), Doubts on the Natural Order of
Societies (1768). Mably believes the individual ownership of land to be the
source of all mischief. It causes inequality of wealth, of which the result is
avarice, ambition, sensuality, indolence, and insolence among the rich, hatred
and envy among the poor, and in the commonwealth misery, restlessness, and
ruin. Refohn is impossible except by some revolution which shall destroy all
institutions unfavourable to equality, and bring about a complete change of
manners and fashions. For it is not enough that the laws should aim at keeping
all citizens at the same level of wealth and dignity. Nil leges due moribus.
It is
difficult to say how far Mably held any part of his ideal to be capable of
practical application in his own time and country. Some buildings are, he says,
too crazy to bear repair, some cesspools so foul that to stir them is to breed
a pestilence. And he applauds Fleury, “ the wisest minister of the century,”
for not attempting reforms, since it is a mistake to court failure. Yet in his
Observations on the History
34
of
France, collecting whatever traces he can find of free institutions, he makes
an attempt to find in the past that old constitution which Burke would have had
the French rebuild. The French ought to attack the evil at its root—-the
despotic power of the Crown. The Parlemervt in 1756 ought to have established
the principle that the nation alone has the right to tax itself. The Court
would have been cowed by a general cry of approbation. No doubt such an
opportunity will recur. He considers that the English are not sufficiently on
their guard against despotism. The King should be powerless to do wrong. He should
have no control over the army, still less be able to summon, prorogue, and
dissolve the legislature at his pleasure, and to corrupt its members with
titles and honours. ' •
These and
other practical precepts had a direct effect and were quoted in the debates of
the revolutionary assemblies. But Mably’s communism and that of Morelly,
associated as it was in their writings with other tenets which formed part of
the Jacobin creed; tended to discredit that creed in the eyes of the
cautious; although communistic theories were repudiated by the vast majority of
even the most radical reformers. Mallet du Pan accused the Jacobins of
intending an agrarian law; Gouverneur Morris believed that they aimed at
establishing Communism. But, although they knew the rich to be their enemies
and the poor their supporters, the Jacobins were not so mad as to think of
touching private property, and thereby converting the timid disapprobation of
the middle classes into active enmity. “ Souls of mud,” said Robespierre, “ who
value nothing but gold, I do not wish to touch your treasures.” He was
convinced that under existing conditions it would be not less difficult to
establish equality of wealth than Communism itself, which was confessedly
chimerical. The sanctity of property was in principle as much respected by the
Republic as by the old monarchy. The property of the emigres, t is true, was
confiscated, but so had been that of the Protestants; while the requisitions
and other arbitrary measures of the Terror were no more due to communistic
principles than the seizure of stores and the destruction of houses ordered by
the commander of a beleaguered fortress. Even the profound misery of 1795 and
1796 provided Babeuf with followers rather than with disciples.
The little
practical effect at the end of the eighteenth century of doctrines which were
to be of such vast importance in the nineteenth century is another proof of the
small influence of theory, unless it happens to fall in with the sentiment of
the moment or to promise a remedy for those evils which are either physically
most unendurable or most inconsistent with existing social and economic
conditions. The Revolution was an attempt to apply in practice the principle of
individual freedom: a negative principle, mainly valuable as an instrument to
overthrow restrictions, which have lost their use and meaning and have become
injurious. But it is remarkable that this negative principle was
embraced with
the fervour of a religious faith. The great work done by the philosophers was
the part they took in exciting this fervour; and it was because there is little
that is original in their teaching that it was received with enthusiasm.
It is when an
author is expressing feelings already in men’s minds, “ when he is thinking
articulately that which those around him are thinking inarticulately,” that his
influence is greatest. A writer, therefore, who is essentially commonplace
like Voltaire, is likely to have greater immediate influence on the fortunes of
his country, though not on the future of mankind, than a Plato or an Aristotle.
Even if we believe that the philosophers did not cause the Revolution, nor
originate the ideas which determined the form it was to take, we must allow
that they precipitated it by giving a definite shape to vague aspirations, by
clearing away the obstacles which restrained the rapidly rising flood of
discontent, by depriving those, whose interests and position made them the
defenders of the old order, of all faith in the righteousness of their cause,
and by inspiring the assailants with hope and enthusiasm.
THE
GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE.
In France the Crown had always been the
symbol of national unity and power. During the period in which the nation under
the skilful guidance of Richelieu and Mazarin achieved supremacy in Europe, the
royal authority became absolute in France itself Louis XIV surpassed all
contemporary despots in his sense of unbounded and irresponsible dominion.
During his long reign the French Monarchy assumed its final form ; and his system
of government, although directed by weaker hands, remained in force until the
outbreak of the Revolution. Fervid as were the French in their loyalty, they
were not willing to allow that they were the subjects of lawless caprice. They
clung to the distinction formulated by Montesquieu between a despotism of which
the principle is fear, and a monarchy of which the principle is honour. The
clergy and the nobles were tenacious of such privileges as the sovereign had
spared; the protests of the Parlements against certain exertions of prerogative
were often received with applause; in some Provinces the Estates kept up some
tradition of self-government; and since the States General, although never
summoned, had never been suppressed, they might be regarded as an essential
part of the French constitution. But such remnants and shadows of the medieval
polity, while they might save the self-respect of the upper classes or even
temper the exercise of power in particular cases, could not conceal the fact
that one man was master of France.
Despotic rule
over a great civilised community implies a concentration of business so
enormous as to exceed the capacity of one man, however able. It is the
officials who govern; and the administrative system is the real constitution.
Thus it was in France. The true centre of power was not the King, but the Royal
Council. On the eve of the Revolution this was a body of about forty members,
comprising the Ministers of State and a much larger number of persons who held
no portfolio. The ministerial dignity might attract men of any rank; and
Ministers were often, though by no means always, nobles or prelates. The
Chancellor, or Keeper of the Seals, was usually a lawyer, as he had grave
duties to
37
perform in
legislation and in connexion with the Courts of Justice. The Royal Household,
Foreign Affairs, War, and the Navy, each gave employment to a Secretary of
State. But perhaps the most influential Minister was the Controller-General of
the Finances, whose duties, at first correctly expressed by his des. jnation,
were gradually enlarged until he became in fact Minister of Public Works,
Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, and Minister of the Interior. The
Controller-General, if, like Colbert or Turgot, he were a man of talent and
energy equal to his task, might exercise the authority of a Premier. The title
of Principal Minister rested with the sovereign to give or to withhold at
pleasure. The Ministers took part in the general business of the Council; but,
for the consideration of such weighty affairs as would in England be decided by
the Cabinet, they, together with any other Councillors whom the King might
select, met under the King’s presidency n different committees known as the
Council of State, the Council of Despatches (Conseil des Depeches), the Royal
Council of Finance and Commerce, and the Inner Committee of War.
The members
of the Council other than Ministers were singly of far inferior consequence.
Sprung as a rule from the upper middle class, they had entered the public
service at an early age; they had worked their way up to posts of confidence
and authority, such as that of Intendant; and they brought to the Council board
the advantages of long experience and administrative dexterity. Their names were
not familiar to the public; nor had they, unless possessed of extraordinary
talent or influence, much prospect of becoming Ministers. But it would be a
mistake to think that the ordinary Councillors were insignificant. In
determining the general course of policy, in drafting new laws, in fixing the
sum to be raised by taxation and the taxes to be imposed, the Ministers would
necessarily have the largest share, and much would be settled in the
ministerial committees. But there remained for the Council as a whole more work
than it could perform. At every step in the progress of absolute monarchy and
centralised administration the powers and the duties of the Council had been
enlarged. The numerous officials of the Civil Service received their orders
from the Council, reported to the Council, sought instructions from the Council
in cases of difficulty, could be called to account for misconduct only with the
sanction of the Council. The whole administration of a great kingdom, from the
apportionment of the faille between the Provinces down to the repair of a
parsonage, passed in endless review before the Council, which vainly strove to
keep down the arrears of national and municipal business. Finally, it exercised
a judicial power practically without limit, since it could at pleasure quash
the decree of any ordinary Court and remove a cause into its own hearing.
From the
central authority we naturally turn to consider its local agents. In France, as
in the other kingdoms which dated from the
Middle Ages,
a number, of administrative systems had arisen and decayed; and all had left
traces at least in forms and titles. As the royal domain had been enlarged in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by the absorption of the great fiefs,
France had been divided into baiMiages and senechaussees, administered by a
royal officer, the bailli or the smechal, somewhat resembling the Anglo-Norman
sheriff; but his powers had become obsolete long before the opening of the
eighteenth century. At a later time the kingdom had been divided into a number
of gouverne- ments, answering roughly to the historic Provinces. The Governors
were the military representatives of the Crown; they were usually men of rank,
and sometimes insubordinate. They had therefore been deprived of all real
power, while keeping their ample emoluments; and in the age preceding the
Revolution the office of Governor was merely a rich sinecure. At length
Richelieu had placed the whole of France under a new class of royal officers,
the Intendants. The jurisdiction of each Intendant was known as a generalite,
so-called because in each there was a Chamber of fiscal officers known as
generau.dc de finances. An Intendant was assisted by a number of subdelegates
(subdelegucs), each of whom had a district known as an Slection, not because
there was any question of popular choice, but from certain fiscal officers
known as the elus. In those Provinces which had preserved their Estates and
were therefore known as pays cFlttats, the elus did not exist and the term
Slection was not in use.
The Intendant
was to his district what the Controller-General was to the kingdom; he
conducted the whole administration, and every kind of public business came
under his care. The collection of the indirect taxes, indeed, belonged to the capitalists
by whom it had been farmed; but the collection of the direct taxes fell to the
Intendant. When the Council had fixed the sum total of the taille to be raised
in the year and had divided it between the generalites, the Intendant
apportioned the share of his gSneralite between the different parishes. The
parish then fixed the quota of each inhabitant and was responsible for its
payment. The Intendant fixed the quotas of each taxpayer in the vingtibnes and
the capitation. The Intendant and his subdelegates carried out the balloting
for the militia. For the maintenance of order the Intendant possessed the most
ample powers. The rural police, the marechaussee, was immediately suhject to
the central authority and therefore at his orders. Although the towns had a
police of their own, municipal selfgovernment was little more than a form, and
the Intendant could dispose of this force also. Moreover the Intendant had a
summary jurisdiction to repress disorder, and, when he sat with assessors who
had received a legal education, could sentence even to death or to the galleys.
Public works were also in the Intendant’s charge, although, in Provinces where
the Estates still met, he was relieved of the greater part of this business.
In.other Provinces the plan of public works was fixed by the Royal
Council; the
execution was directed by the Intendant: and, where recourse was had to the
corvte, it was exacted by his subdelegates.
Another
function of the Intendant was the relief of the poor. A large proportion of the
labouring class were so needy that in time of war or in bad seasons they became
destitute; and, as the steady encroachment of the Crown had almost annulled
the free action of the landed aristocracy and the municipal bodies, it had to
take the chief part in relieving their distress. The Council allotted to each
generalite its share of the royal bounty; the Intendant assigned the portion of
each parish, and with the help of his subdelegates directed the administration
in detail. Since the time of Colbert the government had tried to further
industry and commerce by regulating, constraining, teaching, and rewarding ;
and for all these ends it looked to the Intendant to execute its ordinances.
The Intendant supervised with jealous care the action of every local authority.
The style of Monseigneur, given not merely by peasants but by citizens to the
Intendants despite the fact that they were generally not of noble birth, would
alone show how ample was their right of control and how unsparingly it was
exercised. “ I could never have believed,” Law said to d’Argenson, “ what I
have seen while I had the charge of the finances. Know that this kingdom of
France is governed by thirty Intendants.” Without noise or show the Intendants
before the Revolution had engrossed a power little inferior to that which the
prefects of Napoleon afterwards exercised. The diversity of names and forms,
even of usages and laws, in different parts of France, helped to conceal, but
could not hinder, the uniform movement of the bureaucratic machine.
The
all-pervading influence of the royal authority was not balanced by any general
system of provincial self-government. Materials for such a system had once
existed. It is well known that modem France was formed by a double process.
Great fiefs, which had been all but independent, were resumed by the Crown;
and territories belonging to various adjacent States had been annexed to the
French monarchy. The lands thus united in a common subjection were in some
cases separated by differences of blood, of language, and of civilisation; each
had its own history and traditions ;T each had its own peculiar
usages; and in each the inhabitants had been bound together by a provincial
patriotism, not wholly extinct even in the eighteenth century. But the later
course of events had tended to- blur these distinctions, to centralise the life
of France in the capital, to produce a common French type, and to weaken all
that was either good or bad in provincial feeling. The Kings had instinctively
furthered consolidation and had waged incessant war against provincial
liberties. Most Provinces had anciently possessed Estates, medieval Parliaments
of their own, which the Crown had very Generally allowed to drop. Only in
Artois, Flanders, Burgundy, Britanny, and Languedoc* and some other territories
too small to he
40 Decay of the provincial Estates.
worth naming,
did the Estates continue to assemble. Only in Britanny and Languedoc did they
retain any real power, and even there it was a restricted and peculiar power.
These Estates
had no legislative function. Even the rules of procedure which they adopted
and the resolutions which they passed needed the confirmation of the Council.
They could make grants to the Crown, but could not exclude its taxing power,
while they could not raise a tax or a loan for provincial purposes without
having its consent. They served chiefly to express the wishes of the Province
to the sovereign, to execute a number of public works, and to collect a part of
the royal revenue. Thus the provincial Estates were administrative bodies.
Where they retained some vigour they secured to their respective Provinces an
administration in many details milder and more reasonable than that which
prevailed in other parts of France. Young remarked that the noble roads of
Languedoc were made, not by forced labour, but by a tax which, however unfairly
imposed, was a much lighter burden upon the peasants. In Languedoc, too,
measures were taken to render the assessment of the taille more equitable and
uniform. The finances of Languedoc were in a far sounder state than the
finances of the kingdom. The provincial Estates had also the moral and
political advantage of bringing together for the discussion of matters of
public interest those classes which the insidious policy of the Crown had
always endeavoured to disunite, and of giving some play to those energies which
the servants of the Crown had always viewed with distrust. Yet the provincial
Estates counted for little in France as a whole, and proved in the time of trial
as frail as all other French institutions.
There were
many reasons for their infirmity; but the chief reason was that the Crown and
its servants for ages had done their utmost, not to improve and expand the
provincial Estates, not to adapt them to the needs of a modem people and a high
civilisation, but to get rid of them or, failing that, to reduce their power.
Hence the Estates had disappeared in most Provinces. Hence, in the few where
they survived, they remained medieval assemblies. For, widely as they differed
in constitution, they were all more or less antiquated. In Languedoc the Third
Estate had as many representatives as the clergy and the nobles; and all sat
and voted together. But the deputies of the Third Estate were chosen by the
municipal bodies of the towns which had no popular element. Even the nobles
were not properly represented, since only the holders of certain lands were
capable of sitting. In Britanny the composition of the Estates was still more
unreasonable. The Third Estate had only forty-two deputies, who represented, as
in Languedoc, not the towns but their dose corporations. The First Estate
contained no representatives of the inferior clergy. But ail the nobles of
Britanny were entitled to attend in person; and the nobles present sometimes
amounted to twelve hundred. It is true that each Order sat and voted
separately.
But we cannot wonder that such an assembly should have laid unfair burdens on
the lands of those who were not noble, or that it should have failed to gain
popular support in its last struggles with the Crown. When we add that in the
provincial Estates the peasants, the great bulk of the nation, were not
represented at all, we shall understand how the National Assembly was able to
discard them almost without a murmur from the Provinces.
It was one of
the faults in the local administrative system of France before the Revolution
that there existed no area of self-gbvemment intermediate between the Province,
sometimes of enormous extent and containing as many as two million inhabitants,
and the rural village or commune. The boundaries of the commune generally
coincided with those of the manor or the parish, and had often been traced in
remote antiquity, in Frankish or even in imperial times. Its constitution was
in appearance at least popular. The supreme authority in the commune was the
general assembly of the inhabitants, all persons liable to the taiUe having the
right to attend. Thus, although domestic servants could take no part in the
meeting, the day-labourer could. While bachelors were in many cases excluded,
women seem to have been sometimes admitted. The villagers were summoned by the
church bell and usually met in the open space before the church door. Ten
inhabitants formed a quorum; but for certain purposes the presence of
two-thirds of the parish or even a unanimous vote was required by law. The
assembly had the management of the communal property, which was often valuable;
for the common lands were extensive in France before the Revolution, and were
vested in the community, not, as in England, in the lord of the manor. The
assembly had also the duly of providing for the repair of the church and the
parsonage and of the roads and bridges within the parish. It elected the
communal officers, among whom the syndic and the collectors of the taille were
the most considerable. Other duties such as that of fixing wages or prices were
sometimes imposed upon it by the State. But it had little discretion in the
exercise of its powers. The ignorance and incompetence of its members were
often alleged as reasons for official control—and doubtless with some truth;
for the seigneur, who had lost nearly all his authority in the parish, did not
care to take part in the communal assembly as a simple citizen; and almost all
the other householders were peasants, who, though not so utterly illiterate as
is sometimes alleged, certainly were ill-educated and must often have been very
torpid in mind.
Whatever the
justification, the Intendant controlled every act of the commune. It needed his
permission to assemble; the officers of its choice rtad to be confirmed by him,
and the confirmation was often withheld; it could not buy or sell, let or hire
property, or go to law without the sanction of the Council conveyed through the
Intendant. De Tocqueville mentions a case where the parishioners who wanted to
spend a sum little
42
exceeding £1
had to obtain the leave of the supreme government. Thus to supervise the action
of more than forty thousand communes was a task for which no industry could
suffice; and the parochial business of Prance was always in arrear. The village
syndics were sometimes twenty years behindhand with their accounts. The Royal
Council was no less tardy. A commune, which had been demanding for some years
past licence to cut its own timber for the repair of its own church, declared
in 1721 that the ruinous state of the building left the congregation
unsheltered to the storms. Four years later their petition had not yet been
answered by the Grand Master of Waters and Forests. Delays and formalities made
the simplest parochial undertaking costly* But, if the commune was to be
pitied, the situation of its servants was still harder. The syndic was as much
the agent of the Crown as of the commune, for he had to take part in the
collection of taxes, the adjustment of the corvee, the levying of the militia,
and the quartering of troops. His burthens were so heavy and his gains so small
that the most respectable inhabitants were loth to be chosen, and it was sometimes
necessary to force the office upon the person elected. The collector of the
taille was strictly a servant of the Crown ; and his office, for reasons which
have been stated elsewhere, was even more disliked than that of syndic. Such a
communal self-government could avail little to bring different classes
together or to call forth administrative talent. The Crown and its Ministers
had preserved the communal system as an instrument which might be useful and
could not be dangerous, but they forgot that even the humblest form of selfgovernment
must be made attractive before it can become efficient.
In the
administration of cities and towns the abuses were different, but scarcely less
serious. The history of municipal institutions in France: offers many resemblances
to the history of such institutions in England and other neighbouring
countries. Everywhere from the eleventh century onwards the growth of towns had
led to a strenuous effort after municipal self-government. Each town had
striven for itself and had gained privileges proportioned to its power. Each
had its own charters and its own customs, for there was no general legislation
on municipal affairs, and such resemblances as could be traced were due to
individual imitation, the smaller towns trying as far as possible to gain the
liberties already enjoyed by the greater. In France the Crown had fitfully
encouraged the effort of the towns to free themselves from feudal shackles;
but, when the feudal lords ceased to be dangerous, the Crown itself encroached
on the rights of the towns, leaving them indeed the show of self-government,
but taking away the substance. If we ignore the infinite variety of forms and
titles, we find the government of French towns in the eighteenth century vested
in two bodies, the General Assembly, and the corps de mile, or Town Council.
The General Assembly had once been numerous, including in some towns all the
citizens; but it had become small, often not exceeding sixty or seventy
persons. Some of
its members
might be notables sitting in their own right. The majority were elected either
by the professional corporations, especially of lawyers and public officials,
or by the trade guilds, or by the parishes or quarters of the town. How many
persons enjoyed the municipal franchise in any town would thus depend on a
series of local and historical accidents; but it would appear that usually the
greater part of the General Assembly was appointed by a small part of the
townsfolk. In some towns the General Assembly filled up its vacancies by
cooptation. This General Assembly discharged certain executive functions. It
decided on the purchase or the sale of property, the contracting of a loan, the
imposition of a tax, and other matters which varied from town to town. It also
elected the Town Council, but its freedom of choice was often narrowed by the
fact that certain corporations were entitled as of right to seats on that body.
All the municipal business which was not despatched by the General Assembly
fell to the Town Council.
So far what
had happened in France was like what had happened in England. The municipal
corporations had become narrow oligarchies, usually sluggish and often corrupt,
in any case unequal to the tasks imposed by the growth of population and the
progress of society. But, while the English corporations were left to
themselves, the French corporations had felt the ceaseless interference of the
Crown. This interference had sometimes been prompted by mere lack of money.
Louis XIV had set the example of suppressing the election to municipal offices
and making them purchasable. The towns which could afford to do so redeemed the
right of election, as it was intended they should; and this shameful device was
copied in after years, so that before the death of Louis XV many places had
lost and regained the right of election seven times. In other cases
interference had been prompted by the desire of the central authority to absorb
all power, by the mere love of uniformity, or by the honest wish to make
municipal administration more effective. The royal edicts of 1692, 1764, and
1765, had been prompted by all these motives. Thus the office of Mayor was
introduced into the towns where it had not existed before; and all Mayors were
to be appointed by the Crown. Nor was it only the municipal constitution which
the government modified at pleasure. Its power was felt in the daily course of
municipal business. The Intendant broke in upon the freedom of municipal
elections; he applied stringent remedies to disorder in municipal finance; and
he urged the towns to ambitious undertakings, such as the construction of new
streets and squares, new quays and aqueducts. Like the communal authority, the
municipal authority needed the sanction of the Council, conveyed through the
Intendant, for all dealings with property and for all lawsuits. Projects for
public works had to be approved by the Council; the designs were often
furnished by the engineers of the Intendant’s staff, and contracts for their
execution required the Intendant’s approval. In the pays
44
d’Shction
the ■ Intendant audited the municipal accounts, while in the pays diktats
a commission of the provincial Estates took that duty. Considering the narrow
and irresponsible character of the municipal corporations, this stringent
control by the State had many advantages. The Intendant often gave an impulse
to publid improvements and put a check on personal jobs. But it was not always
in the common interest that he acted. Even his supervision did not prevent many
instances of mismanagement and waste, while his domineering authority must have
discouraged municipal patriotism and the exercise of'orfginal "talent.
Thus local
self-government in France had dwindled to extreme weakness. The old names and
forms disguised in some degree, but hardly restrained, the action of the
central power. By degrees it fashioned the mind of the people Until bureaucracy
seemed the only natural jystem of government. Popular discontent with the
abuses of the system and zeal for new political theories led the Constituent
Assembly to transfer the entire local administration from the servants of the
Crown to the representatives of the Communes, Districts, and Departments. But
this abrupt, unqualified change resulted in unutterable confusion, and when
order returned the rule of expert officials returned also, and under the
Consulate and the Empire became more absolute than it had ever been before. If
we ask how the bureaucracy worked in the eighteenth century, it is not easy to
give a just answer in few words. Compared with many other despotic governments
which have been known among civilised men, the French monarchy might pass for
wise and liberal. Far worse tyrannies have been known in Spain, in Italy, in
Germany. The character of such a government depends largely on the character of
the civil service; and the French civil service was above the average of the
time. Many of its members were upright, intelligent, hard-working men; and a
few, like Turgot, were men of exalted virtue and public spirit. We may say
that, so far as there was change in the character of this class, it was a
change for the better, even under Louis XV, and still more under Louis XVI. The
humane and scientific spirit of the time was felt here as elsewhere. The
development of the country by public works, the improvement of agriculture, the
mitigation of the peasant’s hard lot, attracted much more thought than
formerly. The material progress apparent between the close of the Seven Years’
War and the outbreak of the Revolution had many causes; but part of it was due
to the spredd of enlightenment in the official class.
'Die vices of
the system were, however, enormous. The all-pervading action of the State
enervated private enterprise, voluntary association, and municipal energy. The
bureaucrats had an instinctive jealousy of self-help in any class or in any
district. They were clever and industrious, but they were naturally unable to
do everything and unwilling to let others do what they had to leave undone.
Thus the tendency to expect all improvement from the State rather than from the
efforts of those
Arbitrary and capricious control.
45
interested
was ingrained in the French people, with the result that all the evils which
afflicted society were imputed to the government. Especially in bad seasons,
when a large part of the people suffered from dearth, and the well-meant but
foolish interference of the executive with the transport and sale of com
aggravated the distress, suffering broke out in riot or even petty rebellion. Again,-the
bureaucracy in France, as in other countries, was slow and formal in its
movements. Official reports and returns were numberless, correspondence accumulated,
and the despatch of business, especially at the centre, fell into arrear. .The
pernicious practice of creating offices merely to sell them had increased
beyond belief the number of useless officials, and therewith the friction and
delay of business.
Most
Continental States are still governed by a bureaucracy, but its action is
tempered by the representative system, and by some measure of press criticism.
Neither of these mitigating influences existed in old France. Criticism of the
government was at the peril of the critic. Some freedom was allowed, especially
to fashionable writers, in discussing speculative questions; but direct censure
of administrative acts was almost certain to be visited with punishment.
Secrecy enveloped the business of the State. Even the condition of the finances
was almost unknown to the public until Necker published his Compte Rendu au
Roi. That knowledge which the modem citizen can find in a dozen works of
reference was then the monopoly of persons engaged in the work of
administration. As a result of the principle of secrecy the government was
sometimes made accountable for crimes which it had not committed, and which no
man in his senses would commit. The wildest fables about the wickedness of the
Court and the tyranny of the Ministers would find credence with an ignorant,
suspicious, and suffering people. The same secrecy favoured much oppression and
corruption in detail. An incapable or malevolent official could gp on doing
mischief for years with impunity. In the administration of a modern State
unthrift and jobbery often mock at public censure. They must have been fax more
prevalent where they were so difficult to detect and so perilous to denounce.
A still more
grievous fault of the French administration was its arbitrary and capricious
temper. Were we to fix on the most characteristic difference between the government
of France and that of England in the eighteenth century, we might say that in
England the letter of the law, however imperfect, was held sacred, while in
France the good pleasure of the sovereign, or of his servants, overrode all
statutory restriction. The rulers of France seem not to have understood the
value of fixed principles or the danger of irregular exceptions. Thus the great
benefit which the action of the Crown had undoubtedly rendered to France in
unifying and consolidating the State, in harmonising local Usages, and curbing
individual self-will, was half annulled by the new anomalies and disorders
which the sovereign himself introduced. In a
46
few luminous
sentences de Tocqueville has'summed up his long study of this inveterate evil:
“The
government seldom undertakes or soon abandons the most necessary reforms,
which, in order to succeed, demand a persevering energy; but it incessantly
changes particular regulations or particular laws. In the sphere which it inhabits
nothing remains an instant in repose. New rules succeed one another with a
rapidity so strange that the agents of the State by dint of being commanded
often have trouble in making out how they are to obey. Municipal officers
complain to the Controller General himself of the extreme variability of minor
legislation. ‘ The variation of the financial regulations alone,’ they say, ‘
is such as not to allow a municipal officer, were he irremoveable, to do
anything else save study the new regulations as they appear, even to the point
of being forced to neglect his own business.’ ”
Laws so
lightly made, we may be sure, often remained without execution; and their maker
taught the public to hold them cheap by the multitude of exceptions and
variations which he ordered or allowed. It was thus that, even when an
equitable tax like the vingtiemes was imposed, influential persons and
corporations found means to elude it, at least in part. It was thus that
personal freedom was disregarded at the request of those who could command
influence at Court. The immediate evil was great, the indirect evil was far
greater; The highest service which any government can render to a people is to
instil a sense of law. The old French monarchy left no moral stay of public
order save a blind reverence for the Lord’s anointed. To quote de Tocqueville
once more: “ People often complain that Frenchmen despise the law; alas! when
could they have learnt to respect it? We may say that among the men of the
ancien regime the place which the notion of law ought to occupy in the human
mind was vacant. Every suitor demands a departure from the established rule in
his favour with as much insistence as if he demanded its observance; and in
fact the rule is hardly ever upheld against him, save when it is desired to
evade his request.” The judicial as well sis the administrative system of
France had grown up in the course of ages, had never been revised on broad
principles, and had ended in singular confusion and waste of power. During the
medieval period Courts had been multiplied by the same influences which were at
work throughout feudal Europe. Every lord had the right and duty of holding a
Court for his tenants. Every chartered town sought to gain the amplest
jurisdiction over its own citizens and the stranger within its gates. The
Church covered the land with a complete system of independent Courts
administering ecclesiastical law. Feudal, corporate, and ecclesiastical
competition left little to be done by the royal justice. Duty and interest alike
impelled the Kings of France to enlarge their jurisdiction; and to this end
they found untiring auxiliaries in the legal profession, which became more and
more powerful from the end of the
thirteenth
century Onwards. By degrees the royal Courts overspread France and withdrew
from the other secular Courts their most weighty business. But here, as in
other fields, when the Crown had engrossed the substance of power, its
reforming energy expired. Neither the desire for symmetry nor the consideration
of the public good availed to bring about the final reform, the suppression of
all Courts not emanating directly from the sovereign. The feudal and corporate
Courts lingered on until the Revolution; and the nobles kept a remnant of
jurisdiction long after they had been ousted from public life and stripped of
political influence.
The ordinary
royal Courts were of three degrees; the Parlements, the presidiaux, and the
Courts of the bailliages and senechaussees. There were thirteen Parlements, all
sovereign Courts as they were termed, Courts of the highest rank, from whose
decision there was no appeal. Among these the most ancient, the most
illustrious, and the most powerful was the Parlement of Paris, sprung from the
Curia Regis of the early Capetian Ki«gs, and in its organisation little changed
since the fourteenth century. Its jurisdiction extended over a great part of
the kingdom, and perhaps ten million human beings. The Parlements of Toulouse,
Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, Rouen, Aix, Rennes, Pau, Metz, Douai, Nancy, and
Besan^on, copied faithfully its claims and its pretensions. For the Parlements
deemed themselves more than merely judicial bodies. Their function of
registering the royal edicts, which has been noticed in earlier volumes of this
work, they construed to imply a right of criticising a new law before they
registered it, and even of refusing to register it at all. Although they would
hardly have put their wish in plain, direct terms, they aimed at nothing less
than a veto on legislation and taxation. Moreover they assumed an indefinite
power of making police regulations, even upon subjects so alien from the
dispensation of justice as the trade in com. The executive government in turn
.respassed upon their sovereign jurisdiction; for the Royal Council often
quashed the decrees of the Parlements and removed casus which they had tried
into its own hearing It will be observed that until the Revolution there was no
general Court of Appeal for the whole kingdom.
Next below
the Parlements came the Courts known as presidiaux, instituted in 1551 by Henry
II as tribunals of first instance in certain cases and as tribunals of appeal
from the many inferior Courts, whether royal or feudal. They had the final
decision in all civil cases where the value in dispute did not exceed 2000
livres tournois, and a decision subject to appeal where it did not exceed 4000.
They also possessed a certain criminal jurisdiction. At the eve of the
Revolution there were one hundred and two Courts of this class. In the third
rank stood the Courts of the bailliages and the senechaussees. These
administrative areas had been formed when the direct rule of the King succeeded
the sway of great vassals, such as the Dukes of Normandy or the Counts of
48
Champagne.
Although the bailU or the sinichal had now very little to do, his Court
remained in use for petty causes, and received certain appeals from the feudal
Courts. It was composed of the same persons as those who sat in the presidial;
but a smaller number sufficed to give judgment. In all the royal Courts of
justice a measure of independence was rendered possible by the fact that a seat
on the bench was a recognised form of property. For the constant financial
embarrassment of the Crown had induced Louis XII to make judicial office
saleable, and Henry IV to make it hereditary subject to a slight annual
payment. A judge had therefore a moral assurance that, so long as he observed
the law, he would not forfeit his preferment. He was not a mere official who
could be dismissed at pleasure and without the reprobation of the public. But
the benefit incidental to the abuse was much impaired by the power of evoking
causes from the ordinary tribunals to be heard by the Council, which power the
Crown always asserted and often exercised, as well as by the number of
extraordinary tribunals at its service and under its absolute control. Not only
the Council and the Intendants, but many, other strictly administrative
authorities, exercised an ample jurisdiction, civil, or criminal,! or both.
Those Courts of Justice, which, like the Forest Courts of England, owed their
origin to the sovereign’s possession of immense Crown lands, had been carefully
preserved wherever they could serve to fortify the royal authority. When all
existing tribunals seemed insufficient, the Crown had from time to time
appointed commissioners with extraordinary powers and a summary procedure, to
deal with corrupt financiers, heretics, smugglers, and other troublesome
offenders. These commissions, expressively ' styled Chambres Ardentes, had
become rare in the eighteenth century.
Feudal
iurisdiction in France admitted of three degrees, high, middle, and low. The
seigneur haut justkier originally had cognisance of all causes, civil and
criminal. But the gravest criminal offences, such as treason, coining,
homicide, and highway robbery, had been withdrawn from his Court under the name
of cas royaux; and it had become the practice to hand over to the royal judges
all culprits taken within the seigneur's jurisdiction. A great deal of the
civil litigation had passed to the same authority. The seigneur, who had
moyenne justice, exercised a criminal jurisdiction, which varied greatly in
different provinces. His Court was not competent as a rule to pronounce
sentence of death, and was often restricted to imposing fines of moderate
amount. He had also a certain civil jurisdiction, and powers of police on the
highways and of inspection of weights and measures. Basse justice comprised
only petty cases, civil and criminal, and gave authority to impose no penalty
beyond a small fine. All these three degrees of justice included, however, the
determination of questions rela ng to the seigneur's feudal rights, as against
his tenants. The remains of feudal jurisdiction in the age of Louis XVI were
therefore considerable. But the Crown in the
course of
ages had fettered its exercise. Litigants enjoyed a very extensive right of
appeal from the feudal to the royal Courts. The seigneur was compelled to
exercise his jurisdiction through, a judge, who was required to be at least
twenty-five years old, to be of good character, and to have given some proof of
legal competence. The Crown had even taken steps to render the judge
irremovable by the lord. Since, however, the judges of the feudal Courts were
not highly paid, it was impossible to attract to them lawyers of the highest
character or attainments. One man often acted as judge in several feudal
Courts; and thus his place had to be taken by lieutenants so-called, usually
country lawyers of humble standing.
The
number of feudal Courts was prodigious. In the single province of Maine,
neither very large nor very populous, there were on the eve of the Revolution
at least one hundred and twenty-five. In the single city of Le Mans twenty-nine
feudal Courts could be reckoned. In Angers there were sixteen. The parishionerc
of Gueugnon in Burgundy declared in 1789 that fourteen seigneurs had
jurisdiction within its bounds, and that litigants were perplexed to know who
had power to settle their disputes. The cities and towns frequently had a
jurisdiction of their own, and Courts distinct alike from the royal and the
feudal. Such a multitude of tribunals should have ensured cheap and speedy
justice. But the entanglement of jurisdictions and the possibility of
successive appeals went far to annul this advantage. Much evidence which has
been preserved points to a litigious temper in the Frenchmen of that time.
Lawyers swarmed even in the poorest country districts. One small parish of the
Nivemais contained in 1789 half-a-dozen procureurs and as many notaries. ■
The
multiplicity and confusion of tribunals corresponded to a multiplicity and
confusion of laws. France was unequally divided between the region of customary
and the region of written law. In the south the written law, the Roman law of
Justinian, or in some cases of the Theodosian Code, was in force, although
modified by local usage or modem statute. In the centre and north of France,
except Alsace, customary law, modified in turn by statute or by the influence
of the Roman system, bore sway. But within the two regions there prevailed the
utmost local variety. Writers of repute have reckoned in France on the eve of
the Revolution at least three hundred and sixty distinct bodies of law, in
force sometimes throughout a whole Province, sometimes in a much smaller area.
It is true that the differences between these were often few and slight, but
they were enough to complicate the law and swell the bulk of legal literature.
The mischief of such a multiplicity and confusion of laws had been acknowledged
ever since the time of Louis XI; and in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the rules regarding certain subjects had been codified for the whole
kingdom by royal ordinance. But the obstacles raised against a complete
50
codification
by prejudice or interest could be overcome only by an energy such as the
governments of Louis XV and Louis XVI never possessed. The criminal law was
more uniform and simple- than the civil; but, like' the criminal law of the
surrounding States, it was unreasonable and cruel. The punishment of death was-
not more lavishly awarded than in the English law of that time ; but inhuman
forms of it, such as breaking on the wheel,1 were still in use for
the worst offenders. The execution of Damiens in 1757, for attempting to murder
Louis XV, displayed the same refinement of barbarity which had been seen at the
execution of Ravaillac in ' 1610. The cruelty of the criminal law was enhanced
by its inequality ; for the nobles were exempt from certain painful or
degrading punishments inflicted on the commons. The inquisitorial ihacacter of
criminal procedure, the secret examination of witnesses, and the use of torture
to extract a confession, odious as they must be reckoned, were common to many
Continental States. The withholding of counsel from persons accused of grave
crime was an abuse to be found in England as well as in France.
No blemish of
French law before the Revolution has been more often and more justly denounced
than the lack of any guarantee for personal freedom. That any Frenchman might
be deprived of his liberty by a lettre de cachet, an administrative order under
the privy seal, is perhaps the most generally known fact regarding the old
polity of France. A person thus arrested might remain in prison for an
indefinite time, as there was no legal process by which he could enforce his
release. Since the action of the government was secret, his friends might not
know whither he had vanished, and he might even be ignorant of the cause of his
arrest. Nay, if the record of his case were mislaid, even the Minister
responsible for such prisoners might not know why he was detained. It is true
that in the eighteenth century a great proportion of the persons .thus detained
were domestic offenders, such as undutiful sons; for the lettre de cachet was
an instrument of domestic discipline, and the philanthropic Marquis de Mirabeau
took out many in the idle hope of subduing his unruly household. Again, most of
the persons thus arrested underwent only a brief confinement, sometimes of
weeks or days. Moreover, persons of respectable condition were the most
frequent victims, and were often treated as mildly as was compatible with
detaining them at all. The practice was none the less an abuse, lending itself
to great injustice and cruelty. We may not absolutely credit some piquant
stories as to the profusion with which lettres de cachet were issued under
Louis XV, and we have reason to think that under Louis XVI they were issued with
comparative forbearance; but in all matters of justice and police it may be
fairly said that the despotic temper of the French monarchy thought far too
much of enforcing submission and far too little of the rights of the citizen.
The military
establishment of France before the Revolution was
51
based on.
principles then common to all western Europe, although they have left hardly
any trace in our time. Since the military improvements of the sixteenth
century, discipline and' skill had been valuted more than numbers ; and
discipline and skill were thought to need'lifelong practice. As the number rof
recruits needed in any one year was not great, governments shunned the trouble
and unpopularity of forced enrolment, and enlisted men wherever they could find
them, at home or abroad. The soldier’s lot being hard, the comfortable citizen,
and even the prosperous artisan, was not likely to offer himself to the
recruiting sergeant. The very poor, the thriftless, and the dissolute, were his
natural prey; and to ensnare them he might use every means of deceit and
debauchery. On the other hand the still powerful prejudice handed down from the
age of chivalry, that arms are the true profession for a gentleman, disposed-
the nobles of every land to accept commissions as officers, from their own
sovereign if possible, but, failing that/from any other Christian sovereign
with whom he was not at war; for, even so late as the outbreak of the
Revolution, the calling of a soldier of fortune was not thought dishonourable.
It was therefore difficult for a man of the middle class to become an officer;
and, as he would not willingly become a private soldier, the middle class in
the eighteenth century remained almost entirely unwarlike. In 1789 the
Frenchman of the middle class felt as keen a thrill of novelty when he donned
the uniform of a National Guard as when a little earlier he had recorded his
vote in the elections to the States General.
In the reign
of Louis XVI France maintained about 170,000 regular troops, of whom perhaps
one-sixth were foreigners, Swiss, Germans, Irish, Poles, Swedes, Danes, and
Italians. Prussia, with about one-third of the population of France, maintained
an equal number. The slow historic growth of the regular forces could still be
traced in many irregularities of organisation; and favour and privilege had
cumbered the army with many grotesque abuses. In order to satisfy the nobility
the officers had been multiplied out of all proportion to the privates. At the
beginning of the Revolution there were 966 generals and 1918 staff officers;
that is to say, one general for every 157 privates and one staff officer for
every 79. Those who had enough influence gained their commissions early and
without labour. The Due de Choiseul raised an outcry by refusing to allow any
more colonels of sixteen; and Marshal de Broglie declared all the officers from
the sub-lieutenant to the lieutenant-general totally ignorant of their
profession. The private was poorly paid, had no comforts, and could not rise
above the rank of non-commissioned officer. Bad fare and hard usage made
desertion common. In the Seven Years’ War the French army had tarnished its old
renown, and France had yielded the first place among military States to
Prussia. Yet that there was excellent stuff in the royal army was proved by the
number, both of privates and of officers, who
52
rose to fame
in the wars of. the Republic and the Empire. Out of twenty-four Marshals of
France created by Napoleon, eight had been officers and ten had been privates
under Louis XVI; and Englishmen will remember the great achievements of their,
own army at a time when it was open, though not in the same degree, to many of
the reproaches brought against the old army of France. The French discipline
was not so harsh as the Prussian, nor harsher than the English; and at least
one English traveller in 1789 was impressed with the healthy and vigorous looks
of the common soldier.
The army was
supplemented by a militia of about sixty thousand men. As the term of service
was for six years, the annual contingent required was ten thousand, raised by a
sort of conscription. The burthen was not more than France could easily have
borne had it been fairly distributed; but the privilege enjoyed by many places and
classes doubled the pressure upon those who were not exempt. Thirty -nine
different descriptions of persons were excused on one ground or another. The
people , of the capital were not liable. As the militia service was thus
rendered only by the poorest class of peasants, its hardships were not relieved
by any honourable associations; and, as the militiamen were not well treated,
the balloting was regarded with intense fear and dislike.
Since the
form and operation of government always depend to a very great degree on the
structure of society, this outline of the institutions of France may be
rendered more intelligible by some notice of the classes into which the French
people were divided. By taking account of the relative position and the coifli
:ting interests of the clergy, the nobles, the bourgeoisie, and the peasants
respectively, we may better understand the course which each of these orders
took in the Revolution, and the character and effects of the Revolution itself.
Outwardly the
clergy of France still held the position which had been theirs in the Middle
Ages. They were the only authorised spiritual teachers; for, although the flame
of intolerance was burning low, although the Protestants were but languidly
persecuted, while in Alsace even the Jews were left in peace, the Catholic was
the only religion known to the la,w, the Catholic, the only worship publicly
allowed. A very great number of those employed in the education of youth were
clergy or nuns; and sill other teachers were subject to clerical supervision.
Politically the clergy were the first of the Three Estates, an order possessing
valuable privileges, the only order which enjoyed even partial self-government.
Lastly, the clergy were possessed of immense riches ; and it was vaguely asserted
that they held one-fifth of the soil of France. Inwardly it is true the
condition of the Church was less satisfactory. The zeal of the clergy had
cooled, their discipline was relaxed, and a spirit of indi/eidnce, even of
enmity to religion, had become widely spread. i ■ 1
For want of
accurate statistics the number of the French clergy at
this period
has been variously estimated. It was supposed in 1762 that they then numbered
194,000. It is certain that they were dwindling through the greater part of the
eighteenth century. Taine thought that under Louis XVI they numbered 130,000,
not very unequally distributed between regulars and seculars, there being about
23,000 monks and friars and 37,000 nuns. In an age of indifference the regulars
were most apt to diminish. Thus in Troyes there dwelt in 1695 three hundred and
twenty nuns ; in 1774 there remained only ninety-one. In two spacious
monasteries of the same city only ten monks were left. A royal edict of 1765
had ordained that, when the inmates of any religious House fell below nine, the
House should be closed, the inmates transferred to another House, and the
revenues carried to a fund available for certain religious or charitable
purposes. Under this edict it is said that nearly four hundred Houses were
closed, and that several of the less numerous Orders had vanished from the
kingdom. Yet the cahiers of 1789 frequently refer to the existence of
monasteries almost unpeopled. In the suppression of the Jesuits the government
had taken a still bolder measure. Had no reaction intervened, the Orders of
men would probably have shrunk to a few communities actively employed in
education and charily. , The secular clergy were not subject to a like
decrease. There are said to have been 38,000 parishes in France; and the parish
priests and curates numbered about 60,000. All the remaining seculars may have
amounted to 10,000.
The wealth of
the Church, although it cannot now be accurately measured, was very great. A
committee of the National Assembly estimated its revenues at 170,000,000
livres, and Gomel thinks that they may have amounted to 200,000,000
livres—about one-half of the revenue of the Crown at the accession of Louis
XVI. Fully two-fifths of the whole were derived from tithes, the residue from
landed estate. Arthur Young admits that the tithe was levied with comparative
moderation. It was nowhere a tenth, usually a twelfth or fifteenth, sometimes
no more than a twentieth, of the gross produce. In many places meadows, olive
grounds, and cattle, were exempt; and a new kind of crop, such as potatoes or
clover, did not pay anything until the law was altered in 1783. Nevertheless
the exaction was odious to the thrifty peasants, who had so much to pay; and
the claim to tithe was everywhere most prolific of lawsuits. The tithepayer
grumbled more because the bulk of the tithe went, not to the parish priest, but
to distant Chapters or monasteries, which seldom remembered him in their
bounty. The landed estates of the Church probably yielded more than
100,000,000
livres—no surprising return, if they really occupied one- fifth of the surface
of France. It must be remembered that the great clerical domains were often
ill-managed, and that religious Houses have often been indulgent landlords. The
wealth of the clergy excited the
54 Revenues
and government of the clergy.
more envy
because it was privileged. The clergy were exempt from the taille, and had
redeemed themselves very cheaply from the vmgtibnes and the capitation. The
clergy did indeed every five years grant the Crown a subsidy, whose free and
voluntary character was expressed in the term don gratuit, and in time of war
they often'voted further sums; but these by no means balanced their exemptions.
Even these subsidies they often raised by loans, afterwards repaid out of the
dedmes, a light tax on clerical incomes. The distribution of ecclesiastical
revenues was yet another scandal, for lucrative sinecures were even more
plentiful in the Church than in the State; and those who did most work had as a
rule the least reward. The one hundred and thirty-four Archbishops and Bishops
of France were singularly unequal in their revenues; but their average income
amounted perhaps to 60,000 livres, about £2500 of English money ; and their
wealth was often .doubled by the rich abbacies which they were allowed to hold.
In consequence of the diversion of the tithe from its proper object most of the
parish priests were shamefully ill-paid. The State had been forced to interpose
and enforce a minimum stipend, the portion congrue, fixed in 1768 at 500 livres
and raised in 1786 to 700 livres. Here again there was no equality, for some
cures, who received the whole of the tithes, were comfortable or even rich. The
cahier of Brulon in Maine mentions cures enjoying an income of 10,000, 15,000,
even 30,000 livres. The parish priest was entitled to fees for marriages, etc.
(the casuel), and to certain dues, which the peasants frequently regarded as a
grievance. The religious Houses varied in their condition from poverty to
opulence.
The clergy
enjoyed a real, though limited, power of self-government through their
provincial and national assemblies. The national assembly of the Church of
France met every five years on the King’s summons. Each of the sixteen
provincial assemblies sent as its representatives two Bishops and two of the
inferior clergy. The assembly upon meeting elected a President and then divided
itself into bureaux, which chose commissaries to treat of business in detail.
It. voted the don gratuit, and, in the spirit of an earlier time, joined to its
gift petitions, which the sovereign received with respect and sometimes
granted. Yet we must not overrate the liberties of the clergy; for, in things
ecclesiastical as in things secular, the Crown had always been studious to
enlarge its prerogative. The clerical assemblies might not promulgate any
decree without the King’s previous knowledge and approval. No new religious
House could be established without his sanction. Without the same sanction no
lands could be acquired or alienated by the clergy. The Crown exercised a
patronage so vast and valuable as to ensure clerical obedience. By the
concordat of the year 1516 Francis I had agreed with Leo X that the King should
have the right of nominating Bishops and Archbishops, subject to papal
confirmation, and should also be entitled to fill up a great number of wealthy
abbacies. Many inferior preferments
were in the
King’s gift. He was thus able, not merely to control the clergy, but also to
bind the nobility to himself by new ties of interest. For all the
archbishoprics, all but five of the bishoprics, all the commendatory abbeys,
the commanderies of the Knights of Malta, and the noble Chapters of men and
women, were reserved for persons of gentle birth, who received in this way a
large proportion of the enormous ecclesiastical revenue.
In judging
the character of the French priesthood during the eighteenth century we must
distinguish between the higher and the lower ranks, as well as between the
regulars and the seculars. The superior clergy, taken in the gross, were
courtiers and men of the world. Some notoriously disbelieved the religion which
they were supposed to teach; and some were dissolute in their conduct. Yet the
majority, even under Louis XV, observed outward decorum; and here and there was
to be found a prelate of sterling piety and benevolence. Nor need it be denied
that the pride of birth and the feeling of assured independence, together with
the tradition of Gallican liberties, gave to the French prelates a certain
breadth and firmness of mind, and. helped to save them from some failings which
have been noted in their far more zealous successors. Professional talent and
learning, it is true, were seldom found in this class, nor did any of them in
the age preceding the Revolution gain glory by controversial or apologetic
writings. They were silent or ineffective, while argument and wit and rhetoric
were untiringly exerted against the characters of the clergy and the doctrines
of Christianity. If an acute and vigorous intellect appeared among the French
Bishops, he was too commonly a man of the stamp of Talleyrand, whom accident or
influence had pushed into a splendid but incongruous position. No Bossuet, no
Fenelon, shed the splendour of eloquence and imagination over the decline of
the Gallican Church.
The inferior
clergy offered a glaring contrast to their chiefs. Drawn mostly from a humble
middle class, or even from the peasantry, since their office had so few worldly
allurements, and condemned to poverty and a monotonous routine, they were
rarely men of wide culture or polished manners; but they were usually regular
and edifying in their lives. In spite of occasional scandals, such as will
occur in every large body of professional men, the parish priests appear to
have generally deserved and enjoyed the goodwill of their flocks. They felt for
the people from whom they sprang and amid whom they laboured ; and they often
entertained democratic opinions. They had indeed their own grievances, and they
might be pardoned if they felt some bitterness in reflecting on what stamp of
divine the richest preferments of the Church were so often lavished. Many of
them regarded their Bishop as the common soldier regarded his noble colonel,
and as the peasant regarded the lord of the manor. The abuses of the French
system tended to alienate those whom both duty and interest should have drawn
together;
56
The religious Orders.—Dissent.
and the
privileged orders, a mere handful among discontented millions, were themselves
rent into hostile factions. In the first stage of the Revolution the sympathy
df the parish priests ensured the victory of the Third Estate over the nobles
and the prelates.
The regular
clergy of France in the eighteenth century presented the spectacle so often
seen when ascetic enthusiasm has almost died out. The religious Houses were
still very numerous, and some of them were very wealthy; but they rendered no
proportionate service' to the community. A few Benedictines were honourably
distinguished by their zeal for learning ; and those Orders which busied
themselves in works of charity or in teaching were kept healthy by employment.
That large residue of men and women, who, having taken the vows, found
themselves with no definite occupation, were at best useless and sometimes vicious.
The religious Houses generally were liberal of their alms ; but indiscriminate
Charity has everywhere made more beggars than it relieves. Religious Houses
were often disliked by the peasants because they drew rent and tithes from
parishes on which they conferred no benefit in return. They were incessantly
denounced and ridiculed by men of letters and philosophers; they were regarded
by many statesmen as a useless encumbrance on the national resources; they were
so alien to the spirit of the time that they could not find a sufficient number
of novices; and the monasteries, although not the convents, were slowly tending
to extinction.
The
eighteenth century in France, as in England, offered a contrast between
tolerant public opinion and intolerant laws. The clergy retained enough of the
old persecuting spirit to disgust the laity, but not enough to crush dissent.
The government did not go so far as the clergy wished, and yet went far enough
to share their unpopularity. Infinite bitterness was bred in the Church by the
long and unmeaning warfare between the orthodox and the Jansenists. Protestants
were still outlaws, denied a civil status, and so disabled from having an
authentic record of births and marriages. If they assembled for divine worship,
the congregation might be sent to the galleys and the pastor might be hanged.
Under Louis XV the judicial murder of Calas showed that the spirit of St
Bartholomew’s Day was not extinct; but such incidents were rare, and Louis XVI
gave a lesson to Protestant Kings when he made Necker Minister of Finance. Now
and then feeble attempts were made to suppress the new rationalism. The
publication of the Encyclopedie was at one time arrested. Some of the most
eminent writers of the age were sent to prison, though none were detained for
long or harshly treated. Voltaire thought it prudent to spend the years of his
highest fame and power in exile, and only revisited Paris at the very close of
his life. But such half-hearted persecution merely advertised new ideas and
proclaimed the imbecility of the government. Its worst effect lay in imparting
to the Revolution a tinge of anti-religious rancour.
57
It is
difficult to give the English reader a just conception of the French noblesse
in the eighteenth century. Even the number of the nobles has been very
variously estimated. Taine thought that there were about 140,000, or rather
more than five nobles to every thousand inhabitants of France. The French
noblesse corresponded at once to the English nobility and to the English
gentry. It has often been termed a caste—correctly in so far as every child of
gentle birth was noble—but incorrectly in so far as entrance to the class was
easy; for, apart from the special favour of the Crown, any person might be ennobled
by purchasing one of about four thousand offices. The French nobility as a
whole was not rich. A few families possessing vast estates and attracting the
lavish bounty of the sovereign were indeed as rich as the wealthiest English
nobles. But the majority of French nobles neither owned wide domains nor could
afford a splendid and luxurious life at Versailles. Some possessed very little
land and drew nearly all their income from their seigniorial rights—rights
analogous to those which an English lord of the manor enjoys against the
copyholders. Such rights, often ill-defined and burdensome, were most
unpopular, and bred infinite litigation which absorbed much of the revenue they
produced. The poor noble was condemned by the prejudices of his order to remain
poor, for he might not engage in a lucrative calling and was almost compelled
to enter the army or navy. Pay was small, promotion was tedious, and the great
prizes in these as in other fields were too often intercepted by favour and
intrigue. A prejudice hardly less powerful, though sometimes defied, forbade
the noble to marry any woman not of noble blood and thus recruit his fortunes
with wealth gained in commerce or industry. The virtues and the vices of the
nobility were alike adverse to minute thrift and petty gains. Hence the share
of the nobles in the wealth of France was diminishing for many years previous
to the Revolution. The French noble was usually poorer than a petty English
esquire; and Arthur Young was told at Nimes that many noble families in the
Province of Rouergue contrived to live on fifty or even twenty-five louis a
year.
^The French
nobles as a class were without political power. It is true that they enjoyed
many unjust privileges, such as exemption from the bulk of the direct taxes and
a monopoly of field sports. Again, those nobles who surrounded the sovereign,
waited on his person, and shared his pleasures, had ample opportunities of
procuring favours for themselves and of doing harm to those who had incurred
their hatred. Moreover, the officials of the Crown observed in their dealings
with the nobility a forbearance and a courtesy, a respect for the rights of
human nature, which were too often forgotten in dealing with the other classes.
For after all the King of France was a French gentleman, who shared the tastes,
habits, and prejudices of his order, and wished to gratify his fellows so far
as was compatible with his own absolute power. But that
58
absolute
power came first in his thoughts and in the thoughts of his servants. No
independent will might be allowed to impede the course of his prerogative. For
centuries the Crown with its lawyers and officials had been sapping the power
of the noblesse, and had at length reduced it to political -nullity. The nobles
had lost all voice in making laws and levying taxes when the States General
ceased to meet. The bureaucracy had carefully stripped them of administrative
power in their respective neighbourhoods. They had no part in the levying of
the militia, in the relief of the poor, in the assessment of taxes, in the
execution of public works, or in enforcing the regulations which controlled
commerce and industry. The only political privileges, which they retained were
a share in the Estates of the few Provinces where Estates had survived, and an
enervated feudal jurisdiction. The French noble had no opportunity of combining
with his fellows, or of offering himself as a leader to the commons., A number
of gentlemen- could not meet for any public purpose without official leave. The
noblesse had never shown, eminent political capacity; and what they had,
withered under conditions so deadening. At the outbreak of the Revolution not a
few nobles gave proof of generous ardour for the common good; none save the
discredited, vagabond Mirabeau displayed the acuteness or resource of the bom
statesman. ,
The French
noblesse, as the event proved, was unpopular. It could hardly have been
otherwise, for it, was a body sharply defined by the titles, forms, and
privileges most apt to wound the pride as well as the self-interest of other
classes. Although manners were more humane in France than in some of the
adjoining countries, the noblesse often displayed the arrogance natural to men
who are not merely taught to think themselves superior, but have no occasion to
solicit other men’s suffrages. The isolation of the noblesse, save in. a few
districts, was complete; for the policy of attracting the nobles to Court and
keeping them in attendance on the sovereign had rendered the most illustrious
and wealthy of that order strangers to their own estates. When a noble family,
after long residence at Paris or Versailles, went down to the ancestral
mansion, it usually sought to replenish its purse and lived frugally until it
could .return to the centre of, power and pleasure. The significant phrase,
“exiled to his estates,” tells us how the courtier regarded a sojourn in the
country. Such a landed proprietor could not know the wants of his people or
gain their good-will by furthering their welfare, but was often obliged to
press them for the last farthing in order to feed his artific'al and expensive
manner of life. The poorer nobles, who liyed in the country because they could
not live so cheaply anywhere else, were as little able to improve their land,
to help the peasants, or to encourage local industry. As a class the nobles had
become useless. Their proprietary rights very generally took a form which
hindered the progress of husbandry; their obsolete prejudices debarred them
from
lucrative
callings; and the jealousy of the Crown excluded them from public life.
Arrogance, isolation, and futility, rather than any enormous wickedness, seem
to have been the causes of the ill-will felt towards the French nobles. Very
bad men are found in all times and in all classes, and certainly abounded at
the Court of Louis XV. But much the greater number of the nobility had not the
means, even if they felt the wish, to vie with the Regent Orleans or the Due de
Richelieu, and astonish Europe by prodigal lust and riot. The ordinary French
noble was a man of narrow ideas and strong prejudices, who cherished a false
and flattering notion of the consequence of his own order; but he was often a
man of honour and integrity, who led a spare and frugal life and taught his
children some virtues which our commercial age is too prone to ignore.
Disunion
completed the weakness of the French nobility. Even a small body of men cannot
long be held together save by the effort to get or keep something of value to
all the members. The English landed interest found such an object in political
power and its advantages. The French nobles had no common tie of that kind. The
nobles of the Court, who formed the most elegant society in Europe, despised
their rustic brethren. The provincial noble swelled with anger at the thought
that the reward of his campaigns and scars was intercepted by triflers and
flatterers at Versailles. The noble of ancient lineage flouted the rich upstart
who had bought an office conferring nobility, and affected to be familiar with
descendants of the Crusaders. The “nobility of the sword,” as it was termed,
which made arms its career, looked down upon the “nobility of the robe*” which
preferred to fill, generation after generation, the more dignified places in
the judicature. The absolute monarchy which denied any scope to combined
effort, and the privileges which seemed to exclude all v cigar competition,
left the French nobles free to indulge a mutual jealousy which only perished
with the order.
The middle class
was very differently composed in France and in Cjngland. In England there has
always been a rural middle class either of yeomen or of substantial tenant
farmers. But in France tenant farmers were rare save in a few Provinces; and
the proprietor who cultivated his own land had usually so little as not to
rise above the degree of a peasant. Throughout the greater part of France the
lawyers made up the chief part of what middle class there was in rural
districts. Thus the French middle class was eminently urban, a bourgeoisie in
the proper sense of that term. The towns had gained privileges and exemptions
of various kinds proportioned to their wealth and power; and those citizens who
belonged to the governing body or to any of the professional corporations were
usually favoured above their, fellows. The unfair; apd oppressive taxation
piled upon the dwellers in the country, especially the tax known as the
Jranc-jief. payable by every person who, without being
noble, held a
fief, had hindered prosperous citizens from buying small, estates and setting
up as squires. They preferred to buy an office, and with it the privileges and
the dignity of a servant of the Crown. In the country a townsman would have
found little society; while at home he had friends and connexions who gave him
consequence, atad could often exact full reparation for any affront offered by
a noble.
French
industry and commerce had grown steadily since the death of Louis XIV; and the
urban class had increased in numbers and riches. Towns were indeed both few and
small, if judged by the standard of our own time. According to a return
prepared for Calonne in 1787, France then contained seventy-eight towns with
upwards of 1-0,000 inhabitants and an aggregate population of nearly two
millions. One hundred years later there were in France thrice as many towns
with upwards of 10,000 inhabitants; and their aggregate population was more
than four times as large as in 1787. Levasseur thinks that Paris at that time
contained from 600,000 to 650,000 inhabitants, less than a quarter of its
present population. The return prepared for Calonne estimated the population of
Lyons at 135,000. No other city exceeded
100,000,
and only five had more
than 50,000. But it is doubtful what trust can be put in these statistics; and
much higher figures are given by some contemporary writers. In point of health,
convenience, and safety, the towns of France were also defective. Yet several
were very prosperous; for France then enjoyed a superiority in certain
manufactures which has been partly lost since; and the West India trade, in
spite of frequent interruption ‘by war, was most profitable. The towns began to
put on a modern aspect New quarters were built in spacious streets and squares;
promenades were laid out on the site of the old ramparts; the streets were
better paved and for the first time generally lighted; and a purer and more
copious supply of water was brought sometimes, from a considerable distance. At
Rheims Arthur Young felt bound to confess how much French cities surpassed
English in their dignified and ornamental appearance. At Nantes he lodged in a
new hotel which had been built at a cost of 400,000 livres; and the theatre, “
twice as large as Drury Lane and five times as magnificent,” filled him with
wonder. Bordeaux surprised him no less. Dr Rigby was similarly, charmed with
Lyons and Marseilles. The citizens of these great towns must have been rich and
luxurious. ,
In truth the
bourgeoisie, apart from such legal privileges as they enjoyed, were in many respects
fortunate. The multitude of splendid foundations made a liberal education cheap
and often gratuitous. The citizens were very generally free from the militia
service, and the conscription was as yet1 unknown. Nearly all
lucrative employments were filled by men of this class. It supplied the great
majority of lawyers, judges, and civil servants, the contractors who reaped a
rich harvest in every war, and the financiers who farmed the indirect taxes. If
the
Grievances of the bourgeoisie.
61
bourgeoisie
had little land, they possessed nearly all the capital of France, held the bulk
of the public securities, and counted many a noble and prelate among their
debtors. Intelligent, frugal, and laborious, they were always improving their
stock; and every year they became a greater force in the kingdom. And yet this
class which had so much to lose was profoundly discontented. With a few
illustrious exceptions, such as Mirabeau and Lafayette, the leaders of the
Revolution in every period of its history, even dining the Terror, came from
this class. The bourgeoisie had studied the writings of the philosophers and
economists, and had lost its deference for the priest and the noble. It longed
for a share of power and consideration proportionate to its talent and culture.
It wanted areal municipal self-government and a parliamentary constitution
which would give it a direct voice in public affairs. It was irritated by the
constant official meddling with the processes of industry and the movement of
commerce. It understood how much wealth was lost for lack of simplicity,
equity, and reasonableness in the fiscal system. It watched with alarm the
waste and disorder which imperilled its own savings advanced to the State. It
resented an almost entire exclusion from the army, the navy, and the diplomatic
service. Above all it was embittered by the honorary distinctions of the
nobility, and by the insolence of the more foolish nobles. Even the reflexion,
that any opulent citizen could easily be ennobled, seems to have had no effect
in soothing this exasperation. With these partly selfish motives for desiring a
thorough reformation, there mingled beyond doubt that generous and humane
enthusiasm, which was so widely spread through France in the latter part of the
eighteenth century. Such feelings had not been sobered by any experience of
public life or by any provident fear as to what might ensue were the old order
too roughly assailed. The bourgeoisie were not yet aware, of any danger from
below; nor could they divine that in no long space of time they would
themselves be the theme of invective as bitter as Diderot or Champfort had ever
poured forth against Kings and priests.
Whatever the
prosperity of the towns, France remained eminently agricultural; and it would
appear that, after deducting the townspeople, the nobles, and the clergy and
other professional men in the country districts, four-fifths of the nation,
fully twenty million souls, were employed in tilling the earth. An agricultural
middle class hardly existed save in those north-western Provinces, Normandy,
Picardy, Artois, Flanders, and the lie de France, where proprietors were
accustomed to let their land in large farms. Elsewhere nearly all the
agricultural population were peasants. Thus the peasants vastly outnumbered all
the other classes of French society put together; , The condition of the
peasants was undoubtedly a prime cause of the Revolution; but, since it, varied
in different, parts of France and our information is imperfect, it has been
very differently represented hy different writer/3 according to
the regions
which they knew best, their temperament!, or the political opinions which they
cherished.
The
bulk of the French peasantry had achieved personal freedom, Villenage had been
declining in France ever since the twelfth century; and the number of'persons
more or less Unfree in their-status at the accession of Louis XVI did not
exceed fifteen hundred thousand. These were mostly crowded together in a few
districts. Louis emancipated the last serfs on the royal domain, and might well
have enforced a general emancipation; but serfdom was so exceptional that such
a reform would probably have had little influence on the course of events. :
In the administration of their communes the peasants had also been freed from
the control or supervision of their lctfds. That their local independence was
little more than a form, was due to the action of the Intendant with his
subdelegates, not of the gentry, who had been so carefully divested of
administrative power. 1
The French
peasants had also acquired an immense interest in the land. For lack of full
and trustworthy statistics we cannot speak precisely as to the distribution of
real property. But a recent writer of authority has accepted the opinion that
before the Revolution one-fifth belonged to the Crown or was communal property,
one-fifth belonged to the clergy, one-fifth to the nobles, and two-fifths to
the Third Estate. As few of the middle class were landowners, the share of the
Third Estate belonged mostly to the peasants; and the peasants, who made up
most of the rural communes, must be regarded as holding nearly all the communal
lands. It appears that the peasants were always buying land and so changing the
proportion in their favour. All the testimonies point to an enormous number of
petty properties in France under Louis XVI. Arthur Young states that they
abounded in almost every part of France and supposes more than One-third of the
kingdom to have been occupied by them. Some writers have thought that very small
properties were as numerous then as they now are in France, the great estates
confiscated in the course of the Revolution having been bought in larger
portions by purchasers often belonging to the middle class. The lands still
held by the Crown, the clergy, and the nobles, were in some Provinces let in
farms of considerable size, but in most to peasant metayers, the lord
furnishing a variable proportion of the capital required, and taking a variable
proportion of the gross produce. Young thought that perhaps seven-eighths of
the land let were held on this tenure. An enquiry into the condition of the
French peasants under Louis XVI is therefore threefold, according as it relates
either to the hired labourer in the districts of large farms, or to the metayer,
or to the petty proprietor cultivating his own land.
The condition
of the hired labourer seems to have been as good as in many parts of England,
better than in most countries of Europe. The districts where large farms held
at a money rent abounded were
among the
best tilled, and the farmers were substantial men. The labourer earned
tolerable wages, and sometimes saved enough to buy a patch of land. It was not
these districts which broke out into anarchy in the first months after the
meeting of the States General. It was the districts full of mMayers and small
proprietors that rose Up against the seigneurs; and these were the classes
alleged to have been most wretched. Arthur Young’s verdict on the metayer
system has been often quoted. “In this most miserable of all the modes of
letting land:..the defrauded landlord receives a contemptible rent; the farmer
is in the lowest state of poverty; the land is miserably cultivated, and the
nation suffers as severely as the parties themselves.” As to the petty proprietors,
he concluded that “ small properties are carried much too far in France; that a
most miserable population has been created by them which ought to have had no
existence.” Young had a high standard both of farming and of comfort; the
impressions of other travellers were sometimes more favourable. Walpole, in
1765, thought the condition of the people wonderfully improved within his own
recollection. “ The worst villages are tight, and wooden shoes have
disappeared.” Dr Rigby, in 1789, was in raptures with the aspect of France;
and, though a hasty traveller, he was not a contemptible witness, for he was a
man of talent, accomplished in natural science, and an agricultural amateur
from the pioneer county of Norfolk. Young himself acknowledged that in the
regions of vines and maize and olives, as well as in some northern Provinces,
“France possesses a husbandry equal to our own.”
It would be
more easy than useful to multiply general assertions of contemporaries on both
sides of the case. The evidence which Babeau has collected as to the domestic
economy of the peasants tends to show that they were as a rule meanly and often
wretchedly housed, but that their diet varied in a surprising manner from one
district to another. Here they ate good bread made chiefly or entirely of
wheat; there rye bread was the staple article of food. In some places they ate
meat only on holidays; in other places they consumed as much animal food as
the best paid English labourer. Those differences of soil, climate, and access
to markets, which still render the peasant’s lot so unequal in different parts
of France, were still more potent when communication was difficult, when fiscal
pressure varied from one region to another, and when the movement of produce
was checked by so many artificial barriers. Babeau has shown that the peasant
family often accumulated a surprising quantity of clothes and linen; and that
peasant women usually allowed themselves some trinkets, at least a cross and
chain of silver, sometimes of gold. To what extent the elements of knowledge
were diffused among the peasants is an equally interesting and difficult
enquiry. ■ Many communes possessed an elementary school; but for lack of
funds the schoolmaster was usually ill qualified, and the buildings and appliances
were such as would now be regarded as
64
wretchedly,
insufficient. Taine’s assertio n that out of twenty-six million French people
only one million could read is in itself improbable, and certainly not proved
by the few particulars which he adduces. Babeau professes to have established
that in the districts now forming the Department of the Aube seventy-two per
cent, of the men and twenty- two per cent, of the women knew how to read. Yet a
great number of the municipal officers elected under the laws of the
Constituent Assembly are said to have been unable to read or write.
It might have
been thought that , the difference would be glaring between the metayer, who
gave his landlord a large part of the produce of the land, and the petty proprietor.
But by far the greater number of such proprietors were what we should term
copyholders, not freeholders. From the twelfth century onwards the great
proprietors had been selling land to the peasants, not for a sum paid down, but
for perpetual rent-charges and services. The progress of agriculture and the
fall in the value of money had often made the rent-charge insignificant; but
the services were felt to be more and more irksome as the times of villenage
became more and more remote. The peasant chafed more and more under the corvee
seigneuriale—the claim for a certain amount of unpaid labour—the banalites
which obliged him to send his com to the seigneur's mill, his grapes to the
seigneur's winepress, or his flour to the seigneur's oven, the peages
seigneuriales—tolls levied on the roads and rivers of the vicinage for the
seigneur's benefit—the dr ait de cailombier or right of the seigneur to keep an
indefinite number of pigeons, which found their food in the adjoining
cornfields, and the droit de chasse, which reserved every kind of game within
the manor for the seigneur's amusement. Such manorial rights inflicted on the
peasant a loss out of all proportion to the gain of the lord. What deduction
from the gross value of the peasant’s land they implied we cannot tell, for
they varied from manor to manor, and the estimates which have been attempted
are all more or less uncertain. But experience everywhere has shown that, when
the cultivator comes to regard himself not as tenant but as owner, all rents
and services appear intolerable. It has been found needful to provide for the
enfranchisement of copyholds in England, and for the purchase of farms by the
tenants in Ireland. An enlightened government would have enforced the
commutation of manorial rights in France.
A critical
historian will not adopt without reserve those descriptions of the appalling
misery of the French peasants which have been so often copied from one book
into another. Yet there are solid reasons for thinking that most of them led a very
hard, pinched, insecure life. The condition df the petty farmer or freeholder
is not easy even under the more genial circumstances of the present day. In
France one hundred and fifty years ago his technical skill and command of
capital were far less, and his difficulties were far greater. He was subjected
to unfair and excessive taxation, assessed and collected in such a way as to
65
inflict the
utmost loss and annoyance. He had to pay tithe. When he wished to take his
produce to market he met with many hindrances. Although the highways were often
superb, the cross-roads were usually villainous. On every road and every river
the peasant might expect to pay toll to some lord or coiporation or city or to
the Crown itself. Often he had to pass one of the internal lines of
custom-houses. In selling his com, especially, he was hampered by edicts of the
King and regulations of the Parlements. If his own crops failed in a bad
season, the same obstacles hindered food from coming to him, and forced him to
pay dear for it or go without. Before the extraordinary improvement in
communications due to steam, all countries were liable to times of scarcity,
even of famine, unless, like England and Holland, they were everywhere
accessible to water carriage, or, like Lombardy, unfailing in productiveness.
The frequent recurrence of dearth in France before the Revolution does not
imply so absolute a penury in the mass of the people as we are now apt to
assume; but it does imply that their condition was bad, and in a country so
fruitful and among a people so thrifty proves how injurious were the fiscal and
agrarian systems.
If we judge
France in the eighteenth century by the standard of to-day, we must pronounce
French institutions clumsy, incoherent, and unjust, and a great part of the
French people wretchedly poor and halfcivilised. Yet France held the first
place among European kingdoms; and if the condition of the lower classes was
better in England, in the Netherlands, in a few favoured parts of Germany, and
in northern Italy, it was probably worse in most of the German countries, in
Naples, in Spain, and in Ireland. From the close of the Seven Years’ War to the
outbreak of the Revolution France was growing in population, riches, and
enlightenment. A reasonable and humane temper had spread so widely among
administrators and judges that the spirit of government under Louis XVI was
very different from what it had been under Louis XIV. But in a society where
personal freedom was general, landed property widely diffused, and every class
aspiring to equality with the class above, evils, which elsewhere might have
been borne in patience, were felt to be intolerable. The long reign of a
slothful and sensual Prince gave time for discontent to accumulate and criticism
to become embittered. Class was divided from class; old institutions and
beliefs became objects of scorn; crude theories and impossible hopes gave a new
sting to injustice and oppression; and discerning strangers could foretell,
even while all was calm, the approach of a tremendous catastrophe.
o. h. e. vni.
6
FINANCE.
The generalisation that money is the root of all
revolution has the defects of its simplicity; but among the varied influences
which provoked the French Revolution vicious finance takes the first place.
Apart from it, other causes, seemingly independent, lose much of their
significance^ Even the religious controversy owed much of its acuteness to a
sensitiveness about the rights of the Parlement, which were prized and feared
mainly on account of their bearing upon public finance. Misgovemment made
itself chiefly felt in the unequal and excessive pressure upon the taxpayer,
which alienated the affections of the people from the government; and the
refusal of the Parlement of Paris to legalise by registration permanent
additions to taxation necessitated the convocation of the Assembly of Notables,
and subsequently of the States General, which grew into the Constituent
Assembly.
The problem
before Louis XVI was to avert imminent bankruptcy while relieving the excessive
pressure of taxation upon the lower and middle classes. No system, no
expedients, could effect these objects without such a remodelling of the
constitutional system and the machinery of government as would have amounted to
a complete, if bloodless, revolution. Turgot’s minute to the King upon
municipalities indicates this clearly: “The mischief comes from the fact that
the nation is completely without a constitution.” Finance necessitated organic
changes in the State. The present financial system of Russia works, it is true;
but it is not one which the history and temperament of the French people would
have allowed them to accept from Louis XVI. Roederer, addressing the
Constituent Assembly, said: “ The unanimous mandate of France has settled the
question. Finance must be placed outside the interference of the Executive
power.” The Assembly virtually took upon itself the functions of Treasury
control and of audit—the authorisation of expense, and the scrutiny of accounts;
but the task was an impossible one for its financial representatives—at best a
collection of untrained amateurs already absorbed by politics. It was left to
the Empire and the restored Monarchy to introduce a rational financial system.
The financial resources of France.
67
France in the
eighteenth century was without a budget. The very word first officially appears
in a law of 1806. Living from hand to mouth, its accounts little better than
statements of balances in the Exchequer, or of cash receipts and payments
actually effected, it may almost be said that the financial system of the
ct/ncien regime was to have no system. The history of Revolutionary finance
will be dealt with in a later chapter. We proceed to consider the resources of
government, the machinery of financial administration, and the pressure of
taxation in the reign of Louis XVI.
The domaine,
or feudal property of the Crown, corresponding In the main to our Crown lands,
sufficiently provided for the needs of the early Kings of France; they “ lived
of their own,” with more than sufficient to cover the expenses of their
household and government. This favourable financial position stimulated, it is
asserted, the growth of kingly power; it pushed the monarchy in the direction
of assuming new functions and extending its sphere of influence. On the other
hand, it infected public finance till the end of the eighteenth century with a
belated feudalism. The accounts of the King were his private concern, not to be
divulged to a profane public becoming increasingly sensitive to its
powerlessness in determining the forms or the amount of taxation. Bargains,
exemptions, privileges, were at the will of the sovereign. Particularism
degenerated into chaos. Various causes, including, on the one hand, the alienation
of royal properties by sales and gifts, and, on the other, the increase of
expenditure due partly to the increased wealth and population of the country,
partly to costly wars, reduced the King at an early stage to the necessity of
appealing for additional resources. In 1439-51 the Estates of Languedoil lost
their control over direct as they had previously lost it over indirect
taxation. The annual taille amounted then to 1,200,000 livres, and was raised
entirely from the Third Estate: the nobility and clergy were exempt.
The taille
was from time to time increased, until, on the eve of the Revolution, it
produced 91 millions of livres. To escape payment was a mark of social
distinction: magistrates and their subordinates, financial and Court officials,
members and officers of the Universities, and other classes, secured exemption.
Corporations and towns compounded with the Treasury; and the number of
taillables continually decreased, while the total burden to be borne became
heavier and heavier. In a few provinces the taille was based upon reed estate
and assessed upon a land register, thus becoming, in reality, a land tax.
Elsewhere, it was personal and arbitrary. The total was fixed by the Royal
Council once a year for each election, except in the pays d'etats, where the
sum demanded by the Royal Council was voted and apportioned by the provincial
assemblies. The amount required from each Election once decided, the quota of
each parish was arrived at by the elus, at first nominated by the people, but
already in the fifteenth century by the
68 Taille.—Capitation.—Don gratuit.
King; and the
share of each inhabitant was assessed by persons chosen in the parish. The
assessment varied with the presumed wealth of the taxpayer and depended upon
his mode of living and his apparent prosperity. The contribution was collected
by receivers chosen in the district and made personally responsible for the
payment of the full amount.
Taxpayers
deliberately lowered their standard of livings and refused to stock or cultivate
their farms to the best advantage, having found by experience that the
increased taxation following upon any evidence of improvement was often more
than sufficient to deprive them of the fruits of increased industry and
enterprise. The taiMe was, in this way, a distinct check to the creation of
wealth and to the increase of comfort. The Constituent Assembly pronounced it
responsible for “ a negligence, a deprivation, and an insalubrity in the
majority of rural dwellings, most injurious to the comfort and even to the
preservation of the tillers of the soil.” The so-called corvtrainte solidaire
rendered the wealthiest inhabitants liable to imprisonment until the whole
taille of their district had been paid, even though their own contributions had
been faithfully discharged. If they made good the deficiencies of the
collector, the parish was assessed a second time in one year in order to repay
them. As many as 95 collectors in one Slection of Champagne were imprisoned at
one time.
The
capitation, or poll tax upon the head of each household, was first established
in 1695, during the war of the League of Augsburg and was suppressed after the
Peace of Ryswick, but renewed in 1701 on the occasion of the Spanish War. It
was regarded as a war tax, to be abandoned six months after the conclusion of
peace, but was maintained till 1791. The whole community was liable to it,
according to a classification which reposed upon status and not upon wealth.
There were 22 classes, in the first of which stood the Dauphin alone, assessed
at 2000 livres; in class 2, came the Princes of the Blood, assessed at 1500; at
the bottom of the scale, labourers figured at 40, 30, 10, 3 livres, or even at
20 sols. The clergy had compounded in 1695, and again in 1701, and had finally
in 1709 agreed to pay 24 millions down, thus obtaining exemption till 1789. The
don gratuit, or free gift accorded to the King by the clergy, was revised by
them every five years. In its permanent form it dated from the Conference of
Poissy, 1561, when it was fixed for six years at 1,600,000 livres; but special
grants were added on special occasions. Efforts to make the contribution
compulsory were successfully opposed by the clergy; and, in return for their
don gratuit, they claimed exemption from new taxes like the capitation and the
vingtieme. In 1755 the dan gratuit was settled at 16 millions, at which figure
it stood unaltered until its abolition. The repartition of the burden was left
to the clergy themselves. In 1758 a don gratuit was imposed upon the cities and
towns of France for six years, but successive renewals continued it to the end
of the century. The pays d'Stats and
several towns
made an annual subscription for capitation as in the case of the faille. The
division into classes was made by the Intendants; but, in spite of apparent
equality, the Commons were assessed strictly (the tattle serving as a guide),
while the Nobles were rated according to their personal declarations. They
obtained, under various pretexts, indulgences and. exemptions to such an
extent that they were estimated to pay only one-eighth of their fair
contribution, while the peasantry contributed eight times their equitable
quota. The capitation yielded 21£ millions of limes in 1695, and upwards of 56
millions in 1789.
The vingtieme—r-st
kind of tithe, theoretically payable upon all property, real or personal—was
first imposed by Desmarets in 1710, abolished in 1717, renewed 1733 to 1737,
and again from 1741 to 1749. In 1749 it was made permanent and fixed at the
rate of one vingtieme and. two sols the Imre. A second vingtieme was imposed in
1756, and in 1760 two vingtiemes and. two sols a livre, making roughly
one-sixth of all income. In this case also the pays d'etats arranged for a
fixed annual subscription; and certain towns and corporations either subscribed
or redeemed the tax on easy terms. The clergy, as already explained, were not
separately assessed. The privileged classes successfully exerted their social
influence to evade the strict assessment to which they were legally i liable ;
and Calonne declared that the total yield of the tax was only half the proper
amount. The extent to which personal property escaped may be gauged from the
fact that in 1785 only 2^ millions were derived from personal as against 74
millions from real property.
The aides
were indirect taxes of the nature of excise duties levied chiefly upon alcohol,
but also upon gold and silver ware, steel, iron, cards, paper, starch, etc.
Various localities had purchased exemption in whole or in part, causing innumerable
differences in the various parts of the kingdom.
The traites
or customs, etymologically transit dues, were tolls levied usually for the
benefit of municipal or ecclesiastical corporations, or of nobles, upon goods
passing across the borders of their properties. The Baron de Comere, who
published in 1789 a treatise on finance, prepared a map showing the intricate
divisions and subdivisions of France for the purpose of customs and excise
duties, but declared it impossible to indicate the multiplicity and complexity
of the barriers where transit dues were collected. It would seem indeed that
not even the government possessed any complete record of them. They were in
effect internal customs, requiring an army of collectors, and seriously
fettered the interior commerce of the country. Colbert had endeavoured to
secure uniformity and order by a general tariff; but the pays d'etats, jealous
of their privilege of voting their own assessments, resisted him so effectually
that he was unable to do more than make three great divisions for government
purposes: (i) the five great farms (twelve Provinces mainly around Paris and
between the Somme and the Loire); (ii) the
70
“foreign”
Provinces—Britanny, Auvergne, the south of France, Franche Comte, and Flanders;
(iii) the places “ reputed foreign ”—Alsace, Lorraine, Metz, Verdun, Avignon,
Marseilles, Dunkirk, Bayonne, and L’Orient. Within these several districts
there were no government internal customs, but private and municipal tolls were
numbered by thousands. A boat from Languedoc to Paris laden with wine lost a
fortnight in paying some forty tolls.
Upon various
smaller taxes, such as stamps, posts, tobacco, powder and saltpetre, and import
dues, it is unnecessary to enlarge. The gabelle, or salt tax, deserves fuller
consideration. The government monopoly in salt was stringently enforced. The
country was divided into six districts— the granules gabelles, petites
gdbelles, salines, pays redimes, the provinces franches, and the pays de quart
bouillon. The historical reasons for these distinctions must be sought
elsewhere. Certain places and persons were franc-sale, or exempt. The price of
salt varied in different districts from 50 sols to 60 livres at the same time.
Every individual over eight years of age was supposed to consume a minimum
quantity of salt (sel de devoir), about litres a year; and (unless privileged)
was taxed accordingly. Contraband was rife; 50,000 troops and agents were
employed to suppress it. It was forbidden to use sea water for cooking or manufactures,
to feed cattle in the salt marshes, or to drink at salt springs. Meat and
cheeses could not be preserved for lack of salt; and the breeding of cattle was
hindered. In 1783 there were 4000 domiciliary seizures; 2500 men, 2000 women,
6600 children were arrested. Out of 6000 criminals at the galleys, one-third
were convicted smugglers. The salt tax yielded some 60 millions; the cost of
collection was from 18 to 20 millions1.
Over and
above these contributions, the people paid ecclesiastical tithes, local taxes
(octroi, etc., in which the government sometimes shared), and feudal dues to
their seigneurs, and contributed personal service or forced labour (corvies)
upon public works; for example, making and mending the roads, conveying troops,
stores, etc. They also served in the militia to the number of 60,000—selected
annually by lot—and were burdened with billeting or the gratuitous lodging of
soldiers. Each district was compelled to contribute its contingent to the militia,
md substitutes were not allowed for fear of hindering enlistment for the
standing army. Those liable to service sometimes fled to the mountains Or the
woods, and were hunted down by their neighbours who had no desire to serve in
their stead. The privileged classes and their servants were exempt.
The total
burden of taxation might have been easily borue had it been fairly distributed.
Forbonnais, one of the ablest and best-informed writers on French finance,
wrote in 1758, “ France would be too rich if the taxes were equitably
apportioned.” But the wealthiest classes, by 1 For a map of the
districts of gabelles see Keeker’s Oompte Rendu, 1781.
71
the purchase
of official posts or otherwise, joined the ranks of the privileged, and secured
complete or partial exemption. The practice of farming; the indirect taxes to
the highest bidder encouraged revolting harshness in collection. In his
celebrated anonymous Theory of Taxation, 1760, the elder Mirabeau, addressing
the King, informs him that he has seen a tax-gathering bailiff cut off the hand
of a woman who clung to her cooking utensils when distraint was made upon her
effects. Collectors were appointed by a system of rotation, under which two or
three persons each collected a year’s taxes in turn. This primitive device for
keeping the accounts of each year’s receipts distinct occasionally resulted in
conflicting claims upon a taxpayer in arrear for the current taxes, last year’s
taxes, and the taxes of the year before. Competing among themselves, the
several collectors showed no consideration for the public ; and it was left to
Necker to exempt the bed and clothing of unfortunate debtors from distraint for
taxes. Forcible resistance to arrest or to domiciliary visits was met with the
extremity of armed violence. Adam Smith, with unusual warmth, says: “Those who
consider the blood of the people as nothing, in comparison with the revenue of
the prince, may, perhaps, approve of this method of levying taxes.”
The practice
of farming out a particular tax is of great antiquity. In 1697 the indirect
taxes were leased collectively to a body of financiers, sixty in number,
thenceforward known as the Farmers-general. They were appointed by the King for
six years and paid an agreed sum in advance year by year. The leases were
awarded by Court favour and led to much intrigue and corruption, always at the
ultimate expense of the public. The farmer made large profits. “ He levies,”
says Adam Smith (referring to salt and tobacco), “ two exorbitant profits upon
the people: the profit of the farmer and the still more exorbitant one of the
monopolist.” In 1785 a government analysis disclosed 5 lbs. of salt and 25 lbs.
of surplus water to 100 lbs. of tobacco, a fraud of 23 per cent, in a farm
yielding SO millions of livres. It was on the charge of this fraud that the
farmers-general were guillotined during the Revolution. At a dinner party at
Voltaire’s the exploits of famous robbers were being related. Pressed for a
story in turn, Voltaire began, “ There was once upon a time a farmer-general,”
and, after some hesitation, “ That is all! ” Some of the farmers were
public-spirited and upright men. Beaujon founded a hospital. Helvetius, Dupin,
and Lavoisier, bear honoured names in literature and science. But the system,
convenient as it was to a government anxious rather for the moment than the
future, deserves the stigma of Adam Smith as “ wasteful and expensive.” The
ferme generate produced 37 million livres in 1697, 64 in 1743, 90 in 1763, 112
in 1786, and 180 in 1789.
The banking
system of the country was so imperfect that the remittance of large sums from
place to place was slow, troublesome, expensive, and almost dangerous. On this
account collectors of taxes deducted from
72
the revenue the
cost of collection and defrayed local charges out of the funds in their hands.
The net receipts alone found their way into the exchequer; the pays (Petals
contributed only their surplus;, and the total contributions of the people are
therefore hardly discoverable. One example will illustrate this. Necker, in his
Compte Rend/a of 1781, returns the receipts from the femmes generates unies at
48,427,000 livres* They amounted in fact to 126,000,000, out of whichwere paid
the salaries of the Parlement of Paris, the Chambre des Comptes, the Cour des
Aides, part of the interest on public debt, tithes, etc., in all 77,573,000
livres. Twelve audit offices received the vouchers of their several districts;
but no central authority resumed them as a whole. The Royal Council added the
accounts together and ordered the local Chambres des Comptes to pass them
without waiting for further examination; and the summary was then signed by the
King, leaving a blank for the total, tc admit of subsequent corrections.
Acquits de comptant, or orders upon the Treasuiy, emanating from the King or
the Controller-General, without specifying any service, were, not sent to the
Chambre des• Comptes. Thus at least one-sixth of the expenditure entirely
escaped audit. Other expenses might, for political reasons, be passed for audit
by the Conseil d’etat, or by the Bureau des Finances. The controllers or
auditors, who purchased their officeswere ordered to arrange with the local
revenue officers (whose accounts they checked) for the payments due to them.
Such a regulation was highly dangerous to the scrupulous conduct of their
business ; and it is impossible to view without suspicion discrepancies which
will now never be cleared up. The acquits de comptant received a great
extension under Madame de Pompadour. They increased from some 20 to 30 millions
in 1739 to 117 millions in 1759.
The annual
ledger was disturbed by anticipations and repayments to such an extent that the
accounts of a single year were frequently not closed for ten or twelve years.
In 1789 the anticipations upon future budgets had risen to 282 millions of
livres, or, according to the later statement of Cambon, to 325 millions. The
Controller-General might indeed form an estimate of the normal revenue for the
coming year; but his estimate of expenditure was liable to serious disturbance
from capricious expenditure beyond his control. The acquits de comptant were
increasingly abused; and the creations of pensions without adequate
justification became a scandal of the first magnitude. The publication of the
Livre Rouge, or register of pensions, bound in red, added fuel to the flame of
the Revolution. In April, 1787* Calonne informed the Assembly of Notables that
the pension list amounted to a total of 16 millions of livres. In 1790 Camus
declared the true amount to be over 51 millions. Vouchers for payment were not
always forthcoming. In some instances the pensions were charged upon revenue.
The mistress of a minister received 12,000 livres a year on the contract for
the bread of galley slaves. Economies were effected in the cost of public
73
lighting by
extinguishing lamps upon moonlight nights, and so-called “ pensions on the moon
” were accorded out of the saving. When public debts were created, fictitious
creditors were entered as subscribers, and thus became virtual pensioners. In
1770 the State debt included some 40 or 50 millions of imaginary capital on
this account. One Ducrest, a barber, figured in the Red Book for a pension of
1700 livres as sometime hairdresser to a daughter of the Comte d’Artois who
died as an infant before she had hair to dress. During the eight years 1779 to
1787, the pensions charged in the Livre Rouge, including acquits au porteur and
acquits de constant, amounted to 858,824,250 livres. ■
The deficit
increased from year to year. Bankruptcies, or repudiations of part of the
national obligations, occurred in 1715,1721,1726, 1759, 1770. A
Controller-General with a depleted exchequer raised money how and when he
could. Money was coined lighter, with the result that foreign-made coin of the
new weight crept into circulation to an amount estimated by Forbonnais at three
hundred millions of livres. The payment of expenses, and even of interest on
debt, was postponed to the following year; moneys were borrowed or anticipated
upon future budgets; loans were raised at usurious rates; unnecessary offices
were created and sold, which amounted to borrowing upon annuities; and in this
manner a large floating debt was kept on foot until the issue of a new loan
enabled the government to consolidate a portion of it with the ever-increasing
public debt. Such a course made rapidly for financial ruin. The American War of
Independence cost the French nation from 1000 to 1200 millions. Cambon states
the amount at 1500 millions. No less than 220 millions were still due on this
account in 1783 (Calonne), and 100 millions in 1784 (Necker). In their anxiety
to do a mischief to England the advisers of Louis XVI precipitated the ruin of
the French monarchy—as well by the example of American [^dependence, which they
helped to bring about, as by their mortal blow at the finances of the
struggling government.
Economy in
administration, a peaceful policy, a rigid and businesslike control of public
expend' are, a clear and ordered system of public accounts, might have
alleviated the difficulty. These were the expedients of Necker; but no
permanent solution of the problem was possible without subjecting the
privileged classes to their fair share of taxation, and to this their assent
could not be obtained. Beyond this, the leaven of political liberty and the
increasingly critical attitude of the public made it inevitable that the
taxpayer should be admitted to a share in the direction of financial policy:
The Parlement of Paris, a body of salaried judges who purchased their
appointments, declared itself incompetent to grant permanent taxes; but at the
same time demanded the convocation of the States General, in order “ that the
nation might be instructed in the state of its public finances” before further
taxes were conceded. The wordy warfare of eighteen months between
74
Calonne
and Necker as to the accuracy of Necker’s statement of finance sufficiently
illustrates the shadowy uncertainty which hung over financial administration.
The publication, by royal permission, of the Compte Rendu of Necker in 1781 is
an event of the first importance in the history of French finance. From the
time of Richelieu it had been the policy of government to discourage and even
to punish the public discussion of national finance.
-
Necker’s
account was an estimate of the probable ordinary budget of the year, excluding
war expenditure and other “ extraordinary ” charges. He (improperly) includes
the cash balance in the Treasury as income of the year, and gives no account of
the debt—a large part of which was floating or unfunded. Calonne based his
criticism upon it in the main upon comptes effectifs, or figures of actual
expenditure as certified by the Chambre des Comptes; but these figures were in
themselves exceedingly imperfect for the reasons already given, and much of the
controversy turned upon the question whether floating debt and terminable
annuities were to be regarded as permanent debt or as current expenditure. It
will readily be seen that such simple questions as what were the receipts and
the expenses of government, and the amount of the national debt, year by year,
are not now susceptible of accurate answer: it may indeed be doubted whether an
accurate answer could ever have been given. In 1788 there appeared at Lausanne
a collection of the public accounts of France from 1758 to 1787, usually
attributed to Mathon de la Cour. These were prepared from the official papers
of the Abbe Terray, of Turgot, and of Necker, and showed for the year 1774
expenses of 234 millions, receipts 207 millions, to which Calonne added 12£
millions of extraordinary expenses, chiefly connected with the war. Apparently
some 165 millions of expenses over and above these amounts were paid out of
gross revenue. In 1775, under Turgot, the expenses are estimated at 414£
millions, the receipts at 377|, and the permanent debt charge at 235J millions.
In 1776, under Clugny, the expenses were 402^ millions, the receipts 378£,
while expenses charged upon future budgets amount to 50£ millions. Calonne
places the deficiency in this year at upwards of 37 millions. In 1784 Calonne
sold to Burgundy the privilege of exemption from aides-, and it is estimated
that, out of the total borrowing of 1647 millions between 1776 and 1786 Calonne
alone borrowed 650 millions and a half, at an annual cost of 45 and a half
millions, in 41 months of peace. In 1786 the expenses amounted to 593 and a
half millions, the receipts to 412 and a quarter millions. In 1787 the expenses
exceeded 599 millions, while the receipts were estimated at 474 millions,
though Brienne admitted a deficit of 140 millions and anticipations exceeding
twice that amount. According to Bailly, the nation contributed in 1786 upwards
of 880 millions, of which 558 went to the government, 41£ to the Provinces, and
280£ to private individuals and communities. Again, according to Bailly, the
etat au vrai, based upon
75
actual
receipts and expenditure and eliminating anticipations and repayments, showed
the receipts of the Treasury at 364 millions, the expenses at 442,350,000.
There were, however, in addition, 27,313,000 of pensions and 71,932,000 of
arrears, making the total real deficit of 1785 177,640,000 livres. In 1789 the
true debt amounted to
4,467,478,000, with a charge for interest of 236,150,000. On
the evening of April 30, 1789, there were in the Treasury 58,589,079 livres: 80
millions more were due to the Treasury, and 90 millions of anticipations had
been consumed in advance upon the receipts of 1790, with a further 172 millions
upon the last eight months of 1789.
These figures
sufficiently show the desperate financial position of the French monarchy on
the eve of the Revolution—chronic deficit, increasing public debt, increasing
pressure upon the taxpayers, resulting in increasing exasperation, intensified
by the unfairness of exemption. Without further resources the King was
hopeless. Before granting further resources, the people demanded guarantees
against arbitrary fiscal oppression by large extensions of political power. The
struggle to obtain this power and the opposition to its concession are the
first chapter in the French Revolution.
We are now in
a position to examine the Compte Rendu of 1788, the last presented to the King
before the convocation of the States General. It was prepared by Lambert,
Controller-General under Lomenie de Brienne, and is summarised as follows:
Receipts: livret
Ordinary
(gross) receipts 472,415,549
Extraordinary
receipts 168,130,500
Total
640,546,049
Expenses:
1. Ordinary expenses and charges to be paid
out of
revenue....... 240,420,720
2. Extraordinary expenses and charges to be
paid
out
of revenne ... ••• ... ■■■ ...
6,656,285
3. Repayments and charges to be paid out of
revenue 13,629,567
4. Ordinary expenses to be paid out of the
Exchequer 286,834,369
5. Extraordinary ,, „ ,, ,, 22,739,300
6................. Repayments due at fixed
dates .......................... 62,872,800
Total 633,153,041
At the first
blush it might appear that there is here an estimated surplus revenue of
7,393,008 livres. In reality there is a deficit of 160,737,492 livres. The
ordinary expenses (items 1 and 4) amount to 527,255,089, the ordinary receipts
to 472,415,549—a deficit of 54,839,540 livres on the normal budget. But if we add
the extraordinary expenses (items 2 and 5) and the repayment of loans due
76
in the year
(items 3 and 6), the total becomes 160,737,492. It is converted into a surplus
by treating as “receipts” a number of miscellaneous loans and sales amounting
to 154,327,500 livres and a small balance of miscellaneous windfalls,
13,803,000. With this exception of less than 14 millions the whole of the
extraordinary receipts are borrowings in one form or another. This estimate of
extraordinary receipts was not realised. The cost of raising the loans is not
accounted for. An enormous deficit is virtually treated as if it were revenue I
The gross receipts, in greater detail, are as follows:
Fermes g&nirales:
Gabelles ...
Tobacco
Entries {Octroi, etc.) of Paris
Traites
Sundry receipts
livres
58.560.000
27.000.000
30.000.000
28.440.000 6,106,875
livres
General receipts (direct taxes), (tallies, capitation, vingtiemes, etc.)
3. TUgie gSnirale (aides, etc.)
4. Domaine ... ...
5. Casual revenue ...
6. Post-office ...
7. Mailship service ...
8....... Tolls at Sceaux and Poissy
9. Subscription for duties of maritime
Flanders
10...... Gunpowder
11...... Royal lottery
12...... Vingtieme (subscribed for)
13...... Mint
14...... Assay, etc.
15. Tithe (on Government salaries and pensions)
16...... Utats of Languedoc
17. „ „ Britanny ...
... ... ...
18...... i3 33 Bourgogne
19...... ,, ,, Provence ...
20. General receipts, Languedoc and Roussillon
21...... „ ,,
Britanny
22. ,, ,,
Bresse, Bugey, and Gex ...
23. „ ,,
Provence and locality around
24. „ „
Pau, Bayonne, and Foix
25. Due from the United States of America ...
26...... Forges of La Chaussade
27...... Due from towns for fortifications
28...... Miscellaneous receipts
29. Don gratuit of the clergy; old debts, etc.
150,106,875
156,478,010
51.940.000
51.240.000
5.665.000
10.800.000
1.100.000
630.000
800.000
500.000
9.860.000
574,700 533,774
120.000
966,751
8,584,824
6,115,400
3,201,508
1,997,031
1,210,426
496,060
938,128
895,431
1,260,079
1.600.000
80,000
561,552
4,160,000
Total
472,415,549
Of this total
211,708,977 livres alone were receivable into the exchequer. The sum paid out
of item 1 for cost of collection, charges
The defects
of French finance. 77
assigned,
etc., amounted to 132,305,658 limes: out of item 2,43,134,100; item 3,
40,828,021; item 4, 14,017,550. Item 16 was insufficient by 2,280,787 livres to
meet the expenses charged for the year upon the financial agents in Languedoc.
The net receipt under item 17 is 3,073,421; item 18, 21,038 only. The only
receipts which are nett as well as gross are 10,12,15,25,26, and 27. The items
6, 7,8, and 14 are farmed. Item 25 represents a sum due from the United States
in respect of French assistance during the War of Independence. Of the ordinary
-xpenses about 100^ millions are for the War Department, 45 millions for the
Navy, 9 millions for Foreign Affairs, nearly 32 millions for the Household of
the King and the royal family, or upwards of 186 millions out of a total of
286. The last item had been very considerably cut down. Reductions of 36,266,837
livres had been made in the total estimate of expenses, but such reductions are
not necessarily to be regarded as ultimate economies.
In spite of
the numerous reforms of Turgot and of Necker the finances of France on the eve
of the Revolution illustrate every possible defect. The government did not pay
its way. With gross receipts of 472 millions it had an annual charge of one
half (or upwards of 236 millions) for debt alone; and the debt was ever
growing. A very small portion of it was productive of revenue. State railways,
State telegraphs, and other modem assets to be set against public debts, did
not exist. Practically the whole debt was the heritage of past misgovemment
hung like a millstone around the neck of the nation. Delays in the payment of interest,
the forced reduction of the rate of interest in violation of public faith, the
risk of total repudiation, alarmed the wealthier classes of the bourgeois, the
merchants, the financiers, and the new nobility, who were at once the
government’s chief creditors and its principal critics. The superior credit of
England would have enabled her in case of war to raise easily and rapidly a
large war loan, while France would have been at the mercy of her enemies. Her
treasury empty, her credit exhausted, her resources anticipated in advance, she
could hardly hope to hold her place as a great nation, if she continued to
descend the slope of insolvency. After payment of the debt charge her revenues
fell hopelessly short of the minimum requirements of the public service; and
the most drastic economy would only have succeeded in retarding the final
crash. The direct taxes pressed so heavily upon the tiers Hat that an increase
was not to be thought of. Indirect taxes might, perhaps, by the operation of
what is known as “ the elasticity of the exchequer,” have yielded an even
higher return if they had been reduced. It is almost certain that an increase
in these taxes would have failed to produce a higher revenue. The form of the
taxes was odious to such a degree that in his Compte Rendu au Roi in 1781
Necker published his opinion of the gabelle in terms like these: “One universal
cry rises, so to speak, against this tax. Thousands of men, ceaselessly
attracted by the bait of an easy profit, devote themselves constantly to the
illegal commerce of smuggling
78
Intolerable burdens of the nation.
salt.
Agriculture is abandoned for a career promising greater and quicker returns.
Children under their parents’ eyes grow up in forgetfulness of public probity;
and thus, by a mere fiscal arrangement, is prepared a generation of depraved
humanity. The evil resulting from this school of immorality is incalculable.”
The taxes took immensely more from the pockets of the people than found its way
into the Treasury. Some of the taxes, indeed, hardly paid for the cost of
collection. The apprehension of the taillable as to the amount of his
assessment, with its attendant fatalism, broke his spirit and numbed his
energies. Certainty, the great safeguard of the taxpayer, was wanting. Economy
and efficiency were alike lacking in the mode of collection, and in the
checking and ordering of the public accounts. Finally, equality, the first
great requisite of taxation, was openly flouted. It was requisite that the
people as a whole should shoulder the burden, sweep away local privilege and
personal exemptions, unify the fiscal arrangements of the country, and decide
for itself how best to support the weight of the national engagements. One of
Necker’s numerous adversaries declared that local inequalities were rather
apparent than real, and that where the gabeUe was lightest the taille was
heaviest. This assertion was true only in part. So far as it was true it
lessened the difficulty which would have been encountered in smoothing out the
differences of taxation.
The
calculations of Taine, based upon the reports of the provincial assemblies from
1778 to 1787, show an average contribution of each taillable in respect of
direct taxation (taille, capitation, vmgtieme, etc.), amounting to 53 fr. 15 c.
for each 100 fr. of income assessed to taille. Over and above this the tithe is
14 fr. 28 c. The feudal dues are estimated at the same sum. The total was 81
fr. 71 c. on each 100 fr. of nett revenue; and out of the balance of 18 fr. 29
c. there still remained to be paid the aides, gabelle, etc. As a set-off, the
peasant received the services of the clergy, and even his seigneur rendered him
some return. The monopoly of the lord’s mill, oven, market, etc., was a burden;
but it dated from the time when the lord alone possessed capital enough to
construct the mill; and his fees for milling may thus be regarded as an agreed
bargain. But for the most part the absentee seigneur did little or nothing for
the peasant. His duties of protection, succour, and charity, had fallen into
disuse. The dues were often petty in amount, but on that account all the more
irritating, owing to the time and trouble wasted in paying them long after
their raison d'Stre had ceased to be apparent. The' lods et ventes were a more
serious charge, amounting usually to one-sixth of the purchase-inoney, but
sometimes one-fifth or one-fourth, upon the sale of land, or a lease for more
than nine years. Under such weights as these the very springs of industry were
broken. The active and industrious section of the community yielded up to its
governors the capital which would have made its labours vastly more productive
to the general well-being. Fiscal burdens were ruining alike the government and
the people.
LOUIS XVI.
Louis, third
son of the Dauphin and grandson of Louis XV, was bom on August 23, 1754, and
was therefore in his twentieth year when he succeeded to the throne on May
10,1774. In 1770 he had married Marie-Antoinette, youngest daughter of Maria
Theresa, then fourteen years old. This marriage had been intended to strengthen
the alliance between the Houses ■ of Bourbon and Habsburg, as were
likewise the marriage of Ferdinand of Naples with the Archduchess Maria
Caroline, and the marriage of Ferdinand of Parma with the Archduchess Maria
Amalia.
In person
Louis was large and inclined to corpulence, with little grace of bearing and
with undistinguished features. His intelligence was by no means contemptible.
Although his education had been grossly neglected, he was thoughtful, liked
reading, and possessed a degree of historical and geographical knowledge
unusual among kings. His character presented an amiable contrast to that of
Louis XV. He revolted against the vices of the Court in which he grew up; he
took a serious view of his duty, was religious without fanatical intolerance,
and tried to live in some accord with his profession of faith. He wished to
improve the condition of the people, practised economy in his personal
expenses, and always instinctively preferred upright men for ministers. Yet,
with all these good qualities, Louis was unfit to be an autocrat, and doubly
unfit to govern France on the eve of a revolution. Shy and unsocial, he spent
valuable time in trifling mechanical pursuits or in the hunting-field, where he
used to fatigue himself so much that he would afterwards fall asleep in Council
when grave business was under discussion. He was unequal to prolonged toil or
daring resolution, and so self-distrustful as to be readily swayed this way or
that by those whom he liked or who had frequent access to his company. His very
virtues thus became a snare, for, had he been a worse husband, he would have
been less influenced by that unwise counsellor, his Queen. His lack of will was
phenomenal. When you can keep together a number of oiled ivory balls, said the
Comte de Provence, you may do
80
Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette.
something
with the King. It was thus that, when Louis had set foot on the path of reform,
he was again and again diverted by sinister influences, or retreated before
opposition which had no strength but in his own weakness. So,, when the
Revolution began, he could resolve on no policy and would take no decisive
measure, but drifted on the current of circumstance. Sometimes, indeed, he was
spurred into doing just enough to awaken suspicion, but only to sink back into
the same lethargy and lose whatever advantage continuous action might have
gained. Even at the last, when power was gone and it was only a question of
saving life and liberty, the same failings wrought his destruction. In another
age and country Louis might have proved an excellent constitutional King; but
where fate had placed him he was no more than an inglorious victim.
His Queen,
for very different reasons, was equally unsuited to her position. She began
with the grave disadvantage of representing the Austrian alliance, which was
unpopular both as a departure from French tradition and as the cause of many
misfortunes to France. In the Seven Years’ War France had lost her empire in
India and America; her navy had been destroyed, her military renown had been
tarnished, her finances had been ruined. England and Prussia, the authors of
these calamities, were less detested than the Austrian ally for whom they had
been endured. From the first arrival of Marie-Antoinette there was laid up
against her a fund of grudge and suspicion, and in after years nothing was too
bad to be believed of the Austrian woman. She was unfortunate in her education,
for the Court of Vienna was singularly indifferent to intellectual interests,
and the Archduchesses were brought up with little culture. Maria Theresa has
testified to her own neglect of her daughter, who could not write a good
letter, had no taste for reading, and did not even possess any of the lighter
accomplishments. She was still more unfortunate in being thrown, at the age of
fourteen, into a Court where she had scarcely a friend and where no good was to
be learnt. The heavy, listless youth to whom she was married did nothing' to
gain her affection or respect. The old King, though well disposed towards her,
was too slothful a voluptuary to think of governing his household. She fell
under the influence of his daughters, three maiden ladies of feeble
intelligence, gave herself up to childish amusements and unsuitable companions,
and made no serious effort to understand French character or conciliate French
opinion.
As she grew
up, Marie-Antoinette shook off this degrading dependence, and when children
were bom to her she gained ascendancy over the mind of her husband. She
remained, however, a thoughtless woman, frank to indiscretion, haughty towards
those whom she disliked, little apt to take good advice, and headstrong in all
her actions. She was capable of very warm friendship; but her bosom friends,
such as the. Polignacs and the Princess of Lamballe, had neither the sense nor
the
strength of
character to supply her deficiencies. She was compassionate to distress when it
came before her in bodily form; but she had not enough reach of mind to grasp
the amount of suffering caused by reckless and wasteful government. In affairs
of State she always took the personal view, never the statesman’s. For these
reasons her interference in public affairs was often harmful, and brought upon
her odium even out of proportion to the harm. She displayed noble qualities of
courage and devotion in the closing period of her life; but even then she gave
no proof of that talent for affairs which her mother had possessed in so
eminent a degree.
What the
Queen lacked as an adviser Louis could not hope to find among his nearest
relatives. His next brother, the Comte de Provence, though clever, was at this
time a frivolous trifler, despising the King who disliked him, and a bitter
personal enemy of the Queen. The Comte d’Artois, the youngest of the brothers,
in after life an impenetrable bigot and dullard, now a mere fop and
voluptuary, was on better terms with the Queen; but his influence, such as it
was, tended to the detriment of the King and the kingdom. Philip, Due de
Chartres, afterwards Due d’Orleans, the King’s cousin, was as yet remarked only
for his dissolute manner of life. At a later period he became ambitious, showed
a peculiar enmity to the Queen, and finally set himself up under the thinnest
disguise as a rival to the King.
It is no
longer necessary for the historian to insist that the failings of Louis, his
Queen, and his kinsmen, were not principal causes of the Revolution impending
over France. The Revolution arose from the fact that the French people had
entirely outgrown its institutions and must find new ones if its growth were
not to cease. But the form which that Revolution should take was in large
measure determined by the character of the man whom birth had invested with
supreme authority, and by the personal influences to which he was exposed. A
bold and able King, or even a King capable of holding firmly by a minister of
genius, might have guided the course of events, might have made himself
powerful by administrative reform, and popular by sacrificing the privileged
orders, and might have prolonged the life of the monarchy while saving France
from ten years of unutterable confusion. But, though Louis often saw what was
right, he could not conceive or execute a policy; and, although he tried to
choose honest and capable servants, he could not support them against noisy
opposition. From time to time he would essay reform, abandon it, and take it up
again only to let it fall, until he had taught even the most ignorant that the
state of France was deplorable, but that they must not expect from the King any
adequate improvement. No bigot, no tyrant, no shameless debauchee, ever
educated his people to revolt more effectively than this sensible,
well-meaning, and kindly King.
The mere
accession of a young and amiable pair in place of a
82
[1774
widowed old
profligate naturally called forth a loyal emotion, which was strengthened by
the first events of the new reign. Louis found the public impatient for a
change in the conduct of affairs, which he was quite willing to make. Louis XV
had done nothing since the close of the Seven Years’ War to efface the memory
of its disasters or to regain the. goodwill of the nation. His latest advisers,
the Due d’Aiguillon, who bore a very bad character, the Abbe Terray, who as
Controller- General bad been the author of a fresh bankruptcy, and Maupeou, who
as Chancellor had abolished the Parlements and replaced them with a new- system
of superior Courts, were all exceedingly unpopular. The King disliked these men
and resolved to dismiss them, but without recalling Choiseul, whom they had
driven from power, for Louis was jealous at least of the semblance of authority
and did not mean to give himself a prime minister. He chose for first Minister
the Comte de Maurepas. It was an unfortunate choice, for the sole merit of
Maurepas was to have been brought into disgrace with the late King by Madame de
Pompadour; and age had made him feeble without making him serious. With
Maurepas Louis called to office Miromenil as Keeper of the Seals, Vergennes as
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Comte de St Germain as Minister for War, and
Turgot as Minister of the Navy. Somewhat later Turgot became
Controller-General, and Sartines took over the navy. Later still Malesherbes
was named Minister of the King’s Household. All these ministers were
respectable, and three of them were men of eminent worth.
The first
appointments made by Louis were therefore welcomed by the best opinion in
France. He gamod still louder applause by renouncing the so-called “gift of
joyous accession” and “the girdle of the Queen,” commonly levied when a new
sovereign came to the throne, and by promising in the edict of renunciation
that henceforward frugality should prevail in the public expenditure and the
claims of the public creditor should be fully satisfied. His intention in
making this sacrifice was good, but its wisdom may be questioned. So long as
there was a deficit the Treasury should not have parted with any source of
revenue; and until the finances could be reformed as a whole it would have been
better not to raise sanguine expectations. The recall of the Parlements and the
suppression of the new Courts before the end of 1774 were also popular and also
unwise. The Parlements had been but a feeble check upon tyranny; and their
members, as lawyers, as privileged persons, and as traditional carpers at the
royal will, were enemies of all comprehensive reform. They were barely
reinstated when they began to show their mischievous temper; and they must
share with the Queen and the courtiers the blame of having defeated Turgot’s
beneficent designs Yet Louis had perhaps no alternative. For it was scarcely
possible to maintain the suppression of the Parlements when reversing his predecessor’s
policy in other things; and public opinion, which in France
had
almost become a match for the power of the Crown, insisted on their
restoration. ■
One capital
point Louis had secured. He had found the Controller- General best fitted to
reform the finances. This was now the allessential reform. If it were once
achieved the Crown would have gained an independence and a popularity which
would render all subsequent reforms easy by comparison.
Turgot was
forty-seven years of age. He came of a family long established in Normandy and
respectable, though not noble. His father had held the office of Provost of the
Merchants of Paris, the highest in the old municipal constitution of Paris. As
the youngest of three brothers, of whom one was destined for the army and
another for the law, Turgot was destined to take holy orders. He distinguished
himself at the College of the Sorbonne, but he came to doubt the doctrines of
the Catholic Church; and, although bis talent and character gave promise of
high preferment, he was not one of those whom either the prospect of wealth and
power or the more insidious temptation of doing good under false pretences
could move to palter with his own integrity. As soon as his father’s death set
him free, he gave up his studies for the Church and entered the public service.
In 1761 he became Intendant of the Limousin, a post which he held for thirteen
years, and in which he gave a fine example of the good that might have been
accomplished in France by skilful and humane administration. From these duties
he was called to take a place, and presently the most important place, in the
government. Although his practical experience was considerable, the cast of his
mind was essentially speculative. He had reflected long and deeply upon
political and economic subjects and had come to conclusions in most respects
resembling those of the physiocratic school. Like them he was no enemy of the
royal authority. On the contrary, he thought that a monarch could have no
interest in making bad laws and was a better agent of reform than popular
assemblies, which decide according to their prejudices and so make abuses
perpetual. Like the Physiocrats he considered that agriculture was the only
industry which produced a real surplus, and that all taxes must in the last
resort come out of agricultural produce, and therefore thought a single tax
upon land the best way of raising a revenue and all indirect taxation
mischievous. Like them he believed absolute freedom of production and
distribution to be the best, indeed the only means of ensuring the public
welfare. But he would not proclaim himself a Physiocrat, for the Physiocrats
were a sect, and he regarded the sectarian spirit as mischievous.
He was one of
the simplest and most disinterested of men. His tastes and habits were
studious, and it was only the hope of doing good which led him to accept
office. With a deep pity for the poor and oppressed he joined a masculine sense
of justice. In all his reforms he was careful that none should suffer
undeservedly and that all legal
rights should
be recognised. As a statesman he had some failings. His zeal led him to attempt
too much, and his systematic turn of mind disqualified him for managing men.
Ignorance of the low ways of the world left him open to cabal and intrigue. A
cold and self-contained manner chilled the ardour of friends and deepened the
ill-will of enemies. He studied perfection more than despatch. He spent
infinite pains upon the preambles to the edicts which Louis put forth at his
suggestion. They are admirable justifications of his policy, but we may doubt
whether they had on the public any effect proportioned to his labour. Sometimes
their language was positively indiscreet. The abuses which he attacked were
flagrant enough to draw the severest condemnation from a good and wise man; but
a Minister of the Crown, speaking in his public character, was scarcely
justified in denunciations so vehement as some that may be found in these
preambles. He hoped, doubtless, to make the return to evil impossible. He only
hastened the descent to revolution.
In a very
able letter addressed to the King on taking office Turgot explained the
principles on which he should feel bound to- act. They were:—No bankruptcy, no
new taxes, no loans. The deficit was to be made good by rigorous thrift. He
warned the King that frugality would not be easy, and that he expected to bear
all the odium of it without assistance. He gained the King’s consent to a new
rule that the heads of the different departments should incur no expense
without consulting the Controller-General, and that the amounts appropriated to
the different services should never be exceeded. He suppressed the so-called
ordonnances de comptani. whereby the sovereign or the Controller-General had
formerly authorised disbursements which never appeared in the public accounts.
He put an end to the practice of forcing favoured persons as partners upon the
capitalists who farmed the indirect revenues and were thus reduced to drive a
more unfavourable bargain with the Treasury. He nobly refused the commission
which the Farmers-General had paid to his predecessors. Finally he abolished
several thousands of useless offices in the financial administration, but with
his invariable honesty took steps to reimburse to the holders what they had
paid for their places.
While he thus
sought to lessen the waste of public money he tried all fair means of adding to
the revenue. Many rich persons had defrauded the Crown by evading or resisting
inspection of their carriages and waggons at the barriers of Paris. Turgot checked
this outrage by a severe ordinance, inflicting fine, imprisonment, and confiscation
of the goods thus withdrawn from payment. The State had granted, on
disadvantageous conditions, a monopoly for making gunpowder; Turgot availed
himself of the grantee’s neglect to fulfil his part, cancelled the contract,
and took the monopoly into the hands of the government. He dealt in the same
fashion with the monopoly of the
1774-6]
Removal of trade restrictions.
85
Messageries
for running diligences and post-carriages. He introduced new order and method
into every part of the financial administration. By all these means he effected
a remarkable improvement. At the untimely close of his ministry he had already
reduced the deficit and the anticipations of future revenue to a small amount,
and had so raised the credit of the State that he had obtained from Dutch
capitalists a loan of sixty million livres at 4 per cent, to pay off debts
which his predecessor had borrowed at thrice that rate.
This
improvement was in Turgot’s design the preliminary to the relief of the
taxpayers, especially of the peasants. He could not yet remit taxes, but he
could amend the mode of collection. He abolished the rule whereby all the
inhabitants of a commune were jointly responsible for the taille, a rule by
which many of the most substantial peasants were ruined every year. He
transformed the corvie of transport for military purposes into a money payment.
He abolished the corvie for making and repairing roads, and replaced it by a
tax on all landed proprietors. As the revenue improved, he suppressed or
reduced a number of petty indirect taxes, which tended either to make the
necessaries of life dearer or to hinder commerce and industry. But the taxpayer
might also be relieved by allowing him to use all his energies to enrich
himself; and Turgot, we have said, believed in absolute economic freedom. He
therefore restored free trade in com. The State had hampered the com trade in
the most singular ways, by hindering merchants and farmers from keeping large
stocks in hand, by forbidding exportation, and by setting a maximum price,
while the Parlements had interfered in time of scarcity to keep com within the
limits of their respective jurisdictions. The intention had been to ensure food
to the people, but the effect had been to discourage corn-growing, to bring
about a large importation, and to deepen the misery of bad years. The system
had long been denounced by the Physiocrats and had been partly abolished under
Louis XV, only to be restored after one or two short harvests. By an edict of
September, 1774, Turgot gave complete liberty to the com trade. Again the
harvest was bad, and again the cry was raised that free trade in com meant
starvation to the people. Riots ensued, and the Parlement of Paris protested
against the Controller-General’s innovations. But Turgot still had an
ascendancy over Louis. The riots were put down and the Parlement silenced.
A little
while before the end of his administration Turgot gave like freedom to the wine
trade by cancelling all prohibitions against the sale in any part of the
kingdom of wine grown in any other part. This reform was maintained after he
had been driven from power and most of his work had been undone. But the public
took more heed of another application of the same principle, the famous edict
which suppressed the privileges of the gilds, leaving every man free to earn
his livelihood in the way he thought best. Turgot was now preparing to remodel
taxation
86 Schemes for provincial government. [1774-6
on
physiocratic maxims, to reduce indirect taxes and make direct taxes uniform. He
was not allowed time to do this. But before he left office he gave Erench
commerce a valuable auxiliary by founding the Caisse d'Escompte. Since Law’s
ambitious scheme had ended in ruin, France had remained without a national
bank, and the very name was Unpopular, although the thing would have been
useful. Turgot now authorised a joint-stock association to form the Caisse
which should discount commercial paper, receive deposits, make advances, trade
in bullion, and issue notes payable on presentation. Out of a capital of
15,000,000 livres two-thuds were to be advanced to the Treasury and repaid in
yearly instalments of 1,000,000; but this obligation was afterwards remitted.
Turgot did
not limit his projects to economic reform. The scheme for a system of municipal
assemblies covering the whole of France, which his friend Dupont of Nemours
drew up under his instruction, although never presented to the King, remains an
interesting record of his political principles. An elective assembly in each
parish was to send representatives to a higher assembly in the Canton, which
was in turn to send representatives to a provincial assembly, and this finally
was to send representatives to a general assembly for the whole kingdom. The
franchise was to be reserved to persons holding land of the value of 600 livres
and upwards; but no account was to be taken of the distinctions between the
three Estates. The assemblies were not meant to have any legislative power, for
Turgot, as has been said, distrusted parliamentary legislation. The parish
assembly had no other function than electing deputies to the cantonal assembly.
The assemblies of higher rank were to administer and advise, concerning themselves
especially with public works and the assessment of taxation. By means of these
graded assemblies Turgot hoped to ensure the fullest knowledge of details to
the sovereign and the ministers, to call forth such a sense of duty to the
commonwealth that the government would no longer be regarded by the subject as
an enemy, and to form such a bond of union between men of all three Estates as
might render possible a uniform taxation irrespective of privilege. Had the
experiment been tried, the assemblies might have proved very useful, but it
seems unlikely that they would have kept within the limits traced by Turgot or
left the Crown an unfettered right of legislation. Turgot was aware that the
execution of his scheme would lessen the royal authority, although his
speculative bias hindered him perhaps from noting the rise of democratic
sentiment in France.
We now
approach the period of Turgot’s fall from power. He had done much good and had
earned the applause of his wisest countrymen, but he had made many enemies, and
his tenure of office rested on his ascendancy over the young, inexperienced,
irresolute King. The first shock to that ascendancy was the restoration of the
Parlements. Turgot must have feared and distrusted these bodies, but he
probably thought
it hopeless
to prevent their return. His friend Malesherbes wished the King to summon the
States General, a step which would have reduced the Parlements to
insignificance. But so long a time had passed since the meeting of the Estates
that the experiment might well be considered perilous. Besides, a medieval
assembly like the States General may have seemed to Turgot likely to be as
troublesome as the Parlements. He therefore contented himself with taking some
steps to lessen their power of obstruction, and prevailed with the King to
quash their resistance to the freedom of trade in corn. He then brought
Malesherbes into the government as Minister of the King’s Household.
Malesherbes was known as an advocate of impartial taxation, religious freedom,
and the abolition of lettres de cachet, while his high character and
attainments promised new strength to the administration. But he was a
sensitive, fastidious man, indifferent to power and averse from conflict,
though he lived to display in far darker times the serene courage of a
philosopher. The Parlements were still hostile. The Parlement of Paris ordered
the suppression of a pamphlet by Voltaire in favour of Turgot and free trade in
com, and of another pamphlet by Boncerf against feudal rights. They next showed
a desire to oppose the edicts for the suppression of the corvee and of the
exclusive privileges of the gilds. Still Louis upheld his Minister. He summoned
the Parlement to Versailles, held a “ lit de justice ” on March 12, 1776, and
enforced registration of the edicts. But other enemies were gathering round
Turgot. The clergy had long disapproved of his tolerance, especially of his
endeavour to make the King omit that part of the coronation oath which bound
him to exterminate heretics; and in September, 1775, their .assembly had warned
the King against such specious errors. All the interests which Turgot had
alarmed, the bulk of the privileged nobles and citizens, the courtiers who
disliked honesty in dispensing public money, and at their head the Queen and
the King’s brothers, conspired against Turgot. His well-known views as to the
injurious nature of feudal rights having encouraged an agitation against them
in some Provinces, the Parlement of Paris seized the occasion to make a decree
enjoining the punctual discharge of feudal liabilities. Turgot, understanding
the challenge, asked the King to cancel the decree; but the King refused.
Maurepas now ceased to support Turgot, and Miromenil opposed him openly. The
Queen, incensed by the recall of her friend the Comte de Guines, ambassador in
London, on the joint request of Vergennes and Turgot, broke loose from the
restraining influence of the Austrian ambassador, and did all she could to
overturn the Controller-General. Malesherbes now resigned. “ How happy you are
! ” said poor Louis ; “ why cannot I also quit my place ? ” But he could make
no head against the clamour of almost all who had his respect or affection. The
enemies of Turgot proposed an obscure person named Amelot for the place of
Minister to the Household. Turgot wrote
88
Failure of attempts at reform.
[1776-7
several
letters to the King, injudicious although prophetic. “It was weakness, Sire,
which laid the head of Charles I on the block.” In his despite Amelot was
appointed to succeed Malesherbes; the Comte de Guines was raised to ducal rank;
and on May 12,1776, Turgot received his dismissal.
So ended the
power of the most illustrious Controller-General who had held the office since
the death of Colbert. Turgot had made mistakes; he had tried to do too much at
once; he had been wanting in tact and flexibility; and he had refused to urge
the calling of the States General. Louis was probably glad to be at peace once
more; and all whose interests were contrary to the interest of the commonwealth
rejoiced. But a much greater number who could not make their voice heard were
sad, and the friends of progress who had hailed the young King as a reformer
saw their mistake. Louis meant well, but he was unequal to his task; and the
feeling slowly grew that a radical reform must be the work of the nation.
Turgot had
not been the only reforming minister. Malesherbes as Minister of the Royal
Household had visited the State prisons, had released a great number of
prisoners detained by lettres de cachet on what appeared to be trivial grounds,
and had been sparing beyond example in the issue of these odious warrants which
he sincerely disapproved. The Comte de St Germain had tried to render the
French army once more efficient. He took as his model the Prussian army, generally
allowed since the Seven Years7 War to be the best in Europe, and
copied the Prussian system, not without pedantry. By introducing the austere
subordination, the precise' discharge of duty, and the elaborate drill of
Prussia, he offended all ranks of the service. The common soldiers were
outraged by a rule which authorised the officers to strike them with the flat
of the sword, a rule accepted in Prussia, where the bulk of the privates were
of servile origin, but abhorrent in France, where a sense of dignity had spread
far beyond the class of gentlemen. The nobles were incensed by the suppression
of several of the ornamental Household regiments, and of many agreeable
sinecures. When St Germain’s opponents became formidable he was abandoned by
Maurepas as Turgot had been abandoned in a similar situation. He kept his place
until 1777, and some of the changes which he had made were lasting; but the
chief result of his labours was to further that disaffection among the troops
which broke out in the early period of the Revolution.
On Turgot’s
dismissal the place of Controller-General was given to Clugny de Nuis, whose
brief administration was notable only for the revival of most of the abuses
which Turgot had destroyed. The corvie was again imposed on the peasants; the
com trade again put under restraint; the privileges of the gilds restored with
some mitigations; even the corrupt practices in reference to the farming of the
taxes were revived. Clugny’s ingenuity was seen only in the establishment of a royal
1776]
89
lottery; but
he died in October, 1776, and it became needful to find an abler minister, for
a war with England seemed probable. The French had hailed with natural joy the
dispute between England and her American colonies; and when the first blood was
shed in 1775, still more when the colonists proclaimed their independence in
1776, many Frenchmen felt that the time had come to avenge the loss of Canada.
The colonists were aware of this disposition and tried to take advantage of it;
but the French government was slow in deciding. It could not be seriously
alleged that France had received any real injury from England. Louis was by
nature the most peaceable of all the long Capetian line. We may safely assert
that he did not consider taxation without representation sufficient ground for
revolt, and that he did consider rebels as wrongdoers. Indeed Bertrand de
Molleville assures us that his final resolution to attack England caused him
much remorse in later years. The disasters of the Seven Years’ War were still
recent; and the French navy, in spite of all that had been done to strengthen
it, and of probable assistance from Spain, seemed an unequal match for the navy
of England. Turgot had resisted war as ruinous to his plans of financial
reform, and unnecessary since the colonies even though unaided were sure to
become independent. The King and Maurepas had agreed, and had resolved merely
to help the colonists in secret; but the pressure of public opinion and the
wish to be ready for all emergencies led to costly preparations. Maurepas
therefore proposed to divide the functions of the Controller-General, assigning
the administrative part to a certain Taboureau, and the purely financial
business to the celebrated Necker.
Necker, so
long believed by himself and the public to be a reformer equal to Turgot, was a
native of Geneva, a Protestant, and a banker. He had made a large
fortune—partly, gossip said, by manoeuvres such as men of the world judge very
leniently; and he had frequently engaged in transactions with the French
Treasury. He was really an excellent man of business, who mistook himself for a
genius in finance. He had expressed opinions at variance with the physiocratic
doctrine in a panegyric on Colbert, crowned by the, Academy. In particular he
demurred to the absolute freedom of the com trade, and had gained a prodigious
success by publishing a book on the subject at the very time when the opposition
to Turgot was gathering its forces. He had confirmed the reputation thus won
by a series of memoirs on financial topics, submitted to the King and Maurepas.
But, highly as he was esteemed and much as his help was desired, his religion
debarred him from the title of Controller-General. He therefore received the
style of Director of the Treasury, October 22, 1776, and after Taboureau’s
retirement that of Director-General of Finances, although from the first he
enjoyed all the real authority of a Controller-General.
Necker was
quite competent to work a good system well. Not
90
[me-si
only was he
versed in business, frugal, and laborious, but he was upright, nay, nobly
generous as a public servant, for he refused to draw his ample salary. He
shared the humane spirit of the age, he was anxious to do good and still more
anxious to gain honour. But Necker possessed neither the highest talent nor the
highest virtue. He was not a statesman with large and coherent views; he lacked
the courage to speak unpalatable truths; he never clearly perceived the change that
was passing over France, or rose to the real demands of the dangerous time in
which he lived. He thought too much of his own spotless reputation and too
little of saving the State; he was eminently vain and self-conscious, and
blended with his genuine good qualities something which we are occasionally
tempted to describe as charlatanism.
Upon taking
office Necker had still to meet an annual deficit of not less than 24,000,000
livres, and to provide for the growing expense of warlike preparation. Circumstances
thus imposed an economy agreeable to his own instincts. He therefore entered on
a series of reforms. The expenses of the Court, which amounted to a twelfth of
the total expenditure in time of peace, were the most palpable and frivolous,
and the most unpopular part of the whole, and therefore that which most obviously
called for retrenchment. Necker steadily opposed grants of favours and
pensions, persuaded the King to approve the suppression of many ornamental but
useless offices, and introduced various economies of detail into the royal
housekeeping. The Queen, who did not relish these changes, often resisted
Necker, and sometimes extorted favours for her friends against his will; but on
the whole he was steadily supported by the King. Necker also suppressed many of
the useless offices in the financial administration and simplified its
mechanism. Here too the interested parties raised an outcry, and found
spokesmen in the King’s brothers and the Duke of Orleans; and here too the King
held firm. Necker tried to regulate the grant of pensions which had hitherto
been given on no fixed or rational principles. All demands for pensions were to
be reserved for consideration at a certain time in each year; a list of
pensions expired and pensions conferred was to be drawn up every year for the
Minister, so that he might restrict the new charges to the amount of the old
ones extinguished; and steps were taken to secure punctual payment, hitherto
grossly neglected. These regulations were sensible, but could not uproot the
evil consequences of the absolute discretion enjoyed by the King with regard to
pensions.
Necker also
tried to make the fiscal system more profitable to the Crown and less onerous
to the subject. The system of farming the indirect taxes was more and more
clearly seen to be wasteful; but it could not be suppressed until the
government had a large balance in hand, a thing hardly to be hoped in time of
peace, and in time of war impossible. When the farm of the indirect taxes was
renewed in 1780, Nccker contented himself with taking the aides and some other
impositions
into the
hands of the Treasury, reducing the number of the Farmers- General, making a
much more advantageous bargain with those who were left, and again suppressing
the unjust favours which persons at Court extorted on these occasions. He
wished to amend the gabelle on salt, but did not venture to meet the opposition
of the favoured Provinces. He suppressed that part of the vingtiemes which was
paid by the industrial and commercial classes in the country districts, and
made various small improvements in the collection of the taille.
Necker
essayed other reforms which were not merely financial, and began the
establishment of provincial assemblies, that were to share in the
administration and to point out abuses. At first Necker merely suggested to the
King that, by way of experiment, a single assembly of this kind should be set
up in the province of Berry. It recognised the distinction between the three
Estates; but the Third Estate had as many representatives as the clergy and
nobles together, and all deliberated and voted in common. The members were not
elected, but appointed by the government; and the powers of the assembly were
narrowly defined, as Necker was not prepared to suppress the authority of the
Intendant and his staff. Thus the new assembly resembled the old provincial
Estates rather than the municipalities conceivcd by Turgot. Even this small
concession to self-government proved so beneficial that in the following year
Necker created two more assemblies of the same class in the generalites of
Grenoble and Montauban respectively.
Necker also
gave freedom to the last serfs on the royal domain and tried to assist
enfranchisement elsewhere; but he lost the occasion of a notable reform by not
enacting a general emancipation. He relaxed, but again did not abolish, the
irritating rules which forced manufacturers of cloth and other commodities to
make them of certain sizes and descriptions. He declared the many tolls
throughout the kingdom held by private persons or by corporations redeemable,
and promised that the Crown would begin their redemption at the return of
peace. All these reforms showed good sense and good intentions, but they all
betrayed a certain timidity and inability to conceive large designs. Yet if we
blame Turgot for trying to do too much good at once, it seems unfair to blame
Necker for trying to do good piecemeal.
Not all that
Necker did to replenish the Treasury could countervail what was lost by the
American war. The news of Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga in October, 1777,
gave the French government courage to promise that open help which the
colonists had long implored, and to conclude a formal treaty with them in 1778.
In the ensuing war with England France had nothing to fear on the side of the
Continent. Spain first, then Holland, and finally the Baltic Powers, either
allied themselves with France or threatened to break with England. Accordingly
France was. on the whole successful. The naval supremacy of England was broken
down. During three successive years the
92
[1776-83
combined
French and Spanish fleets swept the Channel, drove the English into their
harbours, and kept Great Britain and Ireland in fear of invasion. In the Mediterranean
Minorca fell, and Gibraltar seemed about to fall. In the Indian waters the
French maintained a more than equal conflict with the English squadron. Beyond
the Atlantic Cornwallis was isolated at Yorktown, and his surrender ensured the
independence of the colonies. Ireland clamoured for free trade and legislative
equality. Although one or two glorious feats of arms enabled Great Britain to
make peace on better terms than at one time seemed possible, the national
spirit had fallen very low, and the most dispassionate Englishmen often spoke
as though their country was undone, or at least had for ever sunk from the
dignity of a great Power. In none of the many wars waged between England and
France has France gained so many successes and inflicted so much injury as in
the war which severed the American colonies from the mother-country.
Thus the
dishonour of the House of Bourbon and the losses of France in the Seven Years’
War were signally avenged. The war had been most popular in France. As it was
unnecessary to raise large armies, the cost in French lives had not been great;
and, as Necker had undertaken to defray the whole expense by loans, the
taxpayer had felt no hardship, nay, had been enriched by the artificial energy
which many industries derive from war. Yet in a few years England was seen to
be greater and more formidable than ever, and the French monarchy was shown to
have received a mortal wound. The war made almost impossible the reform of the
finances, the first condition of all other reform. Thenceforwards another
national insolvency was imminent, and the endeavour to shun it ended in
revolution. A mighty impulse to democratic ideas was involved in assisting the
Americans, whose prime grievance was that they had been taxed without their own
consent. The American colonies were, if we except one or two small Swiss
Cantons, the most democratic societies of that age. The Frenchmen who came to
their help observed among them an equality of conditions and a general
well-being, due chiefly to the inexhaustible resources of a new continent, but
not the less striking. The Americans, in their Declaration of Independence,
spoke a language of abstract philosophy more intelligible to Frenchmen than the
traditional lore of English patriots. The Americans asserted, sword in hand,
maxims which in France had been proclaimed loudly in drawing-rooms but scarcely
whispered in the market-place. The blunt ways of the Americans, their simple
though plentiful mode of life, their active and out-of-door occupations, made
them appear to the heated French fancy a commonwealth of philosophers or of
antique heroes like Cincinnatus and Aristides, or possibly of natural men wise
and virtuous and therefore free and happy, as man was everywhere until he had
been debased by civilisation. Thus many of the French auxiliaries, among whom
Lafayette was the most eminent,
1776-81]
93
returned to
France, feeling that they had seen in practice beyond the ocean what at home
they had only read of in books. A people had proved able to declare itself
free, to give itself a constitution, to shape its own destinies, and all this
without returning to anarchy or even undergoing any dangerous convulsion. And
when Frenchmen saw in succeeding years how their own ancient polity was
failing, and how a sovereign deemed absolute could remedy few of those evils
which he had himself condemned, they perceived no reason why their own nation
should not do what the Americans had done, and regenerate France in a
constituent assembly.
The events of
the American war have been recorded elsewhere. But we must not pass over the
means by which Necker met the cost of the war. He knew the faults of the fiscal
system, was unwilling to enhance the distress of the poor, and overrated the
power of credit. He therefore imposed no fresh burdens, save that he prolonged
to 1790 some few taxes which would otherwise have expired in 1780. He trusted
to borrowing; and his own financial skill and business connexions, as well as
the general success of the French arms, enabled him to borrow great sums,
although upon terms which we should not think favourable. Owing to the
confusion of the French finances, it is impossible to state with any assurance
the total amount of the loans which he contracted. The American war is supposed
to have cost France nearly <£*50,000,000; but it went on for some time after
Necker’s dismissal, and the payment of expenses went on for some time after the
war ended. Gomel supposes that Necker borrowed in all about 530,000,000 livres,
of which
200,000,000
went to cover annual deficits and the rest in strictly military expenses. He
floated his loans by representations of the state of the royal finances so
flattering that charity can hardly suppose him to have believed them himself.
He used, as had sometimes been done before, the credit of the pays cTetats, of
the city of Paris, and of the Order of the Holy Ghost, and he induced the
clergy to lend 14,000,000 livres, repayable by annual instalments of
1,000,000. As he would impose no new taxes, he could not properly provide
either for interest or for a sinking fund. And as the public was not likely to
endure in peace heavier taxation than it had borne in war, we must allow that
Necker prepared a grievous embarrassment for his successors and hastened the
overthrow of the French monarchy.
Necker’s fall
from office was due to an innovation more daring than any which we have yet
mentioned. Secrecy, it has been said, was the rule of the French
administration; and, although the number of persons who concerned themselves
with public affairs was always increasing, very little was really known about
any of the departments of public business. In the finances the lack of order
and method was such that even the King and the Controller-General were without
exact information upon all points of consequence. It is not surprising that
94
Necher's
Compte Rendu au Roi. [i78i
the notions
entertained by the public should have been vague, or that the evils of the
actual system, great as they were, should have been magnified in gossip. Necker
resolved to interest the people in the finances. With the royal permission and
the consent of Maurepas he put forth in 1781 his Compte Rendu au Roi, a
voluminous and particular statement of national revenue and expenditure. It is
true that the wish to please and be admired, so potent a weakness in men of
Necker’s temperament, led him to draw an unfaithful picture, and without
telling absolute falsehoods to make a false impression. Instead of showing what
had been raised and spent in the actual state of war, he drew an imaginary
picture of revenue and expenditure in a normal state of affairs: that is, in
time of peace. Although hte said much about the imperfections of French
finance, so as to heighten the merit of recent reforms which were fully
described, he professed to show the existence of a surplus which had never
existed in the eighteenth century. Great was the satisfaction of intelligent
Frenchmen to find the national resources so ample; greater the enthusiasm
called forth by the sensibility which Necker diffused through this as through
all his other writings and speeches; greatest of all the admiration felt for a
Minister who had dared to enlighten the people because he had no motive for
keeping the people in ignorance.
Not such were
the feelings of Maurepas. Although he had consented to the publication of the
Account, he had not reckoned on the general emotion which it produced, and he
felt jealous, of Necker’s mounting fame and influence. Necker understood that a
cabal was forming against him, and believed that Sartines, the minister for
naval affairs, was a ringleader. He therefore entered into an alliance with the
Queen’s friends, also hostile to Sartines, and urged the King to replace him by
de Castries. Under the impression that Maurepas desired this change, Louis
consented, and was displeased to find that Maurepas was adverse. Maurepas now
became more openly hostile and employed against Necker such devices as
prompting others to carp at the Account,, and betraying to members of the
Parlement of Paris a memoir drawn up by Necker for the King on the subject of
the Provincial Assemblies, in which the conduct of the Parliaments had been
severely censured. The Parlement therefore refused to register a decree for the
formation of a Provincial Assembly in the Boulonnais, but had to submit on
finding that the King still supported Necker. Exalted by this success, Necker
sought to obtain a seat in Council with the style of Minister of State, honours
hitherto withheld on account of his religion; and, although his friends warned
him to be prudent, he declared that he would resign if his wishes were not
granted. When Maurepas assured the King that Necker’s admission to the Council
would be followed by the resignation of the other Ministers, Louis, against his
own wish, and even against the wish of Marie-Antoinette, accepted Necker’s
resignation on May 19, 1781.
We have seen
that Necker was immeasurably inferior to Turgot, and
that his
administration in some respects deserved the severest blame. Yet it was a
mistake in Louis to part with Necker. For Necker was a reformer according to
his powers; and his retirement before the enmity of the futile Maurepas was a
scandal to public opinion. Necker, even more than Choiseul, was escorted home
by the nation. His country- house became a court whither all who wished to be
thought enlightened, humane, and lovers of virtue divorced from power, thronged
to pay their respects. Many nobles came to wait on the banker, and even the
Archbishop of Paris and other prelates paid formal visits to the Calvinist.
Necker was not indeed the wiser or the happier for this homage, which confirmed
his too flattering estimate of his own qualifications. But Louis had a second
time thrown away that power which public opinion alone can give, and which a
wiser sovereign could have turned to such good account for himself and his
kingdom.
There now
ensued a second reaction. The King left to Maurepas the choice of a
Controller-General; and Maurepas, who by this time had a settled distaste for
the pretentious and troublesome persons known as reformers, fixed upon a dull
and respectable veteran, Joly de Fleury, who, we are assured, never lost an
opportunity of lamenting the diffusion of enlightenment. Fleury held office
from June of 1781 to March of 1783. But he and Maurepas thought it necessary to
bruit abroad that they would follow in the footsteps of Necker. Fleury found
that the surplus implied in the Account did not exist even in time of peace,
and imparted the fact to Louis, who now first began to feel that dislike of
Necker which afterwards became a fixed prejudice. As France was still at war,
large sums had to be raised; but the financiers did not extend to Fleury the
confidence which they had placed in Necker, and, as borrowing was difficult,
new taxes were inevitable. A third vingtieme was imposed in July, 1782. Then
the Parlement protested, declaring that the taxpayer could pay no more and that
the public money was squandered. It repeated these complaints even in the act
of registering the edicts for fresh taxation. The Parlement of Besan^on made a
like remonstrance. Although a deputation of that body was summoned to
Versailles to hear a reprimand from the King’s lips, they had scarcely returned
to Besanipon when the incorrigible Parlement demanded the convocation of the
States General. The demand was little noticed at the time, but it was not lost.
It is true that the Parlements had spoken without discernment, and that the war
made new taxes the least of evils. Yet the feeble sovereign and unwise Minister
gave way and ventured on no further taxation. Instead, Joly de Fleury resorted
to the worst of all the traditional resources,. making and selling a number of
useless offices, especially in the financial department.
The reaction was
felt in other ways. A regulation dated May 22, 1781, and passed against the
will of Segur, then Minister of War, required sixteen quarters of nobility for
all officers in the army, thus
96
[l781—3
enhancing an
unjust privilege at the very time when all privileges were more and more called
in question. With similar blindness the Parlements reserved their best places
for persons of at least two degrees of nobility. In many parts of France the
seigneurs became unusually active in enforcing obsolete or doubtful manorial
rights. The clergy gained a recognition of their claim to tithe certain crops
lately introduced, such as lucerne and potatoes. But when the parish priests
represented: the meagreness of their livelihood they were silenced by the
government. Maurepas having died in November, 1781, the King leant chiefly upon
Vergennes, an able man and a master in foreign policy, but little acquainted
with finance or administration. The signing of the preliminaries of peace in
January, 1783, was more welcome to the nation than to the Controller-General,
who knew that he was expected to remit taxes which he could not spare,
considering the enormous growth of the debt. Fearing to suffer for his own
weakness and his predecessor’s, he induced the King to set up a Council of
Finance, With the Controller- General as president, the other councillors being
Vergennes and Miromenil, the latter of wh om, as Keeper, would have to overbear
the resistance of the Parlements. Such a council might have done good in
devising ways of retrenchment, but the other Ministers, especially Segur and
Castries, bought it humiliating thati a new authority should be interposed
between the King and themselves, while the courtiers viewed it as a hindrance
to designs upon the Treasury. A strong cabal was formed against Fleury, who
found that he no longer possessed the King’s confidence, and resigned in
March, 1783.
Fleury was
succeeded by Lefevre d’Ormesson, an honest and industrious man, but unequal to
so perplexed a state of affairs. He feared to lay fresh taxes on the people,
and hoped that with the return of peace borrowing and retrenchment might
suffice. When he applied to his colleagues for an account of the financial
position of their several departments and suggestions for economies, they took
no notice of his request. Thus ended d’Ormesson’s hope of reducing expenses.
The State was in fact without a head, for Louis would neither act as master
himself nor uphold the authority of his Ministers. Driven to despair, d’Ormesson
negotiated a secret advance from the Caisse (TEscompte, the first of a series
of transactions which ruined the Caisse without saving the government. Before
long a crisis forded the Caisse to call for its money, which the Crown could
not repay, so that it had to obtain a royaJ decree suspending cash payments.
Thus d’Ormesson was thrown back, upon borrowing in the open market, and having
filled up the measure of his discredit by other faults he retired in November,
1783.
The
definitive treaty of peace had been signed on September 3,1783. But the effects
of the course taken to raise money during the war remained. The state of the
Treasury was worse than at any previous period of the reign, while the Crown
had lost the confidence of the
nation. It
was so necessary to have an able and daring Controller- General that the King
bestowed the office on Charles-Alexandre de Calonne. Calonne remained
Controller-General for three years and a half, during which time he did more
than any of his predecessors to hasten the Revolution.
He could
already number many years in the public service. He had been Intendant of Metz
and afterwards of Lille, and had long been looking for the preferment which he
now received. He was a courtly, engaging personage, eloquent, sanguine, open to
large ideas, fertile in bold expedients, but incurably frivolous and
unscrupulous. In private life a spendthrift and votary of pleasure, in public
life anxious only to conciliate and astonish, he undertook, perhaps hoped, to
set everything right without offending anybody. France, he had always said,
possessed inexhaustible resources, and if the Crown were poor, it was only
because the Ministers did not know their business; and the saying had just
enough truth to be dangerous. By a lively attack upon Necker’s Compte Rendu
Calonne had gratified Maurepas, although without gain’ng his patronage. He had,
however, impressed many by his clever, daring talk; and even Vergennes was his
friend and believed in his capacity. He could count upon the courtiers, who
felt with unerring instinct that Calonne would not be morose about the public
money. He had been pressed upon the King when Fleury retired, but the King
disliked his character; and, as the Queen shared this dislike, Calonne was
baulked of his ambition. But the resignation of d’Ormesson left the King
without any resource if he would not recall Necker; and he therefore silenced
his doubts and gave to Calonne what he had so eagerly desired.
The new
Controller-General found the state of the Treasury far more alarming than he
had supposed. He afterwards assured the Notables that when he entered on his
office the annual deficit had risen to
80.000.000 livres, the revenue had been anticipated
to the amount of
176.000.000 livres, and the outstanding debts of all kinds
due by the government exceeded 300,000,000 livres. As the public had been kept
in ignorance, and looked for a remission of taxes, it was impossible to meet
these demands by new taxation. Retrenchment, according to Calonne, would have
been equally perilous. For the government had need of all its credit, and
credit can be kept up only by appearing to be rich. Calonne resolved neither to
impose taxes nor to cut down expenditure, but to win the confidence of the
nation by showing unbounded confidence in himself, to borrow as recklessly in
time of peace as Necker had borrowed in time of war, and to put his trust in
the revival of business, the growth of prosperity, and the impetus given by a
lavish outlay of the public money. His first measure was judicious. He recalled
the decree suspending cash payments, reorganised the Caisse d'Escompte, and did
his best to strengthen it in public opinion. His
98
A policy of loans and expenditure.
[1783-5
second
measure was astute. He persuaded Louis to suppress the Council of Finance, thus
freeing himself from the supervision of Vergennes, and gratifying the other
Ministers who resented control. He then began the execution of his policy with
a loan of 100,000,000 livres. He was thus enabled to make an apparent reform by
paying punctually the dividends upon public securities which hitherto had been
almost always in arrear. He gave out that he intended to abolish the internal
customs-barriers which did such injury to commerce; but he never was in a
position to make the immediate sacrifice required. The severe winter having
caused much distress, he readily persuaded Louis to grant a large sum for
relief, which was to be met by economies in the Court and Household. He reduced
the duties on certain articles of common use, such as coffee and sugar. He set
up a sinking-fund which, though modest in amount, was by the magical potency of
compound interest to pay off the debt in a short period. He actually paid into
this sinking-fund the appointed sums for
1785 and 1786, but then stopped for the vulgar
reason that he had no money, and found that, notwithstanding all his ingenuity,
a national debt can never be extinguished by borrowing even on the most
audacious scale. He spent freely on useful public works, such as roads and
harbours. He spent as freely in making friends at Court, gave to all who asked,
paid the debts of the King’s brothers, and enabled the King himself to buy
Rambouillet and St Cloud, A fine harvest in 1784, and the expansion of commerce
and industry owing to the peace, seemed to justify Calonne’s hopes; but his
policy left him always in distress, and he had to renew the practice of
creating and selling offices. By September, 1784, he was forced to issue
another loan of 125,000,000 livres, alleging that it was needed to cover
liabilities incurred in the late war, and promising various reforms in the
incidence and collection of the taxes. But the Parlement, which had always
distrusted Calonne, now took alarm, demurred to registering the edict for the
loan, and presented a remonstrance to the King upon the growth of the public
debt. Since his accession, it said, 1,200,000,000 livres had been borrowed, and
part at least of the recent loans had been wasted. Louis insisted on
registration and the Parlement gave way. Although the loan was nominally issued
at 5 per cent., the advantages given to subscribers brought the real return up
to 8 per cent., a rate so tempting that the whole was speedily subscribed.
In January,
1785, just as the public were beginning to feel somewhat anxious about the
effects of Calonne’s policy, there appeared, without the royal warrant, a new
work by Necker, entitled The Administration of the Finances of France. It
contained much indirect praise of the author and blame of his successors, a
description of the faults of the French financial system, and some remarks and
proposals for improvement, usually of the most cautious character, for, even
now, Necker did not contemplate the suppression of privilege in taxation. He
still assumed
that the
revenue balanced expenditure, and that the financial state of the kingdom was
sound. Whatever the defects of the book, its success was amazing. Bulky as it
was, nearly twelve thousand copies were sold in the first month, and in March a
second edition was sold off. As the actual deficit at this time amounted to
100,000,000 livres a year, Necker had made it yet more difficult for Calonne
ever to disclose the real condition of the Treasury; and for this and for other
reasons Calonne, resenting the publication, obtained a royal order exiling
Necker from Paris. But this only gave fresh credit to the author and brought
deeper suspicion on the Minister. Meanwhile Calonne continued to play his
desperate game. He announced further measures for the relief of distress in the
country districts; he founded a new East India Company; he promulgated new
rules about pensions, and took steps to abate stockjobbing ; he gratified
purists with a scheme for the payment of public creditors defrauded many years
before by Terray, and gratified the courtiers as formerly by giving them
everything they wanted.
But even
Calonne had at length to own that these were makeshifts, and that a State
cannot borrow for ever. Taxation must be made more productive; and, since the
taxpayer could hardly be forced to pay more, exemptions must be abolished.
Calonne thought therefore of taxing the clergy. He resolved to begin with an
enquiry into the value of their possessions—an enquiry more than once meditated
by former Ministers, but always baffled by clerical resistance. Here again his
constant lack of ready money defeated a useful project. He had to demand from
the Assembly of the clergy in 1785 an increase in their free contribution, and
they in return obtained leave to reassemble in
1786 and a promise that nothing farther should be
done till then. When the time came, they were able to stave off enquiry; and
Calonne had to comfort himself with a larger scheme for the taxation of all
privileged persons. Such was his happy disposition that whatever he knew to be
desirable he imagined to be easy.
At the end of
1785 Calonne found it necessary to borrow again. He issued a loan of 80,000,000
livres and again overpowered the reluctance of the Parlement. The loan was
introduced to the public with a flourishing statement of the financial position
and an intimation that the sum now raised would be paid off in ten years. In
1786 Calonne gained his last successes : a favourable bargain with the
Farmers-general and a commercial treaty with England. However empty the French
Treasury, the French nation was at this time prosperous. Industry and commerce
had thriven since the Peace of Versailles, and comfort and luxury were
spreading. The wall lately built round Paris, so as to ensure payment on all
commodities brought into the city, had swelled the proceeds of the octroi.
Owing to these causes the yield of the indirect taxes had been increased; and
Calonne was enabled to lease them for the largest sum yet known. The commercial
treaty with England
was concluded
in September. Such was the impulse given to trade between the two kingdoms that
French imports into England increased in value from 31,000,000 livres before
1786 to 34,000,000 livres in 1787. Yet the treaty caused much discontent in
some Provinces. For the French manufacturers, screened from all competition,
were often inferior to their English rivals in machinery and in organisation,
and were consequently at a disadvantage even in the home market. It was said
also that French custom-house officers were lax as compared with English, so
that English importers into France often evaded payment of duty, while French
importers into England paid in full. Many of the cahiers of 1789 require that
the commercial treaty with England should be denounced or at least modified.
Calonne’s
experience only made him more reckless. As he could not venture on a new loan
he now had recourse to expedients; and in September he actually procured a
decree of Council ordering the city of Paris to raise 30,000,000 livres for
improvements, to be lent to the State during the interval before the works were
begun. The end was evidently at hand. Calonne was forced to begin the bitter
task of enlightening his dupes, and first of all his sovereign. In August he
made a full statement of the financial position to Louis, saying that when he
took office he had found an enormous deficit, that he had vainly tried to make
it good since, that the actual resources of the State were insufficient, and
that all new taxation must be uniform, admitting of no exemption. He therefore
proposed a general land-tax (subvention territoriale) and a stamp-tax. In
order to gain the acquiescence of a disappointed and angry people, benefits
would have to be conferred. Calonne therefore proposed that the corvee should
be suppressed once more, that the internal customs-barriers should be removed,
that the trade in com should be made free, and that elective assemblies without
any distinction of Orders should be set up in all the Provinces. Thus the
circle had been completed. In order to raise money Calonne proposed to enact
once more the principal reforms executed or planned by Turgot and set aside
after Turgot’s dismissal. Within a space of little more than ten years the
policy of the State upon matters of the most vital consequence, matters affecting
the welfare of millions, was to be reversed a second time, not because society
had been transformed or because new enlightenment had been vouchsafed to
Ministers, but merely because the circumstances of the moment made such a
course seem opportune to those who misgoverned the kingdom.
Calonne knew
that the reforms which he advised would be resisted by the Parlements, and he
despaired of overcoming their obstinacy unless public opinion could be enlisted
on the side of the Crown. He therefore proposed to convene a Council of
Notables chosen by the King from the Three Estates of the realm, and to gain
their approval of his schemes. Such Councils had been called in former times,
but the
1786]
A Council of Notables summoned.
101
precedents
were few and remote, and altogether at variance with that unqualified absolute
power which Louis XIV had bequeathed t'o his descendants. To purchase the right
of imposing new taxes by listening to the advice of subjects was to take the
first step towards constitutional monarchy. In the actual temper of the public
none could foresee what a Council of Notables might do, or what might be the
consequences of its action. Almost any other King would have upbraided Calonne
with his manifold deceptions, would have seen the risks inseparable from his
project, and would have dismissed, even if he did not punish, a minister who
had trifled away the last resources of the State. Louis acquiesced without a
struggle. Calonne pressed for speed, and hoped to see his plan executed before the
end of 1786. Vergennes and Miromenil, staunch upholders of the royal authority,
disliked the proposal for convening the Notables, though they did not reject
it, for they knew not what to propose instead. But they were opposed to haste,
and they carried the King with them. Calonne was left to find ways and means
for the interval. As the last loan had been taken up very slowly he would not
issue another, but turned to the Caisse (TEscompte. The Caisse agreed to
increase its capital to 80,000,000 livres and lend
70,000,000
to the Treasury. In return it received a monopoly of issuing notes for the next
thirty years. Calonne struggled on till December, when he was forced to beg
again for prompt action, and the King declared that he would convene the
Notables within a month.
To us who
look back upon the events that ensued this resolution appears big with
momentous consequences. To Louis it seemed an escape from intolerable
perplexity. He wrote to Calonne that he had not been able to sleep the night
after his declaration, but that it was for pleasure. The public were less
satisfied when it appeared from the terms of the summons that the Notables were
convened merely to learn the King’s intentions, for they contended that the
only object was to gain the semblance of national consent to new taxes. A few
discerning men, however, like Lafayette, Mirabeau, and Bailly, saw that matters
would not end there. Calonne was careless about ensuring the nomination of
persons who were at least not his enemies. The composition of the assembly was
singular if we consider the use which it was intended to serve. Out of a total
of one hundred and forty-four, forty-six were Princes or nobles, eleven were
clergymen, twelve were members of the Council, thirty-eight were magistrates of
the supreme Courts, twelve were deputies of the pays d'etats, and twenty-five
were municipal officers. Thus the representatives of the Third Estate were few,
and mostly of that official class which shared many of the prejudices of the
higher ranks. The First and Second Estates, so deeply concerned in the
maintenance of privilege, and the magistracy, at bottom so conservative, formed
an overwhelming majority. Calonne probably hoped thus to disarm his natural
adversaries, more especially the Parlements. For the edicts approved
by the
Notables would still need registration, and the Parlements would have the
opportunity of contesting every reform a second time. The result showed how
erroneous were the Minister’s calculations.
The actual
meeting of the Notables was delayed by the illness and death of Vergennes.
During the interval they remained idle in Paris, where they caught the spirit
of discontent and criticism now general in the capital. Meantime Calonne
behaved with his wonted frivolity. To the last he gave out that the finances
were in excellent order and the debt in course of regular liquidation. He
neglected to break the disappointment which he knew to be inevitable by taking
some at least of the Notables into his confidence. Although he was about to
propound a vast scheme of reform which would touch all the interests of a great
people and require years for complete execution, he took no pains to formulate
it until a few days before the session began. Not until the last week did he
begin drafting the necessary papers. Talleyrand, who, though no expert in
administration or finance, was employed by Calonne to draft the proposals
regarding the com trade and to help in drawing up other parts of the programme,
relates that Calonne did not send for him till February 14. On the 22nd the
Notables met for the first time. During the previous five months Calonne had
done nothing.
After the
King had opened the proceedings, the Controller-General set forth the
necessities of the State and the remedies which he had to offer. He told the
Notables that there had always been a deficit; that it had been growing
throughout the reign; that 1,250,000,000 livres had been borrowed in the last
ten years, and that numerous sums were now due by the government to various
creditors. He added that the existing taxes could not be made to yield more
than at present, and that the only hope lay in the reform of abuses,
particularly in the suppression of privileges. Then he announced the list of
reforms. They included the formation of provincial assemblies, the imposition
of a general land-tax and stamp-tax, the suppression of the vingtiemes and the
corvee, the exemption of the nobles from the capitation, the reduction of the
taille and the gabelle, the restoration of freedom to the com trade, the
improvement of the revenue arising from the royal domain, and various economies
in administration and expedients for reducing the debt. Some of these proposals
could only serve to conciliate the privileged orders. Others were real
reforms. But taken together they could not be executed without long and patient
labour. Thus Calonne announced the establishment of a land-tax payable by all
land-owners. The due assessment of such a tax throughout a great kingdom
implied processes of surveying and valuation which must extend over years. The
gain to the Treasury from the new taxes would be gradual, while its loss in the
suppression or reduction of old taxes would be immediate. In the near future
Calonne’s proposals would yield little; but it was in the near future that a
generous growth of revenue was
needed, or
rather it was needed at once. Even apart from their attachment to privilege,
the Notables might well be surprised and angered by Calonne’s statement. They
were still more provoked by the frank avowal that the King’s resolutions were
fixed and that the Notables had only to devise the most suitable means for
giving them effect. On the following day the Notables listened to the reports
in which the several proposals of the government were explained at length. Then
in obedience to the royal will they separated into seven bureaux, a Prince of
the blood presiding over each, and proceeded to consider what they had heard.
They were not long in raising many objections. They approved, indeed, the
provincial assemblies, but demanded that they should be representative of the
Three Estates. They criticised severely the project of a general land-tax. They
called for accounts of public revenue and expenditure and insisted upon
retrenchment. Calonne tried to overcome their ill-will in a conference with the
presidents and select members of the bureaux. But, though he displayed an
energy and an eloquence in strange contrast with his previous sloth, he could
not cancel the effect of his disclosures or prevail upon the froward humour of
the Notables. Weeks passed away ; the Notables remained in a very bad temper;
and the public, although not admitted to their debates, applauded their
obstinacy.
At length
Calonne, impatient at the resistance he encountered and hoping to overbear it
by stress of public opinion, published his speeches to the Notables and the
statements drawn up for their use, with an introduction which insinuated that
the privileged orders were selfishly hostile to a scheme which would at once
supply the Treasury and relieve the people. He did not pause to think of the
consequences of thus making public opinion a judge and divider over both King
and Notables. Nor did he weigh the power of reprisal which the Notables
possessed. They at once adopted a formal protest denying the insinuation and
declaring that they thought themselves in duty bound to have some assurance
that new taxes were necessary; that economy appeared to them the best means of
restoring the finances; and that they had accordingly asked for full statements
of revenue and expenditure which the Minister had obstinately withheld. As
Louis allowed this protest to be published, it got abroad that he was wavering,
while the public, already prejudiced against Calonne, received it with
applause.
The Notables having
adjourned over Easter, Calonne persuaded the King to dismiss Miromenil on the
ground that he had instigated their opposition and to make Lamoignon Keeper of
the Seals. He then went on to ask for the dismissal of the Baron de Breteuil,
the Minister of the King’s Household, a personal friend of the Queen.
Marie-Antoinette, who had always disliked Calonne, was now incensed against him
and did her best to drive him from power. With the help of the Comte de
Provence and other great persons she succeeded. The King, indifferent
104
[l787
to the
Minister although resolved on his measures, tired and distracted and hoping to
conciliate the Notables, gave way and dismissed Calonne on the very same day
(April 8) on which he had dismissed Miromenil.
Thus for the
third time in his short reign Louis had let himself be deprived of a Minister,
who, whatever his faults of character, was undoubtedly able, and whom he could
not immediately replace with any fit successor. He named de Fourqueux, a plain,
respectable man, Controller-General; but he was quite unequal to the task of
carrying out Calonne’s plans. Montmorin, who had succeeded Vergennes as Foreign
Secretary, begged the King to send for Necker; but Louis had now taken a
dislike to him which necessity alone could overcome. Necker published another
pamphlet to refute Calonne’s statements to the Notables in so far as they
reflected on his character. For this offence he was again exiled from Paris, a
penalty which made him even more an idol than he had yet been. Louis himself
convened the Notables for April 23, and made a judicious speech; but they,
although affected, continued to press for further par ..culars Lafayette, who
was one of the Notables, had expressed the opinion that they had no right to
grant taxes, and this opinion began to gain ground among the rest. Thus time
passed. Nothing was done; the Treasury sank daily into deeper penury; and Louis
was overcome by the difficulties which met him in every direction. The Queen
now insisted that the time required a skilful and popular minister. She
suggested Lomenie de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse, who had distingu. bed
himself as a member of the Estates of Languedoc and as one of the Notables. He
was made, not Controller-General, but chief of the Council of Finance, the
position formerly held by Maurepas and Vergennes. Fourqueux was put aside and
replaced by another man equally obscure, Laurent de VilledeuiL Brienne had
entreated the King to give him Necker for a colleague; but Louis, fixedly averse
to Necker and only half awake to his own danger, .efused. Such was Brienne’s
reputation that even the liberal and philosophic party applauded his
appointment. But the last clerical Prime Minister of France had nothing great
about him save his ambition, which was boundless. He failed to humour the
Notables or to break the Parlements ; he made concessions which earned only
contempt, and reforms which excited no gratitude; he left his master a King
only in name, as bankrupt of authority as of revenue, and France in a condition
scarcely to be distinguished from anarchy.
When he took
office, he had first to consider what he should do with the Notables. While yet
one of their number he had eagerly opposed Calonne’s scheme of reform, which as
Minister he had to execute if it were possible. In a position so invidious he
would perhaps have done well to dissolve the Assembly at once and try other
expedients. Fearing to take this course he resolved to continue the session. By
a lamentable story of the public needs and the promise of extensive economies,
he
persuaded the
Notables to approve a loan of 60,000,000 livres. But this was his only success.
Although he stated the deficit at a higher figure than any given by Calonne, he
could not get their approval for the land- tax or the stamp-tax. They still
declared that they had no taxing power. Only one of their bureaux pronounced
for the land-tax as a substitute for the vmgtiemes. Brienne therefore dissolved
the Notables on May 25.
The Notables
had done nothing, but their assembly had momentous results. The King had
published his distress and yet had obtained no relief. He had once more
explained to the nation how grossly it was misgoverned, had propounded a great
plan of reform, had announced his unalterable purpose to execute it, and had
then wavered before the opposition of an assembly which had no representative
character or lawmaking power. The Notables had called for further information,
had insisted on economy, had raised objections to all new taxes, and had ended
by suggesting that only the nation had the right to tax. Those of the Notables
who were not themselves courtiers went home, to spread in every part of France
their antipathy to the Court and their contempt for the Ministers. From this
time the deference for the Crown, formerly so profound in France, began to
disappear. The King was still esteemed for his gentleness and good-will; but he
was no longer thought competent to reform abuses. The Notables by their
manifest unwillingness to give up privilege in taxation had also embittered the
people against the First and Second Estates; and the belief became general that
France must have a new constitution before the disorder of the finances could
be redressed.
Freed from
the Notables the Ministers had still to consider how they should deal with the
Parlements. For they were still committed to Calonne’s list of reforms, and it
was certain that some of these would be opposed by the Parlements, if only to
keep up their tradition and to gain the popular applause. Lamoignon wished the
King to enact all the reforms in a mass, and if necessary to enforce
registration. But Brienne, already weary and disheartened, would not face a
conflict; and Louis, always soft and hesitating, agreed with Brienne. It was
resolved to enact the reforms part by part, beginning with those which were
thought to be most generally acceptable. Three edicts, therefore— the first
restoring freedom of trade in com, the second creating in all the pays
d'election assemblies like those devised by Necker, and the third commuting the
corvie into a money-tax—were presented to the Parlement and registered without
a murmur. Then the ministers ventured to put forth a new edict imposing the
stamp-tax. As all new taxes were unpopular, the Parlement at once began to
oppose. It appointed a committee to examine the project and resolved to ask the
King for details of public income and expenditure. The King returned a very
mild answer. The public, especially in Paris, applauded the Parlement,
and the
Parlement of Rouen echoed its protest. Still Brienne temporised, when in a
sitting of July 19 a member of the Parlement, the Abbe Sabathier, used the
memorable words, “It is not itats de finance (statements of accounts) that we
want, it is jZtats GenerauxJ" This spark kindled a great fire. The
Parlement at once drew up an address to the King, declaring that only the
nation assembled in its States General could authorise a permanent tax. The
address was coupled with fresh remonstrances as to the waste of public money and
the need of thrift. The King and Ministers shunned a direct encounter, and
presented for registration another edict imposing a general land-tax. Again the
Parlement professed its inability, and demanded the meeting of the States
General. Louis would have shown his high displeasure; but his Queen and
Malesherbes, again a Minister, although without a portfolio, urged him to
forbear. He therefore contented himself with holding a “lit de justice'"
at Versailles on August 6, where d’Aligre, the President of the Parliament, and
Seguier, the Advocate-General, in the strongest terms repeated their
objections; but the edicts were perforce registered. Next day the Parlement met
and declared the registration illegal and null. Still the Ministers wavered,
while the people of Paris were wound up to the highest tension, and the King
and Queen were reviled in outrageous terms. Brienne tried to make a diversion
by announcing economies in the Household, but no man took any notice. The
Parlement next ordered the prosecution of Calonne for misappropriating public
money; and, though the Council annulled this order, Calonne fled to England.
Then the Parlement repeated its censure of the enforced registration and its
demand for the assembling of the States General. The public responded with a
fresh burst of applause. Brienne and his colleagues now resolved to hanish the
Parlement to Troyes. The Parlement went triumphantly into exile and riots
broke out in Paris. The Chambre des Comptes and the Cour des Aides, which had
taken the same tone as the Parlement, escaped with a gentle reprimand. The
exiled magistrates continued their protests, which were echoed by the other
Parlements, while the ministry, pressed on one side by want of funds, and on
the other by public opinion, could not move forwards or backwards. It was of no
avail that Louis bestowed on Brienne a fresh mark of confidence in the title of
Principal Minister, which obliged his colleagues to prepare the business of
their respective departments with him before submitting it to the King.
The course of
foreign affairs helped to complete the discredit of the Ministers. In the
United Provinces the historic feud between the House of Orange and the
republican party had broken out afresh. The republican party had usually
regarded France as their friend and had procured a treaty of alliance with
France in November, 1785. England and Prussia, jealous of French ascendancy,
supported the cause of the Prince of Orange, William V. At length the rancour
of the parties
rose to
actual civil war. Frederick William II, King of Prussia, took advantage of an
affront to his sister Wilhelmina, the Stadholder’s wife, to assemble an army on
the Dutch frontier; and the English government made an alliance with him and
fitted out a naval force. The French government could not see unmoved the ruin
of their party in Holland. They promised the republicans armed support and
resolved to form a camp at Givet. But every active measure was hindered by want
of money and of public confidence. Segur, the Minister of War, and Castries,
the Minister of Marine, resigned because they could not move Brienne to do what
they thought necessary. They were replaced by the Comte de Brienne, the
Archbishop’s younger brother, a man of no consequence, and by the Comte de la
Luzerne, then commanding in St Domingo. As Frederick William now felt certain
that France could and would do nothing, he sent Duke Charles William Ferdinand
of Brunswick to invade Holland, where no resistance was made. France did not
even try to intervene on behalf of her friends. The Orange party thus became
supreme, French influence in Holland was destroyed, and French weakness was
displayed to all Europe. These events could not but sharpen the contempt felt
by the French people for their rulers and embarrass still further the conduct
of affairs at home.
In August
Laurent de Villedeuil resigned the office of Controller- General, and was
succeeded by Lambert, a man equally obscure, the third Controller-General in
five months. About the same time the contest between the Crown and the
Parlement was closed by a precarious peace. Brienne despaired of success
against the violence of public opinion, and was more than ever in need of
money. The Parlement began to tire of its stay in a provincial city and feared to
wear out its popularity. Both parties were thus disposed to treat. The Council
indeed annulled the resolutions taken by the Parlement in August, and prolonged
its exile over the vacation. But when the Parlement deputed d’Aligre to set
forth the obstacles to the dispensation of justice arising from its stay at
Troyes, he found a gracious reception with the King and the chief Minister, who
consented to suppress the edicts for a stamp-tax and a land- tax. All that the
Parlement would do in return was to register an edict, prolonging the time
during which the increased vingtiemes could be levied. It is true that even by
this small favour the Parlement belied its former declaration of inability to
grant taxes. On these terms the Parlement returned to Paris, September 24,
1787, amid the rejoicings of the people, and with the proud sense of a complete
victory over the Crown.
It might have
been foretold that the conflict would presently be renewed. Resistance to the
government was highly popular and in no way dangerous. The Parlement was not
restrained either by accurate knowledge of the necessities of State—for it had
no part in administration, or by large views of public policy—for its
stubbornness was mainly an
affair of
sentiment and tradition, or by the feeling which sobers an opposition in a
free commonwealth that it may be called upon to govern— for the function of the
Parlement in politics was purely negative. On the other side the government was
sinking ever deeper into penury and contempt. About this time Calonne published
his Requite au Roi with the object of clearing his own character and showing
that he had always acted with the knowledge and approval of the King. He
injured the King more than he benefited himself. He did not spare Brienne, and
here his accusations were not thrown away. The public now began to reckon the
chances of national bankruptcy; and the fund-holders became eager for the
meeting of the States General as the only means to a thorough reform of the
finances. Thus the very class which is usually most attached to the existing
order of the State had learnt in France to wish for something little short of a
revolution.
Forced to
raise money, and yet afraid of the Parlement, Brienne took up once more the
policy which had failed with Calonne, the combination of reforms with measures
for filling the treasury. He resolved to issue a series of loans amounting in
all to 120,000,000 livres, but spread over five years, to promise the
convocation of the States General, and to relieve the Protestants from one of
their greatest hardships, the denial of civil status. The Protestants being
neither able nor willing to partake of the sacraments of the Roman Church,
their births, marriages, and deaths were left without legal record, and all
their relations of family and property were thus kept in doubt and confusion.
It was now designed to supply such a record without relieving Protestants from
any of their other disabilities. At Brienne’s instance the King held a “ royal
session ” of the Parlement on November 19, in which the decrees for the loan
and for restoring a civil status to Protestants were presented for
registration. At a “royal session,” herein differing from a “ lit de justice,”
the members of the Parlement were allowed to state and to justify their
opinions; and the discussion had lasted some time when Lamoignon spoke to the
King, who suddenly cut short the debate and ordered immediate registration. The
Duke of Orleans complained of this proceeding as irregular; but the King
refused to listen and took his departure. The Parlement continued its sitting,
and disclaimed all share in the registration of the edicts. There is reason to
believe that, if the debate had not been interrupted, the majority would have
accepted registration. The Ministers had therefore made a fresh mistake; but
they could not overlook such an affront to the sovereign as was implied in the
conduct of the Parlement, and were forced to begin again the hopeless struggle
with these obstinate lawyers. The Duke of Orleans was ordered to retire to his
country-house of Villers-Cotterets, and two of the boldest magistrates, Freteau
and Sabathier, were imprisoned by lettres de cachet. A deputation of the
Parlement was summoned to Versailles to hear a
rebuke from
the King and witness the erasure of the offending resolution. The Parlement
answered with remonstrances, and was abetted by most of the provincial
Parlements. The Parlements had won for a moment the place they had always
desired as leaders and spokesmen of the French nation and seemed a counterpoise
to the power of the Crown. But it would be a mistake to credit them even now
with insight or with large views of government. They set themselves against
even the small measure of toleration which the Ministers had resolved to bestow
on the Protestants. It was not until June, 1788, that they consented to
register this edict. With regard to the finances they had no constructive
policy. And of the results which would flow from the summoning of the States
General they aad, as the event proved, no forecast even approaching the truth.
The new
Provincial Assemblies created in June met before the dose of the year, but
rather exasperated than calmed the public mind. Their constitution disappointed
some reformers, because all the original members were chosen by the Crown, and
were only to be replaced gradually by elected members. Some provinces, like
Hainault and Dauphine, would have preferred the revival of their historic
Estates. In other Provinces the Parlements resisted to the utmost the institution
of the new assemblies. When these hindrances had been overcome and the
assemblies met, they proved not unworthy of the hopes cherished by the
government. The members of the different Estates showed a spirit of cordial
cooperation and industry in devising reforms. But the assemblies, the first
endeavour towards local and popular control, were not easily harmonised with
the old administrative system, rigidly despotic and central. Some friction was
unavoidable. Moreover in these assemblies the gathered discontent of all
classes found utterance; and, as the age was in the highest degree rhetorical
and sentimental, their members sometimes used language directly tending to
encourage disorder. The Ministers had hoped that the assemblies would help in
the collection of taxes, but did not find them very useful for this purpose. A
valuable improvement, but one which could be perfected only by time and with
the advantage of quiet, had been hurried through amid increasing anarchy, and
so proved a new perplexity to its authors. Few governments have sacrificed so
much in power to gain so little in popularity as the government of Louis XVI.
The year 1788
opened without any change in the condition of France. The Ministers tried to
conciliate opinion by such activity as the state of the revenue allowed, and in
March, 1788, they redeemed a royal promise by publishing a statement of
receipts and expenses for the current year, which Gomel has pronounced the
fullest and most trustworthy of those published before the Revolution. It
showed, indeed, a deficit of 160,000,000 livres, which could not easily be made
good by borrowing, since no capitalist would lend without the sanction
110
Proposed judicial
reforms.
[i788
of the
Parlement to the loan: The Parlement, conscious of its power, persisted in
denouncing the severities of the previous November, and in asserting the right
of individuals not to be deprived of liberty save by legal process. The spirit
of criticism and resistance became more and more general, and pamphlets were
multiplied beyond all former precedent. The language of the Parlement was so
revolutionary, and its endeavours to disable the government from borrowing
money or levying taxes were so unscrupulous, that the ministry resolved on a
bold stroke. Two of the ringleaders of the opposition, d’Espremenil and
Goislard, were to be seized and imprisoned; and the Parlement, as an
institution, was to be transformed. That a body created to administer justice
should presume to exercise a veto on laws and taxes was itself anomalous; and
this body in its own sphere was not free from reproach. The judicial system of
France, if system it could be called, was the gradual result of ages, and in
many ways ill-suited to modem French society. The same might be said of law in
France, for the criminal law remained in many particulars barbarous and
inhuman. Brienne and his colleagues proposed therefore to connect the abolition
of the veto claimed by the Parlement with a reform of the law and the judicial
system. Their designs were supposed to be secret, but were in fact well known
to the Parlement. On the night of May 4, when d’Espremenil and Goislard were to
be arrested, they took refuge in the Palace of Justice, whence they had to be
tom by military force on the 6th, after an impressive display of fortitude and
majesty by themselves and their colleagues.
The Parlement
now suspended its sittings, and on May 8 was summoned to a lit de justice at
Versailles. The King there announced the remodelling of the judicature. A new
Cour PlSniere was to take the place of the Parlement, the senior members of the
old Court being, however, eligible to the new. The Cour Pleniere was alone to
exercise the office of registration, the provincial Parlements being henceforth
restrained to strictly judicial duty. The relations and powers of the inferior
Courts were to be so amended as to make justice more cheap and speedy. The
conflicting bodies of custom which had force in different parts of the kingdom
were to be harmonised. Criminal procedure was to be reformed, and in particular
the use of torture to obtain evidence was to be abandoned. The King also
promised that the States General should be convoked as often as the condition
of public affairs made their meeting advisable. The President replied with a
protest that the King could not violate the fundamental laws of the realm. He
added that the Parlement was to suffer merely for having asserted that only the
States General could tax the people. The Cour des Aides and the Chambre des
Comptes, when required to register the edicts, repeated the protest of the
Parlement. The public was divided, for the abuses of the judicial system were
keenly felt and its
1788]
Ill
reformation
was very widely desired; yet the Circumstance that the refusal of the
Parlements to register an edict was the sole constitutional check on despotism
secured perhaps a majority of voices in their favour. The Ministers who had
gone thus far should at least have seen the impossibility of retreat and
therefore the wisdom of acting with vigour. Yet they did nothing further
towards establishing the Cour PUniere, but were content to keep the members of
the Parlement idle at Versailles. Neither Calonne nor Brienne seems ever to
have understood the danger of announcing reforms which they were not able or
not resolved to carry. These Ministers called every part of the old polity of
France in question and then left it little altered. Thus they tutored the
French people in revolution.
Even if
Brienne could flatter himself that he had overthrown the Parlement of Paris,
his work was only half done until the edicts had been registered by the
provincial Parlements. These bodies had been accustomed to obey the political
impulse of the Paris Parlement. They resented the edicts which, by taking away
the power of registration, ended their influence in public affairs, and they
saw in the suppression of the Parlement of Paris a menace to themselves. Most
of the provincial Parlements were therefore determined to resist the edicts as
long as they could; and their means of resistance were formidable. The distinction
between the noblesse of the sword and the noblesse of the robe, which severed
so deeply the courtiers of Versailles from the lawyers of Paris, was much
fainter in the Provinces. By birth, by social intercourse, by common interests
and prejudices, the members of the provincial Parlements were closely bound to
the provincial nobility. This nobility, poor and proud, tenacious of its
dignity and privileges, had long been ripe for mutiny. It bore a bitter grudge
against the grandees who surrounded the King and intercepted his favours. It
winced under the despotic sway of Ministers and Intendants. It had lately seen
its chances of promotion in the army curtailed for the benefit of the higher nobility,
and it now saw its seigniorial jurisdiction assailed by the new edicts. It
resolved to stand by the Parlements to the last. In some at least of the
Provinces, such as Beam, Britanny, or Dauphine, the opposition had a peculiarly
strong case. For these Provinces had come under the direct sway of the Crown
only by virtue of solemn pacts which guaranteed them in the enjoyment of their
own laws and institutions. If the new edicts could be shown to infringe these
chartered rights, the whole force of provincial patriotism would be enlisted in
the Parliamentary opposition.
The middle
class at first took little part in resisting the edicts, although the lawyers
generally followed their professional superiors. But the provincial nobility
had many dependents both in town and country, and did not reflect upon the
danger of raising the mob against the government. The Provinces were
accordingly foremost in resistance to the royal will. In Beam the Parlement
delayed registration as long as
possible.
When it had been suspended from its functions, an insurrection broke out, which
was only calmed when the Parlement resumed its place and duties. The victorious
Parlement pronounced its unwilling registration null, and declared all who
should assist in executing the edicts to be out of the protection of the law.
The government, thus openly defied, would have been content with formal
submission; but, as even this was refused, it sent an order for the whole body
to appear at Versailles. When they arrived, Brienne’s ministry was drawing to a
close, and they were sent home without pun .hment or even rebuke. In Britanny
the Parlement refused to register the edicts, and the representatives of the
three Estates supported its action most strenuously. Bertrand de Molleville,
the Intendant, and the Comte de Thiard, the commandant who had been charged
with the duty of enforcing registration, were furiously assailed by the mob,
while the troops showed an unwillingness to use force which, in a free country,
would have been deemed criminal. As in Beam, so in Britanny, the Parlement
declared the registration null, and pronounced all who had any concern in the
edicts traitors to King and country. The magistrates, it is true, submitted to
lettres de cachet, exiling them from Rennes. But thereupon the commission of
the Estates, which acted for the whole body between its sessions, took up their
cause and sent a deputation to remonstrate with the King. The Ministers denied
them an audience, and even sent them to the Bastille. This tardy vigour merely
produced more deputations. In Dauphine the Parlement declared that if the
edicts were not withdrawn the people would consider themselves released from
their allegiance. The government as usual replied with an order for the arrest
and exile of the magistrates. Then the populace of Grenoble rose against the
garrison, and forced the commandant, the Due de Clermont-Tonnerre, to restore
the magistrates to their places and to confine the soldiers to barracks. The
Parlement, behaving with unusual decorum, stayed just long enough to calm the
multitude, and then quietly withdrew, each man to his appointed place of exile.
In this
resistance to the edicts of May we trace two distinct motives, jealousy of
provincial privilege and weariness of absolute rule. The edicts taken as a
whole embodied a great reform; and it was significant of the time that good
laws should excite rebellion among a people which had so often tamely submitted
to the worst. The forbearance, nay the weakness, of the Ministers is equally
remarkable. They might have taken a higher tone if they could have trusted the
army. But the officers, swayed by liberal ideas or by aristocratic sympathies,
were almost everywhere unwilling to use force even under the grossest
provocation; and where the officers were lukewarm the private soldiers could
not be expected to hold out against the multitude. Yet the historian must own
that the government of Louis XVI treated rebellion with an indulgence which
amounted to abdication. While employing arbitrary
words and forms
inherited from a very different state of society, it showed hesitation and
gentleness inconsistent with strong government.
Brienne was
as unsuccessful with the clergy as with the lawyers. In May he tried to get an
increase in the don gratuit. The clergy refused, and chose commissioners to
draw up a remonstrance to the King, in which they took the side of the
Parlements and claimed all their old privileges. This remonstrance was
presented in June. In reply a royal decree recognised the immunity of the clergy
from taxation. It thus became apparent that the King and the Ministers either
did not understand their own policy or were not in earnest with it, since they
laid down principles merely to discard them, and ended by confirming the abuses
which they had assailed. Had they known it, there was no more to fear from the
selfishness of the privileged orders; for the provincial Parlements had by this
time diffused a spirit of resistance through the whole community, and it was
the nation which henceforth had to be considered by the sovereign and his
advisers. In Dauphine this memorable change was first manifested, and the
assembly of Vizille marked a further approach towards revolution.
On June
14<, 1788, the noblesse of Grenoble held a consultation with cpresentatives
of the other Orders, and agreed by their own authority to revive the ancient
Estates of Dauphine. The Third Estate was to have as many representatives as
the other two, and all were to deliberate and vote in common. The meeting was
fixed for July 21, and the resolutions to be proposed were drafted by
Jean-Joseph Mounier, a young lawyer of Grenoble, who had distinguished himself
in the recent troubles. It is not surprising that the Ministers should have
treated this conduct on the part of a number of private men as an act of
rebellion and have sent down the Marshal de Vaux with troops to restore order.
But the Marshal found such a fierce unanimity in the Province that he deemed it
better to consent that the assembly should meet, so long as the meeting was not
at Grenoble. The leaders were willing to hold it at Vizille, a few miles
distant. On the appointed day nearly five hundred deputies met there, among
them Mounier, who was chosen secretary, guided all their proceedings, and may
be termed the first parliamentary statesman of the French Revolution. The
resolutions now submitted to the assembly condemned the edicts of May, demanded
the convocation of the States General and of the Estates in each Province, and
required that in the Estates of Dauphine the Third Estate should have as many
representatives as the nobles and clergy together. They also declared that the
Estates of Dauphine would never consent to any taxes not granted by the States
General or separate their cause from that of the other Provinces, and insisted
upon the abolition of lettres de cachet. After the deputies at Vizille had
voted these resolutions, and had declared their own assembly permanent until
the edicts should have been withdrawn, they adjourned until September 1. The effect
of their
114
Enquiry into the States General.
[l788
proceedings
upon public opinion was incalculable. An entire Province had given itself a
political constitution, and had announced its resolve to gain one for the whole
kingdom. The deputies had insisted, it is true, upon their provincial rights,
but only as a temporary makeshift, and had been careful not to separate the
interests of Dauphine from the interests of France. In the same spirit they had
implied, although they had not presumed to assert, that in the national
assembly the Third Estate must have a deciding voice. Opposition to arbitrary
power was henceforward to be based not upon ancient forms but on modem needs;
not on the privileges of any order but on the rights of the people , not on the
peculiar laws of a Province but on the common patriotism of all Frenchmen.
Brienne and
his colleagues were angry but had neither spirit nor resources to overcome this
new opposition. All through the summer deputations, complaints, and protests
had been multiplying. The Ministers had tried to silence agitation by a severe
decree of Council dated June 28. Only a week later, a new decree betrayed their
bewilderment. After observing that the number and qualifications of the
electors and the elected, and the procedure of elections for the States General
had never been precisely determined, this decree required municipal and other
officers to search for documents illustrative of these matters and to send them
to the provincial assemblies for consideration and report. It also invited all
men of learning to make independent enquiry, and to send the results of their
labour to the Keeper of the Seals. By this decree the Ministers doubtless
intended to show that they were in earnest, and also to give the public a new theme
which might divert them from sedition. But it showed what a venture was made in
summoning the States General, and how ill the Ministers understood their own
business. Where there was no continuous tradition of parliamentary government,
the Crown should have decided doubtful questions with reference to the needs of
the age, instead of distracting the public with a useless discussion. Even the
decree of July brought no rest to Brienne’s ministry. The King, bewildered by
the storm, ceased to attend to public business, and spent nearly all his time
in hunting. Brienne was worn out; Breteuil resigned; the Treasury was almost
empty; and the time seemed close at hand when there would no longer be a
government. It was resolved therefore to hasten the assembling of the States
General. A decree of August 8 fixed their meeting for May 1, 1789, and
suspended the establishment of the Cour Pleniere.
Even this
abridged interval seemed more than France in her existing condition would
endure. The ever-increasing agitation, with its occasional outbursts of brutal
violence, had checked business; and a very bad harvest announced a season of
distress. The government was so poor that even the movement of troops required
to maintain order was more than it could well afford. Authority had fallen into
such contempt
1788]
115
that it was
more and more difficult to collect the taxes, and the public creditors were now
so thoroughly alarmed that to borrow had become impossible. A decree of August
16 announced that for the present a large proportion of the public liabilities
would be paid in paper. As the Caisse d'Escompte had lent so much of its
capital to the Treasury, this decree involved another, giving its notes forced
circulation. Thus the deficit with which Louis began his reign had now grown
into insolvency. There was only one man in France whose credit could supply the
credit of the State or enable the form of government to linger on until May of
1789. Anxious to save Brienne from disgrace, the Queen tried to gain Necker.
But Necker would not link his fortunes with an unpopular Minister; and, as
Necker alone could find a supply, the Bang had to dismiss Brienne. He retired
on August 25, loaded with favours which would have been ample for the most
successful statesman, and which reflect little honour on himself or the King.
Necker now
became Minister of Finance, with the style of Secretary of State, and was
admitted a member of the Council. The King and Queen, although unfriendly,
submitted perforce to all his recommendations. The public were hysterical with
delight at his return to power, and the funds rose 30 per cent. But the time
was long past when Necker could have restored the vigour of the State; the
sovereign had lost his dignity, the people had forgotten to obey, and the
common wants of the administration could be met only by daily contrivances.
Necker had no other ambition than to reach without further tumult or downright
bankruptcy the day on which the States General were to meet. With the help of
the financiers who trusted him he scraped together a little money to meet
pressing claims; and to improve credit he obtained the recall of the edict
enjoining the Treasury to pay its debts partly in paper. In order to shorten
the agony he induced the King to declare that the States General should meet in
January, 1789; and in order to calm the public, he obtained the dismissal of
Lamoignon, the suppression of the new judicial system, and the restoration of
the Parlements to their old functions. With far less cause than before the
Parlement resumed its old part of opposition. The mob of Paris, constantly
growing more unruly, had wished to celebrate the downfall of Brienne and
Lamoignon by burning their houses, and only desisted when Dubois, the commandant
of the watch, gave orders for the soldiers to fire. The Parlement immediately
on its return summoned Dubois to answer at its bar for his conduct, thus
setting the precedent so often followed in the Revolution of treating the
suppression of savage riot as a crime. But the Parlement was speedily punished
by the loss of that popularity for which it had laboured so hard. When it
registered the decree convoking the States General, it added the condition that
they should be held as in 1614, each Order sitting as a separate House and
voting separately. This proviso, as enabling the clergy and nobles to
116
control
everything, was rejected by all who looked for comprehensive reforms. From this
time onward the Parlement was hardly ever named without reproach, and was
ignored in all political combinations, Within three years it was destroyed
almost without a voice raised in its behalf.
The King and
Necker were hardly wiser than the Parlement. In a country unused to free
institutions every course was full of danger; but the least dangerous would
have been the adoption of principles already applied in the provincial
assemblies, double representation of the Third Estate, deliberation in, common,
and vote by head. Had the Crown boldly accepted these principles, it might have
regained much of its lost influence and have exercised a steadying control over
the States General But Netfker, afraid to decide, advised the King to
reassemble the Notables and to consult them. When they accordingly assembled on
November 6, they gave the advice which might have been foretold. Only one
bureau voted for the double representation of the Third Estate, none for
deliberation in common or vote by head; they insisted upon observance of the
ancient forms; and their one concession to public opinion was in renouncing all
exemptions from taxes. They were dissolved on December 12, after causing some
loss of time and helping to diminish Necker’s popularity., It was now
impossible that the States General should meet before May.
Meanwhile the
political leaders of Dauphine had set forth the demands of the people. We have
seen that the irregular assembly of Vizille had adjourned, after presenting to
the government a list of reforms amounting to a revolution. Always anxious to
conciliate, Necker had sanctioned the renewal of its session, only requiring
that it should meet at the little town of Romans, twenty leagues from Grenoble.
It met again on September 10. The president named by the Ministers, Lefranc de
Pompignan, Archbishop of Vienne, was known for his liberal opinions; yet the
president in the former session, the Comte de Morges, declared on behalf of the
assembly that they recognised him in that, character merely out of xespect for
the King, and without prejudice to their inherent right to name their own
officers—a protest to which the Archbishop himself gave his adhesion. After
this display of independence the assembly began to consider, the subject to
which the Crown had limited its powers, the constitution of the new provincial
Estates. It adopted Mounier’s proposal that the Estates should consist of one
hundred and forty-four deputies, of whom the Third Estate should choose
seventy-two, the nobles forty-eight, and the clergy twenty-four. All were to
deliberate and vote in common. Yet the plan was in some respects not
democratic, since only two places were assigned to cures, and these had to be
proprietors; while only nobles of one hundred years’ standing and a certain
property qualification could be elected, and, in the Third Estate, only those
who paid a certain, sum in taxes could vote, and only those who paid a somewhat
larger sum could
be deputies.
The assembly having adjourned, a decree of the Royal Council confirmed the plan
with some slight amendments. When the assembly met again in November, it called
these amendments in question, as not having been registered in any Court of the
Province, and rejected them all, an act which it held to require no
confirmation by the Crown, and which no Minister ventured to challenge.
The assembly
of Romans also addressed a letter to Necker asking for the double
representation of the Third Estate; but on this point, doubtless, Necker had
solicited their opinion. A great number of municipal and other assemblies had
followed their example. Even the Parlement of Paris, in the hope of regaining
power, had pronounced for the double representation of the Third Estate,
although not for the other demands. Most of the pamphlets which were published
at this time in immense numbers enforced the popular view of the question. On
the other side the Comte d’Artois and several Princes of the blood addressed to
the King a protest against any concession. Necker, who watched the course of
public opinion with his usual anxiety to please all parties, was deeply
perplexed and at length took a middle course. He advised the King to give the
Third Estate double representation, but not to determine the other points. A
royal ordinance decided that the deputies to the States General should number
at least one thousand; that in distributing representation regard should be had
both to population and to taxation; and that the representatives of the Third
Estate should equal in number those of the clergy and nobles. The ordinance was
prefaced with a report by Necker on the points in dispute, which affords the
clearest proof of his inability to divine the future course of events as well
as of his wish to please or at least not to offend men of all conditions. Both
documents were dated December 27, 1788, and were published under the singular
title of “Resulted du Cornell du Roi.” At first received with favour, because
of the assurance of double representation of the Commons, they were less liked
when the public had time to reflect how much they left undecided. The royal letter
convoking the States General, and the regulations determining who should
possess the franchise and how the deputies should be elected, bore the date of
January 24, 1789. All was now ready for the elections, which began a few days
later and took several months to complete.
A new series
of disorders had sprung from the bad harvest of 1788; and Necker had returned
to the practice of regulating the com trade. In September the export of com was
forbidden. In November com and flour were forbidden to be sold elsewhere than
in markets. The government offered premiums to importers of com, and even
bought com itself. As usual these measures caused alarm and hampered traffic
and deepened the distress which they were meant to relieve. In a country where
the government was so much despised and the elements of insurrection were so
plentiful, violent outbreaks were sure to follow. They began in
118
January,
1789, and as the civil and military authorities were afraid to do their duty,
multiplied and became more outrageous. Thus set in the period of disorder
caused by scarcity, and of scarcity rendered more acute by disorder, which
lasted with intervals for ten years. Things were made worse by the severe
winter. All the great rivers of France were frozen, and even the port of
Marseilles was covered with ice. Many poor people died of cold and hunger. As
usual in France, a time of misery produced tales of Ministers and other great
men speculating in food and extracting untold wealth from the starvation of the
people. It was under these evil conditions that the elections to the States
General were held.
Louis XVI had
begun his reign with the best intentions and the fairest hopes. He had always
sought for worthy ministers, and had found one or two of uncommon merit. He had
at least wished to be humane and frugal, and had made many reforms and some
sacrifices. Yet at every step he seemed only to entangle himself in more and
more grievous perplexities. In an age of industrial and commercial progress,
his revenue seemed to melt away and leave him penniless. His authority at home
had sunk, until there was no cheaper way of becoming popular than to defy the
Crown. His influence in Europe, despite the most successful war ever waged
against the national enemy, had all but vanished. He had abdicated in favour of
the Parlements, in favour even of the private assembly of Vizille, before
abdicating in favour of the nation. Worse still remained behind. He was to lose
not only the remnant of prerogative which he still kept, but personal freedom
and safety, and after ,a long train of inconceivable humiliations was to die on
the scaffold. Even when we have allowed, and it is fair to make the fullest
allowance, for the embarrassments which Louis inherited, we must add that no
other reign so forcibly attests the insufficiency in great affairs of good-will
unsupported by wisdom or firmness.
THE ELECTIONS
TO THE STATES GENERAL.
If we would understand the beginnings of
the French Revolution we must carefully guard against certain preconceptions.
The French of 1789 had no experience of parliamentary institutions,* and could
not therefore possess the habits and instincts of parliamentary life. The
desire for self-government, then so general among the upper classes of France,
had been fed by literature and philosophy, not by practice. In the first stage
of the French Revolution even the keenest and most judicial minds could little
forecast the future; while the general public had no prevision whatever, but
lived blindly from day to day. When the King convened the States General, he
was unaware that he was making one of the gravest and most hazardous
experiments in history. When the States General met, the members hardly
suspected the enormous difficulty of their task. When, under their later style
of the National Assembly, they gave to France her first Constitution, they did
not foresee how that Constitution would operate even for a year. Historians are
usually prone to ascribe to human wisdom or cunning much that is the outcome of
mere passion, indolence, or want of thought. But nowhere has this fallacy run
to wilder extremes than in histories of the French Revolution written not long
after the event. Results so wonderful must, it was thought, have been the work
of Machiavellian subtlety. The reverse would have been nearer the truth. The
results were so strange, because the agents had not even that dim prevision
which in ordinary times is possible to public men.
The States
General of France bore scarcely any resemblance to the modem English
Parliament. They had never outgrown the medieval type of national assembly. The
continuous action of the English Parliament had ensured continuous growth and
almost unnoticed adjustment to the new conditions of later ages. In France it
had been otherwise. While in England during the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries a Parliament had been called, as a rule, once a year, and even under
the Tudors and Stewarts had met once every few years, the States General in
France had been called at most irregular intervals, usually
120 The States General. Position of the deputies.
[1789
long, and
tending to grow longer, till after 1614 they were called no more. Therefore
they remained to the last what they had been from the first, an assembly of
Estates, in which the Clergy, the Nobles, and the Third Estate acted as
separate bodies, with separate interests and distinct traditions. The relative
intelligence, wealth, and actual power of the different Estates might change;
but there was no corresponding change in the constitution of the States
General. Meeting so seldom, moreover, the Estates had never been able to define
their procedure or to fix their powers. What had been true at first of all
medieval parliaments remained true of the States General to the end. The
deputies remained agents in relation to their electors, petitioners in relation
to the King, and never became senators empowered and obliged to consider the
interest of the whole commonwealth and to exercise the discretion of a
sovereign legislature.
In relation
to their electors the deputies were, we have said, agents. Their task was to
state the grievances of the electors to the King, and they had little choice as
to the best means of discharging their mission. In every baiUiage or
senichaussie each of the three Estates drew up a list of grievances known as a
cahier des plaintes el doleances. Out of these cahiers the representatives of
that Estate in all the bailliages of the Province compiled a provincial cahier;
and in the States General a committee of each Estate formed out of the
provincial cahiers a general cahier for their own Estate throughout the
kingdom, and this cahier was then presented to the King. The deputies were
bound by these written instructions, and in great measure debarred from making
use of the advantages arising from their fuller knowledge and from their
position as members of an assembly representing the whole of France.
In relation
to the King the deputies were petitioners, not legislators. As in England down
to the Lancastrian period, so in France down to the reign of Louis XIII, the
Estates petitioned for the redress of grievances, and the King promised redress
in return for money or for help in some other form. Whether the King should
grant or refuse the whole of what was asked, or grant part and withhold the
rest, or grant something different but in his opinion better or more convenient,
remained at his own discretion, as it had been at the discretion of the English
Kings in the fourteenth century. The Estates had rarely gone so far as to make
the grant of supply conditional on the redress of grievances; and therefore the
Crown could often evade promising or neglect to fulfil its word. Meantime the
original law-making power of the King remained unabated. The form of the law was
always, the substance of the law was usually, what the sovereign willed. Few
and superficial were the traces left by the activity of the States General upon
the law of old France. So likewise the States General never gained the power of
the purse. They might grant a supply in exchange for redress of grievances;
they never established the maxim that there
could be no
taxation without their consent; and such control over supply as they originally
possessed steadily diminished after 1357.
The historic
States General of France were therefore an institution compatible with almost
absolute monarchy. They did not impose their will upon the sovereign, although
they helped him to ascertain public opinion. What the States General would do,
when they should meet again after an interval of one hundred and seventy-five
years fruitful in change, none could know; and individual wishes or fears
determined all surmises. The language of the royal summons was vague and
comprehensive. It enjoined that the deputies should be furnished with
instructions and powers sufficient to propose, advise, and consent to all that
might concern the wants of the State, the reform of abuses, the establishment
of a fixed and durable order in all parts of the administration, the general
prosperity of the kingdom, and the welfare of each and all of the subjects, and
promised on behalf of the King his good-will to observe and execute all that
should have been conceited between him and the Estates. These words, liberal as
they are, do not exactly ascribe any legislative power to the States General,
certainly not that sole legislative power which they afterwards claimed with
reference to the Constitution. Louis who, though weak and gentle, believed
firmly in his divine right and unlimited prerogative, can hardly have
contemplated, certainly did not desire, such a surrender. Probably he attached
no very definite meaning to the words placed in his mouth, and expected the
States General to show far more deference for ancient usage than Frenchmen in
1789 were disposed to pay. He hoped, in return for limited although substantial
reforms—such as the suppression of all immunities from taxation, the transfer
of the taxing power to the States General, and guarantees for their periodic
meeting— to be set free from his financial embarrassment. Even these reforms
would have ended the absolute power of the Crown; but they would have left the
King, in a very real sense, head of the State; and beyond these reforms we may
feel sure that Louis did not mean to go, or expect to be driven.
Very
different were the hopes and resolutions of a great part of the public. The
government of France had, as we have seen, lost every shred of authority and
was now as much despised as it was disliked. The spirit of criticism which had
been gaining strength all through the eighteenth century and the ever-rising
discontent with the abuses of the old order had found a practical direction and
an immediate object. The most active and aspiring men in the country wanted
much more than the redress of particular grievances; they wanted political, and
indeed social, reconstruction. The “regeneration of France” was expected from
the approaching States General; and inexperience made even so gigantic an
undertaking seem easy. The mounting agitation of the public broke forth in such
a tumult of
122
political
discussion as France had never known till now. Newspapers indeed there were
none save the official journals. But the pamphlets were counted by hundreds,
perhaps by thousands. The government made one feeble attempt to impose silence;
but such an attempt was contrary to the invitation which it had addressed to
all citizens and to Necker’s conciliating policy, and proved altogether
ineffectual. For the first time in French history the press was in fact free.
All the passions so long restrained found utterance. All the ideas hitherto
confined to books or to conversation were hawked about the streets. Men of all
opinions wrote; but the partisans of reform wrote most eagerly and copiously.
They covered an extraordinary range of topics, but dwelt longest on that which
seemed most urgent, the constitution of the approaching States General, above
all on the relation of the three Estates. Deliberation in common and vote by
head they felt to be necessary for the changes which they all desired. It is
true that the clergy and the nobles had very generally intimated a readiness to
forgo their immunity from taxation; true that for the most part they desired
constitutional freedom. But there remained other privileges which they were not
disposed to surrender, nor the Third Estate to spare; the freedom which they
desired would have been in some measure aristocratic, while France was
dominated by democratic theory; and their feudal rights in the soil set them in
opposition to the material interests of the bulk of the people.
In the party
of reform at this time there was none more conspicuous and there were few more
temperate than Jean-Joseph Mounier. Yet Mounier in his Nouvelles Observations
sur les ittats generaux poured scorn upon the ancient constitution and
procedure of the States General, which reduced the deputies to the business of
compiling useless petitions for redress out of the cahiers which they had
received from their electors. He urged his countrymen to give their
representatives the amplest powers, and to regard the cahiers merely as means
of laying stress upon what was most essential, not as restraints to be imposed
on the discretion of legislators. He bade them enjoin upon their representatives
the framing of a constitution, but only in a joint assembly of the three
Estates. Himself an admirer of the English system, and convinced that two
Chambers were necessary to order and freedom, he maintained nevertheless that a
constituent assembly must be one and indivisible. To enforce the same moral
Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes wrote his famous pamphlet Qu’est-ce-que le Tiers ittat
f—which opens with the three well- known questions, “ What is the Third Estate
P Everything. What has it been until now in the political order ? Nothing. What
does it ask ? To be something.” Sieyes sought to put the Third Estate upon its
guard against the other two. The reform of abuses, he argued, is hopeless so
long as those who profit by them have a veto upon change. Therefore
deliberation in common and vote by head are as
necessary as
the double representation of the Third Estate if the States General are to
effect any real good. But what is to be done if the clergy and the nobles,
entrenching themselves in precedent, hold aloof? In that case, he answered, the
Third Estate must go on alone and enact a constitution. After all the Third
Estate is the nation, of which the First and Second Estates are small portions,
and if its deputies by themselves do not form the States General, they will
form a national assembly. Whatever may be thought of the exaggerations and the
fallacies in this memorable pamphlet, it made Sieyes famous and powerful. A
crowd of inferior though often vigorous writers repeated and enforced the
arguments of Mounier and Sieyes.
Along with
the serious attempts to influence the electors came forth a swarm of pamphlets
and fly-sheets often bearing grotesque titles, such as Le Gloria in Excelsis du
Peuple, Le De Prqfumdis de la Noblesse et du ClergS, La Semaine Sainte ou les
Lamentations du Tiers J^tat, etc. These were often couched in the highflown
strain of passionate sensibility which Rousseau had brought into vogue, and
which pervades even the official utterances of that time. Others were steeped
in rancour and abounded in suggestions of hatred and revenge. All were thrown
to a people naturally excitable, which had suffered, and was suffering much,
and which was for the most part ill-educated, wanting in political experience,
unused to political discussion, and now thoroughly suspicious and distrustful
of its rulers. Such literature could not but exasperate the electors and prompt
them in many cases to choose men rather for their vehemence than for their
judgment. It even produced some immediate disorder, especially in Paris, where
the artificial cheapness of bread and the relief works established at
Montmartre had drawn together thousands who could not or would not earn their
living at home, and where the mob was reinforced by many vagrants and ruffians
from all the surrounding Provinces. The conservative party also had recourse to
the press, but their pamphleteers were inferior in talent, in confidence, and
in numbers. Their writings fell comparatively flat, for they could not promise
to the general public more than a part of what it was resolved to take, whereas
the liberals were in the first flush of a sanguine hope, which was not the less
sincere because it was very often unreasonable.
Accustomed as
we are in a free country to watch the currents of public opinion, we must be
surprised that the King and his Ministers took no heed of the growing commotion
in France. They ought to have seen, we think, that the new States General would
differ from all previous assemblies of the kind, and would require to be managed
in a new way. Apparently they saw nothing. Louis spent his time mostly in field
sports, and left to Necker, whom he disliked, the responsibility of guiding the
State through the crisis. Necker, conscious of the royal
disfavour,
harassed by the cabals of the courtiers, unversed in politics as distinct from
finance, and afraid of injuring his reputation, remained passive. The honest
and sagacious Malouet tells us in his Memoirs that he tried to stir Necker to
action. He called on him to make at least an effort towards guiding public
opinion, instead of waiting for its force to sweep him away. Before the
elections took place, Malouet insisted, everything ought to be considered and
determined in the royal Council. The Ministers should decide what they could not
decently defend and what they might safely abandon. They should take large
account of the wants and wishes of the public. Already the commons had risen to
equal power with the nobles and the clergy; and privileges oppressive to the
commons were therefore certain to be abolished. On these principles the
Ministers should settle their plan of concessions and reforms. They should then
by every honest and lawful means recommend this programme to the electoral
assemblies as the model of their cahiers, and put forward as candidates
respectable men who would adhere to the programme. Necker only replied that it
was neither decorous nor safe for Ministers to interfere in any way whatever.
Malouet urged that, without the initiative of the Ministers, nothing but confusion
could be expected from an assembly of twelve hundred inexperienced men, drawn
from all classes and swayed by the most discordant passions. But he argued in
vain. With Necker, and with Armand-Marc Montmorin, the Minister next in
consequence to himself, the fear of taking a decisive part silenced all
considerations of true prudence. The Revolution was fated to run its course,
uncontrolled by any statesmanlike direction.
The
government thus left the field open for eager partisans who undertook the guidance
of the electors. They drew up model cahiers and had them printed and circulated
by thousands or sent in manuscript to the electors for whom they were intended.
They composed manuals for electors, such as the instructions sent by the Duke
of Orleans relating to the States General, and the resolutions to be taken in
the assemblies of the bailliages drawn up by Sieyes.
The royal
letter of convocation and the regulations of January 24 had followed precedent
as far as possible and had tried to reproduce the order observed in the
election of the States General of 1614. Such, however, had been the changes in
that long interval that strict imitation was impossible. The antiquated
bailliages and senechaussees were taken as the electoral divisions. Those which
had been formed since 1614 and had never, therefore, returned deputies to the
States General, were now described as secondary and annexed to older bailliages
and shiechaussies. In Provinces where these divisions had almost disappeared
or had never been established they were now defined in a somewhat arbitrary
manner. In the pays d'etats the provincial Estates had usually claimed the
right of choosing the deputies for the Province;
but
this precedent was now set aside, save in the case of Dauphine, where the revived
Estates had taken the duty upon themselves. In old times it was the cities
which had constituted the Third Estate; but now all cities, even the greatest,
were merged in the baiUiage or senechaussee. Paris alone was treated from the
first as a separate electoral division; although a few other cities, Arles,
Metz, Valenciennes, and Strasbourg, afterwards obtained the same flavour on
grounds peculiar to themselves. .
The franchise
was very generously defined by the regulations. In the First Estate it was
enjoyed not only by the superior clergy but by all parish priests and curates,
not however in the same way or in the same degree. Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots
and beneficed clergymen, appeared in person at the electoral assembly. Each
Chapter was to choose one elector for every ten Canons; and one elector for
every twenty of its members below the rank of Canon. Religious Houses of either
sex were to be represented each by a single elector. In towns, the clergymen
without benefice were to choose electors in the proportion of one to every
twenty. Country curis were entitled to vote, but subject to a proviso that, if
their parish were more than two leagues distant from the town in which the
assembly of the baUliage or senechaussee was held, they could vote only by a
proctor, unless they had an assistant to supply the spiritual wants of the
parishioners in their absence. It was, perhaps, expected that such cures would
name as proctors some of the superior clergy; but they usually preferred men of
their own rank; and this proviso had little influence on the results of the
elections.
In the Second
Estate the suffrage was universal and practically equal. Every noble bom or
naturalised as a Frenchman, and twenty-five years of age, was summoned to the
assembly of the baUliage or senechaussee where he had his domicile. He could
give only one vote in that assembly; but if he possessed a fief elsewhere he
might appoint a proxy to vote in the bailliage where it was situated. Minors
and women holding fiefs might also vote by proxy. All the nobles, save in
Paris, chose their representatives in the States General by direct election.
In the Third
Estate the suffrage was not far short of universal. Every Frenchman bom or
naturalised, twenty-five years of age or upwards, and inscribed on the register
of taxes, might vote. Thus every owner of land, however petty the holding, was
admitted. All professional men, all men of business, and all workmen who were
members of corporations, and paid the taille d'industrie, had a voice in the
elections. Roughly it may be said that only the poorest labourers and downright
paupers were excluded from the franchise. Against this it must be set that the
elections of the Third Estate were indirect, in two, three, or even four
stages. The procedure must appear in English eyes extremely complex. In every
town the members of each gild met to choose deputies in the ratio of one to
every hundred of their number; and
the
corporations termed “ of liberal arts ” chose deputies in the ratio of two for
every hundred. Other inhabitants paying taxes chose deputies in the latter
proportion; and then all three classes of deputies met to form the assembly of
the Third Estate for that town, and chose its representatives in the assembly
of the bailliage. In each rural parish the qualified inhabitants chose two
deputies for every two hundred households, and an additional deputy for each
hundred households after the first two. These rural deputies, together with the
deputies chosen in the towns, formed the preliminary assembly of the Third
Estate for the baiUiage. Where two or more baiUiages were grouped as principal
and secondary, the assembly of each bailliage reduced itself to one- fourth of
its original number. Where a bailliage stood alone, its reduction was not enforced;
but its assembly, if upwards of two hundred, had to be reduced to that figure.
When all these elections and reductions had been finished, the general
assembly of the Third Estate in each electoral division was complete and ready
to act.
The forms of
election were no less curious and antique. When the electing bodies of the
three Estates had been formed, the grand bailli or grand senechal of the
district summoned them all to the general assembly of the three Estates, held
usually in the largest church of the town where he had his official seat. After
hearing mass together, the electors were called over by Estate, by locality,
and by name, and took an oath to execute their task faithfully. The bailli or
senechal then asked the members of each Estate whether they would draw up their
cahier and elect their representatives separately or jointly with the rest.
Each Estate considered this question apart and usually resolved on separate
action. Then the clergy resorted to the Bishop’s palace, the nobles to the
Governor’s house, and the Third Estate to the town-hall. The Bishop presided
over the clerical assembly, the grand bailli or senechal over the nobles, and
the lieutenant-general of the bailliage over the Third Estate. When the cahiers
had been settled and the deputies chosen, the bailli or s'enechal called a new
assembly of the three Estates. Again mass was celebrated; the Bishop and the
bailli or senechal harangued the assembly; the names of the persons chosen were
announced, and they swore to make known in the States General the contents of
the cahiers entrusted to them and to obey the instructions which they had
received. With this ceremony the business of the election was complete, and the
electors returned home.
As a rule the
assemblies chose a substitute to take the place of each deputy, should death,
accident, or illness hinder him from performing his duty; and this precaution
was afterwards approved by royal decree. Many difficulties arose in the course
of the elections through the variety of local usages and institutions with
which the general rules laid down by the government would not accord. In these
cases special regulations had to be made; and discontent was often expressed.
Even so, many
details were
not settled; and some trouble was occasioned by the inexperience of the
electors. As might be inferred from the low qualification and the public
excitement, the number of persons who recorded their votes was
enormous—according to Jean-Paul Rabaut de St Etienne, about six millions; but
this total, perhaps equal to that of all the adult males in France, must be
excessive, for there were some districts, such as the Limousin, where Turgot’s
reforms are said to have diffused contentment among the country people, in
which many failed to vote. In Angoumois we are told there were instances where
beggars, and even women, took part in the elections. But as the system of
indirect election prevented large assemblies in any one place, the deputies of
the Third Estate were chosen with very little disorder.
The conduct
of the government of Louis XVI in the memorable elections of 1789 has often
been arraigned by writers of the most opposite parties. Some have severely
blamed the admission to the franchise of so many poor and ignorant persons who
could not be expected to choose fit representatives. A property qualification,
it is said, should have been required in the Third Estate. Whatever may be
thought of this criticism, no such qualification had been required in the past,
when the Third Estate had usually comprised only the burgesses of the towns.
Nor would it have been easy to fix a reasonable qualification in landed
property. If it had been put low, it would have admitted the class of petty
proprietors, already amounting to millions, which suffered most from the abuses
of the old order and, as the event showed, was the most ripe for violent and
destructive action. In that case the result of the elections would have been
little improved. If the qualification had been put high, it would have excluded
almost the whole of this class, which would have been unfair and dangerous. It
was the misfortune of France, not the fault of Louis or of Necker, that an
agricultural middle class did not exist in most Provinces. Other writers have
asserted that the franchise was given to the crowd of peasants in the hope of
overwhelming the intelligent and liberal citizens of the towns and thus
thwarting reform. But this seems a malicious refinement suggested by the use
which later rulers of France have sometimes made of the peasant vote. There is
no real evidence that the government of Louis XVI understood such a manoeuvre
or, in conferring the franchise so freely, had any thought other than the one
alleged, of enabling the whole people to state its grievances.
It has been
made a reproach that the various electoral assemblies were not allowed to elect
their presiding officers, who were designated by the regulations; in the
bailliage or sinichaussie the bailli or senechal, in towns various municipal
officers, in rural parishes the judge of the seigneur. In the last instance the
complaint seems grounded, since the manorial judge might have the means of
exerting undue influence on the peasants; but in the other cases the grievance
seems unreal. It was
128
Defects and anomalies in the elections.
never thought
to prejudice freedom of election in England that the sheriff should be the
returning officer in counties or the mayor in boroughs; although the sheriff
was a royal officer and the mayor in many cases the representative of a very
few citizens. Even writers most prejudiced against the monarchy have been
forced to allow that the elections of 1789 were free from military or official
constraint, and pure from corruption and intimidation to a degree never again
known for many years. The immemorial government of old France lacked that
peculiar cunning which so many of its short-lived successors learnt in the
fierce struggle for existence. Louis was too easy-tempered, Necker too upright
and too anxious about his good name, and all who were most opposed to change
too childishly ignorant of the forces which they had to resist, for any serious
attempt to bribe or frighten electors. As for the civil and militaiy officers
immediately charged with the maintenance of order, it was never by action,
always by omission, that they offended at this critical time.
The
uniformity of procedure and the quiet of the elections were in several cases
disturbed by party divisions in the pays (Tetats. In these Provinces the
Estates had usually chosen the deputies to the States General. But the Estates
were at this moment viewed with very different feelings by different classes.
As a rule the pays (Tetats were attached to their ancient liberties, which had
ensured them a milder administration than was known in the pays d'election. The
new provincial assemblies, although framed on more liberal principles than the
historic Estates, did not win much affection, because the original members were
chosen by the Crown, and the elective principle was to be introduced only by
degrees. Thus the Provinces which had once possessed Estates wished to revive
them, and those which had never possessed Estates wished to secure them. But in
the Provinces which had never lost their Estates the old attachment was
impaired by a new democratic feeling. Much as they varied in constitution from
Province to Province, the Estates had almost everywhere an aristocratic
character which no longer contented the Third Estate. While, therefore, the
members of the Estates were usually disposed to insist upon their prerogative
of electing deputies to the States General, the aggrieved class usually
welcomed the royal regulations by which that prerogative was ignored. These
various feelings led to several defects or anomalies in the elections.
In the little
province of Bearn, which to the last bore itself as a kingdom united to Prance
upon equal terms, the Estates denounced the royal regulations and declared any
election made in conformity with them null and void. Here a national sentiment
supported the protest, so that no representatives from Bearn appeared at the
opening of the States General. In Britanny it was otherwise. All ranks had
joined to resist Brienne’s measures and had carried their resistance to the
verge of
rebellion.
But now Brienne bad been driven from power, Necker had done everything to
soothe the Bretons and the Estates had been convoked for the end of December.
Thereupon a new conflict began between the nobles and commons of Britanny. For
the Estates of Britanny were so constituted as to give the First and Second
Estates an entire mastery over the Third; and, if the Estates were to elect the
deputies, the Third Estate would scarcely have any voice in the election. The
nobles and clergy stood upon the historic right of the Estates; the commons resisted;
and both parties appealed to the Crown. The debate grew so hot that the
government tried to restore peace by suspending the session of the Estates. The
clergy and nobles continued to sit in defiance of its orders, while the Third
Estate in Rennes and the other towns of the Province formed a confederation to
maintain their cause. Then savage riots broke out in Rennes between the
aristocrats and the democrats. The regulations of January 24, which decided the
issue in a popular sense, were welcomed by the Third Estate, but were denounced
as tyrannical by the nobles and the superior clergy. Finally the Third Estate
chose its deputies in the manner prescribed; the inferior clergy met in
diocesan assemblies for the same purpose; and the nobles and the superior
clergy, refusing to elect, remained without a voice in the States General, thus
weakening the conservative party by thirty suffrages. In Languedoc and Burgundy
little difficulty was felt, as precedents were in favour of direct election to
the States General. But in Provence the Estates, which had been lately restored
and were eminently aristocratic in character, gave Mirabeau his first
opportunity as a defender of popular rights. Here too the government decided
that the people, not the Estates, should elect the deputies; and the Estates,
though with an ill grace, submitted.
In Dauphine
the dections took a form absolutely peculiar. The assembly of Romans, after
settling the constitution of the provincial Estates, had gone on of its own
authority to fix the method by which the deputies of Dauphin^ in the States
General should be chosen. The Estates were to double themselves by the election
of one hundred and forty-four members for this purpose only, and the whole body
was then to elect the representatives of each of the Orders. The revived
Estates met on December 1, 1788, and proceeded early in January to elect the
deputies. They adopted a resolution drawn by Mounier enjoining the deputies to
record no vote on any other subject until the double representation of the
Third Estate, joint deliberation, and vote by head had been secured. These
extraordinary proceedings in Dauphine cast a strange light upon the condition
of France in 1789. An assembly at first without a vestige of lawful power had
given the province a new constitution, and had determined how its deputies to
the States General should be chosen. In the one instance it had overruled, in
the other instance it had forestalled the will of the government. In
neither case
had the government presumed to resist or even to blame this usurpation. The
impotence of the sovereign and the dissolution of the kingdom could not be more
.clearly shown.
The elections
were held in Paris later than anywhere else. In this delay some have seen the
subtle policy of Ministers, anxious to prevent the capital of France and centre
of European civilisation from taking its proper place at the head of the great
revolutionary movement; and the suspicion might seem plausible, if we merely
remembered that Paris soon became the focus of rehellion and remained for
nearly a hundred years the constant anxiety of the different governments that
have ruled over France. But it may be safely affirmed that early in 1789 few
men thought of Paris as a dangerous city. If anywhere in France the conservative
forces might have been thought to be strong in Paris. A capital must always
contain a larger proportion of the upper class; and even the vices of
government may stimulate the prosperity of a capital. In. Paris a vast number
of the inhabitants either held places in connexion with the Parlement, or
ministered to the pleasures' of the rich of all nations who even then abounded
there. The citizens of Paris suffered little from the tax-gatherer, and nothing
from feudal rights. The fortunes of Paris and the monarchy had hitherto been
nseparable; and every annexation of territory, every encroachment on local independence,
had brqught gain to Paris. A city of seven hundred thousand inhabitants was
kept in order by two regiments of infantry and a singularly weak police. The
elections were delayed merely because the government wished as far as possible
to observe ancient claims of right. The Provost of the Merchants who, although
a royal nominee, represented the municipality of Paris as it then stood, and the
Provost of the City, who was more directly the King’s representative, disputed
the right of presiding over the election; nor was it until much paper had been
blotted and many weeks spent that a regulation of March 28, supplemented by
another of April 13, gave the preference to the Provost of the City and settled
the manner of the elections.
Ten deputies
were assigned to the clergy, ten to the nobles, and twenty to the Third Estate.
Owing to the size of Paris, the principle of indirect election was enforced for
all three Orders. The clergy alone held a single general assembly, to choose
one hundred and fifty electors who were to elect its deputies. For the nobles,
Paris was divided into twenty departments. Departmental assemblies were to
choose one hundred and fifty noble electors. Thus the nobles of Paris, alone in
France, were deprived of the right of directly choosing their representatives
in the States General. The Third Estate was to choose three hundred electors in
the assemblies of sixty districts newly formed for that purpose. The Provost of
Paris was to convoke the first two Orders, and the Provost of the Merchants was
to convoke the assemblies of the
Third Estate.
The qualification of voters in this Estate was so far peculiar that persons not
members of any gild or corporation were not entitled to vote unless they paid
six livres of capitation, But this requirement was so easily satisfied that
the eleptors of Paris in 1789 have been estimated at sixty thousand. Strong
protests were made against the regulations on three grounds: first, that the
presidents of the electoral assemblies were servants of the Crown; secondly,
that the nobles did not choose their deputies directly, as elsewhere; and
thirdly, that the three Estates did not meet in one assembly as the commune of
Paris for the joint election qf their representatives. As time pressed,
however, the citizens contented themselves with protesting.
The clergy of
Paris showed a temper which may be explained by the fact that Paris was the
centre of anti-clerical feeling. Their cahier, though fairly liberal in its
political clauses, betrayed a bitter religious intolerance; and all their ten
deputies, headed by the Archbishop of Paris, were highly conservative.
The electors
of the noblesse had taken upon themselves to add to their number all the
supplementary members chosen by the primary assemblies, and then numbered two
hundred and ~:ght. Ten holders of fiefs within the walls were
admitted to vote in their own right. The ten noble deputies were fljl of a liberal
complexion. Among them may be noted the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre, the Comte
de Lally Tollendal, the Due de la Rochefpuca,uld, Adrien Duport. who became
conspicuous among the radicals of the National Assembly, and Lepelletier de
Saint- Fargeau, who lived to be a Jacobin martyr. The cahier entrusted to these
deputies was remarkable in the extent of the reforms which it demanded. Nowhere
else did the nobles live so much in the current of new ideas as in Paris.
Nowhere else was theoretical liberalism, at least, so fashionable. Nowhere else
were social baj-riers more easily surmounted than in Paris, where new men were
always rising and the power of intelligence and of wealth, as distinct from
rank, was most fully manifested.
The Third
Estate did not at first display any uncommon ardour. Nq doubt some felt the
glow described by Bgilly. “When I found myself in the midst of the assembly of
my district,” he writes, “I thought that I breathed a new air; it was strange
to be something in the political order, and in virtue of one’s simple quality
of citizen of Paris.” Yet Bailly noted that the attendance was not very full.
“In those early times we were wont to count upon a great energy in the
Provinces, and perhaps upon the slackness of the city pf Paris.” It appears
that, out of possibly sixty thousand persons qualified, not more than twelve
thousand recorded their votes. The electors of the Third Estate, using the same
freedom as the electors of the noblesse, raised their number to four hundred
and seven. Of these, one hundred and seventy were lawyers ; one hundred and
thirty-seven merchants, shopkeepers, or artisans; thirty^
two belonged
to the official class; and the rest might be regarded as professional men or
men of letters. When the primary elections had been completed and the electors
of the Third Estate had met, it was proposed that they should draw up their
cahier jointly with the other two orders; but the proposal was negatived, and
things took their usual course. The electors declined to allow any official
presidency, choosing as their president Target, a lawyer, afterwards
conspicuous in the National Assembly, and as their secretary Jean-Sylvain
Bailly, the eminent astronomer, destined to a brief popularity and a tragic
death. It is needless to say that all the deputies of the Th: >
Estate were men zealous for reform. Out of the twenty, nine were lawyers, six
were merchants or men of business, one was a doctor, one a receiver-general of
finance, one an academician, and two were authors. The academician was Bailly,
who headed the list. One of the authors was Sieyes, whose services to the Third
Estate were held to outweigh the irregularity of choosing a clergyman. The
business of electing these deputies was not begun till a week after the States
General had met at Versailles. It was not until May 25 that the deputies of
Paris joined their colleagues. The electors of Paris constituted themselves a
permanent assembly to correspond with their representatives—an irregular though
not an unexampled proceeding, which had memorable consequences.
As the
elections drew to a close and the composition of the approaching States General
and the nature of the cahiers became known, the Ministers had a last chance of
taking the initiative in the revolution. Malouet, who- had warned Necker and
Montmorin before, was so much alarmed at the rising commotion of the public
that he made another effort to rouse the Ministers to action. He implored them
to condense into a programme the proposals common to most of the cahiers and thus
put themselves at the head of the main body of opinion. It is true that he took
as the type of the cahiers that which he had induced his own electors at Riom
to accept and which expressed the wishes of the Third Estate in their most
moderate form. So little, however, did Necker or Montmorin understand the real
drift of the time that they objected to Malouet the danger of alienating the
nobles and the clergy from the Crown by too much concession to the people.
Necker overrated his popularity so much as to think that he could hold the
balance between parties in the assembly. But Necker must not bear all the
blame. Even had he understood the pgril, he could not have induced the King to
yield all that most of the cahiers of the Third Estate demanded. Louis had no
penetration; he distrusted Necker; and he was ever open to the solicitation and
intrigue of those who hoped to drive Necker from office. Thus the government
could do nothing but passively await the onset of reforming zeal. We must add
that this helplessness was approved by men of the most conflicting politics.
Malouet found to his amazement that the most reasonable
persons in
all parties thought that the King should propose no plan, but should simply
wait for the resolutions of the States General. The more stubborn of the nobles
and clergy denied to the King any power to modify the old constitution. The
democrats maintained that a constitution could be made only by the deputies of
the people.
When the
States General were complete, they numbered 308 clergymen, 285 nobles, and 621
representatives of the Third Estate—a total of 1214. Among the ecclesiastical
members only one-third belonged to the higher ranks, including 46 prelates and
55 abbes, and only 7 were monks, a singular proof of the unpopularity of the
regulars, even in their own profession. The remaining two-thirds were cures,
generally ill-disposed towards their superiors and well-disposed towards the
Third Estate. The clergy, thus divided, could ill repel any attack upon its
privileges. Among the nobles 265 belonged to the noblesse of the sword and only
20 to the noblesse of the robe. The heads of the legal profession and the
members of the superior Courts, in some respects the most conservative of the
nobility, were therefore but slightly represented in the States General. The
noblesse of the sword comprised 125 nobles of the Court and 140 provincial
nobles. Here also was a feud only less bitter than the feud which paralysed the
clergy. Among the deputies of the Third Estate were three or four ecclesiastics
like Sieyes and 15 nobles,; of whom Honore de Mirabeau is the best known. There
were about a score of royal and a somewhat larger number of municipal officers.
Merchants, bankers, and citizens of independent fortune numbered about 130.
There were about 15 doctors, and about 40 peasants or farmers. But most
numerous among the deputies were the lawyers. There were about 150 persons
holding various places in the judicial system, and upwards of 210 barristers,
notaries, and other members of the legal profession. More than half of the
deputies of the Third Estate were therefore lawyers, who represented' as a rule
not the conservatism of the Parlements, but the angry discontent of the middle
class, and had as little in common with the chiefs of the profession as the
cures had with the Bishops.
If we
consider the representatives of the Third Estate as a whole, we must
acknowledge that they were men of respectable character and good education,
steeped in the fashionable philosophy, especially in the writings of Rousseau,
proud of their intelligence, industry, and orderly lives, and resentful of the
arrogance and frivolity of the nobles, inexperienced, sanguine, and full of
dogma. The unhappy mutual alienation of classes in France, and the, social
barrier between town and country, denied any adequate representation of that
part of the commons whose minds had been enlarged by commerce and industry on a
grand scale, and who might have been cautious because they had everything to
lose by rashness. In old France the lawyers were almost
the only
class of educated laymen other than nobles to be found in the country
districts; and therefore the country lawyers had an excessive sway in the
National Assembly. The keenest of all the adverse critics of the Revolution has
marked this weakness. “The general composition,” Burke wrote, “ was of obscure
provincial advocates, of stewards of petty local jurisdictions, country
attomies, and the whole train of the ministers of municipal litigation, the
fomentors and conductors of the petty War of village vexation. From the moment
I read the list, I saw distinctly and very nearly as it has happened, all that
was to follow.”
In the actual
course of events the Orders were merged, and the curis gave the Third Estate a
decisive majority. From a body thils composed we might expect alertness in
discovering abuses and zeal to remedy them* but scarcely any large or
deliberate wisdom. We fcdtild not hope for a wide outlook upon society, or for
tact or patience in dealing with vast and complex interests. Nor could the
other Estates supply what was wanting to the commons. Many of the nobles and
Some of the superior clergy were full of generous and humane enthusiasm; but
they were also without political experience. The rancour between classes abated
their influence in the assembly, and the unfortunate legislation regarding the
Church at length drove almost all clergymen into opposition. The National
Assembly contained many excellent members of committee, but very few statesmen,
and to them it rarely listened. No wonder, therefore, that it should have made
many good laws, but have failed entirdy to govern.
But the
members of the States General, as We have seen, were not left to the guidance
of their own judgment. They bore Written instructions which were singularly
full and precise. In order to understand their action we must begin with
analysing their cahiers.
The value of
the cahiers of 1789 to the historian of the French Revolution has long been
acknowledged. It is true that the States General of that year met under
circumstances and were moved by an impulse differing from anything known before
and that they did not consider themselves bound by their instructions so
straitly As did their medieval predecessors. Yet it remains true that the National
Assembly accomplished almost nothing which was not suggested in one or other of
the cahiers. All its most memorable enactments, even thbse most doubtful on the
score of wisdom or of justice, were forestalled in some cahiers at least of the
Third Estate. Instructions so full and precise necessarily had weight with the
deputies; partly because tradition, as we have said, pointed that way and
deputies to the States General had always been regarded more as agents or as
messengers than as senators; partly because the political theory then in
fiashion, the theory of Rousseau, placed sovereign power exclusively in the
general body of the citizens; partly because political inexperience hindered
the public
from seeing
how unwise it was to bind legislators too tightly and thus preclude them from
feeling their joint responsibility for the welfare of all France.
The cahiers
are of two kinds. First there are those of each of the three Estates in the d
Cerent bailliages and senichamsees. The clergy and the nobles respectively drew
up in each case a cahier, which they entrusted to their deputies. But the
cahier of the Third Estate was compounded out of those drawn up by the primary
assemblies of the different towns and parishes. These last, numbering many
thousands, have never been published as a whole; but so many have been printed
that we can form a very good opinion of their character. They are far more
varied and they go much more into detail, than the cahiers finally drawn up for
the bailliages. Upon the whole they give a keener sense of reality. In order to
decide finally upon the historical worth of either class of cahier» we must,
however, trace the method by which they were compiled.
The cahiers
were very generally composed upon certain patterns circulated through France at
the time of the elections. To the influence of these models we may partly
ascribe the surprising uniformity in the cahiers. It is true that their scope
is boundless. In one or other almost every conceivable thing is demanded, from
a declaration of the rights of man down to a better distribution of the lamps
in the streets of Paris. Yet, when we put aside grievances merely local or
trivial, for which redress is sought from the State merely because it had
undertaken to regulate everything, and crotchets which an individual or a
clique has persuaded the neighbours to adopts we are impressed with a certain
monotony in the cahiers. It is not an absolute monotony; there are differences
in form and substance corresponding to the differences in character, intelligence,
occupations, and interests between different bodies of electors. We can see
that the models were most effective by way of suggestion; we cannot assert that
they were blindly followed. We may suppose that they exerted upon the draftsmen
of the cahiers the same kind of influence which the political programme adopted
by party chiefs exerts upon the election addresses of their followers. The
models Were meant to embody the supposed wishes of the bulk of the French
nation; and each neighbourhood learnt, sometimes perhaps with surprise-, what
its wishes were. To be more precise in judgment would, with our information, be
hazardous.
We may next
enquire who drew up the individual cahiers. The cahiers of the bailliages and
senechauss&es were in all cases drawn up by educated men, those of the
Third Estate usually by professional men, members of an intelligent, ambitious,
discontented middle class, who had read Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the
Physiocrats—men steeped in the new ideas of the age, whose workmanship gave a
fresh degree of uniformity to the cahiers, because this class throughout France
was really very
much the same
and formed one naturally coherent party. The cahiers of the villages and
country towns were the work of men of every degree of cultivation.
Sometimes—but this was rare—they were drawn up by a man of letters or an
Economist, who lived in the country; and then they display a logical symmetry
and literary elegance which the Academy might have condescended to applaud, and
which must have astonished the petty farmer or shopkeeper. More often they were
the work of such professional men as the country-side could afford, the notary
or the cure, whose imperfect culture betrays itself in overcharged or even
grotesque rhetoric. Sometimes—-but this is not comraon^-they seem to be the
actual composition of humble folk, who could not frame a sentence or even spell
correctly. The little towns or villages occasionally, no doubt, saved
themselves all further trouble by adopting in gross one of the models then
circulating through France, or an elaborate cahier drawn up for a neighbouring
commune by some inhabitant of unusual influence or ability. In all these ways
it happened that the statement of grievances put forth on behalf of the common
people was not the work exactly of the common man. But this must always be the
case; and here again we are not entitled to suppose that it was drawn up
regardless of the real feelings of those whose grievances it rehearsed, or that
they exerted no choice as to the form which it took. Once more we have to
strike a balance between that which the people gave and that which was given to
them.
Upon the
whole, then, the uniformity of the cahiers is a proof, though not an absolute
proof, of the general emotion which then pervaded the greater part of the
French people. When trying to estimate the truthfulness of the cahiers we must
remember that the public were invited to complain, in which case complaint will
always be loud and bitter; and no man better knows how to complain than the
small farmer struggling with taxes, tithes, and manorial dues. The cahiers are
not to be viewed as a dispassionate account of old French society in all its
good as well as in its evil aspects. They are statements of grievances, and
thus record solely what was bad or was thought to be so. We must allow, too,
for the style of expression then current with all who read and wrote. Rousseau
had brought sensibility into fashion, and he who would be thought a man of
virtue had to live in a laboured state of tenderness. In the cahiers of 1789 we
are often vexed with that vague and tearful rhetoric which flowed so copiously
in all the assemblies of the Revolution. But we often read also the touching
complaints of those who really worked and really suffered. In short, no summary
judgment can be passed upon this enormous mass of documents. The cahiers are
not to be read with blind assurance of their constant and literal truth; and
still less are they to be lightly cast aside as the device of professional
agitators. When all allowances have been made, they show how much was amiss in
France; and they show what reforms were desired by Frenchmen.
1789]
The political reforms proposed.
131
In so far as
purely political change is demanded, the caMers of all three Estates have much
in common. All ranks and conditions of men were weary of despotism. The nobles
and the clergy no less than their inferiors desired a balance of powers, a
constitution. It is true that the cahiers of the First and Second Estates often
imply that a constitution already exists, and has only to be restored and
strengthened, while the caMers of the Third Estate usually assume that a
constitution has to be made. The difference was full of meaning, for the clergy
and nobles desired a somewhat aristocratic liberty, which could only be based
on tradition and precedent, since it was not in accord with the spirit of the
time or the wish of the majority. They wanted to limit the power of the Crown,
without losing their distinctive privileges, and did not know that the Crown
was less unpopular than themselves. The Third Estate preferred to ignore the
old institutions of France as never expressly approved by the people, and so
leave the legislature free to mould the constitution to meet their wishes.
Their cahiers often imply that the States General are to make the new
constitution, thus putting the King on one side and leaving him a mere
provisional sovereign until the new order is established.
That part of
the cahiers which refers to the constitution usually begins with demanding that
the government of France be declared a hereditary monarchy, descending to the
males of the House of Bourbon; and this is indeed the one part of the actual
system which it is desired to preserve. The States General are to be convoked
at regular intervals, the persons of their members are to be inviolable, and
their debates are to be public. We often meet with the demand that the States
General should not be dissolved without their own consent. The executive power
is to remain with the King, but the taxing power is to be in the Estates, and
is taken to include the control of loans and what in England is known as the
appropriation of supply. The legislative power is to belong to the Estates
acting jointly with the King. As a rule it is not proposed to leave the King
any initiative in legislation, and some cahiers would allow him only a
suspensive veto upon measures which have been passed by the National Assembly.
But the ministers are to be appointed and dismissed by the King, for they are
the organs of the executive power which resides in him. We find in the cahiers
no inkling of the cabinet system, which was already at work in England,
although as yet imperfect and not clearly apprehended even by the acutest
political writers. The maxim of Montesquieu that the only security for freedom
is the separation of the executive and legislative powers, which was then
hardly questioned even in England, which has left its impress on the
constitution of the United States, and which was received by Frenchmen smarting
under the evils of unlimited monarchy as absolute truth, was destined to give a
very unfortunate bias to the law-making of the revolutionary period. The
cahiers, it is true, insist upon the
138
responsibility
of ministers to the law and to the nation. But the responsibility which they
contemplate is always criminal. They all demand that a minister who has broken
the law shall undergo the penalty of the law. Political responsibility, the
liability of a minister to lose his place as soon as he loses the confidence of
Parliament, is so far from their intention that they generally demand the
exclusion of ministers from that assembly.
Together with
the remodelling of the national government the cahiers desire the remodelling
of provincial and municipal institutions, which are all to become elective. The
reforms of Necker and Brienne in this field are not condemned, but they are not
thought sufficient. It is sometimes expressly said, and it is often clearly
meant, that the whole of the ancient bureaucratic system, the Intendants and
all their staff, should be abolished. The difficulty attending such a complete
revolution in old habits and feelings seems not to have occurred to those who
drew the cahiers. The necessity of subordinating the municipal to the national
authorities was also forgotten. Both of these oversights were repeated in the
Constitution of 1791.
The cahiers
do not merely seek to divide the powers of government; they are equally
concerned to insist upon the liberties of the citizen. Many of them demand a
formal declaration of the rights of man as the preface to the new constitution.
All classes in France fervently desired what an eminent English jurist terms
“the reign of law,” the supremacy of general rules instead of the ever-varying
discretion of the sovereign and his ministers. The right of personal freedom
is claimed with touching emphasis. The suppression of extraordinary tribunals
and arbitrary arrest is loudly called for. Imprisonment by lettre de cachet is
universally denounced, although many cahiers are disposed to allow it under
certain safeguards where the honour and happiness of families are imperilled by
the misconduct of an individual. The right of property is asserted with almost
equal vigour. It is involved in the demands that taxation should be uniform,
that ground should not be taken for public works without punctual payment in
full, and that the fund-holders should be satisfied. But the hatred called
forth by arbitrary government is most vehemently expressed in certain demands
affecting the army. Some cahiers ask that the foreign corps, which formed so
considerable a part of the French army, should be disbanded. Many cahiers wish
to deprive the ministers of all control over the troops in favour of the
municipal authorities or to make the soldier swear that he will never use his
arms against his fellow-citizens. Frenchmen had felt the sting of despotism;
they did not know how soon they were to feel the more cruel torment of anarchy.
Where the
cahiers of the clergy and nobles usually differ from the cahiers of the
commons, is in wishing to preserve the distinctive character of the three
Estates. The two Orders wish the national assembly to
remain an
assembly of Estates; and with hardly an exception they wish each Estate to form
an independent Chamber, deliberating and voting by itself. They would retain
most of the ancient privileges, save the exemption from taxes, which is
generally renounced; while the cahiers of the Third Estate claim substantial equality,
above all free admission to every preferment civil, military, and
ecclesiastical. Still more urgently do they insist upon deliberation in common
and vote by head in the approaching States General. Forestalling the march of
events, the Third Estate of Dijon intimates that in case of resistance, the
representatives of the commons should join with such nobles or clergymen as may
be willing to form a national assembly and remodel the State by their own
authority. All three Estates desired political freedom and self-government; but
the First and Second desired an aristocratic, the Third a democratic, type of
society.
With regard
to law and justice, the Third Estate has many more complaints than the other
two. It suffered more from the abuses of the judicial system than they did. The
members of the higher Courts of justice were a privileged class, mostly noble
and bound by many ties to the rest of the nobility. The lower Courts of justice
were mbstly seigniorial and in the possession of the First and Second Estates.
It is in the cahiers of towns and parishes that we find the most minute and
acrid complaints of the way in which justice is administered. All the Estates
agreed, it is true, in calling for uniform justice and in denouncing
extraordinary Courts and arbitrary intervention by the executive power.
Similarly we find in cahiers of all three Estates the demand for a humane
criminal law and a better criminal procedure. Publicity of criminal trials,
permission to the accused to avail himself of counsel, and the decision of
guilt or innocence by a jury, are demanded in cahiers of all the Orders. But
the cahiers of the Third Estate ask for much more. Very often they desire a
complete recasting of the judicial system. They ask for such a rearrangement of
the Courts as shall make justice readily accessible to all, limit the number of
appeals, and save time and expense. They ask that the judicial office shall no
longer be purchaseable or hereditary, often indeed that it shall be in some
measure elective. They ask that the judges shall be irremovable. They wish the
judges to be paid by salaries, not by fees. The Parlements are very seldom
mentioned with favour, and are often denounced with a bitterness which proves
how extinct was their somewhat unreal popularity. The seigniorial Courts are as
a rule disliked. A cahier here and there dwells on the advantage of having
close at hand a Court where petty disputes may be settled, and even suggests
that the decision of the seigniorial judge should be made final where the value
at stake is below a certain figure. But the general drift of the cahiers runs
the other way. They allege that the judges in the feudal Courts, appointed,
paid, and dismissed by the seigneur,
140
The financial reforms
suggested. [i789
cannot be
impartial as between him and his vassals. They allege that he is often
unqualified, or non-resident, or careless. They complain that the seigneur
neglects the duty of criminal prosecntion because it would cause expense, and
that for the same reason the seigniorial prisons are not properly maintained.
They insist, too, on the extraordinary interlacing of feudal jurisdictions and
the difficulty in many cases of deciding to what feudal court the litigant
should go. Upon the whole the Third Estate was ready to extirpate every trace
of feudalism from the administration of justice and to reserve it entirely for
the Crown and the nation.
The financial
reforms demanded in the cahiers would alone amount to a revolution. Upon the
suppression of privilege in taxation the three Estates were virtually agreed.
The clergy without exception concede this point, although in some bailliages
they wish to retain the power of assessing payments by clergymen. Only in five
bailliages do the nobles demur to forgoing the privilege, although in a few
more they ask for relief to the poorest members of the class. The Third Estate
is of course unanimous on this point, sometimes grateful to the others for
their public spirit, sometimes inclined to treat their surrender as a tardy
atonement for prolonged injustice. The Estates are also agreed as to the chief
means for protecting the State against the chronic deficits of the past. They
agree in reserving the power of taxation and appropriation to the
representatives of the people, in requiring the regular publication of accounts
of revenue and expenditure, and in demanding the responsibility of ministers.
They call for rigorous economy, especially in pensions, which had always
attracted disproportionate notice; but they acknowledge that the nation is
bound to make good the deficit and to satisfy the claims of the public
creditor, although one or two cahiers suggest that the interest on the debt
might be reduced without injustice. What is more serious is that most cahiers,
especially of the Third Estate, condemn the whole fiscal system on two grounds,
one speculative and the other practical. All the existing taxes have been
imposed without the consent of the people, and are therefore unlawful, although
the representatives of the people may continue them until a new system has been
established. Almost all the existing taxes are also condemned as unwise and
oppressive, in fact economically pernicious. The direct taxes, taille,
capitation, and vimgtiemes, and nearly all the indirect taxes —the gabelle, the
aides, the duties on iron, leather, and various other articles—are condemned.
Only two considerable sources of revenue are spared: the customs and the stamps
on certain classes of documents. Even here radical changes are required, for
customs duties are henceforward to be levied on the frontiers only, and the
stamp duties are to be revised and lowered. In proposing new sources of revenue
the authors of the cahiers have been influenced partly by the teaching of the
Physiocrats, partly by democratic ideas, partly by the special needs
and
prejudices of the country population. Generally speaking direct taxation is
preferred to indirect, not ten cahiers in all favouring the continuance of
indirect taxes other than the customs. A direct tax is to be imposed on all the
land of the kingdom; and it is sometimes suggested that this should be taken in
kind. A direct tax is to be laid on property other than land and on the gains
of trades and professions. Special taxes upon articles of luxury are often
recommended. It is the general wish of the cahiers that the assessment and
collection of taxes should be entrusted to the provincial and municipal
assemblies. All desire to end the practice of farming the taxes. With a view to
the extinction of the debt many cahiers advise that the domain of the Crown
should be sold; a few suggest the sale of the lands of the Church. It is
characteristic of the time and the people that this prodigious series of
reforms is regarded as something which can be effected with little trouble or delay.
Only two cahiers, it is said, and those drawn up by the clergy, recognise that
this financial renovation will be a work of time.
When the
cahiers touch upon the affairs of the Church, the divergence between the three
Estates becomes very notable. The clergy themselves, while consenting to forgo
all exemption from taxes, wish to retain their property and honorary privileges
intact. They ask that the nation shall take over the debt of the clergy as
having been incurred for public purposes. The changes which they recommend in
the application of endowments are few and restricted. They jealously insist on
maintaining the supremacy of the Catholic Church and the authority of their
Order. Even when they disclaim any wish to persecute heretics who do not defy
or insult the established faith, they protest against the permission of any
public worship other than the Catholic, and even against the civil equality of
heretics with the faithful. Often they demand that the edict of 1787 conceding
the civil status to Protestants be revised. They very generally demand severe
penalties against the authors and publishers of infidel books, to which they
ascribe the flagrant immorality and iireligion of the time. They often desire
the restoration of national and provincial councils, the strict maintenance of
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and a restraint on the royal right known as the
regale. They condemn the suppression of religious Houses, which had been going
on for many years past, and desire that hereafter none be suppressed save in
conformity with the Canon Law. They often ask that all colleges should be
entrusted to the teaching confraternities, and that all places of education
should be supervised by the Ordinary. In short they demand that in many
respects the State should do more for the Church than it had done hitherto.
The tone of
the nobles towards the Church is very different. They usually express a wish,
it is true, that the privileges of the clergy other than exemption from taxes
should be preserved; but they show no desire
to increase
the power of the Church or to lessen the freedom of the laity. The demand that
the Catholic Church should remain dominant is not so often repeated as the
demand for toleration. The nobles, like other laymen, evidently approved as a
body the growing freedom of opinion. Some at least of the nobles would approve
the suppression of religious Houses and the diversion of some ecclesiastical
endowments to new purposes. When we come to the cahiers of the Third Estate,
especially the countless cahiers of towns and parishes, we understand how the
foundation of the power of the Church in the good-will of the laity had been
shaken, and how the actual state of the Church excited the anger of many who
were not conscious of rejecting her doctrines. The cahiers seldom contain
anything relating to doctrine or worship. The desire for complete religious
freedom is generally expressed in the cahiers of the bailli'iges, the work of a
class possessing considerable culture. But alike in them and in the ruder
statements of grievances drawn up by the primary assemblies, the material
condition of the Church and its share in the national wealth are perpetual
themes of complaint. The parochial clergy, it is true, are usually mentioned
with respect, often with affection, as hardworking, pious, and benevolent men;
and it is desired time after time that they should have a better livelihood. If
they were properly endowed they could dispense with the camel—^the fees for
marriages, baptisms, etc.—and the quite or glane—the periodic demand of dues
from their parishioners. But it would be hard to find any cordial mention of
the Bishops and Archbishops. The regular clergy are more unpopular still. They
are again and again denounced as wealthy, idle, and avaricious, drawing large
sums in tithe and rent from parishes where they dispense no charity, and will
not even contribute to the stipend of the priest or the repair of the fabric.
Some cahiers insist that the tithes they hold should be restored to the
respective parishes and used for religion, charity, and education. Others wish
to see dwindling communities more rapidly suppressed; and a few would do away
with all religious Orders not engaged in active teaching or benevolence. Their
estates might then be sold to pay off the public debt. Tithe, to whomsoever
paid, was naturally disliked by the peasants, who ask to have it extinguished
or at least reduced. A few carry thrift so far as to complain of all payments
to the Court of Rome or even to suggest the institution of a French patriarch.
Now and then a cahier anticipates the National Assembly by demanding that the
State should enter upon the endowments of the Church and should pay a fixed
stipend to all the clergy whose services may be thought necessary.
But it is in regard
to the agrarian system that the cahiers of the Third Estate differ most
materially from those of the clergy and the nobles, who usually demand the
fiill recognition of their proprietary rights, including all manorial claims.
The Third Estate on the contrary expresses a general desire for the extinction
of feudal rights. And when
we pass from
the cahiers of the bailliages and sinichaussees to the original cahiers of the
country parishes, we find that the feudal rights are the peculiar object of the
peasant’s hate. In some of these cahiers little is said about any other
grievance. Among the manorial burdens perhaps the mqst odious were the
so-called banalites, the lord’s exclusive right to have a mill, oven,
winepress, or oilpress for the use of the tenants. The lord’s right to have a
dovecote was almost as great a grievance. Many of the village cahiers ask that
if this right be retained, the pigeons may at least be shut up in seed-time and
harvest, or that the peasants may be allowed to shoot them. A long list of
manorial rights prevailing in different neighbourhoods, such as a right of the
lord to use the peasants’ cattle in drawing stones for the mill or a right of
the lord to employ the peasants in clearing out the moat round his house, and
others, of which the nature is sometimes obscure, are recorded and denounced in
these cahiers. The various payments to the lord in money or in kind are of
course unpopular. Usually it is proposed to commute all manorial rights having
a definite money value at so many years’ purchase, although in some cases the
offer of compensation is omitted. Occasionally a cahier proposes other agrarian
reforms, such as the abolition of entail or the enforcement of equal or nearly
equal partition between children. But in most cases the cahiers of the peasants
are confined to grievances which they felt directly. Among these the
over-preservation of game must not be forgotten. The cahiers of Paris outside
the walls affirm that during the last twelve years the country-folk have been forced
to sow their com and vegetables twice over, and in winter have had to guard
their vines and trees against the teeth of the hares by wrapping them round
with straw. The grievance was still greater when the an;: lals thus
protected were fierce and destructive.
Few burdens
are so often denounced by the peasants as that of the militia service. Time
after time the cahiers complain of the loss incurred by those who have to
attend the balloting, of the subscription which, contrary to law, the young
fellows who had escaped made for their comrade on whom the lot fell, and of the
discredit attaching to those who served in the militia. At least one cahier
asserts that men had been known to mutilate themselves in order to avoid
service. Many cahiers suggest that the parishes should be allowed to hire an
equivalent number of volunteers. When we think how few recruits were taken and
how easy was the service required, and how patiently the French have since
endured the severest conscription with far greater chances of death and
disablement, we are almost forced to conclude that the rhetoric of the cahiers
was somewhat overcharged. It is true that unjust exemptions from the ballot and
other abuses might make them impatient of a burden in itself not very grievous.
Many of the
other reforms demanded in the cahiers are of the highest significance. They
anticipated Napoleon in desiring the career open to
144
The general character of the demands.
[l789
talent, for
they ask over and over again that all citizens should be equally eligible to
all preferment, civil, military, or ecclesiastical, that nobles should be
enabled to practise any profession or engage in commerce without derogating,
and that the gilds and all other forms of restraint on the free exercise of
ability should be extinguished. They ask, often it is true in vague terms, that
education should be reformed and provided at the public expense. They demand
the suppression of mendicity, and an orderly system for relieving distress
without encouraging idleness. They desire the reform of hospitals and prisons.
They claim the emancipation of the last remaining serfs at home and the
abolition of the slave trade in the colonies. These and many other fruitful
ideas are to be found in cahiers, not only of the Third Estate, but also of the
nobles and clergy. For the spirit of improvement was widely diffused, and the
love of mankind which was on the lips of all was in the hearts of many.
He must be
wanting in human sympathy who feels no response in his own soul to this
generous ardour of a great people, this zeal to redress inveterate injustice
and set order in place of confusion. The wide sweep of the French Revolution
was the secret of its charm for mankind as well as a cause of its partial
failure. The French undoubtedly attempted far too much, and with means the
most imperfect; for a working parliamentary system is the slow result of time
and labour. Practice, discipline, party organisation, the feeling of
responsibility raised in those who censure by the knowledge that they may
presently have to govern, the control exerted by a public accustomed to hear
all sides and to learn from all—these are barely enough to secure judgment and
forethought in a parliament working under normal conditions. In 1789 a new
assembly of untrained men was set between a weak, discredited, bankrupt
government and a people rapidly passing beyond control, and in the midst of
anarchy essayed not merely to govern but to create a government, nay more, to
reconstruct a society which had lasted many centuries and numbered many
millions of citizens. The enterprise was so much beyond human power that we
cannot wonder if the National Assembly succeeded in destroying far more than it
could rebuild.
THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY, AND THE SPREAD OF ANARCHY.
The place of meeting for the States General had been
discussed in the Royal Council. With a foreboding of the danger which might
ensue if they met in Paris, Barentin, the Keeper of the Seals, had suggested
Soissons or some other provincial town conveniently situated. Necker demurred
to the expense of removing the Court in the actual distress of the Treasury. He
would have preferred Paris as the place of assembly, because in Paris the
fund-holders were most numerous and had most power over public opinion—a weighty
recommendation in the eyes of a financier who desired the convocation of the
States General chiefly as a means of restoring the national credit. But the
majority of the councillors wished the States General to meet at Versailles,
where the King, Court, and Ministers were already established, thus saving time
and trouble and causing no break in the comfortable tenour of their own lives.
The King decided in favour of Versailles, and the palace of Louis XIV became
the birthplace of modern democracy, as it afterwards became that of the German
Empire.
As to the
graver question, what should be done with the States General when they met, the
King and his Ministers were still without a policy and lost in the forms and
traditions of the past. They had not even determined how far they would go in
resisting the fusion of the three Estates. The officers of the Court had
considered the etiquette suitable to a session of the States General, and,
guided only by precedent, had chosen all the forms most apt to emphasise the
distinction between the Orders, and therefore to incense those whom it was so
important to conciliate. Men of the middle class are naturally disposed to
prize the condescension of a sovereign, and Frenchmen have always been
sensitive on points of ceremony. Prudence therefore enjoined extreme courtesy
towards the Third Estate and the quiet suppression of such antiquated usages as
might wound their new sense of power and dignity. The contrary course was
taken; and the deputies of the Third Estate were made to feel that they were
deemed inferior to the clergy and the nobles.
146
The meeting of the States General.
These
deputies, already convinced that the fusion of the Orders was the only means of
securing the vast reforms which they desired, were not cowed but exasperated by
treatment so injudicious. They immediately engaged in a conflict with the
nobles and the superior clergy, who took their stand upon tradition, and,
encouraged by the demeanour of the King and his Ministers, sought to preserve
for themselves a separate existence and equal power. The King, at length
interposing, did far too little to decide the issue, but far too much for his
own popularity. It was not until many weeks of precious time had been lost,
until party feeling had been fearfully embittered, until the Crown had lost the
little influence it still retainedj and France had passed the verge of
dissolution, that the Third Estate carried its point and turned the ancient
States General into a modem Constituent Assembly.
On Monday,
May 4, 1789, took place the religious ceremony which preceded the opening of
the session. The deputies of the Three Estates met at the church of Notre Dame
and marched in procession to the church of St Louis, where mass was celebrated
and the Bishop of Nancy preached a sermon. Although the deputies assembled at
seven, the King did not appear until ten o’clock. Agreeably to ancient usage,
the members of the Third Estate were plainly attired in black, a mortifying
contrast with the splendid garb of the nobles and prelates. The clergy of
Versailles led the way, then came the Third Estate, then the nobles, and after
them the clerical deputies, and last of all the King and Queen, surrounded by
the Princes and Princesses of the Blood Royal. An immense multitude thronged
the streets, the balconies, and the roofs of Versailles. It received the Third
Estate with loud applause, the nobles and clergy with indifference. It gave a
cordial welcome to the King, but to him alone, for the Princes passed without
notice, and the Queen was deeply wounded by the too apparent disfavour of the
public. The Bishop’s sermon reflected the inconsistent feelings of many among
his audience. While he exhausted his art in describing the misery of the
people, especially the intolerable burden of the taxes, he was careful to
remind the Third Estate that they must not expect too much, and that the
surrender of privilege must always be a matter of grace, not of compulsion. But
the deputies, who were not yet in an irritable frame of mind, listened with facile
enthusiasm. Indeed the men of our colder age can ill comprehend the ecstasy
which was then all but universal. “ Tears of joy flowed from my eyes. My God,
my country, my fellow-citizens had become myself.” Such were the emotions of
the plain, sensible Ferrieres, a Marquis and a conservative.
On the
following day the King opened the session of the States General. The
authorities of the palace, inexperienced in the needs of a parliament, had not
been judicious in their preparations. For the place of assembly they had chosen
the Salle des Menus Plaisirs, merely because it was an enormous room and could
be spared. It had been
1789]
147
hastily
fitted up; and no provision was made to separate the deputies from mere
spectators. Although the deputies had been summoned for eight o’clock, the
ceremony did not begin till ten; and, while the nobles and clergy passed freely
through the great door, the men of the Third Estate were kept waiting in a
narrow corridor until the roll of the bailliages had been called. When at
length all the deputies had taken their places, the King entered, and in a few
words declared the session open. At his command, the Keeper of the Seals then
delivered a long oration, in which he dwelt upon a number of reforms proper to
employ the attention of the Estates. But the most significant passage was a
declaration that the King left the Orders free to determine whether they should
sit and vote jointly or separately. When the Keeper of the Seals had ended,
Neeker began to read his report on the state of the finances; but it was so
long that he found his voice fail and handed it to a secretary. The report was
neither candid nor politic. It was not candid, because Necker in his eagerness
to show how much had already been done to restore the finances, put the deficit
at 56,000,000 livres,. little more than a third of the figures given by Brienne
the year before. He did this by ignoring certain expenses styled extraordinary
and certain reimbursements of loans contracted by the State, although both were
matters of obligation. Nor was the report politic, because Necker, instead of
suggesting large reforms, proposed to cover the deficit by a number of
expedients, some of them judicious, but all too petty to impress a popular
assembly. Like the Keeper of the Seals, he invited the deputies to consider a
long list of subjects, and dwelt on the momentous character of their labours,
yet spoke of joint deliberation by the three Orders as a procedure which might
be useful in some cases, but must in all cases be voluntary. He was applauded
as a matter of course; but, when the ceremony was over and the deputies of the
Third Estate had time to reflect, they could not but be disappointed; and from
this day, although at first by slow degrees, Necker’s popularity began to
abate.
It should be
noted that, on this memorable occasion the Ministers, while inviting the
deputies to an immense range of discussion, did not lay before them any
definite proposals on behalf of the Crown. No bills were brought into the
States General by the King’s advisers. No attempt was made to utilise for the
States General the skill and experience of the public offices. No provision was
made for guiding debate into useful channels. The Crown neglected to take that
initiative which is of such invaluable consequence in legislation, and left the
dearest interests of France at the mercy of a raw, unpractised assembly of
twelve hundred men, who were not agreed even upon the primary matter of their
own constitution. Yet we should err if we ascribed this procedure, in English
eyes so unreasonable, to perversity or to a deep-laid scheme for rendering the
States General futile and ridiculous. It originated in nothing worse
than blind
adherence to the traditions of a remote age. As we have seen, the States
General had never been a legislature in the true sense, nor had the King’s
Ministers ever sat in the States General. To petition for the redress of
grievances had been the function of the States General; to grant or to withhold
redress had been the prerogative of the Crown. When, therefore, the States
General were revived after long disuse, it seemed enough that the King through
his Ministers should encourage them to ask for reforms and promise his most
serious consideration of all their requests. To guide the debates seemed
needless; to influence them seemed improper. When certain Breton deputies, more
alive to the spirit of the time, assured Bertrand de Molleville of their
anxiety to support the Crown and asked for guidance, he consulted Necker, who
declined on principle all private communication with members of the States
General. As during the elections, so in the first days of the session, the
government remained passive and left to chance that direction which it refused
to assume. It was soon to learn the consequences of reviving obsolete
institutions in a society where everything had become new.
Before the
deputies could act, it was necessary that their powers should be verified: in
other words, that each should satisfy his colleagues of his right to the
character which he claimed. The conflict between the Estates therefore took the
form of a dispute as to whether the verification of powers should be joint or
separate. On the morning of May 6 the deputies of the Third Estate found themselves
alone in the Salle des Menus Plaisirs, the nobles and the clergy having
assembled in their respective Chambers. The clergy resolved upon separate
verification of powers, but only by 133 voices to 114, a few of the prelates
and a great number of the curis voting in the minority. The nobles resolved
upon the same course by the decisive majority of 188 to 47, and promptly began
the work of verification. As the men of the Third Estate were determined to
enforce joint verification, they were in a singular position. For they could
not act, they could not even debate without organising themselves in some
degree; and they were afraid lest in giving themselves an organisation they
should seem to accept the position of a separate Chamber. They were, moreover, a
mere crowd of persons unknown to one another, and with less Parliamentary
experience than most English schoolboys. Under these difficulties they behaved
with constancy and astuteness. They agreed to name the senior deputy present
their doyen, and began an informal debate on the question of the hour. Then and
afterwards they had an advantage in occupying the hall which had been dedicated
to the use of the collective States General, and which was spacious enough to
admit the public; while the First and Second Estates, sitting elsewhere and in
private, seemed mere fragments of the national representation.
Parties and
leaders could not exist in an assembly altogether new, but men soon learn to
measure themselves and others in debate, and in
a few days
certain members took an acknowledged ascendancy over their fellows. Among these
was Mounier, perhaps the best known politician in France, esteemed an oracle
upon all questions of Parliamentary procedure, and Sieyes, whose pamphlets had
signalised him as the champion of the Third Estate. Among those of a
conservative temper Malouet speedily gained a distinction due even more to his
character than to his abilities. But these men were presently overshadowed by
one who had no recommendations save genius and courage, whose reputation was
not far removed from infamy, and who, though it was impossible to despise and
difficult to hate him, was deeply distrusted by almost all his colleagues.
Honore-Gabriel Riqueti, Comte de Mirabeau, the scion of an ancient Proven9al
house, was now in his forty-first year. His father, the Marquis de Mirabeau, a
man of rare though perverse talent, and of the strangest, most gnarled
character, half feudal lord, half modem philanthropist, was a voluminous writer
upon political and economical subjects, a worshipper of Quesnay, a fanatic
among the Physiocrats. From early years young Mirabeau gave proof of an
overflowing energy, a boundless versatility, a unique power of fascinating men
and women, but also of a most irregular and ungovernable temperament. He was
incessantly at war with his father, who procured several lettres de cachet for
his confinement. He made an unwise and unhappy marriage which resulted, after
ten years of scandal, in a judicial decree of separation. By the abduction of
Madame Monnier he brought upon himself a capital sentence, never meant to be
executed, and a rigorous imprisonment of more than three years in the castle of
Vincennes. When he regained his freedom, it was only to break finally with both
wife and father. He escaped to a wandering life in England, Prussia, and
elsewhere, earned his bread now as a hack writer and now as a secret agent of
the French Foreign Office, and came to be recognised by ministers as a useful
if not very trustworthy instrument. Seldom has any man destined to greatness
led a life not only so immoral but so ignoble as Mirabeau led until he had
reached middle age. That he pursued his amours without shame or scruple might
admit of palliation in so dissolute a society. But he was lacking in every form
of delicacy. Careless of truth, abounding in profusion, unmeasured in his
language of enmity or friendship, and too often stooping to dishonourable
tricks, such as the unauthorised publication of his correspondence from Berlin
when serving the French government, he almost deserved the bitter gibes and
reproaches with which his father coupled every mention of his name. And yet
Mirabeau had a warm, expansive nature, capable of high ambitions and sensitive
to great ideas. Austerely moral men such as Malouet and Romilly were convinced
of his disposition to goodness; and, indeed, without some genuine worth he
could not have won so many devoted friends.
In the depths
of poverty and shame Mirabeau was sustained by a patrician arrogance which
sorted oddly with his later character of tribune,
150
Mirabeau and his
assistants. [i789
by a most
sanguine spirit, and above all by the consciousness of extraordinary powers.
From the time when the King promised to convoke the States General he felt the
assurance of an illustrious career. When Provence recovered its Estates, he
offered himself as the champion of the popular party against his own order. In
retaliation the nobles denied his claim to a seat among them, on the ground
that he was not possessor of a fief, the qualification required by usage in
Provence. Their enmity only endeared him the more to the common people. At the
time of the elections for the States General he quelled by mere personal
influence two formidable outbreaks, in Aix and in Marseilles respectively, and
was elected by both cities a deputy for the Third Estate. He preferred to sit
for Aix, and returned to Paris already a conspicuous public man.
Mirabeau’s
true bent was to action. Although he always read greedily, especially when a
prisoner, it was without method and without making himself master of any
subject. Although he was a facile writer, turning out translations, histories,
essays, pamphlets, and economic dissertations in endless succession, none of
his works has any lasting value beyond the light which it sheds on the author.
He possessed an extraordinary art of using other men’s minds and appropriating
the fruits of their labour. It is impossible to say how much of his books was
written by himself. Thus the main drudgery of his famous work On the Prussian
Monarchy under Frederick II was done by a certain Major Mauvillon, and Mirabeau
only set the impress of his thought and style upon the material. In his brief
political career he had many assistants, such as Dumont, Duroveray, Claviere, and
Reybaz, who fed his untiring activity with information, with drafts of laws and
pamphlets, and even with notes of speeches. Aulard thinks that we cannot
positively ascribe to Mirabeau any of the orations which he read in the tribune
; only the improvisations being certainly and entirely his own. Yet none can
say that Mirabeau owed power or fame to plagiarism. Nobody has ventured to
dispute his genius as an orator. He was a true rhetorician, rhetorical even in
his familiar letters, with the full-flowing, vehement rhetoric of the South;
but, in spite of all his fire and facility, he was not a debater, for he poured
himself forth in a single effort and did not excel in reply. His biographer,
Lomenie, endorses Macaulay’s epithet of a Wilkes- Chatham as descriptive of
Mirabeau’s peculiar eloquence. A large and powerful frame, a species of heroic
ugliness, mobile and expressive features, and a thick mane of dark hair, made
up a presence which held and overawed his hearers; and he had the true orator’s
voice.
If Mirabeau
was original as an orator, he was still more original as a statesman. His
natural insight had been sharpened in a life of struggle and adventure. He
neither bad the small, systematic mind of the country curb or lawyer, nor
shared the illusions of the courtiers and prelates who basked in the splendour
of Versailles. The fuller knowledge which we now possess clears him from the
old reproach of apostasy, and enables
us to see
that his political tendencies remained the same throughout. From the first he
perceived that the Revolution was irresistible, and would be far-reaching. He
saw that the ancient form of society, and above all the privileged orders, were
doomed to disappear. At the same time he honestly desired a real government. “
Do not multiply vain declamations; revive the executive power.” In this spirit
he desired to preserve the monarchy, and restore to it as much strength as
would be compatible with the Parliamentary system. He looked down upon his
colleagues with a disdain, partly of birth, partly of conscious power; and he
foretold that they would not stop until they had plunged France into chaos. As
early as May, 1789, he had offered the Crown his services to guide and control
the Revolution. But his inward tendency was obscured by many outward
circumstances. A poor, discredited adventurer, he felt that he must play the
demagogue in order to reach the position which he knew himself able to fill.
Though proud of his rank, he knew himself despised and rejected by his brother
nobles; and his scorn for their incapacity was embittered by resentment. His
endeavours towards an understanding with the King and the Ministers were all in
vain; they knew his vices, they could not understand his powers, and they saw
in him little more than an agitator trying to raise his price. It must be
acknowledged too that, with all his energy of character, Mirabeau was unstable.
His angry father once declared that for a soul he had only a mirror where
everything painted itself and disappeared in an instant. We must not expect to
find in Mirabeau’s career that high consistency to which statesmen of firmer
and purer nature and less severely tried have sometimes risen.
His first act
as a deputy was to publish a journal entitled Journal des iiats gbieraux with
the significant motto “Norms rerum nascitur ordo.” In the first number,
published on May 5, he had complained of the irritating etiquette imposed on
the Third Estate, and had criticised the sermon of the Bishop of Nancy. In the
second he made a fierce onslaught upon Necker’s address to the States General.
As he had asked no permission to set up his journal, and Ministers were not
wont to be thus roughly handled, there forthwith appeared a decree of the
Council suppressing it, and another announcing that the actual press
regulations would be enforced until the Estates had considered the subject and
the King had determined what changes were desirable. Mirabeau replied by
bringing out a new journal, Lettres du Comte de Mirabeau a ses commet- tants,
thus sheltering himself behind his character of deputy, and began with a fiery
denunciation of ministerial despotism. The ever-retreating government then
announced that journals and periodicals might publish all that passed in the
States General, but must abstain from comment. This proviso was ignored from
the first by Mirabeau, and soon by everybody.
Even in the
first day’s discussion some hasty spirits among the Third ■
Estate
proposed that they should constitute themselves a National Assembly and proceed
to business forthwith. Malouet proposed that they should send deputations to
argue with the clergy and the nobles; but Mounier objected that by taking this
course they would seem to acknowledge themselves a separate Chamber. On the
second day Mirabeau, for the first time addressing his colleagues, urged that
they should remain passive, but Mounier, changing his mind, supported Malouet
and advised negotiations with the nobles and the clergy. The nobles had
adjourned until May 11, but the clergy returned an encouraging answer and
announced that they would choose representatives to discuss the subject of
verification with the other Estates. The nobles when they reassembled declared
themselves a separate Chamber, but accepted the proposed conference. The Third
Estate was divided on this point. Le Chapelier, a deputy from Rennes, with
Breton vehemence proposed to cut short the controversy by declaring that they
would recognise as lawful representatives only those persons whose powers had
been verified in a joint assembly. But, after a debate which lasted until May
18, commissioners were nominated to confer with the commissioners of the
nobles.
The
conferences took place on May 23 and 25, in presence of the representatives of
the clergy acting as friendly neutrals. The nobles alleged history and
precedent in favour of the separation of the Orders. The commissioners of the
Third Estate replied that history and precedent could be quoted for either
course, but that reason and justice were in favour of the Orders acting
jointly. Neither party was convinced, and the conferences ended without result.
The Third Estate, who had meanwhile been considering their own organisation and
procedure, now resolved to try an appeal to the clergy. On May 27 they solemnly
invited the clergy to a joint verification of powers, and many of the inferior
clergy were visibly disposed to join them at once; but the leaders had enough
influence to prevent immediate action, and the favourable impulse cooled. At
the desire, doubtless, of those who wished to gain time, the King now
interposed to enjoin a renewal of the conferences in the presence of the Keeper
of the Seals and commissioners specially appointed. The clergy assented at
once; the nobles and the Third Estate were for opposite reasons more reluctant;
but Mirabeau, faithful to the principle of deference for the Crown, persuaded
his colleagues to acquiesce, and at the same time to appoint a deputation which
might lay before the King the reasons for their conduct. The conferences were
thus renewed and lasted from June 1 to 9; but, none of the middle ways proposed
finding favour with both parties, no result ensued beyond loss of time and
further exasperation. Meantime the King had treated the Third Estate with siii6ular
want of tact. The illness of his eldest son, which presently proved fatal, was
a valid reason for delay in receiving their deputation; but the reluctance to
cast aside forms of etiquette which
were
considered humiliating was at such a crisis puerile. It was not until June 6
that the deputation was admitted to the royal presence.
The
conferences having failed, Sieyes, encouraged by Mirabeau, moved on June 10
that the Third Estate should for the last time invite the clergy and nobles to
a joint verification of powers, announcing at the same time that they would
proceed to verify forthwith. The proposal was carried by an overwhelming
majority; and it was agreed to send a second deputation to the King to state
the reasons for this decisive step. As neither the nobles nor the clergy
responded to the summons, the Third Estate took action on June 12. Bailly, who
chanced to be then acting as doyen, was named provisional President; the roll
of the bailliages was called; and the work of verification began. All through
that day the deputies were left to themselves; but on the next they were joined
by three cures from Poitou, and on June 14 six other clergymen followed the
example. On that day the verification of powers was completed; and the Third
Estate, now regarding themselves as an actual parliament, had to consider what
title they should assume.
The new
debate thus begun lasted three days. It was difficult indeed to find an
appellation which should express all that the Third Estate and their few
adherents claimed to be, and yet not wholly ignore the rights of the other
Orders who might possibly come to terms. Various titles, sometimes verging upon
the grotesque, were proposed. Sieyes moved that the house should style itself
“The Assembly of the known and verified representatives of the French nation.”
Barere, objecting to this style on the ground that it assumed too much, offered
as an alternative, “legitimate representatives of the majority.of
Frenchmen." Mounier, studying accuracy more than effect, gravely suggested
that they should call themselves, “The Lawful Assembly of the Representatives
of the majority of Frenchmen acting in the absence of the minority.” Always
anxious not to push matters to a breach with the King, Mirabeau advised that
the House should entitle itself, “The Assembly of the Representatives of the
People.” But the deputies did not relish the appellation of representatives of
the people, because “people” might be taken as the equivalent of “populace.” In
vain Mirabeau urged that the friends of freedom had often assumed names far
less honourable, even names devised by the malice of their enemies, and had
turned these into badges of glory. Far from having any effect upon jealous and
distrustful colleagues, his arguments called forth a storm of abuse and
contradiction which even Mirabeau could not encounter. In the midst of this
hubbub Legrand, a deputy from Berry, proposed that they should denominate
themselves “ The National Assembly.” The term had already been applied to the
States General in various pamphlets and cahiers and even by the King himself.
It did full justice to the pretensions of the deputies; it was short,
dignified, and popular, and, in a word, had so many advantages that Sieyes,
catching the sense of his hearers, withdrew his original motion and
adopted the
term proposed by Legrand. On the morning of June 17, after a long and fierce
debate, the amended motion of Sieyes was carried by 491 voices to 90, although
Malouet asserts that the minority would have been far larger but for
intimidation.
The die was
now cast, and the Revolution had begun. Whatever differences of opinion might
be possible regarding the constitution of the ancient States General, it was
certain that a single Estate, in assuming the character of a national
assembly, did something altogether new and altogether exceeding its legal
powers. Although it allowed the deputies of the clergy and nobles to enter as
individuals, it denied a separate existence to those Estates which in law were
its equals. In taking its new title, it shook off all the restraints which
tradition had imposed on the action of any one Estate, or of all the Estates
together. By doing this without the sanction of the Crown, the supreme
legislator for centimes, it advanced a claim to recast the constitution of the
kingdom. The spokesmen of the Third Estate could defend their policy only by an
appeal to abstract reason and justice, in other words by denying validity to
the actual institutions of France. Their favourite argument that the
representatives of twenty-four millions of men should prevail over the
representatives of two hundred thousand implied, indeed, that no government
other than extreme democracy can ever be legitimate, and involved consequences
which most of them would hardly have cared to acknowledge. Yet it must be
admitted that there were very cogent reasons for this momentous decision of the
Third Estate. The historic constitution of the States General was obsolete, and
the attempt to revive it was a grave error. Such were the hindrances to reform
that a revolution of some kind was perhaps unavoidable. But it was natural that
Mirabeau, in his desire to abridge that revolution and to save the authority of
the Crown, should have preferred a more modest title. Many months afterwards he
said to Dumont, “ Ah ! my friend, how right we were in our unwillingness that
the Third Estate should term itself ‘ The National Assembly ’ 1 ”
The Assembly
showed itself aware of the true nature of its action by the measures which it
now took against a possible attack from the Crown. These measures had been indicated
by Mirabeau on June 15, but they were actually drafted and proposed by Target
and Le Chapelier. It was decreed that all the existing taxes, although
unlawful, not having been sanctioned by the people, should continue to be paid
as formerly until the day on which the National Assembly should first separate,
after which all taxes not expressly authorised by the nation should cease and
determine. The Assembly further declared that, immediately after fixing the
principles of the constitution, it would proceed to examine and consolidate the
public debt, and that it placed the public creditor under the guarantee of the
honour and loyalty of the French nation. It also promised an enquiry at the
earliest possible date into the causes and remedies of the
scarcity. The
first of these resolutions made it hopeless in the actual state of France for
the Crown to levy any taxes unless it remained on good terms with the Assembly.
The second enlisted all the fund-holders in the popular cause; and the third
appealed to all who were hungry, or who feared to be so. It is true that the
assertion of the unlawfulness of the actual taxes made the taxpayers more bold
than ever to delay or refuse payment. The revenue became more and more
difficult to collect; and the deficit, quite curable at the opening of the
States General, became enormous. But the Assembly distrusted the King too much
to regret this disorder, and soon found in the confiscation of the Church lands
a resource which it fondly thought inexhaustible. Its resolutions were
admirably adapted to their immediate purpose, and its skill and vigour
contrasted with the slow and feeble measures of its antagonists.
The effect
upon the divided and wavering clergy was soon apparent. On June 19 they decided
by 128 voices to 127 in favour of the joint verification of powers. The nobles,
more united in defence of their privilege, still held firm and voted an address
to the King condemning the usurpations of the Third Estate. The King, though
displeased, had remained inactive. It was not until the evening of the 17th,
when the great debate was over, that his reply to the address voted by the
Third Estate on the 10th had come into the hands of Bailly. It contained little
more than a censure of the term “ privileged Orders” as applied to the clergy
and nobles, and a reproof to the Third Estate for failing in ' deference to
their sovereign. Their adoption of the title of “ National Assembly ” and their
subsequent resolutions could not but alarm Louis. He resolved to hold a “royal
session” and to command the Estates to lose no further time in controversy. For
this purpose preparations in the Salle des Menus Plaisirs were needful, and the
sittings of the Assembly would have to be interrupted. But, instead of giving
formal notice to Bailly as President, the Ministers with discourteous folly
sent the workmen into the hall on June 20 and caused placards to be posted,
announcing the 22nd as the day of the royal session. Only at the last moment
did de Breze, Grand Master of the Ceremonies, inform Bailly by letter that he
was about to proclaim the royal session by the voice of heralds. Bailly took no
heed, but went with the deputies to their accustomed hall; and, finding the
doors shut, adjourned with them to a neighbouring tennis-court. There the
deputies, incensed at the discourtesy with which they had been treated and
suspecting a resolution on the part of the government to interrupt their
sittings, or even to dissolve their assembly, acclaimed Mounier’s proposal that
they should take a solemn oath not to separate until the constitution had been
established. Only a single deputy, a certain Martin of Auch, refused to swear;
and the Oath of the Tennis-Court became one of the most memorable incidents of
the French Revolution.
No notice was
taken of the oath and no attempt was made to check
the debates
of the Assembly, which presently removed its sittings to the church of St
Louis. Here, on June 22, the bulk of the clergy, headed by the Archbishops of
Vienne and Bordeaux and the Bishops of Rodez, Chartres, and Coutances, came to
take their seats beside the commons. Even the nobles were now shaken, and on
the same day the Marquis de Blazons and the Comte d’Agoult joined the National
Assembly. Meantime the royal session had been postponed to the 23rd, for the
King was as usual irresolute, and his advisers were at variance regarding the
tenour of his declarations to the Estates. Necker and his liberal colleagues
wished the King to accept with some reserves the principle of joint
deliberation, and to announce an ample programme of reform. The conservatives,
led by Barentin, altogether rejected joint deliberation and would have had the
King promise as few reforms as possible. Necker had the worst in the debate;
and the royal declaration, which he had drafted, was modified in Barentin’s
sense. Necker did not resign, but, after some hesitation, resolved not to
appear at the royal session, thus saving his credit with the people, though
rendering himself odious to the King and Queen.
On the
morning of the 23rd the deputies reassembled in the Salle des Menus Plaisirs,
but not until the Third Estate had suffered a new affront in being forced to
wait for some time after the clergy and nobles had taken their seats. The
streets of Versailles were lined with troops, and the crowd for the first time
received Louis in gloomy silence. After the King had explained the reasons for
his interference, a Secretary of State read the royal declaration “ with
respect to the holding of the present States General.” It made known the King’s
will that the distinction between the three Estates should be observed as an
essential part of the Constitution, although they might by mutual consent and
with his approval deliberate together when convenient. It annulled the
resolutions taken by the Third Estate on June 17, and all directions given by
electors to their deputies with regard to joint deliberation and vote by head.
From the subjects which might be jointly considered by the three Estates it
excluded the form to be given to the next States General, as well as the feudal
property and the privileges of the clergy and nobility. The separate consent of
the clergy it declared indispensable to every decision affecting the Church.
Another Secretary of State then read “a declaration of the King’s intentions,”
setting forth the reforms which he promised to his people. No new tax was to be
imposed, no loan contracted, without the consent of the States General; the
accounts of revenue and expenditure were to be published; and the sums
appropriated to each department to be fixed beyond possibility of variation.
Immunities from taxation were to cease, and the most unpopular taxes to be
abolished or amended. Personal servitude was to be suppressed. Provincial
Estates were to be established throughout the kingdom. The States General were
invited to consider the
suppression
of lettres de cachet, the grant of a certain liberty to the press, the reform
of the law, and the mitigation of the militia service. But the King expressly
reserved to himself entire authority over the army.
When the
second declaration had been read the King spoke for the last time, announcing
that, if he were abandoned by the States General in the beneficent work of
reform, “ alone he would ensure the happiness of his people,” and enjoining the
Orders to repair the next day each to its separate Chamber. The King and his
train then retired, and the bulk of the nobles and some of the clergy withdrew;
but the rest of the deputies remained motionless in their seats. The Grand
Master of the Ceremonies thereupon came forward and said, “ Gentlemen, you know
the intentions of the King.” Mirabeau (whose words have been variously
reported) answered for the Assembly and said, “ If you have been charged to
make us quit this place, you must ask for orders to use force, for we will not
stir from our places save at the point of the bayonet.” As de Breze declined to
take an answer from a private deputy, Bailly, the President, replied that he
had no power to break up the Assembly until it had deliberated upon the royal
session just over.
Thus ended
the royal session of June 23, memorable as the most striking display of the
King’s weakness. At the advice both of Necker and of Necker’s enemies, Louis
had at length abandoned his merely passive part and had come forward to declare
both the Constitution and the business of the States General. So far he had
only done what it might have been prudent to do earlier. But he acted too late
and under the influence of those whom the Assembly could not fail to distrust.
Moreover the reservations which accompanied the King’s promises were serious.
His concessions did not expressly include periodic States General, or the
recognition of legislative power in the States General, or the responsibility
of ministers. Louis took his stand upon his ancient and undoubted prerogative;
the National Assembly took theirs upon the abstract sovereignty of the people.
Where principles were so sharply opposed, extraordinary wisdom and temper would
have been required to effect a compromise. Moreover the King did not enact any
reform, he merely declared his intentions; and experience had shown that, if
the intentions of Louis were generally good, they were often ineffective. A
year earlier his declaration would have been applauded; it now provoked
murmurs; and the Assembly held on its course as if he had not spoken.
We may wonder
more that Louis should have suffered his wishes so solemnly announced to be
treated with contempt. Some of his advisers may have thought of using force;
but, when de Breze informed the King of the contumacy of the deputies, he
replied that, if the gentlemen of the Third Estate did not choose to quit the
hall, there was nothing to do but to leave them there. No further interference
was attempted. The roll of the Assembly was called, and every
member of the
Third Estate answered to his name. The clergymen whose powers had been verified
claimed to sit and vote; and those who had not yet undergone that formality
asked that their names might be entered on the journals as present. The debate
on the royal session then began; and, after one or two members had spoken,
Sieyes rose and said in his dry, incisive manner, “ Gentlemen, you are to-day
that which you were yesterday.” The applause was loud and general; and the
resolution of Camus that the Assembly persisted in its former decrees was
adopted without a division. Mirabeau then proposed that the Assembly should
declare the persons of its members inviolable. This motion was carried by 493
voices to 34, and the House adjourned to the following day.
Meantime the
commotion was great in Paris and Versailles. In Versailles crowds continued to
grow and to display a menacing temper. On a report that Necker had resigned,
his house was beset with anxious citizens, begging that he would resume office.
In Paris men of business were panic-struck, and rushed to the Caisse (TEscompte
to get gold for their paper. They even prepared a deputation to remonstrate
with the King. The clubs in the Palais-Royal held more violent language than
ever, and the seditious talked of a march on Versailles. Necker had in fact
resigned after the royal session; but the King and Queen were forced to entreat
that he would come back, and he consented. He returned home from the palace
through a rejoicing multitude. According to his own account, generosity forbade
him to ask for the dismissal of his opponents; but, according to Barentin, he
asked for it in vain. The King’s humiliation confirmed his dislike of Necker,
and he readily accepted Necker’s promise to retire at the first intimation and
in such a way as to attract the least notice possible. Within three weeks
Necker learnt how precarious was his tenure.
Now that the
impotence of the Crown was beyond dispute, events marched rapidly towards the
total union of the Three Estates. On June 24 the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre had
moved the nobles, though in vain, that they should join the commons. The next
day he and his supporters to the number of forty-seven, with the Duke of
Orleans at their head, passed over to the National Assembly. Presently other
noblemen followed their example. The clergy continued to come in. The
Archbishop of Paris, the most obstinate opponent of union, was set upon by a
band of ruffians when leaving the chamber of the clergy, and would perhaps have
been murdered had he not consented to do likewise. Although he had promised
under duress, he felt bound by his word and went. The irresolute King accepted
defeat, and at Necker’s prompting wrote to the Cardinal de La Rochefoucauld,
President of the clergy, and the Due de Luxembourg, President of the nobles,
inviting both Orders to join the National Assembly. As the Cardinal and the
Duke hesitated, Louis summoned them to his presence and by personal
solicitation
extorted
their consent. The clergy now professed themselves willing to obey the King if
the nobles would do the like. But among the nobles many, with Cazales and
d’Espremenil at their head, remained obdurate until the King had invoked the
help of his brother, the Comte d’Artois, the chief of the high aristocratic
party. A letter from the Count, alleging that the King’s life was in danger,
silenced opposition; and all the remaining nobles and clergymen took their
seats in the Assembly. Yet a few days later the Cardinal de La Rochefoucauld
made a declaration reserving the right of the clergy in future sessions to sit
and vote separately. So late as July 3 eighty-nine nobles signed a declaration
in favour of upholding the distinction between the Orders. Other symptoms,
trivial in themselves, showed that many of the nobles and the clergy regretted
the surrender which they had made at the instance of the sovereign, and would
take the first opportunity of recovering their independence.
By July 2 the
powers of all the deputies had been duly verified and the National Assembly was
at length complete. On the following day Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun, made a
motion that all imperative instructions given by the electors to their
representatives should be cancelled; and, after a long debate, the substance of
his motion was adopted. The royal declaration had set a precedent for this vote
which effaced yet another peculiarity of the old States General and vested in
the National Assembly the plenitude of sovereign power. The Assembly was at
length free to begin “ the regeneration of Prance.” On July 6 it appointed the
first Committee of the Constitution. But unforeseen events occasioned a brief
crisis, and gave the Revolution a more violent character. Louis must have
regarded the course of the Assembly with as much indignation as was possible to
his sluggish nature. The Assembly had scornfully ignored what he must have
deemed his lawful and justifiable intervention; and it had forced upon him the
indignity of having to exact that very union of the Orders which be disapproved.
Yet left to himself Louis might have accepted this rebuff and continued to
drift on the stream of chance. But those who had prompted his action and saw
more clearly every day the scope of the Revolution that was impending, were not
inclined to yield so easily. They determined to get rid of Necker and of the
Ministers who followed him, and probably to put an end to the National
Assembly. As the dismissal of Necker might lead to an insurrection, a large
force of troops, especially of the foreign regiments in French pay, was
directed upon Paris and Versailles under the command of Marshal de Broglie, a
trusty veteran of the Seven Years’ War. The recent outbreaks of disorder in and
near the capital afforded a pretext for this concentration, but the Assembly at
once divined its real purpose. The deputies of the Third Estate, who were in
constant correspondence with their electors, spread the alarm and set on foot
an agitation throughout the kingdom.
But the
centre of resistance was the capital; and from this time forward Paris becomes
the focus of the Revolution.
For many
months past the fabric of French society had been falling into ruin. The bold
and successful resistance of the Parlements to Brienne had made manifest the
irresolution and weakness of the sovereign and his ministers. The bad harvest
of 1788 and the severe winter which followed had brought many thousands to the
verge of starvation and filled the land with vagabonds and beggars. The
elections for the States General had made political discussion universal, had
given even the most ignorant a vivid notion of the wrongs which they endured,
and had possessed the minds of all who were wretched with the thought of change
and the hope of a great deliverance. Although the electoral assemblies were as
a rule orderly and decorous, the period of the elections had been marked by
many acts of riot and outrage. Taine has reckoned .pwards of three hundred
outbreaks of disorder between March and July of 1789. Most of these might be described
as bread or com riots. The populace rose to prevent grain being carried out of
their district, or to seize the com stored in magazines or religious Houses, or
to force the bakers to sell at less than the market price, or to seize the
bread without paying any price at all. All such acts of violence tended to make
corn scarcer and bread dearer, and so to multiply themselves. Sometimes the
rioters wreaked their grudge on the feudal system by sacking country-houses or
burning, manorial records. Sometimes they ventured on more direct rebellion,
destroying the town barriers and refusing to pay the octroi or even the King’s
taxes. Almost all these acts of lawlessness went unpunished. For the police,
both in town and country, was weak; the soldiers were becoming disaffected, and
the officers, as well as the magistrates and Intendants, swayed either by fear
or by philanthropic sentiment, were most unwilling to take severe measures.
Their forbearance was construed as weakness, and the law continued to be broken
as before. The condition of France in the summer of 1789 is best described by
Taine’s phrase of “spontaneous anarchy.”
No less
alarming was the state of Paris. Then, even more than now, Paris was the centre
of French political life, the source of French political ideas. The victory of
the Parlements over the Crown had nowhere been more complete than in Paris.
Idle and starving people had been drawn to the capital in the hope of sharing
in its profuse charity. The relief works set on foot by the municipal authority
had attracted thousands who did nothing useful, yet could not be turned away
without extreme danger of an insurrection. Among the upper class the
fund-holders, as we have seen, despairing of the solvency of the government,
put all their hope in a political revolution. Men of all conditions were in
such a ferment as had never been known before. For to that age of inexperience
political life had the wonder and the charm of a newly
discovered
continent. There everything seemed possible to eager and restless minds. Every
enthusiast might hope that the public would take his prescription for freedom
and happiness. Every adventurer might feel assured that a boundless career
awaited his ability and daring. Political discussion was therefore general and unceasing.
As yet newspapers were only beginning to appear, and Camille Desmoulins, the
cleverest journalist of the Revolution, was still in quest of a publisher. But
pamphlets still poured from the press, and speakers could everywhere find a
forum. In many of the districts formed for the elections of the Third Estate
the citizens had continued to meet and to discuss the questions of the hour.
Out of one of these assemblies grew the famous dub of the Cordeliers, where
Danton made his first essays as a public speaker and gained his first
adherents. Beside the district assemblies there sprang up a multitude of clubs,
mostly small and shortlived, but in their day full of zealous disputants. For
the labouring classes there were the popular societies which met in the tavern
or in the open street. In such obscure and irresponsible gatherings doctrines
were often upheld and methods were often suggested which no deputy would have
ventured to name at Versailles. Republicans on principle like Desmoulins were
still few; but many were prepared for any violence against the enemies of the
Third Estate.
The Duke of
Orleans had already conceived the project of supplanting Louis on the throne,
and made his own palace the asylum of all the most reckless among the
politicians who then swarmed in Paris. There the most seditious clubs held
their meetings; there the most inflammatory speeches were delivered; and as all
the attractions of sauntering, gambling, and prostitution were added, the
orators never wanted an audience, and the Palais-Royal was crowded day and
night. That the Duke and his friends did more than countenance the revolutionary
party, that they spent pains and money in making serviceable adherents and
recruiting among the destitute and criminal class seems certain, although the
details can never be known. So early as the time of the elections the effect of
all these disorganising agencies was seen in the formidable riots associated
with the name of Reveillon. Reveillon was a manufacturer of wall-papers, a
successful and, so far as is known, an estimable man; but he was alleged to
have said (such reports were incessant in the revolutionary period and usually
murderous) that a workman could live on fifteen sous a day. Accordingly, on
April 27 and again on the 28th, his house was attacked and pillaged by a
furious mob, at one time numbering thousands; and the sack lasted till all the
available troops had been called out and many of the rioters had been killed or
wounded. The authors of the riot were never traced, but they probably had some
aim beyond that of injuring a private individual.
While
disorder in Paris was coming to a head, the force available' for keeping the
peace was insignificant. The ordinary police, the watch
mounted or on
foot, numbered little over one thousand men. It could be reinforced by two
regiments of the line, the Gardes Suisses and the Gardes Frarifaises, which had
permanent quarters in the capital. The Swiss regiment might be trusted to obey
orders, but the French regiment was not to be counted upon. Many of the men had
married Parisian women and were bound by family ties to the lower class of
townspeople. The Duke of Orleans and the partisans of violent revolution seem
to have employed every means of seduction upon the regiment. The new colonel, the
Due de Chatelet, was a martinet, harsh and doubly unpopular with soldiers who
had been living under a relaxed discipline. After many acts of insubordination,
there was discovered in the regiment a secret society whose members had bound
themselves to obey no orders directed against the National Assembly. Several of
the culprits were put under arrest and sent to the prison known as the Abbaye.
On June 30 the mob rose and released the prisoners, and some dragoons and
hussars who had been ordered out to suppress the riot fraternised with the mob.
Matters could not rest here; and the revolutionary clubs, alarmed at their own
boldness, sent a deputation to beg that the Assembly would intercede. The
Assembly having solicited the King to show clemency and soothed the populace,
the prisoners of their own free will returned to the Abbaye, whence they were
presently released by royal order. Such an incident showed that the troops
could not be trusted, and that the power of the Crown in Paris was merely
nominal.
The municipal
authority was equally infirm. In Paris, before the Revolution, the municipal
officers were named by the Crown, and the citizens had no real voice in the
administration. An elective municipality was generally desired, and had been
demanded in the cahiers of Paris. Its germ already existed. The electors of the
Third Estate in Paris had resolved that they would keep together after the
elections in order to correspond with their deputies and to watch over the
interests of the city; but for a time they had so far deferred to the
government as not to hold any meeting. At length, alarmed by the royal
declaration "of June 23, they asked for the use of a room in the Hotel de
Ville; and, failing to get it, they met in a hall in the Rue Dauphine. After
some heated speech and the suggestion of a civic guard, the electors voted an
address to the National Assembly, which was carried to Versailles and received
with gratitude. Although the electors in the eye of the law were mere private
men, the municipal officers, conscious of their own weakness and unpopularity,
and expecting soon to be superseded, were glad to call in such powerful
auxiliaries. On the 27th, accordingly, they granted the electors the use of a
room in the Hotel de Ville. On July 1, after the rescue of the soldiers from
the Abbaye, the electors published an address to the townspeople, urging them
to respect the law. They next took into consideration the establishment of a
civic guard. Their motive at this time seems to have been,
not so much
jealousy with regard to the King’s intentions, as a wish to ensure the safety
of Paris, then lying at the mercy of the lowest populace and of the disaffected
soldiers. On July 11 the formation of such a guard was resolved upon.
Meantime the
Marshal de Broglie had been making ostentatious preparations *at Versailles. He
had, writes Besenval, turned the palace into a headquarters and the gardens
into a camp. He had put a regiment into the orangery, and he openly avowed his
fears for the safety of the King and the Royal family. The Assembly took alarm,
and on the motion of Mirabeau voted an address to the King asking that the
troops might be withdrawn. Louis replied on the 10th that the disorders of
Paris and Versailles had made it necessary to assemble the troops, but that
nothing was designed against the freedom of the Assembly. If the deputies were
still uneasy, he was willing to remove the session to Noyon or Soissons, and to
take up his abode at Compiegne, where he could readily communicate with them.
The Assembly refrained from any discussion of the royal letter, thus tacitly
persevering in its request for the departure of the troops. But on July 11 the
King sent Necker a note dismissing him from his office and enjoining him to
quit the kingdom. Those of his colleagues who had generally acted with Necker,
Montmorin, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Puysegur, Secretary for War, La
Luzerne, Secretary for the Navy, and Saint-Priest, Minister of the King’s
Household, were dismissed at the same time. The Baron de Breteuil, well known
as one of the Queen’s friends, succeeded Necker as chief minister, Marshal de
Broglie took the place of Puysegur, and Foulon and Laporte replaced
Saint-Priest and La Luzerne respectively. The party hostile to the National
Assembly had thus prevailed with the King; but their success was momentary and
their overthrow decisive.
On July 12
the dismissal of Necker became known in Paris, and Camille Desmoulins at the
Palais-Royal gave the signal for insurrection. The rioters, reinforced by a crowd
of deserters from the Gardes Franfaises, had one or two trivial and almost
bloodless encounters with the troops. Although many thousands of soldiers were
at this time assembled round Paris and although the Champ de Mars and the
Champs Illlysees were held in force, nothing serious was done to check the
rising. A great number of the privates had been debauched by the democratic
party, and the chiefs behaved with the same irresolute forbearance which had
been so often displayed elsewhere. Besenval, who commanded in Paris, being left
without orders and shunning responsibility, remained motionless until the mob
had made such apparent way in seducing his men that he resolved to evacuate the
city altogether. Meantime the insurgents beset the Hotel de Ville, where the
electors were sitting, and clamoured for their authorisation to repel by force
the danger which hung over Paris. The electors would not go to that length, but
could not hinder the mob from seizing all the arms in the Hotel de Ville.
Order was now
at an end in Paris. The lawless multitude, which had been so long gathering
there, plundered the gun-shops, broke open the prisons, burnt the octroi
barriers, assailed the houses of unpopular persons, and attacked and robbed the
passers in the streets. The electors could do nothing save decree the
convocation of the districts. On July IS they met and, as the imminent peril
overbore all scruples of form, were joined by de Flesselles, Provost of the
Merchants, and the other officers of the old municipal body. A standing
committee was chosen and began to organise a civic guard of sixty battalions,
one for each district. But it was impossible to master the rioters, who were
hourly joined by crowds of deserters from the regular troops. All through that
day Paris had the aspect of a town taken by storm. All communication with
Versailles was stopped, all letters were opened, and the electors working at
the Hotel de Ville were in constant peril from the excited crowd which filled
every part of the building. By evening the new civic guard were under arms,
patrols were sent out, the streets were lighted, and a measure of safety was
afforded to peaceable citizens. But the insurrection was not at an end. On the
morning of July 14 one party attacked the Hotel des Invalides, whence they
carried off a large quantity of arms and ammunition. Another party with the
same object attacked the Bastille.
The Bastille,
once a fortress but for many years no more than a State prison, was ill
qualified to stand a siege. Its high and massive walls were indeed impregnable
to such artillery as the assailants had seized. But the garrison was small,
amounting to eighty-two invalides and' thirty-two Swiss. The cannon were of
little use except for firing salvos, and there were provisions for two days
only. De Launay, the Governor, behaved much like other officers at the same
time. He made a hesitating defence; he received with courtesy the deputations
which came to demand a surrender; and at length, finding that his men had no
stomach to fight, he surrendered on promise of safety for himself and for them.
The deserters from the Gardes Frangaises, who had done most of the fighting
that there was to do, tried hard to bring the prisoners along in safety, but
before they could reach the Hotel de Ville de Launay and several others were
murdered in the most brutal fashion.
With the fall
of the Bastille the insurrection may be said to have ended, as there was no
longer any position in Paris held by the King’s troops. But all through the day
the tumult and confusion at the Hotel de Ville were indescribable; and in the
evening the murder of Flesselles gave a fresh proof of the lawlessness which
reigned without. It was only by degrees, as the civic guard took a more regular
shape and the worst ruffians who infested Paris were disarmed, that some degree
of order was restored.
At Versailles
the news of the dismissal of Necker and the outbreak
in Paris had
caused the Assembly to vote an address to the King, asking for the withdrawal
of the troops and the formation of a civic guard. As the King returned a
negative answer, the Assembly passed a decree repeating its demands, expressing
its regret at the dismissal of Necker, and declaring the actual ministers
responsible for any attack on the rights of the nation. When informed of this
decree, the King still replied evasively. But, realising at length that the
army could not be trusted and that the insurgents were masters of the capital,
he came in person to the Assembly on the morning of July 15, and announced that
the troops would be withdrawn. The dismissal of Breteuil and his colleagues and
the return of Necker and his friends were necessary and immediate consequences
of the revolution in Paris. Those who had been most actively hostile to Necker
and the National Assembly felt that they were no longer safe. The Comte
d’Artois, the Prince de Conde, the Prince de Conti, the Due de Bourbon, Marshal
de Broglie, and other councillors and courtiers of the same party went into
exile. They were the first of the Emigres. A quarter of a century was to pass
before the few survivors could retrace their steps. Whatever the danger to
which they were exposed, Louis might justly complain of those kinsmen who,
after importuning him to ill-advised action, set the example of flight, and
whose restless intrigues contributed not a little to his final ruin.
The electors
of Paris, in their new character of municipal authority, had deputed some of
their body to inform the Assembly of the late events and to ask for its
protection. In return, the Assembly sent a deputation consisting of all the
members for Paris and twenty-four others. They were greeted with effusion at
the Hotel de Ville, where by a sudden impulse Bailly was chosen Mayor of Paris
and the Marquis de Lafayette Commandant of the National Guard. At the
Archbishop’s suggestion a Te Dernn was sung in the cathedral. Bailly and his
brethren then returned to Versailles to give an account of their mission. As
the new municipality desired a visit from the King, Louis, after making his
will and communicating, undertook a journey which was not without danger. The
new Mayor presented the keys of the city, and, in words not meant to wound,
referred to Henry IV, who had reconquered his people, whereas now the people
had reconquered its King. But it will not seem strange that, when Louis had
reached the Hotel de Ville, embarrassment and humiliation should have disabled
him from making the required harangue, which Bailly had to supply as best he
could. Louis confirmed the nomination of Bailly as Mayor and Lafayette as
Commandant, put the newly-devised tricolour cockade in his hat and set out on
his return to Versailles through crowds shouting “ Long live the King.”
The Marquis
de Lafayette was now in his thirtieth year. While yet a youth he had been led
by a vague love of liberty and a longing for
166
Lafayette and the
National Guard. [i789
adventure to
join the Americans in their revolt against Great Britain, and the Americans had
repaid him with the rank of Major-General. His courage and popular manners
gained their hearts. Even Washington became his close friend. After the
surrender of Yorktown Lafayette returned to enjoy the applause of the Court and
capital and took a foremost place among the liberal nobility. He sat in the
Assembly of the Notables, where he demanded the summoning of the States
General. Through his friend Duport he concerned himself in the resistance of
the Parlements to the ministers. When elected to the States General by the
nobles of Auvergne, he had shown his good-will to the Third Estate; and after
the union of the Orders he was one of the most highly considered men in the
House. He had been the first to offer a draft Declaration of Rights. The office
of Vice-President had been made for him to fill. As an officer of high rank and
of some reputation, who was also zealous in the cause of freedom, he was marked
out for the command of the new civic guard of Paris. He thus became a great
power in the State, but he proved unequal to his task. Although honourable and
well-meaning, he was vain and self-conscious; he wished to reconcile liberty
with order, but wished still more to hold the balance of parties; andyet,;with
all his political ambition, he had no definite policy. He could not work in
harmony with other men; he let precious occasions pass unused, and he wasted
even that popularity which he loved so dearly and which might have been so
serviceable. Within two years he had become impotent, and within three years he
was an exile.
As
Commandant, Lafayette had to organise the new civic guard, which took on his
motion the name of National Guard. This force was to serve two purposes. It was
to maintain order in Paris, the police and regular troops being no longer
available. It was also to ensure the party of reform against any risk of
military invasion for the future. The electors had at first fixed its strength
at two hundred men from every district, or twelve thousand in all. If properly
paid and disciplined such a force might have been able to keep the peace in
Paris. But a much larger force might seem necessary to resist a
counter-revolution. Accordingly the strength of a battalion was now fixed at
800 men, giving a total of 48,000. It has been said that Lafayette wished to
recruit the National Guard from the middle class only and therefore made all
the men enlisted provide themselves with a costly uniform. Since however a
force of 48,000 would be fully one-third of all the men in Paris able to bear
arms, it must have been very largely composed of men below the middle rank in life.
To each battalion there was attached a more select company of chasseurs and
another of grenadiers. A regiment of volunteer cavalry was formed, each trooper
finding his own horse and arms. The Gardes Francoises were incorporated with
the National Guard as a paid battalion. The officers of the lower grades were
elected by the privates, but the staff officers were named by Lafayette.
Lafayette used every art of
popularity to
get and keep control over his men; and well he might, for in an unpaid
volunteer army discipline was scarcely known, and the National Guard was not
really under the command of any authority whether military or civil.
Bailly
remained in a most difficult position. The King had confirmed him in the office
of Mayor; but he had no regular council to help him, for the assembly of
electors was in truth an unauthorised body of private men. Their self-imposed
duty was most laborious, dangerous and thankless. At the end of July they made
way for a new body elected two by each district and therefore 120 in all; a
number afterwards raised to 300. The new municipality met with as much
resistance as the old assembly of electors. In Paris, as Bailly lamented, all
wished to command, none were willing to obey. Those districts especially in
which the democrats were powerful paid no heed to the orders or entreaties of
the municipal council, but behaved as little republics; and, amid the
dissolution of the State, there was no supreme authority, executive or
judicial, to which the Mayor or his advisers could appeal.
In every
great revolution some petty incident becomes symbolical, and thenceforward
holds in the imagination of mankind a place altogether disproportionate. So it
was with the fall of the Bastille. The Bastille was of slight strategic
consequence; its capture was not a brilliant exploit, and was dishonoured by
infamous cruelty. Only seven prisoners, most of them detained for good reason,
were found within its walls. But to popular feeling both in France and abroad
the Bastille was the embodiment of all that is most hateful in arbitrary power;
and the fall of the Bastille seemed to announce a new age of freedom, justice,
and humanity. Moreover the example of the Parisian insurrection was followed
throughout France. In all the cities and towns the old municipal authorities
were overturned and new elective authorities took their place. All the cities
and towns enrolled their National Guards. At the same time the administrative
and judicial system of the Monarchy broke down altogether. With the disappearance
of the Intendants and sub-delegates, police, public works, and the collection
of revenue came well-nigh to an end. The old Courts of Justice, from the manor
Court to the Parlement, ceased to sit. The dwindling of the revenue made it
almost impossible to pay or feed the troops, and so gave the last shock to
expiring discipline. Insubordination became so general that the officers could
no longer keep their men together, much less control their conduct. And, now
that all means of repression were gone, the peasants in most of the Provinces
rose in savage revolt. The country houses were pillaged and burnt, and the
seigneurs with their families were driven by thousands into the towns or across
the frontiers, happy indeed if they could escape, for some were murdered with
every refinement of cruelty. It is unnecessary to recount the details which
Taine has collected with so much industry and described with so much
168
State of Paris.—The
journalists. [i789
power. The
strange and terrible sight of a great civilised people returning to chaos might
have taught the philosophers of that age what the dissolution of the social
compact signifies. Against this anarchy the municipalities and the National
Guards struggled, often with zeal and courage; but they were novices, and their
task might have appalled the maturest wisdom.
The state of
Paris under its new Mayor and Commandant is typical of this period of the
Revolution. It was the first task of Bailly to ensure the daily bread of seven
hundred thousand human beings, amid such disorder within and without that
commerce was dried up and the markets were never sure of forty-eight hours’
supply. To maintain order was the chief business of Lafayette. This may not
seem difficult for an experienced and popular general commanding thousands of
troops, mostly drawn from classes interested in upholding the law. But soldiers
seldom make an effective police, and of all soldiers volunteers are least
suited to police duty. Many recruits, who had been attracted by a showy uniform
and the roll of the drum, did not care to patrol disturbed quarters under
volleys of stones and curses. Some of the National Guards sympathised with riot
and outrage, and others did not abhor riot and outrage sufficiently. The
deserters from the regular army, who came in great numbers, expected licence as
the reward of patriotism, and the fashionable ideas of the hour made discipline
impossible. Therefore, although Lafayette meant well and worked hard, he could
not make Paris orderly or prevent murders like those of Foulon and Berthier.
Nor could he expect any help from without. The National Assembly from time to
time issued an idle proclamation, inviting the citizens to obey the law, or
sent a deputation to implore mercy from murderers; but it had neither the will
nor the means to employ the only arguments which criminals understand.
After the
insurrection of July the press was free from all restraint and newspapers were
multiplied in Paris. They were very small, it is true, for they gave very
little information and were rather daily or weekly essays on political subjects
than what we should term newspapers; yet some of them achieved a great sale and
had a memorable influence. Every party had its own organs, but those which were
most revolutionary sold best. Loustallot’s journal, The Revolutions of Paris,
which first appeared July 17, 1789, is said to have reached a sale of 200,000
copies. From it Camille Desmoulins took the hint for the title of his own
paper, The Revolutions of France and Brabant, which began in November. For wit
and style, if not for reason and humanity, he held the first place among the
journalists of that age. The still more notorious Friend of the People by Marat
first came out on September 12. Marat was at this time forty-seven years old; he
was a doctor, a man of culture, and claimed to have made discoveries. But he
was diseased in body and mind and embittered by ill-success and unfriendly
criticism. As such
men sometimes
will, he took suspicion for wisdom, ferocity for public spirit, and hatred of a
class for love of mankind. He has found apologists ; but the Friend of the
People will always be the most telling indictment against Marat. These and many
other journals now forgotten inflamed the people of Paris and prepared the next
and more violent ph ase of the Revolution. In the meantime they prompted
continual resistance to the law and the municipal authority, and kindled
disorder as fast as Bailly or Lafayette could put it out.
The National
Assembly had no longer anything to fear from the King. The general anarchy
disabled him from raising revenue, administering justice, or moving troops. So
far from being able to assail others, he could not, as the events of October 5
and 6 showed, defend his own personal freedom. If a government could still be
said to exist in France it was to be found in the Assembly and its Committees
rather than in the sovereign and his Ministers. But the Assembly had vanquished
the Crown only to pass under the yoke of the disorderly populace. Especially
after its removal to Paris it was captive in fact although supreme in form.
True wisdom would have disposed the Assembly to narrow the field of debate, to
fix as soon as possible the principles of the new Constitution, and thus to
shorten the painful period of suspense, during which France could have no rest
within and no security abroad. The Assembly in its heat and inexperience took
the opposite course. Before we touch upon its constructive labours, a brief
notice of its procedure, its debates, and its party divisions seems necessary.
For in all these respects it differed much from the parliaments with which we
are best acquainted, and its peculiarities were of considerable moment in the
history of the Revolution.
The
maintenance of order in the National Assembly was for several reasons
difficult. The Assembly, while it remained at Versailles, numbered about twelve
hundred members—almost twice as many as the British House of Commons—men of a
highly-strung race, whose education had in nowise hardened them to the rude shock
of Parliamentary conflict; men without experience of public life, over-worked
and over-excited. The Salle des Menus Plaisvrs afforded room for a crowd of
spectators who had never been trained to silence and respect. Noise and interruption
were therefore incessant, and the speaker who would be heard had to strain his
voice—an almost fatal hindrance to calm debate. After the migration to Paris in
October, 1789, the Assembly met in a somewhat smaller room, the manege, or
riding-school, of the Tuileries. By that time, however, so many members had
fled or ceased from attending that there was still space for five or six
hundred of the public, who were as unruly as before. Hence the sittings of the
Assembly usually resembled a disorderly public meeting, and seldom maintained
the dignity of a senate.
The Third
Estate, we have seen, delayed to organise itself until it
began the
verification of powers. It was only on June 12 that it elected its first
President. The President held office for a fortnight, and was assisted by six
Secretaries, who were elected for a month. As yet there was no code of
procedure. Mirabeau deposited on the bureau a printed copy of a digest of the
rules of the House of Commons, which he had obtained from Romilly, and which
might have been useful at least for suggestion, but the deputies would none of
it. We are not English, they said, and we have no need of the English. Bailly
tells us that he introduced three rules. A call of the House, hitherto
incessant, was to be reserved for. special occasions. In eveiy case a member
wishing to speak was to ask for leave. No member was to speak after the matter
had once come to taking votes. It was only towards the end of July that the
Assembly adopted its first body of rules, which occupies only eight octavo
pages. Even so it contains some rules which were never observed, such as that
forbidding all expressions of applause or dissent by the public. The Assembly,
always afraid of the expiring power of the Crown, was too anxious to court the
favour of the populace; and the sentimental politics of the time regarded every
knot of idlers or ruffians as the French people and entitled to corresponding
deference. A worse mischief than noise was the way in which the gallery
politicians marked unpopular speakers for the vengeance of the Palais-Royal and
the mob. At the close of the debate on the motion to assume the style of
National Assembly, Malouet was assaulted by a stranger on the floor of the
House; and several of those who voted with him received an intimation that
their houses would be burnt down. “ For every impartial man,” he writes, “the
Terror dates from July 14”; and, though he certainly was no dastard, he rarely
went to the debates of the Assembly in Paris without his pistols. Throughout
the French Revolution the party which claimed to be most democratic tried to
silence discussion by fear, and showed the utmost contempt for freedom of
conscience.
The deputies
themselves often displayed the natural courtesy of Frenchmen, but had little
self-command in debate. Disorder was frequent. “ More than once to-day,” Young
wrote on June 15, 1789, “ there were a hundred members on their legs at a time,
and Monsieur Bailly absolutely without power to keep order.” The majority was
overbearing and the minority petulant. As time went on many of the deputies of
the Right ceased from regular debate, laughed, and talked aloud, went out of
the hall when the question was put, and affected to regard the proceedings as
despicable. Had the Assembly taken occasional rest, irritation might have
subsided; but, doubtless with good intentions, it worked too hard, sat long
hours every day, even on Sunday, and allowed itself few and brief adjournments.
Little economy of time was practised, and every irrelevant digression was
welcome if it flattered the prevailing sentiment. A still graver nuisance were
the deputations
from every
part of the kingdom and from all ranks of the people upon every conceivable
topic. At first encouraged as an expression of popular sympathy in the struggle
against the Court, they were afterwards endured from the motives which led the
majority to connive at the disorder in the galleries. They reached their
crowning absurdity in the deputation of the human race led by Anacharsis
Clootz, which appeared on June 19,
1790, and was decreed the honours of the
sitting.
For the more
thorough discussion of legislative proposals the Assembly was divided into a
number of bureaux, formed without election by taking from the alphabetical list
of deputies certain numbers such as the 1st, the 31st, the 61st and so forth,
and renewed every month in such a way that the old members should not come
together again. These bureaux served some of the purposes of Committees in the
British Parliament. Every legislative motion, after having been made and
seconded, was discussed in the Assembly and either rejected or sent to the
bureaux, where it was discussed again and sent back to the Assembly for the
final debate and vote. Still more important were the Committees properly so
called. There was a Committee for almost every department of State and for
almost every branch of legislation, finance, army, navy, diplomacy, tithes,
currency, feudal rights, etc. Several of these Committees encroached upon the
ministerial departments; and the mutual ill-will of Ministers and Committees
increased the disorders of the State. For the Committees often disdained to
avail themselves of the special knowledge possessed by Ministers; and the
Ministers and their subordinates, thwarted by those whom they regarded as
intruders, often took refuge in sullen inaction. Even Necker after a time found
his figures and arguments ignored by the Committee of Finance. The Committee of
Reports, formed to receive and consider all petitions, letters, and addresses
coming from all parts of France, became, says Ferrieres, a species of
departmept for Home Affairs; and the Committee of Researches, formed to unravel
all conspiracies against the nation, was accused of employing the methods of
the cmcien regime against its friends. But it should be remembered that many of
the Committees did legislative work of a high order.
The style of
speaking current in the Assembly had also its effect on business. Under the old
monarchy there had been no scope for political eloquence, but the orator might
exert his powers either in the pulpit or at the bar or in academic harangues on
various subjects. As the style of the clergyman or lawyer was professional and
therefore in some degree unsuited to a popular assembly, it was the academic
style which found most vogue in the debates. Each member who wished to speak
chose a theme, framed a harangue, gave in his name, and when the time arrived
went up into the tribune and spoke often with little or no regard to what
others had said or to the actual stage of the discussion. Thus debating in our
sense of the term was almost unknown. In the absence of party organisation,
there was hardly any means of suppressing dunccs or bores,
and the loss
of time was enormous. Even the patient reader, who does his best to place
himself in the circumstances of that age, will be fatigued and disgusted with
the perpetual strain of artificial emotion. In those days men worked hard to
feel as much as possible, and wore e>rery feeling on their sleeve.
Consequently, when they thought themselves most natural they were most
rhetorical; and when they wished to be pathetic or sublime, they too often
ended in fustian. Although it is allowable and indeed necessaiy for the orator
to flatter his audience, the pitch of adulation in these harangues would move
the laughter of a modem senate. The Assembly is reminded at every turn that it
has outshone the wisdom of all former ages, and that the eyes of the world are
fixed in admiration on its proceedings. But the worst fault of all is the
terrible want of matter. Scarcely any of the speeches have the substance and
variety which comes of a true interest in concrete things and a rich experience
of life. We find instead the endless manipulation of “ principles,” for the
most part half truths imperfectly understood. The excited crowd which filled
the galleries and domineered over the speakers doubtless enjoyed this resonant
verbiage, and patronised it in ^reference to what Aulard scornfully terms
“familiarity of language, the aridity of statistics, and the dryness of
arguments.”
Parties in
the full sense of the word did not exist in the National Assembly. As
parliamentary institutions were new in France, there could be no connexions
with a long history and a slow growth, firmly united in support of definite
principles, and powerful in their submission to acknowledged chiefs. In the
National Assembly there were only such parties as arise in all large bodies of
men with common business to discuss. Its members were brought together by
general resemblance of opinion or even by agreement on a single issue; but
these alliances were unstable and imperfect.
Originally
the deepest division in the Assembly was between those who had desired and
those who had resisted the union of the Three Estates. But when that conflict
was over, a number of groups began to appear. The Extreme Right wished to
preserve the ancient institutions entire with few, if any, improvements. It was
a small party and did not contain .a single statesman. D’Espr^menil, once the
champion of the Parlement against the King, and the Vicomte de Mirabeau,
brother of the renowned orator, were its most notable leaders. Another group,
sometimes described as the Right simply, wished for restraint upon the royal
power, but preferred to effect this by reviving what they called the ancient
Constitution of France. They would have given the States General the power of
levying taxes and making laws, so long as the distinction between the Orders
was upheld; but they refused to base the royal prerogative on parliamentary
sanction. They were in fact Legitimists, who desired an aristocratic
Constitution. Cazales, the worthiest and sincerest leader of this group, stood
high among the orators of the
Assembly. The
Abbe Maury was its stoutest and most unwearied fighter; yet he never impressed
any man with the conviction that he was in earnest. The so-called Right Centre,
otherwise the Monarchiens or Impartiaux, was a still more numerous body, but it
presented various shades of opinion. All, however, aimed at a constitutional
monarchy approaching more or less to the English, as described by Montesquieu
and Blackstone, with the monarch still wielding considerable power and without
the cabinet system. The ablest man in this party was Mounier, who was
discouraged by his experience at Versailles, and, after the removal of the King
to Paris, went into exile. The firmest was Malouet, once Intendant of the Navy
at Toulon, an official of the best type, thoughtful, enlightened, and humane.
He fought his losing battle with a temper unusual anywhere, most unusual in the
National Assembly. On the same side were Lally-Tollendal, Clermont-Tonnerre,
and Bergasse. But, in spite of talent, character, and numbers, this party made
little impression. It was weakened in the first instance by its own divisions.
It was weakened still more by the perversity of the high Royalists, who did not
see that union was necessary to save the Crown, and denounced statesmen like
Malouet and Mounier as traitors and incendiaries. It was also weakened by the
circumstance that its ideal was at variance with the current political
philosophy. For, while the English polity, resting on a balance of opinions and
interests, has a historic source and a practical aim, the philosophy of
Rousseau’s Contrat Social, a tissue of abstractions above either practice or
history, treats all modified forms of self-government as deceptions. Another
weakness lay in the fact that this party cared most for political reform, while
the bulk of the people cared most for social and economic changes. Finally, the
Right Centre was exposed without defence to the methodic terrorism of the
popular party. It has been seen at what risk Malouet discharged his duty. For
voting in favour of the royal veto in legislation, Clermont-Tonnerre received a
letter assuring him that his house would be burnt. When Clermont-Tonnerre and
his friends opened the Club of the Friends of the Monarchical Constitution, the
democrats raised a riot which terrified the municipality into closing it.
Constantly defeated in the House and menaced in the street, the party dwindled
away. Malouet reckoned, perhaps with some exaggeration, that in October, 1787,
they could muster three hundred votes; a year and a half later they had shrunk
to fifty. To the Right Centre the term Royalist is often applied in a way apt
to mislead, as they were neither the only nor the most zealous Royalists.
On the other
side of the House, the Left was roughly coincident with the Constitutionals,
so-called because they made the Constitution of
1791. This party was also known as the
Ministerials, a name adopted when in May, 1790, they founded the Club of 1789,
and as the Feuillants, a name given when they founded the Club of the
Feuillcmts in July, 1790. Including the greater part of the Third Estate and
for a long time the
greater part
of the cures, it was from the first very strong; and, as its opponents more and
more withdrew from public life or even fled the country, its strength increased
till in the later months of the National Assembly it could do as it pleased.
Its political principles may be gathered from the Constitution of 1791, and can
best be dissected when we trace the growth of that Constitution. It was not
consciously destructive, except in the case of privileges. It wished to
preserve the Monarchy, which it rendered null; the connexion of Church with
State, which it made offensive to Catholic consciences; and the rights of
property, which it allowed to be swept away wholesale. At the same time its
social prejudices, its temper, its political philosophy, were all far more
revolutionary than it knew; and, while it imagined itself to be preparing a
stable order of society, it made almost inevitable the state of anarchy which
ensued. It was full of grudge against the First and Second Estates, unbounded
in its optimism and contempt for experience, childlike in its acceptance of the
Contrat Social as the textbook of political wisdom. As time went on, an
internal change took place in this party. The group which at one time led in
revolution, the group which comprised Duport, Alexandre Lameth, and Bamave,
and was termed by Mirabeau The Thirty Voices, came to see that they, had
overshot the mark in trying to reduce the executive power, and tried, though
vainly, to raise it up again. The Extreme Left, the virtually republican group,
were at first very few. Among them were several men who afterwards filled a
great place in the Revolution, Buzot, Dubois-Crance, Petion, and Robespierre.
The son of a respectable lawyer of Arras, Robespierre had been left an orphan
at a very early age, had been adopted by his maternal grandfather, and had
found a patron in the Bishop of his native city. After passing with credit
through school and college, he had been appointed criminal judge of the diocese
of Arras, but had laid down his office rather than pass a sentence of death. He
had then made a practice at the bar and had gained some small literary
successes. In 1789 he was elected a deputy of the Third Estate of Artois. But
his style struck the House as provincial and drew from the Right jeers and
sarcasms which were not forgiven. By dint of practice Robespierre formed a
style to which the Assembly would listen; and by dint of concentration he
gained a certain influence, although he was never popular. That absolute assurance
of his own purity and of the truth of every proposition in the Contrat Social,
which he kept to the end, was already unmistakable, and could not fail to
impress hearers so full of sentiment and of dogma. But the Extreme Left as a
party had very little power and had hardly any influence until after the flight
to Varennes; nor did they find an opportunity of giving effect to their
principles until after the dissolution of the National Assembly.
In this brief
enumeration of parties and of groups no place has been found for the greatest
member of the National Assembly, Mirabeau.
Mirabeau was
never the recognised leader of any party, although at times he swayed the whole
House. For this there were several reasons. He was, we have seen, a practical
man, not a man of system, where almost every man was systematic. For, while he
wished to combine parliamentary freedom with a powerful executive, and in this
approached Mounier and the Right Centre, he had no particular bias in favour of
the English system; he took account of the national temperament, and he saw
that what attracted the masses was not so much self-government as the
destruction of privilege. Hence his political action was not controlled by
party ties, it was prompted by circumstances; he aided or opposed different
parties in turn, often overpowering resistance but never winning full
confidence; and, though he set his mark on French history, he never fulfilled
his ambition either as parliamentary chief or as administrator. We can never
understand Mirabeau’s career in the National Assembly if we conceive of him as
of English statesmen, who by a regular course of promotion rise to the command
of a disciplined party, and rule the State by the will of the people in the
name of the sovereign. Mirabeau was only an adventurer of genius in a
dissolving society.
THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1791.
We have seen that almost all the cahiers expressed a
desire for political self-government, and that the cahiers of the Third Estate
at least demanded the making of a new Constitution. Many of the cahiers entered
into some detail regarding its provisions. Many also required that its
principles should be enacted before any supply was granted to the Crown. As
soon, therefore, as the fusion of the Orders had been effected, the Assembly
undertook to give France a Constitution. The task seemed light, for the spirit
of the majority was confident to excess. “ Politics,” said Sieyfes, “ is a
science which I believe myself to have completed.” “ The Constitution,” said
Barere, “ is already made in the minds of all. There can be no laborious
travail here; the Constitution is perhaps the work of a day, because it is the
result of the enlightenment of an age.” Dumont has remarked that “ every
member of the Assembly thought himself capable of everything; there have never
been seen so many men imagining that they were all legislators, and that they
had come there to redress all the wrongs of the past, to remedy all the errors
of the human spirit, and to assure the happiness of future ages.” Nor will any
person conversant with the memoirs and speeches of that time think that Dumont
has exaggerated. In reality the business of framing a constitution proved very
arduous, and the failure of the National Assembly was well-nigh complete.
The difficulty
did not arise from the strength of the old institutions of France. Within the
space of two years from the meeting of the States General these had been almost
totally destroyed, in part by legislative action, still more by popular
violence. The royal authority went to pieces after the insurrection of July in
Paris and the Provinces, which ended the old administrative system and studded
the land with new municipalities. The same insurrection showed that no trust
could be put in the regular army, and raised up an innumerable militia devoted
to the cause of the Revolution. The rising of the peasants in so many
Provinces, the burning of manor-houses and manorial records, and the hue and
cry raised after the seigneurs, ended the ancient agrarian system
and led
directly to the memorable sitting of August 4, when the feudal tenures, and the
privileges of Orders, cities, and Provinces, were virtually abolished. The
feudal Courts of justice were thus swept away; and the royal Courts of justice,
even the Parlements, were extinguished without effort in the following year.
With equal ease all the ancient historic divisions of France were effaced and
the land laid out in a new system of departments, districts, and cantons. The
abolition of tithe and the confiscation of Church lands destroyed the wealth of
the clergy; the suppression of the religious Orders reduced their numbers; and
the “ civil constitution ” caused a schism among them and among the laity.
Never has an ancient civilised people in so short a space of time made such
wholesale havoc of its old institutions. The Assembly had little need to use
force or skill in clearing the ground, for its adversaries were weak, timid,
and ill-judging, and the insurgent masses constantly forestalled its decrees.
Society seemed to dissolve itself, the better to receive an entirely new mould
from the legislature.
The obstacles
to sound legislation were, however, most formidable. Even the wisest and
firmest statesmen might despair of reducing to order a people which had so utterly
lost all respect for law and was rent by such savage hatreds. The inexperience
and presumption of the majority' in the Assembly were still worse evils. Their
political philosophy was little more than unreflecting reaction against the
past. Because France had been oppressed by absolute monarchy, they denied to
the executive that strength without which no citizen can be safe. Because the
French people had been almost without means of expressing its wants, they
multiplied elective assemblies until the orderly despatch of business hecame
impossible. Knowing almost nothing about public affairs, they did not suspect
with what reserve the lawgiver should apply the maxims of speculative writers;
and when they found in books a formula which flattered their passions they took
it for absolute truth and framed their measures accordingly. Thus, although
they cared little for Montesquieu, who was conservative in his temper and
inductive in his method, they were fascinated by his doctrine that the
separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers one from another
is the primary condition of political liberty. It is true that no general maxim
can restrain the love of power, and that in practice the Assembly was always
encroaching upon the executive sphere, which in words it left to the King. But
in the Constitution of 1791 the principle of the separation of powers was
applied with the most uncritical stringency. The Assembly seems to have
combined it with the more extravagant assertion of Mably, that the executive
power always has been and always will be the enemy of the legislative. Still
stronger and more mischievous was the influence which Rousseau exerted over a
legislature, like himself dogmatic and sentimental. In his other writings
Rousseau sometimes showed a sense of the complexity of real politics, but in
the Contrat Social, the
Bible of the
Constituent Assembly, he set forth an absolutely rigid and impracticable ideal.
He emboldened the majority to scorn experience, to treat men as though they
were all equivalent quantities, to think that a great society can be moulded
and remoulded at the legislator’s will. The Constitution of 1791 was not, and
could not be, conformable to Rousseau’s maxims; but it was too much imbued with
his spirit to be useful or permanent.
A Committee
was named on July 6, 1789, to consider the procedure advisable in framing the
Constitution. The Constitution was, after a final revision, enacted on
September 3, 1791. More than two years, therefore, were spent in the work; and
debates on the Constitution were interspersed with debates on the many other
topics discussed in the National Assembly. The new Constitution of France must
be sought not only in the document which bears that name, but in a number of
statutes which changed the distribution of political power. . To trace the
history of each in detail would require several volumes. It is enough here to
note the conflict of opinions on a few cardinal points, and to sketch the
outline of the new Constitution. We can thus judge the spirit and character of
the whole, and measure its effect upon the history of France.
Mounier was
reporter of the preliminary Committee. Following the suggestion of certain
cahiers, and the wish of some of his colleagues, rather than his own judgment,
he proposed to begin with a declaration of the rights of man. The Assembly
approved, and the matter was soon taken out of his hands, for a crowd of
speculative politicians offered their projects. On July 14 the Assembly chose
the first Committee to draft the Constitution. It consisted of Mounier,
Talleyrand, Sieyes, Cler- mont-Tonnerre, Lally-Tollendal, Le Chapelier,
Bergasse, and Champion de Cice, Archbishop of Bordeaux, who ceased to be a
member when called to the Royal Council. On this Committee the admirers of
English institutions were strong, and Mounier, still at the height of fame, was
the master spirit. He also drew up a Declaration of the Rights of Man, to be
published only as the preface to the new Constitution. On August 1 the Assembly
began to discuss these drafts, over which it wearied itself for many days,
while France was without a government and French society was in dissolution. In
vain Mirabeau, who had acted as reporter of a special committee chosen to
examine all the draft declarations, advised that they should adjourn the
subject of the Declaration until the Constitution had been finished. It was not
until August 27 that the Assembly accepted a form of Declaration differing more
or less from all the original drafts. It contained some useful maxims of
legislation, mixed with vague and unproved propositions, which could be of
little use save as pretexts for disorder. No doubt the Assembly wished to gain
fresh impetus from the nation by a solemn publication of the principles on
which it hoped to remodel France.
But a still
more powerful motive was the childlike belief in every kind of effusion—oaths,
addresses, orations, and declarations—which was almost universal in 1789.
During the next ten years the plainest rights of man were so often and so grossly
outraged that the public came to feel very differently.
The
proceedings on the night of August 4 were of more moment for French
institutions than anything yet effected by the Committee. A report on the
disorder in the Provinces had been presented on the previous day; and the
Assembly was considering a declaration, which might appease the multitude, when
two noblemen, the Vicomte dej| Noailles and the Due d’Aiguillon, proposed that
the Assembly should solemnly proclaim the equality of taxation for all; the
suppression of some of the “ feudal ” burdens, and the right to redeem the rest
at so many years’ purchase. Other nobles rose to support this proposal, which
called forth a series of motions all tending to the relief of the people. The
Vicomte de Beauhamais demanded that criminal punishments should henceforward be
the same for all offenders* and that all citizens should be admitted alike to
the whole range of the public service. The Bishop of Chartres moved the
abolition of the game laws. The Due de La Rochefoucauld urged the
enfranchisement of all the serfs remaining in the kingdom. Thibault, a cure,
asked the Assembly to approve the suppression of the camel. The Archbishop of
Aix proposed the abolition of the gabelle and the aides. The Due de Chatelet
demanded that tithes in kind should be commuted; and the Bishop of Uzes
recognised the right of the nation to dispose of the possesions of the Church.
Other demands and propositions poured in. In all quarters of the House deputies
rose to renounce privileges on behalf of the Provinces or cities which they
represented. The Assembly, now at the highest pitch of enthusiasm, embodied a
number of these motions in decrees. Dupont of Nemours, the Economist, was
almost the only person to hint a doubt as to such haste in making laws about
matters so various and so weighty. Lally-Tollendal passed up to the President a
note: “ Nobody any longer has any self-control; break up the sitting.” It did
not close, however, till the Archbishop of Paris had proposed a Te Deum of
thanksgiving, till the Due de Liancourt had moved that a medal be struck to
commemorate the Fourth of August, till Lally-Tollendal himself had moved to
proclaim Louis XVI the “Restorer of French liberty,” and until the Assembly had
decreed all these motions.
On this
memorable night many of. the nobles and clergy displayed the best and most
generous impulses of the French character. When we think of the doom for which
these patriots were too often reserved, we cannot refuse our deepest compassion
as well as our respect. Yet such is not the way to legislate. Nothing was
gained for public order by announcing all at once the abolition of so many laws
and so many forms of property. Even as the declaration that a]l the existing
taxes
were illegal
had far more effect an the taxpayer than the injunction to pay them while the
Assembly was sitting* so the declaration that feudalism was abolished had far
more effect on the peasant than the reminder that certain territorial claims
were valid and must continue to be satisfied until the Assembly had provided
for their redemption. The actual consequence was that- the seigneurs lost
everything, and that thousands were reduced to beggary. If the Assembly wished
to extinguish manorial rights in an equitable manner, it should hare fixed the
terms of redemption, arranged fjhe procedure, and guaranteed the necessary
funds, before proclaiming that these rights no longer existed. When it came to
deal with the details, it was fettered by the language of its own decrees.
Dumont was justified in observing of the Fourth of August that “ never had such
an immense work been despatched in a few hours. What would have required’ a
year of pains and meditation was proposed, discussed, voted, determined by
acclamation.” Mirabeau had not been present, but, hasty'as was his own
temperament: and averse though he was to privilege* he saw the error. “Just
like our Frenchmen,” he remarked: “ they are an entire month wrangling over
syllables, and in a night they overturn the whole of the ancient order of the
kingdom.”
The sitting
of August 4> therefore, like the insurrections which led to its decrees, was
purely destructive in its results. We may date from that night the
disappearance of French feudalism'. The nobles lost in their seigniorial Courts
the last remnant of public functions spared by ages of royal encroachment; and
the extinction of their manorial revenue took from them a very great part of
their riches. At the same time the way was opened to a still more formidable
invasion of the property of the Church. All these economic and social changes
prepared the way for a simple and highly democratic Constitution; and to the
labours of the constitutional Committee we must here return.
On August 28,
as soon as the debate on the Declaration of Rights had closed, Mounier reported
to the Assembly the order of discussion recommended by the Committee, and
presented the draft articles on the first topic, the Crown and its powers.
Three days later Lally-Tollendal read the report of the same Committee upon the
organisation of the legislature. It was to consist of three parts: the King, a
Senate, and a Representative Chamber; The Committee, wavering between royal
nomination and various elective methods, had left the mode of choosing the
senators undetermined. It proposed that the King should have in legislation an
absolute veto, although no initiative. Thus the creation of a Senate and the
royal veto became the first subjects of cousti tutional discussion in the
National Assembly.
A Senate, or
Second Chamber, was for different reasons unacceptable to both sides of the
Assembly. That the Left should dislike it was a direct inference from their
political theory. Rousseau’s Contrat Social, which regards the assembled people
as alone sovereign and denounces
even the representative
system as a fraud, implicitly condemns any check on, or delay of, popular
resolutions. The Left were haunted with a fear of royal and aristocratic
reaction, which seems hardly intelligible now that we can measure the
incapacity of the King, the weakness of the privileged orders, and the
revolutionary ardour of the masses. They deemed that a Senate even of the
American type might hinder the fulfilment of their principles; and a House of
Lords like the EnglLh they of course rejected.
But the Right
were also hostile, or at least indifferent, to the establishment of a Second
Chamber. The fanatics were against it, lest it should steady and save the
Revolution. “If you were to set up two Chambers,” said Maury, “your
Constitution might last.” These men, despairing of any good save from the
excess of ill, wished things to come to the worst in order that they might come
to reaction after. Many more were influenced by jealousy. A Second Chamber, if
it were to have a conservative force, would be largely if not entirely composed
of great nobles and prelates. But the French noblesse, although it might look
down upon the Third Estate, had a keen feeling of Equality within its own
circle. Holding that one gentleman is as good'as .another, the lesser nobles highly
resented the superiority affected by the great, and thought it intolerable that
the duke or marquis should gam all the power which a seat in a Second Chamber
implies, while the squire was to descend to the level of a common citizen. The
majority, which had come into the Assembly against its will, disliked the
minority which had come of its own accord; and since these liberals, full of
admiration for England, were the warmest upholders of a Second Chamber, the
conservative nobles, always destitute of political insight, gratified their
spleen by helping to throw out the proposal. In like manner the inferior
clergy, hating their chiefs and sympathising with the popular party, had no
mind to create a Second Chamber, which would exalt the Bishop still further
above the cnvrL As for the large number of deputies who had no very strong
opinion, they were cowed by the threats of violence which resounded in all the
popular clubs and newspapers. The result was seen in the final division. On
September 10, 849 deputies voted for a single Chamber; 89 only for two
Chambers, and 122 declared themselves “insufficiently informed.” This was the
first crushing defeat sustained by the admirers of the English Constitution.
It was
speedily followed by another. For some time past the questions, Shall the King
have an absolute veto ? or a limited, a suspensive veto? or no veto whatever?
had been under debate. Here again the majority of the Left were adverse to the
recommendation of the Committee. If the principle of the separation of powers
were rigidly applied, the King, as wielding the executive, must be refused the
smallest measure of legislative power. On the principles of the C&nttat
Social,
the royal
veto was equally to be rejected, as an encroachment on the soyereignty of the
people; in Sieyes’ phrase, a lettre de cachet directed againgt the general wilL
Will, said Rousseau, cannot be delegated, although power mayand the people
cannot, even for a moment, part with its sovereignty! If this were admitted,
the King might be an agent to execute the will of the legislature, but he could
have no voice in legislation. Apart from these, speculative cons'derations, the
Left distrusted the King much, the Ministers more, the Queen and courtiers most
of all. They were afraid that the absolute veto might bar all further progress,
and did not pause to reflect that, the legislature having complete control over
the revenue, the King could hardly use his negative voice except in cases where
he might with some hope of success appeal to the nation from its
representatives.
Those who,
like Mounier, valued .English precedents, do not seem to have noticed that the
King of England had in reality lost the power of rejecting Bills. Hardly any
foreigner then understood that, apart from the existence of a Second Chamber,
the only real check upon capricious legislation in England is the
responsibility of the Cabinet, which controls the majority in the,Commons. Yet
Mounier might expect far more support for the absolute veto than he had gained
for the Second iJhamber. Prudent men had already begun to note the impulsive
.temper of the Assembly, still more its submission to clamour from without, and
were anxious to give, these failings a counterpoise. Among such men was
Mirabeau, who had declared in the debate of June 15 that he would rather live
at Constantinople than in France, if the legislature were to, dispense with the
royal sanction. On this point at least all the high royalists, all who had
opposed the union of the Orders, agreed with Mirabeau and Mounier. The opposing
forces were therefore well matched; and' the. debate was kept up for several
days. Sieyes spoke with all his usual point against allowing the King any veto
whatever. Mounier put forth all. his powers in defence of the recommendations
of the Committee. Mirabeau spoke on the same side, although the feeling that he
had to maintain an unpopular cause seems to have damped his natural fire, and
he refrained from voting in the final division. The event was perhaps
determined by Necker’s excess of caution. Lafayette, who wished to be popular
and was swayed by American precedent, wrote earnestly to Necker and Mounier in
favour of the suspensive veto, warning them of the disasters which might occur
if they tried to obtain more for the King. Bamave, Duport, Alexandre Lamethj
and other leaders of the Left, repeated these prayers and warnings. Mounier was
unshaken; but Necker and some of his colleagues toid their friends in the
House that, unless the absolute veto could be carried by a decisive majority,
it would be better to vote for the suspensive veto. Necker persuaded the
Council to declare for the suspensive yeto, and to send to the Assembly a
memorandum stating
this
resolution. Mourner, who divined its import, induced the Assembly to decide
that the cover should not be opened until after the division. But Necker’s
known irresolution and the menaces of the democrats ensured Mounier’s defeat.
The division took place on September 11. That the King should have a veto was
resolved by 730 voices to 143; that the veto should be merely suspensive was
resolved by 673 voices to 325. This was the second defeat of the party which
derived its political principles from England, and it was decisive.
Mounier,
Bergasse, Lally-Tollendal, and Clermont-Tonnerre now resigned their seats on
the Constitutional Committee; whereupon their colleagues, who had differed with
them regarding the veto, did likewise. The first Constitutional Committee thus
came to an end. On September 15 the Assembly named a new Committee, including,
besides Sieyes, Talleyrand and Le Chapelier, Thouret, Target, Desmeuniers,
Rabaut-Saint-]£tienne, and Tronchet. The new Committee contained not a single
representative of the nobles, and Talleyrand was only in name a representative
of the clergy. It represented the main body of the Left, who desired to
preserve the form while destroying the substance of monarchy. The Constitution
of 1791 was in the main its work.
Soon after
the second Committee had been formed the removal of the King and the National
Assembly from Versailles to Paris gave the Revolution new energy. The
insurrection of October 5 and 6 has been described by different witnesses with
countless differences of detail, but its object and character are clear. The
extreme popular party was enraged at the slow progress made by the Assembly and
full of distrust of the King. The King might well listen to those among his
family and friends who pressed him to quit Versailles for some place where he
might regain his freedom of action and appeal to the loyalty of the Provinces.
Enough was known to raise suspicion; and one or two incidents, small in
themselves, served as the pretext for a tumult. Since the troops assemhled
under Marshal de Broglie had been sent back to their quarters, the palace of
Versailles had been entrusted to the gardes du corps and the National Guard of
the town. These were now reinforced by the Flanders regiment. On October 1 the
officers of the gardes du corps gave a banquet in the palace theatre to the
officers of the Flanders regiment and of the National Guard. After the banquet
the King, Queen, and Dauphin appeared for a few moments, while the company
drank their healths with fervour. When the royal party had retired the guests
grew clamorous, uncivil things were said about the National Assembly, and white
cockades were offered by gardes du corps to the officers of the National Guard,
and accepted by some of them in lieu of the tricolour badges. As the story of
the banquet got about, it was adorned with many circumstances more or less
fabulous; and the public was given to understand that traitors were hatching a
grave military plot against the Assembly and the nation. That there was such a
plot
has never
been proved, and that plotters worth considering would betray themselves in
this boyish fashion is most unlikely.
But nothing
more was needed to raise Paris. There the causes which had kept up disorder
were still at work. Although the harvest of 1789 had been bounteous, the
lawless state of the countiy and constant interference with the com trade
rendered food dear. Many rich inhabitants had left Paris, and foreign visitors
were dwindling. Great numbers of domestic servants and artisans were thus
thrown out of work and in risk of starvation. What with idleness, hunger, zeal
for the Revolution, or mere love of mischief, there were thousands ready to
riot when the orators of the clubs, the agents of the Duke of Orleans, and the
newspapers should give the signal Had the orderly citizens, the National
Guards, and their chief, been resolute to suppress tumult, this might have
mattered little; but the weakness of their action suggests that they likewise
wished to see the King and the Assembly at Paris, and under their own
influence. On The morning of October 5 a crowd, in the first instance chiefly
of women, although afterwards supported by men, assembled in the Place de Greve
and began an assault on the Hotel de Ville. Feebly resisted by the National
Guards on duty, they forced their way in, seized a quantity of arms and were
about to hang an abbe whom they chanced to find there, when a certain Stanislas
Maillard, who had taken part in the attack of the Bastille, raised the cry “To
Versailles.” The women followed him, and on the march were joined by crowds of
male rioters. Lafayette had been sent for, and had arrived after the women had
left the Hotel de Ville. He had put the National Guard under arms, but they
were divided in mind. Many of the battalions, we are assured by Thiebault,
would have obeyed an order to close the roads leading to Versailles, and such
an order must have baffled the insurrection. Lafayette did not give the order
but sat on horseback for several hours in the Place de Greve, vainly haranguing
the National Guards and the populace, till it became known that other riotous crowds
were following the first to Versailles, when the municipality authorised
Lafayette to lead his forces thither also. He set out a little before five
o’clock.
Meantime the
horde of men and women had reached Versailles, had forced their way into the
hall where the Assembly was sitting, had demanded a decree lowering the price
of bread, and showed themselves determined to remain there all night. The King
had come back from hunting to find Versailles in an uproar. The women had sent
him a deputation which he received graciously; but, when the deputation
returned, they were nearly murdered by the rest. About midnight Lafayette
arrived with his troops. Amid rain and mud the National Guards and the mob
bivouacked in the avenues and open spaces of Versailles; and Lafayette, after
taking what proved ineffectual measures . for the safety of the palace, retired
to rest just before daybreak. A little later the Paris mob found an unguarded
door, made their way into the
palace, and
assailed the Queen’s apartment, killing two of the gardes du corps who strove
to withstand them. Marie-Antoinette had barely time to fly to the King’s
apartment, when the rioters rushed into her room, and (stabbed the bed with
their pikes. But now the alarm had been given; and a detachment of the National
Guards appeared in time to stop further violence and save a number of the
gardes du corps from instant death. At length Lafayette himself came and
induced the King and Queen to show themselves on a balcony to the crowd that
filled the court. By announcing the King’s resolution to confirm the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and to come to Paris he turned the fury of the
mob into momentary good humour. On receiving this intelligence the Assembly
declared itself inseparable from the person of the King and prepared to
accompany him. Part of the rioters returned at once, bearing their trophy, the
heads of the murdered gardes du corps. The King and the royal family left
Versailles at noon and, moving slowly with the mixed horde of populace and National
Guards, did not reach Paris till nightfall. They took up their abode in the
Tuileries and were soon followed by the National Assembly, which established
itself in the manege or riding-school. A judicial enquiry into the events of
October 5 and 6 could not be avoided, but had no practical result, although it
cast the deepest suspicion upon the Duke of Orleans, who fell into general
discredit and presently accepted a mission to England as the least shameful
manner of retreat.
- The removal
of the King and the Assembly from Versailles to Paris opens a new period in the
Revolution. On July 14 Louis may be said to have lost his crown; on October 6
he lost his personal freedom, and the Assembly, deliberating in the clutch of
the Parisian mob, was almost as much a prisoner as the King. It did not yield
without a struggle. For a little while strenuous efforts were made to enforce
order. When the mob hung a baker named Francis, two of the murderers were
promptly tried and executed. Mirabeau’s bill giving the municipal authorities
extraordinary power to deal with unlawful assemblies was voted by a large
majority. But the respite thus gained was short; and all who were unpopular
felt themselves in constant peril. A new emigration began, and more than two
hundred deputies of the Right asked for passports; so that the Assembly
resolved to deny them to all who could not assign sufficient cause. Mounier,
having returned to Dauphine and vainly tried to raise the provincial Estates
against the Assembly, spent the winter in retirement and afterwards took refuge
at Geneva.
From this
period also dates the growing power of the Jacobin Club. It had its origin in a
small group of Breton deputies who, while the Assembly was yet at Versailles,
had met occasionally to discuss the questions of the hour. This Breton Club,
when the Assembly came to Paris, held its meetings in the convent of the
Jacobins and opened them
to the
public. It thus became a large popular society. It had always been a gathering
of the Left, but for a long time was not exclusive. Bamave and the Lameths were
at first the favourite speakers. Mirabeau himself was president of the Club so
late as December, 1790. But that tendency of the democratic party to grow ever
narrower and more fanatical, which might be seen in so many other places, was
at work among the Jacobins also. Before the dissolution 'of the Assembly the
Lameths and Bamave had seceded from the Club, and Robespierre and Petion had
gained the ascendancy. Meanwhile the Club had, by means of its affiliated societies,
spread its influence far beyond Paris. It abetted all the disorders of the
capital and the Provinces and did its best to make government impossible,
pending the time when its leaders should govern;
These events
completely changed the relation of parties in the National Assembly.
Outnumbered and hopeless, the Right might prolong the struggle, but could not
hope for victory; while the Left had to encounter only so much resistance as
kept them eager and united. Mirabeau, indeed, was convinced that the Revolution
could not be brought to a happy end unless some authority were restored to the
Crown. Almost immediately after the October insurrection he had begun that
secret correspondence with the King and Queen which paints so vividly the
disorders of the time and the workings of his own powerful but unequal genius.
In the Assembly he might snatch an occasional success, as when he carried a
decree that the regency should always vest in the eldest male relative of a
King under age; but he had no following and could exert no steady power. Nay,
he fell under the suspicion of the popular party, and had to redeem the votes
and speeches most in accord with his own opinions by outbreaks which aroused
the distrust of the King and Queen. He thus failed entirely to control the
course of events.
The relation
of the King’s Ministers to the National Assembly was the next subject of grave
constitutional debate. The familiar maxim of the separation of powers led to
the inference that the chiefs of the executive should be excluded from the
legislature, and the American precedent might be quoted on that side. Yet the
exclusion had already proved inconvenient. In July the Assembly, while
disclaiming executive power, had expressed its regret at Necker’s departure,
and had asked the King to dismiss his new Ministers. Since then Louis had
bestowed office on three well-known members of the Assembly, the Archbishop of
Bordeaux, whom he made Keeper of the Seals, the Comte de La’Tour du Pin, whom
he made Minister of War, and the Archbishop of Vienne, whom he admitted to the
Council; and the Assembly had thanked him for this mark of confidence, although
it excluded the persons preferred from any further share in its proceedings. In
his secret correspondence with the King, Mirabeau had recommended him to
form a
Ministry entirely of men chosen from the Assembly. Some of the most
distinguished chiefs of the Left, the Lameths, Duport, and Bamave, agreed with
Mirabeau on this subject, and wished to replace the actual Ministers, including
Necker, who had lost much of his popularity, by deputies of known liberal
opinions. They encouraged Mirabeau to concert measures with Lafayette; and
Lafayette, while he thought that Necker could not be spared, raised no
objection to the principle that Ministers should sit in the legislature. In a
plan for a new Ministry, which Mirabeau submitted to Lafayette, lie proposed to
retain Necker as chief, with the Archbishop of Bordeaux and La Tour du Pin, but
to fill the other ministerial offices with deputies, reserving for himself only
a seat in Council without a department. Counting on Lafayette’s good-will and
on his own ascendancy, now at its height, Mirabeau felt strong enough to raise
the question in the House; and on November 6, in the course of a financial
debate, he took the opportunity of asserting that the Ministers would never be
in real accord with the Assembly until they had seats there. The State, he
said, must be helpless, while the legislative and executive powers, regarding
each other as enemies, feared to discuss the public interest in common. He
therefore moved that, pending the settlement of the Constitution, the King’s
Ministers should have a consultative voice in the Assembly. Such admirers of
the English system as remained, notably Clermont- Tonnerre, welcomed the
suggestion; and nobody had condemned it, when the debate stood adjourned.
But the
English practice of choosing the Ministers from the legislature was for
opposite reasons distasteful to the Right and the Left. Many of the Right regarded
it as a means of yet further weakening the Crown. The King would be forced to
take the most popular deputies for his Ministers, and his executive power would
be transferred to the Assembly. On the Left many feared that Ministers, who
were members of the Assembly, would possess means of terrifying or corrupting
their colleagues, and that the ablest deputies would be seduced from their
principles by the hope of office and favour. Some rumour of a parliamentary
Ministry, in which Mirabeau would find a place, had got abroad ind had alarmed
jealous patriots. Nothing is stranger in the French Revolution than the
all-pervading suspicion at work under the fair surface of public spirit and
fraternal love; and nothing did more to blight the promise of a better and
happier order of society. When the debate was resumed on the following day, a
young member, named Lanjuinais, who lived to earn an honourable fame, moved a
decree to the effect that no deputy should be allowed to accept any place or
pension from the executive during the existence of the legislature or for three
whole years after. A reference to the aims of Mirabeau aroused all the jealousy
of his colleagues; and Mirabeau felt that there remained no hope of success. He
closed a speech of scorn and defiance with an
amendment
narrowing the prohibition to “ M. de Mirabeau, deputy of the commons of the
senechaussee of Aix.” The Assembly adopted an amendment to the original motion,
by which deputies were to be excluded from office only so long as the Assembly should
last. Mirabeau, who ascribed his defeat to the ill faith of Lafayette and the
enmity of the Ministers, hoped for some time that it might be reversed; but the
opportunity never came, and the principle asserted by Lanjuinais was embodied
in the Constitution.
How little
the principles which guided the Assembly in forming the Constitution would
admit of any real pouter in the executive, was seen in the debates upon the
right of making treaties and declaring war. In the spring of 1790 the dispute
between the English and Spanish governments over the region adjoining Nootka
Sound on the western side of North America had reached such a height that war
seemed probable, and a naval armament was set on foot in England. Spain claimed
the help of France under the Family Compact, and her claim was acknowledged by
Louis and his Ministers. Montmorin therefore informed the President of the
Assembly that, as the English preparations menaced France, the King had ordered
fourteen sail of the line to be got ready for sea. He might well hope that the
ancient enmity against England would impel the Assembly to support the King,
and that the outbreak of loyal and patriotic ardour would impart new life to
the government. But the Assembly, without bestowing a thought on the immediate
need, took occasion to discuss the principles which should hereafter guide
France in her foreign relations. If treaties are acts of sovereign power, and
if the people cannot alienate its sovereignty even for a moment, no treaty can
be valid unless made with the express consent of the people. Since none of the
treaties, by which France was actually bound, had received the express consent
of the people, none of them could be binding in itself, although theme might be
reasons of justice or expediency for acting as though it did bind. Thus France
was free to take her own course in foreign affairs, unfettered by previous
obligations. Robespierre, Petion, Bamave, and other orators of the Left,
proposed that the nation should solemnly renounce all thought of conquest. When
other nations had regained their freedom, they would do the same and wars would
cease; for all wars had hitherto arisen out of the ambition of Kings, and no
nation would take up arms save in a just cause. Diplomacy and ambassadors were
useless; general alliances were out of date; and nothing more was needed than
national pacts with just peoples, The National Assembly should tself undertake
the negotiation of treaties and exercise the power of war and peace. In vain
Mirabeau observed that popular assemblies were as subject to passion as Kings,
and not subject to any responsibility like Ministers. In vain he asked
whether,, because France had suddenly changed her own political system, she
would force all other nations to change theirs. In
vain he urged
the madness of disarming before Europe in arms. In vain he annexed all
imaginable safeguards to his proposal that the King should still have the power
of making war and peace. The King on declaring war was immediately to notify
the fact to the legislature, which might call the Ministers to account or
refuse the necessary credits, or at any time in the course of the war require
the executive to make peace. All treaties with foreign Powers were to be
negotiated and signed by the King and approved by the legislature. The Assembly
manifested its preference for Bamave’s proposal that the legislature should
have the power of concluding treaties and making war or peace, and that the
King should merely have the right to recommend such a course of action as he
thought expedient. The debate aroused a new agitation in Paris, and a fly-sheet
entitled The Treason of the Comte de Mirabeau discovered was hawked all through
the streets. Mirabeau thought it necessary to retreat from his position, and in
a second speech two days later accepted an amendment by Le Chapelier, which was
in effect the same as Bamave’s project, although it expressly reserved to the
King the sole initiative of proposals for war or peace. The Assembly added to
its decree a declaration that the French people renounced all wars of conquest,
and would never employ its forces against the liberty of any other nation.
The Assembly
gave a new proof of its resolve to keep foreign affairs in its own immediate
charge when it cancelled the permission given by the Ministers to the Comte de
Mercy-Argenteau, the Austrian ambassador, for the passage of some Austrian
troops from Luxemburg through France to Belgian territory. It then named a
Committee of six, including Bamave and Mirabeau, to review all treaties to
which France was a party. Meantime the English government continued its
pressure upon the King of Spain (Charles IV), and he renewed his appeal for
help to his kinsman. Mirabeau prevailed on the Diplomatic Committee to turn
the Family Compact into a national compact, at the same time omitting the
offensive clauses. On August 26 the Assembly invited the King to equip
forty-five sail of the line, and to tender to Spain the revised treaty as the
basis of a new alliance. But the Spaniards had not asked the French to conclude
a new treaty; they had called for help under an old treaty, which the Assembly
had cancelled without ask, .ig their leave. Feeling how vain it was to trust an
ally of this kind, they preferred to make terms with their enemy, and, by the Treaty
of the Escurial, October 12, 1790, they yielded all the points which they had
disputed with England. The impotence of the French Crown was now as patent in
foreign as in domestic affairs. It may excite some surprise that the Assembly,
which acknowledged the nation liable for the King’s debts, should have treated
the nation as not bound by treaties which the King had concluded. But the
majority was impelled, not so much by scruples about the sovereign rights of
the nation,
as by deep
jealousy and distrust of the Crown, and by fear lest the emergencies of foreign
affairs should enable it to regain somewhat of its power and dignity.
As the basis
of the new Constitution, the Assembly decreed a new division of the territory.
The old territorial divisions of France, the growth of ages, were in many
respects ill suited to the needs of a modern people. Most ancient of all were
the dioceses, in part at least dating back to the time when Gaul was embraced
in the Roman Empire. Next came the Provinces, formed chiefly in the period of
feudal dispersion. They were very unequal in size, most irregular in form, and
sometimes interlaced in a highly awkward manner. The Crown had from time to
time instituted new modes of division for administrative purposes, governments,
genb-aliUs, elections. Lowest came the towns and rural communes, many of them
defined in a very remote period. In making a new division the Assembly was
prompted partly by the wish to form areas convenient for a new and uniform
system of administration and for the election of deputies to the legislature,
partly by the wish to extirpate along with the Provinces the last traces of
that provincial feeling which had found utterance even in the elections for the
States General. Even in 1789 some of the Provinces regarded themselves as
united on equal terms with the French monarchy and affected the style of a
nation, the Breton, Beamese, Proven9al, or Franc-Comtois nation. According to
the scheme settled by the Constitutional Committee, France was to be divided into
about eighty Departments, as nearly as might be of the same size, each
Department into Districts averaging six or seven, and each District into
Cantons averaging eight or nine. The Cantons were made up of municipalities,
that is, of the old communes, the only historical divisions preserved, in
number upwards of forty thousand.
As the scheme
was finally carried out there were eighty-three Departments. In forming them a
certain regard was paid to provincial boundaries and provincial sentiments. A
small Province sometimes became a Department by itself. A large Province was
usually divided into a number of complete Departments ; and, only where strong
reasons of convenience could be alleged, was a Department formed out of two or
more Provinces. Nevertheless there vanished all that was left of old provincial
institutions as well as of the old administrative system devised by the Kings
of France and their ministers. The new Departments, Districts, aud Cantons,
had no history, no associations, no inner life or bond of common feeling, and
presented a smooth blank surface upon which the legislator might impress
whatever pattern he thought proper. Some writers have blamed the Assembly for
thus wasting the force which immemorial local ties and instinctive local patriotism
might have given to a new system of self-government. But the Assembly was
saturated with the doctrine that esprit de corps is the enemy of public spirit,
and that the attachment of the citizen to any smaller group conflicts
with
allegiance to the commonwealth. In this matter the Assembly partook far more
than it suspected of the jealous temper of the old monarchy and, without
knowing it, cleared the field for a new despotism. Englishmen, who know how
impossible it would be to blot out the English counties, may wonder at the ease
with which the Assembly effected these territorial changes. But it was
characteristic of the French Revolution that the people seemed to find a
pleasure in renouncing their history, and in destroying even the names and
forms which recalled the past.
During these
debates France continued to offer the strange sight of a people almost without
a government and in the highest tension, sometimes of amiable, sometimes of
savage excitement. Characteristic of the time were the so-called “federations”
in which the National Guards of neighbouring districts met to swear mutual
friendship and obedience to the decrees of the Assembly. These federations
began in the south towards the close of 1789. The friends of the Revolution saw
their value. The municipality of Paris proposed and the Assembly decreed on
June 5, 1790, a general federation of the whole of France, to be consummated on
the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille. Deputations from all the
National Guards of the Provinces, from all the regiments of the army, and from
the fleet, were to assemble on that day in the Champ de Mars, together with the
National Guard of Paris, and to swear fidelity to the nation, the law, and the
King. As the labourers employed could not finish the earthen amphitheatre in
time for the ceremony, people of both sexes and of all ages, ranks, and
conditions, came to their help, till, it is said, two hundred thousand men,
women, and children were digging and delving. On July 14, in the presence of
the King, the Queen, the National Assembly, and an innumerable concourse of
spectators, including fourteen thousand representatives of the National Guard
and eleven thousand representatives of the army, Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun,
assisted by two hundred priests in tricolour scarves, celebrated Mass at the
altar raised in the midst of the amphitheatre. Lafayette, the hero of the
hour, was the first to take the oath. He was followed by the president of the
National Assembly and by the King. Then followed the oaths of the deputations.
The electric shock of the enormous crowd, the pageant, the strains of military
music, and the incessant salutes of artillery wrought up the onlookers to what
Ferrieres terms “ a delicious intoxication.” The National Guards from the Provinces
showed much good-will to the King personally; but their zeal for the Revolution
was refreshed by their visit to its centre. Nor did the fraternal scenes
enacted in Paris and other cities and towns hinder the outbreak of passions of
a very different nature.
The
federations completed the dissolution of the regular forces by bringing them
under the direct influence of the revolutionary clubs. The soldiers everywhere
chose regimental committees to manage their
192 The regiment of Chateau-Vieux in mutiny. [1790
affairs, and
sent deputations to their commanders to ask for redress of their grievances,
which were often very real. Garrisons sent deputations to each other or to the
National Assembly. Sometimes the men went further, put their officers under
restraint, helped themselves from the regimental chest, and spent the money in
taverns and brothels. This licence nowhere went further than with the garrison
of Nancy, consisting of two French regiments and the Swiss regiment of
Chateau-Vieux. When the Marquis de Bouille, general of the army of the East,
had failed in bringing them back to obedience, the National Assembly had
interposed and sent an officer of high rank, M. de Malseigne, to carry out its
decree. But the soldiers and mob of Nancy set him at defiance and he barely
escaped from their hands to Luneville. There he was seized by another mutinous
regiment and ht? tided over to the rebels at Nancy. Bouille, having mustered a
small but faithful body of regular troops and a few National Guards, sumironed Nancy
on August 81. After some parleying the rebels obeyed and the mutinous regiments
began to defile out of the city. But then the armed populace fired on Bouille’s
men, who answered bj storming the gate; and the mutineers at the sound of the
cannon hurried back to help their late allies. After a furious combat of three
hours, in which he lost forty officers and four hundred men, Bouille forced his
way into the town and compelled a fresh surrender. The mutiny of Nancy had
caused such alarm that not only the King but the National Assembly returned
thanks to Bouille and the troops which had served under him. In accordance with
the privilege of the Swiss regime) .ts in the service of France, the Swiss
officers sat in judgment upon the mutineers of Chateau-Vieux. Twenty-two were
sentenced to death and some fifty to the galleys. The French regiments were
disbanded, but suffered no further penalty. Regimental clubs were forbidden but
throve none the less. Danton. Marat, and all who like them desired to prolong
anarchy as the means to a more thorough revolution, clamoured against the
general, the Minister for War, and the Assembly itself, and at length got an
amnesty for the Swiss soldiers condemned to the galleys. Desertion continued to
thin the rank and file. The officers emigrated in crowds. Even the firm Bouille
found that he could not trust more than a remnant of his troops, and outside
his command there was no more than the shadow of an army.
The navy had
fallen into equal disorder. Both the workmen in the royal dockyards and the
sailors had their grievances, which they expected the National Assembly to
redress, and both were skilfully urged to mutiny by the clubs and the
newspapers. So early as November, 1789, the workmen at Toulon broke out into
riot because Comte d’Albert de Rions, the director of the port, had forbidden
them to wear the tricolour cockade, or to enlist in the National Guard. As the
only means of saving his life he was hurried off to prison. The commissioner
sent down by the Assembly reported that there was no reason to punish
anybody. A
new director of the port was appointed. At Brest in September, 1790, the
sailors mutinied because a drunken man was ordered off the Patriote for
insulting one of the officers. The popular club at Brest took up the cause of
the mutineers. The municipality interfered to protect them. The Assembly sent
commissioners to restore discipline, but they availed nothing. Although the
mutiny was in part directed against the new penal code for the navy, a
committee report ascribed it to the misconduct of the Secretary for the Navy
and the delay in adopting the tricolour flag. But the resignation of the
Minister and the use of the tricolour did not satisfy the culprits, who forced
the Assembly to repeal the unpopular clauses of the penal code and to give
formal, thanks to the Jacobin club at Brest. There could no longer be any
question of discipline in the French navy. Here also the officers emigrated and
the men deserted. But here the mischief was not repaired as it was in the army.
Neither the Republic nor the Empire could form such a navy as had disputed the
command of the sea with England in the American War.
On the
colonies the Revolution in France had consequences grave in themselves, but
rendered terrible by the perverse handling of the National Assembly. In the
French West India Islands the governors were jealous of the Intendants who had
charge of the finances; the planters and the merchants stood to each other as
the nobles to the bourgeoisie at home; the mulattoes were a large and
discontented class; and the white population was outnumbered by the iiegro
slaves in the proportion of one to eight. Some representatives of the planters
had found seats in the National Assembly, and the events of July had led the
colonists, especially in the great island of San Domingo, to set up
municipalities and enrol National Guards. An assembly of planters at Leogane
went further and claimed for San Domingo the right to give itself a
constitution which would only need to be confirmed by the King. But this
assembly could not resist the new governor, the Comte de Peynier, and its ringleaders
fled to France in August, 1790. Then the commander of the regular troops at
Port-au-Prince, the capital, disarmed the National Guards and imprisoned the
colonial committee. Next the mulattoes raised a rebellion to gain the rights of
citizenship. They were put down, and their leader, Vincent Oge, was broken on
the wheel. Early in 1791 the arrival from France of some troops tainted with
the spirit of mutiny emboldened the mean whites and the colonial troops at
Port-au-Prince to rise and make themselves masters of the city. When these
events were reported at home the National Assembly, without taking any measure
to enforce order, decreed the abolition of slavery and bestowed civic rights on
all the inhabitants of the colonies. Six months later the negroes of San
Domingo, learning that they were free, took up arms and began the most terrible
servile war of modem times, ending in the ruin of the colony. Martinique and
Guadeloupe underwent miseries less in
degree but
the same in kind. Even the isles of Bourbon and Mauritius and the French
settlements in India were shaken by the disorders of the mother country.
In the
beginning of September Necker resigned. Very soon after his return to office in
July of 1789 he had lost all popularity and power. The course of events had
disproved his pretension to be considered a statesman, and the .Assembly
neglected to use even his skill as a man of business. Its committees did his
work without listening to his advice; and his position, which had long been
painful and humiliating, became dangerous after the affair of Nancy. On
September 2 his house had to bo protected by the National Guard against the
mob, which shouted “ Down with the Ministers ! Death to Bouille! ” The next day
he tendered his resignation, which the Assembly accepted without a word of
thanks or regret. He returned to his native country, but not without having
been twice arrested on the way.
The utter
ruin of the ancient institutions of France, the determination of so many of the
principles of the new order, and the redivision of the territory, left, as it
might seem, no more than the details of the Constitution to be enacted. But
the aspect of public affairs, the temper of parties, and the relation of the
King to the Assembly, matters of so much consequence when an absolutely new
system of government was to be elaborated and brought into working, were all
changed for the worse by the attempt of the Assembly to reform or rather
remodel the Church of France.
A change in
the relations of Church and State, a reduction in the number, wealth, and
political power of the clergy were indeed inevitable. Many of the cahiers, we
have seen, touched upon these subjects, although they rarely or never raised
questions of doctrine or worship* The bulk of the French people were orthodox,
if not zealous Catholics; but the Assembly contained a majority, hostile in
different degrees as Jansenists, Protestants, or freethinkers, to the existing
ecclesiastical order, and impatient to requite all that they had suffered from
the intolerance of Rome. It was thus that the Assembly approached the most
delicate and difficult part of its task in a harsh and unsympathetic spirit. It
did not dissolve the connexion of Church and State, but rendered that connexion
intolerable to most of the clergy, even as it had preserved the monarchy whilst
making the King’s position as humiliating as possible.
The merely
political power of the clergy was abated by the union of the three Estates in
one assembly, for it was certain that a constitution framed by a majority of
laymen would never restore their separate political existence. The night of
August 4 witnessed the first inroad upon the wealth of the clergy, inasmuch as
the suppression of feudal rights would affect prelates and monasteries as well
as lay seigneurs, and the suppression of tithes would affect almost all the
clergy. But in that feverish sitting it had not been determined what ancient
rights should
1789-90] Church land and tithe.—Religious Orders.
195
be commuted
for money and what should be merely cancelled. On several occasions the heads
of the Church declared their readiness to make considerable sacrifices, but
they always tried to avert the assertion of the principle that the wealth of
the Church was the property of the nation, and this principle the majority was
resolved to enforce to its uttermost conclusions. First it was decided, against
the arguments of Sieyes, that the tithes should be suppressed without any
compensation. A sum of at least 70,000,000 livres, nearly £3,000,000 a year,
was thus divided among the landowners of France in proportion to their wealth;
and perhaps two-fifths of all the ecclesiastical revenues were swept away at a
single stroke. Meantime disorder had risen to such a height that scarcely any
revenue could be collected; and, as nobody would lend to the State, bankruptcy
seemed approaching. On October 10, therefore, Talleyrand proposed that the
nation should take the Church lands into its possession and sell them in order
to pay its debts. Mirabeau moved the Assembly to declare that these lands
belonged to the nation, subject to the duty of making a provision for the
clergy, and that no cure should have less than 1200 livres a year as stipend. A
law embodying these proposals was voted on November 10; and by a law of
December 19 a sale of lands was actually ordered. At the same time the first
issue of assignats was sanctioned. It is unnecessary here to trace the subsequent
measures by which the vast wealth of the French Church was dissipated.
The numbers
of the clergy were reduced by the law of February, 1790, which deprived
monastic vows of all legal force, leaving the inmates of religious Houses free
to return to the world, suppressed the existing religious Orders, and forbade
the introduction of any new ones. All the monastic property now became
available for secular purposes, but pensions were assigned to the Religious.
Those who wished to continue their former way of life were allowed to do so in
Houses set apart for the purpose; and the Orders engaged in charity or
education, as well as the convents of women, were left undisturbed. Many monks
and friars availed themselves of their new liberty, but the nuns generally preferred
to remain in their convents. As anarchy grew in France, and political and
religious hatreds became more venomous, the condition of those who kept to
their vows became most painful. Their pensions were irregularly paid, they were
harassed by the municipalities, and threatened, sometimes brutally maltreated,
by the mob. All this, however, lay in the future. So tepid was the Catholic
feeling of the time, so useless had most of the monasteries become, and so
unpopular were most of the religious Orders, that the dissolution called forth
little resistance. The Assembly might have acted more wisely in continuing that
gradual suppression of decayed communities which the Crown had begun; but so
far it had not raised up any formidable religious opposition.
It was the
new form imposed upon the relation of the clergy to the State which broke the
alliance between the cures and the commons, and
fastened the
conflict between the French Revolution and the See of Rome. The majority of the
Assembly was imbued with the notion that al independent corporations are evils
to society; and its leaders had committed themselves to the principle that the
clergy shpuld be regarded as a branch of the public service employed to teach
morals and dispense charity. In the F<cclesiastical Committee the prevailing
temper was deepened by the influence of the Jansenists, especially of Camus and
Treilhard; and the “civil constitution of the clergy” presented on its behalf
to the House in May, 1790, was a direct challenge to the feelings and traditions
of orthodox Roman Catholics.
By this
constitution the ancient ecclesiastical dioceses and provinces were set aside.
Henceforward there was to be one Bishop and no more in each Department; and the
Metropolitans were reduced to ten. All French citizens were forbidden to
recognise the authority of any Bishop or Metropolitan whose see lay outside the
kingdom, although by a later amendment a new Bishop was allowed to write to
Rome as a testimony of unity of faith and communion with the head of the Church.
The cathedral Chapters were suppressed, and to each Bishop was assigned a
council of vicars, whose concurrence was needed for every act of jurisdiction.
A reduction was also made in the number of parishes. All ecclesiastical offices
became elective. The Bishop was to be chosen by the electors of the Department,
and the cure by the administrative assembly of the District; while no man was
to be disabled from voting by the circumstance that he was not a Catholic. Only
persons who had been in orders for a time fixed by law were eligible; and when
elected they had to undergo examination by the Bishop or Archbishop; but his
power of rejecting was severely limited. The stipends of all the clergy were
fixed. The Bishop of Paris alone was to receive 50,000 livres a year; the rest
were to have from 20,000 to 12,000 livres according to the size of their
diocese. The parish priests were to receive in Paris 6000 livres, and
elsewhere from 4000 to 1200 livres; and the curates from 2400 to 700 livres.
Residence was enforced by placing the clergy under the control of the local
authority. In order to absent himself for more than a fortnight the Bishop must
obtain leave from the Directory of the Department, the cure from the District
Directory.
The advocates
of the civil constitution of the clergy maintained that it did not touch
doctrine or worship, but merely reformed discipline, and that it did not
therefore encroach on freedom of conscience or go beyond the rightful province
of the secular authority. The commanding influence in the affairs of the
Church, formerly enjoyed by the Crown, might fairly be claimed for the nation.
If the King had formerly nominated the Bishops, and the King and other laymen
had enjoyed the patronage of many livings, why should not the general body of
Frenchmen now exercise the same powers by way of election ? The Jansenists,
who swayed
the Ecclesiastical Committee, were apt to magnify the authority of the State in
the hope of effecting a reformation of the Church. “ A State,” said Treilhard,
“ can admit or exclude a religion; a fortiori it can declare that it wishes a
particular establishment to exist in a particular place or in this or that
manner. When the sovereign believes a reform necessary, no opposition is
admissible.” But, whatever might be alleged in favour of the civil
constitution of the clergy, it did undoubtedly shock the consciences of a great
number of Frenchmen. They held the established discipline of the Church to be
an essential part of the Catholic religion. They felt that the election of
Bishops and parish priests by laymen, who need not even be members of the
Church, and the implied denial of papal jurisdiction, would involve them in the
guilt of schism. Some clerical members of the Assembly proposed the convocation
of a national council to reform the Gallican Church and a negotiation with the
Pope; but this did not satisfy the majority, who wished to enforce the
absolute, unconditional prerogative of the legislature in matters
ecclesiastical. Although the Assembly had adopted the principle of freedom of
conscience and the principle of a State Church, it forgot in regulating the
Church all deference to the scruples of the faithful, and returned unwittingly
but surely to despotic precedents and the old contempt for human liberty.
Early in the
year the Pope had taken alarm at the ecclesiastical measures of the National
Assembly. He could not but condemn the civil constitution of the clergy, which
extinguished his authority iii France, and he warned Louis that its acceptance
would be an act of schism. Louis, with the deepest reluctance, but wholly
unable to resist, gave his sanction to the ecclesiastical decrees on August 27.
The clergy, already incensed by the confiscation of Church lands and the
suppression of the religious Orders, were more stubborn in resistance. Many of
the Bishops had protested against the civil constitution; the parish priests
condemned it; some outbreaks of violence against the Protestants in the south
betrayed the rekindling of fanaticism, and for the first time a popular
movement counter to the Revolution became discernible. At Montauban, where the
Protestant middle class formed a large part of the National Guard, while the
municipality was Catholic, the Catholic mob on May 10 attacked the unarmed
National Guards, killed or wounded sixty, and imprisoned the rest until they
were set free by a commissioner from the National Assembly. A month later the
two religions came to blows in Nimes; and the Protestants, with the help of the
fanatic peasants from the mountains, gained the victory, killing over three
hundred Catholics. Then the Catholic priests and nobles of the neighbouring
departments planned a “ federation ” of Catholic parishes for August 18 on the
plain of Jales; upwards of thirty thousand National Guards met there on the
appointed day, heard mass and agreed to petition the Assembly that the
Catholics of Nimes should be allowed
to arm, that
those who had been imprisoned after the faction-fight should be set free, and
that those who had suffered in their property should receive compensation. The
Assembly denounced the federation of Jales as unlawful, but its promoters kept
banded together.:.
These warning
symptoms only hardened the imperious temper of the National Assembly. On
November 26 the Ecclesiastical Committee reported in favour of compelling all
beneficed ecclesiastics to swear that they would maintain to the utmost of
their power the Constitution decreed by the Assembly and accepted by the King.
After a fierce debate, in which Mirabeau outstripped the intolerance of the
Ecclesiastical Committee, the proposition was carried. The unhappy King
hesitated, tried to gain time, appealed to the Pope; but at length, overborne
by the urgent summons of the Assembly and by threats of instant violence against
the clergy, if not against himself, he yielded and signed on December 26 the
decree which was to bring so many evils upon France. The clerical members of
the Assembly were now required to take the oath. On January 4, 1791, the roll
was called; and Bishops and priests with grave dignity declined.. The majority
then retorted with a decree dej'-iving all ecclesiastics who persisted in their
refusal. Everything that could be devised to induce the people to maltreat the
refractory clergy was done by the popular clubs and newspapers. Yet only four
prelates would swear, and they carried little weight; for the Archbishop of
Sens and the Bishop of Autuh lacked character, and the Bishops of Viviers and
Orleans lacked talent. One hundred and twenty-eight prelates and a large
proportion of parish priests were deprived for refusing the oath. The election
of. their successors caused yet more rancour; and the persons chosen, although
generally respectable, were not of such commanding, merit, as to , make men
forget how they had obtained preferment. Henceforth there were in the Gallican
Church two hostile bodies of clergy: the one upheld by all the power of the
State and all the violence of the mob; the other supported by whatever was left
in France of Catholic zeal and orthodoxy. Bitter religious discord was added to
all the other plagues of the time ; and the mischief begun by the National
Assembly was made irreparable by the Legislative Assembly and the Convention.
The decrees
of the Assembly regarding the Church drove the; King once more into active,
although not open resistance. Since the failure of his attempt to use force in
July of 1789, Louis had waited passively upon events. It is impossible that he
should have approved of recent changes. Holding himself King by the grace of
God, and knowing that he had meant well and made large concessions to the
spirit of the time, he must have resented the loss of power and liberty, and he
must have discerned in the anarchic and miserable state of France the assured
retribution of revolt against lawful authority. Yet so indolent, so irresolute,
so honestly averse from civil bloodshed was Louis, that it was
long before
he concerted any measures against the National Assembly. He put no trust in his
kinsmen who had emigrated, and he had no hope of aid from without. But the
Assembly, in forcing him to approve the civil constitution of the clergy,,had
made him do,what he believed to be wrong, what the Pope had condemned, what
might imperil the souls of millions of faithful subjects as well as his own. In
forcing him to approve the decree which exacted an oath to that constitution,
the Assembly had driven him to take part in persecuting men whom he revered for
a resistance believed by him to be a duty. “ I would rather be King of Metz than
remain King of France in such a position,” he observed after signing the
decree; “ but this shall not last long.” Louis could not indeed shake off those
weaknesses which made him the most futile of conspirators. Still less could he
measure the forces which had issued in the Revolution. To him it seemed that an
unscrupulous faction had misled his good people, had all but deposed himself,
and had oppressed his clergy and nobles. He meditated escaping from Paris,
appealing to the sound part of the nation, and with the help of a display of
force by friendly Powers restoring his authority and giving effect to his
forgotten declaration of June 23, 1789. With more activity and courage, but
with even less judgment, the Queen adopted these plans and looked round for
help from abroad. Little was known, but much was suspected by the par __saas of
the Revolution ; and from the autumn of 1790 events moved. steadily towards the
issue foretold by Mirabeau, the abolition of the, monarchy, and the death of
the King and Queen.
Mirabeau had
strongly dissuaded recourse to foreign Powers, but Mirabeau had lost any little
credit he ever possessed with the King by the rancour which he had
recently displayed against the clergy. His death on April 4,1791, made no
change in the projects entertained at Court. But none of the foreign Powers was
disposed to intervene in French affairs, or to help in ending that paralysis of
French power in which, all found their own advantage. The King and Queen
therefore resolved to accept with seeming good-will whatever measures the
Assembly might tender. There was only one submission which, even to gain time,
the King would not make. Convinced that the priests who had taken the oath were
schismatics, he would not avail himself of their ministrations, but had the
chapel of the Tuileries served by recusants. The revolutionary party insisted
that, he must receive the Sacrament from a “ constitutional ” parish priest.
When Louis tried to evade the difficulty by leaving Paris and spending Easter
at St Cloud, the National Guards who were on duty at the Tuileries would not
allow his departure. The mob rose in their support; the municipal authority
would not interfere; and Lafayette could do nothing. Louis and his family had
to return to the Tuileries. Two days later he had to appear in the Assembly and
solemnly declare himself in the enjoyment pf liberty. Even the phlegmatic
Bourbon must have felt the unutterable degradation of that
20*0 The flight to Varennes.—Martial law
proclaimed. [1791
moment. Yet
such were his embarrassments and so tardy his resolution that two more months
were lost in plotting and preparation. On June 20 Louis attempted to fly with
his family to Metz and the army of Bouille, leaving behind him a proclamation
in which he rehearsed his griefs and retracted his consent to all the measures
which had been tendered to him since the loss of his freedom. On the following
day the fugitives were arrested at Varennes, and all hope of aid from the army,
or from foreign governments, was extinguished. The Comte de Provence, who had
taken another route, and adopted better measures, reached Brussels in safety.
Such was the
awe which had long surrounded the royal office in Prance that the first emotion
of the public, on learning the King’s flight, was one of fear. The alarm was
soon dispelled by the news of his capture; but then the question arose how- he
should be treated. A few Republicans wished to depose Louis, nor did they lack
solid arguments; for what settled quiet could men expect with a King who had in
truth to be kept a prisoner, if he were to acquiesce in his place under the
Constitution ? . The main body of the Left, however, were monarchical in their
peculiar fashion; they were weary of change and saw that the extreme democrats
who would have dealt hardly with the King desired another and a more
destructive revolution in which all who had anything to lose would alike
suffer. The Assembly was satisfied therefore with decreeing that until the King
had accepted the Constitution he should be suspended from his office. In fact
he remained a prisoner as before.
The club of
the Cordeliers with Danton at their head called not only for the deposition but
for the trial of the King. A pe ’tion to that effect •vas laid for signature on
the altar of the nation in the Champ de Mars. Two foolish persons whom
curiosity led to hide themselves under the steps of the altar were found out
and murdered. The National Assembly^ hearing that it was to be attacked,
ordered Bailly to take measures for the safety of Paris. The municipality then
proclaimed martial law, and Bailly and Lafayette went to the Champ de Mars,
where Bailly read the proclamation enjoining the crowd to disperse. The crowd
replied with stones and a few shots; and the National Guards fired, killing or wounding
several persons. A panic ensued and many were trodden under foot in the tumult.
Such was the incident which, became celebrated as the “massacre of the Champ de
Mars,” July 17, 1791, for the Jacobins regarded all endeavours of the
authorities to put down riot as partaking of murder and treason and afterwards
dealt with Bailly accordingly.
Time and
experience had brought the leaders of the Left, Barnave, Duport, and the
Lameths, to those political opinions which they had combated in Mirabeau. At
length they saw like Mirabeau that the Revolution could not be closed until the
executive had regained some power. Like Mirabeau they tried to reach this end
by coming to terms with the King and restoring so much of his prerogative as
would enable
him to resist
further encroachment. Like Mirabeau they were doomed to fail. In order to
strengthen themselves against the Crown they had flattered extreme opinions and
connived at lawless deeds; and, now that the fanatics and ruffians turned
against them, they had no defence save the shadow of an executive power. They
could expect no help from the Right who, since the capture of the King, had
taken no part in the proceedings of the Assembly. They could not gain the
confidence of the King and Queen, who were only'the more embittered by the
failure of their attempt at flight and merely sought to gain time by playing
with the parliamentary leaders. Yet Bamave and Le Chapelier addressed
themselves to Malouet as the most reasonable member of the Right; assuring him
that they would support any fair amendment of the Constitution, if they could
count upon the votes of his friends. Malouet had little hope of satisfying this
condition, but he undertook to criticise the Constitution in the tribune, so as
to give Bamave and Le Chapelier the opportunity of declaring themselves already
convinced of the necessity for certain changes. On August 8 therefore Malouet
ascended the tribune and began a speech to which the House listened so
attentively that the Extreme Left grew impatient, and Le Chapelier suddenly
moved that he should be no longer heard. Having found that scarcely any of the
Right would support Malouet, Le Chapelier and his friends had determined not to
bear alone the enmity of the Extreme Left, but to gain favour by silencing the
very criticism which they had invited. By some strange fatality every attempt
to control the Revolution seemed only to make it more violent.
All hope of
restoring vigour to the executive was thus lost; and the faults of the
Constitution were only enhanced in revision. The Constitutional Act was finally
voted on September 3. Throughout its proceedings the Assembly had claimed a
plenary constituent power and denied to the King any voice in determining the
Constitution. His acceptance of the Constitution was necessary, not to its
validity, but to his continuing to reign. After consulting many of the most
eminent deputies, from Mauiy and Cazales to Bamave and Duport, Louis bowed
himself to unconditional assent. The ceremony of the King’s oath to the Constitution
took place on September 14 in a solemn sitting of the Assembly. Most of its
members believed or hoped that the Revolution had run its course, and that the
new order of things was solidly established. They were weary of their long
toil, and the people were weary of them. On September 30 the National Assembly
came to a close.
The
Constitution of 1791 has for its preface the Declaration of Rights, a curious
mixture of law, morals, and philosophy. Those clauses of the Declaration which
may be termed legal ordain that no man shall be arrested or imprisoned save in
the cases and according to ,the forms prescribed by law; that every man shall
be deemed innocent until he has been judged guilty; that no ex post Jhcto
penalty shall be inflicted; that
no man shall
be troubled for any expression of opinion which does not trouble public safety;
and that there shall be freedom of speaking, writing, and printing. Among the
philosophical clauses those which assert that, all sovereignty resides in the
nation, and that every citizen is entitled to concur in person or by his
representatives in making laws and imposing taxes, are the most noteworthy ;
the former as an express contradiction of the ancient absolute monarchy, the
latter because contradicted by the terms of the, Constitution itself. The
Constitution begins with reenacting the laws which had abolished titles and
orders of nobility, the purchasable and hereditary character of public offices,
privileges of all kinds, all associations of members of trades or professions,
and the binding force of religious vows. It goes on to confirm the new
territorial division and municipal organisation, declares marriage a civil
contract, and establishes civil registers of births, deaths, and marriages.
Only then does it begin to determine the distribution of political power.
Although sovereignty is inalienable in the nation, the nation can exercise its
powers only by delegating them. , The representatives of the nation are the
legislature and the King.
The
legislature was to consist . of a single Chamber; and the number of
representatives was fixed at seven hundred and forty-five. These were
distributed between the Departments, on the threefold basis of extent, of
population, and of the amount paid in direct taxes. Two hundred and forty-seven
representatives were apportioned according to territory, two hundred and
forty-nine according to population, and as many according to the amount of
taxes paid. The indirect method of election was retained. The Primary
Assemblies were held in towns and cantons. They were composed of “active
citizens,” that is to say, men aged twenty-five and paying direct taxes equal
to the, value of at least three days’ labour in that district, inscribed upon
the rolls of the municipality and the National Guard* and not engaged in
domestic service. They had to take the civic oath of fidelity to the, nation,
the law, and the King. No man could exercise the rights of an active citizen in
more than one place. The Primary Assemblies thus composed were to choose electors
in the proportion of one for every hundred active citizens. For the electors a
higher qualification was fixed. Besides fulfilling the other conditions of
active citizenship, they must be owners or usufructuaries of property assessed
to the taxes; if in a town of more than, six thousand nhabitants, at the value
of at least two hundred days’ labour; if elsewhere, at the value of at least
one hundred and fifty days’ labour. In a town of over six thousand inhabitants
the tenant of a house valued at one hundred and fifty days’ labour, and
elsewhere the tenant of a house valued at one hundred days’ labour, were
qualified to be electors. So was any farmer or metayer, whose holding was
assessed at four hundred days’ labour. The electors chose the members of the
legislature, who were only required to satisfy
203
the
conditions of active citizenship. Persons holding office in the administration
or in the Courts of justice might be elected, but had to choose between a seat
in the Assembly and their place in the public service. A member of the
legislature might be reelected once; but after his second term two years must
elapse before he could again offer himself as a candidate. The King and the
servants of the Crown were excluded from any share in determining disputed
points relative to the elections. Before taking their seats the representatives
had to swear, in the name of the French people, that they would live free or
die, and that they would maintain the Constitution.
The
legislature was to last two years, and the King had no power to prorogue or to
dissolve it. At the end of two years a fresh election followed as of course. It
might adjourn itself at discretion, aind during the adjournment the King might
and in certain junctures must convoke it. A deputy could not be Minister during
his term of service or for two years afterwards. But Ministers of the Crown had
an entry and a place assigned, might demand a hearing on matters concerned with
their respective departments, and might on other occasions be granted a hearing
by the House. The legislature had fall legislative power, qualified by the
King’s suspensive veto, which did not extend to financial laws. A Bill was not
to pass until it had been read three times with intervals of at least eight
days. The legislature had executive authority in so far that its consent was
necessary to proclaiming war, and its ratification to treaties of peace,
commerce, or alliance; but it was debarred from any exercise of judicial power.
The King was
styled “ King of the French by the grace of God and the will of the nation.”
Royalty was to be indivisible and hereditary in the; male line of the House of
Bourbon,, according to the rule of primogeniture. At his accession or, if a
minor, when he came of age, he was to take an oath of fidelity to the nation,
the law, and the Constitution. His person was to be inviolable and sacred, but
he was to vacate his office if he failed to take or if he retracted his oath of
fidelity, or if he led a military force against the nation, or did not formally
condemn such an enterprise begun by others in his name, or, lastly, if he
quitted the kingdom and did not return within a time fixed by the legislature.
After vacating or resigning the throne he was to become a simple citizen,
liable for unlawful acts committed since he ceased to be King. At a King’s
accession his private estate was annexed to the national domain, and a Civil
List was settled upon him for life. He was allowed a guard not exceeding 1200
foot and 600 horse, and paid out of the Civil List. It was to be recruited
either from the regular army or from citizens who had served one year in the
National Guard, and its members could obtain no promotion outside their own
body. In case of a minority the nearest male relative became Regent if he
satisfied certain conditions, and the custody of the King’s
person was
entrusted to his mother. Eighteen years was to be the age of majority.
The King was
the supreme executive power. As such he was the head of the administration, and
the chief of the army and navy; he was charged with the external safety of the
kingdom; he named all ambassadors and diplomatic agents; he chose the
commanders of fleets and armies, and conferred the rank of marshal or of
admiral. In the lower grades he had a more limited patronage. He appointed
one-half of the lieutenant-generals, one-third of the colonels and lieutenant-
colonels; two-thirds of the vice-admirals, half of the captains, and one-sixth
of the naval lieutenants; subject in all cases to such laws as might regulate
promotion. He also appointed to the various branches of the civil service. The
annual list of pensions and gratifications to be laid before the legislature
was drawn up by his command. The King fixed the distribution of the forces by land
and sea, conducted negotiations, and signed treaties, subject to ratification
by the legislature. Thus the kingly office, though far different to what it had
been a few years before, might appear to retain considerable force and dignity.
But the restraints upon it were stringent. The King had no control over the
duration of the legislature, for the elections took place irrespective of his
will and he could neither dissolve nor prorogue. He had no initiative in making
laws, although he might invite the legislature to take any subject into
consideration. He had, it is true, a suspensive veto upon bills. Should he
exercise this veto, the measure could not be brought forward again in that
Assembly; but, if it were passed without alteration in the two following, it
became law without his consent. The King might not select his Ministers from
among the deputies, and therefore the deputies were likely to regard his
Ministers as dangerous men, to be suspected and thwarted. The Ministers were
deprived of control over the local authorities and the National Guard, and in a
great measure of control over the regular army. The King might propose a war to
the legislature, but could not undertake one save by its decree. If the case
called for immediate action, the King was to inform the legislature of what had
been done, and, if it happened not to be sitting, was bound to convoke it at
once. Should it disapprove of the recourse to arms, he must arrest the
campaign. Not only was the King debarred from any exercise of judicial power,
but he could not name the judges, who were to be elective. To these substantial
checks upon his power we must add the change of forms intended to impress upon
himself and all the world that his position was now a subordinate and a
regulated one.
The
remodelling of the administrative system ensured the impotence of the
sovereign. For, although he had Ministers, he no longer had local agents or
representatives. The local authorities founded upon the new subdivision of
France were all elective. Each Department had an
administration
of thirty-six persons, chosen for a term of two years by the electors out of
such active citizens as paid in direct contributions at least the value of ten
days’ labour. The administration was renewed by one-half every year. It
consisted of a smaller part, the Directory,' and a larger part, the Council, of
the Department. The Directory, consisting of nine persons, was the executive,
and was always in action. The Council, consisting of all the other members, was
deliberative, and held its session once a year. In every District the
administration was similarly chosen and similarly i divided, the whole body
consisting of twelve members, four of whom acted as the Directory. Below the
District came the Canton, which had no administration, and below the Canton the
communes or municipalities. All active citizens here took part in the election,
but the conditions of being elected were the same as in the District or
Department. As the municipalities varied in population from the smallest
village to the largest city, the number of representatives was graduated from
three, including the Mayor, where the population was under five hundred, to
twenty-one where it exceeded one hundred thousand. These formed the permanent
municipal body; but the active citizens also chose notables, who were in each
municipality twice as many as the representatives, and who sat with these in
the Council General of the commune, summoned only for certain important
affairs. The officers of the municipal body were the Mayor, the Pro- cureur,
and, in the larger communes, the Procurewr substitut. The executive of the
municipal body, known as the Bureau, consisted of one-third of the members,
always including the Mayor. A special constitution was framed for Paris.
The
administration of the Department apportioned its quota of the direct taxes
between the Districts; and the administration of the District apportioned its
quota of these taxes among the municipalities. The authorities of the
Department and the District were also supposed to exercise on behalf of the
State a control and surveillance over the municipalities. But, since they were
elected in their own neighbourhood, not appointed by the Crown, they were not
in any real sense agents of the executive power. Nor had they strength of their
own to make their control and surveillance effective. The Department and the
District were of comparatively little moment, and all real force was in the
municipalities. The municipalities possessed not only the usual powers of local
administration, but also certain powers which in every other country have been
retained by the State. They might almost be said to inherit the all-pervading
authority of the Intendant and his subdelegates. The) had the direction of
public works and the management of public property. To them the National
Assembly entrusted the Church lands for sale. They made out the roll of
tax-payers, assessed the direct taxes, undertook the collection, and forwarded
the sum paid to the District and Department, whence it reached the Treasury.
The
206 Elective judges.—The Courts of justice.
municipalities
alone could call out the troops, the National Guards, or the gendarmerie. The
State, having no local representative, could neither collect its revenue nor
defend its subjects. Nor had it any effective means of compelling the
municipalities to do either. The King might indeed annul the acts of the local
authority if contrary to law; he could suspend it if it were obstinate in
disobedience. But this was an empty form, since he had no command of physical
force, and the judges were elective. Accordingly the municipal authority did as
it pleased, paid in the smallest sum it could, wielded its military power with
the freedom of a prince, arrested travellers, opened letters, occupied forts,
and laid hands on national property at its good pleasure. Thus the revenue
shrank to the merest pittance, and the government became more helpless every
day. Public order depended on the concurrence of more than forty thousand
independent bodies; and the head of the State, virtually imprisoned by the
municipal authority of Paris, was an apt symbol of the condition of the whole
commonwealth. At the same time the municipalities, having no external support,
were commonly helpless against insurrection and had to take their orders from
the local club. So extreme a dispersion of power has perhaps never been
witnessed in Europe.
The judicial
system was entirely renewed in conformity with the ■loctrines of the
sovereignty of the people and the separation of powers. Neither the legislature
nor the King had any part in the administration of justice. The judges indeed
acted in the King’s name, but they were all elected by the people. In each
Canton and town one or more jvges de paix were established. These were chosen
by the “active citizens” out of the citizens eligible to the local
administrative bodies. They held office for a term of two years and could not
be reelected. In every District there was a civil tribunal of five judges,
elected for a term of six years and reeligible. Only professorial lawyers of a
certain standing could be appointed. The different District tribunals in the
same Department acted mutually as Courts of Appeal to each other. A supreme
Court of Cassation, elected by the Departments, was to sit in the same place as
the legislature. There were three degrees of criminal jurisdiction. The
municipality heard petty police cases; the juge de paix and his assessors dealt
with what we should term the lighter misdemeanours; and heinous offenders were
tried by the Criminal Tribunal of the Department, which consisted of a
president and three judges chosen by the electors. A High National Court was
created to try persons accused by the legislature of political offences. Its
members were chosen, two by the electoral Assembly of each Department. No judge
could be deprived of his office unless on conviction of crime. Viewed as a
whole, the new system had the merit of bringing justice within the reach of
all, but afforded no sufficient guarantee for independence. The judges were
numerous ; they were poor; they were elective; and they occupied their seats
only for a time. None of the ordinary Courts was in a
The army.—The navy.—The National
Guards. 207
position to
withstand the stress of public feeling; and no judge could afford to depp’st
popular solicitation or popular threats. He had nothing to fear from the
government; but the government could not protect him if he honestly discharged
his duty. The adoption of the jury in criminal cases, however excellent in
itself, certainly gave no better chance of equity in a time of revolution. But
all must approve the grant of counsel to accused persons, the mitigation of
criminal punishment^ and many other real amendments of criminal law and
The armed
forces of the nation were withdrawn from the King’s authority, as far as was
compatible with their continued existence.' In the regular army the
non-commissioned officers, at each vacancy in their number, agreed on a list of
names. The captain selected three from the list, and the colonel chose from
these. Sub-lieutenants were elected by the officers of the regiment. The
lieutenants and captains and two-thirds of the colonels and lieutenant-colonels
were appointed by seniority. In the navy the King’s power of choice was
similarly restrained. Juries partly composed of privates and non-commissioned
officers were introduced into the military Courts, thus taking from the
commanders their last means of enforcing discipline. Although the Crown had
power to distribute and to move the regular troops for the defence of the
kingdom, it could not employ them to maintain order within. Over the National
Guards the Crown had no control whatever. The Constitution expressly declared
that they were not a military corps, or an institution in the State, being
simply the general body of citizens under arms. No man could be an “active
citizen” unless he were enrolled in the National Guard. All the officers were
elected for one year only and not reeligible until a certain interval had elapsed.
Like the other armed forces, the National Guards could act only on the
requisition of the municipality, but, since it was they who chose the municipal
councillors, this rule put no restraint on their action. Upwards of four
millions of men were thus permanently in arms under officers elected by
themselves, with no discipline beyond that which they chose to undergo, and
answerable to no civil control save that of their own creatures. Anarchy was
thus enrolled, armed, made universal and incurable.
The National
Assembly ended many gross abuses and proclaimed many sound principles, but
failed to endow France with a stable constitution. The blame does not lie
altogether with its members. To give a new form to a great kingdom, which had
endured for many centuries, was a gigantic undertaking, and yet there was
scarcely a single institution in France which did not need to be renovated.
More was required than merely to amend and purify, as in England a hundred
years earlier, a political system in the main adequate to the wants of the
people and rooted in its affections. Even in England it had been
needful to
change the dynasty. In France, moreover, reform had been so long delayed that,
when it came, society broke in pieces. With tumult raging all around, a numerous
assembly could not attain the quiet and singleness of mind necessary to wise
legislation. But whatever the excuses which may be made for the Constituent
Assembly, its work was full of flaws. It conceded too much to theory, yet
failed to satisfy logic. . It preserved some fragments of the old polity, but
did not harmonise them with what was new. In its fear of reaction it ensured a
new revolution.
All these
errors may be traced in its treatment of the King. The institution of
hereditary monarchy, if tried by the principles of the Cantrat Social, must be
pronounced absurd and immoral. The force of habit and tradition and the fear of
involving France in yet worse confusion at home and abroad caused it to be
retained. But it was stripped of all power and usefulness, and abased in a way
that stung even the inert Louis. He had no means of winning the confidence of
the legislature, for he might not take its chiefs to be his Ministers. He had
no means of appealing from the> legislature to the country, for he had no
right of dissolution. His veto on Bills was'merely suspensive; his part in
foreign relations was merely subordinate. He was the chief of an administration
which would not act, and of an armed force which would not obey. The Assembly
might have retorted that the King of England lay under restraints almost as
rigorous; but then the English Cabinet more than supplied his place. The
Assembly was open to censure, not for refusing to pamper a prince, but for
refusing to establish a fit executive. Either the French legislators thought
that a weak executive is essential to freedom, or they regarded the King as a
disarmed and imprisoned enemy who must be kept impotent. In the one alternative
they were assuredly mistaken; in the other they crowned their labours with a
fatal self-contradiction.
The Assembly
was no happier in the constitution which it gave to its successor. In deference
to the teaching of the Contrat Social it expressly declared that every citizen
has a right to concur in making laws and granting taxes. At the same time it
retained the method of indirect election which had been followed in choosing
the deputies to the States General. It required a property qualification for
the “active citizen” and a higher one for the elector, thus reducing many to
the condition of “passive citizens.” Inexperienced as the members of the
National Assembly were, they could not help seeing that a large part of the
population, poor, grossly illiterate, and unused even to the humblest form of
political life, were quite unfit to exercise the suffrage. They were not
niggardly in bestowing the franchise, for the “ active citizens ” numbered
upwards of four millions, and must have amounted to two- thirds of all the
adult males. But, however wise and temperate the restriction, it stood
condemned out of their own mouth. Yet it was
the only
safeguard which they would tolerate. For they refused to institute a Second
Chamber, and they carefully took from the King all means of influencing the
representative body. They did not reflect that, in their eagerness to keep down
the power of the executive, they had exposed the legislature to the dictation
of the nearest body which possessed physical force, of the municipality, or
even of the mob of the capital.
The
administrative system established by the Constitution of 1791 was likewise an
unhappy blending of the old with the new. The public, weary of the so-called
ministerial despotism, the all-absorbing action of the Intendants, the
numberless and tedious references to the Council, desired local self-government
without knowledge of its limits or conditions. Vague recollections of medieval
liberties, an enthusiasm for small republics gained in the course of a
classical education, and loose notions of modem federal commonwealths, such as
the United States of America, were all that men had to supply the want of
experience in the management of local affairs in their own town or district.
Even Mirabeau could so far misapprehend the French character as to declare
himself convinced “that a great empire cannot be tolerably governed save as a
confederation of small states, and that ours will be constituted thus or will
be dissolved.” These feelings led the Constituent Assembly to abolish all the
local organs of the national government, and to set up a purely elective
administration. It multiplied elections until they took up a considerable part
of the life of an active citizen, and elective councils until, according to one
estimate, twelve hundred thousand Frenchmen had a part in managing local aff
irs. Yet even here we can trace the influence of tradition. In old France, so
far as free institutions had extended, the principle that, though deliberation
is for many, action is for one, had never been recognised, and much
administrative work had been done by comparatively clumsy assemblies. The
Constitution, as we have seen, assigned to local administrations much that we
should term national business. But for this also there were precedents. The old
provincial Estates had taken a large part in the assessment and collection of
the royal taxes. The new provincial assemblies set up by Necker and Brienne had
like functions. The assessment and collection of the taille within the parish
had always been left to the inhabitants. It is true that the only argument in
favour of such a system had disappeared with absolute monarchy. It is also true
that industrious citizens could not afford the time demanded by the new
self-administration, and that the new elective bodies came to be filled by
professional politicians of the most dangerous kind. Here again the Assembly
was biassed by its dread of reaction and its eagerness to disable the Crown and
the fallen clergy and nobility. An Englishman may think it strange that
legislators so partial to local self-government should have been uniformly
hostile to voluntary association. But here the doctrine which the Assembly
210 The failure of the Constitution ensured.
derived from
Rousseau, as Rousseau had derived it from Hobbes, blended with the tradition of
despotic monarchy. Even a practical man like Mirabeau could say, “ Particular
societies placed in the general society break the unity of its principles, and
the equilibrium of its forces.” The number of rich and powerful, but obsolete
and useless, corporations in the France of 1789 had contributed to ingrain this
prejudice in those who deemed themselves lovers of liberty.
The French
might rid themselves of their old institutions, but not of their national
character, fashioned by ages of Catholic orthodoxy, absolute kingship, and
administrative centralisation. That character was not in accord with the
theories of the time or with the new Constitution. The dissolution of public
order, the impoverishment of so many citizens, the schism in the Church, the
restless intrigues of the emigrants, the distrust felt for the King, were more
than enough to ruin a system so weak and ill-contrived. The Assembly itself
supplied the only thing needed to ensure failure. On Robespierre’s motion it
had decreed that its members should be incapable of sitting in the next
legislature. All the dear-bought experience of the last two years was thus
wantonly cast away, and France was again entrusted to novices in government.
The Constitution of 1791 was overthrown within a twelvemonth.
THE LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY.
The acceptance of the Constitution by the
King was welcomed by contemporary France as the term of the Revolution, rather
than as an epoch in it. The vast majority of Frenchmen both desired to end the
Revolution and took it for granted that the Constitution would end it. All that
the men of 1789 had fought for was won; the grievances of the ancien regime
were removed, and the Constitution secured to France a modified form of that
monarchical government to which the majority were sincerely attached. Men were
tired both of the drudgery and of the excitement of politics, and desired to
return to their civil occupations. Nothing was further from the heart of France
than the deposition of Louis or the declaration of a guerre a outramce against
Europe.
It is
necessary to enquire how it came about that, in spite of the wishes of the
majority, both these misfortunes occurred. Not least among the causes was the
composition of the new Assembly, in which the extremists managed to secure an
influence totally out of proportion to their numbers. The Jacobin Club, the
only powerful political organisation in France, with headquarters in Paris and
numerous affiliated branches, had been for many months battling for this end;
and its elaborate organisation and the fear inspired by its violence enabled it
to exercise an unforeseen and disastrous influence on the course of the
elections; but long before this it had been at work in the Constituent
Assembly, and had craftily forced through that body measures calculated to
secure for it the mastery in the Legislative. The imposition on all electors of
the civic oath had the effect of disfranchising a great number of the more
respectable voters; for in the civic was comprised the ecclesiastical oath,
which no devout Catholic could accept. If thousands were disfranchised by this
measure, millions were kept away from the polls by the wanton and deliberate
complication of the electoral machinery, which was all a part of the Jacobin
plan. Added to the fact that a certain distaste for politics had already come
over men, this over-elaboration of the electoral arrangements kept all busy
men—in
other words,
all respectable men—away from the ballot, and handed it over to idlers and
vagabonds.
The legal
means of influencing the elections being thus exhausted, the Jacobins did not
hesitate to exercise illegal influences; and violence and terrorism were let
loose upon all moderate citizens. Possessed of the only political organisation
in Prance, they were resolved to keep their monopoly; and the word was given
from Paris for an attack on all constitutional associations, both there and in
the provinces. The Reunion des Amis de la Constitution Monarchique, of which
Malouet was the guiding spirit, and which had been formed with the avowed and
perfectly legitimate object of counteracting the influence of the Jacobin Club,
was forcibly broken up by order of the latter; and similar violence was
employed against all such institutions throughout the kingdom. Not only this,
but on the opening of the polls France was subjected to a systematic Jacquerie;
and domiciliary visits, disarmament of “ aristocrats,'" violence, and
murder, were the weapons employed to keep—not the nobles and priests—but the
respectable bourgeois from registering their votes. Sifted by the restrictive
decrees of the Constituent Assembly, barred from the polls by the excessive
elaboration of the elections, the remnant of the moderate vote was thus driven
away by sheer violence.
It was not
only on the electors that pernicious influences had been at work, but also on
the candidates for election. France had, politically speaking, fallen into a
state of apathy ; the majority of those leisured classes from which the ranks
of politicians are naturally recruited had emigrated; and the middle classes
who remained had not, speaking generally, the time, the money, or the taste for
politics; while members of the Constituent Assembly were excluded from the
Legislative by the decree of May 16, 1791. The better class of citizens were thus
trebly deterred from becoming candidates for the Legislative Assembly. The
government consequently passed in the pel >u on which we are entering into
the hands of a new type of politician—men with ambition but without experience,
and with little or no stake in the country. Most of the members elected were,
as one would expect under such conditions, barristers or journalists, most of
them quite young, and few of any mark or recognised worth.
It is strong
testimony to the real feeling of the country that, for all their activity, the
Jacobins yet found themselves in a minority when, on October 1, the Legislative
Assembly met. It was at .first impossible to tell how parties in the new
Assembly would arrange themselves; but, of the 745 deputies, while 136 only
were enrolled members of the Jacobin Club, 264 were on the books of the
Feuillants. These numbers, it is true, did not accurately indicate the strength
of parties, for many who were not Jacobins sat and voted with the Left of the
Assembly, while not a few of the Constitutionalists on the Right tended to
drift into
the Centre,
where sat some 400 deputies professing no fixed political opinions.
From the
outset the dividing line between the two extreme parties was definite. The
Right (or Feuillants) was loosely united in favour of constitutional
government, though not of the present Constitution without amendment; it was
in fact on the question of how the Constitution should be amended that the
party split up into hopeless divisions. Nor had they any single leader within
the walls of the Assembly to heal these divisions: Ramond, Hua, Jaucourt,
Gouvion, Daverhoult, Vaublanc, Pastoret, Mathieu Dumas, and Bigot de Preameneu,
all sat on the Right, and all were men of courage and distinction : and yet the
Right was not led by any of them, but by Bamave, Duport, and the Lameths from
the Feuillants’ Club—led that is from without.
The Left, who
desired the total overthrow of the Constitution and the continuance of the
Revolution, was in the meantime united in its policy of destruction. For the
present there was no distinction between the Jacobins proper and the Brissotin
Jacobins, who were afterwards to split off and form the “Gironde.” For the time
being the Left was simply Jacobin ; and it was not till the early months of
1792, when the question of the war came to the front, that the cleavage between
the Brissotins and the “ Enrages ” became apparent.
In the
Legislative, the Brissotins far outnumbered their colleagues; and very few
notable Enrages sat in the Assembly. Of the latter the most prominent were
Couthon, an eloquent barrister, who gradually identified himself with the most
violent section of the party and became eventually the most faithful satellite
of Robespierre, Thuriot, also a barrister and the mouthpiece in the Assembly of
Danton, and Chabot, an unfrocked Capuchin. With them sat Bazire, another
barrister, and Merlin of Thionville, a man who was afterwards to make his mark
in the Convention. But the majority of those who were eventually to lead the
Jacobins had no seats in the Legislative; Danton, Robespierre, Marat, to name
only the three most prominent, were all excluded; and the leadership of the
Left thus fell into the hands of the Brissotins, of whom at that time the most
notable were, in the Assembly itself, Brissot, and outside it Madame Roland and
Sieyes. Brissot is an extreme example of the type of frothy mediocrity into
whose hands the government of France was now to fall. The son of a pastrycook
at Chartres, he had adopted journalism as a profession. Having been
unsuccessful in a candidature for the States General he was all the more eager
to grasp at power on his election to the Legislative ; and he was able to use
the specious and subterranean knowledge of European politics, which he had
picked up during an exile in England, and during his editorship of the Courrier
de VEurope, to pose as a great authority on foreign affairs. Thoroughly
insincere and self-seeking, he desired the overthrow of the King, not as a
matter of principle but as
a step to
power for himself, and the outbreak of war simply as a means to that end.
Brissot being chiefly occupied with foreign affairs, it was Madame Roland and
Sieyes who directed the internal policy of the party. Ruled by spite, vanity,
and love of power, Madame Roland associated herself with the extremists—with
Danton and Robespierre, be it observed, as well as with Brissot and Sieyes,
purely for the gratification of those passions : she had set her heart on the
downfall of the throne, not so much from any political conviction as from the
desire to gratify her feminine hatred for Marie-Antoinette, against whom she
believed herself to have a personal grudge. It was probably due more to her
evil influence than to any other cause that the party, instead of devoting itself
to internal legislation, now embarked on a further crusade against the
monarchy. Her colleague, the Abbe Sieyes, was also firmly determined on the
overthrow of the existing order of things, with which, as it was not of his own
designing, he was thoroughly discontented. He seems to have been convinced that
such an overthrow was bound to create an opportunity for a man of his genius to
dictate a new constitution to Prance. But there were a number of members of the
Brissotin party who quickly outshone the regular leaders. Chief among these was
Vergniaud, the greatest orator produced by the Revolution; inferior only to him
were Guadet and Gensonne, All these were deputies of the Gironde, and the fact
that the name Girondins came to replace that of Brissotins is a proof of the
prominence of this section of the party. Amongst the Brissotins sat also men so
conspicuous as Isnard, Condorcet, Fauchet, and Valaze.
Between these
two opposing parties lay the Centre, in which sat an actual numerical majority
of the members. To the youth and inexperience which characterised the whole
Assembly was here added an absence of definite po icy which made the Centre
open to every kind of persuasion or compulsion; and on it the Jacobins brought
all their sinister influence to bear.
Their first
step in this direction was to persuade the Assembly to open its galleries to
the public, and their next to fill them with a noisy mob of their own
supporters, drawn easily enough from the slums which surrounded the Tuileries. Terrorised
within the Assembly, hustled and insulted at its doors, even the more
courageous members of the Right lost heart; and the Centre, at no time
courageous, very soon ceesed to be able to identify itself with any Moderate
measure. It was bad enough when the votes were counted by show of hands; but
when the Jacobins had persuaded the Assembly to adopt the “ appel nominal,” and
each deputy had to declare his vote aloud, the ordeal became altogether too
great for the members of the Centre; and after a time a large number simply
abstained from voting out of sheer terror. This appel nominal was indeed a
powerful factor in the history of the Legislative, making a difference of about
100 votes on a division. Proof of this may be found
in the result
of the elections to the Presidential chair, which continued to be decided by
show of hands. The fact that as late as July 23,1792, the name of a Moderate
(Laffon de Ladebat) was carried is a proof that at heart the Assembly remained
Moderate to the end.
Such were the
phenomena of the Legislative Assembly. It now becomes necessary to pass in
review the other members of the body politic; and first the Court. The King and
Queen had accepted the Constitution with reluctance. The loss of prerogative
was probably welcome to Louis, relieving him as it did of much of the labour
and responsibility that was so distasteful to him; but the Civil Constitution
of the clergy, to which he had been obliged to swear as well as to the
Constitution of 1791, had for the first time, but finally, alienated him from
the Revolution; while in the Queen’s eyes the altered position of the throne
under the new regime was an intolerable degradation. The Court therefore
accepted the Constitution in the hope and belief that it would soon become unworkable.
It is plain
that there was much in common between the attitude of the Court and that of the
Feuillants. Both desired the amendment of the Constitution, and both the
maintenance of the monarchy. But unfortunately the King could not bring himself
to cooperate with the FeuiUcmts. He reproached them, and more especially he
reproached Lafayette, who must now be regarded as a Feuilltmt, with the
authorship of the present situation. Louis, seldom able to confide in anyone,
was incapable of making use of men in whom he did not confide. He now probably
distrusted the Feuillants more than the Jacobins, for while he considered the
former to be traitorous friends, the enmity of the latter was at least open;
and, as in his opinion the Jacobins were all corruptible, they were more to be
despised than feared. The Court was thus cut off from the one party that could
have helped it; nor was it able to avail itself of the only feasible plan of
action. The one preliminary to all schemes for the security and rehabilitation
of the monarchy was still the withdrawal of the King and Queen from Paris. Time
after time in 1792 Louis’ wisest counsellors implored him to take this step,
but were unable to prevail upon him. Reluctance to risk another such fiasco as
the flight to Varennes was not indeed unnatural, but none the less it was most
disastrous. The Court had fallen back on the expedient of a peaceful
intervention of the Powers; and for that purpose Marie-Antoinette was urging
the Emperor to summon a great Congress, and back it with a display of force.
War between the Powers and France she neither desired nor contemplated; while
to Leopold and to Europe both war and Congress seemed useless, and even
harmful, so long as the King and Queen were prisoners in Paris.
The misfortune
was that by entering into negotiations with foreign Powers, even although he
contemplated nothing more than an armed
demonstration,
Louis could easily be painted by unscrupulous politicians who desired his
downfall as plotting for the restoration of the ancien rigitne and as calling
in the armed forces of Europe against his own people. On neither of these
charges was he guilty, yet it was easy thus to mistranslate his most impolitic
attitude. And these were the two very things which would rouse all the real
soul of France to resistance; Frenchmen would never give up their new-found
liberties, nor would they ever suffer the invasion of their country, whereas
they had no idea of fighting for the downfall of the monarchy, the thought of
which was actually distasteful to them, or even for the maintenance of the
Constitution of 1791, for which no one greatly cared.
The private
advisers of the Court at this time were Bamave, Malouet, Dupont of Nemours, and
Mallet du Pan; but to none of them was extended the complete confidence which
might have rendered him really serviceable. And, if he would not trust his
confidential advisers, still less would the King repose confidence in the
Ministers, who indeed were little worthy of it. Delessart, the Minister of the
Interior, was a well- intentioned, mediocre person, much hampered by
ill-health; Tarbe, the Finance Minister, Duportail, the War Minister, and
Duport-du-Tertre, the Minister of Justice, were all absolute nonentities.
Montmorin, who continued temporarily at the Foreign Office, was a man of some
distinction; and when he resigned, November 27, 1791, the King lost the last of
the old Court party; but even Montmorin had never enjoyed his master’s complete
confidence, and it was this feeling, combined with the fact that the King “
would never answer letters,” that drove him from office. Before his
resignation, however, the Ministry had been considerably strengthened by the
accession of Bertrand de Mole ville to the Admiralty. Bertrand had been
Intendant of Britanny, and brought to his department much of the administrative
ability with which so many of the Intendants were endowed: he also brought to
the King a perfectly loyal and devoted attachment, and, so far as this can be
said of anyone, he enjoyed his master’s confidence. The fact that the King and
Queen were sorry when he took office because they esteemed him, illustrates
both the despairing attitude of the Court, and the unfortunate position in
which Ministers were placed by the Constitution. But Bertrand’s capacity was
that of an intriguer rather than a statesman; and he must share with the King
the responsibility for refusing to cooperate with the Feuillants, and for thus
abandoning the last chance of preserving the monarchy.
After this
preliminary survey of the state of affairs at the commencement of the period,
we are in a better position to understand the motives and import of the initial
measures of the Legislative Assembly. The opening sittings were naturally
devoted to matters of procedure and etiquette, but soon the Assembly found
itself obliged to consider two administrative questions of great urgency. The
crisis in the Island of San
i789-9i] San Domingo.—Avignon.
217
Domingo first
engaged its attention. The decree of liberation (May, 1791) had been followed
in September by another, which seemed to threaten revocation, and was the
signal for a fresh outbreak of hostilities in the island; and the whites had
been attacked with great ferocity and determination. It was obviously the duty
of the government to secure safety of life and property by sending a sufficient
body of troops. The Ministry would gladly have done so, but was too feeble to
take so bold a step in face of the opposition of the Brissotins, who had
fostered the rebellion and desired its continuance as a weapon against the
executive. The crisis in San Domingo was not without effect at home, for France
was dependent on the plantations for sugar, coffee, and cotton. The dearth of
these commodities created the first cry for the regulation by government of the
prices of necessaries which was soon to become important. Much of the time of
the Assembly during its first stage was employed in wrangling over the policy
to be adopted in the unhappy island, while the reign of terror and massacre was
permitted to continue unchecked.
The other
seat of trouble was Avignon. This city and the dependent territory of the
Venaissin had, since the fourteenth century, been subject to the Popes. The
mild government of their distant ruler had given the inhabitants little cause
for grievance, but the agitation of 1789 had spread into this enclave. In
March, 1789, a food riot had occasioned the establishment of a garde
bourgeoises and the fever which spread through France after August 4 occasioned
several risings in the later months of 1789, and a “French party” began to
manifest activity. In February, 1790, the time-honoured consular government had
been overthrown; and in April a new municipal government was formally
established, and maintained itself in power in spite of the opposition of the
Pope. In June, owing to the manoeuvres of the French party, civil strife broke
out; and the National Guard of the neighbouring town of Orange intervened. On
June 12 the citizens assembled and passed a resolution declaring the union of their
country to France, which was communicated to the Constituent Assembly. The
influence of Mirabeau was exerted to prevent the recognition of this illegal
act; and the question remained long n suspense, while the condition of the city
and county grew constantly worse. In April, 1791, an armed force set out from
Avignon and laid siege to Carpentras, but was repulsed by the garrison. The
Constituent Assembly thereupon sent a Committee to Avignon, which reported in
favour of union, and on September 13 the union of Avignon and the Venaissin to
France was decreed; but considerable delay ensued before the arrival of armed
forces.
Meanwhile,
the army of bandits which had gathered on the pretext of supporting the union
of Avignon with France had seized the papal castle, a fortress perched on a
rock above the Rhone, from which they were able to dominate the entire town,
and had proceeded to
218
Decrees against
dmigr^s and priests. [1791
establish a
reign of plunder and anarchy. But the Moderates of Avignon were no cowards, and
resisted their oppressors; and when Lescuyer, one of the leaders of the
anarchical party, began to plunder the Mont-de- Ptete, they fell upon him and
killed him. Determined to avenge their leader and to conceal all trace of their
crime before the arrival of the government troops which were daily expected,
the bandits, headed by a fierce desperado called Jourdan, descended on the
city, and, arresting many of the respectable citizens as “ suspects,” thrust
them into prison and there massacred them, to the number of 110, in cold blood.
This atrocious deed took place on October 16 and 17, but it was not till
November 9 that government troops entered the unhappy city, which during the
interval had been at the mercy of Jourdan and his satellites. Under the
protection of the troops the moderate reaction, so long stifled, at once broke
out; Jourdan narrowly escaped with his life, and was sent for trial to Paris,
where his experience in murder found scope in the following September. Two
thousand of the bandits were driven out of Avignon, and the old municipality
was reinstated. The question of sending troops to Avignon was much discussed,
in the Assembly during October; and that body must share with the Ministry the
blame of the unpardonable delay in their despatch both before and after the
massacres, by which the lives and properties of respectable citizens were
placed at the mercy of a gang of murderers. No better proof is needed of the
incapacity of the government than the apathy and dilatoriness displayed in
these two cases of Avignon and San Domingo.
Having
disposed of these matters the Assembly might have been expected to turn its
attention to the work of internal legislation. But, with an absolutely cynical
indifference to the necessity for such work, it turned aside to decree a series
of penal measures against the bmgrks and the pretres non assermentes. Of these
measures those directed against the bnigris, although they at the same time
contravened a provision of the “rights of man,” and also disregarded the
political amnesty decreed by the Constituent, had certainly some justification.
It is true that the emigres were not sufficiently numerous to carry out the
threats of which they were so prodigal. It is also true that their attitude as
advocates of the ancien regime was bitterly resented both by the King of
Prance, who wrote repeatedly to his brothers remonstrating with them for their
extravagant pretensions, and also by the Emperor Leopold, who regarded their
policy as likely to frustrate the efforts which the Powers were making for the
help of Louis. And it is absurd to suppose that any serious politician can
really have regarded the bnigris as a menace to France. In number a paltry
4000, their organisation was honeycombed with intrigue, and they attained no
cohesion before the outbreak of war. At the same time their fulminations were
extremely irritating, and would probably have provoked reprisals from any other
Power similarly situated. The idea of reprisals was not indeed a new one; and
in attacking
the imigres the Legislative was only following the example set by the
Constituent. The question was raised on October 20, and on November 9 a decree
was passed appointing January 1 as the date before which the emigres must
return to France, and condemning to death all the Princes and officials who did
not then return, as well as all who “took part in seditious meetings.” The real
object of this decree was to keep the Emigres out of France, for they were the
most valuable asset the revolutionaries possessed; and it was of the utmost
importance to them that the efforts of the King and the Emperor to dissociate
themselves from the bnigres should not succeed. The decree of November 9 was
admirably calculated to have this effect. Louis was a humane man with very
strong domestic affections, and it was in the highest degree unlikely that he
would sanction a measure which was equivalent to a death sentence on his
brothers; but if he placed his veto upon it he laid himself open to the
accusation of participating in the designs of the emigres for the restoration
of the ancien regime and for the initiation of violent royalist reaction. And
this is exactly what happened, for on November 12 he vetoed the decree, and in
doing so started on the inclined plane of unpopularity which had been prepared
for him.
The action of
the King in vetoing this and subsequent decrees against the emigres was
impolitic if natural. His relations never showed any consideration for him, and
by their extravagant pretensions had done much to jeopardise his throne and
life; they were, in fact, as he knew, his most dangerous enemies, perfectly
callous to his dreadful position, and, indeed, making capital out of it. Had
Louis been wise he would have paid these men back in their own coin ; and it was
sheer folly to sacrifice his slender remnant of popularity to a sentimental
scruple.
It now only
required energy and rapidity of action to foist the character of traitor on the
King. With this object there was passed on November 29 a second decree, directed
this time at a still more vulnerable part in his armour—at the non-juring
priests. By its provisions all priests who did not take the oath within a week
were to be removed from their benefices by the Directories of their respective
Departments, and their stipends to be confiscated for the Treasury. In their
desire to provoke the King to a second veto, the revolutionaries had thus
passed a measure, which was not only barbarous and unwarranted to a far greater
degree than its forerunner, but was impolitic also, because it ran counter to
the religious feelings of the peasantry of France. It touched the King,
however, at his most tender point. He was already conscience- stricken at his
share in the Civil Constitution, and on December 19 he placed his veto on the
decree. He thus did exactly what his enemies had expected and desired.
Meanwhile, on
November 29, a matter of even more serious moment had come up for decision. So
long as France was at peace it would be
impossible to
accuse the King of assisting a foreign invasion; France must therefore go to
war. Here, in a nutshell, we have the foreign policy of Brissot. It was by his
influence that a decree was carried authorising the King to demand the
disbandment of the emigres by the Elector of Trier, to fix the amount of
compensation for the dispossessed Princes, to rearrange the diplomatic corps,
and directing him to mass troops on the frontier to support his demands. Such a
decree would practically commit the country to war; and the wisest of the
King’s private advisers implored him not to consent to it. Unfortunately
circumstances had combined to unite, although from very different motives, a
majority of all parties in favour of war. Brissot, as we know, advocated war as
the simplest means of overthrowing the King; but there was a party which
desired it from the very opposite reason— for the rehabilitation of the
monarchy. Of this party the guiding spirit was Lafayette, who, having resigned
the command of the National Guard (October 8), and having been defeated for the
post of Mayor by Petion (November 14), had been appointed at the end of
December to the command of the Army of the Centre. He was determined to use his
position to effect the rehabilitation of the monarchy under his own protection
by means of a brief and glorious war. Lafayette’s opinion had the greatest
weight with the Moderates in the Assembly; and so it came about that, when he
declared for war, the decree of November 29 was carried with practical
unanimity. One party alone shared the anxiety of the Court to avoid
hostilities—the extreme Jacobins; because they feared that a war, if
successful, would only strengthen the executive. It was then that the cleavage
between them and the Brissotins began to show itself. The Court, however, in
view of the practical unanimity of the Assembly, decided that it was useless to
resist; and the first steps on the road to war were taken. Duportail, who was
pledged to peace, thereupon resigned, and was replaced at the War Office by
Narbonne. By December 14 Louis was able to announce to the Assembly that the
decree had been executed, and an army of 150,000 men ordered to the frontiers.
It was with feelings of despair that the King and Queen found themselves thus
drifting into war: the monarchy was now in their opinion manifestly doomed. War
having once broken out, Louis would be in the impossible position of a King
conducting a campaign in which he himself was forced to sympathise with the
enemies of his country, for with the policy of a restoration by the help of Lafayette
and Narbonne he would have nothing to do.
Louis, Comte
de Narbonne, was a man of brilliant but somewhat unsteady talents. Almost
certainly a grandson of Louis XV, he was by accident of birth and almost of
necessity an adventurer; so at least he seems to have struck contemporaries. It
was by the influence of Lafayette, Talleyrand, and Madame de Stael that he
entered the Ministry; and the policy which he introduced may be regarded as
their attempt
to end the
Revolution. The plan comprised the amendment and strengthening of the
Constitution, and this of necessity involved some rehabilitation of the Royal
prerogative; it was to be effected by means of a European war, which could
easily be provoked by an attack on Clement Wenceslas, the Elector of Trier, and
through him on the Empire. Diplomacy and their own interests would hold back
the other Powers, Prussia in particular. Louis XVI, under Lafayette’s guidance,
would lead his army to victory, and in a short time the new regime would be
established amidst a blaze of military glory, a fair share of which would in
the nature of things accrue to the victorious general and the successful war
minister. It was an attractive scheme; and, as Sorel has well pointed out, it
was in its essentials the very policy which triumphed in 1799 and again in
1814; but the time was not yet.
Narbonne’s
policy threw him into alliance with the Brissotins. They welcomed him as a
fomenter of war, and used him as such only to throw him over by converting the
war, which he aimed at the Elector of Trier and the Empire alone, into a
crusade against Europe; so that the monarchy was ultimately felled by the very
weapon that was to have restored it. His schemes also brought him into
opposition to Bertrand and the majority of his colleagues; and to his
haughtiness and inability to combine with them may be traced the ruin of the
Feuillant Ministry and with it that of Narbonne himself.
On his entry
into the Ministry his energies were at once directed to the acceleration of the
warlike preparations. He demanded a grant of 20,000,000 livres and started in
the middle of December on a personal inspection of the army.
Meanwhile the
Assembly continued its legislation against the emigres. On January 1, 1792, the
Princes and Calonne were “ decreed accused ” of high treason; and on February 9
a decree was passed confiscating all the property of the emigres. This last
was in the main a financial expedient, for by this time the position of the
Treasury was exceedingly critical. Taxes had almost ceased to be paid: there
had been a deficit in the revenue for the four months ending November 30,
amounting to a quarter of the estimated income; assignats had depreciated at
least 40 per cent.; yet here was the War Minister demanding a grant of
20,000,000 livres in specie: the confiscation of the goods of the emigres,
which handed over to the government property of considerably greater value than
the confiscated Mens du clerge, was thus a most welcome windfall. The objcct of
the measure was no doubt largely fiscal; but it was also a reply to the
announcement by the Emperor that he would support the Elector of Trier, which
had been communicated to the Assembly on the previous day. On January 25 an
imperious note was addressed to the Emperor, demanding an explanation of his
attitude. On March 1 Kaunitz’ reply was read: it contained an
attack on the
Jacobins and was, in fact, an insolent interference in the internal affairs of
France. The task of reading the note fell to Delessart. He had always been an
advocate of peace, and it was said that he read it with undue emphasis. This
fanned the suspicion that the Court or the Ministry had prompted it; and from
that moment the outcry against the Ministry came to a head.
Meanwhile
within that body the original dissensions had been widening. Bertrand stood
aloof from the other Ministers as an out-and-out King’s man; directing the
affairs of his department with consistent ability, adopting a brusque and
haughty attitude towards the Assembly, and devoting his spare time to widespread
if somewhat ineffective bribery. He adopted the attitude of the Court with
regard to the war, and opposed it with all the means in his power. Of the other
Ministers, Delessart and Tarbe desired the rehabilitation of the monarchy and
the amendment of the Constitution, but above all desired to avoid war. The same
desire in a less degree governed Duport-du-Tertre, the Garde des sceaux, and
Cahier de Gerville, who had succeeded Delessart as Minister of the Interior,
when Delessart replaced Montmorin at the Foreign Office (November 30). Duport
and Cahier represented the views of Bamave and the Lameths, and were the
orthodox Feuillants of the Ministry. Narbonne, as we have seen, desired the
same object, but proposed to adopt totally different methods; for, while the
Feuillants proper, reverting to the plans of Mirabeau, advocated the removal of
the Court to some provincial town and the dissolution of the Assembly by means
of agitation in the Departments, Narbonne and his friends did not scruple to
make use of the majority in the Assembly to bring on the war by which they
hoped to restore the prestige of the monarchy.
But the
escape of the King from Paris was an item in Narbonne’s plan, as it was and had
been in every plan of the friends of the monarchy, before or after. The idea
was that the royal family should escape in Madame de Stael’s carriage and take
refuge in Lafayette’s camp, when the general would at once take steps to
restore the monarchy as the centre of the military pride of France. But the
whole scheme was rash and ill-judged. Narbonne’s colleagues opposed it, while
the Queen merely laughed at it. Exasperated by this failure, Lafayette now
returned to Paris determined to purge the Ministry of the Feuillants; and on
March 3 he informed the Ministers that Narbonne could no longer serve with
Bertrand. But if Narbonne and Lafayette were determined to get rid of the
Feuillants, the Feuillants were no less determined to get rid of Narbonne, and
they had the advantage of possessing the ear of the King. Narbonne now made a
deliberate attempt to use military influence to gain his own political ends. He
published in the press letters to himself from the three commanders-in-chief at
the front, Lafayette, Rochambeau, and Luckner, in which they deplored the
prospect of his resignation. The only effect of this indiscretion was to
provoke the
King to
dismiss its author; and on March 10 Narbonne was superseded by the Chevalier de
Grave.
It was a most
unfortunate moment for a ministerial crisis. The course of events during the
early days of March seemed to betoken a change in the attitude of some of the
Powers : Spain and Prussia seemed to be falling away from Austria, and on March
9 came the bewildering and wholly unexpected news of the Emperor Leopold’s
death. The maintenance of peace now seemed certain and the funds rose 16 per
cent.; but this prospect only roused Brissot and the war party, who saw the cup
slipping from their lips, to fresh paroxysms of warlike fury. On the 10th
Brissot and Vergniaud fell furiously upon Delessart, accusing him of
treasonable relations with Austria. On the same day his impeachment was decreed
by a huge majority; and that very night he was arrested and sent to Orleans.
Narbonne’s dismissal was now condemned in the Assembly as an act of treachery
on the part of the Court. The regrets of the Assembly were voted, and in face
of the outcry against them the other Ministers resigned (March 10-20).
The crisis
which had thus arisen placed the Court in a lamentable dilemma. The Feuillants,
so far from profiting by the dismissal of their colleague, had fallen with him;
so that, while the Court was in violent opposition to both Lafayette and the
Jacobins, all hope of effective support from the Feuillants was removed. The
Palace was for the moment unprotected, pending the installation of the Garde
Constitution- nelle, which did not take place till March 16. The National Guard
favoured Lafayette, and the armed mob was whole-hearted for the Jacobins;
Vergniaud in his speech of the 16th against Delessart had breathed ill-veiled
threats against the Queen herself. It is not to be wondered at that the King
now “behaved like a man preparing for death.” On March 24 he decided to summon
a Ministry from among the Brissotins. The motives which impelled him to this step
have often been discussed. It is probable that he was influenced solely by the
terror which the situation inspired, deserted as he was by everyone and with
the terrible threats of Vergniaud ringing in his ears. It is possible, however,
that he was influenced by some of his private advisers who were advocates of
the English Constitution, or that he yielded to the dictation of a Central
Committee of Twelve, which had been appointed by the Assembly to guide matters
during the ministerial crisis. De Grave, who, though he had been appointed by
Delessart, was closely connected with the Brissotins, remained at the War
Office. Duranton became Garde des sceauoc, Claviere took the Finances, Roland,
who was entirely in the hands of his wife, the Interior, Dumouriez the Foreign
Office, and Lacoste, a nominee of Dumouriez, the Admiralty. The new combination
was wholly Jacobin in tone. Had he chosen Robespierre and Danton, the King
could not have chosen (with the one exception of Dumouriez) men more hostile to
himself or more anxious for his
downfall. Of
the new ministers Roland was a vain and narrow-minded pedant, who was
constantly boasting of his own virtue and courage. He was ill-equipped for his
important office and brought to it the qualities of a clerk rather than a
statesman ; and the chief importance of his appointment was the power which it
gave to his wife. Claviere had been a prntege of Mirabeau and to him belonged
the doubtful honour of having invented assignats. But by far the most important
member of the ministry was Dumouriez. The exclusion of members of the Assembly
from office tended to throw the portfolios into the hands of clever
adventurers: thus from the adventurer Narbonne the leadership of the Cabinet
passed to the adventurer Dumouriez.
Charles-Fran^ois
Dumouriez was bom in 1739 and had served in the Seven Years’ War. After this he
had entered the service of Choiseul and had taken part in various secret
missions, in the course of which he visited many European countries and
obtained an extensive personal knowledge of the lower channels of diplomacy.
Passing under the influence of Favier, he had next found congenial employment
in the secret diplomacy of Louis XV. His intrigues in Poland in 1771 and 1772
led to a two years’ incarceration in the Bastille. On his release he had become
Commandant at Cherbourg. Though fifty years of age when the Revolution broke
out, he was young enough in spirit to welcome it as a field for his versatile
talents and to greet it as the opening of his career. In 1790 he was sent on a
mission to Belgium. It was there that his restless ingenuity seized on the idea
of uniting that country to France, which now became the basis of his
ministerial policy. His wide if not exalted experience, his keen political
vision, his marvellous genius for expedients, and his natural talent for
intrigue, marked him out—especially in his own eyes—as the man to guide France
in the impending crisis. But he lacked statesmanship and character, and above
all that rare quality by which statesmen gauge the drift of popular feeling. He
had determined upon war; it was as necessary for his career as it had been for
Narbonne’s; but, like Narbonne, he did not contemplate a war with Europe ; on
the contrary he intended to isolate Austria by winning over England, Prussia,
and the States of the Empire, to the side of France. It is impossible not to
admire the penetrating vision, the clear-cut plans, and the acuteness and
energy with which he set about his task. War, however, as he planned it, was a
political expedient, by no means a crusade; and it was a crusade upon which
France was now embarking. Dumouriez’ ingenuity was at fault when he found
himself playing with living chessmen; for now, convinced that they were
confronted with a great conspiracy for the reestablishment of the ancien
regime—the bnigris had taken care to leave no doubt of this and the Brissotins
had encouraged the idea—the people of France rose as no other European nation
had ever before risen, and upset the designs of their enemies together with the
calculations of the Minister.
But in truth
neither King, Ministers, nor Assembly had much option in the matter of peace
and war after the decree of January 25. A few acrimonious notes between the two
governments, a great debate in the Assembly, and war was finally declared on
April 20.
We must now
leave the administration and the Assembly to survey the internal affairs of the
kingdom. The disturbances at Avignon, which have already been noticed, were
only an extreme example of what was taking place in many other parts of France.
Discontent and reaction in the provinces were fomented by three principal
causes. Firstly, the continued depreciation of the assignats and the disappearance
of specie had dislocated all trade, and had roused a great outcry against
“usurers,” as those merchants were termed who refused to receive payment in
paper. Secondly, the want of bread, and, above all, the fear of approaching
want, had made the poorer classes nervous and excitable; and in spite of the
abundance of work and the high rate of wages, in some towns every market-day
was the occasion of a bread riot. It was in such a riot on March 3 that
Simoneau, the Mayor of ^tampes, lost his life in consequence of his courageous
refusal to grant the tariff of fixed prices demanded by the rioters. Thirdly,
the persecution of the non-juring priests added to these economic causes of
disturbance the even more dangerous element of religious dissension.
In Paris also
the signs of anarchy were on the increase ; and the composition of the various
bodies, which were responsible for the administration of the city, encouraged
rather than restrained the forces of disorder. The Commune, whose functions had
not been interfered with by the Constitution, continued to superintend the food
supply of Paris, and had now the additional duty of negotiating the sale of
Church property within the limits of the capital. In November a considerable
change was effected in its personnel. Bailly having resigned the office of
Mayor, a contest for that post took place between Lafayette and Petion,
resulting on November 14 in the election of the latter. Two points concerning
this election are remarkable—first, that only 10,300 electors recorded their
votes ; secondly, that the Court, still cherishing their pique against
Lafayette, supported the Jacobin candidate. Petion, who now became the most
prominent man in Paris, was both stupid and malicious; and in the elevated
position he now occupied his stupidity was as dangerous as his malice. He was
another specimen of the Brissotin type, vain and “virtuous,” the vanity
obvious, but the “ virtue ” questionable. No more undesirable head could have
been found for the municipality, and to his ineptitude and malevolence may be
traced many of the troubles of the summer of 1792. In January, when one-half of
the Commune had to be renewed, the democratisation of its officials was
completed by the election of Manuel, a furious Jacobin, to the position of
Procureur General Syndic, and of Danton to that of Procureur Substitut. At the
same time Sergent and Panis,
226
The regiment of Chateau- Vieux.
two of the
most desperate characters in Paris, obtained seats; and on March 10, by the
opening of its galleries to the public, the Commune came directly under the
influence of the mob. It is plain that it was impossible to rely on a body such
as this, working under such conditions, for the maintenance of order.
But, if the
attitude of the Commune was increasingly favourable to disorder, that of the
departmental authority must be reckoned as wholly and sincerely on the side of
order. The Department of the Seine was organised in the same way as the other
Departments of France; its Conseil General numbered 36 members, but they only
sat during one month of the year, and the real work was done by a committee of
eight, known as the Directoire. of the Department, presided over by the Due de
La Rochefoucauld. Nominally the Department was the highest authority in Paris;
it even had supervisory functions over the Commune itself; but these functions
were so ill-defined, and the means of exercising them so inadequate, that the
Directoire, though governed by the best intentions, was practically powerless.
Such being
the condition of the bodies to whom the government of Paris was entrusted, it
is not surprising that anarchy and mob-rule began to lift their heads. The
outcry against usurers and accapareurs —the name applied to any who laid up a
store of bread or other necessaries—was made the excuse for arming the
proletariate; and during November and December many thousands of pikes were
manufactured and served out to the lower classes. The wearing of the red cap of
Liberty, a custom the origin of which is somewhat obscure, became so popular
also that Dumouriez thought fit to don this head-gear in the Jacobin Club a few
days after his entry into the Ministry. But the culminating sign of the trend
towards lawlessness was the fite held on April 15 in honour of the convicts of
the Swiss regiment de Chateau- Vieux. These men, it will be remembered, had
been sent to the galleys for insubordination. The Swiss government, on being
consulted as to whether or no they should be included in the general amnesty of
the Constitution, begged that the convicts might not be liberated; and, on
December 22, 1791, the Assembly had actually refused to extend any pardon to
them. It is a striking indication of the increase in the forces of anarchy,
which marked the early months of 1792, that the very men whose guilt was
acknowledged by the Assembly in December were awarded a public reception in the
following April. It was Collot d’Herbois, a retired actor, to whose histrionic
taste the absurd theatrical staging of the fite appealed, who took up the cause
of the Swiss, personally conducted them to Paris, and introduced them to the
Assembly (April 12). Not content with the admission of the Swiss to the honours
of the Seance, which was the greatest compliment the Assembly could bestow,
their patrons proceeded to organise a public fete in their honour. The Commune,
guided by Potion, sanctioned the plan; and the opposition
227
of the
Department was overcome by the dedication of the fete to Liberty. Thus on April
15 was celebrated, in honour of these liberated convicts, the first of the many
revolutionary fetes. An attempt was made by the Feuillants' club to organise an
opposition fete, dedicated to la Loi, in honour of the heroic Mayor of
I^tampes. Although strenuously opposed by Robespierre, it was decreed on May 6
and took place on June 1. But the Feuillants did not command the rascaldom of
Paris; the idea had lost its novelty, and the Fete de la Loi was a dismal
failure.
Meanwhile
divisions in the Brissotin Ministry had become apparent. Dumouriez, whose
masterful spirit dominated it, was not a Brissotin at all; nor had he the
slightest desire to establish that party in power at the expense of the King.
He was, in fact, only content to sit in the same Cabinet with his colleagues
because they favoured his war policy. To them, however, this policy was merely
a means of overthrowing the King; and now, in the month of May, with a view to
this overthrow they endeavoured to increase Louis’ unpopularity by provoking
him to further vetoes. In the first place they redoubled their blows at the
pretres non assermentes. Secondly, on May 29, almost before it had been
installed, they proposed the abolition of the King’s constitutional guard ; and
thirdly, on June 4, Servan, who had succeeded de Grave as War Minister on May
9, proposed the formation of a camp of 20,000 federes beneath the walls of
Paris, ostensibly to train these men for active service, but in reality as a
support for insurrection and a standing threat to the Moderates of the city.
It was
characteristic of Louis’ unselfish but stupid nature that of these proposals he
accepted that which was most directly dangerous to himself—the abolition of the
body-guard—and placed his veto on the other two: upon the legislation against
the priests, because it was a matter of conscience, and upon the decree for the
camp, because of a great petition of 8000 citizens protesting against it. On
this a ministerial crisis immediately arose; Roland, acting under the influence
of his wife, presumed to lecture the King ; and Dumouriez, who was not in
sympathy with his colleagues, was glad enough to advise Louis to dismiss them
(June 12), and to entrust him with the reconstruction of the Ministry. This
rebuff to their vanity was more than the Brissotins could bear, and from the
moment of their dismissal they plotted immediate insurrection.
The King was
now in the hands of Dumouriez, who moved to the War Office. The Minister, to
whom the vetoed decrees were in nowise .distasteful provided they seemed likely
to further his own schemes, now desired his Majesty, in return for his services
during the crisis, to withdraw the vetoes. He afterwards, in his Memoires,
asserted that Louis had promised to do so and then went back on his word ; this
was no doubt false. Dumouriez probably expected to persuade the King of
the necessity
of sanctioning the decrees ; and it was the disappointment of this expectation
that led him to resign on June 15, when he took over the command of the Army of
the North. A new Ministry took office drawn from among the friends of
Lafayette; none of them, with the possible exception of Terrier de Monciel,
Minister of the Interior, being of any note or capacity.
Up to the
fall of their Ministry the Brissotins had only vaguely thought of insurrection.
They now threw themselves into it as heartily as the most violent of their
Jacobin colleagues. Already in the early days of June a knot of conspirators
had begun to meet; but, insurrection being still a somewhat uncertain business
even in Paris, the more prominent politicians abstained from direct
participation. Danton, it is true, seems to have been consulted on every point,
but the real work of organisation was done by Santerre, Saint-Huruge (expert in
insurrections), Alexandre, Fournier (afterwards notorious as the butcher of
Versailles), Rossignol, Legendre, and Lazowski, a Polish refugee. Assured of
the cooperation of the Brissotins, the insurrectionaries now applied to the
Commune for leave for an armed deputation to plant a “ mai” in the Tuileries
Gardens on the 20th. This request placed Petion in a dilemma; as a politician
he favoured the insurrection, but its success being doubtful he was unwilling
to compromise himself in his capacity as Mayor by any appearance of supporting
it; he therefore absented himself from the meeting of the Conseil General of
the Commune, which, in reply to the deputation, pointed out the illegality of
armed processions. The Directoire of the Department, which, as we have seen,
was a superior authority to the Commune, now intervened with energetic
exhortations to the latter to see to the preservation of order, but both the
Assembly and the Commune ignored this interference. In spite of much wavering
and vacillation on the part of the time-serving Mayor, the preparations for the
procession were proceeded with, and on the morning of the appointed day two
great crowds were organised, one on the Place de la Bastille and one on the
Place de la Salpetriere, which united under the leadership of Santerre, and,
arriving at the manege at about 1.30 p.m., presented their demand for
admittance.
Meanwhile the
Assembly was debating on the attitude it should adopt. Vergniaud, while
deprecating the introduction of armed petitions, maintained that it was too
late to stop this one. While the debate was in progress the petitioners were
clamouring at the doors of the Assembly; and, after a long wait, during which
the mai (a large poplar) was incongruously planted in the adjoining garden of
the Capuchins, they were at length admitted to the Assembly, where their
petition was read, and through which they slowly filed.
On emerging
from the Assembly the crowd was introduced by the organisers of. the revolt
into the garden of the Tuileries, probably with the idea of attacking the
palace on that its most vulnerable side; but
the presence
of ten battalions of National Guards lining the garden terrace decided the
ringleaders on an alteration of their plan of attack, and they led the crowd
round the palace by way of the quays and through the Guichet de Marigny into
the Place du Carrousel, where the artillery of the battalion Val-de-Grace,
which had marched with the insurgents, had been left in the morning. The
square, which was not very large and was much encumbered with buildings, was
very soon blocked with people, but there was no spontaneous attempt to break
into the palace: at no time indeed during the day did the crowd betray any
.consciousness of the purpose for which it had been brought to the Tuileries.
The crush, however, soon became unbearable, and the ringleaders used it as a
pretext for demanding entrance to the court-yard of the palace through the
Porte Royal, against which the crowd was now pressing. For a time the
gendarmerie declined to consider this request, but they seem to have been
without definite orders; and Ramainvilliers, the commander, was paralysed by
the presence in the palace of municipal authorities, who went about in their
official garb, lecturing the soldiers and giving contradictory instructions.
The camonniers of the battalion Val-de-Grace, instructed probably by the
promoters of the insurrection, now brought forward their artillery; and, in
face of this display of force, the gates were thrown open, and the crowd rushed
into the Tuileries. The King, surrounded by a few faithful attendants and
personal friends, met the intruders in the CEil-de-Boeuf.
Confronted by
a most grave and terrible ordeal, Louis behaved with the utmost courage and
sangfroid. Withdrawing into an embrasure, he bore for some hours the insults
and threats of his tormentors with admirable coolness and phlegm; twice he
invited one of his protectors to feel whether his heart was not beating calmly;
and, although he consented to place a red cap on his head, to drink the health
of the nation, and to wave a sword round his head, he betrayed no weakness in
the matter of the vetoes and made no promises to the crowd.
After this
state of affairs had lasted a considerable time with no further result, it
began to occur to the authorities that the insurrection was hanging fire, and
that if, as now seemed likely, it was to end in failure, they had better pose
as the champions of order. The first to arrive were some of the deputies,
including Vergniaud and Isnard; but their efforts to persuade the mob to leave
the CEil-de-Boeuf were unavailing. About 6 p.m. Petion, who had given no sign
since 11 a.m., forced his way into the King’s presence, and at length, though
not without great difficulty, persuaded the rioters to withdraw; so that at
about 8 p.m. the King was able to leave the hall and rejoin the Queen, who had
been undergoing similar treatment in another apartment. Thus ended the
insurrection of June 20. That it had been deliberately planned there can be no
doubt; its direct object had been to terrorise the King into the withdrawal of
the vetoes; but its promoters must also
have
contemplated the possibility of his assassination. Neither of these oojects had
been gained; the King had been cool enough to refrain from any promises about
the vetoes, and had been saved by his own calmness and the fidelity of his few
protectors from the danger of assassination. Yet the events of the day had not
been without profit for the insur- rectionaries. The violation of the Assembly
and the Tuileries had been effected ; and time and further organisation would
accomplish their ends.' From this date the eyes of all parties were opened to
the realities of the situation; and the ensuing fifty days were given up to
preparations on both sides for the final struggle.
On June 22
the King made a dignified protest to the Assembly, and on the following day a
proclamation to his people. The result was a strong reaction in his favour.
Addresses of sympathy poured in from the Provinces. Some of the Sections of
Paris dissociated themselves from the insurrectionaries. In the Commune itself
men complained of the conduct of the Mayor. Finally, on July 1, a great
petition, backed by nearly 20,000 signatures, condemning the attitude of the
Commune and the behaviour of the Commandant General of the National Guard, was
presented to the King. In addition to this general expression of sympathy,
definite aid seemed likely to come from two quarters. The Directors of the
Department, the ambiguity of whose position had alone prevented them from
averting the catastrophe, now set themselves to stave off a second crisis. They
summoned Ramainvilliers to explain his inaction, instituted an enquiry into the
events of June 20, and approached Petion with a view to the appointment of a
new Commandant General. The enquiry was prolonged until July 7 and resulted in
the suspension by the Department of Petion and Manuel. It so happened that July
7 had been marked by a melodramatic scene of pacification in the Assembly. Upon
the suggestion of Lamourette all the deputies had effusively fraternised; and,
to seal the reconciliation, the King had been sent for and received with cries
of “ Vive le Roi.’’’1 The atmosphere being charged
with pacification, the King decided to refer the Department’s decree of
suspension to the Assembly. When they ungraciously declined to have anything to
do with the matter, Louis was obliged to confirm the decree, for to have vetoed
it would have been to encourage a repetition of June 20. The decree, however,
was quashed by the Assembly on July 13; and Petion and Manuel were reinstated.
This was a signal defeat, for the Department, whose members now one by one
resigned: and from this time forward it ceased to be a force in Paris.
Meanwhile,
however, succour seemed to be forthcoming from another source. Even before June
20 Lafayette had written protesting against the violence of the Jacobins and
demanding the closing of their club. The news of the insurrection therefore
came as a personal affront; and he determined to go to Paris and use his
influence to destroy the faction. Everything seemed to point to the success of
the enterprise. Lafayette
came with the
prestige of a famous soldier; he was still dear to the National Guard which
controlled Paris; the Ministers were his nominees; the majority in the Assembly
was in sympathy with him, and, what was even more important, was ready to give
expression to that sympathy by its votes. He was open, however, to the reproach
of deserting his army in the presence of the enemy. This accusation, though not
literally true, as his army was not in touch with the Austrians, was made the
most of by his enemies; and the shafts of Guadet’s caustic eloquence were
quickly directed against this weak point in his armour, when on June 28 the
general presented himself at the bar. But Lafayette seems to have had a curious
power of inspiring the timid Moderates with courage ; and Guadet’s proposals,
that the War Minister be asked if he had permitted the general to leave his
army and that the Committee of Twelve report on the right of generals to
petition, were rejected by 339 votes to 234. More fatal than the charge of
desertion was the fact that his assistance was utterly distasteful to those to
whom it was proffered. It is not indeed extraordinary that the Court looked
askance on Lafayette, since many of their troubles could be traced to him; but
it was more than unfortunate that at this critical juncture the King and Queen
were unable to swallow their resentment and make use, if it were only for a
time, of the one man who might have saved them. But it was not in their nature
to do so. Lafayette was received with chilly politeness; and it was the Queen
herself who warned Petion of a review of National Guards, at which the general
hoped to win over the armed force for a blow at the Jacobins. Thus the
contemplated coup d’etat was wrecked by those whom it had been destined to
benefit; no advantage had been taken of the Moderates’ victory in the Assembly,
and the Court had rejected the advances of the general. With his departure on
June 30, and the revelation of his impotence, the forces of anarchy and
disorder emerged from their dens. The tide turned finally in favour of the
insurrection- aries.
The arrival
in Paris of the armed bands, which had been summoned ostensibly to celebrate
the feast of the Federation on July 14, was a considerable reinforcement for
the conspirators. The Constitutional Guard having been disbanded and the
loyalty of the National Guard being at best doubtful, it was obvious that the
attitude of these “federes ” would be of the first importance. Every effort was
therefore made by the insurrectionaries, and especially by Barbarous and the
Bolands, to introduce a large body of desperadoes into the city, and by the
Minister of the Interior to prevent their introduction. Terrier de Monciel on
June 30 ordered the Departments to keep their federes at home ; and in reply
the Assembly offered free quarters in Paris from July 14 to 18, after which
they were to be camped at Soissons. In spite of this, the firm attitude of the
Minister so far had effect and so far succeeded that by July 14, the date of
the Federation, not more than
3000fidiris
had arrived; and it must be remembered that many of them were genuine
volunteers, and that between July 14 and 30 more than 5000 left for the front.
Unfortunately, their departure merely weeded out all the respectable men, and
left none but those who had never intended to go to the front at all, but had
come to Paris for the chance of excitement, adventure, and plunder. Of these
^s&iAo-federes the most violent contingent was that sent from Marseilles,
and it was the delay in its arrival that postponed the crisis. Meanwhile a
fresh “ Directory of Insurrection ” was meeting, drawn mainly from the
subordinate ranks of the Jacobins. It included Carra, Santerre, Antoine,
Lazowski, Fournier, Guillaume, and Westermann; but both its actions and the
whole organisation of insurrection were controlled by Danton from his position
as Procureur Substitut of the Commune.
Danton’s
antecedents had given little indication of the part he was now to play: he was
a fairly successful barrister of thirty when the Revolution began. Bom in 1759
of bourgeois parents at Arcis-sur- Aube, his first political enterprises had
been somewhat inglorious; but the outbreak of war seems to have tapped latent
springs, which now, on his reentry into politics, supplied an undercurrent of true
patriotism beneath the eddies of ambition and intrigue. Danton’s character, for
all its blemishes, rings true: the blemishes were conspicuous, for he was
wholly unartificial. Cruel, regardless of human life, unscrupulous, probably
corrupt, he was yet a true patriot; and it was patriotism, even more than the
ambition natural to a man so conscious of his power, that threw him into
politics at this juncture. While he was passionately patriotic he was also
intensely practical; and to a large extent this accounts for, though it does
not condone, the unscrupulous means which he used to gain his ends. To him the
end was everything, the means nothing; but the end was not self-seeking' or
cowardly, however base the means.
With Danton’s
approval, and under the guidance of the Directory of Insurrection, several
abortive outbreaks now occurred. The first of these took place so early as June
25; another premature attempt on July 21 had been stopped by the warnings of
Petion ; a banquet given to the federes on July 26 had been a critical moment.
Finally, on the 30th, the Marseillais marched into Paris. It had been intended
to lead them straight against the Tuileries ; but exaggerated rumours of
serious preparations at the palace cooled the ardour of the insurrectionaries,
and once more the catastrophe was postponed.
Two great
instruments were in fact in course of preparation to ensure the success of the
outbreak. The meetings of the Sections were being organised to counterfeit the
voice of the people; and the National Guard was being further democratised. The
forty-eight Sections or primary Assemblies of the electors of Paris, which
should have been entirely dissolved after the completion of their electoral
functions, had
quite
illegally resumed their sittings. Their very illegality was indeed of a certain
advantage to them, for it gave them, as unofficial bodies, the right to
petition, which was withheld from legally constituted authorities, and of this
they made free use; but it also put them at a disadvantage; for when on July 11
the country, on the motion of Herault, was declared in danger, all legally
constituted bodies began ipso facto to sit “ en permanence,” but the Sections
having no legal status could not do so. This leave to sit “ en permanence ” was
greatly coveted, as it would leave the Sections at the mercy of the Enragis. At
the regular meetings the Moderates in many Sections still possessed a majority
and were able to carry Moderate resolutions, and to present positively
reactionary petitions, some even refusing to open their galleries to the
public. But when on July 25 the Assembly decreed that the Sections were to sit
“ en permanence,” the Moderates could be worn down by sheer physical fatigue.
When the respectable members were compelled by exhaustion to retire, incendiary
motions could be carried by a handful of ruffians; and a small but energetic
minority could represent its will as that of a whole Section. The result of the
decree of July 25 was the announcement three days later by Carra that forty-seven
of the forty-eight Sections favoured the deposition of the King.
Equally
important were the changes now introduced in the organisation of the National
Guard. The insurrectionaries were determined that the disloyalty of that body
should no longer be ambiguous. A decree was therefore carried on August 1, on
the motion of Carnot, opening its ranks to passive as well as to active
citizens, and sanctioning the temporary arming of recruits with pikes. At the
same time the etat-major was reorganised on democratic lines; officers were
forbidden to give any orders save those sanctioned by the Commune; the
artillery was organised by Sections and the special “compagnie: (Tilite'"
suppressed; while, by order of the Mayor, the duty of guarding the Tuileries
was handed over to an agglomeration of drafts from all battalions with the
result that all spnsp of unity and mutual confidence were destroyed. Finally a
number of federes were introduced into the ranks. There could be little doubt
after these changes which way the National Guard would lean when the rising
broke out.
Meanwhile
Paris was in a state of ferment. On the decree of “Patrie en danger ” (passed
July 11, carried out July 22 and 23), a black flag was hoisted over the Hotel
de Ville, and recruiting bureaux were established at every street comer, while
two corteges of officials patrolled the town at regular intervals to the sound
of the trumpet. Every day saw the arrival of fresh bands of federes and the
departure of more volunteers for the front. On July 30 the formidable and
long-expected Marseillais marched in through the Porte St Antoine amidst great
enthusiasm. To Paris thus excited by marchings and recruitings there
came on
August 3 a manifesto from the Duke of Brunswick. This astoundingly impolitic
document, while disclaiming all desire of conquest and all intention of
meddling in the internal affairs of France, and calling on the sane majority of
the French people to declare themselves against the “odious schemes of their
oppressors,” threatened with all “ the rigour of the laws of war ” those who
dared to defend themselves against the invading troops, and the citizens and
town of Paris in the event of a further violation of the Tuileries with an “
exemplary and never-to-be-forgotten vengeance,” by “giving up the town to
military execution and total subversion, and the guilty rebels to the death
they had deserved.” The only effect of Brunswick’s indiscreet language was to
divert to the side of the insurgents many hundreds of moderate men. The very
next day there was a further alarm; and, though it came to nothing, everyone in
Paris now knew that the great insurrection would not be long delayed.
Both sides
were now making their final preparations. On July 25 the terrace of the
FeuiUants, which gave access to the gardens of the Tuileries, was placed under
the control of the Assembly. The Directory of Insurrection, feeling itself too
small and unauthoritative to carry out its programme, in face of the rather
half-hearted attitude of the Commune and the Assembly—for the Brissotins were
by this time inclined to side with the King, if only he would restore their
Ministry—determined (August 9) that the Sections, which had already (July 17) a
central “ Bureau de Correspondance ” sitting at the Hotel de Ville, should elect
a body of commissioners “ to consider the measures to be taken in the existing
circumstances.” This body would have, what no private body of conspirators
could have, the semblance of having been freely chosen by the citizens of Paris
in their primary Assemblies. As a matter of fact, the Sections being en
permanence, it was arranged for the elections to take place at night after all
moderate members had retired; indeed, many of the Section halls were found
deserted save by a few ruffians slumbering on the benches. Twenty at least of
the Sections declined to elect; others elected but gave their representatives
no mandate; in the Arsenal Section only six members were found, who promptly
elected three of their number; but, in spite of irregularities and obstacles,
Commissioners began to arrive at the Hotel de Ville at about 1 a.m. (August
10); and, when Danton looked in at 3 o’clock, he found nineteen Sections
represented, Huguenin in the chair, and Tallien secretary. Amongst the
Commissioners were Panis, Sergent, Robert, Rossignol, Hubert, Marat, Simon,
Lhuillier, and Leonard Bourdon. Robespierre, Fabre d’^glantine, and Billaud,
were also elected, but with characteristic caution seem to have refrained from
taking their seats till the insurrection was over. No reliance, however, can be
placed on the lists of those present on this critical occasion, as they were
drawn up on the following day, when the names of many who had not actually been
present were
incorporated. Thus in the small hours of the morning of August 10 this sinister
body installed itself under the same roof with the legal Commune, ready, should
occasion arise, to usurp the authority of that body, and armed with the
semblance of a popular mandate.
Meanwhile,
with the slender forces at their disposal, the defenders of the Tuileries were
making what preparations they could. Mandat, who, as Commandant General of the
National Guard for the current month, was responsible for the protection of the
palace, and the maintenance of order in the city, was an absolutely loyal and
devoted man. It is difficult to estimate the forces under his command. In
addition to the ordinary guard he had issued summonses to sixteen extra
battalions (10,000 men); but very few responded, and little reliance could be
placed on those who did. With them was a small force of mounted gendarmerie,
but it was evident that the brunt of the defence would fall on the Swiss Guard.
An attempt had been made (July 17) to disband that force, but the Ministers had
managed to keep it at hand; and now on August 9, to the number of 950, it took
up the defence of the Tuileries. The total force of the defenders was probably
about 2500.
In his
preparations Mandat had been much hampered by the duplicity of Petion. That
functionary was ostensibly on the side of order; in his heart of hearts,
however, he favoured the revolt. Thus it was by his directions that the Swiss
were admitted through the barriers, but also by his order that they were
supplied with only thirty rounds of ammunition per man, and the remainder of
the garrison with only three. Hampered as he was, Mandat nevertheless made his
dispositions with considerable skill, and issued his orders with clear
determination. To prevent the junction of the crowds from St Antoine and St
Marcel, he posted a guard on each of the bridges; and it was against these,
especially against that which held the Pont Neuf, where the alarm-gun was
stationed, that the first efforts of the insurrectionaries were directed. By
means of orders extracted from the Commune, and aided by the disloyalty of the
gunners, the bridges were at last secured and the alarm-gun was fired. But, in
spite of this preliminary success, there were signs of some hitch in the
insurrection. The results of the efforts made to gather a great crowd were disappointing.
The tocsin which began to ring at about 12.45 on the morning of the 10th
brought a few recruits and the alarm-gun a few more, not enough, however, to
ensure success in a conflict with a man of Mandat’s determination. The leaders
of the insurrection therefore decided to secure the person of the Commandant.
Mandat was at
the Tuileries, where the apparent failure of the riot had, after 2.30 a.m.,
created a more hopeful feeling. At about 5 a.m. he received a summons—the
second—from the Commune. At this time there was no information at the Tuileries
as to the true state of affairs at the Hotel de Ville, where the Commune had
become a mere tool in the hands of the Sectional Commissioners; yet Mandat
did not wish
to leave his post. Roederer, however, who, with other officials of the
Department and the Commune, was present in the palace, persuaded him that he
was constitutionally bound to obey. The Com- mcmdant therefore reluctantly
proceeded to the Hotel de Ville and presented himself before the Cornell
General of the Commune. His examination before that body was neither long nor
important; but, on emerging from the council-room, he was seized and hurried
into the hall of the Sectional Commissioners, where began the real business for
which he had been brought. Interrogated as to the garrison of the Tuileries, he
courageously deceived the Commissioners as to its strength, and, on being
invited to sign an order directing one-half of the defenders to withdraw,
heroically declined. This was the signal for his arrest, and his arrest was the
signal for the interference of the Commune. That body protested that the
Commissioners were exceeding their powers; the Commissioners replied by voting
the suspension of the Commune and proceeded to occupy the Council hall and to
establish themselves—were they not the elect of the primary Assemblies?—as the
Provisional Commune of Paris. The full import of this coup de main was at once
seen. Mandat was ordered to the Abbaye prison, and on his way there was done to
death on the stairs of the Hotel de Ville; and Petion, whose equivocal attitude
was no longer sufficient, was, greatly to his own relief, placed in
confinement. The conduct of the insurrection, and with it the future government
of France, thus passed into the hands of the Sectional Commissioners
Meanwhile at
the Tuileries the weakness of the defence, after Mandat’s departure, had been
manifested by the very mixed reception given to the King, when he descended to
the courts and the gardens to review the troops. It may have been this
disaffection, combined with the appearance of the first rioters with twelve
pieces of artillery on the Place du Carrousel, that convinced the King’s
advisers that it would be best for him to proceed to the Assembly for
protection ; or it may have been, as Roederer’s very frank narrative seems to
indicate, the fear that the troops might make a stout resistance, and that,
having driven off the rioters, they might attempt some coup on the Assembly.
Louis at first hesitated, urging that he saw very few people in the Carrousel;
but he had lost his military adviser, and ultimately the argument of the “
twelve cannon'’ persuaded him at about 8.30 a.m. to leave the Tuileries for the
Assembly, accompanied by the Queen, the royal family, and a few attendants.
The retreat
of the King was the signal for the desertion of the great majority of the
National Guard; and the Swiss, finding that they were left alone to defend the
Tuileries, abandoned the outer courts and withdrew into the palace itself. The
mob was thus able to enter the Cour Royale, where it found the few remaining
National Guards and the gendarmerie ready to fraternise with it. The Swiss,
however, presented
a resolute
front and resisted the blandishments of Westermann, who harangued them in their
own tongue. Who fired the first shot was never known; if it came from the Swiss
it must be remembered that they were being subjected to the greatest
provocation. It was followed by a volley from the Swiss on the grand staircase
and another from the first-floor windows. The crowd hastily retreated across
the Carrousel and found shelter among the buildings that encumbered the square.
An ineffective exchange of shots continued for about three-quarters of an hour.
The Swiss then cleared the square by a sally and had almost obtained a
comparatively bloodless victory over their cowardly opponents, when an order
arrived from the King that they should cease firing and withdraw to their
barracks.
It seems that
Louis thought that he had, before he left the palace, given orders for the
Swiss to withdraw; but when he heard the volleys he should have known that it
was too late for them to obey; and his actual written order, coming when it
did, was a piece of culpable folly and simply handed over the lives of his devoted
body-guard to the mob. The Swiss withdrew in good order by way of the garden;
and the rioters, though not without hesitation, took possession of the palace
and put practically every living male found within it to the sword. The
retreating Swiss were shot down as they crossed the garden, and the remnant,
200 or 250 men, obedient to a further order from the King, laid down their arms
and were imprisoned in the Church of the Feuillants, where many of them were
massacred on the following day. The loss on the popular side during the
fighting has been estimated at 100 killed and 60 severely wounded. Of the
defenders it may be said that practically no one was killed during the
fighting. A few escaped by way of the Louvre and a tiny remnant of the Swiss
survived; the rest perished after the order to withdraw.
The King
meanwhile and the royal family had been lodged by the Assembly in a reporter’s
box, where they actually remained from 10 a.m. on the 10th till 3 a.m. on the
11th, while the Assembly discussed their fate. In face of the ascendancy of the
insurrectionary Commune, the Assembly was in a very cowed condition : only 284
members were present as against 630 two days previously. A deputation from the
Commune, which practically ordered them to depose the King, was received with
unctuous flattery. At 11 a.m. on the 10th, however, Vergniaud propounded the
Brissotin plan. He proposed that a “ Convention ” should be summoned to produce
a new Constitution, that the King should be not deposed but suspended from his
office, that the Civil List should be abolished, but that at the same time a
gouverneur should be appointed for the Dauphin, and that the King should be
lodged in the Luxembourg with an allowance for expenses. These proposals, which
the Assembly accepted, show that the majority of the Brissotin party had been
playing all along not for a Republic, but for a change of King which
should put
the power in their hands by the reestablishment of a Brissotin Ministry. The
next step therefore was to vote the recall of Roland, Claviere, and Servan, to
whom were added Lebrun, a subordinate of Dumouriez, for Foreign Affairs, Monge
for the Admiralty, and Danton, the organiser of the insurrection, for the
Ministry of Justice. This “Provisional Executive Council” was to hold office
until the Convention met.
But it soon
became clear that these measures would not satisfy the Commune. It was this
body that had borne the actual burden of the revolt; and it had no intention of
relinquishing its newly-won powers or of countenancing any form of monarchy,
the reestablishment of which would not only secure the Brissotins in power, but
would bring retribution to the ringleaders of the revolt. The Commune therefore
was doubly committed to the establishment of a Republic. It was not, however,
supported in this by a majority of Frenchmen, not even by a majority of
Parisians. Paris, the nation, the Assembly itself were all at heart
monarchical. In Paris the very Sections, in spite of the domination of the
faction, had some of them dared to protest against the attacks on the throne.
To the strength of monarchical feeling throughout the country the pitition des
vingt-mille is eloquent testimony; if 20,000 Frenchmen were ready to risk their
necks, as they literally did, in the interests of the Constitution, it is only
reasonable to believe that there was a vastly greater number who shared the
views but not the courage of the signatories. Finally, the Assembly itself^
when protected by the prestige of Lafayette, had betrayed its monarchical leanings
by refusing on August 8 to impeach the General for his support of the Monarchy
in June.
The Commune
would therefore have to fight hard to gain its ends. Two immediate dangers
confronted it: the attitude of Lafayette, and that of the bourgeoisie of Paris.
Once more, as after the insurrection of June 20, it seemed likely that
Lafayette would become the arbiter of the situation; everything appeared to be
in his favour; he was supported, as we have seen, by a majority in the
Assembly; he was at Sedan, within a few days’ march of Paris; the Prussians
were far away on the Moselle; the Departments were on his side, the National
Guard in his favour; all seemed therefore to point to the success of a coup de
main.
But Lafayette
dreaded civil war, and was at any rate too good a patriot to resort to it in
face of the enemy, nor was he inclined to repeat the experiment of a visit to
Paris. He therefore determined to make himself the centre of the monarchical
feeling which he knew to exist in the Provinces. With this object he summoned
the Mayor of Sedan and other local magnates, and received from them assurances
of support, readministered to his troops the oath of fidelity to the
Constitution, and directed the other generals to do the same. The
Commissioners,
sent by the
Assembly to exact an oath of fidelity to the new government, were arrested
(August 14) by the municipality of Sedan. But Lafayette took no further active
steps to carry out his plan: his sensitiveness to the accusation of treachery
rendered his actions half-hearted. The occasion, however, was one where
hesitation was fatal. The Executive Council promptly superseded him; and the
general decided that there was nothing for it but to cross the frontier. He
fell into the hands of the Austrians and remained a prisoner till 1797.
The first and
most pressing danger to the new order of things disappeared with the flight of
Lafayette. It was clear that the Provinces, unorganised, bewildered, and unled,
would not make open resistance. They still trusted the Assembly, and it was the
knowledge of this that decided the Commune to retain that body while riding
rough-shod over it. A message was now sent through the Departments to say that
Louis XVI was overthrown, and that there was ho fear of treachery at home
“because the Commune of Paris was watching over the Assembly.” All the
departmental authorities who had shown signs of reaction were suspended by the
Executive Council; and, the submission of the Provinces being thus assured, the
Commune was able to turn its attention to the danger that threatened it from
the bourgeoisie of Paris. On the 11th, the issue being no longer in doubt,
Robespierre took his seat in that body; and it was he, Billaud-Varennes, and
Marat (who, though not a member, was granted a special tribune and the right to
take part in the debates), that guided the Commune in the ensuing struggle.
Maximilien
Robespierre now steps to the front as a figure of first- rate importance. After
his arrival in Paris as a deputy of the Third Estate, his energies had at first
been chiefly confined to the Jacobin Club, where his long-winded and
self-conscious oratory had a vogue for which it is difficult to account. His
own self-denying ordinance kept him out of the Legislative Assembly, and left
him free to devote his talent for intrigue to the overthrow of the existing
order. The ascendancy of this narrow, fastidious, insignificant, provincial
barrister is one of the most curious facts of the period, a problem beyond the
power of historians to solve. That he was unconcerned for his own pocket, and
therefore free to use his ingenuity for the furtherance of his political
ambitions, is proved beyond all doubt; in a period so utterly corrupt this
incorruptibility no doubt told heavily in his favour. Over and above this, in spite
of his narrow ignorance, Robespierre had yet all the attributes necessary for
posing as an intellectual arid literary genius: a refined appearance, a
fastidiousness in dress uncommon in the circle in which he moved, an air of
superior wisdom, and a command of language, which, because it was not
eloquence, had all the more effect on audiences sated with rhodomontade and
rhetoric. These advantages combined to give him that ascendancy over his blunt
and brutal colleagues, which an appearance of refined taste, dialectical skill,
and ingenuity, so often
attains over
simpler and coarser natures. Thus, while amongst the Vergniauds and Condorcets
of the Assembly Robespierre would have been a laughing-stock, at the Jacobin
Club, especially after the ejection of Brissot (October, 1792), his
intellectual equipment* slender as it was, combined with his frigid and austere
pose, and a certain feline fascination, won for him an influence which
gradually became absolute.
Robespierre
and his allies, convinced that they were in a mino-ity, now determined to
secure themselves in power by terrorising their opponents. On August 11 the
signatories of the two famous petitions of huit-miUe and vingi-mille were
excluded from the exercise of public functions. On the 12th reactionary
journals were suppressed; and, by closing the barriers and tampering with
private correspondence, the Commune created an atmosphere of uneasiness in the
city. The question now arose, how far would the Assembly allow the Commune to
go ? The majority of the deputies were not Republicans, nor were they on the
side of disorder: most of them belonged to that very class at which the Commune
was striking, and thus the contest of the Commune with the bourgeoisie resolved
itself into a struggle with the Assembly.
But the
Assembly was now but the shadow of its always shadowy self. Of its 745 members
only about a third registered their votes, and it was by this time only too
well accustomed to submit to the noisy dictation of galleries and deputations.
The first struggle was over the custody of the King. The Commune was unwilling
that any but itself should have the keeping of so valuable a hostage; and the
Assembly on August 13 gave way, and handed over its prisoner to the Commune, by
whom he was incarcerated in the Temple. After this first victory, the Commune
looked round for some means of getting control of the lives of individuals.
Events played into its hands. On August 11 the new police-law, long under
consideration, had been passed by the Assembly. It handed over to the Commune
the duty of “recherche des crimes contre la s&rete de Fetat” and authorised
all active citizens to drag before the authorities persons suspected of such
crimes. Thus the life of evexy individual in Paris was placed at the mercy of the
Commune. The Assembly made haste to remedy the harm done by this ill-considered
measure, by reviving the power of the “ Conseil du departement ”; but the
furious outcry provoked by this step, and the appearance of Robespierre at the
bar, overawed it into restricting the power of the revived Conseil to the
assessment of taxes. The policing of Paris was thus secured to the Commune.
The next
encroachment was upon the judicial authorities. Already the functions of juges
de paix had been usurped by the Sectioned Assemblies under the supervision of a
“ Comitt de surveillance ” of fifteen members of the Commune. Unlimited power
of imprisonment had been accorded to certain Communal Commissioners, and a list
of “ opponents of the Revolution ” had been handed to the tribunals. But this
was not enough; and the Commune set itself to extort from the Assembly a
special
extraordinary tribunal. On August 11a court-martial had been appointed to try
the military prisoners of August 10; and the more important civil prisoners,
including the ex-ministers, had been sent before the High Court of Orleans. At
the dictation of the Commune the Assembly now abandoned the court-martial and
ordered the election of new juries to try these cases in the criminal Courts.
Robespierre upon this again appeared at the bar (August 15) and demanded a
special tribunal, elected by the Sections, with unlimited power, from which
there should be no appeal. The Assembly fought the matter point by point; but
on the 17th, overpowered by the threats and persistence of the Commune, they
were criminal enough and weak enough to decree the creation of a special
tribunal.
The reason of
all this revolutionary activity is not far to seek: the primary elections for
the Convention, which the Assembly had decreed on August 10, were to commence
on August 27, and the secondary on September 2. Aware that they were supported
by but a small minority of the electors, the Commune employed these measures of
terror simply to secure for themselves a majority at the polls; and by August
26 at any rate, not to suggest an earlier date, it had been decided that, to
complete the Terror, a general massacre of the prisoners should take place to
coincide with the opening of the secondary elections. Events on the frontiers
played into the hands of the faction. On August 26, just at the critical moment
when, on the eve of the primary elections, signs of a more determined
resistance both from the Assembly itself and from some of the Sections were
disclosing themselves, there arrived the news of the fall of the frontier town
of Longwy. With the French armies intact this reverse was of trifling
importance—so at any rate it was regarded by the generals at the front—but it
was sufficient for the demagogues. On the 28th Danton, in the name of the Ministry,
demanded permission for the Commune to subject the city to domiciliary visits,
ostensibly in search for muskets, of which he alleged there were
80.000 in Paris, in reality to secure the arrest
of all reactionaries. This was the crowning item in the great scheme for
delivering over the Moderates of Paris to the faction. From the morning of the
28th to the evening of the 31st these visits were in progress; of the promised
80.000 muskets only 2000 were secured, but, in
their real object, the arrest of Moderates, the result of the visits was all
that could be desired; and by the evening of August 31 every prison was full to
overflowing.
Meanwhile,
however, people had begun to suspect ulterior motives in this revolutionary
energy of the Commune; and some of the Sections petitioned against the
continued usurpations of that body. The result was that on August 30, just when
its plans were reaching consummation, the Commune found itself dissolved by
decree of the Assembly. Set only on preserving for a few days its existence and
that of its Comiti de Surveillance, which was superintending the actual
preparations for
the
massacres, the Commune went the length of restoring Petion to the chair
;■ and he now headed a deputation to the Assembly, where: a
long memoir prepared by Robespierre was read, enlarging on the services of the
Commune. During the whole of the 31st the Assembly stood firm, but on September
1 Thuriot, prompted by Dan ton, persuaded it to reinstate the Commune.
The very next
day was that on which the faction had decided to strike. It was hoped that the
news of the fall of Verdun might arrive in time to serve as a pretext for the
massacres; but it only reached Paris on September 4. The conspirators,
therefore* had to. make the most of the investment of that town and the
probability of its fall; and Manuel proposed that, in view of the military
crisis* the tocsin should be rung, the alarm-gun fired, the “ginb-aW"
sounded, and all able-bodied citizens convoked to the Champ-de-Mars. The
Assembly took up the cry, Vergniaud delivering an eloquent speech, and Danton
the most famous of all his fiery orations. Meanwhile the Comite de
iSWweiZfowctf embarked upon the immediate preparations for the massacres.
Coopting a number of kindred spirits, it first moved the arrest of Roland,
Brissot, and thirty other Brissotins—a deliberate attempt, though it proved
unsuccessful, to include the Brissotins in the massacres; next it sent
emissaries to some of the more violent Sections to extort a demand for the
destruction of the prisoners. In two Sections (Poissonniere and Luxembourg)
this was successful. Thus, when, at 2 p.m., the tocsin began to ring and the
populace to flock to the Champ-de-Mars, the bands of assassins already gathered
by the Comite started on their mission.
The first
victims were twenty-four priests who were awaiting examination in the cells of
the Mairie itself. These unfortunates were bundled into carriages and conducted
towards the Abbaye. On the way their escort of federes tried to provoke the
populace to attack them, and, when they refused, set upon the; victims
themselves. On their arrival at the Abbaye the butchery was soon completed. The
murderers now split up into detachments and distributed themselves among the
various prisons. To give colour to the legend of “popular justice,” no doubt
also to save any friends of the assassins, informal tribunals, on which the
murderers themselves sat, were established: before these the miserable
prisoners were dragged: all priests, royalists, and “aristocrats,” were
condemned at once and thrust out of the Salle de Justice on to the pikes of the
murderers in the courtyard without. That no attempt at any kind of justice was
made by these self-constituted tribunals is proved by the fact that many of the
victims were common criminals, whose very crimes one might have thought would
have commended them to such judges; 43 were boys under eighteen, and at least
35 were women.
Amidst every
circumstance of horror this carnage continued, with little interference from
without, for four whole days. In Paris alone 1400 people perished. But the
massacre was not confined to Paris ; on
the contrary,
to extend it to the Provinces, where the danger of reaction was very
threatening, was one of the first objects of its promoters. Many of the most
important of the State prisoners were at Orleans; and on August 30 the
Assembly, on the demand of the Communej had sent Fournier, an agent of the
Comite de Surveillance, to fetch them-— 43 in number—to Paris. On September 3,
seeing what would be the fate of the prisoners if they entered Paris, the
Assembly ordered Fournier to take them to Saumur. He disobeyed and conducted
them to Versailles, where he was met on September 9 by a detachment of the
expert Paris murderers, who made short work of the prisoners.
This massacre
had been devised as early as August 30, but it was not until September 3 that
the idea of a general massacre throughout the Provinces was developed. On that
day a circular was sent by the hands of Commissioners of the Commune to all the
Departments, announcing the fact that a “portion of the fierce conspirators
detained in the prisons had been put to death by the people,” and suggesting
that the entire nation should hasten to adopt a measure so necessary for the
public safety. Fortunately this incitement had but little effect; and the
massacres at Lyons, Meaux, Rheims, Charleville, and Caen, were comparatively
insignificant. This, however, in no way exonerates the authors of the atrocious
manifesto. It has been suggested that the entire document was forged by Marat,
who had long openly cried out for wholesale massacres; but there is nothing in
the antecedents of Panis, Sergent, and the other members of the Comite de
Surveillance, whose signatures were attached to it, to make it improbable that
these signatures were genuine. The fact that the circular went out in the
official covers of the Ministry of Justice has been used as an argument to
prove that Danton and Fabre d’^glantine were privy to it, though it lacked
their countersign and the ministerial stamp. The suspicion against them is
indeed strong; and when we remember Danton’s attitude towards the Paris
massacres, and the fact that he never denied, but rather took credit for, his
share in both circular and massacres, it is difficult to acquit him.
So much for
the circular; as to the responsibility for the Paris massacres the Comite de
Surveillance must bear the direct and chief blame, but the Commune itself must
have been aware of the acts of its committee. Entrusted as it was with the
control of the armed force, and responsible, therefore, for the safe-keeping of
the prisons, it could and should have ordered the National Guard to protect
them; but the National Guard did nothing, and doubtless had its orders to do
nothing. It could and should have thrown itself between the assassins and their
victims ; on the contrary, such of its members as entered the prisons entered
them to encourage the murderers. Petion, newly restored to power, was doubtless
afraid for his own skin on account of his connexion with the Brissotins. On
Thursday, the last day of the massacres, he
244
Responsibility of Danton and Roland.
[l792
actually went
to the prison of La Force, was horrified, and remonstrated; but he regarded the
ignoring of his remonstrances merely with mild surprise and went away. He
certainly, however, went to Santerre and ordered him to use the National Guard;
and on the whole, though his action was quite ineffective, he comes out of the
matter better than the jther authorities.
As to the Assembly,
it did little to stop the massacres; it had, it is true, half-heartedly tried
to avert them, but had given way to the Commune on every point before they
began; and, now that they were in progress, it was not till September 4 that it
called (quite ineffectively) upon the Sections to take steps to ensure the
security of life and property. It must not be forgotten, however, that the
Brissotins, who after August 10 constituted the large majority of the Assembly,
had themselves been threatened, and doubtless it was fear for their own lives
that made them loth to interfere.
With regard
to the Executive Council, Danton and Roland were the Ministers directly
responsible for the security of prisoners. As to the former it is impossible to
believe that he was ignorant of what was being prepared by his intimates of the
Commune, and circumstantial evidence accumulates round him from every side. It
was he who filled the prisbns, reinstated the Commune, ordered the tocsin to be
rung. As Minister of Justice he was responsible for the life of each prisoner,
and, himself the only truly strong man in Paris, he could have saved them. Yet
his attitude was at best one of cynical indifference; and, if complete proof of
his direct complicity in the massacres is still wanting, he is at least
responsible for never having lifted a finger to stop them. Roland, the other
responsible Minister, though his conduct was no whit more courageous, has at
least this excuse, that his interference would almost certainly have been
useless. This, however, scarcely justifies him in not interfering, and his talk
of “ drawing a veil ” and of “ events perhaps necessary ” was as disgusting as
it was cowardly; he had been directly threatened by Marat, and was doubtless
afraid to move.
THE NATIONAL
CONVENTION TO THE FALL OF THE
GIRONDE.
All eyes were now fixed on the approaching elections
to the National Convention, which had been decreed by the Legislative Assembly
on the morning of August 10,1792.
The fate of
the Republican party was staked upon the result; if the true feeling of France
were allowed expression at the polls, the ascendancy of the Commune and the
demagogues would be at an end. The leaders of that party were fully alive to
the danger; they laboured under no illusions as to the real mind of the people
of France, and they set themselves, with the vigour and unscrupulousness of men
who know that not only their careers but their lives are at stake, to muzzle
the expression of that mind. Above all it was necessary to prevent the
Moderates from carrying the capital. To gag the whole country was a gigantic
task; it would be attempted, but success was more than doubtful; in Paris, on
the other hand, the demagogues had their chance. The city was already in a
suitable state of paralysis; the forces of anarchy and terror were already at
work; the Jacobin Club, the Commune, the armed bands, and the Radical press
were so many instruments in the hands of the faction. If by their aid it could
secure the return of a compact body of its adherents, it would be sure of the
nucleus of a party in the Convention, and, if it could not hope for an actual
majority there, it could make up for its numerical deficiency by the vigour of
its actions; but, if Paris went Moderate, all was lost. Every nerve, therefore,
was strained for a grand effort in that city.
The
arrangements for the elections had been made by the Legislative Assembly.
Manhood suffrage had been proposed, but not carried. The property qualification
for electors indeed had been abolished, but at the same time the age limit (25
years), the disfranchisement of domestic servants, and the system of double
voting, by primary and secondary elections, had been maintained. Under these
provisions the primary elections took place in Paris between August 26 and
September 1. There were in the capital and its environs some 200,000 voters;
and it
was certain
that, if a reasonable percentage of them were to register their votes, the days
of the faction would be numbered. It was therefore once more necessary to keep
away from the polls as many of the respectable voters as possible. One can
hardly help admiring the ingenuity and minute care for detail with which this
disfranchisement was managed. The Sections had already claimed, and the
Assembly weakly admitted the claim, that they should manage the details of the
elections in their own way. Robespierre, making use of this concession,
persuaded his own Section (des Piques), and, through it, the remainder of the
Sections, to abolish the secrecy of the ballot and adopt the vote-
a-haute-voix. In the excited and nervous condition of a city whose barriers
were closed, and whose citizens were being subjected to domiciliary visits and
other inquisitorial measures, it is difficult to overestimate the effect of this
innovation ; for each Section was easily filled with armed ruffians who would
rage against every' Moderate vote; and it must be remembered that all Paris was
by this time dimly conscious of the approach of some murderous crisis, and
every man who gave a Moderate vote felt that he might next day be on the list
of the proscribed. It is not, therefore, astonishing that the polls were
sparsely attended by the respectable classes.
: In spite,
however, of all the precautions adopted by the faction in the primary
elections, it seems that they were by no means confident of the pure
republicanism of the 900 secondary electors chosen. Robespierre had already
caused it to be decreed that the voting at the secondary election should also
be public, and that it should take place in the hall of the Jacobin Club, where
the public galleries were gigantic and easily filled with a suitable mob, and
where the very atmosphere would be favourable to the demagogues. Finally, lest
in spite of all these precautions some undesirable names should creep in to
mar the unity of the “ Paris Deputation,” the right of ostracism, in other
words the right to revise the roll of the deputies elected,! was reserved to
the primary assemblies, a provision which entirely contravened the principle of
double election.
It was, as
had been arranged, under the terrible shadow of the September massacres that
the 900 secondary electors gathered, on September 2, in the Archiepiscopal
Palace; and it was through an alley of corpses—the victims of the Chatelet
prison—stacked upon the Pont-au-Change, that Robespierre led them to the Club
in the Rue St Honors, and there proceeded to sift them like wheat, ejecting
from the hqll all who had signed either of the two petitions (“ huit-mille ”
and “ vmgt-mille ”), and all who “ had been members of anti-civic societies.”
Murder without and unbridled proscription within soon reduced the remaining
electors to a sufficiently plastic i condition; and on September 5 they elected
Robespierre himself first deputy for Paris, and after him Danton, Collot
d’Herbois, Manuel, and Billaud-Varennes, all men of
the most
violent republicanism. One wonders how, in spite of all the precautions taken,
any Moderates had managed to slip in ; perhaps only because even Paris in
September, 1792, could not provide 900 ruffians “ au niveau de la Revolution ”
as conceived by Robespierre' and his friends; yet both Kersaint and
Priestley—men of pronounced Moderate opinions—were nominated; and it was only
by dint of allowing public discussion of the merits of each candidate that
Camille Desmoulins and Marat were preferred to them. The election of Marat, the
instigator of the horrible outrages which were being perpetrated almost under
the eyes of the electors, seemed to set a seal on the ignominy of the
proceedings ; but an even greater depth of ignominy was reached in the election
of Philip, Duke of Orleans. This miserable man owed his election to the good
offices of Marat, to whom he had rendered financial assistance; and it is
probable that the subtle ingenuity of Robespierre prompted him to agree to his
inclusion, in order that, should the Republic collapse, as it seemed at the
time likely that it would, the faction should not be without a candidate for
the throne. As soon as the continuance of the Republic was assured, Orleans was
cast aside like dirt. He was the last deputy elected for Paris, and it may here
be noted that on September 15, by permission of the Commune, he changed his
name to Philippe Egalite. The names of the 24 members of the Paris deputation
were as follows:—Robespierre, Danton, Collot d’Herbois, Manuel,
Billaud-Varennes, Camille Desmoulins, Marat, Lavicomterie, Legendre, Raffron du
Trouillet, Panis, Sergent, Robert, Dusaulx, Frerbn, Beauvais de Preaux, Fabre
d’Eglantine, Osselin, Augustin Robespierre (brother of Maximilien), David the
painter, Boucher, Laignelot, Thomas, and Philip of Orleans. The majority of
them were mere nominees of Robespierre; and the result of the election was as
much a personal triumph for him as a political victory for the faction. From
this time forward he must be reckoned as one of the most important powers in
the Revolution.
It was not to
be expected that the faction would sweep the board in the Provinces so easily
as it had in Paris; yet in some places, in the great industrial centres
especially, it was able by means of its local organisations to apply what may
be called the Parisian methods. Although only in ten of the Departments was the
vote-a-haute-voix imposed on the electors, in most places secondary electors
with mandates in favour of the Monarchy or of the Constitution of 1791 were
successfully—though quite illegally—ostracised. A remarkable feature of the
provincial elections was the dearth of respectable candidates, another proof
that what the majority of the middle classes wanted was simply peace to enjoy
the fruits of 1789. The consequence was that many obscure men were sent up to
the Convention, as well as many professional politicians totally unknown to
their constituents and elected only on newspaper reputations. But the number of
votes recorded gives the best
indication of
the character of the elections. Of the 7,590,000 primary electors in France, it
is reckoned that not more than 630,000 registered their votes, while of the
secondary electors 25 per cent, abstained. The conclusion is that the
Convention was elected, the Republic proclaimed, the King executed, and the
Terror established on the mandate of about 6 per cent, of the electors of
France.
While these
elections were in progress Paris had been given up to pillage; and stolen
property to the amount of many millions had fallen into the hands of the
Commune. On the 16th the Garde-Meuble was broken into and property to the value
of 24,000,000 livres was stolen, including the Crown diamonds. The expiring
Assembly meanwhile was concerned with financial affairs, and by decrees of
September 5 and September 16 forbade the export of specie and plate, the
fabrication of paper-money having been renewed on September 1. But now, in.
view of the reactionary attitude of the Provinces, the failure of the Circular,
the non-success of the faction at the polls, and the increasing courage of the
Moderate Sections of Paris, the Assembly at last took heart and passed decrees
restricting the powers of Commissioners of the Ministiy, and ordering the
arrest of any persons posing as Commissioners of the Commune. Next, tardily
enough it is true, an attempt was made. to restore order and security in the
capital. On September 17 arbitrary arrests and violation of houses were
forbidden, and the Commune was held responsible for the lives of prisoners.
Finally, on the last day of its existence, the Legislative decreed that every
citizen must be provided with a carte de civisme from his Section—a measure
which, by driving strangers out of the city, at first worked for order, but was
afterwards converted into a powerful weapon of terror. New municipal elections
were also ordered. The Assembly took control of the tocsin and alarm-gun, and
reserved to itself the exclusive right to employ all armed forces other than
the National Guard—a blow specially directed at the federes from the Provinces,
many of whom were still in Paris. After this tardy but vigorous effort for the
restoration of order the Legislative dissolved itself, and on September 21 was
replaced in the Manege by the National Convention, which had already held two
preliminary sittings in the Tuileries.
Of the 782
members of the new Convention, 75 had sat in the Constituent and 183 in the
Legislative. There were many lawyers and members of local administrations, some
retired officers, and 48 of the Constitutional clergy. The electioneering
campaign of the faction had so far failed that it was found to control no more
than about 50 members, of whom the Paris deputation accounted for 24; while the
Brissotins, or Girondins as they should now be called, mustered some 120
supporters, the remainder (i.e. the majority) of the deputies not being
identified with either side. The Girondins, however, had so little desire to be
considered Moderate, that they were unwilling at first to occupy
the benches
upon which the Feuillants of the Legislative had sat, which, although always
known as the “ Right,” were, after the changes made on December 27, 1791,
actually on the left of the President’s chair; and it was only after
considerable hesitation, and when the breach between themselves and the faction
had widened, that they finally identified themselves with the Right side of
the House. Opposite to them, high upon the extreme “ Left,” sat the little knot
of Enrages, the Mountain as it came to be called; while on the lower benches on
the floor of the House, the Marais or Plain, sat the great mass of independent
deputies. Amongst the Montagrtards, in addition to the Paris deputies, with whose
names we are already familiar, sat many men who were afterwards to become
famous, the two Prieurs, Carnot, Merlin of Thionville, Robert Lindet, Jean
Bon-Saint-Andre, Philippeaux, Carrier, Fouche, Tallien, Le Bas, Saint-Just,
Herault, Lacroix, Chabot, and Bazire. These men, afterwards to be so widely
separated, were for the present united by the bond of joint responsibility for
the dethronement of the King. They were Republicans, not so much from
principle, as because a Republic, and a Republic controlled by themselves, was
the only form of government in which their lives would be safe.
Amongst the
Girondins sat nearly all the Brissotins of the Legislative ; Condorcet,
Gensonne, Guadet, Brissot, Vergniaud, and Isnard being the most prominent.
These men had before August 10 been divided on the question of a Republic.
Vergniaud, Guadet, and Gensonne, in particular, had not desired the fall of the
throne, and had in fact made secret advances to the Court after June 20; but
there had always been among them a small band of determined Republicans
centring in the salon of Madame Roland; and these were now recruited by the
advent of a number of young and hot-headed deputies, the most conspicuous of
whom were Buzot, Louvet, Rebecqui, and Barbaroux.
The Plain,
which constituted the large majority of the Convention, contained many notable
men, Gregoire, Sieyes, Larevelliere-Lepeaux, Letoumeur, Treilhard, Camus,
Merlin of Douai, Boissy d’Anglas, and Barras; worthy of special mention is
Cambon, who for two years was to control the finances of Fiance; but the
typical man of the Plain was Barere, who by his vivid imagination, fluent
tongue, and constant readiness to speak, combined with his dexterity in
concealing his motives, in choosing phrases of double meaning, and in
explaining away his own words without apparent inconsistency, acquired a most
sinister influence over his colleagues. Drawn for the most part from the lower
middle and small professional classes, the men of the Plain were naturally
inclined at first to look for their lead to the Girondins rather than to the
Mountain, whose violence, and especially their participation in the recent
atrocities, horrified them; Lanjuinais’ phrase, “ Quand je mis arrive a Paris
fai fremi,” well expresses the attitude of the more respectable deputies of the
Plain.
250 Struggle between the Gironde and the
Mountain. [1792
Here,
then, lay the Girondins’ chance; if' they could turn this anti-anarchical
feeling against the faction, the future of France was in their hands. , .
During the
first days of the Convention nothing seemed more probable; the majority of the
deputies leant by predilection towards the Gironde. The first President and all
the Secretaries were Girondins; the Ministry, since Danton, having resigned on
September 29 in order to take his seat in the Convention, had been replaced by
Garat, was strongly Girondin, and was dominated by Roland, who, though
obstinate and pedantic, was not without traces of that courage of which he continually
boasted. There were at least 5000 regular troops in Paris at the disposal of
the government. A strong revulsion of feeling against the excesses of August
and September was evident, not only in the Provinces but in the capital itself,
where some even of the more revolutionary Sections petitioned against the
continued tyranny of the illegal municipality. The cards therefore seemed to be
all in the hands of the Gironde; the question was, would they have the courage
to lead them P
The very
first decree of the Convention showed that the Girondins had decided to disavow
their monarchical leaning, and to outbid their Republican rivals in order to
secure control of the government; for on September 21 all parties united in a
decree abolishing the Monarchy in France.
The ground
was now dear for the struggle of the Gironde against the Mountain and the
Commune. The Gironde, who had prepared the Revolution, were not inclined to
allow their rivals who had executed it to reap all the fruits. Their first blow
was delivered through the medium of a report of the Minister of the Interior on
the condition of France (August 23). Into this report Roland introduced covert
allusions to the massacres and the evil influence of the Commune, even hinting
that the attitude of Paris was becoming injurious to the Revolution. There
followed eight days of personal recrimination, during which Robespierre was
categorically accused by Rebecqui and Barbaroux of aspiring to a
dictatorship—sufficient proof of the outspokenness of his opponents. After
this, issue was joined on the question of the misdeeds of the ComiU de
Surveillance of the Commune. So fierce was the outcry against this body, and so
shaken were the Montagnards by the courage of their opponents, that the ConseU
General of the Commune on September 29 was fain to cut its committee adrift,
and even consented to allow the approaching elections for the renewal of half
the members of the Commune itself to be ante-dated.
The Girondins
now fell into the blunder, which was always to dog their footsteps, of
sacrificing vigour of action to violence of invective. They seem to have taken
fright at their own temerity, and, instead of breaking the Comite de
Surveillance at once, contented themselves with
tamely
demanding its accounts. Marat cleverly threw odium on Roland by suggesting that
his accounts also might not be the worse for a little auditing; and the attack
on the Committee died tamely away.
Very similar
was the conduct of the Gironde in their treatment of another matter of
importance which came up on September 24. On that day a letter from Roland
announced a renewal of atrocities in Chalons-sur-Mame; this news provoked a
succession of outspoken protests from Kersaint, Vergniaud, and Lanjuinais; but
it was Buzot who proposed the formation of a Committee of Six to report on the
condition of the country and the capital, to draw up a law against instigators
of murder, and to propose steps for the provision of a Garde Departementale to
protect the Convention. This Committee, reporting on October 8, recommended the
summoning of 4470 guards from the Departments for the purpose indicated. The
report was the object of a general attack in the Radical press, especially in
the organs of Robespierre, Prudhomme, and Marat; it also provoked a great
outcry in the Jacobin Club, and was instrumental in getting Brissot expelled—an
incident which definitely marks the secession of the Girondins from the Jacobin
party. Finally on October 19, the Sections, at the instigation of Chaumette,
Vice-President of the Conseil General of the Commune, presented an insolent
peti ' ion to the Assembly, denouncing the formation of the Garde as an insult
to Paris. Gensonne replied in brave words that the Assembly could only receive
orders from the people of France; but once more timidity of action followed on
temerity of speech, and the Girondins themselves hastened to shelve the very
measure which they had proposed with such parade of courage.
More
successful was their struggle against the camp which had been established after
August 10 in the northern suburbs of Paris. This camp had been designed, not
only as a training ground for volunteers, but as a fortification for the
defence of the capital, to which every patriot might contribute his labour.
During the month of August it had been the fashion for men and women to go and
dig on the ramparts, but in September the enthusiasm had died down; all the
serious volunteers had gone to the front, so that the camp was no longer
necessary ; and after Valmy the immediate need for fortifications had
disappeared. But the camp was useful to the Commune; accordingly a daily wage
was awarded to every idle rascal who would consent to make pretence of working
with a spade, with the result that innumerable loafers both from Paris and from
the neighbouring country flocked th ther; and the camp became a splendid
recruiting-ground for the forces of disorder. The Convention now boldly
demanded the imposition of piece-work, a system that strikes a loafer in his
tenderest place; and when, after a long wrangle, this innovation was decreed, the
camp was doomed, and on November 3 the works ceased.
But the
greatest triumph of the Convention over the Commune was
in the
elections for a new Mayor, which took place between October 4 and November 30.
These votings are most interesting, both as the last victory of the Moderates
before July, 1794, and also as a further proof of the utter indifference, or
utter cowardice, of the voters of Paris and of the true numerical weakness of
the faction. Of the 160,000 voters in the city not more than one-tenth was
attracted to any one of the numerous elections which now took place. It is
hardly possible that many of the absentees can have been men of extreme views;
all such were carefully gathered to the polls, as the faction was now fighting
with its back to the wall. Yet, not only was the faction consistently
unsuccessful at each of the elections, but the sum-total of its poll never rose
over 5000. After Petion had been elected and had refused, no less a person than
d’Ormesson, an ex - Controleur-General of the ancien rigiine,y/as elected by a
majority of some 500 over Lhuillier, the Jacobin candidate. When he also
refused, Chambon, a physician of the Sal- petriere, a Moderate almost of the
Bailly type, was chosen by 8358 votes to 3900. It was most unfortunate that the
Moderates were unable to keep their poll up to this level in the elections to
the Conseil General of the Commune, which commenced on December 2. It was the
usual story; respectable men were too busy to spare the time for prolonged
elections. On this occasion not one in twenty voters came to the poll, with the
result that, although it had a Moderate Mayor, the new Commune was as much in
the hands of the faction as the old. Twenty- eight only of the members of the
old Commune were reelected, but these included all the ringleaders. Chaumette
and Hubert, who had led the insurrectionary Commune after the translation of
Robespierre and Billaud- Varennes to the Convention, were made respectively
Procwreur and Procureur Substitut; the new blood was if possible more ruffianly
than the old, and thus the renovation of the Commune brought no profit to the
Moderates; rather, by legalising what had been illegal, it left them worse off
than before.
Still,
although there were plentiful signs of growing weakness in the Girondin party,
it had managed to get through the first month with a fair degree of success.
One very important access of strength it received in the shape of a new band of
federes from Marseilles, who this time were to be on the side of order. On
October 21 a deputation, introduced by Barbaroux, expressed the attachment of
these Marseillais to the Gironde. But here again opportunities were not
utilised; and instead of organising the new arrivals the Gironde allowed the
Jacobins to tamper with them, and thus carelessly threw away what might have
been a great access of strength.
Meanwhile,
although their actions were vacillating, the oratorical courage of the
Girondins seemed only to increase. The personal attacks on the formidable
leaders of the Mountain grew daily more virulent, and culminated on October 29
in a great denunciation of Robespierre.
1792] Louvet’s accusation.— Weakness of the
Gironde. 253
Louvet, the
author of this attack, was a new acquisition to the party; he had entered the
Convention as a novice to politics, and had allied himself with the Rolands. He
now seized the opportunity of a report of the Minister of the Interior on “the
state of the capital since August 10,” to bring grave and specific charges
against Robespierre, reviving in his rhetorical attack all the accusations that
had been brought against the demagogue by Rebecqui and Barbarous on September
25. Louvet’s action, though not without courage, only served to display the
inherent weakness of his party. The Girondins were without leaders and
organisation, and the younger members of the party, being uncontrolled,
continually broke away and ran riot. This was what now occurred. Louvet’s
attack took his party by surprise, with the result that, instead of the charges
being pressed home at once, five days were allowed for the preparation of the
defence. In this interval Robespierre was able to mould in his own favour such
public opinion as existed; and, when on November 5 he read his reply, the
galleries were packed with his adherents and he had little difficulty in
refuting Louvet’s charges. It was a serious reverse for the Gironde, and the
first clear indication that the future was not theirs but the Mountain’s. They
had shown their inability either to attack or to resist their opponents with
anything save words; and it now only remained to be seen how far their
opponents would be able to carry them whither they would not.
If we ask bow
it was that the Girondins failed when all seemed so much in their favour, the
answer is fourfold. In the first place they lacked moral force. They had played
all along for their own hand. Posing -as men of principle they were in reality
swayed only by overpowering ambition. Without any general conviction in favour
of a Republic they had exposed the monarchy to attack, simply in order to
recover power for themselves. To effect this selfish end, they had not scrupled
to arouse anarchic forces which they both disliked and knew to be immoral. The
violence of these forces had carried them beyond the limits of their original
designs; and they were now to find that they must either march with their
anarchical allies or surrender the government to them. They were in fact no
longer able to control the forces which they had set in motion; moreover, by
their employment of these forces they had violated their own political
conscience and so undermined their political position.
In the second
place the Girondins lacked cohesion, were indeed entirely without the
organisation of a party. They had many prominent, even preeminent men, but no
leader; and what the unconvinced Plain required was a definite lead. The
eloquence of Vergniaud, the erudition of Condorcet, the biting sarcasms of
Guadet, the cold irony of Gensonne, the reckless courage of Louvet, the
complacent self-confidence of Brissot, and the shallow superiority of the
Rolands, did not compensate for want of political capacity, not to say
statesmanship; and time after
time in the
autumn of 1792 these men foiled one another for want of proper discipline and
control.
In the third
place the Gironde had little popular support in the country, none at all in
Paris. What the majority of Frenchmen desired was a return to moderation; and
such a return was hardly to be expected from men so long identified with a
policy of violence. Most men therefore favoured neither party and were content
to watch the internecine itrugglt with no more than the languid interest of
spectators, rightly regarding the Girondins as even more responsible than the
Montagnards for the overthrow of all that, politically speaking, they held most
precious.
Lacking moral
force, lacking leadership, and lacking popular support, the Girondins also
lacked a common policy. Violence and anarchy having served their turn, they
certainly now desired a return to order, to security for life and property, and
to legal and civilised methods of government; but they had no common plan for
translating these wishes into facts, and above all no determination to force
through the necessary measures. We have seen how the Garde Departementale was
decreed and the decree never carried out; how the fedkris, who had at first
favoured the Gironde, were allowed to fall away and become the servants of the
Montagnards; how the trial of the September criminals was constantly threatened
and as constantly postponed; how men were denounced only to be exonerated, and
accusations raised only to be dropped. We are now to see the Girondins vote the
King’s death against their will, thereby alienpting for ever all moderate
opinion both at home and abroad; and we shall watch them forge one by one the
instruments by which they were themselves to fall, and by which their rivals
were to be established in power.
With quick
discernment the Mountain had seen that the question of the King’s life was the
key to the position. There was no real urgency in the matter; but, rather than
incur a suspicion of Royalism, every politician could be made to vote urgency.
If the Gironde were brave enough, when the matter came up for discussion, to
avow their real feelings and protect Louis, the Mountain would be able to
attack them for Royalist leanings; if on the other hand they could frighten the
Gironde into acquiescence, and so compel them to share the stigma of regicide,
they would finally isolate their opponents from the support of moderate France,
while at the same time they would create a European crisis demanding a strong
and unscrupulous government, which the Mountain could provide, but the Gironde
could not. Calculating on the cowardice of their opponents, the Montagnards
entrusted to them the preliminary investigations into the charges against
Louis; and a Girondist Committee was appointed to examine the Royal papers
seized on August 10; the most important of which were those of the officials of
the Civil List. The report of this Committee was introduced by Valaze on
November 3, and was marked by that total disregard of justice
which was to
characterise every stage of the proceedings. Among other reckless charges, for
instance, Louis was accused of accaparement, that is of buying up grain, sugar,
coffee, etc., in order to create famine. Three days later Mailhe presented the
report of the Committee of Legislation in which the legality of the trial was
discussed. It had been a difficult task for the Committee to find legal
justification for the proceedings. It was patent that Louis was doubly cleared
from all crimes committed before 1791 by the amnesty of that year as well as by
the doctrine of responsibility of ministers; while from those committed after
his acceptance of the Constitution, he was. exonerated by the inviolability
which that Constitution guaranteed him. Over and above this, for bearing arms
against France, the one “ crime ” of which by a stretch of terms Louis might be
considered guilty, the allotted penalty was deposition; and this he had already
suffered. Thus both as an act of justice and as a constitutional act the trial
fell to the ground at once.
With
plausible sophistry therefore the report of Mailhe argued that the matter was
one of State necessity, and that the nation being sovereign could override its
own Constitution. Louis must consequently be tried by the nation; and, as the
Convention was the nation’s fully accredited representative, it was the only
possible tribunal. The debates which arose out of this report showed the
attitude of parties. They were envenomed by insinuations of Royalism on one
side and of “ Orleanism ” on the other, with the result that neither party
dared to support Louis, and that many of those who at heart wished to save him
were terrified into denouncing him. Of all the prominent politicians Lanjuinais
alone lifted his voice, as he lifted it in all righteous causes, against the
specious arguments of Mailhe’s report; but Lanjuinais was not a Girondin but a
non-party man, and, what the Girondins have so often been wrongly deemed, a
true lover of freedom and justice. Honourably associated with him were
Fauchet, constitutional Bishop of Calvados, and Morisson, a Vendeen deputy. The
chief exponents of the opposite view were Saint-Just, a young deputy who was at
present a mere satellite of Robespierre but who afterwards became his
right-hand man, and Robespierre himself. Their attitude was entirely logical;
and Robespierre’s speeches of November 30 and December 3 were, compared with
the shifty and illogical reasoning of the Girondins, both cogent and
consistent. The Convention were not judges, he said, nor was Louis
accused; Louis was condemned on August 10; “ Le proces du tyram c'est
Pinsurrection, son jugement c'est la chute de sa puissance, sa peine celle
qu'eocige la liberie du peuple.” If it was a mere matter of policy—and
it seemed that it was so because on grounds of justice the proceedings could
not be defended—then there was no need for a trial. “ Louis doit mourir parce qu'il faut que la patrie vive.'” Pressing
his arguments to their logical conclusion, Robespierre demanded that sentence
should be immediately passed without the formality of a trial. Louis must
simply
be killed as
a matter of political expediency. The Convention indeed had no power to try
him.
Meanwhile in
the middle of these debates a sensational incident of some importance occurred.
On November 20 Roland entered the hall and deposited on the bureau some bundles
of papers. These, he said, were the contents of an iron press discovered that
veiy morning in the Tuileries; a cursory inspection had shown him that they
incriminated many members of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies. This
announcement threw the Convention into the utmost agitation; so many of its
members had either touched Court gold or had offered to do so, that few felt
safe. Roland was at once accused of tampering with the papers for his own
benefit and that of his friends; but the main result of the incident was that
men became eager to discount by the violence of their present republicanism the
impending revelations of their past venality. Thus the discover} of the iron
press became an important factor in sealing the fate of the King.
For all this,
the majority of the Assembly shrank from adopting the revolting, if consistent,
policy advocated by Robespierre and Saint-Just; and on December 3 it was
decreed that Louis should be tried by the Convention. A Committee of Twenty-one
was entrusted with the preparation of the counts of accusation.
The Gironde
took advantage of the ensuing delay to propose a “scrutin epuratoire ” of the
Convention, by which the name of every deputy would be referred to his
constituents in the primary assemblies. This would have been tantamount to an
appeal to the people and was a deliberate attempt to avoid the responsibility
of trying the King; but the weakness of the Gironde was by this time chronic,
and, on some protests arising, Guadet withdrew the motion. On December 10
Robert Lindet reported for the Committee of Twenty-one; and on the following
day the King was brought to the bar to hear the counts of his indictment.
From the date
of his confinement in the Temple Louis had been subjected to every form of
hardship and degradation, but had retained the calmness, forbearance, and
devoutness, which were always his strongest characteristics. To be suddenly
confronted, amidst every circumstance of contumely and insult, with a list of
charges which, since he had received no copy of the indictment, came to him as
a complete surprise, placed the King in a predicament with which his slow wits
and unready tongue were little fitted to cope. He made no attempt to question
the legality of his trial, and to most of the charges was content to give a
simple denial. Chief among the counts of the indictment were : (1) complicity
in Bouille’s so-called “ plots against the nation,” (2) payment of wages to
emigrated body-guards, (3) favouring of and payment of money to bnigris, (4)
buying up of corn and other monopolies, i.e. accaparement, (5) breach of his
oath by attempting to reverse the Constitution. After denying these charges and
expressing ignorance of all the papers save
1792] The decrees of November 19 and December 15.
257
one in the
iron press, the King asked for counsel to defend him, and, on this request
being grudgingly granted, selected Target and Tronchet. The former declined,
but Malesherbes was appointed at his own request; and he and Tronchet, aided by
a younger advocate named Deseze, undertook the King’s defence.
In the
interval allowed for its preparation two skirmishes took place between the
Mountain and the Gironde. On December 14 an attempt was made to regulate
entrance to the galleries by insisting on the production of tickets. Later
events showed that the adoption of this measure might have altered the result
of the trial; but once more the courage of the Girondins oozed away, and the
motion was tamely withdrawn. On the 16th a further quarrel arose over the
motion of Buzot for the expulsion of all the Bourbons from France. This measure
was expressly directed against Orleans, but once again the Girondins retreated
and fatuously agreed to exempt the very man whom the measure had been designed
to strike.
One other
decree of the: first importance, marking as it does a new departure
in revolutionary politics, falls within this period. On November 19 the
Convention had offered its protection to all nations struggling for freedom;
but they had very soon found that with a depleted treasury it was impossible to
undertake this mission gratuitously. Hence, on the report of Cambon, who had by
this time become the trusted financial adviser of the Convention, it was
decreed that the expenses of the wars of liberation should be transferred to
the shoulders of the liberated countries. France thus ceased to be the
volunteer, and became the mercenary of the cause of “ freedom.” But the decree
of December 15 went further than this; it made “ liberty ” compulsory, and
imposed the revolutionary nostrums of France on all the liberated countries. “Malheur au pewplesaid the report of Cambon, “gui essaiera de
s'affranchir s'il ne rompe au mime instant toutes les chcanes.” This
decree was the manifesto of the war of conquest; and the “ liberty ” which it
heralded was in fact an unmitigated tyranny.
But now on
December 26 the hour arrived for the King’s second appearance at the bar; and
at 9 a.m., escorted by Santerre, Commandant of the National Guard, he entered
the hall. Deseze at once commenced his speech for the defence. One by one the
advocate refuted the charges against Louis, and then boldly accused the
Convention of injustice and of prejudging the case. “ I look round,” he said, “
for judges and I find accusers”; “you take away from Louis not only his
prerogative as a King, but his rights as a citizen.” There followed an eloquent
appeal to the judgment of posterity. “ History will judge your judgment, and
hers will be the verdict of generations to come.” On the conclusion of his
counsel’s address the King withdrew; and the Mountain cried out for immediate
sentence of death. Lanjuinais with admirable sang-froid denounced the iniquity
of such a proceeding, even
entreating
the Assembly to reconsider its determination to sit in judgment, since so many
of them were personal enemies of the accused. “ I and my friends,” he added, “
prefer to die rather than to condemn to death in violation of the law even the
most abominable tyrant.” Unfortunately, though Lanjuinais himself may certainly
have preferred death to dishonour, he was wrong in thinking that his friends
shared either his conscience or his courage.
After this
the Convention gave itself over to a prolonged tumult, during which the fierce
outcry for instant sentence was broken at rare intervals by protests from the
few deputies who, in face of the threats of the Mountain and the clamour of the
galleries, had any courage left. On December 28 Robespierre, in a speech which
has been described as both smelling of oil and reeking of blood, returned to
the theory of the salut public, denouncing the proposal that there should be a
referendum, or appeal to the people, as the “rally-cry of royalism,” and
avowing, candidly enough, that it would mean the downfall of the Republic. On
the other side Vergniaud eloquently urged the appeal to the people, and was
supported by Brissot and Gensonne, of whom the former pleaded the disastrous
effects on foreign relations of a precipitate sentence, and the latter made a
bitter and satirical attack on Robespierre.
Up to this
point there was nothing to indicate what would be the result of the division on
this vital question of a referendum. On the whole it seemed probable that, in
spite of the publicity of the voting, the violence of the spectators, and the
agitation of the Assembly, the humanity and sense of justice of the majority
would yet assert themselves. It was at this juncture that Barere rose, on
January 3, to express the feeling of the Centre. In addition to his power,
already noted, of seeing both sides of a question, Barere had an infallible
intuition as to which way the wind was blowing, and an ingrained desire to sail
with it. His facile and persuasive eloquence enabled him to gloss over the
brutal violences of the Mountain with subtle and refined arguments appealing to
the more fastidious taste of the Plain. Identifying himself with the Moderates
by contemptuous references to Robespierre and Marat, he now proceeded to
justify the policy of the very men whom he seemed to be denouncing, and by a
totally different line of argument arrived at their conclusion, to wit, that
the condemnation of Louis was not a matter of justice, but a great measure of
public safety.
Barere’s
speech closed the debate. It left the Convention with three questions to
decide: first, was Louis guilty: secondly, if guilty, what should be his
punishment: and thirdly, should there be an appeal to the people. It was of the
utmost importance to all who did not desire the King’s death that the last of
these three questions should be taken first; and, when the Girondins, yielding
to the clamour of the galleries and to further specious arguments from Barere,
agreed to take the question of guilt first, they went far to settle the fate of
Louis.
Of the result
of this first vote there could be no doubt. The Girondins had from the outset
made up their minds that they could not openly declare a belief in the King’s
innocence; while the Plain was in its usual plastic condition, and would follow
the winning side. Meanwhile the Montagnards were not idle. They had found a
useful ally in Pache, who in October had succeeded Servan as War Minister.
Pache had been a prottgi of Roland, by whose influence he had obtained the
portfolio. No sooner, however, was he established in power than he deserted his
patron and allied himself with the Mountain. Thenceforward, at a time when an
efficient War Office was of the most vital importance, he was far more occupied
in playing the game of the Jacobins in Paris than in organising or caring for
the armies at the front. It was indeed to protest against the inefficiency of
Pache, as well as against the decree of December 15 and inter alia to save the
King, that Dumouriez on January 6 arrived in Paris. He remained there until the
26th without being able to get a hearing; and when he returned to his army he
had lost his popularity and prestige, and from that time ceased to be a factor
in the Revolution.
Through the
influence of Pache the Jacobins were now able to get the regular troops removed
from Paris; and at the same time they made attempts to gain over the fedtres,
while by dark threats of further massacres the capital was once more reduced to
a state of terror. The result was that of the 739 deputies, the large majority
of whom certainly believed the King to be innocent, not one—not even
Lanjuinais—could be found to say so in the tribune. The acme of courage was
abstention, and only five deputies reached this pitch of valour. It should be
noted that the simple voting of guilty or not guilty on the 34 charges en bloc
was contrary to the principles of the Criminal Code of September 16-29,
1791, which had insisted on each charge being
separately put to the jury. Amongst all the lawyers of the Convention not one
was found to demand the observance of the forms of justice established by the
Constituent.
Issue was
now, joined on the question of the referendum. With characteristic cowardice
the Girondins had chosen this as the ground for their battle, for it would both
save them from accusations of Royalism, and at the same time relieve them from
the responsibility of pronouncing sentence. To the Jacobins on the other hand
the referendum, was even more distasteful than absolute acquittal. Any appeal
to the people would, as they knew, and even had the candour to acknowledge, be
the signal for their overthrow. The result of the vote, announced at
10 p.m. on January 15 by Vergniaud, who was in
the chair, was disastrous. Only 284 of the 717 members present voted for, and
424 voted against it; the want of unity and leadership in the Gironde had once
more shown itself. Of the 60 most prominent Girondins, thirteen, including
Condorcet, Ducos, and Boyer-Fonfrede, had voted against the
motion; and
this internal division in the party had undermined their influence over the
Plain.
Meanwhile, in
view of the approaching vote on the penalty, the Mountain had been busy; and a
determined effort had been made to foment disturbances in the capital. Once
more the1 Sectional Assemblies became the centres of disorder.
Inflammatory petitions poured in to the Assembly; incendiary mobs surrounded
the barriers and the prisons; 132 pieces of cannon were handed over by Pache to
Santerre. The Mayor himself complained to the Assembly of the dangerous
condition of Paris, and pleaded that the armed force should be put under the
control of the Conseil eocecutif. Thus the Moderates of the Convention were
made to feel not only that they were surrounded in the Convention by hostile
and dangerous crowds, but that outside all was prepare^ for another emeute,
even for another September, should-the voling on the final question not commend
itself to the Mountain.
Undismayed by
these threats Lanjuinais moved that a two-thirds majority should be necessary
to carry the death-penalty. Danton, newly returned from the front, marked his
reappearance by securing the rejection of this proposal. The voting on the
supreme question then began and continued for thirty-seven consecutive hours
amidst circumstances of unparalleled disorder. An attempted intervention by
the Spanish ambassador—the second he had made during the trial—was swept aside;
and at last the result was proclaimed. Of 749 members, 28 were absent; 321 had
voted for penalties other than death, mostly for imprisonment, but two, of whom
one was Condorcet, for the galleys; 26 in voting death had demanded a debate on
the postponement of the sentence; 13 had made postponement a condition of their
vote for death; and 361, that is an absolute majority of 1, had voted for
death.
In view of
the narrowness of this majority, the Moderates were encouraged to take a further
vote on the question of a respite; and on January 19, on the proposal of Buzot,
the Convention embarked on its fourth and last a/ppel nominal. But by this time
the Gironde was thoroughly demoralised, and the leader of the opposition to
Buzot’s motion was the Girondin Barbaroux. Thus the respite, although Buzot,
Brissot, Louvet, Valaze and Biroteau voted in favour of it, was defeated by 380
votes to 310, not however before Manuel had, with conspicuous courage,
tendered his resignation on the ground that he had been assaulted within the
Assembly in consequence of his vote. When we remember that Manuel, as Procureur
of the Commune, had actually been present in the prisons during the September
massacres, it is certainly surprising to find him courting death in a
courageous attempt to save the King. He eventually lost his head for refusing
to give evidence against the Queen, and his conduct indicates a strange
alternation of violence and compunction.
The motion
for respite having been lost, the execution was now fixed
for the
following day. The King was granted a confessor; and the Assembly voted that
the French nation should take his family into their care—a decision which
probably disturbed the King far more than his own approaching end. Louis had
indeed long given himself up for lost, and met the announcement of his sentence
with composure. After a painful farewell with his family, he spent the
remainder of his time with his confessor, the Abbe Edgeworth. On the morning of
the 21st he was driven in the company of Santerre and Garat to the Place de la
Revolution. Although there were rumours of plots to save him, one in particular
organised by the Baron de Batz, and although the attitude of the crowd was on
the whole sympathetic, the Jacobins managed everything so well that no incident
occurred. Louis’ behaviour on the scaffold was marked by perfect composure and
piety. His attempt to address the crowd was cut short by the roll of drums. At
10.20 a.m. on January 21, 1793, his head was held up to the crowd by Sanson the
executioner; and another epoch of the Revolution was over.
Responsibility
for the fatal result of the King’s trial must be distributed between the
Mountain, the Plain, and the Gironde. Of these the attitude of the first was
the most logical as it was the least cowardly; the Mountain avowedly desired
the King’s death as a measure of political expediency; that they identified the
safety of the body politic with their own continuance in power need provoke no
surprise; they were honestly and openly in favour of instant death.
Far other was
the position of the Gironde. At the beginning of the trial it is probable that
not a single Girondin either desired or anticipated the King’s death; but they
had once more determined to sacrifice principle in order to secure popularity.
They could not see that the time had now come when the chasm between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariate could no longer be concealed; nor had they
perhaps sufficient political acumen to see that by their condonation of the
Jacobin policy they really stood to lose and not to gain popularity. It cannot
be denied that the power to save the King had lain in the hands of the Gironde
; they still predominated in the Convention—witness the continued presence of
their candidates in the chair and at the secretarial bureau, witness also the
Girondist tone of the various committees. But they had long lost the power to
use their majority ; and during the trial their faults of character worked upon
their faults of discipline and organisation, as the division lists prove. It is
difficult to characterise the votes of some of the Girondins (e.g. those
against death, but also against respite) as anything but the doubling of hunted
animals; but the considerable amount of cross-voting, which not only destroyed
the consistency of the Gironde, but also undermined the confidence of the
Plain, shows, in addition to cowardice, a radical want of party discipline.
As to the
Plain, the individual members revolted from the idea of so needless a crime and
looked appealingly to the Gironde for leadership.
But, as we
have seen, all the lead they got was from Barere. He, no doubt, if he had been
satisfied that the Gironde would vote solid, would have declared himself for
them; but his unfailing sagacity had shown him that the Gironde was not a
winning party; he foresaw the victory of the Mountain; and it was not in his
character to put himself into opposition to any party which was likely to come
into power, least of all to a party so well armed and so unscrupulous as the
Mountain. Barere knew that the success of the Mountain would be the signal for
a general proscription of their opponents ; and, whoever was to be proscribed,
he was determined to be safe. The cunning with which he carried the votes of
the Plain to the side of the Mountain has already been noticed. If the Mountain
is convicted of brutality and the Gironde of selfish cowardice, the Plain
cannot be absolved from the accusation of both weakness and criminal
opportunism.
The tragic
events which have just been narrated did not at once affect the balance of
parties. The death of Louis had certainly been a victory for the Jacobins; but
it remained to be seen whether they would be able to reap its fruits. As to the
Girondins, their attitude during the trial had destroyed their cohesion within
the Assembly and their influence without; but they were still, just as the
Feuillants had been up to the very end of the Legislative, in command of a
majority in the Convention; and outside, in spite of their loss of prestige, a
firm stand for the maintenance of order and property would have ensured to them
the support of a Moderate majority, even in Paris itself. During the early
months of 1793 indeed the Moderates were greatly in the ascendant in the
capital; and there was still a considerable force of federes in the city. The
anarchical policy of the Jacobins and the brutality of Marat and Hebert had
alienated the great bourgeois class. In fact, by this time everyone who had any
property was a Moderate. In spite, therefore, of their discomfiture over the
King’s trial, the prospects of the Girondins in the spring of 1793 seemed by no
means black ; what they lacked was not supporters, but the power to organise
their supporters and the active courage to strike down their adversaries with
the weapons which they undoubtedly held. Their opponents, however, were not
without arms of their own for the coming struggle. Within the Convention
itself they had the potent influence of the galleries and the fear inspired by
the murderous record of Marat; while in Paris the two great clubs, Cordeliers
and Jacobins, were theirs, and the Commune, and with it the National Guard,
were subject to their influence.
Confronted
with a life and death struggle at home, the Girondins had to meet an insreasingly
alarming situation on the frontiers. The death of Louis was the signal for war
with England, Holland, and Spain. It also heralded a general repulse of French
arms at all the seats of war. For guidance in this double crisis the Gironde
had to rely on the weakest Ministry, that had held office since 1789. The War
Office
passed on
February 8 from the incapable and dishonest hands of Pache into those of
Beumonville, equally incapable, though more honest. Roland resigned on January
23; and his departure took away such backbone as the Ministry possessed, and
implied the abandonment by the Girondins of the idea of governing through a
ministry at all. Roland’s successor, Garat, was of all men the most incapable;
a man of letters not of affairs, of theory not of practice, he was content to
contemplate events which he was intended to control. It was a culminating misfortune
for the Gironde that at this critical juncture in their fortunes authority in
the capital should have fallen into such hands. Lebrun, at the Foreign. Office,
brought a certain amount of reason and intelligence to the conduct of foreign
affairs ; but Claviere was anything but a sound finance minister. The fact was
that, with the passing of Danton and Roland from the Ministry, the disastrous
effects of the exclusion of deputies from the Cabinet again came to light; and
the Convention returned to the experiment of a Central Committee to coordinate
the work of the numerous special Committees, and to assist—not yet to
override—Ministers. Such a Committee had already several times been constituted
during the many periods when weak Ministers had held office, but had each time
disappeared as soon as the Ministry received any renewal of strength. Thus a
Committee of Twelve had been appointed on March 9, 1792, at the moment of
Narbonne’s resignation, but had effaced itself before the Brissotin Ministry,
which came into office a few days later, only to be reorganised on June 18 as
the Committee of Twenty-one, after the fall of that Ministry on June 12. Each increase
of members having increased its Jacobinism, the Committee had displayed great
activity during the August crisis. After August 10 its members were increased
to 25, but it had once more effaced itself before the Ministry of Danton; and
only now after Roland’s retirement did it become necessary to reorganise it
afresh. On January 4, 1793, it was renewed as the “ Comite de Defense Generale?
Numbering as it did twenty-five members, it was very unwieldy; and, as it was
open to all deputies to speak, though not to vote, at the debates, it fell into
a condition of weakness and disorder.
It now became
a question whether the Gironde would be able to find other resources with which
to face its enemies at home and the Allies on the frontier. Aid seemed likely to
come from one most efficient quarter. Danton, during the critical months of the
previous autumn, had given proof of his superlative force and ability as an
administrator ; since that time he had been gaining experience on missions to
the armies. What he had seen of warfare, however, had given him food for
reflexion. It was he who had been largely responsible for giving to the war its
colossal scope, who had conjured up the dream of “ natural frontiers,” who had
thundered against all kings, and offered the fellowship of France to all
nations struggling for freedom. The promulgation of such grandiose
ideas had
probably been to him but a device for provoking enthusiasm. He was ever
unscrupulous of means, he was not a man of theories, and, if he had ever believed
in his own programme, he at any rate never felt bound by any rule of
consistency; with his eyes on the future, he was ever ready to break with the
past. Whether experience and contact with war really altered his views, or
whether his formulae had only been adopted to serve a temporary purpose, he was
now in the early days of 1793 convinced of the necessity for giving fixity to
the Revolution, and of the hopelessness of continuing a revolutionary crusade
against the Powers of Europe on the lines laid down by the decree of December
15,
1792. Determined on a policy of settlement at
home and alliances abroad, he began to look round for the nucleus of a new
party wherewith to carry out his designs. Both expediency and his own tastes
pointed to the Gironde. That party still held a majority in the Convention and
still, as compared with its rivals, might commend itself to the people of
France. Danton’s powerful personality might weld the party together, galvanise
the paralysed majority into life, and use it for the restoration of order at
home and the introduction of reason into foreign relations.
But the
Girondins, in addition to a certain conceited rigidity of temperament which
forbade their entering into relations with men who had once been opponents,
were quite unwilling to accept the domination of Danton, of whose masterful
character they had already had experience. They had been fighting all along for
power for themselves and were not prepared to hand that power, or any part of
it, to an outsider. Accordingly, when Danton offered his alliance, they drew
back from him with jealous suspicion. This rebuff threw Danton on his own
resources. Unscrupulous as he was, he must have shrunk from a fresh alliance
with the Jacobins. Yet what alternative was open to him ? Only by their aid
could he establish the strong government that he required. But his association
with the Mountain gave to that party just the access of strength which enabled
it to wrest from him the weapons of his own forging, to turn them to his destruction,
and set up the Terror which those weapons had been designed to prevent.
During the
month of February the lists were being cleared for the great struggle. The
Gironde fulminated against the Mountain, and the Mountain plotted against the
Gironde. It was not until the following month that the reverses to French arms
put a new and fruitful opportunity into the hands of the Jacobins. During
February they had to make as much capital as they could out of the cry of
famine. By means of the armed bands which were now organised on a permanent
footing under the directions of the notorious Maillard, and through the
Sectional Committees, aided also by Pache, who, on leaving the War Office, had
been elected Mayor of Paris, they raised a series of alarming bread riots and
got threatening petitions introduced into the Convention. By such means they
extorted from the public treasury large grants of
money,
ostensibly for the purpose of feeding the capital, and also created that outcry
for a maximum, or fixed price for bread and other necessaries, which afterwards
came to a head in April. The Convention, during these latter days of February,
was engaged on the report of its Constitutional Committee, which had been
presented by Condorcet on February 15. The Constitution proposed by the
Committee was Girondist in tone and closely modelled on the lines of the
Constitution of 1791; it did not commend itself to the Jacobins and was never
passed into law.
Meanwhile the
Commune and the Jacobin and Cordeliers’ Clubs were busily plotting the downfall
of their opponents; and in the early days of March an informal Committee of
Insurrection, which included such desperadoes as Collot, Guzman, Desfieux,
Proly, Lazowski, and possibly Tallien, began to meet at the Cafe Corazza. The
existence of this Committee seems to have been a matter of general knowledge;
but the authorities were too weak or too stupid to take any cognisance of it.
Events at the front played rapidly into the hands of the conspirators. On March
5 arrived the serious news that Aix-la-Chapelle had fallen, and that the siege
of Maastricht had been raised. From the west there came news even more
alarming. For some time past the retired country, immediately south of the
estuary of the Loire, had been much agitated by the course of the Revolution.
The affected area varied greatly in social and geographical character; its
geographical centre, the centre also of disaffection, was the large upland
region lying along both banks of the Sevre-Nantaise. This region, far from
being mountainous, can hardly even be called hilly, its highest point being no
more than 900 feet above sea-level. It spreads in pleasant but featureless
undulations over some 400,000 acres. A cattle-rearing district, divided into
innumerable small enclosures, tilled by small farmers holding for the most part
from resident landowners, it took its name of the Bocage as well from the
wealth of high hedgerows crowded with hedgerow timber which gave it the
appearance of a vast rolling woodland, as from the frequent small forests and
the impenetrable scrub with which the pasturage was interspersed. With a thick
population its towns were few and small; chief among them were Chatillon, Les
Herbiers, La Chataigneraie, Saint-Fulgent, Clisson, Tiffauges, and Montaigu.
Below and around
this irregular, pear-shaped, upland district lay a wider, flatter country,
where a larger and more elaborate tillage, including the cultivation of vines,
was practised, and whose inhabitants were more in touch with the rest of
France. This Plaine formed a complete circle round the Bocage, but the marches
between the two were extremely ill-defined.
Westward
between the Plaine and the Atlantic lay a district of yet another character, a
strange area of land reclaimed from the sea. This country was divided by a
wedge of the Plaine, which penetrated to the joast at Les Sables d’Olonne, into
two parts, one extending round the
mouth of the
Loire and the other round that of the Sevre-Nantaise. Fertile to a high degree,
the “Marais” was intersected by a network of ditches and canals so elaborate as
to make locomotion a fine art. and in winter impossible save in boats,
conditions which rendered military operations a matter of extreme difficulty.
By the
inhabitants of these retired districts the abolition of feudalism was greeted
with but slight enthusiasm, for their feudal relations with the resident
seigneurs left little to be desired. It would be untrue, however, to say that
there was any resistance to the changes. Active opposition was only provoked
when the Legislative Assembly commenced its persecution of the priests arid
bnigris. The measures against the clergy in particular provoked widespread
discontent amongst a people religious to the point of fanaticism; the downfall
of the throne enhanced the discontent; and after August 10 the malcontents were
provided with the double cry of “Church” and “Crown.” By the spring of 1793 the
whole countryside was on the verge of insurrection; and the decree of February
23, which imposed the ballot for the army on the whole of France, only set a
match to a train which had long been laid.
The
insurrection broke out simultaneously and spontaneously among the peasantry of
the Marais and those of the Bocage. Cathelineau, a poor hawker of woollen
goods, took the lead in the latter; and Gaston, a barber, in the
former—sufficient proof that the insurrection was not fomented by the
seigneurs; but no sooner had the peasants risen than they turned to their
seigneurs to lead them, and these nobly responded to the appeal. Charette, a
retired naval lieutenant and a resident proprietor in the Marais, assumed the
command in that district; Bonchamps, a seigneur residing ,iear Saint-Florent, a
man of extreme courage and military ability, and d’Elbee, a retired cavalry
officer, residing on his property near Beaupreau, became the organising spirits
of the insurrectionaries of the Bocage. With them were associated Cathelineau
and a gamekeeper named Stofflet; and they were soon joined by a whole host of
brave and devoted colleagues. No army perhaps before or since could boast of
more heroic leaders than this rabble of peasants which now set its face against
the full tide of the Revolution; to read the exploits of de Lescure, Henri de
La Rochejaquelein, Charette, Stofflet, Cathelineau, and Bonchamps, is to
understand, in part at any rate, the reasons for the success which attended the
insurrection.
At first the
rebels, opposed only by the raw levies from the surrounding districts and the
National Guards of the country towns, carried all before them; Les Herbiers,
Montaigu, Chantonnay, Cholet, and Vihiers all quickly fell into their hands;
and by the end of March, after a decisive victory at Graverau, which placed
Fonteriay, Lufon, and Niort, towns of the southern and western Plaine, at their
mercy, the insurgents were masters of all the towns of the Bocage, and had
even pushed
out into the Plaine; while in the Marais Challans and Noirmoutier were occupied
by Charette, whose victorious career was only checked by the obstinate
resistance of Les Sables d’Olonne.
The news of
this formidable rebellion was now beginning to reach Paris; coupled with the
news of disasters on the eastern frontier, it was indeed serious. Few but the
rawest troops were available for service in the west, and these preliminary successes
made the insurgents daily more formidable. The Republic, therefore, found
itself in the month of March in a most perilous position. France’s extremity
became once more the Jacobins’ opportunity, and they hastened to use for their
own ends the consternation which the news created; but their attempt to clear
Paris for fresh insurrections by getting the federes sent to the front was only
partially successful, and their demands for a Revolutionary Tribunal were
temporarily rejected.
On March 8
Danton and Lacroix arrived in Paris from their mission to the armies, and
hurried to the Assembly to report on the situation. Danton had returned from
the disorganised armies more convinced than ever of the necessity for
establishing a strong conciliatory government. By this time he almost despaired
of persuading the Gironde to cooperate with him; yet he gave them one more
chance, proposing on March 8 that the Ministry should be opened to members of
the Convention. The Gironde were foolish enough to reject this measure, which
would have allowed them to participate in the strong government; their pique
against Danton blinded them to their own welfare. On the same day Danton, while
courageously and characteristically defending Dumouriez and rightly blaming the
War Office for the failure of the French arms, set on foot measures for raising
volunteers in Paris by means of Commissioners sent by the Convention to every
Section. Patriotism thus satisfied, the Convention gave itself over to party
jealousies. The old September cry, “To the front, but leave no traitors
behind,” was renewed; but an attempt to rouse the Sections in favour of a new
Revolutionary Tribunal did not succeed. Undaunted, however, by this failure,
the Jacobin Club published on March 9 an incendiary manifesto with the object
of raising the mob against the Girondins in the Convention. But even this fell
flat. A mob, however, did collect; the War Minister and Petion were hustled,
and the Girondin printing-presses were broken up. Advantage was taken of the tumult
to secure the creation of a Tribunal Criminel extraordinaire. A useful
prototype existed in the Extraordinary Tribunal created on August 17, 1792,
which however had been suppressed on November 29, 1792; it was now revived and
a similar Tribunal was constituted on March 29, 1793, limited at first, as the
August Tribunal had been in scope, and controlled by a supervisory committee of
six Conventiormels. The Insurrectionary Committee now appealed to the
Cordeliers, and these gladly called upon the. authorities of Paris to arrest “
the traitorous Conventionnels ”; but
the Commune
held back, and the Girondins, warned perhaps by Danton, kept away from the
evening sitting, and a shower of rain, coinciding with the appearance of a body
of federes, dispersed the rioters. This conspiracy, known as the “Conjuration
du 9 Mars? had failed in its main object, but had established the first of the
great instruments which were to put all power into the hands of the
Jacobins—the Revolutionary Tribunal.
Events on the
frontier now once again supplied the necessary incentive. The outbreak of
revolt in the Vendee coincided with the defeat of Dumouriez at Neerwinden
(March 18); and at the same time the disaffection in Lyons, Marseilles^ and
Normandy came to a head. Neerwinden, and the news of the establishment of the
Revolutionary Tribunal, determined Dumouriez to turn his arms against the
Convention. He had for long been at variance with the government, and had on
March 12 addressed to them a letter of remonstrance couched in very threatening
terms. He now felt that, in the hands of the new Tribunal, this letter might
cost him his head. He thus stood committed to resistance to the new order of
things ; and, although Danton and Lacroix, who interviewed him on the day after
the battle, succeeded in extracting from him a semi-retractation of the letter,
they returned to Paris more than doubtful of his attitude. Their suspicions
were, indeed, not erroneous, for on March 23 Dumouriez entered into negotiations
with Coburg; and on March 27, in an interview with three Commissioners sent by
the Convention to revolutionise Holland, he denounced the Convention as “ 300
scoundrels and 400 imbeciles,” and declared his intention of starving out Paris
by blocking the rivers and stopping supplies.’ With these evidences of treason
the Commissioners hurried to Paris. Meanwhile the Comitt de Defense Gene rale
had thought it advisable not to reveal the contents of Dumouriez’ violent
letter, and Danton and Lacroix also concealed their suspicions of the general.
Paris, therefore, though agitated and suspicious, was ignorant of the true
gravity of the situation; and the publication of the letter in the Moniteur of
March 25 came like a thunderbolt to the city.
It was at
once seen that the existing government was unequal to the crisis; and increased
powers were given to the Comite de Defense G&nerale, which, however,
remained unwieldy in form, and, in spite of the inclusion of Danton and
Robespierre, Girondist in tone. It was thus not what Danton required; but, such
as it was, it commenced on March 25 to sit en permanence. The series of
calamities to French arms provoked the Jacobins to propose, and the Girondins
to submit to, a corresponding series of vigorous revolutionary measures, and
each military reverse had its prompt legislative echo. Thus the evacuation of
Aix heralded the establishment of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and the despatch
of Representants en mission to each Department, to
complete the
levy of 800,000 men. The outbreak of revolt in La Vendee (March 14) provoked
the outlawry of the rebels on the 19th, and the creation, on the 21st, of
Comitis de Surveillance in every Commune. The defeat of Neerwinden and the
defection of Dumouriez were responsible for the reorganisation of the ComiU de
Defense G&nerale, for the rescinding on April 1 of the law which guaranteed
the inviolability of deputies, for a law of the same date authorising
Commissioners of the Convention to arrest suspects, and for the creation on
April 4 of an army of sansculottes for home use.
During the
last days of March the ferment in Paris was considerable. On the 27th a fresh
Committee of Insurrection was formed, this time at the Arche veche, drawing its
members from the Sections and enjoying the official sanction of the Commune. On
the 80th a climax was reached on the arrival of the three Commissioners to whom
Dumouriez had been so candid; their news left no doubt of the general’s
treason, and men set their teeth to meet the emergency.
In the first
place the War Minister, Beumonville, with four other Commissioners, was
despatched to Dumouriez’ camp; and their arrival forced his hand. Failing to
carry the soldiers with him, he deserted to the Austrians on April 4.
Dumouriez’ coup d'etat had failed; but Paris was as yet ignorant of the result,
and Danton was using the agitation of the capital to secure the establishment
of the second item of the strong government which he required. Once again the
Gironde played into the hands of their opponents; instead of attempting to
govern through the Comite de Defense Genbah which they controlled, they were
themselves the fifst to clamour for its replacement by a Committee of nine.
Thus on April 6 was established the first Committee of Public Safety, with
powers to deliberate in secret and to override Ministers, and with 100,000
livres of secret service money for the month to which its operations were at
first restricted.
It is
difficult to see what benefit the Gironde hoped to derive from this measure,
yet Buzot alone of the Girondins resisted it. It is possible that they expected
to control the new Committee as they had controlled the old; if so they were
very soon undeceived, for no single Girondin found a seat on it. The successful
candidates were Barere, Delmas, Breard, Cambon, Danton, Guyton-Morveau,
Treilhard, Lacroix, and Robert Lindet, of whom Lacroix and Guyton-Morveau were
thoroughgoing Dantonists, while the remainder were compliant members of the
Centre. The Gironde had forgotten the supreme fact that Danton was now against
them. It was their own fault that it was so; Danton had made repeated
overtures, every one of which they had rejected. Finally on April 1 Lasource
had accused him of complicity with Dumouriez and of aspiring to a dictatorship.
Danton was thus driven into an alliance with the extremists, and to secure
their support was obliged to pander to their anarchic and predatoiy policy, to
which he was at heart opposed.
With his
support three items of this policy were quickly decreed— although in principle
only—the formation of an “ army of sansculottes,” the regulation of the price
of bread, and the progressive taxation of the rich. New powers were at the same
time granted to the Representants en mission, and the action of the Tribunal
Criminel extraordinair?, now called the Revolutionary Tribunal, was expedited
by the abolition of the Supervisory Committee, which had hitherto controlled
its actions, and the increase of the power of the Public Prosecutor. At the
same time the Commune was quite irregularly allowed to coopt a hundred new
members, which gave it a much needed demagogic reinforcement.
The strife of
parties now continued under fresh conditions. The Gironde was driven to try its
strength against the combined forces of Dantonists and extreme Jacobins. The
first effort of the latter was directed against the Provinces. For months the
Provinces had been held as a threat over their heads; ;and they had not spared
to retort on the Girondins a general charge of favouring the Provinces at the
expense of the capital, a charge which under the vague name of “ Federalism ”
was eventually to prove ruinous to the Gironde. There was so much truth in it,
that Buzot and the Rolands were notorious admirers of the American system of
federal government and had talked about it as an ideal even for France. At each
election also the Provinces had favoured the reactionaries; the Jacobins were
resolved that this should cease; and in the Representants en mission they held
an admirable device with which to bring it to an end.
The system of
missions of deputies, which had not been unknown in the Constituent and had
been extensively employed by the Legislative, especially after August 10, to
secure the establishment of the provisional government, had been greatly
extended by the Convention; and on March 9, 1793, Commissioners had been
appointed to go to every Department to promote the levy of 300,000 men which
had been decreed on February 23. The Commissioners on April 4 took the title of
Representants en mission. Great care was exercised in their choice, and they
went out with the double object of raising the recruits and of subjecting the
Provinces to the Jacobin domination. Needless to say it was to the latter
object that they gave most of their attention. Everywhere the most arbitrary
measures were enforced; the local Jacobin clubs were raised into legal
authorities and the proletariate invited to pillage; all this, be it noted, no
longer in the name of the Commune or the Jacobins, but in that of the
Convention itself. The result was that by the end of April all France, save
only Lyons, the Vendee, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Rouen, had not only provided
its quota of recruits, but had submitted to the domination of the Jacobins.
Seeing that
the war had been carried into their camp, the Girondins determined to
retaliate; and the absence on mission of so many of the
extremists
left them in an assured majority in the Convention. On April 8, 9, and 10, some
of the Sections had petitioned in favour of the purging of the Convention; and
Robespierre renewed accusations, which he had already made on April 3, that the
Girondins had conspired with Dumouriez to restore the monarchy. On the 10th and
12th Vergniaud and Guadet retaliated, charging their opponents in turn with
plotting an Orleanist restoration. Inspired by their own eloquence the
Girondists on April 13 proceeded to drag Marat before the Revolutionary
Tribunal for incendiary articles published in L'Jmi du Peuple. Marat’s friends
in the Sections replied by demanding on April 15 under the aegis of the Commune
the ostracism of twenty-two Girondist deputies. Neither blow went home; the
Sections’ proposal was rejected on April 20; and on April 24, Marat, whose
trial had been a mere farce, was acquitted. His accusation indeed had been a
blunder, for he was the least dangerous of the Girondins’ enemies, and his
trial only served to bring him a popularity which he had not before possessed.
The Jacobins
now set to work to establish the first of their new measures. The idea of
enforcing a uniform price, or maonmum as it was called, for bread and other
necessaries was not a new one; it had been hinted at by Saint-Just on November
20,1792, had been petitioned for by the Commune on April 18,1793, and had
already been decreed in principle. A practical uniformity in the price of bread
in Paris had been established by the Cornell executif in the previous
September, when, to enable Roland to keep the price at three sous a pound, the
Convention had voted a grant of 20,000,000 livres. Between that time and the
following May the Commune had spent on an average 12,000 livres a day in
keeping prices down. Now on May 3 the principle was extended, though still for
com only, to the whole of France. Each Department was to have its table of
prices, varying according to local conditions. This measure was as much a
weapon of terror as a concession to the predatory desires of the extremists,
and, combined with the prominence which accrued to Marat after his acquittal,
threw all owners of property, however small, into a state of anxiety and caused
a wave of reaction against the extremists. Added to this anxiety for the safety
of property there was a fear lest a new September should endanger men’s
personal safety, for the talk of “ leaving no aristocrat behind ” was again
revived during the recruiting for the Vendee, and the actions of the Commune
began suspiciously to resemble their actions prior to the massacres. On May 12
and 13 it decreed the formation of a “sans- culottic ” army to watch over
Paris, and entrusted the Mayor with the duty of disarming and arresting
suspects. At the same time a fresh Committee of Insurrection began to sit at
the Mairie, presided over by the police authorities and patronised by Pache
himself. On May 19 and 20 this Committee proposed the drawing up of lists of
suspects, and the ostracism of thirty-two Girondist deputies. It is probable
that
another
massacre was designed,. though possibly use would have been made of the
Revolutionary Tribunal.
Confronted
with a crisis so terrible and so imminent, the Girondins determined to take the
bull by the horns. The Convention must shake off at whatever cost the
domination of Paris and vindicate its own supremacy. They proposed therefore
the breaking of the authorities of Paris, and the assembling at Bourges of the
“suppliants'" of the Convention, who, to the number of 298, had been
elected in September, 1792, to fill vacancies in the deputations. Now, in the
event of the destruction of the Convention, its functions would, according to
the motion of Guadet, at once be taken up by the «uppleants thus assembled as a
kind of reserve Assembly. The Mountain was saved from a blow, which would have
been fatal, only by the interference of Barere, who persuaded the Gironde to be
content with the appointment of a Committee to investigate the recent acts of
the Sections and the Commune, and to protect the Convention from conspiracies.
This Commission de Douze was formed on May 18; it drew its members from the
lower ranks of the Gironde, the most prominent being Rabaut- Saint-^tienne.
With this
inadequate weapon the Gironde embarked on the final phase of its struggle with
the Mountain: the Committee, reporting on May 24, recommended the reopening of
the National Guard to Moderates and the appointment of a Moderate Commandant,
and suggested also the regulation of the Section Meetings, whose sittings
should not be prolonged after 10 p.m. The character of the advice thus given
shows how weak the Committee was; for it imposed no penalties and left the
control of the National Guard in the hands of the Commune, whereas the first
steps to the restoration of order and security should have been the complete
suppression of the Commune.
The Committee
however was not of a calibre to take so bold a step and was content with
denouncing the Insurrectionary Committee at the Mairie. On May 24, however, it
went so far as to arrest Hebert, the deputy Procureur Substitut of the Commune,
for an incendiary article in his journal Le Pbre Duchesne. It also demanded the
production of the minutes of the Section meetings, and, on the refusal of the
Cite Section, arrested its president Dobsen. In these actions the Committee
made a double mistake; in the first place, in striking at the Committee at the
Mairie they mistook their adversary; for on May 20 Pache had drawn back from
the responsibility, and the focus of insurrection had once more been
transferred to the more informal, but in other respects identical, Comite
central des commissaires des sections, whose activity in the month of March has
already been noticed, and whose eighty members were still sitting at the
Archeveche. It was at this body and at the Cordeliers’ Club, now far more
incendiary than the Jacobins, that the Committee should have struck. In the
second place, in the arrest of Hebert and
Dobsen, the Committee
repeated the blunder that had been made in the case of Marat; to proscribe
individual leaders was to give a rallying point to the faction. Besides,
Hehert’s coarse and violent humour appealed directly to the rabble, and Le Pere
Duchesne was popular in a sense in which Marat’s L'Ami du Peuple had never
been, so that Hebert’s arrest provoked a considerable outcry.
Battle was
now joined between the Commune, backed by the majority of the Sections, and the
Committee of Twelve, backed by the remainder of the Sections and a wavering
majority of the Convention. Between the two opposing parties lay the Committee
of Public Safety in a curiously double frame of mind, decided, that is, that
the elimination of the Girondins was essential, yet willing to save their
lives, and in particular anxious to save the Convention from any encroachment
on the part of the Commune. This latter body now cried out loudly for the
release of Hebert; and this provoked the Girondin Isnard to an indiscretion,
the most flagrant of which even the Gironde had ever been guilty. In a furious
speech on May 25 he prophesied that, were the Convention injured, Paris would
be annihilated. It was a suggestion of civil war as well as an echo of the
threats of Brunswick; and it did untold harm to his party, alienating large
classes of moderate men, who regarded it as a menace to their lives and
properties. On May 26 the Commune seized the opportunity to demand the
dissolution of the Committee of Twelve. The Committee had just ordered a body
of National Guards to protect the Convention; and Garat, the Minister of the
Interior, who regarded this precaution as a slight on his administration,
reassured the Convention by declaring that the danger was a dream of the Twelve
Committeemen. The ground was thus cut away below the feet of the Committee,
and it was abolished on May 27, only however to be reestablished on May 28 on
the motion of the ever-courageous Lanjuinais.
But the
triumph of the Gironde was ephemeral. They were obliged to release Hebert, Dobsen,
and their other prisoners; and they dared not strike at the Insurrectionary
Committee at the Archeveche, which on May 30 declared itself en permanence,
and, having appointed on May 28 a secret committee of six with the liberated
Dobsen at its head, hastened to bring matters to a crisis. Collecting at the
Archeveche 500 citizens to form a semblance of an electoral body, they declared
the Commune abolished—a step which significantly recalled August 10—and themselves
to be the new municipality. But, having turned out the old body, they at once
coopted it, so that the result of these proceedings was simply the addition of
96 greater ruffians to the Commune.
Thus
renovated, the Commune proceeded, in face of the decree of the Convention, to
appoint Hanriot, an ex-massacreur, Commandant of the National Guard, after
which all was ready for the attack. On May 81, at 7 a.m., the Convention,
which, it must be noted, had moved on May 10 from the Manege to the Tuileries,
was surrounded by a mob
which
during the day increased to about 30,000. A large number were no doubt drawn by
mere curiosity and had by no means come with the idea of purging the
Convention; but a small nucleus, under the direct command of Hanriot, were
determined to secure the proscription of the G: ondins at all costs. In face of
this force, Garat was powerless* and tried to shift the responsibility for the
outbreak on to the shoulders of the Committee of Twelve. Others, more
courageous, demanded the arrest of Hanriot; but the Girondins, with certain
inconspicuous exceptions, tried each man to save himself by yielding to the
violence of the Jacobins; and Vergniaud was content to propose the weak and
meaning* less motion “that the Sections have deserved well of the^a^m."
Then the crowd streamed into the Tuilerieb, demanding the arrest of the
Girondists and the dissolution of the Committee of Twelve. When therefore
Barere proposed in the name of the Committee of Public Safety, which, busied
with the national defence, had declined to commit itself to either side, that
the Committee of Twelve be dissolved, but that at the same time the armed force
be placed on a permanent footing, the Girondists were glad enough to accept
the compromise. Thus at the instance of the Committee of Public Safety the
greatest obstacle to the coup d'itat was removed. ■
The Mountain
were now able to force two other measures upon the dazed Assembly—the payment
of 40 sous a day to all sansculottes who remained under arms, and the reopening
of the Tuileries to the public; while the Commune arrested Madame Roland and
decreed the disarming of suspects. By the evening of May 31 the
insurrectionaries had half won their battle and had secured the weapons
necessary for the accomplishment of the'other half
The following
day passed quietly, but its incidents shed light on the attitude of the
Committee of Public Safety. Pache, the Mayor, in a report to that body
acknowledged the existence of an insurrectionary committee; but the Committee
of Public Safety abstained from action. It was in fact temporising; it welcomed
the purging of the Convention, though, influenced by Danton, it desired to save
the lives of the Girondists, and, being itself the child of the Convention,
wished to protect the parent body from encroachments. In the afternoon the
Girondists met, and talked of flight and of an appeal to the Departments. At a
special evening sitting of the Convention a demand from the Commune for the
arrest of twenty-seven deputies was referred to the Committee of Public Safety.
During the
night the Convention was again surrounded by armed men under Hanriot; and in
the early hours of Sunday morning, June 2, a large crowd of spectators
assembled to see what would happen. Bad news from the Vendee and Lybns caused
some disaffection among the populace, but generally speaking their attitude was
one of indifference. The Convention was now in a curious position; most of the
Girondists
had thrown
down their aims and retired to their own houses, fearing to face their enemies,
and had left their defence to Lanjuinais, who was not a Girondist at all, but
who, by his courageous attitude and their desertion, got himself proscribed
with them; yet even so the Convention was unwilling to decree their arrest. But
it was surrounded by an armed mob, led by a desperate and half-intoxicated
cut-throat. In this predicament a characteristic solution of the dilemma was
propounded by Barere in the name of the Committee of Public Safety. He
suggested that it would be more convenient if the threatened deputies would
kindly proscribe themselves. This absurd and cowardly expedient was rejected
with scorn by Lanjuinais and Barbaroux; but the few other Girondists, who had
had the courage to attend, including Isnard and Fauchet, hastened to accept the
suggestion.
When this
self-elimination of the Gironde had been secured, the insurrection had gone
far enough for the Committee of Public Safety; and they now threw their weight
into the other side of the scale, and, denouncing the Committee of
Insurrection, urged the Convention to break up its sitting: Herault, therefore,
who was in the chair, made his way down to the Place du Carrousel at the head
of the deputies; there he was confronted by Hanriot, who, on being ordered to
remove his guns, with drunken courage gave the command for the gunners to’
stand to their pieces. Onlookers afterwards said that, when the guns were
pointed at the Convention, many muskets were levelled at Hanriot and his men
from the crowd; but the argument of powder and shot was ever persuasive with
the revolutionaries, and, in face of Hanriot’s threatening attitude, the
deputies slunk away through the Tuileries and across the gardens, only to find
the swing-bridge, that led out on to the Place de la Revolution, guarded by an
equally resolute sansculotte.
Headed by
Marat, who had assumed the conduct of an affair so congenial, they returned to
their hall, and, utterly cowed, degraded, and ashamed, voted the suspension of
twenty deputies, two Ministers (Claviere and Lebrun), and of ten of the
Committee of Twelve. At
11 p.m. the Convention—after a sitting of
twelve hours—was at length permitted to break up by its new master, the Mob.
THE FOREIGN
POLICY OF PITT TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR WITH FRANCE.
The War of Independence, which terminated in 1783 by
the recognition of the United States in the Treaty of Versailles, had left
England without a friend in Europe. France, Spain, and the United Provinces had
taken up arms against her; Russia had placed herself at the head of an armed
neutrality, directed against the predominance of British sea power, which was
joined by the maritime nations of the north. Austria was in close connexion
with Russia; and Prussia, in the declining years of Frederick the Great, was an
uncertain factor in European politics. England therefore was in a condition of
entire isolation. In addition her finances were in confusion; and Ireland,
although conciliated by the comparative independence of Grattan’s Parliament,
could hardly be regarded as a source of strength. Such was the position of Great
Britain when William Pitt, at the age of twenty-four, was on December 19, 1783,
appointed First Commissioner of the Treasury.
For the first
ten years of his ministry Pitt devoted himself to the recovery by England of
that place in the councils of Europe which she had previously held, and which
it was her right to occupy. The first two years were spent in placing the
finances on a solid foundation, and in framing a measure of free trade with
Ireland, which the jealousies of the two countries, expressed by their
Parliaments, did not allow to be carried into effect. His next step was to
conclude a commercial treaty with France, which was highly favourable to this
country, and would have been more so if the prejudices of his Cabinet had not
frustrated the designs of the pupil of Adam Smith. By a mixture of audacity and
adroitness he broke the projects of France for a maritime alliance with the
Republican Netherlands by restoring the authority of the Stadholder (William V)
and making the Provinces the assured friend of England. Prussia was also
brought into the combination, so that there was formed in Europe a strong
triple alliance. England, supported by a naval State on one side, and a
military State on the other, could speak
with a voice
which commanded attention. The French Revolution, which broke out in the
following year, has thrown the Triple Alliance of 1788 into the shade; but it
was for four years the dominating authority in Europe, an authority which
always made for peace.
These
successes will be recorded in the following pages. They ended with the
conclusion of the Peace of Sistova in August, 1791, on which occasion Sir
Robert Murray Keith, whose labours had brought it about, wrote to his sisters
that he had made the best peace which had been made these fifty years, and had
helped essentially in the general pacification of Europe. How vain are the
predictions of man ! The ink of the treaty was scarcely dry when the French
government declared war against the Emperor; and on February 1, 1793, France
made a similar declaration against England and the United Provinces. The
remaining years of Pitt’s ministry do not concern us here. The fair fabric of
European peace, founded upon industrial prosperity, was shattered. But it may
be doubted whether the triumphs of these first ten years, which made England
prosperous at home and respected abroad, have ever been surpassed in the annals
of our country.
Pitt chose as
his Foreign Secretary the Marquis of Carmarthen, afterwards Duke of Leeds. His
political memoranda give us precise information with regard to his own views of
our foreign relations, and reveal, incidentally, the views of the Cabinet. It
was necessary for England to find some ally in Europe, and Carmarthen had not
risen above the prejudice of considering France as our natural enemy. The
alliance between France and Austria, which had been formed hy Kaunitz in 1756,
was regarded as unnatural and menacing to the peace of the world; and it was
Carmarthen’s principal object to put an end to it. If Carmarthen had possessed
more political insight he would have seen that the alliance between France and
Austria was rather a hindrance to the action of both than a mutual assistance.
In Austria Joseph II, after sharing power with his mother Maria Theresa, had
recently succeeded to independent sovereignty; and it was rather against him
than against France that the suspicions of the English Foreign Office should
have been directed. Full of good intentions, with a just insight into the evils
and defects of his time, he failed in all his undertakings, and stirred up
bitterness and rebellion where he desired nothing but prosperity and good-will.
He believed that reforms, which required the most delicate handling, could be
effected by the issue of imperial edicts; and we have a picture of him in his
closet, drafting proclamations at his writing-table, which his minister
promptly put into the fire. Learning nothing by the failure of his domestic
projects, he exasperated the Dutch by demolishing the Barrier Fortresses, by
opening the navigation of the Scheldt, and by reviving ancient claims to the
possession of Maestricht. He roused the ill-feeling of Germany and Europe by
projecting the annexation of Bavaria to the Austrian dominions in exchange for
Belgium. This
gave Prussia
an opportunity of placing herself at the head of the League of German Princes,
directed against the predominance of Austria, which was an important stej. in
he long duel between these two Powers which culminated at Sadowa. It was hot to
be expected that France could sympathise with these restless movements. She
desired that the peace of Europe should be preserved, and she wished to
maintain the friendship and the maritime power of Holland. She was also
anxious to keep on good terms with Frederick the Great; and the schemes for the
partition of Turkey, which Joseph formed in conjunction with Russia, were
entirely opposed to the traditional policy and to the best interests of the
French nation.
A
wise minister would also have penetrated and distrusted the po’:cy
of Catharine II, who ruled Russia for thirty-four years. It is humiliating to
read in the correspondence of Sir James . Harris and of Fitzherbert of the
efforts which England made to secure the friendship of Russia, and of the
ill-success which attended them. We went so far as to offer the Empress the
possession of Minorca; but, tempted as she was by the proposal, her calm
judgment realised that the acceptrnre of it would endanger objects which were
to her of much greater importance. However friendly she might seem, and
however much she might appear to be occupied by her literary and other
favourites, her cool head always kept the aggrandisement of Russia steadily in
view. The two Powers, at whose expense she hoped to, increase her dominions and
her influence, were Poland and Turkey. Her eyes were fixed upon
Constantinople,, which it was not for this interests of either France or
England that she should possess. By opposing France we were playing into the
hands of Russia. ,
A statesman
ought to have had some prescience of the calamity which was soon to overwhelm
the monarchy of France, and to have seen that, with an outward appearance of
majesty and strength, it was rotten to the core, and was hastening to the
catastrophe of the Revolution. Pitt, in concluding his commercial treaty with
France, saw that the true interests;of England.lay in the peaceful development
of French commerce and industry;, which Louis XVI and his ministers were
desirous to encourage. By this policy France would have been strengthened to
cope with those tumultuous passions, which, when let loose, were to carry havoc
into every portion of the civilised world. But in the eyes of Carmarthen, and
of the majority of Englishmen, France was still the hereditary enemy of
England; and every intrigue or movement in Europe, however remote, was
attributed to her malicious influence. We knocked at the door of every
chancery. When Russia refused to listen to us we tried to excite the suspicions
of Kaunitz; and his declaration that France had no hostile designs, and was
indeed incapable of mischief,; only made Carmarthen more certain of a secret
plot. Our ambassador at Vienna was directed to assure the Emperor not only that
we had no objection to his opening
1784] Change. of policy in Denmark.
279
the navigation
of the Scheldt, but that there was no object of ambition, however extravagant,
which we should not be prepared to support, if he would only surrender his
unnatural alliance with the House of Bourbon. Pitt was not an attentive
listener to such querulous forebodings. In the early years of his ministry he
paid but little attention to foreign politics; and, when at last induced to
consider with some show of approval plans for separating Austria from France,
and for forming some system on the Continent to counterbalance the House of
Bourbon, he took care to express the strongest conviction that it was necessary
to avoid, if possible, entering into any engagements which were likely to
embroil England in a new war. The objects which Pitt had mainly at heart were
peace, retrenchment, and reform. He believed that Britain, solvent and united,
would be a tower of strength in a bankrupt and distracted Europe.
The first
country to change its attitude towards England was Denmark, which had been one
of the parties to the Armed Neutrality. In 1784 Denmark was virtually governed
by Queen Juliana Maria, stepmother of the imbecile King, Christian VII,
husband of the unfortunate Carolina Matilda, sister of George III. With the
assistance of her Minister, Count Guldberg, she put her own son, Prince
Frederick, prominently forward, while she kept her grandson, the Prince Royal,
under the strictest tutelage, and removed from the Court Count Andreas Peter
Bemstorff, who was known to be favourable to English interests. Efforts had
been made to keep the Crown Prince in a state of childish dependency, and to
cramp his abilities; but he had a large share of penetration, firmness, and
self-command, so that he not only realised the position in which he was placed,
but was able to control his feelings until the time for action arrived. Hugh
Elliot, one of the most brilliant of English diplomatists, was now Minister at
Copenhagen, and his subtle and intriguing spirit soon found material to work
upon. He discovered that Count Bemstorff was in communication with the capital,
and contrived to have an interview with him in Mecklenburg, and to arrange a
plan by which the government of Denmark could be overthrown, and a system more
favourable to England put in its place. On January 28, 1784, the Prince Royal
completed his sixteenth year; and, on being shortly afterwards confirmed, he
became, according to the Danish Constitution, capable of taking part in the
government; but he still concealed his designs. At length, on April 14, at a Council
attended by the King, Prince Frederick, Count Guldberg, and others, the Prince
Royal suddenly rose and read a paper stating the, absolute necessity of a
change in the policy of the government, and concluding with the names of those
whom he wished to be admitted to the Council. He then handed the paper to his
father; and, after some altercation with Prince Frederick, the King signed it.
A second document was then executed, which provided that no order of Council
should henceforth be valid unless it was
countersigned
by the Prince Royal. Bemstorff was recalled, Guldbeig was dismissed, and in the
evening the Prince proceeded quietly' to a Court ball. Elliot was full of
admiration for the youthful hero of the revolution, who had kept his secret for
two years, during which time he had carried on private communications and
correspondences with various people^ until the time had come for him to declare
himself.
This
revolution brought about some change in the politics of the north. Sweden was
displeased at Denmark having acquired the strength of an independent position;
and Carmarthen suspected that she was plotting against Denmark for the
possession of Norway, and that she would be assisted in this enterprise by
France, between whom and Sweden there undoubtedly existed a very close
connexion. He smelt out a plot by which Sweden was to grant to France the use
of the port of Goteborg, receiving the West-Indian island of St Bartholomew in
exchange; and he succeeded in getting a joint note addressed by the Courts of St
Petersburg and Copenhagen to the Court of Stockholm to enquire what were the
intentions of France in this respect. To these matters Pitt applied only a
moderate attention, partly because he was occupied with other cL»ngs, and
partly because he did not share Carmarthen’s fefeling of insecurity. The
friendship of Denmark being assured, Carmarthen endeavoured to effect an
alliance with Russia and with Austria. If Austria could not be gained he would
turn his attention to Prussia. But Russia must come first, not only from her
intrinsic importance, but from the weight and influence which she exercised
over the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin. It was indeed impossible without the
help of Russia to sever the connexion between Austria and France, which our
Foreign Office regarded as disastrous to England and dangerous to Europe.
Russia might object to making an alliance with England, the secular enemy of
France, who was the chosen friend of Catharine’s ally, the Emperor of Austria,
or with Prussia, who was the constant and natural rival of Austria in Germany.
On the other hand, an alliance of England with Berlin and Copenhagen might
seriously offend both the Imperial Courts. Joseph II, with his awkward
restlessness, was about to show the British government a way out of the
difficulty by making an attack on the liberties both of Holland and of Belgium.
A strict
alliance had been concluded between Joseph and Catharine in May, 1781,
expressed not in a formal document, but in a mutual exchange of letters.
Austria guaranteed to Russia the possession of European Russia, and of her
dominions in Poland, as well as the maintenance of Poland in the position of
1773; and in return Austria received the guarantee of her dominions, including
the Low Countries and her possessions in Poland. Joseph also bound himself to
keep the Porte to the strict observance of treaties, and, if Russia should
declare war against Turkey, to join her in the campaign three months later with
the same
number of
troops. This alliance was directed primarily against Turkey, but also against
Prussia. It was a profound secret; Frederick the Great had a suspicion of it,
but knew nothing for certain. Thus fortified Joseph turned his attention to the
Barrier and the Scheldt. By the Treaty of Utrecht the Dutch occupied, as a
barrier, seven Belgian fortresses with 14,000 men at the cost of Belgium; while
the closing of the Scheldt was secured by the Treaty of Munster in 1648. Joseph
began by razing all the barrier fortresses, most of which had fallen into ruin,
maintaining, however, the defences of Luxemburg, Ostend, and the citadel of
Antwerp. In November, 1783, he demanded the restitution of the frontier between
Belgium and Holland on the lines of 1664, the demolition of the Dutch
fortresses on the Scheldt, the removal of the guard-ships, and the surrender of
Maestricht.
If Joseph
reckoned upon the support of the French alliance he was mistaken. France took
the side of Holland against the Emperor, but when war became imminent offered
her mediation. It was proposed that Belgium should enjoy the open navigation of
the Scheldt, but that Maestricht should remain with the United Provinces.
Joseph, irritated by delay, took a high tone, while the Dutch, excited in their
turn, refused to open the river. The Emperor determined to force the passage,
and sent a brigantine down the Scheldt, which on October 8, 1784, was fired
upon by the Dutch, while another ship, sailing up the river, was captured. The
Imperial Ambassador left the Hague; Wassenaer was withdrawn from Vienna; and
the Dutch Commissioner retired from Brussels. An Austrian army was collected in
Belgium, but without artillery or pontoons. The Dutch could offer only a
feeble resistance, but they opened their sluices and flooded the country. King
Frederick of Prussia naturally opposed the Emperor, and a European war seemed
imminent. This was averted by an armistice which resulted in the Treaty of
Fontainebleau, signed on November 8, 1785. The Scheldt remained closed, and the
Emperor gave up his claim to Maestricht on the receipt of ten millions of
florins. Frederick, an astute observer of politics, blamed Joseph for his undue
haste both in threatening war and in making peace.
Coincident
with the question of the Scheldt was that of the Bavarian exchange, a scheme of
Joseph for incorporating the Bavarian with the Austrian dominions, and giving
Belgium to the Elector of Bavaria with the title of the King of Burgundy.
France seemed not indisposed to consent; Charles Theodore, Elector of Bavaria,
who was sixty years old and without children, was favourable to the plan, and
Catharine of Russia gave her approval. Frederick, now nearing his end, watched
very closely a scheme which would give Austria an advantage in the rivalry
between the two great German Powers. In July, 1785, the Fiirstenbund, or League
of Princes, was formed to oppose the plan, and was joined by a majority of the
Electors. Vergennes, after long
wavering,
declared himself opposed to it, and the Emperor had to give it up. This was the
last triumph of Frederick the Great. When he died on August 13, 1786, Joseph
could breathe more freely.
We have seen
that the English Foreign Office distrusted Frederick, and thought that it might
be the best policy for England in her isolated condition to associate herself,
in appearance at least, with the ambitious designs of the Emperor. But we
possessed fortunately at the Hague a great diplomatist with a clearer insight
and a stronger will. Sir James Harris, destined afterwards, as Lord Malmesbury,
to dorm, late the fortunes of the United Provinces, had now come to England to
communicate with the Cabinet, and, in May, 1785, he argued strongly for an
alliance with Prussia. He pointed out that Austria and France were united for
purposes of mutual aggrandisement—a statement not so true as it may have seemed
to be to contemporaries—and that Russia was closely connected with Austria, and
Spain with France. If these five Powers were linked together their influence
would be felt by the whole of Europe, but especially by England and Prussia,
who must therefore concert measures for mutual safety. If England wished
Prussia to be clear and explicit she must be clear and explicit herself; she
must meet the King of Prussia half way and be ready to :make an
alliance with him. If England and Prussia acted together, a league of Princes
would be formed against the aggrandisement of Austria; Russia would be
separated from the Emperor; Denmark would be preserved; Sweden would be
rendered innocuous. This would be a union of defence and security, not one of
attack and ambition. All past transactions must be forgotten, all future
contingencies overlooked, and the importance of the moment alone attended to.
France must on no account have the Low Countries; and, if Prussia would exert
herself to prevent this, England would use similar exertions to prevent Austria
from absorbing Bavaria. The alliance was to be formed on these grounds.
Austria and
Russia were naturally opposed to an alliance between England and Prussia, and
to the accession of Hanover to the Fiirstenbund. On May 26, 1785, we find Count
Kazeneck, the Austrian minister, protesting against the idea that the Emperor
intended to employ force to carry out any of his projects, and complaining of a
newspaper report that the King of England was one of the chief promoters of the
League of Princes. Carmarthen replied that his master would doubtless ever
prove himself, in his Electoral capacity, a zealous assertor of the liberties
and rights of the Empire; and that, if there was no design of infringing them,
no measures of a defensive nature in favour of them ought to give offence.
Kazeneck said that an equitable exchange, agreed to by both parties, could not
create alarm any more than if he and Carmarthen were to exchange their watches.
Carmarthen replied that the value of both watches should be ascertained, and
that what was to be given in exchange should be well known. Kazeneck rejoined
that the House of
Austria
acquired too much advantage from the possession of the Low Countries to think
of bartering them against Bavaria.
The Russian
ambassador at the Court of St James’ at this time was Count Woronzoff, whose
letters from England, recently published, are of great value to the historian.
He was strongly in favour of an alliance between England and Russia, and could
not understand why England should prefer the friendship of Prussia. Calling on
Carmarthen on June 14, he dwelt earnestly on this point. He said that the
Courts of Versailles and Vienna, under an appearance of friendship, entertained
the deepest distrust of each other. The Emperor believed that he would
ultimately overreach Prance, but he was mistaken. France was making every
preparation for war, and would in the course of a year throw off the mask and
attack the Emperor. We know now how erroneous this forecast was. Woronzoff then
approached the subject of the Fiirsten- bwnd. The accession of Hanover to this
League would certainly throw the Emperor into the arms of France, and would
play into the bands of France and Prussia, by preventing any possibility of an
understanding between Austria and England. Carmarthen admitted that his own
favourite scheme was an alliance between England and the two Imperial Courts of
Russia and Austria, but that the Emperor had received every overture with
coldness, and seemed desirous either of seeing England totally unconnected with
the Continent, which was also the wish of France, or else of forcing her to
connect herself with Prussia, a course which Carmarthen would never support
unless compelled to do so by the Emperor. Carmarthen added that the interest of
England was to prevent the Low Countries from ever being alienated, directly or
indirectly, to France, which would be a most serious matter. As a fact the
King of England signed the League, as Elector of Brunswick- Liineburg, on July
23,1785.
It has
already been stated that the Treaty of Fontainebleau between the Emperor and
the States General was signed on November 8,1785. Two days later a treaty of
alliance between France and the Provinces was concluded at the same place. By
this treaty, which was ratified on Christmas Day, France was to furnish troops,
and her ally ships, for their mutual succour; neither was to make peace or to
contract alliance without the consent of the other. At the same time, by a
treaty of commerce, each party was to favour as far as possible the interest
and advantage of the other, by rendering to the other every assistance on all
occasions; and they were not to listen to any negotiations or treaties which
might be detrimental to each other, but to give notice of such negotiations as
soon as they were proposed. These treaties were considered at the time as a
great blow to the power of Great Britain. Vergennes was able to pose as the
pacificator general of the universe. In the words of the Annual Register, it
could not but be a grievous consideration to Englishmen that, while .France,
through the happiness of great ministers
•at home, and
their choice of able negotiators abroad, was spreading her consequence and
extending her influence through the nations of the earth, Great Britain,'
through some unaccountable fatality, seemed to be fallen from that high seat in
which she had so long and gloriously presided, and to be no longer considered,
or almost unremembered, in the general politics or system of Europe. Thus at
the close of 1785 was Holland tied to the chariot wheels of France. But matters
were soon to assume a different complexion.
One result of
the closer relations established between France and the United Provinces was
the conclusion of a commercial treaty between England and France. The
eighteenth article of the Treaty of Versailles contained a provision that
commissioners1 should be appointed on either side to draw up
arrangements of commerce between the two nations, on the basis of reciprocity
and mutual convenience, and that these arrangements were to be completed
within the space of two years, dating from January 1, 1784. The English
Ministry were not very anxious to Cany this clause into effect. In order to put
pressure upon England to fulfil her engagements the French government issued
edicts in July, 1785, forbidding the importation of a number of British
manufactures. Only raw material was allowed to be imported from England; and
shopkeepers were forbidden to exhibit advertisements of “ marchandises
d'Angleterre.” After the friendship between France and Holland had been
established by the Treaty of Fontainebleau Pitt saw that further delay would be
dangerous. In December, writing a letter signed by Carmarthen, he asked for a
further extension of the time, which was just expiring, in order to arrange a
commercial system founded on the law of mutual and reciprocal advantage—a
system which might form a solid and permanent connexion between the trading
part of the two countries. Vergennes granted an extension of six months, which
might be extended to twelve. William Eden, better known by the title afterwards
conferred on him of Lord Auckland, was selected as negotiator. Eden had
hitherto been attached to the’ Opposition, and was a friend of Lord North and
Lord Loughborough. Indeed he was abused by his former associates for deserting
his party. He possessed a clear head and great industry, and probably no better
instrument could have been selected for the work. The treaty was strongly opposed
by Fox, who argued that our commercial prosperity had never been so great as
when our relations with France were most strained.
Eden reached
Paris on March 20, 1786. The principal difficulty in arriving at an agreement
lay in the Methuen Treaty, made with Portugal in 1703, which provided that
Portuguese wines should be imported into England at a duty one-third less than
those of any other country. Pitt, who was a disciple of Adam Smith, with
economic principles far in advance of his age, was personally willing to
abrogate the Methuen Treaty, to receive French wines and brandies on the
terms of the
most favoured nation, and even to make an abatement below the lowest rate of
duty at present existing. France was eager for this step to be taken, but
George III and his other Ministers were too much prejudiced to yield. The
Methuen Treaty was not abrogated till 1831, and the importation of French wines
did not become effective till 1860. The decision unfortunately lay with the
narrow intelligence of Jenkinson, afterwards created successively Lord
Hawkesbuiy and Lord Liverpool. He was inspired by traditional jealousy of the
French and could not believe them to be sincere. A principle of reciprocity had
to be substituted for that of Free Trade. After much discussion the duty on
French wines was lowered to that paid at the time by the wines of Portugal; but
the duty on Portuguese wines was reduced by one-third, in accordance with the
provisions of the Methuen Treaty. French silks, even in the form of ribbons, were
entirely excluded, owing to the opposition of the Spitalfields weavers.
Hardware and cutlery were admitted to either country at a duty not exceeding 10
per cent., cottons and woollens at a duty not exceeding
12 per cent. Cambrics and linens, the products of
France and of Ireland respectively, were admitted at moderate rates.
The treaty
contained other provisions of a more general character. It established a
reciprocal and entirely perfect liberty of navigation and commerce between the
subjects of the two countries. In the case of the outbreak of war a year’s
notice was to be given to the subjects of either Crown for the removal of their
persons or their effects. Both sovereigns reserved the right of countervailing,
by additional duties, the internal duties imposed on manufactures, or the
export duties charged on the raw material of certain articles. Besides this,
contraband was defined, and the manner in which the visitation of ships was to
be conducted in time of war was determined. It was provided that the neutral
flag should not cover the enemy’s goods, and that the property found on
enemies’ ships should be fair prize, unless it had been embarked before the
declaration of war. The duration of the treaty was limited to twelve years.
It is
difficult to pronounce an opinion upon a treaty concluded with France so short
a time before the outbreak of the French Revolution. It is possible that the
economic advantage remained with England, and that our hardware and linens
found a market in France which French wines and brandies failed to obtain here.
But the higher considerations of policy, which were certainly in the mind of
Pitt, are expressed in a letter from Rayneval to Barthelemy, written on the
conclusion of the treaty: “The balance which will result from the treaty is
uncertain; but whatever may happen, we shall at least have acquired the
unappreciable advantage of insensibly diminishing the national hatred, which
has hitherto separated France from England, of substituting a legitimate for a
fraudulent commerce, and of turning the profits of contraband to the advantage
of the State. These considerations are more important
the
indiscreet clamours which* dishonest persons are certain to permit themselves
both in France and in England;’’
We must now
return to the affairs of the United Provinces. This is not the place to show
how their constitution oscillated between an oligarchy of provincial Estates,
supported by France, and the government of ;the Stadholder, which resembled a
monarchy and was favoured by England, or to trace the steps by which the power
of the Stadholder had gradually declined. During the first months of 1786
France was gaining increased influence, and the Stadholder was subject to
continual insults and attacks. Party feeling ran so high that the Province of
Zealand proposed to detach itself from the rest of the confederation and to
place itself under the protection of England* a step which could not be taken
without a war. The English Cabinet was not prepared for war; but it offered the
Prince of Orange material support if. he would place himself at the head of
the. party which was disposed to favour him. A memorial was also presented to
the States, General, warning them of the ambition of France and expressing the
interest felt by England in the maintenance of the power of the Stadholder.
When relations were at the utmost degree of tension Frederick the Great died,
and was succeeded by his nephew, the brother of the Princess of Orange. Our
ambassador describes him as a poor specimen of a King, tall, but undignified
and, ungraceful, sensible, but not refined or elevated in his ideas. He adds
that his moral character is low and that he is much in debt, but that he is
strongly attached to England, and that he wishes to marry his daughter to the
Prince of Wales;
The first
step of the new King of Prussia was to send Count Gortz as ambassador to the
Hague; but this had no effect on the conduct of the Estates of Holland. They
stimulated the formation of free-corps throughout the country; and the Prince,
feeling his life insecure, by the advice of Harris surrounded himself with a
guard. In September the Estates of Holland suspended the Stadholder from his
functions and rescinded the Act of 1766, which gave him the power of military
nominations. The Patriots, as they were called, held a meeting at the French
ambassador’s bouse, where they discussed the advisability of proclaiming the
Stadholder an enemy of the Republic, depriving him of his office, and declaring
it no longer hereditary' in his family. As an answer to this Gortz was recalled
by his sovereign. Harris wrote to Pitt, on November 28, giving a retrospect of
his mission, pointing out the danger of the Dutch being under French influence
and direction in politics, and asking that the friends whom he had succeeded in
gaining for England might not be abandoned. Pitt replied with great caution,
but in terms which were more decided than either Harris or Carmarthen expected.
Carmarthen wrote in exultation, “ Now we have raised his attention to the
important object in question, we must by all means endeavour to keep it up, and
not suffer Holland to be sacrificed either to lawn or cambric.”
The two
parties^ Orange and Republican, were at this time almost equally balanced; but
the supporters of the Stadholder became gradually more numerous. Nearly all the
peasantry were in his favour, and he had a majority in Rotterdam and Utrecht.
Towards the end of March opinion began to change in the States of Holland
itself. The situation of the Republican party became extremely critical. In
their principal stronghold of Amsterdam they were weakened; in Rotterdam they
were completely mastered; Friesland, Utrecht, Zealand, and Gelderland were
against them, and Overyssel alone on their side. Just at this time Harris came
to England. He found some members of the Cabinet in favour of intervention, but
Pitt was more cautious. He said that if we did anything we must be ready for
war. Harris insisted on the danger, probably illusory, of France attacking
England with the assistance of Holland; but Pitt, in a characteristic
utterance, deprecated any interruption to the growth of affluence and
prosperity in the country, and asked whether this was not increasing so fast as
to make her able to resist any force which France could collect for some years
to come. Eventually a Cabinet minute was presented to the King, advising
pecuniary assistance to the Stadholder to the amount of £20,000 advanced as
loan or otherwise.
As soon as
Harris returned to the Hague a plan of action was agreed upon. The Prince was
to place himself at the head of the army commanded by Van der Hop at Amersfort,
which was joined by English officers who volunteered for service, and every day
grew in numbers. The Princess of Orange, a lady of great spirit and accomplishments,
who exercised a deep fascination over Harris, suddenly left Nymegen and went to
the camp at Amersfort. She then continued her journey to the Hague, but was
stopped in the neighbourhood of Gouda by some free-corps and carried under a
strong guard to Schonhoven, where she was treated with some indignity. The
States of Holland passed a resolution approving of her capture, but after a
short time she was released and returned to Nymegen. She wrote to her brother,
the King of Prussia, urging him to avenge the insult passed upon her, and, with
the characteristic hastiness of his disposition, he immediately prepared to
march troops into Holland. This gave rise to a critical situation. The French
were pledged by treaty to defend the Dutch if attacked, but England could not
allow her friend the Stadholder to be crushed under her eyes. The despatches on
this subject, preserved in the Record Office, are well worth studying. There is
one dated July 27, 1787, which, by the frequent erasures and the sentences contributed
in autograph by the different Ministers, shows the care with which it was
drafted. ■
On September
13, 1787, the Prussian army, under the command of the Duke of Brunswick,
advanced from Cleves and entered Gelderland. At the same time Pitt wrote to Eden,
who was still in Paris,
that the
Court of Versailles must abandon the project of extending its influence in the
United Provinces by s’tering their constitution. The authority of the
Stadholder must be preserved; and, if the French 'will not accept these
principles, the question must be decided by war. They must, as things stand,
give up the idea of exercising a jredominant influence in the Republic, or they
must be prepared to fight for it. In this manner a war between France and
England was on the point of breaking out, which, whatever its result, would
have changed the destinies of Europe. But the success of Brunswick was too
rapid. All resistance collapsed. Six days after the Prussian army had crossed
the Vaal the Prince of Orange entered the Hague in triumph, and was invested
with every privilege which had been taken from him.
This result,
so satisfactory to England, having been attained, it became necessary to
provide against a similar danger in the future; and the Court of Prussia urged
us to take steps for this purpose. William Grenville was sent to Paris to
strengthen Eden’s hands, and to make easier for him the disagreeable task of
submitting the friends with whom he had negotiated the treaty of commerce to a
serious humiliation. On October 27 Montmorin signed a declaration that the Eng
of France had not, and never had, the intention of interfering in the affairs
of the Republic of the United Provinces; that he retained no hostile view
towards any quarter relative to what had passed in Holland; that all warlike
preparations shoidd be discontinued on either side; and that the navies should
be again placed on the footing of the peace establishment. A triple alliance
between England, Holland, and Prussia, was now concluded. Lorenz Pieter van de
Spiegel, who, as Pensionary of Zealand, had always been the warm friend of
England, was now Grand Pensionary of Holland, and negotiated the treaty with
England which was signed at the Hague on April 15, 1788. It guaranteed the
hereditary Stadholderate in the House of Orange, and established a defensive
alliance between the two countries. On the same day, and at the same hour, a
similar treaty was signed between the United Provinces and Prussia at Berlin.
The treaty between England and Prussia still remained to be concluded. This was
done at the Loo, where the King of Prussia was staying with his sister. It was
effected by the strength of mind and pertinacity of Harris, working upon the
weak and wavering disposition of Frederick William. Hands saw the King on June
12 at seven in the morning; but it was not till after midnight, while a
brilliant company were dancing, that the King asked Harris to walk with him
behind the ball-room, and told him that he had decided to conclude a
provisional alliance at once, with an act of guarantee for the constitution of
the Dutch Republic, and in the meantime to sound and consult with other Powers
on a more general and extensive alliance. Harris and Alvensleben, the Prussian
Minister, had no secretaries with chem, and spent the rest of the night in
drafting the treaty with secret articles. Early next morning the treaty was
submitted to the King, and
then formally
signed by Alvensleben and Harris in the presence of van det Spiegel, being
entitled the Provisional Treaty of Loo.
Thus was
concluded the Triple Alliance of 1788, a triumph for the foreign policy of
Pitt. Finding England without friends and of no account in Europe, he had in
five years, by establishing her finances on a sound basis, made her respectable
and formidable. He had ^isrogarded the arguments of Carmarthen to join the
Courts of Austria and Russia, who were the freebooters of Europe, and whose
plans were foredoomed to failure, and, following the safer guidance of Harris,
had welded three progressive countries into a solid union, which was a
guarantee for peace. For some time the three allied Powers, under the hegemony
of England, gave the law to Europe. They prevented Denmark from assisting
Russia in her war against Sweden, and gave tranquillity to the North. The efforts
of England were used successfully at Reichenbadi to nip in the bud an
internecine struggle between Prussia and Austria. The Triple Alliance mode
peace between Austria and the Porte at Sistova, between Russia and the Porte at
Jassy; it secured the Belgian Netherlands to Austria; it enabled England to
speak, with force and dignity to Spain in the dispute about Nootka Sound, It
tended to calm the discord of Europe, to curb the ambition of some Powers, and
the revolutionary movements of others; but it was powerless to conjure the
terrible doom which hung over the devoted head of France. The whole course of
its influence bears the impress of the serene and majestic mind of Pitt. Still,
the advocates of non-intervention in the poMics of the Continent may derive from
it some support for their creed. It bound England closely with Holland, and
thus was the final cause of the war with France in 1793. It led Pitt to
contemplate the so-called Russian armament of 1791; and our desertion of
Prussia, enforced by the public opinion of England, led to the desertion of the
Coalition by Prussia at the Peace of Basel in 1795.
The limits at
our disposal will not permit us to dwell in detail upon all these aspects of
international history; we must confine ourselves to those in which England was
most prominently concerned, and these are three ; the dispute about Nootka
Sound, the Russian armament, and the outbreak of the war with revolutionary
France. Scarcely had a year elapsed after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance
when the States General met at Versailles, and an event occurred on the other
side of the world which nearly brought about a European conflagration. Nootka
Sound is a harbour on the west coast of Vancouver Island. It is doubtful by
whom it was first discovered. Perez claims to have gone there in 1774, and Cook
certainly visited the place in 1778, and stayed there a long time. Retaining
what he understood to be the native name of Nootka, he concluded on imperfect
evidence that Spanish vessels had never been there; but, it is not stated that
he took possession of the country for England. For seven years after this the
north-west coasts
290
■
[1790
of America
remained deserted^ until the conclusion of peace again stimulated enterprise.
From 1785 onward English ships, coming both from India and from the mother
country, visited Nootka to purchase furs. In 1788 the Spaniards began to bestir
themselves. They heard that the Russians were invading Alaska, and they did not
wish that either their trade or their territorial rights should be interfered
with. In the following year Flores, Viceroy of Mexico, sent Martinez and Haro,
on the ships Prmcesa and San Carlos, to occupy Nootka before it should be taken
possession of by any other Power. Arriving at Nootka in June, they seized two
English ships, the Iphigenia and the Argonaut, which they found there, and
imprisoned their crews. These were taken to Mexico, but were released by the
Viceroy on the ground of the friendly relations existing between tbe two
nations, and the probability that the traders were ignorant of Spanish rights.
The news of
what had happened came to the English Cabinet through the Spanish ambassador on
February 10, 1790. He asked that the men who had planned the expedition might
be punished, in order to deter others from making settlements in Spanish
territory: We had, unfortunately, at this time, no English Minister at Madrid,
as Lord Auckland had left in the previous year, and his successor had not yet
been appointed. Pitt took the matter into his own hands and acted with the
greatest vigour. The despatches, now extant in the Record Office, are written
with his own pen, and speak with all the imperious dignity of the son of
Chatham. His reply to the letter of the ambassador, dated February 26, is to
the effect that nothing is known of the facts, but that the act of violence
mentioned by the Spanish ambassador must necessarily suspend all discussion of
the claims until the seized vessel should be restored, and an adequate
atonement should be made for a proceeding so injurious to Great Britain. This
haughty reply meant war, and Spain began at once to make preparations for it.
A breach
between England and Spain was of more importance than might appear at first
sight. The Pacte de Famille, ah offensive and defensive alliance between the
two branches of the House of Bourbon, signed on August 15,1765, the last of a
series of similar agreements, was still in force; and the Court of Madrid
called upon that of Versailles to make its engagements good. The matter came
before the National Assembly at the beginning of May; and Mirabeau had to make
up his mind as to the policy to be adopted, both as secret adviser to the
Court, and as Rapporteur of the Diplomatic Committee of the Assembly. On June
23, 1790j he advised the Court that, if they wished to give effect to the
Family Compact, they must get it altered in form, as the nation would never
support an agreement which was purely dynastic in shape. He recommended that
they should send an enVoy to Madrid for that purpose. The official report of
Mirabeau was made to the Assembly on August 25. He proposed to maintain
provisionally the alliance with
Spain until a
union of a more national character could be formed between the two countries;
and he demanded that the French navy should be increased by thirty ships of the
line, a number which the Assembly raised to forty-five. It is stated on the
authority of Miles that Mirabeau received from the Spanish minister a thousand
louis (Tor for this service. Pitt became alarmed. He did not dread a war with
Spain; but a war with Spain and France combined was a more serious matter. He
therefore sought means of influencing the opinion of the Assembly through
other channels than those of regular diplomatic intercourse. For this purpose
he employed two instruments. One of these was William Augustus Miles, a friend
of Lafayette, of Mirabeau, and of the leaders of the Jacobin Club, of which he
was a member. The other was Hugh Elliot, the brilliant diplomatist, whose
success in Denmark we have already narrated, who had been the friend of
Mirabeau’s youth. There are few matters in diplomatic history more wrapped in
mystery than these two missions. The correspondence relating to both of them
has almost entirely disappeared, and has eluded the most careful search; but a
little salvage from the wreck shows us the drift of the vessel’s course.
Pitt sent for
Miles as early as March 4,1790; but Miles did not leave for Paris till July.
His son tells us that the purport of his mission was precise ; he was to exert
his personal influence with the view of inducing the National Assembly to annul
the Family Compact; and he adds that, although not included in his official
instructions, it was understood that the occasion would be used to promote
permanent relations between the two countries. The letters written by Miles to
Pitt between August, 1790, and April, 1791, have entirely disappeared, and they
form the only gap in a voluminous correspondence. He writes, however, to Rose,
on November SO, “ I have very great pleasure in informing you that my mission
is likely to have a fortunate issue, and that no difficulty will be made to
dissolve the Family Compact, provided that France can count upon the friendship
of England in exchange.” An alliance with France was probably more in the mind
of Miles than in that of Pitt. In October, 1790, George III wrote a letter to
Pitt in the following terms : “ From a thorough conviction how essential peace
is to the prosperity of this country, it is impossible for me to object to
anything that may have a chance of effecting it; though not sanguine that Mr H.
Elliot and his French friend are likely to succeed, where caution and much
delicacy are necessary. While our ambassador and official correspondence are
kept clear of this business, it will certainly be wise to keep up the proposed
communication, for the sole purpose of restoring peace, but no encouragement
must be given to forwarding the internal views of the democratic party. We have
honourably not meddled with the internal dissensions of France, and no object
ought to drive us from that honourable ground.” It may be mentioned that
before Miles left London he
had. been
ordered by Pitt to hold no communication, direct or indirect, with Lord Gower.
At the
beginning of October Pitt had sent an ultimatum to Madrid, with instructions to
our minister Fitzherbert that, if it were not accepted within ten days, he was
to quit the capital without taking leave of the Court, and to return to England
by way of Lisbon. Thus peace and war hung in the balance. At this juncture
Elliot was sent to Paris, where it is probable that he remained only a few
days; but the dates are difficult to ascertain. Whatever arguments Elliot used
to Mirabeau or others—and the arguments which he used to Mirabeau may have been
such as to account for the secrecy of the transaction—they were entirely
successful. On October 28 Mirabeau wrote to the Court that peace was not
difficult to preserve; that England and the English Ministry did not desire war
but were entirely anxious for peace; while Spain could not make war without the
assistance of France, but would be beaten at the first cannon-shot. Before this
letter was written Florida-Blanca had come to the conclusion that his country
had neither money nor credit for a foreign war. The hope of allies was vain;
some Powers were hostile or bound to the foe, some were willing but were not
worth having, others would ask too great a price. Russia was the most
promising, America would insist upon the free navigation of the Mississippi and
a large part of Florida, France was not to be depended upon. On October 28, the
veiy date of Mirabeau’s letter to the Court, the Nootka Convention was signed,
by which England secured, and Spain retained, the rights of commerce, navigation,
and settlement on the Pacific coast above San Francisco. Each nation was to
have free access to the establishments of the other in those regions. England
pledged herself, in return, to prevent her subjects from carrying on an illicit
trade with the Spanish settlements, or from approaching within ten leagues of
the coast already occupied by Spain. By this treaty England gained the right to
trade and settle on the north-west coast of America, and Spain relinquished for
ever her claims to sovereignty on this coast as founded on discovery.
The
settlement of the dispute about Nootka Sound enabled England to act with effect
in the matter which followed the Congress of Reichen- bach. These events are
more fully dealt with elsewhere, but a brief summaiy seems needed here. In the
autumn of 1787 Turkey declared war against Russia; and the alliance between
Russia and Austria became effective; and on December 17,1788, the fortress of
Oczakoff was taken by Potemkin after a long siege, with great loss of life.
Belgrade fell before the Austrians on October 9,1789. The Ottoman Empire seemed
tottering to its fall, and was only saved by the death of Joseph II, who had
made the alliance with Catharine. On January 30,1790, just before the Emperor’s
death, Prussia had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the
Porte. It was arranged that in the spring a Turkish army should invade Austrian
territory from the side of Bosnia, while a Prussian army
advanced from
the north. Joseph was not ignorant of this combination, and wrote to Loudon
that he expected to be attacked both by Poland and Prussia. He made
preparations for resistance. An army 130,000 strong was stationed in Bohemia
and Moravia, 100,000 men were massed on the defensive in the Banat, and 30,000
in Galicia. Belgium appeared to be lost; Hungary and Poland were ready for
revolution ; the mind of the Emperor turned towards peace. But on February 20,
1790, he died, a broken-hearted man, conscious of a wasted life.
A month after
his accession, the new Emperor, Leopold II, wrote with his own hand to
Frederick William of Prussia to propose peace; while England, who was connected
with Prussia by the Triple Alliance, declared that she had no desire to weaken
Austria, would be satisfied with a peace on the basis of the status quo, and
would only assist Prussia if she were attacked. The dream of Hertzberg, the
acquisition of Danzig and Thom by Prussia in exchange for Galicia, which
Austria was to surrender to Poland, began to fade away. The answer, however,
sent by Frederick William to Leopold was not very satisfactory; and in June a
Prussian army began to assemble in Silesia. The King joined it at Schonwalde on
June 18, and told the Emperor that he was determined to make war unless his
demand for the cession of Galicia was complied with. Leopold was therefore
compelled to mobilise an army to act against Prussia. England was at this time
embarrassed by the affair of Nootka Sound, and was anxious to avoid further
complications in Europe. Pitt also had no wish for the aggrandisement of
Prussia, and peace was in the forefront of his policy. So when the
representatives of Holland and England came to Reichenbach they declared that
they would support nothing but a peace on the basis of the status quo.
Lucchesini, the Prussian minister, was summoned from Warsaw, and informed the
King that Poland would never consent to the surrender of Danzig and Thom. The
King, ever subject to gusts of feeling, suddenly changed his policy, threw over
Hertzberg, and determined to make peace. The status quo was accepted, and the
convention of Reichenbach was signed on July 27, 1790. Austria agreed to give
up all her conquests in the late war with the Porte; and it was understood that
similar sacrifices should be imposed upon Russia. The policy of Reichenbach,
which averted a war between Prussia and Austria, was another triumph for the
Triple Alliance and for Pitt.
The Treaty of
Sistova between Austria and the Porte was signed on August 30, 1791, but peace
was not restored to Europe. The allied Powers had promised the Porte at
Reichenbach that peace should be made on the principle of the status quo a/nte
beUum, that is, on the basis of a mutual restitution of conquests. This would
have compelled Russia to surrender Oczakoff, which had been won at such a great
sacrifice of life and had given so much glory to Potemkin. Catharine could not
bring herself to make this surrender, and so the war continued. At the
beginning of
March, 1791, Frederick William wrote to Sultan Selim that he was ready to
declare war against Russia if she would not make peace; and we find in the
memoranda of the Duke of Leeds that Cabinets were held on March 21 and 22 at
which it was decided to send a fleet to the Baltic and a squadron to the Black
Sea for the same object. Grenville was opposed to these measures and preferred
to increase the armaments at home. However, a Cabinet minute was drawn up and
delivered to the King on March 25 agreeing to inform the King of Prussia that a
fleet of from 35 to 40 sail would be sent into the Baltic, and a squadron of 10
or 12 ships of the line into the Black Sea to assist the Turks and to combine
with the advance of the Prussian troops on the frontiers of Livonia, and also
to present an ultimatum to, the Court of St Petersburg. The messenger bearing
these documents was despatched to Berlin on March 27. Two days later a message
was sent to Parliament, and the address in answer to it was carried by a large
majority in both Houses. Fox, however, was strenuous in opposition; and
Ministers began to doubt whether the country would ever support a war with
Russia. At a Cabinet held on March 30, the Duke of Richmond, Lord Strafford,
and Lord Grenville, seemed to think that a change of plan was desirable,
whereas the Lord Chancellor, Lord Chatham, Pitt, and the Duke of Leeds, were
opposed to any alteration. On the next day Pitt had a long conversation with
the Duke of Leeds, and told him that several members attached to the government
had voted against the address in the House of Commons, and that the feeling of
the Opposition was rising. The Duke said that if there were any change of
policy he would resign. Pitt replied that he felt not only for him but with
him; but he urged the consequences which the breaking up of the Ministry might
produce to the country in general and to the King in particular. The rest of
the Cabinet were sent for. Lord Strafford declared that he had not slept all
night, but pronounced himself against action, in which he was followed by the
Duke of Richmond and Lord Grenville. Lord Camden was neutral. At the close of
the conversation it became certain that a change of policy was inevitable. The
Cabinet met again in the evening, and sat through the night. At 3 a.m. on April
1, a despatch was drafted by Pitt and signed, somewhat reluctantly, by the Duke
of Leeds, asking for a temporary delay, the reasons for which should be
explained later.
The
opposition of the country to a war with Russia became every day more
pronounced; and Pitt was in receipt of further information which made him less
averse to accepting a compromise. The dispute between England and Russia
turned, as we have said, on the surrender of OczakofF. Lord Auckland, the
intimate friend of Pitt, was at this time British Minister at the Hague. He was
the most trusted and one of the most able of the English diplomats of his
generation; and all the threads of the diplomacy of Europe passed through his
hands. He was strongly opposed to our going to war with Russia, and indeed to
any war at all.
He writes to
Lord Grenville, “It is to me wonderful that any man possessing any object
whatever of honour, property, or security in any established government under
the sun, can incline to increase the confusion of the world in a moment like
the present. Internal tranquillity seems to me to be a consideration, which,
with the example of France before our eyes, ought to supersede ill others.” The
cooperation of Holland was necessary for a war against Russia; and it was
doubtful whether the Dutch desired war. The Dutch admiral Kinbergen, well acquainted
with the coasts of the Black Sea, wrote a memoir demonstrating that Oczakoff
was of little importance compared with Sebastopol. Pitt, after careful
consideration, determined to propose to Catharine that she should retain
Oczakoff, but that the fortifications should be razed; and despatches drafted
in this sense were laid before the Cabinet on April 15. The Duke of Leeds
refused to sign them, and permission was given by the King for Grenville to
sign instead. Six days later the Duke resigned the seals of the Foreign Office,
and they were given to Lord Grenville, the King saying to him that he was
influenced in his choice by the knowledge of his decided opinion how essential
peace was to the welfare of the country. Though the fortifications of Oczakoff
were not actually razed, peace resulted from this proposal; and Oczakoff is now
of little importance.
The Treaty of
Jassy was signed on January 9, 1792; and the conclusion of the war between
Russia and the Porte set the seal to Pitt’s aspirations for the settlement of
Europe. But for one dark cloud, the significance of which was not yet fully
apparent, a statesman might suppose that the peace of the world and the
predominance of England was secured for at least a generation. When Pitt became
Prime Minister England was isolated, nearly bankrupt, and of no account. In
eight years of marvellous government he had reestablished the finances of his
country, had killed the canker of smuggling, had made a firm alliance with two
progressive Powers, disregarding the advice of his Foreign Minister to connect
himself with the military despotisms of the north. By a commercial treaty with
France he had laid the foundations of a friendly understanding, with our
hereditary enemy. At the risk of war he had crushed the blundering and untoward
ambition of Spain, and prevented, by a rare prescience, the natural expansion
of Canada from being thwarted in a vital point. By a firm countenance at
Reichenbach he had stopped a war between Austria and Prussia, and had then,
partly by persuasion and partly by a show of force, constrained warring nations
to clasp hands, Sweden and Russia at Werela, Austria and the Porte at Sistova,
Russia and the Porte at Jassy. At little over thirty years of age the young
Minister could look with pride on a pacified Europe and a dominant England,
which no one could now say was overshadowed by the preponderance of France.
But vain are the previsions of man! In a moment this fair fabric was to be
swept i away by a
cataclysm.
The character of the Minister was to be ehaiiged and his reputation to be
tarnished. As Macaulay tells us, the man whose name, if he had died in 1792,
would have been associated with peace, with freedom and philanthropy, with
temperate reform, with mild and constitutional administration, lived to
associate his name v,' Mi arbitrary government, with harsh laws harshly
executed, and with the most costly and most sanguinary wars of modem times. 1
He lived to be held up to jbloquy as the stem oppressor of England and the
indefatigable disturber of Europe. All this arose from the war with
revolutionary Prance, which was declared against England by the French on
February 1, 1793* and continued, with a short break, till 1815, nine years
after Pitt had been laid in his grave.
We see from
the letter of George III quoted above—and this view might be enforced by
abundant evidence—that the policy of England had been to enforce a strict
neutrality from the first outbreak of the Revolution. England knew nothing of
the Declaration of Pillnitz; when requested in 1791 to join a coalition
against France, she had positively refused to do so. She was one of the first
to recognise the Constitution of 1791. In 1792 she took measures for reducing
her armaments by sea and land; and, when France declared against the Emperor,
she took every pains to assert her neutrality. Six months later she rejected
overtures from the French Princes for simila; reasons. In July, 1792, when war
had broken out, and the French government wished Great Britain to mediate in
the interests of peace, Chauvelin, the French ambassador, was informed that the
King desired to preserve the present harmony, that he would never refuse to
help in making peace, but that his intervention in the present state of war
would be of no use unless it were done at the request of all the parties
interested. His attitude of absolute neutrality was maintained up to August
10. Grenville wrote to Lord Gower on August 9 that Great Britain had been
strictly neutral during the last four years, and that any departure from this
attitude would only commit the King’s name in a business in which he had
hitherto kept himself unengaged, without any reasonable ground of its producing
a good effect. With this view Pitt completely agreed.
The friendly
character of the relations between the two governments is further shown by the
instructions which the Marquis de Chauvelin received, when sent as ambassador
to England, the document being dated April 19,1792. Although Chauvelin was the
official head of the French Mission, the most important member of it was
Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun, who was debarred from open recognition as having
been a member of the ConstUuante. Chauvelin was instructed to secure, not only
the neutrality of E gland,1 but if possible her friendship and
alliance. He was charged to use every argument to keep England out of the
coalition against France, and to induce her to join in a mutual guarantee of
each other’s possessions. He was to propose a continuation of the
1792]
291
Commercial
Treaty of 1786. He was, if possible, to obtain a loan of £3,000,000 or
<£*4,000,000 under the guarantee of the English government, and was to
offer in return the cession of the island of Tobago, which had been for twenty
years (1763-83) under British rule, and was in consequence very largely
inhabited by English.
After August
10 tbe aspect of affairs was entirely changed. Louis was a prisoner in the
Temple, and the royal authority was in abeyance. The impression which these
events made upon the English government may be gauged by the effect which they
produced upon Chauvelin himself. He wrote to Lord Grenville that criminal and
disastrous events had taken place in Paris, that-the security of the National
Assembly had been violated, that men of violent passions had led the multitude
astray. He begged the King of England to use all his influence to prevent the
armies of the enemy from invading French ter. fcory, giving occasion for new
excesses, and compromising still further tbe liberty, the safety, and even the
existence of the King and his family. No sooner had he sent this despatch than
he discovered b mistake. He called on Pitt, with much agitation, and requested
that the note might be returned to him and never mentioned. It was returned;
but a copy was first taken.
It can
scarcely be wondered that under these circumstances the Cabinet determined to
recall Lord Gower from Paris. Grenville was not present at the Council; but
Pitt, Richmond, Chatham, Hawkesbury, and Dundas, all agreed. The language they
used was dignified: “ Under the present circumstances, as it appears that the
executive power has been withdrawn from His Most Christian Majesty, the
credentials under which your excellency has hitherto acted can be no longer
available; and His Majesty judges it proper on this account, as well as
conformable to the principle of neutrality which His Majesty has hitherto
observed, that you should no longer remain at Paris. It is therefore His
Majesty’s pleasure that you should quit it and repair to England as soon as you
conveniently can after procuring the necessary passports. In conversation,
state that His Majesty intends to remain neutral as to the internal government
of France; that it is no deviation from this that he should manifest his
solicitude for the personal situation of Their Most Christian Majesties, and
that he earnestly and anxiously hopes they will at least be secure from any
acts of violence, which could not fail to produce one universal sentiment of
indignation through every country in Europe.” In a circular to foreign
ministers, dated August 21, George III again asserted his neutrality; and
Lebrun, writing from Paris on August 23, although regretting Lord Gower’s
recall, declared himself glad to receive the King’s assurance.
George III
was quite in agreement with the views of his Cabinet in the recall of Lord
Gower, and was of opinion that the effect produced on the mind of Chauvelin by
the events of August 10 was an additional justification for the step. He writes
from Weymouth, August 18,4 p.m.,
“ The drafts
to Lord Gower arid Mr Lindsay transmitted to me by Mr Secretary Dundas, which
were drawn in consequence of a Cabinet meeting, have my fullest approbation. I
perfectly subscribe to the opinion that the note delivered by Mr Chauvelin
renders the measures more necessary. I see no objection to the sending copies
of them to him with a note acknowledging the receipt of his note.” If Lord
Gower had been continued in Paris new credentials must have been made out, and
the government to which they were addressed must have been recognised by the
British government. But there was no government in France which we could
recognise at that time. The Executive Council was only provisional ; the King
was only provisionally suspended from his functions; the Legislative Assembly
was on the point of dissolution, and the National Convention was not yet
summoned. The question, whether we should or should not have opened diplomatic
relations with the French Republic when it was duly constituted, is quite
distinct from the question whether we should have kept an ambassador in Paris
when all government was in a state of transition and flux. The ambassadors of
nearly all the other Powers left Paris at the same time. If Great Britain had
not recalled her ambassador in August it is not probable that she would have
allowed him to remain after the massacre of September, especially when it is
considered that the Duke of Dorset had left Paris in 1789 from apprehensions of
his personal safety.
Although Lord
Gower was recalled from Paris, Chauvelin still remained in London. It has been
said that, although he was disowned by Ministers, he knew himself to be on good
terms with the Opposition, and that he stayed in England that he might be a
centre of intrigue. His despatches give little countenance to this' idea; and
Talleyrand was too well acquainted with the principles of party government in
England to have given it his approval; When war between England and France
became imminent, Chauvelin held some communication with the Opposition by
means of Sheridan, who visited h m secretly. But, so long as there was a hope
of peace and even of alliance between the two countries, his object was to
avoid all suspicion of the kind. His real fear was lest, if he asked permission
to present his letters of recall, the King should refuse to receive him, and
thus the rupture would be brought about which he and his employers were most
anxious to avoid. He writes to the Foreign Minister, Lebrun, on August 31, “It
would be natural to recall me, as the English have recalled Lord Gower, and I
should be glad to go, but let me make the following observation. Lord Gower’s
recall is due only to the motive of dMicatesse monarchique. We have no such
reason; we wish to preserve the best intelligence with England. Besides Mr
Lindsay remains. It might be difficult for you to draw up my letters of recall,
or for me to present them. How very bad if I were refused an audience ! what a
triumph for our enemies! All the friends we have in England are agreed upon
this point.”
The King
stayed at Weymouth from the middle of August to the end of September, during
which time home politics were in abeyance, but events were moving rapidly in
France. On September 20 the cannonade of Valmy announced, as Goethe said to
those who heard it, the birth of a new era; on October 23 a salvo of artillery
all along the French frontier celebrated the liberation of the soil of France
from the invading enemy; before the end of September the French armies had
marched across the border. Nice was taken on September 28, Speier on September
30. The attacked became the aggressors; and the new Republic entered upon a
victorious course of mingled conquest and propaganda. These successes did not
appear to affect British interests until Dumouriez began to overrun Belgium.
The battle of Jemappes was fought on November 6; and on November 14 the capture
of Brussels laid the whole of the Austrian Netherlands at his feet. These
victories encouraged the French to take a higher tone. Chauvelin, who had
avoided going to Court lest he should be badly received, now asked his
government for credentials as Minister of the Republic. He wrote to Lebrun on
November 3, that the time had come to treat openly with England, and that he
wished for positive instructions. It was possible that Britain might overlook
the conquest of Belgium, but the slightest attempt upon Holland must summon her
to arms. The French, however, so little understood the real nature of the
crisis, that Maret, arriving in England on November 8, having just quitted the
victorious Dumouriez, told Chauvelin that the General had spoken with a light
heart of throwing a few shells into Maastricht; but Chauvelin had sense enough
to point out that this would make war with England inevitable.
Maret,
writing from London, explains the situation to Lebrun. He urges him to warn
Dumouriez that if he attacks Holland it will certainly mean war with England.
He says that war is dreaded by the City, even if the government desire to
distract the attention of the people from domestic affairs, and that Dumouriez,
as a “philosopher-general,” will not be insensible to these arguments: that he
will prefer the hope of a general peace to an additional triumph. He adds, with
cynical acuteness: “ Whether the state of our finances makes it impossible for
us to go to war, or the fear of letting loose upon society a mob of the
unemployed by disbanding our armies makes peace impossible, in either case the
attitude of England towards us is of the first importance. If we wish for
peace, let us make an alliance with England ; if we desire war, let us attempt
to form a connexion which will diminish the number of our enemies, and which
may embroil England with Spain. Chauvelin, good fellow as he is, is impossible
here. Send Barthelemy as ambassador extraordinary, and someone else as
subordinate agent. I should be very happy to take this post. Nominate Chauvelin
to some first-rate position. Noel could replace Barthelemy in Switzerland.” If
this advice had been
adopted—and
such was very nearly being the case—peace between the two countries would most
probably have been preserved.
We now come
to the two acts of the French government which formed . the strongest grievance
on the English side, and which are generally considered as the true causes of
the war: the decree of November 19, and the opening of the navigation of the
Scheldt. The decree of November 19 was passed, apparently in great haste, under
the following circumstances. In the middle of the sitting, Ruhl rose and stated
that the district of Darmstadt, which by the Treaty of Ryswick ought to belong
to France, had assumed the national cockade and asked to become French. The
Duke of Zweibriicken had sent an army to stop the movement. “The citizens of
the duchy of Limburg in the district of Darmstadt ask our protection against
the invasion of the despots. Also the Club of the Friends of Liberty and
Equality, established at Mayence, have written to ask whether you will grant
protection to the people of Mayence, or abandon them to the mercy of the
despots who threaten them.” He ended with these words, “ Je demande, moi, que
vous declariez que les peuples qui voudront Jratemiser avec nous serontproteges
par la nation Franqaise” This proposition, it will be seen, is merely
defensive. Fermont moved that the proposition of Ruhl be referred to the
Diplomatic Committee, which ought to determine Whether France should not only
protect but guarantee the liberty of the neighbouring peoples, and this
proposition was supported by Legendre. Brissot said that the Diplomatic
Committee was intending to report on this subject on the Friday following. When
Ruhl urged the cause of the “people of Mayence,” Brissot asked that the
principle of the decree should be voted immediately. At last, Larevelliere-Lepeaux, that distinguished member of the
Directory, who complained that it was so hard to found a new religion to take
the place of Christianity, proposed and carried the following decree: “ La
Convention Nationals declare au nom de la Nation Frangaise qu’elle accordera Jraternite
et secours a tous les peuples qui voudront recouvrer lew liberty, et charge le
pouvobr eoccactif de donner aux generaux les ordres nicessaires pour porter
secours a ces peuples et defendre les dtoyens qui auraient ete vexes, ou qui
pourraient Vetre pour la came de la liberty.” Sergent then
proposed that this decree should be translated and printed in all languages.
The Convention then proceeded to other business. Such is the history of this
famous decree. A few isolated facts reported by a member were made the occasion
for asserting a number of generalities; and the decree, hastily passed, went
even beyond the intention of those who proposed it.
The second
grievance of the English government against the Republic was the opening of the
Scheldt by the French on their occupation of Belgium. Britain appealed on the
one side to the law of nations, they on the other to the law of nature. Both
these appeals may be disregarded. The treaty of 1788 bound us to protect the
Dutch possessions
from attack
or from the threat of attack. But in this instance the Dutch did not protest
against French action, nor did they call upon us for assistance. It was a
matter with which we had no immediate concern. In fact, negotiations were being
opened between the Dutch and a French envoy at the time when the war eventually
broke out. The idea of opening the Scheldt to commerce was not new. It had
been, as we have seen, threatened by Joseph II, and was only laid aside in
consequence of French persuasion. We had offered to support the pretensions of
the Emperor if he would give up his alliance with France. This had been done
while Pitt was Prime Minister. It was scarcely reasonable to regard as an
insult to England, when adopted by one Power, the policy which we had ourselves
favoured in the case of another. The opening of the Scheldt was announced to
Chauvelin by Lebrun on November 27. He says: “No injury is done to the rights
of the Dutch. Our reasons are that the river takes its rise in France, and that
a nation which has obtained its liberty cannot recognise a system of feudalism,
much less submit to it.”
On the very
date of the decree, November 19, Chauvelin wrote to Lord Grenville asking for a
few moments’ conversation, at any time or in any place he might appoint, either
in town or country. Grenville replied stiffly on the 21st, saying that he must,
under the circumstances, request M. Chauvelin to explain the object of the
conference he desires. Chauvelin wrote on the following day, that he thought
the proposed interview would have produced favourable results, but that if Lord
Grenville thinks otherwise he will not insist upon it. A week later Grenville
wrote that he would not'refuse the conversation, and appointed a meeting at the
Foreign Office on the next day at noon. In this interview Chauvelin said that
circumstances changed rapidly in France; hence he could only say now that when
he made his first request he was aathorised to contradict the reports which
prevailed in London of an intention of the French to attack Holland; that he
could then have renewed the assurances which he had before given of his
country’s disposition to respect the neutral Powers, but that since this he
had seen the note delivered by Lord Auckland to the States General, and had
yesterday heard that two French ships had been fired at by the Dutch in the
Scheldt. He could not say what effect such an aggression on the part of the
Dutch might produce, but that the most earnest wish of all the French was to
cultivate peace and friendship with England. He spoke of the opening of the
Scheldt as a thing determined upon; that it was a natural right which the
French had acquired by the conquest of Brabant. He endeavoured to obtain an
admission, expressed or implied, that the treaty between England and Holland did
not extend to that point. Grenville answered that he would have liked more
positive assurances, but that the King was resolved to maintain inviolate all
the rights of his country, and those of its allies.
The main
object of the French government at this time was that England should recognise
the Republic. If this were done, everything could be arranged. Maret,
afterwards the trusted servant of Napoleon, was in London at this time, and has
left us an account of two interviews, one with William Smith, a Liberal member
of Parliament, and the other with Pitt himself. From the first he derived the
impression that England had negotiated with Spain, of which no evidence exists
in the Record Office; that Pitt was extremely reluctant to go to war, which was
true; and that the recognition of the French Republic was not at all unlikely,
which was true also. At the second interview, Pitt began by speaking of his
fear about Holland, of his determination to support the allies of England, and
to enforce the rigorous execution of treaties which united her with other
Powers. He expressed a sincere desire to avoid a war which would be fatal to
the repose and to the prosperity of the two nations, and asked if the same
desire was shared by the French government. Maret gave satisfactory assurances
of this; and Pitt said that, if the French government would authorise someone
to confer with the English Cabinet, someone with whom they could communicate
cordially and frankly, they would be disposed to listen to him and to treat him
with cordiality and confidence. Maret said that in this case England would have
to recognise the Republic; but Pitt replied that this course must be avoided,
as Maret thought, to spare the susceptibilities of the King. Pitt added, “ Do
not reject this offer and we will examine everything carefully.” Maret said
that he would urge Lebrun to send someone. Pitt replied, “Why not yourself?
Write at once to Paris; moments are precious.” This Maret promised to do. Pitt
again spoke of Holland; and, as Maret was going- away, Pitt called him back and
referred to the question of the Scheldt. Maret avoided discussion upon this
point, and Pitt mentioned the decree of November 19. Maret explained that it
only applied to Powers at war with France; upon which Pitt cried, “If an
interpretation of this kind were possible the effect would be excellent.” Maret
assured Pitt that the government had nothing to do with the decree; that it was
the work of a few exalted spirits made in a burst of enthusiasm, and without
discussion. Pitt concluded by urging Maret not to lose a moment in
communicating with Lebrun. We learn from this that at the beginning of December
peace was quite possible; that it was ardently desired by Pitt; that the
burning question was the invasion of Holland; and that other matters might have
been satisfactorily arranged.
Miles wrote
on December 3 that he had found Maret affable, frank, and communicative, that
he had been well received by Pitt, who appeared to be equally well pleased with
him. Their conversation had been very long, and Maret had assured Pitt that
instructions had been sent to Dumouriez to be circumspect in his conduct
towards the Dutch, and to make no attack either on the sovereignty, or the
privileges, or the
independence
of that people. The next day, however, Maret said to Miles, in a fit of
despair, “Peace is out of the question. We have 300,000 men in arms. We must
make them march as far as their legs will carry them, or they will return and
cut our throats.” Still efforts were made on both sides which might have been
successful. On December 7 Lebrun determined to move Chauvelin to the Hague, and
to authorise Maret to treat secretly with the English government. He presented
his project to the Cornell Executif Provisoire, but it was rejected. Further
conference with Pitt was not declined; but Chauvelin, the accredited Minister,
was to be the medium. On the English side, the resumption of diplomatic
relations with France was pressed upon the government by the Opposition, and
was the subject of a special motion by Fox. We find in the Record Office the
imperfect drafts of two letters, probably intended for Mr Lindsay. The first
letter says: “It having been judged advisable by the King’s servants that you
should proceed to Paris with a view to the opening of such a communication and
to the obtaining such explanations as appear highly important at the present
moment for the general advantage of Europe, as well as for the interests of
this country and of France, I have thought it right to entrust you with this
letter, which you may show as your authority for entering into all such
conferences and discussions as may be necessary for these purposes.” The second
letter recommends to the particular attention of the envoy the procuring the
best possible information about the real state of France; the condition of the
interior of the Provinces, that of Paris, the degree of stability which the
republican form of government may appear to have acquired from the late
successes, the disposition, character, and weight of the persons who conduct
the public measures in the Council and the Convention, the state and amount of
their naval preparations, and their prospects in point of finance. The envoy is
also to provide for secret inteUigence in case of war.
Events moved
rapidly towards war. The condition of Europe made it advisable to call out the
militia; and Parliament, which by statute must be summoned soon after this
measure, met on December 13. The next day, Maret, by the advice of Miles, had a
second interview with Pitt; but the Minister declined to discuss State affairs,
or to give any answer as to whether he would see Chauvelin. On December 27
Chauvehn communicated to Grenville the explanations which Lebrun had ordered
him to present. He says that, by the decree of November 19, the National
Convention never meant that the Republic should espouse the quarrels of a few
seditious persons, or should endeavour to excite disturbances in any neutral or
friendly country. The decree is only applicable to those people, who, after
having acquired their liberty by conquest, may have demanded the fraternity and
the assistance of the Republic by the solemn and unequivocal expression of the
general will. France undertakes not to attack Holland so long as she confines
herself
within the
limits of an exact neutrality. The opening of the Scheldt cannot with any
justice be made a cams belli.
The answer,
dated December 81, bears throughout the stamp of the stern and haughty.style of
William Pitt. It states that in the decree of November 19 all England saw the
formal declaration of a design to extend universally the new principles adopted
in France, and to encourage disorder and revolt in all countries, even in those
which are neutral. “ England cannot consider such an explanation as satisfactory,
but must look upon it as a fresh avowal of those dispositions which she sees
with so just an uneasiness and jealousy. With regard to the Scheldt, France can
have no right to annul existing stipulations, unless she also have the right to
set aside equally the other treaties, between all Powers of Europe, and all the
other rights of England arid her allies. She can have no pretence to interfere
in the question of opening the Scheldt, unless she were the sovereign of the
Low Countries, Or had the right to dictate laws to Europe. England will never
consent that France shall arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure, and
under the pretence of a pretended natural right, of which sht makes herself the
only judge, the political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties and
guaranteed hy the consent of all the Powers. This government, adhering to the
ma ’ms which it has followed for more than a century, will also never see with
indifference that France shall make herself, either directly Or indirectly, the
sovereign of the Low Countries, or general arbiter of the rights and liberties
of Europe. If France is really desirous of maintaining peace and friendship
with England, she must show herself disposed to renounce her views of
aggression and aggrandisement, and to confine herself within her own territory,
without insulting other governments, without disturbing their tranquillity,
without violating their rights.” In these sentences is contained the whole case
of England against the encroachments of the Revolution and the conquests of
Napoleon.
We leam from
Miles that Chauvelin dreaded going back to Paris, and urged the Executive
Council to insist upon his being received and acknowledged as Minister
Plenipotentiary from the Republic. His letters of credence were despatched on
January 7, 1793, and an interview was accorded. Grenville said that he must
refer the matter to his colleagues; and on January 20 Chauvelin received a
reply which must have removed any lingering doubt. He had written to ask,
first, whether his letters of credence would be received; and, secondly,
whether the provisions of the Alien Act were to apply to him or not; even in
his present position, to regard him as subject to this law, would be an insult
to his nation. Lord Grenville answers that his letters of credence cannot be
received; that, as Minister from the Most Christian King, he would have enjoyed
all the exemptions which the law grants to public Ministers, but that, as a
private person, he cannot but return to the general mass of foreigners
resident in
England. Louis XVI was executed on January 21, the news reached London at five
o’clock on January 23. On the following day Chauvelin was peremptorily bidden
by an Order in Council to leave the kingdom. He wrote on receiving the order
that it was an unexpected step, and would certainly be regarded as a
declaration for war.
If the
government had waited a little longer this measure would have been unnecessary,
for, on January 22, Chauvelin had been ordered by his own government to leave
London without delay. Dumouriez had persuaded the Executive Council to recall
him, and to send Maret in his place, with a view to Dumouriez proceeding
himself to England at a later period. Chauvelin met the courier conveying this
despatch at Blackheath. It ordered him to send a note to Lord Grenville, saying
that the French are still willing to avoid a rupture, and to preserve a good
intelligence; but this was now out of the question. Maret passed Chauvelin on
the way from Paris to Calais, close to Montreuil. He and his servants were
asleep in their carriages and did not notice Chauvelin’s liveries, so that it
was not until his arrival at Dover on the 29th that he heard of Chauvelin’s
dismissal. Whatever instructions had been given to him were now useless. Maret
reached London on January 30. On the following day he told Miles that France
would relinquish the Scheldt in a manner perfectly satisfactory to England,
would give up Nice and Mainz, renounce the Belgic Provinces, and find a method
which would release Savoy: from being any longer a part of French territory;
she would also withdraw her troops from Belgium, and consent to a general
peace, provided that the Powers would defray in part the expenses of the war.
Maret was to offer himself as negotiator, in the first instance, to arrange the
terms, and that, when he had settled these with the British ministry,
Dumouriez, who he hoped would be well received, would receive full powers to
sign and exchange; that the object of his mission was peace with England.
Maret, not
knowing what effect the dismissal of Chauvelin might have in France, resolved
not to demand an interview with Pitt until fresh instructions arrived from
Paris. He therefore contented himself with sending a note to Lord Grenville to
announce his arrival in England. In the meantime Chauvelin had reached Paris,
and his report decided the vacillating Committee. On February 1 war was
declared by the French against England and Holland. On February 9 George III
wrote to Lord Grenville as follows: “ The confirmation of the step taken by the
faction that governs in France, of jointly declaring war against this kingdom
and the Dutch Republic, is highly agreeable to me, as the mode adopted seems
well calculated to rouse such a spirit in this country, that I trust will curb
the insolence of those despots, and be a means of restoring some degree of
order to that unprincipled country, whose aim at present is to destroy the
foundations of every civilised State.”
THE EUROPEAN
POWERS AND THE EASTERN QUESTION.
- The iighteenth century witnessed a
number of changes of the first magnitude in the international relations of
Europe;' At the very beginning of the century Spain, deprived'of the
Netherlands and of its Italian provinces, passed from the House of Habsburg,
which had held it for.nearly two centuries, to a youhger line of the
Bourbons." After an interval of alienation the new dynasty ■■
became a partner in a family compact which made Spain the more or less
subservient ally of France. Almost at the same time a curiously similar decline
is to be traced in the United Provinces, which had risen to extraordinary
prominence, and had developed a military and naval power out of all proportion
to their internal resources, first in a successful rebellion against Spanish
domination, and later in an equally brilliant struggle against the aggressive
policy of France.; While Spain became bound to France by dynastic ties and by
common antagonism to England, the Dutch Rfepublic came to depend for its
security upon the support and guidance of Great Britain. Thus > two of the
great. Powers of the seventeenth century sank in the eighteenth to the position
of minor States.
These changes
in the south and wefet were accompanied or followed by., equally momentous and
unforeseen changes- in the north and east. Prussia under Frederick the Great
was enabled by a great demonstration of military strength and skill not only to
dispute with Austria the hegemony in Germany, but to assume a place among the
dominant States of Europe. Sweden, which for nearly a century, had been the
strongest and most adventurous of the Baltic Powers, fell after the death of
the last of her warrior Kings under the rule of a selfish and factious
oligarchy. Her inevitable decline under these conditions was accelerated by the
rapid rise of an eastern State which had hitherto been regarded as
semi-barbarous and practically outside the European system. That Russia, in
spite of the frequency of domestic quarrels and dynastic revolutions during the
forty years which followed the death of Peter the Great} should yet have become
at the dose of those years the most powerful and influential State in Europe,
is one of the most surprising
1756-90] European relations in the eighteenth
century. 307
facts in the
history of the . eighteenth century. Nor! is surprise lessened by the
consideration that this development was regarded with jealous misgivings by all
the other Powers of Europe except England, and that Russia reached the zenith
of her importance under the rule of a sovereign who was not a' Russian by
birth, or breeding, but a princess of a petty German Court, who came to the
country as the wife of the heir to the throne and ascended that throne on thie
murder of her husband, When the circumstances of Catharine ITs origin and
accession are taken into account, she must be placed even above Frederick the
Great as the most t'emarkable and successful ruler of her generation. '
The series of
political changes was completed by the termination in 1756 of the
long-continued animosity between France arid Austria, and the conclusion!of
that unequal and uneasy alliance between the two States which the marriage of
Marie-Antoinette with the ill-fated Louis XVI was intended to strengthen. From
this time is to;be noted a complete, shifting of the centre of gravity in-
European politics from the west to the east., It is true that the rivalry of
England arid France continued; but this rivalry was mainly non-European, though
it had some bearing on continental politics*! partly owing to the complicated
relations in which France was involved by her past history,: and partly because
the English King was also a German Elector. But apart from this, a survivor'
from the seventeenth century, or even from the days of the Spanish Succession
War, could hardly have traced any familiar landmarks in the years from 1756 to
1790. The old battle-grounds in Italy and the Netherlands were left in perfect
peace. The main strings of diplomacy were no longer pulled from Versailles,
Madrid, and the ,Hague, but from St Petersburg, Berlin, and Vienna. Even
France, so long the predominant State 'n Europe, fell comparatively into the
background.;
This was no
doubt partly due to the military disasters and humiliation of the Seven Years’
War; but it was also the result of the radically false position in which France
was placed by her adhesion to an obsolete line of policy in Eastern Europe. For
generations it had. been the interest of France to hamper -the action of
Austria by ,maintaining a close connexion with the Powers which were most
immediately hostile to Habsburg aggrandisement. - Sweden, Poland, and Turkey,
had been moved, sometimes singly* sometimes more or less collectively, as
French pawns in the great, game of international politics. It is obvious at a
glance how completely the value of these pieces was altered by the appearance
of Russia on the board. Sweden blocked Russia’s way to the Baltic; Poland stood
between Russia and central Europe; Turkey held the provinces which Russia must
conquer before she could expand to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Every
step which Russia took in advance was taken at the expense of one or other of
these client States .of France ; and every such step diminished their utility
to their western patron. A great statesman might have found an escape from the
awkward
dilemma in which' France was placed by Russian progress. But the ministers who
guided the destinies of France in the earlier half of the eighteenth centuiy
could do nothing but cling blindly to past traditions. Yet French intervention
did nothing but harm to Sweden and Poland, and in 1739 only succeeded in
postponing the partition of Turkey. On the other hand French hostility drove
Russia into a somewhat unnatural alliance with Austria, which lasted almost continuously
from 1726 to 1762 and produced many momentous consequences to Europe. The
climax of confusion was reached when the second Treaty of Versailles in 1757
brought France into actual cooperation with the Power which she had so long
and so ineffectually endeavoured to check. As the ally of Austria and
indirectly of France, Russia occupied Polish Prussia during the Seven Years’
War, in defiance of the traditional policy which France had hitherto pursued.
And yet that traditional policy continued to be maintained by the French
Foreign Office. The penalty for such folly and indecision was incurred in the
first Partition of Poland, which annihilated French influence and prestige in
Eastern Europe.
It was in the
reign of Catharine II that the Eastern Question became for the first time the
main pivot of European politics. The need of gaining the affection of her
Russian subjects compelled her to pose as the enthusiastic champion of the
Greek Church, and to carry on the traditional Russian policy of expansion in the
direction of Poland and Turkey. From the first she gained striking and rapid
successes. She secured the Polish crown for Stanislas Poniatowski; she
frustrated the attempt to restore Polish independence by a reform of the
anarchical constitution; she enforced the acceptance of the Partition of 1772;
and she extorted from the defeated and exhausted Turks the Treaty of Kutschuk
Kainardji, which gave independence to the Tartar Khanates of the Crimea and the
Kuban, and recognised Russia as the champion of the Christian subjects of the
Porte. The series of triumphs, which gave to Catharine a dominant voice in the
affairs of Europe, was due to the adroit use which she made of the bitter
enmity between Austria and Prussia. A combination o£ her two powerful neighbours
would have been fatal to Catharine’s schemes; and she did all in her power,
first to prevent such an alliance, and later, when it was actually formed, to
divert its attention to a scene of action as far as possible distant from
Russia. But for a lortg time such an alliahce seemed to be removed from
practical politics, partly because of inevitably jarring interests in Germany,
and partly owing to the memory of that desperate struggle for Silesia which had
persisted through two great European wars. So long as this animosity lasted—and
it seemed likely to endure as long as the quarrel between England and
France—Catharine’s policy was to play off one State against the other by
bribing each alternately to become her accomplice. It was this adroit but
unscrupulous policy which familiarised Europe
1764-80]
The Russian alliance with Prussia.
309
with
the later conception of the Balance of Power; namely, that the great States
might freely annex the territory of their lesser neighbours, provided their
acquisitions were of equal extent or value. The precedent established in the
successive partitions of Poland was only too faithfully followed in many
readjustments of the political map during the wars with revolutionary Prance. ;
Of the two
Powers with which Catharine had more immediately to deal, Austria, as the ruler
of a large Slav population, had the more direct interest in opposing the growth
of a great Slav empire on her immediate frontier. Maria Theresa in her later
years was keenly conscious of this danger, and desired alike to support Poland
as a buffer State and to maintain the integrity of Turkey. Catharine was thus
driven to turn to Prussia, and in 1764 concluded with Frederick a defensive
treaty for eight years, which was afterwards renewed for a similar period. This
alliance led her to support Prussia in opposing the claims of Austria to the
Bavarian Succession; and the Treaty of Teschen, which in 1779 repudiated these
claims, was concluded under the guarantee of Russia. But Frederick, although
the Russian alliance was rendered necessary to him by the exhaustion of his
dominions after the agony of the Seven Years’ War, by the rupture with England
which followed the fall of the elder Pitt, and by the impotence of France, was
by no means a subservient or an enthusiastic supporter of Russian interests.
On the contrary, it was the general opinion of diplomatists that Prussian
influence was dominant at St Petersburg, and that Count Panin, Catharine’s
chief minister, was in receipt of regular pay from Frederick. In the first
great crisis of Catharine’s reign, when her intervention in Poland led to the
outhreak of a Turkish war (1768), Frederick had not hesitated to check Russian
ambition by a significant parade of a possible approximation between Prussia
and Austria. In 1769 and 1770 he held his two famous interviews with Joseph II;
and the risk of active opposition from Austria and of very inadequate support
from Prussia greatly contributed towards inducing Catharine to consent to
partition Poland, instead of adhering to her previous policy of making Poland a
vassal of Russia. And at the same time Frederick had done little or nothing to
prevent the one great reverse which Russian policy experienced, when the first
coup d'etat of Gustavus III (1772) overthrew the Swedish oligarchy and freed
the monarchy from the intolerable limitations imposed upon it during the two
previous reigns. Thus Catharine had good reason to doubt the utility of the
Prussiar alliance; and the influence of Panin was gradually supplanted by that
of Potemkin, who held out to his mistress the attractive scheme of extending
Russian dominion to the mouths of the southern rivers, and of expelling the
Turks to make room for a revived Greek empire in Constantinople. For such a
scheme more strenuous support was needed than could be expected from Prussia.
Frederick dep'red, not to aggrandise Russia, but to check
the
restless ambition of Austria. With this end in view he actually proposed to
include Turkey, and possibly either France or England, in a common league with
Russia and Prussia. Panin could hardly hope to commend this plan to Catharine,
nor could he even obtain a renewal of the Prussian alliance of 1764, which was
to expire in
1780. . „ :
At this
juncture a favourable opportunity presented itself for renewing the former
alliance between Russia and Austria. For many years there had been serious
differences On both foreign and domestic politics in the Court of Vienna.
Joseph II, who since his father’s. death in 1765 had been Emperor and joint
ruler of the Austrian dominions, was by no means in accord with the cautious
and conservative policy of his mother. He was eager to restore the prestige
of'Austria, and to deprive Prussia of the pfroiid position to which it had so
suddenly been raised. It is true that he admi r ed and consciously sought to
imitate Frederick the Great; he did soj however, not slavishly, but in the
spirit of a rival, who seeks to master the secret of another’s success in order
that he may emulate and surpass his model. His domestic.reforms he had perforce
to postpone till his mother’s death should give him, a free hand; but this made
him all the more persistent in his foreign policy, in which he' was encouraged
by the suppor of Kaunitz. The partition of Poland was repugnant both to the
principles and to the; policy of Maria Theresa; but her scruples were overcome
by the argumeiit that if Austria held aloof Poland would still be sacrificed,
and Austria: would get nothing to counterbalance the gains of her rivals. In
the end, on the express ground that it was not worth while to lose a reputation
for honourable conduct on account of a petty profit, Austria succeeded in
securing the richest share of the spoil. When Russia concluded the advantageous
Treaty of Kutschuk Kainardj i, Austria consoled herself by. seizing the
territory of the Bukowina, though she had no quarrel with, the , Turks, and had
even promised three years before to maintain their cause. The chief
responsibility for these discreditable transactions rests upon; Joseph'and Kaunitz
;; and it was they who prepared and broiight forward the
preposterous claims upon Bavaria on the extinction of the Bavarian branch of
the House of Wittelsbach. But the repulse which they met with at:the Congress
of Teschen convinced them that thieir plans could never prosper until they had
dissolved the alliance between Russia and Prussia. This conviction was
strengthened by the growing coolness between Austria and France. Vergennes, who
became Foreign Minister on the accession of Louis XVI, had previously held the
French embassy at Constantinople, and had there seen clearly the disastrous
results to French interests in the East which had resulted from the Treaty! of
Versailles. A foremost object! of his administration was to free Fiance from
:the excessive subservience to Austrian interests which had prevailed during
the later-years of Louis XV. This determination was c’ sclosed to the world
when - Louis XVI refused to countenance the
1780-4] Alliance between
Russia arid Austria.
311
Bavarian
claims of his brother-in-law, and France joined with Russia in guaranteeing the
Treaty of Teschen. , .
Thus by 1780
conditions were prepared for that Austro-Russian alliance which was a dominant
factor in European politics for the next decade, and very nearly led to the
outbreak of a great European war. In June, 1780, Joseph met, Catharine at
Mohileff; and, in order to complete his acquaintance with the Russian Court,
he subsequently followed the Czarina to St Petersburg. On November 29 the death
of Maria Theresa removed the last obstacle in the way of a complete reversal of
recent Austrian policy. In May, 1781, Joseph and Catharine exchanged formal
letters, by which it was agreed that Austria should support Russia in
compelling Turkey to fulfil its treaty obligations, and in case of war should
employ an equal force either in coercing the Turks or in resisting any other
Power which should interfere as their ally. Russia on the other hand was
pledged to maintain the Pragmatic Sanction, and to defend the Austrian States
against attack. With these mutual obligations was combined the agreement, that
if either ally should gain any acquisition of territory the other should be
entitled to an equivalent.
Frederick the
Great was profoundly chagrincd at the turn which affairs had taken. The
termination of his long alliance with Russia was in itself a serious matter ;
but it was far worse that the advantage which he had lost was transferred to
his one irreconcilable enemy. But Frederick was growing old; he was isolated
both in Germany and in Europe; and for the moment he was powerless. France and
England were still engaged in the war which had arisen out of the American
rebellion; and, even if they had been free, Frederick had no great confidence
in either State. Both - Joseph and Catharine acted as if there was complete
security on the side of Prussia, In 1783, taking advantage of internal
disturbances among the Tartars, Russia annexed the Crimea; and early in the
following year Turkey was compelled by the Treaty of Constantinople to
acquiesce in the annexation: Austria, which under Maria Theresa would have
protested against such a breach of the Treaty of Kutschuk Kainardji, now massed
her troops on the Turkish frontier in order to compel the Porte, to yield.
Meanwhile, Joseph was pursuing with reckless haste a policy of domestic reform
and external aggression that excited the terrified wonder alike of foreign
States and of his own subjects. It is often suggested that the explanation of.
Joseph II’s actions is to be found in his descent from the House of Lorraine,
and his consequent freedom from the prejudices and nborn jharacteristics of the
Habsburgs. But after all Joseph was no more a Lorrainer than were his brother
and his nephew, and yet he differed from them almost as much as from his mother
or his maternal grandfather. His personality is unique in both the dynasties
from which he sprang, and it is difficult to assign any trait in his character
to the influence of heredity. Joseph II was that most dangerous of men, a
theorist in possession of absolute power. No
democrat
inspired with revolutionary fervour could show a more utter disregard of
precedent and tradition, of racial and geographical distinctions, of the
rights of property, and of ecclesiastical and social prejudices, than did this
holder of the oldest secular dignity in Christendom; He attributed the success
of Prussia to the way in which a uniform administration had remedied the
difficulties of geographical isolation. It was his desire to confer the same
boon upon the extraordinary combination of States and races which made up the
Austrian dominions. To do this he must sweep away national habits, provincial
privileges, judicial and other deep-rooted differences, and even distinctions
of language. The task was beyond the powers of any ruler, and probably of any
succession of rulers, and Joseph only reigned alone for ten years. It was no
justification of such chimerical designs that he gave himself up to the duties
of his office as no other ruler did, that he spent nothing on luxury or
personal indulgence, that he was guided neither by mistress nor by favourite,
and that his life was undoubtedly shortened by his self-sacrificing industry.
If Joseph II
may be credited with good intentions in his domestic government, the same
cannot be said of his foreign policy. No ruler in the eighteenth century was
more greedy of territory, or more reckless of the rights of other States and of
treaty obligations in the endeavour to satisfy his greed. He was equally ready
to seize the Danubian principalities from Turkey, to round off his kingdom of
Galicia at the expense of Poland, and to strengthen his dominions in Italy by
the annexation of Venetia. But the project to which he clung most tenaciously
was the acquisition of Bavaria. He could never revive his former claims; even
Russia would not allow the violation of the Treaty of Teschen : but he might
induce the Elector to exchange Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate for the
Austrian Netherlands. To make the bribe more tempting he did not hesitate to
quarrel with the Dutch, by repudiating the burdensome obligation of the barrier
treaty, advancing a claim to Maestricht, and announcing his intention of
opening the Scheldt to commerce. When all was ready he induced his Russian ally
to make overtures to Charles Theodore of Bavaria, who had no great reason to
love his recently acquired electorate and might easily be induced to give it up
for a richer kingdom in the west. But the bargain was not to be made without
effective protest. France was keenly interested in the United Provinces, where
Vergennes had gained a signal diplomatic triumph by restoring the preponderance
of the republican party against the House of Orange and the English alliance.
All that had been gained would have been lost if Joseph had been allowed to
dictate his own terms to the Dutch. And so for the second time since 1756
France interfered to thwart Austrian ambition; and by the Treaty of
Fontainebleau in 1785 Joseph had to withdraw his claim to Maestricht and renew
the treaty obligation to close the Scheldt.
Still more
humiliating was his failure in Germany. The union of Bavaria with Austria would
not only have altered the whole balance between north and south, between Roman
Catholicism and Protestantism, but would have given to the imperial ruler so
great a territorial preponderance as to endanger the independence of all
lesser Princes. Joseph had already inspired alarm by other acts. He had
procured the election of his brother Maximilian to the office of Coadjutor,
which carried with it the right of succession, in the archbishopric of Cologne
and the prince-bishopric of Munster, and had thus materially increased the
influence of his family in both the electoral and the princely College of the
Diet. Even the ecclesiastical States, so long the staunch supporters of the
Habsburgs, were not prepared to acquiesce in the establishment of a really
powerful monarchy in Germany, and preferred to abandon their religious
prejudices by forming a strong alliance with Protestant Prussia. Frederick the
Great saw the opportunity of emerging from the isolation in which he had been
left by the desertion of Russia, and eagerly put himself at the head of the
general hostility to Joseph’s scheme. The Fiirstenbund, the organisation of
which was the last great achievement of the Prussian King, was powerful enough
to prevent the carrying out of the projected exchange, and might, if
Frederick’s successor had possessed more character and capacity, have been the
foundation of a new German federation under Prussian headship.
Joseph II had
good reason to be bitterly disappointed. He had been loyal to Russia, and had
aided his ally to gain that secure footing on the Black Sea which had been so
long and so ardently desired. Already Sevastopol was being fortified, and a
Russian fleet was being built in its harbour. But, on the other hand, Austria
had failed to obtain Bavaria, which was to have been the equivalent to the
aggrandisement of Russia, and the hostile influence of Prussia had been
greatly increased by the League of Princes. Was it worth while to continue an
alliance which had hitherto been so unequal and to Austria so disastrous? This
was the momentous question with which Joseph and Kaunitz were ;onfronted in
1786 and the following year. If there had been any satisfactory alternative
combination, it is possible that they would have insisted upon modifying or
even abandoning the informal agreement of
1781. In any further partition of Turkey Russia
could hardly fail to obtain greater advantages than Austria could hope for; and
Joseph was fond of quoting a significant remark of Vergennes, “ How is compensation
to be given for Constantinople ? ”
But it was
almost impossible to find another alliance which offered any attraction to
Austria. Prussia, in the eyes of both Joseph and his Minister, was the
arch-enemy of Austria; and any alienation of Russia would reestablish the
intimacy between St Petersburg and Berlin which it had cost so much to disturb.
The French alliance, which Kaunitz regarded as the masterpiece of his
diplomacy, was still in existence.
But
France was no longer so submissive as in the past, and had openly opposed
Austria both in its Bavarian schemes and in the Netherlands. Joseph was,
indeed, so indignant at the recent action of his brother-in- law that, but for
the obvious danger of excessive dependence upon Russia, he would probably have
repudiated the French alliance altogether. Of the five Great Powers there
remained only'England,-which before! 1755 had been for several (generations
intimately associated with Austria. Even since.the rupture there had been
little'overt hostility between the two Powers. But there were two strong
arguments against a renewal of the English connexion. If it should prove
necessary under an altered system to oppose the advance of Russia in the East,
there was at this time little prospect that England would render effective
assistance. The Eastern Question had not as yet excited the keen attention of
English statesmen; and it was a tradition of the London Foreign Office to
regard Russia with peculiar favour. During the recent war with the Bourbon
States England had done all'in its power to conciliate Catharine II, and had
even gone so far as to offer to cede Minorca to Russia. And, since the
conclusion of peace in 1783, England had observed a benevolent neutrality at
the time of the annexation of the Crimea. Moreover* an English alliance would
almost inevitably involve a rupture with France and this again would
necessitate vastly increased expenditure for the defence o* the Netherlands and
of the Italian provinces of Austria. The security conferred upon these outlying
possessions by the Treaty of Versailles . (1756) had: always been:
regarded by Kaunitz as the primary justification of that Treaty. ' .
Such a survey
of European relations must inevitably have induced Joseph and Kaunitz to give a
longer trial to' the Russian alliance; and they were further impelled in the
same direction by the successive deaths of Frederick the Great (August 17,1786)
and of Vergennes (February 13, 1787). Both were succeeded by weaker men ; and
there was good reason to expect that Austria would meet with: far less serious
opposition wheu Prussia, was ruled by Frederick William II, and Montmorin
presided over the Foreign Office in France. Under the altered conditions it
seemed by no means impossible that .Russia and Austria combined might dictate
their, own will in the East, and effect that partition of European Turkey which
had been sketched in outline in the negotiations of 1780. These anticipations
were put to the test with (greater rapidity than was intended by the two
allies. For some time the Turks had been more and more disquieted by the
insatiable ambition of Russia. Since the death of Count Panin in 1783 there had
been no restraint on the influence of Potemkin, and he seized every opportunity
to urge the Czarina to extend or to strain her power in the south. And in 1786
and 1787 there seemed little need for any great caution on the part of Russia.
Engiand was quiescent ; France was occupied with- ever-increasing troubles at
home; Prussia was passing through the uneasiness attending the accession
of
a new and untried King. Of the neighbouring smaller Powers, Poland was
apparently slumbering after the excitement that had culminated in the First
Partition,; and both King and nobles vied with each other in seeking to gain
Catharine’s favour. Gustavus III of Sweden had so far done nothing to excite
alarm since his bi .lliant triumph in the first year of his reign; and any
ambitious designs he might entertain were likely to be thwarted by the
malcontent nobles. The ease with which the Crimea had been acquired did not
suggest that the Turks would make any very resolute resistance to the allied
heads of eastern and western Christendom. .
.
It was
therefore with great confidence that Catharine set out in May, 1787, to pay a
ceremonial visit to her new dominions, which she had christened Taurida.
Accompanied by a magnificent Court, including the envoys of France. England,
and Austria, she embarked on the Dnieper; and a fleet of galleys escorted her
to Cherson, which was built to be the capital of the province. On the way she
received a visit from Stanislas Poniatowski, who virtually acknowledged his
vassalage to the mistress from whom he‘ had received* his crown. Near Cherson,
which was entered through an arch bearing the significant inscription, “The way
to Constantinople,” she was joined by Joseph II, travelling in his favourite incognito
as Count Falkenstein. The imperial picnic proceeded on its way through crowds
of applauding peasants by day, while at night the river banks were lighted by
brilliant illuminations. It is true that the voyage- on the Dnieper had to be
abandoned before the mouth of the river was reached, on account of the
appearance of a Turkish fleet, but the journey was continued with no less
magnificence by land; and it was a proud moment for Catharine when she saw at
Sebastopol twenty Russian vessels, on the waters of the Black Sea. The tour was
designed as a demonstration both to friend and foe of the immense resources and
resistless might of Russia; and the impression which it made upon
contemporaries shows that it went a long way towards achieving its end.
But the
Turks, though they might be impressed, refused to be intimidated. Mohammadan
fanaticism was inflamed by the danger to [slam involved in the encouragement
which Russian progress gave to Christianity in the East. Every Russian
consulate was a centre of intrigue against Mohammadan ascendancy; and, even if
the Porte, had been blinded by considerations of policy, it could not afford to
disregard the overwhelming force of opinion among its subjects. The subjection
of the Crimea to Russia was at once a blow to Tartar love of independence and
a serious loss to the Mohammadan Church. Even while the Czarina was in the
Crimea, the Turks were pressing demands upon Russia for the redress, of
grievances. The Hospodar of Moldavia had incurred the displeasure of the Sultan
and had sought, refuge in Russia, who refused to surrender him to his suzerain.
Still more serious was the
316 The outbreak of war between Turkey and
Russia. [i787
dispute about
the principality of Georgia in the Caucasus. For many generations the province
had been disputed between Turkey and Persia; but the recent decline of the
latter Power seemed to justify the Turks in firmly establishing their
authority. Russia, however, intervened, and seemed likely to establish a
protectorate over Georgia, which must lead, as in the case of the Crimea, to
ultimate annexation. The dispatch of Russian troops to Georgia brought matters
to a crisis; and the Turks determined to run the risk of war rather than tamely
submit to further spoliation. No doubt such a decision was not come to without
some hope of direct or indirect aid.
Diez, the
Prussian envoy at Constantinople, was known to be a partisan of the Turks, and
his influence might serve to bring about Prussian intervention in their favour.
Austria might at the last moment stop short of giving active aid to Russia,
especially as Joseph was involved in serious difficulties in the Netherlands.
Hostility to Russia might be stirred up in Poland and in Sweden; and there was
always the possibility that Turkey might recover an old ally in France, or find
a new one in England. Such chances were always to be taken into account, but
there is no reason to suppose that the Turks received direct encouragement or a
formal assurance of support from Prussia or any other Power. Their action was
dictated by passion rather than policy; and they preferred to risk everything
in an honourable struggle rather than tamely submit to insult and loss.
Catharine II had no intention of hurrying matters, and was disposed to a
moderate and temporising policy by her intercourse with Joseph, which had not
resulted in any definite agreement. But on her return from the south to St
Petersburg she learned that immediate hostilities were inevitable. On August
15,1787, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople was summoned to a formal
interview and was called upon to abandon all Russian pretensions in Georgia. He
offered to refer the demand to his Court; but it was too late for such a
familiar expedient for delay, and he was imprisoned in the fortress of the
Seven Towers. This was the Turkish method of declaring war, and it certainly
did not err in any lack of precision. Fortunately for Russia, the preparations
of the Turks were unequal to their courage. Instead of striking a decisive blow
while the enemy was unready, their operations in 1787 were limited to the siege
of Kinbum at the mouth of the Dnieper, which was defended with equal skill and
obstinacy by SuvdrofF. This gave Catharine time to make preparations, and to
call upon Austria for assistance.
In the autumn
of 1787 Joseph II had his last chance of reconsidering the advisability of
going to war with Turkey as the ally of Russia. The prospect was not altogether
an inviting one; and the disparity of power had been brought home to him during
his journey on Russian soil. A listener has preserved a fragment of
conversation between the imperial fellow-travellers. “‘I have thirty million
subjects,’ said one, ‘counting
only males.’
‘ And I have twenty-two, including all,’ replied the other.
‘
I need,’ added one, ‘ an army of 600,000 men from Kamschatka to Riga.’
‘ My needs
are satisfied with exactly half as many,’ was the reply.” In spite of the
difference of resources, Austria was to provide a force equal to that of
Russia, and her reward was still Undetermined. That Joseph would have preferred
to postpone hostilities is certain; but delay was now impossible, and he was
too deeply pledged to repudiate his obligations to Russia. After a winter
spent in planning the campaign and collecting the necessary forces, he declared
war against Turkey in February, 1788. He must have had grave misgivings as to
the morality and the prudence of his action. The Turks had given him no ground
of quarrel; on the contrary they had of late years been extraordinarily careful
to avoid any offence against Austria; and in embarking on a wholly unprovoked
war for the aggrandisement of his own State Joseph had good reason to
anticipate serious difficulties both from the disaffection of his own subjects
and from the inveterate hostility of Prussia.
The first
overt resistance to the government of Joseph II came from the most distant and
least valued of his dominions. The southern Netherlands had been handed over
to Austria in 1714 to be held as it were in trust for the Maritime Powers, who
were primarily interested in the exclusion of French influence and in the
maintenance of a buffer between France and the United Provinces. When Charles
VI endeavoured to revive the commerce of his new possessions by founding the
Ostend Company, England and the Provinces never rested until they had compelled
him to abandon the project. It is not surprising that the Austrian rulers were
eager to find a purchaser for territories which were a source of expense rather
than of revenue, and which by their geographical position involved Austria in
all the intricate jealousies of western politics. Kaunitz proposed in 1757 to
hand the Austrian Netherlands over to the House of Bourbon, on condition that
France should join in effecting the partition of Prussia; and Joseph himself
offered them in exchange for Bavaria. It was only when this project had
perforce to be abandoned that the Emperor set to work to introduce the
administrative reforms which he had already endeavoured to set on foot in his
other dominions. But the task was one which required far greater tact and far
more intimate knowledge of the Netherlands than Joseph possiessed.
There was as
yet no real central government. The various Provinces were for the most part in
enjoyment of the same separate institutions and the same local independence
that they enjoyed when they first came under the rule of the Dukes of Burgundy.
Tie “Joyous Entry,” the charter of Brabant and Limburg which Philip the Good
had sworn to in the fifteenth century, was still confirmed by each successive
Duke on his accession. By one of its clauses, if the sovereign broke the
provisions of the charter, his subjects were released from their obligation of
obedience. Similar, if less explicit, assurances of provincial liberties were
given,
318 Discontent in the Austrian Netherlands.
[1786-7
either
by charter or by treaty, to the people of Flanders, Namur, Hain- ault, and the
other Provinces. There was in each some form of Estates,' which had the right
of granting taxes, and whose consent was necessary for the validity of new
laws. After the great revolt of the Netherlands against Philip II in the
sixteenth century Spain had recovered its hold upon the southern Provinces,
partly by a close alliance with the Roman Catholic clergy, and partly by promises
to maintain local priv’ 5ges and independence. Austria had succeeded to the
traditions of Spanish rule; and,: since the termination of hostility with
France, the Netherlands had enjoyed an unusual period of peace and prosperity.
The office of Viceroy was usually held: by some member of the imperial family,
and since 1780 had been entrusted-to Maria Christina, a sister of Joseph, and
her husband, Albert of Saxe-Teschen. There was some dissatisfaction at the
failure of Joseph’s endeavour to open the Scheldt; but this would soon have
subsided if his restless activity had not led him to attack the double
foundations on which Habsburg domination had so long rested— the supremacy of
the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and the respect for provincial customs and privileges; <
In 1786
Joseph took his first step towards the eradication of ultramontane tendencies
among the Belgian clergy. He had already suppressed some of the too numerous
monasteries, and granted to the Protestants toleration for their worship and admission
to civil employments. He now proceeded to impose upon the clergy an education
which was to inculcate the primary obligation of obedience to the State; and
with that object he founded in Louvain a seminary for the training of future
priests. The University of Louvain, one of the glories of Brabant and a
stronghold of ultramontanism, was transferred to Brussels, where it would be
under: the eye of the government. The students, who noisily demonstrated
against the;change, were coerced into obedience; the Archbishop of Malines was
compelled to go to Vienna to apologise for his protests; and the papal Nuncio
was expelled from the country. In January, 1787, came the first of a series of
Edicts for the reform of the secular administration. A uniform system of
jurisdiction was established, with two'regular Courts of Appeal; and all
feudal and clerical Courts were abolished. The whole of the Netherlands, as if
it were a single dependency, was to be divided into nine districts or circles;
and at the head of each was to be an Intendant nominated from Vienna. For the
support of the new administration certain fixed taxes were allocated, which
thus became permanent charges instead of temporary grants from the various
Estates. 1 Thus in the State as in the Church Joseph attacked the
strongest and most deeply-rooted sentiments of the Belgian people. '
The Estates
of Brabant made themselves the mouthpiece of the general ill-will. They
declared the imperial ordinances to be contrary to the “ Joyous Entry,” refused
to grant supplies, and drew up a formal
178?] Rebellion in the Austrian'Netherlands. 319
protest for
presentation to the Regents. Maria Christina and her husband were in a cruel
dilemma. Since the garrisons had been withdrawn from the barrier fortresses they
had no adequate force at their disposal to put down opposition. They had no
special interest in the Edicts, which had been issued without their opinion
being asked; and they Would have personally preferred the continuance of the
old state of things. A riot in Brussels, organised by van der Noot, an advocate
who was closely identified with the cause of the malcontent hierarchy, forced
them to come to a decision; and on May 30 they agreed to suspend the execution
of the new ordinances so far as they were contrary to the Charter of Brabant.
The news of actual rebellion in the Austrian Netherlands reached Joseph while
he was in Catharine’s company; and, though he tried to disguise his uneasiness,
he was compelled to hasten his return to Vienna. His first impulse was to carry
matters with a high hand. He recalled the Regents, disavowed their action, and
entrusted the temporary government to Count Murray, the commander of the
Austrian forces in the Netherlands. At the same time he called upon the
provincial Estates to combine together in the selection of delegates to
represent their grievances in Vienna. This was a characteristically rash step
to take, as the joint meeting of the representatives in Brussels was the first
step towards a republican federation of Belgium.
On August 15
the thirty delegates were admitted to a formal audience of the Emperor,
reprimanded for their resistance to the benevolent intentions of their ruler,
who desired to improve, not to abolish, their institutions, and ordered on
their return to insist upon the payment of the usual- subsidies and the
revocation of all acts of the Estates which ran counter to the Emperor’s
authority. Only when this complete submission should be made did he hold out
the hope of concessions to his subjects’ demands. He had already collected a
considerable body of troops which were on the march to the Netherlands to
enforce his will. What would have been the result of this resolute attitude it
is impossible to say, for it was abandoned almost as soon as it had been1
assumed. On the very day on which Joseph spoke with such apparent firmness the
Russian envoy was imprisoned in Constantinople. The outbreak of war in the East
made all the difference to Joseph’s plans. Kaunitz, who had never approved the
new system in the Netherlands, could employ the unanswerable argument that it
was impossible to interfere effectually in the East and to gain the advantages
that were offered there, if a large proportion of the Austrian army had to be
employed in suppressing a rebellion in the West. The influence of Catharine II
was also employed for obvious reasons on the side of moderation. Joseph could
not be insensible to such representations; but he could not make up his mind to
abandon measures which he honestly believed to be both advantageous and just.
He recalled the troops that were to have gone to the Netherlands, and adopted
a more conciliatory tone towards the delegates before
their
departure from Vienna. But he had no intention of making permanent
concessions. , ,
When Count
Murray, intimidated by another riot, agreed in September once more ;to
suspend the, ordinances, Joseph dismissed him in disgrace, and entrusted the
military command to d’Alton, a rough and overbearing martinet, while Count
Trautmansdorf was appointed chief Minister in civil affairs. This appointment
was in itself an act of duplicity. While the general advocated severe measures
of repression, the Minister was all for conciliation. The constitutional Edicts
were for a time allowed to drop; and the chief questions at issue during the
winter were the establishment of the seminary at Louvain, the payment of the
taxes, and the disarmament of the volunteers who had taken up arms during the
previous disorders. In most of the Provinces there was an inclination to be
grateful for the Emperor’s moderation, and it was only in Brabant that any
serious difficulties occurred. In January, 1788, the troops fired on the mob at
Brussels; and, though Trautmansdorf disavowed their action, Joseph gave it his
subsequent approval. For a time the display of force was effectual. Some of the
boldest leaders of disaffection, such as van der Noot, went into exile, and on
the immediate questions the Estates gave way. The'University of Louvain was
closed, and the seminary was opened. The volunteers were disarmed and the
taxes were granted. When the Regents returned in the spring of 1788 they found
a superficial tranquillity in the Netherlands. But the causes of disaffection
had not been removed, and the imminent revolution had only been postponed.
While Joseph
II was occupied in dealing with these Belgian disturbances and in preparing
for war with Turkey, Prussia had made a striking demonstration of her power by
a successful intervention in Holland. For several years past the internal
politics of the United Provinces had been a matter of European concern. The
origin of Dutch parties dates from the very foundation of the Republic. On the
one hand was the strong tradition of independence among the burgher class,
especially in the wealthy cities of Holland. On the other hand was the powerful
influence of the Princes of the House of Orange-Nassau, who had rendered such
conspicuous services in the struggle for independence, and had been rewarded
with the grant of a number of offices, some federal and some provincial, which
were collectively known as the stadholdership. The Orange Princes represented
the cause of centralisation, of united national effort, of the interests of the
whole State as against local and class privileges. On the other hand the
republican party represented the ascendancy of the wealthy burghers in the
municipalities, and also the predominance in the federation of the great
Province of Holland, which contributed to the common revenue as much as the
other six Provinces together. The strength of this party lay in the provincial
Estates of Holland and in the town Council of Amsterdam; whereas their
opponents
relied mainly
upon the support of Zeeland and other lesser Provinces, and also upon the lower
classes who resented the exclusive rule of the civic oligarchy in the towns.
The
fluctuations of party strife were necessarily mixed up to some extent with
external relations. In times of danger and crisis the Orange party came to the
front, because united effort was then needed, and this could only be attained
under something like monarchical rule. Thus a French invasion in 1673 gave the
stadholdership to William III after the office had been suspended for
twenty-three years. Oh William’s death in 1702 the main line of his House
became extinct, and the office was again in abeyance until 1747, when another
French invasion not merely revived the jcadholdersl ip but made it hereditary
in the hands of a younger branch of the Orange family and greatly increased its
powers. These events rendered party differences a matter of international
importance. The Orange Princes, raised to power by national antagonism to
France, leaned for support upon England. William HI, himself the grandson of
Charles I, had married a daughter of James II, and had actually worn the
English crown. William IV married the eldest daughter of George II; and his son
and successor, William V, was thus the first cousin of George III. The
republican party was impelled by the spirit of opposition to cultivate friendly
relations with France. But this was impossible as long as France threatened
Dutch independence; and for several generations the party was deprived of
external support and comparatively impotent.
The second
half of the eighteenth century witnessed a very marked change both in the
foreign relations and in the internal politics of the United Provinces. English
dictation became unpopular, while the sense of danger from France was almost
removed. In the Seven Years’ War the Netherlands had been undisturbed by hostilities;
and the enormous advance of English maritime and colonial power excited the
jealousy of the mercantile classes. Vergennes, the ablest French Foreign
Minister of the century, took prompt advantage of the altered sentiments of the
Dutch to bring about a revival of the republican party under the patronage and
encouragement of France. To the astonishment of Europe, the Dutch in 1779
joined in the formidable coalition which had been formed to take advantage of
the difficulties in which Great Britain was involved by the American revolt.
Their ill-success in the war inspired a feeling of bitter hostility against the
Stadholder, William V, who was regarded as a very half-hearted opponent of the
State with which his family had been so long and closely connected. By
championing Dutch interests against Joseph II, Vergennes still further
increased the influence of France; and the Treaty of Fontainebleau was followed
in November, 1785, by the conclusion of a formal alliance between France and
the States General. Encouraged by the assurance of foreign support, the leaders
of the republican party prepared in 1786 to complete their
322 Great Britain, Prussia and the Stadholder.
[1786-7
victory by!
abolishing the hereditary stadholdership which had been established in 1747.
Such a revolution would have been a signal triumph for France and a humiliating
blow to Great Britain. Sir James Harris, who was at this time the English envoy
at the Hague, undertook the task of reorganising the Orange party, and. with
the warm approval of the Stadholder, established intimate relations with all
the various sections of the community, and especially with the leading
politicians of the lesser Provinces, who were hostile to the now omnipotent
Estates of Holland. Matters seemed to have reached a crisis when in September,
1786, William V employed armed force to reduce two towns in Gelderland, which
had rebelled against his authority. The Provincial Estates of Holland,'
claiming a federal authority to which they had no right, retaliated by
depriving him of the command of the army. Everything pointed to civil war; and
the superiority of force was on the side of the republicans, who were confident
of French aid.
Sir James
Harris realised that all was lost unless the partisans of the Stadholder could
also reljr upon foreign support. Pitt, to whom he appealed, refused
,to commit England to a policy; which would probably, involve a
renewal of war with France. The only other State which had both the interest
and the power to intervene was Prussia. The wife of William V was Wilhelmina,
the niece of Frederick the Great, and sister of the heir to the Prussian
throne. To all appeals from Holland Frederick the Great had turned a deaf ear.
From his point of view it was imperative to do nothing which might drive France
once more into close cooperation with Austria. The accession of Frederick
William II excited great hopes in the breast of the Stadholder and his
partisans. The new King was a nearer relative; he was more impulsive and less
experienced; and he was not unwilling to have an early opportunity of posing as
a great personage on the European stage. Hertzberg, who had the chief voice in
foreign affairs, had disapproved of Frederick’s policy of neutrality, and was
in favour of intervention. But a strong party in Berlin, including the King’s j
uncle, Prince Henry, was opposed to any breach of the good understanding with
France. All that the new King would do was to send an envoy with instructions
to arrange some compromise by which the office of Stadholder should be
maintained even though its powers were restricted. Passions and interests,
however, had been too keenly excited to admit of any comp”omise>
even if William V and his English counsellor had been willing to accept one.
The contending parties were standing ready in armed hostility when a dramatic
inpident gave a new turn to the situation.
In June,
1787, Wilhelmina undertook a journey to the Hague in order to represent her
husband’s cause to the States General. On her way from Nymegen, where the Court
had resided since its practical expulsion from the capital, she was arrested
and for a time actually imprisoned by a body of republican troops on the
frontier of Holland.
Lord
Carmarthen, in his answer to a gloomy letter from Harris, shrewdly grasped the
situation. “ Don’t be so disheartened by a check to the Queen ; let her be
covered by the Knight, and all is safe. Seriously, I am sorry for anything so
unpleasant happening to the Princess, whose character so highly deserves a
better fate; the event, however, may still be productive of good. If the King,
her brother, is not the dirtiest and shabbiest of Kings he must resent it,
co&te que co&te.”
Frederick
William II, whatever his defects, did not merit these particular epithets. The
insult to his sister touched the chivalrous instincts of his impulsive nature,
and he promptly demanded that ample satisfaction should be given to her by i;he
States General and the Estates of Holland The demand was evaded, and the latter
assembly continued to discuss the suspension of the Prince of Orange from the
stadholdership of the Province. Frederick William stood firm, and in September
a Prussian army under the Duke of Brunswick crossed the Dutch frontier from the
duchy of Cleves. Pitt’s scruples were overcome by the resolute action of
Prussia; and by a secret convention Great Britain undertook to take part in the
demonstration by raising forty ships, and also to make war on any State which
should oppose Prussian intervention. Everything now turned upon the action of
France. If Vergennes had lived, he might have been willing to strike a blow
rather than allow all the advantages which he had gained to be swept away. But
Vergennes had died in the early part of the year; and his policy died with him.
France was appealing to an Assembly of Notables to find a remedy for acute
financial troubles, and was hardly in a position to add to these troubles by
embarking on a war. In view of the action of the Turks no aid could be expected
from either Austria or Russia, even if those Powers had thought well to
interfere. And so France stood aloof and allowed the republican or “ patriotic
” party to suffer for its excessive confidence in French honour. The abstention
of France decided the fate of Holland. The Prussian march was rather a triumphal
progress than a military invasion. One town after another opened its gates, and
the surrender of Amsterdam on October 10 completed the task of suppressing the
malcontents. William V was restored to all his former authority; and the
hereditary stadholdership was formally declared to be an essential part of the
constitution of the United Provinces. In the Treaty of Paris, October 27,
France recognised these changes.
The chief
gainer by these memorable events was undoubtedly England; and a grateful government
rewarded the services of Sir James Harris with the title of Lord Malmesbury.
But the immediate glory belonged to Prussia; and both Frederick William and
Hertzberg were immensely elated at the ease with which so conspicuous a triumph
had been gained. Hertzberg, the real author of Prussia’s energetic action,
believed that Prussia was now in a position to dictate its will to Europe; and
this self-confidence led him into serious misconceptions and blunders. But
in the
meantime he had gained something besides glory, namely, an alliance with a
first-rate Power. Frederick the. Great had no such alliance in the last six
years of his life, though he had found a substitute in the headship of a league
of German Princes. But purely German politics had no great attraction for
Hertzberg or for the new King. They were petty and parochial as compared with
the great issues of international relations. Thus the Fiirstenbund, though it
still existed and displayed at this time a good deal of activity, was no longer
keenly supported by Prussia; and the scheme of reforming the German
constitution was allowed to drop. Prussia was engaged in what appeared to be a
more promising scheme for realising its old object, the holding of Austria in
check. Cooperation with England in the West might easily develop into common
action in the East. The settlement of the Dutch constitution was a small matter
compared with what might grow out of it. Strenuous negotiations at the Hague in
the early months of 1788 resulted in the conclusion of a Triple Alliance
between Prussia, Great Britain, and the United Provinces, by which the three
Powers were pledged not only to mutual defence, but also to joint action “ for
preserving public tranquillity and for maintaining their common interests.”
The only sphere for such joint action at the time when the treaty was signed
was in the East. The provisional treaty was signed at Loo on June 13, 1788, and
was confirmed on August 13 at Berlin. Thus, at the moment when the first
serious operations in Eastern Europe began, international relations assumed an
intensely interesting character. On the one side were Austria and Russia
engaged in an aggressive war against Turkey, and eager for a partition of
Turkish territory. On the other side was the newly-formed Triple Alliance,
determined to restore tranquillity on terms satisfactory to the interests of
the allied Powers, and therefore opposed to any aggrandisement of either Russia
or Austria. France, which might have decided the balance between the two
coalitions, had lost all influence and prestige, and had for the moment ceased
to be a great Power in Europe. No single event since the battle of Rossbach did
so much to discredit the Bourbon monarchy as the passive acceptance by France
of Prussian intervention in Holland.
Immense
forces were prepared both by Austria and Russia for the campaign of 1788; and,
although the Turks were inspired by religious fanaticism and had often
displayed great tenacity in a defensive war, it was not expected that they
could hold their own against so formidable a coalition. Joseph, who undertook
the command in person, was confident that he would annex to his dominions not
only Servia, which had been lost in 1739, but also Moldavia and Wallachia, and
that Austria would henceforth be supreme on the Lower Danube. His primary
object was the capture of Belgrade, which had already been treacherously
attacked in the previous December before the declaration of war. Bitter
disappointment
awaited the Emperor. His early operations were intentionally dilatory, in
order to allow the Russians time to cooperate. But to his astonishment Jussuf,
the Grand Vizier, concentrated his main forces against the Austrians, and not
only compelled Joseph to fall back from Belgrade, but followed him to the
frontier of the Banat of Temeswar. There the Austrian army, seized by a
disgraceful panic, abandoned the passes in disorder, and allowed the enemy to
enter and ravage an Austrian province. Joseph himself returned to Vienna broken
in health and spirits. The only set-off to his personal defeat was that Prince
Josias of Coburg, in command of the left wing of his army, had established a
strong position in Moldavia by the capture of the fortress of Choczim, and that
the veteran Loudon, who was only employed as a last resource, signalised his
return to active service by storming Dubitza in Bosnia. These successes
compelled the Turks to evacuate the Banat before the winter.
One cause of
the failure of the Austrian campaign in 1788, apart from military blunders and
inefficiency, was that the Russians made far less strenuous exertions than had
been anticipated. It was not till June that Potemkin appeared before Oczakoff,
which offered the most obstinate resistance. After a siege of six months the
town was carried by storm on December 17 ; and a terrible massacre avenged the
losses which the besieging army had suffered before the walls. This, and a
naval victory in the Black Sea which averted a Turkish attack upon the Crimea,
were the only Russian successes in the year. Early in the campaign a large part
of the Russian forces had to be.recalled to meet an unexpected danger in the
north. Gustavus III of Sweden took advantage of the Turkish war to demand from
Russia in arrogant terms the restoration of Finland and Carelia. On Catharine’s
refusal he invaded Finland, while the Swedish fleet threatened to attack the
Russian ships which had been collected at Cronstadt for an expedition to the
Mediterranean. No preparations had been made for resistance to the Swedes; and
for a moment panic reigned in St Petersburg. But the pressing danger disappeared
as speedily as it had arisen. The Swedish officers, drawn from the noble class
which had never forgiven the King for his coup d'etat in 1772, took a mean
revenge by open* mutiny in the field. On the ground that the war had been
falsely represented as one of defence, and that Gustavus was bound to consult
the Diet before undertaking a war of aggression, they not only refused to
advance, but offered Catharine an armistice by which Finland was evacuated. At
sea, after an indecisive battle, the superior seamanship of Greig, the Russian
admiral, succeeded in shutting up the Swedish ships in the harbour of Sveaborg.
Gustavus himself was called home by the news that the Danes, at Russian
instigation, had invaded Sweden from Norway, and were threatening Gflteborg.
The complete humiliation of Sweden was only averted by the action of the Triple
Alliance. The threat that an English fleet would enter the
Sound and a
Prussian array invade Holstein was sufficient to compel Denmark to withdraw its
army from Swedish soil and to observe thenceforward an attitude of strict
neutrality. This action on the part of England is especially noteworthy as the
first step taken by that country in open opposition to Russia.
It is
impossible to do more than enumerate the most important events of the year
1789. Gustavus III took advantage of the popular indignation excited by the
unpatriotic conduct of the nobles and by the Danish invasion to effect another
revolution in the government of Sweden. When the Diet met in February, three of
the Estates, the clergy, the towns, and the peasants, were enthusiastic for the
King. Of the nobles, some were imprisoned for their mutiny in Finland, and the
rest were coerced or intimidated into accepting a new constitution, which the
King himself proposed to the assembly. Henceforth the King was to have supreme
control of peace and war; and a considerable revenue was voted to him without
limit of time. By this means Gustavus was enabled to continue the war and to
return to the command of his army in Finland. But Sweden was no longer so
formidable as in the seventeenth century, and no great successes were gained.
The chief results of the northern war were that Russia was compelled to employ
a considerable force in Finland, and that the Russian navy had to be
concentrated in the Baltic. In spite of this diversion the allies were able to
gain brilliant successes against the Turks. The death of the Sultan Abdul Hamid
and the accession of Selim. Ill led to the recall and the execution of the
Grand Vizier who had so brilliantly defeated Joseph II in the previous year.
His successor proved to be a man of very inferior ability; and the Turks
suffered severely from the want of an efficient commander. The Prince of
Coburg, supported by Suvoroff, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the main
Turkish army on the Rimnik (September 22); and this victory materially aided
Loudon in compelling Belgrade to surrender (October 9). Joseph II for the
moment threw off his sickness to attend a service in St Stephen’s in
celebration of this signal triumph. Nor did success end here. Potemkin captured
a number of fortresses, of which Bender was the most important. Coburg took
Bucharest and occupied the passes into Wallachia; while Loudon reduced
Semendria and blockaded Orsova. Although this blockade was to prove a serious
hindrance, everything seemed prepared for an irresistible advance upon Turkey.
These
military'successes, however, were counterbalanced by rapidly increasing difficulties
elsewhere. In Poland there was a strong and growing party which desired to take
advantage of the eastern war to put an end to Russian ascendancy, and, as a
necessary preliminary, to reform the anarchical constitution which Russia had
resolutely set itself to uphold; Prussia, now that she was estranged from
Russia, would be inclined to support the reforming projects which she had
previously helped to defeat. So long as Catharine was engaged in war
1788-9] Hungary.—The Austrian Netherlands.
327
with both
Turkey and Sweden, it would be difficult for her to employ an adequate force
for the coercion of Poland. Still more serious were the problems with which
Austria was confronted. Joseph’s reforming activity had alienated in all his
dominions both the nobles, who were deprived of the accustomed services of tbe
peasants, and the clergy, who were subjected to unfamiliar State control. In
Hungary, where tbe consciousness of separate racial and national interests had
always created a spirit of antagonism to a German ruler, the hostility to the
Emperor was. peculiarly strong. In order to avoid taking an oath to observe the
constitution, Joseph had refused on his accession to go through the ceremony of
coronation at Pressburg; and he had outraged Hungarian sentiment by bringing
the crown of St Stephen to Vienna. All his measures aimed at the incorporation
of Hungary with the rest of his dominions under a single centralised
administration. Sooner than be Germanised under an absolute ruler, the Magyars
were prepared to rise in insurrection; and in 1789 such a rebellion, with the
prospect of Prussian encouragement and aid, would have been peculiarly formidable.
It was in the
Netherlands, however, that Joseph II met with the most open and uncompromising
opposition. The pacification in the spring of 1788 proved very short-lived, as
nothing had been done to remove the radical divergence between the aims of the
ruler and the wishes of his subjects. The Bishops insisted that the education
of priests belonged exclusively to the clergy, and denounced the teaching of
the professors in the new seminary of Louvain as heretical. Joseph on his side
closed the episcopal seminaries at Malines and Antwerp. The provinces, and
especially Brabant, were resolute to maintain their old- established privileges
and institutions; while the Emperor was equally eager to destroy everything
which weakened the unity of the State and the efficient exercise of monarchical
authority. In 1789 a quarrel between the sovereign and the Estates of Brabant
brought matters to a crisis. The Third Estate refused to assent to a demand for
subsidies; and Joseph proposed to reform its composition by admitting delegates
from other towns besides the three principal cities, which had an exclusive
right of representation. From one point of view this was a liberal and popular
measure; but from another it could be regarded as merely intended to give the
Crown a preponderant influence. The Council of Brabant refused to sanction a
change in the constitution, made merely by royal Edict without being submitted
to the Estates. The Estates were equally resolute in opposing a measure which
had been proposed without consulting them, and was accompanied by a demand for
a permanent revenue.
This struggle
in Brussels was contemporary with the early meetings of the States General in
Versailles. The Third Estate of Brabant was the champion of conservatism and of
obsolete privileges, of the social
and political
system which the French Third Estate sought to destroy; while Joseph represented
in many ways the progressive spirit of the eighteenth century. But the profound
differences between the two movements were forgotten in the superficial
resemblance; and every concession extorted from Louis XVI served to encourage
the opposition to Joseph II. The Emperor, who regarded his brother-in-law’s misfortunes
as the merited result of discreditable weakness, was determined to pursue a
wholly different course. On June 18 he did., in Brabant what in January he had
already done in Hainault; he dissolved the recalcitrant Estates and cancelled
the “ Joyous Entry ” together with all the ancient liberties of the Province.
General d’Alton congratulated his sovereign that the 18th of June, the
anniversary of the battle of Kolin, also saw the establishment of his
sovereignty in the Netherlands. A policy of rigorous coercion was now pursued.
The amnesty which had been granted in the previous year was revoked; and those
who had been active in the work of opposition sought safety by a hasty flight
across the Dutch frontier. At Breda a committee of the leading exiles undertook
the task of organising resistance to military tyranny and of appealing for
support to foreign countries. Even before the final rupture van der Noot had
sounded the States of the Triple Alliance. In London he had received little
attention, as the ministers were absorbed in the disputes about the Regency
during the King’s illness. But both in Berlin and the Hague there was a strong
desire to hamper Austria by encouraging disaffection. The Dutch were especially
eager to punish Joseph H for his attitude both before and during their recent
troubles. He had endeavoured to open the Scheldt; and, although he did not
actually intervene in the strife of parties, he would certainly have supported France
if that country had been able to oppose the Prussians. He had throughout
encouraged the anti-Orange faction and had sheltered its leaders in the
Netherlands after their defeat. Several of these leaders were intimately
associated with d’Alton, the commander of the Austrian forces; and it was
thought that a complete triumph of Joseph’s policy in the Netherlands might
endanger the recent settlement in the United Provinces.
Meanwhile the
fate of the Netherlands depended entirely upon the ability of the military
forces to restrain the general discontent from breaking out into open
rebellion. D’Alton had some 18,000 men at his disposal, and assured his master
that they were sufficient for the purpose. But it would in any case have been
difficult for Joseph to send reinforcements. He could not withdraw troops from
Turkey; and he could not weaken his forces in Hungary and the other Provinces
without serious risk. And, even if he resolved on either step, it required
considerable time to transfer any considerable body of men to the western
Provinces. In Octpber the preparations of the exiles were complete; and two
thousand men under van der Mersch, formerly an officer in the imperial service,
crossed the
frontier into Brabant. In itself the force was contemptible both in numbers and
equipment; but it was rendered formidable by the sympathy and support of the
people. In the open field it might have been easily crushed; but within a town
its fighting power was not inconsiderable, especially sis the Austrian troops were
scattered over a large area and could not concentrate in large numbers at any
point. At Tumhout, where the first encounter took place, the regulars were completely
routed and compelled to withdraw. In Ghent, the chief city of Flanders, a
similar victory of the mob resulted in the expulsion of the garrison. The
Flemings declared themselves independent of Austrian rule, and called upon the
other Provinces to combine in organising a federal republic. It was in vain
that Trautmansdorf issued edicts annulling the recent unpopular measures, and
that Joseph sent Philip Cobenzl with authority to adopt a conciliatory policy.
The Church threw the whole of its vast influence on the side of the rebels; all
proposals for a compromise were rejected; and, after a successful rebellion in
Brussels (December 10), the Austrian troops were withdrawn from Brabant to
Luxemburg, the only Province which remained loyal. In January, 1790, delegates
from the provincial Estates met at Brussels and drew up a federal Constitution
for a Belgian Republic. The chief ministers of the federation were van der Noot
and van Eupen, who represented the alliance of the secular opposition with the
interests of the Homan Catholic Church. The impotence of Austria to put down so
serious a rebellion, though due in the first place to the Turkish war, was much
increased by contemporary events in France. Not only was the Franco- Austrian
alliance practically abolished by the progress of the French Revolution, but
the acts of the National Assembly had already injured interests in Germany
which the Emperor was bound by his office to defend. Thus France, instead of
supporting the Austrian cause in the Netherlands, encouraged and aided the
Belgian revolution. Although the two movements, the one radical and the other
conservative, were essentially divergent from each other, their momentary
alliance is reflected in the name given by Camille Desmoulins to his famous
periodical, Les Revolutions de France et de Brabant.
It is obvious
at a glance that these events in Belgium, combined with the disaffection in
Hungary and the other Austrian dominions, enormously strengthened the Triple
Alliance in its antagonism to Austria and Russia. Prussia, which regarded
itself as the leading Power of the coalition, was naturally eager to take full
advantage of the favourable combination of circumstances to bring about the
humiliation of Austria. The policy advocated by Hertzberg was avowedly based
upon imitation of Frederick IPs action at the time of the First Partition of
Poland. The great King had then avoided the expense and the risks of war; but
his masterly diplomacy had taken advantage of a war in the East to gain for
Prussia a valuable extension of territory. Hertzberg believed that
he could gain
a similar end by similar means. By acting as mediator Prussia could dictate its
will to the belligerent States. The Turks, defeated by superior force, must
make considerable cessions to Austria. Austria, however, weakened by events
elsewhere, must not enlarge her territories without regard to the Balance of
Power. In return for her acquisitions on the Danube, she must resign to Poland
the whole or part of Galicia; and the grateful Poles were to reward Prussia for
advocating their interests by the cession of Danzig and Thom, which would round
off the Prussian gains of 1772 and also give Prussia complete control of the
Vistula. The precise details of the scheme as advocated by Hertzberg varied
with the fluctuations of the eastern war and of other events; but its main
features were always the same—Prussian ascendancy in arranging a general
pacification, the avoidance of actual war, and the acquisition of Danzig and
Thom. The obvious weakness of the policy was that it demanded the concurrence
of too many favourable contingencies. The Turks must be sufficiently humbled,
but yet saved from annihilation; the Poles must be willing to make the desired
exchange of Danzig and Thom for Galicia; Austria must be induced to make
sacrifices in order to recover its rebellious Provinces and to avoid worse
disasters; and above all Prussia must receive the strenuous and loyal support
of its allies.
Hertzberg’s
plan, though it is the most prominent thread in the tangled diplomacy of 1789,
was by no means the only course open to Prussia. A far bolder and more
aggressive policy was advocated in Berlin and by Prussian agents at foreign
Courts, especially by Diez at Constantinople. This was to form a vast
coalition, including not only the Maritime Powers, but also Sweden, Poland, and
the chief States of Germany. As the head of this coalition, Prussia might
undertake to champion the cause of the Turks, and could dictate its will to
Austria and Russia. Poland would be freed from Russian control and erected into
a permanent barrier against Russian advance towards the west, while Turkey
would continue to serve as a barrier in the south. Austria could be compelled
to give up Galicia, could be, if necessary, deprived of the Netherlands, and in
any case would be compelled to submit to Prussian ascendancy in the affairs of
Germany. Both schemes had much to recommend them. That of Hertzberg had the
merit of avoiding actual hostilities; but the other opened more grandiose and
alluring prospects for Prussian ambition. For many months Frederick William II
hesitated between the two alternatives. At one time he was almost pledged to
the support of Hertzberg; but in the early months of 1790 steps were taken by
Prussia which made immediate war with Austria almost inevitable. On January 30
Diez, who had always advocated active assistance to the Turks, concluded a
treaty of alliance with the Porte. Prussia was to assist the Turks to recover
both their losses in the present war and also the Crimea, whereas all that
Turkey undertook
was to
endeavour to obtain in the final treaty of peace the Austrian cession of
Galicia. Diez was finally recalled (May, 1790) and the ratification postponed;
but the treaty was in the end confirmed with the omission of the clause about
the Crimea. A little later an alliance was made with Poland, by which Prussia
was to defend that State against attack (March 29). Prussian troops were
mobilised in Silesia on the very frontier of the Austrian dominions. Loudon had
to be recalled from Turkey to undertake the defence of Bohemia and Moravia.
Frederick William was willing to acknowledge the Belgian Republic, and allowed
Prussian officers to assume the command of its forces. Relations were also
established with the Hungarian malcontents, who were encouraged to rebel by
the prospect of foreign intervention. Galicia was ready to take up arms and to
demand reincorporation with Poland.
It is
difficult to overestimate the importance of the issues that were at stake in
the early months of 1790. If Prussia had carried out a bellicose policy, all
the Powers of Europe, except perhaps the Bourbon and the Italian States, would
have been engaged in a gigantic contest on the Eastern Question. Such a contest
would in itself have involved momentous consequences, which it is needless and
impossible to forecast. But its indirect results must have been no less
weighty. European intervention in France would have been impossible; and the
French Revolution, without the enormous influence exerted by the struggle with
foreign States, must have run a wholly different course. It is therefore a
matter of no small interest to form a clear conception of the causes which
averted a general conflagration in the East, and by bringing about a temporary
reconciliation between Austria and Prussia rendered possible their joint action
against France.
The extreme
confidence of Prussia, which was one of the chief dangers to European peace,
rested very largely upon the successful intervention in the United Provinces
and upon the Triple Alliance which had been formed as its result. Hitherto the
one overt act of the alliance had been the coercion of Denmark; and, when it
was tested by the possibility of active interference in the East, the unity of
aim and interest among the allies proved to be very incomplete. For practical
purposes the alliance consisted of England and Prussia, as Holland was ready to
follow the guidance of its powerful neighbour; and men spoke once more of “the
Maritime Powers” as if they were a single unit in European affairs. Nothing can
be clearer or more distinct than the main lines of Pitt’s polity in Eastern
affairs. He desired to check Russian aggression, and therefore to oppose and
weaken Austria as the ally of Russia. So far his aims were identical with those
of Prussia. He wished to prevent the war from spreading, and to play the part
of a mediator, not of a principal in the struggle. But as regards the
provisions of peace he altogether parted company with Hertzberg and his great
scheme. He had no intention of serving as a cat’s-paw for Prussia, and was not
in the least
inclined to allow the general pacification to be impeded or delayed by what
seemed to him an unreasonable demand for Danzig and Thom. Why should the
cession of territory from Poland to Prussia form part of a treaty between
Russia and Austria on one side and Turkey on the other? The answer that Prussia
desired it was inadequate. British diplomatists were instructed to make it
perfectly clear that their government desired peace on the simple basis of the
status quo ante helium. Pitt was also opposed to Prussian policy with regard to
the Belgian Republic. Only recently England had had good reason to complain of
the action of European States in ^giving their ■ecognition to the
rebellious colonies in America. It would have been too glaring an inconsistency
to employ the same weapon against another State after so bitterly denouncing
its use. There were other reasons tending in the same direction. A republic in
Belgium might easily fall a victim to French influence or French aggression; or
Austria, threatened with the complete loss of the Netherlands, might be willing
to purchase French aid by the cession of the whole or part to France. In either
case the interests of Great Britain and Holland would suffer.
Besides this
divergence of aim between the two States, which seriously hampered Prussia, the
growing interest attaching to events in France tended to avert a
great war in the East. Austria and Prussia, as rivals for the chief influence
in Germany, could not possibly disregard the reasonable demands of German
Princes for compensation on account of the property or the lucrative rights of
which they were deprived by the edicts of a French assembly. But these demands
must certainly remain unsatisfied if Austria and Prussia went to war with each
other.
The death of
Joseph II (February 20, 1790) also made for peace. Few reigns have had a more
tragic end. His one guiding motive was devotion to the interests of his State;
and he lived to see that State on the verge of disruption and ruin. Although
the early disasters had been redeemed by brilliant victories, the Turkish war
could hardly bring any lasting gain to Austria. And yet it had exhausted his
resources, had alienated his subjects, and had given almost overwhelming advantages
to the rival State which he had so keenly desired to humiliate. Everything had
failed in his hands. His best and his worst actions had equally brought
misfortune to his country. Perhaps his greatest service was rendered by his
death. That event saved Austria from dangers which could hardly have been averted
if his life had been prolonged. The concessions and changes of policy, which
Joseph could not possibly have made without losing all credit and authority,
could come with comparatively good grace from his brother and successor.
Leopold II was peculiarly well fitted to deal with the very complicated
difficulties of his position. He had been for twenty-five years a popular and
successful ruler in Tuscany, and he had always been a keenly attentive student
of European politics. He had acquired in Italy some of the subtle insight
and
adroitness which have always characterised the ablest Italian politicians. His
long detachment from Vienna had freed him from many prejudices and personal
relations which might otherwise have hampered or misled him. Even Kaunitz found
in the new ruler a master rather than a pupil.
Leopold II
did not live long enough to justify a claim to be regarded as a consummate
statesman, but he certainly achieved much during the two years that he ruled in
Austria. His primary aim was to avoid a war with Prussia. If that could be done
without humiliating concessions, he might confidently hope to put down
disaffection in Hungary and to recover the Netherlands. To gain his end he had
two strong cards to play. He was prepared to abandon the close alliance with
Russia which Joseph had concluded; and he could argue that, as that alliance
had been the origin of all trouble in the East, so its termination should
remove all obstacles in the way of general peace. He also firmly grasped the
fact that Great Britain was not in complete accord with Prussia, and that of
the two allies Great Britain was primarily hostile to Russia, whereas Prussian
hostility was mainly directed against Austria. To conciliate Britain by a
parade of moderation was the best and most certain method of disarming Prussia.
Nor was Leopold slow to perceive the immense advantage which he had in dealing
with so impulsive and vacillating a ruler as Frederick William II. The Prussian
King had gone so far on the way towards war, that he could not withdraw
without incurring dishonour and the imputation of treacherous dealing. Yet he
allowed himself to be drawn by an adroit personal appeal into negotiations in
which he was ultimately outwitted.
It would take
too long to trace in detail the relations between Austria and Prussia from
Leopold’s letter to Frederick William on March 25,1790, to the diplomatic
conference which was opened at Reichen- bach on June 27. It was at the Prussian
head-quarters in Silesia that the Austrian envoy, Spielmann, met with Hertzberg
to arrange terms of peace. As between Austria and Prussia there was no
insuperable objection to some readjustment of Polish and Turkish territory;
and Hertzberg had confident hopes of carrying through his original scheme. But
in the course of three weeks the difficulties in the Way were found to be
insuperable. The Turks, who could appeal to their unfulfilled treaty with
Prussia, would not agree to restore to Austria the boundary of Passarowitz.
Poland, another ally of Prussia, would hear nothing of the cession of Danzig
and Thom. To persist in the demands meant the alienation of two States whose
support was one essential element in the strength of the Prussian position.
Finally the representatives of the Maritime States, amply satisfied with the
severance of Austria from Russia, declared decisively in favour of the status
quo as against any scheme of territorial exchanges. Hertzberg’s project was
decisively abandoned by the Prussian King; and the interchange of a number of
declarations,
ratified on July 27, constituted the Convention of Reichenbach. The gist of
the agreement was that Austria should grant an immediate armistice to the Turks
and open negotiations for a treaty which should restore matters as they were
before the war. If, however, Austria obtained any concession, it must be freely
granted by the Porte; and Prussia was entitled to claim some equivalent
advantage. So long as war continued between Russia and Turkey, Austria was to
remain in occupation of Choczim, but was pledged to give no assistance to the
Russians. As regards the Netherlands, Austrian authority was to be restored;
but an amnesty was promised, and the Provinces were to recover their old
constitutions under the guarantee of Prussia and the Maritime Powers.
The Convention
of Reichenbach marks a turning-point in the history of Europe. The extreme
tension of the last few months was relaxed. The decisive struggle between
Austria and Prussia was postponed for three-quarters of a century. Austria
escaped from the most serious crisis through which she had passed since the
accession of Maria Theresa. Prussia stepped down from the commanding position
she had occupied since the death of Frederick the Great. The Austro-Russian
alliance was at an end; and the Triple Alliance, which it had provoked, was on
the verge of dissolution. Finally, the way was prepared for a new adjustment of
European relations by the formation of a coalition against France.
Leopold II
had scored a diplomatic triumph of no ordinary magnitude. He had obtained
terms which under the circumstances were the best he could hope for; and he had
contrived to obtain them in such a way that the allies congratulated themselves
on having induced Austria to' consent. He now set himself, with equal subtlety,
to minimise the stipulated intervention of the mediating Powers in the
negotiations both with the Turks and with his rebellious subjects. He relied
upon the confident belief that, so long as Pitt cherished the desire to oppose
Russia, the English government would do nothing that might drive Austria once
more into the Russian alliance. In the winter of 1790 a Congress met at Sistova
to arrange a final treaty with the Turks. If Leopold had adhered to the letter
of his agreement at Reichenbach, the proceedings would have been very short.
But he drew an unforeseen distinction between the status quo de jure and de
facto, and claimed Orsova on the ground that it ought to have belonged to
Austria before the war. The result was that the negotiations were prolonged;
and for a time the Congress was broken up. It was not till August 4, 1791, that
the Treaty of Sistova was formally concluded. By the public articles the former
boundaries were restored; but by a separate convention the Porte agreed to the
cession of Orsova and a strip of territory in Croatia, on condition that the
fortifications of the former should be destroyed. England made no protest; and
Prussia, where Hertzberg’s policy had been completely
abandoned,
made no effort to obtain the equivalent upon which so much stress had been laid
at Reichenbach.
Before the
conclusion of this treaty, Leopold had restored his authority in the Austrian
dominions. He conciliated his subjects by revoking the general land-tax which
Joseph had imposed, and by abandoning his predecessor’s policy of
administrative uniformity and centralisation. So long as the monarchy had an
adequate revenue and supreme control over military and foreign affairs, Leopold
was willing to allow each province to retain its own customs and languages.
Although the Hungarians were on the verge of rebellion when he came to the
throne, he summoned the Hungarian Diet which had not met for nearly fifty
years. To the demands, which were made for further restrictions on the royal
power, he opposed a firm assertion that he would make no change in the
coronation oath which had been taken by Maria Theresa. In November, 1790, he
proceeded to Pressburg, and of his own accord promulgated a law that every
future King should be crowned within six months of his accession. As Joseph II
had refused the ceremony altogether, this was received as a great concession
to national sentiment. The susceptible Magyars welcomed their new sovereign
with enthusiasm, abandoned their distasteful demands for a new capitulation,
and voted a large addition to the revenue.
About the
same time a settlement was effected of the more serious difficulties in the
Netherlands. There the whole conditions had been altered since Reichenbach. The
Belgians had lost all hope of foreign support. The military weakness of
Austria, to which the rebels owed their success in the previous year, was at an
end so soon as the agreement with Prussia and the armistice with the Turks gave
Leopold the free disposal of the Austrian troops. Moreover the newly created
Republic was tom by internal dissensions. The ascendancy of the clericjd and
reactionary politicians, like van der Noot and van Eupen, who had headed the
resistance to Joseph’s reforms, was disputed by a growing democratic party
which derived its principles from France. French emissaries were active in
encouraging this party to demand a free national assembly; and the Congress in
Brussels had to employ force in order to put down the malcontents. Leopold was
already assured of success when he offered to restore the liberties of the
Austrian Netherlands as they had been before the late reign, and demanded that
they should return to their allegiance to himself. Unless these terms were
accepted by November 21, his troops in Luxemburg, strengthened by large
reinforcements, were prepared to compel submission by force of arms. The
republican leaders made a vain effort to obtain better terms. They demanded
that their privileges should be those which they had enjoyed under Charles VI,
and appealed to the envoys of the allies, who were assembled at the Hague for
the purpose of mediation. Prussia and the Maritime Powers were not unwilling to
obtain all reasonable concessions for the Belgians, whose
rebellion had
for a time strengthened their hands, and asked for a prolongation of the
armistice to allow time for further discussion. Leopold, however, adhered to
his ultimatum, and refused to listen to a last proposal from Brussels to
confer the sovereignty on his third son, the Archduke Charles. On November 22
the Austrian troops commenced their advance, and within a week they were before
Brussels. Resistance was impossible. Van der Noot and Ids colleagues fled, the
Congress dissolved itself, and the Belgian Republic was at an end. Meanwhile
the Congress at the Hague had drawn up a Convention, guarantee..ig the
Constitution of the Netherlands as it had been in the reign of Charles VI. The
Austrian envoy signed it on December 10. But Leopold refused his ratification,
and the Convention remained a dead letter. The allies were chagrined that their
mediation was thus slighted; but they did not go beyond empty protests. In the
Netherlands, as in the negotiations with Turkey, Leopold succeeded in asserting
his independence of external control. He took all the gain of the Convention of
Reichenbach, and evaded all that was distasteful in its provisions.
The desertion
of Austria had been a serious blow to Catharine II. Russia was left alone, not
merely to carry on the war with Sweden and Turkey, but also to face the less
active hostility of the Triple Alliance and the growing boldness of the
anti-Russian party in Poland. And Reichenbach opened the possibility of an
approximation between Austria and Prussia, which would destroy the very
foundation on which Russian ascendancy had hitherto rested. Catharine, however,
showed equal courage and resource in meeting the first serious difficulties she
had encountered since her accession. As soon as she learned with certainty that
Austria would come to terms with the allies, she sent an offer of peace to Gustavus
III. Sweden had proved a fair match for Russia in naval warfare; and Gustavus
had recently won a brilliant victory. But his revenue was exhausted; and he
could not carry on the war much longer. He felt flattered that his formidable
opponent should be the first to offer terms; and the terms themselves, a return
to the condition of things before the war, were precisely those which the
allies were willing to demand for Sweden. His increasing desire to champion the
falling monarchy in France made him eager for peace; and the Treaty of Werela
was hastily concluded on August 15,1790.
This was a
great blow to England and Prussia, who were preparing to assist Gustavus with
money and ships. They had relied upon Swedish aid in putting pressure upon
Russia, and now discovered that in case of war Sweden might actually be a
Russian ally. At the same time the Russians continued their exertions against
Turkey, though the odds against them were increased by the Austrian armistice.
The famous storming of Ismail by Suvdroff took place towards the close of 1790.
Catharine, therefore, was undismayed when she received formal notice from
England and Prussia of the Convention of Reichenbach, together
with an
urgent representation that she should, either of her own accord or through the
medium of the allies, make peace with the Turks on the same terms as had been
accepted in principle by the Emperor. Behind the representation was the implied
threat that the allies were prepared to use force to compel the acceptance of
their demand. It was obvious that Catharine could not carry out the original
designs of Potemkin. There could be for the present no expulsion of the Turks
from Europe, no Greek Empire at Constantinople, and no intermediate Christian
kingdom in the Balkan peninsula. But her haughty temper forbade the acceptance
of a mandate; and she was not content to emerge empty- handed from an expensive
and successful war. She made it known that she was willing to make peace, but
that she would retain Oczakoff on the Dniester, which had cost Potemkin so
prolonged an effort in 1788.
The allies
insisted that as Austria had accepted the status quo ante beUum, and, as the
same concession had been given to Sweden, it was contrary to equity to allow
Russia to extend its power at the expense of Turkey. A great deal was said of
the immense importance of Oczakoff, which has since fallen into decay, and of
the advantage which its possession as a fortress would give to Russia in any
later war with Turkey. In March, 1791, Prussia once more collected her forces,
and the English government demanded supplies for the equipment of a naval
expedition to the Baltic. The two Powers drew up and actually despatched to St
Petersburg an ultimatum, to which an answer was required within ten days. For
the second time within twelve months a great European war seemed about to begin
on the Eastern Question. In 179,0 it was Prussia which gave way at the critical
moment, in 1791 it was England. The precise motives which induced Pitt, in the
first place to attach so much importance to the restoration of Oczakoff, and in
the second, place to change his mind with such rapidity, have been a subject of
much discussion. But there can be no doubt that he believed at first that a
resolute attitude would compel Russia to give way, and that he was suddenly
convinced that in the face of parliamentary opposition and public indifference
so resolute an attitude could not be maintained. A special messenger was in
time to prevent the presentation of the ultimatum; the Foreign Secretary
resigned; and Pitt had to explain to the Prussian King the peculiar difficulty
of carrying on a strenuous foreign poljcy in a country blest with parliamentary
institutions. Polite representations were not likely to succeed when bluster
had been so feeble; and Catharine had her own way. On August 11, 1791, the
preliminaries of peace with Turkey were signed at Galatz, and on January 9,
1792, they were confirmed at Jassy. Potemkin, to whose influence the whole war
was largely due, had died in the autumn of 1791. The question of the partition
or preservation of Turkey ceased for the moment to be a disturbing force in
Europe; but events in France and in Poland led to other and more serious
troubles.
The coup d'Hat of June 2,1793, had been
accomplished by a union of three distinct interests, all with one immediate
object—the elimination of the Gironde—but each with a totally different
ulterior design. That of Danton and the Dantonist Committee of Public Safety
had been simply to put the Girondins on one side, because they were an obstacle
to strong government; now that this had been done, any further proceedings
against the fallen party were quite opposed to their wishes. On the other hand
the Robespierrists and enrages of the Convention would not be content with the
results of the coup d'etat until their rivals had been not only suspended but
proscribed and destroyed. Their aim being not a strong government but a Jacobin
government, they regarded the Girondins as an obstacle to their own political
future, and were determined to remove them once for all from their path. Like
the Dantonists, however, they desired to keep the profit of the insurrection
for the Convention, arid to protect the Assembly from further molestation.
But, as had so often before happened in the course of the Revolution, they had
employed, to effect their ends, an intruding and usurping force, whose tyranny
they were now unable to shake off; the agent employed on this occasion had been
the Commune, whose conception of the ultimate ends of the coup d'Hat differed
toto ccelo from those of both Dantonists and Robespierrists. The Commune was in
the hands of Hebert, Chaumette, and their fellows, men who, using the vilest
means, preached the downfall of religion and property, and advocated a policy
of sheer atheism, anarchy, and pillage. These men had borne the main burden of
the insurrection, and not unnaturally expected to reap the reward of their
exertions as soon as their allies of the Corivention could put the lives and
properties of respectable citizens at their mercy by the introduction of
predatory legislation. The coup detat had in fact been as much a victory for
the Commune over the Convention as for the Jacobins and Dantonists over the
Gironde. It is indeed their apprehension of this result that explains the
lukewarm attitude adopted during the crisis by the Committee of Public Safety.
At first it
seemed that the Dantonists might be able to establish
their
interpretation of the coup d'etat. The mild and maternal suspension which they
designed for the Girondins was put in force; the twenty- nine suspended
deputies were merely put under guard in their own houses, even allowed to walk
about Paris under supervision, while the two suspended ministers (Claviere and
Lebrun), similarly guarded, actually continued for three weeks to execute their
ministerial functions, being no doubt far more in sympathy with Denton's
conciliatory policy than were Desforgues and Destoumelles, who ultimately (June
21) succeeded them. The Dantonist regime was also inaugurated in the armies by
the appointment of Custine to the command of the Army of the North, of
Beauhamais to that of the Rhine, and of Biron to that of the Vendee. On June 7
the Committee took a further step, proposing that the lives of the suspended
deputies should be guaranteed by hostages, drawn from the Convention and sent
by that body to the various constituencies. This fantastic proposal, however,
provoked so great an outcry, that both it and a suggestion for a new Commandant
of the National Guard had to be dropped.
While the
Committee of Public Safety had been thus busy in putting its own construction
on the events of June 2, the Commune had not been idle. On the very day of the
insurrection it had put forward demands for the formation of a “ Revolutionary
Army ” for internal use, for the immediate and general enforcement of the
maximum, and for the levying of the forced loan on the “rich”; and on June 3 it
had appointed a Committee to promote cheapness of provisions. It was backed in
all these demands by the Jacobins, who did not want to lose the alliance of the
Commune before the extinction of the Girondins had been completed, and whose
programme therefore, as disclosed by Chabot and Billaud at the club, was for
the present identical with that of the Commune. The fact that Bouchotte, the
War Minister, was a nominee of Hebert, and was able, though at the expense of
efficiency, to enlist the armies on his side by the dissemination of anarchical
literature, told heavily in favour of the Commune. It now seemed probable that,
in spite of the ascendancy of the Dantonists, matters would soon turn to the
profit of the Hotel de Ville, when a series of reactionary outbreaks gave pause
to the advocates of anarchy.
The seat of
the most serious of these outbreaks was Lyons, which city, as the greatest
commercial centre in France, had long, and not without reason, provoked the
jealousy of the Parisian demagogues. The economic disturbance due to the
Revolution had brought ruin to its prosperous industries, the decline in the
silk industry alone throwing
30,000 labourers out of work. These unemployed,
who were not pampered as in Paris by cheap, bread, and whose reasonable
application for a bounty to support their failing industry was refused, were
disgusted with the Revolutionary government and inclined to favour any form of
reaction. After August 10,1792, Commissioners—among them Boissy
340 Reaction at Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux.
[1793
d’A1'
glas—had beien sent to Lyons, and their reports made it clear that an outbreak;
might be expected at any moment. The Jacobin Club had of course a powerful
branch at Lyons, and had got the mastery of the local Commune; but the Mayor,
Niviere-Chol, was a Moderate; and when, in consequence of certain tumults,
domiciliary visits were ordered (January 20,1793) and 150 persons thrown into
prison (February 4), he applied to the Department for troops. The Commune
opposed him, and he resigned (February 7), but was succeeded by another
Moderate. At the end of February the reactionaries again triumphed and
Niviere-Chol was reinstated. In consequence of this the Convention (February
25) nominated Rovere, Bazire, and Legendre, to go to Lyons. Arriving there on
March 2, they set up a local Committee of Public Safety^ quashed the recent
elections, and caused Chajlier, the most prominent of the local Jacobins, to
be elected Mayor. Notwithstanding this, the Commissioners continued to complain
in their reports of the “incivic” ton-; of the city. On May 10 a fresh batch of
Commissioners arrived, at the head of whom was Dubois- Crance, and they at once
joined with the local Commune and Jacobin Club to impqse on the
poverty-stricken city a loan of 6,000,000 livres and a levy for the Vendee.
When Challier tlireatened to carry out these measures by force, the Moderate
National Guard assembled, stormed the municipal buildings, killed 200 “
patriots,” and threw Challier and others into prison. Lyons was thus already
up in arms before June 2, and refused entrance to Robert Lindet, who brought
the news of the coup ditat^ not because it, resented the arrest of the
Girondins, but because of the previous measures of the government and
especially because of the forced loan and levy. Lyons therefore now lay armed
and minatory, waiting to see what the government would do..
At Marseilles
also the Girondist Rebecqui had obtained the expulsion of the. Convention
Commissioners ; and after June 2 a battalion of volunteers was formed to march
on Paris. At Bordeaux there was even greater clamour; the Conventional
Commissioners were ejected, a local Committee of Public Safety established, and
representatives sent all over France to denounce the coup d'etat. At the same
time Normandy declared against the Convention and commenced to prepare an army
to march on the capital.
Meanwhile the
insurrection in the West was growing in vigour. After their successes in March
the insurgents had disbanded for Easter, and some ground was gained by the
Republicans; but on April 30 a fresh rendezvous at Cholet of 30,000 men
resulted after a series of battles in the clearing of the Bocage, and on May 5
the Vendeens laid siege to Thouars, a strongly fortified town far out in the
Plaine on the road to Saumur. Its fall, accomplished by the heroism of de Lescure
and de La Rpchejaquelein, brought the insurgents much needed supplies of arms
and ammunition. May 9 and 13 saw the fall of Parthenay and of La CMtaigneraie,
and on May 16 the army attacked Fontenay, the
chef-lieu
of the Department. The attack was repulsed, but, with a persistence rare in
irregular troops, was renewed on May 20; and, after a desperate battle, in
which both generals and soldiers displayed the most superb courage, the
Republicans were routed with great slaughter, and Fontenay, lying on the
borders of Plaine and Bocage, fell into the hands of tbe Royalists. Masters of
the Plaine eastward of the Bocage, they now pushed on towards the Loire; and on
June 10 a brilliant assault compelled Saumur to surrender. This success, which
gave access to the right bank of the Loire, was of first-rate importance. It
now became necessary for the Vendien leaders to decide on their future lines of
action. They determined on the boldest course—one which, had it succeeded (and
it did all but succeed), would have shaken the Republic to its foundations.
They decided to spread the revolt through Br.i.tanny, Normandy, and Maine,
districts which they rightly regarded as well affected, and to march at the
head of a united North-West against Paris itself. Such a scheme may appear
foolhardy, but at the time there seemed but one obstacle to its realisation—tbe
presence in rear of the army of the important and unblockaded seaport town of
Nantes, where feeling ran high in favour of the Republic.
The insurgent
leaders saw that the capture of Nantes must be the first step towards the
realisation of the^r plans. Appointing Cathelineau commander-in-chief they
advanced, some 30,000 strong, down both banks of the Loire; Angers and Ancenis
surrendered without a shot fired, and on June 29 the outskirts of Nantes were
reached. Charette, who, in spite of numerous repulses, had by the middle of May
made himself practically master of the Marais, was able to cooperate from the
south. Thus the toils closed round the city; everywhere, in Paris, in the
insurgent army, in Nantes itself, capitulation was hourly expected. But it was
now to be proved that courage and devotion were not the monopoly of the
insurgents. Undismayed by the apparently desperate situation, unmoved by
unanimous counsels of surrender, Baco, the Mayor, declared with intrepid
resolution that he would resist to the death. In the few days at his disposal
he put the unfortified town into a state of defence, cut the bridges, blockaded
the streets, and inspired the citizens with his own courage. The insurgents
after all laboured under serious disadvantages; lacking artillery, they could
only hope to carry the city by assault, in which they must needs be greatly
hampered by the difficulty of cooperation between their scattered forces. What
the assault lacked in combination, however, vigour and gallantry amply
supplied. At 7 a.m. on the 29th a struggle commenced, quite Homeric in its
incidents of personal valour. The besiegers were unable to gain a footing in
the town, and at lasti, at 4 p.m., Cathelineau, heading a final desperate
onslaught, received a mortal wound. The Vendiens, with all the sensitiveness
of raw troops, fell back. The crisis of the war was over, and the Republic was
saved.
But it was
not in the Provinces alone that signs of reaction were showing themselves; in
Paris itself all but the very scum of the population dreaded the incendiary
legislation which seemed to be impending and the consequent perpetuation of
insecurity. Twenty-seven of the Sections protested in no measured terms against
the formation of the Revolutionary Army, with the result that that item in the
Jacobin programme was shelved. The Committee of Public Safety desired to
suppress the reactionary outbreaks by mild and conciliatory measures, and was even
ready to amnesty the rebels if the extremists could be persuaded to allow it.
The Committee had on June 7 gone so far as to cashier Hanriot and dissolve the
Revolutionary Committees of the Sections, but the outcry of the extremists
caused them to draw back. Danton himself, although in his speeches he continued
to pander to the lowest tastes of the proletariate, in order to secure the
support of the Hebertists, in his heart desired that the attacks on property
and order should cease; and now, in face of the numerous signs of reaction, the
extremists found it necessary to temporise and to allay the fears of the
bourgeois by the postponement of their predatory schemes. With this object on
June 24 a new Constitution, introduced by Herault, was passed; but, as it was
never intended to come into operation, being merely a manifesto to propitiate,
the bourgeoisie, its enforcement was postponed “ until the peace.” This dummy
Constitution was purposely Dantonist in tone, and in it all predatory
suggestions were carefully suppressed ; the clause on property simply asserted
that society was bound to support the poor either by work or alms, and the
clause on foreign relations, though it accepted Marat’s dictum that “all free
peoples were allies,” was careful to lay down the neo-Dantonist doctrine of
non-intervention.
This
temporising on the part of the Mountain provoked a fierce outburst of anger
from its extreme supporters. These men, Varlet, Roux, Leclerc, Desfieux, Proly,
and a host of others drawn from the very dregs of the population and moved only
by a desire for disorder and plunder, had been the heart and soul of the recent
insurrection. They detested the moderation of the Constitution, and on June 25
and 26 laid their complaints before the Convention and the Commune. Meeting
however with scant encouragement from either, they set to work to plunder on
their own account; and for two days Paris was freely pillaged without
interference on the part of the authorities, the rioters being finally appeased
only by the distribution amongst them of a large anm of money from the
Treasury; after which the Constitution was proclaimed and couriers despatched
to communicate it to the Departments, where on the whole it was favourably
received.
It was now,
however, plain to the Committee, even to Danton himself, that the plans for
conciliation were doomed to failure. It required a man of all Danton’s
resolution and intrepidity to advocate, after a
past so
bloody and violent, a return to order and moderation; it would have required a
man of even more sagacity and persistence than his to carry out such a policy.
To men of the cowardly type of Robespierre, the fear that the restoration of
moderate and equable government would be the signal for vengeance on them for
their innumerable crimes overpowered every other feeling, so that they were
pledged to further violence by that most powerful incentive, the fear of
retribution. The policy of compromise advocated by Danton was thus utterly
abhorrent to the extreme party; the peace which he preached would involve the
prompt execution of the leading Jacobins; the retention of Custine meant the
impeachment of Bouchotte; an amnesty to Lyons, for which Danton was eager,
would hand over the “ patriots ” of that city to a just and certain retribution.
So the Jacobins came to regard Danton as a man dangerous to their very lives,
and, with the instinct of self-preservation, they prepared to strike at him.
On July 8 a
report of the Committee of Public Safety on the suspended Girondins was read.
It proposed the proscription of nine of the fugitive deputies, the impeachment
of five others, and the reinstatement of the remainder. Severe as it seems, it
was in reality the last helpless cry of the conciliatory spirit in face of the
advance of inevitable tyranny and terror; and its moderation was at once made
the pretext for the downfall of Danton and his Committee. The allotted term of
that body was reached on July 10, and, no attempt being made to extend the
period, it was suffered to lapse; and, in the new Committee elected on the same
day, the power which had been gradually slipping out of the hands of the
moderate or Dantonist Jacobins was finally transferred to the extreme or
Robespierrist section. True, Robespierre himself, with characteristic caution,
was not a candidate for the new Committee; but, as soon as it was securely
established, he began to attend its meetings, and on the resignation of
Gasparin (July 24) hastened to get himself nominated. The members elected on
July 10 were Jean Bon Saint-Andr^, Barere, Gasparin, Couthon, Herault, Thuriot,
Prieur of the Marne, Saint-Just, and Robert Lindet. Of these Barere and Lindet
had been original members of the first Committee, Herault, Couthon, and
Saint-Just had been members since May 80, Jean Bon Saint-Andr^ and Gasparin
since June 12. Of the nine members only two, Herault and Thuriot, were
Dantonists; the whole of the remainder, including Barere who was Dantonist only
so long as Danton’s predominance was assured, owned the sway of Robespierre;
above all Couthon and Saint-Just were his intimate allies. The salient feature,
however, was not the substitution of Robespierrists for Dantonists, for the old
Committee after June 12 had comprised a majority of the former, so much as the
elimination of Danton himself. Though he continued to speak in the Convention,
and —in the vain hope of inducing the new rulers to adopt his views—to advocate
the further strengthening of the Committee, and though for a
time there
was a kind of alliance between him and Robespierre, July 10 marks the decline
of Danton’s influence and the rejection of his policy. In March he had set
himself to create an alkpowerful government, with the object of restoring
equilibrium to politics at home and abroad; his masterful genius had succeeded in
.forging the weapon, but—strong as he was—he found it impossible to prevent it
slipping from his hands; and in July it was snatched from him to be used for
ends diametrically opposed to those for which he had designed it. Men moved by
alternate spasms of ambition and cowardice now seized the reins of power, and
democracy run mad was unchained and at large.
This
Second, or Great, Committee of Public Safety experienced in its first few
months of power a few changes of personnel, but after September 6 remained
unchanged until July 27, 1794. As during this period the Committee was the
absolute master of France, it is necessary to have a clear idea of its working
and of the relations of its members one to another. On August 14 Carnot and
Prieiir of the Cdte d’Or were added to replace provisionally Saint-Andre and
Robert Lindet, who had gone on mission ; but, proving indispensable, they were
permanently retained. On September 6 Billaud-Varennes and Collot d’fierbois
were introduced, so that after the retirement of Thuriot and Herault the
Committee numbered eleven. :
It is plain
that a vast work of reorganisation fell to this small knot of men. They found
no staff of permanent officials, no existing administrative machinery ;
everything had to be organised from the very foundation. The men, who set
themselves to accomplish this enormous task, were Ca'rnot,' Saint-Andre, the
two PrieuTs, and Robert Lindet. Camot, a man of forty years, had been deputy
for the Pas-de-Cialais in both Legislative ahd Convention. Absolutely upright
and single-minded, he determined to sacrifice everything to the reorganisation
of the army. To effect this he succeeded in deadening every,other feeling and
was content to Share the odium of the Terror, so long as he was allowed to be
supreme in his own department. He would have been a superlative permanent
official; but he lacked the comprehensive views necessary to a grelat
statesman, and he had practically no influence on the general, policy of the
government of which he was a member. Saint-Andr^ w&s another honest
official of the same type; throughout the Terror he was absorbed in a
whole-hearted effort to restore efficiency to the ruined Navy. Prieur of the
Cote d’Or was Carnot’s right-hand man, and like him absorbed in the pressing needs
of the armies; while his namesake of the Department of the Marne, being
constantly on mission, hardly ever attended the meetings of the Committee.
These men cannot be held guilty of,the bloody policy adopted by their
colleagues, save in so far as they passively , acquiesced in it in order to
maintain themselves in office. To Collot and Billaud, the one a dissolute
cut-throat, the other a gloomy fanatic, both delighting in crime for crime’s
sake, leaning in faict to the
school of
Hubert, the savage excesses of the Terror may be attributed; to them these
excesses were the gratification of natural ferocity, while to Robespierre and
his immediate satellites, Couthon and Saint-Just, they were the logical
reduction into practice of a political theory. Of Robespierre some note has
already been made in these pages. Cowardice and ambition were for ever at
variance within him. Ambition had thrust him into a position to fall from which
involved cortain retribution; cowardice therefore prompted him to avoid this
retribution by striking with blind and bitter fury at all opponents. What might
be mistaken for courage was thus in reality the violence of a desperate and
terrified creature. Georges Couthon, Robespierre’s devoted adherent in the Committee,
was of Auvergne; of Robespierre’s own age and profession, he seems to have
genuinely cared for and believed in his leader; the partial paralysis which
gave a certain pathos to his appearances in the tribune did not prevent his
engaging actively in missions, to the management of which he brought a certain
capacity of independent discrimination, rare in his colleagues. Closely allied
with Robespierre and Couthon was Antoine Louis Leon de Saint-Just. No more than
twenty-five years old when he entered the Convention, Saint-Just immediately
identified himself with all the most violent and most visionary measures;
endowed with an iron courage, rigid conviction, and that faculty of decision
which Robespierre so conspicuously lacked, he now constantly came forward to
supply the deficiencies of his leader. His fantastic dreams of a -egenerated
society were however too puerile even for Robespierre,: who
tolerated them only because he required the fearless energy of 'his young
colleague to effect his own designs.
The new
government did not delay to show its hand. The period of conciliation, which
had been abnormal and a mere tour-de-force of Danton, was at an end ; and the
era of blind and indiscriminate violence commenced The attitude of the
government towards the revolted Provinces was at once altered Normandy had
indeed ceased to trouble. On July 13 a skirmish had taken place at Vernon
between the “Army of Calvados,” which had been ostentatiously moving on Paris
in the Girondin interest, and some Parisian volunteers, aided by the local National
Guard; and the insurgents ran away. The few Girondin deputies, who had i3
anaged to escape to Caen to foment the Norman insurrection, then took ship for
Bordeaux, and Normandy ceased to be a centre of reaction. But in the Vendee,
Lyons, and the south, resistance to the Jacobins continued. Lyons had by this
time openly declared war. A Royalist veteran, the Comte de Precy, was in
command of a formidable force of
40,000 National Guards with 300 guns; and every
preparation was made for a stout resistance. On the very first day. of its
existence the new Committee showed that, for Lyons, the era of conciliation was
over; on Couthon’s motion, the leaders of the revolt were proscribed and the
property of the Lyons “rebels” confiscated for the benefit of the local
“ patriots
”—a direct enticement to men to take arms against the city for the lining of
their own pockets. Utterly regardless of the safety of the frontiers, the
Committee next instructed Kellermann to lead 6000 men against Lyons. The
Lyonnais replied by executing Challier; but they offered to make terms if
Couthon’s decrees were withdrawn. Dubois-Crance, the Conventional Commissioner,
however, insisted on unconditional surrender; and on August 8 hostilities
commenced. In the Vendee also July 10 was the signal for a new regime. A bloody
code of fire and slaughter was imposed upon the revolted districts (August 1),
with the result that on September 5 it was reported that “ des monceaux de
cendres, la mort, la famine s’offrent de tous cotes aux regards des rebeUes.”
Such effect, however, as these severities might have produced was largely
neutralised by the policy, simultaneously adopted, of appointing incapable “
popular ” generals. Biron, Danton’s nominee, was arrested, and the command in
the Vendee was given to Rossignol, who was not only a tipsy and dissolute
scoundrel, but a stupid dnd ignorant coward to boot; so much so that he was
suspended on August 22 by the Convention’s own Commissioners, only however to
be reinstated six days later. It was at this time also (July 12) that, in the
Army of the North, Houchard replaced Custine, who was arrested on July 22,
condemned by the Revolutionary Tribunal, and executed (August 28).
The
enforcement of these violent measures had been greatly facilitated by the course
events were taking at home as well as at the front. On July 13 Paris was
startled by the intelligence of the assassination of Maiat. The “ Ami du
Pewple,” confined to his house by sickness, was in his bath, when a woman named
Charlotte Corday, of Caen, penetrated to his apartment and plunged a dagger
into his heart. She seems to have been actuated not only by private motives of
revenge but also by a genuine desire to avenge the Girondins. It appears indeed
that Charlotte Corday —and she half-mad—was the only person in France who
sincerely regretted the once idolised Gironde. The death of Marat in this
dramatic fashion was of enormous value to the new government. He had, it is
true, long lost his importance, and his bloodthirsty ravings and avowed policy
of murder had been more calculated to embarrass than to aid his colleagues.
Alive, therefore, he would have been a positive obstacle; dead, however, and
dead in a manner so sensational, he was a perfect godsend. The very men, who
would have found him so awkward a colleague, fell into paroxysms of eulogy :
Marat was promptly deified and his remains buried with extravagant pomp on July
19; Charlotte was of course tried and executed; advantage was taken of the
spontaneous act of an enthusiast to persuade people of the existence of vast
Girondin intrigues, and of the consequent necessity for harsh and violent
measures.
Events at the
front had also played into the hands of the Committee, for the month of July
had been a month of disaster for France. On
July 12 the
allies took Conde; on the 23rd Mainz was compelled to surrender; and on the
28th Valenciennes capitulated to Coburg. Once more Paris seemed open to the
advance of the Allies; it was a repetition of August, 1792. But the danger was
in reality not so great as it appeared. The Allies, hopelessly divided, were
united only in their determination not to invade. Of this determination the
Committee was perfectly well aware, and, secure in the knowledge that Paris was
safe, it welcomed tbe reverses of July as an admirable lever for use in
domestic politics. The apparent danger of Prance gave it the excuse for
removing obnoxious generals, for increasing the power of the Revolutionary
Tribunal, for violent measures against foreigners, for atrocities on a colossal
scale in the Vendee, for the commencement of proceedings against the Queen,
and, what it now desired most of all, for the completion of tbe downfall of the
Girondins.
The
proscribed deputies were still wandering about France fomenting ineffectual disturbances.
Neither at Bordeaux nor in any other part of the country was there any serious
outbreak in their favour, and the Committee could have afforded to treat them
with indifference. It was not however inclined to do so, thinking no doubt that
a ruthless vengeance would be a warning to future rivals. The “ Moderate ”
report of July 8 was subjected therefore to the revision of Barere, who
proposed (July 28) the outlawry of twenty-one of the Girondins for rebellion,
and the trial of nine others for complicity therein. This second report,
although adopted, had little immediate effect; and for two months more tbe
threatened deputies remained at large.
The new
government was in fact not yet sufficiently sure of its position to be able to
proceed to extremities. The completion of the Constitution should, by rights,
have heralded the spontaneous dissolution of the Convention—Committee of Public
Safety and all—but Convention and Committee were united in their determination
to cling to power, knowing what to expect if they let go. Danton, who was still
bidding for the favour of the new rulers, identified himself with this policy
of prolonging the power of the Committee; and it was he who, with a boldness
from which the Committee itself shrank, proposed (August 1) “that the Committee
of Public Safety be erected into a Provisional Government.” But the outcry
provoked by this suggestion terrified tbe Committee into a disavowal of their
too outspoken advocate. Robespierre, however, desired to retain for the time
being the alliance of Danton against the threatened combination of Commune, War
Office, and gutter-politicians, which was just as objectionable to the new as
to the old Committee. It was the old story. Robespierre had used the Hebertists
to drive Danton from office; by doing so he had given them a dangerous access
of strength, and he was now obliged to employ the waning but still potent
influence of the great demagogue to lay the evil genius which he had himself
let loose.
To the
Hebertists, power and office, affording as they did the most convenient
opportunities for plunder and patronage, were the only goal of politics; and
they were not content to leave the prizes of victory to Robespierre any more
than to Danton. All through the month of August they were busy pushing forward
measures calculated to increase their own power. On August 10 the f&te of
the Constitution had been celebrated; and on the very next day Lacroix had the
courage to propose that the Convention should fulfil its Constitutional obligations
by dissolving itself—a propc.sal which was greeted with a storm of
execrations. On the same day the Hebertists, through the representatives of the
provincial Communes, who were in Paris for the fete, demanded a levee- en-masse
of the people of France. This was no doubt a splendid inspiration. As a
military expedient it was of course ludicrous and calculated to produce
paralysis in every department of the War Office; for there were neither
rations, arms, clothes, nor officers for such a levy. This however mattered not
at all to the advocates of the scheme. To them it commended itself, not for any
military reason, but because it both had an air of patriotism and was an
admirable means for getting all Moderates out of the way. The impracticability
of the proposal aroused the opposition of Danton; he took up the cry for the
levy, but pointed out the folly of making it universal; “ il faut
mourir,'" he said, “pour la patrie, mais ilfaut mourir utilement.'"
Thus the proposal was converted by the genius of Danton, backed by Carnot and
Prieur of the Cote d’Or, from the collection of a clumsy and powerless rabble
to the orderly enlistment of an effective body of recruits. Only those between
the ages of 18 and 25 were called out. This whittling down of their scheme was
a severe blow to the Hebertists; but the military results of an addition of
450,000 men to the armies were in the end considerable.
Danton’s
interference in this matter of the levee served to widen the breach between him
and the Hebertists; and the defeat of Hebert himself by Par£, an intimate of
Danton, in the election of a Minister of the Interior to replace Garat (August
20), made matters worse. Feeling was thus running very high, when, in the early
days of September, arrived the startling news that Toulon, with the chief fleet
of France, had surrendered on August 23 to the English admiral, Hood. The
disaffection of the two great southern seaports of Marseilles and Toulon had
for some weeks past causted grave anxiety to the government. Marseilles, after
June 2, had expelled the Conventional Commissioners, and despatched an army
against Paris which had penetrated as far as Orange, only however to be driven
from Avignon on July 27 by Carteaux, who had been detached with 1500 men from
the Army of the Alps. Carteaux twice defeated the Marseillais, and finally
entered Marseilles on August 25. The antagonism of Toulon had been roused by
provocations similar to those which had stirred Lyons to resistance. The
Jacobin intrigue and
1793] The Hibertist ascendancy.^-The law ofForty
Sous. 349
violence,
which had long troubled the city, culminated on July 14 in a scheme to murder
respectable citizens. Such a threat provoked them to retaliate; a new
municipality was formed, and five murderers were executed. This insurrection
was therefore, like that of Lyons, mainly a struggle for personal security. The
Conventional Commissioners were now arrested, and Louis XVII proclaimed; but
Barras and Freron, the Commissioners to the Army of Italy, worked with energy
and prudence to check the spread of the revolt; and, after the defeat of the
Marseillais had removed all hope of aid from that quarter, the men of Toulon
determined to invite the allied fleets, which were blockading the harbour, to
occupy the town.
The fall of
Toulon was a climax to the disasters of the Republic, and was the signal for a
great outburst of revolutionary activity. The early days of September saw the
introduction of a series of decrees which may be held to have finally
established the Terror. On September 3 the compulsory loan of 1000 millions was
enforced, the maximum for corn further reduced, and arbitrary steps taken for
the provisioning of Paris. On September 5 the action of the Revolutionary
Tribunal was expedited by its division into four sections. Further, on the
demand of Chaumette, the dominating spirit of the Commune, a Revolutionary Army
of 6000 men was established, to patrol Paris, make war on reactionaries, guard
provisions, and carry out revolutionary laws, a measure which gave legal status
and organisation to those bands of armed and dangerous ruffians which had long,
but hitherto illegally, been the scourge of respectable Paris. Private houses
were next thrown open to search; the Sectional Assemblies were renovated, and
received power to arrest; and, to ensure their efficiency, the “ Law of Forty
Sous ” was passed, on the motion of Danton (September 5), arranging for two
Section meetings a week and a salary of 40 sous for each attendance.
These
measures, provoked and excused by the apparently desperate situation of the
Republic, were welcomed by the Hebertists as a triumph for their opinions.
Their ascendancy was further emphasised by the introduction into the Committee
of Public Safety, on September 6, of Billaud and Collot, both of whom were thoroughly
imbued with Hebertist doctrines. Billaud had marked his return (on August 29)
from a mission to the Army of the North by the delivery of a venomous attack on
the Committee for the evil plight in which he had found that army. It was
tantamount to a vote of censure; and it was to stop the mouth of so dangerous a
critic that the Committee elected him a member and with him introduced his
kindred spirit, Collot. With these two men entered the element of Hebertism, of
sheer, brutal, impolitic violence; and on the day of their election the
Committee may be said to have finally started on the inclined plane of crime.
On September
9 the Hebertists further captured the subordinate but important Comiti de
Surete Generale, which had the control of police
affairs, and
which had hitherto been tinder the influence of Danton. The Commune also
secured a grant of a million weekly for the provisioning of Paris, five-sixths
of which actually found its way into the pockets of the municipalfunctionaries:
one may be certain that this was not the least acceptable of the advantages
which September brought to the Hebertists. The new regime was completed
(September 17) by the introduction of the “ Law of the Suspect.” This infamous
law, “ the procuress of the guillotine,” was the work of the distinguished
jurist, Merlin of Douai; it defined suspects as “ all who had befriended
tyranny, not paid taxes, or who were not furnished with‘ Cartes de Civisme ’
from their Sections.” All such were to be arrested and could be tried by any tribunal;
and the Revolutionary Committees of the Sections were to draw up lists of
suspects for the Comite de Sivrete Generate. This law renewed and completed the
tyranny of the Sections. On the same day the maximum, which had already,
limited as its action was, plunged the Provinces into the most terrible
destitution, was extended to other commodities besides com; and the “crime” of
withdrawing such commodities from sale was made punishable by death and
confiscation. All freedom of agriculture and trade was thus destroyed, and the
State assumed the entire control of both.
The
extremists of the Convention and the Committee now considered themselves
strong enough to proceed with the long-postponed impeachment of the Girondins.
The last remnants of the power of the Dantonists were disappearing; Thuriot,
disgusted at the' introduction of Billaud and Collot, had retired from the
Committee (September 20). Danton himself was meditating withdrawal to his home
at Arcis. Robespierre and his friends, who had been waiting their opportunity
with relentless patience, were not slow to avail themselves of it. On October 3
the doors of the Convention were suddenly locked; and Amar, a friend of
Robespierre and a member of the Comite de SAreti Generate, introduced the Report
of that Committee on the proscribed Girondins. In this fierce measure no less
than 129 deputies were implicated; and so cowed was the Convention that not a
protest was raised. Forty-three deputies were handed over to the Revolutionary
Tribunal, and sixty-five placed under arrest, while the decree of outlawry of
July 28 was maintained against twenty-one. Amongst the forty-three was the
name of Philippe ]£galit£, included no doubt in order to cast upon the
Girondins the odium of Orleanisme, a crime of which the Jacobins alone had been
guilty. A proposal to include in the proscription the seventy-five signatories
of a protest against the coup d’itai of June 2, all members of the Right or
Centre, was postponed on the suggestion of Robespierre; and to this diplomatic
act of clemency he owed that subservience of the Plain, on which he eventually
came to depend. Only twenty-one of the forty-three were immediately
forthcoming, and they were placed in confinement pending the commencement of
proceedings.
The violence
of the attack on the Girondins, as well as all the revolutionary legislation
of September, was Hebertist in origin, and largely due to the presence on the
Committee of Billaud and Collot. But it was not the intention of the
Robespierrists to allow the Commune or the Hebertist Ministry to oust the
Committee of Public Safety. On the contrary they had consented to include the
Hebertist element in the existing government, only as a bribe to induce that
powerful party to refrain from any attempt to establish another form of
government. And now the Committee felt that the time had come when they must
declare their own permanence and that of the Convention; for this declaration
the ground had been carefully prepared by petitions procured from the
Departments, imploring the Convention not to desert France in the hour of
danger. On October 10 therefore Saint-Just proposed that “the government be
revolutionary until the peace”; and thus the final step was taken by which the
Constitution was overridden and the permanent usurpation of the Committee
definitely avowed.
Simultaneously
with this declaration came the momentous news of the fall of Lyons. On August 8
the siege had been commenced by Kellermann; but, as there were not sufficient
forces to invest the city, Dubois-Crance ordered its bombardment. About the
middle of September famine became serious, and by the end of the month the
besiegers, whose numbers now reached 50,000, were able to storm the outworks.
Precy, seeing that all was lost, cut his way out and escaped with about 2000
followers, leaving the city in the hands of the Republicans. Couthon was at
once sent to demolish the town; but, although a savage Terrorist, he was not a
Hebertist, and saw the folly of such a proceeding. He therefore delayed the execution
of the sentence and established a comparatively mild Terror, with the result
that, on October 29, he was recalled, and Collot himself, accompanied by Fouche
and other picked men, with 3000 of the Parisian Revolutionary Army, proceeded
to Lyons and introduced a system of wholesale massacres. The ordinary methods
being too dilatory, prisoners were shot down in large batches, and in seven of
these “ mitraillades” no less than 484 persons were killed. The total number of
victims under the bloody rule of Collot and Fouche has been variously
estimated, and may have been anything from 1600 to 6000. On October 26 the
demolition of houses, begun under Couthon, proceeded at a cost of 400,000
francs a day until a considerable portion of the city was destroyed.
Thus
auspiciously opened the absolute reign of the Committee. But it was not at
Lyons alone that fortune smiled upon the Republican arms; and the late autumn
of 1793 was as much a period of Republican successes as the early autumn had
been of reverses. Everywhere the tireless energy, organising capacity, and
military judgment of Carnot and the “workers” of the Committee began to have
effect. On October 16 Jourdan won the battle of Wattignies; Pichegru and Hoche
commenced
352 The siege of Toulon. Napole&n Bonaparte.
[1793
offensive
operations in November; and on December 26 the latter forced the lines of
Weissenburg and drove the Prussians from Alsace.
Meanwhile
Carteaux after the capture of Marseilles had laid siege to Toulon. The siege,
of Toulon derives much of its interest from the fact that it introduces a new
and fateful character into- the drama of the Revolution, for here Napoleon
Bonaparte may be said to have won his spurs. Of Florentine extraction on both
sides, Bonaparte had been bom in Corsica on August 15, 1769. His father had
been identified with the cause of the patriot Pauli until the island was handed
over to France. Accepting these new rulers he succeeded in getting his son
Napoleon admitted to the military academy at Brienne (April, 1779), in which
school and in the military academy of Paris he was trained, until in 1785 he
received a commission in the French regiment of La Fere. During this period and
until 1790 Napoleon was absorbed in dreams of the independence of Corsica; but
a personal rebuff from his idol, Paoli, caused him to identify himself with
France and the Revolution. He seems to have had powerful friends, and after the
events of June 20 and August 10, of both of which crises he was an eye-witness,
he received a Captain’s Commission and became the devoted servant of the
Revolution. Bonaparte now returned to Corsi ca and attempted to play the
double part of Patriot and Revolutionary, identifying the salvation of Corsica
with the suzerainty of France. Paoli however appealed to England and the
Bonapartes were obliged to take refuge in France.
Napoleon’s
services were employed in the campaign of Carteaux against Marseilles, but he
had no share in the fate of that town, being left behind to reorganise the
artillery at Avignon. Here he was found by the Convention Commissioners,
Salicetti and the younger Robespierre, on their way to join the army; and to
them he showed a pamphlet with the Composition of which he had—not we may
imagine without ulterior motives—been beguiling the distasteful moments of
inaction. This pamphlet, Le Souper de Beaucaire, was an admirable presentation
of the most telling arguments in favour of the Jacobin government, and well
calculated to win the approbation of the Commissioners, who now became eager to
push forward so promising a young Republican. Carteaux had advanced against
Toulon with some 40C-J men, and was joined by a division of the Army of Italy,
with whom were Freron and Barras. After the fall of Lyons more troops became
available; the command was given to Dugommier; and the siege began in earnest.
By the influence of the friendly commissioners Bonaparte now secured the
command of a battery. The strategy by which the town was taken, the essential
part of which was the seizure of Cepet, a promontory that commanded both the
inner and the outer harbours, has often been attributed to him; it seems
however improbable that he was the author of it, although, by his vigour and
the skill with which he directed the artillery, he contributed much to its
success. The English and
Spaniards
soon found the harbour untenable, i and, carrying off a number of the
inhabitants, and either towing away or destroying about one half of the French
ships, they abandoned Toulon to the Republicans, who entered the city on
December 19. The surrendered town was at once handed over to the Convention
Commissioners; they used their powers with extreme ferocity, fusilladed in
three days some 800 citizens, and established a Revolutionary Tribunal which
destroyed about 1800 persons within three months.
At length the
war in the west, after many unexpected vicissitudes, seemed to be nearing its
close. The peril, to which Nantes, and with Nantes the Republic, had been
subjected in June, had determined the government that the insurrection was not
to be trifled with. Wester- mann was instructed to create a diversion in the
Bocage, where he began to lay waste the country; but his violence only provoked
reprisals, and his temerity led to his defeat at Chatillon (July 5), when he
barely escaped by precipitate flight. Throughout July concerted efforts were
made by the Republicans to establish a footing in the Bocage; but, although
they took Chantonnay (July 23), they were unable to hold it, and at the end of
the month the insurgents were still masters of their,own country, devastated
though it was.
Enormous
reinforcements, including the liberated garrison of Mainz, were now hurried
westwards. But the appointment of the ruffian Rossignol to the chief command
(July 27) did not aid matters. On August 1 the government carried a fierce
decree that the revolted districts should be devastated and depopulated, in
face of which the insurgent leaders swore to continue their resistance to the
death. D’Elbee replaced Cathelineau as commander-in-chief: he was probably the
least capable of the possible leaders, and his first action was disastrous. A
concentration of the insurgent forces of both Bocage and Marais was effected
against the important town of Lu^on, the capture of which would have
established permanent communications between the two districts. Owing however
to blundering leadership, and to the unfavourable nature of the open ground,
where artillery, in which arm they were very deficient; told so heavily, the
insurgents sustained the most bloody defeat of the war, and fled eastwards,
leaving, it was said, 6000 dead upon the field. Chantonnay fell once more into
the hands of the Republicans, only however to be retaken on September 5, after
a struggle in which Lucjon was fully avenged. The insurgents were also
victorious in no less tban five other pitched battles between September 18 and
22, the most important of which was that of Torfou-Tiffauges, where the
impetuous valour of the Vendeens bore down, after seven hours’ fighting, even
the resistance of the stubborn defenders of Mainz; and a complete rout was only
averted by the coolness of Kleber.
Now however
the weakness inherent in undisciplined levies began to show itself in personal
quarrels between the leaders. Charette took
offence over
some petty question of booty and suddenly withdrew into the Marais. His
desertion sadly weakened the grande armee; and, several reverses having been
sustained, Bonchamps, the most experienced of its generals, counselled a second
crossing of the Loire and the execution of the old plan of raising a rebellion
in Normandy and Britanny. Before adopting this expedient, however, it was
determined to make one final effort to clear the Bocage. Cholet, its strongest
eastern outwork, was being threatened by the Republicans, and it was decided to
give battle there. Four thousand men were first detached to secure the passage
of the Loire—a precaution which, although no doubt strategically correct, was
disastrous in its moral effect, as it laid bare to the peasants the despairing
attitude of their leaders, and rendered them, when the crisis came, only too
willing to adopt the means of safety provided. During the whole of October 16,
Cholet, a country town perched on a gentle wooded eminence overlooking the
eastward Plaine, was the scene of a desperate struggle. Towards evening a scare
of Republican reinforcements arose and with it the fatal cry “a la
Loire.'" In a last magnificent charge Bonchamps and d’Elbee were both
mortally wounded; and once more, as at Nantes, the fall of their leaders
completed the discomfiture of the peasants, who turned in headlong flight
towards the river. Four thousand Vendeens were dead on the field; their two
most trusted leaders lay dying; the remnant of the army was in hopeless rout.
It is no wonder that the Republicans regarded the insurrection as at an end.
L’^chelle,
however, the incompetent successor of the incompetent Rossignol, was quite
unprepared for the crossing of the Loire, and unable either to prevent it or to
pursue. The majority of the peasants dispersed to their homes, but some 50,000
of the boldest, accompanied by a host of women and children, established
themselves unmolested on the right bank of the Loire. But Bonchamps, the
deviser of the plan, and the one man who might have brought it to a successful
issue, was dying, and it became necessary to appoint a new commander. Henri de
La Rochejaquelein, on whom the choice fell, glorious and inspiring hero though
he was, a tactician of real genius, and in battle the bravest of the brave,
lacked the necessary experience—he was but twenty-one— and had neither the
temper nor the wisdom in council required to extricate the army from its
perilous position. No sooner was the crossing effected than divided counsels
prevailed; the wounded Lescure advised a fresh advance on Nantes, others an
advance into Britanny or Normandy. While they deliberated, the chance of
advancing on Nantes slipped away ; and it was less by choice than of necessity
that the army pushed northwards and on October 28 occupied Laval.
Meanwhile the
Republicans, at last grasping the situation, had flung themselves across the
Loire; and on October 25 their vanguard, under Westermann, engaging the
insurgents somewhat prematurely, was roughly
handled and
compelled to fall back. Two days later the main body came up, and battle was
joined at CMteau Gontier. The Republicans were now to find that, even as
fugitives, their opponents were formidable. De La Rochejaquelein signalised his
first appearance in supreme command by a display not only of his customary
valour, but also of real tactical skill. The incompetence of L’l£chelle was as
conspicuous as the capacity of his opponent. The Republican army was driven in
hopeless confusion over the Mayenrie, and L’^chelle fled to hide his shame at
Nantes. It was now dear that the battle of Cholet had by no means ended the
Vendeen resistance. In order to pursue the fugitive insurgents the Republicans
had evacuated the Vendee itself; and Charette, who had, since his desertion of
the grande armke, been more than holding his own in the Marais, now returned to
Lege, and became a rallyihg-point for further resistance.
Once more,
however, the Republicans were aided by the divided counsels of their
antagonists. La Rochejaquelein had the wisdom to advocate a return to the
Vendee, but neither the patience nor the selfconfidence to press his views,
with the consequence thait the army struck blindly northwards, and occupied
Mayenne (November 2), Fougeres (November 4), and Dol (November 9). Then, in the
vague hope of half-promised assistance from England, they attacked the small
fortified seaport town of Granville, only to find themselves powerless against
even the weakest fortifications for want of suitable artillery.
After this
failure the insurgent generals advocated a withdrawal into Normandy; but the
peasants, now when it was too late, were seized with an overpowering desire to
return home, and, much against his will, La Rochejaquelein turned southward
again. With the courage bom of despair, he snatched on November 18 and 20 two
victories from the Republicans, and entered Dol. These successes of the
dwindling and disheartened, but still dangerous army, may be largely attributed
to the incapacity of Rossignol; and it was ofaly the sagacity of his
subordinates, Kleber and Marceau, that prevented their being turned into
disasters to the Republican army. So disorganised were the Republicans that
they could not prevent the insurgents from reaching Angers, which was saved
only by the strength of its fortifications. An attempt was now made by the
insurgents of the Bocage to secure a oassagr for their fugitive compatriots,
but it was too late. Doubling eastwards in the hope of effecting1 a
crossing at Saumur or Tours, the grande armee, reduced now to some 25,000
broken men, was overtaken at Le Mans by Kleber, Marceau, and Westermann. A
bloody victoiy was followed by a wanton butchery of prisoners; 15,000 persons
are said to have perished in this terrible affair (December 13).
It was now
only a question of how many fugitives could slip across the river ; the fate of
those who remained on the right bank was sealed. Struggling back to Ancenis, La
Rochejaquelein and Stofflet, in a fruitless
attempt to
get the army across by means of a single boat, were cut off from their troops.
Plying westwards, amidst every circumstance of horror, the leaderless remnant
was at length overtaken by Kleber at Savenay (December 23), where, though not
without an heroic and desperate resistance, the last of the grand Royal and
Catholic army, which had so long troubled the Republic, and for a while even
threatened its very existence, was utterly cut to pieces. After this final
defeat the war might have been brought to an end had the government but
consented to act with reasonable clemency; its continuance, after the
annihilation of the main body of the insurgents, is to be attributed to the
insane violence of the Committee and its emissaries. Nantes and Angers were
already furnished with Revolutionary Tribunals; the perpetration of most
wholesale atrocities had commenced; and Carrier, finding that the Revolutionary
Tribunal of Nantes could not dispose of more than 200 victims in a day,
conceived the idea of drowning his prisoners in large batches. Great barges,
filled with unfortunates of all ages and both sexes, were scuttled in the
Loire. In this ghastly fashion not less than 1500 persons perished, possibly
many more. A total of at least
15,000 suffered in different fashions during
Carrier’s four months’ rule at Nantes. Little wonder that, even after Savenay,
the insurgents preferred to remain under arms rather than be done to death in
cold blood.
While the
active members of the Committee were engaged in subjugating the revolted
districts and in driving the allies across the frontiers, its Terrorist members
were busily occupied in establishing their system both in the Provinces and in
Paris itself. In Paris their first step was to institute proceedings against
Marie-Antoinette. The unfortunate Queen, who had been separated from her family
on July 1, and transferred to the Conciergerie on September 1, was there
subjected to preliminary interrogations by the Comite de S&rete Genirale,
while the royal children were examined with shocking indecency by Pache,
Chaumette, Hebert, David, and Simon. On October 14 the Queen appeared before
the Revolutionary Tribunal, and replied, with great dignity and remarkable
skill; to the fierce examination of Hermann, the President. On October 15
Fouquier-Tinville, the Public Prosecutor, delivered his accusation, in which he
charged the Queen with (i.) handing large sums of money to the Emperor before
the Revolution; (ii.) encouraging a Counter-Revolution; (iii.) producing
famine; (iv.) plotting flight and instigating “massacres,” in particular that
of the Champ de Mars ; (v.) forming the “ Austrian Committee ”; (vi.) the
vetoes ; (vii.) planning August 10; (viii.) betraying French plans to the
allies; (ix.) incestuous intercourse with her son (aged eight). Witnesses were
called, and the Queen was subjected to a fierce and prolonged examination. As
she had had no notice of the nature of the charges, she was of course unable to
cross-examine or to call witnesses on her side. Her
counsel’s
defence was perfunctory, and, after Hermann had summed up and the jury had
deliberated fof an hour, a verdict of “ Guilty on all counts ” was brought in.
At 7 a.m. on October 16 Marie-Antoinette was conveyed in a cart to the Place de
la Revolution. She ignored the attentions of the Constitutional cure, bore with
indifference the insults of the mob, and met her death with the same dignified
courage which had characterised her behaviour throughout the proceedings.
The Queen’s
trial over, the attention of the Tribunal was at once transferred to the
proscribed Girondins, who since October 3 had been awaiting trial in the
Conciergerie. Of the twenty-one, who on October 24 appeared at the bar, the
most prominent were Brissot, Vergniaud, and Gensonne. They presented a defence
thoroughly Girondin in spirit; each man, in spite of the knowledge that he was
prejudged, was base enough to try and prove himself a Montagnard. After six
sittings Fouquier complained of the slowness of the proceedings ; and on
October 29 it was enacted that after two days the jury might declare themselves
satisfied of the guilt or innocence of the prisoners. Thus on October 29, at 7
p.m., a verdict of guilty was brought in and sentence pronounced. Valaze
stabbed himself in Court, and on October 81 (10 Brumaire) the remainder went to
the scaffold. Thus perished the main body of the Girondins; but for many months
the pursuit of the fugitives continued. Madame Roland met her fate on November
10 with a real, if characteristically ostentatious, courage ; Lebrun was
executed on December 27; Salles and Guadet on June 19, 1794; Barbaroux shot
himself, but lived to be executed on June 15; and a number of less-known
members mounted the scaffold on various dates in 1793 and 1794. A long list of
suicides brings the Girondins’ story to a close, Roland stabbed himself on
hearing of his wife’s death (November 15), and Claviere on December 8;
Condorcet took poison (March 28); Rebecqui drowned himself (May 3); Petion and
Buzot shot themselves (June 18).
Their rivals
thus disposed of, the Montagnards turned to isolated victims; Philippe ^galite,
a prisoner since April 7, had been guillotined on November 6, bitterly
repenting of his evil deeds; he was followed to the scaffold, on November 12,
by Bailly, whose conduct in the affair of the Champ de Mars was now avenged by
the cruelty and needless prolongation of his execution.
Of the other
victims of this bloody winter the most conspicuous were Bamave and
Duport-du-Tertre (November 28), Manuel (November 14), who perished for his
humane refusal to give evidence against the Queen, and Rabaut (December 5);
while of the generals- the younger Custine (January 3), Houchard (November 17),
Biron (December 31), and the aged Luckner quickly followed one another to the
guillotine; while on May 10, the Princess Elizabeth, sister of Louis XVI,
serenely ended her pure and beautiful life on the scaffold.
Thus the
winter pf 1793? or An in, as we must now call it, for the Republican Cp-lpnfiar
had cpme into fprce on November $4, 17931, saw the Hebertist
regiftie in full power in every direction, and the ascendancy of War Office and
Commune increasing daily. In the Committee, although Billaud was inclined to
fall away from the Hebertists, the influence pf Cojlot, the most violent of the
Terrorists, was very great; in the armies the Hebertists were supreme, while in
every Department gome member pf the party was battening on ill- gotten gains.
It was plain that the government of the country could not long be maintained on
these anarchical lines. The incompetence of the Hebertist generals became
daily more apparent; and the unbridlecj. pillage and peculation which
characterised the regime were ruinous to armies and treasury alike. All
therefore who desired to maintain the power of the Committee saw the necessity
of purging it of its Hebertism. Robespierre, caring nothing for efficiency of
government and even less for the abatement of the Terror, was nevertheless
stung to action by the not unfounded fear lest the Hebertists should attempt to
snatch the power from the Committee and deposit it with the Commune and
Ministries. When Collot left Paris for Lyons early in November, Billaud being
now inclined to thrpw in his lot with the Committee rather than with the
Commune, the anti-Hebertists found themselves in a majority in the Committee,
while in the Convention
1
The Republican Era dated from September 22, 1792, the date of the foundation
of the Republic, which happened to coincide with the Autumnal Equinox. Each
month had 30 days, and was divided into three decades. At the end of the year
were added five Sansculottides or jours complementaires: hut iq the year in and
in every fourth year afterwards a sixth Sansculottide was added, called jour de
la Revolution. The Leap Years Ans iv, vin, etc. were called Sextiles. Each
period of four years was called a Frandade. Romme’s decree (4 Frimaire, An 11),
arranged for a jour de la Revolution at the end of Leap Years, but this
arrangement does not seem to have been adhered to, and the extra day was added
at the end of the years preceding Leap Years. Thus the Gregorian and Republican
Calendars were at variance in these years from September 23 to February 29.
A further
divergence is caused by the fact that the year 1800 was not, in the Gregorian
Calendar, a Leap Year. With the corrections necessary in consequence, the
following key will explain the Calendar:—
To the number
of the day in
Vend&miaire
add 21 to get the number of the day in September. |
||||
Srumaire |
„
21 |
99
93 |
99 |
October. |
Frimaire |
„
20 |
99
99 |
93 |
November. |
Nivose |
„
20 |
99
99 |
99 |
December. |
Plumose |
„
19 |
99
39 |
99 |
January. |
Ventose |
„
18 |
99
99 |
39 |
February. |
Germinal |
„
20 |
99
99 |
99 |
March. |
Florial |
„
19 |
99
99 |
99 |
April. |
Prairial |
„
19 |
99
93 |
99 |
May. |
Messidor |
„
18 |
99
99 |
99 |
June. |
Thermidor |
„
18 |
99
99 |
99 |
July. |
Fructidor |
„
17 |
>9
39 |
99
' |
August. |
Robespierre
could command the votes of the Plain, so many of whom laboured under the
suspicion of Girondism. But the strength of the Commune was considerable, and
the Hebertists were men who would stick at nothing. Robespierre therefore was
disinclined to move without further support, and for this support he now looked
to Danton.
Danton had
since October 12 been in retirement at Arcis. He had been much disgusted by the
brutality and incapacity of the Hebertists. Their behaviour had strengthened
his conviction of the necessity for a moderate and reasonable but at the same time
omnipotent government. It was with the determination to establish such a
government that he now (November 21) returned to Paris. He still favoured the
further strengthening of the Committee, no doubt intending to enter it himself
and to guide its policy in the desired direction. Danton however misjudged the
attitude of Robespierre; that astute self-seeker was moved by no craving for
mercy or moderation, qualities which he regarded as dangerous to himself; he
merely wished to employ Danton’s vigour and conviction to overthrow his rivals.
The policy of mercy was to serve this purpose, after which no more would be
heard of it.
The first
indication of the rapprochement of Danton and Robespierre came in a report of
the latter (November 17) on the state of the nation, in which the remarks on
foreign relations had a strong Dantonist flavour. On November 21 the spread of
atheism was denounced in the Jacobins. Atheism was one of the leading features
in the Hebertist programme, and had been given great prominence in the
legislation of the last two months. On September 18 the stipends of cures had
been reduced; on November 6 Communes had been empowered to remove their cures-,
while the clergy were enticed into resignation by the offer of pensions to
those who abdicated and the reduction of the stipends (traitements) of those
who refused. Meanwhile, under the auspices of Chaumette, Gobel, Archbishop of
Paris, and a number of other “ ecclesiastics ” abjured Christianity (November
7); and on November 10 the Cathedral of Notre Dame was consecrated, amidst much
childish profanity, to the worship of Reason. On November 24 the Commune closed
all the churches of Paris; and within twenty days 2436 French churches were
converted into “ Temples of Reason ” without protest from the Convention.
Robespierre
had cleverly determined to work on the wounded religious feelings of the
community to secure the overthrow of his rivals. In his crusade against atheism
he was joined by Danton; genuine hatred of fanaticism moved the latter, profound
cunning the former. The battle was fought out at the Jacobin Club, where an
epuration was in progress. Danton’s name came up on December 3, and he would
have been epure but for the support of Robespierre. The very next day Danton
passed the great law by which the Committee was to receive its final access of
strength.: Originally mooted by Billaud on November 21, the law of 14 Frimaire
placed all constituted authorities under the
control of
the Committee of Public Safety, replaced the local authorities by “ agents
nationaux ” emanating directly from the Committee, forbade the levying of taxes
by local authorities, prohibited public meetings, and directed all
“Representants en mission" to correspond regularly with the Committee.
This drastic law marks the final step in the establishment of the supremacy of
the Committee of Public Safety. Danton seems to have believed with a confidence
amounting to infatuation in the ultimate success of that Committee and in his
own power of dominating it. His attitude at this moment was that of a gambler
staking his remaining possessions on the hazard responsible for his former
losses.
But the law
of 14 Frimaire did more than strengthen the Committee; it struck a direct and
heavy blow at the Commune by forbidding the formation of any central Committee
of the Sections, and by directing the Sections to correspond no longer with the
Commune but with the Comitt de Sureti Generate.
Meanwhile
the attacks on the Hebertists were increasing in violence. On November 17 a
number of subordinate members of that party, including Vincent and Ronsin, had
been arrested; but this step was premature, and they were subsequently
released. Then an elaborate exposure of the peculations and incapacity of
Ronsin and Rossignol was jommenced by Danton’s friend Philippeaux, who had
witnessed their misdeeds in the Vendee; and on December 5 Camille Desmoulins,
inspired by Danton and patronised by Robespierre himself,1 began the
issue of the Vieux Cordelier, in tbe third number of which (published December
15) he denounced the atrocities of the Hebertists, and suggested the
possibility of a policy of meruy. The Vieux Cordelier sent a great wave of hope
throughout the wretched country; and petitions against the Hebertists poured
into the Convention. Indeed the only excuse which even a Collot could plead for
the Terror had passed away with the French victories of the last months of
1793. The political leaders were however so deeply implicated in the Terror
that any talk of clemency or reaction made them tremble. Danton with his
courageous inconsistency doubly risked his life in advocating a policy of
mercy, knowing that, if successful, it would bring retribution to him for his
share in the Terror, but if unsuccessful it would involve its advocate in its
own ruin. For the moment indeed it seemed that Danton’s hour had come. The
effect of Camille’s stinging epigrams and broad appeal for mercy was immense.
But when Robespierre saw that his ally was serious in his cry for clemency, he
drew back and apologised for his weakness to the Jacobin Club. ■ ■
While matters
thus hung in the balance, the reappearance on December 20 of Collot, fresh from
the massacres of Lyons, turned the scale in favour of the Terrorists. With
coarse effrontery, and inflated by the prestige of his bloody deeds, he
justified his conduct and denounced the cowardice of those who spoke of
clemency. His triumph
was complete;
the Committee rallied to him, and Robespierre himself recanted, declaring
himself (December 25) with incredible meanness, in a report on the principles
of revolutionary government, to be once more in favour of the Terror in all its
excesses. This desertion by their powerful ally left the Dantonists in a most
perilous position. Philippeaux, Bourdon of the Oise, and Desmoulins, were
vigorously denounced in the Jacobin Club ; Robespierre, although he made some
attempt to save Desmoulins, with brazen composure denied his connexion with the
Vieiuc Cordelier. The Dantonists on the other hand courted destruction by the
vigour and temerity of their protests; they lashed out in every direction,
against the Hebertists, against the War Office, against the Committee itself
for its volte-face. On January 12 Fabre d’^glantine, a violent Dantonist and a
man who, knowing much of the inner history of the Terror and its agents, was
really dangerous to men like Collot, was arrested on a number of charges, vague
enough but quite possibly true; and on February 2 the arrested Hebertists were
liberated. Throughout these proceedings Robespierre, posing as a patriotic
revolutionary, sacrificed his late allies with the utmost composure, and, while
reproaching both Dantonists and Hebertists, the one with their moderation, the
other with their violence, inclined more and more to favour the latter at the
expense of the former. Always a prey to indecision and dislike of action,
Robespierre was in fact unable to decide at which of his rivals to strike, or
whether to strike at all; and it was only on February 20 that he was able to
persuade himself to take definite action. The decision to strike came in fact
not from Robespierre but from Saint-Just, who had just returned from the second
of two missions to the army. Saint-Just was a man of iron resolution and came
fresh to the political intrigues of Paris; to him Dantonists and Hebertists
alike were an obstacle and he at once determined to strike at both in quick
succession. That he had no squeamish feelings of moderation he promptly proved
by carrying (February 26) the proposal, originally mooted in January by Couthon,
that the property of suspects should be confiscated for the benefit of poor “
patriots.” -
This was not
only tantamount to a declaration that the Terror was to continue, but a direct
bid for the support of the Sansculottes, who had hitherto been wholly the
proteges of the Commune. It was therefore a back-handed blow at the Hebertists,
a triumph for their principles but at their expense.
It was thus
time for the Hebertists to begin to show their teeth. During the first ten days
of March the crisis was a very grave one for the Committee, and there was
little to indicate how it would end. The Hebertists were in a very strong
position ; the Commune and with it the National Guard, the Mayor, the Minister
of War, and the large bodies of miscreants and gaol-birds who infested Paris,
were all favourable to them. Hanriot also, the victor of June 2, was inclined
to Hebertism;
and the
Cordeliers’ Club was plotting immediate insurrection. But th^ return of
Saint-Just on the other hand had consolidated the Committee. Collot, assured
that his and not Danton’s methods were to prevail, threw in his lot with his
colleagues: Carrier, summoned from Nantes to account for his proconsulship, and
endeavouring to head a Hebertist revolt, was thwarted by the solid front
presented by the Committee; and the rare spectacle was witnessed of the
government triumphing over insurrection. On March 17 Hebert, Vincent, Ronsin,
and seventeen others were arrested, and dragged before the Revolutionary
Tribunal. Many of the party temporarily, and some permanently, escaped justice:
Pache because of his insignificance, Hanriot with Bouchotte and his following
by deserting their colleagues. The trial of the Hebertists was the usual parody
of justice; and on March 24, displaying abject cowardice, they perished on the
scaffold.
The fall and
death of Hebert was greeted with general acclamation, ill-informed men no doubt
believing that it heralded the promised reign of clemency. They were soon to
find out their mistake. Collot and Billaud had only consented to the
destruction of the Hebertists on the understanding that the Terror should
continue on the old lines. As a guarantee they had demanded the sacrifice of
Danton and his party; to this proposal Robespierre, it was said, at first
offered some feeble opposition, terrified no doubt at the prospect of flying at
such dangerous game: but, these scruples being quickly overcome, he threw
himself into his task with venomous ferocity. It was to Saint-Just however that
the attack was entrusted; Robespierre seems to have absolutely convinced that
inexorable republican of the “ incivisme ” of the Dantonists; and on March 30
Saint-Just read to the Committees of Public Safety and General Security a
report for which Robespierre himself had provided notes. On the same evening
the Dantonists were arrested.
Next morning
in the Convention Legendre, with a flash of courage, demanded a hearing at the
bar for his leader, but Robespierre venomously replied that “Danton was not
privileged,” and that they “wanted no idols”; and, after Barere had elaborated
Robespierre’s arguments, Legendre was so cowed that he withdrew his motion with
profuse apologies. Saint- Just then read to the Convention the report which
Robespierre had put into his mouth, It was a ludicrous tissue of falsehoods
from beginning to end; every incident in Danton’s career was distorted in an
unfavourable light; he had been allied with every contre-rivolutionnaire in
turn, with Mirabeau, the Lameths, Dumouriez, Brissot; he had lain hidden on
August 10 (of which day he had of course been, as even Saint-Just must have
known, the life and soul); he had conspired with England against his country
(true enough if to advocate peaceable relations with foreign Powers is
conspiracy); he was an Orleanist (but if so, how much more Robespierre); had
protected Malouet, Duport, Talleyrand (true, perhaps, but no crime); had been
the enemy of Marat (in common with every
reasonable
man); the friend of the Gironde (certainly, in so far as he had desired their
downfall without desiring their death); had played fast and loose in Belgium
(this was probably true); had raised a levy in March to lay Paris bare to the
aristocrats; had provoked the Conjuration of March 9 (these wildly false); had
demanded the head of Hanriot after June 2 (possibly, but Hanriot had been a
Hebcrtist, and was very nearly sent to the guillotine by Robespierre himself);
had conferred with the Queen in the Temple (false, but with a substratum of
truth, inasmuch as he had tried to use the Queen’s life as a counter in foreign
relations); had been responsible for the Vieux Cordelier (Robespierre forgot to
tell Saint-Just that he himself had corrected the proofs). Even his action in
securing the permanence of the Committee was twisted against him.
The venom and
the mendacity of the Report must have gone far to discount its effect, had not
the Convention been slavishly subservient to its author. But Saint-Just’s
oratory also had the ring of conviction; he had little first-hand knowledge of
Danton’s career, had taken little share in the earlier days of the Revolution,
had latterly been four months absent, and had accepted in all good faith
Robespierre’s mendacious story of what had occurred in his absence. Cowed
certainly by fear of Robespierre, influenced perhaps by the fanaticism of
Saint-Just, the Convention confirmed the arrest of the Dantonists. On April 2
their trial commenced. With Danton, Lacroix, Herault, Desmoulins, Wester- mann
(who however was only arrested on April 2), and Philippeaux, the real faction
des indulgents, were ranged at the bar Fabre d’^glantine, who had been awaiting
trial on a charge of peculation since January 12, a number of men of foreign
names and extraction charged with being foreign spies, and Chabot and Bazire
accused of simple malversation. None of these, with the exception of Fabre,
were Dantonists at all. They were introduced merely to obscure the issue, and
to give colour to the charges of peculation brought against Danton. Among the
counts of accusation were venality to the Court, peculation in Belgium,
opposition to June 2, complicity in the Baron de Batz’ plot, and conspiracy
with Dumouriez. In the minor charges there was probably some truth, for Danton
was notoriously careless in money matters and had openly lamented the fate of
the Girondins. The rest were absurd; and, as Danton urged, his whole
Revolutionary career gave them the lie.
But Danton
knew that what was required of the Tribunal was not justice but a sentence of
death; and his defence became a series of appeals to the crowd. Danton was the
most powerful mob-orator that the Revolution had produced; and during the whole
of April 3 his great voice rang through the building, through the neighbouring
streets, and was audible even across the river. It really seemed that popular
opinion might be roused to declare in his favour. The Committee saw the danger,
saw also that the Convention was ready on the slightest pretext to rescind its
vote and release the prisoners. Accordingly on April 4
364 Robespierre's position after Danton’s fall
[1794
Billaud
produced an utterly imaginary story of a Dantonist conspiracy against the
Convention; and Saint-Just read a letter from the Revolutionary Tribunal,
which asserted falsely that the accused were calling for witnesses from the
Convention and appealing to the people. Thus instigated, the Convention decreed
the outlawiy of any prisoner who “interrupted the course of justice.” The jury
then declared themselves satisfied with the evidence. The prisoners were
removed, and the jury deliberated. Sentence of death was conveyed to them in
their cells, for the Court dared not run the risk of further scenes. On the
evening of April 5 the prisoners were executed. Thus was Danton treacherously
hounded to death, with a crowd of common malefactors.
Robespierre,
his rivals on either hand removed, was now supreme; by cunning and stealthy
intrigue he had secured support on every side. The remnant of the fallen
parties, spared for that very purpose, cowered subservient, simply to preserve
their own lives; the Commune, renovated after the fall of Hebert, now boasted a
Robespierrist Mayor (Fleuriot Lescot) and a Robespierrist Agent National
(Payan). On April 1 the Conseil Executif ha.il been replaced by a group of
Convention Committees, in each of which Robespierre’s nominees predominated,
while in the Jacobin Club his influence was greater than ever. In the two great
Committees however his ascendancy was less assured. In the Committee of Public
Safety he had the devoted allegiance of Couthon and Saint-Just; but that of
Billaud, Collot, and Barere grew daily more doubtful, while that of Carnot and
the “workers” depended on the freedom allowed them in their several
departments. In the ComitS de Surete Generate, much alienated by the intrusion
into its legitimate sphere of action of Robespierre’s spies and agents, he
could only count on David and Lebas. But in the Revolutionary Tribunal his
influence was unbounded. In the Convention itself, which, if it still retained
the prestige of its name, had fallen into a condition of shameful paralysis,
though his policy was gradually alienating the Montagnards, Robespierre could
rely more and more on the support of the Plain as the price of his all-powerful
protection.
It is clear
therefore that Robespierre’s power rested on substantial foundations. What use
he desired to make of it it is difficult to say. Cunning rather than
perspicacious, his tactics were superior to his strategy. The fatuity of an
attempt to establish a millennium by the simple means of killing all who failed
to attain the required standard of virtue must have been patent to any but the
blindest theorist. That an endless Terror must at length provoke a desperate
reaction was obvious. Robespierre does not seem to have realised the certain
outcome of his policy; had he done so, Danton's fate would have reminded him of
the-danger that lurked in the word “mercy,” and his cowardice would have
forbidden him to relax the Terror. It is perhaps however fairer to credit him
with being a pure theorist, endowed with little practical foresight but with an
1794]
865
unfailing
faculty of feline cunning. This cunning now prompted him simply to cling to
power and to strike down , every rival in mere selfpreservation. Ambition
urged him in the direction of dictatorship, cowardice' drew him back from so
dangerous a goal; as a compromise between these conflicting motives he began to
aim at becoming the dominating influence in a Convention already emasculated,
and in a Committee which he would have emasculated had he dared.
Blind though
he was, Robespierre perceived that he needed some positive doctrines to capture
popularity. Cut off by physical causes—to his immense chagrin—from military
triumphs, despising Saint-Just’s puerile schemes for the reorganisation of
society, he turned to religion to supply the want. There was in him, moreover,
a vein of mysticism, a touch of sacerdotalism; and it was possibly to gratify
these natural propensities, rather than from any profound policy, that he now
embarked on his mission of imposing a new religion on the country. On May 7 he
laid down the doctrines of immortality and the existence of a “ Supreme Being,”
appointed thirty-six annual festivals, and flxed June 8 for an inaugural fite
to the new Deity. This departure was a direct blow at many of Robespierre’s
colleagues; to Barere, Billaud, Collot, to all who preserved any flavour of
Hebertism, the new religion was a vexatious farce. To the parade of
incorruptibility and “ virtue,” qualities utterly distasteful to men so corrupt
and vicious, was now added this talk of immortality and the existence of God.
Robespierre’s colleagues greeted his scheme with ill-disguised annoyance and a
contempt which stung him to the quick; but they did not dare to break with him.
They were in fact in a very difficult position. Wilder Terrorists than the
arch-Terrorist himself, they had earned his displeasure by the indiscriminate
and disorderly use of the methods which he desired to regulate and organise.
Billaud, Collot, and Barere saw the gulf widening between themselves and
Robespierre, but had no one to whom they could turn save to the Moderates in
whose eyes they were tyrants more bloodstained than Robespierre himself. Thus
for the time they swallowed their discontent and sullenly watched the
preparations for the fete. June 8 was a day of brilliant sunshine and the
Convention assembled in gala dress before the Tuileries, To them, after a
prolonged and much criticised delay, appeared Robespierre, adorned with a
violet coat and bearing a “symbolic” bouquet. He had got himself chosen
President and had thus secured the leading r6le on the great occasion. Mounting
a tribune he delivered an ecstatic Rousseauist harangue, and then headed a
procession into the gaidens where a huge group of wooden statues had been
erected, representing Atheism surrounded by Vices and Folly and threatened by
Wisdom. Atheism was set on fire but refused to catch, and Sagesse got singed—an
unhappy augury. After this came another speech; then a hymn ; and the
procession marched to the Champ de Mars. Here Robespierre ascended an
artificial “monticule”
while a hymn
by Marie-Joseph Chenier was chanted. A salvo of artillery brought the
proceedings to a close.
Such was the
“Fete de Vtltre Supreme.” If anyone thought that it heralded a reign of
moderation he was soon undeceived. Only two days had elapsed when Robespierre
introduced a law which was to complete the structure of the Terror. The Law of
22 Prairial was a sharpening of its most serviceable weapon—the Revolutionary
Tribunal. All forms of evidence, material, moral, verbal, or written, were
henceforth permitted. The right to denounce conspirators was accorded to all
citizens, and that of delivering persons to the Tribunal extended to the two
Committees, the Public Prosecutor, the Reprtsentants en mission, and the
Convention. The last privilege of the Convention, the immunity of its members
from arrest save by consent of the Convention itself, was removed. The outcry
on all sides was tremendous. It has been pleaded that Robespierre intended to
employ this law to strike down the ultraTerrorists and then to close the
Terror. The first part of this assumption is undoubtedly true, the last as
undoubtedly false; the Law of 22 Prairial was no disguised herald of mercy but
simply a means of increasing, legalising, and regulating the Terror.
In face of
this terrific decree the scattered forces of Robespierre’s opponents closed up
their ranks. Some confusion arises from the names attached at different times
to different parties, for parties themselves dispersed and coalesced like the
changing patterns of a kaleidoscope: it is necessary, however, to realise that
at midsummer there was being forriied out of the dregs of the Hebertist and
Dantonist parties a group of Montagnards, who were to be the first agents in
the overthrow of the Terror. The leaders of this party were Tallien, Barras,
and Legendre; every day recruits were pouring in, and included even some
members of the Plain. Thus Cambon, Bourdon of the Oise, Dubois-Crance, Leonard
Bourdon, Merlin of Thionville, Sieyes, and, most important of all, Fouche, the
one man qualified to meet Robespierre on his own ground Of subterranean
intrigue, were all now busily organising resistance to the tyrant.
The Law of 22
Prairial stimulated this resistance, and for the moment seemed likely to secure
the aid of the anti-Robespierrists of the Committee. On July 23 Robespierre
was hotly reproached by Billaud with having passed his law without submitting
it to the Committee. Billaud’s indecision however is demonstrated by his
unwillingness on the one hand openly to support Tallien, and his refusal on the
other to join Robespierre (26 Prairial) in the proscription of the recalcitrant
deputies. Disappointed at Billaud’s half-heartedness, Robespierre now naively
suggested that he might go on mission; but the ruse was too apparent.
The arrest on
27 Prairial of a certain Catharine Theot, a religious maniac whom he had
patronised, was a further rebuff to Robespierre on his most sensitive side. He
succeeded, however, though not without
great
difficulty, in stifling the proceedings; and now, greatly wounded in dignity,
he withdrew from the sittings of Convention and Committee, surrounding Viimsplf
with an atmosphere of mystery and isolation, and attending only the meetings of
the Jacobin Club.
Yet during
this period of semi-retirement relations between Robespierre and his
colleagues were not broken off; nor can he during this period be exonerated
from responsibility for the Terror, which now reached its height. Until June 30
he continued to attend his own bureau, and even after that he attended at least
one meeting of the Committees before July 18. He doubtless thought that
sinister silence would be more persuasive with his antagonists, especially with
those of the Surete Generate, than any active altercation. He was also waiting
for a reverse to French arms to provide him with his opportunity. It never
came, and the victory of Fleurus was a sad blow to his plans. Meanwhile, by his
practical abstention from the Committees he undermined their influence by his
parade of pique; but, intending as he did to continue to govern through them,
after he had once purged them of the discordant element, he was careful not to
sever completely his connexion with them. The interest of the early days of
Thermidor lies in the hesitations of the various groups aware of their danger
to unite against the tyrant. The threatened Montagnards of the Convention were,
as we have seen, rapidly organising under the astute guidance of Fouche; but
the Committee of Public Safety was in a very difficult position. Recognising
that Robespierre had determined to sacrifice them, its members looked around
for allies, but were little tempted to join the Montagnards, who regarded the
downfall of Robespierre only as a step to the overthrow of the whole Committee.
For many
critical days they halted between two opinions. The attack on Robespierre had
been commenced on July 19 with the arrest of Vilate and Naulin, two of
Robespierre’s creatures on the Revolutionary Tribunal, and with the acquittal
by the Tribunal of a certain Rousselin, a journalist against whom he had a
grudge. The meeting of the two Committees on July 20 seems also to have gone
against him; but two days later, when he attended, by invitation, a similar
meeting, a reconciliation was apparently arranged, the Committee undertaking
to see that the Revolutionary Tribunal attended to its work, and even listening
with equanimity to a speech of Saint-Just in which he urged the necessity of a
dictatorship. At this meeting Saint-Just was empowered to draw up a report, and
it was said that lists for a great proscription were being prepared.
Deserted in
this fashion by the great Committee, the minor Committee and the Conventionals
looked piteously to the Plain for help. But the men of the Plain were still to
all appearance the docile satellites of the tyrant. Recent developments however
had begun to open their eyes. After 22 Prairial it was no longer possible to
credit Robespierre with the
368 Robespierre's speech on 8 Thermidor.
intention of
either ending or moderating the Terror; and the deputies of the Plain were
beginning to realise that he only intended to use them, perhaps to sacrifice
them, for his own end?. The recent talk of dictatorship had alarmed them, nor
can they have been quite obi. /ious to the utter ignominy of their slavish
position. Their support of Robespierre therefore was purely selfish; once
satisfied that the conspiracy was likely to succeed they would join in it with
glad relief. With all the perspicacity of trimmers, they probably also guessed
how quickly the Terror would crumble at the first check.
Meanwhile
within the Committee opinion was violently divided. Billaud, whose attitude
throughout the crisis is most puzzling, still scouted the notion that
Robespierre really intended to throw over his colleagues; Carnot and Lindet
were much more decided, and on July 24 Carnot, influenced possibly by military
reasons, despatched a large part of the Parisian artillery to the front. Considering
the important part which the Canonniers had played in every previous revolt,
this step was significant, and was violently denounced by Couthon in the
Jacobin Club. On the same day the Jacobins solemnly denounced Robespierre’s
enemies before the Convention.
Robespierre
himself, with an orator’s vanity, was now relying on the effect of the great
speech which he was composing, and which on 8 Thermidor (July 26) he delivered
in the Convention. It was specious, subtle, indirect, shifty, in fact an admirable
specimen of his oratory; except the financiers, Ramel and Mallarme, it
implicated no one, but it made everyone uncomfortable, and, instead of awing
men into obedience, it terrified them into resistance. Even Saint-Just was
disappointed, and the speech had certainly been inadequate to the occasion; not
because Robespierre’s oratory had fallen below its usual level, but because his
character was utterly incapable of coping with a crisis which demanded
directness either of speech or action. The Convention, however, applauded by
force of habit; and the customary decree “ that the speech be printed ” was
carried. Had Robespierre been content with this all might have been well, but
he attempted to push his triumph further; and Couthon demanded the circulation
of the speech in the Departments. This proposal reopened the discussion; and,
although Couthon’s motion was carried, Robespierre lost ground as each
implicated deputy rose— Cambon, Vadier, Dumont, Billaud, Panis, Freron—and
faced him; he was driven into paroxysms of fury, but could find no words to
reply. The Plain’s confidence was thus greatly shaken, and in the end Couthon’s
decree was revoked. Freron, however, had greatly disconcerted the anti-
Robespierrist members of the Committees by demanding a restriction of their
powers, a suggestion which revealed tbe Montagnards' position in its true
light. However when the Convention rose at 5 p.m. the result was still in
doubt; Robespierre declared himself satisfied; his enemies were still divided,
and the Plain, he thought, still leant to him. During
the night
neither party was idle. Tallien, Barras, Freron, and Fouch£ took matters into
their own hands, and determined to strike, whatever Billaud did. They
encouraged the Montagnards to believe that, with Robespierre, the Committees
must fall, and gave the Plain to understand that Robespierre was not meditating
the dose of the Terror but only the fall of his rivals. Robespierre meanwhile,
his energy seemingly unimpaired by the great heat and his prolonged oratorical
effort, hurried to the Jacobins to repeat his speech there. Its success was the
greater in that it had been prepared rather for that audience than for the
Convention ; and its elusive phraseology was thoroughly to the taste of the
dub, which utterly refused to listen to Collot and Billaud when they attempted
to reply. Payan, Lescot, and Coffinhal now suggested the seizure of the
Tuileries; but Robespierre, with his confidence in his own oratory restored,
and always timid at any suggestion of action, declined to adopt a step which
would certainly have put victory into his hands.
Meanwhile in
the Committee of Public Safety, which was engaged in an all-night sitting,
Saint-Just was watching Robespierre’s interests. The Committee, finding the
problem of how to destroy the tyrant without destroying the tyranny insoluble,
was utterly paralysed. There was a stormy scene between Collot and Saint-Just;
but, when Saint-Just promised to submit the great speech, on the preparation of
which he was engaged, to the Committee, before he read it next day in the
Convention, comparative harmony was restored.
Next morning
both Committee and Convention met at 10. The Committee was waiting for
Saint-Just and his speech, when intelligence came that he had begun to deliver
it in the Convention : the members hurried to the hall to find Saint-Just in
the tribune, and Robespierre, in his Eire Supreme clothes, at the foot of it.
But the Montagnards had resolved on their course of action. Saint-Just had
hardly commenced when he was violently interrupted by Tallien. From that moment
no Robespierrist was permitted to speak; Collot, in the chair, answered every
attempt with “ Tu n’a pas la parole ”; and the cry of “ 2 bas le tyran” drowned
every attempt to gain a hearing. Now, Saint-Just, though young and handsome,
was physically feeble; Couthon was a paralytic; while Robespierre, though
endowed with great endurance, had a weak, shrill voice and no bodily strength.
Danton, in Robespierre’s position, would have forced himself on the Convention;
but there was no one among the Robespierrists with even a measure of Danton’s
fiery energy or physical power. So, protesting shrilly, they were obliged to
listen while Billaud denounced Robespierre as a Moderk, and Tallien, waving a
dagger over the tyrant’s head, got seance permanente decreed. At 2 p.m. there
was a call for Barere. The arch-trimmer, who was armed with two speeches, had
dedded to deliver the one directed against Robespierre ; but he attacked mildly
and indirectly, proposing only the abolition of the office of Commandant
General of the National Guard.
This motion,
which involved the suspension of Hanriot, was carried. Then, when Vadier
intervened and began to chatter about Catharine Theot, Tallien, the
stage-manager of the conspiracy, took up the tale. Robespierre, exasperated,
made a grand effort to mount the tribune, but his voice was drowned by the
President’s bell. Finally the motion for his accusation was carried; his
brother and Le Bas bravely rushed to his side, and, with Couthon and
Saint-Just, were included in the decree. Robespierre’s last despairing appeal
to his late supporters of the Plain had failed; they had thrown him to the
lions. The accused were hurried off to the hall of the Comite de Surete
Generale for temporary confinement there, and the Convention broke up at 5 p.m.
• Meanwhile
the Commune, which had all along been preparing a rising, had decided that the
crisis was one in which the people should perform that “most sacred duty of
insurrection’’ recommended by the Constitution of 1793, and that they
themselves should once again commence to act as the sovereign representatives
of the people. All day Hanriot had been stirring up the proletariate, while the
Commune was busy receiving the allegiance of various Sections. On receipt of
the news of Robespierre’s arrest, Hanriot galloped off in a drunken fury, and
penetrated to the hall of the Comite de Surete Generale, only however to find
himself arrested (7.30 p.m.). The prisoners were now hurried off to various
places of detention, Robespierre himself to the Luxembourg. There, however, the
gaolers refused to admit him, with the result that he was conveyed to the
Mairie, which was technically a place of detention, but where he found himself
among friends. He was therefore practically free, though formally a prisoner, a
situation which greatly commended itself to his duplicity of character.
Meanwhile, the Corned Geniral of the Commune had met at 5.30, the tocsin rang,
and considerable insurrectionary forces assembled on the Place de Greve. The
barriers were closed, a provisional government was appointed (significant
measure), and Robespierre, after repeated refusals to leave his haven of refuge
at the Mairie, was at length (11 p.m.) persuaded to join his friends at the Hotel
de Ville. In breaking his arrest Robespierre, as he must have known, had
exposed himself to a decree of outlawry; and, once hors la lot, he had only to
be caught, identified, and hurried to execution. Nothing short of a
determination to put himself at once at the head of an armed insurrection would
have justified his departure from the Mairie.
Nothing,
however, was further from Robespierre’s thoughts; action of any kind,
especially if it involved physical danger, was repugnant to him. On his arrival
at the Hotel de Ville, therefore, he took no active measures against the
Convention, but sat with his friends, discussing the address, in which the coup
(Fetat should be communicated to the armies. His presence at the Hotel de Ville
only paralysed Hanriot, who, having been released at 8.30, was once more in
command of the insurrectionary forces. The inaction of Hanriot is indeed a
curious feature of the crisis.
The most
plausible solution seems to be that, his neck having been practically in the
noose with the H^bertists, he had every reason to know the danger of offending
Robespierre ; he was also alive to Robespierre’s jealousy and abhorrence of
everything that savoured of militarism, and thus feared to strike a decisive
blow, lest its very success should prove fatal to himself.
While the
Commune was thus wasting its opportunity, the Convention, which had met again
shortly after 7 p.m., was not slow to avail itself of its good fortune. The
bearding of the tyrant that morning had restored self-respect to the Plain; and
now, though in a most perilous position, they quitted themselves for the first
time like men. Billaud and the members of the Committee had flocked to the
Convention for safety, but it was not they who led the Assembly; they played,
indeed, but a sorry part in the proceedings. Robespierre, Hanriot, and all who
supported him were decreed “hors la hi.” The Convention had seized on the weak
spot in Robespierre’s armour. Barras was next appointed commander of the armed
force, and, at 11 p.m., rode out with twelve followers to raise the loyal
Sections, with the result that by 1.30 a.m. he had gathered about 6000 men on
the Place du Carrousel.
Astonished,
no doubt, that the Commune had not long since attacked, but resolved to profit
by their good fortune, the Conventionals at about 1.30 a.m. advanced against
the mob in the Place de Greve.
About forty
members of the Commune were sitting with the Robes- pienists. Great was their
astonishment to find the cannon on the Greve pointed at the Hotel de Ville;
Hanriot rushed in crying that all was lost. By the time the assailants entered
the chamber Le Bas had shot himself, Hanriot had taken refuge in a sewer,
Augui*in Robespierre had leapt from the window, Couthon was beneath the table,
and Robespierre’s jaw was shattered by a pistol-shot, whether self-inflicted,
or the work of a certain Meda, who afterwards claimed the honour, has never
been decided. The members of the Commune made no resistance, and were quickly
arrested.
What had
happened to turn the tables so dramatically? Robespierre had so far forgotten
his treatment in the Convention that morning as to scout the idea of the
Conventionals daring to attack. Nothing therefore had been done to keep the
crowd on the Greve together, and a heavy fall of rain had sent many of them
home. The remainder seemed to have been not unwilling to join Barras and the
Conventionals when they arrived. Thus the Hotel de Ville had been carried
without a shot fired.
Identification
of the prisoners was now the only formality; this was quickly got through. The
two Robespierres, both much hurt, but alive and conscious, Saint-Just, Couthon,
Hanriot, Dumas, Payan, Lescot, Vivier, Simon, and twelve others, were conveyed
amidst scenes of indescribable excitement and popular rejoicing to the Place
de la Revolution, and there beheaded on 10 Thermidor (July 28).
THE
THERMIDORIAN REACTION AND THE END OF THE CONVENTION.
The events of the Ninth of Thermidor
provoked throughout France scenes of unparalleled excitement: the streets of Paris
were filled with an exultant and as it were unmuzzled crowd, which gave vent to
its feelings in fierce execrations against the tyrant and the ninety-five of
his associates who followed him to the scaffold.
More gradual
of course, but not less effectual, was the unmuzzling of provincial France. It
took some time for men to realise that the tyrant was actually dead, but on
realising it the whole country heaved with a vast sigh of joy and relief. The
Terror indeed, through the energy of the Terrorist commissioners, had been no
whit less atrocious in the Provinces than in the capital. We have already seen
something of it at Nantes, Lyons, and Toulon; and the atrocities of Lebon at
Arras, of Tallien at Bordeaux, and of Maignet at Marseilles and Orange, equalled
and perhaps even surpassed those of the more famous proconsuls. Of the total
number of victims no estimate is possible. Taine enumerates
17,000 who certainly perished; but this figure
undoubtedly falls far short of the actual total. The Revolutionary Tribunal of
Paris, however, has left a complete record of its activity. Between April
6,1793 (the date of its installation) and 9 Thermidor, it sent to the scaffold
2625 persons, of whom no fewer than 1366 were condemned in the seven weeks
inaugurated by the Law of 22 Prairial and terminated by the fall of
Robespierre. During that period about 80 per cent, of those accused before it
were sentenced to death.
To suggest
that the fiendish excesses of the government had been in any sense acceptable
to the mass of Frenchmen is ludicrous, inasmuch as it was against that very
mass of Frenchmen, rather than against Royalists, Reactionaries, or Girondins,
that those atrocities had been directed. Men were robbed, maltreated, and
killed, not because they were aristocrats or opponents of the government, but
from motives of plunder and revenge, or from pure lust of blood; and this not
for the salvation of France, but for the benefit of a gang of corrupt
scoundrels, who, in the judgment
of one of the
shrewdest contemporary observers of the Revolution, could claim in Paris no
more than 3000 adherents. Again, the idea that the Terror was introduced and
maintained in order to secure victory for the French arms, or that it conduced
to that victory, is as unwarranted as the belief that it was sanctioned or
condoned by the nation as a whole. Time after time the indifference of the
government to the safety of the frontiers and the armies is conclusively
proved. Except in so far as the Terrorist government included the men who organised
victory, and who tolerated the Terror, not as contributing to victory, but
because they were determined to remain in office, the Terror had no connexion
with the success of the French arms. The victories of the Republic were won not
because but in spite of the Terror, and were due to the fact that the majority
of Frenchmen were not Terrorists, but patriots at heart. Patriotism—to fight
for France—was still possible, almost the only thing possible for the tortured
nation. The one way to be safe and to escape from the horrible nightmare, was
to reach the front as quickly as possible. There, instead of “Jacobin,”
“Patriot,” or “Aristocrat,” one could be a Frenchman again.
For
two years the nation, gagged and spell-bound, had submitted to the tyranny of savage
and self-seeking miscreants. So complete had been the organisation of the
Terror that one wonders how, if its authors had not turned and rent each other,
France could ever have shaken herself free. But, the spell once broken by the
downfall of Robespierre, tbe true voice of France was heard once more, weak and
hollow at first like the voice of one long dumb, but increasing soon to an
angry roar, denouncing the remnants of the tyranny, and dominating tbe
political situation. The strife of parties, the intrigue of factions, the
attitude of individual leaders, so long the sole factors in politics, now
retired into their proper subordination; while beyond and above them the voice
of public opinion reasserted itself. -
Not only did
men begin to talk freely once more in the streets, but the press, after a
forced silence of two years, raised its voice again. Until the summer of 1792
the public press, though much intimidated, may be said to have retained a
measure of independence. Mallet du Pan, one of the most courageous as he was
one of the wisest men of the period, had indeed continued calmly in Paris
editing his Moderate journal, the Mercure, in face of appalling dangers, up to
the very eve of the fall of the Monarchy. The cessation of the Mercure marks the
final blow at the freedom of the press; from that time only journals of the
most radical nature were permitted to appear, and the standard of radicalism
grew rapidly more exacting until such gutter rags as Marat’s I?Ami du Pewple
and Hebert’s Le Pere Duchesne became the leading organs of the Parisian press.
The language used by these journals, especially by Hubert’s, is a sufficient
indication of the class of readers to whom they appealed; and the expedients to
which their editors were driven to make them pay shows that they were far from
being really popular. Marat,
for instance,
stole the Royalist printing-presses in September, 1792; and Hebert extorted
enormous subventions from the War Office for the circulation of his filthy
print among the soldiers. Thus during the Terror the public press had entirely
ceased to fulfil its functions; and one of the earliest signs of the
reawakening of public opinion after Thermidor is the liberation of journalism.
Chief among the reactionary journals was Freron’s L’Orateur du Peuple, which
began to reappear on September 11.
Nor was there
any ambiguity in the interpretation that public opinion, thus liberated, put
upon the coup d'etat. Everywhere, in the streets of Paris, in the Provinces,
not least in the teeming prisons, the news of Robespierre’s fall was acclaimed
as the close of the Terror and as the signal for summary vengeance on its
authors. In the prisons in particular the intelligence was greeted with an
outburst of relief which it is difficult to picture. The prisons indeed,
crowded as they were with victims of every class, from the genuine loyalist to
the humble bourgeois who had dared to prefer coin to assignats, had become a
not unimportant register of popular feeling. Within their walls had grown up a
social order of strangely pathetic interest. Each inmate was on the brink of
eternity, and death was so near that it became but an incident in the day;
determined as they were to make the most of the few hours, the few days, at
most the few weeks, they had to live, the gaiety of these unfortunates was
scarcely interrupted by the entrance of the turnkey for his daily toll of
victims. To one who walked the streets of the unnatural Paris of that ghastly
period not the least strange sound must have been that of laughter and
merriment from barred windows. Only a few days before Thermidor rumours of
approaching massacre had brooded over the prisons; and on the very eve of the
coup d'etat a batch of forty-five had been duly executed, thus missing reprieve
by a few hours only. The outburst of relief in the prisons was happily
justified by the prompt release of hundreds whose presence was required by the
Thermidorians to swell the tide of public opinion against the Terrorist
government; and, although on September 6 there were still 5261 prisoners and on
October 7 as many as 4445, these were for the most part genuine Royalists who
could not safely be set free.
Having noted
the construction which public opinion put upon the crisis, we may now examine
the attitude of parties. The intricate coup d'etat described in the last
chapter had been effected by the coalition of several parties for one common
immediate end. All had desired the downfall of Robespierre, but not all with
the same ulterior object. The anti-Robespierrists of the Committees, such as
Collot and Billaud, had aimed their blow at the person of their colleague, not
in any sense at the system which he embodied, still less at the government of
which he had been the head and of which they were all members. The Thermidorians
on the other hand, that is the anti-Robespierrist Montagnards, regarded
Robespierre’s fall as a step to the overthrow of the government and the
seizure of
power by themselves, and had no idea of accepting the domination of his
colleagues now that he was himself overthrown. But there had been a third party
to the alliance which had brought about the coup d'etat. The Plain, or Moderes,
of the Convention, having broken their long and shameful silence, were not
inclined to put their necks under any fresh yoke, and, the spell of the Terror
once lifted, were determined not to submit to any reestablishment of the
conditions which had reduced them to such a pitch of misery and shame. We shall
now see the profit of the Thermidorian Revolution turn, not to the principals
in the struggle, but to these despised auxiliaries; it did so because, in their
desire to conclude the Terror, they simply reflected the great body of
reawakened public opinion of which we have just spoken.
Billaud,
Collot, Barere, and the Terrorists of the Comite de Surete Generate, regarded
the outbreak of popular jubilation with disgust and alarm, and greeted the
first measure of reaction—the proposal that after a fortnight, during which
period it could dispose of “ Robespierre’s tail,” the Revolutionary Tribunal
should be reconstituted—with uncompromising hostility. The passing of this
proposal, in spite of their opposition, was sufficient indication that
Thermidor was to be the end, not only of Robespierre, but of the Terror.
Fouquier-Tinville, whose continuance in office had been proposed by Barere, was
actually impeached on August 1; and the Law of 22 Prairial was then repealed.
On August 10 the Tribunal was reorganised, with the result that, after the
execution of the minor Robespierrists (August 13), till the end of Fructidor
(September 16), out of 293 accused only 14 were condemned ; from September 17
to October 21 24 out of 312; in Brumaire 5 out of 236; in Frimaire 3 out of
105; and in Pluviose none out of 30.
Further proof
of the reactionary turn things were taking was forthcoming in the
reconstruction of the Committee of Public Safety. The first reconstruction,
however, on July 31, was no victory for the Moderates any more than for the
Terrorists, and turned to the advantage of the Thermidorians proper, who
desired to reorganise rather than to abolish the existing system of government,
and to dominate rather than to destroy the Committee. Of its eleven members,
four were dead, to wit the three Terrorists and Herault. Bon Saint-Andre and Prieur
of the Marne were absent on missions; and of the six members chosen to fill
these vacancies, four were Thermidorians (Tallien, Thuriot, Breard, and
Treilhard), while two were Jacobins (Eschasseriaux and Laloi). The Committee
thus became in tone Thermidorian, with a strong dash of Carnot; its policy was
to adjust and moderate, but not to stop the despotism; to continue the war, and
to maintain the Revolutionary government, with a purged Jacobin Club and a
reformed Revolutionary Tribunal.
The Plain,
however, strengthened by the return to public life of many Conventionnels and
encouraged by the evidences of popular reaction,
had already*
while the Terrorists and Thermidorians were struggling for the control of the
Committee, struck the first blow at the supremacy of the Committee itself. On
11 Thermidor it was enacted that one-quarter of the members should retire each
month. On August 23 this change was developed into a complete reorganisation of
the whole system of government; the twenty-one existing Committees of the
Convention were replaced by sixteen, amongst which the executive power hitherto
monopolised by the Committees of Public Safety and General Security was widely
distributed, the sphere of the Committee of Public Safety, in particular, being
reduced to the control of war and foreign affairs. Special provisions secured
the impossibility of any permanent personal supremacy in the great Committee;
and consecutiveness and vigour of policy were sacrificed to the determination
to avoid a repetition of the state of affairs which had just been ended.
The work of
breaking the old authorities proceeded vigorously throughout the month of
August. By decrees of August 12 and 28 the powers of Representants en mission
were curtailed. The licence hitherto accorded to clubs and popular societies
was withdrawn; the Jacobin Club, it is true, continued to exist until November
12, but after 9 Thermidor repeated interferences with its action rendered it
comparatively innocuous. A corresponding decline crippled also the influence of
provincial societies; and the scope of the Revolutionary Committees, which had
been so serviceable to Robespierre, was greatly circumscribed. On August 24 the
Committees of small towns were suppressed. The number of provincial Committees
was restricted to one for each district; and in Paris their number was reduced
from forty-eight to twelve, while at the same time their powers were greatly
curtailed.
The violent
Robespierrism displayed by the municipality of Paris had brought upon it a
similar fate. On July 27 it was abolished, those of its functionaries who had
played a conspicuous part in the recent crisis being sent to the scaffold. On
August 31 a number of Commissioners were appointed by the Convention to take
over the municipal government, the police administration remaining in the
hands of the Comite de Shrete Generate. Of all the old municipal organisation
the Sections alone remained; and they continued, as we shall see, to be a
potent influence in political matters. Alterations in the control of the
National Guard had been rendered inevitable by the conspicuous part which
Hanriot had played in Thermidor. A staff of five, appointed for ten days at a
time and elected by lot from the Section commanders, now replaced the single
Commandant General. The senior member of this staff was to command for five
days, but orders were only valid when signed by three staff-officers.
These
precautions were of course profoundly distasteful to the old members of the
Committee. Many even of the Thermidorians were alarmed at the great revulsion
of popular feeling. The release of the
prisoners of
the Terror had been forced on them by the necessity of keeping the power out of
the hands of the old government; but the great outcry against the “ patriots ”
and the clamour for vengeance on those who had been responsible for the
wreckage of property and social order were above and beyond anything they had
contemplated. This popular outcry against the Terrorists came to a head with
the trial of 182 prisoners from Nantes, whom Carrier had handed to the Parisian
tribunal in the previous January. Their trial had been delayed and only began
on September 7; then for the first time the full extent of the Nantes
atrocities was revealed; and, accustomed though it was to the sight of blood,
Paris experienced a tremor of horrified disgust. Public indignation rose to
boiling-point. On the other hand the anger of the Jacobin Club was stirred by
the “unpatriotic” attitude of the populace. An attempt to assassinate Tallien,
which was attributed to their machinations, enhanced their growing
unpopularity.
On September
14 the trial ended in the acquittal of the prisoners and the impeachment of the
Nantes tribunal. This of course implicated Carrier, and through him the members
of the old Committee, on whose instructions he had acted. The crisis was
therefore a grave one for Billaud and his colleagues. Fiercely they argued that
the whole Convention, having appointed the Committee, was responsible for the
Terror, and by every expedient the impeachment of Carrier was postponed; but
public outcry increased with every fresh revelation, and at last it became
necessary to deliver Carrier to his enemies. Elaborate precautions were,
however, adopted (October 23) to protect deputies from accusations. The
government Committees were first to decide that there was ground for suspicion;
a Commission of twenty-one, chosen by lot, must then investigate these grounds
and report; whereupon a three days’ discussion in the Convention was to ensue,
in which the accused might take part. All these precautions did not suffice to
save Carrier. On October 29 the Committees decided that there was ground for
suspicion; the Commission of twenty-one was forthwith appointed, and it
reported on November 11. Carrier then defended himself in the Convention, first
impudently denying the charges, and then laying the blame on the Committees.
Billaud and
his colleagues, seeing their danger, opposed each step in the proceedings with
savage but impotent fury. The Convention was xgainst them, and they resorted to
the Jacobin Club to give vent to their rage. This moved the reactionary mob to
attack the club. On November 9 a free fight took place between the Jacobins and
the reactionary bands, which, under the name of “jeunes gens" had been
organised by Freron: the Comiti de Surete Generate declined to interfere, and
on November 12 the club was closed. This was a stunning blow to the old
Terrorist party. Their last support was gone, and they felt the toils closing
round them. Carrier was put on trial, and on December 16 sentenced to death
with two of his satellites; and the acquittal of the
remainder of
the accused was so unpopular that two days later twenty- six out of thirty were
imprisoned again.
During this
period parties in the Convention had been undergoing reconstruction. We see
three distinct groups gradually emerging. The Independents, a union of certain
of the Thermidorians with the Jacobins, all members of the old Mountain,
represented the extreme of Republicanism, short of absolute Hebertism or
absolute Robespierrism; they desired the destruction of the remaining
Robespierrists, but the maintenance of all the leading Terrorist measures; they
inclined to the Left, but to a Left purged of Billaud and Collot, because
Billaud and Collot were too dangerous. Among these men were Merlin of Douai,
the author of the Law of the Suspect; Barras, the victor of Thermidor;
Cambaceres, the most prominent statesman produced by that crisis; and Sieyes,
who now once more glides stealthily to the front.
The
Thermidorians proper formed the second group; they had been responsible for the
recent violent measures against the Jacobins, and in that matter had crossed
the Rubicon. Any rehabilitation of the Jacobins would involve them in utter
ruin; they therefore inclined more and more to the Right, on whose assistance
they relied to keep the Jacobins under; they contemplated, without enthusiasm
but with equanimity, the return to the Constitution of 1791 of which their
Moderate allies talked, and were willing, in deference to these allies, to
relax slightly the cruel severity with which the wretched Dauphin was treated
in his dungeon. Of this party were all the mere self-seekers of the Convention,
such as Tallien and Freron, men who did not scruple to have secret communications
with emigres; its strength was estimated at 150.
The third
group, numbering some 160, was made up of deputies of the old Centre and Right;
they regarded the days of the Republic as numbered, and anticipated the
restoration of the monarchy and the Constitution of 1791. Without any definite
alliance they were able to vote during the early period of the reaction with
the Thermidorians against the Independents; and it was the cooperation of these
two parties that secured the acceptance of the Moderate legislation of the
winter of 1794-5.
Outside the
Convention popular opinion grew daily more favourable to reaction. With the
relaxation of the Terror the laws which it had introduced became intolerable.
The maximum in particular, often evaded even in the height of the Terror, now
became more oppressive than ever. In spite of an excellent harvest, prices rose
to famine height, and the dearness of fuel in a winter remarkable for low
temperatures brought misery little short of that caused by scarcity of
provisions. Throughout the bitter winter nights great queues of shivering
citizens huddled in front of the bakers’, grocers’, and butchers’ shops and the
barges where fuel was sold, in the hope of securing in the morning a miserable
pittance of bad bread, a scrap of meat, or a log of wood.
Assignats,
their security doubly shaken by rumours of peace and suggestions of amnesty to
Emigres, depreciated daily, while forged notes circulated freely. The abolition
of the Commune left the streets of Paris unclean, disorderly, and immoral. The
social and economic condition of the capital was indeed worse than at the
height of the Terror. There were some who, not without a degree of reason,
attributed the distress to the relaxation of the restrictions; but the vast
body of public opinion, as revealed to us by the reports of the secret police,
cried out for the complete repeal of the maximum.
Meanwhile
repeated efforts were being made to secure the impeachment of the Terrorist
members of the old Committees. So early as August 29 Lecointre, the most
excitable of the Thermidorians, had proposed this step; but, although public
opinion favoured the accusation, the motion fell to the ground. It led,
however, to the withdrawal of Billaud, Barere, and Collot from the Committee of
Public Safety. In view of the failure of their efforts to bring their enemies
to justice, the Thermidorians looked round for some means of strengthening the
Moderate vote in the Convention. The Plain was eager for the release of the
seventy-three deputies who had been imprisoned for protesting against June 2;
and, in order to secure the overthrow of their antagonists, the Thermidorians
now acquiesced in this step. On December 9 the seventy-three returned to the
Convention; and, as the Assembly was seldom attended by more than 250 deputies,
this accession of strength left the Moderates arbiters of the situation.
The ultimate
fate of the members of the old Terrorist government was now assured: but it had
been obtained only at the price of surrendering the Convention to the
Moderates. The reactionary trend of politics had, however, been displayed, even
before the return of the seventy-three, in the extension of an amnesty to the
Vendeen insurgents. After Savenay the Vendee had been systematically scoured by
the “ colormes mfernales ” of General Turreau; and in an incredibly short time
had become a smoking desert. But Turreau and his masters soon found that their
brutal policy, so far from bearing down the obstinacy of the insurgents, only
goaded them to a yet more desperate resistance. Hampered though they were by
the daily increasing jealousies of their remaining leaders, the Vendeens were
yet capable of inflicting heavy damage on the Republic. In Britanny also
resistance to the government continued. The disaffection of that Province had
originated in the same fashion as that of the Vendee; but the insurrection
there had never attained any unity, and had been subdued with comparative ease
every time it broke out. But, just because it was without organisation or
concentration, it could not be put down at one blow. Under the leadership of
Cadoudal, Cotterau, Boishardi, and Cormatin, the Ckouans (as the Breton rebels
were called) carried on a ceaseless guerilla warfare with the troops of the
Republic; and, in the summer of 1794, Puisaye,
an
ex-supporter of the Girondins, set out for London to negotiate for English
assistance. Hoche, who was sent to Britanny in October, perceived that this was
just the kind of war that could only be ended by means of wise diplomacy; he
therefore recommended an amnesty for all the western rebels; and on December 1
the government, anxious to end an episode which had proved so disastrous and so
costly to the Republic, gave effect to his recommendations. During December,
January, and February negotiations for a settlement on the basis of this
amnesty were in progress; and, although peace was not concluded until February
15, 1795, the policy which made peace possible dated from December 1,1794.
The
liberation of the seventy-three therefore did little more than accelerate a
process which had already commenced; the amnesty to the Vendkens was already
granted, the attack on the maximum had already begun, the sword was already
hanging over the heads of the Terrorists. The reentry into politics of so many
Moderates quickly brought matters to a head. On December 22 Jobannot and Giraud
reported on the maximum, and Lecointre proposed to remove it from all
commodities except bread; but the Thermidorians were overborne by the Moderates
and the weight of public opinion, and on December 23 tbe law was wholly
repealed. The excitement of the abolition of the most obnoxious of the
Terrorist measures had scarcely died away, when the blow fell upon those of its
authors who survived. Only four days had elapsed when the Committees took
courage to report tbat there was ground for investigating the suspicions
against Billaud, Barere, Collot, and Vadier. According to the provisions laid
down on October 23 a Commission of twenty-one was appointed; and, although its
report was delayed until March 2, there was after December 27 little doubt of
the ultimate fate of the Terrorists.
During this
period of reaction the revulsions of feeling in the Convention had been
steadily reflected in the constantly renovated ranks of the governing
Committee. At first its members had been drawn without exception from the old
Mountain, the most conspicuous being Cambaceres and Merlin of Douai, together
with Carnot and Prieur of the Cote d’Or, whose efficiency in their department made
their presence on the Committee essential, so much so that the law was strained
to keep them there, and that, when Carnot was at last obliged to withdraw for
his month, he continued to control the War Office from outside, and on the
expiry of the month was quickly reinstated. In January, however, the increase
in the strength of the Moderates of the Convention was reflected in the
Committee by the introduction of Boissy d’Anglas, and after him of other
members of the old Plain, although they never attained a majority; later we
shall find ex-Girondins sitting, so that, at one time or another, practically
every shade of opinion was represented.
Considering
the constant changes in personnel, the Comitt de I'An m was wonderfully
successful in giving to its policy a measure of continuity.
This was due
to the practical permanence of its leading members, such as Merlin of Douai and
Cambaceres, who sat for eleven and ten months respectively out of a total of
thirteen, and Boissy d’Anglas, Rewbell, and Sieyes, who, though they did not
enter the Committee until 1795, sat each for seven months. It was also, and
especially, due to the great skill with which it contrived to turn the mind of
the Convention to the establishment of an honourable and profitable peace with
Prussia. To the extremists, to the Independents as well as to the old
Terrorists, the idea of peace with anyone, on any terms, however profitable or
glorious, was abhorrent; while to many of the Moderates on the other hand the
Committee’s indication of the Rhine frontier and “natural” limits as the basis
of negotiation seemed likely to necessitate prolonged and ever- recurring
hostilities. The Committee was, therefore, in a delicate position between two
parties pulling in opposite directions. The Moderates had to be encouraged in
order to prevent the extremists reverting to the idea of a general and
relentless war; while the Mcmtagnards could not be allowed to decline, lest the
Moderates should be content with too little. This is the cue to the history of
public affairs in the winter and spring of the Year hi.
On the whole
the government policy tended more and more to favour the Moderates; and the
necessity for propitiating the Jacobins only slightly modified this tendency.
On December 21 the sale of the property of relations of emigres was stopped,
and on the 29th the sequestrated property of German, English, and Spanish
subjects was restored. On January 12, 1795, the priests and nobles condemned to
deportation were released, while on the 30th a distinctly Moderate report on
foreign policy was delivered by Boissy d’Anglas. The Committee was, in fact,
hard at work on its peace polity; Barthelemy was busy negotiating with the
Prussians at Basel; peace with Tuscany was signed on February 9; on the 15th
Charette agreed to accept the liberal terms offered by the government; and
peace with the Vendeens was signed at La Jaimaie. By this treaty freedom of
worship was granted, the royal assignats were redeemed, a local militia 2000
strong was formed, and the Vendeens exempted from all other military service.
In return Charette acknowledged the Republic and undertook to get the
insurgents to lay down their arms. If we accept the undoubted fact that the
Vendee rebelled not for royalty, but for religion and as a protest against
compulsory military service, and that the mark of Royalism was only
subsequently imprinted on an insurrection which was in its origin social and
religious, then we must acknowledge that all the real grievances were met by
the terms of the Treaty of La Jaunaie.
But the
Republic was to find that a guerilla war is almost as difficult to end by terms
of treaty as by force of arms. A country with no government, and armies with no
commander-in-chief, have not, in fact, the machinery for making treaties. Jealousy
of Charette and of his
assumption of
the right to treat made Stofflet and the Abbe Bernier more determined to
continue the war. No sooner had Canclaux established Charette, with all
ceremony and the military honours of a victor, at Nantes, than he was obliged
to lead his troops against these irreconcil- ables. After a heroic campaign of
two months Stofflet was compelled to accept at Saint-Florent the terms of La
Jaunaie (May 2). On April 20 the Breton rebels had accepted the same conditions
at La Mabilais. Thus by the beginning of May the whole of the rebellious west
had, temporarily at least, accepted the Republic.
Meanwhile in
Paris the tide of reactionary legislation was swelling fast. Four days after La
Jaunaie the government took the important step of conceding liberty of worship.
The religious question was one of the most thorny with which the government was
confronted. No proof was needed that it was impossible either to abolish
religion or to rally it to the Revolution : the whole history of the last two
years bore evidence of this : the Vendee, the failure of the cult of Reason and
the cult of VEtre Supreme, and now the voice of reviving public opinion, all
showed that the majority of Frenchmen were irrevocably attached to the Catholic
religion. Although the previous year had witnessed the most violent attacks on
religion, the Civil Constitution of the clergy had been untouched; and by it
the “ constitutional ” clergy were entitled to their stipends and pensions
which had been thrice solemnly guaranteed by the Convention. But in spite of
this the stipends had gradually ceased to be paid, and on March 26, 1794,
pensions had been abolished, while the closing of churches had finally stopped
all payment.
The
newgovemment had accepted liability under the Civil Constitution and had (18
Thermidor) decreed the payment of pensions to the abdicated clergy, but, being
wholly irreligious, declined to pay stipends. This amounted to a disavowal of
the Civil Constitution, which was based on the principle of a State-supported
religion. Cambon (September 18) reported to the effect that in future the
Republic would decline to support any cult, but that an allowance would be made
to officiating clergy equivalent to the pensions of the abdicated. This measure
was in the main a financial expedient, but the anti-Christianising policy did
not stop here. On December 21 Gregoire, one of the few ecclesiastics of the
Convention who had not apostatised, made an impassioned appeal, not for the
restoration of State religion, but for the recognition of Catholicism. The
Convention vehemently repudiated the suggestion; but public opinion greeted it
with enthusiasm. Everywhere churches were reopened; and Catholicism, which had
never indeed been wholly suppressed, openly lifted its head. The government
dared not interfere, dreading to run counter to public opinion and desiring to
conceal its atheism from Europe pending the peace negotiations. Hence in the
end it gave effect to Gregoire’s proposals in the Law of 3 Vent6se (Februaiy 21).
The scope of this law was indicated in the speech of Boissy d’Anglas who
introduced
it. No more bitter attack on Christianity had ever been heard in the
Convention; “intolerant, bloody, puerile, absurd, and disastrous ” were the
epithets applied to the Catholic religion; “ but,” he went on to say, “we must
have no Hebertism, no persecution”; superstition would die a natural death.
With that he proposed the absolute liberty of all cults; not as a generous
recognition of religion, but as a grudging acknowledgment of the political
necessity of toleration. Restrictions were heaped upon the liberated forms of
worship. Churches were not to be opened; no place of worship was to bear any
external sign of its sacred purpose; no public summoning of congregations was
permitted; no person was to appear in public in religious habit; all assemblies
for worship were placed under police supervision.
Notwithstanding
these harsh and spiteful conditions, the Law of 3 Ventose had granted the
essential point, and on this charter the position of religion was actually
based until the Concordat. Public opinion recognised the importance of the
concession and overlooked the barbarous restrictions. The greatest enthusiasm
prevailed. The very next day masses were said in Paris, and religious fervour
both there and in the Provinces knew no bounds.
It was plain
that the reactionary trend of affairs was likely to give the gravest offence to
the remnant of the Jacobins, and it was not to be expected that that once
omnipotent party would accept without protest this overthrow of all the
principles for which it had fought. Prom the Jacobin point of view the
situation was indeed most critical. The streets had become positively dangerous
to “ patriots ” by reason of the licensed violence of the “Jewries gens ”; the
busts of Marat had been consigned to the sewers; Revolutionary Tribunal,
Committees, Clubs, National Guard, Commune, all the old weapons of the Terror,
had been either blunted or destroyed; the red cap of liberty was everywhere
insulted; the great mother Club was ignominiously closed; the guillotine
threatened the heroes of 1794; a dangerous licence had been accorded to superstition
; the government had already truckled to the rebels of the west and was on the
point of truckling to Prussia. Little wonder that the Jacobins regarded the
situation with alarm and determined to strike a blow before the catastrophe was
completed by the success of Barth^lemy’s negotiations at Basel.
The economic
state of France seemed to favour the Jacobins. The simple repeal of the maximum
had not sufficed to restore normal conditions to the distressed country; the
war continued, and with it the necessity for requisitions and the continued
exclusion of external food supply, while the injuries done to internal trade
and agriculture were found to be greater than could be remedied by a simple
stroke of the pen. The government had indeed been mistaken in repealing the
maximum so hastily; it would have been wiser to retain it with the promise that
after the next harvest it would be removed; by
that time the
conclusion of peace might also have given an impetus to the importation of
food-stuffs. As it was, prices seem to have been little affected by the removal
of the restrictions on 3 Nivose (December 23, 1794), while the scarcity
continued, and even increased. The government was quite alive to the danger of
a famine; and, in its anxiety to allay the popular agitation and to stave off a
crisis which would have ruined its negotiations with Prussia, promised (March
13) a pound of bread daily to every citizen of Paris. Unfortunately this was
more than it could perform; and it was the failure to redeem this promise that
provoked the insurrections of Germinal and Prairial.
Meanwhile
Jacobin outbreaks at Toulon and Marseilles prompted the government to further
measures against their enemies. On March 2 the Committee of Twenty-one, which
had been appointed on December 27 to investigate the charges against Billaud,
Collot, Barere, and Vadier, recommended that the accused be sent before the
Revolutionary Tribunal. This was done amidst a chorus of approval, but to the
intense alarm and disgust of the Jacobins.
But the
Convention did not stop here. It determined still further to strengthen the
ranks of the Moderates for the impending crisis by restoring to their seats the
surviving Girondin deputies. This measure was accepted (March 8) by the
Thermidorians as a means of strengthening their hands against the Jacobins. The
reentry of the restored deputies, sixteen in number and including Lanjuinais,
Isnard, and Louvet, came as a gage of battle thrown down by the Moderates to
the Jacobins. From that day a Jacobin insurrection was a certainty.
It is
possible that even without the Jacobin incitements there would have been some
kind of outbreak in Paris at this juncture, for the distress was daily
increasing. The government, unable to find the promised bread, had begun to
substitute rice; further, in declining to guarantee subsistamces to any but
those domiciled in the city, they had done a grave injustice to the
considerable floating population, especially to the masons, whose labour ceased
during the winter and who were now just returning to Paris with the spring.
Bread riots occurred almost daily. Lecointre, who, after the reinstatement of
the Girondins, had gone over to the Jacobins, put forward (March 19) a demand
for the Constitution of 1793; and while “bread” was the battle-cry of the
starving populace, this became the battle-cry of the Jacobins. The demand for
the Constitution of 1793 was met by the first indication from the Moderates
that their policy comprised the framing of a totally new Constitution. They
also passed a strict police-law against bneutes, and showed what a grave view
they took of the situation by a resolution that, if the Convention were
violated, its survivors should, with the Representants en mission and the
suppliants, constitute themselves a fresh assembly at the town of Chalons.
With that
they turned to the discussion on the accused Terrorist
deputies. For
a week the debate continued; and the accused were warmly and bravely defended
by their ex-colleagues, Lindet, Prieur of the Cote d’Or, and Camot, while Paris
surged without. The Jacobins brought matters to a head on April 1 (12
Germinal), when a mob of angry citizens broke into the Convention and cried out
for “bread and the Constitution of 1793”; they shouted chaotically for four
hours, but, much to the disappointment of their Jacobin instigators, did
nothing further. Meanwhile the government Committees sounded the alarm in the
bourgeois quarters, and mustered some battalions of the National Guard, on the
approach of which the rioters gradually disbanded. No sooner was the hall
cleared than the Convention thundered forth its wrath at the fomenters of the
insurrection. The deportation of the accused deputies, in whose favour the
movement had been largely designed, was at once carried; and sixteen other
Jacobin deputies were decreed arrested—including Leonard Bourdon, Cambon, Amar,
and Lecointre. Pichegru, who was just then at the height of his reputation and
happened to be in Paris, was put in command of the government forces to stamp
out the embers of the insurrection: a task which gave him little difficulty and
was completed in two days.
The failure
of this insurrection of 12 Germinal told heavily in favour of the Moderates
within and without the Convention. The tyranny of the jeunes gens recommenced
with redoubled vigour; Republicans and all the emblems of their regime fell
into contempt; and the talk of a restoration of the Monarchy, which had been
rife before the insurrection, was revived. The dismay and discomfiture of the
Jacobins was complete. Nor were the Moderates of the Convention slow to take
advantage of the evil plight of their antagonists. The arrest of the Jacobins
involved in the plot was followed by a series of decrees directed against that
party. The Committee of Public Safety was increased to sixteen (April 3), and
on April 10 it proposed a decree for the disarming of all persons who had been
concerned in the Terror. At the same time the reorganisation of the National
Guard was undertaken ; the lower classes were excluded from its ranks, which
were once more filled, as in 1791, with bourgeois. The restoration on the same
day of the departmental authorities was a further return to the principles of
1791. Next day (April 11) the subordinate survivors, of the Girondin party were
reinstated.
These various
restorations, to which the Convention had been driven to secure itself against
the Jacobins, reopened the very serious question of the confiscated property of
proscribed persons. By its action in restoring the proscribed, the Convention
had acknowledged the injustice of their proscription. Was it to maintain the
confiscation of their property—an injustice at least as great ? On April 15, on
the motion of Johannot, it was decreed to cut out the word “confiscation” from
all laws, and to return the property of the victims of the Terror to their
surviving relations. But Rewbell, who had entered the Committee of
Public Safety
on April 3, protested in its name against a measure so favourable to Royalists
and emigres. The execution of the decree was postponed, and was only passed
into law—and that in an amended form—on May 3, when the property of all victims
of the guillotine since March 10, 1793, was restored to their families. The
only exceptions were emigres, forgers of assignats, and traitorous generals.
On April 25 a further measure of justice was meted out to the unfortunate
relations of emigres, who had suffered confiscation and been reduced to penuiy
through no faults of their own. A considerable proportion of the property so
confiscated was now restored to its rightful owners.
On the same
day it was decreed that trade in gold and silver should be freed from the
restrictions that had been imposed upon it. This step, which practically
reopened the Bourse, was highly important, and, considering the starving
condition of the Capital and the utter depletion of the Treasury, not very
politic: for its immediate result was to depreciate still further the value of
the assignats—a gold louis was actually sold for 900 francs on the 27th, while
at Basel assignats fell to 5 per cent.—and to send up prices with a bound.
Such were the
measures with which the Moderates sealed their victory of 12 Germinal; but the
effect of that victory was also visible in the manner in which they treated the
question of the Constitution. “ The Constitution of 1793" had been one of
the cries during the crisis of Germinal; and on 1 Germinal the Convention had
appointed a Constitutional Committee. It was not yet hinted that there was any
idea save that of improving upon the dummy Constitution of 1793; it is probable
that at first the Committee regarded this as the task before them; but after
Germinal the idea of developing the Constitution of 1793 was abandoned; and,
when Cambaceres (April 18) reported for the Committee, he recommended the
construction of a totally new Constitution. The Committee then resigned and was
replaced (April 23) by a Committee of Eleven:— Thibaudeau, Lesage,
Larevelliere, Boissy d’Anglas, Creuz^-la-Touche, Lou vet, Daunou, Berlier,
Lanjuinais, Durand-Maillane, and Baudin, of whom only one was an extreme
democrat, and three at least, Lanjuinais, Boissy d’Anglas, and Lesage, were
favourable to Royalty.
It would seem
at first sight that the future at this time looked promising for the
government. It had triumphed over its enemies on 12 Germinal, had passed its
remedial legislation, had concluded peace with Prussia and with the western
rebels, had enlarged and strengthened its Committee of government, rejected the
Constitution of 1793, which would have favoured its Jacobin rivals, and
appointed a Moderate committee to construct a Constitution after its own political
views. Yet, on closer inspection, the triumph will be found more apparent than
real. Already it was whispered that Charette and Stofflet were playing false,
that the peace in the west had in fact been but a feint to gain time; and even
the authors of the Treaty of Basel must
have
perceived that peace with a single Power, with the prospect of continued war
with the rest of Europe, would not satisfy the genuine craving for a real and
general peace which was everywhere evident. With regard to the war the
Committee was in fact on the horns of a dilemma; it dared not face a general
peace, which would have involved the return of the armies—an eventuality which
was full of danger; and it dared not on the other hand continue to disregard
the popular clamour for peace, and the financial situation. Remedial
legislation had still further depleted the Treasury, thus increasing social and
economic ii.jiery. Here was indeed the chief danger which threatened the
government. Whether it took the form of Royalism or Jacobinism the discontent
was equally dangerous. French public opinion always condemns a government which
cannot provide cheap bread. In Paris the allowance became daily smaller, more
irregular, and of worse quality; the month of May saw people fainting and even
dying of starvation in the streets. Some looked for the remedy to a restoration
of the monarchy, others to the reestablishment of the Jacobins; but all
malcontents with one voice condemned the existing government.
Besides all
this, the Royalist turn which the reaction was taking began to cause the
government grave disquietude; and it was not only in Paris that tbe restoration
of Louis XVII was openly talked of. This was a forcible reminder to the
Thermidorians that it was possible to carry the campaign against the Jacobins
too far. The news therefore that the fiery populace of the south was beginning
to take the law into its own hands, and that, on May 5, ninety-seven imprisoned
Terrorists had been ruthlessly butchered at Lyons by an infuriated mob, was highly
disturbing. It was followed by the intelligence of a further atrocity at Aix,
where thirty Terrorists were lynched on May 11. This provoked (May 17) a
Jacobin outbreak in Toulon, which was a hotbed of discontent against every
government in turn, on account of the number of dockyard men thrown out of work
by the ruin of the French navy. Conventional commissioners, with Isnard at
their head, were instructed to suppress this revolt; and on the 31st, though
only after a stout resistance, the rebellious city surrendered. Meanwhile the
“ White Terror,” as it was called, broke out sporadically, all over the south.
Avignon, Arles, and Marseilles, all towns which had suffered unheard-of horrors
during the Red Terror, each in turn became the scene of popular retribution ;
the last of the massacres took place at Marseilles on June 5.
These
incidents, occurring at a time when Royalism and not Jacobinism was the danger,
put the government in a serious difficulty. On May 1 Marie-Joseph Chenier had
made a report, in which he deprecated the Royalist tone of the Provinces; and
on May 10 the powers of the Committee of Public Safety were increased. The disarming
of Terrorists ceased; and the government, terrified by the spectre of Royalism,
suddenly relaxed its persecution of the Jacobins.
And now all
the forces of discontent gathered against the government. In the Convention
itself an active minority of ex-Terrorists was at work, under the leadership of
Goujon, Romme, Bourbotte, Ruhl, and Ruamps. Round them rallied Royalists,
Jacobins, and starving populace, all in fact who desired the downfall of the
Convention. For several days it was plain that another “journee ” was being1
organised; a programme of insurrection Was even circulated in the disaffected
quarters of Paris. On 1 Prairial (May 20) the storm broke. The insurrection of
this date was in the main a bloody reproduction of that of 12 Germinal. Crowds
were gathering in the Carrousel all the morning, and several attempts were made
to force an entry into the Convention. About 4 p.m. the rabble broke through
the National Guard at the doors, filled the hall, and began to threaten Boissy
d’Anglas, who was in the chair. A deputy named Feraud, who intervened to
protect him, was slain; and his head, placed on a pike, was held up before
Boissy, who calmly bowed to it but remained immovable. The crowd continued for
several hours to shout for “bread and the Constitution,” during which time many
of the Moderate deputies effected their escape. About 9 o’clock, Boissy d’Anglas
resigned the chair to Vernier, a feeble old man. The few disaffected deputies
then forced through a number of decrees and commenced to establish a
provisional government.
Meanwhile the
Committee of Public Safety had rallied a number of the bourgeois National
Guard, and these, headed by some of the Thermi- dorian deputies, now rushed
into the hall. After a prolonged struggle, the arrival of reinforcements
enabled them to drive the rabble out of the building. Thirteen Montagnard
deputies, who had taken conspicuous part in the riot, were forthwith arrested;
and by midnight order had been restored.
But the
crisis was by no means ended by the clearing of the Convention. Next morning a
“Convention of the Sovereign People” began to assemble at the Hotel de Ville,
but soon discreetly withdrew to Saint-Antoine. A renewed attack on the
Convention was evidently contemplated. The National Guard hurried off to
blockade the insurgents in the faubourg, but 5 p.m. saw them back at the
Tuileries, with the rebels at their heels. The Convention, greatly alarmed,
endeavoured to conciliate the mob by promises of bread, by ordering its
Constitutional Committee to report within four days, and by repealing the laws
which had restored confiscated property and reopened the Bourse. A deputation
from the rebels was received, caressed by the Assembly, and dismissed with
conciliatory promises.
But the
leaders of the Convention were playing a double game; all these fair Words were
intended only to postpone the issue; until regular troops could be called in to
quell the insurrection. In the midst of the tumult of 1 Prairial the Committee
of Public Safety had sent out hurried messages to gather all the nearest
available battalions. Three thousand
cavalry
entered Paris on May 22; and by the 23rd General Menou, to whom had been
allotted the role played by Pichegru in Germinal, found himself at the head of
20,000 men. In face of this display of force the rebellious faubourg
surrendered at discretion, and the assassin of Feraud was handed over and
executed. Apart from this the restoration of order was attended by no
bloodshed. i
The attempt
to repeat May 31 had utterly failed; and sixty-two Montagnards were promptly
arrested for participation in the plot. Six were condemned to death; even
Carnot and Lindet were for a time in danger. In every direction the embers of
the Terror were firmly stamped out. The Revolutionary Tribunal was finally
abolished; a further concession to religious feeling was made in the
restoration of churches to the cults, on condition that the priests declared
their obedience to the laws; the National Guard was subjected to a further
epuration; and a permanent guard of regular troops was appointed to protect the
Convention.
Public
opinioi agreed in these Moderate measures and in the condemnation of the
Jacobin rebels; but it was by no means contented that the present government
should continue. In the eyes of many the Republic stood condemned of
inefficiency; and, with the final fall of the Jacobins, a strong feeling in
favour of a restoration of the Monarchy in some form became apparent. For many
months this feeling had indeed been on the increase; people talked
significantly of the number “17” with allusion to Louis XVII; “ Veux-tu chasser
de ton given Et la famine et la miseref Retablis lepetit mitron Dans la
boutique de son pere,” ran a contemporary stanza, and it expressed very well
the feeling of a large number of Parisians. The idea that famine and misery
would end only with the reestablishment of the Monarchy grew every day in
strength. Many eyes were thus turned to the Temple, in ignorance of the
terrible tragedy that was being enacted within its walls.
The story of
the Revolution is moving in many of its incidents; the resigned piety of Louis
XVTs end and the superb dignity of his Queen’s, the sufferings of Bailly and
the passing of Danton, stir us all to sympathy; but nothing in the whole
blood-stained tale touches the heart-strings as does the slow and cruel torture
to which the Dauphin was subjected for no fault but that of his birth. Separated
from his mother on the night of July 3, 1793, he was handed over to the mercy
of a friend of Marat—Simon, a cobbler—who received from the Comite de SArete
Generate the assurance that the boy’s death would be welcome to them. By this
low ruffian Louis was treated with inconceivable brutality; and, by the time
that Simon resigned his post in January,, 1794, he had succeeded by kicks,
blpws, and every kind of ilL-treatment, in utterly breaking the sensitive
spirit of the delicate and tenderly-nurtured child. Robespierre did not provide
another guardian in place of Simon; and active maltreatment now gave place
to absolute
neglect—neglect even of the barest necessities of cleanliness and decency. Six
months of such confinement of course amounted to murder accompanied by torture;
the boy was found by the Thermidorians, dazed and almost witless, covered with
sores and vermin, in a pestiferous cell. Respectable and honest keepers were
now appointed^ who did their best to brighten the child’s life and alleviate
his sufferings; but, as the Royalist reaction increased, the Thermidorians
themselves acquiesced, tacitly but deliberately, in the slow murder which the
Terrorists had commenced. Decency and cleanliness and a degree of warmth were granted
to the prisoner; but the necessities of air, exercise, and good food, were
still denied to him. In praising the moderation of the Thermidorian government
it should never be forgotten that they share the blame for the most brutal
crime of the whole Revolution.
Under these
conditions the end was not likely to be long delayed, to the government no
doubt the postponement of the child’s death was a cause of irritation and
alarm. When serious illness was reported in May a doctor was grudgingly
granted; but nothing could have been done even had they wished to save the
boy’s life. The nursing of the dying child was neglected and every
consideration and comfort denied; even his sister, confined in the same prison,
was not allowed to see him. On June 10 the long sufferings were mercifully
ended; the Dauphin passed away, hearing, as he confided to his keeper Lasne, “
heavenly music and the voice of his mother.”
- The
government and all Republicans received the news with ill- concealed
satisfaction. The murder was justified to them by its far-reaching results.
With the death of the Dauphin the claim to the throne passed to the Comte de
Provence, who was now wholly identified with the worst phases of the
Emigration. From that moment a peaceful restoration became impossible; the very
large and important party of constitutional Royalists, including Lanjuinais,
who had recently come to desire a restoration with a constitution on the lines
of that of 1791, at once resigned themselves to the continuance of the
Republic. The Constitutional Committee, whose tone was so Royalist that it
might have reported in favour of a constitutional monarchy, was forced to give
up all such ideas and turned itself to the construction of a strong Republican
executive.
The sacrifice
of the Dauphin had indeed “consecrated the Republic,” but it was not to be
expected that the Bourbons would give up the struggle without striking a blow\
and there was a minority in France which still regarded a restoration on the
lines of the Constitution of 1791 as the best solution of the situation. Had
Louis XVIII acted on the advice of Mallet du Pan and made a large and generous
appeal to the French nation, offering to adopt the principles of 1791, to
amnesty all who had taken part in the Revolution, and to recognise the social
and economic changes of 1789 and 1790, he might have had some hope of
success.
Instead of this however he united against him all Frenchmen, with the
exception of a few ultra-Royalists and the bnigres, by announcing that the
Constitutionalists were more detestable to him than Robespierre himself. This
avowal made it certain that a restoration meant the widen regime and endless
retribution; and France had to abandon with reluctance her hope of finding a
way out of her miseries by tui immediate constitutional restoration.
Quite on a
level with this suicidal declaration of policy was the attempt which was made
to carry it out. As it was hopeless to rally France to such a cause, the only
course was to take advantage of the unrest in the west, to revive the
insurrection there, and supply it with aid from without. The peace between the
Republic and the rebellious Provinces rested on insecure foundations; the
disarmament of the insurgents had proved impossible; and the result was that
the Vendeen armies still existed, disembodied it is true, but ready to mobilise
at a signal from their leaders. The local militia had simply become a small
insurgent army under the command of Charette, and was prepared to become at any
moment a nucleus for renewed hostilities. The Vendee was thus in fact occupied
by the armies of the late combatants, whose attitude to each other became daily
more menacing. In Britanny also the peace of La Mabilais had turned out a
failure: in both Provinces therefore a renewal of hostilities was momentarily
expected. The Royalists now determined to take advantage of these
circumstances. Puisaye, who had been sent to England in 1794, had been
favourably received and was assured of English assistance.
With a show
of scruple, strange in men who had just dealt so cavalierly with the feelings
of their countrymen, the Royalist leaders decided that the assistance from
Great Britain must be indirect. The actual invaders of France must all be
Frenchmen, though they might come in British ships, supplied with British arms
and British money. As the preparations were nearing completion, the welcome
intelligence arrived that Hoche, who perceived that the western insurgents were
actively preparing for a fresh rebellion, had ordered the arrest of as many of
their leaders as could be seized.
Encouraged by
the news of this breach the expedition set sail from Portsmouth on June 10. A
French fleet under Villaret-Joyeuse was defeated on the 22nd; and on the 27th
3600 emigres disembarked near the promontory of Quiberon. Now however the
inherent weakness of the expedition showed itself. A dispute arose as to the
command between Puisaye and his colleague d’Hervilly; and the latter declined
to join in an immediate advance, which was the only chance of raising Britanny.
Invaluable time was then wasted in occupying the useless peninsula of Quiberon,
which was covered by the fortress of Penthievre. This was a mere death-trap;
and Puisaye and the Chouans, a large force of whom had joined the invaders, at
last persuaded d’Hervilly to give
battle.
Hoche’s skill and resolution combined with the insane tactics of the Royalists
to ensure defeat; and on July 19 the luckless expedition found itself shut up
on the barren promontpry. On July 20 Hoche took the protecting fort by a night
attack; 1800 fugitives managed to escape in the boats of the English fleet, and
6000, of whom 1000 were bnigris, fell into the hands of the Republicans. The
episode ended tragically in a wholesale massacre of the emigres prisoners.
Tallien had been sent from Paris to represent the Convention. In his absence
the Royalist intrigues in which he had been engaged began to leak out; no
better way occurred to him of proving his loyalty to the Republic than the
destruction of a few hundred helpless prisoners; he hurried to Pari* and
advocated this course with strenuous vehemence. The Convention, effete and
timorous, was easily persuaded to the bloody deed; and, acting on instructions
from Paris, a Court Martial sentenced 690 emigres to death.
The dangers
to which the Republic was exposed by the languor of the Convention and the
weakness of the governing committee made it daily more important that some
settlement should be reached on the question of a constitution. The
Constitutional Committee, appointed on April 23, had had no easy task. The
materisil with which it had to deal had been constantly changing; in particular
the death of Louis XVII had entirely altered its plans; that event had made
monarchy impossible, while the failure of the emeute of Prairial had finally
sealed the fate of the democratic Constitution of 1793. Consequently the
report, which Boissy d’Anglas introduced on June 23, proposed plans for an
entirely new Constitution. The principles which had guided the Committee were
sane, and the proposals of Boissy d’Anglas went far to solve the really
considerable difficulties of the situation. It was necessary to separate
completely the legislative and executive bodies; to leave both powerful in
their proper spheres, and above all to preserve the executive from undue
dependence on the legislative. It was necessary to simplify and recentralise
the local government; to give security to property, and to the economic
arrangements which the Revolution had established; to curb finally the Paris
mob; and to place the government of France in the hands of men who might be
presumed to be qualified for the task. Such were the problems which the new
Constitution was to solve, and the enumeration of its provisions will show how
it went about the task.
Universal
suffrage was abolished, and abolished, it should be noted, with scarcely a
protest. Residence and the payment of some taxation became the qualification
for the franchise; this franchise was to be exercised directly, that is by the
Primary Assemblies at first hand. But the greatest blow at democracy was the
revival of a property qualification for members of the Legislative Body: in
future no one who did not possess house or landed property was to be eligible.
The Constitution thus became a bourgeois Constitution; and this struck a deadly
blow at democracy.
As to the
Legislative Body, the Committee fell back on the long despised bicameral
system. There were to be two Councils* the Conseil des Cinq^Cents and the
Conseil des Anciens, forming the Corps Legislatif; the members of the former
body were to be elected by the Primary Assemblies and the Anciens were to be
elected from and by the entire Corps Legislatif’, the Cimq-Cents alone could
initiate legislation, and the Anciens (who numbered 250) had the power of vetoing
any measure for one year. An age qualification of thirty years in the
Cinq-Cerits and forty in the Anciens was imposed. The Executive had been the
great difficulty; the idea of a single “ Consul ” had commended itself to those
who still hankered after a monarchy^ but, after the death of Louis XVII, this
plan was given up and it was finally agreed to propose a Directory of five.
These five were to be chosen by the Anciens from a list of fifty drawn up by
the Cinq-Cents; they were to control the Ministries and in fact to inherit the
powers of the Comite de Salut Public. But they were not to sit in the
Legislative Body, nor to control the Exchequer; they were forbidden to command
troops in person, and were liable to impeachment. One Director was to retire annually.
Such was the
body politic proposed by the Committee; but the Constitution went on to lay
down a number of Constitutional Principles. In the first place the freedom of
the Chambers was secured; voting was to be secret; the place of meeting of the
Legislative Body could be changed by the Anciens to some other town; the
sittings were to be public, but the galleries were not to accommodate
spectators numbering more than half the members of either Council, and no
processions were allowed to pass through the halls which they occupied. The
members were granted also certain safeguards from impeachment; a guard of 1500
men was provided, and troops were not to come within a specified distance of
either Council. It will be noted how the disastrous experience of the
Legislative and Convention had burnt itself into the minds of the draughtsmen
of the new Constitution.
The Committee
had next turned to the protection of private rights. The Declaration of the
Rights of Man was retained. No differences of rank were recognised, nor any
State religion. Freedom of the press, and security of property were guaranteed:
labour was to be untrammelled, domiciles inviolable; there were to be no
clubs—a blow at the Jacobins —no public sittings of political societies, no
armed assemblies. Societies were not to present petitions: the Committee had
not forgotten May 31. The return of the emigres was irrevocably forbidden, and
the confiscated property of both clergy and emigres finally guaranteed to its
purchasers —a blow at the ultra-Royalists. With regard to local government the
Departmental Directories were revived at the expense of the Communes;
centralisation such as had not existed in France since the abolition of
Intendants was to be the order of the day.
The
Convention discussed these proposals for seven weeks and did not
accept them
without alteration; for instance, the principle of double election was
maintained and a ligh qualification fixed for secondary electors; passive
citizens were accorded a vote if they voluntarily taxed themselves to the
extent of the value of three days’ work. The property qualification for members
of the Legislative Body was suppressed; and the members of the Anciens were
required by a curious provision to be either married or widowers. Gradualite, a
plan of Mirabeau’s which the Committee had adopted, providing that no one
should hold high office without first having held subordinate office, was
rejected. The Year xii was selected, in preference to the Committee’s
suggestion of the Year ix, as the date by which all citizens must qualify for
the franchise by ability to read and write and by the exercise of a metier
mecanique. Finally the duration of the Legislative Body was fixed at three
years, one-third of the members retiring eveiy year.
Such was the
final plan of the Convention for terminating the Revolution and establishing a
settled rigime in lieu of the provisional government of the Convention. It
provoked little enthusiasm and some criticism, and was acceptable to the
people, not for any inherent virtues, but as the only means at hand for getting
rid of the Convention, whose rule had long since become intolerable. The
summoning of the Primary Assemblies held out the hope that—whatever the merits
or defects of the Constitution itself—its working would be entrusted to men
who, for the first time since 1789, would really represent the people of
France. This feet, which to the majority of Frenchmen was the redeeming feature
in the Constitution, caused the gravest alarm to the Convention itself. The Republic
had so long stifled the voice of popular opinion, monopolised the title of “
patriotism,” and paraded the rabble minority as the respectable majority, that
it is difficult to realise that from first to last, save when true patriotism
seemed temporarily to forbid it, the people of France had preserved in a great
degree tbeir attachment to monarchical government. We have seen how the hopes
of a restoration had been blighted by the death of Louis XVII, and the
impolitic attitude of Louis XVIII; but the desire for a monarchical
constitution was not dead, and most men believed that the Primary Assemblies
would, if allowed to exercise the functions allotted to them by the
Constitution, put the working of that Constitution into the hands of men who
would ultimately convert it into some form of monarchy. This was a threat not
only to the political ambitions, but to the personal security of the Republican
majority in the Convention; and all its Republican members at once rallied
against the idea of B&yalism. The Thermidorians and all regicides joined
the ex-Terrorist Montagnards in this struggle for self-preservation.
On August 18
Baudin, reporting for the Committee of Eleven, proposed a measure which
utterly destroyed the hope that the Primary Assemblies would be allowed a free
voice in the forthcoming elections;
two-thirds of
the members of the present Convention were to pass into the new Corps
Ligislatif. This was agreed to without protest; and it became a question
whether the Convention or the Primary Assemblies should nominate that
two-thirds. After long and angry debates it was decided (August 22) that this
remnant of the rights accorded by the Constitution should be left to the
electors. Further encroachments on the Constitution were also decreed, the age
qualification of thirty for the Cmq-Cents was relaxed for the benefit of
Tallien, and the exclusion of members of the Legislative Body from the
Directory for that of Cambaceres. Such were the decrees of 5 and 13 Fructidor.
Never had
there been a more barefaced act of usurpation, and loud was the outcry from the
disappointed electors. The Constitution was hurriedly submitted to the Primary
Assemblies, and sanctioned by 914,000 votes out of 958,000; while the “ decrees
of the two-thirds ” were only accepted by 167,000 out of 263,000, a significant
fall in the majority. In the Sections of Paris a great clamour at once arose;
and deputation after deputation appeared at the bar with threatening protests.
Notwithstanding this the Convention on September 23 proclaimed the
Constitution, and fixed October 2 for the nomination of the Electoral Colleges,
October 12 for the election of deputies, and November 6 for the meeting of the
Corps Ligislatif.
For a
well-ordered Royalist policy the agitation which followed these decrees would
have been an admirable opportunity. Mallet du Pan declared that Louis could and
should have put himself at the head of the Sectional resistance; but he was!
too deeply involved in fanciful schemes for the restoration of the ancien
regime and the whole prerogative to understand the significance of the crisis.
The latest and most futile of the ultra-Royalist enterprises was an expedition
of the Comte d’Artois to the coast of the Vendee. He was at this moment
hesitating to disembark and continued hesitating until the end of September,
when he landed on the tie d’Yeu; but Hoche’s determined preparations frightened
him, and in November he withdrew in cowardly fashion to England, leaving
Charette and Stofflet, who had gathered considerable forces, to shift for
themselves. The Count’s desertion was a death-sentence to the two remaining
guerilla chiefs. They were captured and executed, Stofflet in January, and
Charette in March, cursing the cowardice of their traitorous Prince. With their
death the long struggle of the Vendee was concluded.
Quite
distinct from the intrigues described above, the genuine agitation in Paris
against the Convention was coming to a head. The Primary Assemblies of the
Sections of the Capital, which had rejected the decrees of Fructidor with a
unanimity marred only by the defection of Section Quinze- Vingis, continued to
sit in defiance Of the law, and, headed by the wealthier central Sections, of
which Section Lepelletier was the most prominent, became the centre of agitation.
By the morning of 12 Vendemiaire forty-four out of forty-eight Sections were in
revolt,
backed by
some 30,000 National Guards. ■ The Convention retaliated by decreeing
itself in permanence and despatching General Menou to deal with Section
Lepelletier. Menou, however, was determined to avoid bloodshed and contented
himself with remonstrances. He was at once removed by the Convention, who
appointed Barras and four others to keep order (n: ^ht of 12-13 Vendemiai re).
Barras proposed the arming of a “sacred battalion of patriots”; a crowd of
ex-Terrorists were liberated and armed; and, terrified by a measure which
threatened to revive the Terror, the respectable Sections now finally
determined to resist. Both sides, however, were without plans or organisation.
The Sections had their 30,000 National Guards, but were without artillery, and
had entrusted the command to General Danican, a man of no energy or capacity.
The Convention had its 1500 “ patriots ” and 4000 regulars, but it lacked
artillery. Barras, however, displayed both ingenuity and energy, and was no
doubt aided by the genius of Bonaparte, who had just lost his appointment at
the War Office and grasped with alacrity the opportunity for distinction which
the crisis seemed to offer. He was not, as has often been asserted, second in
command to Barras; indeed his position was very ill-defined; but Barras trusted
him, and he made great use of him during the insurrection. The fact was at once
grasped that the possession of cannon would be a decisive factor; and at
midnight Murat was sent galloping off to Les Sablons to secure the forty pieces
of the National Guard which were parked there. By 6 a.m. these cannon were in
the precincts of the Tuileries; and the organisation of the defence commenced.
All the narrow streets which led to the Palace were secured and all the
bridges, save the Pont-Neuf which was held by Danican, were guarded.
It was not
until the afternoon of 13 Vendemiaire that the Sections began their advance on
the Tuileries. For a time it was unchecked; and the assailants occupied the
line of the Rue Saint-Honore. Who began the action is still a matter of doubt;
but, fighting once begun, the possession of cannon directed by an expert
artillery officer quickly decided the day. The attacks on the approaches to the
Tuileries were repulsed by artillery fire, and a few volleys of grape-shot
quickly cleared the Rue Saint-Honore; the attack by the left bank of
the river was equally unsuccessful. By 9.30 p.m. the crisis was over. About 100
of the insurgents had been killed. On the 14th the Conventional troops occupied
the rebellious quarters.
The
usurpation of the Convention was now complete, and had been sealed by force of
arms, the best title for all usurpers. It is impossible not to contrast the
events of 13 Vendemiaire, An iv, with those of August 10, 1792. Had the defence
of the Tuileries, on behalf of the legitimate sovereign, been conducted on that
day with a tithe of the determination now displayed on behalf of a usurping
body, the Revolution might have been checked and France might have been spared
the three terrible years of democratic tyranny. ,,
The victors
of Vendemiaire were wise enough to refrain from all attempt at reprisals on
their antagonists. Two of the ringleaders of the Sections were executed, but
Menou, though put on trial for his ambiguous conduct, was acquitted. Bonaparte
was appointed second in command of the army of the Interior, and, on the
resignation of Barras, became its commander-in-chief. But in the Convention
itself the result was a fresh upheaval of parties. The Thermidorians began to
draw away from their allies of the Gironde, and to join the extreme Montagnards
in demanding legislation which would curb the Royalist reaction and prevent it
from dominating the elections. The Electoral Colleges had already been chosen;
and everyone foresaw that, so far as the restrictive decrees of Fructidor
permitted, they would nominate Moderates, and even Royalists, at the expense of
the Conventionals. Tallien and the self-seekers were furious at the prospect of
political extinction and now accordingly allied themselves with the
Montagnards, intending to use the recent insurrection as an excuse for gagging
the electors. It was proposed to quash the primaiy elections of Paris, to
liberate all “ patriots,” including the “ Prairial ” prisoners, and confine all
Emigres and priests. On October 9 there was a fierce quarrel between Tallien
and Lanjuinais, with the result that Tallien crossed to the Mountain, and on
the 15th denounced Lanjuinais from that side of the Assembly. Tallien had
waited before taking this drastic step for the commencement of the secondary
elections (October 12), and only took it because the country was nominating
Moderates and Royalists. On October 22 he proposed the nomination of a
committee of five to advise the Convention as to the steps it should take. The
only hope at the moment was that the Convention might be persuaded to quash the
elections with a high hand, adjourn the Constitution, perpetuate its own rule,
and make this committee its executive: but Tallien’s design was unmasked on the
23rd by Thibaudeau, who boldly denounced the attempt to override the
Constitution. Thibaudeau carried with him the majority of the Convention ; and
the Committee of Five was obliged to be content with a renewal of some of the
old penalties against Emigres and priests (3 Brumaire). The real intentions of
the Committee are laid bare by the fact that they also proposed the reimposition
of the maximum, which, however, was rejected.
The Moderates
had thus been so far successful that the decree for the close of the Convention
on October 26 was maintained. During the last stormy weeks many excellent minor
measures were passed, dealing with educational, legal, and social questions.
The last measure, however, showed once more the attitude of parties; it was a
proposal to amnesty all political offenders since 1791. The Right moved to
except the offenders of Prairial, the Left those of Vendemiaire, and the latter
triumphed. The Convention then dissolved itself (October 26), and on the
following day those Conventionals who had been elected to the Councils
assembled; on October 30 the candidates for the Directory were nominated; and
oh November 4 the new government was completed.
THE GENERAL
WAR.
The death of the Emperor Leopold on March 1,1792,
removed the only hand which was capable of restraining and tempering those outbursts
of feeling, both in Austria and France, which had for the last two years
threatened to plunge Europe into the vortex of war. The first note of the
approaching strife was heard when, in an outburst pf enthusiasm, the
Constituent Assembly had swept away once and for all throughout all the
dominions of the French King the last lingering traces of feudalism. The question,
at once arose, whether France had the right to deprive the landowners of Alsace
of those feudal privileges which she had more or less guaranteed at the Peace
of Westphalia, and had confirmed by subsequent treaties. In February, 1790,
certain Electors, Princes, Knightly Orders, and Knights of the Holy Roman
Empire, who held lands in Alsace, sent a protest to the French government. This
protest was referred to the Feudal Committee of the Constituent Assembly. The
Committee, under the influence of Merlin of Douai, in October, l790, brought
its report before the Assembly. They asserted that the unity of France and
Alsace rested on the unanimous decision of the Alsatians; that ancient treaties
and the stipulations of their former rulers could no longer bind a free people.
Mirabeau saw that such a declaration could only mean war; and accordingly he
persuaded the Assembly to pass a resolution to uphold the sovereignty of
France in Alsace, but at the same time to ask the King to arrange that a
sufficient indemnity should be paid to the Princes of the Empire in
compensation for their losses. This resolution however only postponed the
question, for the majority of the Princes refused to accept any monetary
compensation and took their cases to the imperial Diet.
But this was
not the only cause of friction between France and Austria which arose out of
the side-issues of the Revolution. The King and Queen in secret, and the Comte
d’Artois and the Prince de Conde openly, had demanded the assistance of the
other European Powers to enable them to suppress the Revolution by force. In
December, 1791, Leopold had sent a strongly worded protest against the
transference of
the imperial
territories in Alsace. He had offered secret aid and an asylum to the French
royal family at the time of the flight to Varennes; and further, in July, 1791,
he had issued a circular from Padua to the monarchs of Europe, calling on them
to aid him in freeing the French King from popular restraint. This circular had
led to a conference between the Emperor and the King of Prussia at Pillnitz in
August. It was there settled that, since the preservation of the French
monarchy was an object of universal interest, an invitation should be sent to
the other European Powers, calling on them to aid in restoring1 the
Kang of France to his rightful position; but at the same time safeguarding the
liberties of the French people. To attain this object the two sovereigns
promised to mobilise their forces provided the other Powers would aid them. The
object of Leopold in issuing this declaration was to intimidate the French
people. He knew that the English government would refuse to intervene: that
Russia would promise but would not perform: that the Kings of Spain and Prussia
and the Stadholder of Holland had all very different objects at heart. He had
himself more anxiety for the safety of his sister, and for the maintenance of
the French alliance, than for lie constitutional position of the King of
France. Accordingly, he hailed with joy Louis’ acceptance of the new Constitution
in September. It was in accordance with this policy that the Emperor, early in
January, 1792, at the request of the French King, had used his influence to
compel the Electors of Trier and Mainz to disperse the armed bands of bnigris
who, under d’Artois and Conde, had assembled in those electorates.
But the train
fired at Pillnitz was not destined to be thus easily extinguished. So recently
as December, 1791, the Emperor’s Chancellor Kaunitz had used expressions in a
note, which implied that there was still in existence a league against France.
And later, on February 17, 1792, Leopold had allowed Kaunitz to send another
despatch, which loaded the Girondist leaders of the war party in Paris with
abuse, and called on the French nation to free itself from men who desired to
plunge Europe into a devastating war. Meanwhile Gustavus III of Sweden was
exerting himself to the uttermost at Spa to aid the French imigres; and
Catharine of Russia was striving to embroil Austria and Prussia with France, so
that she might have her hands free to deal with Poland. In February, 1792, the
offensive and defensive alliance concluded between Austria and Prussia
perceptibly increased the chances of war.
In France
itself there were two parties who desired war. The royalist party thought that
a European war would either have the effect of reinforcing the kingly power at
the point of the bayonet, or of restoring the fallen prestige of the monarchy
by a successful resistance to the foreigner; while the Girondins, who came into
power in March, had already begun to fear the Republican tendencies of the
Jacobins, and hoped by a successful foreign war to establish their own
authority, and keep the
strings of
government in their own hands. The policy of the Girondins was if possible to
isolate the war so that France should only have to fight her old enemy Austria.
Events seemed to be tending in this direction, when, in March, 1792, the death
of the Emperor Leopold, and the murder of the Swedish monarch Gustavus III,
brought Frederick William II of Prussia into a leading position. Frederick
William’s character was a curious mixture of vacillation and obstinacy, of
pride and self-delusion. He was in reality much more interested in the affairs
of Poland than in the question of France; but he was thoroughly convinced that
the French Revolution was a danger to all crowned heads in Europe, and that, if
he allowed Austria to assume the championship of the Empire, the position of
Prussia would be forfeited. Accordingly, in spite of the strong French
sympathies of an influential party under the leadership of his uncle Prince
Henry, he refused to be cajoled by the French government into renouncing his
alliance of February, 1792. When, on April 20, the King of France declared war
on the King of Hungary and Bohemia, Frederick William at once took measures to
support his ally. At that moment nobody thought that Europe was entering on a
war which would rage almost without intermission for twenty-three years. France
in the opinion of the cabinets of Europe was already a political nonentity; and
it seemed even doubtful if she would be able to put an army into the field.
At the
commencement of the Revolution, the French army compared not unfavourably in
numbers with the two other great standing armies of central Europe. The
Austrian army was the largest. It had a peace footing of some 270,000 regular
troops, which could be raised to a war footing of 400,000. But Austria had
hitherto seldom shown great military aptitude. The Prussian army had a peace
footing of 162,658 and a war footing of 250,000: its organisation was believed
to be excellent, and it had already established a reputation for quick
mobilisation and hard fighting. The French army was slightly larger than the
Prussian army. On a peace footing it was composed of 172,974 regular
■;roops, and 55,240 militia; which on the outbreak of war could be
augmented to 210,948 regulars and 76,000 militia, or, in round numbers, to a
total war strength of 295,000.
During the
period which followed the Seven Years’ War the French army had undergone many
sound reforms which were due in the main to the genius of the great Foreign
Minister Choiseul. After Choiseul’s fall, Saint-Germain, the War Minister, a
disciple of the German school, continued to work on the same lines.
Saint-Germain laid great stress on peace manoeuvres, and tried moreover to get
rid of the old abuse whereby, on the outbreak of war, troops were hastily
brigaded, and placed under chiefs whom they had never seen before. This reform
was not effected till March, 1788, when the Council of War published an
ordinance whereby France, including Corsica, was divided into 17
military
districts. The districts then of most importance, Flanders, the three
Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and Alsace, were confided to Marshals of
France; the other 14 districts were to be commanded by Lieutenant-Generals,
with complete powers within their districts. Each Commander-in-chief was
responsible within his district for the maintenance of discipline, instruction,
and administration in accordance with the King’s regulations; he was also
responsible for maintaining harmony with the civil power, and for all
arrangements for transport and supply of troops within his district. The
consequence of this reform was that the French army in 1789 was composed of 21
divisions, each commanded by a Lieutenant-General; these divisions were split
up into brigades, so that in the event of war the army would be ready to take
the field under the same staff which had trained it in time of peace. The
militia was composed of 78 garrison battalions, 14 provincial regiments, and 15
regiments of royal grenadiers. By an ordinance of May, 1778, each garrison
battalion was linked to a regular regiment, and a territorial district was allotted
to each regiment. The militia battalion, in time of war, was destined for
garrison service, and to supply the depot for its regular regiment.
To turn now
to the personnel of the army. Up to the Revolution the army had been recruited
entirely by voluntary enlistment. Recruiting was not confined to France, and
there still remained in the French service 23 regiments of foreigners. Recruits
were either attracted by hope of glory, or dazzled by the uniform and bounty,
or driven into the service by troubles at home. As might have been expected the
type of recruit was often undesirable; they were too often loafers, deserters,
or malefactors. The term of enlistment was for eight years; the standard of
height was low, 5 feet 1 inch for the infantry. There were however several very
serious obstacles to recruiting. The pay was poor (6 sous a day); the
government bread was bad; the meat often uneatable; barrack accommodation was
so scanty that two or three soldiers had to sleep in each bed; the barracks and
the hospitals were most insanitary. Although serious attempts were made to
improve both the food and the hospital arrangements, it is not to be wondered
at that the army lost on an average 20,000 men a year from death and desertion.
In spite of these drawbacks there was good fighting material in the royal army.
The old soldier might, occasionally be dissolute, turbulent, and drunken, but
discipline was always easily enforced. There was a strong feeling of esprit de
corps in the several regiments; and on service the natural vivacity and
cheerfulness of their nation carried the French soldiers through all
difficulties and dangers. With plenty of intelligence, quickwitted, and
hard-working, they could always be relied on to rally or cover a retreat.
The backbone
of the army was the non-commissioned officer, grown gray in arms, experienced,
and proud of his authority; always capable
of commanding
a section, usually fit to command a company. He understood his men, guided
Ihem, and enjoyed their coirplete confidence. The American War had attracted a
superior class to the ranks, with the result that by 1788 it was possible to
enforce certain literary and practical tests on all candidates for promotion to
the ranks of corporal and of sergeant. The regimental officers were drawn from
the lesser nobility, and their fathers and grandfathers had often served before
them. Their training commenced when they were 10, and the majority of them had
passed through some military college. By 1789 purchase had been abolished. But
still there was little incentive to make the officer improve himself. Court
favour, influence, and money, were supreme. Thus the officers had no inducement
to make themselves efficient, and frequently left everything to their
non-commissioned officers. Promotion from the ranks was all but impossible.
This grievance had been aggravated when the Comte de Segur in 1781 passed an
ordinance, which excluded all roturiers from becoming officers, save in the
artillery and engineers. Moreover, colonelcies of regiments, and many of the
higher staff appointments, were held by young noblemen and princes who often
had little or no knowledge of military science, and whose promotion, even when
justified by their knowledge, blocked the way of their less fortunate rivals.
As regards
its tactics the French army was quite as advanced as the other armies of the
Continent. Guibert by his Essay on Tactics, and by proof in the field, had
shown that the old system of close column was obsolete. By 1789 the extended
order of Frederick the Great had become the drill of the French army. In the
infantry and cavalry branches of its service the French army was the equal of
the Prussian army, while superior to it in respect of artillery and engineers.
The French artillery was the finest in Europe, both as ' agards numbers, the
excellence of its material, and the skill and courage of its personnel; while
France was the only European Power which paid proper attention to the art of
military engineering.
The moment of
the outbreak of the Revolution was an unfortunate one for the army. The new
system of decentralisation had not had time to take root. The irritation,
caused by the introduction of the Prussian military punishments and by the
ordinance which forbade roturiers from becoming officers, had not yet died
away. Further the army was suffering, as all armies must suffer, from the
effects of a long spell of peace. Still, the meeting of the States General had
at first little effect on the army. The officers took no prominent part in the
elections. The private soldier had no vote. However, among the cahiers sent up
to the Assembly there were many which called for the amelioration of the lot of
the soldier. Some demanded better barrack accommodation, more sanitary
conditions, better winter clothing, and better food. Others called for better
pay, for the privilege of being employed on civil works
during the
period of their military service, and for more scrupulous observance of the
terms of service. But the most numerous were those which demanded the abolition
of all degrading forms of punishment.
Up to the
fall of the Bastille the attitude of the army was doubtful; although owing to
the unpopularity of their commander there had already been a mutiny among the
Gardes Fran$aises. But after that date it was quite certain that (except the
regiments of foreigners) the troops could not be relied upon in the case of
riots, as they would not fire on the populace. In all the military districts
(save that of the east, where de Bouille commanded a powerful force of 25,000
men) discipline deteriorated ; and by the month of September 16,000 men had
deserted their regiments, and enrolled themselves in the National Guards of
Paris.
Meanwhile all
over Prance the bourgeoisie were organising themselves into National Guards. On
paper this force was almost two million strong, though in reality its numbers
were considerably less. But at best it was imperfectly equipped and organised.
Still, the National Guards aided the regular army in putting down the bands of
brigands which swarmed over the country, and helped in the conveyance of
supplies of com, which was the main duty of the army during the winter of 1789,
and the first half of 1790.
The march of
the women to Versailles and the virtual imprisonment of the King in the
Tuileries struck a great blow at the fidelity of the army. The ominous words “
Fatherland ” and u Liberty ” began to be heard in the
barracks. Little by little the soldiers began to grasp the new idea that they
were no longer the King’s soldiers. Hence they came into collision with their
officers; for the officers had been educated in the faith that above everything
stood the King. The National Assembly regarded the revolutionary spirit of the
soldiers with favour; and in June, 1790, it not only refused to sanction the
measures by which the Minister of War proposed to put down the numerous
mutinies, but decreed that each regiment should send a deputation to the
meeting of the Federations in Paris on July 14, 1790. This action, in the
opinion of de Bouille, was the cause of the general insurrection which within a
month took place all through the army. The soldiers everywhere demanded that
their officers should take the oath of allegiance to the nation. All good order
and military discipline were at an end. Even in the corps of de Bouille, which
had hitherto been regarded as most loyal to the King, only the Swiss and the
German troops could be relied on. In every regiment there had sprung up
committees in communication with the Jacobin members of the Assembly: these committees
pretended that the officers had withheld sums of money due to the regiments.
Mutinies broke out at Brest, Saarlouis, Metz, Saargemiind, and Marseilles. The
two most ominous phenomena in these insurrections, in which they differed from
all preceding mutinies, were first that everywhere the soldiers rose under
organised committees, and secondly that
they acted in
accordance with instructions sent from the Jacobin Club in Paris.
On August 6,
1790, the Assembly appointed inspectors to enquire into the soldiers’ accounts;
but in many cases the audit was the signal cor fresh mutinous outbursts. This
was especially the case at Nancy, where three regiments rose in mutiny; and the
mutiny was only put down by de Bouille and his German and Swiss regiments after
three hours’ hard fighting (August 31)* By 1791 the epoch of suspicion had
commenced; and the soldiers were encouraged by Jacobin emissaries to believe
that their officers were in communication with the emigres. On June 21, 1791,
came the attempted flight of the King to the army of de Bouille. From that
moment the position of the regimental officers became intolerable; humiliations
were their daily lot; suspicion and danger hung ever over their heads. They had
seen the Princes of the Blood, the higher nobility, and a great number of the
higher officers of the army, flying across the frontier. They had hitherto
stood fast at their posts because they took their orders only from the King;
but now they saw that the King himself desired to leave France. It was clear
then that their duty also lay across the frontier; the King, by his actions,
had relieved them from their oaths. They were free; the oath taken to the
nation was nothing. When convictions such as these had taken possession of
them, we cannot greatly blame the officers who now deserted. June 21, 1791, is
one of the dates which mark the change of the Royal Army into the Army of the
Revolution.
By August it
became necessary to take steps to supply the places of those officers who had
deserted. The officers who remained either hoped against hope that their troops
would stand loyal, or saw in the changes of revolution that opportunity of
advancement which had hitherto been denied to them, or were by their patriotism
led to stand by the nation rather than by the King. The Assembly now issued a
decree that one half of the new commissions were to be allotted to
non-commissioned officers of the regiments in which the vacancies had occurred,
and the remainder were to be allotted to the sons of citoyens actifs, that is,
citizens who had paid sufficient taxes to render them eligible to sit in the
Assembly.
A further
decree was passed condemning, as deserters, all officers absent without leave
since May 1,1791, and at the same time forbidding soldiers to intimidate their
officers into desertion. But this latter decree had little effect. Although in
September the King took the oath to the new Constitution, order and confidence
were by no means restored in the army. In spite of numerous decrees and of the
new Military Code of October, 1791, the later part of the year was marked by
increasing insubordination and disorder in the army. War alone could cure these
deep-seated evils; and it was during these very months that it began to be dear
that war was inevitable. That this war when it came proved to
be a national
and not a civil war was owing to the bnigris who, instead of remaining in
France and summoning to the aid of the Crown all the latent forces of royalism;
had crossed the frontier with the intention of returning at the heels of the
Austrians and Prussians.
Since war was
within a measurable distance, a decree of the Assembly (December 14, 1791)
divided into three armies the troops stationed along that portion of the
frontier which was threatened. The Army of the North was entrusted to
Rochambeau, the Army of the Centre to Lafayette, both of whom had served in
America; while the Army of the Rhine fell to the command of Luckner, an old
German hussar. These three armies were the first armies of the Revolution. The
soldiers were still those raised by the old Monarchy, but their spirit was
already revolutionary. The personnel of the officers had undergone profound
modification. The majority of the infantry and cavalry officers were gone. The
greater part of tbe old staff of the army had either retired or emigrated, but
the artillery and engineer officers remained. New generals and new staffs had
been appointed; ambition was to be henceforward the order of the day.
Hitherto the
natural method of increasing the army in time of war had been to mobilise and
expand the militia; but this was now impossible, because the militia, in the
eyes of the children of the Revolution, represented one of the worst abuses of
the old regime. The National Guards had all along retained their local
character, and had never been taken under the control of the central
government; nevertheless, dded by the regulars, they had once or twice done
some service in maintaining local order. In 1791, when war seemed imminent, the
idea took shape of transforming the National Guards into troops for active
service. This scheme however met with little favour, especially among the
National Guards themselves. Various other schemes for reinforcing the regular
army by volunteers were mooted. Under the panic created by the flight of the
King, the Assembly passed several decrees; and on August 17 it called for
101,000 volunteers to take up arms, and decided that these volunteers should be
formed into 169 battalions. Owing to the fear of invasion the battalions in the
north-east filled up rapidly; but over the rest of France many difficulties
were met with. In the first moment of enthusiasm men of all ages hastened to
enrol themselves; but when the order to march arrived the majority remained at
home. By September 25 only 60 out of the 169 battalions bad any sort of
organisation. Further, even in these 60 battalions the greatest disorder and
insubordination reigned; and their march through France was one great
plundering expedition.
The War
Minister of France at this moment was the Comte de Narbonne. It was mainly
owing to his endeavours that France had still any regular army and that the
volunteers had any organisation; but in spite of this the Assembly did its best
to thwart him at every point. In
January,
1792, three months before war was declared, Narbonne laid before the Assembly a
report, which showed that the army was 51,000 below strength ; and that it was
impossible to get recruits for the regulars owing to the superior attractions
of pay and service in the volunteers. Meanwhile, the Assembly issued two
decrees which almost entirely crippled the volunteer organisation. The first
decree gave the volunteers liberty to return home at the end of each campaign,
on giving their commanding officers two months’ notice (a campaign, being
supposed to end on December 1); and the second decree allowed the volunteers to
choose their own officers. The question of officers was a difficult one. The
course which good sense would have dictated at this moment was to place the
nomination of volunteer officers in the hands of the military authorities, and
to brigade the volunteer regiments with regular regiments of the line. But the
Assembly refused to take either of these steps. Fortunately for Fiance,
Lafayette, who commanded the Army of the Centre, of his own initiative brigaded
the volunteers with the regulars. From the success of this experiment the
generals commanding the other corps in time followed his example; so that when
the crisis came the French army, thanks to its backbone of regular troops, was
able to oppose some sort of resistance to the enemy.
Thus, at the
commencement of 1792, France was about to enter on a war with an army composed
partly of regular soldiers of the old regime (whose discipline had been
debauched by three years of licensed insubordination, and whose officers were
either viewed with suspicion by their men, or, what was fortunately often the
case, old non-commissioned officers but yet untried in their new rank) partly
of volunteers who had as yet little organisation and less discipline; with a
general staff whose personnel was constantly changing at each fresh outburst of
suspicion; with fortresses long neglected, badly armed, and ill provisioned;
with no system of transport and supply; with a War Office which had still all
the faults of the old regime, its lack of method, its want of responsibility.
Meanwhile the Ministers of War succeeded each other in quick succession,
Narbonne, de Grave, Servan, Dumouriez, Ladjard, and d’Abancourt, six ministers
in six months. Further, the plans,, good or bad, of these ephemeral Ministers
of War were constantly overridden by an Assembly, in which passion stood for
statesmanship, and hypocrisy for patriotism. That France emerged from this
strife, reeling it is true, but unsubdued, was due to two causes. First the
artillery and engineers, the two scientific corps where long training is
everything, had always escaped the faults of the old regime, and had
consequently suffered little during the last three years; while in the line
under the stress of warfare the old soldier recovered to a great extent his
accustomed habit of discipline ; and the volunteers of 1791, after having been
brigaded for some months with regulars, became in time trustworthy troops. But
the second cause, and that which really saved France, was that the
armies of her
two great enemies, Prussia and Austria, had fallen far below their old
standard, and that owing to their mutual jealousy all the evils of a coalition
and of a divided command were to be seen at their worst.
Though war
was declared on April 20, 1792, neither side was really prepared for it;
mobilisation proceeded but slowly, and active hostilities did not break out
till much later. The French preparations were marked by all the blunders which
might have been expected, when an inexperienced War Minister like Servari
received his instructions from a passionate Assembly which knew still less of
the art of war. Instead of attempting to bring the regular regiments and the
volunteers up to their full strength, the Assembly contented itself with
sanctioning Servan’s scheme of calling out 20,000 federes in July, to form a
camp near Paris. In August and September it voted another levy of 42 battalions
of volunteers when as yet only 83 battalions of the levy of 1791 came near to
being complete. These volunteers of 1792 must not be confused with those of
1791. The volunteers of 1791, bad as they were at first, were composed of a
much higher class than those of 1792, and in time formed excellent troops. But
the levies of 1792 were composed of fanatics of the lower orders, impregnated
with all the doctrines of Jacobinism, and never took any active part in the
war.
The Assembly
had counted upon opposing 300,000 regulars and volunteers to the invaders. But,
after the garrisons had been absorbed, the forces which covered the frontier of
France from Dunkirk to Basel on August 10, 1792, amounted to not more than
82,000 men. These forces were divided into three commands. The left, under
Lafayette, covering the frontier from Dunkirk to Montmedy, was 43,000 strong.
The mass of this, army was in three camps on the Flemish border, while a
division
19.000 strong lay at Vaux near Sedan. The centre
under Luckner,
17.000 strong, watched the roads which led into
France by the Moselle. Its front extended from Montmedy to the Vosges, and its
headquarters were at Metz. The Army of the Rhine under Biron composed the right
wing; its duty was to close the passes near Landau and Bitsch, and the great
gap between the Vosges and the Jura, known as the Gate of Burgundy. The Army of
the Reserve (composed of the depots of cavalry regiments and infantry
battalions and of the untrustworthy volunteers of 1792) was collected at
Soissons; it was an unorganised rabble and lacked everything, even arms and
clothing, since the government factories had completely broken down. It was
indeed fortunate for France that the Army of the Reserve never had to be taken
into action; and that the ill-concerted alliance of Austria and Prussia
recoiled before accepting any real trial of strength.
On the side
of the Allies it had been arranged during the month of February, that, in the
event of hostilities breaking out, the Duke of Brunswick should take command of
the allied army; and a plan of operations—which was subsequently in the main
adopted—was then
sketched out.
In accordance with this plan a Prussian army 42,000 strong had reached Coblenz
by the 19th of July. There were also in the neighbourhood of Coblenz 5500
excellent Hessian troops. and 4500 emigres; but the emigres were untrustworthy.
The Austrian arrangements were being hurried on as fast as was possible,
considering their lack of administration. From the Netherlands Clerfayt had
arrived with
15,000 men, and, Hohenlohe on the Rhine was
concentrating 14,000. The total number thus available was some 81,000. There
can be no doubt that these forces, if properly handled, should have been
sufficient to brush aside any resistance that the, French could offer.
But the
reason of the failure of the allied army was that there was not sufficient
community of interest to overcome the hereditary jealousies of Austria and
Prussia. The Allies had but one object in common, and that was to exclude each
other from any part of the,plunder which they hoped for in Poland. The army
suffered from these national jealousies; but it suffered also from the evil of
a divided command. The Duke of Brunswick was naturally cautious and
circumspect; he was always an admirer of France, and rather favoured liberal
thought; moreover, he was growing old and had the caution of old age, and he
had also a reputation to maintain. Moreover he had never taken part in great
operations, and he had accepted the command against his will, at the desire of
the King. His idea was that the Allies should at first, content themselves with
occupying the chain of fortresses running from Nancy through Metz and Sedan to
the Netherlands, and should then try to negotiate with the French. He was
convinced that the occupation of this line of fortresses would place France at
his mercy. Frederick William II was a man of a very different stamp; he was
obstinate, impulsive, and. sanguine; he thoroughly believed in the Prussian
army; and he was anxious to make a dash at Paris, and thus to relieve the King
of France from a false position, and at the same time to increase his own
reputation. Accordingly he used all his royal authority to overcome the
hesitation of Brunswick.
But even this
unfortunate want of unity at headquarters need not have been fatal if the army
itself had been sound. The Prussian infantry was recruited either by the forced
enlistment of serfs, or by deserters and loafers kidnapped all over Europe. But
so strong was the Prussian discipline, and so good were the drill and
manoeuvre, that the Prussian infantry was at all times formidable^ while the
Prussian cavalry, owing to its intelligence, its hardness, and its mobility,
was the first in Europe. The Prussian regimental officers were thoroughly
trained in their work; the majority of them were well educated; all were of
noble birth. The defects of the army lay in the other branches of the service.
The artillery had even in the Seven Years’ War fallen short of the Austrian
artillery, and the Prussian engineers had been notoriously inefficient. Neither
of these services had moved with the times. Further, the staff of the army was
bad; it had suffered from the
effects of
too much routine, too little thought, and too long peace. The medical service
was poverty-stricken, the sanitary servic'e did not exist. We must attribute
the failure of the organisation to the fact that the training of Frederick had
turned out machines, not men. There was no regular system of requisitions; the
army consequently was weakened by a long transport train. The Austrian force
was, as usual, handicapped by the fact that money and supplies were scarce, and
that the generals had to take their orders from Vienna. The emigres were more
of a hindrance than an aid; they had little organisation; the ranks of the
regiments were full of gentlemen, who were individually brave, but collectively
could not be relied on.
Instead of
holding the fortresses of Ehrenbreitstein, Diisseldorf, and Wesel, and
establishing a solid base on both sides of the Rhine, the Allies practically
cut themselves adrift from Germany. The advance commenced on July SO. But they
did not push on and take advantage of the initiative, and of the fact that the
French could only oppose them by 19,000 troops at Sedan and 17,000 at Metz. The
fatal conflict of ideas at headquarters paralysed all movements. The fall of
Longwy on August 27, and of Verdun on September 2, opened the way to Paris. But
much valuable time had been wasted; while the unseasonable weather, the damp,
the insanitary conditions of the camps, and the lack of forethought on the part
of the staff, sowed the seeds of disease and demoralisation throughout the
army.
While the:
Allies were taking a month to cover the distance from the Rhine to the Meuse,
the result of the Brunswick manifesto was making itself felt over France. On
August 10 Louis fled to the Assembly and the mob sacked the Tuileries; while on
August 19 Lafayette, the Commander of the Army of the North, found that his
conscience would not allow him to serve a country which was going to depose his
King. So, after taking all precautions to place his army in the best possible
state for resistance to the foe, he crossed the frontier and surrendered
himself a prisoner to the Austrians. The same day Dumouriez, who was in command
of a corps of the Army of the North at Maulde, received his nomination as
Commander-in-chief of the Army of the North in Lafayette’s place. The Army of
the Centre also underwent a change of command. Luckner had all through August
taken no steps to check the invader. It was his fault that Longwy and Verdun
were so ill-armed, ill-garrisoned, and ill-supplied that they were unable to
hold out. On August 25 Servan, the War Minister, recalled Luckner and placed
Kellermann, a brave soldier, but no strategist, at the head of the Army of the
Centre.
Dumouriez,
the new Commander of the Army of the North, had served in all grades of the
service, and in most countries of Europe. He was the typical political and
military adventurer; energetic,! quickwitted, and optimistic. He grasped the
fact that if the monarchy was
to be saved
the Allies must be checked at once. As Minister he had attempted to detach
Prussia from the Austrian alliance. He now thought that the best way to break
up the alliance and to check the advance was for the French to make a
counter-stroke in the Netherlands. He hoped that, with his army on their right
flank ready? to threaten their rear, and Kellermann at Metz on their left flank
threatening their communications, the Allies would be forced to halt. But on
receiving the news of the investment of Verdun Dumouriez at Sedan saw that
there was not now time for his offensive plan to succeed. He decided,
therefore, to occupy the forest of Argonne, a belt of hilly, wooded country,
forty miles long by seven broad, which lies between the Aisne and the Aire. In
those days, owing to the dense undergrowth, it was only penetrable at certain
spots. By closing the main road between Clermont and St Menehould he would
force the Prussians to go round by more circuitous routes, such as the pass at
Grand Pre, or the clearing at Croix-aux-Bois. The Prussians committed the fatal
mistake of failing to occupy the main Paris road, and also of neglecting to
attack Dumouriez as he marched across their front on September 1 and 2. By
September 3 Dumouriez held the Argonne, and Kellermann was marching up from
Metz to reinforce him. The Allies accordingly had to turn Dumouriez'’ position.
This they effected on September 14 by way of Croix-aux-Bois. On the morning of
the 15th Dumouriez fell back south, in great disorder, and took up a position
facing north at St Menehould, where after some hesitation Kellermann joined him
on the 19th. If the Prussians had broken up their camp at Landres at once, and
kept up contact with Dumouriez, they cduld have completely defeated him before
he effected his junction with Kellermann. But they remained at Landres till the
18th, and it was not till the evening of the 19th that they came into contact
with the French left.
On September
20 was fought the battle of Valmy. The French occupied a position on a ridge of
hills with their backs to Germany; the Prussians attacked them with their backs
to France. The Prussians gained some slight success early in the day; but the
French artillery on the heights of Valmy and Mont Yvron was so well handled that
the Prussian batteries could never silence it. Consequently Brunswick, seeing
how heavily his columns suffered when they came within range of the French
guns, refused to allow the attack to proceed. The Prussians had
34,000 engaged and lost 184 killed and wounded;
the combined armies of Kellermann and Dumouriez were 52,000 strong, but of this
number probably only 36,000 were actually opposed to the Prussians, since
Dumouriez had to keep sufficient troops in hand in case the Austrians and
emigres made a serious effort to force the pass of Les Islettes in his rear.
The French loss was 700 killed and wounded. In view of the demoralisation of
the Prussians on the evening of the 20th we cannot blame Brunswick for refusing
to make a frontal attack on Valmys when
the Prussian
artillery was unable to silence the French guns, and when such an attack would
have exposed his columns to a severe enfilading fire from the guns of Mont
Yvron. The result of the battle was that the Prussians, though demoralised, lay
across the direct road which led to the French reserves at Chalons.
Consequently, on the evening of the 20th Dumouriez ordered Kellermann to fall
back. By the morning of the 21st the combined French force had taken up a
strong position, extending from St Menehould to Dampierre-sur-Auve, whereby Dumouriez
threatened the Prussian left should they advance directly on Chalons, and at
the same time covered the route to Chalons by Vitry-le- Franyois, and thus once
again picked up. communication with his base.
Valmy taught
the world that France was still a nation, and that the French army was still a
force to be reckoned with. Whether the French troops would really have stood if
the Prussians had charged home is hard to say. But once again we must emphasise
the fact that at Valmy it was not the revolutionary troops, but the old royal
army which won the day. The artillery which bore the brunt of the fight was the
artillery of 1789, and Kellermann’s infantry, which stood firm round Valmy, was
(save for two battalions of the volunteers of 1791) composed of regular
regiments of the old Army of the North.
After
September 20 there followed a pause. The Prussians were greatly disheartened by
their ill-success; their organisation and discipline were daily getting worse,
and -their ranks were greatly thinned by disease. On the other hand, the French
troops were elated by their stand against the famous Prussian army; and two
large camps of volunteers were forming, one at Chalons, the other at Auberive
on the Suippe. Still the French troops could not be trusted to assume the
offensive. Both sides therefore were glad to negotiate. Dumouriez was quick to
see the growing friction between Austria and Prussia over the question of
Ansbach and Baireuth, and over the scheme of indemnifying Austria at the
expense of France. He pointed out to the King of Prussia that the lowering of
the prestige of Austria was of vital importance to all the Powers of Europe.
But greatly as he appreciated this argument, the King of Prussia, the defender
of the Divine Bight of Kings, felt himself in honour bound to plead for his
friend the King of France; he therefore demanded that Louis should be
reestablished in the position held by him prior to the outbreak of August 10.
On this point Dumouriez could but temporise, for he had been informed that the
Convention on September 21 had declared France a Republic. Meanwhile the French
commander had no easy task to perform. His strategic position was hardly sound;
the Prussians blocked his main line of retreat on Paris; and, in addition to
the strategic question, he had to face the arrogant jealousy of Kellermann and
the suspicion of the soldiers, who failed to understand the intricacies of a
waiting game.
But
nevertheless day by day the French position was getting stronger.
Servan, the
energetic War Minister, backed by the strong will of the imperious Danton, was
doing good service, till on September 25 the anarchy in Paris forced him to
tesignj He was succeeded by the incompetent self-seeking Pache, but not before
he had placed enough material and men at the disposal of the generals in the
field to have enabled them, if it had been necessary, to have seriously
impeded, if not to have stopped any further advance of the Allies* Dumouriez
himself took energetic measures; he ordered the country on the direct road to
Paris to be devastated, the women and children to be sent behind the Marne, and
the men formed into guerilla bands. The streams of volunteers which flowed into
his camp from Chalons were tested, and if found lacking in discipline and
equipment were promptly sent back. Every effort was made to induce the Prussian
troops to desert. Yet as the days passed the French army round St Menehould
became despondent; food and supplies of all sorts were scarce, and the fact that
the Prussians were worse off hardly alleviated the pangs of hunger. Affairs
seemed grave indeed when on September 29 the armistice ended; but on the 80th
the Prussians started fresh negotiations. They had hitherto been duped by
Dumouriez; it was now their turn to take their revenge.
The French
negotiators were Westermann and Benoit, commissioners from the Convention, but
deeply impregnated with the views of Dumouriez. The Prussian envoys were
Lucchesirii and Kalkreuth. They had been sent, mainly at the desire of
Brunswick, with a view to temporising while he withdrew the allied army from a
very critical position. Disease had reduced the Allies to 17,000 effectives ;
it had become absolutely necessary to retreat. The only possible line of
retreat was the way by which they had advanced, and this was only practicable
if they could traverse the Aisne, and the defiles of the Argonne, without being
pressed by the French. The retreat commenced on September 30, and on October 7
the Allies had crossed the Meuse at Vilosnes. The weather throughout had been
terrible, but fortunately the French had remained inactive. The commissioners
and Dumouriez had great hopes of detaching Prussia from the Austrian alliance,
and had secretly promised not to attack the Prussians till they reached Verdun.
It was not till October 5 that Kellermann was allowed to take up the pursuit
with
25,000 men, while Dillon was told to press on
through Les Islettes after Hohenlohe-Kirchberg’s Austrians. Brunswick had
originally intended to hold the line of the Meuse, but on October 8 he heard
that a column from the French Army of the Rhine had reached Speier and was
threatening his retreat. Accordingly he was glad to enter into negotiations
with Kellermann, whereby operations were virtually suspended. On October 14 the
Prussians evacuated Verdun, and on the 22nd Longwy, and recrossed the frontier
with 10,000 effectives, and 20,000 sick out of the force of 42,000 which had
entered France two months before.
Dumouriez has
been very severely criticised for his share in these
operations.
Military opinion under tbe influence of Jomini holds that he ought to have
attacked the Prussians during their retreat in the defiles of the Argonne; that
he could easily have annihilated them, owing to the number of the sick and
their lack of moral, and that such a blow would have automatically cleared the
Austrians out of the Netherlands and ended the war. But we must remember that
Dumouriez never really grasped the terrible condition of the Prussian army;
that his own force could scarcely be relied on; and that his one desire was to
clear France of the invaders and to do so without risking the prestige of his
raw and ill-disciplined army. Moreover Dumouriez’ negotiations undoubtedly led
up to the final dissolution of the Austro-Prussian alliance at the Treaty of
Basel in February, 1795.
At the
commencement of August, 1792, the Army of the Rhine was composed of about
24,000 men, of whom two-thirds were volunteers. It was holding a long line from
opposite Basel to Landau, where it picked up connexion with the outposts of the
Army of the Centre. The commander-in-chief was Biron, an old soldier, with
plenty of military experience and of tried courage, but fatally lacking in
determination. In this quarter there was no immediate danger. The small German
States remained neutral. In the towns the doctrine of the Rights of Man was
regarded as the advent of the Millennium; but in the country districts it was
not understood. The only States which were really hostile to the French were the
ecclesiastical principalities of Cologne, Trier, and Mainz; but these States
were not formidable. Still Biron had a very hard task to perform. As little
danger was expected, his command was neglected: the fortresses were on the
whole well equipped, but otherwise his army was starved, and merely regarded as
a training school for the volunteers. His staff, always miserably small, was
constantly being reduced and changed by calls made upon it by the Armies of the
Centre and the North. When Kellermann was hastily summoned to take command of
Luckner’s corps at Metz, Lieutenant- General Custine became Biron’s chief
adviser. Custine had seen service in America; he was convinced that he was a
sort of Admirable Crichton, financier, orator, diplomat, and general, while in
fact he was only a dashing cavalry officer with an excellent physique and an
extraordinary appetite for work. On September 19 he was given command of a new
corps called the Armv of the Vosges, formed out of the divisions which were
encamped round Weissenburg.
The object of
this redistribution was to enable the French to make a diversion in Brunswick’s
rear. Dumouriez strongly advocated an attempt to cut the Prussian
communications at Verdun; but Biron settled that Custine should make a raid on
Speier, which was practically the base of the Austrian forces, and only 18
miles from the French fortress of Landau. On September 30, with practically no
opposition, Custine took Speier, and on October 5 detachments of his army
occupied
Worms and
secured the crossing of the Rhine by seizing Philippsburg, The consternation in
Germany was widespread. Baden, Mainz, and Hesse-Darmstadt were in convulsions
of terror, and the Empire resolved to call out its troops. Even Custine’s hasty
evacuation of Speier and Worms on October 10, on the reported approach of an
Austrian column, did not undeceive the Germans. On October 12 Custine heard for
the first time of the check of the Prussians in the Argonne. He at once
reoccupied Speier and Worms. He had already learned that the important fortress
of Mainz was ill-defended, and that there were divisions among the
inhabitants: and a strong French party in the town composed of philosophers and
so-called Liberals had made overtures to him. Accordingly he appeared before
the fortress on October 19, and had the satisfaction of receiving its surrender
on the 21st. If he had been a wise man Custine would now have pushed on down
the Rhine, seized Coblenz, and seriously menaced the retreating Prussians. But
he had conceived the idea of invading Germany* although he had only had 13,000
men with him at Mainz. Frankfort capitulated to a small column under Houchard,
and the French success seemed complete. But, in spite of the acclamations of
certain sections of the people, the mass of the Germans had but little love for
the new French ideas; while Custine’s heavy exactions, which had the one merit
that they fell on rich and poor alike, soon caused the French to be loathed
throughout the captured districts. The Army of the Rhine did much to disillusion
the Germans of those grandiose ideas of French liberty and the Rights of Man
which the admirers of the Revolution had striven to inculcate.
Meanwhile on
October 24 the Prussians heard at Luxemburg of the fall of Mainz. Accordingly
Brunswick at once ordered the army to fall back to secure its retreat. On the
25th the advanced guard reached Coblenz; once there, the Prussians were fairly
secure. Good strategy now demanded that, after making sure of the bridge-heads
at Coblenz and Ehrenbreitstein, the Prussians should have moved up the left
bank of the Rhine and threatened Custine’s position by occupying Bingen. But
disease had so shattered his forces that Brunswick was forced to cross the
river at Coblenz, and put his army into hospital at Montabaur, By the middle of
November the Allies were once again ready to take the field; and Custine, who
had been reinforced by 15,000 men drawn from the garrisons of Alsace, was at
last given an opportunity of showing his generalship. The French commander was
very short of cavalry ; his troops were mainly composed of volunteers; he had
also to find garrisons for Mainz, Frankfort, Worms, Oppenheim, Bingen, and
Kreuznach. He ought accordingly to have evacuated the right bank of the Rhine;
instead of which he took up a defensive position behind the Nidda. This
position did not really cover Frankfort, and the Prussians had simply to march
round his flank to seize the town, which was weakly garrisoned and surrendered
on December 2. Custine thereon fell back on Mainz.
On January
1,1793, new life was given to the French army by the arrival of three
commissioners from the Convention, Rewbell, Merlin of Thionville, and
Haussmann. The Army of the Rhine was now 45,000 strong, composed of 22,000
troops concentrated at Mainz, and 23,000 divided along a line,
Oppenheim—Speier—Kreuznach. Meanwhile the Allies were also greatly encouraged;
Coburg was making his presence felt in the Netherlands; and a French expedition
under Beurnonville had been repulsed near Trier on December 17 by a small force
of Austrians. But, instead of occupying Bingen and thus threatening the French
retreat, Brunswick determined to try to envelope Custine. Kalkreuth was to work
round by the Moselle, and Wurmser was to operate from Mannheim. It was not till
March 21 that the Prussians actually made themselves felt on the French left,
and crossed the Rhine at Bacharach, while on March 26 the French right was also
defeated. Custine thereon determined to fall back. After burning his stores he
evacuated Worms and Speier, and arrived at Landau on April 1. The attempted
invasion of the Electorates had undoubtedly proved a failure; and Custine’s
system of requisitions had entirely shattered the growing French party among
the Rhine States.
During the
Valmy campaign the French force watching the frontier in the Low Countries had
been reduced to some 9000 men. But the Austrians under the Duke of Saxe-Teschen
failed in their only venture, the siege of Lille. On October 5 Dumouriez handed
over the pursuit of the Prussians to Kellermann, and proceeded to Paris to
renew his arrangements for the invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, which he
had been compelled to abandon at the commencement of September. Both Dumouriez
and the Ministers of the Convention were of opinion that Prussia was on the eve
of abandoning Austria, and they thought that the seizure of the Netherlands
would be received with enthusiasm by France as the completion of the old ideal
of the “ natural boundaries.” The Provinces themselves seemed to desire nothing
better than the substitution of French for Austrian rule. In all the Provinces
there was a bitter anti-Austrian party which owed its origin to the
ill-directed attempts of Joseph II to centralise and unify his dominions. This
party was twofold. One section, the Statists, led by van der Noot, desired to
retain the Catholic religion and all the ancient liberties and anomalies of the
various Provinces: the other section, the Republican party, called Vonckists,
was full of enthusiasm for the ideas of the Rights of Man, and above all things
desired a revolution on the lines of that of France. The French Government was
quite aware of the strong anti-Austrian feeling in the Netherlands, but it did
not grasp the fact that above all things, above liberty, glory, and the rights
of man, the people of these Provinces loved their old institutions.
On October 12
Dumouriez, who for the moment had captivated the Jacobin party and was strong
in the support of Danton, carried the
Assembly with
him in his plans for the invasion of Belgium. Tour columns were ordered to
proceed to the Belgian frontier. The centre or main column—Dumouriez’ Army of
the Argonne^—was to concentrate at Valenciennes; its duty was to seize MonS.
Meanwhile a column on the right under Valence—known as the Army of the
Ardennes—based on Givet, was, with the aid of a column under d’Harville from
Maubeuge, to distract attention by moving on Namur. The fourth column, on the
left, under Labourdonnaye, composed of volunteers from the camp of Chalons, was
to feint northwards and if possible seize Tournai, Courtrai, and Ghent. To
oppose these four corps, the Austrians under Saxe- Teschen numbered in all
25,000. But individually the Austrian troops were superior to the French, and
they had a great advantage in their magnificent cavaliy. The French forces
were largely composed of volunteers, who had more zeal than experience; but;
worst of all, the French Commissariat and Ordnance Department completely broke
down. This was the fault of the new War Minister, Pache. Pache was a good
subaltern, a hard worker, but a man of mediocre ability and extremely greedy of
power, and he desired to turn the War Office into a Jacobin Committee. He hated
Dumouriez, and dismissed everybody who was known as one of Dumouriez’ men. On
November 5 Pache instituted a new board known as the Dvrectoire des Achats,
composed of the Ministers of War, the Navy, and the Interior; this board was to
have sole control of purchasing supplies of all sorts. When it came into
operation on January 1, 1793, it inaugurated its rule by a series of frauds and
monopolies which exceeded anything heard of under the old regime. Meanwhile,
the Commissariat Department was thrown completely out of gear; for Pache
dismissed from his post as Commissary-General Doumerc, who had performed
wonders in the way of organisation and forwarding of supplies during the Valmy
campaign. Later in November he arrested Malus, Dumouriez’ commissariat
Staff-officer.
Thus
handicapped, Dumouriez started his campaign by issuing proclamations to the
Belgians, narrating the oppression of the Austrians and the good intentions of
the French. Estimating his troops at their true worth, he saw that his only
chance was to avoid a war of sieges and to trust to a rapid forward movement.
Accordingly he advanced against Saxe-Teschen, who had weakened his force by
attempting to hold the line of Namur— Charleroi—Mons-r-Menin. The Austrians,
13,200 strong, occupied a strong position on the hills near Jemappes, and thus
covered Mons from the north. Dumouriez, reinforced by d’Harville, determined to
force the Austrians from this position on November 6. His plan was to make an
attack all along the line, but especially to attempt to pierce the Austrian
left between Jemappes and Cuesmes. D’Harville was to act with a detached force
on the extreme right, and to try and push round Mons and thus to intercept the
Austrian retreat. There was great unsteadiness, in all the French columns; and
the success
of the attack
was mainly due to the fact that the right column near Cuesmes found some boats
and was thus enabled to cross the Trouille and appear on the Austrian rear. Up
to this time the Austrians had fought well and their cavalry had been used with
great effect, but now they hurriedly evacuated their position. The Austrian commander
did not attempt to hold Mons, but fell back on Brussels. The retreat was not
interfered with, as d’Harville lacked nerve, while Dumouriez’ force was too
tired and disorganised to take up the pursuit. The Austrians in this battle
lost 4000 killed, wounded, and deserters, out of a total of 13,200. The French
success was entirely due to their overwhelming numbers and the energy and
courage displayed by Dumouriez, Thouvenot, the Due de Chartres, and other
general officers. The old battalions of the regular army fought well, and three
battalions of volunteers of 1791 showed considerable pluck and pertinacity. The
artillery, which outweighed the Austrian by 100 guns to 50, was used with great
dexterity; but the volunteers again and again refused to advance to the attack,
and, when they had been induced to do so, broke at the first sign of
resistance.
The victory
of Jemappes dazzled the whole French nation; the shortcomings of the
volunteers, Dumouriez’ mistakes in strategy and tactics, all were forgotten in
the outburst of enthusiasm which greeted the first real victory of the
Republican arms in the field. Europe also was thunderstruck by the amazing
vitality of France. In the Netherlands the immediate effects of the battle
were far-reaching. Mons threw open its gates to Dumouriez on November 7. On
November 8 the Austrian government hurriedly fled from Brussels, and
Saxe-Teschen with the main Austrian force fell back towards Liege. On the 14th
Dumouriez entered Brussels, where the French were enthusiastically received.
The pursuit was vigorously continued; and by November 28 the Austrians had
evacuated the Netherlands, and the French held Liege. Meanwhile Dumouriez had
despatched columns in all directions. Ypres, Fumes, Nieuport, and Bruges,
surrendered to one column; Tournai, Ghent, and Antwerp, to another; Charleroi
and Namur to a third. Dumouriez has been blamed for not concentrating his
forces and attempting to surround and annihilate the main Austrian army under
Clerfayt; but his reason was that he had no supplies. Pache had upset all his
commissariat arrangements. By December 13 Dumouriez’ advance guard had reached
Cleves; but Beumonville, on December 24, was repulsed in his operations along
the Moselle; and Custine at the end of December was falling back before the
Prussians. It was time therefore for Dumouriez’ army to halt, for it was in a
very bad way. The commissariat practically did not exist; but, worst of all,
the defects of the volunteer regulations of 1791 were being felt to the full,
and the army in the Netherlands, which at the end of October had numbered some
100,000, was at the end of December reduced to 45,000.
In Belgium
itself trouble was now brewing.! The people of the Netherlands had been
delighted to be freed from the Austrians; but they had no love of republican
institutions, and they desired their old provincial administration. Moreover,
the French soldiers were showing their hereditary plundering instincts and
their lack of discipline; while the heavy and unexpected exactions, which had
to be enforced owing to the failure of the commissariat, increased the friction
between the civilian population and the army. But the finishing touch came from
Paris, where the Assembly on December 15, at the instigation of Cambon, passed
a decree that in all territories occupied by French troops the new French
Revolutionary institutions should be established. The Belgian people were
furious when they understood the effect of this decree. The result was that
Statist delegates were everywhere elected for the Convention which was to
settle the government of the country. But the French paid no heed to the
desires of the people. On January 26, 1793, Danton incorporated the Belgian
troops in the French army; and after January 31 the only government in the country
was that of the French generals, assisted by national Commissioners from Paris,
who proceeded to use the army to force the Belgians to vote for incorporation.
Such was the
state of affairs in Belgium when on February 1 France declared war on England and
Holland, and followed it up in March by hurling her ultimatum at Spain. The
propagandist decrees had entirely altered the aspect of European politics, and
the war against France now became a matter of principle. Every government in
Europe was directly threatened; no crown for the future was safe. Moreover, the
execution of Louis on January 21 added to the general alarm. England saw her
naval position threatened by the occupation of AntWerp and the opening of the
Scheldt; while the Dutch Republic knew that the French government, so early as
December, 1792, had meditated an invasion of her territories. To meet the
situation, the Committee of General Defence decided that the French forces on
the frontier were to be grouped as follows. The Army of Belgium, 62,000 strong,
was to be directed against Holland and Cleves; the Army of the Moselle, 62,000,
was to lay siege to Coblenz; the Army of the Rhine, 62,000, was to commence
operations in Swabia; while a reserve of 25,000 was to be concentrated at
CMlons. The total armed force of France was to be 502,800 men, of whom 53,000
were cavalry and 20,000 artillery. Meanwhile, during January, the War Office
was reorganised. This reorganisation had the advantage of increasing the
responsibility of the heads of the departments, and at the same time of giving
the War Minister expert advisers, while leaving him responsible for the whole
of the administration. But it tended to increase friction between departments
and to add to departmental jealousies.
Dumouriez’
original plan for the invasion of Holland was that he
himself
should take Maestricht, while Miranda laid siege to Venloo; and that the two
armies should then concentrate and march on Nymegen, the key of Holland. But
the Prussians were too quick for him, and on February 9 they managed to throw a
body of troops into Maestricht. Dumouriez therefore determined that Miranda
should lay siege to Maestricht, while he himself, masking the fortresses west
of the Rhine, should cross the sea at Mondyck and land at Dordrecht, and thus
turn all the eastern defences of Holland and push straight on to Amsterdam
before the Dutch had time to mobilise. The arrangements of this campaign were
considerably facilitated by the fact that once ag^> he had Malus as
Commissary-General-in-Chief in Belgium, while men of his own training like
Thouvenot were on his staff. On February 16 the expeditionary force, composed
of 1000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry (all but three battalions being volunteers),
and 40 guns, crossed the frontier. On February 26 Breda capitulated, and on
March 1 Gertruydenberg.
On the whole
the Netherlander south of the Rhine were glad to receive the French. But on
March 2 disasters began. Miranda, who with 23,000 men was still lying before
Maestricht, heard that the Austrians had crossed the Roer and were pressing
forward. Austria had now a new directing hand, as Count Philip Cobenzl had been
succeeded as foreign Minister by Thugut. Thugut’s hostility to France had begun
when he was Minister at Constantinople; and it was increased by his horror at
recent events. The allied generals held a conference at Frankfort early in
February, 1793, when it was decided that the new Austrian Commander, Prince
Frederick of Saxe- Coburg-Saalfeld, should at once proceed with 40,000 men to
the relief of Maestricht. After relieving Maestricht, he was to send a large
detachment to aid Brunswick who was to besiege Mainz; while Wurmser with
another Austrian army should cross the Rhine between Basel and Mannheim, and
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg should guard Trier and Luxemburg. On March 1 Coburg, with
40,000 Austrians, crossed the Roer, and surprised the French advanced guard
which was scattered in cantonments behind that river. The French army had no
horses for its transport; clothing and supplies were deficient; and most of the
corps were full of raw recruits. In the first action on March 1 the French lost
16 guns, 300 prisoners, and 2000 killed and wounded, while the Austrians’ loss
was some 40. This was entirely due to the good handling of the Austrian
cavalry, and it had the effect of greatly dispiriting the raw French levies. On
March 3 Miranda raised the siege of Maestricht and retreated by the roads
leading to Diest and Louvain. On March 5 he effected a junction with Valence at
Saint-Trond; and took up a defensive position. His right was at Malines, his
centre at Louvain, and his left behind the Dyle.
Coburg should
have pushed on at once and taken advantage of the evident demoralisation of the
enemy. His inaction gave the Frencl a chance. On March 8 the Convention
declared the country in danger
and called
for fresh volunteers, and at the same time recalled Dumouriez from Holland.
Dumouriez left his expeditionary force under du Flers in Holland, hoping, after
he himself had defeated the Austrians, to return and carry out his plan of
invasion. But, when Dumouriez left, the expeditionary force quickly became
demoralised. Meanwhile Holland was arming and England preparing to ship troops
and guns. Consequently on March 15 du Flers fell back behind the Scheldt.
The state of
affairs in Belgium came as a complete surprise to Dumouriez ; the French army
was disorganised and panic-stricken, and the population of Belgium on the verge
of revolt. Ou his arrival at Brussels on March 10 Dumouriez at once issued
three proclamations which greatly restored public confidence. First he passed a
severe censure on the national Commissioners; then he invited the magistrates
to lay their complaints before him; and lastly he dissolved all the Jacobin
clubs. He then proceeded on March 11 to Louvain; and, after taking up his
command there, he wrote on March 12 his famous letter to the Convention,
justifying his conduct by pointing out that the situation in Belgium arose
owing to the avarice and injustice of the national Commissioners. Meanwhile
the soldiers were delighted at the return of their old chief. Dumouriez set to
work to restore discipline. His first object was to send away from his camp
those battalions which were completely untrustworthy. He then proceeded to call
up the best battalions from Brussels to take their place. Dumouriez had no idea
of assuming a passive defence; he decided to take the initiative. He thought
that the country, intersected as it was by streams and ditches, was not
favourable to the Austrian cavalry; and he knew that at the moment Coburg had
weakened himself by sending detachments to Beaulieu at Luxemburg and
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg at Trier. Moreover he hoped to fight a successful
engagement before the Dutch and Hanoverian troops could cross to the assistance
of their allies. But Coburg had awakened to the fact that Dumouriez was doing
wonders, and that France was making desperate efforts to reinforce him. He
also decided to take the initiative and not to await his allies. On March 16
the Austrians attempted to get round the French right at Tirlemont, but were
driven back. Dumouriez spent the 17th in reconnoitring. The Austrians who had
withdrawn to the right bank of the Little Geete occupied the line of hills
running from Racour to Leau.
Dumouriez’
plan was to use his left as a pivot and swing round his whole line on the
Austrian left. The battle commenced at 7 a.m. on the morning of March 18. The
Austrians were at first surprised by the French right. But unfortunately for
the French their right did not extend far enough to outflank the Austrians
posted in Landen; hence the French right attack developed into a frontal attack
on Overwinden which lasted all day. At nightfall the Austrians under Clerfayt
had only just succeeded in driving the French back. In the centre Neerwinden
was
taken and lost and taken again; but the French could not make good their hold
on it, since it was commanded by Coburg’s batteries on the hill above. When
night fell, Neerwinden was still in the hands of the Austrians. The French
right and centre had consequently received a severe check; but on the left
matters had gone still worse. At first the French made good the crossing; but
the Austrians, by a series of successful cavalry charges, sent the volunteers
flying. By nightfall the whole of the French left was in flight behind the
Little Geete. On the morning of the 19th panic had begun to spread; so on that
evening Dumouriez fell back on Cumptich. Coburg, who had only lost 3000 in the
action, did not pursue Dumouriez, and once again threw away a golden
opportunity.
Though the
loss of the battle of Neerwinden was due in a great part to Miranda and the
volunteers, Dumouriez also made glaring mistakes. He had failed to concentrate
his forces properly; he had not called in d’Harville from Namur, or the Army of
Holland; and he had thus thrown away the opportunity of collecting 70,000
troops and providing himself with a force nearly double that of his enemy. On
March 23 negotiations were opened between Coburg and Dumouriez, and an
agreement was made whereby Coburg, who had not grasped the utter demoralisation
of the French, promised not to attack: while the French on their side agreed to
evacuate Brussels, which they did on March 24, to the great delight of the
populace.
So early as
March 12 Dumouriez had notified his discontent to the Convention. His hatred of
the Republic dated back to his quarrels with Pache, Cambon, Marat, and the
Commissioners in Belgium. At one moment he had dreamed of restoring the
Bourbons after a successful campaign against Austria; later he had hoped to
conquer Belgium and Holland and mould them into a Republic, of which he should
be dictator, and with whose armies he might return and restore the monarchy. He
now saw that his defeat at Neerwinden meant the certain victory of his enemies,
the Jacobins; and he determined now to make an arrangement with the Austrians
whereby he might, either by their aid or without it, declare war on the
Jacobins of Paris. Meanwhile, on March 25, Mack arrived from the Austrian
headquarters. It was arranged, firstly, that the French troops should be
allowed peaceably to evacuate Holland; and secondly, that Dumouriez should
withdraw all French troops across the frontier of the Netherlands by March 30.
Accordingly on March 31 the French troops were all on their own side of the
frontier. There was great excitement at Paris. Immediately after Neerwinden the
Comite de Defense Generale had been reconstructed and its membership in- .
creased to twenty-five. Every day brought fresh news of Dumouriez’ intrigues
with the Austrians. Hence on March 30 the Committee determined to despatch a
commission of five, together with Beumonville, the War Minister, to proceed to
the front and make enquiries on the
spot. When
this commission arrived at St-Amand late on the evening of April 1 Dumouriez
promptly handed the members over to the Austrian outposts. He spent the next
four days in attempting to get the whole army to join him and go over to the
Austrians, and also in making arrangements to surrender Douai. Such was his
popularity with the old soldiers of Valmy and Jemappes that the mass of the
regular infantry and cavalry were ready to obey his orders. The artillery,
however, and the volunteers, were too deeply saturated with Republican ideas to
follow Dumouriez against the Jacobin government of France. This was the
death-blow to Dumouriez’ schemes; for on hearing of the decision of the
artillery the line declared that it would never fight its brothers. Consequently
he could only take over to the Austrians on April 5 a handful of hussars and
his own staff, comprising three Lieutenant-Generals, Valence, Marasse, and
Chartres, eight Major-Generals, one Colonel, and two Commissioners of War.
Thus, like Lafayette, Dumouriez put his own honour before that of his country. But
he had already done much for France. In diplomacy he had foreshadowed the
policy which resulted in the Treaty of Basel; as a general he had understood
how best in times of revolution to play upon the sentiment of the French
soldier and make every use of the national traits of character; while as a
strategist he was the forerunner of Napoleon in the art of offensive warfare.
During the
early part of the year 1793 the French arms had been as ursuccessful in the
Rhine Valley as in the Netherlands; while the French administration had become
equally unpopular in both. So early as December 18 Custine had declared Mainz
to be in a state of siege; and on December 31 all hopes of a native
administration disappeared on the arrival of the three Deputies on mission from
the Convention, Merlin of Thionville, Haussmann, and Rewbell. By the end of
January, 1793, Mainz and the surrounding districts on the left bank of the
Rhine had passed from a state of indifference, or sympathetic curiosity, to one
of active hatred and hostility to the French. In spite of this on February 14
the Convention in Paris proclaimed the annexation of Mainz to France. Later in
February elections for a Rhenish National Assembly were carried on under the
supervision of the military authorities, with the result that on March 21 the
Rhenish Convention was forced at the point of the bayonet to vote for
annexation to France. Such was the state of affairs when, as we have seen, on
March 27 Custine had to abandon his attempt to cover Mainz and to fall back on
Landau. Custine entrusted the defence of Mainz to d’Oyse, an engineer officer
who had served in America. The garrison of Mainz was composed of 23,000 troops.
This force was not excessive, considering that many of the volunteers were
married men and refused to take any risks, and further that the populace during
the greater part of the siege had to be kept severely under military control.
Mainz itself was well provisioned with ammunition,
stores, and
food supplies; and it was expected to be able to hold out till the middle of
September.
The actual
investment did not take place till April 14; and it was not till June 5 that
the Prussians opened their heavy batteries on Castel and the French advanced
posts on the islands. By July 17 the bombardment had been so severe that
d’Oys^ called a council of war to consider the situation. At this council the
officer commanding the engineers clearly told hi™ that it was impossible to
make headway against the bombardment. The magazines were either exploded or
empty. Moreover, the moral of the troops was quickly deteriorating; they were
no longer anxious to take part in sorties. D’Oys<* still desired to hold
out; but his hand was forced by the three representatives, who, it is true, had
done good work during the siege, but who now thought that the only way to save
themselves from a long imprisonment in Germany was to capitulate on favourable
terms. Negotiations were accordingly opened on July 18, and on July 23 the
Prussian terms were accepted. The French garrison was to march out with the
honours of war on condition of not serving against the Allies for one year;
while Mainz with all its cannon and equipment was to fall a prize to the
Prussians. Undoubtedly Mainz ought to have held out for at least another month.
Accordingly the Convention refused to accept the terms of the surrender, and
ordered all the officers of the headquarter’s staff of the Mainz garrison to
proceed to Paris for trial. The Convention held such an example to be necessary
at the moment when the fortresses on the north-east frontier of France were
being invested, and the French troops in the south were retreating before the
Spaniards on Perpignan and Bayonne.
When Custine
fell back on Landau at the end of March he was in deep dejection; the Austrian and
Prussian forces were overwhelming in numbers, and his own army was
disorganised; it seemed as if he would have to evacuate the whole of Alsace.
But fortunately for him the Austrians and Prussians did not pursue. The shadow
of the impending partition of Poland and of the Treaty of St Petersburg lay
between them, and prevented them from concentrating their efforts against the
French. During April the main Austrian force under Wurmser lay watching Landau;
the Prussians under Brunswick had their headquarters at Edenkoben, while an
Austrian corps under Hohenlohe-Kirchberg lay overawing Zweibriicken. Mainz was
thus securely covered. In the middle of May Custine was transferred from the
command of the combined Army of the Rhine and the Moselle to that of the Army
of the North and the Ardennes. But before relinquishing his command he had
repaired the fortifications on the lines of Weissenburg, and strengthened the
important fortress of Bitsch, which commanded the main pass across the Vosges.
He had also made sure of the subsidiary passes, so that his communications with
the Army of the Moselle were secured.
During the
month of June the strength of the French armies
424 Houchard.—Beauharnais.—Bouchotte. [1793
increased; on
June 27, when the generals held a conference, the Army of the Moselle under
Houchard was 40,000 strong, and that of the Rhine under Beauharnais 60,000
strong. But, though their numbers were great, both armies were untrustworthy,
as they were full of raw, untrained troops; and no move was made till the
middle of July. By this time Wurmser blocked the advance of the Army of the
Rhine, lying between the mountains and the river at Edenkoben; while Brunswick
with
18,000 men lay at Kaiserslautern, covering the
passes there and ready, if necessary, to move to Kreuznach. Beauharnais, in the
middle of July, crossed the Queis, and, moving slowly forward in touch with the
Army of the Moselle, attacked Wurmser on July 19, and forced him on the night
of the 24th to evacuate Edenkoben, and thus leave the road open to Neustadt,
whereby the communications between the Austrians and the Prussians were for the
moment cut. Meanwhile Houchard had started on July 16 from Saarbriicken; but
his advance had been very slow. When the news of the capitulation of Mainz was
received, both the French armies halted, and then fell back. At this moment the
position of the French in Alsace was seriously compromised. Houchard was
withdrawn to succeed Custine in the command of the Army of the North ; and
30,000 men were drafted from the Armies of the Rhine and the Moselle to
reinforce the Army of the North. On August 10 came the decree of the Convention
whereby all officers of noble birth were cashiered, with the result that the
staffs of the armies had to be entirely reorganised.
This decree
was the work of the War Minister Bouchotte, who had succeeded Beumonville in
the beginning of April. Bouchotte was above all things a Jacobin; his principal
ally was Vincent; he filled all places in the War Office with Jacobins. But his
positive work must not be forgotten, and the difficulties of his position must
be appreciated. He had five great armies to provide for. He was, moreover,
handicapped by the fact that he lacked prestige, and had not sufficient
authority to carry out his orders. He was simply the servant of the Committee
of Public Safety, from which he had to take all his orders. The Committee kept
an actual control over the various generals by means of its Commissioners, or
Representatives on Mission. The powers of these Commissioners were very large;
they could choose what agents they pleased; they could seize for the public
service any goods or chattels which they considered necessary; they had power
if necessary to supersede the general in command of the troops; and all
administrative and municipal bodies had to obey them. As might be expected, the
Commissioners, who knew little of war, made many mistakes; but they made up
for this by their courage, zeal, and patriotism. Moreover, they did much during
the summer of 1793 to reconcile the regulars and the volunteers. They insisted
on the abandonment of the old white uniform of the regulars, and the adoption
by all troops of the new Republican
1793] Dissensions between Austrian and Prussian
armies. 425
blue
uniforms. During the constant changes of generals and staff officers the
Commissioners supplied the only continuity of ideas and aims in the various
armies, and undoubtedly gave great assistance to those military authorities who
were hastily placed in commands which were absolutely new to them.
After the
French retreat on Weissenburg Wurmser proposed to Brunswick that he should help
him to envelope that position, while Hohenlohe threatened Bitsch, and that,
after crushing the French army, the combined Austrian and Prussian armies should
advance on Strassburg. But Brunswick refused. Now that Mainz had fallen,
Lucchesini, the Prussian Foreign Minister, wanted peace and an opportunity to
study the Polish problem. Further, it had become evident that the Austrian plan
was to overrun Alsace with a view to annexing it permanently to the Austrian
dominions. The Army of the Moselle lay at Brunswick’s mercy, but he made no
attempt to annihilate it. Meanwhile Wurmser, a dashing officer—in spite of his
sixty-nine years—decided to push on after the Army of the Rhine. By August 24
he had driven the French back from their advanced position in the Bienwald on
to the lines of Weissenburg. The Commissioners thereon deprived Beauharnais of
his command. Beauharnais was succeeded by Landremont, who in turn was succeeded
by Carlens; but both of these generals were mere nonentities, and the real
command lay in the hands of the Commissioners. The French were very strongly
posted along the lines of Weissenburg; their right being untumable, lying as it
did on Lauterburg and the Rhine, while their left rested on Weissenburg and the
mountains. It was quite evident that, without concerted action with the
Prussians, Wurmser with 30,000 Austrians would be unable to dislodge the Army
of the Rhine, which was about 35,000 strong. It was not till October that
Wurmser could get a promise of help from the Prussians. The plan of the Allies
was that Wurmser should force the lines of Weissenburg, while Brunswick should
march down from Zweibriicken and occupy Bitsch and Worth. On October 13, in
spite of faulty arrangements, Wurmser managed to penetrate the French lines.
Meanwhile the Prussians had occupied Bitsch. The French fell back in great
disorder; and by October 18 they had taken up a position under the guns of
Strassburg. Fortunately for the French neither the Prussians nor the Austrians
interfered with this retreat, although the Allies must have known that the
French army had practically disbanded to plunder, and that it was incapable of
making any sort of resistance. Wurmser thought he had already borne too much of
the fighting; while Brunswick considered that his orders forbade him to go
further south than Worth. Accordingly, although the French armies were now
completely separated, Brunswick did not crush the Army of the Moselle, which
was retreating behind the Saar; while Wurmser, instead of boldly attacking the
French in front of Strassburg, contented himself with laying what
he considered
would be the foundation of the new Austrian regime in Alsace. The result was that
the inhabitants of Alsace forgot their dislike of the French in their hatred of
the invaders; while the Prussians, seeing through the Austrian intentions,
refused to move forward to Saveme and help Wurmser in his attempt to drive the
Army of the Rhine into Tapper Alsace. Thus once again the French had been saved
by the jealousies arising out of the different political aims of the Allies.
So far during
the year 1793 the French had met with a succession of disasters. But fortune
was now about to turn. The first Committee of Public Safety had made every
effort to retrieve the disasters following on the desertion of Dumouriez; but,
though it contained many able men, none of them had shown any great aptitude
for military affairs. The second Committee of Public Safely which came into
being on July 10 had also little military knowledge. However on August 14 it
added to its members two special military members; these were two engineer
officers, Prieur of the Cote d’Or, who was to be responsible for providing the material
for war, and Carnot, who was to have complete authority over the personnel of
the army. The first problem that the new members had to face was how to make
the most of the levee en masse. On August 16 the Convention had decreed that
the French people should rise to a man to defend their independence. This
decree was followed on August 23 by a more emphatic order, which called out all
men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five for service at the front,
while the aged and infirm were to be employed, if necessary, in transport,
garrison, and hospital work at home. The municipal authorities had raised their
quotas by drafting to the army all the maimed, the blind, and the halt, since
everybody who could afford to do so had been allowed to purchase a substitute.
Consequently the reinforcements which arrived at the frontier in August and
September, if they actually did arrive, were generally worse than useless.
Carnot, however, by October had compelled the local authorities to enforce his
amendments to the law. Moreover, instead of forming fresh corps, he drafted the
men who were requisitioned into the existing padres. One of his next duties was
to take vigorous measures to reinforce discipline in the Army of the Rhine. On
October 17 two Commissioners, Saint-Just and Le Bas, were despatched to
Strassburg to report on the failure of the army to hold the lines of
Weissenburg and to punish all abuses without pity.
The
Commissioners found plenty of work to do. It was quite evident that the Army of
the Rhine had suffered defeat firstly for lack of guidance, secondly for lack
of discipline. They proceeded at once to rectify the first evil; they took the
chief command out of the hands of the incompetent Carlens and sent for
Pichegru. Pichegru was the first of the new race of young commanders who owed
their position entirely to the Revolution. He had commenced his military career
in 1789 by enlisting as a private in the artillery. In 1792 he had received his
commission,
and late in that year became a colonel of volunteers. He had never yet seen a
shot fired; but he had had the good fortune to impress Bouchotte, and had
already commanded a corps on the Upper Rhine. His great merit was his power of
penetration; he also possessed a powerful personality which inspired the
soldiers. Though he had no originality, he had that instinctive knowledge which
could distinguish a good from a bad plan. But above all he could choose his men
and make them work for him. The Commissioners, aided by Pichegru, proceeded to
establish a military tribunal for the Army of the Rhine. This tribunal had
power to deal summarily with all cases sent before it, and at once began to
make examples of officers and private soldiers who either shirked their duties
or were at all insubordinate. The next task of the Commissioners was to
organise a proper system of requisition and to enforce the Law of the maximum.
Thus the army was soon fully provisioned and all excuse for plundering was
removed.
The
Commissioners with the Army of the Moselle, Lacoste and Baudot, tried to
imitate the reforms of Saint-Just and Le Bas but with little success. They were
mere fanatics and lacked the instinctive knowledge of what was necessary at
the moment. But salvation came to the Army of the Moselle in another way. At
the commencement of November Delauney was succeeded in his command by Hoche.
Lazare Hoche was the son of an old soldier. He was but 25 years old when he
took over the command of the Army of the Moselle; his early youth had been
spent as a groom in the royal stables; he had next served as a private in the
Gardes Franchises; during the Revolutionary wars he had distinguished himself
at Maastricht, Nieuport, and Dunkirk. He had been in turn the friend of Servan,
Marat, and Robespierre. Later he had attracted the attention of Carnot and owed
his new command to him. Unlike Pichegru he had actually seen service, but like
him he had practically had no training for high command; he had the additional
misfortune that he was naturally despised by his enemies.
Hoche spent
the first three weeks of November reorganising his army and restoring
discipline by impartially striking down all offenders of whatsoever rank.
Towards the end of November, thanks to reinforcements from the Army of the
Rhine, Hoche had 40,000 troops under his command. Accordingly he determined at
once to resume the offensive and make an attempt to relieve Landau. He ought
undoubtedly to have worked in conjunction with Pichegru and driven the Allies
back from Strassburg, by threatening their right in the direction of Worth and
Bitsch. But he was jealous of Pichegru and decided to try and relieve Landau by
way of Kaiserslautern. Operations commenced on November 17. The Prussians at
once evacuated Worth, and, quickly concentrating, fell back fighting on Kaiserslautern.
On November 28 the three days’ battle of Kaiserslautern began; the Prussians
held a strongly entrenched position with 20,000 men, while Hoche attacked
428
Kaiserslautern.—Relief of Landau.
[1793-4
them with
35,000 troops. The French infantry fought well and proved the value of Hoche’s
new discipline. But the enemy was too strongly posted; and Hoche, who had not
studied the ground, made his great effort against the Prussian right, which was
really the strongest part of the position. On the 30th Hoche fell back after
losing some 2000 men, while the Prussian loss was only 829. Meanwhile Pichegru,
in spite of Hoche’s jealousy, had determined to make use of this opportunity.
On November 18, with 33,000 troops, he had moved out and attacked Wurmser. The
Austrian right was now uncovered by the withdrawal of the Prussians.
Accordingly Wurmser fell back on Hagenau.
After Hoche’s
defeat at Kaiserslautern the Prussians continued to hold the three roads
leading to Landau by Kaiserslautern, Amweiler, and Dahme. Hoche therefore
determined to leave a force to contain the Prussians at the passes and to go
himself to help Pichegru with the remainder of the troops at his disposal. The
first thing to be done was to pick up communication with Pichegru. After a week’s
hard fighting on December 22 columns from the Annies of the Rhine and Moselle
drove the enemy out of Worth and effected a junction. Wurmser at once fell back
on the lines of Weissenburg. The jealousy between Hoche and Pichegru threatened
to neutralise all the advantages that had hitherto been gained. But on December
24 Lacoste and Baudot, the Commissioners with the Army of the Moselle,
appointed Hoche Commander-in-chief of the united Armies of the Rhine and the
Moselle. Wurmser was preparing to evacuate Weissenburg on December 26 when
Hoche attacked him with great fury. The result of this action was that by
December 27 the French were once again masters of the lines of Weissenburg;
while on December 30 Wurmser retreated across the Rhine at Philippsburg, and
Brunswick himself evacuated Worms and Oppenheim. Landau was relieved; and early
in January, 1794, the whole of the Palatinate was in the hands of the French.
Hoche was desirous of continuing his success; but the cold weather and lack of
provisions awoke the plundering spirit in his army. His quarrel with Pichegru
to a certain extent also paralysed his actions, so that he had to put his army
into cantonments for the rest of the winter.
In Flanders
during the year 1793 fortune varied very much as it did in the Rhine valley.
Dumouriez was succeeded by Dampierre, a bold and courageous executor of orders,
but no originator, and apt to lose his head. Immediately on taking over the
command Dampierre ordered the Army of the North to concentrate under the
fortresses of Valenciennes, Douai, and Lille. His task was no light one. Every
day the Austrians were being reinforced by Prussian, Hanoverian, English, and
Dutch contingents; while his army was utterly disorganised and dispirited. The
troops had lost all belief in their officers; nobody could tell who would be
the next to desert. The infantry of the line and the artillery only required a
little care and a tight hand; but the weakened cavalry
1793] Council at Antwerp.—Dampierre.—Lamarche.
429
regiments
were absolutely untrustworthy; while the volunteers were constantly drunk, and
the whole army was demoralised by the numbers of women who were in camp. Such
was the only army which stood between the Allies and Paris. But Coburg was no
Marlborough; he was now 56 years old, a quiet, modest soldier who never trusted
his own judgment. His right hand man was Colonel Mack; but Mack’s ideas of
strategy were not sound, as Ulm was to prove later, and he was hampered by the
tact that the Emperor distrusted him.
On April 8
the Allies held a council at Antwerp. Austria was represented by Mettemich and
Starhemberg; England by the Duke of York and Lord Auckland; Holland by the
Prince of Orange; Prussia by Count Keller. Coburg, Mack, and Valence also
attended. It was settled that Coburg should be commander-in-chief of the
Allies. But the council did not separate before the policy of the dismemberment
of France was openly announced. Lord Auckland, on behalf of England, declared
that his country had entered on the war with the intention of getting
compensation. Coburg and Mack attempted to show that any plan of dismemberment
would retard the progress of the campaign. Their objections were bona fide, but
it was only too well known what was the policy of the Emperor and Thugut, On
April 9 the Allies had moved forward and cut off Conde from Valenciennes.
Dampierre ought at once to have advanced from his camp at Bouchain, and
attacked the Austrian force which was round Conde, since it was divided in two
by the Scheldt. He missed his opportunity and simply moved to an entrenched
camp at Famars behind Valenciennes. When at last, on May 1, he did attack
Coburg the Austrians had been strongly reinforced by a Prussian corps.
Dampierre was killed in action on May 7. The Commissioners at once appointed.Lamarche,
who was sixty years of age, to succeed him; but Lamarche had no better success
than Dampierre and contented himself with further fortifying the camp of
Famars. Early in May two diversions were attempted; the one under Championnet
in the direction of Fumes was meant to threaten Ostend; the other under
Kilmaine in the direction of Namur ended in the barren victory of Arlon. But
the Allies, who had now been reinforced by Dutch and Hanoverian troops, could
afford to neglect such diversions, and on May 23 Coburg advanced against the
main French force, enveloped it, and forced it out of its position at Famars.
Thereupon Lamarche fell back on Bouchain, where he was succeeded by Custine.
Custine’s
first idea was to concentrate the Armies of the North, the Moselle, and the
Rhine, and to clear the Netherlands. But Bouchotte refused to give his consent
to such a bold measure. Consequently Custine, having nothing but the Army of
the North to work with, set himself to fortify Caesar’s camp with the intention
of reorganising his army there. He drew up strict orders both for officers and
men; he compelled all troops to wear their proper uniforms; he cashiered all
officers
absent without leave; and he insisted on steady drill for four horn's a day. He
decided, since it was impossible to recruit his army, to divide up the existing
force into battalions 450 strong. He also set himself to train men as cavalry
soldiers and to try to procure horses. He was so far successful that by July 18
he had 39,000 disciplined and organised troops under his command, of which
number 4800 were cavalry. His indiscretion brought about his fall; for,
although he publicly protested against the Girondists, yet in private he railed
against Pache, Marat, Danton, and Robespierre. He was constantly quarrelling
with Bouchotte. He fell foul of the Commissioners, Celliez and Dufrenne, and
even went so far as to imprison theim Consequently on July 10—the day on which
Conde fell—the Committee of Public Safety recalled Custine to Paris. Once there
the hatred of the Jacobins and the fall of Mainz and Valenciennes settled his
fate, and he was guillotined on August 28. Custine’s successor was Kilmaine, an
Irishman, a distinguished cavalry officer; but he could do no more to relieve
Valenciennes than Custine had done before him. Coburg now had 24,000 troops
round Valenciennes engaged in the siege, and a covering force of 20,000, while
he had
10,000 at his own headquarters. In July he was
further reinforced by 15,000 Hessians. On July 26 the town and fortress
surrendered. The fall of Mainz, Conde, and Valenciennes, came as a great blow
to the whole of France; but the lesson had a very salutary effect. The
Committee of Public Safety grasped two facts: first, that France must make a
more national effort; and secondly that the war must be carried on by experts. •
While France
was preparing to arise with renewed vigour from her ashes, the Allies were
courting their own doom. Austria at once claimed Conde and Valenciennes as her
own special possessions; she hinted also that she desired to extend her
frontier to the Somme and carry it up to Sedan. Thereupon the English, the
Prussians, and the Dutch, each expressed a desire to set about securing the
territories which they coveted. It was with difficulty that Coburg could induce
the Allies to promise to remain with him till he had carried out his design of
forcing the French from Caesar’s camp. Caesar’s camp was a strong position—the
north face covered by the Senne, the east1 by the Scheldt. The
Allies were in overwhelming strength; and, after feinting at both the north and
east sides Coburg had still enough troops to enable the Duke of York to turn
the rear of the camp by way of Cambrai. But the movements of the Allies were so
slow that on August 7 the French escaped behind the Scarpe, and entrenched
themselves at Biache between Arras and Douai. There Kilmaine was succeeded by
Houchard (August 9). Houchard was of foreign extraction and could speak but
little French. He first saw service as an officer in the Seven Years’ War; he
had later gained his laurels under Custine. He was no general, but a mere
leader of partisans, who owed his position to the fact that he was a protegi of
Bouchotte.
The position
he had to face was a serious one. His army had been driven aside and was too
weak to threaten the enemies’ communications. Consequently the road to Paris
was open, and Coburg’s cavalry could have arrived there in four days. Moreover
at this moment the English fleet held Toulon; Marseilles and Lyons had risen
against the government; and the war in the Vendee was assuming serious
proportions. But the greed of the Allies saved France. The English insisted on
laying siege to Dunkirk; at the same moment Frederick William ordered the
Prussian troops to move into Luxemburg.
By September
Carnot’s strategy was beginning to shape itself. The French armies were no
longer to be frittered away in detachments, but they were to be concentrated to
deal crushing blows. The Army of the North numbered quite 100,000 men; and a
subsidiary force, 30,000 strong, drawn mainly from the Army of the Moselle, was
gathered at Soissons to save Paris from a raid. By September 5 the force to
relieve Dunkirk had been got together and numbered 42,000 men. Carnot’s plan
had been that Houchard should seize Fumes and thus cut the enemy from their
base. But Houchard thought this too dangerous, and proposed to make a direct
attack on the Hanoverian covering force at Bergues and Hondschoote. Owing to
the swampy ground the force of Hanoverians under Marshal Freytag at Bergues was
not in direct communication with the Duke of York’s force at Rosendal.
Consequently, when the French heavy columns reached the Yser on September 6,
Freytag could only oppose them with some 10,000 troops. But Houchard’s
dispositions were so faulty and he kept so little touch between his different
columns that at the end of the day the French had to fall back behind the Yser.
On September 8 Walmoden, who had succeeded Freytag, gave battle to the French
at Hondschoote with a force of 9000 infantry. Houchard only brought half his
force into the field; but he so outnumbered the enemy that at nightfall he had
driven them out of Hondschoote with a loss of 2585 men out of their 9000. As he
did not advance, the Duke of York early on the morning of the 9th was enabled
to make a hasty retreat to Fumes, and Dunkirk was thus relieved. It had never
been in very great danger, as it had only been invested on one side, and the
English fleet had never attempted to cooperate with the army. Meanwhile on
September 11 Quesnoi had surrendered, and Coburg had proceeded to invest
Maubeuge. Houchard, in spite of his victory at Hondschoote, found himself
unable to utilise his success, and fell back on his camp at Arras, where on
September 28 he was succeeded in command of the Army of the North by Jourdan.
Jourdan had
served in America, but on his return had been obliged to give up his commission
owing to Segur’s decree against the roturiers. On the outbreak of the
revolutionary wars he had been chosen to command a battalion of volunteers.
The new commander’s task was to cover Paris and relieve Maubeuge. Maubeuge was
strongly invested. Coburg
had
surrounded the place with 25,000 men and maintained a covering force of 45,000
in an entrenched position. Maubeuge was the last fortress of the French barrier
in the north-east, and its loss would have completely opened up the way to
Paris. Every effort was therefore made to help Jourdan in his attempt to save
it. On October 15 the relieving force, 50,000 strong, under Jourdan and Carnot
attacked the Austrian covering force at Wattignies. The fight raged all that
day and was most furious on the right, in front of the village of Wattignies,
which was taken and lost three times. On the 17th the French expected another
general engagement, but the enemy had drawn off during the night. Coburg
retreated and raised the siege of Maubeuge.
Thus the
campaign of 1793 ended most successfully for France. The Allies, it is true,
still maintained themselves in the north-east and held Valenciennes and Conde,
but they had failed in their attempts on Dunkirk and Mauheuge. On the eastern
frontier Landau had been relieved and Alsace cleared of the enemy. In the
south-east the army of the Maritime Alps had succeeded in expelling the enemy
from France. The only French territory in the hands of the enemy was Roussillon
in the south-west, where the Spaniards had driven the French under the walls of
Perpignan.
With the
accession of Jourdan, Hoche, and Pichegru, to the command of the Armies of the
North, the Moselle, and the Rhine, the war entered another phase. The mainstay
of the French armies was no longer the old regular troops but the new levies of
the Revolution. A new system of tactics and a new system of strategy were
appearing. Early in 1794 the difference hetween volunteers and regulars
disappeared once for all, when by the decree of January 9 the amalgamation,
which had been foreshadowed by Dumouriez, was actually effected by order of
Dubois-Crance. Throughout all the different French armies two battalions of
volunteers were joined to one battalion of regulars, and thus formed a definite
unit called a demi-brigade. The demi-brigade took the place of the old
regiment. The brigading was finished by March 21, on which day the army of
France was composed of 196 demi- brigades of infantry of the line, and 22
demi-brigades of light infantry. The cavalry was composed of 27 regiments of
heavy cavalry, 59 regiments of light cavalry, forming in all 90,000 sabres. The
artillery was 15,000 strong; it retained its old regimental organisation; but 9
new light artillery regiments were added to it. The organisation of the
engineers was left unchanged, the strength of the corps being fixed at 5300.
The total number of men under arms was thus 850,000.
As regards
administration, a great improvement was made in the method of supplying the
army with food. A general or commissioner was no longer allowed to make what
requisitions he chose. The decree of February, 1794, laid down that in future
the only persons who could make requisitions should be members of the
Commission des Subsistances.
This
Commission worked systematically and sensibly, It summoned to Paris
representatives from the provincial municipalities and carefully explained its
methods. The consequence of this, and of the prompt payment which ensued, was
that for the future there was no longer any real trouble in victualling the
army. Another of the great difficulties which the War Office had to overcome
was that of providing arms, ammunition, and equipment for these swollen
establishments. The government very wisely solved this problem by summoning to
the aid of the executive all the best practical skill, and all the latest
scientific research, that France possessed. Nine great factories were
established in Paris which turned out daily a thousand muskets. Church bells
were used as raw material for making big guns. Four enormous forges were set
going in the Ardennes by Clouet, professor of chemistry at Mezieres. From these
foundries and those in Paris 20,000 guns a year, of various calibre, were
handed over to the military authorities. A new system of manufacturing powder
was invented at Grenelle; the factory there turned out
30,000 lbs. a day. Fourcroy invented a new way of
treating steel, whereby swords and bayonets could be made at great speed. The
Republic, in the words of Barere, was an immense besieged town, and France one
vast camp.
The new
strategy and the new tactics really involved no new principle: they were simply
an adaptation of the old maxim of throwing superior weight on the vital spot.
The strategist was in future not to attempt to guard every pass, nor to pin
himself to the old roads and fortresses. The art of war was no longer to
consist in elaborate sieges. To attack boldly when possible, to surprise the
enemy by sudden concentrations and rapid movements, was in future to be the
order of the day. The battle once won, the enemies’ fortresses could be reduced
at leisure. In the preparations which led to Hondschoote we see for the first
time a real grasp of these principles. An army must no longer trust in
fortified lines and a passive defence; the secret of all defence is the
counterstroke. A new system of tactics had also to be invented to meet the
requirements of the new conditions, and to suit the genius and ardour of the
revolutionary soldiers. Frederick’s system of careful deployments in line, of
constantly seeking the flank of his enemy, was admirably suited to an army of
trained veterans accustomed to fight against enemies who could not manoeuvre. But
the French had neither the patience nor the steadiness for such precise
movements; moreover Frederick’s tactics presumed an immobile enemy. What was
now needed was a system whereby full advantage could be taken of the superior
intelligence1 and elan of the Frencl: soldiers. This was effected by
no longer attacking in line but returning to the old system of attack in
column. The columns were at such distances and intervals that they could
rapidly be deployed into line; and were covered on the centre and flanks by
heavy clouds of skirmishers. The skirmishers were pushed
434 The Allies.—Carnot's plan of campaign.
boldly ujj to
tbe enemy’s line, and the battalion columns supplied tbe superior weight which
was necessary to crush the enemy at the vital spot. The objective was now no
longer the enemy’s flank, but more often his •centre, whereby his force might
be split in two and one half of it surrounded and annihilated. The artillery
was still used to open the battle and to Cover the advance of the infantry, but
it was being used more and more in heavy masses. The duty of the cavalry was to
break the enemy’s cavalry or infantry; it was usually handled with great
boldness. The guiding principle of the new strategy and tactics was Danton’s
phrase: “ Tatidace et toujmirs Taudace.n
While it was
quite clear that the French were once again establishing their claim to be a
nation of soldiers, and were rapidly shaping their military system to meet the
new requirements of the age, the Allies were content to abide by their old
methods. The Prussians clung to the old system of the great Frederick and in
their hearts despised every other army and systiem of warfare. The Austrians
blindly followed the Prussian lead. The ignorance of their profession shown by
British officers was in the opinion of Wellington contemptible; the staff
officers never supervised their commands: but still he allowed that there were
many excellent regiments in the British service. The Duke’s comment on the
operations of the Allies during the year 1794-5 clearly shows one of the causes
of their failure. “ The system of the Austrians,” he writes, “ was all the
fashion...that was to post themselves with an advanced guard some ten miles in
front, and extend their small posts far too wide, under the notion that this
was a security from surprise. What usually happened was that the distant post
was attacked and driven in, the small one fell back in confusion, and the enemy
arrived at their heels and attacked the main army with every advantage.” In
fact the old notion of passive resistance on fortified lines died hard.
Meanwhile the
bonds of alliance were becoming more and more strained. It was only the heavy
subsidy of £150,000 a month, which Pitt paid to the Prussians, that kept them,
in outward form at least, faithful to the Coalition. The French, on the
Contrary, from the end of 1793 had the additional advantage of a single
control. , The whole of the operations in all the various theatres of war were
practically under the supervision of Carnot. There was thus a unity and sense
of proportion in the campaigns of 1794 which had hitherto been lacking. Carnot
divined that the Allies would concentrate on the Sambre or Meuse, attempt to
overwhelm the French resistance in the north-east, and march on Paris. But, instead
of acting on the defensive, he instituted a system of bold counterstrokes.
Jourdan was replaced in command of the Army of the North by Pichegru, under
whose command the Army of the Ardennes was also placed. On March 11 Pichegru
received Carnot’s rough sketch for the campaign. The idea was to stand firmly
on the defensive round Maubeuge, to feint in Flanders, and to throw the main
attack on the
Austrian
communications in the direction of Charleroi. Pichegru could only oppose
180,000 French troops to the 148,000 of the Allies, During January and February
the French gained some successes, but Landrecies fell into the hands of the
Allies. Later, in April and May, the French left under Moreau and Souham
advanced against Clerfayt and defeated him at Menin and Courtrai: they then
advanced towards Ghent. Mack, Coburg’s chief of the staff, thought he saw an
excellent oppurtonity of cutting off this column by a joint movement on Lille
from the direction of Menin and Touraay. Accordingly the English and Austrian
columns were timed to reach Lille on May 18. But Souham, who commanded in
Pichegru’s absence, hearing of this scheme, by an admirable forced march from
Lille, brought together at Turcoing on the 17th a force composed of columns
under Moreau, Macdonald, and Vandamme, and on the 18th defeated in detail the
English and Austrians before they had formed their junction. This victory
caused Coburg to imagine that the principal effort of the enemy would be made
by the Army of the North in the direction of Flanders. Consequently he withdrew
a large portion of his force to the north.
By J une
Carnot’s great scheme was in working order. In May, Jour dan, with 45,000 men
from the Army of the Moselle, came to take over the command of the Army of the
Ardennes. The new army so formed numbered some 100,000 men, and was to be known
later as the Army of the Sambre and Meuse. It might almost be called an army of
veterans; and certainly in no other army were the soldiers of the Revolution
seen to more advantage. Jourdan forced his way over the Meuse, and drove
Beaulieu back before him (May 21-81). He had thus penetrated the allied line of
defence and threatened Namur. But once again operations were beginning to
slacken for want of one single guiding hand, when the Commissioners, by the
advice of Levasseur, appointed Jourdan Commander-in-chief of the joint armies
of the North, the Ardennes, and the Moselle. Jourdan’s first action in his new
command was to take steps to lay siege to Charleroi. Meanwhile he ordered the
Army of the North to make a forward movement which i resulted in the capture of
Ypres and the defeat of Clerfayt at Hooglide. But Jourdan’s mistake of
attempting the siege of Charleroi before the Allies had been beaten in the
field was clearly seen, when on June 16 the Austrians, under Beaulieu and
Alvintzy, appeared in force on the Sambre and forced him to raise the siege of
Charleroi. The Austrians, however, were soon checked; and Charleroi was once
again besieged and fell after a siege of one week.
Jourdan had
barely received the surrender of , Charleroi before Coburg arrived with a force
of 70,000 to relieve it. To oppose this force Jourdan had 80,000 at Fleurus;
moreover he had already entrenched his position, and had even procured a
captive balloon to assist him in reconnoitring. Coburg had committed the usual
Austrian fault of neglecting to concentrate, and his force was too small. The
French
occupied the
heights of Fleurus. The battle commenced at 3 o’clock on the morning of June
25. The artillery of the Allies was very numerous and well handled; so accurate
was its fire that three times the French were driven back on their
entrenchments. At midday, after nine hours’ fighting, the French left and
centre were driven in. But Kleber managed to restore order on the left, and at
six o’clock in the evening Jourdan gathering together all his reserves threw
the enemy into confusion. The Allies lost close on 8000 in the battle. The
battle of Fleurus was far-reaching in its results. In France it sounded the
knell of the Reign of Terror and indirectly resulted in the fall of
Robespierre. Its effect on the war was immediate. The Allies, were each
desirous of protecting their own communications. Tho English thought only of
covering Holland, the Austrians of reaching the Rhine. Thus the French got
possession at once, without further fighting, of the whole of the difficult
country cut up by the Lys, the Scheldt, the Dendre, the Senne, and the Dyle.
Meanwhile the isolated fortresses of Landrecies, Quesnoy, Valenciennes, and
Conde made but little resistance. Accordingly the French were enabled to
continue their advance. Pichegru seized Malines and Antwerp, while Jourdan
drove the Austrians back through Louvaiu and Liege.
The success
of the military operations in the Low Countries during
1794 must be attributed in the main to Jourdan.
Pichegru was no general; he was essentially a politician; by his 'quarrelsome
temper he hindered rather than assisted his colleagues. But in spite of this
Pichegru was to make a greater name than Jourdan. In October, while Jourdan
crushed the Austrians, Pichegru received orders to invade the United Provinces.
Accordingly he followed the route that Dumouriez had sketched out in 1793. He
captured Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Herto- genbosch, and all the Dutch fortresses
in Brabant. He then crossed the Meuse at Grave. The English and Dutch troops
retreated behind the Yssel and ultimately evacuated Old Holland. In spite of an
extraordinarily severe winter the French troops, ragged, hungry, and worn-out,
tiressed on, crossed the Leek, and were received with rapture by the
Republican party in Amsterdam in January, 1795. Meanwhile Ger- truydenberg,
Dort, Rotterdam, and the Hague, surrendered without a blow. To crown all, the
French cavalry under Moreau, supported by a solitary battery of horse
artillery, pushed on to the Helder, found that river frozen hard, and, riding
sword in hand to the Island of Texel, captured the Dutch fleet. By February the
whole of the United Provinces had submitted to the French, and a large section
of the people were demanding the French alliance.
While
Pichegru was star4-’ g on these conquests, Jourdan had
155,000 troops concentrated on the Meuse. In
September he moved his right wing under Scherer across the river at Namur.
Scherer defeated Clerfayt, who had succeeded Coburg, at the Ourthe on September
18. On October 2 the French drove the Austrians back across the Roer. In
1792-5]
Switzerland.—The Sardinian kingdom.
437
October
Jourdan’s main army forced Clerfayt back on the Rhine and took successively
Cologne, Andemach, and Coblenz. The consequence was that by January, 1795,
Jourdan was in contact on his left at Cleves with the Army of Holland, and on
his right at Coblenz with the combined Army of the Moselle and Rhine.
The result of
the operations of the combined Army of the Rhine and Moselle during the summer
of 1794 was that the Prussians were gradually pushed out of the Vosges. In the
autumn Mollendorf, who knew that the news from Poland was unfavourable, refused
to risk his army in any further engagements, and, after evacuating position
after position, fell back across the Rhine on October 6. Thereon the Army of
the Moselle, which formed the left of the combined Army of the Rhine, swung
through Trier, and picked up connexion with Jourdan, who had occupied Coblenz
on October 23. The French, now that the enemy had abandoned the left bank of
the Rhine, seized the bridge-head at Rheinfels on November 2, and occupied
Mannheim on December 25. Meanwhile Mainz and Luxemburg were invested.
In 1792 the
command of the Army of the South had been entrusted to General Montesquiou. His
duty was twofold: first to secure the neutrality of Switzerland; secondly to
operate against the Sardinians. The Swiss, as was natural, were greatly
incensed against the French because of the massacre of the Swiss Guards in
August, 1792; and above all owing to the attempt of the Constituent Assembly to
annex Geneva to France. Montesquiou, however, succeeded in reestablishing
peaceful relations with Switzerland. The neutrality of Switzerland was most
important to the French. Switzerland covered the French frontier on the
south-east. Its occupation by the Allies would have allowed them to turn the
rear of the Army of the Rhine. While Montesquiou was successfully negotiating with
the Swiss, a division of his army, commanded by Anselme, had occupied Nice and
was holding the line of the Var.
The seizure
of Nice and the violation of Savoy, added to the close relationship which
existed between the House of Savoy and the Bourbons, caused Sardinia to declare
war on France. The Sardinians occupied the strong position of Saorgio and held
the crest of the mountains. They were thus in a position to invade France. But
winter put an end to operations. During the first half of 1793 the French, who
were commanded by Kellermann and Biron, were just able to hold the enemy in
check. In July and August, owing to the troubles at Lyons and Marseilles and
the English occupation of Toulon, the Sardinians successfully crossed the
passes and entered Savoy. But in September Kellermann, after two actions, drove
the invading corps of
20.000 Sardinians back from Aigueville on to the
Mont Cenis Pass, in spite of the fact that they were now reinforced by a corps
of Austrians.
438
French successes in
northern Italy. , [1794
During the
year 1794 the French forces in the south-east were split up into two corps,
known as the Army of the Alps and the Army of Italy. This was a grave mistake,
as Bonaparte and other generals pointed out; it resulted in ill-timed efforts
and wasted opportunities. In March and April the Army of the Alps made several
unsuccessful attempts to seize the Mont Cenis Pass. However on April 23 Dumas
got possession of the St Bernard Pass, and on May 14 he captured the Mont Cenis
also. Meanwhile the Army of Italy was endeavouring to oust the Sardinian
General Colli from his strong camp at Saorgio. The camp of Saorgio covered the
important Col di Tenda; from Tenda the road ran straight to Turin. Bonaparte,
who commanded the artillery of the Army of Italy, acted as chief adviser to
General Dumerbion, an old nonentity. It was by his advice that the Committee of
Public Safety allowed General Dumerbion to violate the neutrality of Genoa. A
turning movement was then made by the sources of the Tanaro, and on April 20
Massena seized the redoubts of the Col di Tenda. As the result of twenty days’
fighting the French captured 4000 prisoners and 70 guns, and picked up
communication with the Army of the Alps. Thus by May the French held the
principal chain of the Alps, and were at liberty to invade the plain of
Piedmont. But here their success came to an end. The authorities in Paris
considered that the combined Army of the Alps and Italy would be too large a
corps to be manageable. Accordingly a draft of 10,000 men was despatched, from
the Army of the Alps to the Army of the Rhine. The Army of Italy was still
nominally
80,000 strong, but 22,000 were absorbed by
garrisons, 8000 by depot duty, and 15,000 were in hospital; consequently only
35,000 were left for duty in the field. The Sardinians and Austrians were
holding the line of the fortresses Coni, Mondova, and Ceva. Bonaparte was
authorised to draw up a plan of campaign ; his idea was that the Army of the
Alps should move along the left bank of the Stura, cross the mountains, and cut
the communication between Coni and Demonte; while the Army of Italy would move
forward, keep up communication on the left with the Army of the Alps, and
occupy the plain of Coni. The armies started, and the Army of the Alps had penetrated
the valley of the Stura, and the Army of Italy had already thrown back Colli’s
advance guard, when on August 21 orders came from Paris to halt, and then to
retreat. The reason was that Robespierre had fallen, and all his friends,
including Bonaparte, were regarded with suspicion. Consequently the Committee
stopped all offensive operations in Piedmont, and contented itself with
ordering the occupation of the principal passes of the Alps. Later in the year
Mass&ia prevented the Austrians and Sardinians from seizing Savona and thus
threatening the French communications by the Comice Road. The campaign of 1794
had been unsuccessful; but it left the French in a position from which at any
moment they could invade Piedmont.
We have seen
that, after the execution of Louis, the Spaniards declared war on France. The
war was on one side national, on the other religious. The French were
fighting,to oppose the doctrine of kingship; the Spaniards took up arms to
uphold the Holy Catholic Church, which had been robbed of its possessions by
the Civil Constitution of the clergy. On both sides military preparations were
conspicuous by their absence. Since 1763 the fortresses on either side of the
frontier had been allowed to fall into disrepair. In 1793 on the side of France
the remains of the old Army of the Centre did not exceed 25,000 men. With great
difficulty, by April, 8000 men were collected between the Nive and Nivelle, and
a similar number under the walls of Perpignan. The Spaniards were equally
unprepared for war. The treasury was empty, the army on a very low peace
footing, and there were no stores or material for war. Still the ministers of
Charles IV boldly decided to attempt the conquest of Roussillon with
40,000 troops, and at the same time to cross the
western Pyrenees and push up towards the Loire. All the passes of the Pyrenees
are very high; and further, there are only two practicable passes at the east
end, namely, the Col de Perche lying between the river Segre and the Auch, and
the Col de Perthus between the Tet and the Ter. At the western end of the
mountains lie the passes of Roncesvalles and Mayo covered by Pampeluna; and
along the shore-road there are four passes covered by the towns of San
Sebastian, Bilbao, Santander, and Oviedo. Owing to the great distance between
the groups of passes at the two ends of the mountains the armies on both sides
had to be divided into a western and an eastern army.
The Spanish
Cabinet decided that an advance should at once be made into Roussillon, while
the Army of the West should remain on the defensive in Navarre and Guipuscoa.
Accordingly on April 15 the Spanish Army of the East crossed the frontier under
General Ricardos. If that general had pushed on at once, he might have taken
Perpignan. The French army was in a complete state of demoralisation. One commander
succeeded another in rapid succession. Barbantane, Dagobert, d’Aoust, Thurreau,
and Doppet quickly replaced each other at the whim of the Representatives on
Mission. By the end of 1793 the French had had to abandon their first line of
resistance on the Tech, and had fallen back on their second line the Tet. The
French Army of the West had been a little more successful. By July it amounted
to a force of 30,000 men—destitute, it is true, of all stores or magazines,
without any ideas of obedience, and permeated by the venom of Jacobinism which
trickled in from Bayonne. Its commanders succeeded each other with the usual
rapidity. Servan, Delbecq, and Despres- Crassier all enjoyed the doubtful
honour for but a short time. Luckily for the French, the ^enterprising Spanish
General Curo was held fast by orders from Madrid, and could make no forward
movement. At last
the French
themselves were ready to assume the offensive. But their attempts to cross the
Bidassoa in August and September both failed. In this quarter the net result of
the year’s fighting was that the French had just managed; to cover
Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port and Bayonne.
In 1794 the
French were more successful. In the East they jnce more took the initiative.
Dagohert, an old officer of the Seven Years’ War, crossed the Pass of Perche
and penetrated the valley of the Segre, where he died of fatigue hefore Saint
Miguel. Dugommier, his successor, a good general, had the additional prestige
of being a member of the Convention ; he was moreover heartily seconded in his
efforts by Perignon and Augereau, and by the new Commissioner and Representative
Debrel. Starting in May with a force of 40,000 men, he once again recaptured
the line of the Tech, and drove the enemy across the Pass of Perthes, and
entered Catalonia, where he was confronted by the great Spanish lines at the
Pass of Banyuls which covered Figueras. The French army was starving, and its
only chance of getting stores was to capture Figueras. Dugommier accordingly
decided to attack the lines on November 18; but he was killed while giving his
orders. Perignon, his successor, attacked again the next day, drove the enemy
from their position, and on November 27 forced Figueras to surrender. By 1795
all the fortresses of North Catalonia were in French hands.
At the end of
1793 the Western Army of the Pyrenees was reduced to less than 20,000 men; but
in January, 1794, it received many drafts of recruits. It was not till June
that these recruits could be considered soldiers. Meanwhile the army lay behind
a strong line pf fortifications stretching from the source of the Nive to the
high road through Saint-Jean-de-Luz. The five divisions of the army were so
posted that they held the heads of all the Spanish valleys which lead into
France. The army was under the command of Muller, a very careful general. On
July 31 the French stormed the Spanish camp of San Martial, captured all the
artillery and crossed the Bidassoa. Fuenterrahia and San Sebastian fell during
the first week of August. On August 9 the Spanish general Colomera fell back
hurriedly from Tolosa. Muller ought at once to have advanced on Pampeluna. But
by this time the Commissioner Pinet had so disgusted the inhabitants of
Guipuscoa that a guerilla warfare broke out. The French advance was checked;
they lost San Sebastian but managed to retain Tolosa. During the winter of
1794-5 the Spaniards began to lose heart. But though negotiations for peace
were set on foot, they brought no immediate result. No forward movement was
made during the spring, as peace seemed imminent. At last on June 25 operations
commenced. On July 6 Moncey, the new French commander, cut the Spanish army in
two at Irurzon. Then, leaving Dagonet to watch Pampeluna, he hurried after the
Spanish left. By July 13 he had driven it in rout
before him,
crossed the pass of the Pyrenees, and entered Vittoria. Passing on he took
Bilbao. But on July 22 peace ended the campaign.
At the
commencement of 1795 a general peace seemed possible. France had undoubtedly
once again reestablished her place in Europe. She had defeated all her enemies
on land and added largely to her territories; she had at last gained her
natural boundaries. The first outburst of the propagandist zeal had died out;
Napoleon had not yet taught her to hunger after the territories of her
neighbours. Now that the Terror was over, the time seemed opportune to
establish her conquests on a sure footing, and to take stock of her interior
position. But if France desired peace, much more did several of the members of
the Coalition desire to end the war. Prussia, on October 16, 1794, had
definitely withdrawn her forces from the contest. During 1794 she had only kept
a force on the Rhine in return for the English subsidy. In October England
considered that Prussia had not given her the value of her money, and
accordingly had withdrawn the subsidy. Though Prussia grumbled, she was
undoubtedly glad to have an excuse for retiring and concentrating her attention
on Poland. Meanwhile the Emperor was negotiating with Catharine of Russia; and
on January 3, 1795, they signed a treaty whereby they agreed to partition
Turkey, Venice, Bavaria, and Poland. On the ocean the shadow of the Armed
Neutrality of the North had already fallen across the English Sea Power. In the
west Spain saw with dismay the barrier of the Pyrenees pierced, and the road to
Madrid half uncovered. In the north Holland lay at the feet of tbe victor.
Such was the
condition of Europe when, on January 12, Barthelemy, the French ambassador to
Switzerland, a disciple of Choiseul, met the Prussian envoy Count von der
Goltz, who had been sent by Frederick William at the instigation of Mollendorf,
Prince Hemy, and Lucchesini. Goltz died on February 6, before his mission had
progressed very far, and his place was taken by Hardenberg, one of the future
regenerators of Prussia. On April 5, 1795, Barthelemy on behalf of France, and
Hardenberg on behalf of Prussia, signed the famous Treaty of Basel; whereby
Prussia gave France a free hand on the left bank of the Rhine, and France in
return undertook to respect a line of demarcation which virtually placed
northern Germany under Prussian control. Tbe vexed question of the left bank of
the Rhine was to remain over till it could be settled at a European Congress;
but a secret article arranged for compensation to Prussia, should the French
territory be extended to the Rhine. Meanwhile Holland was treating for peace
directly with the Committee of Public Safety, and on May 16 was glad to accept
the hard terms offered her by France. She became virtually dependent on France,
and had to bear her share in the war against England. The Coalition lost yet
one other member. The death of the young Dauphin
442
Jourdan and Pichegru in Germany.
(Louis XVII)
in June, and the advance of Moncey in northern Spain, threw the Court of Madrid
into confusion. Moreover, the Queen was afraid that the odium of defeat might
fall on her paramour, Godoy. Accordingly negotiations were opened Up with
France, and on July 22, 1795, peace was signed. France evacuated her conquests
in Spain, and received in return the Spanish half of San Domingo; By the end of
1795 Saxony, the two Hesses, Portugal, Naples, the
Duke of Parma, and the Pope, had all made their peace with France. It was quite
clear that the French Republic, under the Directory, was a stable government;
that France had now a clear definite policy; and that she was quite willing to
lend herself to the old political formula of Europe, “ the balance of power”—as
interpreted by herself.
We see then
that in 1795 France had fewer enemies to face. There was no likelihood of a
campaign in the north, though the Army of the North under Moreau had to find
strong garrisons for Holland and the Netherlands. In the Pyrenees, as we have seen,
there was some fighting. But, so far as operations on land went, France had now
practically only two foes to meet. These were the Austrians and the Sardinians.
Accordingly the military operations of interest in this year centre round the
Maritime Alps and the Rhine Valley. On the eastern frontier the French plan of
campaign was that the Army of the Sambre and Meuse under Jourdan, and the Army
of the Rhine and Moselle under Pichegru, should operate in conjunction and
drive the enemy back on the Danube. Jourdan’s first task was to undertake the
siege of Luxemburg with his right wing, while Pichegru’s left wing, or the old
Army of the Moselle, undertook the reduction of Mainz. The sieges went on but
slowly, because Carnot had been succeeded by Aubry and Letoumeur, who were
unable to grapple with the problems of army administration. Consequently, owing
to lack of necessities and stores, both armies suffered very heavily from
disease and desertion. In Jourdan’s army alone, out of a total of 170,000,
76,300 were in hospital. Luxemburg had been invested on November 21, 1794; it
was one of the strongest fortresses in Europe, and did not capitulate till June
25, 1795.
Jourdan then
at once took the offensive. Owing to the lack of proper stores and supplies he
had organised a flotilla from Holland which supplemented his convoys from
France. He crossed the Rhine at Diisseldorf and, pushing back Clerfayt in front
of him, reached the Main, where he hoped to cooperate with Pichegru. Pichegru
had started on September 20 and captured Mannheim. By a sudden movement on
Heidelberg he might have driven a wedge between the two Austrian armies, and,
in conjunction with Jourdan, have crushed in detail first Clerfayt and then
Wurmser. Panic was widespread through the German south-west; the Landgrave of
Darmstadt and the Margrave of Baden fled hurriedly. But Pichegru had entered
into secret negotiations with the Austrians. He had been promised the baton of
a Marshal
of France,
the government of Alsace, one million francs in cash, and
200.000 louis in rentes, a hotel in Paris, and the
CMteau of Chambord. In return he was to employ his army to overthrow the
Directory and restore the Comte de Provence. Instead, therefore, of seizing
this opportunity to crush the Austrians, Pichegru pushed forward two divisions
without supports. He knew that Clerfayt could easily crush these isolated
divisions and could then effect his junction with Wurmser. He hoped that the
united Austrians would then be strong enough to give him an excuse for retreating.
The plan succeeded. Pichegru had to fall back. The Austrians retook Mannheim,
and Pichegru’s army retired in disorder behind the lines of Weissenburg. There,
on December 81,1795, Pichegru signed an armistice with the Austrians.
Jourdan
meanwhile had attempted to come to Pichegru’s help. But he could not prevent
Mannheim from capitulating. Hereupon, as Wurmser had crossed to the left bank
of the Rhine, and Clerfayt was advancing against him, Jourdan fell slowly back
and established a fortified camp at Traarbach. From this position, if
necessary, he could safely cross the Moselle, watch the bridges over that
river, and keep up communication with Luxemburg. Owing to the severity of the
winter, the Austrians on December 19 demanded an armistice, to which Jourdan
gladly acceded. The campaign was a great disappointment to the French. But
their ill success in this year on the Rhine must be set down entirely to the
treachery of Pichegru. If Pichegru had seized his opportunity at Heidelberg the
Austrians ought to have been driven completely out of the Rhine Valley and
forced back to the Danube.
In Italy
during the first half of the year 1795, although the French held the crest of
the mountains, they had to stand on the defensive. The combined
Austro-Sardinian force numbered some 70,000 men, to which the French, owing to
sickness and garrison duty, could only oppose
20.000 of the Army of Italy and 15,000 of the Army
of the Alps.
The plan of
campaign of the Allies was twofold. The King of Sardinia desired to operate by
way of the Mont Cenis and St Bernard Passes and to penetrate into Savoy; while
the Austrians, at the instigation of the English, intended to concentrate
their efforts on the Riviera, working in conjunction with the British fleet.
The French, on their side, disregarded Bonaparte’s plan of a combined movement
of the two armies by way of the Valley of Stura, and attempted to force their
way into the plain of Piedmont by the Borghetta Pass; although the Comice Road
was insecure, as they had not command of the sea. At the end of April
Kellermann was recalled to take command of the two armies. He found his troops
in absolute destitution, strung out on a long line like a cordon. Massena was
at Vado on the right, Macquart at the Col di Tenda in the centre; while
Serrurier on the left occupied the Col di Rosas, whence he held out a hand to
the Army of the Alps, which stretched
from
Barcelonnette to Geneva. Kellermann’s orders were to evacuate Nice and base
himself on the river Var. In spite of this he determined to entrench his army
in the position where he found it. During April, May, and June the Sardinians
were defeated in their attempts to force the Col di Tenda and the Saint
Bernard, Pass In June, de Vins, the. commander-in-chief of the Allies,
determined to make a combined movement. The Austrians were to march on Savona
and the Sardinians on the Col di Tenda. Accordingly on June 34 de Vins made an
attempt to occupy the town of Savona, and, though repulsed, he got possession
of San Giacomo. At the same moment the Sardinians, under Colli, made two
unsuccessful attempts on the Col di Tenda. The capture of San Giacomo made the
French position untenable, and the French right wing had to fall back during
the night of June 28. But, owing to the mutual jealousy of Colli and de Vins,
the Allies were unable to press the retreating French. The French commander
quickly perceived the want of union among the Allies, and determined to resume
the offensive. It was his plan to use the Army of the Alps as a containing
force while, the Army of Italy swung round by the Col di Tenda into the plain
of Piedmont. But the Cornmil tee of Safety ordered Kellermann to advance by
Vado, Montenotte, and Millesimo to Ceva, and there to concentrate his forces
for a campaign in 1796. Kellermann pointed out that his army was not adequate
for such extensive operations. Thereon the Committee deposed him, and appjinted
Scherer in his place. Meanwhile de Vins frittered away his opportunity on the
seaboard in useless expostulations with Nelson.
Scherer took
over his command at the beginning of October. His army was in great
destitution, and would have actually starved, if it had not been for help from
Geroa. as otherwise he could only get supplies when the coasting ships managed
to escape the English cruisers. He adopted Massena’s plan of pushing forward
from the valley of the Tanaro. On November 23 Augereau surprised and routed the
Austro-Sardinian centre, thus causing them to evacuate Loano; while Massdna
aided him by a vigorous attack whereby he regained the crest of the Apennines.
Serrurier on the left met with less success and was repulsed by Colli. But the
French had effected their object; the allied centre was forced to retreat that
night. On the next day Augereau pushed forward through the valley of Loano and
crossed the Apennines, while part of Massena’s force under Joubert occupied the
gorge of San Giacomo. Meanwhile, on the extreme i ight, the rest of Massena’s
force under Dom- martin, aided by* the guns of the French naval squadron, drove
Wallis off the Cornice Road and forced him to escape by the hill-tracks over
the mountains. Scherer was anxious to turn the two days’ battle at Loano into a
complete victory, and at once despatched a division to reinforce Serrurier. But
Colli withstood the French attack, and it was not until he heard of the defeat
of his centre and left wing, that he retired at
night,
leaving behind him his artillery. Serrurier pursued him to Ceva wheve he took
refuge under the guns of that fortress. Meanwhile by November 29 Wallis had
effected his retreat to Dego and Aquila. The net result of this short campaign
was that the Austrians lost 7000 men and 80 guns; while the Sardinians had lost
their fortified camp, two fortresses, and a considerable number of magazines.
Moreover the road to Piedmont now lay open. Undoubtedly Scherer ought to have
pressed on, as Turin was in an uproar* and the allied army had practically
ceased to exist. Instead of so doing he at once went into winter-quarters.
Thus by the
end of 1795 the war had assumed an entirely new complexion. It was now no
longer a question of the right of France to change her government nor of the
Allies desiring to indemnify themselves at the expense of continental France.
The war, subsequent to the Triple Alliance of September, 1795, between England,
Austria, and Russia, was a war of various motives. Austria intended to
indemnify herself in Italy for her losses in the Low Countries; Russia hoped to
find her indemnity in Turkey now that she had got all of Poland she could hope
for. Russia joined this al”ance out of anger against Prussia who had defeated
the Russian schemes of aggrandisement by making peace with France at Basel. So
long as Catharine lived Russia would not actively combine against France.
England really believed that the French occupation of the Low Countries was a
menace to her position, and above all she was desirous of retaining the
colonial conquests she had made, or was about to make, at the expense of France
and Holland. On the side of France also the war had assumed a different
significance. It was no longer a ques tion of defending the fatherland, nor of
acquiring the “natural boundaries,’' nor of liberating fellow-creatures
down-trodden by tyrants. It was to be a war of spoliation and of glory, instead
of faith and principle. France was now fighting either for the glory of the
Directors, or to pay her soldiers, or to distract attention from troubles at
home. The age of Bonaparte had arrived.
By the end of
1795 all these circumstances had left their mark on the French army. The law of
requisition had called out as recruits each year all men of the age of twenty;
from that time the French army was in outward shape a national army. But the
newly formed auxiliary legions from the Netherlands, Italy, and elsewhere
tended to shatter those essentially national ideas which distinguished the army
during the first years of the Revolution. Further, continuous service was
causing the conscript and volunteer to merge his character in that of the
mercenary soldier. Still the French soldier of that age never forgot his
enthusiasm for his country, whether his country was represented to him by the
Republic or by the Emperor. It was this burning enthusiasm working through a
mass of trained veterans which made the French armies practically invincible.
Yet, though the same spirit ran through the whole of the French troops, each
individual army had its special traits.
The Army of
the Sambre and Meuse had the special note of self-sacrifice; in 1794 and 1795
it had to play a subordinate part to Pichegru, as later in 1796 and 1797 it was
sacrificed to Moreau. The Army of the Rhine was the most patriotic and most
completely devoted to the Republic. Under Moreau it was to become the best
disciplined of all the French armies. The Army of Italy was noted for its
bravery; but in it pillage had already laid the seeds of deterioration.
As regards
the staff of the army the years 1792-5 had seen many changes. By 1795 the first
type of general, the ambitious Royalists, the Dumouriez’ and the Custines, had
disappeared. The years 1794-5 were marked by , a new type. The successful
sous-officiers of the old regime, the ardent Republicans, the Hoches, the
Pichegrus, or civilians like Moreau, had forced their way to the top. By the
end of 1795 a yet newer type was developing. The future generals were no longer
politicians, they were before all things soldiers. They loved their men ,• they
loved their profession; above all they loved glory. They were intensely proud
of their soldierly qualities; but they could not take orders from each other.
They could only bow before immense military talents; they were in fact the men
of Napoleon—Dessaix, Kleber, Ney, Soult, Lefebvre, Bemadotte, Macdonald,
Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, Berthier, Augereau, Lannes, Murat, and Massdna.
A great
change was also coming over the officers of the army as a mass. Up to 1795
promotion had been mainly by the election of the soldiers or the selection of
the Representative on Mission. The officer had gained his training in the
field. After 1795 promotion was still open from the ranks; but the Directory
established new schools for officers. Cavalry schools were set up at
Versailles, Luneville, and Angers. The IiJcole Polytechnique and the Nicoles
d’Application for the engineers and artillery furnished officers for these
special branches. The medical department was officered from the special
military medical schools of Paris, Montpellier, and Strassburg.
The end of
1795 therefore marked an epoch in the histoiy of the French army. Its inherent
strength no longer consisted in the remnants of the old royal army, nor in the
fierce devotion of its soldiers to the principles of the Revolution. But its
power lay in the fact that it was now an army of enthusiastic soldiers trained
by years of continuous warfare, and organised entirely with a view to war. In
future it gained its victories, not because its opponents missed their
opportunities and did not recognise their needs; nor because its enemies lacked
cohesion, and were demoralised by jealousies; but because it possessed the
highest military talent of the age; and because its strategy, its tactics, and
its whole organisation, were in unison with the aims and objects of the people
and the rulers or ruler pf France.
THE NAVAL
WAR.
In the later years of the reign of Louis XVI great
attention had been devoted by the French government to its Navy, and both the
material and the personnel of that force had reached a high level of
efficiency. The defects revealed in the American War had been as far as
possible remedied. The insufficient supply of skilled officers and trained
seamen-gunners, which in large measure explained the few reverses suffered by
France in the course of that war, led to the introduction of changes in the
method of recruiting and educating officers, and to the formation of a new
corps of seamen-gunners, organised in nine divisions, each of 1700 men. The
corps of officers, by an ordinance of 1786, was to consist of 100 captains, of
whom 27 were to be commodores; 100 “majors of vessels”; 680 lieutenants; and
840 sub-lieutenants. To enter the corps of officers the cadet had to show proof
of noble birth, but he received a long and carefully thought-out training, and
was required to pass an examination before he was allowed to reach the rank of
lieutenant. Youths of inferior station were permitted to enter the service as
“volunteers;” and from their numbers were chosen the greater part of the
sub-lieutenants, but with the proviso that they could never rise higher than to
lieutenant, and to that por'J i jn only for some remarkable service.
Thus on the eve of the Revolution the French navy was officered by men of noble
birth, and the humbly bom could never aspire to high rank. The field of choice
was narrowed, and it was impossible for the son of middle-class parents to
rise, though in the British navy at this period this was not only feasible but
quite common.
The levelling
tendencies of the Revolution madt short work of all such restrictions in the
French navy; but at the same time the general revolt against authority in every
form, which was one of the features of the revolutionary movement, broke down
all discipline among the subordinate officers and seamen, and rendered the
position of the senior officers so disagreeable that they resigned their
commissions in hundreds.
At Brest
trouble began }n 1789, when an unpopular director of the port, a naval captain,
had to be temporarily removed, because the dockyard
workmen
disliked him. There was an outbreak of anarchism; and the British ambassador in
Paris gave information to the French authorities, who ridiculed the story, that
he had been approached with a view to the destruction of the dockyard. As
subsequently several incendiary attempts were made upon the yard, it is
probable that there was more in this affair than the French authorities
supposed. Similar disorders occurred at the other French naval ports; and at
Toulon there was a serious mutiny which was treated with the most injudicious
lenity. The people of the town and the seamen of the fleet were led to believe
that it was safer to be on the side of disorder than on that of order, and they
speedily profited by the lesson. At the end of the year there was a fresh
outbreak at Toulon, directed against Comte d’Albert de Rions, then commanding
the squadron in that port, and by general acknowledgment the ablest French
naval commander of his day. He was attacked by a number of mutinous workmen in
the dockyard, and through the cowardice and bad faitb of the municipality and
the National Guard was cruelly maltreated, and narrowly escaped with his life.
He was finally imprisoned ; but when the Constituent Assembly heard of his
plight it ordered his release, though without blaming those who had failed to
protect him. Far from being punished, his assailants were declared to have
acted as patriots. De Rions was succeeded by an officer named de Glandeves,
whose treatment was mucb the same. All through 1790 the disorders at Toulon
continued, a captain narrowly escaping death in August at the hands of a mob.
In 1792 Rear-Admiral de Flotte, then commanding the fleet at Toulon, was
attacked, severely wounded, and hanged, while three captains were killed with
him.
At Brest the
state of affairs bad also gone from bad to worse, uecause the government had
not the courage to punish those whom it knew to be guilty of violence and
sedition. The attempt to fit out a fleet in 1790, during the dispute between
England and Spain regarding Nootka Sound, led to a serious outbreak in the
Brest squadron. Tbe men, when they learnt the details of the new penal code
decreed by the Assembly, rose and assailed with abuse d’Albert de Rions, who
after leaving Toulor had been appointed to the command; while in the town there
were serious disturbances. The seamen who had been prominent in this affair
received from the Assembly the most singular punishment conceivable. They were
dismissed from tbe service and sent to their homes, which was probably exactly
what they wanted, since hard work in the fleet, with no pay and little food,
was not an entrancing prospect for anybody. As the result 'of this act of
weakness further troubles followed; and down to the beginning of war with
England there was incessant friction between the officers and men.
One of the
first consequences of these troubles at Brest and Toulon was the emigration of
no fewer than 600 officers, among whom was an unusual proportion of men of
strong character, high principle, and
professional
capacity. The French National Assembly was thus confronted with a new and
difficult problem: how to obtain or improvise officers in a profession which is
peculiarly technical. It set to work to reorganise the navy according to its
own preconceived ideas, disregarding the advice of naval officers of tried
capacity; and the results of its handiwork were seen in every page of French
naval history from the First of June to Trafalgar. It had previously caused
confusion by introducing trial by jury afloat. In April, 1791, it sanctioned a
law abolishing the old methods of recruiting and training officers, and opened
commissions to all Frenchmen below the age of 20, after passing an examination.
Those successful in this competition entered the navy and served for three
years as “ aspirants,” after which they could claim their discharge. Any man who
had served six years at sea, of which one was to be spent in a warship, could
compete for the grade of ensign; and ensigns of more than eight years’ sea
service, two of which were to be in the navy, might be promoted to captain’s
rank; thus a merchant seaman, with but three years of training in a warship,
might find himself in command of a ship of the line. Other decrees from time to
time modified the conditions and rendered them less exacting; in fact, the
Assembly endeavoured to fuse the professions of naval and merchant- marine
officer. In October, 1793, the decree of “purification,” which was caused by
the surrender of Toulon to the English, appeared to complete the
disorganisation of the fleet. This ordained that the various municipalities, in
close relation with the seamen, should determine the “ civism ” of the officers
and hear denunciations of them, after which all who were untrustworthy were to
be replaced from candidates nominated by the local authorities. It was now
possible for merchant officers to rise to the rank of flag officer with little
or no naval training. An earlier and more disastrous measure was the abolition
of the corps of seamen-gunners, and its replacement by a new corps of marine
artillery, commanded by artillery officers from the army. The explanation of
this surprising change was probably the Assembly’s distrust of the “civism ” of
the seamen-gunners. But the abolition of the seamen-gunners deprived the French
navy of its best shots just when they were most wanted, and introduced a
discordant element into the ships’ crews.
The flight or
execution of the ablest senior officers left the navy of France without the
experienced leaders who alone could have confronted the British admirals of
that age with success. Such men as de Rions, Grimouard, Kersaint, and
d’Estaing, could not easily be replaced. A low standard of professional
capacity mnrWprl the French navy throughout the war of 1793; and there were few
of those hard-fought actions which had characterised the American War, and in
which victory generally went to the heavier battery. It was not a navy but a
congeries of ships and men that France placed at sea. A consciousness of this
fact led to such utterances as those of Jean Bon Saint-Andre, to the effect
that the
qualities required for victory at sea were enthusiasm, courage, and audacity.
The same delusion reappears at wide intervals in different nations, so that
Jean Bon cannot be accused of any superlative folly. On land, where grave
disorganisation had been produced by the revolutionary changes in the French
army, a disunited enemy had been encountered; and masses of men had been
employed by the French against the handfuls furnished by the other European
Powers. But at sea the conditions changed. Masses could not be utilised by
France, for the simple reason that the ships into which to put them did not
exist; and for the first time the French revolutionaries encountered men
animated by a national feeling as strong as their own. In the effort to
override skill, the organisers of the republican navy directed their captains
to resort to boarding as far as possible, as it was too hastily assumed that
the British must be deficient in courage, being slaves of the tyrant George
III.
The complete
anarchy on board French ships from the beginning of the Revolution placed the
French fleet at a grave disadvantage in every battle against a disciplined foe.
Even when face to face with the enemy the men at times refused to fight, and
could never be trusted to obey. Instances of gross cowardice were not uncommon.
Early in 1793, on a cruise of the Brest squadron, the Tourville was dismasted
with the loss of her captain and twelve men. Thereupon her crew, in sheer
fright, refused to work the ship. In the Republicain, while tacking, the
foresails were carried away. Several attempts to get her round failed, owing to
the inexperience of the officers and men, of whom only thirty could be induced
by threats or promises to put in an appearance on deck. Even the officers were
backward. In bad weather the seamen hid themselves below; according to the
statement of a competent French officer all discipline had vanished, and it was
impossible to trust the men either to navigate the ship or to fight her. In the
East Indies the crews of the cruisers Cybele and Resolue, when threatened by a
British ship, declared they would only fight if attacked. The cowardice,
ignorance, and inexperience of the officers and men were rendered even more
disastrous by ignorance at headquarters. The instructions sent to the squadrons
from Paris were often confused and contradictory. A good example of this is to
be found in the orders given to Morard de Galles in 1793. He was directed at
one and the same time, with one and the same fleet, to escort a convoy from San
Domingo to France and to prevent the disembarkation of British troops on the
Vendee coast. In the same way, vague and contradictory orders were given to the
navy in 1796 on the eve of the expedition to Ireland. The Ministry of the Navy
had a habit of forgetting that provisions did not last for ever, and that any
French fleet which took the sea under Republican discipline would speedily
stand in need of repairs and refit, owing to the collisions which occurred
whenever any attempt was made to practise fleet tactics, and
owing to the
loss of masts and spars whenever the wind blew with any force. Movements were
prescribed, which the admirals, even had there been the best will on their
part, could not possibly have executed. When the admirals failed, their
patriotism was suspected. If they left inefficient ships behind them when they
put to sea, they were accused of treason by the population of the naval ports ;
if they took the inefficient ships out, their movements were hampered at every
turn; and when they regained port extensive repairs had to be executed, which
brought the naval administration at Paris down upon them, with questions why
they were not able to keep their fleets in good order.
The condition
of the dockyards and of the materiel of the fleet was little better than that
of the personnel. Louis XVI had maintained his fleet in good condition until
the outbreak of the Revolution, and the ships were excellently built and
designed. Herein they had at the outset a marked advantage over British ships
of their own type. But the financial embarrassments of France and the disorder
and incapacity of the revolutionary administration were responsible for a
failure to provide stores and sails on the eve of war. The masts and spars were
bad; the sails were of inferior canvas; the rigging was too often of old rope;
the ironwork throughout the ships was defective in quality. In the later years
of the war the ships were generally overladen with masts of excessive size and
weight, and for this reason not only were they slower than British ships, thus
losing all the advantage of good design in the hulls, but they were also
incapable of being refitted at sea by the crews. Complaints as to the quality
of the powder recur from time to time, while the clothing and provisions
supplied were insufficient or poor in quality. Brest was speedily placed in a
perilous position by the rising in the Vendee against the Republic, and was
repeatedly in danger of actual starvation. Communication with the rest of
France and with Paris was uncertain and slow. There was a want of money; and,
since no one would furnish anything except for cash in consequence of the bad
faith which the republican government showed to its creditors, resort was had
to requisitions, with most unsatisfactory results.
The men
needed for the manning of the fleet were raised from the seafaring population,
or drawn from the army; and, as compulsion was employed, there should have been
no want of good material. But so indifferently was the service administered
that there was a perpetual lack of seamen, partly, no doubt, because of the
superior attractions which privateers offered. The number of ships in the
French fleet at the close of 1792 amounted to 246, of which 86 were of the
line. Of these 13 were building and were not ready for sea, and only 27 were in
commission. The battleships were thus distributed: 39 at Brest, 10 at Lorient,
13 at Rochefort, and 24 at Toulon. The frigates numbered 78. There were 47
corvettes and 35 gunboats and fireships. The French ship was superior to the
British ship of her own class in weight of
metal fired
from long guns, while her projectiles were actually heavier, even when
nominally of the same weight. The French seventy-four fired 990 lb., on her
broadside, as against the British seventy-four’s 972 or 790 lb., for the
British seventy-fours were of several different types, each with a different
battery. The 76 French ships of the line, which were available in early 1793,
fired a total weight of metal on the broadside of 73,957 lb., from 6002 guns.
A Parliamentary
Return shows that the British fleet in 1792 comprised 141 ships of the line,
157 frigates, and 136 smaller craft, or a grand total of 434 vessels. But of
these a large number were in a dilapidated condition, and quite unfit to put to
sea, while others again were on the stocks and incomplete. The ships of the
line actually efficient at the opening of 1793 were 115, mounting a total of
8718 guns, and firing on the broadside 88,957 lb. of metal, which gave the
British battle-squadron an advantage of about 20 per cent, in weight of metal
as against the French. The number of seamen voted in 1792 was but 16,000, of
whom 4425 were marines. The marines were employed at this date and throughout
the war not only as small-arms men and for landing parties, but also as a kind
of naval police, to hold the seamen down and to support the officers. They were
berthed aft, dose to the officers’ quarters, and rarely took the part of the
seamen. On occasions they were replaced by soldiers, who had a share in several
of the important engagements of the war. The number of men borne had been
39,526 in 1790, the year of the Nootka Sound armament, when war with Spain
seemed probable; but from this it had been shortsightedly reduced to 34,097 in
1791 and to 16,000 in 1792. The amount voted in 1792 was only £1,985,482. As
war drew nearer, in December, 1792, an additional 9000 men, 1000 of whom were
to be marines, were voted by Parliament; but the mobilisation of the whole
fleet at that date would have demanded at least 100,000 men, so that this
addition was quite insufficient. By 1799 the total borne was 120,409.
For the
expansion of the fleet from its peace to its war strength, time was required.
The men wanted were obtained in several ways. Voluntary enlistments, generally
with a bounty, supplied a considerable part of the force. Recourse was also had
to the press, to which all seamen were liable. They were taken forcibly, by
gangs of armed men, acting under the direction of an officer, from the British
seaports, or even from British merchant ships at sea. Nominally landsmen were
exempt from this burden, but in practice they were often swept off. Moreover,
many foreigners and Americans were engaged; and, when all these expedients
failed to supply the number of men needed, an Act was passed in 1795, requiring
of the various counties quotas of men, according to the population, the number
ranging from 23 in the case of Rutland, to 1081 in the case of Yorkshire. A few
weeks later this
1793-9] Enlistment and treatment of British
seamen. 453
was followed
by another Act requiring the various ports to supply quotas of men. The total
demanded under these two Acts was 30,000, and in many cases the men thus
obtained seem to have possessed a good education.
As a last
resource there remained the compulsory enlistment of minor criminals.
Smugglers, thieves, and turbulent characters generally, were sent on board to
relieve the country of the cost of their maintenance in prison. When the
political troubles in Ireland began, an infusion of members of secret societies
and United Irishmen was added. The material with which the British officer had
to work was thus unpromising; and the British fleet had here no advantage as
against the French navy, for there was a deep sense of injustice among the
British seamen, which found violent expression later, that they were deprived
of liberty and compelled to fight for the stay-at-homes. “Whilst landsmen
wander uncontrold, And boast the rites of freedom, Oh view the tender’s
loathsome hole [hold] Where droops your injured seamen,” runs a “seditious”
song seized in the Nore mutiny. It proceeds to protest that it is “ shame to
boast your tars’ exploits Then damn those tars to slavery.” It has been justly
remarked that nothing gives a better idea of the capacity of the British
officer than the fact that such material was reduced to order and loyalty, in
the face of injustice so great and of a general disregard of the seamen’s
interests by Parliament. It should also be noted that there were no such
repeated murderous disorders as occurred in the French navy; and that, when
under serious provocation the men did rise in mutiny, they displayed a
remarkable measure of self-restraint, and refused to open communications with
the enemy, the only exceptions to this general rule being one or two outbreaks
where the Irish element was powerful. The fact that such officers as Duncan and
Patton in 1796 and 1797 were drawing the Admiralty’s attention to the need for
reform shows that the seamen had real and deep grievances.
Their
treatment in the service was bad. While allowance must always be made for the
peculiar necessities of war, they were yet subject to much ill-usage at the
hands of the officers. Warrant officers carried rattan canes with which to
“start” the men, as it was called; and captains could inflict up to 48 lashes
of the cat-o’-nine-tails without any right of appeal. Courts-martial inflicted
sentences of as many as 500 lashes, which virtually meant that the culprit was
killed with torture. The pay was low and generally in arrears; the food was not
good, though there had been a sensible improvement since the days of the
American War; the share of prize-money accorded to the seaman was small, and by
the chicanery of the Admiralty Courts was usually withheld for years. As a general
rule, leave was refused to the crews when in port for fear of desertion; and
the married men rarely or never saw their wives and families. The sick and
wounded were neglected; the maimed in battle
were turned
adrift to starve or beg. On the other hand the capable among the men of the
lower deck had better prospects of promotion than in the reformed and
reorganised navy of the present day. The officers were not then drawn from a
limited class; any seaman with capacity and courage might rise. There was, it
is true, a tendency to confine high promotion to men of birth and rank; yet
several of the grea,t officers of this period were humbly bom. Among the famous
“ band of brothers ” who won such glory in the campaign of the Nile were men
who would have been excluded under the present nomination system. Parker, the
leader of the Nore mutiny, had been a midshipman, and had been reduced to the
ranks. There was a practice of interchange between the officers of . the
British navy and merchant service which may explain certain measures of the
French Assembly.
As a general
rule the British officers were men of high character and great capacity,
animated with a spirit of zeal for the service, trained in the American War,
and professionally unmatched in any navy which has ever existed. The officers
in the senior ranks had attained to great reputation and acquired experience in
the handling of ships in the junior ranks. The perpetual change between the
merchant service and the navy, and the elastic system of education and entry,
prevented any such stereotyping of ideas or development of formalism as has
undoubtedly accompanied the growth of most modem navies.
Among the
officers were an unusual number of men of genius. Head and shoulders above all
others was Nelson, at the date of the opening of the war a senior captain, but
only 34 years of age, and in the very prime of manhood. Contemporaries of his,
all of great capacity and merit, were Collingwood, Cornwallis, Saumarez,
Pellew, and Troubridge. Among the senior officers were three great men, Lord
Hood, Adam Duncan, and Sir John Jervis, soon to be better known as Lord St
Vincent. Lord Howe was an able officer, but was at this date too old for hard
work at sea, though he was unusually popular with the men. Where the French could
find no capable admirals,, the British nation had a dozen at its call; and this
fact brought victory despite the mismanagement of statesmen, the indifferent
strategy of the Admiralty, and the defective administration of the ports and
dockyards, where corruption was rampant.
The British
navy had thus a great advantage as against the French in the possession of
experienced commanders—and in war, as Napoleon has said, “ men are nothing, a
man is everything ”—while its admirals’ actions were usually inspired by sound
ideas of strategy. Two principles which spell success in war are to be found in
the plans of Nelson. The first was the principle of the annihilation of the
armed forces of the enemy. Not the mere winning of battles, the capture of some
few prizes, but the complete destruction of the hostile fleets was his aim ;
and he counted no victory as worthy unless this object were attained. His
regret after the
1793-8] The methods, strategy, and
tactics of Nelson. 455
Nile at the
fact that some shattered fragments of the French fleet had escaped his forces
is the truest indication of his greatness as a naval officer, since the
commander must be judged by the manner in which he uses his victories. This
same principle of the complete annihilation of the enemy had been grasped by
Drake; but it was novel in the eighteenth century, until the rise of Napoleon,
who put it into practice in warfare on land. The germ of it was contained in
the Admiralty instructions which directed British commanders to “take, bum, and
sink” the enemy; but by no one was it practised at sea with such energy and
remorselessness as by Nelson. Unlike Howe, Bridport, and Colpoys, he was
indifferent to the damage or loss which his ships sustained in carrying out
this principle, though as a prudent leader he always endeavoured in framing his
plans to obtain the result desired with the minimum expenditure of blood and
material. The second principle in which he shone above the seamen and soldiers
of his own day was in his encouragement of initiative in his officers. Thus he
led into battle men trained to reason, with the result that in each of his
battles the subordinates at critical moments displayed the invaluable quality
of asking, not what they were ordered to do, but what action the spirit of the
orders required to attain success. The orders issued by Nelson were clear and
complete, but they were not paralysing; they did not go into detail; they were
“directives,” not formulas to be mechanically obeyed. His success was thus due
to science and a correct comprehension of the unchanging principles of war.
As the
strategy of Nelson, which is typical of the best in the British navy, was good,
so also were his tactics inspired by deep reflexion and accurate judgment. His
dominating idea in action was to crush a part of the enemy’s force by superior
numbers. This idea he applied in all his battles with the single exception of
Copenhagen, where, however, he may have considered that the gunnery
preponderance of his fleet was sufficient for his purposes, without any attempt
to concentrate superior numbers against the Danes. He disdained precedents, and
never paid any attention to the old tactical idea, which was that when two
fleets joined battle they should form into two lines and engage ship to ship, with
the natural consequence that, if force was evenly distributed on the two sides,
no decisive result followed. It would seem that his ideas were inherited from
Hood, who had wished to put them into practice in the American War and in Golfe
Jouan in 1794.
The
unpreparedness of the British navy at the outset led the Admiralty to adopt a
policy of merely watching the enemy; but gradually, as the navy grew in
numbers and training, this strategy was replaced by determined attack. The
forces of the French were to be brought to battle and destroyed. When those
forces would not fight, but remained in port, as it was found dangerous to
leave them unmasked, the policy of blockading the hostile ports was adopted,
but only after long delay and
late in the
war, since a thoroughly efficient navy was requisite for its execution. At the
beginning of the war the weakness of the British navy and the large force
required to protect British shipping prevented decisive action when the French
fleet was in a hopeless state of disorganisation, though a series of great
naval victories or a close blockade of the French ports in 1793-4 would have
speedily terminated the struggle by reducing France to starvation.
In the
earlier years of the war the British navy had the support of numerous allies,
since the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the Neapolitan navies, were
all acting in cooperation against France. The Spanish navy, however, at this
date was no longer a serious force; the ships were good, but the equipment and
the crews were beneath contempt. The same might be said of the Neapolitan navy,
while the Dutch fleet was too weak to weigh heavily in the scale. Portugal
added six ships of the line and four frigates to the Coalition; and these were
of some value as they were officered in part by Englishmen. The Spanish navy
consisted of 76 ships of the line, of which 56 were in commission, while the
frigates and cruisers numbered 128. They gave at least an appearance of
strength. The Neapolitan navy mustered four battleships, a few frigates, and a
large number of small gunboats. The Dutch navy consisted of 49 ships of the
line, of small size and inferior condition, but useful in shallow water, with
60 smaller craft. Thus the total strength of the Coalition was about 210
effective ships of the line, outnumbering the French by three to one, but
devoid of unity of control and command, and lacking sympathy in ideas and aims.
The naval war
in its earlier stages falls geographically into two campaigns, the northern in
the Atlantic and the Channel, the southern in the Mediterranean, while outside
Europe operations of minor importance were directed by England against the
French colonies. The Mediterranean campaign will be treated first.
In the summer
of 1792 the French government ordered the concentration of a squadron in the
Mediterranean to cooperate with the French army in the war against Sardinia.
This squadron of nine battleships under Rear-Admiral Truguet captured Oneglia
in October. The next operation was an attack upon Sardinia with 5000 troops, in
which Napoleon Bonaparte took part. On the night of February 15, 1793, in an
attempt on Cagliari, the troops were seized with panic and fled, declaring that
they were betrayed by their officers, whom they threatened to hang. At Maddalena
there was a not less discreditable failure, owing to the cowardice of the
seamen and the troops. Bonaparte himself, when he returned to Bonifacio, was
assailed by the crews with cries of “Hang the aristocrat.” This expedition,
though of small military importance, illustrates the difficulties which beset
French commanders. After these operations the French fleet returned to Toulon
and there
remained in
port, as the outbreak of war with England and Spain left it in a position of
dangerous weakness.
When war was
declared, the British fleet in the Mediterranean was composed of small craft
without a single ship of the line; and there was great delay in the despatch of
reinforcements from England. Not until June were 19 vessels of the line
concentrated in the Mediterranean under Vice-Admiral Lord Hood. In July, having
received further reinforcements, Hood appeared before Toulon with 21 ships of
the line to blockade the 17 French sail, which were known to be ready in the
port. Some weeks later, on August 22, two French commissioners came off to his
flag-ship, claiming to represent the Sections of Marseilles, and proposed to
him an alliance, the object of which was to be the reestablishment of the
French monarchy. Hood required that the port and fortress of Toulon should be
placed in his hands, and that the French squadron there should be put out of
commission and handed over to him, to be restored to France on the conclusion
of peace. The Toulonnais, in danger of starvation if the British blockaded the
coast, acceded to his proposals; and, early in the morning of August 28,
British seamen occupied the forts at the entrance to the harbour, while in the
course of the same day the British fleet entered the port. The French ships
offered no resistance, though there was great fermentation among the crews.
Admiral Trogoff, who commanded the French squadron, was in sympathy with the
anti-revolutionary party, and ordered other French vessels at various points on
the southern coast to move to Toulon and there surrender; but in this he was
not obeyed.
Just when
possession had been gained of the place, the British fleet was joined by 17
Spanish sail of the line under Admiral Langara. Subsequently the Neapolitan
fleet arrived with a small force of troops; and these again were followed by
various Sardinian detachments. But the presence of so many nationalities with
varying aims and each jealous of the other, and the divided command, militated
against the successful defence of the place. No large British expeditionary
force was available, though Nelson had very judiciously remarked a week before
the surrender that a great fleet was useless off the Toulon coast without
troops. The revolutionary government at once took steps to recapture the port
and concentrated a strong force against it. If the quality of the French troops
was bad, the unity of direction compensated for faults of equipment and
discipline. The French formed the siege of the town on the land side, while day
by day they received reinforcements which enabled them to attack vigorously. On
the other side, the allies were backward in sending troops, and Hood dared not
deplete his ships of seamen. He was indeed obliged to send to Malta for 1500
Maltese seamen to replace the men he had landed. In December the French, directed
by Bonaparte, stormed Fort Mulgrave, which commanded the entrance to the
harbour. It was evident that the defence of the port could not be much
prolonged,
and the
various allied commanders met in a council of war to decide upon the course to
be taken.
At this
council it was decided that Toulon should be evacuated, that the inhabitants
should be removed, provided they wished to leave the place, that the French
ships of war should either be withdrawn or destroyed, and that steps should be
taken to put these measures into execution that same night (December 17).
Langara promised to undertake the destruction of the French ships in the inner
harbour; the British undertook to attend to those elsewhere. On the 18th the
troops, where they did not retire precipitately of their own accord, were withdrawn
from the advanced positions, ready to embark; and the Republican army closed in
upon the doomed town. The Spaniards, however, whether from deliberate
treachery, of which they have been accused by some British authorities, or from
the difficulty of their task and the incompetence of their officers, which are
more probable explanations, failed to complete their work of destruction; and
the British, badly seconded by them, were unable to bum all the French ships.
In all only 9 ships of the line were thoroughly destroyed, and 4 more were
brought away by the British, leaving the enemy 14 efficient ships at Toulon; 4
had previously been sent away with French seamen of the Republican party to
Brest. Thus, of 31 ships of the line which Toulon had contained, 18 were
saved‘to France, and 13 ships of the line with 9 frigates lost, still further
reducing the strength of the French fleet. Nelson, early during the occupation
of the place, had urged the removal of all the French warships; but this
measure could not be carried out because of the opposition of the Spaniards and
the want of crews to navigate so large a fleet. On the recapture of Toulon,
which took place on December 19, most of the anti-revolutionary party among the
inhabitants were massacred, though nearly 15,000 men, women, and children had
escaped in the allied fleet.
During the
defence of Toulon a small British squadron had been detached to blockade
Corsica; and early in 1794 a British force disembarked on that island. Mainly
through the efforts of Captain Nelson, Bastia was taken on May 22, and on
August 10 Calvi capitulated. The island passed under the influence of England.
Meantime at Toulon the French authorities exerted themselves to the utmost to
repair the damage which had been done to their ships, and to equip a squadron
capable of acting against the British. They were so far successful that in
June, 1794, a squadron of seven sail of the line under Rear-Admiral Martin put
to sea with orders to cruise along the coast, for the purpose of training the
crews. Hood, who was off Corsica, at once proceeded in chase of the French with
thirteen ships and drove them into Golfe Jouan, where he intended to attack
them, but was prevented from carrying out his purpose by bad weather and the
strength of the French batteries ashore. The French fleet returned to Toulon,
and there remained while
its personnel
melted away. Complete disorder reigned in the harbour; the crews, having no
stomach for fighting without pay and with but little food, not unnaturally
deserted, till at the opening of 1795 there were but 2724 seamen left. This
remnant of a great fleet, however, was speedily reinforced, since, owing to the
bad dispositions of the British Admiralty and the ineffective watch kept upon
the forces at Brest, the French were able to send six ships of the line from
Brest to Toulon without molestation.
The situation
of the British fleet in the Mediterranean now became critical. Hood in vain
pleaded with the Admiralty for reinforcements and more attention to his
material needs; but his letters were disregarded, and finally he received an
order from London to strike his flag. His successor was the feeble Vice-Admiral
Hotham. The fleet continued in a wretched condition; the men were mutinous, and
a serious outbreak occurred in the Windsor Castle. Her crew assembled on the
lower deck, demanding the removal of certain officers, which was granted them.
The ships were ill supplied with provisions and stores, and there was a
shortage of 1400 men among the complements.
On March 3,
1795, Admiral Martin put to sea from Toulon with fifteen ships of the line,
having received orders to essay an attack on Corsica, for which purpose he had
embarked 6000 troops on board. His crews were made up in great part of soldiers
and landsmen ; most of his gunners were untrained; and the state of discipline
was still miserable. He might have been expected to fall an easy victim to the
British fleet, which sighted him on March 12, fourteen ships strong. Hotham,
however, did not order an instant attack; and next day, when he signalled a
general chase, the only ship that seriously attacked the French was Nelson’s
Agamemrwn. She assailed the French ship of the line, the fa Ira, which had lost
two topmasts through a collision; but as she received no support from Hotham,
and was indeed ordered by signal to rejoin the bulk of the British fleet, her
enemy escaped for the day. On the 14th the fa Ira, with another vessel which
had her in tow, was cut off and captured. The remainder of the French retired.
Hotham failed to profit by his subordinate’s energy, though Nelson went on
board the flagship and did his best to induce the admiral to follow up the
success. “We must be contented; we have done very well,” was Hotham’s remark,
in a phrase which has become historic. Thus was one of the greatest
opportunities in British naval history flung away, by a commander whose
appointment was one of the gravest blunders committed during the war. The
half-hearted, scrambling, indecisive action showed how inefficient even the
British fleet could be under an indifferent leader, and showed also what credit
is due to Nelson, St Vincent, and Duncan for their victories.
Though the
complaints of the fleet were bitter, Hotham remained in command, and lost a
second opportunity on July 13 of the same year.
The Admiralty
had now sent out reinforcements; for, after Hood had been driven from the
command, it was found that he had been perfectly reasonable and judicious in
his request for more ships and in his appreciation of the situation. But with
twenty-three British ships against seventeen French Hotham once more hesitated
to attack. When he did close his onset was half-hearted, and only resulted in
the destruction of a single French ship. Allowing for the defective condition
of the French vessels and their want of trained seamen, it would be difficult
to discover a worse performance on the part of the British navy than these two
battles. The failure of the British to achieve a decisive victory in the Mediterranean
had disastrous results, as it facilitated the conquest of Italy by the French
and so led to the rise of Napoleon. It was indeed fortunate for British
interests that in November, 1795, Hotham was replaced by Vice-Admiral Sir John
Jervis. Yet the change was not made because of any perception in London that
Hotham was a complete failure; on the contrary, there is evidence to prove that
he was still considered “well qualified to command,” and that the weakness of
his health was the only cause of his supersession.
On the
arrival of Jervis steps were at once taken to improve the discipline of the
fleet, which had fallen to a low ebb; officers were sharply directed to attend
to their professional duty; constant exercise with the great guns was enjoined;
fleet tactics and station keeping received great attention. At the same time
Jervis showed the able officers of his squadron, men such as Nelson and
Troubridge, that his eye was upon them; he gave them every scope for action and
was liberal of praise. Under this skilled direction the moral of the fleet rose
rapidly, and a close and efficient blockade of Toulon was maintained; while
Nelson was detached from the main body of the fleet to annoy the French and to
blockade the coast of northern Italy. With insufficient force and without the
numerous small craft required for such work he was not, however, able to
interfere seriously with their communications.
In the course
of the summer of 1796 the French successes in Italy and the growing hostility
of Spain augmented the difficulties of the British fleet. Jervis had obtained
his supplies from the Italian coast; and, when that fell under the influence of
the French, it was not easy to keep his crews in good health. In August, 1796,
the Spanish government concluded the Treaty of San Ildefonso with the French
government, and became the ally of France. Placed geographically as Spain was
upon the line of communication of the British fleet, the difficulty of
maintaining that line was now much increased, though little military danger was
to be apprehended from the ill-manned squadrons of the Spaniards. The Spanish
fleet at once escorted clear of the Mediterranean a French squadron, which had
been lying at Cadiz blockaded by a British division under Admiral Man. Man was ordered
by Jervis to join him off the Corsican coast; but he did so without taking in
provisions at
Gibraltar,
and had no sooner met Jervis than he was compelled to go back to obtain
supplies. He returned to Gibraltar, was chased by the Spaniards on the way,
lost nerve, and sailed off home, instead of rejoining Jervis. His conduct met
with no adequate punishment; for, though he was ordered to strike his flag and
was never again employed afloat, he was soon after made one of the Naval Lords
of the Admiralty, and employed in directing the strategy of the fleet which his
weakness had so gravely imperilled.
As it was,
the Spaniards with twenty-six sail moved to Toulon, though they ought to have
been strong enough with proper handling to have beaten Jervis, who was greatly
inferior in ships of the line. At Toulon they were joined by twelve French sail
of the line, raising their total force to thirty-eight battleships and a large
number of frigates. Jervis, in the face of such odds, had no course before him
but retreat. He evacuated Corsica, and with his whole fleet and a large convoy
of merchantmen reached Gibraltar in safety in December, 1796. Not for eighteen
months did the British navy show itself in force in the Mediterranean, which
was thus, owing to the behaviour of Man, given over to the enemy. The
abandonment of the Mediterranean left Italy at the mercy of France, and led
every ally of England to distrust her. The strategy that permitted such
weakness on so vital a station was thoroughly defective; for at this date
England had upon paper 160 ships of the line, which should have given her a
marked advantage against France, Holland, and Spain combined, at any point,
while the number of men borne in the fleet in the year 1796 was no fewer than
112,382.
It was now the
turn of the French and Spaniards to throw away their opportunities. For some
weeks they had Jervis at their mercy, but they did nothing. Early in 1797
Jervis moved northwards from Gibraltar, after many minor mishaps to his fleet,
escorted a convoy on its way to Brazil, and then received reinforcements, which
brought up his strength to fifteen sail of the line. With this force, late on
February 13, he sighted a Spanish fleet, twenty-five ships of the line strong,
off Cape St Vincent, on its way round from the Mediterranean to Cadiz, but
blown by the strong gales far to the west of its destination. The enemy were
under Admiral Don Jose de Cordova, an officer of excellent reputation. They had
chased Nelson, who was on his way back from a mission to the Mediterranean to
remove the naval depot at Elba. He rejoined Jervis’ fleet in the afternoon of
the 13th; and Jervis signalled to his squadron to clear for action.
At dawn of
the 14th the British fleet formed in two columns; and, as the morning mist
lifted off the sea, the Spanish fleet came into view to the south. The wind
blew from the west. Though the Spaniards were clearly in superior force, Jervis
resolved to attack, and bore down upon them, still in two columns. The Spanish
fleet was in great disorder, nineteen ships in one group, to windward, and a
smaller group of six
ships to
leeward, endeavouring to join the main body. Jervis’ tactics were to cut in
between the two groups with his fleet and attempt to overpower the larger. Just
before 11 a.m. the signal was made for the British ships to form in single line
ahead. The Culloden led the van, and as she neared the gap in the enemy’s line
which had just been crossed by three Spanish ships, found a fourth in her way.
But Troubridge, her captain, would not draw back, and with the words “ Let the
weakest fend off,” held on his course. The Spaniard yielded before him; he
broke the line about noon, as he passed through the gap in it, pouring two
double-shotted broadsides into the enemy with such precision that it was said
afterwards they had been fired as “ if by a seconds’ watch, and in the silence
of a port-admiral’s inspection.”
The two
portions of the Spanish fleet were thus separated by the interposition of the
British line moving southwards, and it now remained to reap the fruits of this
manoeuvre, by concentrating on a part of their force. Just as the Culloden
broke through the enemy, Jervis made the signal to his ships to tack or turn in
succession northwards, so that the van ships in the British line after passing
through the gap might renew the encounter with the main body of the enemy. At
this signal Troubridge gave a second proof of his seamanly judgment, for just
as the flaghoist floated to the yards of the Victory, the Culloden repeated the
signal, showing that she had it ready and was waiting for it. She tacked so
sharply that Jervis cried in delight, “Look at Troubridge there! He tacks his
ship to battle as if the eyes of all England were upon him.” Behind him the
ships of the fleet followed his example, exchanging fire meantime with the
Spaniards. The British fleet was now in the midst of the turn, in a line
V-shaped, with the main body of the Spaniards passing eastwards above the left
arm of the V, so that there was risk of their effecting a junction with the
smaller body. At this juncture Nelson, whose ship, the Captain, was last but
two in the British line near the head of the right arm of the V, and whose turn
to tack and move north would not have come for some minutes, saw what ought to
be done, and did it without awaiting any signals, thereby giving proof of an
initiative as necessary in the subordinate as it is rare. He wore his ship,
turned out of the line, and flung himself boldly upon the leader of the Spanish
fleet. It was an act of extraordinary judgment and independence, for at that
date initiative in the junior officer was not always kindly viewed by his
superiors ; captains and admirals had been cashiered or reprimanded for
breaking from the line of battle. But Nelson knew exactly the kind of enemy
with which he had to deal; years before, his observant eye had noted that it
took the Spaniards about twenty-four hours to form line of battle. His conduct
made the engagement decisive; without it the battle of St Vincent would have
brought no prizes, though the credit of confronting with success a far superior
fleet would still have remained to Jervis.
Nelson’s
onslaught on the Spanish fleet threw the enemy into complete confusion—a
confusion so great that one of the vessels he attacked was found after her
capture to have the tompions still in the muzzles of several of her
guns—conclusive proof that these had never been cleared for action or
discharged. He closed, and in succession fired into the Santisima Trinidad, on
which the white flag is said to have been hoisted, but which afterwards
escaped; into the San Josef, the Salvador del Mundo, and the Sam Nicolas. Most
of these vessels were of double his weight of broadside; and, but for the fact
that he had perfectly gauged the quality of his opponents, he might have heen
charged with criminal rashness. For some instants, too, he was left
unsupported. His action was so bold and unprecedented that it may well have
taken the ships astern of him by surprise. Collingwood, his lifelong friend, followed
him speedily, and the Culloden and Blenheim also came quickly to his aid, and
not before it was time, as the masts of the Captain were already shot away or
tottering, and the rapidity of her fire had been reduced, owing to the
exhaustion of the ammunition which had been collected on deck before the
opening of the battle. The Spaniards were driven back, and compelled to abandon
their intention of effecting a junction with the smaller body of their fleet.
Collingwood forced the Salvador del Mundo to strike, but without troubling to
take possession of her, attacked another enemy, the San Ysidro, and brought
down her flag. Nelson meanwhile drove his shattered Captain upon the San
Nicolas, boarded her, and with brilliant dash captured her; then, passing from
her to the San Josef, which was entangled with her, carried that ship too,
assisted by the fire which the Prince George was pouring into her.
About this
point the battle was broken off by Jervis. He directed his fleet to prepare to
bring to and cover the four prizes taken. The enemy were still left with 23
ships of the line, many of which had not been engaged, and two of which had
arrived during the battle, so that, had the Spanish admiral shown energy, or
had his crews been capable of making an effort, the case was by no means
hopeless. Of the British fleet five were severely cut up, and would have fought
at a great disadvantage. But the Spaniards made no attempt to renew the action;
and the British formed a close line-ahead, secured the prizes, set to work to
refit them, for they had been dismasted in the conflict, and remained all night
in this posture, repairing damage. At daybreak of the 15th the two fleets were
still in presence of one another; and, according to Spanish authorities,
Cordova offered battle, which was declined by Jervis. This is probable, for
Jervis had not attained to the ideal “not victory but annihilation,” and he
perhaps thought in Hotham’s phrase that he had “done very well.” But the battle
had proved the utter incapacity of the Spanish navy and had shown that little
was to be feared from its ships, whatever their numbers. The
British
admiral, too, must have learned, if he had cared to make enquiry from the
prisoners, that the greater part of the Spanish crews were landsmen, who fought
against their will, who wept when ordered aloft, and declared that they would
prefer to be killed on the spot rather than face a horrible death in so
perilous a service as handling the sails. When the Spanish admiral saw that the
English were unwilling to fight he did not persist in forcing battle upon them,
but edged off and returned to harbour. He was dismissed from the Spanish navy
for his feeble conduct, declared incapable of again holding any command, and
interdicted from residing in the capital or in any of the great naval ports of
Spain.
The British
loss in the battle was 73 killed and 227 severely wounded, the Captain,
Culloden, Blenheim, and Excellent suffering most. The Spanish loss is not
accurately known, but must have been considerable, as 603 men were killed or
wounded in the four ships captured. The forces opposed at the beginnir g of the
action were 15 British ships of 13,100 lbs. broadside to 25 Spanish of 19,980.
The credit
for the victory rests in large measure with Nelson, for Jervis does not appear
to have had any clear idea of what he intended to do; and, had his orders been
rigidly executed, the result must have been quite indecisive. In its moral
effects the success was of great importance. The news of it reached England at
a moment of acute depression, when the cry for peace was being raised and when
specie payment had been suspended. Though there was no mention whatever of
Nelson’s conduct in the official despatch, his name was in every mouth. So
competent a judge as Hood declared that he had immortalised himself, while the
press complained that he exposed himself too much, showing that the nation had
already come to hold his life a precious one. Jervis received a peerage, with
the title of Earl St Vincent; Nelson the order of the Bath; some days before
the news reached England he had been promoted in the ordinary routine to
Rear-Admiral.
The British
fleet followed up its victory, as soon as repairs had been made, by blockading
Cadiz, and was thus engaged when the mutinous movement in the navy, which had
begun in England during March, reached it. St Vincent repressed all signs of
disaffection with extreme vigour and severity, and there was no serious
trouble; but in the boat encounters with the Spaniards it was noted that the
men hung back, and did not fight with alacrity, though St Vincent attributed
their misbehaviour in part to the “ base cowardice ” of the officers in
charge. Be this as it may, the results came near disaster, as Nelson on one
occasion was badly supported and was in consequence all but taken by the enemy.
Nelson was next employed in a coup de main against the Spanish island of
Teneriffe; but there, on July 24-5, he met with a severe repulse, losing 251
men killed, drowned and wounded, and himself receiving a dangerous wound, as
the result of which his right arm had
to be
amputated, and he was compelled to return to England. St Vincent meantime
maintained with energy the blockade of Cadiz. The net result of the campaign in
the south up to the opening of 1798 was that the British had been forced from
the Mediterranean, had been unable to inflict a crushing defeat upon either the
French or Spanish forces in the south, and had been compelled to leave the
French squadron at Toulon unwatched.
In the north
of Europe, down to the beginning of 1797, no decisive victoiy was achieved by
the British, and French squadrons moved backwards and forwards in the Atlantic
without any great difficulty, convoying vessels from the French West Indies and
covering the coasting traffic. In July, 1793, Admiral Lord Howe was despatched
with a fleet of fifteen ships of the line, afterwards raised to seventeen, to
watch the French fleet under Morard de Galles, which was cruir.ing in the Bay
of Biscay, about seventeen sail of the line strong. Howe sighted this fleet
near Belleisle on July 31, and was in its presence for two days; but the
weather was unfavourable, his ships were slower than the French, and he could
not bring on an engagement. On his part, Morard de Galles had so much trouble
with his crews that he did not think of fighting, though on paper his fleet was
stronger than Howe’s; and he was*compelled, in part by want of supplies and
sickness among his men, in part by an insurrectionary movement among the crews
when they learned of the occurrences at Toulon, to return from Quiberon, where
he had put in for supplies, to Brest. The men pretended to think, or, perhaps,
really believed, that his object in taking the fleet to sea was to deliver it
to the British.
The strength
of the French squadron had now risen to 21 ships, but of these only four obeyed
the admiral; five obeyed at times, and the other twelve were openly mutinous.
The conduct of the men filled the Committee of Public Safety with rage, for,
though the revolutionists had begun by destroying all discipline, they were now
discovering the untoward consequences of such a policy. Four commissioners, of
whom the most famous was Jean Bon Saint-Andrd, were despatched to Brest to
reestablish order. Their first proceeding was to put to death, after trial
before a revolutionary tribunal, many French officers and seamen of republican
sympathies who had been sent round by the British from Toulon, where their
presence was dangerous, as they could not be nduced to espouse the cause of the
Bourbons. The next step was to remove Morard de Galles, who was a competent if
not a brilliant officer, and who had distinguished himself in the most glorious
days of the French navy, under Suffren. He was reproached with failure to
repress the insubordination of the men, though it was the Republican government
which had destroyed discipline, by allowing disorder among the men to pass
unpunished and by failing to support officer after officer who had
conscientiously striven to recall the crews to their sense of duty.
Rear-Admirals
Le Large, Landais, and Kerguelen, with whom there was no serious fault to be
found, and a number of captains, who appear to have been among the best
officers in the fleet, were removed from their ships, and in some cases sent
before the revolutionary tribunals and put to death.
The whole
fleet having thus been thrown into fresh confusion and deprived of the officers
who had been acquiring experience under Morard de Galles, it remained to find
new leaders. Four new admirals were appointed; a junior captain,
Villaret-Joyeuse, was promoted Rear- Admiral and Commander-in-chief, under the
delegate Jean Bon, who virtually had arrogated to himself the command; three
other junior captains, Martin, Comic, and Vanstabel, were made Rear-Admirals.
Before this reorganisation was complete a force of six ships of the line was
sent under Vanstabel from Brest to intercept a squadron, which, the French
government learned, was proceeding from England to Toulon, with a large convoy
of troop- and store-ships. The information proved inaccurate, but Vanstabel was
able to effect the capture of a part of another important British convoy, on
its way home from Newfoundland, thus inflicting considerable loss upon the
British. Less satisfactory from the French standpoint was the return to Brest
at the dose of the year of Rear-Admiral Sercey, who had been sent to the West
Indies on the outbreak of war, to escort home French shipping in that quarter
of the world, but had been compelled to return with his mission unfulfilled, owing
to delays caused by the civil war which had broken out in San Domingo and the
mutinous conduct of his crews. It was due to the remissness and unpreparedness
of the British that he was able to recross the Atlantic unmolested, for the
state of discipline in his ships was such that no dependence could be placed on
his seamen. A close blockade of the French ports by the British would have been
the surest method of preventing the French fleet from acquiring experience at
sea, covering the importation of supplies, and attacking British commerce.
During the
early months of 1794 the attention of the French government was concentrated
upon the safe arrival of a great convoy, laden with provisions, which had been
freighted by the French Minister in the United States. Owing to the anarchy
caused by revolutionary measures, cultivation of the land had greatly
diminished throughout France, and a large part of the population was in danger
of starvation. To protect the passage of this convoy Vanstabel was sent from
Brest at the close of 1793 with a division of battleships. The British navy
ought to have strained every nerve to intercept the French, and the surest
method of stopping them was to cruise off the French ports in strength. But
this was what Howe did not care to do; he was cautious, advanced in years, and
sincerely convinced that any fleet which blockaded must rapidly deteriorate in
material and moral. His great object, says his biographer, was “to save the
wear and tear of his ships ”
and not to
destroy the enemy. His policy caused much discontent in England, and the press
of the day attacked him bitterly, nor, it would seem, without justice. It is,
however, only fair to add that in 1794 he was hampered by orders to escort
several convoys.
Howe put to
sea early in May, 1794, with 32 ships of the line and 15 smaller craft, having
in his charge the convoys. When he had escorted them to the Lizard he divided
his force; with 26 battleships he cruised off Brest, awaiting the arrival of
the French convoy, of whose movements he had received information, while he
sent six ships under Admiral Montagu to take the convoys to the Spanish coast.
He cannot have watched Brest closely, for while he was to the west of Ushant a
fleet of 26 French sail of the line slipped past him from that harbour, under
the command of Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse. The French were in some degree
favoured by fogs; but, had the British cruisers been more alert or the
dispositions better studied, so large a force could never have evaded Howe.
News of what had happened reached him through an American vessel; and so
completely did he lose touch of his enemy that for a week he hunted for them in
vain. On May 25, however, two cruisers of the French fleet were seen, chased,
and captured; and moving north-east, to the quarter from which they had
appeared, on May 28 he saw a large fleet. The sea was rough, and a strong wind
was blowing from the south-south-west. Howe at once ordered his ships to
prepare for battle and closed upon the enemy in two divisions, with a flying
squadron of four ships, which had orders to attack the French rear.
The French
formed line of battle, but badly and slowly. Having no desire to accept an
action and leave Howe in the path of the convoy, they made sail tp draw the
British away to the south-east. Howe fell into the trap and pursued. A
scrambling action followed between the leading British ships and the stemmost
of the French, but neither side inflicted any disabling injury upon the other.
The French Revolution- naire and the British Audacious dropped away from their
respective fleets; and the Revolutionnaire might have been captured. As three
British ships were standing after her and pressing her closely, Howe signalled
to them to abandon the pursuit and rejoin the fleet, forming order of battle in
line-ahead. Owing to defects in the code of night signals he did not learn that
she was completely crippled. During the night he followed the French till in
the general chase his ships lost all semblance of a line and the fleet had to
reform at daylight of the 29th. The French had been reinforced in the night by
the arrival of another ship of the line, which, however, had to be detached to
convoy the Revolutionnaire. An attempt was made by Howe to attack and crush the
French rear, passing on opposite tacks. The French met this manoeuvre with
counter-manoeuvre and sustained no serious damage, in part because of the
misconduct of the ship Caesar, which led the British line, and was slow in
closing. The morning passed in desultory,
resultless
firing, and seeing that in this way there was no prospect of obtaining a
victory, Howe ordered his fleet about 1 p.m. to pass through the French line
and get to windward. The Caesar was again slow in obeying, and made no attempt
to break the French line; the other ships in the British van, with one
exception, the Queen, failed even to dose with the enemy; and the Queen, after
closing, found that there was no chance of breaking through—so well did the
French support each other, and such injury did their fire inflict upon her.
It was left
to Howe himself, in his flagship the Queen Charlotte, to set the example, and
show his followers the way through. Coming tenth in the British line, he forced
his ship through the French line, near the rear, but he was only followed by
two British ships. His manoeuvre, however^ seriously threatened the ships in
the French rear, and compelled the French van to turn to its support. The
movement of the van rescued the threatened ships, but not before they had
received serious injury; and a second time the fleets drew apart for the night,
without any decisive success having been obtained by either. On this day, however,
Howe had shown judgment and firmness; his failure was due to the disobedience
of his van ships. In the British fleet the Queen was much damaged; the French
had to send the Indomptahle back to Brest under the escort of another ship of
the line; a third ship of the line could not go, about, and parted company with
the fleet; a fourth was dismasted and had, to be taken in tow. Thus the French
fleet had been reduced during the 28-29th. from 27 vessels of the line to 21
efficients, while the British force had only fallen from 26 to 25, though of
these 25 many had suffered considerable damage. Not only this, but Howe had
worked to windward of the French, and now, if he chose, could force a decisive
battle upon them. If he had had with him the six ships, detached under Montagu,
he should have been able to strike a deadly blow and to annihilate the French.
As it was, on the 30th four ships of the line joined the French and brought
their efficient strength up to 25, while Howe’s detachment was still absent.
Thus he was once more on a footing of equality with his foe.
All the 30th
and morning of the 31st the weather was foggy; and, owing to difficulties in
the transmission of signals, neither fleet could fight. The fog lifted on the
31st, and the British closed once more on their antagonists, but could not
reach a position near enough for battle until the evening; and Howe, not caring
to take the risks of a night action, and knowing that many of his captains
lacked experience, drew off a little. Dining the night the French, whose ships
sailed better than the British, also drew away, but not enough to enable them
to avoid an encounter. On June 1 each side formed in line, the British in line-
abreast, the French in line-ahead, and Howe signalled the order to his ships to
pass through the enemy’s line, raking the vessels in it as they passed. He
intended his whole force to strike the French line
simultaneously;
and, to achieve this, his advance upon the French was slow. His object in
breaking their line and getting to leeward of them was to prevent the escape of
their disabled ships and to use his lower-deck guns with more effect. Once more
the conduct of the Caesar attracted unfavourable attention; at the left
extremity of the British line, a place of honour, she showed no eagerness to
close with the enemy, and opened fire at an excessive distance, throwing her
shots away.
Slightly in
advance of the fleet the Queen Charlotte with Howe’s flag reached the French
line about 9.30 a.m., but at a point three ships away from Villaret-Joyeuse’s
flagship, which Howe desired as a matter of etiquette to engage. He stood along
the French line, till he found his quarry; then he forced his way through the
line, brushing the French flagship’s stem, while one by one the British guns
were fired into her hull, with terrible effect. The Jacobin, close to
Villaret-Joyeuse, failed to give the French admiral any support and weakly
retired. The conflict was now general along the line, and the movements of the
two combatants were wreathed in smoke. There was no effort on the part of the
British to concentrate upon a portion of the French fleet and destroy it; on
the contrary, his ships were ordered by Howe each to pick out an antagonist.
The battle resolved itself into a number of ship combats, with little unity of
design or direction. One of the fiercest of these combats was that between the
French Vengeur du Peuple and the British Brunswick, which grappled each other
and fought broadside to broadside. In this encounter the British had the upper
hand, owing mainly to the fact that they were equipped with flexible rammers
for their lower deck guns. When the ships were touching, the French found it
impossible to load their lower deck guns with the ordinary ramrod. After three
hours’ fighting the two separated, leaving the Brunswick disabled and the
Vengeur desperately injured. The Vengeur was assailed by another British ship,
and all her masts were shot away; towards the evening it was evident that she
was sinking, and she made signals of distress. Some four hundred of her men
were rescued by the British; the others sank with the ship; and it appears to
be the truth that those who perished perished with the cry, “ Vive la
RepubUque,” though they did not, as has been pretended, refuse to surrender.
Many of the
French ships retired from the line early in the action and failed to support
their admiral; many others were dismasted and dropped behind the main body of
the two fleets in action, both drifting before the wind. Seeing that his fleet
was scattered, Villaret took his ship out of the battle to leeward and
signalled to the rest of his force to collect round him. This carried him away
from his injured ships and left the British fleet between him and them; but the
British, now that they had gained a great advantage, failed to make the fullest
use of it, and only won a success which Nelson, not without reason, qualified
with the stinging phrase “a Lord Howe victory.” Of the 12 French
vessels which
had suffered seriously and lost more than one mast, five eventually escaped.
The Vengeur was sunk; six others were captured. Howe felt fears for his fleet,
as the French still showed fight and turned fiercely upon the Queen, which in a
damaged state had dropped away from the other British ships. She was only
extricated from Villaret’s attack by the approach of the main body of the
British fleet. Howe was moreover an old man, and was physically exhausted by
the strain pf many days of chasing and battle. The Culloden and Thunderer,
while pressing after two disabled French vessels to secure them, were recalled
by signal, and the rest of the French fleet was permitted to escape. The British
loss in this series of battles was 290 killed and 858 wounded severely; while
the French are estimated to have lost 5000 men in tilled, wounded, and drowned,
though in this figure the losses in the captured ships are included. In weight
of metal the French were superior, in numbers equal.
The enemy on
the afternoon of June 1 were in a position of decided inferiority; of the 18
ships which remained with Villaret, four were unmanageable and only nine in
good fighting order; while the British had at least 15 efficient ships without
counting their prizes. A resolute pursuit would then and there have ended the
days of Villaret’s squadron. But as it was, Howe bore away for a dockyard, and
Villaret did the same. On his way back to port the French admiral was sighted
off Brest by the squadron under Montagu, which Howe had detached before the
battle, and which had subsequently been reinforced to a total of nine sail of
the line. Instead of keeping at a moderate distance and harassing Villaret,
which with his uninjured ships would not have been impracticable, Montagu
retired to England. On June 12, two days after Montagu had withdrawn, the
French convoy, which had been the immediate cause of the battle, entered Brest.
Thus the British had failed completely in attaining their strategical object,
and had only very imperfectly attained their tactical object—the defeat and
destruction of Villaret’s force. On the whole the French had no reason to be
greatly dissatisfied with this campaign. Their fleet, notwithstanding the disorganisation
caused by the Revolution, had confronted the force of Howe without suffering
complete disaster, and had secured the safe arrival of the great convoy in
France.
In the autumn
of 1794 Howe put to sea with his fleet, after a mutiny in the Culloden had been
suppressed and punished with severity, to escort various important convoys
clear of the Bay of Biscay. He looked into Brest; but no fighting resulted. In
November the French Admiral Nielly sailed from Brest with the object of
intercepting a British convoy homeward bound, but did not succeed in doing
this, though he fell in with the British 74-gun ship Alexander, and captured
her. In December Villaret-Joyeuse received orders to put out and escort
southwards a division of six ships which was destined for the Mediterranean,
and the
arrival of
which at Toulon some weeks later caused Hood so much uneasiness. Though the
British in no way interfered with Villaret, the French ships suffered seriously
from the bad weather, defective material, and the inexperience of the crews.
The Republicain was lost while getting out of Brest; three vessels sank at sea
owing to the damage done to their spars, rigging, and hulls in the battle of
June 1; a fourth ran ashore to escape the same fate; two others were compelled
to make for the nearest harbour to obtain supplies; and the six ships destined
for the Mediterranean, which were the only units in the squadron properly
provisioned, had to tranship to Villaret’s vessels so large a quantity of their
stores that they were unable to undertake the voyage to Toulon and were
compelled to return with Villaret to Brest. Seventy merchantmen were captured
from the British; but this was the only result achieved by risking the fleet.
The squadron for the Mediterranean filled up with stores and succeeded in
getting away from Brest on February %% 1795; eight days earlier Howe had put to
sea with a large fleet, but he made no attempt to blockade the French closely,
and speedily returned to Spithead, leaving his enemy free to go whither they
listed. The bitterness of the French towards the British was indicated by a
decree passed in December, 1794, by the Convention, which ordered that no
British or Hanoverian prisoners were to be taken. In practice, however, this
order was uniformly disregarded by the French navy, as steps were taken on the
part of the British to meet it with reprisals.
For some
months after its disastrous cruise Villaret’s fleet remained in Brest in a
battered condition without sufficient men to take the ships to sea. In May,
1795, however, it was once more in a condition to undertake operations; and a
small squadron under Rear-Admiral Vence was sent into the Bay of Biscay to
escort northwards a French convoy. Vence and his convoy were encountered on
June 8, off Cape Penmarck, by Vice-Admiral Cornwallis with five British ships
of the line and three small craft. Cornwallis’ mission was to keep a watch upon
Brest; he captured several of the convoy and drove Vence under shelter of the
batteries of Belleisle. Hearing of this Villaret put to sea from Brest with
nine sail of the line and a number of smaller ships, and attempted to cut off
Cornwallis. On June 16 he sighted the British detachment and at once gave chase
to it. The admirable nerve and seamanship of Cornwallis brought off the British
force intact. The French showed timidity in attacking, notwithstanding their
great advantage in numbers. Cornwallis was thanked, not undeservedly, by both
Houses of Parliament for his conduct on this occasion.
Villaret was
returning to Brest from his unsuccessful chase, when on June 22 he was sighted
by the main British fleet under Admiral Lord Bridport, who had temporarily
replaced Howe and was covering the disembarkation of a French royalist
expedition at Quiberon. The French fleet was twelve sail of the line strong,
the British main fleet
fourteen
strong, while three more ships were detached under Commodore Sir John Borlase
Warren to cover the landing at Quiberon. Yillaret, in the face of such odds,
with ships under his orders which paid no attention to his signals, could do
nothing but retreat; in the chase that followed his less efficient ships fell
to the rear; on June 23 the Alexander was recaptured by the British off lie de
Groix; the French Formidable was set on fire and compelled to strike; and the
Tigre was also taken. In the opinion of good French officers the whole of the
French fleet might have been captured, if Bridport had displayed energy and
determination; but he was content with his three trophies and allowed Villaret
to retreat to Lorient. There the French remained till the winter, when they
returned in twos and threes to Brest. As the coast was now clear, de Puisaye
with 2500 emigres landed at Quiberon on June 27, and captured Fort Penthievre,
but his victory was short-lived, since on July 20 the fort was recaptured, and
all who could not escape by sea were massacred. During this campaign the
British seized the small islands of Houat, Hoedic, and Yeu, off the French
coast, but failed in attempts to secure Belleisle and Noirmoutier. Yeu was only
held for a few months. Bridport remained at sea until the autumn, and then
returned to winter in port, according to the practice of the navy in the
earlier years of the war. Discouraged by these events, the French government
determined to abandon the policy of risking fleet action for the command of the
sea, and decided to use small squadrons for the attack upon British commerce.
In 1796 the
French, now assured of the assistance of Spain and Holland and freed from all
uneasiness as to the Vendee, prepared to attempt an invasion of British
territory; though in view of the fact that the British had everywhere asserted
their naval superiority and had even succeeded in seizing and holding the
islets of St Marcouf, w thin sight of the Norman coast, the chances of carrying
out such a project were but small. So far back as September, 1793, instructions
had been given by the Committee of Public Safety to prepare at Brest for the
disembarkation of a force of 100,000 men on the British coast; but owing to the
weakness of the French navy this order had remained a dead letter. In 1796,
however, General Hoche took up the project of invasion, and pressed it under
two distinct forms. The first was to land a small force of guerillas, recruited
from criminals and bad characters, who would simply effect a diversion; the
second was an expedition in force, which the Directory decided should be
directed against Ireland, then on the eve of rebellion.
An elaborate
and complicated project was drawn up in June, 1796, by the Directory, which
provided for the following expeditions: (1) against India, where a small force
was to be landed to aid Tippoo Sahib; (2) against Ireland, where the fleet
destined for India was to disembark 5000 men in Connaught; (3) another expedition
with 6000
Hache's expedition to Ireland.
4Y3
men was to
follow to the same quarter from Brest; (4) from Holland a third expedition,
5000 men strong, was to be directed on Connaught; (5) guerilla detachments were
to be landed in Wales and Cornwall, as diversions. But the French navy was not
given clearly to understand that these expeditions against British territory
were of great importance; on the contrary it was allowed to suppose that the
expedition to India was the primary interest, so that preparations were made
for this and not for the Irish enterprises. Hence arose conflicts between Hoche
and the French Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse. In the autumn of 1796 Hoche made a
journey to Basel, where he met the Irish insurrectionary leaders, Lord Edward
Fitzgerald and Arthur O’Connor, and on his return from this interview his plans
were modified. There was to be but one expedition to Ireland, accompanied by a
guerilla diversion on the English coast. The force employed was to be 20,000
strong, and instructions were issued in October to Villaret, giving the French
navy orders to make ready for the expedition to Ireland; but at the same time
the naval authorities were informed that the project aga'i f.i India had not
been abandoned.
Up to this
point the navy at Brest had been preparing for a distant expedition, and now
great changes had to be made in the fittings of the ships, so as to permit of
the conveyance of a large body of men for a short distance. Hence there were
fresh delays and more quarrels between Hoche and Villaret, who might justly
have complained of the want of concentration of purpose on the part of his
superiors at Paris. Hoche was at length directed to choose another admiral as
commander of his naval force; and he selected Rear-Admiral Morard de Galles,
who was experienced, but old, short-sighted, and lacking in decision. The state
of the fleet was deplorable. Of 16 ships of the line nominally ready at Brest,
on November 19, few were prepared to set sail; and no instructions had been
given to the captains. Everything was in “ utter disorder,” according to
Hoche’s own words. 13,897 men were, however, embarked; and, after waiting until
Admiral Richeiy, who had just returned to Brest with a small squadron from a
campaign in Newfoundland waters, was ready for sea, the flotilla set sail on
December 16, numbering 17 battleships, 13 frigates, and 15 other vessels. The
main British fleet was at that moment wintering at Spithead, under the command
of Lord Bridport; a detached squadron under Admiral Colpoys, 13 sail strong,
was cruising to the west of Brest; while closer in to the French port was a
detachment of five frigates and light craft under Captain Sir Edward Pellew. On
December 15 Pellew sent off a ship to tell Colpoys that the French were coming
out; on December 16 another vessel followed on the same mission; on December 17
a third was despatched to England. But at the critical moment when the news
reached England, Bridport, through the negligence of the Admiralty, was left
without instructions, which delayed his sailing for some days.
Thus the
strategic policy of keeping the British fleet in harbour during the winter
instead of blockading the French ports, combined with the slackness at
headquarters, gave the French an opening of which, fortunately for the British,
they were able to make but little use, owing to the bad discipline of their
fleet and the irresolution of their commanders.
Morard de
Galles’ instructions were to avoid fighting, and pursue tactics of evasion. On
leaving Brest he had ordered his fleet to make use of the Raz passage; but, as
night fell and the wind blew strong, he changed his mind and pushed through the
Iroise channel. Only a fraction of his fleet knew of this change of plan and
followed him; the rest of the ships, paying no attention to his signals, and
confused by deceptive signals which Pellew made, with the express purpose of
misleading the French as he clung to their force within half-gunshot, entered
the Raz passage, which is of extreme difficulty. From their want of training
the French ships fell into complete disorder. One vessel of the line struck a
rock and was lost; and though the others safely made the passage of the Raz,
when they reached open water they found that the flagship with Morard de Galles
was not in sight. The instructions in case of separation were to make Mizen
Head on the Irish coast and there cruise for five days. When Mizen Head was
reached the greater part of the expedition was found there, but Morard de
Galles and Hoche were missing. They had embarked in a frigate, and, being
chased by a British vessel, had been driven far to the west. Rear-Admiral
Bouvet, the senior French naval officer, gave orders to enter Bantry Bay, but
was only obeyed by a part of the force, either because of bad seamanship or deliberate
disobedience. On December 22, 16 vessels entered Bere Haven; 19 remained
outside the harbour, and on December 23 had disappeared, scattered by storms.
The ships
which entered the harbour carried only some fragments of the expeditionary
force; Hoche and Morard, who had the plans and the money, were still missing;
and Grouchy, the senior military officer, could dispose of but 6382 men with 8
unhorsed guns. Nevertheless he ordered a disembarkation on December 24i, when
the weather, which had been unfavourable throughout, became so stormy that to
effect a landing was out of the question. On December 25 several of the vessels
in the bay either drove from their anchors or had to weigh and put to sea,
among them Bouvet’s flagship. Those left in the bay followed their example
after a short delay. Bouvet hovered off the coast for a few days and then on
December 29 steered for Brest, short of provisions. Meantime other detachments
of the expedition entered Bantry Bay and there remained, waiting in vain, till January
6; when, as Hoche did not appear and nothing more was seen of the main body of
the expedition, they withdrew, and returned to Brest. As for Hoche and Morard
de Galles, they were unable to approach the Irish coast, owing to easterly
winds, until
December 29, when off Bantry Bay they fell in with two French ships, one in a
sinking condition and the other engaged in removing the crew and troops from
her. From them the commanders leamt of the retreat of Bouvet from Bantry Bay;
and, encumbered with men and short of stores, they determined forthwith to
return to Brest. They anchored off the lie d’Aix after being chased by the
British and aarrowly escaping capture, on January 13. Thus was England
delivered from what Wolf Tone declared with but little exaggeration to have
been her greatest peril since the Armada.
On learning
that the French expedition was at sea, Bridport’s sailing was delayed, as has
been seen, till January 3,1797, when he steered for Brest but failed to
intercept the French retreat. Colpoys, who should have prevented the escape of
the French fleet from Brest, had moved too far from that port; and, when he did
hear on December 19 that the enemy were at sea, he made no effort to find and
attack them, perhaps in part because he had the misfortune to sight a French
squadron on its way round from Toulon to Brest, and chased it. This drew him
away from the Irish expedition. Finally he was caught in a gale and compelled
to run to Spithead. But though the French thus evaded the main British forces,
they suffered heavy losses from collisions with British single ships and
frigate detachments; of the 45 vessels which set sail from Brest seven were
taken, while no fewer than six were wrecked or foundered. Such a heavy loss
from defective material or bad seamanship is the clearest evidence of the fact
that the French navy was at this date unfit to undertake so serious an
enterprise. A report, compiled from the statements of the captains, showed that
the crews were badly clad and unable to face the cold, and that they behaved
mutinously. Some ships were lost at sea because the men could not or would not
shorten sail. As for the British fleet, while the individual ships were
excellently handled, the strategy and generalship that permitted French vessels
to lie in or off Bantry Bay continuously from December 20 to January 6 without
molestation have excited well-merited censure. Nor were adequate preparations
made on land to concentrate a strong force against the French.
The diversion
which the French authorities had planned was even less successful than Hoche’s
expedition. A force of convicts and deserters, 1500 strong, was placed under
the orders of an American adventurer, Colonel Tate, and embarked at Brest, with
orders to destroy Bristol or Liverpool. A landing was to be effected in
Cardigan Bay. On February 22, 1797, the force disembarked from four ships on
the Pembroke coast, but there it was at once surrounded by British yeomanry and
militia under Lord Cawdor. The ships withdrew and it could not reembark. Without
any fighting it surrendered.
Two other
French expeditions to Ireland, in which the French navy cooperated, may be
mentioned here, though both took place in 1798.
The first was
the despatch under General Humbert in August, 1798, of 1099 men embarked in
three frigates. The object was to assist the insurgents in Ireland by giving
them the support of a nucleus of trained soldiers with a large supply of
ammunition and arms. The expedition sailed from Rochefort on August 6, and
standing far out into the Atlantic, reached Ireland unobserved, disembarked the
troops on the 22nd, and returned without misadventure to Prance. Humbert’s
force was too weak to effect anything serious and was landed in a remote comer
of Mayo, where the French found no adherents; yet it marched far into Ireland
before it was met by superior forces and compelled to surrender, on September
8, at Ballinamuck. The second expedition had been originally intended to sail
from Brest simultaneously with General Humbert’s force, but was delayed, as the
government could not provide a month’s advance pay for the troops, who were in
a pitiable state. When the money was found, the British fleet closed in on the
port; and an attempt to put to sea on August 20 had to be abandoned. On
September 16, however, the British were out of sight, as their main fleet had
retired to Torbay; and on that day 10 ships, eight of which were of the frigate
class, under Commodore Boinpard, with 2884 troops under General Hardy, and a
large supply of stores and ammunition for the Irish insurgents, put to sea from
Brest. On the 17th Bompard was seen and chased by cruisers detached from
Bridport’s fleet, and Bridport was informed that the enemy were at sea. The
French were followed and watched by three British frigates until October 4; and
during this long chase news was sent by the British senior captain to Ireland
that the Irish coast was the destination of the expedition. Bridport, as soon
as he learnt of the French movement, despatched three ships of the line and
five frigates under Commodore Sir John Borlase Warren to intercept them. On
October 11 this squadron sighted Bompard to the west of Tory Island, and, after
a long pursuit, attacked him on the 12th, capturing four of his ships. Three
more were taken in the next few days, and the three which were left could
effect nothing and returned to France. Bompard, and the Irish leader, Wolfe
Tone, were among the prisoners taken by the British in the captured ships. A
third small expedition, despatched from France in October under Commodore
Savary, reached Sligo Bay, but there learning of the failure of the other
expeditions hurriedly returned to France, and regained Rochefort in safety.
During the
early months of 1797 the British fleets in home waters were completely
disorganised by mutinies at Spithead and the Nore. In February petitions were
sent by four ships in the Channel fleet to Lord Howe, who had just relinquished
the command of that fleet and possessed great influence among the men. No
attention was given to them, as Bridport reported that there was no serious
feeling of discontent; but in
April, when
the Channel fleet returned to port, fresh petitions were received by Howe,
complaining that, while provisions had increased in price by 30 per cent., the
pay of the seaman remained at its old figure. It was pointed out that the
seamen had been overlooked when the pay of the land forces and militia was
augmented. The men protested that their requests for better pay were not
prompted by any spirit of disaffection or sedition; “on the contrary, it is
indigence and extreme penury alone that is the cause of our complaint.” On
April 12 the Admiralty received news from Admiral Parker, commanding at Portsmouth,
that a concerted scheme existed for the seizure of the Channel fleet on April
16. In a despatch to the Admiralty on April 15 Bridport expressed the hope that
the fleet would not be ordered to sea till some answer had been given to the
men’s request. When on that day the fleet received orders from London by
semaphore to get under way, the crews mutinied, ran up the rigging and cheered,
and elected a parliament of delegates from each ship. Vice-Admiral Sir Alan
Gardner picked out the best men and argued with them, but without effect; and
the admirals reported that it was impossible to think of vigorous measures
against the seamen. On the 16th the mutineers informed their officers that they
would wait two days for a reply from the Admiralty, and, if none arrived, would
put their officers ashore. A document detailing the men’s grievances was drawn
up by the delegates of the fleet; it showed the need of increased pay, asked
for better quality and full weight in the provisions issued, required that the
sick should be better cared for, that the wounded should be paid until they
recovered or were discharged, and that leave to go on shore should be given
when possible. There was nothing unreasonable in these requests; and in the
position in which England then stood it was of the utmost importance that they
should have been promptly granted, as day by day the mutiny spread and began to
assume a more threatening aspect. It was clearly a concerted and organised
movement, though the organisers are hot known.
Four members
of the Admiralty Board went down in great haste to Portsmouth, and on April 18
and 20 gave assurances to the mutineers that their grievances in the matter of
pay should be remedied. The men, however, required the King and Parliament to
sanction the proposals made by the Admiralty and to grant a general pardon. On
this Admiral Gardner declared with impolitic violence that every fifth seaman
in the fleet should be hanged—thus proving that the men had not without good
reason required an act of oblivion. A scuffle resulted, but no harm befell
anyone; indeed, throughout, in the words of an officer of the fleet, the “men
conducted themselves with a degree of prudence and decency which I thought them
incapable of.” Further concessions were inevitable; and on April 23 Bridport
was able to inform the men that the full redress of all grievances had been
conceded, and that the King had granted his pardon to all concerned in the
mutiny. Many
unpopular
officers had by this time been put ashore, especially those who had ill-treated
the men. Among the men’s complaints, as showing what occurred in some ships,
was one to the effect that in the Nymphe three dozen lashes with the
cat-of-nine-tails had been given for “silent contempt,” which meant smiling
after being flogged by the boatswain’s mate, and that the lieutenants in the
same ship regularly beat the men with the end of the fore-brace, a rope 4 in.
round. In the Marlborough the crew asserted that two quartermasters were hung
up to the rigging with their hammocks on their shoulders for an hour and a half
in cold weather, and that a man had died from flogging and ill-treatment at the
hand of Captain Nicholls—an officer whom the Admiralty ultimately removed.
On the 24th
part of the fleet dropped down to St Helen’s, the men expecting to receive the
news that Parliament had voted the grant necessary for the increase in pay. But
no such news arrived. The Admiralty preserved an attitude of secretiveness; in
the House of Lords all mention of the mutiny was deprecated, while in the House
of Commons there was delay in voting the supplies. Indiscreet speeches were
made in Parliament; and on May 1 the Admiralty issued an order directing
officers to use the most vigorous means to ensure proper discipline and
subordination. There was a minatory ring in this order which alarmed the men
and led them to think that faith was going to be broken by the Admiralty. On
May 7 the mutiny broke out afresh, as the fleet refused to obey Bridport’s
order to put to sea. Most of the ships were seized without much resistance from
the officers; but, on the delegates of the fleet proceeding to the London,
which carried the flag of Vice-Admiral Colpoys, a conflict ensued, an officer
was wounded, and the marines fired upon the men, with the result that there was
loss of life, five of the men being killed or mortally wounded. Lieutenant
Bover, who gave the order to fire, was seized; but even in the heat of the
conflict the men granted him a hearing, and though a rope was placed round his
neck they did him no harm, when Colpoys came forward and declared that he had
only obeyed orders. Colpoys himself was threatened with death, and was confined
on board, but in the end was allowed to go. On May 9 copies of the vote of
Parliament granting the increase in supplies were received, but did not allay
the ill-feeling. The extraordinary step was therefore taken by the government
of sending down Howe, with full power to redress all grievances. He arrived at
Portsmouth on May 11—none too soon, for there was talk in one of the ships of
sailing into Brest. On the 13th he induced the crews to express contrition for
their conduct, in return for which he removed the unpopular officers, of whom
34 were of and above lieutenant’s rank, announced the King’s pardon, and
persuaded the men to put to sea. Fifty boats manned with seamen escorted him back
to shore, and delayed the sailing of the fleet. Bridport complained that there
was “ no end to his difficulties ” as the result of the shock that discipline
had received.
The Spithead
mutiny ended on May 17 with the sailing of the fleet. There was a similar
outbreak, similarly met, in a detached squadron of the Channel fleet under
Admiral Curtis, which was lying in Torbay and which came round to Spithead in
defiance of all orders, remaining at Portsmouth after Bridport had sailed.
There was also sporadic trouble in the fleet throughout the summer and autumn,
and there are obscure traces of a political conspiracy to compel the government
to make peace. Yet throughout the mutinies the men protested their readiness to
fight, if the French put to sea, and made no attempt to keep in port the
frigates charged with the protection of British commerce. Admiral Patton
appears on the whole to have been right in declaring that the mutiny was caused
by the men’s hardships and not by “ revolutionary principles.”
At the Nore
and in the North Sea fleet, which was then under Admiral Duncan, watching the
Dutch fleet, a yet more serious outbreak occurred. On May 2 four of the North
Sea ships hoisted the red flag while lying at the Nore, sent their officers
ashore, and anchored across the Thames, beginning a semi-blockade of the port
of London. The trouble appeared at Yarmouth and infected the rest of Duncan’s
fleet. The mutinous ships at the Nore were day by day reinforced; they elected
committees and delegates, and on May 14 chose as their leader Richard Parker,
who had formerly served as midshipman, had been degraded by court martial for
insubordination and discharged as unfit for service in
1794, and had just rejoined the navy as a
“quota” man. They put forward demands far in advance of those of the crews of
the Channel fleet, requiring that leave should be given to the men in port as
matter of right, that prize money should be more evenly divided, and that the
articles of war should be recast and their penalties mitigated. At the same
time they insisted that the Admiralty Board should come to Sheerness and treat
with them. The Channel fleet having returned to obedience, the Admiralty
refused to grant these demands, but offered a pardon to the crews if they were
withdrawn. The seamen, however, declined to submit, fired on the fort at
Sheemess, moored their ships, which in early June had risen to 26 in number,
across the river, enforced a strict blockade, stopped 150 colliers and helped
themselves from these vessels when all supplies were cut off. The Admiralty
Board went down to Sheemess, but, finding the mutineers quite impracticable,
took strong measures. Parliament, on June 6, passed two Acts directed against
the mutineers, one of which forbade all communication with the fleet;
15,000 troops were collected on the coast; the
fort at Tilbury fired on the seamen; the buoys and beacons at the mouth of the
Thames were removed; the batteries on the river were directed to heat the
furnaces and use hot shot if necessary. There were reports that the mutineers
intended to carry the ships over to the French coast; but these do not seem to
have had any real foundation, as the delegates bound themselves
by oath to
have no dealings with any “Jacobins,” protested their loyalty, and on the King’s
birthday fired a royal salute. As the result of the government’s vigorous
measures the mutiny collapsed; and, not without some bloodshed, the vessels
concerned in it submitted one by one. Parker was arrested on board the Sandwich
on June 14, which was the last day of the mutiny. Twenty of the delegates
escaped to France in small boats, but the rest were seized and brought to
trial. Parker, with several others, was condemned to death and executed; many
were flogged round the fleet; and 180 were detained in prison till the victory
of Camperdown, when they were pardoned by the King. At his execution Parker
protested against the ill-treatment to which the seamen were too often
subjected by their officers. It was held by some naval officers that this particular
mutiny was due to political intrigues and the incitement of an extreme section
of the Opposition; but of this no definite proof has as yet been discovered.
Other minor
mutinies occurred in 1797 in the Mediterranean fleet and in the squadron on the
Cape station, but were suppressed without much trouble. In the West Indies,
however, there was a horrible outbreak on board the frigate Hermione, whose
crew, on the night of September 22, rose, killed in cold blood ten of the
officers, and carried the ship into the Spanish port of La Guayra, where they
delivered her into the hands of the enemy. In one or two other ships on foreign
stations there were similar plots, which did not, however, succeed. The feeling
of discontent and disaffection lingered on in the navy for many years, and
caused some uneasiness on the eve of Trafalgar.
It has always
been a source of surprise that the French government made no use of these
mutinies to strike at Ireland or England, since after the return of the French
ships from the unhappy expedition to Bantry Bay in 1797 there were 30 ships of
the line and 14 frigates at Brest under Admiral Villeneuve. These ships,
however, were short of men, having only 15,616 officers and men on board,
whereas their full complement should have been 23,928. The state of discipline
was bad; and there was a general want of stores and equipment. Nothing whatever
was attempted before the end of June; and the opportunity was allowed to pass,
never to recur. An explanation of this inactivity may perhaps be found in a
letter of the French Minister of the Navy to Hoche in June, 1797, wherein he
states that in the existing condition of fermentation in England it would be
unwise to attempt an invasion, as this would unite the nation in resistance to
the invaders; England was to be left to work her own ruin. But, as the same
letter adds that the argument does not apply to Ireland, the French inaction is
not entirely explained.
The mutiny in
the North Sea fleet might well have led to disaster had the Dutch been able to
put to sea during its continuance. In 1795
the Batavian
Republic joined the enemies of England;,, and concluded a treaty with France,
which contained the stipulation that Holland should place 12 ships of the line
and 18 frigates at the disposal of France. The Dutch fleet, though ill-equipped
and not too well affected to the French, had thenceforth to be closely watched;
and this duty was undertaken by Admiral Duncan with the North Sea fleet,
assisted by:a Russian squadron under Admiral Hanikoff. The work was performed
with complete success all through 1795 and 1796; in the autumn of 1796 plans
were made by the British for an attack on Texel Island, but owing to bad
weather it was impossible to execute them. The danger from this quarter grew
greater, when a large force of men was collected on the Dutch coast and a
beginning was made at Dunkirk with the construction of a flotilla of small
craft by a Flemish officer in the French service, Captain Muskeyn. In May,
1797, at the date of the Nore mutiny, the Dutch fleet was reported to the
British government to be preparing for sea, with 42 large transports. The
secret information added that there was little doubt that an invasion was
contemplated. Orders were at once issued to Duncan, then lying at Yarmouth, his
base, to blockade the Dutch or bring them to action. The Russian fleet was
under orders to return to Russia and could not be employed. Duncan, owing to
the mutiny, could only induce 12 of his ships to put to sea, and being detained
by calms off Yarmouth was deserted by all of these except two, the Adamant and
his flagship, the Venerable. By his tact and decision he kept the crews of
these ships loyal at a most critical moment, though he had great trouble with a
mutinous section among the men. With the two ships he boldly undertook the
blockade of the Texel, in which were lying 14 Dutch sail of the line.
The Dutch do
not appear to have been aware of his weakness, as it was the British custom
when blockading only to keep one or two ships close up to the hostile port, and
the others within signalling distance, but out of sight of land. They were,
too, troubled with disaffection among their officers and seamen, while the
French authorities did not bring pressure to bear to secure the sailing of the
fleet until June 21. On that date the Directorate urged that the ships at the
Texel should put to sea as speedily as possible for Ireland with 20,000 men. At
the same time 6000 mien were to sail from Brest in 12 ships of the line. After
five days of great anxiety, from June 5 to 10, in which Duncan asserted his
determination, if attacked, to sink with his two ships in the fairway, the
peril passed and he was reinforced. All through the summer the blockade was
effectively maintained until September, when, ^paring that the Dutch ships had
disembarked their troops, he returned to Yarmouth, leaving only a small
squadron to observe their movements.
He was at
Yarmouth when on October 9 a cruiser brought him the news that the enemy under
Admiral de Winter had put to sea. They had sailed with the intention of
disembarking a force on the Clyde, and so
impelling the
British government to recall its troops from Ireland. On the eve of their
departure Hoche, the life and soul of these enterprises against Ireland, had
died of tuberculosis. The fleet was sent out to oblige the French government,
notwithstanding the protests of.de Winter, who had repeatedly insisted on the
utter futility of an isolated encounter with the British for an object which he
considered chimerical. On October 11 the Dutch, 16 ships of the line strong,
were sighted off Camperdown by Admiral Duncan, who also had 16 ships. A strong
wind was blowing from north to north-west; Duncan was moving southwest, while
the Dutch were standing north-eastwards towards the Texel, so as to bring a
friendly port under their lee. In a straggling line they confronted the British
fleet, which after giving chase and closing with them, formed in a slanting
line abreast, parallel to the Dutch fleet, so as to strike, simultaneously all along
the Dutch line. At 11.25 a.m. Duncan signalled to his ships each to select and
engage an antagonist. He made no attempt to concentrate superior numbers upon a
detail of the enemy; and in this his tactics represent the common procedure of
the British navy before Nelson showed the better method. But at 11.53 he issued
another order which stamps him as a capable and daring leader; his ships were
to break through the Dutch line and engage to leeward. The movement would place
the British fleet in the line of the Dutch retreat and render a decisive battle
certain; it also gave some tactical advantage, since in stormy weather the
ships in the windward line would experience difficulty in opening their lower
deck ports, and would find that the guns ran out by gravity, after the recoil,
before they could be secured and loaded. On the other hand, with the strong
wind that was blowing, Duncan risked losing disabled ships on the dangerous
coast, not far distant.
The battle of
Camperdown, or Kamperduin, was not, as had been planned, a mere ship-to-ship
encounter. Whether by mistake, as the result of the hoisting of an incorrect
signal in the flagship, or by instinct, the British, when they struck the Dutch
line, effected a concentration upon the rear, with the result that the enemy’s
resistance in that direction terminated after an hour of fierce fighting, in
which the loss on either side was very heavy. Some of the Dutch ships struck,
others fled from the line. The British ships disengaged by this success moved
up towards the centre, where Duncan was bearing the brunt of the battle with a
small group of (ships, and was as yet making small headway. The
British Venerable and Ardent were in great peril; the Ardent lost one- third of
her crew, and the Venerable had so many hits betwixt wind and water that the
pumps could scarcely keep the water under; when a fire broke out in the Dutch
Hercules, it was at first supposed in the British fleet that the Venerable was
burning. But with the arrival of the victorious British ships from the Dutch
rear the pressure on Duncan ■was removed and the battle in the centre
inclined decisively against the Dutch. Soon after 3 p.m. the firing died away
along the Dutch line,
1797-8] Bonaparte's plans for
invasion. 483
and the Dutch
flagship Vryheid, with Admiral de Winter on board, lowered her colours. :
.
Of the 16
Dutch ships nine were taken by Duncan, while two Dutch frigates were also
secured by him. Seven ships of the line escaped, one or two bolting
ignominiously from the conflict, but in a very damaged condition. The British
fleet was considerably superior in weight of metal, with a broadside of 11,501
lbs. to the Dutch 9857. The losses -as returned were in the British fleet 203
killed and 622 wounded, and in the Dutch fleet 1160 killed and wounded.
The Dutch
losses, however, were never accurately known, and the figure given includes
slightly wounded who were not counted in the British returns; the casualties
were therefore probably about equal on either side. The Dutch prizes captured
were in a shattered condition, while the victors also sustained great damage.
The victory destroyed the fighting power of the Dutch navy and dispelled all
fear of an invasion from Holland. In August, 1799, the work achieved at
Camperdown was completed by the despatch of a combined expedition to Holland,
which captured the Texel and twelve remaining ships of the Dutch fleet without
bloodshed. '
Soon after
the defeat of the Dutch at Camperdown the French government once more turned
its attention to the invasion of England, and in October, 1797, appointed
Bonaparte, then fresh from his Italian victories, to command the French
expeditionary force. Early in February,
1798, Bonaparte visited the French coast near
Calais, despatching other of his most trusted officers to examine other points.
As the result of his journey he matured the idea of employing a flotilla of
small craft; but his final conclusions were that to effect a landing in England
without oeing master of the sea would be the “most temerarious and difficult
operation ever attempted,” that the French fleet was then unequal to such an
enterprise, and that the enterprise could only be accomplished Tjy surprise. He
pointed out that much time must elapse before the necessary preparations could
be completed, suggested that the best method of procedure would be actually to
renounce all idea of an expedition against England, while still appearing to
prepare for it, and advocated, as a means of compelling the British to make
peace, an expedition to the Levant, which would threaten British commerce. This
report was drawn up on February 23, 1798, and was the precursor of the Egyptian
expedition.'
The British
navy in this period was not less successful in its minor than in its major
operations. Throughout the war isolated ship encounters occurred, in which
almost without exception the British had the upper hand. Some of their
victories were won with consummate ease, owing, no doubt, to the complete
disorganisation of the French as the result of the Revolution.' :
Thus in four single ship actions at the opening ot the war the British took
their opponents without themselves losing a life,
and inflicted
in these four instances casualties of 81, 51, 42, and 20. In some cases the
small loss of the British was due to the French practice of firing to dismast,
which brought defeat on the French in action after action. But the French
shooting was always so bad that French captains were able to make little use of
the superior construction and better lines of their ships. As for the Spaniards,
they were worse seamen than the French, and their hearts do not appear to have
been in the war with England, so that they proved feeble antagonists.
By
interrupting communications between the various colonies of the nations at war
with England and the mother-countries, the British navy facilitated the
reduction of most of the foreign possessions of France and Holland. At the
close of the eighteenth century great economic importance attached to the West
Indies; and it was there that the most important conquests were made. When war
broke out between France and England, the British were called in by the
Royalists of San Domingo and occupied Jeremie, St Nicholas-Mole, and Leogane
without resistance. The French island of Tobago was also captured by the
British in 1793. In the following year a combined expedition under Vice-Admiral
Sir John Jervis and General Sir Charles Grey attacked Martinique and mastered
that island without any great difficulty, following up this success with the
conquest of Santa Lucia and Guadeloupe. Guadeloupe, however, was retaken by,
the French, on the arrival of croops from France, as at this date the French
coast was not closely blockaded and it was possible for considerable
expeditions to cross the iea unobserved.. Other successes were obtained by the
British in San Domingo. But in 1795 the French in Guadeloupe, receiving further
reinforcements, took the offensive, and succeeded in capturing Santa Lucia and
stirring up troublesome insurrections in Dominica, St Vincent, and Grenada. In
1796 the British forces; in the West Indies were strengthened and the tide
turned; Santa Lucia was reconquered; St Vincent and Grenada were reduced to
order. Possession was also taken of the Dutch colony of Demerara; while in
1797, when Spain joined in the war against England, Trinidad was wrested from
her, and an unsuccessful attack was made upon Puerto Rico. In 1797 and 1798 the
towns in San Domingo, of which the British had taken possession, were handed
over to the negro general, Toussaint l’Ouverture. In 1799 the most important
Dutch colony that remained in this part of the world, Surinam, was captured.
On the
Newfoundland coast, possession was taken of the French islands of St
Pierre-Miquelon on the outbreak of war. In the East Indies the French colonies
were captured without difficulty in 1793; and in 1795 the Dutch colonies; of
Ceylon and Malacca and the scattered settlements on ,the Indian coast were
overpowered by small conjoint expeditions. Amboyna and the Banda Islands were
seized in 1796. The Dutch half-way house to India, Cape Town, was attacked in
August,
1795, by a British expedition under
Vice-Admiral Sir George Keith
Elphinstone
with a small body of troops; and, on the British receiving reinforcements from
India, the Dutch capitulated in; September. There was some
insignificant'fighting on the-Sierra Leone coast and on the Madagascar coast
between the British and the French.
A certain
want of strategy and■ method is manifest- in the British minor
operations. No attempt was made to reduce the French colonies of Bourbon and
the Isle of France on the flank of the route to India, whence the French were
able to prey upon British East Indian commerce. In the West Indies the
successes gained by England were of a precarious nature, owing to the manner in
which French squadrons were permitted to cross the Atlantic and to throw in
reinforcements. It was not until a rigorous blockade of the French coast was
enforced by the British navy that the British conquests in this quarter were
finally rendered secure. No attempt was made by the British to attack the
important Spanish possession of Cuba, and Puerto Rico was not seriously
threatened. The colonies of Spain on the American mainland were in the same way
left untroubled, probably because the troops could not be spared to deal an
effective blow against them.
A large
number of British frigates and corvettes patrolled the Bay of Biscay, where the
greatest danger to commerce from the enemy’s cruisers and privateers was to be
apprehended. A strong cruiser squadron under young and enterprising officers
ranged from Cherbourg to Finisterre, and was supported by other divisions of
two, three, or four cruisers, which were found more effective than single
ships. Yet notwithstanding the fact that the number of British frigates and
corvettes steadily rose, till in 1799 it reached 349, the enemy’s depredations
on British commerce were serious. In the years 1793-1800, 3466 British
merchantmen were taken by the enemy, of which 700 were afterwards recaptured by
the British cruisers. The heaviest loss was incurred in the year 1797* A list
prepared by Norman, from what data it is impossible to ascertain, shows the
following results, year by year, for British merchantmen taken by the French,
and French privateers captured by the British, and affords some test of the
intensity at various times of the attacks on commerce:
1793 1794
1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800
British
Merchantmen taken
by
the French 352 644 640 489 949 688 730
666
French
Privateers taken by
the
British ' 44 9 23 41 134 136 104 65
The figures
in this list do not agree with those given above, which are based on Lloyd’s
List.
As the result
of these losses the insurance rates on British shipping were raised by the
underwriters, and there was a natural tendency for British merchants to give
neutral bottoms the preference. But,
fortunately
for England, there were no neutral navies strong enough to afford adequate
protection to neutral commerce; and the two great belligerents treated neutrals
with such severity that the rates of insurance on neutral shipping rose in the
years 1797-9 to a higher point than on British bottoms, and thus brought about
a reaction. The following were the clearances during the years 1792-1800 from
England outwards of vessels, British and foreign, engaged in the foreign trade
(the figures give thousands of tons).
1792 1793
1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 British 1561 1240 1382 1145 1254 1103 1319
1302 1445 Foreign 175 187 218 382 478 396 365 414 685
The heavy
losses of British shipping in 1797 led to the enactment of the Convoy Act in
1798, forbidding vessels to sail without escort; and this produced a great
diminution of captures by the French.
But if
British shipping suffered, French shipping by 1799 had vanished from the sea.
The French government in its exasperation aimed decree after decree at British
trade without effect; but at the same time with singular shortsightedness it
plundered and annoyed neutral shipping to such an extent that this shipping
avoided the French ports, and French trade was left without outlets or inlets
except towards the Continent. Thus, while grass grew in the streets of Havre,
the British shipowner flourished, and British trade expanded under the aegis
of the dominant navy. The expansion might' have been even greater had the
British strength been more intelligently used, for throughout this war there
was no attempt at the Admiralty to work out a comprehensive plan for commerce
protection. Yet the trade supplied the sinews of war, and produced that wealth
which enabled the nation to hold its own, while France was progressively
impoverished, and driven to a disastrous policy of plundering other nations,
which meant perpetual war with her neighbours. French 5 per cents in 1797, the
year of the mutinies in the British navy, were at 20; British 3 per cents at
49. Marseilles was a city of the dead; the streets of Bordeaux were no longer
lighted at night; at Calais the arrival of a ship was so rare an occurrence
that crowds poured out to witness it. While the declared value of British
exports was .£31,252,836 for the year ending January 5,
1799, French over-sea trade had practically
disappeared, and was represented only by exports aggregating a few thousand
pounds.
THE
DIRECTORY.
The history
of the Directory covers a period of four years—November, 1795, to November,
1799. Apart from the rise of Napoleon and the national bankruptcy its main
interest lies in the failure of the attempt to substitute a constitutional for
a revolutionary government.
The Constitution
of the Year hi had great merits;
it was based not on a priori doctrines or metaphysical theories but on
experience. The separation of the legislative and executive functions, the
system of indirect and limited suffrage, the division of large towns into
separate municipalities, were measures dictated to the framers of the
Constitution by their personal knowledge of the events of the Revolution. The
one defect justly attributed to it, the denial to the Directors of the power of
dissolving or adjourning the Chambers, would not have been fatal had the
Constitution fairly started on its career. But this was not the case; quite
unconsciously its authors dealt it a fatal blow by the law passed a few days
after its completion enacting the retention in the Carps Legislatif of
two-thirds of the Members of the Convention for the first and of one-third for
the second year.
Unjust as
this law may have been in theory, and impolitic as it proved to be in fact, it
appealed with irresistible force to the instinct of self-preservation, the
leading motive of the members of the Convention, as of all bodies of men. The
one known sentiment of the electors throughout Prance was their desire to be
rid of the Convention, while in the southern Departments a further desire was
manifesting itself, a desire for personal vengeance. The life of a member of
the ex-Terrorist party seeking reelection would not be Worth an hour’s purchase
if he fell into the hands of one of the Companies of the Sun or of Jesus.
Moreover, a large proportion of the members were poor men, who had years ago
lost their former means of living and were now dependent on the Convention for
their daily bread. A year or two of peaceful progress might materially modify
their present position and give them a fairer chance of a hearing. Under the
influence of these considerations, it is not wonderful that the Convention was
for once agreed and that the decrees retaining the “ two-thirds ” passed with
hardly a dissentient voice. Unhappily, even
the
Convention had not fully realised the hatred and horror which its rule had
inspired. The Sections of Paris rose in insurrection ; and this insurrection
led to a series of events which wrecked the prospects of the new Constitution
before it had come into working existence, and perpetuated many of the worst
features of the Revolution for four years. First came the interference of the
army in civil discord, secondly, the reconversion of the Thermidorian party
into Jacobins and the fatal Law of October 25 (3 Brumaire), thirdly,, the
formation of the “Two-Thirds” into a party bitterly hostile to the new members,
with a temporary majority large enough to enable them to secure five Directors
chosen from their own party. Each of these successive steps led directly to the
coup d’Hat of September, 1797, and to the destruction of the Republic.
Under the new
Constitution the system of election was indirect. The electors, ‘consisting of
all citizens over 21 years, able to read and write, and following a trade or
liable to taxation, met in Primary Assemblies in each Canton and elected the
members of the “Electoral Colleges,” who in their turn assembled in the chief
town of the Department, and in ten days of uninterrupted sittings elected
Deputies, Judges, and Administrative Officers. In future years (except during
the year 1796, when no elections were to take place) the Electoral Colleges
were ordered to assemble on April 10; but on this first occasion they met on
October 20, to elect the Deputies to the Corps Legislatif, 493 of whom (forming
the two-thirds less those to be returned by the colonies) were to be members of
the Convention. On October 29 their task was completed ; but only 389 Members
of the Convention had been returned, leaving 104 to be co-opted by the elected
Conventionalists themselves. The failure to return the necessary number was due
to the fact that the members of the Right of the Convention had been elected
for many Departments and the members of the Left for few or none. Thus Boissy
d’Anglas was returned for seventy-two constituencies, Lanjuinais for
sixty-nine, Thibaudeau for fifty-two, Saladin for thirty-six.
The
newly-elected “ Third ” were for the most part men of character and reputation;
many of them had sat in the Constituent or Legislative Assemblies; others were
lawyers of note, former magistrates, Intendants, or military officers, such as,
to name a few only, Dupont of Nemours, Mathieu Dumas, Barbe-Marbois, Tronchet,
de Seze, Pastoret, and Dumo- lard, the last-named a man gifted with a fatal
fluency which brought small advantage to his friends.
The result of
the election would have been to give a majority in either Chamber to the
Moderate or Constitutional party had it not been for the necessary cooptation
of the hundred and four unelected members of the Convention. As all the members
of the Right and Centre were already elected, it was possible only to coopt the
least obscure or least notorious Conventionalists, but these were sufficient to
give the Conventional or Revolutionary party a majority, temporary and fluctuating,
but
sufficient to outvote the. new “ Third ” and their allies, the members of the
Right of the Convention.
Ineffectual
in the Chambers, the elections were conclusive as to the state of public
opinion throughout the country. The Revolution had undoubtedly benefited many
classes, above all the farmers and peasants who formed the bulk of the
electors. It had abolished the taille and the feudal dues, and had enabled the
farmer to buy the land for which he craved, at an almost nominal price. As Thibaudeau
said, the fall in the assignats, while it had ruined the large proprietors and
rentiers, had made the fortunes of the farmers. On the other hand there
remained bitter memories of the tyranny and exactions of the Representatives on
Mission, of the howling Jacobin mobs, of the Revolutionary tribunals and
commissions, of the guillotine. These were attributed to the Convention and its
Committees, while the solid gains were held to be due to the Revolution itself.
Liberty, Equality, and the Rights of Man, were terms which had lost all charm;
universal ipathy, a hatred of politics, and a longing for peace, had, in the
early days of the Directory, succeeded to the fever and enthusiasm of former
years; all that the electors now desired was to close the Revolution and to
secure their gains against the tyranny of the Convention, and against the
return of the King, the nobles, and the clergy, lest these should question
their right to the property purchased from the estates of the emigres, the
Church, and the national domain. Therefore they returned as their
representatives men whom they could trust to give them a settled government
under a Republican Constitution.
On October 26
the Convention dissolved itself. On the following day the new body proceeded to
elect from among its own number the two hundred and fifty members of the
Council of the “ Andens ” : this done, the Chambers separated, the Andens
taking possession of the Hall in the Tuileries, in which the Convention had
sat, and the Five Hundred of the Manege, the meeting place of the Constituent
Assembly. The election of the Directors occupied the next three days. A meeting
of the leaders of the Conventional Party, held immediately before the election,
had decided that the Directory should be formed of five Members of the
Convention, all of whom had voted the death of Louis XVI. The decision was one
of self-defence; in view of the general hatred of the Convention shown by the
electors, they held it essential to their safety that the executive should
consist of men threatened as they were and bound in defending themselves to
shield their late colleagues also. A list was therefore drawn up, beginning
with the names of the five candidates favoured by the Conventionalists,
Larevelliere-Lepeaux, Sieyes, Rewbell, Barras, and Letoumeur, followed by the
names of forty-four perfectly unknown persons and ending with that of
Cambaceres. The election was a first trial of strength between the two parties;
the members of the new “ Third ” voted for Cambaceres and Larevelliere, but
the
490
Larevelliere-Lepeauoc.
—Rewbell. [1795-6
Conventional
majority prevailed, and on November 1 the five Directors of its choice were
elected by the Anciens. Sieyes declined to accept office on the ground that he
was unfitted for the post and was unpopular with every party. The reason was
partly true. Sieyeis was unfitted to be one among five rulers; his method was
to pronounce his decision epigrammatically; he never condescended to argue or
to compromise; he had also a strong personal dislike to Rewbell; and he bore no
good-will to the Constitution which had been preferred to a scheme of his own.
Carnot, who had been designed for the Ministry of War, was elected in his
place; and the Directory was complete.
On November 3
the Directors installed themselves in the Luxembourg Palace and proceeded to
appoint their six Ministers, Merlin of Douai, Minister of Justice; Benezech, of
the Interior; Delacroix, of Foreign Affairs; Admiral Truguet, of the Navy;
Aubert-Dubayet, of War; and Faipoult, of Finance: the last-named was removed
three months later, and was replaced by Ramel de Nogaret. In the spring of 1796
a seventh Ministry, that of Police, was created, to which Merlin was appointed;
on his return to the Ministry of Justice a few-weeks later he was succeeded by
Cochon de Lapparent.
Louis-Marie
de Larevelliere-Lepeaux, the first of the Directors to be elected, was an
avocat by profession, and had sat both in the Constituent Assembly and in the
Convention. He was slightly deformed in person, awkward, ill-tempered,
inordinately vain, and a dreary, platitudinous speaker; he had been a member of
the Girondist party and still held to their faith and to their prejudices. His
prevailing passion was an intense hatred of Christianity and of the clergy; the
sight of a priest, to use Barras’ phrase, “convulsed him”; and this hatred was
strengthened by his attachment to the sect of Theophilanthropists to be
described hereafter. The efforts made by the Constitutionalists to obtain some
sort of toleration for the clergy attached him, after a short wavering, to
Rewbell and Barras; and thus was formed a permanent majority of the Directors
opposed to the Constitutional party. There is so little to be said in
Larevelliere’s behalf that it is fair to note his honesty in pecuniary matters
and his considerable knowledge of botany.
Jean-Francois
Rewbell, before the Revolution a successful Alsatian avocat, had sat in the
Constituent Assembly and in the Convention. He had been accused, while on a
mission at Mainz, of accepting bribes from the Prussians; and although he had
defended himself with sufficient success to escape prosecution, he never freed
himself from the suspicions of his colleagues. During his term of office he was
constantly surrounded by speculators and army contractors, men, as Carnot said,
“ accused of every form of peculation and fraud,” whom he protected and who
formed his only intimate society. Whether he joined them in robbing the public
purse or whether he successfully speculated with his own money it is impossible
to say; he certainly retired from office with a considerable fortune.
1795-6] Barras.—Letourneur.—Carnot. 491
Rewbell’s
political opinions were entirely revolutionary. His ideal system of government
was a despotism of the type of the Committee of Public Safety; he regarded
personal liberty as an absurd chimera; and altogether disbelieved in the virtue
or honesiy of politicians. These and many like opinions he was in the habit of
expressing with a frank brutality which, coupled with a rough manner, a harsh
voice, and a preference for insulting his colleagues, made him the most
detested public man in France. None the less was he possessed of high ability,
of masterful will, and of great business capacity; he led his two colleagues,
Barras and Larevelliere, and for nearly four years he governed the Directory
while the Directory governed France.
Unlike the
other Directors, all of whom were of the middle class,
Paul-Francpois-Jean-Nicolas de Barras was the cadet of a noble Provencal
family. He had served in the army and, when the Revolution broke out, was
living the life of a declasse gentleman in Paris. His history during the
Convention, his connexion with the young officer Bonaparte, and his conduct on
the great days of Thermidor and of Vendemiaire are well known; his election to
the Directory was no doubt due to the reputation for courage and military skill
which he acquired on these occasions. Barras was tall and handsome, with a
soldier-like frankness of manner and a fine voice. Emerging from a period when
coarseness and vulgarity were part of the necessary equipment of a patriot, he
retained traces of the manners of the old regime; he alone among the Directors
carried himself with dignity in the somewhat flamboyant costume which they were
condemned to assume. He united in his own person the worst characteristics of a
licentious and insolent noble of the time of Louis XV, and of a truculent
patriot of the Terror. Absolutely shameless, without honour or patriotism, he
was ready to sell himself to any party or any country able and willing to
purchase his services; he can hardly be said to have followed any policy except
that of amassing a fortune, in which he succeeded so well, that after spending
vast sums in entertainments and debauchery he retired with a sufficient fortune
to support him in luxurious ease for the remainder of his long life.
Of Letourneur
there is little to be said. He had served as a captain of engineers before the
Revolution, and as a member of the Committee of War of the Convention. During
his sixteen months of office he consistently supported Carnot, and formed with
him the minority of the Directors.
Lazare-Nicolas-Marguerite
Carnot stands on a different plane from the other Directors. He is perhaps the
only member of the Convention to whom the epithet great can be applied. There
can be no doubt of his genius for military organisation, of his patriotism, or
of his probity. But he was now in an impossible position; he was the only
important member of the Committee of Public Safety who had not perished or gone
into exile. Those who were now his colleagues, whether Girondists
or
Thermidorian Dantonists, shared in the common horror of the terrible Committee.
Hardly a day passed on which one or other of them failed to recall to him the
fact that hi? signature was at the bottom of a hundred documents dealing death
and ruin all around with impartial iniquity.
On one
occasion when Barras had attacked him with vehement coarseness, Carnot raised
his hands; “ I swear,” he began, when Barras exclaimed, “Do not lift your
hands, they will drip with blood,” and Carnot sank back into silence. And it
was not only his colleagues who reproached him; his own mind was darkened with
remorse and bitter memories. Hatred of the Terror and dread of its return brought
him into entire sympathy with the “ new Third,” and with Boissy d’Anglas,
Lanjuinais, and the other members of the Convention, who had joined them in the
endeavour to establish a Constitutional Republic. The accusation of royalism
was brought against him as against them, but no accusation could have been more
absolutely false. To de La Rue, one of his supposed fellow-conspirators, he
said, “ If I had the King’s pardon in my pocket I would not trust to it. The
day after his restoration he would be compelled to revoke it.”
Such were the
five men to whom the destiny of France was entrusted. Their powers were great,
practically far greater than those of the legislature. They held the
appointment of all military officers of rank, of the Ministers, the diplomatic
agents, the chief officials of the Excise and Public Domain, and, until the end
of the war, all colonial appointments. They were represented in each Department
and in each municipality by a Commissary, in whose presence and with whose
consent only the departmental or communal authorities could debate or act.
Another Commissary was attached to each tribunal, including the Court of Final
Appeal. They were empowered to sign treaties and to propose to the Corps
I.egislatif declarations of war. The chief limitation of their power was that
they could neither enact nor repeal laws, though they could propose either, and
make any suggestions to the Chambers by formal messages. Their Ministers were
rather chief clerks than Ministers, as the word is now understood, since they
could neither meet together in Council nor sit in either Chamber of the
Legislature. Practically the Directors were their own Ministers, Carnot taking
the direction of the war and of the Army, Rewbell of Justice, Finance, and
Foreign Affairs, Larevelliere of Education, Religion, and National
Manufactures, and Barras of Police. Each Director presided for a term of three
months, acting as chnirman and as spokesman on public occasions. The Directory
was renewable each year by the retirement of one of its members chosen by lot;
the retiring member was ineligible for this office for five years; he was at
once replaced by a fresh election made by the Council of Anciens, from a list
drawn up by the Five Hundred. The emoluments of each Director consisted of a
yearly stipend of about
£5000, a
suite of rooms at the Luxembourg, furniture, equipages, and costumes. A guard
of 120 cavalry and the same number of infantry were under their orders. The
total budget of the Directory, exclusive of the cost of the guard, averaged
from £70,000 to £80,000 yearly.
In practical
working the Directors made an evil use of their power. When they entered on
office they found the Luxembourg swarming with clamorous office-seekers,
ex-members of the Convention, Jacobins often of execrable reputation, dismissed
officers, patriots imprisoned after the insurrections of April 1 and May 20,
1795, and amnestied in October of the same year. From these they selected
judges, magistrates, commissaries, and even diplomatic agents. There is probably
much truth in Larevelliere’s explanation that these “men of blood and plunder ”
were forced upon the Directory by the impossibility of finding persons of good
standing who would consent to serve the government. However this may be, these
Jacobin officials tyrannised and robbed wherever they went, raising a storm of
detestation not against themselves alone but against the Directors also, who
had let them loose upon the countiy. In dealing with the Legislature the
Directors were not more fortunate; their official messages were couched in an
insolent, menacing tone, which constantly increased the ill-feeling between the
rival powers. “ The Directory dreaded nothing so much as a reconciliation with
the Corps Legislatif; they laboured with incredible activity to augment the
causes of discontent and alarm,” writes Carnot, describing the state of affairs
after the elections of 1797; and the same may be said of their conduct from the
day of their taking office. They quarrelled with one another, they quarrelled with
the legislature, with the tribunals, with their own servants. The spirit of
Rewbell—angry, despotic, overbearing—:rings through all their
official documents and their public utterances.
But the worst
feature of the Directory was its corruption. It is not possible to set down in
black and white the exact sums which were paid or received for political or
other services during the four years of their government. Neither briber nor
bribed deposited their accounts in the public archives, or entered them in their
diaries or memoirs. There is, however, one incident in the history of the
Directory which was officially published to the world in two printed messages
from President Adams. In 1796 disputes arose between the Directory and the
government of the United States respecting American vessels captured by French
privateers which led to the recall of the United States Minister. In October,
1797, three American Commissioners were sent to reopen negotiations, at their
head Charles Pinckney, one of the most honourable of American statesmen.
Talleyrand, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, at first through intermediaries,
afterwards in person, demanded for himself a “gratification” of £50,000 and for
the Directors a loan of 32,000,000 Dutch florins (about <£’2,660,000). The
American
Commissioners
rejected these nudest demands, and were ordered to leave Prance.
To this may
be added the following instances. Lord Malmesbury, when negotiating for peace
at Lille, received messages, “ purporting,” as he cautiously eyprc sses it, to
come from Barras, and offering to secure peace for a payment to Rewbell and
himself of £500,000; Lord Malmesbury was also informed that the Portuguese
Minister had paid to these two Directors about £400,000 as the price of the
treaty signed in August, 1797. Barras, on evidence nearly if not quite
conclusive, is said to have demanded from the Venetian envoys before the fall
of Venice upwards of ,£20,000 for his ineffectual support. Talleyrand, on less
trustworthy testimony, is stated to have received during the two years of his
ministry about £60,000 in bribes from foreign Powers. What proportion of the
immense exactions levied on invaded countries— Belgium, Holland, Germany,
Italy, and Switzerland—found its way into the pockets of the Directors and their
Ministers, officers, and Commissaries, cannot even be conjectured; enough has
been said to justify the assertion that the Directory was one of the most
corrupt governments known to history.
Such was the
Executive Government of the Republic. The legislative power lay in the hands of
the Corps Legislatif, whose constitution is described in a previous chapter.
The despotic power of the Convention had been due chiefly to their permanent
Committees and to the representatives whom they sent on missions. The Corps
Legislatif was therefore forbidden to appoint any standing Committee or to send
any representative to the Provinces or the army. No member of either Chamber
could hold any executive office. The Councils could not be lissolved or
adjourned by the Directory; they could under certain circumstances adjourn
themselves, but neither Chamber could do so for more than five days without the
consent of the other. To the Anciens alone belonged the power of changing the
place of meeting.
In the vain
hope of preventing the formation of parties within the Chambers, a clause of
the Law of September 14, 1795, enacted that a separate chair and desk should be
provided for each member; and these were ordered to be balloted for once a
month, so that no two members, except by accident, should sit next to each
other for more than four weeks. It is not improbable that this device was one
of the principal causes of the ease with which the Corps Legislatif was overcome
by the Directors in September, 1797; it certainly accounts for the want of
cohesion which marked their proceedings, the contradictory speeches made by
members supposed to be acting together, and the curious manner in which
resolutions passed one day were repealed or altered on the morrow. The-Chambers
were renewed each year by the retirement of one-third of the members by ballot;
members retiring for the first time could be reelected for a second term, but
no member could
sit for more
than six years consecutively. Each Chamber elected its own President and Secretary
for a period of one month. The sittings opened at noon and, except at critical
periods, when a vote of permanence was passed, rose at 4 p.m. Before September
4, 1797 (18 Fructidor, An v), the Chambers met every day of the week; after
that date they held no sittings on the decadi. The salary of each member
amounted to about 30 fr. per day. A curious costume, burlesqued from ancient
Greek models, was assigned to the members; but this was not adopted until after
September, 1797, when its use became compulsory.
The Directory
and the Corps Legislatif were divided into two parties, the Constitutionalists
and the Revolutionists. The Constitutional party was composed of nearly all
the two hundred and fifty members of the new Third and of many members of the right
of the Convention, of two Directors, Carnot and Letourneur, and of the majority
of the magistrates and other officials elected in 1795. It had the support of
the electors and of the great mass of the people. Its adherents could
consequently hope in two or at most in three years’ time to be in a majority in
the Legislative Body, and consequently to replace the existing Directors, as
they retired, by members of their own party. In fact, nothing but fair play was
needed to make them masters of the future of France. By the opposite party the
Constitutionalists were vehemently accused of enmity to the Republic and of
open or concealed royalism; and, as this accusation was the ground of their
destruction, it is essential to the history of the failure of the Constitution
and the consequent fall of the Republic to enquire how far the charge was true.
Of the fervent semi-religious loyalty to the Crown, which had been the ruling
motive of the old rigvme even in its period of decadence, hardly a trace
remained, except in the western Departments; nor were there more than a handful
of persons in France who cherished a personal devotion towards the stout
personality of Louis XVIII or the doubtful audacity of the Comte d’Artois, if
Louis XVII had survived, it is possible that the members of the Right of the
Convention might have attempted to found a constitutional monarchy with a
council of regency chosen among themselves. There were probably many who, if
driven to choose between a constitutional sovereign and a return of the Terror,
would have accepted the King as the lesser of two evils; and a few who in
theory preferred a constitutional Monarchy to a Republic. Thibaudeau names, in
the Corps Legislatif, fifteen who were of this opinion, but adds that not one
of them had any invincible repugnance to the Republic.
The elections
of 1797 added to the number of these constitutional Monarchists. If it were
possible to imagine a vote taken in the two Chambers on the substitution of a
constitutional sovereign for the Directors, about twenty would have voted in
its favour before the elections of 1797, perhaps as many as forty after these
elections: had the proposition been to restore the French monarchy as it stood
before the
Revolution,
neither before nor after 1797 would a single voice have been raised in its
support. The term “ Royalist” was in fact used by the one party, as the terms
“Jacobin” and “anarchist” were by the other, as the common form of abuse. To
quote Thibaudeau once more: “A man treated with injustice complains—he is a
Royalist; a writer censures an act of the government—he is a Royalist; a
journalist criticises a public official—he is a Royalist.” The real aims of the
Constitutional party had nothing to do with the reestablishment of any form of
monarchy. They were to put an end to the war and to bring the Constitution into
full force; and in order to achieve this it was above all things necessary to
repeal the Law of October 25, 1795 (3 Brumaire). This law, the result of the
insurrection of the Paris Sections and the consequent return of the
Thermidorians to Jacobinism, renewed the revolutionary laws against the clergy
and the relatives of emigres \ and, so long as it remained in force, the
Constitution was crippled by the exclusion of large classes of French citizens
from all rights and all protection.
The
Revolutionary party was composed of three members of the Directory, Rewbell,
Larevelliere-Lepeaux, and Barras, of most of the Ministers, notably the most
powerful of them, Merlin of Douai, of the Commissaries and other officials
appointed by the Directory, and of the majority of the ex-members of the
Convention in the Corps Legislatif. Their policy was to continue the war, to
maintain the Law of October 25, and generally to uphold the revolutionary
system of government. Their guiding motive was not so much revolutionary
enthusiasm or political principle as self-preservation; they desired to prolong
the era of persecution and ostracism as the surest way of saving their own
heads from peril; as regicides they dreaded the return of the monarchy, as
Terrorists they feared the vengeance of the people.
The most
important question, that on which all others turned, was whether the war should
be continued or a general peace concluded. It could no longer be maintained
that France was carrying on the war in defence of her territory. Peace had been
already signed with Prussia in 1795, and with Spain in 1796; Belgium had been
incorporated in the French Republic by the decree of October 1, 1795, which
formed the whole of the Austrian Netherlands into nine Departments of France.
Holland was a vassal ally. Austria on land and England on the sea were now the
only serious adversaries of France. England had no intention of deserting her
ally, but Pitt and his colleagues were prepared to make great sacrifices to
secure peace. In his Message to Parliament on October 29, 1795, George III had
expressed his hope that a settled government might result from the new French
Constitution, with which it might be possible to treat. During the winter of
1795-6 Pitt and Lord Grenville had been earnest in their endeavours to induce
the Austrian government to join Great Britain in negotiating for peace. The
Austrian Ministers however were persuaded that the Directors had
no intention
of coming to terms, nor were they yet prepared to abandon their claims to the
Belgian Provinces. No further steps. were taken until October, 1796, when Lord
Malmesbury was sent to Paris with instructions to insist on the restoration of
Belgium to Austria as a preliminary of peace. This was flatly refused by the
Directory; and Lord Malmesbury was ordered to leave Paris on December 19.
The design of
the campaign of 1796 was to attack Austria from the north and south at once.
The Army of Italy under Bonaparte advancing northward across the Alps was to
join hands with the Army of the Rhine under Moreau advancing from Strassburg,
and with the Army of the Sambre-et-Meuse under Jourdan advancing from the Rhine
Provinces. Bonaparte, the story of whose victories in Italy will be told in a
subsequent chapter, succeeded beyond the wildest expectations; but for the
moment the general plan of campaign fell through, owing to the failure of the
northern armies. Early in June Moreau conveyed his army of 70,000 men across
the Rhine at Kehl; and at the same time Jourdan, at the head of 45,000 troops,
crossed the river at Neuwied. The Archduke Charles, commanding an army of
150,000 men, fell back before the advancing French, until towards the end of
August, when Jourdan had captured Wurzburg and Moreau was fast advancing upon
Munich.
Then the
Archduke, adopting the system by which Bonaparte was carrying all before him in
Italy, sprang upon Jourdan before he could effect a junction with the Army of
the Rhine and drove him backwards by a series of attacks, at Amberg on August
24, at Wurzburg on September 2, at Aschaffenburg on the 13th, and at
Altenkirchen on the 19th. It was here that General Marceau fell into the
Archduke’s hands mortally wounded—a heavy blow to France, for Marceau shared
with Hoche the reputation of being not only a commander of brilliant audacity
but a man of honourable and generous character. On September 20 Jourdan
recrossed the Rhine between Bonn and Neuwied. His army had suffered terribly,
having lost nearly half its number in action, from h anger, disease, or
assassination by the peasantry whom the soldiers had plundered ruthlessly
during their advance. When the Archduke left his lieutenant, General Latour,
with a small force before Moreau, he said, “Let him advance to Vienna if he
can, it matters nothing provided I beat Jourdan.” But Moreau, though at the
head of a fine army, finding himself without supports and far from his base,
was soon obliged to retreat; he achieved his return to Strassburg in perfect
order.
Early in the
same year 1796, Hoche, as much by statesmanship and toleration as by military
skill, completed the pacification of the Vendee and set the great army, which
for three years had been locked up in western France, free to reinforce the
armies of Italy and the Rhine. After sending large reinforcements to each of
these, Hoche himself with
15,000 men embarked in seventeen ships of the line
with a number of
frigates and
transports and a distinguished passenger, Wolfe Tone, for Bantry Bay. A series
of gales broke up the fleet; and by January.1, 1797, the expedition had
returned to Brest without landing a man and with the loss of five ships. But
the failure of ■ Hoche’s expedition and of the campaign in Germany were
more than counterbalanced by the conquest of Italy and by the treaty with
Spain, which doubled the number bf ships and seamen to be brought into action
against England. The triumph of this treaty was however of short duration, for
on February 14 Sir John Jervis’ victory off Cape St Vincent put the Spanish
fleet out of reckoning.
In the spring
of 1797 Hoche, who had succeeded Jour dan in command of the Army of the
Sambre-et-Meuse, recrossed the Rhine and defeated the Austrians at Neuwied on
April 18. Moreau also, after retaking Kehl, was in full advance when both
armies were suddenly checked by the news that on the day of Hoche’s victory
Bonaparte had signed the preliminaries of a peace with Austria at Leoben, which
after six months of negotiation led to the Treaty of Campo Formio, October 17,
1797.
To secure the
general peace it was now necessary only to come to terms with Great Britain and
with Portugal. With Portugal a treaty was signed on August 10, leaving Great
Britain without a single ally in Europe. Pitt had been anxious for1
peace in 1795 and 1796; he was still more anxious now. The mutiny at the Nore,
the threatened rebellion of Ireland, the fall of Consols to forty-eight, were
overpowering arguments against continuing the war single-handed. In July, 1797,
Lord Malmesbury was again sent to France to treat at Lille with three French
plenipotentiaries, the chief of whom was Maret,' the future Due de Bassano.
The English government was prepared to recognise all the French conquests in
Europe and to restore the captured French colonies, retaining only the Cape of
Good Hope taken from the Dutch and Trinidad taken from the Spaniards. Belgium
had been the crux of Lord Malmesbuiy’s first mission; the Cape became that of
his second. The French absolutely demanded its restoration to Holland. Carnot,
in his reply to Bailleul, tells of a conversation with Rewbell which fully
explains the motive of the French anxiety on behalf of their ally; “ Do you
suppose,” said Rewbell, “ that it is for the sake of the Dutch that I demand
the restitution of the Cape? The first object is to recover it, for which we
require Dutch ships and money; that object once achieved, I will soon convince
the Dutch that these colonies belong not to them but to ourselves.” In the
main, however, the hopes of peace depended, not on questions of detail, but on
the results of the deadlock caused by the struggle between the two French
parties. If the Constitutionalists won, peace was assured; if they were beaten,
there was small hope of it. The coup d'etat of September 4 settled the
question; and twelve days later Lord Malmesbury received orders to quit France
within twenty-four
hours. Years
afterwards Carnot, referring to these negotiations, said, “ If my advice had
been followed we should have made peace under conditions which can never occur
again”; and he spoke truly, for no peace made afterwards, with the Exception of
the short-lived Peace of Amiens, has left France with so large a territory or
so great a prestige.
But there
were considerations in the minds of the three Directors and their supporters
which convinced them that in war lay their sole security. France was now
maintaining armies in the field consisting of over a quarter of a million of
men., These men, the flower of the nation, were armed, fedj and clothed by
Europe; far from being a burden on France, they formed the one financial
resource of the country; money, plate, objects of art, poured into France and
would continue to do so while the war lasted. But how in time of peace could
these enormous armies be paid or fed for a month? What if they demanded the
milliard (£40,000,000) promised to them by the Convention ? And, even if the
armies allowed themselves to be disbanded, what was to be done with the
generals ? Would men like Bonaparte, and Hoche, and fifty more of the ablest
officers whom France had ever possessed, be content to vegetate on half-pay?
“Do you suppose,” said Napoleon to Miot de Melito, “ that I am winning fame in
Italy for the glorification of the attorneys of the Directory? Let them try to
remove me from my command and they will soon see what will happen.”
These
considerations go far to account for the eagerness with which the Directory
welcomed Bonaparte’s proposal to take the finest regiments of the army to
Egypt, as well as the recklessness with which, before the ink was dry on the
Treaty of Campo Formio, they begc.n to send armies to revolutionise and plunder
Switzerland and Italy. They must have foreseen that these predatory expeditions
would lead to the renewal of a general war; but of this they had little fear.
What they did fear from the bottom of their souls was peace.
, The
consideration of the attitude of the two parties towards the war has made it!
necessary to refer to events which occurred at a period subsequent to the first
year of the Directory; we must now return to the hardly less lital questions
which divided the Revolutionary from the Constitutional party in the internal
affairs of France—the financial position, the religious difficulty, and the
legislation on the Emigres,
The
history of the finances, of the daily fall in the value of Assignats, and of
the ultimate bankruptcy, are told in a later chapter of this volume: allusion
only can be made here to the increasing financial embarrassments of the
Treasury, the fortunes made by speculators and contractors, the general
dishonesty fostered, almost necessitated, by the uncertainty of the currency;
all essential elements in the hibtory of the Directory. The other questions,
religion and the emigres, must be dealt with somewhat more in detail. .
It need
hardly be said that the religious difficulty became acute in
1791, when the great majority of ecclesiastics
refused to take the oath of conformity to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy.
The persecution which followed had driven most of them from France; of those
who remained no exact statistics are obtainable. It is known only that
forty-one of the Bishops were dead, and that eleven who had lived concealed in
France during the Terror were alive in November, 1795. During the Thermidorian
reaction, laws were passed in September, 1794, and in May, 1795, granting, on
paper at least, freedom of worship, and restoring to the use of any form of
religious observance desired by-the people such churches as had not been
appropriated to State purposes or sold to private purchasers. By twos and
threes the clergy had been returning from abroad or had been creeping from
their hiding-places, and were now often officiating in their former parishes. A
statement in the Anntdes de la Religion in July, 1797, estimates that public
services were then being held in 31,214 communes in the country, while
forty-one churches were open and crowded with worshippers in Paris.
Under the
government of the Directory the legal position of a priest who had not taken
the “ civic oath ” in 1791 was as follows. Artiele 354 of the Constitution
decreed that no one should be prevented from the exercise of the religion of
his choice. On the other hand the Law of October 25, 1795, ordered that the
laws against priests transported or liable to transportation (that is to say,
every member of the orthodox clergy) should be immediately put in force;
meaning simply that every priest who had returned to France was liable to be
executed on identification, and every priest who had remained in France to be
transported for life. The orthodox Roman Church was the form of religion
desired by nine out of ten Christians in France; yet, while by the Constitution
these were free to adopt its services, the priest who ministered to them was,
in the eye of the law, a “ wolf’s-head.” After the coup d'etat of September,
1797, every priest was in fact, as well as in theory, in daily peril; before
that period the law remained nearly a dead letter, only twenty priests losing
their lives. But for this clemency the Directory were not to blame; in one of
their first circulars they urged their commissaries to “wear out the patience
of the priests; not to give them a moment of ease; never to lose sight of these
instruments of murder, royalism, and anarchy.” In the Corps Ligislatif the
Constitutionalists made repeated efforts to repeal the Law of October 25, but
until the elections of 1797 they had not a sufficient majority to effect this:
the clergy were, however, defended in both Chambers by such men as Thibaudeau,
Lanjuinais, Portalis, Barbe-Marbois, Boissy d’Anglas, and many others. Few of
these were Christians in belief or sympathy, but they could understand the
folly of ineffectual persecution and the object- lesson given by Hoche, who was
pacifying the Vendee as much by treating the clergy with common justice as by
force of arms.
The remnant
of the Constitutional Church, since the complete
severance of
Church and State known as the “ National Church,” formed the only other
considerable religious body in Prance. Of the eighty-two constitutional Bishops
elected in 1791, forty still remained in some exercise of their functions; of
the remainder eight had been guillotined, thirteen had died natural deaths, and
twenty-one had abandoned their Orders; of the clergy a large proportion had
married, secularised themselves, or rejoined the orthodox Homan Church.
On this body,
which had little ground for desiring a change of government, the Directors shed
a cold and lack-lustre patronage. They allowed its clergy to share with the
Theophilanthropists the use of Notre Dame, and even to hold a National Council.
But the Constitutional Church had little hold on the mind of the people; its
churches and its coffers were empty; and had it not been for the influence of
Bishop Gregoire, one of the most courageous, interesting and paradoxical
characters of the Revolution, it would hardly have remained in existence until
the dose of the century.
Owing to the
fact that Larevelliere-Lepeaux was its patron if not its apostle, the curious
creed and worship of the Theophilanthropists obtained a momentary notoriety
during the Directory. This was a form of natural religion founded by David
Williams, an English Deist, in 1766, which failed in England, but found in
France a certain number of eminent disciples, such as Bemardin de Saint-Pierre,
Marie-Joseph Chenier, Creuzd-Latouche, David the painter, and Dupont of
Nemours. Its tenets consisted of elegant extracts from the teaching of the
English Deists, and from Zoroaster, Socrates, Seneca, Fenelon, Voltaire, and
above all Rousseau. Its ritual, celebrated on the (tecadi, was composed of an
invocation to the God of Nature, an examination of conscience, hymns, sermons,
and readings from the sages named above, together with special services for
baptisms, marriages, and funerals. The Directors appropriated eighteen
churches in Paris to its use; but, as soon as the novelty wore off, it dwindled
to a, handful of supporters who were finally excluded from the “ national
edifices ” in 1801. The official religion of the Directory, consisting of the
observances of the decadi and the moral and patriotic fetes, existed rather in
theory than in practice until the coup (Ptiat of September, 1797; after that
date, as will be seen, it became a very stem reality.
Perhaps no
passage in the history of the Revolution is so complicated as that of the laws
relative to the emigres; assuredly none has been so persistently misrepresented
by partisan writers.
The
Emigration began in 1789, with consequences as disastrous to the emigres themselves
as to the country they abandoned. Between October,
1792, and the dissolution of the Convention,
upwards of three hundred laws had been passed relating to the emigres
themselves and their relatives. By this mass of legislation each commune was
instructed to frame lists of the emigres within its borders and to forward them
to
the Committee
of Legisla' von of the Convention, who alone had. the power to erase names from
these lists. For a time the lists were drawn up with some care and published by
the Committee; but under the Terror all method died out, and from early in 1793
to the end of the Direbtory the lists grew and multiplied, unexamined and
unrevised. Each person on these lists was an emigre; and as such he or she was
condemned to perpetual banishment, loss of all civil rights, confiscation of
property, and death within twenty-four hours after identification, if found on
French soil.
Nor was it
only the emigres who were condemned. Their relatives were formed into an
ostracised class, deprived of civil rights, obliged to live under police
supervision, liable to a number of special fines and taxes, bound to furnish an
account of whatever property the emigre their relative was heir to, and to hand
over such property or to effect a compromise with the government, which was
held to be in immediate possession of the bnigrfs succession. An emigre is
popularly taken to be a person, usually a member of the old noblesse, who had
fled from France and taken arms against his country or assisted her enemies; in
fact a rebel or a traitor and as such liable to punishment. Such no doubt was
the original emigre against whom the earlier laws were directed; but to this'
class belonged only a small fraction of those inscribed on the lists at the
close of the year 1795. In 1799 the army of Conde was composed of 1007 officers
and 5840 rank- and file; it had never consisted of more than 10,000 ; to double
this number would be to overstate those who had fought against France or had in
any way assisted foreign Powers against her. But the number of persons on the
lists of emigres vastly exceeded 20,000, and included many thousands of men and
women who had never in their lives crossed the frontier. The number can never
be accurately known. In a message of February 26,
1797, the Directory state the number in the
incomplete lists in their hands as 120,000, of whom 60,000 were known to be in
France. In May,
1796, Portalis asserted that more than 100,000
fathers of families who had never left France were on the lists of emigres; in
the same debate it was stated that the number of relations of imigres liable to
confiscation was 300,000. Finally, in 1800, the Minister of Police reported
that the number still on the lists in his hands amounted to 145,000. Recklessness,
wholesale proscription, local and personal jealousy, had contrived to form this
immense class of emigres. At different periods of the Terror the inhabitants of
Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux had been declared emigres; from Nantes, Toulon,
Orange, Avignon, Strassburg, and many other places, thousands had fled to
escape the Revolutionary Commissions, and these were imigr&s. In many
communes all proprietors not actually present when the lists were drawn up were
entered as emigres. Thus the great mathematician, Monge, when Minister of the
Navy, discovered that he was on the list of the Department of the Ardennes,
and that a
farm in that Department belonging to his wife had been put up for sale as
national property. Andre Dumont, speaking in the Council of Five Hundred, tells
of a friend, a zealous Republican, who had acted as Mayor of his native town
for years without knowing that he was on the list of Emigres of a neighbouring
commune;
That such a
system should have lasted for a week after a regular government had been
established seems at first sight impossible; but the explanation is simple.
Vast interests depended on the maintenance of the laws against the emigres.
Their property, with that of the clergy and the national domains, formed the
security on which the assignats were issued, and many thousands of purchasers
had been found for their confiscated estates. If a general amnesty were granted
and the emigres were allowed to reclaim their lands and houses, the assignats
would become waste-paper and the whole social fabric would fair to pieces. So
impossible was it to escape from this vicious circle, that the Constitution
decreed that imigris not included in exceptions already allowed should be
banished for ever from France and that their property belonged to the Republic.
The Constitutional party, while acknowledging the iniquity of the whole system,
did not dare to advocate its complete abolition. They endeavoured only to
repeal the Law of October 25 (3 Brumaire), which deprived the relatives of
emigres of all civil rights and ordered them to live under police supervision.
They also endeavoured to place the duty of removing names from the lists in
the hands of the tribunals or of a committee of the Corps Legislatif; but the
Conventional majority before the elections of 1797 was too strong. The Law of
October 25 remained, and the power of erasure was entrusted to the Directors
and the Minister of Justice. This power fell practically into the hands of
Barras and Merlin of Douai; and consequently none but those with a long purse could
hope for justice. The number removed before September, 1797, was about 15,000;
between that date and the end of the Directoiy veiy few names were erased.
The
discussion of these questions and of the financial difficulties of the Republic
occupied the greater part of the time of the Corps Legislatif before the
elections of 1797. Outside the Chambers, the principal events were the exchange
of “ la file Capet," daughter of Louis XVI, for the eight deputies and
officers delivered to the Austrians by Dumouriez in April, 1793, and the
conspiracies of Babeuf and Brottier.
In February,
1796, the Directors ordered the closing of a number of clubs. Most of these,
the so-called Royalist clubs, were little more *Wn gambling or dancing saloons;
but one, the club of the Pantheon, was of a widely different order. It had four
thousand members and formed a place of refuge for the Terrorists and Jacobins
of Paris and of those who were driven from the Provinces to take refuge in the
capital. In this club existed an esoteric circle calling themselves the Societe
des
itgaux,
the principal members of which were “Gracchus” Babeuf, editor of the- Tribun<■
du Pewple; Sylvain Marechal, a well-known journalist; Drouet, one of
those,recently exchanged for Madame Royale; Antonelle, ex-noble and juryman of
the Revolutionary Tribunal; F&ix Le Peletier, a rich enthusiast;
Buonarotti, president of the club; several ex-members of the Convention,
including Robert Lindet, and Jean- Antoine Rossignol, and four other dismissed
officers.
The closing
of the club did not put an end to the Society, which met in cafes and private
houses and developed the conspiracy known as that of Babeuf. The aims and
methods of the conspirators may be thus briefly summarised. The Revolution had
failed because the rich retained and increased their possessions, while the
poor remained miserable. Another and final revolution was necessary to form an
equitable system under which the land should belong to the State, its fruits to
the people, where all should work and all should fare alike, and riches and
poverty come to a perpetual end. The new Republic was to be governed by elected
functionaries, whose duty it was to collect the produce of the land in
storehouses and distribute it. Literature, art, and religion were to be
proscribed, children to be brought up in common, towns to be destroyed, and all
Frenchmen, dressed in the same costume, to inhabit villages. The first steps
towards the establishment of this golden age are set forth in a document
entitled the Act of Insurrection. The existing government was to be dissolved,
the Directors killed, the members of the Corps Legislatif delivered to the
“judgment of the people,” and all who opposed the insurrectionary committee
exterminated.
These
preliminary matters disposed of, a convention, consisting of sixty-eight
members of the extreme Left of the late Convention and one approved patriot
appointed to represent each Department by the insurrectionary committee, was to
be summoned to establish liberty, equality, and the common happiness. Among the
Jacobins and Terrorists the conspirators found many recruits; but they had
sense enough to see that without a military force they were powerless. A number
of agents were employed to gain over the soldiers of the Paris division by wild
promises of money and plunder. At Grenelle was stationed the Legion of Police,
a force six thousand strong recruited chiefly from the “ Revolutionary Army,”
on which the conspirators mainly relied; but shortly before the insurrection
was timed to break out, the Legion, which was in a semi-mutinous condition, was
broken up, the more insubordinate disbanded, the rest incorporated with various
regiments. Those who were dismissed mostly joined the conspirators; but the
breaking up of the corps was a fatal blow to their plans.
One of the
agents employed to jorrupt the soldiers, Georges Grisel, revealed the
conspiracy to Carnot and to Cochon, the recently appointed Minister of Police;
and on May 10, 1796, the eve of the day appointed for the insurrection, the
leaders were arrested. Eighteen escaped; the
remainder,
forty-six in number, were sent to Vendome to be tried by a High Court of
Justice specially constituted in accordance with the Constitution to try cases
of high treason. One of the prisoners, Drouet, was a member of the Corps
Legislatif, and in accordance with the Constitution could be tried only after a
decree of accusation had been passed by the Chambers. This was carried; but
Drouet escaped from the Abbaye with the connivance of the Directors, as Barras,
probably for once speaking the truth, avers.
On September
7 a body of armed insurgents marched on the camp at Grenelle hoping to find
sympathisers among the troopers of the 21st Dragoons, into which regiment
members of the Legion of Police had been drafted. They were disappointed, for
Malo, the commandant of the regiment, charged them, killing many and taking 132
prisoners, who were tried by a military Commission. Thirty-two, including
Javogues, ex-member of the Convention, and Huguet, ex-Constitutional B hop,
were sentenced to be shot; twenty-seven to be transported, and the remainder to
be discharged. The High Court began its sittings on February 20,1797, and after
a trial lasting for two months sentenced Babeuf and Darthe to death, Buonarotti
and six others to transportation, and acquitted the rest. It was generally held
at the time that Barras, and perhaps Rewbell, had been in communication with
Babeuf and his friends, and that their hands were forced by the information
given by Grisel to Carnot and Cochon. The evidence in favour of this belief is
too lengthy to be given here; it is not conclusive, but is curiously
strengthened by the sympathetic tone in which Barrels writes of the
conspirators, and by his denunciations of Cochon and Grisel. It is not
improbable that the two Directors hoped to play with Babeuf, and to use his
party against the Corps L&gislatif at the critical moment.
A second
conspiracy, this time a royalist movement, was discovered on January 30, 1797,
when the Abbe Brottier, the royalist agent in Paris, La Villeheumois, an
ex-Magistrate, Duveme de Presle, and Baron de Poly, with nine other men and
five women, were arrested. The conspirators had attempted to seduce Malo, the
officer who had dispersed the insurgents at Grenelle, and Ramel, commandant of
the guard of the Corps Legislatif, who, while pretending to listen, kept the
Directors informed of the progress of the plot.
The evidence
as given by Malo revealed simply a foolish attempt to copy the methods of
Babeuf. A sufficient military force was to be secured, the barriers, arsenals,
and public buildings to be seized, the existing government to be dissolved, and
Louis XVIII to be proclaimed. This evidence did not satisfy the Directors’
desire to prove their favourite thesis, that royalists and anarchists were one
and the same. Nothing but the facts could be had from Malo, but Ramel allowed
himself to put into the mouth of Poly statements to the effect that the royal
mercy would be freely extended to the Terrorists of 1793, while the
constitutionalists
of 1789 would feel the full weight of royal vengeance. Lafayette was to be
brought to Paris in an iron cage, and death or thfe galleys awaited the members
of the Constituent Assembly.
The
Directors, thinking that a militaiy tribunal would make shorter work of the
conspirators than a civil Court, sent the prisoners before a military
commission, to be tried for seducing soldiers from their duty. The accused
appealed against the competence of this commission and the Court of Appeal
decided in their favour; but the Directors were peremptory, and the trial
continued. The Commissary of the Directory demanded a sentence of death against
all the prisoners; but the commission, moved by a sense of its own illegality
and perhaps by doubts of the truth of Hamel’s testimony, passed sentences of
imprisonment for various terms against Brottier, Duveme de Presle, La
Villeheumois, and Poly, and acquitted the others. The Directors showed their
disappointment by arranging to send five of the prisoners before a civil Court
on the charge of treason. A delay occurred in consequence of the offer of
Duveme de Presle to produce “revelations” implicating members of the Corps
Legislatif; and, after the coup d’etat of September, 1797, the prisoners were
ultimately transported to Cayenne.
In March and
April, 1797, came the first renewal of the Directory and Corps Legislatif. Two
hundred and sixteen ex-members of the Convention, chosen by ballot, retired;
most of them stood for reelection by the constituencies, but only eleven,
including Boissy d’Anglas, were returned. The result of the elections was to
give the Constitutionalists a working majority in both Chambers; and the
Directors were thus brought face to face with a hostile legislature which they
could neither dissolve nor adjourn. No legal course but submission lay before
them; and, to put their case fairly, such submission was not without danger.
They represented the Convention, and especially the regicides. If they resigned
or ceased to govern, they could no longer protect the Conventionalists or the
great body of Jacobins whom they had appointed to office. On May 20 the new
members took their seats, and on the 27th elected Barthelemy as Director in
succession to Letourneur, whose retirement by ballot was considered to have
been arranged beforehand.
Barthelemy
had long held the position of French Minister in Switzerland and had
successfully negotiated the Peace with Prussia in 1795; but he had little
practical experience of the actual state of France and was rather an excellent
than a strong man. He acted uniformly in concert with Carnot, replacing
Letourneur politically as well as officially. The Constitutionalist majority
was hardly a homogeneous body: it tended towards the formation of an extreme
and a central party. The extreme members, most powerful in the Council of Five
Hundred, were led by Boissy d’Anglas, Pichegru, de La Rue, and Camille Jordan,
newly returned as one of the deputies of Lyons. They placed themselves in
direct hostility to the three Directors, and desired the immediate
repeal of all
revolutionary laws. Some of the members of this party founded a political
society known as the Club de Clichy, and hence the term CUchien became the
nickname by which members of the Constitutional party were known, though in
reality only a small number of them were actually members.
The “
Centre,” strongest in the Council of the Anciens, and represented by such men
as Tron^on-Ducoudray, Simeon, Mathieu Dumas, Barbe-Marbois, Portalis, and
Thibaudeau, were in favour of a gradual modification of the revolutionary laws,
and desired to compromise with the majority of the Directors, respecting their
office and looking forward to a peaceable termination of the existing deadlock
by the gradual replacement of the revolutionary members.
The
Directorial or Conventional party was also composed of two wings, a left
central and a Jacobin section. Most of its more distinguished members joined
the Cercle Constitutionnel, a club recently founded in opposition to the
Clichy, under the influence of Sieyes, Madame de Stael, Benjamin Constant, and
Talleyrand.
During the
period between May 20 and September 4> the Corps Ligislatif was again
chiefly occupied with the questions of the imigris and the clergy. The clauses
of the Law of October 25, 1795, relating to the relatives of imigris, were
repealed; and several, deputies who had been rendered by this law incapable of
sitting were allowed to take their seats. A commission was appointed to
consider the question of religious freedom. On June 17 Camille Jordan made his
celebrated report which, with some modifications, formed the basis of a law
passed on September 1 by which such communes as desired the services of a
priest were declared at liberty to choose one, and the priest thus chosen was,
after making a declaration of submission to the Republic, to be secured from
legal prosecution; churches not otherwise disposed of could be appropriated to
public worship: but no ecclesiastic might wear a distinctive costume, no
religious ceremonies might take place outside the churches, and no endowments
might be given or bequeathed to any religious body. This law, which was
repealed immediately after the coup d'itat of September, 1797, was put forward
as one of the most obvious proofs of a “ royalist conspiracy.”
While these
measures were being debated the anxiety and alarm of the members of the
Constitutional party were daily increasing.. Three of their leaders, Portalis,
Simeon, and Dumas, were deputed to represent to Barras the possibility of a
reconciliation founded on the dismissal of the four Ministers, Merlin,
Delacroix, Ramel de Nogaret, and Truguet, who were obnoxious to the Councils,
and their replacement by men of more moderate opinions. Barras received the
deputation with cordiality; but when on July 16 Carnot, acting in concert with
the members of the Councils, proposed the change, he found that Barras had
concerted with Rewbell and Larevelliere to dismiss not the revolutionary but
the
moderate
Ministers in whom the Councils had full confidence. The removal of Delacroix
and Truguet was agreed to, nor did Carnot and Bavthelemy object to the
appointment of Talleyrand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or of Pleville Le
Pelay to the Ministry of the Navy; but the retention of the two Revolutionary
Ministers, Merlin and Ramel, and the dismissal of the three Constitutionalists,
Ben&ech, Petiet, and Cochon, formed a final breach between the two and the
three Directors, accentuated by the appointment of Francois de Neufchateau to
the Interior, Lenoir Laroche (replaced after a few days by Sotin) to the
Police, and Scherer, a special protegi of Rewbell, to the Ministry of War.
From this
time forward there could be little doubt of the ultimate designs of the three
Directors. Hoche, with a view to another invasion of England, was leading
towards Brest a force of 12,000 men, detached from his army on the Rhine, and
Barras had engaged him to turn this force in the direction of Paris. In this
negotiation Barras seems to have been acting on his own account, for when
intelligence reached the Directory and Councils that Hoche’s army was being
brought within the distance from the Corps Legislatif forbidden by the
Constitution, and he was himself summoned and severely cross-examined by
Carnot, then President of the Directory, the general obtained no countenance
from Barras, who sat by, indifferently reading or pretending to read his
papers. Angry and ill, Hoche withdrew and took no further active share in the
coming struggle. His day was in fact over. On September 19 he died, leaving
Bonaparte, his only equal in reputation and genius, without a rival.
Then the
three Directors turned to Bonaparte. Rumours of the cession of Venice to
Austria had led to heated debates in the Council of the Five Hundred, in the course
of which several deputies, notably Dumolard, the ever fluent haranguer,
attacked Bonaparte, justly no doubt, but fatally; for Bonaparte was wavering
between the two parties, and these philippics either weighed down the balance
on the side of the Directory, or gave him the pretext he desired. He issued a
fiery proclamation to the Army of Italy on the fite of July 14 and encouraged
inflammatory addresses against the royalist conspirators of Clichy. Swiftly
following words by action, Bonaparte sent Augereau to Paris on urgent private
affairs. He took care to warn the three Directors that Augereau was an
excellent soldier but a turbulent politician—a warning which Augereau himself
lost no time in justifying. Blazing with jewels, he pranced through Paris, loudly
announcing that he had come to kill the royalists, and filled the minds of
Rewbell and Larevelliere with apprehensions that he and Barras were planning a
coup d'etat on their own account.
It is
difficult to account for Carnot’s conduct during these critical weeks. He was
urged to place himself at the head of a countermovement and to organise an
attack upon the Directory; but, either
from
weariness or from a conviction that the Directors would not dare to attack him,
he remained inactive and added to the indecision, doubt, and dread of
illegality, which paralysed the majority of the Chambers. Pichegru, Willot, and
the more energetic spirits, could find no followers. Some fled, others debated
on organising the National Guard and increasing the strength of their own small
body of troops; but practically nothing was done, and the Constitutional party
fell without striking a single blow.
On the
evening of September 8 the three members of the Directory constituted
themselves in permanent session and despatched orders to Moreau, whose army had
sent no addresses and whose fidelity they distrusted, to return to Paris. They
then drew up a proclamation announcing that a royalist conspiracy had been
frustrated at the critical moment, and that a great host of emigres, assassins
from Lyons, and brigands from the Vendee, had attacked the posts which
surrounded the Directory, but that their criminal efforts had been defeated by
the vigilance of the government. This proclamation, accompanied by extracts
from the papers taken by Bonaparte from the royalist agent d’Entraigues
inculpating Pichegru and Imbert-Colomes, was posted * throughout Paris during
the night. Barthelemy was arrested in his bed, and indignantly refusing offers
of escape on condition that he would sign his resignation, was sent to the
Temple. Carnot, warned at the last moment, slipped quietly through the
Luxembourg Gardens and ultimately escaped to Switzerland.
At three
o’clock in the morning of September 4 (18 Fructidor, An v), Augereau with 2000
men advanced on the Tuileries, meeting with no opposition from the Guard of the
Carps Legislatif, and arrested Ramel, Commandant of the Guard, Pichegru,
Willot, and a number of other Deputies, most of whom were members of the
Commission of Inspectors charged with the protection of the Councils.
At seven
o’clock the presidents of the two Councils, Lafon-Ladebat and Simeon,
accompanied by about fifty members, attempted to open the day’s sittings but
were ejected. They removed to the house of Lafon- Ladebat, whither they were
followed by an officer of Augereau’s staff who arrested several and dispersed
the remainder. When asked by what law he dared to arrest the Representatives of
the People he replied with simple truth, “By the law of the sword.” The Members
of the Directorial party met at 9 a.m., the Anciens in the Nicole de Santd, the
Five Hundred in the Odeon theatre. There they declared themselves in permanent
session, appointed a Commission of Five, including Sieyes and Boulay of the
Meurthe, and sat throughout the day awaiting the orders of their masters, not
knowing whether their colleagues of yesterday were to be tried, shot off-hand,
or transported. At six in the evening the first message was received from the
Directory; and Boulay was able to announce that the “ Triumph of the Republic
was not to be
stained by
blood.” During the night of September 4 and the following day they sat
surrounded by soldiers and by a disorderly rabble, intimidated by threatening
messages from the Directors, and in the hot haste of terror produced the Law of
September 5 (19 Fructidor).
By, this law,
all the elections of 49 Departments, returning 154 Members, were annulled, and
the Directors were charged to appoint all the magistrates and officials in
these departments until the elections of
1798. Fifty-three persons were ordered to be
immediately transported to such place as the Directors should fix ; among these
were the two Directors, Carnot and Barthelemy, thirty-eight members of the
Corps LegislatifCochon, ex-Minister of Police, Generals Pichegru, Miranda, and
Morgan, the Abbe Brottier and two of his associates. The Law of October 25,
1795 (3 Brumaire, An iv), was reenacted with an additional clause (added in
view of the possibility of peace with Austria and Great Britain) prolonging for
four years after the general peace the disabilities attaching to the relatives
of Emigres. All imigres were ordered to leave France within a fortnight; any
imigre remaining after this period was to be tried by a military commission and
shot within 1 twenty-four hours. The law recently passed on the
Liberty of Worship was repealed; and every priest was ordered to take a special
oath of hatred to royalty and anarchy. The Directors were empowered to transport,
by an administrative order stating the reason of its issue, any priest who
might disturb the public peace. All newspapers and newspaper presses were
placed for one year under the inspection of the police. The power of
proclaiming any commune in a state of siege was invested in the Directory.
On the next
day, September 6, two new Directors, Merlin of Douai and Francois de
Neufch&teau, were elected in place of Carnot and Barthelemy. Merlin, under
the Consulate and Empire an eminent jurist, was as yet known only as the “
author of the Law of the Suspect” and as a harsh and unscrupulous supporter of
the Revolutionary system; Franfois as a writer of dithyrambic plays with a
passion for the observance of fetes and dicadis. Both were by profession
avocats.
From the
point of view of the three Directors nothing could have been more successful
than their coup d'etat. By a few hours of violence they had disposed of two
hostile Directors and of more than two hundred members of the Corps Legislatif,
and had thus crushed all their opponents and erected for themselves a despotism
which Louis XIV or the Committee of Public Safety might have envied.
But however
successful a coup d'etat may be, it requires some justification. The official
explanation of that of 18 Fructidor is contained in the messages and proclamations
of the Directory on September 4 and following days, in the speeches of their
two chief spokesmen in the Corps Legislatif, Boulay and Bailleul, in September,
1797, and in the elaborate report delivered by Bailleul in March, 1798, of a
Commission appointed
to enquire
into the conspiracy. According to these authorities the measures taken by the
three Directors were just in time to save France from the outbreak of a
royalist conspiracy. Had they lingered for twenty-four hours, said the
Directors in their first message to the Corps Legislatif, “the Republic would
have been betrayed to its mortal enemies.” This “ conspiracy ” was formed by
the members of the majority in the Corps Legislatif, and was supported by the
two Directors, Carnot and Barthelemy, by the condemned journalists, and by the
returned emigres and priests. The proofs of the imminent danger from which the
Directors saved the Republic were taken from three sources; first, the
declarations of Duveme de Presle, one of the colleagues of the Abbe Brottier,
consisting of a series of vague accusations of no weight whatever ; secondly,
a number of papers taken by Bonaparte in Italy from a royalist agent, the Comte
d’Entraigues, which contained some letters compromising Pichegru and
Imbert-Colomes, deputy for Lyons; thirdly, the correspondence found in the
carriage of the Austrian general Klinger by Moreau, which was not received by
the Directors until after September 4.
Moreau’s
conduct with regard to this correspondence is somewhat of a mystery. The
letters were discovered and deciphered in May, 1797, but for four months he
kept them in his own hands. On the night of September 3 he was recalled; but,
according to his own account, he was not aware of this until September 8.
Meanwhile on September 5, or as he afterwards asserted on September 3, he
forwarded the entire correspondence to Barthelemy. Why he kept it so long, and
why he sent the letters to Barthelemy and not to the Minister of War, are
questions which admit of no conclusive answer. The documents themselves,
though containing no word in Pichegru’s handwriting, prove that in the autumn
of 1795 he had through the medium of a royalist agent, Fauche Borel, received
proposals made to him by the Prince de Conde to surrender Hiiningen, join the
Prince with his army, and march with him on Paris, where Louis XVIII would be
proclaimed King.
There was
therefore a strong case against Pichegru, and a much weaker case against
Imbert-Colomes; but against the two Directors, the members of the Corps
Legislatif, or the condemned generals, journalists, and others, there was no
case whatever. As for a general conspiracy of all these persons to destroy the
Republic, the charge rests solely on the accusation made by the Directors and
their party. After months of research by a special committee, all that Bailleul
could say was that it was so evident as to require no proof; to quote his own
words : “ We do not try to prove the existence of light, we analyse it.” His
long report is in fact devoted to hysterical diatribes on the iniquity of
priests, epiigres, and journalists, to denunciations of Carnot as the defender
of Kings, of Pastoret and Boissy d’Anglas as repealers of laws against Emigres,
and so forth. Fortunately for Bailleul and his cause, opposition
or criticism
had been effectually silenced in the Corps LAgidatif; but he succeeded in
drawing from Carnot his Reponse au Rapport de J.-C. BailleuI, the most
authentic and interesting account extant of the working of the Constitution of
1795 and of the causes of its destruction.
Of the
fifty-three persons condemned to transportation, fifteen only were in the hands
of the Directors; many of the others had been arrested by Augereau’s officers
but in the absence of instructions had been allowed to go free; a few, among them
Cochon, were subsequently captured; but the greater number escaped. During the
night of September 9 Barthelemy, Lafon-Ladebat, General Murinais, Rovere, and
Tronson de Coudray, of the Anciens; Aubry, Bourdon of the Oise, de La Rue,
Pichegru, and Willot, of the Five Hundred; Ramel, Brottier, Villeheur- nois,
Dossonville—an officer of Police under Cochon—Suard—the well- known author—and
Letellier—Barthelemy’s valet, who refused to leave his master—were taken from
the Temple and conveyed to Rochefort.
Vae
victis was one of the few unchanging revolutionary maxims. These were for the
most part elderly men, who had held high office and done the State some
service, and were now condemned to exile without trial. With a brutality which
admits of no palliation they were carried across France in open iron cages on
wheels, half starved and subjected to every form of insult and misery. On their
arrival at Rochefort they were instantly transferred to’ a corvette and
despatched on a voyage which lasted for more than seven weeks, during which
time they lay in the bare hold fed on little more than mouldy biscuits and
brackish water. After a short rest at Cayenne they were taken to a
fever-stricken deserted village called Sinamary. Eight of the prisoners,
Barthelemy, Pichegru, Aubry, de La Rue, Willot, Ramel, Dossonville, and
Letellier, escaped in a canoe; Aubry and the brave valet Letellier died on the
way; the others arrived after many adventures at Demerara, whence they were
conveyed to England. Six of those who remained behind died within twelve
months, two only, Lafon-Ladebat and Barbe-Marbois, survived and were brought
back to France in 1799.
The new era
of the Directory began by the removal of every magistrate and official in the
forty-nine Departments in which the elections had been annulled, and by the
substitution for them of ex-Con ven- tionalists, Jacobins, and personal
proteges of the Directors. In each district of France a military tribunal was
instituted to identify and shoot emigres. The working of these tribunals
depended greatly on the spirit of the members of each; in some districts the
persons arraigned had as fair a trial as possible, in others accusation and
identification were followed by immediate death. When Honaparte, already
disgusted with the manner in which the Directors had used the victory which
they owed to his aid, arrived at Toulon on his way to Egypt, he issued an order
of the day on the conduct of the military tribunal of that town. The
order begins
thus: “ I learn with profound grief that old men of seventy or eighty years,
and women with young children have been shot on accusations of being emigres;
have the soldiers of liberty become executioners?” In the course of the two
years, September, 1797, to November, 1799, about 160 persons were shot by order
of these tribunals ; a sinister commentary on the boasts of Boulay and
Bailleul that “no blood had been spilt in consequence of the glorious victory
of liberty.”
But the swift
death by a musket-ball was not to be compared to the sufferings of the unhappy
prisoners who underwent the punishment of the guiUotine seche, the term by
which transportation to Cayenne became known. Fortunately for humanity only a
few shiploads of prisoners were actually despatched. The English cruisers were
on the alert; they drove one ship dismasted back to Rochefort, and captured a
second with twenty-five priests on board. After this, imprisonment on the
islands of Re and Oleron was substituted for transportation.
In all 363
prisoners, of whom 292 were priests, were sent to Cayenne. Of these 57 escaped
or were rescued by the English; 187 died (mostly within a few months of their
arrival); and 119 survived the Directory. On the islands 1212 priests and some
hundreds of Bretons, journalists, and others, were imprisoned. As will be seen
from these figures, the chief sufferers were priests. The Law of September 5,
as has already been said, in addition to reenacting the revolutionary laws
against the clergy, gave to the Directors the power to transport, without any
further ceremony than a statement of their reason, any priest whom they considered
to have disturbed the public peace. It had been found impossible to compel the
local authorities to enforce the laws against ecclesiastics, whom they were
often more ready to protect than to persecute ; but from Directors such as
Larevelliere, Merlin, or Francois, no priest could hope for mercy. Arrest
followed the mention of his name or the most trivial complaint. The order
sometimes set forth a definite offence, such as opposing the observance of the
decadi or advocating Christian marriage; more often it ran in some such terms
as these, “Seeing that A. B., priest, is a man of detestable morals and
Junatidses."" Constitutional priests were as liable as others; and
many were transported or imprisoned for refusing to transfer their Sunday
services to the decadi. A few Protestant ministers were also sentenced; and
several ex-priests who had married and joined the “Anarchist” party found that
the indelibility of Holy Orders was not a mere theological dogma. The total
number of priests, against whom these lettres de cachet were issued between
September, 1797, and November, 1799, has been calculated at 1726 in France and
8225 in Belgium. Nearly 8000 of the latter were condemned by orders in blank,
issued after the rising against the conscription in 1798; the majority escaped,
being befriended by the entire population; but all those captured were
imprisoned in France or Belgium.
It was. not
by persecution alone that the Directory attempted to destroy Christianity. At a
time when the country was in imminent danger of invasion, when every industry
required support, when financial disaster threatened to overwhelm the State,
when the chaos of conflicting laws rendered the administration of justice
almost impossible, the Directors and their Ministers made it the main object of
their domestic policy to suppress the Christian Sundays and festivals and to
substitute for them the observance of the decadis and republican fetes. Their
object is expressed clearly in these terms: “to destroy the influence of the
Roman religion by substituting for worn-out impressions new ones more
conformable to reason.” To achieve this they issued laws, orders and circulars
sufficient to fill volumes—the purport of all being to erect the decadi into a
sort of Jewish Sabbath on which no Court, public office, shop, or factory,
should be open, and no work publicly performed in town or country. All
officials and school-children were ordered to attend on each dicadi at the appointed
meeting-place of the Commune, usually the parish church, where a function took
place consisting of the recitation of the officialil Bulletin
decadaire” containing laws and judiciously selected news of the day, followed
by tales of civic virtue and moral instructions often of inconceivable
banality, and ending with the celebration of marriages, which could be legally
performed only on that day. In Paris fifteen churches were appropriated to
these services, all of which were renamed; Notre Dame becoming the Temple of
the Supreme Being, Saint Eustache the Temple of Agriculture, and so forth.
On the other
hand everything possible was done to suppress the observance of Sunday; schools
were ordered to be kept open. No official or person over whom the government
could exercise an influence was allowed to absent himself from work or to show
any sign of holiday- making. In communes, where the administration was in the
hands of the Directors’ nominees, the churches were locked up as Sunday came
round. The same regulations were applied to all fasts and festivals; even the
markets were ordered to be so arranged that fish should not be sold on Fridays
or fast days. For the old festivals were substituted a series of fetes: some
moral, such as the fete of Youth in March, of Marriage in April, of Old Age in
July; others political, as the Execution of the last tyrant (January 21),
Capture of the Bastille (July 14), Foundation of the Republic (September 22),
Eighteenth Fructidor (September 4). But it was beyond the power of the
Directors to force the whole nation to attend the d&cadis and fetes or to
forget the old Sunday holiday. Spectators came to see the marriages on the
decadis-, when there were none they stayed away. The peasants danced and drank
on Sunday and refused to do either on the decadi. As for the fetes so eagerly
celebrated in the early days of enthusiasm, they became a weariness to the
flesh in these times of apathy, contempt, and disgust.
Next to the
clergy the vengeance of the Directors fell most heavily
on the
journalists. Before the coup d’etat the Directory had sent repeated Messages
demanding stricter laws against the freedom of the press, which the Corps
Legislatif had consistently refused to pass. Now the Directors had all they
required; the Law of September 5 gave them the right to suppress any journal of
which they disapproved, while a second law passed on September 8 confiscated
forty-two of the principal newspapers and condemned their proprietors, editors,
and writers to transportation. The greater number escaped; but one of the most
distinguished, Suard, was included in the first ship-load transported to
Cayenne; and many others followed him or were imprisoned at Ol&on or the
lie de Re. Among those condemned in the years 1798 and 1799 were La Harpe, Fontanes,
Michaud, and Lacretelle, in fact the majority of the small body of men of
letters who had survived the Revolution.
During the
months between the coup d’etat and the elections in the spring of 1798 the
Corps Legislatif sank into complete dependence on the Directors and obeyed
their orders almost implicitly. Nearly all those who had given dignity and
prestige to its proceedings were swept away. The Law of September 5 had
eliminated two hundred deputies, and others who had escaped proscription, as Thibaudeau,
Dupont of Nemours, Doulcet, resigned or absented themselves. The promoters of
the coup d'etat, now known as the “Fructidoriens,"" led the Councils;
among these were Marie-Joseph Chenier, Tallien, Jean Debry, General Jourdan,
Chazal, Bailleul, and Boulay. Sieyes could hardly be said to belong to any
party, though he had been one of the most important promoters of the coup
d'etat, and had sat on the Commission which drew up the Law of September 5.
Beyond self-interest Sieyes was moved by few passions; but he was not free from
a genuine hatred of all who had belonged to the former noblesse. He was
responsible for the only attempt at independent action on the part of the
Councils. This was a proposition to “ ostracise,” that is to banish from
France, every ex-noble or person who had held high office under the Monarchy.
Characteristically he made Boulay his mouthpiece in bringing forward this
scheme, which would have affected the lives and properties of many thousands of
innocent persons. It met with such universal execration that it was promptly
withdrawn, to be replaced by a foolish law declaring all ex-nobles to be
foreigners who could obtain the rights of French citizens only by going through
the process of naturalisation.
One measure
of supreme importance was dictated to the Corps Ligislatif by the Directors and
was passed by them on September 30,
1797, the law of the Budget for the Year vi,
which practically wrote off two-thirds of the interest on the Public Debt. This
act of bankruptcy is dealt with in a later chapter; it is only possible here to
repeat that the history of these years cannot be thoroughly understood without
constantly bearing in mind the influence of the financial position on the
political action of the government.
Under the
Constitution the Primary Assemblies were due to meet in March, 1798, and the
Electoral Colleges during the first days of April. The electors in this year
were called upon to replace or reelect the last Third of the members of the
Convention, as well as to fill the seats of those expelled in September, 1797.
In all, 437 deputies, nearly two- thirds of the entire Corps Legislatif, were
to be returned. The moderate party was crushed; but a fresh and more formidable
opposition was coming to the front.
In the summer
of 1797 the Directors had promoted the formation of “Constitutional Clubs”
throughout the country. These clubs had grown rapidly, corresponded with each
other, and accepted the direction of the central “Cercle ConstitutioTmel'"
in Paris; they now formed a compact and powerful ultra-revolutionary
organisation, which had become intensely hostile to the Directory and was
supported by the great mass of the electorate. “ In old days we had one tyrant,
now we have five,” was a sentiment which was shared not by Jacobins only but by
all who had suffered from the bankruptcy or from the petty tyrants who
represented the Directory. Long before the elections began it was obvious to
the Directors and to the “ Fructidorians ” that they would be hopelessly beaten
; and they prepared to defend themselves after their own fashion.
Denunciations
of anarchists and threats of a new Fructidor poured from the official presses;
but the chief reliance of the Directors rested on the promotion of an organised
system of “ scissions.” Wherever the Directorial party found itself in a
minority in the Electoral Colleges, its members were encouraged to declare that
the election was not free; to retire, form themselves into a separate college,
and return their own candidate. By the electoral law as it stood the double
return would be brought before the Chambers after the new members had taken
their seats on May 20. But, to meet the exigencies of the present elections,
the Fructidorians carried through the Corps Legislatif a new law giving the power
of verifying the returns to the existing Chambers before the new members could
sit. Accordingly the majority set to work to declare every new member in favour
of the Directory duly returned, whether he had been chosen by the majority or
by the minority in “ scission." But so few were the voters who had given
their suffrage in favour of the Directory that even this ingenious device
failed. Something more drastic was required, and it was not wanting.
A message was
received from the Directory declaring that anarchists and Royalists were
identical, and that both took their orders from the so-called King and must be
again suppressed. A commission was appointed to consider this message, of which
Bailleul was the spokesman ; and on his report a law was hurried through both
Chambers on May 11, 1798, which, after setting forth that the elections were
the result of a Royalist conspiracy to return anarchists wherever they were not
strong enough to return a Royalist, proceeded to declare the elections
in seven
Departments entirely null and void, to select the candidates least
objectionable to the Directory in twenty-three other Departments, and finally
to exclude by name forty-eight “ anarchist ” deputies (among whom, of all
possible people, was Cambaceres), from the remaining Departments. This second
coup d'etat, known as that of 22 Floreal, An vi, passed off for the moment
quite peaceably. Two days later Francois de NeufcMteau, probably by a
preconcerted arrangement, drew the retiring ballot and was succeeded as Director
by Treilhard, avocat and ex-member of the Convention, who had played a leading
part in the coup d'Hat of September, 1797. Francis was shortly afterwards
consoled by the Ministry of the Interior.
This was the
last victory of the Directors. The elimination of deputies had not been
sufficiently sweeping; and the men who had carried out the Directors’ latest
coup d'etat either were, or found it necessary to appear, ashamed of the
cynicism of their proceedings. The whole country was in revolt, and the Fructidorbns
themselves changed sides during the course of the next twelve months, even
Boulay and Bailleul changing their masters and accepting leading briefs from
the other side.
Since
September, 1797, the Directors had been absolute; their rule had led to nothing
but ruin at home and the threat of disaster abroad. Nor was it merely failure
with which the Directors were charged: they were accused also of promoting and
fostering a new class of speculators, commissaries, and contractors, whose
fortunes were built upon the public distress. The men, dishonest, reckless, and
vulgar, flaunted their wealth in lavish or debauched display; the women lived
in a sort of delirium of shamelessness, exhibiting themselves in costumes more
indecent than nudity, changing their husbands at their own caprice, and trading
on their charms or the influence of their lovers. Two at least of the
Directors, Rewbell and Barras, were known to be the patrons of these people,
and were believed to be their partners.
From June,
1798, to May, 1799, the Directors kept up a losing fight with the Corps
Legislatif over the question of finance and supply. Their position was that
there existed a large and not clearly ascertained deficit, that the expenses of
the next year would amount to at least <£28,000,000, and that new means of
increasing the revenue must be found. The Corps Legislatif denied that the
revenue was insufficient, and declared that the financial difficulties were due
to the waste and corruption of the executive. One Commission appointed to
examine the demands of the Directory reported that “ no part of the
administration was free from corruption and immorality”; another “that the
deficit was caused solely by the most monstrous and revolting corruption and
waste." Before the elections of 1799 the Directors themselves were not
directly charged by name, but their Ministers and Commissaries were attacked
with increasing energy. Those who were the objects of the most bitter
denunciations
were Scherer,
Minister of War, Trouve, Commissary at Milan, a protege of
Larevelliere-Lepeaux, and Rapinat, Commissary in Switzerland, brother-in-law of
Rewbell, whose harsh, overbearing rapacity had made his name a byword
throughout Europe. The Directors so far bent before the storm as to recall
Trouve and Rapinat and to remove Scherer by giving him the command of the Army
of Italy, where the hatred in which he was held by officers and men contributed
not a little to the series of disasters which befell the French throughout
Italy in the spring and summer of 1799.
In the midst
of these financial furies the Corps Legislatif passed the only law enacted
under the Directory which has produced a permanent influence on history, the
Law of Conscription. The armies of the Convention had been raised partly by
voluntary enlistment, partly by the great levee en masse of 300,000 men made by
the Committee of Public Safety. Five years of constant warfare had greatly
reduced the strength of the French forces in the field. Bonaparte had carried
the picked veterans to Egypt; and of those who remained 100,000 men were
scattered from Amsterdam to Bern and Naples, barely sufficing to prevent the
peoples of the vassal Republics which the Directors had founded in Holland, in
Switzerland, and in Italy, from rising against their benefactors.
By the summer
of 1798 it was clear that a renewal of the war with Austria was inevitable, and
that the armies must be largely reinforced. To effect this a law proposed by
General Jourdan was finally passed establishing the system of conscription, by
declaring that all unmarried French citizens between the ages of twenty and
twenty-five were liable to military service. The number of conscripts required
each year was made the subject of an annual law. The young men in each
Department were to be registered in five classes, the first consisting of those
between twenty and twenty-one, and so on in an ascending scale of age to the
last class, those between twenty-four and twenty-five. The conscripts each year
were to be drawn from the first class, each subsequent class to be called out
only in case the first did not furnish a sufficient number. Other clauses
enacted that officers of the cavalry and infantry were to be appointed from
those who had served for three years in the ranks, exception being made in favour
of any who had shown special gallantry in action. This law, which placed so
magnificent a weapon in the hands of Bonaparte, and which has for a century
formed the basis of the military system of Europe, was under the Directory
worse than a failure.
On September
24 the first annual law fixed the number of conscripts required at 200,000. The
Directors reduced this to 184,000 by excluding the Departments which had been
ravaged by the Vendee and Chouam wars, nominally “to promote the growth of the
population and reestablish agriculture,” in reality to stave off the outbreak
of a fresh civil war. After eight months of strenuous effort not more than
37,000
conscripts
had been drafted into the various armies. For the moment it seemed that
military ardour was dead throughout France. Evasions, false certificates of
marriage, self-mutilation, and wholesale desertion, formed not the exception
but the rule. Of 1200 conscripts mustered at Aix all but 250 deserted in the
course of a few weeks ; of 2000 conscripts marching from Luxembourg to Tours
1200 deserted; in the Haute Loire 1087 of the 1400 conscripts deserted; and so
from north to south throughout the country.
In many
Departments deserters were declared emigres, and their relatives imprisoned or
heavily fined ; but such measures only aggravated the evil, for the outlawed
deserters joined the brigands or formed themselves into bands and resisted
arrest by force. In Belgium the conscription was met by open rebellion. The
Belgians had been maddened by the robberies and insolence of the Commissaries,
by the persecution of the clergy, and by the closing of the churches. The
peasantry now rose against this last demand, and for three months, without
leaders and without arms, held their ground against regular French troops,
burning trees of liberty, reopening churches, and killing or driving away the
French officials. They were at last subdued ; the whole body of the clergy,
8000 in number, as has already been said, were sentenced to imprisonment, and
the peasants were mercilessly punished; but Belgium furnished few conscripts to
the French army.
The Electoral
Colleges met on April 23, 1799. The war with Austria and Russia had already
opened disastrously. The electors knew that Jourdan had been defeated on the
Rhine, that the armies of Italy had been everywhere beaten and were in full
retreat, and that the only general in whom they had absolute faith was in
Egypt. Alternately dreaded and despised at home, the Directors had hitherto
been the dictators of war and peace abroad ; they had now lost their last
security, the prestige of success. When the news of the assassination of the
French envoys at Rastatt on April 28 arrived in Paris, it was loudly asserted
that they had been murdered by order of the Directory. The assertion was of
course ridiculous, but interesting as showing how completely the Directors were
lost in public estimation.
The elections
resulted in the return of a large number of advanced Jacobins, of nearly all
those who had been excluded by the coup d'etat of May 11, 1798, and of a
considerable contingent of those who had been known as Fructidorians, but were
now the determined enemies of the existing Directors, if not of the Directory
itself as a form of executive government. To complete the misfortunes of the
Directors, Rewbell, the only man among them capable of facing the storm,
retired by ballot on May 9.
Sieyes was at
once elected in his place, and this time he did not refuse. He had been absent
from France since May 10, 1798, on a mission of the highest importance, the
object of which was to induce the
new King of
Prussia, Frederick William III, to exchange his neutrality for an active
alliance with France; and the belief, though absolutely unwarranted, that he
had succeeded, raised still higher the curious prestige which attached itself
to his name. His election may be taken as an acknowledgment by all parties in
the State of the failure of the Constitution, and of their belief that he was
the one Frenchman able to produce a new one.
Sieyes
himself had been meditating a design to place a foreign prince on a
constitutional throne ; he thought at one time of a marriage between the
Archduke Charles and Madame Royale, afterwards of approaching the Duke of
Brunswick. But these thoughts had led to no form of action, and were probably
now replaced by a resolution to renew the project of the Constitution which had
been so contemptuously set aside by the “ Commission of Eleven ” in 1795,
reserving to himself in the post of Grand Elector as great an amount of dignity
and emolument and as small an amount of responsibility as he could secure. What
may have been his exact design is matter of conjecture; the one thing certain
is that to elect him to the Directory was to admit the enemy within the
fortress. His election marks the end of the Constitution of the Year 111. The
events that followed, the expulsion of the then Directors, the hopeless
failure of the Corps Ligislatif to take their place, the intrigues of Sieyes
and Barras, all these belong to the history of the coup d'etat of Brumaire, and
will be found in a later chapter, relating that momentous change in the history
of the Revolution.
THE
EXTINCTION OF POLAND, 1788-97.
It is difficult for anyone whose knowledge of
history goes no further back than the eighteenth century to realise that Poland
was once a considerable Power in Europe; that under its Jagello Kings it
headed a successful struggle of the Slavs to resist German expansion and German
domination ; that under the Vasa dynasty it was the stronghold of the Catholic
reaction in northern Europe; that in the reign of John Sobieski it turned the
scale in the last great struggle with the Turks and rolled back the victorious
forces of the Crescent from the walls of Vienna. After Sobieski’s death the
history of Poland is a record of rapid and apparently irretrievable decadence.
Its decline is usually attributed to the vices of its Constitution : to the
elective monarchy and the pacta conventa which extorted from each successive
King an acknowledgment of his impotence in the State; to the exclusive
representation of the nobles in the Diet, and the absence of any middle class
to bridge the gulf between the privileged oligarchy and the down-trodden serfs;
to the liberum veto, which made unanimity necessary for any valid decision of
the Diet, and gave to a faction, however inconsiderable in itself, the power of
thwarting the national will; and finally to the anarchical right of
Confederation, which made it lawful for a band of nobles to pursue a common aim
even by force of arms. Nowhere, except perhaps in fifteenth century Scotland,
were conditions so favourable to disorder; and nowhere was there less efficient
machinery for its repression.
But it is a
mistake to suppose that this very faulty constitution was the only or even the
most prominent cause of the decline of Poland. The maintenance of its former
power and importance was rendered impossible by the rise of the two
neighbouring States of Russia and Prussia. Russia aspired to be the greatest of
Slavonic States, and strove to identify the interests of the Slavs with those
of the Greek Church. Hitherto Poland had been without question the most
influential and the most civilised of the Slavonic kingdoms, but she had
received Christianity from the Church of Rome. As Poland was also an obstacle
to the connexion with Germany from which Russia derived a chief part of her
western
teaching, it
was inevitable that Russian expansion must be harmful and probably fatal to
Poland. Equally deeply-rooted was the antagonism of Prussia. The Prussian Kings
took their title from that part of Prussia which they inherited from the
Teutonic Knights. The Knights, who constituted as it were a corporate ancestor
of the Hohenzollems, had formerly waged a successful crusade against the Slavs
on the southern side of the Baltic, but had ultimately been worsted and
deprived both of their independence and of the bulk of their territory by the
Jagello Kings, who united Lithuania with Poland. East Prussia remained a Polish
fief till after the middle of the seventeenth century; and even then the
Province was until 1772 completely severed from Brandenburg, the kernel of the
Hohenzollem dominions, by the Polish Province of West Prussia. Moreover the
Electors of Brandenburg and Kings of Prussia were Protestants; and after the
conversion of the Saxon dynasty they became the recognised champions of
Protestant interests in northern Germany. In this capacity they were
necessarily hostile to Poland, which had long upheld the cause of militant Roman
Catholicism. On every ground, therefore, geographical, political, and
religious, the interests of Poland were opposed to those of her eastern and her
western neighbour.
Of the two
hostile States Russia was by far the more active enemy of Poland. In 1733, on
the death of Augustus II of Saxony, the Poles chose a native King, who was also
the father-in-law of the King of Prance. Russia vetoed the election, and
compelled the Poles to accept a second Saxon ruler, in the person of Augustus
III. Prussia on this occasion remained sulkily neutral, because she had every
reason to dislike the union of Saxony and Poland, and was not yet familiar with
the idea of cooperation with Russia. But thirty years later, when the Polish
throne was again vacant, Russia and Prussia acted in complete harmony. By their
treaty in 1764 they agreed to procure the election of a native noble, to
prevent the abolition of the liberum veto or the establishment of hereditary
monarchy, and to introduce a new element of discord into the Republic by
releasing the dissidents, both Protestants and members of the Greek Church,
from the law which excluded them from political employments. The first of these
objects, owing to the weakness or apathy of the Powers which should have
supported Poland, was achieved without difficulty. The Poles elected Stanislas
Poniatowski, whose personal charms had gained for him a prominent place among
the numerous lovers of Catharine II. His chief qualification from the Russian
point of view was that he was likely to be a docile vassal to the mistress who
had been so lavish as to reward him with a crown. But Stanislas’ weak and
impulsive nature was open to influence from within as well as from without. In
the intervals between his fits of terror at the possible displeasure of the
Czarina, he was a zealous Roman Catholic and a patriotic Pole. He desired, as
did the bulk of his subjects, to maintain
the
ascendancy of the established Church, and to strengthen Poland by reforming its
lamentable constitution. But Russian arguments “armed with cannon and bayonets”
were more than Polish King or Diet could resist. Under the open dictation of
the Russian ambassador, backed up by a Russian army, the Diet voted in 1767 the
repeal of the laws against the dissidents, and in 1768 accepted a treaty by
which Russia guaranteed the integrity of the Polish territory and the
maintenance of the Polish constitution.
Ecclesiastical
zeal combined with patriotic fervour to impel all lovers of their country and
its Church to resist the foreign Power which attacked both the religion and the
independence of Poland. In 1768 the Confederation of Bar was formed by the
malcontent nobles, with the object of restoring the supremacy of Roman
Catholicism and repudiating the treaty with Russia. The latter Power at once
employed all its force to crush what it chose to regard as a rebellion. But
Austria and Prance encouraged the Confederates, while Turkey seized the first
pretext to declare war against Russia. Thus Russian intervention in Poland
seemed likely to lead to a European war on a large scale. Frederick the Great,
who must have been drawn into such a war as the ally of Russia, was eager to
continue the work of peaceful administration, which was necessary to enable his
country to recover from its exhausting efforts during the last great struggle.
He saw that Austria held the key of the situation, and that Austria could only
be appealed to through her cupidity. But at whose expense could a bribe be
furnished? Turkey had provinces which were coveted at Vienna; but Turkey was
still too strong to be partitioned, and Prussia had no interest in weakening
the Porte. There remained Poland, too feeble and distracted to resist, and the
possessor of districts which were of incalculable value to the Prussian King.
The project of partition, adroitly suggested from Berlin, was found to provide
the easiest and the most attractive solution of all difficulties. Maria Theresa
took the bribe with tears of shame and remorse, but the more she wept the more
territory she demanded. In 1772 the three robber-Powers made a treaty by which
they agreed that in order to restore public tranquillity they would enforce
claims upon Poland which were “ as ancient as they were legitimate.” It took
three years of intimidation to overcome Polish resistance; but in 1775 the
Diet at last consented to the ccssion of territory, to the creation of a
permanent Council which was to be a mere agent of Russia, and to a renewed
guarantee of its constitution by the Powers who had used that constitution as
a pretext for intervention and for self-aggrandisement. Russia took the
Provinces adjacent to its frontier; Austria took Galicia; and Prussia obtained
the coveted Province of West Prussia, but without the municipal republics of
Danzig and Thom, which remained in nominal subjection to Poland.
The First
Partition left Poland not only weakened by the loss of nearly
one-third of
her territory, but also to all intents and purposes a dependency of Russia.
Russian troops were quartered in the country; and the Russian ambassador was as
omnipotent at Warsaw as is the British Resident at the court of a petty Indian
prince. The spirit of a proud nation chafed indignantly at the undisguised
exercise of foreign dictation; and the violent antipathy to Russia generated during
these years strengthened the conviction that a thorough reform of the
constitution was necessary if Poland was ever to recover its independence.
Gradually the prospects of the reforming party were improved by external
events. In 1780 the alliance between Russia and Prussia, which had been so
disastrous to Poland, came to an end. The Austro-Russian alliance, which took
its place, was more threatening to Turkey than to Poland. With Austria the
relations of Poland had been traditionally friendly. The two States had been
united from time to time by common hostility to Protestantism and to the Turks.
It is true that their good understanding had been occasionally interrupted by
the influence of France in Poland; but since 1756 the long antagonism between
France and Austria had come to an end. Austria had joined in the partition of
1772; but it was notorious that she had been to the last moment an unwilling
accomplice. Austria had no reason, such as Prussia had, either to dread a
revival of Poland, or to prohibit a reunion of Poland and Saxony.
So far,
therefore, as Austrian influence supplanted that of Prussia at St Petersburg,
Poland was justified in congratulating herself on the exchange. In 1787 the
Turks declared war against Russia. In 1788 Joseph II announced his intention of
taking up arms against the Turks, but on the other hand Sweden attacked Russia,
and the Triple Alliance was formed between Prussia and the Maritime Powers to
thwart the ambitious designs of the two imperial Courts. These events had a decisive
influence upon the position of Poland, whose alliance was sought on both sides.
Catharine II offered to renew her guarantee of the integrity of the Polish
territories, and demanded leave to raise in Poland thirty thousand horsemen for
the Russian army. Stanislas hoped to induce the Czarina to consent to the
establishment of hereditary monarchy in return for Polish assistance.
Meanwhile Prussia also made overtures to Poland, The Prussian envoy, Buchholz,
pointed out that the Russian guarantee could only be directed against Prussia,
and offered that Frederick William II would undertake a similar obligation. He
urged that the Turks had done nothing to incur the hostility of Poland, and
that the weakening of Turkey would strengthen the Power which already
domineered over the Republic. Finally, he held out hopes that Prussia would
support a substantial measure of constitutional reform. It was at this
juncture that the famous “ Four years’ Diet” met at Warsaw on October 6, 1788.
In the
dietines, or preliminary meetings of electors, the anti-Russian
party had
triumphed; and the majority of the nances were in favour of Polish independence
and of constitutional reform. The first measure of the Diet, on October 7, was
to form itself into a Confederation, so as to avoid the paralysing effect of
the liberum veto. The proposals for cooperation with Russia were not even
submitted to the assembly, which demanded the immediate withdrawal of the
Russian troops from Polish soil. Catharine, who needed all her forces against
Turkey and Sweden, could not refuse to comply. The permanent Council, which had
been established in 1775, was abolished, and thus Russian domination was for
the moment overthrown. At the same time the overtures of Prussia were eagerly
welcomed, and the leaders of the reforming party put themselves in close
communication with the Prussian and English ambassadors. Unfortunately for
Poland, there was no leader who realised the imperative importance of haste.
The favourable circumstances of 1788 and 1789 were not likely to be
indefinitely prolonged. If the reforms of 1791 had been adopted two years
earlier, they would at any rate have had a chance of taking root, and also
Prussia might have been so pledged to their maintenance that she could not
break faith. But the opportunity was allowed to slip and it never returned.
It must be
admitted that there were many excuses for delay. The Poles were not experts in
constitutional procedure, and the possibilities of obstruction were veiy great.
King Stanislas at the commencement was still under Russian influence, and it
was only very gradually that his extreme dread of St Petersburg was overpowered
by a sense of loyalty to the interests of the nation. The conclusion of a
treaty with Prussia was impeded, partly by the suspicion which Prussia’s past
attitude towards Poland excited, and partly by Hertzberg’s desire for a bargain
by which Danzig and Thom were to be given up in return for some cession on the
part of Austria. The more patriotic the reformers were, the more they hesitated
to approve a transaction which involved the surrender of Polish territory;
while mercantile interests were opposed to any weakening of Polish control of
its one great navigable river, the Vistula. And although the principle of
reform was accepted by the majority in the Diet, it was by no means easy to
obtain any general agreement as to details. Thus it was notorious that the
practice of electing to the kingship had over and over again given occasion for
domestic discord and foreign intervention. Yet the proposal to establish
hereditary succession ran counter to many of the strongest prejudices of the
Poles, and was inconsistent with their traditional conception of “liberty.” The
admission to the Diet of urban delegates was imperatively necessary to give
stability and unity to the State; but many of the nobles hesitated to sacrifice
their prescriptive monopoly of political power. It was a moot point whether
constitutional change should precede or follow the conclusion of an alliance
with Prussia and the Maritime States. Almost every question offered unlimited
opportunity
for that
discursive eloquence which in Poland took the place of orderly debate.
It was not
until March 29, 1790, that the defensive treaty with Prussia was formally
approved, and it contained no stipulation with regard to Danzig and Thom. This
has often been held to have been a mistake on the part of the Polish patriots.
If the Prussian alliance was all-important, it was foolish to- be too
scrupulous and niggardly about the terms. A sacrifice at the time might have
served to avert far greater losses in the future. As it was, Prussia was
chagrined by Polish obstinacy; and the Conference of Reichenbach, which finally
disappointed Prussia’s hopes of making a profit out of the Eastern imbroglio,
made the Polish alliance comparatively valueless at Berlin. With the rupture of
the Austro-Russian alliance the Eastern Question receded more and more into the
background; and the probability steadily grew that Prussia would find it to her
interest to repudiate her obligations to Poland, as she had already repudiated
her obligations to Turkey. So long as Poland could be useful, it was desirable
that the Republic should be strengthened in every way; and the partisans of
reform were encouraged to proceed with their work in confident reliance upon
Prussian support. But when the need of the alliance was at an end, Prussia
almost inevitably reverted to the old policy of keeping Poland weak and
divided.
Yet the Diet
at Warsaw continued to discuss schemes of reform as if nothing had occurred to
diminish the chance of carrying them out. Progress was as slow as ever. The
extreme limit of the duration of a Diet was two years, and the term was rapidly
approaching. It was obviously absurd to leave an unfinished task to wholly new
hands. The difficulty, which gave rise to prolonged discussion, was at last met
by ordering fresh elections to take place, but the delegates chosen were to be
added to those already sitting. This doubling of the Diet, which took place on
December 16,1790, made little difference to the balance of parties, but it
certainly did not tend to shorten debate. In the early months of 1791 two
decisions were reached. Certain regulations were made with regard to the
procedure of future Diets. As opinion was not yet prepared to accept the vote
of a simple majority, it was agreed that declarations of war, treaties of
peace, and political laws should require a majority of three-quarters of the
assembly, whereas taxes could be voted by two-thirds; and it was laid down as a
permanent rule that no Diet might authorise a cession of territory, which had
the effect of still further cooling the zeal of Prussia in the Polish cause. At
this rate the new Constitution would take years to enact. The opposition,
composed partly of bigoted Republicans and partly of more or less interested
partisans of Russia, justified its resolute obstruction by appealing to a law
of 1768, which made unanimity necessary for any change in fundamental laws.
To overcome
obstruction it was necessary for the reformers to resort to something like a
coup d'etat. It was agreed to bring forward a draft Constitution ready made,
and to carry it en bloc by acclamation so as to avoid the endless discussion of
successive clauses. Stanislas, who had now thrown himself on the patriotic
side, undertook the task of making the formal proposition. The date originally
chosen was anticipated by two days through fear of premature disclosures; and
on May 3, 1791, Stanislas Poniatowski enjoyed the finest triumph of his life.
Proceedings commenced with a report of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, in
which stress was laid upon dangers which threatened the Republic, the
possibility of a new partition, the avowed hostility of Russia, the risk of
treachery on the part of Prussia, and the corruption of native Poles by foreign
gold. A marshal of the Diet solemnly called upon the King to propose some means
of saving the State. In response to this appeal Stanislas declared his
conviction that safety could only be attained by the establishment of a new
Constitution, and announced that he held the plan of such a Constitution in his
hands. The reading of the draft was followed by impassioned speeches; and from
the loud expressions of applause or dissent the opinion of the vast majority
could be clearly gathered. Amid intense excitement the King rose to take a
solemn oath to observe the new Constitution, and called upon the Deputies to
follow him to the cathedral so as to give added solemnity to their momentous
decision. Some twelve members remained gloomily obstinate in their seats; the
rest streamed in an impressive procession through the midst of an applauding
mob from the palace to the church, where before the high altar they recited the
formula of the royal oath.
The main
object of the Constitution was to give such power to the monarchy that it
should be able in the future to maintain national unity and to suppress
disorder. Henceforth the throne was to be filled, not by election, but by
hereditary succession. On the death of the reigning King the crown was to pass
to the Elector of Saxony and his heirs, either male or female. The King was to
have supreme control of the army, and the nomination of members of the Senate
and of officers of State. Executive power was to be in the hands of the King
and of six responsible ministers. The right of legislation was vested in the
Diet, which was to consist of two Chambers, to meet every two years, and to
include deputies from the free towns. All laws were to be approved by the King,
but his veto could only postpone the execution of a law from one Diet to
another. The liberum veto and the right of Confederation were suppressed “ as
contrary to the spirit of the present Constitution and tending to trouble the
State.” Roman Catholicism was to remain the dominant religion of the State and
proselytism was forbidden; but toleration was assured to the adherents of other
creeds.
Poland was
for the moment tranquil and triumphant. Many of the most strenuous opponents of
reform declared their intention of accepting
the new
system of government when they were convinced that it had received the approval
of the nation. But the maintenance of the Constitution of May 3 depended less
on the wishes of the Poles themselves than on the action of the neighbouring
States; and to understand what followed it is necessary to form a clear
conception of their attitude. In attempting to do this it is imperative to
remember that the Polish Question was not and could not be isolated from the
other great questions which agitated Europe at the time, the growing demand
for intervention in France, and the unfinished negotiations for a final
settlement of the Eastern Question. As regards Poland it is perfectly easy to
define the policy adopted at St Petersburg. The promulgation of the new
Constitution was a deliberate act of defiance to Russia. Catharine II had from
the first warned the Poles that she would not tolerate any infringement of the
Constitution which she had guaranteed in 1768 and again in 1775. Hitherto she
had been so busied with military operations in the south and north that she
had been compelled to neglect the affairs of Poland. But in the spring of 1791
her hands were comparatively free. She had concluded a Treaty with Gustavus
IH, and she had announced her willingness to concede peace to the Turks on
condition that Oczakoff should be ceded to Russia. That condition was resented
by England and by Prussia; but their hostility was already discounted by Pitt’s
inability to carry public opinion with him in his resistance to Russian
aggrandisement. As soon as the Turkish war was at an end—and the preliminaries
of peace were signed in August— Catharine had made up her mind to subordinate
all other considerations to the imperative necessity of restoring Russian
domination in Poland. There was only one obstacle in the way of active
measures. Catharine required a preliminary assurance that she would not be
impeded by the joint opposition of Austria and Prussia. In 1791 it was not
possible to gain this assurance, and therefore Russian intervention in Poland
was postponed. But it is characteristic of Catharine that she had clearly
formulated in her own mind a way out of the novel difficulty created by the
momentary cooperation of two States which had for half a century been
implacably hostile to each other. “ I cudgel my brains,” she said, “to urge the
Courts of Vienna and Berlin to busy themselves with the affairs of France. I
wish them to do this that I may have my own elbows free. I have many unfinished
enterprises and I wish these two Courts to be fully occupied so that they may
not disturb me.” It was for this that Catharine was waiting. So soon as Austria
and Prussia were engaged in France, Russia was prepared to deal with Poland.
The attitude
of Austria is equally clear. Leopold II had deliberately abandoned the
pro-Russian policy of his predecessor, and had reverted to the sounder
traditions of Maria Theresa. Nothing could be more in harmony with the
essential interests of Austria than the existence of a
strong Polish
State, united by dynastic ties with Saxony, and equally ready to oppose the
ambitions of Russia on the one side or of Prussia on the other. Such a State
would immensely strengthen Roman Catholicism and revive Austrian influence in
northern Germany. It would probably put an end to the Fiirstenbund. To Leopold,
therefore, it was an obvious and imperative duty to support the new Polish
Constitution. So distinct was Austrian interest in the matter that it has been
held, though without adequate documentary evidence, that Austria must have
inspired the coup d'etat of May 3.
For Prussia
the problem was far less simple than for the other two Powers. Some glimpses
have already been given of the conflict of interests in Berlin. In itself the
reorganisation of Poland, and still more the reunion of Poland with Saxony, ran
counter to all the legitimate ambitions of Prussia. The cession of Danzig and
Thom might have rendered the dose more palateable, but without the sweetmeat it
was undisguisedly nauseous. Hertzberg urged the straightforward course of
promptly denouncing the Constitution and demanding its withdrawal. But
Hertzberg’s influence had been declining since Reichenbach; and in 1791 he was
practically superseded by Bischoffswerder, a Saxon by birth, who had obtained
almost complete ascendancy over the feeble-minded Frederick William II.
Bischoffswerder was eager to bring about an alliance between Austria and
Prussia, to which the chief hindrance was the Emperor’s delay in the
negotiations at Sistova. Prussia was gradually drifting from the firm lines of
policy which Frederick the Great had pursued and Hertzberg had more or less
endeavoured to follow. During the transition from one system to another
vacillation was almost inevitable ; and this vacillation is most clearly to be
seen in the relations of Prussia with Poland. Moreover in May, 1791, there was
still a possibility of a war with Russia on the Turkish question; and until
that was completely removed it was obviously impolitic on the part of Prus 1a
to quarrel with a possible ally in Poland. All these considerations help to
explain if not to justify those acts of Frederick William which afterwards
brought upon him the imputation of the grossest perfidy.
On May 16 the
Prussian envoy at Warsaw in a formal communication to the Diet expressed his
master’s pleasure at “the firm and decisive conduct of the Estates, which he
regards as best fitted to give a solid foundation to the government and the
prosperity of Poland.” At the same time the Prussian King sent his
congratulations to the Elector of Saxony, and urged him to accept the proffered
succession to the Polish throne. The only reservation which he made was, that
in case of the accession of an heiress, her husband must not be chosen from any
of the three dynasties of Russia, Prussia, or Austria. Bischoffswerder was sent
from Berlin on a special embassy to the Emperor, who was in Italy. The
negotiations were delayed by Leopold’s parade of a desire to
conciliate
Russia, which was a mere ruse to raise the value of his ultimate agreement, and
also by the necessity of delaying any final conclusion until his return to
Vienna. But on July 25 Bischoffswerder signed the preliminaries of a treaty
between Austria and Prussia, by which it was agreed to guarantee the integrity
and the free Constitution of Poland, to invite the Elector of Saxony to accept
the Polish offers, and to make a formal stipulation prohibiting the accession
to the throne of Poland of any Prince belonging to the three neighbouring
States.
The alliance
of Austria and Prussia was almost as startling a diplomatic revolution as the
Treaty of Versailles between Prance and Austria in 1756. In September the
Emperor and the Prussian King held their famous interview at Pillnitz, a seat
of the Elector of Saxony. Although the discussions were mainly concerned with
the affairs of France, the very place of meeting was significant of a common
understanding with regard to Poland, and the agreement of July was renewed. At
the same time, intervention in France was made conditional on the concerted
action of the great Powers, and England had formally declared in favour of a
policy of abstention. Le0P°ld II was too wary to fall into the very
obvious trap set by the royalist intrigues and lofty professions of Catharine
II. He knew that a war with France would leave Poland at the mercy of Russia,
and for this and other reasons he desired peace in the west. It was an immense
relief to him when the acceptance of the French Constitution by Louis XVI
seemed for a time to remove foreign intervention from practical politics.
At the end of
1791 the position of affairs was this. Russia was anxious to overthrow the
recent Constitution and with it the independence of Poland. But Catharine’s
hand was stayed for the time by the agreement of Austria and Prussia to uphold
the Polish Constitution, and by her failure so far to induce any European
Prince except Gustavus III to undertake a crusade in the cause of monarchy in
France. So long as this state of things continued, Poland was comparatively
safe, though the Poles made little use of their brief interval of security to
prepare for the inevitable struggle in the future. But in the early months of
1792 a series of events made the prospect far less propitious for Poland than it
had hitherto been. On January 9 Russia finally closed the Turkish war by the
Treaty of Jassy, and the Russian armies were free to act elsewhere. On January
18 the Franconian principalities of Ansbach and Baireuth reverted to Frederick
William II, as head of the House of Hohenzollem, on the abdication of his relative,
the ruling Prince. This tended to revive a feeling of jealousy between Vienna
and Berlin, as Austria had every reason to dislike an extension of Prussian
power into southern Germany. At the same time the Prussian King showed a
growing unwillingness to uphold what was distinctly an Austrian policy with
regard to Poland. When the preliminary treaty of July 25 was transformed on
February 7 into the
definite
Treaty of Berlin, the engagement to maintain “ the free Constitution of
Poland” was practically annulled by the alteration into “a free Constitution.”
The substitution of the indefinite for the definite article pledged Prussia to
as much or as little as she chose. Leopold was profoundly chagrined; but it was
impossible to break off the negotiation on the point because the bellicose
attitude of the majority in the Legislative Assembly was rendering it more and
more difficult to avoid a war with France. On March 1 Leopold II suddenly died,
and with him perished all hopes of a peaceful maintenance of the status quo.
His successor, Francis II, was young and inexperienced, and before long he fell
under the influence cf politicians who believed that Austria would profit by
war. The eminently cautious and farsighted policy of Leopold was abandoned; and
Austria reverted to that reckless acquisitiveness which had characterised the
rule of Joseph II. From this time events marched with rapidity. A Girondin
ministry came into power in France; and on April 20 the French Assembly
declared war against Austria. Prussia, which had for some time been more eager
for a rupture than its ally, prepared at once to cany out the obligations which
it had undertaken by the recent treaty.
This was the
conjuncture for which Catharine had been waiting; and Poland soon learned how
insecure were the foundations on which the new Constitution rested. In April
the long-delayed answer of the Elector of Saxony was received at Warsaw. In it
he declared that he could only accept the Polish offer on condition that it was
approved by the neighbouring Powers, and that certain changes were made in the
Constitution, notably the securing of the Crown to future Electors of Saxony by
the exclusion of female succession. This was equivalent to a refusal, as Russia
had already denounced the Constitution, and Prussia was bound to oppose the
permanent union of Poland with Saxony. The chiefs of the Polish malcontents,
who had spent the winter in Russia waiting for the instructions of their
mistress, now returned to Poland, and on May 14 formed the Confederation of
Targowice. In their manifesto they denounced the recent establishment of
despotism in Poland, demanded the restoration of liberty and the old
constitution, and appealed to Russia for assistance. Four days later the
Russian Minister presented to the Diet Catharine’s formal declaration of her
intention to support the Confederation. On May 19, little more than a fortnight
after the anniversary of the new Constitution had been formally celebrated at
Warsaw, one Russian army entered Poland and another crossed the frontier into
Lithuania.
The Poles
were as panic-stricken as if they had had no reason to anticipate such action
on the part of Russia. The Diet voted almost absolute powers to the King. The
army was placed under his command; and he was authorised, if he thought it
necessary, to raise a levee en masse. The whole revenue, together with large
loans, were entrusted
to his
disposal. He could select officers, grant promotion, and raise men to noble
rank at his complete discretion. In return for this confidence Stanislas swore
to defend with his life the nation and the Constitution. At the same time an
appeal was made to Prussia to fulfil the stipulations of the treaty of 1790.
The appeal had been foreseen at Berlin, and the Prussian Court was furnished
with a cynical and unblushing answer. The gist of it was that the Poland which
Prussia had promised to defend was the Poland of 1790 : this had been
completely transformed by the acceptance of a Constitution which had been drawn
up without the knowledge and concurrence of Prussia; therefore Prussia was
under no obligation to defend Poland in 1792. The issue of a contest, in which
the Poles were left without assistance to oppose the overwhelming military
strength of Russia, was never for a moment in doubt. They displayed both
courage and capacity in several encounters, notably in an engagement at
Dubienka, where Kosciusko enhanced the military reputation which he had gained
under Washington in the American War. But superior numbers always turned the
scale and compelled the Polish forces to retreat. In the course of six weeks
the whole country was practically in Russian occupation, and effective
resistance was at an end.
Stanislas, in
spite of his oath, had never joined the army, nor even left Warsaw. He was
neither a fool nor a hero, and he would not commit himself to what he knew to
be a hopeless struggle On July 22 he signed his adhesion to the Confederation
of Targowice, and justified his action on the ground that it was the only way
to avoid a partition. His position at the time, denounced by one party and
distrusted by both, was not enviable. He was nominally King; but his power was
annulled both by the restoration of the old constitution and by the supremacy
which the events of the war placed in the hands of the leaders of the
Confederation. They in their turn were mere puppets of Russia, as they learned
to their cost when they tried to govern independently and to gain private
profit from their success. Poland, which a few months before had almost aspired
to the rank of a great Power, was again to all intents and purposes a Province
of Russia.
Catharine
owed her easy triumph mainly to the interested complicity of Prussia and the
preoccupation of Austria in the western war. But in spite of these advantages
she could not venture to retain exclusive possession of her prey, though she
would have liked to do so. Even before the outbreak of the French war she had
thought it wise to disarm any possible hostility on the part of Prussia by
suggesting another partition of Poland. Once started, the proposal was not
likely to be readily abandoned, and in fact it took a prominent place in the
negotiations between Austria and Prussia with reference to their cooperation in
France. ’ Disinterested intervention in the cause of a brother King, or even of
monarchy in the abstract, was quite beyond
the normal
bounds of international ethics in the eighteenth century. Both States intended
to be paid for their services; and it was obviously desirable to avert a
possible dispute by securing some preliminary agreement as to their respective
rewards. At the same time it was felt to be rather awkward to mulct a Prince
whose cause they professed to espouse; and such a scheme was not likely to
conciliate the French royalists, whose support was counted upon in the
campaign. So, although Austria at one time would have liked to recover Alsace
or to restore the dispossessed dynasty in Lorraine, the idea of purloining
French provinces was for the time abandoned. It became necessary, therefore, to
look for payment elsewhere.
Quite early
in the negotiations Prussia, encouraged by the suggestion from St Petersburg,
declared her intention to take a portion of Poland; although the integrity of Poland,
if not its later Constitution, had been guaranteed by the Treaty of 1790. The
lesson of perfidy is soon learnt and easily repeated. Austria—and here the
reversion to Joseph II’s policy is most conspicuous—fell back upon the old
scheme of exchanging the Netherlands for Bavaria. This was also suggested from
St Petersburg—so eager was Catharine to find sops to pacify the recent
upholders of Polish independence. This projected exchange had been foiled
before by Prussian opposition : but, if that opposition were now withdrawn,
there seemed to be no longer any insuperable difficulty in carrying it out. It
is true that Kaunitz, who had previously favoured the exchange, deemed it
monstrous that Prussia should be allowed to join in penalising Poland for having
framed a Constitution which Austria had formally approved. But Kaunitz had as
little influence over Francis II as over his father; his advice was contemned,
and in August, 1792, he retired from an office which he had held for half a
century. As Austria had made up her mind to abandon the Poles, it was easy for
Russia to come to terms with the Emperor by a treaty signed on July IS, 1792,
which approved of the restoration of the old Constitution in Poland. On August
7 a similar treaty was made with Prussia. Nothing was said in either treaty
about partition. Catharine was satisfied to have obtained the sanction of the
two Courts for her coercion of Poland, and left them to settle between
themselves the question of compenss1 on for their efforts in the
French war. This had not been settled before the outbreak of hostilities, and
continued to be a subject of incessant and sometimes acrimonious negotiation
during the autumn and winter of 1792.
On neither
side was any attempt made to disguise the unprincipled rapacity of both
governments or their profound mutual distrust. Prussia, abandoning the very
foundations of Frederick’s policy, agreed to consent to the Austrian
acquisition of Bavaria for the Netherlands, on condition that Prussia should
take a part of Poland. This failed to satisfy the ministers at Vienna, who
pointed out that the Prussian gain
would be
immediate, whereas that of Austria was contingent on the Elector of Bavaria’s
consent. Also a Polish Province was an actual increase of territory, while a
mere exchange of one possession for another might bring to Austria no increase
either of population or of revenue. On the sacred ground of the equal balance
Austria calmly proposed that Prussia should add the Brandenburg principalities
of Ansbach and Baireuth to Bavaria. Nothing could have been better calculated
to excite fury at Berlin than the suggestion that Prussia should hand over
territory to Austria, that she should make a sacrifice to benefit her detested
ally, and that that sacrifice should consist of these ancient possessions of
the House of Hohenzollem. The refusal of Frederick William was so vehement and
decisive that Austria was forced either to withdraw the demand or to break up
the alliance.
Then new
difficulties arose. The allied forces withdrew not without ignominy from
Champagne; the French pressed on into the Netherlands; and Dumouriez won the
battle of Jemappes. The Provinces which had been so recently rescued from the
hands of native rebels, fell at the first blow to a foreign invader. The exchange
project faded at once into the dim distance. How could Charles Theodore be
asked to hand over Bavaria in exchange for territories of which Austria could
no longer dispose ? All the more feverishly did Austria insist upon the
principle of equality. If Prussia gained a part of Poland with the approval of
Russia, then Austria, sooner than wait for her equivalent, must at the same
time have an equal share of Poland. To this rather belated demand Prussia would
not consent; and even if Prussia had given way Russia would probably have
interposed an effective veto. But, unfortunately for Austria, the actual
condition of affairs gave an enormous advantage in the negotiation to the
allied but none the less rival State. Prussia could withdraw from the war without
loss, and loudly threatened that she would do so if her demands were not
accepted both by Austria and by Russia. On the other hand Austria could neither
abandon the war, leaving the Netherlands in French occupation, nor could she
afford to dispense with Prussian aid. Haugwitz, who represented Prussia in the
dispute, found no difficulty in playing a diplomatic hand of such overwhelming
strength ; and on December 19 he extorted from the Austrian government a
grudging and ungracious consent to a separate agreement between Berlin and St
Petersburg with regard to Poland. But Austria did not abandon her claims upon
Poland, although she ceased to press for their immediate satisfaction; and
confidential communications with Russia Urged that the concessions to Prussia
should be cut down to the smallest possible dimensions.
To Catharine
the spectacle of this rather undignified comedy had given undiluted pleasure.
The more Austria and Prussia quarrelled, the better could Russia return to its
old game of playing one off against the other. For a moment it seemed possible
that she might utilise their
growing
jealousy to keep Poland in its present state of subjection, and withdraw the
suggestion of partition which had been made under wholly different
circumstances. A more impulsive or less prudent ruler would probably have
yielded to the temptation. But Catharine could exercise consummate
self-restraint in political affairs. It was safer, and therefore in the end
better, to be content with a smaller gain than to run the risk of driving
Austria and Prussia into a closer alliance with each other and also into an
abandonment of the French war. To keep them at war, and to keep Russia out of
the war, meant her own undisturbed dictatorship in the East. For this it was
worth while to make some sacrifice in order to satisfy the greed of Prussia.
Having once made up her mind, Catharine acted with characteristic promptitude.
Instead of haggling over the rather exorbitant pretensions of Prussia, she
simply met them by largely increasing the Russian share.
The terms of
the Partition Treaty were arranged with great rapidity. The Prussian share,
which included Danzig and Thom as well as the district of Posen, was estimated
to contain a population of a million and a half. The Provinces assigned to
Russia were four times as extensive and included at least twice as many
inhabitants. The two Powers agreed to use their good offices to procure for
Austria the exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria with “ such other
advantages as may suit the general welfare.” This left open the possibility of
punishing France for its adoption of an avowedly aggressive policy. Prussia
pledged herself to continue the war until order had been restored in France and
the French conquests were given up. Although these provisions were designed to
propitiate Vienna, it was felt that a partition of Poland from which Austria
was altogether excluded must be so distasteful to that State that it was agreed
to keep the provisions secret until steps had been taken to carry the treaty
into effect. So far as Russia was concerned this was already done, since
Russian troops were in occupation of more than the Provinces to be annexed.
Prussia lost no time in gaining a similar position. The Treaty of Partition was
not actually signed until January 23, 1793. But on January 14 a Prussian army
under the command of Mollendorf entered Poland; and two days later was
published the extraordinary manifesto in which Frederick William announced his
intention of saving Europe from contagion by crushing the germs of French
revolutionary doctrines in Poland. The pretext was a monstrous piece of
hypocrisy, but the Prussian advance was none the less irresistible. In fact the
Poles were absolutely helpless. Their strong places were held by Russian garrisons,
and their troops were scattered over the country under the eye of superior
Russian forces. The only place which offered any resistance was Danzig, and a
few rounds of artillery fire were enough to compel its surrender. By the end of
the third week of March the preparations for enforcing the treaty were
complete. The Poles within the stipulated boundaries received notification that
they had suddenly
become either
Russian or Prussian subjects and that they must take an oath of allegiance to
their new masters. At the same time a formal communication was made to the
Court of Vienna of the precise terms of the Partition Treaty.
Neither to
the Poles nor to the Austrian government can the news have come exactly as a
surprise. The events of the last few weeks had given ample proof that Russia
and Prussia had come to terms with each other, and their agreement necessarily
implied partition. Nevertheless the final removal of all uncertainty caused to
both the most acute sensations of disgust and anger. Austria, from her own
point of view, had been not only overreached but treated with great contempt.
While the two neighbouring and rival States were taking to themselves new
lands, new subjects, new sources of revenue, and new recruiting grounds for
their armies, Austria was to be content with the assurance of “ good offices ”
for the carrying out of a bargain which might never be made, and at any rate
could ouly be arranged in the possibly distant future. Moreover the respective
slices of Poland were enormous, far beyond anything which Austria had been led
to anticipate in the negotiations of the previous year. Also the details of the
Partition brought Russian territory into actual touch with the frontier of
Austrian dominions, so that the buffer State, to which Austria had always
attached so much importance, had ceased to exist. Finally, these momentous
changes, affecting the balance of power and the most vital interests of
Austria, had been carried into effect; and Austria, on the strength of an
agreement which had been strained far beyond its original scope, had never been
allowed to have any voice whatever in their settlement. The material loss and
the humiliation were great; and Francis II manifested his displeasure. Philip
Cobenzl and Spielmann, the two Ministers who had conducted the fatal
conferences with Haugwitz, were removed to other duties; and Baron Thugut was
summoned to assume control of the department of foreign affairs. Austria let it
be known in diplomatic circles that she had never pledged herself to acceptance
of the Partition Treaty. The obvious ill-will between Vienna and Berlin was of
evil omen for the campaign of 1793.
The Poles had
no Ministers to degrade; and diplomatic protests on their part were not likely
to receive much attention. To them the publication of the Partition was an
absolutely crushing blow. The Poland which was left to enjoy a nominal and
precarious independence under Stanislas Poniatowski, with all the luxuries of
the liberum veto and the right of Confederation and the privilege of electing a
native noble to succeed to the empty title of King, was no larger than the
provinces of Poland which had been transformed by the signature of a foreign
despot into Russian districts. And it is only fair to say that the leaders of
the Confederation of Targowice were for the most part even more stunned by
Catharine’s action than the professed patriots. The latter had a
shrewd
suspicion of Russian aims; but the former had prated so much about the
Czarina’s disinterested affection for Poland that they had come to believe in
it themselves. That Catharine should trample upon Polish independence was bad
enough; that she should hand over a part of Poland to the perjured power of
Prussia was infinitely worse. When the envoys of Russia and Prussia demanded
the summons of a Diet to give formal sanction to the Partition, the Confederate
leaders replied that they had no power to call a national assembly, and that
they had taken an oath to maintain the integrity of Poland. To get over the
difficulty, it was necessary to restore the permanent Council which the
previous Diet had abolished. This Council, composed of nominees of the Russian
ambassador, summoned the Diet to meet at Grodno in Lithuania. The elections
took place under the supervision of Russian troops, and corruption and
intimidation were equally employed to secure the return of docile delegates.
The Provinces destined for partition were not represented ; and all who had
supported the Constitution of May 3 or had refused to join the Confederation of
Targowice were excluded from either voting or sitting.
The
unfortunate Stanislas wrote to Catharine imploring permission to resign a Crown
which he could no longer wear with honour to himself or profit to his subjects.
He received a firm answer that he had no right to abdicate at a moment when he
could be useful to Poland in its extremity, with no obscure threat that even in
retirement he would not escape from Russian displeasure. He was ordered to
repair from Warsaw to Grodno, where the Diet was opened on June 17. Two days
later the two envoys presented an identical note in which they demanded the
appointment of a committee to arrange a treaty with Russia and Prussia. But
even in the carefully packed assembly there was no lack of patriotic ardour. It
was felt that delay might bring a turn of affairs in favour of Poland. Austria
might be in a position to give weight to her indignant protests. England had
never disguised her disapproval of the treatment of Poland, and was now an
important member of the Coalition against Prance. It was notorious that Russia
and Prussia had no great love for each other, and it might be possible to
separate the interests of the two Courts. Prom the Polish point of view
Prussia, as a traitorous ally, was infinitely more hateful than Russia; and
submission to the latter Power would lose half its bitterness if the perfidious
greed of the Court of Berlin could be baulked. This desire to divide the two
allies from each other is conspicuous in the action of the Diet. To Sievers, the
Russian plenipotentiary, they replied by dwelling on the loyalty of the
Confederation of Targowice to Russian interests, and by an appeal to the
magnanimity of the Empress. To Buchholz, the representative of Prussia, they
addressed a demand that the Prussian troops should be withdrawn from Polish
soil.
The
unexpected opposition of the Diet could only be overcome by
coercion, and
Russia alone had the power to apply the remedy. Grodno had been deliberately
chosen as the place of meeting, in order to remove the Diet from the
neighbourhood of the Prussian troops and to give to Russia the absolute control
of the assembly. Buchholz could only appeal for assistance to his
fellow-ambassador, and so played a very secondary part in the negotiations.
Sievers did not hesitate to employ the most open intimidation to overcome the
reluctance of the Diet to approve the dismemberment of Poland. He confiscated
the property of the prominent malcontents, and went so far as to seize the
persons of seven deputies. The Diet protested that their proceedings were no
longer free, and continued their studied policy of delay. A committee was
appointed to enter into negotiations with Russia, but without authority to cede
any territory or to negotiate with Prussia. The addition to this committee of
seven members to be nominated by Sievers was unanimously rejected. The Russian
minister on July 16 sent in a declaration which showed that his patience was
exhausted. “ Any longer delay and the refusal to grant full powers to the
delegation will be regarded as a refusal to treat and a declaration of
hostility. In that case the troops of her imperial Majesty will enter into
military occupation of the lands and dwellings of those members of the Diet who
oppose the general wish of the nation. If the King should adhere to the
opposition, this occupation will be extended to the royal domains and to the
property of all who support the King. Another result of the proceedings of the
Diet will be the seizure of the State revenues, and the cessation of all
payments to the troops, who will be forced to live at the expense of the
unfortunate inhabitants of the country,” This was sufficiently plain speaking;
and though in the first fervour of indignation deputies clamoured that they
were willing and eager to go to Siberia, more prudent counsels prevailed in the
end, and full powers were granted to the committee by seventy-three votes to
twenty. On July 23 a treaty was signed with Russia by which that country
received legal possession of the provinces which it had already seized by
virtue of its agreement with Prussia.
The Diet had
successfully evaded the original demand of the two envoys for a joint
negotiation and treaty with Poland. Buchholz, who had reluctantly stood aside
while his colleague had successfully pressed the claims of Russia, now came
forward to demand the appointment of delegates to negotiate a treaty with
Prussia. The Diet appealed for Russian support against the monstrous
pretensions of a State which had never received any wrong from Poland and had
actually encouraged the Poles to take those measures which had incurred Russian
displeasure. Sievers replied that the Diet had no alternative but to come to
terms with Prussia, and that he was compelled by his instructions to advise
them to yield without delay. But the whole tone of his note was so different
from that of his recent communications that it did more harm than good to the
Prussian cause. Stanislas and the Diet were encouraged
to believe
that Prussia would in the end receive very lukewarm support from St Petersburg.
In this belief the Diet drew up a formal answer to Buchholz on July 31, in
which they coolly enquired whether or no the Prussian King considered himself
bound by the Treaty of 1790, and, as they believed him to be a man of honour,
begged him to withdraw his troops, whose presence on Polish soil was so
glaringly inconsistent with the tenour of the treaty.
Negotiations
begun in this spirit were not likely to be expeditious. The Diet had appointed
a committee to arrange a commercial treaty with Prussia, but had forbidden the
members even to discuss any scheme for the alienation of territory. Buchholz
naturally contended that these powers were quite inadequate; and the whole
matter was referred back to the Diet, where the debates consisted of little but
envenomed diatribes against the treachery of the Prussian King. Sievers was
appealed to on both sides, but his intervention proved wholly unsatisfactory.
Since the treaty of January 23 the Prussian forces in Poland had introduced
several practical changes in the boundaries which had been fixed on paper; and
Buchholz wished to have these confirmed by the Polish Diet. Russia had done the
same thing on a larger scale ; and her rectifications had been approved without
much protest. The Prussian envoy was unprepared for opposition in what seemed
of trifling importance. But Russia was willing to impress on its ally a sense
of dependence and inferiority. A modified treaty, restricting the Prussian
boundary, was put forward; and on September 2, 1793, the Diet, surrounded with
a great parade of Russian military force, by a vote of 61 to 23 authorised the
approval of this treaty, provided that it was not put into force until a treaty
of commerce had been signed, and the whole had been secured by a Russian
guarantee. But on the ground that the modifications and conditions introduced
had never been approved by his master, Buchholz announced to the Diet that its
decision was wholly nugatory, and demanded that the Prussian terms should be
accepted as they stood.
These
exasperating delays at Grodno were ruinous to the western campaign. The Allies
lost the opportunity of a decisive triumph which had been opened by their
successes in the early part of the year; and the Coalition was very nearly
dissolved. Prussia attributed the obstinacy of the Poles and the lukewarmness
of Russia to the secret intrigues of Austria. Austria retaliated by declaring
that Prussia had encouraged the Duke of Zweibriicken to refuse his consent to
the exchange of Bavaria, and had thus broken the distinct pledge it had given
to support that project. Instead of proceeding with an energetic campaign on
the Rhine, the two Allies spent all their time in these mutual recriminations.
If Prussia had to coerce the Poles, and if, as seemed possible, Russia withheld
all active assistance, it would be impossible to spare either money or men for
the war against France, of which Prussia was
already
weary. Things might be even worse, and Prussia, instead of fighting France,
might have to go to war with Austria. So intense was the passionate
determination of the Prussian King and his Ministers not to part with the booty
which had seemed to be actually in their hands, that Frederick William quitted
the Prussian camp on September 29, ordered the troops to remain absolutely
inactive, and hurried to look after his more pressing interests in the East.
But, before
he actually started, events had taken a new turn at Grodno. Catharine had
desired to make Prussia feel its dependence upon Russia and abandon the
autocratic extensions of its frontier. But she had no intention of allowing the
French war to come to an abrupt end, or of giving Frederick William an excuse
for evading his promise to carry it on. As soon as she thought matters had gone
far enough, she sent instructions to Sievers to bring the Poles to a more
reasonable mind. The Diet was informed that it must approve the Prussian treaty
without any of the conditions which it had previously attached to it. At the
same time Buchholz was instructed to meet Russian wishes by consenting to the
restricted boundary. In the evening of September 22 four deputies were arrested
and transported out of the town. On the next day the Russian commander occupied
a seat by the royal throne, and Russian soldiers guarded all the entrances to
the hall. It was announced to the deputies that they would not be allowed to
depart until they had come to a decision. In this crisis the deputies took the
most dramatic and startling course that was possible for a Polish assembly; they
held their tongues. The embarrassed general was prepared for every emergency
but this. He could denounce a speech as giving evidence of “Jacobinism”; he
could send a file of soldiers to silence or arrest a too vehement orator; but
against this conspiracy of silence he was powerless. About three in the
morning, when even silence had become exhausting, it was suggested as a
solution of the difficulty that “ silence gives consent." The proposal to
approve the treaty was read by one of the marshals. The assembly sat dumb, and
it was declared that the motion was carried. By virtue of this inarticulate
decision the treaty with Prussia was signed on September 25. It is plain that
Russia used greater brutality in enforcing consent to the Prussian than to her
own demands, in order that all the world might see how much more unfounded and
distasteful the former must be. A fortnight before the consummation of the
Partition the Confederation of Targowice, which had made itself for ever
hateful to all patriotic Poles, had been dissolved. The Diet of Grodno, which
could at any rate plead that its action had been compelled by superior force,
was allowed to continue its session till November 23. Among its last acts were
the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between Russia and the mutilated State
which still bore the name of Poland, and the formal revocation of all the
measures of the preceding Diet, including the famous Constitution of May 3.
The legality
of the Partition Treaties of 1793 might be accepted by the European chanceries,
but it was certain to be contested by the Poles; and their arguments were not
without force. What right had any authority, either native or foreign, to
exclude from a Polish Diet the representatives of more than half the country ?
If the cession of territories required popular consent to make it valid, surely
the consent of those who were most immediately affected, who were to be
transferred by the transaction to another allegiance, was preeminently
necessary. Then the elections had notoriously been influenced by corruption and
Russian dictation ; and even so the delegates thus chosen had only been induced
to give their approval by the grossest measures of coercion. It was farcical to
give the name of national assent to the acts of such a Diet as that of Grodno,
still more to acts which had been passed under such conditions as those of
September 23. And there was the present as well as the past to excite Polish
indignation. The so-called treaty of alliance, which had been signed on October
16, was really an acknowledgment of Polish subjection. Stanislas Poniatowski
was a mere agent of the Russian Minister at Warsaw. Sievers, though he had done
his work in coercing the Diet, was considered too lenient for his post, and was
superseded by Igelstrom, the commander of the Russian troops in Poland. His
rule was an insolent and undisguised military despotism.
If the Poles
were to submit without protest, it would justify the accusation so frequently
made against them that they were incapable and unworthy of national
independence. But no one could say that they were incapable of conspiracy.
Under the very eyes of the Russian general and his army of occupation the most
ingenious and elaborate plots were developed. Secret societies were formed with
the object of recovering the independence of Poland and restoring the
Constitution of May 3. A regular correspondence was carried on between the
plotters at home and the Polish exiles abroad. An eminent group of these,
including Kosciusko, the hero of Dubienka, and the leaders of the “ Four years’
Diet,” had found refuge in Saxony. They undertook to sound the chief foreign
Courts as to their willingness to aid the cause of Poland. But their reports
were by no means encouraging. Even the Powers which were most hostile to Russia
and Prussia would give no active assistance to the Poles. Austria had refused
to assent to the Partition of 1793, not out of love for Poland, but because the
rivals of Austria gained advantages in which she had no share. What Thugut
wanted was a further partition which would enable Austria to make up for her
previous abstinence. Turkey had good reason to fear that when Russia had
finished with Poland she would revert to the scheme of aggression in the south
which had been for the moment abandoned. But the Turks had not yet recovered
from the exhausting effects of the last war, and were not prepared to provoke a
quarrel with Russia. The State
which had
derived the greatest benefit from Polish disturbances, and was destined to
derive still greater benefit from their continuance, was France. France,
however, was at the same time passing through a terrible domestic crisis, and
carrying on a war against enemies on every side. Her sympathy with the Poles,
even combined with her obvious interest in stirring up trouble in the East,
could not possibly take the form of practical help. The only State which held
out any eventual prospect of assistance was Sweden, but Sweden could hardly do
much against Russia and Prussia combined, and there was always a pro- Russian
party among the Swedish nobles. So far as the informal embassies of the Polish
exiles went, the conclusion they suggested was that Poland must wait for more
favourable circumstances.
But delay was
rendered impossible by events in Poland. Igelstrom, though he could not
discover the precise plans or the persons of the conspirators, who are said to
have numbered 20,000, was fully aware that plots of some kind were going on. To
meet the danger he determined at the beginning of March, 1794, to disarm and
disband a large part of the native army in Poland. Without these troops it
would be impossible for the plotters to attempt anything; and therefore it was
necessary to strike at once or to abandon all hope. Unexpected success
attended a rising which was at first inspired rather by despair than by
confidence. The brigade of Madalinski refused to obey the orders to disband,
demanded their arrears of pay, and marched in the direction of Cracow. The
citizens of Cracow rose and expelled its Russian garrison. Kosciusko, who had
hurried from Saxony at the first intelligence from Madalinski, was proclaimed
commander-in-chief. On March 24 he published his manifesto, which was a virtual
declaration of war against Russia and Prussia, and called upon all the
patriots to rally to his standard. On April 4 he met at Raslawice a Russian
detachment which had been sent in pursuit of Madalinski, and, thanks to the
bravery of the Polish peasants, he gained a hard-won victory. This success,
though of trifling importance in itself, gave immense encouragement to the
insurgents. Igelstrom determined to disarm the Polish troops in Warsaw, but the
attempt only provoked a rising in the capital. After two days’ desperate
fighting in the streets the Russian commander, with such of his troops as were
neither killed nor wounded nor prisoners, evacuated Warsaw on April 18. A
provisional government sent the news to Kosciusko, recognised his
dictatorship, and adhered to the principles of the manifesto of March 24. Five
days later Wilna, the chief town of Lithuania, followed the example of Cracow
and Warsaw by expelling its foreign garrison. On every side the Russians, but
lately the absolute masters of the country, were retreating towards the eastern
frontier in order to concentrate their forces and to await the arrival of
reinforcements. There was once more a free Poland. Stanislas Poniatowski,
accustomed by this time to a
passive role,
remained at Warsaw, as ready to obey his own subjects as he had been docile to
his foreign masters. The Poles rather pitied than detested him; but he no
longer enjoyed either confidence or respect, and all real authority was
concentrated in the hands of Kosciusko.
The news of
this Polish revolution caused a profound sensation in Europe, and exercised a
decisive influence on events in the west. Prussia and Austria had come in the
course of 1793 to the verge of a deadly quarrel. So long as Austria refused to
accede to the treaty which had been made at St Petersburg on January 23,
Prussia would do nothing which might facilitate the acquisition by its rival
either of Bavaria or of French Provinces. Moreover, Prussia was really
exhausted by having to maintain two armies, one in the west and the other in
Poland. At the beginning of 1794 it was obvious that Prussia, in spite of the
scruples of Frederick William, would soon withdraw from active cooperation
against France; and that Austria could not, and perhaps would not, do anything
to alter or avert this decision. At this juncture the Maritime Powers, whose
interests were vitally affected by the danger of a French occupation of the
Netherlands, stepped in to exert their influence with I'russia. Lord
Malmesbury, who enjoyed in a special degree the confidence of the Dutch
government, was despatched on a special mission to the Court of Berlin; and on
April 19 he concluded a treaty or convention with Haugwitz at the Hague. A
Prussian commander (by which was understood the King in person) was to lead
62,000 men to support the common cause against France. For the mobilisation and
maintenance of this force the Maritime Powers were to pay large subsidies, and
all conquests were to be at their disposal.
This treaty
was actually contemporary with the events in Warsaw which made it so much
waste-paper. Probably in any case it could not have worked satisfactorily.
England looked upon the Prussian troops as so many mercenaries, to be employed
wherever the Cabinet in London thought fit, i.e. in the Netherlands. Prussia,
on the other hand, expected to be handsomely paid for looking after her own
interests, and deemed it degrading to a great Power to allow the movements of
its troops to be dictated by another. Besides, the defence or the recovery of
the Netherlands would primarily benefit Austria; and no Prussian statesman or
soldier wished to do that. But these inherent objections to the treaty were as
nothing, compared to the obstacles placed in the way of its execution by the
Polish rising. If the news had come earlier, the agreement would certainly not
have been signed. As it was, nothing remained for Prussia but to disregard its
provisions. Frederick William himself thought this course dishonourable, and
wished to go in person to lead his troops against the French. But his Ministers
convinced him that he had no right to play Don Quixote at the expense of his
country’s interest, and that Prussia must give its chief attention to Poland.
Not only did
the insurrection threaten the security of what had
already been
acquired, but it opened the possibility of fresh acquisitions. It was certain that
the suppression of the rebellion would end in the final overthrow of Poland.
The great prize would probably be partitioned, but the adjustment of shares
would give rise to endless disputes. Austria would assuredly demand a share
this time; and if Catharine chose to . favour Austria rather than Prussia^
Austria might avenge, the slights it had received in the previous year. If
Prussia intended to have a decisive or even an influential voifce in the fate
of Poland, she must take the lead in crushing the rebellion and must occupy the
districts which she desired to retain. Possession was a most admirable argument
in diplomacy. Frederick William was convinced by these arguments, sent what
troops he could collect to Poland in May, and proceeded thither in person at
the beginning of June. Mollendorf, who commanded on the Rhine, absolutely
refused the request on the part of England that he should go to the
Netherlands. He could hardly do otherwise when the most influential adviser of
the King wrote to him to express his “regret that the Maritime Powers have
given us such generous terms as to induce us to sign the convention of the
Hague.” Malmesbury tried all his powers of argument and polite invective, but
quite in vain. The Treaty of the Hague was worse than" useless. It created
hopes which were never fulfilled, and much time and temper were spent in trying
to hold Prussia to a bargain which she had no intention of fulfilling.
Malmesbury may have got the better of Haugwitz in fixing the terms of the
treaty: but Prussia got the ^better of England by interpreting these terms as
she thought fit. Whtta the subsidies were withheld, Hardenberg calmly denounced
the treaty as if the Maritime Powers had broken their pledge (October 25,
1794). France was able to seize the Netherlands and to drive the Allies from
the left bank of the Rhine, because the two great military Powers of the
Coalition fixed their gaze, not on the fate of Brussels or Mainz, but on that
of Cracow and Warsaw.
The news from
Poland was quite as startling in Vienna and St Petersburg as in Berlin.
Thugut, who was now omnipotent in the control of Austrian foreign policy,
attributed the recent humiliations of Austria to what he considered the blunder
of Leopold II in alienating Russia. Ever since he came to power he had striven
to win the favour of Catharine. His long tenure of the embassy in
Constantinople had given him a great knowledge of eastern affairs; and he held
out to the Czarina the prospect of renewed cooperation between Austria and
Russia against Turkey. Catharine, who thought that the Polish question was for
the moment settled, was not unwilling to resume the ambitious schemes which she
had been compelled to drop in 1791. The war against France, which had served
her so well in dealing with Poland, would be equally useful in preventing any
interference to save the Porte. During tiie winter of 1793-4 considerable
preparations were made for a Turkish campaign.
Among these
preparations was a weakening of the Russian forces in Poland, and this had contributed
to the temporary success of the insurrection. All these plans were at once and
completely abandoned when intelligence came that Warsaw was free and that
Igelstrom and his army were in retreat. All that Catharine could do was to
leave an adequate force in the south to check the Turks if they in their turn
were tempted to attempt an aggressive movement. Every soldier that could be
spared was to be sent to Poland.
Catharine
never wavered as to her primary intention. Poland was to be blotted out. As she
put it, “ the time has come, not only to extinguish to the last spark the fire
that has been lighted in our neighbourhood, but to prevent any possible
rekindling of the ashes.” Equally unhesitating was the attitude of Austria.
Francis II had gone to the Netherlands early in the year. Thugut, as soon as he
knew of the events in Warsaw, followed his master and brought him back to
Vienna. This was conclusive evidence that the most pressing interests of
Austria lay in the east rather than in the west, and that, in order to gain a
part of Poland and to prevent another one-sided aggrandisement of Prussia, the
Court of Vienna would give up the Netherlands, and possibly make peace with
France. This was as serious a blow to the Maritime Powers as the failure of Prussia
to carry out the promises made at the Hague. France had good reason to
congratulate itself upon the diversion caused by Kosciusko. Not even in the
most brilliant campaigns of Cond^ and Turenne had French armies gained such
important and such continuous successes as in 1794.
Meanwhile
Prussia had the start of her two neighbours in Poland, and seemed likely to
make the most of it. Kosciusko’s position was from the first utterly hopeless.
Against what must be in the end an overwhelming hostile force he had an army
which was inadequate in numbers, in arms, and in discipline; while at the same
time he had to control a divided people. He was too much of a democrat to
please the nobles, and too much of an aristocrat to conciliate either the
peasants or the citizens. The peasants with their scythe-blades formed his most
trustworthy infantry, and he showed his appreciation of their merits by always
wearing a peasant’s dress. But their really enthusiastic support could only be
gained by the abolition of serfdom, and he dared not exasperate the nobles by
such a measure. In the towns, and especially in Warsaw, a democratic party had
asserted itself which desired to emulate the methods of Republican France, and
to promote unity by putting the partisans of Russia to death. The Slavonic
nature is suspicious, and a “law of suspects” in Poland would have decimated
the population. Kosciusko, whose position somewhat resembled that of Lafayette,
was forced to put down disorder with severity; but every punishment which he inflicted
served to excite enmity and even suspicion against himself
In such
circumstances a resolute campaign on the part of the Prussians
must have
proved decisive. The King entered Poland with the confident hope that he would
crush the rebellion at once and have time to win fresh laurels against the more
genuine Jacobins in the west. In his first encounter with the Poles on June 6,
at Rawka, he inflicted so crushing a defeat that Kosciusko felt it necessary at
all risks to retreat for the defence of Warsaw. Cracow was left so feebly
garrisoned that it surrendered to the Prussians on June 15. This was a great
blow to the Austrians, who had destined Cracow for themselves. But after these
successes the Prussians did nothing but waste time. They allowed the Polish
army to conduct its hazardous and discouraging march without, serious molestation.
Frederick William and his incompetent advisers spent their days in reading
despatches from Vienna and St Petersburg and in discussing politics rather
than strategy. It was not until July 2 that they appeared before Warsaw, which
was covered by the Polish troops under Kosciusko. Instead of ordering a storm,
which would almost certainly have been successful, Frederick William sat down
to blockade an unfortified city and an imperfectly entrenched army. It is true
he had some excuse in the inadequate support given to him by the Russian troops
which were associated with him in the siege. But this in itself should have
opened his eyes to the fact that he was playing into the hands of Russia.
Catharine wished the Poles to be occupied until she was ready to strike, but
she had no desire that Prussia should gain such a decisive success as the
reduction of Warsaw. While the Prussian army remained inactive, a rising broke
out in the recently annexed Provinces. On the ground that their convoys were
exposed to capture and their communications threatened, the besieging forces
abandoned their enterprise and retired from Warsaw on September 6.
The
exultation of the Poles at so unexpected a triumph was as shortlived as it was
intense. The Austrians were already invading the kingdom from the south. The
Russians had reoccupied Wilna on August 12, and had since made themselves
masters of the whole of Lithuania. But the most serious news was that Suvdroff,
the captor of Ismail and the most successful general Russia had yet produced,
was marching upon Poland with the bulk of the army which had been collected for
a possible campaign against the Turks. The progress of Suvdroff was as rapid and
decisive as that of Frederick William had been dilatory and ineffective. In one
engagement after another the Polish forces in his way were cut to pieces. Each
disaster caused a panic in Warsaw, and every panic increased the difficulty of
maintaining order among the unreasoning citizens who attributed failure to
treachery. The Russian troops under Fersen, who had retreated with the
Prussians from the siege of Warsaw, received orders to join the advancing army
of Suvdroff. For a time they were hindered by the difficulty of crossing the
Vistula; but at last they succeeded in forcing a passage. Kosciusko determined
on a last effort to prevent the junction of the hostile forces. At Maciejowice
he threw
himself
against Fersen, but after a desperate struggle his army was utterly routed
(October 10). Kosciusko himself was wounded and taken prisoner. From this
moment the most sanguine of Polish patriots were reduced to despair.
Suvdroff,
after uniting the victorious troops of Fersen with his own, advanced with fatal
rapidity upon Warsaw. His summons to surrender was refused, and the suburb of
Praga on the right bank of the Vistula was hastily entrenched. If any hopes
were entertained that the Russian general would be content with a blockade,
they were doomed to speedy disappointment. On November 4, after a vigorous
bombardment, the attacking forces threw themselves into the trenches with a
reckless contempt of danger. Their fury had been roused by the stories of the
treatment of Russians in the streets of the capital, and their battle-ciy was,
“ Remember Warsaw.” The Poles, many of whom were untrained citizens, gave way
before such a terrific onslaught; and a frightful massacre followed the entiy
of the Russians into Praga. The destruction of the bridge over the Vistula,
which cut off all possibility of retreat, enormously increased the bloodshed.
Many of those who had escaped from fire and sword perished in the
river-current. From the bloodstained suburb Suvdroff could dictate his own
terms to the trembling capital, which had no alternative but surrender. On
November 8 the Russians made their entry into Warsaw, and the freedom of Poland
was at an end. After the terrible lesson which had been taught at Praga there
was no need of exceptional severity to intimidate the Poles. Stanislas
Poniatowski was sent to reside at Grodno, to await what further humiliations
might be in store for him. The political leaders of the revolution were
despatched to share the captivity of Kosciusko in St Petersburg. But the
troops which were still in the field were allowed to capitulate upon honourable
terms. On the death of Catharine (1796) her successor Paul released Kosciusko
and his fellow-prisoners. After visits to England and America, the hero of the
last phase of Polish independence found a peaceful home for many years in
France. He ultimately died in Switzerland in 1817, having never revisited his
native country.
Thus it was
Russia, and not Prussia, which gained the militaiy credit attaching to the
suppression of the Polish insurrection ; and Catharine II, who had already
presided over two measures of partition, was enabled to dictate the ultimate
fate of Poland. The general character of the negotiations, which took place at
St Petersburg, is easily grasped. Catharine postponed any complete disclosure
of her intentions until the success of Suvdroff was assured. Then she declared
that the Russian frontier must be advanced to the Bug. Although this gave her
the lion’s share of the spoil, the other two Powers were too eager to gain her
support for their own claims to venture upon any objection. The rest of Poland
was left to be shared by Austria and Prussia, with Russia as arbitress of any
disputes which might arise. From the very first, long before Warsaw
had fallen,
it was known that the demands of the two States were irre- »ncilable. Prussia
had taken an active part in opposing the Polish rebels, had spent large sums of
money, and had brought a considerable force into the field. Though the siege of
Warsaw had been abandoned, Cracow and no small area of Poland had been and were
still occupied by Prussian troops. Austria, on the other hand, had sent 15,000
soldiers to Lublin, but they had never even come into collision with the Polish
ibrces. If, then, the shares were to be at all proportioned to effort or
sacrifice Prussia could contend that she was entitled to far more consideration
than Austria. But Thugut in his instructions had furnished the Austrian
plenipotentiary with counterbalancing arguments on the other side. He laid
great stress upon the fact that Austria had never received anything to
compensate for the aggrandisement of the other States in 1793, and practically
claimed a share in the previous as well as in the present partition. As regards
sacrifice and effort, he pointed to the action of Austria in maintaining the
common interests against France. Prussia had betrayed these interests and
broken her plighted word, in order to be able to seek her own selfish gains in
Poland.
If gratitude
were a dominant force in politics, Russia should have given support to Prussia.
It was Prussian intervention that had met the first vigour of the insurrection
and had held it in check while Russia was for the moment powerless. In fact
Prussia had rendered a double service, both by what she had done and by what
she had left undone. She had succeeded in breaking the force of the rebellion,
and had then stepped aside to allow Russia to administer the final blow. But an
irksome obligation is as dangerous to international as to personal friendship.
Russia did not wish to admit that Prussia had played any part in the overthrow
of Poland. On the contrary, the Prussians had been too officious; they had
tried to settle matters by themselves in order to gain an advantage over their
neighbours, and had found the task more than they were able to perform. At a
very early date it became dear that Russia would support Austria as against
Prussia, just as Thugut had declared that he did not object to Russia having
more of Poland provided that Prussia had less.
The two rival
plenipotentiaries at St Petersburg were Cobenzl for Austria and Tauenzien for
Prussia. Both had separate conferences with Ostermann, the Russian Chancellor,
before the three met in a general congress on December 19. The proceedings on
this occasion, therefore, present only a summary of what had already been
discussed in greater detail. The main dispute turned upon the palatinates of
Cracow and Sandomir. Both Austria and Prussia claimed them, and they were
actually in the hands of Prussia. Cobenzl declared that no partition would be
satisfactory to the Emperor, unless these districts were handed over to
Austria^ Ostermann, as he had already done in previous conferences, expressed
the view that the Austrian demands were reasonable.
Tauenzien
rather feebly suggested that, if Russia wished to gratify the Emperor, this
might be done out of the large territory which Russia had appropriated and not
out of the small share of Prussia. Cobenzl broke in with the remark that
Austria thoroughly approved of the demands of Russia; and the combination of
two against one was apparent. Tauenzien, in obedience to his instructions,
declared that, rather than hand over the disputed territories to Austria,
Prussia would prefer to make no partition at all, and to leave Poland as it was
in 1793.
This protest
broke up the conference; but the action of Prussia had been anticipated and
provided against beforehand. Russia and Austria proceeded to settle the matter
between themselves, and on January 3, 1795, drew up their own arrangements for
the Partition of Poland. The preamble of the treaty asserts that “ Poland
having been entirely subjected and conquered by the arms of the Empress,” she
has determined to arrange with her allies for a complete partition of that
State, “ which has shown an absolute incapacity to form a government which
should enable it to live peaceably under the laws or to maintain itself in independence.”
The respective shares were defined by geographical boundaries. The Russian
frontier was to start from Galicia along the Bug to Brzesc in Lithuania, thence
in as straight a line as possible to Grodno, and from that town along the
Niemen to the border of East Prussia. The Austrian share, which included Cracow
and the disputed palatinates, extended the province of Galicia by adding to it
the whole district between the Pilica, the Vistula, and the Bug. These
acquisitions were to be guaranteed to each other by the two States. As soon as
Prussia declared its adhesion to the treaty, that State was to receive the rest
of Poland with a similar guarantee from Austria and Russia.
On the same
day two further declarations were exchanged between the two contracting Powers.
By the first Austria at last acceded to the second Treaty of Partition (January
23, 1793), thus accepting the promise of “good offices” for the exchange of the
Netherlands for Bavaria. The second, which constituted a secret treaty of
immense importance, was necessitated partly by the possibility that force would
have to be employed to wrest from Prussia the districts which were to be given
to Austria, partly by the desire on the part of Russia to reaffirm the alliance
of the two Courts against Turkey, and partly by Thugut’s strenuous persistence
in demanding that Austria should receive some substantial indemnity both for
the gains of Russia and Prussia in 1793, and for her own exertions in the war
against France. The agreement as to an eventual partition of Turkey, contained
in the autograph letters which Catharine and Joseph II had exchanged in 1782,
was formally renewed. The engagement as to mutual aid in a future war with the
Porte was extended to include the case of hostilities with Prussia. If that
State attacked either of the allies, the other was to employ all its forces
against “ the common enemy.” As to the claims of Austria for
indemnities,
Russia was to aid that State in obtaining them, either at the expense of
France, or if that should be impossible by asserting the rights of Austria to
large parts of the dominions of Venice, or by “ such other project of
acquisition as may suitably gain the desired end.” This blank cheque to
Austria, which was not to apply to any further spoliation of Turkey, can only
have been intended to cover the possibility of annexations in Germany.
This secret
treaty gives us the due to Catharine’s primary motive for supporting Austria
against Prussia in the previous negotiations. It is very much the same motive
which had induced her in 1780 to turn from her alliance with Frederick the
Great to that with Joseph II. Prussia was a very useful ally against Poland,
but a very useless ally against Turkey. Of Austria precisely the reverse might
be said. Now that Poland was about to be obliterated, the Prussian alliance
ceased to be of any great immediate value. On the other hand, when Poland was
disposed of, the partition of Turkey, in which Austria was the destined
accomplice, became at once the primary duty of Russia. Thugut had been dever
enough to offer precisely the bribe which Russia was eager to accept. Leopold
II had disconcerted Catharine by abandoning the policy of Joseph. Thugut. was
willing to return to it in order to humiliate Prussia; and Catharine was prompt
to make him register the promise. No doubt she was also influenced by other
reasons. She had always personally disliked Frederick William II; and she was
especially irritated at this time by his incessant parade of those virtuous and
honourable intentions, which his Ministers as constantly induced him to
abandon. She thought that he had been suspiciously eager to take advantage of
Russia’s misfortunes at the beginning of Kosdusko’s rebellion; and her
malignant pleasure at the retreat from Warsaw served to show how chagrined she
would have been by a complete Prussian triumph over the Poles.
Her ardent
desire was that the two neighbouring States should continue to carry on the war
against France, and that Russia should continue to hold aloof. With this aim
she had inserted in the treaty of 1793 the dause which pledged the Prussian
King to prolong his exertions in that war until its avowed objects had been
obtained. In defiance of this pledge, and of the further obligations to the
Maritime Powers under the Convention of the Hague, Prussia had done almost
nothing in the campaign of 1794 and had since opened negotiations for a
separate peace with the French Republic. Austria, on the other hand, had
reasons of her own for continuing the struggle with France, and thus
established another daim to Catharine’s favour. But this at the same time made
her the more annoyed with Prussia, because all hostile designs against Turkey
would have to be postponed so long as Austria’s hands were tied by the western
war, while Prussia had the free disposal of all her forces. Finally, it was
Catharine’s interest to keep the balance fairly
1795]
Prussia reluctantly accedes to
partition.
551
equal between
the two great German States, and not to allow either to gain marked superiority
over the other. In 1793 she had given Prussia a substantial reward, while
Austria had been left in the cold. This was in itself a reason for taking the
opposite course in 1795.
The Treaty of
Partition was at first as carefully concealed as the more specifically secret
treaty which accompanied it. Suspicions were entertained at Berlin, and they
constituted one among many arguments for concluding the Treaty of Basel with
France (April 5,1795). But for some time there was no open act to justify
suspicion. The Prussian troops remained in occupation of Cracow and the
disputed palatinates; and no steps were taken even to demand their withdrawal.
In fact, Austria was extremely afraid of the probable wrath of Prussia, and
refused all suggestions from St Petersburg as to a communication of the treaty
to the Court of Berlin until some 80,000 men had been collected on the Bohemian
frontier to guard against attack. It was not till August 9 that the Russian and
Austrian envoys made a joint announcement to the Prussian Ministers of the
action of their respective governments. Prussia now discovered that since
January 3 the two Courts had decided to carry out the very scheme of partition
against which Tauenzien had so passionately protested.
The
intelligence was in the highest degree unwelcome and disquieting, but it did
not lead to war. Indeed, Frederick William had lost much of the buoyant
confidence with which he had begun his reign. Since the Prussian intervention
in Holland none of his undertakings had been crowned with conspicuous success.
It is true that he had added to his dominions Danzig and Thom with a
considerable area of Polish territory; but these acquisitions, gratifying
enough in themselves, had been made in a way which reflected no great credit
upon Prussia. The turning-point in his reign had been the abandonment of the
threatening attitude which he had assumed just before the conference at
Reichenbach. From that date onward he had met with a series of disappointments.
Prussia had not, indeed, experienced any crushing disaster. There had been
nothing to show to the world those defects of the military system which were so
conspicuous in 1806. But the cumulative effect of such events as the retreat
from Champagne, the inaction of 1794 in the west, and the repulse from Warsaw
in the east, was at least equivalent to the discredit which would have followed
defeat in battle. Prussia was completely isolated in Europe; and neither the
King nor his advisers dared to nm the risk of an open rupture with Russia and
Austria. They sullenly agreed to resume negotiations at St Petersburg; and
Tauenzien was once more authorised to confer with Ostermann and Cobenzl.
On the 28th
and 31st of August the plenipotentiaries met to discuss the same problems as
before, and again they failed to remove the seemingly irreconcilable
differences between Austria and Prussia. The Czarina was compelled to undertake
the task of suggesting a compromise, which
was in the
end accepted. On October 2A the revised scheme of partition was rendered
practicable by the agreement of the three contracting Powers. The Russian share
was left absolutely unaltered; but Austria agreed to give up a slip of
territoiy between the Vistula, the Bug, and the Narew, which was necessary to
give to Prussia secure possession of Warsaw. Prussian troops were to evacuate
within six weeks the town of Cracow and all other territories which the treaty
assigned to Austria. The precise limits between the Austrian and Prussian
possessions on the side of the palatinate of Cracow were left to be fixed by
commissioners from the two States, with a third commissioner on the part of
Russia to act as mediator and, if need be, as arbitrator between his
colleagues. This treaty was followed on November 25 by a formal abdication on
the part of Stanislas Poniatowski. The deposed King was not ungenerously
treated. His debts were paid and he received an adequate pension. After the
death of Catharine he took up his residence in St Petersburg, and died there in
1798.
There
remained several tangled threads to be separated before the partition could be
regarded as finally settled The financial obligations both of the King and of
the Polish State, together with the provision for the former’s pension, had to
be divided between the contracting Powers. The difficult question of the
allegiance of landowners whose possessions lay in more than one of the three
subdivisions had to be dealt with. Above all, the delimitation of the
boundaries between the Austrian and Prussian territories gave rise to endless
quarrels on points of detail; and their settlement required equal tact and
firmness on the part of the Czarina, in whose hands rested, as it had always
done, the final decision between the conflicting pretensions of her neighbours.
Catharine herself died on November 16, 1796, and left the formal ratification
to her successor Paul. But the actual work had all been done before her death;
and the final Treaty of January 26,1797, is to be assigned to her guidance
quite as much as any agreement drawn up in her lifetime. It consisted of three
distinct documents. The first distributed in varying proportions the financial
obligations which devolved upon the partitionaiy Powers, and decreed that there
should be in the future no mixed or divided allegiance. Any possessor of land
in more than one of the now separate parts of Poland must decide to which of
the three States he wishes to belong, and must within five years sell or
otherwise dispose of his property in what was thenceforth to be a foreign
country. To this document was appended the act of abdication of the late King.
A very lengthy “ definitive act ” laid down in minute detail the precise
boundaries between the respective dominions wherever it was necessary to have
artificial divisions. Finally, there was a brief secret article by which the
three sovereigns, recognising “the necessity of abolishing everything which may
recall the memory of the existence of the kingdom of Poland,” pledged
themselves never to include such a designation among their various territorial
titles.
BONAPARTE AND
THE CONQUEST OF ITALY.
At the close of the month of March, 1796, a young
and inexperienced general arrived at Nice to take command of the French Army
of Italy. Within a fortnight he gained his first victory over the Austrians in
the pass that separates the Alps from the Apennines. On April 28 he forced
their Piedmontese allies to sign an armistice, which detached the Court of
Turin from the Coalition. In the next four weeks the French overran Lombardy
and began the investment of Mantua. Three successive armies sent by the
Habsburgs for the relief of that fortress were scattered in flight. In
Februaiy, 1797, the Pope sued for terms from the regicide Republic; and on
April 18, 1797, the young French commander compelled the Austrians to sign
preliminaries of peace at Leoben, within eighty miles of their capital. These
events were of more than passing importance. They stamped themselves deep into
the life of Europe. Italy looks back on that year as the beginning of her new
life. The future of democracy on the Continent of Europe was profoundly
affected by the rapid rise of the French Republic to the rank of a great
conquering Power; and the whole of the civilised world was to feel the results
of a campaign which assured the future of Napoleon.
Events never
march with this swift and easy decisiveness unless the strokes of a man of
genius are helped by the weakness, folly, or disunion of his adversaries; and
it will be well briefly to review those conditions, physical and political,
which favoured the overthrow of Habsburg influence in Italy and the
substitution for it of that of France.
It is a
commonplace to assert that the fate of the peninsula ultimately depends on the
power which holds the basin formed by the rivers Po and Adige. As Napoleon
himself remarked at St Helena, Italy is too long for its breadth. Its defence
must always lie in the chief passes of the Alps and in the lines of
communication that traverse the neck of the peninsula, the district between
Genoa and Venice. The Alps are a formidable barrier; but so numerous are their
passes that a skilful enemy threatening Italy from the west has often been able
to elude the Jefenders and to pom1 in his forces at some weakly
guarded point in the
long curving
line between Savona and the Great St Bernard; and, when once a passage has been
forced, the valley of the Po conducts the invader to this neck of the
peninsula, few natural obstacles other than the affluents of the main stream
impeding his progress. An army entering Italy from the west has far fewer
obstacles to surmount than one coming from the north. The passes of the
Maritime Alps are far shorter than those of the Tyrolese, Camic, and Noric
Alps; and an army marching from the west, after reaching the upper course of
the river Po, can choose either bank of that stream for its line of march, and
strike either at Mantua or at Bologna with no hindrance from the marshes and
the two main rivers which stretch athwart the course of northern invaders.
Consequently the peninsula has more often been successfully overrun from the
side of Prance than from that of Austria; and the conqueror who firmly grips
the neck of Italy has usually been able to reduce to submission the medley of
States in the peninsula itself.
The political
influence which one nation can exert upon another of diverse race and habits of
mind rests ultimately on force. This is seen in the history of Italy, which
shows us an intellectual but emasculated race for some centuries bowing its
neck to French, Spanish, or German domination, feeling the last the most
irksome, and despite many a setback steadily reducing the area of imperial
influence. In the eighteenth century, when the military prowess of Spain had
declined and that of France was under a cloud, the, Habsburgs gained the
supremacy; at the outbreak of the war of the French Revolution they possessed
lie duchy of Milan, with Mantua and some scattered imperial fiefs further to
the west. A Habsburg Archduke, Ferdinand III, also held the grand duchy of
Tuscany, but made peace with France in February, 1795. Duke Ercole III of the
ancient House of Este, who ruled over Modena, generally favoured Austrian
policy, but remained neutral in the present war. Thus Austrian resources in
Italy were limited to the straggling territory that stretched from the Simplon
Pass to the fortress of Mantua on the south-east. The fortress of Alessandria
then belonged to the kingdom pf Sardinia; and the Habsburgs therefore owned no
Italian stronghold of the first rank save Mantua. The strength of this city was
undoubtedly great; but it suffered from the cardinal defect of the Austrian
position in Italy, that of being wholly cut off from the Habsburg dominions
north of the Alps, on which the defence of the Milanese ultimately depended.
True, a right of way was claimed, and very freely used, by the Court of Vienna
through the Venetian lands to the north of. Mantua; but, though the political
barrier grew weaker with every generation as the vitality of Venice declined,
the obstacles which nature opposed became more formidable as armies came to
depend more and more on artillery. ,
Weak as the
neck of Italy always must be, it was still further weakened by political
division. Far from being held as a whole by a
great
military Power, it was shared between Austria, the Duke of Modena, the Duke of
Parma (a timid priest-ridden descendant of the Spanish Bourbons), the papal
See, and the moribund oligarchy of Venice. The Pope had broken off diplomatic
relations with France not long after the seizure of Avignon, but for the
present limited his hostility to the launching of spiritual thunders against
the sacrilegious Republic. Venice, a prey to a cramping oligarchy and
enervating luxury, long wavered between hatred of French democracy and fear of
Austrian aggression, and finally fell back on the policy of doing nothing,
which was fast sapping its power, as also that of its ancient rival, Genoa.
Alone among
Italian States, the kingdom of Sardinia kept up something of its former
vigour. King Victor Amadeus III throughout his long reign had sought to
beautify his capital, to promote industiy and agriculture, and to spread wealth
more widely by relieving rich monasteries of some of their superfluous lands
and treasures. But his chief interest lay in his army. To bring it up to the
level of that of Frederick the Great was the passion of his life; and to secure
perfection on the parade-ground he ultimately sacrificed the energy of his
subjects and the equilibrium of his finances. As father-in-law of the French
Princes, the Comte de Provence and the Comte d’Artois, he was among the first
to enter on hostilities with the French Revolution (1792); but he soon saw his
outlying Provinces, Savoy and Nice, overrun; and the military help which
Austria grudgingly gave hardly availed to hold the French at bay in the passes
of the Maritime Alps. The old King’s hatred of France scarcely abated even when
the Court of Vienna imposed very onerous terms on its hard-pressed ally in the
Treaty of Valenciennes (May 23, 1794). The Piedmontese, on the other hand, were
weary of a struggle which brought them face to face with political and
financial ruin, mainly, as it seemed, in the interests of an overbearing and
not very active confederate; and everything showed that their proverbial
patience and loyalty were strained almost to the breaking point.
Nowhere else
in Italy could there be found a tithe of the manly vigour, warlike prowess, and
administrative capacity that had hitherto marked the people and government of
the little subalpine realm. The opposites of these qualities were to be seen in
an extreme form in the kingdom of Naples. Ferdinand IV, a scion of the Spanish
Bourbons, and his Queen, Marie-Caroline, were an ill-matched couple; the nickname
of il Re lazzarone fitly sums up the personality of the King, while his
domineering consort gave free play to spasmodic impulses such as had marred the
career of her sister, Marie-Antoinette. The execution of that helpless captive
fanned Queen Caroline’s hatred of the French Revolution to a fury which brought
her at times to the verge of madness; but the periods of indolence or despair
that generally followed imparted to the policy of the Neapolitan Court a zigzag
course which perplexed and exasperated its allies. Eventually, a small force
was sent northwards
to help the
Austrians against the French; but, apart from thirteen squadrons of excellent
cavalry, this aid was of little account; it arrived in small detachments, and
so late as to effect nothing.
This brief
survey will show that, if a French army could break through the outer line of
defence, there was little to stay its progress until the Austrian defenders
rested on their immediate base, the stronghold of Mantua. The very district
wherein lay the ultimate means of defending Italy was that which was most
divided among puny or decadent States; and there was no strength or unity in
the peninsula that could retrieve the day when once a conqueror firmly held the
lines of the Mincio and Adige. The organising genius and military prowess of
ancient Rome had finally failed to hold up against the difficulties inherent in
the defence of Italy; and the old Roman spirit now seemed utterly extinct. In
place of it there was seen a petty particularism which hindered all attempts at
union, and a disposition to welcome the French as liberators from the heavy
yoke of the Habsburgs, or the dull regime of Doge, King, and Cardinal. Milan
was the headquarters of the Gallic and Jacobin propaganda. This was not
surprising, seeing that the Milanese had to pay a considerable sum every year
to escape the severities of the Austrian militia system, and had in all handed
over 70,000,000 florins in tribute to the Court of Vienna during forty-seven
years. The Guelf feeling against the “ barbarians ” had never wholly died out
even in the years of political torpor that weighed down Italy before the
outbreak of the French Revolution; and the sight of a whole nation springing to
arms in 1793 and hurling back the trained armies of Austria, Prussia, England,
Spain, and Sardinia, sent a thrill of excitement through the peninsula. The “
Rights of Man ” seemed to summon all peoples to a new political life; and the
victories of the sansculottes served to clinch the beliefs of enthusiasts that
the old monarchies were doomed to fall, and that the future lay with
regenerated and militant nations.
The French
representative at Genoa carefully fed these hopes; and the Committee of Public
Safety sent sums of money for the support of the Jacobin clubs which sprang up
in the chief Italian towns. These clubs, frequently held in connexion with
Masonic lodges, were most numerous in the south, where the capricious despotism
of Queen Caroline and the grinding pressure of feudal abuses predisposed men to
revolt; in the Legations of the Papal States, where the memory of former civic
liberties embittered men against the torpid yet exasperating rule of an
unchanging clericalism; and in Lombardy, where the earlier promises of reforms
by the Habsburgs were belied by the severities of a timorous reaction. At
Palermo the innate repugnance of an island people to a despotism exercised from
the mainland found expression in a Jacobin plot, for which a young advocate, di
Blasi, and three others, were executed (May, 1795). In the previous year, at
Bologna, hatred of the rule of
the Pope’s
Legate led to a similar hapless attempt by a young townsman, Luigi Zamboni,
and a student of the university, di Rolandis di Castel-Alfeo, who were
afterwards honoured as the first martyrs of the Risorgimento. At Milan the grip
of the Tedeschi was too strong to admit of active resistance by the numerous
clubs that spread the network of intrigue throughout Lombardy; for the present
they watched the progress of the French with eager interest and wove subtle
schemes to help them. Even in loyal Piedmont the Jacobins gained a following as
the war ran its weary course, and a few desperadoes hatched a plot for opening
the gates of Turin to the French. Two of the ringleaders suffered death for
their folly (July, 1794); but the affair showed that the old order of things
was doomed, and that sweeping changes must take place so soon as the
Republicans burst through the outer ring of defence on the west.
What were the
forces on which rested the difficult duty of holding the western passes against
the French ? They consisted of two armies, the Austrian and the Sardinian; the
effective strength of which in the month of March, 1796, may be reckoned at
somewhat below 32,000 and
20.000 men, respectively. These numbers by no
means represented the whole fighting strength. The Austrians had nearly as many
more in garrison or cantoned in Lombardy, the Mantuan, and Tyrol; but half of
these were raw troops or militia. As many as 20,000 Piedmontese troops were
watching the passes of the Maritime Alps from Coni to Susa and Aosta; in fact,
the total of the Sardinian forces, inclusive of
30.000 ill-armed and partly disaffected militia,
was placed as high as
80.000 men ; but its fighting strength was barely
half of that estimate, even if we reckon in the auxiliary corps of 5000 men
under General Provera, which the Habsburgs had placed at the disposal of their
allies. The strength of the Sardinian army lay in the infantry, which was
brave, and for the most part inured to mountain warfare; the cavalry and
artillery were inferior in quality; and the efficiency of all branches of the
service was dulled by a slavish adherence to promotion by seniority, by dislike
of the Austrian alliance, and by a long succession of defeats.
Much the same
may be said of the Imperialist forces, with this cause of weakness superadded:
that, being recruited from the many distinct peoples under the Habsburg sway,
they had little of that cohesion which in time of disaster enables beaten
fragments quickly to reunite and present a threatening front. Many of the
Habsburg regiments were excellent, and the cavalry ranked as the finest in
Europe; but all through the service was felt the blighting breath of Court
influence, which set aside deserving men in favour of carpet knights, and had
raised to the higher ranks many officers who were incompetent at all times and
even showed cowardice when face to face with danger. Merit, on the other hand,
too often languished in obscurity. Thus, when this antiquated system was pitted
against one that had ruthlessly sent military misfits to the
guillotine,
and even now thrust them aside in favour of active and able men, it was doomed
to overthrow by that inexorable law which ordains the survival of the fittest.
Of this law French democrats were the militant exponents; while the cumbrous
War Council and the intriguing cliques of Vienna and Milan furnish the
classical instance in modem warfare of that habit of following the broad and
easy way of routine and favouritism which has so often led old monarchies to
destruction.
Nor was there
any solidarity of interest or feeling between the Austrian and Sardinian
armies. To this lack of cohesion may largely be attributed the defeats which
they had suffered in the years 1793-5. The chief of these, inflicted by Massena
near Loano on November 23, 1795, cost them 5000 prisoners and 80 cannon,
besides yielding to the Republicans the whole of the Genoese Riviera as far as
Savona and the pass to the north of that town. The Austrian commander, de Wins,
was thereupon replaced by the septuagenarian Beaulieu, a Belgian subject of the
Emperor. He had served with credit, if not with distinction, in the Low
Countries; but his appointment seems to have been due veiy largely to the hopes
entertained by the Courts of Vienna and Turin that his warm friendship with the
Sardinian commander, Colli, would impart to the operations that unity of aim
that had hitherto been fatally lacking. Events, however, were to show that the
divergence of interests was too serious to be set right by the friendliness of
the commanders-in- chief ; and in other respects the choice of so old a man as
Beaulieu was in itself a disaster. He had none of that physical and mental
buoyancy which enabled Bliicher at the same age to soar above discouragement;
above all, he lacked both the insight which sees the path of safety in a crisis
and the force of character which inspires bands of runaways to renew the fight.
The mishaps
which call to the front the bom leaders of men revealed no such man on the
Austrian side, save a few colonels of regiments for whom their military system
could find no fitting sphere. Beaulieu was poorly seconded by Argenteau, whose
insouciance had largely contributed to the defeat at Loano. Court influence not
only led to his acquittal on that count, but sent him back with the rank of
Field-Marshal; and his confidence in the favour of the Archduke Ferdinand, who controlled
affairs at Milan, prompted him to independent conduct that helped to mar the
campaign. The Lieutenant Field-Marshals, Sebottendorf and Melas, were more
competent and more obedient than Argenteau, though old age already weighed upon
Melas. Liptay, Pittone, and the heroic Rukavina, were good divisional leaders,
but found little opportunity for the exercise of their best qualities. Indeed,
except in the most seasoned regiments, the Imperialists displayed the passive
virtues of loyalty in spite of official discouragements, and fortitude amidst
defeats, rather than the dash and enterprise that achieve great results. Of the
Sardinian commander, Colli, little need be said, save that, in
spite of
growing infirmities, he struggled hard to retrieve an extremely difficult
situation.
The reports
sent to the British Foreign Office by Eden and Trevor, our ambassadors at
Vienna and Turin, reveal the discouragement which beset both of those Courts
after the defeat at Loano. Thugut, the Austrian Chancellor, assured Eden that,
unless Great Britain furnished another loan of £3,000,000, and Russia sent
troops instead of good wishes, the Emperor must be content with waging a
defensive war, “ waiting the effect which the distresses and distractions of
France may produce.” As for the Habsburg States, they were exhausted; and a
strong party was working for peace. The Sardinian Court, wrote Trevor on
January 30, 1796, was in the depths of despair, and longed to conclude an
armistice so as to screen the little realm from a French incursion. The King
would persevere, but with little hope of success as long as Austria maintained
a defensive strategy which left Piedmont open to the worst blows. A change of
system was needed; for the rivalries of the Austrian generals and the intrigues
of the governing clique at Milan clogged all the operations. The Sardinian
Court was then proposing at Vienna that Victor Amadeus should have the supreme
command of both armies, with Beaulieu as Quartermaster-General. This suggestion
and that of an armistice in Italy aroused angry feelings at Vienna; for, as
Trevor phrased it in his despatch of February 9, “ it had the air of saying, ‘
If you do not think it worth your while to assist us, we can and will make
peace with France.’ ” As a matter of fact the Republic had sought to entice
Sardinia to make a separate peace by proposing a joint conquest of the Milanese
and the cession of this splendid province to Sardinia in exchange for Savoy and
Nice. Victor Amadeus had spurned the offer, but some of his counsellors
intrigued for peace, which they averred was necessary now that Austria had
concluded an armistice on the Rhine and Great Britain was withholding the
promised subsidies.
For the
British government had also shown signs of wavering. It would far exceed the
limits of our space adequately to set forth the little known plan of preparing
for a general peace which Pitt and Grenville began to draw up in the autumn of
1795. It took definite form in the despatch of December 22, penned by
Grenville, our Foreign Minister, to Eden, in which he explained that France was
obviously in need of peace, and proposed that, even if she made no overtures,
the British and Austrian governments should jointly declare their willingness
to receive and consider any proposals for a general pacification. The
consideration of the terms on which peace might be made naturally took time,
especially as the Emperor demurred to some of the British suggestions; but the
matter was still being discussed when the Italian Campaign of 1796 opened up a
new cycle of war and relegated the proposals of the Court of St James to a
world that had seemingly passed
560
[1769-96
away for
ever. Yet they had one disastrous practical issue. In the hope of realising
peace Grenville directed Eden and Trevor to hold back British subsidies as fax
as possible; and thus both the Austrian and Sardinian armies were left badly
equipped and wholly unfitted to withstand the terrific blows now to be showered
upon them.
There are
crises in the great drama of human development when every conceivable
circumstance seems to further the rise of a genius. Truly this was the case at
the beginning of the year 1796. Never did the stars shed a more baleful
influence than on the men who then were scheming and striving on behalf of the
monarchical cause, when ally thwarted ally, and even keen-sighted statesmen
deemed that the weary struggle between the Revolution and the Kings was about
to end in stale-mate. The genius was at hand who willed otherwise. A young player
saw that the game had scarcely begun. In a comer of the board, where little of
note had yet been accomplished, a bewildering development was now to take
place. This new opening was the Italian Campaign; the name of the player was
Napoleon Bonaparte.
The future
conqueror was the second surviving child of Charles- Marie Bonaparte and his
wife Letizia (nee Ramolino), and was bom at Ajaccio in 1769. At that time
Prance was fastening her grip on Corsica, the claim to which she had cheaply
acquired from the Genoese Republic. The young Napoleon later shared to the full
the resentment felt by the islanders at this shabby proceeding; and, though his
family was of patrician rank on both sides, and had formerly upheld the Genoese
party, he long showed a strongly insular spirit, which in no wise abated during
his time of education in Prance, first at Brienne, and afterwards at the “
1'tcole MUitaire ” in Paris. Indeed, he declared that he would never forgive
his father for deserting the cause of the Corsican champion Paoli. Even when he
entered the French army as sous-lieictenamt in the artillery regiment La Fere
(1785), he spent all his spare time in studying Rousseau and as many historical
works as his scanty means could procure in order to equip himself for writing a
book, and thereby proving the right of the Corsicans to be free and nerving
them for the future struggle with France.
These insular
feelings, however, slowly died away as the spell of the French Revolution and
its message, la carriere ouverte aux talents, wrought on his spirit, arousing
some hopes for the future of mankind and opening up golden vistas to his own
boundless egotism. In his second very prolonged furlough in Corsica he came to
an open feud with Paoli, who declared for severance from France and union with
England; and ihe young officer, worsted in the ensuing strife, fled with his
family to the coast of Provence. There his untiring energy, his skill in the
organisation of artillery, and his faculty of seeing to the heart of a problem,
largely contributed to the recapture of Toulon from the English, Spanish, and
Neapolitan forces; and, subsequently, as commander of
the artillery
of the Army of Italy, he had a share in drafting at Colmars a memorable plan
(May 81, 1794) adopted by the Commissioners, for uniting the Army of the Alps
to the Army of Italy, and thus changing an ineffective defensive into a
vigorous offensive which should carry the French far down the valley of the
river Stura. He also took a prominent part in the campaign that gradually edged
the Austro-Sardinian forces from the Col di Tenda and along the coast back to
Savona. In July he was charged by the Commissioner, Ricord, with a secret
mission: to inspect Savona and Genoa, to counteract Austrian intrigues at the
latter city, and to gain all the military news possible. Then it was that he
saw the importance of the pass north of Savona; and he seems to have been the
moving spirit in the subsequent operations which finally drove the Allies from
that pass and from their position at Dego. There, amidst the northern spurs of
the Apennines, he gazed down the valley of the eastern Bormida, which was to be
his avenue to fame, and at the close of the final conflict he penned these
notable words, “ The Battle of Dego would have been decisive against the
Emperor, in his Lombard States, if we had had three hours more daylight.” This
sentence, throbbing with baffled eagerness, but instinct with prescience,
contains the thought-germ of the Italian Campaign.
At present
nothing more could be done, for the Commissioner, Albitte, refused to allow any
prolonged pursuit of the Austrians, and any decisive movement against the
Sardinians at Ceva such as might have brought them to sue for peace. The
whirligig of Parisian afiairs also brought Bonaparte’s life into sudden danger.
The overthrow of Robespierre in Thermidor led to a close scrutiny of the
actions of all those who, like the young general of artillery, had been on
friendly terms with the younger brother of the Terrorist chief; and Ricord’s
action in sending Bonaparte on the secret mission to Genoa led to the arrest
of the latter. He was cast into prison, and owed his life and his release only
to the pres mg need that was felt of good artillery officers. For some months
the Committee of Public Safety and the commander of the Army of Italy advised a
defensive policy in the south-east. In March, 1795, an order came for Bonaparte
to take an infantry command in the Vendee War. He delayed his departure for two
months, but, on his arrival at Paris, refused, on the plea of ill-health, to
proceed to his new sphere of duty. Amidst poverty and doubt as to the future he
at times fell a prey to misanthropy, and shook off the Jacobinical creed that
had hitherto partially checked the dictates of his own egotism. “ Life is but a
light dream that soon vanishes,” he wrote to his brother Joseph. But now, as
earlier, he studied hard and gained that knowledge of history and the art of
war which was to serve him so well. He was girding himself for the task of
writing a history of recent events, when the news that Kellermann and the Army
of Italy had been beaten back along the coast nerved him to work out in detail
the plan of campaign which he
had drafted
in the summer of 1794, and which (so Volney assured Chaptal) he trenchantly set
forth in the autumn to the Commissioner Turreau at Nice.
In quick
succession he now, in July, 1795, drew up two Mbnoires for the Committee of
Public Safety. In the earlier of these (No. 50 of the official Correspondance
de NapoMon I) he urged that the Army of Italy should be strongly reinforced
from the Army of the Pyrenees (peace being then almost assured with Spain); and
that Loano and Vado should be recaptured, so that during the winter positions
could be secured whence overwhelming pressure might be brought to bear on the
Court of Turin. Then, in the favourable season—February to Midsummer—the sansculottes
must overrun Lombardy, replenish their stores in that fertile land, blockade
Mantua, penetrate into Tyrol, and, joining hands with the Army of the Rhine,
compel the Emperor to accept terms from the Republic. The later Mbnoire (No.
49) is more detailed. In it Bonaparte assumed that the Army of the Pyrenees
could send large reinforcements which would enable the Republicans to advance
with numbers at least equal to those of the enemy; he also pointed out, in
terms very like those set forth in his earlier scheme, that as the French
forces were at present spread over a semicircle, in a barren and mountainous
country from Loano to the St Bernard, while the enemy held the diameter, the
defensive was not only more costly but far more dangerous than the most daring
offensive. The French must pierce into this semicircle and drive the Austrians
from the positions whence they controlled the King of Sardinia; the Allies
could easily be separated, for the Austrians would by preference defend
Lombardy, while the Sardinians must guard the entrance to Piedmont. Peace being
assured with the Court of Turin, Lombardy could with ease be overrun, Mantua
seized, and Tyrol invaded, as he had previously indicated. The key to the whole
problem is thus stated, “ Nature has limited France to the Alps, but she has
also limited the Empire to Tyrol.”
This, then,
is the basis of the confidence which the young officer felt. The doctrines of
Rousseau concerning the influence of nature on man, the principles of strategy,
and the teaching of history as to the events that make and unmake empires,
alike proclaimed the futility of a northern race striving to hold a straggling
fraction of the soil of Italy in face of a great popular impulse championed by
a powerful invader. In truth, so striking were the arguments of these two
Memoires that they helped to procure for their writer from Pontecoulant the
post of assistant at the Topographic Bureau of the Committee of Public Safety
(August 19); and the instructions sent by that body to Kellermann at once
breathed a livelier tone than before. Scherer took the place of Kellermann, and
the arrival of 16,000 splendid fighting men from the Army of the Pyrenees
helped to secure the decisive victory near Loano; but, despite Massena’s fiery
pursuit of the enemy almost as far as Dego, the new
commander-in-chief
failed to rise to the height of the situation. He stopped short at the very
point where the grand campaign should have begun. This was what Bonaparte
pointed out in further notes to the Committee. For a time his name had been
removed from the list of general officers owing to the discovery of his
prolonged refusal to take up his command in the Vendee, but he more than
recovered his former position by the skill and vigour that he displayed when
suddenly appointed to help Barras during the fateful day of 13 Vendemiaire.
With the enhanced prestige which he now enjoyed, he showed incisively (January
19, 1796) that, while the Austrians were flying beyond Acqui, the victors
should have turned aside so as to crush the Sardinians at their entrenched camp
of Ceva, and force the Court of Turin to sue for peace; then “ We enter
Lombardy, as if it were Champagne, without obstacles.” This plan attracted the
attention of the Committee, which pressed it on Scherer, only to receive the
wearily cynical reply that the man who had formed it had better come to carry
it out. The Committee took him at his word, and decided on February 29, 1796,
that he should be replaced by Bonaparte. The appointment was ratified on March
2.
It is needful
to dwell on these facts, for they refute the statements frequently made that
the young general owed his position to female influence. In the month of
January he gained the hand of Josephine de Beauhamais, a young widow of Creole
extraction, one of the most fascinating figures in the gay salon of Mme
Tallien. Though scandalous tongues named her one of the mistresses of Barras,
the young general conceived for her a passion of southern intensity, which she
at first coquettishly fanned until its fiery force puzzled and alarmed her.
Doubtfully and languidly, her Creole nonchalance yielded to the insistence of
her suitor, for she noted that his hawk-like gaze gained ascendancy over all,
even over the Directors themselves. Her chief consolation was that, if she
married the needy young man, Barras would help to gain him the command of the
Army of Italy; and there seemed ground for hoping that, worn by constant study
and hardships and a prey to a malarial fever contracted at Toulon, he would
find in the peninsula either speedy death or imperishable renown. As for
Bonaparte he accepted the promise of Barras’ help with his usual unbending
pride, that flashed out in the scorn with which he spoke to Josephine of the
envy shown hy his former comrades, “Do they think that I need patronage to
succeed ? They will be only too happy for me to grant them mine. My sword is at
my side, and with it I shall go far.” He knew full well that his promotion was
due to his plan of campaign which would hear him on to fortune. He was right.
Carnot had, as far back as 1794, seen the need of some such scheme of
operations, but had hitherto failed to find any man fitted to carry them out.
Pondering on the proved courage of Bonaparte, together with the intellectual
eminence reflected in his plan of campaign, he judged that his daring spirit,
strategic genius, and knowledge of the
country, must
achieve great results in the policy of war and conquest on which the Directors
were now firmly bent. In 1799 he declared that it was he who had proposed
Bonaparte’s appointment; and the testimony of another Director,
Larevellicre-L^peaux, also proves that it was not brought about by Barras and
female intrigues. On March 9 the marriage took place; and after a honeymoon of
two days the young commander left his bride and set out for the headquarters at
Nice, where he arrived on March 27.
He found the
Army of Italy in a state of confusion and discouragement. The whole district
had been swept bare of supplies, and the English fleet often intercepted those
coming from Genoa or Leghorn; some of the regiments were half in rags, and all
of them grumbled loudly at the arrears of pay and the peculations of
contractors. Scherer’s softness had lowered the tone of the whole army; and
the remodelling of the regimental system, which was still proceeding, gave many
an outlet for the utterance of mutinous threats. As for the generals, they
looked with pity or disdain on the pale thin figure which, on the strength of a
victory gained in the streets of Paris, ventured to take up this impossible
task. They were speedily undeceived. The tall swashbuckler, Augereau, who at
first almost openly mocked at the “ lath of a man,” speedily fell under the
power of his keen grey eyes and curt, masterful speech; Massena, proud of his
recent triumphs, that cast into the shade all Bonaparte’s exploits, received
him with bluff camaraderie, which was checked at once by the magic of genius;
and he soon had to own the superiority of military science to the mere
.fighting instincts which his own life of hardship and struggle had so keenly
whetted. For the rest, the stem old Serurier, the warlike Swiss La Harpe, the
gallant Cervoni, and others, soon proved their worth. With the aid of the
friends whom Bonaparte brought from Paris—Berthier, the most methodical, hardworking,
and intelligent of executants, a man whose strength and devotion set at naught
days and nights of almost ceaseless toil; Murat, already known as a dashing
officer of cavalry; the sardonic but very able Marmont; that trusty friend and
almost puritanical zealot, Duroc, along with his opposite, the bright, vain,
and sociable Junot—order began ta be evolved from chaos at the headquarters at
Nice. Funds were raised from local banks to meet the most pressing needs;
peculations were promptly stopped; the troops were fired by the prospect of
glory and plenty which the new commander held out as theirs in the fertile plains
of Italy ; and—significant change—he called them not citoyens but soldats. For
the first time, too, he thoroughly identified himself with the French by
writing his name Bonaparte.
At the
beginning of the month of April the military situation was as follows. The
French army was spread out widely from Nice to Loano, and thence up to and even
beyond Savona. In fact, one of Scherer’s last acts had been, on the request of
the Commissioner Salicetti, to despatch
a brigade to
Voltri, in order to bring pressure to bear upon the Genoese government and
induce them to grant a loan. The results of this move were so marvellously
favourable to the French that it has been inscribed in the Napoleonic legend as
a first signal proof of the young commander’s foresight in seeking to lure
Beaulieu and half of his army into the Riviera. But the despatches of Scherer
award to him the responsibility for this move; while Bonaparte’s letter of
April 6 to the Directors proves no less clearly that he disapproved of it as
arousing Genoa to hostility and the somnolent Austrians to nervous
watchfulness. In truth, his “ star ” never shone more auspiciously than at the
dawn of his career. This will be evident if we review the plans of the Allies.
In an interview which Colli had with Beaulieu at Alessandria on March 27 he
strongly urged a joint forward movement in two massed columns, the Austrians
driving the French from Dego in on Savona, while the Sardinians were to strike
through a more westerly pass at Loano, and thus cut the hostile line in half.
This admirable plan did not please Beaulieu. In its place he proposed to hustle
the French all along their front; and, as soon as he heard of the move of their
vanguard on Voltri, he withdrew troops from Dego, in order to meet it face to
face in the Genoese Riviera, and refused to trust to the plan of cutting its
communications at Savona, which Colli pointed out would produce the same result
in a more trenchant manner. The scheme adopted by the Austrian commander
bristled with faults, the worst being that it led to a dangerous dispersion of
force, as the column sent through the Bocchetta Pass, north of Genoa, and then
along the narrow coast-line, must be almost entirely severed from the centre at
Dego by the Apennines. Indeed, so grave were the risks involved by this
severance of forces in proportion to the military results thereby attainable,
that the whole movement has often been ascribed to a design of the Austrians to
seize Genoa; but the despatches of the English Minister at Turin show that rumour
had greatly magnified the French force at Voltri; and it is also known that
Beaulieu wished to concert with Nelson a plan for capturing it entirely at that
seaport. Early in April he therefore led some 10,000 men in that direction,
while Argenteau at the centre in front of Dego disposed of a smaller force for
the seizure of Savona. The Sardinian army, numbering little more than
20,000 men, was farther away to the west at, and
to the front of, the camp of Ceva.
Well served
by his spies at Genoa and Turin, Bonaparte heard of these faulty dispositions
and prepared to deal out prompt punishment. Directing Cervoni at Voltri to hold
firm and then to fall back slowly before superior forces, he himself hurried to
Savona and took command of the 13,000 men already grouped thereabouts under the
command of Massena. The French outposts held the heights dominating the pass
that led northwards to Carcare and Dego; one of these bodies, commanded by
Fomesy and Rampon, occupied an old fort on Monte Legino
and bravely
beat off the attacks of Argenteau’s vanguard (April 11). Reinforced in the
night by Massena and La Harpe, the Republicans fiercely assailed Argenteau very
early on the morrow; their dense columns speedily drove in his force, only 3000
strong, through the upper and lower parts of the village of Montenotte, and he
rallied scarcely 700 men at Dego. Bonaparte, from a height further to the west,
witnessed this running fight, but bent all his energy to the task of hurrying
up the divisions of Joubert and Augereau, comprising 8000 men in all, along the
high road through Carcare, which the folly of Beaulieu and the timidity of the
Sardinians had left open. Up its slopes cannon and stores could be sent with
ease—it was known by the peasants as the “road of cannon”—and at nightfall of
the 12th a French army of nearly 20,000 men strongly held Carcare and its
neighbouring summits. The first part of the campaign was won. Bonaparte had
sundered the feeble link that held together the allied forces at the head of
the forked road leading towards Alessandria and Turin, and could carry out the
long-cherished plan of crushing them in detail.
But now the
Sardinians were on the alert; Provera and a handful of brave men threw
themselves into the old castle of Cosseria, to the west of Carcare, and beat
off several attacks of Augereau’s best troops. Other parts of the French
forces, however, drove the foe from the village of Millesimo (April 18); and on
the morrow Provera saw himself cut off and compelled by lack of food to
surrender. Relieved of all immediate danger on the west, but still careful to
keep his headquarters nearly midway between the smaller armies of the Allies,
Bonaparte now sent Mass&ia and La Harpe against Dego. This strong position,
commanding the valley of the eastern Bormida, was held by some 4000 Austrians,
who beat off all frontal attacks, until Massena, working round the hills to the
east, surrounded the place and brought about a capitulation (April 14).
Argenteau, meanwhile, lay strangely inactive a short distance away. Elated by
their victory and exasperated by the lack of food, the French spread out widely
in search of the supplies which Bonaparte’s severest orders failed to extort
from his base on the coast. Early on the morrow the victors, while still buried
in drunken slumber, were assailed by five battalions led by Vukassovich, which
Beaulieu had sent from Voltri to keep touch with his centre, and were driven
headlong from the town. It needed a second attack to regain Dego; and this time
the Austrians cut their way through to Acqui. The incident is of interest as
showing that the Imperialists, when well led, were fully equal to the French,
and also that, if Argenteau had acted with energy on the previous day, he might
perhaps have saved the situation. The opportunity was now lost; Beaulieu
swiftly retired inland to Acqui, threw the burden of blame on Argenteau, whom
he disgraced, and drew in his scattered forces to that town.
The
Sardinians, cut off by a long unbroken ridge from the remains of the Austrian
centre, were now to feel the full weight of Bonaparte’s blows. The young leader
was eager to reap every advantage from the central position he had so easily
seized. Leaving La Harpe to observe Acqui, he turned fiercely against the
entrenched camp of Ceva in the valley of the Tanaro. There Colli had checked
Augereau severely on the 16th; but now, seeing his communications with Turin
threatened by the irruption of other French columns, he left but a scanty force
to hold that camp, and withdrew early on the 17th to St Michel. Again he dealt
the French vanguard, under Serurier, a sharp blow. Bonaparte, however, drawing
up fresh troops from Ormea—his new line of communications with Nice—outflanked
and hustled the Piedmontese as they sought to take position at Mondovi, and
speedily scattered their array (April 21). A prey to discouragement, even
before the campaign began, the Sardinians were now in the depths of despair;
and Bonaparte, pressing remorselessly on their rear, received the first
proposals for an armistice (April 22). These he refused until the arrival of
fresh troops enabled him to extort harder terms. He then, when near Cherasco,
entertained the Piedmontese envoys with quiet dignity, but threatened an attack
on that town unless his final conditions were speedily accepted. Having 38,000
men at hand, besides 7000 rapidly drawing near to the Col di Tenda, while
scarcely 10,000 Sardinian regulars barred the road to Turin, he had that Court
at his mercy; for Beaulieu, meanwhile, made but the feeblest of efforts to
stretch a helping hand to his hard- stricken allies. The armistice of Cherasco
was accordingly signed at 2 a.m. on the 28th; it assured the complete
neutrality of the ldngdom of Sardinia, and the occupation by the French of the
fortresses of Coni, Ceva, Tortona, and (provisionally) of Alessandria, while
they also had the right of passing through Valenza. The gain of Coni was in
itself a great advantage, as it opened up direct communication with Nice and
left the British fleet powerless to intercept supplies. Requisitions were also
laid without mercy on the southern part of Piedmont, as well as on Genoa, for
having suffered the breach of its neutrality by the Allies. Bonaparte
furthermore asked for 15,000 men to be sent to him from Kellermann’s Army of the
Alps; and, by dint of representing himself as dangerously weak in front of a
powerful foe, he gained the promise of fully 10,000 men from that quarter. He
also sought by all possible arguments to induce the Directors to conclude peace
with the Court of Turin, so as to leave the Army of Italy free for the grand
designs to which his brilliant successes had been merely the prelude.
Meanwhile he
endeavoured to help on the negotiations by aiming another blow at Beaulieu.
Again he succeeded. Though delayed by the lack of ammunition and even of shoes,
he pressed hard on the retreating Austrians, and induced them to believe that
he would cross the river Po at Valenza, into which town the terms of the
armistice, designedly made
568 Bonaparte’s advance into Lombardy.
public, gave
him the right to enter. While this device held no small part of the Austrian
forces on the direct road into Lombardy, that which runs through Valenza and
Pavia, Bonaparte hurried two powerful columns towards Stradella and Piacenza on
the south hank of the Po, where there were few natural obstacles to hinder the
advance. “My intention ” (he wrote on May 6) “ is to cross [the river Po] as
near as possible to Milan so as to have no more obstacles before reaching that
capital. By this means I shall turn the three lines of defence that Beaulieu
has arranged along the rivers Agogna, Terdoppio, and Ticino.” The crossing at
Piacenza evidently offered most advantages; still he subordinated this masterly
flanking move to the facts of the situation. In the same letter he wrote that
if Beaulieu evacuated all the district between Valenza and Pavia he would
quietly cross at Valenza; hut, if the enemy did not divine his secret, then
Piacenza would be his place of crossing if boats were found there. Simplicity in
the general design, a skilful persistence in dovetailing subordinate movements
into that design, and a prudent pliability in the choice of means—such were the
characteristics of Bonaparte’s warfare even at the outset, as they have been
those of all great leaders.
Fortune once
more showered on him the favours which she rarely withholds from those who
neglect no means of winning them. Beaulieu was weakly striving to guard all the
crossings—an impossible task with his small army—and on the morning of May 7 sent
Liptay with 5000 men (a force which the French have always represented as 8000)
to seize Piacenza; the French vanguard, under the intrepid Lannes, was just in
time to seize boats and make good its hold on the northern bank when, near
nightfall, Liptay’s scouts appeared. During the night Augereau’s division, the
“ fighting ” division of the army, came up, reinforced that of Dallemagne, and
helped him on the morrow to throw back the Austrians on the village of Fombio.
There an obstinate fight took place, but an energetic flank movement led to
Liptay’s hurried retreat towards Pizzighettone. Meanwhile Beaulieu, with the
main body, ad* vanced to help his lieutenant, only to find Fombio and its
environs strongly held by the French. Even so, his unexpected approach, at
nightfall caused a panic among the French, during which La Harpe was killed;
but Berthier and Dallemagne restored order and beat off the assailants. A
renewed attack in force by Beaulieu might still have placed the French in grave
danger; but he rather tamely made off towards Lodi.
Bonaparte now
saw the importance of driving the enemy beyond the river Adda in order to
deprive the Sardinians of their last hope of aid from their allies; and he
accordingly pressed on Beaulieu’s track. That leader was too dispirited to try
his fortune even on the banks of the Adda, and left the defence of the town and
bridge of Lodi to his lieutenant, Sebottendorf, who with 9600 men was hurrying
back from
Pavia. On the
morning of May 10 the French drove this column into Lodi, which they entered
with little resistance shortly before noon. Bonaparte prudently gave his men a
time of rest in the town, which lies on the west side of the river, while he
cannonaded the enemy on the lower and more exposed bank opposite. Sebottendorf’s
only desire was to effect his retreat so as to join the main body; but he now
ordered a stand to be made at the bridge and along the banks of the Adda.
Having drawn up more troops, Bonaparte ordered the cavalry to proceed
northwards and cross by a ford higher up the stream, while, under cover of the
buildings of Lodi, he himself made ready a column of picked troops, headed by
grenadiers, who were to carry the bridge by a rush. Shortly after five o’clock
he launched this column from the shelter of the town at the long, narrow bridge
; despite the redoubled fire of the enemy it gained half the length, but then
faltered beneath the storm. At once the leaders, Mass&ra and his
aides-de-camp, Lautour and Reille, together with Berthier, Lannes, and Cervoni,
rushed to rally the leading files; again they pressed forward, only to waver
again, under the terrible flank and frontal fire. A second column now gave
weight to the attack; some scores of its men, seeing that the river was
fordable on the further side, swarmed down the wooden supports of the bridge to
a sandbank, waded thence to the shore, and sharply engaged the defenders, who
speedily gave way under this opportune diversion and the final rush of the
surviving grenadiers. Even now, though the bridge was won, all was not over.
The Austrian reserves marched up to support their two first lines; and a charge
of their horsemen nearly drove the French back to the bridge. Not until the
divisions of Massena and Cervoni passed over the bridge, while that of Augereau
came up from the crossing at Borghetto, did the swaying melee at last roll
eastwards. Overborne by numbers, outflanked, and at last assailed by several
squadrons of French chasseurs, the Imperialists took to flight; yet still their
hussars and the fine Neapolitan horse many a time rallied and checked the
pursuit, so that their total losses did not exceed 153 killed, 182 wounded,
1700 prisoners, and 15 cannon. The French lost no guns and prisoners, but had
more than 500 killed and wounded. On the next day Bonaparte captured
Pizzighettone; Cremona also opened its gates ; but with wise restraint he
forbore to pursue Beaulieu towards Mantua until the news of the ratification of
peace with Sardinia should relieve him of all fear for his communications. For
the present, he was satisfied with holding the line of the Adda.
In truth, the
importance of the battle of Lodi is personal and political rather than
strategic. For the reason just stated it exercised no direct influence on the
campaign. Not until May 22, after hearing of the signature of the treaty of
peace with Sardinia, did Bonaparte take the final steps for the march on
Mantua, which was to prelude the intended invasion of Tyrol and the junction
with the French Army of
the Rhine. An
examination of his correspondence seems to show that one of his chief motives
in fighting the battle of Lodi was to arouse both in the army and in France
such a storm of enthusiasm on his behalf as must overbear the opposition which
he now encountered from the Directory. His relations with that body were
sharply strained from the moment when they heard of his disobedience in
granting an armistice to the Court of Turin—a question of high policy which
they expressly reserved to their Commissioner, Salicetti, or, preferably, to themselves
alone. The half-ironical tone of the young commander’s excuses for his
disobedience, which, in truth, were unanswerably cogent, cut them to the quick
; and, alarmed at the pretensions of this masterful genius and their own
helplessness, they sent off a courier from Paris four days before the battle of
Lodi, with a most important despatch signed by Carnot himself. After frigidly
congratulating Bonaparte on his first successes, it commended him for
consulting Salicetti as to the armistice, and warned him against carrying out
the plan, sketched in his (Bonaparte’s) letter of April 28 from Cherasoo, of
invading Tyrol and joining the Army of the Rhine in Bavaria. “ The imperious
necessity of ending the war in the present campaign,” wrote Carnot, “forbade so
ambitious a scheme, which might end in great reverses; he must therefore drive
the Austrians as far as the Tyrolean gorges and then turn against Tuscany and
Rome, so as to chase from central Italy, and finally from Corsica, the
perfidious English, so long masters of the Mediterranean.” To this end the
Directors resolved to divide the commands in Italy: Bonaparte was to undertake
the southern expedition, Kellermann meanwhile holding the Milanese and
subjecting it to heavy contributions until it could be bartered away in the
negotiations for a general continental peace.
Bonaparte
received this disagreeable, but not unexpected, news on May 13 or 14 at Lodi;
and his concern was doubtless increased by his having sinned a second time in
granting an armistice to the Duke of Parma for a heavy ransom (May 9).
Nevertheless he took a lofty tone. He assured the Directors that Beaulieu still
had a large army and would soon receive 10,000 fresh troops ; the expedition to
Leghorn and Rome was a small affair, but there must be unity in the operations
if Italy was to be won : “ Everyone has his own way of making war. General
Kellermann has more experience and will do better than I; but together we shall
do very badly.” The argument was again unanswerable, as Carnot must have known;
but it gained redoubled force from the mighty wave of enthusiasm that was then
rolling over Paris at the news that Bonaparte’s men had seized the bridge of
Lodi from Beaulieu’s whole army—a misstatement which the young leader carefully
disseminated in his bulletin, though he must have known its falsity. A few
days later came the further news that the Republicans had entered Milan in
triumph amidst the boundless rejoicings of the liberated people,
and that the
Austrian garrison was besieged in the citadel. As a result of this bewildering
series of triumphs, the civilian rulers of France gave way before the rapidly
rising force of militarism, and nothing more was heard of their proposal to
divide the Italian command.
Bonaparte’s
belief in the strength of his position further led him to grant, on his own
responsibility, an armistice to the Duke of Modena, on condition that he
promptly paid 750,000 francs, and surrendered valuable stores, besides twenty
pictures that were to be selected by French commissioners from his galleries.
In carrying out the Directors’ bidding to press heavily on the Milanese,
Bonaparte was careful to send to Paris thirty-two of the finest paintings of
Milan and Parma, including several Correggios. Not that he himself cared much for
art, for to the end of his life he judged a picture solely by its accuracy; but
his conduct in this respect offers a curious proof of the rigidly mathematical
cast of his mind, which thought little of chefs d'ceuvre in themselves, but
correctly calculated the political prestige that would accrue to the man who
showered them on the galleries and museums of France. He was right; the spoils
of the art treasures of Milan, Venice, Florence, and Rome were to assure his
general popularity at Paris, just as the sums which he extorted from Italian
potentates helped to stop the mouths of the Directors. Before long he ventured
to address these last with ironical familiarity, as appears in his letter of
June 1, announcing a present of 100 horses to them :. “ One hundred
carriage-horses set out from Milan to-morrow, the finest that could be found in
Lombardy; they will replace the mediocre horses that draw your carriages.” The
facilities for plunder tacitly granted by the young commander also began to sap
Republican feelings in the Army of Italy; and by the side of love of la patrie
there grew up that passionate devotion to a chief which is often fatal to
liberty. The sequel was to justify the sage remark of Montesquieu that it was
contrary to reason for a democratic Republic to conquer towns which could not
enter into the sphere of its democracy ; and that its own liberty ran great
risks owing to the large powers granted to the officers sent into the conquered
Provinces.
The three
days of rejoicings kept by the people of Milan on the entry of the French
troops gave place to a time, first of suspense, and finally of resentment, when
it was found that little, except the planting of trees, was done in the cause
of liberty, while the burden of exactions was crushingly heavy. At Milan there
was a serious riot; and at Pavia the townsfolk and peasants overpowered the
small French garrison. Bonaparte speedily returned, ordered the municipals to
be shot, and sent 200 hostages to France (May 26). Having, by these stem
measures, cowed the populace, and having arranged for the provisional
government of the Milanese, he for the second time set out for Mantua. On May
22 he had received the longed-for news of the ratification of the peace with
Sardinia; and, assured as to his communications, he now
entered the
territory of Venice* whose neutrality was thenceforth violated by both sides.
Bonaparte, through his then trusted agent, Adjutant- General Landrieux, cajoled
two Venetian officers into signing a secret treaty (May 27), whereby the French
were allowed to pursue the Austrians through the Venetian territory or besiege
them in Venetian fortresses, paying 3,000,000 francs at the close of the war
for the damage thus caused. The Venetian government was weak enough to
acquiesce in this guileful compact.
Making
skilful demonstrations against Tyrol on the north of Lake Garda so as to
distract Beaulieu’s attention, Bonaparte now launched a force of 22,000 men at
about half that number of the Austrians defending the line of the upper Mincio
near Valeggio, and on successive days drove them pell-mell northward up the
valley of the Adige almost as far as Roveredo. There, amidst the Tyrolese Alps,
Beaulieu rested his troops, while the French began the siege of Mantua. The
British officer, Colonel Graham, then at the Austrian headquarters, reported
that discontent was loudly expressed: “Many of the officers comfort themselves
with thinking that defeat must force peace, and others express themselves in
terms of despair.” It is therefore not surprising that Beaulieu was relieved of
the command for which his age, his broken health, and his despondency obviously
unfitted him. He had committed nearly every possible fault in the past
campaign. Widely sundering his forces at the outset, he had seen his connexion
with the Sardinians severed in the first two days; the sluggishness of
Argenteau led to the widening of that fatal gap; and, during the critical days
when an armistice was discussed at Cherasco, Beaulieu made only the tamest of
efforts to help his hard-pressnd allies. Outwitted by Bonaparte on the banks of
the Po, he could still have made a good stand at the Adda if he had massed his
men either at Pizzighettone or at Lodi. Instead of this he let his columns
remain scattered during retreat; and the French were held at bay at Lodi for a
few hours only by the steady courage of a single Austrian division. Finally,
the feints which Bonaparte made at various points on the Mincio and towards the
north of Lake Garda led this hapless commander to spread out his line until its
attenuated centre was easily pierced. In truth, his one achievement was that he
garrisoned and victualled Mantua against a long siege.
In these
circumstances the Court of Vienna devolved the command on another
septuagenarian, Marshal Wurmser. His personality inspired neither the officers
nor Colonel Graham with hope. “ The zeal of this good old man,” wrote Graham, “
is not enough, and there is nothing else.” Nevertheless, while fortune seemed
to have showered all her favours on Bonaparte, she withheld one needful boon.
Though the armistice on the Rhine should have ended on June 1, yet the two
French armies in that quarter made none of those decisive movements which his
eager brain—even so far back as in his plan of May, 1794—had always
pictured as
helping to batter down the Austrian defence. After Lodi he wrote to Carnot: “
It is possible that I may soon attack Mantua. If I carry that fortress, nothing
hinders my penetrating into Bavaria : in two Meades I can be in. the heart of
Germany. Could you not combine my movements with the operations of these two
armies [on the Rhine] ? I imagine that they are now fighting on the Rhine; if
the armistice continued, the Army of Italy would be crushed.” This last fear
now seemed about to be realised; and, whatever was the real reason for the
inaction on the Rhine, Bonaparte certainly ascribed it to the malice which the
Directors entertained against him. Mantua also was too strongly held to be
carried by storm and was destined for some seven months to afford a memorable
proof of the power of a well- garrisoned stronghold to “ contain ” an enemy’s
army if it is of no great size. Nay, it seemed likely that the French might be
driven under the walls of Mantua by the irruption of a relieving force. Austria
in Tyrol now enjoyed that advantage of a central position between the two great
fields of war which, on a smaller scale, Bonaparte had seized and held with so
masterful a grip between the Austro-Sardinian forces in April. She could
therefore speedily throw her weight on either side, and she prepared to throw
it against Bonaparte, by detaching some 25,000 men from her Rhenish army and
quietly massing them in Tyrol.
While Wurmser
was organising this force, his young opponent pressed on the siege of Mantua
and strengthened his position on the excellent line of defence formed by the
Adige from the plateau of Rivoli on the north to the cities of Verona and
Legnago. The long-promised reinforcement from Kellermann’s Army of the Alps
arrived in the middle of June; and Bonaparte, hearing that Wurmser could make
no serious move before the second week of July, employed the intervening time
in chastising the bandits of the Apennines and in making a dash southwards so
as to chase the English from Leghorn and overawe the Pope and the King of
Naples. His success was complete; he confiscated a great store of British
merchandise at the Tuscan port, and sent off a body of his compatriots to rouse
Corsica against George III. The King of Naples promptly signed an armistice as
soon as the, French menaced his States; and, when the Republicans overran the
“Legations” and pushed on to Pistoia, the Pope nervously sued for a truce,
which was granted on condition that he paid a sum of 21,000,000 francs, in
specie or in kind, besides surrendering 500 manuscripts and 100 pictures or
basts at the choice of French commissioners (June 23). Among the busts those of
Junius and Marcus Brutus were expressly named. . The French were also to
garrison the citadel of Ancona and to hold the Legations of Bologna and
Ferrara, having the right to levy contributions there : these amounted to
13,000,000 francs. The French also captured in the Legations 200 bronze cannon
and many thousands of muskets. Elsewhere exactions and spoils were gathered in
with the same assiduity; and Salicetti
estimated in
his report sent to the Directory and dated 10 Thermidor (July 28) that
contributions of war to the amount of 61,805,000 francs in money or in kind had
been levied in Italy. Events thus showed the correctness of Nelson’s prophecy
six months earlier as to the results of an invasion of the peninsula by the
French. “Holland and Flanders, with their own country, they have entirely
stripped; Italy is the goldmine, and, if once entered, is without the means of
resistance.”
At this time
the Austrian garrison holding the citadel of Milan surrendered to General
Despinoy. Bonaparte thus had the satisfaction of seeing his communications with
France completely secured, while the rulers of Italy were constrained to supply
his troops with the sinews of war. Early in July he was able to announce to the
Directors the capture of 697 cannon in the course of the campaign: as for the
pictures and statues, they were so numerous as to cause him great embarrassment
with regard to means of transport to Paris. All these prodigious gains were now
at stake. Moreau’s crossing of the Rhine late in June was too late to distract
the Austrian plans. The war-cloud long gathering in the Alps was now drifting
southwards.
On July 29
the Imperialists attacked Massena’s division at La Corona, to the north of
Rivoli, and drove it back in great disorder; others pressed on Despinoy and
Augereau lower down the Adige, while a force of 17,000 men under Quosdanovich
'wound round to the west of Lake Garda with the aim of cutting Bonaparte’s
communications at Brescia on the high road to France. Wurmser, with 24,000 men,
marched down the right bank of the Adige, compelling the French to give up that
important defensive line; while Quosdanovich worsted Sauret’s division to the
north of Lonato and seized Brescia with its magazines and numbers of the
French wounded. After hearing these tidings, Bonaparte on July 30 withdrew
Massena and Augereau behind the banks of the Molinella and Mincio in the hope
of still covering the siege of Mantua, threw back a further force to repel
Quosdanovich, and warned Serurier to prepare to send off the siege artillery
from before Mantua to the river Po if need should arise. On the 30th, when the
Austrian attack developed with full vigour on the Mincio, as well as on the
side of Brescia, the commander-in-chief rode to the central position of Rover-
bella and ordered Serurier to raise the siege of Mantua secretly by night and
throw into the Mincio or the marshes the cannon and stores that he could not
carry away. On July 81, then, the French gave up the lines of the Mincio and
Molinella so as to concentrate near Castiglione and Montechiaro, Augereau avers
that his commander, on arriving at this latter place, showed extreme
nervousness and hesitation. In fact the position was critical, especially as
the numbers and exact positions of the enemy were little known; but Bonaparte’s
hold on the principles of strategy—the result of long study—had led him to
choose the only means of safety, namely, an abandonment of all non-essentials,
even
1796]
Solferino. Wurmser
driven back. 575
including the
siege of Mantua, in order to regain the advantage of a central position between
the two divided parts of the hostile array. Acting in unison, they could have
crushed him; but while sundered by Lake Garda and the intervening French force
they could be beaten in detail—a danger not foreseen by Weyrother and Duka, the
designers of this enveloping strategy.
Bonaparte’s
masterly counter-stroke received unlooked-for help from Wurmser. That veteran,
either from exhaustion caused by the heat or from overweening joy at the
deliverance of Mantua, remained with some
16,000 men in that fortress and sent at first only
a feeble column under Liptay on the track of the French, thereby enabling
Bonaparte to throw his weight against the scattered forces of Quosdanovich to
the south-west of the lake. Driven by Augereau from Brescia on August 1, they
were worsted in three engagements on the next two days (known collectively as
the battle of Lonato) and fell back northwards in confusion. On August 3
Augereau dashed eastwards against Wurmser’s vanguard at Castiglione and beat it
back, despite the arrival of reinforcements from Mantua. This last news aroused
Wurmser from his dream of triumph, and he led a strong force to Solferino in
the hope of joining hands with Quosdanovich. Indeed, Graham asserts that the
two Austrian generals had formally arranged to give battle to the French on the
7th. However that may be, Bonaparte gave them no respite. On the 4th he ordered
Fiorella with 5000 men of Serurier’s division to make a forced march from
Marcaria on the south to Medola, so as in due course to crush the left wing of
the Imperialists. These were now drawn up, some 25,000 in number, with their right
strongly posted on the hilly ground near the height of Solferino, whose
tower-crowned slopes were destined once again to witness the retreat of the
Austrian double-headed eagle before the tricolour standards of France.
Wurmser’s desire to feel after the remnants of Quosdanovich’s corps, now away
to the north, was largely responsible for Austria’s overthrow. Stretching out
boldly on that side where Bonaparte humoured his wish, he weakened his left
flank in the plain. It was a fatal mistake. Fiorella was quickly coming up and
charged almost into his headquarters. Beating back this onset, the Marshal
sought hastily to re-form his array; but, while engaged in this delicate
operation, he was fiercely attacked at the centre and right by Augereau and
Massena. At once his lines wavered and then speedily melted into bands of
runaways, whose flight was scarcely stayed by the shelter of the Mincio far in
their rear. Thence the Imperialists fell back on La Corona, having lost, in
all, some 17,000 men.
Yet Wurmser
had not wholly failed; besides re victualling Mantua, he had taken Bonaparte’s
siege artillery, the want of which was for the future to make the investment of
that stronghold a mere wearisome blockade. Of all the mistakes in Bonaparte’s
early campaigns the most serious, assuredly, was his lack of due preparation
against the inroad of
676
the Austrians
which had been expected for five weeks or more. It is the opinion of the best
military writers that, if the Austrians had not weakened their main army by
detaching as many as 17,000 men to the west of Lake Garda, but had acted
promptly and with solid masses on the Mincio and at Castiglione, the position
of Bonaparte must have been desperate; and a disaster would have meant for him
irreparable disgrace at the hands of the jealous and resentful Directors. As it
was, he was able to send to them a grandiloquent account of his victories,
asserting that he had taken from twelve to fifteen thousand prisoners and would
march on Vienna so soon as a division of Moreau’s army reached Innsbruck.
It seems
certain that he meant ultimately to take the road through Bassano and Friuli;
but in any case he resolved to move first against the Imperialists about Trent,
leaving 6000 men to observe Mantua, and the same number in front of Verona to
hold in check Wurmser’s main force, cantoned about Roveredo and Bassano.
We may fitly
pause here to pass in brief review the mental qualities that led to these
astonishing results. From the first, Bonaparte displayed all the qualities that
mark a bom commander. Long study of the careers of great leaders had given him
a grip of the principles of strategy which strengthened his naturally keen
perception, and suggested a ready solution of difficulties as they occurred.
Hence, except before the first battle of Castiglione, we find in him no trace
of nervousness or hesitation such as too often paralyses the action of young
generals. Having carefully studied the ground, together with the motives that
must influence his opponents’ moves, he formed thereon his general plan of
campaign, strictly subordinating it, however, to the shifting fortunes of the
game. This power of assigning to facts their real importance was his dominant
characteristic so long as his mind retained its flexibility; witness his
uncommon detachment of mind in holding almost aloof from his first pitched
battle at Montenotte, in order to press on the hinder columns into a gap
between the Allies. This keenness of insight, that distinguished the essential
from the less essential—for the fight itself soon proved to be a foregone
conclusion—stamped him at once as a great commander. If, later, his besetting
sin, excess of confidence, led him to cling too closely to the siege of Mantua
almost under the curl of Wurmser’s advancing wave—a mistake which cost him his
siege-train—yet it was the miscalculation of a great and masterful nature,
whose discernment and energy promptly brought about the triumphant rally at the
all important central position to the west of Castiglione.
In view of
this wealth of natural gifts, any enquiry whether Bonaparte owed much to the
examples of other commanders who had culled laurels in Northern Italy might
seem to be superfluous. Seeing, however, that his indebtedness to the example
set by the Marshal de Maillebois in 1745 has been very positively affirmed
(from the time of the Marquis Costa de Beauregard, who published his valuable
memoirs in 1816, down
1745, 1796] Comparison of
Maillebois’ campaign. 577
to the
present day), we may well pause to examine the extent of this obligation. It
may be granted that Bonaparte, so far back as the first plan of campaign, which
he drafted at Colmars conjointly with the Commissioners (May, 1794), must have
known of the details of Maillebois’ campaign, as described by Saint Simon or
Pezay; for the other reports of the Commissioners frequently named those works.
It has also been lately shown that Bonaparte almost certainly had the latter
book in his possession during his campaign of 1796. Parts of the general plan which
Pezay attributed to Maillebois may perhaps have influenced Bonaparte, notably
those which set forth the need of sundering the allied forces of the Austrians
and Sardinians, and compelling the latter to sue for peace. This operation,
however, was known to, and approved by, the younger Robespierre, Carnot, the
Commissioners, and all men of insight in the years 1798-5; and Bonaparte
probably gained it first through Carnot, who enjoined it more than once, and
the Commissioners. Furthermore, the student who carefully follows in the
Correspondance the development of his plan of campaign, from the crude sketch
of May, 1794, to the keen strategic conceptions of July, 1795, and January,
1796, will see that there are throughout radical divergences from the plan actually
followed by Maillebois. The Marshal began, continued, and ended his campaign in
a different manner from that of 1796. Maillebois, with the aid of the
Spaniards, was warring against the disunited forces of the Austrians and
Piedmontese, then lying in the valleys of the Tanaro and Bormida. Setting out
from Mentone with the Franco-Spanish army, he followed the Cornice Road,
crossed the mountains by the pass north of Savona, and drove the Piedmontese
down the valley of the Bormida past Acqui. Meanwhile, another Spanish army,
marching from Modena to Genoa, made use of the Bocchetta pass north of that
seaport, and edged back the Austrians towards Alessandria. Near that fortress
Maillebois joined the Spanish army that had marched from Genoa, while behind the
river Tanaro the Austrians and Piedmontese effected their junction.
Now, it is
clear that Bonaparte followed Maillebois’ plan only so far as to use the pass
north of Savona—a pass which he himself surveyed in 1794. In all other respects
his operations far surpassed those of the Marshal, who, operating against
divided foes, allowed them to unite; whereas Bonaparte, sundering by a few
sharp strokes allies who were already in touch, kept them apart by a trenchant
use of the commanding central position which he seized at Altare, and then
turned on the Sardinians and compelled them to sue for terms. Whatever
Maillebois’ plan may have been for bringing about this desirable result, he did
not attain it. True, at a later date in his campaign, he separated the opposing
forces by throwing a bridge over the Po at Stradella and seizing Pavia; and, in
consequence, the Sardinians, with unnecessary weakness, retreated for the
defence of their own realm. But, even so, he did not
follow them
and compel them to sue for terms; and the presence of unsubdued enemies in his
rear, along with the “eccentric” movements of the Spaniards, marred his whole
campaign. If Bonaparte gained a hint here and there from Maillebois1
programme, he assuredly learnt far more from the faults in its execution.
Nor can we
see in the young commander’s final pursuit of Beaulieu to Rivoli, and his
holding the line of the Adige in order to cover the siege of Mantua, a mere
result of study of the work of Maillebois’ engineer, Bourcet, who recommended
the occupation of this important strategic line. Here again Costa de Beauregard
states that Bonaparte borrowed from Bourcet his idea of holding the Adige and
the plateau of Rivoli. Bourcet certainly stated that the plateau of Rivoli was
a position that could be guarded by 500 men ; but we may point out that the
importance of the line of the Adige, with the strong natural position of Rivoli
and the fortresses of Verona and Legnago, was obvious to everyone, and that its
occupation was enjoined on Bonaparte by Carnot. Further, apart from the paltry
stream of the Molinella, there was no other barrier to oppose to a relieving
force marching from Tyrol or Friuli. It is of course true that Bonaparte always
studied military history with great care; from Guibert he very early borrowed
the maxim that he made so peculiarly his own, “War ought to support war”; but,
while gleaning much from his predecessors, his mind ever bowed instinctively
before the empire of tangible indisputable facts, as he did in the case now
before us. To this union of wide-sweeping vision with a passion for the mastery
of details he owed his ascendancy over the generality of mankind, in whom width
of view is apt to beget dreaminess of aim or diffuseness of action, while
absorption in the practical for the most part ends in brainless drudgery.
We now return
to the details of the campaign. After making good the defects of his transport
and commissariat, Bonaparte was ready for the offensive, and sent the divisions
of Augereau, Massena, and Vaubois, against the Austrians near Roveredo, whence
they were dislodged with heavy loss on September 4. In fact, the sudden advance
of the French caught them at the beginning of difficult movements of their own.
Wurmser had weakened his forces, which did not exceed 41,000 men, by sending a
division under Mezaros southwards against Verona so as to relieve Mantua, and
was himself heading for the same goal by way of Bassano and the valley of the
Brenta; while Davidovich was left with forces insufficient to defend the strong
natural position of Lavis, north of Trent. Bonaparte, unaware of Wurmser’s
purpose, resolved to pursue him down that valley and surround him in the
Venetian lowlands. Augereau and Massena accordingly plunged into the gorges of
the upper Brenta, swept before them the first fragments of the hostile array,
then the main body itself at Bassano, and, rushing on triumphant into the
plain, cut off Wurmser and his Veronese division from all contact with
1796]
Wurmser takes refuge in
Mantua. 579
the Empire.
Even so, the staunch old Marshal was not wholly dazed by the rush of this
devastating flood. With a large band of stragglers he struck out westwards, and
charged Mezaros to seize Legnago at all costs. Fortune smiled on this desperate
enterprise. Bonaparte, fearing lest Wurmser should gain the Papal States, hung
less closely on his rear, and the French detachment guarding Legnago weakly
gave up that town. There, consequently, Wurmser and Mezaros crossed the Adige,
and, overpowering a detachment of the French besiegers of Mantua, gained the
shelter of its outworks. In front of St George and La Favorita they sought to
hold their ground; but again they were worsted and fell back into the crowded
and unhealthy fortress (September 15). Of an army of
41,000 men with which Wurmser began his brief
campaign, a mere fragment remained fit for active service. The rest were flying
across the Alps, or were in the grip of the young conqueror.
Despite the
crushing disasters entailed by the recent ill-considered plans, Francis II
determined to relieve Mantua by operations of the same general description. He
still had some grounds for hope. In the month of October the Archduke Charles
severely defeated the French in Germany, and could therefore throw into Tyrol
reinforcements far outnumbering those which Bonaparte could receive. The next
effort, in truth, came very near to success. A new commander-in-chief,
Alvintzy, was soon at the head of 60,000 troops (though many of these were raw
militia), and designed to strike his main blow with 35,000 men through Friuli,
while the rest under Davidovich were to descend the valley of the Adige. This
division of forces, though ultimately as fatal to success as it had proved to
be to Wurmser, much perplexed Bonaparte at the outset. The French were driven
from the plateau of Rivoli, and when their main body attacked Alvintzy on the
heights of Caldiero, to the east of Verona, they suffered a severe defeat,
losing 2000 killed and wounded and 700 prisoners (November 12). Bonaparte
retrieved the situation by a daring night march down the right bank of the
Adige, which he crossed on pontoons at Ronco, and by taking position amid the
marshes of Areola on Alvintzy’s flank. This move offers a good example of
Napoleonic strategy, which always aimed at forcing the enemy to fight in a
disadvantageous position. Sometimes he threatened a great city that they were
guarding- more often he threatened their communications. It was so in this
case. At Areola the fighting on the causeways and dikes would naturally favour
the French, who, though slightly inferior in number, excelled the Imperialists
in prowess. Perhaps a more skilful and determined commander than Alvintzy would
have disregarded this menace, which was more apparent than real, and, while
blocking the French for a time amid the swamps, would have strained every nerve
to join hands with Davidovich beyond Verona. But, as an Austrian column was
already at Areola, Alvintzy took up the challenge which Bonaparte threw down.
In fact, the Imperialists
were already moving
so as to cross the Adige at Zevio, and surround the French near Verona. Three
days of desperate lighting ensued on the dikes and at the bridge of Areola,
where at the outset Bonaparte himself nearly lost his life; on the third day,
however, the superiority of the Republicans in tenacity and resource finally
prevailed. Their flanking movement to the east of Areola alarmed the defenders,
who beat an undignified retreat, and that, too, at the very time when
Davidovich was drawing near on the north-west, and when Wurmser sought to break
out from Mantua. With the loss of 6100 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners (a
total which Bonaparte more than doubled in his bulletin), Alvintzy fell back
towards Bassano, while Davidovich barely made his escape into Tyrol.
Austria put
forth her last effort to regain Italy early in the year
1797. It was arranged that Alvintzy at the head
of 28,000 men should overpower the French at Rivoli, while Provera with 9000
attacked the line of the lower Adige and other demonstrations distracted
Bonaparte’s attention elsewhere. The student of military history will observe
that this plan of enveloping the French at several points resembled in its
salient features the other schemes which achieved a temporary and partial
success at the risk of almost certain overthrow at the hands of a skilful and
determined commander. The sequel was what might have been expected when
Bonaparte was concerned. As before, the French were driven from La Corona and
fell back on the lower Adige; not until January 13, when full reports came in
from different quarters, was their commander convinced that the main attack
would be at Rivoli. At once he hurried northwards with 13,000 men to reinforce
Joubert’s division, now very hard pressed on the plateau of Rivoli. Bonaparte
knew the strength of this post, which gave him the advantage of a central
station between the two almost parallel valleys of the Adige and of a small
tributary; while the Austrians could only attack from those valleys or from the
narrow ridge that connects the plateau with the overhanging heights of Monte
Baldo. Their onsets were therefore widely spread out and further suffered from
the impossibility of bringing their artillery up from the valley of the Adige
by the long, winding slopes of the one practicable road that led to the summit
of the plateau. These defects of their position, together with their
ill-concerted attacks in six separate columns, gave the victory to Bonaparte.
The westernmost column, which worked round the French rear, was finally itself
surrounded and had to ground arms. Having utterly shattered Alvintzy’s main
force, the young commander flew southwards and captured nearly the whole of
Provera’s corps near Mantua. The cycle of triumphs was completed by the
surrender of that fortress on February 2, with 18,000 men, 315 cannon, and an
immense quantity of munitions of war.
The French
conquest of Italy was virtually complete when Wurmser hoisted the white flag at
Mantua. It now only remained to chastise the
Pope for the
hostility that he had lately manifested and to wrest from Austria a final
acknowledgment of French supremacy in the peninsula. Both of these concluding
efforts were crowned with startlingly easy and complete success. The papal
troops fled at the sight of the French bayonets, and Pius VI was fain to sign
the terms of peace agreed on at Tolentino (February 19) ; whereby he bound
himself to pay 30,000,000 francs before the end of April, and to hand over the
sum of 300,000,000 francs to the French government as atonement for the murder
of Basseville, a secretary of the French Legation, by the Roman populace in
1793. Bonaparte also wrote on that same day that the savants were gathering in
a rich harvest at Ravenna, Rimini, Pesaro, Ancona, Perugia, and Loretto—at the
last of which they despoiled the famous shrine— and that these gains, together
with those from Rome, would yield up to France “almost every fine thing in
Italy, except a few objects at Turin and Naples." He also sent to the
Directors the Madonna and relics of Loretto, with the disappointing
announcement, “The Madonna is of wood ”—a phrase which throws some light on his
convictions respecting religion. And yet there are not wanting signs in his
words and actions that he sought to spare the Holy See from the full blast of
revolutionary wrath and to prepare the way for that future good understanding
which took form in the Concordat of 1801-2.
Having
enriched French coffers and museums from Guelfic sources, Bonaparte now
proceeded to thrust the Tedeschi from the utmost bounds of the peninsula.
Alvintzy’s successor, Archduke Charles, had in the meantime brought to their
forces the encouragement of his great influence and of an untarnished military
fame; there was also the hope of reinforcements coming from the armies in
Germany, if the French remained inactive in that quarter. This latter
circumstance caused Bonaparte much uneasiness, as his correspondence shows; but
he decided to attack Austria through Friuli, relying on the valour of his
troops and on the formal promise of the Directors, that both the French armies
on the Rhine would press the Emperor hard in Germany. His hope of indirect help
from Moreau and Hoche was to be wholly falsified, for neither of them was in a
position to make any forward move; but the fighting powers of the Army of Italy
were to prove an unfailing resource. Its numbers also were now raised to more
than 70,000 men by reinforcements, which included a fine division from the Army
of the Rhine, under the command of a fiery young Gascon, Bemadotte. As yet
Archduke Charles had received no succour from that quarter, and he was further
burdened by the duty of covering the seaport of Trieste, which the War Council
strictly enjoined. Worst of all, however, was the despair that settled on the
Imperialists when it was seen that even his influence failed to extirpate the
canker of favouritism. “ The discontent remains " (wrote Graham on March
14) “ which makes many officers be absent under pretence of sickness;...the
difference of
the number of
French and Austrian officers in proportion to the men is of itself sufficient
to account for all the defeats of the latter in such a country as this; this is
a daily subject of conversation here with those most in the Archduke’s
confidence, but they look on the evil as irremediable on account of the
obstinacy with which the old system is adhered to at Vienna.”
It is
needless to relate fully the details of a campaign in which Court favourites
and a too pliable ruler doomed thousands of brave men to butchery and the Empire
to merited disgrace. Overpowered by numbers, and still more hopelessly
outmatched in fighting efficiency, the Imperialists fell back in rapid
succession from the banks of the Piave, Tagliamento, and Isonzo (March 10-19),
losing heavily in prisoners and deserters. The Archduke retired towards Lay
bach; but, on hearing that Massena on the extreme left of the French was about
to seize the Col di TarVis, the chief pass of the Camic Alps, he hurried
reinforcements to that important point, the defence of which had been strangely
neglected. The mistake was irreparable. An Austrian force, separated from the
main command, was cut off by the divisions of Massena and Guieu; and the French
veterans beat back every effort of the Archduke to recover the snowy heights above
Tarvis. After losing some 20,000 men in the first two weeks of the campaign,
Charles hurriedly retreated through Klagenfurt, where Bonaparte established his
headquarters on March SO. Near that city the French commander drew together the
divisions of Massena, Guieu, Chabot, and Bemadotte; he also directed Joubert,
whose powerful corps in Tyrol had driven the foe over the Brenner Pass, to
wheel to the east through the Pusterthal and assure the communications of the
main army. Nervous, however, at hearing of no movement of the French on the
Rhine, he sent on March SI a “ philosophic ” letter to the Archduke in which he
adjured him to stop the effusion of blood and grant an armistice. To the
Directors he justified his conduct on the ground that the terms he would
secretly sign were far more favourable than those sent by General Clarke, whom
they had attached to him as diplomatic adviser and controller. Receiving no
satisfactory reply from Charles, he pushed on triumphantly as far as Judenburg,
where at midnight of April 7-8 the Archduke agreed to a truce up to April IS.
On that day General Merveldt brought to the French headquarters at Leoben
proposals for the prolongation of the armistice, with a view to the signature
of preliminaries of peace. Three French projects were drawn up to this end; and
it is noteworthy that the first and third of these named, or clearly implied,
the partition of Venetia.
The
preliminaries of peace were signed on April 18 near Leoben by Merveldt and the
Marquis di Gallo for Austria, and by Bonaparte on behalf of France. Clarke was
at this time absent in Italy; and the urgency of the occasion could reasonably
be alleged by the young commander for this crowning irregularity. The Emperor
Francis now
gave up all
claims to his Belgic Provinces and “ recognised the limits of France as decreed
by the laws of the French Republic.” For this loss he was to receive, on the
signature of the definitive treaty, an “ equitable indemnity.” The French
further covenanted to restore the other Habsburg lands occupied by them and to
retire to Italy. Peace was to be declared between France and the Empire,
details being left for settlement in a Congress. The term “equitable
indemnity” was defined in secret articles, which provided that, while the
Emperor renounced all claims on his Italian lands to the west of the river
Oglio (that is, the Milanese) he was to acquire all the mainland territories of
Venice east of that river, inclusive of Dalmatia and the Italian part of
Istria. To Venice were allotted the three Legations of Romagna, Ferrara, and
Bologna, which had recently been incorporated as the Cispadane Republic under
the protection of France. The Duke of Modena, lately dispossessed of his duchy,
was to have a suitable indemnity in Germany. To this last provision only did
Thugut offer any strong opposition. Nothing was said either in the published or
the secret articles respecting the Ionian Isles of Venice or the Rhine
boundary.
The motives
which led to the signature of the preliminaries were complex. On his side
Bonaparte was apprehensive for his communications. Joubert’s march, to
safeguard his rear, had been hindered by a widespread rising of the Tyrolese;
and the Venetians had risen against the French at Verona and elsewhere—events
that will claim our attention presently. He was also fearful that the inaction
of the French on the Rhine would leave Austria free to overwhelm him now that
he had ventured into the heart of her dominions. Had he known the real state of
things—that Hoche was about to cross the Rhine on the very day after the
preliminaries were signed, and that Moreau was circumspectly preparing for the
same step—the Habsburg Power would certainly not have come off so easily. But
he did not hear these long-wished-for tidings until his return to Italy; and
his precarious position at Leoben warranted his naming the signature of those
terms une operation militaire.
The Court of
Vienna, on the other hand, had many reasons for accepting the present
conditions. Austria was at the end of her resources, and the clamour for peace
was becoming serious. The family ties that bound the Emperor Francis to the
Court of Naples (still trembling for fear of France) urged him speedily to make
peace. Furthermore, though the Austrian Chancellor, Baron Thugut, had clung to
the English alliance, he was deeply annoyed by the withdrawal of our fleet from
the Mediterranean in the previous November, and even asserted that this was the
chief cause of the Austrian reverses in Italy. In the same month, moreover, the
Czarina Catharine II had died; and her successor, Paul I, showed no sign of
carrying out her wish of entering the Coalition against France. Thus the
general situation of affairs was unpromising; though the circumstances of the
moment favoured the
Viennese
government in so far that it knew of the actual situation of the Rhenish
armies, which was unknown to Bonaparte. In such a case prudence prescribed the
acceptance of the terms now offered. They were not unfavourable ; Venetia had
long been a coveted prize; Mantua was still to be the bulwark of Habsburg power
beyond the Alps.
In truth,
neither side took these preliminaries seriously. The Austrian Court was as well
aware as Bonaparte himself that he had no authority for signing any such
compact. “If you sincerely wish for peace,” Bonaparte wrote to the Directory on
April 22, “then the preliminaries, which will be susceptible of all the
changes that we desire, will promptly bring about a solid pacification, such
that it alone will gain us the Rhine boundary, or nearly so. In this case,
perhaps, it would be well to declare war against Venice; that would enable the
Emperor to enter into possession of her mainland, and us to unite Bologna,
Ferrara, and Romagna to the Milanese Republic.” In other words, peace was to be
assured by the virtual extinction of the neutral Venetian State. This was
definitely arranged between Bonaparte and Merveldt; it was the corner-stone of
the compact of Leoben.
He had
already prepared the Directors for some such design. On April 5 (that is, before
he heard of the outbreak at Verona, soon to be described) he warned them that
the democratic ferment at Brescia and Bergamo, where the authority of the Doge
had been cast down, might lead to the overthrow of the Venetian government; and
there are grounds for believing that he had a hand in secretly encouraging the
risings at those towns. His conduct towards Venice had throughout been
threateningly ambiguous, in accordance with the tone of his letter of June 7,
1796, to the Directory: “ If your plan is to extract five or six million francs
from Venice, I have expressly prepared for you this sort of rupture with
her....If you have more pronounced intentions, I think you ought to keep up
this subject of quarrel, instruct me as to your wishes, and await the
favourable moment, which I will seize according to circumstances; for we must
not have everybody on our hands at once.” The Directory gave him a free hand in
exploiting the wealth of Venice, and seemingly cared little what was her doom.
The time for action was now at hand and brought with it an excuse for pressing
hard on that hapless State. The Venetians on the mainland had long been
restless under the load of exactions foisted upon them as the sequel to the
one-sided agreement into which Bonaparte and Landrieux had cajoled the
government at the close of May, 1796. Thus, when their spoilers seemed to be
engulfed amid the Austrian Alps, the worst sufferers, the men of Verona, rose
on Easter Monday (April 17) with a wild impulse of revenge and massacred numbers
of Frenchmen, both soldiers and civilians, and even the wounded left behind in
their city. For three days the burghers and armed peasants struggled on against
the French garrison in the castles, whose cannon dealt havoc throughout the
city;
but then came
news of the Peace of Leoben, which put an end to all hopes of Austrian aid.
In the case
of this outbreak, known as the Pdques vironaisesf as
also of the democratic risings at Brescia and Bergamo, there are grounds for
believing that they were due in the first instance to agents in the pay of the
French; though events such as the perfidious entry of their troops into the
Venetian fortress of Crema, and their many outrages on the townsfolk and
peasantry of Venetia, would in themselves have naturally led to a bloody
retaliation. The democrats of Brescia and Bergamo, after declaring their
independence of Venice, elected as their commander- in-chief the French
Adjutant-general, Landrieux, who had had a hand in these events. This same
intriguer, chief of the staff of Kilmaine’s division holding Venetia and
Lombardy, had tortuous dealings with the wire-pullers of the local Jacobin
clubs, especially with a Milanese democrat named Salvadori. This man had the
effrontery to issue a Venetian proclamation, purporting to come from the
provedditore, Battaglia, which invited the people of the mainland to rise
against the French. This impudent forgery, dated March 20, but put forth on
April 5, was speedily disavowed by Battaglia and the Venetian Senate; but it
certainly helped on the collision at Verona. The connexion of Bonaparte with
Landrieux has been denied on the ground that he would not have provoked a
rising during the campaign among the Noric Alps, and also because he
subsequently disgraced him. These arguments, however, count for little in the
case of a man who was always unscrupulous in his use and rejection of tools.
Furthermore, the following phrase, which he used respecting Venice in his
letter of March 24,1797, to the Directory, shows that he already harboured some
extensive design against her. “ The great point in all this is to gain time.”
On April 9, that is after signing the truce at Judenburg with the Archduke
Charles, he took the highly provocative step of sending Junot to Venice charged
with an insolent letter to the Doge, which he was forthwith to read aloud to
the Grand Council of the nobles. In it the commander-in-chief accused that body
of the blackest perfidy in arming peasants and causing them to massacre
“several hundreds” of his soldiers. The event which called forth this tirade
was the following. The discreditable means whereby the French gained possession
of Crema from its Venetian garrison had so exasperated all the neighbouring
districts, that the sturdy mountaineers dwelling on the west of Lake Garda
swooped down on a detachment of Lombards, Poles, and French at Salo, and after
a sharp fight captured some 300 of them. There was nothing to show the
complicity of the timid Venetian oligarchy in this affair; but Kilmaine’s
report of it enabled Bonaparte to ply the Signoria with the missive described
above. His satisfaction with the situation finds expression in his letter of
April 9 to Kilmaine. “ If the Venetian affair is well conducted, as all that
you do is, those fellows will soon repent their perfidy. The govern
ment of
Venice, shut up in its little isle, would not, you may be sure, be of long
duration.” Once again that formerly proud aristocracy quailed before his
threats; but the people of the outlying towns, notably Verona, quivered with anger
at this further insult inflicted by Junot, which was doubtless the final cause
of the fierce outbreak of Easter Monday. That Bonaparte expected something of
the sort may be inferred from his almost complete silence respecting this
affair, a silence that contrasts strangely with the tone of righteous anger
which he was now to assume concerning another collision far less important than
that of Verona.
This last
collision took place in the harbour of Venice. A French gunboat, Le Liberateur
de Vltalie, persisted in entering the Lido, the harbour of Venice, whence
foreign war-ships were now excluded; on refusing to withdraw she was fired on
by the forts, with the result that four men were killed, including the captain
Laugier, and the vessel herself was captured (April 21). In vain did the Senate
seek to appease Bonaparte’s wrath by sending a deputation to him at Gratz to
explain that this unfortunate affair was due to Laugier’s infraction of
Venetian law. In vain did they offer reparation. He would none of it. “ I will
be a second Attila to Venice,” he exclaimed. He refused to receive the envoys
sent by the Senate; and to the Directory he wrote (April 30) that this last
incident was “ the most atrocious affair of the century.”
Nevertheless
he prepared to act with caution. The Queen of the Adriatic could not easily be
seized without a fleet; and on the sea France was nearly helpless. He therefore
prepared to drop the dissolving acid of democracy on the already crumbling
fabric of the Venetian State. Its working was swift and sure. Through the
medium of Villetard, the secretary of the French Embassy in Venice, who had now
taken the place of the ambassador, the Senators were cajoled into the belief
that the adoption of a constitution like that of France was their only means of
safety, and that in that case Austria would find her compensation in Bavaria.
Clutching at this hope, and nervous at the sound of the French cannon now
thundering at Mestre, the Great Council of the nobles sat in state to decide on
the fate of the Republic. The aged Doge Manin and 537 members were present, and
of these only 12 had the courage to vote against the adoption of the
provisional government proposed by the French (May, 1). To complete their
terror, Bonaparte launched at them a manifesto which amounted to a declaration
of war against Venice (May 2), but consented to receive a deputation that
humbly sought his presence at Milan. To these trembling envoys he accorded a
truce; thereupon Villetard, unaware of the final act of treachery which the
general had in view, cast about to secure the dismissal of the Slavonian
troops, and the erection of a democratic municipality which should serve to
invite the French to enter the city.
Once more the
Venetians were ensnared; from among the democratic minority Villetard picked
out suitable municipals; and on May 12, after
the trusty
Slavonian troops had been sent away, the Great Council ordained by 512 voices
to 20 that the public authority should devolve on the newly-elected body. On
the morrow, in pursuance of the wishes of the new democratic government,
Venetian vessels brought the French to the forts of the island city; and on the
16th the new municipals, decked with Italian tricolour scarves of office, were
escorted in triumph by French military bands around the square of St Mark
amidst the applause of scanty groups of democrats, whose childish glee blinded
them to the signs of coming disaster. Their underlings then proceeded to plant
trees of liberty and to bum the insignia of the Doge and the Golden Book of the
Republic, symbols of well-nigh 500 years of civic life—a life in the main
glorious and beneficent, but now to be cut short by the doom which awaits
enervating luxury and cowardly inaction.
In reviewing
the fall of Venice, one cannot avoid the reflexion that the end ought to have
come, and might readily have come, in far other guise. Had her rulers, even one
month earlier, taken the forged manifesto at its word; had they, while
denouncing its treachery, armed the many thousand peasants of the Bergamesque
and Veronese who loved their Republic as much as they longed for revenge on the
French; had they boldly sided with Austria, besought the aid of the Tyrolese
and the Croats, and launched their devoted Slavonian troops on Bonaparte’s
rear, they might have cut him off amidst the Styrian Alps and reduced him to
the sorest straits. Had the attempt failed, the Queen of the Adriatic would
have fallen; but at least she would have won in her dying agony something of
that halo of glory with which a nobler Manin was to crown her half a century
later, when the breath of nationality roused her to a new life and taught her
sons how to die for Italy.
The doom of
her ancient rival was tamer, more protracted, and less noteworthy. During four
years Genoa had dragged on a miserable existence, seeking to remain neutral in
the strife between the powerful nations warring at her gates, and receiving
from both sides provocations and insults. Bonaparte’s Corsican patriotism had
so far waned as to leave behind little of the hatred that he once felt for the
former mistress of his island; and during his Italian campaign his feeling
towards her was one of contempt for her weakness, modified by an opportunist
resolve to drain away her wealth. By a skilful mingling of military threats and
financial demands he succeeded in equipping his army from Genoese sources in
some of the crises in the early part of the campaign. As his position in Italy
improved, his tone hardened; on July 6, 1796, he charged Faypoult, the French
envoy at Genoa, to support the democrats in that city by all possible means,
and to procure the banishment of the chief aristocratic families attached to
the Austrian cause. Feuds thenceforth arose between the two factions in Genoa;
the news of the fall of the Venetian oligarchy fanned these passions into a
flame, and after terrible street fighting the democrats were routed (May 28).
One or two
French
subjects having been slain, Bonaparte was able to carry matters with a high
hand. From the castle of Mombello near Milan, where he was living in almost
royal pomp, he sent a threatening and insulting letter to the Doge and Senate,
which his aide-de-camp, Lavalette, read forth with military hauteur. “We will
fight,” cried some of the Senators; but the majority saw the hopelessness of
resisting the two French divisions now on the march, and soon agreed to send
envoys to treat with the master of Italy. Thus, on June 6, a provisional treaty
was signed at Mombello, which changed the form of the Genoese government. The rule
of the nobles gave place to a democracy of a moderate type, the legislative
power being entrusted to two popularly elected chambers, while the executive
functions were wielded by a Doge and twelve Senators. This compromise between
the forms of the old Genoese constitution and those of the French Directory is
of some significance, as marking a transition in Bonaparte’s beliefs from
Jacobinism towards autocracy. He further intervened to check the extravagances
of the now victorious democrats, and, when disorders arose, sternly repressed
them by armed force; the numbers of the Genoese Directory and Councils were
thereafter lessened, and the Republic took the name Ligurian. But, whatever the
changes in form and title, French control was assured; and Bonaparte wrote
(November 12, 1797) that, as the constitution would probably not suit Genoa,
there would be little difficulty in bringing that people to its knees with a
prayer that they might become French citizens.
On a higher
plane is Bonaparte’s work in the making and organisation of the first
democratic Republic of modem Italy. For some time after his first entry into
Milan (May 15, 1796) he was unable to do more than organise in one or two
Lombard cities consultative committees and National Guards, seeing that the
Directors specifically bade him refrain from committing France to any permanent
responsibility in a Province, which they prized solely for its immediate value
in plunder and for its prospective value as an object of barter in the coming
bargain with Austria. Their instructions with respect to Modena, however, were
entirely vague; thus, when the men of Reggio and Modena rose in revolt,
overthrew the ducal rule, and appealed to Bonaparte for protection, he gladly
accorded it; for this action promised to bring about that permanence of French
rule in Italy which was his dearest wish (October 4, 1796). Nor was this all.
On the subsequent arrival of a despatch from Paris warning him against any such
step, he informed the Directory that he had already recognised the new popular
government at Modena, and had also invited deputies from the Legations of
Bologna and Ferrara, which had just renounced the papal sway, to join those of
Modena. The Congress was duly held; and the new State took the title of the Cispadane
Republic (October 16, 1796). In December the Lombard democrats also held a
Congress, and, with the General's permission, sent a deputation to that of
Reggio. The formation of the Lombard
Republic was
proceeding at the time of the last battles with Austria; and the Milanese
patriots asked for some guarantee of their independence.
Bonaparte’s
conduct in this matter affords a singular proof of his duplicity. In an undated
reply (probably of April 12, 1797, from Gratz) he assured them that every
French victory was a line of their constitutional charter; but, writing four
days later from Leoben, he informed the Directors that, as Austria refused any
compensation in Germany, he had offered her “the evacuation of the Milanese and
of Lombardy” by the French. This she also refused; thereupon the preliminaries
were drawn up, reserving the independence of Lombardy, but secretly awarding
the greater part of the Cispadane Republic to Venice. This double-dealing, and
the contemptuous phrase in his letter of October 26, 1797, referring to
babblers and fools who longed for the universal republic, show that his
erection of these Republics was due less to love of liberty and enthusiasm for
Italy than to his perception of their value as pawns in the great game which he
was about to carry to a second stage. Or, as he frankly said to Melzi at
Mombello: “As for your country, Monsieur de Melzi, it possesses still fewer
elements of republicanism than France and can be managed more easily than any
other
we must give
way to the fever of the moment. We are going to have one or two Republics here
of our own sort. Monge will arrange that for us.”
Even so,
however, his designs for Northern Italy stood on a far higher plane than the
mean and narrow aims which the Directory had at first enjoined; and to his stem
but statesmanlike repression of both the extreme parties, clericals and
Jacobins, the young Republics owed whatever consistency they possessed. Four
Committees, chosen by him, were at work through the spring and early summer under
his direction to draw up the constitution of the Lombard State, which now
received the name “Cisalpine Republic.” Its inauguration on July 9 was the
occasion of a great and joyous civic festival at Milan. The new constitution
was largely modelled on that of the French Directory; and, in order to guard
against the choice of too reactionary or Jacobinical deputies, the French
Republic, through the medium of its general, named the first Directors,
representatives, and officials, of the new commonwealth. Despite the former
hesitations of Bonaparte, the Cispadanes begged so hard for a union with the
Cisalpine Republic, that he yielded to their wishes in this respect (July 15).
The Cisalpines also acquired in August the Venetian lands west of the Oglio,
and, after the signature of peace with Austria, those between the Oglio and the
Adige. The outbreak of disturbances between governors and governed in the Swiss
territory of the Valtelline further enabled Bonaparte to intervene in that
quarter; and, in defiance of the protests of both classes, he annexed that
district to the Cisalpine Republic (November). Thus, the close of the year saw
all the lands between Lake Maggiore, the river Adige, and the town of Rimini on
the Adriatic, grouped together
in a compact
and wealthy State comprising some three and a half million inhabitants.
Progress in truly constitutional government was hardly to be looked for in a
polity which owed its mechanism and its very existence to a methodising
autocrat; yet, in spite of Napoleon’s rigorous control, Italians there began to
free themselves from the inertia of ages and to learn the first hard lessons of
self-rule.
The extension
of the Cisalpine Republic to the banks of the Adige was a result, partly of the
skill and forcefulness displayed by Bonaparte in the final negotiations with
Austria, and partly of his unscrupulous sale of the city of Venice. It would
far exceed the limits of this chapter were we to attempt any survey of the
general negotiations with Austria, or to describe the means employed by
Bonaparte before and after the coup diktat of Fructidor to bend the Directors
to his will. Suffice it to say that the support which he gave to the tottering
Directory enabled it to crush the constitutional and royalist opposition in
France, and empowered him in the last resort to dictate terms to the body which
he had so largely helped to preserve. He accordingly disregarded the explicit
and repeated orders of these soi-disamt rulers that neither Venice nor any part
of Venetia must be ceded to the Emperor, even if war were to break out again.
In truth, he was resolved on the complete extinction of Venetian rule. So fax
back as May 27, at the veiy first conference with the Austrian
plenipotentiaries with respect to the definitive treaty of peace, he had
arranged that the city of Venice should pass to the Emperor; and he justified
this extraord nary step by stating to the Directors that this decadent city,
with its silly and cowardly populace, was in no way fitted for liberty. France
would therefore plunder her arsenal, carry off all the ships and cannon, and
keep for herself Corfu.
It is worthy
of remark that on the previous day he had written to the new municipality of
Venice, expressing his wish to do all in his power to “ consolidate your liberty,”
and his longing to see Italy “ free and independent of strangers.” The motive
of this passing sycophancy is to be found in his need of the help of the
municipality for the equipping of a Venetian fleet that was to secure the
Ionian Isles—for France. The seizure once effected, his tone hardened; and
throughout all the negotiations we may note his fixed resolve to partition the
remains of the Venetian State, so that France might gain those important
islands. The thoughts which prompted his present course of action are set forth
in his letter of September 13 to Talleyrand, now the Minister for Foreign
Affairs—a letter which suggestively shows the connexion between his bargaining
with Austria and the second great enterprise of his career. “I think that henceforth
the chief maxim of the [French] Republic should be never to give up Corfu,
Zante, etc. On the contrary we ought to establish ourselves firmly there; we
shall find there immense resources for commerce, and they will be of great
interest for us in the future movements of Europe. Why should we not take
possession of
the island of Malta ?.. .If it came about that at our peace with England we
were obliged to cede the Cape of Good Hope, we ought to take possession of
Egypt. The Venetians alone have for several centuries had a certain
preponderance there, but very precarious. One could set out from here with
25,000 men, escorted by eight or ten Venetian ships of the line or frigates,
and seize it. Egypt does not really belong to the Grand Signior.” In this letter,
as in the unscrupulous care with which he had compassed the seizure of the
Ionian Isles by means of Venetian vessels, we mark what might be termed the
passing away from his thoughts of the Italian motif and the first suggestions
of the incoming of another dominating motif, that of the Orient. The transition
in the world of fact was to be effected by the wiping out of Venice as an
independent State.
The secret
articles signed at Leoben left a dim hope that Venice might retain these
islands and even win the Legations. But these arrangements were antiquated now
that the French held the capital, the fleet, and the Ionian Isles themselves.
Venetian independence stood in the way of Bonaparte’s new design, that of
securing the complete supremacy of France in the Mediterranean as a prelude to
a vast expansion in the Levant. He meant to be heir to the city that once did “
hold the golden East in fee.” This is the key that unlocks the intricacies of
his policy during the months of diplomatic fencing with the Austrian
plenipotentiary, Cobenzl, at Udine and Passariano. He was bent on securing
peace with Austria and gaining the Ionian Isles; but this last implied the
extinction of Venice. He therefore made no opposition to the handing over of
that city to Austria, assuring the Directors that only so would the Emperor
consent to the extension of France to the Rhine. He judged that this bait,
together with the gain of the Adige boundary and the Legations for the
Cisalpine State, would serve to satisfy the French people and overbear the
opposition of its government. As for the Habsburgs, they offered a stout
resistance to the acquisition of the Ionian Isles by France and to that of the
Adige boundary by the Cisalpine Republic. They held out in the hope that the
internal difficulties of France would clog her diplomacy; but the coup d'etat
of 18 Fructidor, carried out at Paris by Bonaparte’s lieutenant, Augereau,
drove from office and into exile Carnot and Barthelemy, who had pleaded for
moderation both in internal affairs and in the terms of peace, and installed in
power Jacobins of an uncompromising type. “ In fact (wrote Augereau on 18
Fructidor) my mission is fulfilled and
the
promises of the Army of Italy have been made good this night___ This
event is a
great step towards peace ; it is for you to cover the space that still keeps us
from it.” Feeling surer of his ground, Bonaparte now pressed Cobenzl hard, and
after a last violent scene gained the Ionian Isles for France.
Peace was
accordingly signed at the village of Campo Formio, near
Udine, on
October 17. Its terms, public and secret, were as follows. In Italy Austria was
to gain Venice and the whole of Venetia as far as the lines of the Adige and
the lower Po, together with Dalmatia and Venetian Istria, while France acquired
the Ionian Isles. The Emperof renounced all claims to his Netherland Provinces;
he further agreed to cede the Breisgau to the dispossessed Duke of Modena, and
to summon a Congress at Rastatt for the settlement of German affairs; he also
recognised the independence of the Cisalpine Republic with the frontiers
described above—save that the Valtelline was annexed a month later. The secret
articles stipulated that the Emperor would use his influence at the Congress to
procure the extension of the eastern boundary of France to the Rhine, the
French government on its side helping him to acquire the archbishopric of
Salzburg and a frontier strip of Bavaria. The imperial fiefs enclaved in
Genoese territory were allotted to the newly styled Ligurian Republic; and
other rights of the Empire in Italy similarly lapsed in favour of the Cisalpine
State. No artillery was to be removed by the Austrians from Mainz, or by the
French from Venice or the other Venetian fortresses held by them. This
epoch-marking treaty was signed for France by Bonaparte alone, Clarke having
recently been recalled in disgrace owing to his connexions with Carnot.
The news that
their own city was to be handed over to Austria, and that too by the army which
had at first boasted of its liberating mission, aroused the men and women of
Venice to sobs of anger and wails of despair. In hot haste the former rulers
sent off a deputation to proceed secretly to Paris and bribe the
Directors—Barras had already been worked on by their ambassador, Querini—so as
to annul this treacherous compact. Even this last effort failed. The secret
leaked out to the ever watchful Bonaparte, who forthwith sent his aide-de-camp,
Duroc, to defeat this forlorn hope of Venetian liberty. The envoys were brought
to him at Milan, bore his bitter taunts in silence, and then made an appeal
which moved the Frenchmen to tears. Even the hard Corsican was so far touched
as to let them go in peace; but he straightway proceeded with the details of
the evacuation of the hapless city in favour of the Austrians. Among the
instructions which he sent to Villetard, his hitherto unconscious tool in a
crime of which he now beheld the consummation, the following order held a
foremost place: “ We must leave nothing that can be useful to the Emperor and
favour the establishment of a navy. Everything useful to the navy must go to
France.” In defiance, therefore, of Bonaparte’s secret compact with the
Emperor, cannon, powder, and stores were taken from the Venetian arsenals; and
the useless ships, among them the venerable Bucentaur, were burnt. As if this
were not enough, the masterpieces of Titian and Tintoretto were seized for the
glory of France or the profit of plunderers; and the massive bronze horses,
successively the spoils of Romans and Venetians, which tradition assigns to the
Greek Lysippus,
were hoisted
down from the portals of St Mark and dragged away, thereafter to grace, until
the year of Waterloo, the summit of the arch in the Place du Carrousel at
Paris. The Austrians entered the city early in 1798 ; and, when the Doge Manin
brought the eleven hundred years of Venetian independence to an ignominious
close by taking the oath of allegiance to the hated Tedeschi, he fell to the
ground senseless with shame and grief.
The last
scenes in the revolutionising of Italy by the French were connected with their
occupation of Rome and Naples, events which led to the establishment of
Republics in those cities; but these further developments will be more fitly
treated in connexion with the War of the Second Coalition. The French conquest
of Italy was virtually complete when Austria agreed to the terms of the Treaty
of Campo Formio; and Bonaparte showed his perception of the fact by leaving
Italy in the middle of November in order to catch a glimpse of German affairs
at Rastatt, to procure the ratification of the treaty, and thereafter to
receive at Paris the homage of an enraptured people.
That homage
was well deserved. In many points of view the Italian campaign of 1796-7 must
always stand out as a noteworthy landmark. In the annals of warfare it showed
an immense advance on the previous strategy of the Revolutionary age, namely,
in the swifter and more decisive use of masses of men either in dominant
central positions, or against the weak point of an extended line, or against
the enemy’s communications. In the sphere of French politics it assured the
ascendancy of military instincts over the democratic theories of the
Revolution. Historians of European development will always point to Bonaparte’s
early masterpiece as the first important triumph of French revolutionary
agencies, if not of purely revolutionary principles, among a great cognate
people, and as affording the means of their further extension at a time when it
seemed that the fight with Europe must cease, owing to the exhaustion of the
resources of France. No less memorable was its influence on Italy. Her patriots
agree that, however unworthy were the means employed, the war, with its ensuing
civic and political changes—and we may even include among them the despair that
settled for eight years on Venice—brought about the decay of the old order of
things and the growth of a feeling of nationality which no reaction could stamp
out. But, above and beyond these material and local considerations, students
who mark the rise and fall of the moral principles that sway the destinies of
mankind must brand the closing scene of the war as a crowning act of treachery
to the generous though perhaps visionary aims that largely prompted its
inception in 1792, and as the starting-point of a series of campaigns prompted
by personal ambition and a desire for national aggrandisement.
THE EGYPTIAN
EXPEDITION.
Nothing is more remarkable in the course of the French
Revolution —a story fertile in paradoxes—than the sudden collapse of the
attempts of the advanced democrats to make individual preeminence thenceforth
difficult or impossible. The seeming success of their Procrustean methods
during the first seven years of the catastrophic period led all the more surely
to a reaction in which one great personality was to overtop the mediocrities
installed in office at Paris and sweep away the barriers that fear or jealousy
set up. This reaction made great strides during the Italian Campaign; the
Egyptian Expedition brought it to the goal. Bonaparte had all along valued his
Italian command for the independence which it necessarily implied. As far back
as January 19, 1796, he pointed out in writing to the Directors the need of
according complete trust to their commander in the peninsula; and the fact that
an answer to a despatch sent from Venetia rarely reached him within three weeks
was of no small importance in assuring his freedom of action during the final
negotiations, which in their turn paved the way for the events now to be
described.
After
receiving at Rastatt the ratification of the Treaty of Campo Formio by the
envoys of the Emperor, Bonaparte returned to the capital to receive the
compliments of the Directors, of whose jealousy he was fully aware, and the cheers
of a populace, which his patrician instincts scorned. The action of the
Directory had already shown their nervous desire to remove him from Paris. On
receipt of the news of the conclusion of peace with Austria they appointed him
to command the Army of England; and in February, 1798, he made a short tour
along the northern coasts, to judge whether an invasion by a flotilla of small
vessels seemed practicable. On' February 23 he reported in a sense hostile to
the enterprise, that the crossing must take seven or eight hours and would be
impossible except during the long nights of winter; in any case, it would be a
most daring and difficult operation so long as England controlled the sea.
Unless an additional sum of 300,000 francs a decade were forthcoming for the
long and costly preparations, he
advised that
they should be kept up only in appearance, while France bent her energies
either to the task of securing the control of the mouths of the Rhine and Elbe
(the first suggestion of the scheme later on known as the Continental System)
or to that of an expedition to the Levant so as to menace British commerce with
the East Indies. This inspection of the northern seaboard was probably a blind
to hide from the world his real intent, which for some months had aimed at the
last-named alternative.
The Orient
always exercised a strange fascination over him, a fact which some have
explained by a possible strain of eastern blood in his Corsican ancestry.
Certain it is that so far back as August, 1795, he seriously thought of going
to Turkey to reorganise the artillery of the Sultan. When the course of the
Italian Campaign brought him to Ancona, in February, 1797, he noted the
importance of that harbour: “In twenty- four hours one crosses from here to
Macedonia.” There, also, he seized Russian despatches on their way to the
Knights of Malta, relating to the plans of the Czar Paul for gaining control of
the island. The incident opened his eyes to the importance of securing Malta.
He strongly urged this on the Directory in his letter of May 26; and during the
final negotiations with Austria, which largely turned on the acquisition of the
Ionian Isles by France, he wrote (September 13) that Malta ought to be seized;
for with that post and Corfu the French would be masters of the Mediterranean
and could then conquer Egypt. He seriously discussed this last enterprise with
the savant Monge, whom he summoned to headquarters; and, as Monge had served as
Minister of the Navy in 1793, he was able to give information about the plans
for --eking Egypt.
The valley of
the Nile had long attracted the attention of French statesmen. The first
suggestion that France should seize that land emanated, strange to say, from
Leibniz in the form of a memoire, of which he personally brought the substance
before Louis XIV in 1672. It is doubtful, however, whether Bonaparte knew of
this memoire until the year 1803. The first definite plan for the conquest of
Egypt was formed by the Due de Choiseul in the reign of Louis XV; but nothing
came of it. The scheme was revived in a Mimoire sur la Turquie drawn up in 1781
by Saint-Priest, French Ambassador at Constantinople. The consular and
commercial agents of France in the Levant never lost sight of the scheme; one,
named Magallon, had long been working in Egypt with this end in view, and sent
in a report to this effect in February, 1798. The plan found favour with many
of the more ambitious of the Jacobins, who confidently counted on ruining
England by attacking her eastern possessions and commerce from that point of
vantage. Bonaparte could therefore reckon on solid support for his proposal. He
also sent for Poussielgue, secretary of the French Legation at Genoa, who had
relatives settled at Malta, and despatched him on a mission
to Valetta
and Levantine ports, ostensibly to open up trade, “but in reality to put the
last touch to the design that we have on this island ” (letter of November 12,
1797). The envoy succeeded in undermining the discipline of the Knights and the
rule of the Order, with results which will presently appear. According to the
Director Barras, he and his colleagues were informed by Bonaparte at the time
of the conclusion of the Treaty of Campo Formio that he (Bonaparte) could “ buy
” Malta for 600,000 francs; the Directory approved of the bargain—such is the
testimony of Barras. Even if we reject this as an invention, there seems little
doubt that the Directory about that time resolved to seize the island.
The Egyptian
Expedition was not definitely determined on until the beginning of March, 1798.
The consent of the Directors to this ambitious design has often been attributed
solely to fear of the general and a desire to remove him and other active and
intriguing officers far away from Paris. Doubtless this motive largely
influenced their calculations, as it certainly was a governing motive in his
own decision; but they also cherished the kindred hopes of founding a colonial
empire, and of dealing British commerce a far more serious blow than that dealt
by the recent confiscation of all British merchandise found in France and her
vassal lands. On the theme of a French colonial empire Talleyrand had
eloquently discoursed to the Institute of France on July 3, 1797, shortly
before his appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the middle of the
month of February following he presented to the Directory a memoire which set
forth in detail the advantages of an Egyptian Expedition. As Bonaparte had
close relations with the Minister all through the winter of 1797-8, it seems
difficult to accept the conjecture of de La Jonquiere that the m&noire
(which he has recently published) was drawn up independently of the general.
However this may be, there is no doubt that this document, together with
Bonaparte’s report of February 23, as to the impossibility of invading England,
powerfully contributed to the official decision. It was clinched by the news of
the successful occupation of Bern by the French troops— an event which promised
the easy revolutionising of Switzerland and the ready extraction of funds from
the cantonal treasuries.
Without
recourse to outside help no great expedition could have been prepared. The
financial position of France had for some months been that of practical
bankruptcy. In his letter of September 3, 1797, Bonaparte declared that he had
sent in all 50,000,000 francs from Italy to the government at Paris, including
a million francs for naval preparations at Toulon, which, he complained, had
been diverted to Paris. At the close of that month the Directory liquidated the
State debts, two- thirds being written, off in a form which speedily proved to
be worthless. After the peace with Austria, French armies could no longer levy
exactions on Germany, and the financial situation went from bad to worse. The
conduct of the French in Switzerland, if not their initial act of intervention,
has therefore
been generally attributed to this pressing financial need, and it is
significant that Bonaparte ceaselessly pressed on the Directory the need of
revolutionising that land. As will be shown in a later chapter, the opportunity
came in the first days of 1798. A large force was sent to revolutionise the
Swiss Confederation, and entered Bern (March 5). A central indivisible Republic
was set up ; Geneva and Miihlhausen were annexed to France; and a great amount
of treasure was taken from the people themselves and from the cantonal
exchequers; 130 cannon and 60,000 muskets also fell into French hands. Part of
these resources went straightway to Toulon, as the letters of Napoleon prove.
The French
occupation of Rome will also be described in a later chapter; but we may note
here that no small part of the wealth wrung from the papal treasury, the
private property of the Pope, and from the citizens, went to further the
equipment of Bonaparte’s armada. Even so, the lack of money grievously hampered
the preparations. Though the naval resources of Venice, Genoa, the new Roman
Republic, and Corsica were requisitioned, sound ships were not forthcoming in
the number required; and many of the transports proved to be unseaworthy, while
all were overcrowded. However, considering the wretched condition of the
French navy and the financial embarrassments of the State, the speed of the
preparations is very noteworthy as showing the eager activity of Bonaparte.
The aims of
the expedition were thus defined in secret decrees drawn up by him, and signed
by the Directory on April 12: “ The army of the East shall take possession of
Egypt; the Commander-in-chief shall chase the English from all their
possessions in the East which he can reach, and in particular he shall destroy
all their comptoirs in the Red Sea. He shall have the Isthmus of Suez cut
through; and he shall take all the steps necessary to assure the free and
exclusive possession of the Red Sea to the French Republic. He shall ameliorate
by all the means in his power the lot of the natives of Egypt. He shall
maintain, as far as it depends on him, a good understanding with the Grand
Signor and his immediate subjects.” He was further charged to take possession
of the island of Malta; and the French frigates at tie de France and Reunion
were to sail for Suez, there to be placed under his orders.
Bonaparte had
recently been elected a member of that famous learned body, “ the Institute of
France,” and quietly made arrangements to take with him a number of learned men
with a view to the investigation of the antiquities, arts, and natural
resources of Egypt. Considering the extent and variety of these preparations,
which included the engagement of Arab interpreters, it reflects discredit on
the British government that the destination of this great armada was so long
kept secret.
The Toulon
fleet set sail on May 19; and, when the contingents from Marseilles, Genoa,
Civita Vecchia, and Corsica effected their junction, the armada comprised
thirteen ships-of-the-line, fourteen frigates (some
of them
unarmed), a large number of smaller vessels of war, and about 300 transports.
Upwards of 35,000 troops were on board, along with 1230 horses. If we include
the crews, the commission of savants sent to explore the wonders of Egypt, and
the attendants, the total number of persons aboard was about 50,000; it has
even been placed so high as
54,000. Half of the crews of the transports were
aliens; and- many of the French sailors and troops were discontented owing to
arrears of pay. It is not surprising, then, that Admiral Brueys, the naval
commander acting under Bonaparte, had grave fears as to the efficiency of his
unwieldy fleet, and trembled when he heard that Nelson was on his track.
The disregard
of Britain’s naval power shown both by Bonaparte and by the Directory in their
oriental schemes strikes us now as fatuous in the extreme. It should be
remembered, however, that the alliance concluded between France and Spain in
1796 had led to the removal of the British fleet from the Mediterranean.
Further, the French government believed that the expeditionary forces
assembled at Brest and other French ports, for the support of the forthcoming
Irish rebellion, must detain all the British naval forces on blockade service
or in the home waters, while Bonaparte’s capture of Malta and Egypt would
deprive England of the best naval bases in the central and eastern
Mediterranean. The reasoning seemed to be sound, but it was invalidated by the
premature explosion of Irish disaffection and by the resolve of the Pitt
Ministry (formed on or before April 20, 1798) to send a powerful fleet into the
Mediterranean, not primarily for the purpose of thwarting Bonaparte, but (as
will be shown below) in order to protect Naples. In brief, the British
government was about to act on the Napoleonic plan of defending itself by means
of attacking the enemy in an unexpected quarter, namely, Italy. And this bold
conduct proved to be the means of safety.
The almost
miraculous escape of the French fleet, and the other naval events of the
expedition, are detailed below; and we need therefore merely state that part of
the armed force was landed at Valetta, and, thanks to the previous use of
French gold among the Knights and the present offer of a German principality
and 300,000 francs’ annuity to the Grand Master, easily brought that
impregnable fortress to surrender, the assailants losing only three men killed
and five or six wounded. Bonaparte spent a week in Malta, in order to organise
the administration of the new colony on a modem basis and to replenish his
coffers by requisitions and plunder. Setting sail for the east on June 19, he,
a few days later, lifted the veil of secrecy as to his destination by proclaiming
that he was about to deal England a terrible blow by seizing Egypt. He bade his
men respect the manners and beliefs of the Egyptians and show the same
toleration that they had manifested towards “the religion of Moses and of Jesus
Christ.”
By signal good
fortune the armada just missed Nelson off Crete; but, when nearing the coast of
Egypt, the frigate Junon, which was sent on ahead to Alexandria for news,
brought back the startling intelligence that the English fleet had left only
the previous evening. The tidings were at once conveyed to Bonaparte in the
flag-ship V Orient; and the antiquary, Denon, who watched him at this critical
moment, declared that his countenance showed not the slightest change. The
position was full of danger: the transports were straggling over many miles of
sea, exposed to a northerly gale against a lee shore. Nevertheless, Bonaparte
ordered preparations for an immediate disembarkation in the road of Marabout.
It was begun with very great difficulty and some loss of life. On the evening
of July 1 no guns could be landed; and only about 5000 men of the divisions
commanded by Menou, Kleber, and Bon were available for the projected attack on
Alexandria.
Nevertheless,
encouraged by the dauntless bearing of their commander, who had braved the
dangers of the night-landing with his usual stem fortitude, the troops shook
off all sense of sickness, weariness, and depression, when shortly before dawn
the order came to march into the desert. The pangs of thirst soon succeeded,
only to furnish another stimulus—the hope of finding water in the city.
Alexandria was weakly held; but soldiers and townsfolk for a time poured a hot
fire on' the three columns of attack, until the well-ordered rushes of veteran
infantry carried the weak places of the ancient ramparts. Inside the city the
defence was obstinately kept up; and around or inside the chief mosques victory
was assured only by the extermination of the Muslim. By four o’clock the
fighting was over, and the last of the forts surrendered. Kleber and Menou
sustained serious wounds as they bravely led on their columns; and the
assailants in all lost about 40 killed and 100 wounded. At this slight cost did
the French make good their position on land.
Reinforcements
now poured in from Marabout and enabled Bonaparte to overawe by a show of force
the populace which at the same time he sought to win over by clemency. In a
skilfully worded proclamation he assured the peoples of Egypt that he had come
to chastise only the governing caste of Mamelukes for their depredations on
French merchants; that, far from wishing to destroy the religion of the Muslim,
he had more respect for God, Mohammad, and the Koran than the Mamelukes had
shown; that the French had destroyed the Pope and the Knights of Malta who levied
war on the Muslim; thrice blessed, therefore, would be those who sided with the
French, blessed even those who remained neutral, and thrice unhappy those who
fought against them; the sheikhs, cadis, and imams might continue their duties,
confiscating only the goods of the Mamelukes and thereby bringing glory to the
Sultan. This proclamation, dated both in the Revolutionary and in the Muslim
style,
furnishes an
instance of the wondrous adaptability of Bonaparte’s genius. Many of its
phrases were modelled on the Koran, which he carefully studied on the voyage;
and the document throughout appealed very skilfully to the hatred felt by
Arabs, Turks, Copts, and Bedouins alike, for the governing military caste of
the Mamelukes.
These
arrogant warriors, their ranks recruited by Circassian youths, formed a choice
body of horsemen which held the Turkish Pasha representing the Sultan, the
Turks and Arabs of the towns, the miserable and degraded Copts, and the desert
tribes, in virtually complete subjection. They were organised in bands of 500
or 600 warriors headed by Beys, the chief of whom, Murad and Ibrahim, were in
constant rivalry. This quasi-feudal order, which dated from the time of
Saladin, had of late been unusually oppressive and extortionate; while their
oppression of the handful of French merchants at the ports furnished Napoleon
with the sole excuse for his enterprise, which in point of law ranked as mere
piracy. True, the power of the Sultan in Egypt was now but a mere shadow; but
time after time, in many a Province of the Turkish Empire, his power had sprung
to new life even after seeming death; and Bonaparte’s defence of his
expedition, on the ground that it would bring glory to the Sultan, never
imposed on the Turkish Pasha at Cairo, the Sultan’s Minister at Paris, or the
Sublime Porte itself. Scarcely more successful was Bonaparte’s appeal to the
Muslim, which sought to apply to the unbending dogmatism of the East that
skilful policy of balance in religious matters whereby he had secretly gained
credit with the Papacy and the orthodox in Italy and France. There, after the
persecuting vagaries of the Jacobins, a trimmer was appreciated; in the East he
was an unknown creature, and, when known, was despised. Denon relates that at
the first interview of the Sheikh Koraim with Bonaparte, after the capture of
Alexandria, he could discern in the Muslim’s face a dissimulation shaken but
not subdued by the generous conduct and politic appeals of the conqueror ; and
that phrase sums up once for all the mental attitude of the various strata of
the Egyptian populace towards their self-styled liberators.
The
commander-in-chief well knew that victory alone could give weight to these
arguments. He therefore acted with his usual swift decision. Leaving behind the
wounded with Kleber, who for a time acted as governor of Alexandria, he ordered
Desaix’ divisions to set out on the night of July 3, for the desert march to
Damanhur. Even during the chilly night the troops plodded painfully through the
shifting sand which covered most of the track. The Alexandrian canal was then
dry, and the cisterns on the way had been filled with stones by the Arabs.
Thus, when the sun smote on the already weary columns, the pangs of thirst
became unbearable; and the succeeding columns, those ofReynier’s division,
finding the muddy bottoms of the cisterns drained almost dry, nearly perished
from exhaustion. Panics and fusillades by
night
attested the state of nervous irritation of the troops; and, if the Mamelukes
had attacked in force at this time, the result might have been fatal. They were
content, however, with desultory skirmishing by day and cutting off the
stragglers, a course of action which kept the fainting columns on the move and
in something like order. It seems that the Mameluke chiefs, Murad and Ibrahim,
hearing that the French were nearly all on foot, expected an easy triumph over
them and sought to entice as many of them as possible into the heart of the
country. Bonaparte fed this confidence by ordering the infantry to screen the
cavalry so that the Mamelukes might be tempted to charge home. Nor was the
French artillery to be used until the great battle came. The art of war, he
wrote, consists in “keeping all my extraordinary means hidden, making no use of
them, and thus surprising them [the enemy] the more when we have to fight a
great force.” These dispositions were completely successful.
On the 7th
Desaix’ and Reynier’s men reached Damanhur, where abundance of water was found.
Three days later they struck the Nile itself at Rahmaniyeh, and the soldiers
rushed into its waters to quench their unbearable thirst. Thenceforth their lot
was easier; but the complaints both of officers and men did not cease; they
even reached the ears of Bonaparte himself, who sternly rebuked the malcontents
by his words and still more by sharing fully in the necessary hardships of the
march. Meanwhile he charged Dugua, who temporarily took Kleber’s place, to
occupy Rosetta and thence make his way up the course of the Nile to rejoin the
other divisions. This was successfully carried out, while the divisions of Bon
and Vial (the latter for a time taking the place of Menou) made the shorter
march across the desert to strengthen the vanguard. During the days of rest and
concentration at Rahmaniyeh (July 10-12) the Commander-in-chief ordered the
formation of a flotilla of boats so as to secure supplies and attack Mameluke
positions on the banks of the river. On the 12th Bonaparte heard of the advance
of Murad’s horsemen to Chebre'iss, or Chobrakit—the name is diversely spelt.
The five divisions above named, moving forward in as many squares, soon drew
the wished-for attack. The Mameluke horsemen, some 3000 strong, dashed forward,
then circled round the squares in the hope of finding a weak spot; but on
receiving a steady fire they soon wheeled off, baffled by superiority of
numbers and discipline. Their contemptible infantry, largely armed with flails
and sticks, was soon dislodged from the village. The French flotilla rendered
good service in both operations (July 13).
Dismayed by
this unlooked-for mishap, the Mamelukes now awaited the French near Cairo,
contenting themselves with ordering the populace to come forth and throw up
entrenchments at Embabeh on the opposite bank. Whether from jealousy of Murad,
or from a belief that the French would divide and advance on both sides,
Ibrahim kept his
horsemen on
the right bank; and great seemed to be his surprise on hearing that Bonaparte’s
army was wholly on the other side away from Cairo. Very few of Ibrahim’s men crossed
the river for the fight, and nearly 2000 choice warriors gazed helplessly
across the river while the fate of the campaign rested with the cavaliers of
Murad. On nearing the Mameluke forces shortly after noon of July 21, the French
formed in five great hollow squares, having the cavalry inside and the cannon
chiefly posted at the comers. The strongest division, that of Desaix, was on
the right; next came those of Reynier and Dugua; while the divisions of Vial
and Bon marched near to the river to storm the entrenchments of Embabeh. Desaix
and Reynier bore the brunt of the attack; for the hastily formed entrenchments
of Embabeh were held almost entirely by poorly armed fellaheen, who, like the
vast crowd on the other bank of the Nile, believed that victory would come for
their much shouting.
The squares
of Desaix and Reynier had passed through the village of Bechtil and many of the
men were spreading through its houses for plunder, when a cloud of Murad’s
horsemen drove onward against them. Charging in no set array, but with a fury
that seemed to scorn death, they dashed on the front of the two squares. “ I
have never in all my military career,” wrote General Belliard, “ seen a charge
pushed with so much vigour, and that cost the enemy so many men. The front of
our divisions was covered with dead; there were some even who expired in our
ranks.” Many charged through the space between the two squares and into the
village in the rear, where they fought with the stragglers, but were driven off
by a detachment sent thither; others caracoled to and fro around the squares,
losing heavily from the well-sustained fire. In half-an-hour all serious
fighting was over on the French right wing. The central square, that of Dugua,
in which Bonaparte took his stand, sustained no onset. On the left, the
divisions of Bon and Vial easily forced the entrenchments of Embabeh; and
Marmont, pushing on above that place, cut off the flight of mounted fugitives
up the bank. Thereupon great numbers of fellaheen and some mounted Mamelukes
threw themselves into the Nile; but very few reached the other side. Bertrand,
who was in Bon’s division, estimated the numbers drowned at 1000, the slain at
600. All the artillery and stores of the camp were taken, with 400 horses and
as many camels. The losses of the Mamelukes who charged the right wing were
also heavy, but the estimates vary very greatly. Murad, after showing signal
daring, which cost him a sabre-cut on the cheek, now drew off his shattered
bands towards the Pyramids and made for Upper Egypt: while his older, less
enterprising, and more politic rival turned rein towards Cairo, whence he rode
off in the night with his 2000 horsemen in the direction of Palestine; the
Turkish Pasha accompanied him in his flight.
Such was the
battle, afterwards known as the Battle of the Pyramids
(July 21).
The casualties of the French were surprisingly small, namely, about 30 killed
and 300 wounded. In fact, apart from the losses sustained by the cutting off of
stragglers during the march, the number of killed since the landing at Marabout
did not as yet exceed 100—a fact which sufficiently vouches for the steadiness
of the French infantry and the skill of their leader in adapting himself to a
novel kind of warfare.
On the night
after the battle of the Pyramids Cairo was a scene of wild confusion. The
departure of Ibrahim and his squadrons, the burning of the Mameluke flotilla
at Embabeh, and the explosion of powder magazines threw the populace into an
indescribable panic; rich merchants with their harems, Turks and Copts, traders
and beggars, rushed into the desert, where many of them fell a prey to robbery
and outrage at the hands of the Arabs. The city itself was given over to
rapine. Bands of marauders forced open and burnt the palaces of Ibrahim and Murad,
and began a general pillage; they even sought to overpower the Europeans in
their quarter; these, however, offered a stout resistance which kept the rabble
at bay until the dawn of day brought relief. Bonaparte had expected that
Ibrahim would hold out in Cairo; but the subordinate official, whom the Turkish
Pasha left behind without instructions at the time of his own hurried flight,
now turned a ready ear to the solicitations of the European merchants that he
should gain favour with the conqueror by a ready surrender. Commissioning them
to be his emissaries, he despatched them to the French headquarters, now at
Ghizeh. Bonaparte received them gladly, and at once sent Dupuy with half a
brigade to receive the surrender of Cairo, while Bon’s division was to hold the
powerful citadel outside the city. These operations were easily effected on the
evening of July 22 and in the course of the 23rd. Seeking even now to keep on
good terms with Turkey, Bonaparte wrote to the absent Pasha assuring to him his
position and his revenues, and promising that the Porte should receive its
tribute as before. Whether this promise was meant to be permanent may be
doubted; but in any case it was well suited to serve Bonaparte’s immediate
ends.
After
entering Cairo on July 25 he appointed nine sheikhs to form a Divan supervising
municipal affairs always under his own control. He further sought, and with
some success, to tempt back the most influential of the fugitives and to revive
trade and industry, by assuring protection for property and respect for the
rites of the Muslim. On the 27th he established Divans for the provinces of
Alexandria, Rosetta, Ghizeh, and Kelyoub, acting respectively under the control
of Kleber, Menou, Bel- liard, and Murat; Intendants were charged with the
collection of taxes formerly raised by the Mamelukes and thenceforth belonging
to the French Republic. While seeking to promote order by civilised means,
Bonaparte always recognised the need for severity, especially towards the
rabble of Cairo. “Every day” (he wrote to Menou on July 31) “ I have five or
six heads cut off in the streets of Cairo.” Nor did he relax
his efforts
against the Mamelukes. Desaix was already marching southwards to pursue Murad
Bey’s force, and Bonaparte vainly sought to win over that gallant chief by
offering to leave him in undisturbed possession of the province of Girgeh as
far south as the First Cataract. Overtures to Ibrahim having also failed,
Bonaparte moved against him; and, after a sharp cavalry affair at Salahiyeh
(August 11), Ibrahim withdrew from Egy pt. An offer made by Bonaparte that they
should come to an understanding through the Turkish Pasha brought no answer;
Reynier’s division and Leclerc’s cavalry were therefore left to guard the
eastern approaches to Egypt, while the commander retraced his course to Cairo.
But now, when
the conquest seemed complete, news came to hand from Kleber that an unforeseen
disaster had placed everything at hazard. When near Belbe'fs on the 13th,
Bonaparte heard that nearly the whole of his fleet had been destroyed by
Nelson. Taking Kleber’s aide-de-camp aside, he heard the details of the battle,
whereupon he uttered the words : “ We have no longer a fleet. Well! we must
remain in these lands and then come forth great, like the ancients.” Lavalette
gives a variant of the story, making himself the central figure; but his
version is inconsistent with the details given in the Correspondance de
NapoMon.
With respect,
however, to the question whether Bonaparte did, or did not, order Brueys to take
the fleet away to Corfu, the Correspondance is untrustworthy. The general
afterwards strove with all his might to prove that he did issue such an order;
but the contemporary letters of Jaubert and Ganteaume, published in the
Intercepted Letters (whose genuineness is admitted by de La Jonquiere), prove,
on the contrary, that Bonaparte ordered Brueys to remain on the Egyptian coast.
Brueys afterwards found by repeated soundings that the harbour at Alexandria
could not be entered and cleared with safety by large ships. Nothing therefore
remained but to stay at Aboukir, with the result that is well known. Indeed, it
is now quite clear that Bonaparte very much underrated the difficulties of the
whole expedition. He stated in his letters to Joseph Bonaparte and others that
he meant to return to France in the autumn of 1798. If this be so, he can never
really have been bent on the grandiose projects that he afterwards put forward,
namely, of conquering India and thereafter returning by Constantinople “to take
Europe in the rear.” The last much-quoted phrase occurs only in the not very
trustworthy work compiled at St Helena by Las Cases from Napoleon’s
conversations. Indeed, in the case of one who so often acted on Talleyrand’s
adage, that language served to conceal thought, there can be no certainty as to
his real intentions during the Egyptian Expedition. Of this alone we can be
sure, that his ultimate aims were to dazzle France and to pave the way for his
own supremacy when the Directory should be thoroughly discredited. In a letter
which he wrote to Joseph Bonaparte in July, 1798, after hearing of the
unfaithfulness of Josephine, he urged his brother to buy an estate in Burgundy
for him (Napoleon)
to winter in.
And it seems probable that disappointment at the state of affairs in Egypt may
have helped to form this determination of returning speedily to France.
The Battle of
the Nile seemed fatal even to the more practicable design of supervising the
settlement of the colony and awaiting the first opportunity to return to
France. At present, nothing could be done except to consolidate French rule in
Egypt and trust to the chapter of accidents for communication with France.
Bonaparte had as yet no official news from Paris; and none reached him until
September 9. The army, officers and soldiers alike, had all along been
disgusted by the unhealthiness and seeming bankruptcy of Egypt; the prevalent
depression of spirits may be seen by the letters of Tallien and others in the
Intercepted Letters, published by the British government. But Bonaparte’s
spirits rose with danger and isolation. In truth, the task of grafting French
customs on an unkindly oriental stock served only to brace his organising
faculties to their fullest strength. While supervising the administration of
the country, the defence of the coast against the English fleet, that of the
upper valley of the Nile against Murad, and that of the eastern frontier
against Ibrahim, he sought to provide for the needs of the army by exploiting
to the full the resources of Egypt and to lay the whole of civilisation under a
lasting debt by pushing on the exploration of its long-buried treasures of art
and learning. In order to impart method and consistency to these efforts he
established at Cairo, on August 22, the Institute of Egypt, divided into four
sections: (1) Mathematics, (2) Physics, (3) Political Economy (strictly
speaking, Public Economy), (4) Literature and Arts. Each section was to hold
two meetings a decade. The mathematician and physicist, Monge, was President;
and Bonaparte accepted the office of Vice-President. The Decade itgyptienne,
brought out every ten days at Cairo, and the Mbnoires sur Tltgypte, published
by order of the Tribunate of France in 1801, together with the works of Denon,
Jomard, Monge, and Villiers du Terrage, show how varied were the activities of
this Institute.
At the first
sitting of the Institute, Bonaparte asked attention to the following questions.
Could the baking ovens of the army be improved? Could any substitute be found
for hops in the making of beer ? What means were there of purifying the water
of the Nile ? Which was the more serviceable at Cairo, the windmill, or a mill
turned by water ? How could gunpowder be made in Egypt ? In what position were
jurisprudence and education in Egypt, and how could they be improved in ways
wished for by the natives? These problems show how practical were the aims
which Bonaparte set before the savants. ■ Not that they
were in any sense limited to enquiries of pressing utility. Later on, Denon and
others studied the ruins of buildings, measured the Sphinx, and made drawings
of the colossal statues; while Jomard began to unlock the secrets of
hieroglyphics—a work greatly furthered a few
years
afterwards by means of the trilingual Rosetta Stone unearthed by Menou, which
fell into British hands in 1801. Caffarelli, Monge, and Fourier prepared to
measure the surface of the land. Monge, Berthollet, and other physicists and
chemists, undertook an analysis of the different soils and studied the phenomena
of the inundation of the Nile. Conte and Hassenfratz sought to establish the
manufacture of cannon and gunpowder, the minting of coins, the tanning of
leather, etc.; while the medical enthusiasm of Larrey and Desgenettes effected
a slight and temporary improvement in the hygiene of Cairo. All men were
stimulated by the phenomenal activity and buoyant strength of Bonaparte
himself, who succeeded in breathing something of his spirit into the soldiers
and civilians and even in reconciling them to Egypt.
But his
deference to Muslim rites, his attendance and recital of prayers with the due
swayings of the body at the festival of the Prophet’s natal day, his
encouragement of the joyous customs attending the rising of the Nile, failed to
win over the faithful to whole-hearted allegiance. The idemas were never
deceived; and when exactions and heavy taxes spread discontent throughout the
Delta, and measures of severe repression promptly followed, rebellion flamed
forth at Cairo on October 21. Here the first rumours of approaching hostilities
with Turkey helped to excite passions in all quarters. A convoy of French
wounded coming from Salahiyeh was massacred by Arabs near the northern gate.
The news spread through the city; at once the rabble rose in revolt, while the
imams of the mosques proclaimed war on the unbelievers. General Dupuy was
killed; the troops had to give ground; and a large part of Cairo fell into the
hands of the rebels. Street fighting would have cost the French too dear; their
commander therefore ordered Dommartin to plant cannon on rising ground near the
citadel and rain balls on the headquarters of the revolt, the Grand Mosque
itself; the cannonade was kept up through the night, while Lannes beat off an
attack of Arabs and peasants from without. The horrors of that night and the
loss of some 2000 men cowed the insurgents of Cairo into surrender; thereupon
Bonaparte took summary vengeance on the Arabs who had massacred the convoy of
wounded. A band of trooos led by his aides-de-camp, Eugene Beauhamais and
Croizier, surprised the supposed perpetrators of the deed and cut off their
heads; these were placed in sacks, taken to Cairo, and rolled forth on the
Ezbekiyeh square, to the horror of the populace. This display of ferocity made
Bonaparte master of Cairo. It is, however, noteworthy that many of the traders
had held aloof from the rising. Denon relates several cases in which Frenchmen
were hidden away in safety; his own abode was protected by a friendly Muslim
who came to smoke at the door as if it were his own. The Institute also escaped
the widespread pillage.
Bonaparte now
instructed his engineers, Caffarelli and Bertrand, to build forts to overawe
the most unruly quarters. The formation of a
mercantile
company, composed of the chief European traders, promised to renew the commerce
of the city, which had nearly vanished, along with gold and silver money, since
the French invasion. Other signs seemed to augur well for the future. In spite
of great natural difficulties, Desaix had waged a successful camuaign against
Murad Bey in the Fayoum and was now driving him towards Assouan. Accordingly,
at Christmastide Bonaparte set out from Cairo for Suez, which had already been
occupied by part of Bon’s division. During his brief sojourn there he took steps
for reviving the trade of this once important city and surveying the coasts
southward to Tor and the Island of Shad wan. At Suez, too, he received a
deputation from the monks of Mount Sinai, whom he gratified by signing his name
in their volume; it was the same in which Selim, Saladin, and, it is said, even
the Prophet himself, had written their names, recommending the monastery to the
consideration of their followers. Near Suez Bonaparte detected traces of the
ancient canal cut by Sesostris between the Red Sea and the Nile; its course was
subsequently traced for a long distance; but events rendered it impossible to
undertake the larger scheme of connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.
During this journey Bonaparte gave orders for the construction of two corvettes
and also for the formation of a camel- corps; the mobility of such a body had
been proved by Desaix during his campaign in Upper Egypt.
The
commander-in-chief’s return to Cairo was hastened by the capture of despatches
from Ibrahim and Djezzar, which proved that the Mamelukes now had the help of
Djezzar, the virtually independent Pasha of Acre. Their vanguard had already
advanced as far as El Arish, a fort situated on the oasis between Palestine and
Egypt; and this seemed to presage hostilities on the part of Turkey. In point
of fact the Sultan had been at war with France since September 11; and on
December 23, 1798, he concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with
Russia, to which Great Britain acceded on January 2,1799. France had declared
war on Naples on December 4, 1798. These important events were but dimly known
to Bonaparte, to whom the Directory rarely deigned to send news; but on
February 8 he heard through merchants coming on a Ragusan ship that the
Neapolitans had declared war on France and driven the French from Rome; while a
large Russo-Turkish fleet was blockading Corfu. Bonaparte, asserting that this
news was confused and contradictory, assured the Directory, two days later,
that the last tidings brought from Europe were to the effect that all was quiet
in that continent.
Whatever were
his inmost thoughts on this all-important subject, he resolved to strike at his
foes on the borders of Syria before the outbreak of war with Turkey. The
following practical statements in his letter of February 10, if contrasted with
the grandiose schemes which he afterwards assigned as the real aim of the
Syrian Expedition, reveal something of the difference that exists between the
Bonaparte of fact and the
Bonaparte of
romance. “In this operation I have three aims: (1) To assure the conquest of
Egypt by constructing a stronghold beyond the desert, and thenceforth to remove
the armies of any nation whatsoever from Egypt to such a distance that they can
in no way combine with a European army which should come to land on its coasts.
(2) To oblige the Porte to explain itself and thereby support the negotiations
that you have doubtless set on foot, and the mission of the consul Beauchamp,
whom I am sending to Constantinople on the great Turkish caravel. (3) Finally,
to deprive the English fleet of the supplies that it draws from Syria, by
employing the two remaining months of winter so as to make all that coast
friendly to me through war and negotiations.” He concluded by renewing the
promise already made in his letter of October 7,1798, that, if he heard of the
outbreak of war between France and the Kings, he would return.
We may here
point out that even after the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir,
Bonaparte seems to have cherished the hope that Turkey would not regard the
French seizure of Egypt as a casus belli—a signal proof of the tenacity with
which he clung to preconceived notions. It is also worth remarking that, if he
really believed in the possibility of peace with Turkey, he cannot at the same
time have been seriously preparing to march through Asia Minor with a view to
the conquest of Constantinople.
In fact this
latter project seems to be a gloss on the original plan, which was to strike at
Ibrahim and Djezzar, before their forces marched into Egypt and joined any
British force that might be sent. Still less is there any trace in his letters,
written at that time, of the scheme of marching to India. It is true that, on
January 25, 1799, he wrote to the Imam of Muscat asking him to forward a letter
to Tippoo Sahib, in which he informed that ruler of the arrival on the banks of
the Red Sea of his “innumerable and invincible army, filled with the desire of
delivering you from the iron yoke of England.” But surely this was only a device
to busy the British in India, and thereby weaken any attempt that they might
make to land in Egypt. We may note in passing that the effect of this missive
was annulled by the news of the battle of the Nile, which Nelson had been
careful to send on to Bombay by way of Aleppo. Finally, it is noteworthy that
Bonaparte’s Syrian army consisted of four small divisions, those of Kleber,
Reynier, Bon, and Lannes, and numbered rather fewer than 13,000 fighting men.
As many as 10,000 soldiers were left in Lower Egypt, while Desaix’ force
campaigning on the Upper Nile comprised 6500 men. A statement of these numbers
shows that the Syrian force, at least at the outset, was not intended for any
far-reaching enterprise. If the invasion of European Turkey, or of India, was
contemplated, it must have been before the battle of the Nile wrested from
France the command of the sea. Doubtless, Bonaparte looked on the acquisition
of the Syrian ports and of Suez as affording valuable bases for future military
and naval expeditions*.
but his
letters and the dispositions of his troops seem to prove that those wider
designs were not to be carried out with the slender military and naval
resources, and amidst the political uncertainties, of the present. If any
further proof of this be needed it is to be found in his letter of June 28,
1799, to the Directors, where he writes that, if they succeed in sending him
15,000 more men, “we shall be able to go anywhere, even to Constantinople.”
This was perhaps in answer to their despatch of November 4, 1798 (which did not
reach him until the end of March at Acre), wherein they urged him, if he
thought it advisable, to strike at Delhi or at Constantinople. At that time,
however, the goal of his ambition was certainly not Delhi, but Paris.
We now return
to the events of the Syrian campaign. On February 8 the French vanguard under
Reynier had a doubtful and bloody encounter with the Turks and Mamelukes at El
Arish; but the arrival of the division of Kleber and his skilful night attack
on the relieving force sent by Djezzar decided the fate of the fort, which
surrendered on February 20. The garrison of 1500 men was released on condition
that it would not take part in the war in Syria or Egypt for a year. Marching
on by way of Gaza and Ramleh, the French appeared before Jaffa on March 4. On
the two following days they repelled vigorous sorties, and learnt from some
Albanian prisoners that all the. garrison of El Arish had come to join that of
Jaffa. On March 7, when the walls were already breached by the French cannon,
Bonaparte offered easy terms in case of capitulation. In reply the head of his
envoy was cut off and placed on a pike over the chief tower. The French then
redoubled their cannonade until, shortly after noon, Lannes’ column of assault
rushed up the breach and swept the ramparts clear. Building after building fell
before the fury of the French, who gave no quarter; two of Bonaparte’s
aides-de- camp, however, ventured to spare the lives of a large number in a
caravanserai. This incident placed him in a difficult position. Food was very
scarce; the garrison had violated the rules of war—some of them twice over; and
after a deliberation of two days he decided to have the 2000 survivors shot.
The ghastly sentence was carried out on the seashore, the doomed men meeting
their fate with Eastern stoicism.
During the
halt at Jaffa the plague began to make its ravages felt. Some 200 men of
Kleber’s division had already died of it at Alexandria: and the lurking pest
now rapidly spread among the victors. Bonaparte decided to march against Acre,
so as to keep the disease under by exercise and fresh air.
After a sharp
action with the enemy at Kakoun, not far from Nablus, the army made its way to
Haifa, the roadstead near Acre, and Bonaparte established his headquarters on a
spur of Mount Carmel (March 17). Thence he could discern in the distance two
British men- of-war off Acre. They were H.M.Ss. Theseus and Tigre, under the
command of Commodore Sir Sidney Smith, a brave but somewhat vain
and
self-willed young officer, who, after Nelson’s fleet was ordered away to the
coast of Naples, received the command of the remaining British ships in the
Levant. He had cannonaded Alexandria early in February with little result; and,
knowing the importance which his nominal chief, Nelson, attached to
Acre—witness the Nelson despatches of December 17, 1798—he sent on the Theseus
to that port, and speedily followed thither with the Tigre. The former ship had
on board a skilled French engineer, Phelippeaux, who at once began to improve
the ruinous defences.
It fell to
Sir Sidney Smith to effect still more for the defence. After the fall of Jaffa,
Bonaparte ordered the French flotilla at Damietta to set sail for that town and
await instructions, which directed it to Acre. On March 18 he sent word to
Jaffa to detain the flotilla there. But it was now too late. Already the
flotilla was nearing Mount Carmel; in rounding that promontory it was seen by
the Tigre, which chased and captured all the seven vessels, though net the
corvette convoying them. The prizes were of priceless value; they mounted 34
guns in all, and carried besides the siege artillery and ammunition on which
Bonaparte reckoned for the reduction of Acre. Thenceforth the assailants had to
bear the fire of their own heavy ordnance, while for the present they had to
rely on two carronades taken at Haifa, four mortars, and 36 field- pieces. The
walls, however, were very weak; as Sir Sidney said, they were defences and not
fortifications. Moreover, Djezzar, more anxious to preserve his independence
from the attacks of a Turkish fleet than to guard against the onsets of Syrian
tribes by land, had mounted all his best guns on the sea front. The French,
despite the mishap to their siege train, expected to make short work of the defence.
In this, however, they reckoned without taking due account of the exposure of
columns of assault to flanking fire from the enemy’s ships. The position of
Acre, on a low-lying promontory of rectangular shape, gave the utmost possible
advantage to the Power that held the sea. The natural conditions were exactly
the converse of those prevailing at Toulon. There, in 1793, the configuration
of the land placed the allied fleet at the mercy of the investing army as soon
as it mastered the promontory commanding the harbour. At Acre the war-ships
commanded both the approaches and the town itself. Some of the small gunboats
were, however, sunk by the French guns early in the siege.
The French
broke ground for their trenches on March 19. Caffarelli, the commander of the
engineers, proposed to breach the walls at the north-eastern corner, as being
the farthest removed from the ships, and also because the aqueduct and ruins in
that vicinity partly covered the approaches; while at the comer itself stood a
lofty tower, which, when once seized, would enable the assailants to dominate
that part of the town. The bombardment began on March 23; and on the afternoon
of the next day a great part of the tower fell with a crash. But Phelippeaux
and Captain Miller of the Theseus, foreseeing such a mishap, had made
a
counterscarp which now stopped all efforts of the French sappers. Djezzar in
his alarm had gone on board a ship; but, seeing the firm behaviour of the
British sailors and marines, he now decided on a desperate defence. Part of the
counterscarp was blown up on the 28th, and heroic efforts were made by Bon and
Laugier to carry the place by storm; but the attempt ended in a bloody repulse,
which cost Laugier his life. Nevertheless, the guns on the wall, the broadsides
of the shipping, and the frequent sallies of the garrison failed to stop the
progress of the French in their trenches; and by the middle of April the
combatants were often within pistol-range.
Already,
however, news had come that the Pasha of Damascus was mustering large but
hitherto scattered bands on the right bank of the Jordan. To attack these
relieving forces before they neared Acre was as sound strategy as that which
had dictated the whole of the Syrian campaign. Accordingly, Bonaparte sent off
Murat and Junot with 1000 men to attack the northern bands—an enterprise in
which Junot completely succeeded near Nazareth on April 8. Meanwhile Kleber,
with his division, was heading towards the Pasha’s main body with the aim of
cutting it off from Damascus. Not far from the foot of Mount Tabor he was
himself sharply attacked and surrounded by hordes of yelling horsemen. The
inequality of numbers placed his small division in jeopardy, when, to the joy
of his dauntless but weary infantry, the sound of Bonaparte’s cannon was heard
among the hills. The commander-in- chief, divining the risks incurred by his
daring lieutenant, was marching to the rescue with part of Bon’s division.
Skilfully screening his onset, he came upon the enemy when in the midst of
their most furious efforts to pierce Kleber’s ranks. The surprise was the more
astounding, the victory the more complete; and hundreds of the Turks,
Mamelukes, Nablusians, and Syrian tribesmen, were sabred in their flight or
perished in the waters of the Jordan (April 16-17). After an absence of only
five days from Acre, Bonaparte returned in triumph, believing that the
Christians of the Lebanon and other Syrian tribes would now espouse his cause.
Some of them did so; but the majority waited to see the issue of events at
Acre—an attitude that was confirmed by Sir Sidney Smith’s skilful device of
sending among them copies of the Muslim address which Bonaparte had put forth
after his capture of Alexandria.
At Acre,
meanwhile, the fortune of war still hung in the balance. On the day of
Bonaparte’s return to the camp (April 19) three French frigates from Alexandria
succeeded in landing six heavy pieces of artillery near Mount Carmel; for so
fierce and persistent was the fighting at Acre that Sir Sidney Smith dared not
remove his ships from that position. These same frigates, however, soon
afterwards brought news of the approach of a Turkish fleet and convoy, two of
whose ships they had captured. The news gave new vigour to the assailants,
fortified as they already were by the increase to their battering power. On
April 25
they fired a
mine with terrific effect, bringing down half of the great tower, killing its
garrison, and making a great breach in the walls; but the storming column that
rushed forward was baffled by inner entrenchments and the loopholed walls of
the Mosque and of Djezzar’s palace. The French guns thereafter breached the
second tower on the east front, that nearer the sea, and battered down
stretches of the walls; in reply to which Phelippeaux and the British officers
built two ravelins, one covering the eastern wall near the gate by the sea, the
other on the north front near Djezzar’s palace. The enfilading fire from these
projecting angles, and the musketry poured in from the inner walls, helped the
British bluejackets and Djezzar’s Albanians to beat off the issault of May 1.
On that day Phelippeaux succumbed to sunstroke; but the crisis of the struggle
found an able successor, Colonel Douglas, ready to take his place, i
That crisis
was now at hand. On May 4 the second tower showed a practicable breach, and the
French mine driven towards the counterscarp between, the two towers was
nearing its goal, when the British engineers countermined with equal rapidity
and success, thereby causing the final assault to be postponed to the 9th. But
on the 7th the Turkish fleet hove in view on the horizon. The sight determined
Bonaparte to carry the place at once. A light breeze blowing from the land
promised to delay the rescuers several hours; and within that time the three
solid columns of assault must, it appeared, overwhelm the feeble defences.
Rambeaud headed the force that made for the second breach; Escale’s column was
to penetrate by the ruins of the great tower; while it fell to Lannes, with the
third column, to clinch the affair at one or other of these places. The first
column rushed over the short distance between the trenches and the walls,
protected from the ships’ broadsides by traverses which the French engineers
had skilfully thrown up, but riddled by grapeshot from two British guns, one in
the lighthouse, the other in the east ravelin. Nevertheless, the column swept
up the breach and through the first defences, there to be checked and finally
driven back about nightfall by the concentric fire poured on them from the
town. At the great tower the first success of the French was equally brilliant
and better sustained. Again they seized and held its remaining portion; and
daylight showed the tricolour waving from its summit. Seeing that the boats of
the Turkish fleet were as yet but halfway to shore, while the fire of the
defence was slackening, Sir Sidney at once lanHpH sailors said marines, and led
them to the place of danger, which he held until the Turkish succours arrived.
The rescuers now assumed the offensive, and made a sally against the French
trenches; but they were cut off or beaten back with heavy losses, which some
French memoir-writers have reckoned at 6000 men. At this time Kleber’s division
was ready to hand, elated by its victory at Mount Tabor. Bonaparte urged on
these choice troops against the wearied garrison; but the bravery of Kleber,
Lannes,
and their
devoted followers, dashed itself in vain against British tenacity and Muslim
fanaticism. The defenders now let the storming parties come in by way of the
great tower into Djezzar’s garden, and there laid them low by bullet, sabre,
and dagger. Lannes was dragged away by his grenadiers half dead from this
death-trap; and in the end both armies sank back exhausted by twenty-five hours
of murderous conflict.
Still the
French kept their lodgment at the great tower; and Smith in his official report
of May 9 stated that, as the great breach could be ascended by 50 men abreast,
the defence would probably [be overpowered. He clung on, however, with praiseworthy
stubbornness, and the event justified his high-souled resolve. The plague was
now spreading among the French, and impaired their striking power. On May 10
Bonaparte wrote to the Directory that it would cost him too many men to storm
the town house by house, and that “ having reduced Acre to a heap of stones,”
and fulfilled the aim of his expedition, he would return to Egypt so as to be
ready to oppose the European or Turkish army which might be expected to land
there in July or August. His decision was probably influenced by news gained
from English prisoners of the outbreak of war in Europe and the entry of the
French into Naples—an event which promised to bring about a second coalition.
This was far more threatening news than that which he had received at the
close of March, when a courier arrived bringing the Directors’ despatch of
November 4, with no decisive tidings from Europe, and allowing him to strike at
Constantinople or India. There was now nothing left but to return to Egypt.
Accordingly after nine days more of heavy cannonading he drew off his troops in
the night of May 20-21, having already sent off the wounded.
The exact
losses of the French before Acre will probably never be known, owing to the
politic reticence of their leader. His own official estimate of 500 killed and
1000 wounded in the whole of the Syrian campaign was of course only intended to
reassure the French public; it is also utterly inconsistent with his statement
to the Directory on June 28,1799, that the whole Egyptian campaign had cost him
5344 men. At St Helena he told Admiral Malcolm that the “ expedition to Acre ”
had cost him 6000 men, of whom 1600 were killed. Larrey, the chief physician,
states in his Relation that 800 wounded were finally sent from Jaffa to Egypt by
land and 1200 by sea. Nearly all these losses were incurred at Acre. Among the
slain were Generals Bon, Caffarelli, and Rambeaud, four adjutants, and 43 other
officers. In sore plight the army wound its way back to Jaffa, harassed on the
seaboard by British gunboats and among the sand-hills by the Nablusians. In
spite of Bonaparte’s efforts many of the wounded were cut off or left behind.
At Jaffa most of the sufferers were sent on by sea to Egypt, receiving on their
way chivalrous aid in supplies from Sir Sidney Smith. The stories circulated by
Wilson and Miot, that numbers of the plague-stricken French were poisoned in
the Jaffa hospitals by order of Bonaparte just
before his
departure, are disproved by Larrey’s account, as also by Sir Sidney’s despatch
of May 30 from Jaffa: “ Seven poor wretches are left alive in the hospital;
they are protected and shall be taken care of.” The army with difficulty
surmounted the toils of the last marches through the desert. The crops around
Jaffa, Bamleh, and Gaza, were burnt in order to deprive pursuers of supplies;
and a garrison was left at El Arish. The strength of Bonaparte’s will was never
more displayed than during the prolonged agor’es of the retreat to Egypt; and
this same faculty enabled him to inspire his exhausted troops with energy to
figure as the conquerors of Syria on their return. Kleber’s division was
diverted to Damietta, while most of the troops marched to Cairo, and on June 14
made a triumphal entry, displaying the 16 Turkish officers and 17 flags captured.
The army had covered the 300 miles from Acre in twenty-six days—a marvellous
performance, if we consider the absence of roads and the other difficulties to
be overcome.
Bonaparte
found the colony heaving with ill-suppressed excitement. As to this we may cite
the evidence of a letter written on May 5, by General Dugua, the commander at
Cairo, to General Damas, and stating that there was a general ferment, which
must lead to revolt if Bonaparte’s army did not soon return. He added these
ominous words: “We stand in need of money, money, money, also men, munitions of
war, wood, iron, and the good-will of the inhabitants.” The only encouraging
fact of the situation was that Desaix had worsted Murad Bey in a tedious
campaign on the Upper Nile and was now, with the aid of General BeUiard,
governing that Province with success.
Events,
however, once again threatened the whole work of conquest with demolition. At
Ghizeh, on July 15, the commander-in-chief heard from Marmont at Alexandria
that a large Turkish fleet was in sight. At once he set out for Bahmaniyeh, and
on his arrival there, hearing that some 10,000 Turkish regulars had landed at
Aboukir and stormed the fort, he ordered a concentration of troops, Kleber’s
division moving to Bosetta, while Desaix began to evacuate Upper Egypt. By
these means Bonaparte, on July 21, opposed the Turkish expedition with a force
nearly as large, which, in pursuance of his usual rule, he massed together when
at a prudent distance from the enemy. With this he moved to Birket, thence to
Alexandria, and prepared for an immediate attack on the two lines of
entrenchments which the Turks had hastily thrown up across the narrow isthmus
west of Aboukir. A village, on which their centre rested, presented the chief
defence of the first line. On the two wings Lannes, who now commanded Bon’s
division, and d’Estaing, speedily burst through the defences opposite them,
while the horsemen and dromedaries of Murat, easily clearing all impediments at
the centre, threw the whole of the first line into utter disorder. Many
hundreds of the Turks rushed into the sea and were drowned in the effort to
reach their gun-vessels.
Bonaparte
gave his troops a few hours’ rest before attacking the second line of defence;
this was strengthened at the centre by a redoubt, and in the rear was the old
fort of Aboukir, now in possession of the enemy. At three o’clock the second
battle began; at first d’Estaing gained a lodgment on the Turkish right, while
Lannes forced the entrenchments near the lake; but the fire from the redoubt
speedily checked the French centre and left, while the volleys from the
gunboats on the lake foiled Murat’s utmost efforts to penetrate on that side.
The attack failed; the French had fallen back, when the Turks rushed out of
their entrenchments to slay the wounded and mutilate the dead. At once
Bonaparte ordered an attack on the barbarian horde; and the French, fiercely
rallying, burst through their disordered bands and seized the earthworks. Murat
and his horsemen also swept with the refluent tide into the space between the
entrenchments and the fort, and, driving before them the terror-stricken mob,
sabred hundreds in the shallows and choked many more in the depths. Heavy
cannon were then brought up against the fort and for two days dealt havoc among
the crowded and stifled garrison. When more than half had perished, the 2000
wretched survivors surrendered. They were almost the only relic of a picked
Turkish army of more than 10,000 men.
This
extraordinary exploit seemed to fulfil Bonaparte’s resolve, expressed in a
letter of July 20, that the Turks must have a lesson such as would assure to
France the possession of Egypt. But the results of this dramatic triumph were
to be compromised by the news conveyed in a packet of newspapers which Sir
Sidney Smith sent ashore in the course of the arrangements for an exchange of
prisoners. Bonaparte had as yet received only two despatches from the Directory
during his fifteen months’ absence from France; and he could not know that on
May 26 the Directors had written a letter urging him and a large part of the
army to leave Egypt on the powerful fleet of Admiral Bruix, then on the coast
of Provence, and destined by them for Egypt. For reasons which cannot here be
detailed, Bruix left the Mediterranean, and the project came to naught. We may
remark here that the report of Bonaparte frequently receiving news from France
through his brothers is probably incorrect. If he had had such news he would
not have persevered so long with the siege of Acre; nor would he have shown the
eager interest that he now displayed as he read the papers, the Journal de
Francfort, and the Courrier Frangais of London, all through the night of August
2-3. His resolve was taken at once. The decisive triumph of Aboukir enabled him
to leave Egypt and take up those political designs in France of which he had
never lost sight. The next day he had a private talk with Rear-Admiral
Ganteaume, then set out on the Nile for a hasty visit to Cairo, and quickly
returned, giving out that he waS going to make an inspection of the coast. Sir
Sidney Smith having left those waters in order to revictual at Cyprus, there
was no
difficulty in
secretly putting off by night from the coast, about a league to the west of
Alexandria. The hurried rush of generals and aides-de-camp into the boats
showed the eagerness of the little, party to have done with Egypt. Besides
Bonaparte there were Berthier, Mnrat, Lannes, Marmont, Andreossi, Bessieres,
Ganteaume, Eugene Beauhamais, Duroc, Bourrienne, and Merlin, as well as
\h&. savants, Monge, Berthollet, Denon, and others. The Venetian-built
frigates, Muir on and Carrere * received this illustrious company, and through
many risks bore them safely to France, Bonaparte landing at Frejus on October
9.
The departure
of the commander-in-chief was perfectly justifiable on political grounds. The
dangerous position of France now called him to fulfil his repeated promises to
the Directory that he would return as soon as the conquest of Egypt seemed
to.be assured. The crushing blow to the choice Turkish force at Aboukir seemed
to seal that conquest; and the call of duty summoned him to defend the
Cisalpine Republic, and if possible to save its stronghold, Mantua.
Nevertheless, his hasty and stealthy departure aroused in the army bitter
feelings which found vent in gibes at Bonatrape. In truth, the expedition had
never been popular. Egypt disappointed the hopes of nearly all but the savants.
The prospect of possessing six arpents of its soil had called forth the jeers
of the soldiery from the time of their arrival; and the hope of dealing in the
future a death-blow to England’s eastern commerce scarcely reconciled the
soldiers to arrears of pay, ophthalmia, dysentery, and insect pests in the
present. Bonaparte’s will nerved them throughout, to their manifold toils; but,
this motive power gone, officers and men gave way to discontent and lassitude.
Kleber, his
successor, was a hero in fight, but lacked Bonaparte’s statesmanlike,
qualities. ■ His very natural annoyance at his chief’s treatment of him
increased when he found out the bankrupt state of the colony. His despatches of
September 11 and October 8 show that, on taking over the command there was not
a sou in the military chests; the arrears of pay amounted to 3,000,000 francs,
while the general budget showed in the autumn of 1799 a deficit of 10,000,000
francs. Though Bonaparte afterwards sought to disprove these statements, it is
now clear that Kleber really understated the case. The statistics given in jthe
Intercepted Letters (vol. hi, pp. 60, 61) show that the deficit exceeded
11,000,000
francs. Kleber therefore stopped many of the public works ordered by Bonaparte,
and confessed in the despatch of October 8 (written to the Directory and
intercepted by British cruisers) that, since the destruction of the French
fleet at Aboukir, peace with Turkey, would alone enable them to “ withdraw from
an enterprise the objects of which were no longer attainable.” This opinion was
not shared by the second in command, General Menou; but Kleber came to believe,
and not unreasonably, that the case set forth in Bonaparte’s last letter of
August 22 to him had virtually arisen: namely, that if no succour should come
from
France before
the month of May following, and the plague should carry off more than 1500 men,
he would be justified in treating for peace with Turkey, even if it implied the
retrocession of Egypt. It is true that Bonaparte accompanied this guarded
advice by the warning that such a surrender would be a terrible misfortune for France;
for, in the imminent decay of Turkey, her Egyptian Provinces would probably go
to another European Power. But the mere stating of the conditions that might
justify surrender is certain to predispose a successor to that step, when he
feels himself deserted and overwhelmed by difficulties.
The whole
army naturally thought itself deserted. The naval help, on which Bonaparte very
naturally counted, through the combined action of the French and Spanish
fleets, was not forthcoming; Britain continued to lord it over the
Mediterranean; and Kleber was glad to enter into terms with the Turks, under
the sanction of Sir Sidney Smith, in the Treaty of El Arish (January 24, 1800),
by which the French forces were to evacuate Egypt, on condition of their not
serving against Great Britain and Turkey in the present war. In agreeing to
this arrangement, Sir Sidney Smith not only exceeded his original instructions
but contravened Nelson’s order of March 18, 1799: “ I must strictly charge and
command you never to give any French ship or man leave to quit Egypt.” In
obedience to instructions from the Admiralty, Lord Keith, the admiral then
commanding in the Mediterranean, also wrote to Smith from Port Mahon in the
same sense on January 8,1800; but he did not receive the letter before he
sanctioned the El Arish agreement. Keith also sent a letter to Kleber to warn
him that the French would not leave Egypt unless they surrendered as prisoners
of war with their ships and stores. On seeing that Smith had exceeded his
powers, Kleber indignantly exclaimed against English perfidy, renewed the war,
and inflicted a severe defeat on the Turks at Heliopolis (March 20,1800).
These last
events, however, fall without the limits of this volume; and we can only state
that Kleber was assassinated by a Muslim fanatic on June 14, 1800, and that his
successor, General Menou, still more signally failed to overcome the growing
difficulties of his position. Despite Bonaparte’s efforts after Marengo to send
succour from Italy, very few vessels succeeded in eluding the British fleet. In
March, 1801, a British force under General Abercrombie landed in Aboukir Bay,
and the battle outside Alexandria, which cost him his life, virtually decided
the fate of the French garrisons. His successor, Hutchinson, cautiously
advanced towards Cairo, which the Grand Vizier approached from the north-east.
General Baird, with a force drawn mainly from India, and in part from the Cape
of Good Hope, had landed at Kosseir in the Red Sea, but was not in time to take
part in the fighting outside Cairo. The garrison, under General Belliard, soon
surrendered; it comprised about 9000 effectives (including some Greeks and
Ethiopians) and 4000 sick, with 320 cannon. Menou, who held out in Alexandria,
exclaimed
against
Belliard’s action as an eternal disgrace to the French arms; in fact he hoped
for the arrival of a French squadron with 5000 men, which Bonaparte had sent
off. Hutchinson and Coote, however, pressed him so hard that he also
capitulated with 10,500 men (inclusive of some Greeks)* 312 cannon, and a few
ships of war (August 30, 1801). Both of these forces were to be conveyed back
to France as prisoners of war. The works of art and curios gained by the
savants for the museums of France were likewise to be surrendered, though this
rule was not earned out with undue stringency and they retained their private
collections.
Bonaparte’s
rage at the news of the loss of Egypt proved the reality of his ulterior
designs, as expressed in his letter of October 7, 1798, to the Directory: “The
European Power which is mistress of Egypt is in the long run mistress of
India.” However much we may doubt his later statement, “Fai manque a ma fortune
a St Jean 6?Acre*—if this means that he was then on the high road to conquer
India—it is nevertheless certain that he looked on the conquest of Egypt,
together with Jaffa and Acre, as a needful preliminary to that enterprise, to
which he so persistently returned in the years 1803, 1807, and 1810. His
imperious nature instinctively felt that the docile, fate-ridden peoples of the
East would offer more yielding material than the sturdier nations of Europe,
and that in the Orient his star would speedily rise to the zenith, dazzling the
Western world with an irresistible splendour. He was also strongly attracted by
the Mohammadan creed, for which, even at St Helena, he many times expressed his
preference over that of Christianity, as being simpler and more suited to the
elemental morality of eastern peoples. His remarks to Gourgaud and Las Cases on
this topic show how highly he admired the warlike prowess evoked by the
Prophet, and the appeal to the sensuous instincts which nerves the Moslem in
the hour of danger. In one other respect Bonaparte seemed made for the East.
His frame resembled that of a seasoned oriental. In Egypt he shook off the
febrile symptoms contracted during the hardships of the long autumn siege of
Toulon, and showed the underlying strength of his constitution. When others
flagged in the scorching heat, he went about buoyant and active (so Savary
asserts), his uniform tightly buttoned up to his throat as at Paris, and never
showing the slightest discomfort. Physically, then, as well as in the boundless
range of his ambition and the dogmatic and semi-fatalistic cast of his mind, he
was uniquely equipped for conquering Asiatics and holding them in awe. What
would he not have achieved had these instinctive longings been realised in
action ?
Even amidst
the failure of these designs, it is clear that they worked mightily on the
European polity. In one sense the Egyptian Expedition was a melodramatic
enterprise, intended to exalt the fame of Bonaparte at the expense of the
unpicturesque mediocrities who then ruled at Paris; and as such it was an
unqualified success. The inability of the Directors to ride out the political
storm which their folly had so largely
provoked was
exposed at the very time when stories of Bonaparte’s eastern exploits were on
every tongue; and rumour made of him a St Louis, crusading for the glory of
France and banished from her shores by the envy of self-seeking incompetence.
This contrast goes far to explain the events of Brumaire.
Moreover, the
Eastern expedition gave a colonial and commercial bias to French policy which
brought it into sharper conflict than ever with that of Britain. The quarrel
respecting predominance in the Netherlands—the chief cause of war in 1793—was
now envenomed by the blow aimed at Britain’s Eastern Empire. This accounts for
the energy thrown by Pitt’s Ministry into Mediterranean and Indian affairs, as
also for their efforts to form a new coalition in Europe. Thus the
Revolutionary Wars, which seemed in 1797 to have burnt themselves out on the
Continent, once more wrapped it in flame. Finally, the new struggle, being
prompted ultimately by commercial and colonial disputes between England and
France, and by territorial questions in Europe itself, was of a very different
character from that waged by the sansculottes of 1793. The change of motive
soon showed itself in the changed temper of the combatants. If Bonaparte was
right in stating to Talleyrand, shortly before the Treaty of Campo Formio,
that they no longer had in France the same enthusiasm and the same “great
masses” as means of recruiting, it was doubly true now that the cycle of war
revolved about questions analogous to those of the reign of the Grand Monarque.
And while democratic ardour inevitably waned, the need of far-seeing
statesmanship and capable administration was ever on the increase, thereby
forging one more link in the chain of circumstances that bound the fortunes of
Bonaparte to those of his adopted country.
THE STRUGGLE
FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN.
DrniiNG the
spring of 1798 the British Admiralty received disquieting reports of a great
armament which was preparing at Toulon, ostensibly for an expedition to
Ireland. Its true purpose was however as yet obscure, though from the
unseaworthy condition of the transports collected it was most improbable that
the force would be risked upon the Atlantic. The Mediterranean had now been
abandoned by the British fleet for more than a year, and the French, if they
cared to face heavy risks, might strike at any country on its littoral. On May
2,
1798, Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson was
detached from Lord St Vincent’s fleet blockading Cadiz, with three ships of the
line and five small craft, his orders being to use every effort to ascertain
what the French were doing and what were their real objects. Soon after he had
parted company, St Vincent sent after him, recalling him to take the command of
a much stronger squadron; but the message never reached him. He was sighted by
the French scouts off Toulon on May 17, and made some small captures on the
coast of Provence. From the men on board these he learnt that a large fleet and
army were on the point of sailing for some unknown destination. While cruising
off Toulon and endeavouring to obtain further information, his flagship was
dismasted (May 20), owing, in all probability, to the inexperience of her crew,
for she was newly commissioned and badly manned. His small craft parted
company, and he was left with the battleships alone. He was compelled to retire
to the Sardinian coast to refit, and thus he missed the French fleet for the
first time. It had sailed from Toulon on May 19.
Meantime St
Vincent had received orders from England to send a fleet into the
Mediterranean, as soon as reinforcements should have reached him, with the
object of destroying the Toulon firmament. He was informed that he might either
go himself as commander of that fleet, or choose a subordinate, preferably
Nelson. This selection of an officer whose transcendent capacity was not then
fully understood at home, and who had incurred the reputation in the Navy of
reckless temerity, has been attributed with much probability to the personal
influence of
George III, whose son, the Duke of Clarence, knew Nelson intimately and had
divined his great qualities. St Vincent was no less an admirer of Nelson, and
acted upon the suggestion forthwith. He despatched to his junior the very pick
of his fleet, eleven ships of the line, under officers of the boldest and
ablest type, men whom Nelson afterwards called his “band of brothers,” from the
ardour with which they sank all personal prepossessions and served the national
cause.
The squadron,
which did not effect its concentration until June 7, was far more formidable
than would at first sight appear from its numbers. It was composed of thirteen
74-gun ships of the line, one 50-gun ship, and one sloop. The ships included
were not all that could be desired; the hulls of two were in a defective state;
the others were short of stores, and a French prisoner speaks of Nelson’s
squadron as being “ very badly equipped, alike in the matter of naval stores
and provisions; their rigging was as old as could be.” But the crews had been
trained and disciplined under St Vincent; great attention had been paid to
gunnery; and the manoeuvring was of the smartest. To serve under St Vincent was
regarded by competent and ambitious men as the swiftest road to promotion,
because, though he was arbitrary and imperious by nature, exacting the most
implicit obedience and mercilessly punishing incompetence and inefficiency, he
was quick to discern and reward merit. It was indeed from his fleet that most
of the officers who covered themselves with glory in this war proceeded.
Nelson, then, owed much to his commander-in-chief; yet he was himself precisely
the man who could make the best use of the opportunities offered him; and,
burning with zeal himself, his example inspired the same spirit in others.
His
instructions, conceived in the most stirring terms, directed him to follow the
Toulon fleet wherever it went and to destroy it. He was to compel neutrals to
give him supplies, should compulsion be required, and was to be prepared to
take great risks. His own spirit was so confident of success that he declared
to one of his captains that not one of the French should escape—and this
although he believed the enemy to be 15 sail of the line strong. Since Naples
and Sicily were mentioned first in his letter of instructions as the probable
destination of the enemy, he moved to Naples, and on the way received definite
information that the French fleet had been seen off the south coast of Sicily
on June 4. Through the intervention of the British Minister at Naples, Sir
William Hamilton, secret orders were sent to the Neapolitan authorities in
Sicily to grant Nelson supplies. Off Sicily on June 22 he learnt from a neutral
that Malta had already fallen, and that the French fleet had sailed eastwards
on June 16. This news was false, as the French were at Malta till the night of
the 18th, but in the absence of numerous frigates, for which he and his
commander-in-chief had repeatedly applied, he could do nothing to verify it. In
vain had St Vincent informed the Admiralty in May that “ less than 20 efficient
frigates will not be sufficient
for the
extensive prospective operations.” He acted upon the supposition that the
information was possibly true, and at once decided to sail with all speed co
Egypt, which his information seemed now to indicate as the final destination of
the French.
By a singular
chance vessels of the French squadron were sighted by his force that very day,
June 22. Two French frigates were seen from the deck of one of the British
vessels and a line of battleship from another; but the want of cruisers
prevented proper reconnaissance and examination of these strangers, though
Nelson had expected to meet and destroy the; French at sea on this very day and
in this place. After the information he had received, he did not like to take
the risk of scattering his battleships in a general chase. That night there was
a mist, and the British ships exchanged gun signals. So close were the two
forces that the French heard the reports of these guns plainly, and headed
northwards, away from the British, when the danger to them for the moment
passed. Their strength was 13 ships of the line: one of 120 guns, three of 80
guns, and the rest of 74 guns, with seven cruisers, 26 smaller armed ships, and
318 vessels, laden with 38,000 troops, 171 guns, and stores. They were under
the supreme command of Bonaparte,, under whom was Admiral Brueys, in charge of
the naval force. The war-ships were encumbered with men and stores, the 74s
having each over 350 troops on board; the crews were in great part composed of
pressed men who detested the service and were not broken to discipline. One
reason, indeed, for placing so many soldiers in the fighting ships was to find
substitutes for seamen, who were not to be obtained by hook or by crook;
another reason was to provide a force capable of compelling the half-mutinous
crews to fight. In the past Brueys had had repeatedly to deplore the want of
obedience on board, the readiness of the men to leave their posts in action,
and the utter impossibility of enforcing discipline when all offences had to be
tried by jury; and, although on the eve of the departure the jury system had
been abolished, its effects lived after it. It did not improve matters that the
pay was heavily in arrears, which was certainly one explanation of the shortage
of 2049 seamen in the fighting squadron, while rations were not always issued
regularly. The country round Toulon, before the start, had been filled with
deserters from both the army and the fleet.
The materiel
of the fleet was no better than the personnel. Three of the 74s were old and
rotten—one so rotten that she had proved unable to carry the ordinary battery
of a French 74, and had had her armament reduced in consequence. Another 74,
though not quite so bad, was unfit for hard service. All the ships were short
of marine stores, owing to the economic straits to which the financial
disorganisation produced by the Revolution had reduced France. They were most
inadequately provisioned for such an expedition as that which they were
undertaking; for though orders had been issued that three months’ food
and water
should be embarked there were few of the ships which actually received such an
allowance on board. This defective equipment had a fatal influence at every
turn upon the military efficiency of Brueys’ fleet. Cables, anchors, spars,
sails, all were of poor quality or worn; and this was all the more serious
since, from the want of skilled seamen and officers of naval experience, it
would be difficult to make such repairs as Nelson’s Vanguard effected in a few
days.
The senior
officers of the French navy do not appear to have been consulted in framing the
general plan, though it is difficult to say whether at the start they realised
the danger to which they were to expose themselves. If the British fleet were
encountered at sea, the orders issued in the French fleet were to use every
effort to close and board, when it was hoped that the large number of troops
carried would procure success. It was not known as yet that any considerable
British force was inside the Straits of Gibraltar; at the most Nelson was
supposed to have with him six or seven ships, of small size. There can be but
little doubt that, had the two forces met, the result would have been a
disaster for the French, seeing that they had not seamen enough both to
manoeuvre their ships and to work their guns, while, as Marmont says in his
memoirs, the fleet was so badly equipped, the crews were so weak and so devoid
of training, and the batteries so encumbered with stores, that everything was
risked on the throw of the dice. The progress of the flotilla was intolerably
slow, averaging less than 50 miles a day, though this very defect saved it from
destruction on the voyage. It arrived off Malta on June 9; and, owing mainly to
treachery, the place fell without any serious resistance. On the 19th the
expedition made sail for Egypt, and, after seeing far off in the haze of a
summer day some British ships (which however seemed to the French not to be
eager to bring on a battle) arrived off Alexandria without misadventure. As the
topmasts of the French cruiser Junon in advance of the fleet rose to the west,
those of Nelson’s fleet dropped below the horizon to the east. Thus a second
time the French fleet had had the narrowest of escapes. If only a supply of
cruisers had accompanied Nelson’s fleet, nothing could have saved Bonaparte,
for it is certain that in such circumstances the British admiral would have
left a frigate to keep watch for his enemy. As it was, he was completely
deceived by the tardiness with which the French had accomplished their voyage,
and now came to the conclusion that they must have struck at either Syria or
the Dardanelles. Without a moment’s delay he decided to sail to Alexandretta;
thither he stood and found no trace of the French; it was the same at Candia;
and on July 19, disconsolate and baffled, he was back at Syracuse for the
purpose of reprovisioning and watering his ships.
Indomitable
as had been his energy, his mental suffering at his want of success was acute.
He was perfectly aware of the issues which
hung upon the
defeat of the French; and he well knew the storin of criticism which would
break upon the head of his commander-in-chief if he, a young protege, proved a
failure on his first great mission. In England he was already being censured
for remissness and incompetence. He sailed again: for the East on
July 25, having now received intelligence which satisfied him that, wherever
the French had gone, they were not to the west of him. Running up to the Morea,
he gained information that the enemy had sailed to Alexandria, and instantly
headed for that port. His fleet was ready to fight at a moment’s notice; daily
the crews were exercised with great guns and small arms; all his plans were
prepared; in calms it was his custom to meet his captains in conference, and
with them discuss his battle tactics. Though there has been great controversy
on the question to whom must be ascribed the credit of the plan adopted in the
now impending battle, the central idea was indubitably Nelson’s. It was to
concentrate an overwhelming force upon a detail of the enemy’s fleet, supposing
that fleet were found at anchor; and the statements of Saumarez show that the
plan of doubling on the enemy, by engaging the hostile ships on both
broadsides, was among the proposals discussed in Nelson’s conferences with his
captains.
Meantime the
French army had disembarked, not without encountering considerable difficulties
in the operation, and was marching on Cairo. If a document in the
correspondence of Napoleon can be believed, Brueys was ordered by his
commander-in-chief either to move his fleet into the harbour of Alexandria, or
to take up a defensible position in Aboukir Bay, or, if this were impossible,
to sail to Corfu. There is, however, reason to regard this order as a
deliberate forgery intended to save the reputation of Napoleon. All the
trustworthy documents which remain— for in the later years of the Empire there
was a wholesale destruction of papers and orders—indicate that Brueys had
received definite instructions not to leave Egypt, though he himself was aware
that the only prudent course was to return to Toulon. The moral support of the
fleet was necessary to the French army, while there was always a possibility of
a hurried withdrawal of that army being necessitated by a defeat. Moreover
Bonaparte at the outset hoped to be able to return to France in a few weeks
after his landing, and resume the direction of , the plans for the invasion of
England. It is thus evident that the story of Brueys having been ordered to
Corfu must be dismissed as a mere fable. To move the fleet into the harbour at
Alexandria was found impracticable, owing to the insufficient depth of water in
the channels giving entrance to that haven. The battleships would need to be
lightened, and only two could be moved into the harbour each day. If the
British appeared while the fleet was in the act of moving in, it would clearly
be liable to be taken in detail and destroyed. As the result of the lack of
supplies in Egypt, heavy demands were made by the army upon the stores carried
in the fleet; and quite early in July the want of rations made it impossible
for Brueys to
sail either to Corfu or France. Finally the fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay (July
7), worse supplied than ever with seamen, since many had been detached for
service with the French flotilla on the Nile and for various shore duties; so
short of rations that the crews on board were in danger of starvation, and in a
position which was from the military point of view indefensible. The food which
remained on board was diminishing by daily consumption, and even water was
only to be obtained with infinite difficulty and in insufficient quality, till,
as Brueys wrote a week before the battle, “ the fleet is on the verge of
perishing of hunger and thirst.” Officers and men, without pay or other money,
were living from hand to mouth.
The French
battleships were anchored in a single line a mile and three-quarters long, the
bearing of which was north-north-west and south-south-east. There was a slight
bend in the centre. The weakest ships were at the head of the line, and some
support was given by a second and inner line of four frigates and three small craft.
The first ship in the line of battleships was distant no less than 3200 yards
from Aboukir Island, where was a battery of two mortars, and 6000 yards from
the mainland at Aboukir Point, where was a feebly armed fort. The depth of
water in which the French were moored was 7 fathoms; for, although Brueys had
ordered that the head of the line should anchor in 5 fathoms, he had been
disobeyed by the captain of the Guerrier, a fact which illustrates the bad
discipline of the: fleet and the untrustworthiness of its- officers.
For some hundreds of yards the water inside the line and between it and the
shore was deep enough for ships of the line to manoeuvre. Brueys’ attention had
been called to the weakness of his dispositions; and a plan had been suggested to
him which would have brought the line closer to the shore, tad at the same time
have permitted the various ships in it to support one another better. But for
some reason or other he made no change; he appears to have feared for his rear
and centre rather than his van; perhaps, also, he was lulled to a fatal
security by the fact that a French frigate had grounded on entering the bay,
and had only been got off with extreme difficulty. He had definitively
determined to fight at anchor, as he had not enough seamen to manoeuvre a;t
sea, or indeed supplies of food and water for a cruise of more than a few
hours. He was in this posture when at 2 p.m. on August 1 the signal was made
that twelve ships were approaching. They were speedily made out to be enemies;
the French boat-parties engaged ■in obtaining provisions, water, and
fuel, were recalled; and at 8 orders were issued to prepare for battle.
For a moment
Brueys seems-to have thought of fighting under sail, notwithstanding ■
his previous dispositions. He signalled to bend topsails, but a few minutes
later annulled the order and directed his fleet to-fight at its moorings. This
unexpected change was due to the remonstrances of two of his officers, who went
on board the flagship as
626
Nelson appears and
instcmtly attacks. [i798
the British
were in the act of closing. Another order directed every ship to pass a hawser
to the next ship astern and to fasten to this hawser a warp so as to be able to
turn the ship, if required, and bring her broadside to bear against the enemy.
A second anchor was to be laid out to the south-west. Had these measures been
carried out, without greatly improving the military position, they would have
rendered it even more difficult than it actually was for the French ships to
get under way; but, owing to the absence of many boats and the fact that the
crews were actively employed in clearing the ships and preparing for battle,
they do not seem to have been executed. Brueys thought that Nelson would not
attack that day, as the hour was already late, and the difficulties of a night
action for the British, in waters which they had not surveyed, would be
enormous.
The wind blew
north-north-west as the British bore down. Soon »fter the enemy were sighted,
Nelson made the signal to prepare for battle, and followed this, up, as soon as
he could see the exact position of the French, with orders to prepare to anchor
by the stem, with springs upon the cable. Half-an-hour later, the portion of
the enemy’s force upon which the concentration was to be effected was indicated
in the signal, “ Attack enemy’s van and centre.” As the wind was blowing down
the French line, this disposition would enable the British ships anchored about
the French van to move down by paying out cable, while the French ships at. the
rear of the line, tied up with anchors, hawsers, and warps and with' the wind
dead against them, would be almost helpless to intervene. Up to this point the
British,fleet had been in no order; to the French, indeed, it seemed, as years
afterwards at Trafalgar, that the approach was being made in confusion. But now
the signal to form line of battle went up, and with a rapidity and precision
that drew admiration from the French officers, eleven British ships formed into
line. Three others were at some distance, and had not as yet been able to join
the squadron. The line, however, could not, eyen at this point, have been a
precise one, since the two leading British ships ran a glorious race to decide
which should be the first into battle. Foley, who commanded the winner in this
race, as he neared the Guerrier, the head ship in the French line, looked; for
her anchor-buoy, and saw at once that he had ample room to steer inside his
enemy. Inside he came, as the enemy’s guns opened a steady fire, and,:
as Nelson’s last signal, “ Engage more closely,” floated to the yards,
delivered a terrible broadside into the Guerrier, came-to with his anchor
astern, and, as this did not bring him up smartly, drifted down to the second
French ship, the Conquer ant, and poured into her a not less tenable fire.. . ,
,
The French
seem to have been taken completely by surprise by this manoeuvre. There is some
evidence to show that on the shore side their batteries were not clear for
action, but were lumbered up with boxes and all kinds of impedimenta. That they
should not have cleared on the
inshore side
was natural enough, as they persistently underrated the risk of the British
fleet doubling upon them. It is certain that the British ships which anchored
inshore suffered very little loss, probably because of this fact. The second
British ship, the Zealous, followed Foley and anchored opposite to the leading
Frenchman, inshore of him. Three other of Nelson’s ships did the same; the rest
of the British fleet engaged on the seaward side. In the first phase of the
battle eight British ships were concentrated upon the leading six of Brueys,
the British captains for the most part so placing their commands as to bring a
raking fire to bear on the enemy. The artillery duel was at first well
sustained by the French, though their fire was far slower than that of the
British ships. But the concentration speedily began to tell, even though from
time to time the British ships had to hold their fire for fear of injuring one
another, as night was now falling, and the whole of the bay was wrapped in
dense clouds of smoke.
The two
leading ships in the French fleet suffered grievously under the British fire.
The Guerner’s foremast fell in seven minutes amidst a round of cheers from the
British fleet; in twenty minutes all three masts were down. Her rotten timber
fliew in showers of splinters; immense gaps showed where portholes had been;
most of her guns were put out of action; and about 8.30 p.m. or a little later
she struck. She had been reduced to such a state that she had scarcely been
able to fire a shot for an hour. The Conquerant succumbed a little earlier. The
third ship, the Spartiate, was now assailed not only by the British vessels
which had attacked the leaders in the line, but also by Nelson’s ■Jags.
::p, the Vanguard. Yet, though little more than a floating target, and now tom
by the concentrated fire of four British ships, the Spartiate held out till
after 9.30 p.m. and only struck when two-fifths of her crew were hors de combat,
and her hull pierced by 76 shots below the waterline. The fourth enemy, the
Aquilon, lost her captain early in the fight, and saw the next astern, the
Peuple Souverain, drift away through the severance of her cables. She struck in
a terrible plight shortly before 10 p.m. The Peuple Souverain received a
raking, fire from the Orion, and was engaged broadside to broadside by the
Defence; she was speedily reduced to. a wreck, driven from the line, arid
compelled to strike her flag. So far the battle had gone most favourably for
the British, but lower down the French line a disaster had been narrowly
averted. The last two ships in the British line—the Majestic and the
Bellerophon, for the Culloden had run ashore and was out of the fight, with the
50-gun Leander standing by her—in the confusion, darkness, and smoke pushed too
far down the enemy’s line, and had to fight away from support. Of these two,
the Bellerophon engaged the huge Orient of quite double her force, and was most
severely handled; all her three masts came down, and there is evidence to show
that about the time the Orient took fire the Bellerophon cut her cable and
withdrew from the
battle in
some disorder. The, Majestic, which had joined in the attack on the Orient, was
also beaten off and forced down the line, where she engaged the Heureux. The
crisis of the fight had now arrived; but, just when aid was most needed the
Swifitsure, Alexander, and Lea/nder, with several of the ships which had
already crushed the French van, arrived to cooperate in the final attack, on
the French centre.
The most
formidable ships in the centre were the 80-gun Franklin and the 120 Orient,
astern of which again was another 80, the Tonnant. Six British vessels were now
firing into them. About 9 p.m. three boats caught fire, but were cut away, on
board the great: Orient; a few minutes later a fire broke out on the poop, but
had only attacked some heaps of splinters and rubbish when it was put out. It
reappeared ten minutes later in the mizzen-channels, and speedily obtained a fatal
hold on the ship, running up the rigging and along the deck with the speed of
lightning. The British fire prevented the crew from extinguishing it, arid
shattered the fire-engines and the buckets which had been placed in readiness
for any emergiency. Already Brueys had been killed, and the French flagship was
in terrible disorder, her decks covered with killed and wounded. A little after
10 the flames reached the middle deck and the order was given to the crew to
save themselves; the wounded had to be abandoned to their fate. At 10.15, by
French time, the Orient blew up with a fearful uproar, which seemed to stun the
combatants. Blazing wreckage fell on the British Alexander, but the fires which
it started were put out. For more than ten minutes dead silence followed; then
a French ship took up the battle and the cannonade was resumed, continuing
thenceforth spasmodically till daylight, when it again became fierce as the
French rear was assailed. By this'time only two French ships of the line, the
Tell and the Genereux, and one frigate, were in a seaworthy condition. These
spread sail and took to flight; the other ten French ships were burnt or
captured. Early in the fight Nelson had received a severe wound; and in the
concluding stage of the action the want of his controlling hand was sorely
felt. Had he remained unhurt it is certain that not one of the enemy’s ships
would have escaped him. As it was, his order to pursue and capture the remnant
of the French fleet was not properly carried out.
In numbers engaged
the two fleets were equal, whether ships or men be reckoned. But in weight of
metal the French had a greater advantage, as their ships threw from the
broadside 13,880 lbs., as against the British 11,330. Yet, as the French lacked
the men to work the guns, this preponderance was not of much service to them.
Of the fourteen British ships of the line one took no part in the action. The
other thirteen included one 50-gun ship, a very weak vessel. The French loss,
though never exactly ascertained, is placed at 1700 killed and drowned, while
350 who escaped ashore were killed by Arabs. The wounded numbered 1479; and
more than 2000 unwounded prisoners were taken
by the
British and released, as there were no supplies for them, while it was an
additional argument for their release that if placed ashore they would be a
serious embarrassment to Bonaparte’s commissariat.
The battle
was really the decisive naval engagement of the whole struggle with France from
1793 to 1815. The vigour and boldness of Nelson’s tactics and his complete and
appalling success destroyed all feeling of confidence in the French navy. In
most of the French ships there was no want of bravery* whatever the lack of
discipline and skill. The men fought and died like heroes; captain after captain
refused to be taken below when badly wounded; and, though a French captain
complains of “ the cowardice of many officers and of the greater part of the
crews,” under such demoralising circumstances in a fleet exposed to such an
attack it was not to be expected that there would be no signs of weakness. The
officers were indeed the picked men of their service; they had the advantage in
force and they knew it. It was the first time within the memory of living man
that such a victoiy had been won against odds. Neither the First, of June, nor
St Vincent, nor Camper- down, could compare in results with this action. For
here it might truly be said that the ideal of “ not victory, but annihilation ”
had been attained by the British. Beyond question the greatness of the success
was due to Nelson; it stamped his capacity as a fighting seaman, and proved
that at least on the' sea England could oppose to the French a leader in
judgment, energy and decision the equal of Bonaparte himself. No other such
victory was gained in the seventeen years of war which were still to follow,
except by Nelson; yet, other British admirals had opportunities not less
magnificent, and he had,shown them the way.
The
destruction of the French fleet had for the moment a serious moral effect on
the French army, which it left isolated from France and unable to communicate
except with the greatest difficulty with that country. Its capture or
destruction was only a question of time, in view of the vigorous naval blockade
which the British were able to impose. Nelson at once returned to Naples,
obeying his orders to protect that kingdom; but he left behind him a force
ample to watch the Egyptian ports, which promptly put a stop to all commerce
and hindered French communications along the coast. In 1799 Sir Sidney Smith
was appointed to the command of this detached force, and rendered the utmost
service to the Turks in Syria, npt only by intercepting the French battering
train, but also by landing seamen and guns at Acre. The resistance thus opposed
at Acre to Bonaparte prevented him from undertaking further schemes of
conquest in Asia Minor
Meantime the
British in the Mediterranean, reinforced by the alliance of the Portuguese,
Neapolitan, Russian, and Turkish navies—not that any of these forces counted
very seriously in the scale—had blockaded Malta, which place did not, however,
surrender until September 5, 1800, after both the French battleships which had
escaped from Aboukir
Bay had
fallen into the hands, of the British navy. In November, 1798, a squadron
detached from St Vincent’s fleet had taken possession of Minorca. The French
government, in face of its growing difficulties at home and abroad, took steps
in 1799 to withdraw Bonaparte and his army from Egypt. In April, Bruix with 25
French ships of the line slipped put of Brest,, owing in part to the slackness
of the British blockade, in part to the anxiety of the British admiral to cover
Ireland; he pushed south, entered the Mediterranean, and placed himself with
greatly superior forces between the scattered detachments of the British fleet.
It looked as if the game was in his hands, but his ships were so badly equipped
and his captains such bad seamen that he could not trust them in action ; the
gunnery of his men was so deplorable that they could not in a thousand rounds
once hit a corsair, at which the whole fleet, fired. Bruix steered to Toulon ;
and his mere appearance compelled the British; to withdraw from before Malta,
and enabled the French to throw supplies into that island. Owing to the state
of his ships he did not venture to move to Egypt; and his skilfully planned
combinations failed, no doubt because he feared to suffer the fate which had
befallen Brueys, and because he was aware that, as soon as they learned
definitely the direction of his movement, the British would follow him in
superior force. He left Toulon on his return voyage with 22 ships; sailed to
Caathagena, where he picked up a Spanish squadron; and then with a fleet 40
ships strong, returned to the Atlantic, having accomplished nothing, though he
had caused the British government some moments of acute anxiety. He had
purposed on leaving the Mediterranean to cruise off Madeira, intending as soon
as the British fleets had dispersed in quest of him to return to the Mediterranean.
This would have been a clever and puzzling combination for the British; but
owing to the ill-will of the Spaniards and the wretched condition of their
ships he was obliged to renounce this part of his scheme and to sail for Brest,
taking the Spaniards with him. If useless for any other purpose they at least
served as hostages.
During
Nelson’s operations in the Mediterranean the British fleet blockading Cadiz had
been exposed to serious dangers from within. A plot had been hatched by the
United Irishmen in the ships to seize the fleet. Unlike the mutinies of 1797
this was a revolutionary movement, instigated by the corresponding societies in
England and led by a man named Bott, who had entered the navy for the express
purpose of sapping its loyalty. If the confessions of the ringleaders can be
trusted, it was intended to kill the leading officers, and then either to push
up the Mediterranean and bring over Nelson’s ships, or to sail for Ireland,
where a formidable insurrection had already broken out. The plot was, however,
detected in June, 1798, and the conspirators were seized, tried by
court-martial, ahd condignly punished. It had been openly said by them that the
Mediterranean fleet would be as bad as the
fleet at the
Nore had been in 1797. There are traces of a similar political plot in the
Channel fleet at this, date; but in that case the conspiracy was thwarted by
the bold action of Captain Pellew. The existence of such disaffection, however,
illustrates the difficulties with which the officers of the British navy had to
grapple, and shows that, if much fault was to be found with the seamen supplied
to the French navy, the raw material of the British navy was not very much >
better. No evidence has as yet been found to prove that the French government
had a hand in these plots, yet there is intrinsic probability in the belief
that it abetted them.
When Bruix’
fleet turned northwards to Toulon, the British squadron under Nelson returned
to Naples from Palermo, where it had been protecting the Neapolitan royal
family. In Naples, during the absence of the British fleet, a revolutionary
movement had broken out, led by the best men in the country and encouraged by
the French. The revolutionists, however, had been attacked by a motley force of
royalists, under Cardinal Ruffo, assisted by small detachments of Russian and
Turkish troops, and had been driven into the forts at Naples and compelled to
surrender, on June 23, 1799, on terms which granted immunity to all who had
participated :n the revolutionary movement, or, if they desired it,
a safe-conduct to Toulon. Ruffo throughout held that the insurgents had been as
much sinned against as sinning, and had told his Court with great common-sense
that “ a few bombs and a general pardon will end the business.” But on June 24,
after the capitulation had been concluded and signed by the British naval
officer in command in the Bay of Naples, as well as by Cardinal Ruffo and the
Russian and Turkish commanders, though before it had been completely executed,
Nelson appeared with his ships. He had been entrusted by the Neapolitan Court
with authority over Cardinal Ruffo, and disapproved of the Cardinal’s leaning
to merciful treatment of the republicans. He pointed out that Ruffo had
disobeyed instructions from the King of Naples in granting lenient terms to the
insurgents, and announced his determination to annul the capitulation. A stormy
interview between Nelson and Rufto took place,: in which Ruffo,
though supported by protests from the Russian and Turkish commanders, failed to
carry his point, or to obtain Nelson’s sanction for a policy which was both
humane and statesmanlike. But at this moment in his career Nelson was suffering
physically and mentally from the strain of the Nile campaign; and his usual
sane judgment was dominated by the influence of the British Minister at the
Neapolitan Court, Sir William Hamilton, and his wife, whose conduct was
inspired in part by anxiety to bind the Queen of Naples to England, and in part
by what appears to have been personal jealousy of Ruffo. Unquestionably the
Neapolitan royal family: had rendered valuable services to Nelson
and to the British cause, and this fact may have contributed to blind his
judgment. But the best way
of
repaying these services was not to support measures which could only provoke a
violent reaction. Finally, after much talk, the insurgents were informed of
Nelson’s determination to disregard the capitulation, though there is reason to
think that this intimation was couched in ambiguous terms, and that treachery
was shown in some quarter, either by Hamilton, whose mistakes' in his
despatches covering these incidents are such as to provoke some suspicion, or
more probably by Ruffo, in order to regain credit with his Court when he. found
that no efforts on his part could move Nelson. Be this as it may, the
insurgents came out; the forts were delivered up; and the garrison and persons
implicated were placed on board the transports.1 ■ ,: . .
.
Among the. insurgents, had been a distinguished Neapolitan officer, Prince,
Caracciolo^ who, after serving in the royal navy of Naples, had more or less
reluctantly espoused.the cause of the revolutionary government, and had fled
from the forts before the capitulation was concluded. He was therefore in no
sense covered by its terms. Captured in disguise, he was brought in chains to
Nelson’s flagship, and at Nelson’s order was immediately tried by a
court-martial of Neapolitan officers convened on board the British flagship and
found guilty of high treason. The sentence of death was carried .out with
extreme and unnecessary haste* Nor was this the last of the, unfortunate
incidents at Naples. The prisoners seized in the transports under such painful
circumstances, were handed over by the British admiral to the mercy: of the Neapolitan
Court, which was as cruel as it was cowardly; and they, though for the most
part men of high character, were put to death by the royal executioners and by
the mob of Naples. A spirit of extreme ferocity indeed seems to brood over all
the actions of the British navy in the Bay of; Naples, so that we find the
gallant and able Troubridge even before this afl'air of the capitulation
jesting in a letter to Nelson over the offering of a “Jacobin’s head,” and
Nelson passing on the remark to Lord St Vincent, as a capital joke. There was
no concern as to the guilt of the man killed, though it is now known that the
so-called Jacobin was innocent and had been faithful to the royal eause. When
Lord Keith, Nelson’s superior in command on the Mediterranean station, heard
from Nelson’s despatches of these proceedings, he at once ordered Nelson to
use his influence to moderate the savagery of the Neapolitan Court. There is no
evidence to prove that Nelson did so. Nor were these incidents without, effect
on national interests and on his own career. ; There is some reason
to think that distrust of his judgment engendered by his supposed subservience
to the Neapolitan Court led the Admiralty to pass him over when a successor was
being appointed , to Lord St Vincent in the Mediterranean command', though he
was incomparably the ablest and greatest officer of his day, and was by the
general consent of later , critics the man best fitted for the post. .. . , ■
THE SECOND
COALITION.
As in the
case of the Egyptian expedition, so too in that of the French conquest of
Italy, a sudden falling off of interest is observable among the actors directly
concerned, after the departure of the protagonist from the scenes which he had
made peculiarly his own. As the plans of these enterprises were due to the
foresight of Bonaparte, so also Ills masterful energy drove them forward with a
force that none of his lieutenants could hope to rival. But there is this
difference between the two cases. Whereas the Egyptian expedition after the
withdrawal of the commander-in-chief resembled a spent ball that turns and .
wavers until it comes to rest, the French conquest of Italy, on the other hand,
was pushed on to farther lengths by men whose abilities both in statecraft and
in strategy were too weak to grapple with the difficulties into which their
revolutionary zeal or personal ambition had led them. In truth, the seeds, of
future strife were scattered abroad before Bonaparte set sail for the East;
and we must therefore begin our review of the Causes that led to the war of the
Second Coalition by noticing first the weakness of the European system, and
secondly the events. which brought it once more into collision with
Revolutionary France. ,
It is
difficult now to realise the helplessness of the old monarchies in the period
that followed the Treaty of Campo Formio. That compact dealt a fatal blow to
the traditional order of things in Italy and Germany. The partition of the
Venetian :la,nds and the erection of the Cisalpine and Ligurian
Republics inevitably led to other changes in Italy. Despite the article which
guaranteed the independence of those Slates, France continued to control the
resources of northern Italy; her troops overawed the. King of Sardinia, and
the French garrison. at Ancona sought to revolutionise that city as a means of
undermining1 the power of, the Pope. With Ancona and Corfu as naval
bases, she controlled the Adriatic and threatened Austrian commerce.
The influence
of that treaty on German affairs was also disastrous. In the secret articles
Austria promised to help France to acquire the Rhine boundary, she herself
gaining Salzburg and a part of( the east of
Bavaria. Thus
the Emperor, the official champion of Germany, and the hereditary guardian of
the Church, had secretly agreed to French encroachments, provided that Austria
gained part of Bavaria and despoiled an Archbishop. In pursuance of these
secret terms, the Republican troops advanced at the close of the year and held
all the important points on the left bank of the Rhine, thus exercising at the
Congress of Rastatt, now called to arrange peace between France and the Empire,
a material pressure which redoubled the power of French diplomacy. As will
shortly appear, the scarcely veiled hostility of Austria and Prussia left
Germany helpless. Furthermore, these States were weak in all that makes for
moral force. The material exhaustion of the Habsburg Power was not so serious
as to be beyond the power of statesmen speedily to repair; but the narrowness
of mind and infirmity of purpose of its ruler, Francis II, forbade any hope of
those drastic reforms in the army and the public service which the Archduke
Charles and others saw to be necessary. The Foreign Minister, Thugut, whose
courage and tenacity gave some dignity to an otherwise coarse and limited
nature, still sought to show a bold front to French aggressions; but he was
thwarted at every turn by intriguing coteries that made his position almost
unbearable; and tbe rusty governmental machine clanked along in the old
grooves, to the de'pai. ■ of friends and the derision of foes.
Over c gainst
this patriarchal and morally bankrupt organism stood that of Prussia, smaller,
less imposing, but more compact, still enjoying much of the military prestige
bequeathed by the great Frederick and now relieved of the worst burdens of
favouritism, extravagance, and moral disgrace, that had clung about his
successor. Frederick William II died in November, 1797, and was succeeded by
his son of the same name, a young man of twenty-seven, whose strictly moral
life and honesty of purpose promised better things. Some moral improvement may
be credited to the young King and to his consort, the beautiful Queen Louisa;
but the evils of Prussian policy continued unchanged. The annals of Prussia as
well as the earlier misfortunes of France showed that public affairs could not
be set right without the exercise of governing gifts that neither Louis XVI nor
Frederick William III possessed. Neither of these young rulers possessed the requisite
knowledge of men and affairs, or had any opportunity of enlarging the narrow
outlook on life due to their secluded upbringing. Worst of all, the King of
Prussia was beset by the same indecision that crippled the reforming efforts of
his French prototype. Externally, he seemed to hold a position of great power.
By the Treaty of Basel (April 5, 1795) his predecessor had made peace with
France, giving up to the Republic his trans-Rhenane lands, binding the other
States of North and Central Germany to neutrality during the remainder of the
war with France, and secretly securing the reversion of the Bishopric of
Munster. Neutrality was to be enforced in the case of Hanover, if necessary, by
a Prussian occupation.
This act of
subservience left Prussia free to throw her whole weight into Polish affairs,
and she received her recompense at the Third Partition of Poland, But the
material gains (immediate and prospective) were purchased by a loss of
prestige; and it was now incumbent on the new ruler to abandon the role of
time-serving dependence on France into which the policy of the Foreign
M’nister, Haugwitz, had betrayed the kingdom. Nevertheless, Frederick William
III wholly failed to rise to a true sense of the duty of Prussia towards
Germany. The wish for peace with France and the hope of rounding off his lands
in the west by gains at the expense of Austria and the ecclesiastical States
blinded him to the risks which this policy involved; and Prussia held to the
easy and profitable course that was to lead her to Jena.
Russia was
likewise an uncertain factor in European politics. The death of Catharine II in
November, 1796, was a serious blow to the First Coalition. Her successor, Paul
I, who came to the throne after a long period of disgrace and captivity, already
gave signs of that eccentric and violent character which was by turns to amuse
and exasperate the statesmen of Europe. For some months he seemed intent on
reversing the policy of his mother alike in domestic and foreign affairs; but
by degrees his feelings responded more and more to appeals made from Vienna and
London to oppose the progress of the Republicans. He allowed “Louis XVni ” to
settle at Mittau, where that hapless wanderer arrived in March, 1798. But he
refused to see him at his capital; and it is doubtful whether he would have
taken up arms against France had not Bonaparte’s seizure of Malta thwarted his
pet scheme of using the title of Protector of the Order of St John, recently
bestowed on him by the Knights, as a means of securing that island for his
Empire. In this, as in many other respects, the action of the great Corsican
produced results which even he did not foresee. The Maltese grievance rankled
deep in the soul of the northern autocrat, giving consistency to his otherwise
wavering purposes, and leading him for a time so far to reverse the traditional
Muscovite policy towards the Sultan as to bind Russia and Turkey in united
action against the intrusive western Power that threatened to overturn the
East.
As for Great
Britain, there seemed in the early part of the year 1798 but the faintest
chance that she would once more arouse the Continent against France. Her
finances showed only a slight recovery from the recent monetary crisis. The
alliance of France and Spain brought about the withdrawal of the British fleet
from the Mediterranean in November, 1796; and the signs of rebellion fast
gathering in Ireland foreshadowed the gravest of dangers, if the expeditions
preparing in the northern ports of France should effect a landing. In one other
respect the strife between Great Britain and France became embittered. On
October 31,1796, the Directory had promulgated a law excluding British goods
from all lands over which France had control, and authorising
their capture
even on neutral ships. Cotton and woollen goods, together with hardware,
pottery, and refined sugar,, were to be considered: as of British
origin and their importation was forbidden1 under pain of
confiscation. The execution' of these measures, and the effort to impose them
on Spain, and Holland, produced the utmost degree of exasperation in England
and served to give the war a national character which it had not at first
possessed. Two1 alternatives were open: either to accept the terms
which the Directory might see fit to dictate; or to attack France with
yet'greater vigour, in the hope that the results of the Treaty of Campo Formio
would speedily become unbearable on the Continent. The latter course was
adopted.,
Even in
France few believed that the peace with Austria would be lasting ; witness the
exclamation of Sieyes on hearing the terms: “This treaty is not a peace, it is
the . call to a new war.” Equally prophetic was.Bonaparte’s utterance
concerning the Directors on leaving Milan for Rastatt in November, 1797: “ They
will set Italy on fire and cause us to be chased out.” The situation then
existing in Italy was one of unstable equilibrium, the overgrown and aggressive
power of France in the: north having no counterpoise in the influence of
Austria or .qf the States of the centre and south, which looked on the progress
of the Revolution with a hatred scarcely curbed, by a sense of their own
weakness. The Directors were fully conscious alike of the hatred and the
weakness;, and the Jacobins called on them especially to stamp out the Papacy,
and thus to complete the intellectual and political overturn. The Directors
themselves were eager for the conquest of Rome, because it would yield a
profitable return to the French treasury, then in sore straits owing
to the failure of a projected loan. Their despatches to Bonaparte during his
Italian campaign, leave no doubt on these points.
Ibat the
young conqueror also cared nothing for the Holy See is clear from his curious
suggestion of February 1,1797, that the Directory should give Rome to Spain.
For the time being, however, he did not seriously aim at the overthrow of the
Temporal Power: first,, because he was unwilling to figure as the declared foe
of the Papacy, whose power over men’s consciences he intended in the future to
use, and secondly, because he saw the folly of plunging his army deep into “the
boot” of Italy , until peace could be arranged with Austria. As long as he
could keep a French garrison at Ancona and set about the founding of a Republic
at that valuable seaport, he was content with exercising a profitable pressure
on the Vatican, extorting its jewels and its most precious Works of airt, and
awaiting the decease of the feeble old Pope, Pius VI. After the coup cTetat pi
18 Fructidor (September 4, 1797) the Directory was more than ever hostile to
the Pope; and Joseph Bonaparte, who succeeded Cacault as ambassador at Rome in
the early summer of 1797, received instructions from his brother, dated
September 29, 1797, to protest against the appointment of Provera as commander
of the
papal troops
and to demand his dismissal within twenty-four hours. Bonaparte actually used
the. threatening phrase that this matter alone, if well managed, might lead to
the ruin of the Court of Rome. He also suggested that if, on the death of the
Pope, no popular rising took place, Joseph must at all costs prevent the
election of Cardinal Albani, who was supposed to be guilty of the murder of
Bassevill-j, a secretary of the French embassy in Rome, in 1793. The Directory
even added an order that on the death of Pius VI no other Pope was to be
elected. On November 12,1797, at the close of his stay in Italy, Bonaparte sent
General Duphot to help Joseph in furthering the cause of the Roman democrats;
and the French embassy in the Corsini palace became their rallying-point.
Knowing that
the Directory eagerly desired an excuse for tearing up the Treaty of Tolentino,
which it had always disapproved, the Roman malcontents now sought to provoke a
collision as a necessary prelude to French intervention. On December 27, 1797,
they assembled at the Villa Medici (the seat of the French Academy in Rome) and
shouted for the Republic, until on the appearance of papal horsemen they took
to flight, leaving behind a sack full of French tricolour cockades. Joseph Bonaparte
at once disavowed all connexion with this affair. On the next day the democrats
crowded to the French embassy; and, as before, a detachment of cavalry rode up
to disperse them. Several of the democrats rushed for safety into the
courtyard of the embassy, whereupon Duphot ran down with drawn sword to act as
peacemaker, as Joseph Bonaparte stated in his not very convincing report; or,
as the clerical version ran, to head them in their attack on the soldiers
outside. Rushing into the street, he was mortally wounded by the firing of the
Papalini, which nearly cost the life of the ambassador himself, as Joseph
Bonaparte avers. The ambassador now refused to hear the explanations and apologies
of the Vatican and left Rome early on the following morning. How far the
responsibility for this outrage should be allotted to the Roman Jacobins, the
alleged secret plotters of the Vatican, or the wire-pullers of the French
government, is even now matter of doubt. Evidently hostilities were
thenceforth inevitable, and in these France had much to gain and Rome
everything to lose. Berthier forthwith received orders to march on Rome; and,
with a force of French veterans and Polish volunteers, he soon appeared before
the walls. No defence being attempted, he occupied the Castle of St Angelo
until the democrats gained the ascendant inside the city. On February 15 they
assembled in the ancient Forum, declared for the restoration of the Roman
Republic, and elected seven Consuls. Then, on their invitation, Berthier entered
Rome and saluted the young Republic on the Capitol in the name of France. The
Pope was thereupon insulted in his palace because he refused to leave Rome; his
pastoral staff and even a ring from his finger were snatched from him by the
brutal French commissioner, Haller, who forthwith ordered him into a carriage
that drove away towards the confines of Tuscany. There his enfeebled frame
found quiet
for a space among the Augustinians of Siena; but a year later he was removed
thence by Order of the Directory amidst ever- increasing indignities to his
last abode, Valence, in the south of France.
Thus fell the
Temporal Power, almost without a struggle, and yet in a manner that awakened
pity for the Papacy in the breasts of many who had hitherto worked for its overthrow.
Among the many mistakes of the Revolutionary rulers of France, assuredly not
the least was that of heaping contumely on the octogenarian Pontiff who had
consistently offered a passive resistance to their threats, extortions, and
intrigues. The feelings of sympathy with Pius VI were strengthened by a comparison
of his mild and cultured sovereignty with the scenes of vandalism that ensued
under the rule of the liberators. While a constitution of the French type took
form under the nominal sway of the Roman Consuls, it soon appeared that the
raison d'etre of the young Roman Republic was to be found in the financial
needs of France and of the Army of Italy. One of the French commissioners wrote
the following frank avowal of his views of the situation : “ The Revolution at
Rome has not yet been productive enough. The only course to take, so as to
derive from it a more suitable return, is to consider and to treat the finances
of the Roman State as the finances of the French army.” This course of conduct
found general approval among officers and commissioners* The Vatican was
stripped bare of its priceless treasures of art; and the palaces' of the Roman
nobility underwent the same fate, except where the owners offered ransoms
sufficient to tempt the cupidity of the plunderers. The secret influence that
prompted these actions stands revealed in the letter which Berthier wrote to
Bonaparte, on receipt of the order to march to Rome:—“ In sending me to Rome
you appoint me treasurer to the chest of the Army of England.”
Immediately
before Berthier’s return to the north of Italy, and after the arrival of his
successor, Massena,. a remarkable mutiny took place among the French troops at
Rome. Stung by the contrast between their own ill-paid, half-starving condition
and the luxury of the chief civil and military marauders, the subalterns and
rank and file drew up vehement protests, first against Berthier, and then, when
he weakly humoured the petitioners, against his less pliable and, as it seems,
less culpable successor. Finding his orders defied, Massena handed over the
command to Dallemagne and left the city. At sight of this mutiny the
working-men of the Transtiberine quarter flew to arms and sought to drive out
the French. They were crushed (February 24, 1798), as was a rising; of the
peasantry around Albano; but it was long before Dallemagne and his successor St
Cyr brought the men to obedience and put down their “ directing committee ” in
the garrison. In April and July further futile risings took place in Umbria and
the Campagna. The immediate results, then, of the French occupation of Rome
were the extraction of some
60,000,000
francs besides countless works of art and valuables, while on
the other
hand the discipline of the army and the reputation of its leaders were
impaired, and their liberators became odious both to populace and peasantry.
The
indignation in northern Italy was equally greiat. There the national sentiment,
gathering strength month by month, resented the French exactions, which seemed
to be the chief practical result of deliverance from the Austrian yoke. The
Councils of the Cisalpine Republic refused to ratify a treaty forced on their
envoy at Paris on February 22, 1798, under which the Republic would have not
only to support 25,000 French troops and 22,000 Cisalpines, but also to
subscribe to the war . loan of the1 Directory, link itself closely
with France in industrial affairs, and subordinate its foreign policy to that
of the great Republic. By a display of armed force Berthier thereupon “purged”
the Councils of the Italianissime, and the treaty was passed (March 20). Thus
was the independence of the Cisalpine Republic, as guaranteed by the Treaty of
Campo Formio, practically annulled. It is not surprising that the Emperor
Francis thereafter refused to recognise the envoy of the Republic at Vienna, on
the ground that the State which he represented was a vassal to France.
Even more
disastrous to the good fame of the French Republic was the occupation of
Switzerland. There the French ambassador, Barthelemy, had for five years by his
wisdom and moderation kept the Cantons free from war and internal strife. But
his work was now to be reversed by influences of a sinister character.
Bonaparte, in passing from Milan to Rastatt in November, 1797,: noted
the schisms that were developing in that land, and encouraged the deitaocrats
to further action. At Basel he had an interview with their leader, Ochs ,• and
a scheme of action seems to have been arranged, Ochs stirring up the north,
while Mengaud, La Harpe, and others, Worked in the Pays de Vaud. On arriving at
Paris, Bonaparte threw in his influence in favour of French intervention in
Switzerland. A pretext was found in the agitation in the Pays de Vaud against
the mild rule of the Bernese oligarchy. There was no widespread movement for
calling in the French. The few petitions sent by the Vaudois were signed by a
mere handful of persons, that from Lausanne bearing only 130 names. Already by
December 28, 1797, the Directory had decided to intervene; at the close of
January, 1798, Menard, with 15,000 troops of the Army of Italy, entered
Switzerland and marched to Lausanne; and when Brune, who took the supreme
command, brought up reinforcements, the Bernese troops were overpowered and
the capital was occupied (March 5). The Swiss Confederacy was thereupon
dissolved, and Brune sought to partition the land into three Republics. In the
end, however, the differences between suzerain, subject, and “allied” districts
were levelled; feudal customs were swept away; and a centralised constitution,
closely resembling that of the French Directory, was set up under the name of
the Helvetic Republic one and
indivisible.
This title did not prevent the annexation of the: “ allied ” city of Geneva to
France (Miihlhausen had already been absorbed in January); still less was it a
safeguard against the financial designs of the French government. First Brune,
next Le Carlier, and finally a commissioner who bore the appropriate name of
Rapinat, extorted large sums from the cantonal treasuries as well' as from
religious Houses and from the people themselves in the form of requisitions.
The total amount wrung from Switzerland exceeded 23,000,000 francs. As was
noted above, large sums of money, as well as munitions of war, were sent
straightway to Toulon for use in the Egyptian expedition.
These
proceedings marred the,prospects of the new Constitution. In any case, the
imposition of a centralised government on a land, where natural conditions and
the genius of the inhabitants alike indicate the need of cantonal freedom,
would have met with the gravest difficulties; but success was impossible when
the constitution-builders of one day were proved on the next to be the spoilers
of the people whom they claimed to have liberated. Several of the Cantons rose
in revolt; and, despite the failure of the Swiss of the plains, the sturdy
mountaineers of the original Cantons, Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden, still
defied the innovators. , On May 2 the Schwyzers, under Reding, dealt the French
severe checks at Rothenthurm and Morgarten, and on the following day routed
them at the southern end of Lake Zug. : A convention was then,
offered . them, and most of; them laid down their, arms. War, however, soon
burst forth again owing to the overbearing conduct of Rapinat, who altered the
composition of the Swiss Directory so as to- subject it the more completely to
that of France. The reconstituted body commanded on July 29 that all the Swiss
should swear obedience, to the new order of things., This behest, and the
interference of the authorities with their ancient customs, drove the central
Cantons to revolt. Schwyz and Uri were cajoled into subservience; but the men
of Unterwalden held firm until overborne by greatly superior forces. Their
last stand, at the town of Stanz, ended in a massacre; more than 1000 men, and
as many as 102 women and 25 children were slain (September 9). A remarkable
instance of Swiss, tenacity ,was shown at the chapel of St Jacob, between Stanz
and Saamen, which eighteen women held against the French, sealing at last their
devotion with their life-blood. By the close .of September the unequal struggle
was at an end. The subservience of Switzerland had been further assured by the
signing of a treaty (August 19) which bound her to help France in all wars
(except those waged over-sea), to recognise French rule in the former bishopric
of Basel, and to grant to France the use of two loads connecting her lands with
southern Germany and Italy. The French covenanted to withdraw their army of occupation
in three months, but gave no effect to this clause.
It remained
to deal with the extensive district of the Grisoris. Here the difficulties were
great. The loss of the Valtelline predisposed the
inhabitants
against the French. In vain did French emissaries seek to stir up discontent in
that remote region. The atrocities committed at Stanz had opened the eyes of
these mountaineers; they rushed to arms to guard their western passes; and
their General Diet, on October 17, besought the Emperor to despatch an
auxiliary corps. In accordance with an arrangement of long standing, Austrian
troops were sent and took up winter quarters almost face to face with the
French encamped, on the borders. War would have broken out had not the French
Directory deemed it inopportune to provoke hostilities with the Emperor at that
juncture.
The
impression caused by these events was widespread and profound. The revulsion of
feeling in the minds of the formerly Gallophil poets, Wordsworth and Coleridge,
found expression in lofty strains of indignation that expressed the general
verdict of civilised Europe. Nor were Frenchmen unaffected by these sentiments.
The banished ex-Director, Carnot, published in Germany a pamphlet protesting
against this “ impious war,” and asserting that it was the policy of the French
Directory “to consolidate its strength by the destruction of its neighbours,
whom it treated as friends as long as it could extract anything from them; and
when the time came to destroy them, there was no want of pretexts to realise
the fable of the wolf and the lamb.” Germany also was moved to its depths by
the French conquest and spoliation of a land that had formerly been a part of
the Holy Roman Empire. In fact, had not Germany been rent asunder by the
secular feud of Austria and Prussia, war would at once have been declared
against France on the Swiss question.
But the
Empire was in its dotage, and Austria and Prussia were for the time chiefly
concerned with checking one another’s territorial designs at the Congress of
Rastatt. The limits of our space allow only a brief summary of the complex
negotiations and intrigues that there took place. The Congress opened on
December 16, 1797; Count Metternich represented the Empire ; Counts Lehrbach
and Cobenzl, the Habsburg States; Count Goertz and Baron Jacobi, Prussia;
Bonaparte, Treilhard, and Bonnier, France; while numerous envoys came from the
lesser German States. Before Bonaparte left for Paris he induced the Austrians
to withdraw their troops behind the river Lech, in pursuance of a secret
article signed at Campo Formio. The French thereupon surrounded Mainz and
Ehrenbreitstein, the former of which capitulated, while they besieged the
latter fortress for a year. Here, as in the case of Switzerland, the
overweening policy of France is traceable to the new Directory and to the
general who had installed it in power. His contempt for the Germanic System is
expressed in his letter of May 27, 1797: “ If the Germanic Body did not exist,
it would be necessary to create it for our convenience.”
By means of
intimidation unsparingly applied to Austria and the
German
States, their plenipotentiaries at Rastatt were brought to abandon the
principle of the integrity of the Empire, the whole of the left bank of the
Rhine being, with a slight reservation, ceded to France (March 9, 1798).
Territorial indemnities for the dispossessed German Princes could be found only
by the secularisation of the ecclesiastical States to the east of the Rhine;
and for these rich and helpless domains Prussia and several of the central and
southern States struggled and intrigued with the powerful aid of France.
Despite the
secret clause of the Treaty of Campo Formio which awarded the Archbishopric of
Salzburg to Austria, any plan of wholesale secularisation was most repugnant to
the Emperor; and, in his double capacity as elective head of the Empire and
hereditary ruler of the Habsburg dominions, he now resisted a proposal
threatening destruction to the spiritual States, which comprised 3,000,000
inhabitants, and sent three Electors to the Electoral College of eight and
thirty-five members to the College of Princes. The French plenipotentiaries,
knowing of the secret article relative to Salzburg signed at Campo Formio, made
light of his opposition; they also firmly opposed the execution of another
secret article which allotted a large strip of the south-east of Bavaria to the
Habsburg power. With respect to Salzburg, however, Francis II let it be known
that he would give way; he further suggested that Austria would forgo any
territorial gain in Germany provided that Prussia would do likewise. This
undertaking the Court of Berlin refused to give; and its plenipotentiaries
eagerly but vainly plied those of France to know the purport of the secret
articles referred to above, so that they might expose the weak points of
Austrian policy. Thus the enmity of Austria and Prussia and the ill-concealed
greed of many of the secular Princes placed German policy at the mercy of the
French envoys, who used their advantage with insolent disdain, Bonnier and the
new comer, Jean de Bry, being remarkable for their boorishness. Their conduct
was scarcely to be bome even by the princelings and place-hunters who thronged
their antechambers at Rastatt; but when Bemadotte, the French ambassador at
Vienna, adopted the same attitude and displayed a huge tricolour flag over the
gate of the embassy on the eve of a patriotic festival, the anger of the
Viennese knew no bounds, and they tore down the hated ensign (April 13). Nor
was Bemadotte’s indiscretion merely a hasty exhibition of Gascon bravado. The
French despatches prove the display of the tricolour to have been an injunction
of the French Foreign Office. Bemadotte forthwith left the capital; the two
countries once more seemed to be on the brink of war, until, partly owing to
Bonaparte’s good offices (for he was then on the point of sailing to the East),
the affair was patched up by Cobenzl and Francois de Neufchateau in conferences
held at Selz near Rastatt (May SO-July 6). On May 1 Thugut had been succeeded
by the more yielding Cobenzl as Foreign Minister.
Even before
this collision at Vienna the Emperor had, on March 9, taken the important step
of appealing to the Czar Paul to mediate between Austria, Prussia, and France
on German affairs. The resolve of the French to act as “ the arbiters of Europe
” (a course of action which Bonaparte had enjoined on Talleyrand in his famous
letter of October 7,
1797) was being exercised with a success so
complete that no other way of saving Germany seemed to be left. The Czar at
once consented; but the envoy whom he sent to Berlin, Prince Repnin, was partly
won over to the Prussian way of looking at German affairs. The formation of a
new league was therefore very slow. In vain did the British government press
the Court of Vienna to come to an understanding with that of Berlin and boldly
withstand the demands of France. The trust formerly felt in British policy had
been weakened by two events: first, by the withdrawal of our fleet from the
Mediterranean in November, 1796, and secondly, by a long and bitter dispute as
to the repayment of the loans raised in England for Austria during the late
war, amounting to £1,620,000. A convention had been signed in May, 1797, by
Count Starhemberg, the Imperial envoy in London, on terms analogous to those of
the year 1795; but the method of repayment therein proposed aroused great
discontent at Vienna, and on various pretexts that Court refused to repay the
stipulated sum. Many reams of despatches went from Downing Street to Vienna
filled with protests against Austria’s neglect of her treaty obligations. It
was in vain. Eden’s representations only increased the feeling against England.
A specimen of the Austrian retorts may be seen in Thugut’s despatch to
Starhemberg, of March 17, 1798. In this the Chancellor claimed that the
non-payment of British subsidies before the campaign of 1796 marred Austrian
prospects from the outset, while the retreat of the fleet from the
Mediterranean ruined the campaign in its later stages; further, that we had
prompted Naples to sign a separate peace in that year; and finally that the
pecuniary convention with Austria was framed on terms “ vraiment
judaiquesNevertheless, as the policy of great States ought not to be determined
by private rancour, he hoped that Great Britain would now loyally support
Austria against “ a fierce nation irrevocably determined on the total
subversion of Europe and rapidly marching to that end.” He therefore charged
Starhemberg to find out whether Britain could grant effective financial help to
Austria and continue the war in the year 1799; also whether she could send a
fleet into the Mediterranean.
By April 20
Pitt had decided to satisfy Thugut by despatching a powerful fleet to the
Mediterranean for the defence of the kingdom of Naples, whose interests were
now endangered by the threatening attitude of the French in Rome. The
announcement of this resolve to the governments of Austria, Russia, and
Naples, had no small share in hplping on the formation of a. new coalition.
Nelson was sent into the Mediterranean, with results that astonished the
world, hitherto ignorant of
Bonaparte’s
intentions. Rumour had confidently pointed to Naples, Sicily, or Ireland, as
the goal of Bonaparte’s armada; and great was the sense of relief at Vienna and
Naples when it was known that, after the capture of Malta, he had sailed to the
Levant.
Meanwhile
other events betokened the outbreak of war. The French, not content with
claiming at the Congress of Rastatt the chief tetes de pont on the right bank
of the Rhine, pressed on the siege of the Imperial garrison in Ehrenbreitstein,
an action that aroused general indignation. In fact, French aggressions in
Switzerland, Italy, and the Empire, together with the resolve of Great Britain
to send a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean for the protection of Naples,
spurred on the Courts of Russia and Austria to action against France. Yet the
conduct of Paul and Francis showed characteristic differences. While the Czar
throughout the month of May declaimed against the overbearing Republicans,
began the formation of a corps that was to help Austria, and made ready a fleet
in the Baltic for the support of England in the North Sea, the cautious
Habsburg sought in the growing difficulties of France a means of finding a
profitable compromise with her. Cobenzl used the private conferences held at
Selz, in 1798, as a means of probing French policy so as to find out what gains
France would allot to Austria in Italy and Germany. He pressed the special French
envoy, Francois de Neufchateau, to grant to the Habsburgs the Legations at the
expense of the Roman State, and the line of the Oglio in place of the Adige;
also, while sparing the Empire the shock of secularisation, to allow Austria to
expand westward at the expense of Bavaria. The Directory at once refused these
demands, as well as a second reduced series, and pointed to Turkey as providing
rich compensation for France, Austria, and Russia alike. Cobenzl replied, in
effect, that Austria had no wish to reopen the Eastern Question; she asked for
a good frontier in Italy; if that were granted, France might seize Piedmont; if
it were not granted, she demanded the exact fulfilment of the terms of Campo
Formio, which implied the independence of Rome and of the Cisalpine and Swiss
Republics. To this Francois retorted that those affairs did not concern
Austria, and alleged the consent of those nations. The conferences ended on
July 6; and Cobenzl returned to Vienna with the belief that war was
inevitable—a conviction which gained strength when the news arrived that the
French troops had occupied the citadel of Turin, thereby reducing to a shadow
the authority of Charles Emmanuel IV (July 3). Everything seemed to show that
France looked on Switzerland and Italy as her own, and on the first convenient
opportunity would seize the Grisons and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
With the
Neapolitan Court the Habsburgs were intimately connected, the Queen,
Marie-Caroline, being at once aunt and mother-in-law of the Emperor Francis II;
besides, the seizure of southern Italy would mean the complete domination of
the Adriatic by France, and the ruin of the
commerce of
Trieste. Already on May 20, 1798, a defensive treaty between Austria and Naples
had been signed at Vienna whereby the two States agreed to help one another to
the extent of 60,000 and 40,000 troops respectively; but, as the Viennese draft
of the treaty left the sphere of action of the Neapolitan contingent altogether
vague, while the Court of Naples insisted that it should be limited to Italy,
ratification was delayed; and the despatches of Sir Morton Eden leave little
doubt that the delay was expected by the Court of Vienna, which sought to put
off the outbreak of war as long as possible, and treated the British Minister
with the utmost reserve. Cobenzl also kept open the affair of the loan,
presumably because George III insisted on its settlement as a necessary
preliminary to any alliance.
The
Habsburgs, in fact, based all their hopes on the help of Russia; and the
actions of the Czar hitherto betokened less energy in military affairs than in
those of the navy. In July his promised succour took shape in a convention
according military aid to the Habsburgs; but the contingent was very slow in
assembling. The news of the capture of Malta by Bonaparte gave strength and
solidity to his purposes, and through him to those of the Habsburgs. Thugut
once more took the reins of office, and at the end of July despatched Cobenzl
to Berlin to persuade Prussia to join the Czar in decisive action against
Prance. In an important despatch of July 24 Thugut declared that recent events
at Rome and in the Cisalpine and Helvetic Republics (especially in the last
named) were incompatible with the safety of Austria, Naples, and Tuscany. These
arguments were without effect. Frederick William refused the Austrian
proposals, just as he had declined the offer of a French alliance which Sieyes
was specially charged to make to him; and Prussia maintained an attitude of
stubborn half-threatening neutrality which angered and perplexed the allies, as
she did in the not dissimilar crisis of 1805.
At St
Petersburg everything seemed to smile on Cobenzl’s enterprise. In the violent
and wayward nature of the Czar Paul the mood that might be counted on with some
approach to certainty was that of vanity; and, having latterly accepted the
title of Protector of the Order of Malta, he took the French seizure of that
island as a personal affront of the most heinous kind. He now sheltered many of
the outcast knights, empowering them to establish a Priory of the Order in his
own palace. In their turn they named him Grand Master of the Order in place of
the traitor who had surrendered Valetta to the French. Paul accepted the title
(October 27), fulminated against sacrilegious traitors and robbers with
unctuous vehemence similar to that used by the Knights in their manifesto, and
decorated his new mistress, Mademoiselle Lapukine, with the insignia of the
Order. The rise of this favourite, due to a curious intrigue fomented by the
valet and ex-barber, Kutaitsoff, helped on the Austrian cause, seeing that the
Czarina, and the now discarded mistress,
Mademoiselle
Nelidoff, were somewhat Prussian in their leanings. Sensuous passion and
wounded vanity therefore alike favoured the growth of the new coalition at the
capital which was now the centre of European diplomacy.
Indeed, the
pacific leanings that marked the first eighteen months of Paul’s reign had
already given place to delight in the army and a resolve to copy the minutiae
of the Prussian military service. Pipeclay and pig-tails were forced on the
soldiery; and endless parades convinced Paul that his army was now as perfect a
machine as that of the great Frederick. He longed to prove this to the world.
But, owing to the opposition of some of his Ministers, and the uncertainty
respecting the ulterior aims of Austria in case she drew the sword, the month
of August nearly wore away before the promised auxiliary corps began to march
towards Galicia. The open and definite policy of Britain inspired confidence,
and the Czar welcomed a suggestion made by the British Ambassador, Sir Charles
Whitworth, as to the advisability of an Anglo- Russian expedition acting
against Holland from Hanover as a base. British influence was wholly in the
ascendant. In vain did the Directory ply the Czar with secret offers, made
through the Swiss La Harpe, to join in the partition of the Turkish Empire.
These insinuations (so Whitworth reported in his despatch of August 17 to
Downing Street) gained over some of the Russian Ministers; but in Paul’s mind
the thought of completing the work begun by Peter the Great and Catharine II
seemed to find no place. He bound himself to the Sultan by a treaty, and
despatched a powerful fleet from Sebastopol through the Dardanelles to act with
the Turks in the Mediterranean (September,
1798).
Even here the would-be Allies could not shake off their feelings of distrust.
The novel apparition of a Russian Black Sea fleet in the Mediterranean caused
some alarm at Vienna, especially when its aim was known to be the blockade of
the French in Corfu. The pressing need was to land a Russo-Turkish force in
Egypt (as Nelson strongly advised), or to grant to Naples the help for which
she was already pleading. The blockade of Corfu showed that Russia looked more
to her own territorial designs than to effective action against France; and
Whitworth’s despatches reveal Paul’s fears that England would not only capture
but keep Malta.
The violent
caprices of the Czar caused even greater concern. His transports of anger
against the lovers of Catharine II could be overlooked; but when the bluff old
warrior, Suvdroff, was sent in disgrace to his estates for writing a couple of
lines of doggerel on the introduction of Prussian pig-tails into the army, and
a captain of the Guard publicly received a cuff on the head for having joked
about the Czar’s German tendencies in a private letter opened by the police,
warriors and statesmen alike began to question the durability of Russia’s
polity and the sanity of her ruler. Nor were his whims confined to home
affairs. Matters of gravest moment swayed to and fro under the breath of his
caprice.
Thus, on the
arrival of a report as to the bad quality of the Austrian food-supplies
provided on the Galician frontier, he sent an order to dissolve the whole
auxiliary corps on which the Habsburgs set such store. Whitworth reported to
London on October 4 that his utmost efforts and those of Cobenzl barely availed
to set matters right. At last, on October 25, the first Russian troops entered
Galicia; but not until Christmas did they reach Briinn; and, even so, the
contingent mustered scarcely 25,000 strong in place of the 60,000 men for which
Austria had covenanted. Is it surprising that Francis II and Thugut wished to
see Russia wholly committed to war with France before they provoked a rupture ?
The same
fears as to the trustworthiness of Paul’s professions undoubtedly led the
British Ministry to press on the formation of a compact that would bind Great
Britain, Russia, Austria, and (if possible) Prussia, in lasting bonds. The
proposal took form in a despatch dated from Downing Street, November 16,
proposing that the four Powers should employ “ their united efforts to reduce
France within her ancient limits (an object of evident and pressing interest to
the future tranquillity and independence of Europe), to which [alliance] every
other Power should be invited to accede.” The territorial aims of Austria
should be as far as possible satisfied, and, as the Emperor looked mainly to
Italy, it ought not to be difficult to please both Powers. The acquisition of
the Milanese, in addition to his recent gains in Italy, would probably
indemnify Francis II for his efforts against France. As for the King of
Prussia, it was known that he wished to see the House of Orange restored to
Holland; and he should be invited to state his wishes in other directions. The
independence of Switzerland and Holland must be a sine qua non of a durable
peace, the strengthening of the latter being secured by union with the southern
Netherlands, their “civil and religious constitutions” being duly safeguarded.
With these aims the Russian Ministers professed complete sympathy, even while
they expressed doubts as to Prussia’s cooperation and Austria’s
straightforwardness. On the latter point the doubts of English Ministers were
equally great. Indeed, the vacillations of the Imperial government moved
Whitworth to the following unusual outburst in his despatch of December 18,
1798 : “God only knows what may be the intentions of the Court of Vienna, but
it certainly is felt here that unless some solid assurance of support is held
out [to it], such is its want of confidence, the natural effect of its own
fluctuating conduct, it will in despair listen to the tempting offers now
proposed by the Directory.” Austria, it is true, did not accede to the offers
here referred to of a joint partition of the Turkish Empire ; but both Russia
and England credited her with the desire to do so at the last moment and to leave
them stranded. This explains the delay, which was to prove so fatal, in the
formation of the Second Coalition.
The only
differences between Russian and British policy were with respect to the
restoration of the French monarchy and the question of Malta. So far back as
July 24,1798, Whitworth reported the aim of the Czar and his Ministers to be “
the reestablishment of general tranquillity on safe and honourable terms, and
not the restoration of the French monarchy such as was proposed, and would
never have been departed from, by the late Empress.” On the other hand, George
III and Pitt adhered to the design of restoring the French monarchy. This
design inspired British policy until Pitt’s resignation, after which a change
took place. The difference did not, however, affect the cordiality existing
between the Courts of London and St Petersburg; the question was clearly
remote.
The Maltese
affair touched Paul far more nearly, especially when British cruisers began to
blockade Valetta. For the Order of St John, as now reconstituted and settled in
his own palace, he had a fatherly love. “ He enters into every detail,” wrote
Whitworth, “ with the most enthusiastic ardour.” Somewhat later the British
envoy reported the Czar’s rancour against all who did not bow down before the
new Imperial toy. Because the new Elector of Bavaria, Maximilian Joseph,
sequestrated the revenues of the Order, his Minister was straightway driven
from St Petersburg in the depth of winter and taken to the frontier by the
police. The same lot next befell the Spanish ambassador; and the Portuguese
Minister lived in daily dread of a message of expulsion. The Bailli de Litta,
the Prior of the Russian branch of the Order, who had been the means of
conferring the Grand Mastership on the Czar, was also banished to his estates
for having taken too much upon himself and paid too little reverence to his
august superior. It is not surprising that Whitworth urged the British
government to lose no time in recognising the Czar’s new title, otherwise he
himself might at any time be expelled; for “ the rock of Malta is that on which
all men split.” One incident placed Paul’s enthusiasm in a somewhat sinister
light. After the signature of the Anglo-Russian Treaty (soon to be noticed) a
ukase appeared appointing a distinguished Russian general to command at Malta.
On Whitworth significantly enquiring as to the meaning of this phrase, he
received the reply that it should have been worded “ to command the Russian
troops at Malta.” Our ambassador accepted the explanation, and even added to
Grenville that he believed the Czar’s action about the island was prompted by
enthusiasm, not by ambition. The British Ministry took a less charitable view
of the case, and thenceforth gave close heed to Russian schemes in the
Mediterranean. Nelson’s fears were no less keen, as his despatches show.
Despite all
these difficulties an Anglo-Russian Treaty was at the last very speedily
arranged and signed on December 29, 1798—partly, it would seem, owing to the
bribe of 40,000 roubles given by Whitworth to the Czar’s valet, Kutaitsoff, “
whose credit with Paul increases daily.”
This compact
bound the two Powers in close alliance, with the general aim of bringing back
France to her pre-revolutionary boundaries, Russia setting on foot a new army
of 45,000 men (as a matter of fact it fell short of this by 10,000), on
condition of receiving a British subsidy of £75,000 per month, together with a
preliminary sum of £225,000 towards the equipment of this force. On the other
hand, all hopes of an Anglo-Austrian alliance seemed doomed to disappointment.
The wretched disputes about the repayment of the loan by Austria dragged
on—they were not settled until the close of 1799—Grenville even declaring that
Austria’s refusal to fulfil her treaty obligations seemed to argue a secret
arrangement with the French or a wish to come to terms with them at the last
moment.
Meanwhile, a
petty Power in the south had rushed into the arena, thereby marring alike the
cautious calculations of Austria and the far-seeing policy of Pitt. The news of
the battle of the Nile threw the King, Queen, and the royalists of Naples, into
a delirium of joy (September 4). Queen Caroline poured forth her ecstasy to
Lady Hamilton in a letter that showed the fears which had haunted the rulers of
Naples ever since the French took Rome and lorded it in the Mediterranean. On
the 22nd, when Nelson himself arrived, the enthusiasm knew no bounds; and the
feelings of the Court and of the generally royalist populace set strongly in
favour of war with France, now that her greatest general and the flower of her
soldiery were shut up helplessly in Egypt. On Nelson’s request aid was speedily
sent to the British and Portuguese ships engaged in blockading the French
garrison in Valetta; the native Maltese meanwhile threatened the fortress by
land, declared the King of Naples their lawful ruler, and donned his colours.
The old suzerain rights of the realm of the Two Sicilies over the island gave a
show of reason to these proceedings.
Accordingly,
the French ambassador did not leave Naples; nor was the help given to the
British ships at Naples and off Valetta by Ferdinand treated as a casus belli
agaJr’st him by the French Directoiy. The news of the battle of the Nile and of
the Russian assistance afforded to Austria gave pause to the rulers of France.
In truth, they were not ready to face the gathering coalition. On September 23,
at General Jourdan’s motion, the Councils passed a law enjoining military
service on all men capable of bearing arms between twenty and twenty-five years
of age—a law which inaugurated the period of great citizen armies. On September
27 a further decree ordered a levy of 200,000 men, but scarcely a fourth of
that number answered the call. Moreover, the policy of annexation had scattered
the defenders of France from the Helder to the Roman Campagna. The old troops,
indeed, were ready; as many as 180,000 Frenchmen had seen service, and some
55,000 of their allies (Dutch, Swiss, and Cisalpines) were reputed to be
efficient. But what were these against the forces of Russia, Great Britain,
Austria,
the Holy
Roman Empire, Naples, not to speak of Turkey in the east ? The failure of the
three French expeditions against Ireland and of the Irish revolt itself had
weakened the French navy and restored England’s striking power. Indeed, the
recent outbreak of hostilities between France and the United States seemed to
presage a war in which all the world, from the Mississippi to the Volga and the
Euphrates, would combine to overbear the haughty Republic. In such a case, was
it rash to set the ball rolling against a remote part of the long line of the
French defensive ?
Such were the
thoughts that weighed with Nelson and the rulers of Naples. Their right hand
now as always was General Acton, whose varied powers had raised him to the
chief posts in the kingdom. While the fear of France lay heavy on the royal
couple he was kept aloof, and the more temporising Marchese di Gallo held the
portfolio for Foreign Affairs—an arrangement which deceived no one at Naples or
Paris, least of all Nelson. The Admiral’s hatred for “the French robbers” was
now fanned by his sudden and unconquerable passion for Lady Hamilton. The
beautiful wife of Sir William Hamilton, the septuagenarian ambassador who
upheld British interests at Naples, was a bosom- friend of Queen Caroline, and
shared her hatred of all republicans. Lady Hamilton’s influence thus instilled
into Nelson a fatal drop of political venom. Thenceforth his outlook on
Continental events was no longer solely that of a British admiral; it became,
for a time at least, that of a Neapolitan Bourbon.
The Court of
Naples now showed the utmost arrogance. Already it had occupied the papal fiefs
of Benevento and Ponte Corvo, and now dreamt of the conquest of Rome and Corfu.
If the worst should come, it had the British fleet at hand for safe conveyance
to Sicily. Another cause of hesitation on its part was also removed. None of
the Neapolitan generals had seemed worthy of leading a division ; but
Caroline’s prayers to the Emperor to send them a leader were now answered by
the arrival of General Mack. Mack’s reputation is one of the puzzles in which
this period abounds, until we remember that his capacity as a strategist and
organiser shone merely by comparison with that of the other Austrian generals.
Of this he seems to have had some inkling himself; for Eden had recently
reported that he was strongly averse from war in central Europe. Nevertheless,
he now came to reform and lead an army of which he knew nothing, and nearly
half of which consisted of recruits lately tom from the plough or the gambling
dens of Naples. Outwardly that army seemed to be ready for anything; and the
Queen now sought to draw the Emperor into her toils, alleging that the French
were about to invade the Two Sicilies and that it was wiser to deal the blow
than to wait to receive it.
Francis,
however, turned a deaf ear to protestations and prayers alike. Nay, he saw in
the entreaty not merely the action of a headstrong
Queen and
revengeful favourites; he discerned the hand of England. Eden reported that the
Emperor spoke out his suspicions to the Neapolitan envoy; and Thugut afterwards
in an interview with him accused the British Ministry “ with unusual warmth ”
of pushing on the King and Queen of Naples so that their family ties with the
Emperor and the alliance nearly completed between them should involve Austria
in the struggle. Eden no less warmly repelled the taunt; but he had not at hand
so complete a refutation as that which the British archives supply. On October
3 (the day when the belated news of Nelson’s victory reached London) Grenville
warned the Neapolitan envoy of the risks of attacking France; he also wrote to
Hamilton in these terms: “ His [Britannic] Majesty was not insensible of the
danger which must attend such a resolution, if taken without the fullest
assurances of support from the Court of Vienna....In this situation it appeared
that the decision both in point of substance and of time must be left to his
Sicilian Majesty’s own determination, and that the most friendly conduct which
his [Britannic] Majesty could pursue on this subject was to refer the
negotiation to Naples, and thus to leave it to his Sicilian Majesty to act in
this respect as circumstances may require, and particularly as may be found
most expedient from a view of the final resolutions (whatever they may be) of
the Court of Vienna.” Grenville therefore sent full powers to Hamilton for
concluding an Anglo-Neapolitan alliance, but warned him that no loan must be expected
from Great Britain.
These
warnings came too late. The Neapolitan Court and their British ad risers had
already thrown caution to the winds. On October 16, before receiving
Grenville’s despatch, Hamilton wrote to him that the French government had ordered
an army of 60,000 men to act against Naples—an absurdly false report—and that “
the conferences we have had with General Acton have certainly decided this
government to the salutary determination of attacking rather than waiting to be
attacked.” On November 19 he reported Mack’s great satisfaction with the
Neapolitan army, at a review held near Caserta on the 12th, when Mack assured
Nelson that “he had never in all his experience seen so fine a body of men.”
Hamilton added : “ In the evening we (i.e. Nelson and he) had a consultation
with Generals Mack and Acton in which we all agreed that the boldest measures
were the safest.” The ambassador further passed sentence on himself by the
admission, “ The uncertainty of the Emperor’s support seemed to be the only
drawback.” This informal council then and there decided that the army should
enter the Roman States on the 23rd. Nelson also offered to take 5000 troops by
sea to Leghorn in answer to the prayers of the Grand Duke of Tuscany for help.
During these conferences Grenville’s despatch arrived, but too late to give
pause to the Queen and her self-constituted advisers. The fate of Naples was
already decided by her and by Lady Hamilton.
On November
22 Nelson sailed with 5000 Neapolitan troops for Leghorn to raise Tuscany
against the French; two days later the Neapolitan main army, about 40,000
strong, crossed the boundary in five columns and headed for Rome, whence the
French commander, Championnet, withdrew in haste with the small garrison.
Taking this action, not as a prudent strategic move for the purpose of
concentration on his base of operations, Ancona, but as a confession of
weakness, Ferdinand came up and entered Rome as conqueror amidst loud acclamations
at the overthrow of the French (November 29). His triumph was short-lived.
After concentrating the French forces and taking up a good central position,
Championnet burst upon the widely dispersed columns which Mack judged to be
needful for the success of the enveloping movements to which Austrian strategy
still clung. Two of the Neapolitan divisions were shattered at Fermo and Temi,
and the chief mass of them at Civita Castellana; thereafter the invaders never
dared to look the Republicans in the face. Championnet’s men reentered Rome on
December 9, and thence pushed the wreck of Mack’s army before them to the banks
of the Yolturno. The strongholds of the Abruzzi surrendered at discretion; and
Gaeta, which might have been another Acre to the French, opened its gates to
Ney at the first summons.
But now, when
all seemed won, the French found before them a sturdier foe than the royal
army. The peasants flocked to arms at the appeal of priests and dealt severe
checks to isolated French divisions. The lazzaroni of Naples also bestirred
themselves for a great effort. They had long been known for their hardihood and
fierceness, their hatred of new ways, and devotion to the reigning House. For
them the easy life of the city and the favour of its patron saint, Januarius,
were all in all. The ideas of the Revolution and the Republic, which had
filtered into the social strata above them, aroused their hatred because they
were new ; and now, when King and Queen seemed about to flee before an army of
infidel innovators, the rabble clamoured for arms, slaughtered an Austrian
courier under the King’s eyes, and refused to depart from the palace until the
King promised not to leave them. But promises sat lightly upon Ferdinand.
Already he was concerting with Nelson the means of escape from this warlike
populace; and on the night of December 21 the royal family, together with the
Hamiltons, the chief Ministers, and 20,000,000 ducats in treasure, stealthily
made their way to the British fleet, which forthwith sailed for Palermo. The
government of the mainland was entrusted to Prince Pignatelli; in reality it
passed to the lazzaroni. Helped by some of the disbanded troops, they secured
the forts, Castel Nuovo and Castel dell’ Uovo, and prepared for a desperate
defence of the city. Meanwhile Mack had concluded regular warfare by a truce
which made over to the enemy the fortress of Capua and all the land to the
north of the Voltumo (January 12, 1799); a few days later he fled from his
mutinous soldiery to the French
camp, where
he received scornful permission to proceed to the north of Italy.
The truce was
soon broken by the French. The Neapolitan reformers, fearing for their lives
amidst that fierce rabble, secretly sent a message to Championnet bidding him
advance with all speed. The lazzaroni, raging the more at every sign of treachery,
thronged out to fight him ; and villages and farmhouses became the scenes of
savage fighting which cost the invaders dear. Yet little by little they pressed
in on the capital. There the democrats by a ruse had seized on the Castle of St
Elmo; but even that misfortune failed to cow the lazzaroni; they beat back
Generals Mounier and Duhesme from the northern suburb; and, when Thiebault
finally carried that post, the city still defied the Republicans. The struggle
went on street by street and house by house; and only after two more days of
slaughter did disciplined valour triumph over southern fanaticism. Even then it
was as much a triumph of tact as of force. Championnet was one of the few
French generals of that period who showed skill in dealing with alien peoples.
As the fighting waned, he spoke to the lazzaroni in their own tongue, promising
freedom for their city, every comfort for its population, and the utmost
respect for St Januarius. The words told with magical force; Thiebault marched
with a guard of honour to the shrine of the saint, and himself with politic
hypocrisy knelt at the altar. On that very evening Championnet and his staff
received an overwhelming ovation at the theatre from the democrats, now
exultant at their escape from a petty and capricious tyranny.
Taking
advantage of this revulsion of feeling, Championnet at once established the
Parthenopean Republic on the ruins of the Bourbon rule (January 23). At first
the change was eagerly welcomed by the middle classes and many of the nobles;
five eminent men were chosen as Directors ; and the Councils, elected on the
French model, set about the abolition of tithes and of feudal abuses, and in
every way strove to recall the days of July and August, 1789, at Paris and
Versailles. These bright hopes were soon to be overcast. The exaction of
60,000,000 francs from the conquered territory would alone have strained the
gratitude of the Neapolitan democrats; but now there settled down on the city
the harpies that had sucked the life from Rome and other Italian
capitals,—commissioners selecting pictures for the Paris galleries,
contractors, who, under the guise of catering for the army, starved the
soldiers and gorged themselves, together with traffickers of many kinds, all at
the expense of the liberated land. These mean marauders, albeit protected by
the diplomatic agent Faypoult, newly come from Paris, at first met with a sharp
rebuff. Championnet’s justice was no less marked than his courage; and, seeing
whither all this was tending, he first curbed the chief plunderers, and on
their defying his authority, expelled the “ commission ” from Neapolitan
territory. They
speedily had
their revenge. Appealing to the French Directory, they procured his disgrace ;
on the last day of February he handed over the command to Macdonald, who was on
good terms with Faypoult and his following. The plunder went on once more, and
with it the area of discontent and revolt steadily widened, Naples becoming a
byword against France and a source of hope for her enemies.
The rupture
with Naples decided the French Directory to vigorous action in northern Italy.
They had long marked Piedmont as their own. Looking on a European war as
certain, they sent the ambitious young Barth ele my Joubert, who had lately
dictated terms to the Batavian Republic, to end matters with the King of
Sardinia. The French commander of the citadel of Turin, Emmanuel Grouchy, set
the Jacobin wire-pullers to work throughout the kingdom; and, when the
democrats were on the point of revolt, Joubert marched in to repress disorder.
Charles Emmanuel IV, after being subjected to the most ignominious treatment,
abdicated (December 9, 1798), retiring to Florence, and thence to the island of
Sardinia, where the House of Savoy found shelter till the year 1814. Piedmont
provided the invaders with rich prey; apart from the spoiling of palaces,
churches, and museums, it paid
10,330,000 francs to the French treasury within the
space of three months. The natural result was a fierce and widespread revolt
which greatly weakened the French position in northern Italy. As had happened
with Holland, Switzerland, Rome, and Naples, the intervention of the French
furnished the Allies with the casus belli and France herself with the sinews of
war.
These events
in Italy likewise clinched the Anglo-Russian alliance, which, as we have seen,
was concluded on December 29. Exactly a month before the Czar had covenanted to
send military and naval help to the King of Naples. Portugal was already at war
with France. Nevertheless, half of the month of February, 1799, had slipped by
before the Czar was convinced that Austria would draw the sword. Whitworth
reported on February 19 that the long uncertainties were at an end, and that
the force destined by Russia for the help of Naples would now operate with her
first expeditionary force in the north of Italy and with the Austrians, thq
combined armies being placed under the command of that fierce fighter,
SuvdrofF. Another powerful Russian force, that subsidised by Great Britain, was
being prepared for service on the Rhine ; and the Pitt Ministry strongly
advised that it should be directed towards Switzerland, as was afterwards done.
The news of
these alliances and the overthrow of the dynasties of Naples and Savoy, as well
as the encroachments of the French in Germany, stirred the Viennese government
to new activity. While the Congress of Rastatt was sitting, a Russian corps was
marching to the aid of Austria and the Republican troops were besieging
Ehrenbreitstein; and now, while the French demands on Germany were steadily
rising, came
the news that
the Imperial garrison in that stronghold had surrendered to the Republicans.
The long farce of the Congress was evidently played out. Yet the French
plenipotentiaries kept their posts, skilfully feeding the hopes of the smaller
German States with the prospect of rich Church lands and threatening the Empire
with war if the Russians should enter any of its States. On January 81, 1799,
they warned the Austrian envoy that if they were not informed of the retreat of
the Russians within fifteen days war would ensue. The Habsburg Court returned
no answer; and, before dawn on March 1, two French armies crossed the Rhine.
Eleven days later Austria declared war, yet the Congress continued to discuss
the terms of peace between France and the Empire. Even the news of the decisive
victory of the Archduke Charles at Stockach (March 25) failed to stop the
trafficking of the petty Princes with the French envoys under the wing of
Prussia; and the auction was proceeding when the Emperor launched a declaration
dissolving the Congress and annulling all its acts (April 8). The French
envoys, affecting indignation at this irregular ending to the activities of
fifteen months, held their ground; and the approach of the Austrian vanguard to
Rastatt found them still treating with their German clients.
But now the
farce was to end in tragedy. Pursuant to the orders that came from Paris, the
French plenipotentiaries remained at Rastatt several days after their German
colleagues had left; the Viennese Court, suspecting that this obstinacy implied
the existence of important plans between France and her newly-found vassals,
seems to have passed the hint to headquarters to seize the envoys’ papers. The
Archduke Charles being temporarily absent from duty owing to a nervous
disorder, the control passed into the hands of General Schmidt, well known for
his hatred of France ; he placed around the town a regiment of Szekler hussars
commanded by an unscrupulous man, Barbaczy, while near by was another regiment
comprising a band of French emigres. Barbaczy bade the French envoys depart,
seeing that the Congress was at an end. They declined. On April 25 horsemen
seized the papers of one of their couriers. On the 28th Barbaczy ordered them to
leave the town within twenty-four hours, and refused any safe conduct. Setting
out at night, they were stopped almost at once; Szekler hussars (or emigres in
their uniform) dragged them from their carriages and slew Bonnier and Roberjot
outright; de Bry was left for dead, but afterwards escaped. The valuables of
their families and all their papers were seized.
Such are the
bare facts as to the outrage. Its inmost secrets will perhaps never be known.
An official enquiry set on foot by the Austrian government came to an abrupt
end, and all the documents relating to the subject soon vanished from the
archives of Vienna. The action of the Directory in exposing its envoys to
needless dangers gave some colour to the suggestion that it sought to win
popularity for the war
out of their
blood. But, even if we accept this very strained explanation, which then found
strangely wide credence, Austria is not absolved from a damning charge.
Barbaczy and his tools were guilty of the deliberate murder of men who had not
yet ceased to be plenipotentiaries, whose persons were therefore inviolable;
yet the murderers were never reprimanded or degraded. In spite of some
suspicious evidence which has recently been brought to light, it still seems
probable that the Austrian authorities meant to do no more than chastise the
envoys for their unbearable insolence and seize their papers. If this alone was
their aim, the outcome was a ghastly blunder. The estimable Roberjot was tom
from the arms of his wife and slain, while the swashbuckler Jean de Bry
escaped. Above all, no state papers of any importance were found. In its
defiance of the law of nations for the attainment of petty ends, as in its
mysterious ineffectiveness, the outrage stands without a parallel in the modem
history of civilised nations.
This sinister
event added passion to the strife already raging in Germany, Switzerland, and
Italy. The limits of our space, however, prevent any but the briefest notice of
the war of 1799. Despite the long preparations of Austria, the French were
first in the field and gained a few successes on the Upper Inn, which could not
be followed up owing to Jour dan’s crushing defeat by the Archduke Charles at
Stockach in Swabia (March 25). Whether from weak health, excess of prudence, or
the interference of the Hofkriegsraih with his plans, Charles neglected to reap
the full fruits of victory; and the French fell back unharmed through the Black
Forest to the Rhine.
In Italy loss
upon loss befell the tricolour flag. There the French had 102,000 men in the
northern provinces, and 32,000 men in and around Naples, besides 32,000 Italian
and Polish allies. But these forces were widely scattered and ineffectively
handled. The commander- in chief, Scherer, was speedily driven by the Austrians
from the lines of the Adige, Mincio, and Oglio, and Mantua was left to its
fate. Once behind the Adda, Scherer resigned the command to Moreau. Even this
skilful leader was no match for the masterful Suvdroff, who now brought 18,000
Russians to help about double that number of Habsburg troops in the field. The
furious onset of the Muscovites under their beloved leader was irresistible;
the Allies pierced the French lines, unduly spread out along the right bank of
the Adda, forced the bridgehead at Cassano, and, capturing Serurier with 3000
men (April 27), forthwith entered Milan. A month later the Allies, with the
help of the Piedmontese royalists, gained possession of the city of Turin; and
Moreau had great difficulty in cutting his way through the passes of the Maritime
Alps to the Genoese coast.
Meanwhile
Macdonald was advancing with the French forces drawn from Naples and Central
Italy, now 36,000 strong, his progress also being hampered by the risings of
the peasantry. Yet his entry on the scene of
action was at
first incisive. He defeated the Austrians at Modena (June 12), thereby
paralysing the allied advance westwards. Moreau, who reached Genoa on June 27,
thereupon ordered him to strike at the communications of the Allies between
Piacenza and Mantua, and so draw SuvorofF away to the east, while he himself
assailed his rear. This plan came near to success, but Suvdroff by a rapid
concentration and forced march threw himself on Macdonald while Moreau was
still in Genoa, dealt the Army of Naples terrible blows in three days’ fighting
on the banks of the Tidone and Trebbia (June 17—19), and compelled it to
retreat towards the Apennines. In sore plight the beaten troops crossed those
mountains, and, doubling back by way of Spezzia and the Comice Hoad, finally
reached Genoa in a state of utter exhaustion. There Macdonald met Moreau, whose
movements had been too much hampered by his earlier losses of materiel to
effect anything of importance against Suvdroff’s rear. The Russian leader,
after routing Macdonald, had faced about and forced him to retire through the
Bocchetta Pass. For these brilliant achievements Suvdroff received the title of
Prince with the cognomen “Italiski” (Italian). On the French side Macdonald
retired on the plea of illness, and the united French forces were entrusted to
General Joubert.
These
disasters brought about the fall of the Cisalpine, Roman, and Parthenopean
Republics. Everywhere the democrats felt the anger of priests and the hatred of
the fickle populace ; but nowhere did reaction lead to tragedies so sombre as
those which befell the city of Naples. There the new faith, beloved by the
cultured few, remained a suspected novelty to the rabble; and the shooting of
royalist conspirators in the southern districts failed to keep the country for
the Republic even while the French were at hand. Macdonald’s retirement at the
close of April gave full force to the reaction. He left two French battalions
in the Castle of St Elmo, while the patriot forces held the smaller forts,
Nuovo and dell’ Uovo. But what was this against a British squadron acting under
Troubridge, a Russo-Turkish detachment sent from Corfu, and the royalist bands
mustering in the south under the King’s envoy, Cardinal Ruffo P In the middle
of June these forces closed in on Naples and speedily cooped up the Republicans
in the castles named above. Ruffo, however, fearing the approach of Bruix’
Franco-Spanish fleet then hovering off the Genoese coast, parleyed with the
garrisons of the Castelli Nuovo and dell’ Uovo, and arranged for a capitulation,
granting them the honours of war and a safe conduct (June 19). In granting
these very lenient terms Ruffo went beyond the supplementary instructions of
April 29 sent to him by the King. Such ais they were, these terms received the
signature of Captain Foote, then commanding the British force (June 23).
But on the
morrow, instead of Bruix, Nelson appeared in the offing and ranged his 18
men-of-war and 22 gun-vessels off the city. This
658
Nelson and the Neapolitan rebels.
event spread
dismay among the Republicans. Invested with unlimited powers by the King at
Palermo, and claiming with reason that his arrival completely altered the
situation, Nelson determined to set aside the capitulations granted to the
garrisons, which had not yet been carried out; that with the garrison at
Castellamare had taken effect, and Nelson respected it. Ruffo, while firmly
protesting against this, warned the two garrisons of the change in the
situation (evening of June 25); and the commander of the Castel Nuovo sent a reply
which proves him to have known of the change. Neither Nelson, nor Captains
Troubridge and Ball, who saw the commanders of both castles, made any promise
that the lives of the garrisons should be spared. Nelson asserted that he had
the right to override the Cardinal’s authority as much as that of Captain
Foote, and that the capitulations with the rebels were null and void until
ratified by the King, who alone could decide on their pardon. It was with
knowledge of these facts that the garrisons came out on the evening of June 26.
On the 28th, after the arrival of orders from Palermo, their leaders were
seized, and, after Ferdinand had reached Naples on July 10, were executed by
the Neapolitan authorities. Nelson’s conduct in this matter was certainly marked
by vindictiveness and ferocity; but the charge of treacherously setting at
naught a completed compact has never been made good. Indeed, a comparison of
the original documents lately published by the Navy Records Society with the
version of them given by Dumas and Sacchinelli, shows that Nelson’s detractors
have, in some cases, had little regard for truth. In the case of Prince
Caracciolo, however, his action was quite indefensible.
The arrival
of Ferdinand saw the beginning of a royalist Reign of Terror. Those who had
taken arms against him were put to death by hundreds in the capital and in the
provinces. Even the civilians, including the elite of the country, who
temperately administered public affairs after the flight of the Court, found no
mercy; as many as 120 of them went to the scaffold; and Naples never recovered
from the treatment now inflicted by the boorish King, who from Nelson’s
flagship dispensed justice to his subjects and then sailed away to Palermo. St
Elmo surrendered on July 12 to Captain Troubridge, who also assisted in
reducing Capua a few weeks later. Their garrisons were sent to France. For his
share in these events Nelson received from Ferdinand the questionable honour of
the Dukedom of Bronte in Sicily. George III, however, accorded to the victor of
the Nile at his first appearance at Court a most chilling reception ; and
Hamilton justly received a more serious rebuke. During those terrible days of
midsummer he held no mandate from the Sicilian Bourbons. While on Nelson’s ship
it behoved him as British Minister to curb the vindictiveness of the admiral
and of the Neapolitan royalists. He made one weak effort to do so; but, on the
whole, he was as clay in their hands. He therefore soon received
the order to
quit a post where his senile weakness had soiled his country’s flag and his own
public and private reputation.
Thus closed
this episode, the most pitiful, perhaps, in the annals of peoples who have
heedlessly sought to break away from an unbearable past and to win their way
forthwith to a political millennium. The childlike faith of the Neapolitan
democrats, their southern impetuosity, the baleful interference of foreigners,
the Medea-like hatred of Marie- Caroline and the Circean figure of Lady
Hamilton, help to invest those events with dramatic vividness. And the drama
was not without its Nemesis. If Naples lost her noblest sons, she yet blasted
the fame of the intervening foreigners, and she bequeathed to Italians and
Englishmen of a later day the duty of vengeance and reparation in the overthrow
of the thenceforth detested Bourbons.
Meanwhile the
French were on the brink of still greater disasters in the north of the
peninsula. The citadel of Alessandria surrendered on July 22, and eight days
later Mantua hoisted the white flag. These events set free large besieging
forces of the Allies; the recent arrival of reinforcements from Russia also
brought the Muscovite total up to
27,000 men. Thus it was against foes superior in
numbers and prestige that the French moved out from the shelter of Genoa early
in August. Saint-Cyr advised delay; but the ambitious young Joubert, not
knowing of the fall of Mantua, burned to strike a blow that might lessen the
pressure on that garrison. He therefore seized the commanding heights above the
town of Novi. There the French, 35,000 strong, were surprised by Kray’s
Austrians, whose skirmishers slew Joubert at the outset. Nevertheless the
French bravely rallied and beat back three onsets of SuvdrofTs somewhat
scattered divisions. Late in the day the Russian leader ordered the Austrian
general Melas, who had come up with 9000 troops, to circle round the heights
and attack the French right flank and rear on the side of Gavi. Before this
unexpected onset the wearied French broke and fled. The village and defile of
Pasturana were now their only way of escape. The gorge was speedily choked by
waggons and guns; and on the maddened rout a Hungarian battalion, crowning a
height further south, opened fire with frightful effect. Darkness alone saved
the Republicans from utter ruin. As it was, they lost 12,000 men and all hope
of regaining Piedmont (August 15).
But, as often
happens, the breath of victory fanned to a flame the smouldering hatreds of the
Allies. These resulted from the nature of the arrangements between Russia and
Austria. The Emperor Francis looked on SuvdrofTs Russians as an auxiliary
corps, and their leader as under his direction. Against the dictation to which
this naturally led, Suvdroff chafed and stormed, while his men vaunted the
prowess of the chief whose triumphs had been gained despite the foolish
meddlings of the Viennese government. The Austrian officers, on the other hand,
censured his tactics at Novi as tardy and unskilful, and held
up to shame
the maraudings of his troops as the deeds of ruthless barbarians. Already, too,
the territorial designs of Austria had come into sharp conflict with the aims
of Russia and Great Britain. On hearing of the capture of Turin by the Allies,
the Czar bade SuvorofF invite Charles Emmanuel back to his former capital, a
proposal which Francis II and Thugut sharply countermanded. In vain did Eden,
during the last days of his mission at Vienna, press upon the latter the
legitimate claims of the House of Savoy. In his last important despatch to
Downing Street he reported that Austria’s aims were limited to extension of her
borders, especially in Italy, where she looked on the greater part of Piedmont,
and probably Tuscany and the Legations, as her indemnity. The instructions
issued to Lord Minto, the new British ambassador at Vienna, laid stress on a
change of government in France and a general restoration of the expelled
dynasties; but his remonstrances to the Austrian Minister (August 10) evoked
the reply that the affair concerned Austria alone; that Suvdroff commanded an
auxiliary Russian corps, it was true, but the Emperor Francis regarded him as
an Austrian general in his own service; besides, the treaty of Charles Emmanuel
with France (April 5, 1797) made him an enemy to Austria, which therefore
intended to treat Piedmont as conquered territory, the events of 1798 having
shown that the barrier fortresses of that land ought to be in the hand of a
competent military Power.
Long before
this piece of impertinent folly reached England, the British government had seen
the urgent need of withdrawing Suvdroff from the dictation of Vienna and
uniting all the Russian forces under his control. In the middle of June
Grenville urged Whitworth to suggest to the Czar the desirability of sending
the Russian leader and his countrymen into Switzerland and of placing the
subsidised army destined for that land under his command. On July 9 our
ambassador reported to his chief Paul’s hearty approval of this measure, which
would enable the veteran with 50,000 Russians, and the Archduke Charles with
upwards of 30,000 Austrians, to sweep Massena from Switzerland, and then form
an imposing mass for the invasion of France under the aegis of the Comte de
Provence by the open frontier of Franche Comte. Such was the plan to be pressed
on the Court of Vienna by the new ambassador, Lord Minto. It met with no
difficulty there; and, as previously agreed, Lord Mulgrave went as the British
military representative to the Archduke Charles’ headquarters for the combined
working out of this scheme.
Its working
out was a masterpiece of shortsighted selfishness. As the new Russian army
under Korsakoff, some 30,000 strong, marched into Switzerland, the Archduke
Charles’ troops were withdrawn in order to besiege Philippsburg and Mainz, thus
leaving the Allies no stronger than before, and exposing SuvorofTs corps of
20,000 men to grave risks: That insult might not be wanting, Thugut on August 9
declared
the holding
of any council on military affairs to be needless for the present campaign;
Mulgrave’s presence was therefore superfluous. As for the proposal to recall
Charles Emmanuel, Thugut hotly declared that it was an English intrigue at St
Petersburg, to which Austria would never consent. Five weeks later Minto
reported the efforts made by an Austrian clique to set the Czar against England
by the wholly false charge that we meant to keep Malta, and he remarked with
humorous despair that the Allies spent as much time over one another’s plans as
over those of the enemy. This was literally true of the course of action
imposed on the Archduke Charles. His removal from a strong position near Zurich
to the middle Rhine was mainly due to the wish of his Court to have an army
ready to watch affairs in the Netherlands, whither an Anglo-Russian expedition
was about to be sent. Thugut suspected, and with some reason, that the Allies
were urging Prussia to cooperate in that quarter by holding out to her the hope
of gains near the Dutch boundary. Eden in his last interview with Thugut
sounded him as to the possibility of Austria acceding to some such arrangement;
he received a haughty refusal. The upshot of it all was that the arrival of
Korsakoff led to no increase of strength for the Allies in Switzerland owing to
Austrian fears that her hated Prussian rival might gain too much land on the
lower Rhine; and the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland, soon to be noticed,
received no support from Prussia owing to the secular jealousy of the two
German States.
Switzerland,
however, was to witness the most dramatic series of disasters ever brought
about by the jealousy of allies. SuvdrofFs enterprise fared ill from the
outset. Whether from mere ill-humour, or, as he stated, owing to the
treacherous neglect of his Austrian allies to supply him with transport, he was
slow in moving northwards to the upper Ticino. Lecourbe’s obstinate defence of
its narrowing defiles further delayed his progress; and only by desperate
fighting and with heavy losses did the plain-dwellers of the east hew their way
over the St Gothard Pass and down its northern slopes against troops inured to
mountain fighting. While this strife of Titans was going on in the gorges of
the upper Reuss, Massena saw his chance. By masterly movements and sharp
fighting his lieutenant, Oudinot, thrust 15,000 men behind Korsakoff at Zurich,
while Massena and Mortier barred his advance with 18,000 men and shut him up in
the town with his back to the lake and the river Limmat. After struggling for
nearly two days to free himself from their grip, he at last formed his infantry
into a dense mass and cut his way through Oudinot’s lines, leaving behind,
however, 8000 prisoners, 100 cannon, and all his treasure and stores (September
25-26). At the same time Soult, on the river Linth, overpowered Hotze’s corps
of Austrians destined for the immediate support of Suvdroff, took 3000
prisoners, and drove the survivors out of Switzerland. Suvdroff heard the first
rumours of these disasters near Altdorf (September 28). There too he
found that
there was no road to Schwyz, as he had been led to expect. Nevertheless,
leaving guns and waggons, he struggled over the mountains to Muotta, only to
learn the full truth about Korsakoff and that Massena was in force at Schwyz on
his flank. A weaker man would have bent under these blows of fortune. From
SuvtSroff they called forth a defiant resolve to cross trackless wastes rather
than surrender. Beating off several attacks, in one of which his unsupported
footmen captured several French cannon, he forced his way through the Panixer
Pass, and led 15,000 starving, ragged, but unconquerable veterans into the
Grisons, entering Chur on October 8. Thence he made his way to Lindau, and,
refusing to take concerted action with the Austrians, sullenly retired into
winter quarters (October 30). The plan which, with intelligent cooperation of
the three armies, might have laid Switzerland at the feet of the Allies, led to
the overthrow of two Russian armies, and ruined the hopes of the Coalition.
The autumn
likewise brought disaster to the Allies in the north. In pursuance of an
Anglo-Russian treaty of June 11-22, 1799, a joint expedition was prepared
against Holland. The British force, 12,000 strong, landed at the Helder (August
27) and by the aid of Dutch royalists gained unopposed possession of the Dutch
fleet moored at the Texel. It then beat off an attack of French and Batavians
led by Brune and Daendels. When the 17,000 Russians under General Hermann
arrived in the middle of September a combined attack was made on Brune’s army
at Bergen. The precipitation of the Russians on the right wing and the lack of
timely support by the British on that side, marred the enterprise; and, though
the Duke of York beat the Republicans at the centre and left, the Allies had to
retreat with the loss of 4000 men (September 19). A further reverse decided the
Duke to fall back on his entrenchments at Zype. These events deterred the
Orange party from attempting the promised rising and rendered hopeless the
prospect of help from Prussia, on which the Allies had counted. When sickness
began to waste the allied forces the British government decided to recall its
troops. The Duke of York thereupon concluded a convention with Brune at Alkmaar
by which he agreed to evacuate Holland, the British retaining the Dutch fleet
(October 18). The Russian force was quartered in the Channel Islands for the
winter. This sorry ending to a great expedition aroused general indignation,
but the Czar Paul met the news with unexpected firmness and admitted that
Hermann was mainly to blame for the mishap at Bergen.
Paul’s wrath
fell in unstinted measure on Austria. Before the news of the mishaps in
Switzerland and Holland reached him he had already (October 13) sent a curt
summons to that government to declare what gains it contemplated making in
Italy, and to explain why its resident at Turin treated Piedmont as Austrian
territory. Unless satisfactory answers to these questions reached St
Petersburg, Paul asserted that he
would break
off all relations with the Court of Vienna and leave the House of Habsburg to
its fate. Before a reply reached him, he received the news of the battle of
Zurich along with Suvdroff’s bitter complaints of his treatment by the
Austrians. At once he wrote to Francis II (October 23) that he must part
company with an ally who sacrificed the interests of Europe to his own
aggrandisement. He thereupon recalled Suvoroff and Korsakoff to Russia.
Nevertheless,
Francis II and Thugut held on their way with a dogged resolve which seemed to
be justified by results. For, though the events in Switzerland compelled the
Archduke Charles to retreat from the Rhine, yet Italy fell more and more under
Habsburg control. On November 4 Melas cut in twain Championnet’s army on the
banks of the Stura, and drove part of it with heavy loss to the Col di Tenda, while
the remainder fled for safety to Genoa. The French garrison of Ancona
surrendered to the Russian fleet on November 13; and on December 2 the fortress
of Coni fell into Austrian hands. Francis II imperiously demanded that Ancona
should be given up to his troops; and the dispute over this subject rendered
impossible any accommodation between the two Powers. Austria seemed, however,
to have triumphed. The end of the campaign found the tricolour waving only
above the sore-stricken garrison of Genoa, while Savoy and Nice lay open to the
Imperialists.
These
successes were to count for little in the history of the world as compared with
the landing of Bonaparte on October 9 at Frejus. In this case also the
particularist aims of the Allies had marred everything. If the Russian fleet,
instead of operating in the Adriatic, had helped to seal up the Egyptian ports,
as Nelson urged, the French commander could scarcely have slipped away. But the
action of the Russians in the Mediterranean was like that of the Austrians on
land; they thought far more of gaining a hold on the Ionian Isles, Malta,
Ancona, and, a little later, Corsica, than of serving the common cause. Thus,
for lack of that frank understanding and cooperation which Pitt had striven to
bring about, the efforts of the Allies hopelessly miscarried by land and by
sea, their fleets failing to shut up in Egypt the one man whose presence in
Europe was most to be dreaded. Fourteen years were to elapse before there
recurred so favourable an opportunity of reducing the overgrown power of France
as that which the Allies now threw away; and then it was a Europe vivified by
the reforms originating from the Revolution which finally beat down the might
of Napoleon.
The strength
gained by France from that great popular upheaval was shown by the war of 1799.
The efforts of the Allies to wrest the Netherlands, the Rhineland, and
Switzerland from her grasp failed, even when her best general and her finest
troops were far away. This failure resulted mainly from the belated opening of
the war, the neutrality of Prussia,
and the
narrow particularism of Habsburg policy. Had the Allies been ready in the
summer of 1798 to throw powerful forces into the three countries above named
they would have been welcomed by half of those populations. As it was, their
delays enabled France to coerce the Dutch, overpower the Swiss federals, and
capture Ehrenbreitstein and other Rhenish strongholds. Except in Italy, the
efforts of the Allies in 1799 failed to recover the positions which France easily
seized in the previous year during the tedious bargainings of the Powers. For
that fatal delay, as also for the collapse of the Coalition, the territorial
schemes of Thugut were in large measure responsible; but blame must rest
equally on the Court of Berlin, whose suspicious policy degraded Prussia in the
eyes of her own people and weakened the striking power of Austria and Russia.
Even the successes of the Allies in Italy conduced to the ultimate triumph of
France; for they swelled that cry for a strong government which enabled
Bonaparte to establish a military dictatorship, destined to overthrow in turn
the Continental Powers, whose incapacity for common action now stood glaringly
revealed.
By the spring of 1799 the government of the
Directory had become completely discredited. With power little short of
absolute it had neither made a brilliant peace, nor procured the means of
continuing the war. In its foreign relations it was “ insolent, base and
awkward,” at home violent and oppressive. A series of coups d'etat, directed
alternately against Jacobins and royalists, had emphasised the fact that the
chief object of the Directors was not to serve France but to maintain their own
tenure of power. Meanwhile the country was paying a heavy price for its
government of tegicidal defence. In the Alps whole villages were peopled with
brigands ; in Eure-et-Loir we read of a tribe of marauders “ with chiefs,
sub-chiefs, shopkeepers, spies, a barber, a surgeon, tailors, cooks, tutors for
the lads, and a cure ”; in the west of nine Departments, in the south-east of
four, infested with the plague of chouannerie, not to speak of perpetual
ferments in the region of the Pyrenees. Against this multitudinous and sporadic
disorder spreading over forty- five out of the eighty-six Departments of
France, a gendarmerie weak and partially recruited from retired Jacobins, a
disheartened and feeble National Guard, civil authorities incapable, dishonest,
and perpetually changed, could effect but little. Everywhere there were crowds
of functionaries, but nowhere was there effective administration. The Justices
of the Peace were elected, and served the faction to which they owed their
promotion ; the Courts were too much frightened to be fair ; the Mayors were for
the most part illiterate; the police failed to pursue crime; and in local no
less than in central government fiscal disorder reigned supreme. The
Revolution, having destroyed all the old corporations, legal, religious, and
industrial, had left the individual face to face with the State, so that an
extreme theory of collective control had been insensibly but logically
substituted for the individualism of 1789. It was for the State to organise
education, to tend the sick, to assist the poor, and to succour the orphan—the
State, which was bankrupt of money, racked with political passion, and charged
with the task of defending the national frontiers against foreign invasion.
Thus all the
functions of
government were negligently performed. An amhitious educational scheme existed
on paper, but there was no education; and hospitals, roads, and canals, indeed
all public works, shared the general decay.
Meanwhile the
Jacobin spirit, at once suspicious and tyrannical, still pervaded the rulers of
France. There was no political liberty, with a legislature twice mutilated,
with elections persistently controlled by government, and with a press
supervised by the police. It is true that religious freedom was accorded in
principle; but the State, neutral in name and profession, was in reality
hostile to all forms of worship. A petty but effective persecution succeeded
the coarser forms of violence. No church could summon its congregation by a
bell; no priest or Bishop could publish an ecclesiastical charge, or wear his ecclesiastical
raiment outside the sacred edifice. To bear a crucifix in a village street was
a crime; and a priest was sent to prison for attending a funeral with a
surplice hidden under his great-coat. The priest was indeed no longer required
to swear the oath to the Civil Constitution; but an oath of hatred to royalty
and anarchy and of attachment and fidelity to the Constitution of the Year 111
was exacted from him. Rather than so bind themselves, many Catholic priests
deserted their churches and celebrated mass in the woods. All kinds of petty
tyrannies were connected with the culte decadaire. All work was to cease on
the decadi, save such as was pronounced urgent by an administrative authority.
No shops might be opened on the decadi, no shops shut on Sunday. It is no
wonder that the populace of France revolted against the Puritans of the
Republic just as the people of England revolted against Cromwell.
Land had been
liberated by the Revolution from feudal dues and tithes, from corvees and
tolls; and it was in consequence better cultivated and more fertile than under
the ancien regime. But though population increased during the Revolution and
the peasant was richer than formerly, he was far from content with his
government. He hated the new tyranny of conscription, the land tax, the
personal tax, the tax on doors and windows, and the stringent measures by which
these taxes were enforced. Above all, he loathed the religious persecution, the
interference with habits sanctified by lbng usage and associated with all that
was picturesque, gay, and emotional in village life. In the towns the economic
situation had been profoundly altered by the events of the last ten years. On
the one hand great misery had been created by the social dissolution, the
outburst of barbarism, the war, the decay of the ports, the annihilation of
credit, the depreciation of the assignats— misery such that 13,000 factories
out of 15,000 were closed in Lyons, and at Bordeaux they had ceased to light
the streets at night. On the other hand, the seeds of future economic advance
had been sown by the abolition of the gild and trade restrictions. Hence, while
big businesses
went to ruin,
many small fortunes were made, and the numbers of the proletariate were
diminished.
Amid the
disorder, the misery, and the vices of the time, there was one all-pervading
passion—the craving for peace abroad and methodical government at home.
Everyone was disgusted with the Revolution; but no one save the priest and the
emigre wished to recall the amcien regime. The quarrel indeed was not so much
with the principles of the Revolution, as with the men who embodied them; with
the orgies of the Luxembourg, doubtless magnified in public fame; with the
proscription of respectable citizens; with the violation of electoral freedom
and the exploitation of France in the interests of a discredited faction. But
the disgust, though real and general, was too inert to prompt men to action;
and it was the most serious feature in the situation, that, though the
administration of France was insensibly falling to pieces, no one had the
spirit or vigour to mend it. A feeling of hopeless lassitude paralysed alike
the official and the non-official world. Decrees were slackly executed; taxes
were unpaid; and the intelligence of a French defeat or a French victory found
the public listless and unconcerned.
The main
strength of the Directory had been derived from the military triumphs of
France. But in the spring of 1799 the tide of victory suddenly turned, and,
while Jourdan was beaten at Stockach and driven across the Rhine, the defeat of
Scherer and Moreau in Italy left the peninsula to the Russians and Austrians.
The situation seemed nearly desperate. In spite of the bankruptcy of 1797, the
Directory was without funds, having indeed an unavowed deficit of three hundred
million francs; the royalists of the west began to move more actively, and
emigres were intriguing with Barras. On May 27 Suvdroff was in Turin; and an
invasion of France assisted by royalist help from within seemed possible, or
rather imminent. In the French army disgust at official incompetence became
more and more pronounced; and in the cowardly and servile Councils a group of
politicians was forming itself, which desired to replace the Directory by a
more stable and orderly government, by means of a revision of the Constitution.
The astute mind of Talleyrand, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the fluent
and adroit pen of Roederer, were enlisted in the cause of the Moderates; and
since the terms of the Constitution did not permit of a speedy revision, it was
resolved to have recourse to extra-legal methods and to overthrow the
government with help from the Directory itself. On May 11 the lot—not without a
guiding hand, said a Paris rumour, elaborately contradicted in the
Moniteur—decided that Rewbell was to retire; and the Executive was deprived of
its most resolute and unpopular member. Who was to take the place of the
retiring Director ? There was one name upon the lips of all who wished well to
the Republic—the name of the only man who had preserved a reputation for
political wisdom through all the crises of the Revolution,
the French
ambassador at Berlin-, the Abbe Sieyes. The Five Hundred put the name of Sieyes
upon the list of their candidates; and on May 16 he was elected after three
scrutinies, the intrigues of Talleyrand contributing, it is said, to the
result.
No one had
given more ample pledges to the Revolution than the man who had first made the
Third Estate conscious of its rights and claims, who had helped to draft the
oath of the Tennis Court and the first revolutionary Constitution, who had
voted the King’s death, publicly abjured Christianity, and served on the
Committee of Public Safety. Of all the men of 1789 he alone preserved, or laid
claim to have preserved, the principles of liberty in their primitive purity;
and he had a reputation for inflexible purpose and high political doctrine
which outweighed a poor physique, a voice harsh and thin, and a total absence
of that easy good-nature which is so essential in the handling of assemblies.
His political theories were abstract; his heart was dry; and, while his
temperament was such as to shrink from the exuberance of life, his proud and
narrow intellect flouted tradition. But he was convinced and self-confident,
and possessed the singular art, remarked on by Sainte- Beuve, of baptising a
situation in a pregnant and memorable phrase. His intelligence, which was
narrow, intermittent, and original, was fortified by a genuine interest in
political speculation and a hardy growth of middle-class prejudice. Hating the
nobles* distrusting the priests, and despising the people, he aimed at securing
a government of revolutionary defence, so contrived as to preserve his own
party in power, and to exclude for ever the royalists and the Jacobins. To
reconcile all the warring elements in the French State was a task which lay
beyond his horizon to conceive. He had “lived” during the Terror by complaisance
and time-serving, with the Voltairian philosophy bottled up in his brain, and
vanity accumulating its dust-heaps within him. He emerged more exclusive than
ever, his name shrouded in mystery. It was known that he disapproved of the
Directorial Constitution, in the making of which he had not been consulted. It
was believed that he harboured great constitutional schemes in that mind which
was thought to be deep, because it was subtle, ingenious, and economical of its
elusive treasure. Amid the small lawyers and noisy rhetoricians Sieyes towered
as an intellectual giant, as “ the most sincere and wisest republican of his
time.” His reserve, his silence, which had once tantalised Mirabeau into paying
him a splendid compliment, and his conspicuous past, made him the hero of the
hour. It was notorious that he was never at a loss for views ; it was believed
that his views would save the State.
While Sieyes
was travelling from Berlin to Paris, the elections to the Councils were taking
place; and, though the official candidates of the executive were unscrupulously
recommended to the electors, the incoming Third proved to be mainly Jacobin and
strengthened the opposition to the Directory. There ensued a violent
parliamentary campaign
against the
corruption at headquarters, which had starved the army, enriched officials and contractors
at the public expense, and openly proclaimed an enormous deficit. “Depuration
des Jonctiormaires publics,” “la punition des grands coupables" were the
battle-cries of the hour. On June 5, 1799 (17 Prairial), the Councils voted an
address to the French people, in which the abuses of the government were
denounced and a strict enquiry was demanded. After violent and protracted
debates on the censure, the press was freed from police control; and the most
absolute licence, suddenly succeeding a regime of vigilant repression,
increased the volume of obloquy and excitement. When Sieyes arrived from Berlin
on June 7, everyone told him that three of the Directors, Larevelliere, Merlin,
and Treilhard, had become impossible, and that their dismissal was indispensable
to any serious reform. Sieyes soon came to the same conclusion; while Barras,
sheltered to some extent by tact, good-nature, and prodigality, and perceiving
that his colleagues were already doomed, resolved to assist in securing their
downfall. The Councils opened their attack on June 16. It was discovered that
the election of Treilhard was illegal, having been made within the year
succeeding his membership of the legislature; and, though twelve months had
intervened since the election had taken place, the Five Hundred declined to
condone the informality and the Anciens ratified their decree. The place of the
retiring Director was filled by Gohier, President of the Cour de Cassation and
formerly Minister of Justice under the Convention, honest, narrow, and
mediocre, a staunch republican in politics.
On the 18th
(30 Prairial) the Directors addressed a message to the Councils, denouncing the
manoeuvres of the English, the ruin of the finances, and the divisions in the
State; and the deputies, seeing in this communication the menace of a coup
d'etat, swore that they would outlaw any who might attempt to violate the
security and independence of the Legislature. That evening the recalcitrant
Directors, urged by Barras and many members of the Councils, were forced to
resign, to avert worse things; but though Larevelliere, “ the patriarch,” never
returned to public life, and Theophilanthropism became the laughing-stock of
Paris, Merlin was destined to win an honourable reputation as one of the great
legists of the Empire.
The
revolution of Prairial was “a day of dupes.” The Moderates had hoped to
strengthen the hands of Sieyes and to promote the cause of constitutional
revision ; but in the struggle they had been obliged to accept the aid of the
violent party in the Councils; and of the new Directors two, Gohier and
Moulins, the latter a morose and incompetent general, were at once too stupid
and too loyal to enter into their plans. The third, Roger Ducos, was a man of
more pliable material. Without ability or convictions he would vote, as he had
always voted, for the winning side. Sieyes indeed boasted that he had driven
from the temple
those who
bartered and sold and dishonoured the Republic, and that the policy of France
would henceforth assume a more decent and useful shape. But if the days of
Prairial brought profit to any party, it was rather to the Jacobins than to the
Moderates. The Directory was weaker and more divided than before; for, while
Sieyes and Ducos were plotting its overthrow, Moulins and Gohier were staunch
republicans, and Barras “ the rotten ” stood outside, determined to play for
his own hand and to join whichever of the two sections should prove to be the
stronger, Among the population at large the revolution of Prairial passed almost
unheeded. What significance could there be in the substitution of three
nullities for three incapables? Yet it was the beginning of the end of the
Revolutionary period, and the first step towards the Empire.
But though
the coup d'etat of Prairial found the people cold, it left the Councils in a
state of excited and perilous effervescence. A month of heated nocturnal
oratory and unjust revolutionary laws ensued, and it seemed as if the country
might relapse into the power of the Jacobins, who governed the Five Hundred
rather by force of courage, discipline, and tenacity, than of numerical
superiority. More than fifty newspapers defamed the government and poured
their filthy abuse on everyone who took part in public life. It was in vain
that the Anciens essayed to stem the tide of violence. The Five Hundred
attempted to establish the principle that the Directory had no power to
intervene in legislation, and maintained a Committee of Eleven, which, formed
to satisfy the exigencies of Prairial, threatened to claim the functions of the
old Committee of Public Safety. Fuel, both legitimate and inexhaustible, was
provided for the fires of Jacobin eloquence by the financial scandals of the
old government; and there were loud cries for the prosecution of the ex-Directors
and their agents, two of whom, Scherer and Rapinat, obtained a special
notoriety in these debates. The conduct of an unsuccessful Minister of War was
naturally provocative of criticism; and the Jacobins saw in the calculated
languor with which the prosecution of Scherer was conducted evidence of
secrets which would compromise the government. Two bad and violent laws
advertised the ascendancy of the violent faction and the disappointing
impotence of Sieyes. The law of hostages (July 12), “ a worthy sister of the
law of suspects,” authorised the administration to choose hostages from the
relations of emigres and ci-devant nobles in communes proclaimed as disturbed.
These hostages were to be imprisoned, and, if escape was attempted, were liable
to execution. For every murdered republican four hostages were to be deported
and their goods sequestrated, and a fine of 5000 francs imposed upon all the
hostages collectively. This barbarous law, which was declared applicable to
twelve Departments in the west, and subsequently extended to certain regions in
the south, far from assuaging, only increased the disturbance. “It is the
government of
’93,” men cried, “and we will not stand it.” Societies were formed to inflict
reprisals on officials who tried to enforce the law; peaceable burgesses
slipped off’ to join robber bands rather than expose themselves to its
crueltieschouans seized republican hostages; and in the south the epidemic of
brigandage became more intense than ever. A progressive income-tax of a hundred
million francs (August 22) was as fatal to property as the law of hostages was
injurious to liberty, subjecting as it did all propertied persons to
indefinite and arbitrary exactions. Commerce ceased; wealth was scrupulously
hidden; the stamp and registration duties fell away to nothing; and only a
third of the tax found its way to the Treasury.
In the hopes
of rallying popular enthusiasm, the Jacobin Club was reconstituted under a new
title, and with signal weakness was permitted to hold its meetings in the
MamZge, in the very hall where the three great assemblies of the Revolution had
held debate. About a hundred and fifty deputies joined the society, whose
debates were instinct with the old delirium of ’93, mingled with a current of
socialism or communism proceeding from the democratic movements of 1795 and
1796. In the Cafe Godeau near the Tuileries the anarchists spoke of
slaughtering thousands of victims to the shades of Robespierre and Babeuf. The
rumour ran that the Council of Five Hundred wished to reestablish the Committee
of Public Safety; and it was said that at some dinner Jourdan, the most
prominent general in Paris, had drunk to the resurrection of pikes. Rioting
broke out again in the streets of Paris, until at last the Andens plucked up courage
and closed the Manege. The society then crossed the Seine and took up its
quarters in the church of the Jacobins in the Rue du Bac—universally detested,
openly attacked in the press, hissed in the theatres, but still feared and
still formidable, with members in the police, on the staff, in the
administrations, with a large following in the Five Hundred, and with the
sympathy of two of the Directors, Gohier and Moulins. Three generals,
Bemadotte, Jourdan, and Augereau, the first of whom was Minister of War,
belonged to the party.
All that was
sane and moderate in French opinion was ranged with Sieyes against the Jacobins
of the Club and the Five Hundred, but the conservative reformers needed two
things, force and prestige. Sieyes, who had seen Carnot and held communication
with Lafayette, was not content with rallying all the Moderates to his cause.
Like his predecessor in office, who on May 26 had appealed to Bonaparte to
return and save them, Sieyes looked about him for a sword. But Bonaparte was a
force too distant and perhaps also too incalculable to serve the turn of the
moment; and the message to Egypt was countermanded. In his absence the destined
saviour of the Republic seemed to be Joubert, young, chivalrous, heroic, and
talented; and to him was entrusted the Army of Italy. If Joubert could beat
SuvdrofF in Italy, he would return
to Paris, the
laurels of victory on his brow, and assist the government to crush the Jacobins
and to recast the Constitution. There was a feeling among the associates of Si
-yes that France needed some form of constitutional monarchy; and Sieyes
himself is said to have listened to the agents of the Duke of Orleans. Others
spoke of a Prussian Prince, of the Duke of Brunswick, of a Spanish Bourbon, of
a Protector; and Madame de Stael in an unpublished work proposed to establish
Protestantism as the State religion. The idea of monarchy was in the air four
months before Brumaire.
On July 16
Joubert left Paris, bearing with him the hopes of the Revisionists, and the
confidences of some royalist agents ; and meanwhile Sieyes, seconded by
Cambac&rks, the new Minister of Justice, and also by the Council of
Anciens, strove to destroy the influence of the Jacobins. A contest arose
between the Councils on a most vital point, the power to draft troops into
Paris and its environs. If this were left to the executive, it would at any
time be able to overcome the Jacobins of the Five Hundred by a display of
force; and accordingly the Five Hundred decreed to deprive the Directory of
this dangerous prerogative. The Ancients saw the purpose of their adversaries,
threw out the clause, and gained a clear victory for the Revisionist party. But
Sieyes’ most important auxiliary was not the Council of Anciens but Fouche, the
mitraMleur of Lyons, who on July 20 was named Minister of Police in place of
the jovial and incompetent Bourguignon. Prompt, subtle, unscrupulous and bold,
the ex-Terrorist correctly gauged the situation, and, seeing that the day for
Jacobinical excess was past, was prepared ruthlessly to crush his former
associates. A series of striking and effective measures showed that the
government had gained a great Minister of Police. The military command of Paris
was transferred from Marbot the soldier-politician to Lefebvre the soldier-automaton;
the Jacobin club room in the Rue du Bac was closed, the club papers were
seized, and sixty-eight journalists, representing some twenty-five newspapers,
were deported to the island of Oleron. A great sigh of relief, mingled with
some astonishment at the facility of the triumph, went up from Paris. But
though the formal organisation of the Jacobins was destroyed, the Jacobin
spirit was still present in the Five Hundred; and the first disaster on the
frontier was calculated to quicken its activities.
On August 15
Joubert was slain at Novi; and all Italy save Liguria passed into the power of
the foe. The last hope of saving France seemed to have perished, or rather the
last hope but one. There was still Bonaparte. “ (Test Bonaparte qui nous
manque,” wrote the Surveillant of August 30, giving voice to a common
aspiration; and the Directory also had come to see the necessity for his
recall. On September 10 a determination was reached to negotiate through the
Spanish ambassador at the Porte for the return of the general and his army at
the price of
the
restitution of Egypt. It was a formal stipulation that the Army of Egypt should
return with its commander; and to this end Bonaparte was directed (September
18) to take all the military and political steps which his genius and the
course of events might dictate. Before this message was delivered Bonaparte had
left Egypt; and meanwhile the situation of the government in Paris was
extremely critical. While the frontiers of France were open to invasion through
the defeat of Joubert, the intelligence, received through English papers, of
Bonaparte’s check in Syria dashed the hopes of an oriental diversion which
should relieve the pressure of the Coalition upon France. At the same time the
vigorous measures taken against the press exasperated the Jacobin party; and
the Five Hundred, divining in this procedure an impending coup d'etat, resolved
to parry the attack. General Jourdan, the victor of Fleurus, was an ardent and
sincere republican, a man of high and simple character, whose great military
reputation was adroitly exploited by his Jacobin friends. He approached
Bemadotte, the Minister of War, and proposed the arrest of Sieyes and Barras
and the establishment of a Jacobin government; but, as Bemadotte proved irresolute,
it was necessary to fall back upon parliamentary methods. On September 14 (28
Fructidor) Jourdan got up in the Five Hundred and demanded that the Council
should declare the country in danger and that a special commission should be
formed to propose measures for the public safety. If the decree had been
carried, the Constitution would have been practically suspended and France
plunged in chaos. There was a free fight in the Councils, accompanied by
furious cries from the spectators. The President was openly threatened with
death. Lucien Bonaparte, the cleverest and most ambitious of the Bonaparte
brothers, ail adroit parliamentarian, prompt in speech and histrionic resource,
attacked the motion; and, after the passions had exhausted themselves, the President
took advantage of the general lassitude to move the adjournment of the
discussion. If a vote had been taken that night, the Directoiy might have
fallen.
At eleven o
clock at night Sieyes assembled his colleagues, and at once proceeded to
discuss the removal of Bemadotte, whose loyalty was dubious and whose position
at the Ministry of War gave him a special importance. Luckily for the
Directory, Bemadotte had often perorated on the insufficient measure of support
which he had received from the government, and on his willingness to retire. He
had actually offered in the presence of Barras to resign; but the offer was
insincere and had never been committed to writing. By the mere offer, however,
he had played into the hands of the enemy. The resignation of the’ general was
formally accepted, at the very moment when the Five Hundred were resuming their
sittings. In the end, the motion of Jourdan was after a violent debate thrown
out by 245 votes to 171 The Jacobins had organised a band of adherents in the streets,
and
c. at. a.
viii*
blows were
struck in the Place de la Concorde. But it was clear that public opinion was
against the party of violence, and that there was no desire to see the
executive authority transferred from the Luxembourg to the Palais Bourbon. The
excesses of these debates only rendered the Legislature more despised and
odious than before. But it was still regarded with fear, and the Directors
nightly expected to be assaulted by the mob.
Towards the
middle of September the horizon unexpectedly brightened. On September 19 Brune
repulsed the Anglo-Russian army in Holland with considerable loss; on September
25, 26 Massena won a great victory over Korsakoff at Zurich, killing or taking
twelve thousand of the enemy and a hundred and fifty guns. Then followed the
intelligence of the desperate retreat of Suvdroff, of his heavy losses among
Alpine snows; and then on October 3 came, brilliant news from another quarter,
the defeat of eighteen thousand Turks by Bonaparte at Aboukir. On October 8
three new successes were announced. The fort of Aboukir had been recaptured,
the retreat of Suvdroff in the Grisons was officially confirmed, and Paris
learnt of eleven guns and fifteen hundred prisoners taken from the
Anglo-Russian forces in the sand-hills near Castricum. While victory was in the
air and Prance was rousing herself from the apathy and depression of the
previous months Bonaparte landed at St Raphael, near Frejus. He had left Egypt
before the call of the Directory had reached him, attended only by Monge and
Berthollet, and a few of his favourite generals. When the news was announced
(October 13) at a dinner-party in the Luxembourg, Moreau, freshly returned
from Italy, turned to Sieyes and said, “ There is your man; he will carry out
your coup d’etat much better than I.”
From the
olive groves of Provence to the boulevards of Paris the enthusiasm was
indescribable. Prance had experienced no such thrill of emotion since the fall
of the Bastille ten years before. Her greatest general, the aureole of victory
on his brow, and invested with the glamour of an eastern crusade, beside whose
romance all the admirable campaigns of Holland and of Switzerland seemed tame
and domestic, had returned to save the Republic, to clear out all that was
sordid and corrupt, to quell the hideous menace of the Jacobins, and above all
to finish the war by an honourable peace. Even the Five Hundred caught the
infection, and on October 21 elected Lucien Bonaparte to be their President.
Nobody dreamt of empire or despotism. On the contrary, Bonaparte was regarded
as the symbol of all that was most hopeful and glorious in the Revolution.
On the
morning of the 16th the general arrived in Paris, attended by Berthier, Monge,
and Berthollet, and repaired to his house in the Rue Chantereine, which was
instantly rechristened Rue de la Victoire. The Directory, advised by Bernadotte
to court-martial the man who had deserted his army, and broken the quarantine
on the Provencal coast,
shrank from
so great an outrage to national feeling, and gave him a formal reception.
Wherever he moved, there was a crowd eager to see and to salute the hero of so
miraculous an Odyssey. The papers were studious to note his comings and his
goings, the olive tints of his cheek, the unpowdered hair, the shy evasion of
applause, the civilian frock-coat. All parties aimed at securing his
assistance; and Talleyrand and Roederer, Barras and Gohier, Moulins and the
brothers Lucien and Joseph, were frequent visitors to the house in the Rue de
la Victoire.
But Bonaparte
was determined not to commit himself prematurely, to study the ground before he
commenced the action, and above all to prevent his name from being exploited in
the interests of a faction. Going out but little, and then for the most part in
civilian attire, dining with savants, discoursing to his colleagues of the
Institute on the state of the ancient monuments of Egypt and the prospects of a
Suez canal, he seemed bent on demonstrating the possession of civilian virtues
and the aptitude for domestic affairs. Meanwhile he subscribed to all the
newspapers, cross-examined his guests, and scanned the eddying currents of the
public mind. His first idea was to enter the Directory and to effect the
necessary changes with as little violence as possible; but to this course there
were two obstacles. The Constitution had declared that a Director must have
reached at least his fortieth year, and Bonaparte was only thirty. And it is
probable also that, having sounded Gohier •and Moulins, he had discovered a tacit
or avowed opposition. It was necessary therefore that he should rise to power
with the help of one of the factions. Real the ex-Dantonist, Fouche, and
Josephine, urged an alliance with Barras; and ancient friendship seemed to
point in the same direction. But Barras had not divined the scope of
Bonaparte’s ambitions, and believed that he would be content with the Italian
command, while the Presidency of the new Republic went to another. At a dinner
at the Luxembourg on the night of October 29 he suggested to Bonaparte the
name of General Hedouville, and met a glance of contempt which dissolved his
speech in incoherent stutters. “ There is nothin to be done with such a man,”
said Bonaparte to Real and Fouche. It was enough to decide him to embrace the
party of Sieyes.
The coalition
with Sieyes was not accomplished without obstacles, but it was recommended by
solid advantages. Whereas Barras was personally discredited* Sieyes enjoyed a
high reputation. Whereas Barras was surrounded by parasites, Sieyes was followed
by a party, by Roger Ducos among the Directors, by the majority of the Anciens,
by a faction of the Five Hundred, including the President and the Inspectors.
Finally Sieyes, alien though he was in temperament, recognised and valued the
intelligence of Bonaparte, saying of him with perfect truth that of all the
soldiers he was most of a civilian, and that of the generals he was the only
one whose intelligence balanced his will. On October 23 they met for the first
time; after October 29 they were allies, using as the chief
intermediaries
in the secret plot Talleyrand, Roederer, and Lucien. On the immediate object to
be obtained, the overthrow of the Directory and the revision of the
Constitution, the two principals were agreed. But it is probable enough, as
Lucien reports, that Bonaparte declined to discuss further eventualities. Such
a discussion would have laid bare fatal differences between the Revisionists;
for, while some wished for a King and some for a regenerated Republic,
Bonaparte intended to make himself master of France. 1
Meanwhile
Bonaparte accepted the outlines of the plot which had been prepared by Sieyes
and his confederates. It was arranged that the Anciens, taking advantage of
three articles in the Constitution (102,103, 104), should vote the transference
of the two assemblies to St Cloud, on the pretext that their deliberations were
endangered by a Jacobin conspiracy in Paris, but in reality in order that the
Revisionist movement might not be imperilled by the workmen of Paris. At the
same time the Anciens were to entrust the command of the troops to Bonaparte
under the pretext of securing the execution of the decree. Among the Directors,
Siey&s and Ducos were of the movement; Barras would be induced to resign ;
and, as for Moulins and Gohier, they could be easily prevented from injuring
the course of the conspiracy. On the second day the two Councils, deliberating
in the midst of the troops, would be compelled to vote a revision of the
Constitution. But as Sieyes had nothing ready, and—though there had been talk
of a decennial Consulate, a Senate elected for life, and a system of indirect
election—constitutional discussions would only have divided the party, it was
determined that the Councils should be compelled to decree a provisional
government during which the details of the Constitution might be elaborated.
Three Consuls were to be appointed, who with one or two legislative commissions
should draw up a Constitution and submit it to a plebiscite.
So general
was the sense of unrest that even the Jacobin deputies shared the infection.
Meeting at Bemadotte’s house about October 31, they resolved that they were
disposed to place Bonaparte at the head of the executive, provided that
representative government and liberty were guaranteed by good institutions; and
Jourdan was sent to open negotiations. Bonaparte flattered their prejudices.
He would recover Italy, restore the sister Republics. They believed that he was
with them. But in truth there was no section of opinion which he did not attempt
to captivate. The party of the Institute, the old Encyclopedists, orthodox
revolutionaries who hated the Christian religion, were charmed with a general
who professed an admiration for Laplace’s Mecanique Celeste, and was capable of
describing to them the ancient monuments of Egypt. The liberals of 1789, even
the royalists, placed their hopes in him; and, outside the circle of professed
politicians, the auguries were favourable. The masses of Paris, temporarily
excited by a stream of victories, had relapsed into incurious apathy. The
troops, whose pay
had been
irregular, were violent against the Directory; but the temper of the fifteen
hundred men who served as the guard of the Directory and the Councils was more
doubtful, and, being for the most part hot republicans, they would not
improbably act as the Councils required.
Among the
generals, Jourdan might prove to be a determined opponent. Moreau, as timid and
undecided in politics as he was valiant and expert in war, was content to serve
under Bonaparte, whom he was perhaps not sorry to see drawn into civil strife.
Great efforts were made to seduce Bemadotte, who was popular and influential;
but, too ambitious and envious to play a subordinate role, Bernadotte refused
to allow himself to be definitely enlisted, and his attitude was uncertain to
the last. There was however little fear of the officers in Paris, among whom
Murat and Leclerc, Lannes and Berthier had spread the propaganda. It was
believed that Jube, the adjutant-general of the Directorial guard, and
Blanchard, who commanded the guard of the Councils, would come over; and no
difficulty was anticipated on the side of Lefebvre. The great contractors were
not unfavourable, for a motion had been voted in the Five Hundred which
threatened their interests. The banker Collot lent two million francs.
Cambaceres, Minister of Justice, Le Couteulx de Canteleu, who presided over the
central administration of the Seine, and Real, departmental Commissioner, were
of the plot, the latter believing until the end that it would redound to the
advantage of his friends. Barras, Benjamin Constant, Semonville, Regnier,
Cornet, and Fargues among the Andens; Chazal, Boulay, Fregeville, and
Villetard, among the Five Hundred, were deeply committed and worked to secure adherents.
But the number of persons entrusted with the full secret was limited carefully.
On 15
Brumaire (November 6) a banquet was given by the Councils to Bonaparte and
Moreau in the Church of St Sulpice. A crowd collected to see the arrival of the
Egyptian hero, and shouted “ Peace ! Peace! ” as his carriage drove up. After a
dinner, remarkable for the constraint and embarrassment of the guests, the
general, who for fear of poison had brought his own bread and wine, rose and
drank to the union of all Frenchmen, and then slipped away “like a flash of
lightning.” The next day he saw Jourdan, whose absence from the festival had
been remarked, and might portend trouble. The Jacobin general professed himself
discontented with the government, and offered to unite his forces with those
of Bonaparte. The offer was declined; but Bonaparte assured Jourdan that
everything would be done in the interest of the Republic and that he need feel
no uneasiness as to the result. On the morning of the 7th the twenty chief
conspirators of the Councils met at the house of Lemercier, President of the
Andens, and agreed that the measure transferring the Councils should be
proposed by the Commission of Inspectors who were responsible for the police
and the security of the Chambers. On November 8 the last preparations were
made. Decrees, newspaper articles,
posters, a
song for the HaUes, proclamations, and pamphlets were prepared; the officers
were told to be in the Rue de la Victoire at 6 a.m. on the following day; and
the troops were informed that Bonaparte would review them early in the next
morning in the garden of the Tuileries. At midnight Josephine despatched an
invitation to Gohier and his wife to breakfast with her at eight o’clock on the
following day. Fouche had already closed the barriers; and Real, directorial
Commissioner for the Department of Paris, had suspended the twelve municipal
councils of the capital. The Directory had received due warning of all or much
that was intended from Dubois-Craned, the Minister of War; but, quieted by the
insidious assurances of Fouche, they did not think it necessary to adopt
precautions. For the conspirators it was essential to precipitate events, since
on October 30 the Five Hundred had pronounced themselves in principle against
the progressive income-tax, and further manifestations of a rational and
moderate policy would deprive the plot of a valuable pretext.
The morning
of 18 Brumaire (November 9) broke fair and mild. At
7 a.m. the Council of the Anciens met at the
Tuileries; and Comet, President of the Commission of the Inspectors, denounced
in vague and pompous terms the existence of a formidable Jacobin conspiracy.
This idle bombast passed unquestioned in an assembly already committed to the
cause of the conspiracy—for upwards of sixty doubtful members had not received
a summons—and a decree was voted in pursuance of the programme, to the effect
that the Legislature was transferred to the commune of St Cloud, that the two
Councils were to meet in the palace at midday on the 19th, and that meanwhile
all exercise of their deliberative functions was forbidden. The third article
entmsted to General Bonaparte the execution of the decree, and placed under his
command all the troops in Paris, and in the 17th military division. It was
further resolved that the general should concert measures with the Commissions
of the Inspectors of the two Councils, and that the decree should be printed
and distributed through all the communes of the Republic. Two Inspectors, Comet
and Baraillon, were despatched to announce the result to Bonaparte.
At a very
early hour in the morning the Rue de la Victoire was crowded with generals,
aides-de-camp, and orderlies. Lefebvre, one of the first to arrive, was
instantly won over. “ See,” said Bonaparte, “ here is the sword I carried at
the Pyramids; I give it you as a mark of my esteem and confidence.” Moreau,
Macdonald, and Beumonville rode up to offer their homage and to execute the
orders which should be given. But all efforts to secure Bemadotte proved vain.
He came indeed at the instance of Joseph, but in civil attire; and, when
Bonaparte, having received the decree of transference, rode off to the
Tuileries with his generals behind him, Bernadotte suddenly slipped away,
saying to Joseph that ill-success would attend the movement. In a brief
conversation
Bonaparte had
vainly employed all his arts to win over the republican general. But his
defection was of no consequence. Mounted on a black and spirited charger
Bonaparte rode along the boulevards and down to the Tuileries at the head of a
brilliant cavalcade of fifteen hundred horse; Lefebvre, Berthier, Lannes,
Murat, Macdonald, and Beumonville were with him from the first: Marmont joined
on the way. The Champs Jlllysees and the gardens of the Tuileries were-filled
with troops; and the Anciens were gathered in the palace to receive from the
general his formal acceptance of the office which had been conferred on him.
Standing at the bar of the Assembly Bonaparte, clearly ill at his ease,
delivered a speech which was alike brief, peremptory, and vague. The Republic
was perishing, and the Anciens had passed a decree which would save it. He and
the brave men round him wished for a Republic founded upon liberty, equality,
and the sacred principles of national representation. He swore that they would
have it. “ Notts lejuronscried the generals, and the spectators thundered out
applause. When Garat rose to point out that the general had avoided swearing
fidelity to the Constitution, the President declared all further proceedings
out of order, and the members left the hall with cries of “ Vive la RepubUque.”
As Bonaparte passed out into the garden to show himself to the troops, his eye
lit upon Bottot, the messenger and secretary of Barras. With a swift dramatic
instinct Bonaparte summoned him to approach, and then, having listened to his
message, launched out into a famous apostrophe, the lines of which had been
recently suggested to him by the address of a Jacobin club at Grenoble. “
What,” he asked, “ have you done with this France which I left so brilliant? I
left you peace, I find war. I left you victories, I find defeats. I left you
the millions of Italy, I find laws of spoliation and misery.” The words were
addressed in loud and ringing tones, not to Bottot, but to the serried ranks of
the soldiers, to the newspapers, and to posterity. In a murmur he assured the
emissary of Barras that his sentiments towards the Director remained unchanged;
and then, mounting his horse, he rode out to review and harangue the troops and
made his military dispositions for the day.
In order that
the decree of the Anciens should be constitutionally promulgated, it was
necessary to obtain the formal assent of three out of the five Directors; and a
separate invitation had been sent out to each of the Directors about 7 a.m. by
the Commission of Inspectors. Sieyes and Ducos, who in pursuance of the scheme
had determined to resign, rode down to the Tuileries about 9 a.m.; but Gohier
had declined Josephine’s invitation to breakfast, sending his wife alone, and
it was probable that he, Moulins, and Barras, would offer resistance. The
desertion of the Directorial guard, the mutual jealousies of the Directors, and
the refusal of Lagarde, the secretary of the Directory, to countersign any
order which had not obtained three Directorial signatures, greatly simplified
the situation. While Josephine contrived to instil into Madame Gohier
680
the idea that
it was Barras against whom alone the movement was directed, Barras could not
believe that Bonaparte contemplated the deposition of bis former patron.
Instead therefore of taking action, all three Directors passively awaited the
development of events. Between 11 a.m. and midday Talleyrand and Admiral Bruix
were ushered into the presence of Barras, who was hourly expecting flattering
propositions from Bonaparte. They brought instead a florid letter of
resignation which had been penned by Roederer in the early hours of the
morning, and this Barras was brought to sign. Whether a sum of money was
offered and accepted must remain in doubt, but Talleyrand was not the man to
leave the situation in obscurity. On that very afternoon the exDirector drove
out of Paris escorted by a guard of a hundred dragoons. Meanwhile about 3 p.m. Gohier
and Moulins arrived in the Tuileries, which had become the centre of political
life and action in Paris.
The name of
Gohier was attached to the decree, which was now capable of being promulgated
with all the formalities; and the two republican Directors were pressed to
resign office after the example of Sieyes and Ducos. In the midst of a heated
altercation a letter was brought in to Bonaparte. “ General Moulins,” he said,
“ you are related to Santerre? They say he is stirring up the men of the faubourg
St Antoine and intends to put himself at their head. If he moves I will have
him shot.” Moulins replied that Santerre was no relation of his and no
agitator, and that he would not stir without orders from the government. “ The
Directorate,” replied Bonaparte, “ no longer exists. The Republic is in danger
and must be saved. I will it. We can only succeed by dint of energy. Sieyes and
Ducos are resigning. Barras has sent in his resignation; you will not stand out
in the cold and refuse yours.” Threats and cajoleries however made no mark on
Gohier and Moulins, and the two men drove back unconquered to the Luxembourg.
In their absence Moreau with a guard of three hundred soldiers had beset the
palace, and the Directors returned to find themselves close prisoners in their
official residence. Though Moulins managed to escape through a window in the
night, the words of Bonaparte had come true and the Directorate had ceased to
exist.
On the left
bank of the Seine the Five Hundred assembled in the Palais Bourbon about
midday. While the minutes of the last meeting were being read it was announced
that an important communication had arrived. It was the edict of the Anciens
commanding the adjournment of the Councils to St Cloud. Ere a voice could be
raised in expostulation or enquiry, Lucien, the President, adjourned the
Assembly, the majority of whom were unacquainted with the design. A strong
squadron of cavalry posted outside the palace may have contributed to the
success of the manoeuvre.
In the
evening Bonaparte, Sieyes, Ducos, and their principal allies held a meeting in
the Hall of the Inspectors. All agreed that the
Directory
should be suppressed, and that provisional consuls should recast the
Constitution. But what precisely was to be the procedure of the next day ? If
the two Councils were amenable, all would be ■ well. But if they were
not? There was but little concert, and the meeting broke up without a definite
plan for the morrow. Yet one important suggestion had been cast aside. When
Sieyfes urged that fdrty Jacobin deputies should be arrested in the night,
Bonaparte roundly declined to accept the suggestion. Such methods, he said,
belonged solely to the party which had destroyed France. Bat there was an
incalculable as well as a terrible element in Jacobinism, and Bonaparte loaded
his pistols before he went to bed. Meanwhile Bemadotte at Salicetti’s house was
proposing to the Jacobin deputies of the Five Hundred, who were desperately
concerting measures for the morrow, that, as soon as they met at St Cloud, they
should call upon him to share the military command with Bonaparte. The general
of the Five Hundred would thus be able to check the general of the Anciens, and
possibly to control the course of events in the interests of the party—a
foolish plot communicated, it is said, to Bonaparte by Salicetti himself. So uncertain
was the situation that Cambaceres and Chazal concerted an alternative
government in case Bonaparte should fail. But there can be no surer index of
the public feeling than the fact that in the very midst of the coup d'Stat the
three per cents went up several points. The walls of Paris had been placarded
since eleven in the morning with the adroit posters of Roederer, who spoke of
finances ruined by the forced loan, of civil war stirred up by the law of
hostages, of revenue anticipated, credit extinguished, workshops and factories
closed on the eve of winter, and of a government which had not only abolished
the Constitution, but had failed to secure liberty, property, or peace. In an
adventure of this kind everything depends upon celerity. The Jacobins had been
fairly surprised on November 9; and it behoved the friends of Bonaparte to push
their advantage home before their adversaries had time to *-ally, to
concert plans, and to comprehend the situation. But the plan of campaign was
marked by two serious defects. Of necessity the operations extended over two
days; and, when once the Anciens had decreed the transference of the
Legislature, their constitutional powers of initiative were exhausted. Unless
therefore they were prepared to act unconstitutionally—and by temperament they
were prone to respect legal forms—the Anciens would be compelled to leave the
conduct of affairs to the other Council, with its inflammatory temper and its
hostile or suspicious majority. In the meeting held in the Hall of the Inspectors
on the evening of the 9th Lucien had given assurances that the Five Hundred
would accept the revision of the Constitution as tamely as they had accepted
the decree of transference; and it is possible that, if a snap vote had been
taken early in the morning, the prediction would have proved true. But,
doubtless owing to over-confidence, the
details were
mismanaged. The hour for the meeting of the Councils had been fixed for midday,
which was later than was wise; and, when the members assembled, between 8 and
10 a.m., they found the Park already filled with troops, and the Orangerie, the
hall destined for the Five Hundred, not yet ready for their reception.
Strolling on the terrace, or through the corridors, while the workmen were
completing their task, the deputies discussed the situation, and as they talked
their indignation grew to a white heat. What was this plot upon the pretext of
which the Councils had been removed from Paris ? What was the meaning of the
troops who were already bivouacked in the Park ? Why had many of the Anciens
received no summons to the Council of yesterday? It was plain that there was an
attempt on foot to force them to overthrow the Constitution. Thus, when at last,
at 1 p.m. the Orangerie was ready, the deputies streamed in thrilling with
excitement and passion, which Lucien, with his nasal voice, and his face
disfigured with glasses, was utterly unable to still. The proceedings were
opened by Gaudin, one of the conspirators, who proposed that a small commission
should be formed to report on the situation of the Republic and to concert
measures for the public safety, and that proceedings should be adjourned until
the report had been received. Wild cries saluted a proposition which was
clearly intended to assist the Anciens in the work of subversion. “ The
Constitution first,” shouted Delbrel, “the Constitution or death. The bayonets
do not frighten us; we are free here.” While the room resounded with shouts of
“ No Dictatorship,” “Down with the Dictators,” Grandmaison got up to propose
that the members of the Council should individually renew their oath to the
Constitution. The whole Assembly rose to its feet with cries of “ Vive la
R&pubMque, Vive la Constitution”; and the motion, so flattering to the
theatrical tastes of French demagogues, was carried by acclamation. For the
space of two hours member after member stepped up to the tribune, extended his
arm and took the oath; and this operation, futile in itself and especially
fatal to the Jacobin cause, was protracted until hard upon four o’clock.
Meanwhile the
Anciens had opened their sessions in the Gallery of Apollo, a splendid room,
frescoed by Mignard, upon the first-floor of the right-hand wing of the castle.
From the first the debate gave promise of troublous passions and undecided
wills. Savary and Guyomard asked why they had received no summons on the
previous day; others demanded further details as to the great conspiracy. To
avert the storm, Farges, his speech punctuated with murmurs of dissent, spoke
darkly of nefarious propositions made to a general in whom the hopes of the
Republic were placed, and proposed that the sittings should be suspended until
an official notification had been received that the majority of the Five
Hundred were collected. Meanwhile a message was to be sent to advertise the
Directors that the Anciens had opened their sessions at
St Cloud.
This was at 8.15 p.m. A quarter of an hour later, news arrived that four of the
Directors had resigned and that the fifth was under surveillance; and the
Council reassembled to receive the notification, which had probably been
expressly devised to prompt it to bolder courses
Bonaparte,
Sieyes, and Ducos were watching events in the hall of the Inspectors of the
Five Hundred, a room on the first-floor of the castle, just above the entrance
gate and not far from the Gallery of Apollo. Officers and deputies came and
went, informing them of every change in the atmosphere of the Chambers, and in
particular Lavalette, an aide- de-camp, brought news every five minutes from
the Five Hundred.
The prospect
became hourly more anxious. It was rumoured that emissaries had been sent from
the Orangerie to raise the faubourgs; it was known that even the faithful Anciens
were vacillating; it was announced that Jourdan and Augereau had arrived at the
castle. Bonaparte determined to intervene. Marching into the Gallery of Apollo,
with Berthier and Bourrienne to support him, he demanded and obtained
permission to address the Assembly. But for once his nerve failed him, and his
speech was broken, confused, and vague. The Assembly, he said, was on a
volcano; he must be permitted to speak with the freedom of a soldier; he did
not intend to play the part of Caesar or Cromwell; the Directors had resigned
and the Anciens alone could save the country. As for the Constitution, it had
been violated again and again and was respected by no one. Asked for the
details of the conspiracy, the general improvised a calumny against Barras and
Moulins; but it was clear that he could give no positive facts. A second speech
made at the instance of Comudet was wilder still, and ended with an undisguised
appeal to the bayonets of the grenadiers. At last, nudged by Bourrienne and
Berthier, he stammered to a conclusion, turned on his heel and, calling out,
“Let all who love me follow me," quitted the hall, leaving his supporters
among the Anciens confounded and perplexed by his unfortunate intervention. At
the bottom of the steps, after sending a confident note to Josephine, he turned
into the passage which led to the Orangerie and suddenly appeared at the door,
hat and riding-whip in hand, and escorted by four grenadiers. We cannot tell
what was in his mind. Did he merely wish to explore the temper of the Assembly
? Did he calculate that his appearance would throw it into a dishonourable
confusion, or did he expect to dominate the course of its proceedings ? At a
later time he asserted that he wished to confound the Jacobins by revealing the
overtures made to him by Jourdan. Possibly he was seeking in definite action
some relief for tense nerves, without any clear idea of the purpose which
action would serve. The Assembly, which was excitedly discussing the
resignation of Barras when the plumes and uniforms glistened in the doorway,
rose to its feet in fury at the sight; a rush was made for Bonaparte* and the
gigantic Destrem aimed vigorous
blows at the
intruder, while the hall resounded with cries of “ Down with the Dictator,” “
Down with Cromwell.” Members leapt from their seats shouting “ Outlaw him,
outlaw him,” blows were freely exchanged, and, as the officers and soldiers
standing at the door rushed in to extricate their general, half suffocated and
half fainting, terrified spectators sprang out of the windows into the garden.
It was a scene of vulgar brutality for which Bonaparte had been unprepared; but
the best witnesses concur i. i stating that no daggers were raised.
A motion was
now brought in that Bonaparte should be outlawed; and, if this had been
promptly passed and an order for arrest issued to the troops, it is possible
that they would have bowed to the will of the Assembly. But, while the deputies
were confused and passionate, their President, Lucien, kept his head. With rare
courage and tenacity he declined to put the motion; gained some minutes by
resigning the presidency to Chazal; and mounting the tribww, spoke and argued
until a cross current of fear shot through the stream of indignation, and the
Assembly wasted precious time in discussing a sortie en masse to Paris and the
removal of Bonaparte from his military command. Soon afterwards a new access
of fury swept over the room, with fresh cries for the outlawry of the general;
and Lucien, despairing of mastery, sent Fregeville, an Inspector of the hall,
to his brother, saying that unless the sittings were interrupted before ten
minutes he could answer for nothing. The folly of the Jacobins gave him time.
Instead of putting the crucial motion, they disputed the tribune with one another,
everyone wanting to speak, to make his mark, to propose a motion. When Lucien,
obtaining a moment’s audience, asked that his brother might be heard, there
were cries of “ No.” Then, with a melodramatic gesture which momentarily
impressed audience and spectators, he threw off the insignia of his office, and
clung to the tribune, awaiting rescue. A captain of grenadiers with ten men
appeared at the door, made their way up the hall, and Lucien followed them out
into the courtyard, signing to the vice-president that the sitting should be
dissolved.
Bonaparte was
outside with the troops. After his adventure in the Orangerie he had returned
buffeted and unnerved to the room on the first-floor in which he had spent the
earlier part of the afternoon. Swiftly courage and resource returned to him.
The deputy Farges was sent in to the Anciens to prompt them to decisive action,
and to stir their indignation by a picture of daggers drawn against the general
in the Five Hundred. But the manoeuvre failed. The Anciens went into secret
committee, and, resorting to the device of all weak bodies, named a commission
to propose a report. Meanwhile a message arrived that outlawry had been voted
in the Five Hundred. The news, exaggerated though it proved to be, precipitated
the crisis. “ Since they outlaw you, they are outlaws themselves,” said Sieyes
firmly. Advancing to the open window, sword in hand, Bonaparte called his
troops to arms,
descended the
stairs, and mounting his horse rode out on to the terrace to excite the loyalty
and stimulate the passions of his men. The country had been pillaged ; his
brave soldiers were starving; and when he went in to the Assembly to speak,
traitors salaried by England had replied to him with daggers. A scratch upon
his hand accredited a fable, which was industriously spread by Murat, Leclerc,
and Serrurier. The linesmen and dragoons received their general with
transports, and heaped imprecations upon the lawyers, to whose corrupt
self-seeking they attributed their bruised feet and tattered uniforms; but the
temper of the grenadiers of the Legislature stationed in the inner court was
more doubtful; and, if Jourdan or Augereau had given them a lead against
Bonaparte, history might have taken a different turn.
But the
appearance of Lucien, if not actually decisive, put the issue beyond question.
Calling for a horse and a roll on the drums to enjoin silence, he spoke to the
troops as the President of the Council of Five Hundred, fie declared to them
that the majority of that Assembly was under the sway of a fraction of “
audacious brigands ” armed with daggers and “inspired no doubt by the fatal
genius of the English government,” and he called upon “ the warriors to deliver
the majority of the representatives.” “ These brigands,” he concluded, “ are
not the representatives of the people, but the representatives of the dagger.”
It would seem that the troops still wavered in indecision, till Lucien, asking
for a sword, pointed it against the breast of his brother and swore that he
would slay him with his own hand if ever he attacked the liberties of France.
The melodrama was cheap but effective, and the grenadiers were reassured and
eager to march. At a sign from Bonaparte the drums beat the charge, and a
column of grenadiers, led according to some accounts by Murat, advanced with
fixed bayonets to the castle door, and then through the long and oblique
corridors to the Orangerie. The gleam of the bayonets in the doorway provoked a
scene of wild but brief confusion. Red-robed deputies leapt in terror from the
windows; others mounted the seats and yelled abuse ; others rushed to the
tribune to make history or melodrama, while the drums were kept rolling in
order to drown the clamour. But the steady pressure of the bayonets was
irresistible, and in five minutes the hall was cleared. It is said that the
commanding officer told the deputies from the tribune that they did not know
how to make peace or war, and that they had nothing more to do in that place.
It was now
past five; and, as the legislators of the last revolutionary Assembly of France
were pursuing their devious flight through the park under the opaque mist of a
November evening, and leaving shreds of their crimson robes on the orange
trees, Lucien, whose readiness and melodramatic gift never failed him through
the day, hurried to the Andens to explain the situation. With calculated pathos
he depicted the aflray in the Lower Chamber, the daggers drawn on Bonaparte,
and
the
conspiracy against the Republic. Quickened and encouraged by this intelligence,
Comudet’s commission proceeded to draft the required decree, which named
Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Ducos provisional Consuls, adjourned the Councils till
February 20, and created an intermediary Legislative Commission formed from the
Anciens, who acted upon the assumption that the other Council had dissolved
itself. Between 7 and
8 p.m. the decree was passed with one
dissentient voice, and the Anciens adjourned till 9. During the interval a
remnant of the fugitive Five Hundred, varying according to different accounts
from twenty-four to a hundred and fifty, were being gathered together by the.
emissaries of Lucien and called to the Orangerie. It was seen that the
concurrence of the Second Chamber would give constitutional authority to the
acts of the conspirators; and, when the Rump opened its sittings at nine
o’clock in the dim light of three candles, all the formalities were observed.
Lucien took the chair; Chazal proposed a motion, which differed merely from the
decree which had passed the Anciens in respect of the composition of the
Legislative Commission, which was now to be derived from both Councils; and a
committee was appointed to present a report. In the interval of its
deliberations a vote was passed that Lefebvre, Murat, and Gardanne, with the
soldiers who had acted under their command, had deserved well of their country;
and Lucien improved the weary hours of the night by a third oration upon the
legendary daggers, which formed the official apology for the use of force, and
the resort to constitutional revision.
At 11 o’clock
the Committee returned and presented its propositions. The Directory was to be
abolished, and the provisional government entrusted to Bonaparte, Sieyes, and
Ducos. The Legislature was adjourned till February 20, 1800, but 62 members of
the opposition were excluded from it by name, and a commission of 25 members
was appointed to act in conjunction with the commission of the Anciens in all
urgent matters of police, legislation, and finance, to prepare necessary organic
changes, and to elaborate a civil code. At 1 a.m. the measure passed the
Anciens; and an hour later the three Consuls were summoned to the Orangerie to
swear “fidelity to the Republic one and indivisible, to liberty, equality, and
the representative system.” Vague words denoted vague aspirations, but the
dominant thought of the Revisionists was aptly rendered by Boulay when in
moving the resolutions in the Orangerie he spoke of nationalising the Republic.
At 3 a.m. Bonaparte drove back to Paris with Sieyes and Lucien, silent and
wrapped in thought. It was 4.30 a.m. before the Anciens had named their
commission; and the first streak of dawn must have been shining in the sky
before the last of the legislators recrossed the barriers. Paris was calm and
satisfied with the event. The stoiy of the daggers had been announced at the
theatres by the agents of Fouche on the night before; and in the morning the
citizens of the capital read upon the posters how twenty assassins had
attacked
General Bonaparte in the Council of Five Hundred, and bow his life had been
saved by the brave grenadiers of the Legislature. Two davs later the Moniteur
recounted that Thomas Thome, the grenadier, whose sleeve had been tom in
defending Bonaparte from the blow of a dagger, had breakfasted and dined with
the general, and that la citoyerme Bonaparte had embraced Thomas Thome and put
upon his finger a diamond ring valued at two thousand crowns.
^
De
Tocqueville has said of the coup d'etat of Brumaire that nothing could have
been worse conceived or worse conducted. Yet it accomplished its object
without the shedding of a drop of blood; and, as the Prussian ambassador in
Pans pointed out to his master, it differed from all previous revolutionary
days, in that it brought neither suspicion nor fear, but rather universal joy
and hope. A member of the Anciens reflected the general feeling, when he told
his constituents that it was not a case of one faction vanquishing another;
that it was the Republic which had triumphed over the agitators, the French
people who had triumphed over anarchy and royalism. The country was well
content that the “ lawyers’ clerks " should return to their office-stools,
and cease their sterile discordant clamours. France was tired of the
revolutionary phraseology and the revolutionary legislation, of the
oft-repeated formulae which had cloaked tenuity of thought, and of the feverish
rush of decrees which had perpetuated discord and perplexed administration.
The whole country was content to subscribe to the dictum of that deputy of the
Meuse, who, in apologising for the coup detat to his Department, said that of
all the curses which can afflict the moral world there is none more terrible
than the permanence of a body which ceaselessly deliberates and ceaselessly
makes laws. Those who lived through the period which elapsed between 18
Fructidor and 18 Brumaire never forgot their sensations of impotence and
despair. It seemed that the Terror had become a chronic malady, and that the
virus of civil strife was too deeply set in the body politic to be eliminated
even by heroic remedies. It was a Terror without the consolations of hope,
unredeemed by great achievements, and leading to no salutary end. But in the
hour of darkness Bonaparte returned, a brilliant ray shooting from the
mysterious East, and the ugly shadows melted suddenly away. Here was the man
raised above the ignoble strife of parties, the man of firm will, clear eye,
and abrupt speech, who would clinch the Revolution and reconcile liberty with
order. Men of every type concurred in his enterprise, aiding it either with
secret prayers or overt act: soldiers from the Army of the Rhine, soldiers from
the Army of Italy, men of the Mountain and men of the Plain, doctrinaires of
the Institute who denied God, doctrinaires of royalism who affirmed the
Tridentine decrees, peasants whose sole passion was for their plot of land,
burgesses who cared for little but a quiet life, bankers who craved for
enlarged credit, diplomats who wished to see amenity restored to public life, all
who
cared for
peace, all who cared for social stability, all who cared for the glory of
Prance. Little sympathy was felt for the fallen Councils. They had talked
wildly and governed ill. They had not even made the long expected Civil Code,
or cured the desperate finance which had brought the monarchy to its grave. In
the government of the Directors Prance had discovered neither virtue,
intellect, nor wisdom. To he a Director of the French Republic was indeed, as
Sieyes said, a trade above all others “terrible and infernal.” Yet though much
was to be gained by the concentration of the executive authority, and much also
by the suppression of extravagant political debate, the price was destined to
be such as no one in France imagined on that November evening, while the
deputies were rushing wildly through the park, and the fog was falling upon the
last fevers of the French Revolution.
REVOLUTIONARY
FINANCE.
The intensity and unanimity of public opinion upon
public finance are strikingly exhibited in the cahiers or lists of grievances
and suggestions which each of the three Orders in each electoral district
compiled, in accordance with ancient usage, before selecting its
representatives for the States General. These voluminous documents were reduced
to some order for the National Assembly by Clermont-Tonnerre (Report of July
27, 1789). The nobility, except in five bailliages, agreed to surrender their
pecuniary privileges, while retaining their honorary social distinctions. The
clergy consented to renounce all their privileges, but desired that the debt of
the Church might be taken over by the State. All three Orders were practically
unanimous in condemning the financial system of the ancien regime. They
demanded equality before the tax- gatherer, the public control of taxation and
expenditure and of the public debt, and the establishment of a Constitution as
a preliminary to further proceedings. Their proposals were not confined to
general principles, but set out in great detail the reforms demanded; and the
language employed by the Third Estate was often forcible and impatient,
sometimes even menacing. On May 4,1789, the deputies, after being formally
received by the King, attended mass at the church of St Louis, where the Bishop
of Nancy delivered, in the royal presence, a sermon, described by a
contemporary journal as “terrible, against despotism, the luxury of courts, the
prodigality of princes, and the depredations of ministers.” The church rang
with applause. There could be no mistaking the sentiments of the
representatives of the nation in favour of retrenchment and reform.
On the
following day the King opened the States General with a speech of which the
main idea is financial reform. Excitement was at its height when Necker rose to
make his financial statement. He proceeded to minimise the difficulties in
which the government was placed. Brienne’s Compte Rendu of 1788 shows a deficit
of over 160 millions of livres. But 76,502,000 livres of debt redeemable in
1788 had not been redeemed; and the decree of August 16, 1788, exhibited
beyond doubt
the insolvency of the government by suspending the payment of interest as well
as deferring the repayment of principal. Provision had been made in the Compte
Rendu as well for this repayment as for 29,395,000 livres of expenditure
classified as extraordinary. Necker removed both these items from the account,
and after some minor adjustments stated the true deficit at 56,150,000. Both
items were, however, properly chargeable to the year. Necker’s method was the
same as in his Compte Rendu of 1781: to throw all extraordinary expenses into
the public debt, and to provide in the estimates of the year only for interest,
without a sinking fund. There can be little doubt that he was further anxious
to magnify his reputation and his influence by parading as a result of his
eight months of office a reduction of the deficit from 160 to 56 millions. The
56 millions could easily be found. A new contract with the Farmers-general
would increase the revenue by 18 millions; a further sum of 15 to 18 millions
was to come from the customs payable by the Company of the Indies; the Crown
lands, Post Office, Direct Taxes, etc., would yield an increase of 5 or 6
millions; and 7 millions more would be raised by abolishing the arrangement
under which various Provinces had compounded for the payment of aides.
Economies were to be effected in the households of Monsieur and of the Comte
d’Artois (900,000 livres); the bounty on the slave trade (2,400,000 livres)
would be abolished, etc. etc. “ What a country, gentlemen! ” he exclaimed, “
where, without new taxation and by mere imperceptible adjustments, we can sweep
away a deficit which has made such a stir in Europe ! ” “ If the privileged
classes pay their share of the national charges like the rest of his Majesty’s
subjects, all will be plain sailing.”
For three
hours the deputies listened to this harangue, overloaded with trivialities,
such as the profit to be made by extending the sale of snuff to Britanny, and
expanded by tedious platitudes, while failing to give any assurance upon the
crucial questions of a change in the financial and constitutional system.
Necker had shown himself, as Adam Smith had tersely declared, “a mere man of
detail.” His fatigued auditors were filled with disappointment, if not with
consternation. It was no part of their intention to allow “ the deficit to be
swept away,” until they had utilised the financial embarrassment of the
government as a lever for organic reform. “ The public debt,” said Mirabeau on
one occasion, “has been the germ of our liberties.” Necker proposed to pay the
interest on the debt suspended by Brienne. “ He wastes our time,” said another
witness, “by proving that a nation like France ought not to go bankrupt, while
he maintains silence upon all that is essential.”
In the
treatise which Necker published in 1791 upon his own administration he
observes that a nation is not really free, until it obtains or resumes the
power of consenting to or refusing taxation and borrowing, and of deciding upon
and verifying all expenditure; and he declares that
all these
salutary changes were ensured before the meeting of the States General. In the
light of this statement his address of May 5 was a fatal error of judgment. His
admissions, that a loan of 80 millions would probably be needed for 1789, and
that 172 millions were already consumed in advance in “ anticipations ” of the
revenue of the next eight months and 90 millions in anticipations upon the
revenue of 1790, revealed the hollowness of the suggestion lurking in his
speech, that the King had not been obliged to call the States General together
for financial reasons. They were, in theory, a mere consultative body. No
proposal is made to them. They are informed of the state of affairs; and, now
that they are assembled, they may usefully consider various topics of public
importance, and favour the King with such suggestions as they may wish to
offer. This theory was soon to be rudely upset.
On June
17,1789, the Third Estate constituted itself the National Assembly, and on the
same day passed as its first “ decree ” a resolution, moved by Target and Le
Chapelier, proclaiming “all existing taxes illegal, as not sanctioned by the
consent of the people, and therefore null and void in their creation,
extension, and prorogation,” but declaring that “the National Assembly
provisionally and unanimously consents on behalf of the nation that they may
continue to be levied as heretofore until the first separation of the Assembly,
on and from which date the Assembly decrees that all taxes not expressly,
formally, and freely accorded by it shall entirely cease in all the Provinces
of the kingdom, howsoever administered.” It was added that the Assembly, “as
soon as it shall, have fixed, in concert with his Majesty, the principles of
national regeneration, will occupy itself with the examination and
consolidation of the public debt, and hereby places the creditors of the State
under the protection of the honour and loyalty of the French nation.” This
addendum was designed to reassure the public creditors—a powerful party,
especially in Paris—and to fortify them in their support of the Assembly, in
which alone they saw any hope, against the Court party.
On June 23
the King held a secmce royale and made a declaration, of which the first six
Articles may be thus summarised: 1. No new tax shall be established, and no old
tax prolonged beyond the term fixed by law, without the consent of the deputies
of the nation. 2. All new taxes imposed or old taxes continued shall be in
force only until the meeting of the next States General. 3. No loan shall be
raised without the consent of the deputies of the nation, except in case of war
or other national danger, when the Sovereign may at once borrow up to 100
millions. 4. The States General will examine the financial situation and have
such information as may be necessary to enlighten them on the subject. 5. The
tables of receipts and expenses shall be annually published in a form proposed
by the States General and approved by the King. 6. The sums assigned to each
branch of the public service will
be settled in
a fixed and invariable manner, and the King submits to this rule the expenses
of his Household.
There are
here no guarantees for the voting of the budget or even for its annual
examination by the representatives of the nation. The Declaration of Eights
(August 26) and the articles of the Constitution (October 1) included these
safeguards, and were, after much hesitation, sanctioned by the King (November
3). Other articles of the declaration of June 23 gave a tardy adherence to the
principles of the mandate contained in the cahiers. The public debt was to be
consolidated, and the pecuniary privileges of the nobility and clergy were to
be abolished when voted by their Orders. The taille was to be suppressed, and
replaced by extra vmgtiemes or other taxes paid by all alike. Franc-fief was
to be abolished as soon as the financial situation permitted. Personal
servitudes were to be converted into money payments charged on the general
budget. The internal customs were to be swept away. The gabelle and aides were
to be reformed, and the taxes upon salt reduced. Corvees were to cease, rights
of mortmain to be bought up, and provincial assemblies to be instituted. On
the morning of this declaration Necker resigned upon a point of difference as
to the separation of the three Orders. On July 4 the Assembly refused to
sanction a loan till the Constitution should be established. On July 11 the
King begged Necker to leave France; but the Assembly at once declared that
Necker and his dismissed colleagues took with them their esteem and regret,
that the new Ministers had not their confidence, and that “the Assembly will
never consent to a disgraceful bankruptcy.” On July 16 Necker was recalled and
the Ministry reconstituted.
In his speech
of May 5 Necker had informed the States General that, in the uncertainty which
prevailed, taxes were being held back, and that over 80 millions of the current
year’s revenue from direct taxes were in arrear. The resolutions of the
Assembly had in the meantime given rise to much misunderstanding. It was
rumoured in the provinces that numerous dues and taxes had been swept away,
that the people of Paris no longer paid octrois, etc. Ill-disposed, though
often better-informed, persons lent their authority to these assumptions, and
in many districts the fiscal barriers were destroyed, the officials put to
flight, their offices pillaged, and their registers burned. On August 4 two
great landed proprietors, the Vicomte de Noailles and the Due d’Aiguillon,
proposed and the Assembly decreed immediate financial reform. Local and personal
privileges regarding taxation were to be abolished. Feudal dues were to be
redeemed and personal servitudes abolished. Ecclesiastical tithes were to be
suppressed, and the State was to take over the expenses of the Church. From
this date the peasants ceased to pay even those redeemable dues of the seigneur
which rested upon value received or were of the nature of copyhold rents; and
the forcible destruction of deeds and titles in country chateaux was the
occasion of much further
rioting and
pillage. These decrees of August 4 were sanctioned by the King on November 3.
On August 7
Necker urgently entreated the Assembly to authorise a loan of 30 millions at 5
per cent, to meet two months’ expenses. He stated that twelve months before, on
resuming office, he had found but
400,000 livres in the Treasury. Special expenses had
been necessitated by the distress consequent upon the bad harvest and serious
storms. It had been necessary to buy corn from abroad, and to find employment
in national workshops at the gates of Paris for thousands of needy workmen. The
taxes were not coming in, and receipts were diminishing from day to day.
Smuggling was increasing almost unchecked. Local receivers of taxes were in
some cases unable to meet the liabilities charged upon them. The situation was
critical. One of the earliest acts of the Assembly had been to constitute (July
11,1789) a Finance Committee, on whose advice they now assented to the loan but
reduced the rate of interest to 4J per cent. At this reduced rate the issue was
a failure. On August 27 Necker wrote to say that only 2,600,000 livres had been
subscribed, and to ask for authority to borrow 80 millions at 5 per cent., half
the subscription to be permitted to be in instruments of credit already
outstanding against the Treasury. Authority was given, but only 44,342,000
livres were subscribed, of which a moiety consisted of government obligations
whose value had fallen below par. On August 29 the internal trade in com, wine,
and agricultural produce was freed from transit dues.
On September
16 the Finance Committee, taking up a proposal made by Necker on August 27,
proposed to modify the rigour of the gabelle, and to reduce the price of salt
everywhere to 6 sous the pound. The annual yield was at this time about 60
millions, and the Assembly hesitated to sweep away at once so important a
branch of revenue. By a law dated September 23, the law relating to gabelle was
much alleviated, the price reduced to 10 sous where it had previously been
higher, and a promise given to abolish it as soon as possible. The loss under
this law was estimated at 30 millions a year. Serious riots at once broke out
in Anjou. The people refused to pay even the modified tax, and drove off the
collectors by force of arms. The Assembly next voted the suppression of
compositions for the vingtiemes. On September 17 Necker applied to the Caisse
d’Escompte for a loan of 12 millions to pay the troops. The Caisse asked for
the authority of the Assembly, which, after hearing Necker’s explanations,
sanctioned the loan. A week later Necker made a clean breast of his
difficulties. He told the Assembly that he foresaw a deficit of 160 millions in
1789, and at least an equal deficit in 1790. The Province of Touraine had
already opened a patriotic subscription, and the example had been followed by a
few individuals and by some scattered parishes, without any appreciable result.
Necker now proposed a contribution patriotique throughout the
nation. Each
taxpayer was to declare his revenue and contribute 25 per cent, of it to the
Exchequer. 1116 Assembly hesitated. One of the members exclaimed, “ Catiline is
at the gates! ” “ No, gentlemen ! ” cried Mirabeau, “Catiline is not at your
gates. He never will be! But Bankruptcy, hideous Bankruptcy is there; it
threatens to engulf you, your property, your honour—and you deliberate ! ” The
proposal was carried. The deputies were anxious to liquidate the ancien regime,
and to work out a fair and effective system of taxation for the future. They
looked to the past only in order to avoid bankruptcy, to the present as a
period of transition to be hurried through by temporary expedients, and they
proceeded light-heartedly to abolish existing taxation without much concern for
immediate substitutes. On September 28 they swept away the droit de Jrarw-Jief,
payable upon the transfer of “ noble lands ” to bourgeois owners—a sacrifice of
1,800,000 livres a year.
Ministers
were now in an equivocal position. Their power was rapidly passing into the
hands of the Assembly, while their responsibility was unimpaired. They
requested (October 24) to be allowed to share in the deliberations of the
Assembly, but their request was rejected. On October 10 Talleyrand proposed the
nationalisation of Church property. The income of the Church was estimated at
150 millions a year, of which 70 came from land, and 80 from tithes. At 30
years’ purchase the land should yield, it was urged, at least, 2100 millions,
of which 500 millions might be used to extinguish annuities costing 50 millions
a year, 500 millions to buy out the holders of sinecures who had purchased
“judicial” offices, and the balance of 1100 millions to wipe out debt costing 60
millions a year. The nation, relieved of these annual charges, would provide 5£
millions a year for the clergy, and would abolish the gabelle and ultimately
the tithe. On the motion of Mirabeau it was resolved (November 2) that all the
Church property was at the disposal of the nation, which would suitably provide
for the expenses of public worship, the maintenance of its ministers, and the
relief of the poor, under the surveillance and following the advice of the
Provinces. Each cure was to have at least 1200 livres a year, apart from his
house and garden. On November 3 the Parlements, which were beginning to mutter,
were suppressed till further orders. Mirabeau’s effort to link the Ministers
with the Assembly was defeated by a decree ordering that no member of the
Assembly should be at the same time a Minister. This measure, aimed in part at
Mirabeau himself, completed the confusion of financial administration.
The Caisse
d'Escompte, founded in 1776, was a private banking company with a capital of 15
millions, of which 10 were ad\anced to the rreasury in return for 13 millions
of Treasury bills payable in 13 months. It had the right of issuing notes, kept
the banking account of government, and was the forerunner of the Bank of
France. On November 14 Necker informed the Assembly that he was in urgent need
of 170 millions.
He proposed
that the Caisse d’Escompte should be made a National Bank, should advance a sum
of 170 millions to the Treasury, and should be authorised to issue 240 millions
of national bank-notes. On November 23 the great chemist Lavoisier, one of the
honorary directors of the Company, was called upon to explain to the Assembly
the situation of the Caisse, which was in a dangerous position because of the
excessive loans it had already made to government, by royal order, in violation
of its statutes. Necker’s plan was referred to the Finance Committee, which,
however, reported its own proposals as if nothing had happened. Its report of
November 16 (the second report is dated November 18) is the earliest document
which gives the general views of the Assembly on the subject of the public
revenue and expenditure, and deserves some attention.
In general
accordance with the cahiers these reports propose a revision and reduction of
expenses, the liquidation of all State debts, the maintenance of a few direct
taxes, with a preference for a tax on the net revenue of land, the abolition of
personal taxes payable to private persons or communities, the right of the
people’s representatives to vote the annual receipts and expenses and to allot
the contributions between the several public services, as well as to supervise
the ministerial use of credit. All payments were to be suspended till January
1, 1790, except the pay of the troops on land and sea, the service of the debt,
and the arrears of pensions. Other payments were to be deferred for the
scrutiny of a Committee. A report had been received from the Treasury (August
3), estimating the expenses at 531,513,000 livres and the Exchequer receipts at
473,294,000. The debt, excluding annuities and perpetual debt, was returned at
878 millions; and the deficit for November and December alone would amount to
87 millions. The abolition of the gabelle and aides would sacrifice 108J
millions of revenue; but 60 millions might well be raised from “ moderate ”
duties on salt and alcohol. The Committee boldly “economised” 119 millions, on
paper, of the estimated expenditure, but no adjustments of the figures could
get over the lack of money to meet pressing obligations. On December 19
something had to be done to avoid bankruptcy before the close of the year. The
Committee proposed, and the Assembly agreed to, the creation of a special
exchequer (Caisse de Veoctraordinaire) under the control of the Assembly, to
receive the proceeds of the sales of national property, the patriotic gifts and
contributions, and other extraordinary resources, out of which it was to pay
the temporary debt, to reduce or extinguish permanent debt as might be
directed, and to meet any special expenditure charged upon its funds by the
Assembly. Church and State property to the value of 400 millions was to be
sold, 80 millions to be borrowed from the Caisse d’Escompte, to which 184
millions were already owing, and 400 millions of assignats to be issued
(December 21).
With the word
assignats we strike the key-note of Revolutionary finance and may turn aside to
give some account of their history. At
their first
issue they were of the nature of mortgage bonds secured upon the nationalised
property. The Crown lands had been taken over by the nation (October 7, 1789),
and a Civil List was in course of being settled (June, 1790) on the King. The
real value of the property of the Church has been much debated, but need not
detain us here. The essential feature of the financial operation was to
“liquidate the ancien regime” by paying off its heritage of debt and oppressive
charges out of capital so far as it was impossible to do this out of revenue.
Purchasers were to pay for the property in assignats, and the assignats were,
on their return to the government, to be gradually extinguished by 1795. The
first question which arose was, should they bear interest ? One of the deputies
propounded the dilemma that the assignat was either as good as cash, in which
case it ought not to bear interest any more than if it were a coin; or it was
not as good, in which case interest would not suffice to keep up its value as a
circulating medium, but would even create mistrust of it at the outset. It was
decided that the first issue (400 millions) should carry interest at 5 per
cent., payable to the last holder on the last day of the year; and, to avoid
driving out metallic currency, no assignat was to be of lower denomination than
200 livres. On April 15, 1790, the rate was reduced to 3 per cent, and
assignats were made forced currency or legal tender, such of them as were
tendered as purchase-money for national property were to be cancelled and
publicly burned, while others were to be destroyed by lot, as they came in,
according to a settled proportion of extraordinary receipts. On September 29
the maximum of assignats was raised to 1200 millions; and all interest on past,
present, or future issues was abolished. In vain Talleyrand, Dupont of Nemours,
and other deputies pointed out the dangers of this course. Dupont called
attention to the paper currency of the United States, which ten years before
had issued notes guaranteed by the government, with its immense resources, its
men of trusted probity like Washington and Franklin, and yet had come to such a
pass that “ a pair of boots fetched 36,000 livres of paper money, and a supper
for four persons, at an ordinary cash price of 10 dollars, cost 50,000 livres
in paper.” Mirabeau overbore all opposition. He ridiculed their fears, argued
that necessity compelled them to face any risk there might be in the
experiment, and, above all, that the assignat was a political agent of the
greatest possible efficacy for ensuring the security of the Constitution. “
Wheresoever an assignat is found, there surely will repose with it a secret
prayer for the credit of the assignats, a desire for their solidity.” The
holders, he declared, would wish to see them converted by the sale of the
nationalised property, and would be necessarily defenders of the Assembly’s
programme, creditors interested in its success. The deputies were now on a
fatal slope. On June 19, 1791, a further creation of 600 millions was
authorised, and smaller denominations were introduced. The gabelle had been
abolished
(March 26, 1790),
and lay tithes yielding 100 millions a year (April 20, 1790) were redeemed.
It is
unnecessary to follow step by step the further financial measures of the
Constituante. In the ferment of its activity it had appointed Committees
including, besides the Finance Committee already mentioned, which had nine
sub-committees, a Taxation Committee (January 18, 1790) to draw up a new plan
of financial organisation, and a Pensions Committee (December 31, 1789), to
report upon and revise the pension list. Some idea of their labours may be
gathered from the fact that the last-mentioned Committee divided itself into
six sections, sat for 12 hours a day with an interval of three hours in the
afternoon, and undertook the revision of 30,000 pensions. A decree of April 27,
1791, reorganising the public offices, stripped the Treasury of almost all its
remaining attributes, leaving it merely to maintain and execute the law
relative to taxation. Budgets and accounts were no longer to concern the
Treasury. The Assembly was supreme and all-powerful in finance. Later
(September 17-29, 1791) the Assembly took over the audit of accounts, with a
central office of 15 members working under its control.
Some relief
from these colossal labours was to be looked for from the creation of local
governments. The municipalities and provincial Assemblies were entrusted with
large administrative powers to deal with education, pauperism, highways,
police, and assessments to taxes, to be collected by their nominees on account
of the central government. Again and again Ministers complained to the Assembly
of the laxity of the local authorities in protecting the interests of the
Treasury. The Assembly exhorted them to show more energy, but in vain. They
were unwilling even to call out municipal guards to repair the barriers for the
collection of aides, etc. when these were burned or battered down by the mob;
and nothing would induce them to incur the risk of riots and the certainty of
local unpopularity by rigorous measures to enforce the payment of taxes to be
remitted to Paris. The central government had no direct representative in their
midst. Without any clearly defined head or centre of authority, they were
themselves incapable of prompt and effective action. Symptoms of anarchy soon
appeared. Upon studied neglect in the payment of direct taxes followed
smuggling and frauds on the excise, and even pilfering. Timber was stolen from
the national woods and forests to an alarming extent; and the National Assembly
passed urgent decrees forbidding their sale and placing them under the
protection of the nation. Purchasers of nationalised estates, after paying a
small first instalment, cut growing or ornamental timber, pulled down buildings
and sold the materials, and gave up their bargains before the next instalment
became due, thus making a considerable profit at the expense of serious
dilapidations. The repeal of important taxes without the immediate substitution
of new sources of revenue, the failure to collect the taxes which remained due,
and the increase of expenditure
under the
Constituante throw the deficits of the cmcien regime into the shade.
It might be
supposed that this decrease of taxation afforded, at any rate, a corresponding
relief to the people, many of whom—impoverished by the ancien regime and
suffering from a bad harvest—were much in need of a breathing space. The
Finance Committee reported on October 13, 1790, that the deficit of the last
three months of the year was likely to amount to 134 millions, only 96 millions
of revenue coming in instead of the expected 230, owing to the “perishing of
different sources of revenue.” They continue: “What does the people gain by
this reduction ? Nothing. Fraud alone enriches itself at the expense of the
Treasuiy, and the innkeeper sells his liquor not a whit cheaper to the
miserable creature whom it entices,” although the duty is unpaid. The patriotic
contribution of one-fourth of the net revenue of the people, spread over three
years, was estimated to produce 500 millions in all, or not less than 150
millions a year. In the six months ending March 8, 1790, the patriotic gift had
yielded 1,042,000 livres; and a further sum of two millions was expected in the
next six months. On July 24, 1790, Necker presented to the Assembly an account
from May 1, 1789, to April 30, 1790, in which the patriotic contribution
figures at 9,721,000 livres. The normal expenses of the period (519 millions)
had exceeded the ordinary receipts by 163 millions, and the extraordinary
expenses had amounted to 209 millions, mainly for the extinction of temporary
borrowings. The expenses had increased about 80 per cent, in a single year. On
November 16, 1789, the Finance Committee had estimated the receipts in 1790 at
445,749,000, and the expenses at 412,333,492 livres. On March 6, 1790, Necker
predicted a deficit of 294 millions for the following six months; and the
Assembly, after reducing some of the proposed expenditure, called upon him for
a further account.
Meanwhile
current requirements were met by assignats, issued at frequent intervals. On
May 29 Necker presented his estimate for the last eight months of 1790. The
receipts are taken as 656,625,000 livres, the expenses as 645,210,000—a surplus
of 11,415,000. The public remembered with derision the similar result in his
Compte Rendu of 1781—satirised as the conte bleu or blue fairy-book, from the
colour of its wrapper—and the Assembly treated the report with studied neglect.
380 millions of assignats were reckoned among the “receipts.” The patriotic
gifts and contributions were estimated at 32 millions, and it was assumed that
the taxes would now come in with regularity. In September the Finance Committee
reported the debt to be 1,878,816,354 livres. Necker, who had repeatedly
protested against the use of assignats to meet current expenditure, resigned
his office (September 3). The Assembly had lost confidence in him, as a man
unable to rise to the height of altered circumstances, and viewed his departure
with indifference. Towards the close of the year appeared Calonne’s book, Ulttat
de la France, a present
et
a venir, in which he criticised fiercely the financial situation and the
financial plans of the Assembly. The book created a great sensation, but had no
influence upon the march of events. Five millions of revenue were abandoned by
the suppression (October 31) of the traites; further public works were started
for the relief of the unemployed; special war credits were opened to provide
for apprehended hostilities with England or for the possible intervention of
foreign Powers; and assignats were issued as required.
The taxes of
the future were suggested by the Finance Committee on September 11: a
contribution fonciere of 300 millions to be levied on land-owners, upon their
average net revenues for the last 15 years (not to exceed one-sixtieth of net
revenue), the assessments to be made and the amounts collected in each case by
the local authorities (enacted December 1, 1790); and a contribution mobiliere
(January 13, 1791) on moveable properly, estimated to produce 66 millions, under
five heads: a poll tax, taxes on domestic servants, on pleasure-horses, on
salaries (5 per cent, on income as “presumed” from rent), and on
dwelling-houses (3 per cent, of presumed income). The stamp duties were to be
adjusted and reduced; and the debts of the pays (Tetats (162 millions) incurred
on the royal service were added to the national debt.
The budget of
1791 is estimated (February 6) at 582 millions on both sides of the account, of
which 60 millions came from the Caisse de Vextraordinaire and 55 millions from
the sale of salt and tobacco in hand. The actual receipts and expenses are
nowhere to be precisely ascertained. Partial, confused, and conflicting
accounts were presented from time to time. “We would give a good deal,” says
Stourm, “to be able to reconstruct the budgets of this period. But no one will
ever succeed in doing so, even approximately.” All deficiencies are met by
frequent “votes on account” of assignats representing capital resources. “In
the last resort,” said Mirabeau at the Assembly, “ one hears but this, ‘ I have
so much: I need so much.’ And the Assembly makes answer, ‘ How have you so much
? Why do you need so much ? ’ ” It must be added that these questions received
no adequate reply. When the Cour des Comptes was abolished (September 3, 1790)
some of its accounts were as much as 18 years in arrear, and a large number had
been outstanding for ten years or upwards. Ramel (Minister of Finance, 1796-9)
expresses the opinion that the regular receipts of government from taxation,
year by year, during the regime of paper-money, did not exceed 300 millions,
paid by those who could or would. The conservative party unsuccessfully
endeavoured to force the Finance Committee to lay before the Assembly, prior to
its dissolution, accounts of income and expenditure for its term of office, and
a statement of the present financial position. On the last day of its existence
(September 30,1790) there were in hand 35 millions; and 346 millions of
assignats remained unissued out of the authorised total of 1800 millions.
The
Constituent Assembly had “ muddled through ” at an enormous cost. It left the
nation witb adequate guarantees of popular financial control, with a unified
and levelled field of public finance, and achieved the extinction of unjust and
oppressive taxation. It gave earnest of a desire for economy in expenditure,
and for the reduction, as rapidly as possible, of public debt. It has been made
the object of much indiscriminate abuse as confiscating and extravagant.
Extravagant it was not, except that it afforded an illustration of the truth
that for governments, as for individuals, nothing is so expensive as to be
short of money. No one can read its debates without being struck by its
consistent desire for fairness in compensating the legatees of the old system.
Circumstances were sometimes too strong for it. The refusal of the peasants to
pay or redeem their feudal dues classified by the Assembly as “redeemable” only
proved that the deputies were in advance of the moral sense of their
constituents. A Leasehold Enfranchisement Act is not an Act of confiscation
when it lays down terms of purchase which the leaseholders actively or
passively refuse to carry out while successfully ignoring the obligations of
their leases. The pension revisions, which come nearest in substance to
harshness and oppression, are unexceptionable in point of form. Royal pensions
were always a matter of grace and favour. Long and faithful public service
established no legal claim to one of these. They might be stopped or reduced at
any time, as the financial situation might require. The Livre Rouge was only
communicated to the Pensions Committee after much objection on Necker’s part,
and was finally delivered to them with the condition that the expenses of the
King’s predecessors should not be examined. The report of the Committee has
been criticised on the grounds that it lacked a sense of proportion, fastening
ad invidiam upon trivial abuses; that it confounded pensions which were really
bounty with those which were deferred payment for past services—or even payment
for present services, eg. to guardians of royal residences; that the
indiscriminate reduction of the large pensions was unjust, and the temporary
suspension of smaller pensions, pending revision, an act of cruelty to old
soldiers and other needy veterans of the State. The decree of January 1, 1790,
ordered all arrears of pension to date to be paid; but no payment was to be at
a higher rate than 3000 livres a year, unless the pensioner was 70 years of age
or over, in which case he might be paid up to a yearly rate of
12,000 livres. Camus, the president and reporter
of the Committee, showed himself particularly anxious to secure the continuance
of small pensions which had been duly earned. And the decree above mentioned is
an example, at all events, of discrimination. The Committee put the claims of
public servants to pension upon a legal footing, and revised in a democratic
and utilitarian spirit the large pensions previously granted from year to year
by the King. In this matter they need little defence.
Apart from
such criticism, however, the financial blunders of the
Constituent
Assembly were sufficiently grave. Anxious, almost compelled, to do everything
at once, the Assembiy weakened the arm of the executive at a time when it
needed strengthening. To this jealous check, paralysing the public service, was
largely due the falling off of revenue, which combined with other causes to
lead the State into further danger. The Treasury was deprived of its resources
by the repeal of existing taxes, before new taxes were put in their place. The
nationalisation of Church and Crown property was effected in a crude and
foolish manner. To fling such masses of land upon the market at one time, and
at such a time, was senseless, and ought not to have been regarded as
inevitable. The issue of assignats was an insidious and a dangerous measure
even at the outset. But if they had been limited in their amount to the
saleable value of the nationalised property, and promptly withdrawn from circulation
pari passu with the sales, they might not have seriously depreciated. Even so
the proceeds should have been regarded as extraordinary resources, not
available for meeting the current expenses of the year, which in times of peace
should have been met out of current revenue. Unhappily, with this fund at its
back, the Assembly drew upon it with frequency to meet ordinary expenditure,
and bequeathed this fatal facility to its successors, with the result that new
issues inflated the currency beyond any possibility of redemption.
An eminent
writer has commented with severity upon certain critics of the Revolution: “ Si
on avait ete sage! those cry, who consider the Revolution as a futile mutiny.
But then prudence itself was impossible.” If, however, we look back at the
history of the Constituante, it appears that it would have been as simple to
appeal to the patriotism of the people to endure for a moment the continuance
of “transitional ” taxation of a normal character, as to institute a voluntary
system of patriotic gifts and contributions. Had this been done, the
nationalised property might have been realised without the resort to assignats,
and the whole financial history of the Revolution would have been changed.
We have dwelt
at length upon the measures taken by the Constituent Assembly because it laid
the bases of the present financial system of France; and its successors present
comparatively little of interest or importance to the student of finance, so
far as innovations are concerned. The Legislative Assembly concerned itself
mainly with the proscription of the emigres and of the non-juring clergy, and
with the constitutional position of the King. The Convention and the Directory
presented occasional accounts, but no budget is to be found until the Consulate
introduced firmness and order into public administration ; and from 1793 even
public accounts are wanting. The Commissioners of Audit, appointed by the
decree of September 17-29, 1791, to work under the immediate supervision of the
Assembly, performed their functions until the creation of a regular Audit
Office in 1807; but they were hopelessly
in arreax,
and no proper authority existed for deciding general questions in dispute
between the various financial officers. The Commission was reorganised by a law
of June 24,1793, and was called upon by the law of August 22, 1795, to denounce
publicly malversations and irregularities, which continued however to evade its
attempts to check them. “ The incalculable losses undergone during the
Revolution have never been brought to audited account” (d’Audiflret). In the
fourth year of the Republic no audited account had been passed since 1787.
The most
complete summary which we possess of the financial administration of the
Constituante is contained in a report of the Finance Committee of September
1791, for the period May 5, 1789— August 31, 1791. In these twenty-eight out of
the twenty-nine months of its existence the receipts were 277,351,125 limes of
ordinary, and
1.162.404.040 livres of extraordinary revenue; the expenses,
1,102,852,387 livres, in addition to 211,21.1,615 of extraordinary expenditure,
and 154,958,491 livres of repayment of debt. Over and above the debt inherited
by the Assembly in 1789 it had contracted 3,500 millions, of which about
one-third had been paid off. Its apologists point to the Church lands, the
Crown lands, and the property of the emigres, as a proof that the assets of the
nation were still in excess of its liabilities. It had decreed (September 17, 1791)
the separation of the accounts for each year, their examination by the Assembly
itself, and their publication (from January 1) at the beginning of each
session. Each Minister sent in his estimates direct to the Assembly, which
brought them together and drew up the financial programme of the year.
We come now
to Cambon’s financial statement for 1792. The total expenses are estimated at
827,551,476 livres, and the receipts at 856,981,853. The ordinary expenses are
stated at 303,194,184 livres. The receipts include 281,591,138 livres of
arrears of taxes. The ordinary receipts are estimated at 438 millions,
including contribution fondere (240 millions), contribution mobUiire (60
millions), and stamps (80 millions); but of this total 300 millions were estimated
to be likely to be in arrear —a net receipt in 1792 of taxes for the year of
only 138 millions ! The Caisse de Vextraordinaire had disposed of resources
amounting on September 22, 1792, to 2,632,538,116 livres, and had only 28 or 29
millions of paper left. According to a later statement of Claviere the arrears
had yielded 198 millions, but nothing had been received in respect of 1792, and
the balance showed a deficiency of 558 millions.
At the end of
September, 1792, 2700 millions in assignats had been issued, of which 67
millions had been paid in again. 3300 millions additional were issued in the
short space of seven months—400 on October 24, 1792, 600 on November 21, 300 on
December 14, 800 on February 1,1793, and 1200 on May 7. The Convention is responsible
for the emission of 7274 millions. The Directory raised the total to
45.578.810.040 livres. This figure, officially stated
in debate, was
challenged at
the time, but differs little from the result arrived at by Camus (45,481
millions). Ramel gives the amount as 48,478 millions, later authorities, after
allowing for redemptions, as 44,577 millions. On February 18, 1796, 1167
millions in the hands of government were burned; and about 24,000 millions were
outstanding when repudiation took place in 1797.
The average
value of the paper as compared with silver is shown in an Appendix. It will be
seen with what care the enormous and varying figures of Revolutionary finance
are to be interpreted when the silver Yvtrre varied at from a little over one
to more than three hundred times the value of its nominal equivalent in paper.
The warnings of Dupont of Nemours were more than justified. A pound of sugar
sold for 400 livres, a pound of soap for 230, a pound of candles for 140
livres.
To tender or
receive assignats at less than their face value was made punishable by
imprisonment for six months for the first, and 20 years for the second, offence
(August 1, 1793), and ultimately (May 10, 1794) by death. This last provision
was repealed after the Terror (2 Nivose, 1794). Assignats of royal origin,
which had depreciated 8 or 10 per cent, less than republican assignats in 1793,
aroused the anger of government; and all denominations of them over 100 livres
apiece, amounting to 558 millions, were demonetised (July 31, 1793), on the
ground that aristocrats alone could possess such large notes. On September 5 in
the same year the use of coin and the refusal of assignats were made punishable
by death. On May 2,1793, a maximum price had been fixed by law for all grain.
The decree of September 5 minutely fixed the prices of all articles by a
maximum schedule. To the prices of 1790 (the year when prices began to be
affected by assignats) was added one-third, plus a profit of 5 per cent, on
wholesale, and 10 per cent, on retail trading. This maximum was augmented by
two-thirds (Vendemiaire, An hi), and
finally abolished 2 Nivose of the same year. Its paralysing effect upon
commerce was as great as any of its opponents could have predicted.
The
denominations of notes had been reduced from time to time, to as little as 10
sous (Assemblee Legislative); and gold and silver became so scarce that when
Napoleon set out (February 23,1796) to take command of the Army of Italy, the
utmost efforts of the Treasury could provide him only with a war-chest of 2000
louis in coin, which he took in his carriage. Arrived at Nice he issued an
order of the day allotting 4 of his louis to each general under his command,
for military purposes. “It was,” says Bresson, “an enormous sum. For a long
time past nobody had known what it was to have coin.”
A certain
number of assignats had been paid in for taxes or other government claims (e.g.
the purchase of national property), while others had been annulled, reducing
the amount in circulation to 36,000, and eventually to 24,000 millions. A law
of 2 Nivose, An iv, decreed that
the total in
circulation was not to exceed 40,000 millions, and that the plates and stamps
were to be destroyed . as soon as this figure was reached This destruction took
place on 30 Pluviose, An iv (February 18, 1796), but the urgent need for more
money induced the government to issue mandats territoriaux to the amount of
2400 millions of livres between March and September, 1796 (decree of 22
Germinal, An iv), which differed little in principle from assignats. They were
ordered to be current at thirty times the value of assignats, which were to be
converted into mandats. On the day of issue of the mandats (April 11,1796) 100
francs in assignats were quoted at 18 francs in coin. The mandats fell to 5 per
cent, of their face value by September 10, and gradually went down to
1 per cent. On May 21, 1797, all assignats
and mandats in the hands of the public were demonetised. Enormous suffering was
inflicted upon large numbers of people at various stages of this disastrous
experiment; and the government itself incurred colossal losses by the discharge
in depreciated paper of obligations contracted towards it in coin.
The chief
financial events of 1793 were the consolidation of the Exchequer, by the amalgamation
of the various caisses (Domaime, Extraordinaire, and the Treasury); a forced
loan of 1000 millions from those having an income of 2000 livres and upwards
(May 20)—a measure which temporarily raised the value of the assignats—and the
great operation known as the opening of the Grand Livre (August 24). This
measure, proposed by Cambon, was designed to consolidate the public debt by
cancelling the stock issued under various conditions prior to the Revolution,
and issuing in its place a new stock of uniform character, so that all the
fund-holders should hold stock of the revolutionary government and feel, like
Mirabeau’s holder of assignats, interested in its stability. Every fund-holder
was to be inscribed in the Great Book or register of the public debt for the
amount due to him every year; and the service of the debt was thus unified and
simplified. The occasion was taken to summarise the various debt charges.
Ordinary borrowings being capitalised at 5 per cent, and annuities at 10 per
cent., the total was stated at 6,626,400,000 livres.
Holders of
old debt who neglected to present their certificates for exchange, or to
collect their arrears of interest, found themselves penalised by the successive
reduction of arrears to 80, 50, 20, 5 per cent., and finally by the
cancellation of outstanding certificates and arrears. Interest was paid in
assignats at their face value until 28 Pluviose, An iv, from which date
assignats were paid on the basis of 10 livres in assignats for each livre due
to the fund-holder. On September 30,1797 (9 Vendemiaire, An vi), occurred the
famous “bankruptcy of the consolidated third.” The debt inscribed in the Grand
Livre was reduced by two-thiids, and bons au porteur (bonds to bearer) were
issued for the two- thirds of capital wiped out from the debt. These bonds were
receivable in payment for property purchased from the nation. They fell to
70 per cent,
below par at the time of issue, and were soon completely worthless. At the end
of the Directory the annual charge of the consolidated debt was 46 millions,
representing at 5 per cent, a capital of 920 millions, in addition to an annual
sum of 29 millions in respect of annuities.
What was the
value of the property nationalised by the French Revolution ? Ramel estimated
the amount at 3300 millions, but this is much below the mark. Eschasseriaux
valued it for the Cornett des Anciens in the fourth year of the Republic at a
total of 5253 millions (specie value), of which 3195 millions were for Church
and Crown lands and 2058 millions for the property of the emigres. To this must
be added 2000 millions from property nationalised in Belgium after its
annexation. From the outbreak of the Revolution the position of the nobility
had been increasingly difficult. Their titles and liveries were abolished (June
19, 1790). They were unprotected in rural districts from the violence of the
Jacquerie. Such rights as were left to them were no longer enforced. The
menacing attitude of the peasantry, and the hostility of government, caused
many of them to leave the country—some to join the army of Conde, others to
wait peacefully for quieter times. All alike were stricken after the flight to
Vareimes by decrees declaring them banished and liable to execution (March 28,
1793), and their property was confiscated (February 9 and July 27, 1792). The
Terror attacked their families and ordered the confiscation of the property
even of those who harboured the families of emigres.
Reference has
already been made to the evils which resulted from the insufficiently
considered delegation of government functions to the local authorities (law of
December 1,1790). The abolition of octroi duties on the one hand, the
responsibility for increased administration on the other, seriously compromised
local finance. Municipalities were authorised to retain one-sixteenth of the
proceeds of national property sold through their agency—the amount to be
applied to the extinction of their debts, for which purpose they were also to
sell all their property not set apart for common enjoyment (August 5, 1791). On
August 24, 1793, all the debts of local authorities outstanding a fortnight
earlier were nationalised. In return for the cost of collecting government
taxes, etc. the ordinary contributions were augmented by additional sous to be
retained by the local authorities. But the contributions {fonciere and
personnelle) could not be established in a day. The machinery of a new system
of taxation, involving elaborate valuations and assessments, would have
strained for many months the resources of a regular branch of the government
service. The inexperienced communes were unequal to the task. The lists for the
Year hi were not completed at the end of the Year v. At the beginning of the
Consulate less than a third of the lists for the Year vii had been drawn up. Many of these lagging payments were
never recovered; and the municipalities, themselves
almost devoid
of means, neglected their new duties. Education was entrusted to their charge,
but the schools had been generally sold with Church property, and 200,000
school-children were left without instruction. The highways were not repaired.
Peasants who had grumbled at the corvees found themselves wasting more time and
money in transport than they had previously devoted to forced public works.
Turnpikes were set up to levy tolls on the Eng'ish system. The assessment to
the contribution personneUe and the tax upon luxury (July 25, 1795) were
entrusted to “juries of equity? (jurys d’equiU) by the law of August 1, 1797;
but their proceedings, based upon favouritism and pique, were far more
arbitrary than the worst abuses of the anden regime, and gave rise to so much
scandal that, they were suppressed (December 23, 1798). The additional sous had
already been taken over by government, which abolished the local budgets of
departments and communes, but not of municipalities (19 Fructidor, An 11), and
resumed the direction of most of the national services. Hospitals and charities
were nationalised (23 Messidor, An 11), and the main lines of modem local
finance in France were laid down by the law of December 23, 1798, authorising
additions up to 17£ per cent, for local purposes. The State management of the
collection of revenue was the first step taken by Gaudin (November 24, 1799),
when at the beginning of the Consulate he succeeded to an empty treasury. Until
this was done, the national exchequer was in an impossible position.
The general
financial position after the third year of the Republic can only be summarily
indicated. Ramel, with access to official documents and official advisers, was
unable to arrive at any clear conclusions. So long as the paper-money was in
circulation the accounts present an insoluble enigma. On 17 Brumaire, An iv,
was presented a “sort of budget," amounting to 3000 millions of expenses
in paper-money, the louis of
24 limes being at this time worth 3080 livres
in paper. The principal financial feature of the year was a further forced loan
of 600 millions, one-half being payable in grain. The actual expenses were
returned at 618,512,627 livres, and the receipts at 561,820,176 livres (specie
value). The estimate for An v (16 Brumaire) amounted to lOOO million livres
(specie value), of which 450 was required for ordinary expenditure and 550 for
war. The ordinary expenditure was subsequently returned at 568,421,555 livres,
and the ordinary receipts at 340 millions. The estimate of the various
government departments for the ordinary expenditure of An vi amounted to
643,436,581 millions, reduced by the Corps Ligislatif to 616 millions (voted 9
Vendemiaire). With the Year vi we have, says Ramel, who may henceforward be
adopted as our most trustworthy guide, a return to order. The exchequer revenue
amounted to 418,995,118 livres, in addition to 3,317,043 for the repair of
roads, and 105,009,555 paid over to local authorities. 50 millions of arrears
were outstanding, and the deficit of the year stood at 25,157,613 livres.
The
receipts of the next three years are
stated as follows (An ix estimated).
Gross Net
An
m 728,071,441 639,079,892
An
viii 799,355,744 608,684,207
An
ix 636,765,196 486,721,413
The gross “
contributions of conquered countries ” are 18, 14, and 12 millions respectively
for these three years; 12, 9, and 9 millions net. In the Year viii are included 5 millions from the sale
of national property in Holland. The following table shows the items of
principal importance, in net figures of millions.
|
An
vii |
An
vm |
An
ix |
Contribution*
directes |
276 |
286£ |
276£ |
„
indirecte* |
150 |
128 |
noi |
Domaine |
25 |
21 |
18 |
Sale
of furniture and moveables |
5 |
2-9 |
2'9 |
„
national estates |
33 |
40-6 |
30 |
The
contributions from foreign countries were a considerable resource of the
revolutionary government. Napoleon, in particular, was one of its most valuable
assets. He collected the taxes in Italy, held individuals and towns to ransom,
raised forced loans and war indemnities, commandeered enormous supplies, and
even pillaged museums, art galleries, and private collections, to send coin and
valuable articles to the Directory. Stores, horses, munitions of war captured
in battle, were sold and captured again. He fed, clothed, and “found” his army
at the expense of the localities in which they were quartered, and remitted
substantial balances to the government in Paris. His proclamations declare that
the French soldiers who brought the torch of liberty to oppressed humanity at
the cost of their blood must at least be paid for their pains. Paid in gold or
in kind, the soldiers drew comparisons to the disadvantage of a civilian
government paying in worthless paper; and the fatal assignat thus enhanced the
prestige of the military chiefs. Requisitions were not confined to foreigners.
Ramel sagely observes that they are ruinous to individuals when they are not
paid for, because then everything is worth taking, and ruinous to government
when they are paid for because then everything is over-estimated. The expenses
of government were enormous; 14 armies were on foot, covering a line of 500
leagues from the mouth of the Ems to the Adriatic, and some of the pay-lists show
as many as 1,400,000 soldiers. Whole battalions, no doubt, existed only on
paper, and serious malversations occurred in the War Office, and in certain
revenue departments where officials speculated with the government money.
For some time
public relief works were carried on, which were little more than simple
charity. 40 sous a day were paid to the
audience
of popular societies. Succour was accorded to all the larger communes. At Paris
bread costing 8 sous a pound in cash was practically given away to the
populace. To meet all these expenses the government threw all the resources of
the country into hotchpot. The salaries of the clergy and the civil list had
ceased to be paid. Church property, Crown property, the lands, houses, goods,
and chattels of the bnigres were seized. Forced loans and forced gifts,
voluntary contributions in kind and money, perquisitions, the seizure of
Church plate worth 45 millions, and of Church bells worth 15 millions, a sum of
500 millions from the countries occupied by the armies of the Republic— these
are examples of the means of supporting the Revolution. It had “liquidated the
ancien regime” but, as has been well said, it was confronted with the necessity
of liquidating itself. The strong hand of Napoleon and the trained intelligence
of Gaudin found little to change in the laws affecting finance; but not until
the return of order and authority did financial affairs emerge from chaos. The
worthless paper, assignats, mandats, bonds of half-a-dozen descriptions,
receipts for requisitions, etc. were gradually destroyed. The 15 millions of
gros sous or large copper coins issued in 1791, and the 150 millions of copper
money, into which the Church bells not used for making cannon were struck in
1794-5, soon became reinforced by gold and silver. Industry and commerce
revived with the establishment of security; and the financial blunders of the
Revolution took their place among regrettable incidents in a struggle which the
French nation determined to survive, at whatever cost.
Table
of the Depreciation of assignats at Paris, showing
the value in coin of 100 Imre*:
1789
November 95
I
January 96
I
July 95
J
January 91
I
July 87
1
ST7 2
(January 51
July 23
1790
1791
1793
™
\ixr %
I
January 18
I
July —
1795
Number of
livres in assignats which could be purchased for 24 livres in cash on the 1st
of each month:
1795 April, 238; May, 299; June, 439; July, 808;
August, 807; September,
1101;
October, 1205; November, 2588; December, 3575.
1796 January, 4658; February, 5337; March, 7200.
The figures,
derived from official sources, are set out in greater detail in Bresson, n.
226, and in Ramel (pp. cit.). The provincial prices frequently differ from
those of Paris. The last quotation on the Bourse was on 21 Prairial, An iv. The
official equivalents are usually higher than the market rates.
The reader
may refer for a discussion of principles and policy with regard to assignats to
Thiers, Revolution franfaise; J. B. Say, Traiii d’tconomie politique', P.
Leroy-Beaulieu, Science des Finances.
II.
For
convenience of reference may be noted the following financial measures, many of
them “ fundamental ” in French finance:
Tax on doors
and windows, November 24, 1798.
Trade
licences, created 1791, abandoned 1793, renewed the same year, amended in
1796 (6 Fructidor, An iv), finally settled, October
28,1797, and October 22,1798. Customs tariff, July 28—August 6-22, 1791.
Transfer
duties, 22 Frimaire, An vn.
Stamp laws,
December 12, 1790—February 18, 1791. Amended by 9 Venddmiaire and 3 Brumaire,
An vi. Basis of present law 13 Brumaire, An vii.
Playing-cards, duty abolished, March 2, 1791. New duty imposed, 9 Vend£miaire,
An vi. The same law imposed a duty upon hackney carriages.
Tobacco
monopoly abolished 1790. Duty of 60 frs. per 100 kilos, imposed 22 Germinal, An
v, and an increased duty on manufacture, 22 Brumaire, An vii. State lottery abolished 25
Frimaire, An 11. Restored 17 Vendemiaire, An vz.
FRENCH LAW IN
THE AGE OF THE REVOLUTION.
On the eve of the Revolution France was
consumed by an intense desire for reform; for reforms in government, in
society, in the family, in the measurement of time and of space. The current
opinion was that everything ought to be remodelled, public law, private law,
constitution, and customs. Turgot forcibly summed up the revolutionary idea:
“There is no reason,” said he, “for maintaining institutions founded without
reason.” It is difficult for us to form an adequate picture of the
extraordinary intellectual activity of those memorable .days. 1789 forms the
very atmosphere of our present life; it is the air we breathe, and it needs a
real effort on our part to conceive men and affairs as they were at the opening
of the modem era.
This new
world, that the year 1789 revealed rather than brought into being, was hailed
with unparalleled enthusiasm. For centuries the nation had been Waiting for
reforms ; those long-standing grievances and sufferings which keep alive a
people’s need and desire for social regeneration haul been handed down from
age to age. The philosophy and literature of the eighteenth century reflect
this condition of men’s minds and sum up these aspirations, which they at the
same time developed and strengthened. At length under their powerful influence
fermentation began, heads were turned, imaginations inflamed. The ideal
society, imagined by philosophers and men of letters, was to be realised here
on earth; hatred and injustice, war and suffering were to be banished from the
world; justice, virtue, and peace were to reign among men, who thenceforth were
to er<joy equal rights and less unequal fortunes, and live free beneath the
aegis of the Law. As to the means which were to regenerate society, a
constitution, decrees, a declaration would suffice, since “ ignorance,
forgetfulness, or contempt of the rights of man, are the sole causes of the
national ills.” (Preamble to the Declaration af Rights.)
A whole
generation trusted in this scheme and drank of this intoxicating draught; and
there was joy, enthusiasm, and faith, such as had never been known—an
enthusiasm and a faith that spread throughout Europe. Only a few of the higher
natures retained enough freedom of
mind, enough
self-control, to be able to judge this great effort of humanity. The famous
Wilhelm von Humboldt, when yet a young man, had already said: “ Constitutions
cannot be grafted on mankind like buds on trees. Where time and nature do not
come to his assistance, man can make no more lasting work than bind together a
few flowers that the first sunbeams will wither.” Let the legislator therefore,
Humboldt continued, avoid attaching himself to an ideal, to purely rational
conceptions; let him be satisfied to steer the present towards the distant
vision of perfection. Since this new constitution seemed to him above all else
an effort of logic and reason, he considered it but still-born. “Will this
constitution succeed?” he wrote. “To judge by all historical precedent: no! But
it will awaken ideas and desires for new things and possi i 'lities. It will
leave its traces far beyond the boundaries of France. Between the conception
and the realisation of an idea extend vast intervals of space and time.”
In this
sentence of death, pronounced by a man of genius, we can yet feel a tremor of
the immense enthusiasm which had greeted the Revolution. But the judgment
itself was too absolute: to a certain extent Humboldt was mistaken. The work of
the Revolution was not purely rational. Philosophers and theorists, even when
occupied in constructing the most abstract systems, while they fancy themselves
wandering freely beyond the sphere of facts and of contingent data, still
remain, and are fated to remain, the expression of needs, the product of
circumstances, the outcome of their own time. The stately edifice which they
rear to the clouds covers tangible realities, and their principles are but the
cloak of facts. When the theorists of the Revolution demanded in the name of
their principles the abolition of the privileges of the nobility, they did but
finish the work of centuries, for the nobility was crumbling with age. When
they demanded the abolition of local customs, and the introduction of legal
uniformity, again they were completing the work of centuries ; this aspiration
towards a uniform law dates from the times of St Louis, and two centuries later
it was formulated. When the legislators published the declaration, “None shall
be interfered with on account of his opinions, even of his religious opinions,
provided that their manifestation does not disturb public order as established
by law,” they were still giving their sanction to the patient labours of time,
for manners had changed and did not allow of religious persecution. When they
proclaimed the principle of the voting of taxes by the representatives of the
nation, they were restoring the ancient right, for whose recognition the long
and determined efforts of the Parlements had already prepared the monarchy.
In several
parts of the work of the Revolution which we are about to survey we shall
easily recognise this historical character, which is an invaluable pledge of v
.tal y and durability. The part that the forefathers have played in the work
of their children is too often forgotten. Certainly it is not to be found in
all the laws concerning private affairs
enacted by
revolutionary assemblies, but it may be observed in them far more often than is
commonly believed, and to this it is due that the revolutionary governments in
those days of fever, madness, ard blood contrived, in spite of all, to lay
certain firm foundations.
Two
aspirations widely different, indeed to some extent incompatible, which at this
time took hold of all minds, must first compel our attention: the aspiration
for provincial liberties, and that for legislative unity.
France,
forced by her Kings to centralise, desired the restoration of local privileges,
especially the restoration of the Provincial Estates. Her hopes were destined
to be deceived; the powerful historic current which drove her towards
administrative and political unity increased; and far from regaining privileges
taken from them during the preceding centuries, the Provinces lost those which
still remained to them.
Private law
is in its essence changed less easily than constitutional law. Moreover
provincial customs had retained more hold on public esteem than had the laws
concerning public administration. Doubtless the penal code and procedure, which
are so intimately connected with order and public safety, had by degrees come
within the sphere of royal authority; but private law in its proper sense, that
aggregate of legal ideas which corresponds to the modem Civil Code, had almost
entirely escaped the royal influence. The Crown, although since the days of
Louis XI it had dreamed of unity in civil law, had very rarely dared to act in
this sense; and in 1789 the provincial customs still remained in force. But for
a long time two great influences had been at work to weaken and slowly
undermine them: Roman Law, and the custom of Paris. Roman Law, though its
influence was everywhere felt, was chiefly operative in the southern Provinces,
the region of droit ecrit; the custom of Paris, although it also influenced the
whole of France, held a more marked sway in the centre than in the rest of the
kingdom.
The wish for
unity in private law, though not universal, was widely felt. Magistrates and
private citizens alike suffered from the great inconveniences of diversity of
custom: a diversity which engenders, multiplies, and confuses legal
proceedings. On the other hand, in the domain of public law, in which
centralisation had already triumphed, it was the evils due to this
centralisation which brought about suffering and complaints. And thus arose two
somewhat incompatible desires, on the one hand that for political
decentralisation and for the restoration of local liberties, and on the other
that for legislative centralisation and for the unity of private law. The
desire for local liberties was swept away by the powerful historic movement
towards centralisation. The desire for the unity of civil law was realised to
some extent during the Revolutionary period by the passing of a series of very
important laws, and completely satisfied in 1804 by the enactment of the Civil
Code. Failure in the one case and success in the other were both due to the
same
historical
law, namely, the law of centralisation and unification, which in varying
degrees has governed Europe for five or six centuries, and takes effect on any
society that is growing old.
Among general
reforms some of those which concerned private rather than public law were the
first to be carried; and, as we shall see, they were passed with little
consideration. As to official efforts to endow France with a uniform body of
civil law, the Constituent Assembly went no further than the general principle;
the legislators busied themselves with the matter, but no serious work of this
kind was done until the Convention took it in hand. During the Revolutionary
period, strictly so-called, the end was not attained.
Criminal law
had been unified by the Crown, but retained its harsh and almost barbarous
character. At the end of the eighteenth century it was the object of the
keenest criticism. Even before the era of the Revolution Lonis XVI had brought
about an important reform in this province. The remodelling of the penal code
and the simplification of criminal procedure were in 1789 among the most
pressing preoccupations of the enlightened part of the nation. The Constituent
Assembly, so early as the month of November, 1789, passed a decree reforming
the criminal law; in September, 1791, it enacted a penal code and a code of
criminal procedure. The Convention sketched a system of procedure and enacted a
new penal code.
Civil Law. Land Tenure.
Let us first
review and classify the great reforms concerning private law which made way for
the Civil Code. After that we will cursorily examine criminal law and
procedure. The subject-matter of the Civil Code may be brought under two
principal heads, the land law and the law of personal condition. We begin with
the land law, premising, however, that it is impossible entirely to separate
this subject from that of personal status.
In June and
July, 1789, the delegates of the nation thought that their first duty was to
provide France with a constitution. There was no reason to expect that the
first important act of the Assembly would be the abolition of the feudal
system. The decisions embraced in what is generally called the abolition of the
feudal system belong in great measure to the history of private law. These
therefore must have the first place in our statement. The famous night of
August 4 was the starting-point for a series of decrees, which in the course of
a few years violently solved the problem of land law and feudalism.
The need of
simplification in matters connected with the land was strongly felt. Estates
had been for centuries encumbered with different dues, the origin and reason of
which were for the most part equally obscure to payer and receiver. Some of the
best minds were working
714
for the
redemption of these charges. Boncerf issued a project of this sort which made a
great sensation, but was condemned by the Parlement of Paris (1776), as the
Essay on the Redemption of Rent-charges amd Dues on Land had been twenty-five
years before (1751). These absurd condemnations suppressed the books, but not
the evils which were their subject. The evil became more acute than ever; for
the land dues had become more galling to the tenants, because the proprietors
of large estates, themselves for the most part in monetary embarrassment,
exacted their rights, or still more often caused them to be exacted, with more
rigour and exactness than theretofore. The detested terriers, which served in
the collection of rents and dues for manorial lords, were being constantly
elaborated, with a method and precision hitherto unknown, for the improvement
of the landlords’ revenue. The compilation of terriers became an art, reaching
daily a higher degree of perfection.
The lords had
to bear the weight of all the indignation which the efforts of their collectors
and agents excited among the people; and as the fief was the most conspicuous
land tenure, public opinion began to set strongly against what was called
feudalism or the feudal system. The need for reform which filled all minds had
its watchword: “the abolition of the feudal system.”
What was the
exact meaning of these words “ feudalism,” “ feudal ” ? No one really knew. For
the people everything that was bad and hateful was feudal. As to the learned,
in order to distinguish what was feudal, they invented a formula which is both
logically and historically false. We shall soon see the important part played
by this formula at the outset of one phase of the Revolutionary era.
With the
system of the land-law strictly so called there was connected a question
concerning personal status. The ancient system of slavery, which had been by
degrees transformed and softened down, had not entirely disappeared; in some
provinces it was represented by servage, also called mainmorte. Serfdom
replaced the ancient slavery; but by gradual transformation it had become
almost indistinguishable from freedom. Much rhetoric has been spent on the
subject of serfdom; but it may be said that by 1789 in most cases the question
whether a man was a serf or a freeman was of much more consequence to his heirs
than to himself; for the right of inheritance was different for the families of
serfs and for those of freemen, being subject to more restrictions in the case
of the mainmortables. And this was perhaps the chief distinction in 1789
between serfs and freemen. But public opinion called for the abolition of these
last traces of ancient servitude.
Such was the
state of men’s minds at the moment when the delegates of the three Estates met
at Versailles. The deputies, however, did not class these questions among their
most important business. They wished to begin the regeneration of France by
voting a constitution. Events forced them to modify the order of their
undertakings. The capture of
the Bastille
reacted on the whole of the kingdom. It was the signal for a formidable
effervescence, which rapidly spread across France. Chateaux were raided and
cartularies thrown to the flames. The people laid its strong hand on this
detested feudalism. After the taking of the, Bastille the Crown had
surrendered; after these riots and burnings “ feudalism ” capitulated.
On August 4,
1789, at the evening session, Target, a deputy of the Third Estate, proposed a
resolution on the safety of the kingdom. “ The National Assembly,” so runs the
motion, “ considering that—while its sole preoccupation is to establish ■
the welfare of the people on the basis of a free constitution—the disturbances
and riots which trouble certain Provinces cause alarms and endanger the sacred
rights of property and personal security, declares that the ancient laws are
still in force and must be executed until the authority of the nation may have
repealed
or modified them that all customary
dues and payments
shall be
rendered as in the past, until the Assembly shall have ordered otherwise.” It
is remarkable that the representatives of the privileged classes proved
themselves animated by a spirit very different from that of this deputy of the
Third Estate. Instead of attempting to dam the flood, they did not hesitate to
remove all barriers and yield themselves to it. The generous Vicomte de
Noailles gave the signal. After an improvised discussion in which the wise Due
d’Aiguillon, the prudent Dupont of Nemours, the impetuous Le Guen de Kerangal
(deputy of the Third Estate for Lower Britanny), also took part, the Assembly,
carried away by enthusiasm, in the course of a few hours passed a series of
resolutions, which were officially summed up by the fateful words “destruction
of the feudal system.” Within a few hours all classes sacrificed their
privileges in a positive fever of generosity, a delirium of abnegation. “ The
events of August 4,” says de Tocqueville, “ were the result of fear and
enthusiasm, combined in a proportion impossible to determine.” It took six days
to draw up in their final form and to publish the resolutions adopted by show
of hands in a session of six hours; and even so this six days’ work was hasty
and imperfect.
The decrees of August 4 open with a sentence to this effect:—
L'assemblee nationale detruit entierement le regime feodal et decrete que, dans
les droits et devoirs tant feodauoc que censuels, ceux qui tiennent a la
mainrrwrte reelle ou personnelle et a la servitude personnelle, et ceusc qui
les representent, sont abolis sans indemnity, et torn les autres declares
rachetables.
The first
article among the decrees of August 4 concerns directly land tenure and
indirectly personal status. All duties and all renders representing serfdom
(mammorte) are abolished without compensation, and on the other hand those that
are not connected with serfdom are leclared simply redeemable. This
distinction, theoretically very satisfactory, was practically much less so,
for in very many cases the origin
716
Sweeping abolition of ancient rights.
of a due was
doubtful or unknown. For centuries there had been tenements called servile,
for the possession of the land entailed a state of serfdom, but one from which
the tenant could free himself at will by ceding the property. This is that
“real serfdom” (mammorte reelk) mentioned in the first article of the decrees
of August 4. It was widely spread in Franche-Comte and Burgundy. How was anyone
to understand why a family, which had received a free tenement charged with a
perpetual rent, should still be obliged to pay that rent, while a neighbouring
family, which had received a servile tenement, was relieved of all charges
without having to pay any indemnity ? But such was the result of those famous
decrees. It would have been more politic, and at the same time more equitable,
to proclaim the possibility of redemption for all duties and all payments,
whatsoever had been their origin. And in fact in March, 1790, the Constituent
Assembly revoked the decrees of August 4 and proclaimed that only the duties
and burdens of purely personal serfdom were entirely suppressed.
The decrees
of August 4, not content with abolishing all servile dues, did away with all
feudal rights of jurisdiction and all exclusive sporting rights. They went
further and attacked the rights of the Church; they suppressed the tithes due
to religious bodies and many other tithes as well, declaring the remainder to
be redeemable. By so doing they completely overturned the privileges and
fortunes of ecclesiastical bodies and of many private persons. Louis XVI could
not sanction these decrees without giving the1 lie to
his own proclamation. He had solemnly proclaimed on June 23: “ All property
without exception shall invariably be respected, and by property his Majesty
expressly understands tithes, rents, feudal and seigniorial rights and dues,
and in general all rights and prerogatives, whether valuable or honorary,
attached to estates and fiefs.” He had expressed a desire that the abolition of
serfdom, enacted for the royal domain, should be extended to the whole kingdom,
provided that indemnity were forthcoming. The decrees were in direct
contradiction to the intentions of the King; we need not therefore be surprised
at the difficulty with which the royal sanction was obtained. The terrible days
of October witnessed the pressure and intimidation brought to bear on the
monarch to force him to give his consent, and it was at last given on November
3; and the revolutionary work of August 4 was then completed.
The old land
law was still in force, at least in the sense that all rents and dues not
connected with serfdom were respected and merely declared redeemable. The dues
thus retained after all constituted a large part of the value of the land.
These the Revolution now proceeded to attack. A crowd of tenants, with no taint
or trace of servitude about them, could not understand why their dues were
still to be paid, while those of their neighbours, supposed to be serfs or
descended from serfs, were simply abolished. Besides, there were many cases in
Subsequent legislation against feudalism. 717
which, as a
matter of fact, the distinction could not be drawn. This difficulty helped to
force the hand of the legislators; they thought, themselves obliged to take
more radical measures, which were at the same time more iniquitous and less
justifiable. These we will now consider.
“ The
National Assembly entirely abolishes the feudal system,” said the decrees of
August 4. And yet the very same paragraph proclaimed the continuance, unless
they were redeemed, of a host of feudal dues and revenues; so that in fact the
feudal system was not destroyed. Now, what is a feudal charge P Jurists claimed
to be able to distinguish between a feudal charge upon land and a simple charge
upon land with no feudal character; and as a matter of fact this distinction
was currently accepted. Every educated Frenchman, unless willing to declare
himself incapable of distinguishing in what was admittedly a difficult problem,
believed in the existence of feudal land-charges, as distinct from other
land-charges not of a feudal nature; and public opinion disapproved only of
feudal land-charges. As soon as the difficulty of distinguishing between the
dues abolished by the Constituent Assembly and those which it retained called
for new legislation, the attack was directed exclusively against feudal
land-charges. The common man, it is true, was incapable of distinguishing the
characteristics of feudal tenure; but lawyers claimed to be able to do so.
However by glancing at certain dates we can see that this distinction was very
difficult to apply. It was not till a fortnight after the Jeposition of the
King, a fortnight after August 10,1792, that these feudal dues were attacked;
they were not even then suppressed, but were placed in a very uncomfortable
legal position.
It was
decided that in case of a dispute between the claimant of a feudal charge and
the tenant of the land the burden of proving a grant subject to feudal dues
should lie upon the claimant; in other words, all property was held to be free
of feudal burdens unless proof was brought to the contrary (decree of August
25-28, 1792). This decision is important : it implies the absolute abolition
of all feudal dues which did not originate in the concession of land. For there
existed, as we shall see, a series of dues which did not originate in a
contract, but were the outcome, as it has sometimes been expressed, of
feodalite dominante, not of feodalite contractante. We shall return later to
this interesting categoiy. Dues originating in a feudal contract remained
payable, but the onus of proving the contract lay with the landlord.
Meantime the
Republic was proclaimed, or rather asserted. Louis XVI was condemned to death
and guillotined. The Reign of Terror spread through France. The ancient Church
of France was destroyed; all the ancient official bodies were prostrate. Only
one ancient institution remained, weakened it is true and menaced, and this was
feudal land- tenure ; for no law had as yet simply abolished feudal land-dues.
These
were not
suppressed till the middle of the Reign of Terror, six months after the King’s
death. It is the law of July 17, 1793, which proclaims that Tcnites redevances
ci-devant seignewriales, droits Jeodaux, cermtels, fixes, et casuels, sont
supprimes sans ivdemnite. Any charges on the land that were not feudal were
still retained.
Whence
came all this hesitation and delay ? Why were these feudal revenues to be the
last tardy sacrifice offered on the altar of the Revolution ? The .
explanation is very simple. In a great number of, cases the tenures that were
known asjiefs and censives did not differ essentially from other tenures.
Though a jurist might consider himself capable of distinguishing between what
was feudal and what was not, he certainly would be unable to say why feudal
landed interests were less to be respected than other landed interests.
Moreover the legal distinction is strangely deceptive; this was vaguely felt to
be the case, and doubtless for this reason there was so much hesitation. .
Thenceforth
the tribunals were to search in darkness for the marks of feudalism. During the
late Middle Ages, and even nearer our own time than that, judges had used a
special method of discovering witches. They applied pins and needles to all
parts of the body of the suspected person till they found some place insensible
to pain. If they discovered this non-sensitive spot (which really exists in
hysterical patients) they were sure of their witch at once. In the eighteenth.
century lawyers, and following them magistrates, had a means almost as good for
discovering the feudal virus. They put this question: “ Has the proprietor of
the superior tenement a certain right, called direct dominion, direct seignory,
or simply direct right over the subject tenement ?” The whole problem lay in this
one question. Learned lawyers had probed the mystery of feudalism; they knew
that where the word “ direct, ” occurs there was feudalism; and so the “
directe ” in these disputes concerning feudalism answers to the non-sensitive
place in the trials for sorcery—■ but perhaps with a certain
disadvantage, for it was even more difficult to recognise. ,
And what was
this “direct right”? By one of those mischances that are only too common in the
history of law, jurists had selected as the mark of a barbarous and feudal
contract what was really a Roman term and idea; both idea and expression were
introduced into legal phraseology by medieval civilians. To explain: in Roman
law actio directa is an action derived expressly from a statute; actio utilis
is that granted by analogy with the case giving rise to the direct action.
Actio utilis is therefore an extension of the direct action. Romanists, Azo in
particular, use the expressions dominium directum, dominium utile. We can see
that these expressions are inspired by the terms actio directa, actio utilis;
and that by direct dominion they understand the proprietary right, which gives
rise to a direct action; by dominium utile the right which occasions an actio
utilis. It was in connexion with emphyteusis
that these
terms dominium, directum, dominium utile were first used; the lessor of a long
lease kept the direct dominion, the lessee received the dominium utile. There
are many striking analogies between the fief of barbarian origin and the Roman
emphyteusis. Medieval lawyers applied the terms direct dominion (dominium
directum), direct seignory, or simply “direct” to feudal relations. These
expressions conveyed the idea of a feeble right on the part of the vassal, and
a far stronger right, ownership (at least in the eye of the law) on the part
of the suzerain. But in course of time, the suzerain’s right having grown
weaker and weaker, the words were no longer consonant with the facts. Thus the
importance of “ direct dominion ” lessened from century to century; at the end
of the old regime the development was complete. The dominium utile was
considered as the true ownership; “ direct dominion ” had ceased to be anything
more than a sort of troublesome “ servitude.”
So this
supposed characteristic of feudal contracts was of entirely Roman origin. But
how was the “direct right” to be recognised? What needle could the modem lawyer
use to discover the “ direct right ”? It was often expressly mentioned in the
title-deeds, and in that case there was no difficulty. If it was not mentioned,
lawyers were agreed that it existed wherever the tenant’s land was described as
a jkf or censive; that it also existed when the due was described as cens, not
as rente. Land paying a cens is encumbered with a feudal charge; land paying rente
is encumbered with a non-feudal charge. It mattered little that the charge
called cens might be identical with the charge called rente; one was feudal,
the other was not. But the list of exceptions was formidable, for if the
civilians had first spoken of direct right in the case of emphyteusis, we must
add that they had continued to use it in the same connexion. And yet no one
will claim that the Graeco-Roman emphyteusis was a feudal contract. Here we
have therefore a “ direct right,” frequent in charters and in the drafts of
notaries, which was not exposed to the attacks of the enemies of feudalism.
This they could not but know: so they had to make another distinction and to
recognise the existence of a “direct right” free from all feudal taint, which they
called directe privee; they separated it from seigniorial direct right and
agreed to respect it.
This tardy
victory of justice and common-sense was not the first, nor the only one. A
reactionary influence had been felt since 1795; it arose from two sources, the
interests of private individuals and those of the State. Those private persons
who had been despoiled demanded justice; and the State, having seized the
possessions of the emigres and those of the Church and thus come into the
rights of the despoiled proprietors, was the victim of its own laws. On 15
Messidor in the Year iv (1796) the Directory sent word to the Council of the
Five Hundred asking them to revise these laws, which had ruined many fathers of
families and occasioned a loss to the Republic estimated at 120,000,000 livres
on the
720
basis
of the value of currency in 1790. On 18 Ventose, in the Year v (1796),
Treilhard, making a direct attack on the work of the Convention, proposed to
rescind the laws of July 17 and October 2,1793, by right of which all charges
on land tainted with the least sign of feudalism were suppressed without
indemnity. This radical decision was not adopted, but partial measures helped
to lessen the evil. In its rage against feudalism, incredible as it may seem,
the Convention had been on the point of abolishing the rights of a lessor, even
in case of a short lease, if the gr;ant showed the slightest sign of feudalism.
These decisions had ruined very many landlords in the west of France, whose
estates were leased by a special contract called bail d congement or domaine
conge able. “ On such lines,” as Lemerer very properly remarked in his speech
to the Five Hundred, “ it would be allowable to discover traces of feudalism
everywhere, and by means of this marvellous discovery to invalidate all human
contracts !” The law of 9 Brumaire in the Year vi (October 30, 1797) couched in
halting and indirect terms, wiped out this injustice as far as ■lomaine
congAabte was concerned. .
This phantom
of feudalism escaped the grasp of its pursuer. A distinction between different
sources of ncome, treating some as feudal and in consequence suppressing them
without compensation, others as aon-feudal and so to be retained unless
redeemed, could not rest on a serious and scientific basis. It would have been
possible to find some less absurd distinction, but none would have been quite.
satisfactory; for feudal land-rights are at bottom proprietary rights and
analogous to any others of this kind. Simple right of redemption for all dues
would have been the only sensible and practical measure. France would only have
had to .follow the system adopted by Savoy, where enfranchisement had been in
regular use since the edicts of 1762 and 1771; but this system was not adopted.
French
tribunals for many years were forced to make use of the astonishing criterion,
with which the reader is now acquainted, whenever they wished to put in force
the absolute suppression of feudal dues, and consequently had to decide what
was feudal and what was not. They had not at that time, nor would they have
to-day, any other compass by which to steer their course than la directe, which
an old writer, d’Argentrd, has so well compared to a will o’ the wisp. Before
August 4, 1789, a notary, engaged to draw up a perpetual lease with the view of
emphasising the rights of his client (the lessor), would not have hesitated to
mention the existence of “direct” rights on his client’s side had he thought
this possible, or at least to use some phrase implying “direct” rights. From
August 4 onwards—or to speak more correctly, from November 3, 1789—this very
precaution would have been the ruin of the luckless client; it would have
occasioned the absolute suppression of his income.
Such were the
rough and ready methods, which unravelled, or rather cut, the “ complexion
feudcde ” as it was called, The land was thus freed
from the
so-called feudal obligations which burdened it. Any perpetual dues not of a
feudal character were henceforth redeemable (law of December 18-29, 1790).
According to the lawyers the land started free and untrammelled under the new
legislation. Let us not however exaggerate the force and extent of this new
enfranchisement of the soil. Certainly, so far as individuals were concerned,
the land was freed from all irredeemable perpetual charges and enfranchised
from the feudal superiority. But what was its legal position with regard to the
State ? Had not the State a “ direct dominion ” over all lands ? This is a question
which history can answer. In the Middle Ages and the centuries which followed,
land free from all superiority and all extrinsic charges was called an alleu.
For more than six centuries the efforts of the lords and the King had been
constantly directed to turning all such alleiix for their own advantage into
fiefs or censives; that is to say into estates burdened with some charge,
service, or due. In 1789 the legislators, well pleased with their work, naively
declared that henceforth all French land was to be alleu. But they forgot that
the King, the overlord of the whole kingdom, over which he claimed a universal
directe, had been for two centuries the most powerful adversary of the alleux;
that he had from the first made them 1: ble to payment of rents and fines on
change of ownership, then to royal taxation, thus taking from them their
essential character of fiscal immunity. They forgot that the revolutionary
State was the King’s heir, and consequently enjoyed this veiy same royal and
universal superiority. It was not therefore the alleu which won the day in
1789; for the universal “direct dominion’’ of the State was maintained and
confirmed. Indeed French tribunals, for more than half a century, expressly
recognised the “direct dominion” of the modem State over all lands. But for the
last forty years (since the arret de cassation of 1857) magistrates have been
afraid of the term “ directe ” ,• they will have no more to do with directe
even for the benefit of the State. But, nevertheless, French land, subject as
it is to an annual land-tax, and on occasion to succession dues, has no right
to the name alleu. Lawyers’ illusions make no difference as to this fact.
This triumph
of the universal superiority of the State demands a short explanation. The long
struggle of the French Kings against the alleu was at bottom nothing else than
the encroachment of the State, growing stronger and more powerful every day. In
the thirteenth century, and still more in the fourteenth, the State began to
reclaim the universal right of taxation which it had lost since about the ninth
century. This historical right is represented during the Middle Ages by claims
to collect a cens from estates which till then had been free from all dues; the
King and the lords supported their claims by the famous axiom, “ N-ulle terre
sans seigneur ” (unless the contrary be proven). This axiom played an important
part in the struggle of six centuries, which ended in the triumph of the
universal suzerainty of the
722
King. With
these four words, “ Nulle terre sans seigneur,” dues were levied on very many
allodial estates without title or ground. A little later the King, without
yielding his claims to feudal dues, orig.' ikted a modem system of taxation,,
which by. degrees was extended to all estates. In consequence many proprietors
fell victims, to this double fiscal system^the feudal cens (connected by
imperceptible links with the Roman system of taxation) , and modem taxes. The
cens in such cases was not a rent that had been reserved upon a grant of land;
it was preeminently-one of the results of that sort of feudalism which is
imposed by superior force (feodalite dpminante), as distinguished from that
which arises from a contract {feodalite contractante). Such an aspect of
affairs explains and in part justifies the popular hatred of “ feudalism.”
Those charges which are neither the price of a grant nor the effect of a
contract, belong as it seems to a category of rights, sometimes called in
eleventh century charters malae consuetudines. They are in fact in their very
origin a mere abuse.
But time
gives a sort of legitimation to land dues, which at their beginning were
unjust. In point of fact modem proprietors never had possessed any land whose
value was not lowered by an amount proportionate to the existing charges.. No
one therefore is injured by a land due of ancient origin. That is why the
enfranchisement system: is justifiable, even for dues of unjust origin.
Moreover it is almost always impossible to distinguish ancient charges
originating in, a contract, from ancient charges imposed by craft, by force, or
by virtue of the famous principle, “Nulle terre sans seigneur.” Thus, from
whatever point of view we regard this question, we must always, regret that the
enfranchisement system was not universally and uniformly applied to all charges
in existence in 1789, whatever their origin.
The
Constituent Assembly blindly carried out its enfranchisement of land. Thinking
to serve the most legitimate interests, it struck a blow at the interests and
rights of the poor by authorising all proprietors to nullify rights of
pasturage by the enclosure of the ground. Its phraseology is solemn enough: “
the right of enclosing or throwing open an estate is an outcome of the right of
ownership and cannot be denied to any proprietor” (Decree of September
28-October 6, 1791, Sect. iv, Art. 4). Such absolute principles fly in the face
of history. The Assembly is here translating into pompous axioms the new and
extreme tendencies of the Economists and of certain royal edicts, against which
there is no lack of protest even in the reports of 1789. The Constituent
Assembly was herein unconsciously dealing a blow at an ancient right of the
people, older by some thousand years than that feudalism whose hated traces at
this time were sought everywhere. It struck also the newly emancipated tenants,
who thought that of course they would be entitled to, grazing rights over land
which in their opinion had belonged to them as well as to their lord. Such
grazing rights: and
Communal property.—Mortgage. 7 23
common of
pasturage had a double origin, in primitive communism and in ancient grants.
The decree
just quoted, of September 28-October 6, 1791, is deserving of special
attention. It is a small code of rural laws, many of whose articles are still
in force. The one I have just cited has indeed found its way into the Civil
Code (Art. 646).
It was the
Economists also, who propdsed to the Constituent Assembly a law, which, far
from enfranchising the land, was a constant menace to certain classes of real
estate. The decree to which I allude (May 1, 1790) calls on proprietors of
marsh-lands to drain them, and announces that the State reserves the right of
alienating such property from those who refuse to undertake the task of
drainage. “ Society,” said the reporter of this decree, “ cannot admit of any
property protected by law, without tacit obligation to cultivate the same.” And
with this economic movement was connected the decree of August 14, 1792,
ordering the division of the lands of the communes, the effect of which was
somewhat lessened by a decree of June 10, 1793. Both these laws tended to
abolish communal property in favour of private persons. Their effects, though
limited, were disastrous. The division of communal property, against which
earlier in the eighteenth century so many had protested in the name of the
poor, injured the very class whom the Convention believed it was serving. A
reactionary movement very soon set in. The law of 21 Prairial of the Year iv
(June 9, 1796) suspended the division of communal property, that of 2 Prairial
of the Year v (May 21, 1797) forbade it. In this case again the small holders
were sacrificed to principles and theories; for the common lands, where the
cattle graze, were a great resource to them.
There are
charges incumbent on certain estates which no one could regard as feudal. The
legislators of the Revolution could not dream of enfranchising land from
mortgage (hypotheque)—that right in real estate which a debtor hands over to
his creditor. No one thought of suppressing mortgages; but the Constituent and
Legislative Assemblies busied themselves with improving the regulations. During
the last two centuries the government of the monarchy had repeatedly attempted
to reform the conditidns of mortgage; and the Convention, resuming the task,
finally brought forward a code of mortgage laws (9 Messidor of the Year hi,
June 27, 1795), some of which were certainly a great innovation. They seemed to
invite private owners to raise money on their land, following the example of
the State, which was ruining its credit by issuing paper-money secured on the
value of the national property. This was the famous system of cedtdes
hypothecates. The Convention very wisely drew back from a piece of work that
was manifestly most inopportune1; it suspended the execution of the
law which had been passed. The Constituent Assembly had not been able to deal
with mortgages except by a decree of secondary importance
(September
20, 1789); and they were not systematically dealt with until the Directory
passed the laws of 11 Brumaire of the Year vii
(November 1,
1798) and 21 Ventose of the same year (March
11,1799). This law of
11 Brumaire required that a mortgage or
hypothec should be specific and publicly registered; the origin of these
principles is customary, for the Roman mortgage was secret. Beside this it drew
valuable ideas from the Prussian code of 1794. Subsequently those who drew up
the Civil Code introduced modifications in the application of these principles,
which brought on them very serious criticism.
If the
Directory in its reform of mortgages profited by the experience of medieval
lawyers and the administrators of the last centuries, the Constituent Assembly,
on the day when it proclaimed the legality of loans on interest (October 3,
1789), which had so long been forbidden, merely confirmed a tendency which had
been developing for centuries, and which quite recently had found able
defenders among economists and lawyers, such as Turgot and Bentham. The very
term “loan on interest" replacing the old word “ usury ” sums up the
intellectual work by which lawyers and casuists had almost succeeded in
prevailing over dogma. It is a strange thing that Roman Law should have thus
penetrated moral theology, and by easy stages have brought the conciliatory
idea of interest into the very heart of the theory of usury. “ We do not lend
on usury,” money-lenders had. said. “ We merely exact id quod interest, that is
to say the lucrum cessans and the damnum emergens." Now the famous lucrum
cessans and damnum emergens, which helped theologians to solve the problem
raised by the prohibition of usury, are simply ideas of Roman origin. After
all, the Constituent Assembly did but authorise a practice which, despite legal
prohibition, had become almost usual, and which theology, influenced by Roman
Law, was half inclined to recognise.
Not content
with enfranchising real estate, the Revolutionary Assemblies evolved certain
rules and principles respecting literary and industrial property, which formed
the starting-point for modem legislation. For many years everything tended to
bring about attempts at legislation in this sphere. Examples seen abroad could
not but hasten this development. England had, in fact, distanced France in
matters relating to industrial and literary ownership. Denmark also had surpassed
her so far as literary ownership was concerned. Finally, one of the articles of
the Constitution of the United States (1787), which sketched, as it were, a
programme on this subject for the American Republic, was calculated to arrest
public attention on this side of the Atlantic. This article recognises among
federal prerogatives the duty of “furthering the progress of: the sciences and
useful arts, by assuring to authors and inventors for limited spaces of time
exclusive rights to 'heir publications and discoveries.” In this matter of
literary ownership
the first
question which arose in the French assemblies was not that of the rights of
authors in general. The point in question was the reciprocal rights of dramatic
authors and actors. A petition signed by La Harpe, Beaumarchais, Sedaine, and
other men of letters, besides several memorials from Beaumarchais, brought the
matter before the Constituent Assembly and occasioned the decree of January
13-19, 1791, which determined the relations of dramatic authors and actors. The
chief precedent on this subject was a regulation of 1697, modified in favour of
the actors in 1757. The decree of 1791 ended this continually recurring
struggle which had arisen in the eighteenth century between authors and actors,
a struggle in which Beaumarchais played a very active part.
The rights of
authors in general were regulated by a decree of July 19-24, .1793. Until then
the rights of authors, and still more those of publishers, had been based, not
on a general and uniform law, but on special and personal acts of royal
authority called privileges. In the second half of the eighteenth century the
practice of the Courts, though it was not always very consistent, showed a
desire to safeguard the rights of authors, and even those of their families, by
its interpretation of these privileges. The decree of July 19-24, 1793, is the
reflexion and summary of several decisions of 1777; but it is less favourable
to men of letters than some of these decisions, which expressly mention an
author’s rights in pc 'petuity. In the system introduced by the decree of 1793
the ownership expired ten years after the death of the author.
Inventions
were encouraged in France during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by a
system of privileges, analogous to thfe privileges granted to publishers and
authors. In the same way these were transformed into a legal system of
temporary monopoly by means of brevets dPinvention (decree of December 81,
1790-January 7, 1791). This decree seems to have two very distinct sources:
one, a royal proclamation of December 24, 1762, is French; the other is
English, a statute of 1623 which the Norman chamber of commerce in 1787, the
deputies of commerce in 1788, and the inspectors general of commerce in 1799
had petitioned to have introduced into France.
The progress
we have traced in the development of literary and industrial ownership is
perfectly normal. It is by means of the constant repetition of a phenomenon (in
this case the royal privileges) that custom is worked out and positive law
built up.
Civil Law. Law of Persons.
Having
examined the laws regarding property, let us consider those concerning persons,
their rights and their status.
Individualism
and equality were the fundamental principles from
which
these French legislators drew their inspiration. By individualism is meant that
spirit of hostility to associations which daily grew stronger under the old
regime in proportion as royal absolutism developed, and resulted jn 1790-4 in
the complete suppression of all associations, fraternities, and corporate
bodies. Trade gilds were abolished in 1791, though it would have sufficed to
declare all crafts open; religious bodies were abolished in 1790 and 1792 ;
academies and literary societies in 1793; financial associations in 1794. A
principle twice laid down, in June, 1791, and August, 1792, brought about these
destructive measures: “ The abolition of every kind of corporation formed among
citizens of the same State is a fundamental basis of the French constitution ”
(June 14-17, 1791); “ an absolutely free State cannot allow any corporation
within its bosom” (August 18, 1792). It would be more exact to say, “ an
absolutely despotic State cannot allow of any corporation within its bosom.”
Indeed the royal power had constantly striven to restrict the liberty of
associations ; it had even in 1776 issued an edict concerning them (very soon
withdrawn) which is already tinged with the despotic ideas of Jacobinism. “ The
source of this eyil,” said Turgot like a true Jacobin, “ is in the right
granted to artisans of the same trade to assemble and meet as a body.” This is
the very idea which was to triumph twenty years ,later. Turgot would not reform
; he- preferred to destroy. The Jacobins belonged to the same school; they
continued the old regime, and achieved with exaggeration the work that it had
begun. ,
But during
the eighteenth century there were two opposite tendencies strongly marked; one
was official, so to say, and doctrinaire, and opposed associations; the other,
less apparent, but mqre deeply rooted, led, on the other hand, to the formation
of new groups, and to the preservation of existing bodies. These vital forces,
in combination with the interests which were being menaced or sacrificed, broke
like a ,storm on Turgot directly after the publication of the Edict of 1776,
and roused the Parlement of Paris against him. These forces during the
eighteenth century organised agricultural societies, financial companies, and
finally, on the eve of the Revolution, life-insurance companies—a new thing in
France, and even illegal. Thus some forces worked for creation and propagation,
others for suppression and destruction,; but here also the destructive element
triumphed during the Revolution. Nevertheless, life very quickly regained its
rights. Creative impulses returned. Associations were formed or renewed; the
laws were relaxed. French legislation still bears the bleeding marks of this
triumph of despotism over the spirit of liberty.
Such, in
brief, is the history of the savage blows struck by the French Revolution at
the right of association. It attempted to suppress without exception all those
abstractions called “artificial persons,” sacrificing them to the chief juristic
person of them all, the greatest
abstraction,
the State—that monster of which Bonaparte was soon to be the brain. And before
its incarnation in a soldier’s genius, the State had already become for a brief
space incarnate, strangely enough, in a voluntary society, in a club, in the
dreaded society of Jacobins, which reigned over France at the very time when
revolutionary legislation forbade all associations!
As to natural
persons, “ men who live and die ” as they used to be called, the chief concern
of the eighteenth century on their account was that they should enjoy equal
rights. Public opinion markedly inclined to the abolition of the privileges of
nobles and the suppression of such edicts as put heretics outside the pale of
the law. “ The best state of things for which anyone can hope,” d’Argenson had
said, “ is that in which the essential function of the monarch is to preserve
equality by preventing the formation of an aristocratic caste.” “ No one has
any
idea,”
he adds, “ of the barm caused by an hereditary nobility........ There
will be no
peace till the last vestige of the division between nobles and roturiers has
been wiped out.” So much for the nobility. As to heretics, it is well known
that directly after the death of Louis XIV the Regent thought of reviving the
Edict of Nantes, which for nearly a hundred years had brought to France such
tolerance and liberty as were in accordance with the customs of the time. A
little later the Abbe Morellet, Ripert de Monclar, Voltaire, and Portalis, as
faithful representatives of public opinion in this matter, pleaded for this
very cause, the cause of liberty of conscience, which before their time
Basnage, Saurin, and the Minister Claude, had eloquently defended. Tolerance,
moreover, was gaining ground in England, in Germany, and almost throughout
Europe. At last, in 1787, Louis XVI made a decisive step in this direction.
In both
questions, that of the privileges of nobles and that of the disabilities of
heretics, the great example of the United States, where for more than a century
so many new seeds had been germinating, was vividly present to all minds. The
several bills or declarations of rights, the Declaration of Independence
(1776), the Constitution of 1787, circulated in the hands of all and were to
serve as models. The Constitutions of Virginia (1776), Maryland (1776),
Massachusetts (1779-80), and the Constitution of the United States (1787)
forbade, either implicitly or explicitly, all bestowal of titles of nobility.
Liberty of conscience had also been proclaimed. These precedents gave great
force to the mighty current moving in men’s souls.
At
the dawn of the Revolution this current found its highest expression in the
famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens (August 26-November
8,1789). The report read by Champion de Cice, Archbishop of Bordeaux, to the
Constituent Assembly on July 27, 1789, gives us valuable information as to the
sources of that celebrated document. It runs as follows:—...... “ We have thought it
advisable that the constitution should be preceded by a
declaration
of
the rights of man and of citizens Our soil
should by right be
the first to
which this grand idea, conceived in another hemisphere, should be transplanted.
We cooperated in the events which gave North America her liberty, and now she
shows us on what principles we ought to base the preservation of our own.
Formerly we carried fetters into the New World; now it teaches us to protect
ourselves from the misfortune of being obliged to wear them.”
Two articles
only from the Declaration of the Rights of Man shall be quoted—Art. 1: “ Men
are bom free and with equal rights: free and equal they remain ”; and Art. 10 :
“ No one is to be interfered with on account of his opinions, even on the
subject of religion, so long as their manifestation does not disturb public
order as established by law.” These pregnant sentences are directly inspired,
the first by the Declaration of the Rights of Massachusetts (1779-80)—the
Declaration of the Rights of Pennsylvania (1776), and the Bill of Rights of
Virginia (1776) are both nearly akin to the French declaration, but in a less
marked degree—the second by the Bill of Rights of New Hampshire (1784). They
sufficed for the abolition of the rights and privileges of nobles and clergy,
and for the abolition of serfdom, which the decrees of August 4 had not taken
the trouble expressly to abolish; since they contented themselves with doing
away for ever with all servile dues. But these new regulations, in their
fullest interpretation, admitted heretics and Jews on a free footing into
French society; and, taken together with the decrees of August 4, the first
article of the Declaration abolished the last vestiges of serfdom.
But side by
side with serfdom, the faint reflexion of slavery, slavery itself had been
reinstituted in the colonies by Christian nations. Perhaps the signal for a
reaction in America was given by the Quakers, who from 1751 onwards refused
membership of their body to those who wished to retain slaves. Twenty-nine
years later the State of Pennsylvania passed its first Act in favour of
liberty. In England the illustrious Wilberforce inspired the efforts of the
Committee (composed chiefly of Quakers) for the Suppression of the Slave Trade.
A similar very active society was formed in France, the Society of Friends of
the Negroes. Thus liberty was near at hand in 1789. Would French law continue
to recognise slavery in the colonies, having declared that “ all men are born
free and with equal rights, and that free and equal they remain”? Such a question
could not fail to be asked; but the answer was long in coming. On September
28,1791, the Constituent Assembly proclaimed the principle that “ every
individual is free so soon as he comes into France.” But this was no more than
the restoration of a law that had been in force in France for three hundred
years, and had only fallen into neglect for some fifty years in the eighteenth
century. The fundamental decision was passed by the Convention. A decree of 16
Pluviose to 21 Germinal of the Year ii
(February
4-April 11, 1794) abolished slavery in all French colonies, and conferred bn
the negroes the rights of French citizens. The time for this measure was
ill-chosen, and the precautions needed for such a change had not been observed.
Liberty lasted only a short time. Napoleon boldly restored slavery in 1802.
Though the
Revolution did not abolish slavery till 1794, so early as 1790 it granted to
foreigners equal successional rights with Frenchmen (decree of August 6-18,
1790); in other words it abolished the right of aubaine (the confiscation of
the goods of an alien dying in France), which had for a long time been
undermined by international treaties, and in most cases reduced to a very
slight special due on succession.
Our attention
must now be directed to the abolition of nobility and the admission of Jews and
heretics into French society. The decrees of August 4 were more precise than
the Declaration, and had expressly abolished the pecuniary privileges of the
nobility, as far as subsidies were concerned (Art. 9). The King had forestalled
this abolition on June 23 in the declaration of his intentions; it had,
moreover, been much discussed, and the Crown had for a long while been working
in this direction in different ways, chiefly by the creation of new taxes to be
contributed by the whole nation.
The law of
succession to noble estates and in noble families, which was distinguished by a
certain privileged position accorded to an eldest son, remained in force for
the nobility after August 4 and after the Declaration of the Rights of Man,
forming a sort of inner fortress, which might have helped to keep together the
fortunes, and therewith the influence, of the nobles. The Assembly very soon
took this in hand, thus evincing their strong wish to bring about less
inequality of fortune. On the eve of the Revolution Filangieri had written a
few pages which were widely read, on the “ best ways of bringing about a degree
of equality in the distribution of money and wealth,” and on the “ obstacles
which existing laws oppose to this scheme.” He dwelt upon the social benefits
resulting from a multiplicity of proprietors. French legislators were to be
influenced by the same idea in their decrees on succession, whether
testamentary or intestate; it had been brought into favour by eighteenth
century philosophy.
The
preference for males and for eldest sons which had prevailed among the nobles
was done away with by the decree of March 15, 1790. A later decree (April
8,1791) which was violently opposed by certain Norman deputies and several
representatives of the country of written (Roman) law, extended this law of
equality to the successions to roturier tenements; for in certain districts
preferential rights had been given to the eldest sons even of roturiers.
While hostile
to the territorial privileges of the nobility, the spirit of equality had
further objects in view. After August 4,1789, the French nobility might be said
still to exist, but only as a dismantled nobility,
without civil
or political privileges. What exists only in words and ideas seems intangible.
However, from March 15,. 1790, the Assembly made war against even these
remnants, and proclaimed “All honorary distinctions, all power and superiority,
resulting from the feudal system, are abolished.” On June 19 of the same year
the attack was renewed and carried further than before; for all hereditary
nobility, titles of rank, liveries, and armorial bearings were abolished. “
Sheer insanity! ” Such was Mirabeau’s judgment on this session of June 19. “ It
is sheer
insanity and Lafayette, whether through stupidity or
perfidy, is wholly
an
accomplice.”
The
legislator is powerless against public opinion, but against wishes and
interests he has arms. The nobles, reduced from their rank and deprived of the
rights of succession by primogeniture ab mtestato, could still, by testamentary
disposition, struggle against the intentions of the legislators. This the
latter foresaw. From 1789 onwards the liberty of testamentary disposition, so
far as direct heirs are concerned, had been threatened in the Constituent
Assembly. It found a powerful adversary in the great Mirabeau, who wrote a
famous speech against this freedom of testation, which had its origin in Roman
law, while in many French districts ancient custom remained strangely hostile
to it. The speech was read to the Constituent Assembly on April 2, 1791, the
day after the death of the great tribune. Mirabeau’s idea is that absolute
freedom of bequest is the source of all feudal abuses. He invokes the
principles of natural law and the laws of Solon. It did not occur to him for an
instant to cite French custom—he knew nothing of it! Mirabeau wished to limit
the devisable part to a tenth of the testator’s property. Robespierre also
opposed testamentary freedom; “this freedom,” said he, “is the source of too
great an inequality in wealth, which in its turn is the source of political
inequality.”
Testamentary
freedom was resolutely defended by Cazales, Saint- Martin, and others. Here in
the midst of the assemblies we can trace the two currents, which even in the
eighteenth century divided public opinion on this matter, one for, the other
against. The first laws limiting testamentary liberty were not passed until
after the fall of the monarchy. Entail (substitution), much restricted in the
last two centuries by royal ordinances, was forbidden by the laws of August 25
and October 25,1792. Finally (March 7, 1793) the Convention abolished the right
of disposing of property whether by testamentary disposition, or by gift inter
vivos, or by settlement on the direct line of succession; all descendants were
to have a right to an equal part of the property of their lineal predecessors.
So the law no longer merely aimed at equality; henceforth this was prescribed
despite the wishes of relatives The law of 17 Nivose of the Year ii (January 6,
1794) completed this system; it confirmed those levelling measures, so hostile
to the aristocracy, and gave them a retrospective effect. The same measure set
up
a new law for
collateral inheritance. Customary French law in such cases took into account
the origin of the title to the property by giving patema patemis, materna
maternis. Revolutionary law ignored this distinction and divided the
inheritance into two equal parts—one for the relatives on the father’s side,
the other for those on the mother’s. By this means the fortunes even of
roturiers would be reduced by degrees to a certain equality; rich families
would gradually be despoiled for the benefit of poor families. Such at least
was the idea of the legislators.
These laws of
succession, by their universal character, affected not only noble families but
also those of roturiers, whose customs they modified to a very great extent.
In this connexion we must also mention the abolition by statute in 1790 (July
19-23) of the retrait ligriager: the right that a heir had in certain cases of
buying back the property that his ancestors had alienated. The retrait lignager
had been condemned by Merlin (report of July 17,1790) as contrary to the
liberty of commerce and to that wonderful Law of Nature which was invoked in
season and out of season. But a reaction in favour, not of the aristocracy but
of paternal authority, was soon made manifest; the abolition of the right of
testation had, it was said, dealt a blow to the authority of the father of a
family. This evil must be stopped. A fresh law of 4 Germinal of the Year vin
(March 25, 1800) allowed the head of a family to dispose of a considerable part
of his property. The right of favouring one among his children was restored to
the father in districts where the “ droit ecrit ” obtained, and newly created
in several districts subject to customary law; for under the old regime the
custom of several districts had in bourgeois families kept alive the old law of
absolute equality among direct heirs. So the Roman testament, for a short time
forbidden throughout France, made a triumphal entry even into Provinces that
till then had always resisted it. In vain the tribune Legonidec opposed this
new project, and resolutely maintained that it was a mistake to set down
national demoralisation and the weakening of paternal authority to the
principles of equality established by the new laws of succession. However, the
right of succession by primogeniture ab intestato, and entail, those two
buttresses of the aristocracy, were never restored.
As to the
clergy, their pecuniary privileges, which had suffered during the last two
centimes, were annihilated ,in a couple of lines by Article 13 of the
Declaration: “A general contribution is indispensable for the maintenance of
police and to defray the expenses of administration; it must be apportioned
equally among all citizens according to their means.” Jurisdictional privileges
were also abolished in their turn (decree of September 7-11, 1790) by the
suppression of ecclesiastical tribunals or “ officialities,” whose powers had
been for the last three centuries constantly weakened and diminished.
Though
ecclesiastics enjoyed legal privileges, certain clerical classes
in return
laboured under most remarkable legal disabilities in the time of the old
rigime; we refer to the “civil death” of the religious. A religious, after
taking the vows, was not allowed to make a will, nor to receive any inheritance
or legacy. Indeed, if he had not already disposed of his property before his
profession, the next of kin inherited as though he had actually died. This was
called in old law the civil death of the religious. This strange disability had
been established in the interest of families, in order to assure to them the
preservation of their patrimony. The civil death of the professed religious was
abolished during the Revolution, though not until late in its course. The
decisions and facts which led to it were as follows. In February, 1790, the Constituent
Assembly issued a decree to the following effect:—“ The constitutional law of
the kingdom will not in future recognise monastic vows taken by persons of
either sex; consequently such Orders and Congregations as take such vows are
now and for the future suppressed in France, nor can any similar Orders be
established in the future.” The Constituent Assembly, in adopting these active
measures of suppression, disregarded the dictum of Bentham . “ In Catholic
countries, it is sufficient for the destruction of all that is injurious to
liberty, in convents, etc., to refuse the sanction of the laws to monastic
vows.”
From the
point of view of common-sense the unfrocked monks should at once have resumed
all their civil and political rights. But down to 1793 French legislators could
not boast logical consistency in this matter. Although they solemnly declared
that they did not recognise monastic vows, they went on recognising some of the
effects of those vows. A decree of February 20-March 26, 1790, declares that
monks or nuns, who have left their convents, are debarred from inheriting in
competition with other relatives. As in the Middle Ages, the object is still
to protect the family; for, if the unfrocked monk has no other counterclaimant
than the Treasury, he becomes capable of inheriting. No further rights of
inheritance were granted to unfrocked monks and nuns until a decree of the
Convention of October 9,1793. When issuing that decree the Convention did not
act from a disinterested respect for principles; it is to be feared that the
object was to favour certain unfrocked monks who enjoyed powerful protection.
This decree, made to suit a particular occasion, permanently affected French
law on the point; when fraternities and Orders were revived, the old legal
disabilities were not reestablished in their entirety; but a reminiscence of
these disabilities may be seen in a law of 1825 touching female religious
communities.
In order to
follow out the application of the principles laid down by the Declaration of
the Rights of Man, we must now examine the position of heretics and Jews and
enter into the question of the marriage laws. We cannot advance far without
encountering the marked contradiction between principles and actions, which
during the Revolutionary period so often confronts us. Men who proclaimed
liberty of conscience in 1789,
733
and a second
time in 1791, and yet again in 1793, at the same time carried on remorseless
persecution of Catholic priests, and this in open defiance of their own
doctrines. They continued the despotic traditions of the old regime and even
exaggerated them. The training they had received bore its fruits. But the
principles which the sufferings of humanity during centuries had called forth
and ripened, the principles which these men promulgated even while they
trampled them under foot, have a very different worth from that of these
legislators. It has been said of them that they were giants. We need not accept
that estimate; but the thought which inspired them was great. Meanwhile these
heralds of liberty delayed the very liberty which they proclaimed. It is not
necessary to analyse the decrees and laws, which seek their justification in
that formula, “the government will be revolutionary until time of peace,” for
these violent measures belong chiefly to political history; but it was
necessary to glance at them in passing, since these revolutionary measures
attacked liberty of conscience and individual liberty, the foundations of
private law. These attacks had no lasting influence on French law; but the new
ways of thought had some very important consequences which have left their mark
on legislation and take a definite place in it from the time of the Revolution.
On December
24, 1789, the Constituent Assembly, developing the principle laid down by the
Declaration of the Rights of Man, announced that in order to hold any civil or
military office it was not necessary to be a Catholici The decree had
Protestants chiefly in view. Public opinion was not yet so ripe for the
admission of Jews as for that of Protestants. Mirabeau, the Abbe Gregoire, and
Clermont-Tonnerre were almost the only politicians of any consideration in
France, who took any immediate interest in the question of Jews. The
Declaration of the Rights of Man, the decree of December 24, 1789, and the
Constitution of 1791, only by implication set Jews on the same footing as other
Frenchmen. The logical consequences of the principles involved in these
documents were indeed drawn by a statute (January 28, 1790) in favour of
certain Jews of Spanish, Portuguese, and Avignonese extraction, who lived in
the south of France, and had even under the old regime enjoyed a privileged
position; but this concession was made in such a way that to a certain extent it
indirectly militated against the other Israelites in the countiy, by keeping
them outside the pale of ordinary law. Alsatian Jews, who were said to be
usurers, were in especially bad odour. In Paris, on the other hand, public
opinion favoured the Jews. It was in Paris that a very remarkable movement was
headed by the advocate Godard; a sort of referendum was organised; out of 60
districts 53 voted for the Jews, one against them; as to the other six we are
not informed. The Commune, basing jts action on the opinion of these 53
districts, laid an address in favour of the Jews before the Assembly, which the
Abbe Merlot, then president, himself presented (February 25, 1790).
734
Equality• among Frenchmen.
But the
solution of the question was deferred, i At last on September 27, 1791, a
member of the Constituent'Assembly asked for a definite decision and gained his
point: the terms of the declaration were settled on the following day; a decree
dated September 28 explicitly granted to the Jews all civic rights, and
formally set them on an equality with other citizens. In 1806 Napoleon
indirectly went back upon these enfranchising laws and lowered the legal status
of the Jews of a large part of the north-east of France by depriving them for a
time of the right to obtain execution against the goods of their debtors. This
measure was only temporary. It was withdrawn in 1808, owing to a solemn
declaration by the Sanhedrim (March 2, 1807) that Israelites living under the
rule of Napoleon would renounce all precepts of the law of the Old Testament
which might be contrary to the law of France; in this way they answered all
juridical objections which had been brought against their emancipation. But
though these solemn assurances procured the withdrawal of the moratorium proclaimed
in 1806, and even averted an alarming storm which was about to fall on the
Jews, they were far from attaining a complete success; for the very decree
which put an end to the exceptional measures of 1806 enacted for a period of
ten years several new departures from the usual course of law to the
disadvantage of Jews. Complete civil and legal- equality for Jews only dates
from the end of this period (1818).
The process
of the rehabilitation of Protestants was quicker, and suffered no reaction
because men’s minds were more ready for it. The Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the decree'of December 24, 1789, did not satisfy the Assembly. It
wished, if possible, to heal the wounds inflicted by a century of persecution ;
it therefore ordered the restitution of all property seized from fugitive
Protestants since the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. It proclaimed all
descendants of exiles for religion’s sake to be French subjects (decree of
December 15, 1790). Finally, the Constitution of 1791 further confirmed the
principles laid down in 1789, the eligibility of all citizens for public
employments and the liberty of worship. Those slight barriers which, even after
the edict of 1787, separated Protestants and Catholics in France, were now
broken down; and there was perfect equality among Frenchmen.
We now come
to the veiy complex history of revolutionary legislation in matters concerning
the constitution of the family. It is a strange mixture of laws, which may be
called historic, because they are the product of the evolution of centuries,
and of improvised decrees without link or root to bind them to the past. The
former have a lasting character, the latter proved ephemeral.
Following the
chronological order of events we will consider first paternal authority, then
marriage. One of the most important laws that the Revolutionary Assemblies
devoted to the subject of paternal
authority
brought a peaceful ending to an evolution which centuries had prepared, and
which was already completed throughout half France. This was the decree of the
Legislative Assembly, which for the whole of France freed sons from paternal
authority as soon as they came of age. Up to the end of the old regime in
districts where “ written,” that is to say Roman, law obtained, paternal
authority was not completely relaxed until the actual death of the father; at
least as regards property it continued during his lifetime; In districts ruled
by custom, on the other hand, emancipation! from paternal authority at the age
of twenty-five had-long been' the rule. ■
By the terms
of a decision of the Parlement of Paris in 1673 fathers of families possessed
the right of paternal correction over those of their children who.had not
attained the age of twenty-five. Any man under that age could be put in prison
by his father’s orders. As soon as the son had reached the full age of
twenty-five this paternal right no longer existed without qualification. There
was however an extra-judicial means of causing the imprisonment of a son over
twenty-five years old by obtaining a lettre de cachet from the King. When the
great Mirabeau was imprisoned on the authority of a lettre de cachet at the
request of his father in the Chateau d’lf he was over twenty-five years of age.
Lettres de cachet were done away with by the decree of March 16, 1790; but the
general state of things formulated in the decision of the Parlement of Paris in
1673 still continued. It was abolished by the decree of August 16-24, 1790. By
the terms of this decree the right of imprisoning a child ceases as soon as
the young man reaches the age of twenty; the time of detention could not exceed
a year. Further, the father was no longer allowed the right of condemning the
son to imprisonment; this penalty could only be inflicted by a family tribunal
consisting of father, mother, and grandfather or guardian. The family tribunal
did not outlast Revolutionary legislation. It was at bottom nothing further
than a family council, strengthened and armed with fresh powers.
But for the
age-limit in case of imprisonment of minors, under the laws of 1790 majority
was still fixed at twenty-five; and paternal authority over property as it
existed in the South of France remained unchanged. It was not until the decree
of August 28, 1792' that the attainment of a majority of twenty-five in itself
constituted enfranchisement throughout France. Henceforth a man of twenty-five
was free not only in respect of his person, but also in respect of property,
alike in northern and southern France. A little'later, the decrees of September
20, 1792, and January- 31, 1793, fixed the legal majority at twenty-one instead
of
twenty-five years.
It is not
surprising that this triumph of enfranchisement by majority was final. It had
been gradually prepared Indeed it is characteristic of most of the durable laws
framed during the Revolutionary period that’ they were the outcome of centimes
of exertion; and inversely it is
characteristic
of the ephemeral measures, that they had no root in the past and came without
preparatipn, and were in a word improvised.
We will now
consider legislation regarding marriage, in which historical elements are
imperfectly combined with others, more recent and far less durable. All
Frenchmen, whether Catholics; Protestants, Jews or freethinkers, were to enjoy1
the same civil rights. That was the recognised principle. But a grave question
soon arose: in order to attain this end, would it be necessary to alter the
marriage laws ? This step did not at first strike the Constituent Assembly , as
inevitable. Since 1787 marriage had ceased to be legally impossible for
non-Catholics; thenceforth a civil marriage (for which the practice of the
Courts had previously managed to provide a substitute) was open to them, so
that the new principles’.-of. liberty and equality seemed to be satisfied. It
cannot however be too clearly impressed on the reader, that, stari i lg from
the promulgation of the civil constitution for the clergy (July to August,
1790), this legislation worked to the disadvantage of orthodox Catholics. A heavy
blow was struck at their religious liberty, for in order to be married they
were obliged to have recourse to priests who had taken the oath, that is to say
to schismatics. The edict of 1787 did not establish purely civil marriage for
the benefit of Catholics, but only for that of non-Catholics. It was not until
1791 that the Constituent Assembly, combining the results of centuries of
evolution in doctrine and practice into a principle, and, acting on the
precedent afforded by the decrees of Joseph II in 1783 and of the Synod of
Pistoia in 1786, implicitly laid down the principle of civil marriage for all
Frenchmen. “ In the eye of the law marriage is simply a civil contract ”: these
are the very words of the Constitution of 1791. Certainly the Assembly in
passing this section of the law gave no thought to the interests of orthodox
Catholics. Very possibly however it may have been turned to account by some of
the faithful, helping them to solve the delicate problem by a double marriage—a
legal marriage by civil contract and a religious marriage by sacrament in the
presence of a priest who had not taken the oath.
By the decree
of September 20-25,1792, the Legislative Assembly finally established in
France, or to speak more exactly extended to all Frenchmen, what we call civil
marriage, that is to say marriage before the public officer of the municipality
without the intervention of a priest.. All transactions affecting civil status
were at the same time secularised; the written registers of births, marriages,
and deaths were taken from the clergy and entrusted to municipal officials.
This
extremely important law was in a very large measure the outcome of a movement,
which for two centuries had influenced legal theory, the practice of the
Courts, and legislation. On the one hand,, legal doctrine had constantly sought
to accentuate the contractual element in marriage ; starting from the
principle, in favour among canonists and
theologians,
that the contract is the matter of the Sacrament., it claimed this contract for
its own province as being a temporal affair, and thus became mistress of the
situation. The lay Courts, by taking possession of the contract, which was
regarded as the “ matter ” of the Sacrament, in effect took possession of the
marriage. Moreover the Crown, which in part had originated the system of
registration for births, marriages, and deaths, had never left off legislating
on the subject; so that the parish priests, in their quality of custodians of
the registers, really were dependent on the civil power.
The decree of
September 20, 1792, contains the following interesting decision as to the
minimum age for marriage. “ The minimum age for marriage is the completion of
the fifteenth year for men, and of the thirteenth for girls.” This article brings
civil law sensibly nearer to Canon Law, a fact which has not been sufficiently
noticed. Canon Law, like Roman law, allows of marriage at fourteen and twelve
years of age. The consent of father or mother was indispensable until the age
of twenty-one; but any person who had attained that age might marry without
asking the consent of his parents or guardians. The older law obliged the
person of full age to approach his relatives with a formal and respectful
petition for consent; and this formality was reestablished by the Civil Code.
The decree of
the Legislative Assembly which secularised marriage was followed on the same
day by an equally important decree establishing divorce. One or two cahiers of
the Third Estate, a few pamphlets, and occasional writings, demanded in 1789
the establishment of divorce; but public opinion and legal theory were not
quite ready for it. Divorce in France was something of an innovation, though it
is true that a man like Montesquieu could approve it. Divorce had its partisans,
chief among whom was the sinister Duke of Orleans. But neither public opinion,
nor legal theory, was prepared to accept it. The law of divorce was inscribed
among the laws of the State, but even the Constitutional Church solemnly
rejected it (1797); the Revolutionary Assemblies never ceased to tinker it; it
was altered for the last time by the legislation of 1804, abolished in 1816,
and did not reappear until 1884.
Not only was
divorce established by law in 1792, but by the same law judicial separation was
implicitly abolished, so that ill-assorted couples had no other resource than
dissolution of marriage. No less drastic remedy was open to them. Moreover, the
dignity and moral elevation of marriage seem to be called in question by the
legislators. This appears especially in the statutes relating to natural
children. The history of Revolutionary legislation as regards natural children
is very remarkable. On March 25,1792, a lady named Grandval petitioned the
Assembly for a law permitting natural children to succeed to the mother’s
inheritance and to become capable of receiving universal or
residuary
)equests. There was much to be said for this petition. French legislation, in
giving bastards the right to inherit from their mother, would simply have given
general force to a rule which already applied in certain Provinces, and thus
have satisfied the well-justified wishes of humanitarians. •
It must be
noted that this lady had in view only the inheritance of the mother, not that
of the father, and that under the old regime natural children already inherited
from the mother in certain districts of France, for instance at Valenciennes,
Lille, St Omer, and throughout Dauphine. The petitioner, or rather the
well-informed man who drew up the petition for her, was not ignorant of
provincial customs and quoted them with just praise, a very rare thing at this
time. In conclusion, he felicitously applied a proverb known to the customary
law, “No one is a bastard by the mother’s side.” The petitioner, an unmarried
mother, was present, though she did not herself read her request. The
president, with the silly pomposity so common at that time, turning to the
lady, said: “ Madam, the claims of Nature are to a free nation the first of all
laws. The National Assembly will devote all its attention to the interesting
petition you have just presented. The Assembly applauds and treasures the
sentiment which dictated it, and invites you to the sitting.” Applause followed
the words, and the petition was confided to the Legislative Committee.
The
Committee, which had already considered the question, hesitated, issued a
scheme, withdrew it, and ended by adopting the principles of “pure reason,” or
the nearest approach to it. In other words they proposed to proclaim the rights
of Nature. On June 4, 1793, the Convention laid down the principle that
bastards should inherit both from father and mother; on August 9 this idea was
stated more precisely : recognised natural children, unless bom of adultery or
incest, were to have the same rights as legitimate children. Thus the equality
is almost absolute. The petition of 1792 is left far behind. It is interesting
to observe the attitude of the chairman, Cambaceres, in this matter. On June 4
he demanded only a part of what was given to the legitimate child for the
illegitimate. Two months later, on August 9, he had completely thrown aside
these last prejudices. Not only did he, in common with all the Committee, claim
for natural children not bom of adultery an equal share with the legitimate,
but he further explained that his own opinions were still more radical; to his
mind all children without distinction, even those born of adultery, ought to
have the right of inheriting from those who brought them into the world. We
might infer that this future Arch-Chancellor and prince of the Empire was an
advocate of the abolition of marriage, which in his system becomes an
inexplicable superfluity.
This
monstrous equality between legitimate and natural children, proclaimed by the
Convention, had for some years, by virtue of the decree
Legislation concerning natural children.
139
of November
2, 1793, a retrospective efficacy; until August, 1796, it benefited children
bom between July 14, 1789, and November 2,1793, with some reservations in
favour of legitimate children who had already received their shares. On the
other hand, on November 2, 1793, the hesitating Convention deferred, until the
publication of the Civil Code, a definite decision on the rights of natural
children to inheritances, accruing after that date. Between November 2, 1793,
and the publication of the Civil Code (March 20,1804) the successional rights
of natural children remained uncertain. The tribunals were unable to decide
upon the rights of children bom out of wedlock whose father or mother died
during this time. The provisions of the legislation of June-August, 1793, from
which even the Convention itself flinched, were not retained by those who
framed the Civil Code, but a few features of Revolutionary legislation were
left standing. These legislative innovations, as a matter of fact, defeated
their own ends. There was a wish to improve the lot of natural children; and it
was supposed that this end would be attained if they were allowed a certain
share in their father’s property. But the concession of this share tended to
deny any sort of right to natural children not recognised by their fathers, and
to prohibit investigation into questions of paternity, which would expose
families to terrible blackmailing. Thenceforward the natural children, whom
their fathers would consent to recognise, were only a small minority. It
followed then that those natural children who benefited by this new legislation
were rare and privileged exceptions; the generality of bastards had a worse
fate than before, because they had lost the right to institute an investigation
of paternity for the purpose of enforcing against their fathers a certain right
to alimony, which the old law had somewhat easily accorded to them. This is a
striking example of the harm that legislators can do when they improvise laws.
The
eighteenth century was moved by a natural desire for reaction, against certain
artificial institutions, laws, and customs. It carried reaction to excess,
calling it a return to simplicity and nature. But, while the law of nature may
be held to justify the legislation relating to bastardy, in the question of
adoption Rome got the better of nature. The Legislative Assembly (January 18,
1792), and later the Convention, legalised the principle of adoption. The Convention
set about making regulations for it. Strangely enough in this matter the
Assembly very soon was ruled, less by a desire to imitate the Romans, than by a
vain hope, that by introducing adoption it would lead to the further division
of fortunes.
Cambaceres,
that master of flattery, speaking of adoption in the Preliminary Report of the
first scheme for the Civil Code, called it an “admirable institution; which you
have had the honour of reestablishing. It is intimately bound up with the
constitution of the Republic, for it leads without disturbance to the
subdivision of large fortunes.” But how
does adoption
lead to the division of fortunes ? Here is the key to the enigma. The
Convention, rejecting Azema’s project, which denied the right of adoption to
all who had children, took up a different scheme, which gave fathers of
families the power to adopt. If they made use of this right they would increase
the number of shares, which would be a gain to society. The hope of seeing
fathers diminish the fortune of their children by the introduction of strangers
into the family is one of the strangest ideas of a time which was fertile in
strange ideas! The legislators however foresaw that on the other hand rich men
with no descendants might, by adopting a child, provide themselves with a sole
heir, and thus avoid the parcelling out of their estate among the statutory
heirs. To avoid this danger they reduced the claim of the adopted child on the
estate of its adopter to an amount which would bring in the annual income of
300 quintals of wheat—another return to nature, for the terrible panic caused
by paper-money prevented them counting by livres or francs. Thus, although the
institution of adoption came in conflict with the cult of nature, which
inspired the law on illegitimacy, at any rate the Convention in passing both
laws remained true to a single political idea—to the dominating idea already
familiar to the reader, which can be summed up in the words, “ division of
fortunes, tending to equality.”
A chapter on
adoption formed a part of the Convention’s Civil Code, to be mentioned below.
Adoption shared the fate of the whole of that Civil Code; it hung in suspense,
unregulated. However, as the principle had been legalised by the Legislative
Assembly, all adoptions taking place after January 18, 1792, were recognised as
valid. It remained for those who drew up the Civil Code to legislate on the
subject. It need only be observed here that what the Convention foolishly
regarded as an excellent expedient for the division of fortunes has proved
itself in our days an aid to the concentration of wealth.
Projects of a Civil Code.
At the end of
the Revolutionary period very little indeed remained of the old local customs.
Everything connected with feudalism had been abolished. Intestate inheritance
was entirely altered. The law relating to wills was remodelled. Mortgage too
(which had fallen however rather within the sphere of royal edicts than within
that of custom) was reorganised. Marriage does not come into account, for that
was a religious institution, which was outside the scope of the old provincial
codes. The disposition of property as between husband and wife, and wardship,
were almost the only subjects of importance which escaped the hasty judgment of
the legislators, although the Convention discussed the disposition of property
between husband and wife without coming to any conclusion.
Hasty indeed
was their judgment. In the space of a few years.
everything
was to be remodelled at once: society, the Constitution, public law, and civil
law. Prodigious activity was brought to the colossal task. An almost unbroken
series of decrees and laws had gone to the building up of the universal Civil
Code, now nearly complete, which the Constituent Assembly had promised to the
nation. But, strange to say, this idea of a universal code still hovered over
the heads of the legislators, and for the most part was kept quite distinct
from the legislative decisions, which from day to day, little by little, were
forming that Code. It was as if there were two inspirations, simultaneous and
concurrent. Laws were constantly being promulgated, which in truth were
fragments of the Code, and yet as a rule a distinction was made between the two
kinds of work, which really had the same end in view; so that at last the Code,
which was always being adjourned, was practically ready. It had been made
without any definite intention of passing it.
We have just
considered some of these disconnected chapters. They were once more retouched,
altered, redrafted, and in some points seriously modified before, under
Bonaparte, they became the Civil Code. But the idea of the Code was developed
during the Revolutionary period; it was always present, though never completely
realised. It has already been observed that the idea of codification, which had
long existed in France, during the eighteenth century had become almost general
in Europe. Sweden had started her code in 1736; Bavaria hers in 1751-6; Austria
and Prussia had been working at their codes for many years. France, when in
1789 she began to unify her laws, entered one of those wide tracks, which
almost all Europe was treading in the eighteenth century, moved by the same
impulses.
The
Constituent Assembly twice decreed that a code of civil law should be drawn up,
clear, simple, suited to the Constitution and common to the whole kingdom. But
what was this code to be ? Cazales, the deputy for Languedoc, proposed to
impose Roman law on the whole of France. This violent solution, simple as it
appeared, would only have served to complicate the problem; for ancient Roman
law applied to modem society could only be a borrowed garment, which would constantly
need altering, remodelling, unpicking, and remaking.
The
Constituent Assembly promulgated a penal code and a code of criminal procedure
to be noticed below. But it was left for the Convention seriously to attempt
the labour of a Civil Code. Four projects for the Code had already been
elaborated, before the fifth which was destined to succeed. We will recall these
various efforts. On June 25, 1793, the Convention issued the remarkable order
to the Legislative Committee to present a scheme for a Civil Code within the
next month; and, which was still more remarkable, the order was carried out
almost to time. The Legislative Committee presented a clear methodical scheme
of 719 articles on August 9, 1793. The Convention, amid disorder at home and
war abroad, peacefully deliberated on questions of
inheritance,
alluvial lands, illegitimate children, and the whole body of civil law, from
August 22 to October 28,1793. But though the project was passed it was not
promulgated, as it was thought to be too complex. The Convention confined
itself to the proclamation of separate portions.
On September
9,1794 (23 Fructidor of the Year ii),
the committee presented a second scheme of 297 articles, a sort of summary,
which only contained the principles involved and their immediate consequences.
The Convention soon perceived that this was more the skeleton of a code than
the Code itself. The discussion of it was suspended. A third scheme was
presented, not to the Convention, but to the Council of Five Hundred by the
so-called Commission for the Classification of Laws (June 14, 1796—24 Prairial
of the Year iv). This scheme, which according to Portalis was a masterpiece of
method and exactness, was scarcely examined and remained almost entirely a dead
letter. Jacqueminot presented a fourth scheme to the Legislative Commission of
the Council of Five Hundred (30 Frimaire of the Year viii—December 21,
1799).
This project was not discussed. Finally an order from the Consuls (24 Thermidor
of the Year viii—August 12,1800)
commissioned Tronchet, Maleville, Bigot, Preameneu, and Portalis, to draw up a
fresh project for a Code. This fifth scheme developed into the Civil Code; an
imperfect piece of work it certainly was, but wise, well weighed, and saturated
with traditional elements.
Penal Law and Law of Procedure.
During the
second half of the eighteenth century the “voice of Nature ” as they called it,
the “ voice of Humanity,” made itself heard on every hand. One of the most
trying scandals, that offended the “ sensitive souls ” of the period, was the
state of criminal procedure and the penal system. Criminal procedure was
inquisitorial and secret; the penal system was needlessly cruel. Even civil
procedure caused serious complaint. As society grows old, procedure becomes
disastrously cumbrous. It grows both complicated and costly, because on the one
hand complexity of interests and of business demands more time, more special
knowledge and more study, and in this way lawyers become more indispensable;
while on the other hand, yielding to corrupt influences of personal interest,
they delight to complicate and by artificial means to make more burdensome what
in its own nature and by force of circumstances is complicated and burdensome
already. In the eighteenth century this evil was very great. There was a
general wish for simpler judicial mechanism. On the eve of the Revolution the
King and his Ministers took on them to interpret the needs of the people. They
demanded schemes of reform from the Parlement; then they reformed on their own
authority until, wearied by the Parlements opposition, they withdrew their
measures. It was the Revolution that to a great
extent
completed this difficult task, organised a new criminal procedure, and altered
the penal system. But with regard to civil procedure it proved, as we shall
see, unsuccessful.
Ever since
the sixteenth century some few had protested against the abuses of this
inquisitorial and secret method of procedure combined with torture, which in
France and almost throughout Europe had taken the place of the old system of
accusation. Among these generous forerunners were Jean Constantin, Dumoulin,
and Pierre Ayrault, who criticised the secret procedure (confirmed by the
ordinance of 1539) in no measured terms. In the seventeenth century a German
Jesuit, Friedrich von Spee, exposed the cruelty and folly of torture; and two
Frenchmen, La Roche Flavin, President of the Chamber of Requests, and Augustin
Nicolas, President of the Dijon Parlement, spoke with conviction in this
sense. So did Lamoignon in the commission which drew up the great criminal
ordinance of the reign of Louis XIV (1670).
But these
were isolated protests. A century after the publication of Augustin Nicolas’
work, a hundred and fifty years after Spee’s little book had appeared, two
hundred and fifty years after Jean Constantin, Dumoulin, and Pierre Ayrault,
public opinion at last was roused. It was roused by Montesquieu, Beccaria, and
Voltaire, Beccaria’s able commentator. Secret procedure, torture, the fierce
penal system bequeathed by the Middle Ages to the century of Madame de Pompadour,
were thenceforward condemned; and some of this ancient lumber was thrown
overboard even before the era of the Revolution.
For French
publicists of the eighteenth century, the inquisitorial and secret criminal
procedure was no longer summed up in the ordinance of 1539, but in that of
1670—a more careful and complete piece of work. It was this small royal code
which was to be repealed and replaced. But how was this to be done? These
active minds, that set out to reform the world, undertook a gigantic enquiry
into both past and present; they investigated what had been and what actually
existed in foreign countries. “In these investigations,” says Esmein, “whereas
the history of France ought chiefly to have occupied the attention of
Frenchmen, the institutions of two foreign nations attracted most notice, those
of the Romans and the English. Now during the best period of Roman history, and
in contemporary England, there was a very different crira ial procedure from
that known in France; cases were tried in open Court, there was full liberty of
defence, and judgment was given by a jury.”
English
procedure struck the French as a living model. “ It is not the custom in
England to examine witnesses secretly,” writes Voltaire; “ that would make them
informers. Procedure is public; secret trials are the inventions of tyranny.” “
We have abolished torture,” he makes his Englishman say in the ABC, “against
which Nature appeals in vain in other countries. This hideous means of
destroying the weak and
innocent and
letting the strong criminal escape was last used by the infamous Judge
Jeffreys, who delighted in the infernal custom in the reign of James II.” “In
Prance,” writes Voltaire, “the criminal code certainly seems planned to ruin
citizens, in England, to be their safeguard.” In this respect Eugland stood
alone in Europe. But even in England a certain admixture of inquisitorial and
secret procedure was in use, as if to correct the faults of the native method.
Moreover, despite the superiority of the English system, unfavourable evidence
concerning the British Courts of law themselves was by no means lacking.
Justice has always been more influenced by men than by laws.
As regards
the penal system, the excessive harshness of punishments was just as terrible
in England as it was in France, and was an offence to superior minds. “
Experience has shown,” says Montesquieu, “ that in countries where slight
punishments are in use the citizen’s mind is as much affected by them as it
would be elsewhere by greater ones.” Beccaria also declares that all penalties
not necessary for the maintenance of public safety are iniquitous. More and
more attention was devoted to this point. In 1780 the Academy of
Chalons-sur-Marne offered a prize for an essay “on the best way of mitigating
the harshness of French penal law without endangering public safety.” The
numerous competitors demand publicity of procedure, suppression of the oath of
the accused, abolition of torture, full liberty of defence, and the system of
preuves morales. Moreover, about this time several notorious miscarriages of
justice gave certain generous agitators occasion to show up the faults of
inquisitorial and secret justice. An officer of the Parlement of Bordeaux,
Dupaty, published a memorial couched in strong terms, which made an immense
sensation. Its suppression was ordered, just as that of Boncerfs famous
memorial on the redemption of feudal rights had been decreed.
However,
before the Revolutionary period, public opinion in France, as ’ in most
European States, gained successes in this sphere which prom ied a definite victory.
Two royal proclamations announced the abolition of torture; the first (August
24,1780) did away with la question priparatoire, that is, torture inflicted on
a man accused of a crime punishable by death ; the second (May 1, 1788)
abolished la question prealable, that is, torture inflicted on a condemned
criminal to extort from him the names of his accomplices. In this latter
proclamation the King forbids the passing of sentence without statement of the
offence, and assures public reparation to those accused and acquitted. He even
holds out prospects of offering later some pecuniary indemnity, such as
Voltaire had strongly recommended in his Commentaire sur le livre des delits et
des peines (1766) and Mably also had proposed—a proposal in which Necker took a
special interest. Although many cahiers of 1789 demand reparation for those
accused and declared innocent, this subject does not recur in later laws.
Finally, Louis XVI solemnly announced his intention
745
of
remodelling the whole of French criminal law, or in other words of revising the
ordinance of 1670. For this purpose he opened a roving investigation, in which
all Frenchmen might take part. “ In order to set about this great work with the
requisite method and discernment, we propose to illuminate the throne, on which
divine Providence has placed us, with all, possible information. All our
subjects will be allowed to take part in the execution of the project with
which we are occupied, by addressing observations and memoranda, which they
think will throw light on the matter, to the Keeper of our Seals. Thus we shall
raise the results of public opinion to the rank of laws, after they have been
submitted to the test of a searching and matured examination, and we shall seek
all means of mitigating the severity of punishments without compromising good
order and public safety.” The new spirit inspired these words of the King’s and
dictated the excellent decree of reform. There followed a series of very
important measures, which were violently opposed by the Parlements of Paris,
Metz, and Besan^on, the Cour des Aides, and other bodies. On September 23,1788,
the King withdrew his declarations of May 1; and the project fell through.
It was the
Revolution that transformed criminal law and utterly overthrew the ordinance of
1670. The cahiers urgently demanded reform ; almost all insisted on the
publicity of procedure, the right of the accused to obtain the help of counsel,
the abolition of the oath exacted of the accused, and the establishment of
trial by jury. Herein the authors of some of the cahiers had English usage in
view; others, like Pierre Ayrault, based their reforms on old French custom.
The demand was general for the abolition of lettres de cachet, which brought
such confusion into the administration of justice. The petitions of these
cahiers sketch out the chief lines which the reforms inaugurated by the Constituent
Assembly were to take. The Assembly passed them in haste, retouched them with
feverish precipitation, and bequeathed to another Assembly the business of
remodelling them once more. In June, 1789, the King announced his intention of
abolishing lettres de cachet. On March 16, 1790, the Constituent Assembly
ordered the release of all those who were imprisoned extra-judicially. This was
the end of an abuse or rather a survival, rooted in the ancient conception of a
King as supreme and sovereign judge, which by the time of its tardy disappearance
in the last years of the paternal Louis XVI had lost most of those hateful
characteristics which had in some ages belonged to it.
We may now
review in succession the reforms in criminal procedure. A decree of October
8-9, 1789, passed chiefly at the instigation, of Lafayette, assured to the
accused publicity of procedure and the help of counsel so soon as the
preliminary examination was over. It also abolished torture once more ; but it
did not radically alter old methods of procedure. The deficiencies of this
provisional decree—for as such the Constituent Assembly regarded it—were
supplied by supplementary
decrees of
August 22-25 and October 12-19, 1790. Later it was replaced by the fundamental
decree of September 16-29, 1791, which reorganised criminal procedure on an
entirely new basis. This decree is in effect a code of criminal procedure, and
to a great extent a simple copy of English legislation. It was accompanied by a
penal code (September 25-October 6, 1791). The jury d? accusation and the jury
de jugement, adopted despite the resistance of the elder Garat (session March 81,
1790), are the essential characteristics of the new system. Sieyes and Duport
wished to introduce the English jury even in civil cases. Tronchet managed to
prevent this. And so the old jury, which had passed from France to England
during the Middle Ages, was introduced once more, after the States of North
America had vied with each other in setting it down in their constitutions as
an essential liberty. Procedure before the jury (Taccusation was not public. It
was not so in England, for even there the inquisitorial system had left its
mark. Before the jury de jugement procedure was oral and public. The use of
written documents was not, however, done away with. Notes were taken of the
preliminary examination made by the juge de paice, and of the statements and
answers made by the accused before the jury cFaccusation. But it was very
strange and quite contrary to the purpose in view, which was the protection of
the accused, that these “notes (Finterrogatoire ” and “ eclaircissements par
ecrit ” were placed at the disposition of the public prosecutor, but not of the
defence. The functions of the public prosecutor were greatly reduced; and
private persons were allowed much greater and more effectual rights of accusation
than formerly.
This new law
left much to be desired. This was recognised, and less than three years
afterwards the Convention commissioned Cambaceres and Merlin to prepare a
complete project (8 Floreal, An ii).
Merlin single-handed revised the code of crimes and penalties, which the
Convention passed without discussion on October 25, 1795 (3 Brumaire, An iv).
It was a very well-arranged piece of work, which retained the chief features of
the decree of 1791 improved and perfected. The results of the preliminary
examination are to be reduced to writing and treated as they should be in
equitable legislation. They are to be placed at the disposal of the accused as
well as of the public prosecutor, on pain of all further procedure being null.
But although
Revolutionary legislation gave the accused many advantages which he had not
enjoyed under the old law, it took from him a most valuable one, which, in the
absence of any statutes dealing with this matter, the experience and scruples
of ancient lawyers and the considerations of theorists had built up: namely
what is known in France as the systeme des preuves tegales as opposed to a
systeme des preuves morales. This system may be summed up as follows: Whatever
may be the private conviction of the judge, he cannot condemn while
certain
proofs, of which the nature is defined, are lacking. These legislators made a
direct attack on this rampart, which the science of criminal law had raised,
and which, though somewhat artificial and pedantic, was often a most valuable
protection to the accused, and a guarantee against the influence of passion.
Instead of improving or simplifying the principles which endeavoured to define
in advance the value to be assigned to various kinds of evidence, they utterly
suppressed the old rules. “The personal conviction of the jurymen,” says
Article 372 of the Code of Crimes and Penalties, “ is here in question, and it
is this conviction which the law calls on them to pronounce.” “ The law does
not call on them to explain the means by which that conviction was brought home
to them; it prescribes no rule by which to decide on the fulness and
sufficiency of proof.” The same principle, expressed almost in the same terms,
is to be found in the decree on criminal procedure of September 29-October 21,
1791. Henceforth the judge is not to be hampered by any formulated principles
about evidence, and law proclaims her own liberty. There would no longer be any
need for certain criminalists, unworthy the name, to come to her help with
monstrous axioms, like that quoted by Filangieri, “In atrocissimis leviores
conjecturae sufficiunt et licet judici jura transgrediJ" We have travelled
far from the ideas of Brissot de Warville, who in 1781, while sharply
criticising the system of preuves Kgales, retained an essential part of it, the
necessity for two witnesses; still further from the wise doctrine which
Robespierre in vain formulated on January 4,1791. “We must combine,” said he,
“ the confidence rightly placed in legal proofs, with that due to the private
conviction of the judge. Thus the accused will not be declared guilty without
the existence of legal proofs; but he will not be condemned on legal proofs if
they are contrary to the knowledge and private conviction of the judges.” It
cannot be denied that on this subject Robespierre spoke on the side of truth
and justice. Turgot and Condorcet had made the same claim before. Robespierre
and the Revolution reflect one another. In civil law the Revolution set up
principles which it violated; in criminal law it promulgated laws,
distinguished by considerable wisdom, such as these under consideration, and
enacted exceptional laws, which far surpass any of the old regime in arbitrary
and bloodthirsty injustice. And this contrast between theory and practice was
never carried to such an extreme as in Maximilien Robespierre. He propounded to
the Constituent Assembly a theory, which is the safeguard of those falsely
accused; only a little later he sent crowds of innocent people to death.
France did
not borrow from England this radical suppression of what Englishmen know as the
law of evidence. On the contrary, rules admitting or excluding evidence played
a great part in English trials at the end of the eighteenth century and do so
to-day.
But this is
not all. Under the sway of Revolutionary legislation in
France the
accused lost a chance of escape, which till that time all peoples, the most
civilised as well as the most savage, had left him. The right of pardon, that
will be necessary to human society so long as men are judged by men, French
legislators, faithful followers of Beccaria, took from the executive power,
despite the efforts of the Abbe Maury. They suppressed it by a vote of June 4,
1791, and a decree of September
25 to October 6,1791 (Part i, tit. vii, art. 13). This monstrous decision
was based on a theory and a sentiment. The theory was the distinction between
the judicial and the executive powers. “ We no longer have a Constitution, if
the King has the right to pardon,” said Dubois-Crance to the Jacobin Club. The
sentiment was an excessive confidence in the legislative reforms enacted—such
reforms as in their view would henceforth render useless the ancient right of
pardon. Beccaria had shared this illusion, so had Brissot de Warville. It is a
striking example of the mistakes into which men may be led by a theory, however
wise in itself, if pursued to its utmost consequences, and by blind belief in
the efficacy of law. “ When legislation is good,” said Brissot de Warville in
1781, “free pardon is but a sin against the law.” And of course the Revolutionists
considered that their legislation was good.
Moreover the
abuse of pardons, too often extorted as a mere favour without any avowable
reason, was present to all minds. In this as in all other directions the
radical spirit of the Revolution did away with the custom in order to suppress
the abuse. Why did not French legislators, instead of slavishly copying
Beccaria, consult Montesquieu, or use the American models so familiar to them,
the constitutions of Virginia or North Carolina for example ? A reaction
followed in French public opinion; but this reaction was tardy and wavering. It
is noticeable with what hesitation and timorous prudence Bentham opens the door
to the indispensable right of pardon in his Treatise on Civil and Penal
Legislation (1802), published in France by Etienne Dumont. Just at this time
the right of pardon, lessened and suspiciously regarded, had returned to French
legislation, (senatus-consulte organique, 16 Thermidor, Year x, August 4,
1801).
It is almost
incredible that the responsible author, Beccaria, who had most to do with
bringing about this disastrous movement of public opinion1 against
the right of pardon, himself heads his Treatise on Crimes and Penalties with
these truthful words, which are his own condemnation: “ Political philosophy
cannot gain any lasting good for society unless it is founded on the indelible
sentiments of the human heart.’’
The great
reforms in procedure of which we have spoken, which overthrew custom and
tradition, coincided with the hasty destruction of the whole social,
administrative, and judicial structure, and could not at
1
See also Lois fondamentales et sacrtes: “Lois p&nales,” art. 10 (1755) in
Morelly, Code de la Nature (a work ascribed to Diderot), p. 178 of
Villegardelle’s reprint.
such a time
yield good results. It might be worth while to investigate whether crime did
not increase in France, during the Revolutionary period, in exact proportion to
this “ perfecting ” of criminal legislation The best laws—and it seems doubtful
whether those under consideration deserve this epithet—the best laws owe their
value almost as much to circumstances and surroundings as to their intrinsic
merit. The inefficacy of the new legislation was plain to all minds at the
beginning of the century. The law of 7 Pluviose of the Year ix (January
27,1801) showed a marked return to older methods. It enacted that witnesses
should be examined in the absence of the accused, before he came before the
jury d?accusation; before this jury written proofs were to take the place of
verbal discussion, and the public prosecutor resumed a number of functions of
which he had been deprived by former laws. It is plain that legislation was
tending to a sort of compromise between the old system and the new. It was even
possible that the new system would soon break down entirely. The jury system
was much contested ; in those terribly troubled times it could not escape the
influences both of political prejudice and of fear. Turgot, in his
correspondence with Condorcet, had from 1771 onwards raised objections to the
system, which later could not but be repeated. A powerful reaction was within
an ace of reviving the ordinance of 1670. After many discussions and struggles
the jury system, which was to spread throughout Europe, was rescued. The result
of these debates was the Code of Criminal Investigation of 1808; “at once a
composite work and a compromise, it borrowed from Revolutionary law almost all
the rules concerning pleading and judgment, and from the ordinance of 1670
almost all those concerning preliminary procedure.” The jury de jvgement,
public oral procedure, and freedom of defence to the accused—these are the
steps toward progress finally taken by the new legislation.
In the matter
of punishment France had been inspired by Beccaria’s humanitarian idea, which
the Constituent Assembly had inserted in the Declaration of the Rights of Man :
“ the law must not ordain any penalties that are not evidently and strictly
necessary.” This principle dictated to the legislators of the eighteenth
century, throughout almost the whole of Christendom, reforms which one might
suppose to be the result of an agreement among the European States. The King of
Naples, the Empress Maria Theresa, Louis XVI, Joseph II, and the Duke of
Tuscany, forestalled or prepared the work of the Revolutionary Assemblies. In
1790 the Constituent Assembly solemnly proclaimed that penalties should be
mitigated and proportioned to the offences (decree of August 16-24, 1790, tit.
n, art. 21). In 1791, besides suppressing needless insults and horrible
tortures, it was decreed that “ the penalty of death is henceforth to consist
simply in deprivation of life. Branding is abolished.” And the Convention, as
if to expiate its crimes, on October 26, 1795, closed its blood-stained career
by the
celebrated
resolution: “ The penalty of death will be abolished throughout the French
Republic from the day of the proclamation of peace,” an act of iuward good
intentions, which was not even inserted in the bulletin des lois. But we must
not forget that this very penalty of death, condemned in theory by Beccaria,
had already been abolished in Austria by Joseph II, in Tuscany by the
Grand-Duke Leopold, and in practice suppressed by Elizabeth and Catharine II in
Russia.
Ihering has
said that the history of penalties is the history of their abolition; it may
better be said of their constant mitigation. Perhaps this idea is more
particularly true as applied to Christian nations, in whose hearts a fruitful
germ of pity has been implanted, and whose minds for more than twelve hundred
years have been occupied with a concern which we are much mistaken in calling
modem, the concern for the abolition of the penalty of death. But this
mitigation of penalties is by no means regular or constant. At the moment when
the Constituent Assembly and the Convention were discussing the problem of the
penalty of death, several quite recent humanitarian decrees, quoted above,
which might have served as examples to French legislators, had already been
partly withdrawn or repealed. Humanity progresses, but by uneven steps; it
advances by action and reaction. We have seen Robespierre’s just observations
on the question of proof in criminal cases. We find this orator again at the
bar of the Constituent Assembly on the day when the penalty of death was under
discussion. With Duport, he proposed to abolish it. “ Listen to the voice of
justice and reason,” said this humanitarian, too little known in such a
character, “ it proclaims that human judgments are never certain enough to
justify society in taking the life of a man condemned by other men subject to
error.” This great philanthropist was deprived of the consolation of taking
part in the voting of the Convention on October 26, 1795.
There is
another penalty which Beccaria had criticised strongly— confiscation. It was
abolished throughout France by the decree of January 21, 1790, but
reestablished after August 10 (decree of August 30-September 3,1792; decree of
October 22, 1793,1 Brumaire, Year ii;
law of May 3, 1795, 14 Floreal, Year in). The immoderate use, made during the
period we are considering, both of the penalty of death and of confiscation, is
notorious. Even the Convention, to its credit, was overcome by remorse on this
point (May 3, 1795). But the honour of a final abolition is due to the
Restoration. It was proclaimed by the charter of June 4-10, 1814 (art. 66), and
confirmed by the charter of 1830 (art. 57), and by the Constitution of 1848
(art. 12).
We now come
to civil procedure. This subject does not admit of great elaboration. It has
already been pointed out that public opinion was greatly roused against the
tardiness of procedure, the petty artifices of lawyers, the increased expense
of litigation. Complaints of this kind
may be traced
from century to century, ever since the time when the restoration of Roman law
and the definite establishment of Canon Law by their ever-increasing influence
complicated the system of civil justice. Civil procedure, in throwing off its
primitive barbarism, had lost its simplicity, rapidity, and cheapness. It
became the secret of the lawyers, and on this secret they flourished. Since the
fourteenth century this evil had been manifest to the clear-sighted; and the
most various remedies had been tried. Pope Clement V and the energetic Gallican
Pierre du Bois had in vain striven to correct these abuses. The old evils
remained; legislators and politicians waged war against them without success.
Prance, Prussia, and even Poland, legislated against this pest of litigation.
In Germany Leibniz, whose great intellect could not remain indifferent to any
scientific problem or any human interest, brought the force of his great genius
to this question of the simplification of justice. Toward the end of the old
regime Louis XVI in vain urged the Parlement to take up this great work, and
subsequently, in May, 1788, decided to promulgate two ordinances concerning the
administration of justice, which ordered the abolition of certain irregular
tribunals (the Bureau de Fmcmces and the Chambre du domaine et Tresor). These
ordinances, which were withdrawn in September, form a preface to the
Revolutionary laws.
This subject
had therefore been actually opened, and was even officially under discussion at
the very beginning of the Revolutionary era. On June 23, 1789, in the
declaration of his intentions, the King announced that he would “ give his
serious attention ” to any projects presented to him, which related to the
administration of justice and the means of perfecting civil and criminal law.
On August 16, 1790, the Committee of Agriculture laid before the Constituent
Assembly a motion containing the following naive but significant article: “
Country people are to be protected from sharp practice and usury.” How they
were to be protected the Committee did not take the trouble to explain; but on
that same day the Assembly attempted to apply a whole collection of remedies,
which have more to do with judicial organisation than with procedure strictly
speaking, and which therefore for the most part lie outside our province. This
was the decree of August 16-24, 1790. This decree gives considerable
development and fresh force to the system of arbitration, and even offers to
litigants in any civil case, of what nature soever, an arbitrator chosen by the
State itself, the juge de paix. This magistrate, new to France under this name,
existed in England and in several English colonies, notably in Virginia;
Voltaire had made the discovery in Holland, and on his recommendation a great
lord, the Due de Rohan-Chabot, had already introduced the juge de paix into his
Breton estates; yet the juge de paix was none other than the old paisewr or
peacemaker of feudal times. But who would at that time have suspected this much
vaunted official of being the offspring of that hateftd and “ barbarous ” epoch
? The decree of 1790 abolished the venality of
752
judicial
offices, proclaimed justice to be gratuitous, organised the election of judges,
which Turgot had preached since 1771, suppressed all exceptional jurisdictions,,
while admitting that tribunals of commerce might be established (reestablished
would have been the more correct term) in any town on the request of the
administration of the Department: in fact it organised new jurisdictions
throughout France. But this decree did not directly modify civil procedure. In
this respect it was content with a promise: “The code of civil procedure shall
be immediately reformed in such a way as to make it simpler, more expeditious,
and less costly” (tit. n, art. 20). None of the Revolutionary assemblies had
the necessary leisure to complete so delicate and difficult a task. Even the
Constituent Assembly passed the express resolution: “ That until the National
Assembly shall have made enactment as to the simplification of procedure,
attorneys shall strictly follow the procedure established by the ordinance of
1667 and later regulations ” (decree of March 6-27, 1791, art. 34). The same
day a very simple but happily inspired measure was passed: “ No ci-devant
attorney, clerk, bailiff, lawyer, or proctor, can represent the principal
parties at the bureau de paix; and other citizens will only be admitted as
proxies, when they are fully empowered to compromise.” In this short article
distrust of lawyers is certainly plain enough; but two years later it went to
greater lengths.
On October
24,1793 (3 Brumaire, Year n), the Convention sketched a rough attempt at the
simplification of procedure, which cannot be called a code. Its ruling idea is
contained in Article 12: “ The office of attorney- at-law (avoue) is abolished,
but litigants may empower mere mandatories to represent them. Such
representatives cannot claim any reward or salary for their services from the
citizens whose confidence they have received.” This radical measure bears
witness to the degree of hostility felt against lawyers. It was hoped that by
doing away with the officials who represented procedure, sharp practice also
would be suppressed. The election of judges (decree of August 16-24, 1790, tit.
ii, art. 3), the suppression of notaries (September 29-October 3, 1791), the
abolition of schools of law (September 15, 1793), all form part of this idea.
Certainly the suppression of law schools coincided with that of all
institutions for higher study and faculties of theology, medicine, and arts;
but it survived far longer than most of the other suppressions, because it was
rooted in a hatred at once of longer standing and more intense than the
ordinary vandalism of that time. The spirit of the Jacobins was devoted to simple
methods ; it stayed neither to correct nor to cure, it cut and rooted out. The
attorneys and the law schools shared the same fate with the King, the nobility,
the Church, the magistracy. Abuses should not be tolerated, but we should
nevertheless penetrate to the reasons of abuses. The varied and complex
formalism of procedure is due to deep-rooted causes. And that is perhaps why
the Revolution in the long run proved so utterly powerless when confronted
by the
question of procedure. It bequeathed to the Empire the ordinance of 1667 and
the later regulations which it had received from the monarchy. The Empire in
its turn, when it came to promulgate a Code of Procedure, made exhaustive use
of these old sources. As to attorneys, they were reestablished under the
Consulate (27 Ventose of the Year viii, March
18, 1800, art. 93).
Taken
as a whole, the legislative efforts of the Revolutionary epoch manifest a
truth, which no historian of whatsoever school ever expressed more felicitously
and clearly than Portalis in the preliminary discourse of the Civil Code : “
The Codes of nations are the work of time; properly speaking they are not
made.” A good legislator rarely invents. He makes use of the rich funds of
practice and existing theory, or again he intelligently imitates neighbouring
States. It may chance that by this means he may find the past of his own nation
in the present condition of another people. The ancient paiseurs and juries
returned to France by way of Holland, England, and the United States. ,
And so the
sound idea of the fellowship of humanity gains confirmation and precision. The
prince, or the assembly engaged in legislation, has countless collaborators in
the country and outside it, in the present or the past, obscure practitioners
beside a crowd of authors and writers, some without name or glory, others more
kindly treated by Fame. In a word, the good lawgiver has not indeed more wit
than Voltaire, but more good sense; more knowledge and true legal spirit than
Montesquieu; and this lawgiver is—all the world.
French
legislation in the century just past wielded a great influence, because it was
of this character. It was above all a collective and universal work in the wide
sense which has been indicated. Taken in its entirety it is the result of historical
forces, and no mere invention or artificial creation.
EUROPE AND
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.
The French Revolution is the most
important event in the life of modem Europe. Herder compared it. to the
Reformation and the rise of Christianity; and it deserves to be ranked with
those two great moments in histoiy, because like them it destroyed the
landmarks of the world in which generations of men had passed their lives,
because it was a movement towards a completer humanity, and because it too was
a rebgion, with its doctrines, its apostles, and its martyrs. It brought on the
stage of human affairs forces which have moulded the thoughts and actions of
men ever since, and have taken a permanent place among the formative influences
of civilisation. As Christianity taught man that he was a spiritual being, and
the Reformation proclaimed that nothing need stand between the soul and God, so
the Revolution asserted the equality of man, conceiving individuals as
partakers of % common nature and declaring each one of them, regardless of
birth, colour, or religion, to be possessed of certain inalienable rights.
This doctrine
expressed itself in three main principles. The first was the sovereignty of the
people: a conception differing widely from the old belief that the object of
government was the good of the governed. The system of enlightened despotism,
itself an immense advance on earlier theory and practice, broke down, because
the work perished with the worker. What Joseph II aimed at, the French
Revolution achieved. The second doctrine which France proclaimed was the
principle of personal liberty. The intrinsic weakness of feudalism lay in its
obstructing the free play of natural gifts. Feudalism as a system of relations
between the King and the nobility had nearly disappeared from Europe; but as a
system governing the relations between the nobility and the peasantry it still
lingered on. It received a mortal blow from the Revolution; for the recognition
of individual liberty involved the disappearance of serfdom and the abolition
of social privileges. Feudalism maintained and intensified the irregularities
of nature, while the object and effect of the Revolution was to diminish them.
The potency of the Revolution is shown in nothing more clearly
than in the
fact that in the reaction which followed the great war no attempt was made to
return to the old restrictions on personal liberty. The third doctrine, that of
nationality, was foreign to the cosmopolitan teaching on which the leaders were
nourished, nor did it appear till Europe began to interfere; but it arose
naturally from the idea of the sovereignty of the people. The exaggerated
centralisation of the eighteenth century had led men to think of States as
districts subject to a certain authority, rather than as nations bound together
by ties of blood, religion, language, or common traditions and aspirations. The
French Revolution astonished Europe by the spectacle of a nation thinking and
acting independently of its government. The conception of nationality was
condemned at Vienna; but the idea had taken root, and the arrangements of the
Congress in which the principle was violated were precisely those which were
most speedily upset.
The Wilkes
controversy and the American War had led to a remarkable revival of political
activity in England. The decade preceding 1789 witnessed the hirth of a
vigorous movement for parliamentary reform; the platform began to assume the
place which it has ever since occupied; and political societies were formed for
propaganda. Ideas that are best described as radical were thrown into
circulation by the writings of Priestley and Price, Major Cartwright and Jebb,
Granville Sharp and Sir William Jones, Wynne and Burgh, and by the speeches of
Home Tooke and Sawbridge. The leading thinkers of France and England paid
visits to one another, and, under Shelburne’s roof at Bowood, Priestley,
Bentham, and Romilly met Dumont, Morellet, and Mirabeau. Rousseau’s educational
theories had found disciples in Day and Edgeworth, and republicanism was
represented by Mrs Macaulay, the historian, and Hollis.
The French
Revolution came as a surprise to England, and the first voices were of
congratulation. Fox’s exclamation, that the fall of the Bastille was much the
greatest and best event that had ever happened, expressed, if in somewhat
exuberant terms, the disinterested satisfaction with which the great majority
of Englishmen witnessed the downfall of a despotic government. Those who cared
nothing for the emancipation of the French people congratulated England on the
paralysis to which the Revolution had reduced her formidable rival. To many it
was the beginning of a new era of peace, progress, and enlightenment, the
realisation of those generous visions of perfectibility which floated before so
many of the noblest minds in the latter part of the eighteenth century.
"Bliss
was it in that dawn to be alive,
But to be
young was very heaven ! ”
The
publication of Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France in the autumn of
1790 gave a rude shock to public opinion. He had been
untouched by
the emotions which in a greater or less degree affected almost all his
contemporaries on receiving the news of the uprising of France; and the march
to Versailles convinced him that nothing but evil would come, of the
Revolution. When Dr Price a few weeks later congratulated France on carrying
further the principles of 1688, Burke took up his pen to establish the
difference between French and English methods. After infinite elaboration the
treatise appeared in November, 1790. It was addressed to two themes, the
Revolution in France, and the right method of effecting political change.
The
discussion of the Revolution was vitiated by Burke’s failure to grasp its chief
determinant causes. He declared France to have the elements of a constitution
very nearly as good as could be wished, and he was imperfectly aware of the
economic condition of the people. Arthur Young’s Travels were not yet
published; and Burke had forgotten the weighty maxim of Sully, which he had
once quoted with approval, that the people never rebel from passion of attack,
but from impatience of suffering. He knew that the finances were disorganised;
but he failed to understand that even financial reform involved .fundamental
readjustments of the social and political order. He charged the Assembly with
a passion for innovation, not knowing that the greater part of its work was in
accordance with the desires of the majority of French citizens as recorded in
the cahiers. In a word, he did not realise that the cmcien regime was rotten to
the core, that, feudalism was doomed, and that a revolution from below could
only have been avoided by a revolution from above. Nor did he recognise that
the Assembly was composed in large measure of men, necessarily indeed without
experience, but honourable and disinterested, and who, when he laid down his
pen, had already lifted an immense burden from the shoulders of the French
people. On the other hand, he displayed true foresight in declaring that the
Revolution would fail to bring about a condition of political stability and
that power would tend to pass to the most violent.
The
permanently valuable part of the Reflections is that in which Burke passes to
the general question of the method and justification of political change—a
theme involving the discussion of the still wider problem of the nature of
human society. His thesis, which was developed at greater length a few months
later in the Appeal to the Old Whigs, is that the events of 1688 exemplified the
principles by which alone revolutions were to be j ustified. Since the
thoughts and instincts of ninety-nine in every hundred persons are those of the
environment in which they are bom, reforms must come in the shape of a gradual
modification. In current opinion society consisted of an association of
individuals bound together by a contract for certain definite purposes. To this
view Burke opposed the conception of a living organism whose character is
determined by its history, and whose members are bound to one another and to
the whole by innumerable unseen influences. In this recognition of
the
unconscious and historical element in human association lies Burke’s supreme
claim to greatness as a political thinker. Though a weighty protest against the
mechanical view of society had been uttered by Montesquieu, it was Burke’s
Reflections which overthrew the supremacy of Locke, and formed the
starting-point of a number of schools of thought, agreeing in the rejection of
the individualistic rationalism which had dominated the eighteenth century. The
work is not only the greatest exposition of the philosophic basis of
conservatism ever written, but a declaration of the principles of evolution,
continuity, and solidarity, which must hold their place in all sound political
thinking. Against the omnipotence of the individual, he sets the collective
reason ; against the claims of the present, he sets the accumulated experience
of the past; for natural rights he offers social rights; for liberty he
substitutes law. Society is a partnership between those who are living, those
who are dead, and those who are yet to be born.
In his
victorious protest against the prevalent individualism Burke fell into the
opposite error. For him, the present ceases to be merely the heir of the past
and becomes its slave. States are denied the power of free self-determination
inherent in every living society. The fatal weakness of Burke’s method is that
prescription appeals only to a certain class of mind, and that it can never be
a substitute for common-sense, utility, or abstract reason. Moreover, despite
his passionate denunciation of metaphysical politics, Burke’s own philosophy is
suffused with mysticism His profoundly religious temper led him to regard the
moral relations and duties of man and the order of society as of divine
institution. Religion was for him not a buttress of the social fabric, but its
foundation. He believed that there was an element of mysteiy in the cohesion of
men in society, an unseen force that gave vitality to the organisation; and
this conviction led to his unreasonable fear that the vital spark might at any
moment be extinguished. Human association requires no other explanation than
the common nature and the common needs of men; and in introducing a mystical
sanction he seriously weakened the force of his appeal.
Burke’s work
immediately became the absorbing topic of conversation. The King said it was a
book which every gentleman should read. Mackintosh named it the manifesto of
the counter-revolution, and as such it was hailed with enthusiasm by the
governing classes throughout Europe. It had hitherto been possible to witness
the exciting scenes of the Revolution with sympathy or dislike and yet to feel
that they had no direct bearing on the future of England. Burke asked his
readers to believe that the occurrences concerned them scarcely less than
France, and that the moral, social, and political foundations on which the
fabric of civilisation rested were threatened by them. Windham foretold that
the book would turn the stream of opinion throughout Europe; but though it made
conservatives more conservative, it made radicals more
758
radical. Its
sweeping condemnation of popular principles called an army of democratic
champions into the field. Burke’s old friend, Sir Philip Francis, wrote him a
letter of pungent criticism; Fox declared the book to be mere madness; and
every aspect of his argument was subjected to sharp attack by Priestley, Mary
Wolstonecraft, Mrs Macaulay, Capel Lofft, Sir Brooke Boothby, Christie, and
many other writers.
Of the
answers to Burke the most powerful and the most philosophically interesting
was that of Mackintosh (1791). , Indeed the Vindiciae Gatticae is on the whole
the ablest contemporary defence of the essential work of the Revolution.
Mackintosh lays his finger on the cause of Burke’s capital error when he
asserts that the Revolution was the revolt of a nation. The events of 1789
differed from those of 1688, because in one case it was sufficient to substitute
William for James, whereas in the other it was necessary to eradicate abuses
that were bound up with the whole framework of national organisation. Passing
to the particular acts of the Assembly, he devotes special attention to the
measure which aroused Burke’s particular animosity. He has not the slightest
doubt of the legal and moral right of a nation to convert Church property to
national uses; and in the present instance the additional advantage was secured
of the downfall of a great corporation which had shown itself the implacable
enemy of political and intellectual freedom. The excesses had been relatively
few; and, had they been as deplorable as the fabrications of the emigres
asserted, they would not have outweighed the inestimable benefits that had
accnied. On one point, says Mackintosh, the friends and enemies of the
Revolution are at one. Both are convinced that its influence will not be
confined to France. In a remarkable forecast he declares that if an
anti-revolutionary alliance were to be formed it would have no other effect
than to animate patriotism and banish division, while failure would set in
motion forces that would subvert the old governments of Europe. The probability
of a decisive advance outweighed the possible dangers of failure. “Where would
be the atrocious guilt of a grand experiment to ascertain the portion of
freedom and happiness that can be created by political institutions ? ” In that
question is summed up the temperamental difference between Burke and his
critic. The strength of Mackintosh’s book lies in its recognition of the fact
that the Revolution was the work of the nation, and that many of the
achievements of the Assembly were in the highest degree beneficial; its
weakness is in its failure to perceive that the monarchy was not likely to
survive the sudden destruction of the privileged orders, and that in the
struggle for sovereignty the work of reform would be terminated.
The Vindiciae
Gallkae had attacked Burke without going outside principles with which Englishmen
were familiar. The Rights of Man (1791), on the other hand, compelled attention
not less by the novelty of its ideas than by its consummate pamphleteering
skill. Mackintosh had spoken for the educated middle class. Paine would speak
on behalf
of those whom
Burke called the swinish multitude. His narrative is among the most valuable
sources of our information as to the earlier effects of the Revolution. Burke,
he said, had made the mistake of leaving the people out of his calculation. He
had pitied the plumage and forgotten the dying bird. The leaders, like their
predecessors in 1688 and 1776, had proceeded on the assumption that no
generation could bind its successor. This assumption was the basis of all sound
political thinking. The people were entitled to establish any government they
thought fit, so long as there was no hereditary element in it, and to alter the
existing government at their will and pleasure. Whatever contract may have been
made, they could never surrender the natural rights which they possessed. The
practical difficulties of Paine’s teaching are obvious. He is not aware of the
danger that the will of a portion of the people might be mistaken for the will
of the whole, nor that his principles apply only to societies which have
reached a certain stage of political education. To Paine, with his mind full of
the United States, a nation was merely an aggregate of men, all keenly
interested in politics. The difference between the systems of Burke and Paine
is precisely this difference in their view of the average man. To Burke a
nation was a community graded into classes, the members of which differ as much
in their intellectual endowments as in the extent of their property—the &Teater
number consisting of men untrained by study or experience to form a correct
opinion on great constitutional questions, and regarding existing institutions,
not as they conform to certain abstract tests, but as possessing a prescriptive
claim on their respect and obedience. Paine was utterly blind to the part which
prescription plays in the opinions and conduct of men. He combined the
characteristic hopefulness of the eighteenth century with an extravagant
contempt for the past. No two writers could differ more fundamentally; and they
are at an almost equal distance from the thought of our own day.
The effect of
The Rights of Man in frightening the governing classes was even greater than
that produced by the Reflections. The unflinching ppeal to natural rights, the
outspoken contempt for the English Constitution, the audacious attacks on the
King, and the confident assumption that monarchy and aristocracy would speedily
disappear from Europe, seemed a confirmation of their worst fears. The alarm
increased, when it was known that the book was selling by tens of thousands. At
first Burke had stood alone among the Whigs; and, though several of his
colleagues came to adopt his opinions, they desired to avoid a rupture with
Fox. But the events of 1792 made compromise impossible. In the papers of Lord
Malmesbury and Sir Gilbert Elliot may be traced almost from day to day the
conflict in Whig minds between fear of the Revolution and loyalty to their
leader. Finally Portland yielded to pressure and joined Pitt, taking with him
Fitzwilliam, Windham, and the majority of the great Whig families. With Fox
remained Grey,
Sheridan,
Erskine, Francis, Shelburne, Stanhope, Lauderdale, and Bedford. After a few
years Fox and some of his friends ceased to attend the debates in Parliament.
The course of internal English politics during this period is reserved,
however, for treatment in a later volume.
While the
Whig party was thus reduced to impotence, a revival took place in the reform
movement in the country. Thomas Hardy, a shoemaker, formed an organisation
among artisans similar to the political societies which had sprung up among the
middle classes. The aims of the “ Corresponding Society,” as the new body was
called, were those of Major Cartwright and the radicals; but the entrance-fee
was only one shilling and the subscription a penny a week. Branches were formed
in different parts of London, each sending a representative to a central weekly
committee. The issue of a Royal Proclamation against seditious writings in May
failed to arrest its advance. The society entered into correspondence with
similar associations in the provinces, and its hands were strengthened by the
foundation of the “ Friends of the People,” by Grey and Erskine. In November,
1792, the Corresponding Society made its first false step by an address to the
National Convention, the excitable tone of which differed greatly from its
previous manifestoes. Several other associations sent addresses, that of the
Constitutional Society being presented with an expression of hope that before
long a similar address might be sent to a National Convention in England.
The eulogies
lavished on the revolutionists within a few weeks of the fall of the monarchy
added to the general apprehension, and led to an attempt to adapt political
association to conservative uses. John Reeves, the learned historian of English
law, returned to England from Newfoundland in October, and immediately founded
an “Association for preserving Liberty and Property against Republicans and
Levellers,” which flooded the country with pamphlets, warning Englishmen against
French ideas and denouncing reformers as incendiaries. Indeed, in his anxiety
to heap odium on every democratic principle, Reeves attacked the theory of
English government that had been universal since 1688, and was censured by
Parliament. The success of the Association in arresting the attention of the
country was prodigious. If the first blow against French ideas had been struck
by Burke, the second was struck by Reeves. Parliament was unexpectedly called
together in December; and the Speech from the Throne declared that a design
existed to subvert the Constitution. The prosecution of The Rights of Man began
on December 18; and Erskine stepped forward to defend the author, who was
absent in Paris. The verdict was a foregone conclusion, and other prosecutions
followed. The decree of the Convention (November 19) offering to aid any people
in a struggle with its rulers, though explained away by the French envoys, had
caused the greatest alarm. The spy and the informer were abroad; correspondence
was violated; and mobs rioted in the name of law and order. A Convention held
in
Edinburgh in
1793, and attended by delegates from the English societies, was broken up, and
crushing sentiences were imposed on the leading members. A few weeks later Pitt
determined to attack the London reformers, who had meanwhile begun to hold
large though orderly open-air meetings.'
The trial of
Hardy, Home Tooke, Thelwall, Holcroft, and their comrades, for High Treason
(1794) represents the culminating moment in the conflict between Toryism and
Radicalism in England. The contending parties were worthily represented by Sir
John Scott, afterwards Lord Eldon, and Erskine. One piece of evidence appeared
damaging till it was explained. It was found that certain people had arms in
their possession. The answer of the reformers was that, since the police had
rendered no assistance in the riots in Birmingham, Manchester, and elsewhere,
they were compelled to provide for their own defence. There was nothing in
their conduct, speeches, or writings, which could be construed as a
recommendation to violence. After eight days of intense excitement the jury
declared Hardy not guilty. The acquittal of Horne Tooke, the most conservative
of reformers and an opponent of universal suffrage, followed; and the lesser
men were released without trial.
The evidence
collected by the prosecution confirms the impression derived from a study of
the writings and character of the reformers that Pitt and his colleagues
misjudged the problem before them. They had convinced themselves that the
associations consisted of men who hated monarchy, despised religion, and were
prepared to repeat the horrors of the French Revolution on English soil. As a
matter of fact they represented a movement for radical Parliamentary reform
which had begun some years before the Revolution. Pitt and Richmond had
withdrawn, but its general character had remained unchanged A practical blunder
was committed in demanding such a sweeping change as universal suffrage in a
period of excitement; but the demand was not a new one. Though there was a
certain amount of loose talk over liquor in the taverns, genuine x-epublicans
were rare. And, further, the movement was throughout purely political. With the
exception of Godwin and Spence, who stood aloof from the agitation, the
reformers were no more enemies of property, of religion, or of the family, than
Pitt himself. On the other hand, the panic of the governing class is
intelligible. They were scared by the appearance of large and well-organised societies
demanding annual parliaments and universal suffrage. In the second place, they
were alarmed by the rapidity with which reform in France had been followed by
bloodshed and anarchy, forgetting in their terror that the factors which
produced the conflagration in France were absent in England. But above all the
reformers made a fatal mistake in the company which they kept. Though utterly
opposed to the use of force, their indiscriminate eulogies of the
revolutionists, while England was
762
shuddering at
the September massacres, gave colour to the charge that they too were friends
to bloodshed and revolution. Scarcely less damaging was their association with
Paine and with the English colony in Paris, certain members of which had by
this time completely identified themselves with the fortunes and ambitions of
France.
The failure
of the prosecutions was a great blow to the government. The Constitutional
Society broke up; but the Corresponding Society increased its numbers, and continued
its great open-air demonstrations. The enthusiasm for the French war, which had
never been great, altogether disappeared. The fall of Robespierre, the failure
of the English arms, the final destruction of Poland, the withdrawal of some of
the Powers at the Treaty of Basel, and above all the rapid rise of prices
produced a profound change. Early in 1795 Wilberforce voted against the war,
and later in the year Auckland demanded peace in a widely- read pamphlet. On
his way to open Parliament in the autumn the King’s coach was mobbed, and cries
of “ peace ” and “ bread ” resounded in the streets. Pitt responded with the
Treason and Sedition Bills; but popular feeling continued to rise. A pamphlet
by Erskine, who had opposed the war from the beginning, went through 33
editions in the year. In vain Burke vented his indignation in successive
Letters on a Regicide Peace. Finally, Pitt yielded to the demand by sending
Lord Malmesbury to Paris. But the peremptory rejection of the English terms by
the Directors led to a revival of anti-Gallican feeling, which was strengthened
by the attack on Ireland, the invasion of Switzerland in 1798, and the seizure
of power by Bonaparte in 1799. Arthur Young, Mackintosh, the Lake Poets, and
many others who had welcomed the Revolution, had long since recanted. The
Corresponding Society was dissolved. Burke had estimated the incorrigible
Jacobins at 80,000, or one-fifth of educated Englishmen; but the rise of
Napoleon and the aggressions of France changed the character of the struggle.
Almost without exception the men who had given a general support to the
Revolution, and had opposed the war with the Republic, rallied to the
government. The Revolutionary era was at an end, and the Napoleonic era had
begun.
The effects
of the Revolution in England had been to inspire the majority with an
unreasoning dread of change. But for this feeling, Parliament might have been
reformed, Nonconformists freed from their disabilities, and the Slave Trade
abolished before the end of the century. In one direction alone was there an
advance. In the universal panic even the Roman Church came to appear as a
bulwark against anarchy; and the reception in England of the exiled French
priests marks a welcome advance in the practice of religious toleration.
As defenders
of the Christian faith, and as members of the upper and upper-middle classes,
the Bishops and clergy of the Established Church ranged themselves from the
beginning among the antagonists of the
Revolution.
The most active of its opponents was Porteus, Bishop of London, the spokesman
of the Evangelical section, to whom the French Revolution appeared less a
political than a moral revolt, to be best combated by religious influences.
With this end in view he delivered popular lectures on Christian evidences, and
made himself responsible for the distribution of the antir-revolutionary tracts
of Hannah More, the only writer on the conservative side who reached the ear of
the common people. A far greater man, Bishop Horsley, attacked the Revolution
with scarcely less energy. The story is well known how the peroration of his
sermon in Westminster Abbey, a few days after the death of Louis XVI, moved the
congregation by an uncontrollable impulse to rise to their feet. He was the
author of the celebrated declaration that all that the people had to do with
the laws was to obey them. His Charges breathe fire and slaughter against
Jacobins, French and English; and he even persuaded himself to believe that a
Jacobin propaganda was being carried on in Methodist Sunday-schools.
The Church
was not, however, without men who viewed the Revolution in a different light.
Bishop Watson warmly greeted the occurrences in France, and declared that the
majority of every nation had at all times a right to change its government.
When war was declared he supported motions for peace on the ground that the
French Republic was not, and never had been, a danger to England. Dr Parr, the
greatest scholar and the most striking personality among the clergy, must also
be counted among definitely liberal influences. His admiration for the
character and policy of Fox was unbounded, and he numbered among his friends
all the reformers of the time. Almost equally distant from the general attitude
of Churchmen were the opinions of Paley. In his Moral and Political Philosophy
he frankly authorises resistance in the case of the sovereign’s ill-behaviour
or imbecility; while his short tract, published in 1792, entitled Reasons for
Contentment addressed to the Labouring Part of the British Public, merely
argues how little political change can increase individual happiness. Well
might Dean Milner declare Paley to be as loose in his politics as in his
theology. Among lay spokesmen of the Church Wilberforce was by far the most
eminent. He was fully alive to the need of reform both in France and England,
and he realised the value of many of the ideas embodied in the Revolution,
though he was shocked by the irreligion of the leaders. Some years later, in a
remarkable study of Pitt, he declared that his friend might have inspired the
country with such confidence in the constitution that an attack on the
Revolution would have been regarded as unnecessary, and the war, the cause of
all subsequent troubles, might have been avoided.
The
Universities in the eighteenth century were annexes of the Established Church.
With the accession of George III Oxford had exchanged Jacobitism for Toryism,
and on the outbreak of the Revolution feeling ran high. Tom Paine was burned
in effigy, Nonconformist
ministers
were assaulted, and a “ Loyal Association” was formed. The minority appears to
have consisted of two hot-headed undergraduates, nanied Southey and Landor.-
In Cambridge feel g was at first less unanimous. A branch of the Constitutional
Society was formed, and the Vice-Chancellor welcomed the fall of the Bastille.
But with the progress of the Revolution new passions were aroused. The houses
of supposed Jacobins were attacked; Tom Paine was burned in effigy on Market
Hill; and the publicans engaged to watch for all attempts to proselytise on
their premises. After the condemnation in 1793 of Frend, a Fellow of Jesus
College who had become a Unitarian, for a pamphlet against the war, little more
is heard of French sympathies in Cambridge.
Nine out of
ten Englishmen who sympathised with the Revolution were outside the Established
Church; and the Unitarians, intellectually the strongest of the Nonconformist
bodies, were almost unanimously favourable. The famous sermon of Dr Price
struck a note at the beginning of the crisis that was echoed in almost eveiy
meeting-house in the country. He was quickly joined by Priestley, who took up
the gage of battle thrown down by Burke, and was made a French citizen. On the
occasion of a dinner held in 1791 to commemorate the fell of the Bastille, a
Birmingham mob marched out to Priestley’s house and destroyed his library,
manuscripts, and scientific apparatus. Feeling that England was no place for
him, he sailed to America. After his departure, the most distinguished
Unitarian champion of French ideas was Gilbert Wakefield, the classical
scholar, who had left the English Church. In 1794,' in his Spirit of
Christianity compared with the Spirit of the Times* he warned both sides that
little could be hoped from violence; and in 1798 he was imprisoned for a
vigorous denunciation of the war policy of the government. The greatest
preacher in the Free Churches and the leading Baptist of his time, Robert Hall,
had declared the Revolution the most splendid event in history. In 1793, in a
passionate attack on Bishop Horsley, he defended the liberty of the press,
denounced electoral abuses, and spoke admiringly of the United States. Not till
the rise of Napoleon did Hall become a supporter of the war, though without
retracting any of his earlier opinions. Indeed, with the exception of Dr
Sayers, of Norwich, recantations appear to have been unknown among the
Nonconformists.
The
Revolution was followed with sympathetic interest by several groups of
cultivated men, chiefly Nonconformists, iu the provinces. The most interesting
of these circles was at Norwich, the intellectual life of which centred round
the Unitarian Chapel. Among leading figures were Dr Aikin, the brother of Mrs
Barbauld and the founder of the Monthly Review, John Taylor, the hymn-writer;
his wife, who was compared to Madame Roland and Lucy Hutchinson; William
Taylor, the first English student of German literature; Dr Alderson and his
gifted daughter Amelia, afterwards Mrs Opie; the Martineaus, soon to become
famous
through two of their children; and finally the great Quaker family of the
Gurneys of Earlham. A second group was to be found in the neighbourhood of
Birmingham, the nucleus of which was the celebrated “Lunar Society,” formed by
the Lichfield friends, Lovell Edgeworth, Day, and Erasmus Darwin, and joined by
Wedgwood, Boulton, Watt, Priestley, Parr, and others interested in science and
philosophy. The Liverpool group contained two important figures. Dr Currie,
already prominent as an opponent of the Slave Trade, read Burke’s Reflections
with sorrow and indignation; and on the outbreak of war he published one of the
most powerful pamphlets of the time. So highly was his judgment valued that he
was invited by Wilberforce to report on the effect of the war on trade, with a
view to approaching Pitt. There is no better representative of the opponents of
the war and of Pitt’s system of repression than Dr Currie, a strong monarchist,
a supporter of Pitt till the Revolution, a wealthy and cultivated man and an
active philanthropist. By his side stood William Roscoe, the historian of the
Renaissance, a wealthy lawyer and a strong abolitionist.
The opinion
of the capital was divided. While the Common Council supported Pitt’s policy at
home and abroad, the Livery strongly opposed the war and demanded the dismissal
of Ministers. The success of the Corresponding Society, the enthusiasm with
which the result of the trials of 1794 was greeted, and the magnitude of the
open-air demonstrations in favour of parliamentary reform, indicate the presence
of a strong democratic feeling among large numbers of the artisan classes. A
group of advanced thinkers, including Godwin and Paine, Aikin and Priestley,
Tooke and Gilbert Wakefield, gathered round Joseph Johnson the publisher. The
life and soul of the circle was Fuseli, the art critic, who had left
Switzerland as a young man; but the most interesting figure was Mary
Wolstonecraft, whom Johnson had persuaded to devote herself entirely to
literature. Her answer to Burke had made her known, and her Vindication of the
Rights of Women made her famous. She boldly declared sex to be a secondary
consideration, and demanded that men and women should meet on the ground of
their common humanity.
When the
Revolution broke out Cowper was the leading figure in English literature. He
had foretold the fall of the Bastille some years before it occurred, and had
expressed his love of liberty in many powerful passages. The sovereignty of the
people appeared to him indisputable and the anti-revolutionary alliance a
mistake. But his gentle, feminine nature shrank from every kind of violence. He
was ageing; and the Revolution spoke everywhere through younger voices.
It was not
till his visit to France in 1791 that Wordsworth became really interested in
the Revolution. When he met the French officer, Michael Beaupuy, he realised
quite suddenly that the hopes that were stirring in men’s minds were also his
own innermost feelings. On reaching Paris shortly after the September massacres
he thirsted to throw himself
into the
vortex ; and on-his return to England he defended the execution of the King and
declared a republic to be the best form of government. The tragedy of The
Borderers marks his emancipation from the sway of Godwin and the revolutionary
school; and the profound dejection into which he had been plunged by the
horrors of the Revolution gave place to an interest in the teaching of nature,
a sympathy with the joys and sorrows of individual men and women, and a belief
in an overruling Providence. The process has been described by the poet himself
in imperishable verse in The Prelude. Though the revolutionary influence was
profoundly modified by deeper reflexion and by intercourse with Coleridge and
other friends, those fiery years left their imprint. Whert Napoleon entered on his
crusade against the liberties of Europe the voice of Wordsworth was raised in
sonnets which express in a final form the principles, purged from their baser
elements, which he had learned from France and by which he now condemned her.
When the
Revolution broke out Southey was at Westminster School, where he read Rousseau
and Gibbon; and when he went to Oxford in 1792 he was already a freethinker and
a republican. At the age of twenty his ideals and animosities found vent in Wat
Tyler, a play in which John Ball delivers sermons derived from Godwin, and in
Joan of Arc, in which the English invader is denounced in correct republican
phraseology. In the summer of 1794 Southey and Coleridge met at Oxford. Both
felt deeply the fall of the Girondins, and both hated their Jacobin successors.
They were disenchanted with the old world and without definite prospects. Why
should they not settle in the new world and lead a life in common according to
nature? Coleridge’s glowing words found a ready echo, and the two young men
went their way to make converts to Pantisocracy. Volunteers were enrolled for
the Susquelwma colony; but though little money was needed for the scheme, that
little was not forthcoming. The dream was rudely interrupted, and in 1795
Southey went to Spain. In the volumes of minor poems issued in 1797 and 1799 we
meet with numerous victims of an unjust social order, homage to Rousseau and
Mary Wolstonecraft, Falkland and Hampden, keen sympathy with suffering and
burning hatred of oppression; but by the close of the century Southey had
completely discarded bis democratic opinions, though retaining throughout life
a ready sympathy for any plan of direct social amelioration.
When
Coleridge entered Jesus College, Cambridge, in 1792, he fell under the influence
of Frend. In 1794 he cooperated with Southey in The Fall of Robespierre, in
which he forcibly expressed his attachment to Revolution principles and his
abhorrence of the fallen tyrant. When the Susquehanna scheme was given up, he
explained his ideas in lectures to Bristol audiences and in sonnets and
newspaper articles. He retained his French sympathies till 1797, when he
proclaimed the change in the magnificent ode entitled Recantation. The Fears in
Solitude marks his
Coleridge, Landor, and lesser poets. 767
realisation
that England belongs to him not less than to Pitt. The Revolution had appealed
to Coleridge largely through his love of speculation, whereas Southey had
welcomed it as a revolt against injustice. Coleridge, alone of the three
friends, was by nature a thinker with an innate passion for first principles.
The Essays on his Own Times asserted that every institution had an underlying
idea, and that the duty of the thinker and the statesman was to reinterpret it
and to free it from accretions. His firm belief in Divine government, expressed
in the Religious Musings, further separated him from the extreme revolutionary
school. The reaction was in consequence less violent than in the case of his
friends. Many years later he declared that, though he had never been a Jacobin,
there was much good in Jacobinism, and that the errors of the opposite party
were equally gross and far less excusable. One fault only would he confess; he
had hoped too boldly of our common nature. ■
No Englishman
was more fitted by temperament to enter into certain moods of the Revolution
than Landor. While still at Rugby he had conceived the dislike of monarchy
which he retained throughout life. His first considerable poem, Gebir,
published in 1798, was a political sermon in verse. All champions of liberty
were to him flawless heroes, and kings in most cases were tyrants, fit only to
be assassinated. His political creed was more a matter of temperament than
reflexion. Like Alfieri, whom he in some ways resembled, Landor was a
republican without being a democrat. To the French people he came to entertain
a deep aversion. They had, he declared in 1802, ruined the cause of liberty for
ever, and in Bonaparte they possessed the tyrant they deserved. On the other
leading poets of the time the impression of the Revolution was but slight.
Crabbe had greeted the dawn and was frightened by the shadows. Rogers hurried
over to Paris to study events and retained the opinions he had imbibed from
Priestley and Price ; but there is no echo of the Revolution in his poems.
Blake, lost in a world of dreams, touches politics only by an appearance in
Court owing to an unguarded expression. Numberless odes were evoked by the
Revolution from writers of lesser calibre, such as Merry, Roscoe, James Montgomery,
Anna Seward, and Miss Barbauld; but of such writings the Needy Knifegrinder and
a few other poems of the AntiJacobin alone survive. The novel was chosen by
more than one writer as a vehicle for propaganda. The literary vices of
Godwin’s striking romance Caleb Williams were reproduced in the stories of
Holcroft, Bage, and Majy Wolstonecraft, without its redeeming power. The
influence of the Revolution on writers of the second generation, Byron,
Shelley, Moore, Hazlitt, Leigh Hunt, cannot be discussed here.
There were
two thinkers who took no great part in the literary controversy provoked by the
Revolution who nevertheless were in different degrees influenced by it.
Godwin’s Political Justice was the direct
768
Godwin.—Malthus.
outcome
of the philosophic movement in France, and indeed, in its deification of pure
intellect, is rather French than English. Since men, apparently with the
exception of kings and priests, possessed no innate tendency to evil, their
vices must be due to outside agencies. The chief of these baneful influences
was government; and improvement was to be sought in removing the control of man
over man. The transition from the actual to the ideal must not be accomplished
by force; and so averse was Godwin to coercion that he disapproved of the
storming of the Bastille. A National Assembly or a President was as dangerous
to the liberty of the individual as a King. Private property was no less contrary
to political justice than Church property, since a loaf of bread belonged to
him who most needed it. Punishment implied guilt; but man’s will was not free.
What the laws called crime was a miscalculation of consequences due to
ignorance, and must therefore be met, not by punishment, but by argument and
education. Religion was a fettering of the free use of the reason. Marriage was
an aftair of property and the worst of all properties. Cooperation is almost as
distasteful to Godwin as coercion, involving as it does the sacrifice of
complete freedom of judgment and action. In his second edition, published in
1796, he somewhat modified his communistic views; and, after the death of his
wife, he confessed that he had underestimated feeling as a factor in society;
but his hatred of every kind of restriction on individual liberty never changed.
As education spread, government would become superfluous. Like Condorcet and
his friend Holcroffc, Godwin bebeved that the secret of perpetual life might be
learned, and that as sensual gratifications lost their power children would
cease to be bom. There would be plain living and high thinking. Every man would
seek with ineffable ardour the good of all. ■
Though Godwin
was not an actor, he was an influence on actors. His confidence in the power of
reason to guide the individual aright and to reform society made him the idol
of young men. Pitt’s determination not to prosecute the author of a work which
cost three guineas revealed his conviction that Godwin would never reach the
multitude. His influence was on individuals—a passing influence on Wordsworth,
Coleridge, Southey, Tom Wedgwood, Crabb Robinson, a permanent influence on
Shelley. On the other hand Godwin was informed by Pair, Mackintosh, and a host
of other critics, that his system was foolish and immoral; and Malthus told him
that it was impossible. The elder Malthus was a disciple and friend of
Rousseau; and the publication of Godwin’s Enqvirer in 1797 led to discussions
between father and son. The younger Malthus foresaw a fatal obstacle to the
dreams of his father and of Godwin in the growth of an excessive population.
The Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) postulates only the necessity
of food and the permanence of the marriage instinct. It was a natural law that
population multiplied up to the limit of food. Numbers involved a
769
struggle for
existence; and a struggle for existence involved inequality. Instead of
children ceasing to be bom, as Godwin suggested, there would be more than ever,
since they would be supported by the community. The State would break down, not
from the vices of human character, but from the laws of nature.
Godwin’s
views on property were shared by two thinkers. In a remarkable tract, entitled
The Fmd af Oppression, Thomas Spence expressed his amazement that Paine and
the democrats should have overlooked the source of every abuse. A committee in
every parish should seize the land in the vicinity, bum the title-deeds, and
administer it for the good of all. The tract met with so much hostile criticism
from the reformers that Spence issued an ironical recantation. The only other
socialist of the time was Oswald, a Scotchman.
The second
eminent thinker who took no direct share in political life was Bentham. His
name was already well known in France when the Revolution occurred, and he was personally
acquainted with a number of French thinkers. He drew up a treatise on procedure
for the Assembly, and earned French citizenship by his offer to erect a model
prison. In his tract, Truth v. Ashurst, written in 1792, he congratulated the
French on their simplification of the law, and declared that whatever harm they
had done to one another they had done none to England. But he was by no means
favourable to the principles of the Revolution. His Anarchical Fallacies is a
merciless criticism of the French Declaration of Rights. Abstract rights were a
contradiction in terms; for rights, which are claims to liberty, no less than
laws, which are infringements of liberty, must be defended by a reference to
utility. liberty, for example, was dependent on capacity, since many persons
needed protection owing to weakness, ignorance, or imprudence. Inequality,
again, was to be condemned, not as an injustice, but as tending to diminish
happiness. The first requisite of happiness was security; and if the claims of
equality conflicted with it they must be sacrificed. On the other hand, Bentham
was in many ways a child of the revolutionary age. History had no authority for
him, and he was as ready to construct a new legal system as the French to
improvise a new State. In later years, finding the path to legal reform blocked
by existing institutions, he advocated a republic, and came to accept the
Rights of Man as desirable in practice if wrong in theory.
The
intellectual activity of Scotland found an outlet in almost every direction
except politics. The mental horizon had been widened by the lectures and
writings of Hume and Adam Smith, Reid and Lord Kames, Ferguson and Ogilvie, and
even by the extravagances of Lord Monboddo. The Universities were the centre of
thought, and their atmosphere was distinctly more liberal than that of Oxford
or Cambridge. Professor Millar’s course on law and politics drew large
audiences at Glasgow, and
the lectures
of Dugald Stewart at Edinburgh were compared by one of his distinguished pupils
to the opening of the heavens. The French Revolution rapidly divided society
into two camps. It was welcomed by the Whigs and in the Universities. The
veteran historian Robertson gave thanks that he had lived to see the dawn of
freedom ; and Dugald Stewart, who had visited France a few months before the
outbreak, threw his influence on the same side. Sympathy, however, was almost
confined to academic circles and the lower middle classes. The nobility, with
the exception of Lord Lauderdale, were stout supporters of Pitt and Dundas ;
and the lawyers, whose business was to deal with the intricacies of feudal land
law, were resolutely hostile to French ideas. The movement for parliamentary
reform which had enjoyed the countenance of Dundas was abruptly terminated. The
panic grew, and Dugald Stewart described the infatuation of the country as
beyond belief. The leading sympathisers with French ideas carefully avoided any
action tending to increase the alarm. Archibald Fletcher, the founder of the
movement for burgh reform, and Henry Erskine, the most eminent of Whig
advocates, refused to join the “ Friends of the People,” though in sympathy
with their proposals.
Left without
leaders, the working-classes began to assert themselves. In 1792 the
celebration of the King’s birthday was marked by riots, and Dundas was burnt in
effigy. Shortly after, Thomas Muir, a rising advocate, founded a society of
reformers, the members of which had solemnly to affirm allegiance to the
government by King, Lords, and Commons. In 1793 he was arrested on a charge of
exciting disaffection and sentenced to transportation for fourteen years. For
promoting a similar society in Dundee, Palmer, an Anglican clergyman, was
sentenced to seven years’ transportation. Despite these crushing sentences a
Convention met in Edinburgh in November, and was attended by delegates from
about fifty Scotch and English societies for parliamentary reform. The
discussion opened with prayer; visitors were admitted; and a daily bulletin was
issued. At the fifteenth sitting the meeting was broken up by the government.
Margarot and Gerald, the delegates of the Corresponding Society, and Skirving,
the Secretary of the Convention, were selected for punishment. Their trial was
chiefly notable for the brutal conduct of Braxfield, the Scottish Jeffreys.
Though the Scottish law of treason differed from the English, Lord Cockbum has
pointed out many illegalities in the proceedings. The prisoners were sentenced
to fourteen years’ transportation to Botany Bay. Not one of them had
countenanced force; and when Watt, a spy, had urged them to employ it, he had
received the reply, “ Mr Watt, these things do not belong to the cause of
reform.” In the following year Henry Erskine, the brother of the great
advocate, was deposed from his position as Dean of Faculty for denouncing the
war. The opposition was silenced; but it was at this moment that Jeffrey,
Brougham, Homer, and other
young men,
who were opposed to the war and the Dundas regmne, began to discuss the ideas
which were to take shape in the Edinburgh Review.
The only
political writings produced in Scotland by the Revolution were the anti-Jacobin
tirades of Playfair and Robison and the vagaries of Oswald; but in literature
certain French ideas found an eminent representative. In the uprising of the
common people Burns saw the reflexion of his own passionate hatred of social
inequality. He presented the guns of a smuggler with a letter of
congratulation to the French Assembly in 1792. On one occasion he chose as a
toast “the last verse of the last chapter of the last book of Kings”; on
another he refused to stand or uncover when “ God save the King ” was played.
The philosophical and abstract side of the Revolution left him untouched. It
was the struggle for equality based on the conception of a common manhood that
stirred his enthusiasm and drew music from his lyre.
The
Revolution was hailed with far more general satisfaction in Ireland than in
Scotland. The establishment of Grattan’s Parliament had quickened the sense of
Irish nationality, and the close historical relationship with France led to an
eager interest in her fortunes. Lord Robert Stewart, later Lord Castlereagh,
joined in toasts to the sovereignty of the people and the conquerors of the
Bastille. Charlemont hailed the Revolution as a wonderful and glorious change ;
and, though disgusted by the later excesses, felt sure that despotism would
never return, and that the final outcome would be freedom tempered by law. The
Volunteers, whose organisation had not entirely broken up, congratulated
France on her achievement. Catholics and Presbyterians naturally joined in
approving a revolution which had secured religious equality and parliamentary
reform. To accomplish these objects, by combining into one party all who desired
them, Wolfe Tone created the society of “United Irishmen” in 1791. In its
origin the greater number of United Irishmen did not look beyond the ostensible
objects of the association; but Tone and others among the founders soon
conceived the idea of establishing an independent Irish republic. In 1792
Grattan founded the society of the “ Friends of the Constitution ” to carry out
the ideas to which the Whig Club would not pledge itself, while resolutely
opposing republican propaganda. But the time was unfavourable for a middle
party, and Ireland was rapidly divided between the foes of reform and the
friends of France. Though the founders of the United Irish movement were nearly
all Protestants, the unbending attitude of the government drove many middle-class
Catholics into the Society, and the peasantry were gradually won over by the
influence of “ Defenderism.” The outbreak of war in 1793 gave an immense
impetus to violent counsels. Lord Edward Fitzgerald was dismissed from the army
for attending a dinner given by the English colony in Paris to celebrate
French
victories, and began to urge the despatch of a French expedition to Ireland.
Tone, Napper Tandy, O’Connor, and others, journeyed to Paris and informed the
French government that the country was only awaiting the landing of troops in
order to rise. An expedition under Hoche reached Bantry Bay in the winter of
1796, but was dispersed and forced to return by a storm. From this time the
danger diminished. The aggressions of the Directory convinced many that the
French would arrive as liberators and remain as conquerors; and the Orange movement
began to detach many Presbyterians. When Humbert landed in 1798 there was
little likelihood of success; and the scoffs of the French troops scandalised
their Catholic supporters. The invasion was repelled; the rebellion was
suppressed; and the leaders of the United Irishmen committed suicide or were
executed.
1
The
Revolutionary decade produced little genuine political thinking in Ireland.
McKenna, one of the most capable Catholic writers, appealed to his
fellow-Catholics not to weaken the Crown nor seek an impossible equality; and
Alexander Knox, the ablest of the Protestants, submitted the conception of
popular sovereignty to a searching analysis in his Thoughts on the Witt of the
People. But the most remarkable work of this era of Irish life was not a
discussion of the French Revolution, but the autobiography of Wolfe Tone.
Though
Germany was almost completely unknown to France at the outbreak of the
Revolution, French manners, French literature, and French ideas were more
familiar to Germany than to any other part of Europe. In no country had
Rousseau’s educational theories found disciples so earnest as Basedow and
Campe. The Ayfklarimg, under the guidance of Wolff and Lessing, and even in its
later and narrower form under Nicolai, had weakened respect for all beliefs and
institutions, and had taught men to rely on their own reason. In distant
Konigsberg Kant was pointing out the limits of pure reason. In every department
save political thinking Germany had witnessed an immense advance. On the other
hand certain influences prepared the way for the reception of the ideas of the
Revolution. The traffic in human flesh carried on by the Elector of Hesse drew
all eyes to the struggle in North America; and the establishment of the
Republic was for many Germans the beginning of a recovery from political
paralysis. A second influence was journalism. For twenty years before the
Revolution the powerful voice of Schlozer “ the Rhadamanthus of Gottingen,” had
been raised in protest against the abuses that disgraced the greater number of
German States. In Swabia a somewhat similar critical and educative work was
carried on by Schubart, though on more democratic lines. In the third place,
the Masonic movement had challenged traditional ideas. The suppression of the
Illuminati in Bavaria in 1784 had dispersed them all over the Empire; and
Weishaupt and Knigge taught that kings were
no longer
needed and that nobility was but the tool of despotism. A fourth influence was
the Sturm und Drang movement in literature. Schiller had grown up an
enthusiastic admirer of Rousseau, and in his early dramas, Die Rauber, Kabale
und Liebe, and Fiesco, he had sung the glories of social and political revolt.
Goethe’s Gotz emphasised similar virtues, and Richter and other young writers
poured ridicule on the nobility. Finally no national feeling opposed the entry
of foreign ideas. Lessing had avowed himself a cosmopolitan, and Goethe and
Schiller followed in his footsteps. For these reasons Germany, though unable to
initiate a system of political ideas, was peculiarly fitted to receive those
which might emanate from another country.
The drama of
the Revolution was hailed with delight by the greater number of the leading
minds in Germany. Wieland, Schubart, and Schlozer welcomed the news in their
journals, the last-named declaring that the angels were surely singing Te Deums
in heaven. Campe set off with Wilhelm von Humboldt to Paris. “Is it really
true,” he wrote, “ that the Greeks and Romans I see around me were but a few
weeks ago French?” Klopstock, the veteran of German literature, regretted that
he had not a hundred voices to celebrate the birth of liberty, and declared
that if he had sons he would go with them to Paris and demand French
citizenship. Burger and Voss, Richter and Htilderlin, Herder and Stolberg,
loudly expressed their joy. In the schools and universities enthusiasm was
universal; Hegel and Schelling declaimed revolutionary sentiments at Tubingen;
and Georg Kemer (the brother of Justinus) stole away from Stuttgart to
Strassburg for the holidays. The kingdom of Prussia had been in the full tide
of intellectual reaction since the death of Frederick the Great, and was
seething with discontent at the rule of his nephew and the favourites Wollner
and Bischoffswerder. The Francophil traditions of the Great King were carried
on by Prince Henry, and outside the Court the reception of the Revolution was
favourable. The journals of Archenholtz and Nicolai declared their approval;
and in the circle of Henriette Herz and Rahel Levin, in which the intellectual
life of Berlin already centred, there was but one opinion. Gentz declared that
mankind had awakened from its long sleep, and that the Revolution was the first
practical triumph of philosophy. Hertzberg asserted in a public address that it
would improve not only the administration of France but her relations with
other countries. The weightiest vote in Prussia, that of Immanuel Kant, was
cast on the same side. Enthusiasm reached its highest point in the frontier
States of the Rhineland, the greater part of which consisted of ecclesiastical
principalities.
This mood,
however, was not universal. Gleim, Jacobi, the Niebuhrs, and Justus Moser
looked on the Revolution with apprehension from the beginning. Stein remained
deaf to its appeal, and Kotzebue, who paid a visit to Paris in the first winter
of the Revolution, satirised the conflict
between
revolutionary ideals and feminine weakness in his Ladies' Jacobin Club. Nor was
there praise from the two greatest voices in German literature. Goethe deplored
the haste and violence of the Revolution, though his Grosslcophta shows that he
was no friend to the fallen regime. As Luther interrupted and in great measure
destroyed the work of the Renaissance, so the Revolution interrupted and might
destroy the Aufklarwng. He declared on the evening after the cannonade at Valmy
that a new era had begun; but he regarded the future with apprehension. The
Burgergeneral, written in 1793, expresses in humorous form Goethe’s dislike of
propaganda, and his view, repeated in the exquisite idyll of Hermann und
Dorothea, that the fulfilment of the duty that lies to hand and the formation
of a happy home is the better course. In the case of Schiller romantic
sansculottism has been banished by his historical studies. France was not
educated enough for equality, and liberty must be reached through beauty,
through aesthetic culture. Soon after he had received French citizenship as the
author of Die Rauber the horrors of the Revolution drove him into violent
antagonism. He planned an appeal to France for the life of the King; but Louis’
head fell before the design was accomplished. The change in Schiller’s opinions
was typical; and the outbreak of war, the September massacres, and the
execution of the King, divided the nation sharply into two classes. Schlozer,
Wieland, Scharnhorst, Gagem, Campe, Stolberg, and many others who had welcomed
the Revolution declared against it. Klopstock and Herder bore the September
massacres, but were converted by the death of the King, though Herder declared
that neither side could win laurels in the war. The terror of Jacobinism spread
through the land. Seditious writings were seized ; and a revolt among Silesian
weavers prevented the removal of feudal services in the Prussian Land Code of
1794. The most eloquent, systematic, and untiring opponent of the Revolution,
and the most eminent German publicist of his time, was Friedrich Gentz. He had
warmly welcomed the events of 1789, but gradually modified his opinions. His
translation of Burke’s Reflections, with notes and appendices, appeared in 1792
; and in the following year he issued a powerful reply to Mackintosh. He
declared his object to be an attack on the Revolution from its own standpoint.
Burke met it with an appeal to prescription and de Maistre with an appeal to
religion; but Gentz was as unflinching a political rationalist as any Jacobin,
and he condemned it on the ground that France did not correspond with the
model State. He never ceased to praise the summoning of the States General; but
he considered the destruction of the Estates a mistake, since a monarchy
without a nobility was either a nullity or an oriental despotism. Like Mallet
du Pan, whom as a thinker he greatly resembles, Gentz found the nearest
approach to his ideal in the English constitution.
The
Revolution none the less still counted influential supporters.
Fichte, in
his Correction of Public Judgment on the French Revolution, accepted Kant’s
theory of an original contract, not as a historic fact but as the theoretical
foundation for a union of intelligent beings. No contract could be final, for
the development of moral culture demanded the continual renewal of
constitutional forms. The State was not the author of rights, but the mechanism
by which they were protected. The philosopher of Konigsberg also maintained
his opinions. In his essay On Theory and Practice, written in 1793, he asserted
freedom, equality before the law, and a share in legislation to be fundamental
rights. In his essay On the Strife of the Faculties, published in 1798, he
declared that the misdeeds of the Jacobins were nothing to those of the tyrants
of past time, and that the Revolution, though outwardly a failure, would in the
long run prove a blessing to mankind. Possessed by an overmastering hatred of
war, he saw in the overthrow of the French monarchy the first step towards the
federation of republics, which he advocated in his essay On Perpetual Peace.
While the
greater part of Germany only knew of the doings of the French republicans by
report, the inhabitants of the Rhineland made their personal acquaintance. When
war broke out in 1792 the Elector of Mainz fled without striking a blow; and,
when Custine arrived and declared that be came as a liberator, enthusiasm knew
no bounds. A political club was formed, and a Convention was summoned from
other parts of the Rhineland. The moving spirit in these proceedings was Georg
Forster, who had accompanied Cook round the world. The Convention had scarcely
met in April, 1793, when the French were expelled for a short time by the
allied troops. On their return they alienated many of their friends; but
administrative and legal reforms were introduced, and French influence was
deep and lasting. More than one of the Mainz circle fell a victim to the
Revolution. Deputed to represent the Convention, Forster settled in Paris,
where he died disillusioned in 1794. Adam Lux, who accompanied him, lost hope
on the fall of the Girondins, and courted death in defence of Charlotte Corday.
A third figure, who played a leading part in the politics of the Rhineland,
Eulogius Schneider, left his professorship at Bonn and settled at Strass- burg.
Excitement turned his head, and he travelled through the surrounding districts
with a guillotine, till Saint-Just, in the course of a tour of inspection, sent
him to be executed in Paris. The leading figure in the later politics of the
Rhineland was Gorres of Coblenz. Neither the Terror nor the incorporation of
his country with France had dimmed his revolutionary fervour; and in his
journal, the Rothes Blatt, he eloquently defended French principles. But
Brumaire put an end to all hopes. The political clubs were closed and
discussion was stifled. Gorres returned from a journey to Paris a
constitutional monarchist; and his book on his mission marks the close of the
most interesting chapter of Rhenish history.
The invasion
of French ideas reached Bavaria later than any other part of Germany. An agent
of the Directory reported in 1796 renewed activity on the part of the
Illuminati; but there was little intellectual activity till the coming of the
French in 1800. Their departure was followed by the reforming era of Max Joseph
and his Minister Montgelas, both of whom were deeply influenced by the ideas of
the Revolution.
In addition
to its direct influence, the Revolution must be counted amongst the factors
which produced the Romantic School. The reaction against the narrow
rationalism, into which under the leadership of Nicolai the movement for
intellectual freedom had degenerated, was intensified by the passionate
individualism that the revolutionary gale carried over Europe. The Romanticists
understood the Revolution as a defiance of tradition and the establishment of
human life on a basis of pure feeling. The transition from advanced political
ideas to an attack on the moral order, which was feared by so many, actually
occurred in the group of lawless young men and women who surrounded Friedrich
Schlegel. But speculative and practical anarchy quickly led to the revival of
the principle of authority. Count Stolberg entered the Roman Church in 1800,
and was followed by several of the leaders of the Romantic school, including,
in 1808, Friedrich Schlegel himself. Schleiermacher’s Discourses on Religion
and Fichte’s Vocation of Man reflected and strengthened the growing
seriousness. Savigny called attention to the historical element in law and
institutions. The conservative reaction was felt in every department of
intellectual activity.
The dominions
of the House of Habsburg were intellectually too backward to be much affected
by the Revolution; and the reforms of the Emperor Joseph had strengthened
instead of weakening the conservatism of his subjects. The diminution of the
power of the Crown appeared likely to lead away from rather than towards the
only change demanded by the masses, namely the mitigation or abolition of the
feudal system. The leader of the attack on French ideas was Alois Hofmann,
Professor of Rhetoric at Vienna and a friend of the Emperor Leopold. No
newspaper of the time pursued the Revolution with such unrelenting hostility as
the Wiener Zeitung, of which Hofmann was editor. He traced the crisis above all
to books. A universal conspiracy was on the point of breaking out, planned by
the Illuminati; and to combat it the Order of Jesuits should be revived. Though
it was dangerous to combat Hofmann, two noteworthy antagonists presented
themselves. Revolutions, said the poet Alxinger, never occurred without reason,
and would not occur at all if reforms were carried in due time. The Emperor
Joseph had freed Austria from such a danger. He knew of no Jacobinism; but if
Hofmann succeeded in muzzling the Press, the continuance of order could not be
guaranteed. Alxinger was supported by Sonnenfels, the illustrious colleague of
Joseph’s reforming work. In
a pamphlet
published in 1793 and in his Rectorial address to the University in 1794 he
pointed out the benefits of the Revolution. Hofmann replied at length; but his
work was taken up by Thugut and political discussion came to an end.
Bohemia was
but slightly stirred by the Revolution; but Hungary was more affected than any
part of the Habsburg dominions. The county assemblies, which had never lost the
traditions of self-government, caught the inspiration of Paris ; but instead
of affirming abstract principles, the orators demanded the revival of their
ancestral liberties. The democratic party, small but active, found its strength
in the towns and carried on propaganda by anonymous pamphlets. The Diet, convoked
by Leopold on his accession, met in 1790, and carried a number of laws
emphasising and safeguarding the historic independence of Hungary. The spirit
of 1789 was manifest in the abolition of Protestant disabilities and the
admission of the burgher class to office. Though the Emperor was anxious to
improve the legal position of the peasantry, the nobles were strong enough to
defeat all far-reaching proposals. With the death of Leopold in 1792 reform
slumbered till it was taken up again by Szechenyi in 1825. The fear of
Jacobinism was spreading over Europe, and the reaction triumphed in 1794, when
Kaunitz died and Thugut became supreme. The Protestants were denounced as
Jacobins, and a new persecution broke out. Harassed by the censorship, the
democrats formed secret societies and organised plots. The leader of the
extreme party was Martinovics, an ambitious and unscrupulous Slav, whose alert
mind had won the notice of Joseph and Leopold. He had been entrusted with
several diplomatic missions, one of them to France, from which he had returned
a republican. In 1794 Martinovics and his chief colleagues were arrested. The
silence of the judges renders it probable that their objects did not include an
attack on the established government; but the whole episode is one of the most
obscure chapters in Hungarian history. The Court was terrified by events in
France, and the leaders were executed in 1795. Several of the democrats
committed suicide, and about 50, among them the poet Kazinczy, were imprisoned.
Liberal professors were dismissed from Buda, Kant’s philosophy was forbidden,
dangerous books were burned, and Hungarian Jacobinism abruptly disappeared.
The
Aufkldrwng had been represented in Italy by a body of distinguished thinkers.
Beccaria had given definite shape to the growing humanitarianism of the age.
Verri, the leader of the Milanese reformers, had put forward enlightened views
of economics and administration. Filangieri had set forth the ideals of liberty
and equality in his eloquent Science of Legislation. Mario Pagano, the most
eminent of Vico’s disciples, and Genovesi, the distinguished economist, had
created a liberal atmosphere in the university of Naples. In the department of
belles-lettres,
Parini had satirised the idle life of the nobles, Casti had ridiculed the
courts of Europe, and Alfieri had denounced monarchy and tyranny. Moreover,
though the enlightened despots, whether rulers, such as Charles III in Naples
and Leopold in Tuscany, or Ministers, such as Tanucci and du Tillot, Caracciolo
and Firmian, had broken down many hoary abuses, the governments were not strong
enough in the respect of their subjects or the character of the rulers to offer
resistance to the inrush of French ideas. Ferdinand of Naples was completely
dominated by his Austrian wife and his Prime Minister, Acton, and his kingdom
was in confusion. The internal condition of the Papal States had long seen
unsatisfactory, and had not been improved by the reigning Pope, Pius VI.
Tuscany was the best governed country in Italy if not in Europe; but the
Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty had had no time to take root. The Republics of
Venice, Genoa, and Lucca were weak and corrupt. Lombardy was an Austrian
province, and Parma and Modena were appanages.
The early
stages of the Revolution were welcomed by the leading minds of Italy. Leopold I
of Tuscany declared that the regeneration of France would influence every
government in Europe and put an end to numberless injustices. His Minister, Manfredini,
was in thorough sympathy with French ideas. Count Gorani, who had seen more of
Europe than any other Italian, went straight to Paris and was enrolled as a
citizen. Verri believed that he saw an arch of light reaching from Paris to
Italy. Alfieri, Parini, and Pindemonte celebrated the events in verse. The
Italian States were spared the horrors of revolution; for Italy already
possessed much that France had to demand. Feudalism had never taken deep root,
and except in Naples and Sicily had almost disappeared. Nor did the nobility
occupy the same position as in some other countries. For these reasons it was
reform and not revolution that was desired. As the sky darkened, the dominant
sentiment in Italy was of abhorrence and terror. The lower classes had never
been deeply stirred, and manuscript sonnets in detestation of “ French liberty
” circulated from hand to hand. Extreme opinions were found chiefly among the
journalists, students, and artists. At Naples, Palermo, and Bologna, young
nobles were imprisoned or executed; but their deaths aroused little sympathy.
The murder of de Basseville, the French agent, in the streets of Rome in
January, 1793, expressed in the language of the mob the disappointment
generally felt at the course of the Revolution. To this feeling utterance was
given by the two most distinguished living Italian poets. In his Bassvilliana,
Monti, borrowing the machinery of the Divina Commedia, depicted the soul of his
friend, the murdered diplomat, cleansed from the revolutionary taint, looking
down on the scenes in which he had borne a part as a penance before entering
Paradise. Though Monti regulated his opinions by the changing fortunes of the
combatants, the splendid diction and imagery of his epic make it one of
the most
striking literary products of the revolutionary era. The Revolution was
combated with greater power by Alfieri. The great dramatist had lived for years
in the society of Greeks and Romans, and had breathed the atmosphere of their
haughty republicanism. Though he had approved tyrannicide in his work Della
Tiramiide, he despised democracy; and, after being surprised into an ode of
congratulation by the fall of the Bastille, he entered on a crusade which
terminated only with his life. He had never admired France; and the
confiscation of his property after his flight from Paris in August, 1792,
raised his indignation to fever heat. His Autobiography records in prose and
the Misogallo in verse his reflexions on the Revolution in France and Italy.
The hostility of Italians was increased by the truculence and rapacity of the
French armies. The appearance of Bonaparte in 1796 was hailed with enthusiasm
in Lombardy; and Verri, Melzi, Parini, and other reformers, offered their
support. The astonishing progress of the French arms and the creation of
republics by Bonaparte appear to have dazzled the imagination of the masses ;
for in 1797 an extraordinary wave of enthusiasm passed over the country. Monti
wrote a palinode for the Bassvilliana. Trees of liberty sprang up in the piazzas,
and tricolour cockades filled the streets. The unreality of the world in which
men were living was shown in the foundation of the Roman Republic, when the
titles and ceremonies of classical times were revived under the mouths of
French guns.
The establishment
of the Parthenopean Republic is the last and most interesting chapter in the
history of the revolutionary era in Italy. From the beginning Ferdinand and
Caroline had shown themselves as hostile to France as they dared, and had
harshly repressed the Francophil party led by Ettore Carafa. When Championnet
entered Naples in 1799 the Court fled precipitately to Sicily. But the French
troops were in danger of being cut off and quickly retired; and the Republic
found itself without defenders. Never had a State rulers more high-minded and
unpractical than Maria Pagano, Vincenzo Russo, and their colleagues; and no
journalist ever worked more earnestly for the instruction of the people than
Eleonora Pimeutel. But the leaders disagreed among themselves as to the speed
with which feudalism should be abolished; and when the army of Cardinal Ruffo
arrived the city fell away from its philosophic rulers. Carafe, and Caracciolo,
Pagano and Eleonora Pimentel were hanged, and the Parthenopean Republic was
extinguished in blood. The reaction, heralded by Ruffo in the south and
Suvdroff in the north, swept over Italy with irresistible force. A religious
fury invaded the populace, and trees of liberty were replaced by crosses. Armed
bands were formed and marched singing litanies to the expulsion of the French
and Jews, and all enemies of the Faith. The Jacobins disappeared as if by
magic.
The reaction
was sudden; but in truth it was only the surface of Italian life that had been
touched by French ideas. Yet the vision of a
i'ree and
united Italy had taken shape during these tempestuous years. Till now the dream
of a few thinkers, the force of events had made it the cry of the people, and
the cause had been consecrated by the blood of the Neapolitan martyrs. It was
not without significance that the last sonnet of the Misogallo should be a
noble hymn to the resurrection of Italy.
The House of
Savoy, though taking its royal title from Sardinia, derived its principal
strength from its hereditary possessions north of the Alps. For fifty years
before the Revolution the State stood neutral in the struggles of Europe. The
administration had been improved, and the relics of feudalism gradually
discarded. There was little political liberty and little political discontent
under the patriarchal sway of Victor Amadeus III, a well-intentioned ruler of
mediocre ability. As father-in-law of the brothers of Louis XVI, he naturally
accepted the emigri view of the Revolution, and Turin and Chambery were rapidly
filled with the ancient nobility of France. The inhabitants of the mountain
valleys knew little of French ideas; but the conduct of the emigres turned the
majority of the town population into warm supporters of the Revolution. The
government vacillated; and, when in 1792 it threw in its lot with Austria,
French troops overran Savoy and Nice without striking a blow, and were received
with enthusiasm. Montesquiou reported that the people were prepared for a
revolution on the French model. A “National Assembly of the Allobroges” was
summoned to Chambery; the monarchy was abolished; the Church lands were seized;
and the work which had occupied France three years was accomplished in four
days. But the French invasion was witnessed with very different feelings in the
higher ranks of the State. Count Henri Costa, one of the most distinguished of
the senators, had greeted the Revolution with enthusiasm, but he quickly came
to share the views of his intimate friend and fellow-senator Joseph de Maistre.
Till 1789 de Maistre had Seen regarded as one of the most liberal of prominent
Savoyards; but he foresaw the probability of mob rule and rapidly became a
determined opponent of the Revolution. The invasion drove him to Lausanne,
where he issued his Letters of a Savoy Royalist, in which he contrasted the
existing confusion with the calm prosperity of previous years and urged
Savoyards to throw off the French yoke and recall their lawful rulers. But
while de Maistre was asserting that a restoration would not involve reprisals,
the King was busily drawing up a list of names for punishment in the belief
that Austrian arms would before long set him again on his throne. In his
Considerations sur la Frame, published in 1796, de Maistre addressed himself to
a wider audience. Unlike most other anti-revolutionary writers of the time he
carefully distinguished between France and the Revolution. France was and would
remain the chief of nations and the favourite of Providence. The Revolution was
the work of
God, not of men—a punishment for the impiety that France had permitted herself
to adopt. When the sin had been atoned, she would again raise her head; and the
monarchy, and with it order and religion, would be restored. The book became
the Bible of the emigres, and was read by Bonaparte at the moment that his first
victories were turning his thoughts towards the future. But de Maistre had more
hope of a restoration in France than in his own country. Called to Turin in
1797, he found Charles Emmanuel discouraged and vacillating, and in 1798
witnessed his abdication and flight to Sardinia.
At the end of
the eighteenth century, the Swiss Cantons exhibited every form of government
from the most democratic to the most exclusive; but the general tendency had
been in the direction of oligarchy, and revolts had been of frequent
occurrence. The most celebrated of these contests occurred in 1782 in Geneva
(which, though not one of the Cantons, was virtually part of Switzerland) and
was notable as the first political experience of Mallet du Pan and other men
destined to play a leading role in the Revolution. On the other hand a
remarkable intellectual revival had taken place. The Helvetic Society, founded
by Iselin and Gessner in 1762 and joined by men of all races and Churches,
proved a powerful instrument of education, and rendered familiar the idea of
national unity, which was strengthened by the songs of Lavater and the Swiss
History of Johannes Muller.
The opening
scenes of the Revolution were hailed with delight by the Helvetic Society, by
the leading men in German and French Switzerland, and by the exiles of Geneva
and Bern, who formed the Helvetic Club in Paris. Johannes Muller, who was
residing in Mainz, declared the destruction of the Bastille the best event
since the fall of Rome. Lavater took his view of the event from his friends the
Rolands. Pestalozzi was made a citizen and invited to Paris to help in the
reform of education. The arrival of the emigres increased the popular sympathy
with the Revolution. The governments, on the other hand, were for the most part
hostile. The Federal Diet rejected the demand for the recognition of the
Constitution of 1791, protested against the oath imposed on the Swiss regiments
in the service of Louis XVI, and broke off relations on the fall of the
monarchy. It seemed probable that war would break out in 1792. That the
struggle was postponed for six years was due above all to Barthelemy, the
French agent. Though firmly attached to the Revolution, he was opposed to
propaganda, and still more to intervention. Despite the wishes of Dumouriez he
hplrl aloof from Ochs and other democratic leaders, and in 1793 persuaded his
government solemnly to recognise the neutrality of Switzerland. The following
years witnessed a continuation of the constitutional struggle, and the
governments met every demand for reform by repression. The reformers, in
consequence, led by Ochs, the tribune of Basel, and La Harpe,
who had
returned from Russia, adopted the idea of overthrowing the oligarchies with
French help. The Federal spirit was dead, the Cantons were distrustful of each
other, and the democrats were everywhere in active or suppressed revolt. At the
end of 1797 the Directory violated Swiss territory, and in a few weeks the
country was in flames. The panic- stricken governments resigned or were
suppressed. Bern offered defiance to her foreign and domestic foes; but her
troops were tom by dissensions and after a few skirmishes the proud and wealthy
State capitulated. A highly centralised constitution was drawn up by Ochs on
the model of the Directory, privileges were abolished, and feudal burdens were
swept away. But the French quickly discredited their work by shameless
exploitation. La Harpe was appalled by the conduct of the armies he had
summoned, and Lavater and Karl Haller raised their voices against the exactions
of the deliverer. Revolts broke out but were suppressed in blood. A few weeks’
experience had done more to transform Swiss opinion than Mallet du Pan, the
brothers Pictet, and other journalists had accomplished in as many years.
Though Spain
and France were as closely connected as family ties and treaties could make
them, no two peoples differed more sharply in their intellectual outlook. The
reforms of Charles III and his Ministers had never passed from the laws into
the lives of the population, and the power of the Church was unbroken, and
almost uncontested. Ignorant, poor, devoted to the dynasty, the Spaniards cared
much for their religion and their provincial privileges and little for
political liberty or administrative reform. In Spain alone was the Revolution
regarded with dislike from the beginning. The news of the fall of the Bastille
was received with disgust, for Spanish prestige was felt to rest largely on the
Pacte de Famille. Florida Blanca, whom Charles IV had continued in power, ordered
the officers to abstain froih discussing French politics. How little there was
to fear from the contagion of French principles was seen in the autumn of 1789
in the meeting of the Cortes, which proved the most servile that had ever met.
The Inquisition condemned the works of Necker and other French writers, and
foreign newspapers were forbidden. The King was deeply incensed when some of
the Powers recognised the Constitution of 1791, and sent aid to the emigres,
who gathered in Catalonia. Cabarrus was arrested on a charge of conniption, but
really for his democratic and sceptical views. Jovellanos was banished to his
home in the distant Asturias. Campomanes was deprived of his position in the
Council of Castile. The only newspaper allowed to appear in Madrid rigidly
excluded all news from France. Foreigners were forced to swear fidelity to the
King of Spain and the Catholic Faith, and to renounce the protection of their
consuls. The system of repression was continued by Aranda, who succeeded his
political adversary, Florida Blanca, in 1792, and by Godoy, who succeeded
Aranda.
With the
execution of Louis XVI, a near relative of their own monarch, the cry for war
became uncontrollable. Volunteers proffered their services, money poured in,
and an Archbishop offered to raise a regiment of priests for the holy war.
Condorcet had appealed to Spain in 1792 in his Avis aux Espagnols to adopt some
at least of the reforms that had been carried out in France; and the Abbe
Marchena, who had fled from the Inquisition, attempted to organise propaganda
from the south of France. But their appeals fell on deaf ears. The German
traveller Fischer found that the name of Frenchman was used at this time as a
term of reproach; and when the gage of battle was flung down by France in the
spring of 1793 the rejoicing was universal. The reverses which fell on the
Spanish arms during 1793-4 speedily cooled the enthusiasm for the war; and the
Peace of Basel restored the waning popularity of Godoy. But the French alliance
which followed did no more than the French war to inoculate the people with the
principles of the Revolution. French ideas were confined to a handful of men.
Llorente secretly prepared his attack on the Inquisition; and the poets
Quintana and Melendez read their Locke and Condorcet in private. Olavide, who
had been banished by the Inquisition as a Voltairean, was taught by a narrow
escape from the guillotine to abjure his heresies; and his work on the Triumph,
of the Gospel, appearing in 1797, obtained an enormous circulation. Not till
the discussions at Cadiz in 1812 do we hear the unmistakable echo of the voice
of the Revolution.
After the
somewhat violent activity of Pombal and the expulsion of the Jesuits Portugal
had sunk back into torpor. The throne was occupied by Queen Maria, a weak woman
suffering from religious mania. A few of the ideas of the AwfklaruTig had
filtered in through the Masonic lodges, and the students at Coimbra read their
Voltaire and Raynal; but the intellectual life of the nation was at a low ebb,
and the Prince Regent told Beckford that the kingdom belonged to the monks.
In 1789
Portugal was represented in Paris by a Minister who expressed unfeigned
pleasure at the opening scenes of the Revolution, and urged the creation of
local Parliaments and administrative reform. The Foreign Minister allowed the
official Gazette to salute the fall of the Bastille. Copies of the Constitution
of 1791 were sold by French booksellers, the Duke de Lafoes held Masonic
meetings in his palace, and Correa da Serra, the botanist, circulated
democratic literature. But the Queen and the Church were from the beginning
greatly alarmed; and the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon ordered the parish
priests to warn their flocks against French ideas. Diplomatic relations with
France were broken off on the fall of the monarchy; and when Portugal threw in
her lot with Spain and England in the summer of 1793 she yielded to no country
in anti-revolutionary zeal. The Regent was thoroughly
and found an
agent in Manique, the Intendant of Police. The French residents in Lisbon,
mostly respectable merchants, were in many cases imprisoned or expelled, the
houses of the American Minister and consul were watched, and Portugal lay
prostrate at the feet of the terrible Intendant and his spies. The most
distinguished Portuguese writer of the age, Bocage, who had returned in 1790
from a prolonged sojourn in the East, was kept under observation from the
moment of landing. His views were expressed in a powerful sonnet on despotism;
and though he condemned the excesses, and wrote a sympathetic elegy on Marie-
Antoinette, his faith in France survived his imprisonment.
By far the
most remarkable of European rulers contemporary with the Revolution was
Catharine of Russia. In her early years she had studied Plutarch and admired
Montesquieu. In 1767 she summoned a Commission to St Petersburg to codify the
laws, writing with her own hands the long and powerful Instruction for the
Code, so liberal as to be forbidden to circulate in France. She desired the
abolition of serfdom, but found that Russian opinion was not ripe for it. This
period of her life was brought to a close by the revolt of Pugatcheff in 1775.
She still spoke and wrote of her republican soul; but her ideas hardened and
her conduct became more autocratic. She was the friend of the philo- sophes;
but Rousseau was never a favourite, Voltaire cared nothing for political
liberty, and Grimm, her most intimate friend in France and her correspondent
for twenty years, looked with unconcealed contempt on democratic tendencies.
She disapproved of the American Revolution, and spoke contemptuously of
constitutional monarchy. The early acts of the States General alarmed her, and
the fall of the Bastille made her a violent reactionary. On hearing the news of
the October days she foretold the death of the King. The French ambassador
Segur relates in his memoirs that the fall of the Bastille was hailed with
delight except at Court, though he adds that the joy was of short duration. His
statement is not confirmed by other authorities; and it is probable that the
enthusiasm was almost confined to the foreign residents. Russia was a country
without a bourgeoisie-, and the serfs were unaware that a Revolution was going
on at the other end of Europe. The nobles spoke French and enjoyed French
literature; but they had no taste for ideas that threatened their prerogatives.
The young Count Stroganoff, later the Minister of Alexander, was led by his
tutor Romme to embrace French ideas and become a member of the Jacobin Club, and
the Princes Galitzine watched the storming of the Bastille; but they were
exceptions. Karamsin, the eminent historian, paid a long visit to Paris, and
described his impressions in letters which became steadily less hopeful. The
only influence which had in any way prepared Russia for the reception of French
ideas was the Masonic movement, of which Novikoff, the greatest moral and
intellectual force in Russia, was the life and soul. The
Empress had
at first looked on it with favour, but in the crisis of the Revolution she
turned savagely against it. On the fall of the monarchy the French ambassador
was dismissed, Novikoff was imprisoned, the Masonic lodges were closed, and
their publications burned. Radist- cheff, the author of A Journey from St
Petersburg to Moscow, a remarkable plea for the immediate abolition of
serfdom, was exiled to Siberia for an Ode to Liberty attacking the reaction. On
the death of Louis, Catharine took to her bed. French residents were ordered to
swear hatred to the Revolution and fidelity to Louis XVII and the Catholic
religion, on pain of expulsion. The French consul was dismissed, the treaty of
commerce was abrogated, French ships were excluded from the harbours, and
Russian corn was forbidden to be sold to France. The busts of the philosophes
were removed from the galleries of the Hermitage. French ties worn by the
Russian dandies were forbidden, and Marat’s brother, who was living in St
Petersburg, was ordered to change his name. The word republic was excised from
the pieces played at the theatres. In the letters to Grimm constitutionalists
and regicides are involved in indiscriminate condemnation.
In the early
months of 1792 the Empress wrote her Memoir on the French Revolution. She
declared the cause of Louis to be the cause of kings, and asserted that 10,000
men starting from the eastern frontier could reach Paris and restore the power
of the monarchy. She promised to send a small force to cooperate with Sweden in
a descent on Normandy; but the murder of Gustavus occurred before any step was
taken. She had in fact no intention of taking an active part in the war. She
pronounced sentence on the Revolution, but left it to others to execute. Her
plan was to see Austria and Prussia engage themselves irretrievably in the west
and to use the opportunity of seizing what was left of Poland. In her
confidential Russian correspondence with her generals and Ministers the French
Revolution is scarcely mentioned. Not till there was nothing more of Poland to
seize did she determine to send Suvoroff with a large army to the Rhine. A few
weeks later she was dead.
The great
Empress was succeeded by her son Paul, who inherited the anti-Gallican zeal of
his mother without her clear vision and calm judgm it. But a rival influence
began at this moment to make itself felt. The heir to the throne, Alexander,
had been educated by La Harpe, the famous Swiss republican, who had based his
instruction on Plutarch and Tacitus, and taught his pupil to see in the French
Revolution the application of Greek and Roman maxims. The kmzgres tried to
remove this dangerous influence; but Catharine allowed him to remain till 1795.
How great was his influence over the impressionable mind of his pupil is known
to us from the graphic memoirs of Adam Czartoryski. The young prince rejoiced
in the establishment of the French Republic and the success of French arms,
declared republicanism the only reasonable form of government, and detested the
policy and atmosphere of his father’s
Court. While
the Emperor pursued his mad career his heir was engaged in discussions with
Czartoryski, Stroganoff, and a few other young and ardent reformers. Though in
later life Alexander fell under other influences his complex character never
lost the imprint of the experiences and counsellors of his youth.
A few weeks
after the fall of the Bastille Poland set to work to remedy the defects which
had brought her so near destruction; and in 1791 the Constitution, which won
the praise of Burke and Fox alike, was completed. Its cardinal feature was the
strengthening of the executive power; and indeed it approximated more to
English than to French models. But the instrument which might have saved Poland
was forged too late, and was denounced by Catharine and Frederick William II as
the work of Jacobins. The leading Polish patriots were certainly imbued with
French ideas. Kollontai, the principal author of the Constitution,
distinguished as an educationalist, statesman, and orator, made his house the
rendezvous of advanced thinkers, and believed that the reform of the government
must be followed by the abolition of serfdom. Kosciusko had read French
philosophy and was presented with French citizenship. Potocki, a Polish
Girondin, had lived much abroad and had brought back an enthusiasm for the
Rights of Man. The early teaching of Adam Czartoryski had been entirely
republican. But the direct share of France in Polish affairs was
inconsiderable. Her ambassador was dismissed after the fall of the monarchy;
and the Court of Stanislas joined that of Catharine in mourning the death of
the King. The first act of the national Government of 1794 was to send a
mission to the Convention; but France was unable to avert the final
catastrophe, and the fortunes of the two races were not closely blended till
the Polish Legions, formed out of the remnants of the patriots, took service in
the French army.
In the
straggle between the Austrian Netherlands and the Emperor Joseph the party of
tradition was reinforced by a body of men under the leadership of Francis
Vonck, penetrated with democratic ideas and touched with religious scepticism.
Hating Austria no less than the followers of van der Noot, they demanded the
suppression of privileges and the extension of the franchise. On the collapse
of the imperial power they demanded a constitution in which the Third Estate
should have double representation. Van der Noot turned savagely against his
former allies, the clergy denounced them to the people as disciples of
Voltaire, and the Vonckists only escaped death by flight to France, where they
agitated for the establishment of a Belgian republic on the French model.
Jemappes opened the country to French arms ; but the elections that followed
showed that the majority were opposed to the introduction of French methods of
government, and still more to the idea of union
with France.
When Belgium was conquered a second time in 1795 the French officials reported
the people to be willing to accept the rule of France if their religious
feelings were not outraged. But with incredible stupidity the French suppressed
religious Houses, forbade ecclesiastical dress, and made no effort to conceal
their scorn for the religious sentiments of the people. Indifference passed
into dislike, and dislike into indignation when the aged Cardinal Franckenberg,
Archbishop of Malines, the most honoured figure in the country, was arrested in
1797 and hurried across the frontier. In the following year the peasants
refused to fight for an unchristian Republic. The revolt was suppressed, large
numbers of priests were banished, and the Consulate had to begin the work of
conciliation in a disaffected country. The chief result of the Revolution had
been to intensify the attachment of the Belgians to their Church.
Since his
restoration by Prussian arms in 1787 the Prince of Orange had shown himself
more and more despotic. Most of the leaders of the unsuccessful revolt had
taken refuge in France, and among these exiles the Revolution found
enthusiastic supporters. Two thousand volunteers came forward to serve with
Dumouriez, and Batavian Committees were formed in Antwerp and Paris. The easy
conquest of Belgium determined France to invade the Netherlands, and war was
declared on the same day as against England. French propaganda was meanwhile
carried on actively in the clubs and literary societies in Leyden, Utrecht, and
Amsterdam; and, when the invasion took place in 1795, the power of resistance
had been undermined. The character of the Revolution had been already modified
by Thermidor, and Camot issued strict orders against exploitation. The army
used its victory with moderation, and abuses were prevented by the efforts of
Paulus and Schimmelpenninck in Rotterdam and Amsterdam respectively. The
Stadholderate and the old constitution of the Estates were abolished and the
Rights of Man were officially recognised. Roman Catholics and Jews received
full political rights, and the independence of the Batavian Republic was
guaranteed by France. The revolution was carried out so quietly, partly because
there were no wealthy and idle noblesse and no richly endowed and reactionary
Church to attack, and partly owing to the moderation of the Dutch leaders. But
the most difficult work was yet to be done. A national assembly met in 1796
under the presidency of Paulus; but nearly half the country remained true to
the House of Orange, while the adherents of the new order were divided between
unitary and federal views. A constitution modelled on the Directory was
rejected in 1797, and a series of coup d’Uats was carried out by Daendels. But
the Orange party was prevented from gaining adherents by the uncompromising
views of the Prince. Not till Schimmelpenninck became Grand Pensionary in 1805,
did the countiy enjoy a respite from internal strife.
788
Denmark.—Sweden.
The
revolutionary decade was not a period of distinction in Dutch literature. By
far the most eminent writer of the time was Bilderdyck, who in a series of odes
implored the people to believe that true freedom was only to be found under a
good monarch. When the French invasion occurred Bilderdyck refused the oath to
the Rights of Man and was banished.
At the
outbreak of the Revolution the government of Denmark was one of the best in
Europe. The work of Struensee was continued by the Crown Prince Frederick, who
took over the reins of power from his imbecile father in 1784, and by his
Minister Bemstorff. Serfdom was abolished on the Crown lands, and in 1792
Denmark led the way in forbidding the slave-trade within her dominions. The
policy of the Regent was one of strict neutrality; and the reverberation of the
Revolution was faint. A few writers were carried away by enthusiasm. Steffens,
a brilliant young Norwegian, formed a Jacobin club in Copenhagen; but he never
ceased to revere the royal House. The elder Heiberg and Malte-Brun, afterwards
famous as a geographer, were banished for attacking the institutions of their
country with unmeasured violence in verse and in their journals. The most
eminent writer of the time, Jens Baggesen, observed greater moderation. He
realised that the Revolution could only be the beginning of emancipation, and
he wrote a Hymn to Freedom, to be swig cufler God knows how many centuries. In
his noble poem The Revolution, written in 1793, he drew a striking picture of
the tempest, but declared that it would bring peace and freedom. But the Terror
called forth a powerful ode, To the Furies, and Baggesen doubted for a moment
whether the sun would ever return. The Revolution was also followed with
sympathy by a small group of men in Holstein, mostly connected with the University
of Kiel. The leading spirits were Ehlers and Cramer, the latter of whom was
dismissed from his chair in 1794 and settled in Paris. Rist, the well-known
diplomatist, relates in his autobiography that he at first wished to enlist
under Brunswick, but that his opinions were changed by the study of pamphlets.
In the circle of Carsten Niebuhr, the famous traveller, we meet Thibaut the
jurist and other partisans of French ideas, though the host and his son were
strongly opposed to them from the beginning.
In no country
did French literary models hold such unquestioned sway as in Sweden. But,
though his visit to Paris in 1771 had left an ineffaceable impression on his
memory, Gustavus strongly condemned the Revolution from the beginning. On
hearing of the summons of the States General he declared that the King had
thereby lost his throne, and perhaps his life. The courtiers complained that
all other topics had been driven from conversation at the royal table. He at
once offered the emigres an asylum, and issued orders to exclude any
ship flying
the tricolour from Swedish harbours. The ambassador in Paris, de Stael, a Mason
and a friend of the philosophers, urged his master to recognise the new
government. But Gustavus, who had determined to be the leader of an
anti-revolutionary crusade, recalled de Stael and appointed Fersen, whose ideas
of the crisis coincided with his own. The murder of the King in 1792 led to a
complete change. The Regent, the Duke of Sudermania, was under the influence of
Reuterholm, a disciple of Rousseau. The liberty of the press was restored and a
rapprochement was effected with France. But when the young King attained his
majority in 1796, Reuterholm was banished; and the ideas of Gustavus III once
more prevailed.
Swedish
literature under the leadership of Kellgren was too exclusively concerned with
questions of form to occupy itself with weightier problems. The only writer who
represented the world-wide conflict of ideas was Thorild, equally distinguished
as journalist and poet. For some years he had agitated for an increase of
political liberty, and in 1788-9 he had paid a long visit to England and
studied its constitution. Deeply imbued with Rousseauism, he advocated the
burning of cities as the nurseries of vice, and the formation of small
communities scattered through the country districts, the States grouping
themselves into a world republic. The Revolution was hailed as the moment for
the accomplishment of these changes, a Divine act, the most solemn
manifestation of God’s power since the Flood.
The
Revolution was followed with eager interest in the Balkan peninsula. Greek
students from the universities of France and Greek merchants engaged in the
carrying trade to Marseilles, brought back French ideas. As victory followed
victory Greek patriots turned their eyes from Russia to France. A revolt was
planned by Rhegas, in consultation with the French ambassador at Vienna; but
the arrest and execution of the great poet put an end for a time to the idea of
a rising. But the seed had been sown; and at a later period Kolokotronis
declared that the Revolution had taught him that the time to strike for freedom
was at hand.
In addition
to the strictly contemporary effects of the Revolution already indicated, its
operation is to be traced in the revival of Roman Catholicism. In one respect
the Revolution was the culmination of the Aufklarung, the principal aim and
result of which had been to diminish the power of the Church. The suppression
of the Jesuits was a public confession of impotence, and since the Reformation
its prestige had never been lower. During the Revolution de Maistre declared
that, though directed against Catholicism and in favour of democracy, its
result would be exactly the contrary. The immediate consequence of French propaganda
was to give current^ to a purely secular view of
life, and in
its ultimate effect it has acted as a powerful solvent of every form of belief;
but its intermediate result was that foretold by de Maistre. The Papacy won
back its power by suffering. The forcible deportation of the aged Pope, Pius
VI, in 1797 may be taken as the beginning of the revival; and the violence of
the attack on religion in France and in the countries that she overran
strengthened the reaction. The conclusion of the Concordat was merely the
recognition of a change that had already occurred. After a period during which
no belief and no institution had passed unchallenged, the principle of
authority regained its place. The emotional appeal was made in Chateaubriand’s
Genie du Christianisme, and the appeal to reason received its classic
expression a few years later in de Maistre’s work Du Pape.
To the
Revolution is also due the extension of the principle of equality in new
directions. The conception of common citizenship, which was the practical side
of the doctrine, made it impossible to maintain the disabilities of the Jews.
Their case had been eloquently stated by Lessing and Dohm before 1789; but it
is to the Revolution, to Mirabeau and Gregoire, to the march of the French armies,
that the Jews look back as the sighal for their emancipation. Equally
impossible was it to tolerate slavery. While the English abolitionists were
largely animated by religious feeling, the men who founded the Societe des Amis
des Nows approached the problem from the standard of human equality. The
Constitutional Assembly chivalrously declared the slaves in French possessions
to be citizens of France; and, though the dread of Jacobinism retarded
abolition, its ultimate triumph owed much to the world-wide currency of French
ideas. In the third place the Revolution marks a turning-point in the history
of women. Though the National Assembly refused to receive a petition for female
suffrage, the conception of equality could not fail to lead to the demand for equal
treatment and equal opportunities for the sexes. Their case was fully stated by
Hippel and Mary Wolstonecraft, and supported by Condorcet, Friedrich Schlegel,
Bentham, and other thinkers, in whose writings most of the legal and social
changes that have been effected were foreshadowed. And finally the principle of
equality gave an immense impetus to socialism. The nationalisation of the land
appears frequently in the pamphlets of the Revolutionary era; and with the
conspiracy of Babeuf socialism ceased to be merely a speculative doctrine and
became a political programme. But more important than any direct advocacy was
the effect of the sudden changes of ownership and the attack on the idea of the
sacredness of property. It is in the socialist movement that the operation of
the ideas promulgated by the French Revolution is most clearly traceable at the
present time.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Deschiens. Collection de Materiaux pour l’hist. de la Revolution.
Bibliogr. des Journaux. Paris. 1829.
Hatin, E. Bibliographic de la Presse p£riodique franfaise. Paris.
1866. Kircheisen, F. A bibliography of Napoleon. London.
1902.
Lumbroso, A. Bibliografia Ragionata dell’ Epoca Napoleonica. Rome. 1895
etc. In progress
Toumeux, M. Les Sources Bihliographiques de 1’Histoire de la Revolution
Franfaise. Paris. 1898 etc. In progress.
Bibliographic de 1’Histoire de Paris pendant
la Revolution. Paris. 1890 etc.
In progress.
Tuetey, A. Repertoire des Sources Manuscrites de l’Histoire de Paris
pendant la Revolution. Paris. 1890 etc. In progress.
II. WORKS ON CONTEMPORARY FRENCH AND EUROPEAN
HISTORY.
Alison, Sir
A. History of Europe during the French Revolution. 10 vols.
Edinburgh.
1833-42.
Arnault, N.
V. and others. Biographic universelle des Contemporains (from 1789).
20 vols. Paris. 1820-5.
Aulard, F. A. Les Orateurs de la Legislative et de la Convention. 2
vols. Paris. 1885-6.
Histoire Politique de la Revolution Franfaise.
Paris. 1901.
Biographic Universelle. Ancienne et Modeme. 55 vols. Paris. 1811-33.
Biographie Moderne, ou Dictionnaire historique des hommes qui se sont fait un
nom.
4 vols. Leipzig. 1802.
Bire, E. Legendes Revolutionnaires. Paris. 1893.
Bourein, E. and Challamel, J. B. M. A. Dictionnaire de la Revolution
Francaise. Paris. 1893.
Buchez, P. J. B. and Roui, P. C. Histoire Parlementaire de la Revolution
Franfaise. 40
vols. Paris. 1834-8.
Carlyle, T.
The French Revolution. 3 vols. London. 1837. Ed. C. R. L. Fletcher, with
Introduction, notes, and appendices. 3 vols. London.
1902. Ed. J. H. Rose. 2 vols. London. 1902.
Cherest, A. La chute de l’ancien regime. 3 vols. Paris. 1884-6.
Cheruel, P. A. Dictionnaire historique des institutions, moeurs, et
coutumes de la France. 2 vols. Paris. 1899.
Croker, J. W.
Essays on the French Revolution. London. 1857.
Dayot, A. La Revolution Franfaise; Constituante, Legislative,
Convention, Directoire, d’apres des peintures, sculptures, gravures, medailles,
objets du temps. Palis. 1896. •
Deux Amis de la Liberte. Histoire de la Revolution de 1789 et de
l’Etablissement d’une Constitution en France. Vols. i-vii, by F. M. Kerverseau and Clavelin. Vols. vm-xvin,
Histoire de la Revolution de France (mainly written by V. Lombard de Laugres
and D. Leriquet: vols. xvx and xvn being by Caignard de Mailly). 19
vols. Paris. 1792-1803.
Dictionary of
National Biography. Edd. L. Stephen and S. Lee. 69 vols.
London. 1885-1901.
Droz, F. X. I. Histoire du Regne de Louis XVI pendant les annees ou l’on
pouvait prevenir ou diriger la Revolution Fran9aise. 3 vols. Paris. 1854.
Duvergier de Hauranne, P. Histoire du Gouvemement parlementaire en France
1814-48. 10 vols. Paris. 1857-72.
Hausser, L. Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur
Griindung des deutschen Bundes. 4 vols. Berlin. 1859-60.
Heigel, C. T. von. Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis
zur Auflosung des alten Reichs. Stuttgart.
1899.
Helie, F. A. T. Les Constitutions de la France. Paris. 2 vols. 1875-9.
Lacretelle (le jeune), J. C. D. Histoire de la France pendant le xvrn* Siecle.
6 vols. Paris. 1819.
Lalanne, L. Dictionnaire historique de la France. Paris. 1872.
Lavisse, E.
and Rambaud, A. N. Histoire Generale. Vol. viii.
Paris. 1896. Lecky, W. E. H. A History of England during the eighteenth
century. 7 vols. London. 1892.
Martin, B. L. H. Histoire de France depuis 1789 jusqu’a nos jours. 8 vols. Paris. 1878-85.
Mayer, J. Die Franzos.-Spanische Allianz, 1796-1807. 2 vols. Linz. 1895-6. Michelet, J. Histoire de la Revolution Franfaise. 9 vols. Paris. 1879.
Mignet, F. A. M. Histoire de la Revolution Franfaise. 2 vols. Paris.
1861. Montgaillard, G. H. Rocques de. Histoire de France depuis la fin du regne
de Louis XVI jusqu’a l’annee 1825. 9 vols. Paris. 1827.
Nouvelle Biographie Generale depnis les temps les plus recules jusqu’a
nos jours.
46 vols. Paris. 1855-66.
Robinet, J. F. E. Dictionnaire de la Revolution et de l’Empire. 2 vols.
Paris. 1899.
Rocquain, F. L’esprit revolutionnaire avant la Revolution. Paris.
1878.
Rose, J. H.
The revolutionary and Napoleonic era (Camb. Hist.
Series). Cambridge. 1901.
Sagnac, P. H. La Legislation Civile de la Revolution, 1789-1804. Essai
d’histoire sociale. Paris. 1898.
Schmidt, W. A. Tableaux de la Revolution Franchise publies sur les
papiers inedits du departement et de la police secrete de Paris. 3 vols.
Leipzig. 1867-71.
Paris pendant la Revolution d’apres les
rapports de la police secrete, 17891800. 4 vols.
Paris. 1880-94.
Seeley, (Sir)
J. R. Life and Times of Stein. 3 vols. Cambridge. 1878.
Smyth, W.
Lectures on the French Revolution. 3 vols.
Cambridge. 1840. Sorel, A. L’Europe et la Revolution Fran^aiae. 6 vols. Paris.
1885-1903 etc. Stael-Holstein, A. L. G. de, Mme. Considerations sur les
principaux evenemen^ de la Revolution. 3 vols.
London. 1819.
Stephens, H.
Morse. European History, 1789-1815. (Periods of Europ. Hist.) London. 1900.
The principal speeches of the Statesmen and
Orators of the French Revolution.
2 vols. Oxford.
1892.
Sybel, H. von. Geschichte der Revolutionzeit von 1789 bis 1800. 6
vols.
Stuttgart.
1853-79. Translated by W. C. Perry. 4 vols.
London. 1867-9. Taine, H. A. Les Origines de la France Contemporaine. La
Revolution. 6 vols. Paris. 1876-94. The Revolution. Trans. J. Durand. 4 vols.
London. 1876-85.
Thiers, L. A. Histoire de la Revolution Franijaise. 2
vols. Paris. 1882. Translated by F. Schoberl. 5
vols. London. 1881.
Toulongeon, F. E. de. Histoire de France depuis la Revolution de 1789. 7 vols. Paris. 1801-10.
Wachsmuth, W. Geschichte Frankreichs im Revolutionszeitalter. (Gesch. d.
europ. Staaten.) Vols. i and u. Hamburg. 1840-2,
PERIODICALS.
La Revolution Fran^aise; Revue historique. Vols. i-xi. Ed. A. Dide, Vols. hi, etc. Ed. F. A. Aulard. Paris. 1881 etc. In progress.
Revue de la Revolution Franyaise. Edd. C.
d’Hericault and G. Bord. 16 vols. Paris.
1883-9.
MAPS AND PLANS.
De Maries, J. Paris ancien et modeme. 3 vols. Paris. 1838.
Duvotenay, T. Atlas pour servir a I’intelligence des campagnes de la
Revolution Franchise de Thiers. Paris. 1880.
Faucou, L. Plan de la ville de Paris en 1789. Dresse sous la direction
d’A. Renaud et Hocherau. Paris. (Decreed 1887.)
Plan de la ville de Paris. Periode
Revolutionnaire (1790-4). Dresse
sous la direction d’A. Renaud et Hocherau. Paris.
(Decreed 1887-)
[Both based
on the plan of E. Vemiquet, mde infra."]
Paris a travers les ages. Aspects successifs des monuments et quartiers
historiques de Paris depuis le xinma siecle jusqu’a nos jours,
fidelement restitues d’apres les documents authentiques par F. Hoffbauer. Texte
par & Fournier, P. Lacroix, A. de Montaiglon, A. Bonnadot, J. Cousin,
Franklin, V. Dufour, etc. 14 vols. Paris. 1875-82.
Vemiquet, E. Atlas du Plan General de la Ville de Paris. Paris. 1795.
THE REPUBLICAN CALENDAR.
Almanach National de France. Paris. 1693 etc. In progress.
L’Art de verifier les dates depuis 1770 jusqu’a nos jours. Vol.
v. i-xvi. Paris. 1821-44.
PHILOSOPHY
AND THE REVOLUTION.
A. NOTABLE WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND KINDRED
SUBJECTS IN THE AGE PRECEDING THE REVOLUTION.
Abeille, L. P. Reflexions sur la police des grains. Paris. 1764.
Argenson, R. L. de Voyer de Paulmy, Marquis de. Considerations sur le
gouverne- ment ancien et present de la France. Amsterdam.
1765. Reprinted. Paris. 1784 and 1787.
Journal et m£moires. Ed. E. J. B. Rathery. 9
vols. Paris. 1859-67.
dayle, P. CEuvres diverges. 4 vols. The Hague. 1727-31.
The best edition of the Dictionary is the reprint in 16 vols. Paris. 1820-4.
Boncerf, P. F. Les inconvenients des droits feodaux. Paris. 1776.
Boulainvilliers, H., Comte de Histoire de l’ancien gouvernement de
France.
3 vols. TTie Hague. 1727.
L’l^tat de France, etc. 3 vols. Rouen. 1773.
Cantillon, R. Essai sur la nature du commerce en general. London. 1755.
Diderot, D. CEuvres. 22 vols. 8vo. Paris. 1821. [The complete edition of his
works.]
and d’Alembert, J. Le R.
Encyclopedic; par une soci£t£ de gens de lettres.
17 vols. Paris. Neufchatel 1751-65. Supplement. 4 vols. Amsterdam.
1776-7.
Dupin, C. Memoire sur les Bleds. Paris. 1748.
[First tract advocating free trade in corn. Dupin was a
publican.]
Dupont de Nemours, P S. Reflexions sur la richesse de 1’lHtat. Paris.
1763.
Physiocratie. Leyden. 1767-8. (Articles by
Quesnay edited by Dupont.)
[Hence the
name of “physiocrats ” given by J. B. Say to the economists.] Galiani, F. Dialogue sur le commerce des bleds. London. 1770.
Correspondance, publiee par G. Maugras. 2
vols. Paris. 1884.
Grimm, Baron F. M. Correspondance litteraire, philosophique et critique
de Grimm et de Diderot depuis 1753 presqu’en 1790. 15 vols. Paris 1829-31.
Helv£tius, C. A. CEuvres. 14 vols. Paris. 1795.
[Holbach, Baron P. H. O. von, under pseudonym of] Mirabaud. Systeme de
la nature. Paris. 1770. Best edition. 2 vols. Paris. 1821.
Le Trosne, G. F. Traits de 1’administration provinciale et de la r£forme
de l’impot.
1770. Re-edited. 2 vols. Basel. 1788.
De l'ordre social. Paris. 1777
Mably, G.
Bonnot de, Abbd. Entretiens de Phocion sur le rapport de la morale avec
la politique. 1763.
Observations sur l’histoire de France. Paris.
1765.
Doutes sur l’ordre naturel des Soci£t£s The
Hague. 1768.
Mably, G.
Bonnot de, Abbe. De 1’etude de l’histoire. Paris. 1778.
(These works,
which contain his social and political theories, are republished in the edition
of his collected works. 15 vols. Paris. 1794-5.)
Mercier de la Riviere, F. F. J. H. L’ordre naturel et essentiel des
soci^tes poli- tiques. London. 1767.
Mirabean, V. Riquetti de, Marquis. L’Ami des hommes. 3 vols. Avignon.
1756.
Theorie de l’impot. Paris. 1760.
Philosophic Rurale. Amsterdam. 1764.
Les dconomiques. Amsterdam. 1769.
Lettres £conomiques. Amsterdam. 1770.
Montesquieu, Baron C. Secondat de. Lettres persanes. Paris. 1721.
Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur
et de la decadence des Romaics.
Paris. 1734.
L’Esprit des Lois. Geneva. 1748.
(The best
edition of Montesquieu is that by Laboulaye. 5
vols. Paris. 1876-9.)
Morellet, A. Lettres sur la police des grains. Paris. 1764.
Morelly. Le Prince, les delices du coeur, ou traits des qualit£s d’un
grand roi.
2 vols. Amsterdam. 1751.
Les Basiliades ou Les ties flottantes du
cflebre.Pilpa'i, traduit de l’lndien.
Paris. 1753.
Code de la nature. Amsterdam.
1755. Reprinted. Paris. 1841.
Quesnay, F.
Articles “Fermier” and “Grains” in the Encyclopedie.
Tableau oeconomique. 1758. Reprinted by the
British Economic Association. 1894.
Raynal, G. T. F. Histoire du Parlement d’Angleterre. Paris. 1748.
Histoire philosophique et politique des Indes.
Publ.
anonymously. “Amsterdam” [Paris]. 1771. With author’s name. 4 vols. Geneva. 1780. Rousseau, J. J. Discours sur les sciences et les
arts 1750. Discours sur l’in£galite 1754. Econoraie Politique (article in the
Encyclopedie) 1754. Emile 1761. Contrat Social 1762. Lettres 6crites de la
montagne 1765. Considerations sur le gouvemementde Pologne 1772. Best edition
of collected works: CEuvres, avec des notes, etc. Ed. V. D. de Musset-Pathay.
20 vols. Paris. 1827. Saint-Pierre, C. I. Castel de, Abbg. Discours sur la
Polysynodie. Amsterdam. 1719.
Projet de paix perpetuelle. 3 vols. Utrecht.
1713.
Memoire sur les pauvres mendiants. 1724.
1- Annales Politiques. 2
vols. London. 1757.
CEuvres. 16 vols. Rotterdam. 1738-41.
Turgot, A. R. J., Baron de l’Aulne. Etude sur Gournay. 1752.
Lettres sur la tolerance civile. Paris. 1754.
Reflexions sur la formation et la distribution
des richesses. Paris. 1766.
Memoire sur les prets a interet et sur
l’usure. 1769.
Lettres sur la liberte du
commerce des grains. Paris. 1771.
CEuvres. 9 vols. Paris. 1808-11.
Correspondance ine'dite de
Turgot et de Condorcet. Ed. C. Henry. Paris.
1882. '
Vauban, S. Le Prestre de, Marshal. Dime royale. Paris. 1707. Reprinted
in Guillaumin’s Petite Bibliotheque Economique.
Voltaire, F. M. Arouet de. Lettres philosophiques, ou Lettres Rentes de
Londres sur les Anglais. Amsterdam. 1734.
Zadig ou La Destinee, Histoire onentale.
Nancy. 1748.
La voix du sage et du peuple. “Amsterdam chez
le Sincere." Paris. 1750.
Le Micromegas. London. 1752.
Candide, ou L’Optimisme. Geneva. 1759.
Voltaire, F. M. Arouet de. Essay sur l’histoire generale et sur les
moeurs et l’esprit des nations depuis Charlemagne jusqu’a nos jours. Paris.
1756.
Idees republicaines par un membre d’un corps
(No place or date. Geneva.
Sermon des Cinquantes. (No place and dated
1749. Geneva. 1762.)
Traite sur la tolerance. Geneva. 1763.
Dictionnaire philosophique “ London ”
[Geneva]. 1764.
Relation de la mort du chevalier de la Barre,
par M. Cars***, avocat au
Conseil du Roi, a M. le Marquis de Beccaria. 15 Juillet, 1766.
Avis an public sur les parricides imputes aux
Calas et aux Sirven. Geneva.
1766.
Commentaire sur le livre des delits et des
peines par un avocat de province.
Geneva. 1766.
L’Ingenu. “ Utrecht ” [Geneva], 1767.
L’homme aux qnarante ecus. Geneva. 1768.
La Princesse de Babilone. Geneva. 1768.
L’A. B. C. Dialogue curieux traduit de
1’Anglais & Londres chez Robert
Freeman. 1762. Geneva. 1768.
L’histoire du Parlement. Geneva. 1769.
Dieu et les hommes. CEuvre theologique mais
raisonnable par le docteur
Oberst, traduit par Jacques Aimon. “Berlin” [Geneva]. 1769.
Histoire de Jenni. “London” [Geneva], 1775.
La Bible, enfin expliquee par plusieurs
aumoniers de S. M. L. R. D. P
“London”
[Geneva]. 1776.
To understand
fully Voltaire’s views on theological, political, and social questions, it is
also necessary to read his correspondence, and especially that with d’Alembert.
Collection des principaux Economistes. Guillaumin. Paris. 1843-8. Vol.
i. Economistes financiers du xviii® siecle.
Vol.
n. Physiocrates. Vols. in and iv. (Euvres de Turgot.
B. WORKS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL WRITERS.
Le Marquis d’Argenson. E. Zevort. Paris. 1880.
D’Argenson, economiste. A. Alem. Paris. 1900.
D’Argenson C. A. Sainte-Beuve. Causeries du Lundi, xn. 93—xiv. 238. 16 vols. Paris. 1882-5.
Melchior Grimm. E. H. A. Scherer. Paris. 1887.
Montesquieu. A. Sorel. (Grands Ecrivains series.) Paris. 1887.
Histoire de Montesquieu, sa vie et ses oeuvres L Vian. Paris. 1878.
Jjjloge de Montesquieu. A. F. Villemain. Paris. 1816.
Commentaire sur “l’esprit des lois” de Montesquieu. A. L. C. Destutt de
Tracy. Paris. 1819.
Montesquieu et la thlorie du gouvernement. H. Barckhausen. Bordeaux. 1900. Die Darstellung der franzosischen Zustande in
Montesquieu’s Lettres persanes verglichen mit der Wirklichkeit. Marcus. Breslau. 1902.
Montesquieu. Etudes sur le xvin6 siecle. P. E. Bersot. Paris.
1855. Montesquieu. C. A. Sainte-Beuve. Causeries du Lundi, vn. 41.
Histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de J.-J. Rousseau. V. D. de
Musset-Pathay.
2 vols. Paris. 1822.
J.-J. Rousseau, sa vie et ses ouvrages. Saint-Marc Girardin. 2 vols. 1875.
J.-J. Rousseau, sein Lehen und seine Werke. Bockerhoff. 3 vols. Leipzig.
1863. Rousseau. J. Morley. 2 vols. London. 1886.
La vie et les oeuvres de J.-J. Rousseau. H. Beaudouin. Paris. 1891.
J.-J. Rousseau. A. Chuquet. Paris. 1893. (Grands Illcrivains series.)
Natural
Rights. D. G. Ritchie. Chs. i. n. in. London. 1895.
J.-J. Rousseau’s Sozialphilosophie. F. Haymann. Leipzig. 1898.
Die Staatstheorie des Contrat Social. M. liepmann. Halle. 1896.
Rechtsphilosophie des J.-J. Rousseau. M. Liepmann. Berlin. 1898.
Origines des idees politiques de J.-J. Rousseau. J. Vuij. Geneva. 1889.
J.-J. Rousseau juge par les Genevois d’aujourd’hui. Geneva. 1879.
J.-J. Rousseau. C. A. Sainte-Beuve. Causeries du Lundi, n. 63—hi. 78—xv. 223. 16 vols. Paris. 1882-6.
fitude sur la vie et les Merits de l’Abb6 de Saint-Pierre. E. Goumy.
Paris. 1859. L’Abbe de Saint-Pierre. C. A. Sainte-Beuve. Causeries du Lundi,
xv. 246.
Der Abbe de Saint-Pierre. E. Hertz.
Preuss. Jahrbiicher. Vol. un Berlin. Nov. and Dec. 1888.
Voltaire et la societe francaise au xvm* siecle. G. Desnoiresterres. 7 vols. Paris. 1867-75.
Voltaire’s Leben und Werke. R. Mahrenholtz. 2 vols. Oppeln. 1885.
Voltaire. J.
Morley. London. 1886.
Voltaire. K.
Rosenkranz. Leipzig. 1874.
Voltaire. E. Champion. 2nd edition. Paris. 1897.
The Life of
Voltaire. S. G. Tallentyre. London. 1903.
Voltaire und Rousseau in ihrer sozialen Bedeutung. J. B. Meyer. Berlin.
1856. Voltaire. Sechs Vortrage von D. F. Strauss. Leipzig. 1870.
Lettre sur le centenaire de Voltaire par F. Dupanloup. Paris. 1878.
Voltaire-studien. K. Mayer. Wien. 1879.
Voltaire et le Voltairisme. J. F. Nourisson. Paris. 1879.
Voltaire et la philosophic du xvni” siecle. H. Martin. Paris. 1878.
Choiseul et Voltaire. P. Calmettes. Paris. 1902.
Voltaire. C. A. Sainte-Beuve. Causeries du Lundi, n.
208-266—in. 105—xin. 1 and xv. 29.
C. WORKS ON THE ECONOMISTS.
Les ^conomistes fran^ais du xvm8 siecle. L. de Lavergne.
Paris. 1870.
Histoire des doctrines £conomiques. A. Espinas. Paris. 1891.
Etudes sur les principaux economistes. G. du Puynode. Paris. 1868.
The Physiocrats. H. Higgs. London. 1897.
Du maxime “ Laissez faire et laissez passer." W. Oncken. Berne.
1886.
Dupont de Nemours et l’ecole physiocratique. G. Schelle. Paris. 1888.
Vincent de Gournay. G. Schelle. Paris. 1897.
Les doctrines economiques et sociales du Marquis de Mirabeau dans “L’ami
des hommes.” L. Brocard. Paris. 1902.
L’abbe de Mably. V. I. Guerrier. Paris. 1886.
Les Mirabeau. L. de Lomenie. Vol. n. Paris. 1879.
Quesnay et la Physiocratie. Yves Guyot. Paris. 1896.
Introduction aux oeuvres de Quesnay. A. Oncken.
Paris and Frankfort. 1888. Turgot. L. Say. (Grands £crivains series.) Paris.
1887.
Vie de
Turgot. M. J. A. N. Caritat de Condorcet (vol. v of his works, edition 1804).
20 vols. Paris. 1804.
Turgot. J.
Morley. Critical Miscellanies. Vol. n. London. 1886.
La philosophie de Turgot. A. Mastier. Paris. 1862.
Turgot et ses doctrines. A. Neymarck. 2 vols. Paris. 1885.
D. WORKS ON THE ENCYCLOPEDISTS.
Les Encyclopedistes. L. Ducros. Paris. 1891.
Les Encyclopedistes, leurs travaux, leurs doctrines et leur influence. P.
Duprat. Paris. 1866.
Diderot and
the Encyclopaedists. J. Morley. 2 vols. London.
1886.
Diderot. Jjtude par E. H. A. Scherer. Paris. 1880.
Diderot’s Leben und Werke. K. Rosenkranz. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1866.
Diderot. C. A. Sainte-Beuve. Causeries du Lundi, ni. 293.
Portraits littdraires, i.
3 vols. Paris. 1862-4.
Diderot. J. Reinach. (Grands IScrivains series.) Paris. 1894.
Diderot et Catherine II. M. Toumeux. Paris. 1899.
Diderot. L.
Ducros. Paris. 1894.
E. WORKS
DEALING GENERALLY WITH THE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY IN
FRANCE.
Aubertin, C. L’esprit public au xviii'
siecle. £tude sur les m&noires et les correspondances politiques des
contemporains, 1715-89. Paris. 1872.
Barni, J. Histoire des idees morales et politiques en France au xvme
siecle. 3 vols. Paris. 1865-73.
Barruel, A. Memoires pour servir a l’histoire du Jacobinisme. 4
parts. London.
1797-8. ‘
Bosanquet, B.
Philosophical theory of the State. London. 1903.
Brunetiere, F. Etudes critiques sur l’histoire de la litterature
franfaise. 7 vols. Paris. 1881-90.
Cournot, A. A. Considerations sur la marche des id£es. 2 vols. Paris.
1872. Cousin, V. Histoire de la philosophie du xvme siecle. 2 vols.
Paris. 1840. Espinas, A. La philosophie sociale du xvme siecle et la
Revolution. Paris. 1891. Faguet, E. Le dix-huitieme siecle. Strides
litteraires. Paris. 1890.
Hettner, H. A. T. Literaturgeschichte des achtzehnten Jabrhunderts. Part n.
3 vols.
Brunswick. 1894.
Honegger, J. J. Kritische Geschichte der franzosischen Cultureinfliisse. Berlin. 1875.
Janet, P. Histoire de la philosophie morale et politique dans
l’antiquite et les temps modernes. 2 vols. 3rd ed. Paris.
1882.
Koch, E. Beitrage zur Geschichte der politischen Ideen. Vol. u. Demokratie. 1896.
Lanfrey, P. L’^glise et les philosophes au xviii6 siecle.
Paris. 1879.
Mallet du Pan, J. F. Du degre d’influence qu’a eu la philosophie
francoise sur la Revolution. Mercure Britannique, vol. n. 5 vols. London.
1788-1800. Michel, H. L’idee de l’Etat. 3rd ed. Paris. 1896.
Mohl, R. von. Geschichte und Literatur der Staatswissenschaften. 3 vols. Erlangen. 1855-8.
Mounier, J. J. De l’influence attribute aux Philosophes, aux
Francs-Mafons, et aux Illumines sur la Revolution de France. Paris. 1822.
Renouvier, C. B. Introduction 4 la philosophie analytique de l’histoire.
Les id^es, les religions, les systemes. Paris. 1896.
Rocquain, F. L’esprit revolutionnaire avant la Revolution. Paris. 1878.
Taine, H. A. L’ancien regime. Vol. i of Les Origines de la France
Contemporaine. 6 vols. Paris. 1876-94. (Cf. J. Morley, France in
the 18th century, vol. m of Critical Miscellanies. 3 vols. London. 1886.)
Villemain, A. F. Cours de litterature franfaise. 6 vols. Paris. 1864.
Vinet, A. R. Histoire de la litterature franfaise du xviii* siecle. 2 vols.
Paris. 1875.
I. MANUSCRIPTS.
Archives Nationales, in Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris. The
numbers of the MSS. dealing with the Revolutionary period are 244—51; 307—12;
323; 1773—9; 1855; 1866—7; 3520; 3524—28; 3568—74 ; 3660—4121; 4525—4789 ;
4790; 5097; 5895 ; 5896 ; 6140; 6574—6; 6791—6 ; 6798—802 ; 7000—6 ; 7818;
13713—17; 13736. See Catalogue General des Manuscrits Fran^ais par
Henri Ormont. Paris.
1895 etc. (in progress).
H. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Jourdan, A.
J. L., Decrusy, F. A. and Isambert. Recueil
General des Anciennes Lois Franchises depuis l’an 420 jusqu’a la Revolution de
1789. 29
vols. Paris. 1821-33.
A great deal
of information on the subject of this chapter is also to he found in the
Cahiers of 1789, references to which are given in the bibliography to Chapters
IV, V, VI and VII.
A complete
bibliography of such subjects as the institutions of France in the eighteenth
century, the working of government, the structure of society and the character
of social life would include all the authorities for the history of France at
that time and a very great part of contemporary French literature. Among the
more useful works may be noted:
Argenson, M.
A. R. de Voyer de Paulmy, Marquis de. Journal et
Memoires.
9 vols. Paris. 1859-67.
Barbier, E. J. F. Journal historique et anecdotique du regue de Louis
XV.
4 vols. Paris. 1847-56.
Societe de l’Histoire de France.
Henault, C.
J. F. (President). Memoires. Paris. 1855.
Luynes, C. P. d’Albert, Due de. Memoires sur la Cour de Lonis XV. Edited
by L. E. Dussieux and E. Soulie. 17 vols. Paris. 1860-5.
See also the
works of contemporary philosophers, economists, historians and men of letters
cited in the bibliographies to Chapters I and III.
See also:
Babeau, A. Les Voyageurs en France depuis la Renaissance jusqu’a la
Revolution;
and the
writers therein cited. Paris. 1885.
Rigby, E.
Letters from France etc. in 1789. London. 1880.
Young, A.
Travels in France during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789. 2 vols. Bury St Edmunds. 1792-4.
(a) General.
Boiteau d’Ambly, D. A. P. L’etat de la France en 1789. Paris. 1861.
Granier de Cassagnac, A. Histoire des Causes de la Revolution Fran^aise
de 1789. Paris. 1850.
Taine, H. A. L’Ancien Regime. Vol. i of Les Origines de la France
Contemporaine.
6 vols. Paris. 1876-94.
Tocqueville, Comte C. A. H. M. Clerel de. L’Ancien Regime et la
Revolution. Paris.
1856.
Much information
is also to be found in general histories of the reign of Louis XV, to which
reference is made in the bibliographies of Vol. VI.
(b) Special.
(i) Local
Administration.
Babeau, A. Le Village sons l’Ancien Regime. Paris. 1878.
La Ville sous l’Ancien Regime. Paris. 1880.
La Province sous l’Ancien Regime. 2
vols. Paris. 1894.
(ii) Finance.
(See
works cited in bibliography of Chapter III.)
(iii) The Army.
Babeau, A. La Vie Militaire sous l’Ancien Regime. 2 vols. Paris.
1889-90. Dussieux, L. L’Armee en France. 3 vols. Versailles. 1884.
Jung, H. F. T. Bonaparte et son Temps. 3 vols.
Paris. 1880-1.
(iv) The Church.
Pressense, E. de. L’^glise et la Revolution Fran^aise. 3rd ed. Paris.
1889.
(v) Land tenure.
Doniol, H. La Revolution Fran^aise et la Feodalite. Paris.
1874.
(vi)
Condition of the people.
Avenel, G., Vicomte de. Histoire feonomique de la Propriete, des
salaires, des denrees et de tous les Prix en general depuis l’an 1200 jusqu’en
l’an 1800.
4 vols. Paris. 1894-8.
La Fortune Privee a travers sept siecles.
Paris. 1895.
Babeau, A. La Vie Rurale dans l’ancienne France. Paris. 1883.
Les artisans et les domestiques d’autrefois.
Paris. 1886.
Les Bourgeois d’autrefois. Paris. 1886.
Levasseur, E. La Population Franfaise. 3 vols.
Paris. 1889-92.
(vii) Public
opinion in the eighteenth century.
Aubertin, C. L’esprit public au dix-huitieme siecle. Paris. 1872.
Rocquain, F. L’esprit revolutionnaire avant la Revolution. Paris.
1878.
FINANCE.
A very full
account of the literature of the subject will be found in
Stourm, R. Bibliographie historique des finances de la France au
dix-huitieme siecle. Paris. 1895.
II.
Bailly, A. Histoire financiere de la France depuis l’origine de la
monarchie jusqu’a la fin de 1786. 2 vols. Paris. 1880.
Boiteau, P. Etat de la France en 1789. Paris. 1861.
Bouchard, L. Systeme financier de l’ancienne monarchie. Paris. 1891.
Gasquet, A. Precis des institutions politiques et sociales de l’ancieime
France.
Paris. 2 vols. 1885.
Gomel, C. Les causes financieres de la Revolution Fran^aise. Paris. 2
vols. 1892-3.
Necker, J. De l’administration des finances de la France. 3 vols. Paris.
1784. Say, L. Dictionnaire des finances. 2 vols.
Paris. 1889. (See especially the articles Budget giniral de Vfitat by P.
Boiteau, and Contributions directes by
E. Vignes.)
Stourm, R. Les Finances de l’Ancien Regime et de la Revolution. 2 vols.
Paris. 1885.
Taiue, H. A. L’ancien regime. Vol. i of Les Origines de la France Contemporaine.
6 vols. Paris. 1876-94.
Tocqueville, Comte A. de. L’ancien regime et la Revolution. Paris. 1856.
Viihrer, A. Histoire de la dette publique de la France. 2
vols. Paris. 1886.
III.
The Archives
Nationales in Paris contain large quantities of manuscript material for the
reconstitution of the figures of receipts and expenses towards the end of the
reign of Louis XVI; but the figures are full of pitfalls, and it is probable
that little modification remains to be made in the etats or comptes rendus.
Viewed from the point of the taxpayer, the gross contributions will no doubt be
found to exceed to some extent the figures now generally accepted.
THE
BREAKDOWN OF GOVERNMENT IN FRANCE AND THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.
I. MANUSCRIPTS.
Archives Nationales, Paris. See under Chapter II.
II. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Archives Parlementaires. Mavidal, J. et Laurent, E. Paris. 1867 etc In
progress. Bailly, J. S. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1821-2.
Belle'e, A. and Duchemin, V Cahiers de Plaintes et Doleances des
Paroisses de la Province de Maine. 4 vols. Le Mans. 1881-93.
Bertrand de Mole ville, A. F., Marquis de. Memoires Particulieres. 2
vols. Paris. 1816.
Berville, St A. and Barriere, J. F. Memoires pour servir.. 68 vols.
Paris. 1821-8. Besenval, Baron P. V. de. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1821.
Bouille, F. C. A., Marquis de. Memoires. Paris. 1821.
Brette, A. Recueil de documents relatifs a la convocation des etats
generaux de 1789. 2 vols. Paris. 1894-6.
Calonne, C. A. de. £tat de la France. London. 1790.
Campan, Mme J. L. H. de. Memoires sur la Vie Priv^e de Marie-Antoinette.
3 vols. Paris. 1823.
Charmasse, A. de. Cahiers des Paroisses et Communaut£s du bailliage
d’Autun. Autun. 1895. _
Chassin, Ch. L. Les Elections et les Cahiers de Paris en 1789. Documents
recueillis, mis en ordre et annotes. 4 vols. Paris. 1888.
Condorcet, M. J. A. N. Caritat, Marquis de. Vie de Turgot. Paris. 1786.
Courrier de Provence (a continuation of the journal begun by Mirabeau under the
name first of Mats G4neraux aud afterwards of Lettres du comte de Mirabeau d
ses commettants). Paris. 1789-91.
Deux Amis de la Liberty. Histoire de la Revolution de 1789 et de
1’IStaMissement d une Constitution en France, vols. i-vii, F. M. Kerverseau and
Clavelin. Vols. vm-xvin, Histoire de la Revolution de France [mainly written by
V. Lombard de Laugres and D. Le'riquet: vols. xvi and xvii being by Caignard de Mailly]. 19 vols. Paris.
1792-1803.
Dumont, E. Souvenirs sur Mirabeau. Paris. 1832.
Ferrieres, C. E., Marquis de. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1821.
Gazette Nationale ou Moniteur universel. Vols. i-ix. Paris. 1789 etc.
Lafayette, M. J. P. R. Y. G. Motier, Marquis de. Memoires et
Correspondance du general Lafayette. 6 vols. Paris. 1837-8.
Lally-Tollendal, T. G., Marquis de. Memoires concernant
Marie-Antoinette.
3 vols. London. 1804-9.
Lehodey, N. Journal des Etats-Generaux. 27 vols. Paris. 1789-91.
Loriquet, H. Cahiers de Doleances de 1789 dans lc Departement du Pas de
Calais.
2 vols. Arras. 1891.
Mallet du Pan, J. F. Me'moires et Correspondance pour servir a
l’histoire de la Revolution Fran^aise, edited by A. Sayous. 2 vols. Paris.
1851.
Malouet, P. V. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1874.,
Marie Antoinette. Briefwechsel mit
Joseph II und Leopold II. Leipzig. .1866. Mege, F.
Les Cahiers des Paroisses d’Auvergne en 1789. Clermont Ferrand. 1899.
Mercy-Argenteau, Comte F. de. Correspondance secrete avec l’lmperatrice Marie-
Therese, avec les lettres de Marie-Thdrese et de Marie-Antoinette. 3 vols.
Paris. 1875.
Correspondance secrete avec l’Empereur Joseph
II et le Prince de ; Kaunitz.
3 vols. Paris. 1889-91.
Mirabeau, G. H. R., Comte de. Correspondance avec le Comte de la Marck,
edited by Bacourt. 3 vols. Paris. 1851.
Mireur, F. Cahiers des Doleances de la Sendchaussee de Draguignan.
Draguignan.
1889. .
Mondenard, A. de. Cahiers de l’Agenois. Villeneuve-sur-Lot. 1889.
Morellet, A., Abbe. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1822.
Moms, Gouverneur. Diary and Letters. 2 vols. London. 1889.
Mounier, J. J. Nouvelles Observations sur les Etats-Gdneraux de France.
Paris. 1789.
Recberches sur les causes qui ont empeche les
Fran^ais de devenir libres.
2 vols. Geneva. 1792.
Proces-verbal de l’Assemblee Nationale. 75 vols. Paris. 1789-91.
Rabaud Saint-Etienne, J. P. Almanach historique de la Revolution
Franfaise. Paris.
1791.
Rigby, E.
Letters from France, etc. in 1789. London. 1880.
Sieyes, E.
J., Abbd. Qu’est-ce que le Tiers Etat ? Paris. 1789.
Stael-Holstein, Mme A. L. G. de. Considerations sur les principaux
evcnemens de la Revolution. 3 vols. London. 1818.
Talleyrand-Perigord, C. M. de, Prince. Memoires. 5 vols. Paris.
1891-2. Thiebault, Baron D. A. P. F. C. H., General. Memoires. 5 vols. Paris.
1893-5. Young, A. Travels in France during the years 1787, 1788 and 1789. 2
vols. Bury St Edmunds. 1792-4.
Beside the
partial collections of Cahiers above mentioned, others have been published and
fresh ones appear from time to time. The most general collection jet published
is in vols. i to vi of the
Archives Parlementaires.
in. WORKS OF
A GENERAL CHARACTER.
Blanc, L. Histoire de la Revolution. 12 vols. Paris. 1847-62.
Cherest, A. La Chute de l’ancien regime. 3 vols. Paris. 1884-6.
Jobez, A. La France sous Louis XVI. 2 vols. Paris. 1877-81.
Michelet, J. Histoire de la Revolution Franipaise. 9
vols. Paris. 1847-53. Stephens, H. M. A History of the French Revolution (to
1793, unfinished). Vols. i and n. London. 1886-91.
IV. MEMOIRS AND MONOGRAPHS.
Aulard, F. A. Les Orateurs de 1’Assemble Constituante. Paris. 1882.
Bord, G. La Prise de la Bastille. Paris. 1882.
Cha&sin, C. L. Le Ge'nie de la Revolution. 2 vols. Paris. 1863-5.
Fomeron, H. Histoire generale des Emigres pendant la Revolution
Franfaise.
2 vols. Paris. 1884.
Fournel, V. Les Hommes du 14 Juillet. Paris. 1890.
Gomel, C. Histoire financiere de 1’Assemble Constituante. 2 vols. Paris.
1896-7. Goncourt, £. and J. de. Histoire de la Societe francaise pendant la
Revolution. Paris. 1889.
Lanzac de Laborie, L. de. Jean-Joseph Mounier. Paris. 1887.
Lomenie, L. de. Les Mirabeau. 5 vols. Paris. 1889-91.
Mallet, B.
Mallet du Pan and the French Revolution. London. 1902.
Montigny, L. de. Memoires de Mirabeau. 8 vols. Paris. 1834^5.
Pressense, E. de. L’Eglise et la Revolution Francaise. Paris. 1889.
Stern, A. Das Leben Mirabeaus. 2 vols.
Berlin. 1889.
Stourm, Ren£. Les Finances de l'Ancien Regime et de la Revolution.
Origines du systeme financier actuel. 2 vols. Paris. 1885.
Tocqueville, Comte A. de. CEnvres. Vol. vrn. Chapitres in^dits de
l’ouvrage destind a faire suite au livre L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution.
(Fragments historiques.) Paris. 1877.
THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, THE NATIONAL CONVENTION,
THE TERROR, THERMIDOR, VENDEMIAIRE.
I. MANUSCRIPTS.
Archives
Nationales. Paris. See under Chapter II.
II. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Angouleme, Marie Therese Charlotte, Duchesse de. L’histoire complete de
la captivite de la Famille Royale a la Tour du Temple. Paris and London. 1870.
Aulard, F. A. La Societe des Jacobins. Recueil des Documents pour
l’Histoire du Club. Paris. 1889.
Recueil des Actes du Comite de Salut Public.
Paris. 1889.
Barbaroux, C. J. M. Memoires (Berville et Barriere, Memoires pour
servir...). Paris. 1827.
Bertrand de Moleville, A. F., Marquis. Memoires Particulieres. 2 vols.
Paris.
1816.
Berville, St A. et Barriere, J. F. Memoires pour servir... 68
vols. Paris. 1821-8. Browning, O. The Despatches of Earl Gower. London. 1885.
Burke,
Edmund. Thoughts on the Prospect of a Regicide Peace, in a Series of Letters. London. 1796.
Buzot, F. N. L. Memoires sur la Revolution Franfaise. Paris. 1828.
Campan, Mme J. L. H. de. Memoires sur la Vie Privee de Marie-Antoinette.
3 vols. Paris. 1823.
Carnot, Comte L. N. M. Correspondance generale de Carnot. Publiee avec
des notes historiques et biographiques par E. Charavay. Paris. 1892 etc. In
progress.
Memoires Historiques et Militaires sur Carnot.
Paris. 1824.
Chenier, Marie-Andre de. (Euvres Poetiques. Paris. 1862.
Chenier, Marie-Joseph de. (Euvres Anciennes. 5 vols. Paris. 1826.
Convention Nationale, Bulletin de la. Paris. 1793.
Proces Verbal de la; depuis et compris le 20
Septembre 1792. 72 vols.
Paris. 1792-6.
Daunou, P. C. F. Memoires. Paris. 1846.
Desmoulins, C. Histoire des Brissotins. Paris. 1792.
Deux Amis de la Liberte. Histoire de la Revolution de 1789, et de
l’l^tablissement d’une Constitution en France. Vols. i-vn.
By F. M. Kerverseau andClavelin. Vols. vm-xvni. Histoire de la Revolution de
France [mainly written by
V. Lombard de Laugres and D. Leriquet: vols.
xvi and xvii being by Caignard de
Mailly]. 19 vols. Paris. 1792-1803.
Durand de Maillane, P. T. Histoire de la Convention Nationale (Berville
et Barriere, Memoires pour servir...). Paris. 1825.
Ferrieres, C. E., Marquis de. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1821.
Fersen, Count H. A. von. Le Comte de Fersen et la cour de France. 2
vols. Paris. 1877-8. Diary and correspondence relating to the Court of France,
translated by K. Wormsley. London. 1902.
Kaunitz-Rietbergj
W. A., Prince. Correspondance Secrete (see Mercy-Argenteau). Lafayette, M. J. P. R. Y. G., Marquis de. Memoires et correspondance du
general Lafayette. 6 vols. Paris. 1837-8.
Lally-Tollendal, T. G., Marquis de. Memoires concernant
Marie-Antoinette. Paris. 1804.
La Revelliere de Ldpeaux, L. M. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1895.
Mallet du Pan, J. F. Me'moires et correspondance pour servir a
l’histoire de la Revolution Frantpaise, edited A. Sayous. 2 vols. Paris. 1851.
Malouet, Baron P. V. de. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1874.
Meillan, A. Memoires (Berville et Barriere, Memoires pour servir...).
Paris. 1823.
Mercier, S. Paris pendant la Revolution, ou le Nouveau Paris. 2 vols.
Paris. 1862. Mercy-Argenteau, Comte F. de. Correspondance secrete avec
l’Empereur Joseph II et le Prince de Kaunitz. 3 vols. Paris. 1889-91.
Morris, G. Diary and Letters. 2 vols. London. 1889.
Pasquier, E. A. G. Audiffret. Histoire de mon temps. Memoires du
Chancelier Pasquier. Paris. 1873.
Puisaye, Comte J. G. de. Memoires. 6 vols. London. 1803-8.
Rochejaquelein, M. L. V. du Vergier, Marquise de La. Memoires. 2 vols.
Paris. 1860.
Roederer, Comte P. L. Chronique de 50 jours; de 20 Juin au 10 Aout 1792.
Paris. 1846.
Roland, Mme
M. J. (See Dauban.)
Sainte-Croix, L. C. Bigot de. Histoire de la Conspiration du 10 Aout
1792. London. 1793.
Sapinaud de Bois-Huguet, Mme de. Memoires historiques sur La Vendee.
Paris. 1821.
Sieyes, E. J., Abbe. Notice sur la Vie de Sieyes. Paris. 1795.
Stael-Holstein, Mme A. L. G. de. Considerations sur les principaux
evenemens de la Revolution. 3 vols. London. 1819.
Thibaudeau, Comte A. C. Memoires, 1765-92. Paris. 1875.
Tourzel, L. E. F. F. A. J. J. du Bouchet de Sourches, Duchesse. Memoirs.
2 vols. Paris. 1883.
Turreau de Garambouville, Baron L. M. Memoires pour servir a l’histoire
de la guerre de la Vende'e. Paris. 1824.
Vauban, Comte A. J. Le Prestre de. Me'moires pour servir a l’histoire de
la guerre de La Vendee. Paris. 1806.
Vaudreuil, Comte J. H. F. Rigaud de. Correspondance intime du Comte de
Vaudreuil et du Comte d’Artois pendant l’emigration, 1789-1815. 2 vols. Paris.
1889.
Vaultier, M. C. F. E. Souvenirs de 1’Insurrection Normande. Caen. 1858.
Vieux Cordelier, le. Journal redige par Camille Desmoulins. 7 nos.
Paris. 1793-4.
Weber, J. Memoires conceriiant Marie-Antoinette, Archiduchesse d’Autriche,
Reine de France; et sur plusieurs e'poques importantes de la Revolution Franchise,
depuis son origine jusqu’au 16 octobre, 1793. 3 vols.
London. 1804-9.
III. MEMOIRS AND MONOGRAPHS.
Alger, J. G.
Paris in 1789-1794. London. 1902.
Englishmen in the French Revolution. London. 1889.
Ashbee, H. S. Marat en Angleterre. Paris. 1890.
Avenel, G. A. Cloots, l’Orateur du genre humain. 2 vols. Paris. 1865.
Babeau, A. L’Ecole du Village pendant la Revolution. Paris. 1881.
Balleydier, A. Histoire politique et militaire du peuple de Lyon pendant
la Revolution Fran^aise. 3 vols. Paris. 1845. '
Beaucbesne, A. H. Du Bois de. Louis XVII, sa vie, son agonie, sa mort:
captivity de la famille royale au Temple. 2 vols. Paris. 1861.
La Vie de Mme Elizabeth, soeur de Louis XVI. 2
vols. Paris. 1869.
Bedolliere, E. Gigault de la. Histoire de la Garde Nationale. Paris.
1848. Belloc, H. Danton, a study. London. 1899.
Bertin, G. Mme de Lamballe. Paris. 1888.
Bougeart, A. Marat, l’Ami dn peuple. 2 vols. Paris. 1865.
Brochet, L. La Vendee a travel’s les Ages. 3 vols. Paris. 1902.
Cabanes, A. Marat Inconnu. Paris. 1891.
Campardan, E. Le Tribunal Revolutionnaire de Paris. 2 vols. Paris. 1866.
Challamel, J. B. M. A. Les Clubs Contre-revolutionnaires. Paris. 1893.
Chevremont, F. J. P. Marat. Esprit Politique, accompagne de sa vie
scientifique, politique et priv6e. 2 vols. Paris. 1880.
Chuquet, A. La jeunesse de Napoleon. 3 vols. Paris. 1897-9.
Les Guerres de la Revolution. Paris. 1886. In
progress.
Claretie, J. Camille Desmoulins, Lucile Desmoulins. Etude sur les
Dantonistes. Paris. 1875.
Cloquet, J. G. Souvenirs sur la vie privee de Lafayette. Paris. 1836.
Dauban, C. A. Etude sur Mme Roland et son temps. 2 vols. Paris. 1864.
La Demagogie a Paris en 1794 et en 1795.
Paris. 1869.
Memoires de Mme Roland, edition publiee avec
des notes par C. A. D.
Paris. 1864.
Les Prisons de Paris sous la Revolution.
Paris. 1870.
Dandet, E. Histoire des Conspirations Royalistes du Midi sous la
Revolution.
1790-3. Paris. 1881.
Dulaure, J. A. Histoire physique, civile et morale des Environs de
Paris. 7 vols. Paris. 1825-8.
Histoire physique, civile et morale de Paris.
10 vols. Paris. 1829.
Fragments des Souvenirs sur les joumees du 31
mai et 2 juin, 1793. Paris.
1846.
Fomeron, H. Histoire des Emigres pendant la Revolution. 2 vols. Paris. 1884. Forster, J. G. A. Briefwechsel mit S. T.
Sommerring. Brunswick. 1877. Fournier, A. Napoleon I. Eine
Biographic. Prague. 1882.
Napoleon I. Traduit par E. Jaegle. 2 vols.
Paris. 1891-2.
Gomel, C. Les causes financieres de la Revolution Franyaise. 2 vols.
Paris. 1892-3. Granier de Cassagnac, A. Histoire des Girondins et des Massacres
de Septembre.
2 vols. Paris. 1860.
3ros, J. Le Comite de Salut Public de la Convention Nationale. Paris.
1893. Guepin, A. Histoire de Nantes. Nantes. 1839.
Guiffrey, J. J. Les Conventionnels. (Academies. Paris. Societe de Paris.
1889.
L’histoire de la Revolution Franyaise.) Paris. 1889.
Hamel, E. Histoire de Robespierre. Paris. 1865-7.
Histoire de Saint-Just. 2 vols. Brussels.
1860.
Hericault, C. D. de. La Revolution de Thermidor. Paris. 1876.
Len6tre, G. Un Conspirateur royaliste pendant la Terreur. Le Baron de
Batz. Paris. 1896.
Lescure, M. F. A. de. La Princesse de Lamballe. Marie-Therese-Louise de
Savoie- Carignan; sa vie; sa mort.... Paris. 1864.
Rivarol et la Societe pendant la Revolution et
l’Emigration. Paris. 1883.
La Vraie Marie-Antoinette, etude historique,
politique et morale. Paris. 1863.
Lomenie, L. de. Beaumarchais et son temps. Etudes sur la societe en
France au xviii® siecle. Paris.
1856.
Mallet, B.
Mallet du Pan and the French Revolution. London. 1902.
Masson, F. Le Departement des Affaires ]<itrangeres pendant la
Revolution 1787-1804. Paris. 1877.
Mege, F. Correspondance de Georges Couthon. Paris. 1872.
Metzger, A. Revolution Franijaise. Lyon en 1789-95. 10 vols. Lyons.
1882-7. Moland, L. E. D. Theatre de la Revolution, ou choix de pieces de
theatre qui ont fait sensation pendant la periode revolutionnaire. Paris. 1877.
Mortimer-Temaux, L. Histoire de la Terreur, 1792-4, d’apres des documents
authentiques et inedits. Paris. 1862 etc. In progress.
Nougaret, P. J. B. Histoire des prisons de Paris et des Departements. 4
vols. Paris. 1797.
Pellet, M. Etude historique et bibliographique sur The'roigne de
Mericourt, etc. Paris. 1886.
Riouffe, H. Memoires sur les prisons. 2 vols. Paris. 1823.
Robinet, J. F. E. Danton, Homme d’etat. Documents et pieces
justificatives. Paris. 1889.
Le Mouvement religieux pendant la Revolution
1789-1801. Paris. 1896.
Robiquet, P. Le Personnel Municipal de Paris pendant la Revolution.
Paris. 1890. Stourm, R. Les Finances de l’Ancien Regime et de la Revolution.
Origines du systeme financier actuel. 2 vols. Paris. 1885.
Tournois. Histoire de L. P. J. due d’Orleans et du parti d’Orleans dans
ses rapports avec la Revolution Franipaise. 2 vols. Paris. 1842.
Tuetey, A. L’Assistance puhlique a Paris pendant la Revolution. 2 vols.
Paris.
1895. .
Vatel, C. Rechercb.es historiques sur les Girondins. Vergniaud;
manuscrits, lettres et papiers edites par C. V. 2 vols. Paris. 1873.
Vauban, Comte A. J. Le Prestre de. Memoires pour servir a l’histoire de
la guerre de La Vendee. Paris. 1806.
Vaultier, M. C. F. E. Souvenirs de l’lnsurrection Normande. Caen. 1858.
Vautibault, T. P. Gazeau de. Les d’Orleans au tribunal de l’histoire. Paris.
1888 etc. Viihrer. Histoire de la dette publique en France. 2 vols. Paris.
1886.
Wallon, H. A. La Terreur. Etudes critiques sur l’histoire de la
Revolution Franyaise. 2 vols. Paris. 1881.
Zivy, H. Le Treize Vende'miaire, An iv. Paris. 1898.
MAPS.
Duvotenay, T. Atlas pour servir a Intelligence des campagnes de la
Revolution Fran^aise de Thiers. Paris. 1880.
Faucou, L. Plan de la ville de Paris en 1789. Dresse sous la direction
d’A. Renaud et Hocherau. Paris. (Decreed 1887.)
Plan de la ville de Paris. Period©
Revolutionnaire (1790-4). Dresse sous
la direction d’A. Renaud et Hocherau. Paris. (Decreed 1887.)
Vemiquet, E. Atlas du Plan General de la Ville de Paris. Paris.
1795.
FOREIGN
POLICY OF PITT TO 1793.
ARCHIVES.
The
authorities for a history of Foreign Policy must be mainly the correspondence
between the representatives of a country abroad and the home government which are
more or less accessible to students. For the present chapter the correspondence
preserved in the English Record Office under the Titles France, Holland,
Austria, Prussia and Spain is indispensahle; and the letters of D. Hailes,
first from France and then from Poland, may be mentioned as of special
interest. The correspondence relating to England in the French Foreign Office
is also of great value. It is admirably arranged, with carefully written
abstracts, and is easily accessible. There is also much of interest in the
British Museum, especially the Auckland papers, and the Leeds papers.
PUBLISHED
CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTS.
Ameth, A.,
Ritter von. Joseph II und Katharina von Russland. Briefwechsel.
Vienna. 1869.
Marie Antoinette, Joseph II und Leopold II. Briefwechsel.
Vienna. 1866.
Joseph II und Leopold II von Toscana. 2
vols. Vienna. 1872.
Auckland, W.
Eden, Lord. Journal and Correspondence. 4 vols.
London. 1861. Bacourt, A. de. Correspondance entre le Comte de Mirabeau et le
Comte de la Marck. 3 vols. Paris. 1851.
Beer, A. Die erste Theilung Polens. 3 vols. Vienna. 1873.
Joseph II, Leopold II und Kaunitz. Briefwechsel. Paris. 1873.
Brunner, S. Correspondance intime de l’Empereur Joseph II avec Cobenzl.
Mainz. 1871.
Buchez, P. J. B. and Roux, P. C. Histoire Parlementaire de la Resolution
Fran9aise.
48 vols.
Paris. 1834r-8.
Buckingham,
R. P. T. N., Duke of. Memoirs of the Court and Cabinet of George III. 2 vols.
London. 1853.
Burges, Sir
J. Bland. Selections from the Letters and Correspondence of. London. 1885.
Carlisle, G.
J. Howard, Earl of. Papers. Historical Manuscripts Commission. 1897. Cornwallis, C., Marquis. Correspondence. 3 vols. London. 1859.
Flammermont, J. Correspondance des agents diplomatiques etrangers en France
avant la Revolution. Paris. 1896.
Fortescue, J.
B., MSS. of. Historical Manuscripts Commission. 3 vols. London. 1894.
Gower, G. G.
L., Earl. Despatches of Earl Gower, edited by Oscar Browning.
Cambridge.
1885. .
Keith, Sir R.
M. Memoirs and Correspondence, edited by Mrs Gillespie Smyth.
2 vols.
London. 1849.
Leeds, F.
Osborne, Duke of. Political Memoranda of, edited by Oscar Browning.
Camden
Society. London. 1884.
Malmesbury,
J. Harris, Earl of. Diaries and Correspondence. 4 vols. London. 1844.
Martens, G. F. von. Recueil des principaux Traitds d’alliance, de paix,
etc. 8 vols.
Gottingen. 1817-35.
Metternich, C. W. N. L., Prince. Nachgelassene Papiere. 8 vols.
Vienna. 1880-4.
Miles, W. A.
Correspondence on the French Revolution. 2 vols. London. 1890. Smith, P. V.
Papers. Royal Historical Commission. 1888.
Vivenot, A. von. Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserpolitik
Oesterreichs wahrend der franzosischen Revolutionskriege. Vienna.
1873 etc. In progress. Vorontsov, Prince. Archives (in Russian and French).
Vol. rx. Moscow. 1870 etc. In progress.
CONTEMPORARY
MEMOIRS.
Boyen, H.
von. Denkwurdigkeiten und Erinnerungen. 3 parts. Leipzig. 1889. Dedem de Gelder, Baron A. B. G. de. M&noires. Ed. Mrs Lecky. Paris. 1900. Dohm, C. C. W. von.
Denkwurdigkeiten meiner Zeit. 6 vols. Lemgo. 1814-19. Goertz, Count J. E. von
der. Historische und politische Denkwurdigkeiten. 2 pts. Stuttgart. 1887-8.
Hogendorp, G. K., Count van. Brieven en Gedenkschriften. 3 vols. The Hague.
1866-76.
Schlieffen, M. E. von. Einige Betreffnisse und Erlebungen. Berlin. 1830.
Segur, Comte L. P. de. Memoires ou Souvenirs et Anecdotes. 3 vols.
Paris. 1826-7. Soulavie, J. L. Giraud. Memoires historiques et politiques du
r&gne de Louis XVI depuis son mariage jusqu’a sa mort. 6 vols. Paris. 1801.
Thiebault, D. Souvenirs de 20 ans de sejour a Berlin. 6 vols. Paris. 1804. Voss, Countess S. W. C. M. von.
Neunundsechzig Jahre am Preussischen Hofe. Leipzig. 1876.
OTHER WORKS.
Bailleu, P. Die Entstehung des Fiirstenbundes. Sybel’s Historische
Zeitschrift. 41.
Bancroft, H.
H. History of the Pacific States of North America, vol. xxii. 39 vols. San
Francisco. 1882-90.
Barral-Montferrat, Marquis de. Dix ans de paix armee entre la France et
l’Angle- terre, 1783-93. Paris. 1893.
Bohtlingk, A. Die hollandische Revolution und der Furstenbund. Bonn. 1874.
Browning, O.
The Flight to Varennes and other historical essays. London. 1892.
Bruckner, A. Katharina die Zweite. Berlin. 1883.
Colenbrander, H. T. De Patriottentijd hoofdzakelijk naar buitenlandsche
beschei- den. The
Hague. 1897 etc. In progress.
Elliot, H.
Memoirs of, edited by Lady Minto. Edinburgh.
1868.
Ernouf, Baron A. A. Maret, Duo de Bassano. Paris. 1878.
Flassan, G. de Raxis de. Histoire generale et raisonn^e de la Diplomatic
franyaise, vol. vn. 7 vols. Paris. 1811.
Gronau, W. C. C. W. von Dobm nach seinem Wollen nnd Handeln. Ein biogra-
phiscber Versuch. Lemgo. 1824.
Herrmann, A. L. Geschichte des russischen Staates. (Gesch. d. europ.
Staaten.)
4 vols. Hamburg
and Gotha. 1846-60.
Koch, C. G. de, and Scholl, M. F. S. Histoire abregee des Traites de Paix.
Brussels. 1838.
Krauel, R. Graf Herzberg als Minister Friedrich Wilhelms II. Berlin. 1899.
Prinz Heinrich von Preussen in Paris wahrend
der Jahre 1784 und 1788 bis
1789. Berlin.
1899.
Luckwaldt, F. Die englisch-preussiche Allianz von 1788. Leipzig.
1902.
Marsh, H. The
History of the Politics of Great Britain and France. 2 vols. Cambridge. 1800.
Michael, W. Englands Stellung zur ersten Teilung Polens. Hamburg. 1890.
Niebuhr, B. G. Geschichte des Zeitalters der Revolution. 2 vols. Hamburg. 1845. Pingaud, L. Choiseul-Gouffier: la France en
Orient sous Louis XVI. Paris. 1887. Ranke, L. von.
Die deutschen Machte und der Furstenbund. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1871-2. 2nd ed.
Vols. xxxi-n of Sammtliche Werke. Leipzig. 1875.
Denkwiirdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fiirsten
C. A. von Hardenberg. 5 vols.
Leipzig. 1877. 2nd ed. Vols. xi,vi-viii
of Sammtliche Werke. Leipzig. 1879-81.
Salomon, F. Das politische System des jiingeren Pitt und die zweite Teilung
Polens. Leipzig. 1901.
Schmidt, W. A. Geschichte der preussisch-deutschen Unionsbestrebungen seit
der Zcit Friedrichs des Grossen. Berlin. 1851.
Segur, Comte L. P. de. Tableau historique et politique de l’Europe
depuis 1786-96. Paris. 1801
Sorel, A. La Question d’Orient au xviii®
siecle. Paris. 1878.
Stanhope, P.
H. S., Earl. Life of William Pitt. 4 vols. London. 1861-2.
Stem, A. Das Leben Mirabeaus. 2 vols Berlin. 1889.
Witt, P. de. Une invasion Prussienne en Hollande en 1787. Paris. 1886. Wittichen, F. K. Preussen und England in der
europaischen Politik 1785-8. Heidelberg. 1902.
Wittichen, P. Die Polnische Politik Preussens 1788-90. Gottingen. 1899.
Wolf, A. Oesterreich unter Maria Theresia, Josef II und Leopold II. Berlin.
1883.
Zinkeisen, J. W. Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa. (Gesch. d.
europ. Staaten.) 7 vols. Hamburg. 1840-63.
CHAPTERS XI and XVII.
1. GENERAL.
Original Authorities.
Ameth, A.,
Ritter von. Graf Philipp Cobenzl und seine Memoiren. Vienna.
1885.
Joseph II und Leopold von Toscana. Briefwechsel von 1781 his 1790.
2 vols. Vienna.
1872.
Joseph II und Katharina von Russland.
Briefwechsel. Vienna. 1869.
Beer, A. Joseph II, Leopold II und Kaunitz. Briefwechsel. Vienna. 1873.
Leopold II, Franz II und Catharina.
Correspondenz, nebst einer Einleitung
zur Geschichte der Politik Leopolds II. Leipzig.
1874.
Brunner, S. Correspondances intimes de l’Empereur Joseph II avec son ami
le Comte de Cobenzl et son premier ministre le Prince de Kaunitz. Mainz. 1871.
Dohm, C. C. W. von. Denkwiirdigkeiten meiner Zeit, oder Beitrage zur
Geschichte vom letzten Viertel des achtzehnten und vom Anfang des neunzehnten
Jahrhunderts (1778-1806). 5 vols. Lemgo. 1814-19.
Hertzberg, Graf E. F. von. Recueil des Deductions, Manifestes,
Declarations, Traites, et autres actes et ecrits publics qui ont ete rediges et
publies pour la cour de Prusse, par le Ministre d’etat Comte de Hertzberg (1756-90).
3 vols. Berlin. 1790-95.
Joseph II und Graf Ludwig Cobenzl. Briefwechsel (1780-90). Herausg. von
Adolf Beer und Joseph Ritter von Fiedler. Fontes rerum Austriacarum, Abtheilung
n. Diplomataria et Acta, Bd 53, 54. 2 vols. Vienna. 1901.
Keith, Sir R.
M. Memoirs and Correspondence. 2 vols. London. 1849.
Ligne, C. J., Prince de. Me'moires et Melanges Historiques et
Litteraires. 5
vols. Paris. 1827-9.
Memoirs, Letters and Miscellaneous Papers.
Selected and translated by
Katharine
Prescott Wormely. 2 vols. London. 1899.
[This is the
latest of a large number of selections and extracts from the writings
of the Prince
de Ligne which have been published from time to time.]
Malmesbury,
J. Harris, Earl of. Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of
Malmesbury. 4 vols. London. 1844.
Martens, G. F. von. Recueil des principaux Traites conclus par les
puissances de l’Europe depuis 1761 jusqu’a present. Seconde edition, revue et
augmente'e par le Baron Charles de Martens. 8 vols. Gottingen. 1817-35.
Recueil des Traites et Conventions conclus par
la Russie avec les Puissances
Etrangeres. St Petersburg. 1875- . In progress.
Mercy-Argenteau, Comte F. de. Correspondance secrete avec l’Empereur
Joseph II, et le Prince de Kaunitz, publiee par le Chevalier Alfred d’Ameth et
Jules Flammermont 2 vols. Paris. 1889,
1891.
Briefe des Grafen, K. K. Bevollmachtigten
Ministers in den Oesterreichischen
Niederlanden an den K. K. Ausserordentlichen Gesandten zu London Grafen
Louis Starhemberg (vom 26 Dec. 1791 bis 15 Aug. 1794). Originaldocumente aus
dem schriftlichen Nachlasse des letzteren gesammelt und geordnet nebst
Erlauterungen von dessen Enkel A. Graf Thiirheim. Innsbruck.
1884.
Minto, G.
Elliot, first Earl of. Life and Letters from 1751 to 1806. 3 vols. London. 1874.
Neumann, L. Recueil des Traites et Conventions conclus par l’Autriche
avec les puissances etrangeres, depuis 1763 jusqu’a nos jours. 6 vols. Leipzig. 1855-9.
Schlitter, H. Kaunitz, Philip Cobenzl und Spielmann. Briefwechsel
(1779-92). Vienna. 1899.
Segur, Comte L. P. de. Tableau Historique et Politique de l’Europe
depuis
1786 jusqu’en 1796, contenant
l’Histoire des principaux evenements du regne de F. Guillaume II, roi de
Prusse, et un Precis des Revolutions de Brabant, de Hollande, de Pologne et de
France. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Paris. 1801.
Memoires, ou Souvenirs et Anecdotes. 3rd ed. 3
vols. Paris.
1827.
2. THE BELGIAN REVOLUTION.
Original Authorities.
Alton, R., General de. Copies des lettres du General d’A. a l’Empereur
Joseph II. Brussels. 1790.
Dohm, C. C. W. von. Die Lutticher Revolution im Jahr 1789 und das Benehmen
Sr. Ktinigl. Majestat von Preussen bey derselben. Berlin. 1790.
Linguet, S. N. H. Lettres au Comte de Trauttmansdorf, Ministre
Ple'nipotentiaire pour l’Empereur aux Pays-Bas, en 1788 et 1789. Brussels. 1790.
Marie Christine. Briefe der Erzherzogin M. C., Statthalterin der
Niederlande, an Leopold II. Herausg. von Dr Hans Schlitter. Fontes rerum
Austriacarum, Section n. Diplomataria et Acta, vol. 48. 1.
Vienna. 1896.
Wolf, A.
Leopold H und Marie Christine. Briefwechsel (1781-92). Vienna. 1867.
Secondary Works.
Borguet, A. Histoire des Beiges a la fin du dix-huitieme siecle. 2 vols.
Brussels. 1844. 2nd ed. 1861-3.
Histoire de la Revolution Liegeoise de 1789.
Liege. 1865.
Delplace, L. Joseph II et la Revolution Braban^onne. Bruges. 1891.
Juste, T. La Republique Beige, 1790. Brussels. 1884.
Histoire de la Revolution Beige de 1790. 3 vols. Brussels. 1846.
Lorenz, O. Joseph II und die Belgische Revolution, nach den Papieren des
General-Gouvemeurs Grafen Murray 1787. Vienna. 1863.
Magnette, F. Joseph II et la liberte de l’Escaut. Memoires couronnes et
autres Memoires publies par l’Academie Royale des Sciences de Belgique. Vol. lv 7
Brussels. 1898.
’
’ '
Wolf, A. Marie Christine, Erzherzogin von Oesterreich. 2
vols. Vienna. 1867.
3. THE UNITED PROVINCES.
Original Authorities.
Bowdler, T.
Letters written in Holland in the months of September and October, 1787, to
which is added a collection of letters and other papers relating to the journey
of the Princess of Orange on the 28th of June, 1787. London. 1788.
De Jonge, J. K. J. Documents politiques et diplomatiques sur les
revolutions de
1787 et 1795 dans la Republique des
Provinces Unies. Nederlandsch Rijks- archief, i. The Hague. 1857.
History of
the Internal Affairs of the United Provinces, from the year 1780 to the
commencement of hostilities in June 1787. London. 1787.
History of
the late Revolution in the Dutch Republic. (By George Ellis, who was Secretary
to Sir James Harris.) London. 1789.
Linguet, S. N. H. Nouveau Memoire sur l’ouverture de l’Escaut. Brussels.
1785.
Mandrillon, J. H. Memoires pour servir a l’Histoire de la Revolution des
Provinces Unies en 1787. Paris. 1791.
Ondaatje, Q. Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis der omventeling van 1787.
Dunkirk.
1792.
Pfau, T. P. von. Geschichte des preussischen Feldzuges in der Provinz
Holland im Jahr 1787. 2 vols. Berlin. 1790.
Precis Politique sur les differences qui se sont eleve'es entre
l’Empereur et les l^tats G&eraux des Provinces Unies, relativement a
l’Escaut. Paris. 1785.
Sammlung unpartheiischer Schriften iiber die neulichen Unruhen in den
vereinigten und den Oestreichischen Niederlanden. 2 vols. Berlin. 1789.
Secondary Works.
De Witt, P. Une Invasion prussienne en Hollande en 1787. Paris.
1887.
Nijhoff. De Hertog
van Brunswijk. The Hague. 1889.
Schenk, W. G. F. Wilhelm der Fiinfte. Stuttgart.
1854.
4. AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA.
Original Authorities.
Dolfin, D., Relation de, 1793. Fontes Rerum Austriacarum, Section n.
Diplo- mataria, Vol. xxii.
Die Relationen der Botschaften Venedigs iiber Oesterreich
im achtzehnten Jahrhundert. Herausg. von Alfred Ritter von Arneth. Vienna.
1863.
Kupke, G. Eine Relation iiber den preussischen Hof vom Jahre 1795. Quellen
und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven. Bd. i. p. 261. Rome. 1898.
Massenbach, C. von. Memoiren zur Geschichte des preussischen Staates unter
Friedrich Wilhelm II und III. 3 vols. Berlin. 1809.
Sorel, A. Recueil des Instructions donnees aux Ambassadeurs de France en
Autriche (1648-1789). Paris. 1884.
Vivenot, A. von. Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserpolitik wahrend
der franzosischen Revolutionskriege, 1790-1801. Vienna. 1873. In progress.
Thugut, Clerfayt und Wurmser.
Originaldocumente aus dem K. K. Haus-,
Hof-, und Staats-Archiv und dem K. K. Kriegs-Archiv in Wien von Juli 1794
bis Februar 1797. Vienna. 1869.
Waddington, A. Recueil des Instructions donnees aux Ambassadeurs de
France en Prusse. Paris. 1902.
Secondary Works.
Cosel, E. von. Geschichte des preussischen Staates und Volkes unter den
Hohen- zollemschen Fiirsten. 8 vols. Leipzig. 1869-76.
Denis, E. L’Allemagne von 1789 a 1815. Paris. 1896.
Duncker, M. Friedrich Wilhelm II und Graf Hertzberg. Historische
Zeitschrift. Munich. 1877.
Ebertz, F. Geschichte des Preussischen Staates. 7 vols. Breslau. 1873.
Hausser, L. Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen his zur
Griindung des deutschen Bundes. 3rd ed. 4 vols. Berlin. 1861-3. Heigel, K. T.
Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur Aufldsung des alten
Reiches. Berlin. 1883.
Huber, F. X. Geschichte Josephs II. 2 vols. Vienna. 1792.
Huffer, H. Oesterreich und Preussen gegenuber der franzosischen Revolution
bis zum Abschluss des Friedens von Campo Formio. Bonn. 1868.
Lehmann, M. Freiherr vom Stein. Part i: Von der Reform. 1757-1807. Leipzig.
1902. .
Menzel, K. A. Zwanzig Jahre Preussischer Geschichte. 1786 bis 1806. Berlin.
1849. .
Pertz, G. H. Das Leben des Ministers Freiherm vom Stein. Vol. i. 6 vols.
Berlin. 1849.
Philippson, M. Geschichte des Preussischen Staatswesens vom Tode Friedrichs
des Grossen bis zu den Freiheitskriegen. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1880-2.
Ranke, L. von. Denkwiirdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fiirsten von
Hardenberg.
5 vols.
Leipzig. 1877. 2nd ed. Vols. jclvi-viii of
Sammtliche Werke. Leipzig. 1879-81.
Die Deutschen Machte und der Furstenbund. 2
vols. Berlin. 1872. 2nd ed.
Vols. xxxi-n of Sammtliche Werke.
Sayous, M. E. Histoire des Hongrois de 1790 a 1815. Paris. 1872. .
Schmidt, W. A. Preussens Deutsche Politik. Die Dreifiirstenbunde, 1785,
1806, 1849. 2nd ed. Berlin. 1850.
Geschichte der Preussisch-Deutschen
Unionsbestrebungen, von 1780 bis
1790. Leipzig.
1871.
Seeley, Sir J. R. Life of Stein. 3 vols. Cambridge. 1878.
Simmern, Langwerth von. Oesterreich und das Reich im Kampfe gegen die
franzosische Revolution, 1790-7. 2 vols. Berlin. 1880.
Syhel, H. von. Kaiser Leopold II. Hist. Zeitschrift. Munich. 1863 and 1864.
Treitschke, H. von. Deutsche Geschichte im xixten Jahrhundert. Vol. i. Berlin.
1879.
Unzer, A. Hertzberg’s Anteil an den Preussich-Oesterreicjsischen
Verhandlungen, 1778-9. Frankfort. 1890.
Vehse, E.
Memoirs of the Court, Aristocracy and Diplomacy of Austria. Translated from
the German by Franz C. F. Demmler. 2 vols. London. 1856.
Memoirs of the Court of Prussia. Translated by
F. C. F. Demmler.
London. 1864.
Vivenot, A. von. Herzog Albrecht von Sachsen-Teschen als
Reichsfeldmarschall. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des ReichsverfaUes und des
Baseler Friedens.
3 vols. Vienna.
1864-6.
Wolf, G. Oesterreich und Preussen, 1780-90. Vienna. 1880.
5. RUSSIA, TURKEY AND THE EASTERN QUESTION.
Original Authorities.
Boulgakoff,
Ya. L (Russian Ambassador at Constantinople in 1792). Papiers. Collection de la Societe Imperiale de l’Histoire de Russie. St
Petersburg. Vol. XLVI.
Catharine II, Memoires de l’lmperatrice, e'crits par elle-meme, precedes
d’une preface par A. Herzen. London. 1859.
L)a jhkoff, E. R., Fiirstin. Memoiren zur Geschichte der Kaiserin Katharina
II, nebst Einleitung von Alexander Herzen. 2 vols.
Hamburg. 1857.
Masson, C. F. P. Memoires Secretes sur la Russie et particulierement sur
la fin du regne de Catharine II et sur celui de Paul I. (Published
anonymously.) 2nd ed. 3 vols. London. 1802.
Rambaud, A. N. Recueil des Instructions donn£es aux Ambassadeurs de
France en Russie. Paris. 1884.
Rapt de la Bukovine, d’apres des Documents Authentiques. In Archives
Diplo- matiques. Paris. 1875.
Tott, Baron
F. de. Memoirs, containing state of Turkish Empire and Crimea during the war
with Russia. Translated. 2 vols. London. 1786.
Secondary Works.
Beer, A. Die Orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774. Prague and
Leipzig. 1883. Bruckner, A. Katharina die Zweite. Berlin. 1885.
Castera, J. H. Histoire de Catharine II, Imperatrice de Russie. Paris. 1799. Hammer-Purgstall, J. von. Geschichte des
Osmanischen Reiches. 10 vols. Pesth. 1827-35.
Herrmann, E. Geschichte des russichen Staates. (Gesch. d. europ. Staaten.)
4 vols. Hamburg and Gotha. 1846-60.
Rambaud, A. N. Histoire de la Russie. Paris. 1878. Translated
by Mrs L. B.
Lang. 2 vols.
London. 1879. i'ooke, W. History of Russia in the reign of Catharine II. 4th
ed. 3 vols. London. 1800.
Waliszewski,
K. The Romance of an Empress (Catharine II of Russia). 2 vols. London. 1894.
The Story of a Throne (Catharine II of
Russia). 2 vols. London. 1895.
Zinkeisen, J. W. Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa. (Gesch. der
europ. Staaten.) 7 vols. Hamburg. 1840-63.
6. POLAND.
Original Authorities.
Farges, L. Recueil des Instructions donnees aux Ambassadeurs de la
France en Pologne. 2 vols. Paris. 1888.
Favrat, F. A. von. Beytrage zur Geschichte der Polnischen Feldzuge von
1794-6, aus dem franzosischen MS. des Verfassers iibersetzt. Berlin. 1799.
Geordnete Sammlung der Regierungsschriften und Proklamationen die seit dem
23 Marz 1794 in Pohlen erschienen, mit einer nahern Beschreibung von ihrem
Anfange bis auf den heutigen Tag fortgesetzt, von einem Warschauer Burger. Warsaw. 1795.
Kilinski, J. Me'moires sur la Revolution Polonaise de 1794 et sur ma
captivite 4 Petersbourg. (Translated from the Polish.) Paris. 1861.
Mehee, J. C. H. Histoire de la pr£tendue Revolution de Pologne, avec un
examen de sa nouvelle Constitution. Paris. 1792.
Oginski, M. Memoires sur la Pologne et les Polonais, depuis 1788 jusqu’a
la fin de 1815. 4 vols. Faris. 1826-7.
Pister. Memoires sur la Revolution de la Pologne, trouv£s k Berlin. Paris. 1806. Potocki, I., Kollataj, H. and Durochowski,
F. K. Vom Entstehen und Untergauge der Polnischen Konstitution vom 3ten
May, 1791. Translated by S. B. Linde. Lemberg. 1793.
Versuch einer Geschichte der letzten Polnischen Revolution vom Jahre 1794.
2 Theile. (Anonymous.) Sine
loco. 1796.
Zajacznek, J. Histoire de la Revolution de Pologne en 1794, par un
temoin oculaire. Paris. 1797.
Secondary Works.
Blum, K. L. Ein russischer Staatsmann. Denkwiirdigkeiten des Grafen
Sievers.
4 vols.
Leipzig. 1864.
Briiggen, Baron E. von der. Die erste Theilung Folens und die Constitution
vom
3 Mai 1791.
Preussische Jahrbiicher, 1873 and 1875.
Polens Auflosung. Leipzig. 1878.
Ferrand, Comte A. de. Histoire des trois demembrements de Pologne. 3 vols. Paris. 1820.
Jekel, F. J. Darstellung der Staatsveranderung Polens. Vienna. 1794.
XaiseT, A. Geschichte der Polnischen Revolution vom Jahre 1794. 2
vols. Leipzig. 1838.
Korzon, F.
Internal History of Poland under Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski.
(In Polish.) 4 vols. Cracow. 1882-6.
Kostomarow, N. J. Die letzten Jahre der Repuhlik Polens. St
Petersburg. 1870. Kraszewski, I. J. Poland at the time of the three Partitions.
(In Polish.) Posen. 1873.
Lelewel, J. Histoire de Pologne. 2 vols. Paris. 1844.
Smitt, F. von. Suworow und Polens Untergang. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1858.
Solov<?v, S. M. Geschichte des Falles von Polen. Gotha. 1866.
Treskow, A. von. Feldzug der Preussen, 1794. Berlin. 1837.
7. SWEDEN.
Original Authorities.
Adlerbeth, Baron G. G. Historiska Anteckningar. 3 vols. Orebro. 1856-7.
Ehrensvard, Baron G. J. Dagboksanteckningar forda vid Gustaf Ill’s Hof af
fuherre G. J. E. 2 vols. Stockholm. 1818.
Engestrom, Baron L. von. Minnen och Anteckningar. Stockholm. 1876.
Geijer, E. G. Des Konigs Gustavs III nachgelassene Papiere. 2 vols. Upsala. 1843. Gustave III, roi de Suede, Collection des ecrits
politiques, literaires et dramatiques de, suivie de sa correspondance. 5 vols.
Stockholm. 1803.
Hesse, Prince Charles de. Memoires sur la campagne de 1788 en Suede. Copenhagen. 1789.
Liliencrantz, Count J. Anteckningar och Memorial. Konglicht Samfundet for
utgifvande af handskrifter rorande Skandinaviens historia. Vol.
viii. Stockholm. 1878.
Toll, J. C.
Biografiskteckning. 2 vols. Stockholm. 1849-50.
Secondary Works.
Akeson, N. Gustaf Ill’s Forhallauden till Franska Revolutionen.
Arndt, C. M. Schwedische Geschichte unter Gustav III. Leipzig.
1839.
Bain, R. N.
Gustavus III and his Contemporaries, 1746-92. 2
vols. London. 1894. D’Aquila, C. J. E. H. Histoire des Evenemens Memorables du
regne de Gustave III, Roi de Suede. 2 vols. Paris. 1807.
Geffrey, A. Gustave III et la Cour de France. 2nd ed. 2
vols. Paris. 1867. Grot, Y. K. Ekaterina i Gustav III. Academy of Sciences. Vol. xxx. St Petersburg 1877.
Mellin, P. E. Verschworung und Mordattentat gegen Gustav III, Konig von
Schweden. Gotha. 1890.
Odhner, C. J. Sveriges politiske historia under Gustaf
III regering. Stockholm
1885. ‘
Posselt, C. L. Geschichte Gustavs III. Karlsruhe.
1792.
Sheridan, C.
F. History of the Late Revolution in Sweden. London. 1778. Tegner, E. Fran
tredje Gustafs dagar. Anteckningar och minnen af
E. Schroder- heim etc. 3 vols. Stockholm. 1892-4.
I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES.
Bardin* Baron E. A. Dictionnaire de l’armee de terre. Vol. n, pp.
445-465.
4 vols. Paris. 1841-51.
Duruy, A. L’armee royale en 1789. Paris. 1889.
Lavisse, E. and Rambaud, A. Histoire Generale du ive Siecle a
nos jours. Vol. vii, chap. vii. Vol. vm, ch. v. Paris. 1893-1901.
II. ARCHIVES.
Berlin, Government archives: Despatches of Brunswick, Mollendorf,
Manstein, Haugwitz, Hardenberg and Buchholz.
Gotha:
Despatches of Brunswick.
The Hague:
Despatches of officers in command of Dutch troops.
London,
Record Office: Despatches of the Duke of York.
Paris, Bibliotheque du Depot de la guerre: Collection of ordonnanees and
military regulations. Archives du Depot de la guerre:
Correspondence of various generals in command of corps during the period.
Vienna :
Despatches of Coburg, Wurmser, and Wallis.
III. CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES.
Le Moniteur Universel. Paris. 1792-5.
Minerva. Berlin. ] 792-5.
Gazette Nationale. Paris. 1789 etc.
Journal de Paris. Paris.
Annual Register. 1792-5. London. 1758 etc.
Aulard, P. A. Collection de documents relatifs a 1’histoire de Prance.
Paris. 1888.
Charavay, E. Correspondance generale de Carnot. Paris. 1892 etc. In
progress.
Correspondance originale des Emigres; ou Les Emigres peints par
eux-memes. Paris. 1793.
Deutsche Revue. Lombard Letters. Berlin. Feb. and March, 1883.
Gal baud, F. T. Observations sur la petition presentee a la Convention
Nationale dans sa seance du 28 octobre, 1792. Paris. 1792.
Kellermann, F. C., Due de Valmy. Expose de la conduite de Kellermann. 2
Parts. Chambery. 1793.
Malmesbury,
J. Harris, Earl of. Diaries and Correspondence of the first Earl Malmesbury. 4 vols. London. 1844.
Martens, Baron T. T. Recueil general de traites. Gottingen. 1887.
Minutoli, H. C. Menu, Baron von. Der Feldzug der
Verbundeten in Frankreich im Jahre 1792. Berlin. 1847. •
Mirabeau, H. G. Riquetti, Comte de. Systeme militaire de la Prusse. In
Biblio- theque du Depot de la guerre. London. 1788.
Rousselin, Corbeau de Saint-Albin, A. C. O., Comte. Vie de Lazare Hocbe.
2 vols. Paris. 1798.
Vivenot, A. von. Thugut, Clerfayt, und Wurmser. (Original Documents.)
Vienna. 1869.
Vertrauliche Briefe des Freiberm von Thugut.
Vienna. 1872.
Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen
Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs wahrend der
franzosischen Revolutionskriege (1790-1801). Vienna. 1873 etc. In
progress.
IV. MEMOIRS.
Bouille, F. C. A., Marquis de. Memoires, edited by M. F.
Barriere. Paris. 1859. Dumouriez, C. F. Memoires, edited by F. S. Barriere. 2 vols. Paris. 1848. Goguelat, Baron F. de. Memoires. Paris. 1823.
Gonneville, A. O. Le Harivel de. Souvenirs militaires. Paris. 1875.
Gouvion St Cyr, L. de. Memoires sur les campagnes des armees du Rhin de
1792, jusqu’a la paix de Campo Formio. 4 vols.
Paris. 1829.
Hardenberg, C. A. von, Prince. Denkwiirdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers
Fiirsten von Hardenberg. Edited by L. von Ranke. 5 vols. Leipzig. 1877.
Lafayette, M. J. P. R. G. Motier, Marquis de. Memoires. 6 vols. Paris. 1837-8.
Lauzun, A. L. Gontaut, Due de. Memoires, edited by Lacour. Paris. 1858. Lavalette, Comte A. M. C. de. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris.
1831.
Ligne, C. J., Prince de. Memoires Paris. 1860.
Marmont, A. F. C. Viesse, Marshal de. Le Mare'chal de Marmont devant
l’histoire. Paris. 1848.
Massena, A., Prince of Essling. Memoires. Paris. 1848.
Massenbach, C. von. Memoiren iiber meine Verhaltnisse zum preucsischen
Staat und insbesondere zum Herzoge von Braunschweig. 2 vols. Amsterdam. 1809.
Minutoli, H. C. Menu, Baron von. Militarische Erinnerungen aus dem Tagebuche
des Generallieutenants von Minutoli. Berlin. 1845.
Rochambeau, J. B. D. de Vimeur, Marshal de. Memoires. Paris. 1809.
Saint-Germains, Comte C. L. de. Memoires. Paris. 1779.
Saxe, Marshal de. Lettres et Memoires. Edited by Count de Grimoard. 5
vols. Paris. 1794.
Segur, Comte P. L. de. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1824-6.
Soult, N. J. de Dieu, Marshal. Memoires. Paris. 1854
V. MILITARY HISTORIES.
Belleval, R., Marquis de. Un capitaine au regiment du roi. Paris. 1894. Bogislanski, A. V. Das Leben des Generals
Dumouriez. Berlin. 1789.
Bonnal, E. Operations et batailles, 1792-1800. Paris. 1889.
Bonnechose, E. de. Lazare Hoche. Edited by H. Bue. London. 1878.
Chassin, C. L. L’armee de la Revolution, la paix et la guerre. Paris.
1867. Chuquet, A. Les Guerres de la Revolution. Paris. 1886 etc. In progress.
Clermont, P. Les campagnes en sabots. Paris. 1900.
Desprez, C. Vie de Lazare Hoche. Paris. 1880.
Dessaix, J. and Folliet, A. litude bistorique sur la Revolution et
l’Empire en Savoie. Le Gene'ral Dessaix, sa vie politique et militaire. Annecy.
1879. Dubail, E. Precis de l’histoire militaire. Paris. 1879-80.
Duruy, A. L’arme'e royale en 1789. Paris. 1888.
Etudes d’histoire militaire sur la Revolution
et l’Empire. Paris. 1889.
DussieuXj L. E. L’armee en France, son histoire et organisation, depuis
les temps anciens jusqu’a nos jours. 3 vols. Versailles. 1884.
Fervel, J. N. Campagnes de la Revolution dans les Pyrenees orientales.
Paris. 1851-3.
Foucart, P. and Finot, J. La de'fense nationale dans le Nord, 1792 a
1802. 2 vols. Lille. 1890-3.
Foy, M. S. Histoire de la Guerre de la Peninsule, sous Napoleon. Paris.
1827. Gaftarel P. Les campagnes de la premiere Republique. Paris. 1888.
Goethe, J. W.
von. Campagne in Frankreich. Edited by A. Chuquet. Paris. 1884. Goltz, C., Baron von der. Rosbach und Jena. Studien iiber die
Zustande und das geistige Leben in der preussischen Armee. Berlin. 1883.
Grimoardj Comte P. H. de. Essai theorique et pratique sur les batailles.
Paris. 1775.
Constitution des troupes legeres. Paris. 1782.
Guibertj Comte J. A. H. de. CEuvres militaires. 5 vols. Paris. 1803.
Guillon, E. Les Generaux de la Republique. Paris. 1885.
Hauterive, 12. de. L’armee sous la Revolution 1789-94. Paris. 1894.
Jominij Baron A. H. de. Histoire critique et militaire des campagnes de
la Revolution, de 1792 a 1801. 5 vols. avec atlas. Paris. 1820-4.
Jung, H. F. T. Dubois de Crance. L’armee et la Revolutiou, 1747-1814. 2
vols. Paris. 1884.
Krebs, V. and Moris, H. Campagnes des Alpes pendant la Revolution. 2 vols. Paris. 1891-5.
Lufft, A. Der Feldzug am Mittelrhein, von Mitte August bis Ende Dezember,
1793. Freiburg. 1881.
Michelet, J. Les soldats de la Revolution. Paris. 1878.
Montgaillard, J. B. M. Roques de. La trahison de Pichegru. Paris. 1804.
Pajol, Comte C. P. V. Kleber, sa vie, sa correspondance. Paris. 1877.
Parfait, Noel. Le General Marceau. Paris. 1893.
Pascal, A. Histoire de l’armee et de tous les regiments depuis les
premiers temps de la monarchic jusqu’a nos jours, 1847-58. 5 vols. Paris.
1859-60.
Petit, M. Les Prussiens en Champagne, 1792. Paris. 1890.
Pinelli, F. A. Storia militare de Piemonte. 3 vols. Turin. 1854-55.
Poisson, Baron C. L’armee et la garde nationale. 4 vols. 1789-92. Paris.
1858-62. Rambaud, A. N. Les Franijais sur le Rhin, 1790-1804. La domination Franfaise en Allemagne. Paris. 1873.
Ranke, L. von. Ursprung und Beginn der Revolutionskriege 1791 und 1792.
2nd ed. Vol. xlv of Sammtliche
Werke. Leipzig. 1879.
Romagny, C. M. Histoire generate de l’Armee nationale. depuis Bouvines
jusqu’a nos jours. Paris. 1893.
Rouquet, J. Les Caisses d’epargne, leur regime ancien et nouveau. Paris.
1896. Rousset, C. F. M. Les volontaires, 1791-4. Paris. 1882.
Sainte-Chapelle. L’Armee et la Patrie. L’histoire generale des
institutions militaires de France pendant la Revolution. 3 vols. Paris.
1820-1.
Thaon, I., Comte di Revel. Memoires sur la guerre des Alpes et les
ev&ements en Piemont pendant la Revolution Franchise, tires des papiers du
Comte I. Thaon. Rome. 1871.
Toulongeon, H. J. R., Marquis de. Une mission militaire en Prusse en
1786. Paris. 1881.
Vernon, Baron J. L. C. Gay de. Memoires sur les operations militaires
des generaux en chef Custine et Houchard, pendant les annees 1792-3. Paris. 1844. Vivenot, A. von. Herzog Albrecht von
Sachsen-Teschen, als Reichsfeldmarschall.
2 parts. Vienna. 1864-6.
Wilkinson, H.
S. War and Policy. (Essay in.) London. 1900.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Watt, R.
Bibliotheca Britannica. Under names of officers, “navy,” “mutiny.”
4 vols. Edinburgh. 1824.
UNPUBLISHED
MATERIAL.
In the Public
Record Office, London, an enormous mass of material of which the following
items are of the most importance:
Admiralty,
Secretary, “In Letters."
Vols. 98-114.
Despatches and correspondence of Admirals commanding Channel Fleet.
167-9.
Despatches of Admirals commanding on East Indian Station. 245-9. Despatches of
Admirals commanding on Jamaica Station. 316-22. Despatches of Admirals
commanding on Leeward Isles Station. 891-403. Despatches of Admirals commanding
on Mediterranean Station. 473-4. Despatches of Admirals commanding on
Newfoundland Station. 492-4. Despatches of Admirals commanding on North
American Station.
521-7.
Despatches of Admirals commanding on North Sea Station. 3245. Correspondence
relating to the Russian Squadron (1795-6). 6125. Petitions (1793-7).
727-9.
Correspondence of Admiral commanding at the Nore and Sheemess (Mutiny of 1797).
811-2.
Correspondence of Admiral commanding at Plymouth.
1021-4.
Correspondence of Admiral commanding at Portsmouth. 5330-50. Proceedings of Courts-Martial.
3984-6.
Intelligence.
3991.
Ireland.
4156-82.
Letters from the Secretary of State.
Logs of
Ships, under the Ship’s name, year by year.
Navy List
Books, 1792-1800.
Admiralty,
Secretary, “ Out Letters.”
Vols. 122-38.
Orders and Instructions.
270-290.
Lords’ Letters.
598-625.
Secretary’s Letters to Admirals and Public Offices.
In the “
Admiralty, Secretary, In Letters,” are also the letters of Captains and
Lieutenants of ships, under the initials of the officers, year by year.
In the
Archives de la Marine at Paris is much material, including Ships’ Logs,
Admirals’ Despatches, reports of Courts of Inquiry, Intelligence; Me'moires et
Projets.
In the
Archives de la Guerre at Paris is further material, hearing on the French
projects of invasion. (Armee d’Angleterre.)
In the Archives des Affaires llltrangeres at Paris. Correspondance avec
la Hollande. Vol.
596.
In the
British Museum Library, London, are certain of the original despatches of the
Admirals from 1794 to 1806 (MSS. Catalogue, vol. 49, 313). The Egerton MSS. in
the same Library include papers and letters bearing on the Navy.
In the Irish
Record Office, Dublin Castle.
Vols. 338.
French Invasions.
408 ; 601.
State of the Country.
470. United
Irishmen and the French.
Other
unpublished matter in the Spanish and Dutch Archives.
DOCUMENTS.
Annual
Register, The. London. 1793-1800.
Annual
Register, The New. London. 1793-1800.
Blanchard, C. F. Re'pertoire General des Lois...sur la Marine. 3
vols. Paris. 1849-59.
Cobbett, W.
Parliamentary History of England. (The early form of Hansard.)
London.
1793-1800.
Correspondance
de Napoleon I. Vols. 3, 29. Paris. 1859-69.
Correspondence
between the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty...and Sir J. Orde. London.
1802.
Jackson,
Rear-Admiral T. S. (Editor). Logs of the Great Sea Fights. 1794^1805 Navy
Records Society. 2 vols. London. 1899-1900.
Laughton, J.
K. (Editor). The Naval Miscellany. Vol. i. (Letters of Hood and Lieut. Beaver.)
Navy Records Society. London. 1902.
(Editor). Official Documents Illustrating the
Social Life and Internal
Discipline of
the Navy in the 18th Century. Navy Records Society. London, in prep.
London Gazette, The. London. 1793-1800.
Moniteur Universel, Le. Paris. 1793-1800.
Naval
Chronicle, The. 40 vols. London. 1798-1818.
Rapport sur les mouvements qui ont eu lieu sur l’Escadre commandee par
le Vice- Amiral Morard de Galles, par J. B. St Andre. Brest. 1793.
Schomberg,
Captain I. Naval Chronology. 5 vols. London. 1802.
Steel, David.
Steel’s Naval Chronologist of the War. London, n.d.
Steel’s Original and Correct List of the Royal
Navy. (Periodical.) London.
1793-1800.
Tabular
Statement, A, of the Number of Seamen...from the year 1756 inclusive.
(Parliamentary
Return, 168 of 1860.) London.
Times, The.
London. 1793-1800.
GENERAL NAVAL
HISTORIES.
Brenton,
Captain E. P. The Naval History of Great Britain. 2 vols. London. 1837. Chabaud-Arnault, C. Histoire des Flottes
Militaires. Paris. 1889.
Chevalier, E. Histoire de la Marine fran^aise sous la Premiere
Re'publique. Paris. 1883.
Chevalier, B. Histoire de la Marine franfaise sous le Consulat et
l’Empire. Paris.
1886.
Clowes, Sir
W. L. The Royal Navy. Vol. rv. London. 1899.
Colomb,
Admiral P. H. Naval Warfare. 2nd Edition. London.
1895.
Dumas, Comte M. de. Precis des Evenements Militaires. Vols.
x and n. Paris.
1817.
Ekins,
Admiral C. Naval Battles from 1744 to the Peace in 1814. London. 1824. Graviere, E. J. de la. Guerres Maritimes sons la
Re'publique et l’Empire. 2 vols. Paris, n.d.
Guerin, L. Histoire maritime de la France. ‘6 vols.
Paris. 1859-63.
James, W. The
Naval History of Great Britain. 6 vols. New Ed. London. 1886. Index to the
above in the Navy Records Society publications, Vol. iv, by
C. G. Toogood. London. 1895.
Jonge, J. C.
de. Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen. 6 vols.
Gravenhage. 1833-48.
Kerguelen, Admiral Y. J. de T. Precis de la guerre presente et des
causes de la Destruction de la Marine. Paris. An ix.
Mahan, Capt.
A. T, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire. 2 vols. London, n.d.
Troude, O. Batailles Navales de la France. 4 vols. Paris. 1867.
Victoires, Conquetes, Desastres...des Franfais de 1792 a 1815. 27
vols. Paris. 1817-21,
NAVAL
TECHNOLOGY.
Chamock, J.
History of Marine Architecture. 3 vols. London. 1802.
Derrick, C.
Memoirs of the Rise and Progress of the Royal Navy. London. 1806. Encyclopedie
Methodique. Marine. 3 vols. Paris. 1783-7.
Falconer, W.
An Universal Dictionary of the Marine. London. 1789.
Lever, D. The
Young Sea-Officer’s Sheet Anchor. London. 1808.
Steel, D. The
Ship-Master’s Assistant. London. 1799.
System of
Naval Tactics, A. London. 1797.
BIOGRAPHIES
AND LETTERS ETC. OF INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS.
Allardyce, A.
Memoir of the Hon. G. K. Elphinstone, K.B., Viscount Keith. London. 1882.
Allen, J.
Memoir of the Life and Services of Admiral Sir W. Hargood. Greenwich. 1841
Barrow, J.
Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir W. S. Smith. 2 vols.
London. 1848.
The Life of Richard, Earl Howe. London. 1838.
Bevan, A. B.
and Wolryche-Whitmore, H. B. A Sailor of King George. The Journals of Capt. F.
Hoffman, 1793-1814. London. 1901.
Bourchier,
Lady J. B. Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir E. Codrington. 2 vols. London.
1873.
Brenton,
Captain E. P. Life and Correspondence of John, Earl of St Vincent, Admiral of
the Fleet. 2 vols. London. 1838.
Brenton, Sir
L. C. P. Memoir of Vice-Admiral Sir J. Brenton. 2nd ed.
London. 1885
Camperdown, Earl of. Admiral Duncan. London. 1898.
Charnock, J.
Biographia Navalis...from the year 1660 to the present time. 6 vols. London.
l794r-8.
Chatterton,
Lady Georgiana. Memorials Personal aud Historical of Admiral Lord Gambier. 2
vols. London. 1861.
Clarke, J. S.
and M’Arthur, J. Life of Admiral Lord Nelson. 2nd Ed. 3 vols. 1840.
Collingwood,
G. L. N. A Selection from the Public and Private Correspondence of Vice-Admiral
Lord Collingwood. London. 1828.
Dundonald,
Earl of. The Autobiography of a Seaman. London. 1861.
Fabre, E. Le Contre-Amiral Bouvet. Paris. 1887.
Gardner,
Commander J. A. Reminiscences of, 1775-1806. Edited by Sir R. Vesey Hamilton.
(Navy Records Society.) Iiondon, in prep.
James,
Rear-Admiral B. Journal of, 1752-1828. Edited by Prof. J. K. Laughton.
(Navy Records
Society.) London. 1896.
Laughton, J.
K. (Editor). From Howard to Nelson. Twelve Sailors. London.
1899.
Mahan, Capt. A.
T. Types of Naval Officers (Jervis, Saumarez, Pellew).
London. 1902.
The Life of Nelson. (2nd Ed.) London. 1899.
Markham,
Admiral John. A Naval Career during the old War: being...the life of Adm. John
Markham. London. 1883.
Marshall,
Lieutenant J. Royal Naval Biography. 12 vols. London. 1823-35. Martin, Journals
and Letters of Admiral of the Fleet Sir T. B. Martin, 1773-1854. Edited by Sir
R. V. Hamilton. (Navy Records Society.) 3 vols. London. 1898-1902. (Index in
vol. i.)
Minto, Sir G.
Elliot, first Earl of. Life and Letters of. 3 vols. London. 1874. Murray, Capt.
A. Memoir of the Naval Life and Services of Admiral Sir P. Durham. London.
1846.
Nicolas, Sir
N. H. Dispatches and Letters of Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson. 7 vols. London. 1844-6.
Nicolas, —. Jeanbon St Andre. Sa vie et ses e'crits. Montauban.
1848.
Osier, E. The
Life of Admiral Lord Exmouth. London. 1835.
Parker, R.
[Mutineer]. The Trial, Life and Anecdotes of R. Parker. Manchester.
1797. (Anon.)
An Impartial...account of the Life of R. Parker.
London. 1797. (Anon.),
Phillimore,
Rear-Admiral A. The Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir W. Parker.
3 vols. London. 1876-80.
Ralfe, J.
Naval Biography of Great Britain. 4 vols. London. 1828.
floss,
Captain Sir J. Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord Saumarez.
2 vols. London. 1838.
Rousselin, Corbeau de St Albin, Count. Vie de L. Hoche. 2
vols. Paris. 1798. Stanhope, Earl. Life of the Hon. William Pitt. 4 vols.
London. 1862.
Tucker, J. S.
Memoirs of Admiral the Rt Hon. the Earl of St Vincent. 2 vols. London.' 1844.
Hennequin, J. F. G. Biographie Maritime. 3 vols. Paris.
1835-7.
O’Byme, W.
Naval Biographical Dictionary. London. 1849.
SPECIAL
WORKS.
Expeditions, French and British.
British
Minor Expeditions, Compiled in the Intelligence Branch of the Quartermaster’s
Dept. London. 1884. ,
Desbriere, Capitaine E. Projets et Tentatives de Debarquement aux lies
Britanniques. 1793-1805.
5 vols. Paris. 1900-2.
Irish Expeditions.
Conduct of
the Admiralty in the Late Expedition of the Enemy to the Coast of Ireland.
(Anon.) London. 1797.
Escande, G.
Hoche en Irelande, 1795-8. Paris. 1888.
Gordon, J.
History of the Rebellion in Ireland. London. 1803.
Gribayedoff,
V. The French Invasion of Ireland in 1798. New York.
1890. Grouchy, Marquis de. Memoires du Mar&hal de Grouchy. 5 vols. Paris.
1874. Guillon, E. La France et l’lrlande pendant la Revolution. Paris. 1888.
Jonnes, A. Moreau de. A ventures de Guerre. Paris. 1893.
Moore, T. The
Life and Death of Lord E. Fitzgerald. Dublin. 1848.
Percy
Society. Early English Poetry. (Bantry.) Vol. xxi, p. 17. London. 1848. Sorel,
A. Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797. Paris. 1896.
Tone, Wolfe
T. Life of T. W. Tone...written by himself and continued by his son. 2 vols.
Washington. 1826.
Welsh Expedition.
Archaeologia
Cambrensis, Oct. 1883. (French at Fishguard.) Cambrian Archaeological
Association. London. lames, M. E. The Fishguard Invasion. London. 1897.
Brest and Toulon.
Bran, V. Guerres Maritimes de la France; Port de Toulon... 2 vols.
Paris. 1861. Chuquet, A. La Jeunesse de Napoleon. Toulon. Paris. 1899.
Cottin, P. Toulon et les Anglais en 1793. Paris. 1898.
Lambert. Histoire de Toulon. 4 vols. Toulon. 1887-92.
Levot, P. Histoire de la Ville de Brest pendant la Terreur. Brest, n.d.
Histoire de la Ville de Brest sous le Directoire
et le Consulat Brest. n.d.
Pons, M. Z. Memoires pour servir a l’Histoire de la Ville de Toulon. Paris.
1825.
St Vincent.
Drinkwater-Bethune,
Colonel J. A Narrative of the Battle of St Vincent. 2nd Ed. London. 1840.
Quiberon.
Chassin, C. L. Le General Hoche a Quiberon. Paris. 1897.
Closmadeuc, G. T. de. Quiberon, 1795. limigrds et Chouans. Paris. 1899.
Puisaye, J. G. Comte de. Memoires pour servir a l’Histoire du Parti Royaliste.
' 6 vols. Londres et Paris. 1803-6.
Robert, C. 1795. Expedition des Emigres a Quiberon. Paris.
1899.
The Mutinies.
A Letter from
a Naval Officer to a Friend on the late...Mutiny. London. 1797. Cunningham,
Rear-Admiral Sir Chas. A Narrative of the occurrences...during the Mutiny at
the Nore. Chatham. 1829.
Patton,
Rear-Admiral Philip. Account of the Mntinies at Spithead and St Helen’s in
April and May, 1797. [Not in British Museum.]
Camperdown.
Bom, G. D. “
D’Vrijheid.” 1781-97. Geschiedenis van een Vlaggeschip. Amsterdam. 1897.
Cambier,
Lieut.-Col. J. R. J. P. De Nederlandsche Mariniers van 1665 tot 1900. Holder.
1899.
Omond, G. W.
T. The Arniston Memoirs. Edinburgh. 1887.
Volledige
Verslag van de Zeebataille van 11 Oct. door het Committe des Marine aan de Nat.
Vergadering gedaan. 1797.
Winter,
Vice-Admiral J. W. de, Comte de Huessen. Sententie.
Privateers.
Williams, G.
History of the Liverpool Privateers. London. 1897.
Marines.
Nicolas,
Lieut. P. H. Historical Record of the Royal Marine Forces. 2 vols. London. 1845.
West Indies.
Ardouin, B. Etudes sur l’histoire d’Haiti. Paris. 1853-.
Edwards, B.
The History Civil and Ecclesiastical of the British Colonies in the West
Indies. 5th Ed. 6 vols. London. 1819.
Willyama, C.
Account of the Campaign in the West Indies under Sir C. Grey and Sir J. Jervis.
London. 1796.
Commerce and Shipping.
Colquhoun, P.
Treatise on the Commerce and Police of the River Thames... London. 1800.
Lindsay, W.
S. History of Merchant Shipping. 4 vols. London. 1874-6. Macpherson, D. Annals
of Commerce. 4 vols. London. 1805.
McArthur, J.
Financial Facts of the Eighteenth Century... London. 1801. Norman, C. B. The
Corsairs of France. London. 1887.
I. OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS AND DOCUMENTS.
Constitution de la Republique fran^aise et lois y relatives. Paris.
1795.
The
Constitution of the Year in will also be found in “Les Constitutions de la
Prance depuis 1789, par L. Duguit et H. Monnier.” Paris. 1898.
Bulletin des Lois de la Republique frani^iise, Ans iv-viii. 9 vols. Paris. 1794-9.
Collection generale des Lois, Proclamations, Arretes et autres Actes du
Directoire executif. 5 vols. Paris. 1796-1800.
Proces-Verbal des seances du Conseil des Anciens. 49 vols. Paris.
1795-9.
Proces-Verhal des seances du Conseil des Cinq-Cents. 50
vols. Paris. 1796-9.
The
proceedings of both Councils will be found also in the “Journal des debats
et lois du Corps Legislatif” and in vols. 37 and 38 of the “ Histoire
parlementaire
de la Revolution par P. J. B. Buchez et P. C. Roux.” Paris. 1838.
Costumes des Representans du peuple, du Directoire executif, des
Ministres, etc. Paris. 1795.
II. CONTEMPORARY WORKS AND DOCUMENTS ON THE
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STATE OF FRANCE, 1795-9.
Aulard, F. A. Paris pendant la Reaction thermidorienne et sous le Directoire.
5 vols. Paris. 1898-1902. Collection de documents relatifs a l’histoire de
Paris pendant la Revolution.
L’^tat de la France en l’an viii et en l’an ix. Documents publies
par
F. A. Aulard. Paris. 1897. Soc.
de l’histoire de la Revolution Fran^aise.
Burke, E.
Thoughts on the prospects of a Regicide Peace. London.
1796.
Mallet du Pan, J. Mercure Britannique, ou notices historiques et
critiques sur les affaires du terns. 5 vols. London. 1798-1800.
Correspondance inedite de Mallet du Pan avec
la Cour de Vienne, 1794-8.
Publiee par A. Michel. 2 vols. Paris. 1884.
Meister, J. H. Souvenirs de mon dernier Voyage a Paris. Paris.
1797.
Moody, C. L.
A Sketch of modern France in a series of letters to a Lady of Fashion written
in the years 1796 and 1797 during a tour through France. By a Lady. Edited by
C. L. Moody. London. 1798. French translation under the title “ La France et
Paris sous le Directoire. Lettres traduites et
annotees par A. Babeau.” Paris. 1888.
Rocquain, F. L’Etat de la France au 18 Brumaire d’apres les rapports deR
Conseilleurs d’Etat. Paris. 1894.
III. MEMOIRS, ETC.
Barras, P. F. J. N. de. Memoires publiees avec une introduction generate
par
G. Durny. 4 vols. Paris. 1895-6.
English translation by C. E. Roche. 4 vols. London. 1895-6.
Doulcet de Pontecoulant, Comte L. G. Souvenirs historiques et
parlementaires.
Vol. n. Le Directoire. Paris. 1862.
Fauche Borel, L. Memoires. 4 vols. Paris. 1829.
Gohier, L. J. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1824.
La Revelliere de Lepeaux, L. M. de. Memoires, publie'es par son fils. 3
vols. Paris. 1895.
Malmesbury,
J. Harris, Earl of. Diaries and correspondence of James, first Earl of
Malmesbury. Edited by his grandson, the third Earl. 4 vols. London. 1844.
Thibaudeau, A. C. Memoires sur la Convention et le Directoire. Vol. ii. Le Directoire. Paris. 1827.
See also
below under the Coup d’Etat of 18 Fructidor.
IV. SEPARATE SUBJECTS AND EVENTS.
A. The Clergy.
Bire, E. Le Clerge de France pendant la Revolution. Lyons. 1901.
Jordan, C. Discours et rapport sur la liberte, l’exercise et la police
de tous les Cultes dans la seance du Conseil des Cinq-Cents du 29 prairial, an
v.
Pierre, V. La Deportation ecclesiastique sous le Directoire. Paris.
1896. Soc. d’histoire contemporaine.
La Terreur sous le Directoire. Histoire de la
persecution apres le Coup
d’Etat du 18 Fructidor. Paris. 1887.
Thys, A. La persecution religieuse en Belgique sous le Directoire,
1798-9. Antwerp. 1899.
B. The I^migrIss.
Daudet, E. Histoire de Immigration. Les JSmigres et la seconde
coalition, 17971800. Paris. 1886.
Lally-Tollendal, Comte T. G. de. Defense des Emigres fran^ais. Paris.
1797.
Translated
into English by J. Gifford. London. 1797.
Morellet, A. Appel a l’opinion publique dans la cause des peres et
meres, a'ieuls et aieules d’fimigres. Paris. 1796.
Demiere defense des peres et meres etc.
d’fimigres. Paris. 1796.
C. Conspiracy
of Babeuf.
Advielle, V. Histoire de Gracchus Babeuf et du Babouvisme. 2 vols.
Paris. 1884. Buonarroti, P. Conspiration pour l’egalite, dite de Babeuf. 2
vols. Brussels. 1828. Later editions published in 1850 and 1869. English
translation by Bronterre O’Brien. London. 1836.
Copie des pieces saisies dans le local que Baboeuf occupoit lors de son
arrestation. Paris. 1797.
Debats du proces instruit par la Haute Cour de Justice contre Drouet,
Baboeuf et autres. 4 vols. Paris. 1797.
D. Coup d’Etat of the 18th Fbuotjdob
(September, 1797).
Ayme, J. J. Deportation et naufrage de J.-J. Ayme, suivis du tableau de
vie et de mort des deportes a son depart de la Guyanne. Paris. 1800.
Bailleul, J. C. Rapport sur la Conjuration du 18 fructidor, an v, au nom
d’une Commission speciale. Paris. 1798.
Barbe-Marbois, F. de. Journal d’un deporte non juge, ou deportation en
violation des lois decretees le 18 fructidor. 2 vols. Brussels. 1835.
Carnot, L. N. M. Reponse au Rapport fait sur la Conjuration du 18
fructidor, an v, par J.-C. Bailleul. London. 1799. English translation. London.
1799. De La Rue, J. E. Histoire du dix-huit fructidor, ou Memoires contenant la
verite sur les divers evenemens qui so rattachent a cette conjuration. Paris.
1821. Dumas, M. Souvenirs du Lieutenant-General Comte Mathieu Dumas de 1770 a
1836, publies par son fils C. Dumas. Paris. 1839. English translation. London.
1839.
Jordan, C. Camille Jordan, Depute du Rhone, a ses commettans sur la
revolution du 18 fructidor. Paris. 1797. English translation by
J. Gifford. London.
1798.
Pierre, V. 18
Fructidor. Documents pour la plupart inedits recueillis par V.
Pierre. Paris. 1893. Soc. d’histoire contemporaine.
Pitou, L. Ange. Voyage & Cayenne et chez les Antropophages. Ouvrage
contenant le tableau general des deportes. 2 vols. Paris. 1805.
Ramel, J. P. Journal ou Temoignage de 1’Adjutant-General Ramel, l’un des
deportes k la Guyanne apres le 18 fructidor. Hamburg.
1799. English translations. London, 1799, and Norwich, 1805.
Sorel,
A. Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797. Paris. 1896.
Among the
collection of books and pamphlets relating to the French Revolution in the
British Museum are 33 volumes of tracts relating to the period of the Directory,
among which are 14 vols. on the Babeuf Conspiracy and 11 vols. on the Coup
d’Etat of Fructidor.
V. GENERAL HISTORIES.
Barante, A. G. P. D. de. Histoire du Directoire. 3 vols. Paris. 1855.
Fabre de l’Aude, J. P. Histoire secrete du Directoire. 2 vols. Paris.
1832. Goncourt, E. and J. de. Histoire de la societe franfaise pendant le
Directoire. Paris. 1855.
Granier de Cassagnac, A. Histoire du Directoire. 3 vols. Paris. 1857.
Hamel, E. Histoire de la Republique fra^aise sous le Directoire et sous
le Consulat. Paris. 1872.
Lacretelle, J. C. D. Precis historique de la Resolution. Directoire
executive.
2 vols. Paris. 1806. Second edition. Paris. 1810.
Sciout, L. Le Directoire. 4 vols. Paris. 1895-7.
Sorel, A. L’Europe et la Revolution Franfaise. V” Partie. Bonaparte et
le Directoire. Paris. 1903.
Bigeon, A. Sieyes. L’homme, le constituant. Paris. 1893.
Bonnal, E. Carnot d’apres les archives nationales, etc. Paris. 1888.
Carnot, L. H. Memoires sur Carnot, par son fils. 2
vols. Paris. 1861-4.
Mallet, B.
Mallet du Pan and the French Revolution. London. 1902.
Neton, A. Sieyes d’apres des documents inedits. Paris. 1900.
Pallain, G. Le Ministere de Talleyrand sous le Directoire. Paris. 1901.
Picaud, A. Carnot, l’organisateur de la victoire. Paris. 1888.
Tissot, P. F. Memoires historiques et militaires sur Lazare Carnot. Paris.
1824. For Autobiographies see above, under Memoirs, etc.
BONAPARTE
AND THE CONQUEST OF ITALY.
I. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS.
British Foreign Office Records.
Austria. Nos.
43—45.
Italian
States. No. 57.
Sardinia. Nos. 20—21.
II. PUBLISHED MATERIALS.
Documents.
Barthelemy, F., Marquis de. Papiers. Edited by J. Kaulek. 4 vols. Paris. 1886-8.
■ Correspondance de
Napoleon I. Vols. i-iv.
32 vols. Paris. 1858-69.
Fortescue, J.
B., MSS. of. The Dropmore Papers. Vol. m. Historical Manuscripts Commission. 3
vols. London. 1892-1.
Graham,
Colonel T. Despatches from the Austrian Headquarters, 1796-7. Printed in
English Historical Review. January and April. 1899. London. 1886 etc.
Huffer, H. Quellen zur Geschichte der franz. Revolution.
Leipzig. 1901 etc. In progress.
Nelson,
Viscount. Despatches and Letters. Edited by Sir N. H. Nicholas. Vols.
ii and in. 7 vols.
London. 1844-6.
Vivenot, A. von. Vertrauliche Briefe von Thugut (Quellen). 2
vols. Vienna. 1872.
Thugut, Clerfayt, und Wurmser. Vienna. 1869.
Military Works.
Chuquet, A. Les Guerres de la Revolution Franijaise. (The
last vols. deal with 1795-6.) Paris. 1886 etc.
In progress.
Clausewitz, C. von. Werke. Vol. iv. 10 vols. Berlin.
1832-7.
La Campagne de 1796 en Italie. Traduit par J.
Colin. Paris. 1899.
On War. Translation by Colonel J. J. Graham. 3 vols. London. 1873.
Colin, Captain J. L’^ducation militaire de Napole'on. Paris. 1901.
Fabry, J. G. A. Histoire de I’Armee d’ltalie (1796-7). 3 vols. Paris.
1900-1. Fabry, J. B. G. Itine'raire de Buonaparte. Paris. 1815.
A. G. Maximes de Guerre de Napoleon I. Paris. 1897.
J. G. (Capitaine). Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-7. Paris. 1898.
Gachot, E. Histoire militaire de Massena. La Premiere Campagne d’ltalie
(1795-8). Paris. 1901.
Jomini, Baron A. H. de. Histoire critique et militaire des Guerres de la
Revolution. Vols. viii-xx. 15 vols. Paris. 1820-4.
Krebs, V. L. and Moris, H. Campagne des Alpes pendant la Revolution. 2
vols. Paris. 1891-5.
Pierron, General E. Comment s’est forme le Genie militaire de Napoleon
I. Paris. 1895.
Pinelli, F.
A. Storia Militare del Piemonte. Turin. 1854.
Wilkinson, S.
Napoleon: the first Phase. In The Owens College Historical Essays. London.
1902.
X. Reponse au
General Pierron. Paris.
Yorck von
Wartenburg, H. L. D. M., Count. Napoleon as General. Edited by Major W. H.
James. 2 vols. London. 1902.
Biographical and General Works.
Bonnal, E. de
Ganges. Histoire de Dessaix. Paris. 1889.
Les Armees de la Republique. Paris.
1889.
Botta, C. G.
G. Storia d’ Italia (1789-1814). 4 vols. Revised
Edition. Paris. 1832.
Bouvier, F. Bonaparte en Italie. Vol. i. Paris. 1899 etc. In progress.
Costa de Beauregard, A., Marquis. Un Homme d’autrefois. Paris. 1877.
Dessaix, J. and A. Foliot. Le General
Dessaix. Annecy. 1879.
Hausser, L. Deutsche Geschichte (1786-1815). 4
vols. Berlin. 4th edition. 1869. Jung, H. F. T. Bonaparte et son Temps
(1769-99). 3 vols. (Paris. 1885.)
Koch, J. B. F. Memoires de Massena. 4 vols. (Paris. 1848.)
Lanfrey, P. Histoire de Napole'on. 5 vols.
Paris. 1875. Translated into English in 4 vols. 2nd ed. 1886.
Lavisse, E.
and Rambaud, A. N. La Revolution Franfaise (1789-99). Vol. vm of Histoire
Generale. 12 vols. Paris. 1893-1901.
Lynedoch,
Lord (Colonel T. Graham). Memoir of, by J. M. Graham. Edinburgh. 1847.
Mallet Du Pan, J. F. Correspondance in^dite avec la Cour de Vienne
(1794-8).
2 vols. Paris. 1884.
Michelet, J. Les Soldats de la Revolution. Paris. 1878.
Oncken, W. Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreichs, und der
Befreiungs- kriege. 2 vols. Berlin. 1880. Vol. i, 1789-99.
Pajol, Comte C. P. V. Kleber; sa Vie, sa Correspondance. Paris. 1877.
Pontecoulant, L. G. Le Doulcet, Comte de. Souvenirs historiques et
parlementaires.
4 vols. Paris. 1861-5.
Quinet, E. Les Revolutions d’ltalie. Paris. 1848.
Rose, J. H.
Life of Napoleon I. 3rd ed. 2 vols. London. 1903.
Sargent, H.
H. Napoleon Bonaparte’s first Campaign. London. 1895.
Sciout, L. Le Directoire. 3 vols. Paris. 1895.
Sorel, A. L’Europe et la Revolution Franfaise. Parts iv-vn. Paris.
1902-4.
In progress.
Bonaparte et Hoche en 1797. Paris. 1896.
Thoumas, General C. A. Le Marechal Lannes. Paris. 1891.
Memoires et Souvenirs.
Among the
numerous Memoires, the following may be named as more or less trustworthy:
Abrantfe, L. Junot, Duchesse de.
Barras, Comte P. F. J. N. de.
Belliard, Comte A. D.
Bourrienne, L. A. Fauvelet de.
Carnot, Comte
L. N. M.
Chaptal, Comte J. A. C.
Desvemois, Baron N. P.
Dumas, Comte M.
Gohier, L. J.
Lareveilliere-Lepeaux, L. M. de.
Lavalette, Comte A. M. de.
Marbot, Baron A. A. A M.
Marmont, A. F. L. Viesse de, Marshal.
Massena, A., Marshal.
Miot, Comte A. F. de Melito.
Pontecoulant, Comte L. G. Le Doulcet de.
Saint-Cyr, G.
Savary, A. J. M. R., Due de Rovigo.
Soult, N. J. de Dieu, Marshal Thibaudeau, Comte A. C.
Thiebault,
Baron D. A. P. F. C. H.
Diplomacy.
Barral, D., Comte de. J^tude sur l’Histoire diplomatique de l’Euiope.
Deuxieme Partie, 1789-1815. Vol. i. Paris. 1880 etc. In progress.
Beer, A. Leopold II, Franz II, und Catarina. Leipzig. 1874.
Bourgoing, F. de. Histoire diplomatique de l’Europe pendant la
Revolution Fran9aise. 4 vols. Paris. 1865-85.
Du Teil, J. Rome, Naples et le Directoire. Armistices et Traites
(1796-7). Paris. 1902.
Forneron, H. Histoire gene'rale des Emigres. 2 vols. Paris. 1884.
Grosjean. Les Relations de la France avec les Deux Siciles. Paris. 1888.
Huffer, H. Quellen zur Geschichte der franzosischen Revolution. Leipzig.
1901 etc. In progress.
Die Politik der deutschen Machte. 3 vols. Munster. 1869.
Masson, F. Les Diplomates de la Revolution. Paris. 1882.
Le Departement des Affaire? et angeres pendant
la Revolution (1787-1804).
Pallain, G. Le Ministere de Talleyrand sous le Directoire. Paris. 1891.
Pingaud, L. Un Agent secret sous la Revolution et l’Empire. Le Comte
d’Antraigues. Paris. 1893.
Vivenot, A. von. Vertrauliche
Briefe von Thugut. Vienna. 1869.
Thugut, Clerfayt, und Wurmser. Vienna. 1869.
Quellen zur Geschichte der deutschen
Kaiserpolitik Oesterreichs wahrend
der franzosischen Revolutionskriege, 1790-1801. Vienna. 1873 etc.
Italian States.
In addition
to the works of Botta and Costa de Beauregard already quoted, the following
deal almost exclusively with Italian affairs:
Beccatini. Storia del memorabile triennale Governo francese e se dicente
Cisalpino. Bianchi, N. Storia della Monarchia piemontese dal 1773 sino al 1861.
Turin.
1877 etc. In progress.
Bonfadini, R.
La Repubblica Cisalpina, articles in the “Politecnieo ” of 1866. Milan.
Bonnal de Ganges, E. La Chute d’une Republique (Venise). Paris. 1885.
Cantu, C. Storia di cento Anni (1750-1850). 3 vols. Florence. 1851.
Carutti, D. Storia - della Corte di' Savoia durante la Rivoluzione e 1’
Impero francese. 2 vols. Turin. 1892.
Costa de Beauregard, H, J., Marquis. Memoires historiques de la Maison
de Savoie. Turin. 1816.
Daru, Comte P. A. N. B. Histoire de Venise. 9 vols. Turin.- 1873.
Ferrari, G. La Revolution et les Revolutionnaires en Italie. Revue des
deux Mondes. 1844. Paris. .
Franchetti,
A. Storia d’ Italia dal 1789 al 1799. Milan. 1878.
Gaffarel, P. Bonaparte et les Republiques italiennes (1796-1799). Paris.
1895. Gallavresi, G. L’ invasione francese in Milano 1796. Milan. 1903.
Kovalevsky, M. La Fin d’une Aristocratie (Venise). Traduit par C. de
Krauz. Turin. 1902.
Melzi, G. Memorie, documenti, e lettere inediti. 2 vols. Milan. 1865.
Pellet, M. La Revolution de Genes en 1797. Paris. 1894.
Perini, O. Storia di Verona dal 1790 al 1822. 3 vols. Verona. 1873-5.
Romanin, S. Storia Documentata di Venezia. 11 vols. Venice. 1852 etc.
Sciout, L. La Republique francaise et la Republique de Genes. In Revue
des Questions historiques. January 1889. Paris.
Thaon, Comte I. di Revel. Memoires sur les Guerres des Alpes et les
Eveneinents en Pie'mont. Rome. 1871.
Tivaroni, C.
Storia critica del Risorgimento italiano. 3 vols. Turin. 1899 etc. In progress.
CHAPTERS
XIX and XX.
THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION.
I. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL.
The Public
Record Office, London, contains a mass of material of which the following items
are of importance:
Admiralty,
Secretary. Letters, Admirals’ Despatches, Mediterranean. Vols. 397-400.
Courts Martial. Vols. 5342-50.
Archives de la Marine. Paris. BB. 4.
Navy List
Books, 1798-9.
II. DOCUMENTS.
Brotonne, L. de. Demieres lettres inddites de Napoleon. Paris.
1903.
Copies
of Original Letters intercepted by
the Fleet under....... Lord Nelson.
2 vols.
London. 1799.
Correspondance
de Napoleon I. Vols. iv, v, xxix. 32 vols. Paris. 1858-69. Gutteridge, H. C.
Documents relating to the Suppression of the Jacobin Revolution at Naples in
June, 1799. Navy Records Society. London. 1903. Jackson, T. S. Logs of the
Great Sea Fights. Vol. i. Navy Records Society.
London. 1899.
Lecestre, L.
Lettres inedites de Napoleon. Paris. 1897.
Morrison, A.
Collection of Autograph Letters. The Hamilton and Nelson Papers.
Vol. n. 2
vols. London. 1894. (Printed for private circulation.)
Naval
Chronicle. 40 vols. London. 1799-1818.
Nelson,
Viscount. Despatches and Letters. Ed. Sir N. H. Nicholas. VoL ni.
7 vols. London. 1844-6.
III. GENERAL ACCOUNTS.
Berry., Sir
E. An Authentic Narrative of the Proceedings of H.M.’s Squadron
under
the Command of. Nelson. London. 1798.
Boulay de la Meurthe, Comte A. J. C. J. Le Directoire et l’Expedition
d’Egy pte. Paris. 1885.
Bruiij V, Guerres Maritimes de la France. Vol. n. 2 vole. Paris. 1861.
Chevalier, E. Histoire de la Marine Fracijaise sous la Premiere Republique. Paris.
1886.
Clowes, Sir
W. L. The Royal Navy. Vol. iv. London. 1899 etc.
Graviere, J. P. E. Jurien de la. Guerres Maritimes. Vol. i. 2 vols. Paris.
1883. James, W. The Naval History of Great Britain. Vol. u. 6 vols. London. 1886. La Jonquiere, C. E. L. M. de Taffanel d'e. L’Expedition
d’^gypte, 1798-1801.
Vols. i-m. Paris. 1899 etc.
Lanfrey, P. L’Histoire de Napoleon. 6 vols.
Paris. 1867-73 (1876). English translation. 2nd ed. 4 vols. London. 1886.
Loir, M. La
bataille d’Aboukir. Paris. 1895.
Mahan, A. T.
The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution.
Vol. i. 2
vols. London. 1893.
Rose, J. H,
Life of Napoleon. 3rd ed. 2 vols. London. 1903.
Sorel, A. L’Europe et la Revolution Franyaise. Parts v-vn.
Paris. 1903-4. Willyams, C. A Voyage up the Mediterranean in H.M.S. Swiftsure.
London. 1802.
IV. SPECIAL WORKS.
Archivio
Storico per le province Napoletane. Vols. v, vi, vih, x, xi, xnn. Societa di storia
patria. Naples. 1876 etc. badham, F. P. Nelson at Naples. London. 1900.
Cacciatore, A. Esame del Reame di Napoli di P. Colletta. 2 vols. Naples.
1850. Coco, V. Saggio Storico sulla rivoluzione di Napoli. Naples. 1861.
Colletta, P. Storia del Reame di Napoli. 2 vols. Capo Iago. 1838.
Denon, D. V. Voyage dans la basse et la haute J^gypte. 2 vols. Paris.
1802. Desgenettes, E. Histoire medicale de l’Armee d’Orient. Paris. 1802.
Driault, E. La Question d’Orient. Paris. 1898.
Dumas Davy de la Pailleterie, A. I Borboni di Napoli. Vol.
v. 10 vols. Naples. 1862-3.
Edwards, H.
Sutherland. Russian Projects against India. London. 1886.
English
Historical Review, xv, p. 699. London. 1900.
Foote. E. J.
Vindication of his Conduct in the Bay of Naples. London. 1807. Giglioli, C. H.
D. Naples in 1799. London. 1903.
Helfert,
Baron J. A. von. Fabrizio Ruffo. Vienna. 1882.
Jeafireson,
J. C. Lady Hamilton and Lord Nelson. New ed. London. 1897. Jomard, E. F.
Description de 1’Egypte. 20 vols. Paris. 1809-28.
Knight, C.
Autobiography. 2nd ed. London. 1861.
La Tour du Pin de la Charce, H. de. Les demiers jours (de l’Ordre de
Malte. (In Revue de la Revolution. Vol. v, p. 307.) 16 vols. Paris. 1883-9.
Lemmi. Nelson
e Caracciolo.
Loir, M.
Brueys a Aboukir.
Lommaco, F.
Rapporto fatto al Cittad. Carnot. Naples. 1836.
Macmillan’s
Magazine. United Irishmen in the British Fleet. March, 1899. Maresca, A.
Archivio Storico per le province Napoletane. Vol.
xxiv, 2. Societa di storia patria. Naples. 1876 etc.
Gli Avvenimenti di Napoli (June 13-July 12,
1799). Naples.
1900.
Navy League
Journal. The Nile Campaign. By Wilson, H. W. August, 1899. London. 1895 etc.
Sacchinelli, D. Memorie storiche sulla Vita del Cardinale F. Ruffo.
Naples. 1836.
Villari, P. Nelson, Caracciolo, e la RepubblicaNeapoletana (1799).
NuovaAntologia.
Florence. February, 1899. . .
Wilson, R. T.
History of the British Expedition to Egypt. London. 1803. Wurm, C. F. Diplomatische Geschichte der orientalischen
Fraige. Leipzig.
1858.
Allardyce, A.
. A Memoir of the Hon. G. Keith Elphinstone, Viscount Keith.
London.
1882. ' , ,
Barrow, J.
Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir W. S. Smith. 2 vpls.. 1848. Berthollet, C. L. Notice sur la vie et les ouvrages de
Berthollet. Par E. F. Jomard.
Annecy. 1844. ,
Dessaix, J. and Foliot, A. Le General .Dessaix. . innecy. 1879.
Dupin, C. Les Services et les Travaux de Gaspard Monge. Paris. 1819.
Emouf, Baron A. A. Le General Kleber. Paris. 1867.
Larrey, Baron D. J. Relation historique et chirurgicale' de l’Expedition
de l’armee d’Orient en Egypte et en Syrie. Paris. 1803.
Laughton, J.
K. Nelson (English Men of Action). London. 1895.
The Nelson Memorial. London. 1896.
Mahan, A. T.
The Life of Nelson. 2nd' ed. revised.' 2 vols. London.
1899. Marmont, A. F. L. V. de, Due de Raguse. Memoires. Vol. i. 3rd ed. 9 vols.
. , Paris. 1857.
Pajol, Comte C. P. V. Kleber; sa Vie, sa Correspondance. Paris.
1877.
Pettigrew,
T. J. Memoirs of the Life of........... Lord
Nelson. 2nd ed. Vol. i. 2 vols.
London.,
1849.
Ross, Sir J.
Memoirs and Correspondence of Admiral Lord de Saumarez. 2 vols. London.. 1838.
Savary, A. J.
M. R., Due de Rovigo. Memoires. . Vol. i. 8 vols. Paris. 1828.
Thoumas, General C. A. Le Marechal Lannes. Paris. 1891. .
Tucker,
J. S. Memoirs of Admiral the Earl of St
Vincent. 2 vols. London.
1844.
, ,
MEMOIRS AND
SOUVENIRS.
In addition
to those mentioned above, the most serviceable for the Eastern Expedition are
those of:
Belliard, A. D.
Berthier, P. A., Prince.
Desvemois, Baron N. P.
Lavalette, Comte A. M. de.
Laugier, C., Comte de Bellecour.
Miot, J.
Regnier, C.
A., Due do Massa.
Villiers du Terrage, R E. de.
FRANCE
AND THE SECOND COALITION.
The
enumeration of authorities in the Bibliographies of the four preceding Chapters
for the history of French and general European affairs also applies to this
Chapter. The following unpublished Records bear on the years 1798-9.
British Foreign Office Records.
Austria, Nos. 51-56.
Prussia, Nos. 47-66. itussia, Nos. 40-45.
Sicily and
Naples, Nos. 11-14.
Switzerland,
Nos. 22-28.
II.
The Congress of Rastatt.
Bailleu, P. Preussen und Frankreich 1797 et seq. in the Preussi iche
Staatsarchiven, 2 vols. Leipzig. 1881-7.
Clercq, A. J. H. de. Recueil de Trait^s de la France. Paris. 1864 etc.
In progress. Garden, Comte G. de. Histoire gene'rale des Traites. Vol. vi. 14
vols. Paris.
1848-59.
Helfert, Baron J. A. von. Der Rastadter
Gesandtenmord. Vienna. 1874.
Zur Losung der Rastatter Gesandtenmord-Frage.
Stuttgart 1900.
Huffer, H. Der Rastatter Congress.
Der Rastatter
Gesandtenmord. Bonn. 1896.
Koechlin, R. La Politique fran^aise au Congres de Rastadt. In Annales de
l’^cole libre des Sciences politiques. 1886-8. Paris.
La Revelliere de Lepeaur, L. M. de. Memoires. 3 vols. Paris. 1895.
Mallet du Pan, J. F. Correspondance ine'dite avec la Cour de Vienne
(l794r-8).
2 vols. Paris. 1884.
Martens, G. F. von. Recueil de Traites. Vols. yin,
ix. 20 vols. Gottingen.
1802-42. .
Masson, F. Les Diplomates de la Revolution. Paris. 1882.
Pallain, G. Le Ministere de Talleyrand sous le Directoire. Paris. 1891.
Correspondance diplomatique de Talleyrand.
1797-9. Paris. 1891.
Rambaud, A. Les Franyais sur le Rhin. Paris. 1880.
Ranke, L. von. Denkwurdigkeiten des Staatskanzlers Fiirsten von Hardenberg.
Vol. i. 5 vols. Leipzig. 1877. 2nd ed. Vols. xlvi-viii
of Sammtliche Werke. Leipzig. 1879-81.
Vivenot, A- von. Vertrauliche Briefe des Freiherm von Thugut, Vienna. 1869.
Zur Geschichte des Rastatter Congresses.
Vienna. 1871.
Die Politik des Vicekanzlers Graf Philipp von
Cobenzl unter Kaiser Franz II.
Vienna. 1874.
The Roman Republic).
Artand de Montor, A. F. Histoire des souverains Pontifes Roraains. Vol.
vm, Pie VI. 8 vols. Paris. 1846-9.
Blanchard, P. L. Pre'cis historique de la vie...de Pie VI. London.
1800. Bourgoing, J. F. de. Memoires historiques sur
Pie VI. 2 vols. Paris. 1799. Costituzione della Repubblica Romana. Rome. 1798.
Dufourcq, A. Le Regime jacohin en Italie (1796-9). Paris. 1900.
Du Teil, T. Rome, Naples et 1© Directdfre: Armistices et Traites
(1796-7). Paris. 1902.
Gaffarel, P. Bonaparte et les Republiques italiermes (1796-9). Paris.
1895. Koch, General J. B. F. Memoires de Mascena. 7 vols. Paris. 1848-50.
Napoleon. Correspondance. Vols. 11, in. 82 volsi Paris. 1858-69:
Reinhard, Comte C. F. de. Lettres a ma Mere. Paris. 1901.
Sciout, L. Le Directoire et la Republique romaine. Revue des Questions
historiques. January, 1886.
See also the
Memoires of Joseph Bonaparte (King Joseph), edited by P. E. A. Ducasse; of
Lucien Bonaparte, edited by H. F. T. Jung; with those of Marmont, A. F. L.
Viesse de, Marshal; Miot de Melito, Comte A. F.; and Thiebault, Baron D. A. P.
F. C. H.
IV.
Naples and Sicily.
(See
also Bibliography for Chapters XIX and XX.)
Annesley, G.
(Viscount Valentia). Private journal of the Affairs of Sicily (British Museum,
Add. MSS. 19426).
Archivio
Storico per le province Napoletane (especially fbi* the years v, vi, vm, x, xi,
xvi, xviii, xxn, xxiv, xxv). Societa di storia patfia. Naples. 1876 etc. Badham, F. P. Nelson at
Naples. London. 1900.
Revue Napoieonienne, April-Sept. 1903
(Frascati).
Dumas Davy de la Pailleterie, A. I Borboni di Napoli. Vol.
v. 10 vols. Naples. 1862-3.
Foote, Capt.
E. J. Vindication of his Conduct......in the Bay of Naples in the
Summer Of
1799- 2nd edit. London. 1810.
Gagniere, A. La Reine Marie-Caroline de Naples. 3rd edit.
Paris. 1886. Gutteridge, H. C. Documents relating to the Suppression of the
Jacobin Revolution at Naples. (Navy Records Society.) London. 1903.
Helfert, J.
A., Baron von. Maria Carolina von Oesterreich, Konigin von Neapel und Sicilien.
Vienna. 1884, 1898.
Fabrizio Ruffo. Vienna. 1882.
Jeaffreson,
J. C. Lady Hamilton and Lord Nelson. 2 Vols. New edit. London.
1897.
Mahan, Capt.
A. T The Life of Nelson. 2 vols. 2nd edit. London. 1899.
The Neapolitan Republicans and
Nelson’s'accuseSfs. English Historical Review.
July 1899'.
Palumbo, R.
Maria Carolina. Naples. 1‘877.
Pepe, General
G. Memorie. Paris. 1847. Also Engl. edit. 3 Vols. London. 1846. [lose, Right
Hon. G. Diaries and Correspondence. 2 vols. London. I860. Sacchinelli, D.
Memorie storiche sulla Vita' del Cardinale F. Ruffo. Naples. 1836. Vlllavi, P.
Nelson, Caracciolo, e la Repubblica Napoletana (1799). Nuova Antologia.
Florence. February, 1899.
Switzerland
(1798-9).
Brune,
Marshal G. M. A. Correspondance, edited by Sturler in the Archiv fur
schweizerische Geschichte, tom. xn for 1858. Zurich.
Dandliker, K. Geschichte der Schweiz. 3 vols. Zurich. 1892-5.
Erlach, R. von. Zur bemischen Kriegsgeschichte des Jahres 1798. Bern. 1881. Koch, J. B. F. Memoires de Massena. 7 vols. Paris. 1848-50.
La Harpe, F. C. Correspondance inedite... relative a l’lnddpendance du
Pays de Vaud. Geneva. 1881.
Instructions sur l’Assemblee representative de
la Republique lemanique.
Paris. 1798.
Mallet du Pan, J. F. La Destruction die la Ligue helvetique. From
the Mercure Britannique for Oct. 1798. 5 vols.
London. 1798-1800.
Muralt, C. von. Hans von Reinhard. Zurich. 1838.
Muret. L'Invasion de la Suisse en 1798. Lausanne. 1881-4.
Raoul-Rochette, D. Histoire de la Revolution helvetique de 1797 k 1803.
Paris. 1823.
Roverea, F. de. Memoires. Paris. 1848.
Seigneux, G. H. de. Precis historique de la Revolution du canton de
Vaud...
en 1798. 2 vols. Lausanne. 1831.
Tillier, A. von. Histoire de la Republique helvetique. 2
vols. Geneva. 1846. Vieusseux, A. History of Switzerland. London. 1846.
The War of 1799.
Angeli, M. E. von. Erzherzog Carl von Oesterreich als Feldherr und HeereS-
organisator. 5 vols. Vienna and Leipzig. 1896-7.
Charles (Archduke of Austria). Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1799 in
Deutschland!
und in der Schweiz. 2 vols. Vienna. 1819.
Gachot, E. Souvarow en Italie (1799). Paris. 1903.
Hartmann, O. Der Antheil der Russen am Feldzug von 1799 in der Schweiz.
Zurich. 1892.
Hiiffer, H. Quellen zur Geschichte des Zeitalters der franzosischen
Revolution. Vol. x. Leipzig. 1900 etc. In progress.
Der Feldzug in
Holland und die Stellung1 Preussens. Historische Viertel-
jahrschrift. Leipzig. 1902 etc. In progress.
Jomini, Baron A. H. de. Histoire critique et militaire des Guerres de la
Revolution. Vol. xii. 15 vols. Paris. 1820-4.
Koch, J. B. F. Memoires de Massena. 7 vols. Paris. 1848-50.
Lecourbe, Comte C. J. Le General Lecourbe. Paris. 1895.
Milyutin, D.
A. History of the War between Russia and France in 1799. St Petersburg. 1852.
Rousselin de Saint-Albii, A. C. Championnet. Paris. 1860.
Spalding,
Lieutenant-Colonel H. Suvdroff. London. 1890.
Suvdroff, A.
V., Prince, Marshal. Histoire des Campagnes du Marshal de Suwarow
(Snvoroff). (Anon.)
3 vols. Hamburg and Paris. 1-799-1802.
Also the
Memoirs of Lowenstem, I. von; Macdonald, E. J. J. A.; Marbot, A.; Oudinot, C.
N.; St Cyr, L. G.; Soult, N. J. de Dieu; Thiebault, D. A. P. F. C. H.
For official
publications and documents see Bibliography to Chapter XVI. For a list of
newspapers bearing on the period see Lavis^e et Rambaud, Histoire Generale,
tom. vin, p. 411. For full bibliographical references see the notes to Vandal,
L’Avenement de Bonaparte. Paris. 1902.
I. MEMOIRS.
Barras, Comte P. F. Z. N. de. Memoires. Ed. G. Duruy. 4 vols. Paris.
1895-6.
Bonaparte, Joseph. Memoires et correspondance politique et militaire.
Ed.
Ducasse. 10 vols. Paris. 1853-4.
Bonaparte, Lucien, et ses memoires, 1775-1840. Ed. H. F. T. Jung. Paris.
1882-3. Bonrrienne, L. A. Faurelet de. Memoires. Ed. D. Lacroix. 5 vols. Paris.
1899. Brugiere de Barante, C. Souvenirs de. 8 vols. Paris. 1890-1901.
Chastenay de Lanty, Comtesse L. M. V. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1896-7.
Chateaubriand, Vicomte F. R. de. Memoires d’outre tombe. 12 vols. Paris.
1849-50. ,
Dufort de Cheverny, Comte J. N. Me'moires. Ed. A. de Crevecoeur. 2 vols.
Paris. 1886.
Fouchd, J., Duke of Otranto. Memoires. 2 pts. Paris. 1824 Gohier, L. J.
Memoires. Paris. 1814.
Lafayette^ M. J. P., Marquis. Memoires et correspondance. 6 vols. Paris.
1837-8. La Revelliere de Ldpeaux, L. M. de. Memoires. Ed. R. D. d’Angers. 3
vols. Paris. 1895.
Lavalette, Comte A. M. Chamans de. Memoires. 2 vols. Paris. 1831.
Lescure, M. F. A. de. Memoires sur les Joumees revolutionnaires. 2 vols.
Paris. 1875.
Marmont, A. F. L. Viesse de, Marshal. Memoires. 9 vols. Paris. 1857.
Roederer, Comte P. L. CEuvres, vol. hi. 8
vols. Paris. 1853-9.
Savary, L. J. Mon Examen de conscience sur le 18 Brumaire. Paris. 1819.
Scgur, Comte P. P. de. Mdmoires d’un aide-de-camp de Napoleon. 3 vols. Paris.
1894-5.
Talleyrand-Pe'rigord, C. M. de,. Prince. Mdmoires. Paris. 1890.
Thidbault, Baron D. A. P. F. C. H. Mdmoires. 5 vols. Paris. 1893-5.
H. CORRESPONDENCE, CONTEMPORARY
DOCUMENTS, PAMPHLETS, ETC.
Bailleu, iP. Preussen und Fraukreich von 1795 bis 1807 (Publicationen aus
den Konigl. Preuss. Staatsarchiven). Leipzig. 1881 etc. In
progress.
Buonaparte k Saint-Cloud ou la fameuse Journee, par L. ancien membre du
conseil des 500. Paris. 1814.
Combes-Dounous, J. J. Notice sur le 18rBrnmaire. Paris. 1814.
Comet, Comte M. A. Notice historique sur le 18 Brumaire. Paris. 1819.
Faure, B., membre du conseil des anciens a ses concitoyens, 10 Frim. An
vm.
Paris. 1799. '
Fidvde, J. Correspondance et relations avec Bonaparte. 3 vols. Paris.
1836. Harmand, J. B., depute par le departement de la Meuse a ses concitoyens.
Jourdan, J. B. Notice sur le 18 Brumaire. Carnet Historique, February,
1901. Saint-Gervais, depute de l’Aude a ses Commettans. Paris. 1799.
Savary, L. J., depute au Conseil des Cinq-Cents par le departement de
l’Eure a ses commettans. Paris. 1799.
Schmidt, W. A. Tableaux de la Revolution Franchise. 3 vols. Paris.
1880-90. Stael-Holstein, Baron E. M. de. Correspondance diplomatique avec le
Baron de Brinkman. Paris. 1881.
III. GENERAL HISTORIES.
Aulard, F. A. Etudes et lemons sur la Revolution Fran^aise. Paris.
1893-1902.
Paris pendant la reaction thermidorienne et
sous le Directoire. 6 vols.
Paris. 1898-1902.
Jung, H. F. T. Bonaparte et son temps. 3 vols. Paris. 1880-1.
Masson, F. Napoleon et sa iamille, vol. i. Paris. 1897 etc.
Sorel, A. L’Europe et la Revolution Fran9aise. Parts v-vii. Paris. 1903-4. In progress.
Vandal, A. L’Avenement de Bonaparte. Paris. 1902.
In progress.
IV. SPECIAL WORKS.
Madelin, L.
Fouche. 2 vols. Paris. 1901.
Mallet dn Pan, J. F. La Revolution Fran9aise vue de l’etranger. Ed.
Francois Descostes. Paris. 1897.
Neton, A. Sieyes d’apres des documents inedits. Paris. 1900.
Rocquain, F. ]£tat de France au 18 Brumaire., Paris. 1874.
In addition
to the works mentioned at the end of Chapter III the following works may be
consulted :
Bressonj Jacques. Histoire financiere de la France. 2 vols. Svo. Paris.
1829. Buchez et Roux. Histoire parlementaire de la Revolution. 40 vols. 8vo.
Paris. 1834-8.
Cuthbertson, Qive. On the depreciation of assignats:
Economic Review, October,
1898.
D’lvernois, Sir F. Tableau des finances de la France pendant 1’annee
1796. 8vo. Paris. 1796.
Tableau historique et politique des pertes que
la Revolution et la Guerre ont
caus£es au Peuple Fran^ais dans sa Population, son Agriculture, ses
Colonies, ses Manufactures, et son Commerce. 8vo. Paris. Mars, 1799.
Ganilh, Ch. Essai politique sur le revenu public. 2 vols. 8vo. Paris.
1823. Gomel, Ch. Histoire financiere de l’Assemblee Constituante. 2 vols. 8vo.
Paris.
1896-7.
Lameth, A. de. Histoire de l’AssembMe Constituante. 2 vols. 8vo. Paris.
1828-9. La Rupelle, S. de. Les finances de la guerre de 1796 a 1815. Annales de
l’Ecole libre des sciences politiques. Paris. 1892.
L’art de verifier les dates de la Revolution. 8vo. Paris. An xii.
Levasseur, E. Histoire des classes ouvrieres et de l’industrie en France
de 1789 a 1870. Vol. i. 8vo. Paris. 1903.
The Assignats. Journal of Political Economy. Chicago. March, 1894.
Macarel, L. A. and Boulatignier, J. De la fortune publique en France et
de son administration. 3 vols. 8vo. Paris. 1838.
Ramel, D. V. Des finances de la rdpublique franijaise en l’att ix. Svo.
Paris. An ix.
Taine, H. Les origiiies de la France contemporaine. VoL iv. La
Revolution. 8vo. Paris. 1885.
The principal
source of information as to the finances of the period 1789-99 is the record of
debates in the successive Legislatures. The British Museum is especially rich
in pamphlet literature (some of it unique) upon this topic—Collections F, R,
and F.R., known as the Croker tracts, catalogued and classified by G. K.
Fortescue, 1899.
FRENCH
LAW IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA.
Bexon, S. V. Parallele du code penal d’Angleterre avec les lois p£nales
franipaises. Paris. An viii.
Boutmy, E. G. La Declaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen et M.
Jellinek.
Annales de l’£cole libre des Sciences politiques, 1902, pp. 415-443.
Desjardins, A. Les cahiers des etats generaux en 1879 et la legislation'
criminelle. Paris. 1883.
Esmein, A. Histoire de la procedure criminelle en France et specialement
de la procedure inquisitoriale depuis le xiii® siecle jusqu’a nos jours. Paris.
1882. Giorgio del Vecchio. La dichiarazione dei diritti dell’ uomo e del
cittadino nella Rivoluzione francese. Genoa. 1903.
Janet, P. Les principes de 1789. Les Declarations des droits de l'homme
en Amerique et en France. Revue bleue, 1886,
pp. 513-524; 545-557; Paris. 1864 etc.
Jellinek, G. Die Erklarung der Menschen- und Biirgerrechte. Leipzig. 1895.
La declaration des droits de l’homme et du
citoyen, contribution a l’histoire
du droit constitntionnel modeme, trad, par Fardis, preface par Larnaude.
Paris. 1902.
Declaration des droits de l’homme et du
citoyen. Reponse a M. Boutmy.
Revue du droit public et de la science politique, 1902, pp. 386-400.
Die Erklarung
der Menschen- und Burgerrechte, zweite, erweiterte Auflage,
Leipzig, 1904 (Staats- und Volkerrechtliche Abhandlungen, x, 3).
Laferriere, L. F. J. Histoire du principe des Institutions et des Lois
pendant la Revolution Franfaise de 1789 a 1804. Paris. 1852.
Mavidal, J. and Laurent, E. Archives parlementaires, lro
serie, 1787-99-1800.
Paris. 1867 etc. In progress.
Sagnac, P. La Legislation civile de la Revolution Franfaise (1789-1804),
Essai d’histoire sociale. Paris. 1898.
Wollet, P. Droit prive et sources. Histoire du droit civil franfais
accompagnee de notions de droit canonique et d’indications bibliographiques
(seconde edition du Precis), pp. 706-728 et passim. Paris. 1893.
Walch, E. La declaration des droits de rhomme et du citoyen et
l’assembiee constituante. (These.) Paris. 1903.
EUROPE
AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.
GENERAL.
:
Barruel, A.,
Abbe. Memoirs illustrating the history of Jacohinism. 4 vols. London. 1797-8.
Blennerhassett, Lady C. J. Madame de Stael. 3 vols. London. 1889.
Cretineau-Joly, J. A. M. L’^glise en face de la Revolution. 2 vols. Paris.
1859. Doniol, H. La Revolution Fran^aise et la Feodalite. Paris. 1883.
Forneron, H. Histoire des Emigres. 2 vols. Paris. 1884.
Janet, P. La Philosophic de la Revolution franfaise. Paris.
1892.
Lavisse, E.
and Rambaud, A. N. Histoire Generale. Vol. vm. 12 vols. Paris. 1893-1901.
Merriam, C.
History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau. New York.
1900. ...
Nippold, F. Handbuch der neuesten Kirchengeschichte. Bd i. Berlin. 1889. Sciout, L. Le Directoire. 4 vols. Paris. 1895-7.
Sorel, A. L’Europe et la Revolution Fran^se. 6 vols. Paris.
1885 etc. Stephens, H. M. Revolutionary Europe. London. 1902.
ENGLAND.
Original Sources.
Anti-Jacobin,
the. 36 numbers. London. 1797-8.
Binns, J.
Recollections. Philadelphia. 1854.
Burke, E.
Reflections on the Revolution in France. Ed. Payne. Oxford. 1886.
Letters on a Regicide Peace. Ed. Payne, .
Oxford. 1892.
Coleridge, S.
T. Essays on his own Times. 3 vols. London. 1850.
Comparative
display of British Opinions on the French Revolution. 3 vols.
London.
1811. :
Edgeworth, R.
L. Memoirs. 2 vols. London. 1820.
Godwin, W.
Political Justice. London. 1793.
Hall, R.
Miscellaneous Works. London. 1889.
Holcroft, T.
Memoirs. 3 vols. London. 1816.
Holland,
Lord. Memoirs of the Whig party. Vol. i. 2 vols. London. 1852-4. Mackintosh,
(Sir) James. Vindiciae Gallicae. London. 1791.
Miles, W.
Correspondence on the French Revolution. 2 vols. London. 1890.
Moore, Dr J.
View of the causes and progress of the French Revolution. 2 vols.
London.
1795. ■ ■ ■
Paine,
T. Rights of Man. London. 1792. ' ■
Place, F.
Additional ms. British Museum, 27789-27859.
Price, Dr R.
Discourse on the Love of our Country. London. 1789.
Reeves, J.
Thoughts on the English Government. London. 1795.
Revolution
Society, Correspondence of the. London. 1792.
Romilly, Sir
S. Memoirs. 3 vols. London. 1840.
Watson, R.,
Bishop of Llandaff, Anecdotes of the life of. 2 vols. London. 1816. Windham, W.
Diary. London. 1866.
Wordsworth,
W. The Prelude. London. 1850.
:
Young, A. The
example of France a warning to Britain. London. 1793.
Secondary Works.
(a) General.
Alger, J. G.
Englishmen in the French Revolution. London. 1889.
Campbell,
Lord. Lives of the Lord Chancellors. Vols. v-vn. 8 vols. London. 1845-69.
Dowden, E.
The French Revolution and English Literature. London. 1897. Fox-Boume, H. R.
English Newspapers. Vol. i. 2 vols. London. 1887. Halevy, L. La Formation
du radicalisme philosophique. 2 vols. , Paris. 1901. Jephson, H.
The Platform, its rise and progress. Vol. i. 2 vols. London. 1892. Kent, C. The
English Radicals. London. 1899.
Lebon, A.
L’Angleterre et l’Emigration fra^aise. Paris. 1882.
Lecky, W. E.
H. History of England in the 18th century. Vols. vr-vu.
7 vols.
London. 1892.
Smith, E. The
English Jacobins. London. 1881.
(6)
Biographies.
Aikin, L.
Memoir of Dr Aikin. 2 vols. London. 1823.
Bonar, J.
Malthus and his work. London. 1885.
Clayden, P.
W. Early Life of S. Rogers. London. 1887.
Clough, E. R.
Mary Wollstonecraft. London. 1898.
Conway,: W. M.
Life of Thomas Paine. 2 vols. New York. 1892.
Currie, W.
Memoirs of Dr Currie. 2 vols. London. 1831.
Field, W.
Memoirs of Samuel Parr. 2 vols. London. 1828.
Fitzmaurice,
Lord E. Life of Lord Shelburne. Vol. in. London. 1876. Hammond, J. L. Fox.
London. 1903.
Legouis, E.
The Early Life of Wordsworth. London. 1897.
Mackintosh,
R. Life of Sir J. Mackintosh. 2 vols. London. 1835.
Minto,
Countess of. Life of Sir Gilbert Elliot. 3 vols. London. 1874.
Morley, John.
Burke, a historical study. London. 1867.
Paul, C.
Kegan. William Godwin. 2 vols. London. 1876.
Rae, W. F.
Life of Sheridan. 2 vols. London. 1896.
Roberts, W.
Memoirs of Hannah More. 4 vols. London. 1834.
Roscoe, H.
Life of William Roscoe. 2 vols. London. 1833.
Rutt, J. Life
of Priestley. 2 vols. London. 1831.
Sanford, Mrs
H. Thomas Poole and his friends. 2 vols. London. 1888. Schimmelpennirick, Mrs
M. A. Autobiography. London. 1858.
Southey, R.
Life and Correspondence. Vols. i-ii.
London. 1849.
Stanhope, P.
H., Earl. Life of Pitt. 4 vols. London. 1862.
Stephen, Sir
L. The English Utilitarians. Vol. i. Bentham. 3 vols.. London. 1900.
Thelwall,
Mrs. Liife of John Thelwall. London. 1837.
Twiss, H.
Life of Lord Eldon. Vol. z. 3 vols. London. 1844. Wakefield, G. Memoirs. 2
vols. London. 1804.
Wilberforce,
W. Life and Correspondence. 2 vols. London. 1838. Wright, T. The Works of
Gillray. London. 1874.
[SCOTLAND.
Original Squroes.
Burns, R.
Poems. London. 1830.
Cockburn, H.,
Lord. Memorials of his Time. Edinburgh. 1856.
Fletcher, Mrs
E. Autobiography. Edinburgh. 1875.
Robison, J.
Proofs of a Conspiracy against all the Religions and Governments of Europe.
Edinburgh. 1797-
Secondary Authorities.
Angellier, A.
Robert Bums. 2 vols. Paris. 1893.
Cockburn, H.,
Lord. Life of Jeffrey. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1852.
—~ Examination
of the Trials for Sedition. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1888.
Craik, H. A
century of Scottish History. 2 vols. Edinburgh. 1901.
Fergusson, A.
Henry Erskine. Edinburgh. 1882.
Lichtenberger, A. Le Socialisme Utopique. Oswald.
Paris. 1898.
IRELAND.
Original Sources.
Knox, A.
Essays on the Political Circumstances of Ireland. London. 1799. McKenna, T.
Essay on Parliamentary Reform. Dublin. 1793.
Tone, T.
Wolfe. Autobipgraphy. Ed. R. B. O’Brien. 2 vols. London. 1893.
Secondary Works.
Falkiner, C.
Litton. Studies in Irish History and Biography. London.
1902. Guillon, E. La France et l'lrlande pendant la Revolution. Paris.
1888.
Lecky, W. E.
H. History of Ireland in the 18th century. Vols. ii-v. 5 vols. London. 1892.
Madden, R.
The United Irishmen. 7 vols. London. 1842-6.
GERMANY.
Original Sources.
Brandes, E. Ueber einige bisherige Folgen der franzdsischen Revolution in
Rficksicht auf Deutschland. Hanover. 1792.
Campe, J. H. Briefe aus Paris. Brunswick. 1790.
Fichte, J. G. Beitrage zur Berichtigung der Urtheile fiber die franzoaische
Revolution. Werke. Vol. vi. 8 vols. Berlin. 1845-6.
Gentz, F. von. Ausgewahlte Schriften. Vols. i-ii.
5 vols. Stuttgart. 1836-8. Klopstock, F. Oden. Ed. F. Muncker. 2 vols.
Stuttgart. 1889.
Rehberg, A. Untersuchungen fiber die franzdsische Revolution. 2 vols.
Hanover. 1793.
Secondary Authorities.
(a) General.
Heigel, K. Deutsche Geschichte seit dem Tode Friedrichs des Grossen. Vol.
i.
Stuttgart. 1899 etc.
Hettaer, H. C. T. Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur im 18ton
Jahrhundert.
Vols. n-iv. 5 vols. Brunswick. 1893-4.
Perthes, C. Folitische Zustande und Personen in Deutschland zur Zeit der
franzosischen Herrschaft. Gotha. 1862.
Philippson, M. Geschichte des Preussischen Staatswesens. 2 vols. Leipzig.
1880. Rambaud, A. Les Fran^ais sur le Rhin, 1792-1804. Paris. 1891.
Remling, F. Die Rheinpfalz in der Revolutionszeit. 2 vols. Speyer. 1865-6.
Salomon, L. Geschichte des deutschen Zeitungswesens. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1900-2.
Venedey, J. Die deutschen Republikaner unter der franzosischen Republik.
Leipzig, 1870.
Wenck, W. Deutschland vor hundert Jahjen. 2 vols. Leipzig. 1887.
Wohlwill, A. Welthiirgerthum und Vaterlandsliebe der Schwaben. Hamburg.
1875.
(6) Biogru ahie^
Adamson, R. Fichte. Edinburgh. 1881.
Beaulieu-Marconnai, Baron C. von. Karl von
Dalherg und seine Zeit. 2 vols. Weimar. 1879.
Dowden, E.
Goethe and the French Revolution, in New Studies in Literature. London. 1895.
Goschen, G.
J., Viscount. G. J. Goschen. 2 vols. London. 1902.
Guglia, E. Friedrich von Gentz. Vienna. 1901.
Haym, R. Herder. 2 vols. Berlin. 1885.
Janssen, J. Graf Stolberg. Freiburg im Breisgau. 1882.
Kapp, F. J. E. Bollmann. Berlin. 1880.
Konig, H. Georg Forster. 2 vols.
Lang, W. Graf Reinhard. Bamberg. 1896.
Leyser, J. J. H. Campe. 2 vols. Brunswick. 1877.
Muhlenbeck, E. Euloge Schneider. Strassburg. 1896.
Muncker, F. F. G. Klopstock. Stuttgart. 1888.
Perthes, F. Memoirs. Vol. i. 2 vols. London. 1857.
Rabany, C. Kotzebue. Paris. 1893.
Rieger, C. Schiller’s Verhaltniss zur franzosischen Revolution. Vienna.
1885. Sepp, R. Gorres. Nordlingen. 1877.
Sidgwick, Mrs
A. Caroline SchlegeL London. 1889.
Winkworth, S.
Niebuhr’s Life and Letters. Vol. i. 3 vols. London. 1852. Wohlwill, A. Georg
Kerner. Hamburg. 1886.
AUSTRIA.
OriginAii Sources.
Alxinger, J. B. Anti-Hofmann. 2 vols. Vienna. 1792.
Hofmann, L. A. Wiener Zeitung. Vienna. 1792-3. Erinnerungen. Vienna. 1795.
Secondary Works.
Brunner, S. Die Mysterien der Aufklarung in Oesterreich. Mayence. 1869.
Kopetsky, F. J. v. Sonnenfels. Vienna. 1882.
Sayous, E. Histoire des Hongrois, 1790-1815. Paris. 1872.
ITALY.
Original Sources.
Alfieri, V. II Misogallo. Florence. 1799.
Monti, V. La Bassvilliana. Assisi. 1793.
Secondary Works.
BouVier, F. Bonaparte en Italie. Paris. 1899.
Dejob, C. Mme de Stael et l’ltalie. Avec une bibliographic de
1’influence franfaise en Italie, 1796-1814. Paris. 1890.
Dufourcq, A. Le regime Jacobin en Italie. Paris. 1900.
Franchetti, A. Storia d’ Italia, 1789-99. Milan.
Giglioli, C.
Naples in 1799. London. 1903.
Helfert, Baron J. A. von. Fabrizio Ruffo. Vienna. 1882.
Maria-Karolina von Neapel. Vienna. 1884.
Landau, M. Geschichte der Italienischen Litteratur im IS1™
Jahrhundert. Berlin.
1899.
La Vita Italiana durante la Rivoluzione francese e 1’ Impero. Milan. 1900.
Masson, F. Les diplomates de la Revolution. Hugo de Bassville. Paris. 1882. Le
Cardinal de Bernis. Paris. 1884.
Monnier, M. Un aventurier Italien, le Comte Joseph Gorani. Paris. 1884 Reumont, A. Die Grafin von Albany. 2
vols. Berlin. 1860.
Silvagni, D.
Rome, its Princes, Priests and People. 3 vols. London. 188S-7. Vicchi, L. V.
Monti. 4 vols. Florence. 1879-87.
Les Franfais a Rome, 1792-5. Rome. 1892.
SAVOY.
Original Sources. iviaistre, J. de. Considerations sur la France.
Lausanne. 1796.
Seoonsary Works.
Carutti, D. Storia della Corte di Savoia durante la rivoluzione e 1’
impero francese.
2 vols. Turin. 1892.
Cogordan, G. Joseph de Maistre. Paris. 1894.
Costa de Beauregard, A., Marquis. Recollections of Marquis de
Beauregard. 2 vols. London. 1877.
Jescostes, F. Joseph de Maistre pendant la Revolution Franfaise. Tours. 1895.
SWITZERLAND.
Dandliker, K. Geschichte der Schweiz. Vol. m. 3 vols. Zurich.
1892-5. A Short History of Switzerland. London. 1899.
Lavater et la Revolution Fran^aise. La Revolution Fra^aise. Vol. xxxiv.
Societe de l’Histoire de la Revolution. Paris. 1881 etc.
Mallet, B. Mallet du Pan and the French Revolution. London. 1902.
Morikofer, J. C. Die schweizerische Literatur des IS1611
Jahrhunderts. Leipzig. 1861.
Pictet, E. Pictet de Rochemont. Geneva. 1892.
Rossel, V. Histoire litteraire de la Suisse romande. 2 vols. Geneva. 1889-91. Steinlen, A. C. V. de
Bonstetten. Lausanne. 1860.
Stroehlin, H. La Mission de Barthelemy en Suisse. Geneva. 1900.
Wyss, F. von. Lehen der beiden Biirgermeister D. v. Wyss. 2 vols. Zurich.
1884-6.
SPAIN.
Baumgarten, H. Geschichte Spaniens zur Zeit der franzosischen Revolution. Beilin. 1861.
Godoy, M. Memoirs. 2 vols. London. 1836.
.
Grandmaison, G. de. L’Ambassade fran^aise en Espagne pendant la Revolution.
Paris. 1892.
Lavalle, J. Don Pablo de Olavide. Lima. 1885.
Menendez y Pelayo, M. Estudios de critica literaria. Tercera Serie. El
Abate Marchena. Madrid. 1900.
Sorel, A La Diplomatie fran^aise en Espagne. Revue Historique. Vols.
xi-xin. Paris. 1876 etc.
Sybel, H. von. Spanien gegen die franzosische Revolution. Historische
Zeitschrift.
Vol. ix. Munich. 1859 etc.
Tratchevsky, H. L’Espagne a l’epoque de la Revolution Fran9aise. Revue
Historique. Vol. xxxi. Paris. 1876 etc.
Yriarte, C. Goya. Paris. 1867.
PORTUGAL.
Braga, T. Bocage. Oporto. 1902.
Latino Coelho, J. M. Historia politica e militar de Portugal. Vol. ii. 3 vols. Lisbon. 1874^91.
RUSSIA.
Original Sources.
Catherine II. Correspondance avec Grimm. St Petersburg. 1878.
Czartoryski, A. J. Memoirs. Vol. i. 2 vols. London. 1888.
Secondary Works.
Lariviere, C.
de. Catherine II et la Revolution Fra^aise. Paris. 1895.
Pingaud, L. Les Fra^ais en Russie et les Russes en France. Paris. 1886.
Pypin, A. N. Die geistigen Bewegungen in Russland in der ersten Halfte des
xix.
Jahrhunderts.
Vol. i. Berlin. 1894.
Waliszewski,
K. The Romance of an Empress. 2 vols. London. 1894.
The Story of a Throne. 2 vols. London. 1895.
c.
m. h. viii. 54
GREECE.
Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, K. Geschichte Griechenlands. Vol. i. 2 vols.
Leipzig. 1870.
Original Sources.
Czartoryski, A. J. Memoirs. Vol. i. 2 vols. London. 1888.
Oginski, M. Memoires sur la Pologne. Vol. I. 4
vols. Paris. 1826-7.
Secondary Works.
Briiggen, E. von der. Polens Auflosung. Leipzig. 1878.
Nitschmann, H. Geschichte der polnischen Litteratur. Leipzig. 1889.
BELGIUM.
Delplace, L. La Belgique et la Revolution Fr'an^aise. Louvain. 1895.
La Belgique sous la domination fran^aise. 2
vols. Louvain. 1896.
Lanzac de Laborie, L. La Domination franfaise en Belgique, 1795-1814. 2
vols. Palis. 1895.
Levae, A. Les Jacobins de Bruxelles. Brussels. 1846.
Verhaegen, A. Le Cardinal Franckenberg. Lille. 1889.
P. Le Tribuiial revolutioniiaire de Bruxelles.
Brussels. 1893.
HOLLAND.
Joriesen, T. De Patriotten te Amsterdam in 1794. Amsterdam.
1873.
De Overgave van Amsterdam in Januari 1795. Amsterdam. 1884.
Kollewijn, R. Bilderdijk. 2 vols. Amsterdam.
1891.
Legrand, L. La Revolution Fran^aise en Hollande. Paris. 1895.
Mendels, M. H. W. Daendels (1762-1818). 2 vols. The
Hague. 1890.
DENMARK.
Original Sources.
Baggesen, J. I. Poetische Werke. Vol. n. 5 vols. Leipzig. 1836.
Steffens, H. Was ich erlebte. Vols. i-ii. 10 vols. Breslau. 1840-4.
Secondary Works.
Holm, E. Den
offentlige Mening, 1784-99. Copenhagen. 1888.
SWEDEN.
Bain, R. N.
Gustavus III and his Contemporaries. 2 vols.
London. 1894. Schweitzer, P. Geschichte! der skandinavischen Litteratur. Vol.
n. 3 vols. Leipzig. 1885-9.
1697
1734
1748
1751
1753
1755
1758
1760
1764
1770
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
1781
1783
OF
Bayle’s
Dictionary.
Voltaire’s
Letters an the English.
Montesquieu’s
Esprit des Lois.
Publication
of the Encyclopedie begins.
Rousseau’s
Discourse on the origin of inequality.
Morelly’s Code de la Nature.
Quesnay’s Tableau jOconomique.
Rousseau’s Contrat Social.
Stanislas
Poniatowski elected King of Poland.
Marriage of
Louis with Marie-Antoinette.
Accession of
Louis XVI.
Maurepas
First Minister.
Turgot Controller-General.
The
Parlements recalled.
Treaty of
Kutschuk Kainardji between Russia and Turkey:
First
Partition of Poland.
Opposition of
Parlement of Paris to Reform. Lit de Justice.
Declaration
of American Independence.
Turgot
dismissed.
Necker Finance
Minister.
Burgoyne’s
surrender at Saratoga.
Treaty
between France and the American Colonies.
Liberation of
the royal serfs.
Publication of Necker’s Compte Rendu au Roi.
Alliance
between Russia and Austria against Turkey.
Necker
dismissed. ■
Death of Maurepas.
1
‘reliminariae of peace with England signed. >
A Council of
Finance set up.
Resignation
of Joly de Fleury.
Peace with
England concluded.
Calonne
Controller-General.
Pitt Prime
Minister of Great Britain.
Russia
annexes the Crimea.
Treaty of
Constantinople.
The Parlement
demurs to'a loan of 125,000,000 livres. Registration enforced.
1784 October. The Dutch fire on an Austrian vessel
in the Scheldt.
1785 Necker on The Administration of the Finances of
France.
July. George
III joins the Fiirstenbund.
August.
Arrest of the Cardinal de Rohan. The diamond necklace. November. Treaty of
Fontainebleau.
1786 Commercial treaty between France and Englaud.
August.
Calonne’s proposals for reform.
„
17. Death of Frederick the Great. Accession of Frederick William II. December.
The Notables summoned.
1787 Joseph II’s edicts for the government of the
Netherlands.
February 13.
Death of Vergenngs.
„ 22. The
Notables meet.
May. Meeting
of Catharine II and Joseph II in the Crimea.
„
1. Lomenie de Brienne chief of the Council of Finance.
„
25. The Notables dissolved.
Lomenie’s
edicts. The Parlement opposes the stamp tax.
Jnne.
Princess Wilhelmina arrested in Holland.
August 6. Lit
de justice. The Parlement goes into exile.
„
15. Turkey declares war on Russia.
September 13.
The Prussians invade Gelderland.
„
24. The Parlement returns to Paris.
October.
William V restored to power.
,,
27. Treaty of Paris.
November.
Lomenie proposes fresh loans. Royal Session.
1788 April 15. Alliance between England and Holland.
May. Arrest
of d’Espremenil and Goislard. Lit de Justice at
Versailles.
New dour
PUniere.
June 13.
Provisional treaty of Loo. The Triple Alliance.
July. Meeting
at Vizille.
Gustavus III
invades Finland.
August.
States General summoned.
„ 25. Lomenie
gives place to Necker.
September*
Assembly at Romans.
October 6.
Meeting of the Four Years’ Diet in Poland.
November. The
Notables reassemble.
December.
Double representation of the Third Estate decreed.
Scarcity and
bread riots begin.
,,
17. Capture of Oczakoff.
1789 January 24. Definitive summons of the States
General.
May 4. The
States General meet at Versailles.
June. British
vessels seized in Nootka Sound.
The Third
Estate adopts the style of National Assembly.
The liberties
of Brabant cancelled.
Oath of the
Tennis-court.
The Royal
Session. The King’s declarations.
Union of the
three Estates.
The first
Committee of the Constitution appointed.
Necker
ordered to quit the kingdom.
Fall of the
Bastille.
Necker
recalled. First emigration. Bailly Mayor.
Formation of
National Guards. Risings in the Provinces.
August 4-5.
Resolutions against feudal abuses and serfdom.
October 1.
The banquet at Versailles.
Rebellion in
the Austrian Netherlands.
99 |
17. |
99 |
18. |
99 |
20. |
99 |
23. |
99 |
27. |
July |
6. |
99 |
11. |
99 |
14. |
1789 October 5. March to Versailles.
„ 6. The King
and the Assembly removed to Paris.
„
9. The Austrians take Belgrade.
November 2.
The possessions of the Church nationalised.
December 21.
Assignats issued.
1790 January 30. Alliance of Prussia with the Porte.
February.
Spain and Englaud at issue as to Nootka Sound.
„ 20. Death
of Joseph II. Accession of Leopold II.
JIarch 29.
Defensive alliance between Poland and Prussia.
June 12.
Union of Avignon to France resolved by the citizens of Avignon. July 12. The
Civil Constitution of the clergy decreed.
„
14. First fete of the Federation.
,, 27.
Convention of Reichenbach signed.
August. The
federation of Jales.
Revolt of the
regiment of Chateau-Vieux.
The Civil
Constitution of the clergy receives the roys.1 assent.
„ 15. Treaty
of Werela between Sweden and Russia.
September 4.
Resignation of Necker.
,, 6. Mutiny
at Brest.
October 28.
The Nootka Convention.
November.
Burke’s Reflections on the French Revolution.
December.
Suppression of the Belgian Republic.
„ 16. The Polish
Diet doubled.
„ 26. Louis
XVI gives his assent to requiring the clergy to swear fidelity to the Civil
constitution.
1791 March. The Russian Armament.
April 4.
Death of Mirabean.
May 3. The
new Polish Constitution proclaimed.
June 21. The
flight to Varennes.
July 6. The
circular of Padua.
„
17. The massacre of the Champ de Mars.
„ 25.
Alliance between Austria and Prussia.
August 22.
Rising of the negroes at San Domingo.
,, 27.
Declaration of Pillnitz.
„ 30. Treaty
of Sistova signed.
September 3.
The Constitution voted.
„
13. The union of Avignon with France decreed.
„ 30. The
National Assembly comes to an end.
October 1.
The Legislative Assembly begins.
„
8. Lafayette resigns the command of the National Guard.
,, 16, 17.
Massacres at Avignon.
November 9.
Decree against the emigres. Vetoed Nov. 12.
„
14. Petion Mayor of Paris.
„ 29. Decree
against the non-juring priests.
December 19.
The King vetoes the decree against the priests.
1792 January 9. The Treaty of Jassy.
„ 18. Ansbach
and Baireuth escheat to Prussia.
February 7.
Treaty of Berlin between Austria and Prussia.
,, 9. The
property of the emigres confiscated.
March 1.
Death of the Emperor Leopold.
„ 10. The Comte de Narbonne superseded.
Fall of the
Feuillant Ministry.
„ 24.
Brissotin Ministry.
,, 29. Murder
of Gustavus III.
1792
April 15. |
Fete
in honour of the Swiss of the regiment of Chateau-Vieu: |
|
99 |
20. |
War
declared against Austria. |
May |
19. |
The
Russian armies invade Poland. ,, , ; |
June |
10. |
Petition
,of the 8000 against the camp of fidires. |
99 |
12. |
The
Brissotins dismissed. |
99 |
20. |
The
mob invades the Tuileries. |
99 |
28. |
Lafayette
at the bar of the Assembly. . |
July |
1. |
Petition
of the 20,000. |
99 |
11. |
The
country declared in danger. |
99 |
13. |
Treaty
between Austria and Russia. |
99 |
14. |
Feast
of. the Federation, Francis II Emperor. |
99 |
25. |
The
Sections begin ,to sit eft permanence. . |
99 |
27. |
Manifesto
of the Duke of Brunswick. |
August
1. |
The
National Guard reorganised. |
|
99 |
7. |
Treaty
between :Russia and Prussia. ; |
99 |
10. |
Attack
on the Tuileries. Massacre of the Swiss. Louis a |
|
|
prisoner.
Elections to the National Convention decreed. |
99 |
20. |
Flight
of Lafayette.. . |
99 |
23. |
Fall
of Longwy. ■.. , |
99 |
27. |
Primary
Elections .to the Convention begin., ; |
September
2. |
The
Massacres in the prisons. Secondary elections to the |
|
|
|
Convention.
The Allies occupy Verdun, |
99 |
20. |
The
Battle of Valmy., , |
99 |
21. |
The
Convention meets., i ,. |
99 |
22. |
The..
Republic,.proclaimed. |
99 |
28. |
Nice
occupied. War with Sardinia. , . |
October |
14. |
Retreat
of the Prussians. : . |
99 |
21. |
Custine
occupies Mainz., . • , |
November |
3. |
Report
of the Committee on charges against Louis. |
99 |
6. |
Battle
of Jemappes. , . |
99 |
14. |
Brussels.
occupied by, the French. , • , |
99 |
19. |
Protection
to nations struggling for freedom decreed. |
99 |
27. |
Savoy,
incorporated in Franc,e. . ' , , |
December |
3. |
The
trial of Louis XVI decreed. , |
99 |
15. |
Compulsory
liberty , decreed.. |
99 |
18. |
Prosecution
of Paine’s Bightt of Man. |
99 |
31. |
Pitt’s
remonstrance. , .. |
1793 January 4. Comite
de Difeme Generale established*
„
13. Basseville murdered in Rome.
,,
14. The Prussians enter Poland,
„
19. The immediate death of Louis XVI
decreed.
,,
21. The King executed. ... ,
„
23. Second Partition Treaty.
; .
,
February
1. War declared by France against
England and Holland.
,,
23. Decree for the ballot for the
army.
March
7. |
War
declared on Spain. |
|||
99 |
8. |
Dumouriez
recalled from Holland. |
||
99 |
9. |
Representants
en mission sent out.. , |
||
99 |
14. |
Revolt
in the Vendee. . , , , . . , |
||
99 |
18. |
Dumouriez
defeated at Neerwinden. Tfte Netherlands evaeuated. |
||
99 |
29. |
Extraordinary
Criminal Tribunal reestablished. |
||
April |
5. |
Defection
of Dumouriez, , |
||
99 |
6. |
First
Committee of Public Safety. |
||
99 |
14. |
The
siege of Mainz begins.. |
||
May |
3. |
|
||
3) |
18. |
|
||
33 |
31. |
|
||
June |
2. |
|
||
>s |
6. |
|
||
» |
17. |
|
||
July |
10. |
|
||
» |
13. |
|
||
>> |
23. |
|
||
>3 |
26. |
|
||
1793 May 3. Decree of the maximum.
The Committee
of Twelve.
Insurrection
of 12 Prairial.
Fall of the
Gironde.
Protest
of the 73 deputies. '
Diet of
Grodno.
The Great
Committee of Public Safety. Decline of Danton’s influence. Fall of Conde.
Assassination of Marat.
Mainz capitulates. Polish treaty with Russia signed.
Fall of
Valenciennes.
August. All
officers of noble birth cashiered.
,,
10. Levee-en-masse decreed.
„
28. Hood occupies Toulon.
September 5.
Law of Forty Sous. The Revolutionary Tribunal divided into four sections.
})
6. Collot d’Herbois and Billaud-Varennes added to the Committee of Public
Safety.
„
8. Battle of Hondschoote.
„
17. Law of the Suspect.
„
23-24. Dumb sitting of the Polish Diet at Grodno.
„
25. Prussian demands conceded by Poland.
October 3.
The Girondins proscribed. The 73 imprisoned.
,,
9. Embargo on English goods. 1
j, 14. Trial
of the Queen begins.
„
16. Battle of Wattignies. Execution of Marie-Antoinette.
„
24. Trial of the Girondins.
November. The
Terror in Lyons.
,,
10. The Feast of Reason. •
,,
12. Execution of Philippe l^galite.
„
26-28. Battle of Kaiserslautern.
December
12. Defeats of the Vendee insurgents at Le Mans and (Dec. 23) at Savenay. 1 ' ' 1
„
18. Toulon evacuated by the British and the Spaniards.
„
26. Wurmser defeated at Weissenburg.
1794 January 17. Turreau and his colonnes infernales
against the Vendee. March 24. The Hebertists executed. Publication of
Kosciusko’s manifesto. April 3-5. Trial and execution of Danton.
„
18. Russians evacuate Warsaw.
,,
19. Convention of the Hague between England and Prussia.
May. The
French occupy the passes leading to Piedmont.
„
18. The English and the Austrians defeated at Lille.
„ 21-31.
Jourdan crosses the Meuse and threatens Charleroi.
„
23. Treaty of Valenciennes between Austria and Sardinia.
,,
28-June 1. Howe in action with Villaret-Joyeuse.
June 6.
Battle of Rawka.
„
8. Fete de VEtre Supreme.
10. Law of 22 Prairial.
„
25. Coburg defeated at Fleurus.
July
27-28. (9-10 Thermidor.) Fall and death of Robespierre. The Commune of Paris
abolished. -
„
31. The Committee of Public Safety reconstructed.
August 1.
Fo’uquier-Tin ville impeached.
},
12, 28. The powers of Reprisentants en mission curtailed.
1794 August 22. Law of Forty Sous abolished.
„ 23.
The Government reorganised. .
,, 29.
Billaud, Barere, Collot, leave the Committee of Public Safety. September 6.
Blockade of Warsaw raised.
October,
1794-January, 1795. Pichegru conquers the Low Countries. Jourdan occupies
Cologne, Andernach, Coblenz.
Battle
of Maciejowice. . ,
Home Tooke
and others acquitted of treason The Russians enter Warsaw.
The Jacobin
Club closed.
Perignon
occupies Figueras.
Return
of the 73 deputies. ,
Carrier
sentenced to death.
Congress at
St Petersburg.
The maximum
abolished.
Mannheim
occupied.
Pichegru
invades Holland.
Boissy
d’Anglas joins the Committee of Public Safety. Treaty between the Emperor and
Catharine II for the partition or acquisition of Turkey, Venice, Bavaria, and
Poland.
Pichegru in
Amsterdam.
Peace with
Tuscany.
Peace of La
Jaunaie.
Liberty of
worship decreed.
March 2.
Billaud, Barere, Collot, and Vadier brought to trial.
,, 8. The
Girondins recalled.
,, 21.
Constitutional Committee appointed.
April 1.
Insurrection of 12 Germinal.
„ 5. The
Treaty of Basel signed.
,, 20. Peace
in Britanny.
May-June. The
White Terror.
May 7.
Fouquier-Tinville executed.
„ 16. Holland
makes terms with France.
,, 20.
Insurrection of 1 Prairial.
June 10.
Death of the Dauphin (Louis XVII).
,, 25.
Luxemburg capitulates.
,, 27. Landing
of Emigres at Quiberon.
July 20. The
Emigres at Quiberon captured.
„ 22. Peace
concluded with Spain.
August 22-30.
Decrees of Fructidor (the two-thirds).
September 6.
Jourdan crosses the Rhine.
,, 20.
Pichegru occupies Mannheim.
Octqbpr 1.
Belgium incorporated with France.
„ 3-5.
Insurrection of Vendemiaire.
,, 24.
Revised scheme for the Partition of Poland.
„ 25. Law
against priests.
„ 26. The
Convention dissolved.
November 3.
The Directory installed.
„ 23-4.
Battle of Loano.
,, 25.
Abdication of Stanislas Poniatowski.
December 19.
Jourdan concludes an armistice, with the Austrians.
„ 31.
Pichegru signs an armistice with the Austrians at Weissen- burg.
„
10. „ 29. November 8. „ 11. „ 27. December 9. „ 16. „ 19. „ 23. „ 25. 27.
1795 January.
„ 19.
February 9.
„ 15.
„ 21.
1796 February 1. Paris divided into 12
Municipalities.
„
27. Closing of the Pantheon Club.
March 19.
Freedom of the press decreed.
„
27. Bonaparte arrives at Nice.
April 11-28.
Successes of Bonaparte.
,,
28. Armistice of Cherasco.
May 10. The
conspiracy of Babeuf suppressed. Battle of Lodi.
„
15. Peace with Sardinia.
June. Moreau
and Jourdan cross the Rhine.
July 29.
Advance of Wurmser.
,,
31. Siege of Mantua raised.
August 2-4.
Battles of Castiglione, etc.
„ 19. Treaty
of San lldefonso. Spain allied with France. Successes of the Archduke Charles.
September.
Retreat of Moreau and Jourdan.
October 5.
Spain declares war against England.
,,
16. Cispadane Republic founded.
November.
British fleet withdrawn from the Mediterranean.
„ 16-17.
Battle of Areola.
„
16. Death of Catharine II.
December 16.
Hoche sets sail from Brest for Ireland.
„ 19. Lord
Malmesbury ordered to leave Paris.
1797 January 14. Battle of Rivoli.
„
26. Final treaty of Polish Partition.
„ 30. The
conspiracy of Brottier suppressed.
February 2.
Surrender of Mantua.
„ 14. Battle
of Cape St Vincent.
„ 19. The
Pope makes peace at Tolentino.
April 16.
Mutiny of the fleet at Spithead.
„ 18.
Preliminaries of peace signed at Leoben.
May 1-16. The
Venetians adopt a new constitution.
„
2. Mutiny at the Nore.
Admiral
Duncan blockades the Texel.
,, 20. The
newly elected members of the Corps Ligislatif take their seats. „ 27.
Barthelemy elected Director in place of Letoumeur.
June 6.
Provisional treaty with Genoa.
„
28. The French at Corfn.
July 9. The
Cisalpine Republic formed and (July 16) united with the Cispadane
„ 16. The
Moderate Ministers dismissed.
September 4.
Coup d'itat of 18 Fructidor.
„
5. Law of 19 Fructidor.
,, 6. Merlin
of Douai and Francis de Neufchateau elected as Directors.
„ 30.
Bankruptcy of the two-thirds.
October 11.
Battle of Camperdown.
„
17. Peace of Campo Formio.
Bonaparte
appointed to command the force intended for the invasion of England.
December 16.
Congress at Rastatt opens.
1798 February 16. Roman Republic established.
„
20. Pius VI leaves Rome.
March 6. The
French occupy Bern.
,, 9. The
left bank of the Rhine ceded to France.
1798 March 20. Treaty forced on the Cisalpine
Republic.
,j
29. Helvetic Republic proclaimed. ' :
May
1. Cobenzl succeeds Thugut. . '
,,
11. Second coup d’Stat to deal with the elections.
,,
13. Francois succeeded by Treilhard as Director.
,,
19. Bonaparte sets sail from Toulon.
June. Riot in
the British Mediterranean fleet.
„
12. Malta surrenders to the French.
July 2. Alexandria
occupied.
„
21. Battle of the Pyramids. 1
August
1-2. Battle of the Nile. -
,,
22. Humbert’s force lands in Ireland:
September.
Russian fleet in' the' Mediterranean.
,,
5. Law of conscription.
October 21.
Rebellion at Cairo.
November.
English occupy Minorca.
,,
29. Ferdinand I of Naples enters Rome.
December 4.
France declares war against Naples.
„
9. Charles Emmanuel IV of Sardinia abdicates.
„ 21.
Ferdinand and his Court take flight from Naples for Palermo.
1799 January 2. Great Britain joins Russo-Turkish
alliance.
„
23. The Parthenopean Republic established.
February 20.
The French capture El Arish.
March 1. The
French cross the Rhine.
„
7. Jaffa occupied.
„
12. Austria declares war on Franco.
„ 19. Siege
of Acre begun.
„ 25. Jourdan
defeated.at Stockach hy the Archduke Charles.
April. Bruix
in the Mediterranean.
„ 28. Murder
of French envoys at Rastatt.
May 9.
Rewbell retires from the Directory. Sieyes elected.
„
20-1. Siege of Acre raised.
New third of
the Legislative Body elected.
June. Suvoroff’s
campaign in Italy.
„
14. The French army in Cairo.
„
18. Revolution of 30 Prairial.
,,
23. Neapolitan rebels surrender to Ruffo.
July 12. Law
of Hostages.
„
25. The Turks defeated at Aboukir. ‘
August 13.
The Jacobin Club again closed.
„ 15. Joubert
defeated and killed at Novi.
„
22-3. Bonaparte sets sail from Egypt.
August-October.
British force in Holland.
September-October.
Suvdroff driven out of Switzerland.
October 9.
Bonaparte lands at Frejus.
Paul
recalls Suvdroff and Korsakoff. "
November 9. Coup d'(tat of 18 Brumaire.
,,
10. The Councils at Saint-Cloud.
December 24.
The new Constitution comes into force.
1800 January 24. Treaty of El Arish.
March 20. The
Turks defeated at Heliopolis.
June 14.
Kleber assassinated.
September 5.
Malta surrenders to the English.
1801 August. The French forces in Egypt capitulate.
Abaneonrt,
C.-X.-J. Franqueville de, 406 Abdul Hamid, Sultan, 326 Abercromby, General Sir
Balph, 617 Aboukir, battle of (1799), 614-5, 674 Aequi, 567
Acre, siege
of, 610-3, 619 Acton, General Joseph, 650 Adams, John, President of U. S. A.,
and the Directory, 493 Administration of the Finances of France, the (by
Necker), 98-9 Adoption of children, legislation concerning, 739
Agrarian
burdens, 64 -
Agriculture,
views of Physiocrats on, 83 Aides, defined, 69; 76, 91, 140 Aiguillon, A.
V.-Duplessis Due de, 82 Alary, Abb6 Pierre-Joseph, 15 Albert, Duke of
Saxe-Teschen, 318 Albitte, Antoine Louis de, 561 Alembert, Jean le Bond de, 26
Alexander, Czarewitch, 785 Alexandria, seizure of 1798, 599 Alfieri, Vittorio,
attitude of to Revolution, 779 ,
Aligre, Etienne-Franpois de, president of the Parlement (1787), 106
Alleu, 721
Alsace and
France, 398 Alton, General Comte Bichard de, 320, 328 Alvensleben, Count Philip
Charles von, 288
Alvintzy,
Baron Nicholas de, 435, 579, 580 A mar, J.-B.-A., 350; 385 Amelot, Minister of
household (1776), 87-8 American War of Independence, cost to France of the, 73,
77; French sympathy ■with, 89, 91; effects of, 92, 93 Ami du People, Le,
373 Anciens, the Council of, 393, 489, 490, 670, 671, 672, 679, 682, 683, 705
Anglo-Bussian Treaty (1798), 648 Anselme, J.-B. Modeste d’, 437 Aoust, Eustache
de, 439 Argenson, B.-L. da Voyer, Marquis de,' 1694-1757, 9, 12, 21, 26; his
Considerations on the Government of France, 16 Army, the French, 51-2, 112,
138; St Germain’s attempts to reform, 88; Crown
patronage in,
204, 207; organisation of, 401-3; re-organisation (1793), 432 Artois, Comte de,
39; oharacter of, 81, 395, 398, 399, 550; emigrates,,1789, 165; accused of high
treason, 221 Assemblies, Assembly, see National, Provincial
Assignats,
695-6, 703; first issue of, 195;
table of
depreciation of, 709 Association, the right of, 726 Association for preserving
Liberty and Property, the, 760 Attorney-at-law (avoue), office of, abolished,
752 Aubaine, 729
Aubert-Dubayet,
Minister of War, 490 Aubry, Francois, 442 '
Auckland, W.
Eden, Lord, 290, 294 sq., 301, 429 Aufkldrung, the, 772 sq.
Augereau, P.
F. C., Due de Castiglione, 440, 444, 508, 564, 566-9, 575, 578, 591 Augustus
III, long of Poland, 522 Austria, war declared against (1792), 225; movements
of (1793), 419; negotiations with Poland, 532-4; treaty between, and Bussia
(1798), 599; situation in
(1796),
634; declares war against France (1799), 655; and the Bevolution, 776, 777
Austrian Netherlands, effects of the Bevolution on, 786 Avignon, union of with
Francs, 217-8
Babsau,
Albert, on the French peasants, 63 sq.
Babeuf,
Fran<;ois-Noel, 34; conspiracy of, 503-5
Baco, Mayor
of Nantes, 341 Baggesen, Jens; his posms, 788 Bailleul, J.-C., 510, 511, 515,
Sl6 Bailli, 38, 48
Bailli,
grand, or sSn&chal, 126 Bailliages, 38, 120, 124, 126; courts of, 47, 48
Bailly, A.,
74
Bailly,
Jean-Sylvain, president of National Assembly; 101, 131 sq., 153, 165, 167 sq.,
357, 389 Banalites, 64
Bar,
confederation of, 523 Barbantane, H.-P.-F.-B. Paget, Marquis de, 439
Barbaroux, C.-J.-M., 249, 250, 260, 357 Barb6-Marbois, F., Marquis de,
488, 507 Barbier, C.-J.-F., 9, 12 Barentin, C.-L.-F. de Paule de, 156 Bardre,
B. de Vienzao, 249, 258, 262, 275, 347, 374, 375, 380 Barnave, A.-P.-J.-M.-F.,
Marquis de, 174, 186, 200, 213, 216, 357 Barras, Paul-Francois-Jean-Nicholas,
349, 366, 369, 371, 378, 396, 489; family of, 491, 507, 508, 517, 563-4, 592,
669, 675, 680
Barthelemy,
F., Marquis de, 299, 381, 441, 506, 509, 510, 511, 591, 639 Basel, treaty of
(1795), 289, 386, 441, 551, 634
Bassano, Duo
ds, see Maret Basse justice, 48
Bastards,
legislation regarding, 738, 739 iastille, fall of the, 164, 167 Battaglia
(Venetian provedditare), 585 Baudin, P.-C.-L. (des Ardennes), 394 Baudot,
M.-A., 427, 428 Bayle, Pierre, 4; his Dictionary, o; his Commentaire
philosophique sur le Compelle Intrare, 5 Bazire, C., 213, 249, 340 B6arn,
Parlement of, 111-2 B£arn, provinoe of, 128 Beauharnaia, Alexandre, 339, 424-5
Beauhamais, Eugene de, 606, 616 Beauharnais, Josephine de, 563 Beaulieu,
Jean-Pierre, Baron de, 420, 435, 558, 565, 567-8, 572 Beauregard, Marquis Costa
de, 576 Becoaria, C.B., Marquis de, 13; his Treatise on Crimes and Penalties,
748; on penalties, 749 .
Belgian
Bepublic, suppression of, 335 Belgium, absorption of in France (1795), 496
Belliard, General Comte A.-D., 602, 603;
capitulation
of, 617 B6n6zech, Pierre, Minister of the Interior,
490, 508 Benoit, Pierre-Victor, 412 Bentham, Jeremy,
his Treatise on Civil and Penal Legislation, 748; attitude of to the
Revolution, 769 Bergasse, Nicolas, 173, 178 Bernadotte, J. B. Jules (King
Charles John XIV of Sweden), 581; French Ambassador at Venice (1798), 642;
Minister of War (1799), 673, 677-8 Bernier, Abbe E.-A. (Bishop of Orleans), 382
Berthier, Commandant Victor Leopold, enters Boms, 637, 638, 683 Berthier,
Louie-Alexandre, Marshal, Prinos de Wagram, 564, 568, 569 Bcrthollet,
Claude-Louis, 606, 616 Bertin, H.-L.-J.-B., 24 Besenval, Baron Pierre-Victor
de, Commandant of Paris, 163
Beurnonville, Pisrre Biel, Marquis de, Minister of War (1793), 263,
269, 415, 417, 421 Bilderdyck, Guillaume, 788 Billaud-Varennes, J.-N., 339,
344, 349,3508, 359, 362, 366, 368, 369, 371, 374-5, 377, 386
Biron, A.-L. de Gontaut, Due de Lauzun et ds, 339, 346, 357, 407, 413,
437 Bischoflswerder, General J. K. von, 529 Blasi, 556
Bocage, M.-M. Barbosa du, 784 Boisgelin de Cuce, Cardinal J. de Dieu-
Baymond de, 24 Boishardi, Charles, Chevalier de, 379 Boissy d’Anglas, Comte
F.-Antoine de, 340, 380, 388, 392, 488, 506, 511 Bompard, Commodore J.-B.-F.,
commands the expedition to Ireland (1798), 476 Bon, L.-A., General, 599, 611;
death, 613 Bonaparte, Joseph, Ambassador to Bome
(1797),
636-7 Bonaparte, Lucien, 673; president of the Five Hundred, 674, 680; leaves
the Assembly, 684, 685 Bonaparte, Napoleon, writes Le Smiper de Beaucaire,
352; assistant to Barras, 396, 397; his generals, 446; in the war against
Sardinia, 456; and Austria, 497, 498; an obstacle to peace, 499; his Italian
expedition, Chap. XVIII; descent and training of, 352, 560; his feud with
Paoli, 560; secret commission of, 561; arrest of, 561; preparing a history,
561; his Mimoires of 1795, 562; in Topographic Bureau, 562; appointed to army
of Italy, 563; marriage, 563; spelling of name, 564 j advances into Lombardy,
568 sq.; quarrels with the Directors, 570; siege of Mantua, 572, 580; hie plan
of campaign compared with that of Maillebois, 576-8; letter to Archduke
Charles, 582; designs against Northern Italy, 587 sq.; the East, 591; Treaty of
Campo Formio, 591-2; leaves Italy, 593; appointed to command expedition to
England, 594; Egyptian Expedition, Chap. XIX; seizes Alexai <ria, 599;
hattle of Pyramids, 602; at Cairo, 603 eq.; Syrian Campaign, 608-13; defeats
Turks at Aboukir, 614; lands at FrSjus (1799), 663, 674; and 18th Brn- maire,
678 sq.; provisional Consul, 686 Boncerf, Pierre-Franpois, 87; his Essay on the
Redemption of Rent-charges and Dues on Land, 714, 744 Bonchamps, Artis de, 266,
354 Borel, Fauchs, 511
Bossuet,
Jacques-B6nigne (Bishop of Meaux), 6 '
Bottot
(secretary of Barras), 679 Boucher (priest), 3
Bouchotte, Jean-Baptiste-Noel, 339, 343,
424, 429
Bouilld and Nancy, Marquis de, 192, 403, 404
Boulainvilliers,
Comte H. de (1658-1722),
14; his
History of the Ancient Government of France. 14:
Letters on the Parlement, 14
Boulay de la Meurthe, Comte' Antoine- J.-C.-J., 509, 510, 515 Bourbon,
Louis-Henri, Due de, emigrates, 1789, 165
Bourbons, the motion to expel them from France, 257 Bourbotte, Pierre,
388 Bourcet, Pierre-Joseph da, 578 Bourdon (of the Oise), Fran<fois-Louis,
361, 366
Bourdon, L.-J.-J. da la Crosnidre, 366; 385 Bourgeoisie, the, 59 sq.;
grievances of, 61 Bourrienne, Louis-A.-F. de, 683 Bover, Lieutenant, 478
Breteuil, Baron L.-A. le Tonnelin de, Minister of Eng’s Household (1787), 103,
114; succeeds Necker (1789), 163 Br£z£, Henri-E., Marquis de Dreux, Grand
Master of the Ceremonies, 155 Bridport, Admiral Lord, 455, 471, 474-6 Brienne,
Comte de, 107 Brienne, Lom6nie de, Archbishop of Toulouse, budgets, 74,75;
dissolves Notables, 105; oontest with Parlement, 106; compromise with the
Parlement, 107; proposes judicial reforms, 110; the decrees of June and July,
1788, 114; dismissed, 115 Brissot, Jean-Pierre, 213, 214, 220, 258,
300, 357
Brissotins,
the, 213, 214, 228, 237 British Fleet, strength and condition of the
(1792),
452-3 Broglie, Marshal de, on ignorance of officers, 51, 159; Secretary for
War, 163, 165 Brottier, Abb§, conspiracy of, 503, 505-6 Brneys d’Aigalliers, Admiral
t'.-P., 598, 604 Bruix, Admiral Eustache de, 615, 630, 631, 657 *
“ Brumaire,”
Chap. XXII passim; the 18th, 678 sqq.; the 19th, 682 sqq.
Brune,
Guillaume-Marie-Anne, 639-40,662, 674
Brunswick,
Charles William Ferdinand, Duke of, manifesto of (1792), 234, 287,
323, Chap. XIV
passim Buchholz (Prussian envoy in Poland), 524, 537 sqq.
Bulletin
decadaire, 514 Bureau, Municipal, 205; des Finances, 72 Burke, Edmund, 134; his
Letters on a Regicide Peace, 762; Reflections on French Revolution, 755-9;
Appeal to the Old Whigs, 756 Burns, Robert, attitude of to the Revoln- tion,
771
Buzot,
F.-L.-Nicolas, 174, 257; his motion on the sentence of Louis XVI, 260
Cadondal,
Georges, 379 Caffarelli du Falga, General L.-M.-J.-Maxi- milien, 606, 610; his
death, 613 Cahiers, 120, 689; description of, 134,
135; as
evidence, 136; reforms proposed in, 137 sq.
Cairo, Bonaparte at, 603 ; rebellion at, 606 Caisse d'Escompte, 86, 96,
97, 101, 115, 693-4: de Vextraordinaire, 695, 699 Calendar, the Republican, 358
n.
Calonne, Charles-Alexandre
de, Controller- General, 60, 69, 72; on Necker’s budget 74; his antecedents,
97; his financial administration, 97 sqq.; proposals to Notables, 102;
dismissed, 1787,104; flees to England, 106; Requete au Roi, 108; accused of
high treason, 221; his L'&tat de la France, a, present et <t venir, 698
Calvin, John, 3, 31
Camhac£rds,
J.-J.-R6gis de, 380, 386, 395, 489, 517, 681, 739 Cambon, Joseph, 72, 73, 257,
366, 382, 418, 421; financial statement of (1793), 702 ; and the Grand Livre,
704 Camden, C. P., Earl, 294 Camperdown, A. Duncan, Earl of, 453 sq., 479-82
Camperdown,
battle of (1797), 482 Campo Formio, treaty of (1797), 498-9, 591-2, 633, 636,
639, 662 Camus, Armand-Gaston, 72, 158, 196;
president
Pensions Committee, 700 Canclauxe, General, Comte J.-B.-C. de, 382 Cantillon,
Philippe de, On the Nature of Trade, 21 Cantons, the, of 1791, 205 Capitation,
38, 54, 68, 69, 76, 140 Carleris, 425-6
Carmarthen,
Marquis of, see Leeds, duke of Carnot, L.-N.-M., 344; and the levee-en- masse,
348, 351; in danger of death, 389; his authority in army, 426; strategy of
(1793),
431 sqq.; Minister of War, 490-2; and Lord Malmesbury, 498-9; and the coup
d’etat (1797), 508-12; his Rgponse au Rapport de J.-G. Bailleul, 512; opposition
to Directors, 570; hie banishment, 641
Carrier,
Jean-Baptiste, at Nantes, 356, 362 impeachment of, 377 Carteaux, Jean-Franfois,
348, 352 Camel, the, 54 Cos royaux, 48
Cassono,
battle of (1799), 656 Castiglione, battle of (1796), 575 Catharine II, Empress
of Bussia, 278, 293,.
307, 308; and peace, 336, 399, 522, 550 ; on the
French Revolution, 784-5; her instructions for the Code, 784 Cathelineau,
Jacques, 341, 353 Cawdor, Lord, 475 Cazal&s, J.-A.-Marie de, 159, 172 Cens,
719, 722-3
Cervoni,, Jean-Baptiste, 564, 565, 569 Chabot de l’Allier,
George-Antoine, 339 Chalier, Marie-Joseph, 340 Chamhon de Moutaux, Nicolas,
Mayor of Paris (1792), 252 Chambres Ardentes, 48
Chambre des Gom.ptes, the, 72, 74, 106, 110 Champ de Mare, massacre of,
see Massacre Championnet, Jean-Etienne, 429, 652 sq., 663
Chancellor or
Keeper of the Seals,' the, 36 Charette, Fran<joia-A., 266, 353, 355, 381,
382, 386, 391, 395 Charles, Archduke of Austria, 336, 497, 581-2, 655-6, 660
Charles IV, King of Spain, 439 Charles Emmannel IV, King of Sardinia,
644, 654; 660 Charles Theodore, Elector of Bavaria,
281, 312, 534
Charles
William Ferdinand, see Brunswiok Chartres, Louis-Philippe, Duo de (1793), 417,
422
Chateau-Vieux,
Swiss Begiment of, 192;
fete, in
honour of, 226 Chatelet, Due de, Colonel of Gardes Fran- gaises (1789), 162
Chatham, second Earl of, 294 Chaumette, Pierre-Gaspard, 338, 349, 359
Chauvelin, Eranqois-B., Marquis de, 296, 297 s<i„ 29b, 303 Chazal,
Jean-Pierre, 515, 681, 684 Ch6nier, Marie-Joseph, on Rousseau, 28, 366, 387,
515 Cherasco, armistice of, 567 Chesterfield, fourth Earl of, 21 Choiseul,
E.-F., Due de, 82; his army reforms, 400 Chouam, the, 379, 391 Christian VII,
King of Denmark, 279 Church, condition of the, in France before the Bevolution,
53-56; its wealth, 53; lands, 62; re-modelled by A?,s." ably 1789,195 sq.;
churoh land declared the property of the nation, 195, 694; effect of the
Revolution on the, 789 Cisalpine Republic, the, 589-90 Cispadane Republio, the,
588-9 ■
Civil Code,
projects of a, 740 sq.
ClaviSre,
fetienne, Minister of Finance 1792, 223, 224, 339 ‘ '
Clerfayt, F.-S.-C.-Joseph de Croix, 408, 417,
420, 435, 436, 442 Clergy, the French, before the
Bevolution, 51 sq.; regular, 56; and capitation, 68; and Turgot, 87j and
Calonne, 99; and Brienne, 113; and the franchise for States General, 125; their
representatives in, 133; join National Assembly, 156; the cahiers and the, 139,
141, 142; the non-juring, 219; civil constitution of the (1790), 196; refuse
oath demanded by Assembly, 197; and the Directory, 499-500; in 1799, 666; laws regarding,
731, 732 Clermont-Tonnerre, Comte de, 131; joins the National Assembly, 158,
173, 183 Clootz, Anacharsis, his deputation of the human race, 171 Clouet,
professor of chemistry, 433 Clubs in Paris, 1789, 161; olosing of, 503 ; the
Cercle Constitutionnel, 507, 516; the
C.
de Clichy, 507; the C. of Cordeliere, 161, 200, 262, 362; C. de VEntresol, 15;
Club, the Jacobin, ses Jacobin Club Clugny de Nuis, J.-E.-Bernard, his budget
of 1776, 74, 88 Coalition, the Second, Chap. XXI Cobenzl, Count Ludwig, 548,
551, 591, 642, 645 .
Cobenzl,
Count Philip, 329, 419, 536 Coburg-Saalfeld, Frederick Josias, Prince of Saxe-,
347, 415, 429 Coohon de Lapparent, Comte Charles, 508, 510
Code
of Crimes and Penalties of 1795, 746-7 Coffinhal, Jean-Baptiste, 369 Colbert, Jean-Baptiste,
8, 69 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, attitude of to the Bevolution, 766-7 Colli,
General Baron de, 444, 558, 565,;
567 Collingwood, Cuthbert, Lord, ,454, 463 Collot d’Herbois, Jean-Marie, 226,
344, 349, 350, 351, 358, 360, 362, 369, 374-5, 380 Colonies, French, 193
Colpoys, Admiral John, 455, 474, 475, 478 ComSr^, Baron de, on fiuance, 69
ComitS central des commissaires des sections, 269, 272; de Defense Generals,
263, 268, 269; de Salut Public, Chaps. XII, XIII
passim; members of, 269; de Surete GenSrale, 349, 375; de Surveillance, 240
sq., 250, 269 Commission de Dome, the, 272 gq. Committee of
Insurrection at the Mairie, 271 Communal property, 723 Commune, its duties and
powers, 41, 42; the, of Paris, 225, 226; replaced by Sectional Commission, 236,
238; and Assembly, 240; and the Department of the Seine, 226; Chaps. XII, XIII passim Compte Rendu of Necker (1781), 74, 77, 94;
of Lambert (1788), 75 Concordat of 1516, the, 54 Cond^, Louis-Joseph de
Bourbon, Prince de, 398, 399, 429, 430, 502, 511 Condillac, Abb6 de Munaux, 33
Condorcet, M.-J.-A.-N.-Caritat, Marquis de, 214, 259, 260, 357; Avis aux
Espagnols, 783
" Conjuration du 9 Man,” la, 268 Conscription, law of, 518, 519
Conseil, des Anciens, see Anciens ; des Cinq- Csnts, 393; Royal, 36, 37;
Executif Pro- visoire, 303 Constant, Benjamin, 507 Constitu -1 Assembly, see
also National Assembly, Chaps. VI, VII, XXIII-XXIV pa lm\ its
Declaration of the Bights of Man, 178, 727 sq.; declares for a Single Chamber,
188; its treaty-making power, 188;. its suppression of tithe, religious Orders,
eto., 194-8; its finanoe, Chap. XXIII passim; its laws, Chap. XXIV passim .
Constitution
of 1791, the,. Chapter VII, 176-210; its enactments, j 201-7; its
defects,
208-10; its duration,, 210, 296; of the Year in (1795), 392, 393, 487 sq.
Constitutionals, the (party), 173 “ Continental System,” the, 595 Contrainte
solidaire, 68 Gontrat Social, le, 29, 174, 208 Controller-General of the
Finances, 37 Convention, tee National Convention Copenhagen, battle of (1801),
455 Copyright, 725 Corday, Charlotte, 346 Cordova, Admiral Don Jos6 de, 461,
463 Cormatin, P.-M.-F. Deeoteux de, 379 Com trade, the French, 25; legislation
of Turgot on, 1774, 85; action of Clugny de Nuis regarding, 88; in 1788, 271
Cornie, Bear-Admiral, 466 Cornwallis, Sir William, Vice-Admiral, 454, 471
Corps
Legislatif, 393; Chap. XVI passim, Gorvie, 39; modified by Turgot, 85, 100,
102; commuted into a money tax, 105, 692; seigneuriale, 64 Cottereau, J. (“Jean
Chouan”), 379 Council of Antwerp (1793), 429; of Despatches (Ganseil des
depeahes), 37; of Finance, Fleury’s, 96; suppressed, 98; of Notables, 101 sqq.
Gaur
des Aides, 72, 106, 110; des Comptes, 699; PUnierc, 110-111, 114 Gourt of Final
Appeal, 492; Courts, feudal, their number, 49; the royal, 46 sqq. Couthon,
Georges, 213, 345, 351, 361, 368,
370
Cowper,
William, 765 Croizier, aide-de-camp to Bonaparte, 606 Crown patronage,
enactments of Constitution of 1791 concerning, 204 Curo, General, 439 jurtis,
Admiral Sir Boger, 479 Custine, General A.-Philippe, Comte de, 339, 343, 346,
413-7, 422-4, 429-30 Custom of Paris, 712
Dagobert, General, 439-40 Daflemagne, Baron Claude, 56S Damican,
General, 396 Dampierre, A.-H.-M.-Pigot, Marquis de, 428 sq.
Danton,
Georges-Jacques, 213; antecedents of, 232; Minister of Justice, 233; and the
Septemher massacres, 243^-4; at trial of Louis XVI, 260; approaches the
Gironde, 263-9; and the Dantonist Committee, 342; his alliance with
Bobespierre, 347 ; his trial and death, 363, 412, 418 Dauphin^, Estates of,
113, 116, 117, 129 Davidovich, Baron Paul, 578, 580 Debrel, Pierre, 440 Debry,
Jean, 515, 655, 656 Decimes, 54
Declaration
of the Bights of Man, see Bights of Man 1
•
Deficits, 73
sq.
Dego, battle
of (1794), 561
Delaoroix,
Jacques-Yincent, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 490, 507 Delauney, B. -B.
-Jordan, 427 Delbscq, General, 439 Delessart, A. de Valdeo, Minister of
Interior, 216, 222, 223 Denmark, attitude of, to the Bevolution, 788 ..
Denon,
Dominique-Vivant, 599, 605, 606, 616
Departments
of France, 190, 205; Directory in the, 205 Desaix, Joseph-Marie, in Egypt, 600
sq. Desdze, Raymond, defends King at trial, 257 Desfieux, Francois, 342 De'-.forgues
(Dantonist), 339 Desmarets, Nicolas, 69 Desmoulins, Camille, 8; gives signal
for insurrection, 163; hie Les Revolutions de Franee et de Brabant, 148, 329;
his Le Vieux Cordelier, 361 Despinoy, H.-F.-Joseph, 574 Desprfis-Crassier,
J.-E.-Philibert, 439 Destoumelles (Dantonist), 339 Diderot, Denis, 5; and the
Abbd Baynal, 26 sq.
Diez, H. F. von (Prussian envoy in Constantinople), 316, 330 Directe,
la, 718 sqq.
Directoire
des Achats, 416; of the Seine, 226, 228 .
“Directory of
Insurrection,’' 232 Directory, the, 393, Chap. XVI, 633, 636-8, 639, 665,
680-1, 686, 701 Divorce, legislation regarding, 737 Djezzar, Pasha of Acre,
■ 607, 608, 609, 610, 611
Dobsen,
Claude-Emmanuel, 272-3 D'omaine, 67; receipts of, in 1788, 76 Don gratuit, 54,
68
Donoughmore,
Earl of (General J. H.
Hutchinson), 617-18 Doppet, F.-Am£d6e, 439 Dorset, J. F. Sackville, Duke
of, 298 Doulcet, A.-T.-Louis,1515 Doumerc, General, 416 Droit de
chasse, 64; de colombier, 64;
ecrit, 712, 731; de franc-fief, 692, 694 Drouet, Jean-Baptiste, 505
Dubois de Craned, E.-L.-Alexis, 174, 340, 346, 357, 366, 432 Ducos, Boger, 669,
679, 680, 686 Du Fless, L.-C. La Motte Angode, 420 Dugommier, J.-F.-Coquille,
352, 440 Dugua, General, 601, 614 Duka (Austrian General), 575 Dumas, Comte
Matthieu, 488, 507 Dumolard, Jacques-Victor, 488, 508 Dumouriez,
Charles-Fran^ois, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 223; character and antecedents,
224; in power, • 227; hig Memoires, 227; visits Paris, 259 ; defection
of, 268-9 ; overruns Belgium, 299; recalled, 305 ; Minister of War, 406; >
Allied Forces, 409; at Yalmy, 410, 411;
after the
battle, 412, 413; Austrian Netherlands, 4X5-21; treason of, 422; Pichegru, 436;
battle of Jemappes, 534
Duncan,
Admiral, see Camperdown, Earl of Dunkirk, relief of, 431 Dupont of Nemours,
Fierre-Samnel (17391817), 21; his Reflexions an the Riches of the Nation, 23;
216, 488, 515, 696, 703 Duport, Adrien, 131, 174, 200, 213 Duport-du-Tertre,
M.-L.-Francois, 357 Dupuy, General D.-Martin, 603; died, 606 Duroc, G.-C. de
M., Due de Frioul, 564, 592 Dutch Republic, and the French Revolution, 787
Duverne de Presle, 505, 506, 511
Eastern
Question, the, and the European Powers, Chap. XI, passim last Prussia, 522
figlantine, Fabre de, 361 Egyptian Expedition, the, Chap. XIX, 594619; results
of, 618 El Arish, treaty of (1800), 617 Elb6e, H.-L. Gigot de, 353, 354
Elections: to the States General, Chap. Y, 119 sqq.; to the Legislative
Assembly, 211 sqq.; to the Convention, 241, 245 sqq.; to the Legielative Body,
488-9, 506, 516, 519 Elizabeth, Princess, 357 Elliot, Hugh, 279, 291
Elphinstone, Vice-Admiral Sir George, 485 film, 38, 67
Amigris,
165, 185, 218-19, 221; laws relative to, 501-3 EncyclopSdie, the (1751-72), 1,
5, 56 England, Foreign Policy of (1784-93), Chap. X, 276 sqq.; Commercial
Treaty with France (1786), 99, 100; attitude of to French Revolution, 755-69
Entail (substitution), 730 Entraigues. Comte de, 509, 511 Equality, doctrines
of, 754 Ercole III, Duke of Modena, 554 Espr£m6nil, J.-J. Duval de, 110, 159,
172 Estaing, Comte de, 449, 614, 615 Estate, the First, and the Second,
suffrage in for States General, 125; the Third, representation in Notables of
1787, 101; in Notables of 1788, 116, 117; suffrage in for States General, 125,
127 ; elections in Paris, 131; representation in States General, 133; their
cahiers, 138 sq.; their attitude to the Church, 142; rural grievanoes of, 143;
verification of their powers, 148; form the National As- lembly, 153-4, 691
Estates, provinoial, 38 sq.; their powers, 40; in Britanny, 129; in Dauphin^,
113, 116, 117, 129 Etats Gdnfiraux, see States General Eupen, General van, 329,
335 Exmouth, Viscount (Admiral Sir Edward Pellew), 454, 474
Falkenstein,
Count (incognito of Joseph II), 315
Family Compaot,
the (Bourbon), 189 eq., 290 Fauchet, Claude, 214 Faypoult, Guillaume-Charles,
Minister of Finance, 490, 587 Federation, General, of June, 1790, 191 Fdderes,
the, 191, 231 Fenelon, F. de S. de Lamotte, Archbishop of Cambray, 8 F6raud,
Jean, 388
Ferdinand
III, Archduke of Tuscany, 554 Ferdinand IV, Kiug of Naples, 555, 654;
expedition to Rome (1798), 649, 652,'658 -t and Neapolitan
rebels, 631 Ferme generate, 71, 72, 76 Fermont, 300 Fersen, General, 546, 547
Fetes, national, 226-7 ; republican, 514 -r Fete de I’Etre Supreme,
365-6 Feudal rights, and the Paris Parlement (1776), 87; and the decrees of
August 4, 1789, 714 sq.; legislation against, 717 sq., 722
Feuillants,
the, 173, 212, 215; ministry, 216, 222, 223 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, attitude
of to French Bevolution, 775 Figueras, 440
Finance,
French, Chap. Ill, 66 sqq., Chap.
XXIII, 689
sqq.
Fiorella,
Paul-Antoine, 575 Fitzgerald, Lord Edward, 473, 771 Fitzherbert, Alleyne, 278,
292 Flesselles, Jacques de, Provost of the Merchants, murdered 1789, 164
Fleurus, battle of (1794), 367, 436 Fleury, Joly de, Controller-General 1781-3,
95 ; his Council of Finance, 96; resigns 1783, 96 Flores, Viceroy of Mexico,
290 Florida-Blanca, F. A. M., Count, 292, 782 Flotte, Rear-Admiral de, 448
Fontainebleau, 1st treaty of (1785), 281, 312; 2nd treaty of (1785), 283, 373
Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de, 15 Forbonnais, F. V6ron de, on taxes, 70
Fornesy, 565 Forster, Georg, 775
Fouch^,
Joseph (Due d’Otranto), minister of polioe, 366, 367, 351, 672 Foulon,
J.-Fran9ois, Minister of Xing’s Household 1789, 163; murdered, 168
Fouquier-Tinville, A.-Quentin, PublioProse- cutor, 356, 357, 875 Fourcroy,
A.-Franpois de, 433 Fournier, Claude, 228, 243 Fourqueux, Controller-General
1787, 104 Four Years’ Diet (1788), 524 Fox, Charles James, 284, 294, 303, 759
Franc-fief, 59
Franoie II,
Emperor, 536, 545, 579, 634 Fran501s de NeufcMteau, 508, 510, 517 Frederick II,
King of Prussia (Frederiok the Great), 281, 282, 286, 309, 313
Frederick
William II, King of Prussia, 107, 286-9, 314, 322. 400, 408, 441, 530, 534-5,
544, 634 Frederick William HI, King of Prussia, 634, 645
Freemasons,
the, 772, 783, 784, 789 French army, the, see Army, the French;
navy, the,
see Navy, the French French ports, disorders at, 192-3, 448; towns, population,
commeros and appearance of, 60 Fr&ron, L.-Stanislas, 349, 352; L’Orateur
du Peuple, 374 Freytag, H. W. von, Field-Marshal, 431 “Friends of the
Constitution, the,” 771 “Friends of the People, the,” 760, 770 Fruotidor,
Decrees of (1795), 395 Filrsteniund, the, 281, 313, 324
Gabelle
(or salt tax), the, 70; amount of in 1788,76; Necker on, 77, 91, 102, 140, 693
Galiani, AbbS Dom Gelestine, his Dialogues on the Cam Trade, 25 Galles,
Bear-Admiral Morard de, 450, 465-6, 473-4 Gallo, M. Martrizzi, Marquis di, 582 Garat,
D.-Joseph, 263, 273-4, 348, 679 Garde Departementale, the, 251 Gardes
Frangaises, the insubordination of (1789), 162; incorporated with the National
Guard, 166; Nationales, 166, 191, 207, 233, 403, 405; Suisses, 162 Gardner,
Vice-Admiral Sir Allan, 477 Gasparin, T.-Augustin de, 343 Gen&raux de
finances, 38 Geneva, annexed to France (1798), 640 Genoa, 587-8
Gsnsonn£,
Armand, 214, 249, 251, 258, 357 Gentz, Friedrich von, 774 George III, King, his
letter to Pitt, 291, 297-8, 305; message to Parliament, 496 Germany, opinion
in, regarding French Revolution, 773-6 “ Gift of joyous accession, the,” 82
Gilds, privileges suppressed by Turgot, 85 Giraud (member of Convention), 380
“Girdle of the Queen, the,” 82 Girondins, the, in the Convention, 213, 214; prominent
members of, 249; their struggle with the Mountain, 250 sq.; and King’s death,
254, 261; fall of, 275; trial of, 357; restoration of, 3S4 GlaudS70S, de (naval
officer), 448 Glane, the, 142
Gobel,
J.-B.-Joseph, Archbishop of Paris, 359 Godwin, William, his Political Justice,
767 Goethe, J. Wolfgang von, his attitude to the Bevolution, 299 Gohier,
L.-Jerome, 669, 680 Goislard (member of the Parlement), 110 Goltz, Count von
der, 441 Gorres, Jakob Joseph, 775 Gbrtz, J. Eustach, Count, 286 Goujon,
J.-M.-C.-Alexandre, 388 Gournay, Vincent de (economist), 22, 24
Gouvernements,
38 Gower, Earl, 292, 296 Gradualite, 394 Graham, Colonel, 572, 581-2 Grattan,
Henry, 771
Grave,
Chevalier Pierre-Marie de, Minister of War (1792), 223, 406 Greece, attitude
of, to the Bevolution, 789 Greig, Admiral, 325 Grenelle, factory at, 433
Grenville, Lord William, 288, 294, 296-7,
301, 304-5, 496, 559-60, 649, 651 Grey, General Sir
Charles, 486 Grimm, F. Melchior, Baron de, 27, 184, 785 Grimouard, N.-H.-Bdnd,
Comte de, 449 Grisel, Georges, 504 Grodno, Diet of, 537-40 Grotius, Hugo, 3, 29
Grouohy, Emmanuel,,Marquis de, 474 Guadet, Marguerite-Elie, executed, 214, 272,
357
Guibert,
J.-A.-H., his Essay on Tactics, 402 Guieu, Jean-Joseph, 582 Guines, Comte de,
Ambassador in London, 87, 88 Gnldberg, Count, 279 Gustavus III, King of Sweden,
309, 315, 325, 326, 336, 399 ; murder of, 400, 530 ; attitude of to the
Bevolution, 789
Hague, treaty
of the (1788), 288 Hall, Bobert, on the Bevolution, 764 Hamilton, Sir William,
British ambassador at Naples, 631, 650, 651, 658 Hampden, Viscount (J. H.
Trevor), British Minister at Turin, 559 sq.
Hanikoff,
Admiral, 481 Hanriot, Francois, Commandant of National Guard, 273-5, 342, 361,
370, 371 Hardenberg, Karl August, Prince von, 441, 544
Hardy,
General, 476
Hardy,
Thomas, his “Corresponding Society,” 760, 761, 762, 770 Harris, Sir James, see
Earl of Malmesbury Harville, L.-A.-J. des Ursins, Comte de, 416, 417, 421
Haugwitz, C.
A. H. K., Count von, 534, 536, 543 Haussmann, Nicholas, 415, 422 Hawkesbury,
Lord, see Earl of Liverpool Hubert, Jacques-B£n£, his Le Pere Duchesne, 272,
273, 373, 338, 339; death of, 362 Helvetic Bepublic, the, 639 Helvetic Society,
the, 781 Helv&ius, C.-A., 9, 26 Herault de SScheUes, M.-J., 275, 343, 344,
363, 375 Heretics, 727
Hermann,
M.-J.-A., President of Bevolu- tionary Tribunal, 356 Hertzberg, E. Frederick,
Count von, 293,
324, 327-30, 331, 334, 525, 529
Hervilly, Louis-Charles, Comte de, 391 Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679), 6
Hoohe,
General Lazare, 351, 380, 391, 395,
427, 432; and the project of the invasion of
England, 472 sq.; death of, 482,497-8,
508, 583; expedition to Ireland, 772 Hofmann, Alois,
776
Hohenlohe-Kirchberg, F. W., Prince von,
408, 419, 420, 423 ■
Holbach,
P.-H.-Thiry, Baron de, 26 Holland, Civil War in (1787), 107, 286-9, 320-2; war
with France, 262, 419-421, 436
Hondschoota,
battls of (1793), 431 Hood, Admiral Lord, 348, 454, 457, 459 Horsley, S.,
Bishop of St Asaph, 763 Hotham, Vice-Admiral, 457, 460 Houchard, General
Jean-Nicolas, 346, 357, 414, 424, 430 Howe, Earl, 454, 455, 465,467; and
Villaret- Joyeuse, 469; and the Spithead Mutiny, 476
Huguet,
Antoine, 505 Humbert, General, his expedition to Ireland, 476
Humboldt,
Wilhelm von, on the French Constitution, 711 Hungary, 327, 329, 335 Hutchinson,
General J. H., see Donough- mora, Earl of
Ibrahim Bey,
600, 601, 603 Igelstrom, Otto Henry, Count, 541, 542 Illuminati, the, 772, 776
Imbert-Colom^s, Jacques, 509, 511 Impartiaux (Right Centre of National
Assembly), 173 Independents in the Convention, 378 Indirect imposts, 69
Inquisition, the, and Necker, 782 Institute of Egypt, the, 605; of France, the,
597
Intendants,
37, 38-39; functions of, 41, 43;
and Peasants,
62 ; disappearance of, 167 Ionian Isles, the, 591-2 ,
Ireland,
French expedition to, 473; public opinion regarding the Revolution, 771 Isnard,
Maximin, 214, 384, 387 Italy, invasion of, 443; Chap. XVIII533 sq.; 633, 636-9,
649-54, 656-9; opinion in regarding the Revolution, 777-80
Jacobin Club,
the, 185-6, 211 sq., 246, 262; as reconstituted (1799), 671-2; Jacobin Clubs in
Italy, 556 Jaffa, siege of, 609, 613 Jal6s, federation of, 197 Janseniste, the,
8, 194, 196 Jassy, treaty of (1792), 295, 337, 630 Jemappes, battle of (1792),
299, 417, 534 Jenkineon, R. B. J., see Liverpool, Earl of Jervis, Vice-Admiral
Sir John,see St Vincent, Lord
Jesus,
Company of, 487 Jews, 728; their position during the Revolution, 732-4, 790
Johannot, Joseph-Jean, 380, 385
Joroard, Jacques, 605 Jomini, A.-Henri, Baron, 413 Jordan, Camille, 506,
507 Joseph II, Emperor, 277, 278, 293, 310-20,
324-32
Joubert,
General, 444, 566, 580, 582, 657, 659, 671-2 Jourdan, M. Jouve, at Avignon, 218
Jourdan, Marshal Comte J.-B., 431-7; in Germany, 442-3, 497, 498, 515, 518,
519, 656, 673, 683 Judicature, remodelling of the French, 110 Judicial system,
French, before the Revolution, 46-9; and cahiers, 139-40; of 1791, 200;
procedure, 745-53 Juge de paix, the, 751 Juliana Maria, Qneen of Denmark, 279
June 1, 1794, battle of, 469 Junot, Jean-Andoche, Due d’Abrantes, 564, 585,
586, 611 Jury system, the, in France, 746, 747, 749 Jussuf, Grand Vizier, 325
Kaiserslautern,
battle of (1743), 427 Kalkreuth, Count F. Adolph, 412, 415 Kamperduin, see
Camperdown Kant, Immanuel, 773 Kaunitz, Prince, 221, 277, 310, 313-14, 317,
319, 333, 399, 533 Kazeneck, Count, 282 Keeper of the Seals or Chancellor, 36
Keith, Admiral Lord, 617 Keith, Sir Robert Murray, 277 Kellermann, Francois,
346, 351, 409-16, 437, 561-2, 570, 573 Kerguelen, Rear-Admiral, 466 Kersaint,
Comte A.-G.-S. de Ccetnempreu de 449
Kilmaine,
Charles-Edouard, 429, 430, 585 Kinbergen, D.-B.-J. Henri, 295 Kinbum, siege of,
316 Kleber, Jean-Baptiste, 353, 355-6, 436, 599 sq., 616-17 Klinger, General,
511 Klopstock, Friedrich Gottlieb, 773, 774 Korsakoff, A. Mikhailovitch, 660-3
Kosciusko, Thaddeus, 532, S4I-3, 545-7 Kutschuk Kainardji, treaty of, 308, 310
Labourdounaye, A.-F.-Augustin, Comte de, 416
La Bruyere,
Jean de, 8 Lacoste, Jean-Baptiste, 427-8 Lacroix, J.-F. de, 267-9, 348 Ladjard,
Minister of War, 406 Lafayette, Marquis de, 101, 104; and the National Guard,
165-6; his character, 164; and riot of women, 184, 215; commands Centre Army,
220; retnrns to Paris, 222; candidate for Mayoralty, 225; visit to Paris
(1792), 231; flight of, 238, 405, 407, 409, 504 Lafon-Ladfflbat, Andrfi-Daniel,
509, 512 La Harpe, A.-E. de, General, 564-8 La Harpe, F.-C. de, 782
La Harpe,
J.-F. de, 515 La Jaunaye, treaty of (1795), 381 LaUy-ToUendal, Comta de,
131,173,178,183 La Luzerne, C.-Henxi, Comte de, Secretary for Navy, dismissed
(1789), 163 Lamarohe, Fran^oia-Joaeph, 429 Lamballe, Princess of, 80 Lamhert,
G.-G., Baron de Ch&nerollea, hia Compte Rendu of 1788, 75,76; Controller-
General, 1787, 107 Lameth, Alexandre, 174, 186, 200, 213 Lamoignon,
Chr&den-Francoia, dismissed, 115
Land tenure,
62-5, 703-23 Landaia, Rear-Admiral, 466 Landau, relief of, 428 Landor, Walter
Savage, attitude of to Revolution, 767 Landremont, Charlea-Hyacinthe, 425
Landrieux, Adjutant-General, 572, 584, 585 Langara, Admiral, 457, 458
Languedoo, 39, 40
Lanjuinais, J.-Denis, Comte, 187, 255, 257, 260, 284, 377, 390, 488, 500
Lannea, Jean, Duo de Montebello, 568, 569, 606-16 passim,
Laporte, Arnaud de, Secretary for the Navy (1789), 163
Larevellidre-L^peaux, Louia-Marie de, 300, 489-90, 496, 501, 507 sq., 564, 669
La Rochefoucauld, Cardinal de, 131; President of the Clergy (1789), 158 La
Rochejaquelein, Henri de Verger, Comte de, 266, 340, 354 sq.
La Rue, I.-E., Chevalier de, 506 Las Caaea, M.-J.-E.-A.-Dieudonn^,
Marquis de, 604, 618 Lasne (gaoler), 390 Latonr, General, 497 La Tour du Pin,
Comta de, 186 Laugier, Captain, 586 Launey, B.-R.-Jourdan, Governor of tha
Bastille, 164 Lantour, B.-Jean Aim6, 569 Lavalette, A.-M. Chamana, Comte de,
588 Lavater, Johann Caspar, 781 La Villeheumoia, C.-H. Berthollet de, 506
Lavoisier, Antoine-Laurent, 71, 695 Law, French, in the Revolutionary Period,
Chap. XXIV, 710 sq.
Le Bas, P.-F.-Joseph, 370, 371, 426 Lebrun Tendu, P.-M.-Henri, Minister
of Foreign Affairs (1792), 235, 298, 303, 339, 357
Le Chapelier, J.-Rene G., 178, 201 L’EcheUe, Jean, 354, 355 Leclerc,
General V.-Emmanuel, 342, 604 Lecointre, Laurent, 379, 380, 384, 385 Leeda,
fifth Duke of, 294 Leffivre d’Ormesson, Controller General
(1783), 96, 252 Lefranc de Pompignan, 116 Legendre, Louis, 340, 362, 366
Legislative Assembly, Chap. VIQ passim, 202-3,208-9,212-244;
parties in the, 213,
214; its
decree against emigres and prieata, 218, 219; deolarea war against Austria,
225; last meaaurea of, 248; ita finance, 701 aq.; its legialation, Chap. XXIV
passim
Legislative
body, see Corps Legislatif Legrand, Jerome, 153 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, hia
Egyptian plan, 595 Le Large, Rear-Admiral, 466 Lanoir, Laroche, 508 Leoben,
treaty of (1797), 582-3 Leopold II, Emperor, 52-78, 218, 219, 221, 223, 293,
333, 530-1, 544, 545 Lepelletier de Saint-Fargeau, 131 Leaoot, Fleuriot (Mayor
of the Commune),
364, 369, 371 Lescure, L.-Marie,
Marquis de, 266, 340, 354
Letourneur, C.-L.-F.-Honord, 442, 489,
491, 506
Lettres de cachet, 50, 113, 735, 745 Levaaseur, on the population of
Paria in 1787, 60 LevSe-en-masse, 348 Liberum veto, 521, 527 Lindet, Robert,
340, 345, 366, 389 Lindaay, Charge d’affaires at Paria, 298, 303 Liptay,
General, 558, 568, 575 Lit de justice, 87, 106, 108, 110 Lithuania, 522
Liverpool, C.
Jenkinson, Earl of, 285 Livre Rouge, 72, 73, 100 Loano, battle of (1795), 444,
558 Loclie, John, 7, 10, 757 Lodi, battle of (1796), 569 Lods et ventes, 78
London
opinion regarding French Revolution, 765 Loo, treaty of the (1788), 289, 324
Loudon, Marshal, 326, 331 Louia XV, 82
Louia XVI,
King of France, Chap. XVI; his character, 79; hia firat appointments, 82;
summons Notables, 101, 102; 1787 dia- miaaes Calonne, 104; 1788 dismiaaea
Brienne, 115,118; Royal Sesaion of 1789, 156-7; dismisses Necker, 163; at the
Veraailles banquet 1789,183; and the riot of women, 184; removes to Paris, 185;
attenda federation of June, 1790,191; his flight to Varennes, 200; accepts the
Constitution, 201, 215; his deposition, 211 aq.; and the Feuillants, 215;
vetoes the decree againat SmigrSs and non-juring prieats, 219; and tbe
inaurrection of June 20,229; quita the Tuileries, 236; in the Temple, 210;
trial, 255-60; counts of indictment against, 256; execution of, 261, 305,409;
declaration of June 23, 1789, 691, 692; his attempt to remodel criminal law,
744-5; and civil procedure, 751 Louia, Dauphin, (Louis XVII), death of, 390,
392, 441-2 Louia XVIII, 390, 635
Loustallot, ^llis^e, bis journal The Revolutions of Paris, 168 Louvain,
University of, 318, 320, 327 L’Ouverture, Toussaint, 484 Louvet, de Couvray,
Jean-Baptiste, 249, 253, 260, 384 Lucchesini, Jerome, Marquis de, 293, 412,
425, 441
Luckner,
Baron Nicolas de, 357, 405, 407,
409, 413
Luxembourg,
Duo de, president of the nobles (1789), 158 Lyons, population of in 1787,60;
fall of, 351
Mably,
Gabriel Bonnot de (1709-85), 1, 26, 33
Macdonald,
E.-J.-J.-A., Due de Tarente (1794), 435, 654,- 656 Maohault d’Amouville, J. -
B., Finance Minister, 24, 25 Mack, General, 421, 429, 435, 650, 652 Mackintosh,
Sir James, his Vindiciae Galli- cae, 758, 762 Macquart, General, 443
Madalinski, Antoine, 542 Maillard, Stanislas, and women’s riot, 184, 264
Maillehois,
Marshal de, 576-8 Mainmorte, 714-6
Mainz, siege
of, 422; fall of, 423, 430;
garrison of,
353 Maistra, Joseph de, 780, 781, 789, 790 Malesherbes, Chretien, 82; character
of, 87; and the Physiocrats, 24; resignation of, 87; 88, 106; defends the King,
267 Mallarmfi, F.-B6nfi-Auguste, 368 Mallet du Pan, J., his Mercure
Britannique,
1, 216, 373, 390, 395, 781-2 Malmesbury, Sir
James Harris, first Earl of, 278, 282, 322 sq., 494, 497 sq., 543 Malo,
General, 505
Malouet,
Baron Pierre-Victor, his Memoirs, 124; 132, 149, 170, 173, 201, 216 Malta, 695,
596, 598, 636, 645, 648, 649 Malthus, T. B., his Essay on the Principle of
Population, 768 Malus (Commissary-General), 416, 419 Mamelukes, the, 600 Man,
Admiral, 460-1 Mandat, A.-J.-G., Marquis de, Commandant Ggngral of National
Guard, 235-6 Maniu, Lodovico, Doge of Venice, 686, 593 Mantua, siege of, 672;
relief of, 574; fall of, 680
Manuel, Louis-Pierre, Procureur-G^n&al- Syndic, 226, 230, 260, 357
Marais, the, 353 Marass6, J.-B. Blandine de, 422 Marat, Jean-Paul, 213; and the
September «lpisaortu, 243; assassinated, 346; his L’Ami du Peuple,
168, 271, 373 Marcean, General, 365, 497 Mar€chams€e (rural polioe), 38 Maret,
J.-B., Due de Bassano, 299, 302, 305, 498
Maria
Christina, Arohduchess, Duchess of Saxe-Tesohen (sister of Joseph II), 318 sq.
Maria Theresa, Empress, 80, 309; death of, 311 Mariana, Juan, 3 sq.
Marie-Antoinette,
Queen of France, her marriage, 79; charaoter, 80; and Turgot, 87; and Calonne,
103; and de Brienne,
104, 185; trial of, 356; execution of, 357
Marmont,
A.-F.-L. Viesse de, Duo de Baguse, 664, 602 sqq.
Marriage
legislation during the Revolution, 736 sq.
Marseillais,
the, 232-3 Martin, Joseph, of Auch, 155 Martin, Admiral, 458, 459, 466 Massacre
of the Champ de Mars (1791), 200; September massacres (1792), 241-4 Mass6na,
Andr6, Due de BivoU, 4, 36, 443, 444, 562 sqq., 574 sq., 578, 582 Massena,
battle of (1795), 558 Mathon de La Cour, C.-Joseph, collection of publie
accounts attributed to, 74 Maurepas, J.-F. Ph61ypeaux, Comte de, 82, 87, 89,
94, 96 Maury, Abb6, 173
Maximilian,
Archduke of Austria (Elector of Cologne), 313 Maximum, the, 271, 378 sq.
Mayors, 43
M6da, Charles Andr£, 371 Meilhan, Gabriel de Senae de, 9 Melas,
Lieutenant-Field-Marshal, 658, 659, 663
Memoires sur I’Egypte (1801), 605 Menou, General, 389, 396, 397, 599,
606, 616, 617, 618 Mercier de La BiviSre, 23, 24 Mercure Britannique, 1, 373
Mercy-Argenteau, Comte F. C. de, 558,566, 572
Merlin of
Donai, 350, 378, 380, 398, 490, 508,510,669; revises the Code of Crimes, 746
Merlin of
Thionvills, 213, 366, 415, 422 Merveldt, General, 582, 584 Metayers, 62, 63
Methuen Treaty, the (1703), 284 Metternich, Prince, 429 Mezaros, General, 578
Michelangelo (Buonarotti), 505 Milan and the Jacobin propaganda, 556 Miles,
William Augustus, 291, 302 sqq. Militia in France, before Bevolution, 52, 70
Minto, G. Elliot, Earl of, 660 Mirabeau, Comte Honor6-Gabriel Biquetti de, 68;
his character and aims, 14951; his Journal des Jiltats gSngraux, 151; his position
in National Assembly, 176; president of Jacobin Club, 186; death, 199; on
nationalisation of Church property, 694; on assignats, 696; on freedom of
testation, 730; 290 sqq, 358, 394, 898 Mirabeau, Marquis de (1716-89), 27, 60,
149; his
L’Ami des Sommes, 21; his meeting with Quesnay, 22; his Theory of Taxation, 71
Mirabeau, Vioomte de, 172 Miranda, Dom Francisco de, General, 419,
421, 510
Miromesnil,
A.-T. Hue de, Keeper of the Seals (1774), 82, 87, 96, 101; dismissed, 103
Modena,
battle of (1799), 657 Modena, Ercole HI, Duke of (1796), 571, 583
Mohammadanism, 606; Bonaparte and, 618 Moleville, Bertrand de, 216; minister of
Navy (1791), 222 Mollendorff, Field-Marshal Count W. J.
Heinrich von,
437, 441, 535 Mombello, treaty of (1797), 588 Monarchiens, les (Bight Centre of
National Assembly), 173 Monarchists, Constitutional, 495 Monasteries, 53, 732
Moncey, Baron A.-J., Due de Conegliano, 440, 442
Monciel, A.-B.-M. Terrier, Marquis de, Minister of Interior (1792), 228
Monge, Comte G. de Peluse, 502, 595, 605, 616
Montagnards, see Mountain Montagu, Sir George, 468, 470 Montaigne,
Michel E. de, 4, 27 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de, 1, 14, 17-21,
26, 137, 177 Montesquiou, General, 437 Monti, Vincenzo, 778 ; his Bassvilliana,
779 Montigny, Trudaine de, and the Physiocrats, 24
Montlosier, F.-D. de Beynaud, Comte de, 8 Montmorin, Armand-Marc, Comte
ds, Foreign Secretary (1787), 104, 124, 163, 216, 222, 288, 314 Moreau, General
Jean-Victor, 435 sq., 442, 497, 498, 509, 511, 574, 583, 656 sq. Morelly, his
Code de la Nature, 16, 26, 32 Mortgage (hypotheque), 723, 724 Moulin, J.
-Auguste, baron, 669, 680 Mounier, Jean-Joseph, 1, 113, 116; Nour velies
Observations sur les £tats generaux, 122, 129, 149; proposes the Tennis Court
oath, 155, 173, 178, 182, 183 Monntain, the, Chaps. VIII, IX,
XII, XTII passim Muller, Johannes, 781 Muller, General, 440
Municipal
assemblies, Turgot’s scheme of, 86 Municipalities before the Bevolution, 42,
43, 205, 706 Murad Bey, 600-3
Murat,
Joachim, King of Naples, 396, 564, 603-16 passim Muskeyn, Captain, 481 Murray,
Count, 319, 320
Nancy, mutiny
of, 192 Nantes, assault of, 341 Naples, kingdom of, 555, 631-2, 643 sq.,
649 sq.; fall
of the Parthenopean Bepublic at, 653; and Nelson, 657-8 Napoleon, see Bonaparte
Narbonne, Comte Louis de, Minister of War (1791), 220; his policy, 221, 405,
406 National Assembly, the, Chaps. VI, VII, XXIH, XXIV passim; the title, 153,
691; its procedure, 169-74 ; bureaux and committees of, 171; parties in,
172-4; its first decree, 691; its Declaration of the Bights of Man, 178, 692;
its sitting of Aug. 4, 179-80; declares for a Single Chamber, 181; diBousses
King’s veto, 181-3; second Constitutional Committee of, 183; removes to Paris,
185; remodels Church of France, 194-8; votes the Constitution, 201; its
finance, 66, 692-702; its legislation, Chap. XXIV passim National Convention,
the, Chaps. IX, XH, XIH, XXHI, XXIV passim; proposed by Vergniaud, 237;
elections for, 245-8; Paris Deputies in, 247; parties in, 24954; abolishes
monarchy, 250; votes King’s death, 259-60; parties in, after King’s death, 262;
its finance, 702-6 ; its legislation, Chap. XXIV passim Naval War, the
(1792-9), Chap. XV, 447 sq.;
Chap. XX, 620
sq.
Navy, French,
the state of in 1790, 192; Crown patronage in, 204, 207; position of, 447-8;
British, 452; and other navies, 456 Necker, Jacques, 25; his Gomptv Rendu au
Roi, 45, 71, 74, 89,94,698; Finance Minister, 89-95; character of, 90;
proposals of for Provincial Assemblies, 91; financial expedients of, 73, 93;
his resignation, 94; his Administration of the Finances of France, 98, 99;
exiled from Paris, 99, 104; recalled, Minister of Finance (1788), 115; his
statement at States General, 147; dismissed (1789), 163; returns (1789), 165;
financial statement of, May 5, 1789, 689, 690, 692; his Treatise on his own
administration (published in 1791), 690; resignation of (June 23, 1789), 692,
698
Neerwinden,
battle of (1793), 268, 420-1 Nelson, Horatio, Earl, 457, 458-64, 621-32, 650,
658
NeufcMteau,
Francis de, 508, 510, 517 Newspapers of the Bevolution, 168 Nicholls, Captain,
478 Niebuhr, Barthold G., 773 Nile, battle of the (1798), 604 Nivemais, Due dc,
27 Nivi^re-Chol, Mayor of LyonB, 340 Nobility, the, of France, 57-9, 62, 69; as
deputies in Third Estate, 133; their cahiers, 138; their privileges, 727; law
of succession, 729; abolished, 730 Nonconformists in England, attitude of the,
to the Bevolution, 764 Nootka Sound, 188, 289 Nootka Convention (1790), 292
Nore, mutiny
at the, 479 Norman, G. W., liBt of British maritime losses, 1793-1800, 485-6
Notables, the, and Calonne, 97; Council of, Bummoned 1786, 101; composition,
101; first meeting, 102; oppoeition to Calonne, 103; diBBolved by de Brienne,
105; re-asBemble 1788, 116 Novi, battle of (1799), 659 NovikoS, W. Ivanovitch,
784^5 Nulie terre sans seigneur, 721-2 Nuns, before the Rsvolution, 53, 56
Oath of the
TenniB Court, 155 OehB, Peter, 639, 781-2 O’Connor, Arthur, 473 Octroi, 70
Oezakoff,
surrender of, 294, 295, 325 Olavide, P. A. Joseph, his Triumph of the Gospel,
783 Orange, Prince of (William V), 106, 286-8, 320-3, 429 Orateur du Peuple,
le, 374 Ordere, religious, before the Bevolution, 56; suppressed, 732
Ordonnances de comptant, 84 Orleans, Louis-Phifippe-Joseph, Due de, 108; joine
National ABBemhly, 158, 161, 184; goes to England, 185 ; elected to Convention,
247; l&galite, 247; 257, 350, 357, 737
Orleans,
Philippe, Due de, Regent of France,
8
OBtend
Company, the, 317 Ostermann, Count H. J. F. von, 548, 551 Oyak, de, at Mainz,
422, 423
Fache,
Jean-NicolaB, War Minister (1792), 259 sq., 264, 412, 416 sq., 421 Pacta
conventa, 521 Pacte de Famille, see Family Compact Paine, Thomas, his Bights of
Man, 759;
prosecution
of, 760 Paley, William, his Moral and Political Philosophy, 763; hiB Seasons
for Contentment, etc., 763 Pamphlets of 1789, 122, 123 Panin, Count N.
Ivanovitch, 309, 310, 314 Paoli, Pascal, 352, 560 P&ques veromises, 585
Pardon, right of suppressed (1791), 748 Par6, Jules, 348
PariB,
population of in 1787, 60; eleotions in for States General, 130; method of
election, 130; electors, 162, 165, 167; sections of, 233-4; deputation to the
Convention, 247; Parlement of, 47, 66, 72; and taxes, 73; and Turgot, 85;
summoned to VerBailleB 1776, 87, 99; demands States General, 106; Brienne
Edicts, 106; banished to Troyes, 106; its compromiBe with Brienne, 107; ite contest
with Brienne, 106; returns to Paris, 107; on Beparate voting for StateB
General, 115
Parker,
Admiral Riohard, 454, 477, 479-80 Parlements, recalled in 1774, 82; and Turgot,
87, 95; and Brienne’s Edicts,
105, 111; of B6am, 112; denounced in cahiers, 139;
abolished, 177 Parma, Ferdinand, Dnke of, 570 Parthenopean Republic, the, 653,
779 Pascal, Blaise, 5-6, 27 PaBtoret, C.-E.-J.-P., Marquis de, 488, 511
Patents, 725
Paternal
authority in France, 735 Patrie, la, en danger, decree of, 233 “PatriotB,” the,
in United Provinces, 286 Patton, Philipps, Admiral (1797), 453 Paul I, Emperor
of RuBsia, 635; and the seizure of Malta, 645, 648, 662; 785-6 Payan
(Robespierrist), 364, 367, 369, 371 Pays d’Election, 38, 43, 67, 128; d’Etats,
38, 44, 67, 69, 128; de quart bouillon, 70; redimes, 70 PSages seigneuriaux 64
Peasants, before the Revolntion, 61-65; their numbers, 61; holdings, 62;
condition of, 63; taxation of, 69; and the Seigneurs, 78; in 1799, 666; 714,
722-3 Pellew, Sir Edward, see Exmouth, Viscount Penal syBtem during the
Revolution, 742-50 Pensions, before the Revolution, 72 sq., 90;
Committee of, 697, 700 Perez and Nootka Sound, 289 Perignon, Marshal
D.-C., Marqnis de, 440 Pere Duchesne, le, 373 Petiet, Claude, 508
Potion de Villenenve, Jerome, 174, 186, 220, 225, 229-30 PetitionB,
“huit-miUe,” 227; “ vingt-mitte,”
230 238
Phglippeaux, A. le Picard de, 610, 612 Philippeaux, Pierre, 361
Philosophers, the, Chap. I passim; influence of, 34, 61
PhysiocratB, or EoonomiBtB, the, 22, 23;
advocate
compulsory education, 24; 83 Pichegru, General Charles, 351, 385, 389, 426 sq.,
432, 434, 436; in Germany, 442-3, 506, 509-11 Pitt, William, Chap. X passim;
276, 322, 323; his Eastern polioy, 331, 332, 337; and the BubBidy to PruBBia,
434; concludes peaoe with Franoe, 496, 559, 560, 761, 762
Plain,
prominent members of the, 249; 261, 350
Plevilla le Peley, G. R., Admiral, 508 Poland, Chap. XVII
passim.; 521; its neighbours, 523; Firat Partition of, 523; Constitution of
May, 1791,527; conquest by Russia, 532; treaty, 538; Second Partition, 535 ;
hostility to PruBsia, 539 ; disoontent in, 541; Prussian invasion of, 545-6;
Third Partition of, 547-8; final destruction of, 552; attitude of to Revolution,
786; oonBtitntion, 786 PolignacB, the, 80 Poly, Baron de, 505, 506
Pontficoulant,
L.-G. Doubet de, 562 Population in French towns before the devolution, 60
Portalis, J.-E.-Marie, 507 Porteus, Beilby, Bishop of London, 763 Portion
congrue, 54
Portugal,
treaty of with France (1797), 498;
attitude of
towards Revolution, 783 Potemkin, Gregor, Prince, 293, 309, 314,
325-6,
337 Poussielgue, Jean-Baptiste, 595 Pragmatic Sanction, the, 311 Prairial, the
coup d’itat of, 669-70 Prdcy, L.-F. Perrin, Comte de, 345 Presidiaux, 47
Press,
freedom of, 122, 373-4 Preuves Ugales, 746-7 Price, Dr Bichard, 764 Priestley,
Joseph, nominated for Convention, 247, 764 Priests, treatment of, 194-8, 513,
666;
French in
England, 762 Prieur of the C6te d’Or, 344, 348, 426 Prieur of the Marne, 343,
375 Primary Assemblies of 1791, 202 Principal Minister, title of the, 37
Procedure, English, compared with French, 743 sq.; civil, 751 Proly
(Montagnard), 342 Property nationalised by the Revolution, 705
Protestants
before the Revolution, 56, 87, 89, 108, 109, 141, 194, 197; position of during
Revolution, 733, 734, 736 Provence, Comte de, character of, 81; accused of
high treason, 390, 635 Provera, General, 557, 566, 580 Provincee, abolished
(1790), 190; the “foreign,” 70
Provincial
government and Estates, 39 sqq.; Turgot’s schemes for, 86; assemblies, 91, 102;
(1788), 109 “Provisional Executive Council” of 1792, 238
Provost of
the Merchants (Paris), 130 Prussia, her army before the Revolution, 51, 400;
and the Fiirstenbund, 281-3, 313; Triple Alliance, 288; and the Eastern Question,
330, 331; and Holland, 288-9, 320-4; policy of at Reichenbach, 293, 334, 526;
her war with France, 225, 408 sq.; and the Peace of Basel, 441-2; and Poland,
521-9, 532-5, 539, 543-4, 545-52; her treaty with France (1793), 539; situation
in 1796, 634 Puisaye, Joseph, Comte de, 379, 391 PuysiSgur, P.-L. de Chasteret,
Comte de, Secretary for War, dismissed 1789, 163 Pyramids, battle of the
(1798), 602
Quakers, the,
Voltaire on, 10, 728 Querini (Yenetian Ambassador at Paris), 592
Quesnay,
Francois, 21; his meeting with Mirabeau, 22; Fermier, 22; Grains, 22;
Tableau ihconomique, 22; Doctrines of, 23-5 .
Qu’est-ce-que le Tiers Etati (by SieySs), 122 Quite,- the, 142 Quiberon
expedition, the, 391 Quosdanovich, 574, 575
Rabaut-Saint-l3tienne, Jean-Paul, 21, 183, 272, 357
Rambeaud,
General, 612; death, 613 Ramel, Finance Minister, 368, 505, 508,
509, 699
Rampon,
General Comte A.-G., 565 Rapinat, 518, 604
Rastatt,
Congress of, 634, 641-2; murder of French envoys at, 655 Raynal, Abb6,
Philosophical and Political History of the Indies (1774), 26 Rayneval,
J.-M.-Gerard, 285 Reason, worship of, 359 Rebecqui, F.-Trophime, 249, 250, 340
Reeves, John, his Association for preserving Liberty and Property against
Republicans and Levellers, 760 Referendum, 258, 259 Rggale, 141
Reichenbach, Songress of, 293; Convention of, 334, 526 Reille, Marshal,
569 Reprisentants en mission, 270, 376, 494 Republican Calendar, 358 n.
RSsultat du Comeil du Roi (1788), 117 Retrait lignager, 731 ,
Reunion des Amis de la Constitution mon- archique, broken up, 212
R6veillon riots, the, 161 Revenue, the French, Chaps. HI, XXTTT passim
Revolutionary Finance, Chap. XXITT; Party, the (1795-6), 495; Tribunal,
the, 267, 349, 372, 375 Revolutions de France et Brabant, 329 Rewbell,
Jean-Fran<jois, 381, 385, 415, 422, 489, 490-1, 505, 507, 517, 519, 667
Reynier, Comte J.-L.-Ebenezer, 600, 602 Rhegas (Greek patriot and poet), 789
Ricardos, General, 439 Richardson, Samuel, 27 Richery, Admiral, 473 Richmond,
C. Lennox, Duke of, 294 Ricord, Jean-Franpois, 561 Rigby, Dr, 60, 63
Rights of
Man, 178, 201, 393, 556, 692, 710, 727 sq., 749, 787 Rions, Comte d’Albert de,
448, 449 “ Risorgimento,” 557 Rivarol, Antoine, Comte de, 8 Roberjot, Claude
(French diplomatist), 641, 655
Robespierre
Augustin, the younger, 352,
371
Robespierre,
Fran<jois-Maximilien-Joseph Isidore, 20; and Rousseau, 32; and the Jacobins,
34; his antecedents, 174; in Jacobin Club, 186; in the Legislative,
213; his
aseendanoy, 237; and the Convention Elections, 246; action of at King’s Trial,
255; and the Committee of Fublio Safety, 343; his alliance with Danton, 347;
with Saint-Just and Conthon, 345; coalition against, 367; his speech of 8
Thermidor (1794), 368; arrest of, 370; outlawry and execution of, 371; on legal
proofs, 767; on penalty of death, 750 Bochambeau, General Vicomte de, 405
Eoederer, Pierre-Louis, 8, 66, 680-1 Boland de la Platidre, J.-Marie, Minister
of Interior (1792), 223-4; 238, 244, 256, 263 Boland, Madame, 213 sq., 249, 357
Bolandis di Castel-Alfeo, di, 557 Bomans, assembly at, 116, 117 Bomantio
School, the, and the Bevolution, 776
Bome, rising
at (1797), 637; ocoupied by French, 638; occupied by Ferdinand, 652 Bomme,
Gilbert, 388 Bonsin, Charles-Philippe, 360 Bose, G., letter from W. A. Miles,
291 Bossignol, J.-A., 346, 353, 354, 355 Boussean, Jean-Jacques, his Discourse
on Inequality, 1, 3; Contrat social, 7, 29; Simile, 7,20; Nouvelle itloise, 27;
theories of, 28-32; Emile, 28; Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 28;
Letters from the Mountain, 29; Considerations on the Government of Poland, 29;
art. Economic, 30; 136, 176; influence on Bonaparte, 562
Boux,
Jacques, 342
Bov6re,
J.-S., Marquis de Fonvielle, 340 Boyal Council, 36; of Finance and Commerce,
37, 67 “Boyal Session,” 108; (1787), 155-7 Buamps, Pierre-Charles, 388 Buhl,
Philippe-Jacques, 300, 388 Bukavina, General, 558 Bussia, Chap. XVII passim-,
and England, 278, 280, 282-3, 294, 295, 337; and Austria, 280, 282, 309, 311,
313-18, 32437; and the Eastern Question, 308, 31518, 324-6, 337 ;. and
Prussia, 309-11, 329-37; and Sweden, 325-6, 336; allied with Turkey, 646; and
Bevolution, 784—6; and Poland, Chap. XVII passim; see also Catharine II; and
Paul II Bussia and Austria, treaty between (1792) 533, (1795) 549
Saint-Evremond,
C.-M. de Saint Denis, (1613-1703), 4 Samt-Germam, Comte de, Minister of War
(1774), 82; attempts to reform army, 88, 400
Saint-Huruge,
Marquis de, 228 Saint-Juet, Antoine-Louise-Leon, and the King’s Trial, 255; and
Bobeapierre, 343; enters Convention, 345; overrides the Constitution, 351;
return to Paris, 361; reports to Public Safety, 362-3 ; and the
reorganisation
of society, 365; and Collot, 369; decree of arrest aminst, 370; death of, 371;
sent to Strassburg, 426 Saint-Pierre, Abb6 de, 15 Saint-Priest, Comte J.-H.-B.
de, Minister of King’s Household, dismissed (1789), 163 Saint-Simon, L. de
Bouvray, Due de, 8 Saint Vincent, battle of (1797), 462-4 St Vincent, Lord
(Vioe-Admiral Sir John Jervis), 454, 460, 461, 462, 464, 486, 498 Saitines,
Navy Minister (1774), 82, 94 Saladin (member of Convention), 488 Salicetti,
Christophe, 352, 564-5, 570-4 Salles, J.-B., executed, 357 Salt tax, the, 70
Salvadori
(Milanese democrat), 585 San Domingo, 217 San Udefonso, treaty of (1796), 460
Santerre, Claude, 228 Sardinia, kingdom of, 437,555; treaty with France (1796),
569, 571; abdication of King Charles Emmanuel IV of, 654; attitude to
Bevolution, 780 Saumarez, Admiral, 454 Sauret, Baron P.-F. de la Berie, 574
Savary, Commodore, expedition to Ireland, 476
Savoy, see
Sardinian Kingdom Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld, Prinos Frederick Joeias of, 419-21
Saxe-Teeohen, Duke Albert of, 415, 416, 417 Scherer, Barth&emi-L.-J., 436,
444, 445, 508, 518, 562, 563, 564, 564-5, 656, 670 Schiller, J. C. Friedrich
von, attitude of to Bevolution, 774 Schimmelpennmck, Comte Boger-Jean, 787
Schlegel, Friedrich von, 776 Scotland, opinion in, regarding Bevolution, 770
Scrutin
Spuratoire, 256 Sebottendorf, Lieutenant Field-Marshal von, 558, 568-9
Sectional
Commissioners, 234; displace Commune, 236 S6gur, Comte de, Minister of War
(1781), 95, 107, 402 Seigneurs, feudal rights of, 48, 57, 714sq.; manorial
rights, 64; their relation to peasants, 78; in the Vendee, 266; seigneur haut
jmticier, 48 Sel de devoir, 70 Selim III, Sultan, 294, 326 S4n€chal, 38, 48;
Grand, 126 S4ngchams€es, 38, 47, 48, 120, 124 September massacres, see Massacre
Sercey, Bear-Admiral, 466 Serfs, before the Bevolution, 62, 714, 715, 728
Sergent, M.-A. -Francois, 300 Serurier, Comte J.-M.-P., 443-5, 564, 567,
574^5 Servage, 714
Servan,
Joseph, 406, 407, 412, 439 Seven Years’ War, the, 51 Size, Paul-Victor de, 4S8
Sheridan,
Biohard Brinsley, 298 Sievers, Count J. J. von, 537 aq., 540 sq. Sieyds, Emmanuel-Joeeph, 1, 20, 122; his Qu’est-ce-que le Tiers Etatf
122; 132,149, 179, 213-14, 366, 378, 489-90, 507, 509, 515, 519-24; elected ae
Director, 668; hie character, 668; Chap. XXII passim
Simfion, Joseph-J&rome, 507, 509 Simon, Antoine, and the Dauphin, 389
Siatova, Peace of, 277, 293, 334 Slavery, lawa respecting, 728; effect of
Kevolution on, 790 Smith, Adam, on taxes, 71, 276 Smith, Sir Sidney, 609-11,
614; Nelson and, 617 Smith, William, 302 Sobieeki, John, King of Poland, 521
Socialism, effect of the Bevolution on, 790 Society des itgaux, 503-4 Sotin,
P.-S.-M. de la Coindi&re, 508 Souham, General Joseph, 435 Soult, N.-J. de Dieu,
Duo de Dalmatie, 661 Souper de Beaucaire, le, 352 Southey, Bobert, his attitude
to the Bevolution, 766
Spain and the
Family Compact, 187; war with (1793), 262, 418; war with (1794), 439; peace
with (1796), 496; attitude to the Bevolution, 782 Spence, Thomas, hie The End
of Oppression, 769 Spiegel, Laurens van der, 288 Spielmann, Baron, 333, 536
Spithead, mutiny at, 476-8 Stael, Madame de, 507, 672 Stamp duties, 140
Stanislas
Poniatowski, King of Poland,
308, 541; elected, 523; and the Four Years’ Diet,
525-8; and the Polish war, 531-2; and the Diet of Grodno, 536-8; his
abdication, 552 Starhemberg, George Adam, Prince, 429, 643
States
General, The, 106,110; summoned, 114-15; Elections to, Chap. V; cahiers des
doUmces of, 120, 134 sq.; their past history, 120-1; franchise for the, 125;
modes of election for, 126; anomalies in the elections, 128; elections of in
Paris, 130; composition of, 133; several demands of the Three Estatss, 139;
cahiers on Church affairs, 141-2; opened by the King, 146-7; verification of
powers of, 148; the Third Estate dsclares itself to be the National Assembly,
153; tee National Assembly Stockach, battle of, 1799, 655 Stofflet, Nicolas,
355, 382, 386, 395 Strafford, Lord, 297
Strategy and
tactics, new (1794), 433;
naval, 455 Suard,
J.-B.-Antoine, 515 Subdelegatea (subdclcguis), 38 Subvention territoriale,
proposed by Calonne, 100
Succession,
lawa of, 729-31; regarding bastards, 737 sq.
Suez, Isthmus
of, 597 Sun, Company of the, 487 Sunday observance forbidden (1797-9), 514
Suppliants of the Convention, 272 Suv6rof£, Prince (Count P. Alexis Vassili-
vich), 316, 326, 336, 546-7, 656-7, 661 S^. ’en, her war with Bussia, 325-6;
peace, 336; attitude of to the Bevolution, 788-9 Swiss Guards, massacre of the,
237 Switzerland, Republic set up in, 597; occupation of, 639; made a Bepublio,
639; Treaty with France (1798), 640; and the French Bevolution, 781-2 Syndic of
Commune, his duties, 42 Syrian Campaign, the, 608-13
Taboureau
(Finance Minister), 89 Tactics and Strategy, 433; naval, 455 Tactics, Essay on,
by Gnibert, 402 Taille, the, 38, 41, 54, 67, 68,69 ; Taine on, 78; modified by
Turgot, 85; d’industrie, 125; 140, 489, 692 Taine, Hippolyte, on the numbers of
the clergy before the Bevolution, 53; on the numbers of the noblesse, 57; on education
of peasants, 64; on the taille, 78; on disorders, 160 Talleyrand-Pdrigord,
C.-Maurioe de, Bishop of Autun (Prince of Benevento), 102,159, 178, 191, 296,
298, 493, 507, 508; his Memoir on Egyptian Expedition, 596, 680; on the
nationalisation of Church property, 696 Tallien, Jsan-Lambsrt, 366, 369, 377,
378, 392, 394, 397, 515 Tallien, Madame, 563 Target, G.-Jean-Baptiste, 132,
183, 715 Targowice, Confederation of, 531, 532, 536 Tate, Colonel, 475
Tauentzien
von Wittembarg, Count B. F. E., 548, 549, 551 Taxation, Chaps. Ill, 66, XXIII,
689; proposed by Cahiers, 140-1; decrees of August 4, 1789, 179 Tedeschi, 557,
581, 593 Temple, Sir William, 7 Tennis Court, oath of the, see Oath Tarray,
Abbe, reimposes Corn Taxes, 25, 74, 82, 99 Terriers, 714
Terror, the,
Chap. XII, 338 sq.; the Whits, 387
Teschen,
Congress of, 310; Trsaty of
(1784),
309, 311 Testation, freedom of, laws regarding, 730 Theophilanthropists, the,
490, 501 Theory of Taxation (1760) (by the elder Mirabeau), 71 Th£ot,
Catharine, 366 Thermidor, the Bevolution of (1794), 9, 369 Thibadeau,
Antoine-Claire, 397, 488, 489, 500, 507, 515 Thugut, Baron Franz von, 419, 429,
536,
541, 544-5,
548-9, 559, 583, 634, 643,
645, 651, 661, 777 Thorild, Thomas, 789 Thouvenot,
General Pierre, 417, 419 Thuriot de la Rossi&re, J.-Alexandre, 213,350
Tidone and Trebbia, battle of (1799), 657 Tithe, before the Revolution, 53-4;
suppressed by National Assembly, 195; 694, 697, 716
Tocqueville,
Alexis-C.-H.-Clerel de, 8; on anomalies of local government, 46 Tolentino,
Treaty of (1797), 581, 637 Tone, Wolfe, 475, 476, 498, 771, 772 Tooke, John
Horne, 761 Torbay, mutiny at, 479 Torfou-Tiffauges, battle of (1793), 353
Torture, in Francs, 743; abolition of, 744 Toulon, occupied by English, 348,
457;
recaptured,
352, 458 Town Council (Corps de Ville), 42-3 Traites (customs), 69; in 1788, 76
Trauttmanedorff, Prince Ferdinand von, 320 329
Treilhard,
Jean-Baptiste, 196,197, 517, 669 Trevor, J. H., see Hampden, Viecount Trials
for High Treason in England (1794), 761
Tribunal
Criminel extraordinaire (Revolutionary Tribunal), 267 Trier, Clement
Wenceslas, Elector of, 220, 221
Triple
Alliance of 1788, the, 277, 289, 324 Trogoff, Admiral, 457 Tronchet,
Franpois-Denis, 257, 488 Tronpon-Ducoudray, P.-C.-J.-Baptiste, 507 Troubridge,
Admiral Sir Thomas, 454, 462 Trouvfi, Claude-Joseph, Baron, 518 TroyeB,
Parlement baniBhed to, 106, 107 Trudaine, Daniel-Charles, 22 Truguet,
Rear-Admiral, 456, 490, 507 Turgot, Anne-Robert-Jacques, 3; and the privileges
of the nobility, 14; administration of, 25; on Municipalities, 66, 79;
Controller-General (1774), 82-3; his previous history and charaoter, 83-4; his
administration, 84; removes trade restrictions, 85; founds the Caisse
d’Esoompte, 86; hostility of Parlements against, 87; dismissed, 88 Turkey,
308-10,315-7; her war with Austria and Rusaia, 324-6; allied with Prussia, 330;
at Reiohenbach, 333; treaty of Jassy, 337; situation in 1796, 635; allied with
Russia, 646 Turreau, General, in the Vendee, 379; in the Pyrenees, 439 Two
Sioilies, the, tee Naples
XJnigenitus,
Bull, 9 “ United Irishmen,” the, 771, 772 United Provinces, 286; conquest of
(17945), 436 . . United States, and copyright, 724; _ their example as to
privileges and disabilities, 727-8
Universities,
English, and the Revolution, 763-4
Vadier, M.-G.-Alexis, 370, 380 Valaze, C.-E. du Friche de, 214, 357
Valenoe, C.-M.-A. de T.-Timbronne, Comte de, 416, 419, 422, 429 Valenciennes,
fall of, 430; treaty of (1796), 555
Valmy, battle of (1792), 410 Vandamme, D.-J., Comte d’Unsbourg, 435 Van
der Hop, General, 287 Van der Mersch, J. A., 328 Van der Noot, H. N., 319, 320,
329, 325-6, 415
VanBtabel,
Rear-Admiral Pierre-Jean, 466 Varennes, the Flight to, 404 Varlet,
C.-Z.-Joseph, 342 Vasa dynasty, the, in Sweden, 521 Vauban, Marshal S. le Frestre
de, 8; his Dime Royale, 15 Vaubois, Comte C.-H. Belgrand de, 578 Vence,
Rear-Admiral, 471 Vendee, the, insurrection of, 265-6, 341-2, 353-4, 379, 381
Vendemiaire, insurrection of, 396; results of, 397
Venice and
Napoleon (1797), 584 sq., 588 Vergennes, Comte C.-Gravier de, Minister for
Foreign Affairs (1774), 82, 87, 96, 101; his death, 102; 281, 283, 310, 321,
323
Vergniaud,
Pierre-Victorin, 214; proposeB convention, 237, 249, 253 sq., 357 Versailles,
Treaty of (1756), 314; (1757), 308; (1783), 284; maroh of women to, 403
Veto, the
King’s, 181-2, 204 Vial, Honorfi, 601-2
Victor
Amadeus HI, Duke of Savoy (V. A.
II, King of Sardinia), 555, 559 Vieux Cordelier,
le, 360, 361 Villaret-Joyeuse, Rear-Admiral, 391, 466-9, 473
Villedeuil,
Laurent de, Controller-General (1787), 104, 107 Villeneuve, Admiral, 480
Villetard, A.-E.-Pierre, 586, 592 Vincent, Franijois-Nioolas, 360, 424
Vingtilmes, 38, 46, 54, 68, 69; in Receipts of (1788), 76, 91, 95, 102, 140
Vins, General de, 444 Vizille, meeting of (1788), 113 sqq. Voltaire,
Fran<;ois-M. Arouet de, 4, 7, 9, 10; his Letters on the English, 9, 10, 11;
his Idees Republicainee, 12; his pamphlet on free-trade suppressed, 10-14, 87;
and Turgot, 25, 26-7; on Farmers-General, 71; cited, 743-4 Vonck, Francis, 78G
Vonckists, 415 Vote-d-haute-voix, 246-7 Vukassovioh, Baron Philippe de, 566
Wallis,
Field-Marshal Count, 444, 445
Walmoden-Gimborn,
Field-Marshal J. L.
Count yon,
431 Walpole, Horace (Earl of Orford), 27, 63 War, the General (1792-5), Chap.
XIV, 398 Warren, Commodore Sir John Borlase, 472, 476
Warsaw
captured by Rnssia, 547 Wassenaer (Dutch Ambassador at Vienna), 281
Wattignies,
battle of (1793), 432 Wellington, Duke of, on the AuBtrians
(1794),
434 Westermann, General Francois-Joseph, 3-53-5, 412 West Indies, the, 484
Westphalia, Peace of, 398 Weyrother, General, 575 “WMte Terror, the,” 387
Whitworth, Sir Charles, British Ambassador to Bussia (1798), 646-7 Wilhelmina,
Prince of Orange, wife of William V, 287, 322 William HI, Prince of Orange, 321
William V, see Orange, Prince of Williams, David, founder of Theophilan-
thropy, 501 "
Willot,
Amfed^e, 509 Wins, de (Austrian General), 558 Winter, Admiral de, 481, 482, 483
Wollstoneoraft, Mary, her Vindication of the Rights of Women, 765, 790 Women,
condition of, aB affected by the Revolution, 790 Women, riot of (1789), 184
Wordsworth, William, and the Revolution, 765-6
Woronzoff,
Count, 283 Wurmser, Marshal, 415, 419, 423-4, 425,
428, 442-3, 572-5, 578-9
York,
Frederick, Duke of (1793), 429-30;
(1799), 662 Young,
Arthur, 21, 40; on tithe, 53; on poverty of noblesse, 57; on French cities, 60;
on small holdings, 62; on the metayer system, 63, 762
Zamboni,
Luigi, 557 Zurich, battle of (1799), 661, 674 Zweibriioken, Charles II, Duke
of, 300, 539
OAMBRIDOB:
PRINTED BY J. AND 0. V. CLAY, AT THE UNIVERSITY FBESS.